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MARSHALL R. SCHMIDT
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PERCEPTIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL CRIME: SENTENCING RECCOMENDATIONS AND THE ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR OCCUPATIONAL OFFENSES

A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

BY

Dr. Amy Kroska, Chair

Dr. Kermyt G. Anderson

Dr. Stephanie Burge

Dr. Constance Chapple

Dr. Trina Hope

Dedicated to my mom, there is no way I could have done this without you. Thank you.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines how offender and case attributes affect criminal perceptions, responsibility attributions, and recommended sentencing outcomes for occupational and organizational crimes. I use affect control theory and attribution theory to derive my predictions. I test predictions using online vignette experiments administered to: community college students in the South, students at a large southern university, and Amazon Mechanical Turk users.

First, I examine how an offender's occupational status, gender, and the word used to describe an offender's crime affect the recommended monetary fine and recommended prison sentence that participants assign to offenders. Consistent with my affect control theory-derived predictions, I find that occupational status increases recommended punishment, that females are punished more leniently than males, and that offenders described as overcharging clients are recommended a lighter prison sentence but not a lighter monetary fine than offenders who are described as stealing from clients.

Second, extending previous research, I examine the independent and mediating effects of negative and potent post-crime impressions of occupational offenders on punishment. As predicted, I find high occupational status increases punishment, and that this effect is mediated by post-crime impressions of offender potency and power. However, contrary to predictions, I find that post-crime impressions of offender negativity and status do not mediate the effect of occupational status on punishment.

Lastly, I examine how the social role of offenders and the description of an offender's offense as either following or departing from standard operating procedures affects attributions of responsibility and the recommended monetary fine that participants assign to offenders. I find support for attribution theory predictions on attributions of causality and coerciveness for both

the social role of offenders and standard operating procedures. However, findings on attributions of intentionality for the social role of offenders, and findings on attributions of knowledge for standard operating procedures, are opposite of predictions. I also find that attributions of moral wrongfulness for the social role of offenders and standard operating procedures are contrary to predictions. Consistent with punishment hypotheses, participants recommended greater monetary fines for autonomous offenders and offenders described as offending against standard operating procedures than conformist offenders and those offenders described as offending by following standard operating procedures. In partial support of mediation predictions, I find that causality and coerciveness both mediate the effect of the social role of offenders and standard operating procedures on the recommended monetary fine participants assign to offenders.

Chapter 1: A Brief Introduction and Dissertation Overview

Introduction

Numerous studies examine the different factors that affect sentencing outcomes. Despite the extensive literature in this area, there are still a number of open questions. For instance, the effect of an offender's occupational status on sentencing outcomes is unclear. Research also does not show how an offender's gender affects sentencing outcomes for occupational crime or how differences in crime description for different crime types affect recommended punishment. Moreover, research does not clearly explain the factors that drive criminal perceptions of occupational offenders and how facets of organizational offending affect both perceptions of culpability and punishment outcomes. In this dissertation, I begin to address research gaps in the aforementioned areas and address weaknesses in previous research.

I use affect control theory (Heise 1979, 2007), a mathematical theory of impression formation, to develop predictions for how offender attributes and perceptions of offenders and their crimes affect punitiveness. I use attribution theory (Heider 1958), a theory that explains how individuals attribute responsibility for events, to develop predictions for how facets of organizational crime affect attributions of responsibility and recommended sentences. I test my predictions with vignette experiments administered through an online survey to three different groups: students at a community college in the South, students at a large southern university, and Amazon Mechanical Turkers.

The substantive chapters of this dissertation, chapters 2, 3, and 4, are organized as three separate and complete studies. Since each study includes a literature review, explanation of its theoretical framework and derivation of hypotheses, and a description of methods, analyses, and findings, I do not explain each study in great detail in this introduction. Although each study

examines criminal perceptions and punishment, each study considers different research questions. Chapters 2 and 3 extend and improve on some of my previous work using similar experimental designs and the same theoretical framework. Both chapters 2 and 3 use the same set of vignettes and both use affect control theory; however, each chapter has a different sample and different sets of analyses, including different predictor variables. Chapter 4 uses a different set of experimental vignettes than chapters 2 and 3, and a different theoretical framework, sample of research participants, and analyses that test other experimental conditions on different outcome variables. Below, I describe each of the substantive chapters and the final concluding chapter in more detail.

Dissertation Overview

Chapter 2 extends and improves on recent research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) and addresses gaps in past research by examining how three factors affect recommended punishment: an offender's occupational status, the word used to describe the offender's crime, and an offender's gender. Although we know that offenders' socio-demographic and socio-economic attributes affect sentencing outcomes, the effect of an offender's occupational prestige is unknown. Research focusing on punitive attitudes and sentencing outcomes that compares different crime types also compares unequal crimes and shows mixed results; thus, the effects of crime type and crime description on punitive attitudes and sentencing are unclear. Additionally, although research consistently shows that female offenders are treated more leniently than male offenders when they commit street crimes, it is unclear if this effect persists for occupational crimes. Sentencing theories suggest that offender attributes differentially affect sentencing outcomes through stereotyped traits of offenders connected to perceptions of an offender's criminality, yet these theories do not explain how all offender attributes should affect criminal

perceptions and sentencing. Therefore, I examine these relationships and address gaps in previous research by using a vignette experiment that varies the offender's occupation, the description of the crime, and the offender's gender. Following recent research mentioned above, I use affect control theory to generate theoretical predictions; however, going beyond this previous research: I examine a greater number of occupations with more varied status categories, compare two non-violent crimes (rather than comparing a violent crime to a non-violent crime), use a larger and more diverse research sample, use two measures of punitiveness, and examine processes across two different institutions.

Chapter 3 further examines how an offender's occupational status affects sentencing outcomes. Like chapter 2, this study uses experimental methods and affect control theory. This chapter also improves and extends on recent research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018), which tested theoretical predictions for how combined negative and powerful post-crime impressions of occupational offenders increase perceptions of criminality and, in turn, recommended sentencing. In this chapter, though, I improve and extend on previous research by examining the independent and mediating effects of negative and powerful post-crime impressions of occupational offenders to determine which perceptual factors mediate the relationship between an offender's occupational status and recommended punishment. I also operationalize occupational status by using a more precise measure of occupational status than past research, and I also operationalize post-crime offender negativity and potency using the conceptually similar measures of status and power from other group processes work. Although this chapter uses the same experimental vignettes from chapter 2, it uses a different sample of participants, and it also includes a different focal independent variable and mediating variables and analyses not included in chapter 2.

Using a different set of vignettes than chapters 2 and 3, chapter 4 examines how two facets of organizational offending, an offender's social role and the description of an offender's offense as either following or departing from standard operating procedures, affect both attributions of responsibility and recommended punishment for a financial crime. We know from past research that an offender's social role in an offense (i.e., if they offend on their own, by following the direction of others, or in a context in which their peers are also offending) affects how observers attribute responsibility for offenses. And, we know that describing an offense as one that is either typical or atypical in a particular organizational setting and situation (i.e., an offense that occurs while either following standard operating procedures of an organization or offending against standard operating procedures) affects responsibility attributions. However, past research in this area fails to connect responsibility attributions to recommended punishment outcomes, uses inconsistent measures of responsibility across studies, examines non-representative workplace crimes in vignettes, and fails to examine how organizational facets of offending affect punishment. Previous studies have also failed to determine if or how responsibility attributions mediate the relationship between organizational facets of offending and punishment. To address these gaps and improve on weaknesses in past research, I draw on and partially test a proposed model that integrates sociological and psychological approaches to understanding how responsibility attributions are made to offenders in organizational settings (Gailey and Lee 2005a). I also measure responsibility as a multi-dimensional concept, and I examine how responsibility attributions are made to offenders who commit financial crimes in the financial services industry.

Finally, chapter 5 summarizes in textual and tabular form the findings from chapters 2, 3, and 4 and briefly discusses the overall significance and implications of these results.

Chapter 2: Criminal Sentiments and Occupational Crime: How Occupation, Crime Description, and Offender Gender Affect Punitive Attitudes

Research consistently finds that offender attributes (e.g., race, gender, and age) differentially affect sentencing outcomes for the same or similar crimes (e.g., Albonetti 1997; Bontrager, Bales, and Chiricos 2005; Brennan 2006; Bridges and Steen 1998; Demuth and Steffensmeier 2004; Johnson 2003, 2005; Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer 2008; Kramer and Steffensmeier 1993; Kramer and Ulmer 2002; Spohn and Holleran 2000; Steen, Engen, and Gainey 2005; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Warren, Chiricos, and Bales 2012; Wooldredge 2010); however, this research does not explain the effect of all case attributes or how case attributes affect sentencing outcomes for white-collar crime. For instance, the effect of occupational status (Holtfreter 2013; Payne, Dabney, and Ekhomu 2011; Tillman and Pontell 1992) and gender (Gottschalk and Rundmo 2014; Holtfreter 2013; Van Slyke and Bales 2013) on sentencing outcomes for white-collar crime is unclear. Moreover, research on sentencing and punitive attitudes either focuses on street crime, compares unequal crimes, or presents mixed results for the effect of crime type on punitive attitudes and sentencing outcomes. Thus, it is unclear if differences in punitive attitudes and sentencing across crime types exist because of differences in how people think and feel about these crimes, or because of differences in the specific crimes being compared, and it is unclear if attitudes differ and sentencing disparities exist when differences in crime description are controlled.

Therefore, I use a vignette experiment that allows me to test the independent and joint effects of occupational status, offender gender, and crime description on participant recommended sentencing outcomes for occupational crime. I draw on and extend previous work (Kroska and Schmidt 2018), but I go beyond this work by: 1) testing a larger number of occupations with a more diverse range of status categories; 2) contrasting a white-collar crime

word (overcharge) with a non-violent (rather than a violent) street crime word (steal from); 3) using a larger and more demographically diverse sample; 4) utilizing two measures of punitiveness; and 5) examining these processes across two different institutions (health care and financial services).

Occupational Status and Sentencing

As other research notes, the effect of occupational status on sentencing outcomes is mixed. Some research shows that high occupational status decreases punishment, for instance, research finds that auto thieves are punished more harshly than physicians who commit Medicare fraud (Tillman and Pontell 1992). Conversely, other research shows the opposite, that occupational status increases punishment, for example, that high occupational status health care professionals are given harsher sentences than lower level health care professionals (Payne et al. 2011). Still other research shows that occupational status has no effect on sentencing outcomes. For instance, research finds no effect for manager status or education on incarceration or sentence length for white-collar offenders (Holtfreter 2013).

The mixed findings on occupational status and sentencing may be due to a number of factors. Studies have used different definitions of occupational crime and different conceptions of offender status, which creates unequal comparisons across studies. Many studies on occupation and sentencing are also methodologically limited by the use of archival court data. Archival court datasets do not have controls for all of the factors that distinguish high status offenders from low status offenders; thus, the statistical models in these studies cannot establish non-spuriousness between an offender's SES or occupational status and sentencing. Establishing non-spuriousness is crucial to understanding the effect of occupational status on sentencing, because an offender's occupational status may be tied to other factors that impact sentencing. For

instance, high occupational status and high SES offenders are more likely than lower status offenders to be able to afford better legal representation, to better understand the legal process, and to gain the empathy of judges and other criminal justice officials that are from similar social backgrounds (Shapiro 1990). I address these methodological weaknesses by utilizing a vignette experiment that allows me to isolate the effect of occupational status and thereby establish non-spuriousness.

Although overall findings are mixed, recent research shows that high occupational status increases recommended punishment (Kroska and Schmidt 2018). This research finds that white-collar offenders (executives and physicians) are recommended a greater prison sentence by research participants than lower status blue- or pink-collar offenders (handymen and shop clerks) when they commit the same crime (Kroska and Schmidt 2018). This research uses a vignette experiment and is able to control for differences between types of offenders and offenses. Findings from this research suggest that high occupational status increases recommended punishment for occupational crimes. I extend this research by testing a larger number of occupations with a more diverse status range (accountant, CEO, doctor, nurse, and receptionist) across two institutions (health care and financial services) and use two measures of punitiveness (a prison sentence and a monetary fine).

Crime Description and Sentencing: Occupational Crime vs. Street Crime

Studies that compare occupational crime to street crime mostly compare unequal crimes and this research shows mixed results. For instance, research shows: no difference in punitiveness by crime type when comparing fraud and robbery (Schoepfer, Carmichael and Piquero 2007); that Ponzi schemes are viewed as more serious than auto theft, burglary, and prostitution, and that respondents indicate that Ponzi scheme offenders should be punished with a

prison or jail sentence compared to a monetary fine or probation (Dodge, Bosick and Van Antwerp 2013); and still other research shows that violent street crimes are perceived of as more serious and assigned harsher prison sentences by research participants than harmful white-collar crimes (Michel 2016).

Studies that compare crime types may also confound the effect of crime type with crime description or other crime attributes, especially, as noted by other researchers (e.g., see Michel 2016), when comparing crimes that result in different types of harm to victims. For instance, the 2005 and 2010 National Public Survey on White-collar Crime, one of the primary studies on differences in attitudes that compares white-collar crimes to street crimes, asks respondents to compare a baseline crime of a person stealing a car worth $10,000 to: embezzlement, illegal toxic waste disposal, misrepresentation of pharmaceutical drug testing, selling private health care information, selling nuclear secrets and classified information, manipulating financial markets, and other large scale and serious crimes with wide-scale victimization and societal-level damage (Huff, Desilets and Kane 2010; Kane and Wall 2006). Questions then ask respondents about perceptions of comparative seriousness for these crimes. This research finds that all white-collar crimes when compared to the baseline scenario are rated as more serious by participants, and researchers conclude that most white-collar crimes are perceived of as more serious than street crimes and more serious than how they were perceived of than in the past. However, when researchers later group all crimes asked about in the survey by crime type (i.e., white-collar crime vs. street crime), on average white-collar crimes are only rated as slightly more serious than the other street crimes (burglary, assault, and robbery) asked about in the survey (a difference of .08 for the 2005 and .02 for the 2010 survey), and researchers do not report if this is a significant difference (i.e., all they report is mean scores). It is difficult to draw conclusions

from this research, because differences in the magnitude, severity, type of victimization, and the reach of these crimes, and differences in how these crimes are described may confound the effect of crime type with crime description or other crime attributes. Thus, the effect of crime type and crime description on criminal perceptions, punitive attitudes, and punishment is unclear.

However, research using experimental methods that can control for description differences by crime type finds that offenses which are described using a word associated with street crime (rob) are punished more harshly than offenses described with a word associated with white-collar crime (overcharge) (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) even though the crimes, other than the verb used to describe them, are exactly the same. The current experimental design follows that of Kroska and Schmidt (2018) but uses the words "steal from" rather than "rob" while holding constant all other relevant crime attributes. Thus, I improve upon this research by using a word associated with non-violent street crime, which allows me to eliminate the possibility that participant punitive attitudes are, at least in part, driven by exposure to a violent crime. Moreover, by controlling for description differences I also address weakness in previous studies that compare unequal crimes. Overcharging describes a type of billing or business scheme fraud associated with white-collar crime and stealing describes larceny/theft which is associated with street crime (USDOJ 2017). This research also helps to disentangle perceptions of the criminal from perceptions of the crime by crossing the type of crime with offender's status.

Gender and Sentencing

Considerable research shows that females are sentenced more leniently than males for the same crime (Albonetti 1997; Spohn and Beichnner 2000; Spohn et al. 1985; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2006; Steffensmeier et al. 1993, 1995, 1998). For instance, research controlling for offense seriousness, prior criminal record, offender race, offender employment, and other

offender and offense characteristics finds that females in Kansas City, Chicago, and Miami all receive more lenient treatment than comparable male offenders (Spohn and Beichnner 2000). Likewise, other research shows lenient punishment for females, finding that offender gender even has a greater effect on sentencing outcomes than race (Steffensmeir and Demuth 2006). However, in part, because white-collar offenders are more likely to be male (Benson and Gottschalk 2015; Daly 1989; Wheeler et al. 1988), although arrest rates show this gap has narrowed over time (Heimer 2000; Steffensmeir 1993) and that gender varies by type of white-collar crime (Holtfreter 2005), only limited white-collar crime research controls for offender gender, and this research shows mixed results. Thus, it is not clear from this research if female white-collar offenders, like female street offenders, are treated more leniently than male offenders.

Early white-collar crime research, using sentencing data, found that female offenders were less likely than males to be incarcerated for an offense but no effect for gender on the length of imprisonment (Wheeler, Weisburd and Bode 1982). Although analyses in this research controlled for offender SES, criminal background, and role in the offense, they did not control for offender occupational status. Other research used this data to look at characteristics of white-collar offenders and found that females in the sample were lower status offenders (e.g., clerical workers), while most of the males in the sample were higher level offenders (e.g., managers or administrators) (Daly 1989). These findings suggest that offenders may have not had access to commit similar crimes and that their actions may have been viewed differently by their occupational status, which possibly explains the lack of significant findings for gender on length of imprisonment.

More recent research presents mixed results. Recent research on women's roles in fraud cases finds no effect for gender on the decision to incarcerate offenders or on sentence length (Holtfreter 2013). However, conclusions from this study are somewhat limited by measurement validity and recall bias issues, as it is based on a survey that asked fraud investigators to recall and report on past cases from memory. Similarly, other recent research shows no effect for offender gender on sentence length (Gottschalk and Rundmo 2014), but the findings from this research may not be generalizable, as they are based on a small sample of Norwegian offenders. Research using Florida sentencing guideline data from 1994 to 2004, though, does find that female offenders are punished more leniently than male offenders regardless of crime type, and that female street offenders receive the most lenient sentencing (Van Slyke and Bales 2013). This research suggests that the lenient sentencing found for female offenders who commit street crime extends to white-collar crimes, but that female street offenders are still punished less harshly than female white-collar offenders. I am able to control for occupational differences between offenders and differences in crime description and, in doing so, provide a more thorough test of the role of offender gender on sentencing outcomes. Thus, to address the mixed findings from current research and the lack of studies overall, I vary offender gender across vignettes.

Theories on Sentencing

As outlined in previous research, the two main theories of sentencing, the focal concerns perspective and the uncertainty avoidance perspective, do not provide clarity on how occupational status affects sentencing outcomes. These theories only clearly explain how more well studied extra-legal factors, such as race, gender, and age affect sentencing outcomes. Extra-legal factors like race are more closely linked to stereotyped perceptions of criminality and

dangerousness, and, according to these theories, judges rely on these perceptions, in part, to come to sentencing recommendations (Albonetti 1991; Steffensmeier et al.1998). Empirical research supports this link between stereotyped perceptions of criminality and sentencing for race, age, and gender, finding that offenders who are young, black or Hispanic, and male are consistently given heavier sentences than offenders who are older, white, and female (Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Warren et al. 2012). However, it is not clear from these theories how occupation should affect sentencing, as occupation is not clearly linked to stereotyped perceptions of criminality. I address the aforementioned theoretical issues by using a theory that is more suited to explain impression formation processes, affect control theory (ACT).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Affect Control Theory

ACT (Heise 1979, 2007; MacKinnon 1994; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988) explains the impression formation processes that underlie social interactions using a series of empirically derived impression formation equations. ACT holds that all social concepts have affective meanings tied to them and that these affective meanings influence how social interactions develop and are understood by both actors and observers. The affective meanings of social concepts vary along the three universal dimensions of meaning identified by Osgood, May, and Miron (1975) in their cross-cultural research: evaluation, potency, and activity (EPA). Evaluation represents how good or bad a social concept is, potency how powerful or powerless a concept is, and activity how lively or inactive a social concept is. EPA profiles have been collected by ACT researchers across several cultures using semantic differential scales that range from -4.3 to 4.3. These profiles are compiled in dictionaries.

In ACT, fundamental sentiments are culturally-held sentiments for how social actors or observers normally feel about behaviors, objects, or other actors (Heise 1979, 2007). Transient impressions are the momentary impressions of event elements evoked after viewing a situation. ACT's central proposition is that individuals attempt to match their transient impressions to fundamental sentiments of events; when fundamental sentiments do not match transient impressions, deflection occurs. High deflection indicates that an event seems unlikely or odd, while low deflection scores indicate that an event seems likely or reasonable. Individuals can reduce deflection by constructing or cognitively reconstructing the elements of social interactions, such that their preexisting sentiments match their transient impressions of elements in the interaction.

ACT's impression formation equations are accessible through its computer program, *Interact*, which allows researchers to simulate social interactions (Heise 1995). Using *Interact,* I can simulate social interactions and quantify changes in impressions of event elements from fundamental sentiments, and I can predict future actions and processes that actors and observers use to make sense of an event. For instance, individuals see a physician as quite good (2.42), quite powerful (2.38), and neutral on activity (-0.15) (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2016)[1]. When a physician (2.42, 2.38, -0.15) does something that is expected of him or her, like giving medical treatment (3.08, 2.80, 1.57) to a client (1.39, 1.27, 0.92), deflection is low (3.33) and transient impressions of the physician are similar to fundamental sentiments.

[1] EPA profiles used are taken from the 2015 Georgia combined gender dictionary (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2016) unless noted otherwise. EPA profile ratings are quantified as follows: -4.3 is infinitely bad/powerless/inactive; -3.0 is extremely bad/powerless/inactive; -2.0 is quite bad/powerless/inactive; -1.00 is slightly bad/powerless/inactive; 0 is neutral, neither bad nor good/powerless nor powerful/inactive or active; +1.00 is slightly good/powerful/active; +2 is quite good/powerful/active; +3.0 is extremely good/powerful/active; and, +4.3 is infinitely good/powerful/active (Heise 2007).

However, when a physician does something unexpected, like brawls with (-2.04, 0.70, 2.74) a client (1.39, 1.27, 0.92), deflection is high (15.59), and transient impressions of the physician are slightly bad (-0.58), quite potent (1.76), and slightly active (1.09). The decrease in evaluation for a physician who brawls with a client is an expected impression formation effect given that a good and powerful actor is doing a bad thing to a slightly good object (client evaluation = 1.39). However, when a more criminalistic actor, such as a loan shark (-1.72, 1.82, 0.49), brawls with a client, deflection (4.56) is lower. Transient impressions show that a loan shark who brawls with a client is evaluated only slightly more negatively than normally (-1.87 compared to -1.72) and is seen as slightly less potent (1.51 compared to 1.82) but more active (1.27 compared to 0.49). The larger deflection score for the physician who brawls with a client and the differences between pre-event fundamental sentiments and transient impressions shows how elements of events can shape actor and observer impressions of these events.

The results from *Interact* in the simulations above illustrate ACT's main proposition: that individuals will construct and reconstruct elements of events so that they align with fundamental sentiments. For instance, ACT predicts that after witnessing a physician steal from a client, the client should be relabeled as someone who is slightly bad (-1.42), slightly potent (0.75), and slightly active (1.09), such as a rival. Transient impressions of the physician also show a large decrease in evaluation (-1.33 compared to 2.42), a decrease in potency (1.97 compared to 2.38), and an increase in activity (0.42 compared to -0.15). ACT predicts an action that is extremely good, quite potent, and slightly active, because an action with that EPA profile should help the physician regain some of the positive evaluation lost after stealing from a client. Similarly, ACT predicts that observers will relabel the client whom the physician stole from as evaluatively

much worse than the client's fundamental evaluation, because labeling a client in this way would make the action of the physician seem more reasonable or believable.

I draw on *Interact* simulations, like those above, to develop hypotheses for how occupational identities, offender gender, and the words used to describe a crime are likely to impact impression formation and, in turn, sentencing recommendations. I expect that the transient evaluation and potency impressions of the occupational identities, offender gender, and the word used to describe the actors' behaviors to mediate the relationship between the three manipulated elements of the event (offender's occupational identity, offender gender, and the crime word) and the recommended sentence. In testing the effect of occupation, offender gender, and crime word on sentencing recommendations, I draw on previous work that uses transient impressions of evaluation and potency to quantify criminal sentiments (Kroska, Lee and Carr 2017a, 2017b; Kroska and Schmidt 2018). Kroska and Schmidt (2018), for instance, find that transient impressions of evaluation and potency for occupational identities and crime behaviors (criminality scores) predict the recommended prison sentences that research participants assign to offenders. Thus, based on predictions from ACT and previous work, I expect high transient impressions of actor and behavior negativity and power (i.e., criminality scores or criminal sentiments) to increase the recommended punishment assigned by participants. Further, this hypothesis, and the use of criminal sentiments, as noted in previous work (Kroska, Lee and Carr 2017a, 2017b; Kroska and Schmidt 2018), is based on the observance that the most outwardly criminalistic identities and behaviors from the *Interact* dictionary are also those that are consistently highly negatively evaluated and highly potent. For instance, a rapist is considered infinitely bad (-3.95) and quite potent (1.69), while murdering someone is considered infinitely bad (-4.15) and quite powerful (2.41).

Hypotheses

ACT Impression Formation: Occupational Status, Crime Word, and Offender Gender Hypotheses

I expect that occupational status, crime word, and gender will affect recommended sentencing through their effect on the transient evaluation and transient potency impressions of the actor in vignettes and his or her behavior (criminal sentiments). I use *Interact* simulations to develop hypotheses for how these case attributes affect impression formation processes and, resultantly, recommended punishment.

[Table 2.1 here]

Occupational Status Hypotheses

Transient evaluation and transient potency of the occupational actors. Table 2.1 shows the transient impressions of the occupational identities of the actors used in the vignettes for Study 1. As seen in Table 2.1, the occupations in the vignette can be ranked based on cumulative transient evaluation and potency scores (criminality scores) (Kroska et al. 2017b; Kroska and Schmidt 2018), the two dimensions from ACT that I expect will affect impressions of criminality and sentencing. Following previous work (Kroska et al. 2017b; Kroska and Schmidt 2018), I create criminality scores by reversing transient impressions of evaluation and summing them with transient impressions of potency (i.e., occupational actor criminality score = (-1 x transient actor evaluation) + transient actor potency), with higher cumulative evaluation and potency scores predicting greater criminal sentiments and recommended sentencing for offenders. I show individual rankings for criminal sentiments of occupations in tables, but I group similar occupations together in later analyses, so I also present averages in Table 2.1.

Criminality scores show that the occupations used in the vignettes can be ranked in the following order, with higher scores indicating a greater criminal perception and predicted

recommended punishment: 1) CEO 2) doctor 3) accountant 4) nurse, and 5) receptionist. According to ACT, negatively evaluated behaviors decrease transient evaluation impressions of the actor and increase transient potency impressions (Heise 2007). The results from *Interact* in Table 2.1 suggest that the crimes of higher status offenders appear more powerful than the crimes of the lower status offenders, and the results show that evaluation differences between occupational statuses are greatly reduced. Thus, I expect that the higher transient potency impressions of higher occupational status offenders and the lower transient evaluative impressions, will result in high occupational status offenders' offenses being viewed as criminally worse than lower occupational status offenders, and that these high criminal sentiments will increase the recommended punishment that research participants assign to high occupational status offenders:

> *Occupational status recommended prison sentence hypothesis*: Participants will recommend a greater prison sentence to high status offenders than they do to medium status offenders, and they will recommend a greater prison sentence to medium status offenders than they do to lower status offenders (i.e., CEO and doctor > accountant and nurse > receptionists).
>
> *Occupational status recommended monetary fine hypothesis*: Participants will recommend a greater monetary fine to high status offenders than they do to medium status offenders, and they will recommend a greater monetary fine to medium status offenders than they do to lower status offenders (i.e., CEO and doctor > accountant and nurse > receptionists).

[Table 2.2 here]

Crime Word Hypotheses

Transient evaluation and transient potency of the occupational actors' behaviors. Criminality scores for crime words are calculated in the same way as described for occupational actors above (i.e., behavior criminality score = (-1 x transient behavior evaluation) + transient behavior potency). Table 2.2 shows, regardless of who commits the offense, that stealing from a client is evaluated more negatively and considered more powerful than overcharging a client.

Thus, criminal perceptions are greater for offenders described as stealing from clients than offenders described as overcharging clients, and these offenders should receive greater recommended punishment:

> *Crime word recommended prison sentence hypothesis*: Participants will recommend a greater prison sentence for offenders who are described as "stealing from" rather than "overcharging" their clients.
>
> *Crime word recommended monetary fine hypothesis*: Participants will recommend a greater monetary fine for offenders who are described as "stealing from" rather than "overcharging" their clients.

Gender Hypotheses

[Table 2.3 here]

Transient evaluation and transient potency of the occupational offenders' gender. Table 2.3 shows transient impressions for the different occupational actors used in the vignettes by gender of the actor. I use gender as a modifier, amalgamating it with occupational identities in *Interact*, so that I can test the predicted effect of gender on sentencing outcomes. Again, criminality scores are calculated in the same manner as described above (i.e., gendered actor criminality = (-1 x transient gendered actor evaluation) + transient gendered actor potency). As seen in Table 2.3, for every occupation and crime, criminal sentiments are greater for male offenders than female offenders. Together, these simulation results suggest that male offenders will be assigned a greater sentence than female offenders:

> *Offender gender recommended prison sentence hypothesis*: Participants will recommend a greater prison sentence to male offenders than female offenders.
>
> *Offender gender recommended monetary fine hypothesis*: Participants will recommend a greater monetary fine to male offenders than female offenders.

Methods

Sample

I collected data from three samples during the fall of 2017: (1) a sample of college students at a large southern university, (2) a sample of college students at a southern community college, and (3) a sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk) users. University student participation was incentivized by offering participants the opportunity to be included in a lottery drawing for one of nine twenty-five-dollar Amazon gift cards. Community college student participation was incentivized by offering class credit or extra credit to subjects for their participation. Mturk is an online service provided by Amazon that recruits users to fill out surveys for pay, and Mturk users were paid one dollar each for their participation. By including Mturk participants, this research improves on previous mock juror studies that utilize only student samples. Further, research shows the high-quality nature of Mturk data and suggests that including crowdsourced samples, like Mturk, increases the generalizability of findings (Shank 2016; Weinberg, Freese and McElhattan 2014). This mock juror sample provides for a greater understanding of punitive attitudes and criminal perceptions, even though in the real world, judges, and not jurors, decide on sentencing outcomes.

Experimental design

I utilize a vignette experiment with two 3 x 2 x 2 designs that vary the occupation (accountant, CEO, doctor, nurse, and receptionist) and gender (male or female) of the actor in the vignette and the word used to describe the crime (overcharge or steal from) across two different institutions (health care and financial services).

[Figure 2.1 here]

The health care vignette describes a male or female doctor, nurse, or receptionist who works at a senior retirement community, while the financial services vignette describes a male or

female CEO, accountant, or receptionist who works at a financial planning and investments firm. The occupations were chosen because they are common occupations with which participants should be familiar. The vignettes explicitly tell the participants the age (35) and race (white) of the offender, and the names of the characters used in the vignette, Todd or Emily, are two of the most common names given to white boys and girls born between 1974 and 1979 (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004), close to the time the vignette character would have been born. The full vignettes are as follows:

> *Financial services vignette*: **Emily Smith/Todd Smith** is a thirty-five-year-old white **female/male receptionist/accountant/CEO** who has worked at a small private financial planning and investments firm for the last twelve years. The firm works with clients to develop financial plans for their future, including estate planning, retirement planning, insurance dealings, and portfolio investing. **Emily/Todd** is well liked by clients of the firm, and is also one of the longest tenured and most trusted workers at the facility, even being given access to all of the organization's billing systems. **Emily/Todd** is also seen by many clients and those in **her/his** company as someone who is meticulous and careful in **her/his** work, so **she/he** knows that **her/his** work will only be checked if a major issue arises and that neither the firm nor **her/his** clients are likely to question **her/his** work, because clients usually have many investments, and the firm processes too many transactions to check on prices of all investments and services sold. For the last eight years **Emily/Todd** has been able to **steal from/overcharge** clients by providing inflated costs on investments and by adding extra fees for services to clients' accounts. **Emily/Todd** has been able to personally profit about $100,000 over an eight-year period. As a consequence, clients suffer financial losses, though each loses no more than $200 dollars. The firm does not suffer as a direct result of **Emily's/Todd's** actions as increases in fees cover the losses.
>
> *Health care vignette:* **Emily Smith/Todd Smith** is a thirty-five-year-old white **female/male receptionist/nurse/doctor** who has worked at a small private senior retirement community for the last twelve years. The retirement community offers both independent and assisted living accommodations for residents and also makes available medical services to residents. **Emily/Todd** is well liked by residents in the community, and is also one of the longest tenured and most trusted workers at the facility, even being given access to all of the organization's billing systems. **Emily/Todd** is also seen by many in the retirement community as an advocate for residents, and many residents have entrusted **her/him** with access to their private health care and financial information. **Emily/Todd** knows that **her/his** work will only be checked if a major issue arises and that neither residents nor insurers are likely to question **her/his** work, because residents receive a lot of medical paperwork, and insurers process too many claims to check if all the claims are legitimate. For the last eight years **Emily/Todd** has been able to **steal**

> **from/overcharge** residents and insurers by adding extra fees and services to residents' bills and by charging these false claims to insurers. **Emily/Todd** has been able to personally profit about $100,000 over an eight-year period. As a consequence, residents suffer financial losses, though each loses no more than $200. Insurance companies lose money from false claims, but yearly premium increases cover those losses.

Condition Variables

Medium status (nurse and accountant) and *low status* (receptionists) are dummy variables for the offender's occupation that participants were exposed to in vignettes, and *high status* (CEO and doctor), is the omitted category. *Overcharge* is a dummy variable for the crime word that participants were exposed to, with *steal from* being the omitted category. *Female offender* is a dummy variable for the gender of the offender in vignettes, with male offender as the omitted category.

Dependent Variables

Prison sentence is the recommended prison sentence that participants assign to the offender in the vignette. Participants were asked what sentence they would recommend if Emily/Todd were to be punished with a prison sentence and only a prison sentence. Responses were arranged on a slider scale with "No prison" on the left and "25" on the right as anchor points. The title above the slider scale was "Prison Sentence in Years," and there were tick marks above the scale at five-year intervals, but participants were also able to drag the slider to select an exact amount of years, which was displayed to the right of the scale.

Monetary fine is the recommended monetary fine that participants assign to the offender in the vignette. Participants were asked how large a fine they would recommend if Emily/Todd were to be punished with a fine and only a fine. Respondents used a slider scale with "No fine" on the left and "$1,000,000" on the right as anchor points. Responses to monetary fine were divided by ten thousand to create a scale that ranges from zero to one hundred.

Skewness and kurtosis tests indicate that recommended prison sentence and recommended monetary fine are non-normally distributed. However, graphing residual results from ordinary least squares regression (OLS) shows that prison sentence and monetary fine are only slightly non-normally distributed, and alternative methods of analysis and dependent variable transformations were explored. Variable transformations did not make the distribution completely normal and make the results less easily interpretable and meaningful (i.e., analyses suggest using a square root transformation that does not produce a meaningful or logical metric for measuring punishment recommendations). Ordered logistic regression (OLR) residual results show the most normal distribution, but since the OLR results are the same as OLS, and OLS allows me to retain the use of continuous dependent variables, I use OLS. Table 2.4 below presents the descriptive statistics for all variables included in analyses.

[Table 2.4 here]

Control variables

Medical vignette is a dummy variable that controls for differences between the two sets of vignettes, the medical vignette and the financial services vignette.

Appropriate legal punishment control variables. Community service, *monetary fine*, *probation*, and *imprisonment* are dummy variables for the type of punishment that participants indicate is the most appropriate legal response to the crime they read in the vignette. Participants were instructed to choose all that apply.

Controls for participant attributes. Female and *gender non-conforming* control for the gender of participants, with *male* omitted. *Student* is a dummy variable that is used to control for differences between *Mturk* users and student participants. The two student samples were

combined, because substantive differences were not found between the university and community college samples.

[Tables 2.5 and 2.6 here]

RESULTS

Occupation and Recommended Punishment

Table 2.5 shows the OLS regression results for the effect of all variables on recommended prison sentence, and Table 2.6 shows the OLS regression results for the effect of all variables on recommend monetary fine. Consistent with the ACT-derived occupational status recommended prison sentence and recommended monetary fine hypotheses, occupational status increases the recommended punishment participants assign to offenders.

As seen in Model 1 of Table 2.5, both of the groupings of medium and low status occupations, nurse and accountant (b = -0.571, se = 0.269, p = 0.034) and receptionists (b = -0.543, se = 0.270, p = 0.044), receive significantly lighter recommended prison sentences than those in the higher occupational status category (CEO and doctor). The same results can be found for monetary fine in Model 1 of Table 2.6, with nurse and accountant (b = -9.267, se = 1.633, p = 0.000) and receptionists (b = -8.437, se = 1.640, p = 0.000) recommended significantly lighter monetary fines than CEOs and doctors. The coefficients for occupational status remain negative and significant as participant demographic attributes and appropriate legal punishment variables are added (Model 2) but drop to non-significance for recommended prison sentence once interactions between offender occupation and offender gender are added in Model 3.

As seen in Model 3 of Table 2.5, the effect of occupational status on recommended sentence does differ by the gender of the offender but only for the lowest status occupation, and

the interaction just reaches the cut off for significance ($p = 0.045$). The difference in slopes is significant ($b = -1.011$, $se = 0.503$, $p = 0.045$), and as seen in figure 2.2 (below) the slope for female offenders is much steeper ($b = -1.159$, $se = 0.353$, $p = 0.001$) than the slope for male offenders ($b = -0.148$, $se = 0.357$, $p = 0.679$). I also examine the effect of occupational status on recommended monetary fine by gender of the offender, but neither of these interactions reach significance, and the main effect of occupation on monetary fine, as seen in Model 3 of Table 2.6, remains highly significant ($p<0.001$) for both groupings of occupations. I also explore the interaction between occupation and crime word (not shown), but none of the coefficients ever reach significance for either recommended prison sentence or monetary fine.

Thus, results in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 provide evidence to support ACT predictions on occupation and suggest that occupational status does affect sentencing outcomes but not in the exact ordering of individual occupations as predicted by criminal sentiments from ACT.

[Figure 2.2 here]

Crime Word and Recommended Punishment

As predicted by the ACT crime word hypotheses, participants recommend a greater prison sentence for offenders who are described as stealing from rather than overcharging their clients. Table 2.5 shows that this effect holds across all models. However, Table 2.6 shows that crime word is not a significant predictor of recommended monetary fine, as the crime word coefficient never reaches significance. Crime word is negatively related to monetary fine in Model 1, but once participant demographics and participants' selection of the appropriate legal punishment are controlled for in Model 2, this relationship becomes positive. These results suggest that describing a crime with a word associated with white-collar crime reduces the

recommended prison sentence participants assign to offenders but not the recommended monetary fine.

Gender and Recommended Punishment

Consistent with the ACT offender gender hypotheses, participants recommend greater punishments for male offenders than they do for female offenders. Models 1 and 2 in Table 2.5 and Models 1-3 in Table 2.6 all show that participants recommend a significantly lighter prison sentence and monetary fine for female offenders than male offenders. I also explore the relationship between offender gender and crime word to determine if the effect of gender on recommended punishment varies by type of crime, but interactions between offender gender and crime word never reach significance (not shown).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Past research does not clearly show how occupation, crime description, and offender gender affect recommended punishment outcomes for white-collar crime. Further, the theories designed to explain differential sentencing outcomes, the focal concerns perspective and the uncertainty avoidance perspective, only offer predictions for how attributes that are more clearly linked to perceptions of offender criminality and dangerousness are likely to affect sentencing outcomes. I addressed these literature gaps and build on previous work (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) by using a vignette experiment to test the effect of occupational status, offender gender, and crime description on recommended punishment outcomes for occupational offenses. I go beyond previous work by: including a greater range of occupations, using a non-violent street crime, utilizing a more expansive sample, including two measures of punitiveness, and by examining these processes across two different institutions.

To develop my predictions, I drew on affect control theory. ACT explains the impression formation processes that underlie criminal perceptions. Moreover, this theory of group processes is more suited than theories from the sentencing literature to explain how all offender and case attributes are likely to affect crime perceptions and punishment outcomes, and findings from this research provide further support for the application of ACT to the study of crime.

Results provide support for ACT-derived predictions that high occupational status increases recommended sentencing. These findings are also consistent with other work that finds that occupational status increases recommended prison sentences for white-collar offenders (Kroska and Schmidt 2018). Further, my results hold across a wide range of occupational statuses, two different institutions, and two different measures of punitiveness. Thus, the current research suggests that high status occupational offenders do not benefit from their high occupational status in the sentencing process and, additionally, that they may even suffer a greater punishment penalty because of their high occupational status. This finding is interesting given the advantages that high occupational status and high SES offenders are likely to benefit from in the criminal justice system and legal processes (Shapiro 1990), especially given the fact that white-collar offenders are less likely to be caught and prosecuted for their crimes in the first place, and that they are more likely to settle out of court or agree to a plea bargain before going to trial (e.g., see Huff, Desilets and Kane 2010; Simpson 2013). This finding suggests that participants either are more upset, worried, or offended by the crimes of high-status offenders and, as a result, assign them harsher punishment. Or, that participants may be aware of the benefits afforded these types of offenders in the legal process and judicial system, and that, because of this, participants assign them heavier punishment. Future work should explore what dimensions of criminal perceptions explain the relationship between occupational status and

punishment and if objective knowledge on crime or media consumption affects punitive attitudes.

Findings for the effect of gender on recommend punishment for occupational offenses also support ACT offender gender predictions, with male offenders receiving a significantly harsher recommended punishment than females. These findings are also in line with findings from the sentencing literature more generally, which finds that males are more likely to receive harsher punishments than females (Albonetti 1997; Spohn and Beichnner 2000; Spohn, Welch and Gruhl 1985; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2006; Steffensmeier, Kramer and Ulmer 1995; Steffensmeier, Kramer and Streifel 1993; Steffensmeier, Ulmer and Kramer 1998) and limited findings that show more lenient treatment for female white-collar offenders (Van Slyke and Bales 2013). This finding is important though, given the overall lack of studies on female white-collar offenders and the insignificant findings on gender in recent research on white-collar offending (Gottschalk and Rundmo 2014; Holtfreter 2013).

Finally, findings for the effect of crime word on recommended sentencing also confirm ACT predictions that the street crime of theft/larceny results in greater recommended prison sentences assigned by participants than the occupational crime of overcharging clients. These findings also match the findings of Kroska and Schmidt (2018) on offense description and underline the important role that the word used to describe a crime has on crime impressions and, in turn, recommended sentencing outcomes. However, I do not find any effect for crime word on recommended monetary fines. The lack of findings for the effect of crime word on recommended monetary fine was unexpected, especially given the strong findings for crime word on recommended prison sentencing. This result, though, may indicate participants' preferences for punishing occupational offenders with an actual prison sentence rather than just a monetary fine.

Questions asked participants how large of a monetary fine that offenders should receive if they *only* receive a monetary fine and how long of a prison sentence that offenders should receive if they *only* receive a prison sentence. Thus, a monetary fine might be seen as inconsequential to occupational offenders, especially if their crimes result in significant monetary gains, and this finding may be reflective of what other white-collar crime researchers suggest is a current shift to more punitive attitudes concerning white-collar crime (Cullen, Hartman and Jonson 2009).

Limitations and future research

This research was limited in that it only tested five occupations using two different crime words across two different fields of work. Future research in this area should expand its scope by including a greater number of more diverse occupations that differ more significantly on transient impressions of evaluation and potency, and future work should also include crimes other than theft or billing fraud. Further, future work in this area may benefit from the use of ACT-derived deference scores (Freeland and Hoey 2018) in developing predictions for how occupational status considerations impact criminal perceptions. Similarly, more work should be done applying other theories of group processes to the study of crime, as group processes theories are particularly well suited to understanding the underlying processes behind punitive attitudes, perceptions of criminal acts, and how the framing of crime events matter.

Future work should also explore how the cultural context and organizational nature of white-collar offending, as well as offense severity, affects perceptions and punishment outcomes. Finally, future work would also benefit from testing the effect of other offender attributes that are significant in the sentencing literature, like race and age, which have not been examined for occupational crime. Moreover, although this research is an improvement on past studies that

have only used student samples, this research would greatly benefit from a sampling of real-world judges who are tasked with making actual sentencing recommendations.

Tables and Figures for Chapter 2

Figure 2.1 Experimental Vignette Design

	Male		Female	
Financial Vignette	Overcharge	Steal From	Overcharge	Steal from
High status (CEO)	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4
Medium status (Accountant)	Condition 5	Condition 6	Condition 7	Condition 8
Low status (Receptionist)	Condition 9	Condition 10	Condition 11	Condition 12
Health Care Vignette				
High status (Doctor)	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4
Medium status (Nurse)	Condition 5	Condition 6	Condition 7	Condition 8
Low status (Receptionist)	Condition 9	Condition 10	Condition 11	Condition 12


Figure 2.2 Prison Sentence by Gender Occupational Status
Recommended Prison Sentence
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
High
Low
Occupational Status
Male
Female

Figure 2.2

Table 2.1 Fundamental Sentiments, Transient Impressions, and Criminality Scores for Occupational Identities used in Vignettes

	Fundamental Sentiments		Transient Impressions						
			After Overcharging			After Stealing From			
Occupational Identities	E	P	E	P	**Criminality Score**	E	P	**Criminality Score**	**Total Criminality Score**
High Status									
CEO	.98	3.29	-1.17	2.47	**3.64**	-1.64	2.55	**4.19**	**7.83**
Doctor	2.73	2.94	-.69	2.21	**2.90**	-1.26	2.28	**3.54**	**6.44**
Average (CEO and Doctor)**:** Medium Status	1.86	3.12	-.93	2.34	**3.27**	-1.45	2.42	**3.87**	**7.14**
Accountant	1.14	1.32	-1.13	1.35	**2.48**	-1.61	1.41	**3.02**	**5.50**
Nurse	2.86	1.89	-.66	1.70	**2.36**	-1.24	1.76	**3.00**	**5.36**
Average (Accountant and Nurse)**:** Low Status	2.00	1.61	-.90	1.53	**2.42**	-1.43	1.59	**3.01**	**5.43**
Receptionist (health care and financial)	1.29	-.25	-1.09	.56	**1.65**	-1.57	.61	**2.18**	**3.83**

Notes: E is evaluation and P is potency. Evaluation and potency profiles were taken from the Georgia 2015 combined dictionary, client (1.39, 1.27, 0.92) is object (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2016). Calculation of criminality scores: Criminality scores = (-1 x transient evaluation) + transient potency (Kroska et al. 2017b; Kroska and Schmidt 2018).

Table 2.2 Fundamental Sentiments, Transient Impressions, and Criminality Scores for Crime Words used in Vignettes

Crime Word	Fundamental Sentiments	Transient Impressions					**Total Criminality Scores**
		CEO	Doctor	Accountant	Nurse	Receptionist	
Overcharge							
Evaluation	-2.66	-1.84	-1.77	-1.83	-1.77	1.82	
Potency	.89	1.56	1.46	1.24	1.29	.99	
Criminality Scores:		**3.40**	**3.23**	**3.07**	**3.06**	**2.81**	**15.57**
		CEO	Doctor	Accountant	Nurse	Receptionist	
Steal From							
Evaluation	-3.50	-2.40	-2.38	-2.40	-2.38	-2.40	
Potency	.78	1.61	1.49	1.29	1.32	1.03	
Criminality Scores:		**4.01**	**3.87**	**3.69**	**3.70**	**3.43**	**18.70**

Notes: Evaluation and Potency profiles were taken from the Georgia 2015 combined dictionary, client (1.39, 1.27, 0.92) is object (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2016). Calculation of criminality scores: Criminality scores = (-1 x transient evaluation) + transient potency (Kroska et al. 2017b; Kroska and Schmidt 2018).

Table 2.3 Fundamental Sentiments, Transient Impressions, and Criminality Scores for Male and Female Offenders from Vignettes

Occupational Identities	Fundamental Sentiments		Transient Impressions						**Total Criminality Scores**
			After overcharging			After stealing from			
	E	P	E	P	Criminality Scores	E	P	Criminality Scores	
Male									
CEO	1.00	2.36	-1.16	1.97	**3.13**	-1.64	2.04	**3.68**	
Doctor	2.19	2.25	-.84	1.86	**2.70**	-1.38	1.93	**3.31**	
Nurse	2.28	1.68	-.82	1.59	**2.41**	-1.36	1.65	**3.01**	
Accountant	1.11	1.28	-1.14	1.35	**2.49**	-1.61	1.41	**3.02**	
Receptionist	1.21	.43	-1.11	.92	**2.03**	-1.59	.98	**2.57**	
Total:					**12.76**			**15.59**	**28.35**
Female									
CEO	1.16	2.20	-1.12	1.89	**3.01**	-1.60	1.96	**3.56**	
Doctor	2.40	2.09	-.78	1.78	**2.56**	-1.33	1.85	**3.18**	
Nurse	2.50	1.52	-.76	1.51	**2.27**	-1.31	1.57	**2.88**	
Accountant	1.28	1.33	-1.09	1.27	**2.36**	-1.58	1.33	**2.91**	
Receptionist	1.38	.27	-1.06	.84	**1.90**	-1.55	.90	**2.45**	
Total:					**12.10**			**14.98**	**27.08**

Notes: E is evaluation and P is potency. Evaluation and potency profiles were taken from the Georgia 2015 combined dictionary, client (1.39, 1.27, 0.92) is object (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2016). Calculation of criminality scores: Criminality scores = (-1 x transient evaluation) + transient potency (Kroska et al. 2017b; Kroska and Schmidt 2018).

Table 2.4 Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Analyses (N = 1,399)

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Dependent Variables				
Prison	4.36	4.15	0	25
Monetary fine	29.59	25.37	0	100
Independent Variables				
Conditions				
High status (CEO and Doctor)	.34		0	1
Middle status (Accountant and Nurse)	.34		0	1
Low status (Receptionists) (omitted)	.33		0	1
Overcharge	.51		0	1
Steal from (omitted)	.49		0	1
Female offender	.51		0	1
Male offender (omitted)	.49		0	1
Health care vignette	.50		0	1
Financial services vignette (omitted)	.50		0	1
Appropriate Legal Punishment				
Community service	.33		0	1
Monetary fine	.64		0	1
Probation	.36		0	1
Imprisonment	.47		0	1
Participant Attributes				
College students	.67		0	1
Community college students	.02		0	1
University students	.65		0	1
Mturk (omitted)	.33		0	1
Female	.58		0	1
Gender non-conforming	.004		0	1
Male (omitted)	.42		0	1

Table 2.5 OLS Regressions of Recommended Prison Sentence on Conditions and Controls (N = 1,399)

	Recommended Prison Sentence		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Conditions			
Medium status (0 = high status)	-.571*	-.583*	.357
	(.269)	(.250)	(.358)
Medium status x female offender			-.443
			(.502)
Low status (0 = high status)	-.543*	-.659**	-.148
	(.270)	(.251)	(.357)
Low status x female offender			-1.011*
			(.503)
Overcharge (0 = steal from)	-.716**	-.418*	-.425*
	(.220)	(.206)	(.206)
Female offender (0 = male)	-.812***	-.733***	-.250
	(.220)	(.205)	(.354)
Health care vignette (0 = medical vignette)	.137	.122	.121
	(.220)	(.204)	(.204)
Appropriate Legal Punishment			
Community service		-.073	-.102
		(.247)	(.247)
Monetary fine		-.953***	-.968***
		(.248)	(.248)
Probation		-.197	-.187
		(.239)	(.239)
Imprisonment		2.468***	2.442***
		(.240)	(.240)
Participant Attributes			
Student (0 = Mturk)		-.034	-.041
		(.222)	(.222)
Female (0 = male)		-.462*	-.487*
		(.211)	(.211)
Gender non-conforming (0 = male)		.252	.273
		(1.726)	(1.732)
Intercept	5.436	5.120	4.925
	(.271)	(.392)	(.411)
R^2	.021	.164	.166
Adjusted R^2	.018	.156	.158

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † $p<.10$; * $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$.

Table 2.6 OLS Regressions of Recommended Monetary Fine on Conditions and Controls (N = 1,399)

	Recommended Monetary Fine		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Conditions			
Medium status (0 = high status)	-9.267***	-9.013***	-11.538***
	(1.633)	(1.605)	(2.300)
Medium status x female offender			4.940
			(3.222)
Low status (0 = high status)	-8.437***	-8.631***	-9.717***
	(1.640)	(1.607)	(2.291)
Low status x female offender			2.117
			(3.229)
Overcharge (0 = steal from)	-.212	.796	.838
	(1.338)	(1.323)	(1.323)
Female Offender (0 = male)	-2.865*	-2.688*	-5.033*
	(1.337)	(1.312)	(2.273)
Health care vignette (0 = medical vignette)	-1.788	-1.789	-1.775
	(1.338)	(1.311)	(1.311)
Appropriate Legal Punishment			
Community service		-2.044	-1.841
		(1.582)	(1.588)
Monetary fine		-.116	-.136
		(1.588)	(1.589)
Probation		.665	.587
		(1.534)	(1.534)
Imprisonment		9.861***	9.922***
		(1.541)	(1.543)
Participant Attributes			
Student (0 = Mturk)		-2.281	-2.295
		(1.422)	(1.423)
Female (0 = male)		.499	.596
		(1.351)	(1.354)
Gender non-conforming (0 = male)		-3.720	-2.398
		(11.075)	(11.115)
Intercept	37.925	34.403	35.476
	(1.647)	(2.516)	(2.640)
R^2	.032	.078	.079
Adjusted R^2	.028	.070	.070

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † $p<.10$; * $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$.

Chapter 3: Why Does Occupational Clout Affect Sentencing Outcomes?: Exploring the Perceptual Mediators

A white-collar offender's occupation, and associated clout, provides an offender with opportunities to perpetrate crimes through legitimized opportunity structures (Benson and Simpson 2009; Piquero and Benson 2004; Prechel and Morris 2010). Despite the important role occupation can play in the commission of a white-collar offense, it is unclear how occupation affects sentencing as the effect of occupational status on sentencing outcomes is mixed (Holtfreter 2013; Payne, Dabney, and Ekhomu 2011; Maddan et al. 2012; Tillman and Pontell 1992). Moreover, perceptions of offender dangerousness, threat, and culpability are clearly linked to certain offender attributes, like race (Albonetti 1991; Bridges and Crutchfield 1998; Bridges and Steen 1998; Farrell and Swigert 1986; Freiburger, Marcum, and Pierce 2010; Kramer and Steffensmeier 1993; Meithe and Moore 1986; Steen, Engen, and Gainey 2005; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer 1998; Zatz 1984, 1985), and these linked attributes are shown to differentially affect sentencing outcomes for similar crimes (Albonetti 1997; Bontrager, Bales, and Chiricos 2005; Brennan 2006; Bridges and Steen 1998; Demuth and Steffensmeier 2004; Johnson 2003; Spohn and Holleran 2000; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Warren, Chiricos, and Bales 2012). Yet, this research does not suggest how occupation should affect sentencing, because occupation is not clearly linked to criminal perceptions.

However, recent work using affect control theory (ACT), a mathematical theory of impression formation and impression management (Heise 1979, 2007; MacKinnon 1994; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988), establishes that theoretically simulated post-event impressions of goodness or badness (in ACT evaluation) and powerfulness or powerlessness (in ACT potency) for an occupational offender and the offender's crime predict the recommended prison sentence that participants assign to offenders (Kroska and Schmidt 2018). This research combines the

ACT dimensions of evaluation and potency to create "criminal scores," or criminal sentiments. These criminal sentiments are post-crime affective meanings attributed to different elements of a criminal event. This research finds that greater criminal sentiments for higher occupational status offenders correspond to greater recommended punishment for these offenders. However, this research does not make clear if both components of criminal sentiments – post-event impressions of evaluation and potency – are equally and independently predictive of punishment. For instance, it is possible that one component of criminal sentiments drives the relationship between an offender's occupational status and recommended punishment. Additionally, this research uses theoretically simulated post-event impressions, an ordinal ranking of occupations, and a convenience sample of female college students.

I extend and improve upon this research by: 1) examining how the different dimensions of criminal sentiments (post-event impressions of evaluation and potency) mediate the relationship between an offender's occupational status and sentencing outcomes; 2) using post-event impressions from research participants rather than theoretical simulations, as I explain more fully below; 3) using deference scores (Freeland and Hoey 2018), a more precise measurement of occupational status, or occupational prestige, rather than ordinal rankings of occupations, to operationalize occupational status; 4) additionally operationalizing evaluation and potency using concepts from other group processes theories that are proposed as conceptually similar; and 5) using a larger and more diverse research sample. I examine these relationships with an online vignette experiment administered to college students and Amazon Mechanical Turk users in which offenders of varying occupational statuses commit a crime via opportunities provided by their occupation.

Linking Occupational Status to Criminal Perceptions and Sentencing

As mentioned above, this research is an extension and improvement of recent research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018). Therefore, I first briefly review the literature gaps and weaknesses outlined in that research and how researchers address those gaps. There are at least three major limitations of past research linking occupational status to criminal perceptions and sentencing: (1) previous work does not show a clear empirical pattern for the effect of occupational status on sentencing outcomes, (2) methodological issues in prior research prevent this work from establishing non-spuriousness between an offender's occupational status and sentencing outcomes, and (3) current sentencing theories are unable to explain how occupation should affect sentencing outcomes.

Occupational Status, Sentencing, and Establishing Non-spuriousness. The first two limitations of past research are likely related. It is unclear from the limited current empirical research how an offender's occupational status affects sentencing outcomes. Some research shows that high occupational status increases punishment (e.g., Payne et al. 2011), and other research shows that high occupational status decreases punishment (e.g., Maddan et al. 2012), while still other research shows that occupational status has no effect on punishment (e.g., Holtfreter 2013). The lack of clarity for how an offender's status affects punishment is likely due to differences across studies in how researchers define and model offender status and the data available to researchers.

Much research uses archival court data and is unable to control for an offender's occupation. Instead, this research uses other measures that are related to an offender's occupation. This research groups offenders by SES or relative class position, education, type of white-collar crime, or other related measures, but even this research shows mixed results. For

instance, research shows that SES or class position both increases (Hagan and Parker 1985; Weisburd, Waring, and Wheeler 1990; Weisburd et al. 1991; Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode 1982) and decreases punishment (Eitle 2000), while still other research shows that SES is unrelated to punishment (Benson and Walker 1988; Gottschalk and Rundmo 2014).

Recent research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) addresses methodological weaknesses in prior research by using experimental methods to examine how occupational status affects sentencing. Using a vignette experiment, this research is able to isolate the effect of an offender's occupational status, while controlling for other offender attributes and crime factors, and, in doing so, establish non-spuriousness between an offender's occupational status and sentencing outcomes. This methodological improvement addresses weaknesses in previous studies that use archival court data and are unable to statistically control for differences between high and low status offenders and their crimes. However, this research operationalizes occupational status by grouping together white-collar offenders and blue- and pink-collar offenders and comparing these groupings. I improve on this study by using a more precise measurement of occupational status that I explain more fully in sections below.

Criminal Perceptions and Sentencing. Theories that explain how offender attributes affect sentencing outcomes, the focal concerns perspective (Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer 1998) and the uncertainty avoidance perspective (Albonetti 1991), do not clearly explain how an offender's occupation is likely to affect sentencing. These theories suggest that perceptions of criminality are informed by evaluations of an offender's dangerousness (Steffensmeier and Demuth 2006), and that when judicial decision-makers sentence offenders, they are primarily concerned with an offender's blameworthiness, the possible threat the offender poses to the

community, the practical implications of their decisions (Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer 1998), and how likely a sentence is to deter future criminality (Albonetti 1991).

However, since judicial decision-makers have incomplete information and limited resources, they rely on past sentencing decisions and stereotyped traits of criminality when making sentencing decisions. Empirical research supports this link between stereotyped traits of offender criminality and sentencing (Albonetti 1997; Bontrager, Bales, and Chiricos 2005; Brennan 2006; Bridges and Steen 1998; Demuth and Steffensmeier 2004; Johnson 2003; Spohn and Holleran 2000; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Warren, Chiricos, and Bales 2012). However, since occupation is not clearly linked to criminal perceptions, sentencing theories do not suggest how occupation should affect sentencing.

Recent work (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) addresses the lack of predictions from current sentencing theories regarding the effect of occupation on sentencing by using ACT, a theory that explains social interactions and impression formation processes. As I explain more fully below, ACT is based on a series of empirically derived impression formation equations that explain impression formation processes (Heise 1979, 2007; MacKinnon 1994; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988). These impression formation equations and the affective meanings on which social concepts (i.e., actors, behaviors, and objects) vary are contained in ACT's computer program, *Interact* (Heise 1995). Using *Interact*, Kroska and Schmidt (2018) simulate events in which offenders from different occupational statuses commit a crime. From these simulations, they use post-event impressions of evaluation (goodness versus badness) and potency (powerfulness versus powerlessness) for an offender and the offender's crime to create criminality scores for how criminal an offender and the event seem (criminal sentiments). They reverse the direction of post-event impressions of evaluation and add them to post-event impressions of potency to create

criminality scores, so that post-event negative impressions of evaluation and post-event positive impressions of potency correspond to greater impressions of criminality. Using these theoretically derived predictions, this research tests the effect of occupational status on sentencing and finds, as predicted, that higher occupational status offenders are punished more harshly than lower occupational status offenders (Kroska and Schmidt 2018).

However, it is unclear from this research if these dimensions are dually and equally related to criminal impressions for occupational offenders or if one dimension drives the relationship. In order to understand how post-event impressions of evaluation and potency are independently related to punishment, I keep the dimensions of post-event evaluation and potency separate, and I examine how post-event impressions mediate the effect of occupational status on punishment. I explain more fully how I do this below and how I improve upon this research, but first I more fully explain ACT, because it underlies the existing work in this area, the current study, and my hypotheses.

Affect Control Theory

ACT (Heise 1979, 2007; MacKinnon 1994; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988) is a theory of impression formation and impression management. ACT is based on a series of empirically derived impression formation equations that are used to quantify and express changes in affective meanings that are tied to all social concepts (i.e., actors, behaviors, and objects). The affective meanings of social concepts influence how social interactions develop and how actors and observers understand and make sense of these interactions. Affective meanings in ACT are operationalized using three culturally universal dimensions of meaning identified by Osgood, May, and Miron (1975): evaluation (how good or bad a concept is), potency (how much power a concept has), and activity (how lively a concept is) (EPA). EPA profiles have been collected by

ACT researchers across several cultures using semantic differential scales that range from -4.3 to 4.3. These profiles are compiled in dictionaries.

The meanings normally associated with social concepts are termed fundamental sentiments, while transient impressions are the in-context meanings that actors or observers attribute to social concepts after an event (Heise 1979, 2007). The central premise of ACT is that, after an event, actors and observers attempt to make sense of event elements by cognitively reconstructing transient impressions so that they align with fundamental sentiments, or they behaviorally act in ways to maintain fundamental sentiments, such that actors and observers are able to maintain the usual meanings they associate with event elements (Heise 1979, 2007).

Researchers can simulate social interactions and develop testable hypotheses using ACT's computer program, *Interact*, into which its impression formation equations are programmed (Heise 1995). Using *Interact*, researches can observe how the affective meanings of elements of social interactions change and how actors attempt to maintain fundamental meanings. For example, individuals fundamentally see a mother as someone who is extremely good (3.10), extremely powerful (2.71), and slightly active (0.82) (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2016)[2]. When a mother (3.10, 2.71, 0.82) does something expected, like comforts (3.45, 2.61, -1.46) a child (1.97, -1.17, 1.99), transient impressions of the mother (4.82, 1.93, 0.37) are similar to fundamental sentiments (3.10, 2.71, 0.82), because the mother's actions are in line with how we would expect her to act towards a child; thus, impressions of the mother change little.

[2] EPA profiles used are taken from the 2015 Georgia combined dictionary (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2016) unless noted otherwise. EPA profile ratings are quantified as follows: -4.3 is infinitely bad/powerless/inactive; -3.0 is extremely bad/powerless/inactive; -2.0 is quite bad/powerless/inactive; -1.00 is slightly bad/powerless/inactive; 0 is neutral, neither bad nor good/powerless nor powerful/inactive or active; +1.00 is slightly good/powerful/active; +2 is quite good/powerful/active; +3.0 is extremely good/powerful/active; and, +4.3 is infinitely good/powerful/active (Heise 2007).

However, when a mother (3.10, 2.71, 0.82) does something unexpected, like cheats (-3.33, 0.12, 0.01) a child (1.97, -1.17, 1.99), transient impressions show that the mother decreases significantly in evaluation (-2.66 compared to 3.10), that she is also viewed as less potent (1.98 compared to 2.71), and that she is viewed as slightly less active (1.13 compared to 0.82). The decrease in evaluation for a mother who cheats a child illustrates an expected impression formation effect, because an extremely good (3.10) and extremely powerful (2.71) actor is doing an extremely bad (-3.33) action to a quite good (1.97) and slightly powerless object (-1.17) – this is not a good or potent enough action for a mother interacting with her child to maintain fundamental sentiments. Results in *Interact*, in fact, suggest that after a mother cheats a child an observer may try to make sense of the event by labeling the mother with the criminal identity of a robber (2.38, 0.40, 0.18) or the child as a brute (-1.35, 1.56, 1.28). Simulation results also suggest a reparative action for the mother that is extremely good, quite powerful, and slightly inactive, such as cuddling or consoling the child. Relabeling the identities of the mother and the child by observers and the reparative actions suggested after an event for interactants are an attempt to maintain fundamental sentiments after an event.

Changes in the affective meanings attributed to actors' identities and the suggested behaviors in these results from *Interact* illustrate ACT's main proposition: that individuals construct and reconstruct elements of events so that they align with fundamental sentiments. I draw on ACT predictions like those above for how high-status occupational offenders who commit a crime against a client are viewed. ACT suggests that highly powerful occupational offenders who direct a highly negative action onto a slightly good and slightly powerful object are viewed as bad actors; thus, I expect them to be assigned harsher punishment.

The Current Study

The current study draws on recent work outlined above (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) but improves and extends this research in a number of significant and important ways. As mentioned above, I use a larger and more diverse research sample, I use post-event impressions from actual research participants (rather than theoretically simulated impressions), I use deference scores to operationalize occupational status (rather than ordinal rankings), I keep criminal sentiment dimensions (post-event evaluation and potency) separate, and I also operationalize post-event evaluation and potency using additional measures from other group processes work that have been proposed as conceptually similar.

Kroska and Schmidt (2018) utilize a convenience sample of all female college students. I use a sample of participants from a southern community college, a large southern university, and Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk) users, and I include both males and females in my sample. My sample size is larger than Kroska and Schmidt's (2018) (1,170 compared to 557); however, demographically, other than a higher average age by approximately five years (mean age = 30), my sample is similar to Kroska and Schmidt's (2018). Mturk is an online service provided by Amazon that recruits users to fill out surveys for pay. By including Mturk participants, this research goes beyond Kroska and Schmidt (2018) and other mock juror studies, which utilize convenience samples of college students. Moreover, recent research shows that crowdsourced samples (e.g., Mturk) provide for high-quality data and should increase the generalizability of findings (Coppock 2018; Shank 2016; Weinberg, Freese and McElhattan 2014).

Rather than using theoretical predictions from simulations in *Interact*, I use post-event impressions from participants in my study. *Interact* uses ACT's impression formation equations and the affective fundamental meanings of social concepts contained in dictionaries that have

been rated by research participants to generate predictions. Predictions from *Interact* have shown to be reliable; however, they are theoretical predictions based on ratings from other research participants. I use actual post-event impressions collected from research participants after exposure to vignettes. The vignettes I use provide greater context for the actors and the actors' crimes and collecting transient impressions from research participants who are asked about the particular actor described to them in the vignette should provide for a more accurate estimation of post-event impressions of the actors from vignettes.

Kroska and Schmidt (2018) use ordinal rankings of occupational status (white-collar vs. blue- and pink-collar), and I improve on this research by using deference scores (Freeland and Hoey 2018). Recent research uses ACT to create occupational status, or prestige, rankings that reflect the multidimensional nature of occupational status, termed deference scores (Freeland and Hoey 2018). Freeland and Hoey (2018) derive their conception of status from Weber's (1946, 1978) definition of status and take into account the cultural esteem afforded an occupation, the power associated with a position, and the class structure in which the occupation is situated when creating deference scores. They situate occupational statuses within networks of deference relationships using ACT impression formation equations to calculate the likelihood that one occupational status will defer to another. These measures of deference are compared to measures of occupational prestige from other research (e.g., rankings from the General Social Survey) and are shown to be more predictive of participant rankings for occupations from poll data than other occupational prestige rankings. I use deference scores that they calculated to operationalize occupational status for offenders in my vignettes. For a full explanation of how deference scores are calculated see Freeland and Hoey (2018).

Drawing on ACT predictions and research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018), showing that high status occupational offenders are viewed as more criminal and assigned harsher punishment than low status occupational offenders, I expect that high deference scores will increase the recommended prison sentence that participants assign to offenders.

> *Deference score hypothesis*: High deference scores will increase the recommended prison sentence that participants assign to offenders.

[Table 3.1 here]

ACT predicts that high status occupational offenders who perpetrate a crime are viewed as bad actors, because they are highly potent actors (e.g., fundamental potency for CEO is 3.29 and doctor is 2.94) directing a highly negative action (fundamental evaluation: overcharging -2.66, stealing -3.50) onto a slightly good and slightly powerful object (object is client, client fundamental EPA: 1.39, 1.27, 0.92). Like recent work (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) suggests, I expect that occupational status affects sentencing through criminal perceptions. Thus, I expect that highly negative post-event impressions of evaluation and highly positive post-event impressions of potency will increase the recommended prison sentence that participants assign to offenders, and that these high criminal perceptions will mediate the positive effect of an offender's occupational status on participant recommended prison sentencing.

Group processes research suggests that evaluation is roughly conceptually similar to the theoretical concept of status and that potency is similar to the concept of power (Heise 1999:9; Kemper and Collins 1990:40; MacKinnon and Langford 1994:221; Rodgers 2015:71). Empirical work shows a relationship between affective impressions and performance expectations based on status (Dippong and Kalkhoff 2015) and a positive relationship between evaluation and status and power and potency (Rogalin, Soboroff and Lovaglia 2007). Based on the proposed similarities of these theoretical concepts, I expect that, like post-event impressions of evaluation

and potency, high post-event impressions of status and power will mediate the positive effect of occupational status on recommended prison sentencing. Thus, I offer the following mediation hypotheses:

> *Evaluation and status mediation hypotheses 1-2*: Post-event impressions of (1) actor evaluation and (2) actor status will mediate the positive effect of deference scores on recommended prison sentencing.
>
> *Potency and power mediation hypotheses 1-2*: Post-event impressions of (1) actor potency and (2) actor power will mediate the positive effect of deference scores on recommended prison sentencing.

Methods

Sample

I collected data from three samples during the fall of 2017: (1) a sample of college students at a large southern university, (2) a sample of college students at a southern community college, and (3) a sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk) users. University student participation was incentivized by offering participants the opportunity to be included in a lottery drawing for one of nine twenty-five-dollar Amazon gift cards. Community college student participation was incentivized by offering class credit or extra credit to subjects for their participation. Mturk users were paid one dollar each for their participation.

Experimental Design

This research uses a vignette experiment with two 3 x 2 x 2 designs that vary the occupation (accountant, CEO, doctor, nurse, and receptionist) and gender (male or female) of the actor in the vignette and the word used to describe the actor's crime (overcharge or steal from) across two different institutions (health care and financial services). I focus on the effect of an offender's occupational status, via deference scores, on punitive outcomes in this research. I do not offer hypotheses regarding manipulations for the word used to describe the offender's crime or the offender's gender, but they varied across vignettes, so I control for them in the analyses.

Additionally, questions used to measure mediation variables ask about the specific character in the vignette, so participants' assessments of these characters likely include considerations related to the offender's gender and the specific crime of the offender from the vignette.

The health care vignette describes a male or female doctor, nurse, or receptionist who works at a senior retirement community, while the financial services vignette describes a male or female CEO, accountant, or receptionist who works at a financial planning and investments firm. The occupations were chosen because they are common occupations with which participants should be familiar. The vignettes explicitly tell the participants the age (35) and race (white) of the offender, and the names of the characters used in the vignette, Todd or Emily, are two of the most common names given to white boys and girls born between 1974 and 1979 (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004), close to the time the vignette character would have been born. The full vignettes are as follows:

> *Financial services vignette*: **Emily Smith/Todd Smith** is a thirty-five-year-old white **female/male receptionist/accountant/CEO** who has worked at a small private financial planning and investments firm for the last twelve years. The firm works with clients to develop financial plans for their future, including estate planning, retirement planning, insurance dealings, and portfolio investing. **Emily/Todd** is well liked by clients of the firm, and is also one of the longest tenured and most trusted workers at the facility, even being given access to all of the organization's billing systems. **Emily/Todd** is also seen by many clients and those in **her/his** company as someone who is meticulous and careful in **her/his** work, so **she/he** knows that **her/his** work will only be checked if a major issue arises and that neither the firm nor **her/his** clients are likely to question **her/his** work, because clients usually have many investments, and the firm processes too many transactions to check on prices of all investments and services sold. For the last eight years **Emily/Todd** has been able to **steal from/overcharge** clients by providing inflated costs on investments and by adding extra fees for services to clients' accounts. **Emily/Todd** has been able to personally profit about $100,000 over an eight-year period. As a consequence, clients suffer financial losses, though each loses no more than $200 dollars. The firm does not suffer as a direct result of **Emily's/Todd's** actions as increases in fees cover the losses.
>
> *Health care vignette:* **Emily Smith/Todd Smith** is a thirty-five-year-old white **female/male receptionist/nurse/doctor** who has worked at a small private senior retirement community for the last twelve years. The retirement community offers both

> independent and assisted living accommodations for residents and also makes available medical services to residents. **Emily/Todd** is well liked by residents in the community, and is also one of the longest tenured and most trusted workers at the facility, even being given access to all of the organization's billing systems. **Emily/Todd** is also seen by many in the retirement community as an advocate for residents, and many residents have entrusted **her/him** with access to their private health care and financial information. **Emily/Todd** knows that **her/his** work will only be checked if a major issue arises and that neither residents nor insurers are likely to question **her/his** work, because residents receive a lot of medical paperwork, and insurers process too many claims to check if all the claims are legitimate. For the last eight years **Emily/Todd** has been able to **steal from/overcharge** residents and insurers by adding extra fees and services to residents' bills and by charging these false claims to insurers. **Emily/Todd** has been able to personally profit about $100,000 over an eight-year period. As a consequence, residents suffer financial losses, though each loses no more than $200. Insurance companies lose money from false claims, but yearly premium increases cover those losses.

Condition Variables

Overcharge is a dummy variable for the crime word that participants were exposed to, with *steal from* being the omitted category. *Female offender* is a dummy variable for the gender of the offender in vignettes, with male offender as the omitted category. *Medical vignette* is a dummy variable that controls for differences between the two sets of vignettes, the medical vignette and the financial services vignette.

Dependent Variable

Prison sentence is the recommended prison sentence that participants assign to the offender in the vignette. Participants were asked what sentence they would recommend if Emily/Todd were to be punished with a prison sentence and only a prison sentence. Responses were arranged on a slider scale with "No prison" on the left and "25" on the right as anchor points. The title above the slider scale was "Prison Sentence in Years," and there were tick marks above the scale at five-year intervals, but participants were also able to drag the slider to select an exact amount of years, which was displayed to the right of the scale. Tests of normality for prison sentencing show it is slightly skewed (1.98) and the distribution does have a high kurtosis

score (8.15); however, graphing residual results from ordinary least squares regression shows that prison sentencing is normally distributed.

[Table 3.2 here]

Focal Independent Variable

Deference scores are occupational status rankings calculated by previous researchers (Freeland and Hoey 2018). I create a variable that matches the deference score for the occupation of the offender in the vignette (accountants, CEOs, doctors, nurses, and receptionists) that participants were exposed to with participants' responses (see Table 3.1 for deference scores). So, for instance, if a participant was exposed to a doctor in the vignette, that participant would have the deference score of 9.83 assigned to him or her.

Mediators

Post-event evaluation and potency. After exposure to the vignette, participants were asked to rate Todd or Emily from the pre-sentencing report using semantic differential scales with nine radio button indicators. *Post-event evaluation* was anchored with "Bad, Good" and "Awful, Nice," *post-event potency* was anchored with "Powerless, Powerful" and "Little, Big." The radio button indicator in the middle of the scale was labeled as "neutral," (coded as 0) and radio buttons on each side of the scale were labeled "slightly" (coded as -1/+1), "quite" (coded as -2/+2), "extremely" (coded as -3/+3) and "infinitely" (coded as -4.3/+4.3). I reverse the direction of *post-event evaluation*, so that high *post-event evaluation* scores indicate that an offender is viewed negatively.

Post-event status. Post-event status was measured using five items: (1) "In your opinion, how valuable to society is Todd/Emily?," which was anchored with "Of no value whatsoever" on the left and "Extremely valuable" on the right; (2) "What do you think is the social rank of Todd/Emily compared to other people in other occupations?," which was anchored with

"Extremely low rank" on the left and "Extremely high rank" on the right; (3) "In your opinion, how much status does Todd/Emily generally possess?," which was anchored with "Extremely low status" on the left and "Extremely high status" on the right; (4) "In your opinion, how competent is Todd/Emily?," which was anchored with "Extremely incompetent" on the left and "Extremely competent" on the right; and (5) "In your opinion, how intelligent is Todd/Emily?," which was anchored with "Extremely unintelligent" on the left and "Extremely intelligent" on the right (alpha = .74).

Post-event power. *Post-event power* was measured using four items: (1) "In your opinion, how much direct control over the lives of others does Todd/Emily have?," which was anchored with "No control at all" on the left and "Total control" on the right; (2) "How much power do you think Emily/Todd has to keep people from getting what they want or need?," which was anchored with "No power at all" on the left and "A great amount of power" on the right; (3) "How likely do you think it is for Emily/Todd to be able to carry out his or her own will by overcoming the resistance of others?," which was anchored with "Extremely unlikely" on the left and "Extremely likely" on the right; and (4) "How much authority do you think Todd/Emily has to enforce decisions against powerful individuals and organizations?," which was anchored with "No authority whatsoever" on the left and "A great amount of authority" on the right (alpha = .70).

Post-event status and *post-event power* are summed averages of the multiple measures of each respective concept described above. The items that comprise the composites were all measured using 101-point semantic differential slider scales and were divided by 10 to create scales ranging from 0-10. I also examined how each item for both respective composites loaded onto each construct using factor analysis, and all items loaded onto single factors. There were no

substantial differences between the factored and summed versions of the variables, and I use the composites created by taking the summed average of items.

Control Variables for Participant Attributes

Female and *gender non-conforming* control for the gender of participants, with *male* omitted. *Student* is a dummy variable that is used to control for differences between *Mturk* users and student participants. The two student samples were combined, because significant differences were not found between the university and community college samples.

RESULTS

Main Effects Model: Deference Scores

Consistent with the deference score recommended prison sentence hypothesis, results in Model 1 in Table 3.4 show that high deference scores increase the recommended prison sentence that participants assign to offenders (b = .173, se = .082, p = .040). This result aligns with findings from recent research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) and provides further evidence that offender's occupational status increases recommended punitiveness. Below, I discuss the results of the mediation analyses.

[Table 3.3 here]

Mediation Analyses for Proposed Mediators

Participants' post-event impressions of evaluation, status, potency, and power of the vignette character were predicted to mediate the relationship between deference scores and participant recommended prison sentencing. For mediation to occur, four conditions must be met: (1) the independent variable must be significantly related to the mediator variable, (2) the independent variable must be significantly related to the dependent variable, (3) the mediating variable must be significantly related to the dependent variable when the independent variable is

controlled, and (4) the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable must decrease after the mediator is controlled (Baron and Kenny 1986; Holmbeck 2003).

[Table 3.4 here]

The effect of offender deference scores, the focal independent variable, on each of the proposed mediating variables, post-event impressions of offender evaluation, status, potency, and power, can be seen in Table 3.3. The first model in Table 3.3 for each of the respective mediating variables (Models 1, 3, 5, and 7) shows the effect of deference scores, conditions, and participant attributes on the proposed mediators, and the second model (Models 2, 4, 6, and 8) shows these same effects while also controlling each of the other mediating variables. As seen in models 1 and 2, the first condition for establishing mediation is not met for post-event impressions of evaluation, because the effect of deference scores on post-event impressions of evaluation does not reach conventional standards of significance; thus, I do not include post-event impressions of evaluation in any of the models in Table 3.4. Results in Table 3.3 verify that the first condition necessary for establishing mediation is met for post-event impressions of status and power, as deference scores are significantly related to all of the proposed mediators. Potency only meets the first condition necessary for establishing mediation when the other mediators are not controlled.

As noted above, the effect of deference scores on participant recommended prison sentencing can be seen in Model 1 in Table 3.4, showing that the second condition necessary for establishing mediation is met. The effect of the mediating variables, post-event impressions of status, potency, and power, on participant recommended prison sentencing, the dependent variable, when the focal independent variable, deference scores, is controlled can be seen in Models 2-4 in Table 3.4. These results confirm that the third condition necessary for establishing

mediation is met for post-event impressions of potency and power. Results show that post-event impressions of potency and power are significantly related to the recommended prison sentence that participants assign to offenders when deference scores are controlled (see models 3 and 4); however, the third condition is only met for post-event impressions of potency when the other mediator variables are not controlled.

Finally, any decrease in the effect of deference scores on participant recommended prison sentencing, after the mediators are controlled, can be observed by comparing differences in significance levels and deference score coefficients in Model 1 to Models 2-4 in Table 3.4. Again, results show that only post-event impressions of the offender's potency and power meet the fourth condition necessary for establishing mediation, as the effect of deference scores on recommended prison sentencing decreases once post-event impressions of offender potency (decreases from $b = .173$, $p = .040$ to $b = .129$, $p = .122$) and power (decreases from $b = .173$, $p = .040$ to $b = .028$, $p = .738$) are controlled, but, again, this effect only holds for post-event impressions of potency when the other mediating variables are not controlled in the analyses. The results of a Sobel test, as seen in Table 3.4, confirm these findings. Sobel test results show that participants' post-event impressions of potency mediate approximately 25 percent of the effect of deference scores on recommended prison sentencing when the other mediating variables are not controlled ($p = .011$). Sobel test results for post-event impressions of power also show that participants' post-event impressions of power mediate approximately 84% of the effect of deference scores on participant recommended prison sentencing when the other mediators are not controlled ($p = .000$) and approximately 51% of the effect when the other mediators are controlled ($p = .000$).

Correlation tests show that evaluation and status (r = .112, p = .000) and power and potency (r = .288, p = .000) are not highly correlated but that they are significantly correlated. As seen in Table 3.4, results in model 5 and Sobel test results suggest that post-event impressions of status exhibit a significant suppression effect for deference scores on prison sentencing when post-event impressions of potency and power are controlled. Overall, results suggest that the effect of an offender's occupational status on participants' punitive attitudes are driven by post-event impressions of an offender's power or potency but not post-event impressions of an offender's evaluation or status.

Discussion and Conclusion

Although the effect of occupational status on criminal perceptions and sentencing outcomes from previous research is unclear, recent research shows that occupational status affects punitiveness through post-event criminal impressions of offenders (Kroska and Schmidt 2018). This research used simulated post-event impressions of occupational offenders to derive predictions, and, as predicted, found that higher status white-collar occupational offenders (executives and physicians) were assigned a harsher punishment than lower status blue- and pink-collar offenders (handymen and shop clerks) by research participants. However, this research does not make clear if both dimensions of criminal impressions, post-event impressions of evaluation and potency, are independently related to punishment, to what degree each dimension is related to punishment, and if post-event impressions mediate the effect of an offender's occupational status on punishment. Moreover, this research used ordinal rankings of occupational status, theoretically simulated post-event impressions, and a narrow convenience sample of all female college students.

I clarify how dimensions of criminal impressions explain the relationship between an offender's occupational status and punitiveness by keeping separate the dimensions of evaluation and potency, and I examine how post-event impressions mediate the effect of an offender's occupational status on punishment. I also improve on this research by using deference scores (Freeland and Hoey 2018), a more precise way of ranking occupations, to operationalize occupational status. Further, I use post-event impressions of offenders from vignettes collected by research participants, and I use a larger research sample that includes both males and females and college students and Mturkers. Finally, I also operationalize post-event impressions of an offender's evaluation and potency in two additional ways by including measures for post-event impressions of status and power, theoretical concepts from group processes work that have been proposed as conceptually similar to evaluation and potency.

Consistent with my ACT-based predictions, I find that offenders whose occupations are associated with high degrees of deference are assigned greater punishment by participants. These findings align with the recent research mentioned above (Kroska and Schmidt 2018). I find mixed support for post-event impressions of offender evaluation and potency mediating the effect of deference scores on punishment. Post-event impressions of an offender's potency and power mediate the effect of deference scores on punishment, but I do not find any support for my predictions on evaluation or status mediating the effect of deference scores on punishment. However, results do indicate that post-event impressions of offender status exhibit a significant suppression effect for deference scores on punishment, but status is only a significant suppressor when post-event impressions of potency and power are both or singularly controlled in models.

Evaluating the effect of the different dimensions of criminal impressions separately allowed me to parse out if both dimensions of criminal impressions affect punishment.

Additionally, measuring the dimensions of criminal impressions using similar theoretical concepts strengthens the finding that post-event impressions of power or potency, rather than evaluation or status, is what drives the relationship between an offender's occupational status and punishment. Findings indicate that the relationship between deference scores and recommended punishment is explained by post-event impressions of an offender's power or potency. These findings suggest that criminal perceptions for occupational offenders increase punishment because of how powerful offenders seem after perpetrating a crime.

Since greater post-event impressions of higher occupational status offenders as powerful increase punishment for these types of offenders, post-event impressions of offender power are likely correlated with other measures shown to increase offender criminal perceptions and crime concern more generally. Perceptions of an offender as dangerous, likely to commit the same or a similar crime in the future, as blameworthy, and as a threat to the community are theorized by the focal concerns perspective and the uncertainty avoidance perspective, the two major sentencing theories, to increase criminal perceptions and sentencing outcomes (Albonetti 1991; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2006; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer1998). High occupational status offenders who appear more powerful after committing a crime may also appear as more dangerous because they are in occupations that provide them with future opportunities to commit the same crime through legitimized opportunity structures. Additionally, certain occupations, like doctors, nurses, and accountants, may appear more powerful and dangerous after perpetrating an occupational crime because victims are reliant upon these sorts of offenders for the offender's expertise and services. Victims likely have limited familiarity with certain practices when soliciting services from professionals who provide specialized services or have specialized knowledge and are, therefore, unlikely to challenge or question these sorts of

professionals. Further, these impressions may be related to expectations of trust that are connected to certain occupations (e.g., physicians, see Thom, Hall, and Pawlson 2004), and violating expectations of trust may also increase post-event impressions of power. Thus, post-event impressions of power for high status offenders may be, in part, shaped by the type of service offenders provide, how victims are dependent upon these professionals for their services, and the potential damage a powerful offender who utilizes legitimized opportunity structures to commit crime can do to unsuspecting victims if left unchecked. Therefore, harsher punishments for offenders who are viewed as more powerful after a crime may be, in part, guided by these considerations. Future research, as discussed below, should further examine how these considerations are related to post-event impressions of offender power and recommended punishment. Finally, relatedly, high post-event impressions of power may also increase participant perceptions of offender blameworthiness, as offenders who are viewed as more powerful after their crime may also be viewed as in more control of their actions and their actions' outcomes.

Limitations and Future Research

This research was limited in that it only tested the effect of deference scores on punishment from five occupations. Future work in this area should test more occupations and should select for a wider range of deference scores, and future work should also explore crimes of offenders outside of the medical and financial services fields. This research was also limited in that it only explored certain types of crimes and certain types of victims. Further work in this area should explore how other types of white-collar crime, like embezzlement, insider trading, or identity theft affect post-event impressions of offender power and how perceptions of offender power vary by level of crime victimization. For instance, research could explore how crimes with

wide scale societal victimization, like environmental white-collar crimes, affect post-event impressions of offender power. Future work in this area should also more carefully evaluate how post-event impressions of power are related to factors described in sentencing theories as likely to increase criminal perceptions and affect sentencing outcomes. Future research should also evaluate if greater trust expectations for high status occupational offenders predict greater post-event impressions of power and how violations of trust expectations are related to punitive attitudes. Future work in this area should also examine how post-event impressions of offender power affect participant fear of crime more generally and fear of crime victimization. This work and future work in the area of criminal perceptions could also be improved by integrating measures that account for how responsibility is attributed to offenders. Research from the attribution of responsibility literature, for instance, suggests that responsibility is differentially attributed to offenders based on both the offender's role in the offense and the offender's social status (Hamilton 1978, 1986; Hamilton and Sanders 1981). Future work in this area should also vary offender characteristics that are shown to affect criminal perceptions and sentencing outcomes for street crimes that have not been explored for white-collar crimes, like race, age and gender. Finally, future work in this area should also include measures of seriousness and crime severity to determine if the effect of occupational status on sentencing decreases as perceptions of offense seriousness or crime severity increase.

Tables for Chapter 3

Table 3.1 Occupations from Vignettes by Deference Scores

Occupational Identity	Deference Score
Doctor	9.83
Nurse	8.77
CEO	7.57
Accountant	5.36
Receptionist	5.24

Note: Deference scores are taken from Freeland and Hoey (2018)

Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Analyses (N = 1,170)

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Dependent Variable				
Recommended prison sentence	4.42	4.24	0	25
Focal Independent Variable				
Deference scores	6.95	1.75	5.24	9.38
Conditions				
Overcharge	.51		0	1
Steal from (omitted)	.49		0	1
Female offender	.49		0	1
Male offender (omitted)	.51		0	1
Health care vignette	.51		0	1
Financial services vignette (omitted)	.49		0	1
Mediating Variables				
Post-event Evaluation	1.99	1.86	-4.3	4.3
Post-event Status	6.73	1.60	0	10
Post-event Potency	.85	1.54	-4.3	4.3
Post-event Power	6.18	1.68	0	10
Participant Attributes				
College student	.61		0	1
University sample	.59		0	1
Community college sample	.02		0	1
Mturk (omitted)	.39		0	1
Female	.57		0	1
Gender non-conforming	.00		0	1
Male (omitted)	.43		0	1

Table 3.3 OLS Regressions of Post-event Mediators on Deference Scores for Offenders from Vignettes, Conditions, Post-event Mediators as Controls, and Participant Attributes (N = 1,170)

Post-event Mediators as Dependent Variables	Post-event Evaluation		Post-event Status		Post-event Potency		Post-event Power	
Models	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Focal Independent Variable								
Deference scores	.039	.068†	.378***	.271***	.194***	.021	.302***	.179***
	(.036)	(.038)	(.029)	(.028)	(.030)	(.029)	(.031)	(.031)
Conditions								
Overcharge (0 = steal from)	.064	.113	.188*	.109	.207*	.136†	.105	.013
	(.108)	(.105)	(.086)	(.079)	(.088)	(.079)	(.092)	(.087)
Female offender (0 = male)	-.300**	-.304**	.002	.009	-.057	-.088	-.052	-.000
	(.107)	(.104)	(.086)	(.079)	(.088)	(.079)	(.092)	(.087)
Health care vignette (0 = medical vignette)	.057	-.115	-.764***	-.630***	-.398***	-.140	-.023	.210*
	(.126)	(.126)	(.101)	(.093)	(.104)	(.095)	(.109)	(.105)
Post-event Mediator Variables as Controls								
Post-event Evaluation				-.062**		-.134***		.131***
				(.022)		(.022)		(.024)
Post-event Status		-.110**				.322***		.196***
		(.039)				(.028)		(.032)
Post-event Potency		-.233***		.317***				.227***
		(.038)		(.028)				(.032)
Post-event Power		.189***		.159***		.187***		
		(.035)		(.026)		(.026)		
R^2	.031	.089	.153	.302	.042	.235	.122	.224
Adjusted R^2	.025	.082	.148	.296	.036	.228	.117	.217
Mean VIF	1.12	1.22	1.12	1.16	1.12	1.19	1.12	1.19

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † $p<.10$; * $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$. Participant attributes are controlled for but not displayed in table.

Table 3.4 OLS Regressions of Recommended Prison Sentence on Deference Scores, Conditions, Post-event Mediators, and Controls and Sobel Test Results (N = 1,170)

	Recommended Prison Sentence					Single mediator controlled		All mediators controlled	
Models	1	2	3	4	5	% Mediated	*p*	% Mediated	*p*
Focal Independent Variable									
Deference scores	.173*	.202*	.129	.028	.093				
	(.082)	(.088)	(.084)	(.084)	(.088)				
Conditions									
Overcharge (0 = steal from)	-.700**	-.685**	-.746**	-.750**	-.739**				
	(.246)	(.246)	(.246)	(.242)	(.242)				
Female offender (0 = male)	-.804**	-.804**	-.791**	-.779**	-.767**				
	(.245)	(.246)	(.245)	(.242)	(.241)				
Health care vignette (0 = medical vignette)	-.214	-.273	-.125	-.203	-.343				
	(.288)	(.295)	(.289)	(.284)	(.290)				
Post-event Mediating Variables									
Post-event Status		-.078			-.286**	-17.00	.353	-470.90	.002
		(.083)			(.090)				
Post-event Potency			.223**		.195*	25.06	.011	2.52	.680
			(.081)		(.088)				
Post-event Power				.479***	.497***	83.66	.000	50.68	.000
				(.077)	(.080)				
Participant Attributes									
Student (0 = Mturk)	-.506*	-.469†	-.533*	-.381	-.264				
	(.254)	(.257)	(.254)	(.251)	(.254)				
Female (0 = male)	-.501*	-.488†	-.515*	-.744**	-.718**				
	(.251)	(.252)	(.251)	(.250)	(.249)				

Gender non-conforming (0 = male)	-2.304 (2.433)	-2.305 (2.434)	-2.188 (2.427)	-2.362 (2.395)	-2.265 (2.385)
Intercept	4.678 (.587)	4.990 (.676)	4.786 (.586)	2.790 (.652)	3.964 (.735)
R^2	.028	.028	.034	.059	.068
Adjusted R^2	.022	.022	.027	.053	.060
Mean VIF	1.12	1.17	1.12	1.14	1.22

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † $p<.10$; * $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$.

Chapter 4: Social Roles and Standard Operating Procedures: Attributions of Responsibility and Punishment for Financial Crime

Numerous criminological studies attempt to explain how people attribute responsibility for wrongdoing (e.g., see Applegate et al. 2000; Blatier 2000; Carroll 1978; Cochran, Boots and Chamlin 2006; Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003; Cullen et al. 1985; Grasmick and McGill 1994; Hawkins 1981; Michel 2017; Unnever et al. 2010; Young 1991). However, few of these studies account for how responsibility is attributed for workplace crimes (Gailey 2013; Gailey and Lee 2005b, 2008; Hamilton and Sanders 1995, 1996; Hans and Erman 1989; Sanders et al. 1996; Sanders, Yuasa and Hamilton 1998) and how the organizational context in which these crimes occur affect these attributions (Gailey 2013).

Attribution theory (Heider 1958) explains that individuals attribute responsibility for wrongdoing to either the actors involved in an event or to the context in which the event occurs. Research on responsibility attributions in organizational settings shows that an offender's social role (i.e., if offenders are described as autonomous, obedient, or conformist offenders) and an offense's description as an atypical or typical organizational practice (i.e., a standard operating procedure) affect individuals' assessments of responsibility. However, this research focuses on non-representative workplace crimes and, more specifically, does not examine how responsibility is attributed to offenders who commit dangerous financial crimes. It also tends to utilize single-item measures of responsibility, inconsistent measures of responsibility across studies, and does not examine how facets of organizational offending and attributions of responsibility affect recommended punishment for offenders. Thus, it is unclear if findings regarding attribution of responsibility processes persist when considering financial crimes and when using improved measurements of responsibility, and it is unclear how organizational facets of offending and attributions of responsibility affect recommended punishment.

Drawing on attribution theory and past research, I use a vignette experiment to examine how the social role of offenders and standard operating procedures (SOPs) affect both attributions of responsibility and the recommended monetary fine participants assign to offenders who commit financial crimes. Further, I examine how attributions of responsibility mediate the relationship between an offender's social role and SOPs and recommended punishment. My vignette experiment varies: 1) the social role of the offender; 2) whether offenders are described as offending by either following or acting against SOPs; 3) the offender's gender; and 4) the extent of financial losses that result from the crime. I go beyond past research by measuring responsibility as a multidimensional concept, and I partially test a modified version of a proposed integrated model of the attribution of responsibility for wrongdoing in organizations (Gailey and Lee 2005a). Additionally, I more comprehensively control for participant attributes than past research, and I include a more expansive sample that goes beyond the college student samples used in previous research (e.g., Gailey 2013; Gailey and Lee 2005b; Gailey and Lee 2008; Hans and Ermann 1989; Hamilton and Hagiwara 1992). I begin by describing attribution theory, the theory that underlies my hypotheses and undergirds previous research in this area.

Attribution Theory

Attribution theory explains how individuals attribute responsibility for themselves and others (Heider 1944, 1958). The central premise of the theory is that attributions of responsibility depend on whether individuals view causes of behavior as a result of internal or external factors (Heider 1944, 1958; Jones and Davis 1965; Kelley 1967). When observers determine that a behavior is a result of internal factors (i.e., actor personality characteristics or actor disposition), they attribute the behavior to the actor (Heider 1944, 1958; Jones and Davis 1965; Kelley 1967; Sabini, Siepmann and Stein 2001; Sims 2003; Skitka et al. 2002). Conversely, when observers

determine that a behavior is due to external or environmental factors (i.e., social structure or organizational context), they attribute the behavior to the situational context in which the behavior occurs, thus absolving the actor of responsibility or blame (Cullen et al. 1985; Heider 1944, 1958; Jones and Davis 1965; Kelley 1967; Sims 2003; Woolfolk, Doris and Darley 2006).

The determination of how to identify the causes of behavior is based on how individuals combine and analyze facts they know about the behavior, actor, and situation (i.e., what they are able to observe and their pre-existing knowledge on subjects and situations), and how individuals then sort this information through their pre-existing frameworks of understanding (i.e., their cultural understandings of events and actions and how they understand the world more broadly). Based on individuals' combination and analyses of these conceptions and facts in their cognitive frameworks, they then internally or externally attribute guilt, blameworthiness, and responsibility (Heider 1944, 1958; Jones and Davis 1965; Kelley 1967, 1973).

Attribution theorists have integrated the ideas of "roles and deeds" and "respondent characteristics and influences" (Hamilton 1978, 1986; Hamilton and Sanders 1981) into attribution models to explain how an actor's social role, social status, and perceptions of the actor's intentions affect individuals' attributions of responsibility. Roles are conceived of as both the actor's hierarchical position within an organization (social status) (i.e., if they are a superior or a subordinate in an organizational setting or structure) and their level of involvement in the act itself (social role) (i.e., if offenders are described as offending in autonomous, obedient, or conformist roles). Deeds account for what actors actually did and their intentions. Respondent characteristics and influences refer to the fact that people from different social backgrounds interpret and understand events, and attribute causes of those events, differently (Hamilton and Hagiwara 1992). For instance, research shows that gender, cultural background, and educational

attainment all differentially affect attributions of responsibility (Hamilton and Hagiwara 1992; Hamilton and Sanders 1996; Gailey 2013; Sanders and Hamilton 1987; Sanders et al. 1996).

Attribution theorists have also proposed an integrated model for how attributions of responsibility are assigned for wrongdoing in organizations (Gailey and Lee 2005a), and I draw on this model. This proposed model synthesizes past work (i.e., Hamilton 1978, 1986; Hamilton and Sanders 1981; Shaver 1985) and incorporates the idea of social or organizational context. The model uses Shaver's (1985) multidimensional conceptualization of responsibility, which accounts for both legal culpability and morality. Shaver explains that there are at least five dimensions of responsibility: 1) causality (i.e., did the actor directly or tangentially cause the act); 2) knowledge (i.e., was the actor aware or could the actor foresee the consequences of his or her actions); 3) intentionality (i.e., was the action intentional or accidental) 4); coercion (i.e., was free will inhibited); and 5) moral wrongfulness (i.e., how morally wrong was the action).The integrated model also suggests the inclusion of media frames, standard operating procedures (SOPs), mental schemas, and outcome severity. Drawing on this model, I include SOPs, perceptions of offense seriousness, and a number of control variables in my models. The limited work that partially tests the integrated model (e.g., see Gailey 2013) finds support for SOPs on multiple dimensions of responsibility. Next, I briefly review limitations in previous attribution of responsibility research, and how I address these limitations.

Limitations of Past Research

Previous attribution of responsibility research suffers from three major weaknesses: 1) a lack of interdisciplinary work across attribution studies in sociology and psychology, 2) inconsistent and underdeveloped measurement of responsibility across studies, and 3) the

majority of studies use the same vignettes that describe crimes that are non-representative of most workplace crimes.

The first two weaknesses in past research are both related to differences across studies in sociology and psychology. I address the first major limitation by using an integrated model that draws on sociological and psychological studies to test the attribution of responsibility within organizations (Gailey and Lee 2005a). The second major limitation of past research is the inconsistent and inadequate measurement of responsibility across studies. Psychologists have employed a number of different measures, including blame, causation, fault, guilt, morality, responsibility, and others (Critchlow 1985; Gebotys and Dasgupta 2001; Harvey and Rule 1978; Krulewitz and Nash 1979). Sociologists have been more consistent in measuring responsibility; however, sociologists' measurements do not account for the multidimensional nature of responsibility. For instance, much research relies on studies that use single item measures of responsibility or liability (e.g., see Ackerman et al. 1984; Gailey and Lee 2005b; Harrison and Esqueda 2000; Hamilton and Sanders 1981, 1995, 1996; Hans and Erman 1989; Sanders and Hamilton 1987; Sanders et al. 1996) or a single item to measure the likelihood that subjects would employ a similar explanation for wrongdoing (see Hamilton and Hagiwara 1992). This is problematic, because attribution theory suggests (Gailey and Lee 2005a; Shaver 1985) and empirical work shows (Gailey and Falk 2008; Gailey 2013) that responsibility is multidimensional. To address measurement issues in past research, I use a multi-dimensional measure of responsibility (Shaver 1985).

Finally, much past research uses vignettes that describes crimes that are non-representative of most workplace or white-collar crimes and likely to elicit strong reactions (e.g., injecting terminally ill patients with high doses of plutonium without consent, exposing

prisoners' testicles to large amounts of X-ray radiation, feeding small doses of radioactive oatmeal to developmentally disabled children, large scale faulty auto design defects, toxic waste spills or dumping, suppression of news stories, or the side effects of inadequately tested and defective prescription drugs) (Gailey 2013; Gailey and Lee 2005b; Gailey and Lee 2008; Hamilton and Sanders 1995, 1996; Hans and Erman 1989; Sanders et al. 1996). Moreover, none of this research examines financial crimes (i.e., crimes that are a result of the manipulation of financial instruments or markets and primarily result in financial losses to victims) or crimes perpetrated by offenders in the financial services industry (i.e., individuals or organizations whose primary business is financial advising, management, and investment of clients' monies). Thus, this research ignores many organizational crimes and white-collar crimes, crimes that a large portion of which are financial in nature and many of which are committed by offenders in the financial services industry (Huff, Desilets, and Kane 2010; Kane and Wall 2006; Reiman and Leighton 2013). To address this weakness, I utilize vignettes that describe a financial crime committed by offenders in the financial services industry.

Next, I review literature on the way that attributions are affected by the social role of offenders and standard operating procedures, the two facets of organizational offending that I focus on in this research. I also explain my predictions for how these facets of organizational offending affect responsibility attributions and punishment.

Attributions of Responsibility for Social Roles and Standard Operating Procedures

Social roles. Offenders who commit crimes in an organizational setting can offend autonomously by acting of their own volition, they can offend as conformists in a group context where everyone else is also offending, or they can offend in an obedient role by following the direct orders of superiors. Autonomous offenders are consistently rated as most responsible for

their actions (Gailey 2013; Gailey and Lee 2005b, 2008; Hamilton and Sanders 1995, 1996; Sanders et al. 1996).

Only one study, of which I am aware, examines the effect of conformist offending on attributions of responsibility. This research finds that participants assign more responsibility to autonomous than conformist or obedient offenders and greater responsibility to conformist offenders than obedient offenders (Hamilton and Sanders 1995). Crimes that occur at an organizational or industry level may not be directly ordered by superiors. Rather, crimes may be directly or indirectly facilitated through corporate or industry cultures that permit or encourage risky or unethical business practices in the pursuit of profits or goals, and wherein there is a belief that everyone at an organization or within a particular industry is also engaged in the same illegal practices (Clinard and Yeager 1980; Geis 1967; Shover 2007; Shover and Hochstetler 2002; Vaughan 1996, 2007). In these environments, employees may feel that they must participate in illegal or unethical practices to keep their job, further their career, or so that an organization remains competitive, and, in these situations, other employees may teach or initiate offenders into these illegal or unethical practices. In order to examine the impact of social roles on attributions of responsibility for a financial crime, I describe offenders as autonomous (i.e., as acting on their own) or as conformists (i.e., offending with peers). Following past research showing that autonomous offenders are attributed more responsibility than conformist offenders (Hamilton and Sanders 1995), I expect that participants will assign greater attributions of responsibility to autonomous offenders than to conformist offenders:

> *Social Role Hypotheses*: Participants will attribute greater (1) causality, (2) knowledge, (3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and less (5) coerciveness to autonomous offenders than to conformist offenders.

Standard operating procedures. SOPs account for the fact that organizations develop behavioral scripts that guide employees' actions and institutional practices (DiMaggio 1997; Gailey 2013; Gailey and Lee 2005a; Frieland and Alford 1991; Jackall 1988; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Simon 1996). As other researchers note, even when actors act autonomously and think they are acting of their own free will, there are always institutional logics at play that guide behaviors and limit choices (Gailey and Lee 2005a). Further, unethical and illegal practices become so embedded in organizations and industries, and so normalized and routinized, that many times offenders are not even fully cognizant of their offending, or consider their actions wrongful, even if what they are doing is unethical or technically illegal (Ashforth and Vikas 2003; Ashforth et al. 2008; Gottschalk 2012).

The only study, of which I am aware, that directly tests the effect of SOPs on attributions of responsibility finds that respondents assign more causality, intentionality, and moral wrongfulness to organizations where offenses were committed in which the offense is described as typical within the organization (i.e., as a SOP) (Gailey 2013). Like much attribution research, this study asks about attributions for the specific actor described in the vignette and the organization in separate questions, and this research does not find any effect for SOPs on any responsibility outcomes for individual offenders within the organization. The lack of findings for SOPs on attributions of responsibility for individual offenders in this research may reflect participants' assumptions that SOPs are likely institutional or industry issues. Therefore, participants, in this instance, may have absolved individual actors of blame. This explanation is consistent with previous attribution work, which suggests that individuals view employees as less responsible than organizations, because employees are only partial moral agents in the

offending decision-making process who are ultimately limited in their responsibility and any liability for an offense (Sanders et al. 1996).

The description of SOPs in this research, though, may undercut the role of organizational culture and institutional logics that guide SOPs, as this research describes the actor as only being aware of past practices by the organization (i.e., "Dave knew from past experience that using patients in this manner was typical [not typical] of AEC-funded research.") (Gailey 2013:9). In this instance, the act described may appear to research participants as a practice that is engaged in infrequently or rarely and only loosely supported by an organization. This is in contrast to a SOP being described as something that is normally or routinely engaged in as a standard business practice that is supported by or embedded in organizational guidelines or institutional culture, so much so that the actor does not have to think about his or her actions (Ashforth and Vikas 2003; Ashforth et al. 2008).

To test the effect of SOPs on attributions of responsibility, I describe the offense in the context of a corporate culture that encourages (or discourages) illegal actions as part of normal business practices, and I describe the idea as coming from (or not coming from) those who are in the highest positions of authority at the organization. Describing the idea of offending in this manner should indicate to participants that the wrongdoing committed by offenders is a common (or atypical) practice that is (or is not) normal within this particular setting, and that the organizational culture present in the institution described supports (or does not support) this practice. This manipulation is not the same as previous attribution research on obedience, because I do not describe the action as being ordered by superiors, but as embedded (or not) in the institutional logics within the organization that guides actors' decisions.

Contrary to previous findings on organizational responsibility for SOPs, and in consideration of non-findings from this research on attributions of individual responsibility (Gailey 2013), I expect that offending against SOPs will increase attributions of responsibility to offenders. I expect greater attributions of responsibility to offenders who act against SOPs, because, like autonomous offenders, I expect participants to view offending as a result of the individual offender's decision to offend rather than the context of the offense compelling the offender to act. Further, I expect that participants will view offenses that violate SOPs as occurring as a result of the disposition of the offender, as the offender is not just acting of his or her own accord but also acting against organizational guidelines that discourage offending. Thus, I expect participants to assign offenders described as offending against SOPs greater responsibility than offenders who offend by following SOPs:

> *SOP*s *Hypotheses*: Participants will attribute greater (1) causality, (2) knowledge, (3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and (5) less coerciveness to offenders who offended against SOPs than those who offend by following SOPs.

Responsibility Attributions and Punitiveness

Previous research examines how responsibility attributions predict punitive attitudes (e.g., see Applegate et al. 2000; Blatier 2000; Carroll 1978; Cochran, Boots and Chamlin 2006; Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003; Cullen et al. 1985; Grasmick and McGill 1994; Hawkins 1981; Michel 2017; Unnever et al. 2010; Young 1991). However, this research focuses on how participants' beliefs regarding the causes of crime (i.e., if participants take a dispositional view on crime, attributing the crime to personal characteristics or a situational view attributing it to circumstance) predict their support for more general rehabilitative or retributive sentencing philosophies. For instance, this research shows how situational attributions increase support for rehabilitative punishment (Applegate et al. 2000), how political conservatives dispositional

attributions increase support for capital punishment (Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003), and how dispositional attributions increase perceived seriousness and punitiveness for violent corporate offenders (Michel 2017). This research suggests that attributions of responsibility affect punitive attitudes and philosophies more generally, with dispositional or internal attributions (i.e., person rather than context attributions) increasing punitiveness, but it leaves open questions concerning how responsibility attributions shape recommended punishment for specific offenders and offenses. Further, it is unclear from this research how facets of organizational offending and attributions of responsibility for organizational offenders predict punishment outcomes. Following the logic of attribution theory and drawing on previous research that shows social roles and SOPs affect responsibility attributions, though, I expect that greater attributions of responsibility will also increase recommended punishment. Thus, I expect that autonomous offenders and offenders described as offending against SOPs (i.e., offenders whom I expect will be assigned greater responsibility) will be recommended greater monetary fines by participants. I also expect that attributions of responsibility will decrease the positive effect of autonomous and atypical SOPs offending on participant recommended punishment.

> *Social Role Punishment Hypothesis*: Participants will recommend a greater monetary fine to autonomous offenders than they do to conformist offenders.
>
> *SOPs Punishment Hypothesis*: Participants will recommend a greater monetary fine to offenders who offended against SOPs than those who offend by following SOPs.
>
> *Social Role Mediation Hypotheses*: Participants' attributions of offender (1) causality, (2) knowledge, (3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and (5) non-coerciveness will mediate the relationship between exposure to an autonomous offender and their recommended monetary fine.
>
> *SOPs Mediation Hypotheses*: Participants' attributions of offender (1) causality, (2) knowledge, (3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and (5) non-coerciveness will mediate the relationship between exposure to an offender offending against SOPs and their recommended monetary fine.

Methods

Sample

I collected data from three samples during the fall of 2017: (1) a sample of college students at a large southern university, (2) a sample of college students at a southern community college, and (3) a sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk) users. University student participation was incentivized by offering participants the opportunity to be included in a lottery drawing for one of nine twenty-five-dollar Amazon gift cards. The university student sample includes both undergraduates and graduate students. Community college student participation was incentivized by offering class credit or extra credit to subjects for their participation. Mturk is an online service provided by Amazon that recruits users to fill out surveys for pay, and Mturk users were paid one dollar each for their participation

Experimental Design

I use a vignette experiment that varies four factors: (1) the social role of the offender (autonomous vs. conformist), (2) whether the offender was described as offending by following or acting against SOPs, (3) the offender's gender (male or female), and (4) the extent of financial losses that result from the crime (a few dozen clients losing $3,000 each resulting in a total loss of about $100,000 vs. a few hundred clients losing $3,000 each resulting in a total loss of about $1,000,000). This creates a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 factorial vignette design.

[Figure 4.1 here]

The vignette describes a financial crime in which those at the company (National Finance) illegally use clients' money from personal investment accounts to cover business losses for an unspecified period of time. Clients' personal money is used to cover business losses without the knowledge of clients, and money brought in from newly recruited clients is also used

to cover losses to long-term clients. The vignette keeps constant the crime's description and it explicitly states that the practice being described in the vignette is illegal. The names of the vignette characters, Todd or Emily, are two of the most common names given to white boys and girls born between 1974 and 1979 (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004). The full vignette is as follows:

> **Emily/Todd** Smith works in the financial services industry for National Finance, which is a private financial planning and investments firm that primarily works with clients to diversify their financial investments. **Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers has/have** full control over many of **her/his/their** clients' investment accounts. **Her/His/Their** control includes the ability to transfer money to and from personal investment accounts without approval of clients. People in positions of authority at National Finance have created a corporate culture that **encourages/discourages** pushing the limits in investments with clients' money as part of their normal business practices. National Finance has had a rough past five years, having lost significant client money through bad investments. As a result, **Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers has/have** felt compelled to **work together to** illegally use investment money from newly recruited clients to cover losses to long term clients. **Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers** know**(s)** that it is illegal to use **her/his/their** clients' personal money to cover business losses, but that no one will know as long as long-term investors are still seeing returns on their investments. This idea to cover long term losses with money from new investors **comes from/does *not* come from** those who are in the highest positions of authority at National Finance. Eventually, **Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers was/were** unable to cover the losses made on older accounts with money from new investors; consequently **a few dozen clients lost $3,000 each, resulting in a total loss of about $100,000/a few hundred clients lost $3,000 each, resulting in a total loss of about $1,000,000**.

Condition Variables

Autonomous offender (manipulated using "Emily/Todd' or "her/his") and *conformist offender* (manipulated using "Emily/Todd" and "her/his co-workers," or "their," and "work together") are dummy variables for the social role of offenders in vignettes, and *conformist offender* is the omitted category. *Against standard operating procedures* (manipulated using "discourages" and "does *not* come from") and *following standard operating procedures* (manipulated using "encourages" and "comes from") are dummy variables for the organizational

offending context that participants were exposed to (i.e., one in which the offender participating in the business practice described was offending by either following SOPs or acting against SOPs), with *following standard operating procedures* as the omitted category.

Condition controls. *Gender of the offender* (female = 1, male = 0) and *financial losses* (high financial loss ($100,000,000) = 1, low financial loss ($100,000) = 0) also vary across conditions, so they are controlled in all models.

[Table 4.1 here]

Dependent Variables

Dimensions of responsibility. I use the five individual components of responsibility outlined in previous research (Shaver 1985) as dependent variables to measure responsibility, and I later examine these same variables as mediators between the social role of offenders and punishment and between SOPs and punishment. The measures I use for the different dimensions of responsibility are modified versions of items used by previous researchers (Gailey and Falk 2008). Participants were asked in separate questions about these measures. All questions used 101-point semantic differential slider scales with "Strongly disagree" as an anchor point on the left side of the scale and "Strongly agree" as an anchor point on the right side of the scale. I divided each item by 10, so all items range from 1-10, with higher scores indicating higher ratings on each item and greater internal attributions. The *causality* dimension of responsibility was measured with four items: (1) Todd/Emily is responsible for what happened; (2) Todd/Emily is at fault for what happened; (3) Todd/Emily could have avoided what happened; and (4) The crime described in the pre-sentencing report was preventable. The *knowledge* dimension was measured with three items: (1) Todd/Emily was aware of the potential consequences for what happened; (2) Todd/Emily was able to foresee the harm of his/her actions; and (3) Todd/Emily

recognized the seriousness of his/her actions. The *intentionality* dimension was measured with four items: (1) Todd/Emily intended to commit the crime; (2) Todd/Emily intended to harm clients of National Finance; (3) Todd's/Emily's actions were an accident (reverse coded); and (4) Todd/Emily planned his/her actions in advance. The *coercion* dimension was measured with four items: (1) Todd/Emily acted of his/her own will; (2) Other people influenced Todd/Emily to act (reverse coded); (3) Todd/Emily was coerced in his/her actions (reverse coded); and (4) Someone else besides Todd/Emily was responsible for the crime (reverse coded). Higher scores on *coercion* indicate less coerciveness for the actor who commits the offense, and less coerciveness indicates more responsibility for the actor compared to the situational context (an internal attribution). And, finally, the *moral wrongfulness* dimension is measured with four items: (1) What Todd/Emily did was wrong; (2) Todd/Emily was acting morally (reverse coded); (3) Todd/Emily was deceitful in his/her actions; and (4) Todd/Emily was justified in his/her actions (reverse coded).

Each of these five measures were individually combined into composites using principal-factor analysis, and each measure respectively comprised a single factor (see Table 4.1). I drop two items that measure intentionality because of low loadings, an actor's intention to harm clients (.31) and perceptions of the actor's actions as an accident (.38) (loadings for dropped items not shown in Table 4.1). Alpha reliability scores for knowledge (.69) and intentionality (.66) fall below the ordinary threshold of .70. However, previous attribution research also indicates low alpha scores (e.g., see Gailey 2013; Michel 2017) and still retains all dimensions of responsibility, as theoretical reasoning suggests their inclusion. Moreover, other work suggests the limitations of relying solely on alpha levels in creating composites (Cronbach 2004; McDonald 1985). Following previous research (Gailey 2013; Gailey and Falk 2008) and the

proposed integrated model I draw on (Gailey and Lee 2005a), I also keep the five dimensions of responsibility as separate factored variables, rather than combining them.

[Table 4.2 here]

Monetary fine is the recommended monetary fine that participants assign to the offender in the vignette, and I use this dependent variable to measure punishment. Participants were asked how large a fine they would recommend if Emily/Todd from the vignette were to be punished with a fine and only a fine. Participants used a slider scale with "No fine" on the left and "$1,000,000" on the right as anchor points. Responses to monetary fine were divided by ten thousand to create a scale that ranges from zero to one hundred.

Control Variables

Appropriate legal punishment control variables. Community service, *monetary fine*, *probation*, and *imprisonment* are dummy variables for the type of punishment that participants indicate is the most appropriate legal response to the crime they read in the vignette. Participants were instructed to choose all that apply.

Perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics. Drawing on Gailey and Lee's (2005a) integrated model, I also wanted models, within data limitations, to account for behavioral consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus. So, I include controls for the participants' perception of the likelihood that the offender would commit the same crime again, that the offender committed the same crime in the past, that the offender is usually law abiding, and perceptions of the offender's behavior as bad. I also include a control for participants' perceptions of the offender's status and for participants' perceptions of the offender's behavior as serious. Each of these measures were captured using 101-point semantic differential slider scales and each

measure was divided by 10. In the interest of space, the full wording of these items and their anchors can be found in Appendix A.

Participant attributes. I also include controls for participant demographics, cultural background, religion, and educational attainment. *Age* is continuous, and I also include a squared version of this variable. *Participant education* collapses six categories into a dichotomous variable with those who have less than a bachelor's degree omitted. *Student* is a dummy variable that controls for differences between *Mturk* users and student participants. *Female* and *gender non-conforming* control for participants' gender, with *male* omitted. *Parental education* averages together participants' mother's and father's highest levels of education, with values ranging from 1 (no high school degree) to 6 (a graduate or professional degree). *Personal income* was measured with the question "What is your estimated yearly income?," and participants were given ten categories with $20,000 ranges and a final category of $200,000 or greater. *Political leaning* was measured with a 101-point semantic differential slider scale that asked participants to respond to the prompt "Politically, I am:," with "Extremely Liberal" on the left and "Extremely Conservative" on the right. This variable was divided by 10, and higher scores indicate greater conservatism. *Race and ethnicity* is comprised of six categories, with white as the omitted category. *Religious affiliation* allowed participants to choose from seventeen categories or enter their own answer. I follow a modified version of Steensland and colleagues' (2000) categorization scheme and collapsed these categories into those shown in Table 2. Finally, *religious attendance frequency* was measured with "How frequently do you attend religious services?," with participants given the response options: never, once or twice a year, several times a year, monthly, weekly, multiple times a week, or daily. I do not show the results for participant's attributes in Tables 4.3-4.5, but the full models can be found in Appendix A.

[Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 here]

RESULTS

Responsibility Attributions for the Social Role of Offenders and Standard Operating Procedures

Tables 4.3 and 4.5 show the OLS regression results for the effect of all variables on the five dimensions of responsibility. Model 1 only includes condition variables, Model 2 adds dimensions of responsibility (omitting the dimension of responsibility that is the dependent variable in each respective model), and Model 3 displays the full models that also control for appropriate legal punishment, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, and participant attributes. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 only show coefficients for autonomous offenders, SOPs, and dimensions of responsibility, but the full models can be found in Appendix A[3].

Consistent with social role attribution hypotheses, participants attributed more causality and less coerciveness to autonomous than conformist offenders. However, contrary to social role attribution hypotheses, participants attributed less intentionality and moral wrongfulness to autonomous than conformist offenders. I did not find any significant effect of offender's social role on knowledge attributions. I also find, consistent with SOPs attribution hypotheses, that participants attributed more causality and less coerciveness to offenders described as offending against SOPs than those described as offending by following SOPs. Contrary to SOPs attribution hypotheses, I find that participants attributed less knowledge and moral wrongfulness to offenders described as offending against SOPs than those described as offending by following

[3] I also examined interaction effects between the social role of the offender and SOPs context. I do not show offender gender, financial losses, or the interaction between the social role of the offender and SOPs context in Tables 4.3-4.5, but the full models can be found in Appendix A. The full models also include coefficients for appropriate legal punishment, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, and participant attributes. Controls for participant demographics are not needed in a study with random assignment to conditions; however, the proposed integrated model I draw on (Gailey and Lee 2005a) suggests their inclusion.

SOPs. I did not find any significant effect of SOPs on intentionality attributions. I also examined interaction effects between conditions on each dimension of responsibility. Participants attributed less coerciveness to autonomous offenders who also offend against SOPs (b = 0.463, se = 0.085, p = 0.000) than conformist offenders who offend by following SOPs; however, this is the only interaction effect that ever reaches significance. Models in Table 4.3 and 4.4 suggest possible suppression or mediation effects for social roles and SOPs on attributions for different dimensions of responsibility. I examine these relationships, but I do not show results of these tests in tables. Suppression and mediation analyses show: causality suppresses the effect of SOPs on moral wrongfulness and knowledge attributions, and causality suppresses the effect of autonomous offending on intentionality and moral wrongfulness attributions; coerciveness is a suppressor for autonomous offending on intentionality attributions and for autonomous offending and SOPs on moral wrongfulness attributions; intentionality exhibits a suppression effect for autonomous offending on moral wrongfulness attributions; and, moral wrongfulness mediates the effect of autonomous offending on intentionality attributions.

[Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 here]

Punishment Hypotheses

Table 4.5 shows OLS results for the recommended monetary fine that participants assign to offenders. All models in Table 4.5 include controls for all conditions, appropriate legal punishment, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, and participant attributes. Model 1 provides support for both the social role and SOPs punishment hypotheses. As predicted in the social role punishment hypothesis, participants recommended greater monetary fines for autonomous offenders than conformist offenders. And, consistent with the SOPs punishment

hypothesis, participants recommended greater monetary fines to offenders described as offending against SOPs than those who offend by following SOPs.

Social Role and SOPs Mediation Hypotheses

Models 2-6 in Table 4.5 add the five dimensions of responsibility necessary to test the social role and SOPs mediation hypotheses. Model 7 displays the full model, which also includes all of the dimensions of responsibility. Consistent with mediation hypotheses, causality and coerciveness both mediate the effect of autonomous offending on recommended monetary fine and offending against SOPs on recommended monetary fine. Differences between Model 1 and 2 in Table 4.5 shows participants' assessments of causality mediate the effect of autonomous offending on the monetary fine participants recommend to offenders (b = 8.635, p = 0.000 to b = 7.196, p = 0.001). Sobel test results in Table 4.6 confirm the mediation effect, showing that causality mediates approximately 17% (p = .022) of the effect of autonomous offending on recommended monetary fine when only one mediator is controlled and approximately 20% of the effect when all mediators are controlled (p = .020). I also find that causality mediates the effect of offending against SOPs on the recommended monetary fine participants assign to offenders (b = 4.311, p = 0.044 to b = 2.715, p = 0.225). Sobel test results show that causality mediates approximately 37% (p = .021) of this effect when only one mediator is controlled and approximately 113% of the effect when all mediators are controlled (p = .027). Changes from Model 1 to Model 5 in Table 4.5 show that the effect of autonomous offending (b = 8.635, p = 0.000 to b = 6.510, p = 0.005) on recommended monetary fine and offending against SOPs (b = 4.311, p = 0.044 to b = 1.277, p = 0.613) on recommended monetary fine are mediated by participants' assessments of coerciveness. Sobel test results show that coerciveness only acts as a significant mediator when it is the only mediator in the model. When coerciveness is the only

mediator in the model, it mediates 25% of the effect of autonomous offending (p = .025) on recommended monetary fine and approximately 70% of the effect of SOPs (p = .024) on recommended monetary fine. I do not find support for mediation effects for the knowledge, intentionality, or moral wrongfulness dimensions of responsibility. However, results do suggest that participants' assessments of moral wrongfulness suppress the effect of autonomous offending on recommended monetary fine and offending against SOPs on recommended monetary fine, but only when the other dimensions of responsibility are also controlled in the model.

Discussion and Conclusion

Limited research examines how responsibility is attributed to offenders who commit crimes in the workplace and how facets of organizational offending affect responsibility attributions. Prior research finds that the social role of offenders (Gailey 2013; Gailey and Lee 2005b, 2008; Hamilton and Sanders 1995, 1996; Sanders et al. 1996) and SOPs (Gailey 2013) affect attributions of responsibility. However, prior research mostly utilizes inconsistent measures that do not account for the multidimensional nature of responsibility, vignettes that describe non-representative workplace crimes, and convenience samples of college students. Further, this research does not connect responsibility attributions to recommended punishment. Theoretical work proposes an integrated model to evaluate attributions of responsibility in the workplace (Gailey and Lee 2005a), yet only limited research partially tests this model (Gailey 2013).

To address weaknesses in prior research and further examine how aspects of organizational workplace crimes affect responsibility attributions, I used a vignette experiment in which participants were exposed to a crime committed by offenders in the financial services

industry. I drew on and partially tested the proposed integrated model for the attribution of responsibility within organizations (Gailey and Lee 2005a). I measured responsibility as a multidimensional concept, I more comprehensively controlled for participant attributes than past research, and I included a more expansive sample than past research. Additionally, I examined how the social role of offenders and SOPs affected the recommended monetary fine participants assigned to offenders and how dimensions of responsibility mediate this relationship.

Consistent with predictions, results show that participants assigned more causality and less coerciveness to autonomous offenders and offenders who offended against SOPs than conformist offenders and those who offended by following SOPs. Findings on more causality and less coerciveness for autonomous offenders are consistent with past attribution research (Hamilton and Sanders 1995). Findings on causality for offenders who offended against SOPs differ somewhat from past research, which found more causality assigned to organizations and non-findings for individuals (Gailey 2013). However, prior research asked about causality for individuals and the organization in separate questions and manipulated SOPs by indicating that the actor knew that the practice described was either typical or atypical of past practices by the organization. I manipulated SOPs by describing the type of organizational culture in place where the offense occurred, and I described the practice as either being embedded (or not) in institutional logics as part of normal business practices, a description that is closer to how the organizational studies and institutional logics literature describes SOPs (Ashforth and Vikas 2003; Ashforth et al. 2008). Thus, my findings on causality for offenders who offend against SOPs are not surprising, given that these offenders' actions are less likely than those who offend by following SOPs to be viewed as a result of the situation or circumstance in which the offense occurs, since offenders who offend by following SOPs are merely following practices that are

normal or encouraged in the place where they work. Gailey (2013) does not include measures of coerciveness for SOPs; thus, it is unclear from past research how SOPs should affect coerciveness. However, following attribution theory, and logically, coerciveness should not be attributed to offenders who offend against SOPs, because actors in this context are actually discouraged from offending by the environment in which the offending occurs, and my results support this supposition.

Inconsistent with my predictions, participants attributed less intentionality to autonomous offenders than conformist offenders, and participants attributed less knowledge to offenders who offended against SOPs than those who offended by following SOPs. Also inconsistent with my predictions, participants attributed less moral wrongfulness to autonomous offenders and to offenders who offended against SOPs than conformist offenders or those who offended by following SOPs. I believe these unexpected findings may be related. These findings may be, in part, a result of questions only asking about attributions for offenders from vignettes and not organizations. Since participants are not asked about attributions of responsibility for the organization, participants may actually be trying to indicate greater external attributions of intentionality, knowledge, and moral wrongfulness rather than wanting to make internal attributions to individual actors. Participants may have also viewed conformist offenders' actions as more intentional and offenders who offend by following SOPs as more knowledgeable, because describing offenses in this manner makes it clear that these are actions being engaged in by multiple people with some level of coordinated effort, planning, or decision to engage in the actions described. Therefore, participants, on these respective dimensions of responsibility, may view the actions of groups of offenders as more deliberate and offenders who offended in corporate cultures that encourage risk taking as more aware of what they are doing. Additionally,

greater external attributions may be more likely, because vignettes gave no indication that offenders directly personally benefitted or profited from their actions, which should suggest to participants that offenders' actions, instead, were intended to benefit the organization. Similarly, participants may have viewed the offenses of conformists and those who offended by following SOPs to be worse because of the presumed organizational or institutional nature of their offending or the seemingly larger scope of their crimes. Again, in this instance, participants may be attributing more moral wrongfulness to the situation as a whole (i.e., externally), compared to offenders who acted alone or against organizational guidelines. Findings on greater external attributions of moral wrongfulness for SOPs would also align with findings in previous research (Gailey 2013). Thus, although these findings are contrary to my predictions, given that questions only asked about individual offenders, it is possible that participants viewed intentionality, knowledge, and moral wrongfulness as more attributable to the organization or situation as a whole rather than an individual offender.

Although previous research does not suggest how the social role of offenders or SOPs should affect punishment, I predicted that autonomous offenders and offenders who offend against SOPs would be recommended a greater monetary fine by participants. Consistent with my predictions, results showed that autonomous offenders are recommended a greater monetary fine than conformist offenders and offenders who offended against SOPs are recommended a greater monetary fine by participants than offenders who offended by following SOPs. Thus, the current research establishes a clearer relationship between these two aspects of organizational offending and punitiveness. From a policy perspective, and in terms of practical implications, these findings suggest that citizens may be in favor of charging and fining individual offenders,

in addition to or rather than organizations, even when offenders commit offenses on behalf of or for the benefit of an organization.

Previous research also does not suggest how attributions of responsibility for facets of organizational offending are related to punishment. So, I examined if dimensions of responsibility mediated the effect of autonomous offending and offending against SOPs on recommended punishment, and I found limited support for mediation effects. Participants' assessments of causality and coerciveness both mediate the effect of autonomous offending and offending against SOPs on recommended punishment; however, none of the other dimensions of responsibility act as significant mediators. These findings suggest that assessments of responsibility for aspects of organizational offending are only somewhat related to recommended punishment. High assessments of causality and coerciveness mediating the effect of autonomous offending on recommended monetary fines and offending against SOPs on recommended monetary fines suggests punitiveness is driven by assessments of how directly involved offenders were in the offense and how much offenders made a free decision to act. Punitiveness, in this case, is unrelated to how much actors actually knew what it was that they were doing, the aim or goal of their actions, or any assessment of how moral their actions were. Shaver's (1985) multidimensional measure of responsibility accounts for both legal and moral culpability, and results suggest that punitive attitudes for organizational financial crimes are guided more so by assessments of what offenders did, and less so by assessments of why or how offenders did what they did. Although intention and full knowledge may contribute to both legal assessments and moral assessments, findings on these dimensions affecting recommended punishment are non-significant, while findings on causality and coerciveness are significantly related to punishment recommendations. And, participants' assessments of moral wrongfulness, though exhibiting a

significant suppression effect in the full models when the other dimensions of responsibility are also controlled, do not mediate the effect of autonomous offending on recommended monetary fines or offending against SOPs on recommended monetary fines. Thus, these findings suggest that punitiveness for autonomous offenders and offenders who offend against SOPs and commit financial crimes are more related to participants assessments of dimensions of responsibility concerned with legal considerations than moral considerations.

The current study improved on past research by providing a more comprehensive evaluation of how aspects of organizational crime contribute to attributions of responsibility and how responsibility attributions relate to punishment. Using a multidimensional measure of responsibility allowed me to more thoroughly examine which dimensions of responsibility drive responsibility assessments. And, using vignettes that described a financial crime provided a more representative evaluation of how responsibility is assigned to offenders who commit workplace or organizational crimes. Below, I review limitations of this study and suggest future research.

Limitations and Future work

This research was limited in that it did not fully test Gailey and Lee's (2005a) integrated model. It was further limited because it only asked about attributions of individual offenders rather than both the offender and the organization that the offender works for. Future work in this area should fully test the integrated model and should also ask about responsibility attributions for both organizations and offenders. Further work testing this model should also use a structural equation modeling approach to examine how different dimensions of responsibility contribute to the overall concept of responsibility and affect recommended punishment outcomes. This research was also limited in that it only explored one type of financial crime. Future work in this area should explore other financial crimes as well as other types of white-collar crime. Future

work in this area should also vary the social status of offenders by varying both occupational prestige and the offender's position within the organizational structure. Finally, future work should also examine other aspects of organizational offending, for instance, findings on responsibility and punitiveness may also vary by the type and size of the organization in which the offense occurs.

Tables and Figures for Chapter 4

Figure 4.1 Experimental Vignette Design

Autonomous vs. Conformist Offenders	Following Standard Operating Procedures		Against Standard Operating Procedures	
	Greater Financial Losses	*Lesser Financial Losses*	*Greater Financial Losses*	*Lesser Financial Losses*
Autonomous male	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4
Conformist male	Condition 5	Condition 6	Condition 7	Condition 8
Autonomous female	Condition 9	Condition 10	Condition 11	Condition 12
Conformist female	Condition 13	Condition 14	Condition 15	Condition 16

Table 4.1 Factor Loadings, Explained Variance, and Alpha Reliability Scores for Measures of Responsibility using Principal-Factor Analysis after Varimax Rotation (N = 870)

	Factor Loadings		
Causality			
Todd/Emily is responsible for what happened	.834	**Alpha**	.818
Todd/Emily is at fault for what happened	.856	**Explained Variance**	2.187
Todd/Emily could have avoided what happened	.706	**Proportion of Explained Variance**	.994
The crime described in the pre-sentencing report was preventable	.512		
Knowledge			
Todd/Emily was aware of the potential consequences for what happened	.615	**Alpha**	.688
Todd/Emily was able to foresee the harm of his/her actions	.709	**Explained Variance**	1.192
Todd/Emily recognized the seriousness of his/her actions	.557	**Proportion of Explained Variance**	1.347
Intentionality			
Todd/Emily intended to commit the crime	.604	**Alpha**	.657
Todd/Emily planned his/her actions in advance	.604	**Explained Variance**	.730
		Proportion of Explained Variance	1.520
Coercion			
Todd/Emily acted of his/her own will	.472	**Alpha**	.768
Other people influenced Todd/Emily to act	.765	**Explained Variance**	1.758
Todd/Emily was coerced in his/her actions	.708	**Proportion of Explained Variance**	1.224
Someone else besides Todd/Emily was responsible for the crime	.670		
Moral Wrongfulness			
What Todd/Emily did was wrong	.614	**Alpha**	.757
Todd/Emily was acting morally	.684	**Explained Variance**	1.679

Todd/Emily was deceitful in his/her actions	.608	**Proportion of Explained Variance**	1.250
Todd/Emily was justified in his/her actions	.682		

Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Analyses (N = 870)

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Dependent Variables				
Dimensions of Responsibility				
Causality	.00	.92	-4.61	.87
Knowledge	.00	.80	-3.57	.90
Intentionality	.00	.76	-2.41	.74
Coercion	.00	.86	-1.98	1.52
Moral wrongfulness	.00	.85	-4.90	.70
Punishment				
Monetary fine	39.38	35.90	0	100
Independent Variables				
Conditions				
Autonomous offender	.49		0	1
Conformist offender (omitted)	.51		0	1
Against standard operating procedures	.49		0	1
Following standard operating procedures (omitted)	.51		0	1
Female offender	.51		0	1
Male offender (omitted)	.49		0	1
High financial loss	.51		0	1
Low financial loss (omitted)	.49		0	1
Appropriate Legal Punishment				
Community service	.29		0	1
Monetary fine	.54		0	1
Probation	.39		0	1
Imprisonment	.53		0	1
Perceptions of Actor and Behavior Characteristics				
Offender will commit the same crime again	4.38	2.95	0	10
Offender committed same crime in the past	5.26	2.86	0	10
Offender as law abiding	5.65	2.36	0	10
Offender status	5.76	2.25	0	10
Bad behavior	1.93	1.84	0	10
Behavior seriousness	7.33	2.20	0	10
Participant Attributes				
Age	29.34	11.52	18	77
Age squared	993.29	864.38	324	5,929
Participant education				
Less than bachelor's degree (omitted)	.48		0	1
Bachelor's degree or higher	.42		0	1
Student	.63		0	1

Mturk (omitted)	.37		0	1
Gender				
Female	.59		0	1
Gender non-conforming	.003		0	1
Male (omitted)	.41		0	1
Parental education	3.86	1.45	1	6
Personal income	2.14	1.66	1	11
Political leaning	4.10	2.71	0	10
Race and ethnicity				
African American	.05		0	1
American Indian	.04		0	1
Asian American, Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander	.09		0	1
Hispanic	.06		0	1
Mixed race, international, or other	.03		0	1
White (omitted)	.73		0	1
Religious affiliation				
Catholic	.13		0	1
Evangelical Protestant [a]	.32		0	1
Mainline Protestant [b] (omitted)	.08		0	1
No affiliation, agnostic, or atheist	.39		0	1
Other [c]	.08		0	1
Religious attendance frequency	2.70	1.71	1	7

Notes: [a] Assembly of God, Baptist, Born Again Christian, Evangelical, Non-denominational Christian, Pentecostal, Seventh-day Adventist. [b] Episcopalian, Lutheran, Methodist, or Presbyterian. [c] Buddhist, Hindu, Jew, Mormon Muslim, other, or multiple affiliations.

Table 4.3 OLS Regressions of Causality, Knowledge, and Intentionality on Conditions and Controls (N = 870)

	Causality			Knowledge			Intentionality		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Conditions									
Autonomous offender (0 = conformist offender)	.374*** (.059)	.281*** (.050)	.306*** (.048)	.013 (.054)	-.056 (.052)	-.031 (.053)	-.046 (.047)	-.140** (.045)	-.120** (.046)
Against standard operating procedures (0 = following standard operating procedures)	.483*** (.059)	.230*** (.053)	.250*** (.052)	.031 (.054)	-.150** (.055)	-.133* (.057)	.155** (.047)	.006 (.048)	.022 (.047)
Dimensions of Responsibility									
Causality					.204*** (.034)	.158*** (.037)		.170*** (.030)	.138*** (.031)
Knowledge		.194*** (.033)	.136*** (.032)					.248*** (.028)	.225*** (.028)
Intentionality		.216*** (.038)	.170*** (.038)		.332*** (.038)	.322*** (.040)			
Coercion		.216*** (.038)	.198*** (.034)		.028 (.036)	.025 (.037)		.061† (.031)	.064* (.031)
Moral Wrongfulness		.383*** (.030)	.336*** (.037)		.132* (.034)	.100* (.041)		.108*** (.029)	.107** (.035)
Intercept	-.432 (.066)	-.222 (.056)	-.991 (.304)	-.017 (.061)	.131 (.058)	-.100 (.329)	-.099 (.053)	.029 (.050)	-.010 (.275)
R^2	.110	.484	.551	.004	.268	.301	.016	.290	.367

Adjusted R^2	.106	.479	.531	-.001	.261	.270	.011	.284	.339

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † $p<.10$; * $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$. Models 1-2 also control all conditions. Models 3 controls: all conditions, appropriate legal punishment variables, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, and participant attributes.

Table 4.4 OLS Regressions of Coercion and Moral Wrongfulness on Conditions and Controls (N = 870)

	Coercion			Moral Wrongfulness		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Conditions						
Autonomous offender (0 = conformist offender)	.571*** (.047)	.504*** (.046)	.504*** (.046)	-.073 (.057)	-.290*** (.052)	-.181*** (.044)
Against standard operating procedures (0 = following standard operating procedures)	.841*** (.048)	.722*** (.046)	.721*** (.046)	.067 (.057)	-.259*** (.055)	-.143** (.047)
Dimensions of Responsibility						
Causality		.207*** (.032)	.197*** (.034)		.406*** (.032)	.270*** (.030)
Knowledge		.025 (.032)	.021 (.032)		.108** (.034)	.069* (.029)
Intentionality		.072† (.037)	.078* (.038)		.146*** (.039)	.106** (.034)
Coercion					.124*** (.036)	.064* (.031)
Moral Wrongfulness		.109** (.032)	.080* (.039)			
Intercept	-.722 (.053)	-.618 (.050)	-.434 (.305)	-.062 (.064)	.219 (.058)	-.720 (.273)
R^2	.347	.453	.491	.007	.348	.571
Adjusted R^2	.344	.447	.467	.003	.342	.552

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † $p<.10$; * $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$. Models 1-2 also control all conditions. Models 3 controls: all conditions, appropriate legal punishment variables, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, and participant attributes.

Table 4.5 OLS Regressions of Recommended Monetary Fine on Conditions, Dimensions of Responsibility, and Controls (N = 870)

	Recommended Monetary Fine						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Conditions							
Autonomous offender (0 = conformist offender)	8.635*** (2.128)	7.196** (2.206)	8.619*** (2.129)	8.674*** (2.128)	6.499** (2.320)	8.562*** (2.127)	4.971* (2.383)
Against standard operating procedures (0 = following standard operating procedures)	4.311* (2.141)	2.715 (2.237)	4.306* (2.142)	4.050† (2.155)	1.277 (2.517)	4.425* (2.142)	-.119 (2.552)
Dimensions of Responsibility							
Causality		3.494* (1.465)					4.185* (1.676)
Knowledge			.442 (1.443)				-.490 (1.559)
Intentionality				1.801 (1.706)			1.206 (1.865)
Coercion					3.672* (1.612)		3.141† (1.681)
Moral Wrongfulness						-2.290 (1.708)	-4.937** (1.871)
Intercept	-14.350 (14.533)	-7.785 (14.751)	-14.008 (14.583)	-13.168 (14.575)	-10.736 (14.583)	-17.588 (14.725)	-9.965 (14.788)
R^2	.291	.296	.291	.292	.296	.293	.305
Adjusted R^2	.263	.267	.263	.263	.267	.264	.273

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † $p<.10$; * $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$. Models 1-7 control: all conditions, appropriate legal punishment variables, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, and participant attributes.

Table 4.6 Sobel Test Results (N = 870)

	Recommended Monetary Fine							
	Autonomous offending				Atypical operating procedure			
	Single mediator controlled		All mediators controlled		Single mediator controlled		All mediators controlled	
	% Mediated	*p*	% Mediated	*p*	% Mediated	*p*	% Mediated	*p*
Dimensions of Responsibility								
Causality	16.67	.022	20.48	.020	37.02	.021	112.84	.027
Knowledge	.19	.777	.31	.781	.11	.862	-121.20	.756
Intentionality	-.45	.652	-3.01	.529	6.05	.314	-28.19	.709
Coercion	24.74	.025	24.16	.066	70.37	.024	105.56	.064
Moral Wrongfulness	.85	.517	15.23	.026	-2.64	.383	120.34	.046

Notes: † $p<.10$; * $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This dissertation examined how offender and case attributes affect criminal perceptions, responsibility attributions, and recommended sentencing outcomes for occupational and organizational crimes. All chapters used online vignette experiments administered to community college students in the South, students at a large southern university, and Amazon Mechanical Turk users. Chapter 2 assessed how an offender's occupational status, gender, and the word used to describe an offender's crime affected the recommended prison sentence and monetary fine that participants assigned to offenders. Chapter 3 further assessed how an offender's occupational status affects recommended punitiveness by examining the mediation effects of post-crime impressions of offenders on the recommended prison sentence that participants assigned to offenders. Finally, chapter 4 explored how aspects of organizational offenses contribute to responsibility attributions and the recommended monetary fine that participants assigned to offenders. Below, I briefly describe each of these studies and I summarize findings from each of the studies in greater detail. Table 5.1 also shows the summary of all hypotheses tested. I conclude by discussing the implications of findings from this dissertation.

[Table 5.1 here]

Summary of Studies and their Findings

Chapter 2: Criminal Sentiments and Occupational Crime: How Occupation, Crime Description, and Offender Gender Affect Punitive Attitudes. The first study, described in chapter 2, examined the effect of an offender's occupational status, an offender's gender, and the word used to describe an offender's crime on the recommended monetary fine and prison sentence that participants assigned to offenders. Following previous research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018), this study used affect control theory's (Heise 1979, 2007) computer program, *Interact* (Heise 1995),

to run simulations and then used results from theoretical simulations to calculate criminality scores for each of the manipulations in its vignettes. Criminality scores were calculated by combining post-event negative and potent impressions of offenders and the word used to describe their crime, and criminality scores showed that high status occupational offenders, male offenders, and offenders described as stealing were viewed more negatively and as more powerful after their offense than lower occupational status offenders, female offenders, and offenders described as overcharging clients. Thus, I predicted that greater criminal impressions of offenders would correspond with greater recommended punishment for these offenders. Consistent with my ACT-derived predictions, I found: (1) that high status occupational offenders (CEOs and doctors) were punished more harshly than medium status offenders (nurses and accountants) and low status offenders (receptionists); (2) that male offenders were punished more harshly than female offenders; and (3) that offenders described as stealing from clients, a crime description associated with street crime, were given a greater prison sentence but not a greater monetary fine by research participants than offenders described as overcharging clients, a crime description associated with white-collar crime. Thus, consistent with previous research, these findings suggest that high occupational status increases punishment, and that describing a crime using a word associated with street crime, rather than a white-collar crime, increases punishment. These findings also suggest that the leniency afforded female street offenders persists for female offenders who commit occupational crimes.

Chapter 3: Why Does Occupational Clout Affect Sentencing Outcomes?: Exploring the Perceptual Mediators. The second study, described in chapter 3, extended recent research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018) by examining the independent and mediating effects of negative and potent post-crime impressions of occupational offenders. This study used ACT calculated

deference scores (Freeland and Hoey 2018), a more precise measurement of occupational status than that used in previous research, to operationalize an offender's occupational status. This study also used status and power, measures from other group processes research that are proposed as conceptually similar to evaluation and potency from ACT, as additional ways of operationalizing post-event impressions of evaluation and potency. Following previous research (Kroska and Schmidt 2018), I predicted that high occupational status, operationalized using deference scores, would increase the recommended prison sentence that participants assigned to offenders. I also predicted that post-event impressions of an offender's evaluation or status and potency or power would mediate the effect of occupational status on punishment by reducing the positive effect of deference scores on the recommended prison sentence that participants assigned to offenders. Consistent with predictions, I found that high deference scores increased the recommended prison sentence that participants assigned to offenders. I found partial support for my mediation hypotheses, with post-event impressions of potency and power, but not evaluation or status, mediating the effect of deference scores on recommended prison sentencing. Findings from this research suggest that post-event impressions of an offender as powerful, rather than bad or having a high status, are what explains the relationship between an offender's occupational status and recommended punitiveness.

Chapter 4: Social Roles and Standard Operating Procedures: Attributions of Responsibility and Punishment for Financial Crime. The third study, described in chapter 4, used attribution theory (Heider 1985) to examine how two facets of organizational offending, the social role of offenders and standard operating procedures, affected responsibility attributions and participant recommended punishment for offenders who committed financial crimes while working in the financial services industry. I drew on and partially tested an integrated model for

the attribution of responsibility in organizational settings (Gailey and Lee 2005a), and I used a multi-dimensional measure of responsibility (Shaver 1985). Following past research (Hamilton and Sanders 1995), I predicted that offenders who offended autonomously would be assigned greater attributions of responsibility than offenders who were described as offending as conformists. Only limited research has tested the effect of standard operating procedures on responsibility attributions (e.g., Gailey 2013). Contrary to this research, I asked about attributions of responsibility for the offender and not the offender and the organization in which the offense occurred. I also manipulated standard operating procedures differently by describing the corporate culture and institutional logics in place in the institution in which the offense occurred. Thus, I predicted that offenders who were described as offending against standard operating procedures would be assigned greater attributions of responsibility for their offenses by participants than offenders who were described as offending by following standard operating procedures.

Previous research also does not suggest how facets of organizational offending should affect punishment outcomes and how responsibility attributions are related to punishment. However, following the logic of attribution theory, and drawing on research that suggests how responsibility is attributed to offenders, I predicted that autonomous offenders and offenders who offended against standard operating procedures, offenders who I predicted would also be attributed greater responsibility for their offenses, would be assigned greater monetary fines by participants. I also predicted that greater responsibility attributions would mediate the relationship between the social role of offenders on punishment and standard operating procedures on punishment.

Consistent with predictions, I found that participants attributed more causality and less coerciveness to autonomous offenders and offenders described as offending against standard operating procedures for their offenses than conformist offenders and offenders who offend by following standard operating procedures. However, contrary to my predictions, I found that participants attributed less intentionality to autonomous offenders than conformist offenders, and I found that participants attributed less knowledge to offenders who offended against standard operating procedures than offenders who offended by following standard operating procedures. Also contrary to my predictions, I found that participants attributed less moral wrongfulness to autonomous offenders and offenders described as offending against standard operating procedures than conformist offenders and those offenders described as offending by following standard operating procedures.

Consistent with punishment hypotheses, participants recommended greater monetary fines for autonomous offenders and offenders described as offending against standard operating procedures than conformist offenders and those offenders described as offending by following standard operating procedures. And, finally, in partial support of mediation hypotheses, I found that causality and coercion both mediated the effect of the social role of offenders on punishment and standard operating procedures on punishment. However, I did not find significant mediation effects for any of the other dimensions of responsibility.

Implications of Findings

The results of findings from the three studies that comprise this dissertation shed significant light on criminal impressions and punitiveness for occupational crimes. Findings on occupation, offender gender, differences in punitiveness by the word used to describe a crime, and how facets of organizational offending affect responsibility attributions and punishment all

have significant implications for research, courtroom proceedings, and the criminal justice system and the application of the law.

Significantly, past research does not clearly link an offender's occupational status to criminal perceptions or show how an offender's occupational status affects sentencing outcomes. Findings from this dissertation show that, rather than a high-status occupation having a protective effect for offenders that decreases perceptions of criminality, high occupational status increases perceptions of criminality and high-status occupational offenders are recommended greater sentences for their crimes. Further, I find that high-status occupational offenders are punished more harshly for their crimes using two different operationalizations of occupational status. Thus, this dissertation contributes to a growing body of literature that shows that occupational status increases recommended punitiveness. Criminologists began studying white-collar crimes because they believed that high status offenders were more likely to get away with their crimes and they believed that an offender's high status decreased criminal impressions of white-collar offenders (Sutherland 1940, 1983). However, findings from this dissertation support the idea that we are in a period of transformed attention concerning white-collar crimes (Cullen, Hartman, and Johnson 2009). Therefore, citizens may be more in favor of harsher punishments for white-collar criminals than in the past, and judges and criminal justice officials may also be more willing to assign harsher punishments for white-collar offenders than in the past. However, despite these findings and findings in recent research, higher status occupational offenders still benefit from their high-status position in multiple ways when interacting with the criminal justice system (Shaprio 1990), and judges still have significant leeway in assigning sentences. Thus, in the future, policy makers and criminal justice officials may need to take into account the greater

public desire to punish high-status offenders while also assuring offenders are punished according to the law.

Findings from this dissertation, though, also show that occupational status affects punitiveness because of how powerful high-status occupational offenders appear after committing a crime. This finding is important, because it suggests that punitiveness for occupational offenders is not related to the offender's occupational status itself but post-event impressions of power. This finding is further buttressed by the lack of support for post-event impressions of evaluation or status of an offender affecting recommended punishment. Further research in this area should examine what it is about high-status occupational offenders that makes them appear more powerful after committing a crime than lower status offenders and if this effect decreases as the severity of low occupational status offender's crimes increase. Moreover, future research should examine if post-event impressions of power increase punitiveness for non-occupational identities and non-occupational crimes to determine if this effect is unique to occupational identities and occupational crimes. Further research in this area should also examine if the crimes of high-status occupational offenders increase fear of crime more generally and fear of being a victim of white-collar crime in particular.

Notably, this dissertation also finds that participants recommend a lighter punishment for female offenders than male offenders. Although previous research shows that female offenders are punished less harshly for street crimes than male offenders, it was unclear if this effect persisted for occupational crimes. Female offenders being punished less harshly for occupational crimes suggests that the leniency afforded females in the sentencing process is unrelated to the type of crimes they commit. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that there was no significant interaction effect found between offender gender and crime word conditions. Thus,

these finding suggest that judicial decision makers and sentencing guidelines may need to better account for sentencing discrepancies related to an offender's gender. Future research in this area should also examine what factors influence the lenient treatment found for female offenders across crime types.

Differences in the recommended prison sentence assigned to offenders by the verb used to describe an offender's offense are particularly alarming. Using vignettes allowed me to control any differences across crimes and crime types, and offenses only varied by referring to the crime as either "stealing from" or "overcharging" clients. The vignettes described the crimes in such a manner that it was clear that the overcharging of clients was systematic and purposeful; thus, it is highly unlikely that participants believed the overcharging was accidental. This difference in findings points to the significant impact that the way in which a crime or an offender is presented, including the language used to describe a crime, can have on crime impressions. For instance, other research shows that the ways in which defendants present themselves in a court setting affects how their crimes are viewed and subsequent punishment. For example, research shows that offenders appearing as remorseful in court reduces punishments assigned to them (Robinson, Smith-Lovin, and Tsoudis 1994; Tsoudis and Smith-Lovin 1998). Thus, the word used to describe a crime may have a similar effect on punishment outcomes, because it allows for a crime to be framed in ways that may also affect how offenders are viewed and, subsequently, the punishment assigned to them. Additionally, these findings also allude to the significant role and power attorneys and other criminal justice officials have in shaping how a crime is viewed by the language they use in a courtroom when talking about a crime or an offender. Moreover, although crimes in this research were not evaluated by judges, judges are not immune to cognitive biases and how the affective meanings of words can affect these biases,

as well as, as mentioned above, judges have significant authority to depart from established sentencing guidelines. Thus, future research should more carefully evaluate how the affective meanings of words used in a court context to describe both offenders and their crimes affect sentencing outcomes.

Finally, findings on attributions of responsibility for the social role of offenders and standard operating procedures and how responsibility attributions affect punishment outcomes have significant implications for research on the attribution of responsibility. I find that the social role of offenders and standard operating procedures are both significantly related to multiple dimensions of responsibility, but that they both vary on the respective dimensions to which they are related and the direction of the effect (see Table 5.1). If responsibility is a multidimensional concept as suggested by attribution theory (Gailey and Lee 2005a; Shaver 1985) and empirical work (Gailey and Falk 2008; Gailey 2013), and differences in findings from this dissertation, previous research that uses single item measures of responsibility may have incorrectly assessed the degree to which responsibility was attributed to offenders and organizations. Findings also suggest that responsibility attributions only partially affect punishment outcomes. Both autonomous offenders and offenders who offended against standard operating procedures were assigned greater punishment by participants. However, neither autonomous offenders or offenders who offended against standard operating procedures were assigned greater attributions of responsibility on all dimensions of responsibility, and only two dimensions of responsibility, causality and coerciveness, mediated the effect of the social role of offenders on punishment and standard operating procedures on punishment. High assessments of causality and coerciveness mediating the effect of autonomous offending on recommended monetary fines and offending against SOPs on recommended monetary fines suggests punitiveness is driven by assessments of

how directly involved offenders were in the offense and how much offenders made a free decision to act. Punitiveness, in this case, was unrelated to how much actors actually knew what it was that they were doing (knowledge), the aim or goal of their actions (intent), or any assessment of how moral their actions were (moral wrongfulness). These findings could suggest that responsibility attributions are only partially predictive of punishment outcomes, even though, intuitively, all responsibility attributions should predict punitiveness. Or, findings could also suggest that facets of organizational offending that I did not examine or account for explain the lack of findings on all dimensions. For instance, attribution theory also suggests that an offender's social status (Hamilton 1978, 1986; Hamilton and Sanders 1981) within an organizational structure affects how their offenses are viewed, and empirical work on responsibility attributions suggests that employees are only viewed as partial moral agents (Sanders et al. 1996) because they are limited in their decision-making to offend. Therefore, the lack of findings on the other three dimensions affecting punishment may vary according to different components of organizational offending. For instance, it is possible that, in the case of organizational offending, an offender's social status (i.e., if they are a superior or a subordinate in an organizational setting or structure) may drive assessments on the knowledge, intent, or morality dimensions of responsibility, which, in turn, then affect punishment. Thus, future work should more carefully examine the relationship between the different facets of organizational offending, responsibility attributions, and punitive attitudes to determine how and when responsibility attributions are related to punitiveness.

Table for Chapter 5

Table 5.1 Summary of Hypotheses Results

Hypothesis	Result
Chapter 2	
Occupational status recommended prison sentence hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater prison sentence to high status offenders than they do to medium status offenders, and they will recommend a greater prison sentence to medium status offenders than they do to lower status offenders (i.e., CEO and doctor > accountant and nurse > receptionists).	Supported
Occupational status recommended monetary fine hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater monetary fine to high status offenders than they do to medium status offenders, and they will recommend a greater monetary fine to medium status offenders than they do to lower status offenders (i.e., CEO and doctor > accountant and nurse > receptionists).	Supported
Crime word recommended prison sentence hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater prison sentence for offenders who are described as "stealing from" rather than "overcharging" their clients.	Supported
Crime word recommended monetary fine hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater monetary fine for offenders who are described as "stealing from" rather than "overcharging" their clients.	Rejected
Offender gender recommended prison sentence hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater prison sentence to male offenders than female offenders.	Supported
Offender gender recommended monetary fine hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater monetary fine to male offenders than female offenders.	Supported
Chapter 3	
Deference score hypothesis: High deference scores will increase the recommended prison sentence that participants assign to offenders.	Supported
Evaluation and status mediation hypotheses 1-2: Post-event impressions of (1) actor evaluation and (2) actor status will mediate the positive effect of deference scores on recommended prison sentencing.	Rejected

Potency and power mediation hypotheses 1-2: Post-event impressions of (1) actor potency and (2) actor power will mediate the positive effect of deference scores on recommended prison sentencing.	Supported
Chapter 4	
Social Role Hypotheses: Participants will attribute greater (1) causality, (2) knowledge, (3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and less (5) coerciveness to autonomous offenders than to conformist offenders.	
Causality	Supported
Knowledge	Rejected
Intentionality	Rejected*
Moral wrongfulness	Rejected*
Coercion	Supported
Standard Operating Procedure Hypotheses: Participants will attribute greater (1) causality, (2) knowledge, (3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and less (5) coerciveness to offenders who offended against standard operating procedures than those who offend by following standard operating procedures.	
Causality	Supported
Knowledge	Rejected*
Intentionality	Rejected
Moral wrongfulness	Rejected*
Coercion	Supported
Social Role Punishment Hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater monetary fine to autonomous offenders than they do to conformist offenders.	Supported
Standard Operating Procedure Punishment Hypothesis: Participants will recommend a greater monetary fine to offenders who offended against standard operating procedures than those who offend by following standard operating procedures.	Supported
Social Role Mediation Hypotheses: Participants' attributions of offender (1) causality, (2) knowledge, (3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and (5) non-coerciveness will mediate the relationship between exposure to an autonomous offender and their recommended monetary fine.	
Causality	Supported
Knowledge	Rejected
Intentionality	Rejected
Moral wrongfulness	Rejected
Coercion	Supported

Standard Operating Procedure Mediation Hypotheses: Participants' attributions of offender (1) causality, (2) knowledge, (3) intentionality, (4) moral wrongfulness, and (5) non-coerciveness will mediate the relationship between exposure to an offender offending against standard operating procedures and their recommended monetary.	
Causality	Supported
Knowledge	Rejected
Intentionality	Rejected
Moral wrongfulness	Rejected
Coercion	Supported

Note: *Relationship was significant but in opposite direction of what hypothesis predicted

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Appendix A: Measures and Full Tables for Chapter 4

Table A1. Measures and Anchors for Perceptions of Actor and Behavior Characteristics

Variable Name	Wording and Anchors
Offender will commit the same crime again	How likely do you think it is that Todd/Emily will commit this same crime in the future? (Extremely unlikely/Extremely likely)
Offender committed the same crime in the past	How often do you think Todd/Emily has committed this same crime in the past? (Very rarely/Very often)
Offender as law abiding	In your opinion, how likely is it that Todd/Emily generally obeys the law? (Extremely unlikely/Extremely likely)
Offender status	In your opinion, how much status does Todd/Emily generally possess? (Extremely low status/Extremely high status)
Bad Behavior	In your opinion, what Todd/Emily did was… (Good, nice/Bad, awful)
Behavior seriousness	Emily's/Todd's crime is a serious crime. (Strongly disagree/Strongly agree)

Table A2. OLS Regressions of Causality, Knowledge, and Intentionality on Conditions and Controls (N = 870)

	Causality			Knowledge			Intentionality		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Conditions									
Autonomous offender (0 = conformist offender)	.374*** (.059)	.306*** (.048)	.308*** (.062)	.013 (.054)	-.032 (.053)	-.050 (.068)	-.073 (.052)	-.120** (.044)	-.069 (.056)
Against standard operating procedures (0 = standard operating procedure)	.483*** (.059)	.250*** (.052)	.252*** (.065)	.031 (.054)	-.131* (.057)	-.151* (.070)	.173*** (.052)	.022 (.047)	.072 (.059)
Female offender (0 = male offender)	-.028 (.059)	-.005 (.048)	-.005 (.045)	-.059 (.054)	-.082† (.048)	-.082† (.048)	.045 (.052)	.079† (.040)	.078† (.042)
High Financial Loss (0 = low financial loss)	.051 (.059)	-.045 (.044)	-.045 (.044)	.058 (.054)	.014 (.047)	.014 (.048)	.066 (.052)	-.020 (.040)	-.020 (.040)
Autonomous offender x against standard operating procedures			-.005 (.089)			.041 (.095)			-.116 (.080)
Dimensions of Responsibility									
Causality					.158*** (.037)	.158*** (.037)		.138*** (.031)	.137*** (.031)
Knowledge		.136*** (.032)	.136*** (.032)					.225*** (.028)	.225*** (.028)
Intentionality		.170*** (.036)	.170*** (.036)		.322*** (.040)	.323*** (.040)			
Coercion		.198*** (.034)	.198*** (.035)		.025 (.037)	.022 (.038)		.064* (.031)	.072** (.032)
Moral Wrongfulness		.336*** (.037)	.333*** (.037)		.100* (.041)	.100* (.041)		.107** (.035)	.105** (.035)
Appropriate Legal Punishment									
Community service		-.016 (.054)	-.016 (.054)		.096† (.058)	.096† (.058)		.023 (.048)	.024 (.048)
Monetary fine		-.014	-.014		-.088†	-.087†		.059	.057

	(.049)	(.049)	(.052)	(.052)	(.044)	(.044)
Probation	.092†	.090†	.041	.042	-.100*	-.102*
	(.051)	(.052)	(.055)	(.055)	(.046)	(.046)
Imprisonment	.085	.088	.004	.005	-.026	-.030
	(.056)	(.056)	(.060)	(.060)	(.050)	(.050)
Perceptions of Actor and Behavior Characteristics						
Offender will commit the same crime again	-.001	-.001	.012	.012	.015†	.015†
	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)	(.008)	(.008)
Offender committed same crime in the past	.012	.011	-.006	-.006	.023**	.022**
	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)	(.008)
Offender as law abiding	-.004	-.004	.003	.003	.011	.011
	(.010)	(.010)	(.011)	(.011)	(.009)	(.009)
Offender status	.030**	.030**	.019†	.019†	.017†	.017†
	(.010)	(.010)	(.011)	(.011)	(.009)	(.009)
Bad behavior	-.005	-.005	-.003	-.003	.001	.002
	(.016)	(.016)	(.017)	(.017)	(.015)	(.015)
Behavior seriousness	.076***	.076***	.025†	.025†	.017	.017
	(.012)	(.012)	(.013)	(.013)	(.011)	(.011)
Participant Attributes						
Age	.013	.013	-.014	-.014	-.012	-.012
	(.012)	(.012)	(.013)	(.013)	(.011)	(.011)
Age squared	-.000	-.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Bachelor's degree or higher (0 = less than bachelor's degree)	-.149**	-.149**	-.047	-.046	.067	.065
	(.052)	(.052)	(.057)	(.057)	(.047)	(.047)
Student (0 = Mturk)	-.086	-.086	-.099	-.101	-.093†	-.088†
	(.059)	(.060)	(.064)	(.064)	(.053)	(.053)
Female (0 = Male)	-.113*	-.113*	.084†	.083†	-.103*	-.101*
	(.046)	(.046)	(.050)	(.050)	(.042)	(.042)
Gender non-conforming (0 = Male)	-.237	-.238	-.254	-.252	.518	.510
	(.377)	(.378)	(.406)	(.406)	(.339)	(.339)

Parental education		-.000	-.000		.002	.002		-.016	-.016
		(.016)	(.016)		(.018)	(.018)		(.015)	(.015)
Personal income		-.002	-.002		.038*	.038*		-.008	-.008
		(.016)	(.016)		(.017)	(.017)		(.014)	(.014)
Political leaning		-.001	-.001		-.005	-.005		-.006	-.006
		(.009)	(.009)		(.010)	(.010)		(.008)	(.008)
Race and Ethnicity									
African American		-.011	-.011		.010	.008		-.146	-.140
		(.101)	(.101)		(.108)	(.108)		(.090)	(.090)
American Indian		.084	.084		.082	.080		-.178†	-.172†
		(.113)	(.114)		(.122)	(.122)		(.102)	(.102)
Asian American, Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander		-.042	-.042		-.055	-.055		-.114	-.115
		(.087)	(.087)		(.093)	(.093)		(.078)	(.078)
Hispanic		-.016	-.016		.067	.067		-.169*	-.169*
		(.095)	(.096)		(.102)	(.103)		(.086)	(.085)
Mixed race, international, or other		.143	.143		.155	.157		-.525***	-.528***
		(.139)	(.139)		(.149)	(.149)		(.124)	(.124)
Religious affiliation									
Catholic		-.015	-.015		.195†	.195†		-.085	-.086
		(.099)	(.099)		(.106)	(.106)		(.089)	(.089)
Evangelical Protestant		.013	.013		.204*	.205*		-.149†	-.152†
		(.087)	(.087)		(.093)	(.093)		(.078)	(.078)
No affiliation, agnostic, or atheist		-.169†	-.169†		.068	.068		-.050	-.051
		(.096)	(.096)		(.103)	(.103)		(.086)	(.086)
Other		-.036	-.036		.183	.183		-.026	-.024
		(.115)	(.115)		(.123)	(.123)		(.103)	(.103)
Religious attendance frequency		.005	.005		-.019	-.019		.009	.009
		(.018)	(.018)		(.019)	(.019)		(.016)	(.016)
Intercept	-.432	-.991	-.991	-.017	-.100	-.095	-.105	-.010	-.025
	(.066)	(.304)	(.304)	(.061)	(.329)	(.329)	(.058)	(.275)	(.275)

R^2	.110	.551	.551	.004	.301	.301	.018	.367	.369
Adjusted R^2	.106	.531	.531	-.001	.270	.269	.014	.339	.340

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † $p<.10$; * $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$. Models 1only include conditions. Model 2 includes all conditions, appropriate legal punishment variables, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, and participant attributes. Model 3 includes all variables in Model 2 and an interaction effect between autonomous offenders and offending against standard operating procedures.

Table A3. OLS Regressions of Coercion and Moral Wrongfulness on Conditions and Controls (N = 870)

	Coercion			Moral Wrongfulness		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Conditions						
Autonomous offender (0 = conformist offender)	.571*** (.047)	.504*** (.046)	.284*** (.061)	-.073 (.057)	-.181*** (.044)	-.150** (.056)
Against standard operating procedures (0 = standard operating procedures)	.841*** (.048)	.721*** (.046)	.496*** (.062)	.067 (.057)	-.143** (.047)	-.112† (.058)
Female offender (0 = male offender)	.043 (.048)	.044 (.045)	.044 (.044)	.027 (.057)	-.004 (.040)	-.005 (.040)
High Financial Loss (0 = low financial loss)	.016 (.047)	-.016 (.044)	-.013 (.043)	.102† (.573)	.038 (.040)	.038 (.040)
Autonomous offender x against standard operating procedures			.460*** (.085)			-.071 (.079)
Dimensions of Responsibility						
Causality		.197*** (.034)	.190*** (.033)		.270*** (.030)	.270*** (.030)
Knowledge		.021 (.032)	.018 (.032)		.069* (.029)	.070* (.029)
Intentionality		.078* (.038)	.086* (.038)		.106** (.034)	.105** (.034)
Coercion					.064† (.031)	.069* (.032)
Moral Wrongfulness		.080* (.038)	.083* (.038)			
Appropriate Legal Punishment						
Community service		-.091† (.054)	-.089† (.053)		.037 (.048)	.038 (.048)
Monetary fine		.029 (.049)	.033 (.048)		-.009 (.044)	-.009 (.044)

Probation	.005	.017	.023	.021
	(.051)	(.050)	(.046)	(.046)
Imprisonment	.109†	.119*	.010	.008
	(.056)	(.055)	(.050)	(.050)
Perceptions of Actor and Behavior Characteristics				
Offender will commit the same crime again	.005	.004	-.016*	-.016*
	(.009)	(.009)	(.008)	(.008)
Offender committed same crime in the past	-.009	-.005	.007	.006
	(.009)	(.009)	(.008)	(.008)
Offender as law abiding	-.030**	-.027**	.001	.001
	(.010)	(.010)	(.009)	(.009)
Offender status	-.007	-.007	-.016†	-.016†
	(.010)	(.010)	(.009)	(.009)
Bad behavior	-.013	-.014	-.191***	-.190***
	(.016)	(.016)	(.013)	(.013)
Behavior seriousness	-.031*	-.031*	.009	.009
	(.012)	(.012)	(.011)	(.011)
Participant Attributes				
Age	.008	.008	.044***	.044***
	(.012)	(.012)	(.011)	(.011)
Age squared	-.000	-.000	-.000**	-.000
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Bachelor's degree or higher (0 = less than bachelor's degree)	-.052	-.043	.039	.037
	(.052)	(.052)	(.047)	(.047)
Student (0 = Mturk)	.067	.048	.222***	.224***
	(.059)	(.058)	(.053)	(.053)
Female (0 = Male)	-.032	-.039	.127**	.128**
	(.046)	(.046)	(.041)	(.041)
Gender non-conforming (0 = Male)	-.748*	-.696†	-.167	-.171
	(.375)	(.369)	(.338)	(.338)

Parental education		-.019	-.018		.044**	.044**
		(.016)	(.015)		(.015)	(.015)
Personal income		.021	.018		-.009	-.009
		(.016)	(.015)		(.014)	(.014)
Political leaning		.015	.015		.001	.001
		(.009)	(.009)		(.008)	(.008)
Race and Ethnicity						
African American		.090	.064		.033	.037
		(.100)	(.099)		(.090)	(.090)
American Indian		.065	.040		-.091	-.087
		(.113)	(.111)		(.101)	(.102)
Asian American, Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander		-.242**	-.227**		-.259***	-.260***
		(.086)	(.085)		(.077)	(.077)
Hispanic		-.022	-.023		.004	.005
		(.095)	(.094)		(.085)	(.085)
Mixed race, international, or other		-.098	-.077		.060	.057
		(.139)	(.136)		(.125)	(.125)
Religious affiliation						
Catholic		.224*	.219*		-.081	-.081
		(.098)	(.097)		(.089)	(.089)
Evangelical Protestant		.151†	.158†		-.061	-.063
		(.086)	(.085)		(.078)	(.078)
No affiliation, agnostic, or atheist		.177†	.173†		.109	.109
		(.096)	(.094)		(.086)	(.086)
Other		.280*	.265*		-.081	-.080
		(.114)	(.112)		(.103)	(.103)
Religious attendance frequency		-.024	-.024		.018	.018
		(.018)	(.017)		(.016)	(.016)
Intercept	-.722	-.434	-.357	-.062	-.720	-.729
	(.053)	(.305)	(.300)	(.064)	(.273)	(.273)

R^2	.347	.491	.507	.007	.571	.572
Adjusted R^2	.344	.467	.485	.003	.552	.552

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † $p<.10$; * $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$. Models 1only include conditions. Model 2 includes all conditions, appropriate legal punishment variables, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, and participant attributes. Model 3 includes all variables in Model 2 and an interaction effect between autonomous offenders and offending against standard operating procedures.

Table A4. OLS Regressions of Recommended Monetary Fine on Conditions, Dimensions of Responsibility, and Controls (N = 870)

	Monetary Fine						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Conditions							
Autonomous offender (0 = conformist offender)	8.635*** (2.128)	7.196** (2.206)	8.619*** (2.129)	8.674*** (2.128)	6.499** (2.320)	8.562*** (2.127)	4.971* (2.383)
Against standard operating procedures (0 = standard operating procedures)	4.311* (2.141)	2.715 (2.237)	4.306* (2.142)	4.050† (2.156)	1.277 (2.517)	4.425* (2.142)	-.119 (2.552)
Female offender (0 = male offender)	-4.145† (2.169)	-4.188† (2.163)	-4.121† (2.172)	-4.274* (2.173)	-4.332* (2.165)	-4.131† (2.168)	-4.439* (2.163)
High Financial Loss (0 = low financial loss)	23.714*** (2.149)	23.880*** (2.144)	23.714*** (2.150)	23.761*** (2.149)	23.807*** (2.144)	23.760*** (2.148)	24.126*** (2.138)
Dimensions of Responsibility							
Causality		3.494* (1.465)					4.185* (1.676)
Knowledge			.442 (1.443)				-.490 (1.559)
Intentionality				1.801 (1.706)			1.206 (1.865)
Coercion					3.672* (1.612)		3.141† (1.681)
Moral Wrongfulness						-2.290 (1.708)	-4.937** (1.871)
Intercept	-14.350	-7.785	-14.008	-13.168	-10.736	-17.588	-9.965

	(14.533)	(14.751)	(14.583)	(14.575)	(14.583)	(14.725)	(14.788)
R^2	.291	.296	.291	.292	.296	.293	.305
Adjusted R^2	.263	.267	.263	.263	.267	.264	.273

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; † $p<.10$; * $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$. Models 1-7 control for: all conditions, appropriate legal punishment variables, perceptions of actor and behavior characteristics, and participant attributes.

Appendix B: Survey Instrument

I am participating in this research

As a student at the University of Oklahoma
As a student at Oklahoma City Community College
As a Mechanical Turk User

[**If OU student or Mturk user, ask 18 or older question. If OCCC participant as 18 or older question with parental consent option.]**

[Only if answered OU or Mturk on where] Are you 18 or older?

Yes
No

[**If Yes, ask what year born question. If no, send to end of survey and present with not 18 or older message.]**

What year were you born? Please write it in the box below.

(text box)

*****Only display assent form if OCCC participant has indicated that they have turned in a signed parental consent form. *****

Signed Assent (Over 12) to Participate in Research

Would you like to be involved in research at the University of Oklahoma?

I am Marshall from the University of Oklahoma and I invite you to participate in my research project entitled Mock Jurors' Reactions to Crime. This research is being conducted at The University of Oklahoma. You were selected as a possible participant because you are enrolled in classes at Oklahoma City Community College. In order to participate in this research, you must give your assent and your parent/s must give their permission.

Please read this document and contact me to ask any questions that you may have BEFORE agreeing to take part in my research.

What is the purpose of this research? The purpose of this research is to understand attitudes and opinions on crime.

How many participants will be in this research? About 2,000 people will take part in this research.

What will I be asked to do? If you agree to be in this research, you will take an online 15-minute survey one time.

How long will this take? Your participation will take about 15 minutes one time.

What are the risks and/or benefits if I participate? There are no more than minimal risks and no benefits from being in this research.

Will I be compensated for participating? You will be reimbursed for your time and participation in this study with course credit or extra credit. The points you receives are determined by your course instructor. You must complete the survey to receive any credit. Some of the questions require a response to advance to the next screen. So, to complete the survey and receive credit, you must answer those questions.

Who will see my information? In research reports, there will be no information that will make it possible to identify you. Research records will be stored securely and only approved researchers and the OU Institutional Review Board will have access to the records.

You have the right to access the research data that has been collected about you as a part of this research. However, you may not have access to this information until the entire research has completely finished and you consent to this temporary restriction.

Do I have to participate? No. If you do not participate, you will not be penalized or lose benefits or services unrelated to the research. If you decide to participate, you don't have to answer any question and can stop participating at any time.

Will my identity be anonymous or confidential? Your name will not be retained or linked with your responses.

Who do I contact with questions, concerns or complaints? If you have questions, concerns or complaints about the research or have experienced a research-related injury, the researchers conducting the study can be contacted at:

Marshall Schmidt (Principal Investigator)
Email: marshall.r.schmidt-1@ou.edu
Phone: (405) 325-1751

Dr. Amy Kroska (Faculty Sponsor)
Email: amykroska@ou.edu
Phone: (405) 325-1751

You can also contact the University of Oklahoma – Norman Campus Institutional Review Board (OU-NC IRB) at 405-325-8110 or irb@ou.edu if you have questions about your rights as a research participant, concerns, or complaints about the research and wish to talk to someone other than the researcher(s) or if you cannot reach the researcher(s).

You may print out a copy of this consent form to keep.

Statement of Consent

I have read the above information. I have asked questions and have received satisfactory answers. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to indicate so below.

This study has been approved by the University of Oklahoma, Norman Campus IRB.

IRB Number: 8098
Approval Date: 05/25/2017

(radio button) I agree to participate

(radio button) I decline to participate

*****Only display informed consent form if participant indicates that they are 18 or older.*****

University of Oklahoma
Institutional Review Board
Informed Consent to Participate in a Research Study

Project Title: Mock Jurors' Reaction to Crime
Principal Investigator: Marshall Schmidt
Department: Sociology

You are being asked to volunteer for this research study. This study is being conducted at the University of Oklahoma. You were selected as a possible participant because you are registered as a current student at OU, you are registered as a current student at Oklahoma City Community College, or as a Mechanical Turk user. You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this study.

Please read this form before agreeing to take part in this study.

Purpose of the research study

The purpose of this study is to investigate perceptions of crime.

Number of participants

About 2,000 people will participate in this experiment.

Procedures

If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire on-line.

Length of participation

The study should take about 15 minutes.

The risks of being in this study are

There are no more than minimal risks associated with this study.

Compensation

University of Oklahoma students will be compensated by their entry into a lottery drawing for one of six $25 Amazon gift cards. Oklahoma City Community College students will be

compensated for their time and participation with class credit. If you are taking this survey as a Mechanical Turk user you will be compensated $1.00 for your participation in the study. You must complete the survey to receive any form of compensation. Some of the questions require a correct response to advance to the next screen. So, to complete the survey and receive credit, you must answer those questions.

Confidentiality

In published reports, there will be no information included that will make it possible to identify you. Research records will be stored securely and only approved researchers will have access to the records.

The University of Oklahoma Institutional Review Board may inspect and/or copy research records for quality assurance and data analysis.

Voluntary nature of the study

Participation in this study is voluntary. If you withdraw or decline participation, you will not be penalized or lose benefits or services unrelated to the study. If you decide to participate, you may decline to answer any question and may choose to withdraw at any time.

Contacts and questions

If you have concerns, complaints, or questions, the researchers conducting this study can be contacted at:

Marshall Schmidt (Principal Investigator)
Email: marshall.r.schmidt-1@ou.edu
Phone: (405) 325-1751

Dr. Amy Kroska (Faculty Sponsor)
Email: amykroska@ou.edu
Phone: (405) 325-1751

If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, concerns, or complaints about the research and wish to talk to someone other than individuals on the research team, or if you cannot reach the research team, you may contact the University of Oklahoma – Norman Campus Institutional Review Board (OU-NC IRB) at 405-325-8110 or irb@ou.edu.

You may print out a copy of this consent form to keep.

Statement of Consent

I have read the above information. I have asked questions and have received satisfactory answers. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to indicate so below.

This study has been approved by the University of Oklahoma, Norman Campus IRB.

IRB Number: 8098
Approval Date: 05/25/2017

I agree to participate
I decline to participate

Instructions for Logging Off and Resuming Work Later
If you need to log off before you have completed the survey, you can save your work and pick up where you left off as long as: (1) you resume work on the *same computer* using the *same web browser*, and (2) you do *not* clear your browser history or cookies before resuming work. If you do not follow these steps, you will lose your work and have to start the survey again from the beginning.

Perceptions of Crime

Instructions: Please give your honest personal opinions and feelings when answering questions.

We would like to start by collecting some information about you.

What is your age? Please write it in the box below.
(text box)
What is your gender? Please write it in the box below.
(text box)

What is your ethnic or racial background?
African American
American Indian
Asian
Hispanic
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
White/Caucasian
International student (you will be asked to specify country)
Other, please specify: (text box)

(If international student) What country? (text box)

What is the highest level of education **you** have completed?
Did not graduate from high school/did not earn a GED
High school graduate/GED
Some college but no degree
Associate's degree (e.g., AA, AS, AAS)
Bachelor's degree (e.g., BA, BS)
Graduate or professional degree (e.g., MA, MS, PhD, MD, DDS, JD)

Are you currently enrolled in college (undergraduate)?

Yes
No
I am enrolled in a combined BA/MA or BS/MS program

[**If yes, ask question on undergraduate status. If no, skip to question on graduate school]**

[Only if yes to under] What is your undergraduate status?

Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Combined BA/MA or BS/MS (e.g., a program that combines a BA or BS with an MA or MS degree) (you will be asked other questions)
Other (please specify): (text box)

[**If respondent indicated BA/MA, ask question on program. If no, skip to question on graduate school]**

[Only if answered combined on undergyr] Where are you in your progress toward your BA/MA or BS/MS? (please explain)

(text box)

[Only if answered combined on undergyr] Are you taking predominately undergraduate or graduate level classes? (please explain)

(text box)

[Ask if answered no on under.] Are you currently enrolled in graduate or professional school?

Yes
No

[**If yes, ask question on graduate school status and question on program of study. If no and no on under, skip to question on marital status. If no but yes on under then ask question on major]**

[Ask if answered yes on grad.] What year are you in graduate school?

First year
Second year
Third year
Fourth year
Fifth year
Sixth year or higher

[Ask if answered yes on grad.] What is your program of study? (please write it in the box below)

(text box)

[**If yes to undergraduate and no to graduate school ask major question.]**

[Ask if answered yes on under.] What is your academic major? (please choose only one)

Business (Accounting, Economics, Finance, Management etc.)
Computer Science, Engineering
Education
Humanities (Art, Communications, English, Foreign Languages, History, Journalism, Music, Philosophy, etc.)
Natural/Physical Sciences (Agriculture, Biology, Chemistry, Geology, Mathematics, Medicine, Natural Resources, Nursing, Pharmacy, Physics, Pre-Med. etc.)
Social/Behavioral Sciences (Anthropology, Political Science, Psychology, Sociology, Social Work, etc.)
Undecided
Other (Please Specify): (text box)

What is your marital status?

Never Married
Cohabiting with significant other but not married
Married
Married but separated
Widowed
Divorced

Do you have children?

Yes
No

[if yes to child ask question on how many]

[if yes on child, ask] How many children do you have?

(text box)

How many hours per week do you usually work for pay?

0
1-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51-60
61 or more

What is your occupation? (please type it in the box below)

(text box)

What is the highest level of education your **father** achieved?

Did not graduate from high school/did not earn a GED
High school graduate/GED
Some college but no degree
Associate's degree (e.g., AA, AS, AAS)
Bachelor's degree (e.g., BA, BS)
Graduate or professional degree (e.g., Master's, PhD, MD, DDS, JD)
Don't know

What is the highest level of education your **mother** achieved?

Did not graduate from high school/did not earn a GED
High school graduate/GED
Some college but no degree
Associate's degree (e.g., AA, AS, AAS)
Bachelor's degree (e.g., BA, BS)
Graduate or professional degree (e.g., Master's, PhD, MD, DDS, JD)
Don't know

[Only ask if answered yes on under or yes on grad] What is your **parents'** combined estimated yearly **income**?

$0-19,999
$20,000-39,999
$40,000-59,999
$60,000-79,999
$80,000-99,999
$100,000-119,999
$120,000-139,999
$140,000-159,999
$160,000-179,999
$180,000-199,999
$200,000-or greater

What is **your** estimated yearly **income**?

$0-19,999
$20,000-39,999
$40,000-59,999
$60,000-79,999
$80,000-99,999
$100,000-119,999
$120,000-139,999
$140,000-159,999
$160,000-179,999
$180,000-199,999
$200,000-or greater

With which of the following do you **most** affiliate? (please choose one)

No religion/secular
Agnostic
Atheist
Assembly of God
Baptist
Born-again Christian
Buddhism
Catholic
Christian, non-denominational
Episcopalian/Anglican
Evangelical Christian
Islam/Muslim
Jewish
Lutheran
Methodist/Wesleyan
Pentecostal/Charismatic
Presbyterian
Other (please specify): (text box)

How frequently do you attend religious services?

Never
Once or twice a year
Several times a year
Monthly
Weekly
Multiple times a week
Daily

About how many hours a week do you think you spend reading news articles (both online and in print)?

0 hours_____100 hours

Below are two scales on which the political views that people might hold are arranged. Click and drag the slider to indicate where you see yourself along each continuum:

Politically, I am:

Extremely Liberal _____ Extremely Conservative

I see myself as:

100% Democrat _____ 100% Republican

If the continuum from Democrat to Republican does not fit how you see yourself, you can use this box to more fully describe how you see yourself politically.

(textbox)

Instructions: Now please carefully read the information below from a pre-sentencing case summary report. Imagine that you are a juror who is being asked to weigh in on this court case. After reading the pre-sentencing case summary report, you will be asked to give your own opinion about features of the case. We will also ask you memory questions to be sure that you read the pre-sentencing case summary report carefully. As previously stated, you are eligible for compensation for your time and participation in the study via class credit or entry into a gift card lottery as a student participant, or payment as Mechanical Turk user. However, if you fail to answer at least 2 out of the 3 memory questions correctly, this will indicate that you have not read the pre-sentencing case summary report carefully, and you will not be permitted to complete the survey or be eligible for compensation.

(Bolded words with slashes indicate different conditions within vignettes. Respondents will only be exposed to one condition).

Medical vignette:

Emily Smith/Todd Smith is a thirty-five-year-old white **female/male receptionist/nurse/doctor** who has worked at a small private senior retirement community for the last twelve years. The retirement community offers both independent and assisted living accommodations for residents and also makes available medical services to residents. **Emily/Todd** is well liked by residents in the community, and is also one of the longest tenured and most trusted workers at the facility, even being given access to all of the organization's billing systems. **Emily/Todd** is also seen by many in the retirement community as an advocate for residents, and many residents have entrusted **her/him** with access to their private health care and financial information. **Emily/Todd** knows that **her/his** work will only be checked if a major issue arises and that neither residents nor insurers are likely to question **her/his** work, because residents receive a lot of medical paperwork, and insurers process too many claims to check if all the claims are legitimate. For the last eight years **Emily/Todd** has been able to **steal from/overcharge** residents and insurers by adding extra fees and services to residents' bills and by charging these false claims to insurers. **Emily/Todd** has been able to personally profit about $100,000 over an eight-year period. As a consequence, residents suffer financial losses, though each loses no more than $200. Insurance companies lose money from false claims, but yearly premium increases cover those losses.

Financial services vignette:

Emily Smith/Todd Smith is a thirty-five-year-old white **female/male receptionist/accountant/CEO** who has worked at a small private financial planning and investments firm for the last twelve years. The firm works with clients to develop financial plans

for their future, including estate planning, retirement planning, insurance dealings, and portfolio investing. **Emily/Todd** is well liked by clients of the firm, and is also one of the longest tenured and most trusted workers at the facility, even being given access to all of the organization's billing systems. **Emily/Todd** is also seen by many clients and those in **her/his** company as someone who is meticulous and careful in **her/his** work, so **she/he** knows that **her/his** work will only be checked if a major issue arises and that neither the firm nor **her/his** clients are likely to question **her/his** work, because clients usually have many investments, and the firm processes too many transactions to check on prices of all investments and services sold. For the last eight years **Emily/Todd** has been able to **steal from/overcharge** clients by providing inflated costs on investments and by adding extra fees for services to clients' accounts. **Emily/Todd** has been able to personally profit about $100,000 over an eight-year period. As a consequence, clients suffer financial losses, though each loses no more than $200 dollars. The firm does not suffer as a direct result of **Emily's/Todd's** actions as increases in fees cover the losses.

According to the pre-sentencing report, what was the occupation of the person who committed the crime?

Accountant
CEO
Doctor
Nurse
Receptionist

According to the pre-sentencing report, what crime was committed?

Overcharging clients
Destruction of clients' property
Stealing from clients

According to the pre-sentencing report, about how much *total* money was lost as a result of the crime?

$100,000
$1,000,000

Vignettes and manipulations for study 2

Emily/Todd Smith works in the financial services industry for National Finance, which is a private financial planning and investments firm that primarily works with clients to diversify their financial investments. **Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers**

has/have full control over many of **her/his/their** clients' investment accounts. **Her/His/Their** control includes the ability to transfer money to and from personal investment accounts without approval of clients. People in positions of authority at National Finance have created a corporate culture that **encourages/discourages** pushing the limits in investments with clients' money as part of their normal business practices. National Finance has had a rough past five years, having lost significant client money through bad investments. As a result, **Emily/Todd/Todd and his co- workers/Emily and her co-workers has/have** felt compelled to **work together to** illegally use investment money from newly recruited clients to cover losses to long term clients. **Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers** know**(s)** that it is illegal to use **her/his/their** clients' personal money to cover business losses, but that no one will know as long as long-term investors are still seeing returns on their investments. This idea to cover long term losses with money from new investors **comes from/does *not* come from** those who are in the highest positions of authority at National Finance. Eventually, **Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers was/were** unable to cover the losses made on older accounts with money from new investors; consequently **a few dozen clients lost $3,000 each, resulting in a total loss of about $100,000/a few hundred clients lost $3,000 each, resulting in a total loss of about $1,000,000**.

According to the pre-sentencing report, who committed the crime?

No one
An individual employee
A group of employees

According to the pre-sentencing report, did those who were in positions of authority at National Finance create a corporate culture that encouraged employees to push the limits in investments with clients' money?

Yes
No

According to the pre-sentencing report, about how much *total* money was lost as a result of the crime?

$100,000
$1,000,000

Now, please take a moment to think about **Emily's/Todd's crime and its consequences**. Answer each of the following questions by either clicking and dragging the slider to the position or selecting the choice that corresponds to your judgment. The pre-sentencing case summary

report has been provided for your reference.

Medical vignette:

Emily Smith/Todd Smith is a thirty-five-year-old white **female/male receptionist/nurse/doctor** who has worked at a small private senior retirement community for the last twelve years. The retirement community offers both independent and assisted living accommodations for residents and also makes available medical services to residents. **Emily/Todd** is well liked by residents in the community, and is also one of the longest tenured and most trusted workers at the facility, even being given access to all of the organization's billing systems. **Emily/Todd** is also seen by many in the retirement community as an advocate for residents, and many residents have entrusted **her/him** with access to their private health care and financial information. **Emily/Todd** knows that **her/his** work will only be checked if a major issue arises and that neither residents nor insurers are likely to question **her/his** work, because residents receive a lot of medical paperwork, and insurers process too many claims to check if all the claims are legitimate. For the last eight years **Emily/Todd** has been able to **steal from/overcharge** residents and insurers by adding extra fees and services to residents' bills and by charging these false claims to insurers. **Emily/Todd** has been able to personally profit about $100,000 over an eight-year period. As a consequence, residents suffer financial losses, though each loses no more than $200. Insurance companies lose money from false claims, but yearly premium increases cover those losses.

Financial services vignette:

Emily Smith/Todd Smith is a thirty-five-year-old white **female/male receptionist/accountant/CEO** who has worked at a small private financial planning and investments firm for the last twelve years. The firm works with clients to develop financial plans for their future, including estate planning, retirement planning, insurance dealings, and portfolio investing. **Emily/Todd** is well liked by clients of the firm, and is also one of the longest tenured and most trusted workers at the facility, even being given access to all of the organization's billing systems. **Emily/Todd** is also seen by many clients and those in **her/his** company as someone who is meticulous and careful in **her/his** work, so **she/he** knows that **her/his** work will only be checked if a major issue arises and that neither the firm nor **her/his** clients are likely to question **her/his** work, because clients usually have many investments, and the firm processes too many transactions to check on prices of all investments and services sold. For the last eight years **Emily/Todd** has been able to **steal from/overcharge** clients by providing inflated costs on investments and by adding extra fees for services to clients' accounts. **Emily/Todd** has been able to personally profit about $100,000 over an eight-year period. As a consequence, clients suffer financial losses, though each loses no more than $200 dollars. The firm does not suffer as a direct result of **Emily's/Todd's** actions as increases in fees cover the losses.

Emily/Todd Smith works in the financial services industry for National Finance, which is a private financial planning and investments firm that primarily works with clients to diversify their financial investments. **Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers has/have** full control over many of **her/his/their** clients' investment accounts. **Her/His/Their** control includes the ability to transfer money to and from personal investment accounts without

approval of clients. People in positions of authority at National Finance have created a corporate culture that **encourages/discourages** pushing the limits in investments with clients' money as part of their normal business practices. National Finance has had a rough past five years, having lost significant client money through bad investments. As a result, **Emily/Todd/Todd and his co- workers/Emily and her co-workers has/have** felt compelled to **work together to** illegally use investment money from newly recruited clients to cover losses to long term clients. **Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers** know**(s)** that it is illegal to use **her/his/their** clients' personal money to cover business losses, but that no one will know as long as long-term investors are still seeing returns on their investments. This idea to cover long term losses with money from new investors **comes from/does *not* come from** those who are in the highest positions of authority at National Finance. Eventually, **Emily/Todd/Todd and his co-workers/Emily and her co-workers was/were** unable to cover the losses made on older accounts with money from new investors; consequently **a few dozen clients lost $3,000 each, resulting in a total loss of about $100,000/a few hundred clients lost $3,000 each, resulting in a total loss of about $1,000,000**.

How should **Emily/Todd** be punished for **her/his** crime? (choose all that apply)

Community service
A monetary fine
Probation
Imprisonment

Imagine now that **Emily/Todd** will be punished with a fine and *only a fine*. How large should the fine should be?

No fine_____ $1,000,000

Imagine now that **Emily/Todd** will be punished with a prison sentence and *only a prison sentence*. How long should the sentence be?

Prison Sentence In Years

No Prison___5 ____10_____15_____20_____25 (years displayed)

Emily's/Todd's crime is a serious crime.

Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Stealing is a serious crime.

Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Overcharging is a serious crime.

Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Please provide your opinion on each of the following questions by clicking and dragging the slider to the position that corresponds to your judgment.

Todd/Emily is responsible for what happened.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Todd/Emily is at fault for what happened.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Todd/Emily could have avoided what happened.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

The crime described in the pre-sentencing report was preventable.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Todd/Emily was aware of the potential consequences for what happened.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Todd/Emily was able to foresee the harm of **his/her** actions.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Todd/Emily recognized the seriousness of **his/her** actions.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Todd/Emily intended to commit the crime.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Todd/Emily intended to harm **residents at the retirement community/clients at the financial planning and investments firm/clients of National Finance.**
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Todd's/Emily's actions were an accident.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Todd/Emily planned **his/her** actions in advance.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Todd/Emily acted of **his/her** own will.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Other people influenced **Todd/Emily** to act.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Todd/Emily was coerced in **his/her** actions.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Someone else besides **Todd/Emily** was responsible for the crime.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

What **Todd/Emily** did was wrong.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Todd/Emily was acting morally.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Todd/Emily was deceitful in **his/her** actions.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Todd/Emily was justified in **his/her** actions.
Strongly disagree _____ Strongly agree

Please take a moment and think about the description of **Todd/Emily** given in the pre-sentencing report. Answer each of the following questions by clicking and dragging the slider to the position that corresponds to your judgment of **Todd/Emily**.

In your opinion, how much status does **Todd/Emily** generally possess?
Extremely low status_____ Extremely high status

In your opinion, how competent is **Todd/Emily**?
Extremely incompetent_____ Extremely competent

In your opinion, how intelligent is **Todd/Emily**?
Extremely unintelligent_____ Extremely intelligent

How likely do you think it is that **Todd/Emily** will commit this same crime in the future?
Extremely unlikely_____ Extremely likely

How often do you think **Todd/Emily** has committed this same crime in the past?
Very rarely _____ Very often

In your opinion how likely is it that **Todd/Emily** generally obeys the law?
Extremely unlikely_____ Extremely likely

In your opinion, what **Todd/Emily** did was…
Good, nice_____Bad, awful

In your opinion, what **Todd/Emily** did was…
Powerful, nice_____ Powerless, little

In your opinion, how dangerous is **Todd/Emily**?
Not at all dangerous _____ Extremely dangerous

In your opinion, how blameworthy is **Todd/Emily**?
Not at all blameworthy _____ Extremely blameworthy

In your opinion, how much direct control over the lives of others does **Todd/Emily** have?

No control at all _____ Total control

How much power do you think **Emily/Todd** has to keep people from getting what they want or need?

No power at all_____ A great amount of power

How likely do you think it is for **Emily/Todd** to be able to carry out **his or her** own will by overcoming the resistance of others?

Extremely unlikely_____ Extremely likely

How much authority do you think **Todd/Emily** has to enforce decisions against powerful individuals and organizations?

No authority whatsoever _____ A great amount of authority

In your opinion, how valuable to society is **Todd/Emily**?

Of no value whatsoever_____ Extremely valuable

What do you think is the social rank of **Todd/Emily** compared to people in other occupations?

Extremely low rank_____ Extremely high rank

Recent research on judgments about crime shows that judgements are affected by context. Differences in how people feel, their previous knowledge and experience, and their environment can affect judgments about crime. To help us understand how people make judgements on crime, we are interested in information about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read directions; if not, some results may not tell us very much about judgements on crime in the real world. To show that you have read the instructions, please select the "none of the above" option as your answer to the question below about feelings. Thank you. How would you best describe your feelings right now?

Delighted
Pleased
Neutral
Unhappy
Miserable
None of the above

In this section of the survey, you are asked to report your understanding of different types of identities, people, and behaviors.

Each row of circles is like a ruler for measuring how you feel. Select a circle that indicates how close something is to the description at one end of the ruler or the other. If something is not close to either description, select the middle circle. For example, if you were rating "a grandfather," you might rate it like this:



In this example, a grandfather is rated as extremely good, quite powerful, and neutral in activity.

Take note of two important features of this survey. 1.) Not all answer choices for the seven scales are shown in the example. Only three answer choices are shown, but there will be seven total scales for each item. For instance, the example only shows scales that range from "Bad" to "Good," "Powerless" to "Powerful," and "Active" to "Inactive." However, items will also have scales ranging from "Awful" to "Nice," "Little" to "Big," "Slow" to "Fast," and "Quiet" to "Noisy." 2.) The order of the scales also changes from item to item. For example, sometimes the scale that ranges from “Bad” to “Good” is first, sometimes it is second, other times it is third, fourth, fifth, or even sixth. Given the changing order of the scales, it is important that you carefully read each scale on the survey. In the example below, we show you the same identity rated with a set of scales that are arranged differently.

In this example, a grandfather is rated just as it was in the first example—as quite powerful and big, neutral in activity, and extremely good and nice.

Now, you are going to be asked to report your understanding of different types of cultural identities and behaviors. Mark off how close each identity is to the description at one end of the ruler or the other.



a friend is

an employee is
a group of employees are
a group of employees who steal from clients are
an employee who steals from clients is
a group of employees who overcharge clients are
an employee who overcharges clients is
A receptionist is
A nurse is
A doctor is
An accountant is
A CEO is
Stealing from someone is
Overcharging someone is
Emily/Todd from the pre-sentencing case report is
Bad_____Good
Awful_____Nice
Powerless___Powerful
Little_____Big
Slow_____Fast
Quiet_____Noisy
Inactive____Active

Below are some general questions about your experiences with crime. Again, please give your honest personal opinions and feelings when answering questions.

Do you know anyone who has been arrested for a street crime?

Yes
No
[If no skip to question on victimization, if yes ask who]

[Only ask if yes on scares] If you answered yes to the previous question, who was this person? (check all that apply)

Yourself
Acquaintance
Friend
Relative
Other

Do you know anyone who has been a victim of street crime?

Yes
No
[If no skip to question on white-collar crime, if yes ask who]

[Only ask if yes on scvic] If you answered yes to the previous question, who was this person? (check all that apply)

Yourself

Acquaintance
Friend
Relative
Other

Do you know anyone who has been arrested for a white-collar crime?
Yes
No
[If no skip to question on victimization, if yes ask who]

[Only ask if yes on wcarres] If you answered yes to the previous question, who was this person? (check all that apply)
Yourself
Acquaintance
Friend
Relative
Other

Do you know anyone who has been a victim of white-collar crime?
Yes
No
[If no skip to next block of questions, if yes ask who]

[Only ask if yes on wcvic] If you answered yes to the previous question, who was this person? (check all that apply)
Yourself
Acquaintance
Friend
Relative
Other

STUDENTS AND MTURK USERS ARE DIRECTED TO A NEW SURVEY WITH THE FOLLOWING PROMPTS (Last questions in main survey)

OU Student
Thank you for your participation in this study. If you wish to be eligible for the $25.00 gift card lottery as compensation for your participation in the study, then please follow the link below (it will take you to a new webpage), and enter the requested information. In order to be eligible for the lottery you do need to enter your email address and OU 4x4. You will not be contacted for any reason other than to be notified if you win a gift card. Your email address will and OU 4x4 will not be shared with anyone, nor will it be retained after the lottery.

QUALTRICS LINK:
https://outartsandsciences.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_9FWmQaPiVA8jA9L
OCCC Student

Thank you for your participation in this study. If you wish to be eligible to receive class credit for your participation in the study, then please follow the link below (it will take you to a new webpage), and enter the requested information. In order to be eligible to receive class credit you do need to enter your name, class number, and class section number. You will not be contacted for any reason, and your information will not be shared with anyone, nor will it be retained after the class credit is assigned.

QUALTRICS LINK:

https://outartsandsciences.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_81b8Fqw1Q37qlXT

Mturk

Thank you for your participation in this study! The next page will show your MTurk confirmation code.

NEW ANYOMOUS SURVEYS ACCESSED FROM LINKS

OU Student sample anonymous survey

Thank you for your participation in this study. If you wish to be eligible for a $25 Amazon gift card lottery as compensation for your participation in the study, please enter the requested information below. These responses will be kept separate from your survey, and you will only be contacted if you are a lottery winner.

Are you currently enrolled in Medical school, Law school, or in the Master of Business Administration program?

Yes

No

[If yes, ask question on which school. If no, skip to question on email]

In which school or program are you currently enrolled?

Medical school

Law school

MBA program

Joint Law and MBA program (e.g., JD/MBA)

Other (please specify): (text box)

Please enter your email address in the box below. Your email address will not be shared with anyone, nor will it be retained after the research has been completed:

(textbox)

Please enter your 4x4 in the box below:

(textbox)

Thank you for your participation in this research!

OCCC Student sample anonymous survey

Thank you for your participation in this study. If you wish to receive credit for your time and participation in the study, please enter the requested information below. These responses will be kept separate from your survey, and your information will only be used to assign credit for your participation.

Please enter your name in the box below:

(textbox)

Please enter your course number in the box below:
(textbox)

Please enter your course section number in the box below:
(textbox)

Thank you for your participation in this research!

Failure of attention checks message
Thank you for taking this survey. As previously stated in the directions, there are certain requirements that must be met in order to participate and receive compensation.

You are receiving this message because you are not eligible to complete the study and receive compensation. This is because you failed to answer multiple questions correctly that checked to see if you read and understood the instructions.

If you are an Amazon Mechanical Turk user, this follows Amazon Mechanical Turk policy, which states that a "Requester may reject your work if the HIT was not completed or the instructions were not followed." You may close this window or use your explorer bar to navigate back to the Amazon Mechanical Turk site.

If you are a student taking this survey you are ineligible for class credit or entry into the gift card lottery, because you did not answer the memory questions correctly, which indicates that you did not follow directions. You may close this window.

Not 18 or older

You must 18 years of age or older to participate in this research.

Not 18 or older OCCC

You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this research, or have turned in a signed parental consent form.

Appendix C: IRB Approval Letter

The UNIVERSITY of OKLAHOMA

Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects

Approval of Initial Submission – Exempt from IRB Review – AP01

Date: May 25, 2017 **IRB#:** 8098

Principal Investigator: Mr Marshall R Schmidt **Approval Date:** 05/24/2017

Exempt Category: 2

Study Title: Mock Jurors' Reactions to Crime

On behalf of the Institutional Review Board (IRB), I have reviewed the above-referenced research study and determined that it meets the criteria for exemption from IRB review. To view the documents approved for this submission, open this study from the *My Studies* option, go to *Submission History*, go to *Completed Submissions* tab and then click the *Details* icon.

As principal investigator of this research study, you are responsible to:

- Conduct the research study in a manner consistent with the requirements of the IRB and federal regulations 45 CFR 46.
- Request approval from the IRB prior to implementing any/all modifications as changes could affect the exempt status determination.
- Maintain accurate and complete study records for evaluation by the HRPP Quality Improvement Program and, if applicable, inspection by regulatory agencies and/or the study sponsor.
- Notify the IRB at the completion of the project.

If you have questions about this notification or using iRIS, contact the IRB @ 405-325-8110 or irb@ou.edu.

Cordially,

Fred Beard, Ph.D.
Vice Chair, Institutional Review Board