EXISTENTIAL SPATIALITY

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Abstract: We examine the traditional Western accounts of spatiality, seen through the prisms of both the Western and Eastern philosophic paradigms. We then attempt a movement towards a new spatial account, where embodiment, spatiality, and the possibilities of being are seen as equally primordial with one another. Our spatial account launches from and subsequently beyond that of Heidegger, especially where embodiment and the role of Dasein are concerned.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Section 1: The Question of Space

Have we satisfactorily, philosophically uncovered the question: how is existence spatial? No, we have not. Western philosophy has traditionally asked and endeavored to ask instead the question: what is space? Pre-philosophically, the question is formulated to presume ‘space’ must depend somehow upon a definite, definable what – and this ontological presupposition has escaped mostly unchallenged, as a matter of the Western paradigm. Kant asked the question of space and time: "Are they actual entities? Are they only determinations or also relations of things ... Or are they such that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the subjective constitution of our mind ... ?"\(^1\) His referral to space as being possibly an "actual entity" is intended to represent the metaphysical view of Newton, while its possibly being a "relation of things" is meant to summarize Leibniz. Kant's view is that spatiality is a pure, immediate, and non-empirical intuition of the subject. We may also situate Cartesian space comfortably in the midst of these views, in that Descartes' extensio affords spatiality the ontological status of a quasi-entity. In all the mentioned spatial accounts, however, lurks the ontological presumption that space is metaphysically dependent upon some form of an ontological what: an entity

\(^1\) *Critique of Pure Reason*, part first, section I
(Newton), relations between things (Leibniz), extended substance (Descartes), and an internal representation of a subject (Kant). The establishing of these various forms of what, as we shall explore, not only rests upon unclear, implicit ontological foundations, but presupposes what we shall uncover as 'existential spatiality,' so as to trace out each what pre-philosophically as a matter of presupposition, then adopting it as the existential focus of spatial philosophy – i.e. the what where spatiality resides or from whence it comes. This foundation informs all spatial exploration which follows, such that any subsequent exploring seeks not to uncover 'space' necessarily, but by the presupposed, existential focus on 'what,' to provide an already-narrowed account of 'space' qua what, which is less primordial than and always presupposes existential space.

Section 2: The Subject-Object Spectrum

There are two, ontologically familiar forms of what which traditionally characterize the treatment of spatiality in Western philosophy: the subject and the object. As an overview of spatial accounts, these two ontological forms and the various relations of them constitute what we shall entitle the ‘subject-object’ spectrum. We shall find in section 1.2 that the establishment of both as some manner of entity, a phenomenon which we shall later call 'entification,' presupposes existential spatiality by its appropriation – i.e. the pre-philosophical seizing of existential spatiality, so as to implicitly, and hence dubiously, place the ontological focus on the ontological what.

In subject-oriented accounts of space, such as that of Kant, spatiality is contingent upon some ability or faculty of the subject to spatialize, thus making spatializing subjectively dependent. Ontologically, the subject is existentially 'reaching out,' often
from some 'internal space,' to the presumed 'external' world of objects and spatializing
them by some means. Correspondingly, in object-oriented accounts of space, such as that
of Newton, we find pre-philosophically traced objects, the exercise and establishment of
which we shall, in section 1.2, term as 'delineation.' Opposite to subjects, philosophers
conceive objects, in objective spatial accounts, to be constitutively spatial, rather than
spatial by some ability or faculty, and hence objectively spatialized.

Situated between the subjective account of Kant, and the objective account of
Newton, are those accounts of Descartes, Leibniz, and Heidegger. The Cartesian account
of spatiality, along with its res extensa, or 'extended body,' at once attempts an utterly
objective rendition of space (the "generic unity" he attributes to all space), while
simultaneously seeking to individuate that space into bodies, by the same definition of
'extension.' A dissonance arises here, where the very same 'extension' at once constitutes
a body and the 'generic space' on which it resides, while also individuating those bodies
from that generic space. This double-layering of extension is not alleviated by Descartes’
claim that a body resides everywhere (hence, there is no such thing as empty space), as
this is tantamount to claiming that extension is every ‘there,’ when this would already be
provided by a ‘generic unity’ being attributed to extended space, irrespective of body.
That 'generic space' is extension, as well as the body which somehow occupies that
generic space, is therefore a double-layering of spatiality and embodiment, resolvable
only by concluding that either all space is extended body (in which case there is no
'generic unity,' and 'there' is constituted by its body), or that there is a generic unity to
space, and 'there' is universally and objectively there, irrespective of body, which must
not be the same extension as generic space. Thus, we situate Cartesian spatiality in the
middle of the spectrum, where spatiality is a 'quasi-thing.' Leibniz, by postulating that spatiality inheres in relations between things, has crafted essentially an objective rendition of space, though his usage of 'relations' may grant the suggestion of relativity. A ‘thing’ conceived relative to substance is a stable, independent (of other substances) existence, and so places Leibniz squarely within the ranks of Newton.

Heidegger, though aiming to uncover the more primordial, ontological ground which other spatialities presuppose (the spatiality of the ready-to-hand), provides a spatial account that is nonetheless Dasein-centered, which, coming from phenomenology, we may call 'lived space.' The first-person, lived aspect of Heidegger's account, and the existential focus placed on Dasein as a sort of ‘center’ of spatiality, situates Heidegger's spatial account in the neighborhood of what-oriented spatial accounts, and indeed subjective accounts – but to what extent? Heidegger himself addresses the perceived subjectivity of his spatial account, when he claims that the first-person, phenomenological experience of the ready-to-hand, though subjective in the sense that it is lived by a loose ‘subject,’ perhaps reveals reality at its most real.

If, then, Dasein is existentially spatial, having the characteristics of de-distancing and directionality, the former of which is Dasein's structure of being able to "bring things close, having them to hand," or the capability of ontologically bringing an equipment-piece from its farness (not Euclidean distance, but existential remoteness from Dasein's worldly involvements) and making that farness vanish, freeing that equipment-piece for involvement. Thus, de-distancing could be said to be the circumspective freeing for involvement of the ready-to-hand in an equipmental context, in a region which is

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2 Being and Time, part one, section III, subsection 106
characterized by the totality of those involvements. Being de-distancing, then, Dasein makes the ontological distance of equipment vanish, and devotes it to the overall 'for-the-sake-of-which,' such as bringing a hammer closer, having it to hand, and bringing it into the equipmental context that is devoted to building a shelter for Dasein, so that it may live more comfortably. As Dasein is existentially spatial through de-distancing, its connection to the world, and indeed spatiality, is thus also existential, which requires that Dasein is not fully closed and has the characteristic of 'insideness,' as would a substance, such as a free-floating subject, who occupies only an 'internal' world. However, Heidegger does refer, in an ontologically unclear sense, to Dasein as "an entity"\(^3\) that ontologically is within-the-world, without providing an ontological account of why Dasein is necessarily an 'entity.' Though Dasein does not have the fully, spatially 'inside' character of a definite \textit{what} qua traditional subjective accounts of Western philosophy, it nonetheless has the characteristic of being an entity, which is, to some degree, prioritized and standing from out of the total, unitary world. Additionally, the spatiality of Dasein is always \textit{active} (that is, spatiality depends upon time; or, space emerges from and is understood through time), and is always through the lens of Dasein’s perspective (though, Heidegger claims that this reveals "reality at its most real"\(^4\)).

In total, with Dasein being an entity, and its spatiality being always active and first-person centered, Heidegger has provided a quasi-subjective account of spatiality, placing his view in the neighborhood of the subjective one of Kant, but not so far as to be wholly subjective (indeed, Heidegger denies that his account is reducible to subjectivity). Rather, we should say Heidegger’s account is colored by subjectivity, though the precise

\(^{3}\) \textit{Being and Time}, H section 7

\(^{4}\) \textit{Being and Time}, H section 106
extent to which it is as such remains undecided, due to the unclarified status of Dasein as an entity (*ein Seiende*; literally, ‘that which is’) and how far Dasein stands out from the world by being that entity (i.e. is Dasein simply the unitary phenomenon of being-in-the-world; or is Dasein centered upon and prioritized in a sense beyond?). That is, Heidegger explicates and describes Dasein in an ontological sense of spatiality but does not ontologically involve a condition which his ontological case of spatiality presupposes, which is that of embodiment. Given his immediate bifurcation of *Being and Time*'s terminology into 'ontological' and 'ontic,' and his preference to speak on a universal level of Being more primordial than that of anything ontic (though, Dasein exists ontico-ontologically, and all existentiales must be lived in the *existentiell* sense), it is arguable that he neglected embodiment to the extent that it is ontico-ontological in an unclear sense. The ontological structures of spatiality, or the *existentiales* of Dasein, are clear, but embodiment, being at once ontic and ontological, is never lucidly considered as an *existentiale*.

Indeed, Heidegger's lack of treatment and presupposition of embodiment casts Dasein not as a free-floating subject, but as a dubiously embodied entity, whose structures of de-distancing and directionality, understood as *existentiales*, rely upon and presuppose that the world itself is embodied, so as to have Dasein be capable of circumspection (that is, having eye-sight, touch, fingers, and an embodied position within the world) and to have the ready-to-hand equipment be capable of being disclosed to circumspection (that is, the existentiality of the ready-to-hand must be disclosed through and as the bodies of equipment). It appears, therefore, that the existentiality of spatiality,
as Heidegger's case show us, cannot come fully into view without explicitly treating embodiment as something similar to an \textit{existentiale}.

Though Heidegger highlights an important and often overlooked aspect of spatiality – namely, that it is lived in a first-person, phenomenological way – his account may remark little on such distances as those that are astronomical or sub-atomic in nature, and hence reside outside of the scale in which human beings may conceivably have an immediate experience of space. That is, there is an unaddressed aspect of spatiality, which does not appear to be wholly first-person oriented, though it may somehow underlie, in the case of quantum distances, or be some sort of aggregate of, in the case of astronomical distances, the space that is lived in the first-person. Correspondingly, when Kant denies objectivity to spatiality, and attributes it solely to a subjective, cognitive faculty, he forfeits the ability to account for spatial aspects which phenomenally appear to be relatively stable and subject-invariant, such as that of distance between two locations, which must be, for a subject or an object, and indeed anything \textit{embodied} above the sub-atomic level (i.e. stably embodied), traversed to travel between spatial environments. However, when we consider highly objective renditions of spatiality, such as those of Newton and Leibniz, we do not find any room for lived considerations. Spatiality is, with beings for whom that being is an issue, always lived, such as in Heidegger's portrayal of the sidewalk beneath my feet as being ontically closer to me than the situation to which I am devoting my attention afar, yet simultaneously ontologically more distant. The directionality of existentiality, which he attributes to Dasein, is omitted by objective accounts, by their passive, object-oriented spatial view, which renders the subject an incidental ‘who’ to whom spatiality is disclosed. Of course,
subjective accounts, as we portrayed, omit objective considerations that seem to depend little on the subject, insofar as they are phenomena which anything embodied must encounter.

The difficulties encountered by the object and subject oriented views are therefore mirror images of one another. In both accounts, however, as a matter of existential appropriation, space has been already presupposed by establishing an ontologically unclear and delineated what, to which our existential focus attends, and which orients our spatial view before we begin its explication at all. We have, as a consequence of our focus, pre-philosophically oriented our accounts in a definite way towards spatiality, before our description has even begun. If spatiality is to be uncovered existentially, then we must explore more primordially than its various appropriations, and seek to illuminate existential spatiality at its most primordial.

Section 3: Beyond the S-O Spectrum, Existential Spatiality

The lurking what of spatiality has been steadfastly employed to explicate the spatial phenomenon of 'there,' and always in the manner of answering the question: "what is 'there'?" As we portrayed, both the subjective and objective accounts depend upon some definite what, with Newton's conversion of a universal 'there' into an infinite substance, and Kant's proclamation that spatiality only resides in the subject, being the extremes of the spectrum. The phenomenon of 'there' is never uncovered in its most primordial origin, only by depending it somehow upon a what that is less primordial than 'there,' as that what presupposes 'there.' That is, we have yet to see 'there' emerge primordially. We have yet to uncover the how of 'there,' without viewing 'there' through a
substance-focused lens. Were we to reformulate the question to read: "how is 'there' there," then we would be conceiving of 'there' still as a what and adopting that vantage as our existential focus, progressing not far from traditional accounts. Correspondingly, were we to ask: "what is the 'how' of 'there," then we would fall prey to the same quandary. If the how of 'there,' understood not as a what but as a phenomenal how, is to be uncovered, then we must instead ask: "how is there," and not understand 'there' as being akin to a point in space, but as being a primordial phenomenon that is spatializing. Indeed, spatializing, or the how and the phenomenon of 'there,' we shall uncover by uncovering three existential conditions that are equiprimordial with one another:

- Embodiment
- Spatiality
- Being

To uncover these as they are equiprimordial, we shall seek a unitary, phenomenological account involving the three existential phenomena of:

- Embodiment, as ‘laid-bare,’ ‘made-vulnerable,’ and ‘opening/unfolding’
- Orientation
- Interaction and relation

Prior to our approach of that task, however, we must develop, as a transitionary guide from what to how, which does not demand a definite what, a thorough account of how the unity of spatiality has been passed over, and why the accounts which populate the subject/object spectrum suffer from such difficulties as to motivate a shift of our focus to more primordial origins of spatiality.
Section 4: The Western Paradigm

The unity of spatiality, in Western philosophy, has been passed over very simply due to the paradigm of the West which, by its construction, disallows primordial, unitary phenomena to come into view. Indeed, this paradigm is what establishes the constant presence of what in spatial philosophy, and thereby simultaneously foregoes the possibility of unity, and pre-philosophically decides spatiality on a level that is less primordial than 'there.' The power, and consequently the potential peril, of paradigms is that they function, philosophically or not, often much like implicit and unexposed premises of an analytic argument, and thus endanger anything further which depends upon them, should their presence be exposed and shown to be problematic. Typically, we call such premises presuppositions, and indeed, a paradigm is, in essence, a broadly applied set of presuppositions that provide a consensus-based ground that purports to be primordial, but has already decided many aspects of primordial philosophy (such as dividing 'world' into 'subject' and 'object') as a matter of existential appropriation, and often prevents us from bringing into view that primordial ground from which philosophy emerges without an extant paradigm. This stealth and obscuring of that primordial ground is how the what of spatial philosophy, and subsequently the subject/object spectrum thereof, has for centuries served as the ground for Western spatial accounts, despite the myriad difficulties occasioned by the presence and usage of that limited ground. We shall thus portray the Western paradigm definitely in its presuppositions, and reveal them as they pertain to spatiality. The Western paradigm has three features relevant to spatiality⁵:

⁵ See reference for Heitz, Marty.
• Substantive metaphysics, or a substance-based ontology (i.e. thing-hood, subjects, and objects).

• External relatedness (to the thing, and between things), or non-existential relations (i.e. the subject, as opposed to objects; and internal, as opposed to external – all of which must be coordinated in such a way that does not affect the existentiality of either).

• Either/or logic (in lieu of both/and).

The first aspect of the Western paradigm, as it is present in spatial philosophy, we discovered in the ontological presumption that space is metaphysically dependent upon some form of a definite what. Pre-philosophically, we take substance or thing as the focus of our ontology, and indeed begin our spatial accounts on this ground, without thoroughly considering this substance-based view to be ontologically limited, and hence, the narrowed ground upon which spatial accounts rest. In this way, by asking the question "what is space?," we have partially answered ourselves by deciding to make 'space' answerable to 'substance,' and thus have also tasked ourselves to look in a narrower sense for the outstanding portion of the answer for which we are searching. We are therefore predestining our spatial questions to have preordained answers, by employing our paradigm.

Newton treats space as an absolute entity, such that space is, in essence, an unbounded substance, where substance is understood metaphysically as an independent existence (i.e. a de-worlded thing). As a matter of consequence, we shall argue, the existential divorce that occurs when a 'substance' is traced out pre-philosophically by delineation necessitates that all relations thereof are external to that substantive 'thing'
and all such 'things.' We shall also, in the Newtonian section, explore how this treatment appears to be contradictory, given our exploration of delineation as being integral to substance and thing-hood.

Leibniz conceives of space as being constituted by the relation of things, such that space becomes construed as being thing-dependent, which, as we shall explore in the Leibniz section, converts space into an external relation between existentially divorced things, failing to explicate how 'things' are established or how they become the focus of spatial ontology, and how external relations between independent things amounts to the existential phenomenon of spatializing. We shall contend that 'things' are hazily presupposed to be traced out of the world by means of delineation, which we shall uncover as a pre-philosophical appropriation of existential space.

Descartes contends that space is the extension of bodies in length, breadth, and depth, and that all bodies are res extensa. This conception of spatiality is, in all ways, a substance-based one, given that the ontological focus is the 'extended body,' despite Descartes' later, confused attempt to attribute a generic unity to extended space, which we shall explore in the Cartesian section. His failure to stitch together the 'spatiality-of' the res extensa into his generic unity of space, together with his failure to take such a generic unity and individuate it ontologically into 'things' qua 'substance,' whilst maintaining that unity, culminate in an ontologically confused spatial account. The same consequence of external relatedness, which we attribute to Newton, shall also be discovered here.

Finally, Kant's account is one which delineates a 'subject,' and hence 'objects,' as well as an 'external' and 'internal' world. By the former, Kant takes a 'subject' as his
ontological focus, directed towards 'objects,' which places the focus of his spatial
ontology on subjectivity, related externally to objectivity.

**Section 5: The Chinese Paradigm**

The Chinese Paradigm, in contrast to the Western one, may be characterized by:

- Eventfulness (as opposed to a static, rigid world in which dualities are not ‘in’ one
  another, are opposed to each other, and entertain no interactions which touch them
  existentially, the Chinese viewpoint is one of dynamism and change; that is, there
  is a sense of spontaneity and ‘self-soing’ to the world, in which all things
  mutually arise and are connected and interact existentially, such as yin/yang (or
  light/dark, or any dual pair) which are existentially connected and only are as they
  are because of their existential interaction, which is dynamic and fluid).

- Internal relatedness (existentially, ‘things’ bleed seamlessly into one another;
  existential interactions, hence ‘no-thing’ is a fully independent existence in the
  way of a substance; ‘things’ are mutually arising and defining existentially, and
  thus are ‘in’ one another as a unity; as such, there is not a sense of external, causal
  determinism).

- Both/and logic.

To uncover the first feature – eventfulness – we shall invoke the illustration of
yin/yang. Employing the familiar language of our existential account, we can say that yin
and yang are *equiprimordial* with one another existentially. That is, yin and yang arise
mutually and do not cause or precede one another, being entwined on the level of
existentiality. Furthermore, though there exists a difference between them, yin and yang
do not exist separately: there is no ‘yin’ separated from ‘yang,’ which is contradictory to
the definition of a substance (i.e. independent existence). To be sure, yin and yang cannot
be conceived of as substances, owing to how both are not themselves absolutely\(^6\), in the
way that a substance is itself in an absolute, independent sense. This feature stems from
how ‘yin’ is in ‘yang’ and how ‘yang’ is in ‘yin,’ in the sense that, for yin to be yin, yang
must also be in yin. For a substance, there must necessarily be no other substance
existentially 'in' that substance, otherwise that substance is not that substance, but another
substance entirely that is an amalgam of those substances. Thus, substances must
necessarily be related externally in terms of existentiality, whereas yin/yang, owing to
their existential entwining, are related internally. If we are to endeavor into a realm
outside of external relatedness, such as that of internal relations, then substantive
metaphysics becomes unintelligible.

Thus, the understanding of ‘yin’ and ‘yang’ is that they are mutually arising, and that
they are not ‘yin’ or ‘yang’ absolutely but are existentially in one another. To further
illustrate this point, we may employ the example of magnetism, where the two poles are
different yet not separate, and indeed are inside one another, in how they collectively
constitute the whole phenomenon of magnetism. That phenomenon is a flowing from one
polarity into the other, such that the two poles are that phenomenon. That there is a
'distance,' in terms of difference, does not result in separation of the two poles, and
instead is creative, allowing the two poles to be that whole phenomenon. This
understanding is that of yin/yang, where the difference between them is not separation,
and indeed, creates both as the unitary whole that they are, which flows and circles

\(^6\) A further illustrative phrase of this point is: "nothing is anything absolutely."
endlessly, being dynamic and ever-changing. Indeed, the Chinese Paradigm emphasizes the flowing and impermanent aspects of reality, as well as the dynamic aspect, which is illustrated in yin/yang cycling with one another endlessly, ever-changing in the existential interplay between them.

A key sub-feature of the ‘eventfulness’ feature of the Chinese Paradigm is that of dynamism. Primarily, similar to how Heidegger remarks that the world is not an entity that is discovered within the world, the Eastern worldview is one which illustrates the world as a rich set of existential interplays, which are always changing and evolving, impermanent and shifting. There is no substance of ‘light,’ rather there is ‘light-ing,’ which unfolds alongside ‘dark-ing,’ which is not the substance of ‘dark’ – again, similar to how we can paraphrase Heidegger’s view as contending that there is no ‘world,’ rather only ‘worlding.’ The world for the Chinese and our purposes therefore is a phenomenal unfolding and emerging, which is a unified whole that is dynamic (i.e. light and dark do not simply mutually arise; their phenomenal unfolding is the emergence of a unitary phenomenon that contains both yet is not contained by either, as is illustrated in the yin/yang relation to Wuji, which we shall discuss later). If we were to illustrate the Western conception of the duality of light/dark and yin/yang, we would, instead of the traditional symbol, discover a circle wherein exactly half is colored black and half is colored white, without any overlap between the two shades. The circle would not turn or cycle, and there would be no opportunity for change or existential interaction (i.e. these would be diametrically opposed substances). Within the Eastern view, illustrated by the yin/yang symbol and its turning, there is an emerging and a flow to what is supremely ultimate and ultimately real; yet what is ultimate and real is not a thing which reveals
itself through a flow – rather, the ultimate and real is that flowing and emerging. Thus, contrary to the view of substance, in which that substance is static and unchanging – lest it should lose the also-static properties which define it as that thing – change and impermanence are existential conditions of the world, in which every-thing is interactive and involved existentially with change. With regards to our spatial philosophic aims, we take the world to be constitutively interactive, such that the existentiality of phenomena necessarily includes dynamic, existential interactions, in which that dynamism reveals itself to be those phenomena in an inextricable, rather than accidental\(^7\), sense.

The totality of yin/yang is a unitary whole, the circle which is the whole of the illustration. It is this whole that only is revealed and comes into view when the philosophic view of substantive metaphysics is forfeited, owing again to how substance necessitates external relatedness, which disallows its internal counterpart, and thus covers the possibility of any two 'substances' being seen as existentially related and constituting a whole. As for how this interpretation informs our existential account herein, we must note that our explicit aim is to uncover spatiality, embodiment, and the possibilities of being as being equiprimordial in the same sense of yin/yang. Additionally, we are also attempting to move beyond substantive metaphysics, into the realm of internal relatedness concerning phenomena which are equiprimordial, such that our three equiprimordial phenomena are existentially entwined with one another. That is, if we are to attempt to extract 'yin' by itself, and we begin to pull philosophically it apart from

\(^7\) The term ‘accident’ is employed in sense of those, such as Aquinas, who designated the term to mean a non-intrinsic property of a substance that occurs to it accidentally. The thing may lose or gain this property without consequence to its being that substance. Many aspects of change may be dismissed as simply being accidents to a still-static substance; hence, our desire to consider change as an inextricable, existential condition of the world.
yang, we find ourselves unable to do so, as yin is existentially entwined with yang. In this same way, we are attempting to uncover an account wherein embodiment, spatiality, and the possibilities of being are together in the same sense.

To conceive of existentiality in such a way, the third feature of the Chinese Paradigm becomes necessary, which is that of both/and logic. In the terms of yin/yang, yin is both yin and yang. It is both 'itself' and 'not-itself.' The existence of any substance simultaneously as 'itself' and 'not-itself' is unintelligible and contradictory to the definition of substance, which is precisely the motivation for the Western Paradigm relying upon the provision of 'either/or' logic. A substance simply is itself and exists independently of all which is not-itself. As for our account, the notion of embodiment, spatiality, and the possibilities of being, in an existential sense, being one another flows from 'both/and' logic, where all three of the phenomena are equiprimordial, internally related, and are themselves and one another. One of the principal difficulties which we highlighted in the Western Paradigm's treatment of spatiality is that spatiality itself (in objective accounts) or the spatializing subject (in subjective accounts) is chosen as the existential focus and then is treated as a substance, which divorces it from the 'not-itself' and positions it existentially external thereto. There is the 'itself,' which is either space itself or the subject, and then the 'not-itself,' which is all else without. The question of external coordination of these substances then arises, which, as we have highlighted and shall illustrate in more depth in section one, is problematic, as spatiality never emerges as a whole or as world, and indeed, leaves some fundamental questions unresolved. Such
questions are: if spatiality is objective, then how is the subject existentially spatial? Is the subject objectively spatial, yet its experience of spatiality is subjective? Furthermore, if spatiality is wholly subjective, then how is the subject 'there'? Is the apparent presupposition of 'there' in subjective accounts explicable by subjectivity? As we have attempted to shine light upon in this introduction and in section one, many of these difficulties are endemic to and stem from the substantiveness and external relatedness of the Western Paradigm. Avoiding these difficulties, then, for our account is a matter of shifting the paradigm from which we begin our philosophic discovering.

We have highlighted an aspect of the Chinese Paradigm, which is that yin and yang are mutually related rather than independent substances that are externally related to one another. If that which is ultimately real, then, is not an ontology of substances, then the question of the ultimately real remains unresolved. For the Chinese Paradigm, the ultimately real is yin/yang, their mutual arising and identity, and their existential entwining, which is expressed by the name of *Wuji*, or the supreme ultimate. The term *Wuji* carries the significations of ‘boundless,’ ‘limitless,’ and ‘inexhaustible.’ It is the unitary whole which yin and yang are as they are: existentially ‘in’ one another and thus mutually defining, dynamic and cycling, and unable to be divorced from one another.

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8 That is, if space is objective, for instance in the way of Newton, then the subject is simply 'on' a point in space and nothing more. Yet, the subject, if they are objectively there in the same way as all other entities, must be somehow spatial. Are their bodies spatial? Fully objective space is an absolute background, so it would seem that we have 'body' and then 'space' separately. Descartes attempted a 'generic unity' of space, i.e. the absolute background, and then identified spatiality with body, which led to a double-layering ontology of space.

9 An objective account might attempt to say that the subjective experience of space exists, but existentially is not defining of space and therefore is irrelevant. Heidegger critiqued this view extensively in his rejection of philosophy theorizing and abstracting the world to such an extent that it becomes dead and unlived, when we encounter the world precisely as we live and experience it.

10 It appears, in fact, that 'there' is being presupposed by subjective accounts by presupposing that the subject is embodied, which is the subject’s mode of 'being-there,' another phenomenon which is passed over yet tacitly presupposed.
with the ‘distance’ between them being polar in the sense previously discussed. Seen as a unitary whole, this is the portrait of *Wuji*. In our account, we seek to uncover ‘world’ as a unitary whole through equiprimordial and existentially intertwined phenomena, which takes inspiration from the Chinese Paradigm and its portrayal of *Wuji*. Specifically, we seek to uncover ‘world’ as the phenomenon of ‘being-there’ that emerges through the phenomena of embodiment, spatiality, and the possibilities of being. Similar to how yin/yang are not an essence and *Wuji* is existence uncaptured by any essence, we do not conceive of these phenomena as having a substantive being, and rather endeavor to uncover them *as being* their phenomenal disclosing. In the sense of a unitary, illimitable whole that is uncaptured by essence, our notion of phenomenal disclosing and emergence, *Wuji*, and Heidegger’s ‘world,’ which a whole that is not an entity to be discovered within the world, are all interrelated.

**Section 6: The Passing-Over Phenomena of Western Spatiality**

How are we, then, without attending to a definite *what*, to uncover philosophically the *how* of space and existential spatiality? That is, how are we to uncover the four existential, spatial phenomena which we outlined previously, in a manner which is thematic and may bring the overall phenomenon of spatializing into view? For Heidegger, the art of phenomenology is "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself, in the very way in which it shows itself from itself."\(^{11}\) While we shall neither attend to a definite *it*, nor concern ourselves with letting a *substance* show itself from itself and be seen as such, we shall nonetheless allow the existential, spatial phenomena to be

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\(^{11}\) *Being and Time*, H section 34
uncovered as they are in primordiality, without "bracketing the world,"\textsuperscript{12} as Heidegger states, and without seeking the detached viewpoint upon which Husserl insists\textsuperscript{13}. The simple motivation for this approach is that the world is ontologically spatial, and thus any phenomenological uncovering of existential spatiality must phenomenally show spatiality as it is within the world. This is to say that spatiality is equiprimordial with the world, and that spatiality and the world are co-disclosed (we shall use 'disclose' to mean 'to lay open to view,' and have the connotations of 'to open up' and 'to unfold'). Necessarily, our philosophic uncovering denies that space is any sort of substance, due to how, were space a substance, its existence would be utterly independent, and thus could exist apart from any world, and would be externally related to all worlds, capable of being some entity encountered within a world. As Heidegger states, the world (and hence, its existential spatiality) is not an entity encountered within the world. Whenever 'empty space' is portrayed as a positive example of spatiality existing independent of some loosely conceived notion of 'a world,' and thus enjoying a substantive existence and external relations to any world, what is being presupposed is that 'a world' is identified with matter (particularly, baryonic matter), and that the absence of matter denotes the absence of worldhood. Thus, 'empty space' is typically construed as being 'space without baryonic matter,' reinforcing the paradigmatic tendency in Western philosophy towards substantive metaphysics, such that where there is no substance, there is an absolute 'nothing.' Indeed, we might remark that there is 'no-thing' in space thus emptied, but must thereby realize that existential space, yet present, is more primordial than 'any-thing,' and is equiprimordially disclosed with the world-hood of that world of space devoid of matter.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Being and Time}, H section 112
\textsuperscript{13} See reference for Husserl
That is, there is yet a spatial world and worldhood in which there is no baryonic matter, the spatiality of which does not convey a divorce of space from matter, such that they are externally related thereafter, but a revealing of the primordial origins and heritage of all delineated, material 'things' in existential space. Herein, the primordiality of existential space that is beyond 'things' comes into view. Thus, the existential phenomenon of *embodiment*, which must somehow involve matter (though not necessarily in the sense of pure identification therewith), must also involve existential spatiality and matter in such a way that they are not externally related, and indeed are involved in a unitary, spatializing phenomenon, while uncovering embodiment as an *unfolding* or *laying open* of space and being. The carving of 'things' from out of that unfolding of existential spatiality, employing matter as a guideline for drawing existential boundaries, is what will be revealed to be less primordial than existential spatiality. Unlike Heidegger's existential spatial account, our uncovering will involve embodiment as a crucial, existential phenomenon that is equiprimordial with being and spatiality, and indeed, the other three, outlined phenomena of existential spatiality.

In section one, we shall uncover the phenomena encountered in traditional, Western accounts of spatiality, which are the presuppositions that support and are supported by the Western paradigm. These will be the four existential phenomena of:

- Delineation
- Divorce
- Appropriation
- Entification
By philosophically uncovering and portraying these phenomena that presuppose existential spatiality, so as to convert it into a less-than-primordial spatiality of substance, we shall see that spatiality appears non-unitary when it is viewed on a level less primordial than that of the existential. That is, when existential spatiality is divided by the aforementioned four phenomena, which nonetheless presuppose it, it appears in its less primordial version to be non-unitary. The only way in which existential spatiality appears as such, however, is by such a division. Thus, the S-O spectrum, which arises from the four phenomena, involves a mode of being that is founded upon a more primordial one. On that primordial level, the division of the S-O spectrum are seen, at least, to be not inevitable and inherent but philosophic choices of a paradigm.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF WESTERN SPATIAL ACCOUNTS

Section 1: Cartesian Space

The defining aspect of spatiality for Descartes is what he terms as ‘extension’ (extensio). In relation to material objects, or bodies in general, for them to be extended is to be "a thing possessing extension in length, breadth, and depth."\textsuperscript{14}

One ontological observation which we may already make is the employment of the first aspect of the Western paradigm (substantive metaphysics), which is present in the term 'thing,' here synonymous with 'body' or 'matter.' Primarily, the taking of the totality of the world’s spatial disclosure and dividing it into definite portions of 'what-is-disclosed,' or more familiarly, 'things,' which then must bear some external (i.e. existentially divorced) relation to each other and the 'subject' who divides, is to engage in the phenomenon of \textit{delineation}, or the outlining of 'things' with existential boundaries that are enclosing, and hence, defining of a 'thing' in its complete ontological enclosure. This delineation is the ontological ground for ‘thing-hood.’ The result of its phenomenon is an ontologically traced-out thing, which is then explicitly seized and cast definitely as an entity or substance, which results in the phenomenon of \textit{entification}, or the forging of entities. However, delineation, and subsequently the definiteness of a thing, are

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{The Method, Meditations and Philosophy of Descartes}, pg. 335, IV
existentially spatial, as the drawing and outlining of boundaries necessitate that we have, at least, some pre-philosophical understanding of spatiality, owing to how ‘boundary’ is existentially spatial and, applied to the disclosure of the world, carries existential significance. Defined generally, a boundary is something that indicates the farthest limit, as of an area; border. The spatial nature of 'boundary' is made clearer by the terms 'limit' and 'border,' taken ontologically. The ontological signification of 'boundary' is uncovered in that, taking the unity of the world's spatiality, an existential line, being an incision made in that unity, can be drawn within the as yet non-individuated and total unity, individuating that unity into definite ‘whats,’ which constitute the ‘what-is-disclosed’ view of spatially. Drawn about some pre-philosophically decided ‘what,’ that existential line becomes a delineating border that defines the existential area limited thereby. The border, its area, and the limit thereof, collectively are a delineation, which inherits an identity of delineated 'what-ness' that individuates it, and taken existentially, becomes a divorced 'thing.' Thus, the substantive, existential appropriation of boundaries, requisite for 'thing-hood' to be established, is a phenomenon of manipulating spatiality in the existential sense. Such appropriation is, when conducted on the basis of the Western paradigm and its metaphysical presuppositions, a pre-philosophical deciding of the world's spatiality, while leaving the ontological grounds thereof obscured and hazy, beneath a fog of indefiniteness. When the primordiality of spatiality is left obfuscated by indefinite ontology, or worse, is sundered into less primordial 'things,' we lose sight of spatiality as a unity, and instead examine some pre-philosophically selected 'spatiality-of,' attempting to begin from this narrowed spatiality and then portray a spatiality that has the unity of the one which we passed over already by making spatiality
some 'spatiality-of.' As we explicated previously, this ‘spatiality-of,’ in Western accounts, is a spatiality of some definite what (i.e. substance).

Prior to his explication of spatiality, Descartes has involved, pre-philosophically, and as a matter of presupposition, a definite ontological assumption of spatiality, which narrows his discussion from spatiality, considered primordially, to the spatiality of 'thinghood.' Consequent upon this existential narrowing, difficulties issuing from how he is endeavoring, as we alluded, to regain the unity already forfeited by making spatiality into a 'spatiality-of.' The difficulty encountered in beginning from spatialities-of, and attempting to synthesize their disparateness into a whole, is that the world and spatiality are co-disclosed as a unitary whole that is world. By this co-disclosure, we do not mean that the world and spatiality are disclosed to some thing or are disclosed as a thing, but that they are, per the term disclose, opened up, laid open, and unfolded, equiprimordially. If the world and spatiality are disclosed as a unitary whole, then unless they come into our sight in their wholeness, some portion of its unity will inevitably escape our view, as the wholeness is only whole in its wholeness, and not as stitched-together portions, where the scars of existential division and the external relations between portions yet persist.

This inability to achieve wholeness through patched-together portions is made obvious by the second feature of the Western paradigm, which is that of 'external relatedness.' If the 'spatialities-of' are considered as separate from one another – such as in the case of the spatiality of substances in space, where substances are existences independent of one another – then for them to be combined, they must be related somehow to one another; though, once made definite as separate, their relations to one another are already decided to be external to each. The externality of their relations is
inevitable, owing to how those 'spatialities-of' have been existentially divorced from one another already, being founded upon 'thing-hood,' and thus represent twin, substantive entities that we may attempt to combine, but only by relations which are external to each substance. Unification, or making-unitary, is achievable only if there are primordial, unifying grounds which underlie all substances, which does not come into the view of substance-based ontologies by the definition of substances as independent existences. With external relatedness, and thus thing-hood, such unitary grounds have already been discarded and do not come into view, as both the notions of 'external' and 'internal' are divisions made in a unity that precedes each and is requisite for such division to be fashioned, such as the world's spatiality. 'External' is understood as external to the 'internal' space of a thing, and 'internal' is understood as 'external' to the 'external' space beyond the thing. Inherently, the spatiality is thing-centered, and becomes conceived always in terms of externality, owing to how the thing is the prioritized focus. It would be untenable to say 'external' is understood as 'internal' to – what? There is a created necessity to posit a thing there – be it air, mass, empty space conceived as substance, et cetera. The continual positing of a subsequent thing results in either conceiving of 'external' as meaning absolute space, or theorizing 'external' to be the 'internal' place of a related thing. In the first case, 'external' understood as absolute space grants space an unclear sort of thing-hood, though incompletely, due to absolute space being abstract in such a way that it is illimitable and thus not able to be completely delineated as a 'thing.' This gives us an ontologically incoherent spatial account. In the second case, 'external' conceived as the 'internal' place of a related thing throws us into the grip of an unending spiral, where we progress through infinitely many such external (relative to the thing)
relations, and at its end do not see any unitary grounds, only an infinite series of tied-together entities, with the question of spatiality and its unity unresolved. Finally, it would be equally untenable to say 'internal' is understood only as 'internal' to the space of the thing, as this is a tautology and neglects that 'internal,' by necessity, creates an 'external,' for which we must account spatially in terms of thing-hood. Thus, stitching together 'spatialities-of' by means of external relations, we have already passed over the unitary grounds by which they could be united, as we are appropriating ontologically the world into disparate portions, such as 'external' and 'internal,' 'subject' and 'object,' or 'thing' and 'observer.' Therefore, to relate portions of a unitary phenomenon to one another, by means of external relatedness, is to create a patchwork that is not existentially stitched-together, and which will unravel if those external relations are severed; the unity cannot be synthesized from portions of itself.

To make definite the ontological difficulties Descartes suffers in his explication of spatiality, owing to the pre-philosophical framing of spatiality as a narrower 'spatiality-of,' in this instance the spatiality of thing-hood, and stemming from the foggy ontological ground of his spatiality, as well as flowing from the unity already passed over in the 'spatiality-of' that is unachievable by patching 'spatialities-of' together by means of external relatedness, we shall examine how his notion of "extension" functions in light of these aforementioned concerns.

Descartes continues: "for in fact the extension in length, breadth, and depth which constitutes the space occupied by a body, is exactly the same as that which constitutes the
body."\textsuperscript{15} Recalling that he has pre-philosophically framed spatiality in terms of the spatiality of thing-hood, his ontologically prioritized focus is that of the thing, here synonymous with body and matter. Thus we are, before we have made any definite ontological description, already considering the body as a thing and space as a quasi-thing, with the looming problem before us of how externally to relate these two things. This is the central challenge of the spatiality of thing-hood: to elucidate a thing in its own spatiality, and then abridge the gulf between that thing's spatiality and the spatiality that, by construction, has already been posited to be 'beyond' the thing and thus external. A glaring difficulty we see here is that, in order to elucidate a thing in its own spatiality, some version of spatiality must be pre-philosophically employed, which is what Descartes did when he defined 'a thing' by giving it extension, though that extension is as yet only the 'extension-of' thing-hood. In the above passage, Descartes is now attempting to abridge the gulf between the 'spatiality-of' thing-hood and spatiality in the abstract.

In order to make his passage more ontologically definite, we should pay attention to how existentiality is being appropriated by the spatial, existential modifiers in the statement. In the first clause, Descartes asserts that extension 'constitutes' the space 'occupied' by a body. As extension is what Descartes previously employed in order to make the body into a thing, his claiming that extension also 'constitutes' space itself converts space into a quasi-thing. We say only quasi-thing, since a requisite for thing-hood, discussed previously, was delineation, or tracing the borders of, within the co-disclosure of spatiality and the world, which, with this conception of space as pure extension, is locally feasible, but unattainable with respect to the totality of extended spatiality.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{The Method, Meditations and Philosophy of Descartes, pg. 338, X}
space, as that totality is not prior conceived with any sort of limitations. The relation, then, between 'thing' and 'space' is one of externality. The externality of their relation becomes more readily apparent in the following existential modifier of 'occupy,' as it is contrasted with 'constitute.' There is a fundamental, ontological incompatibility between 'constitute' and 'occupy,' where 'constitute' is taken to be an existential condition, and occupy is taken to signify an external relatedness. If extension is what constitutes a 'thing,' or 'body,' and then is what constitutes space also, primarily space is made into a quasi-thing, which necessitates that there is external relatedness between the 'things,' as we have already shown. However, Descartes wishes spatiality and the 'thing' to have ontological similitude, to where they are constituted by the selfsame existential condition, termed as extension. This existential relation, to which he appears to be endeavoring, is not one of externality, and indeed, is prior to the 'entification' of the co-disclosure of the world and spatiality. 'Occupy' is an external relation, where a 'thing' is merely 'on' or incidental to a particular point or region of space, but is not existentially related to its 'there,' from either the perspectives of the 'thing' or space. This is the external relation befitting of Descartes' spatiality, and it cannot, per his discussion, be reconciled with 'constitute,' such that a 'thing' merely 'occupies' its there, as a matter of external relatedness, but is simultaneously existentially 'constituted' by its there. Extension, therefore, appears to be a layering of contradictory relations.

We see, thus far, that Descartes has narrowed the uncovering of spatiality as a unity to a particular 'spatiality-of,' which here is the spatiality of thing-hood, and has provided us with an account where the 'thing' is traced out by the appropriation of existential space, and then is traced out in terms of extension, which is subsequently
employed to trace out space itself, in terms of quasi-thing-hood, and results in a layering of relations with contradicting existentiality. His account of spatiality so far has failed to achieve the patching together of the spatialities of things in order to uncover a unified view of space, and has failed by virtue of the crucial contradiction between external and existential relatedness that plagues his description.

In defense of Descartes, one may allude to a subsequent passage, where he states, regarding the distinction between body and space:

"The difference consists in the fact that, in the body, we consider its extension as if it were an individual thing, and think that it is always changed whenever the body changes. However, we attribute a generic unity to the extension of the space, so that when the body which fills the space has been changed, the extension of the space itself is not considered to have been changed but to remain one and the same; as long as it remains of the same size and shape and maintains the same situation among certain external bodies by means of which we specify that space."\(^\text{16}\)

Apparent in this passage is Descartes' attempt to reconcile the patched-together spatiality of thing-hood with space considered as a whole. Also apparent, in the first, quoted sentence, is that extension, as a consequence of Descartes' account, has been assigned a quasi-thing-hood, though its thing-hood does not consign it to be altered whenever body is altered; to the contrary, the quasi-thing-hood of space necessitates that it relates to body externally, and thus does not change when the body is altered. Thus, the first sentiment encountered of his in this passage is one which is nonsensical. If

\(^{16}\) *The Method, Meditations and Philosophy of Descartes, pg. 338, XIV*
extension, made synonymous with space by constitution, were a thing, to which Descartes tacitly agreed previously, it would not alter when the body is altered; the body merely 'occupies' that space, per his account. The difficulty, again, is that extension is assigned a double, ontological mandate: it is simultaneously what constitutes spatiality, as well as the body, while body merely 'occupies' space as a matter of external relatedness. The second sentence in the quoted passage makes his insistence on such a view readily apparent. He attributes a 'generic unity' to space, such that the extension of space is not altered, if the extension of the body is altered. If extension constitutes both body and space, then the question remains: how does extension, which is both spatiality and body, not change in total with body? The existential divorce between 'thing' and 'spatiality,' present from the first quoted passage, has haunted Descartes' account throughout, and has revealed itself here again. To re-iterate an earlier point: when thinghood has been delineated, its existential borders have been closed, so that it relates, as a matter of mechanism and externality, to all other things thus traced. By considering two 'things' side-by-side to one another, and pairing them as such existentially, their possible, unitary ground has been passed over, and instead is attempted confusedly by reconciliation that deals with closed existential borders. The endeavor is foredoomed to fail in its aim.

Conceiving of space instead as a 'generic unity' worsens Descartes' difficulties: space has now become absolute, and has its own extension that appears divorced from that of 'things,' while retaining the quasi-thing-hood which emerged earlier in his account. Here we see the emergence of the absolutist account, developed and espoused by Newton, where spatiality has a quasi-thing-hood, and the spatiality of thing-hood is one
of a bounded thing that moves 'on' the existentially divorced background of space, which is immutable.

**Section 2: Newton, Leibniz, and Absolutist Space**

Newton conceives of space as an absolute, universal entity, such that space is, in essence, an unbounded substance, where substance is understood metaphysically as an independent existence (i.e. a de-worlded thing). Consequently, conceiving of space as a delineated, entitified, and hence existentially independent, thing, is the very philosophic motion which enables Newton to portray space as being an absolute, universal entity. The existential divorce that occurs when such a substance is thus traced necessitates that all relations thereof are external to that substantive thing and all such things. Once more, this existential maneuver of Newton's allows for his conception of space as being externally related to every embodiment, such that anything embodied moves 'on' or 'in' space, where 'on' and 'in' are understood to imply that space is the absolute background upon which or within which some body moves. Any thing and its there are thus non-existentially related, reaffirming the predisposition of Western philosophy towards its existential focus upon thing-hood, due to that thing never 'being-opened' in any way from its delineation and never coming into view as interdependent with a world.

Two glaring difficulties arise from the summarizing of Newton's spatial account as being one wherein space is a delineated, entitified, existentially independent substance that entertains external relations to all that is within or upon space. Namely, a requisite for thing-hood to be traced-out is delineation, where existential borders thus traced enclose an area that possesses the whole character of 'inside.' Only once delineation
traces completely closed borders that enclose a definite, existential area, may a 'thing' thereby be existentially divorced and held forth as a substance from out of existential spatiality. The first difficulty encountered is, as has been steadfastly the case so far, that the establishment of space as such presupposes a more primordial existential spatiality, whereby Newtonian space is established. If spatiality is to be equiprimordial with worldhood, and co-disclosed therewith, then there must be no spatial sense more primordial than both. Given the presupposition and appropriation of existential space contained within the Newtonian account, we must contend that it is therefore less primordial than that which it presupposes and appropriates. Although Newton's spatiality endeavors, by being absolutist and wholly objective, to be unitary by being utterly independent, it has overlooked the unity which it presupposes to exist, and has done so by looking to the substantive level, which is less primordial than the unappropriated, existential level that is unitary and equiprimordial with worldhood.

The second difficulty of Newton's spatial rendition is that his joint insistence on substantive metaphysics and space being absolute, unbounded, and universal, results in a contradiction. Particularly, that space is entified, or delineated into a substance, and that it is simultaneously also unbounded and infinite, is a contradiction in ontology. Were space to be entified and ontologically cast a substance, then it must possess the requisite condition of being fully, existentially enclosed, and have delineated borders which trace the area which inherits the full character of existential 'insideness.' To posit that some 'thing' may be infinite and unbounded is thus contradictory to the ontology of thing-hood. If space is to be infinite and unbounded, then it must be admitted that it cannot be considered 'some-thing,' in the sense of substantive metaphysics. Correspondingly, if
space is not to be infinite and unbounded, and instead finite and bounded, then it may be considered as 'a thing,' but with the additional difficulty that finitude and boundary are aspects of existential spatiality, which herein would be employed to limit that spatiality which they constitute, resulting in the ponderous conclusion that existential spatiality limits the totality of itself, by itself. In essence, the totality of existential spatiality would be tantamount to no more than a region, though such a region is established only by virtue of existential spatiality, of which it is an aspect. The conclusion with which we are confronted is that it appears most coherent to consider spatiality as existential spatiality, which is unbounded, infinite, and 'no-thing.' This conclusion entails that space cannot be absolute and irrespective of the world, but instead that it is interdependent with the world with which it is equiprimordial. Here, we obtain an insight into how existential spatiality, the world, and worldhood, are disclosed, unfolded, and laid open as the phenomenon of spatializing, and constitute the phenomenal there. If the world, worldhood, and spatiality are thus disclosed, then each there is existentially unified with every there, making embodiment an existential orientation. By embodiment – what we shall call ‘being-body’ – existentiality is oriented, and its interactions and relations are a communion of itself with itself. The world, as we shall consider, is the existential, spatial interdependence of world-hood and all within-the-world, where each being is a ‘being-there,’ and all being is disclosed, unfolded, and laid open by the phenomenon of spatializing.

Leibniz, by maintaining that spatiality inheres in the relations of 'things,' places himself in the spectrum of objective spatiality, by both considering those relations to be absolute, though thing-dependent, and by pre-philosophically delineating 'objects' and then attributing external (to the existentiality of the object/substance) relations between
those objects, so as to cast space as relational, but relational in such a sense that an absolute set of spatial relations only require the condition that things/objects are somehow 'there,' so as to establish an objective space. The spatiality of Newton was absolute, regardless of things within space, as it was a thing in itself, while Leibniz's spatiality is absolute and dependent upon only one further, unclear condition, which is that things are somehow 'there' in the world. The relational aspect of Leibniz's account, thus, does not provide for those spatial relations to be existentially modified by a thing, or to existentially modify that thing, and represents only a shift from space as an entity in itself to space as an entity that results from and is dependent upon other entities, but in such a way that is external to those things. These spatial relations, being the results of delineation, not only presuppose existential spatiality by the establishment of those things, and thus are external to those things, but consequently make space non-existential. That is, if space is to inhere in an external relation between things, where the externality thereof results from the existential divorce between things, then spatiality must be non-existent. If spatiality is to be as such, then what we have conceived of as being 'existential spatiality' is less primordial than its own presupposition and appropriation, upon which Leibniz's account relies.

Absolutist, objective space suffers, as did the semi-objective Cartesian account, from unclear and conflicted ontology, failing to bring existential spatiality into view in its primordial and unified character. Furthermore, the phenomenon of 'being-there,' as would existentially disclose all bodies, has gone missing, and indeed, has become trivialized, such that 'being-there' means no more than 'being-at-a-point-in-space.' Here we see an
appeal to Euclidean geometry, wherein space is rectilinear and able to be mapped by flattened planes, whether considered singularly or arranged in an overlaid series.

As an ontological framework, we yet remain with an objective spatiality which is given, and things-in-space which are likewise provided, with the addition that those things may interact with space only insofar as they move 'in' or 'on' space, but in such a way that the existentiality of the thing and space are unchanged by interaction, and thus do not existentially interact, and are existentially divorced from one another. In total, we have yet to bring into view the primordial, unified existential spatiality which would disclose spatiality and the body together existentially, as opposed to the above account, wherein space is given and things-in-space are provided.

Section 3: Subjective and Existential Spatiality

If we are to affirm that the subject is not necessarily existentially embodied, then we must do so by claiming that the 'internal' subject is not 'there' as a matter thereof, and furthermore is not existentially within the world, but 'on' or 'in' the world as a cup is 'on' a table or water is 'in' a glass. A glaring difficulty plagues us immediately, beginning with how the subject, if denied its embodiment within the world in an existential sense, yet retains its far less obvious, or clear, quasi-embodiment as an 'internal region' without which lurks an 'external region.' Thereby, the subject is encompassed, traced, and delineated, inheriting a manner of self-inflicted thing-hood and becoming, by presupposition, yet 'there' in the manner of pure 'being-inside' which, as a substance, must entertain external relations to 'there' and the whole of spatiality, and therefore is 'in' or 'on' space and the world in the non-existential sense above highlighted. Thus, a subject, if
reaved of its embodiment qua existentiality, is by its very positing a quasi-embodiment which results from delineation, and hence, is less primordial than existential embodiment. Should embodiment be understood as an existential condition, whereby existential orientation and interaction/rela
tion are uncovered and disclosed, rendering spatializing as the phenomenal opening and being-vulnerable of this being within the world, then we bring into view that any opening of being is vulnerable in the possibilities that are laid bare and 'there,' such that any 'there' is an opening and being-vulnerable of being. Correspondingly, any being is an opening and being-vulnerable of 'there.' The world is thus conceived both as the existential interdependence of being in terms of embodiment, orientation, and interaction/rela
tion, in addition to the 'there' of these existential conditions, where the 'there' of embodiment, equiprimordial with being, is the spatializing which discloses being, which is being-vulnerable 'there' and interdependent with all being. Here, we have first uncovered an introductory view of existential spatiality.
CHAPTER III

TOWARDS EXISTENTIAL SPATIALITY

Section 1: Ontological and Existential

We have explicitly stated our goal as being that of uncovering existential spatiality in its unitary character, by the light of phenomenology. In our introductory view of existential spatiality, we noted that the ‘there’ of embodiment is equiprimordial with the possibilities of being, which are phenomenally disclosed as spatial. Thus, embodiment, being, and spatiality are all equiprimordial with one another, and are phenomenally revealed as being such – that is, all at once, as an existential whole, without one preceding or causing the other. As we aimed to reveal how the ‘subject-object’ spectrum is a founded mode of being – i.e. a mode of being which is founded upon being, which is more primordial than it – we shall uncover our alternative view in such a way that is not existentially founded upon a more primordial mode of being, or alternatively stated, equiprimordial. In noticing and questioning that we favor the term ‘existential’ as it relates to phenomenology, rather than ‘ontological,’ we gain an opportunity to explicate our approach of uncovering, and so must clarify that we conceive of ‘ontological’ as it expresses the condition of existence – i.e. the condition of spatial existence, and what, in the sense of being, constitutes spatiality. To employ Heideggerian
terminology, the ontology of space is the *existentiale* structure of Dasein’s being-in-the-world that is constitutively spatial. Heidegger’s sense of ‘ontological’ is that we may outline the *existentiale* characteristics of Dasein that structure its ontology, or what the condition of Dasein’s spatial existence *is* and how Dasein is constitutively spatial. For instance, two such items are de-distancing and directionality. The sense in which we are favoring and employing ‘existential’, however, differs greatly in three important regards.

Firstly, the *existentiale* characteristics of Dasein are considered by Heidegger to be structural and constitutive of its existence as Dasein, which places its structure in the realm of Kant’s *a priori* (i.e. established ‘prior to’), with the exception that each *existentiale* must be lived by Dasein – and lived in the *existentiell* sense. The sense in which we are using ‘existential’ avoids the essentialist tendency (the first feature of the Western paradigm) that is revealed in identifying ‘structural,’ ‘constitutive,’ or ‘a priori’ ontological characteristics of an entity, by seeking to discover only the ‘how’ by which spatiality is disclosed in its existentiality by spatial phenomena, without *a priori* structuring or being centered upon an entity.

Provided that we are claiming spatiality and embodiment are equiprimordial, along with the possibilities of being, the issue arises of whether embodiment is without entity – and if an individual body, which might spatially constitute that entity, is seen as an entity. We must therefore highlight the phenomenal fact that no individual body is ever encountered as only that body; rather, it is encountered in relation to world. Indeed, each body is encountered as it is related to every other body, and thus, to the totality of all interrelated bodies. For instance, my body only discloses certain possibilities, such as jumping, running, and climbing, because there are other bodies, such as rocks, that
constitute that phenomenon inasmuch as my body. Thus, my body does not reveal the possibility of the rock being climbed, nor does the rock reveal the possibility of my body to climb; rather, the rock and my body co-disclose the possibility of climbing. This co-disclosure is not a 'disclosing-to-whom,' but simply a disclosing (we might say to world, but 'world' is not an entity). If we were to narrow our existential focus to only my body, and consider it an independent body, then we would exclude the view of world from our sight, with which it is interdependent to be a body. That is, a body is only as it is, and only discloses the possibilities of being that it is, precisely because it is in relation to all other bodies – that is, embodiment connects all bodies. The phenomenon of embodiment, thus, is not a dualistic one, but is the unity of the possibilities of being that exist in relation to one another as embodiment. An individual body does not come into view as being 'entified,' or made into an entity, because it is existentially open to world and intertwined with world, and thus, all embodiment. There are no rigid (i.e. substantive), existential borders that we may outline, on the basis of body, provided that the embodied possibilities of being are integrated seamlessly with one another existentially.

Thus, ‘existential’ here assumes the sense of ‘phenomenal,’ while not necessarily identifying structural, constitutive, or a priori characteristics of any entity or any-thing, marking an important distinction from Heidegger’s ontology. Indeed, Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein could be seen as a Kantian a priori characterization of Dasein's being-in-the-world, with the addendum that the a priori must be lived and understood in the existentiell sense, as well.

Secondly, Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein, and hence his spatial account, is predicated upon having Dasein as his primary focus, which affords Dasein an ontological
priority. Indeed, the Heideggerian account of spatiality is only so through Dasein. However, this fact does not render Heidegger's account a subjective one. In the subject-object spectrum, the existential focus is either upon the subject (space is subjective; i.e. the subject 'spatializes'), or upon the object (space is objective; i.e. the world 'spatializes' itself regardless of a subject), or some mixture thereof that attempts to negotiate 'subject' and 'object,' while maintaining each ontologically. Heidegger, by turning his philosophical eye towards being and worldhood, undercuts those two extremes, and reveals them to be ontologically founded modes of 'being-in-the-world.' Yet, the being that is 'being-in-the-world' is Dasein, and only through Dasein and its understanding does the question of that being have meaning. Without Dasein, the question of being simply cannot be asked, and is not answered either affirmatively or negatively. This prioritizes Dasein ontologically, and renders it as the existential focus. Thus, we must ask: what is the ontological status of Dasein as a being? Is it an entity, subject, object, or not ontologically definite as an entity at all? Certainly, Dasein does not have the Aristotelian sense of 'essence' – i.e. it is not an independent existence with a fixed nature, whose teleology it is to fulfill that nature, and the degree to which it does so being the extent to which it is virtuous – though its prioritization grants it the unclarified sense of an 'entity,' through whose understanding being and meaning are uncovered. There is a semi-definite 'who' about Dasein, to whom being is an issue. As Dasein is 'being-in-the-world,' the world is primarily uncovered in its worldhood through Dasein, owing to Dasein's status as 'who,' relative to that status of 'what' that belong to the other entities of the world. Dasein thus 'stands out' of the world as the entity for whom being is an issue, and through whom being and meaning are uncovered by their understanding of that being – including
that understanding which uncovers spatiality. The ontological structures of the world and their significance, which constitute Heideggerian spatiality, thus arise with Dasein and its understanding, and not through any other being. This prioritizes Dasein as the existential focus of Heideggerian spatiality, which is spatiality as it is encountered and lived by Dasein. The sense in which we are using the term 'existential' seeks to avoid any such prioritization, by regarding existentiality and spatiality as an unbroken whole that is revealed in its wholeness by existential and spatial phenomenology.

The term ‘existential’ avoids also the traditional sense in which ontology is the “study of the nature of being,” and instead strives to be the “disclosure of being, embodiment, and spatiality in how they co-arise as existentially spatial and embodied phenomena.” As we mentioned previously, there exists no definite what (an entity, subject, or object; a thing) that is being uncovered by such phenomena, since this presupposes an explicit subject-object relation (i.e. the ‘subject-who-uncovers’ and the ‘that-which-is-uncovered’) and enlists an already-appropriated existential spatiality that is more primordial than its appropriation. Instead, existentiality, and hence spatiality and embodiment, are the disclosing phenomena; they are the phenomena that disclose. We may confusedly apply subject-oriented language to describe this existential identity, by claiming that “existentiality discloses itself in itself, by itself, as it is seen spatially by itself in itself.” Yet, the referent ‘it’ is utterly empty: existentiality does not precede disclosing, nor does disclosure follow upon the establishment of existentiality.

Accordingly, in our existential view, it is disallowed for any entity to be ‘disclosed’ by spatial and existential phenomena.
Thirdly, Heidegger distinguishes ‘ontological’ as it pertains to ‘ontic,’ by the first meaning ‘the fundamental ground or foundation of being,’ while reserving the second for ‘the factical situation of being, concrete and individual.’ To understand the ‘ontological’ characteristics of Dasein is to uncover the existentiales of its Being; while to observe the ontic, factical, and local situation of Dasein is to understand the existentiell sense. Ultimately, the existentiales must be encountered and understood in an existentiell sense, such as we see in Dasein being constitutively (i.e. ontologically; in the existentiale sense) spatial, yet living (i.e. existentiell sense) that ontology by encountering and observing its factical and local situation in the equipment-context of the ready-to-hand, wherein it ontologically has the characteristics of ‘bringing-close’ (Entfernung; de-distancing) and ‘directionality’ that constitute how its Being is involved within its ontic, factical situation. Dasein is structured ontologically to use ‘circumspection’ (Umsicht; circumspection, ‘around-sight’) to understand its environment or local situation, which it then ‘de-distances’ and brings close by, for example, assigning a particular tool a ‘whereto’ (Wozu; literally, ‘where’ and ‘to’) of its use – all of which transpires in the ontic locale. The difficulty, to which Heidegger unwittingly alludes, is that “Dasein exists factically.”¹⁷ That is, the concrete, individual, and local situation of Dasein are how Dasein exists. Lurking unclarified within this ‘how’ is the shadow of embodiment, which Heidegger admits “presents its own problematic,”¹⁸ and which he does not explicitly address. While Dasein does exist ontically-ontologically – that is, at once both ontically and ontologically – Heidegger does not clarify whether the embodiment of Dasein and that of its environment is ontic, ontological, or ontic-ontological. We might suppose that

¹⁷ Being and Time, H section 110
¹⁸ Being and Time, H section 108
the embodiment of Dasein must be ontic-ontological, given that Dasein exists as such, but we are provided with little sense in which the embodiment of Dasein is ontological. Indeed, given that Dasein being there, in its environment, presupposes the embodiment of Dasein, and that the equipment-context presupposes the body of each equipment-piece and the locale of its use, as well as Heidegger’s ontological structures of the world seeming not to involve explicitly embodiment in any definite way, the most likely site for embodiment in the Heideggerian realm would be the ontic (over which the ontological would take precedence; i.e. we have eyes because we are beings that “see”).

To be fair, Heidegger could argue that, if the ontological must be lived in the ontic sense, then embodiment, and indeed, everything ontic, is implicitly contained within his explication of Dasein’s ontological characteristics – yet this ignores the possibility of considering embodiment as an existentiale. Curiously, embodiment is implicitly considered as an existentiale, when Heidegger discusses the phenomenon of a tool becoming ‘de-worlded’ and becoming obtrusive, which is the breakdown of the ‘ready-to-hand.’ The tool is then seen in its de-worlded character as just ‘present-at-hand-and-nothing-more,’ or simply as matter that is nearby in the sense of measurable distance, which is distinct from the ‘environment’ (Umwelt; ‘around-world’) of the equipment-context and the existential sense of nearby in de-distancing (Entfernung). This phenomenon, however, may occur as a result from a change in its embodiment, such as when a tool breaks and thereby must forfeit its existential assignments in the equipment-context. In the Heideggerian context, that the phenomenon of de-worlding, where the unitary phenomenon of worldhood is revealed in its deficient mode, may result as a

19 Aside from supposing that embodiment must be implicitly included in Zuhandenheit (readiness-to-hand)
consequence of an alteration in embodiment, reveals how the possibilities of being of a tool are altered by a change in embodiment – and thus, due to Dasein’s involvement in the equipment-context, how those possibilities of Dasein are altered as well, when the embodiment of a tool changes. The alteration in a tool’s embodiment, then, shines light upon how the possibilities of existentiality are altered precisely by a change in body, and that embodiment may be brought from its unclarified position as most likely ontic, possibly ontic-ontological, to be considered as an existential – or, for us, in the view of existential phenomenology. The term ‘existential,’ as we are using it phenomenally, shines light upon how existentiality and spatiality are disclosed equiprimordially, which is by the phenomenon of embodiment – thus involving what would be, for Heidegger, at once ontological and ontic/factual.

Section 2: The Western Paradigm and the Existential Approach

There are two sub-features to the Western paradigm, relating to the existential approach, that must be introduced and critiqued, before we are to advance in our discussion:

- Beginning philosophy on the level of theory and abstraction, aiming towards universalization
- The forgetfulness of Being

The first sub-feature is the tendency of almost all Western philosophy to begin and remain on the level of theory and abstraction. This approach necessitates that any ‘lived’ considerations are discarded or outright ignored, and that the world to which we are now philosophically gazing is ‘dead.” In Heideggerian terms, the type of being that Western
philosophy assigns the world becomes ‘present-at-hand’ and nothing more. The static – as opposed to involved in a world – and dead – instead of alive and lived – world of theory and abstraction is prevalent in each spatial account we have hitherto encountered, save for that of Heidegger, who was the first in the Western tradition to advance any notion of ‘aliveness’ or ‘world’ into spatiality. The Cartesian rendition of spatiality, where extension constitutes ontologically both body and the ‘generic unity’ of extended space upon which those bodies rest, is not a spatial environment of living or ‘being-alive,’ but a theoretical account, where space has been abstracted away from any world and divested of the possibility of ‘being-involved’ in any existential phenomenon. As Heidegger rightly claims, Cartesian spatiality is never encountered or experienced in Dasein’s careful dealings, and it is only once the world has been stripped of its ‘worldhood’ (i.e. theorized and abstracted) that something such as Cartesian spatiality becomes possible. Newtonian space, where space is a background for the world, relegates spatiality to such a remote position, that it cannot be encountered within the world at all. The same conclusion, of course, holds true for Leibnizian space, which, as we have explicated previously, is another rendition of absolutist space. Finally, Kantian spatiality, which is wholly subjective, and thus appears at first glance to possess the most potentiality for lived considerations amongst our considered accounts, does not fulfill its promising appearance, when its account, as well, dismisses space to a passive ‘mental filter.’ This filter is a form of intuition that ‘spatializes’ the world in the subject’s mind, mostly in the sense that the subject, by this inner intuition, spatially represents ‘objects’ to themselves. The Western paradigm as a whole, which hitherto has vacillated between the center and extremes of the subject-object spectrum, has prioritized theory, alongside

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20 Being and Time, H section 100
truth and analytical superiority, as well as abstraction, to the extent that a possible relationship of existentiality and spatiality, as well as a phenomenological, lived approach to spatiality, initially appear unfathomable (with the exception of Heidegger). Indeed, the question of existentiality, relative to spatiality, was pre-philosophically solved by the adherence of Western philosophy to the subject-object spectrum itself. Only once Heidegger employed his critique of primordiality, which aimed to find the fundamental, ontological ground beneath the subject-object spectrum, did any such notion of existential spatiality become possible within the Western paradigm.

Consequently, by beginning and remaining on the level of theory and abstraction in Western philosophy, we have made it our tradition to be forgetful of and ignore considerations of being and existentiality, which is the second sub-feature of the Western paradigm. It is therefore unsurprising that we should encounter a complete sort of ‘ignore-ance’ of existentiality in traditional Western accounts of spatiality. Nonetheless, whenever we speak philosophically of spatiality, we are also speaking of existentiality, as existentiality is the spatial world of which we are speaking. If that existentiality is pre-philosophically decided, on the basis of paradigm, and then forgotten and ignored, we encounter spatial accounts wherein the existential status of space is often limited only to one particular type of being (objective or subjective), or is described in terms of confused ontologies (Descartes), and is bereft, when we employ the theoretical and abstract approach of the Western paradigm, of lived or worldly considerations. Indeed, the notions of lived space and worldhood cannot come into our view, should we remain forgetful of being.
The tendency towards substantive metaphysics, and consequently the pre-philosophical omission of being, is so prevalent, that some philosophies within the existentialist movement – which allegedly pay more heed explicitly to being – yet have substantive tendencies creep into their ontologies in the same pre-philosophic way, creating a sort of ‘existentialist lapse’ with regard to being. For instance, Sartre’s famous dictum that “existence precedes essence,”\(^{21}\) which is at the heart of his philosophy in *Being and Nothingness*, attempts to deny the Aristotelian sense of ‘essence’ that declares each thing has a nature that constitutes what it is, and instead proposes that existence is more primordial than essence, and that by living and seizing their absolute personal freedom, each person decides and becomes what they are. What Sartre does not dispense with, however, is the lingering shadow of ‘essence,’ which we see in his placing of the “I think” into the ontological constitution of the ‘for-itself,’ mitigating the absolute nothingness thereof and mixing it with the deterministic being of the ‘in-itself,’ to which an ontological constitution is simply given, as it is in the case of an object. This placement of the “I think” converts the for-itself (i.e. the human being) into a sort of semi-definite *what* through granting it a quasi-nature ontologically, despite Sartre emphatically denying that the for-itself has a nature. In fact, Sartre ascribes absolute freedom and pure nothingness to the ontological constitution of the for-itself, which is in agreement with his claim that existence precedes essence. However, Sartre essentially inverts the Cartesian dictum of “I think, therefore I am” to read “I am, therefore I think,” by ontologically retaining the “I think” in the pure nothingness of the for-itself and essentializing them by making *one* of the possibilities of their being ontologically necessary and existentially compulsory for them to be that being. Thinking for the for-

\(^{21}\) See Sartre & Mairet reference
itself, thus, is not a mode of being founded upon the pure nothingness of the for-itself, and instead is equiprimordial with that being. The equiprimordiality of ‘thinking’ and ‘being’ exactly represents the essentializing that is present in Sartre.

One difficulty seen here is that Sartre is not describing a unitary phenomenon, which is revealed in both its proficient and deficient modes, such as is the case with Heidegger's being-in-the-world, which is uncovered as Dasein's being-in-the-world. Dasein is being-in-the-world ontologically, which makes 'world' unavoidable and uncovered, regardless of whether Dasein chooses to do anything or not. As the ontological structures of the world arise with Dasein, they are there, 'being-with' Dasein. Worldhood is revealed when Dasein is engaged in their concernful dealings in the equipment-context, as well as when a tool breaks and becomes obtrusive, taken out of the context of the ready-to-hand and 'de-worlded.' The being of the for-itself is only sensible when considered in its proficient mode of being, when the for-itself creates itself from nothingness in its existential project. The deficient mode, when the for-itself refuses that ontological task, renders the definition unintelligible. The difficulty with the deficient mode is similar to that encountered in the Aristotelian claim that "all men by nature desire to know." Should a 'man' desire to know, being in the proficient mode, then the definition attains. However, should they desire not to know, or prefer and seek not to know, being in the deficient mode, then we are posed with the perplexing question as to whether the claim is true and the person in question is not a person, or if the claim is false and the person in question is a person. The first possibility appears absurd, as it entails that a person may un-person themselves by refusing to know. The second possibility may attain – but then, the claim

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22 See Aristotle reference
is false, and 'man' or 'person' is left hazy. In either case, the ontology of 'person' or 'man' appears to be founded more primordially than upon the claim that all men desire to know – that is, on the fundamental ground of being, rather than assessments of being. Similarly, with Sartre, we are confronted by whether the for-itself refusing to create itself renders the for-itself not the for-itself, or if the claim that the for-itself creates itself is necessarily false and that the for-itself is simply absolute freedom, unconditional upon what it is that the for-itself does. Provided that Sartre claims the former, the human being is thus condemned to create themselves from nothingness, which contradicts our conventional understanding of that which is 'absolute freedom.' The condemnation of mankind to seize its existence and create itself as an essence is, in spirit, a re-founding of essentialism atop existentialism, as was the case with introducing the "I think" into the pure nothingness of the human being.

As we've illustrated, there is a pattern in Sartre's philosophy for essentialism to creep inside and take the 'for-itself' human being, which initially is seen in light of its existentiality which is more primordial than essence, and essentialize it, making it closer to the type of being of the 'in-itself,' for which its being is already determined. The term 'essence' necessarily involves a sort of capturing, a seizing and making static of what is alive and dynamic, and as such is fundamentally incompatible with phenomenology, the principle advantage of which is its ability to view existence dynamically, and at most establish a 'phenomenal being,' where that which we are considering is the phenomenon (i.e. for us, 'spatiality' being 'spatializing'). Ultimately, if existence is always becoming, and is always unfinished, there is never any particular, capturable 'essence' at which it
arrives. For existential phenomenology, a more appropriate phrase might be that “existence is uncaptured by essence.”

Heidegger, also, in *Being and Time*, strangely decides pre-philosophically to repeatedly call Dasein an ‘entity,’ with his aim in the work being to identify the ‘who’ of Dasein and the ontological structures of world which arise with Dasein. The language he employs is unclear, with respect to what he intends by the term ‘entity,’ and also provided that the direct translation of the terms which he explicitly employs relative to ‘entity’ are Dasein (*Dasein*; ‘being-there’), Be-ing (*Sein*; ‘to be’), and Beings (*Seienden*; ‘those whos and whats which are’). However, we may highlight some important distinctions Heidegger makes concerning Dasein that portray it as being questionably close to the traditional Western ‘subject.’ Firstly, that Dasein is existentially prioritized which, as we have previously discussed, distinguishes it from all else within the world, in terms of ontological importance. In fact, the question of the meaning of being is only meaningful because of and to Dasein; and the world only ‘worlds’ through Dasein. Indeed, Dasein is exclusively a ‘who’ rather than a ‘what,’ which is the status of all else within the world, precisely because they are the only being for whom that being is an issue. In subjective philosophical accounts, the subject also ‘stands out’ ontologically in terms of importance, and typically is the ontological entity which may provide meaning and truth in a world otherwise inherently lacking both. For Heidegger, being, meaning, and understanding are all fundamentally intertwined. Thus, without Dasein, the world would not necessarily lack being or meaning, but the questions of each would simply be unanswerable due to the lack of Dasein’s understanding – or have a ‘zero-value,’ rather than being answered positively or negatively. So, while Heidegger does not outline a
‘subject’ per se, who may give meaning to a world inherently lacking it, he nonetheless portrays an entity in Dasein that is curiously close, in terms of existential importance, to a subject. To be sure, Heidegger responds to the possible criticism of Dasein’s ontological ‘de-distancing’ characteristic as being wholly subjective, and thus dismissible by non-subjectivist accounts, by claiming that “this ‘subjectivity’ perhaps uncovers the ‘Reality’ of the world at its most Real.”

It remains unclear, based upon this response, how Dasein as an entity and with its ontological characteristics (such as de-distancing) is distinguishable from a subject, provided that a prototypical subjectivist account would contend precisely that the subjective perspective reveals the reality of the world in the only sense in which we may establish it is real – in lieu, of course, of the possibility of an objective account. So, while Heidegger does not outline a ‘subject’ per se, which is ‘in-itself,’ it is nonetheless apparent that there is a slight ‘existentialist lapse’ in his philosophy that results in the entifying of Dasein, to some degree.

In total, if the existentialist approach to phenomenology is to succeed in uncovering an account of spatiality, then we must avoid beginning and remaining on the level of theory and abstraction philosophically, which would condemn us to failure in discovering a spatial ‘world’ that might be lived. We must also pay attention to becoming forgetful of being or committing ‘existentialist lapses,’ as both would result in oversights that will distort our view of existentiality as a whole in its unbrokenness and unitary character, which we wish to uncover as being equiprimordial with spatiality and embodiment, with which it is entwined as the total phenomenon of disclosure.

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23 *Being and Time*, H section 106
24 Being-in-the-world is one candidate response. Heidegger outlines Dasein as being-in-the-world, which is a unitary phenomenon, yet terms Dasein as an ‘entity’ and provides the aforementioned response to whether his spatiality, which involves being-in-the-world, is subjective.
Section 3: The Importance of Existentiality and Spatiality

As Heidegger correctly observes, the importance of a clarified understanding of Being may be seen in how, pre-philosophically, Being is understood and involved in language (albeit hazily), and how that hazy, pre-philosophical understanding of Being may result in confused ontologies (for example, as he contends, the res extensa of Descartes\(^\text{25}\)), due to the fundamental ground of Being remaining darkened and covered. That is, if we found ontologies upon any ground less than the primordial one of Being, we have, pre-philosophically, and hence unclearly, already decided Being in such a way that we are implicitly making presuppositions about it. We discussed such presuppositions of existential spatiality at length in section one, where we advanced the phenomena of delineation, divorce, appropriation, and entification all as being founded fundamentally upon the presuppositions of the Western paradigm. The importance, then, of uncovering existentiality independently from the Western paradigm is paramount, if we wish not to decide pre-philosophically the level of existence by presupposition and risk conflicted and confused ontologies, where quasi-problems arise from paradigmatic assumptions (Heidegger identifies proof of the ‘external world’ as one such quasi-problem) and are presented as though they are difficulties inherent in existentiality, when they result only from our presuppositions thereof. Thus, to clear such presuppositions and allow existentiality to be disclosed phenomenally as disclosure, without the ‘subject-object’ spectrum and all features of the Western paradigm which were presupposed about existentiality, is to bring into view a non-presupposed, philosophical, phenomenal (non-essentialist), and non-paradigmatic light of existentiality that is not ‘framed’ by those

\(^{25}\) Being and Time, H section 94
presuppositions than which it is more primordial. That light of existentiality only shines in its wholeness through a ‘frameless’ window.

What is the character of this ‘frameless window’? As we are involving the term in our philosophic uncovering, ‘frameless’ simply implies ‘without existentiality already decided as a matter of paradigm,’ where paradigm is understood to the most fundamental, philosophic world-view that informs not only philosophic theories, but the ways in which the world is interpreted before philosophy begins – that is, paradigm influences both phenomenology (how disclosure is seen) and lived experiences. As Heidegger rejected the idea that there could be a view that is without presupposition, which we see in the ‘fore-having,’ ‘fore-sight,’ and ‘fore-conception’ of the world, as well as the Hermeneutic situation, we should clarify that we are not intending to reveal a completely presuppositionless, theoretical view that is detached from world and “from nowhere.”

The frameless window of existentiality is instead letting existentiality be ‘seen’ philosophically as disclosure, without the subject-object spectrum, and without ontological structures, in terms of a unitary whole in which no ‘entity’ has existential priority. The view is not from nowhere, but instead may be from any vantage point within the world, whereby ‘world’ as a whole comes into view, through the existential interdependence of that vantage point with the world. For Heidegger, the vantage point and the point of access to ‘world’ was Dasein, the human being for whom that being is an issue. For us, the ‘point of access’ to world is embodiment, which we shall consider equiprimordially with spatiality and existentiality. That is, our point of philosophic access is as primordial as that which we shall uncover alongside it (indeed, as it was with Dasein, our point of access also needs to be uncovered). Our presupposition, explicitly, is
that embodiment is given as a phenomenon – that is, embodiment and bodies ‘occur’ phenomenally. How does embodiment relate, then, to being, on this phenomenally primordial and philosophically developmental level? Heidegger offers an excellent beginning thought: “Because ‘Being’ is not in fact accessible as an entity, it is expressed through attributes – definite characteristics of the entities under consideration, characteristics which themselves are.”26 Here, he is criticizing Descartes’ tacit presupposition of substantiality (or substance as such), claiming that, because ‘Being’ itself is not encounterable as an entity within the world, in Western philosophy it has become synonymous in meaning with characteristics of ‘beings,’ such that those characteristics become themselves ‘beings,’ replacing the looked-over problematic of ‘Being’ as such with the ontology of characteristics that practically are considered themselves as ‘substances.’ A philosophic view that is to unite Being and embodiment on an equiprimordial level, then, must look to the existential possibilities of Being as they are disclosed as being embodiment. That is, there is not an ‘entity’ or ‘substance’ that ‘has’ characteristics which themselves come to be understood practically as substances, such as the extensio of Descartes, but that Being is understood as ‘possibilities of Being,’” meaning possibilities of Being-as-a-world, as they are disclosed as embodiment. The interdependence of world that is world, to which we alluded previously, is revealed as the interdependence of those embodied possibilities.

The importance of uncovering a spatial account, however, is yet left unaddressed. As we mentioned previously, existentiality and spatiality are disclosure, and so disclosing existentiality is tantamount to spatiality disclosing, as well. The importance of

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26 Being and Time, H section 94
uncovering spatiality, then, augments that of uncovering existentiality. Primarily, it is crucial that we uncover spatiality in how spatiality is the disclosure of existentiality, the ‘laying-bare,’ ‘opening/unfolding,’ and ‘making-vulnerable’ of the possibilities of existence. That is, existence is disclosed spatially, and so are the relationships of existences to other existences, such as those of humans to one another, or humans to their existential situation within the world. For instance, it is only because my existence is spatially disclosed in the way that it is that I may direct the possibilities of my existence towards others and my situation within the world in certain ways, such as we see in the river example. In this example, I am standing on one river-bank, looking across the river towards the other bank, and surmising how I might best cross the river to attain the other side. The embodiment of the entire scene informs how I live that scene, in the existential sense. Were I of prodigious bodily height, I would existentially encounter that scene in the same way I would stepping over a small, shallow puddle, and thus live my embodiment – and live my embodied environment – in a radically different existential way. Thus, the interdependence of embodiment considered as a whole – i.e. my embodiment, taken alongside all other bodies, to where all bodies are considered as a whole phenomenon of embodiment – is revealed phenomenally in the ‘being-together’ of my embodiment and that of all else to unfold a lived scene, the living of which flows from my embodiment (e.g. my height, length of legs), the embodiment of the river (e.g. its volume, temperature, speed), the embodiment of the banks (e.g. how far apart, relative to my body's capability to close that distance), and the embodiment of the earth itself (e.g. gravity, relative to my body's ability to defy gravity and move through the air). The phenomena of each of these embodiments at once discloses the possibilities of
existentiality, but also positions and orients those possibilities in particular ways, without forfeiting the unity and wholeness of existentiality. We wish to emphasize that the issues of embodiment and positioning, and the experience of both, are not limited to the human being. Indeed, the interdependent phenomena of embodiment reveal themselves also in, for instance, a tree that is upon earth, the atmosphere of which allows for the presence of its kind, positioned in a certain way upon a hillside, with a particular density of wood, a unique root structure, an individual length of branches, and a discernable position relative to typical wind-directions. The way in which that tree ‘experiences’ its local situation and environment is wholly interdependent with its embodiment and the embodiments of all that existentially interact therewith, such that all embodiments of its situation collectively unite in the embodiment of ‘the situation’ itself, which is the phenomenal blooming of world. The unity of existentiality, however, is not lost, owing to how each of those embodiments are interdependent with one another for their possibilities of existence to unfold and be lived, such that the whole of the phenomenon of embodiment reveals itself as embodied, existential interdependence.

Spatiality, existentiality, and embodiment, then are equiprimordial with one another as phenomena, but also with what we might call the ‘work they do,’ or providing world through the existential interdependence of the possibilities of being through embodiment. Provided that Heidegger placed Dasein in the role of the discovery/disclosure that provides world – i.e. Dasein being as Dasein uncovers world – the significance of world was equiprimordial with Dasein’s understanding. That we have de-prioritized Dasein existentially removes the possibility that we might rely upon Heidegger’s structure of significance as it is uncovered through Dasein. What, then,
replaces that significance? How do we attribute significance to spatiality, such as in the river example previously? The interdependence of the possibilities of being within the spatial world provides the existential significance. There is a unitary significance to the world existentially, given that the possibilities of embodied being are mutually arising, mutually defining, and interdependent with one another to be at all. The world, thus, is significance as being this existential interdependence. The subsequent significance that provides for the possibility of lived spatiality, which was vacated with our departure from the Heideggerian realm of Dasein, is given by how these possibilities of embodied being as a spatial world are not static – i.e. oriented and positioned relative to one another in a way that is unmoving – but in a sense which is dynamic, which allows for that interdependence to be unfolded and lived as world. Of course, living-as-world, in terms of living existential interdependence, is founded upon that interdependence, and so is founded upon the possibilities of embodied being and their relation to one another. Thus, ‘living-world’ may be uncovered as the dynamic, existential interactions\textsuperscript{27} between the possibilities of being, whereby those possibilities are ‘living,’ rather than ‘lived’ by something substantive. The ‘living’ is the dynamic, existential interactions between the possibilities of being that are interdependent as world. Here, we see the notion of ‘internal relatedness’ appear, as opposed to the Western paradigm’s tenet of external relatedness. That is, ‘internal relatedness’ is the phenomenal observation that, as being-alive, the possibilities of being blend seamlessly into one another, to where all within the world dynamically lives with all within the world, and such that there is no existential separation between them, but that they exist interdependently in the existential sense. Indeed, all within the world lives the possibilities of being that are disclosed by

\textsuperscript{27} Existential interaction will be the subject of section 3.3
embodiment – ranging from the human being, to the tree, to the rock. The way in which that embodiment is lived, in the particular sense, then becomes a question that distinguishes those three phenomenal beings from one another.

We must acknowledge, prior to approaching in detail the first existential phenomenon of spatiality – embodiment and orientation, which we have once listed and once briefly introduced – the differences from and debt to Western philosophy that our account will owe, as well as explicate what our beginning ‘ground’ will be to uncover embodiment as an existential phenomenon. All which has appeared hitherto in our account is either a negative introduction (critiquing the Western paradigm, criticizing traditional spatial accounts) or a positive yet cursory introduction to a fuller account of existential spatiality, which we wish now to uncover in its fullest detail, uniting and extending all of what we have previously described. The ‘ground’ from which we will begin is precisely the existential unity which has been passed over by Western philosophy in its paradigm, and which Heidegger’s account, though a tremendous advancement in spatial accounts, through introducing such notions as ‘lived,’ ‘being-in,’ and ‘worldhood’ explicitly into such accounts, ultimately fails to bring into view, chiefly by its omission of embodiment and its attempt to derive spatiality from temporality – both of which we shall seek to avoid. This ‘ground,’ therefore, is unframed by the Western paradigm, and will be brought into view in its unitary character, with its wholeness never having been broken. As we have stated that we wish to uncover spatiality and being synonymously through existential phenomena, we shall be simultaneously discussing the unity of existentiality and spatiality, and how they are equiprimordially and phenomenally disclosed as disclosing. We shall emphasize the
aspect of unity in the forthcoming discussion, which is an important distinction, relative to the Western paradigm: we shall not be engaging in substantive metaphysics. We are to explore existential phenomenology, which does not, as we encountered in the instance of embodiment and orientation, entail that there is any definite what being acted upon, and certainly does not involve any notions of two ‘entities’ relating to or interacting with one another. Instead, in the case of embodiment and orientation, all embodiment is uncovered as world equiprimordially, and that existential interdependence which is world is precisely that which is unfolded and lived. To be sure, the ‘existential interdependence’ is not a thing that is lived by another thing – rather, it is unfolding and living. The dualistic nature of our subject-verb-oriented language will regularly be clarified and re-phrased in the forthcoming sections, to clarify and emphasize the existential approach as being unitary.

**Section 4: Subject, Object, and Being-Body**

All of the six features of the Western paradigm that we have outlined thus far have coalesced traditionally to give rise to two related interpretations of the existentiality of embodiment: object-body and subject-body. Object-body is the body which has the existentiality similar to the Heideggerian ‘present-at-hand’ and the Sartrean ‘in-itself,’ in that it is objectified, determined, and de-worlded. It is also considered as a substance (i.e. an independent existence with an essence or nature). This type of embodiment is exactly that which underlies strict mind-body dualisms, which suppose that a mind inhabits an object-body, while remaining ontologically distinct therefrom. The mind is typically associated with the identity of the embodied thing, while the body is an incidental container or vehicle of the mind. The object-body, in existential terms, contains the mind
as a glass holds the water within its container – the mind and water are merely ‘in’ their bodily container, in the manner of external relatedness, which denies any possible existential significance of ‘being-in,’ in terms of existential interdependence. The object-body, additionally, is divested of any possible involvement within a world, due to how its existentiality is already objectified. There is no ‘tying-together’ or uniting of the object-body in the existential sense with other object-bodies or with a world that is the whole of the interdependence of bodies with one another. A direct consequence of abstractly treating existence as a substance is that its existentiality is severed from all other existence, and must relate thereto in the manner of external relatedness, which forms the basis of objective, spatial accounts. The accounts of Newton, Leibniz, and Descartes all conceive space as the external relatedness of object-bodies. For Descartes, this would be the *res extensa*, as the *res cogitans* is not involved with extended space.

Subject-body, such as we encounter in Kant and, to a lesser degree, in Heidegger, is the body that ontically places the subject/entity *there* – yet *there* in a sense that the body itself is ‘present-at-hand-and-nothing-more’ or ‘in-itself.’ Confusingly, the subject-body is treated as though it is ontic and present-at-hand, or alternatively reduced to the determined being of the ‘in-itself,’ while simultaneously being related to and influencing the being of Dasein, the ‘ready-to-hand,’ and the ‘for-itself.’ If the possibilities of Dasein’s being – which *is* its possibilities – are altered with the alteration of its embodiment, as we discussed previously, then its embodiment must be ontological, rather than ontic. However, the embodiment of Dasein is instead treated in the mode of ‘subject-body,’ wherein the body is ontically ‘there’ and establishes the subject as ‘there’ in the ontic sense – yet its involvement ends there and does not extend into the ontological
constitution of Dasein. Ontologically, body is not seen explicitly (rather than implicitly, as is the case with the subject-body of Dasein) as body in Heideggerian phenomenology, until the breakdown of the ready-to-hand, in which case the de-worlding and becoming obtrusive of a piece of equipment reveals body as something objectified and present-at-hand. That is, body is not encountered in Dasein’s concernful dealings as body, unless it is in the deficient mode of the phenomenon of ‘worlding.’ There is no explicit account of how embodiment is related to the proficient mode of that phenomenon, where it can be encountered explicitly by Dasein in its concernful dealings in the equipment-context of the ready-to-hand.

Similarly, the embodiment of the ‘ready-to-hand’ alters not only worldhood, but indeed, Dasein in its careful dealings, as we see in the example of the breaking and becoming obtrusive of the ready-to-hand. Sartre, of course, does not attempt a spatial account, but splits Heidegger’s unitary phenomenon of ‘world’ into a dualistic setting of subject and object, while bifurcating ‘being’ into ‘for-itself’ and ‘in-itself.’ Somehow, the conscious subject of the ‘for-itself’ must be there, yet without an account of embodiment, is merely there spatially in the manner of subject-body, which is a sort of vessel that delivers the subject to ‘there’ like a post-man inserting a parcel of mail into its box. Curiously, the absolute freedom of the ‘for-itself’ becomes immediately impossible, when embodiment is accounted for as the uncovering of existentiality. That is, the possibilities of existentiality arise equiprimordially with embodiment, and as such, necessitate that the ‘for-itself’ does not choose its embodiment, but rather is ‘being-thrown-into-a-body’ for whom that embodiment is an existential issue. In this sense, the total, existential freedom of consciousness and the ‘for-itself’ is limited and conditioned
by embodiment, equiprimordially with the “mysterious upsurge” of the being of the ‘for-itself.’

In total, subject-body is the ontic way in which the subject is ‘there,’ as well as the fact that the subject is there ontically. As we saw in the phenomenon of delineation, the object-body and subject-body are plucked from the unity of spatiality and existentiality and traced-out with existential borders that divorce them from other bodies and the world considered as a whole. It is here that we wish to grant an additional dimension to the phenomenon of delineation: it occurs primarily on the basis of embodiment, resulting either in the object-body or the subject-body. The existential borders requisite for tracing-out a substance from the unity of existentiality are those of embodiment understood existentially, which gives rise to a third type of body that is more primordial than either object or subject-body, and of which object and subject-body are appropriations: that of being-body. The type of existential body which substance (subject and object) possesses is a theoretical, de-worlded, and delineated being-body that is ignored and forgotten in its existentiality, and which is appropriated on the basis of substantive metaphysics, becoming divorced from all the rest of existentiality and entified as a static entity. Indeed, we can phrase ‘substance’ alternatively as ‘delineated being-body.’

If we wish to bring into view being-body in its primordiality, then we must dispense with the phenomena of delineation, divorce, appropriation, and entification. We shall, then, consider the version of being-body to which all four of the aforementioned phenomena have occurred pre-philosophically, and repeal each, until we obtain an initial,
primordial view of being-body without the existential filter and frame of the Western paradigm.

**Section 5: World as Being-Body**

The final result of the phenomena of delineation, divorce, and appropriation is entification, or the forging of an entity – an independent, privileged existence that is de-worlded, has an essence, and is existentially fixed. The entity is existentially sealed by the strict borders of delineation, unable to existentially interact or be interdependent with other entities, and possesses the character of ‘inside’ and ‘closed’ that divorce it from the rest of existentiality. That is, the existential borders of the entity are not permeable to any degree, owing to its establishment as ‘independent’ existentially. Pre-philosophically, this occurs as a matter of the appropriation of existential spatiality. To repeal these four phenomena, then, we must begin with their final stage of entification.

To uncover the existentiality that is hidden by entification, we must first, as we would with anything that possesses the character of ‘closed’ which we would wish to peer inside, ‘open’ the entity by removing the existential borders traced around it by delineation. Recalling that delineation is the phenomenon by which we pre-philosophically ‘trace-out’ portion of the unity of existential spatiality and grant it sealed borders that bestow the traced-out portion with the character of inside and closed, when we delineate a particular existence, we are also thereby delineating the rest of existential spatiality, in terms of the traced-out existence being ‘that’ and the non-traced-out portion of existential spatiality being ‘not-that.’ To erase the borders of delineation is to efface the dualistic distinction of ‘that’ and ‘not-that’ on the level of existentiality, not merely
on the level of naming or theoretical thought. There subsists no longer the dichotomy of ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ in existential terms, nor is there ‘closed’ or ‘open’ in their absolute senses. What we discover with the entity for whom those existential borders are erased is that we may no longer pluck it from out of its unity in existential spatiality and identify it essentially in a fixed sense, but instead phenomenally in a dynamic sense.

For instance, let us consider the example of a tree, initially conceived of as an entity that possesses an object-body. We have delineated its existence as ‘tree’ by tracing out its object-body from out of the rest of the world, and have defined the tree as ‘that tree’ and the remaining world as ‘not-that-tree.’ The existential borders of that tree are those of its embodiment, which are those of its object-body. We have thus delineated the tree, and thereby also divorced it existentially from all else by confining the existentiality of ‘tree’ to essence, which, in its existential independence, possesses the character of ‘closed’ and ‘inside.’ The tree has a character of ‘inside’ and ‘closed,’ meaning that all which is attributable existentially to that tree is only within the object-body borders of that tree, and nowhere else. No-thing ‘outside’ of that tree may touch the existence of that tree, nor may that tree existentially interact with anything outside of itself. All interactions of the tree with objects outside of itself are superficial and external, existentially. In this view, the tree has no world, no heritage, and begins life when it is born, only to perish utterly when it dies, transpiring as an isolated phenomenon destined for eventual inexistence. This is the resultant view of the Western paradigm, with regards to an entity. The existentiality of the tree is plucked from out of the unity of existential spatiality: it is unitary only with itself, and thus is fixed. That existence, when considered as having an object-body, is not considered as being equiprimordial with that body – i.e.
tree is not existentially observed as the tree-ing of its body. The object-body has the being of the present-at-hand, and so has no existential significance. The body of the tree, thus, is only the anchor for the theoretical and substantive idea of tree, from which we derive ‘appearances’ and ‘properties’ of its object-body that are unrelated to its existentiality, except as some sort of ‘accidental’ traits that are external to its essence, which is the ‘thing-maker.’ The existential discovery that ‘tree’ is disclosed by ‘tree-ing’ that is unitary with ‘world’ is impossible, when the tree is entified and has an object-body. It is precisely that discovery which is made, when we dispense with entification.

To ‘open’ the entity and peer ‘inside’ of it, let us look at the involvements of the entity with all within the world, such as in the case of the tree, which we were previously discussing. Firstly, the body of the tree: how is it established? It has its heritage in a seed, but that seed does not bloom as the phenomenon of tree, without soil and its nutrients, water, and shelter. From whence does the seed come? Obviously, it comes from the body of another tree, indicating that the embodiment of ‘tree’ reproduces itself, thereby interlinking, as a matter of heritage, a host of trees together. Once the seed unfolds into an above-ground tree: how is the body of the tree held together? Primarily, it is a carbon-based organism, which have organic chemical bonding properties. Additionally, however, that bonded-together mesh of carbon atoms is involved with the totality of the Earth’s bodies, through the phenomenon of gravity. It is the ‘push-to-the-center’ of gravity, meeting with the ‘push-against-that-push-to-the-center’ of the tree-body, that establishes the equilibrium of forces revealed as the tree’s body, which is a stasis of interacting phenomena. To look at how the tree’s embodiment is ‘lived,’ we must look only at the totality of the involvement of the tree with all in it environment. The tree’s roots extend
deeply into the soil, which affords the tree stability against wind and other toppling forces, and additionally allows the tree to uptake water and nutrients, the latter of which is assisted by various bacteria that search out nutrients such as nitrogen. The uniting of water, nutrients, bacteria, and tree roots result in the uptake of nutrients and water by the tree, which then pulls that water to its leaves or needles, at which point that water interacts with the sunlight in the phenomenon of photosynthesis. Again, it is the union and stasis of two phenomena – the uptake of water and of the sun’s radiation – that reveal the interdependence of the tree with its environment. The tree then fixes carbon dioxide in the soil, and breathes oxygen into the air, as well as water vapor. The sky, in return, draws moisture from the oceans and carries it, in the form of rain-storms, to the tree, at which point the cycle continues unabated. This example is to illustrate that, regardless of what aspect of the tree to which we devote our attention, we cannot isolate the tree to simply its object-body. In fact, we cannot isolate the tree to only its nearby environment, conceived of in terms of measurable, material distance. Instead, we uncover a myriad of phenomenon all converging, interacting, and uniting in the phenomenon that is disclosed as ‘tree,’ in which case the ‘tree’ is disclosed as the ‘tree-ing’ of the world.

The significance of world as unitary interdependence is revealed by how each instance of what we might take as an ‘essence’ and an independent existence is revealed, by its involvement with world, to be interdependent with that world, such that it may only exist as it is by that interdependence. Therefore, the only way in which we may attain something like ‘essence’ is to ignore that interdependence; yet, this ‘ignor-ance’ is to ignore that existentiality which is most primordial, and which, in every case, underlies the existence of every-‘thing.’ If each ‘thing,’ then, is revealed primordially as the united
convergence of phenomena that are interdependent as phenomena – that which is world – then what becomes of the object-body, with which we began? The object-body was unrelated to any possibilities of being. Yet, if we examine how the interdependence that is world discloses the possibilities of being, which is through the convergence of many interrelated phenomena, then we see that the ‘object-body’ is a philosophic attitude towards the more primordial ‘being-body,’ which is that interdependence of Being, as it is revealed through the phenomenon of embodiment. In the instance of the tree, the interdependence of Being was revealed by how every phenomenon which was the tree’s body was co-dependent with other phenomena to be as it was. That is, the tree’s body itself was the disclosure of carbon-bonding, gravity, and their existential interaction to disclose a body in its possibilities of being, alongside many other phenomena that were the disclosure of its embodiment. Thus, the ‘being-body’ discloses the possibilities of being, as they are embodied.

The world, then, as a united whole of the embodied possibilities of being, is ‘being-body,’ and all embodiment within the world is ‘being-body.’ Additionally, the world is not a coordination of individual ‘being-bodies,’ but the total disclosure of the possibilities of being as embodiment. As the possibilities of being are disclosed as embodiment in interdependence – that is, the possibilities of embodiment are co-disclosed, such that they exist only in existential relation to one another – then the world is that interdependence, which is revealed through world as ‘being-body.’
CHAPTER IV

EXISTENTIAL SPATIALITY

Section 1: Introductory View of the Possibilities of Being

A main point of departure of our account from that of Heidegger is our de-centering of spatiality and world from Dasein, as well as our phenomenon of world being expressed in that of emergence. To summarize Heidegger’s being-in-the-world briefly, the world only ‘worlds’ through Dasein as being-in-the-world (that is, Dasein and the structural totality of ‘world’ arise together). Were Dasein not to be present, then for Heidegger, there would not be a ‘being-there’ to ask the question of being or to have its being to be, and so the question of whether there is a world or being in general has no answer (for Heidegger, who would be there to answer?). In this aspect, being-there, world, and phenomenology are centered upon Dasein and its structure as ‘care,’ which is the structural totality of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, through which the world ‘worlds.’ To de-center the world from Dasein is to reveal an existentiality in which Dasein may still be allowed and situated, but in which Dasein does not have existential priority and is not necessary for the world to arise and to be as world. We accomplish this by predicating our phenomenology upon the possibilities of being, which we wish to

28 For Heidegger, there is no ‘independent world’ – rather ‘worlding,’ understood phenomenologically through Dasein’s experience within-the-world.
uncover as being equiprimordial with spatiality and embodiment, the totality of which is the unitary phenomenon of ‘being-there.’

As the possibilities of being are equiprimordial with spatiality and embodiment, there is no sense to be made by our choosing to speak of them as though they are separate entities in themselves that are then embodied and made spatial. That is, the Platonic and Aristotelian theories of form, where the form is in the realm of forms or in the object, respectively, is not that which we are endeavoring to uncover. In both theories, the form is ontologically distinct from the object that is either participating in or playing host to that form (i.e. the form is a substance, as is the object to which it relates). Our view seeks to explicate that the possibilities of being, spatiality, and embodiment are the total disclosure that is ‘being-there.’ This total disclosure we shall call ‘emergence,’ which is the emerging of ‘being-there’ as the possibilities of being, spatiality, and embodiment. Thus, there is no form which contains the possibilities of being that then is made spatial and embodied by means of an object that is both. Consequently, there is no causal or sequential sequence or hierarchy of ontological objects, which externally relate to one another in terms of substantive metaphysics, that define the ‘what-ness’ of existentiality, in our account.

How, then, are we to speak of the possibilities of being? There exists a considerable diversity amongst those possibilities, spanning from those of a rock, an animal, and a human being, to mention one possible continuum. At the most primordial level, that which unites all such possibilities is that they are first, as an existential condition, opened as the phenomenon of emergence to be encounterable to other possibilities, and second, as an accompanying condition, that they are encountering other
possibilities and being encountered thereby. This existential condition of simultaneously ‘being-encountering’ and ‘being-encountered’ affords what we shall regard as the primordial sentience of being. When we speak of phenomenological terms, such as ‘nearness,’ ‘farness,’ and ‘reachability,’ with respect to the possibilities of being, we are referring to this sentience, which is not innate or inherent in these possibilities as a matter of external relation yet exists as them. That is, the existential interdependence of these possibilities, opened as emergence and as world, is revealed phenomenologically as ‘being-encountering’ and ‘being-encountered.’ These possibilities exist as interdependence, and as such, are their encounterability. Additionally, the possibilities of a being such as Dasein, which is its possibilities in a different sense than a rock, have their primordial foundation upon this sentience of being, though their emergence is different in how they existentially relate to other possibilities that are of and not of Dasein. That is, Heidegger’s phenomenology of Dasein may be founded upon and brought into view by this primordial sentience of being. In this way, our phenomenology is de-centered from Dasein, yet allows still for Dasein to be situated therein.

We mentioned that the possibilities of being are not akin to a form, nor are they extant entities which are then substantiated in an object and thus externally relate thereto. Being non-substantive, these possibilities are revealed as a unitary whole that, considering being is the most primordial level and therefore is its own border, appears to be infinite. How are we to understand the totality of the possibilities of being as non-substantive and infinite? Primarily, we view the possibilities of being as being infinite being, which is every possibility yet is contained by none, and therefore is not a

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29 In essence, only being borders/limits being, as it is the most primordial level and the level of existentiality.
substance itself. Infinite being also does not involve a problem of transcendence, owing to how that being is every possibility – not in the way of representation, inherence, participation, or commanding, which are all external relations. The totality of the possibilities of being are infinite being, and not in the sense of a summated whole. Rather, the possibilities of being are the disclosure of world, and as such, are the disclosure of existential interdependence, which is an unbroken, unitary whole that is greater than the summation of its possible constituent parts. Akin to how we revealed, in previous sections, spatiality to open into a unity, when the presuppositions of the Western paradigm are repealed, so too are the possibilities of being more primordial than substance and form, brought into view on the most primordial level as simply possibilities that are existentially interdependent with one another and exist as world.

The phenomenon of emergence, which we outlined previously, entails two notions which require some clarification: the first of which is ‘a phenomenon;’ the second of which is ‘embodiment.’ With regards to phenomenon, our usage of the term takes inspiration from the Greek term 'phainein,' from which the term 'phainómenon,' or phenomenon, derives as a passive participle. 'Phaínein' translates to 'to reveal,' 'to show,' and 'to make known.' Phenomenon, as we conceive of it, is thus a subjectless, objectless30 showing and revealing – or, as we often involve the term, a disclosing of the same sort. The question as to whom or what the showing or revealing is occurring is a possible quandary following upon that definition, which highlights the more fundamental question of who or what is experiencing that revealing and showing. As the possibilities of being,

30 That the term phenomenon is a passive participle inspired the idea of there not being a subject or object to whom or to which the phenomenon occurs, and the possibilities of being emerging in such a way that places the focus on world, rather than entity.
as we argue, are their disclosure as the phenomenon of emergence, so too are they their experience, in recalling the primordial sentience of being and the disclosure of the possibilities of being as world. Succinctly, the world is its experience, which again, may include a being such as Dasein, which experiences in a different sense than a tree, yet which is of the same primordial foundation in the sentience of being. The view, then, of phenomenon is not a 'view from nowhere' – rather, it is a view from within the world, by the world, of the world as it is as world.

As phenomena involve some notion of time, provided how they are a sort of revealing or showing which is unintelligible without some notion of progression, we should remark on the potential difficulty of interpreting ubiquitous and enduring phenomena such as spatiality, the possibilities of being, and embodiment in terms of emergence and temporality. To this, we answer that, on the existential level, the previously listed spatial phenomena are not the temporal revealing of some essence or form that itself is timeless or 'in-itself,' and rather are revealing and emergence. To address our main concern, the phenomenon of emergence, which we outlined previously, is therefore a continual emergence and revealing, the directionality of which is not progressing from beginning to end\(^{31}\), and instead is circular and cyclical, so as to exist always and everywhere as that emergence emerging. Our usage of 'phenomenon,' in total, is then a subjectless, objectless disclosing that is a perpetual unfolding with respect to time.

\(^{31}\) Additionally, it is not from 'birth' to 'death.' Rather, the 'beginning' and 'end' are the same destination, which leaves the phenomenon as a perpetual unfolding.
The second notion requiring clarification – that of embodiment – is dubious only in comparison to the traditional, ontological understanding of the term. That is, typically 'embodiment' entails some entity being situated somehow inside of an object-body. Some philosophic accounts provide claims of a 'union' between that entity and the object-body, yet the body and that entity are ontologically separable and thus divorceable, with the identity of the entity typically residing without the body.³² Our aim is not to wed the entity and the object-body together, so as to fully establish the proposed union between them. Instead, we endeavor to position our account more primordially than the entity and object-body both and uncover being in its possibilities prior to being grouped into an entity, as well as uncovering body as being equiprimordial with the disclosure of the possibilities of being – or as being ‘being-body.’ That is, the body is the disclosure of the possibilities of being. As such, we also do not wish to limit our understanding of body to the physical body, and instead aim to re-interpret and re-encounter the body as the way of 'being-there,' which opens the possibility that the body may unfold in myriad ways that are still founded upon the primordial position of the body as the how of 'being-there.' In this way, the body is not a receptacle or a wedding-object for a mind, soul, or spirit, and instead becomes re-interpreted in an existential view, where, in the case of Dasein, it unfolds equiprimordially with the possibilities of its being, which is equiprimordial with meaning and understanding, for Heidegger. In this sense, we may give an additional interpretation of embodiment as the presence of being – how 'being' is 'there.' This is not to say that embodiment is a 're-presentation' of the 'presentation' of being that is already 'there,' prior to embodiment. Rather, it is to say that embodiment is the presentation of

³² Such as Descartes' res cogitans, for example.
being, alongside spatiality, in such a sense that all three – embodiment, being, and spatiality – are equiprimordial in the phenomenon which we entitled 'emergence.'

Section 2: Embodiment

If being and spatiality are equiprimordial and we have dispensed with embodiment being limited to the object-body, then the unfolding of the possibilities of existentiality is that of spatial embodiment, as well. That is, the unfolding of spatial embodiment is the disclosing of the possibilities of existentiality and being. Thus, embodiment carries an existential significance, which we have encapsulated by the term ‘being-body.’ We have explored how ‘world’ is ‘being-body,’ which we discovered by uncovering the existential interdependence of all embodiment, yet we have not explored fully the phenomenon of embodiment, which we have tasked ourselves to uncover philosophically as the unfolding of existentiality and being. The phenomenon of embodiment, therefore, must be brought into view clearly enough to show how the ‘being’ and ‘body’ of ‘being-body’ are equiprimordial with one another existentially.

As we have argued, ‘being’ is ‘there,’ such that every ‘there’ is being, and all of ‘being’ is there. We must clarify, again, that these are equiprimordial with one another, so that there is not first some being which then becomes there, nor is there a ‘there’ which precedes some being becoming ‘there.’ As being is possibilities, which we may define as an unfolding phenomenon of being (such as a tree’s possibilities are the unfolding phenomenon of being), then these possibilities are disclosed alongside spatiality in ‘being-there,’ which is the phenomenon of embodiment. That is, the possibilities of being are equiprimordial with embodiment. Thus, the phenomenon of embodiment is the
‘laying-bare’ and ‘making-vulnerable’ of the possibilities of being spatially, in the sense of ‘being-body,’ the existential interdependence of which we uncovered as ‘world.’ To uncover the import of these terms, we must first clarify the involvement of being within them.

Prior to explicating the phenomena of ‘laying-bare’ and ‘making-vulnerable,’ we must note that being’s possibilities being disclosed alongside spatiality is not a ‘disclosing-to-whom,’ in the sense of Heidegger’s disclosure, which is a laying-out of interpretation. Heidegger’s disclosure necessitates that disclosure discloses through Dasein, akin to how ‘world’ only ‘worlds’ through Dasein. Our view, with an eye cast to uncovering a unitary character, is that spatiality, as it is equiprimordially disclosed alongside being and embodiment, is a disclosure which, being disclosed, may be encountered or not encountered by Dasein. That is, the disclosure is a truth itself, where truth is conceived to be a disclosure of *what is*. The question of encountering that disclosure then becomes one of understanding and of how Dasein interprets and lives that disclosure. Additionally, Dasein, being disclosed itself, is existentially included in the unitary phenomenon of spatial, embodied disclosure. Thus, the way in which Dasein understands, interprets, and lives that disclosure and being disclosed is not in the modality of subject-object, where a subject relates to a separate, objective world. However, our treatment of the possibilities of being and of world here is intended to de-center Dasein as the entity through whom the world ‘worlds,’ and instead philosophically uncover an account in which Dasein, as per Heidegger, is allowed philosophically but is not inevitable for ‘world’ to be disclosed.
The ‘laying-bare’ of existentiality through the phenomenon of embodiment is to say that the possibilities of being are freed, as being-body, to be interdependent with the total possibilities of the existentially interdependent ‘world.’ This subsumes the Heideggerian ‘ready-to-hand’ – where we may say the possibilities of equipment have been laid bare by embodiment and therefore made encounterable for Dasein, thus entering the existential spatiality of the equipment-context – yet is broader, for chiefly two reasons. First, we are considering embodiment as an existential phenomenon and as ‘being-body,’ and so have a clear sight of how the possibilities of being for equipment are becoming encounterable, whereas Heidegger must presuppose embodiment and relegate it to the ontic sense. Secondly, we do not prioritize Dasein as the entity for whom the equipment-context must be encounterable, and so have an avenue by which we can explicate how the existential interdependence of the possibilities of equipment and Dasein together unfold as world. This makes possible a unitary, spatial view, rather than an entity-oriented view.

As Heidegger contends, the world is not an entity within the world to be encountered. In the spirit of this definition, our sense of ‘laying-bare’ the possibilities of being is not a laying-bare-of-something-to-something, but a laying-bare in the existential sense (we explicated our sense of 'existential' in section 2.1). Indeed, our sense of ‘laying-bare’ is an existential freeing, where ‘freedom’ is understood to mean ‘worlded,’ or ‘interdependent as world.’ As world is the interdependence of all the freed possibilities of

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33 We are seeking to explicate the embodied foundations, and the possibilities of being disclosed thereby, which are presupposed by and thus more primordial than the equipment-context. The Heideggerian 'in-order-to' and 'for-the-sake-of-which,' which necessitate Dasein's involvement, follow from and involve this more primordial foundation.

34 *Being and Time*, H section 72
being, and is also embodied, then the phenomenon of embodiment is the interdependence of the freed possibilities of being. While embodiment has been seen to be limiting and confining of the possibilities of being, by our view it is also freeing of these possibilities. That is, the possibilities of being are freed for interaction and interdependence by embodiment, as by embodiment those possibilities existentially are a ‘there’ which may interact and be interdependent with every ‘there.’ Therefore, we may say that ‘being-there’ is the freedom to ‘be-as-world,’ with its interdependence and interactions. Lest we begin to conceive of ‘there’ as any sort of delineated entity, or think a possibility or a group thereof to be the same, we must again emphasize that we are speaking on the existential level, where we do not have the ‘subject-object’ modality, and instead we are bringing different aspects of a unity into view, without engaging in delineation. 'There,' by existential interdependence with every 'there,' has no privileged, separate existence, and existentially is connected in its dependence upon each 'there.' The culmination of this view is that 'there' is not distinguishable as any separate 'there' and is disclosed as the interdependence with every 'there.' The term 'there' thus refers to the totality of 'being-there,' which is the freedom to 'be-as-world,' or the existential freedom of any possible 'there' to be disclosed interdependently with every 'there' as world. Any particular 'there,' then, is only the existential interrelation of every 'there,' as that particular 'there' is only 'there' by that interrelatedness.

The traditional impulse in Western philosophy, which is clearly seen in substance-based metaphysics, is to regard the body as being encapsulating and individuating of being, as well as limiting and having the existential character of 'inside' and 'closed,' relative to the 'outside' that is beyond the body. If we consider the 'border' of body,
which we introduced as being involved in the phenomenon of delineation, there is a phenomenal sense in which that border 'houses,' such as the bark of a tree or the skin of a human being housing what might be called 'internal.' However, that phenomenal housing is not an absolute, existential separation of body from world, as that same border existentially connects the body to the environment, other bodies, and all possible involvements with the world. Indeed, the body is always and everywhere interdependent with world, connected thereto by the very same border which houses what we might call 'internal.' The possibilities of being are only there and interrelated by embodiment.

Embodiment, thus, simultaneously presents the possibilities of being and houses them, yet opens and frees them for interdependence as world. The existential focus in Western philosophy has been narrowed to be upon the housing aspect of embodiment, to the extent where the broad sense of 'housing' becomes the existentially divorcing sense of encapsulation and individuation. Thus, the connecting aspect of embodiment is never glimpsed in Western philosophy. Our focus is broadened to bring into view both the housing and connecting aspect of embodiment, with respect to the possibilities of being.

In total, we have said the possibilities of being are ‘laid-bare’ and freed for worldly interdependence and interaction as being-body which is ‘there.’ The ‘laying-bare' and freeing of these possibilities of being is also a ‘making-vulnerable’ of them in that their baring is a freeing, and that freeing is only so through their being made vulnerable. That is, the laying-bare of these possibilities is their opening and unfolding as world through embodiment, which frees them for the interdependence and interactions of world – the ‘being-free’ of which is possible by ‘being-made-vulnerable.’ The phenomenon of ‘making-vulnerable,’ then, is the phenomenon of those opened possibilities being
freedom and openness, as the world which they are as interdependence and interaction. The term ‘vulnerable’ denotes the possibility of ‘being-affected,’ but in the sense of a given, existential openness to be affected as embodied being. The world, we can say, then, is vulnerable to ‘itself,’ in that its possibilities are always ‘being-affected,’ and in the existential sense, where interdependence is always a sort of *affecting*, such that all within the world exists mutually with all else in the world. That is, the world is the existential interdependence that is all affecting all existentially.³⁵

As an example, my being embodied lays bare the possibilities of my being in that certain possibilities for me are disclosed by my body – though those possibilities are only as they are in relation to the embodiment of the world 'beyond' my body. That is, my bodily possibilities are only possible because they are co-disclosed with the possibilities of the embodied world, in a sort of mutual arising of possibilities. This is what is meant by being disclosed as interdependence. A portion of my laid-bare embodiment is my five senses, which are certain possibilities of my being. These senses, however, are not solely ‘mine’ in that they have the character of ‘being-inside’ and thus belonging only to myself. They are, rather, co-disclosed with the world, in the way that the ‘what-is-sensed’ is existentially interdependent with ‘what-is-sensing.’ For instance, the ‘what-is-sensed’ of my eyesight is a visible region, while ‘what-is-sensing’ is my eyes and their embodied possibility of sight. The visible region around my embodiment and my eyes and their embodied possibility arise in interdependence, in that there is no experience of one

³⁵ This is not to be confused with causality, which entails at least a semi-definite entity to be the 'cause' and a semi-definite entity to be 'they-who-are-affected,' with the effect being the 'affecting.' Being-affected as interdependence is more primordial, in that there is no separable 'cause' and 'effect,' but rather the existential phenomenon of *being* the affecting. That is, spatial being disclosed by embodiment is the affecting which is revealed as the interdependent 'world.' The affecting is thus on the existential level, where world is affecting world is affecting world – and this is what 'world' is.
without the other – they both are the experience. In this sense, I do not ‘see’ a visible region, but the possibilities of my being exist as embodied world, which is disclosed in the phenomenon of sensing. Thus, the phenomenon of sensing is unitary. It does not involve entities sensing objects, but rather the possibilities of being – such as seeing – being disclosed in an interdependence that is world; and one way in which that world is disclosed, is through the phenomenon of sensing.

Consequently, my eyes, which are an embodied possibility of sight, are not an object in which the possibility is inherent, but existentially are the phenomenon of sight. Provided that eyes are an embodiment of this phenomenon, it is the embodiment which discloses the possibility of sight and opens and unfolds that possibility of being, freeing it to be as world, in which it is an affecting. Here, the affecting is the unitary phenomenon of seeing, where 'what-is-sensed' is existentially interdependent with 'what-is-sensing,' such that both are the totality of 'seeing,' in which the sensed and the sensing are that phenomenon existentially. Embodiment is the phenomenon which opens and discloses this possibility.

My embodiment discloses those possibilities of my being, such as sight. So, it is in this way that my embodiment lays bare and frees the possibilities of my being to ‘be-as-world,’ or to be interdependent as world. It is also in this way that this freedom is the freedom to be ‘there,’ interpreted in the existential sense of ‘being-body,’ rather than the de-worlded sense of the ‘object-body.’ The possibilities of my embodiment thus are that freedom to be ‘there.’ Yet, along with being disclosed as ‘being-there,’ they are that disclosure, in the sense that they are the continual disclosing of the possibilities of my being as embodiment. So, the possibility of my being for sight, which is disclosed as my
eyes, is continually disclosed as them, such that my sight-possibility is its disclosure as my eyes, as it is continually disclosed as them. This is the view that my possibility of sight always exists in and as world as a consequence of its embodiment, and that it is also its own disclosure as my eyes. This necessitates the subsequent view that my eyes do not ‘see,’ but are the possibility of sight, and my eyes are the embodiment of sight. By such embodiment of my eyes, that possibility of sight is always ‘there,’ and is always in and as world, which implies that it is always interdependent with world. As we said that interdependence is always a sort of affecting – here, the existential sort – such that the unitary phenomena of world are the affecting. We saw this in the case of eyesight, where the visible region and my eyes were ‘being-affected’ and were discovered to be the disclosure of a whole world in the phenomenon of sensing. Primarily, it is through the phenomenon of embodiment that such possibilities are always ‘open’ and ‘freed’ to ‘being-affected,’ or to being involved existentially within world as its unitary phenomena. The freedom, then, to ‘be-affected’ is the freedom to be vulnerable; and vulnerability is as such by embodiment.

As a simple example of ‘being-made-vulnerable,’ consider again the human body and its disclosed possibilities of being. These are all vulnerable to the world because they are embodied, which brings embodiment into view as a ‘housing’ of these possibilities. That is, embodiment lays them bare and opens them, but is also a ‘connecting’ of these possibilities to world, in that it opens them for ‘being-affected.’ Thus, ‘being-vulnerable’ is a sort of subjectless, objectless offering of the possibilities of being as and to world. We may bring this into view by considering how the human body simultaneously ‘houses’ the possibilities of the human being – such as the possibility of wielding a
hammer – but also connects those possibilities to the world. For instance, my embodiment houses the possibility of my ‘being-here’ as embodied being, yet also opens and connects my possibilities to world, such as in the case where I am crossing the road. In this scenario, the possibilities of my being, housed by my body, are connected in myriad ways to world and exist as world. It is only because the world is disclosed as embodied being that I can surmise the distance from one side of the road to the other, employ my legs to traverse that distance, and estimate whether I may cross before being struck by a car. Indeed, the only way in which the possibility of ‘being-struck-by-a-car’ exists at all is because my possibilities have been ‘made-vulnerable’ as world, in which ‘being-struck-by-a-car’ is possible. Should my possibilities of being not be disclosed as embodiment, and thus not ‘be-vulnerable,’ that possibility would not exist. Thus, ‘making-vulnerable’ is the subjectless, objectless offering of the possibilities of being to world by embodiment, where those possibilities are their ‘there,’ and are open to ‘being-affected,’ such that they are the world as interdependence.

In summary, we have discovered the phenomenon of embodiment to be the ‘laying-bare’ and ‘making-vulnerable’ of the possibilities of being, both of which we have explicated as phenomena. To re-visit an earlier contention, this newer view of spatiality is broader than the Heideggerian ready-to-hand, which may be derived from our account. The ‘laying-bare’ of the possibilities of being for the equipment-context is the possibilities of being that are disclosed by the embodiments of the equipment and Dasein.

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36 By our view, psychological effects, such as being angry that someone stole my car, would be a possibility of being that is opened by my embodied possibilities of being and those of the car. As disclosure, we are existentially interrelated and interact (section 3.3) in such a way that we are the possibility of 'being-angered,' which is the phenomenon of the same name. In a unitary sense, this possibility of 'being-angered' exists as (not in) myself and the car, as again, the 'what-is-angered' is existentially interdependent with 'what-is-angered-over,' akin to the phenomenon of eyesight. More generally, there are no separable 'what-causes' and 'what-is-affected,' in the existential sense.
The ‘making-vulnerable’ of possibilities is the openness and freedom of the equipment, owing to embodiment, to be brought into the equipment-context, in addition to Dasein’s bodily opened possibility of ‘de-severance,’ or existential openness for bringing that equipment into its equipment-context. Our rendition of ‘world’ is simply the total embodied, equipmental context, as well as the overall ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ which we may consider to be the disclosed interdependence of Dasein’s world as embodied world. The Heideggerian view of spatiality, however, provides an insufficient account of embodiment, and thus foregoes the vital opportunity to bring into view existentially ways in which embodiment reveals the unitary phenomena of world. Now that we have brought embodiment and world into view in various ways, we must explore how embodiment, as it is disclosed as world, is the world in terms of the orientation of its possibilities.

Section 3: Orientation

The disclosure of the possibilities of being by the phenomenon of embodiment, and what those possibilities are, are existentially intertwined with how embodiment is disclosed and are the disclosure of possibilities, as world in interdependence. We have previously described two phenomena of this ‘how,’ which were the laying-bare and making-vulnerable of possibilities. A third phenomenon is the orientation of the possibilities of being as world. What is meant by ‘orientation’? Primarily, the senses of the term we wish to utilize are those of ‘positioning’ and ‘being-in-relation-to.’

Positioning is the phenomenon by which embodiment is always and everywhere situated, and always is its place. As we discussed previously, the possibilities of embodiment are mutually arising as world – such as my eyes and their possibility of sight.
are as they are only because the world has been disclosed similarly in its possibilities by embodiment. This observation is what led us to the revealing of the unitary phenomenon of sensing. Embodiment, then, exists as interdependence, which is world and ‘being-affected.’ We contended before that ‘being-vulnerable’ is the open, existential condition of ‘being-affected,’ yet have not explored the how of ‘being-affected,’ which is existentially revealed by ‘positioning.’ To reveal positioning in its existentiality, let us consider, rather than a ‘material’ body, a body that is existential possibilities, which are disclosed as interdependence with all other possibilities. As we explicated previously, those possibilities only are as they are because they mutually arise with all possibilities of world. Phenomenally, we discover that the possibilities of being are ‘dis-covered’ as embodiment, and are so mutually and collectively as an environment, which is the existential situation of how those possibilities are situated existentially. That is, the possibilities of being are opened by embodiment (laying-bare and making-vulnerable), and are so in such a way that they are situated in an environment, which exists as the whole of the existential situation.

The existential situation is not how each individual body is situated, but how the phenomenon of embodiment as the disclosed possibilities of being, brought into view as a whole, is interrelated, and how those possibilities thus are interrelated. Primarily, as a phenomenally revealed aspect of embodiment, there are possibilities of embodied being that have the character of ‘nearness’ or ‘farness’ from one another, alongside the notions

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37 As opposed to viewing the body as an object, which is divorced in its possibilities from world, except on the subject-object level of external cause-and-effect, we are viewing the body as existing as the possibilities of world. That is, a body is the embodied possibilities of world. Viewing the body as an ‘object’ is to neglect its interdependence with world. The object does not have the intentionality and understanding of Dasein.
of ‘local,’ ‘region,’ and ‘distant’ or ‘far-away.’ For instance, to recall the example where I am standing on the river-bank, looking to the opposite one, and considering whether I may leap the intervening distance, that opposite side has the character of ‘nearness’ when the river is low and non-threatening, while it displays the aspect of ‘farness’ when the river is flooded and raging. This lived consideration of spatiality reveals how considering ‘material’ bodies and ‘material’ distance covers up the underlying existential interaction of possibilities as they are disclosed by embodiment as world, and thus existential distance. Continuing from the aspects of ‘nearness’ and ‘farness,’ there is a phenomenal sense in which that scene – myself, on a river bank, attempting to overleap the river – is my local ‘situation’ and is a particular ‘region,’ beyond which everything is ‘distant’ and ‘far-away.’ The lived, phenomenal lens reveals to us that this sense arises from the possibility of existential interaction (where 'possible' refers to 'reachable'). That is, if I, as embodied possibilities, can interact existentially with the scene, then all which is ‘reachable’ in that situation existentially has the possibilities of its embodied being oriented towards mine in the way of ‘nearness,’ where I may existentially interact therewith (existential interaction will be the matter of section 3.3). This ‘nearness’ depends, however, upon the how of embodiment’s disclosure, which localizes the possibilities of being in the way we previously mentioned as being ‘housing.’ For

38 'Nearness' and 'farness' are not necessarily relative only to the observer. They are relative to the possibilities of being. For instance, a tree directly next to another tree is existentially quite near, because the possibilities of each being are 'reachable,' while a tree on the other side of the world is quite far, because those possibilities are unreachable. This is not dependent on material distance, which is a measurement of and covers up existential distance. The distancing of these possibilities in terms of their interaction and reachability is what gives rise to existential distance and the measurement thereof, which is 'material distance' understood as a theoretical, abstract view of existential distance.

39 The river’s embodied being is oriented towards mine, in the sense that I and the river both exist as the possibilities that are only as they are because they are oriented towards world. That is, by existing as embodied possibilities, the river and I already are the possibility of 'overleaping' and 'being-overleapt,' where once more, 'what-overleaps' and 'what-is-overleapt' are existentially interdependent. Orientation is merely the orientation and the how of this interdependence.
instance, as a consequence of my embodiment, I may not have legs at all, and so the
distance to the opposite river-bank will be enormously long; or, oppositely, I may have
unusually long legs, to where I may almost overstep the river and give a slight jump to
attain my goal, in which case the intervening distance shrinks considerably. Therefore,
my embodiment, in conjunction with all other embodiment, determines what is
‘reachable’ – not solely for my embodiment, but also in the unitary, worldly sense, which
is that where the co-establishing of ‘reachable’ comes into view, such that my
embodiment, collectively with the embodiment of the scene, reveals how remote the
possibilities of being are from one another.

Provided that embodiment is, fundamentally, a phenomenal localizing of
possibilities – that is, making certain possibilities local and certain non-local – the
phenomenon of embodiment is the establishing also of existential distance. ‘Material
distance’ is never encountered, and indeed, is no more than relatively stable existential
distance. To see this, consider the typically conceived 'material' distance between the
earth and the moon. Human beings may traverse this distance, yet the earth and the moon
are relatively stable within it and do not do so. This is tantamount to the observation that
human beings are beings for whom that being is an issue, or that human beings have their
‘being to be.’ The earth and moon phenomenally display a different relation towards the
possibilities of their being, and so the existential distance between them is relatively
stable, as compared to the distance between two mobile human beings within the world.
The relative stability of existential distance becomes interpreted as being abiding and
concrete, and thus becomes conceived of as being ‘material distance,’ in the same way
that relatively stable existences become gradually interpreted as being ‘independent
existences.’ In both instances, the view of existentiality is lost as a consequence of apparent stability.

Were I to traverse the intervening distance between the earth and moon, I would also simply be re-orienting the possibilities of my being, at each moment of the journey, towards all other possibilities by motion. This is a sort of shifting and re-orienting of my existential possibilities too. To recall the river example, my traversing the intervening distance and overleaping the river also is a re-orientation of my possibilities by motion, which also is a change in relation to ‘nearness’ and ‘farness’ existentially – or, a change in positioning. Positioning arises from the existential situation, and altering the existential situation is thus a change in how the possibilities of being are situated, which is an altering of position. For instance, the tree which resides on the opposite side of the river-bank, before I overleaped the river, displayed the character of ‘farness,’ in that it was mostly inaccessible to my bodily possibilities. Yet it also conveyed enough ‘nearness’ that the possibilities of our beings gave rise to the unitary phenomenon of ‘encountering,’ where they mutually and existentially interacted with one another. Overleaping the river, I brought the possibilities of the tree’s being more towards the character of ‘nearness,’ in that I could then touch its body, smell its scent, and, if I wished, alter its embodiment.

The tree has become, to recall an earlier term, ‘reachable’ existentially. Should I wander away from that tree and leave the scene altogether, there is a sense in which I departed a ‘region,’ where there was a particular, existential local situation that involved the interrelations and interactions of certain possibilities of being. For instance, if I wander away to ascend a mountain-peak, then the possibilities of being are radically different, and the world as it is disclosed in that local situation displays itself differently.
Thus, ‘region’ is where the possibilities of being are oriented towards one another in such a way that they display interrelations and interactions with the character of ‘nearness’ or ‘reachability.’ It therefore ends where those possibilities become ‘unreachable’ and ‘far.’ The phenomenon of ‘being-distant’ or ‘being-far-away’ is revealed by that inaccessibility of the possibilities of being, such that any interactions or interrelations have the character of ‘farness,’ such as those possibilities of mine and Neptune. We are both yet embodied world, which is a unitary phenomenon that unites us, yet any existential interactions or interrelations the possibilities of our beings might entertain have the character of ‘farness,’ owing to how those possibilities are oriented.

To be certain, this orientation is not founded upon material or concrete distance – rather, it is existential distance. To provide another example of how this is so, consider the experience of approaching a gathering of people, which is being housed in a friend's apartment. Suppose that the door to this gathering is initially closed, yet the inside lights are visible from the outside through a window, and the noise within the party is audible beyond the apartment. The 'material' distance that separates myself, standing in front of the door, from the gathering, is merely the width of the door. Yet in the existential sense, I am far more distant. I am a portion of the 'region' of the party in that some possibilities of mine and the inside party are interrelated – these include my hearing the noise, seeing the lights, and having the possibility of entering with the character of 'nearness.' My subsequent entering and bringing the nearness of those possibilities even closer is a re-orientation of the possibilities of my being and those within the party, as all become re-oriented according to the interactions and interrelations that are revealed by the embodied
scene and the change in the positioning of not only myself, but all within the party. The 'concrete' distance that was traversed is negligible, yet the existential distance was vast.

This phenomenon reveals how 'material' distance – or the relatively stable existential distance – that was traversed is a subset of the larger set of existential distance, which may change in such a way that does not affect the subset of relatively stable distance. That relatively stable portion is the positioning of the embodiment of the earth and the building in which the party is being housed, such that there is no re-orientation of those possibilities if I close an existential distance that is broader than that relatively stable portion. That is to say, the relatively stable portion is a special subset of existential distance, where the re-orientation of and subsequent new positioning of certain possibilities does not affect that stable portion. We might say it is 'condensed' in its possibilities by atomic forces, in the case of the distance from the front of door to the inside of it. However, the broader, less condensed portion of possibilities are accessible to my possibilities as *lived* experience, which has existential distances that are not divorced from that relatively stable portion, yet which leave its stability intact – i.e. it does not re-orient those possibilities or change their positioning.

Thus, we may say that the relatively stable existential distance – such as the distance from the earth to the moon, or from one major city to another – is a relatively stable orientation of the possibilities which are that existential distance, but which is a subset of a much broader, more inclusive set of existential distance. Some portion of that distance may alter and re-orient itself and possibilities, in such a way that leaves that relatively stable portion untouched. We revealed this in the phenomenon of how the 'distance' between myself and the party was, in terms of the relatively stable distance,
quite short, and was spared from change by my re-orientation, in which I altered a portion of existential distance that was broader and vaster than the relatively stable portion. This portion beyond the relatively stable one is, in our example, an existential distance that is accessible by *living* existential distance, or having the possibilities of that distance as an issue of being. The human being is not necessarily the only being for whom that being could be an issue, however. If we suppose that animals, less explicitly, re-orient the possibilities of their being and change their positioning, and do so in a way that phenomenally reveals understanding of both, then we must concede that those possibilities and that existential distance are lived. The phenomenal glimpses into a wholly unitary, lived space that are provided by revealing a relatively stable portion of existential space that is often called 'material,' alongside a portion beyond that is accessible as 'lived' and which leaves that stable portion oriented and positioned, gives rise to our intended conclusion. That is, that even the broader, lived space is present as oriented and positioned embodiment, as it was in the party-scene from our example. Thus, embodiment is not merely 'extended space' or 'extended body' in space, nor is 'material distance' the absolute, unchanging background of Newton.

We have thus revealed orientation, and the possibility of re-orientation as a change in positioning, to be a 'being-in-relation-to.' The orientation of the possibilities of being has the character of orienting those possibilities 'towards,' understood not as a 'towards-what,' but as a 'towards' in the existential sense, where those possibilities of being are 'being-towards.' As in our example of myself and the river, my possibilities of being are oriented 'towards' the possibilities of the river, and thus, through our embodiment, our possibilities are revealed as 'being-towards,' such as the length of my
legs and the water level of the river – both of which disclose certain possibilities, such as my overleaping the river, by embodiment. As we said, these possibilities of my embodiment are not oriented 'towards' the river as a definite 'what,' but the being-towards of my possibilities and the being-towards of the river disclose the possibility of a phenomenon, namely my overleaping the river. The being-towards of my possibilities is 'towards' only world, which is not a definite what, but a total disclosure of possibilities, with which mine mutually arise.

**Section 4: Interaction and Relation**

The possibilities of existential interaction and relation are primarily disclosed by the ‘being-towards’ and ‘being-in-relation-to’ of orientation. The ‘being-towards’ of embodied possibilities itself is disclosed by how ‘a possibility’ is never by itself – it always is in relation to other possibilities, thus revealing its ‘being-towards’ as that existential relation, and ‘being-in-relation-to’ as the co-dependence of those possibilities to be as possibilities. The embodied world, then, is the totality of these existential relations, though not in the sense that we may summate the relations together and derive some semblance of ‘world’ from that resultant sum. Indeed, the possibilities that are ‘being-towards’ one another are only ever in relation to one another, and as such, are seen only in their existential relatedness as a unity that is ‘being-in-relation-to,’ and thus, the interdependence that is world. The relatedness of the possibilities of being, therefore, depends upon how they are in relation to one another – or upon how they are their embodiment. Consequently, the ‘being-in-relation-to’ of these possibilities is their co-dependence to be as embodied possibility, or that one embodied possibility is never revealed by itself, but in mutual definition with other possibilities. Within the ‘being-
towards’ and ‘being-in-relation-to’ of these possibilities, however, is the possibility of existential interaction, or the phenomenon of how existential relatedness is lived.

We have partially revealed the phenomenon of existential interaction previously in the modification of embodiment, which alters extant possibilities and discloses new ones. If the head of a hammer is sundered, or if the human being loses its physical embodiment through death, then the ‘being-in-relation-to’ of those possibilities towards other possibilities is radically altered. The hammer without its head is reduced in its former possibility of hammering; and some might use a functionalist argument to claim that it no longer is a hammer at all. The human being, without its physical embodiment, finds its ‘being-in-relation-to’ completely altered, though not necessarily annihilated altogether. If we presume that the perishing of the physical body is the ending of the human being, then the human ‘being-in-relation-to’ is lost altogether. However, our philosophy thus far has revealed embodiment to be equiprimordial with ‘being-there,’ such that embodied being is always ‘there.’ Though we shall not attempt such a feat in this paper, there exists the possibility of further exploration into the notion that embodied ‘being-there,’ at the point of physical death, alters its embodiment such that it becomes something akin to an ‘energy-body’ or ‘spirit-body.’ Death, then, phenomenally is the altering in its possibilities of a being’s ‘being-in-relation-to’ and a re-orienting of its ‘being-towards.’ There is no substantive 'something,' by this view, which moves on beyond death. This view of death is explicitly aimed to lessen the strength of the view that purports death to require either the annihilation or preservation of a substantive 'something.' We are advocating that there is simply 'being-there' that is embodied and always is there, and that death is a matter of an alteration in the disclosure of this
embodiment, akin to similar alterations in embodiment which we explore here. There exists no clear division between the 'living' and the 'dead,' except in that the living are 'being-there' in such a way that they are encounterable in the particular, embodied way to which we are accustomed – that of the physical body – whereas the dead are 'being-there' in a way that they are encounterable in a different sense, as a different embodied disclosure of their possibilities of being. Death, then, is the transformation of the embodied possibilities of being and how they are 'there.' Regardless of this exploratory possibility, alterations in embodiment are alterations in how the possibilities of being are disclosed as ‘there,’ which is an existential interaction.

As we discussed previously, the Western paradigm’s view of ‘interaction’ is that of subject-object interaction, where ‘some-thing’ does ‘something’ to ‘some-thing.’ The possibility of existential interaction is lost on this view, as it is substance-based and mediated by external relations, and thus, existentially external interactions. The prototypical Western view of our hammer example, for instance, would be to suppose that a ‘subject,’ for whom the hammer is an ‘object,’ does something to the hammer, which causes an alteration in its form. Curiously, the only instance in which an existential consideration typically is invoked, is when the loss of ‘identity’ is considered. For example, we see this in posing the question of whether the broken hammer is the same hammer as before (this is tantamount to the question of an object’s endurance through time, which both Descartes and Kant answered by referencing the activity of the human mind).

Our existential view of this interaction is that the hammer, by its interaction with a human being, is altered in the possibilities of its being and embodiment together, yet in
its not having a head, is revealing a possibility of being that was disclosed already as its original embodiment. That is, in its embodiment where it yet possessed a head, the hammer simultaneously was the possibilities of having and not having a head – or, more generally, the possibilities of being are not only positive (i.e. the 'having'), but also negative (i.e. 'not-having'), which existentially are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, the human being who sunders the hammer is not doing anything to the hammer, but is existentially interacting with the hammer to reveal a possibility of its being that was already disclosed by its embodiment. For the human being, as well, the existential possibility of being a physical body is disclosed alongside with the possibility of not being a physical body – or, more generally, the possibility of what we commonly term as 'being born,' or being a physical body, is existentially paired with 'being dead,' which reveals the unitary 'being' that is simultaneously both born and dead. Birth and death, correspondingly, do not happen to the human being, yet instead reveal possibilities of the human being that were disclosed already as its embodiment.

As to whether the broken hammer is the 'same' hammer as before it was broken, we must note that 'same' refers to the endurance of an object, or an independent existence that is persistent throughout time. By this view of existentiality, that object is already 'traced-out' of the world and set aside, contained 'in-itself.' Typically, as we mentioned in section 2, this tracing is conducted on the basis of embodiment, or the ability to individuate as individual bodies. The 'sameness' here thus refers both to the 'object-body,' typically as a matter of appearance, and the ability of the one who traced to recognize that object-body, typically as a matter of mind. In total, the object being the same rests upon the ability of the one who traced it from out of the world to cognize its bodily appearance
as being sufficiently similar to its previous embodied state, so as to trace it out of the
world once more. Should the embodied state become too dissimilar in appearance, or
should the mind of the tracer become too confused by a change in the object's object-
body to trace it once more, then 'sameness' is lost. The sameness, however, belongs
always to an object-body and to the mind of the tracer – or alternatively, a subject.

This is not our existential view, which is that the possibilities of an 'object' being
as it is in that bodily state and the object not being as it is in that bodily state are co-
disclosed as its embodiment. That is, those possibilities are equiprimordial with one
another. Consequently, the 'object' is neither the same nor different should its
embodiment be altered, as it is always both possibilities. 'Sameness' refers to a positive
aspect of being enduring through time and being subjectively recognized as such; while
in our existentialist view, all embodied possibilities of being, both positive and negative,
are co-disclosed with one another. These possibilities, therefore, do not belong solely to
the 'object,' as 'being-as-it-is' in terms of its embodiment refers not to object but to world.
That is, the positive and negative aspects of being for the object belong to the world, not
to the object in and of itself or the subject who recognizes its appearance. Therefore, in
the case of a hammer, 'being-as-it-is' with a head is co-disclosed with 'being-as-it-is'
without a head, in the embodiment of the hammer, which is the possibilities of being
disclosed in relation to world. The hammer becoming broken and losing its head is the
revealing of a possibility that always was disclosed as the embodiment of the hammer,
which existed always as embodied world, and thus revealed as world both possibilities of
the hammer.
That is, the 'being-there' of the hammer as world always disclosed both the possibilities of having and not having a head, such both possibilities have already arisen, regardless of whether they are 'seen' in appearance. Typically, only the positive aspect of being, such as the hammer having a head, is both seen in appearance and realized 'as being' – and thus a hammer exists – while the negative aspect of being, such as the hammer not having a head, is 'seen' in appearance but not realized 'as being,' and thus is conceived to be either the outright loss of a hammer or an alteration that produces another object altogether. It is mutually contradictory for an object, understood as a traced-out, independent existence, to be both the positive and negative aspects of its being, as the object was traced-out on the basis of its positive being solely. That is, its object-body remains sufficiently similar to its current appearance so as to be traceable by a subject who recognizes it. The 'tracing-out' of the object-body is not conducted on the basis of the negative aspects of its being, as those point away from the 'object.' In the object-based view, those aspects point towards nothing – a privation of existence. In the existentialist view of world, those aspects point towards world, and that both the positive and negative aspects of being are co-disclosed as world, such as the hammer was disclosed, in its embodiment, as world, being both the positive and negative aspects of being.

The negative possibilities of 'hammer' do all exist as hammer. 'Hammer' exists as the possibility of 'having-a-head' and 'not-having-a-head' simultaneously. Provided that hammer was disclosed as embodiment which cannot think, it is that negative possibility. It is disclosed as 'not-being-able-to-think.' The positive possibility of the human being – that it can think – corresponds to the negative aspect that the hammer cannot think. Thus, these possibilities arise together in embodiment, regardless of whether the hammer ever thinks or the human being is incapable of thinking. 'Hammer' is disclosed as those positive possibilities of being disclosed by its embodiment, as well as those negative ones which are equally indispensible. Not being Frankenstein's monster is another negative aspect of being for the hammer, regardless of whether the hammer ever realizes the corresponding positive possibility, and regardless of whether that positive possibility is 'seen' as another being's embodied disclosure. Were the hammer to be the positive aspect of being Frankenstein's monster, it would be debatable as to whether it is a hammer.

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Existential interaction, then, which alters embodiment, does not change the possibilities of being and of world, yet reveals them and frees them for being 'seen' in 'being-towards' and 'being-in-relation-to.' It is thus an interplay of possibilities that reveals them as their relational interplaying. The interplaying aspect of existential interaction comes into view in the phenomenon of 'regioning.' To recall what we previously explicated concerning a region, it is the environment wherein certain possibilities of being are 'reachable' and have the character of 'nearness.' We revealed 'region' before in its relations, such as the relations of my embodiment to that of a tree across the river, with the character of 'nearness,' such that I was able to encounter the possibilities of the tree's being in such a way that the interactions our joint, embodied possibilities were 'reachable.' Additionally, we brought 'region' into view as an orientation of the possibilities of embodied being with the interactive character of 'nearness.' Region, thus, is the totality of the existential interactions with that interactive character of 'nearness.'

One example of 'region' is the equipment-context of Heidegger. In the equipment-context, Dasein, in its concernful dealings, encounters pieces of equipment not as 'pieces,' but as 'the room,' or the totality of the equipment-context. However, Dasein remains, as an entity, the relational center of that context, in that the context is revealed as Dasein's existential structure of 'de-severance,' or the 'bringing-close' of the pieces of equipment, having them to hand – i.e. assigning those pieces of equipment their context according to use. Dasein and the ready-to-hand constitute an example of both 'region' and existential interaction, yet in such a way that embodiment is for the most part ignored in its role within 'bringing-close' and 'giving-nearness-to.' Secondarily, the question as to whether
'equipment-context' is reducible to 'subjective context' is difficult to resolve, given how Dasein is simultaneously considered as an entity about whom the relations center (hence, subjective and contextual), as well as an ontological structure that connects the whole of the equipment-context (hence, existential and world).

To phenomenally uncover 'region' more broadly, we should recall the example of entering a gathering of friends at a party, where I, as my embodied possibilities, enter a doorway and encounter the scene of that party. The possibilities of my being are revealed by my embodiment and its 'being-there,' and thus encountered, co-extensively with the party encountered in its totality. This existential 'encountering' is revealed through embodiment, as the possibilities of my being are re-oriented simultaneously with those of the party, such that my possibilities are the totality of party and its existential relations. The existential relations are those of the whole of the embodied possibilities, such as the friends with whom I may converse, who are revealed now in their character of 'nearness,' as opposed to their character of 'far-away,' which they displayed when I stood on the opposite side of the doorway. The entire 'region' of the party is revealed, in the possibilities of embodied being, as 'being-near,' which does not center upon my being or those of any present, but is the totality of the existential relations of all the possibilities of being that display the character of 'being-near.'

For instance, such possibilities that display the character of 'being-near,' and thus are open to existential relations with that character, are the possibility of entertaining conversation with my friends, and of receiving a drink in my hand, both of which re-orient the possibilities of being. Conversing, I experience a 'being-with' and an existential connectedness with the other person, such that the possibilities of our beings are re-
oriented with the furthered and deeper character of 'nearness,' as opposed to the person upon the opposite side of the room, conversing with another. I also experience a disposition of my being, in its possibilities, towards the atmosphere of the party, considered as a whole, which is not merely the sum of all elements present therein, but is experienced in its wholeness as that immediate disposition of mine. This is the how of how the possibilities of my being are being-oriented towards those of the party. The party, however, is also an embodied scene, owing to how it is, in its wholeness, present as body, though not present as a body. The 'bringing-near' of the possibilities of the part to mine, and mine thereto mutually, is thus not a matter of my body traversing material distance, but of my body being re-oriented in its possibilities towards those of the party, such that the existential character of 'far-away' is forfeited, and the character of 'nearness' is encountered.

Remember, embodiment is simultaneously the 'housing' of the possibilities of my being, yet is also the connecting of those possibilities to world, and as such, is at once the revealing of the possibilities of my being. First, they are revealed in their negative aspect of 'not-being-encountered,' when I am not present at the party. Then, they are revealed in their positive aspect of 'being-encountered,' once I am present. My being, however, is simultaneously both those positive and negative aspects. As such, I was always 'there,' even in my absence, though that possibility of my being was possibly not 'seen.'

41 It must be emphasized that I am 'there,' regardless of whether my presence or absence is ever 'seen.' This is due to how my being is simultaneously the negative and positive aspects of itself. The 'seeing' of my absence is different from my 'being-there' already by the negative aspects of my being. The 'seeing' is simply the recognition of that negative aspect, which is already 'there,' independent of seeing, by the embodied, spatial disclosure of the possibilities of my being. This necessitates that possibilities which are not yet disclosed, then they are neither positive nor negative, given that they yet have a neutral relation to my embodied being. The question concerning them is a zero-value question.
possibility is seen, however, if a person at the party was expecting my presence and encountered the scene of the party to discover if I were there, only to find that I was not. Thereby, they have thus re-oriented the possibilities of their being towards mine in such a way that they experience my absence, and thus, the negative aspect of the possibilities of my being. Or, alternatively, they experience my 'being-there' in its negative aspect. As was the case with the changing of 'object,' the existential scene of the party has not 'changed' in the sense that it is different in its possibilities, nor is it the same. That is, the possibilities of my being are 'there' and 'every-where' by their disclosure as embodiment, regardless of 'where' that body is materially. Correspondingly, 'region' is not limited by material distance, nor does it change or remain the same. It is also 'there,' in its negative aspect, whenever the existential character of 'nearness' is forfeited, such as when the party disbands. To be sure, I may experience that forfeiture of 'nearness' when I arrive at a location, with the expectation that a party is to be there, only to encounter that party's absence. In that sense, the 'party' is always there, in its possibilities, as region.

Region, thus, is the totality of the existential relations of embodied being in an environment where those relations display the character of 'nearness' and is present as embodied being, though it neither changes nor remains the same with the orientation and re-orientation of the possibilities of embodied being that relate to that region with 'nearness.' It therefore also is not 'centered' upon any prioritized existence and thus is not subjectively, or inter-subjectively, established, owing to how it is 'there' as world, regardless of whether it is ever 'seen.' The existential relations which orient and re-orient the possibilities of being in the phenomenon of 'bringing-near' reveal themselves as region in their nearness, and in the character of those relations 'being-near.' We have thus
arrived at a glimpse of how region, and thus, when the characters of both 'nearness' and 'far-away' come into view, may be phenomenally revealed by the existential interaction of embodied being that is 'being-oriented.'


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LEXICON OF TERMS

i. **Equiprimordial**: Literally, equally primordial. Philosophically, its connotation is that whichever phenomena are equiprimordial arise together and do not come before or after one another, and thus are not causally related. For instance, there is not first Being, from which spatiality results as a derivative mode of Being; Being *is* spatial. As a counterexample, ‘subject’ is not equiprimordial with Being, as it is a founded mode of Being, which is more primordial and precedes ‘subject.’

ii. **Border/Boundary**: The dividing line which establishes ‘inside’ and ‘outside,’ in terms of existentiality. We employ it in relation to the subject-object mode of being, where ‘subject’ has a border with ‘object,’ and its ‘inside’ or ‘in-itself’ has a border with the ‘external world.’ This border, however, only differentiates, and does not connect.

iii. **Delineation**: The philosophic process by which a portion of the world is ‘traced-out’ by the means of borders, and thus sealed existentially, with the character of ‘inside’ and ‘in-itself.’ Together with existential divorce, which results from delineation, it is how a ‘substance’ is established philosophically. It is how the subject-object spectrum arises from the primordiality of Being, and how the subject-object spectrum is a founded mode of Being.

iv. **Appropriation**: The philosophic seizing of existentiality and dividing it as a matter of delineation, on the basis of presuppositions that are founded upon Being, yet which ignore the primordiality of Being and instead pre-philosophically decide Being. Being in is primordiality is overlooked, and instead is shown only in its founded modes, such as subject-object. We show that the Western paradigm and its substantive metaphysics engage in this.

v. **Divorce**: As a result of delineation, the ‘substance’ is not existentially involved or interdependent with any other substance, thus divorcing their Beings and establishing the substance as an independent existence.

vi. **Entification**: The total, end result philosophically of existential appropriation, delineation, and divorce. The forging of an entity, as it is understood in substantive metaphysics.
vii. **Ontic**: The factual situation of being, concrete and individual. A particular instance of an ontological condition; an individual example of an ontological condition that is broader than that instance. For example, there is 'a situation,' which is ontic, and then 'situated-ness,' which is ontological.

viii. **Ontological**: The fundamental ground or foundation of being. In contrast to ontic, it is a condition on the level of ontology, such as 'situated-ness,' or what it is to be 'situated' – as opposed to simply being in an individual situation. Heidegger's question of being is addressed by 'ontological;' though, we prefer the term 'existential' for our purposes.

ix. **Being-in-the-world**: A Heideggerian term, it is a replacement term for subject/object, and all other terms which traditionally describe the human being and its world in substantive terms. Primarily, it is the human being's familiarity with the world, in the ontological sense. That is, is the totality of the ontological structures of worldhood that arise with the human being. As such, it is a holistic phenomenon of world that 'worlds' through the human being.

x. **Existentale**: A Heideggerian term, it is a structural item of Dasein's 'being-in-the-world,' or an ontological condition of Dasein, such as its 'being-in' as such, which is not being in the world as a foot in a shoe, but in the sense of 'being-involved' in the world on the ontological level.

xi. **Existentiell**: A Heideggerian term, it is how Dasein lives, on the level of the ontic, the ontological structures of its being-in-the-world. That is, how Dasein lives, in its everyday environment, the structural items of its ontology. Ultimately, every existentiale must be understood in the existentiell sense, for Heidegger.

xii. **Dasein**: A Heideggerian term, it translates to both 'being-there' and 'being-here.' Heidegger employs this term as a synonym for the human being, foregoing traditional monikers, such as 'soul,' 'mind,' or 'subject.' It is intended to highlight the human being as a being, who has a character of 'mineness' and is thrown into the world. They are never decontextualized from 'world,' and thus are never fully independent existences qua substance.

xiii. **Uncovering**: The philosophical bringing-into-view of being by the light of phenomenology. Heidegger employs this term in reference to Dasein 'taking-the-lid-off' or 'un-covering' the being of the world. We employ the term not in reference to Dasein, but maintain its original spirit, in using it to describe how we are philosophically bringing being into view and 'dis-covering' in our inquiry.

xiv. **Disclosure**: The phenomenal bringing-into-view of being as it is equiprimordial with spatiality and embodiment. That is, the disclosure of the possibilities of being that are spatial and embodied. In our inquiry into spatiality, we are philosophically uncovering the phenomenal disclosure of being, spatiality, and embodiment. It means to 'lay open to view' and has the connotations of 'to open up' and 'to unfold.'

xv. **Existentiality**: The totality of the possibilities of being, brought into view as a unitary, unbroken whole.

xvi. **Western Paradigm**: The presuppositions which characterize the lens through which Western philosophy views reality, which thus informs all its philosophical explorations, before they begin. Our aim by using this term is to highlight how
'subject-object' and similar such presuppositions of ontology are founded modes of being, which are founded upon the primordial possibilities of being.

xvii. **External relatedness:** The paradigmatic tendency of Western philosophy to conceive of relations between substances which are external to the existence of those two substances. Hence, the subject and the object interact in a way that is external existentially to each, such that their existences remain separate and independent as substances. This is different from 'internal relatedness,' where the existences of all within the world blend seamlessly into one another, and thus interaction is, in its primordial character, existential.

xviii. **Internal relatedness:** The tendency of Eastern philosophy to view existence as dynamic and interrelated, in which existences are existentially interactive and interdependent with one another. Those existences blend seamlessly into one another, and thus interaction is, in its primordial character, existential. Unlike external relatedness, this is not a relation between substances.
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