DO WOMEN COUNT? WOMEN NEGOTIATORS AND

THE CONTENT OF PEACE AGREEEMENTS

By

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Abstract: International organizations, including the United Nations, have worked hard to brand gender equality as a tool for attaining long lasting peace (Bell and Rourke 2010). These efforts have persisted for decades, notably gaining traction with the passage of Security Resolution 1325 by the United Nations (Cohn 2008). Current studies on women and peace have found empirical evidence to support the argument that women's inclusion and consideration in peacebuilding leads to a greater likelihood of peace and a lasting agreement (Stone 2015; Krause, Krause, Branfors 2018). Scholarship argues that women are good for peace because women bring a greater emphasis to the needs of civilians and vulnerable groups (El-Bushra 2007; Radu and Badulescu 2017). This underlying causal mechanism for the relationship between women and sustainable peace is widely recognized, but has not been empirically tested in the literature (Paffenholz et al. 2018). In fact, qualitative research on women's involvement in peace negotiations asserts that women's ability to influence the process is heavily limited in most cases studied (Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016). I evaluate the commonly accepted explanation for the positive effects women have on peace with the following research question, "How do women influence the content of peace agreements?"

I evaluate the relationship between numbers of women negotiators and the number of provisions on human rights and gendered interests. I examine the relationship between women and agreement provisions with a sample of 906 peace agreements from 32 individual peace processes over the course of twenty years (1990-2010), using a negative binomial regression analysis. I do not expect to find a strong correlation between women's presence in negotiation roles, defined as the number of women present at the negotiation, and the number of peace agreement provisions pertaining to human rights and women's rights. Rather than numbers, a major mediating factor is whether women have influence on the process, measured by the ability for women negotiators to speak, vote, and actively participate in decision-making discussions (Paffenholz et al. 2016). I conduct a qualitative analysis to demonstrate the applicability of my theory, using peace processes as illustrative examples of the mediating effects of influence on the relationship between women negotiators on women and peace.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

International organizations, including the United Nations, have worked hard to brand gender equality as a tool for attaining long lasting peace (Ellerby 2017; Bell and Rourke 2010). These efforts have persisted for decades, notably gaining traction with the passage of Security Resolution 1325 by the United Nations (Cohn 2008; Tryggestad 2009). This resolution repeatedly emphasized the importance for state leaders to incorporate women and women's interests in peacebuilding, arguing that women's inclusion is an essential component of sustainable peace (UNSCR 1325 2000; Tryggestad 2009). Current studies on women and peace have found empirical evidence to support the argument that women's inclusion and consideration in peacebuilding leads to a greater likelihood of peace and a lasting agreement (Stone 2015; Krause, Krause, Branfors 2018). Scholarship argues that women are good for peace because women bring a greater emphasis to the needs of civilians and vulnerable groups (El-Bushra 2007; Radu and Badulescu 2017). This underlying causal mechanism for the relationship between women and sustainable peace is widely recognized, but has not been empirically tested in the literature (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Ellerby 2017). In fact, qualitative research on women's involvement in peace finds that women have very limited influence in most cases studied, making it unlikely that women could increase the consideration of any interests in peace (O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016). I evaluate the commonly accepted explanation for the positive effects women have on peace with the following research question, "How do women influence the content of peace agreements?"

This study aims to evaluate the relationship between numbers of women negotiators and the number of peace agreement provisions that pertain to human rights and gendered interests. The scholarship on women and peace have provided many compelling arguments to support that women are more likely to support and consider human rights and women's interests (de La Rey and Mckay 2006; El-Bushra 2007). However, I do not expect to find a strong correlation between women's presence in negotiation roles, defined as the number of women present at the negotiation, and the number of peace agreement provisions pertaining to human rights and women's rights. Rather than numbers, a major mediating factor is whether women have influence on the process, measured by the ability for women negotiators to speak, vote, and actively participate in decision-making discussions (Paffenholz et al. 2016). Regardless of the proportion of votes held by women negotiators, I expect that the preferences of women negotiators will not translate into the content of agreements. This is because it is highly unlikely that women negotiators will be able to vote, or push for the inclusion of issues on the negotiation agenda (O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016). Pulling from case studies, I argue that women's ability to influence peace processes is hindered by exclusionary practices from their male counterparts (O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016). I theorize that actors will conduct exclusionary practice due to gender bias, and that these widely held normative ideas about differences between genders persist (Ellerby 2017). However, I theorize that women can exploit these same traditional views and cultural norms responsible for their exclusion, as a means to justify their inclusion in peace processes and other processes of decision-making (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Ellerby 2017). I outline three different mechanisms in my theory, where women use normative expectations of gender to gain access and exercise high levels of influence in peace negotiations. I will test my expectations for women's participation in negotiations by quantitatively analyzing the relationship between numbers of women negotiators and numbers of peace agreement provisions on human rights and gendered interests. After showing that the

relationship between women and peace agreement provisions is weak, I use illustrative examples in a qualitative analysis to provide evidence to support my theory that the lack of correlations between numbers of women and provisions is caused by mediating effects from the level of influence women negotiators have on peace negotiations.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The literature on women's participation in peace presents inconsistent and unclear depictions of the effects women have on peace, and the mechanisms in which women negotiators can overcome barriers to women's inclusion (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019). I begin by explaining the inconsistencies in the different theoretical propositions behind women's positive effects on peace (Charlesworth 2008; Caprioli 2000; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Stone 2015). Scholarship argues that women have positive effects on peace many reasons, including assertions that women are naturally more peaceful, women are more inclined to prefer peace due to their increased vulnerability, and that women are more likely to promote human rights and gendered interests (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Charlesworth 2008; Caprioli 2000). I focus on the argument that the women are good for peace because they are more likely to promote human rights and gendered interests, because this is the most widely recognized argument in the literature (Stone 2018; Swiss and Anderson 2014; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019). I then provide a summary of the literature to justify my approach and reasoning behind testing the relationship between women negotiators and peace agreements on human rights and gendered interests.

Naturally Peaceful

Scholarship argues that women are good for peace because women are naturally more peaceful (Charlesworth 2008; Caprioli 2000). This argument asserts that women are naturally less competitive and more compassionate, making women more inclined to want peace than men (Charlesworth 2008; Caprioli 2000). The theory stipulates that women's nature and their role as mothers and caretakers makes women more caring and concerned for others (Gilligan 1979; Caprioli 2000). It is problematic to argue that adding women to peace negotiations is essential for peace, because this places the responsibility of conflict resolution on women (Ellerby 2017). The assertion that biology and societal role is to blame for men not pushing for peace at the same rate as women does not hold men accountable for failing to prioritize conflict resolution over competition and personal gains (Caprioli 2000; Charlesworth 2008; Ellerby 2017). Apart from this problematic point of view, case studies have shown many examples in which women begin advocating for peace as an act of desperation, not out of compassion (Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). For example, women in Somaliland originally rallied in support for the Somali Civil war (1990-1994) (Paffenholz et al. 2016). However, women negotiators and women's peace organizations quickly shifted their efforts to push for peace rather than the continuation of conflict when violence escalated as a product of the Somali Civil War, and began occurring between more groups that were previously cooperative (Paffenholz et al. 2016). Women promoting peace in Somaliland's Civil War (1990-1994) were not motivated by their peaceful or compassionate nature, but rather as a means to seek protection and safety from a violent and dangerous situation (El-Bushra 2007; Paffenholz et al. 2016; Charlesworth 2008).

Vulnerability

Second, women's inclination to support peace is also theorized to be caused by women's vulnerability in conflict (Caprioli 2000; Ellerby 2017; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). Scholarship and

documents passed by the United Nations, claim that women are more likely to push for conflict resolution because women face comparatively greater levels of economic insecurity and sexual/physical violence during conflict (Radu and Badulescu 2017; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Caprioli 2000; UNSC 1325). Research on women's experiences in conflict has found universally high rates of sexual violence and death in women in conflict situations (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). However, women's experiences and preferences are dependent on their identities, shaped by their class, race, ethic group, sexual orientation etc. (Ellerby 2017; Paffenholz et al. 2016). These differences in women's identities will cause women to prefer conflict when it benefits the identity group most important to the individual woman (Charleswoth 2008; Caprioli 2000; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). As a result, we see some women engaging in combat and acting to escalate conflict when it coincides with their needs (Charlesworth 2008). In Papua New Guinea's Bougainville (2000) peace process, people native to the island of Bougainville became hostile in response to increased immigration of other ethnic groups to the island (El-Bushra 2007; Buchanan et al. 2012). Women from the Bougainville Island distracted troops from Papua New Guinea by inviting soldiers to play volleyball (Buchanan et al. 2012; Hermkerns 2007). This was a tactical ruse that allowed the resistance army to carry out the Kangu Beach Massacre (1996), a brutal attack on Papua New Guinea's defense force (Charlesworth 2008; Buchanan et al. 2012; Hermkerns 2007). This is an example of women choosing to escalate violence and conflict, rather than the pursuit of peace due to women's preferences informed by ethnic identities.

Human Rights and Gendered Interests

Third, scholars argue that women should be included in peace negotiations because women have their own unique role in the community, and are more in touch with problems on the ground (Radu and Baldulescu 2017; Reilly 2007; de La Rey and Mckay 2006). In conflict, men often make up the majority of combatants, giving women more responsibility in the home,

workforce, and community (El-Bushra 2007; Radu and Baldulescu 2017). For example, the

Darfur peace talks of 2006 originally only featured some political elites and rebel diaspora

groups. Women from refugee camps were granted a seat at the table after some pushing from,

third party mediator, Senator S.B. Jaffer (Paffenholz et al. 2016). These women were a great

resource to the peace process because these women refugees knew much more about the needs of

the civilian population than the other actors involved (Paffenholz et al. 2016). The resulting peace

agreement from the talks in Abuja featured many provisions centered on advancing human rights

(Paffenholz et al. 2016). Scholars argue that the unique roles and experiences women have during

conflict make women more connected and aware of the most pressing concerns in terms of

human rights and women's rights, because women make up the majority of civilians and leaders

in the community (True and Riveros-Morales 2019; El-Bushra 2007; Radu and Baldulescu 2017;

Reilly 2007). I focus on the argument that women's inclusion leads to a greater consideration for

human rights and gendered interests, because this is the most widely recognized explanation for

the positive effects women have on peace (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-

Morales 2019; Stone 2015; de La Rey and Mckay 2006; Radu and Badulescu 2017).

Research on Women and Peace

The argument that women increase the consideration of human rights and gendered

interests is used to explain the finding that women have positive effects on peace in quantitative

studies (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Stone 2015). A

main approach in the research on women and peace, utilizes quantitative methods to compare the

duration and likelihood of peace of peace processes with women negotiators to peace processes

that do not have women negotiators (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-

Morales 2019; Stone 2015). This method does not account for linear effects of numbers of

women negotiators because it looks at women's participation categorically rather than

continuously. Meaning that this method does not account for how different amounts of women

negotiators can have more or less of an impact on peace. Additionally, the limited data on women negotiators and signatories causes authors to use a very small sample, with the average number of cases used ranging from 50-100 agreements (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Stone 2015). To gain some perspective on how this may not be representative, the largest database on peace has about 1,500 peace agreements signed from 1900-2016, which is the time-frame typically represented in these quantitative studies (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Stone 2015). The findings of these studies almost exclusively show that peace processes involving women acting as negotiators are more likely to have peace, longer lasting peace, and the inclusion of women's interests than peace processes without women (Stone 2015; Swiss and Anderson 2014; Ellerby 2013; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019). However, the causal mechanism used to explain women's positive effects on peace lacks empirical support (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Stone 2015). Little research on the relationship between women and human rights has been conducted, but studies on gendered interests have found empirical support to indicate that peace processes with women have more provisions on gendered interests (True and Morales-Riveros 2019; Domingo et al. 2015; Swiss and Anderson 2014). As previously mentioned, these studies lack a sufficient sample size of generalizable results and does not describe the linear relationship between women and the inclusion of gendered interests (Stone 2015; True and Morales-Riveros 2019).

The largely untested assertion that women increase the consideration for human rights in peace becomes especially problematic when you consider the qualitative research on women's experiences in peace processes (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). These studies use interviews and surveys and use case studies to determine how women shaped the peacebuilding process (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). This method allows

researchers to find more than just a correlation between the presence of women and peace, but rather offer more evidence of women's actual contributions to the peace process were. Results from these studies showed that women's participation in peace processes is often severely limited, and that women are often excluded from important decision-making discussions (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). This calls into question the assertion that women could have caused more support for human rights and women's interests in peace processes, because women negotiators are often unable to exert influence on peace negotiations (Paffenholz et al. 2016;Buchanan et al. 2012; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). I provided much needed empirical testing of the assertion that women increase the consideration for human rights and gendered interests by testing the relationship between numbers of women negotiations and peace agreement provisions on these topics.

Why are Peace Agreement Provisions Important?

The most common and observable method for determining the extent to which human rights and gendered interests are considered during peace is through the content of peace agreements (Bell and Rourke 2010; Ellerby 2013; Swiss and Anderson 2014; True and Morales-Riveros 2019). While issues included in the content of peace agreements are not a guarantee that they will be addressed in practice, the issues prioritized in these documents are more likely to be implemented in post-conflict situations than those that are not included (Cohn 2008; Bell and Rourke 2010). Peace agreements have been argued to be especially important because it is the first step in which the new political, economic and social systems of a country after conflict (Ellerby 2013). When peace agreement provisions focus on human rights and gendered interests, they can address the underlying causes of the conflict and the grievances resulting from the war. This is often defined as positive peace, which involves more than just getting a conflict to end, but rather the act of sustaining peace (Lederach 1997; Gates, Mokleiv Nygård, and Trappeniers

2016; Reilly 2007). The history of violence can heighten tensions between groups and the scarcity of resources can result in levels of insecurity high enough to motivate vulnerable groups to reengage in conflict as a defense (Gates, Mokleiv Nygård, and Trappeniers 2016). Governments can build trust amongst civilians and potential insurgents by respecting and serving the needs of the whole population (Gates, Mokleiv Nygård, and Trappeniers 2016). Peace agreements can promote positive peace by building democratic institutions, creating programs to distribute resources to marginalized groups, and establish disarmament procedures (Ellerby 2013; Gates, Mokleiv Nygård, and Trappeniers 2016). These mechanisms increase the durability of peace by creating political institutions and social systems that cater to the needs of the entire population (Lederach 1997).

Actors in these negotiations determine which groups benefit most in terms of allocation of power, protection, and resources (Ellerby 2013). Peace agreements can support women's specific interests by including provisions that improve conditions for women by increasing their political, economic, and social rights (Ellerby 2013; True and Morales-Riveros 2019). In addition, peace agreement provisions can improve women's security by outlawing domestic and sexual violence (Ellerby 2013; True and Morales-Riveros 2019). For example, peace agreement provisions in Rwanda's Arusha Accords established ad hoc tribunals (Anderlini 2014). These tribunals were designed to ensure that crimes of sexual violence were charged and prosecuted as crimes against humanity, and greatly reduced acts of gender based violence (Anderlini 2014).

Human rights can be supported in agreement provisions that support vulnerable groups, establish programs to offer aid and assistance, and build trust between civilians and the ruling sovereign body (de La Rey and Mckay 2006; Jansen 2006). For example, provisions within the Chapultepec agreement in El Salvador (1992), established a reintegration program for the former rebel combatants, ultimately bolstering the durability of peace (Conway, Martinez, and Gammage 2004; Anderlini 2014). This reintegration program reduced lowered the capabilities of the rebel

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group to conduct an insurgent attack by incentivizing participation in a disarmament and demobilization program with compensation (Conway, Martinez and Gammage 2004; Anderlini 2014). Immediately after the resolution of the conflict, the reintegration program provided members of the insurgent group with land, mental and physical health care, and other basic human needs (Conway, Martinez and Gammage 2004; Anderlini 2014). The agreement protected once marginalized groups, and integrated excluded individuals back into society. By ensuring the protections, freedom, and security of once vulnerable groups, the Chapultepec Accord built trust and raised the cost of rebellion (Lederach 1997; Conway, Martinez and Gammage 2004; Gates, Mokleiv Nygård, and Trappeniers 2016).

What Does it Mean for Women to Influence Peace Negotiations?

I argue that influence will mediate the relationship between numbers of women negotiators and numbers of provisions on human rights and gendered interests. The literature defines influence as the ability for women's groups and networks to push for their own preferences on the agenda before, during, or after the negotiation (Paffenholz et al. 2018). This also includes women's groups' ability to push for negotiations to begin or for agreements to be signed. Counting the number of women serving as negotiators is not enough to measure the extent to which women can influence peace agreements (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). This is because opposition to women's inclusion amongst the public and their male counterparts in the negotiation can prevent women from influencing the peace process (Paffenholz 2014; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). These actors can prevent women from being able to push for human rights and women's interests by imposing threats, having closed-door meetings, and by refusing to consider contributions from women negotiators during agenda setting or decision-making discussions (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Paffenholz 2014; Buchanan et al. 2012; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Without being able to speak, vote, or actively participate in the peace process, it is unlikely that women will be able to increase

consideration of any issue. I predict that women's level of influence is important to women

shaping peace agreement content, but how do women gain influence on peace?

How Do You Ensure Women are Influential in Peace Agreements?

The literature proposes a number of mechanisms to increase women's level of influence

in peace processes (O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et. al 2016;

Paffenholz et. al 2018). These mechanisms alter structural factors of the peace process to

accomplish one of three things. First, is to increase the number of women in the peace process.

The number of women in a peace process can increase when political elite involved in the

negotiation advocate for women's inclusion. In peace talks in Burundi (1996), Mediator Julius

Nyerere negotiated and pushed for the incorporation of women's groups in the process

(Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). This effort afforded very little influence to women

in the negotiation because the request faced a lot of opposition. Eventually, women were granted

observer status as a compromise and lacked actual decision-making authority in the process

(Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). Another predicted method for increasing the

number of women in peace negotiations is to incorporate women in the early and less exclusive

phases (Paffenholz et al. 2018) This can set a precedent for women's involvement in peace

processes, and lead to more women being included in later stages (Paffenholz et al. 2018;

O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Although research has found a correlation

between early women's involvement and the number of women negotiators, it is far more likely

that processes with more women involved in both these stages occurred because there was less

opposition to women's inclusion (Paffenholz et al. 2016). The most common method for

increasing the number of women in a peace process is the implementations of a quota or

minimum requirement of female delegates in the process (Paffenholz et al. 2018). This

mechanism will only cause an increase in women's influence if women are allowed to vote and

speak in the negotiation process. For example, in the Bangsamoro Peace Process in The

Philippines (2014), the state leader granted 50% of negotiator to women (O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). This was a symbolic gesture from the Philippines to gain legitimacy and financial support from the United Nations during their peace process (Paffenholz et al. 2016). It was evident that no real effort was being made to improve gender equality, and the male delegates excluded women from the voting process by having closed door meetings (Paffenholz et al. 2016). This mechanism will not ultimately cause women to be influential, because it only changes the composition of gendered institutions and leaves the gendered cultures and individuals in place (Ellerby 2017).

The second type of mechanisms predicted to increase women's influence aims to make women more capable negotiators (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). International organizations and women's groups can increase public pressure for increasing the number of women by acting as support structures (O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). These organizations support women by hosting workshops, which publicly highlights women's preparation and training to act as a negotiator. International actors like the United Nations incentivize women's inclusion in peace processes by providing financial assistance and equating this effort with democracy and legitimacy (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Cohn 2008). State leaders and political elites may often include women in peace negotiations as symbolic gesture to signal commitment to women's equality, but will not act to ensure women's influence or make any effort to share power (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo Sun City Talks (2002), UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women) organized workshops to better prepare women to serve as negotiators, and in increase in negotiators did occur (Paffenholz et al. 2016). When public pressure and international organization involvement increases, it is very likely that state leaders might opt to include more women as a gesture. This gesture however will not likely coincide with an acceptance in women's presence from their counterparts or the public, meaning that the

exclusion may continue through informal practices that aren't as visible or documented. The women in the Democratic Republic of the Congo also experienced informal barriers, and resorted to blocking the exits of the negotiation room as an effort to get the peace agreement signed (Paffenholz et al. 2016).

The third type of proposed mechanisms ensure women's influence by regulating communication in decision-making discussions (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). This is done by the implementation of decision-making procedures, which ensure equal participation and voting privileges for all negotiators. Male delegates opposed to women's inclusion in peace negotiations can get around this mechanism by holding closed-door meetings or ignoring the votes and issues presented by women negotiators. An alternative method to ensure women's ability to communicate in negotiators is through transfer strategies. Women's groups can write position papers, or documents written to outline issues of importance, which should be incorporated in peace agreements (Paffenholz et al. 2016). Transfer strategies ensure that these documents written by women's groups are circulated to the delegates within the peace negotiation (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). This strategy may make women more able to reach negotiators but it will not make their male counterparts more willing to listen to what women have to say during peace negotiation talks. I argue that that these proposed variables act as "megaphones," or mechanisms that allow women to communicate more clearly and be heard by other representatives. Following assertions in the literature, I predict that women's influence is limited due to opposition from their male counterparts and the public (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). These proposed "megaphone" mechanisms are not what causes women to influence peace processes, because they do not address the preferences and beliefs held by the public and male delegates involved in the process. These long held beliefs about differences between men and women are hard to overcome. However, the literature has provided evidence that these normative expectations can be reframed or exploited by women to bolster their

influence on peace negotiations (O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et. al 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). I introduce the mechanisms in which women are able to use these normative expectations of gender to their advantage in my next section.

CHAPTER III

THEORY

My goal for this paper is to evaluate and explain the relationship between women's

descriptive representation in negotiations and the number of resulting agreement provisions that

pertain to human rights and gendered interests. In this section, I theorize that women's level of

influence will have large mediating effects on the relationship between women negotiators and

peace agreements. As a result, I do not expect to find a strong positive correlation

between women's presence in negotiation roles and the number of provisions pertaining to human

rights and women's rights (O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et. al 2016;

Buchanan et al. 2012). I argue that these interests held by women negotiators will not be

translated into most agreements because most women negotiators are unable to speak or vote

during the process (O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et. al 2016;

Buchanan et al. 2012). After arguing for the importance of influence, I explain what differentiates

the peace processes in which women are unable to participate from the negotiations where

women can exercise influence on the content of peace agreements. I wrap up my theory section

by introducing three different mechanisms in which women can overcome opposition to their

inclusion and push for the inclusion of human rights and gendered interests.

Women *want* to increase the number of peace agreement provisions on human rights and

women's interests. I theorize that women in particular will push for the inclusion of women's

rights and human rights in peace agreements for several reasons. The first possible reason is that

women negotiators may vote for gendered interests and human rights issues because it is in their best interest and therefore a rational decision (El-Bushra 2007; de La Rey and Mckay 2006).

I assume that actors included in peace negotiations are self-interested, meaning that they will support issues and direct resources to groups they identify with. Women are likely to have similar interests based on their experiences in conflict situations. The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women commissioned an assessment of the impact armed conflict has on women, the report provided compelling evidence to support that there are universal themes and adversities faced by women in conflict all over the world. (El-Bushra 2007; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). Conflict primarily occurs in less developed countries, where women are already disadvantaged because of a lack of authority, financial opportunity, and from a greater acceptance of sexual violence (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; El-Bushra 2007). In addition to gender based violence, conflict impacts women by causing a hindrance to resource access, disruption of services, and loss of financial contributions from any male members within the household (Jansen 2006). The majority of deaths for women in conflict occur because of disease and malnutrition (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). These deaths are attributed to conflict rather than nature because conflict creates a culture of abuse for human rights and amplifies existing inequalities for marginalized groups (Jansen 2006; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002).

Second, women are less likely to become combatants in conflict (El-Bushra 2007; de La Rey and Mckay 2006). With the majority of the male population absent from the home, women take on more responsibility in the home, workforce, and community (El-Bushra 2007; Radu and Badulescu 2017). Women make up the majority of civilians, making them more likely to be aware of and connected to human rights issues (de La Rey and Mckay 2006; Radu and Badulescu 2017). It is important to note that women do not all have the same interests and experiences (Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2018). I do not assume that all women negotiators will be

interested in supporting what has been defined as "gendered interests" (Cohn 2008). However, I pull from existing literature to explain additional incentives for women negotiators to support human rights and gendered interests regardless of their own prerogatives (Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018; Paffenholz et al. 2018). Women negotiators may vote for human rights and gender issues in order to build public support for their inclusion and for the peace process overall (Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018). Women negotiators can foster more support from society by forming "linkages" with women's civil society groups (Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018). These groups are unified on gendered interests and humanitarian reform, and inform women negotiators of which issues are important to the public (Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018). Women negotiators have an incentive to push for greater numbers of provisions pertaining to human rights and gendered interests in order to gain more support for their inclusion and the peace process overall (Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018). This connection and support system between negotiators and civil society groups are unlikely to be formed if women cannot influence the peace negotiation, as these civil society groups would have little incentive to support the women negotiators (Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018).

Just because women want to increase the number of provisions on human rights and peace agreements does not mean that women negotiators can influence the content of peace agreements (O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz 2014). Pulling from other studies, I conceptualize women's influence as the ability for negotiators to place issues on the agenda, vote, and participate in decision-making discussions, and push for a negotiation to begin or end by signing the agreement (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Current scholarship on women's participation in peace processes notes common occurrences of exclusionary practices to women negotiators, which occurs due to opposition from political elites and the public (Ellerby 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016). The observed trend in aversion to women's inclusion in peace processes amongst political

elites often leads to closed door meetings, threats, and a lack of consideration for the interests supported by women negotiators (Paffenholz et al. 2018; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Male political elites are likely to hold larger shares in terms of political rights, power, and wealth, giving them a rational incentive to use their power to maintain their larger share of the benefits (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). As a result, some political elites may choose to exclude or refrain from allocating rights and resources to other groups. This is a viable option for political elites because of their higher levels of power and influence compared to other marginalized groups (Ellerby 2017). Case studies seem to indicate that women negotiators are far more likely to be elite comparatively in status, and thus will share more common interests with the general public (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). In processes in which women do not share commonalities with the public in terms of class, I argue that elite women negotiators are more likely to support the interests of marginalized groups because of their connection to women's peace groups. Other studies have found in interviews that women's activist groups can foster public support for women's inclusion in exchange for support of the issues favored by the group (Kraus, Kraus, and Branfors 2018; Jansen 2006; de La Rey and Mckay 2006; Radu and Baldulescu 2017). Women negotiators are more likely to connect with local groups over their counterparts, male political elites, because they are in greater need of support and legitimacy due the resistance typically met with women's inclusion (Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2018; Kraus, Kraus, and Branfors 2018).

Other studies have found many instances in which the participation of women negotiators in peace processes is substantially limited by opposition from society and their male counterparts, I predict that my sample will have similar frequencies of peace processes in which women cannot vote or speak (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). As a result, I argue that the high frequency of exclusionary practices will limit the extent to which women can push for the inclusion of human rights and gendered interests in

peace agreements. While I am not predicting that women negotiators will not be able exercise influence on peace agreements in every peace negotiation, I expect the large amount of cases in my sample with influential women negotiators will cause my large quantitative study to yield results indicating a weak relationship overall.

Hypothesis: The number of women negotiators will not have positive or significant effects on the number of peace agreement provisions that pertain to gendered interests and human rights.

I have just argued that the effect of the numbers of women negotiators on peace agreements depends on the level of influence women negotiators have on the peace process. I predict that most cases in the sample will show instances in which women are unable to participate, causing results to show a weak relationship between these two variables. While I am not predicting for this to be a dominant occurrence in my sample, case studies have shown many instances in which women have been able to influence negotiations (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; de La Rey and Mckay 2006). Given that influence is what allows women negotiators to change the content of peace agreements and utilize their strength in numbers, it is important to understand what differentiates the processes where women are excluded from decision-making in peace process from the negotiations where women can influence the process. As outlined in the literature review, many of these studies argue that changes to structural aspects of the peace process will allow women to exercise influence over the peace process (Paffenholz et al. 2018; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et. al 2016). I argue that these proposed mechanisms, or "megaphones" will not maximize women's ability to engage in peace negotiations. This is because these mechanisms simply allow women to speak more freely or be present during discussions, but they do not increase the likelihood that women's votes and opinions will be considered by their male counterparts. The best long-term solution for women negotiators to gain influence in peace processes would be for these long held cultural biases

against women's inclusion in leadership roles and the public sector to be discarded amongst elites and society alike (Ellerby 2017). However, most countries are far from foregoing their ideas about gender differences and from embracing women as equal counterparts to men (Ellerby 2017). I assert that gender bias motivates actors to exclude women from decision making decisions, but I do not claim that women must change these normative expectations of gender in order to influence peace. In contrast, I argue that women negotiators are able to use these more traditional perceptions of gender to their advantage. I classify three different mechanisms in which this could be accomplished, based on my own observations of instances in which women negotiators exploit gender roles.

1. **Vulnerability**

2. **Expectations of Modesty**

3. **Emphasizing their Unique Role**

First, women negotiators can exert influence on peace negotiations by using perceptions of vulnerability to their advantage. In peace talks in Somalia (1993), women in the negotiation room were not granted the ability to vote, harshly limiting their ability to influence the peace process. However, women delegates were able to pressure their male counter parts to sign the peace agreement by publicly going on a hunger strike until a peace agreement was signed (Paffenholz et al. 2016). Women were able to successfully pressure negotiators due to the negative attention, which caused public concerns for the women's safety to arise (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). Second, women exploit normative expectations of women's modesty. Forty women delegates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were able to block the exits of the negotiation room and imprison the remaining 502 male delegates in the negotiation room until the peace agreement was signed (Paffenholz et al. 2016). This effort was successful because of cultural stigmas associated with touching women (Paffenholz et al. 2016). Women

have even proved to be influential on peace from outside the negotiation room, in Somaliland (1993), women threatened to publicly undress in full view of the negotiators (Paffenholz et al. 2016). These efforts from women in peace activist groups led to the signing and incorporation of human rights issues in the resulting agreement (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). The last method, women overcome opposition to their inclusion by emphasizing women's "unique role" in home and community. Women negotiators in Papua New Guinea branded themselves as "mothers of the land" to gain access to the negotiation room and to build trust with both sides of the conflict (Hermkerns 2007 pp 12). By embracing long-term held values and beliefs held by the actors responsible for limiting women's influence on peace processes, women are able to convince or coerce the actors responsible for limiting women's influence to allow their active participation in the peace process (Hermkerns 2007; Buchanan et al. 2012). By using these three mechanisms, small numbers of women negotiators and women from outside of the negotiation room can influence peace processes.

I theorize that the numbers of women in negotiations will largely be unimportant to describing which peace agreements have large amounts of provisions on human rights and gendered interests. While there is strength in numbers of likeminded delegates within any voting body, a place at the table is not enough for women to add their own preferences to the agenda (Ellerby 2013; Paffenholz et al. 2018). I argue that the exclusionary practices women face are a product of opposition to women's incorporation into roles outside of the home. My theory differs from other works on women's experiences in negotiations by arguing that structural changes to biased institutions will not be enough (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). I theorize that the same biased individuals and informal practices will remain, preventing women from being able to shape the content of peace agreements (Ellerby 2017). In my next section, I outline my two step methodological approach to support this theory. I begin by testing my theory that opposition to women's participation will be high in terms of frequency by

quantitatively evaluating the relationship between number of women negotiators and numbers of provisions on human rights and gendered interests. Subsequently, I conduct a qualitative analysis, using illustrative examples to demonstrate the shortcomings of previously proposed mechanisms for allowing women to influence the process. I use this analysis to provide support for my theory that women can exploit normative expectations, by outlining occurrences in which women utilized the three different mechanisms classified in this section. I aim to use these illustrative examples to show that the ability for women to speak and vote in negotiations is essential for women to increase consideration for human rights and gendered interests in peace agreements.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

In this analysis, I aim to explain the relationship of women's descriptive representation in peace negotiations on the number of human rights provisions and the representation of gendered interests in peace agreements. My first objective in this analysis is to evaluate this relationship statistically. I use a negative binomial regression analysis to evaluate the effect the percentage of woman negotiators has on the number of provisions on human rights and gendered interests. This specific type of regression is well suited to my data, because my sample is comprised of over-dispersed data, that counts the number of times the incidence of human rights and gendered provisions occurs in peace agreements (UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 1987).

My unit of analysis for this study is peace agreements. This is because each peace agreement has a measurable number of women negotiators and a measureable number of peace agreement provisions, which can be categorized into gendered interests or human rights. The literature defines "peace process" to include all negotiations and peace agreements that aim to resolve the same conflict (Bell and Rourke 2010). My sample includes 906 peace agreements from 32 peace processes that were signed from 1990-2016, and were found in the PA-X Peace Agreement Database (2017). A full list of all the peace processes included in my sample can be found in Table 7 in the appendix. The conflicts included in my sample are intrastate conflicts, this is conflict occurring between a state and an entity within the same country rather than conflict between two countries. Some of the conflict resolutions lead to the formation of a new country

including Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, and South Sedan. State data used in cases where the country associated with the conflict had not been formed yet was collected from the state in which new state emerged from.

This practice will allow me to use data that best describes the socioeconomic conditions for all actors involved in the conflict because actors on both sides of the conflict were subject to the conditions and rulings of the state that originally covered both territories (Bell and Rourke 2010: Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019). The new state resulting from the conflict was unlikely to have unique cultural or socioeconomic conditions because individuals belonging to this territory lacked sovereignty until the rebels or insurgent population gained independence and formed a new state (Krause, Krause and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019).

I argue that my sample is representative of the total population for several reasons. First, The United Nations found that all peace processes from 1992-2011 had an average of nine percent of women negotiators, and my sample has the same average of woman negotiators between the 32 peace processes included (UN Women 2012). Second, my samples distribution and amount of provisions on human rights and gendered interests is consistent with what we know about the total population of peace agreements from 1990-2016. It is not possible to access the content of the total population of peace agreements written 1990-2016, so I reference other works on the content of peace agreements to determine if my sample is representative of all peace agreements written at this time (Bell and Rourke 2010; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018). I use this because the current research on peace agreement content is the only source available to help us understand how often peace agreements include human rights and gendered interests (Bell and Rourke 2010; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018). Only fifty percent of peace agreements in my sample have any mention of gendered interests, I argue this is representative of all peace agreements because other works

reported a range from 43 percent to 65 percent of peace agreements with references to women (Ellerby 2013; Bell and Rourke 2010; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Ellerby 2016). It is also likely that my sample reflects trends of growth in provisions on human and women's rights, because my sample and other research found a large increase in such provisions after the passage of the United Nations' Security Resolution 1325 in 2000 (Ellerby 2013; Bell and Rourke 2010; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Ellerby 2016; UNSCR 1325 2000). In addition to having the same rates of gendered provisions, growth, and women's participation, my sample also reflects a large proportion of the total population of peace agreements signed from 1990-2016. While the exact number of peace agreements signed in that time period are unknown, I can argue that my sample is large enough to describe the total population because it includes 60 percent of the peace agreements listed in the largest existing database on peace agreements (Bell et al. 2017).

My first dependent variable is the number of human rights provisions within the peace agreement, this is a count variable is coded to depict the number of provisions in the peace agreement that correspond to human rights issues. I got data on the number of human rights provisions for each peace agreement in my sample from the PA-X Peace agreement database (2017). I chose this database because it was the largest and most comprehensive source available for information on peace agreement content (Bell et al. 2017). The database codes peace agreement provisions as "human rights" related when it includes any references pertaining to equality, democracy, protection, civil and political rights, human rights frameworks, socio-economic rights, etc. The large amount of information available in this database allows me to include every peace process with published data on the number of women negotiators involved, which gives more confidence in my results.

My second dependent variable measures the number of peace agreement provisions with references to gendered interests, which also comes from the PA-X Gender Peace Agreement Database (2017). The database includes any references pertaining to women, gender, and sexual

or gender based violence. Provisions coded as "gendered" in the PA-X Gender Database (2017) can simply reference women, or have specific provisions meant to address and improve the social, political, and economic rights for women. Ellerby (2013) argues that these provisions can be categorized in four main types. Gendered provisions can help women by improving their incorporation in peace processes, representation in all decision-making levels, protection from violence and oppression, and recognition of women's unique needs and preferences (Ellerby 2013). I do not differentiate between the different types of provisions that are measured as gendered, because I do not expect any unique effects from women's inclusion on any particular type of provision for women's interests. Despite universal themes in women's experiences during conflict, the unique circumstances of the war and variance between each woman's preferences may make different types of provisions more valuable (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). The differences in priorities amongst different actors in peace negotiations makes it impossible to determine which type of gendered provisions are more likely to occur or be more favored by actors in the process (Ellerby 2013). As previously discussed, some works argue that women rationally push for their own interests to be included (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Radu and Badulescu 2017; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Given that women's preferences are dependent on their own identities and the unique circumstances of conflict, it is impossible to identify which type of gendered provisions will be prioritized (Paffenholz et al. 2018).

My independent variable is women's participation in peace agreements. I will be measuring my independent variable using data on the percentage of women negotiators associated with the peace agreements within my sample. Data on the number of women negotiators comes from the Council on Foreign Relations (2018) database and reports from the United Nations (2017). This will indicate the number of women appointed to formal positions within the negotiation room. I did not have access to data on the exact number of women negotiators in all 906 peace agreements included in my analysis, so I used data on the number of women

negotiators from the most comprehensive or important peace agreement in each process for all peace agreements belonging to the same peace process (PA-X Peace Agreement Database 2017). The decision to enter the same data on women negotiators for every agreement in the same process allowed me to increase my sample from 45 peace agreements to 906 peace agreements. Literature on women's participation in peace argues that women's ability to influence peace is influenced by variables outside of numbers, including previous instances of women's involvement and socioeconomic conditions within the country (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). This sample size will allow me to include enough control variables to isolate the relationship between my independent and dependent variable without over specifying the model (Lawless 1987).

This method could be problematic, because it will measure entire peace processes by the number of women negotiators involved in the comprehensive agreement alone. Meaning that peace processes with high levels of women negotiators in all 50 agreements in a process, will look similar to peace processes that had little to no women involved in the process until the final agreement (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Swiss and Anderson 2014; Domingo et al. 2015). My model will have a lesser ability to evaluate this relationship because of the lack of certainty in the number of women negotiators in each individual negotiation. I do not expect my use of data for only one agreement in a peace process for all associated agreements to hinder the credibility of my results, for many reasons. My first reason is based on my theory that women can influence agreements from outside and inside the room. While I focus on women's influence from inside the negotiation room, the effects from women's peace activism and mass action cannot be so easily distinguished. Peace processes with high numbers of women negotiators throughout are likely to have the same number of women involved as processes that didn't have women negotiators until the final agreement. I base this claim on observations from cases studies that find that the late inclusion of women negotiators is often a result of highly effective and strong efforts

from women's advocacy groups outside the room (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012 O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015).

Given that an increase in women negotiators during later stages of the process indicates that women's groups were highly active, it is likely that peace processes without a later increase had the same numbers of women involved when you consider actors inside and outside the room (Paffenholz et al. 2018). If negotiators who gained access in response to the involvement from women's groups cause the inclusion of human rights and gender provisions, then these cases are affected by women's descriptive and direct representation and should be included in my analysis. This is because women's groups were responsible for the inclusion of women in the negotiation room. The peace processes with high numbers of women negotiators may not have had the same number of women in every agreement, however, the number of women negotiators recorded in the data reflect the most critical stage for the development of women's and human rights in the peace process (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Bell and Rourke 2010). Early agreements, like ceasefire agreements, are written to establish procedures and rules for the peace negotiation (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Bell and Rourke 2010). So, women's involvement is not as important in early agreements of processes because this is not when actors draft and discuss provisions on human rights and gendered interests (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Ellerby 2013). The consideration of human rights and women's interests occurs in later or more comprehensive agreements because these documents are meant to establish new institutions for a post-conflict regime (Ellerby 2013).

Other studies have included different measures for women's participation in peace agreements, using the number of women signatories or mediators in the negotiation (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Stone 2015). I include measures of signatories versus negotiators for each process in the appendix, which shows multiple peace processes in which the number of signatories is higher than negotiators. A higher number of

signatories indicates that there were more women allowed to sign the agreement, than the number of women able to participate in the negotiation. Signatories can often be a symbolic role, where women are allowed to sign a peace agreement as a gesture, meaning that women signatories may not even be granted access to the negotiation room (Paffenholz et al. 2016). I predict that women's level of influence will mediate the effects of women's presence on the number of provisions on human and women's rights. I measure the proportion of women negotiators because this position should give women access to the negotiation room and represent the peace processes in which women are more likely to be able to vote and speak in peace processes (True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Paffenholz et al. 2018). Additionally, mediator and signatory roles are not mutually exclusive, meaning that one person may hold both roles in the same negotiation (Paffenholz et al. 2018). I aim to test the effects of the number of women in negotiations on peace agreement content, so getting an accurate count of the number of women involved is important. I can make sure to get an accurate measure of the number of women involved by excluding the signatory measure to prevent the same delegate from being counted twice in one negotiation. Table 7 in the appendix also shows peace processes with a higher numbers of women negotiators than signatories. Case studies suggest that negotiators are unable to sign peace agreements due to opposition and exclusion from their male counterparts (Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016). In my theory, I argue that women can influence peace negotiations by speaking and voting. I use the number of negotiators over signatories because I still expect that women can be influential in negotiations without being able to sign the agreement.

Mediators are third party members and their inclusion occurs in small numbers because less mediators are used in the negotiation (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012 O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Women acting as mediators typically belong to a third party, not the country associated with the conflict (Buchanan et al. 2012 O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et al. 2016). My theory argues that influential women will vote

for women's and human rights because it serves their own interests directly in that country, or improves their level of legitimacy as their efforts to push women's interests incentivizes local women's groups to support the delegate (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018). This personal incentive to improve local conditions for women or ties to local women's groups will not be applicable to women mediators. Additionally, I aim to explore the mediating effects of influence on the relationship between women's presence in negotiations and provisions on women's and human rights. Women mediators' ability to exercise most likely differs from the local women encapsulated in my theory, because mediators are often recognized political elites. My theory argues that opposition to women's inclusion will limit the extent to which women can influence negotiations, eliminating the ability for women to act on their preferences and support human rights and gendered interests. Established political elites will have more credibility and are not likely to face the same obstacles as local women negotiators. In order to test the applicability of my theory that the effects of women's participation on agreements is dependent on the ability of women negotiators to influence the process, I only include a variable for the number of women negotiators.

In addition to my independent variable, I also include several control variables in my statistical analysis. As previously mentioned, the type of the peace agreement is a large determinant of which issues are covered (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Bell and Rourke 2010). Comprehensive and Constitution agreements are written with the intent to establish new procedures and institutions, which ultimately leads to a greater likelihood for content to be focused on human rights and gendered interests (Ellerby 2013; Bell and Rourke 2010). These agreements are given a much more to accomplish than others, because they are meant to cater to the needs of civilians and refugees, rather than just create procedures and rules (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Swiss and Anderson 2014). To control for potential effects of agreement type

on the number of provisions allocated to human and women's rights, I include an indicator of the length of the peace agreement in my analysis.

I also control for a variable that measures the country's overall respect for human rights. Using data from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (2014), I use the empowerment rights index (Cigranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). which constructed to reflect the extent to which the government supports and allows foreign movements, domestic movements, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly & association, workers' rights, electoral self-determination, and freedom of religion (Cigranelli and Richards 2014). The database gauges a government's respect for human rights by looking at a government's practices in response to religious practices, women's inclusion in society, and protest (Cigranelli and Richards 2014). These practices are then rated and coded into an index variable for empowerment rights, which ranges from 0 (no government respect for these seven rights) to 14 (full government respect for these seven rights) (Cigranelli and Richards 2014). This variable measures specifically the government's respect for human rights by combining other variables in the database which describe the extent to which a government grants citizens and women personal freedoms. The index includes measures for women's political, social, and economic rights (Cigranelli and Richards 2014). This is especially useful because scholars have found that the level of equality between genders is highly related to the extent to which women are accepted in leadership or public sector roles outside the home (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Fish 2002). Rather than including all 14 values as individual levels or variables in my negative binomial regression, I code the variable dichotomously. The average score for the entire world and my sample is 8, so I assign all countries with values below the average value (scores 0-7) a 0. I code all countries with scores about 7 as 1(Cigranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). The quantitative results of my negative binomial regression analysis will exclude the variable for countries with above average respect for human rights (Human Rights=1) because this variable is redundant (Lawless 1987). This

variable is redundant because the coefficient for countries below average respect scores for human rights (Human Rights=0) will represent the difference in the incident rate for the independent variable compared to the reference group (Human Rights=1) (Lawless 1987). This method will allow me to compare countries with high respect for human rights with low respect and the correlations between these variables with human rights or gendered interests provisions.

The literature argues that the socioeconomic conditions within a country can increase or limit the country's likelihood to support human rights and women's interests (Ellerby 2017; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018). I control for possible effects of women's incorporation in the workplace with data from the World Bank (2017) on the percentage of women in the labor force compared to men for the country and year associated with signing of the peace agreement. Countries with larger amounts of women in the workforce may be more inclined to support women's economic rights and equal treatment overall, and are also more likely to have a better economy overall (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Bell and Rourke 2010). This could potentially cause a higher number of human rights provisions and gendered interests regardless of women's participation because these countries have more funds and resources to support human and women's rights (Paffenholz et al. 2018). Additionally, countries with a larger number of women in the workforce have societies have fewer gender gaps in terms of education, rights, and opportunities (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

When a country already has more women involved in roles outside of the home, then concessions for women's interests and further advancement will be more attainable because it requires less compromise (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Ellerby 2017). Countries with less disparities between sexes will not need to allocate as much resources and effort to supporting women's equality and opportunities, making support for gendered interests and its inclusion more likely in countries with women more active in the workplace rather than the home. I also control for birthrate or the number of births per woman to further capture any potential effects of

differences between genders within a country (World Bank 2017; Paffenholz et al. 2018; Swiss and Anderson 2014). Countries with economic downturns in conflict may simply have less women involved because of job availability. When jobs become scarce, women are often the first to be fired or revert back to roles in the home due to societal expectations of men in the workforce (Caprioli 2000; Ellerby 2017). Men are also more likely to make more income, meaning that households looking to have a parent or worker in the home would rationally choose for women to take that role (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Ellerby 2017). The inclusion of birth rate accounts for a countries' previous level of respect for reproductive life and indicates levels of equality between gender, as more children typically results in a higher likelihood for women to remain in traditional homemaker roles (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Ellerby 2017). The number of births per woman also describes the rate in which women can participate in the community, which can be limited by large numbers of children (True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Stone 2015). This is important because I predict that women's roles as leaders in the community leads to women becoming more likely to advocate for human rights because of their awareness and connectedness to what the public needs. Previous works on women's participation have found that the passage of a gender quota can indicate a country's greater likelihood to support women's rights (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Domingo et al. 2015; Swiss and Anderson 2014). I pull data from the gender quota database from the Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2016) to measure if the country had passed a quota before the peace agreement was signed. Gender quotas are not always followed and can be passed as an effort for a country to look more democratic, rather than be an effort to improve women's political inclusion (Ellerby 2017; Domingo et al. 2015).

To compensate for this, I also control for the percentage of women in the lower of house of parliament in the country at the year the peace agreement is signed (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018). I measure for this with data from the World Bank (2017).

Countries with a historical precedence of women holding elected office may have a greater respect for human rights and women's interests than countries without an observable amount of women involved in government. This variable accounts for differences in opportunities between sexes that occur beyond economic conditions. For example, peace agreements from the Burundian Civil War peace process had some of the highest numbers of human rights and gendered provisions, in addition to a comparatively high birth rate and a low percentage of women in the workforce (World Bank 2017). Burundi placed in the top quarter of women's parliamentary representation amongst the other county-years included in my sample, which indicates a greater amount of political equality between sexes and a greater likelihood of country support overall for women's rights (World Bank 2017). The parliament variable will indicate the higher precedent of women's involvement in Burundi. This is not indicated by Burundi's values for birth rate and workplace participation, as they both can be influenced by a country's economic state.

Finally, I recognize in my theory that women do not need to be in the negotiation room to influence the content of peace agreements. While women negotiators' ability to influence peace agreement content should be higher than for women acting outside the formal process, studies have found that women's groups can be effective advocates for peace and human rights (Jansen 2006; Radu and Baldulescu 2017; Paffenholz et al. 2016). I control for potential effects of women's peace activist groups by including a control variable, WINGO. The WINGO variable stands for women's international groups and measures the number of local chapters of international women's groups each associated country has at the year the peace agreement was signed. This variable comes from replication data from Hughes et al. (forthcoming) and includes data on the number of women's international groups from every five years. Following the lead of other studies, I imputed missing data based on trends in growth and coded this variable dichotomously to minimize error. The WINGO variable was coded as 0 if the number of

women's groups in the country at the year the peace agreement is signed is under the median value of the total sample, which is 35.4 (Swiss and Anderson 2014). The quantitative results of my negative binomial regression analysis will exclude the variable for countries with above the median number of women's groups at the year the peace agreement is signed, rights (Women's Groups=1) because this variable is redundant (Lawless 1987). This variable is redundant because the coefficient for countries below the median numbers of women's groups (Women's Groups=0) will represent the difference in the incident rate for the independent variable compared to the reference group (Women's Groups=1) (Lawless 1987). Research shows that women's group engage in peace activism more than any other group (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; Jansen 2006). A disadvantage of this data is that it doesn't describe which groups are more influential which is likely to be indicated by the number of funds allocated to the group and how many members belong to each group. I think this variable is still worth including because countries with large numbers of women's groups are more likely to have at least a few powerful organizations that influence peace processes because of the high support and mobilization of groups overall.

I am not anticipating to find a strong and positive correlation between the number of women negotiators and the number of human rights provisions and gendered provisions, because I expect the negotiator's level of influence to act as a mediating factor between these variables. Women negotiators are likely to be uninfluential in peace negotiations because their perspective is not valued by political elites (Paffenholz et al. 2016). The lack of acceptance for women's presence in negotiations leads to exclusionary practices, which prevent women from being able to speak and vote to advance their preferences for human and women's rights (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Ellerby 2013). I predict that these situations will occur enough to skew the results of my statistical analysis.

After running my negative binomial regression to statistically evaluate the relationship and test this prediction, I will conduct a qualitative analysis with illustrative examples. I predict that influence will mediate the effects numbers of women negotiators have on numbers of provisions. The qualitative analysis will explain the inner workings behind instances in which the number of women does not positively influence the content of peace agreements. I will pull examples without a clear relationship between the number of women and number of peace agreement provisions, and will determine if influence was responsible for the lack of observable effect from the numbers of women negotiators on numbers of provisions. I determine if these peace processes had women negotiators with especially low in influence or high influence by comparing the average numbers of negotiators and the average numbers of provisions for human rights and gendered interests. I assume that peace processes with below average numbers of women negotiators and above average numbers of provisions have extremely influential women negotiators. I expect to find instances in which this small proportion of women negotiators gain influence by exploiting gender norms, and will look for the proposed mechanisms for gender norm exploitation in my theory. In my qualitative analysis, I select examples with highly influential women negotiators to evaluate the applicability of my theory that extreme influence can be achieved with the exploitation of gender norms despite small numbers of women negotiators. I also include peace processes with above the average percentage of women negotiators that had below average numbers of provisions on human rights and gendered provisions, because I assume that these processes will have especially uninfluential woman negotiators. In these peace processes, I look for instances of exclusionary practices are utilized by civilians and male negotiators. This is because I theorize that these practices hinder the ability for women negotiators to exercise influence over peace processes. I also use this time to discuss the presence of "megaphone" mechanisms, or the different variables identified in the literature to improve women's influence (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Buchanan et al. 2012). These are often rules and procedures that can be created or altered to allow women more access to participation in

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decision-making discussions (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). I argue that these "megaphone" mechanisms will not allow women to become influential because they do not address the underlying causes of women's exclusion, gender bias (Ellerby 2017). I look for the presence of these proposed mechanisms maximize influence in examples with uninfluential women negotiators as an effort to provide evidence that these mechanisms are not being effective. I use these illustrative examples to identify these proposed mechanisms for maximizing women's influence in these peace processes and explain the extent to which they effected the process as well.

CHAPTER V

QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

In my theory, I do not expect to find a strong correlation between the number of women in negotiation roles and the number of provisions pertaining to human rights and women's rights. I support the argument that women negotiators *want* support these issues, but assert that this does not mean that women negotiators *can* effectively influence the negotiation and shape peace agreement content. Case studies indicate that women's participation in negotiations is largely inhibited by exclusionary practices from their male counterparts and other civilians (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). This observed high rate of obstacles to women's ability to participate in negotiations is why I expect the relationship between the number of women negotiators and the number of human rights and gendered provisions to be weakly correlated in my quantitative analysis. This predicted mediating variable is measured by women's ability to speak or vote in negotiations, which is not currently quantifiable based on a lack of data availability. I begin testing my theory by evaluating the relationship between the number of women and peace agreement provisions, to confirm that there is a high frequency of negotiations with uninfluential women negotiators. After my analysis, I follow up with a qualitative study to demonstrate how the levels of influence that women negotiators have is what enables women to impact the content of peace agreements. I conducted two separate negative binomial regressions for each dependent variable, human rights and gendered interests.

I use count data in my quantitative analysis, which counts the number of provisions on human rights and gendered interests in my sample. The descriptive statistics for all variables included in my analysis are observable in the appendix in Table 8. Of the 906 agreements in my sample, only 860 cases could be included in the quantitative analysis. This is because of a lack of data for the socioeconomic conditions of South Sedan in recent years. In peace agreements signed before 2011, I used data from Sudan to fill gaps from missing data on South Sudan (Ellerby 2012; Hunt 2003). I chose to exclude the peace agreements signed in South Sudan after 2011, because South Sudan was recognized as an independent country at that time (Ellerby 2012; Hunt 2003). I conducted two separate analyses with two separate models for each dependent variable. The strength of the correlation for the length variable was particularly high in my analyses, so I included an additional model that excludes this control variable and ceasefire agreements. Ceasefire agreements are typically the shortest agreements in a process, and are written to establish rules and procedures (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Bell and Rourke 2010). Eliminating ceasefire agreements decreased the need to control for length and cut out agreements in the sample that were unlikely to have provisions on human rights and gendered interests. My results indicate the exclusion of the length variable may have been necessary, because many variables show significance in the second model (Lawless 1987). The statistical tables below show an Exponentiated β coefficient, so I could illustrate the size of the effect from each variable included on the numbers of human rights and gendered interests (UCLA:IDRE 2018). Results with the β coefficient are available in Table 9 for Human Rights provisions, and for gendered provisions in Table 10.

The conditional means and variances for human rights provisions and gendered provisions by my independent variable (% of Woman Negotiators) is featured in Tables 1a and 1b. I predict that the number of woman negotiators will not be a strong predictor of human rights provisions and gendered interests, and the results of Table 1a and 1b suggest some support for

this. This is because the mean value of the outcome variables (human rights and gendered

provisions) does not show any pattern of growth or decline as the percentage of women

negotiators increases (UCLA:IDRE 2018). Additionally, Tables 1a and 1b indicate that the data

in the sample is over-dispersed, because the conditional means of human rights and gendered

provisions for each level of woman negotiator is lower than the conditional variances

(UCLA:IDRE 2018). This supports my choice of a Negative Binomial model for my analysis,

which is well suited for over-dispersed count data (UCLA:IDRE 2018).

Table 1a. Mean Value of Human Rights Provisions by Women Negotiators					Table 1b. Mean Value of Gendered Provisions by Women Negotiators			
% Woman Negotiators	Mean	N	Variance		% Woman Negotiators	Mean	N	Variance
0	8.54	339	565.515		0	0.83	339	14.261
2	34.64	14	3244.863		2	7.79	14	295.104
3	21.83	6	2060.967		3	0.33	6	0.667
4	3.53	34	106.681		4	0.35	34	1.084
5	8.63	19	175.246		5	3.53	19	201.374
8	17.23	40	2680.589		8	3.58	40	152.661
9	4.83	36	36.143		9	3.78	36	47.721
10	7.76	33	287.377		10	0.48	33	1.195
11	3.46	39	16.413		11	0.05	39	0.05
12	33.56	16	4998.796		12	5.31	16	166.496
13	13.13	32	253.661		13	1.94	32	34.77
15	8.91	22	173.706		15	5.77	22	157.898
17	41	3	5043		17	10.67	3	341.333
25	4	10	15.111		25	0	10	0
30	23.67	15	6822.667		30	3.4	15	134.114
32	3.23	114	47.204		32	0.31	114	1.684
33	5.34	134	218.992		33	1.04	134	17.261
Total	8.61	906	696.905		Total	1.43	906	37.999

The results of my first negative binomial regression is reported in Table 2, which displays

the relationship between the percentage of women negotiators and Human Rights provisions. I

conducted a chi-square test of independence, which compares the level of significance (p< .05) to the model's overall pearson chi square value divided by the degrees of freedom (UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 1987). Results indicated that the test statistics were well over .05, so the null hypothesis could be rejected for both models (UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 1987). The pearson chi square/d.f was 1.76 for Model 1 and reached a value of 6.04 for Model 2. This justified my reasoning to continue with my analyses because both models were shown to be appropriately specified. In other words, the number of variables in the model are sizeable, dispersed, and correlated enough to produce reportable results (UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 1987). I also referenced an omnibus test, for both the models included in Table 2 to further confirm the appropriateness of my model choice and significance of my results. The likelihood ratio chi square value in the omnibus test provides a test of the overall model compared to a model without any predictors (UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 1987). The results show that the models in Table 2 are both a vast improvement over a null model, with Model 1 have a high likelihood ratio chi-square value of 1006.01 p < .001 and Model 2 with a value of 169.84 p<.001. This reflects that the predictor variables do explain some variance in the number of human rights provisions in peace agreements and that Models 1 and 2 are worth interpreting.

The independent variable in Table 2 is the percentage of women negotiators, which was found to be statistically insignificant in both models. This supports my hypothesis that there would not be an observable correlation between women negotiators and human rights provisions. My hypothesis stipulates that high numbers of women negotiators can lead to more peace agreement provisions on human rights, but that this effect heavily depends on the level of influence held by women negotiators. I do not predict that woman negotiators will have enough influence in most peace processes, so an analyses with a large sample should not show an observable correlation between these two variables. Model 1 in Table 2 only shows statistical significance for the control variable for length of peace agreement in pages (Length). From the

results of Model 1, we can expect the percent change in the incident rate of human rights provisions to increase by 7.1% (p< .001) for every one unit increase in the number of pages within a peace agreement. Model 2 in Table 2 shows that the inclusion of the length variable may have skewed results, because more variables become statistically significant after all ceasefire agreements and length variable is excluded.

Results from Model 2 in Table 2 show that the control variable for a country's respect for human rights is statistically significant Exp(β)= 1.953 (p <. 001). Meaning that the incident rate for countries with below average respect for human rights (Human Rights=0) is .95 times the incident rate for the reference group (Cigranelli and Richards 2014; UCLA:IDRE 2018). I included this control variable expecting that more respect for human rights in a country would have positive implications for the number of provisions on human rights (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Paffenholz et al 2018). This variable goes against my expectations and those presented in the literature, because the Exponentiated β coefficient is above 1.0 in its 95% confidence interval for the lower level of the human rights variable (UCLA: IDRE 2018; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Paffenholz et al 2018). The increase in human rights provisions associated with lower levels of a country's respect for human rights (Human Rights=0) could indicate that countries with high respect for human rights may have comparatively less of a need to include more provisions on this topic. Also, many peace agreement provisions are not implemented well, so a higher frequency of human rights provisions may not actually be related to a country's desire to improve human rights conditions (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). Rather, the inclusion of many provisions on human rights could be an effort to signal to international organizations that these countries want to improve conditions for human rights as a means to gain approval and receive more aid and assistance (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002).

Table 2. Negative Binomial Regression Results: Human Rights Provisions

Dependent variable: Human Rights Provisions	Model 1 Exp(β)	Model 2 Exp(β)
(Intercept)	2.154**	2.971***
	(.274)	(.267)
Respect for Human Rights=0	1.077	1.953***
	(.100)	(.106)
Women's Groups=0	1.211	1.596***
	(.107)	(.117)
IV: Women Negotiators	0.998	1.002
	(.005)	(.005)
Length	1.071***	
	(.004)	
Gender Quota	0.993	1.016**
	(.005)	(.005)
Birth Rate	.003	1.057*
	(.024)	(.028)
Work force	1.002	1.004
	(.005)	(.005)
% of Women's Parliamentary Representation	1.006 (.007)	1.008 (.007)
N	860	707

$*p < .05;$ $** p < .01;$ $*** p < .001.$

The variable for the number of women's groups also goes against expectations in Model 2. The countries with less than the average number of woman's groups (Women's groups=0), have an incident rate of .596 times the incident rate for the excluded variable representing the countries with above the median number of women's groups (Women's groups=1) holding all other variables constant (UCLA:IDRE 2018). I predicted that the Exp(β) coefficient would be below 1.0 because the literature shows that many women's groups can be highly influential on peace and can push for the inclusion of more provisions on certain issues and for the agreement to be signed (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012). This variable could be presenting in

opposite directions than predicted because the number of women's groups may not be as important as the strength, size, and activeness of the women's groups with a country at the year the peace agreement is signed. The control variable for the number of births per woman (Birth Rate), was predicted to have a Exp(β) coefficient below zero. This assertion was based on common theoretical propositions in the literature, which argued that higher rates of births per women indicate lower levels of women's inclusion in the public sector, and more restrictions for women wanting to take on roles and positions outside of the home (Paffenholz et al. 2018; True and Riveros-Morales 2019). When women have more access to reproductive control this can mean that more women have more choices in terms of professional vocations. However, when you consider the specific contexts of the developing countries this assertion can become problematic (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Ellerby 2017). Forced sterilization is a common practice in developing countries undergoing conflict, which could also lower birth rates and be more closely related to poor conditions for women and human rights (Ellerby 2017; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). My control variable for Gender Quotas was the only statistically significant control variable that followed my predictions, showing that the percentage change in the incident rate of human rights provisions is a 1.6% increase for every one unit increase in the percentage mandated for women in electoral gender quotas at the year the peace agreement was signed.

I also provide a correlation matrix of all the variables included in quantitative analysis for human rights provisions below in Table 3. This matrix allows me to detect multicollinearity in my control and independent variable, or if any variables are too closely related (UCLA:IDRE 2018). The inclusion of independent and control variables that are correlated to each other can diminish effects of these variables on the dependent variable, misrepresenting relationships of the variables in the model (UCLA:IDRE 2018). The results of Table 3 do not show any correlation coefficients between variables that are greater than .7, giving no indication of multicollinearity in my model (UCLA:IDRE 2018).

Table 3. Correlation Matrix for Human Rights Results

	(Intercept)	Woman Negotiators	Human Rights=0	Women's Groups=0	Length	Quota	Birth Rate	Workforce	Women's Representation
(Intercept)	1.000	-0.655	-0.377	-0.461	-0.065	-0.230	-0.231	-0.852	-0.078
Woman Negotiators	-0.655	1.000	0.542	0.418	0.037	0.336	0.081	0.422	-0.249
Human Rights=0	-0.377	0.542	1.000	0.008	0.003	0.067	-0.112	0.201	-0.079
Woman's Groups=0	-0.461	0.418	0.008	1.000	-0.012	0.173	-0.252	0.260	0.259
Length	-0.065	0.037	0.003	-0.012	1.000	-0.123	-0.091	-0.062	0.043
Quota	-0.230	0.336	0.067	0.173	-0.123	1.000	0.172	0.240	-0.541
Birth Rate	-0.231	0.081	-0.112	-0.252	-0.091	0.172	1.000	0.091	-0.364
Workforce	-0.852	0.422	0.201	0.260	-0.062	0.240	0.091	1.000	-0.068
Women's Representation	-0.078	-0.249	-0.079	0.259	0.043	-0.541	-0.364	-0.068	1.000

My second negative binomial regression results are reported in Table 4, with a dependent variable measuring the number of gendered provisions in a peace agreement. The results of the chi-square independence test for both models included in Table 4 had values well over the .05 value of significance, indicating that I could reject the null hypothesis and that the data was well suited to the model (UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 1987). In addition, I conducted an omnibus test, the high values and significance of the likelihood ratio chi-squares for Model 1 (963.35 p < .001) and Model 2 (283.93 p<.001) show that my model describes more variance than the null model (UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 1987). Results from Table 1b show a much higher conditional variance than conditional means for gendered provisions in each level of percentages of woman than negotiators, indicating over-dispersion of data (UCLA:IDRE 2018). The results from the hypothesis tests and the conditional means table indicate that my data is well suited to the model and my data is worth interpreting for Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 (UCLA:IDRE 2018; Lawless 1987).

Table 4, which tests the relationship between the number of women negotiators and the number of gendered provisions in the resulting peace agreement, had mixed results for my

hypothesis. The first model includes peace agreements of all different types and the length variable, and does not find statistical significance for women negotiators as predicted. Model 2 contradicts my hypothesis, finding that the percent change of the incident rate for gendered provisions increases by 1.2% for every one unit increase in the percentage of women negotiators. The second model does estimate a small effect from women negotiators and this correlation is of the lowest statistical significance in comparison to all other variables included. My control variables are meant to represent various measures of women's status and economic development, so it makes sense that these variables more strongly predict provisions on gendered interests rather than human rights. My argument that countries with poorer conditions for human rights is supported in Model 1 and Model 2 of Table 4 both finding that Human Rights=0 has more than double times the incident rate for gendered provisions than for the excluded reference group of countries with above average scores for respect for human rights (Human Rights=1). Similarly, Women's Groups and Birth rate continue to present against predictions in results. This further supports my argument that these variables are not properly capturing the effects of strong active women's groups over large numbers, and the consequences of forced sterilization (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Ellerby 2017).

Table 4. Negative Binomial Regression Results: Gendered Provisions

DV: Gendered Provisions	Model 1 Exp(β)	Model 2 Exp(β)
(Intercept)	0.65***	0.098***
	(.345)	(.313)
Respect for Human Rights=0	1.532**	2.275***
	(.157)	(.141)
Women's Groups=0	1.092	1.576**
	(.161)	(.152)
IV: Women Negotiators	1.009	1.012*
	(.006)	(.005)
Length	1.069**	
	(.005)	
Gender Quota	1.016***	1.032***
	(.039)	(.006)
Birth Rate	1.174***	1.032***
	(.039)	(.037)
Work force	1.004	1.014**
	(.006)	(.005)
% Women in Legislative	1.043***	1.053***
	(.009)	(.008)
N	860	707

*$p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

The control variable for Gender Quotas was statistically significant and the percent change of the incident rate of gendered provisions is a 3.2 % increase for every one unit in in the percentage mandated for women in electoral gender quotas at the year the peace agreement was signed. I argue earlier that the inclusion of more human rights provisions may be motivated by country leaders with a poor reputation, looking to signal to international organizations that they are making efforts to improve (Ellerby 2017; Domingo et al. 2015). The adoption of gender quotas can also be a way for country leaders to make an observable effort to improve gender

equality, as a means to gain favor, aid, and assistance from international groups that give support to countries that prioritize this value (Domingo et al. 2015; Ellerby 2017). Likewise, country leaders will include large amounts of women in peace processes to show international organizations that they are making steps to improve gender equality (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). It could be that these same countries adopting gender quotas are appointing large amounts of woman negotiators and writing lots of gendered provisions as a means to signal more commitment to gender equality.

However, the statistical significance of % of women in the workforce $Exp(\beta)$= 1.014 (p <. 01) and the % of Women in the Legislative Branch $Exp(\beta)$= 1.053 (p <. 001) in Model 2 indicates that the correlation between number of women negotiators and quotas to gendered provisions may be more than just an empty gesture. The number of countries that included gendered provisions was much smaller than those that passed human rights provisions. The significance of these control variables for women's status amongst this smaller pool of agreements that included gendered provisions may indicate that countries with more gender equitable conditions may be doing more to include, protect, and recognize women.

The correlation matrix of all the variables included in quantitative analysis for gendered rights provisions is reported in Table 5. The results of Table 5 do not show any correlation coefficients between variables that are greater than .7, giving no indication of multicollinearity in my model (UCLA:IDRE 2018). I predicted that the correlation between the number of women negotiators and human rights and gendered interests would not be represented in my quantitative results, because common finding that women negotiators are often unable to speak or vote in peace negotiations despite their seat at the table (Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015).

Table 5. Correlation Matrix for Gendered Provisions Results

	(Intercept)	Woman Negotiators	Human Rights= 0	Women's Groups=0	Length	Quota	Birth Rate	Work force	Women's Rep
(Intercept)	1.000	-0.514	-0.231	-0.359	-0.060	-0.137	-0.299	-0.817	-0.200
Woman Negotiators	-0.514	1.000	0.496	0.297	0.013	0.125	-0.013	0.242	-0.141
Human Rights=0	-0.231	0.496	1.000	-0.061	0.118	-0.050	-0.321	0.086	-0.064
Women's Groups=0	-0.359	0.297	-0.061	1.000	-0.057	0.236	-0.343	0.247	0.252
Length	-0.060	0.013	0.118	-0.057	1.000	-0.120	-0.042	-0.151	0.052
Quota	-0.137	0.125	-0.050	0.236	-0.120	1.000	0.108	0.136	-0.446
Birth Rate	-0.299	-0.013	-0.321	-0.343	-0.042	0.108	1.000	0.141	-0.297
Workforce	-0.817	0.242	0.086	0.247	-0.151	0.136	0.141	1.000	0.056
Women's Rep	-0.200	-0.141	-0.064	0.252	0.052	-0.446	-0.297	0.056	1.000

The relationship between women negotiators and human rights has lacked empirical evaluation in the research on women and peace, and the results from my quantitative analysis support my theory that women negotiations are not able to significantly change the number of human rights provisions. Research on women negotiators and gendered provisions has found that peace processes with women negotiators will have more gendered provisions than peace processes without women negotiators (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Swiss and Anderson 2014). However, does the proportion of women negotiators matter? The results from Model 2 in Table 4 indicate that increases in the number of women negotiators $(\text{Exp}(\beta) = 1.012$ $(p < .05)$, is a statistically significant predictor of provisions on gendered interests. The stronger statistical significance of all variables in Table 4 compared to Table 2, give support to the argument that women's status and presence matters more for gendered provisions than for human rights provisions (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018). In my literature review, I discuss the effects of cleavages in actors' identities on their own preferences (Rehn and Sirleaf

2002; Paffenholz et al. 2016). Women negotiators may be more unified in their votes on women's issues than human rights issues, making the number of women negotiators more directly descriptive of the number of votes for women's issues specifically (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Anderlini 2014). Additionally, women negotiators may be included in negotiations as members of a women's coalition (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Anderlini 2014; Buchanan et al. 2012). Negotiators appointed to serve solely on a women's coalition may feel obligated to vote and push for issues that belong to this particular category, making these actors' level of influence fairly limited on issues outside of gendered interests (Paffenholz et al. 2018; Ellerby 2017).

I argue that women are more likely to support the inclusion of human rights and women's interests, and that there is strength in numbers of likeminded delegates in any voting body. However, a dominant proportion of women will not be able to shape peace agreement content to match their own preferences without the ability to vote, speak, and influence the overall negotiation process. Based on case study research, I predicted that a weak correlation between numbers of women and provisions will be found because the majority of agreements in my sample will have uninfluential negotiators due to exclusionary practices from civilians and political elites (Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). In peace processes where civilians and political elites engage in these behaviors, I am predicting that even large proportions of women negotiators can coincide with agreements containing little to no provisions on human rights and gendered interests. Despite this opposition to women's participation in peace, I predict that women can overcome these barriers by exploiting the same gender norms responsible for women's exclusion in the first place (Ellerby 2017). In these peace processes, women exert substantial effects on the peace process by emphasizing their unique role in society as women, stressing the need for protection by publicizing their vulnerability, and by using normative expectations of modesty to their advantage (Blocking exists without fear of being touched or forcibly removed, threatening to actively

undressing publicly out of protest). I theorize that these mechanisms will enable women to

successfully push for the inclusion of many provisions on human rights and gendered interests,

despite small numbers of descriptive representation. This is an additional explanation for why I

predicted the relationship between women negotiators and provisions would be unobservable,

because peace processes with small numbers of highly influential women negotiators would

coincide with large numbers of human rights provisions. So far, my analysis has provided some

support for my hypothesis, showing no correlation between the percentage of woman negotiators

and the number of human rights provisions and mixed results for gendered provisions. However, I

have not provided any evidence to support the conclusion that the lack of correlation between

women and the consideration for human rights and gendered interests is caused by low or high

levels of influence. In the next section, I will provide a qualitative analysis to further illustrate the

applicability of my theory.

CHAPTER VI

QUALITATIVE RESULTS

In my theory, I argue that women are inclined to support human rights and gendered interests, so I expect the mediating effects of influence to be present in peace processes with nonlinear relationships between the numbers of women negotiators and the numbers of peace agreement provisions. To further illustrate my predictions, I have provided an illustration of the thresholds for peace processes where women have high and low influence on a scatter plots for human rights provisions in Figure 1 and gendered provisions in Figure 2. In Figures 1 and 2 the green dotted line represents the average number of woman negotiators and the yellow dotted line represents the average number of human rights in Figure 1 and gendered provisions in Figure 2. The scatter plot in Figures 1 and 2 collapses all 906 peace agreements into 32 peace processes and shows the average number of human rights and gendered provisions within all agreements in the peace process. I choose to include the 46 peace agreements from conflicts in South Sedan after 2011 that weren't present in my quantitative analysis, because I was only missing data on country demographics and women's status for those peace agreements. These peace processes should be included in these figures because there is reliable data on the number of peace agreements and women involved in these negotiations in my sample. While looking at the scatterplots, it is important to note that the majority of peace processes included in my sample have less than twenty percent of women negotiators.

While this is representative of most peace processes today, which have less than 20% women negotiators ,this is a potential disadvantage because my sample may not accurately represent the effects that large proportions of women negotiators have on peace processes. There are very few peace processes in my sample with over 20 percent of women negotiators, and these processes all have below average numbers of provisions thus low levels of influence. Case studies argue that that most of the peace processes in my sample appointed the sizeable proportion of women negotiators as an effort to signal commitments to gender equality to international organizations, but not as an effort to share power or improve women's inclusion (O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016). If peace processes were to implement over 20% women negotiators as a genuine effort to improve conditions for women and for human rights, a sizeable amount of women negotiators could potentially have extensive voting power and influence (Paffenholz et al 2018). It is known if there are enough peace processes with over 20% of influential women negotiators in the real world, to render my sample misrepresentative. Case studies show that the majority of large proportions of women negotiators included in negotiations lack influence, which supports the representativeness of my sample (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Buchanan et al. 2012).

My decision to collapse all 906 peace agreements in my sample into 32 peace processes in Figures 1 and 2, controls for the difference in page length between agreements (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018; Ellerby 2013). This is important because length was shown to have a very strong correlation to human rights and gendered provisions. I have drawn an estimated trend line for the effect that women negotiators would have on the number of agreement provisions if there were no obstacles or anomalies to the level of influence of women negotiators. This estimated trend line for numbers of provisions without mediating effects from low or high influence is labeled as "normal influence', observable as the blue solid line in Figures 1 and 2.

**Figure 1. Scatterplot: Average Number of Human Rights Provisions per Agreement**

Figure 2. Scatterplot: Average Number of Gendered Provisions per Agreement

The purple shaded region in Figures 1 and 2 represents peace processes with low influence. I assume that the peace processes that fell within the purple region in Figures 1 and 2 had especially uninfluential women negotiators because I assume that women negotiators would vote to support human rights and gendered interests. Therefore, peace processes above average numbers of women negotiators and below average numbers of agreement provisions on human rights and gendered interests must be a product of women negotiators being unable to vote and support their preferences. I expect to find observable effects from exclusionary practices from male negotiators and the public, because this has been found to be a large barrier to women's influence in case studies (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; Buchanan et al. 2012). I strategically chose illustrative examples from the peace processes that fell within the purple region in Figures 1 and 2 because I expect to find easily observable mediating effects from influence on the relationship of numbers of women negotiators and provisions on human rights and gendered interests. The orange shaded region in Figures 1 and 2 represents peace processes with high influence. I assume that the peace processes that fell within the orange region in Figures 1 and 2 had highly influential women negotiators because of that large number of provisions on human rights and gendered interests included in the final agreement without a lot of voting power from the small proportion of women negotiators. I assume that women negotiators would vote to support human rights and gendered interests. I expect to find women exploiting gender norms in these examples, because I theorize that the exploitation of normative expectations of gender allows women to be especially effective at increasing the consideration of human rights and gendered interests in peace. I strategically chose illustrative examples from the peace processes that fell within the orange region in Figures 1 and 2, because I expect to find easily observable mediating effects from the high levels influence in the women negotiators on the relationship of numbers of women negotiators and provisions on human rights and gendered interests.

The peace processes chosen as my illustrative examples are The Darfur Peace Process (2006) and the Yemeni Civil War of (2011) and The Arta Peace Process in Liberia (2003), and the Nepalese Insurgency (2006) (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). These peace processes all present either in the orange shaded region (high influence) or the purple shaded region (low influence) in Figures 1 and 2. I will also evaluate the validity of my theory and assertions in reference to the selected peace processes by identifying if the women with unusually high levels of influence engaged in my causal mechanism of exploiting gender norms to their advantage. One of my largest critiques of current literature on women's influence in peace negotiations pertained to the "megaphone" mechanisms, in which rules and procedures could be altered to allow women more access to participation in decision-making discussions (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Table 6 presents a comparison of the averages of negotiators and provisions between the illustrative examples and the overall sample.

Table 6: Qualitative Analysis Descriptive Statistics

Peace Process Name	Average Number of Women Negotiators	Average Number of Human Rights Provisions per Agreement	Average Number of Gendered Provisions per Agreement
Total Sample	10.22%	11.28	2.38
Accra Peace Process	0.00%	5.03	.043
Darfur Peace Process	8.00%	31.10	6.95
Yemeni Civil War 2011	30.00%	1.33	2.67

My first example, the Accra Peace Process shows that women can exercise influence on peace processes by exploiting gender norms, while controlling for the numbers of women negotiators. The Accra Peace Process in Liberia (2003) did not have any women acting as

negotiators, but it is important to note that 17% of women were granted the status of observers (O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Observers cannot vote or speak in negotiations, granting certainty that the women in the negotiation room could not exercise influence, based on my conceptualization of influence (Paffenholz et al. 2016). This sizeable amount of women in the negotiation room was thanks to the involvement of many international organizations including the Women in Peacebuilding Network (Paffenholz et al. 2016). The literature argues that the extensive amounts of resources and supports women had in the Accra Peace Process (2003) allowed women to exercise influence on the peace process (Paffenholz et al. 2018). However, the average number of human rights provisions in all the peace agreements in this process was half of the total sample's average. Even worse, Liberia's average of gendered provisions was .043, less than a fourth of the sample's average. The level of influence from the women present in the room was extremely limited, because women observers were not granted the privilege to vote or speak during decision-making discussions. Women from outside of the room exercised far more influence on the peace process however, and pressured negotiators to sign the final agreement by threatening to publicly undress in full view of the negotiators (Paffenholz et al. 2016: O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). The threat of the women had so much weight due to cultural contexts, which allowed women to become a major influence on the promotion of peace (Paffenholz et al. 2016: O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015).

The second example illustrates that small numbers of women negotiators can be extremely influential in negotiations by exploiting gender norms, leading to large numbers of provisions on human rights and gendered provisions. The Darfur Peace Process in South Sudan (2006) had the highest averages of provisions on human rights and gendered interests per agreement in my sample but had less than a tenth of women negotiators (Ellerby 2012; Buchanan et al. 2012; Hunt 2003). Women in Sudan experienced very high levels of opposition and hostility in response to their inclusion in the peace process, and had very little resources at their disposal

(Hunt 2003; Ogunsanya 2007). The literature would predict that women's level of influence would be especially low here, based on the country's socioeconomic situation and lack of quotas or protection from institutional procedures (Paffenholz et al. 2016; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015; World Bank 2017).

Despite this, women in Sudan were able to influence the peace process by emphasizing their vulnerability and need for protection and by violating normative expectations of modesty. Women in Sudan lacked resources, freedoms, and inclusion from other actors involved in the peace process (Hunt 2003; Ellerby 2012). In Sudanese culture, viewing a women relative in the nude is considered a curse (Ogunsanya 2007). Sudanese woman used this normative expectation of modesty attached to their own bodies to disarm their relatives by threatening to undress (Ogunsaya 2007). Women also drew attention to the violence and abductions of child soldiers by marching naked (Hunt 2003). To draw international attention to the conflict, Women in Sudan spoke publicly about the high rates of sexual violence they endured, and the violence to their children (Hunt 2003). These actions are linked to the strength of the content within the resulting agreements, which were written in assistance with the United Nations (Paffenholz et al. 2016; PA-X Peace Agreement Database 2016). Women in Sudan did not have contextual or procedural conditions that allowed them to be influential negotiators, but were able to get support for the inclusion of provisions that address the high rates of physical and sexual violence through their radical demonstrations and peace activism (Ogunsaya 2007; Hunt 2003).

My next illustrative example comes from peace agreements in the Yemeni Civil Conflicts of 2011, which were far below the average of the sample. The agreements in this process had an average of 2.67 human rights provisions and zero gendered provisions. I chose to include this peace process to support my critique of "megaphones" or changes in rules or procedures to maximize the influence of women negotiators (Buchanan et al. 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016: O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015).The procedures in place in Yemen (2011) were

heavily favorable for women. For starters, the inclusion of women was heavily supported by the

United Nations special advisor at the time, Jamal Benomar (O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and

Paffenholz 2015). After many efforts to push for women's inclusion in an all male process, a 30%

quota for the negotiation was passed for 30 and an additional 40 reserved seats for a separate

woman's coalition (O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). A proportion of women this

size should have provided the women with an extreme advantage in terms of veto power, this

advantage was heightened by a procedural rule requiring 90% approval for resolutions to be

adopted (Paffenholz et al. 2016). The negotiation delegates were split into working groups and a

woman was required to hold one of the four leadership positions available in each group.

Literature on the peace process in Yemen (2011) makes it very clear that opposition to women's

inclusion was very high despite the quota (Paffenholz et al. 2016: O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and

Paffenholz 2015). The women negotiators were threatened, attacked, and shamed for participating

and especial contention was directed at participants who pushed for women's issues (Buchanan et

al 2012; Paffenholz et al. 2016). In an attempt to counter all of the opposition, women's

international organizations and the United Nations held training sessions and facilitated

workshops to prepare women to contribute in a meaningful way (Paffenholz et al. 2016). The

procedural and structural characteristics of this peace process were hand crafted to support the

inclusion of marginalized groups and women (Paffenholz et al. 2016: O'Reilly, Souilleabhain,

and Paffenholz 2015). However, this did not stop the other negotiators from being highly

contentious to their involvement in the process (Paffenholz et al. 2016: O'Reilly, Souilleabhain,

and Paffenholz 2015). Even if women did choose to vote despite threats and attacks, other

negotiators found a way to get around all the rules and started holding meetings at night. When

women tried to attend meetings at night unattended, pictures of them were posted online calling

them "dishonorable" for being unaccompanied at night (Paffenholz et al. 2016: O'Reilly,

Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Women in the peace process had the opportunity to be

heard, but the procedural protections did not make other actors in the political process more

willing to listen. The peace processes selected for my illustrative examples showed evidence of mediating effects from influence on the ability for women negotiators to increase the number of provisions on human rights and gendered interests.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Scholarship argues that women are good for peace because women place a greater consideration for the needs of the community during the peacebuilding process (de La Rey and Mckay 2006; El-Bushra 2007; Stone 2015). I theorized that women's preferences in support of human rights and gendered interests will not cause a greater amount of provisions on these issues, because of the frequent occurrence where women negotiators lack the ability to influence peace processes. My results provided support for my hypothesis, showing that the correlation between women negotiators and human rights provisions was of no statistical significance. However, my results also showed that the numbers of women negotiators may be more strongly correlated to gendered peace agreement provisions. This may be due the greater inclusion of women in negotiations as a part of a woman's coalition. This could cause a stronger correlation for woman negotiators to gendered provisions because women negotiators may feel more obligated to advocate for gendered interests if they belong specifically to women's coalition in the negotiation room (Paffenholz et al. 2018; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Additionally, a woman's coalition may be more likely to vote in unison and have more influence on women's interests than on other human rights interests (Paffenholz et al. 2018; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Additionally, the results from my statistical analysis indicated that the length of the peace agreement was a very important determinant of whether human rights provisions and gendered interests would be included.

Future studies in this area should not included ceasefire agreements in their sample, because these documents typically lack content beyond procedural guidelines (Bell and Rourke 2010).

My quantitative results went against expectations when it showed that countries with less respect for human rights were more likely to include provisions on human rights and gendered interests. This could indicate that countries with more human rights violations may include more provisions on these issues as an effort to correct and improve current conditions. One of the countries with the largest amounts of peace agreement provisions was South Sedan in the Darfur Peace Process (2006), this peace agreement is widely acknowledged for being very poorly carried out (Ellerby 2012; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). Literature on peace agreements shows that the poor implementation of peace agreement provisions designed to improve human rights and women's rights are the norm, not the rarity (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). It may be that these provisions are passed to gain favor and funding from international actors, rather than as a genuine effort to improve human rights and women's rights (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Paffenholz et al. 2018).

I predicted that the lack of correlation between the number of women negotiators and numbers of provisions would be caused by mediating effects from influence. I expected that a lot of peace process in my sample would have peace processes where few women negotiators produced large numbers of provisions with high levels of influence, or where many women lacked influence and signed an agreement with very little provisions on peace. I was able to illustrate that many of the peace processes in my sample fit this description. In my analysis of the Yemen Peace Process (2011), I showed that the large numbers of women negotiators were unable to influence peace agreement content due to exclusionary practices from their male counterparts and other members in their community. My analysis of the Darfur Peace Process (2006), allowed

me to present evidence that women can exploit normative expectations of gender to overcome these obstacles to their level of influence in peace negotiations. This supported my argument that small numbers of women can create peace agreements with large numbers of peace agreement provisions on human rights and gendered interests when they utilize the three proposed mechanisms in my theory. In an ideal scenario, the level of influence peace negotiators would be quantifiable and easily accessible data. Interpretations of women's influence in case studies are inconsistent and hard to compare between peace processes (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Buchanan et al. 2012; O'Reilly, Souilleabhain, and Paffenholz 2015). Future research should look for instances in which women are excluded from voting, and how this correlates with the number of peace agreement provisions on human rights and gendered interests. Information on the number of women negotiators and the extent to which each negotiator could participate and vote is especially lacking for individual peace agreements, rather than just within a peace process overall. Future research can also examine the extent to which human rights and gendered provisions are being translated into actual policy and serving as a means to improve conditions for human rights and for women in post-conflict situations. In order for gendered provisions and human rights to serve as a causal mechanism for positive effects on the durability, these provisions must create change to the social, economic, and political fabric within a country. Without the implementation of these provisions, little contributions can be made in terms of the concept *positive peace* (Lederach 1997; Gates, Mokleiv Nygård, and Trappeniers 2016). Meaning that the quality of peace will not improve because trust in the ruling regime and cooperation between groups within society will not be follow the inclusion of human rights and gendered provisions if they serve as empty promises, rather than a means to serve the people (Lederach 1997; Gates, Mokleiv Nygård, and Trappeniers 2016). This study aimed to evaluate the relationship between women and human rights provisions because it is often identified as an underlying causal mechanism for the finding that women's presence in peace leads to more durable peace (Stone 2015; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018). My results and conclusions offer

very little support for this widely acknowledged yet untested underlying causal mechanism (Stone 2015; Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018). More research needs to be conducted to evaluate why women have positive effects on peace, because these arguments inform decisions of country leaders and have led to a greater level of inclusion for women in peace.

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APPENDICES

Table 7. Cases Included in Quantitative Analysis

PEACE PROCESS	COUNTRY	% WOMEN SIGNATORY	% WOMEN NEGOTIATOR
ABUJA PEACE PROCESS	Liberia	0	0
ACCRA PEACE PROCESS	Ivory Coast	0	0
ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS	Burundi	0	2
BONN PEACE PROCESS	Afghanistan	9	9
BALKAN CONFLICT 1	Bosnia	0	0
BOUGAINVILLE CONFLICT	Papua New Guinea	7	4
CHAPULTEPEC PEACE PROCESS	El Salvador	12	13
COLOMBIAN CIVIL WAR	Colombia	2	33
BALKAN CONFLICT 2	Croatia	0	11
DARFUR PEACE PROCESS	Sudan	0	8
EAST TIMOR PEACE PROCESS	Indonesia	0	0
FREE ACEH PEACE PROCESS	Indonesia	8	0
GUATEMALAN CIVIL WAR	Guatemala	11	10
HONDURAS COUP D'ÉTAT	Honduras	33	0
JUBA PEACE PROCESS	Uganda	0	9
KENYAN POST-ELECTORAL VIOLENCE	Kenya	0	25
BALKAN CONFLICT 3	Kosovo	0	3
LIBREVILLE CONFLICT	CAF	0	0
MINDANAO PEACE PROCESS	Philippines	32	35
NAVAISHA PEACE PROCESS	South Sudan	0	0
NEPALESE INSURGENCY	Nepal	33	33
NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT	Ireland	10	10
OHRID PEACE PROCESS	Macedonia	0	5
OSLO PEACE PROCESS	Philippines	25	32
SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR	Sierra Leone	0	0
SOMALI CIVIL WAR	Somalia	0	0
SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT	South Sudan	15	15
SUN CITY PEACE PROCESS	DRC	5	12
TUAREG WARS	Mali	5	5
YEMENI CIVIL WAR 1994	Yemen	30	30
YEMENI CIVIL WAR 2011	Yemen	30	30
ZIMBABWEAN POST-ELECTORAL CRISIS	Zimbabwe	17	17

Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Quantitative Analysis

		N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance
DEPENDENT VARIABLES	Human Rights Provisions	860	0.00	322.00	8.66	26.97	725.97
	Gendered Provisions	860	0.00	63.00	1.42	6.10	37.23
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	Women Negotiators	860	0.00	33.00	12.98	13.73	187.77
CATEGORICAL CONTROL VARIABLES	Human Rights Index=0	418					
	Women's Organizations=0	422					
	Length of Peace Agreement	860	1.00	245.00	7.24	19.64	385.65
CONTINUOUS CONTROL VARIABLES	Birth Rate	860	1.47	8.61	3.75	1.84	3.32
	% of Women Workforce	860	8.13	52.86	38.32	9.47	89.73
	Women's Representation	860	0.00	33.20	11.07	7.89	63.03

Table 9. Beta Coefficient Regression Results: Human Rights Provisions

Dependent variable: Human Rights Provisions	Model 1 β	Model 2 β
(Intercept)	.767**	1.089***
	(.274)	(.267)
Respect for Human Rights=0	.074	.669***
	(.100)	(.106)
Women's Groups=0	.191	.468***
	(.107)	(.117)
IV: Women Negotiators	-.002	.002
	(.005)	(.005)
Length	.068***	
	(.004)	
Gender Quota	-.007	.016**
	(.005)	(.005)
Birth Rate	.003	.055*
	(.024)	(.028)
Work force	.002	.004
	(.005)	(.005)
% of Women's Parliamentary Representation	.006	.008
	(.007)	(.007)
N	860	707

Table 10. Beta Coefficient Regression Results: Gendered Provisions

DV: Gendered Provisions	Model 1 β	Model 2 β
(Intercept)	-2.728*** (.345)	-2.319*** (.313)
Respect for Human Rights=0	.426** (.157)	.822*** (.141)
Respect for Human Rights=1	0[a]	0[a]
Women's Groups=0	.088 (.161)	.455** (.152)
Women's Groups=1	0[a]	0[a]
IV: Women Negotiators	.009 (.006)	.012* (.005)
Length	.066** (.005)	
Gender Quota	.160*** (.039)	.032*** (.006)
Birth Rate	.160*** (.039)	.134*** (.037)
Work force	.004 (.006)	.014** (.005)
% Women in Legislative	.042*** (.009)	.052*** (.008)
N	860	707

VITA

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Master of Arts

Thesis: DO WOMEN COUNT? WOMEN NEGOTIATORS AND THE CONTENT OF
          PEACE AGREEMENTS

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