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PAWNS AMONG KINGS: THE INFLUENCE OF SMALL POWERS IN POST-COLD WAR
NATO

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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Dedication

It is my honor and privilege to dedicate this dissertation to my cousin, First Lieutenant Douglas F. Jones (U.S. Army). Douglas graduated from West Point in 2008 where he studied International Relations. He is currently serving in the 101st Airborne Division in Afghanistan where he and his men face the enemy on a near daily basis. My thoughts and prayers continue to go out to you and your men. Thank you for serving your country and NATO. May God protect you and your company and grant you victory in battle.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables	
List of Figures	
CHAPTER 1.....	1
Introduction	
Literature Review	
Dissertation Overview	
CHAPTER 2.....	21
Introduction to NATO History	
Introduction to NATO’s Decision-making Procedures and Organizational Hierarchy	
CHAPTER 3.....	61
Power and Influence in NATO	
A Theoretical Model of Influence	
Research Methods and Case Selection	
Summary of Dissertation Findings	
CHAPTER 4.....	113
Denmark and NATO Enlargement to the Baltic States	
CHAPTER 5.....	162
Greece and NATO Membership to Macedonia	
CHAPTER 6.....	210
Belgium and the 2003 NATO Deployment to Turkey	
CHAPTER 7.....	260
Review of Overall Findings	
Theoretical Implications	
Future Research	
Predictions and Policy Implications	
Bibliography	283
Appendix A – North Atlantic Treaty	308
Appendix B – List of Acronyms	311

List of Tables

Table 1.1	Conditions that Improve the Chances of Small Power Influence (Fox)
Table 1.2	Conditions that Improve the Chances of Small Power Influence (Lindell-Persson)
Table 3.1	Aggregate Military Power Rankings in NATO
Table 3.2	Influence Tactics
Table 5.1	Greek-Turkish Disagreements in the Aegean Sea
Table 5.2	Name Recognition Preferences among NATO Allies
Table 5.3	U.S. Military Assistance to Greece and Turkey

List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Annual U.S. Foreign Military Assistance

Figure 2.2 U.S. Forces in Europe

Figure 2.3 NATO Structures After 1952

Figure 2.4 Survey Question on Troop Levels in Afghanistan, Summer 2009

Figure 2.5 Map of NATO Members and Partners

Figure 2.6 NATO's Principle Civilian and Military Structures

Figure 3.1 Two Influence Formula Options

Figure 3.2 Selected Influence Formula

Figure 3.3 Influence Model

Figure 3.4 Antecedents to Small Power Success in NATO

Figure 4.1 Map Of Denmark

Figure 4.2 Map of the Baltic Region

Figure 5.1 Map Of Greece

Figure 5.2 Geographical Macedonia in 1913

Figure 6.1 Map Of Belgium

Figure 7.1 Survey Question for Assessing Influence Rankings in NATO

Figure 7.2 Survey Question for Assessing the Effectiveness of Influence Tactics

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to scrutinize the relationship between general material capabilities (i.e. power) and influence in a specific military alliance: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I shed light on the following puzzle: how do small powers wield influence in an organization traditionally led by great powers?

For the purposes of this project, I define influence as a state's demonstrated ability to achieve desired alliance policies. A theoretical model is proposed that takes into account four critical inputs (i.e. independent variable categories) into influence outcomes: 1) Systemic Factors, 2) Institutional Factors, 3) Domestic Factors and 4) Influence Tactics. The framework is proposed as one useful for future studies of influence outcomes in international organizations.

The study's three primary case studies are from the post-Cold War era and include two successful influence attempts (Denmark and Greece) and one failed case (Belgium). The findings of the study indicate that national level factors (especially a state's intensity of interest and political cohesion) must be considered along with international level factors (i.e. security dependency and institutional factors) in order to fully understand small power influence in NATO. Additionally, a small power's ability to secure sponsorship from one of NATO's four great powers was demonstrated as critical for influence success. These results fill a gap in International Relations literature. It challenges previously held assumptions about small power influence and helps explain the antecedents of key security policy decisions in the North Atlantic region.

Chapter 1 – Introduction

*The Spartans voted that the treaty [with Athens] had been broken and that war should be declared not so much because they were influenced by the speeches of their allies as because they were afraid of the further growth of Athenian power, seeing, as they did, that already the greater part of Hellas was under the control of Athens.*¹

The above passage from Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian Wars* is often cited as a foundation for one of international relation's most dominant theories: realism. Two conclusions are drawn from this analysis. The first is that war is often caused by power imbalances. But the first hypothesis only makes sense when considered in light of a second fundamental relationship, namely that *power* - especially military might - easily converts into *influence* or *control* and is thus the most important variable in IR politics. Influence and control are represented as a one-way street; that is, the strong influence the weak. The arguments made by Sparta's smaller ally, Corinth, were inconsequential as to Sparta's ultimate decision to go to war with Athens, and Athens' military power facilitated its control over the smaller city-states of Hellas. As another of Thucydides' passages reminds us: "The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."² Centuries later, this maxim remains fundamental to much mainstream IR theory, leading security scholars like Thomas Schelling to insist that "[t]he power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy - vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy."³

¹ Thucydides and Finley, *History of the Peloponnesian Wars*, 87.

² Ibid., 402.

³ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 2.

This study scrutinizes the inevitability of the relationship between general material capabilities and influence in a modern-day alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). I seek to answer the following research question: under what conditions are small powers able to wield influence in an organization traditionally led by great powers? According to some IR scholars, NATO provides two important benefits to a small power: 1) security and 2) the ability to influence alliance politics. As described by Robert Keohane, small powers join U.S.-dominated alliances “as much for the influence on American policy this will give them as for the commitment they receive by treaty.”⁴ Other scholars dismiss this rationale as fantasy. They argue that small powers enter alliances reluctantly precisely because they understand that this decision entails a tremendous forfeit of both foreign policy autonomy and influence. Hans Morgenthau predicts that, in an alliance, “[t]he distribution of benefits is...likely to reflect the distribution of power within the alliance, as is the determination of policies. A great power has a good chance to have its way with a weak ally as concerns benefits and policies, and it is for this reason that Machiavelli warned weak nations against making alliances with strong ones except by necessity.”⁵ From this perspective, small powers should expect to remain spectators during the policy-making processes of a security organization. In other words, membership in NATO does little to change the reality that small powers remain mere pawns in a large game of international chess.

Despite this debate, very little research has been conducted to determine just how much and under what conditions small powers have influence in NATO. To

⁴ “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” 180; See also Ikenberry, “State Power and the Institutional Bargain.”

⁵ *Politics Among Nations, Brief Edition*, 200-201.

date, most NATO research on this issue has focused on one particular type of influence relationship: that is, the ability of small powers to shirk great power requests to increase defense spending and “free-ride” on the security available to all members of the alliance.⁶ While this research contributes to the understanding of NATO politics, it captures only one dimension of a much more complex phenomenon. Left out is the entire collective decision-making process itself – a process where great and small powers alike spend valuable time and resources to affect organizational policies. During this process, the great powers are without question the “heavy hitters” in the alliance. However, recently there have been important instances when small powers played a key role in determining the behavior and policies of the alliance. For example, despite strong hesitations on the part of NATO’s strongest members, Denmark took the lead in securing membership for the Baltic states (i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Importantly, these states - all three of which border Russia - are the only NATO members that were once part of the USSR. In contrast, while NATO’s most powerful nations support Macedonia’s acceptance into the alliance, Greece has successfully blocked its membership based on reasons mostly unrelated to collective security or institutional norms.

At first glance, it is perhaps tempting to conclude that institutional factors alone explain the results above. As I describe in further detail later on, NATO makes decisions via the rule of *consensus*, which means that any member of the organization has the formal right to veto alliance policies that it does not accept. The threat of this veto also provides members with leverage as they pursue their own

⁶ See Olson and Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances”; Murdoch and Sandler, “Complementarity, Free Riding, and the Military Expenditures of NATO Allies.”

goals within the organization. While these rules are without question significant factors that contribute to our understanding of NATO policies, the historical record tells us that small powers are often unable to exercise this privilege to its full extent, even when their immediate interests and preferences seem to dictate otherwise. For example, when in 1950 the U.S. began to push for NATO membership for Turkey, three small powers (Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands) were strongly opposed. These nations insisted that the North Atlantic Treaty was founded on more than a strategic logic. Turkish membership, they claimed, would corrupt the “ideological purity” and “political homogeneity” of NATO.⁷ As late as April 1951 the British felt the same way, but their concern was overshadowed “by a concern not to cut across the bows of the U.S. on the matter.”⁸ After Britain abandoned its formal opposition to Turkey’s admission, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands eventually acquiesced, unwilling to oppose the U.S. and the emerging consensus among NATO’s great powers. Turkey became an official NATO member in 1952.

Dan Smith argues in his book, *Pressure: How America Runs NATO*, that this type of outcome is the norm rather than the exception in the alliance:

Time and again in NATO, this sort of process has been played out more or less publicly. The USA is consistently able to prevail, to win on policies which are unpopular with allied governments or their electorates, or both. It is neither secret nor surprising. It is part and parcel of the USA being a superpower. It wins on such issues because it is a superpower; it is a superpower because it wins.⁹

⁷ Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War*, 79.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁹ *Pressure: How America Runs NATO*, 4. While I agree with Smith that the American influence over its allies during the Cold War was substantial, I think his analysis is somewhat exaggerated – perhaps due to his case selection method. There are important Cold War examples of small power tenacity vis-à-vis the U.S., especially when American policies involved the territories of its smaller allies. Some of the examples are provided in the upcoming chapters. See, for example, Chapter 3, footnote 12. .

Smith goes on to concede that there are “exceptions to prove the rule,” but insists that most of these exceptions “are not related to issues which fall within the ambit of security policy and NATO strategy.”¹⁰ If this is true, then the recent Danish and Greek “success stories” listed earlier are indeed exceptions to the exceptions. Their significance and distinctiveness are the foundations of the theoretical puzzle for this study and beg several related theoretical questions. How were these smaller states able to achieve influence disproportionate to their general power status? What conditions permit a small power to take advantage of NATO’s policy-making rules and norms? And finally, what are some of the non-material sources of influence that small powers typically employ?

The central argument of this dissertation is that small power influence in post-Cold War NATO is greatly enhanced by exploring variables at the national or “second-image” level. I argue that – under certain conditions - a state’s relative influence is significantly affected by factors that have little to do with conditions at the systemic or regime level of analysis. Important among these idiosyncratic factors are four non-material variables observable at the domestic level: 1) an ally’s internal political cohesion, 2) its relative intensity of interest in an alliance outcome, 3) its expertise on a policy issue and 4) the Influence Tactics it employs.

In some respects, this point of view goes against the grain of two dominant theories in IR, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, both of which are known as systemic or “third image” theories.¹¹ From a neorealist perspective, important outcomes in IR – especially those related to security - are largely the result of the

¹⁰ Ibid., 4.

¹¹ See Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*.

anarchic structure of the international system. In this system states are primarily differentiated based on their relative material capabilities and, consequently, can be thought of as “billiard balls” or “black boxes” that vary only in size. In short, the internal characteristics of states are cast aside and the relationship between material power and influence is taken as given.¹² Neorealism’s not-too-distant cousin, neoliberal institutionalism, also emphasizes analysis at the systemic level. Unlike neorealists, however, these scholars contend that *international institutions* (defined by Keohane as “persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations”¹³) moderate the dire consequences of anarchy and thus have an independent effect on outcomes in IR.¹⁴ Neoliberal institutionalists studying security outcomes in Europe thus tend to focus on the norms and rules associated with NATO’s policy-making process.¹⁵ Neither of the above theoretical approaches is able to adequately account for small power influence in NATO. Neorealism fails in that it insists on focusing almost exclusively on great powers and the causes of war. It is thus not equipped to explain instances when states with comparatively little power had significant impact in a security alliance.¹⁶ Institutional perspectives fail short in that – as explained above – incidences of significant small power influence are extremely rare. Given that the policy-making institutions in NATO have remained relatively constant over the

¹² See Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 18; Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” 81.

¹³ “International Institutions,” 383.

¹⁴ See Keohane and Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory.”

¹⁵ See, for example, Duffield, “International Regimes and Alliance Behavior.”

¹⁶ For example, Mearsheimer’s version of neorealism “focuses on the great powers because these states have the largest impact on what happens in international politics. The fortunes of all states – great powers and smaller powers alike – are determined primarily by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability.” Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 5.

years, it is difficult to insist that these factors “made the key difference” in the outcomes considered here. Clearly, something else is needed to explain these exceptional phenomena.

Despite the above claims, however, the findings of this research do not comprise a repudiation of the contributions of either neoliberal institutionalists or neorealists. Furthermore, I do not insist that attention to domestic variables constitutes a comprehensive theoretical perspective or level of analysis. I simply maintain that, for a study of small power influence in NATO, incorporating second-image variables is necessary in order to fill in the gaps and account for some of the anomalies of third-image explanations of important IR outcomes. Third-image theories are valuable in that they demonstrate how structures (both systemic and institutional) confine, limit, discourage or encourage certain behaviors. In many ways they constitute or define the realm of the possible. This study certainly corroborates this finding. But what happens when the international environment changes such that certain structural factors are relaxed? Because structural theories inherently admit that structures do change, it is consistent with this assumption that during some periods in history these structures are more restrictive, while in others they are less so. If this is indeed true, then a theoretical approach that focuses exclusively on aggregate material power – and more specifically on great powers - risks ignoring the important contributions of non-great powers in an alliance, as well as the non-material conditions that facilitate their impact on alliance decisions.

Unlike much IR literature, this analysis does not address the merits and significance of NATO as an IO *per se*, but rather the processes whereby its actions

and policies are determined. At the same time, however, it is important to recognize that NATO represents the most powerful concentration of military capabilities in the world. As such its decisions and policies often have enormous consequences for the international security environment. This makes an analysis of NATO policy-making a potentially critical contribution to both IO and IR security studies.

Literature Review

The assumptions and hypotheses incorporated in this analysis of small power influence in NATO were taken from a wide range of both IR and non-IR theories and sub-theories, to include general IR theory, alliance theory, bargaining theory, organizational theory (from both domestic and international perspectives) and foreign policy theory. Rather than create a separate review of the literature from each of these approaches, I reference their specific contributions to this dissertation in Chapter 3, which introduces the basic theoretical model and hypotheses used in this study. In this section, however, I provide a brief historical summary of the seminal works in small power studies. I anticipate that such a review will be particularly helpful for most American IR scholars, who are likely less familiar with this body of literature. Next, I introduce two works devoted specifically to the relationship between power and influence in IR, each of which is referenced frequently in the pursuing chapters.

Small Power Research¹⁷

Despite the growing number of small states in the last half-century, small power research in IR was partially sidelined by the emergence of Cold War bipolarity and the resurgence of realism.¹⁸ Though the creation of the UN sparked some discussion of the role of small powers in IR,¹⁹ the subject did not acquire serious attention until 1959, the year Annette Baker Fox published her seminal study, *The Power of Small States*, a book that “marked the beginning of a genuine school of small state studies.”²⁰ In her comparative analysis of five small powers during World War II, Fox concludes that military might is “only one mark of political power” and argues that these small states achieved noteworthy influence through various “economic, ideological and diplomatic methods.”²¹ She concludes her inductive analysis with a list of twenty-two “conditions for success” that correlate with the ability of small powers to resist the pressures of great powers during wartime. Consistent with the central argument of this dissertation, Fox’s inventory includes factors at both the national and international levels of analysis. The list, included in a table below, is exceptional in its comprehensiveness and its proven applicability to other small state research endeavors. Notably, Fox admits her uncertainty as to the extent the findings of her study of *non-aligned* small powers are “applicable to understanding the great-power—small-power relationship within

¹⁷ A recent, highly accessible and comprehensive inventory of small state literature is found in an Annotated Bibliography completed by Jessica Beyer in Ingebritsen et al., *Small States in International Relations*, 293-318.

¹⁸ For a review of small state studies prior to World War II, see Amstrup, “The Perennial Problem of Small States,” 162-164.

¹⁹ See Neumann and Gstohl, “Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?,” 9.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

²¹ *The Power of Small States*, 2.

coalitions such as NATO.”²² As demonstrated in the cases that follow, many of the causal factors that provide influence advantages to non-aligned small powers are also significant for those in a defensive alliance.

Compared to Fox’s work, David Vital’s two influential books, *The Inequality of States* (1967) and *The Survival of Small States* (1971), provide a more pessimistic account of the ability of small powers to significantly impact outcomes in IR.²³ Focusing on the experiences of *non-aligned* small states, he argues that the legal equality granted to states in the international system does not translate into any consistently meaningful political advantage and insists that, as soon as a great power takes a serious interest in the affairs of a small state, the latter typically has little chance of remaining truly autonomous. He concludes:

In the final analysis, the condition of the small state which wishes to retain its political identity and autonomy has elements of the tragic. It may be sure of retaining identity and autonomy only so long as it is fortunate enough to be free of pressure – which is to say, only so long as its capacity for autonomous action is not put to the test. Conflict with a great power is, ultimately, a conflict over autonomy. ... The heart of the matter is therefore the management of conflict; but here too the minor power faces an irresolvable contradiction: it tends to be caught between incompatible imperatives – between ... the long term need to diminish the intensity of the conflict and ... the short term need to raise the prospective costs to the other side as high as possible.²⁴

Robert Rothstein challenges many of Vital’s findings in his seminal book titled *Alliances and Small Powers* (1968), though his analysis is limited to *aligned* small powers. Above all, his book sets out to establish the proposition that “small

²² Ibid., 187.

²³ *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations; The Survival of Small States.*

²⁴ Quoted in Schou and Brundtland, *Small States in International Relations*, 22.

powers are something more than or different from great powers writ small.”²⁵ In other words, small powers are different in both degree and kind; they have different objectives and manage their security from an entirely different perspective than great powers. Furthermore, he insists that several characteristics of the contemporary international environment (e.g. the revulsion of war, the proliferation of international norms and laws and a growing focus on domestic concerns by industrialized states) “have made it progressively easier for many small powers to survive and prosper.”²⁶

Together, the works published by Fox, Rothstein and Vital prompted a flurry of small power research in both the U.S. and Europe.²⁷ But while Rothstein’s claim that small powers are not just “mini versions” of great powers became a widely accepted premise in small state theory, the subfield experienced some difficulty in moving past this rather vague assertion. Beyond the recognition that most small states demonstrated a greater interest in economics, developing international law, the establishment of international courts and supporting international organizations (especially those based on democratic principles and the sovereign equality of states), the potential to make useful generalizations about the entire category of small states was not satisfactorily demonstrated.²⁸ This acknowledged weakness was soon critiqued by Niels Amstrup (1973) and Peter Baehr (1975), who

²⁵ *Alliances and Small Powers*, 1.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 20.

²⁷ Notable examples include Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies”; *Small Powers in Alignment*; Hirsch, “Influence without Power: Small States in European Politics”; Barston, *The Other Powers*; Mathisen, *The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers*; Schou and Brundtland, *Small States in International Relations*; Goldmann and Sjøstedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*.

²⁸ Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, 29; Vandenbosch, “The Small States in International Politics and Organization,” 304.

argued that small state research suffered from two important problems. First, as Amstrup explained, small state studies – though increasingly abundant – were impeded by “an astonishing lack of cumulation in these contributions.”²⁹ Second, the subfield continued to stall due an absolute lack of consensus over the proper definition of the term “small state.” According to Baehr, the concept was ambiguous, arbitrary and, most importantly, “too large to serve as a valid concept for scientific analysis.”³⁰

As Iver Neuman and Sieglinde Gstöhl note, the above condemnations coincided with a noticeable lull in small state studies in the coming years, especially the 1980s and early 1990s.³¹ However, noteworthy contributions to the subfield did not disappear altogether. For example, in 1981 Michael Handel produced a case study analysis titled *Weak States in the International System*, a work that sought to unearth “general insights and observations on the behavior and position of the weak states in international relations.”³² Using a primarily “third image” perspective, Handel finds that periods of competition among great powers enhance the bargaining power of weak states. But this finding is conditional. When the security of the weak state is directly threatened, the advantage tips again towards those states that have superior military might. Thus, state-specific factors like *geographic location* must be considered when assessing the ability of weaker states to realize independent state interests. For example, he notes that “studies of Finland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Poland, Hungary, and Israel stress problems of survival

²⁹ “The Perennial Problem of Small States,” 178.

³⁰ “Review,” 461.

³¹ “Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?,” 12.

³² *Weak States in the International System*, 4.

and vulnerability, while works on Portugal, New Zealand, Chile, and even Switzerland and Sweden emphasize their relative safety and capacity to hold their own against the powers.”³³ Though this dissertation recognizes and indeed emphasizes the impact of these “third-image” factors, the findings here challenge Handel’s assumption that “domestic determinants” are “less salient in weak states,”³⁴ especially in the post-Cold War era.

A second noteworthy work that surfaced in the 1980s was Ulf Lindell and Stefan Persson’s *The Paradox of Weak State Power: A Research and Literature Overview* (1986). These Swedish scholars brought together existing small power research efforts in order to take inventory of the “propositions that have been made concerning the ways in which small states can exercise influence over Great Powers.”³⁵ The propositions reviewed in the article are presented in a table at the end of this chapter.

With the collapse of bipolarity in the early 1990s, small power research witnessed a renewed emphasis.³⁶ The end of the Cold War - an event that prompted the expansion of the EU and NATO into Central and Eastern Europe - led to the dethroning of neorealism as the dominant theory in IR and the rise in popularity of social constructivism and liberal theories of IR. These scholars’ emphasis on ideational factors (e.g. norms, identity and ideas) suggested that small states were less encumbered by their lack of military might. An important example, especially for this dissertation, was Thomas Risse-Kappen’s *Cooperation Among Democracies*

³³ Ibid., 6.

³⁴ Ibid., 3.

³⁵ “The Paradox of Weak State Power,” 79.

³⁶ Neumann and Gstohl, “Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?,” 14.

(1995). Risse-Kappen argues that, during the Cold War, American foreign policy was indeed influenced by the interests of European allies – a phenomenon that cannot be explained by “traditional alliance theories emphasizing strategic interactions and power-based bargaining.”³⁷ He insists that “the transatlantic alliance constitutes a community of liberal democracies” where European states influence the U.S. through four mechanisms: 1) the norm of consultation, 2) the inappropriateness of using material resources in bargaining, 3) the appropriateness of using domestic pressure to increase one’s leverage in bargaining and 4) the effectiveness of “transnational and transgovernmental coalitions among societal and bureaucratic actors” in the U.S.³⁸ Though Risse-Kappen’s dependent variable (i.e. American foreign policy) is different than the dependent variable in this research (i.e. NATO policy), the applicability of these factors is readily apparent given the unquestioned leadership role of the U.S. within the organization. As such, the mechanisms listed above are considered (directly or indirectly) in the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3.

Minus Risse-Kappen’s 1995 work (a study that focused exclusively on the Cold War) there is a noticeable absence of research on the influence of small powers in NATO. While several studies of small power influence in international organizations have appeared since the end of the Cold War, NATO remains largely unexamined in this respect. This is particularly true for the post-Cold War era. This project thus fills a critical gap in both IO and security studies literature by addressing this important topic.

³⁷ *Cooperation Among Democracies*, 3.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

The theoretical findings of the research described above – to include those summarized in the Lindell-Persson literature review - demonstrate the complexity of the issue of small power influence, as well as the difficulty facing those who wish to create testable hypotheses from such a diverse list of variables. This dissertation endeavors to take a first step towards integrating the most frequently posited of these propositions and applying them specifically to a security organization in the post-Cold War era. In addition to considering only the most common inferences from past research, I also employ a technique proven effective for overcoming the methodological challenges inherent in comparative case studies; that is, combining two or more variables that convey essentially the same concept or characteristic.³⁹ For example, three of Fox's variables (listed numbers 4, 5 and 6 in Table 1.1) and six of the variables included in the Lindell-Persson review (listed numbers 3, 5, 6, 15, 17 and 26 in Table 1.2) are presented in Chapter 3 as a single variable called *security dependency*. Using the approaches described here, I succeed in surmounting the two primary critiques offered by Amstrup and Baehr. The first - that small power research suffers from a "lack of cumulation" - is addressed by generating specific hypotheses from decades of past research for use in a more deductive research design. The second – that the concept of small powers is too ambiguous, arbitrary and large – is addressed by limiting my research endeavor to a study of Western small powers participating in a single IO.

³⁹ See Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method."

Power and Influence in IR Research

From a conceptual and methodological standpoint, the study that most closely resembles the analysis in this dissertation appeared in 1973. In a research project titled *The Anatomy of Influence*, Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson brought together a number of prominent IR scholars to examine eight different IOs in the period from 1945 to 1970. The goal of the study was “to understand the sources of influence and the ways influence is exercised by analyzing how decisions have been made in these agencies.”⁴⁰ While this dissertation has a similar goal, it differs from the Cox and Jacobson study in two key aspects. First, this dissertation focuses on a single IO and thus cannot, by itself, make cross-IO comparisons. Second, my research scrutinizes decision-making processes in a *security* IO. IR realists argue that cooperation on security issues is inherently different than cooperation on other issues (e.g. economic, environmental, etc.). According to Robert Jervis, security issues are unique in that: 1) they are more competitive since military power is perceived as a purely relative concept, 2) a state who protects itself against the consequences of defection can be seen as threatening to other states, 3) the stakes are higher and 4) detection is more difficult which results in greater uncertainty.⁴¹ Despite these two key differences, the Cox and Jacobson study provides a highly useful framework from which to address the research question at hand. As explained in Chapter 3, the findings of the Cox and Jacobson study also contributed significantly to the construction of the experimental hypotheses considered in this dissertation.

⁴⁰ Cox and Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence*, vii.

⁴¹ “Security Regimes,” 358-359.

A second important work that relates to this research – this time from the perspective of European scholars - is Kjell Goldmann and Gunnar Sjöstedt's 1979 book, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence: Problems in the Study of International Influence*.⁴² While less systematic than the Cox and Jacobson study, their project also addresses many of the conceptual and theoretical issues that are critical to a study on influence in NATO. Especially relevant is its focus on security issues in IR. The study concludes with a plea for future research on the relationship between capabilities and influence: "The research strategy which I shall suggest here is the comparative study of different cases of the exercise of power. If it were possible systematically to build up knowledge of how power is exercised by various actors and under different conditions this would imply a corresponding contribution to the theories of power bases."⁴³ This dissertation endeavors to take additional steps towards this objective.

Dissertation Overview

Chapter 2 contains an introduction to NATO's history and policy-making procedures. Those already familiar with NATO may feel comfortable either skimming or skipping this chapter.

Chapter 3 begins with an explanation of this study's dependent variable: *influence*. In contrast with some major works, influence in this research is considered as distinct from the concept of power. In short, I define influence as *a state's demonstrated ability to achieve desired NATO policies*. Second, I describe how

⁴² *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 271.

influence in NATO is identified and compared in this research. Third, I present the traditional theoretical relationship between material power and influence, as well as the method I use to differentiate between great powers and small powers in NATO. Fourth, I present the theoretical model that guides my research and the four basic hypotheses that stem from it. I also introduce a list of potential Influence Tactics that states may use as they pursue their policy preferences in the organization. Fifth, I present my research methods and briefly introduce the three primary cases I consider in this project. In the final section I summarize the overall findings of my comparative analysis.

Chapters 4 to 6 contain the in-depth case studies of this dissertation. I begin each chapter with a short history of the security policies adopted by the small powers under scrutiny, to include their decisions to join the alliance and their Cold War and post-Cold War experiences as members of NATO. I then present my primary case studies and consider the explanatory power of the causal variables posited in Chapter 3. I also discuss the potential significance of unhypothesized factors (i.e. alternative or additional variables) as they pertain to each case.

In Chapter 7, I briefly review my empirical findings in the light of my theoretical expectations. Next I discuss the implications of this research for security studies and IR theory in general. I then propose some avenues for further research on influence in NATO and make some general predictions about the future of small power influence in the organization.

Table 1.1 Conditions that Improve the Chances of Small Power Influence (Fox)

1. The more numerous the great powers with conflicting demands who were concerned about the small power and who could give effect to their concern	12. The larger the number of neutrals
2. The more equal the balance of military strength among the contending great powers in the region of the small state	13. The capacity and will to employ force to resist violently an act of violence, and the great power's realization of these facts
3. The greater the range of competing interests elsewhere on which the demanding great power needed to focus	14. A conciliatory approach, making concessions where the great power's dominance is unquestionable
4. The greater the distance the small state was located from a direct line between belligerents	15. Unity in government, a constitutional consensus, and self-control among the people despite the activities of subversives in their midst
5. The more massive the physical barriers to invasion of the small state	16. Friendly relations with neighboring small states
6. The larger the quantity of scarce commodities or services useful for war purposes which the small state controlled and the more critical the scarcity to one or both sides	17. Possession and use of accurate political and military intelligence regarding the great powers and the ability to calculate correctly their dispositions
7. The more self-contained the small state's economy	18. The ability to concentrate on the main goal at the expense of other values
8. The less unified the side making the demand	19. Negotiators with experience, imagination, flexibility, nerve, and capacity to conceal intentions disadvantageous to the demanding state
9. The greater the moral inhibition in the demanding power to the use of force when their was an alternative	20. The capacity to set off the demands of one side against those of the other while extracting concessions from each
10. The more influential the groups in the demanding power identifying themselves with the small state	21. Readiness to exploit each great power's interest in the small state's ability to resist the other side by securing from them the economic and military supplies permitting the small state to build up its defense against any side
11. The longer the small state had been a member of the family of nations, an independent country with which the great powers had had to negotiate	22. The ability to practice the art of procrastination . . . (e.g. avoiding a decision until its timeliness disappears)
Source: <i>The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II</i> (1959) – Annette Baker Fox	

Table 1.2 Conditions that Improve the Chances of Small Power Influence (Lindell-Persson)

1. <i>An equality of power in the international system</i> (Fox 1959, Branner 1972, Handel 1981, refuted by Rothstein 1968)	15. <i>A great power's dependence on military bases in the small state's territory</i> (Keohane 1971)
2. <i>Bipolar systems, especially balanced ones</i> (Hoffman 1968)	16. <i>A general asymmetry in resolve</i> (Jönsson 1981)
3. <i>A high degree of tension and conflict in the international system</i> (Fox 1959, Rothstein 1968, Wolfers 1962, Branner 1972, refuted by Handel 1981)	17. <i>A lesser need for or dependence on the alliance</i> (Jönsson 1981)
4. <i>An increase in the acceptance of international norms</i> (Rothstein 1968, Goldmann 1979)	18. <i>Competition between great powers over the sale of military supplies and weapons to small powers</i> (Cahn 1979, Handel 1981)
5. <i>The greater the distance the small state was located from great powers</i> (Fox 1959, Handel 1981, refuted by Ronfeldt 1978)	19. <i>A great power's belief in 'domino theories'</i> (Keohane 1971)
6. <i>The easier it is to defend one's borders</i> (Fox 1959, Bjöl 1968)	20. <i>An ability to formulate legitimate solutions</i> (Bjöl 1968)
7. <i>A location at the center of an important network of international transactions</i> (Sjöstedt 1977)	21. <i>The ability to penetrate the national politics of a great power</i> (Keohane 1971, Handel 1981)
8. <i>The possession of scarce natural resources or industries</i> (Handel 1981)	22. <i>The ability to threaten internal collapse</i> (Keohane 1971)
9. <i>An ethnically homogeneous population and unity among the political elite regarding basic values</i> (Fox 1959, Handel 1981)	23. <i>Establishing a 'super-loyal' strategy with a great power leader</i> (Ronfeldt 1978, Handel 1981, refuted by Keohane 1971)
10. <i>A good reputation as reliable and sensible</i> (Bjöl 1968, Sjöstedt 1977)	24. <i>A state's expertise on a single subject area</i> (Barston 1973)
11. <i>Well-working and adjustable government institutions</i> (Handel 1981)	25. <i>An ability to appeal to international norms</i> (Fox 1959, Zartman 1971)
12. <i>The ability to restrict one's foreign interests to regional issues</i> (Fox 1959, Bjöl 1968, Keohane 1971, Andrew 1970, Hoffman 1978)	26. <i>The ability to make a credible threat to align with the other side</i> (Suhrie 1973)
13. <i>A highly centralized and stable government that results in credible and unambiguous commitments</i> (Schelling 1966, Jönsson 1981)	27. <i>The ability to manipulate an international organization's procedural rules</i> (Zartman 1971; 1985)
14. <i>An ability to express a policy position clearly and unambiguously, which demonstrates resolve</i> (Jönsson 1981)	Source: <i>The Paradox of Weak State Power: A Research and Literature Overview</i> (1986) – Ulf Lindell and Stefan Persson

Chapter 2 – Introduction to NATO

NATO's primary goal is to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.

Lord Hastings Ismay
NATO's First Secretary General

Introduction to NATO History

NATO's contributions toward winning the Cold War gave it a reputation as the most successful alliance in history.¹ But NATO's history now includes over twenty years of post-Cold War activity and, somewhat ironically, the last two decades have been busier than the four decades that followed its genesis in 1949. The dissolution of the USSR signaled both the welcomed end to Western Europe's most menacing external threat and the beginning of a less stable and more complex security environment. The unanticipated shocks of the 1990s and 2000s have forced NATO members to rethink the alliance's *raison d'être* and, subsequently, its institutional foundations. As described below, this period of unprecedented change in NATO has - at a minimum - increased the opportunities for small powers in NATO to influence the multitude of decisions the alliance has considered in recent years.

Much scholarly attention has been allocated to NATO's origins and Cold War history, as well as its recent military engagements, enlargement and transformation. The purposes of this project do not require that I duplicate these efforts. Instead, in what follows I simply offer a brief synopsis of NATO's history to serve as the backdrop for my analysis of small power influence and a primer for those less familiar with NATO's past. In short, it is my belief that you cannot understand NATO's recent history without an appreciation for its origins and Cold War

¹ For example, see Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO*, 8; Duignan, *NATO*, ix, 17-18.

existence. Importantly, my précis also includes a description of NATO's current policy-making process – a process whose guiding principles are based on consultation and consensus. It is my assessment that this process is not well understood in the scholarly literature on NATO and thus deserves more scrutiny.

The Origins of NATO²

Following World War II, U.S. President Harry Truman began to demobilize the American military forces that had fought and won against German aggression in Europe. As Europe started picking up the pieces of another devastating conflict, many in the international community recognized the opportunity to reinvigorate efforts towards creating a global institution to promote peace. The United Nations was born as a result of this common vision, a vision echoed in the preamble of the UN Charter: “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”³ Despite the cautious optimism that resulted from the formation of the UN, security concerns in European governments remained focused on the potential for a resurgent Germany. The American response to this anxiety took several years to develop, but eventually included two strategies: 1) financial aid and 2) security guarantees. The U.S. agreed to provide financial assistance to Europe via the Marshall Plan in order to rebuild and stabilize its war-torn economy. The policy unavoidably required that western Germany's industrial base (especially its steel- and coal-producing capacities) be

² For in-depth accounts of NATO's origins, see Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance*; and Kaplan, *The United States and NATO*.

³ “UN Charter.”

restored both for reparation purposes and as a resource for the reconstruction of its neighbors. While it agreed with the plan in principle, France feared that Germany's recovery would eventually outpace its own.⁴ It became clear that any economic policies designed to stabilize the region needed to be supplemented by formalized security guarantees among the democratic nations of the West.

At first, Europe's security concerns resulted in the Brussels Treaty and later the formation of the Western European Union (WEU) - a defensive alliance created in the spring of 1948 that initially included Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.⁵ Had Europe's security trepidations remained isolated to the future of Germany, the Brussels Treaty might have sufficed as a reasonable assurance against potential external aggression. But it was soon evident that Germany was not the only concern for the United States and its European allies. Disagreements with Stalin over the future of Germany and the Soviet Union's persistent support for communist forces across Europe quickly revealed an emerging conflict of interest among the victors of WWII. The Soviet-instigated civil war in Greece, a communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet blockade of Berlin were testimony to another looming threat to European peace and stability. The WEU knew that its forces were no match for the Soviet military - a military that, unlike the U.S., had kept its forces at WWII levels. Even with the addition of western Germany's economic resources, France in particular was unconvinced that Europe could provide a balance against the Soviet Union. The sentiment was shared by other European leaders such as Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, who after

⁴ Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance*, 18.

⁵ West Germany and Italy joined the WEU in 1954.

some hesitancy finally agreed that “any defense arrangement which did not include the United States would be without practical value.”⁶

Recognizing its new position in the post-war era and the unprofitable consequences of isolationism, the U.S. reversed a long-held foreign policy tradition and agreed to link its security to that of Europe in a time of relative peace. As described by Timothy Ireland, “the U.S. government broke with two of its most time-honored traditions in American foreign policy: George Washington’s Farewell Address dictum against entanglement in permanent alliances and James Monroe’s doctrine of the mutual exclusiveness of European and western hemispheric political affairs.”⁷ The U.S., Canada and the U.K. began secret talks in March of 1948 to discuss the form that such a security guarantee would take. While many options were considered, it was eventually agreed that a multilateral treaty would best serve the interests of nations on both sides of the Atlantic. The result of nine months of deliberations between the summer of 1948 and the spring of 1949 became the Washington Treaty (also known as the North Atlantic Treaty). It was signed on April 4, 1949 by twelve nations: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the U.K. and the U.S.⁸ While the agreement did not explicitly address the Soviet threat, that threat rapidly became the alliance’s primary focus. In fact, the signing of the treaty only barely preempted the Soviet Union’s first detonation of an atomic bomb later that August.

⁶ Quoted in Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance*, 64.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁸ The U.S. Senate passed the North Atlantic Treaty on July 21, 1949 by a vote of 83 to 13. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the ratification process of all signatory states.

From Treaty to Organization

While the North Atlantic Treaty contains fourteen Articles, it is understood that the backbone of the agreement was – and continues to be – Article 5 (see Appendix A for the complete text of the Treaty). It is Article 5 that identifies the Treaty as a defensive pact:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.⁹

What is often overlooked in Article 5 is the ambiguous nature of the commitment expected by the alliance's member states. The pledge that each member will take "such action as it deems necessary" falls short of an absolute guarantee that all members will mobilize the full military capabilities available to them in the event of an attack. Against the wishes of the European nations, this language was included in the final version of the Treaty largely to appease the U.S. Senate, who was not yet willing to sacrifice its influence on American war declarations. The stipulations of Article 11, which hold that the provisions of the Treaty will be "carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes," further illustrates the initial hesitance of U.S. politicians to become automatically entangled in Europe's potential security crises.¹⁰

⁹ "North Atlantic Treaty."

¹⁰ Ibid.

What truly solidified the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe were the implications of Article 3 and the eventual creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Article 3 requires that each member, “by means of continuous and effective self-help and *mutual aid*, will maintain and develop their individual and *collective capacity* to resist armed attack.”¹¹ As Lawrence Kaplan notes, “the promises of Article 5 were essentially passive; Article 3, on the other hand, signified activity; raising the level of military expenditures, integrating national efforts, and providing military aid to one another.”¹² The European members of the alliance were persistent in their requests to receive military aid towards this end. The U.S. obliged, but insisted that military aid be granted in exchange for basing rights in Europe.¹³ This was the first of two phases in the alliance’s evolution that would establish the “trip-wire” for a U.S. response to any potential aggression by the Soviets.

The second phase that cemented the American commitment to Europe was the creation of an organization intended to institutionalize the political and military dimensions of the alliance. The “O” in NATO came about partly as a result of the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea in June of 1950. The event convinced Truman that the Soviets had imperialistic aspirations that - if left unchecked - could spread to Germany and the rest of the European continent.¹⁴ Most importantly, the invasion ended the “great debate” in the U.S. Congress over the extent to which U.S. conventional forces should become a permanent and

¹¹ “North Atlantic Treaty” *Emphasis added*.


¹² *The United States and NATO*, 121.

¹³ Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance*, 127.

¹⁴ Kaplan, *The United States and NATO*, 145, 148.


integrated component of a European defense strategy.¹⁵ Both military aid and the deployment of U.S. troops to Europe accelerated as a result of the Korean conflict (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Though the institutions of NATO began to take form after the North Atlantic Council's (NAC) first session on September 17, 1949, it is widely acknowledged that these institutions - especially NATO's integrated military forces - received increased attention after the summer of 1950.

Figure 2.1 Annual U.S. Foreign Military Assistance in millions, historical U.S. Dollars



Source: "Assistance Data," <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/> (accessed 4 December 2009)

Figure 2.2 U.S. Forces in Europe



Source: "Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005," <http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/cda06-02.cfm> (accessed 4 December 2009)

¹⁵ See Carpenter, "United States' NATO Policy at the Crossroads."

NATO established its first official headquarters in Paris, France. Under the authority granted in Article 9 of the Treaty, the NAC began to create the political and military “subsidiary bodies” to support the objectives of Articles 3 and 5. One of the first bodies created under this authority was the Military Committee (MC). Established in October 1949, the MC was made up of the respective chiefs of defense of each nation and was the advisory group charged with drawing up plans for the unified defense of the North Atlantic area.¹⁶ Two subcommittees were created to assist the MC. The first subcommittee, the *Standing Group*, was composed of military representatives from France, the UK and the U.S. and was established “to facilitate the rapid and efficient conduct of the work of the Military Committee.”¹⁷ Due to its small size, the fact that it met on a more regular basis than the MC and, most importantly, because of the status of its members, the Standing Group had considerable influence on alliance defense policies. In response to the Standing Group’s dominance, Canada and the Netherlands helped create a second subcommittee, the *Military Representatives Committee*. This committee, made up of representatives of each of the chiefs of defense, met on a more regular basis than the MC. However, the Military Representatives Committee never succeeded in becoming an effective balance to the Standing Group.¹⁸

In December of 1950, NATO members selected General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the organization’s first Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR), thus beginning the formation of an integrated military structure in


¹⁶ “Final Communiqué of the first Session of the North Atlantic Council.”

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See Bland, *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance*, 146-161; See *NATO Strategy Documents*, XI n. 1.

Europe led by an American general.¹⁹ In February of 1952, NATO created its top civilian position, the Secretary General (SecGen), “to provide political guidance and leadership to the alliance.”²⁰ The first NATO SecGen, Lord Hastings L. Ismay from the U.K., was provided with an international civilian staff (IS) of specialists to support and advise him in his position. 1952 was also the first year that the allies sent official ambassadors to the NAC, which began meeting in “permanent session” (i.e. on a weekly basis). Figure 2.3 below summarizes NATO’s organizational hierarchy as it existed in April of 1952.

Figure 2.3 NATO Structures After 1952



Source: Pedlow, *NATO Strategy Documents*, XVI.

In summary, what occurred in the years immediately following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty was an increased entanglement of U.S. security with that of its European allies. The alliance became more than a promise of solidarity; it

¹⁹ Eisenhower helped create his headquarters (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe or SHAPE) and took command of Allied Command Europe (ACE) on April 2, 1951 *NATO Strategy Documents*, XV.

²⁰ Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO*, 15.

became an increasingly elaborate organization that automatically involved the U.S. in any security crises that erupted in Europe. Spurred by the unsettling events on the Korean peninsula in 1950, the U.S. increased its military footprint on the European continent and American troops became “hostages” in a plan to deter Soviet aggression. As Kaplan describes: “Recognition that a divided Germany, like a divided Korea, created conditions in which East Germany could perform the role of North Korea led not simply to more funds...but to a transformation of the Atlantic alliance. The United States found itself shedding the substance as well and the language of isolationism.”²¹

Cold War NATO

It is no secret that the “glue” that held NATO together during most of the Cold War was a common perception of threat. The Soviet military embodied an easily identifiable danger to the European continent. NATO’s four Cold War *Strategic Concepts* assumed that an “armed attack” as outlined in Article 5 would come from a single, recognizable source.²² All other threats paled in comparison and received marginal attention. The Cold War quickly became a contest of nuclear arms production and global turf battles between the world’s newest hegemon. While the U.S. initially had the upper hand on the former matter, the Soviets rapidly gained ground in the early years of the stand off. By 1953 they had successfully tested their

²¹ *The United States and NATO*, 150.

²² NATO’s four classified Cold War strategies were DC 6/1 (1949), MC 3/5 (1952), MC 14/2 (1957) and MC 14/3 (1968). See *NATO Strategy Documents*; Rynning and Ringsmose, “Come Home, NATO?”

first hydrogen bomb, and in 1957 they launched Sputnik, proving their formidability in the field of ballistic missiles.

As part of the global turf battle described above, NATO expanded during the early years of the Cold War – an option addressed in Article 10 of the Treaty. In February 1952, the Alliance increased its presence in the Mediterranean by granting membership to Greece and Turkey. In 1955 West Germany became a NATO member, the same year that the Soviet Union created the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact was the non-voluntary counter to the western alliance and included Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR. Of course, Europe was not the only playing field for the world’s two superpowers. Each pole sought to define its respective zones of influence on the globe. The U.S. political strategy for this endeavor, “containment,” was largely the brainchild of State Department official George Kennan. Kennan, one of Truman’s closest advisors, interpreted the Soviet’s interests as inherently expansionist. He sought to counter this expansion by explicitly identifying what regions of the globe were critically important to U.S. interests. According to John Gaddis, “the idea was to confront our principal adversary in arenas of competition chosen by us, employing means most consistent with the kinds of power we could most feasibly bring to bear.”²³ For the U.S., these interests primarily included Western Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean and Near East, and the Pacific offshore island chain.²⁴ While the interpretation and implementation of containment differed from White House administration to

²³ “The Rise, Fall and Future of Détente,” 357.

²⁴ Ibid.

administration, the core ideas remained a fundamental part of U.S.-NATO strategy throughout the Cold War.

In conjunction with its geopolitical strategy for countering Soviet influence, the West also developed its first military strategies. NATO's initial response to the post-WWII environment was a strategy based on deterrence, "massive retaliation" and "forward defense." First and foremost, the alliance made it clear that any attack on NATO soil would prompt the U.S. to employ the full might of its strategic arsenal in an "instant and devastating nuclear counteroffensive."²⁵ The emphasis on deterrence and the American nuclear umbrella had the added benefit of alleviating the defense-spending burdens of the U.S. and its allies. While the strategy was not popular among all NATO allies, it did minimize the need for large standing armies and gave the Europeans the opportunity to concentrate on reconstruction and social welfare programs.

In terms of its conventional response to an attack, NATO adopted a policy of forward defense. Forward defense meant that NATO committed itself to stopping a Warsaw Pact attack as far east as possible, in particular at the inter-German border where NATO deployed its armies in an almost continuous line along the 500-mile Central Front. From a military standpoint, forward defense was controversial given that it depended on the costly process of attrition. It was also seen by some as unrealistic given the Warsaw Pact's vastly superior numbers. Critics of the approach insisted that a strategy based on a maneuver-oriented defense – in which the alliance was willing to acquiesce large amounts of terrain in the war's initial phases

²⁵ From MC 14/2. Quoted in *NATO Strategy Documents*, XX.

– was a superior option.²⁶ However, regardless of the operational realities of the approach, forward defense was the only politically viable option to the alliance. The West Germans in particular were adamant in their unwillingness to offer their homeland as a sacrificial lamb for the good of the alliance.

NATO Adapts: Détente and the Flexible Response

The 1960s was a tumultuous period in NATO history that ended with relaxed tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but increased tensions among key allied members. A new U.S. administration under President John F. Kennedy took the reins in 1961 and began to question the practicality of the “massive retaliation” doctrine. As George Pedlow recounts, “Kennedy was much more concerned about the possibility of limited warfare than an all-out Soviet nuclear attack, and he also worried that war might start by accident or by miscalculation.”²⁷ Discussions began in Washington and NATO about shifting to a policy of “flexible response,” a military strategy that reemphasized the role of conventional forces as a possible first-response to non-nuclear aggression. The French, who were skeptical that the U.S. would indeed commit its nuclear arsenal in the event of an invasion of Europe, vehemently opposed this policy shift.²⁸ French President Charles de Gaulle was not alone among European leaders in his belief that “No U.S. President will exchange

²⁶ For a discussion of the forward defense strategy and its critics, see Mearsheimer, “Maneuver, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front.”

²⁷ *NATO Strategy Documents*, XXI.

²⁸ De Gaulle had also proposed that that any decisions concerning the Alliance’s use of nuclear weapons be made by a “triumvirate” of powers (France, the U.S. and the UK) – a policy that the U.S rejected.

Chicago for Lyon.”²⁹ The debate in NATO over the switch to a military strategy based on “flexible response” and “escalation” was partly sidetracked by events that included the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War.

At the same time that new military strategies were being considered in NATO, many leaders in the West began to explore political solutions to East-West tensions – a strategy that became known as “détente.” In many ways, the policies of détente were simply a reaction to existing perceptions of threat among NATO members. East-West zones of influence had been largely established, and the devastating consequences of an all-out nuclear shootout seemed to make war less likely. As de Gaulle explained to the U.S. ambassador to France, the Soviet threat had “now apparently diminished to the point where virtually no one in Europe and...in the United States believed in a Soviet attack.”³⁰ The French response to this perception – not to mention its increasing confidence in its own nuclear capabilities – was a gradual disengagement with the alliance that culminated in de Gaulle’s notification to President Johnson on March 7, 1966 that France would be pulling out of NATO. Though it continued its participation in the NAC, France pushed for a more “European” approach to its security.

Belgium and the Harmel Report: A Cold War Example of Small Power Influence

France’s departure from NATO created a crisis of legitimacy for the alliance.³¹

The U.S. felt the need to reassert its leadership in European security affairs and

²⁹ Quoted in *NATO Strategy Documents*, XXI.

³⁰ Quoted in Bozo, “Détente versus Alliance,” 347.

³¹ As the former SACEUR reported to the U.S. Congress: “We have clearly moved from disarray to dissension to crisis.” Quoted in Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO*, 28.

reestablish NATO's *raison d'être*. This was especially critical given "eroding support for the Alliance in the public opinions of [the] respective nations" and the upcoming twenty-year anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty – the year that Article 13 delineates as a member's first opportunity to withdraw from the alliance.³² The result was a Belgian initiative that came to be known as the *Harmel Report*.³³ The proposal, made by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel in the fall of 1966, was for a joint NATO study "to identify the tasks which lie before [NATO], in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for a durable peace."³⁴ After extensive deliberations, the final draft of the report was accepted by the NAC on 14 December 1967. It succeeded in demonstrating NATO's compatibility with détente by highlighting the non-defensive (i.e. political and collective security) merits of the Atlantic community. In sum, what the Harmel exercise achieved was the formal redefinition of NATO's scope beyond a nuclear-based defensive alliance.

The Belgian-initiated Harmel Exercise is without doubt a remarkable example of small power influence within NATO. Why was Belgium successful? Although the case certainly merits additional scrutiny, a few cursory inferences are plausible. First, as already alluded to above, Belgium's overall "active alliance involvement" and "unquestionable" loyalty placed it, in the words of Govaerts, "in a favorable position to be . . . an outpost of NATO's détente policy."³⁵ Second, the institutionalization of détente in NATO gained traction at a time when the

³² Bozo, "Détente versus Alliance," 344.

³³ Similar requests for such study were also made by Canada as early as 1964. Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO*, 29.

³⁴ From NATO Document M3(66)3, quoted in *The Harmel Report*.

³⁵ "Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg," 362-363.

dependency dynamic between the U.S. and Belgium shifted in favor of the latter. The late 1960s coincided with a period when: 1) war with the Soviets appeared increasingly unlikely, 2) a key ally, France, withdrew from the core structures of the alliance and 3) the official “expiration date” of the Atlantic Treaty (1969) was quickly approaching. When coupled with the growing discontent in Europe over America’s “distraction” in Vietnam, it is easy to see why the U.S. felt obligated to reemphasize the importance of the alliance and Washington’s continued commitment to Western Europe. These events compelled the U.S. to grant Belgium – one of the recognized leaders of détente position – a substantial voice in determining the future strategy of the alliance. As Bozo explains, “[leading officials] were eager to demonstrate . . . that the U.S. administration was 'much occupied with NATO, East-West relations, and other European problems', and the redefinition of the Alliance's functions through the Harmel exercise was clearly a key element of the demonstration.”³⁶ In short, Belgium’s successful influence attempt occurred at a time when the U.S. feared that it was losing its grip as the undisputed leader of the West, a development that made it more amenable to small power initiatives.

Third, Belgium’s dedication to its version of *Ostpolitik* was a high interest issue in Belgium that benefitted from widespread and unwavering support in the government and Parliament. From the time that Spaak proposed a regional solution to Europe’s security until the commencement of the Harmel Exercise twenty years later, Belgian diplomats “cautiously and persistently” championed the advantages of

³⁶ “Détente versus Alliance,” 351.

non-military prescriptions to the challenges of the Cold War.³⁷ Finally, over the years the Belgians gained a reputation as pioneers in the delicate art of East-West relations. Despite early setbacks at the outset of the Cold War (see p.216), Belgium began to regain lost ground in the 1960s. In 1965 Belgium became a member of the “UN Group of Nine,” a group established to further contacts between East and West.³⁸ In the years leading up to the Harmel study, Belgian officials established regular contacts with the USSR, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia.³⁹ During a visit to Poland in September 1966, Harmel and his Polish colleague, Adam Rapacki, confirmed in a joint communiqué their support for the Soviet-proposed *Conference on Security and Co-operation (CSCE)*.⁴⁰ Belgium was the first ally to make official contacts with the Soviet Union after the Czechoslovakia crisis of 1968, and it was the first NATO country to officially recognize the German Democratic Republic.⁴¹ Diplomatic initiatives like the ones listed here gave Belgium a degree of expertise that gained the respect of other alliance members. Finally, Belgium succeeded in securing the support of other small powers in the alliance (in particular Denmark and Norway⁴²), as well as that of one of NATO’s great powers, France.⁴³

Flexible Response

At the same time that NATO was formally redefining its political objectives,

³⁷ Reychler, “The Passive Constrained,” 20.

³⁸ Govaerts, “Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg,” 362.

³⁹ Reychler, “The Passive Constrained,” 20; Fitzmaurice, *Politics of Belgium*, 233.

⁴⁰ Coolsaet, *Atlantic Loyalty*, 26-27.

⁴¹ Reychler, “The Passive Constrained,” 20.

⁴² Dörfer, “Scandinavia and NATO,” 28; Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making*, 51.

⁴³ Bozo, “Détente versus Alliance.”

the U.S. took advantage of France's withdrawal from the alliance to push through the military policy of "flexible response," as laid out in NATO's fourth Strategic Concept: MC 14/3. Although France continued to hold a seat at the NAC, NATO began the norm of considering military policies in its Defense Planning Committee (DPC), where France's veto was not a threat. Like the NAC, the DPC was chaired by the SecGen and consisted of the same PermReps that held seats in the NAC. In other words, after 1966 the DPC essentially became the NAC minus France.

NATO's policy of *détente* continued until 1979. On December 25, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and military spending and modernization were reinvigorated under Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. Between 1976 and 1988 U.S. military expenditures more than tripled.⁴⁴ Though tensions never reached the heights witnessed during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the "neo-Cold War" was characterized by harsh rhetoric on the part of the Reagan administration, which did not shy away from labeling the USSR as the "evil empire."

In 1982 NATO enlarged for the third time in its history. Despite the close military cooperation between Spain and NATO countries (especially the U.S.), Spain was denied membership largely due to its controversial domestic regime. The rightwing dictatorship under General Francisco Franco, while it was aptly anti-communist, was also anti-socialist. Notwithstanding the obvious strategic advantages of Spain's location, geography and naval forces,⁴⁵ its accession to the Alliance was unacceptable to socialist-leaning allies like Denmark and Norway. It was not until Franco's death in 1975 and Spain's ensuing transition towards

⁴⁴ Singer and Small, *Correlates of War*.

⁴⁵ See Preston and Smyth, *Spain, the EEC, and NATO*, 15-17.

democracy that Spain became a viable candidate for NATO. Spain became NATO's sixteenth member in June 1982.⁴⁶

Though American-Soviet tensions elevated in the 1980s, the sources of their disputes generally remained outside the North Atlantic area. This allowed some breathing room for diplomats on both sides of the East-West divide. Negotiations on arms reductions for Europe continued much as they had under détente, and domestic reform in Russia under Mikhail Gorbachev paved the way for the astonishing events of 1989-1991.⁴⁷

NATO after the Cold War

The abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union was a phenomenon that took many people, including those in NATO, by surprise. While in many ways it was regarded as a victory for the West, there was also a sense of apprehension as officials pondered NATO's future as a security organization. From the perspective of realist scholars, the disappearance of a common threat signals the eventual demise of an alliance. For example, John Mearsheimer posited this prediction in 1990: "[I]t is the Soviet threat that provides the glue that holds NATO together. Take away that offensive threat and the United States is likely to abandon the Continent, whereupon the defensive alliance it has headed for forty years may disintegrate."⁴⁸

In the midst of this theoretical and foreign policy debate, NATO Heads of State gathered in London in July 1990 to conduct a fundamental review of NATO's

⁴⁶ Spain did not join NATO's integrated military command structure until 1998.

⁴⁷ For an analysis of the cycles of detente and tension during the Cold War, see DePorte, "NATO and Detente: Cycles in History."

⁴⁸ "Back to the Future," 52.

strategic foundations. NATO's *New Strategic Concept* – the first unclassified version of its kind - received NAC approval in 1991 and was the beginning of NATO's transformation into the post-Cold War era. In it NATO members recognized that “The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared. On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain.”⁴⁹ Coping with these risks would require a more “broad approach to security” than had been the case during the Cold War.

In April 1999, NATO Heads of State met once again to update the *Strategic Concept* of 1991. The new document clarified even further the extent of NATO's transformation by including commitments to “crisis management,” “conflict prevention,” “crisis response operations” and “peacekeeping.”⁵⁰ From the pledge of collective defense to collective security, the range of possible sources of instability had widened, and identifying these sources became an essential objective of the alliance. As we know from recent history, it did not take long before NATO was confronted on both these issues. In short, these sources identified themselves.

At the same time that NATO officials were “transforming” the alliance following the end of the Cold War, the alliance had its first opportunity to prove itself as a collective security organization. The violence that broke out in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 seemed to fit the description of the security risks in the 1991 *Strategic Concept*. The conflict was both interstate and intrastate and had the potential of affecting the security of nations outside Croatia and Serbia. However,

⁴⁹ From Part I-5 “The Alliance's New Strategic Concept.”

⁵⁰ From Part I-10, III-31 “The Alliance's Strategic Concept.”

NATO Heads of State could not agree on the extent to which the violence represented a threat to their vital interests. President George H.W. Bush argued that the conflict was a European concern and refused to commit U.S. forces to the region.⁵¹ His successor, President Bill Clinton, was more willing to entertain discussions of involvement in the conflict, but was only willing to employ airpower to the region until a cease-fire had been concluded. In fact, the Clinton administration was more adamant than its European counterparts that the conflict warranted an immediate NATO response. Most Europeans viewed the conflict as a civil war and assumed the situation could only be resolved internally through a political consensus among the Serbs, Croats and Muslims of the region.⁵² Despite initial disagreements, eventually NATO got the blessing of the UN Security Council and the NAC decided – for the first time in history - to respond to a crisis with NATO-led forces. It began a twelve-day air campaign that ended on September 20, 1995 and eventually led to the Dayton Peace Accords later that year. NATO subsequently deployed 60,000 NATO troops to the region to enforce the peace agreement.

The conflict that erupted in Kosovo at the end of the 1990s presented NATO with its second serious crisis in the post-Cold War era. As the forces under the command of Slobodan Milosevic began systematically attacking Kosovar Muslims, NATO's credibility as a peace enforcer was in jeopardy. On March 23, 1999, NATO launched *Operation Allied Force* (OAF): a seventy-eight day air-campaign that featured air force units from fourteen member-states. The campaign forced the

⁵¹ Rupp, *NATO After 9/11*, 65.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 67.

withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo, but the road to success exposed other challenges for the alliance. First, Russian objections to a NATO-led campaign meant that NATO had to react without approval from the UN Security Council. Second, once the decision to act was made, NATO members had difficulty agreeing on the appropriate application of military force to use in the operation. This difficulty translated into challenges for NATO's SACEUR, U.S. General Wesley Clark. The lack of cohesion hampered the decision-making process and left a bad taste in the mouths of military leaders from the U.S.⁵³ Finally, the operation highlighted the limitations of the military capabilities of many of OAF's participants. As explained by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, "The Kosovo war was mainly an experience of Europe's own insufficiency and weakness; we as Europeans never could have coped with the Balkan wars that were caused by Milosevic without the help of the U.S. The sad truth is that Kosovo showed Europe is still not able to solve its own problems."⁵⁴

While NATO was transforming its institutions and participating in its first "out-of-area" operations, it was also increasing in numbers. What began as NATO's *Partnership for Peace* (PfP) program soon became the "foot in the door" to the alliance for many Central and Eastern European countries. First supported by the U.S., Germany and Denmark, NATO expansion became a means to fill the "security void" that resulted from the Soviet withdrawal from the core of Europe.⁵⁵ Though reaching consensus on expansion issues has been extremely difficult for NATO

⁵³ "Within NATO, a UN Battle Rages by Proxy."

⁵⁴ Quoted in Rupp, *NATO After 9/11*, 70.

⁵⁵ Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement," 703.

members, the alliance has nonetheless expanded in four phases since the end of the Cold War: a newly united Germany (1990); Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (1999); Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (2004); and Albania and Croatia (2009). In just ten years, the alliance had expanded from sixteen to twenty-eight members.

A map that displays NATO's current members is included at the end of this chapter. It includes those nations currently taking part in NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP), a follow-on to the PfP program designed specifically to prepare countries for alliance membership. NATO's post-Cold War expansion is covered in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

From 9/11 to ISAF

If NATO needed a common threat to unite it in the post-Cold War transition, then the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 provided the closest approximation of that threat. On September 12, representatives to the NAC agreed to assist the U.S. with military support. The NAC insisted that "[t]he commitment to collective self-defence embodied in the Washington Treaty was first entered into in circumstances very different from those that exist now, but it remains no less valid and no less essential today, in a world subject to the scourge of international terrorism."⁵⁶ Returning once again to its commitment to collective defense, NATO had a chance to prove that its Cold War posture was still legitimate and effective. The results were mixed. The U.S. was initially unwilling to consider a NATO-led response in

⁵⁶ "Statement by the North Atlantic Council."

Afghanistan, perhaps due to the negative experiences it had in the Kosovo campaign. On the other hand, NATO did deploy aircraft from its jointly managed airbase in Geilenkirchen, Germany. The NATO owned and operated AWACS aircraft arrived at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma on October 9 and immediately began missions patrolling the skies over Washington, D.C. and New York. The deployment, while not directly involved in the war in Afghanistan, allowed American AWACS to take part in the United States mission in the Middle East.⁵⁷

In terms of its political effects, was international terrorism a sufficient replacement for the Soviet threat of the Cold War? The obvious answer is “No.” First, the U.S. under President George W. Bush stretched the scope of the “War on Terrorism” beyond the limits that many Europeans could accept. The 2003 invasion of Iraq exposed diverging viewpoints in the War on Terrorism (see Chapter 6), as well as a continued American willingness to “go it alone.” Second, despite the devastation witnessed at the events of 9/11 – not to mention the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid - many NATO members are simply not convinced that the terrorist threat is a significant one, especially when compared with the previously feared all-out nuclear war against the Soviets. Following Bush’s famous “axis of evil” speech in 2002, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin made this comment: “One cannot reduce the world’s problems to the single dimension of the fight against terror...nor can one rely on solving them through the dominance of military means.”⁵⁸ As one Norwegian scholar, Espen Eide, puts it: “There is no common

⁵⁷ Bensahel, *The Counterterrorism Coalitions*, 8-9; Service, “Radar Planes From NATO To Patrol U.S. Coast - Canada, France Aiding Effort in Afghanistan.”

⁵⁸ Quoted in Rupp, *NATO After 9/11*.

enemy to substitute for the threat posed by Communism or the Soviet Union.

'Terrorism' doesn't do the trick."⁵⁹

In spite of its rocky start following 9/11, NATO has since become involved in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan and, in August of 2003, it took complete command of the UN-mandated *International Security Assistance Force* (ISAF). Today ISAF remains NATO's "key priority."⁶⁰ A building resurgence of Taliban forces near Afghanistan's eastern border and increasing Pashtun resentment for the newly established government are forcing the alliance to increase funding and manpower for the region. Since President Obama's inauguration in January 2009, the U.S. administration has twice committed to raise troop levels for the conflict. As of December 2009, there were 104,000 international troops in Afghanistan, 68,000 of which were American.⁶¹ 30,000 additional U.S. troops have been promised in the upcoming months, as well as almost 7,000 from non-U.S. participants.⁶²

As it stands today, the U.S.-NATO strategy in Afghanistan consists of two important components. First, ISAF is equipping and training the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan police forces to "provide security for the provincial reconstruction effort, to offer special protection against cross-border movement (smuggling) and for customs collection, to enhance safe movement on the roads, and to improve local intelligence."⁶³ A second pillar of the strategy employs units called *Provisional Reconstruction Teams* (PRTs). As explained by Robert Oakley and T.X.

⁵⁹ "Debate: Should NATO Play and more Political Role?."

⁶⁰ See "Final Statement: Meeting of the North Atlantic Council."

⁶¹ Montopoli, "Chart: Troop Levels in Afghanistan Over the Years."

⁶² Rasmussen, "Statement by NATO Secretary General on Force Generation for Afghanistan."

⁶³ Oakley and Hammes, "Securing Afghanistan," 369.

Hammes, “the PRT concept is drawn from time-tested counterinsurgency doctrine of extending the reach and influence of the central government.”⁶⁴ There are currently twenty-six PRTs operating in Afghanistan, each formed around a U.S. or international military force between 60 and 100 soldiers. The goals of this approach are to provide security and assistance for the community and to promote confidence in the new government’s abilities to serve the interests of its people. As one PRT commander, U.S. LtCol Dan Moy, described it: “At the point when people place their trust and confidence in their government to take care of [those] areas that are vital to their lives here, that’s when the government will have increasing capacity to perform those functions.”⁶⁵

At present NATO is once again working to clarify its ends and means. The events following 9/11 and the rapid expansion of its membership have created a new security dynamic that has yet to be rectified with a comprehensive and cohesive strategy. Today there exists an unmistakable tension within the alliance. On the one side are those nations who allege that they perceive little to no direct threat to their survival or autonomy. Illustrative of this perception, most of Europe reduced its defense spending by about 25 percent since the end of the Cold War. In order to justify continued participation in the alliance to their publics, these nations advocate NATO’s importance as a collective security organization - one that can manage risks both in and outside the North Atlantic region. There is no greater manifestation of this position in NATO than its creation of the *NATO Response Force*

⁶⁴ Ibid., 370.

⁶⁵ Baker, “Hope is Victory in Afghanistan.”

(NRF).⁶⁶ The impetus behind the NRF was the desire on the part of the U.S. and many European nations to create a small, flexible and modern expeditionary capability that could respond rapidly to crises that erupt inside and outside the region. Not unlike the mission of the U.S. Marines, the NRF – which consists of 25,000 combat ready personnel – is NATO’s “first force in, first force out” solution to potential security emergencies. The NRF concept was approved in 2003 and was declared fully operational at NATO’s 2006 Riga Summit.⁶⁷


On the other end of the spectrum there are those countries of the alliance – in particular NATO’s newest members – who still perceive a serious external threat to their sovereignty. For member nations in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia remains a top security priority. These countries joined NATO to resolutely remove themselves from under the umbrella of their Cold War master. An increasingly aggressive Russia under the guidance of Vladimir Putin fanned the flames of this concern. These allies highlight Russia’s recent conduct in Georgia, its controversial natural gas policies, cyber attacks on Estonia and massive military exercises on their borders as proof that Russia should be a prime concern for the alliance. Any change in strategy that minimizes this threat in NATO invokes a strong reaction from these nations. Though they have made relatively significant contributions to NATO’s collective security endeavors, the new members insist that the backbone of the alliance should remain its Article 5 commitment. As NATO continues to focus on “out-of-area” operations, the euphoria that followed the acceptance of these nations into NATO is fading among the publics of Central and Eastern Europeans. If NATO

⁶⁶ For a discussion of the origins and development of the NRF, see Kugler, “The NATO Response Force.”

⁶⁷ “The NATO Response Force.”

continues to focus on expeditionary operations (e.g. ISAF) to the detriment of its collective defense promises, the organization risks decreasing support from these new allies. It is becoming increasingly difficult for leaders to convince these publics that the billions of dollars spent for NATO operations overseas are contributing to the safety and security of their homelands. A 2009 poll conducted by the U.S. German Marshall Plan reveals public support for ISAF and thus captures the differing priorities among NATO allies (see Figure 2.4 below).

Figure 2.4 Survey Question on Troop Levels in Afghanistan, Summer 2009⁶⁸



Source: Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2009, <http://www.gmfus.org/trends/toplinedata.html> (accessed 22 December 2009)

⁶⁸ The exact question asked was: "As you may know, (COUNTRY) currently has troops stationed in Afghanistan. In your view, should (COUNTRY) increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, keep its troops at its current level, reduce the number of its troops or should it withdraw all troops from Afghanistan?"

At NATO's 60th anniversary summit in April 2009, allied Heads of State agreed that it was time to update the NATO's ten year-old Strategic Concept to account for the post-9/11 environment, as well as the implications of a much larger alliance. Following the summit, NATO SecGen Anders Fogh Rasmussen put together a group of twelve "experts" to conduct an in-depth analysis of the alliance and, ultimately, to provide its recommendations for NATO's seventh Strategic Concept. The group of experts - chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright - "represents a broad spectrum of large and small NATO members and offers a balanced combination of insiders and outsiders, including from the private sector, think tanks and the academic community."⁶⁹ Based on the guidance given by the NAC to the SecGen, the new Strategic Concept should be completed and approved at NATO's next formal summit in autumn 2010. Without question, a contentious area of debate will be the proper balance between NATO's collective defense and collective security demands.

NATO's Decision-making Procedures and Organizational Hierarchy

The North Atlantic Council

While NATO's decisions-making norms remain fundamentally unchanged since its early years, the organization's key institutions have from time to time undergone modifications. One institution that has not changed a great deal, however, is NATO's highest decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council. In the spirit of NATO's norm of consultation, the NAC meets in what is called "permanent

⁶⁹ "A Roadmap for the New Strategic Concept."

session.” At a minimum, the NAC convenes every week (usually on a Wednesday), the only exception being the period between Christmas and New Year’s Day.⁷⁰ Normally the NAC meets at the ambassadorial level, which requires that each ally delegate its national authority to a Permanent Representative (PermRep) to the Council. The PermReps – whose offices and delegations are located at the NATO HQ in Brussels⁷¹ - provide the essential continuity to the political workings of the organization. At least twice a year the NAC meets at the level of the foreign ministers, and for seminal occasions the NAC meets at the level of the heads of state – usually at NATO’s highly publicized “Summits.” When the Council (or any other committee) meets, representatives sit around a large table in alphabetical order according to their country name in English. This practice has an interesting consequence for the placement of NATO’s four great powers, as the U.S. and the U.K. PermReps sit next to each other, as do the PermReps from France and Germany. Finally, it is worth mentioning that all formal discussions and policies in NATO - including the NAC - are in either French or English. While each is considered an official NATO language, English is by far used more prominently.

The Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group

In addition to the NAC, there are two other highly important political bodies in NATO: the Defense Planning Committee (created in 1963) and the Nuclear Planning Group (created in 1967). As discussed previously, the DPC is typically

⁷⁰ At any time of the year, representatives to the NAC must be ready to convene within 6 hours.

⁷¹ Following France’s withdrawal from the core of the alliance in 1966, the NATO HQ moved to its present location in Brussels, Belgium.

composed of the PermReps to NATO and, according to the NATO Handbook, the Committee “deals with most defense matters and subjects related to collective defense planning.”⁷² At least twice a year the DPC meets at the level of defense ministers. Until very recently, the DPC was unique in that it included all member nations except France. This changed in April 2009 when France agreed to reintegrate its conventional forces into NATO’s military command structure. However, France continues to remain outside NATO’s nuclear defense structures, which means that it does not hold a seat at NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The NPG, which also meets at either the level of NATO PermReps or national defense ministers, is charged with making policies regarding “the safety, security and survivability of nuclear weapons, communications and information systems, deployment issues and wider questions of common concern such as nuclear arms control and nuclear proliferation.”⁷³

Policies made by the NAC, the DPC and the NPG have equal authority, regardless of the level at which they are decided. Additionally, all three groups receive support from NATO’s International Staff (IS) – a team of approximately 1200 policy experts and their staffs that fall under the administration of the SecGen. The IS is divided into six divisions, each headed by an Assistance Secretary General. Its formal responsibility is to “provide advice, guidance and administrative support to the national delegations at NATO Headquarters.”⁷⁴ Finally, NATO’s three senior political committees are also supported by 34 specialized sub-committees, whose

⁷² *NATO Handbook*, 36.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 36-37. Since 1979, both nuclear and non-nuclear members of NATO are invited to hold a seat at the NPG.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 77.

titles include, for example: the Political-Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace, the Science Committee, the Air Traffic Management Committee and the Archives Committee.

The Military Committee and NATO's Two Strategic Commands

The Military Committee (MC) is the most senior military body in NATO and is subordinate to NATO's senior political groups (i.e. the NAC, the DPC and the NPG). Following France's withdrawal from the core of the alliance in 1966, the Standing Group (the advisory group made up of military leaders from France, the U.S. and the U.K.) was eliminated from the organizational structure of the alliance. Since its inception, the allies recognized that the Standing Group was antithetical to the founding principles and norms of the alliance. The Group's elite status in the organization and its informal usurpation of the MC gave it a bad reputation among non-participants. France's voluntary withdrawal from the MC's structures gave the alliance the opportunity to reestablish the Committee's intended place as NATO's highest military authority.⁷⁵

The MC has two primary roles: 1) to provide military counsel prior to policy decisions and 2) to direct the execution of defense-related decisions once they reach agreement by member nations. Not unlike the senior political bodies of NATO, the MC normally meets at the level of its permanent military representatives (MILREPS), each of which is a senior military officer who has an office and staff at

⁷⁵ Bland, *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance*, 145.

the NATO HQ.⁷⁶ The MILREPS report to and receive guidance from their respective chiefs of defense.

The MC is chaired by the Chairman of the Military Committee, a position nominated by the chiefs of defense for a three-year term. So that it can promptly respond to its civilian leaders' direction, the MC convenes each Thursday - the day immediately following the meeting of the NAC. The MC is supported by 500 members of the International Military Staff (IMS), a rough equivalent of the IS that consists primarily of military staff officers who perform in an "international capacity for the common interest of the Alliance rather than on behalf of their country of origin."⁷⁷

The MC also seeks advice from its two functionally distinct Strategic Commands: Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation. Allied Command Operations (ACO) - the operational backbone of NATO's integrated military structure in Europe - is the amalgam of the once regionally separated commands in NATO: Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic. In short, when NATO conducts military exercises or goes to war, it is ACO that runs the show. The commander of ACO is the SACEUR (still an American position) and his HQ is near Mons, Belgium.

Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was created in 2002 and its HQ is located in Norfolk, Virginia. As described by NATO's website: "[ACT is responsible for] the transformation of NATO's military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine. It is [charged with] enhancing training, particularly of commanders and

⁷⁶ Since it has no military forces, Iceland's representative to the MC is a civilian.

⁷⁷ *NATO Handbook*, 101.

staffs, conducting experiments to assess new concepts, and promoting interoperability throughout the Alliance.”⁷⁸ ACT is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), a position that now belongs to a French general following France’s reintegration into NATO’s integrated military structure.

Even for those officials who are familiar with NATO’s institutions, the organizational structure in NATO often seems like what Dan Smith characterized as a complex “labyrinth” of committees. As Smith capitulated after studying NATO’s institutions, “[the alliance comprises] a structure so complex that I would defy anybody to produce a comprehensive and comprehensible organisation chart of NATO on anything smaller than a pretty large wall.”⁷⁹ After studying NATO and visiting its HQ, I agree with Smith and thus do not attempt to create such a chart here. However, a simplified version (one comprehensible though not comprehensive) is often circulated in NATO circles and is provided below.

Consensus


All the decision-making bodies in NATO produce policies based on the norm of consensus. According to the NATO Handbook, “A decision reached by consensus is an agreement reached by common consent and *supported by each member country*.”⁸⁰ Despite this characterization’s official venue, the latter part of this description is an exaggeration, if not an outright misrepresentation of the true meaning of consensus in NATO. It is *not* true that members necessarily support each

⁷⁸ “Allied Command Transformation.”

⁷⁹ *Pressure: How America Runs NATO*, 9.

⁸⁰ *NATO Handbook*, 33. *Emphasis added*.

Figure 2.5 NATO's Principle Civilian and Military Structures



Source: Handout from the NATO Staff Officer Orientation Course

decision made in committee. The alliance does not decide based on complete unanimity; there is no voting in NATO. All that is really required is that no nations explicitly reject a proposal made in one of NATO's committees. In the words of one NATO official, what is required for a decision to be made is that all nations are content with a "Non No" to a proposed policy. This does not mean that policy-making is easy in NATO. The constant threat of a veto from any member state – large or small – means that many national positions must be taken into account before consensus is reached. As such, the *wording* that any given policy includes is of great importance for the consensus process. As described by Paul Gallis, "Wrangling over precise phrasing of a document can be a means to provide clarity for decision-makers; in contrast, it can also be meant to provide *vagueness* that gives political

cover to a member government that may give its own interpretation to its populace about the purpose of a NATO decision.”⁸¹

Consultation

Unlike domestic legislative bodies – where open conflict and public posturing is seen as beneficial to its members – NATO committees like the NAC strive to maintain a persona of like-mindedness and cordiality. As such, the confidential nature of committee meetings is just as important to protect the reputations of NATO and its allies as it is to protect military secrets. When there are real disagreements, representatives to NATO usually downplay them when speaking in public forums. Often the real battles over policy matters occur in much less formal venues, for example in private meetings among key players or at the NATO HQ coffee shop.

The entire process, from the informal gatherings over coffee to the more formal NAC meetings, encompasses what NATO calls “consultation.” The understood goal of the consultation process is not to find the *best* policy, but rather the policy that is most *acceptable* (sometimes the least unacceptable) to member nations. As such, the NATO HQ in Brussels becomes the hub for ideas on allied security policies. As Douglas Bland describes, “As haggling serves to discover prices in a market, so consultation serves as the mechanism for discovering policy in NATO.”⁸² The “marketplace” process is often frustrating for those in NATO who come from a military background, one that instills the virtues of efficiency and rationality.

⁸¹ Gallis, “NATO’s Decision-Making Procedure,” 4-5. *Emphasis added.*

⁸² *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance*, 2.

However, it is facilitated by the virtue of continuity. As the NATO handbook explains: “The practice of exchanging info and consulting on a daily basis ensures that governments can come together at short notice whenever necessary, often with prior knowledge of their respective preoccupations, in order to agree on common policies.”⁸³

The Secretary General

In the journey towards consensus, the NATO SecGen plays a particularly important role. Though he has no official veto in any committee, the SecGen has the power to convene the PermReps and to set the agenda for committee meetings. The SecGen also has a handy tool at his disposal that he can use when an important NATO decision reaches an impasse. In what is known as the “silent procedure,” the SecGen can announce a resolution that will automatically become official NATO policy provided that no nation formally (i.e. in writing) sends its objection to the SecGen in a specified time period – an action called “breaking silence.” The approach is particularly useful when a large majority agrees on a policy, but there are one or two allies who remain hesitant about a decision. At times the tactic is used in an attempt to circumvent a country by “forc[ing] a less-enthusiastic ally to formally oppose the secretary general,” a choice that would risk humiliation for NATO and the particular country if the response were reported by the media.⁸⁴ At other times the silence procedure is used to protect an ally that understands that a decision must be made, but cannot - often due to domestic public opinion - openly support a

⁸³ *NATO Handbook*, 39.

⁸⁴ Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO*, 107.

NATO action. Partly because silence procedures are not well understood in NATO member countries, the opposing nation can then “wash its hands” of any involvement in the decision.

Informal Institutions in NATO

While NATO is officially dedicated to the formal equality of states participating in the alliance, all allies recognize the special political status of NATO’s four great powers: France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. In fact, prior to each weekly NAC meeting the representatives of these four nations gather to discuss the issues most important to their respective states. These “coffees” are hosted by the PermReps on a rotating basis. Following these informal meetings, the host nation prepares talking points that are later passed to the SecGen. The SecGen uses this document to set the agenda for Council meetings.⁸⁵

Conclusion


The principles and norms upon which NATO was founded have been relatively constant throughout its existence. NATO remains an organization dedicated to the principles of national sovereignty and the indivisible security of the North Atlantic region, as well as to the norms of consultation and consensus. While these norms provide NATO’s small powers with organizational leverage they might otherwise not possess, this leverage was moderated during the height of the Cold War. The inability to provide for their own security left these allies highly

⁸⁵ Hunter, “Interview by author.”

dependent on NATO's great powers. As international tensions subsided and stability increased in Western Europe, the alliance made internal adjustments that reflected these changes and further benefited small powers in the organization, as witnessed in the eventual abolition of the Standing Group in 1967. However, even following the end of the Cold War, significant small power influence in the alliance is a rare occurrence. In short, the organization is still dominated by NATO's most powerful members: France, Germany, the U.S. and the U.K. This observation suggests further analysis regarding the relationship between power and influence in NATO, especially for instances when small powers do succeed in their influence attempts.

In the proceeding chapters of this study, I take a closer look NATO's post-Cold War (1989-2009) history, while paying particular attention to three of NATO's small powers: Denmark, Greece and Belgium. Focusing my analysis in this fashion is beneficial because the "third image" factors - while not constant across the entire twenty-year period or across allies - are fundamentally different than those that existed in the Cold War. When coupled with the process-tracing method of analysis, this allows me to additionally explore the extent to which domestic factors and/or Influence Tactics are contributing variables to NATO's policy outcomes.

Figure 2.6 Map of NATO Members and Partners



Source: Produced by TSO

Source: TSO, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmdfence/276/27607.htm>

Chapter 3 – Concepts, Theory, Methods and Findings

Power and Influence in NATO

This chapter presents the key concepts and social scientific methods used in this research project. I present the theoretical model and the hypotheses used to guide the research and introduce the three primary case studies of this comparative analysis. Finally, I conclude by summarizing the most important findings of this dissertation.

Defining Power

There are typically two meanings of the term *power* used in political analysis. The first meaning defines *power as capabilities*. This perspective is consistent with the notion that the 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes gave to the concept when he defined it as “man’s present means to any future apparent good.”¹ For scholars studying states as their primary units of analysis, power is determined by measuring material factors like GDP, military expenditures, population, territorial size or the possession of nuclear weapons.² It is most often from this perspective we derive concepts such as “relative power” and the “balance of power,” as well as state categories like small powers, middle powers, great powers and superpowers.

The second use of the term defines *power as influence*. This is consistent with the popular interpretation offered by Robert Dahl in his 1957 article, “The Concept of Power.” He defines power in terms of a relation between actors and offers the

¹ *Leviathan*, 78.

² For example, see Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

following description of the concept: “*A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do.”³ This definition, which is inherently bilateral in nature, forces the analyst to observe state behavior rather than characteristics in order to attribute power to any particular actor. Thus while the first definition equates power with capabilities, Dahl’s definition makes a distinction between the two. Instead he considers capabilities as “bases of power.” Power bases are the resources that an actor can use to modify the behavior of another.⁴ Power bases may be used in a variety of ways (sometimes successfully and sometimes not) and may translate effectively into power in some instances more than in others. A state’s power bases would certainly include wealth and military might, but could also include non-material resources such as information, diplomacy skills, or reputation.⁵

In the presentation that follows, the use of the term *power* is consistent with the *power as capabilities* concept, though arguments from both perspectives are considered in the analysis. In order to differentiate between potential types of power, the term *aggregate material power* (AMP) is employed to mean what realists would commonly simplify as power; that is: a state’s *overall war potential* or the *general military and economic capabilities that may be used to win a war*. Due to their wide acceptance, I adopt terms such as great powers and small powers, with the understanding that these terms refer to a state’s relative AMP. At the same time, I do not assume that militarily and economically powerful states wield influence under

³ “The Concept of Power,” 202-203.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 203.

⁵ For a list and description of power bases (here called Power Base Elements or PBEs), see Goldmann and Sjøstedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 26-31.

all circumstances. For the purposes of this research, the correlation between a state's overall war potential and its resulting influence is tested, not assumed. In short, AMP serves as one of many variables in the comparative analysis, while the relative influence among allies is the dependent variable. I now turn to a more thorough discussion of the meaning of influence for this project.

Defining Influence

The above discussion concludes by defining power as capabilities. In this study, the concept of influence focuses on *the exercise of power*. From this perspective, Dahl's 1957 definition of power corresponds with my use of the word influence.⁶ However, while I incorporate much of Dahl's notion of this concept in my analysis, I adopt a broader definition that better suits a study of organizations. As it applies to NATO, I define influence as *a state's demonstrated ability to achieve desired NATO policies*. Other scholars – most of whom use the terms *power* and *influence* interchangeably - offer similar definitions. For example, Bertrand Russell defines influence as “the production of intended effects,” while Henry Mintzberg defines the concept as affecting or effecting organizational outcomes.⁷ Similarly, Morgan McCall defines influence as “simply the ability to get things done the way one wants them to be done,” which includes “influence over people, processes and/or things.”⁸ Finally, Olav Knudsen defines influence as “a state's degree of

⁶ In a later work Dahl actually uses the term "influence" in place of "power over." Here his notion of "power" is described as a type of influence, what he calls "coercive influence." See *Modern Political Analysis*, 40-50.


⁷ *Power: A New Social Analysis*, 35; *Power In and Around Organizations*, 4.

⁸ “Power, Authority, and Influence,” 187. McCall uses the terms power and influence interchangeably.

achievement – by its own efforts – of goals which apply, in part or total, to conditions beyond its jurisdiction.”⁹

The strength of any research framework depends both on its conceptual merits and its applicability to the real world. With this in mind, a broader definition of influence (i.e. one that measures outcomes rather than individual state behavior) is more appropriate for a study of organizational influence. As is apparent from Dahl’s definition above, influence is conceived of as a relationship between an actor *A* and a target *B*, where the behavior of the target is measured as the dependent variable. This framework can be expanded when more than two actors are involved, though its usefulness declines as the number of actors increases (see Figure 3.1 below).

Figure 3.1 Two Influence Formula Options¹⁰



⁹ “Capabilities, Issue-areas, and Inter-State Power,” 87. Knudsen uses the term power where I use influence.

¹⁰ *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 274.

Due to the nature of policy-making in many IOs, it is sometimes difficult to reduce policy outcomes to dyadic interactions. As explained by Gunnar Sjöstedt, in multimember organizations “the work in committees, the plenary meetings and their respective contributions to the outcome of the negotiations do not easily let themselves be analyzed by the bilateral model of the exercise of power.”¹¹ Sjöstedt’s solution to this dilemma is a supplemental formula for influence that measures organizational outcomes as the dependent variable, where an “outcome” equals “the result of a process of interaction between *A* and a number of other actors” (see Figure 3.2 below).

*Figure 3.2 Selected Influence Formula*¹²



The *actor-outcome* formula is particularly relevant to this type of research because the primary cases of interest are those when small powers successfully influenced NATO *policies*, not simply the behavior of individual states within NATO. The resulting general definition of influence - *a state’s demonstrated ability to achieve desired alliance policies* - thus provides a broader yet conceptually consistent alternative to the one provided by Dahl.¹³ It is conceptually consistent because it recognizes that *actor-target* interactions occur prior to and ultimately shape organizational decisions. Accordingly, the *actor-outcome* framework places necessary limits on the universe of cases applicable to this research, yet it

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 275.

¹³ Ibid., 276.

acknowledges that policy-making in NATO is a relational process of competing interests and multiple dyadic interactions.

Offensive and Defensive Influence

Another important limitation of Dahl's definition of influence is that, at face value, it restricts our analysis to an incident when *A* gets *B* to do something that *B* *would not* otherwise do. A more complete measurement of influence would also include observations when *A* prevents *B* from doing something that *B* *would* otherwise do. In traditional IR jargon, the former concept is consistent with the notion of *compellence* while the latter fits the meaning of *deterrence*.¹⁴ Both concepts fit into a framework explained by Kjoll Goldmann described as *offensive* influence.¹⁵ They are offensive because the focus is influencing the behavior of other actors in the relationship. In the context of an IO, members who attempt to influence an organization offensively are also sometimes identified as *initiators*.¹⁶

Also helpful in an analysis of influence is the notion of *defensive* influence. According to Goldmann, *B* has defensive influence in relation to *A* "to the extent that *A* is unable to control *B*'s behavior."¹⁷ Offensive and defensive influence are basically two sides of the same coin or, in Goldmann's words, "the same phenomenon seen in different perspectives."¹⁸ Defensive influence can thus be thought of as the extent to

¹⁴ See Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 69-91. More often these terms are used in reference to a state's rivals, not its allies.

¹⁵ Goldmann and Sjostedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 14. Goldmann uses the phrases offensive and defensive power.

¹⁶ Cox and Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence*, 12.

¹⁷ Goldmann and Sjostedt, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 14.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

which *B* is able to refuse or block *A*'s offensive influence attempts. This concept is particularly relevant for a study of small power influence.¹⁹ Scholars who concentrate on small power research attest that these states' foreign policy endeavors are more often reactive than proactive. As Maria Papadakis and Harvey Starr explain: "The ability of a small state to exercise influence is thus usually understood as its ability to resist the demands of a larger state."²⁰ In the context of an IO, states that attempt to influence an organization defensively are also sometimes referred to as *vetoers*.²¹

Identifying Influence in NATO

How do we know when a successful influence attempt has occurred? Influence entails a relationship between actor preferences on the one hand and policies on the other.²² To make the claim that "successful" influence occurred three observations should be made. First, at some given point in time *the preferences of actors must differ*. For example, actors *A* and *B* prefer outcome *X* while actor *C* prefers outcome *Y*. The insistence that the preferences must differ does not mean that they inherently conflict. It would include times when actor *B* was content with the status quo but was convinced to modify that position because of reasons provided by actor *A*. The important point is that without the input from actor *A*,

¹⁹ Erling Bjøl provides perhaps the most succinct statement of the three dimensions of influence: "One may identify at least three different meanings of 'power': power to persuade somebody to do something you want him to do, power to dissuade somebody from doing something you do not want him to do, and power not to do what somebody wants you to do." "The Small State in International Politics," 36.

²⁰ "Opportunity, Willingness, and Small States," 425.

²¹ Cox and Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence*, 12.

²² Jack Nagel captures part of this concept when he defines power as "a relation between the preferences of an actor regarding an outcome and the outcome itself." See *The Descriptive Analysis of Power*, 10.

actor *B* would not have modified its behavior. As such, contrary to some scholars,²³ I include *persuasion* as a form of influence that is relevant to my analysis. Scholars like D.H. Wrong have similarly accepted this point of view. He classifies persuasion as a form of influence “because it clearly represents a means by which an actor may achieve an intended effect on another’s behaviour” and “depends on resources that are unequally distributed.”²⁴ The notion of influence considered here is thus consistent with the popular conception in IR known as “soft power.” As Joseph Nye explains, soft power is “getting others to want the outcomes you want” and includes “persuasion,” “the ability to move people by argument” and “the ability to attract.”²⁵

Second, in order to assert that political influence took place, *the eventual outcome must correspond closely with or, at a minimum, shift significantly toward the initial preferences of one actor or group of actors.* As noted above, the outcomes of interest in this project are the collective decisions made within the constructs of the alliance’s decision-making rules. Finally, *it must be demonstrated that the positive correlation between outcomes and an ally’s preferences were associated with an explicit influence attempt.*

²³ The notion of influence used here is incompatible with a framework developed by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall. They note that their notion of power “is restricted to the production of particular kinds of effects, namely those on the capacities of actors to determine the conditions of their existence.” This excludes, they insist, “social relations of joint action through mutual agreement and interactions in which one actor is able to convince another actor to alter voluntarily and freely its beliefs, interests, or action.” “Power in International Politics,” 42.

²⁴ Wrong uses the term “power” rather than influence. He defines persuasion as including the following: “Where A presents arguments, appeals or exhortations to B, and B, after independently evaluating their content in light of his own values and goals, accepts A’s communication as the basis of his own behaviour, A has successfully persuaded B.” *Power*, 32-33; Richard Neustadt also insists that persuasion is a key component of power, especially for U.S. Presidents. See *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*, 11; See also Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, 198.

²⁵ *Soft Power*, 5-6.

Comparing Influence in NATO

In addition to observing instances of influence among allies in NATO, it is germane to make conclusions about the relative influence of actors in the alliance - that is, to qualitatively measure and compare the magnitude of influence observed. Compared with identifying instances of influence, this process is less straightforward. Two basic guidelines are used for such a comparison. The first measure, borrowing again from Dahl, is "the amount of change in the position of the actor influenced."²⁶ For example, assume ally *A* requests assistance from the alliance for a military operation. Ally *A* requests 10,000 troops for the operation, but allies *B*, *C*, and *D* are initially willing to provide only 2,000 troops. After the interaction is complete, allies *B*, *C* and *D* agree to provide 9,000 troops. *Ceteris paribus*, we can make an intuitive conclusion that *A* had more influence than its allies in this instance.²⁷

The second guideline used to approximate the magnitude of influence is a qualitative evaluation of the *significance* of the final outcome. By significance I mean the immediate and potential impact on the alliance and the overall security of the Atlantic area. In short, this includes an assessment of the costs and benefits the outcome entails for the alliance as a whole.²⁸ Intuitively, we would attribute more influence to an ally that was able to make an impact on an issue of high significance than to an ally that was able to get its way on an issue of low significance. For this

²⁶ *Modern Political Analysis*, 42.

²⁷ My observation of state preferences includes efforts to distinguish between a state's "true" preferences and its public position on an issue. In bargaining situations sometimes actors take extreme positions in order to improve their gains in the event of a compromise. As much as possible I try to cut through the rhetoric to establish true preferences. See *Ibid.*, 43.

²⁸ Dahl describes a similar concept that he calls "the subjective psychological costs of compliance." *Ibid.*

research, the challenge thus lies in finding cases of comparable significance to make reasonable theoretical comparisons. Because by definition no case is alike, this is understandably difficult. However, by selecting categories of outcomes that are relatively high in significance we can begin to make qualified comparisons across cases. In short, the three categories of highly significant policies considered in this research are: 1) Military Interventions (*when and how NATO decides to use military force in response to security crises*) 2) Membership (*which countries will be allowed to become members of the alliance*) and 3) Strategy (*the goals and purposes of the alliance and how it plans to achieve them*). Each of these decisions is ultimately made via consensus at the level of the North Atlantic Council (NATO's highest decision-making body). This criterion serves two additional purposes for my project. First, it forces the analysis to focus on cases where the great powers – as leaders of the alliance – should have a real vested interest. These cases are difficult tests for my hypotheses because we do not expect small states to have influence on these issues. Second, the criterion compels the analysis towards cases that are of consequence to the overall stability of the transatlantic region. This further adds to the relevance of my research in terms of its contribution to international security studies.

A Theoretical Model of Influence

As Vital reminds us, “the smaller the human and material resources of a state, the greater are the difficulties it must surmount if it is to maintain any valid political options at all and, in consequence, the smaller the state, the less viable it is

as a genuinely independent member of the international community.”²⁹ As evident in the prediction by Morgenthau cited earlier, this relationship straightforwardly applies to military alliances such as NATO. In short, states in NATO that have a relatively greater AMP are expected to enjoy greater influence. In cases where significant small power influence is evident, it is necessary to complicate this explanation by considering additional independent variables. To accomplish this task I introduce a basic theoretical model to guide this research. Following the advice of David Baldwin, the model was created using an interdisciplinary approach that combines findings from psychology and studies of domestic organizations (e.g. firms or legislative bodies) with those of IO and security studies.³⁰ Since each is interested in explaining the sources of influence, it is logical and appropriate to inquire whether variables established in one discipline are relevant in another.

While existing models of influence vary, it is possible to synthesize the important aspects of each into a workable framework. For example, Morgan McCall, Jr. argues that influence in an organization is “in large part a function of *being in the right place, at the right time, with the right resources, and doing the right thing.*”³¹ Coming from the psychology perspective, Gary Yukl *et al* argue that *influence tactics, agent power and content factors* independently affect influence outcomes.³² Cox and Jacobson provide an influence model specifically designed for IOs that includes three factors: 1) the actors’ positions in the organizational hierarchy, 2) the type of decision being made and 3) the environment, where the latter is described as “the

³⁰ “Inter-Nation Influence Revisited,” 472.

³¹ “Power, Authority, and Influence,” 189 *Emphasis added*. McCall equates the term power with influence.

³² Kim and Falbe, “Antecedents of Influence Outcomes” *Emphasis added*.

stratification of state power, the economic and political characteristics of states, and the patterns of alignment and conflict among states.”³³ Kjell Goldman’s model of influence includes “[t]hose characteristics of *A*, of the relation between *A* and *B*, and of the system in which *A* and *B* are components, which lead to *A*’s possessing power over *B*.”³⁴ Finally, P. Terrence Hopmann develops a rational-choice model of negotiations that predicts that influence outcomes will favor the actor that: 1) has the least to lose from remaining at the status quo and 2) “has the greatest resources available to reinforce his strategic behavior, including commitments, threats and promises.”³⁵

While these and other formulations differ in some respects, they suggest some of the common factors that affect influence outcomes. In this study, these variables are categorized as 1) *Institutional Factors*, 2) *Systemic Factors*, 3) *Domestic Factors* and 4) *Influence Tactics*. The relationship between these variables is modeled in an arrow diagram in Figure 3.3 below.

In addition to applying the concepts and findings from the disciplines referred to earlier, the above model also fits nicely into the leading small power research of the last several decades. For example, it is more or less consistent with Ulf Lindell and Stefan Persson’s small power literature review, *The Paradox of Weak State Power*, in which they summarize the factors theorized to contribute to small power influence.³⁶ They separate these factors into groups that include: the structure and state of the international system, international norms, actors’ internal

³³ *The Anatomy of Influence*, 27, 35.


³⁴ *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence*, 16.

³⁵ “Asymmetrical Bargaining in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,” 162-163.

³⁶ “The Paradox of Weak State Power.”

qualities, and strategies or tactics, where the first two groups are presented as “background variables” that are largely viewed as “necessary but not sufficient conditions for the exercise of small state power.”³⁷

Figure 3.3 Influence Model



The purpose of the Influence Model is to systematically focus this research by providing a framework for its hypotheses. Like all models, it is a simplification of reality rather than a complete representation of it. However, as demonstrated throughout this dissertation, the influence model presented here meets the three basic criteria of analytical models demanded by J. David Singer: 1) “highly accurate *description* of the phenomena under consideration”, 2) “a capacity to *explain* the relationships among the phenomena under investigation,” and 3) “the promise of reliable prediction.”³⁸

³⁷ Ibid., 83.

³⁸ “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” 78-80.

1. Institutional Factors

Institutional factors are the principles, rules and norms of the IO in which a state operates. Importantly, they include an IO's decision-making rules, whether those rules are based on common practices such as majority, plurality or consensus procedures. As explained in Chapter 1, the impact of institutions on state behavior and security outcomes is highly contested. Realists like John Mearsheimer and Susan Strange argue that institutions make little to no impact – end of discussion; at most they are epiphenomenal factors that, when considered, distort more basic causal factors like power and interests.³⁹ Realists like Robert Jervis qualify this view by maintaining that, under certain specific circumstances, institutional factors may indeed “matter” (for example, when the great powers are content with the status quo and war is viewed as costly).⁴⁰ Though he concedes that it would take more courage than he possesses to insist that institutional factors do not matter, realist Stephen Krasner still argues that they are best viewed as “intervening variables” that stand between basic causal variables and outcomes.⁴¹

In contrast to the pure structural realists, neoliberal institutionalists like Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin are adamant that institutions, to include security institutions like NATO, are indeed independently significant factors in IR:

What we argue is that institutions make a significant difference in conjunction with power realities. Institutions are important “independently” only in the ordinary sense used in social science: controlling for the effects of power and interests, it matters whether they exist. They also have an

³⁹ Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”; Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones.”

⁴⁰ “Security Regimes.”

⁴¹ “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences.”

interactive effect, meaning that their impact on outcomes varies, depending on the nature of power and interests.⁴²

Because I focus exclusively on NATO in my dissertation, many of the institutional factors (e.g. norms of consultation and consensus procedures) remain constant across my cases. These factors are what Stephen Van Evera describes as “antecedent conditions” or, when operationalized, “condition variables.” Antecedent conditions include any phenomenon “whose presence activates or magnifies the action of a causal law or hypothesis. Without it causation operates more weakly.”⁴³ Thus while these factors deserve attention in this analysis, they are not able to fully explain variation in the dependent variable between the cases examined in this study. However, to the extent that it is clear that these factors are determined to be causally important – for example, when compared to thoughtful consideration of counterfactuals – their significance is incorporated into this study’s conclusions.

2. Systemic Factors

Systemic factors (also commonly known as *structural* or *environmental* factors) are those “third-image” variables that have their source outside the formal organization. In general terms, systemic factors provide the international context within which a state must act. They provide the structures that push, pull and leverage states, denying some opportunities and facilitating others.

⁴² “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” 387.

⁴³ *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 9-11.

Aggregate Military Power

Because the phenomena of interest in this study are instances of small power influence, the traditional power-influence relationship provides a basis for my selection criteria. In other words, I control for power by selecting cases where small powers had disproportionately greater influence than would be expected, an endeavor that requires that I differentiate between small powers and *non*-small powers in the alliance.

In the context of NATO, there is scholarly and intraorganizational consensus that four states in particular are very influential in the policy-making process of the organization: France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S.⁴⁴ These states' influential reputations correspond accurately with data that approximates their relative AMP. For example, when comparing NATO states using a measurement known as the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), these four countries consistently rank in the top four positions in the alliance (see Table 3.1 below). In fact, with this index these countries represent approximately 70% of the alliance's AMP. Finally, although France, Germany and the U.K. clearly rank among NATO's great powers, it is also clear that the U.S. remains in a category by itself, as it represents nearly half of the AMP for the entire alliance.

⁴⁴ See, for example, Wintz, "Collective Action or Collective Inaction"; Bauwens, Knudsen, and Clesse, *Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*, 74; Andrews, "The United States and its Atlantic Partners," 74.

Table 3.1 Aggregate Military Power Rankings in NATO

Country	1990		2000		2007			
	CINC	Percent CINC NATO	Country	CINC	Percent CINC NATO	Country	CINC	Percent CINC NATO
1.USA	0.13938	48.03	1. USA	0.14295	46.90	1. USA	0.14215	47.68
2.UK	0.02529	8.71	2. Germany	0.02815	9.23	2. Germany	0.02408	8.08
3.Germany	0.02442	8.41	3. UK	0.02206	7.24	3. UK	0.02116	7.10
4.France	0.02212	7.62	4. France	0.02074	6.80	4. France	0.01892	6.35
5.Italy	0.02024	6.97	5. Italy	0.01886	6.19	5. Italy	0.01742	5.84
6.Turkey	0.01273	4.39	6. Turkey	0.01500	4.92	6. Turkey	0.01432	4.80
7.Spain	0.01182	4.07	7. Canada	0.01182	3.88	7. Spain	0.01139	3.82
8.Canada	0.01161	4.00	8. Spain	0.01098	3.60	8. Canada	0.01068	3.58
9. Netherlands	0.00702	2.42	9. Poland	0.00820	2.69	9. Poland	0.00694	2.33
10. Belgium	0.00584	2.01	10. Netherlands	0.00639	2.10	10. Netherlands	0.00565	1.89
11. Greece	0.00344	1.19	11. Belgium	0.00538	1.77	11. Belgium	0.00389	1.31
12. Norway	0.00195	0.67	12. Greece	0.00385	1.26	12. Greece	0.00381	1.28
13. Portugal	0.00194	0.67	13. Czech Rep	0.00297	0.98	13. Romania	0.00321	1.08
14. Denmark	0.00160	0.55	14. Portugal	0.00197	0.65	14. Czech Rep	0.00235	0.79
15. Luxembourg	0.00077	0.27	15. Hungary	0.00185	0.61	15. Portugal	0.00184	0.62
16. Iceland	0.00004	0.01	16. Norway	0.00157	0.52	16. Norway	0.00164	0.55
TOTAL:	0.29021	100.00	17. Denmark	0.00141	0.46	17. Hungary	0.00161	0.54
			18. Luxembourg	0.00057	0.19	18. Denmark	0.00149	0.50
			19. Iceland	0.00005	0.02	19. Slovakia	0.00143	0.48
			TOTAL:	0.30477	100.00	20. Bulgaria	0.00142	0.48
						21. Croatia	0.00058	0.19
						22. Lithuania	0.00044	0.15
						23. Luxembourg	0.00043	0.14
						24. Slovenia	0.00035	0.12
						25. Latvia	0.00034	0.12
						26. Albania	0.00028	0.09
						27. Estonia	0.00025	0.08
						28. Iceland	0.00004	0.01
						TOTAL:	0.29813	100.00

Note: CINC stands for Composite Index of National Capability. CINC Data aggregates measurements of a country's: 1) Energy Consumption, 2) Iron and Steel Production, 3) Military Expenditure, 4) Military Personnel, 5) Total Population, and 6) Urban Population

Source: Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965."

While isolating the great powers in NATO is somewhat straightforward, placing the remaining states into useful categories is more difficult. In IR theory, the principles for and utility of creating a sub-type of states labeled “small powers” is a rather controversial issue and, while important and interesting, I do not spend much time engaging in this debate here.⁴⁵ For this project I simply need to define the universe of cases that reasonably corresponds with small powers in NATO. Based on the “scholarly consensus” method, this could be accomplished by focusing on the remaining “non-great” powers. However, Italy remains somewhat problematic since its measurements are not far from the fourth ranked state (i.e. France) using the CINC measurement. As such Italy is not considered a small power in this research. In short, states that follow Italy (i.e. those with less than 5% of the alliance’s AMP) constitute the universe of cases for this analysis of small power influence.

Security Dependency

In addition to AMP, a second important variable at the systemic level of analysis is security dependency. A state is dependent on another state to the extent that it requires the resources or services of that state in order to survive or prosper. Systemic factors are key predictors of influence outcomes in that the greater state *B*’s dependency on *A*, the greater influence *A* generally has over *B*. In an alliance, the most critical relationship of dependency is based on security. By definition, at least one member of a defensive alliance is dependent on others for its protection.

⁴⁵ For more on this debate, see Amstrup, “The Perennial Problem of Small States”; Baehr, “Review - Small States.”

Hypothesis 1: The less a small power is dependent on the alliance to protect it against its primary security threats, the greater influence it will have in NATO.

According to Glenn Snyder, the systemic factors that determine a state's level of dependency include: 1) "[its] need for assistance as a function of the extent to which its military capability falls short of its potential adversary's capability," 2) "its partner's capacity to supply the assistance," 3) "the state's degree of conflict and tension with the adversary" and 4) "the state's realignment alternatives."⁴⁶ The relationship between security dependency and influence is echoed by James Morrow, who argues that alliances generally entail a trade-off between *security* and *autonomy*. In asymmetric alliances, Morrow explains, the great powers provide security benefits to smaller powers in exchange for the ability to change the status quo according to great power preferences.⁴⁷ G. John Ikenberry calls this arrangement the *institutional bargain*: "the leading state wants to reduce compliance costs and weaker states want to reduce their costs of security protection."⁴⁸ Though all alliances are founded on a certain degree of mutual dependence, Stephen Walt explains that the criticality of security usually tips the balance in favor of the great powers. In short, asymmetric alliances often lead to asymmetrical dependence. Walt notes that "leverage will be enhanced if the supplier [i.e. the great power] enjoys an asymmetry of dependence vis-à-vis the recipient....In

⁴⁶ See Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 471-472; See also Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, 473; Reynolds and McKinlay, "The Concept of Interdependence," 142.

⁴⁷ "Alliances and Asymmetry."

⁴⁸ "State Power and the Institutional Bargain," 50.

short, when one ally does not need the other very much, its leverage should increase.”⁴⁹

Of course, power asymmetry within an alliance is not the only thing that affects dependency relationships. As both Walt and Snyder contend, an important concept in alliance theory is the degree of *threat* faced by an ally. In short, a greater threat makes a small power more dependent on the alliance (especially its great powers), and thus less influential. According to Walt, we can expect a small power to feel most threatened when 1) its geographic location is near a much stronger state, 2) it perceives that nearby state as having aggressive intentions and 3) the aggressive state has superior offensive capabilities.⁵⁰ To assess threat in this research, I adopt a basic framework created by Mark Wintz that echoes much of Walt’s notion of the concept. Wintz evaluates threat along four dimensions (*imminence, probability, proximity, and severity*) and describes them as follows:

“Imminence” is defined as nearness in time (i.e. the higher the imminence rating, the lower amount of reaction time is available to policy-makers once the threat becomes actual rather than potential). “Probability” is defined as the likelihood of the threat moving from potentially to actually occurring. “Proximity” is defined as the nearness of regime members in geographic space to the source of the threat. And “severity” is defined as the damage that would occur to member states in terms of (primarily) loss of human life and (secondarily) economic damage and/or disruption if the threat became actualized.⁵¹

To be clear, the ability to influence alliance policy may have nothing to do with the threats inherent in the specific policy under consideration. For example, the Baltic allies’ willingness to contribute to the NATO war in Afghanistan has little to do with

⁴⁹ *The Origins of Alliances*, 43; See also Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 9.

⁵⁰ *The Origins of Alliances*, 22-25.

⁵¹ “Collective Action or Collective Inaction,” 54.

any perception of threat from the Taliban or Al Qaeda, but a lot to do with these nations' dependence on the alliance vis-à-vis their Russian neighbors. In other words, in order to gauge security dependence, the entirety of threats facing a small power must be examined.

Finally, as indicated by Snyder's criteria for alliance dependency noted above, a small power may achieve an advantage in an alliance when it is evident that it has legitimate alternatives for alignment. In short, a great power who values the maintenance of the alliance may be more willing to make concessions to a small power that feels its security can be adequately guaranteed elsewhere.

3. Domestic Factors

The list of national resources that might be used to influence outcomes is in many ways only limited by imagination. As McCall notes, "[v]irtually anything that is relatively scarce and desired by others can be viewed as a resource which gives [influence] to whomever controls it."⁵² In security studies, many scholars simplify this category by focusing exclusively on a state's general military capabilities or, as I described earlier, its AMP. However, there are other potentially critical resources that have been shown to give states leverage in bargaining situations.⁵³ While realists tend to focus more on the unique material assets that give states leverage (e.g. natural resources, geographic location, etc.), scholars that study organizations

⁵² "Power, Authority, and Influence," 193.

⁵³ Even realists like Morgenthau agree with this general principle. He notes that: "[T]he correlation between benefits, policies, and [aggregate] power is by no means inevitable. A weak nation may well possess an asset which is of such great value for its strong ally as to be irreplaceable. Here the unique benefit the former is able to grant or withhold may give it within the alliance a status completely out of keeping with the actual distribution of material power." *Politics Among Nations, Brief Edition*, 201.

insist that many non-material factors give actors advantages in policy formation negotiations. The non-material resources considered here include: 1) a state's expertise, 2) its intensity of interest on a given issue-area and 3) its political cohesion.

Expertise

Research indicates that a small power possessing expertise about a particular issue-area may have an advantage in pursuing policy objectives.⁵⁴ In the literature on organizations, expert power is "derived from the extent of knowledge possessed by a group or individual...[and] is restricted to particular areas."⁵⁵ According to organizations scholar David Mechanic, "to the extent that a low-ranking participant has important expert knowledge not available to high-ranking participants, he is likely to have power over them."⁵⁶ Like other sources of influence, the significance of expertise is often based on its demand and its scarcity. Hence we would expect the influence gained by small power expertise to be greatest when this expertise is critical to accomplishing NATO objectives and when the majority of NATO members lack this expertise.

Hypothesis 2: Small powers that have expertise will have greater influence in NATO.

For this research, I divide expertise into four main types: regional, technical, executive and institutional. Regional expertise (*knowledge of the politics, economy,*

⁵⁴ See Lindell and Persson, "The Paradox of Weak State Power," 99, n. 103; Barston, *The Other Powers*, 26.

⁵⁵ Warren, "Power, Visibility, and Conformity in Formal Organizations," 953.

⁵⁶ "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations," 357.

geography and culture of a particular region) is approximated by looking at a state's proximity to and/or its historical interaction with that region. Technical expertise (*proficiency in the production or use of security related technologies*) is measured by analyzing an ally's degree of success in using defense technologies in combat or training exercises, as well as by its level of exports in security-related goods or services. Executive expertise (*knowledge about how to achieve certain policy goals*) is evaluated by looking at a state's success in achieving similar policy goals in separate but similar scenarios. Both technical and executive expertise are also measured by a state's participation in one of seventeen of NATO's *Centers of Excellence* (COE). A COE is described as a "nationally or multinationally sponsored entity, which offers recognized expertise and experience to the benefit of the Alliance."⁵⁷ COEs are nationally funded and allies participate in them on a voluntary basis.

The fourth category, institutional expertise, is defined as a state's *knowledge of the NATO policy-making process*. As the Cox and Jacobson study concluded, an actor in an IO may acquire a certain level of proficiency in the essential dynamics of this process – a resource that tends to grow the longer an actor takes part in the organization.⁵⁸ These authors maintain that for small powers, "the attribute most widely shared among the more influential individual actors in the [IO] was long association with the organization."⁵⁹ To a large degree, differences in a nation's institutional expertise would depend on individual assessments of the diplomats

⁵⁷ "Centres of Excellence."

⁵⁸ See also Mechanic, "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations," 353.

⁵⁹ *The Anatomy of Influence*, 395-396.

that represent it in the organization. However, assuming that NATO diplomats successfully pass on their experiences and lessons-learned in NATO to their successors, this type of expertise may be approximated by looking at the number of years an ally has been a member of the alliance. In other words, we would expect newer members of the alliance to have less institutional expertise than those that were NATO's founding members.⁶⁰

Finally, all four types of expertise presented here may be qualitatively measured by considering a state's reputation among its allies. In short, by examining the statements of national leaders and NATO officials (both publicly and via interviews), the types and degrees of expertise may be reasonably ascertained.

Intensity of Interest

A second non-material factor recognized as important in predicting small power influence is its *degree of interest*. As Mechanic's study of domestic organizations reveals, an individual's interest in an outcome affects his behavior: "there is a direct relationship between the amount of effort a person is willing to exert in an area and the power he can command," and that "effort exerted is directly related to the degree of interest one has in an area."⁶¹ Jacob Sewell, who studied UNESCO in the Cox and Jacobson project, corroborates this basic correlation for IOs and suggests that the "[i]ntensity of interest and thus of participation is the best

⁶⁰ As explained later on, this variable is largely controlled for given the selection of cases involving three long-standing members of the alliance.

⁶¹ "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations," 359.

guide to influence by governments.”⁶² By definition, small powers have limited material and manpower resources to allocate towards the achievement of their goals. But these states are often able to compensate for this handicap by focusing their efforts on only the most important foreign policy priorities.

Hypothesis 3: The greater a small power’s interest on a particular NATO policy issue (relative to the great powers), the greater influence the small power will have on that issue.

Like most variables in politics, intensity of interest is a relative concept.⁶³

When a great power takes a keen interest in an organizational policy, it will likely bring to bear an abundance of resources and diplomatic pressures to achieve its goals. However, even the government of a superpower like the U.S. does not have infinite capacities. As a leader in NATO and on the larger international scene, a great power’s attention can become extremely diffuse. Keohane notes that “a great power must carefully choose the issues on which it will use strong political, military, or economic pressure.”⁶⁴ Annette Fox echoes this argument in *The Power of Small States*, where she found that a small power’s chance of resisting great power pressures increased with “the greater the range of competing interests elsewhere on which the demanding great power needed to focus.”⁶⁵ That global leaders can become overwhelmed with attempts at managing multiple affairs gives small states

⁶² “UNESCO: Pluralism Rampant,” 174; An author from the same study, Lawrence Sheinman, made the same conclusion. In his study of the IAEA, he concluded that: “[influence] stratification does tend to correlate to a high degree with environmental status [i.e. power]. However, another variable – interest – tends to intervene between environmental status and influence, once again limiting the explanatory power of the environment.” “IAEA: Atomic Condominium?,” 261.

⁶³ Walt calls this concept “asymmetry of motivation.” *The Origins of Alliances*, 44; Stanley Hoffmann refers to a similar concept he calls “asymmetry of attention.” Quoted in Lindell and Persson, “The Paradox of Weak State Power,” 84.

⁶⁴ “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” 162.

⁶⁵ *The Power of Small States*, 184.

an advantage, and this advantage is even greater when the small state is focused and determined. Unlike its great power allies, a small power can largely ignore larger patterns of international politics and, as Keohane explains, “concentrate on a narrow range of vital interests.”⁶⁶ Thus, even though a policy is of serious consequence to a great power, a small power may gain an influence advantage if its great power ally, at the time, has “bigger fish to fry.”

In addition to the relative efficacy associated with a higher intensity of interest, there is also a psychological dimension that likely increases a small power’s chance for influence in an organization. The advantage is based on the reasonable assumption that members in NATO are able to identify and quantify the interests of their fellow allies. In their discussion of crisis bargaining, Snyder and Diesing explain that “statesmen do have *some* basis for estimating the magnitude of others’ interests in particular conflicts. They are probably able at least to rank them in some sort of hierarchy – some vital, some moderately important, some peripheral, and so on.”⁶⁷ For NATO, this assumption has even more merit given the institutionalization of weekly consultations in its multiple committees (see Chapter 2). Once these subjective calculations are made, asymmetries in interest become the basis for an ally’s *resolve* in the North Atlantic Council.⁶⁸ As Snyder and Diesing maintain, “a

⁶⁶ “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” 162-163.

⁶⁷ *Conflict Among Nations*, 186.

⁶⁸ The importance of the effects of a state’s relative interest and resolve has been proven significant, albeit in a different context, in research on deterrence vis-à-vis adversaries. In what has been termed a “balance of interests” proposition, Huth and Russett argue that: “Bargaining power is a product of resolve as well as of capability, and resolve is in turn a function of the interests at stake...” Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?,” 502; See also George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, 52.

state's resolve in a particular case is a function of how it perceives the comparative interests of itself and its opponent."⁶⁹

Intensity of interest is assessed by ranking and comparing the security related priorities of NATO members and by analyzing how they allocate their time and resources towards these priorities.

Political Cohesion

Finally, a state's degree of *political cohesion* (sometimes referred to as *domestic consensus*) may also be related to its influence in an IO. By political cohesion I mean the extent to which foreign policy objectives are uncontested within the state.⁷⁰ Once again, political cohesion is a relative concept. As explained below, its leverage is expected to be greatest when a state with high political cohesion is attempting to influence a state with low political cohesion. In short, one actor's weakness is often another actor's advantage.

Hypothesis 4: The greater a small power's political cohesion on a given issue (relative to the great powers), the greater influence the small power will have on that issue.

Of course, in order to contemplate the significance of political cohesion in a study of NATO politics, we must first relax the assumption of the state as a "unitary actor" and recognize that multiple players within the state may contribute to its

⁶⁹ *Conflict Among Nations*, 186.

⁷⁰ This concept is consistent with Wolfram Hanrieder's definition of "consensus," which he defines as "the existing degree of agreement on policy projects among the relevant elements of a national system's decision-making process." He argues that the concepts of compatibility (i.e. the degree of feasibility of various foreign policy goals given the strictures and opportunities of the international system) and consensus allow the IR analyst "to view foreign policy as a continuous process bridging the analytical barriers between the international and domestic political system." Hanrieder, "Compatibility and Consensus," 977.

foreign policy decisions. This exercise, viewed as largely irrelevant from the perspective of many neorealists, is nonetheless familiar among those like Graham Allison, Jack Snyder and Morton Halperin who explore foreign policy from a “bureaucratic” or “domestic” politics paradigm.⁷¹ As Allison and Halperin describe: “the ‘maker’ of government policy is not one calculating decision-maker, but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors who differ substantially about what their government should do on any particular issue and who compete in attempting to affect both governmental decisions and the actions of their governments.”⁷²

What does political cohesion have to do with influence in NATO? There are at least three causal mechanisms that help explain why political cohesion might affect a state’s influence in an organization. First, political cohesion is significant because its absence may leave a state vulnerable to penetration from external actors. As Swedish scholar Bengt Sundelius noted in 1983, “the exerting of international influence at present involves exploiting differences within foreign governmental structures.”⁷³ In some cases, states may be able to take advantage of intra-state divisions in order to promote their policy preferences from the inside. The concept applies to small powers and great powers alike. From the small power perspective, Trygve Mathisen explains how success or failure in international relations depends on “the ability of a small state to preserve its internal stability and social cohesion

⁷¹ See Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*; Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics”; Snyder, *Myths of Empire*.

⁷² “Bureaucratic Politics,” 42.

⁷³ “Coping with Structural Security Threats,” 288.

when it is exposed to the pressure and counter-pressure of the great powers.”⁷⁴

When key elements in a small state are divided over the foreign policy preferences for the country, great powers can exploit this discord by using their vast resources to bolster the actors and groups that share their preferences. Though a small power’s political cohesion will often vary from issue to issue, many small powers benefit from the existence of centralized and concentrated decision-making structures, as well as relatively homogeneous populations that are more likely to share the same values and perceptions regarding foreign affairs.⁷⁵

Small powers are not the only states vulnerable to the effects of low political cohesion. Especially in a highly open society like that found in the U.S., small powers may gain access to “pressure points” that help them take advantage of divisions within a great power’s government. As Erling Bjøl notes: “the optimal situation is probably to deal with a great power whose political system is based on the separation of power concept . . . Two of the fundamental conditions of a successful foreign policy established by Richelieu, *le secret* and *l’unité de direction*, are practically impossible to create in America and hence it is an ideal terrain for small state manipulation.”⁷⁶ The argument was echoed by Keohane: “to achieve the bargaining position that they desire, the small state’s officials and diplomats must develop close ties with the powerful elements of American society, taking advantage

⁷⁴ *The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers*, 22.

⁷⁵ Ronfeldt, “Superclients and Superpowers,” 11; Papadakis and Starr, “Opportunity, Willingness, and Small States,” 426-427.

⁷⁶ “The Small State in International Politics,” 35.

of the fact that U.S. policy is largely the outcome of clash and compromise among separate interest groups and bureaucratic units.”⁷⁷

A second potential benefit of a relatively high degree of political cohesion in a small state is that its government is able to focus its scarce time and resources externally rather than internally. When there is not domestic consensus about a particular NATO policy, leaders in the government of a small power are forced to engage more fully in what Robert Putnam calls “two-level games” (i.e. negotiations at the *national* and *international* level).⁷⁸ As Putnam describes, “the political complexities for the players in this two-level game are staggering,” especially given the fact that “moves that are rational for a player at one board . . . may be impolitic for that same player at the other board.”⁷⁹ When a wide consensus exists within the state, these calculations are more straightforward, thus allowing the government to concentrate its efforts externally. In other words, instead of allocating its time and resources towards persuading domestic players that a certain NATO policy is or is not in their best interests, a government that enjoys widespread agreement on a policy can focus outwards in an effort to convince other members of the alliance of the costs or benefits of the policy.

Finally, small states with high political cohesion may benefit from a greater degree of credibility at the bargaining table. This advantage coincides with the smaller “win-set” that commonly results from such a condition.⁸⁰ Putnam explains

⁷⁷ “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” 164; See also Haskel, “Access to Society.”

⁷⁸ “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.”

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 434.

⁸⁰ A “win-set” is the set of all possible [international level] agreements that would “win” – that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents – when simply voted up or down.” *Ibid.*, 437.

that: “The larger the perceived win-set of a negotiator, the more he can be ‘pushed around’ by the other [international level] negotiators. Conversely, a small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage: ‘I’d like to accept your proposal, but I could never get it accepted at home.’”⁸¹ Additionally, given the occurrence of national elections within member-states in NATO, political cohesion also enhances allied perceptions of credibility when policies are negotiated over several months or even years. When a government’s chances of remaining in power are in question, allies who disagree with its policy position may stall in hopes that a new government might be more amenable their preferences. In contrast, when allies understand that election results will have little to no bearing on a state’s policy preferences, this tactic is no longer a valid option.

Who are the key players involved in foreign policy formation? The short answer to this question is, of course, *it depends*. Who plays varies from country to country and across time, and also depends on the type issue under consideration. Thus for each case examined in this study, it is important to identify the most influential players within the state. For democratic nations like those in Europe, however, foreign policy positions are largely influenced by a handful of significant actors and groups. The first and most important of these actors (what Allison and Halperin would categorize as *senior players* or *Chiefs*) are: the Head of State, the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister. Secondary players (referred to as *junior players* or *Indians*) often include military generals, the heads of intelligence agencies, the leaders of the dominant parties in the legislature and, sometimes, the

⁸¹ Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 440; See also Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 19-28.

monarchy. Additional players may include the public (measured primarily via opinion polls), the press, religious leaders, interest groups and foreign policy institutes (i.e. “think tanks”).⁸² Once the key foreign policy players are identified, political cohesion is then evaluated by looking at the policy preferences of these players. In short, the greater the uniformity among these preferences, the greater the political cohesion (and *vice versa*).

4. Influence Tactics

An influence tactic is an expedient for achieving a desired goal. Actors take into account *Institutional, Systemic* and *Domestic Factors* before deciding which tactics to employ. Snyder and Diesing note that “strategy and tactics in the bargaining process mediate between value structures and outcomes.”⁸³ As such, tactics can be viewed as an intervening variable that is partially *though not completely* dependent other factors. An actor that has the right resources in place for a given situation may not succeed if it does not use the proper tactics. As stated by Baldwin, “mere possession of power resources does not suffice to enable *A* to influence *B*. *A* must mediate between his resources and *B*’s actions, a job that *A* may do either skillfully or clumsily.”⁸⁴

⁸² Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 47; Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 296.

⁸³ *Conflict Among Nations*, 194.

⁸⁴ “Power Analysis and World Politics,” 477.

In order to determine whether tactics are important variables for explaining influence, I examined the relevant literature and developed a list of eight influence approaches to be assessed in my research (described below):⁸⁵

Table 3.2 Influence Tactics

Approach	Description
a. Assertiveness	<i>The use of a direct and forceful approach</i>
b. Bargaining	<i>The use of negotiation through the exchange of benefits or favors</i>
c. Coalition-building	<i>The mobilization of other countries in NATO who share the same preferences</i>
d. Commitment	<i>Communicating your positioning clearly to other countries and letting them know you will not compromise beyond a certain point</i>
e. Ingratiation	<i>Acting humble, flattery and the promotion of goodwill</i>
f. Sanctions	<i>Threatening to remove a benefit or apply a punishment</i>
g. Reasoning	<i>The use of facts and data to support the development of a logical argument</i>
h. Sponsorship	<i>Gaining the support of larger countries in NATO to back up your requests</i>

The tactics listed above should not be thought of as mutually exclusive. Some tactics may be combined in order to affect policy outcomes. As such, rather than including these tactics as explicit hypotheses for my research, I simply assess their significance in contributing to the success or failure of small power influence attempts.

Given the nature of diplomatic relations, some of the tactics listed above are more difficult to measure than others. For example, country representatives are not eager to admit publicly that – in specific instances - they indulged in “flattery” or “the exchange of benefits or favors” in order to achieve their desired goals in NATO. As such, I tread cautiously when making conclusions based on these factors, while at the same time insisting that they are too important to ignore altogether. In sum, the

⁸⁵ Of these tactics, five come from a study of organizations conducted by David Kipnis et al (a,c,e,g, and h), one comes from an interstate bargaining model developed by P. Terrence Hopmann (d) and two are common to both works (b and f). Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson, “Intraorganizational Influence Tactics”; Kipnis et al., “Patterns of Managerial Influence”; Hopmann, “Asymmetrical Bargaining in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.”

analysis of Influence Tactics in this project should be viewed as a mere first step towards filling an important lacuna in our understanding of influence in NATO.

Assessing the success of the tactics listed above is accomplished primarily via interviews of NATO officials and their manifestation (or lack thereof) in my case studies of small power influence.

Research Methods

Like many projects in political science research, this dissertation relies on both deductive and inductive causal analysis. Though the hypotheses considered here are based on general propositions posited from an amalgamation of past research, it is recognized that this type of “testing” has never been done for a study of small powers in NATO. As such, the hypotheses are utilized primarily as a way to guide the research. At the same time, however, a key benefit of descriptive historical analysis is the elucidation of missing variables, intervening processes, issues of sequencing and the like – all of which are important aspects of *theory-development*. This study attempts to remain amenable to these potential advantages.

In its most basic form, the analysis in this dissertation is founded on the tenets of comparative case studies and process-tracing. The choice of methods (e.g. as opposed to statistical analysis) is based on two factors intrinsic to this genre of research puzzle. The first is the inherent difficulty in quantifying this study’s dependent variable: influence. Though the selection of case studies in this project was based on the reasonable categories of “successful” and “unsuccessful” influence attempts, in reality there is rarely a case of either *complete* or *nil* influence – at least,

not when an ally makes a legitimate attempt to influence policy. In most cases an ally's influence falls somewhere in between absolute and no influence, and attempts to quantify this variation - especially in a somewhat inaccessible, multi-member organization like NATO - risks arbitrariness, inaccuracy and excess complexity.⁸⁶ Second, the comparative case study method is necessary because of the relatively rare observation of significant small power influence in NATO.⁸⁷ As such, this subject of research suffers from a common social science research predicament: many variables and a small number of cases. The objective in this analysis is thus to control as much as possible – using established techniques in comparative research – for the non-experimental variables that are recognized as potentially significant.

Dimensions of Comparison

Comparison in this dissertation takes place along three dimensions. The first and primary dimension is inherent in what is known as the “deviant case” or “outlier” method. As explained by Jason Seawright and John Gerring, a deviant case method “selects cases that, by reference to some general cross-case relationship, demonstrate a surprising value; they are poorly explained.”⁸⁸ In this type of study “the researcher hopes that causal processes within the deviant case will illustrate

⁸⁶ Cox and Jacobson share this view. They conclude that, “[a]lthough it is possible to define influence in reasonably precise terms and even to illustrate its components with mathematical symbols and equations, no method has yet been discovered for satisfactorily giving quantitative expression to influence in the context on international organization.” *The Anatomy of Influence*, 371.

⁸⁷ This is due both to its infrequent occurrence and the inherent confidentiality of NATO policy-making processes and outcomes.

⁸⁸ “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research,” 302; See also Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 86.

some causal factor that is applicable to other (deviant) cases.”⁸⁹ The two deviant cases in this analysis are those in which small powers in NATO had significant influence (i.e. Denmark and Greece). As “deviant cases,” these phenomena are what Arend Lijphart describes as “implicitly comparative.” He argues that “the deviant case may be likened to the ‘experimental group’ with the remainder of the cases constituting the ‘control group.’”⁹⁰ In other words, the first dimension of comparison is between individual cases and the already-established relationship between AMP and influence. Second, the use of more than one case in this research allows me to make comparisons *between* individual cases in order to assess the validity of my hypotheses. Finally, when possible, I make qualified comparisons *within* individual countries by considering how variables change throughout time.

Controls

By focusing primarily on cases when states with limited material resources had considerable influence, this study automatically controls for *AMP* as a valid explanation for the ultimate outcome. Additionally, this study attempts to control for both *Institutional* and *Systemic* factors that might explain small power influence. The former supposition – introduced in a previous section – is perhaps most obvious. By focusing on a single IO whose policy-making principles, norms and procedures have changed little over the last 60 years, it is difficult to claim that *Institutional* factors were the most significant contributors to these extraordinary

⁸⁹ Seawright and Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research,” 302; See also Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” 692-693.

⁹⁰ “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” 693.

outcomes. Controlling for *Systemic* factors – in this study defined in terms of security dependency – is more difficult. However, selecting cases from the post-Cold War period – when the Soviet threat no longer dominated the dependency relationship in the alliance – is a logical first step. At the same time, dependency on the alliance is not constant across allies, thus necessitating a closer measurement of this variable (via Hypothesis 1) rather than an *a priori* assumption that all allies are now significantly less dependent on the alliance. A final control in this research pertains chiefly to the notion of institutional expertise (i.e. *knowledge of the NATO policy-making process*). In this project I consider only long-standing members of the alliance (i.e. states that became members from 1949 to 1952). It is assumed that these members are reasonably well versed in the policy-making processes within NATO.

Process-tracing

In addition to relying on the comparative method, this study benefits from what is known as “process-tracing” – an advantage not intrinsic to pure statistical analysis. According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, process-tracing is a method that “attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”⁹¹ They argue that while “cases studies using process-tracing cannot *test* theories that are underspecified, they can play an

⁹¹ *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 206.

important role in the *development* of theories.”⁹² The influence model and its corresponding hypotheses are theoretically-based yet underdeveloped as explanations of NATO policy-making outcomes. Finally, George and Bennett state that process-tracing is useful when it is not possible to find cases similar in every respect except one (i.e. where one or more of several variables may potentially have causal impact).⁹³ While restricting my cases to NATO and the post-Cold War era controls for many of the hypothesized relationships between influence and its antecedents, this research design cannot fully control for all the potentially significant explanatory variables.

Expectations

What conclusions should we expect from this type of analysis? First, it is important to note that these cases are not used to reject the claim that AMP is closely related to influence. The AMP-Influence relationship is recognized as a probabilistic hypothesis that at times simply needs to be supplemented with additional variables. My non-AMP hypotheses (i.e. Hypotheses 1-4) are a way to focus and guide the research towards this end. Second, because the cases were selected based on the dependent variable, the study is not designed to pinpoint “sufficient” conditions. Instead, the purpose of this type of analysis is to isolate “necessary” conditions, as well as conditions that – alone or in concert - increase or decrease a small power’s chances of influencing the policies of the alliance.⁹⁴

⁹² Ibid., 209.

⁹³ Ibid., 214.

⁹⁴ See Dion, “Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study.”

Data Gathering

The data for this project was assembled using both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources included official alliance documents (available primarily from the NATO website and the NATO Handbook), public speeches and over thirty interviews by the author. The face-to-face interviews took place at the NATO HQ in Brussels (October-November 2009) and in Washington, DC (March 2010) at various foreign policy institutions and national embassies. Several interviews were also conducted over the phone. The individuals interviewed included former and current Ambassadors (PermReps) to NATO, foreign ministry officials, NATO staff and military officers. As much as possible, I sought the perspectives of both small and great power diplomats. The secondary sources used for this dissertation included historical accounts, journal articles, newspaper articles and interviews with regional scholars.

Case Selection

This study examines the post-Cold War influence of three of NATO's small powers: Denmark, Greece and Belgium. Based on the AMP indices presented in Table 3.1, there is little doubt that these allies qualify for small power status within NATO. In addition, the officials interviewed from these nations readily self-identified their respective countries as "small states." While these three allies differ in many respects (politically, culturally, historically, geographically, etc.), they are also

similar in that they joined the alliance early on and thus have several decades of experience in NATO policy-making.

The first two case studies (Denmark and Greece) constitute the deviant cases of this research project in that, as small powers, their influence is notionally unexpected. While both of these cases involve membership decisions in the alliance, they differ in that the Danish case is an example of *offensive* influence (i.e. where Denmark effectively took the initiative), while the Greek case is an example of *defensive* influence (i.e. where Greece vetoed a popular alliance decision). A brief introduction to these decisions is described below:

1) *Denmark's success in securing NATO membership for the Baltic States (1996-2004)*. The four great powers in the NATO were initially hesitant to support enlargement to the Baltic States. The British were worried that the Baltic States would be too difficult to defend. The Germans were especially concerned about the Russian reaction to such a decision.⁹⁵ The French (and the Italians) were adamant that enlargement should be restricted to five countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia). The United States was willing to consider Baltic membership at a future date, but was not willing to push for it for fear of upsetting the French. At the 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid, the Danish Prime Minister was able to secure language on NATO's enlargement policy that labeled the Baltic States as "aspiring members" – a result that set the

⁹⁵ Blank, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do?" 21-33.

- stage for their eventual membership in 2004.⁹⁶ While this decision took place in 1997, Denmark's push for Baltic membership to NATO began two years earlier.
- 2) *Greece's success in preventing NATO membership for Macedonia (2008-present).*
- Despite strong consensus among the rest of the alliance members, Greece has successfully blocked Macedonian membership to NATO due to an unresolved dispute over this Balkan country's constitutional name. NATO's great powers have been eager to extend the alliance into the Balkans in order to stabilize the region, especially after Kosovo's February 2008 declaration of independence.⁹⁷

In addition to the two deviant cases described above, I also conducted research on a case where a small power was not successful in achieving its preferred outcome for the alliance. This step provides a contrast with the basic findings of my research and a single case. This method, used by authors like Theda Skocpol in her seminal work *States and Social Revolutions*, is helpful when the primary method of case selection is based on the dependent variable. As described by Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, Skocpol presents her contrast observations as "control cases" and uses them to highlight the importance of her causal arguments.⁹⁸ The Belgian case is briefly described here:

⁹⁶ Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 245-248.

⁹⁷ "Greece Rejects Macedonia NATO Bid."

⁹⁸ *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 129; Seawright and Gerring also concur that mixing and matching case selection strategies is sometimes necessary. They conclude that "where the cases allow for a variety of empirical strategies, there is no reason not to pursue them." "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research," 306.

3) *Belgium's failed attempt to block the deployment of NATO forces to Turkey (2002-2003)*. This deployment, requested by the U.S. and later Turkey, was based on Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and was meant primarily to protect Turkey against a potential Iraqi attack from the south. The Belgians argued that this deployment undermined the ongoing processes of the United Nations and signaled that NATO already accepted the logic that the war with Iraq was inevitable. Ultimately, the alliance agreed to go forward with the deployment following Belgium's consent in February 2003.

As noted above, a recognized limitation of this research design is that – in an effort to simplify the analysis - it sets up a dichotomous dependent variable (i.e. successful and failed influence attempts). Again, in reality there are few cases of either complete or nil influence in the NAC, especially when the country under scrutiny makes a valid attempt to affect the final decision. The Belgian case certainly falls somewhere between these two extremes. As I describe in Chapter 6, the timing and substance of the final agreement were notably affected by Belgium's position. When possible, I make plausible conclusions to account for this influence; and it will be up to the reader to assess the strength of these claims. However, I argue that the essential core of the decision – the anticipatory deployment of defensive forces to Turkey – was clearly and vehemently opposed by the Belgian government, thus qualifying the case as a failed influence attempt in the NAC.

Summary of the Dissertation's Findings

The results of this study support the argument that an appreciation for national level factors greatly increases our understanding of small power influence in NATO. While systemic and institutional factors are without question causally significant, they are not fully able to explain the cases examined here. As such, the findings also support the application of the influence model introduced above as a theoretical tool for understanding the outcomes of influence attempts in NATO. In what follows, I use this model to summarize this study's most important conclusions.

Institutional Factors

While institutional factors alone cannot explain the rare instances of significant small power influence in NATO, they are without question critical to a basic understanding of NATO policy-making. Most important among these factors is the consensus rule. As explained below, the prospects for a small power to achieve its preferences in the organization greatly depends on its ability to use the tactic of *commitment*, and this tactic is made possible by each ally's formal right to veto decisions in the NAC.

Additionally, the case studies that follow demonstrate that a state's right to veto is important for both *offensive* and *defensive* influence attempts in the alliance. In 1997 the Danish delegation threatened to block an invitation to three Central European states in order to secure official support for the membership aspirations of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, while in 2008 Greece's right to veto prevented an

invitation to the Republic of Macedonia. At the same time, in 2003 Belgium was not able to block a deployment to Turkey that it clearly opposed – a clear indication that other factors must be examined in order to fully understand the opportunities and limitations provided by NATO’s consensus rule.

Systemic Factors

A major contribution of this study is the presentation of systemic factors in terms of security dependency. In order to appreciate the political leverage intrinsic to NATO’s great powers, it is useful to consider the extent to which small powers are dependent on the alliance to protect them from their most important security concerns. The deviant cases examined here confirm that the less dependent a small state is, the greater freedom it has to challenge the leadership of more powerful allies like the U.S. Even Greece, a country with perhaps the greatest threat to its territorial integrity, was able to stand its ground during the debate over membership to FYROM – a result that can only be understood in light of Greece’s recognition that the alliance is unable to safeguard it from potential Turkish aggression.

The Belgian case study demonstrates that a low level of security dependency is not a sufficient predictor of small power influence in NATO. In Chapter 6 we observe that Belgian leaders were emboldened by their country’s low threat environment and the emergence of an alternative security framework in Europe (i.e. the EU and its ESDP). However, the potential for unforeseen security risks from within and outside the European continent - combined with the current relative

military weakness of EU nations - means that small powers in NATO remain susceptible to U.S. pressure when American interests peak. The ability to overcome this residual political leverage depends largely on factors not found at the systemic level.

Domestic Factors

Expertise

Of the three independent variables examined at the domestic level of analysis, *expertise* was arguably the least significant in terms of its affect on small state influence in NATO. In the primary cases examined in this dissertation, it was important only in the Danish case. The fact that Denmark possessed a considerable degree of *regional* and *executive* expertise contributed to its ability to prepare the Baltics states for membership in the alliance, as well as the Danes' ability to promote Baltic membership within the NAC. In contrast, to the extent that Greece had a measurable degree of *regional* expertise with regard to the Balkan region and FYROM's potential membership in NATO, it was not able to translate this expertise into any meaningful leverage in the alliance. Finally, Belgium did not have any considerable amount of expertise related to the decision to deploy forces to Turkey, a finding that is not surprising given its distance from the region and its lack of participation in military operations there in the past two decades.

These results indicate that expertise is not a necessary condition for small power influence in the organization. The most plausible explanation for this outcome is the fact that NATO's great powers are able to devote more resources

towards the attainment of this influence multiplier. Given their greater propensity to be involved in military operations beyond their borders, they also frequently accumulate knowledge of regional characteristics and the efficacy of various security policies. At the same time, the findings of past research on small power expertise, as well as the significance it had in the Danish case, suggest that this variable should not be ignored altogether.

Intensity of Interest

A small state's relative intensity of interest in a NATO policy was a consistently powerful predictor of the outcome of its influence attempts. In cases where a small power had a greater inherent interest in a particular decision, it was considerably more likely to prevail. This finding was valid even in cases where the outcome was of significant consequence to the great powers. In contrast, when a great power's interest in an organizational decision was also high, as demonstrated in the Belgian case, the small power's chances of success correspondingly diminished.

The reasons for the association between interest intensity and influence are largely consistent with the predicted causal mechanisms described above. First, great powers like the U.S. are obliged to contend with a greater range of international issues, a condition that diminishes their ability to use their political power equally across all policies discussed in the NAC. In contrast, small powers are able to focus their otherwise limited resources and political clout towards one or two of their most important priorities. Second, a small state's intensity of interest

becomes readily recognized by its allies, a factor that contributes to its perceived *resolve* and its ability to use the tactic of *commitment*.

Finally, the Danish and Belgium cases demonstrated that a state's *overall* influence in NATO is significantly affected by the extent to which it pursues its foreign policy efforts through the alliance. The recent surge in Danish influence is facilitated by its focus on "Atlantic" solutions to its security problems, while Belgium's decline in influence is consistent with its focus on "European" solutions to security risk management. In other words, a small power's intensity of interest in the organization itself seems to be a probable predictor of its success rate in the NAC.

Political Cohesion

Another necessary condition for small power success in NATO is its relative degree of political cohesion. In the two deviant cases examined in this study, the influence attempts corresponded with security policies that were uncontested within the state. For example, all key players in the foreign policy-making circles within Denmark – to include the general public – supported extending NATO membership to the Baltics. In Greece, there is widespread agreement that its northern neighbor should not be allowed to join the alliance under its constitutional name: the Republic of Macedonia. Above all, this consensus enhanced the *credibility* of their positions and – like the intensity of interest variable – facilitated their ability to use the tactic of *commitment*. It also permitted these nations to focus their

persuasive efforts towards other members of the alliance, especially towards those great power nations who were divided over the policy in question.

In the decision to deploy defensive forces to Turkey, political cohesion within Belgium was also considerably high, once again indicating that this variable is not a sufficient variable for explaining small power influence in NATO. At the same time, the importance of the variable is demonstrated when a comparison is made between American and Belgian political cohesion. In short, the evidence implies that Belgium did not experience a comparative advantage due to a similarly high degree of political cohesion in the U.S.

Influence Tactics

Though scholars of domestic organizations frequently study the efficacy of various Influence Tactics, there is an unfortunate paucity of research on this topic for international organizations, especially when it comes to NATO. Though this research design is not equipped to make assertions of the causal power of any of the Influence Tactics posited above, it takes a needed first step towards this goal.

The most consistently observed tactics related to small power success in NATO were those of *sponsorship* and *commitment*. In fact, the results of the primary cases imply that that the former reinforces the latter in alliance politics.

Sponsorship

The Danish government's ability to convince the U.S. government that enlargement to the Baltics contributed to the stability in Europe was vital to its


eventual success, and France's support of the Greek position also gave them needed political weight. In contrast, Belgium was only able to maintain its opposition to the 2003 deployment to Turkey as long as it had the direct backing of France and Germany within the NAC - once this support disappeared, so did the Belgian's willingness to block the proposal. Based on these results, it is possible that great power sponsorship – once achieved - may approximate a sufficient condition for small power influence in the organization. When a great-power ally supports a small power's policy-position, that "sponsor" can bear the brunt of the pressure within the alliance.

Though great power sponsorship was clearly important in the cases examined in this study, it is also apparent that there are instances when it is difficult to determine exactly *how* sponsorship was achieved. In the Danish case, it was relatively clear that the government actively sought American support for its Baltic initiatives. In the Greek case, whether Greek leaders actively sought French support is somewhat ambiguous. As explained in Chapter 5, it is perhaps just as likely that France took advantage of the controversy by reaching out to Greece in an effort to bolster its leadership position within Europe. This is the nature of international diplomacy, especially as it occurs within NATO. As such, future studies on Influence Tactics in NATO must be careful to distinguish between a *condition* (great power sponsorship) and an explicit *tactic* (the pursuit of great power sponsorship).

Commitment

The cases considered here suggest that a small state's ability to effectively use the tactic of commitment depends on three factors. First, the evidence indicates that there is an interactive effect between high political cohesion and intensity of interest that bolsters the efficacy of the commitment strategy. In short, states perceived to have high *credibility* (a product of the political cohesion) and *resolve* (a product of their interest intensity) are more effective in their use of this tactic. This dynamic is clearly displayed in both the Danish and Greek cases of successful influence attempts. The commitment tactic also appears to be highly dependent on political support from at least one great power. Small powers that attain the patronage of one of NATO's great powers are more willing to maintain a clear and steadfast position, even when a majority in NATO disagrees with this stance. When these three conditions are not met, it is unlikely that a small power will be willing to either initiate or block a controversial policy in the organization. This relationship is replicated in the figure below:

Figure 3.4 Antecedents to Small Power Success in NATO



Remaining Influence Tactics

Among the remaining Influence Tactics presented in this chapter, none appeared to reach the significance of the two mentioned previously. However, interviews conducted at the NATO HQ indicate that *coalition-building* is recognized as an effective first step when small powers introduce an initiative in the organization. This tactic was also observed as effective in the Danish case, as well as the two supplementary cases included in this study. Coalition-building among small powers was largely presented as a first step towards securing the buy-in of one or more great powers.

Ingratiation, a tactic frequently used during influence attempts in domestic organizations, was also attempted in the cases studied here. However, the tactic frequently takes on a slightly different form in the context of NATO. Though overt flattery does occur, the tactic is perhaps more consistent with the concept of “loyalty” or “influence-through-intimacy.” In other words, small powers agree to support - in word and deed - the initiatives of great powers like the U.S. in exchange for support for their unique interests. For example, Denmark is working hard to transform its military according to U.S. initiatives for the alliance, and its military has been a substantial contributor to American-led operations in Afghanistan. This involvement makes it easier to approach the U.S. when the Danish government wants to pursue its own interests in NATO.

Reasoning was also highlighted as an important tactic during interviews with NATO officials. Those queried insisted that it is vital to present pragmatic policies that are consistent with the established norms of the alliance. Though the

effectiveness of this tactic was demonstrated in the Danish case, its ineffectiveness in the Greek case did not prevent it from blocking the membership aspirations of the Republic of Macedonia.

The remaining tactics (*assertiveness, bargaining and sanctions*) were not emphasized during the interviews conducted for this research. To the extent that they occurred in the case studies examined in this dissertation, they were not regarded as effective.

Chapter 4 - Denmark and NATO Enlargement to the Baltic States

Foreign policy is not only power politics. It is also the question of creating a better and safer world. Denmark's possibilities of influencing international developments are not great, but this does not absolve us from a moral responsibility. Where circumstances allow, we must turn the scales in favour of a development which corresponds to our aspirations and ideals.

Danish Defence Minister Hans Hækkerup¹

Figure 4.1 Map Of Denmark



Chapter Overview

This chapter explores Denmark's influence in the post-Cold War Atlantic alliance, especially its influence on NATO's decision to offer membership to the three Baltic states. In recent years Denmark has transformed its previous reputation as the organization's quintessential "free-rider" to NATO's "impeccable ally."² Along with this transformation Denmark now enjoys a period of disproportionate

¹ Quoted in Petersen and Due-Nielsen, *Adaptation and Activism*, 13.

² See Ringsmose and Rynning, "The Impeccable Ally? Denmark, NATO, and the Uncertain Future of Top Tier Membership."

influence in the alliance. It is recognized as an ally that, in the words of many NATO officials, frequently “punches above its weight” in the organization. In many respects Denmark’s post-Cold War history constitutes an entire period of deviance from the norm, as it has increased its influence without a corresponding increase in AMP.

Before discussing the selected case study of Danish influence in NATO, I provide a short history of Denmark’s alignment decisions, to include its Cold War experiences in the Atlantic alliance. Following the presentation of the case study, I assess the strength of my hypotheses as plausible accounts for Denmark’s success vis-à-vis Baltic membership in NATO. I also consider the extent to which these hypotheses explain Denmark’s overall surge in influence in the alliance.

The Cold War: The Limited Partnership

According to Hakan Wiberg, small powers typically have four options for pursuing their security: 1) bilateral alliances with a great power, 2) membership in a multilateral alliance around one or more great powers, 3) an alliance of two or several small states or 4) non-alignment/neutrality.³ In an effort to preserve its political sovereignty, Denmark’s traditional inclination has been to avoid security agreements involving great powers. Absent the conditions for pursuing the third option mentioned above, Denmark maintained a staunch preference for neutrality from 1864 (following its defeat in the Schleswig-Holstein War) until the post-World War II era.⁴ During this period Denmark’s security policies exempted it from any major military conflict, including World War I. In fact, after World War I Danish

³ “Security Problems of Small Nations,” 36.

⁴ Heisler, “Denmark’s Quest for Security,” 60.

Foreign Minister P. Munch adopted a neutrality posture that attempted an even greater withdrawal from great power politics. Munch summarized the approach, known as *ligge død* (translated “stay put”), as follows: “The first and last demand which we must make on Danish diplomacy is that it shall keep quiet and do its utmost to secure that we may live as unnoticed as possible.”⁵

Denmark’s neutrality postured was deemed unsustainable following the events of World War II. On 9 April 1940, Adolph Hitler reneged on his 1939 non-aggression pact with Denmark, as German forces invaded and subsequently occupied Denmark. The failure of Danish neutrality to prevent German aggression had a lasting effect on its post-war foreign policy stance. Absent the economic strength and political will to drastically increase its military power, Denmark abandoned formal neutrality and began considering alignment options. As I describe below, however, Denmark did not completely forsake its neutrality roots.

Denmark’s post-war position left it vulnerable to both a resurgent Germany and an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union. The Social Democratic Party, the Liberals and the Conservatives each agreed that alignment should first be pursued “outside the framework of the emerging Western and Soviet blocs.”⁶ Only when plans for a Scandinavian Defense Union (SDU) fell apart - due to disagreements between Norway and Sweden – did Denmark turn to the American-led North Atlantic alliance.⁷ An invitation to join the alliance was offered on 15 March 1949 and Danish leaders, somewhat reluctantly, accepted. As Martin Heisler explains:

⁵ Quoted in Petersen and Due-Nielsen, *Adaptation and Activism*, 15.

⁶ Heisler, “Denmark’s Quest for Security,” 64.

⁷ Norway preferred an SDU that would be aligned with the West, while Sweden did not. *Ibid.*

“For Denmark, the choice of NATO was made because none of the preferred alternatives was available.”⁸

Though it was widely agreed that Denmark would be a difficult territory to defend in the event of a Soviet invasion, Denmark’s littoral advantages made it an acceptable addition to the Western alliance. NATO access to Greenland was also a chief priority for American strategists, who welcomed the use of the vast island for commercial and military air bases.⁹ But Denmark’s somewhat unenthusiastic participation in NATO defense strategies was a challenge for the U.S. for the duration of the Cold War. While they were formally allied with the West, the Danes were determined to portray a non-provocative posture vis-à-vis the Soviets. In sum, Denmark tried to enjoy the best of both worlds; it valued the protection of the alliance, but maintained a quasi-neutrality stance with the East.¹⁰ The endeavor – combined with the domestic pressures of a social welfare state¹¹ - led to several contentious policies that directly affected the alliance. These included, for example: 1) an unwillingness to base foreign aircraft or troops on the Danish mainland in peacetime,¹² 2) a failure to maintain an adequate defense capability¹³ and 3) a

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Wilkinson, “Denmark and NATO,” 394.

¹⁰ See Dörfer, “Scandinavia and NATO.”

¹¹ Joffe, “The “Scandilux” Connection,” 236.

¹² Following a 1951 NATO study, it was concluded that the alliance needed U.S. Air Force squadrons stationed in Denmark proper (i.e. Jutland). The Danish government rejected the proposal in 1953, establishing the basis for the long-standing Danish position. However, in 1976 the Danish government agreed to arrange for wartime access to five of its air bases by permitting the U.S. to preposition fuel, spare parts and ammunition at the bases. It did not allow for similar preparations for U.S. Marine forces. At the same time, the government gave the U.S. military substantial access to Greenland. Dörfer, “Scandinavia and NATO,” 18, 20.

¹³ Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making*, 56.

refusal to allow nuclear weapons in Denmark.¹⁴ Again, these policies were established in an effort to minimize tensions with the Soviets and thus prevent some of the potential consequences of the well-known “security dilemma” in IR.¹⁵

The friction between the U.S. and Denmark increased further during the 1980’s, when the U.S. curtailed its strategy of *détente* and pushed through its nuclear weapons modernization program (known as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF) and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). These actions alienated a left-leaning Danish public that was highly skeptical of nuclear politics and led to the dark ages of Danish-NATO cooperation. Danish participation in NATO in the 1980s is commonly known as the ‘footnote period,’ as Danish leaders – though they did not formally veto U.S. policies - added their official objections to several American initiatives. In a work published in 1985, Heisler described the consequences of the Danish resistance:

Over the past few years, Denmark has become the focus – indeed, for some, the symbol – of “under-performance” of Alliance responsibilities along several lines. Specific criticisms of Danish policy have been based on the perception that it is “free-riding” – shirking its responsibilities – in terms of its budgetary effort for defense, as well as providing less than optimal support for Alliance policies. The pejorative term “Denmarkization” has come to symbolize a greater or lesser tendency in this direction in Alliance-related behavior and policies of some states, Denmark most of all.¹⁶

In sum, what becomes apparent from an analysis of Danish participation in NATO during the Cold War is that a majority of its influence attempts were of a principally

¹⁴ The refusal to allow nuclear weapons included U.S. naval ships that visited ports in Denmark. For most of the Cold War, this stipulation was enforced on “good faith,” as it was in Norway. However, in 1988 the Danish parliament passed legislation that required port officials to transmit via radio a “reminder” to U.S. captains that Denmark was a nuclear-free nation. Heisler, “Denmark’s Quest for Security,” 69-70; Smith, *Pressure: How America Runs NATO*, 199.

¹⁵ See Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.”

¹⁶ “Denmark’s Quest for Security,” 65.

reactive nature. In the vernacular of this study's dependent variable, Denmark primarily exhibited *defensive* influence. It sought to moderate the alliance's reliance on purely military-related strategies to promote European security and instead advocated the merits of détente, collective security, the rule of law and self-determination. Moves away from these principles resulted in resistance on the part of the Danes.

Denmark had a mixed record of success as a small power "vetoer". On the one hand, it was relatively successful in thwarting U.S. attempts at using the Danish mainland as a platform for American military might. It also withstood – with few real consequences – the frequent criticisms that it was "free-riding" on the U.S. defense commitment. On the other hand, Denmark was generally unsuccessful in its attempts to prevent unpopular NATO policies that were outside its formal jurisdiction. For example, Denmark initially opposed all three phases of NATO expansion – that is, to Turkey, Greece, West Germany and Spain – largely due to the increased risk of entrapment and to claims that these countries (especially Turkey and Spain) did not have adequate cultural ties or sufficient track records of democracy.¹⁷ Denmark also failed to steer the alliance away from what it felt were overly aggressive nuclear doctrines (e.g. "massive retaliation," "first-use" and the INF initiative). These failures occurred in spite of Denmark's formal veto power in the NAC – an indicator of the limitations of a small power's institutional power when systemic factors are paramount. In short, Denmark recognized its ultimate dependence on greater powers in the alliance and the natural loss of influence that

¹⁷ Wilkinson, "Denmark and NATO," 395-400; Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War*, 79, 140.

this entailed.

The end of the Cold War dramatically changed Denmark's relationship with NATO. In a very short period of time, Denmark changed from a persistent impediment to U.S. direction in the alliance, to a veritable leader in NATO's recent transformation. While in the past Denmark saw NATO as a necessary evil, it now embraces the organization as a vital pillar of its security approach – one that is consistent with its overall security outlook. Denmark's participation in the policy-making process is no longer exemplified by its defensive influence (i.e. efforts to veto great power influence attempts), but rather its offensive influence (i.e. proactive efforts to define and shape the organization's goals and decisions).

Denmark and the NATO Membership for the Baltic States

According to Jonathan Eyal, “the decision to enlarge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization represents the most serious and complicated transformation in Europe's security arrangements since the collapse of the Berlin Wall.”¹⁸ To be sure, the consequences of adding additional members to the alliance are especially serious given the implications of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Nonetheless, as early as January of 1994 U.S. President Bill Clinton was already declaring that “the question was no longer whether NATO will take in new members, but when and how.”¹⁹ The following year NATO completed an in-house study on the matter that concluded that “the end of the Cold War provided a unique opportunity to build improved security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area and that NATO enlargement

¹⁸ “NATO's Enlargement,” 695.

¹⁹ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 703.

would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all.”²⁰ Despite these statements, the enlargement strategy – like most NATO decisions – ultimately depends on member consensus. Considering the enormous ramifications of such an endeavor, it is not surprising that consensus was difficult to achieve.

While both the in-house NATO study and the U.S. concurred that expanding the alliance would contribute to stabilizing the region, it was the “when and how?” - and more importantly the “who?” - that became the more challenging questions for the alliance. The complexities of the issue ignited a fierce debate within the alliance. To begin with, it is not surprising that the anticipated costs and benefits of extending membership are not perceived uniformly across the alliance. In short, enlargement typically hinges on five related concerns: 1) the predicted Russian response, 2) the feasibility of defending the potential ally from an attack, 3) the anticipated cost to the alliance (to include how that cost will be distributed), 4) the extent to which the potential ally’s domestic institutions conform to NATO’s principles and norms and 5) how enlargement might affect the “balance of influence” within NATO.

On all five issues the newly independent Baltic states faced an uphill battle in their pursuit for membership. If they had any chance of securing their place in NATO – an objective they pursued very early on - they needed a champion from *within* the alliance to fight for their cause. From the time that NATO enlargement in Europe became a real possibility to the day that Estonia, and Latvia and Lithuania became official members in 2004, the Balts had no greater advocate in the alliance than the nation of Denmark. While it is true that Baltic membership could not have been

²⁰ “NATO Enlargement.”

achieved without the eventual support of the U.S., it is possible that without the skill and determination of the Danish government, Baltic membership would today remain in a state of limbo – a position that countries like Ukraine and Georgia understand all too well. As one former U.S. official from the State Department put it, “If the Danes hadn’t pushed for it, it is perfectly plausible that NATO enlargement would not have included the Baltic States.”²¹ Below I describe how this small power in NATO “pushed for” and eventually prevailed on this long-term and important NATO decision. I discuss the controversy surrounding the enlargement debate and why membership for the Baltic states was initially viewed as chimeric. In short, I argue that Baltic membership in NATO cannot be understood without an appreciation for the role of Danish initiatives.

The first hurdle in the general enlargement process was the effort to include a newly unified Germany in the Atlantic alliance. Because the prospect largely hinged on securing a favorable response from the Soviets, government officials and academics in the West initially viewed it as a “mission impossible.” Accordingly, the eventual Soviet acquiescence to the plan was deemed by some as one of President George H. W. Bush’s “greatest foreign policy accomplishments.”²² However, in the eyes of the Moscow officials, the arrangement came with an explicit guarantee that NATO expansion would end here.²³ Whether the concession was actually offered is still open for debate, but the perception from Russia made it increasingly challenging for the forthcoming enlargement process. Any talk of extension

²¹ Asmus, “Interview by author.”

²² Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 3.

²³ The promise allegedly came from Secretary of State James Baker and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. See Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 4-5; Eyal, “NATO's Enlargement,” 698-699.

eastward was seen as reneging on previous arrangements and as taking advantage of Russia's internal troubles. Consequently, fears of an aggressive Russian response were foremost in the minds of European leaders.

In addition to the "Russian problem," France disliked enlargement because it feared the policy would result in a relative loss of influence in Europe and in NATO. As Frank Schimmelfennig describes, "the French government perceived NATO enlargement as a way to maintain U.S. dominance in the new Europe."²⁴ France also feared that Germany's close economic ties with Central Europe would potentially lead to a formidable coalition of influence inside the alliance – with Germany as its natural head.²⁵ The British, on the other hand, were averse to the policy for more pragmatic reasons. They felt it would reduce the cohesiveness and effectiveness of the alliance and argued that "enlargement should enhance the security of the alliance as a whole and not just that of individual members."²⁶

The concern over NATO expansion was also felt on the other side of the Atlantic, as several prominent American foreign policy experts and scholars – to include George Kennan and Thomas Friedman - warned of a pending resurrection of the Cold War.²⁷ Inside the U.S. government the policy was no less controversial. President Bill Clinton faced strong resistance from officials in the State Department

²⁴ "NATO's Enlargement to the East," 39.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Fifty former senators, cabinet secretaries, ambassadors, etc. sent a letter to President Clinton in June 1997, urging him to reconsider NATO expansion. See "NATO Expansion"; Kennan called the plan "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era." "NATO Expansion Would Be a Fateful Blunder"; See also "NATO Expansion and the Danger of a Second Cold War"; and Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When*, 140-141.

(especially the Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott²⁸), the Department of Defense (especially Secretary of Defense, William Perry) and from his own senior staff.²⁹ U.S. military leaders also conveyed anxiety. As one State Department official recounted: “The U.S. military was looking for ways to reduce its engagement in Europe – not to increase it. Talk about using NATO to project stability did not sound like a real military mission to many senior uniformed officers.”³⁰

Finally, enlargement faced an institutional barrier in that NATO expansion requires more than just approval from the NAC. Most countries in NATO require the endorsement of parliament in order to accept new members into the Treaty. For example, ratification of NATO enlargement in the U.S. requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate.³¹ This means that – even more than other NATO decisions - the decision-making process inherently takes on a domestic dimension, as Heads of State must engage directly in Robert Putnam’s well-known “two-level game.”³² According to the 1995 predictions of scholar Charles Kupchan, the domestic aspects of enlargement would ultimately lead to the policy’s failure: “In the America I live in, political willingness to send troops into harm’s way has been shrinking since the Cold War’s end, not expanding...[A]s soon as debate on the Senate floor gets serious

²⁸ Hunter, “Interview by author.”

²⁹ Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 27, 96-98 .

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 28.

³¹ For a summary of NATO members' legal and administrative processes for enlargement ratification see Sean Kay and Hans Binnendijk, “After the Madrid Summit: Parliamentary Ratification of NATO Enlargement,” *Strategic Forum*, March 1997.

³² See “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.”

and turns to dollars and lives, the rest of the country will suddenly pay attention. Overnight, NATO expansion becomes a big loser.”³³

Given these obstacles, it is indeed remarkable that the enlargement process continued into its next phase. However, the venture benefitted from early support from within one of NATO’s big hitters: Germany. In particular, it was the German Defense Minister, Volker R  he, who became one of the earliest and most public proponents of expansion.³⁴ R  he was worried about the security implications of having a non-aligned region on Germany’s eastern border. In October of 1993 he argued that “preemptive crisis management for us Germans means that we move the Western stability zone as far as possible to the East. It is not in Germany’s interest to remain a state on the eastern fringes of the Western prosperity zone.”³⁵

The idea also benefitted from the support of scholars from an influential American think tank: the RAND Corporation. At the same time that R  he was going public with his perspective on the future of European security, Ronald Asmus, F. Stephen Larrabee and Richard Kugler published a widely circulated article in *Foreign Affairs* titled “Building a New NATO.”³⁶ In it they laid out some of the first comprehensive and compelling arguments *for* and *against* enlargement. In the end, the article promoted both EU and NATO membership for the Visegrad nations (i.e. for Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and possibly Slovakia), and at the same time advocated an increase in diplomatic, economic and military cooperation with

³³ Quoted in Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When*, 142.

³⁴ R  he’s open support for enlargement dates back to May 1993. “R  he Calls for Ex-East Bloc to Join NATO.”

³⁵ Quoted in Boyes, “Bonn Wants East in Updated NATO,” 6.

³⁶ The first (non-public) draft of the article was titled “The Twin Arcs of Crisis.” “Building a New NATO.”

the Russians. The popularity of the article caught the attention of R uhe, who subsequently convinced the German government to finance RAND for further research on the subject. According to Asmus, the arrangement created somewhat of a “mini-sensation,” as RAND had to this point never taken money from a foreign government to conduct a defense-related study.³⁷ Nonetheless, the research was approved and a second article resulted (1995).³⁸ Authored by the same three scholars that had published the 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article, it addressed more specifically the *process* through which the alliance might extend membership to Central Europe.

At the end of the day, the arguments in support of enlargement convinced President Clinton and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake that – despite its difficulties - the policy needed to go forward. In his second term, Clinton strategically appointed Madeleine Albright as his new Secretary of State. Born in Czechoslovakia, Albright had firsthand knowledge of and a personal appreciation for Central Europe and its tragic history. Highly respected on both sides of the Atlantic, she became an effective advocate for Clinton’s new vision for NATO. In brief, Albright’s appointment signaled the seriousness of the U.S. position and created the necessary momentum for the policy heading into the 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid. Despite the initial objections from France and the U.K., enlargement into Central Europe (especially to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) eventually became viewed as a *fait accompli*.

As NATO’s great powers focused their attention on the future of Central

³⁷ Asmus, “Interview by author.”

³⁸ Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee, “NATO - Expansion.”

Europe, the Baltic states were initially left out of the enlargement debate. Given the conditions surrounding Baltic membership, this is not surprising. As I explain below, however, Denmark persistently kept the Baltic issue on the NATO radar. It used its knowledge of the Baltic region, a judicious use of limited resources and adept diplomatic skills to help make Baltic membership a reality. Any IR approach that insists on paying inordinate attention to NATO's great powers will miss the significant contributions of Denmark towards this end. In sum, Baltic membership in NATO cannot be understood without an appreciation for the Danish leadership role.

The Baltics, You've Got to be Kidding Me!

It is difficult to imagine anything that could more rapidly destroy any prospect of a cooperative relationship [with the West and Japan] than a Russian incursion into the Baltics, whatever the justification claimed. . . . Baltic membership of NATO would be a particular provocation to the Russians, and a nightmare for Western military planners.


*Engaging Russia: A Report to the Trilateral Commission*³⁹

Unique among the Soviet republics, the Baltic states were the only three nations that existed as fully independent countries prior to World War II. Their inclusion in the USSR was the ultimate consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939, when Stalin agreed to leave Poland's fate to Hitler in exchange for control of the tiny (but strategically important) Baltics. Nearly fifty years later, these republics declared their independence from a weakening USSR in the spring of 1990 – a courageous move considering the Soviet forces that remained in the region. An almost equally gutsy decision was the early recognition of this independence on

³⁹ *Engaging Russia*, 119.

the part of the Nordic countries – Denmark being the first.⁴⁰

Figure 4.2 Map of the Baltic Region



Source: Bildt, "The Baltic Litmus Test," 77.

Though Russian President Boris Yeltsin eventually recognized the independence of the Baltic states in September 1991, Russian troops remained inside their borders until the fall of 1994. In addition to Russia's lingering military footprint in the region, the Baltic governments had to contend with another Cold War legacy: the presence of a large number of Russian-speaking inhabitants in their territories.⁴¹ This reality, which was especially prevalent in Estonia and Latvia, was the consequence of "Soviet policies of heavy industrialization and deliberate demographic change" that prevented post-war repatriation for dispersed Baltic citizens and brought thousands of Russians to the region.⁴²

The scenario witnessed here contrasts significantly with that observed in

⁴⁰ The U.S. was the thirty-fourth country to recognize Baltic independence. As Ron Asmus reported from his visits to the region: "One could hardly spend an evening in a pub in Tallinn, Riga or Vilnius without someone bringing up the fact that President George Bush had hesitated in recognizing Baltic independence in 1991 for fear of undercutting Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev." Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 232.

⁴¹ Before WWII, the Russian minority populations in Estonia and Latvia were less than ten percent - today, they are around 36 and 28 percent respectively. MccGwire, "NATO Expansion."

⁴² "The Baltic Litmus Test," 78-79.

Central Europe. Russia's Cold War investment in the Baltics gave it an inherently greater interest in the region's future. It was from this perspective that Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt wrote the 1994 *Foreign Affairs* article cited just above. Bildt insisted that, "More than any other part of the former Soviet empire, Russia's policies toward the Baltic countries will be the litmus test of its new direction."⁴³ However, while the Prime Minister simultaneously recommended policies of increased economic and security cooperation between Western Europe and the Baltics (e.g. via the EU and the WEU), he stopped short of even mentioning the North Atlantic alliance. His silence underscored a soon familiar caution for the West: *don't go too far*.

In addition to the problems mentioned above, the Baltics' potential integration into NATO was hampered by its paucity of military power and its location. While countries like Poland and the Czech Republic had relatively robust and self-sufficient forces, the Baltics were essentially starting from scratch. Given Article 3's pledge of "mutual aid," NATO's great powers feared this would place an unacceptable burden on their defense resources. This fact, coupled with the region's close proximity to Russia (both the mainland and the Kaliningrad enclave), meant that a strategy of forward defense would be – in the minds of most military leaders – politically and militarily unfeasible. As one report concluded:

Before accepting these nations into the Alliance, serious consideration would have to be given regarding how NATO would defend their borders and make good on its Article V obligations. Given their geographic position, utter vulnerability and the impossibility of defending them with conventional forces, this would seem to entail the stationing of American troops on their soil

⁴³ Ibid., 72.

to try to provide credible deterrence through a nuclear trip wire.⁴⁴

That said, even if the alliance agreed to station American troops in the region, the move would certainly provoke a strong response from Russia.

Denmark as Mentor

Despite the substantial barriers described above, Denmark was able to manipulate the parameters surrounding the Baltic predicament so that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were able to join the NATO alliance. To be clear, Denmark did not desire Baltic membership in the very beginning. As I indicate below, this policy shift came a short time later. But Danish leaders did appreciate early on that the new security environment in Europe presented it with both opportunities and risks that demanded immediate attention. They also recognized that while the West faced a plethora of post-Cold War challenges, the state's small size meant it was not equipped to participate across a wide variety of issues.

From this position, Denmark first developed a strategy based on regional cooperation with the Baltics. From 1993 to 1994 Denmark signed bilateral security agreements with five nations, to include the Baltics, Poland and Russia. The initiatives were later integrated into the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace program, with the goal of strengthening "mutual relations in the military field" through joint military training and exercises, security courses, search and rescue operations, military exchanges and consultations between military leaders at all

⁴⁴ *Engaging Russia*, 48.

levels.⁴⁵ The efforts contributed positively to the region's stability while not overwhelming the Danish military. As the Minister of Defense, Hans Hækkerup, explained:

It is emphasized in the agreements that activities related to the area around the Baltic Sea will be given priority because, in its cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries, Denmark has chosen to concentrate on this zone. Realistically, we do not have the resources to make a noticeable contribution by cooperating individually with all the Central and Eastern European countries, so, rather than do a little in many places, we will do as much as possible closer to home.⁴⁶

An important derivative of the Danish agreements was the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT). The project was a multinational effort to create a joint peacekeeping unit suitable for UN Chapter VI operations. BALTBAT is coordinated by Denmark, but also receives assistance from Finland, Norway and Sweden. In an effort to express their rejection of Russian influence and their embrace of the West, the Baltics insisted on conducting the cooperative endeavor in English. The British, who were initially hesitant to provide more direct and open support to the project for fear of provoking the Russians, agreed nonetheless to provide the Baltic troops with English language training.⁴⁷ The U.S., Poland and Germany agreed to contribute equipment. The battalion included a multinational headquarters and three rifle companies, one from each of the Baltic states.⁴⁸ Many of these soldiers gained on-the-job experience when they deployed as part of a Danish peacekeeping unit in Croatia and as a part of the Nordic Brigade in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Though their input to the operation was

⁴⁵ "Cooperation around the Baltic Sea."

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Carlsen, "Interview by author."

⁴⁸ Moller, "BALTBAT - Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead," 38.

admittedly small, the venture demonstrated that these nations were willing and able to contribute to NATO's post-Cold War security activities. The BALTBAT program was complemented by an array of other mentoring initiatives, to include BALTDEFCOL (a combined Baltic defense college in Estonia), BALTNET (an internationally manned Air Surveillance and Coordination Centre located in Lithuania) and BALTRON (a joint Baltic Squadron of naval vessels).⁴⁹

The BALT-programs quickly became a framework from which other NATO members would assist and advise future alliance candidates. Even U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry – an outspoken skeptic of Baltic membership - lauded the program in a speech in Copenhagen in September 1996:

The Baltic Battalion is the model that we all look to - and we can thank our host nation, Denmark, and their defense minister, Hans Hækkerup, for his personal leadership in this really magnificent effort. It is precisely this kind of mentoring that will bring countries like the Baltics into meaningful participation in the partnership and ultimately it will make NATO membership a reality for them.⁵⁰

Perry's comment reveals an important issue on the minds of U.S. leaders. The most important value added from the Danish-Baltic partnership could not be measured in terms of equipment, technical expertise, organizational structures and the like. To be sure, these results contributed positively to the Baltics' eventual membership. But the real significance of the partnership was that the U.S. realized it would not have to share the burdens of Baltic membership alone - it could count on the Nordic nations, especially Denmark, to take an active role in bringing the Baltics "into the fold."

⁴⁹ Larrabee, *The Baltic States and NATO Membership*, 3-4.

⁵⁰ "NATO and a "Super" Partners in Europe."

As discussed previously, Danish activism is a new phenomenon – and one not expected from a small power. But in this case Denmark played an important role. It changed the boundaries of what was possible in a way that great powers might have been unable to do. It used its knowledge of the region and of small power politics to develop appropriate security agreements and assistance programs. Its small power status meant that it could take the lead on such initiatives without provoking a strong response from the Russians. In fact, whenever possible Denmark and its Nordic partners invited the Russians to participate in their security-related policies – to include, for example, military training and multinational exercises. Finally, Danish leadership made it possible for NATO’s great powers to contribute – in supporting roles - to the security policies for the Baltic region. In summary, what began as a policy to engage in regional defense cooperation soon became a stepping-stone for something more ambitious: NATO membership. While this was not an original goal of the Danish government, the momentum that was building for expansion into Central Europe added an even greater incentive to support the Baltics. In the eyes of Danish leaders, expansion’s progeny would be a security vacuum in the Baltics – and one that an increasingly insecure Russia might find too enticing to leave alone.

Shaping the Debate

Danish leaders realized early on that membership for the Baltics required more than changing the facts on the ground; they would have to shape the forthcoming debate in NATO’s vast decision-making circles. On the former issue no

one could deny the positive transformations taking place from within each of the Baltic states. Democratic reform occurred at an impressive rate, and Estonia and Latvia (with Danish prodding and assistance⁵¹) began adopting constructive policies towards integrating their Russian minorities. Nordic-Baltic security initiatives were recognized as exemplary policies for preparing states for entrance into the alliance. These steps no-doubt moved them closer to their goal. But domestic reform is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for NATO membership. The process entails much more than fulfilling the requirements of a membership checklist. At the end of the day each existing NATO member – in particular the great powers - must be convinced that such a decision is in its best interest. Thus if Baltic membership was going to happen, Denmark had two options: 1) engage directly in the debate and attempt to “punch above its weight” or 2) find a great power sponsor to assist in the “fight.” In the end Denmark used a combination of both strategies to achieve its goal.

Given the harsh resistance to the idea of Baltic membership among Europe’s great powers,⁵² both Danish and Baltic leaders focused most of their efforts on influencing the U.S. For their part, the Baltics sent their top diplomats to Washington – some of them former U.S. citizens – to plead their case with White House officials. They also benefitted from the lobbying efforts of the “small but well organized” Baltic-Americans, who took advantage of opportunities to speak to the U.S. Congress

⁵¹ Petersen, “Danish Security Policy After the Cold War: Adaptation and Innovation,” 184.

⁵² The Baltic states had hoped for greater political backing from Germany, but Chancellor Kohl's concern over the Russian response precluded active support. Following a disappointing visit by the Estonian President to Bonn, a German paper concluded that “[t]he confidence that was originally placed in Germany as the strong and reliable 'champion of the Balts' in the West has thus been undermined.” “Baltic States 'Disappointed' with Bonn on NATO Entry.”

as often as they could.⁵³ However, on the whole Baltic leaders remained impatient with the pace at which the U.S. was addressing its security concerns. The initial enthusiasm that was felt after joining the PfP program in early 1994 soon faded. Baltic leaders understood that this program fell short of promising any real security guarantees. By the end of that year all three countries made it clear that their foreign policy goals including nothing short of an American promise for defense.⁵⁴ But the U.S. administration's ardent focus on Russian security sensitivities and domestic reform left doubts in the minds of Baltic politicians. They constantly feared that U.S.-Russian negotiations were heading towards a compromise that would permit NATO enlargement to Central Europe at the expense of the Baltics.⁵⁵

Meanwhile, the Danes began considering other American influence nodes. One of the most creative tactics the Danish government used to affect the enlargement debate was its cooperative engagement with RAND scholars. The popularity and impact of the articles published in 1993 and 1995 impressed Danish diplomats, but they made little mention of the Baltics. The Danish Defense Ministry sent one of its top officials, Ambassador Per Carlsen, to RAND to address the issue. Carlsen hoped that RAND would be willing to take their German-funded study one step further and present the Baltic case. However, Danish laws precluded the allocation of government funds to foreign research institutions like RAND. Because Carlsen

⁵³ Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 158-159.

⁵⁴ Hultdt, "The Enlargement and the Baltic States," 168-169.

⁵⁵ In fact, the Russian President had this plan in mind leading up to the Madrid Summit. As Steve Larrabee reported: "At the Helsinki summit in March 1997, President Yeltsin tried to get a private oral agreement from President Clinton - a 'gentleman's agreement' that would not be made public - not to admit the Baltic states into the Alliance. President Clinton flatly refused to make such a commitment." *The Baltic States and NATO Membership*, 5.

recognized that a Danish publication would not carry the necessary political weight, he made the trip to RAND headquarters in Santa Monica to see if an arrangement could be made.⁵⁶

Carlsen sat down with the RAND team to convey the fundamental Danish position: “You can’t enlarge NATO without thinking about the Baltics.” According to Carlsen, it was time to start thinking about NATO membership for these three small nations. As Asmus recounted later, the assertion initially shocked him: “You’ve got to be kidding me!” he thought, “It’s going to take a miracle just to get Poland in!” But Carlsen explained his reasoning in sensible, policy-oriented terms. The arguments were strong, but the authors doubted their ability to make the case. “For one,” Asmus admitted to Carlsen, “I’ve never even been to the Baltics!” To that Carlsen responded, “I’ll take you.” The agreement resulted in a one-week tour of the Baltic region that included the original enlargement researchers (Asmus, Larrabee and Kugler), as well as a Soviet studies scholar, Robert Nurick. The trip – approved and sponsored by the Danish Defense Minister - served as a quasi-payment for the study.⁵⁷

Prior to the trip, Asmus and Nurick put together the first draft of an article that addressed the pros and cons of Baltic membership, as well as the initiatives that should be supported leading to this milestone. The draft was distributed to senior officials in Washington, Copenhagen and the three Baltic states. When they arrived in Vilnius, the authors were somewhat surprised by the Lithuanian reaction to the draft. Nurick described their unforeseen welcome in a recent phone interview:

⁵⁶ Carlsen, “Interview by author.”

⁵⁷ Carlsen, “Interview by author”; Asmus, “Interview by author.”

The Baltic tour was very interesting – it started in Lithuania. They had seen a draft of the article before we arrived. We didn't expect a parade, but thought we had done them at least a small service by raising the issue. The reaction of most was very different - they were furious - and for interesting reasons. In essence, the response of many was: "We were so close to getting into NATO until you wrote that article!"⁵⁸

In brief, there were two major bones of contention with the arguments raised in the article. To begin with, Asmus and Nurick understood better than their Baltic friends that the politics of NATO enlargement would exclude Baltic accession in the near future. The introductory paragraph of the article stated that "while no official 'short list' of primary candidates as yet exists, the Baltic states, for reasons detailed below, are unlikely to be in the first tranche of new Alliance members."⁵⁹ This starting point frustrated many Baltic leaders, especially the Lithuanian President, Vytautis Landsbergis. Landsbergis was still hopeful that the Baltics could secure an invitation to join the alliance at the 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid. "Landsbergis's view was simple," Asmus later wrote, "U.S. policy should be to enlarge NATO as fast as possible to remove any lingering Russian imperial temptations. Like the Nike commercial, his motto was: 'Just do it.'"⁶⁰

The second issue was the oft-repeated assertion that the Baltics were simply "indefensible." On this point the Danes felt some sympathy with the Baltic position. After all, this was the same argument raised when Denmark was first considered as a NATO member. If it were a disqualifier for membership, Danish officials asserted, then Denmark's nearly 50-year history in the alliance was also a fluke. The Danes even took the group to Bornholm (a small Danish island 120 miles southeast of

⁵⁸ Nurick, "Interview by author."

⁵⁹ "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," 121.

⁶⁰ *Opening NATO's Door*, 232-233.

Copenhagen) to emphasize their position. “If we can promise security for this small island,” the argument went, “then Baltic defense should not be an issue.”⁶¹

Despite these sticking points, the trip was ultimately a success for both the Baltics and the RAND team. For the RAND scholars, the trip gave them a greater appreciation for the Baltic perspective and their genuine desire to partner with the West. As Nurick explained: “The tour reinforced my sense that they needed support. These people are worth it.”⁶² Both authors also concurred that the tour improved the substance and the tone of the final draft. While the article did not meet all the expectations of the Baltic leaders, it was an influential work that helped keep the issue on the radar in Washington. The article, published in *Survival* in the summer of 1996, was the first substantial scholarship on the issue from a prominent American institution. Soon it was circulating among high-ranking U.S. diplomats. According to Asmus, whom Albright later hired to work for the State Department in 1996, “the RAND paper had an immediate impact in terms of framing the policy debate. [Strobe] Talbott handed out copies to visitors as an example of the kind of ideas the U.S. was considering and used it push the government’s thinking as well.”⁶³

The Politics of the Madrid Summit⁶⁴

The July 1997 Summit in Madrid was the single most critical event in the

⁶¹ Carlsen, “Interview by author.”

⁶² Nurick, “Interview by author.”

⁶³ *Opening NATO's Door*, 161.

⁶⁴ As explained in Chapter 1, one challenge of studying influence in NATO is that NAC meetings (to include Summits) are strategically held behind closed doors. The Summit described here is unique in that many of the details of its proceedings were presented in a 2002 book written by Ron Asmus. Asmus was granted permission to use classified State Department documents to complete his work. *Ibid.*, xxi.

enlargement debate.⁶⁵ As Heads of State gathered in the Spanish capital, the national positions on enlargement were – with one partial exception - well known. Each ally understood the essential arguments *for* and *against* enlargement, as well as the issues that pertained to individual states. Though it was generally accepted that three nations would be offered an invitation to join the alliance, the fate of the several other Central and Eastern European states was very uncertain. As such, the greatest debates centered on the precise language of the Summit’s forthcoming official declaration. In total, eight countries had some support for short-term membership: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. The UK delegation was unenthusiastic about enlargement in general and thus preferred to limit as much as possible the number of invitations offered. French President Jacques Chirac remained concerned about the balance of influence in the alliance and hence wanted an immediate invitation to Romania – a country with which it had close cultural and historical ties. France ultimately formed a coalition of support with Italy to advocate membership for both Romania and Slovenia. The coalition eventually grew to include Canada, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.⁶⁶ German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s position going into the Summit was the least transparent. The Germans were

⁶⁵ Just two months prior to the Summit, NATO and Russian leaders met and signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Though it did not address the issue directly, a primary goal of the Act was to alleviate Russian concerns about the forthcoming enlargement plan. The treaty reemphasized the parties’ commitment to transparency and cooperation on European security issues and proclaimed that “NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries.” More importantly, NATO promised that “in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.” The language was specific enough to ease tensions and vague enough to allow flexible interpretations. “NATO-Russia Founding Act.”

⁶⁶ Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When*, 120.

generally in favor of an inclusive enlargement process, but above all emphasized their immediate backing of their closest neighbors - Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Given Defense Minister R  he's public statements against Baltic membership and Kohl's relative silence, it was unclear whether this would lead to overt support for three, five or all eight potential members.⁶⁷

The U.S. had three primary concerns going into the NAC meeting. First, the Clinton Administration knew that Senate approval of the next wave of enlargement had a much greater chance of passing if only three candidates were on the list.⁶⁸ They also recognized that NATO's consensus rules favored this position. Accordingly, the U.S. decided to use its political capital to limit enlargement to three. Second, given France's position Clinton felt obligated to find a way to "save face" for Chirac. "I want a result in which Jacques Chirac can say that he won," Clinton insisted.⁶⁹ Finally, while the U.S. wanted language in the declaration that kept the door open (or at least did not close the door) for future members, it did not want the Summit declaration to explicitly mention future candidates.⁷⁰

Among the eight states under consideration, the Baltics had by far the least support leading up to Madrid. Though they did not expect consensus on a first round accession for the Baltic states, the Danish delegation did not want language in the declaration that would lead to an unfavorable security environment in the region. Danish Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen felt strongly that either an explicit or implicit invitation to just five members would "send the wrong signal to

⁶⁷ Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 241-243, 340 n. 102.

⁶⁸ Asmus, "Interview by author."

⁶⁹ Quoted in Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 241.

⁷⁰ Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 239-241; Hunter, "Interview by author."

Moscow . . . [and] leave the Baltic states vulnerable and subject to Russian pressure.”⁷¹ This left Denmark with two favorable outcomes: 1) an invitation to the three favored Visegrad nations, with no specific mention of other potential members, or 2) a declaration that explicitly supported the membership ambitions of all eight countries under consideration. Denmark knew it had the support of Norway and Iceland on these positions. However, Danish leaders were not sure how the Americans and Germans would respond to the French, who wanted open support for Romania, but seemed adamant that Baltic membership should not be addressed – even indirectly - at this Summit.

The NATO Heads of State assembled as the NAC on 8 July 1997. As the Summit got under way, the U.S. delegation quickly expended its political clout to limit the next round of expansion to three countries. Having acquiesced to this result, the French and Italian diplomats worked to secure language that would clearly endorse Romania and Slovenia and, from the Danish perspective, prejudice the Baltic states. It was up to Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen to fight for the Baltics – a mission he pursued with great resolve. “Unless I get my language about the Baltics,” he insisted, “There will be no agreement.”⁷² Eventually the NATO SecGen, Javier Solana, introduced a compromise that included two separate paragraphs - the first one supporting Romania and Slovenia and the second one supporting the Baltics. After several heated exchanges between the French and Italians (who rejected the compromise) and the Danes (who accepted it), Chancellor Kohl offered his support for the SecGen’s solution. No further objections were raised and the issue was

⁷¹ Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 244-245.

⁷² Hunter, “Interview by author.”

settled.⁷³ The exact language of the compromise, taken from the *Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation*, is provided below:

With regard to the aspiring members, we recognise with great interest and take account of the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law in a number of southeastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia.

... At the same time, we recognise the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region, which are also aspiring members. As we look to the future of the Alliance, progress towards these objectives will be important for our overall goal of a free, prosperous and undivided Europe at peace.⁷⁴

The language in the above paragraphs was significant in that both groups were officially referenced as “aspiring members.” While this did not guarantee eventual membership for these states, it did commit the organization to a new direction. For the first time the NAC publicly announced that the Baltic nations were headed toward full membership in the alliance.⁷⁵ This was particularly significant given the rhetoric of NATO leaders, who regularly insisted that Moscow did not have ‘veto authority’ over enlargement decisions. Since it was well known that the Baltic issue hinged primarily on the Russian question, backing out after Madrid would signal submission to Russian demands.

In April of 1999, NATO launched its Membership Action Plan (MAP). Building on the lessons learned from the PfP program and the accession experiences of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, MAP was more specifically tailored to prepare

⁷³ Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, 245-248.

⁷⁴ “Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation.”

⁷⁵ The Danish and American officials that I interviewed concurred with this assertion. Per Carlsen insisted that “[Madrid] is where we got the results.” Carlsen, “Interview by author”; Ron Asmus stated that “If the language about the Balts as ‘aspiring members’ had not been in the communiqués, I don’t think they’d be in today.” Asmus, “Interview by author.”

individual nations who sought alliance membership. As the Baltic states continued their domestic reform efforts according to NATO's membership criteria, it became increasingly difficult for the remaining skeptics to support enlargement to other states without recognising the rights of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As former George W. Bush official and Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker recounts: "The Baltic states outperformed everybody else. They created impeccable democratic institutions and became responsible for their Russian minorities. They were the stars. We couldn't credibly enlarge to other nations without enlarging to the Baltics."⁷⁶

By 2001, the U.S. position on the issue became unambiguous. In a July speech in Warsaw, President Bush threw down the American gauntlet:

All of Europe's new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom – and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe – as Europe's old democracies have. . . . As we plan the [2002 NATO] Prague Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom.

The statement signaled the U.S. commitment to a second round of enlargement that would include the Baltics. Though the Germans were perhaps the last of NATO's great powers to acquiesce to such an ambitious policy, by 2001 leaders of both the governing and opposition parties in Germany seemed willing to go along with the plan.⁷⁷ At the Prague Summit, the Baltics (along with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) received official invitations to join the alliance. Unlike the Madrid Summit, there were no objections from NATO allies. All seven countries became

⁷⁶ "Interview by author"; By 2003, both the OSCE and the EU certified that Baltic citizenship laws conformed to their institutional norms. *The Baltic States and NATO Membership*, 6.

⁷⁷ Larrabee, "NATO Enlargement: Prague and Beyond."

official NATO members on 29 March 2004.

Explaining the Danish Influence

Based on this study's definition of influence (i.e. *a state's demonstrated ability to achieve desired alliance policies*), the Danish contribution to enlargement to the Baltic states is clearly a case of significant small power influence in NATO.

Enlargement has been one of the most consequential and contentious policies in NATO's post-Cold War history. Within the alliance, great power preferences differed substantially. Even the U.S. - who eventually put its superpower weight behind the policy - did not initially support the plan, especially to the Baltics. Denmark, on the other hand, steadily promoted enlargement to the Baltics despite its unpopularity. It worked in the region to favorably change the actual characteristics and structural relationships of these countries, and its leaders skillfully manipulated the political mechanisms within NATO circles to achieve their goals. The eventual partnership between the U.S. and Denmark towards this outcome does not diminish the important part that Denmark played. To be sure, Baltic membership would not have occurred without American support. But Danish leaders played a key role in promoting this objective inside U.S. policy-making forums. The Danish success in securing robust pro-membership language in the Madrid Summit declaration – a case where the U.S. was reluctant to take a hard stance – further indicates the disproportionate impact of this small NATO nation. Below I assess the extent to which the hypothesized variables presented in Chapter 3 explain this specific outcome.

Security Dependency

While it is difficult to gauge the relative significance of the precursors to influence, of great importance in the case of Denmark is the dramatic decrease in its dependence on great power members for its security. In a short period of time Denmark went from being a front-line state on the European battlefield – one where the nearest Soviet air bases were just four minutes away – to an ally that, since 1992, has no perceived direct threat to its territorial integrity.⁷⁸ Using the criteria established in Chapter 3, the Danes perceive little *imminent, probable, proximate* or *severe* threat to their territory or population. The perception is encapsulated in a 2004 document published by Danish Ministry of Defence, which states that: “The current security policy situation is characterized by the lack of a conventional threat to the Danish territory in the foreseeable future.”⁷⁹

A noteworthy result of this new environment is that alliance solidarity against communist imperialism and fears of abandonment – issues that used to limit the extent to which Denmark could realistically challenge U.S. leadership – are no longer critical. In its place is an environment where a small state like Denmark now has the opportunity and the incentives to pursue its own objectives in NATO. When international tensions are high, small powers like Denmark are generally forced to “hunker down” within a defensive alliance while the great powers engage in policies of *realpolitik*. Reduced tensions permit the opposite response. Especially following transition periods - when international tensions shift from high to low threat - small

⁷⁸ Petersen, “Danish Security Policy After the Cold War: Adaptation and Innovation,” 171-177.

⁷⁹ “Danish Armed Forces: International Perspectives,” 6.

powers have increased chances to engage in proactive foreign-policy endeavors. As it concerns the Baltic case, Denmark seized the opportunities that resulted from the post-Cold War transition to alter the security framework in the Baltic region. Its leadership role is a prime example of a small power capitalizing on a more peaceful yet underspecified security environment. As the world's great powers – particularly Russia and the U.S. – scrambled to manage the wide-ranging consequences of the Cold War's end, Denmark took a proactive role in its “own backyard” – a role it likely would not have risked if the Russian threat still existed.

This outcome is largely consistent with a major tenet of neorealism, a perspective that gives a clear precedence to structural factors when explaining outcomes in IR. As Kenneth Waltz explains, “Structural change affects the behavior of states and the outcomes their interactions produce.”⁸⁰ At the same time, however, the Danish case demonstrates the limits of an approach focused excessively on great powers. Given that NATO is no longer an alliance that emphasizes the deterrent power of large conventional armies and the American nuclear umbrella, an ally's AMP – while it remains an important factor in the influence equation – is no longer directly linked to a vital relationship of security dependency. Thus while power and dependency remain important predictors of influence in NATO, recent events indicate that other factors are required to understand the transformations taking place in post-Cold War Europe. This is especially evident given that – compared to Denmark - other small powers played only minor parts in the first two rounds of enlargement. In sum, a low threat environment is likely an important enabling

⁸⁰ Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 39.

condition for proactive influence, but it does not automatically result in disproportional influence. It is hence worthwhile to examine the role that Domestic Factors and Influence Tactics played in this outcome.

Expertise

The Danes had two types of expertise that contributed to their disproportionate influence in the Baltic case. First, their *regional* expertise (i.e. *knowledge of the politics, economy, geography and culture of a particular region*) undoubtedly played a key role in their success. When the Cold War ended and great power policy-makers labored to develop a new security framework for Europe, Danish leaders took the initiative to create the BALT-projects described above. These projects benefitted from Denmark's historical cooperation with the Nordic states (e.g. via the Nordic Council), and they added to their appreciation and understanding of Baltic-specific concerns. The Danish-led cooperation helped Denmark when it lobbied the U.S. for NATO enlargement to the Baltics. Throughout the process the U.S. viewed them as regional specialists who understood the challenges facing the region's newest actors.

Second, the Danes demonstrated the value of *executive* experience (i.e. *knowledge about how to achieve certain policy goals*). They used their geopolitical position and their knowledge of international relations to create collaborative efforts with both regional and great power partners. They succeeded in gaining the support of traditional allies like France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. for their Baltic security initiatives, and at the same time reached out to Poland and Russia in

a plan to better address their concerns. Importantly, Danish leaders appreciated the challenges that come with being a small state in close proximity to a potential aggressor. They assisted the Baltic states in crafting foreign and domestic policies that were feasible and effective, and they understood better than their Baltic partners how to access and manipulate key political mechanisms to advance their cause. These actions set these states on a path towards reform that coincided with both the EU's and NATO's membership requirements. The Balts were recognized as "star performers" in the accession process.

Without question the most important outcome attributed to Danish regional and executive expertise was in securing U.S. support for Baltic membership in NATO. But even after this became certain, Denmark and its Nordic neighbors continued to play an important role as policy consultants. Reflecting back on his experiences in the U.S. State Department, Asmus wrote:

[Our Nordic allies] were, if anything, even more supportive in word and deed than the U.S. We looked to them for advice and ideas on how to craft our strategy. They knew the region better than we did and understood the importance of getting the U.S. more involved—and often lobbied for more U.S. involvement vis-à-vis more skeptical Europeans. The convergence of U.S.-Nordic thinking on the Baltic issue led to a kind of implicit strategic alliance and cooperation in the region that would, in turn, play a key role at the NATO Madrid summit.⁸¹

In the Baltic case, it does not appear that either *technical* or *institutional* expertise were significant factors contributing to the final result. The inconsequential impact of Denmark's institutional expertise (i.e. *proficiency with the NATO policy-making process*) was expected. First, while today Denmark may indeed benefit from its long history in the organization, the important debates regarding

⁸¹ *Opening NATO's Door*, 231.

Baltic membership occurred primarily among other long-term members of the alliance - France, Germany, and the U.S. being the most important. At the Madrid Summit, NATO's consensus rules - not the Danish delegation's knowledge of them - facilitated the compromise that moved the Baltics further towards their goal. Second, the nature and significance of the enlargement policy meant that much of the interstate diplomacy took place outside the organizational framework commonly used for other NATO policies. At the end of the day, the NATO Foreign Ministers and Heads of State - not the NATO bureaucracy - authored the Madrid declaration language that all members could accept. In short, the complex decision-making procedures that characterize some NATO policy-making endeavors played only a minor part in the outcome.

Intensity of Interest

The opportunities and challenges that resulted from the end of the Cold War were not felt uniformly across the NATO alliance. For small powers like Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not lead to the kind of security challenges that confronted members on NATO's eastern front. Germany, on the other hand, experienced these challenges immediately and accordingly devoted its attention to issues like national reunification and NATO membership for Central European countries. The U.S. - now the world's lone superpower - scrambled to formulate new policies and allocate resources to manage a multitude of unforeseen circumstances around the globe, not the least of which included Russian reform and the violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Europe's non-NATO great power,

Russia, was preoccupied with political and economic crises, as well as a bitter civil war in Chechnya.

From the perspective of Danish foreign policy officials, their most urgent concern was the consequences of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian independence. Especially given Russia's history in the Baltics, managing the security implications of this event became one of Denmark's top priorities. Danish leaders understood the "big picture" significance of a number of other security issues, but equally understood that their small power status meant their contributions vis-à-vis these issues would be minimal. In the words of their Defense Minister, "rather than do a little in many places, we will do as much as possible closer to home." This reaction points to a consistent tendency in small power politics. In short, a small power is most concerned about instability near its borders. As Fox puts it in her seminal work, a small power's "scope of attention" is much more limited compared to greater powers. The latter groups' leaders are obligated to "broaden their gaze to sweep the whole international arena," a result which makes "the diplomatic task of the small power leader much easier than that of the great powers in one respect."⁸²

In addition to its geographically induced interest in Baltic membership, Denmark has a more general incentive to concentrate its foreign-policy endeavors within the context of NATO: the Danish opt-out from the EU's defense policies. Though Denmark has been an active player in the EU since its entrance into the Union in 1973, it is thus far a virtual non-participant in the military aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Danish opt-out is the result of a

⁸² *The Power of Small States*, 181.

June 1992 national referendum, when the Danish public narrowly rejected the Maastricht Treaty by 50.7 percent to 49.3 percent.⁸³ Polling data suggested that the Treaty's defense policies were a principal cause of its defeat⁸⁴ - most likely due to public sensitivities to an IO that might undermine Danish sovereignty.⁸⁵ In the end the referendum forced Denmark's leading parties to rethink their approach to the EU's security framework.⁸⁶ The outcome, known as the "national compromise," secured the support of seven of eight parties in the *Folketing*.⁸⁷ In brief, it allowed Denmark to accept the Maastricht Treaty with four caveats, one of which included an abstention from the EU's defense policies.⁸⁸ The compromise, known as the Edinburgh Agreement, overcame the referendum process in 1993, receiving 57% of the public's support.⁸⁹

What does this EU exemption have to do with Denmark's influence attempts in NATO? One important result is that Denmark's Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense can (and often must) focus the majority of their defense-related efforts

⁸³ Danish politicians were comfortable approving the Treaty and having the WEU membership debate at a later date. It passed the Treaty in May by 130 votes to 25. Petersen, "Danish Security Policy After the Cold War: Adaptation and Innovation," 189.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ As Tiilikainen describes, "Reservations about a European political union containing supranational – or even federal – elements seem to have a solid political base in Denmark, which was occupied by Germany during World War II. From a Danish perspective, the lack of supranational elements helps to make NATO a preferable option to an ESDP that seems to reinforce the EU's development towards a superstate." Tiilikainen, "The Nordic Countries and the EU-NATO Relationship," 52.

⁸⁶ The Maastricht Treaty (Article J.4) refers the planning and execution of the EU's defense policies to the WEU – an organization in which Denmark is only an "observer" state. While in 1992 the Social Democrats and Radicals opposed membership in the WEU, the Conservatives and Liberals pressed for an eventual accession. Nonetheless, party leaders from both sides originally agreed to support the Treaty and leave the WEU debate for a later date.

⁸⁷ Petersen, "Danish Security Policy After the Cold War: Adaptation and Innovation," 189.

⁸⁸ "Edinburgh Agreement."

⁸⁹ Petersen and Due-Nielsen, *Adaptation and Activism*, 23.

through a single security IO.⁹⁰ Where other small powers in NATO (for example, Belgium or Spain) must respond to simultaneous efforts in both NATO and the EU, Denmark has a comparative advantage due to the self-imposed limitation on its foreign defense options.⁹¹ In a very general sense, it is likely that this is a contributing though not a sufficient factor that accounts for Denmark's recent influence in the alliance - and it is likely that this affected the Baltic outcome as well.

Political Cohesion

In this dissertation political cohesion is defined as the extent to which foreign policy objectives are uncontested within the state. Wolfram Henrieder insists that a state's degree of political cohesion (what he calls "consensus") "imposes boundaries on the activities the political system can pursue without risking fragmentation" and is thus "a standard of feasibility, especially in a democratic political system."⁹² As explained in Chapter 3, the causal mechanisms that connect political cohesion with greater influence include: 1) a reduced vulnerability to influence attempts by other allies, 2) the freedom to focus on influence tactics outside the state (i.e. towards other allies) rather than inside the state (i.e. towards key players within society) and 3) an ability to consistently and credibly pursue a policy over a long period of time, even as elections lead to changes in government.

⁹⁰ Denmark's official position is that "NATO today is the only realistic multilateral framework for a military solution" to security crises. "Danish Armed Forces: International Perspectives," 19.

⁹¹ The overlap between these two security frameworks (and other similar IOs) has spawned a new conceptual model known as "international regime complexity." As Stephanie Hofman explains, the result is a highly ambiguous relationship between the two IOs, as "ESDP and NATO mandates are largely similar and do not specify either a functional or geographic division of labor between the two institutions." Hofmann, "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security," 46.

⁹² "Compatibility and Consensus," 977.

On the Baltic issue political cohesion was high and, importantly, it emerged rather quickly. Within Denmark, the evidence indicates that Defense Minister Hækkerup (Social Democratic Party) first advocated the policy. The Foreign Minister, Niels Helveg Petersen (Radical Liberal Party), agreed but was perhaps more sensitive than Hækkerup to Russian interests in the region.⁹³ Petersen promoted Baltic security via membership in the EU – a policy that Russia did not contest – but also recognized that “[t]he EU’s ‘soft’ security guarantee only works because there is also a ‘hard guarantee.’ This is provided by NATO.”⁹⁴ Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (Social Democratic Party), like his Defense Minister, lobbied for a swift enlargement process that included the Baltics.⁹⁵

Notwithstanding the security-related reasons for Baltic membership, the government also benefitted from public sentiment for Balts. Danish citizens felt sympathy (some insist, “guilt”⁹⁶) for the Baltic peoples, especially given the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the fact that the West implicitly turned a blind eye to the Soviet subjugation of these once independent states during the Cold War. Policies designed to bring the Baltics back into the West were popular among most Danish people. Likely due to its support among constituencies, the policy soon garnered the support of all of the major parties in the parliament.⁹⁷ In

⁹³ Petersen, “Danish Security Policy After the Cold War: Adaptation and Innovation,” 183-184; Carlsen, “Interview by author.”

⁹⁴ Petersen, “Petersen on Role of NATO, WEU IGC Meeting.”

⁹⁵ Rasmussen argued that “If too much time passes between the admission of the first country and that of the Baltic states it will further emphasize that they have a lower status where security is concerned. There is a risk that this would strengthen Russian nationalistic tendencies...” “Prime Minister on Security Policy, EU Widening.”

⁹⁶ See Lasas, “Guilt, Sympathy, and Cooperation.”

⁹⁷ Carlsen, “Interview by author.”

1994 and 1997, the *Folketing* passed resolutions that asked the government to ensure the Baltic states had the same opportunities to join NATO as the Central European countries.⁹⁸ In short, Baltic membership rapidly became a largely uncontested and politically profitable foreign policy position. By 1994, the government could focus its attention on promoting the policy outside – rather than inside – Danish borders. The policy received consistent support even as parliamentary coalitions shifted from the center-left in the 1990s to the center-right following the 2001 elections.

In terms of Denmark's overall influence (i.e. across the entire period under scrutiny), we also observe a high degree of political cohesion on security related policies. While differences among the key players in Denmark do exist, the last twenty years have witnessed an era of relative congruence. The fall of the Soviet empire meant that disputes about how to handle Denmark's greatest security threat were now irrelevant, ushering in a new era of Danish military activism with NATO as its foundation. Contemporary evidence of Denmark's political cohesion is found in the five-year Defence Agreements that Denmark uses to orient its defense policies. These agreements have regularly gained the explicit support of six (2004) and seven (2009) of its largest parties (from both the governing and opposition coalitions). Public distrust of the EU's military structure and the "national compromise" that materialized also served to solidify a NATO-oriented preference among key parties in the *Folketing*. As the Agreement for 2005-2009 states: "the political parties behind the Defense Agreement agree that NATO is the central forum

⁹⁸ Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate*, 110.

for joint security – and defense cooperation.”⁹⁹ In sum, membership in NATO now has the support of a wide spectrum of parties in the *Folketing*. As Danish scholars Carsten Due-Nielsen and Nikolaj Petersen report, “whereas NATO membership used to be contested by the left wing, membership is now only opposed by insignificant fringe groups.”¹⁰⁰

Danish representatives to NATO also enjoy the broad support of a large majority of the public. While Cold War levels of support for Danish membership in NATO averaged around 50 percent *For* and 20 percent *Against*,¹⁰¹ N. Petersen notes that lately “public opinion polls regularly report pro-NATO responses from over 70 percent of the public, and less than 10 percent against.”¹⁰² The public’s appreciation for the alliance emboldens the Danish delegation to NATO; they pursue their policies with little fear of negative political repercussions back home. In other words, from the standpoint of Danish representatives, it is politically profitable to be “pro-NATO.”

A positive consequence of a broad political cohesion on foreign policy issues is the consistency with which Denmark can pursue its goals. *Ceteris paribus*, the longer a small power is able to persist on a given policy preference, the more likely it will prevail. Due-Nielsen and Petersen find this to be consistent with the Danish experience: “To a large extent, . . . the consensus system has resulted in a credible continuity in Denmark’s foreign policy and also in an ability to take flexible

⁹⁹ “The Danish Defence Agreement 2005-2009.”

¹⁰⁰ *Adaptation and Activism*, 41.

¹⁰¹ Gallup Institute polls from 1949 to 1982. Cited in Heisler, “Denmark’s Quest for Security,” 75.

¹⁰² “Danish Security Policy After the Cold War: Adaptation and Innovation,” 179.

advantage of international trends and opportunities.”¹⁰³

Though it is difficult to verify empirically, Danish cohesion also likely gives the representatives to NATO leverage when they pursue their interests in the organization’s decision-making committees, as other member understand that these policies represent credible Danish preferences that are unlikely to change with shifts in domestic power. This assessment is consistent with another study of Danish influence in NATO. In a contrasting case, Karoliina Honkanen argues that the lack of Danish cohesion during Denmark’s “footnote period” contributed to an overall decrease in influence over NATO policy. As described above, Denmark was obliged to make official disclaimers to NATO policies - especially those dealing with INF and SDI - during the 1980s due to acute disagreements among key players in the government and the *Folketing*. As she concludes:

On the one hand, the case of Danish footnotes indicates NATO’s flexibility: Denmark was allowed to pursue policies which contrasted with official NATO policies. On the other hand, it demonstrates how important domestic consensus is for a small state’s ability to play a role within NATO. In other words, it was evident to all the Allies that Denmark spoke with little authority in NATO, since the footnotes in the NATO communiqués referred directly to the disputes in the *Folketing*.¹⁰⁴

Influence Tactics

Influence tactics are the intentional methods an ally uses to achieve its organizational goals. In the Baltic case Denmark used several of the common approaches presented in Chapter 3. First, it changed the “facts on the ground” in the Baltic region by recruiting the Nordic countries and NATO’s great powers for

¹⁰³ *Adaptation and Activism*, 32.

¹⁰⁴ *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making*, 53-54.

various security-related initiatives. This *coalition-building* tactic (i.e. *the mobilization of other countries in NATO who share the same preferences*) did not translate into immediate support for Baltic membership in NATO, but it was an important first-step in a much longer process. It moved Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania closer to NATO's membership criteria and kept the security issues of the Baltic states on the agendas of the great powers. Absent these programs, Danish leaders would not have dared insisting on accommodating language for the Baltics at the Madrid Summit. Baltic membership may have happened much later or possibly not at all. In short, the effect of the Danish-led cooperative efforts altered the realm of the possible – a result that a small power like Denmark could not have achieved on its own.

Next, Denmark used a combination of *reasoning* (i.e. *the use of facts and data to support the development of a logical argument*) and *sponsorship* (i.e. *gaining the support of larger countries in NATO to back up your requests*) to facilitate Baltic membership. The former tactic demonstrates an important link between expertise and influence. In other words, expertise is only valuable if it is converted into appropriate and reasonable policies. By *appropriate* I mean the goals are consistent with the alliance's strategic vision. On this account Denmark ultimately convinced the alliance that stability in Europe would be harmed if NATO expanded eastward and left the Baltic states in a security "no-man's-land." NATO's vision of a "Europe whole and free" could thus not exclude the Baltics. Even the so-called "indefensibility" argument was exposed as inconsistent with the history and tenets of the alliance. The argument was *reasonable* in that Denmark presented a workable framework (the means) for achieving its desire ends. This framework (exemplified

in the BALTBAT project) became a model that other nations would follow in their path to NATO accession.

Denmark's ability to formulate its argument was certainly enhanced by assistance from the RAND Corporation. However, the significance of the Danish-RAND collaboration went beyond the creation of a coherent line of reasoning for international consumption - it was a means to secure *American* sponsorship for its goals. The Ministry of Defence appreciated the prestige and wide exposure that a RAND publication would carry in the U.S. Based on Ron Asmus' unique role as both a contributing author and subsequently a U.S. State Department official, we are able to glimpse how Danish leaders accessed one of the many influence nodes in American foreign politics. The timing of the input was equally as critical, as key U.S. players were still grappling with how to proceed in a new and unfamiliar unipolar environment. Danish leaders succeeded in staying ahead of the debate - they did not wait in the trenches as the great powers determined the fate of their neighbors. In the end these efforts secured the support of the Clinton administration. When American sponsorship became more certain, Denmark continued to act as an advisor and political partner.

In the Baltic case we observe another interactive effect between an influence tactic (sponsorship) and a national characteristic (political cohesion). Denmark's early political cohesion on the Baltic issue facilitated its successful penetration into the more fragmented American foreign policy apparatus. Before a coherent policy stance emerged in the Clinton administration, Danish officials sought out prospective supporters of their ideas and helped them "make their case for them."

This is an especially effective tactic when used in an open political structure like that of the U.S. As such, it is a traditional “weapon of the weak” with regards to influencing U.S. foreign policy. In short, both America’s power and political accessibility make it an attractive target for small power influence attempts.

Finally, the Asmus account of the inter-ally politics of the Madrid Summit reveals how Danish leaders employed the tactic of *commitment* (i.e. *communicating your position clearly to other countries and letting them know you will not compromise beyond a certain point*). Danish leaders insisted that any official declaration that prejudiced the Baltic cause would be unacceptable. The use and effectiveness of this tactic is perhaps unexpected from a small power. However, the case demonstrates the potential power of institutional factors in an international organization. In sum, NATO decision-making rules do tend to result in policies of the least common denominator and give small powers the opportunity to moderate great power domination of the organization. At the same time, the relatively infrequent use of such a hard line tactic from a small power underscores the effect that the “adversary game” has on the “alliance game.” The low-tension security environment of the post-Cold War era likely emboldens and liberates small powers when their national interests are at stake. Finally, Danish commitment was facilitated by both its recognized intensity of interest (which communicated its resolve) and its political cohesion (which communicated its credibility).

Additional/Alternative Variables

Some scholars may argue that the case described here is perfectly consistent with the predictions of neorealism. In short, the ultimate outcome can be explained by the fact that the U.S. – NATO’s most powerful member – desired Baltic membership. As such, neorealism’s focus on power and interests are all that is needed to understand why the Baltics are now in the alliance, thus making a study of small powers and the examination of additional variables superfluous. However, such a perspective would fail to appreciate how American interests progressed during the enlargement debate. Because neorealism *assumes* interests, it is ill-equipped to examine cases in which a great power’s interests are not easily apparent. This is a recognized weakness of strictly rational approaches, which must make *a priori* conjectures about national priorities based on the general premise of self-interested states. But as authors like Alexander Wendt have argued, state interests are not entirely exogenous to interaction.¹⁰⁵ American support for Baltic membership in NATO evolved through interactive processes at both the domestic and international level. The case described above clearly demonstrates why Denmark’s involvement at both these levels is critical to understanding the U.S. government’s eventual support for Baltic membership.

Summary

During the early decades of the Cold War, the Soviet threat left Denmark highly dependent on NATO’s great powers for its security. Though Denmark

¹⁰⁵ “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” 394.

certainly benefitted from the alliance's formal commitment to the sovereign equality of states, consultation and consensus, Denmark was unable to make a significant impact on organizational policy. As the heightened tensions of the Cold War waned, passing through détente and later to the fall of the Soviet Union, the structures of the international system relaxed their grip on this previously vulnerable nation. With this decompression Denmark has been increasingly able to capitalize on NATO's institutional advantages.

At the same time, noteworthy small power influence in NATO is not prevalent in the post-Cold War era. Denmark's influence in the organization during the enlargement debate remains exceptional, thus requiring further explanation. To understand how Denmark succeeded in securing membership for the Baltics, I have argued that we must look at national level factors. Denmark's high degree of political cohesion and intensity of interest relative to its allies clearly facilitated its ultimate achievement – a plausible indication that these factors are necessary conditions for small power success in NATO. Additionally, Denmark's regional and executive expertise were demonstrated as contributing factors towards convincing NATO allies, particularly the U.S., that the Baltics' membership in the Atlantic alliance was necessary and feasible.

Finally, influence tactics (especially *coalition-building*, *reasoning*, *commitment* and *sponsorship*) definitely played an important role in the final outcome - though at this stage it is difficult to make generalizations about the causal significance of these factors (either individually or in combination). Further research that focuses more closely on this category of factors would certainly be a valuable contribution to

understanding influence in NATO. However, based on the case studies examined in this research project, it seems clear that great power sponsorship is vital for influencing (both offensively and defensively) strategically significant policies in NATO. When it comes time to lobby for controversial positions in the NAC, small powers are unable to “go it alone.”

Chapter 5 – Greece and NATO Membership to Macedonia

The Balkans produce much more history than they can consume.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill¹

Figure 5.1 Map Of Greece²



Chapter Overview

This chapter explores Greece's influence in the post-Cold War Atlantic alliance, especially its influence in the Balkan region and its "veto" of plans to bring the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) into NATO. A member since 1952, Greece has always had a unique relationship with the alliance. Even during the Cold War its most immediate security concerns came from inside, rather than outside, the geographical boundaries of the treaty. Consequently, efforts to

¹ Bakoyannis, "Opinion."

² "Greece" As the following discussion reveals, this map's labeling of "Macedonia" is offensive to many Greeks. .

generalize from the Greek case must be made with prudence.³ At the same time, the significance of Greece's present refusal to accept FYROM into NATO - both in terms of its willingness to challenge the prevailing consensus in the alliance and the impact of its actions - encourages its inclusion in this study. During the course of the interviews conducted at the NATO HQ, the Greek case was consistently highlighted as a prime example of *defensive influence* in the organization. NATO officials are quick to point out that NATO is run by consensus and this means that any member - from Luxembourg to the United States - can hold up or block a NATO initiative. In other words, defensive influence is *institutionally* the easiest form of influence available to a small power. However, incidences when a small power will use its institutional rights to single-handedly impede a significant decision are few and far between. This case is clearly an exception and thus merits further study.

I begin by discussing Greece's exceptional position in the Atlantic alliance during the Cold War. I explain how the escalation of the Greek-Turkish conflict made the dissolution of the USSR less consequential for the Greeks. In short, since 1974 their primary security concern has been with a fellow NATO member, Turkey, rather than Russia and the Eastern bloc. I assess the effects of this dynamic on Greece's influence and its implications for the validity of Hypothesis 1. Finally, I explore the repercussions of the breakup of Yugoslavia on Greek foreign policy and present the primary case study of this chapter: Greece's so-called "veto" of FYROM membership at the Bucharest Summit. By 2008, FYROM met the minimum

³ Greece is not the only nation to be challenged by intra-alliance tensions. In the early years of the alliance, Germany remained a potential threat in the eyes of many European nations (e.g. France, Belgium, Denmark, etc.).

standards of the alliance and was expected to receive an invitation to join NATO along with two other members of the so-called “Adriatic Three”: Croatia and Albania. However, the ongoing dispute between Greece and FYROM over the latter’s preferred constitutional name, *The Republic of Macedonia*, has become the sole remaining obstacle for accession into the alliance.

The Cold War: Threats from Within

Unlike Denmark, Greece has a long history of participation in military alliances. Given its small power status, its strategic location in the eastern Mediterranean (the “crossroads” between Europe, Asia and Africa) and its responsibility to protect nearly 2,000 Greek islands, Greece has consistently elected to align with powerful naval forces in the region. Since the mid-nineteenth century it has aligned with Great Britain, and in both World Wars it aligned against Germany, first on the side of the Triple Entente and later with the Allies. Immediately following the end of World War II, Greece became one of the first hot spots in the ideological struggle between communism and the West. The 1946-1949 Civil War pitted Soviet and Yugoslav-sponsored communist forces against the right-wing government and the Greek monarchy. Fearful of a communist victory, the American administration initiated the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 – a move that, according to Thanos Veremis, “inaugurated an era of U.S. involvement in Europe and an overt American role in running Greek affairs.”⁴ The Marshall Plan, which began a few months later, extended even further the U.S. commitment to Greece and

⁴ “Greece and NATO,” 240.

resulted in three billion dollars of economic and military aid between 1947 and 1960.⁵ The Civil War's end in 1949 was a victory for the American-supported Greek government, but left the country weak and politically divided, and thus still vulnerable to internal unrest.

Greece joined the Atlantic alliance in 1952, alongside Turkey. While Turkish membership was sought largely for the country's geostrategic position, Greek membership was required to ensure steady support for and allegiance from anti-communist elements inside Greece. Left with few alternatives, the Greek government sacrificed much of its autonomy in exchange for American sponsorship. As one prominent Greek scholar, Van Coufoudakis, describes: "This led to the limitation of Greek defence and foreign policy options. Greek policy makers were ineffective in capitalizing on Greece's strategic assets and value in order to promote Greek national interests. Consequently, the U.S. and NATO took for granted Greece's commitment and downgraded its strategic significance."⁶ Though the U.S. policy in Greece was initially guided by liberal democratic ideals, these ideals were readily cast aside in favor of a strong center-right government and Greek military forces that answered directly to U.S. generals rather than elected Greek officials.⁷ The U.S. capitalized on its access to Greek territory in order to pursue its policy of global containment and deterrence. Four U.S. military bases and communications stations were established in Greece, as well as several NATO Air Defense Ground

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Quoted in Dokos, "Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting," 45.

⁷ Veremis, "Greece and NATO," 241-242.

Environment sites (to monitor the military activity of Warsaw pact countries) and nuclear weapons storage facilities.⁸

From the end of the Civil War until the late 1950s, Greek security concerns remained focused on internal instability and the suppression of communist elements inside the country. Additionally, Greece kept a close eye on two of its communist neighbors to the north, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, who frequently made territorial claims on the Macedonian region inside northeastern Greece.⁹ By the 1960s the threat of a communist takeover in Greece began to fade,¹⁰ a result that created the necessary space for groups on the left to reenter the political scene. In 1958, the United Democratic Left (EDA) became the second party in parliament, and in 1964 the Centre Union Party (EK) won a convincing victory in Greece. Following its electoral triumph, the EK's leader (Prime Minister Papandreou) immediately challenged the authority of extra-parliamentary actors in Greece, especially the military and the Greek monarchy. The clash threatened Greece's military leaders, who had grown used to the power granted them during the Civil War and their support from the right.¹¹ Under the guise of a reported communist uprising, the military took control of the government and ruled the country from 1967-1974. Though the U.S. condemned the coup and temporarily withdrew its financial

⁸ Veremis, "Greece and NATO," 237; Moustakis and Sheehan, "Greek Security Policy after the Cold War," 99.

⁹ Veremis, "Greece and NATO," 243-244. ; Veremis, "Greece and Turkey," 16-17.

¹⁰ Though U.S. support for Greek anti-communist elements was an important reason for the latter group's success, they also benefitted from Josip Tito's break with Cominform in 1948, which "deprived the Greek Communist forces of their strategic exit to Yugoslavia and of Yugoslav support." Veremis, "Greece and Turkey," 3.

¹¹ As Veremis reports, "In no other profession than in the armed forces was allegiance to the crown or to conservative members of government more vital for personal advancement." Veremis, "Greece and NATO," 248.

assistance to the Greek armed forces,¹² it nonetheless provided the dictatorship with legitimacy via visits from high-ranking diplomats and continued cooperation on security matters. Greece maintained its status as a NATO member despite its remarkably obvious disregard of the alliance's democratic norms.¹³

The military dictatorship in Greece was eventually brought to its knees due to its mishandling of the "Cyprus issue." A British colony since 1925, the island's population was predominantly Greek (80%), but also harbored a significant Turkish minority (18%). By the 1950s, as British influence in the Mediterranean began to wane, both the Greek government and the Greek Cypriots began considering unification (*enosis*) with Greece. Under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios, the Greek Cypriots brought the issue to the UN. In order to "provide a counterweight to Greek demands," Britain insisted that the Turkish government be included in the discussion – a decision that would have lasting repercussions for Cyprus.¹⁴ A multilateral agreement signed in 1959 eventually gave Cyprus quasi-independence and set up a government with shared power between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority.¹⁵ The solution proved unable to pacify ethnic and political tensions in Cyprus, however, and Turkish invasions of the island in 1964 and 1967 were averted only after U.S. and NATO diplomatic interventions. Then, in 1974, the Greek junta orchestrated a coup against the Makarios-led government in an attempt to unify Cyprus with Greece. The coup triggered the Turkish invasion of northern

¹² Migdalovitz, *Greece and Turkey*.

¹³ Veremis, "Greece and Turkey," 18-19; Pasmazoglou, "Greek Security."

¹⁴ Veremis, "Greece and Turkey," 10.

¹⁵ The agreement allowed Britain to continue the use of its military bases on the island and established that Greece and Turkey would contribute contingency forces of 950 and 650 respectively. *Ibid.*, 11.

Cyprus and left 37 percent of the island under Turkish control. The Greek military, fraught with internal divisions and unable to simultaneously manage the Cyprus conflict and domestic affairs, relinquished its power to a civilian government under Constantine Karamanlis and the New Democratic Party (ND).¹⁶

In terms of Greek foreign policy, there were several lasting consequences of the events surrounding the 1974 Cyprus conflict. First, in December 1974 the Karamanlis government instigated a national referendum that ultimately terminated the Greek monarchy.¹⁷ This - along with the military's retreat from politics - eliminated two traditional intruders into Greece's foreign policy circle. It also marked the beginning of democratic consolidation in Greece, as future elections resulted in the peaceful and regular transition of governing coalitions led by either the center-right ND party or the center-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK).¹⁸ Second, the invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus by the Turkish military produced a new status quo on the island and firmly established Turkey as Greece's primary security threat. Over the last three and a half decades leaders from ND and PASOK have differed only marginally concerning their positions on the Greek-Turkish conflict.¹⁹ Finally, Greece recognized that NATO and the U.S. were no longer willing to act as collective security arbiters in the Turkish-Greek conflict.²⁰ This realization, combined with the Alliance's seven-year approbation of the junta,

¹⁶ Ibid., 12.

¹⁷ Couloumbis, "Greek Foreign Policy: Debates and Priorities," 33.

¹⁸ Veremis, "Greece and NATO," 266.

¹⁹ Ibid., 254.

²⁰ Ironically, during the 1974 invasion the Turks used 35,000 troops assigned to the NATO military structure and armed with NATO weapons against, albeit indirectly, a fellow NATO member. Moustakis and Sheehan, "Greek Security Policy after the Cold War," 96.

resulted in Greece's temporary withdrawal from the military structures of NATO from 14 August 1974 to 20 October 1980.²¹

Table 5.1 Greek-Turkish Disagreements in the Aegean Sea

Issue	Greek Position	Turkish Position
<i>Delimitation of the continental shelf</i>	Greece points out that customary international law allows exploration and exploitation rights over the continental shelf up to 100 miles from Greece's coastal and island baselines.	Turkey claims that Greece is seeking a <i>de facto</i> sovereignty over the whole Aegean Sea. According to the Turks, the Aegean seabed is actually a prolongation of the Anatolian land mass and Greek islands do not have their own area of continental shelf. The difference to be settled concerns the partition of the entire Aegean continental shelf. Turkey should acquire areas of the shelf west of the Greek islands up to the middle of the Aegean.
<i>Aegean territorial waters</i>	Greece adheres to a six nautical mile territorial sea in the Aegean but claims a right to unilateral expansion to twelve nautical miles, based on the International Law of the Sea.	Turkey also claims a six nautical mile territorial sea in the Aegean but it extends it to twelve miles off its Black Sea and Mediterranean coasts. Turkey has threatened war with Greece if it extends its territorial sea to twelve miles in the Aegean (an action which would deprive Turkey's Aegean coast all direct exits to international waters).
<i>Aegean airspace</i>	Greece claims a national airspace of ten nautical miles beyond her coast (i.e. extending four miles beyond the limit of her territorial sea). This limit was set in 1931 and was never challenged by Turkey until 1975.	Turkey argues that the application of the ten-mile claim, if applied to all Greek islands and islets, would reduce international airspace in the Aegean by 50 percent.
<i>Greek militarization of east-Aegean islands</i>	Greece argues that islands such as Lemnos and Samothrace were relieved of their demilitarized status following the Montreux Convention of 1936. The fortification of the islands of Chios, Lesbos and Samos were in response to the establishment of the Turkish Fourth Army at Izmir in 1975, a force that includes 35,000 combat personnel equipped with landing craft and other amphibious capabilities.	Turkey argues that the militarization of Greek islands is in breach of the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947).
<i>Source: Veremis, "Greece and Turkey," 14-15; Veremis, "Greece and NATO," 274-276; Moustakis and Sheehan, "Greek Security Policy after the Cold War," 96-98; Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute."</i>		

Though the Cyprus issue is one of the cruxes of the Greek-Turkish conflict, there are numerous other points of contention between these two rivals. In summary, they include: 1) the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean

²¹ Veremis, "Greece and NATO," 268-269. Greece would have rejoined the military structure of the alliance much earlier had it not been for Turkey's persistent veto.

Sea, 2) Aegean territorial waters, 3) Aegean airspace, and 4) the militarization of several of the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean (see Table 5.1 above). Not surprisingly, these disagreements are a severe impediment to NATO training and operations in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas.²² They also have a profound affect on attempts to coordinate security activities between NATO and the EU (an organization that currently includes Cyprus but excludes Turkey).

Given its preoccupation with Turkey, the end of the Cold War did not substantially reduce Greece's threat perception or change its defense priorities.²³ In fact, as Greek scholars Fotios Moustakis and Michael Sheehan explain, in the 1990s relations with Turkey deteriorated even further. For example, in 1993 Greece raised the stakes in the Cyprus issue by implementing a policy of *extended deterrence*. In short, "Cyprus was brought within the Greek security perimeter and a new defence doctrine was adopted that declared that renewed Turkish aggression in Cyprus would constitute a *casus belli* for Greece."²⁴ Additional antagonisms included a 1996 sovereignty dispute over the islands of Imia/Kardak and the discovery in 1999 that Greece provided shelter to the Kurdish rebel leader, Abdullah Öcalan. Though the "earthquake diplomacy" that occurred following the Greek and Turkish earthquakes of 1999 temporarily improved Greek-Turkish relations, it did not provide a

²² For example, in October 2000 Turkey blocked Greek fighter aircraft from participating in the latter phases of Exercise Destined Glory, which took place in the Aegean region. Warning Athens of potential "undesired results," Ankara insisted that Greece's persistent overflight of the islands of Limnos and Ikaria were a violation of past agreements that defined this airspace as "demilitarized." Greece subsequently withdrew from the exercise. "Military Overflights Not Forbidden."

²³ As Veremis described in 1984, "Whether their evaluation of Soviet intent is correct or not, the fact remains that both [Greece and Turkey] consider the Warsaw Pact threat as one which is not of immediate concern. ... [Greece] is mainly preoccupied with what is perceived as a threat from Turkey." Veremis, "Greece and Turkey," 35.

²⁴ Moustakis and Sheehan, "Greek Security Policy after the Cold War," 97.

sufficient stepping-stone towards the resolution of this multifaceted conflict. In short, as these authors describe, Greece and Turkey continue to have “defense and foreign policy establishments shaped by a realist world-view.”²⁵ As a result, while other European countries took the opportunity to reduce defense-related spending following the Cold War’s end, Greece continues to spend an average of 5-6% of its GDP on defense (20% of its budget).²⁶ This spending ratio nearly triples the 2% benchmark established for NATO allies, a benchmark that most NATO members in Europe fail to achieve.

While the collapse of the Soviet Union did not significantly reduce Greece’s threat perceptions, the fragmentation of the Yugoslav federation did have a profound effect on Greek security. As violence spread throughout the Balkan region, Greek leaders worried about the potential consequences of war refugees, the disruption of regional trade and the opportunities for Turkish infiltration into the Balkans. In addition, the Republic of Macedonia’s declaration of independence in the fall of 1991 revived fears that Greece’s northern border might be called into question – an issue discussed in more detail later in this chapter.²⁷

NATO’s 1995 and 1999 bombing campaigns against the Serbian President, Slobodan Milošević, created another uncomfortable situation for the Greeks and their Western allies. On the one hand, Greek leaders – fearing the consequences of irredentist policies from Albanians and the southern Slavs - felt that a strong Serbian state in control of both Kosovo and FYROM would be in Greece’s best

²⁵ Ibid., 110.

²⁶ Ibid., 47, 107, 109-111.

²⁷ Gallagher, *The Balkans in the New Millennium*, 2.

interest.²⁸ This led to an infamous partnership with the Serbian leadership throughout the decade – a partnership supported by both major parties and reinforced by widespread feelings of religious²⁹ and historical³⁰ kinship with the Orthodox Serbs.³¹ On the other hand, Greece recognized the importance of maintaining its economic and security ties to the West. In particular, Greece still relied on U.S. military aid in order to preserve the approximate balance of power between it and Turkey (see Table 5.3). The result was a somewhat two-faced approach in which Greece openly cooperated with Milošević and, at the same time, did not veto NATO decisions to strike the Serb government and its military forces.³²

In terms of Greece's influence in the Kosovo case, the events described here do not fit neatly into the framework provided in this study. Though Greece's dependence on Western institutions and U.S. military aid discouraged it from halting NATO decisions (i.e. the air-campaigns), the Greek government simultaneously undermined NATO strategy through actions that included: 1) violating the UN oil embargo and financial sanctions imposed on Serbia, 2) transferring arms to Bosnian Serbs, 3) regularly welcoming Milošević and Radovan Karadžić (the Bosnian Serb leader) to Greece and praising their controversial

²⁸ Gallagher, *The Balkans in the New Millennium*, 10; Rossos, *Macedonia and the Macedonians*, 269-270.

²⁹ See Brown and Theodossopoulos, "The Performance of Anxiety."

³⁰ Greece and Serbia were allies in both the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912-1913).

³¹ For a detailed account of the Greek-Serb partnership, see Michas, *Unholy Alliance*.

³² I found no evidence that Greece made a legitimate effort in the NAC to block the air-campaign on Kosovo. As such, this case may not directly qualify as a "failed influence attempt" in NATO. Though it is not exactly clear why it did not attempt to exercise its veto right, the findings from this study imply that Greece's dependence on U.S. military aid and its inability to obtain a great power sponsor to support its position likely contributed to its unwillingness to officially impede the action. Offering a somewhat different perspective, NATO scholar Sean Kay argues that Greece's compliance was the result of a combination of normative reasons (i.e. human rights violations) and Greece's realization that NATO was experiencing a crisis of relevancy – in other words, the war was in part "an institutional rescue mission for NATO." "NATO, the Kosovo War and Neoliberal Theory," 22.

policies and 4) alerting Serb hardliners of NATO operational plans.³³ As such, the 1990s are perhaps best understood as a decade in which NATO and its great powers were unable to control the *extra-organizational* behavior of a small and strategically located ally. In fact, the consequences of Greece's pro-Serbian policies may have contributed to Milošević's persistence and the prolongation of the war, as Milošević continually believed he could exploit inter-NATO differences to survive the conflict.³⁴

In summary, Greece's history in NATO is best characterized by its *decreasing* dependence on the alliance to address its most urgent security concerns. In the early stages of the Cold War, the Greek government willingly forfeited influence in domestic and foreign affairs in exchange for support against communist forces inside its borders; it was arguably the least autonomous member of the Atlantic alliance during this period. This willingness subsided, however, as internal stability increased and Greek leaders recognized that NATO was an inadequate framework to address its most pressing security concerns, especially those relating to Turkey. As one scholar explained the relationship in 1989:

In Greece, NATO is accused of being useless in the dispute with Turkey, unable to provide for Greek security against a threat from a member state. There is undeniable substance in this charge. To the extent that Greek interests and territorial integrity face an identifiable and immediate threat, it is from Turkey rather than the USSR or its allies. NATO has no machinery for mediating in – far less actually resolving – disputes of this sort between its members. Its founding assumption of unity under U.S. leadership against the Soviet threat inherently regulates intra-alliance disputes to a very weak second place.³⁵

³³ The Greek government denies the allegation that it leaked NATO air strike plans. Michas, *Unholy Alliance*, 38-39.

³⁴ Gallagher, *The Balkans in the New Millennium*, 55.

³⁵ Smith, *Pressure: How America Runs NATO*, 205.

In the post-Cold War era, Greek perceptions of NATO remained largely unchanged. From their vantage point, NATO consistently refuses to rebuke Turkey for its repeated violations of international law, and the alliance's policies in the Balkans often run contrary to core Greek interests. Even so, Greece cannot afford complete alienation from the West. The traditional Greek solution to this dilemma consists of a precarious balancing act. In public, government officials regularly criticize NATO policies and, as witnessed in the Balkan conflict, sometimes pursue individualistic foreign policy objectives that run contrary to the prevalent NATO consensus. At the same time, Greece is judicious in its right to "veto" NATO decisions. In the NAC, Greece strives to maintain a reputation as a satisfactory "team-player" - leading Moustakis and Sheehan to even conclude that "the Greek government co-operated fully with its NATO allies throughout the [Kosovo] crisis."³⁶ As indicated above, however, Greece decided to deviate from this rule-of-thumb in its 2008 rejection of FYROM's membership aspirations. In the following sections, I describe the historical background of the FYROM name issue and assess the explanatory power of my hypotheses for the Greek case.

Greece and NATO Membership for FYROM

A name cannot be an objection for the accession of a country.
Maxime Verhagen, Dutch Foreign Minister³⁷

What is Macedonia? For the outside observer, it is not easy to pinpoint an objective answer to the so-called "Macedonian Question". The issue is permeated

³⁶ "Greek Security Policy after the Cold War," 105.

³⁷ "Greece Rejects Macedonia NATO Bid."

with so much political and emotional bias that it is often difficult to separate fact from fiction. Not surprisingly, the recent emergence of an independent Republic of Macedonia in 1991 triggered an abundance of new literature on the subject - some of which is balanced, some which openly approaches the question from a particular point of view, and some which addresses the issue with underlying political motives.³⁸ In what follows, my goal is to present this issue as it relates most directly to the study at hand and avoid getting bogged down into what is understandably an impassioned debate. Because this chapter examines Greece's role in the controversy, I necessarily allocate more attention to the Greek than the Slav Macedonian perspective. I begin by examining the history of Macedonia as both a political unit and a geographic area.

In ancient times, Macedonia was associated with the Kingdom of Macedon – a Greek state first ruled by the Argead Dynasty and which rose to prominence in the 4th century B.C. under King Phillip II and his son, Alexander the Great. Although under Alexander the boundaries of the Macedon Empire expanded to include modern-day Greece, parts of Persia, India and Egypt, *geographical* Macedonia is largely associated with a much smaller region in the central part of the Balkan Peninsula.³⁹ In 168 B.C. the Romans completed their conquest of the ancient Macedonian empire and for the next two millennia Macedonia as an independent

³⁸ See, for example, Poulton, *Who Are the Macedonians?*; For a Greek perspective, see Papavizas, *Claiming Macedonia*; For a Slavic perspective, see Rossos, *Macedonia and the Macedonians*.

³⁹ As Andrew Rossos explains, geographic Macedonia's borders are commonly defined as "the mountains of Sar Planina, Skopska Crna Gora, Kozjak, Osogovo, and Rila to the north; the western slopes of Rhodope upland and the lower Mesta (Nestos) River to the south; and the Gramos massif, Lake Prespa, and Lake Ohrid, and the Korab and Iablonica range, to the west, toward Albania. Macedonia covers about [26,155 square miles], or about 15 percent of the Balkan Peninsula." Rossos, *Macedonia and the Macedonians*, 1.

polity ceased to exist. As Andrew Rossos describes, during this period “the Macedonian name disappeared from the historical stage and consciousness. It became merely a geographical expression describing a disputed territory of indeterminate boundaries.”⁴⁰

In the late 14th and early 15th century the Ottoman Empire conquered the entire Macedonian region. By the time the Ottomans were driven out five hundred years later, geographical Macedonia’s ethnic makeup had changed significantly. At the dawn of the twentieth century, the largest group in the region - making up about half the total population – were the Slavs, who began migrating there in large numbers during the 6th century. Rossos reports that by 1912 the ethnic composition of Macedonia likely included: 1,150,000 Slavs, 400,000 Turks, 300,000 Greeks, 200,000 Vlachs, 120,000 Albanians, 100,000 Jews and 10,000 Gypsies.⁴¹ The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 resulted in the expulsion of the Ottomans from the peninsula and the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest - an agreement that divided geographical Macedonia among Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. The Treaty was most advantageous for Greece, however, as it acquired 51.5% of the Macedonian region, nearly doubling the country’s size and population.⁴² Ten years later, following the Greco-Turkish War, the Treaty of Lausanne stipulated a massive exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey. Over a million Greek “refugees” left Asia Minor, approximately half of which settled in what is now known as Greek

⁴⁰ Ibid., xviii.

⁴¹ Ibid., 5.

⁴² Tziampiris, “Greece and the Balkans in the Twentieth Century,” 139-140.

Macedonia.⁴³ According to Greek scholars - who rely on League of Nations data and a national census in Greece - over 88% of the population of Greek Macedonia was ethnic Greek by 1928.⁴⁴

Figure 5.2 Geographical Macedonia in 1913



Source: Rossos, *Macedonia and the Macedonians*, 119

Though the tripartite division of Macedonia was momentarily upset during World Wars I and II, the settlement established by the Treaty of Bucharest remains the basis for the current status quo in the region. In short, contemporary Macedonia

⁴³ Nikolaos Zahariadis reports that 638,000 ethnic Greeks settled in Greek Macedonia. “Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy,” 657, n. 38; Rossos reports that 565,143 settled in the region. *Macedonia and the Macedonians*, 142.

⁴⁴ Neither report entertained the possibility of a separate (i.e. non-Greek) Macedonian ethnicity. Papavizas, *Claiming Macedonia*, 85-86.

includes three separate sections: 1) Vardar Macedonia to the northwest, 2) Greek or Aegean Macedonia to the south and 3) Bulgarian or Pirin Macedonia to the northeast.⁴⁵ As World War II came to an end, the world witnessed the resurrection of a political entity bearing the Macedonian name. In 1944 Vardar Macedonia became the People's Republic of Macedonia (after 1974, the Socialist Federal Republic of Macedonia) - the smallest of six republics in the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Throughout the Greek Civil War of 1946-1949, communist leaders in the Balkans (e.g. Tito) tried to fan the flame of irredentist Macedonian sentiment in order to recruit anti-Greek constituents.⁴⁶ As mentioned above, Greek leaders became increasingly sensitive to nationalistic claims to their territory during this period. However, the government's relentless suppression of these elements in Greece - as well as the ascendancy of superpower politics in the 1950s - did much to stifle the Macedonian Question for the next four decades. As Aristotle Tziampiris describes: "In terms of foreign policy and regional international relations, what ensued was a long period of peace, stability and limited cooperation among Greece and most Balkan states. In effect, the Cold War 'froze' History in the Balkans."⁴⁷

Greece and Macedonia after the Cold War

As argued above, the Soviet Union's fall from superpower status did not significantly change Greece's security priorities. However, the ensuing breakup of

⁴⁵ There is also a small section of geographical Macedonia in southeast Albania.

⁴⁶ Tziampiris, "Greece and the Balkans in the Twentieth Century," 142.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 137.

Yugoslavia reignited the historical controversies that had previously plagued the Balkans. For Greece, the most immediate consequence of the power vacuum in the region was the introduction of a new and autonomous state on its northern border. Following an 8 September referendum that overwhelmingly supported independence, the national assembly in Skopje officially declared independence on 17 September 1991.⁴⁸ Two months later, the assembly presented the country's new democratic constitution and name, *The Republic of Macedonia*. According to the constitution's preamble, the Republic is founded on "the historical fact that Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people."⁴⁹

On the one hand, Greece directly benefitted from the Republic of Macedonia's peaceful separation from Yugoslavia – a fortune not experienced by other Yugoslav republics. But from the Greek perspective, this benefit was overshadowed by Skopje's monopolistic claims to the history, culture, genealogy and geography of an important element in Greek heritage. One of the first points of contention was the language adopted in Articles 3 and 49 of the new Republic's constitution. Article 3 states that "the borders of the Republic of Macedonia may be changed only in accordance with the constitution." When combined with Article 49, which asserted that the Republic "cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighbouring countries," the Greeks felt that this signaled Skopje's desire to expand its southern border.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Rossos, *Macedonia and the Macedonians*, 266.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Papavizas, *Claiming Macedonia*, 219-222. Greece vehemently denies the existence of a Macedonian minority in Greece.

Greece also objected to the alleged pilfering of symbols associated with the ancient Kingdom of Macedon. Most notably, the Republic of Macedonia adopted the *Sun of Vergina* as the predominant emblem for the new state. The figure is a sixteen-ray star that is widely believed to be the emblem of King Philip II.⁵¹ The Skopje government placed the star on the country's national flag, government buildings and later on postage stamps.⁵² It also printed national currency that featured the famous White Tower of Thessaloniki.

Finally, Greece rejected Skopje's right to use the term "The Republic of Macedonia" as its internationally acknowledged name. For the Greeks this title - which in common parlance would no doubt be shortened to "Macedonia" - inherently discounted Greece's deep historical ties with the region. Once again, Greek leaders insisted that the name had "irredentist overtones" that might disrupt the territorial status quo established in 1913. As stated by Greek Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras (ND): "If Skopje is allowed not only to usurp, but also as an independent state to monopolize the [Macedonian] name, old disputes will resurface and new extensive conflicts [will take place] in the entire region. [The name will become] a vehicle of expansionist dreams, not only for territory, but also for the Macedonian inheritance through the ages."⁵³

The response from Greek society to the so-called aggressive actions of its northern neighbor was widespread and increasingly extreme. Rather than taking the lead and crafting a pragmatic policy position on the issue, Greek leaders fell prey

⁵¹ The symbol was discovered in a tomb forty miles west of Thessaloniki in 1970. *Ibid.*, 225.

⁵² A year prior (1992) the Greek post office issued a series of stamps portraying traditional Macedonian symbols and inscribed with the phrase "Macedonia was and will always be Greek."

⁵³ Quoted in Papavizas, *Claiming Macedonia*, 222.

and later contributed to a counter-nationalist swell within Greek society. Prior to the 1990s, it was generally accepted in Greece that the concept of “Macedonia” had two reasonable meanings for the Balkan region: 1) historical ties with the ancient Hellenic kingdom of Macedon and 2) a roughly defined geographic region that included territory north of Greece’s borders.⁵⁴ In response to the events of 1991, however, acknowledging the latter meaning was soon viewed as treason. Spurred on by a sensationalist Greek media and a surge of new and outspoken Greek “historians,” the Greek public became highly energized by the controversy and enticed its representatives to confront the Skopje government. The movement showcased its resolve in February 1992, when over one million Greek citizens demonstrated in the streets of Greek Macedonia’s capital, Thessaloniki. Using the slogan *Makedonia einai elliniki* (“Macedonia is Greek”), they rejected the possibility of a flexible interpretation of the Macedonian label. As Evangelos Kofos describes: “Like the dry forest of August, the logic of the ‘one and only Macedonia’ argument caught fire with the imagination of an ill-informed Greek public.”⁵⁵

It took little time for the government to respond to the overwhelming public uprising. Foreign Minister Andonis Samaras (ND) brought the issue to the EU’s Council of Foreign Ministers, which on 16 December 1991 endorsed three Greek proposals on the matter: 1) Skopje must denounce any territorial claims over Greek Macedonia, 2) it must acknowledge that there is no “Macedonian” minority in Greece and 3) it must discontinue using the name “Macedonia.” Securing EU support on these three points was viewed as a major success. It succeeded in persuading

⁵⁴ Kofos, “Greece’s Macedonian Adventure,” 2-3.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

President Kiro Gligorov to amend Article's 3 and 49 of the constitution, thus fulfilling the first two conditions of the EU declaration. But the endorsement failed to address Greece's most important concern, as Gligorov made no indication that he would consider changing the Republic's name.⁵⁶

By 1992 the "Macedonian" controversy began engulfing the parliament and Greek party politics. As Evangelos Kofos describes, an ideological competition emerged both *between* and *within* Greece's two leading parties. Andreas Papandreou (PASOK), the leader of the opposition at the time, was one of the first to make a move. He insisted that the EU declaration on the name issue could not be considered a diplomatic victory unless it was interpreted to exclude all derivatives of the name "Macedonia," a reading that would also prohibit compound names (e.g. New Macedonia or Northern Macedonia). This *maximalist* position - "neither Macedonia nor its derivatives" - soon caught on with the already roused Greek public. Not to be outdone by the opposition, ND leaders adopted similar platforms.⁵⁷ A period of peculiar "ethnic outbidding" soon characterized Greek politics; this despite the fact that the rival ethnic group was outside the Greek polity.⁵⁸

PASOK won the first battle of ethnic outbidding in October 1993. Earlier that year the dispute had shifted from the EU to the UN. In April, the UN passed Resolution 817, which recognized Macedonia as an independent state under a

⁵⁶ Papavizas, *Claiming Macedonia*, 222-223.

⁵⁷ Kofos, "Greece's Macedonian Adventure," 6-9.

⁵⁸ As Rabushka and Shepsle note in their seminal text: "Moderation on the ethnic issue is a viable strategy only if ethnicity is not salient. Once ethnicity becomes salient and, as a consequence, all issues are interpreted in ethnic terms, the rhetoric of cooperation and mutual trust sounds painfully weak. More importantly, it is strategically vulnerable to flame fanning and the politics of outbidding." Rabushka and Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies*, 86.

provisional name: *The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* or *FYROM*.⁵⁹ Meanwhile, negotiations began under the guidance of UN mediators (Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance) to resolve the name issue. In May they presented both governments with a compromise treaty – unofficially blessed by the Foreign Ministries of each party – that recommended a solution using a compound name. At first, Prime Minister Mitsotakis (ND) seemed willing to consider the proposal. When both the opposition and his fellow party members strongly objected, however, he turned down the treaty and tried to return to the “maximalist” position.⁶⁰ It was too late. By the October elections the PASOK party established itself as the “true champions” of Greek Macedonia’s identity and soundly regained control of the government.⁶¹ Throughout his tenure, Papandreou openly and consistently embraced the “maximalist” position. As NATO countries began officially recognizing FYROM, he deflected Greek outrage toward the West and their “hostile foreign interests.” Then, in February 1994, the Prime Minister commenced a near total embargo on FYROM in an endeavor to force Skopje’s leaders into submission.⁶² The aggressive tactic further alienated Greece from its Western allies, who increasingly viewed the Greek government as an obstinate bully vis-à-vis its much weaker neighbor. In fact, over time even the Greek public came to deem the embargo excessive, especially as Greek business leaders realized they were missing out on emergent economic opportunities to the north.⁶³

⁵⁹ “UN Resolution 817.”

⁶⁰ Kofos, “Greece’s Macedonian Adventure,” 7.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 7-8.

⁶² The embargo did not include food and pharmaceuticals. *Ibid.*, 8.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 9.

In September 1995 Greece and FYROM signed the “Interim Accord” in New York. Arbitrated by UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance, the agreement ended the embargo in exchange for Skopje’s willingness to remove the Vergina Sun from its flag.⁶⁴ But the accord did little to address the all-important name issue. However, as indicated below, it did stipulate that Greece would not block Skopje’s right to join international organizations, so long as it did so using its UN designation (i.e. FYROM):

Article 11. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the First Part [Greece] agrees not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part [The Republic of Macedonia] in international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions of which [Greece] is a member; however, [Greece] reserves the right to object to any membership referred to above if and to the extent [The Republic of Macedonia] is to be referred to in such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 [i.e. as FYROM] (1993).⁶⁵

Article 11 appeared to remove one of Greece’s principal bargaining chips in the name dispute, especially given its membership in the West’s two most cherished institutions, the EU and NATO. When FYROM joined NATO’s PfP program in 1995 and MAP in 1999,⁶⁶ it seemed as though its membership in the alliance would not be affected by the ongoing dispute.

From the 1995 Interim Accord until the 2008 Bucharest Summit, Greece gradually backed away from its “maximalist” position and began to entertain the possibility of a solution to the controversy by means of the “compound name” option. Meanwhile, leaders in Skopje moved in the opposite direction. Not only were they emboldened by the results of the Interim Accord, they were also convinced that

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ “Greece-FYROM Interim Accord.”

⁶⁶ “NATO’s Relations with FYROM.”

NATO's strategy to stabilize the Balkan region – a goal that benefitted from Skopje's steady cooperation - gave them valuable leverage. As economic activity between Greece and FYROM increased,⁶⁷ and Greece became increasingly distracted by rising tensions with Turkey, Skopje did not appear ready to budge. As Kofos describes, "Gilgorov made no secret of his belief that the name dispute gradually would be diffused, with no concessions on his part."⁶⁸ The position was further strengthened as, one by one, national capitals in the West started officially recognizing the Macedonian state by their preferred name, "The Republic of Macedonia."⁶⁹

Table 5.2 Name Recognition Preferences among NATO Allies

NATO Allies that use "FYROM" for Official Diplomatic Relations	NATO Allies that use "The Republic of Macedonia" for Official Diplomatic Relations
Belgium	Albania
Denmark – uses "Macedonia (FYROM)"	Bulgaria
France	Canada
Germany	Croatia
Greece	Czech Republic
Latvia	Estonia
Portugal	Hungary
Spain	Iceland
<i>Source:</i> Accurate information for this table was not easy to gather. Due to the sensitivities of the issue, some governments are hesitant to establish an official position either way. Additionally, the Macedonian Embassy keeps its list of countries that officially refer to it as the Republic of Macedonia "confidential." The data for this table came primarily from the official websites of the individual Foreign Ministries. I also benefitted from the assistance from the United Macedonian Diaspora.	Italy
	Lithuania
	Luxembourg
	Netherlands
	Norway
	Poland
	Romania
	Slovakia
	Slovenia
	Turkey
	United Kingdom
	United States

⁶⁷ As Nikos Zaikos reports: "By 1999 the value of Greece's exports to FYROM had risen to USD 425,100,000, making that country Greece's principal trading partner in the Balkans." "The Interim Accord," 49.

⁶⁸ Kofos, "Greece's Macedonian Adventure," 10.

⁶⁹ Today more than 120 countries recognize Macedonia under its constitutional name. The U.S. recognized the Republic of Macedonia by this name on 8 November 2004, reportedly in exchange for its support of the Iraq War. Meaney and Mylonas, "The Name Game."

In July 2006, the ethnically oriented Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity party (VMRO-DPMNE) regained control of the parliament in Skopje. The origins of the party go back to 1893, when various factions of Slavs first organized to promote their independence from the Ottomans and, after 1913, the Greeks and Bulgarians.⁷⁰ Though its composition and identity evolved throughout the twentieth century, the group consistently advanced the rights of Slav Macedonians and, at times, the unification of the Macedonian region under a single state. As such, it is perhaps not surprising that most Greeks are highly suspicious of the VMRO-DPMNE and its leadership. In fact, in recent years VMRO-DPMNE has done little to improve its reputation. The party and its nationalist supporters have “posthumously slavified” many of Greece’s most important historical figures, to include King Phillip II, Alexander the Great and Aristotle. These distortions are now prominent in school textbooks⁷¹ and were reinforced when, in December 2006, the government renamed Skopje’s airport *Skopje Alexander the Great Airport*. Groups associated with the party also frequently produce and distribute maps of a “unified Macedonia” with Thessaloniki as its capital. At a national ceremony on 4 February 2008, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski placed a wreath at a memorial adorned with a map of “greater Macedonia” that encompasses the Macedonia province in Greece and Mount Olympus.⁷² From the Greek standpoint, the actions mentioned here violated

⁷⁰ The organization was previously known by the designation "IMRO." Rossos, *Macedonia and the Macedonians*, 102-106; Papavizas, *Claiming Macedonia*, 42-44.

⁷¹ According to some reports, the textbooks describe Thessaloniki as "occupied territory." Meaney and Mylonas, "The Name Game."

⁷² Gatzoulis, "FYROM has Only Itself to Blame."

Article 7 of the 1995 Interim Accord, which requires that “Each Party shall promptly take effective measures to prohibit hostile activities or propaganda by State-controlled agencies and to discourage acts by private entities likely to incite violence, hatred or hostility against each other.”⁷³

The 2008 Bucharest Summit (2-4 April)

In the months prior to NATO’s twentieth Summit, there was a general consensus that Croatia, Albania and FYROM now met the alliance’s membership criteria.⁷⁴ All three cooperated closely with NATO to help stabilize the Balkans,⁷⁵ and by 2008 each candidate was a five-year veteran of ISAF. Aside from their qualifications, NATO allies agreed that extending membership to the “Adriatic Three” would further stabilize the ethnically charged Balkan region, signaling the closing chapters of a nearly twenty year crisis in NATO’s backyard. Regarding the Greek-FYROM name dispute, NATO leaders recognized that the resolution of the dispute would necessarily transpire outside the organization.⁷⁶ In short, the controversy was not viewed as a “NATO issue.” As such, most felt the dispute should not be a showstopper for FYROM’s invitation to join the alliance. Bearing in mind the yet precarious settlement between the Slav Macedonians and the Albanian

⁷³ “Greece-FYROM Interim Accord.”

⁷⁴ For a discussion of the membership qualifications of all three countries, see Morelli et al., *NATO Enlargement: Albania, Croatia, and Possible Future Candidates*.

⁷⁵ In August 2001, the Skopje government invited NATO to assist in quelling tensions between the country’s ethnic Albanian minority and national security forces. The result was a series of three continuous operations in FYROM (2001-2003) under the Ohrid Framework Agreement. “Under this agreement, the government pledged to improve the rights of its ethnic Albanian population. In exchange, ethnic Albanian representatives agreed to abandon separatist demands and hand over weapons to a NATO force.” “Peace Support Operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”

⁷⁶ Since December 1999, the name dispute has been mediated by UN official Matthew Nimetz. *Secretary-General Appoints New Personal Envoy for Talks between Greece, FYROM*.

minority in FYROM, the potential consequences of invitations to only Albania and Croatia - which might exacerbate ethnic tensions in western FYROM - outweighed any squabble over a state's name.⁷⁷

Among the great powers in NATO, the U.S. was the most public advocate for FYROM's invitation. Especially given Skopje's support in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, the Bush Administration felt obligated to repay the favor by acting as FYROM's mentor in the membership process and offering its endorsement in the NAC.⁷⁸ Many also sensed that President Bush, now in the final months of his second term, believed that enlargement into the Balkans would contribute to his personal legacy as a champion of post-communist Europe.⁷⁹ As the Summit approached, U.S. officials insisted that the U.S. President was "not going to accept no [by the Greeks] for an answer."⁸⁰ Yet despite this apparent doggedness, most evidence indicates that FYROM's membership in NATO was not one of the top priorities for the Administration. Three separate issues dominated the U.S.'s foreign policy agenda leading up to the Summit: 1) the future of NATO's relationship with Ukraine⁸¹ and Georgia, 2) the effects of Kosovo's recent declaration of independence, and, most importantly, 3) NATO's continuing challenges in Afghanistan. "My administration has made it abundantly clear we expect people to carry a heavy burden if they're

⁷⁷ "Peace Support Operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia."

⁷⁸ Meaney and Mylonas, "The Name Game"; In 2008 FYROM contributed 135 troops to ISAF, compared to Greece's 130 troops. *ISAF Key Facts and Figures Placemat*.

⁷⁹ See, for example, Myers and Shanker, "NATO Expansion, and a Bush Legacy, Are in Doubt"; This was also the view of a high ranking Greek official I interviewed, who claimed that "the issue almost became personal [for Bush]." Greek Official, "Interview by author."

⁸⁰ "NATO Allies Turn Backs on Bush."

⁸¹ Just prior to going to Bucharest, the U.S. President stopped in Kiev to convey his "strong support" for Ukraine's membership in NATO. "Helping Ukraine move toward NATO membership is in the interest of every member in the alliance and will help advance security and freedom in this region and around the world," Bush said. Harding, Borger, and Chrisafis, "NATO Summit: Bush-Putin."

going to be ... in Afghanistan," Bush stated in March. "I am going to go to Bucharest...[to] encourage people to contribute more."⁸²

Additionally, the President probably recognized the growing sympathy for the Greek position coming from the U.S. Congress. Though the Senate and House passed legislation in March 2007 supporting the "timely admission" of Albania, Croatia and FYROM into NATO, this declaration was in fact no different than the official Greek position on the matter.⁸³ Two months later, members of both chambers expressed their disdain for FYROM's recent behavior. In May 2007, 120 members of the House (both Republicans and Democrats) co-sponsored Resolution 356, which condemned FYROM for its "propaganda" and "hostile activities," and urged Skopje to "review the contents of textbooks, maps, and teaching aids to ensure that such tools are stating accurate information."⁸⁴ A few months later, Senators Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Olympia Snowe (R-ME) and Barack Obama (D-IL) introduced a similar resolution in the Senate.⁸⁵ To be sure, Congressional backing was no doubt facilitated by the existence of approximately 3 million Greek Americans and an influential ethnic Greek lobby – the latter often regarded as second only to the Jewish lobby in terms of its political clout in the U.S.⁸⁶

Greece's most loyal supporter in the FYROM dispute was France. While France openly asserted that FYROM "met the basic criteria for getting a membership invitation," its president, Nicolas Sarkozy, had both personal and strategic motives

⁸² "Bush to NATO: Share Burden."

⁸³ Morelli et al., *NATO Enlargement: Albania, Croatia, and Possible Future Candidates*, 32.

⁸⁴ "House Resolution 356."

⁸⁵ Menendez, "Senate Resolution 300."

⁸⁶ Mathias, "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy"; Swigert, *Influence of the Greek-American Lobby*.

for supporting Greece.⁸⁷ To begin with, Sarkozy's maternal grandfather was Greek and, in fact, was born in Thessaloniki. Sarkozy and Greece also shared in common their distrust of the Turks, the former having repeatedly snubbed Turkey's aspirations of joining the EU. Finally, Sarkozy has consistently and vigorously campaigned on behalf of France's defense industries. With the Greeks needing to upgrade their inventory of fighter aircraft, which currently includes both French-made Mirage 2000s and U.S.-made F-16s, Sarkozy perhaps looked to benefit from his support of the Greek position. While concrete evidence of a "deal" between Greece and France is not available, U.S. officials were at least suspicious of an undisclosed arrangement leading up to the Summit. On 5 February, EADS (a joint French, German and Spanish aerospace corporation) signed a €9.7 million contract with Greece's government controlled Hellenic Aerospace Industry SA to provide the latter with "technology and know-how to bolster its airframe design and development capability."⁸⁸ Then, on 10 March, Dassault Aviation (the manufacturer of France's newest fighter, the *Rafale*) opened an office in Athens "to expand technology exchange and cooperation with Hellenic Aerospace Industry."⁸⁹ Again, the relationship between these events and the NATO Summit are unclear, but perceptions in some U.S. circles were that Greece was securing support for its position on the name issue.⁹⁰ Regardless, it seems clear that Greece went into the Summit knowing it had one great power willing to back its position. When Sarkozy spoke to the Greek Parliament in Athens - two months after FYROM's membership

⁸⁷ "DM Elenovski: France Supports Macedonia's NATO Membership."

⁸⁸ "EADS Eurofighter Signs with Greece."

⁸⁹ Parmalee, "Rafale in Greece."

⁹⁰ Volker, "Interview by author."

was rebuffed – he made these statements in a speech titled “Greece-France: A New Alliance”:

Let me say ... that the settlement of the [FYROM] name dispute is a precondition for any accession [to NATO or the EU]. Solidarity between France and Greece has been and will be real. I have told the Prime Minister that Greece’s position is legitimate, responsible and open to dialogue ... I want you to know that France favours the Greek side and we will not change our stance.⁹¹

The remaining line-up in the NAC was generally hopeful that FYROM would get an invitation at the April Summit. However, the extent to which they supported Greece’s pre-condition for FYROM’s accession is more difficult to determine.

Regarding NATO’s two remaining great powers, both Germany⁹² and the U.K.⁹³ seemed generally supportive of FYROM, though the latter was perhaps less vocal at the actual Summit.⁹⁴ Among the smaller powers in NATO, it depends somewhat on whether or not you believe the reports coming from Skopje or Athens. For example, according to articles published by the Macedonian Information Agency (MIA) prior to the Summit, all NATO allies except Greece (i.e. including France⁹⁵) provided their “unconditional support to Macedonia’s membership.”⁹⁶ In contrast, the Athens News Agency (ANA) reported that Italy, Spain Iceland and Luxembourg joined France (“the warmest supporter of the Greek position”) in their support of Greece’s “veto,”

⁹¹ “Greece–France: A New Alliance.”

⁹² A German newspaper reported its government was “strongly backing” membership for all three candidates, adding that “[i]t would be the wrong signal if we did not now succeed in admitting FYROM.” “Germany Advocates NATO Membership for Macedonia.”

⁹³ According to a source within Macedonia (Makfax), British Foreign Secretary David Miliband sent a letter to Macedonia stating that “Great Britain is a strong supporter of Macedonia’s aspirations to join the Euro-Atlantic community.” “Support to Macedonia’s NATO Bid.”

⁹⁴ “Macedonia Does Not Start Accession Negotiations.”

⁹⁵ “DM Elenovski: France Supports Macedonia’s NATO Membership” This report came out following a meeting with the French Defence Minister, Herve Morin, on 11 March.

⁹⁶ “Macedonia’s Chance of Receiving NATO Invitation Reportedly Reduced.”

while only Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Turkey⁹⁷ “supported a NATO invitation to Macedonia without any preconditions.”⁹⁸ Following the release of the above-cited ANA account, MIA reported that the Italian Embassy explicitly denied Greek reports of “the alleged opposed opinion of Italy regarding the NATO invitation for Republic of Macedonia.”⁹⁹ In summary, it is obvious that both of the disputing parties claimed more support for their position than actually existed. It also appears to be the case that NATO allies (minus perhaps France) did not have a problem admitting FYROM into the alliance under its UN-designated moniker.

Nonetheless, it became increasingly apparent to NATO allies that, barring an eleventh-hour compromise on the name issue, Greece was not willing to consider approving FYROM’s accession. By 2008 Greece considered its northern neighbor in direct breach of the 1995 Interim Accord, thus relieving Greece of the legal prohibitions described in Article 11. In a January speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., Deputy Foreign Minister Dimitrios Katsoudas clarified the Greek position:

The U.S. brokered, UN sponsored, Interim Accord of 1995 clearly provides for the two sides to work on finding a definite solution to this problem; for acts of propaganda and irredentism to stop immediately; for symbols and history not to be usurped. Still, twelve years later, all of these absurd [propaganda] practices continue in earnest in Skopje. ... [The government] completely ignores that it has itself made nonsense of this, as well as of many other provisions of the Interim Accord, particularly those stipulating the need for abstaining from irredentism and the usurpation of the history and symbols of Greek Macedonia. ...

⁹⁷ Interestingly though perhaps not surprisingly, on every official NATO document that uses the term “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” Turkey insists on including a footnote that states: “Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.”

⁹⁸ “Macedonia Does Not Start Accession Negotiations.”

⁹⁹ “Italian Embassy Denies Media Reports on Support of Veto on Macedonia NATO Entry.”

In any case, my country has reached the very limit of its patience and, unless a solution is found by March, we are fully determined not to allow the entry of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia either into NATO or, to come to my competence, to the EU, later.¹⁰⁰

These official declarations, as well as those made by Greek officials to their constituents in Greece, tied the hands of the delegation as the Summit drew near. By the time the official NAC meeting commenced on 3 April, the Council knew not to force the issue. In the end the Greek delegation did not even have to use its “formal veto.” The NAC approved the invitations for Albania and Croatia and publicly announced “that an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached.”¹⁰¹ Humiliated, the delegation from FYROM “walked out” of the Summit and returned to Skopje.¹⁰² The Summit declaration was an enormous victory for the Greek delegation, as *NATO* officially acknowledged that the resolution of the name dispute was a prerequisite for FYROM’s accession. In short, Greece regained some of the leverage it had lost following the 1995 Interim Accord.

Explaining the Greek Influence

Based on this study’s definition of influence (i.e. *a state’s demonstrated ability to achieve desired alliance policies*), the Greek rejection of FYROM’s NATO membership in 2008 is clearly a case of significant small power influence. Unlike the Danish case, however, this case exemplifies the other side of the influence coin - what others and I call *defensive* influence. Within the alliance, only one nation -

¹⁰⁰ Katsoudas, “Speech of the Foreign Minister’s Secretary General for European Affairs.”

¹⁰¹ *Bucharest Summit Declaration*.

¹⁰² Tran, “Macedonia Walks Out of NATO Talks.”

Greece – had a problem with FYROM’s constitutional name. Minus this caveat, NATO was eager to invite FYROM into the NATO fold. And though the U.S. went into the Summit determined overcome the standoff, Greece stood its ground. Below I assess the extent to which the hypothesized variables presented in Chapter 3 explain this specific outcome.

Security Dependency

Even a cursory examination of Greece’s security environment in the last century reveals that it is a highly unique case in NATO. Nonetheless, the above analysis demonstrates the universality and the explanatory power of Hypothesis 1. When Greece joined the Atlantic alliance in 1952, it was almost completely dependent on the U.S. and NATO to protect it against the communist threat. The presence of active and hostile communist elements inside Greece meant that its most pressing security concerns were exceptionally *imminent, probable, proximate* and *severe*. World War II left Greece weak and vulnerable, and thus unable to address its own security challenges. Without external economic and military assistance, it is unlikely the Greek government would have survived the conflict. The price for this assistance was an enormous loss of foreign policy autonomy and influence. For nearly three decades Greece’s ministry of defense followed the lead of NATO’s great power leader - the U.S.

As the battle against internal communist forces subsided in Greece, the country gradually became less reliant on outside support. Especially as the Turkish threat became increasingly critical in the 1970s, the Greek government recognized

that its membership in NATO was not an adequate guarantee against outside aggression. NATO's approbation of the Greek junta from 1967-1974 further convinced politicians that the alliance was not interested in addressing direct threats to the Greek polity. Thus when the Cold War ended, Greece continued to think in terms of its own unique security environment. Whereas other countries in NATO began reducing defense spending and making their militaries more "expeditionary," Greece continued to spend 5-6% of its GDP on conventional, territorial forces. Though Greece is notably less secure than other members of the alliance, the increased autonomy Greece enjoys gives it the latitude to publicly criticize NATO policy and, as witnessed in the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, even some leeway to enact policies that directly undermine NATO strategy.

The above analysis is not meant to insist that Greece does not benefit from its membership with Western institutions. To be sure, Greece understands that part of its fate depends on the success and viability of NATO. The result is the delicate balancing act described earlier. In NATO, Greece has traditionally worked to maintain a reputation as a "team player." It typically does not impede significant great power initiatives in the alliance even when these initiatives are antithetical to Greek interests; case in point, Greece did not veto NATO's initiation of the air campaign against the Serbs in 1999. However, in the years leading up to the Bucharest Summit, U.S. leverage vis-à-vis Greece diminished even further. Until the end of the 1990s, the U.S. contributed substantially to Greek defense efforts and, by and large, adhered to a policy that provided a 1.4:1 ratio of Turkish to Greek military

aid.¹⁰³ Thus while the U.S. and NATO did not directly address Greek concerns about Turkey, this policy was viewed as a tolerable means of maintaining the balance of power in the Aegean region. By 2008, this practice had vanished. Whereas from 1991 to 2000 the U.S. furnished Greece with military aid averaging \$278 million annually, that number dropped to \$2.3 million in the period from 2001-2008. During these same periods, the Turkish to Greek ratio increased from 1.5:1 to 13:1 respectively (see Table 5.3 below). Though this variation does not provide a complete explanation for the outcome at the Bucharest Summit, it provides us with a useful theoretical clue to explain the disparities between 1999 and 2008.

In conclusion, Greece's lack of faith in and, subsequently, lack of dependency on NATO's collective security institutions likely contributed to its refusal of FYROM's membership in the alliance. However, it would be an exaggeration to claim (as many Greek politicians do) that *FYROM* – with a population just over 2 million – represents a traditional security threat to Greece.¹⁰⁴ At most, FYROM's actions embody what Moustakis and Sheehan call an “[acute] challenge to their identity ... , so that a ‘societal’ security threat exists.”¹⁰⁵ At the same time, this does not in any way minimize the salience of Hypothesis 1. If Greece were highly dependent on NATO or the U.S. to manage *any* of its security concerns, Greece would have likely felt obliged to concede to FYROM's accession. Indeed, this was the consistent pattern during the Cold War, when several small powers objected to enlargement to countries such as Turkey and Spain, but nonetheless declined their institutional

¹⁰³ Migdalovitz, *Greece and Turkey*.

¹⁰⁴ As Gallagher reports, "in the 1990s [Greece's] annual defense spending exceeded the GDP of Albania and Macedonia. Gallagher, *The Balkans in the New Millennium*, 4.

¹⁰⁵ “Greek Security Policy after the Cold War,” 103.

right to block their memberships (see Chapter 2). As it stands, Greece – though it is one of the most “threatened” allies in the alliance – is less impeded by Walt’s concept of “asymmetrical dependence.” At the end of the day, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty does not provide the necessary insurance against Greece’s greatest threat: Turkey. As such, it has greater liberty to disregard or challenge the prevailing consensus in the alliance when its most important foreign policy objectives are at stake.

Expertise

Greece had at its disposal two forms of expertise that might have proven valuable in the case study presented here: *regional expertise* (i.e. *knowledge of the politics, economy, geography and culture of a particular region*) and *institutional expertise* (i.e. *proficiency with the NATO policy-making process*). However, in this instance neither resource contributed significantly to Greece’s successful influence attempt. First, as an established and respected state in the Balkan region (the historical source of no less than Plato and Thucydides), Greece should have been looked to as a primary source of information on the Macedonian Question. But instead of presenting a balanced and objective account of the issue, Greek politicians got caught up in the nationalistic excitement that followed FYROM’s independence.

Table 5.3 U.S. Military Assistance to Greece and Turkey in millions, constant 2008 \$U.S.

	1974	1975	1976*	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Greece (G)	248.7	287.0	696.2	451.6	474.7	432.5	340.5	374.3	553.4	530.1	911.2	882.5	742.9	577.1	559.3	548.7	526.6
Turkey (T)	709.7	353.6	739.0	475.9	452.7	480.6	531.4	793.0	759.0	1305.3	1238.4	1063.7	827.2	801.7	787.6	709.7	756.1
Ratio (T/G)	2.85	1.23	1.06	1.05	0.95	1.11	1.56	2.12	1.37	2.46	1.36	1.21	1.11	1.39	1.41	1.29	1.44

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Greece (G)	509.7	496.8	461.0	394.1	333.7	342.0	161.8	2.6	55.8	20.2	6.0	0.6	8.7	0.6	1.1	0.6	0.6	0.4
Turkey (T)	1033.0	713.8	675.4	560.0	480.1	564.2	227.0	7.3	19.5	4.5	2.2	84.1	23.5	44.9	40.7	18.8	18.2	9.7
Ratio (T/G)	2.03	1.44	1.46	1.42	1.44	1.65	1.40	2.79	0.35	0.22	0.37	142.56	2.70	70.13	36.36	31.32	31.84	22.02

* In 1976 the U.S. Government changed its fiscal year from July-June to October-September. The numbers in this column represent the 15-month period from July 1975 to September 1976.

Source: "Assistance Data," Government, *Greenbook*, 2010, <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/>.

The result was a deluge of ill-informed, hyperbolic rhetoric meant to rally support and distract the public from Greece's domestic problems.¹⁰⁶ Without a doubt, both FYROM and Greece were guilty of historical fabrications. But Greece, as the older and larger party in the dispute, was expected to "take the high road" in the matter. After its early dedication to the "maximalist" position and the economic embargo of 1994-1995, much of the international community began losing respect for the Greek position. In short, in the eyes of many allies Greece was no longer trusted as an objective source in the controversy.

Greece's *institutional* expertise was also not a contributing factor in the FYROM case. Though by 2008 the alliance included several new allies, Greece's experience as a long-time member in the alliance did not appear to give it any significant advantage. As in the Danish case, the key players were NATO's great powers – particularly the U.S. and France – each of who are well versed in NATO policy-making mechanisms. Again, it is clear that NATO's consensus rules (i.e. an *Institutional Factor*) - rather than the Greek delegation's knowledge of them – allowed this small power to block an otherwise accepted organizational decision. Had NATO decision-making rules been based on majoritarian principles, it is quite plausible that FYROM would now be a NATO ally.

Intensity of Interest

Without question, a significant factor contributing to the outcome of this case was Greece's intense interest in convincing its northern neighbor to change its

¹⁰⁶ *The Balkans in the New Millennium*, 4.

constitutional name. The issue roused the passions of nearly every part of Greek society. For nearly seventeen years the issue remained a hot topic in Greece – from the local coffee shops to the parliament in Athens. Though issues surrounding Turkey continue to dominate Greece’s foreign and defense policies, the challenges with FYROM at times even superseded the former in intensity. Indeed, as described above, the fate of political parties and their leaders often hung in the balance of the FYROM issue. As Kofos explains:

Not since the mass demonstrations of the Cypriot anti-colonial struggle of the 1950s, had Greek society and the Greeks of the diaspora exhibited such awareness and involvement in a foreign policy issue, such as the recognition of a new independent state on their northern boundaries ... [The country witnessed] mass demonstrations, of a much grandeur scale than anything registered in Greece’s past.¹⁰⁷

When the above intensity is compared with that of NATO’s – and in particular the U.S. - it becomes clear why Greece was able to withstand attempts to alter its position. The comparison demonstrates the limits of great power influence in a geographically extensive, multi-member organization. While a great power like the U.S. must divide its attention among several issues, a minor power like Greece has a much smaller range of interests. In short, this disparity in interest intensity helps small powers compensate for disparities in material resources. Thus as NATO policies relating to Ukraine, Georgia, Kosovo and Afghanistan inundated the Summit’s agenda, FYROM’s membership faded in significance. As one Greek scholar described following the Summit:

With [the] overheat of geostrategic, economic and energy interests, as well as with the desperate effort of the U.S. government to remind Europeans that the issue of Afghanistan is still in the agenda, and there is a need to reinforce

¹⁰⁷ “Greece’s Macedonian Adventure,” 11.

the allied presence there, the issue of the accession of FYROM to the Euroatlantic Alliance along with the name issue, have been placed down on the list of the summit's priorities. The Greek government didn't receive substantial pressure for the FYROM issue, which does not have either an energy or a serious geostrategic importance, as the center of international interest has moved northwards to its neighbor, the newly established Republic of Kosovo. The center of international interest, and particularly of U.S. interest, has been moved from FYROM to Kosovo.¹⁰⁸

Meanwhile, Greece went into the Summit with one obvious goal in mind – a goal it was determined not to forsake. NATO members clearly understood that Greece was willing to do all it could to prevent FYROM's membership minus the resolution of the name issue. Once the Greek position was clearly and emphatically stated, NATO allies recognized that the calculation of relative resolve tipped the balance in Greece's favor. Though they continued their rhetoric in support of FYROM's accession, countries like the U.S. devoted their efforts towards policies that were deemed more fruitful.

Political Cohesion

Greece entered the NATO alliance in 1952 as an extremely divided society. Early on, the greatest division existed among various communist elements on the far left and a coalition of key players on the right. This lack of cohesion left Greece highly vulnerable to outside interference - from Tito and the Soviets on the one hand, to NATO and the U.S. on the other. When Greece at last succeeded in suppressing the communist revolution, it eliminated a major access point into Greek society. At the same time, however, on foreign policy issues Greece continued to suffer from internal rivalries. During the first half of the Cold War, numerous key

¹⁰⁸ Serefidis, "The Euro-Atlantic Divisions and the Greek Veto."

players in society – from the military to the monarchy to the church - felt obliged to meddle in government affairs, each with its own political motivations. Thus Veremis wrote in 1988: “It is impossible to speak of the Greek state as though it were an immutable entity. ...Greece has persistently suffered from deep political and social divisions that have prevented the formation of a coherent and broadly supported foreign policy.”¹⁰⁹

By 1974, however, certain events transpired that promoted cohesion among Greece’s foreign policy actors. First, democratic consolidation in Greece coincided with the removal of the Greek monarchy and the submission of the military to civilian authorities. Since 1974 foreign policy has been largely defined by Greece’s two leading parties: PASOK and ND. Second, the increasing threat posed by Turkey did much to congeal Greece’s defense outlook. As Moustakis and Sheehan point out: “Every Greek government since 1995 has seen Turkey as its primary security threat.”¹¹⁰ Importantly, the Greek public overwhelmingly supports all policies that challenge Turkish claims on its territory.

In sum, the political culture in Greece is such that actual or potential encroachments on its sovereignty rouse and unite the country – and its political leaders are more than willing to ride the tide of these sentiments. Hence when Greece’s northern neighbor – a republic long-associated with irredentism - declared its independence in 1991, public passion and political ambition fused to create a united front against FYROM. Though the extent to which Greece’s government has been willing to cooperate with Skopje has not been consistent, one issue – the

¹⁰⁹ “Greece and NATO,” 236.

¹¹⁰ “Greek Security Policy after the Cold War,” 95.

latter's right to use name "The Republic of Macedonia" – has never been questioned. Both PASOK and ND have held firm for eighteen years on this issue. As the former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Kurt Volker, described: "There is a very united front on the FYROM issue. When the New Democracy was voted in [2004], there was not an inch of change."¹¹¹ This consistency is not surprising given the public's opinion on the matter. Prior to the Summit, a poll indicated that 84 percent of Greeks approved of blocking FYROM's invitation if no compromise on the name could be reached in time.¹¹² Compared with the U.S. position on the controversy, the difference is striking. With President Bush in his last months in office and the U.S. Congress - to include then presidential candidate Obama - seemingly more sympathetic to the Greek position, the Greek government felt comfortable sustaining a bold stance in the NAC. As Julianne Smith, a Europe analyst at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies, emphasized just before the meeting in Bucharest: "Many [allied leaders] are looking forward now to the next president in Washington and are already thinking about what the 2009 summit will bring."¹¹³

Influence Tactics

Several of the influence tactics posited in Chapter 3 might have contributed to the outcome examined above. The most explicit and effective tactic used was that of *commitment* (i.e. *communicating your positioning clearly to other countries and letting them know you will not compromise beyond a certain point*). Months before

¹¹¹ "Interview by author."

¹¹² "Think-tank Urges EU to Pressure Greece."

¹¹³ Quoted in Spetalnick, "Bush Seeks to Salvage Legacy."

the Summit began in April 2008, Greece leaders drew a clear line in the sand: *no resolution to the name dispute, no membership*. Once again, systemic and institutional factors certainly facilitated this steadfastness. First, Greece was not overly dependent on the alliance for its security and thus was able to make a credible challenge to the prevailing preference of the organization. Second, NATO's decision-making rules permitted Greece to turn resolve into group rejection. But these factors are not sufficient explanations for the final result. The case considered here demonstrates the interactive effect of both high political cohesion and intensity of interest with the commitment strategy. Greek diplomats correctly calculated that their hard-line position was bolstered by conditions within Greece. In short, Greece was able to make up for its small power status by adopting a stance consistent with intense and widespread sentiment inside Greece.

Clearly the greatest challenge facing the Greek delegation was their ability to effectively use *reasoning* (i.e. *the use of facts and data to support the development of a logical argument*) to explain their opposition to FYROM's membership in the alliance. To many observers, both inside and outside the alliance, there is simply no obvious reason why a state's name should have anything to do with NATO membership. Moreover, the sensationalism that characterized the Greek position in the early years of the dispute contributed to its difficulties in presenting a consistent and credible explanation for its refusal. That said, perhaps the most legitimate argument offered was that NATO candidates are expected to achieve, in addition to their internal reforms, "good relations with neighboring countries" prior to accession – a requirement repeated frequently by American officials throughout

NATO's enlargement process.¹¹⁴ Because the relationship in question in this case is with another ally, the issue here is one of alliance solidarity. This is particularly important for Greece given its rocky relationship with Turkey. As one Greek official explained it: "You want to know that your ally is on your side. We already have an ally that is questionable, we don't need a second."¹¹⁵ It is difficult to gauge the significance that this argument had in NATO capitals and the NAC. However, the evidence examined here indicates that most NATO allies felt Macedonia met the basic criteria for the alliance, implying that the name issue was viewed as a bilateral dispute having little to do with security or the principles and norms of the alliance. Though the French President later insisted that the Greek position was "legitimate" and "responsible," he offered no elaboration as to why it was consistent with these adjectives. Given these factors, I argue that *reasoning* as an Influence Tactic had a relatively small impact on the outcome under scrutiny.

An important finding of this dissertation is that, in order for a small power to achieve desired outcomes in NATO, great power *sponsorship* is critical. This case contributes to this assertion. Greece benefitted considerably from its support from France. What is less clear is *to what extent* and *how* Greece actively pursued French patronage. Having already discounted *reasoning* as a significant factor, two additional explanations remain plausible. The first is that Greece used its upcoming decision regarding the upgrade to its fighter aircraft inventory as a bargaining chip to secure French support. The use of such a tactic is at least consistent with past scholarship on small power influence. As Handel argues: "The bargaining power of

¹¹⁴ See, for example, "Perry News Conference."

¹¹⁵ Greek Official, "Interview by author."

weak states before an arms deal is usually high, for the great powers compete for political influence and hegemony, as well as economic profits.”¹¹⁶ However, the secrecy of such deals makes it difficult – especially in this case – to confidently allege that French support was conditional on a future purchase of French-made weapon systems. All we can say at this point is that the realization that Greece was deciding between American and French fighters gave Greece some leverage when arguing its case before French leaders – a factor that is more consistent with a peripheral *condition* than an explicit Influence Tactic.

A second plausible explanation for France’s sponsorship of the Greek position is that the collaboration was the result of a French initiative rather than a coherent tactic developed within Greece. Throughout its participation in the Atlantic alliance, France has continuously been concerned with its capacity to be a security leader within Europe. The Bush Administration’s adamant stance on the Macedonian issue gave Sarkozy the opportunity to win the hearts of another European nation at a time when America’s popularity was declining and France was lobbying for a stronger and more independent European security framework – an issue discussed further in Chapter 6. In short, it is probable that France hopes to “cash in” on its public support for the Greek veto as it pursues its strategic vision for France and Europe.

Additional/Alternative Variables

One might argue that NATO ultimately denied the Republic of Macedonia a place in the alliance because it understood the country did not yet meet the

¹¹⁶ *Weak States in the International System*, 87.

standards of membership. Albania, Croatia and FYROM each pursued membership via the Membership Action Plan, a classified program that establishes unique criteria for each individual country. The available evidence indicates that, among the three candidates considered in 2008, FYROM ranked third - an assessment confirmed by the U.S. Ambassador to NATO in November 2007.¹¹⁷

Without doubt, among the most important of the challenges related to FYROM's candidacy has been the state of its political reforms. As Vincent Morelli et al report, in 2007 intense political conflict in the Macedonian parliament prevented the nation from "passing key reform measures, including bills relating to implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement."¹¹⁸ Though the nation regained some ground in early 2008, these achievements were somewhat marred when, just before the Summit, the Macedonian government nearly collapsed when an ethnic Albanian party briefly left the coalition.

Though these events were monitored carefully within the alliance, there is no indication that they were contributing factors to its rejection. Especially given its support for NATO-led operations in the Balkans, its impressive contributions to ISAF and its remarkable military reforms, FYROM was considered worthy of NATO membership. Perhaps even more important, its membership was seen as critical to further stabilizing the Adriatic region. As such, NATO leaders - to include the Greeks - made no mention of FYROM's inadequate reforms as reasons to reject its membership aspirations. The communiqué of the Bucharest Summit confirms this widely held conviction: "[the NAC] agreed that an invitation to the former Yugoslav

¹¹⁷ "Macedonia "Lagging Behind" ."

¹¹⁸ *NATO Enlargement: Albania, Croatia, and Possible Future Candidates*, 13.

Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached.”¹¹⁹

Summary

Following World War II, the Greek government was not able to cope with the security challenges facing the nation. The U.S., eager to limit Soviet influence in Europe, became a willing patron to the anti-communist elements within Greece. By accepting the protection of the U.S. and NATO, Greece exchanged autonomy for security. The Greek relationship with NATO changed, however, when fears of a communist takeover were replaced by the Turkish threat – a threat that NATO was unable to adequately address. This shift in security dependency, a phenomenon amplified by the recent change in U.S. policy concerning military aid to Greece, provides this small power with the structural space to pursue its own interests in the Balkan region. Whereas previously it could not afford to exercise its institutional right to veto disliked policies in the NAC, today it has significantly less systemic constraints.

Like most other small powers in NATO, Greece has not been a regular impediment to great power initiatives in the NAC. As such, even given the conditions described above, the 2008 Greek case demands further explanation. The results of this analysis provide a convincing indication that national level factors, especially its high degree of political cohesion and intensity of interest, contributed to Greece’s willingness and ability to stand its ground at the Bucharest Summit. Compared to

¹¹⁹ *Bucharest Summit Declaration.*

other allies in NATO, the Greek resolve was unambiguous. Its leaders accurately deduced that the other members in NATO - especially the U.S. - did not have the same degree of cohesion or interest vis-à-vis FYROM's membership. Though the rhetoric from the Bush Administration indicated its genuine desire to overcome the Greek opposition, in reality its attention was divided among several more pressing NATO issues. This outcome correlates closely with the theoretical predictions of Hypotheses 3 and 4. In contrast, one hypothesized factor, Greek expertise, appeared to contribute only marginally to its successful influence attempt.

Of the eight Influence Tactics proposed in Chapter 3, the most noteworthy was Greece's use of *commitment* – an effective approach given the conditions both inside and outside the country. Its ability to capitalize on French support was equally important, though the lack of evidence precludes a confident assertion that Greece actively pursued French *sponsorship*. Either way, it seems clear that when a policy garners the support of a sizeable majority within NATO, especially on issues of high significance to the alliance, NATO's consensus rules are not an adequate guarantee that individual small powers can overcome the momentum of the organization. At a minimum, Greece needed the tacit support of the French government in order to withstand the otherwise overwhelming pressure exuding within in the NAC. The necessity of great power backing is both more transparent and consequential in the following chapter of this study.

Chapter 6 – Belgium and the 2003 NATO Deployment to Turkey

It is not necessary to exaggerate the influence that a small state can exercise on the politics of the great powers. Without a doubt, it can soften the clashes or propose conciliatory formulas; but whatever the talents of its statesmen, the determinism to which the politics of the great powers is obedient escapes its range of action.

Fernand van Langenhove
Belgian Foreign Minister, July 9, 1936¹

Figure 6.1 Map Of Belgium



Chapter Overview

This chapter focuses on Belgium’s influence in post-Cold War NATO, in particular its attempts in early 2003 to block the deployment of defensive forces to Turkey in anticipation of the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Unlike the cases discussed previously, the case scrutinized here is an example of a *failed* influence attempt. As such, while the cases examined in Chapters 4 and 5 are “deviant cases” of small

¹ Quoted in Helmreich, *Belgium and Europe*, 405.

power influence, this case more or less conforms to the established norm in IR - in short, the greater a state's AMP, the greater influence it will have. As explained in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, however, the case is not one of complete failure. Though NATO's deployment to Turkey essentially took place according to American wishes, the timing of the deployment, as well as some of the addendums linked to the deployment, were affected by the coalition that was opposed to the overall policy. Without question, some of the credit for this change goes to Belgium.

In addition to adding to the number of observations in this small-N study, the Belgian case analysis serves three purposes. First, it demonstrates the limits of NATO's consensus rules as they pertain to small allies. In other words, though every ally has the institutional right to veto policies it does not agree with, the pressures of being an isolated small power in the NAC are most often too much to bear, especially when the issue is of grave importance to one or more great powers. Second, the heated debates surrounding the decision to deploy NATO forces to Turkey represented the greatest intra-Alliance crisis since 1966, when France left the military structure of the alliance.² The early division of NATO's great powers on the issue, with the U.S. and the U.K. on one side and France and Germany on the other, at times appeared to threaten the very existence of the alliance. The confrontation left NATO's remaining members with tough choices, and their ultimate decisions reveal a great deal about the challenges of being an aligned small power. Finally, including a case of negative influence will provide a contrast with the basic findings of the

² This was also the public assessment of the of the Spanish Defence Minister, Frederico Trillo. Staunton, "Second NATO Bid to Heal Split over Turkey Fails."

previously examined deviant cases. As described in Chapter 3, this method is helpful when the primary method of case selection is based primarily on the dependent variable. In other words, this contrast observation serves as a “control case” that helps shed light on the nature of the hypothesized variables (e.g. *necessary* vs. *sufficient*), and highlights the importance of the causal arguments.³

Like the chapters before it, this chapter begins with a short history of Belgian security policy, to include the country’s decision to abandon neutrality following World War II and join the Atlantic alliance, as well as its subsequent role within the organization. I separate Belgium’s relationship with the alliance into two periods. In the first period (1949-1979), Belgium willingly accepted American leadership in the alliance and sought to influence the alliance through its loyalty to the U.S. In the second period (1980-2009), Belgium started to challenge American leadership and shifted its allegiance to the EU and its great power leaders, especially France and Germany. Today Belgium is counted as one of NATO’s so-called “Europeanists.” Like its great power mentor to the south, Belgium sees the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to create a European counterbalance to the U.S. As I describe below, this shift in strategy is a crucial factor that explains Belgium’s willingness to challenge the U.S. during the debate of 2003.

Belgium’s Pre-NATO Dilemma: Evading Scylla and Charybdis (1830-1949)

Both before and after its emergence as a sovereign country in the early 19th century, Belgium’s security options have been highly constrained by the interests

³ Dion, “Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study.”

and decisions of Europe's great powers. For nearly two millennia, the small nation was at the mercy of the ever-changing European empire system, first under the Romans, followed by the Celts, Franks, Spaniards, French, Austrians and the Dutch respectively.⁴ Even after its independence in 1830, the Belgian government had little latitude to determine the course of its foreign policy strategy. At the London Conference of 1839, the five continental powers decided that Belgium would play the role of a "buffer state" against the historically revisionist French. Belgium thus entered a lengthy period of "enforced" and "perpetual" neutrality (i.e. a condition of neutrality demanded and guaranteed by other states).⁵ Though the compulsory arrangement deprived the small power of the freedom to choose sides in the event of a conflict, from the Belgian perspective it was instrumental in preventing wars with France from spilling into its territory.⁶ By 1914, however, the situation in Europe had changed drastically. France and Great Britain were now aligned and Germany was the likely aggressor. With the understanding that any war with France would automatically bring Britain into the fight, the Germans had no strategic reason to avoid Belgium. Executing the basic premises of the infamous Schlieffen Plan, German forces crossed the Belgian border on 4 August 1914.⁷

Following World War I, provisions in the Treaty of Versailles provided Belgium with the first opportunity to develop its own defense strategy. The recent

⁴ Joffe, "The "Scandilux" Connection," 225.

⁵ For further discussion of the difference between "simple" and "perpetual" neutrality, as well as Belgium's neutrality policy from 1831 to 1914, see Lapradelle, "The Neutrality of Belgium."

⁶ An example of how this policy functioned occurred in 1870. As Rothstein describes, "when France and Prussia were on the verge of war, Great Britain extracted a promise from both to leave neutral Belgium untouched. The Belgians were saved and the war passed them by." *Alliances and Small Powers*, 65-66.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 67.

failure of neutrality initially prompted Belgian leaders to pursue military guarantees with France (1920) and Great Britain (1925).⁸ But as Germany rearmed and appeared increasingly hostile, Belgium foresaw two vexing yet traditional small power scenarios: 1) entrapment (vis-à-vis its relationship with France) and abandonment (given Great Britain's ambiguous response to Hitler's provocative foreign policy posture).⁹ In 1936, Belgium began a last-ditch effort to return to neutrality.¹⁰ The effectiveness of this strategy is well known. On 10 May 1940, Belgium again fell prey to German aggression. With the exception of King Leopold III, the Belgian government fled to London for the duration of the five-year conflict.¹¹

During their exile, while Churchill was still preoccupied with the war, Belgium and the other Benelux governments started sketching out their ideas for the postwar security framework in Europe. As scholar Frans Govaerts describes, each had learned two important lessons. First, "neutrality or independence could never again be the basis of security" and, second, any global security institution needed to be reinforced by "a more tangible regional defense organization."¹² One of the earliest and most influential advocates of the latter approach was the Belgian Prime Minister/Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak (Socialist Party). As late as February 1948, France and Great Britain were only interested in forming bilateral security agreements to deter future German aggression. Spaak felt strongly that

⁸ Reychler, "The Passive Constrained," 3-4; Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, 76-88.

⁹ See Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 466-468.

¹⁰ Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, 102, 104-110, 113.

¹¹ Helmreich, *Belgium and Europe*, 356.

¹² "Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg," 295, 298.

such a strategy would be ineffective in guaranteeing lasting peace and prosperity on the continent. Instead, the Belgian minister advocated a security community of Western European nations under British leadership. The kind of arrangement he had in mind was more than a simple defense pact directed against Germany; it included an institutionalized “system of regular and periodical consultations.”¹³ From his perspective, a strictly regional framework – one politically independent from the U.S. – would be less threatening to the Soviets and thus prevent the creation of “antagonist blocs” in Europe.¹⁴ As described in Chapter 2, the multilateral formula eventually won the day and became the basis of the 1948 Brussels Treaty and the WEU.¹⁵

When talks began in Washington to consider including the U.S. and Canada in Europe’s security structures, Spaak was initially hesitant. All along he preferred a three-pillar approach to the postwar environment, with a united Europe as the unbiased counterweight between the U.S. and the USSR. Key players inside Belgium’s southern neighbor shared this sentiment. As Escott Reid explains, Spaak’s Socialist party was likely influenced by its counterpart in France, which “feared the possibility of continuing control by the United States over western Europe even after western Europe had been strengthened economically and militarily.”¹⁶ Consequently, throughout the negotiations Spaak was undoubtedly mindful of both domestic politics and the predispositions of the French. However, the former constraints were less substantial given Belgium’s unambiguous need for American

¹³ Ibid., 314.

¹⁴ Coolsaet, *Atlantic Loyalty*, 7.

¹⁵ Govaerts, “Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg,” 315.

¹⁶ *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949*, 116.

support and the Parliament's secondary role in determining the nation's foreign policy. In the first three decades following the war, defense policy in Belgium was the domain of a restricted group of elites within the government, with limited interplay between both Parliament and the general public.¹⁷ Hence as France finally warmed to the idea of an Atlantic pact in September 1948, and Spaak recognized that Britain was unwilling to play the role of the "extra-continental balancer" in Europe, the Foreign Minister had little trouble swaying the Parliament to support the more expansive security strategy.¹⁸ In both the Chamber and the Senate, the North Atlantic Treaty received wide support; only the Communists voted against it.¹⁹

The Cold War - Act I: Belgium as the Loyal Ally (1949-1979)

While the Atlantic pact succeeded in fulfilling Spaak's vision of a multilateral defense pact, it impeded another of the government's primary objectives: non-confrontational relations with the Soviet Union. As formal partners with the U.S., Belgium forfeited some of its credibility as a neutral mediator in the emerging bipolar system.²⁰ Nonetheless, Belgium continued to pursue efforts at reducing tensions between the East and West, both bilaterally and via the NATO framework. Whereas the U.S. focused largely on deterring the Soviets via military means, Belgium consistently championed the tenets of détente. "An alliance," Spaak

¹⁷ Reyckler, "The Passive Constrained," 12, 22-23.

¹⁸ Coolsaet, *Atlantic Loyalty*, 3,6.

¹⁹ Govaerts, "Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg," 320.

²⁰ Belgium's reputation as a mediator was also damaged when the Soviets discovered that a Belgian mining company in the Congo was providing the U.S. with uranium ore. Coolsaet, *Atlantic Loyalty*, 7-8.

insisted, “which is and which continues to be, whatever its success, a purely military alliance would in the ultimate analysis be weak and in danger.”²¹ The strategy had wide support among all political parties and became the cornerstone of Belgian security policy in NATO.²²

Given its more precarious relationship with the Soviets and the Eastern bloc, Belgium reinforced its approach using another common small power strategy. In contrast with the *détente* posture adopted by Denmark during the same period, Belgium embraced what Josef Joffe calls the “influence-through-intimacy” tactic – an approach consistent with the notion of *ingratiatio* described in Chapter 3. As Joffe describes, “[i]nstead of maintaining their distance from a leading power, [a small power] may choose the opposite strategy . . . on the assumption that closeness to the bloc leader yields leverage through loyalty.”²³ Belgium’s “loyalty” to the alliance and its *de facto* leader was expressed in a variety of manners. The first was through its willingness to accommodate the presence of a small cache of tactical nuclear weapons at NATO bases in Belgium, a decision made by the government with “little publicity” and – despite significant misgivings among the Communist and Socialist parties – “practically no debate in Parliament.”²⁴ Second, Belgium contributed its share, however small, to NATO military forces. From 1953 to 1980, it spent on average 3.4% of its GNP on defense, a ratio that permitted a steady increase in its defense expenditures (from 20,589 million BF in 1953 to 115,754 million BF by

²¹ Jordan, *Political Leadership in NATO*, 62.

²² Govaerts, “Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg,” 319, 370.

²³ “The “Scandilux” Connection,” 231; See also Reyhler, “The Passive Constrained,” 6-7.

²⁴ Reyhler, “The Passive Constrained,” 10. The decision was made in 1957 and the weapons arrived in Belgium in 1963.

1980).²⁵ From a “financial-burden-sharing standpoint,” this translated into a 0.91% increase in Belgium’s respective contribution to NATO’s total defense expenditures.²⁶ In fact, in the 1970s Belgium was the only European ally to make regular increases in its defense spending and, following a NATO mandate in 1977, it was one of only two allies to comply with the annual three percent increase in its defense budget.²⁷ Belgium’s spending trends were complemented by its direct contribution to the defense of NATO’s eastern front. Despite its small size, the Belgian military provided some 30,000 troops (approximately 29% of its overall forces) for the defense of Germany, meaning it contributed a “higher proportion of its total military in Germany than did any of the other stationing Allies except Britain.”²⁸

A third manifestation of Belgium’s loyalty transpired in February 1966, when de Gaulle decided to remove France from the military structures of the alliance. Despite its close cultural and economic ties with the French, the Belgian government remained steadfast to the founding principles and institutions of the organization. On 12 March, the Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel (Christian Democrat), published a communiqué stressing Belgium’s devotion “to all obligations contracted in [the alliance’s] framework” and identifying NATO as “an essential element of the political and military cooperation among the Western nations.”²⁹ De Gaulle’s announcement also prompted NATO leaders to reconsider the sites of the alliance’s political and

²⁵ See Ibid., 13, table 1.1.

²⁶ Ibid., 14; 15, table 1.3.

²⁷ Coolsaet, *Atlantic Loyalty*, 30.

²⁸ Murray, “Small States, Domestic Institutions and NATO,” 142-145; Singer and Small, *Correlates of War*.

²⁹ Govaerts, “Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg,” 367.

military headquarters, which were up to this point located in Paris. Belgium quickly became the frontrunner for these facilities, a development that was welcomed and supported by Harmel. The government submitted motions to both the Chamber and Senate that “portrayed the move as an illustration of Belgium’s solidarity with the Alliance,” while quelling concerns that the transfer would create additional expenses for Belgium.³⁰ The motions passed in both chambers with large majorities.³¹ The NATO HQ moved to its present location in Brussels, while the military headquarters (SHAPE) moved just north of the Belgian city of Mons.

While Belgium’s early role in NATO was perhaps not decisive, the efficacy of Belgium’s “influence-through-intimacy” tactic is nonetheless apparent. Early on, Belgium’s loyalty to the alliance was rewarded with the appointment of Spaak as NATO’s second SecGen (1957-1961).³² More significant, however, was the Belgian contribution to the institutionalization of détente in NATO during the late 1960s. The commencement of the “Harmel Exercise” was the culmination of two decades of persistent prodding within the NAC. As described in Chapter 2, the exercise was an in-house reassessment of the primary “tasks” of the alliance. The Council’s unanimous adoption of the Harmel Report on 14 December 1967 was a triumph for those like Belgium who felt the alliance – and in particular the U.S. – needed to intensify efforts towards political reconciliation between the East and West. In the final report, the Council agreed to promote “greater cooperation between the states

³⁰ Reychler, “The Passive Constrained,” 19.

³¹ The vote in the House was 118 in favor, 61 against and 16 abstentions. The vote in the Senate was 96 in favor, 33 against and 22 abstentions. Ibid.

³² Jordan, *Political Leadership in NATO*, 62, 66-72. Jordan described the Belgian SecGen as an “imaginative, flexible, and effective negotiator who ceaselessly sought grounds for an accommodation between disputing parties”.

of Europe” and emphasized that North America’s contribution towards peace “must not be limited to defence and deterrence.”³³ Decades after its adoption, the Harmel Report was credited as “a turning point in the history of the Alliance” and, according to French scholar Frédéric Bozo, the key to the Alliance’s survival following the end of the Cold War.³⁴

The Cold War - Act II: From Intimacy to Disillusion (1979-2009)

By 1979, several related events inside and outside Belgium coalesced to trigger the end of Belgium’s steadfast loyalty to the Atlantic alliance. The first was the “regionalization and fractionalization” of Belgium’s political parties.³⁵ As the renowned comparative scholar Arend Lijphart attests, Belgium is the epitome of a “deeply divided society” – one that suffers from ideological, religious and, most importantly, ethnolinguistic cleavages.³⁶ The crux of the ethnolinguistic division in Belgium is the roughly north-south divide between the Flemish-speaking peoples of Flanders (who hold a hold a small majority in terms of population) and the French-speaking peoples of Walloon and Brussels (who until recently dominated Belgian politics and held a larger portion of Belgian wealth).³⁷ In the 1960s north-south divisions spread and began to overwhelm Belgian politics. These domestic schisms provoked the rise in popularity of “federalist parties” in Belgium and, in 1968, the first divorce of a major political party, the Christian Democrats, into linguistically-

³³ *The Harmel Report*.

³⁴ “Détente versus Alliance,” 343.

³⁵ Reychler, “The Passive Constrained,” 29.

³⁶ “The Belgian Example of Cultural Coexistence,” 9-10.

³⁷ Hooghe, “From Regionalism to Federalism.”

defined parties.³⁸ The party split caused a chain reaction that spread to the Liberals in 1971 and the Socialists in 1978.³⁹ In addition to its effects on Belgium's political parties, heightened ethnic awareness also resulted in two major revisions of the nation's constitution. In general terms, the amendments of 1970 led to the official recognition of *cultural communities* (Flemish, French and German) and *regions* (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) within Belgium, while the amendments of 1980 bestowed upon these sub-units considerably more political autonomy.⁴⁰ The reforms also stipulated that the Belgian government needed to respect the rule of "parity"; that is, that there must be an equal number of Flemish and francophone ministers in the executive branch.⁴¹

The sweeping political changes occurring inside Belgium coincided with both an increasing awareness by the Belgian public of defense policy issues and a rising skepticism of the value of NATO. As Luc Reyckers describes, in the late 1970s "public opinion adopted more of an 'elite-challenging' than 'elite-following' attitude."⁴² Surveys capturing public sentiments about NATO seem to substantiate this assertion, as the number of "no opinion" responses (the majority response in the 1960s) steadily decreased and were largely replaced by negative attitudes about

³⁸ Gerard-Libois and Mabilie, "Belgian Electoral Politics," 132; Fitzmaurice, *Politics of Belgium*, 51-52; Another development that altered the dynamics of north-south politics was the decline of Walloon industry. As Deschouwer describes, in the 1960s "the economic centre of the country shifted from the south to the north," a result which "triggered a renewal and political strengthening of a Walloon Movement." *The Politics of Belgium*, 37.

³⁹ Deschouwer, *The Politics of Belgium*, 40; See also De Winter, Swyngedouw, and Dumont, "Party system(s) and electoral behaviour in Belgium."

⁴⁰ Molitor, "The Reform of the Belgian Constitution," 142-146; Fitzmaurice, *Politics of Belgium*, 128-141; Hooghe, "From Regionalism to Federalism," 55-56.

⁴¹ Deschouwer, *The Politics of Belgium*, 50.

⁴² "The Passive Constrained," 26.

NATO and its policies.⁴³ The ultimate result of this phenomenon was the gradual *politicization* of Belgium's foreign policy, as party leaders sought to capitalize on issues that would bolster their chances for reelection. In short, as Reychler explains, no longer was the government the "*cavalier seul*" on Belgian security issues.⁴⁴

Given the domestic climate described above, it is not surprising that these developments had a significant impact on Belgium's ability to preserve the "widespread consensus" about the nation's defense policy that existed prior to 1979. The tendency for Belgium's political parties to take their cues from their counterparts in France and Germany only complicated its foreign policymaking process and resulted in a gradual abandonment of Belgium's unquestioned loyalty to American leadership in NATO.⁴⁵ This new dynamic was no more evident than during the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) controversy of the 1980s. In response to the Soviet deployment of its SS-20 missile, the NAC decided in December 1979 to deploy a new generation of American nuclear weapons in Europe (i.e. cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles). In order to accept the proposal, the Germans insisted that the new missiles be deployed throughout the alliance (i.e. to other countries in addition to the Federal Republic and Great Britain) – a condition that was eventually agreed should include Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands.⁴⁶ The Belgian government supported the policy, but now faced an emboldened and

⁴³ Govaerts, "Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg," 381-382; Reychler, "The Passive Constrained," 22.

⁴⁴ "The Passive Constrained," 24.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁴⁶ The final agreement included the deployment of 572 new missiles in Europe: 108 Pershing II missiles and 96 cruise missiles in West Germany, 160 cruise missiles in Great Britain, 112 cruise missiles in Italy, and 48 cruise missiles in both Belgium and Holland. Faurby, Holm, and Petersen, "Introduction: The INF Issue - History and Implications," 12-13.

divided Parliament, as well as a growing and increasingly active peace movement in Belgium. At the 1980 NATO Summit in Ankara, the Belgian Foreign Minister was forced to concede that “domestic problems inhibited his country from providing a definitive answer about the installation of the INF weapons.”⁴⁷ The complex issues behind these “domestic problems” were summarized by Belgian scholar Rik Coolsaet and provide a glimpse of the challenges the Belgian government faced during the debate:

From 1980 onwards nuclear weapons in Belgium became pawns on the political chessboard. The INF debate led . . . to significant political division in Belgium, against the background of regular mass demonstrations that brought a hundred thousand Belgians out on the streets. The Christian Democrats were divided, with the labour wing and the right wing on opposite sides of the fence. French-speaking and Flemish Social Democrats perceived the issue somewhat differently. The former, although they too opposed the deployment of nuclear missiles on Belgian soil, were clearly more susceptible to the view expressed by the French President, François Mitterrand . . . The Flemish Social Democrats, for their part, were more inclined towards the détente-oriented standpoint of the West-German Social Democrats.⁴⁸

The debate over the INF deployment in Belgium continued for nearly five years. The country was clearly divided over the issue; a majority of the public and a near majority in Parliament were against the proposal.⁴⁹ Even among the Flemish Christian Democrats, the party of pro-INF Foreign Minister, support was limited.⁵⁰ Nonetheless, on 14 March 1985 the Belgian government finally approved the deployment of the weapons in Belgium.⁵¹ However, the experiences contributed to a marked shift from a generally “Atlantacist” to an “Europeanist” predisposition in

⁴⁷ Reyhler, “The Passive Constrained,” 38.

⁴⁸ *Atlantic Loyalty*, 30-31.

⁴⁹ Reyhler, “The Passive Constrained,” 40-41.

⁵⁰ Coolsaet, *Atlantic Loyalty*, 31.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

Belgium. From this point on, Belgium began to give greater deference to Europe's great powers (especially France and Germany) and the institutions of the EU.

As the end of the Cold War approached, Belgium continued to rescind the policies that in earlier decades gave it a reputation as one of NATO's loyal allies. As IR scholar Sarah Murray describes, in the mid-1980s Belgium reversed previous trends and began reducing its military expenditures. The cuts led to a noticeable decline in the military's standards of equipment, readiness and training, a development that drew the critique of those in NATO. By 1987, the Belgian Defense Minister admitted that Belgium could only meet 38% of its NATO assigned tasks. After the Belgian Socialists entered the government in 1988, force reductions in Belgium continued, going well beyond those required in the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).⁵²

At the same time that Belgium was making cuts in its defense expenditures, the government continued to reinforce its preferences for a stronger and more independent European security framework. America's military and political dominance during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, a war in which Belgium refused to take part, convinced Belgian leaders of the desirability of equipping the EU with its own military capabilities.⁵³ As the Minister of Defense, Guy Coëme, explained in October 1991: "A politically unified Europe should have a security and defence policy of its own that is not subordinate to any other organization."⁵⁴ Once again, the government followed the lead of France and Germany, who together began

⁵² Murray, "Small States, Domestic Institutions and NATO," 148-154.

⁵³ The government also did not allow Britain to buy Belgian's spare artillery shells for the war. "NATO's Gloomy Choice."

⁵⁴ Quoted in Coolsaet, *Atlantic Loyalty*, 40.

considering how they might use the WEU as the basis for a “defense arm” in the EU.⁵⁵ The proposal, greeted with enthusiasm in Belgium, was not popular with the U.S. and other Atlantacists in NATO. As Coolsaet explains, it was further evidence of the country’s new security perspective: “With this Belgium came full circle. Atlantacism had given way again to Europeanism. Europe once more became the primary framework for Belgian defence and security policy, while NATO dropped to second row.”⁵⁶

Though NATO’s involvement in the Bosnian conflicts of the 1990s forced a partial hiatus of Belgium’s Europeanist aspirations, they received renewed emphasis when French President Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair launched the ESDP initiative at Saint Malo in 1998.⁵⁷ Following the summit, the new “purple-green” government in Belgium offered – in no uncertain terms - its endorsement: “I don’t want to be the United States’ servant,” asserted the new Belgian Foreign Minister, Louis Michel (French Liberal).⁵⁸ This uncharacteristically intrepid assertion – one that not only supported the strengthening of the EU’s foreign policy mechanisms but openly hinted at an underlying disdain for American leadership in Europe – became somewhat of the norm for the Belgian government over the next several years, especially after the Bush Administration took the reins in 2000. Belgium’s increasingly aggressive stance was only exacerbated when, following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, NATO sought to invoke Article 5 for the first time in its history. On 12 September, the NATO SecGen, Lord

⁵⁵ This new defense arm became the EU's "Eurocorp." See Coolsaet, *Atlantic Loyalty*.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁵⁷ Howorth, *Saint-Malo Plus Five*.

⁵⁸ Quoted in Coolsaet, *Atlantic Loyalty*, 44.

Robertson, arranged a meeting of the NAC followed immediately by a press conference to announce the decision. Belgium was the final ally to give its consent, delaying the decision and the press conference for several hours. Lord Robertson was furious. Only after a direct and firm “rebuke” via a conference call to the Belgian cabinet in Brussels did the government finally concede its approval.⁵⁹ The hesitation left a bad taste in the mouths of NATO’s Atlantacists and foreshadowed the startling events of 2003.

Belgium and the 2003 Deployment of NATO Forces to Turkey

I believe that, of course, we are absolutely partners of the United States, but they must understand that if they have an agenda, if they have concerns, if they have motives and good reasons, we too have our own reading of events, we have our own vision of the world, we also have our own convictions concerning the best way of organizing the world.

Louis Michel

Belgian Foreign Minister, February 2003⁶⁰

It is no secret that the Bush Administration’s policies following 9/11 were not popular among many in Europe.⁶¹ As described in Chapter 2, the U.S. initially sidelined NATO when it decided to manage war in Afghanistan outside the framework of the alliance. Whether the allies had the military capabilities to make a significant contribution to this effort is perhaps questionable, but the decision nonetheless signaled Bush’s preference to construct *ad hoc* “coalitions of the willing,” where the cumbersome politics of consultation and consensus were largely absent.⁶² Nonetheless, it was the prelude to the war in Iraq that truly stretched the

⁵⁹ Wilson, “Interview by author.”

⁶⁰ “Belgian Foreign Minister Explains NATO Veto.”

⁶¹ See, for example, *America’s Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties*.

⁶² Suinen, “Vu de Wallonie,” 127.

limits of solidarity within the alliance, dividing NATO's great powers into two opposing camps. When the U.S. requested that NATO consider employing defensive measures to protect Turkey in anticipation of a U.S.-led war in Iraq, the proposal obliged each of the allies to take sides. In what follows I examine Belgium's decision to join with France and Germany against the prevailing consensus in the NAC. More importantly, I consider whether the hypothesized factors presented in Chapter 3 explain Belgium's inability to withstand the intense diplomatic pressure exerted by the U.S. within the NAC.

Background of the 2003 Iraq Conflict

Although the removal of Saddam Hussein from power was the official policy of the U.S. government since October of 1998, it did not gain real traction until after 9/11.⁶³ Especially following his "axis of evil" speech in January 2002, it became increasingly clear to the international community that the U.S. president was contemplating using military means to oust the dictator that had, among other things, brutally attacked his own citizens with chemical weapons, invaded Kuwait in 1990, consistently defied U.N. Security Council mandates and was widely suspected to be producing WMDs. The plan under consideration was consistent with the White House's newly espoused and controversial interpretation of the right of *preemption* (also known as the "Bush Doctrine"), which in the case of WMDs relaxed the

⁶³ "H.R.4655: Iraq Liberation Act."

timeline for a determination of imminent threat.⁶⁴ On 12 September 2002, Bush used these terms to make his case before the U.N. General Assembly:

Delegates to the General Assembly, we have been more than patient. We've tried sanctions. We've tried the carrot of oil-for-food and the stick of coalition military strikes. But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has nuclear weapons is when, God forbid, he uses one. We owe it to all our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming.⁶⁵

A month after his U.N. speech, the U.S. Congress passed the Iraq War Resolution, authorizing the President to use U.S. military might in Iraq as he deemed “necessary and appropriate.” The authorization passed with comfortable margins - with votes of 296 to 133 in the House (46 more than the President’s father had in 1991) and 77 to 23 in the Senate.⁶⁶ In stark contrast to the publics in other allied nations, a large majority of Americans - as much as 75% by March 2003 - supported the war.⁶⁷

The Bush Administration now had the “blank check” it desired to prosecute the war unilaterally, but both the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, helped convince Bush to continue pursuing the endorsement of the U.N.⁶⁸ After seven weeks of intense negotiations, the Security Council unanimously passed U.N. Resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002, which agreed that Saddam was in breach of previous U.N. resolutions, remained a threat to peace and security in the region, and that his regime would face “serious

⁶⁴ One of the earliest presentations of the "Bush Doctrine" was made at a speech at West Point in June 2002. “Text of Bush's Speech at West Point.”

⁶⁵ “President Bush's Address to the United Nations.”

⁶⁶ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 203-204.

⁶⁷ *Iraq*.

⁶⁸ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 161-162.

consequences” in the event of continued violations of its obligations.⁶⁹ However, France and the U.S. interpreted the resolution differently. While France felt that the determination to deliver “serious consequences” required a follow-up resolution, the U.S. considered any infringement of 1441 as an automatic *casus belli*.⁷⁰

The Origins of Dissent: NATO’s Europeanists Take a Stand

Before the closing weeks of 2002, a NATO response to the events occurring in Iraq was not seriously considered. At the November Prague Summit, Iraq was not high on the agenda, despite the fact that the NAC officially noted NATO’s “commitment to take effective action to assist and support the efforts of the U.N.”⁷¹ Then on 4 December 2002, the American Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, traveled to the NATO HQ to discuss the implications to NATO and its allies of a war with Iraq. By mid-January the discussion evolved into a list of specific tasks the alliance might perform as preventative measures during a potential conflict:⁷²

- 1) The deployment of NATO AWACS surveillance aircraft to Turkey
- 2) The deployment of Patriot antimissiles to Turkey
- 3) The deployment biological and chemical protection equipment
- 4) The use of NATO naval forces to help defend U.S. ships heading to the Persian Gulf through the Mediterranean
- 5) Enlisting NATO troops to guard U.S. bases in Europe
- 6) Substituting NATO forces for U.S. troops that might be redeployed from peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and elsewhere

⁶⁹ Shawcross, *Allies*, 118.

⁷⁰ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 221-227; Wall, “The French-American War over Iraq,” 131-132.

⁷¹ *Prague Summit Statement on Iraq*.

⁷² Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 139.

Though there was initially little resistance to this contingency planning, this reportedly changed when NATO's circuitous connection with the Iraq conflict was leaked to the public. Soon after the leak, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg insisted that the planning be discontinued; claiming that consideration of the tasking would be a premature acknowledgment of the notion that war was inevitable.⁷³ Below I briefly examine the historical basis for this opposition and how the coalition eventually collapsed, leaving Belgium as the lone ally in opposition to the prevailing consensus in the NAC.

Germany

The fact that the public's awareness of NATO planning altered official positions within the NAC highlights once again to the importance of both systemic and domestic factors in foreign policy formation. This was certainly true for Germany. As scholar Tuomas Forsberg argues, the end of the Cold War signaled the beginning of a "normalization" process in German foreign policy, one in which "Germany would emancipate itself from the postwar restrictions on its international behaviour and be like the other large Western powers."⁷⁴ Especially following its unification, German leaders began to feel increasingly comfortable asserting their own visions of the future of German and, indeed, European security strategies. The newly realized freedom was clearly manifested in the debate over Iraq. With public opinion in Germany overwhelmingly opposed to the war, German politicians took

⁷³ Ibid., 136-137. Though Luxembourg was opposed to the deployment decision, it dropped its formal opposition to policy by February 2003.

⁷⁴ "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq," 215; See also Zimmermann, "Security Exporters."

advantage of a new strategic environment in Europe.⁷⁵ Only members of Germany's Christian Democratic Party were willing to openly support the U.S. position.⁷⁶

President Bush, undoubtedly aware of the rising opposition to his plans for Iraq, visited Germany in May 2002. After making his case with Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (Social Democratic Party), Bush agreed not to start preparations for the war before the upcoming German elections in September, while Schröder promised not to make the war a central platform of his reelection campaign.⁷⁷ However, increasing unemployment numbers during Schröder's first term made this promise difficult to uphold, and as the polls continued to predict the defeat of his red-green coalition, his campaign team convinced him to take advantage of the widespread antiwar sentiment in Germany.⁷⁸ On the campaign trail, Schröder openly vowed not to participate in America's "adventure," even under a U.N. mandate, while one of his cabinet members unapologetically compared Bush to Adolph Hitler.⁷⁹ The antiwar stance boosted Schröder to a narrow victory in the fall, but the damage to U.S.-German relations was palpable. Following his reelection, Bush did not telephone Schröder to congratulate him and reportedly declined to speak with him at international meetings.⁸⁰ Though Bush and Schröder later worked to mend their soured relationship, the rift did not provide a promising foundation for diplomacy

⁷⁵ Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq," 218; Up to 80% of the German people opposed a war in Iraq. Rubin, "Germany Digs Hole."

⁷⁶ Rubin, "Germany Digs Hole."

⁷⁷ Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq," 218.

⁷⁸ Shawcross, *Allies*, 100-101; Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq," 218.

⁷⁹ Slevin, "U.S. Officials Cold-Shoulder Schroeder; Rumsfeld."

⁸⁰ Shawcross, *Allies*, 104; Disparaging comments by the U.S. Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, also contributed to the strained relationship. Rumsfeld referred to Germany as part of the 'old Europe' and lumped it together with Libya and Cuba as countries that were not willing to help the U.S. Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq," 219.

as NATO addressed the defense of Turkey in February 2003. As T. Forsberg explains:

The German position on the war on Iraq emerged in an ad hoc fashion, rather than as a result of conscious strategic thinking. An important accidental factor was the timing of the Bundestag elections. Without the election campaign, Schröder might have tried to steer a course much closer to the United States – or he might at least have refrained from strong criticism and rigid positions. Once the disagreements started, however, they escalated owing to the dynamics of mutual distrust, frustration and misunderstanding.⁸¹

In the end, Germany's estrangement with the U.S. compelled it to look for other likeminded leaders in Europe. Fearing isolation, Schröder quickly aligned with a more traditional American "antagonist" inside NATO: France.

France

Without question, France is the quintessential "Europeanist" ally within NATO. Since the days of de Gaulle, French leaders have consistently fought for a more independent European system, one in which – when compared to an Atlantic framework - France plays a significantly more substantive and active role. The French government's efforts to strengthen the foreign policy identity and mechanisms of the EU are part and parcel of this viewpoint, and its vision for Europe is widely shared among its citizenry.⁸² Given this political culture – combined with its economic ties with Iraq and the presence of over 5 million Muslims within its borders – it is perhaps not surprising that the U.S. and France

⁸¹ "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq," 226.

⁸² For example, while 61 percent of Europeans admit they want the EU to become a superpower equal to the U.S., among the French this number increases to 91 percent. Wall, "The French-American War over Iraq," 124.

might find themselves on opposite sides of the Iraq question.⁸³ However, the confrontation did not seem inevitable from the beginning. The compromise U.N. Resolution of November was an implicit indication that France – unlike Germany – was willing to participate militarily in a U.N.-sanctioned war against Saddam. A combination of other events appear to indicate the French President’s admission that a second Gulf War might be forthcoming, to include: 1) the deployment of the naval carrier *Charles de Gaulle* to the Middle East, 2) his notice to the French military in a New Year’s address to “be prepared to deploy in new theaters,” and 3) the dispatch of a French general to Washington to discuss possible contributions to military operations against Iraq.⁸⁴ But as the Bush Administration continued to rebuff Germany for its alleged betrayal, Chirac decided to take advantage of the opportunity to strengthen French ties with another European great power.⁸⁵ On 22 January, while the NAC was debating the possibility of the NATO deployment to Turkey, Chirac and Schröder met in Paris to celebrate the 40-year anniversary of the French-German Elysée Treaty. In a joint statement, the two leaders self-identified their nations (with no mention of Great Britain) as the “motors” of Europe, and insisted that “[e]xperience shows that when Berlin and Paris agree, Europe can move forward; if there is disagreement, Europe marks time.”⁸⁶ It was also during this short meeting that Germany and France officially aligned their policy of

⁸³ Press-Barnathan, “Managing the Hegemon,” 302.

⁸⁴ Wall, “The French-American War over Iraq,” 131; Champion et al., “Allies at Odds: Behind U.S. Rift With Europeans”; See also Kelley, “Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing,” 160-161.

⁸⁵ Kelley, “Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing,” 166.

⁸⁶ Quoted in Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 130.

opposition to the U.S. plan.⁸⁷ As Irwin Wall reports, “Germany pressured France not to approve of the war, and provided Chirac with what appeared to be a golden opportunity to win it definitively from its dependence on Washington into an enduring relationship with France, a goal of French policy since the 1950s.”⁸⁸ The newly solidified coalition was strengthened by Germany’s recent appointment as a non-permanent member and the Chair of the U.N. Security Council on 1 January.⁸⁹ By the end of the month, the U.S. began to abandon any hope it once had to prosecute the war under the blessings of the U.N.

Belgium

As explained in Chapter 2, the “big four” in NATO customarily work hard to synchronize their policies before bringing them to the table at the NAC. National politics made this increasingly unlikely by February 2003. With the great powers split down the middle on the Iraq issue, this left NATO’s small power leaders in a difficult position. Despite the war’s unpopularity in Western Europe, the U.S. succeeded in securing the support of Britain and several smaller powers in the alliance. On 30 January, the leaders of eight NATO nations (the Czech Republic, Spain, Portugal, Italy, the U.K., Hungary, Poland and Denmark) published a joint statement in the *Wall Street Journal* to announce their support for President Bush’s leadership on the Iraq issue, insisting that the West “must remain united in insisting

⁸⁷ Champion et al., “Allies at Odds: Behind U.S. Rift With Europeans.”

⁸⁸ “The French-American War over Iraq,” 133; See also Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 127.

⁸⁹ Browne, “The United Nations Security Council – Its Role in the Iraq Crisis: A Brief Overview,” 2.

that [Saddam's] regime be disarmed."⁹⁰ Though the wording of the statement was technically consistent with the views promoted by Schröder and Chirac, the publication was conspicuous by their deliberate exclusion. According to Gordon and Shapiro, the two were not even notified that the statement was being prepared.⁹¹

Another Western leader not informed about the release of the *Wall Street Journal* article was the Prime Minister of Belgium, Guy Verhofstadt (Flemish Liberal Party). Like his counterpart in Germany, Verhofstadt was anticipating a national election while the debate over Iraq heated up. With 80 percent of Belgians and all of the country's major parties in opposition to the war, Verhofstadt risked the dismantling of his government if he appeared too accommodating to the pro-war momentum in the alliance.⁹² Especially given the presence of the anti-NATO Green parties within his coalition, the Prime Minister had to tread carefully. Mere hints of capitulation were quickly spotlighted by his political partners on the left.⁹³ Emboldened by the positions taken by France and Germany, the Prime Minister decided to adopt a tough stance. At one point he even questioned the viability of the North Atlantic Treaty, insisting that recent U.S. behavior vis-à-vis Iraq made it "very likely that NATO will cease to be an alliance in the future."⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Aznar et al., "United We Stand."

⁹¹ *Allies at War*, 130.

⁹² According to this poll, there were no noticeable differences between Flemish and Walloon respondents. "Belgians Oppose Iraq War"; Depauw and Deweerdt, "Belgian Politics in 2003," 265.

⁹³ A particularly controversial issue within the Parliament followed the revelation that the U.S. was using Belgian ports and airspace to transport military equipment to the Middle East. A leader in the Flemish ecology party, Peter Vanhoutte, accused Verhofstadt of "buttering up the Americans behind the scenes." Brinckman, "Belgian Premier Urges Parties"; "Tension High within Belgian Government."

⁹⁴ Quoted in Coolsaet, *Atlantic Loyalty*, 45.

Belgium's Foreign Minister, Louis Michel (Walloon Liberal Party), was an even more outspoken critic. Using language heretofore rare among allied leaders, especially from a small power, the Foreign Minister openly chastised the U.S. and Britain. He called Blair a "belligerent grandstander" and insisted that Belgium was "no lackey of the United States."⁹⁵ Following Powell's intelligence briefing at the U.N. on February 5, described by the Secretary of State as "conclusive and irrefutable" proof of Saddam's criminality, his Belgian counterpart immediately dismissed the evidence as "not convincing enough."⁹⁶ In hindsight Michel's appraisal of the testimony was largely vindicated, but at the time the statement was more than one of fact or fiction - it was a rejection of the pro-American reflex that most small powers in NATO once accepted. Though dissatisfaction with U.S. leadership was not uncommon during the height of the Cold War, government officials traditionally concealed these sentiments in the name of alliance solidarity. For Belgium, the significant reduction in the overall threat level - as well as the emergence of alternative security frameworks within Europe - is reducing the salience of these dependency structures.

Lord Robertson and the "Silent Procedure"

On the afternoon of Thursday, 6 February, Lord Robertson convened a special meeting of the NAC in order to discuss once again the U.S. proposal to provide Turkey with defensive weapon systems. The Scottish SecGen clearly

⁹⁵ Evans-Pritchard, "Belgian Foreign Minister Tops EU Most-hated List"; Doornaert, "Daily Denounces Belgium."

⁹⁶ "Powell's Evidence "Not Convincing Enough"."

supported and, indeed, promoted the measure. While historically many NATO SecGens viewed their role in NATO as a mere arbitrator among allies, Robertson took a different approach. Those close to him testify that he saw himself as a leader within the NAC, and his actions during the Iraq debate corroborate this persona.⁹⁷ Nonetheless, after three weeks of intense diplomacy, the SecGen was unable to convince the delegations in France, Germany and Belgium to continue with the proposed preparations for the pending conflict. Immediately following the council session, Robertson held a press conference to announce that the allies remained at an impasse. He also announced that he had decided to employ one of the SecGen's most powerful tools within the NAC: the so-called "silent procedure" (see Chapter 2). Per NATO tradition, the procedure included an official letter sent to each of the delegations at the NATO HQ. In this case it described a "series of proposals" for the alliance, to include the deployment of NATO AWACS, Patriot missiles and chemical and biological weapons protection units to Turkey, as well as the plan to replace some allied soldiers who were guarding U.S. bases with European forces.⁹⁸ The deadline for a response to the letter was set for noon on Monday, 10 February. As the SecGen explained during the press conference: "These proposals are immediately put into effect at the end of the silence procedure if no country has broken the silence procedure. So that would lead to an automatic decision in the case where all countries agree."⁹⁹ By publicly announcing the procedure, Robertson clearly sought to put pressure on the three allies in opposition to the policy. If they

⁹⁷ Wilson, "Interview by author"; Burns, "Interview by author."

⁹⁸ Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 139.

⁹⁹ Robertson (NATO SecGen), "Statement."

wanted to continue to hold up the deployment, they would need the political fortitude to do so officially and publicly.

Despite the added pressure, the coalition did not balk. By the morning of 10 February, France, Germany and Belgium each “broke silence” by submitting their official reservations to the SecGen. They continued to argue that, given the ongoing U.N. inspections, the initiative was premature. In the words of the Belgian Foreign Minister, the proposal “would signify that we have already entered into the logic of war, that . . . any chance, any initiative to still resolve the [Iraq] conflict in a peaceful way was gone.”¹⁰⁰

In response to the procedural veto, Turkey officially invoked Article 4 (for the first time in NATO history) of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that “the Parties will consult whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”¹⁰¹ The motion upped the ante further since, for the first time, the request was coming directly from Turkey – not to mention the fact that it was wrapped in the legitimacy of a core alliance norm.¹⁰² Given this new development, the Council was temporarily adjourned and scheduled for a second meeting later that afternoon. Meanwhile, NATO’s Military Committee (MC) was tasked to prepare a briefing for the NAC to

¹⁰⁰ “Axis of Obstruction”; Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 138; The Belgian Prime Minister made a similar statement: “If Turkey is ever attacked, we’ll stand by its side, that is not an issue here. At issue is, are we at a logical point where we are at war?... A peaceful solution is still possible, if we give more equipment, more possibilities to the U.N. weapons inspectors.” “3 Nations Veto NATO Move.”

¹⁰¹ Robertson (NATO SecGen), “Press Statement.”

¹⁰² Though the evidence is lacking, it is likely that the U.S. convinced the Turks to make the appeal. At a minimum, the French believed this to be the case. Wilson, “Interview by author.”

address “the nature of the threat faced by Turkey.”¹⁰³ Though a briefing by the MC is meant to provide an apolitical presentation of the collective judgments of the alliance’s military leaders, there was something inherently political about the country-of-origin of the presenter. In 2002, the Chairman of the MC was allocated to a German general, and in this case the honor fell to the German four-star, General Harald Kujat. Suspicions among the opposing coalition were that the actual threat to Turkey was minimal, and that the U.S. was simply using NATO to provide a sense of international legitimacy to the pending conflict.¹⁰⁴ If the MC’s threat assessment indicated otherwise, then it would be increasingly difficult to justify denying the Turkish request, especially if the appraisal came from one of Germany’s most distinguished military officers.

Following the classified briefing, the NAC adjourned for the day in order to give the delegations time to consult with their respective capitals. As Lord Robertson explained in the post-meeting press conference: “It’ll be up to the nations to decide what they take from that briefing and what conclusion they arrive at.”¹⁰⁵ Based on his personal evaluation of the intelligence, however, the SecGen was clearly convinced of the seriousness of the risk, and he was not afraid to share this appraisal with the press. “From [the Chairman’s briefing] it was evident that these concerns are legitimate and the threat is real. . . .” he told reporters, “I think it was pretty sobering advice that they got from somebody with huge military experience

¹⁰³ Robertson (NATO SecGen), “Statement to the Press.”

¹⁰⁴ Wilson, “Interview by author.”

¹⁰⁵ Robertson (NATO SecGen), “Statement to the Press.”

and it may well affect the way in which they think about this issue when the morning comes.”¹⁰⁶

Though the briefing by the MC did not have an immediate affect on the stalemate, within a few days one ally – Germany - began to show signs of reconciliation. The eventual shift was also facilitated by the fact that, on 12 February, the U.S. offered an abridged proposal to the NAC - one that did not include its previous request to backfill security forces at U.S. bases in Europe or those redeploying from the Balkans.¹⁰⁷ The following day the Germans notified the French that they were no longer willing to block the measure.¹⁰⁸

With Germany now on board, only France and Belgium persisted in opposition, though neither appeared willing to budge. A report from a Belgian newspaper indicates that Foreign Minister Michel remained steadfast in criticism of the U.S. “They did not succeed in catching bin Laden,” he alleged, “and now they have to find an enemy they can beat. I think it has to do with power, probably also very likely with oil and the humiliation they suffered.”¹⁰⁹ Nonetheless, the breakthrough with Germany gave the plan’s supporters the opportunity to execute another procedural tactic to overcome the deadlock. The SecGen shifted the proposal to the DPC – where, since 1996, France was no longer a member and thus had no power to veto.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 139; Hughes, “War on Iraq the Countdown: NATO’s Veto Crisis on Turkey Deepens.”

¹⁰⁸ Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 140.

¹⁰⁹ Evans-Pritchard, “Belgian Foreign Minister Tops EU Most-hated List.”

¹¹⁰ Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalitions*, 21.

The DPC was scheduled to meet the weekend of 15-16 February, which gave Belgium – now completely isolated - the opportunity to consider the U.N. inspection reports by Hans Blix and Mohammed ElBaradei. All in all the reports should have strengthened Belgium’s position. On 14 February, Blix told the U.N. Security Council that “the situation had improved,” while ElBaradei maintained that his team had “to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq.”¹¹¹ The Belgian delegation continued to plead for language that would link the proposal to future decisions by the U.N. Security Council.¹¹² However, the pressure against Belgium during the 16 February DPC deliberations was intense. According to the *Washington Post*, Verhofstadt and Michel were called more than a half-dozen times during the record-breaking thirteen-hour meeting.¹¹³ In the end, the Belgian government yielded to the pressures of isolation and agreed to the proposal. In his prepared statement to the press, the SecGen declared the following:

It’s been a long day for all of us. But we have come to a conclusion. Ambassadors of 18 NATO nations, members in the Defence Planning Committee of NATO, came to this building this morning confident that we had the elements necessary to provide the basis for a consensus decision. The discussions today were both arduous but constructive. One country – Belgium – proposed amendments to a draft decision sheet which were discussed and considered at some length. I am happy to announce that we have been able – collectively – to overcome the impasse we have faced for the past few days.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Quoted in Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 143-144.

¹¹² Richburg, “NATO Agrees to Begin Aid To Turkey: Germany, Belgium Stand Down as Deadlock Ends”; Richburg, “Canada Helps Break NATO Stalemate”; “NATO Compromise on Turkey Defence”; Rubin, “NATO Agrees on Defense of Turkey in War.”

¹¹³ Richburg, “NATO Agrees to Begin Aid To Turkey: Germany, Belgium Stand Down as Deadlock Ends.”

¹¹⁴ Robertson (NATO SecGen), “Statement.”

Though the official text of the decision emphasized the defensive nature of the deployment, as well as the alliance's continued support of the U.N. and Resolution 1441, the proposal was contrary to the basic premises previously espoused by Belgium's leaders. In the language repeated frequently by Belgian leaders, NATO had "entered into the logic of the war." NATO was moving forward with a deployment that anticipated a war with Iraq - a war instigated by the U.S. and vehemently opposed by Belgium. Importantly, the agreement stated that the deployment was "without prejudice to . . . future decisions by NATO or the U.N. Security Council."¹¹⁵

On 20 February, the NATO SACEUR, General James Jones, ordered the deployment of NATO AWACS to the Konya air base in Turkey. The first aircraft and crews, including airmen from both Germany and Belgium, arrived in Konya on 26 February. NATO AWACS began providing 24-hr surveillance the next day under the designation *Operation Crescent Guard*.¹¹⁶ Dutch and American Patriot batteries left for Turkey beginning on 1 March.¹¹⁷ The American-led war with Iraq began on 20 March. Throughout the conflict, the Iraqi military made no attempt to attack its neighbor to the north.

Explaining the Belgian Influence

Based on this study's definition of influence (i.e. *a state's demonstrated ability to achieve desired alliance policies*), the case described above is largely consistent

¹¹⁵ "NATO Support to Turkey."

¹¹⁶ When the operation ended on 16 April 2003, the NATO crews had flown more than 100 missions and 950 flying hours. *NATO Defensive Assistance to Turkey*.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

with a failed influence attempt by a small power in NATO. The Belgian government believed that sending NATO troops to Turkey signaled the alliance's acceptance that the conflict was inevitable and thus provided indirect support for the war. However, that this is not the reading offered by some Belgian officials and scholars following these events. According to one senior Belgian official, explaining what he called the "2003 Hiccup," the government held up the decision in order to "to make sure the mission was strictly defensive, to make sure there was a central role of the U.N., [and] to make sure this was not seen as a first step to war - these conditions were met."¹¹⁸ A close examination of the evidence indicates that this was not the reason that Belgium finally agreed to the deployment. Between the time the U.S. first proposed the measure in mid-January until it was finally accepted a month later, the Belgian leaders emphasized the inappropriateness of the defensive deployment to Turkey minus either a direct attack on Turkey or a U.N. mandate for the war. Though the American "earmarks" regarding troop replacements were also opposed, this was not the crux of the argument coming from the Belgian government. Additionally, the earmarks were dropped four days prior to the Belgian acquiescence to the decision in the NAC.

Given the final outcome, this case considered here is consistent with the prediction of the power-influence relationship described in Chapter 3. In the end, Belgium, like other small powers in the alliance, conceded to the wishes of the organization's most powerful member. At the same time, findings from the two previous cases – the deviant cases of this study – encourage further comparative

¹¹⁸ "Interview by author"; For a Belgian scholars' perspective, see Coolsaet, "Déjà vu in de NAVO."

analysis. Several related questions are in order. For example, are the variables deemed as significant in the Danish and Greek cases (where these allies were successful) also significant in the Belgian case? In other words, is there covariation between the study's independent and dependent variables? Are the factors that contributed to Denmark and Greece's success *necessary, sufficient or probabilistic*? In the following analysis I consider Hypotheses 1-4 of this study in order to shed light on these important questions.

Security Dependency

In the first half of the twentieth century, Belgium was perhaps the most vulnerable country in Western Europe. Its small power status and its unfortunate location amid Germany, France and the United Kingdom left it with few good options to avoid war. In contrast, the post-World War II environment was a marked improvement for Belgian security. For the first time in its history, the country was formally aligned with its great power neighbors. Though the emerging Cold War with the USSR left the nation highly dependent on U.S. assistance, Belgium willingly accepted this dependency because it "kept the Germans down" and "the Russians out." However, as the German threat faded in significance and East-West tensions began to thaw, the environment presented Belgian leaders with the opportunity to make an imprint on alliance policy. Absent these changes, it is unlikely NATO would have adopted the premises of *détente* outlined in the Harmel Report.

The end of the Cold War decreased Belgian's dependency on the U.S. even further. As international structures loosened their grip on this small state, Belgium's

willingness to bow to U.S. pressures correspondingly decreased. Though it does not always succeed, Belgium feels more and more comfortable challenging U.S. leadership within the alliance. At times this behavior represents a genuine disagreement of opinion, while at other times it stems from the dynamics of domestic politics and the calculations involved in election campaigns.¹¹⁹ In either case, the results of this study indicate that – especially in the post-Cold War era – what happens *inside* an ally’s borders are increasingly significant predictors of its behavior and its ability to influence the policies of an international organization.

The events of 2002-2003 are consistent with the above analysis. *Ceteris paribus*, the more confident a country felt that its overall security was not at risk, the more freedom it had to challenge the Bush Administration’s policies vis-à-vis Iraq. Thus while current and prospective NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe unanimously supported the Administration’s plans for disarming Saddam from the beginning, France, Germany and Belgium had some leeway to oppose the U.S. plan.¹²⁰ During the Cold War, it is unlikely that this opposition would have taken the form that it did. Even Germany, one of NATO’s recognized great powers, has been reluctant to thwart U.S. leadership until very recently. But as Hubert Zimmermann explains, “the German debate about the Iraq War demonstrates that the restraining

¹¹⁹ Kahler, “US Politics and Transatlantic Relations,” 83.

¹²⁰ This support included members of the so-called “Vilnius 10” (named after the Lithuanian city from which these nations together announced their desire to join NATO). On February 5th, the group (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania) published a letter in leading papers around the world in support of American plans to disarm Saddam. Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 132-133.

influence of the Cold War is now gone, and with it the viability of transatlantic cooperation based exclusively on agreement among government elites.”¹²¹

A similar analysis – though admittedly to a lesser extent due to its small stature – can be made for Belgium. Although the nation eventually failed to prevent the NATO deployment to Turkey, its willingness to oppose and, moreover, publicly criticize the U.S. government stemmed from an awareness that the country’s threat environment had changed. With no perceivable threat on the horizon, Belgian leaders felt comfortable directly challenging the organization’s traditional leader. Given the public’s overwhelming opposition to the war, the government understood that an accommodating posture might have negative repercussions at Belgium’s national elections. The results of the May elections, though significantly influenced by domestic issues and - to a lesser extent - election rule changes,¹²² at least imply that the government was given some credit for its ability to hold out the longest during the showdown. The core of the government (i.e. the Liberals and the Socialists parties) remained in power, allowing both Verhofstadt and Michel to maintain their respective posts in the cabinet.¹²³

In the final analysis, however, the Belgian case explored here exemplifies an instance of a *failed* influence attempt. As such, it would be inaccurate to conclude that the absence of an identifiable *imminent, probable, proximate* or *severe* threat to Belgium suggests that it will be able to, by itself, block an unwelcomed U.S. initiative in NATO. While the security dependency relationship has over the years shifted in

¹²¹ “Security Exporters,” 151.

¹²² See Fitzmaurice, “Belgium Stays ‘Purple’”; De Winter, Swyngedouw, and Dumont, “Party system(s) and electoral behaviour in Belgium.”

¹²³ Depauw and Deweerdt, “Belgian Politics in 2003.”

Belgium's favor, the relationship still exists to a significant degree. A plausible explanation for this comes from alliance theory, which predicts that a country like Belgium values defense guarantees from the U.S. and NATO because it recognizes that there may be unforeseen threats to its security around the corner - the so-called "shadow of war."¹²⁴ As it stands today, Belgium has no viable alternative to NATO and thus remains dependent on the guarantees institutionalized in NATO's defense pact. The EU is still divided over whether it should create a European equivalent of the Atlantic alliance - and to the extent that these institutions are in the making, many European nations lack the means and/or the political will to back these institutions with "hard power" assets.¹²⁵ In short, the end of the Cold War left the dependency constraints between the U.S. and its allies weakened, but they remain an impediment to defensive influence attempts in NATO as long as Europe is unable to construct a working substitute for the Atlantic alliance. Though in the future this may change, for the moment it leaves Belgium susceptible to failure if it single-handedly attempts to obstruct great power initiatives - especially those coming from the U.S. - in the alliance. As IR scholar Galia Press-Barnathan explains, this is the reality of small power existence when aligned with the world's only superpower: "Once they are more prepared to face the possible consequences of abandonment, smaller allies will be able to make a more credible threat of withholding cooperation in order to restrain the hegemon effectively."¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, 4; Press-Barnathan, "Managing the Hegemon," 278.

¹²⁵ Press-Barnathan, "Managing the Hegemon," 308; Michel, "Allocution de Monsieur Leo Michel," 141; Moravcsik, "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain," 83.

¹²⁶ "Managing the Hegemon," 284.

Expertise

Evidence from the case examined here indicates that Belgium did not have measurable *regional, technical* or *executive* expertise to give it leverage during the 2003 debate in NATO. It did not possess any unique knowledge of Iraq or the Middle East; in fact, its decision not to join the military coalition of the 1990-1991 Gulf War probably gave it less authority – especially in the eyes of those allies that did participate - to judge the potential threat posed by the Iraqi regime. At the end of the day, the threat assessments provided by Turkey and NATO’s MC were likely the most credible in the eyes of the NAC.

In terms of its institutional expertise (i.e. *proficiency with the NATO policy-making process*), Belgium did not have an advantage vis-à-vis its primary antagonists in the NAC – each of whom were long-time members of the organization. On the other hand, it is worth noting that one of the Belgian officials I interviewed insisted that - due to the realities of domestic politics in the country - Belgian diplomats are familiar with the type of bargaining that occurs in the alliance. As he explained it: “Belgium has a tradition as a consensus builder – compromise is instilled in our character and we bring this to NATO.”¹²⁷ Unfortunately, the secrecy of NATO committee meetings makes it difficult to accurately assess the extent to which this familiarity translates into influence within the organization. Additionally, the dynamics of consensus in a multimember security organization like NATO (where material capabilities are the predominant currency) are quite different than those experienced in the Belgian government (where votes are the predominant

¹²⁷ Senior Belgian Official, “Interview by author.”

currency). Either way, it seems clear that it was not Belgium's lack of institutional expertise that contributed to its failure in this case.

Intensity of Interest

Before examining the specifics of Hypothesis 3 and its explanatory power in the Iraq debate, it is worth stepping back for a moment to consider Belgium's overall level of interest in NATO and its policies. As explained above, Belgium is part of a minority in the alliance that can be characterized as "Europeanist" rather than "Atlanticist." From the Belgian perspective, the end of the Cold War presented Europe with the opportunity to reduce its dependency on the U.S. and develop an autonomous European foreign policy presence. Thus while other "Atlanticist" allies (e.g. the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and the U.K.) are dedicating their efforts towards strengthening NATO in order to meet the challenges of the 21st century, Belgium has increasingly shifted its focus towards the EU.

One might even say that Denmark and Belgium have traded positions within the alliance. During the Cold War, Denmark was generally a reluctant ally whose influence attempts in the organization were largely defensive in nature. Today, Denmark embraces the alliance as a fundamental pillar of its security posture and places secondary emphasis on the EU's defense initiatives. It is taking a leading role in transforming the alliance, and its relationship with the U.S. is much improved. Belgium, on the other hand, is gradually discarding its strategy of allegiance to the U.S. in exchange for allegiance to the EU and its great power leaders, especially France and Germany. In broad terms, Belgium now uses its position in NATO

defensively. Based on the interviews conducted for this research, Belgium has a reputation as an ally that contributes very little¹²⁸ and “tries to block everything.”¹²⁹ This reputation - deserved or not - is most likely a result of Belgium’s predisposition for a stronger EU, where military power discrepancies are less pronounced and “soft-power” is the foreign policy tool of choice. In relation to Hypothesis 3 of this study, the intensity of interest with which Belgium pursues its security objectives in NATO and the EU has shifted towards the latter, and with this shift Belgium is witnessing an overall loss of influence in the alliance.

In terms of Belgium’s eventual failure to maintain its opposition to the 2003 deployment to Turkey, it was the U.S.’s intensity of interest that best accounts for the final outcome of the standoff. In contrast to the previous cases in this study, the Iraq crisis was without a doubt “Washington’s top foreign priority” in early 2003.¹³⁰ Once the U.S. government concluded that Saddam Hussein needed to be removed by force, Bush understood that the war would be the defining issue of his first term, and he employed the preponderance of his diplomatic resources to achieve his goals.¹³¹ With the help of the British NATO SecGen, this intensity was echoed within NATO. Both the frequency and length of the special meetings of the NAC demonstrate the determination with which the pro-deployment coalition pursued its objective. As the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, R. Nicholas Burns, recounts: “We felt

¹²⁸ Using one important metric of contributions to NATO operations, troop participation in ISAF, this reputation appears somewhat accurate. While Denmark and Norway (each with populations around 5 million) currently contribute 750 and 500 troops respectively to ISAF, Belgium (with a population of over 10 million) contributes only 575 troops. “ISAF Troop Strength.”

¹²⁹ In the spirit of alliance solidarity, most of the NATO officials who shared this perception requested that they remain anonymous.

¹³⁰ Champion et al., “Allies at Odds: Behind U.S. Rift With Europeans.”

¹³¹ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 150.

very strongly about this issue. Secretary Powell and I both worked the phones [to allied governments] very hard. We were determined to win and we did.”¹³²

Traditionally in the NAC, allied members agree to set aside – at least temporarily - issues where common ground is absent. The U.S. was clearly unwilling to accept such an outcome.¹³³

In Belgium, preventing a war in Iraq was certainly not a trivial issue on the government’s priority list in early 2003. Unlike the scenario in Germany, the debate in NATO heated up *before* Belgium held its national elections and thus had the potential to affect the elections results if it was not handled properly. The Belgian delegation’s willingness to remain in opposition to the NATO deployment to Turkey, even after France and Germany “left” the coalition, also indicates the significance the government placed on the issue. However, Verhofstadt’s coalition went into the May elections, as Fitzmaurice explained, “in good shape, with a good record, a fairly good image, poll numbers and prospects.”¹³⁴ In contrast with the domestic environment facing Chancellor Schröder during his first term, the Belgian government benefitted from a relatively sound economy, which enabled it to both “cut taxes and increase social spending.”¹³⁵

Additionally, Belgium has inherently less interest – compared to the world’s only hegemon – in a conflict that takes place thousands of miles from its borders. As past analyses demonstrate, small states like Belgium are typically much more interested in regional security phenomena. Great powers cannot always afford this

¹³² Burns, “Interview by author.”

¹³³ See Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 137.

¹³⁴ “Belgium Stays 'Purple',” 148-149.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 148.

luxury. The U.S. saw Iraq as a serious threat to stability in the Middle East. It used its superpower “weight” to isolate the opposition and force through its proposal. The intense pressure faced by Belgium in February 2003 stands in stark contrast to that experienced by Denmark and Greece in the previously examined cases.

Political Cohesion

Despite the fractionalized nature of Belgian politics, there was indeed wide consensus within Belgium (both in the government and among the citizenry) that a war with Iraq was premature and illegitimate. This consensus was mirrored in the debate over NATO’s role in the conflict. In other words, opposition to the war equaled opposition to the decision to deploy anticipatory forces to Turkey. From the perspective of the Belgian Prime Minister, this cohesion was crucial in order to withstand the pressure coming from those who supported the war – a conviction emphasized in a speech given in front of the Belgian parliament in March. With the war now underway and NATO forces operating in Turkey, Verhofstadt pleaded with all parties to maintain their endorsement of the government’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the invasion, insisting to his fellow Belgians that: “A consensus is indispensable in the current international crisis.”¹³⁶ However, though Belgium’s high political cohesion in 2003 likely contributed to the delay of the deployment, as well as the removal of the “earmarks” not associated with the defense of Turkey, it was not enough to tie the February decision in the NAC to approval from the U.N. Security Council.

¹³⁶ Brinckman, “Belgian Premier Urges Parties.”

Accordingly, the Belgian case study's greatest contribution to this dissertation is in clarifying the nature of political cohesion as it relates to small power influence in NATO. The comparison confirms that, by itself, internal political cohesion is not a sufficient condition for small power influence success – a finding that holds true even during the structurally more permissive post-Cold War environment. This finding is not incompatible with the results of this study's deviant cases. By selecting on the dependent variable for those cases, one expects to reveal necessary conditions or, as Douglas Dion describes it, conditions that “open the door to contingent and probabilistic occurrences.”¹³⁷ In other words, high political cohesion in the Danish and Greek cases significantly improved their chances for success, but it did not guarantee it. As addressed in the conclusion below, other factors - acting in unison with political cohesion - must be analyzed to better explain these outcomes.

Additionally, this case highlights the *relative* nature of the political cohesion variable. Though cohesion was high inside Belgium, it was also quite high in the U.S. By the time the NAC started seriously discussing the deployment, President Bush managed to secure solid support for the war from the members of his cabinet, the Congress and the general public. In Congress, this support was reproduced over the issue of using NATO forces to defend Turkey, as members of both parties openly expressed their disapproval over the plan's detractors.¹³⁸ Given the somewhat hostile environment in Washington, Belgium's ability penetrate the otherwise open

¹³⁷ “Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study,” 136.

¹³⁸ See Firestone, “Anger Rises in U.S. over Recalcitrant NATO Allies” For example, the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee, Tom Lantos of California, stated he was “disgusted by the blind intransigence and utter ingratitude of France, Germany and Belgium . . . The failure of these states to honor their commitments is beneath contempt.”

polymaking arena in the U.S. was severely hampered. Finally, Belgium's relatively small "win-set" gave it less leverage than otherwise expected given the comparably narrow "win-set" established by the American position. In the end, American political cohesion and intensity of interest – backed by American power - facilitated its effective use of the tactic of *commitment* (i.e. *communicating your positioning clearly to other countries and letting them know you will not compromise beyond a certain point*) inside the NAC. In the next section, I describe the importance of the Influence Tactics as they pertain to the diplomacy efforts of the Belgian government.

Influence Tactics

The Belgian government attempted a combination of Influence Tactics in its effort to block NATO's deployment to Turkey in 2003. The most important factor contributing to Belgium's ultimate failure was its inability to maintain great power *sponsorship* for its position. Once Belgium became isolated in its opposition to the deployment, it was unable to withstand the pressure of the large majority in the NAC.

In contrast, as long as France and Germany joined the Belgian delegation in its resistance to the deployment, the small power was willing and able to use its institutional veto. Though French and German sponsorship occurred somewhat naturally – perhaps blurring somewhat the conceptual lines between the *sponsorship* and *coalition-building* – Belgium assumed an obvious supporting role to preserve the partnership. It understood that it needed Franco-German support in order to be successful, and it worked to maintain this support through its public

recognition of their leadership efforts – a strategy most consistent with the notion of *ingratiatio* (i.e. *acting humble, flattery and the promotion of goodwill*). While overall this tactic is best understood in terms of Belgian support for French leadership in the EU, it was also exemplified in the Iraq debate through public statements, such as the one made by Foreign Minister Michel on 10 February:

Yes, I am perhaps a small, old country, but I am very happy to be a country today which is close to France, which in a way is saving the honour of Europe somewhat and, in a way, has already prevented war from going ahead so far. Had it not been for the very courageous and quite remarkable attitude of President Chirac, who is playing his part as it should be played as far as the Security Council is concerned, we would already be at war today and we would have let slip a number of chances, of opportunities to avert this war, which would have repercussions, not just, of course, for the Iraqi people, which is already very detrimental, but also for the European countries, for our economies, for our internal European equilibrium.¹³⁹

In summary, Belgium no longer exhibits the visceral pro-American reflex it once had. At the same time, neither it did not completely abandon its “influence through intimacy” approach to alliance politics – it is simply shifting its allegiance to its great power neighbors, especially to France.

Perhaps the most surprising Influence Tactic – especially for a small power - was Belgium’s use of assertiveness (i.e. *the use of a direct and forceful approach*). The Belgian Foreign Minister was particularly dismissive of the U.S. proposal in public - indeed considerably more dismissive than his French and German counterparts.¹⁴⁰ As described above, the willingness to publicly challenge American leadership in NATO is a product of the post-Cold War environment and Belgium’s obvious preference for a stronger European security identity. It was also made

¹³⁹ “Belgian Foreign Minister Explains NATO Veto.”

¹⁴⁰ See Sturtewagon, “Belgium is Monumentally Overplaying its Hand”; Evans-Pritchard, “Belgian Foreign Minister Tops EU Most-hated List.”

easier by the fact that Germany and France shared similar positions in the 2003 debate. Whether or not Belgium's forcefulness was mirrored in the proceedings of the NAC is not entirely clear. Nonetheless, the consequences of Belgium's extra-organizational statements correlates with those found in more systematic studies of upward-influence in domestic organizations. These studies routinely find that assertiveness (also known as "pressure") is an ineffective strategy for achieving desired results in an organization, especially when employed by a lower-ranking member in the bureaucracy.¹⁴¹ Further research on the use of this tactic in NATO is needed to validate this conclusion.¹⁴²

As alluded to above, Belgian leaders also attempted the tactic of *commitment* to achieve their desired outcome. Belgian ministers made it clear that, minus another U.N. Security Council resolution or a direct attack against Turkey, the deployment was premature. This commitment was best exemplified by the Belgian's willingness to "break silence" after SecGen Robertson attempted to end the deliberations in the NAC by 10 February. Belgian's ability to take a firm position was no doubt made possible by the high internal cohesion on the issue within the state. However, the tactic was ineffective given the comparably high cohesion and commitment strategy coming from the U.S., as well as the eventual loss of great power sponsorship that occurred when Germany and France "left" the opposition.

¹⁴¹ For a summary of these studies, as well as one that corroborates their findings, see Falbe and Yukl, "Consequences for Managers of Using Single Influence Tactics and Combinations of Tactics," 642-643.

¹⁴² A cursory survey of NATO officials indicates that, within the organization, this is not a common tactic employed by small powers.

Additional/Alternative Variables

Two independent variables not directly addressed in this study's hypotheses also deserve mention in the case study described here. First, the leadership efforts of the NATO SecGen, Lord Robertson, were critical to understanding the final outcome. His unambiguous support for the deployment and the tactics he used to promote the decision in NATO (e.g. the "public" use of the "silence procedure" and the policy's reassignment to the DPC) put additional pressure on France, Germany and Belgium. As such, I agree with scholars like Juan Linz who argue that, at times, individual leadership's "contribution is so obvious that it should be given its due."¹⁴³ Though in most cases *leadership* is best treated as a "residual variable" (i.e. one that "should not be introduced before the explanatory power of other variables has been exhausted"), I contend that this specific case is incomplete without an explicit acknowledgment of the significance of Lord Robertson's individual contribution to the final outcome.

Second, the interactive affect between public opinion and the timing of national elections appeared to contribute significantly to the willingness of both German and Belgian leaders to challenge U.S. leadership in Europe. In other words, when unpopular decisions are addressed in the NAC shortly before a national election, a government may have a greater incentive to defy the majority within the alliance. Future studies of influence in NATO may benefit from attention to this dynamic and its effect on an ally's ability to use the tactic of commitment in the NAC.

¹⁴³ *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, 100 n. 11.

Summary

Belgium's post-Cold War experience in the alliance is best described as one in which the government is shifting its primary political allegiance from NATO to the EU. With this shift, Belgium is experiencing an overall loss of influence in the alliance. The country participates at a relatively low level in allied operations, and its influence attempts in the NAC are more defensive than offensive. This policy evolution is facilitated by a lower security dependency vis-à-vis the Atlantic alliance, but a noteworthy degree of residual dependency remains based on the EU's current "hard power" deficit. This latter condition leaves the country susceptible to failure when the U.S. employs the full weight of its political pressure. Whether this will continue to hamper Belgium's ability to block U.S. initiatives depends on both its perceived threat level and its ability to realistically rely on the EU to protect it from the "shadow of the future." Indeed, when the 2003 debate concluded, the Belgian government invited leaders from France, Germany and Luxembourg to Brussels to participate in a defense summit. The goal of the meeting (the so-called "Chocolate Summit") "was to explore whether their close consultation and cooperation during the Iraq crisis could constitute the basis for a more durable enhanced cooperation between them in the field of defence, which might then accelerate the development of the ESDP."¹⁴⁴ The summit is yet another indication that Belgium wants to shift its dependency away from the U.S. and NATO.

In the 2003 debate, four conditions contributed significantly to Belgium's ultimate failure. Though Belgium had relatively high political cohesion and a

¹⁴⁴ Coolsaet, "European Security: What, Why, When, How?"

moderate degree of interest intensity over the deployment issue, this potential advantage was trumped by an equal or greater degree of political cohesion and interest intensity coming from the U.S. Belgian failure was also greatly affected by ultimate loss of great power sponsorship for the government's position. In the end, these factors left the nation unable to effectively pursue the commitment tactic, even given its institutional right to veto the policy in the NAC. Finally, Lord Robertson's role as SecGen, one in which he took an extremely proactive stance, contributed significantly to Belgium's inability maintain its "veto" of the deployment proposal.

Chapter 7 – Conclusion

The findings of these case studies fill a gap in IR research by combining past theoretical propositions from a variety of relevant research endeavors and applying them to a specific security IO. This dissertation is the first to generate testable hypotheses from the myriad of findings related to small powers/“lower participants” in organizations in order to evaluate the relationship between power and influence in NATO. It also offers a workable theoretical model for understanding influence antecedents that should prove valuable for future studies of NATO and other security IOs. Importantly, this model includes factors at both the international and domestic levels of analysis – each of which were proven important to the understanding of the outcomes considered in this dissertation. More specifically, I argue that the notion of security dependency is the most straightforward approach for understanding the systemic pressures that push and pull small powers in an alliance. When small powers are highly dependent on the alliance to counter their most important security threats, the dependency relationship limits the extent to which they are able to challenge great power leadership. Similarly, NATO’s consensus rules were the most significant institutional factors that contributed to small power success in the alliance. Without the formal right to veto policies in the NAC, small powers would not have the same opportunities to modify or reject policies that did not complement their interests. While these “third image” factors are unable to fully explain exceptional instances of small state influence, they comprise the essential background conditions that either aggravate or alleviate the difficulties inherent in being a small ally in NATO.

Two domestic level variables – high relative interest intensity and political cohesion – were demonstrated as necessary conditions for small power accomplishments in the organization. These factors contributed to a small ally's ability to make credible and resolute commitments in the NAC, as did the backing of at least one great power in the alliance. Additionally, the results of this study imply that expertise may increase a small power's ability to influence specific policies related to that expertise, but this factor appears less significant than others considered herein. Finally, the case studies examined here indicate that Influence Tactics are likely intervening variables that are important for understanding influence in NATO, though future research on this category of variables is needed to determine their causal significance.

Theoretical Implications

The arguments posited above have two important implications for IR theory. First, they both reaffirm and suggest modifications to G. John Ikenberry's notion of the "institutional bargain" between leading and weak states. Ikenberry's theory of international institutions attempts to explain why strong and weak states would agree to establish multilateral institutions like NATO that place limits on a member's autonomy. From the perspective of the small state, this study largely confirms his assertion that small powers agree to enter into long-term security agreements because these agreements "[put] limitations and restraints on the behavior of the leading state."¹ The most important manifestation of this proposition in NATO is the

¹ "State Power and the Institutional Bargain," 52.

organization's devotion to the consensus rule. Small states accept membership the alliance because it provides both security and an effective means to temper the domination of great power allies, especially the U.S. The *formal* equality of members in the NAC does not equate to *actual* equality in terms of influencing alliance policy, but it does alter the gradient of the traditional power-influence relationship to the benefit of those with relatively less AMP. This finding is not inconsistent with an argument by one of IR's prominent neorealists, Joseph Greico, who hypothesizes that:

[I]f states share a common interest and undertake negotiations on rules constituting a collaborative arrangement, then the weaker but still influential partners will seek to ensure that the rules so constructed will provide sufficient opportunities for them voice their concerns and interests and thereby prevent or at least ameliorate their domination by stronger partners.²

The case studies examined here indicate that the rules established in the formative years of the alliance do in fact continue to assist small powers, even as power discrepancies within the organization remain stark.

At the same, Ikenberry's explanation as to why *leading powers* would agree to establish a multilateral institution like NATO requires further elucidation. According to Ikenberry, one reason the U.S. agreed to participate in an institutionalized security framework in Europe is that such a framework would continue to benefit it when its power declined: "Institutions can both conserve and prolong the power advantages of the leading state."³ However, this assertion fails to explain why the U.S. would agree to decision-making procedures based on consensus when the alliance was first created. The proposition is enhanced when

² "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme," 34.

³ "State Power and the Institutional Bargain," 52.

considerations of dependency are included in the argument. As Keohane reminds us: “Relationships of power *and* dependence in world politics [are] important determinants of the characteristics of international regimes.”⁴ NATO was fashioned at a time when East-West tensions were paramount. It is plausible that U.S. leaders understood that Europe’s reliance on American economic and military guarantees would reduce the extent to which small powers could realistically capitalize on their inherent veto right in the NAC. In other words, as long as these states depended on the U.S. to protect them from the Soviet threat, the U.S. had enormous freedom to dominate the policy-making process in the organization.

Adding a dependency dimension to the notion of an institutional bargain also explains recent attempts by U.S. policy-makers to alter the decision-making rules in NATO. This proposal became increasingly salient following the 2003 crisis in NATO, prompting U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) to make the following statement on the Senate floor:

First, I agree that we must eliminate the “consensus rule,” the antiquated requirement in the NATO charter that nearly prevented NATO from protecting one of its own members, Turkey, before the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom. ... Secondly, I support the need for a new rule in NATO that authorizes the members of the alliance to suspend the membership of any country in NATO which no longer supports the ideals of the alliance. The recent refusal of support on the part of some of our allies during the build-up for and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom has shown the need for such a change.⁵

Reed’s statement took place during Spring 2003 Senate deliberations over the ratification of treaty protocols on NATO enlargement. The final resolution, which passed 96-0, contained an amendment recommending that the President place the

⁴ *After Hegemony*, 71. *Emphasis added*.

⁵ Quoted in Michel, “NATO Decisionmaking: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?” 203.

issue of reforming NATO's decision-making rules on the NAC agenda by late 2004.⁶ Congress made a similar request to the Secretary of Defense in the 2004 Defense Authorization Bill.⁷ These proposals have yet to bear much fruit within the alliance, especially given the fact that any changes to the consensus rule must be made by consensus. But they hint at an underlying recognition on the part of many U.S. policy-makers that the dependency relationship within the alliance has shifted. In somewhat of a contrast to the predictions made by Ikenberry, the U.S. is over time experiencing a decrease in its "power advantages" in the alliance, even as American military might remains overwhelmingly uncontested in the organization. This phenomenon is better accounted for by the end of the Soviet threat than an assessment of American AMP.

A second theoretical implication derived from this study is that – in contrast to the predictions of mainstream neorealism - incidences of significant small power influence in the alliance do indeed occur. Furthermore, these outcomes cannot be explained without examining the domestic sources of influence, a finding that encourages the use of a theoretical model such as the one presented in Chapter 3. In other words, instances of small power influence in post-Cold War NATO cannot be explained by factors – both systemic and institutional - that are constant across cases. This realization points the scholar towards variables at the second image of analysis, a move that helps fill in the gaps and account for some of the anomalies in systemic and regime explanations of significant IR outcomes. While this approach is perhaps less parsimonious than those that focus on a single level of analysis, I

⁶ Ibid., 204.

⁷ Ibid.

submit that the sacrifice is acceptable and indeed necessary in order to explain the antecedents of policy influence in NATO.

Future Research - *Methods*

A recognized limitation of the research conducted in this dissertation is the inevitable difficulty in quantifying its dependent variable. Indeed, this has been a challenge of all studies of influence in international organizations. As Cox and Jacobson conclude, “no method has yet been discovered for satisfactorily giving quantitative expression to influence in an organization.”⁸ This hurdle is only augmented in “closed” organizations like NATO, where the policy proceedings of the organization are not open to the public.

For this study, the problem of measuring influence was simplified by the creation of a dichotomous dependent variable (i.e. *success* and *failure*). While this division was reasonable given the objective at hand, future research may benefit from a more nuanced approach. One promising solution is a tool known as the *reputational method*. The reputational method of measuring influence enlists what Dahl calls “well-placed judges.”⁹ The argument is that certain individuals within an organization can make a reasonable assessment of general influence rankings of the organization’s members. Use of the reputational method may be conducted using interviews and/or surveys. The value of this approach depends on selecting appropriate “judges” (i.e. those very familiar with the decision-making processes in

⁸ *The Anatomy of Influence*, 371.

⁹ *Modern Political Analysis*, 52.

the IO) and ensuring that the participants understand the researchers notion of influence,¹⁰ as well as its scope.¹¹

Because the research question in this dissertation focused on decisions made within the NAC, the most qualified “judges” to assess influence within the Council were the PermReps to NATO and their respective staffs. In fact, early on in this research I presented a prototype survey to NATO officials to gauge whether the various national delegations within NATO would be amenable to such a research tool. Among other things, the survey asked the participants to evaluate individual countries based on their overall influence in NATO decision-making/policy-making using a scale from 0 to 10 (where 0 = *No influence* and 10 = *Very great influence*). The general consensus was that, even if the survey were anonymous, national representatives would not feel comfortable contributing to data that would rank their fellow allies. This feedback is perhaps not surprising given the organization’s traditional dedication to solidarity and the formal equality of its members.

Given the hesitancies described above, I offer two alternatives that may prove fruitful for future research on influence in NATO. The first is the use of *former* NATO PermReps and delegation officials as respondents for a survey. Based on my interviews, these officials are much more willing to make candid assessments of the contributions of various allies to the policies produced in the NAC. However, the feasibility of such a method is complicated by the fact that these officials are

¹⁰ Knudsen found that in a large majority of cases the question "who in the IO is most influential?" did not require elaboration. However, when respondents requested further explanation of the concept, he offered the following definition: "effectiveness in persuading other countries to adopt or support their positions, or in raising support for draft resolutions." Knudsen, "Capabilities, Issue-areas, and Inter-State Power," 100.

¹¹ For a critique of the reputational method, see Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of "Community Power"."

scattered over a large geographical area in the Atlantic region – a reality that makes the distribution and collection of such a survey difficult.

A potentially more practical option is the use of members of the *International Staff* (IS) within NATO. As described in Chapter 2, the IS is an advisory group that “supports the process of consensus-building and decision-making” in NATO committees.¹² The IS is made up of personnel from each of the member countries in NATO, and while these officials bring with them the unique perspectives of their countries of origin, they work directly for NATO rather than any national government. Based on interviews with these officials, they appear to be somewhat less inhibited in their responses regarding the relative influence of NATO members, especially when their statements remained anonymous. A survey of IS officials has the added benefit of the opportunity to capture responses from a relatively large group (up to 1200) in a single location (i.e. the NATO HQ).¹³ The five divisions of the IS whose personnel are most familiar with security policy-making in the alliance are: 1) the NATO Office of Resources, 2) the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, 3) the Defense Policy and Planning Division, 4) the Operations Division and 5) the Defense Investment Division.¹⁴

While the use of the survey method succeeds in giving influence a quantitative expression, it must be recognized that the method captures a “reputation for influence” - a measurement that approximates but does not equate

¹² *NATO Handbook*, 75.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 73.

¹⁴ A sixth potentially useful source for NATO “judges” is the new Emerging Security Challenges Division. This division, created in August 2010, will focus on issues such as terrorism, cyber defense and energy security. “New NATO Division.”

perfectly with actual influence.¹⁵ Additionally, if the method is carried out using a survey question like the one introduced above, the results fail to differentiate between offensive and defensive influence. In the Cox and Jacobson study, scholar Joseph Nye sought to resolve this weakness by creating a survey that captured the “direction of influence.”¹⁶ Using Nye’s survey as a template, a question like the one presented below might prove useful for estimating influence in NATO. The scores collected from this instrument could be assessed separately (i.e. in terms of offensive or defensive influence) or aggregated to approximate an ally’s overall influence.

Figure 7.1 Survey Question for Assessing Influence Rankings in NATO

<i>Natonnia:</i>			
Prevents successfully on important issues:		Initiates successfully on important issues:	
Frequently	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (3)	Frequently	<input type="checkbox"/> (3)
Occasionally	<input type="checkbox"/> (2)	Occasionally	<input type="checkbox"/> (2)
Rarely	<input type="checkbox"/> (1)	Rarely	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (1)
Never	<input type="checkbox"/> (0)	Never	<input type="checkbox"/> (0)
Note: Scoring rules included in parentheses.			

As represented above, the reputational method is useful for capturing an ally’s overall influence in the alliance. As such, the scope of the measurement is best limited in terms of time (i.e. either a snapshot assessment or an assessment defined in terms of a specified time period). The data succeeds in permitting the researcher to make a more straightforward comparison between an ally’s AMP and influence in NATO. However, this comparison will not isolate individual instances of influence, a

¹⁵ Cox and Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence*, 24.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 361.

limitation that encourages further use of comparative case studies to assess policy-specific influence and draw out causal inferences.

Finally, the use of a survey may also be advantageous for evaluating the effectiveness of one of this study’s independent variable categories: *Influence Tactics*. Again, the use of “well-placed judges” in NATO provides the researcher with the opportunity to rely on the day-to-day observations of present or past NATO officials to provide data on the strategies small powers use to promote their interests in the organization. A sample question is provided here:

Figure 7.2 Survey Question for Assessing the Effectiveness of Influence Tactics

Please rate the following approaches/tactics based on their effectiveness in helping small powers achieve their policy preferences in NATO:											
Approach	Description										
Assertiveness	<i>The use of a direct and forceful approach</i>										
Never effective											Very Effective
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Don't know
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Future Research - Additional Case Studies of Small Power Influence in NATO

The historical rarity of small power influence in NATO begs the question: is it worth the effort to theorize about such an infrequent phenomenon? The significance of the organizational outcomes described in Chapters 4-6 indicates that these cases deserve scholarly attention. Furthermore, recent policy developments within NATO suggest that the frequency of cases of small power influence in the alliance is increasing. The alleviation of Cold War pressures and the proliferation of security risks facing the alliance appear to be permitting small powers greater leverage within the organization, especially on issues in which they have great interest. This

development makes an understanding of the factors that contribute to small power influence in NATO all the more critical.

In this section I offer three potentially fecund cases for future research on this subject: 1) Denmark and the Comprehensive Approach, 2) Estonia and Cyber Defense and 3) Norway and the High North. Though all three cases involve yet ongoing debates within the alliance, the Danish case has progressed to the point that several preliminary conclusions are possible. While further research on Danish influence towards this organizational policy shift is necessary, the evidence presented here is largely consistent with the findings of the primary cases in this dissertation. The remaining two cases are still in their early stages in NATO and thus require future research before plausible conclusions can be made.

1. Denmark and the Comprehensive Approach

It was mentioned at the outset of Chapter 4 that the outcome of the Baltic membership debate was not the only instance of disproportionate Danish influence in post-Cold War NATO. Of particular note is the Danish role in getting a policy based on the “Comprehensive Approach” (CA) to crisis-management approved at the 2008 NATO Summit. The emphasis of the CA is based on a post-Cold War environment where most risks are recognized as multidimensional and asymmetric rather than one-dimensional and conventional; in short, NATO now appreciates that “military instruments alone are not sufficient to deal with complex crises.”¹⁷ In general terms, the CA solution to this challenge is founded on the notion that the

¹⁷ Nagy, “NATO’s Contribution to a Comprehensive Approach.”

institutional mechanisms needed to coordinate the “hard” and “soft” elements of power – especially those among multiple nations and IOs - must be clearly established *prior to* the outbreak of a crisis, in contrast to the obviously *ad hoc* fashion that this coordination has taken place in most recent multinational operations. As such, it has been defined as “synchronizing all the elements of national and international power” at the strategic rather than tactical level - to include military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, social, commercial, financial and economic elements.¹⁸

According to interviews with NATO officials and works by NATO scholars, the genesis of NATO’s CA is credited to a Danish initiative that was introduced into the organization’s agenda in late 2004.¹⁹ From this point forward, Denmark persistently worked within NATO circles to advance this strategy as one critical for the future success of the alliance. In the spring of 2006, Denmark and six other allies (the Czech Republic, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia and Hungary) circulated a paper at the NATO HQ that described some of the basic ideas of the approach and what these nations were trying to achieve in the alliance; the U.S. later joined the group.²⁰ Despite considerable hesitations and skepticism among many NATO allies – in particular from those who felt the alliance should remain focused on military instruments of power - the Danish efforts are paying off. CA was first referenced as a NATO priority at the Riga Summit in 2006, and the “Action Plan” for the use of the CA in NATO was adopted at the Bucharest Summit in 2008.

¹⁸ Schnaubelt, *Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach*, 7; See also Peterson and Binnendijk, “The Comprehensive Approach Initiative,” 1.

¹⁹ Schnaubelt, *Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach*, 157.

²⁰ Petersen, “Presentation at NATO Comprehensive Approach Workshop.”

Operationally it is being applied in the PRTs involved in NATO's mission in Afghanistan. Strategically it is expected to be a foundational part of NATO's new Strategic Concept – projected to be officially release in fall 2010. As one former NATO official put it, “the Comprehensive Approach is now NATO theology.”²¹

What factors explain the important role that Denmark is playing in institutionalizing the CA strategy in NATO? A number of the conditions argued as significant in the Baltic case apply to this one as well. For starters, the systemic factors affecting Denmark's degree of security dependence remain largely unchanged since the 1990s, thus giving Denmark greater freedom to promote its preferred vision of Atlantic security within the NAC. Next, national-level factors certainly facilitated Denmark's success. First, Denmark benefitted from a considerable degree of executive expertise in civil-military coordination due to national efforts both inside and outside its borders. At the domestic level, in 2004 the Danish government launched an initiative known as the *Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations* (CPA, for short) – a policy that became a pillar of the Danish Defense Bill for 2005-2009.²² According to Danish government officials, the policy was based on “a strong tradition of civilian foreign aid provided by Denmark,”²³ as well as Danish experiences in Afghanistan (especially those in the Helmand province), the Balkans, Eritrea and Iraq.²⁴ The CPA has as its aim to assure that “all Danish actors operating in crisis areas . . . work

²¹ Wilson, “Interview by author.”

²² Petersen, “Presentation at NATO Comprehensive Approach Workshop.”

²³ Danish Official, “Interview by author”; According to most reports, Denmark regularly ranks 2nd in the world in terms of foreign aid based on a country's GDP. See, for example, Shah, *Foreign Aid for Development Assistance*.

²⁴ Fischer and Christensen, “Improving Civil-military Cooperation the Danish Way.”

towards the goal of stabilizing and normalizing living conditions in a coordinated manner.”²⁵ Danish expertise is also augmented by its participation as a one of four founding/sponsor members of NATO’s Civil-Military Cooperation Center of Excellence (CCOE). The center, located in the Netherlands, was established in 2001 and became a NATO-accredited COE in July 2007. CCOE has as its mission:

To assist NATO, Sponsoring Nations and other military and civil institutions/organisations in their operational and transformation efforts in the field of civil-military interaction by providing innovative and timely advice and subject matter expertise in the development of existing and new concepts, policy and doctrine; specialised education and training; and the contribution to the lessons learned processes.²⁶

In sum, the Danish government is using its recognized expertise in civil-military coordination policies to effectively advance its agenda within the alliance.

Second, Denmark likely benefits from its relative intensity of interest in promoting CA in NATO. Again, due to its current opt-outs from the EU’s defense structures, Denmark must focus its security-related efforts primarily through NATO. This gives Denmark a comparative advantage over other small nations that must divide their attention and resources between two – often competing – security frameworks. Third, Denmark’s success in NATO is facilitated by a broad consensus within the country over the appropriate means of achieving peace and stability in Atlantic region and beyond. This consensus begins with a basic acceptance of the idea that, in today’s environment, Danish personnel and resources need to be deployed outside its borders and even outside the boundaries of the alliance in order to achieve the country’s security goals. In the words of a Danish official

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ “Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence.”

working at the NATO HQ: “In Denmark, nobody questions the fact that we should be involved ‘out of area.’ The support for this crosses party lines.”²⁷ At the same time, the manner in which Danish forces deploy is extremely important. The promotion of CA within NATO has the support of roughly 80% of the MPs in the Folketing.²⁸ As a high-ranking Danish diplomat explained it, “If the Danish parliament is going to support something in NATO, it helps if it is framed in the Comprehensive Approach strategy in order to get a majority of support.”²⁹ In this case, the most important causal mechanisms associated with Danish political cohesion and successful influence are: 1) the government’s ability to focus its persuasive efforts externally (i.e. outside the nation) and 2) the Danish delegation’s ability to present its interests credibly within the NAC (i.e. as long-term interests that are consistent with the majority sentiment in Denmark).

Finally, Influence Tactics are playing an interesting and important role in contributing to the acceptance of CA in NATO. The most important of these are *reasoning, coalition-building, and sponsorship*:

- A. *Reasoning* - The Danes are drawing on their expertise in civil-military coordination policies in order to construct coherent and valid arguments for the implementation of CA for NATO. They hosted or co-hosted three seminars on CA. The first seminar, which took place in Copenhagen in June 2005, was organized to “kick-start the discussion [of CA] within the

²⁷ Danish Official, “Interview by author.”

²⁸ High Ranking Danish Official, “Interview by author.”

²⁹ Ibid.

Alliance.”³⁰ Follow-up seminars were co-hosted by the Royal Danish Embassy in Washington, D.C. in May 2007 and May 2009. The seminars were instrumental in explaining the Danish position, sharing ideas between seminar participants and, more generally, for gathering support for the initiative among NATO allies.³¹

- B. *Coalition-building* - In order to improve their chances for success, the Danes reached out to like-minded small powers within NATO (i.e. the Czech Republic, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia and Hungary). Together these nations worked to put and keep CA on the agenda in the NAC. U.S. officials evidently liked what they saw in the 2006 position paper co-authored by these nations and soon joined the group in their active backing of CA.
- C. *Sponsorship* – In this case, great power support is again critical for the achievement of Danish influence in NATO. Not unlike the Baltic membership case, Danish officials reached out to a prominent American “think-tank” to help promote their cause. This time, the Danish government created a partnership with the *National Defense University* (NDU) and its *Center for Technology and National Security Policy*. The

³⁰ Petersen, “Presentation at NATO Comprehensive Approach Workshop.”

³¹ As the Danish Ambassador to the U.S. explained: “A lot of time was spent in the first phase spelling out what Concerted Planning and Action [later CA] was not. A key message in our talking points was – and is – that the aim is not to develop new, independent NATO-capabilities at the expense of others but to strengthen the Alliance’s ability to engage in cooperation with – not control of – other actors such as the EU, UN and OSCE. We also wanted more generally to improve NATO’s mission planning to take into account these challenges.” Ibid.

Center – well-known and highly respected in NATO circles – hosted and co-sponsored the CA seminars in 2007 and 2009, thus providing the Danish initiative with added prestige and legitimacy. Additionally, in 2007 Danish Ambassador Friis Petersen partnered with a respected NATO scholar from NDU, Hans Binnendijk (also a member of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Advisors Group), to publish an article in *Defense Horizons* titled “The Comprehensive Approach Initiative: Future Options for NATO.”³² As NATO leaders gathered in Bucharest in 2008, these same authors published an op-ed in the *Washington Times* further emphasizing the criticality of committing to CA for conflict resolution.³³ In sum, Denmark’s cooperation with an influential great power institution facilitated its ability to both elucidate and promote CA as a vital strategic shift within NATO.

2. Estonia and Cyber Defense

Next to Iceland, Estonia is currently the smallest NATO member in terms of its AMP. Using the CINC measurements presented in Chapter 3, Estonia contributes a mere 0.08% to the overall material power capacities of the alliance. Located just west of Russia, a country that recently conducted large-scale military exercises near the Estonian-Russian border,³⁴ Estonia perceives a much greater threat to its territorial sovereignty than NATO’s Western allies. When the above factors are combined with its relative inexperience as a member of the alliance, one would

³² Petersen and Binnendijk, “The Comprehensive Approach Initiative.”

³³ Petersen and Binnendijk, “NATO Needs New Lease.”

³⁴ “NATO Concerned over Major Russian Exercise.”

perhaps not expect this small Baltic nation to have much influence within the organization. But despite these challenges, Estonia is recognized within the alliance as an ally that has influence disproportionate with its small size. Though it lacks the political leverage to directly challenge most great power initiatives in the alliance, it is seen as a leader in one security-related issue that has gained increasing attention over the past decade: *Cyber Defense*.

On 27 April 2007, the Estonian government moved a Soviet-era memorial (the “Bronze Soldier”) from the central square of its capital city, Tallinn. The relocation incited protests from Russians in Estonia and Russia and was followed by a massive “denial-of-service” attack on both private and government sector computer networks. Speculation in Estonia were that these attacks came from within Russia, a theory later substantiated when Sergei Markov, a State Duma member from the pro-Kremlin Unified Russia party, announced that one of his assistants had carried out the attacks.³⁵ Estonia, regarded as one of the EU’s most technologically advanced members, responded quickly and effectively to the attacks.³⁶ Following the assault, the government doubled its efforts towards improving its highly sophisticated cyber defense system – a system that NATO members such as Germany, Spain and Italy are now reported as showing interest in acquiring.³⁷ Additionally, Estonia now hosts NATO’s Cyber Defense Operations

³⁵ “Estonia Leads the Way.”

³⁶ Lesk, “The New Front Line,” 76; O’Dwyer, “Estonia Sees Market for its Cyber Expertise” According to the Estonian Defense Minister, Jaak Aaviksoo, American officials have admitted that “Estonia coped better with the attack than the U.S. would have done under similar circumstances”.

³⁷ O’Dwyer, “Estonia Sees Market for its Cyber Expertise.”

Center of Excellence (CCD-COE), a cooperative effort that houses NATO's top cyber defense experts.

Future research on small power influence in NATO would benefit from an assessment of Estonia's ability to translate its technical and executive expertise in cyber defense into influence over NATO policies. Though the alliance is still grappling with the extent to which cyber attacks apply to the principles of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the NAC is taking its first steps towards generating policies to manage this rapidly expanding security concern. For example, in 2008 allied leaders committed the organization to "continuing the development of NATO's cyber defense capabilities and strengthening the linkages between NATO and national authorities."³⁸ NATO followed-up this request with the creation of the Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA), a unit within the alliance charged with enhancing "member cyber defences by providing a centralized bureau for coordinating member responses to the full spectrum of cyber attack."³⁹ As recent as April 2010, Estonia and NATO signed an agreement that "creates a legal framework for cyber defence cooperation between NATO and Estonia" and "will facilitate the exchange of information and provide the means for creating a mechanism for assistance in case of cyber attacks."⁴⁰ A case study that examines Estonia's contribution towards these and future policy decisions related to cyber defense would certainly add to our understanding of the factors contributing to small power influence in NATO.

³⁸ From the declaration of the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit. Quoted in Hughes, "NATO and Cyber Defense."

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ "NATO and Estonia Conclude Agreement on Cyber Defence."

3. Norway and the High North

Another small power in NATO that is emerging as a key contributor to NATO's post-Cold War strategic transformation is Norway. As NATO continues to focus a majority of its attention and resources to operations in Afghanistan, Norway is concerned that the alliance is becoming distracted from its more traditional goals, especially those related to the defense of the Atlantic area. This concern is especially salient to the security challenges emerging in the littoral region of the High North. The Norwegians are quick to point out that while the North Atlantic Treaty defines the alliance's southern "boundary" as the Tropic of Cancer, it makes no similar limitation to the north.⁴¹ As rising global temperatures continue to melt the polar ice cap in the Arctic region, new sea routes and increased access to natural resources (especially oil and gas) are the near-term results. Given increased Russian activity in the High North – to include its August 2007 placement of a Russian flag on the seabed of the floor beneath the North Pole⁴² - the Norwegians are interested in committing NATO to developing a more comprehensive plan to address the potentially grave security challenges inherent with this strategic effect. To this end, the Norwegian delegation began placing the issue of the High North on the NATO agenda in 2007.⁴³ They soon gained the cooperation of nations like Iceland and Denmark, as well as some support from the Canadians and the U.S. Though their efforts succeeded in getting the issue recognized in communiqué of the 2009 NATO

⁴¹ Bo, "Security in the High North - Perceptions and Misperceptions."

⁴² Faulconbridge, "Russians Plant Flag on Arctic Seabed to Stake Energy Claim."

⁴³ Anonymous NATO Official, "Interview by author."

Summit at Strasbourg-Kehl (an important first step for any major strategic policy change in NATO), the extent to which NATO is ready to make firm security commitments to the region remains to be seen. One important indicator of the alliance's common agreement vis-à-vis the High North will be its mention (or lack thereof) in the Strategic Concept expected to be released in fall 2010. An in-depth case study that examines the success or failure of these Norwegian initiatives would provide a further test of the hypotheses presented in this dissertation, especially given the Norwegian government's seemingly high interest intensity on this issue.

Predictions and Policy Implications

As long as NATO is no longer defined by a single, potentially devastating threat, small powers within the Atlantic alliance can be expected to have greater opportunities to influence significant policies of the organization. Stated another way, the less small states are dependent on the alliance to protect them against their most important security concerns, the less great powers will be able to use their superior AMP as political leverage in the NAC. To date there is nothing that replaces the Soviet threat, a welcomed outcome but one that alleviates the once automatic reflex toward alliance solidarity.

The prediction described above is likely to be enhanced as long as NATO and the U.S. continue to conduct military operations in Afghanistan. As U.S. officials in NATO focus a preponderance of their attention on ISAF, this provides the opportunity for smaller powers to concentrate their scarce resources towards security challenges closer to home. This general discrepancy in interest intensity

was revealed – though somewhat anecdotally - during a 2009 interview with a high-ranking American military general in NATO. When queried as to what two or three issues being addressed by NATO were most important to the U.S., his response was simple: “ISAF, ISAF, ISAF.” The general then qualified his response by conveying that, though ISAF was not the only important issue on the NATO agenda, it was “overwhelmingly number one.”⁴⁴ In contrast, most small power representatives to NATO appeared to provide mere lip-service to the mantra that “ISAF is NATO’s number one priority” – an assertion they quickly followed up with more enthusiastic descriptions of their unique “secondary” concerns.

The above predictions do not imply that small power influence in the alliance will ever rise to levels equal to that of its great powers. The assets available to great power governments still consistently translates into influence, a reality explained both by the amount of material and personnel resources these nations are able to apportion to the organization and the ever-present “shadow of the future” – a future where unforeseen security threats may materialize without adequate warning. Given this reality, the findings of this dissertation imply that conditions at the second-image level of analysis will often be the decisive factors as to whether or not small states will be successful within the organization.

Finally, it is clear that some allies in NATO – in particular some of its newest members – still feel threatened by the Russian military. This threat is likely to temper the extent to which some of NATO’s eastern allies can take advantage of the organization’s consensus rules. It also serves as a caution to countries like Georgia

⁴⁴ Petersen (USAF), “Interview by author.”

and the Ukraine – states that need to recognize the tradeoff between security and autonomy as potential members of the Atlantic alliance. In contrast, prospective members like Sweden and Finland – each of who are currently exploring the pros and cons of NATO membership – may be less encumbered by these critical systemic pressures.

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Appendix A: The North Atlantic Treaty Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,

including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government

of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

Appendix B - List of Acronyms

ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANA	Athens News Agency
AMP	Aggregate Material Power
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CDMA	Cyber Defence Management Authority (NATO)
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (1990)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPA	Concerted Planning and Action of Civil-Military Activities in Intl. Ops
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
EDA	United Democratic Left (Greece)
EK	Centre Union Party (Greece)
ESDP	<i>European Security and Defence Policy</i>
EU	European Union
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
IO	International Organization
IMS	International Military Staff (NATO)
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
IR	International Relations

IS	International Staff (NATO)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
KKE	Communist Party (Greece)
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MC	Military Committee (NATO)
MIA	Macedonian Information Agency
MILREP	Military Representative to NATO
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAC	North Atlantic Council
ND	New Democratic Party (Greece)
NDU	National Defense University (U.S.)
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group (NATO)
NRF	NATO Response Force
OAF	Operation Allied Force
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Greece)
PermRep	Permanent Representative (Ambassador) to NATO
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PRT	Provisional Reconstruction Team (Afghanistan)
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SDU	Scandinavian Defense Union

SecGen	Secretary General (NATO)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction