

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE ORTHODOX ETHIC? THE ROLE OF CHRISTIAN ORTHODOXY IN
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS IN MACEDONIA

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

By

NELA MRCHKOVSKA

Norman, Oklahoma

2019

THE ORTHODOX ETHIC? THE ROLE OF CHRISTIAN ORTHODOXY IN
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS IN MACEDONIA

A THESIS APPROVED FOR THE
COLLEGE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

BY

Dr. Mark Raymond, Chair

Dr. Daniel Hicks

Dr. Natalie Letsa

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my entire thesis committee for the guidance, patience, and expertise they provided throughout this project. I thank my thesis chair, Dr. Mark Raymond, for his constant encouragement and motivation, and for always being available and willing to discuss the doubts that come with writing a thesis. His teaching and mentorship are appreciated. I would also like to thank Dr. Dan Hicks for dedicating many hours into helping me with the study design for the thesis; I would have not been able to conduct the field study for this thesis if it was not for his expertise and immense support throughout it. Finally, my sincere thanks to Dr. Natalie Letsa for her feedback.

I would also like to thank the University of Oklahoma and the College of International Studies for the continuous support from their faculty and staff, opportunities for research, recognition through scholarships, and free food to get me through the long days and evenings of graduate work.

I also attribute the completion of this project and my success in the master's program to my fellow graduate students. There are many of them that are dear to my heart, but I would like to thank Nicole and Stefanie for easing me into the graduate school world and being my academic role models. I would also like to thank Lilli, Alex, and Josie for the celebratory nights after finishing each chapter—at times, those nights were the needed motivation that kept me going.

Thank you to my family and my friends from near and far who supported me with long Skype calls, care packages, love and encouragement that they never fail to show. Special thank you to my parents for their sacrifice and unwavering support to pursue my dreams. Ви благодарам многу, мама и тато!

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	iv
Introduction	1
Thesis Overview	1
Empirical Background	2
Field Research and Methodology	4
Findings	6
Significance	7
Chapter Overview	8
Chapter I: Theoretical Framework and Case Study.....	11
Theoretical Framework	17
Macedonia as a Case Study	23
Conclusion	35
Chapter II: Religion and Political Affairs in Macedonia	37
Religion and Political Affairs in Literature.....	40
Christian Orthodoxy, National Identity, and Nationalism in the Case of Macedonia	50
Discussion and Conclusion.....	61
Chapter III: Religion and Economic Affairs in Macedonia	71
Religion and Economic Affairs in the Literature	75
Macedonian Christian Orthodoxy and Economic Affairs.....	92
Data	105
Empirical Strategy.....	120
Findings	121
Discussion.....	131
Limitations and Future Research	134
Conclusion	136
Thesis Conclusion.....	139

Review of Religion and Political Affairs	139
Review of Religion and Economic Affairs	142
Significance, Implications, and Contribution.....	146
Suggestions for Future Research	149
Bibliography	152
Appendix I: Survey Instrument	161
Appendix II: Robustness Tables.....	179
Appendix III: Questions & Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables in Tables..	181
Appendix IV: Tables with OLS Regression Coefficients.....	183

List of Tables

Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents	107
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Religious Affiliation Variable.....	110
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Religious Practice Variables	112
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Religious Influence Variables	114
Table 5. Regression Results for Variables testing Hypothesis 1.....	124
Table 6. Regression Results for the Variable Testing Hypothesis 2	126
Table 7. Regression Results for the Variables Testing Hypothesis 3.....	128
Table 8. Regression Results for the Variables Testing Hypothesis 4.....	131
Appendix Table 1. Odds Ratio for Male vs. Female Sample	194
Appendix Table 2. Odds Ration with Controls	195
Appendix Table 3. Questions & Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 1	196
Appendix Table 4. Questions & Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 2	196
Appendix Table 5. Questions & Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 3	197
Appendix Table 6. Questions & Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 4	197
Appendix Table 7. OLS Regression Results for Variables testing Hypothesis 1	198
Appendix Table 8. OLS Regression Results for Variables testing Hypothesis 2	198
Appendix Table 9. OLS Regression Results for Variables testing Hypothesis 3	199
Appendix Table 10. OLS Regression Results for Variables testing Hypothesis 4	199

Abstract

Max Weber's analysis in his prominent book *The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* has prompted a generation of research that observes the role and impact of religion in world affairs. The core of Weber's thesis is his argument that religious teachings have imposed psychological sanctions in individuals, and in turn, these sanctions have affected people's behavior in worldly affairs. Guided by this argument, this thesis explores religious influence in the political and economic domain and seeks to understand the dynamics through which these influences materialize in people's behavior and attitudes. In both domains, this thesis finds evidence that it is the threat to the ontological security of actors that elicits the enactment of religious norms, which in turn affect people's behavior and attitudes in the political and economic spheres. The evidence in this thesis is drawn from a case study of Christian Orthodoxy and a field study in Macedonia. Drawing from field surveys, religious doctrines, and the existent literature, I delineate Christian Orthodox norms in respect to political and economic behavior and empirically test the extent to which these norms are manifested in the behavior of Christian Orthodox adherents. Influence of Christian Orthodox norms are found in both the political and economic domains in the case of Macedonia. Moreover, this thesis detects an intricate interplay of the logic of appropriateness and self-interest in the enactment of Christian Orthodox norms in Macedonia.

Introduction

Thesis Overview

Perusal of historical records reveals that there are only few examples of organized societies and communities that have not developed affinities towards religious practices.¹ We understand religion to be a powerful phenomenon that has been used to give rise to and destroy societies. Through its ability to provide unity, uniformity, and security to individuals, religion has been given a prominent spot in the analysis of development of societies.

This thesis contributes to the literature by drawing upon classic social theories and recent social scientific research to investigate religious norms, rules, institutions, and practices and their implications on world affairs. Specifically, this thesis examines how religious norms, rules, institutions, and practices influence the peculiar political and economic developments in one society. While the primary research question of this thesis is analyzing the role of religious elements in political and economic developments, the thesis also includes a conversation on the process of norm conformation and the phenomenon of norm conflict in societies in order to better understand the way religion affects world affairs. In this secondary analysis, evidence suggests that individuals' enactment of religious elements is due to the ability of religion to provide stability and security in times when the individual fears for its existence in his earthly life and for his salvation in the afterlife.

After providing the overarching theoretical discussion on norm conformation and norm conflict, as well as the predominant arguments that I gather from the theoretical discussion, I

¹ Max Weber, *Methodology of Social Sciences*, trans. ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York, NY: Routledge 2017): 6.

introduce a case study that I use to test the theories and arguments I establish. The purpose of the thesis is to first depict how religious elements fortify their influence in a society, and then observe the effects of these elements in one society. The main argument that this thesis seeks to support is that to understand the political and economic developments in one country, one needs to thoroughly analyze the historical, cultural, and social heritage of that country. Only then would we be able to advance effective policies in the political and economic domain that are in concert with the ideologies already existent in that society.

Empirical Background

In the political domain, religion is often viewed as a solidifier in nationalistic movements.² Considering the rise in religious movements around the world, as well as the violent means some movements utilize in achieving their goals, religion has developed an unfavorable reputation in some global communities and conversations. Moreover, the practice of religious nationalism in some states, instead of the secular nationalism prevalent in the West, is creating concerns for politicians and policymakers; these concerns arise from notions that religious nationalists lean towards violence and disregard for democracy and human rights.³ The above observations are indicators that religion mainly has negative connotations in the political domain. By deconstructing religion into its fundamental units and relating them to the creation of national identity and the rise of nationalism, one's perception of religious influence in these political phenomena may become more nuanced. I investigate the existing research on the

² Rogers Brubaker, "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches," *Nations and Nationalism* 18, no. 1 (November 2011): 2-20, accessed December 1, 2017, doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00486.x; Sabrina R. Ramet, *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics* (Duke University Press Books 1988); Barbara-Anne J. Rieffer, "Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship," *Ethnicities* 3, no. 2 (June 2003): 215-242, accessed December 1, 2017. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796803003002003>

³ Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 2007)

relationship through a literature review, and then I test the same with empirical evidence from a case study of Macedonia.⁴ I find that, consistent with the literature, different groups in Macedonia are utilizing religious norms, rules, institutions, and practices to protect and secure the ontological identity of the country. Additionally, I find that the extent to which these different groups utilize religion to protect the country's ontological security in contrast to securing their own physical and ontological securities is conditional on their interests and circumstances.

I also investigate a related, but separate question of religious norms and economic behavior. The relationship between religion and economic outcomes has been analyzed from a number of different perspectives—relationships with economic growth, economic performance, economic attitudes and behavior are some of these perspectives that the literature includes.⁵ This thesis elaborates on the angle that examines the economic consequences of individual attitudes and behavior as influenced by religious norms, a view mainly influenced by Max Weber and his work in the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Specifically, this thesis builds upon the Weberian findings by contrasting his findings on the Protestant denomination and material culture with the norms of the Christian Orthodox denomination. Therefore, this thesis applies the Weberian model to a new set of religious norms, the Christian Orthodox norms, and attempts to bridge some dividing points in the existing literature on this relationship with a concentrated research design.

⁴ The country's official and constitutional name is the Republic of Macedonia. The country is also known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a provisional name that is used by international organizations such as the European Union and the United Nations due to an ongoing name dispute with Macedonia's southern neighbor, Greece. This thesis will refer to the country by its official and constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia or Macedonia.

⁵ Robert J. Barro and Rachel M. McCleary, "Religion and Economy," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 49-72; Robin Grier, "The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross-National Study of 63 Former Colonies," *Kyklos* 50, no.1 (February 1997): 47-62, accessed May 2017, doi: 10.1111/1467-6435.00003.

The empirical evidence in this analysis also come from a case study of Macedonia, a predominantly Christian Orthodox country, where evidence of Christian Orthodox norms as well as the implications of these norms on the individuals of that society is gathered. The analysis discovered that Christian Orthodox norms, compared to the Protestant norms in regard to their guidance for adherents' appropriate economic behavior, discourage working in excess of the subsistence level, encourage giving to the community rather than saving, and are distrustful of wealth-multiplying techniques in the economic models. Together with other norms that I discovered in the analysis, I constructed four hypotheses that, based on the Christian Orthodox norms, suggested what one should expect to observe in the economic attitudes and behavior of Christian Orthodox adherents. With the data I gathered from respondents' answers to a survey, I was able to confirm three out of the four hypotheses with a sufficient level of confidence.

Field Research and Methodology

The evidence used in this thesis was collected during field research in Macedonia in the summer of 2017. I chose Macedonia as a case study as it is a country with a long religious history and a country where religious norms and practices are still highly pertinent according to a study conducted in December of 2016.⁶ Therefore, Macedonia presents an excellent case study to observe the relationships of religion, politics, and economics. Macedonia's dominant religion is Christian Orthodoxy, and the majority of the thesis is dedicated to discerning Christian Orthodox norms rules, institutions, and social practices and their effects on political and economic behavior. Considering that empirical evidence on Christian Orthodox values and Christian

⁶ Vladimir Bozhinovski and Marjan Nikolovski, "The Perceptions of the Citizens on Religion and its Role in the Multiconfessional Society [Перцепцијата на граѓаните за религијата и нејзината улога во мултиконфесионалните општества," Trans. by author, *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung* (December 19, 2016), accessed December 1, 2017, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_47556-1522-2-30.pdf?161227140211

Orthodox adherents' behavior is limited in the literature, this element of the study is a valuable addition to the literature as it provides data on Christian Orthodox values and surveys the behavior of Christian Orthodox adherents.

The IRB-approved field research consisted of two parts. I first conducted semi-structured interviews over a period of one month with religious leaders from the major religious denominations in the country. Through the interviews, I sought to understand two things: (1) the religious climate and its interaction with the political forces in the country, and (2) the religious norms regarding work ethic as professed by the different religious denominations. As previously mentioned, due to the magnitude and significance of Christian Orthodoxy in the county, the majority of the interviews were conducted with Christian Orthodox priests and most of the collected information was on Christian Orthodox norms. I will seek to further explore other religions in similar ways with further research. During the first part of the field research, I conducted ten interviews⁷ and managed to access a number of primary and secondary sources with studies, opinions, and reports on issues related to my topics of interest. I used evidence from the interviewees' key points and quotes as support in my case study analysis.

The second part of the field research consisted of survey distribution among the Macedonian population. The survey was constructed in a way that measured the influence of religious norms in peoples' lives and their economic behavior. With the surveys, I was able to observe the following: (1) the extent to which Christian Orthodox adherents enact the religious norms of their faith, and (2) the economic behavioral tendencies of Christian Orthodox adherents. Over a period of two months, I collected 612 surveys. I analyzed the data from the surveys by employing both OLS and binary logistic regressions.

⁷ All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement

Findings

The field research and the subsequent case study confirmed the expected findings and yielded the following conclusions:

- (1) Concerning the influence of religious values on the formation of national identity and nationalism, the literature argues that religious values are evoked and become part of the national identity in times of existential crisis and state of instability.⁸ Consequently, there is a collective urge to retain the stability, the cohesion, and "the truth" that religion offers. This collective urge is perceived as an effort to secure and protect the ontological identity of the individual, the various subnational groups, and the nation, respectively. This collective urge is reflected in the rise of nationalistic movements, a quintessential example of efforts to sustain one society's physical and ontological identity. I find empirical evidence of this process in the case study of Macedonia. In other words, I find that in times of crisis, different groups find comfort, cohesion, and security in the salience of religious values.
- (2) Regarding the influence of religion in the economic sphere, due to the historically long prevalence of Christian Orthodoxy in Macedonia, as well as the continuous interdependence of religion and secular affairs in the country, Christian Orthodox norms are still prevalent in the society and reflected in the adherents' attitudes and behavior. In this analysis, I discern influences of other societal forces throughout the years as well as individual characteristics of Christian Orthodox followers, and I find that religious norms have separate and independent effect on the behavior of Christian Orthodox adherents. Moreover, since Christian Orthodoxy belongs in the traditional, mystic, and inner-focused religions, I find that the attitudes and behavior of Christian Orthodox adherents to be more conservative in the economic sphere.

⁸ Catarina Kinnvall, "Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security," *Political Psychology* 25, no. 5 (October 2004): 743.

(3) Finally, the historical and societal analysis in the case study of Macedonia, and the findings from this analysis support the overall argument of this thesis. Namely, the deep roots of religion in the historical development of the country, the recurrent crises to Macedonia's nationhood and security, and the struggle for identity should explain the stronghold that religion has in the Macedonian secular affairs. Additionally, the enduring presence of Christian Orthodoxy in the country suggests that its norms are embedded in the society despite the convoluted processes of norm confirmation and norm conflict. I find that Christian Orthodox norms in regard to economic attitudes and behavior are still present and practiced, consciously or subconsciously, by the Christian Orthodox adherents.

Significance

The contribution of this study to the literature on religion and worldly activities is manifold. By applying in-depth interdisciplinary analysis, and combining classic social theories with recent social scientific research, this study contributes to the literature in the following ways:

- (1) Looking closely at the processes of conformation and evolution of religious norms, rules, institutions and social practices allows for a more focused analysis on the interaction between these phenomena and world activities. This investigation is especially critical in the political domain as violent religious movements have influenced opinions that religious factors as inherently violent. This study presents an analysis that will hopefully create a more objective perspective on the issue.
- (2) With the empirical evidence on religion and economic behavior, I expand on Max Weber's model and apply his logic of analysis to another set of religious norms, the Christian Orthodox norms. Considering the importance of Weber's theory, expanding the model to

other religions allows for discovering novel relationships between other religious norms and economic attitudes.

- (3) The data I gathered from the field research on economic behavior by Christian Orthodox adherents fills a gap in the literature. The literature often blends Christian Orthodoxy with post-communist dummies or other Eastern religions.⁹ The collected data enables a close analysis of the relationship between Christian Orthodox adherents' normative and economic behavior.
- (4) This study confirms the anticipated findings and provides robust evidence of an influence of certain historical and societal developments in the case of Macedonia, therefore this case study should serve as an example that every country has its own historical and cultural heritage that influences political and economic developments in the same. Before we use a sweeping argument and label all religious movements as violent, or conservative behavior as primitive, scholars and policy makers should devote more time to finding the underlying reasons for such developments. Only then we would be able to implement and enact policies that improve the conditions of countries, while also recognizing and adapting to existing cultures and institutions in the respective societies. After all, we should be aware that ideas do not operate in an ideological vacuum.

Chapter Overview

The remainder of the thesis is organized in three chapters. The first chapter frames the thesis within the constructivist approach, provides working definitions of concepts used

⁹ Christian Bjørnskov, "Determinants of Generalized Trust: A Cross-Country Comparison," *Public Choice* 130, no.1-2 (January 2007):6, accessed April 23, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9069-1>

throughout the thesis, and introduces debates within the constructivist literature, such as norm conformation and norm conflict, that are also applicable in the thesis. In the same chapter, I include historical and current-day information on the presence of religion in Macedonia. By doing so, I aim to present the suitability of using Macedonia as a case study.

The second chapter is dedicated to observing the relationship between religion and political developments. The first half extrapolates findings from the literature on this relationship. It includes general discussion on conformation to religious norms, and the role of religion in the building of a national identity, nationalism and connection to ontological security of different actors. The second half of this chapter first presents a brief overview of the stand of the Christian Orthodox church's position with regard to the nation, nationhood, and nationalism, and then, presents evidence from the case study. Throughout the chapter, I make a connection between the findings of the literature about the theorized relationship between religion, nation-building, and nationalism and the evidence from the case study.

The third chapter presents analysis on religion and economic developments in the country. Specifically, I observe the economic attitudes and behavior of the members of the society in order to understand why certain economic developments are not well adapted and enacted in the country. The first half of the chapter analyzes the Weberian model and his findings on the relationship between Protestantism and the material culture and provides a literature review of studies that have previously attempted to quantify Weber's findings. I then frame my study and the study design within the existing literature. Finally, I exhibit the findings from my study. I first present Christian Orthodox norms in regard to economic behavior as found in the Serbian, Greek, and Russian literature. Then I reveal the Christian Orthodox norms as deduced from the field interviews and the perusal of the doctrines and popular Christian

Orthodox literature during the field research in Macedonia. In continuation to the norm discussion, I present the results from the survey data and I discuss the implications of the survey data and findings on the preceding theoretical conclusions.

In the conclusion, I complete the discussion in this thesis by tying together the arguments made throughout the thesis, providing suggestions for future research, and discussing the theoretical and policy implications of this thesis.

Chapter I: Theoretical Framework and Case Study

“For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order.”- Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism

Introduction

Commencing the chapter on religious norms, rules, institutions and social practices with Weber’s overarching conclusion in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* seems fitting as this chapter investigates the influence religious norms, rules, institutions and social practices have on the development of political and economic phenomena. More specifically, this chapter observes how religious ideas, norms, and institutions form and progress through history while interacting with and consequentially shaping the world’s political and economic developments. The constructivist approach will guide this chapter’s analysis as it is an approach that precisely argues that "reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures that give meaning to the material world."¹⁰ Constructivism is based on the argument that the material world is not only based on individual preferences and rational choices, but it is constructed by the behavior of the people within it— their shared knowledge, the collective meaning they attribute to the world, their authority and legitimacy, the rules, institutions and material resources employed in their existence and behavior, and their practices and concerted activities.¹¹ Max Weber, as one of the originators of this approach, emphasizes the importance of social factors in human action by stating: "We are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take

¹⁰ Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in Worldly Affairs,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no.3 (September 1997): 320, accessed November 10, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066197003003003>

¹¹ Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground...”, 321

a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance.”¹² Fittingly, Weber’s model of idea evolution and its effectiveness in history is a pertinent framework in this thesis.

Religion has been a significant and enduring force since the early days of civilization. This system of norms, rules, institutions and practices can undeniably be analyzed through the constructivist lens; the religious system and its evolution through the ages pose an excellent case study where the interactions of people within the system can be observed and analyzed for effects of the interaction between the respective units in the system on the material world. The strength of the following project is also in its empirical value in providing analysis of a religion other than Protestantism; this is especially valuable considering the prevalence of economic stagnation and political instability throughout much of the Orthodox world. The remainder of this chapter is organized by first defining terms that will be used throughout the rest of the thesis, followed by an introduction of the overarching theoretical framework that I will use in the case study. Following that, I present my case study by providing a historical analysis of the religious presence in the country of Macedonia and by delivering the modern pertinence of religion in the Macedonian society— by doing so, I attempt to convince the reader of the suitability of using Macedonia as a case study for this project.

Definitions

To provide clarity to the language and terms that I will use throughout the thesis, in continuation, I define several of the most frequently discussed terms.

Religion is often in the center of people’s system of values, yet definitions of religion are wide-ranging. For this thesis, I will be using Durkheim's definition of religion that states “[religion is] a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say,

¹² Max Weber, *Methodology of Social Sciences*, 81

things set apart and forbidden--beliefs and practices which unite in one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.”¹³ The three major and notable elements of this definition are ‘a system of beliefs and practices’, ‘sacred things,’ and ‘moral community.’ This definition encompasses the idea that, in social analysis, religion should not be only approached as a body of ideas and theological viewpoints, but also as a formal organization and as a social group where ideas are exchanged, shaped, and reshaped.¹⁴ Within this context, it is also imperative that I make a distinction between religion and spirituality. While there are an ongoing debate and confounding definitions of the meaning of a *spiritual* person and its distinction from a *religious* one, for this thesis, *spirituality* is defined as “private, emergent, emotional, and individual,” while *religious* is a person who adheres to a certain organized religion, that is “corporate, public, and stable.”¹⁵ The primary focus of this chapter and the overall thesis is Christian Orthodoxy, one of the three main Christian religions, with the other two being Catholicism and Protestantism.

Norms are central to constructivism. Fortunately, there is a general agreement on the definition of a norm. A *norm* is a "standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”¹⁶ Therefore, adherents to a specific organized religion, i.e., Christian Orthodoxy, have norms shared by the community of Christian Orthodox adherents that may or may not be shared by followers of other organized religion. However, the fact that there are set of norms shared by one community does not necessarily mean that they are equally interpreted or applied by every

¹³ Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, ed. Joseph Ward Swain (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2008), 47.

¹⁴ Jeff Haynes, “Religion, Secularisation and Politics: A Postmodern Conspectus,” *Third World Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (September 1997): 710, accessed November 10, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993213>

¹⁵ Courtney Bender, "Religion and Spirituality: History, Discourse, Measurement," *Social Science Research Council* (January 2007), accessed November 10, 2017, <http://religion.ssrc.org/reforum/Bender.pdf>

¹⁶ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 887-917, accessed November 10, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789>

member of the community; each member can specify the shared ruleset in slightly divergent manner.¹⁷ Norms specific to Christian Orthodoxy are analyzed later in the thesis.

Rules can take different definitions depending on the discipline in which they are promoted, but in this case, *rules* are used synonymously with *social rules*. Some scholars have the tendency of viewing rules “simply as outcomes, chosen by actors for their utility in reducing transaction and information costs,” however, this view is being challenged by academics like Sandholtz, who argue that while actors do modify rules, “the rules also shape the range of strategic and discursive options available to actors.”¹⁸ Moreover, Sandholtz argues that rules are not only enacted for actors’ utility, but also due to actors’ belief in the appropriateness of norms. The next section observes this debate closely. Therefore, in this thesis, I treat *rules* as outcomes chosen by actors for their utility or their belief in the norm appropriateness but are continuously reshaped by the same actors due to the effect *rules* have in shaping the actors’ conduct.

Another debate in the literature is in regard to the difference between norms and rules. While some constructivists view rules as distinct from norms as they believe rules are formalized and written, others use norms and rules interchangeably and argue that both norms and rules have the same meaning, and can be both written and formal, or understood and informal.¹⁹ While I certainly agree that rules are more frequently associated with formal and written guidelines, I find the latter approach of using norms and rules interchangeably more suitable in the religious context; through anecdotes and field interviews, I have discovered that many followers adhere to

¹⁷ Wayne Sandholtz, “Dynamics of International Norm Change: Wars against Wartime Plunder,” *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (March 2008): 101-131, accessed November 15, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107087766>

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Friedrich, Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions. On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 1989): 26-32; Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia, SC: South Carolina Press 1989): 36-43

certain religious rules, but do not necessarily attend religious services or read religious texts. Therefore, regardless of whether the standard of appropriate behavior is disseminated in the society through an informal or formal channel, it essentially denotes the same thing. Henceforth, I use the terms *rules* and *norms* interchangeably.

Social practices are easily confused with the concepts of behavior and action, but there is a distinction between these three concepts. Cook and Brown assist in making this distinction by conceiving them as a gradation; in an illustrative manner, they pose that any doing is a behavior, behavior with imbued meaning is an action, and practice is "action informed by meaning drawn from a particular group context."²⁰ Keeping this distinction in mind, I use the following definition when explaining practices: "Practices are socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world."²¹ Therefore, religious practices are taken as socially meaningful actions with religious motivation and background knowledge that is reflected in the material world, political and economic included. One key word in the definition of practices is background knowledge, and the treatment of background knowledge as a major factor in the way social practices are portrayed in the material world. As important as the argument about background knowledge is, Adler and Pouliot do not provide precise explanation of what background knowledge entails. I find that an explanation to this omission is provided by Muller, who argues that background knowledge is not an "individualistic construction of the actors," as rationalist theory would suggest, but instead it is the rules and norms shaped by cultural and social factors that form the background knowledge,

²⁰ Scott D. N. Cook and John Seely Brown, "Bridging Epistemologies: The Generative Dance between Organizational Knowledge and Organizational Knowing," *Organization Science* 10, no. 4 (July 1999): 387, accessed November 15, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2640362>

²¹ Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, "International Practices," *International Theory* 3, no. 1 (February 2011): 1-36, accessed October 12, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297191000031X>

and subsequently, the social practices.²² Moreover, the same construction of background knowledge serves as a paradigm through which the practices are evaluated by the actors' audience, in addition to it being an explanation to the actors' practices. This conclusion inevitably serves as another argument why observing religious norms is important in evaluating people's attitudes in the political and economic sphere.

Friedrich Kratochwil strongly defends the idea of not treating religion as only "terms of ideas or a doctrine," but including practices when considering religion as a phenomenon; his argument is that treating norms or ideas in isolation of practices creates a fallacy since in a given situation there are a multitude of conclusions that are logically possible, but only through application we can truly observe the intent. Thus, in order for a situation to be truly understood there needs to be "analysis and justification beyond logic and even 'the law' (or the scripture)".²³ I agree with Kratochwil's argument and apply it in my study by analyzing the practices that different actors utilize while using religious norms and rules to justify their application.

Institutions are defined in the literature as "a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations."²⁴ Scholars have revealed similarities between the definition of institutions and norms. However, they have also found the difference in the aggregation, meaning unlike the single standards of behavior that defines a *norm*, "institutions emphasize the way in which behavioral rules are

²² Harald Muller, "Arguing, Bargaining, and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory, and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 10, no.3 (September, 2004): 399, accessed February 20, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066104045542>

²³ Friedrich Kratochwil, "Religion and (Inter)National Politics: On the Heuristics of Identities, Structures, and Agents," *Alternatives Global Local, Political* 30, no.2 (April 2005): 113-140, accessed November 10, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540503000201>

²⁴ James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," *International Organizations* 52, no. 4 (1998): 948, accessed November 15, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601363>

structured together and interrelate."²⁵ While the object of worship is likely the first thing that comes to mind when referring to religious institutions, it is essential to emphasize the social meaning behind it, i.e., the religious practices and rules that define the behavior of adherents of a particular religious group in situations such as political and economic changes.

Having considered the definitions of commonly used concepts in the thesis, next, I discuss the broader theoretical framework and overarching arguments that will guide the analysis of the subsequent case study.

Theoretical Framework

Since the principal research question in this thesis is the role of religion in political and economic developments in one country, it is necessary that I frame the question within an overall argument that it is threaded throughout the chapters. A number of constructivists, especially in the poststructuralist school, have noted that to understand the development of one society, one needs to observe the historical, collective, and cultural traits of a society.²⁶ The fundamentals of this school lay in the belief of continuities of history and complexity of societies, and in the emphasis of histories of local struggles, and humans as socially constructed individuals with discrete cultural and social heritages.²⁷ As such, scholars in this field view conventional development as constraining, and advocate for development that aligns with societies' own trajectories. I would argue that this thesis is fitting within the poststructuralist framework as it considers the historically and socially embedded set of norms of a particular religion in the Macedonian society and it examines the interaction of those norms with political and economic modern developments. In other words, this thesis attempts to provide evidence for the school's

²⁵ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 891.

²⁶ Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick, *Theories of Development*, (New York, NY: The Guilford Press 2015): 222

²⁷ *Ibid*, 223, 234

arguments by showing that certain social and cultural factors, such as religion, influence people's attitudes and behavior that is not reflective of the attitudes and behavior of people in other modern societies. Providing evidence for this argument will suggest that Macedonia, a society with highly prevalent Christian Orthodox values, follows its own trajectory of development and adaptation to economic and political changes. This framework is suitable in guiding my analysis and answering what is the overall question of this thesis, assessing the influence of Christian Orthodox religious norms, rules, institutions, and social practices in political and economic developments in Macedonia.

To be able to answer the posed research question and evaluate the role of religion in the secular affairs of Macedonia, an important step in the process is analyzing the reasons why people conform to norms, i.e. religious norms in this case; understanding the reasons behind conformation to norms helps us in better evaluating the power of religion on political and economic developments. Fortunately, this is an aspect that the constructivist literature has paid significant attention.

In the constructivist literature on norm conformation and evolution, one often finds a debate among scholars who believe in strictly rational behavior that drives norm-formation and norm-conformation, and scholars who believe that actors engage in norm-formation and norm-conforming behavior "because they understand the behavior to be good, desirable, and appropriate," or else called the "logic of appropriateness."²⁸ Therefore, the debate amounts to whether actors create and enact norms due to utility maximization or because they believe in the goodness of norms. Based on this debate, there are several questions that arise in this thesis: Does the formation of new religious thoughts and norms happen due to the elites' self-interest in

²⁸ Finnemore, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 912

getting what they want or because they truly believe in the appropriateness of these norms, or perhaps due to a combination of both or as a result of a third factor? Do adherents of religious schools conform to their norms because they believe in the sacredness of these norms or because they also want to maximize their utilization of world affairs? Or perhaps it is the fear of being judged by the community for not choosing certain norms? I do not claim to be able to find definitive answers to these questions that reduce the conformation to norms to one specific reason, nonetheless, my thesis reveals evidence in the case of Macedonia that support one or multiple explanation to the argument. The answers to these questions assist in establishing the impact of religious norms on political and economic development as understanding the mechanism through which these norms become effective in world activities is essential in assessing the effects. In the political domain, I will seek the answers to these questions by observing the enactment of Christian Orthodox religious norms and their influence in the formation of national identity and nationalism in Macedonia. In the economic domain, I will explore Christian Orthodox norms and I will seek to explain how these norms are practiced in the society, and subsequently, how they impact the economic behavior of Christian Orthodox adherents.

A similar debate between rationality and norms centers on the question of whether actors adhere to norms out of choice or due to the social structure— norms of behavior, social institutions, and the values, roles, and rules they represent, hence, the influence from the broader social and cultural environment.²⁹ The difference of opinions on this issue in this literature is still prevalent, and while there is a consensus that both kind of processes matter in norm enactment, a definitive answer of their relatedness has not been established. While my analysis of religious

²⁹ Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 913.

norms may not produce clear determination to one side of the debate or other, it is intriguing to explore whether enduring religious norms in a country are still practiced due to peoples' conscious choice or due to these religious norms being "internalized" in people by the power of the social structure. Alternatively, both of these effects can be possible and relevant causally. My analysis provides evidence for the latter.

To conclude the review on the debate on norm formation and conformation, I highlight several arguments from the above analysis that assisted in forming my expectations of the forthcoming case study in regard to norms conformation, evolution, and subsequent effects on political and economic developments. As previously mentioned, I avoid making definitive claims about causes that reduce the reasons why a person or a certain group of people chooses to adhere to forms to solely one reason. This is because there are many confounding factors that make the analysis more nuanced than one that provides one answer. For instance, the motivations behind norm formation and conformation can be different dependent on the unit of analysis; in other words, one cannot expect that the motivations of the political elites, the religious elites, and the ordinary adherent are the same. Moreover, one cannot expect that different individuals within these groups have the same motivations. Contrary to the teachings of rationalist theory, I do not believe that all members across these three groups are driven by self-interest. Despite the persuasiveness of the "logic of appropriateness," claiming that all actors choose norms because they believe in the goodness of the same is also unwise. As the below case study analysis would show, there are religious adherents that choose to affiliate with a certain religion as part of his or her national identity and national affirmation over other groups, and there are those that firmly believe that religion should be practiced separately from secular activities, and as such they practice religion devotedly for religious reasons. I expect the motivation behind the enactment of

religious norms to be different at the most, or some motivations to be more prevalent than the others at the least.

Finally, in regard to the debate on actors' choice of norm conformation due to their choice or due to the effects of the social structure, once again, it would be difficult to determine that it is one factor over the other. The difficulty lays in the issue of subjectivity when actors are questioned about their motivations. However, the question I posed does not necessarily seek a definitive answer of one factor over the other, but instead explores both forces in norm formation. Nonetheless, because of the high interdependence of religion and secular affairs, as well as the long history of religion in Macedonia, I expect to find strong influence of the social structures on peoples' adherence to religious norms.

In addition to exploring the norm conformation and evolution in one society, the constructivist literature also includes the phenomenon of norm conflict. As one would expect, there are a multitude of sets of norms that are circulating in today's society. While religious sets of norms are one of them, there are certainly subsets of this set that align with norms from different religious denominations. These sets of norms interact with continuously emerging and constantly evolving norms from different social spheres. Additionally, constructivists argue that there are no set of norms that cover every contingency, and as such, disputes arise internally and between different sets of rules in regard to which norms apply in certain developments.³⁰ Sandholtz argues that as a result of the tension between norms, norms follow a cyclical change that modifies the existing norms.³¹

³⁰ Wayne Sandholtz, "Dynamics of International Norm Change: Wars against Wartime Plunder," 101

³¹ Ibid, 103.

In his book, Weber also contrasts Protestant work ethic with Catholic work ethic in parts of the book. The contrast he presents triggers an analysis of the interaction between religious norms and the norms and values of capitalism, and hence, serves as an example of interaction between two seemingly different sets of values. The third chapter of this thesis will also examine the relationship between religious norms, the Christian Orthodox norms, and an increasingly penetrating economic system, capitalism. It is intriguing to analyze whether and how the two separate sets of norms interact and are modified in the case of Christian Orthodoxy and capitalism. One evidence of this interaction is the issue of “A Code of Moral Principles and Rules in Economic Activity” by the World’s Russian People Council, a document that served as a moral and religious response to the modern economic developments.³² Although the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church has not issued such code yet, field interviews with Christian Orthodox reveal that similar principles are taught by the Macedonian Church as well. In the third chapter, I analyze if, and to what extent, the capitalistic set of norms have modified the preexisting Christian Orthodox values in the Macedonian society.

To conclude, the debates and arguments I outlined above will guide the analysis of the case study of Macedonia. The case study provides evidence that indeed historical and societal developments of religious adherence shape the society’s response to the building of a nation and the rise of nationalism in the political sphere, and the attitudes and behavior of the society’s members in the economic sphere. The subsequent chapters will provide the “expected” behavior of a religious society in nation building and nationalism, and economic attitudes and behavior as observed in the literature, and then they will present evidence of the Macedonian case study to

³² Vsevolod Chaplin, “Russian Orthodox Church and Economic Ethics at the Turn of the Millennium,” *Commentary on Social and Moral Issues of the Day*, accessed January 5, 2017, <http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles5/ChaplinEconomicEthics.php>

compare and contrast the existing literature. Additionally, the case study also suggests that the debate on norm conformation and norm conflict is indeed nuanced, and attempts to capture motivations behind norm conformation and evidence and evolution from norm conflict when possible.

Macedonia as a Case Study

The following two sections provide an overview of the religious endurance and presence in Macedonia through its history and in today's society. I do this to illustrate the appropriateness of using Macedonia as a case study where the role of religion in world affairs can be adequately studied.

History of Religion in Macedonia

Macedonia has a rich religious history that has shaped the society and its cultural heritage through the centuries. Macedonia has 29 religions, religious groups, and religious communities. Five of these, the Christian Orthodox Church, the Islamic religious community, the Catholic Church, the United Methodist Church, and the Jewish community, compose the majority of the religious adherents in Macedonia, and these same five religious groups are included in the Macedonian Constitution (Устав на Република Македонија).³³ A trait of the Macedonian society is that religious division is the same as ethnic division in the society; the ethnic Macedonians are predominantly Christian Orthodox, while the Albanians, the largest minority in the country, are Muslim.³⁴ Although there is a significant amount of adherents of the other

³³ Комисија за Односи со Верските Заедници и Религиозни Групи, За Нас [About the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Groups], Trans. by Author, Accessed January 31, 2018
<http://www.kovz.gov.mk/?ItemID=1906BEA071923A40B2ECFB5752517506>

³⁴ Vladimir Bozhinovski, "The Perceptions of the Citizens on Religion and its Role in the Multiconfessional Society"

religions, and there is historical evidence of their presence in Macedonia, for this thesis, I focus on the primary religion in Macedonia, Christian Orthodoxy.³⁵ The following historical overview focuses on Christian Orthodoxy, however it does reference other religions for comparison.

The roots of Christian Orthodoxy in Macedonia can be traced back to the second half of the first century when Saint Paul the Apostle began to spread Christianity in Macedonia and the wider Balkan region.³⁶ During the early and middle centuries, Christianity flourished on Macedonian land. Remnants from these years are present in almost every city, reflected in the hundreds of churches and monasteries that carry the spirit from those ages. During the Byzantine years, emperor Justinian I, who was originally from a town in Macedonia, was eminent in the strengthening of Christian religion in the region and the foundation of a formal Christian church. It is important to note that during this period is when we trace back the trail of religious influence in the political affairs of the country as the laws of God were imported to serve as laws of men in the so-called Orthodox Empire.³⁷ In the second half of the 10th century,³⁸ the autocephalous Ohrid Archdiocese was established with the rank of patriarchate, a significant milestone for the formal Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC) as this rank made the Ohrid Archdiocese equal to the rank of other Christian Orthodox churches in the region.³⁸

With the arrival of the Ottoman Empire in Macedonia in the 14th century, Christianity began to experience turbulent years. With the penetration of Turks and Muslims, many Christian

³⁵ Approximately 64.8% of the Macedonian population is Christian Orthodox according to the CIA's World Factbook; Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Macedonia," accessed February 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mk.html>

³⁶ Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Groups: Religious Almanah of Republic of Macedonia (Skopje: Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Groups), 2, accessed January 6, 2018, <http://www.kovz.gov.mk/WBStorage/Files/almanah%20nova%20verzija%20cel%20najnov.pdf>

³⁷ Anastas Vangeli, "Religion, Nationalism and Counter-Secularization: The Case of the Macedonian Orthodox Church," *Ilia State University: Identity Studies in the Caucasus and the Black Sea Region* 2 (2010): 81

³⁸ Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Groups: Religious Almanah of Republic of Macedonia, 4; Ohrid is a city in Macedonia where Christianity first started spreading. As such, Ohrid is regarded as a holy city, and thus, chosen to be the city where the Archdiocese is founded.

churches were subdued by the spread of Islam; churches were made into mosques or destroyed to make space for the emerging mosques. Some churches still bear witness of these years with icons in a number of churches being partially or completely destroyed. In 1767, a Turkish sultan abolished the Ohrid Archdiocese, an action that was a significant setback for the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church.³⁹ However, the Ottoman Empire was not only dismissive to the formal church, but also to the local church and customs. Much like folklore stories from other historical occupations, folklore stories in Macedonia recite events when the Turks forced Macedonian Christian girls to marry Turks and convert to Islam. Some write about Macedonian Christians voluntarily converting to Islam to avoid the high taxes they were charged due to their religion.⁴⁰ Folklore also reveals events of Macedonian Christians placing a permanent tattoo of a cross on their male children's foreheads in order to avoid the Turks taking them for *devshirme*⁴¹ and converting them to Islam. Five centuries of Ottoman rule caused deep changes in Macedonian society and Christian Orthodoxy. The Ottoman era is the principal contributor to the multireligiosity and multiethnicity prevailing in Macedonia today. During the Ottoman empire, a large inflow of Albanians inhabited Macedonia. Since Albanians were mainly of Islamic faith or converted to Islam during their assimilation with the Turks, Islam became the second largest religion in Macedonia. Additionally, the pluralistic theocracy of the Ottoman Empire, and the

³⁹ Ibid, 4

⁴⁰ Svetoslav Ribolov, "The Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire and its Perspectives for Theological Dialogue," Bulgaria: University of Sofia, 2013, accessed January 10, 2018, <http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=ree>

⁴¹ Devshirme also known as the *blood tax* or *tribute in blood*, was the practice where the Ottoman Empire sent military officers to take boys, ages 8 to 18, from their families in order that they be raised to serve the state. This tax of sons was imposed only on the Christian subjects of the empire, in the villages of the Balkans and Anatolia.

Ottoman Empire practice to equalize religious affiliation with citizenship and nationality contributed to the later overall presence of ethnic and religious cleavages in Macedonia.⁴²

During the late 19th and early 20th century, Ottoman rule in the Balkans had started to weaken; this was demonstrated by the liberation of Macedonia's neighboring countries —Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. Invoking Christian Orthodoxy as a common religion, these countries united under the slogan "Let's save our Christian brothers!" and mobilized to liberate Macedonia from the Turks.⁴³ With the help of its neighbors, Macedonia was liberated from a five-century occupation; this liberation brought hope to Macedonians for a reestablishment of their nation and revitalizing their culture, however, information about secret annexes emerged revealing that the call in religion's name for liberalization of Macedonia by its neighbors was just a pretext for the Balkan countries to expand into Macedonia territorially.⁴⁴ The economically weak and politically unstable Macedonia was not prepared to defend against its neighbors, and was likely to fall victim to the secret plans of its Balkan "allies" during the Balkan Wars. However, the internal misunderstanding between the other Balkan countries did not allow for the fulfillment of their agreement in entirety and brought an end to the Balkan Wars (1912-1913).

Following the Balkan wars, Macedonia lost parts of its territory to Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Albania. Even though significant damage was done geographically, the forced assimilation of the Macedonian people to the culture of the people under whose jurisdiction they were apportioned was more consequential. Macedonians in the seceded parts were not allowed to use Macedonian language, practice Macedonian traditions, or affiliate with Macedonian history

⁴² Anastas Vangeli, "Religion, Nationalism and Counter-Secularization: The Case of the Macedonian Orthodox Church," 79

⁴³ Mitrova, Makedonka, and Marija Pandevska, "Балканските војни и актуелните состојби на Балканот," *Balkanica Posnaniensia Acta et studia* 20, 2013, 106-116

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 110

or culture. In regard to religion, despite the shared Christian Orthodox religion, a substantial number of Christians were killed or were forced to flee when the allies fell out. However, the people of Islamic faith that lived within the former borders of Macedonia were the ones that experienced the largest suffering during the Balkan Wars. Most of the Muslim people, Turks and Albanians, were either killed or forced into exile. A number of Muslim villages were destroyed, and thousands of Muslims were massacred. Estimates suggest that 632,000, or 27% of the Muslims of Ottoman Europe, died during the Balkan Wars, in Macedonia and elsewhere.⁴⁵ Although smaller in numbers, the Jewish members of the community, who migrated with the movement of people in the Ottoman Empire, also suffered during the Balkan Wars. About 120,000 Jews were separated from the former Ottoman empire in which they relished tolerance to a certain degree. Jewish communities were exhausted from their economic resources, were used as soldiers, and were killed for non-cooperation.⁴⁶

While World War I and II were raging on the European fronts, the Balkan countries were undergoing different geographical assemblies, which eventually led to the formation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (later Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) in 1945. In the course of socialist development and distribution of the population due to industrialization, the population experienced many geographical and social transformations.⁴⁷ Yugoslavia became a multinational community with a variety of cultures, languages and ethnic characteristics. In addition to the great diversity of national, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic traits,

⁴⁵ Justin McCarthy, "1912-1913 Balkan Wars Death and Forced Exile of Ottoman Muslims: An Annotated Map," University of Louisville, accessed January 10, 2018, <http://www.tc-america.org/files/news/pdf/balkan-wars-map.pdf>

⁴⁶ The American Jewish Year Book, "The Balkan Wars and the Jews," American Jewish Society. Accessed January 15, 2018,

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23600748.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ac3cc0804f296a356a0abf744727ee3c9>

⁴⁷ Stevan Majstorovic, "In Yugoslavia: Self-management and culture," United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1980, accessed January 15, 2018, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001341/134196eo.pdf>

Yugoslavia was a land with various religious denominations: Christian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Muslim and Jewish along with minor groups of Baptists, Adventists and others.⁴⁸ During this time, the public manifestation of Christian Orthodoxy in Macedonia and other Balkan countries with predominantly Christian Orthodox populations, was largely suppressed. Such attitude towards Christian Orthodoxy was due to the fact that Marxist atheism was religiously practiced by the Yugoslavian communist regime, but also because Josip Broz Tito recognized the power of the Christian Orthodox church in evoking nationalistic spirit in the respective countries; subduing the church's power was to the advantage of the influential politics of Tito's rule.⁴⁹

The first efforts to re-establish the Ohrid Archdiocese as the official Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church started in 1945, but these efforts did not come to any fruition until 1967 due to continued conflicts with the Serbian Orthodox Church and its unwillingness to give Macedonia an independent jurisdiction over its religious community.⁵⁰ The reasons for such delay in allowing a separate Macedonian church are manifold, however, one can argue that the fear of having a separate church that has the potential of assembling adherents and vitalizing the fragile Macedonian national spirit was a major reason for the Serbian unwillingness for cooperation. The Macedonian Orthodox Church has been autocephalous since July 19, 1967; however, it is yet to be officially recognized and canonized by the other Christian Orthodox Churches.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 15

⁴⁹ Augustine Casiday, *The Orthodox Christian World*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012): 137; Sabrina P. Ramet, *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and Eastern European Politics*, (Durham, NC: Duke Press Policy Studies, 1988): 23.

⁵⁰ Комисија за Односи со Верските Заедници и Религиозни Групи, За Нас [About the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Groups], <http://www.kovz.gov.mk/?ItemID=1906BEA071923A40B2ECFB5752517506>

The Macedonian Orthodox Church has maintained its presence ever since. Today, the Church consists of eleven dioceses, eight of which are within Macedonian borders and three of them have jurisdiction over the Macedonian diaspora.⁵¹ There is a copious number of religious properties in the country, and new ones are emerging each year. There are 1,842 Christian Orthodox churches and monasteries, 578 mosques, 30 Catholic churches, 12 Evangelist-Methodist churches, and 3 Jewish religious properties in Macedonia. Reports show that there is one church or mosque per 831 residents, almost 15 times more than the European average of religious buildings per residents.⁵² Out of the 29 recognized religious communities in Macedonia, the Macedonian Orthodox Church reportedly has 1,310,184 followers. The other religious communities are the Islamic Community in the Republic of Macedonia with 674,015 followers, the Catholic Church with 7,008 followers, and other smaller Christian groups (Protestant, Adventists, Baptists, Evangelists, Evangelist-Methodists, Reformers, and Jehovah witnesses) with 19,679 followers.⁵³

The Macedonian Orthodox Church continues to play an immense role in Macedonian society. It is an active voice in the societal, cultural, and political matters of the country. Despite its designation as being separate from the state, some argue that Macedonia is, in fact, a semi-secular state, meaning that religion does influence secular matters in the country; this claim will

⁵¹ Macedonian Orthodox Church- Archdiocese of Ohrid: History of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, accessed January 14, 2018, <http://www.mpc.org.mk/English/MPC/history-mpc.asp>

⁵² Jelena Pavlovska et al, Карта на верски објекти во Република Македонија [Map of religious objects in the Republic of Macedonia], Комисија за односи со верските заедници и религиозни групи Скопје Менора, 2011; Aleksandar Pisarev, “Cross and Crescent Divide up Macedonia,” *Balkan Insight*, accessed January 15, 2018, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/cross-and-crescent-divide-up-macedonia>

⁵³ Number are according to the latest data from 2009; Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, “Адресар на црквите, религиозните заедници и религиозните групи во Македонија [Address book of the churches, religious communities and groups in Macedonia] ,” Trans. by author, Скопје: Борографија, 2009.

be further analyzed in the section on religion and national identity in Macedonia.⁵⁴ The following segment analyzes the magnitude of religious presence in the modern Macedonian society.

Religiosity of the Modern Macedonian Society

The brief religious history in the previous section already provides a preliminary picture of the religious presence in Macedonian society. In this section, I provide an analysis of the extent to which the historical presence and significance of religion in Macedonia has penetrated into the society and has influenced the citizens' outlook on religion. Understanding the religiosity of one society, including the prevalent religious norms, rules, institutions, and social practices, will help the analysis of religious involvement and effect in world affairs. In other words, one would expect that the more religious the society is, and the more present religious norms are in the society, the more influence they would have in the attitudes and behavior of that society's members. I utilize evidence from studies conducted in Macedonia to assess the level of religiosity in the country, as well as some reoccurring religious norms, rules, and practices in regard to the construction of the Macedonian national identity and nationalism in Macedonia.

A study that was first conducted in 2006 and then improved and repeated in 2016 covers the topic of religiosity of the Macedonian people and derives results that are representative of the overall religiosity in the country.⁵⁵ Next, I present some of the findings of the study that pertain to Christian Orthodoxy, but I also include some statistics on Islam followers in Macedonia,

⁵⁴ Bertlesmann Stiftung, "BTI 2010: Macedonia Country Report," accessed March 2018, <https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/mkd/ity/2010/itr/ecse/>; Aleksandar Pisarev, "Cross and Crescent Divide up Macedonia," *Balkan Insight*, accessed January 15, 2018, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/cross-and-crescent-divide-up-macedonia>.

⁵⁵ Vladimir Bozhinovski, "The Perceptions of the Citizens on Religion and its Role in the Multiconfessional Society [Перцепцијата на граѓаните за религијата и нејзината улога во мултиконфесионалните општества]"; In the study, 1111 participants were selected to participate in the survey. All participants were over 18 years old and were surveyed via phone.

mainly as a comparison that will assist in understanding political situations included later in the thesis.

The study finds that 75% of the respondents declare themselves as Christian Orthodox, while 21.6% are Muslim, 0.4% are Catholic, and 0.2% belong to other undetermined religion.⁵⁶ Only 2.4% declared themselves to be atheist. From the Macedonian respondents, 95.8% are Christian Orthodox, while 98.3% and 1.7% of the Albanians are Muslim and Christian Orthodox, respectively. While almost 98% of the respondents declared affiliation with a religion, only 83% stated they are religious or somewhat religious. This is a discrepancy that I also find in the results of my survey data; a possible explanation for such result is respondents using religious affiliation as part of their national identity, while not necessarily practicing religion. The fact that only 44.8% of the Macedonian respondents have read the bible also reinforces the claim that religious practice is not high among the Macedonian Christians. Rates of church attendance are also relatively low when compared to the high percentage of religious affiliation and religiosity; namely, only 47.3% of the Macedonian Christians attend church several times a month, with only 9.8% attending weekly. In contrast, 80.8% of the Albanians have read the Quran, suggesting that intensity of religious practice is significantly higher among Albanians.

Despite the low percentage of religious practice among Macedonians, 69.2% have declared that they believe in God, and 50.7% responded that religion has a significant or somewhat significant influence in their lives. Moreover, when asked whether religious or ethnic affiliation is more important to the respondent, 44.4% of the Macedonian Christians stated religion is more important than ethnicity. In the Albanian pool, 74.1% of the respondents have

⁵⁶ The percentage of Christian Orthodox is higher than the percentage that was earlier reported (64.8%). This number is dependent on the data source.

answered that religion has significant or somewhat significant influence in their lives, and 32.5% of them stated that religion is more important to them than ethnic affiliation.

The above data suggests that overall, the Albanian Muslim population in Macedonia has higher religious practice rates and deem religion as an important influence in their lives significantly more than Macedonians. However, despite the low religious practice rates among Macedonians, 83% of them declared themselves as religious, 50.7% responded that religion is important or somewhat important to them, and to 44.4% religion is more important than ethnicity; these numbers still suggest that religion is relevant in the Macedonian society, Macedonian Christian and Albanian Muslim included.

The field study I conducted in Macedonia also examined some of the above questions. The findings of my study are consistent with the findings of the above study. Out of the 612 respondents, 75% identified themselves with a religion, and 73% as religious or somewhat religious. Only 6% of the Christian Orthodox followers attend church every week, but 66% attend several times a year and on important religious holidays. 14% of the respondents reported that religion has a big difference in their lives, while 40% responded that the influence is moderate.⁵⁷ Unfortunately, my sample on Muslim respondents is rather limited and the findings from that pool are not significant to be listed.

One can also notice the religious presence in the country from observations of the daily life in Macedonia. A field study conducted in 2009 on an analogous topic in Macedonia found that “for most of [his] informants below 35 years of age, showing that they were Orthodox Christians was important. A majority of them wore small praying chains, with small knots tied

⁵⁷ Nela Mrchkovska, “Religious Norms, Rules, Institutions, and Social Practices” (master’s thesis, University of Oklahoma, 2018), x.

together by a cross as a bracelet to show their allegiance to the Church.”⁵⁸ During my research in the country, I also noticed this outward display of religious affiliation that was rather common among Macedonian people. Besides wearing religious bracelets and necklaces, another common appearance was taxi drivers hanging crosses in their cars as a way to distinguish themselves from the other drivers and perhaps attract customers that hold similar views as themselves. While one can argue that this observation is not an indication of religiosity, but rather an evidence of cultural belonging, I would still argue that the high presence of religious symbols, traditions, and customs can have an affect people’s attitudes and behavior.

The findings from the studies mentioned above align with, and complement, each other, thus suggesting that the picture they all provide on the religiosity of the Macedonian society is consistent with reality. Following from the presented statistical findings from the above studies, one can conclude that religion is generally present in Macedonia. However, the finding that 95.8% of the Macedonians identify as Christian Orthodox, but only 44.8% of them have declared themselves religious, also suggests that for Macedonians religion is more part of people’s identity, cultural heritage and tradition rather than a belief system. Nonetheless, as I argued above, Macedonians paradoxically may not be highly religious, as religiosity is defined in the literature, but religion still strongly influences political and economic behavior. Religious norms and beliefs, although embedded in the broader cultural context, are nevertheless present and influential.

The general findings on the religiosity of Macedonian society suggest that Macedonia is a rather intriguing case to study on the topic of religion. Religion as a complex phenomenon is

⁵⁸ Morten Dehli Andreassen, “If you don’t vote VMRO, you are not Macedonian: A Study of Macedonian identity and national discourse in Skope” (master’s thesis, University of Bergen, 2011, accessed January 31, 2018, http://bora.uib.no/bitstream/handle/1956/5066/85188172.pdf;jsessionid=151517D7A8F39BCEA18DC52F757B8DC4.bora-uib_worker?sequence=1).

multidimensional, and as such can take many forms and multiple roles. From the above analysis, it can be concluded that religion in Macedonia is (1) a set of beliefs and practices, (2) a national and ethnic identity, and (3) an indistinguishable part in the set of cultural values and practices. These three roles depict the integrative function of religion, where religion functions in a way that unites the cultural, social, and personal value systems in one element.⁵⁹ By fulfilling this function, religion becomes an important aspect of the person's identity that grows into a collective identity. Therefore, the substantial role that religion plays in someone's life is not always the role of religious dedication to a certain system of beliefs, but it can also be embedded in the cultural values of a nation and carry considerable significance. These religious roots subsequently affect people's choices, both in the political and economic spheres, and shape people's behavior.

Above, I discussed a debate among constructivists in regard to the question of why actors adhere to norms—the debate was whether adherence happens out of actors' choice or due to the social structure. If one considers reading the holy text and regularly attending religious services to be indicators for people's conscious choice of studying and following religious norms, then the above analysis and the adherents' responses may certainly suggest that the social structure is very much, if not more, relevant in people's choices to identify themselves with a certain religion and adhere to the norms circulated among those similar to them in the case of Macedonia. More specifically, my argument is that if a person does not practice religion in a traditional manner, i.e. by reading the holy text or attending religious services where these religious norms and rules are being preached, but still responds that religion has influence in his or her life (over 50% of

⁵⁹ Ganka Cvetanova, "Религијата и Студентската Популација [Religion and the Student Population]," in *Идентитетите на студентската популација во Република Македонија 2016*, ed. Ganka Cvetanova (Skopje: University of St. Cyril and Methodius).

Christian Orthodox responded that religion has a significant or somewhat significant influence in their lives), and even considers religion to be more important than their ethnicity, then one can conclude that they receive these norms and rules from the social structures around them.⁶⁰ This does not necessarily mean that they do not adhere to them because they choose to do so, but it is important to acknowledge the way religious norms become accepted and circulated in the society.

Conclusion

This chapter serves as a foreword to the subsequent two chapters and the case study in this thesis. The main purpose of this chapter was to introduce the theoretical approach within which this thesis is grounded; specifically, I introduced the constructivist approach as the most suitable framework as this thesis is based on the argument that norms, rules, institutions and social practices shape and give meaning to the reality. This thesis observes the religious norms, rules, institutions, and social practices, specifically, and the way they shape political and economic developments. Guided by the constructivist argument that societal developments are best understood when each society is studied within its own historical and cultural context, I chose to include a case study where this argument is tested with empirical evidence.

Within the constructivist approach, I then discovered several arguments on norm conformation, norm evolution, and norm conflict that are necessary derivatives in the process from norm formation to norm effects in the society. The literature on these arguments revealed a rather nuanced relationship, where the motivation behind norm conformation, the process of norm evolution, and the consequences of norm conflict are not linear and definitive. With the

⁶⁰ Vladimir Bozhinovski, “The Perceptions of the Citizens on Religion and its Role in the Multiconfessional Society [Перцепцијата на граѓаните за религијата и нејзината улога во мултиконфесионалните општества]”

case study and analyses in the next two chapter, I observe this relationship and find evidence for these nuanced relationships.

Finally, in the last two sections, I presented the case study I chose to test the above arguments and answer the overall research question. I found deep religious roots in the history of Macedonia, strong interdependent relationship between religion and secular affairs in Macedonia, and intricate religious traits of the modern Macedonian society. These characteristics make Macedonia a well-rounded case study for the question posed in this thesis. Moreover, the fact that the primary religion in question is Christian Orthodoxy serves as a comparison analysis to Protestantism, a religious denomination that is often cited in similar analyses in the economic sphere.

Chapter II: Religion and Political Affairs in Macedonia

“After the fall of man, the man feels insecurity, fear, and agony due to his mortality in the earthly life. It is natural for man to feel confident in his own language and his own kind, which he sees as a projection of himself and his family in his unnatural life. He cannot love others more than he loves himself, he cannot contribute to the community by sacrificing his family, he cannot overcome phyletism”

- Metropolitan of Navpaktos Jerotej Vlahos

Introduction

The above quote by Metropolitan Naypaktos Jerotej Vlahos captures the essence of the argument I present in this chapter. Namely, the metropolitan is critical of phyletism, an ecclesiological heresy that conflates the Church and its ecclesiastical affairs with nationalism, and attributed the rise of this phenomenon to man’s “insecurity, fear, and agony due to his mortality”. The insecurity, fear, and agony that a man feels as a result of the unknown prompts his behavior to look for those alike him, to confide in and to relate to in his earthly life. As metropolitan Vlahos argues in the remainder of his message, the Church does not approve of the existence and spread of phyletism, or the use of the Church’s name and doctrines for the purpose of accomplishing nationalistic goals, as the purpose of the Church is to unite Christians and erase any limitations of time and space. While such statement is characteristic of the Christian Orthodox Church doctrines, normatively, Christian Orthodoxy has been used to promote division among people from different ethnicities and nationalities by church leaders and politicians alike. The remainder of this chapter presents evidence for this claim.

The first part of this chapter provides a review of the existing literature on religion and political affairs, including the current arguments surrounding the conformation to religious norms and the role of religion in the building of national identity and the formation of nationalism. The findings from the review align with metropolitan Vlahos claims, religious

norms seem to be indeed enacted when the ontological security of groups is threatened. Namely, ontological security is a need experienced on multiple levels, from the individual to the state level. On the individual level, it is “the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in time—as being rather than constantly changing—in order to realize a sense of agency”.⁶¹ The sense of agency is inherently in need of a stable cognitive environment that becomes unstable when an actor is faced with uncertainty that does not allow for the actor to “systematically relate ends to means”.⁶² In other words, this uncertainty becomes a threat to the ontological security of the individual. To achieve stability, a cognitive and behavioral certainty, theorists of ontological security individual identity argue that individuals form and sustain relationships and establish routines.⁶³ The religious institutions, as well as the religious practices, norms, and rules are certainly a quintessential example of foundations that provide and foster relationships, and seek answers to the unknown.

This need for ontological security can be observed not only on individual level, but also on subnational and national level as well. Scholars in the international relations field have come to the understanding that states and inter-societal groups do not seek only physical security, but ontological security as well. One of the rationales used to justify this understanding is the fact that a state and a society, both units that are composed of members, seek ways to maintain distinctiveness of one group or state from another group or state by maintaining identity coherence for each group.⁶⁴ Similarly, as both the state and different inter-societal groups are composed of members, the states and subgroups are reflecting images of the ontological security

⁶¹ Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity* (New York, NY: Polity Press, 1991) in Mitzen (2006)

⁶² Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no.3, (September, 2006): 342, accessed March 15, 2018: <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1354066106067346>.

⁶³ *Ibid*, 343.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 352.

of their members and as such, the states and subgroups seek ontological security as well.⁶⁵ Therefore, states and subgroups also act as protectors of the ontological security of their group, as their members do within.

The latter part of this chapter looks closely at the case of Macedonia. Specifically, it observes the role of Christian Orthodoxy in building of the Macedonian national identity after its independence in 1991. It also observes the enactment of religious values by different groups—the Church, the government elite, and the civilians—in times of crisis such as the 2001 insurgency in Macedonia. The case study reveals that dependent on the societal circumstances, these three different groups conform, influence, shape, and change religious norms in the society. Through this analysis, I also depict the role of religion in arousing nationalistic sentiments in a multireligious and multiethnic society such as Macedonia. The analysis of the case study in this chapter reflects the claims above and the findings from the literature review that follows, and reveals that different groups endorse religious norms, rules, institutions, and social practices dependent on their respective situations and the perceived threat to their existence, and their level of insecurity. By providing the empirical evidence with the case study, I enrich the literature on norm conformation, norm evolution, and norm conflict with empirical evidence.

I conclude this chapter with a discussion on the findings in the Macedonian case, and with a connection between the existing literature and the findings. Moreover, based on the analysis performed in this chapter, I suggest explanations of Macedonia's current political development challenges, as well as implications for future developments in the political sphere.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 352.

Religion and Political Affairs in Literature

The global resurgence of religious movements around the world has caused an intense debate among scholars and politicians on the issue of whether these religious movements are indicators of political change, isolated occurrences that do not significantly impede the process of secularization, or signs of revolted societies whose norms are in conflict with “modern” sets of norms. To be able to understand and meaningfully participate in the debate on this issue, and recognize how religious norms, rules, institutions and practices affect sociopolitical developments, it is essential that we understand first why these religious movements form, and how they disperse. Understanding this process will allow us to determine whether religious movements in modern times are indeed isolated cases of unsatisfied groups or if they are phenomena that have the potential of penetrating the broader society and thus, influence larger political change. In the following section, I attempt to answer the questions above by observing religion as a building block of national identity conception and the influence of religion and its components on nationalism.

Religion as Part of a National Identity Formation

Prior to the analysis of the relationship between religion and the formation of national identity, there is a need for an established working definition of national identity. Finding an all-encompassing definition of a concept as intricate and multi-dimensional as national identity is certainly not an easy task, however, I pull elements from a few definitions to formulate one. To derive the definition of national identity, one first needs to understand the concept of nation as different from an often-confounded term, state. Nation, as defined by Nye and Welch, is "a group of people who have some combination of common language, culture, religion, history,

mythology, identity, or sense of destiny."⁶⁶ It is an "essentially irrational, psychological bond that binds fellow nationals together."⁶⁷ The nation is what Benedict Anderson calls "an imagined community," as despite the fact that members of one community may never see, meet or hear of all members of that community, "yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion".⁶⁸ These imagined communities, as a matter of fact, are what allowed for *Homo sapiens* to survive obstacles through history; anthropologists argue that the large-scale human cooperation that allowed for the survival of our species lays in the "common myths that exist only in people's collective imagination".⁶⁹ These common myths have evolved through history as religion, culture, and mythology; via horizontal comradeship and the use of language, symbols, and traditions, these myths create a nation with a unique national identity. Therefore, national identity is the maintenance and continuous reproduction of the language, culture, religion, history, mythology, as well as, symbols, memories, and traditions that comprise peculiarities of nations and bind peoples within.⁷⁰

One cannot dispute the fact that religion, in some kind of shape or form, has been one of the most common myths circulated among members of the community. Whether it is a belief in multiple gods, in animals, in one God, or in a sage, religion has been said to be a common thread that holds communities together. In his book, *The Sociology of Religion*, Max Weber claims that there is no known society in human history "without its special god."⁷¹ Much like a state flag, or

⁶⁶ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A. Welch, "Explaining Conflict and Cooperation: Tolls and Techniques of the Trade" in *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History* (Pearson 2012): 38-47.

⁶⁷ Walker Connor, "A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a..." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no. 4 (September 2010): 377-400.

⁶⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, (New York, NY: Verso, 2006): 49.

⁶⁹ Yuval Noah Harari, *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind*, (London, UK: Vintage Books, 2015): 27.

⁷⁰ Anthony D. Smith, "The Sacred Dimension of Nationalism," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 3 (December 2000): 796, accessed November 15, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290030301>.

⁷¹ Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion* (Boston, MA: Beakon Press 1963): 14.

a hymn, or a language, religious symbols and beliefs make two people that do not know each other to believe in their common purpose within the community. However, I would argue that religious beliefs often have deeper sociological influence on people as they help in making sense of otherwise rationally unexplainable occurrences. While a flag and a language are binding factors for one community, they are also tangible and concrete. Religion, on the other side, is a social construct that was created to explain phenomena that tangible elements could not explain. Henceforth, with the Cognitive Revolution and the ability of people to transmit these beliefs to future generations through language, story-telling and behavior, religion maintained its abstractness and importance, eventually creating devoted believers who found tools to explain the unexplainable in times of uncertainty and insecurity.⁷² Moreover, these beliefs also created fearing individuals, which in turn, influenced the psychology and behavior of its followers.

One would think that with the Scientific revolution, the increased importance of science and technology, and the continuous seminal explanations of things that were previously unexplained, the pervasiveness of religious beliefs will diminish. This was certainly the thinking of the nineteenth century social thinkers, who even created the secularization theory, the thesis of “slow and steady death of religion” due to modernization in the industrialized countries.⁷³ However, we are witnesses of resurgence of religious movements in recent years, the push back against the secular state by religious groups, and the persistent presence of religious explanations in an increasingly modernized and scientific world. Perhaps the reason for such a robust nature of religion lays in its ability to provide stability in uncertain and insecure times. I can observe

⁷² Yuval Noah Harari, *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind*: 33.

⁷³ Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2004): 3.

this if I consider events in the modern world that, even if not unexplainable, still serve as a destabilizing force that creates uncertainty and insecurity.

One such destabilizing force is certainly globalization. The “increased [and rapid] movement of goods, services, technology, borders, ideas and people” that characterizes globalization creates anxiety from the new and unknown, prompting people to search for “constant time- and space-bound identities.”⁷⁴ The consequences of the fast-paced and impersonal globalization are very well explained in the words of Giddens, who writes: “the individual feels bereft and alone in a world in which he or she lacks the psychological support and the sense of security provided by more traditional settings.”⁷⁵ The individual’s search for such psychological support, stability, and fundamental sense of safety can indeed be found within the premises of the nation and national identity, a paramount example of time- and space-bound identity. Similarly, religion then is also an effective rallying point than other elements because it provides the needed stability and unity.⁷⁶ More specifically, religion provides the following traits in times of chaos and uncertainty: (1) it provides answers to the existence itself by utilizing the rules set by God, eliminating the responsibility of having to choose for oneself in a chaotic world, (2) it has an established and consistent structure that, together with the ability to provide existential answers, it provides stability, and lastly (3) it creates the space for rediscovery, reintervention, and reconceptualization of past events based on fixed religious interpretation; this ability creates linkages with past events, symbols, or objects and allows the

⁷⁴ Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security,”: 743.

⁷⁵ Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1991): 33.

⁷⁶ Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism,” 757.

human to return to something known.⁷⁷ In other words, both nation and religion strengthen the ontological security of individuals as it makes them feel secure and accepted.

Therefore, religion with its power of influence in uncertain times has almost curative abilities on the individuals' capability to deal with uncertainty and state of insecurity. As such, one could establish that religious norms and ideas are formed due to an unconscious self-interest in making oneself better adapted to one's environment, but ultimately maintained because of one's belief in the goodness of these norms and ideas. However, without further empirical evidence, this argument should be qualified by an observation that Kratochwil also makes: "as outside observers [we can assume] the true interests of a person," but in reality, the person is the only "judge of his or her interests [in adopting a religious norm]."⁷⁸

Taking the above points in consideration, it is apparent why religion has such a stronghold in the identity of one nation, and why I expect to observe peculiar attitudes and behaviors of believers in a nation with prevailing religious beliefs in my study. In addition to the deep historical religious roots in Macedonia, as well as Macedonia being a host of Christian Orthodoxy, a religious denomination that is deemed as traditional when compared to other Christian religions, Macedonia, as a society and economy in transition, has been facing with a number of existential crises. Therefore, I would argue that the above points can be effectively tested in a case study of Macedonia.

Religion and Nationalism

⁷⁷ Ibid, 759.

⁷⁸ Kratochwil, "Religion and (Inter)National Politics," 114.

Where this discussion becomes more intricate is in the institutionalization of religious identities. For the religion to maintain itself, it has to "have some superior claim to a particular notion of truth and mode of earthly existence."⁷⁹ Thus, religions take the "earthy" shape of religious objects, symbols, institutions, and religious norms are shared through a "sense of belonging" and "a fellow feeling" among the adherents of the same religion.⁸⁰ This is where the concept of nationalism becomes relevant as the "fellow feeling" and the "sense of belonging" is what gives power to nationalistic movements. It would help the discussion in this section if I provide a working definition of nationalism as well.

In this discussion, nationalism takes the definition of the "subdued expressions of identity-based on shared assumptions why a community constitutes a nation and why the state that rules it is legitimate," not the acute "xenophobic extremes of patriotism."⁸¹ As Anderson defines nationalism in his book *Imagined Communities*, as simply "invent[ing] nations where they do not exist".⁸² Similarly, the religious institutions, still believers in the one truth they profess, and their norms, rules, and practices do not take extreme measures in retaining and spreading the same. This is the approach that Juergensmeyer takes in his book on religious nationalism and the secular state, *The New Cold War*. Juergensmeyer discusses "new religious revolutionaries," who do not necessarily rally against the political structures that are emerging, such as the democratic procedures of a nation-state, but rather reject the Western notion that "nationalism can be defined solely as a matter of secular contact."⁸³ Instead, they believe in

⁷⁹ Kinnvall, "Globalization and Religious Nationalism," 759.

⁸⁰ These terms were first coined by Walker Connor, "A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a..." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no.4 (October 1978), accessed February 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1978.9993240>, and Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretations of Cultures*, (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers 1963), respectively.

⁸¹ Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?*: 6.

⁸² Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6.

⁸³ *Ibid*, 7.

nation-state with political ideology based on traditional principles of religion that are also encompassed in their national identity. In this regard, religious nationalism is understood as a system of values that are based on religious and traditionalistic principles idiosyncratic to those nation-states that practice it.

The moment religious beliefs surpass the personal level of faith, it becomes more difficult to observe whether individuals join and mobilize into religious institutions because of their belief in the goodness of these institutions and community building or because of their intentions to use the atavistic emotions of the religious masses in pursuit of self-interested quests. Indeed, the atrocities committed in the name of religion in nationalistic pursuits make for a substantial evidence for those sentiments; 9/11 in the United States, the Bosnian genocide, and the number of ISIS terrorist attacks in the name of religion are well-documented. However, one needs to take into account the fact that these groups belong to a movement that takes an extreme meaning of religion, fundamentalism, and these individuals are likely part of a well-situated elites in the social setting. Arguing that religious extremists and fundamentalists choose to mobilize religious institutions because of their belief in the goodness of their faith is arguable and this topic has certainly received attention from the research community. Some evidence shows that the majority of attacks in the name of religion have a politically strategic purpose, however, these studies cannot claim that the motivations of individuals within these groups.⁸⁴ Therefore, the reason for the mobilization and spread of such religious fundamentalism can certainly be argued that it is due to material and self-interested pursuits, but it is also important to emphasize that this argument does not necessarily apply to the individual and his or her initial reason to join the

⁸⁴ Bergen et al., "Jihadist Terrorism 16 Years after 9/11: A Threat Assessment," *New America* (September 2017)

religious institution, but rather the intentions of elites that gain control of these religious institutions in need of leadership.

Additionally, as previously argued, different groups have divergent motivation to enact religious norms. Another group of observation is religious leaders and their call of religion for nationalistic purposes; the discussion is whether the motivation lays in the leaders' profound belief in the values they profess and practice or is it a matter of embodying an ideology that allows them to maximize their utility, i.e., better control of their people. As previously discussed, the security that people of a community seek in changing times is provided partly by religious values, therefore, embodying religious nationalism may allow for a nation-state to use these traits in better controlling its people. I do not attempt to find a conclusive answer to the posed question since doing so would be outside of the scope of this thesis. However, I argue that exploring this question would reveal the channel through which religious norms affect political behavior. I apply the dilemma of why religious norms are enacted in nationalistic movements and how they affect the same on a case study of Macedonia and base my answer on empirical evidence collected during field research. By doing so, I hope to provide an answer that, although may not be definitive or generalizable, is supported by empirical evidence and provides an analysis that can be applied to other case studies in further research.

Above, I have attempted to gather existing arguments in the literature on the role of religion in the creation of national identity and nationalism. To understand why religious movements form in first place and why people conform to religious norms, I analyzed its building unit, the religious norm, and the reason for the mobilization of religious norms. I discovered that religious norms are intensified and reemployed when the ontological security of the individual is threatened; this claim is especially pertinent in societies where there is a close

link between religion and national identity. The threat of globalization and modernization can, therefore, be linked to the reappearance of religious movements around the world. The answer to the second question, how do religious movements form, was derived from the same logic, but this time, the power of the “fellow feeling” and the “sense of belonging” is what accounted for the transformation of a religious norm of the private realm into collective religious practices and movements. Finally, I observed how religious norms and their institutionalized forms affect nationalism. In this analysis, I found two opposing views. One views religion’s role in nationalism as destructive and one, understanding the notion that religion is not inherently violent, views religion as a system of values that is embodied in some national identities more than others. In those societies, as religious values are part of their identity cohesion, members are more likely to invoke religion in their nationalistic pursuit. Once again, I observe the threat to ontological security in play on the group level as well.

In the pursuit of answering the above points, I also sought to discover whether people employ and adhere to religious norms due to their self-interest and utility maximization, or due to their belief in the appropriateness of the norms. I argued that although the individual may initially conform to religious norms in self-interest, i.e., to preserve oneself in a state of insecurity, he or she continues to adhere to them because of his or her belief in the norms' appropriateness. However, the discussion becomes more complex once we analyze norm conformation on the group level, as well as when we consider people in different societal roles; civilians, religious leaders, and government leaders have their own group-specific motivations. Nonetheless, the analysis revealed that the threat to each of these groups’ ontological security is often the motivation and cause behind their norm conformation. I attempt to explore the question further in a case study presented later in the thesis.

Christian Orthodox Norms and Rules on Political Secular Matters

In the introduction of this chapter, I briefly referenced a message from metropolitan Vlahos, who stated that the Church's does not support using Christian Orthodoxy for the pursuit of secular objectives, a principle the Church calls phyletism, and imputed any such behavior as heresy and contrary to the Christian Orthodox doctrines.⁸⁵ However, it is more common than not that Christian Orthodox adherents, as well as Christian Orthodox leaders, use religion in the pursuit of nationalistic objectives rather than using it as "realization and manifestation of the unity and catholicity of the Church".⁸⁶ In addition to the Church's doctrines of unity and catholicity, both indicating principles that surpass ethnic and national borders, Christian Orthodoxy also practices the supranational religious creed, a principle that once again is reflective of a religion that should not be concerned with secular affairs, especially in the political domain.

Scholars have discovered in many cases that the Christian Orthodox Church has diverted from the above doctrines, and has instead turned to religion that is highly intertwined with national identities and nationalism.⁸⁷ This finding is precisely what constructivists have discovered to be internal contradictions within complex rule systems, where the interpretation

⁸⁵ Jerotej Vlahos, "Надминување на Национализмот [Overcoming Nationalism]," Македонска Православна Црква Скопска Епархија, accessed January 20, 2018,

http://www.spe.org.mk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=434%3Aanadminuvanje-na-nacionalizmot&catid=51%3Asovremeni-predizvici&Itemid=87

⁸⁶ "Nations and Nationalism: A Challenge to Orthodox Ecclesiology," *Pemptousia*, accessed March 30, 2018, <http://pemptousia.com/2013/03/nations-and-nationalism-a-challenge-to-orthodox-ecclesiology/>

⁸⁷ Ivan Ivekovic, "Nationalism and the Political Use and Abuse of Religion: The Politicization of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam in Yugoslav successor states," *Social Compass* 49, no.4, accessed March 30, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0037768602049004004>; Lucian N. Leustean, "Orthodoxy and political myths in Balkan national identities," *National Identities* 10, no. 4: 421-432, accessed March 30, 2018, doi: [10.1080/14608940802519045](https://doi.org/10.1080/14608940802519045); Milan Vukomanovic, "The Serbian Orthodox Church as a Political Actor in the Aftermath of October 5, 2000," *Politics and Religion* 1, no.2: 237-269, Accessed March 30, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199>; Ipek Yosmaoglu, *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence, and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia*, (New York, NY: Cornell University, 2014)

and application of these rules are subjective to different groups and individuals.⁸⁸ The following case study on Macedonia adds to this literature by providing evidence that the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church is another institution where there are factions within the institutions that practice the opposite of what the Christian Orthodox doctrines claim. The analysis in the case study discovers and provides evidence that, as suggested by the literature, it is the threat to the ontological security of the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church, the Macedonians, and the political parties that prompts religious leaders, political leaders, and citizens to create a symbiotic relationship in which they use religious sentiment to protect the security of their respective groups and that of the country. As previously argued, this propensity rises under times of uncertainty and stress, where groups vie to mobilize religious norms and rules to provide comfort and response to the anxiety that people feel— an action that would, if successful, increase the groups' own security. Next, I present the evidence in the case of Macedonia.

Christian Orthodoxy, National Identity, and Nationalism in the Case of Macedonia

The controversial debate of the role of nationalism during the aftermath of the Yugoslavian dissolution in 1990s has been raised many times in the literature.⁸⁹ However, there is also a deep connection between religion and the creation of nationalist tendencies in the ex-Yugoslavian countries; while this connection is more evident in some countries and events, such as the role of *Christoslavism* in the Bosnian genocide and the fight for Kosovo, a number of other ex-Yugoslavian countries have a substantial presence of religious sentiments that played a

⁸⁸ Wayne Sandholtz, "Dynamics of International Norm Change: Wars against Wartime Plunder," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (March 2008): 101-131, accessed November 15, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107087766>.

⁸⁹ Aleksandar Pavkovic, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans*, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, LLC, 2000); Robert M. Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics," *Slavic Review* 51, no.4: 654-673, accessed March 30, 2018, doi.org/10.2307/1500130.

role in the years of their nation-building and nationalistic movement through the years.⁹⁰ Macedonia is one of them.

It is important to note that in the following analysis on this topic and elsewhere in the thesis, I continue to use the definition of nationalism that I provided at the beginning of this chapter, and that is “not the xenophobic extremes of patriotism, but the subdued expressions of identity based on shared assumptions why a community constitutes a nation and why the state that rules is legitimate”.⁹¹ This definition will ensure that any conclusion that I establish in the analysis does not suggest that certain religions, such as Christian Orthodoxy, are violent or that xenophobic extremes are inherent in Christian Orthodoxy, but rather my conclusions may suggest that Orthodox norms and principles may evoke intense collective and patriotic feelings that in turn may be a factor in the rise of nationalism.

The influence of religion in the building of the nation after Macedonia’s independence in 1991 is evident in many instances. In the beginning of its nation-building, Macedonia took a definitive democratic direction on the question of religion. The relation between the government and the religious groups in the country, as established in the Constitution, was based on two principles: (1) separation of religion and the state, and (2) guarantee for freedom of religious expression.⁹² However, as reality showed in the following years, the execution of these principles was rather challenging; the religious influence in state affairs was significant and numerous religious communities did not all get equal treatment from the secular state. The reason for such challenges was the difficulty in finding a balance among three important factors in the “new”

⁹⁰ Michael A. Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California, 1998): 11.

⁹¹ Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?* 6.

⁹² Aleksandar Spasenovski, “Политичките партии и границите на секуларизмот во Република Македонија [The political parties and the limits of secularism in Republic of Macedonia],” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2014, accessed January 15, 2018, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_40070-1522-2-30.pdf?141225140859.

Macedonian society: (1) the country's efforts to adopt international western standards, (2) the traditional Orthodox values present in the majority of Macedonians, and (3) the realities from existing religious diversity.⁹³ Although each of these factors carries its weight in the process, I would argue that the presence of traditional Orthodox values made the efforts to isolate religion from the state especially difficult.

I discern that, in addition to the immense historical presence of Orthodoxy, the reason why this factor is especially relevant in the discussion of nation-building is due to the need to preserve these traditional values after centuries of efforts for an independent national identity. In other words, these values are like a thread that connects the many years of struggle to achieve nationhood; detaching from them would mean dishonoring the numerous ancestors who fought to liberate Macedonia from oppressors that harmed Macedonian people and did not share the same values. The changes that were happening after the independence of Macedonia, to some, was an attack to the ontological security of Macedonia; the Christian Orthodox identity had been an integral part of the society, and the pursuit of Western-based ideas and secularization was perceived as a threat to the stability of the Macedonian identity. An interview from 2017 with the former premier Nikola Gruevski, a controversial and conservative, yet exceptionally influential figure in Macedonian politics for 10 years, was quoted saying: "Remember one thing: As long as in one country heroes from the past and celebrated and cherished, that country will bear new heroes".⁹⁴ This message is also reflected in his party's *Doctrine* from 2009, where it is stated: "Spirituality, religion, and faith are the eternal food of the Macedonian identity during all the

⁹³ Ibid

⁹⁴ VMRO-DPMNE, interview with Nikola Gruevski, "Нашите херои треба да се слават, а не да се понижуваат заради дневна политика, сите споменици кои ќе ги срушат [Our heroes should be celebrated, not underestimated because of politics...], accessed January 31, 2018, accessed <https://vmro-dpmne.org.mk/pres-centar/intervjua/nashite-heroi-treba-da-se-slavat-a-ne-da-se-ponizhuvaat-zaradi-dnevna-politika>.

turmoil that the Macedonian people have endured...therefore, an exceptional place in the Macedonian state and society is given to the Macedonian Orthodox Church”.⁹⁵ The Orthodox religion and its traditional values carry the same weight as the fight for an independent Macedonian language, and the continued struggle for recognition of a Macedonian state by its neighbors.

I would also argue that despite the complexities that arise from multireligiosity and multiculturalism in a country, the same are intensified and exaggerated when there is one or multiple religious communities whose past struggles resonate strongly in the present. The fact that the battles for a Macedonian nation, unified under the same language, culture, religion, and a recognized country name still persist only intensifies the patriotic and nationalistic feeling of traditional ethnic Macedonians today. Evidence from interviews, recordings and newspapers presented later in this chapter confirm this sentiment in the Macedonian society.

This kind of sentiment becomes particularly present in times of instability. At the beginning of this chapter, my review of the literature revealed that individuals call upon their religious feelings when their stability and security is shaken; it is argued that the same can be concluded for the group, or a nation, in times of increased threat to collective security and identity.⁹⁶ In the Macedonian case, this was evident during the 2001 insurgency. The causes of the 2001 insurgency are contested. While some argue that Macedonia’s treaty with Serbia to secure their common frontier against Albanian guerillas and the implementation of tougher border controls caused the uprisings in 2001, others argue that it was the existential threat from the Albanian guerillas that prompted the Macedonian government to take precautionary steps

⁹⁵ Anastas Vangeli, “Religion, Nationalism and Counter-Secularization: The Case of the Macedonian Orthodox Church,” 85.

⁹⁶ Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism,” 114.

that later developed in a murderous war.⁹⁷ Whatever the cause for the war, it is undisputed what became the goal of the war. As the *Christian Science Monitor* reported in 2001: “To ethnic Albanians, 95 percent of whom are Muslim, the conflict is about gaining constitutional equality as a minority; to ethnic Macedonians, it is about clinging to a fragile national identity as Orthodox Christians”.⁹⁸ The events during the war bolstered the nationalistic spirit, and nationalistic rhetoric used during and after the war had significant and increasing presence of religious markings. Diplomats like Tihomir Ilievski used this rhetoric in their public addresses: “Macedonians as a people have been threatened by Muslim domination for centuries, and it is the church that held our people together...The church is the basis for our history, traditions - and the future of our state”.⁹⁹ Interviewed citizens during this period also evoked religious feelings in their evaluation of the situation; one citizen is recorded saying “The Church means everything to Macedonians...There is no Macedonian people without the Orthodox Church”.¹⁰⁰

The Church and its leaders also had their say and influence during this period as well. For instance, the Church was a proponent of “fighting the Albanian guerillas” as that was perceived as a way to defend and protect “the dignity, status, position, and role of the Church in the Constitution”.¹⁰¹ The Church was also a vehement opponent of the Ohrid Framework Agreement after the 2001 insurgency.¹⁰² The Ohrid Framework Agreement was established to resolve the disputes mainly between the Macedonian majority and Albanian minority, however, the agreement brought changes to the Constitution that equalized the role of the Macedonian

⁹⁷ Michael Palairret, *Macedonia: Voyage through History* (Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2015): 345

⁹⁸ Arie Farnam, “In Macedonia, religion a weapon,” *Christian Science Monitor*, accessed January 15, 2018, <https://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0919/p6s1-woeu.html>

⁹⁹ Ibid

¹⁰⁰ Arie Farnam, “In Macedonia, religion a weapon”

¹⁰¹ Ivan Ivekovic, “Nationalism and the Political Use and Abuse of Religion: The Politicization of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam in Yugoslav Successor States,” 533.

¹⁰² Ibid, 533.

Orthodox Church with other religious communities. To this, prominent bishops from the Macedonian Orthodox Church harshly criticized the political parties, and even accused then-president Boris Trajkovski of being the ringleader of “Protestant conspiracy” as a Methodist.¹⁰³

During this period, an increase in attendance at religious services have been noted as well, suggesting that the messages that were spread from both sides were appealing to followers.¹⁰⁴ Although we cannot establish a causal relationship, it is possible that these messages have encouraged destructive behavior that brought the annihilation and destruction of 28 churches and 16 mosques.¹⁰⁵ These religious properties, it turns out, were used as ideological weapons during the war, and are yet another evidence of how this war was seen as a threat to the ontological security of both groups; in their attempt to secure their own identities, both groups use extreme elements to destabilize the opposing identity group.

The war ended and amends between the two parties were completed, but the use of religious sentiment for political objectives continues to this day. The cities are saturated with religious properties, and new ones are being built every year. It is not uncommon for one to see churches and mosques standing tall within a few square miles of each other. Religious leaders claim that the reason for the increase in religious objects is because there is a need; however, many pundits argue that the real reason lays in the desire to “seal ethnic divisions”.¹⁰⁶ A prominent religious leader in the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church, Fr Boban Mitevski, is quoted in a local newspaper as confirming that the construction of new churches is a response to

¹⁰³ Ivan Ivekovic, “Nationalism and the Political Use and Abuse of Religion: The Politicization of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam in Yugoslav Successor States,” 535.

¹⁰⁴ Arie Farnam, “In Macedonia, religion a weapon”

¹⁰⁵ Michael Palaret, *Macedonia: Voyage through History*, 337.

¹⁰⁶ Aleksandar Pisarev, “Cross and Crescent Divide up Macedonia,” *Balkan Insight*, accessed January 15, 2018, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/cross-and-crescent-divide-up-macedonia>

the “invading tendencies” of the Albanian Muslims, who “mark [the conquered territory] with religious objects even when in reality there are no people or believers living on that territory”.¹⁰⁷

The aforementioned evidence suggests that the combination of religiously heavy history, the clinging to traditional values, as well as the existential threats in modern history makes for a state that is highly attached to its religious identity. However, these traits also reveal clear preference towards one religion in a pluralistic society. The preference of the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church (MOC) is evident in many instances. The government’s favoritism of MOC was even apparent in the Constitution of Macedonia before its amendment in 2001. For instance, Article 19 of the Constitution clearly favored the Macedonian Christian Orthodox church by stating “The Macedonian Orthodox Church, as well as other religious communities and religious groups are independent of the state and equal by law”.¹⁰⁸ However, with the establishment of the Ohrid Framework Agreement after the 2001 insurgency, certain parts of the Constitution were revised in order to reflect the aforementioned two principles more accurately; article 19 of the Constitution now states: “The Macedonian Orthodox Church, as well as the Islamic Community in the Republic of Macedonia, the Catholic Church, the United Methodist Church, and other religious communities and religious groups...”¹⁰⁹ Although the mentioned Constitution change and other article modifications that took place during the same period did not grant any additional legal rights to any of the groups, the changes contributed to an ideological satisfaction and equal treatment of all major religious communities in the country.

This preference for the Christian Orthodox Church is also reflected in the leading parties’ platforms. Namely, despite the abovementioned Article 19 which states that “religious

¹⁰⁷ Ibid

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

¹⁰⁹ Ibid

communities and groups are separate from the state and equal before the law,” the political parties in Macedonia have included the Macedonian Orthodox Church as part of their respective doctrines or have underlined the importance of the history of the Church in their party platforms. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity/Внатрешна Македонска Револуционерна Организација - Демократска Партија за Македонско Национално Единство (IMRO-DPMN/ВМРО-ДПМНЕ), known for its conservative values, shows clear preference for the Macedonian Orthodox Church in its doctrine by stating the following and similar principles: “...the Church is of an essential support to the country,” and “the Macedonian Orthodox Church takes an exceptional place in the Macedonian country and the Macedonian society.”¹¹⁰ The second largest political party in the country, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia/Социјал-демократскиот Сојуз на Македонија (SDUM/СДСМ), shows less favoritism towards the Macedonian church, and in the past, it has advocated for a more secular state.¹¹¹ However, in their party platforms they have also recognized the Church as a “key historical factor in the development and fortification of the Macedonian national identity”.¹¹² The fact that even the political party that is often regarded as progressive, Western-oriented, and more secular has acknowledged and given the Macedonian church a prominent place in their platform is also telling of the importance of the Macedonian Orthodox Church in the Macedonian society.

The relationship between the government and the Macedonian Orthodox Church caused public unrest and scrutiny from the wider public in 2009 when the state’s support of building a

¹¹⁰ VMRO-DPMNE, Доктрина [Doctrine] , Вредностите на ВМРО ДПМНЕ [The values of VMRO-DPMNE], accessed January 15, 2018, <https://vmro-dpmne.org.mk/files/wp-content/uploads/documents/doktrina.pdf>.

¹¹¹ Aleksandar Spasenovski, “Политичките партии и границите на секуларизмот во Република Македонија [The political parties and the limits of secularism in Republic of Macedonia]”

¹¹² Anastas Vangeli, “Religion, Nationalism and Counter-Secularization: The Case of the Macedonian Orthodox Church,” 85.

church on the main square in the capital of the country caused protests around the city, increased interethnic tensions, and raised questions about the separation between church and state.¹¹³ The church was eventually built and it is located on the main square of the capital city, Skopje; this was accomplished mainly due to the support that MOC enjoyed from the ruling party at that time—another evidence of the close relationship between religion and the state. Religious leaders are also continuously present during political rallies or other political events. At an event in 2002, then-premier Ljupcho Georgievski and then-minister of interior affairs Ljube Bohskovski presented honor medals to the Macedonian special forces by having a religious ceremony where Archbishop Stefan blessed the special forces and honored them with Jesus-faced medals.¹¹⁴ The event enraged the Albanian community as they believed such actions by the Macedonian authorities contributed to the “divisions of state organs on religious and national basis.”¹¹⁵ The relationship between the church and the state continues to be cautiously close. Religious leaders from the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church believe that Macedonia can never be completely secular due to “centuries-old interweaving of culture, tradition and history with religion,” however, others argue that such a close relationship alienates its citizens from one another and further deepens the religious and ethnic cleavages in the country.¹¹⁶ Two of the priests I interviewed during my field study shared the first opinion, and added: “The Church and the state are indivisible. The same people constitute both the church and the state.”¹¹⁷

The 2012 International Religious Freedom Report also reported favorable treatment of the MOC by the ruling government at the time. The report cites concerns by other religious

¹¹³ US Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights, and Labor: Macedonia, accessed January 28, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136044.htm>

¹¹⁴ Vladimir Jovanovski, “Macedonia: Church enrages Albanians,” *Institute for War & Peace Reporting*, 2002, accessed January 28, 2018, <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/macedonia-church-enrages-albanians>

¹¹⁵ Ibid

¹¹⁶ Aleksandar Pisarev, “Cross and Crescent Divide up Macedonia”

¹¹⁷ Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from a local Orthodox church, July 03 & 08, 2017

communities over the government's "granting [the Church] public properties free of charge, providing funding for the construction of new Orthodox churches, and inviting representatives of the MOC - OA [Macedonian Orthodox Church- Ohrid Archdiocese] but not of other groups to attend groundbreaking ceremonies and other functions".¹¹⁸ During my field interviews, a religious leader from the Catholic community expressed similar concerns. He said that the government's preference of the MOC hurt the Catholic community when a prominent spot in the city where a Catholic Church once stood was given to MOC for construction of an Orthodox church.¹¹⁹

The 2012 report on religious freedom reveals another aspect of the government's relation to MOC. The report accuses the then-ruling party, which was mainly composed of ethnic Macedonians, of "politicizing religious issues for its own political gain by appealing to the religious beliefs and identity of the country's majority and by using the MOC - OA [Macedonian Orthodox Church- Ohrid Archdiocese as a tool to that end".¹²⁰ This conclusion has been a concern for other monitoring bodies in the country as well.

One study that was conducted in December 2017 examined the use of religious rhetoric in the political campaigns before the elections in 2016, another politically and socially turbulent period in Macedonia.¹²¹ The study reports that during the parties' campaigning, it was a common occurrence for politicians to visit churches or mosques and include these visits in their campaign messages and advertisements. The study also lists some of the common religious undertones

¹¹⁸ United States Department of State, Macedonia 2012 International Religious Freedom Report: Executive Summary, accessed January 18, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/06/10/Macedonia_4.pdf.

¹¹⁹ Interview with a Catholic priest from a local Catholic church, June 08, 2017

¹²⁰ United States Department of State, Macedonia 2012 International Religious Freedom Report: Executive Summary

¹²¹ Vladimir Bozhinovski and Marjan Nikolovski, "Религијата во Политичките Кампањи: Користење на Религијата во Предизборните Кампањи [Religion in Political Campaigns: The Use of Religion in Pre-election campaigns," accessed January 29, 2018, <http://www.kas.de/mazedonien/mk/publications/51156/>

used in the parties' messages; messages such as "Allah has decided that all Albanians should live united," used by the Albanian political parties and "God protects the Macedonian identity," used by the Macedonian political parties were frequent in political public events and campaign materials.¹²² One interesting finding was that 35.9% of the respondents agreed that religious undertones were used more in the 2016 elections than before, and 30.3% said that these kind of messages were used as much as in previous elections; 59.5% of the respondents agreed that the political parties use religion to achieve their political goals.¹²³ However, one interesting, and rather surprising finding, is that the inclusion of religious messages and symbols did not have an effect on the respondents' party choice in the elections (73.5% of the respondents answered negatively to the question, while only approximately 14% responded that it does influence their choice).

Even though one would expect that religious messages would influence respondents' opinion since religion is such an important factor in the society and is a cultural marker for the Macedonians, I would argue that this contradiction can be attributed to the low trust of Macedonians in the political parties rather than a deflation of the previous conclusion of religion being a cultural marker; the level of religiosity in Macedonia, as presented in the previous chapter, suggests that people have high regards of religion, therefore, it is more likely that the low trust in political parties is a bigger factor in people's indifference towards religious messages by these political parties.¹²⁴ The goal of the study was to assess the use and abuse of religious

¹²² Ibid

¹²³ Bozhinovski and Nikolovski, "Религијата во Политичките Кампањи: Користење на Религијата во Предиборните Кампањи [Religion in Political Campaigns: The Use of Religion in Pre-election campaigns]"

¹²⁴ According to a 2007 study done by the Macedonian International Cooperation Center, less than 25% of the Macedonian citizens have significant or somewhat significant trust in political parties <http://www.mcms.org.mk/images/docs/2007/doverbata-vo-gragjanskoto-opstetsvo-2007.pdf>; considering that the political situation in Macedonia has only worsened since 2007, I can claim with some certainty that the trust level since 2007 has only gotten lower.

sentiment for political gains of the leading parties. The findings delivered quantitative evidence for the interdependence of religion and politics from the citizens' perspective, and the same revealed telling results.

The report on religious freedom previously mentioned, as well as the findings of the study, can be analyzed through a debate on norms conformation that I introduced in the previous chapter—the debate between norm conformation due to the “logic of appropriateness” or utility maximization. In the first chapter, I posed a question: Does the formation of new religious thoughts and norms happen due to the elites' self-interest in getting what they want or because they truly believe in the appropriateness of these norms? As suggested in the theoretical answer to this question, an either/or answer is not possible nor desired, but the above analysis suggests that there is definitely evidence of the political parties' exploitation of religious undertones for utility maximization. For instance, Christian Orthodox doctrines, as portrayed in the message by Metropolitan of Navpaktos Jerotej Vlahos, profess peace and faith with no national boundaries, however, as I noted above, the message by the prominent Christian Orthodox religious leader who during the war years encouraged fighting to defend the dignity of the Church is a commonly found message in popular literature and communication.¹²⁵ This example, as well as other ones mentioned above, suggest that defending the Church's prominence in the country was perhaps more important to its leadership rather than preserving the principles their religion espouses.

Discussion and Conclusion

¹²⁵ Philip LeMasters, Peace in Orthodox Liturgy and Life, *In Communion: Website of the Orthodox Peace Fellowship*, accessed January 20, 2018, <https://incommunion.org/2004/12/29/peace-in-orthodox-liturgy-and-life/>; see page 18.

The analysis above covered the process of nation-building and the role of religion during this process. It followed the genesis of the modern nation from Macedonia's early establishment of the nation and its Constitution, to the Constitution's revisions, and the societal and political impacts of these changes. It also covered the evolution of the role of religion in times of instability, the 2001 insurgency. The conclusion from the analysis and the presented empirical evidence from the literature, the media, various speeches, government publications and other primary resources should be apparent— political developments in Macedonia are historically founded on religion. One would expect that such strong interdependence between religion and the political developments, and especially the preference of one religious community, would instigate high prevalence of religious norms in the emergence of nationalism. The case of Macedonia validated this claim as the above analysis provided evidence of the use of religious sentiments in nationalistic remarks from politicians, religious leaders, and citizens alike.

I discerned two potential reasons why religion has such a distinctive role in the political developments of Macedonia: (1) the historical presence of Christian Orthodoxy, and (2) the emotional attachment to the events and people that have historically fought for the perseverance of the traditional values, which are tightly connected to the Orthodox ones. These two factors have given religion a profound spot in the political developments in Macedonia— in the building and the preservation of the nation. The inevitable conclusion from the analysis of the Macedonian case is that despite the efforts Macedonia has made to separate religion from the functions of the state, it will still take time until Macedonia learns to balance the country's efforts to adopt international western standards, the traditional Orthodox values present in the majority of Macedonians, and the realities from the existing religious diversity in the functions of the state. The deep roots of religious traditions in the country and the strong desire to build a

national identity that has been suppressed for centuries make it hard to detach religion from the secular affairs.

Nevertheless, I would argue that the aforementioned two factors are not unique to the historical developments of Macedonia. Religion has been a present and influential element in the development of many nations, and every nation has heroes that evoke patriotic sentiments in its people. However, Christian Orthodoxy seems to have shown endurance and agility in the pressure of secularization and modernization. The international pattern of international state religions reveals that states with Orthodoxy as a state religion, together with Islam, are the only ones that have witnessed an increase in number from year 1900 to year 2000.¹²⁶ My analysis in this chapter suggested that the possible explanation for the enduring and increasing adherence to Christian Orthodoxy is a response to the ongoing threat to Macedonia's ontological security. The same trend cannot be observed for Catholicism and Protestantism, which as the other two main Christian religions, have experienced a decline in the number of states with these religions as state religions.¹²⁷ While having a state religion does not measure the influence of religion in countries' political development in its entirety, it is still an indicator of high prevalence of religion in these countries.

One can also conclude that having a state religion is, in turn, an instrumental factor in nationalistic tendencies. As the aforementioned analysis showed ethnic Macedonian nationalism has been historically connected to the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church.¹²⁸ However, Macedonia is not the only state where the Christian Orthodox Church has been linked to the

¹²⁶ Robert J. Barro, Rachel M. McCleary, "Which Countries Have State Religions?," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Volume 120, Issue 4, 1 November 2005, 1360, <https://doi.org/10.1162/003355305775097515>

¹²⁷ Ibid, 1365.

¹²⁸ Anastas Vangeli, "Religion, Nationalism and Counter-Secularization: The Case of the Macedonian Orthodox Church," 75.

presence of nationalism. For instance, Russia is a state where linkage between the Russian Orthodox Church and nationalism is particularly strong; many view the “notion of Russian brotherhood central to Russian national chauvinism”.¹²⁹ Serbia is another state where Christian Orthodoxy is the single largest religious faith, and similarly, the Serbian Orthodox Church and its followers are often cited for revealing nationalistic propensities; evidence of this claim are convincingly present in the deconstruction of events during the Bosnian War.¹³⁰ The Helleno-Christian nationalism in Greece has also gained substantial attention, prompting scholars to analyze the politicization of religion and religious nationalism in Greece.¹³¹ Therefore, Macedonia is not the only country where the linkage between Christian Orthodoxy and nationalism has been observed, proving that the relationship between Christian Orthodoxy and nationalism is operational even outside of a country context.

The above observations beg the question whether there is something inherent in Christian Orthodox norms, rules, institutions, and practices that stimulate nationalistic sentiments, or it is the historical circumstances of countries that yield similar occurrences in relation to the Christian Orthodox Church and the state. Exploring the suggested question in detail is outside of the scope of this thesis as this thesis focuses on Christian Orthodoxy and nationalism in the case of Macedonia and provides explanations that is applicable in the Macedonian case. However, I advance several general observations on the topic of Christian Orthodox norms, rules, institutions, and practices and nationalistic propensities.

¹²⁹ Zoe Katrina Knowx. *Russian Society and the Orthodox Church Religion in Russia after Communism*. 1st ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 66; Aleksandr Verkhovsky, “The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Nationalist, Xenophobic and Antiwestern Tendencies in Russia Today: Not Nationalism, but Fundamentalism,” *Religion, State, and Society* 30, no. 4, accessed January 15, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0963749022000022879>

¹³⁰ Michael Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press 1998)

¹³¹ Nikos Chrysoloras, “Why Orthodoxy? Religion and Nationalism in Greek Political Culture,” *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 4, no.1, accessed March 30, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-9469.2004.tb00057.x>

The first chapter introduced a perspective on norm change and norm conflict. I wrote that constructivists argue that there are every set of norms changes through internal and external tensions, and as such, norms are subject to conflict and eventually, to modification.¹³² Consequently, I would argue that there are different degrees to which distinctive sets of norms are amenable to change. Moreover, norms that are perceived to be a significant part of a valued identity may be unlikely to change when certain event challenge and threaten that identity. Christian Orthodox norms and their traditional and conservative nature clash with the “modern” set of norms— a set of norms that is characterized by traits opposite of those of Orthodoxy, traits like individualism, diversity, and pluralism. A priest that I interviewed was quick to provide an answer to my question on the relationship between Orthodoxy and modernity: “The religion will endure the distractions of the modern times, but not by a way of compromise, but by a way of adaptation of the modern tools to disseminate the truth and bring people on the true path”.¹³³ Therefore, perhaps it is the rigidity of Christian Orthodoxy that does not allow for easy adaptation to the characteristics of the modern time, and it may be these conservative and traditional Orthodox values that provide comfort when people are faced with the unknowns of the modern time providing Orthodoxy the spotlight it possesses in the traditional society. I do not attempt to argue that Christian Orthodoxy is the only religion that embodies rigid and conservative set of values for one can argue that every set of religious values possesses these characteristics inherently. However, it seems that Christian Orthodox norms have persisted and endured inflexibility in certain aspects; it is an intriguing question for future research to delineate whether it is the historical factor of less stable countries that are also predominantly Christian

¹³² Wayne Sandholtz, “Dynamics of International Norm Change: Wars against Wartime Plunder,” 6.

¹³³ Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from a local Orthodox church, July 03, 2017.

Orthodox that vitalizes this trait, or there is perhaps a peculiarity in Christian Orthodox norms and teachings.

One can contrast the evolution of Christian Orthodox rigidity with that of Catholicism. Catholicism was historically rather rigid in its practices and beliefs; the actions of the Inquisition is sufficient evidence for the extreme measure they took to prevent any deviation from their norms. However, even the Catholics eventually allowed for a change of attitude and behavior towards members that challenge Catholic norms. Curious about the possible reasons why the Christian Orthodox community seem to be unyielding in changing times, I asked one of my interviewees who responded by claiming that the difference lays in the practical nature of Catholicism and in contrast, the mysticism and sacrifice embedded in Christian Orthodox nature. As an example of this difference, he mentioned the way the Catholic practice of confession has changed through the years; while both the Orthodox and Catholic practice of confession require face-to-face confession with a priest, when the Catholic priests realized that the frequency of confessions decreases, they introduced the confessional box to encourage adherents to confess without the pressure of face-to-face conversation.¹³⁴ The Christian Orthodox practice of confession has retained its traditional character and adherents confess stringently face-to-face with the priest. Although this statement is anecdotal, and it needs to be supported with further research into the matter, it still provides an idea of the reasons for the differences of norm rigidity in two historically rigid religions.

One other issue that is apparent from the evidence in the analysis in this chapter is the different interpretations of religious norms by diverse groups. The fact that a number of religious leaders use rhetoric that is not supported by Christian Orthodox norms and rules as established

¹³⁴ Interview with a Catholic priest from a local Catholic church, June 30, 2017.

by the Church as institutions suggests that there is another factor that influences such attitudes and behavior of prominent religious leaders.

Recognizing the existence of nationalism in the Christian Orthodox communities, some prominent leaders in the Christian Orthodox Church have addressed the teachings of the Church regarding nationalism. For instance, Metropolitan of Navpaktos Jerotej Vlahos, in a discussion of nationalism as a phenomenon, writes: “Nationalism is a heresy of Orthodoxy, and that means that every nationalism is a gulf, spreading division on the account of harmony...Orthodoxy in itself is ‘uber-national,’ it does not divide people by their nations”.¹³⁵ He uses quotes from the Bible and references historic Orthodox leaders to support his claims.¹³⁶ However, in the analysis above, I discovered substantial evidence that reveals attitudes of religious leaders that are different than the words shared by the Metropolitan and those before him. Those words seem to create the rift that Christian Orthodoxy in its basic principles is trying to eradicate. Therefore, one conclusion I draw is that, once again, the threat and challenge to the Macedonian society’s ontological security is what drives the current religious community to use nationalist interpretation of the Orthodox faith rather than the cosmopolitan one as suggested by the Metropolitan and other principles written in the Orthodox doctrines and records.

When asked about the prevailing nationalistic rhetoric among Orthodox leaders in Macedonia as well as in other predominantly Christian Orthodox countries, one of the interviewees during my field research claimed that such rhetoric has emerged as a result of the Church’s efforts to preserve itself: “Through history, many have attempted to dissolve the Christian Orthodox Church, and as a response, the instinct to survive emerges among the

¹³⁵ Jerotej Vlahos, “Надминување на Национализмот [Overcoming Nationalism]”

¹³⁶ Ibid

supporters of the Church. We realize that to survive, we ought to raise a nation to support us”.¹³⁷ This is an interesting perspective that suggests self-interest does play a role into the formation and conformation to norms by institutions as well. However, more importantly, this self-interest is motivated by the threat to the ontological security of the Church and the faith itself.

I recognize that the above observations would benefit from more evidence and further research into the question. I encourage additional exploration on the topic of Christian Orthodox norms, rules, institutions and practices and nationalism outside of a country context. In addition to providing some suggestive evidence on the topic of Christian Orthodoxy and nationalism, these observations and the previous analysis provide some insight into the norm conformation, norm evolution, and norm conflict.

The constructivist literature argues that people form and conform to religious norms in times of instability and existential crises. In the case of Macedonia, I found evidence that supports this claim. The rhetoric during the 2001 insurgency provided evidence that indeed resilient religious rhetoric was much more present during these times of instability in Macedonia. Even though during this event the political and social turbulences in the society were at their height, one could argue that Macedonia has been facing with challenges to its existence for centuries and is yet to emerge from the existential insecurity it finds itself. In such a climate, as expected, one finds a high prevalence of religious sentiment. To the Macedonian people, Christian Orthodoxy has been the institutionalized force that brings them together in unity in the building of their nation. The desire to be seen as a recognized nation, as people with historical culture and traditions, and as defenders of their ancestors’ battles, motivates them to hang on to every thread that binds them; religion is one of them. To the Macedonian politicians, evidence

¹³⁷ Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from a local Orthodox church, July 05, 2018.

shows that religion is used as a tool that helps them achieve their political goals and ambitions. Arguing that the politicians' enactment of religious norms, institutions and practices is solely due to self-interest is speculative, nonetheless, evidence suggest that indeed self-interest is a factor in this process. To the Christian Orthodox Church and its leadership, the need for security and existential survival seem to prevail in the everyday religious discourse; religious leaders use religious norms and institutions to fortify the nation, in the process abandoning the uber-national nature of Christian Orthodoxy.

Finally, norms are best studied when we evaluate the effects they have on society. In this chapter, I reconciled the role of religion in building a national identity and in raising nationalism. From the historical, sociological, and political analysis above, I conclude that religion has a significant role in the building of the Macedonian nation and the resurgence of religious nationalism since the collapse of Yugoslavia. Evidence from the Constitution, from political parties' platforms, interviews, as well as daily media, reveal high interdependence of religion and the Macedonian state. Even though there have been significant efforts to adapt to western standards and secularize the country, the historically embedded Orthodox values do not allow for complete abandonment of these traditional values and as such, they are highly prevalent in the nationhood of Macedonia.

Other influential factor in Macedonian society is the diverse religious community. This diversity is seen as a threat to the Macedonian national cohesiveness. The 2001 insurgency, as well as remaining religious and ethnic tensions, enhance the rhetoric that diversity is disruptive to the building of the nation. As a result, religious sentiments also contribute to the rise of nationalism in the country. The construction of religious objects that are used as ideological weapons or as territory inscriptions, and the statements of prominent religious leaders, are just

two ways that portray the relationship between religion and nationalism. Even though it was outside of the scope of this thesis to discover the root of this connection, the previous chapter included some suggestive observations that would benefit from further research on the topic.

Through the case analysis of Macedonia, this chapter first reviewed the literature on why religious norms, rules, institutions and practices are formed and accepted in the society and how they interact with phenomena such as the building of a nation and nationhood, and nationalism. The chapter then presented evidence from the case study of Macedonia that confirmed some findings of the literature, and also added idiosyncratic historical elements that aided in understanding the occurrences in the Macedonian politics. Finally, the chapter tied the findings from the literature and the case study to establish and complete the overall argument.

Similarly, Chapter 3 observes the Christian Orthodox norms, rules, institutions, and practices and their effect on economic behavior and attitude of Christian Orthodox followers.

Chapter III: Religion and Economic Affairs in Macedonia

“‘Somali men are not lazy,’ he protested. ‘We are very proud people. We are descendants of Abraham, and if you descend from Abraham, you don’t do manual labor. We don’t cook. We don’t make tea. We don’t clean or sweep. We don’t do construction or garbage collection. Our only business is animal herding’”

- Nina Munk, *The Idealist*

Introduction

The discussion of religion and economic development has gained significant attention in the literature ever since Max Weber published his work on the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Weber, together with Durkheim, observed closely the effects of religion from a sociological perspective. I draw from these scholars’ work and emphasize their argument that the power of religion is in its ability to psychologically influence how adherents behave in secular affairs. The relationship with individuals’ economic behavior is especially intriguing and a subject of research by many scholars, as I show later in this chapter.

The first part of this chapter introduces the Weberian model and the ways in which Weber’s analysis has influenced my approach in this thesis. Namely, I draw from Weber’s inquiry into how ideas become effective forces and construct my question of how religious norms, rules, institutions, and social practices are formed and followed in the society. Additionally, Weber’s investigation of religious influences on the formation and expansion of the material culture embedded in the capitalistic system, prompted what is perhaps the overarching research question in this chapter— the Christian Orthodox norms and ethics, and

their influence on human attitudes towards the material world and economic activity. In a way, this thesis and the research question I explore serves as a comparative analysis to Weber's model by analyzing Christian Orthodoxy and economic attitudes as compared to Weber's Protestant ethic and economic attitudes.

In addition to introducing Weber's analysis, I include his findings, and the implications of his findings. One of his most notable arguments is that the economic ethics that are professed by a particular religion are not necessarily ethics that are found in the theological textbooks but are a product of the psychological sanctions that are placed by a religious context as a whole; these psychological sanctions, in turn, influence people's attitudes. I make a similar argument in this chapter as well. I argue that the historical presence of Christian Orthodoxy and the interconnectedness of religion and secular affairs in Macedonia have created and fostered religious norms that influence people's attitudes, behavior and practices in the economic domain. In other words, even though one may not find formal Christian Orthodox rules of conduct, there are existing norms created through social interactions in a religious context that have remained in circulation in the society. Moreover, one may not recognize that his or her attitude is influenced by Christian Orthodoxy, but I would argue that these residual norms are being subconsciously utilized in the formation of attitudes and practices of people who have been exposed to these social interactions.

Taking in consideration that the above argument is rather complicated and elusive in nature, I argue that the most effective way to measure whether my argument holds ground is by capturing the effects that Christian Orthodox norms have in the society. I do this by examining Christian Orthodox adherents' attitudes, behavior, and practices in the economic sphere in order to be able to identify the interaction between the Christian Orthodox norms and their effects on

the society. I examined whether what we know about the Christian Orthodox norms has implications for Christian Orthodox adherents' attitudes and behavior by distributing a survey that was designed to capture their attitudes, beliefs, and their practices in the economic sphere. The design of the survey was constructed by drawing upon studies that have already attempted to observe the same phenomenon, as well as from accounts from religious leaders regarding Christian Orthodox norms and ethics in the economic sphere that I collected during field interviews in Macedonia.

After providing an introduction to the Weberian model, I provide an extensive literature review of studies that have attempted to quantify Weber's findings. In addition to discerning the techniques and findings of these studies, I credit several studies that I used to design the study for this thesis. Despite the valuable findings that have resulted from studies on the relationship between religion and economic performance, economic growth, and economic attitudes, studies from both the macro and micro economic approaches have drawbacks and limitations. I outline these limitations and I argue that my study seeks to address some of these limitations. My study's main contribution in this regard is providing empirical evidence of a religious denomination, Christian Orthodoxy which is often overlooked in the data literature. Moreover, my study does what the studies I cite in the literature review have called for— it connects specific religious norms to adherents' behavior.

Following the literature review, I provide a brief overview of the Christian Orthodox principles and rules as found in the literature. The literature is narrow in this respect, as once again, not many scholars have observed Christian Orthodoxy in this manner specifically; however, I draw from the Russian, Serbian, and Greek literature and find several studies that contribute to the description of generally accepted Christian Orthodox norms. Following the

synopsis of the broader Christian Orthodox principles is the overview of the Christian Orthodox norms, rules, and practices as observed in the Macedonian society. In this part, I provide a detailed account of the field interviews I conducted with religious leaders in Macedonia. I conducted ten interviews in total.¹³⁸ Six of the ten interviewees were prominent priests from the main Macedonian Orthodox Church and other local churches in Skopje, Macedonia. One of the interviewees was a Catholic priest from a local Catholic Church in Skopje, Macedonia. Another one of the interviewees was a Christian Orthodox monk from a rural town in Eastern Macedonia, and two interviewees are priests from the rural areas of Western Macedonia. I intentionally included a diverse group of religious leaders, some that are closer and some more distant to the mainstream religious institutions, as to ensure that the answers were controlled for the politics and the conventional discourse of the Church.

The answers I gathered from the interviews helped me in learning the norms and rules of the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church in regard to economic activity. I then used what I learned from the interviews in constructing survey questions that attempted to capture the extent to which these norms professed by Christian Orthodox leaders are being respected and practiced by the Macedonian people who have been exposed to the doctrine. In continuation of this chapter, I present and explain in detail the questions that I used in the survey and what norm, behavior, or practice each of the questions were constructed to capture. In the same section, I offer the conceptual framework that links religious norms and rules with economic activity. The subsequent three sections provide a detailed account of the data, the empirical strategy used in the survey analysis, and the findings of the analysis. The last section binds the initial argument with the data findings and provides a conclusion.

¹³⁸ All interviews were confidential, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. I provide the semi-structured questions I used for the interview in Appendix I at the end of this chapter.

Religion and Economic Affairs in the Literature

When investigating the topic of religion and economic affairs one must consider the theses posed by Max Weber in his research on the relationship between religious ideas and the economic characteristics of human conduct. Weber's work in the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* prompted intellectuals from various fields, economic historians to sociologists and anthropologists, to account for the Protestant ethic in their respective fields of research on development.¹³⁹ Weber's idea of analyzing the relationship between one's conceptualization of the divine and his or her action in the social domain is profound, and his arguments on the same are well-rounded and supported. I find Weber's work most valuable and relevant to my work in the following ways:

- (1) With his study, Weber contributes to the "understanding of the manner in which ideas become effective forces in history."¹⁴⁰ In my study, Weber's *ideas* are more specifically observed as norms, rules, institutions and social practices. Analogously, through my analysis and later case study, I also observe how norms, rules, institutions and social practices are formed and followed in the society.
- (2) Weber's most profound work is his investigation into religious forces created during the Reformation and their contribution to the "qualitative formation and the quantitative expansion of [the capitalistic] spirit over the world."¹⁴¹ More specifically, he is interested in how forms of religious beliefs and religious movements correlate with practical morals and

¹³⁹ Gianfranco Poggi, *Calvinism and the capitalist spirit Max Weber's protestant ethic*, (Palgrave, 1983); Robin Grier, "The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross-National Study of 63 Former Colonies," *Kyklos* 50, no.1 (February 1997): 47-62, accessed May 2017, doi: 10.1111/1467-6435.00003; Anthony Gill, "Weber in Latin America: Is Protestant Growth Enabling the Consolidation of Democratic Capitalism?" *Democratization* 11, no 4: 42-65

¹⁴⁰ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Lexington, KY: Renaissance Classics 2012): 46

¹⁴¹ Ibid

the material culture. Even though Weber is aware of the intricacies involved in establishing a causal relationship between the Protestant Ethic and the materialistic culture, he still finds qualitative evidence of correlation between the Protestant ethic and capitalism.¹⁴² I follow the same argument but use the religious beliefs and religious norms from the Christian Orthodox doctrines to observe the same relationship as did Weber.

- (3) Finally, as mentioned above, one of Weber's argument that I facilitate in my study is the argument that people's behavior, in the economic sphere in this case, is a product of a psychological sanctions that are constructed and professed by the religious structures. One of the most influential religious elements on the person's psychology is the process of salvation and the way in which a person achieves redemption in the afterlife. While most religions prior to the Reformation have professed monastic asceticism, the Protestant doctrine, in contrast gave birth to the notion of "the calling," defined as "a life-task, a definite field in which to work".¹⁴³ The birth of "the calling" gave a new meaning to what "living acceptably to God" and achieving redemption in the afterlife entailed: it was not "to surpass worldly mortality in monastic asceticism," but instead it was "solely through the fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon the individual by the position in his world".¹⁴⁴ In my thesis, I contrast the concept of "the calling" from the Protestant school with the "monastic asceticism" of Christian Orthodoxy, which in the modern church is labeled with the words "sacrifice," "obedience," and "humility," and observe how these teachings could have possibly affected Christian Orthodox adherents' psychology inversely that would in turn, influence their behavior in the economic sphere differently.

¹⁴² Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, 38; Weber scrupulously qualifies his analysis by stating that it is not his intent to claim that capitalism has evolved because of certain religious beliefs formed during the Reformation

¹⁴³ Weber, 37

¹⁴⁴ Weber, 38

In addition to utilizing the Weberian model to observe the above three points, in this chapter, I also continue the discussion of norm conformation, norm evolution, and norm conflict from the previous chapters.

The course of norm conformation in the economic sphere follows the same pattern as the norm conformation I discussed in the political sphere in the previous chapter; norm conformation is a process that is different depending on the group of members that is adopting certain sets of norms. In the economic sphere, perhaps one of the most suitable case studies have been the enactment of various *developmentalism* policies in Latin America.¹⁴⁵ Constructivists have followed the success of *developmentalism* ideas and institutions development, conformation, and dispersion in Latin America.¹⁴⁶ In particular, constructivists have observed ideas that are related to economic development of the periphery, and institutions that have assisted with the dispersion of these ideas.¹⁴⁷ Two findings that are relevant and related to my thesis have emerged from these studies: Similarly to my findings in the political sphere, in this literature, scholars find that the policy makers and the political elite have different ideas and motivations to enact economic policies when compared to the broader social census.¹⁴⁸ Secondly, scholars argue that the newly emerged ideas “do not enter an ideological vacuum,” arguing that in order for the economic development ideas to become accepted and effective, they need to fit within the “existing [historically formed] ideologies of important economic and social groups”.¹⁴⁹ This second point reiterates my overall argument of considering the historical, cultural, and social context of one society in explaining its adaptation to new norms, rules, institutions, and practices. Specifically, I

¹⁴⁵ *Developmentalism* is an economic theory that emerged after the Cold War, and aimed to develop underdeveloped countries by introducing new policies that were based on the capitalist model.

¹⁴⁶ Kathryn Sikink, *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina*, (Los Angeles, CA: Cornell University, 2012).

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 1.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 2.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 2.

argue that in the adaptation to new policies, the religious heritage of a society needs to be considered as this heritage harmoniously influences the way people perceive new ideas or policies. The second point also highlights the process of norm conflict and outlines one reason of why norm conflicts emerge.

Finally, one last argument from the constructivist literature on *developmentalism* that is worth mentioning and also related to the arguments in this thesis is the motivations behind the conformation to norms. The initial question I posed in this thesis was whether people conform to norms due to self-interest or due to their belief in the goodness of norms, also called the “logic of appropriateness”. In the analysis of norms in the political sphere, I found that the motivations are dependent on the group of members, but it is also nuanced and seldom absolute of one motivation over the other. Scholars that have pondered the same question agree that ideas (or as I more specifically define them in this thesis as norms and rules) can be utilized by actors to “mystify and legitimize taken in their own self-interest” and can be enacted due to their nature and meaning and therefore, have autonomous effects on outcomes in the society.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, scholars find that both political (self-interest) and ideological (normative) factors influence the conformation to ideas, or norms. The analysis of my study follows the same logic and finds evidence for this, and the previous points made above.

In the next section, I provide a literature review of the studies that have attempted to quantify Weber’s previously mentioned thesis.¹⁵¹ There have also been studies that have applied

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 5.

¹⁵¹ Robert J. Barro and Rachel M. McCleary, “Religion and Economy,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 49-72; Robin Grier, “The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross-National Study of 63 Former Colonies,” *Kyklos* 50, no.1 (February 1997): 47-62, accessed May 2017, doi: 10.1111/1467-6435.00003;

Weber's model to different religions.¹⁵² Weber's occasional contrast with the Catholic religion in his book has sparked the interest to investigate whether other forms of religious beliefs are potentially not compatible with capitalistic values. In continuation, I provide a brief overview of these studies. Then, I extend onto Weber's model and add to the existing literature by investigating Christian Orthodox norms in relation to the work ethic professed by the Christian Orthodox institution. I do this to qualitatively present what I quantitatively test later in the thesis by analyzing data from a field research where I collected survey responses from Christian Orthodox adherents.

Literature Review

The goal of the literature review in this section is to assess studies that examine the relationship in question in this thesis. In addition to identifying the gap in these studies, I also emphasize and credit studies that I draw from to construct my study design.

In the literature, the relationship between religion and the economy has been investigated in a number of ways. For instance, one approach has been observing religion as a dependent variable and the effect of economic development as an independent variable with aims to establish how economic development affects religious beliefs and attitudes.¹⁵³ Conversely, studies have investigated the economic consequences of religious beliefs and attitudes; this is the category where Weber's analysis belongs and where this thesis seeks to contribute.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002); Platteau, Jean-Philippe. "Religion, politics, and development: Lessons from the lands of Islam." *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 68 (2008): 329-251., William Form and Fred C. Pampel. "Social Stratification and the Development of Urban Labor Markets in India," *Social Forces* 57.1 (1978): 119-135.

¹⁵³ Robert J. Barro and Rachel M. McCleary, "Religion and Economy," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 49-72.

¹⁵⁴ Robin Grier, "The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross-National Study of 63 Former Colonies," *Kyklos* 50, no.1 (February 1997): 47-62, accessed May 2017, doi: 10.1111/1467-6435.00003; Robert J.

Additionally, there is the field of religious economics that consists of studies that observe economic policies from a religious perspective.¹⁵⁵ Every perspective brings valuable contribution to the understanding of the relationship between religion and the economy, but this thesis focuses on the second one, the investigation of economic consequences of religious norms, rules, institutions and social practices.

The majority of the studies examining the economic consequences of religion do so by using a macroeconomic approach in cross-national studies. For instance, Grier conducts a cross-national study of 63 former colonies and seeks to investigate whether Spanish ex-colonies with Catholicism as their historically largest religion perform markedly worse than their British counterparts with Protestantism as a predominant religion.¹⁵⁶ Although Grier finds a strong positive statistical relationship between Protestantism and economic growth, she also calls for more research on the link between specific religious values and economic development to find the "true basis for the correlation between Protestantism and growth."¹⁵⁷ In Barro and McCleary, the authors use international data on religiosity and investigate the impacts of church attendance and religious beliefs on economic growth.¹⁵⁸ One finding from the study is that the causal effect flows from religion to economic growth based on the measurements of instrumental variables, and another that economic growth depends on the extent of believing relative to belonging, meaning that respondents' answers to questions regarding believing in religious elements are

Barro and Rachel M. McCleary, "Religion and Economic Growth across Countries," *American Sociological Review* 68, no. 5 (October 2003): 760-781, accessed May 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1519761>; Marcus Noland, "Religion and Economic Performance," *World Development* 33, no.8 (August 2005): 1215-1232, accessed May 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.03.006>

¹⁵⁵ Laurence R. Iannaccone, "Introduction to the Economics of Religion," *Journal of Economic Literature* 36, no. 3 (September 1998): 1465-1495.

¹⁵⁶ Robin Grier, "The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross-National Study of 63 Former Colonies," 55.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 57.

¹⁵⁸ Robert J. Barro and Rachel M. McCleary, "Religion and Economic Growth across Countries," 765.

more indicative of country's economic growth than respondents' answer to religious affiliation.¹⁵⁹ However, they also call for further research into channels such as religious beliefs and their influence on work ethic, thrift and other economically conducive factors at a country-wide level with subnational data. Barro and McCleary conduct another study in 2006. They use the same international data as before, and they expand the same with measures of religiosity such as the extent of religious beliefs and the rate of attendance at religious services.¹⁶⁰ They also compare these religiosity measures across the major religions. Their most noteworthy finding from this study is the importance of including religiosity measures in understanding the link between religion and economic growth.¹⁶¹ Guiso et al. examine individual behavior based on their religion in a cross-country study and find significant results in relationships that vindicate Weber to some extent.¹⁶²

However, as Noland points out, although the cross-national data are suggestive, they are "subject to distortion arising from the inability to adequately control for country-specific economic, political, and institutional influences."¹⁶³ Due to the limitations posed by macroeconomic studies on the subject, academics have turned their focus to the use of subnational data and microeconomic approach in their studies. Noland conducts a study using subnational data from three countries to examine the relationship between Islam as a religious affiliation and economic development, and contrary to previous studies, finds that Islam is not a drag on economic growth.¹⁶⁴ Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott study the economic effects of religious practices by observing Ramadan fasting and find that religious practices affect

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, 770.

¹⁶⁰ Robert J. Barro and Rachel M. McCleary, "Religion and Economy," 68.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, 69.

¹⁶² Luigi Guiso et al., "People's Opium? Religion and Economic Attitudes," *Journal of Monetary Economics* 50, no. 1 (January 2003): 225-282, accessed May 2017, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932\(02\)00202-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00202-7).

¹⁶³ Marcus Noland, "Religion and Economic Performance," 1220.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, 1228.

economic performance negatively.¹⁶⁵ Some studies have investigated religion in its historical context and have found that the way religion evolved in certain societies contributed to the difference in development in societies.¹⁶⁶ The studies with a microeconomic analysis are not spared from limitations either. One often-cited constraint is that these studies are most commonly based on a single country, making it impractical for generalization. However, these studies add value to the literature as they identify an essential relationship between a given religion and certain economic performance or development difference.

From the brief overview of the literature on the topic, one can conclude that the debate on the effects of religion on economic performance is not yet complete. The existing studies encompass several problems due to the complex nature of religion as a system of beliefs. Future research is yet to resolve the issues surrounding the cross-country studies and their inability to capture a clear link between religion and economic outcomes. As suggested by Grier, and Barro and McCleary, a more thorough analysis of religious beliefs as practiced by individual religions is essential to establish a clear relationship. Moreover, future studies have the responsibility of narrowing the concept of economic performance to a variable that is narrower than economic growth, as economic growth in itself is an outcome that can be influenced by a wide range of factors.

I propose that these challenges are resolved by first, thorough analysis of the norms, rules, institutions, and practices of individual religions in relation to economic behavior,

¹⁶⁵ Filipe Campante and David Yanagizawa-Drott, "Does Religion Affect Economic Growth and Happiness? Evidence from Ramadan," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 130, no.2 (May 2015): 615-658, accessed September 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv002>

¹⁶⁶ Lisa Blydes and Eric Chaney, "The Feudal Revolution and Europe's Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World before 1500 CE," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 1 (February 2013): 16-34; Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1993); Jared Rubin, *Rulers, Religion, and Riches* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2017)

similarly to what Weber has done with the analysis of the Protestant work ethic. Henceforth, a collection of data on adherents' economic attitudes is needed to establish to what extent the analyzed religious peculiarities are practiced by adherents of the same religion and reflected in the economic sphere. Ideally, the data collection would be done across countries to eliminate the possible interfering factor of country-specific differences. However, this issue can be eliminated by controlling for exogenous events. I would also argue that comprehensive analysis of individual religions is essential as it permits examination of traits that are peculiar to different religions; as Grier suggested, performing such analysis can assist in establishing a clear link between the two phenomena. I also agree with Guiso et al. that considering economic attitudes instead of economic growth allows for a reduction of the effect of potential spurious factors; therefore, indicators of economic attitudes should be the dependent variable in the analysis.¹⁶⁷ Using the logic of these arguments, I construct the study design used in field research for contribution to this thesis.

The previous section provided a brief literature review on the economic consequences of religious beliefs, aiming to outline the already established relationships and detect the gap in the topic. The review concluded by establishing that there is no definitive resolution to the current debate on religious beliefs and economic attitudes. In the same section, I introduced the study design that I utilize in the thesis, anticipating that its implementation will resolve some of the issues for the gap in the literature. In continuation, I also discuss and present the findings of the first step of the study, defining Christian Orthodox norms and work ethic, thriftiness, and general Christian Orthodox guidelines in leading one's economic life. I find that Christian Orthodox doctrine in this regard is similar to other traditionalistic religions. However, I argue that the

¹⁶⁷ Guiso et al., "People's Opium? Religion and Economic Attitudes," 13.

emphasis of the Christian Orthodox Church on 'sacrifice' instead of Protestant's 'calling' in world affairs is the factor that could be the explanatory factor in the different normative behavior in the economic domain. Also, my initial argument that these practices may not still be as vital in the society but are effective due to their norm fortification in the society is yet to be empirically tested, but doing so will add to the existing debate in the constructivist literature on whether norm-conformation occurs due to the actor's choice or the influence of social structures. I provide this claim after conducting an empirical test in the continuation of this chapter.

Christian Orthodoxy, Moral Principles, and Rules in Economic Secular Matters

Christian Orthodoxy is one of the three main Christian denominations, and it is estimated to have approximately 200 million followers worldwide.¹⁶⁸ Christian Orthodoxy consists of a large number of Churches, some autocephalous and some autonomous.¹⁶⁹ Even though all of the churches are united in their beliefs, the theology, and the way of worship, they are different in the cultural traditions they represent. For instance, it is said that “[the churches] draw on elements of Greek, Middle Eastern, Russian and Slav culture”.¹⁷⁰ This difference has given the separate Orthodox churches their geographical distinction, and as such, today there is the Greek Orthodox Church, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Georgian Orthodox Church etc.

One could argue that the distinction is not only in the different geographic regions they represent, but as I mention above, they are also a reflection of the different cultural traditions,

¹⁶⁸ Eastern Orthodox Church. Religions. Accessed February 10, 2018, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/subdivisions/easternorthodox_1.shtml

¹⁶⁹ In Chapter 2, I provided a brief history of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, and classified MOC as autonomous, but not autocephalous. In short, a Church becomes autocephalous if it is recognized by all of the other Orthodox Churches and it is given “autocephaly” by its Mother Church. Otherwise, the Church remains with a “autonomous” status.

¹⁷⁰ Eastern Orthodox Church. Religions. Accessed February 10, 2018, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/subdivisions/easternorthodox_1.shtml

historical developments, and societal values in their respective regions. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the analysis in this thesis, I account for all Christian Orthodox institutions as sharing the same norms in regard to economic activity as it has been recognized that the only difference between the Orthodox churches in one region, Eastern Christian Orthodoxy in this case, is the difference in their geography and not in their theology, worship, or beliefs.¹⁷¹ Whether there is a difference in forming and practicing norms within the Christian Orthodox population due to the influence of country-specific developments in their respective geographies is outside of the scope of this thesis, but nonetheless, an intriguing topic to explore in the future. In this thesis, I present findings on the topic as studied and observed in Macedonian Christian Orthodoxy.

In the literature, there is a limited focus on the Christian Orthodox religious norms specifically and its economic ethics. Some scholars have analyzed Christian Orthodox principles and economic ethics, but mainly in the context of Russia and Greece. Nevertheless, I already established that for the purpose of this investigation the geographical differences will not significantly skew the analysis and the findings from these studies will contribute to the general account of Christian Orthodox norms. Next, I summarize the Christian Orthodox moral principles and rules in economic activity as found in studies of Russian, Serbian, and Greek Christian Orthodoxy.

Among the studies on Russian Christian Orthodoxy and its economic ethics, there are scholars that have studied Russian Orthodoxy before the Soviet period, and some that have studied the economic ethics of contemporary Russian Orthodox Christianity.¹⁷² The studies that

¹⁷¹ Ibid

¹⁷² Andreas Buss, "The Economic Ethics of Russian-Orthodox Christianity: Part II- Russian Old Believers and Sects," *International Sociology* 4, no.4, (December, 1989): 447-472, Accessed February 10, 2018, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/026858089004004007#>; Ivan Zabaev, "The Economic Ethics of Contemporary Russian Orthodox Christianity: A Weberian Perspective," *Journal of Economic Sociology*

focus on Russian Orthodoxy before the Soviet period provide historical overviews of the Russian Orthodox Church and its integration in the patrimonial state that contributed to the difference in church-state relationship from the Western world, but also to the importance of religious principles in the Russian society.¹⁷³ These studies traced the development of the Russian Church, its practices, and theological discourse and characterized Russian Orthodoxy as magical-traditional, ritual, and mystical.¹⁷⁴

The magical and mystical characteristics of Orthodoxy have had several effects on the society. Mysticism is explained by Weber as opposite of “the calling” that emerged from the Reformation; while “the calling” is the idea of salvation through work and proving one’s religious merit through activity and material success, mysticism, in contrast, is understood as earning an eternal award by “passive contemplation and quite repose to God”.¹⁷⁵ The practice of “obedience and humility” is often mentioned in Christian Orthodox doctrines, and this characteristic of mysticism can be the reason why such emphasis is given to obedience and humility. Moreover, the very definition of mysticism describes an experience that is characterized by unknowns, or something that is beyond one’s intellect. Unsurprisingly, Christian Orthodoxy perceives God as transcendental and unknowable, believing that “it is possible to say what God is not, but it is impossible to say what He is”.¹⁷⁶ Christian Orthodoxy also strongly refutes predestination, and instead believes that one’s salvation is dependent on whether or not one’s conduct of life resembles the principles by which Jesus lived, exhibited in

(September, 2015), Accessed February 10, 2018, https://ecsoc.hse.ru/data/2015/09/30/1074401098/ecsoc_t16_n4.pdf#page=148; Andreas Buss, “The Economic Ethics of Russian-Orthodox Christianity: Part I, *International Sociology* 4, no. 3 (September, 1989): 253-258, Accessed February 10, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1177/026858089004003001>

¹⁷³ Andreas Buss, “The Economic Ethics of Russian-Orthodox Christianity: Part I,” 243.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, 251.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, 252.

¹⁷⁶ The Doctrine of the Orthodox Church: The Basic Doctrines, *Orthodox Christian Information Center*, Accessed February 10, 2018, <http://orthodoxinfo.com/general/doctrine1.aspx>

the Christian Orthodox doctrines. Therefore, it is possible that the mysticism, the unknown, and the directives of the Christian Orthodox Church that one's salvation is achieved by following the Christian Orthodox doctrines have affected the adherents' psychology in a way that makes them obedient and humble in the economic sphere as well.

To Orthodox Christians, the highest authority is given to the Church, unlike the Catholic Christians and the Protestants who place the highest authority in the Pope and the Scriptures.¹⁷⁷ The Church in turn is perceived "as a communal group united in love," which brings together the "Christian brotherly love that will lead to unity of all things".¹⁷⁸ Hence, the importance that Christian Orthodox give to the Church and the communion it bestows have perhaps influenced the emphasis that Christian Orthodoxy places on community and brotherly behavior.

The aforementioned characteristics, among others, led the authors of the pre-Soviet studies of Christian Orthodoxy to summarize the following implications of Christian Orthodox norms on economic ethics: (1) Christian Orthodox believers should be indifferent towards worldly activities as salvation is achieved by acting "against the world and worldly activities, not in and by them," (2) Adherents should disregard vocational activity, but appreciate the "anachoretic life-style of monasticism, the perfection of human life," (3) the Church does not offer a rational innerworldly ethic of conduct, and (4) Christian Orthodox believers should be aware that the non-brotherly reality of the economic world is in contradiction to the communal needs of Christian Orthodoxy.¹⁷⁹

The goal of the studies of contemporary Russian Christian Orthodoxy was to observe whether the descriptions of the practices and principles of pre-revolutionary Orthodoxy in Russia

¹⁷⁷ Andreas Buss, "The Economic Ethics of Russian-Orthodox Christianity: Part I," 243.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, 252.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 256.

are similar to those practiced in modern Orthodoxy in Russia. After conducting field research, the author of one such study, Ivan Zabaev, finds that economic practices of modern Orthodoxy in Russia “show the same motivational pattern which is implemented in practice and described by ethics [as in pre-revolutionary Orthodoxy]”.¹⁸⁰ Namely, after examining doctrinal texts, pastoral and popular Orthodox literature, and his own account of interviews with monks and priests, he finds that “for an Orthodox Christian, ‘good action’ in the economy (or his ‘utility function’) is action which aids his humility and obedience, not which aids his success”.¹⁸¹ The author uses evidence from multiple source in the Russian literature and theology to support his observation that the findings by the scholars of pre-Soviet Russian Orthodoxy, as described above, still hold true in modern Russian society.

In December 2002, the 7th World Russian People’s Council presented “A Code of Moral Principles and Rules in Economic Activity,” which is a document that establishes moral norms in dealings in the economic and social life.¹⁸² The Council claimed that the document is not a regulation of the economic process, but rather “a moral message of the biblical tradition as it has been experienced by the Orthodox Church and other traditional religious communities”.¹⁸³ This document seems to be an evolution from the pre-revolutionary Christian Orthodoxy in Russia, which as I noted in the previous paragraph, did not offer a guide in the rational inner worldly ethic of conduct. Although the document, “A Code of Moral Principles and Rules in Economic Activity,” is said to reflect the assimilation of the ten commandments of the Mosaic Law by Christianity and “other religions traditionally confessed in Russia,” taking in consideration the prevalence of the Christian Orthodox Church, as well as the fact that the document was

¹⁸⁰ Ivan Zabaev, “The Economic Ethics of Contemporary Russian Orthodox Christianity: A Weberian Perspective,” 161.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, 162.

¹⁸² Vsevolod Chaplin, “Russian Orthodox Church and Economic Ethics at the Turn of the Millennium”

¹⁸³ Ibid

predominantly endorsed by Christian Orthodox leaders such as the Patriarch Alexy II, one can argue that this document is mainly a reflection of the Russian Christian Orthodox norms. The document highlights the following traits in regard to moral ethics in economic activity:

- (1) The document attempts to “establish an economic order as to help realize in a harmonious way both spiritual aspirations and the material interests of both the individual and the society”. Therefore, the guidance that the document gives in regard to accumulation of wealth, owning property, and handling wealth is that “the accumulation of wealth for the sake of wealth will lead the individual and his business and the national economy to an impasse...the use of property in economy should not be of narrow egoistic nature and should not contradict the common interest...It is a duty of a wealthy person to do good to people without expecting public recognition”.¹⁸⁴
- (2) Another perspective that the document provides is their instructions in Section IV of the Code that the worker needs to have a time for “rest and intellectual, spiritual, and physical development”.¹⁸⁵
- (3) The rest of the Code instruct businesses and individuals in handling economic activity while espousing the ten commandments. Therefore, the commandments “do not steal,” “do not commit adultery,” etc., and their implementation in the economic activities and business operations are outlined in the Code. Section VII, VIII, and IX instruct that there should be no tolerance for “morally abject methods” in competition, no tolerance towards criminal and

¹⁸⁴ Code II of the Moral Code, accessed February 15, 2018, <http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles5/ChaplinEconomicEthics.php>

¹⁸⁵ Code IV of the Moral Code, accessed February 15, 2018, <http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles5/ChaplinEconomicEthics.php>

immoral practice, and fairness in the distribution of fruits of work among partners and workers.

Although limited in quantity, similar analyses have been done on the Serbian Orthodox Church. In these studies, authors argue that historically the Serbian Orthodox Church has also had significant influence in the political and economic developments of the state. As such, they also argue that the religious influences on people's values and attitudes in the political and economic spheres are substantial. These studies characterize Christian Orthodoxy as "immersed in mystical spiritual discipline," and that in economic matters, "[its] emphasis is in self-sufficiency, ideally promoting a solid 'middle class,' neither seeking existence at the level of mere subsistence, nor enjoying excess".¹⁸⁶ This balance between spirituality and materialism, between self-interests and solidarity, between wealth accumulation, spending, individualism and social justice is a reoccurring characteristic in the literature of Serbian Christian Orthodox principles; in the analysis of the interaction between Serbian Christian Orthodoxy and the modern neoliberal political economics, Churich likewise finds that Christian Orthodoxy has significantly contrasting values with neoliberalism.¹⁸⁷

In the sense of theological and liturgical tradition, Greek Christian Orthodoxy is the same as other Eastern European Christian Orthodox philosophies.¹⁸⁸ Investigation into the core concepts of Greek Orthodoxy yield similar results as the ones I observed above in Russian and

¹⁸⁶ Irinej Dobrijevic, "The Orthodox Spirit and the Ethic of Capitalism: A Case Study on Serbia and Montenegro and the Serbian Orthodox Church," *Serbian Studies: Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies* 20 no.1 (2006), accessed February 15, 2018, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/257658/pdf>

¹⁸⁷ Zhivojin Churich, "The Orthodox Religion in Serbia and the Contemporary Neoliberal Political Economics [Православна Религија у Србији и Савремена Неолиберална Економска Политика]," *Institute of Political Studies* (2007), trans. by author, accessed February 20, 2018, <https://www.ceol.com/search/article-detail?id=229866>, 89.

¹⁸⁸ George Gotsis, "The Impact of Greek Orthodoxy on Entrepreneurship: A Theoretical Framework," *Journal of Entreprising Communities: People and Places in the Global Economy* 3, no. 2 (2009), Accessed February 10, 2018, <http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/17506200910960851>, 170.

Serbian Orthodoxy. Namely, studies find that Greek Orthodox principles in relation to economic activity are mainly “respect for the world and the others, rejecting their exploitation for egoistic purposes,” “inter-relatedness and wholeness,” and “otherworldliness and nearness”.¹⁸⁹ These characteristics, an interwoven combination of mysticism and brotherhood, are reflected in the principles of obedience, humility, and communion of the Orthodox doctrine. One study theorizes that based on these traits, a Greek Orthodox follower should be highly ethical in the conveyance of economic activities, devoted to serving others rather than egoistically pursuing self-serving deeds, and finally, revealing communal affinities in the wider community.¹⁹⁰

The above overview of the Christian Orthodox denomination and its core principles in relation to economic activities and modernization through the studies found in the literature on Russian, Serbian, and Greek Orthodoxy aimed to provide an inclusive account of the reoccurring themes of Christian Orthodox principles that could guide and influence the economic ethics of its followers. While some churches endow their followers with explicit codes and documents on the appropriate economic behavior, others embed these principles in the messages they share with the followers through church services and informal channels. Regardless of the means of communication, the above overview revealed recurring principles across the different geographical institutions of Christian Orthodoxy. Characterization of the religion as mystical and magical has created the sentiment of otherworldliness when one is thinking of God. This sentiment, in turn, compels followers to act in obedience and humility and live in the image of God in order to be accepted in the afterlife. The Christian Orthodox Church professes that such life is one that is, at most, indifferent towards the world activities, or at least, well-balanced between self-enrichment and solidarity, or accumulation of wealth and social justice.

¹⁸⁹ George Gotsis, “The Impact of Greek Orthodoxy...,” 154.

¹⁹⁰ George Gotsis, The Impact of Greek Orthodoxy on Entrepreneurship...,” 164.

The next section is dedicated to the Macedonian Christian Orthodoxy. To my knowledge and perusal of the literature, the findings in this thesis is among the first efforts of this nature in regard to Macedonian Christian Orthodoxy. Although numerous studies have been written about the history of the Church, the role of the Church, and the relationship of the Church and the state, there are limited to no studies that have investigated the core principles of Macedonian Orthodoxy in regard to economic activities. Additionally, the sections following the next provide something that the studies reviewed above have identified as gap in their research— assessing the practice and effects of the economic ethics of Christian Orthodoxy on its followers.

Macedonian Christian Orthodoxy and Economic Affairs

The following dissection of rules, principles and codes of Macedonian Orthodoxy is a result of field interviews conducted in the Summer of 2017 in Macedonia. The interviews were conducted in person, with an exception of one priest who chose the interview to be conducted over the telephone. I interviewed a total of ten religious leaders, the majority of whom were priests and one monk. Out of the ten interviewees, nine of them were Christian Orthodox and one of them was Catholic. I interviewed the Catholic priest to be able to make a comparison in certain aspects. The priests were selected by contacting local churches and inquiring to speak with a representative from the Church or someone that would be knowledgeable on the topic. Upon the priests' consent to be interview, I conducted the interview. There were six priests that were from the city of Skopje and the main Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church (Македонска Соборна Црква) and four that were from other cities and villages in Macedonia. Out of the twenty inquiries I made during the one-month investigation, I managed to conduct ten interviews. During the same period, I also visited academic institutions where I discussed the topic with academics from the Macedonian University, I gathered periodicals and other archival

documents from the institutions of the Church, and I attended assemblies where religious leaders were addressing the citizens. Next, I present my findings:

A) Interviews with Religious Leaders

In interviews with religious leaders during my field research, when asked about the Church's position on work ethic, economic affairs, and material wealth, the majority of the interviewees answered by quoting the following excerpt from the Bible: "It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of God."¹⁹¹ However, they all qualified the statement by stating that being rich is not a sin in itself, but the temptations that come with wealth is what makes it hard for a wealthy person to live by the standards of the Church and Christ himself. One priest defined the temptations that come from wealth as inclinations towards opportunism and greediness, while another as a trap towards rapaciousness.

While there is a certain stigma about wealth in the Orthodox Church, the Church acknowledges that one cannot lead a completely ascetic life and it suggests that wealth should be accumulated as much as it is enough for meeting the basic needs of life. If one's wealth is more than that needed for a rudimentary life, then the wealth should be handled with care and purpose. One priest quoted a precept 'your hand should sweat three times before you give money somewhere,' suggesting that if one is fortunate enough to have more than needed, it should be spent wisely towards good deeds.¹⁹²

None of the interviewed Christian Orthodox priests proposed that work should be neglected, but instead that rewards from hard work should be wisely consumed. Moreover, the

¹⁹¹ Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from the Macedonian Christian Orthodox church, June 11, 2017.

¹⁹² Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from a local Orthodox church, Skopje, July 05, 2017.

majority of the interviewees argued that one should practice firm balance in their pursuit of wealth and spiritual peace. Namely, they argued that there have been some beliefs circulated in the society in the past that financial equality is the right way to live a Christian life and to achieve this, people have completely abandoned work; even though these people have professed such beliefs in the name of Christianity, the Christian Orthodox Church, they argued, is a strong supporter of hardworking people. However, the key to leading a righteous Christian life is that the followers do not get lost in the material world and the path to wealth accumulation, but to remember that even in work, there are distractions that can lead one in the wrong path. As long as one learns how to balance work for his or her sustainability and to help one another, work is justified and encouraged.

One priest also criticized the notion of competition, a recognizable attribute of capitalism that has become the leading characteristic of working people in the modern society. He said: “In the world today, there is a huge battle going on, a battle between people. It is all due to this concept of competition, but what we need to know is that this competition creates a status quo and a generation of people that are slaves to the material”.¹⁹³

Both the Catholic, and more so the Christian Orthodox priests, spoke against capitalism as "the greatest evil."¹⁹⁴ Citing the disproportion of wealth and economic inequality, one of the priests, stated that capitalism is gaining wealth on account of the other, while another went as far as to argue that the pressure of capitalism and its contradiction with the values of Eastern religions causes people's suicides around the world.¹⁹⁵ “These neoliberal values take a person outside of its comfort zone, on an unchecked pathway that diminishes ‘the natural’ in a person,”

¹⁹³ Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from a local Orthodox church, Skopje, July 05, 2017.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from a local Orthodox church, Skopje, July 05, 2017.

¹⁹⁵ Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from a local Orthodox church, July 08, 2017; Interview with a Catholic priest from a local Catholic church, Skopje, June 30, 2017.

maintained a priest when talking about the modern times and capitalism.¹⁹⁶ These claims from religious leaders that religion serves as “a comfort zone” and that it represents “the natural” in a person bring us back to the argument I initially made about the reason why religion is enacted in critical and changing times. I would also argue that in the economic sphere, the challenges that competition and the race to wealth (or one may argue it is rather a race to survive) makes it more tempting for people to revert to religious principles to guide them in the process. Although this may be a rather elusive process to study on an individual level, one could argue that the backlash that neoliberal economic policies have faced since the 1990s on a national level is a way to scale back on the societal repercussions that competition has brought.

One other intriguing and recurring observation in the interviews was the Orthodox Church position towards the organized economy. One priest stated that “Jesus does not recognize borrowing on credit, and the Church does not believe in interest, and the banking industry,” for the Church believes that we should help our brothers and sisters without a personal stake in the process. Influences of both socialism and Islam can be noted in this statement as both socialist and Ottoman structures were highly critical of financial capitalism. The priest continued by stating that although the integration in the economic institutions, among other factors, make countries better off, the Christian Orthodox Church should remain an advocate for investing inward, towards the person rather than outwards, towards the material. Another echoed the same remarks by stating that Christian Orthodox adherents should be striving towards inner spiritual peace, rather than accumulation of wealth on the account of other people.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from the Macedonian Christian Orthodox church, June 11, 2017.

¹⁹⁷ Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from a local Orthodox church, June 15, 2017.

Finally, I was curious whether Christian Orthodoxy is unique in its perspective, or perhaps the Catholic faith holds the same views. To this question, the Catholic priest provided rather similar sentiments towards work and material wealth. He talked about sharing the wealth that God has enabled for people as sharing enriches the soul spiritually.¹⁹⁸ He spoke about the many humanitarian activities the Church has organized, but he spoke of them very humbly, as “the left hand should not know when the right hand gives,” he said while arguing that a person should give but not tell and brag about it; bragging about the good deeds one commits cancels the good deed.

Generally speaking, there are key differences between the Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church in their somewhat different theologies. While the Catholic Church is known to be more practical, the Eastern Christian Orthodox Church is more theoretical and mystical in its practices. This difference is reflected in the way the institutions worship, hold their liturgy, and in the physical structures of their institutions. Christian Orthodox churches and monasteries have a mysterious look to them, and their architecture is built in a similar way, mystic and numinous. The worship at the Christian Orthodox Church is usually a sung or chanted service, accompanied by a litany of prayers and burning incense. Moreover, in contrast to the Catholic pragmatism, Christian Orthodox mysticism may differently impact people perceive and perform in the world. Namely, if Christian Orthodoxy portrays the divinity as mystic and distant, it may also create the feeling of otherworldliness, and as such, prompts people to be more fearful, more obedient and humble in their actions in the world. I asked my interviewees about this claim, and they agreed that "Christian Orthodoxy belongs to the Eastern religions, which are those mystic religions that are oriented internally, towards the person itself

¹⁹⁸ Interview with a Catholic priest from a local Catholic church, Skopje, June 30, 2017.

rather than externally, towards the material world.”¹⁹⁹ One priest also argued that if Marxists believed that by changing the world, we change the person, the Christian Orthodox Church believes that we should change the person, to change the world— a viewpoint that aligns with the "internally-oriented" doctrines of Christian Orthodoxy.²⁰⁰ The next section presents the results from my perusal of the doctrinal text of the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the popular Christian Orthodox literature in Macedonia. Many of the principles discussed in the following texts align with the accounts of the interviewed religious leaders.

B) Doctrinal Text of the Macedonian Orthodox Church and Popular Christian Orthodox Literature in Macedonia

The Macedonian Orthodox Church issues a number of official newspapers. One of them is the Official Newspaper of the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church (*Службен Лист на Македонската Православна Црква*) that is being distributed as a hard copy to the local churches. In addition to informing the religious community of news about the Church, the newspaper is abundant with essays that address the Christian Orthodox outlook on modern social issues. During my field research, I was able to peruse the newspaper issue for the month of June. Among the essays, there was an excerpt from Kekaumenos, an eleventh-century writer with momentous influence in the Orthodox church, where he addressed the concept of work. It states: “Be careful that your life doesn’t pass by without sweat. But, don’t forget about God and the church-going...and limit yourself in the race for wealth, so the wealth doesn’t become your unsatisfying thirst.”²⁰¹ In continuation, Kekaumenos warns his followers to not let wealth

¹⁹⁹ Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from a local Orthodox church, July 08, 2017.

²⁰⁰ Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from a local Orthodox church, July 08, 2017.

²⁰¹ Ratomir Grozdanoski, “Библијата, верата и мудроста [The Bible, the Faith, and the Wisdom],” *Службен Лист на Македонската Православна Црква* 2 (2017)

become their “unassuaged thirst, because the power is not in the money, but in the serving and in one’s mind”.²⁰²

One other newspaper, also available electronically, is a newspaper by the Skopje Eparchy, The Orthodox Path (*Православниот Пат*). Similar to the Official Newspaper of the MOC, this newspaper also covers modern topics in relation to Christian Orthodoxy. One of the newspaper issues covered a topic called “Preconceptions and incorrectly disseminated beliefs about Christianity and its doctrines”. One of the preconceptions the article addressed is the notion that a good Christian Orthodox practices asceticism to a point that he or she gives up every kind of life pleasures, material ones included. The author argues that contrary to this common belief, Christian Orthodoxy does not believe that ascetic behavior should restrict personal freedom and life pleasures that one enjoys, as long as any behavior is characterized by well-balanced choices. Namely, Christian Orthodoxy advocates for a balance between an obsessive avoidance of every Earthly pleasure and an indulgence of passions that can regress the spiritual well-being.²⁰³ This was one of the principles I discovered in the studies of Serbian Orthodoxy revealed as well.

A number of churches in Macedonia have priests who try to spread the message of the Macedonian Orthodoxy through publishing on churches’ blogs and websites. In my scrutiny of such websites and blogs, I have found some that address the Orthodox ethics in relation to economic activity and modernization. For instance, a prominent priest and a theology professor in an inner city in Macedonia, Prilep, writes the following on his church’s blog website: “The

²⁰² Ibid

²⁰³ Irina Nikolovska, “Preconceptions and Incorrectly Disseminated Beliefs about Christianity and its Doctrines [Предрасуди и раширени погрешни верувања за христијанството како начин на живот и доктрина,” *Orthodox Path [Православен Пат Списание на Скопската Епархија]* 15, no.41/42, accessed March 1, 2018, <https://www.yumpu.com/xx/document/view/59234832/-41-42>

person thrives towards the earthly wealth thinking that it will comfort him, but he does not notice that it is exactly the wealth that causes him to worry and makes his life harder. The Christian should know that the material wealth does not do him any good unless it is God that gives him eternal life.”²⁰⁴ In a different post, the same priest writes about the Christian Orthodox attitudes towards work. He uses excerpts from the Bible to justify his argument that work should be done with two primary moral motivations, sustain ourselves and help those that have a need from us.²⁰⁵ Only by working and having those two motivations in mind would one person achieve discipline of the mind and the body.²⁰⁶

When it comes to the attitudes of the Church towards modernization and the capitalist society, the popular Orthodox literature shares the same concerns as the religious leaders I interviewed. They define the modern society as “a structure based on individualism, personal interests, indifference towards others or complete rejection of the others”.²⁰⁷ Moreover, they argue that the deregulation of the economic system has relished an immense power for people to rule over other people, forgetting about the weaker and the needier ones in the process.²⁰⁸ They are highly critical of the emerging order of the society and they vow to utilize the Church and everything that the Church stands for to bring people back in community and unity.²⁰⁹

Taking in consideration the traditionalist nature of Christian Orthodoxy, it should not come as a surprise that the observations made through interviews and perusal of the popular

²⁰⁴ Zlatko Angeleski, “Православниот став за сопственоста [The Christian Orthodox Position on Ownership]” Официјален блог на црквата “Свето Благовештение” (April 14, 2016), accessed November 28, 2017, https://blagovesti.wordpress.com/2016/04/14/православниот-став-за-сопственоста/#_ftn1

²⁰⁵ Zlatko Angeleski, “Work and its fruits [Трудот и неговите плодови],” accessed March 1, 2018, <https://blagovesti.wordpress.com/2015/10/31/трудот-и-неговите-плодови/>

²⁰⁶ Ibid

²⁰⁷ Emil Trajchev, “Црквата како заедница и нејзината улога во современото општество [The Church as community and its role in the modern society]” accessed March 3, 2018, <https://blagovesti.wordpress.com/2015/08/12/црквата-како-заедница-и-нејзината-уло-2/>

²⁰⁸ Ibid

²⁰⁹ Zlatko Angeleski, “Work and its fruits [Трудот и неговите плодови]”

literature are conflicting with the values of capitalism and modernization. Max Weber himself notes that traditionalism is the most significant opponent of capitalism.²¹⁰ Weber claims that “the chances of overcoming traditionalism are greatest on account of religious upbringing...and long and arduous process of education.”²¹¹ He finds that ‘the calling,’ meaning “the valuation of the fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs as the highest form the moral activity of the individual could assume,” is a product of a religious education during the Reformation. This concept of ‘calling’ has become a characteristic of the social ethic of capitalistic culture, creating a sense of obligation toward one’s success in professional sense or material possessions.²¹²

In contrast, the Christian Orthodox education has not utilized the concept of ‘the calling’ in such sense, and instead, it has retained its traditionalistic outlooks. Additionally, in the history of Christian Orthodox education, religious leaders have instead exploited the concept of ‘sacrifice’ in worldly affairs. For instance, the official website of the church St. Annunciation (Свето Благовештение) in Prilep, Macedonia, writes about the Christian sacrifice in giving up their land and material possession for the building of monasteries and churches. The author writes that the sacrifice of the Christian followers in this regard contributes to the spiritual unity of the followers, and it was also “economically effective.”²¹³ To support such deeds, the Church professes Acts 4:32 that states: “All the believers were one in heart and mind. No one claimed that any of their possessions was their own, but they shared everything they had.”²¹⁴ This attitude, as well as some of the ones I gathered from the Russian Orthodoxy principles, provide an adequate contrast of the Protestant ethic and the concept of “the calling” and Christian Orthodoxy’s concept of “sacrifice,” “servitude,” and “passive contemplation”. Weber argues

²¹⁰ Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, 22.

²¹¹ Ibid, 22.

²¹² Ibid, 16.

²¹³ Zlatko Angeleski, “Православниот став за сопственоста [The Christian Orthodox Position on Ownership]”

²¹⁴ Acts 4:32

these differences affect the psychological development in individuals, and subsequently, their attitudes and behavior towards world activities.

The above observations capture the essence of Christian Orthodox norms regarding economic behavior in Macedonia. The extent to which these norms are embedded in a predominantly Christian Orthodox society and practiced by self-proclaimed Christian Orthodox adherents is an elusive phenomenon to capture, however, I attempt to do this with the results of the surveys, the second step of my study design I present in the next section. The survey examined the respondents' attitude towards material wealth, economic integration, and other values that are characteristic of the capitalistic system. The question and the answer that is sought after is whether these adherents practice the Christian Orthodox norms of sacrifice, inner peace, wealth distribution in their economic lives, or they are also motivated by self-interest and success in the capitalistic world as conventional rational economics have led us to believe.

The Link Between Religious Principles and Economic Activity

To understand the link between religion and economic development, one must understand first how religious norms are formed and circulated in the society, and second, how these norms affect the economic behavior on individual and communal level. The formation and circulation of religious norms was discussed in Chapter I. To reiterate, I concluded that religious norms are enacted in times of instability, at times when the existential security of a person or a group is under threat. Religion serves as a stability factor, one that provides existential answers and eternal 'truths'. Another seminal finding in regard to the conformation to religious norms is the fact that religion provides hope that something that is bigger than them, and something that is unexplainable will eventually provide relief of the tension they undergo during times of

insecurity. They are accepted and circulated by a group in the society as they are a factor of unity, they provide a feeling of belonging and acknowledgement.

In the economic sphere, the challenges that modernization and the capitalist system brought contributed to another kind of tumult in societies. There is growing evidence that economic inequality, as well as the “materialistic and image-conscious times,” in developed and developing societies alike have contributed to increased levels of anxiety.²¹⁵ While conditions like “status anxiety” and “image anxiety” are common among people as young as 15 years old in the developed countries and certainly a big issue, more traditional societies are facing with an additional layer of issues. Despite the efforts to move from labels such as “traditional” and “modern” societies, the current global economic system is unquestionably supportive of neoliberal practices that divide the societies into traditional and modern; contrary to many neoliberal and modernization theorists, this division is not inherently problematic on its own, however, it becomes problematic when societies are forced to abandon their traditional outlooks in order to fit in the global economic order. This “forced” transformation from traditional to modern societies, from the known to the unknown, creates anxiety, agitation, and confusion among people.²¹⁶ These conditions in turn create fertile grounds for people’s increased reverence of religion and religious norms.

When in times of crisis, instability or discomfort, people conform to religious norms, one could hypothesize that the conformation to religious norms somehow affects the behavior of religious adherents; naturally, we first ought to know what are the norms that adherents follow,

²¹⁵ Graham Peebles, “The Rise of Anxiety in the Age of Inequality,” openDemocracy: Free Thinking for the World (May 20, 2017), accessed March 10, 2018, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/graham-peeble/anxiety-in-age-of-inequality>

²¹⁶ Peet, Richard, and Elaine R. Hartwick. *Theories of development: contentions, arguments, alternatives*. (New York: The Guilford Press 2015), 222-268.

and then observe what their effects are. Weber was the first to introduce the idea that the rationally structured ideas about salvation affect the individual's psychology and motivate their behavior in world activities.²¹⁷ I use a similar conceptual argument: Religious norms about one's conduct of life in order to be rewarded by God have historically and robustly circulated in the Macedonian society ever since the establishment of Christian Orthodoxy. These norms in turn have guided their attitudes, behavior and practices in economic activities. Next, I propose two ways, one on an individual and one on a communal level, in which the Orthodox religious principles can affect economic attitudes and behavior.

A) The Individual Level

The examination of the historical and popular literature, as well as academic studies and field interviews regarding Christian Orthodox principles revealed that, historically, the Christian Orthodox Church has emphasized indifference towards world activities and has professed that world activities should be approached in a way that aids obedience and humility. In economic activities particularly, Christian Orthodoxy guides adherents to use vocational activities and wealth attainment as long as they are used for a mere subsistence of the person, and as long as any excess is used towards the common good and not towards the success of one over the other. The finding that these principles have been found through the literature in the past and in modern times points to a conclusion that Christian Orthodox institution have retained these principles even in changing times of prevailing modernizing and capitalistic values in societies.

The question that I seek to answer is whether the abovementioned principles have been adopted as norms in a society with a predominantly Christian Orthodox population and are

²¹⁷ Andreas Buss, "The Economic Ethics of Russian-Orthodox Christianity," 255.

subsequently practiced and reflected in economic attitudes and behavior. I postulate the following hypotheses about Christian Orthodox adherents' economic attitudes and behavior:

H1: A Christian Orthodox is more likely to choose participating in Church, practicing religious activities, and humility and obedience over acquiring wealth and working.

H2: A Christian Orthodox is instructed to treat the Church as the highest authority, and as such, one can expect that a Christian Orthodox places trust in the Church and the Bible above trust in the government, the market, international organizations and other secular counterparts to the Church.

H3: A Christian Orthodox is less likely to place value in market mechanisms than employ wealth-multiplying techniques, instead chooses more conservative mechanisms of investing and saving excess wealth and borrowing money.

B) The Communal/Organizational Level

Considering the emphasis Christian Orthodoxy places on the notion of “brotherly love,” and “community,” and the evidence I found that religious leaders are distrustful and critical of the individualism and egoism that has spread with capitalism, one could hypothesize that,

H4: A Christian Orthodox is more likely to choose the community (friends, neighbors, the poor) over individual gain.

The questionnaire that I distributed in Macedonia during my field research was designed in a way that included questions that test the hypotheses above. The complete questionnaire is provided in Appendix I. In the following section, I present the data obtained via the

questionnaire. In the same section, I provide a connection between the questions and the hypotheses.

Data

The data for the study was collected from a 53-question survey. The surveys were distributed in the Macedonian population using a convenience sampling methodology and two types of surveys, in-person surveys_and_online surveys. The in-person surveys were given to people selected by convenience in three cities (survey sites included schools, bus stations, parks, and neighborhoods), while the online surveys were dispersed through social media and channels designated for survey distributions. All of the surveys were anonymous and completed by the respondents themselves. The respondents either completed the in-person surveys in privacy at the time of distribution or returned the surveys at a designated location if they chose to complete the survey at a later time. The online surveys were collected with the survey system Qualtrics. From the distributed surveys, there were a total of 619 collected responses, both hard and electronic copies. The demographic characteristics of the respondents are presented in Table 1. The demographics reveal that female respondents dominate the sample (92.28% of the Christian Orthodox sample is female); I account for this sampling characteristic in more detail later in this chapter where I include a table with coefficients for male and female respondents separately and I find that, in fact, male respondents show higher propensities for religiosity and religious influence. Therefore, the lack of male respondents should not significantly influence the findings in this thesis as a larger number of male respondents would likely only strengthen the findings. Additionally, another sampling characteristic is the large number of urban dwellers with high education. These respondents are likely to be among the least religious people in the country, therefore, a more representative survey with a larger number or rural dwellers would likely

strengthen the findings in the thesis." To provide more context to my sample, I also include a p-value column with measures that determine the differences across the demographic characteristics between the Christian Orthodox and non-Christian Orthodox samples are real or it is a chance difference. I find that there is a significant difference in several categories: (1) it is significantly more likely that a person that belongs in the first age category, 18 to 25 and the second age category, 26 to 50 to be a Christian Orthodox, (2) it is significantly more likely that a respondent that is single, married or widow/er to be a Christian Orthodox, and (3) it is significantly more likely that a student respondent is a Christian Orthodox. The p-values for each of the categories is reported in the table.

Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents

Variable	Christian Orthodox		Non- Christian Orthodox		p-v
Age	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	
18-25	87	16.3	27	27.55	0.012
26-50	383	74.08	60	61.22	0.009
51-65	40	7.74	10	10.20	0.413
65+	7	1.35	1	1.02	0.790
Sex					
Male	40	7.72	12	12.24	0.140
Female	478	92.28	86	87.76	0.140
Marital status					
Married	353	68.28	52	53.61	0.005
Single	135	26.11	40	41.24	0.002
Divorced	20	3.87	1	1.03	0.159
Separated	2	0.39	0	0	0.540
Widow/er	7	1.35	4	4.12	0.059
Employment Status					
Employed	381	73.55	67	69.07	0.363
Unemployed	73	14.09	16	16.44	0.538
Student	43	8.30	10	4.12	0.051
Retired	7	1.35	3	3.09	0.214
Recently Fired/Resigned	14	2.70	1	1.03	0.328
Geographical Area					
Rural	54	10.42	4	4.12	0.051
Urban	464	89.58	93	95.88	0.051
Socioeconomic Status*					
Low	71	14.23	20	21.28	0.082
Middle	372	74.55	59	62.77	0.019
High	56	11.22)	15	15.96	0.195
Education					
PhD	7	1.36	2	2.04	0.608
Masters	71	13.79	10	10.20	0.338
College	262	50.87	55	56.12	0.341
High School	173	33.59	30	30.61	0.566
No High School	2	0.39	1	1.02	0.421
N	518**		100		

*Low (below 200 euros/month); Middle (between 200 and 600 euros a month), and High (above 600 euros a month)

**The Christian Orthodox sample (N) varies between 499 and 518 depending on specification.

Independent Variable: Religiosity

To test the hypotheses posed above, I treat *religiosity* as an independent variable in the analysis of the data. Similarly to Guiso et al., in constructing the variable *religiosity*, I do not use only religious affiliation and self-identified religiosity, but I also include measures of religious practice and religious influence in order to capture different degrees of respondents' religiosity.²¹⁸ Therefore, the independent variable *religiosity* in my study is constructed of measures of (1) religious affiliation, (2) religious practice, and (3) religious influence. I use the measure of religious affiliation to extract a sample of religious respondents who are Christian Orthodox. I use the measures of religious practice and religious influence to control for degree of religiosity in my analysis.

A) Religious affiliation

Religious affiliation is determined based on the responses to two questions: (1) Do you consider yourself a religious person, and (2) Do you identify yourself with a religion? If yes, which one. The purpose of these two questions is to acquire respondents' self-reported religiosity and affiliation with religion. Religiosity as a concept is multidimensional and can be a subject to different interpretations. In the survey, religiosity was defined as "belief in God and devoted to organized religion or religious practices". The variable for religiosity and affiliation with religious denomination is moderately and positively related (the correlation coefficient is 0.5175). The variable for religiosity is also moderately and positively correlated with the index for religious practice (the correlation coefficient is 0.6490). The relatively high and positive

²¹⁸ Luigi Guiso et al., "People's Opium? Religion and Economic Attitudes," *Journal of Monetary Economics* 50, no. 1 (January 2003): 225-282, accessed May 2017, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932\(02\)00202-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00202-7)

correlation between these two sets of variables indicate that respondents have utilized the established definition of religiosity in their response to the survey questions.

The breakdown of respondents according to their self-reported religiosity reveals that 75.08% of the respondents have declared themselves as religious, and 87.62% of the respondents have identified themselves with a specific religion. One would expect that the percentage of respondents that have identified themselves as religious would be the same or higher than the respondents that have declared affiliation with certain religion. However, in the case of my pool of respondents, there are more people that have identified themselves with a religion than there are religious respondents. After checking for missing observations, I note that there are no respondents that have responded to the question of religious denomination and have not responded on the question of religiosity. Therefore, I conclude that the difference between these two variables is perhaps attributed to respondents who are not religious but identify themselves with a religious denomination as part of their national identity, or as part of their personal or family history. Chapter II examined this phenomenon in the Macedonian society. For instance, the findings from my sample reveal that out of the 518 respondents who have identified themselves as Christian Orthodox, 90 of them have declared themselves as non-religious. This means that 17% of my Christian Orthodox sample only views religion as part of their national and/or personal identity. Below, I present a table with the breakdown of the responses to the three questions regarding religiosity and religious affiliation.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Religious Affiliation Variable

Religious Affiliation	Frequency	Percent
Are you religious?		
Definitely Yes/Yes	461	75.08
No	153	24.92
Do you identify yourself with a religion?		
Yes	538	87.62
No	76	12.38
Religion?		
Christian Orthodox	518	94.70
Catholicism	5	0.91
Islam	18	3.29
Protestantism	0	0
Buddhism	2	0.37
Other *	4	0.73
Total (N)	615	

*Agnostic or otherwise not defined; ** N varies between 547 and 615

B) Religious Practice

I included religious practice as one of the measures of religiosity as logically, one would expect that the more frequently a person is practicing religious beliefs, traditions, and customs, the more religious the person is. The correlation between the respondents' religiosity of my survey and their reported religious practices confirms the claim as well (the correlation coefficient is 0.6490). Consequently, one would expect that the same person is influenced by religion more in his or her daily, and world, activities. The measure of religious practice is based on three questions from the survey: (1) How often do you pray, (2) How often do you attend religious services (aside from weddings and funerals), and (3) How often do you donate to your religious institutions? The responses to the questions varied on a 6-point scale from a point

indicating highly intensive practices to no practices at all. In order to compose one variable from the responses of the three questions, I used a principal component analysis (pca), and I also created an index with the weighted average of practice variable to assess which analysis more effectively captures the responses. Both indices were highly correlated with one another, indicating that either of these methods are arguably defensible for the analysis (the correlation coefficient is 0.9977); I have chosen to use the weighted average index construct for the remainder of the analysis in this chapter.²¹⁹ Below I present the summary of the responses to the three aforementioned questions.

²¹⁹ The weighted average was performed on 612 observations (N=612), the mean is .5572803 and the standard deviation is .1864022. The minimum index is .1666667 and the maximum is 1. There are four respondents that have scored the maximum of 1 on the weighted average index scale for religious practice.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Religious Practice Variables

Religious Practice	Frequency	Percent
How often do you pray?		
A few times a day	59	11.39
Every morning/night	110	21.24
Only when attending church	154	29.73
Only at religious services/weddings/funerals	18	3.47
Not very often	144	27.80
Never	33	6.37
How often do you attend religious services?		
Once a Week	31	5.98
Several times a month	100	19.31
Several times a year	256	49.42
Only for important religious holidays	86	16.60
Less than once a year/Hardly ever	43	8.30
Never	2	0.39
How often do you donate to your religious institution?		
Once a Week	12	2.33
Once a Month	38	7.38
On religious holidays	118	22.91
Per need	195	37.86
On special occasions	78	15.15
Never	74	14.37
Total (N)	518*	

* N varies between 515 and 518

C) Religious Influence

Finally, with the variable *religious influence*, I wanted to capture the importance of religion in respondents' lives as they perceive it. I argue that incorporating this measurement in the analysis is important as it allows for an assessment of whether indicating that religion is important in one's life is correlated to and has a significant relationship with one practicing and implementing religious norms in world activities, such as economic attitudes and behavior. This measurement is based on four questions from the survey: (1) How important is it/would be that your child/children are religious, (2) Have you/would you baptize your children, (3) How important is God in your life, and (4) How much would you say that your religion influences your life and everyday activities? Examining people's attitudes and choices in regard to their children is a powerful way to examine their true attitudes, hence the reason for including questions (1) and (2) in the construction of the religious influence measurement.²²⁰

Similar to the measurement of religious practice, I used a principal component analysis (pca) and an index of weighted averages for each of the questions. As in the case of the religious practice measurement, both indices of religious influence measurement were highly correlated with one another as well, indicating that either of these methods are arguably defensible for the analysis (the correlation coefficient is 0.9994); I have chosen to use the weighted average index construct for the remainder of the analysis in this chapter.²²¹ Below I present a summary of the responses to the four questions.

²²⁰ Question 1 and 2 were taken and modified from the World Value Survey, Wave 6 (2010-2014) questionnaire.

²²¹ The weighted average was performed on 602 observations (N=602), the mean is .7936047 and the standard deviation is .1834384. The minimum index is .3333333 and the maximum is 1. There are 78 respondents that have scored the maximum of 1 on the weighted average index scale for religious influence.

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Religious Influence Variables

Religious Influence	Frequency	Percent
How important is it to you that your children are/would be religious?		
Extremely Important/Important	296	57.48
Somewhat important	151	29.32
Not important at all	68	13.20
Have you/would you baptize your children?		
Yes	464	90.27
Maybe	36	7.00
No	14	2.72
How important is God in your life?		
Extremely Important/Important	434	84.11
Somewhat important	66	12.79
Not important at all	16	3.10
How much would you say that religion has influence in your everyday life?		
Extremely a lot/A lot	93	17.95
Somewhat influential	285	55.02
Not at all	140	27.03
Total (N)	518*	

*N varies from 514 to 518

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables are constructs of the investigation of Christian Orthodox principles presented earlier in the chapter. Based on the discovered principles, I constructed questions in the survey that should reveal whether the principles found in Christian Orthodoxy are adopted and practiced among the Macedonian people. Equally, these questions examine the

economic attitudes and behavior of the respondents; the responses will later be used to analyze whether the Christian Orthodox followers portray attitudes and behavior in their economic lives that are peculiar to Christian Orthodoxy.

First Hypothesis

To assess the veracity of the first hypothesis, which aims to test whether a Christian Orthodox adherent chooses participating in Church, practicing religious activities, and humility and obedience over acquiring wealth and working, I used the following three questions:

- (1) Please rank the following factors based on the importance they have in your life:
Church/other religious institution, Bible/other religious text, Work & Money, Peace, Family, Friends;
- (2) Identify the top three characteristics from the following list that you want/would want your children to respect: unselfishness in helping others, obedience & humility, participation in Church/other religious object and religious activities, reading and studying the Bible/other religious text, effort in education and work, independence, financial thriftiness, and determination;
- (3) Choose one of the listed choices in each row based on personal importance: (1) Peace and having little or (2) busy life and having more;
- (4) Choose one of the listed choices in each row based on personal importance: (1) Work more and pray less, or (2) work less and pray more.

The first question was intended to capture what percent of Christian Orthodox followers chose Church and Bible over work and money. I constructed a new variable that grouped the

respondents in two groups, one that was composed of respondents who ranked Church or Bible over Work and Money in terms of personal importance in their lives, and one that chose the opposite. In my sample, 74.02% of the Christian Orthodox respondents belonged in the first group; this means that 74.02% of the respondents in my sample chose Church and Bible over Work and Money.

As previously stated, there are studies that show asking questions about respondents' attitudes and choices for their children more clearly elicits their true attitudes. For this reason, I included the second question above.²²² The second question aimed to capture whether respondents would teach their children to respect principles that are close to the Christian Orthodox values over principles that are related to work and material achievements. Similarly to the previous question, I constructed a new variable that assembled respondents in two groups; one group represented respondents that chose any of the first set of values (unselfishness in helping others, obedience and humility, participation in Church and religious activities, and studying the Bible as top three principles they would teach their children) over the second set of values (work, independence, financial thriftiness, and determination). The second group was composed of respondents that chose the opposite. The findings from my sample of Christian Orthodox revealed that 78.19% of the sample chose values from the first set of values as the top three priorities that parents teach their children over values from the second set of values.

Finally, the third and fourth questions directly measure whether a respondent adopts the basic principles of the Christian Orthodox Church in regard to economic ethics and inquires whether peace and praying more is more important to them than busy life and having more

²²² I used and modified a question from the World Values Survey that aimed to capture whether parents, or would-be parents, choose unselfishness in helping others obedience & humility, participation in Church and religious activities, reading and studying the Bible over work, independence, financial thriftiness, and determination.

wealth. A new variable was created that shows the percentage of respondents that chose the first over the latter. The findings show that 78.69% chose peace and having little as more important than busy life and having more. However, only 21.29% chose praying more as more important than having more wealth. There could be several explanations to the difference in these two outcomes; one is that adherents display Christian Orthodox norms, but do not fervently follow religious practice. Another is that peace is generally a desired state of mind, not necessarily peculiar to Christian Orthodoxy; as such, perhaps asking a respondent to rank peace over work and money is not a strong measure of the Christian Orthodox norms conformation. I take the nuance of this question in consideration when interpreting the results in later analysis.

Second Hypothesis

The second hypothesis claims that a Christian Orthodox respondent places the Church and the Bible as superior in the social hierarchy. Therefore, one would expect that a Christian Orthodox respondent will also place trust in the Church and the Bible over their secular counterparts. I used the following question from the survey to assess this hypothesis:

- (1) Please rank the following based on your trust in them: Church/other religious object, Bible/other religious text, government institutions, market, police, international organizations?

Similar to the variable in question one, I then constructed a new variable that shows the percentage of Christian Orthodox followers that have ranked their trust in Church and Bible above the trust in government institution, the market, the police or international organizations. 46% of my Christian Orthodox sample ranked trust in the Church or the Bible over the government institutions, the market, the police or international organizations.

Third Hypothesis

The third hypothesis states that a Christian Orthodox is not likely to value market mechanisms that grow wealth, and because of that, a Christian Orthodox employs more conservative method of investing and saving excess wealth, and of borrowing money. I employ several questions to test this hypothesis:

- (1) Rank your preference of ways to invest your money: Trading market, New business, Real estate investment, Buying gold/silver, Savings account;
- (2) Rank your preference of ways to save your money: In a bank, with a family member, at a personal location, I'd rather spend them now than save;
- (3) Rank your preference of ways to borrow money: The bank, a neighbor/a family member, sell personal property, a pawnshop, an informal lender.

In all three questions, the options were constructed in a way that they range from market mechanisms that are riskier and serve as wealth-multipliers to market mechanisms that are more conservative. In my sample of Christian Orthodox, 32.35% ranked investment by buying gold/silver over investment by trading in the market, opening a new business, or investing in real estate; 35.42% chose saving with a family member or at a personal location, and spending the money rather than saving them over saving them in a bank; finally, 76.13% would rather borrow from a neighbor or a family member, would rather sell property or borrow from a pawnshop or informal lender over borrowing from a bank.²²³

²²³ One potential argument is that the undesirability of the followers to facilitate more progressive ways to save their money has less to do with their values and norm conformation, and more to do with the performance of the formal economy and the viability of the economic mechanisms. While this is certainly a reasonable argument, the key measures of Macedonia's economic performance prove to be stable and comparable to those of OECD. Key

Forth Hypothesis

Finally, the fourth hypothesis reflects the Christian Orthodox doctrines that profess and continuously reinforce the notion of community and togetherness. To assess the pertinence of this norm in the society, I use several questions:

- (1) What do you think. Choose one: Competition is good because it stimulates people to work hard or competition is harmful because it brings the worst in people;
- (2) Choose one of the listed choices in each row based on personal importance: Cooperating in team or working alone;
- (3) Choose one of the listed choices in each row based on personal importance: Giving to the poor and homeless or saving for the future.

The options in the three questions aim to measure whether the respondent finds the importance of a community to be higher of that of individual gains. By inquiring whether competition is harmful in their opinion, I intended to capture their attitudes towards competing against members from the community; only 13.81% of my Christian Orthodox sample find competition to be harmful, and the rest believe competition is stimulating. 58.73% of the Christian Orthodox sample would rather work in team over working alone; this question was meant to assess to what extent cooperation with community members is important to Christian Orthodox adherents. Finally, 46.28% of the sample answered that they would rather give to the community over saving for their future.

measurements such as the rate of inflation and price stability, gross domestic product, the stock market index, and the currency exchange rate have been performing well in the past five years. Macedonia was also one of the Western Balkan countries that was essentially unaffected by the Greek Financial Crisis due to its effective monetary policies. Further research should statistically control for this argument.

The tables with descriptive statistics for each of the questions above is included in Appendix I. In the next section, I present the empirical strategy I employ to assess the relationship between religiosity as an independent variable and respondents' attitudes and behavior in the economic sphere.

Empirical Strategy

To observe the relationship between religiosity and the attitudes of the respondents' in their economic lives and their practice of the Christian Orthodox norms, I use the following OLS estimate:

$$\text{Attitudes}_i = \alpha + \beta_i \text{religiosity}_i + \gamma C_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where i is indicating the individual's response to questions about attitudes and behavior, β is the coefficient of interest on the measure of religiosity where religiosity is defined as a combination of religious practice and religious influence, and as religious practice and religious influence separately depending on the regression model. C_i are a set of controls including age, sex, marital status, employment status, geographical area, socioeconomic status, and education. I ran the regressions with and without the controls in each panel to observe the effects of those control variables.

I apply the OLS estimate for each of the eleven dependent variables presented in the previous section. To check for robustness of the model, I also use a binary logistics estimate to observe the relationship. I run both estimates by regressing the eleven dependent variables on the religiosity index. The religiosity index, depending on the model I use, is either an index of both religious practice and religious influence measures, or a measure of religious practice and a

measure of religious influence separately. The reason I use the indices separately is to test for joint significance.

Findings

After running the regression estimates, both the OLS and the binary logistic estimates reveal same results. For simplicity purposes, I present only the logistic regressions in this section, however, I have included the OLS regressions in Appendix III. The binary logistic regression results predict the odds of the dependent variable being a case based on the values of the independent variable. Therefore, in interpreting the regression results, I look to examine what are the odds that the respondent would choose the first set of values over the second one in each of the questions based on his or her response to religious practice and/or religious influence, bearing in mind that the religious practice and the religious influence indices are both constructed in a way that a higher index means higher religiosity (in terms of self-reported practice and influence).

The results from the logit regressions are displayed in the following manner: There are four tables (Table 5 through Table 9). Each of the tables present the odds ratio of the questions used to test the hypotheses. In addition, each question is tested through three models: the first model tests the practice index on the respondent's behavior/attitude, the second model tests the influence index on the respondent's behavior/attitude, and finally the third one performs a joint test for both the practice and influence index on the respondent's behavior/attitude. There are four panels presented in the tables below (Panel A through Panel D for each hypothesis). Panel A and Panel C present the odds ratio for each of the questions used to test the individual hypothesis, while Panel B and D include the effect of control variables on the odds ratio. As previously mentioned, I use age, sex, marital status, employment status, geographical area,

socioeconomic status, and education as control variables. I do not include the control variables individually on the tables in this chapter, but the robustness table in Appendix II presents the control variables separately.

Regressions Results for the First Hypothesis

Table 5 presents the regression results for the four questions/variables that I have selected to test the first hypothesis. The results from the logit for the first question reveal a somewhat contradictory relationship between religiosity and the propensity of a Christian Orthodox adherent chooses participating in Church, practicing religious activities, and humility and obedience over acquiring wealth and working. However, due to the insignificance of the results across all models, I choose to omit that question. An exception to the overall insignificant findings is Model 2. In Model 2, I regress the choices of question one to the religious influence index alone; the results show negative and significant relationship on the first level. This means that the higher the index of religious influence is, the less likely it is for a Christian Orthodox to choose participating in Church, practicing religious activities, and humility and obedience over acquiring wealth and working.

The results from the logit for the second question reveal findings that are significant across almost all models. Namely, Model 4 reveals that the odds for a respondent to choose the first group of attitudes over the latter increases by 9.9 times (890%) with one unit increase of religious practice; in other words, the results reveal that the respondent is 9.9 times more likely to choose teaching his or her children to respect principles that are close to the Christian Orthodox values over principles that are related to work and material achievements.²²⁴ The effect

²²⁴ For simplicity, I choose to present the odds ratio as “times more likely,” however, the same coefficient can be presented as percentage by subtracting 1 from the odds ratio and multiplying it by 100.

is reduced after including the control variables; however, this effect is still significant on the third level (the odds coefficient is 7.9 after controlling for individual characteristics). Model 5 also reveals a positive and significant relationship between the religious influence index and the respondents' responses to the second question; this means that with every one unit increase of the religious influence index, the respondent is 7.8 times without controls, and 7.06 times with controls, more likely to choose any of the first set of values (unselfishness in helping others, obedience and humility, participation in Church and religious activities, and studying the Bible as top three principles they would teach their children) over the second set of values (work, independence, financial thriftiness, and determination). The findings are significant on the third and second level, respectively. When the religious practice and the religious influence indices are jointly tested in the model, the effects decrease, and the religious influence loses its significance. However, the religious practice index retains its significance and a positive relationship.

The regressions with the responses to question three as dependent variable also reveal significant and positive results across almost all models. Model 7 is significant on the third level, both without and with controls; for every unit of increase of religious practices, a respondent is 9.12 and 9.57 times more likely to choose peace and having little over busy life and having more. The same is true when I use the religious influence index as an independent variable, however, the effect is reduced to 8.98 and 8.58, without and with controls respectively (Model 8). The effect of the religious influence index also decreases and loses its significance when used jointly with the religious practice index, in both without and with controls models. The effect of the religious practice index is reduced to 4.89 (without controls) and 6.42 (with controls), however it is still significant on the first and second level, respectively (Model 9).

The coefficients generated from the regressions on question five are relatively high and significant on the third level across all models. Models 10, 11, and 12 in Panel B present the coefficients for all models. Recalling from the previous section when descriptive statistics revealed a substantial difference between the percentage of respondents that chose peace over work and money (78.69% chose the first over the latter), as opposed to the percentage of respondents that chose prayer over work and money (21.29 chose the first over the latter), it is not surprising that the regression analysis of the second question exhibits a high coefficient across all models; even though small percentage of respondents chose prayer over work and money, their responses are meaningful and highly indicative of how the extent of one's religiosity (practicing it and claiming it influences one) influences his or her attitude towards work and money. Thus, even if I choose to omit the third question due to its nuanced inquiry, I would still argue that the responses to the fourth question are sufficient in establishing the response to the first hypothesis.

Table 5. Regression Results for Variables testing Hypothesis 1

	Q1			Q2		
Panel A	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
practice	0.484		0.985	9.905***		5.925**
influence		0.222*	0.221		7.471***	2.396
Panel B	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
practice w/controls	0.521		1.064	7.941***		4.928*
influence w/controls		0.248*	0.235		7.063**	2.566
	Q3			Q4		
Panel C	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
practice	9.124***		4.896*	108.9801***		12.049***
influence		8.989***	3.037		10684.69***	2270.71***
Panel D	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
practice w/controls	9.575***		6.425**	226.661***		25.101***
influence w/controls		8.583***	2.521		14775.66***	2177.134***

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; N of observations varies by specification from 457 to 515

Based on the regression results from Table 5, and the significant and positive relationship that I find in three of the four questions I used to test the first hypothesis, I argue that there is sufficient evidence to confirm the first hypothesis. Therefore, a Christian Orthodox does choose religious services and practicing religious activities over working and acquiring wealth, humility and obedience over financial thriftiness, as more important when asked to choose between those two sets of values. This propensity increases with the degree of influence the respondent claims religion to have in his or her life, and it also increases with the degree of religious practice the respondent claims.

Regressions Results for the Second Hypothesis

Based on the Christian Orthodox belief in the Church as an institution with the highest authority, as well as the importance of the Bible in the Christian Orthodox worship, I posed the second hypothesis, which claims that a Christian Orthodox places trust in the Church and the Bible above its secular counterparts, i.e. the government, the market, the police or international organizations.

The results from the regressions are presented in Table 6. Model 1 shows that when I regress the responses to question five on the index of religious practice, the results reveal positive and significant relationship between the two, meaning that with every unit of increase of the religious practice index, the respondent is 5.42 times more likely to choose trust in the Church and the Bible over its secular counterparts. The coefficient does not considerably lose its effect or its significance once I control for individual characteristics. Model 2 reveals that the significance of the model and the coefficient decrease when I consider religious influence as independent variable, however there is still significance on the first level and the relationship is

still positive; every one unit increase in the respondent's religious influence results in 3.34 and 3.43 times higher likelihood that the respondent will choose trusting the Church and the Bible over the government and its institutions, the market, and international organizations. The effect of this independent variable decreases and loses its significance when it is jointly tested with the religious practice variable in Model 3. The effect of religious practice and the significance of the relationships are both reduced, however, it is still significant on the second level.

Table 6. Regression Results for the Variable Testing Hypothesis 2

Panel A	Q5		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
practice	5.425***		4.528**
influence		3.335*	1.215
practice w/controls	5.168***		4.476**
influence w/controls		3.428*	1.275

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; N of observations varies by specification from 458 to 486

Taking in consideration that individuals are more likely to report more correctly the intensity of their religious practices, such as attendance, donation, and praying, rather than their self-perception of how much religion influences them, it is not surprising that the effects of religious influence are smaller compared to the effects of religious practice. This is evident in the regression results in both Table 5 and Table 6.

Based on the regression results in Panel A, I confirm the relationship posed in the second hypothesis. The results reveal that a Christian Orthodox does indeed show high propensity of trusting the Church and the Bible over the government, the market, the police or international organizations. This propensity is intensified with the increase of religious practice and religious influence. Therefore, the evidence above supports the claim of the second hypothesis as well.

Regressions Results for the Third Hypothesis

The third hypothesis posited that if a Christian Orthodox follows the Christian Orthodox doctrine and its skepticism of the mechanisms of the formal economy that are designed to grow wealth, then the Christian Orthodox respondent is likely to avoid integrating in the formal economy and is likely to avoid utilizing the mechanisms that are designed for wealth multiplication.

The results from the regressions on the variables that tests the third hypothesis are presented in Table 7. All three models yielded mainly negative, but insignificant relationship between the respondents' choices in question six and their religiosity. The only positive, but still insignificant relationship, is observed between religious influence, without and with controls, and the respondents' choice of market mechanisms for investment. The relationship stays the same in Model 3 where I jointly test religious influence and religious practice.

I found similar results for question 8. There were no significant relationships between the independent variables and the respondents' choices of borrowing market mechanisms in the three different models. All of the relationships yielded negative relationships, but once again, with no significance in their p-values.

Regressions results from question 7, however, yielded significant results across almost all models. The coefficients in Model 4 are relatively high and significant. They reveal positive and significant relationship at the third level between the religious practice index and the respondents' choice of market mechanisms for saving. A Christian Orthodox individual is likely to choose a family member, a personal location or spend than save money over saving money in a bank; this likelihood increases 11.77 times with each unit increase of religious practice. The

coefficient experiences slight decrease once we control for individual characteristics, however the relationship is still significant and positive at the third level. The same can be observed for the religious influence index in Model 5; the coefficient is 10.50 and 10.54, without and with controls respectively. The effect of the religious influence index significantly decreases and loses the significance once we jointly test the indices of religious practice and religious influence. However, the index of religious practice retains significance at the second level and yields a coefficient of 6.56 (without controls) and 6.14 (with controls).

Table 7. Regression Results for the Variables Testing Hypothesis 3

		Q6			Q7	
Panel A	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
practice	0.839		0.651	11.773***		6.564**
influence		1.216*	1.614		10.505***	2.919
Panel B	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
practice w/controls	0.655		0.506	11.453***		6.137**
influence w/controls		1.086	1.685		10.544***	3.067
		Q8				
Panel C	(13)	(14)	(15)			
practice	0.523		0.689			
influence		0.432	0.562			
Panel D	(19)	(20)	(21)			
practice w/controls	0.422		0.417			
influence w/controls		0.540	0.999			

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Number of Observations (N) varies by specification from 473 to 515

Based on the regression results in Table 7, I find insufficient evidence to support the third hypothesis, which claimed that a Christian Orthodox is likely to choose more conservative mechanisms of investing, saving and borrowing money. However, I find no evidence to completely reject the hypothesis since two questions, despite the negative relationship, exhibited insignificant relationship. The only relationship I can explain with certainty is the relationship between the religiosity of Christian Orthodox and his or her attitudes towards savings

mechanisms. To this extent, a Christian Orthodox is likely to choose saving through more conservative manners such as saving with a family member or at a personal location over saving in a bank. This relationship can be further explained by the observation that with every unit increase of religious practice, a Christian Orthodox is almost 12 times more likely to choose more conservative ways to save. The previous two questions can be a subject of further research, where the claim in the third hypotheses can be tested with perhaps different survey questions or more data points.

Regressions Results for the Fourth Hypothesis

Considering the strong emphasis the Christian Orthodox doctrine places on “brotherly love” and “communion,” as well as the Christian Orthodox contempt for egoism, the fourth hypothesis claimed that a Christian Orthodox will choose the community over his or her own individual gain.

Table 8 presents the results from the regression tests ran on three questions that attempted to test the fourth hypothesis. The results from the regression of the responses from question nine on the respondents’ religiosity reveal positive, but insignificant relationship. The only significant coefficient is the one between respondents who find competition is harmful and the index of religious influence, however, once I control for individual characteristics, the relationship loses significance. Therefore, I find no evidence of a relationship between respondents’ attitudes towards competition and religiosity.

Question ten captures the Christian Orthodox respondent’s choice of working in team over working alone. The relationship between the responses to this question and the index of religious practice is positive and significant at the first level; a Christian Orthodox is likely to

choose working in team over working alone, and it is 3.05 times more likely to do so with every unit increase of religious practice (Model 4). The magnitude of the coefficient increases once we control for individual characteristics, and once we perform a joint test with the index of religious influence (Model 6). The same is not observed for Model 5 and testing the index of religious index. Even though the model yields a positive relationship, this is not a significant one. Moreover, the coefficient loses its magnitude and turns negative once we perform a joint test in Model 6.

The regression tests with responses from question eleven and religiosity are positive and significant across all models. Even though the coefficients decrease in Model 9, they retain their positive and significant relationship. The results show that a Christian Orthodox is likely to choose giving to the community over saving for the future, and he is 17.43 times more likely to do so with every unit increase of religious practice, and 32.72 times more likely to do so with every one unit increase of religious influence. The coefficients decrease to 17.1822 and 27.36406, with controls for both indices respectively (Model 7 & 8). The coefficients decrease further to 5.75 and 9.59 with controls once I joint test them in Model 9, however the relationship is significant at the third level as in the previous two models. One limitation to these effects is the fact that I cannot compare respondents' self-reported values towards giving to the community with their actual behavior. A follow-up survey is needed to assess the levels of charitable giving, both through monetary donations and volunteering.

Table 8. Regression Results for the Variables Testing Hypothesis 4

		Q9			Q10	
Panel A	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
practice	3.465		1.496	2.777		4.536**
influence		6.119*	4.694		1.205	0.457
Panel B	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
practice w/controls	3.670		2.996	3.056*		5.315**
influence w/controls		6.517	2.275		.750	.154
		Q11				
Panel C	(13)	(14)	(15)			
practice	17.433***		4.838**			
influence		32.728***	11.468***			
Panel D	(19)	(20)	(21)			
practice w/controls	17.182***		5.749**			
influence w/controls		27.364***	8.598**			

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Number of Observations (N) varies by specification from 473 to 515

Based on the evidence from Table 8, I have relatively strong evidence to confirm the fourth hypothesis. The fact that a Christian Orthodox is likely to choose giving to the community over choosing to save for his or her future, and that a Christian Orthodox would rather work in a team over working alone, and we can claim so with certainty as these relationships were significant, can be attributed to the Christian Orthodox preference of community over individual development. The evidence for supporting the hypothesis would have been stronger had I found that Christian Orthodox respondents find competition harmful, as that would have strengthened the argument made with the fourth hypothesis. However, due to the insignificance of the relationship, I cannot claim the latter with any certainty.

Discussion

In the previous two sections, I provided descriptive analysis of the survey data, as well as the regression analysis with which I attempted to explain the relationship between Christian Orthodoxy and the attitudes and behavior in the economic sphere. The descriptive data simply

exhibited the percentage of Christian Orthodox that follow certain Christian Orthodox norms or captured their attitude and behavior towards different market mechanisms. The results from the descriptive statistics of the survey data were suggestive, however, the regression analysis helped me in explaining the Christian Orthodox attitudes and behavior in the economic sphere based on the intensity of their religiosity.

Based on the results from the both analysis, I have sufficient evidence to respond to the previously established hypotheses to some extent and with some degree of certainty.

I can confirm the first hypothesis as I am confident in the significance that three out of the four questions showed. Therefore, the positive relationship reveals that a respondent that declares him or herself as Christian Orthodox exhibits propensity to choose participating in Church, practicing religious activities, and humility and obedience over acquiring wealth and working; this relationship remains significant across models that employ both religious practice and religious influence as indicators.

The second hypothesis can also be confirmed; a Christian Orthodox respondent is likely to place trust in the Church and the Bible above trust in government institutions, the market, and international organizations. A Christian Orthodox that has higher religious practice index is more likely to portray this attitude. The same can be concluded for a Christian Orthodox with a higher self-declared religious influence, however, with less significance in this relationship.

The results that sought to test the third hypothesis are not suggestive or predictive to the extent of the previous two. Only one of the questions, the question that inquired Christian Orthodox respondents' practice of saving money yielded significant and explanatory results. Based on these results, I can confirm the hypothesis that a Christian Orthodox shows a

propensity to choose more conservative mechanisms to save money, and this is true and significant in models where I test for intensity of religious practice and religious influence. Due to the insignificant results of the questions on investing and borrowing, I cannot make a definitive claim on the hypothesis for investment and borrowing.

Finally, only one of the questions that test the fourth hypothesis produced results that are robust and significant across all models. The results disclosed that a Christian Orthodox chooses to give to the community over saving for the future; this effect remained significant for the intensity of Christian Orthodox practices, and religious influence. I would argue that the robustness and the significance of the results, as well as the content of the question is sufficient in confirming the fourth hypothesis.

Overall, across all panels and models, the index of religious practice proved to be more robust than the index of religious influence. This effect is expected, as responses to intensity of religious influence are highly subjective, while the index of religious practice tends to be a more objective measure. Nonetheless, in the majority of questions, both indices proved to yield significant results in the analysis. In the model where I used joint test for the two indices, the significance and effect of the coefficient decreased; this outcome is likely due to the moderately high correlation between the two indices, therefore the model explains less of the variance in the dependent variables when the both indices are considered jointly. For this reason, I do not believe that this outcome from the joint model is problematic to the analysis.

Generally taken, the analysis so far supports my argument that Christian Orthodox adherents reveal more conservative attitudes and behavior in their economic activities. However, there are limitations to the study that do not allow for a causal statement to be established yet.

Next, I address the limitations of my study and I propose some ways that my study can be improved with future research.

Limitations and Future Research

One limitation to my study is the prevalent number of female respondents in my sample; the ratio of male to female respondents is one to eleven. Taken that the majority of my sample is women (nearly 90% of the sample), the findings can be regarded as a representation of Christian Orthodox women's attitudes and behavior in the economic sphere. Despite the efforts to target more male respondents, the response rate from men was significantly lower. Male respondents either refused to fill out a survey or partially filled it out, which required discarding the response completely. In Appendix II, I include a robustness table where I present coefficients separately for the male and female respondents for the questions used in the analysis. I find that when the odds ratio for the male sample yields significant results, the odds are higher than when the same analysis is performed on the female sample. The fact that the odds ratios for the male sample are higher than those of the female sample suggests that the religious influences I found in the analysis would be further strengthened with additional male respondents. Additionally, such surprising finding calls for further research on this topic.

Another limitation is that part of the survey was distributed via social media and other internet channels, and therefore my sample is limited to respondents that have access to a computer and the internet. I attempted to mitigate for this limitation by also distributing hard copies of my survey and conducting in-person surveys, nonetheless, the ratio of hard-copy survey to online survey is one to nine. However, I would argue that this limitation is not detrimental to the findings as a survey that included more low-income and rural respondents is

likely to discover an even stronger relationship between religiosity and economic behavior, which would have resulted in strengthening the findings.

I would argue that the predictive analysis is highly suggestive of the relationship between Christian Orthodox religiosity and attitudes and behavior in the economic sphere, I still cannot claim any causal relationship. This limitation is mainly due to my analysis being done on a sample of Christian Orthodox respondents, and the lack of non-Christian Orthodox respondents as comparative units. In future research, I focus on conducting analysis that will show whether the case of a respondent being a Christian Orthodox predicts his or her attitudes and behavior in economic activities and practices. My data is limited by a large sample of Christian Orthodox adherents, and a relatively smaller sample of non-Christian Orthodox respondents. To conduct a more comprehensive analysis, my study needs more data.

There is also the issue of external validity, as the data was gathered within one country and the findings cannot be generalized to other countries. The attitudes and behavior that the respondents display can be attributed to cultural factors and country-specific developments. In future research, I plan to control for this issue by collecting data across countries. One way to do this is to compare the World Value Survey data collected from similar questions answered by Christian Orthodox respondents from different countries. Another way is to extend my field research to other predominantly Christian Orthodox countries like Serbia and Bulgaria.

Regarding factors such as country-specific developments, one apparent factor is the effect of socialism on the attitudes and behavior of respondents; one can notice that some of the Christian Orthodox norms align with the characteristics of a socialist society. Macedonia functioned as a socialist society until the succession from Yugoslavia in 1991; after 1991,

Macedonia underwent significant reconstruction in order to transform to a capitalist society. To test for the influences of socialism on the sample's responses, I plan on dividing my sample on respondents who were born and lived during the socialist era, and respondents who were born after 1991. Technically, respondents who were born after 1991 were not exposed to the socialist mechanisms in the society, thus this should reduce the effect of socialism on the respondents' attitudes and behavior.

Finally, one issue that is inherent in social science surveys is the probability of respondents' lack of transparency in answering survey questions. There is the possibility that a respondent is not comfortable providing answers that may present them in an unfavorable manner i.e. selfish, self-centered, greedy etc. I attempted to address this issue by ensuring respondents that the survey is anonymous and confidential. Moreover, there is a risk of my sample not being representative of the overall Macedonian population due to the utilization of convenience sampling rather than random sampling as a survey methodology. There is a possibility of over- or under-representations of the attributes, attitudes, and behavior of the Macedonian population. Future work will focus on weighting the sample from this study to the national consensus in order to address this limitation.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter, I posed an argument that the historical presence of Christian Orthodoxy and the interconnectedness of religion and secular affairs in Macedonia have created and fostered religious norms that influence people's attitudes toward economic activity. To provide evidence for my argument, I first investigated Christian Orthodox norms as observed in other predominantly Christian Orthodox countries; I did this in order to isolate the

possibility that the Christian Orthodox norms I find in the investigation of the Macedonian society are peculiar to the Macedonian society alone.

The following section provided evidence of the Christian Orthodox norms, specifically those devised to regulate economic behavior, in the Macedonian society. I analyzed MOC doctrinal texts and popular Christian Orthodox literature, and I utilized evidence from primary resources, my interviews with religious leaders, to delineate several reoccurring Christian Orthodox norms across all resources. I found that Christian Orthodoxy shows a strong preference towards a well-balanced life and is generally distrustful of market mechanisms that are meant to multiply wealth. Consequently, Christian Orthodox leaders advise against egoistic behavior such as saving in excess and multiplying wealth. They believe in salvation through following and practicing God's words, provided in the doctrines.

Based on the findings from the norm investigation, I postulated four hypotheses that I then tested with the results from the survey. I was able to confirm three of the hypotheses with a sufficient level of robustness and certainty. Recognizing that there are limitations to the analysis due to sample and endogeneity issues, I still find the study to be substantial and suggestive of the relationship between Christian Orthodox religiosity and economic attitudes and behavior.

Specifically, I find the study significant as it revealed that a large percentage of Christian Orthodox attitudes align closely to the Christian Orthodox norms I outlined with the investigation. This suggests that the Christian Orthodox followers do adhere and conform to Christian Orthodox norms. Consequently, the effects of these norms, as observed through the behavior of the respondents in terms of their practices in the economic sphere, are reflected on

the followers. With some certainty, I was able to show evidence that these respondents are more likely to choose conservative mechanisms in saving their wealth over more progressive ones.

More broadly, the implication of this study is that it provides evidence that, contrary to the rational economic theory, not every human being acts of a self-interest, and not every human being exhibits egoistic tendencies when it comes to accumulating wealth. This study suggests that there are potentially social forces, such as religious norms, that shape the behavior of human beings in the economic sphere as well. The study adds to the emerging literature of studies that explore ethnic backgrounds, religious beliefs, upbringing, and other cultural differences that influence our conception of fairness, competitiveness, judgement, as well as our beliefs about the nature of the person. These differences are very often deeply engrained in people, and neither a government nor a market can (nor should) hastily change people's attitudes and behavior in the world. Our different conceptualizations of every day concepts shape our actions and how we behave in worldly activities. The study presented in this chapter simply tried to capture the role religious beliefs of a specific religious group play in the society, and the economic sphere specifically.

Thesis Conclusion

In the previous chapter, I investigated the role of religious norms, rules, institutions, and social practices in political and economic developments in the case study of Macedonia. As the findings show, religion still plays a prominent role in the Macedonian society in both political and economic domains. Through the analysis, it was also illustrated what allowed for these religious forces to become effective in the society and how they influenced the various political developments in the country, as well as the different economic attitudes and behavior of Christian Orthodox adherents. I will briefly review and summarize the findings of both the political and economic domains, before discussing the significance of this thesis, the contribution to the constructivist approach and implications of this thesis for similar scholarship, and providing suggestions for future research.

Review of Religion and Political Affairs

In the analysis of the relationship of religion and political developments, I chose to look specifically at the role of religion in two political developments, one is the building of a national identity, and the other one is nationalism.

In the review of the literature that examines the first relationship, the relationship between religion and national identity, I first observed the significance of religion on the individual level. I discovered that religious values are enacted in times of crisis and instability, at times when the individual's self-preservation is threatened and when the individual feels outside of his or her comfort zone. Religion then provides the psychological support, stability, and fundamental sense of safety because of its ability to provide existential answers based on rules set by God instead of the individual himself to have to seek and choose rules in uncomfortable

and perhaps overwhelming circumstances.²²⁵ Moreover, religion being a common myth, is inherently uniting and delivering of the “fellowship” feeling, where individuals bond under a common belief in something that collectively secures their existence. Therefore, on the individual level, it is the threat to existential security that makes individuals to cling to something that is known, stable, and continuous.

Scaling up to the national level, I observed the same uniting propensities of religion for including religious norms, symbols, practices, and traditions in the building of a nation. In many ways, the constructs of nation and religion share similar characteristics; they are both factors for the creation of “imagined communities,” where the members of their communities have a common imagine of what unites them in their communion.²²⁶ Also like other uniting factors of a nation, such as language or a flag, an anthem, religion binds members of one nation together. However, we seldom observe revolutions in the name of an anthem or a language, but religion has erected revolutions and movements in past and modern times. I argued that the distinguishing reason lays in the abstract nature, the multiple interpretations, and most importantly, the psychological influences of religious beliefs on individuals. Therefore, religion becomes an enduring and sensitive part of the national identity of one country.

The enactment of religious elements in nationalistic movements, however, is due to the belief of the actors in these movements that their existential security and their unity are under threat. Therefore, it is once again the ontological security that is of concern to the actors in these nationalistic movements. It is perhaps the ability of religion to psychologically and emotionally unite members of one nation that contributes to the prominent spot of religion in these

²²⁵ Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism,” 759.

²²⁶ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 49.

movements; it is the need for perseverance and security of the nation or society that the nationalistic movements seek to protect. In a way, religion invigorates these movements.

The analysis becomes more intricate when we analyze different actors within these movements. The motivations behind enacting religion in these movements differ depending on the actor; the participation of civilians, religious groups, and government elites and their motivations and role in the utilization of religious elements in nationalistic movements differ based on the extent to which their ontological security is threatened.

With the analysis in the case study of Macedonia, I found consistence between the findings of the literature and the empirical evidence. Macedonia served as an excellent case study for observing the role of religion in its nation building as the country gained its independence after long years of both occupation or control of other states in 1991. Therefore, the nation building of Macedonia is recent, and arguably still ongoing process where the role of religion can be compatibly studied. The empirical evidence revealed strong religious presence, predominantly of the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church, in the building of the nation. In the perusal of the Macedonian Constitution, as well as numerous political, religious, and media statements, the empirical evidence proves that religion is used as a uniting factor in the building of a nation. One can argue, based on the evidence, that Christian Orthodoxy even holds a more prominent spot than the other elements of the nation.

However, such a strong relationship between the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church and the secular affairs in Macedonia creates tensions in a multiethnic and multireligious society such as the Macedonian society. Therefore, since its independence, Macedonia has been faced with many political crises that were partly influenced precisely due to the numerous ethnic and

religious cleavages in Macedonia and the prominent role given to religion in secular affairs. Nonetheless, these crises, and more specifically the crisis of 2001 allowed for me to observe the above theoretical claim that religion is vigorously enacted in times of crises and when the ontological security of different actors is threatened. Through statements by civilians, religious leaders, and government officials, I was able to observe the motivations and the extent to which these groups were able to enact religious elements in order to protect their ontological security, and/or the ontological security of their community or group.

This analysis added to the overall argument that the political developments in one country cannot be analyzed from a uniform and standard set of assumptions as a country like Macedonia has had recurrent and historical struggles to establish itself as an independent nation. These characteristics, in combination with the historical pride in Christian Orthodoxy, makes for a nation that is sees religion as integral to its identity and that is especially prone to enact religion in order to secure its ontological identity.

Review of Religion and Economic Affairs

In the analysis of the relation between religion and economic attitudes and behavior, I mainly draw from the Weberian model to construct the arguments on the relationship, and I also rely upon subsequent studies that have attempted to quantify and test Weber's claims in the literature of religion and economic outcomes.

The two primary arguments that I drew from Weber's work is his concerns with first, how religious ideas become effective forces in the society, and second, how forms of religious beliefs and religious movements correlate with practical morals and the material culture. In

regard to the first question, Weber himself provides an answer that I use as an argument throughout the thesis. Namely, the argument is that the individuals' attitudes and behavior in the economic aspect of the society are a product of the psychological sanctions that are placed by a religious context as a whole and these psychological sanctions, in turn, influence people's attitudes. One important contrast that I made between the Weberian analysis of the psychological sanction proposed by the Reformation and the Protestant denomination and the one that Christian Orthodox norms and institutions have proposed and professed is in the difference between the concept of the Protestant's "calling" and the Christian Orthodox "obedience, sacrifice, and humility".

Based on this difference, as well as other Christian Orthodox norms that I found with my investigation into Christian Orthodox norms and their message for appropriate attitudes and behavior in the economic sphere, I expected to be able to analyze the second question that is concerned with the correlation between normative forms of the Christian Orthodox faith and the material culture. To achieve this, I utilize the data I gathered during my field study where I surveyed Christian Orthodox adherents, questioned their adherence to Christian Orthodox norms and their attitudes and behavior in the economic sphere where I included questions that are reflective of the material culture that Weber outlines in his work.

The survey data analysis revealed that a significant portion of the Christian Orthodox population in Macedonia follows the principles that are promoted with Christian Orthodox norms. Some of these principles included church attendance and reading of the Bible over acquiring wealth and working; obedience, humility, participation in the Church over independence and financial thriftiness; choosing peace and praying more over busy life and more wealth; trusting the Church as the highest authority over the government; avoiding wealth-

multiplying techniques and other questions that measured their conformation to Christian Orthodox norms.

Moreover, I used the survey data to regress the level of religiosity of Christian Orthodox adherents on their choices to adhere to Christian Orthodox norms and practice economic behavior and have economic attitudes that are in line with the Christian Orthodox teachings. I posed four hypotheses; the survey data yielded robust evidence to confirm three of the four hypotheses. Namely, I confirmed the hypothesis that claimed that a respondent that declares him or herself as Christian Orthodox exhibits propensity to choose participating in Church, practicing religious activities, and humility and obedience over acquiring wealth and working. I also confirmed the second hypotheses that posed that a Christian Orthodox respondent is likely to place trust in the Church and the Bible above trust in government institutions, the market, and international organizations. I was not able to confirm the third hypothesis that claimed that a Christian Orthodox shows a propensity to choose more conservative mechanisms to save money, and this is true and significant in models where I test for intensity of religious practice and religious influence. Due to the insignificant results of the questions on investing and borrowing, I was unable to make a definitive claim on the hypothesis for investment and borrowing. Finally, the fourth hypothesis that a Christian Orthodox chooses to give to the community over saving for the future was confirmed due to the robustness and significance of the results.

While the results of the study were able to confirm the question on correlation between Christian Orthodox norms and the material culture, the analysis also helped in confirming that there are social forces that also influence individuals' behavior in the economic sphere other than the assumed self-interest. Additionally, the evidence suggests a validation of the overarching argument in this thesis that one can claim that certain economic policies are not well adapted and

enacted in Macedonia because the ideas and principles behind these policies are not compatible with the values presented in the culture; a reason why the historical, cultural, and societal context of one country is important when evaluating development.

Now that I have reviewed the two principal questions in this thesis, I conclude the review by reiterating the argument of how these two seemingly different domains are tied together. In other words, while it seems that the two questions address dissimilar subjects, I argue that they have several traits in common. The first thing is that both questions address how something ecclesiastical such as religious norms, rules, institutions, and practices affect something that is the opposite of ecclesiastical, material and performed outside of the spiritual domain, i.e. politics and economics. Through the analysis, I found that both of these domains are affected by religious elements in the same way; in both domains the reasons for individuals' enactment of religious elements is due to the power of religion to provide stability and security in times when the individual fears for his or her existence in earthly life and for salvation in the afterlife. In the political domain, it is the fear of the changing societies, of the unknown, and of the dissimilar. In the political domain, religion provides cohesion and unity that ostensibly shields and provides comfort to adherents in changing times. In the economic domain, it is perhaps the fear of the unknown in the afterlife, and it is the psychological need to know one will experience redemption in the afterlife; perhaps that is the reason why Christian Orthodox choose to be obedient and humble, instead of seeking their self-interest in the economic domain. Unarguably, while the fear of the unknown has certainly proven to be a motivating factor in obeying and enacting religious norms, people also adhere to religious norms simply because of their sincere belief in these norms. These two factors are certainly not identical nor mutually exclusive, but

instead, they both influence and guide the behavior of adherents at various points and circumstances of their lives.

Naturally, as much as one can form opinions based on observable behavior, there is always the unobserved part, the human psychology in these processes that is harder to capture. Nonetheless, this study shed light on the fact that it is the fear of the unknown that empowers religious elements and binds these two domains together. Moreover, the findings of this study in both domains contributed to the argument that for newly introduced policies, political and economic included, to be effective in one society, there needs to a consideration of the existing ideologies of that society; ideologies, such as the Christian Orthodox ideology in Macedonia that has been in creation for centuries.

Significance, Implications, and Contribution

The empirical findings in this thesis illustrate the effect that religious norms, rules, institutions, and practices can have in both the political and the economic domains of a country. The significance of the findings in the political domain is especially relevant for Macedonia; the findings suggest that the combination of intricate historical connections to religion, the emotional attachment to people and events that have led to the national emancipation of the country, and the multireligious and multiethnic society will make it difficult for the society to detach itself from religious sentiments. Understanding this heritage should assist policymakers in their decision making. Taking the historical developments in consideration, one would rightfully suggest that any radical changes that are imposed on the Macedonian society, especially by third parties as it was the case after the 2001 insurgency and the establishment of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, would be met with dissatisfaction from the majority of the public. The evidence that was included from statements by different actors is suggestive that there is an

existent sentiment that clings to traditional and religious values. This realization can also have policy implications for Macedonia. Whatever political changes are enacted in the country, they need to be enacted with consideration and open discussion where these values are recognized. As a young country with significant insecurity to its ontological identity and existence, political and policy changes that further exacerbate the fragile Macedonian identity may further infuriate and invigorate nationalistic movements. There needs to be a social representation of the traditional groups, in addition to the progressive parties, in order for the country to achieve a common ground peacefully. The current political situation in Macedonia shows the exact opposite.

In addition to the significance the findings have for Macedonia, the investigation into why religion is an enduring factor in building a nation and why religion is enacted in the nationalistic sentiments of members of a society has offered a more objective approach to religious movements worldwide. Often times, religious movements in modern times are perceived as inherently violent. While I do not claim that historical and cultural heritage of a society can be a justification for violence posed by certain religious movements, I would argue that enacting religious sentiments should not always be viewed with disdain as doing so further frustrates members of a religious society; as this thesis presented, these religious values provide comfort and security to people, unwillingly separating them from these values may irritate individuals and make them feel marginalized.

The significance of the findings in the economic domain are manifold. As the literature review of the studies that examine the relationship between religion and economic outcomes showed, there is a gap that a number of the authors detected — the need for quantifying the relationship between specific religious principles and the economic behavior of the adherents to be able to observe the direct relationship between them. The study in this thesis was designed

precisely to fill this gap. Moreover, I focused on the Christian Orthodox denomination as there is a limited number of studies that have included empirical evidence on Christian Orthodox adherents. Finally, there is significance in finding that an individual is not always a rational actor and does not always act of self-interest in her economic choices. There are social and cultural factors, such as religious contexts, that have influenced the psychological sanctions and in turn, the attitudes and behavior of adherents in the economic sphere as well.

In regard to Macedonia, the suggestive findings in the economic realm that there are certain peculiarities in the way Christian Orthodox adherents interact with the material culture suggests that there should be certain consideration of this characteristics in policy implementation as well. While using cultural, and religious, explanation for the development economic status of Macedonia is limited, and seeking policy interventions that can potentially influence and change these cultural traits constraining, there needs to be an open discussion about these conflict of norms among Macedonians to ensure proper understanding of this relationship. A potential tactic would be a corroboration with representatives from religious institutions in addressing such challenges. For example, the Russian Christian Orthodox Church has proposed a code that mentors its adherents on dealing with the societal changes and modernity while also staying true to their faith and moral conduct. By doing so, religious leaders could provide the adjustment and comfort needed in a changing society, while also not changing the character of the faith.

Since the study revealed evidence that there are historical and societal factors in the case of Macedonia that have influenced the peculiar enactment of religious norms in nation building, nationalistic sentiments, and economic attitudes and behavior, this case study should serve as an example that every country has its own historical and cultural heritage that influences political

and economic developments in the country. Therefore, scholars and policymakers should devote more time in learning the peculiarities of countries' development in societal and cultural context as well in order to be able to implement policies that are effective. To reiterate the argument I have made several times throughout the thesis, new ideas and policies are not independent of the existent ideological realities on the ground, and their effectiveness is conditional upon the reconciliation of new ideas with existent norms, rules, institutions, and practices.

Suggestions for Future Research

The rise of reinvigorated religious movements and religious sentiments have weakened the arguments of the secularization theory and its prediction of a “slow and steady death of religion” with modernization. Therefore, the debate on the power of religion is not over yet.

Unfortunately, some violent movements in the name of religion, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have prompted people to generalize and view religious movements and religious sentiments as inherently prone to violence, or perceive them as backward and in other negative context. I argue that we should make an effort to understand the power of religion in modern societies and establish ways in which religion can function in secular conditions. The literature on norm conflict tells us that different sets of norms are in conflict of at all times, and through these conflicts, the evolution and formation of norms continues. It is our task that we find a way that we respect the comfort, the security, and the stability that religious norms bring to some societies and not force sets of norms that is perceived as violation to their ontological identity by the members of those societies.

The goal of this study was to shed a light on the increased religious sentiment in Macedonia and find the motivations and reason for this occurrence. Additionally, with the

analysis of religious norm conformation in the economic sphere, the study showed that the adherence to religion is threaded deep into the societies and the adherents' behavior and attitude. I would argue that this kind of analysis can be broadened to capture similar effects in other societies as well, especially in those alike the Macedonian society where religion holds a prominent place.

The analysis done in this thesis has yielded significant empirical evidence, nonetheless, the study design can certainly be improved with future research. In the analysis of the relationship between religion and political developments, a statistical qualitative analysis would enrich the findings. Although this study included a substantial number of statements from various actors in the political field, including a qualitative analysis such as perhaps a discourse analysis can assist in statistically depicting the pattern of religious sentiments from different groups of interest in the political field.

In the analysis of the relationship between religion and economic behavior, I listed several limitations to the study in this thesis and suggested ways that it can be improved. Here, I echo what I suggested in the chapter and call for future research that would address causality in the relationship between religious principles and economic attitudes and behavior. In the chapter I proposed some techniques that can be used to assist with determining causality in the relationship. Furthermore, I would argue that the strength of the study design is in the connection it makes between specific principles (norms, rules, practices) of Christian Orthodoxy, as well as the intensity of belief and practice of these norms, and the attitudes and behavior of Christian Orthodox adherents. This kind of design predicts a more precise relationship, unlike other designs where studies use general variables such as religious affiliation and macroeconomic elements such as economic growth or economic performance indicators to depict the

relationship. I would suggest that studying the study design that was introduced in this thesis should be improved and implemented in other religious denominations and societies.

Overall, despite the strengths that this study brought forward, there are certainly potential avenues for future research that should be explored as the relationship between religion and economic development especially is yet to be fully established. In the political domain, we certainly need to continue having a discussion on the role of religion in political affairs as enacting religion in the secular affairs of certain countries is likely to continue.

Bibliography

- Adler, Emanuel .“Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in Worldly Affairs.” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no.3 (September 1997): 320. Accessed November 10, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066197003003003>.
- Adler, Emanuel and Vincent Pouliot. “International Practices,” *International Theory* 3, no. 1 (February 2011): 1-36. Accessed October 12, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297191000031X>
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*, (New York, NY: Verso, 2006).
- Andreassen, Morten Dehli. “If you don’t vote VMRO, you are not Macedonian: A Study of Macedonian identity and national discourse in Skope” (master’s thesis, University of Bergen, 2011, accessed January 31, 2018. http://bora.uib.no/bitstream/handle/1956/5066/85188172.pdf;jsessionid=151517D7A8F39BCEA18DC52F757B8DC4.bora-uib_worker?sequence=1
- Angeleski, Zlatko. “Православниот став за сопственоста [The Christian Orthodox Position on Ownership].” Официјален блог на црквата “Свето Благовештение” (April 14, 2016). Accessed November 28, 2017. https://blagovesti.wordpress.com/2016/04/14/православниот-став-за-сопственоста/#_ftn1
- , “Work and its fruits [Трудот и неговите плодови],” accessed March 1, 2018, <https://blagovesti.wordpress.com/2015/10/31/трудот-и-неговите-плодови/>
- Barro, Robert J. and Rachel M. McCleary. “Religion and Economy.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 49-72.
- Barro, Robert J. and Rachel M. McCleary. “Which Countries Have State Religions?” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120, no. 4 (November, 2005): 1360, <https://doi.org/10.1162/003355305775097515>
- Barro, Robert J. and Rachel M. McCleary. “Religion and Economic Growth across Countries.” *American Sociological Review* 68, no. 5 (October 2003): 760-781. Accessed May 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1519761>.

Bender, Courtney . "Religion and Spirituality: History, Discourse, Measurement." *Social Science Research Council* (January 2007). Accessed November 10, 2017.
<http://religion.ssrc.org/reforum/Bender.pdf>

Bergen et al. "Jihadist Terrorism 16 Years after 9/11: A Threat Assessment." *New America* (September 2017).

Bertlesmann Stiftung, "BTI 2010: Macedonia Country Report," accessed March 2018,
<https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/mkd/ity/2010/itr/ecse/>

Bjørnskov, Christian. "Determinants of Generalized Trust: A Cross-Country Comparison." *Public Choice* 130, no.1-2 (January 2007). Accessed April 23, 2018.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9069-1>

Blydes, Lisa and Eric Chaney. "The Feudal Revolution and Europe's Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World before 1500 CE." *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 1 (February 2013): 16- 34. Accessed September 2017.
doi:10.1017/S0003055412000561

Bozhinovski, Vladimir and Marjan Nikolovski. "The Perceptions of the Citizens on Religion and its Role in the Multiconfessional Society [Перцепцијата на граѓаните за религијата и нејзината улога во мултиконфесионалните општества." Trans. by author, *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung* (December 19, 2016). Accessed December 1, 2017.
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_47556-1522-2-30.pdf?161227140211

Bozhinovski, Vladimir and Marjan Nikolovski. "Религијата во Политичките Кампањи: Користење на Религијата во Предизборните Кампањи [Religion in Political Campaigns: The Use of Religion in Pre-election campaigns." Accessed January 29, 2018.
<http://www.kas.de/mazedonien/mk/publications/51156/>

Brubaker, Rogers . "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches," *Nations and Nationalism* 18, no. 1 (November 2011): 2-20. Accessed December 1, 2017. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00486.x.

Buss, Andreas. "The Economic Ethics of Russian-Orthodox Christianity: Part II- Russian Old Believers and Sects." *International Sociology* December 1, 1989): 447-472. Accessed February 10, 2018, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/026858089004004007#>.

- Buss, Andreas. "The Economic Ethics of Russian-Orthodox Christianity: Part I." *International Sociology* 4, no. 3 (September, 1989): 253-258. Accessed February 10, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1177/026858089004003001>.
- Campante, Filipe and David Yanagizawa-Drott. "Does Religion Affect Economic Growth and Happiness? Evidence from Ramadan." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 130, no.2 (May 2015): 615-658. Accessed September 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv002>.
- Casiday, Augustine. *The Orthodox Christian World*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012).
- Chaplin, Vsevolod. "Russian Orthodox Church and Economic Ethics at the Turn of the Millennium." *Commentary on Social and Moral Issues of the Day*. Accessed January 5, 2017. <http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles5/ChaplinEconomicEthics.php>.
- Chrysoloras, Nikos. "Why Orthodoxy? Religion and Nationalism in Greek Political Culture." *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 4, no.1. Accessed March 30, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-9469.2004.tb00057.x>
- Churich, Zhivojin. "The Orthodox Religion in Serbia and the Contemporary Neoliberal Political Economics [Православна Религија у Србији и Савремена Неолиберална Економска Политика]." *Institute of Political Studies* (2007), trans. by author. Accessed February 20, 2018, <https://www.cceol.com/search/article-detail?id=229866>.
- Cook, Scott D. N. and John Seely Brown. "Bridging Epistemologies: The Generative Dance between Organizational Knowledge and Organizational Knowing." *Organization Science* 10, no. 4 (July 1999). Accessed November 15, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2640362>.
- Cvetanova, Ganka. "Религијата и Студентската Популација [Religion and the Student Population]," in *Идентитетите на студентската популација во Република Македонија 2016*, ed. Ganka Cvetanova (Skopje: University of St. Cyril and Methodius).
- Dobrijevic, Irinej. "The Orthodox Spirit and the Ethic of Capitalism: A Case Study on Serbia and Montenegro and the Serbian Orthodox Church." *Serbian Studies: Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies* 20 no.1 (2006). Accessed February 15, 2018. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/257658/pdf>.

Durkheim, Emile. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, ed. Joseph Ward Swain (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2008), 47.

Farnam, Arie. "In Macedonia, religion a weapon," *Christian Science Monitor*, accessed January 15, 2018, <https://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0919/p6s1-woeu.html>.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 887-917. Accessed November 10, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789>.

Form, William and Fred C. Pampel. "Social Stratification and the Development of Urban Labor Markets in India," *Social Forces* 57.1 (1978): 119-135.

Gill, Anthony. "Weber in Latin America: Is Protestant Growth Enabling the Consolidation of Democratic Capitalism?" *Democratization* 11, no 4: 42-65.

Gotsis, George. "The Impact of Greek Orthodoxy on Entrepreneurship: A Theoretical Framework." *Journal of Entreprising Communities: People and Places in the Global Economy* 3, no. 2 (2009). Accessed February 10, 2018. <http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/17506200910960851>

Grier, Robin. "The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross-National Study of 63 Former Colonies." *Kyklos* 50, no.1 (February 1997): 47-62. Accessed May 2017. doi: 10.1111/1467-6435.00003.

Grozdanoski, Ratomir. "Библијата, верата и мудроста [The Bible, the Faith, and the Wisdom]." Nikolovska, Irina. "Preconceptions and Incorrectly Disseminated Beliefs about Christianity and its Doctrines [Предрасуди и раширени погрешни верувања за христијанството како начин на живот и доктрина." *Orthodox Path [Православен Пат Списание на Скопската Епархија]* 15, no.41/42. Accessed March 1, 2018, <https://www.yumpu.com/xx/document/view/59234832/-41-42>.

Guiso et al. "People's Opium? Religion and Economic Attitudes." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 50, no. 1 (January 2003): 225-282. Accessed May 10, 2017. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932\(02\)00202-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00202-7)

- Haynes, Jeff. "Religion, Secularisation and Politics: A Postmodern Conspectus." *Third World Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (September 1997): 710. Accessed November 10, 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993213>.
- Harari, Yuval Noah. *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind*, (London, UK: Vintage Books, 2015).
- Iannaccone, Laurence R. "Introduction to the Economics of Religion." *Journal of Economic Literature* 36, no. 3 (September 1998): 1465-1495. Accessed September 5, 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2564806>
- Ivekovic, Ivan. "Nationalism and the Political Use and Abuse of Religion: The Politicization of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam in Yugoslav successor states." *Social Compass* 49, no.4, 523-536. Accessed March 30, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0037768602049004004>.
- Jovanovski, Vladimir. "Macedonia: Church enrages Albanians," *Institute for War & Peace Reporting* (2002). Accessed January 28, 2018. <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/macedonia-church-enrages-albanians>
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. *The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 2007).
- Kinnvall, Catarina. "Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security." *Political Psychology* 25, no. 5 (October 2004): 743.
- Knowx, Zoe Katrina. *Russian Society and the Orthodox Church Religion in Russia after Communism*. 1st ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009).
- Kratochwil, Friedrich. *Rules, Norms, and Decisions. On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 1989): 26-32.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich. "Religion and (Inter)National Politics: On the Heuristics of Identities, Structures, and Agents." *Alternatives Global Local, Political* 30, no.2 (April 2005): 113-140. Accessed November 10, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540503000201>.

LeMasters, Philip. Peace in Orthodox Liturgy and Life. In *Communion: Website of the Orthodox Pace Fellowship*. Accessed January 20, 2018.
<https://incommunion.org/2004/12/29/peace-in-orthodox-liturgy-and-life/>.

Leustean, Lucian N. "Orthodoxy and political myths in Balkan national identities." *National Identities* 10, no. 4: 421-432. Accessed March 30, 2018.
doi: [10.1080/14608940802519045](https://doi.org/10.1080/14608940802519045).

Lewis, Bernard. *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Majstorovic, Stevan. "In Yugoslavia: Self-management and culture." *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* (1980). Accessed January 15, 2018,
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001341/134196eo.pdf>

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders." *International Organizations* 52, no. 4 (1998): 943- 969. Accessed November 15, 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601363>

McCarthy, Justin. "1912-1913 Balkan Wars Death and Forced Exile of Ottoman Muslims: An Annotated Map." University of Louisville. Accessed January 10, 2018. <http://www.tc-america.org/files/news/pdf/balkan-wars-map.pdf>

Mitrova, Makedonka and Marija Pandevska, "Балканските војни и актуелните состојби на Балканот," *Balkanica Posnaniensia Acta et studia* 20, 2013, 106-116.

Mitzen, Jennifer. "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma." *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no.3, (September, 2006), 341-370.

Muller, Harald. "Arguing, Bargaining, and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory, and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 10, no.3 (September, 2004): 395-435. Accessed February 20, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066104045542>

Noland, Marcus. "Religion and Economic Performance." *World Development* 33, no.8 (August 2005): 1215-1232. Accessed May 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.03.006>.

- Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2004).
- Nye, Jr., Joseph S. and David A. Welch. "Explaining Conflict and Cooperation: Tolls and Techniques of the Trade." in *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History* (Pearson 2012): 38-47.
- Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood. *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia, SC: South Carolina Press 1989): 36-43.
- Palairret, Michael. *Macedonia: Voyage through History* (Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2015).
- Peebles, Graham. "The Rise of Anxiety in the Age of Inequality." openDemocracy: Free Thinking for the World (May 20, 2017). Accessed March 10, 2018.
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/graham-peebles/anxiety-in-age-of-inequality>
- Peet, Richard, and Elaine R. Hartwick. *Theories of development: contentions, arguments, alternatives*. (New York: The Guilford Press 2015).
- Pisarev, Aleksandar. "Cross and Crescent Divide up Macedonia," *Balkan Insight*. Accessed January 15, 2018, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/cross-and-crescent-divide-up-macedonia>.
- Platteau, Jean-Philippe. "Religion, politics, and development: Lessons from the lands of Islam." *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 68 (2008): 329-251.
- Poggi, Gianfranco. *Calvinism and the capitalist spirit Max Weber's protestant ethic*. (Palgrave, 1983)
- Putnam, Robert. *Making Democracy Work*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1993).
- Ramet, Sabrina R. *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics* (Duke University Press Books 1988).

- Ribolov, Svetoslav. "The Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire and its Perspectives for Theological Dialogue." Bulgaria: University of Sofia (2013). Accessed January 10, 2018. <http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=ree>
- Rieffer, Barbara-Anne J. "Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship." *Ethnicities* 3, no. 2 (June 2003): 215-242. Accessed December 1, 2017. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796803003002003>.
- Rubin, Jared. *Rulers, Religion, and Riches*. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2017). Sandholtz, Wayne. "Dynamics of International Norm Change: Wars against Wartime Plunder." *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (March 2008): 101-131. Accessed November 15, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107087766>.
- Sells, Michael A. *The Bridge Betrayed : Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California, 1998).
- Smith, Anthony D. "The Sacred Dimension of Nationalism." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 3 (December 2000): 796. Accessed November 15, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290030301>.
- Spasenovski, Aleksandar. "Политичките партии и границите на секуларизмот во Република Македонија [The political parties and the limits of secularism in Republic of Macedonia]." Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2014. Accessed January 15, 2018. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_40070-1522-2-30.pdf?141225140859
- Trajchev, Emil. "Црквата како заедница и нејзината улога во современото општество [The Church as community and its role in the modern society]." Accessed March 3, 2018. <https://blagovesti.wordpress.com/2015/08/12/црквата-како-заедница-и-нејзината-улога-2/>
- Vangeli, Anastas. "Religion, Nationalism and Counter-Secularization: The Case of the Macedonian Orthodox Church." Ilia State University: *Identity Studies in the Caucasus and the Black Sea Region* 2 (2010). Accessed March 10, 2018. <http://ojs.iliauni.edu.ge/index.php/identitystudies/article/view/13/9>

Verkhovsky, Aleksandr. "The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Nationalist, Xenophobic and Antiwestern Tendencies in Russia Today: Not Nationalism, but Fundamentalism." *Religion, State, and Society* 30, no. 4. Accessed January 15, 2018.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0963749022000022879>

Vukomanovic, Milan. "The Serbian Orthodox Church as a Political Actor in the Aftermath of October 5, 2000." *Politics and Religion* 1, no.2: 237-269. Accessed March 30, 2018.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048308000199>.

Walker, Connor. "A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a..." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no. 4 (September 2010): 377-400.

Weber, Max. *Methodology of Social Sciences*, trans. ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York, NY: Routledge 2017).

Weber, Max. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Lexington, KY: Renaissance Classics 2012).

——— *The Sociology of Religion*. (Boston, MA: Beakon Press 1963).

Yosmaoglu, Ipek. *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence, and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia*, (New York, NY: Cornell University , 2014).

Zabaev, Ivan. "The Economic Ethics of Contemporary Russian Orthodox Christianity: A Weberian Perspective." *Journal of Economic Sociology* (September, 2015). Accessed February 10, 2018.
https://ecsoc.hse.ru/data/2015/09/30/1074401098/ecsoc_t16_n4.pdf#page=148.

Appendix I: Survey Instrument

Q1 What is your age?

- 18-25
 - 26-50
 - 51-65
 - 65+
-

Q2 What is your gender?

- Male
 - Female
-

Q3 What is your marital status?

- Married
- Single
- Divorced
- Separated
- Widowed

Q4 What is your current employment status?

- Employed
 - Unemployed
 - Student
 - Retired
 - Recently fired
 - Recently voluntarily quit
-

Q4a If you have ever been laid off from your job, please indicate below at what age:

Q5 If employed, are you an employee at:

- Public sector
 - Private Sector
 - Civil Organization
 - Self-employed
-

Q6 What is your geographical area?

- Rural
 - Urban
-

Q7 Please provide zip code/city name:

Q8 What is your social status?

- Low income (below \$300/month)
- Middle income (between \$300-\$600/month)
- High income (above \$600/month)

Q9 What state would you say is your health in? (very good=no health problems in the past 6 months; good=some health problems in the past 6 months; fair= sick rather regularly; poor=chronic illness)

- Very good
- Good
- Fair
- Poor

Q10 Have you ever had a health scare or near death experience?

- Yes
- No

Q10a If yes, at what age?

Q11 What is the highest education you have completed?

- PhD
 - Master's
 - College
 - High School
 - Middle School
 - Incomplete middle school
-

Q12 Do you consider yourself a religious person?

- Definitely Yes
 - Somewhat Religious
 - Definitely No
-

Q13 Is your significant other a religious person?

- Yes
 - Somewhat
 - No
 - No partner
-

Q14 How important is it for you that your significant other is from the same religion?

- Extremely important
 - Important
 - Slightly important
 - Not at all important
 - No partner
-

Q15 How important is it for you that your children are religious?

- Extremely important
 - Important
 - Slightly important
 - Not important at all
-

Q16 Have you been baptized?

- Yes
 - No
-

Q16a If yes, at what age?

Q17 Would you/have you baptized your children?

- Yes
 - Maybe
 - No
-

Q18 Do you identify yourself with a religion or a religious denomination?

- Yes
 - No
-

Q19 If yes, please check one:

- Christian Orthodox
 - Christian Catholic
 - Islam
 - Protestantism
 - Buddhism
 - Other (please specify below) _____
-

Q20 How often do you attend church or religious services (apart from weddings and funerals)?

- Once a Week
 - Several Times a Month
 - Several Times a Year
 - Only for Important Religious Holidays
 - Less than once a year
 - Hardly Ever
 - Never
-

Q21 Have you changed your religion since birth?

- Yes
 - No
-

Q21a If yes, at what age did you convert?

Q22 What factor do you think has the largest influence on your moral values?

- Bible or your religion's respective religious texts
 - Parents/family
 - God
 - Community/civil organizations/sport clubs
 - School
 - Friends
-

Q23 How important is God in your life?

- Extremely important
 - Important
 - Less important
 - Not at all important
-

Q24 How often do you pray?

- A few times throughout the day
 - Every morning/night
 - Only when attending church
 - Only at religious services/weddings/baptisms/funerals
 - Not very often
 - Never
-

Q25 Please rank the following according to the importance they have in your life.

- _____ Family
 - _____ Church
 - _____ Friends/Leisure Time
 - _____ Work/Money
 - _____ Bible
 - _____ Peace
-

Q26 Do you believe in afterlife? (not using for now)

- Yes
 - No
 - Not sure
-

Q27 Do you believe in heaven and hell? (not using for now)

- Yes
 - No
 - Not sure
-

Q28 How much does religion affect your everyday choices in marriage/at work/school/economic choices?

- A great deal
 - A lot
 - A moderate amount
 - A little
 - None at all
-

Q29 Please write in what ways does religion affect your choices.

Q30 Identify the top three characteristics from the following list that you want your child to respect the most:

- Hard work and education
 - Independence
 - Selflessness in helping others
 - Reading and obeying the Bible/Other respective religious text
 - Attending church/your respective religious place of worship and practicing religion
 - Thriftiness and financial security
 - Determination
 - Responsibility and obedience
-

Q31 Please rank the following based on your confidence/trust in them (1 being the least confidence and 8 being the most confidence).

- _____ Family
 - _____ the Church/other respective place of worship
 - _____ Neighbors and Friends
 - _____ the Bible/other respective sacred text
 - _____ Government Institutions
 - _____ the Market Economy and Banks
 - _____ Police
 - _____ International Organizations
-

Q32 How often do you donate money/goods to the Church?

- Once a week
 - Once a month
 - On religious holidays
 - On occasions depending on need
 - On special occasions
 - Never
-

Q33 Choose one of the listed choices in each row based on personal importance

	First Statement (1)	Second Statement (0)
1. (1) Peace and having little or (0) Busy life and having more	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2. (1) Owning a lot of property or (2) Having a lot of friends	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. (1) Giving to the poor and homeless or (0) Saving for the future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4. (1) Feeling controlled but secure or (2) Having freedom but stressed and unstable economic life	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5. Work more and pray less or (0) work less and pray more (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
6. (0) Cooperating in team or (1) Working alone	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q34 Taking all things together, would you say you are...?

- Very Happy
 - Somewhat Happy
 - Not Very Happy
 - Not Happy at All
-

Q35 Do you think:

- Your city needs more churches
 - Your city needs more schools
-

Q36 Do you think:

- Your city needs more churches
 - Your city needs more malls
-

Q37 Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following statements? Don't know how to code it, not using it for now.

	Agree (1)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (2)	Disagree (3)
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When a mother works for pay, the children suffer (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Poor people are poor because they are lazy (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q38 What do you think should be Macedonia's top priority?

- Economic growth
 - Strong defense forces
 - Restoring and growing family and religious values
 - Joining the EU
 - Other (please specify below) _____
-

Q39 What do you think? Choose one.

- competition is good because it stimulates people to work hard
 - competition is harmful because it brings the worst in people
-

Q40 If you have to complete a task in a governmental institution, would you rather:

- Get it done more slowly, but still effectively, without connections
 - Get it done faster with connections when it clearly breaches protocol
-

Q41 Rank your preference of ways to invest your money:

- _____ In the trading market
 - _____ Savings account in a bank
 - _____ Investing in real estate
 - _____ Opening a new business
 - _____ Buying gold/silver jewelry
-

Q42 Rank your preference of ways to save your money:

- In a bank
 - With a family member
 - At a personal location
 - I'd rather spend them now than save
-

Q43 Rank your preference of ways you would borrow money:

- A neighbor
 - The bank
 - A family member
 - Sell personal property
 - A pawnshop
 - An informal lender
-

Q44 Do you have a stable savings plan for the future?

- Yes
 - No
 - Somewhat stable plan
-

Q45 Do you have a life insurance?

- Yes
 - No
-

Q46 Do you think having a saving plan is important?

Yes

No

Q47 Are you concerned about your financial future?

Yes

No

Q48 Should religion and politics be separated in Macedonia?

Yes

No

Not sure

Appendix II: Robustness Tables

Appendix Table 1. Odds Ratio for Male vs. Female Sample

Question #	Female		Male	
	Practice Index	Influence Index	Practice Index	Influence Index
Q1	.264**	.127***	47.524*	87.560
Q2	11.055***	6.461***	5.513	33.387
Q3	6.272***	9.596***	122.977**	3.904
Q4	126.664***	21608.67***	47.594*	120.499
Q5	4.102**	4.633**	34.312*	.103
Q6	.807	1.538	1.088	.077
Q7	10.156***	12.500**	102.397*	1.127
Q8	.474	.389	1.644	.999
Q9	5.635**	13.968**	.133	.001*
Q10	2.993*	1.371	2.868	.579
Q11	17.894***	26.311***	14.574*	485.013**

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 2. Odds Ratio with Controls

	Q2		Q3		Q4	
	Practice Index	Influence Index	Practice Index	Influence Index	Practice Index	Influence Index
Odds Ratio	6.372***	6.671*	8.047***	8.411***	131.745***	3657.896***
Geo (Rural)	.824	.861	1.611	1.784	1.039	1.124
Age (18-25)	.632	.677	1.17	4.00	4734155	448496
Age (26-50)	.531	.537	3.07	1.04	3579077	3146800
Age (51-65)	.214	.220	6.85	2.29	1762604	1730663
SocEco (Low)	1.804	1.93	2.844*	2.786**	2.376	2.562***
SocEco (Mid)	1.362	1.359	1.886	1.895	3.108	3.199***
Education (HS)	1.122	1.10	1.318	1.253	.643	.695
Education (College)	.929	.895	1.734	1.691	.487	.592
Education (Master)	.968	.907	.737	.731	.312	.404
	Q7		Q11			
	Practice Index	Influence Index	Practice Index	Influence Index		
Odd Ratio	10.498	21.233***	10.192***	7.254		
Geo (Rural)	.986	1.033	1.026	1.086		
Age (18-25)	774707.4	316616.9	.684	.646		
Age (26-50)	622140.8	235216.1	.978	.917		
Age (51-65)	647693.7	283446.1	1.140	1.037		
SocEco (Low)	5.937	6.2247***	2.342*	2.463		
SocEco (Mid)	5.007	4.99613***	1.135	1.206		
Education (HS)	.852	.792	.582	.575		
Education (College)	1.026	1.046	.599	.573		
Education (Master)	.921	.846	.547	.562		

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix III: Questions & Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables in Tables

Appendix Table 3. Questions & Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 1

Dependent Variable (H1)	Frequency	Percent
Q1 Personal Importance in Respondents' Lives		
Ranked Church or Bible over Work and Money	358	73.21
Q2 Top Three Priorities that Respondents Teach their Children		
Chose unselfishness in helping others obedience & humility, participation in Church and religious activities, reading and studying the Bible over work, independence, financial thriftiness, and determination	405	78.19
Q3 Respondents' Preferred Personal Importance		
Chose peace and having little as more important than busy life and having more	410	79.92
Chose praying more as more important than having more wealth	106	21.29

* N for the Christian Orthodox sample varies between 489 and 518

Appendix Table 4. Questions & Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 2

Dependent Variable (H2)	Frequency	Percent
Q4 Trust		
Ranked trust in Church or Bible over Government Institutions, Market, Police, or IOs	224	46.00

* N for the Christian Orthodox sample varies between 485 and 518

Appendix Table 5. Questions & Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 3

Dependent Variable (H3)	Frequency	Percent
Q5 Investment		
Buying gold/silver over trading market, new business, real estate	155	32.02
Q6 Saving		
Family member, personal location, rather spend them than save over bank	156	36.36
Q7 Borrowing		
a neighbor/a family member, sell personal property, a pawnshop, an informal lender over bank	364	75.83

*N for the Christian Orthodox sample varies between 429 and 484

Appendix Table 6. Questions & Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 4

Dependent Variable (H4)	Frequency	Percent
Q8 Competition and Cooperation		
Competition is harmful over stimulating	71	13.81
Working in team over working alone	296	58.73
Q9 Community		
Giving to the community over saving for the future	235	46.17

* N for the Christian Orthodox sample varies between 504 and 514

Appendix IV: Tables with OLS Regression Coefficients

Appendix Table 7. OLS Regression Results for Hypothesis 1

	Q1			Q2		
Panel A	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
practice	-0.142		-0.003	0.385***		0.289**
influence		-0.277*	-0.278		0.371***	0.181
Panel B	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
practice w/controls	-0.115		0.003	0.330***		0.237*
influence w/controls		-0.225	-0.229		0.347***	0.191
	Q3			Q4		
Panel C	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
practice	0.3534245***		0.2471896*	0.7013411***		0.3761216***
influence		0.3873978***	0.2157331		.9012644***	.6438899***
Panel D	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
practice w/controls	0.3223693***		0.2601235*	0.6996185***		0.400109***
influence w/controls		0.3326835***	0.1533333		.8697639***	.5982002***

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Number of Observations (N) varies by specification from 457 to 515

Appendix Table 8. OLS Regression Results for Hypothesis 2

	Q5		
Panel A	(1)	(2)	(3)
practice	0.413***		0.371**
influence		0.294*	0.044
practice w/controls	0.366***		.337*
influence w/controls		0.276*	0.047

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; N varies by specification from 458 to 486

Appendix Table 9. OLS Regression Results for Hypothesis 3

		Q6			Q7	
Panel A	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
practice	-0.0382		-0.094	0.549***		0.428**
influence		0.043	0.1046		0.502***	0.2053
Panel B	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
practice w/controls	-0.086		-0.142	0.506***		0.395**
influence w/controls		0.019	0.112		0.457***	0.179
		Q8				
Panel C	(13)	(14)	(15)			
practice	-0.118		-0.069			
influence		-0.149	-0.101			
Panel D	(19)	(20)	(21)			
practice w/controls	-0.145		-0.148			
influence w/controls		-0.101	-0.000035			

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Number of Observations (N) varies by specification from 473 to 515

Appendix Table 10. OLS Regression Results for Hypothesis 4

		Q9			Q10	
Panel A	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
practice	0.146		0.049	0.246*		0.364**
influence		0.191*	0.159		0.065	-0.188
Panel B	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
practice w/controls	0.139		0.081	0.252*		0.391**
influence w/controls		0.165	0.112		0.032	-0.239
		Q11				
Panel C	(13)	(14)	(15)			
practice	0.677***		0.373**			
influence		0.783***	0.529***			
Panel D	(19)	(20)	(21)			
practice w/controls	0.652***		0.402**			
influence w/controls		0.722***	0.448**			

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Number of Observations (N) varies by specification from 473 to 515