

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

POLICY NARRATIVES AND CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY MAKING OVER

THE DISPUTED DIAOYU ISLANDS:

TESTING SYSTEMS THEORY IN CHINA

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

LU, TAO
Norman, Oklahoma
2012

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TESTING SYSTEMS THEORY IN CHINA

A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY

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Dedicated
to
my parents, Aimee and Mengdan

Acknowledgements

I am very happy that I finally come to this stage when I can thank all those who have helped me in this process in a written format in my dissertation. This dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance and help of several individuals who in one way or another contributed and extended their valuable assistance in the preparation and completion of this project.

First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Aimee Franklin, the chair of my dissertation committee. This project would not even have existed without her encouragement, guidance and support. I enjoy each of those intensive meetings I had with her, and it has always been a pleasure to discuss about any research projects with Dr. Franklin, whose wisdom and charisma demonstrate the excitement of academic research.

This dissertation also received guidance and support from Dr. Mark Frazier, Dr. Jonathan Monten, Dr. Keith Gaddie and Dr. Gary Copeland. Their advice and assistance greatly contributed to the completion of this dissertation. In addition, my colleague and friend Sondra Petty generously offered help in reviewing the rough draft of this dissertation. It would have been much more difficult without her help.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my beloved Mengdan Bao. I cannot imagine those days dominated by intensive reading and typing without her presence and support.

All in all, I am so grateful that I am the lucky one who has all those encouragement, support and help from so many people. Your presence has made this process enjoyable.

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Abstract

China's foreign policy has been making an assertive turn. Over the disputed Diaoyu Islands against Japan, China adopted the most assertive policy so far in 2010. However, in previous incidents of 1996 and 2004, such assertive policy was not found. What explains China's recent assertive foreign policy?

By integrating the two-level game into David Easton's Systems Theory to explain Chinese foreign policy making, this dissertation expects to generate a theoretical framework that can apply to foreign policy making in an authoritarian context. This dissertation examines China's foreign policy making during three incidents over the Diaoyu Islands against Japan, in 1996, 2004 and 2010. China was reactive and passive in 1996. In 2004 however, China was steadfast, demanding Japan to release arrested Chinese citizens. In 2010, China adopted the most assertive policy among these three against Japan, the "countermeasures", which involved a series of suspensions of bilateral contacts after Japan detained a Chinese fisherman in waters near the disputed Diaoyu Islands.

What explains the variation in Chinese reactions in these three incidents? First of all, the government's actions are responsive to Japan's actions. The stronger Japan's actions are, the stronger the Chinese public's mobilization is, and the more assertive policy the government has to take. This partially explains why the Chinese government adopted the most assertive policy in 2010. I have described in chapter 7 that "jurisdiction" issues involving arrest and trial of Chinese citizens are most concerned by China.

Second, in order to investigate the nuances in Chinese foreign policy making, I employ a narrative analysis approach to compare the policy preferences of the government, intellectuals and the Public Opinion Leaders (POLs) in three incidents. The narrative analysis suggests the development of bottom-up policy actors who function as mediating institutions in Chinese foreign policy making, including the intellectuals and the POLs. The authoritarian government seems to respond to the policy narratives in order to stabilize domestic policy relations, suggesting policy actions that are dramatically different than those employed over the course of history.

This project contributes to extant literature a revised version of Easton's Systems Theory. In addition to previous version of Systems Theory, I add arrows symbolizing the interaction of quelling and appeasing between the government and the public. I also add a "two-level game" arrow denoting the interaction among the Chinese government, the public and Japan. This revised model offers a more robust tool than previous version in capturing the nuanced interactions in Chinese foreign policy making. This research contributes to our knowledge in both International Relations and Public Policy disciplines over the topic of China. Based upon this model, future research can be conducted to explore China's foreign policy making over foreign policy issues, analyzing when China is to become more assertive in its foreign policy. Knowledge generated from this research can also inform the development of mediating institutions and the influence of social media in China's policy making process.

“In regard to China-Japan relations, reactions among youths, especially students, are strong. If difficult problems were to appear still further, it will become impossible to explain them to the people. It will become impossible to control them. I want you to understand this position which we are in.”

----- Deng Xiaoping, speaking at a meeting with high-level Japanese officials, including Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Agriculture, and Forestry, June 28, 1987¹

¹ Whiting (1989), p. 164, in translation from *Cankao Xiaoxi*, June 30, 1987.

James Yang
May, 22/2012

I do what
I think is
right!



----- Designed by the author, drawn by James Yang,
a long-time, truthful friend.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Small Islands, Big Influence

In March 2012, China's ships were patrolling around the water near the disputed Diaoyu Islands (Japan calls them Senkaku Islands) in the East China Sea. Ships of Japan Coast Guard (JCG) were just a few nautical miles away, ready for possible confrontation.

In September 2010, a Chinese fisherman, Mr. Zhan Qixiong, was arrested by JCG while he and his crew were fishing in the waters near the Diaoyu Islands. After Mr. Zhan was arrested, China adopted an unprecedentedly assertive "countermeasure" policy against Japan, demanding the unconditional release of Mr. Zhan.

Covering an area of seven square kilometers (1,700 acres) in total, the Diaoyu Islands have no population, no arable territory, nor any precious resources on the islands. However, these islands seem to be big issue in China-Japan bilateral relations than what their size would indicate. While China claims sovereignty of these islands based on historical discovery, Japan stated that they discovered these islands as *terra nullius* in 1884. The term *terra nullius* in international law denotes the status of a territory that has never ever been governed by any human society, therefore, whoever discovers the territory will have indisputable sovereignty over it.

These islands were under the US trusteeship since the end of World War II, and they were *returned* to Japan along with Ryukyu (Okinawa) by the United States in 1972. Since early 1970s, there have been generations of Chinese activists, identifying themselves as the "Defend Diaoyu Movement" (DDM) activists, calling for the return of the Diaoyu Islands to China. DDM activists are those individuals who actively advocate China's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, usually with actions.

Beginning with some Chinese graduate students in the United States, they now spread across Taiwan, Hong Kong, the North America and the mainland China. DDM in mainland China developed after the 1996 incident over the Diaoyu Islands. The strategies they adopt include holding protests in cities, and trying to land on the disputed islands to demonstrate China's sovereignty. Their successful landing in 2004 caused an incident between China and Japan, in which China successfully pressured Japan to release the seven DDM activists landing on the disputed islands.

Numerous incidents have happened over these islands in history, and the dispute over these unpopulated small islands does not seem to be ending soon. On March 2, 2012, the Japanese government announced its plan to rename 39 islands in the East China Sea, including the disputed Diaoyu Islands. In reaction, on March 3, the Chinese government also announced its plan of renaming these islands. Whether the disputed islands are called Diaoyu Islands or Senkaku Islands is deemed an important issue by both governments, symbolizing who has sovereignty over them.

Another motivation for this project is that China is about to see its leadership transition in 2012.¹ Both these two sets of events - the imminent transition of administration in China and series of crisis over disputed islands- happen at a critical time when the world is debating about how a rapid-developing China will act in the twenty-first century, especially under its new leadership in the near future.

One issue when discussing China as a rising power is how its geopolitical situation may inhibit its development. When discussing the "tragedy of great power politics", Mearsheimer woefully underestimated this aspect when he predicted China would pose as a great challenge to the United States hegemony.² In his discussion of

¹ The transition will not take place until 2012, and the full power will be handed to the new government in two years (2014). For the nomination of new leader Xi, Jinping and the transition of power in Chinese government, see "Xi who must be obeyed", *The Economist* (2010-10-21).

² Page 401 in Mearsheimer, John (2001) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. W.W. Norton & Company: New

the “great power politics in the twenty-first century”, Mearsheimer acknowledged the territorial disputes China had with its neighbors,³ although he did not take into consideration that these disputes may cost a considerable amount of China’s wealth even after its economy has quickly developed.⁴ Many other scholars realize the geopolitical challenges China faces, and estimate the influence of these challenges will have on China’s rise as a world power. For instance, William Overholt of the RAND Corporation, in his testimony to the U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission on May 19, 2005, highlighted the challenge China is facing on its borders, “Chinese military has to defend 11,000 miles of not-always-friendly borders, and its growing military is far from excessive for the tasks it faces.”⁵ In June 2011, in the Munk Debate at the University of Toronto over whether the twenty-first century will belong to China,⁶ Fareed Zakaria and Henry Kissinger both expressed the concerns over how China’s geopolitical situation has and will inhibit its rising. An important issue they mentioned was the territorial dispute over islands China is having with neighboring states⁷, including the one with Japan (over the *Diaoyu* Islands), and another with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei (over the *Nansha Qundao*, the Spratly Islands).

Disputes over islands comprise an important sector in China’s relations with its neighbors. This background makes research on China’s behavior in island disputes relevant: observations on how China behaves in these territorial disputes offer insights

York.

³ Page 375 in Mearsheimer, John (2001).

⁴ Rather, Mearsheimer argued that China’s prospects of becoming a potential hegemon depend largely on whether its economy continues modernizing at a rapid pace. See Page 401 in Mearsheimer (2001).

⁵ See Page 13 in Overholt, William (2005), *China and Globalization*, testimony presented to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on May 19, 2005. Overholt, William (2005) *China and Globalization*. Santa Monica, CA : RAND [Congressional Series CT-244].

⁶ See www.munkdebates.com for a video of this debate between Niall Ferguson and David Daokui Li (on the *for* side) and Fareed Zakaria and Henry Kissinger (on the “against” side).

⁷ For nations involved and disputes over the Spratly Islands, see also Bennett, Michael. (1991-1992). “The People’s Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute”, *Stanford Journal of International Law* 28 – 425.

into how China handles relationships with its neighboring countries. These observations also open a window for inferring how China will act in this century - after its economy has been expanding aggressively at double-digit rates for more than a decade.

Why are Islands so Important?

In order to understand China's foreign policy making and its trends in the future, China's past actions in islands disputes offer a solid basis. In this sense, islands are important.

First and foremost, islands are of equal – if not more – importance as continental territories for countries. As Shaw argued, the sea historically serves two important functions, as a medium of communication, and “as a vast reservoir of resources, both living and non-living.”⁸ Therefore, sea water has been an important facet of national interests for states.⁹ In terms of “as a reservoir of resources for living”, ocean freight shipping takes about 90 percent of world trade today, especially in those industries like crude oil, minerals and cargos. An island represents an area of surrounding territorial sea, and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), both of which are crucial for military and commercial interests of states. Furthermore, it can be concluded that islands are valuable to states not only in their symbol of *territory*, but also because of their geographical, economic, military and even emotional values. In this sense, even a remote island would involve sovereignty in the same sense that a piece of continental territory would.¹⁰ Therefore, we can expect states to demonstrate as much attention and resolve in defending their sovereignty over disputed islands as that over

⁸ Shaw (1991) at 337.

⁹ Alfred T Mahan (2006) *The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783*. Kessinger Publishing.

¹⁰ See pp 45 in Browett, Derek (1979). *The Legal Regime of Islands in International Law*. Oceana Publications, Inc.: Dobbes Ferry, New York.

disputed continental territories. Actually, in both disputes China is involved in, the disputed islands are believed to locate upon a large reserve of crude oil and natural gas.

Second, the equal attention and resolve states give to islands and continental territories *may* indicate almost equal likelihood of conflicts, however, I would argue that disputes over islands offer fewer incentives for nations to adopt military means than in disputes over continental territories, controlling for other factors. Therefore, island disputes yield more space for interstate interaction and bargaining.

Compared with territorial disputes regarding continental land, island disputes have less incentive to bring states into war because geographic protections offered by great waters increases the difficulty of initiating military conflicts. States can be deterred from fighting for islands by factors including sophisticated naval technology, amphibian warfare strategy and difficulty in governing islands after victory. John Mearsheimer also mentioned the hurdle big water presents for conquest.¹¹

Empirically, China was unable to send its armies to liberate Taiwan after 1949 (when the Communist took over all mainland China) due to the wide Taiwan Straits and inferior navy China had at that time¹². On the contrary, in his research of causality between territorial disputes and war, Kocs argued that “territorial disputes between *contiguous states* are an extremely potent predictor of interstate war.”¹³ Therefore, we see the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands lasting for about four decades and the Spratly Islands for even longer. From the interactions of all parties over the disputed islands, researchers can better understand how foreign policy decisions are made.

None the less, it should be noted the argument that large bodies of water are

¹¹ See Mearsheimer (2001) on his discussion about the primacy of land power (87-96). Mearsheimer argued that independent naval power must be accompanied by amphibious assault and landings to conquer another country, which requires military technology not easily acquirable.

¹² Michael O'Hanlon (2000). “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan”. *International Security* 25-2: 51-86.

¹³ Page 160 in Kocs, Stephen (1995) “Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945-1987” *Journal of Politics* 57-1: 159-175.

natural barriers to prevent wars from happening is contestable. For instance, over the Falkland Islands, Britain (eight thousand miles away from the Falkland Islands) waged a war and won over Argentina (three hundred miles away) in 1982. Therefore, relative military power of both parties matter in determining whether an island dispute will escalate into war. In the two island disputes China is involved in, in terms of military power, Japan is not an countries any weaker than China; in the Spratly Islands, another island dispute China is involved in today, however, China is not facing a single country, but rather, a group of countries including Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and indirectly the US. The power of all these countries added together will deter China from resolving the dispute with force.

In sum, islands are of great importance, but in the two island disputes (Diaoyu Islands and Spratly Islands), with a large body of water as the natural barrier and obstacle, China is deterred from initiating wars. Therefore, island disputes allow more space for investigating foreign policy making in China.

Policy Approach of Studying Islands Disputes

Island disputes are defined as officially acknowledged conflicting claims of sovereignty over the same island(s) by two or more sovereign states. In this project, I used the word “crisis” to refer to those decisive moments when China and Japan express their conflicting claims over the disputed islands.

China’s actions in island disputes offer a window for understanding China’s foreign policy making. This dissertation will investigate the foreign policy actions adopted by China over the disputed Diaoyu Islands, with expectation to find out what explains China’s assertive policy emerging in recent incidents

To explain China's assertive policy in the Diaoyu Islands dispute, two theories may apply. However, their inadequacy to explain China's assertive turn in its foreign policy proves the necessity of adopting a public policy approach of studying domestic influence on foreign policy making. Realism from the International Relations (IR) discipline would argue that China's increasing power against Japan in the past decade explains China's increasingly assertive power. While it explains the change of foreign policy partially, it fails to point out the causes for the change in China's foreign policy. With increasing power, China has been more assertive over the Diaoyu Islands dispute, however, it has not been more assertive against Vietnam than in the middle 1980s, when it fought a war against Vietnam for disputed islands in the South China Sea, for example. Therefore, the change in relative power may partially accounts for the assertive change in China's foreign policy, but it does not reveal the cause of this change, nor does it predict what will happen in the future. Alternatively, top-down approach may explain the assertive policy as strategy adopted by the Chinese government. However, this explanation seems inaccurate in believing that the Chinese government can make foreign policy free of domestic influence. Nor does it help to generate a trajectory for China's foreign policy in the future over islands disputes and other foreign policy issues.

In order to start from a small island and bilateral relations and then expand to the role of public opinion in foreign policy making and how the state may use these policy actions to influence domestic policy, the Systems Theory from public policy literature is a better alternative to address the process of Chinese foreign policy making.

By following a policy perspective with the Systems Theory, my dissertation investigates the foreign and domestic policy interplay in actions China adopts over the

disputed islands.

This dissertation identifies three incidents for research, these incidents over the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan happened in 1996, 2004 and 2010. China adopted different policy actions: in 1996, China's actions were passive and featured low-level protests, which were made mostly by government officials below the ministerial-level. In 2004, however, China adopted more assertive actions when seven Chinese DDM activists were arrested by Japan after landing on the Diaoyu Islands. Japan released Chinese DDM activists almost immediately in response to China's protestation. China adopted high-level protests in the 2004 incident. In 2010, however, China took the most assertive actions among these three incidents. China termed these actions against Japan "countermeasures", which included suspension of all ministerial-provincial dialogues, the cancellation of cooperative meetings in aviation route and coals, and the refusal to issue visa for Japanese cultural exchange groups. Why were these assertive policies adopted by China in 2010? Are they an indication of possible changes in China's foreign policy in general?

These incidents shed light to the long-time discussion of whether public opinion influences China's foreign policy making. David Easton's Systems Theory seems a helpful tool for explaining China's foreign policy making, but a puzzle remains on whether it is sufficient to illustrate all nuanced interactions between the Chinese government and other actors in foreign policy making.

Domestic and Foreign Policy Narratives: How It Helps.

In order to enhance the applicability of Systems Theory in China's foreign policy, with the expectation of producing a revised version of a more robust Systems Theory in explaining China's assertive foreign policy, this dissertation focuses on the

narratives of policy actors in three incidents over the Diaoyu Islands.

Analysis in this project is reliant upon narrative analysis, believing that what actors say in the policy making process indicate their stances over the dispute and reflecting different policy outputs they prefer. An analysis of their narratives surrounding an incident will reveal the interaction among actors.

Who are those actors? Following Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, I identify actors at three levels in Chinese foreign policy making: the government (“elites” as Fewsmith and Rosen defined), intellectuals (“sub-elites”), and the public (“the popular”).¹⁴ Recently academia has studied the variety of actors joining in Chinese foreign policy making. Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, for example, have identified business sectors, local governments, research institutions and academia, the media and “netizens” (net-citizens) as the most notable actors in Chinese foreign policy making.¹⁵ With respect to the dispute on the Diaoyu Islands, however, only the last two categories (research institutions and academia, the media and netizens) are relevant. Therefore, I include these three actors, government, intellectuals and the public in my analysis. I also use media as the venue for transferring information, and employ public opinion leaders (POLs) as a proxy for estimating public opinion.

I compare their narratives in each incident according to the time-lag, i.e. which happened first and how the narratives of another actor changed later. By revealing what they said and did during and after each incident, I argue that the Chinese government is facing the “demands” from the public and constant “support” from the intellectuals. The public almost always makes more assertive demands than the government can adopt; failure of the government to appease the public, however, will

¹⁴ Fewsmith, Joseph and Stanley Rosen. (2001). “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does ‘public Opinion’ matter?” in David M. Lampton ed. *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform*. Stanford University Press.

¹⁵ Jakobson, Linda and Dean Knox. (2010). “New Foreign Policy Actors in China.” STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI) *Policy Paper* No. 26. Sep., 2010.

end up requiring the government spending extra resources on quelling domestic public opinion. Therefore, Easton's Systems Theory needs to be modified by adding *quelling* as a form of interaction between the government and the public.

Moreover, by conducting narratives analysis, it can be found that the Chinese government is facing a two-level game (as Putnam phrased it in 1988), when adopting foreign policy over the Diaoyu Islands. On one hand, it allows some public mobilization domestically to show to Japan, demonstrating the government is under pressure from domestic public opinion, but on the other hand, the Chinese government signals to Japan that it is under the influence of domestic public opinion when adopting assertive foreign policy, so the government may maintain the stability of bilateral relations. Therefore, Easton's model – in order to be applied to the Chinese context – also needs to accommodate this two-level game.

The conclusion of this dissertation speaks to a wide audience, from China scholars to the decision makers of those states who are concerned by a more assertive China. Intellectually, while it is difficult to draw an affirmative conclusion on the influence of public opinion on Chinese foreign policy making, my dissertation reveals that the government does respond to public opinion, which is measured using POLs as a proxy. The government listens and cites public opinion and modifies its foreign policy to appease the domestic public, rather than to quell domestic public sentiment. For decision makers, this dissertation's analysis yields a finding which resembles that of Thomas Christensen in 2010 on a similar topic. China's foreign policy is driven by foreign countries' actions, as well as its domestic public opinion –the latter's influence has increased recently.

This finding also contributes to the understanding of the role played by mediating

institutions in Chinese politics, with mature moderating institutions absent in contemporary Chinese politics. Some unexpected findings are also interesting for future researchers, including the role played by social media in public mobilization in China and how the Chinese government's loosening grip of media censorship will further involve the public in policy making – to name just a few. These are interesting topics encountered in this dissertation, and are worthwhile for research in the future.

Currently China is engaged in a multilateral dispute over the Spratly Islands which is now extending out to the South China Sea and involving additional nations. This situation offers an inviting context for testing the model generated in this dissertation and investigating China's foreign and domestic policy making in a two-level game theory.

Conclusion: Structure of this Dissertation

This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents background information necessary for understanding the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. With respect to the Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese sentiments against Japan are quite negative. Where do these negative sentiments come from? It is necessary to understand the suffering of China in the past century prior to 1949 (the so-called “hundred years of humiliation”) to fully grasp the root of contemporary sentiments of the Chinese public. This chapter also presents background information about the Chinese government, Chinese foreign policy makers and Chinese foreign policy making theories.

Chapter 3 starts with considering an IR answer to the puzzle of China's assertive policy. The shift of relative powers between China and Japan can partially explain when assertive policy is adopted, but it does not demonstrate why China adopts

assertive policy over certain disputes, but not others. In addition, Chapter 3 also reviews three bodies of literature, respectively, on the Systems Theory, on the topic of public opinion and foreign policy making, and on the “two-level game” by Putnam. This chapter reviews previous research on public opinion and foreign policy making, pointing out that there has been a trend for Chinese foreign policy making to be influenced by public opinion. The review of the “two-level game” in this chapter summarizes Putnam’s theory and its previous usage.

Chapter 4 introduces the methodology of this project, and also defines those key concepts relevant to analysis of narratives. This chapter also includes an example of text by Hilary Clinton to demonstrate my approach of narrative analysis with java software Yoshikoder and word clouds.

Chapter 5, 6 and 7 are the analytical chapters. Chapter 5 analyzes the different policy actions taken by Chinese government in the three incidents, while Chapter 6 conducts narrative analysis of actors in these three incidents. Chapter 7 summarizes the analysis and points out how the narratives indicate the interaction among the government, intellectuals and the public. Chapter 7 also draws a conclusion on the applicability of Easton’s Systems Theory in a Chinese context. By adding the *quelling* interaction between government and the public, and integrating the “two-level game”, the Systems Theory serves as a robust tool for analyzing Chinese foreign policy making. Moreover, by adding multiple Systems Theory models together, I show that previous incident will have impact on the next around of policy making by influencing the “environment” with “institutional memory.” In this sense, multiple Systems Theory models construct a 3-D game for future incidents.

Chapter 8 summarizes findings and practical implications, and concludes this project by pointing out possible topics for future research. It also acknowledges those

threats towards the validity of this research.

CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUNDS: CHINESE HISTORY, GOVERNMENT, AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

I. Memory of Humiliation: China Before 1949

With the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, twentieth century China was divided into two eras. In the pre-1949 era, the suffering of the Chinese people during the two world wars and numerous civil conflicts has influenced the way of thinking of contemporary Chinese government and the public. After 1949, the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) terminated the hundred years of humiliation and has witnessed a rise of nationalism on both the government and the public sides.

This chapter serves the purpose of explaining background terms and concepts that will be mentioned in the following chapters. It is organized to include the following parts. First, I will present the substances of the *hundred years of humiliation*. China suffered before 1949. The suffering China endured at the hands of the West and Japan sets a background for understanding the Diaoyu Islands dispute – with the memories China had from Japan throughout history, the Diaoyu islands reflect just one example of Chinese negative sentiment towards Japan. The second part reviews the negative sentiment Chinese has towards Japan. Such a negative sentiment is reflected on several contemporary issues, including the Diaoyu Islands. The third part turns to presents the political system of China, emphasizing the foreign policy making organs. The fourth part of this chapter describes the roles played by intellectuals and the public in Chinese foreign policy making throughout history, concluding in the analysis of why these actors have more influence on foreign policy making now than in any other time in history.

According to Peter Gries, Chinese nationalism has a fundamental tone of

humiliation and suffering.¹ This feeling of suffering and of being bullied before 1949 has had an impact on China's national pride, and has also allowed the communist government to be supported by the people in 1949. As Gries described, the communist regime's advocacy of nationalism has catered to the feeling of suffering among the public. The best evidence that demonstrates the government's nationalist argument was what Chairman Mao Zedong said towards millions of people around the world in Tiananmen Square on October 1, 1949. In his speech announcing the foundation of the PRC, Chairman Mao said, "Chinese people, from today on, have stood up!" – implying that before 1949, the Chinese people had been "kneeling down" in a hierarchical society below the foreign imperialists and previous government. But where were the Chinese people standing? From the debris of two world wars and three years of civil war against the Nationalist regime, who fled to Taiwan in 1949.

The following part presents the source of China's memory of humiliation in the twentieth century by reviewing the Chinese *hundred years of humiliation* [*bai nian guo chi*]. Knowledge of Chinese history will help readers understand the political narratives made by the government, the intellectuals and also the public, most importantly, why such a high level of sentiment was shared by all of them.

Hundred Years of Humiliation.

From 1842 until 1949, the 107 years are remembered as the "hundred years of humiliation." The key events of humiliation in these hundred years are summarized in Table 2.1.

¹ Gries, Peter. (2005). *China's New Nationalism*. University of Berkeley Press.

Table 2.1 Key Events in the “Hundred Years of Humiliation”

Date	Events
1840-1842	The First Opium War
1842	The <i>Treaty of Nanking</i> was signed between China and Britain; Hong Kong was ceded
1843	The Treaty of Bogue between China and Britain; Britain obtained “extraterritoriality” in China.
1844	The Treaty of Wang Hya between US and China; US obtained all trading privileges Britain had received. The Treaty of Whampoa between France and China; France obtained all trading privileges Britain had received.
1856-1860	The Second Opium War (Arrow War) between China and Britain-France alliance. Anglo-France alliance invaded Beijing and destroyed the Summer Palace. Four Treaties of Tientsen between China and Britain, France, US and Russia respectively. These treaties force China to open more ports for trade, legalize opium trade and ceded large amount of territory to Russia.
1887	China ceded Macau to Portugal.
1894	The <i>Jiawu</i> War broke out between China and Japan (the First Sino-Japanese War). China signed the Shimonoseki Treaty, ceding Taiwan and all its affiliates to Japan and paid Japan two hundred million taels of silver.
1900-1901	Multi-national armies invaded Beijing [<i>Ba Guo Lian Jun</i>]. China was forced to sign the Boxer Protocol and pay the invading nations four hundred million taels of silver.
1912	Qing Dynasty was overthrown. Republic of China (ROC) was established.
1931-9-18	Japan occupied the three provinces in Northeast China.
1932	Manchukuo was established under the control of Japan. Resigned Qing emperor Pu Yi (Emperor <i>Xuan 'tong</i>) was designated by Japan as the head of state.
1937-7-7	Japan occupied Wanping near Beijing and initiated comprehensive invasion to China. The Second Sino-Japanese war broke out.
1937-12-13	Japan occupied the capital city of ROC, Nanjing (Nanking) and committed the Nanjing Massacre. ROC government relocated to Chongqing.
1945-8-15	Japan surrendered, World War II ended.
1946-1949	China’s Civil War.
1949-10-1	The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded.

Before 1949, there had been two regimes governing China: the Qing Dynasty, governed by the *Manchu* elites (1644-1912) and the Republic of China (ROC) governed by the Nationalist [or *Kuomintang*] (1912-1949). The Qing Dynasty surrendered its power in 1912, as suggested by a former Qing general named Yuan Shikai who acted on behalf of revolutionaries who later became known as the Nationalists. In the same year, the ROC was founded in Nanjing. Qing Dynasty, the last imperial dynasty of China, had ruled China since 1644. The ruling elites of Qing Dynasty were not *Han* Chinese, which comprises more than 90% of all residents in China, but they were a group of people from Northeastern China, called the “Manchu” [*man zu*]. Manchu nomads overthrew the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) ruled by the *Han* Chinese in 1644, occupied their capital Beijing in the same year and terminated all regional regimes in South China in the following decades. The Manchu-governing Qing Dynasty became the national government of China during the next three centuries until 1912.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of ROC, and his Nationalist Party were devoted to the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty since the late 19th century, when the “hundred years of humiliation” passed by its half. After he founded the Republic of China in 1912, China witnessed multiple domestic conflicts among different regions and military warlords. During the World War II, Japan occupied all major cities in East China, including Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and even Wuhan in the central China. A civil war broke out between Communist and the Nationalist after the World War II ended in 1945, until the PRC regime was founded in 1949.

The “Hundred Years of Humiliation” began in 1842, when the First Opium War

between the Qing Dynasty and Britain ended with the Nanking Treaty,² in which China ceded Hong Kong to Britain. In addition, China was forced to open five ports to Britain for trade, Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo and Shanghai, and also to pay Britain six million silver dollars for Britain's losses in the opium trade. That was not the end - with the Opium War and Treaty of Nanking, China's nightmare in international politics had just begun.

In 1843, Britain forced China to sign the Treaty of Bogue (*Humen Tiaoyue*), which gave Britain the extraterritoriality in China and most-favored-nation status. Per the request of extraterritoriality, a British citizen in China could only be tried by British consular officers, not under Chinese jurisdiction. With the "most-favored-nation" status, Britain would receive any trading privileges China had granted or would grant to any other countries.

In 1844, the United States forced China to sign another treaty, the Treaty of Wang Hya [*Wang Xia Tiaoyue*]. According to this treaty, the United States also obtained extraterritoriality in China, as well as all privileges in trading that Britain had obtained with the Treaty of Nanking and the Treaty of Bogue. France obtained from China the same privileges given to Britain in 1844 with the Treaty of Whampoa (*Huangpu Tiaoyue*).

These treaties were signed when China was outpaced and preempted by the advanced military technology of the West during the First Opium War. In 1840, British vessels attacked the Chinese port of Zhenjiang, a city 50 miles east of Nanjing (also spelled as Nanking). After centuries of isolation, the Chinese government found itself far behind the West in technology and military prowess. British military vessels resided outside the city of Nanjing, and threatened to attack this major city in

² Nanjing, a city in Southeast China, was spelt as "Nanking" before 1949.

Southeast China. In order to appease Britain, the Qing Government succumbed and agreed to sign the Treaty of Nanking on the *HMS Cornwallis* on the water north of Nanjing City on August 29, 1842. The United States and France had similar requests for trading privileges – and the Qing Dynasty agreed to both as it was in awe of their advanced technology.

In 1856, when the Taiping Rebellion – (a rebellion waged by peasants in the name of heterodox Christian) swept over Southern China, the Second Opium war (also known as the “Arrow War”, or “Anglo-French expedition to China”) broke out between China and Britain who was allied with France. China lost the war again, with four more unequal treaties signed, the four Treaties of Tientsen (with Britain, France, Russia and the US respectively) in 1856. These treaties forced China to open more ports to the West, to allow Christian missionary activities and to legalize opium trade with China. In addition, China had to compensate British and French troops with six million taels of silver. Between China and Russia, the Treaties of 1858 and 1860 ceded to Russia a territory of 150 square kilometers, just slightly smaller than the size of the American state of Alaska. In the subsequent decades, Western countries came to China and enjoyed trading privileges granted under those unequal treaties. Even a small country like Portugal was able to force China to sign a treaty and occupy Macau in 1887.

Since 1842, the first four decades of humiliation forced China to open up to the West. Meanwhile, these experiences educated Chinese officials about modern international relations. For example, it acquainted China with the modern diplomatic norms and systems. If consider those experiences educational, the tuition was very high.

Similar to China, Japan was also forced to open its country to the West in 1853, when the Western steam vessels arrived at Japanese ports and forced Japan to accept unequal treaties.³ Three decades after economic, social and some political reforms, called the Meiji Restoration, Japan became another world power with which China was faced. Before 1898, Japan was able to control Korea, which had been protected by China under the so-called tribute system. A war broke out between China and Japan to determine the status of Korea. China lost to Japan in the Jiawu War (the First China-Japan war) in 1894. Japan was even more insatiable than previous Western powers: it wanted Taiwan and all of its affiliates, and also two hundred million taels of silver dollars from China, which equaled three times the annual Gross Domestic Production (GDP) of Japan in the 1890s.

In 1894, the humiliation worsened with Japan's victory over China, resulting in the loss of Taiwan, and arguably the Diaoyu islands. The defeat in 1894 was even more unacceptable for the Chinese than previous the losses against Britain, France or the United States. If the Western powers' victory against China can be explained by China's long-time self-isolation, and therefore their technological advancement in the past centuries, the victory of Japan was astonishing. Japan had been a weak neighbor of China and after only three decades of reform, Japan's military power was able to defeat China, which is ten times the size of Japan, calling itself the "Middle Kingdom." As a consequence of this unequal treaty and a reflection of Chinese intellectuals' wish to change China's humiliating situation, domestic reform has been advocated since 1895. In 1895, intellectuals who were taking the meritocratic official selection exam in Beijing wrote a petition letter to the Manchu Emperor, demanding reform. In 1898, the so-called "Reform in the Year of Wuxu" (1898) was implemented to imitate the

³ Japan called these Western steam vessels "the black boats" because they were made of iron and looked differently from the wooden boats which were popular in Asia at that time.

Japanese and promote social and political reforms. However, the intellectuals' plan in 1898 was centered on a young emperor whose power was actually in the hands of his mother, who was strongly against the reforms, believing they might undermine the interest of ruling Manchu elites. The reforms were terminated after 103 days of implementation, with the young emperor being imprisoned by his mother and dozens of intellectuals executed in public.

Just two years later, in 1900, troops from eight countries invaded China when the Chinese government was unable to quell the domestic Boxer Rebellion. The Boxer Rebellion was a movement organized by civilians who called themselves "boxers" with their xenophobic advocates; they rallied against Western imperialism and Christianity. In the Beijing Battle, Britain, Russia, Japan, France, Germany, America, Belgium and Austria-Hungary formed an alliance and invaded Beijing, forcing the Chinese empress (after imprisoning her son- the emperor, she became the *de facto* leader of China) to leave Beijing as a refugee. The photograph in Figure 2.1 taken in 1900 shows Western invaders sitting on the throne of Chinese emperor in the Forbidden City, after the Chinese emperor was ousted along with his mother.

Figure 2.1. [Ba guo Lian jun] Military Ally of Eight States in Beijing



The invasion was waged in the name of ending the Boxer Rebellion. The consequence of this invasion, however, included the temporary relocation of government, the signing of the Boxer Protocol in 1901, and a remittance from the Qing Government to all eight countries totaled at 450 million taels of silver, which was equal to US\$ 335 million gold dollars or £67 million at that time, approximately equal to US\$6.653 billion today.⁴

The loss of the Beijing Battle to the multi-national army intensified the domestic conflict between the public and the ruling Manchu elites. The constant cession of lands and the large amount of compensation paid to invaders, including Japan, severely undermined the authority of the Qing government. Decades of humiliation accompanied China into the twentieth century.

The Chinese Revolution [also known as “Xinhai Revolution”] on October 10, 1911 brought the Qing Dynasty to an end and replaced it with the Republic of China (ROC). When established, the ROC advocated the anti-Manchurism [*pai man zhu yi*], aimed at ousting all Manchus in China and overthrowing the Manchu regime. ROC became the first republic in Chinese history after overthrowing the Qing Dynasty. However, it did not end the *hundred years of humiliation*.

After 1912, the central government was not able to control hundreds of warlords in different areas of China. For example, Northeastern China was under the control of Zhang Zuolin. These warlords did not always obey the central government and conflicts happened frequently.

On September 18, 1931, Japanese troops occupied the three provinces in Northeast China, and in 1932, Japan invited the resigned Qing emperor, *Xuantong*, to become the Emperor of the Manchurian nation (*Manchukuo*). However, the emperor

⁴ Spence, Jonathan D. (1991). *The Search for Modern China*. WW Norton & Co.

was controlled by Japan from his personal life to his political administration. The Japanese language was taught in all schools in Manchukuo, and emperor would have to include Japanese officers at all levels of his government. China was divided. *September 18*, from then on, became the anniversary remembering the invasion of Japan.

Figure 2.2 notes in green the territory of the Manchurian nation, which was a regime controlled by Japan and ruled by last Manchu emperor in the Qing Dynasty. The territory of the Manchurian nation covers three provinces in Northeast China today - Jilin, Liaoning and Helongjiang, covering an area of more than 430 million square miles, with a population of 37 million in 1937. Also in Figure 2.3, the red areas denote Japan and all territories it had formally acquired, including Taiwan (occupied in 1894 from China), and the entire Korean Peninsula (Japan forced Korea to “merge” with Japan in 1910 via the Japan–Korea Annexation Treaty).

Figure 2.2 Map of Manchukuo (1932) [In green]



Figure 2.3-1 National Flag of Manchukuo (1932-1945)



Figure 2.3.-2 National Flag of ROC (1912-1949)




Figure 2.3-1 shows the newly adopted national flag of Manchukuo that was used to represent the independence of Manchukuo from the ROC (its national flag is shown in 2.3-2). Given the independence of Manchukuo, this action further inflamed the relationship because it was suggesting that traditional Chinese lands were now under Japan's control. The Manchuria regime, controlled by Japan, considered itself a separate state from China. The rest for China, however, was under the *de jure* control of Chinese central government.

Japan waged a comprehensive invasion of “China” – the southern part of China to the south of Manchuria on July 7, 1937, when Japanese troops in Manchuria occupied a small town south of Beijing called Wanping, using the search for a lost Japanese soldier as an excuse. The second China-Japan War broke out.

As in 1894, China could still offer a strong opposition to Japan in 1937. On December 13, 1937, Japanese troops occupied then capital city of ROC, Nanjing (also spelled as “Nanking”). In the six weeks following Japan's capture of Nanjing, Japanese troops committed mass murder, massive war rape and looting in Nanjing,

with more than 300,000 Chinese citizens being killed, and hundreds of thousands of Chinese women raped. This incident is known as the Nanjing Massacre (or the Rape of Nanking) in 1937.⁵

The atrocities Japanese troops committed in Nanjing were appalling, as suggested by Iris Chang's 1997 book title *The Rape of Nanking* and the records of foreigners like John Rabe who stayed in Nanjing during the massacre. As Rabe, a German engineer who stayed in Nanjing during the massacre wrote in his diary on December 13, 1937,

“It is not until we tour the city that we learn the extent of destruction. We come across corpses every 100 to 200 yards. The bodies of civilians that I examined had bullet holes in their backs. These people had presumably been fleeing and were shot from behind. The Japanese march through the city in groups of ten to twenty soldiers and loot the shops (...) I watched with my own eyes as they looted the café of our German baker Herr Kiessling. Hempel's hotel was broken into as well, as almost every shop on Chung Shang and Taiping Road.”⁶

Japanese troops systematically massacred unarmed Chinese citizens and prisoners of war (POWs), and searched door-to-door for women to rape, including infants and the elderly. The Nanjing Massacre was the peak of Japanese atrocities during the World War II in China, and its impact on Chinese sentiment towards Japan is still a stumbling block between China and Japan today.

Before Japan occupied Nanjing, the ROC government had moved to Chongqing, a city in West China. The ROC government stayed there until 1945, when Japan surrendered and retreated from China.

During the World War II, Chinese communists gained public support and power in rural areas. Their criticism towards the ROC government for its one-party dominance finally led to the civil war between Communist and the Nationalist from

⁵ For more about this tragedy, see Chang, Iris (1997). *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*. Basic Books. AND Woods, John E. (1998). *The Good man of Nanking, the Diaries of John Rabe*. Also in the movie directed by Zhang, Yimou, *The Flowers of War* (2011), and *Nanking* (2007), directed by Bill Guttentag and Dan Sturman.

⁶ Woods, John E. (1998). *The Good man of Nanking, the Diaries of John Rabe*. p. 67.

1946 to 1949. The Civil War ended with the victory of the communists and the PRC regime was founded on October 1, 1949. The Nationalists fled to Taiwan, where the ROC regime still exists today.

Cumulatively, the hundred years of humiliation from 1842 to 1949 severely hurt the national pride of the Chinese people, and resulted in the public demand for a more assertive national government to defend China against foreign intrusions in her domestic spheres. In this context, Chairman Mao's speech emphasizing that the "Chinese people have stood up" in 1949 was inviting for the public, and the PRC government obtained support from the public and also its legitimacy for terminating the *hundred years of humiliation*. The public, on the other hand, became sensitive to any actions taken by Japan or the West, with the presumption that they always had hostile intention towards China.

Hundred years of humiliation also set the stage for contemporary Chinese territorial disputes. To highlight a key facet of the humiliation in history, China was forced to cede lands and compensate. The PRC government and the Chinese people do not want to see territory cession happen again.

II. History: Contemporary China's Anti-Japanese Sentiments

Japan was an important contributor to China's hundred years of humiliation. Two Sino-Japanese wars (one in 1894, the second in 1937-1945) caused tens of millions of casualties in China. More importantly, the insatiable demands of Japan in 1894 and atrocities committed during the World War II altogether functioned as a big obstacle for the Chinese public to view Japan as a friendly neighbors. Worse still, the Chinese public believes that the Japanese government established after World War II has

refused to offer formal apologies to the Chinese victims.

However, it should be noted that the negative sentiment from the Chinese government did not emerge (though has existed since 1894) until after Deng Xiaoping's rule in late 1980s. When Mao Zedong was ruling China, he met with the Japanese Prime Minister and asked for "no apology" from Japan. As Susan Shirk mentioned in her 2007 book, in the era of Mao Zedong, the strong leader had "little need to mobilize popular sentiment against Japan," because he had "unchallenged authority on foreign policy matters."⁷ The same logic can be applied to describe the China-Japan relations under Deng Xiaoping's rule from 1978 to the early 1990s, when China had a peaceful relationship with Japan, and the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands was "shelved" by Deng.

However, the Chinese government began to view Japan as both a historical evil and an imminent challenger since the Jiang Zemin administration (starting from early 1990s). As Susan Shirk stated, after the "strong men" era of Mao and Deng, Jiang and incumbent Chinese President Hu have no experience fighting in wars as Mao and Deng did, therefore they dare not risk their ruling status by being lenient with Japan.⁸ Such a change of the Chinese government's stance towards Japan between Mao-Deng rule (*strong men* era) and Jiang/Hu administrations may also be explained by the different experiences of leaders during the World War II: while Mao and Deng were leading armies fighting against Japan, Jiang was a student suffering under the Japanese rule.⁹

On the other hand, the Chinese public always has negative sentiment against Japan whoever the leader is. Even under Mao's rule in 1965, at a Japanese cultural

⁷ Shirk, Susan. (2007). *Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail its Peaceful Rise*. Oxford University Press.

⁸ See Shirk (2007), pp. 46-47 and 158.

⁹ See Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. (2005). *The man who changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*. Crown. Chapter 2 mentioned Jiang's experience as a student under Japanese rule of China in the late 1930s.

exhibition in Beijing, people came in and saw the Japanese flag, they “fell to the floor in shock and dismay, they had such bad memories.”¹⁰ This background may indicate the importance of leadership in China-Japan relations. However, after Mao and Deng, we are and will be an era without *strong men* who have prestige to control the Chinese public’s sentiment, then where will be China heading in its Japan policy?

A large amount of literature is devoted to the China-Japan relationship in the twentieth century. To describe a narrative on the complicated feelings between these two countries, there are several key issues that go hand-in-hand with the Diaoyu Islands dispute in bilateral relations. As the websites of several Defend Diaoyu Movement (DDM) groups indicated, these issues have the roots in the history of the World War II, including the quests for compensation to victims suffering from Japanese chemical weapons, massacre in Nanjing, and “comfort” women, and the fact that Japan never made an apology to China after the Second World War. In the late twentieth century, whether the Japanese prime minister should pay an annual tribute (*canbai*) to the Yasukuni Shrine¹¹ is a highly disputable topic even within Japan. That Japan owes China an apology has been a main complaint among the Chinese public, and such an attitude has a great impact on China’s Japan policy, including the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands.

In his analysis of security dilemmas in East Asia, Thomas Christensen stated that despite a more formidable US military force to China, Chinese analysts “view Japan with much less trust and, in many cases, with a loathing rarely found in their attitudes about the United States.”¹² According to Christensen, Chinese aversion towards Japan sprang from two aspects, one is the historical legacy and Japan’s attitude

¹⁰ See Shrik (2007), pp. 158.

¹¹ Yasukuni Shrine is a Japanese shrine in Tokyo, where generations of martyrs of Japan were memorized, including those war criminals who waged the World War II in Asia. Many of these war criminals were responsible for massacres and atrocities in Asia during the World War II.

¹² See pp. 52 in Christensen, Thomas. “Security Dilemmas in East Asia.” *International Security* 23-4: 49-80.

towards historical issues, the other is a more imminent judgment on Japan's military power and potential.¹³ The interaction of these two factors led to a negative, anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese public. Such anti-Japanese sentiments are so strong that it prevails in all aspects, not only political, but also in economic and cultural domains. Several incidents reflect Chinese public's negative sentiments against Japan.

In 2003 a famous Chinese actress Zhao Wei took a series of pictures for a fashion magazine, wearing dresses decorated with Japanese flag. The Chinese public waged a large scale of mobilization, demanding Zhao to apologize. In 2003, the explosion of a mustard gas bomb left by Japanese troops in World War II in Qiqihar caused mass protests and condemnation of Chinese public against Japan. Also in 2003, a sex party organized by the Japanese on *September 18* in Zhuhai exploded nation-wide protests and accusation against Japan.¹⁴

When political protests take place, a popular slogan is to ask the Chinese people to boycott Japanese products (*dizhi rihuo*). In 2003, when China was trying to develop its own bullet train system between Beijing and Shanghai, the Chinese public waged a protest against Japanese-made products. Chinese nationalist Feng Jinhua organized an online signature-gathering project to protest against the purchase of the Japanese bullet train (*Shinkansen*). Feng gathered approximately 100,000 signatures, and sent them to Premier Wen Jiabao to demonstrate the opposition of Chinese public against this possible billion-dollar contract with Japan. Feng believed his action made "significant influence", which led to a Chinese government announcement stating the contract is postponed and China would listen to "the opinion of its people."¹⁵

¹³ *Ibid*, pp. 55.

¹⁴ Gries, Peter. (2005). "China's 'new thinking' on Japan". *The China Quarterly*, No. 184, pp. 831-850.

¹⁵ Li, Mujin. "Cyberspace nationalism led to a new chapter to Chinese nationalism" (*Wangluo minzuzhiyi xiankai zhongguo minzuzhiyi xinpianzhang*), published on *International Herald Tribune (Guoji xianqu daobao)*, Beijing.

These seemingly radical protests actually are windows that display the negative feeling towards Japan among the Chinese public. Anti-Japanese sentiments are so strong that a small issue, like an actress wearing the Japanese sun-flag, inappropriate humor by Japanese students in Xi'an, can explode the barrel of explosives of nationalism.

At these protests and eruptions of anti-Japanese sentiment, the role of the Chinese government is ambivalent. The Communist Party of China (CPC) won the trust of the people by advocating nationalism after the World War II. As Christensen stated, "nationalism has always been a strong element of the legitimacy of the CPC, and opposing Japanese imperialism is at the core of this nationalist story."¹⁶ Meanwhile, the CPC has reservation on anti-Japanese protests, worrying that they may "backfire," leading to the public questioning the Chinese government's policy, even its legitimacy.¹⁷

This discussion leads to question how the Chinese government is constituted and how their foreign policy making process accommodates the influence of public opinion.

III. Top- down: PRC Government and Chinese Foreign Policy Making

The Chinese Political System

Before discussing Chinese foreign policy making on the island dispute, it is necessary for readers to know about China's political system and its foreign policy making structures. Information in this part is important not only in providing a background for the following discussion about the foreign policy over the disputed

2003-9-18.

¹⁶ Christensen (1999),pp. 54.

¹⁷ See Gries (2002).

islands, but also in presenting a government isolating itself from influence of effective moderating institutions. The opaque nature of the Chinese government renders the “black box” of David Easton applicable to a Chinese context.

The PRC government was founded under a strong leader, Mao Tse-tung (*Pinyin* as Mao Ze-dong)’s rule since 1949. As the strong leader, he waged the Cultural Revolution in 1966, expecting to “purify” the entire country by annihilating all vestiges of feudalism and capitalism in China. After Mao passed away, another PRC founder Deng Xiaoping came to power and pushed for China’s *Reform and Opening up policy* in 1978. Since 1978, China has moved from a closed, centrally-planned economy to a “more market-oriented one, playing a major global role.”¹⁸ After Deng, Jiang Zemin became the General Secretary of CPC and Commander of PLA in 1989, and then the Chinese president in 1993. Under his rule, China’s economy developed at a fast pace. Incumbent Chinese president Hu Jintao assumed his leadership in 2003.

Though often considered an authoritarian, communist state with an opaque decision-making process, the Chinese government within the “black box” does include two state institutions: one includes the government institutions (executive, legislative and judicial branches) as almost all countries have; the other set of institutions refers to the ruling Communist party, which is designated in China’s Constitution as *the* ruling party. These two sets of institutions are integrated and also interlocking each other.¹⁹ On one hand, China is controlled by one political party, and the party system dominates the bureaucracy, and also the military and the National People’s Congress (NPC), which is a legislative body functioning like the Congress in American politics; on the other hand, the bureaucracy, military and NPC also have their influence in Chinese policy making by offering feedbacks and assistance

¹⁸ CIA world factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>.

¹⁹ Dumbaugh, Kerry. (2010). *Understanding Chinese Political System*. DIANE Publishing.

towards the communist party. Moreover, even though considered an authoritarian, one-party government, China does have eight minor political parties. They assist the Communist Party in different organizations at both national and local levels.

State Government

With Beijing as the capital, the Chinese government governs 23 provinces (including Taiwan), 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities, as well as the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and Macau Special Administrative Region (MSAR). Within the Chinese government, the incumbent Chief of State is President Hu Jintao, who was appointed by the National People's Congress in 2003. He is currently holding his second five-year term. A president can serve no more than two terms. The President of China is also the chief diplomat, and usually the Communist party leader.

In the executive branch, the Head of Government is Premier Wen Jiabao, who was nominated by President Hu, reviewed by the National People's Congress in 2003. The Premier is appointed and can also be removed by the President. The cabinet of government, the State Council is chaired by the Premier. It is composed of one Premier, four Vice-Premiers, five State Councilors, and numerous ministers and commissioners in charge of ministries and commissions in the State Council. Members of the State Council are nominated by the Premier, reviewed by NPC and appointed/removed by the President.

Within ministries of the State Council there are vertical hierarchies governing different policy areas. The Premier heads the national system of the bureaucracy, which includes ministries (for instance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of National Defense and Ministry of Agriculture) and organizations directly under the

State Council (for example, the General Administration of Customs, and State Administration of Taxation) – all of these ministries have a hierarchical organization governing policy areas at both national and local levels.

Figure 2.4.
Ministries and Commissions of State Council of the People’s Republic of China

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of National Defense
National Development and Reform Commission
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Science and Technology
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
State Ethnic Affairs Commission
Ministry of Public Security
Ministry of State Security
Ministry of Supervision
Ministry of Civil Affairs
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
Ministry of Land and Resources
Ministry of Environmental Protection
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development
Ministry of Transport
Ministry of Railways
Ministry of Water Resources
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Commerce
Ministry of Culture
Ministry of Health
National Population and Family Planning Commission
People's Bank of China
National Audit Office

Source: Chinese Central Government website (gov.cn)

China adopts a unitary system between the national government and provincial governments (including 5 autonomous regions). However, government system between HKSAR/MSAR and the central government is one that resembles federalism: HKSAR and MSAR surrender diplomatic and military rights to Beijing, while they retain other powers including currency issuance and maintaining their own judicial systems (the so-called “one country, two systems”).

The National People’s Congress (NPC) functions as the legislative branch of the government. It currently has 2,987 seats, with the members elected “by municipal, regional, and provincial people's congresses, and People's Liberation Army to serve five-year terms.”²⁰ Members of the Congress meet every five years, the next forthcoming meeting is scheduled to occur between December 2012 and March 2013. The NPC has the constitutional right of amending the Constitution. Between the convocation of two NPC meetings, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC), consisted of 150 members of the National People’s Congress, convenes between the plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress. When they convene, they make laws on behalf of the NPC. NPCSC is chaired by the top legislator, who ranks the third in Chinese politics, behind the Party Secretary and President. The current Chairman of NPCSC is Mr. Wu Bangguo.

With regard to the judicial branch, China has its Supreme People’s Court in Beijing and local court system comprised of higher, intermediate, and basic courts in the provinces and autonomous regions. Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan have their own judicial systems under the “one country, two system” principle. While Mainland China maintains a civil law system, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan have their own judicial systems. For example, Hong Kong adopts a common law system.

²⁰ CIA World Factbook, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>.

Party System

The Chinese government is unique with its dual set of institutions of a national government and the Communist Party in decision making. The President of China, Mr. Hu Jintao, is also the party leader of Communist Party of China (CPC), and also the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Unlike the President of the United States, who becomes the Commander in Chief only after he becomes president, China's Commander-in-Chief is the chair of the CPC Central Military Commission and also PRC Central Military Commission. In other words, theoretically, the President of China and the Commander in Chief of PLA can be two different individuals. However, these three positions (General Secretary of CPC, President and Commander in Chief) usually fall onto one individual after the terms transitions.


Within the CPC, there are organizations that interlock with ministries and commissions in all levels of governments. The CPC's supreme power resides in the National Party Congress, which is held every five years, and it is convened by the Central Committee of CPC. The Central Committee is selected by the National Party Congress and it represents CPC outside of the party when the National Party Congress is not in session. The Central Committee has 204 members, and at the core of the Central Committee is a nine-member committee, the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. The leader of the Standing Committee is known as the "Chief Secretary" – it is usually the President of China. This nine-member committee functions as the hub of Chinese policy making, including the President of China, the Premier of State Council and the chair of NPC – they also hold positions in national government.

The CPC Central Committee also appoints the Chairman of the Central Military

Commission, who is also the *de facto* Commander in Chief of the PLA.

Under the Central Politburo, there are those functioning departments and commissions within CPC, for instances, the General Affairs Office, the Organization Department, the Publicity Department, the International Liaison Department etc. They have overlapping areas within the ministries and commissions in the State Council, however, they all focus on party affairs.

Figure 2.5 The Organization of CPC.



(Source: *China.gov.cn*).

To sum up, what is unique in the Chinese political system is the existence of two sets of institutions: the Party system and the State government system. They integrate under the leadership of the CPC, and all state government departments follow the policy decisions of the CPC; meanwhile, state governments also make decisions, which may have influence on the CPC. These two sets of institutions are integrated so

that all state governments at all levels must be accompanied by a branch of the CPC. At local levels, the Secretary of the Party is usually higher than local government leader in Chinese political hierarchies. On the other hand, these two institutions also interlock each other by overlapping in some policy areas, for example, foreign policy.

Organizations in China's Foreign Policy Making

The central leadership, *i.e.* the CPC Standing Politburo Committee and other members of the Politburo assumes the task of formulating China's foreign policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the organization in charge of Chinese foreign policy implementation. As stated on the official website of the MFA, the main responsibilities of the MFA include "to implement the state's diplomatic principles and policies and related laws and regulations; safeguard national sovereignty, security and interests on behalf of the state; run diplomatic affairs on behalf of the state and the government; and handle diplomatic activities between leaders of the CPC and the state with foreign leaders."²¹ Other than the MFA, the CPC department International Communication Office, and the foreign relations department of the PLA General Staff Department also function in implementing the state's diplomatic principles and policies, with emphasis on the communication of political parties and military collaboration respectively.

The MFA assumes the tasks of formulating and implementing China's foreign policy. The current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yang Jiechi, served as the Ambassador to the United States between 2001 and 2005. MFA maintain regular press conference with MFA spokesperson.

The first press conference of MFA was held on March 26, 1982, by then-Minister

²¹ "Main Responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China." Available at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zyzz/t558670.htm>.

of Foreign Affairs, Qian Qichen. Since then, regular press conference has been an regular institution of China's MFA. Ministry of Foreign Affairs has four spokespersons now, Ms. Jiang Yu, Dr. Ma Chaoxu, Mr. Hong Lei, and Mr. Liu Weimin.

Since 1995, MFA press conferences have been held twice a week on Tuesday and Thursday. Since August 2011, MFA increased the number of press conferences to 5 times per week. Press conference starts at 3 o'clock every workday afternoon in MFA headquarter in Beijing. Q&A sessions have been an integral part of MFA press conferences since 1988, when the limits on raising questions were removed. When the MFA officials speak at the press conferences, their statements are construed to be the official voice of the Chinese government.

The International Communication Office in the CPC was established to manage the relations of CPC with other communist parties around the world. It was modeled after the Soviet system and played important role before the Cold War ended. Nowadays, it still functions by maintaining close contacts with communist parties in North Korea, Cuba and Vietnam. However, its influence on the West is limited. Since the end of the Cold War, this organization of the party has been declining. They are inherently an organ of the party, and therefore does not speak on the behalf of the Chinese government.

Even though the President of China is also the leader of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the PLA's influence on foreign policy is constrained to policy areas and departments related to military. For instance, the Foreign Relations department in the PLA General Staff Department helps to arrange the visit of foreign warship to visit Chinese ports. However, PLA as an entity in general has been found playing an important role in Chinese foreign policy making, especially during the Jiang and Hu

administrations, when the leaders had no experience of military service.

These organizations construct the system of Chinese foreign policy making and implementation. Foreign policy decisions are usually announced through several venues. First, the MFA makes statements on foreign policy issues usually after an incident. For example, after the arrest of Chinese fisherman by Japan, the MFA issued an official statement. MFA also makes statements at its regular press conferences. These conferences are held to voice the Chinese government's official position on foreign policy issues.

Second, the government leaders, including the Premier, Minister of Foreign Affairs, sometimes make statements on China's foreign policy stances. Never in PRC history had these three sources given conflicting information.

Third, the Party voices its foreign policy stance in its official newspaper, the *People Daily (Renmin Ribao)*. Controlled by the Central Committee of CPC, the *People's Daily* offers a venue for understanding the policy stance of the Chinese central government. In addition, Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television (CCTV) are both fully owned and controlled by the Chinese government, therefore, they offer reliable "official" information on China's foreign policy decisions. Other than these sources, all the others are considered as "unofficial" in this project. However, it should be noted that the boundary between *official* and *unofficial* media is blurry. The *Global Times (huan qiu shi bao)*, for example, is a newspaper sitting on the boundary between official and unofficial sources. Owned and administered by the *People's Daily*, the *Global Times* is very sensitive to popular press in its publications however. When gathering data on the Chinese government's position, I go for those "official" media, discarding all the others, including the *Global Times*. The existence

of the *Global Times* in a country where censorship is active, however, indicates the Chinese government's concern of the public opinion.

This description of the Chinese government's institutional arrangement may lead to an impression that a top-down approach will yield the richest rewards in understanding foreign policy of this communist nation. However, events in recent years suggest the development of additional social institutions whose actions may be mediating official Chinese public policy. This dissertation will reveal that a bottom-up approach, which focuses on public opinion and intellectuals, will make our understanding more robust on how and why Chinese foreign policy is made.

IV. Bottom up? : Intellectuals, Public Opinion Leaders and Foreign Policy Making in China

Chinese intellectuals and public opinion leaders (POLs) maintain a historical tradition of striving to participate in policy issues in China. This tradition is evidenced in the ancient Chinese saying that “common citizens are responsible for the prosperity and failure of the state.” [国家兴亡，匹夫有责]

Chinese intellectuals [*zhi shi fen zi*] preserve a tradition of offering the authorities wise policy advice with their knowledge and expertise since the imperial eras of China. Such a tradition of intellectuals in political life has its root in the meritocratic official selection system in imperial China. As early as in the latter Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), Chinese intellectuals organized associations to comment on national political affairs and offer their advice. In the late 16th century, the Donglin Academy in east China Wuxi city, was the forum for Chinese intellectuals to meet and discuss

about politics.²² In imperial dynasties with meritocratic official selection system, Chinese intellectuals were prepared to govern a nation ever since they studied for the government official exam (*ke ju*). In Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), intellectuals still played an important role in government administrations. In the late 19th century, for example, Chinese intellectuals advocated the *Wuxu* reform 1898 after China's defeat in the first Sino-Japan war.

During the 38 years of ROC governance in China, intellectuals, including college students, organized several protests, criticizing the government's weak foreign policy. The best known protests were the mass protests on May 4, 1919 and December 9, 1935.

The protests on May 4, 1919, or known as "May 4 Movement" (*wu si yun dong*), was waged against the government's weak foreign policy at the Paris Peace Conference, when the League of Nations gave the previous German occupying Shandong Province in east China to Japan. In 1919, the Chinese government also signed the 21-demands Treaty with Japan, in which Japan's occupation of Shan Dong was confirmed and Japan obtained exclusive control over China's mining and railway systems. Mass protests organized by Chinese college students on May 4 criticized the government and demanded the Chinese government to forfeit its treaty with Japan. In 1935, another mass protest was organized on December 9 to protest Chinese government's appeasement policy during Japan's annexation of the Hebei Province in North China. Later remembered as the "December 9 Movement", it reflects the sentiments Chinese intellectuals and colleges students had towards a weak government on foreign policy.

During both movements, Chinese intellectuals participated with their expertise

²² Dong Lin Academy (东林书院) located in Wuxi, China, was organized by Chinese intellectuals in the late Ming Dynasty, and scholars of this academy educated students and also make public comments on political issues.

and knowledge to suggest the best policy for China, inheriting the spirit of Chinese intellectuals as reflected from the Dong Lin Academy. In 1919, the “New Cultural Movement” spread all across China, and intellectuals advocated the concepts of “Democracy” and “Science” for China and believed these two concepts would save China from a weak, semi-colonized state. In 1935, college students demonstrated their enthusiasm for politics and they turned out to be the core of intellectuals after the PRC was founded.²³

Despite of their tradition of active participation in politics and commentary, Chinese intellectuals are often ignored, or even persecuted by the authorities. Throughout history, Chinese intellectuals are often the victims of political conflicts. The Dong Lin Academy in Ming Dynasty, for example, was brutally destroyed in 1626 by the government controlled by eunuchs. They criticized the Academy for questioning the policies of the government. In 1898, the reform advocated by intellectuals lasted only three months. The dominant conservative power, headed by the Empress, crushed the reform, imprisoned the Emperor who supported the reform, and executed those major participants of this reform. In the twentieth century, the “May 4 movement” and the “December 9 Movement” both witnessed the blood of college students and quelled advocates of the intellectuals. In history, it seems that the intellectuals are struggling for the consent and tolerance of the authorities; whenever the authorities saw the intellectuals threaten their legitimacy, however, intellectuals were to be stifled.

After the PRC was founded in 1949, intellectuals continued to play an important role in politics, until 1956, when waves of anti-rightist movements constrained many

²³ See He, Jiadong. (2003). “Where are we, and where are we going to?” [*wo men zai na li, wo men you wang he chu qu?*] *Forum for Social Science* [*she hui ke xue lun tan*] 2003-4.

intellectuals.²⁴ The Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 then set the mainland China into turmoil.

After the Cultural Revolution, the role played by intellectuals and public opinion leaders in Chinese politics increased continually. The role played by intellectuals in Chinese foreign policy making has been documented by Zhao Quansheng in his book chapter titled “*Impact of Intellectuals and Think Tanks on Chinese Foreign Policy.*”²⁵ According to Zhao, he believed that this increase of intellectuals’ influence can be explained by the development of civil society in China, the greater demand of policy input from the Chinese government and the “growing professionalism in the foreign policy apparatus” required in diplomatic system in China.²⁶ For these reasons, we see intellectuals’ opinions becoming more influential in Chinese foreign policy making.

However, it must be noted that even after the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government still exercised considerable influence over intellectuals. For instance, the government used to determine where a professor would work. Now universities and faculties have obtained much more autonomy and mobility than before, but the government “still exercises substantial control by making top leadership.”²⁷

Meanwhile, the changes in civil society, demands for policy input, and “growing professionalism” also lead to more influential public opinion in Chinese foreign policy making. The public, which also contributed to the two movements in 1919 and 1935, was also suppressed by the government. Before 1912, public opinion exploded in a form like the Boxer Rebellion or Taiping Revolution, which were bottom-up uprisings seeking to overthrow the regime. Currently, public opinion has a much

²⁴ For the experience of intellectuals in 1956, see Zhang, Yihe. (2004). *Last Aristocrats [zui hou de gui zu]*. Oxford University Press: Hong Kong.

²⁵ In Hao, Yufan and Lin Su ed. (2005). *China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy*. Ashgate.

²⁶ Zhao in Hao and Lin (2005), pp. 134-135.

²⁷ See Mohrman, Kathryn, Yiqun Geng, and Yingjie Wang. (2011). “Faculty Life in China.” *The NEA 2011 Almanac Of Higher Education*.

larger influence than ever before due to the development of mass media and Internet.

Conclusion

To summarize this chapter, China's negative sentiment towards Japan has historical root. In the century prior to 1949, China was in the so-called *hundred years of humiliation*, the legacy of which has impacted how the contemporary Chinese government and public understand foreign policy issues. In this chapter, I have reviewed the substance of the *hundred years of humiliation*. Knowledge in this regard is helpful for understanding the contemporary Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan.

Moreover, this chapter introduces the Chinese political system and foreign policy making process. The information is offered as background knowledge for a discussion of Chinese foreign policy making. This chapter also points out that recently in Chinese foreign policy making, there has been a tendency to accommodate more actors in addition to the government.

CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter starts with reviewing the Balance of Power theory. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the IR theory can explain China's assertive policy in part. However, it still needs an investigation from public policy perspective on China's foreign policy making. Moreover, in Chapter 2, I showed that with the evolution of the roles of Chinese intellectuals and public opinion leaders ("POLs" herein), Chinese public policy no longer seems to be dominated by the state as the only institutional actor. This suggests that the policymaking environment has shifted so that the Chinese government is receiving "inputs" from additional institutions. Additionally, the "outputs" of Chinese foreign policy making also needs to target to these domestic actors. The second part of this chapter reviews the Systems Theory.

As suggested in Chapter 2 as well, the advent of POLs is a relatively new phenomenon in China, occurring in parallel with the development of unofficial media sources. Now it can be expected that there are two streams of information that may influence how the Chinese people understand the government's public policy actions as well as how Chinese leaders receive and respond to inputs from the public: through the official venue such as the official newspaper and television, or the unofficial venue, which includes social media, the Internet and those media not directly controlled by the Chinese government.

The last part of this chapter will focus on previous research on public opinion in Chinese foreign policy making, and on the correlation between foreign policy and domestic politics in a two-level game. Drawing from Putnam's work in 1988, the first level of the game at the international stage impacts domestic institutions, and now, with the introduction of the additional mediating institutions, we can observe a second

level game in Chinese domestic politics, where the public, led by POLs, exercises pressures on Chinese government; the latter meanwhile seeks to control public opinion by suppressing domestic public mobilization.

I. Balance of Power and Assertive Policy over Disputed Islands

From the perspective of International Relations (IR), the emergency of assertive policy of China in recent incidents can be explained with a simple logic: the relative power of China has been much stronger vis-à-vis Japan in 2010 than in 2004 or 1996. Following this logic, it can be concluded that China's assertive policy in 2010 is explained by its stronger economic and military power.

While it is true that China has been much stronger than before, however, this explanation only partially explains the story. If a much stronger China will suffice to explain its assertive policy, we should ask why China has not yet been assertive over the countries in other island disputes (say, Vietnam). Furthermore, if this theory explains the assertive policy, we may expect that China will keep adopting assertive policy in foreign policy in the future since China is much stronger. However, this does not seem true. Foreign policy is so complex that it cannot be captured and explained by a single factor.

The argument emphasizing on relative power will be supported by those realists in IR, treating states as billiard balls and ignoring what is inside of them. Hans Morgenthau, for example, emphasized that states have the similar nature and will seek for power at the expenses of norms and rules.¹ Kenneth Waltz, however, argued that what can explain states' behavior include those factors at the international level, rather

¹ Morgenthau, Hans (1955). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Fifth Edition. Knopf: New York.

than the domestic levels.² John Mearsheimer, a modern realist famous for his pessimistic understanding of great power politics, would also agree to underplay domestic politics when analyzing international relations.³

By treating states as black billiard balls and ignoring the “inside” of states, the discipline of IR maintains a distance from that of Comparative Politics, which strives to solve those puzzles relevant with domestic politics in different states. However, such realist arguments from IR face challenges. Stephen Krasner, for example, reviewed the analogies of “billiard balls” and “tectonic plates.”⁴ As he reviewed, while both analogies believe the outcomes of international relations are a function of the distribution of power among states, yet, the billiard balls analogy “is concerned solely with the political interactions among states;” while the tectonic analogy is concerned with “the impact of the distribution of state power on various international environments.”⁵ By reviewing these two analogies, Krasner was trying to identify the position of regimes in IR, which was a key argument by those institutionlists in IR. Krasner, with his revision to realist theory, was also named by Keohane as a “subversive realist,”⁶ whose theory share some characteristics with realism, institutionalism and even constructivism. From billiard balls to tectonic plates, Krasner challenged the underestimation of domestic politics of traditional realists.

However, in order to account for the variations in international relations, ignoring domestic politics is not only insufficient, but also misleading. In order to explain why a state sometimes adopts certain foreign policies but not others, it needs to delve into the domestic image for explanations. Jack Snyder, for example, argued that domestic

² Waltz, K.N. (1959) *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.

³ Mearsheimer, John (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. W.W. Norton & Company: New York.

⁴ Krasner, Stephen. (1982). “Regimes and the limits of realism: regimes as autonomous variables.” *International Organizations*, 36-2: 497-510.

⁵ Krasner (1982), pp. 498.

⁶ Keohane, Robert. (2010). “Stephen Krasner: Subversive Realist.” Prepared for delivery at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-5, 2010.

interest groups are those key factors that lead to the overextension of foreign policies of major powers in history.⁷ By investigating the domestic politics, scholars are able to find out what is the cause of certain foreign policies. After all, foreign policies are made and implemented by domestic institutions.

On the topic of China's assertive foreign policy, the Balance of Power policy may explain part of the story. With much stronger military powers relative to Japan in 2010, China had the capability to act more assertively than before. While this argument is not wrong, it does not help to explain China's foreign policy making, nor does it aid to predict future Chinese foreign policy.

China's foreign policy is made in response to events at international level, however, the government is also facing domestic challenge towards its legitimacy. Therefore, the government's domestic considerations must be factored into the analysis of its foreign policy. Moreover, the explanation of relative power for assertive change of China's foreign policy does not reveal the policy making process in China, and it tells little about what we can expect in the future. With China's relative power keeps growing, will it be more assertive, or will it possibility calm down? What are the government's calculations behind these assertive policies? These questions seem to be unresolved following the logic of the Balance of Power theory, refusing to enter the inside of the billiard balls.

An analysis of the domestic institutions of China's foreign policy making, however, yields knowledge on the Chinese foreign policy making. Such knowledge allows us to predict China's possible future actions. Fravel, for instance, emphasized that regime insecurity is the key factor that explains why China is willing to compromise on its territorial disputes.⁸ Jessica Weiss, emphasizes the strategic use of

⁷ Snyder, Jack. (1993). *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Cornell University Press.

⁸ Fravel, Taylor. (2008). *Strong Borders, Secure Nations: Cooperation and Conflict in China's territorial Disputes*.

public opinion in China's foreign policy making so the government can harvest more benefit at the international negotiations.⁹ These are both endeavors to investigate the domestic forces that influence China's foreign policy.

However, what is missing here is a clear framework that can reflect the nuanced interaction between the government and the public in foreign policy making. Nuanced interaction includes how the government acts in front of the public, and how the public responds to government's actions during foreign policy making process.

Fravel's analysis reveals the concerns government feels from domestic and foreign factors, emphasizing on domestic instability. However, it does not reveal how Chinese government interacts with its public in a specific dispute. In addition to "fear" of insecurity, the government also wants to manage the public sentiment. No government is facing threats to regime every day.

What is helpful for understanding an authoritarian state's policy making process is the dynamic of how government's decisions are mediated or moderated by domestic institutions. Knowledge in this regard not only helps us to understand how decisions are made, but also offers insights on the trajectory of future foreign policy making.

Therefore, what is necessary is not only to enter the black box for domestic institutions, but also analyzing how they interact with each other in a specific dispute. Easton's Systems Theory proposed in 1953 seems a suitable model for investigating China's foreign policy making.

II. David Easton's Analysis of Political Systems

In 1953, David Easton proposed the path-breaking "systems theory", which, as

Princeton University Press.

⁹ Chen, Jessica Weiss. (2008). "Powerful Patriots: Nationalism, Diplomacy, and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Foreign Protest." Dissertation: UC: San Diego.

Easton stated, was valuable for research in the social sciences because it allows researchers to “view political life as a system of interrelated activities.”¹⁰ Easton’s systems theory treats political life as a system of activities, and believes we can separate political life from the rest of social activities, at least for analytical purposes.

As Easton elaborated on the systems theory in 1965, he believed that system analysis sprang from “the fundamental decision to view political life as a system of behavior.”¹¹ System analysis is conceptualized on the basis of four main general premises: the *system*, *environment*, *response*, and *feedback*.¹² These four premises delineate the approach of system analysis, and they altogether highlight political life as a “*system*” under influences from “*environments*” - “a *system* is distinguishable from the *environment* in which it exists and is open to influence from it.”¹³ The system then *responds* “with efforts to regulate or cope with stress flowing from environmental as well as internal sources”; meanwhile, in the face of stress, the system generates *feedback* “to its actors and decision-makers.”¹⁴ System analysis on the basis of these four premises allows researchers to focus on political system and study how political system persists and works in societies. As Easton stated, “in its ultimate system this mode of analysis will enable the investigator to understand more fully the way in which some kinds of political system in a society manages to persist in the face of stresses that might well have been expected to lead to its destruction.”¹⁵

Easton’s system analysis of political life is best and widely illustrated with Figure 3.1, in which the “political system” converts “inputs” into “outputs” within the background of the “environment”. The process of conversion takes place within the

¹⁰ Easton, David. (1957). “An Approach to the analysis of Political Systems.” *World Politics* Vol.9, No. 3: pp. 383-400.

¹¹ Pp. 23 in Easton, David. (1965). *A Framework for Political Analysis*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.


¹² *Supra*, pp.24-25.

¹³ *Supra*, pp. 24.

¹⁴ *Ibid*.

¹⁵ *Supra*, pp. 25.

Figure 3.1 Systems Theory by David Easton (1957)



black box of the “political system”, and “outputs” of the process will have influence on the “environment” and also help to create more “inputs” to maintain the continuous functioning of this system.

Easton’s systems theory includes three key elements in addressing the mechanism of how it works: *political system*, *inputs* and *outputs*. The concept of “political system” lies at the center of this process, and it functions as a “black box” that converts “input” into “outputs”, which are often policies and authoritarian decisions in political life.

In order to identify “political system” from other systems in a society, Easton pointed out that we need to identify “its fundamental units” and “establish the boundaries that demarcate it from units outside the system.”¹⁶ In order to distinguish a “political system” from the environment, Easton suggested that “the boundary of a political system is ... by all those actions more or less directly related to the making of binding decisions for the society”,¹⁷ therefore, all those actions that do not “partake this characteristic” will be considered as part of the “environment” outside of the political system.

Other than the “political system”, “input” is what keeps the political system

¹⁶ Easton (1957), pp. 385.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

working. “Outputs”, on the other hand, are the consequence of policy process, and they determine the impact of the political system on society. The presence of “input” and “output” links political system with the environment: while “input” gets political system to work, “outputs” generate impacts on society, and also create opportunities for generating new “inputs.”

Easton identified two forms of “inputs” - demands and support. They altogether “furnish it [the system] both with the raw material or information the system is called upon to process and with the energy to keep it going.”¹⁸ Specifically, Easton raised two questions over the demands, first, how do demands arise and assume their particular character in society? Second, how are demands transformed into issues? These two questions actually have revealed a puzzle that policy theorists after Easton have been striving to solve, which is, in the public policy domain, why some demands get attention while others do not?¹⁹ As Professor Wang Shaoguang from the Chinese University of Hong Kong once commented, “in any society the number of potential public issues almost always exceeds the capabilities of the government to process them.”²⁰ The study of why and how some policy demands, but not others, win the attention from the political system therefore becomes one central theme of policy science.

On the other hand, as another form of “input”, support is also fed into the black box of the political system and converted into “outputs”. Easton categorized two forms of “support”: a) support can consist of “*actions* promoting goals, interests and actions of another person”; or b) supportive behavior can be offered in the form of non-observable external acts. For instance, we can demonstrate support to a political

¹⁸ Easton (1957), pp. 387.

¹⁹ Easton (1957), pp. 389.

²⁰ Wang, Shaoguang. (2008). “Changing Models of China’s Policy Agenda Setting.” *Modern China*, Vol. 34, No. 1, The Nature of the Chinese State: Dialogues among Western and Chinese Scholars, I (Jan., 2008), pp. 56-87.

candidate by voting (“support with actions”), or as we often say someone is “loyal to its party, attached to democracy, or infused with patriotism” (“feelings” or “non-observable external action”).²¹ Furthermore, Easton categorized “support” directed to a political system into three elements – support for the community, the regime, and the government.²² Before the input goes into the “black box” of political system, demands and support shall interact: “for the demands to be processed into outputs, it is equally essential that the members of the system stand ready to support the existence of a political community and some stable rules of common action that we call regime.”²³

Where does support come from? Easton identifies two mechanisms to explain the source of support. First, the output of the political system “constitutes a body of specific inducements for the member of a system to support that system.”²⁴ In this way, what is produced by the political system will have impacts on the environment, and such impacts help to foster support towards the political system. Second, the system maintains the flow of support through a process called “politicization”. Easton defined politicization as a process in which members of a society learn about political patterns.²⁵ Through politicization, an individual learns to play its political role, “which includes the absorption of the proper political attitudes.”²⁶ Such a process of politicization ensures the continuity of political participation and helps members of society to understand what is expected of them and how they should act in political life. Easton provided the repetitive communication of norms and goals in almost all societies as an example. In any society, through a political socialized process with parents, peers as decisive links, as well as “physical symbols such as flags or totems,

²¹ Easton (1957), pp. 390.

²² *Supra*, 393.

²³ Easton (1957), pp. 394.

²⁴ *Supra*, pp. 395.

²⁵ *Supra*, pp.397.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

ceremonies and rituals freighted with political meaning,” individuals are educated about the political norms and goals of that society.²⁷

In sum, while the outputs of political process can generate inducements for members of society to offer “support”, the process of politicization also enables members to learn about the rewards and punishments in political life, and absorb their own political orientation. Easton also argued that the process of politicization happens in almost all societies repetitively in the form of communicating the goals and norms to others.²⁸ In this sense, the political system not only generates “outputs” that impact society, but also serves the purpose of educating. With these two mechanisms, support towards the political system is generated and sustained for keeping system working. Demands and support are fed into the “black box”, and are then converted into “output” in the form of authoritarian decisions, which impacts the environment and helps to create more inputs.

Easton’s systems theory is a milestone in the history of political science. He introduced the political science discipline to the concept of system analysis, which had been popular in the natural sciences. His theory has encouraged theorists after him to solve the puzzles in the policy making process.

Easton’s theory has been criticized for treating the “political system” as a black box – between “input” and “output”, what is inside of the black box called “political system”? Later, John Kingdon’s multiple streams framework, for example, helps to address this gap by focusing on the process of “transforming inputs into outputs, that is, the working of the black box.”²⁹ Kingdon, however, supplemented David Easton’s theory by specifying what is inside of the “black box”. According to Kingdon, what

²⁷ Easton (1957), pp. 399.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Zahariadis, Nikolaos. (1999). “Ambiguity, Time, and Multiple Streams.” In Paul A. Sabatier ed. *Theories of the Policy Process*. Westview Press.

explains policy change is the merging of three “streams”, the problem stream, the policy stream and the politics stream. When these three streams converge, as Kingdon suggested, it creates a “policy window” for policy change.³⁰ None the less, in my project, what is to be understood is the “environment”, and inputs from the public and intellectuals to the government and the interactions between the government, intellectuals and the public. In this project, I look at their interactions primarily in policy stream and some political stream when a policy window opens, but not the problem stream. Therefore, Kingdon’s division of three systems may not be appropriate for an authoritarian state considering the absence of effective moderating institutions.

Despite of its drawback of ignoring the inside of the “black box,” Easton’s system analysis is interesting and useful for analyzing public opinion and China’s foreign policy for the following two reasons.

First, due to its weakness in ignoring the inside constitution of “black box” in Easton’s theory, the “black box” is not accurate for democratic forms of government where policymaking can only occur after multiple official actors have achieved consensus on an action. In the federal government of the United States, for example, all three branches of government must concur for a federal law to be enacted and to remain legally binding. In an authoritarian state, however, the “black box” metaphor is suitable: the political system is distinguished from the “environment” because of its opaque decision making process, and also the role of the government as the final decision maker not accountable for people with free elections as their counterpart are in democracies.

Easton’s model has seldom (if ever) been applied to an authoritarian form of

³⁰ Kingdon, John. (1996). *Agendas, alternatives, and Public Policies*. 2nd ed. Boston: Little, Brown. See also analysis of Kingdon’s multiple stream theory of policy change in Smith, Kevin and Christopher Larimer. (2009). *The public policy theory premier*. Westview Press.

government, where neither the attainment of consensus between the government and the public nor the lack of any legal challenge is a condition of official policymaking. This research tests the Easton model in Chinese foreign policy making to determine if the original version of the Easton model applies equally well to an institution that is officially distanced from the public and involves a non-transparent “secret” policy making process unknown to the public. Right now, when it comes to foreign policy making, China does not have any established moderating institutions – defined as a shared power arrangement between multiple actors where they must reach consensus to make policy decisions (see Chapter 4 for more information) – some empirical evidence suggests that moderating institutions make policy actions less extreme and more stable. Has China evolved to a situation where the state must take into consideration mediating institutions (before moderating institutions are established)? Is there a trajectory for intellectuals and public opinion leaders to become moderating institutions?

Second, Easton’s conception of systems theory allows for the articulation of nuances in the policymaking environment. In the case of Chinese island conflicts with Japan, there is reason to believe that the environment for foreign policy making is profoundly influenced by domestic policy actors because of the strong nationalist feelings arising from the hundred years of humiliation described in Chapter 2. This research proposes that the policy making environment should be split into two domains – foreign and domestic policy – and modeled as a two-level game to explain the government narratives in a feedback loop. To what extent are policy actions aimed at creating a domestic policy environment that is supportive of foreign policy making? This version of the model also captures the interaction between the government and the public in foreign policy making. The “black box” does receive “demand and

support” from the domestic side, and foreign policy made by the government serves the purposes of “satisfying” the demands and securing support from the public towards the government. Public opinion still matters in foreign policy making in authoritarian states (as will be reviewed in the third part). By converting these demands and support into foreign policy, the government can appease the “demands,” which actually *can* lead to domestic turmoil that undermines the government’s legitimacy. In this sense, systems theory presents a model that can integrate Putnam’s two-level game (as will be reviewed below), with the foreign policy as the output, impacting the environment and appeasing the input from the domestic side.

III. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Making

Public opinion was famously defined by Professor V.O. Key in 1961 as “opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed.”³¹ With the development of surveying methods and statistics after 1961, public opinion is now more often understood as the collective views of a particular group of population. Whether public opinion matters for policy making has been a question perplexing generations of scholars. Public mobilizations, however, reflect the public opinion on certain occasions.

Research on the connection between public opinion and foreign policy making can be traced back to Kant. As an early democratic peace theorist, Kant posited that world perpetual peace can best be achieved by liberal democracies, within which public opinion can express freely and therefore exercise influence on foreign policy decisions.

Within International Relations (IR) scholarship, traditional realists like Hans

³¹ Key, V.O. (1961). *Public Opinion and American Democracy*. Knopf.

Morgenthau doubted the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. As Morgenthau stated, “the rational requirements of good foreign policy cannot from the outset count on the support of a public opinion whose preferences are emotional rather than rational.”³² Further research on the correlation between public opinion and foreign policy suggests the “permissive mood” of public opinion, which according to Gabriel Almond, characterizes the fact that public opinion is just passively influenced by decisions made by elites.³³ According to Gabriel Almond in 1960, the “mood theory” posits that the public’s “attention to or interest in foreign policy is generally low and subject to major fluctuations in times of crisis” and the public attention is “one of indifference,” therefore, Almond believes the public is too volatile to provide stable support for international commitments of the US government.³⁴ In general, researches after the World War II on this topic indicate that public opinion has little – if any - influence on foreign policy making because it is passively reacting to foreign policies made by elites. In 1992, Holsti reviewed the historical evolution of the so-called “post-war consensus” on public opinion and foreign policy and offered three major theoretical propositions to reflect this body of scholars after World War II:

- “1. Public opinion is highly volatile and thus it provides very dubious foundations for a sound foreign policy.
2. Public attitudes on foreign affairs are so lacking in structure and coherence that they might best be described as "non-attitudes."
3. At the end of the day, however, public opinion has a very limited impact on the conduct of foreign policy.”³⁵

With the Vietnam War as a milestone in the field, previous propositions about passive reactions of public opinion on foreign policymaking were gradually overturned. In the 1960s, with the escalation of military conflict in Southeast Asia

³² See pp. 558 in Morgenthau, Hans. (1978). *Politics among nations*. New York: Knopf.

³³ Gabriel Almond, (1950).*The American People and Foreign Policy*.New York: Praeger.

³⁴ See pp. 53 in Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger. Also pp. 536 in Caspary, William. (1970). “The "Mood Theory": A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, No. 2: 536-547.

³⁵ Pp. 442 in Holsti, Ole (1992). “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus.” *International Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 4: 439-466.

and widespread anti-war protests in the United States, the influence of public opinion on foreign policy was reevaluated. In addition, as James Reilly concluded, with the development of survey and statistical methods and the acceptance of behaviorist approach in social science, researchers were technically capable of evaluating the impact of public opinion on foreign policy.

In 1970, William Caspary criticized Gabriel Almond's "mood theory" of public opinion. Using polls and statistical methods, Caspary found that both the premise and the conclusion of mood theory were false. Rather, he revealed that American public opinion was characterized by a "strong and stable" permissive mood toward international involvements. By emphasizing the strength and stability of "permissive mood", Caspary rejected Almond's claim that the public pays "unstable" attention to foreign affairs – on the contrary, Caspary argued that public mood towards international affairs was stable and strong, and varied according to the changes in international affairs.³⁶ With this argument, Caspary undermined Almond's conclusion that public opinion is not able to provide stable support to foreign policy making because its attention is permissive and unstable.

Also in 1970, Sidney Verba and Richard Brody found that American public opinion towards the Vietnam War was more stable and influential on foreign policy making than previously thought. The intellectual outcomes of research in the decade after the Vietnam War were crystallized by the argument of the "rally around the flag" effect. John Mueller discovered that the presidential approval rate will increase by 5-6% during events that 1. Are international; 2. Deal with the United States and the president; and 3. Are specific, dramatic and sharply focused.³⁷ The increase in approval rating was explained by the "rally effect", in which the change in public

³⁶ Caspary (1970), pp. 546.

³⁷ Mueller, John. (1970). Presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson. *American Political Science Review* 64:18-34.

opinion gets people to “rally around the flag” by demonstrating more support to the government and putting aside their political differences.³⁸ According to research on public opinion and foreign policy after the Vietnam War, the proposition that public opinion was “volatile” was undermined.

After the 1970s, more empirical research oriented towards the influence of public opinion on foreign policy making was conducted. For example, in presidential campaigns in the US, Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida revealed that the public perceives the different stances of candidates over foreign policy issues and their perception influences votes in presidential elections.³⁹ Therefore, presidential candidates had reason to carefully draft their stances on foreign policy issues in front of the public who does respond to their appeals. In addition, public opinion has been proved to be highly correlated with international affairs. Other than Caspary’s revelation of the variance of public opinion towards Soviet Union’s threat, Mueller uncovered the positive correlation between public opposition and the curve of rising deaths during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.⁴⁰ Bruce Russett and Donald Deluca in 1981 also revealed that American public opinion is responding to world events – “or at least to their perceptions of world events.”⁴¹ Later in 1983 they identified a similar pattern of influence international environment has over public opinion in Western Europe.⁴²

On the basis of these explorations and the knowledge that public opinion in Western liberal democracies are responding to international events, scholars in this era

³⁸ The “rally around the flag” effect was then tested statistically by Oneal, John R. and Anna Lillian Bryan. (1995). “The rally 'round the flag effect in u.s. Foreign policy crises, 1950-1985.” *Political Behavior* 17, 4: 379-402. And Oneal, John, Brad Lian and James Joyner. (1996). “Are the American People “Pretty Prudent”? Public Responses to U.S. Uses of Force, 1950-1988.” *International Studies Quarterly* 40: 261-280. Also Baker, William and John Oneal (2001). “Patriotism or Opinion Leadership? The Nature and Origins of the “rally around the flag” effect.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 45-5: 661-687.

³⁹ J. H. Aldrich, J.L. Sullivan, and E. Borgida, “Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates ‘Waltz before a Blind Audience’,” *American Political Science Review* 83 (1989): 123-141.

⁴⁰ Mueller, John. (1973). *War, President and Public Opinion*. New York: Wiley.

⁴¹ Russett, Bruce and Donald Deluca. (1981). ““Don't Tread on Me”: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Eighties.” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 96, No. 3: 381-399.

⁴² Russett, Bruce and Donald Deluca. (1983). “Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe.” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 98, No. 2:179-196.

came to agree that public opinion does have an impact on foreign policy making indeed, at least in Western liberal democracies. Therefore, the previous pessimistic mood in academia over public opinion's influence on foreign policy making faded. Using statistical analysis, scholars identified high congruence between public opinion preference and foreign policy change. For instance, examining public opinion and policy data in the US from 1935 to 1979, Page and Shapiro found out that "public opinion is often a proximate cause of policy, affecting policy more than policy influences opinion."⁴³ Specifically, they revealed that policy tends to move "in the same direction as public opinion most often when the opinion change is large and when it is stable - that is, not reversed by fluctuations."⁴⁴ Hartley and Russett's research on public opinion and US military spending also proves the consistent influence of public opinion on foreign policy.⁴⁵ On the other hand, when making foreign policies, elites are usually subjected to the influence of public opinion. As Powlick and Katz argued in 1998, officials usually have to anticipate what the public preference would be. In order to reach that goal, they usually use their "political instinct" to gauge what the public opinion is to become, then "policymakers act within their own understanding of the general policy attitude of the public using such interpretation as a set of policy constraints."⁴⁶ By this, researchers have casted doubts towards previous proposition that public opinion has very limited impact on foreign policy.

In the 1990s, the next wave of research on public opinion's influence on foreign policy then turns to focus on *how* public opinion exercises its influence on foreign

⁴³ Pp. 175 in Page, Benjamin and Robert Shapiro. (1983). "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 77, No. 1: 175-190.

⁴⁴ *Supra*, pp. 181.

⁴⁵ Hartley, Thomas and Bruce Russett. (1992). "Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who Governs Military Spending in the United States?" *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 4: 905-915.

⁴⁶ Pp. 45 in Phillip J. Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz, "Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus." *Mershon International Studies Review* 42, no. 1 (May 1998): 29-61.

policy, which is a topic usually far away from ordinary citizens. As Ole Holsti stated in his review of this field since the end of World War II to early 1990s, “we have a good deal more systematic evidence describing the state of or trends in, public opinion than on how it has affected the actual conduct of foreign affairs.”⁴⁷ The most important question in the field, according to Holsti, was

“To what extent, on what kinds of issues, under what circumstances, and in what types of political systems, if any, does it have an impact on public policy? If it has an influence, what are the means by which public attitudes make their impact felt by decision-makers?”⁴⁸

In the 1990s, the scholarly focus shifted to analyze the mechanism of how public opinion influences foreign policy. Empirically, it was acknowledged that in democracies, the influence of public opinion on foreign policy is not the same as, say pressure groups, mostly because public opinion is more “amorphous or diffuse in quality.”⁴⁹ The explanation of how public opinion, as an institution, influences foreign policy of democracies therefore features, primarily, free election and autonomous media. With free elections, it holds foreign policy makers accountable for the policies they make; and such “accountability” is closely linked with the votes they will win (or lose) from the public in future elections. Therefore, as James Reilly phrased, democratic leaders’ “*fear of punishment*” in future election demands them to avoid foreign policy choices that will go against anticipated public opinion.⁵⁰ On the other hand, autonomous media, as a “filter” that can and will freely cover the policy for the public, also allow public opinion to be presented to elites, and thereby play a key role in facilitating public opinion influences on foreign policy.⁵¹ The norms of

⁴⁷ Pp. 451 in Holsti, Ole. (1992). “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus.” *International Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 4: 439-466.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Studying Substantive Democracy,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 27, no. 1 (March 1994): 9-17.

⁵⁰ Pp.9 in Reilly, James (2008). See also pp.12 in Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Studying Substantive Democracy,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 27, no. 1 (March 1994): 9-17.

⁵¹ See pp. 38 and figure 1 on pp.32 in Powlick, Philip and Andrew Katz. (1998). “Defining the American Public

“substantive democracy”, which includes, but is not limited to, free and fair elections and autonomous media, encourage politicians to consider public opinion in foreign policy making.

However, in authoritarian states, where mechanisms of democracies are woefully missing, it can lead to speculation that leaders can make foreign policy decision without as many constraints from domestic side as in democracies. China does not have nation-wide free elections or strong enough political parties that can contest the ruling CPC. Likewise, an autonomous media is a relatively recent development. The impact of this Chinese environmental context makes for an interesting test of Easton’s model.

In that context, do Chinese public opinion inputs have the expected level of influence on foreign policy making as in democracies?

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in China: Fragmented Authoritarianism

While scholars come to a consensus that public opinion influences foreign policy making in liberal democracies, whether public opinion in an authoritarian state like China can influence foreign policy is still a topic under exploration.

In academia, “China scholars” explore and analyze new societal variables in explaining Chinese foreign policy making. It must be noted that a big context for this discussion is that the “strong man” era was gone: Mao and Deng, who founded the communist regime, have passed on their power to younger generations of Jiang and Hu. Therefore, in Chinese foreign policy making, models dominated by strong leaders are giving space to models that integrate more actors including public opinion. With

the absence of “strong men”, the decision making process is more fragmented than before.

As reviewed in Chapter 2, foreign policy made by the Chinese government usually occurs in the black box and is reported as a consensus existing within the circles of high-ranking government officials. Since the economic opening and reform in 1979, China has witnessed the growth of social groups in numbers and development of their influence in public sphere. In addition, the commercialization of mass media in China is also impacting decision making on both foreign and domestic issues.⁵²

Because of these changes, the Chinese political regime needs to be redefined for more accuracy. For example, David Lampton revealed that China’s foreign policy making has witnessed the so-called “*corporate pluralization*”, which is characterized by “the proliferation of organization, groups, and sometimes individuals in the policy-making process.”⁵³ The term “corporate” derives from Lampton’s observation that many social groups in China are currently participating in political spheres in corporatist fashion, being “licensed” by the government.⁵⁴ This trend, along with the deepening globalization, professionalization of decision makers and the stakeholder consciousness,⁵⁵ has changed the landscape of the Chinese foreign policy making process.

These trends are taking place, and China scholars have noticed these changes and are studying their influence on China’s foreign and domestic policy making. Andrew Mertha from Cornell University, for example, in his research on China’s hydropower

⁵² Shirk, Susan. (2007). “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China.” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 8 (1) 43–70.

⁵³ See pp. 12 in David M. Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process: Is it Changing and Does It Matter?” in *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000*, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2001): 1-39.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ See Wang, Shaoguang. (2008). “Changing Models of China’s Policy Agenda Setting.” *Modern China*. Vol. 34, No. 1, *The Nature of the Chinese State: Dialogues among Western and Chinese Scholars*, pp. 56-87.

policy, asserted that China's political liberalization has gone through the stage of "fragmented authoritarianism" (consensus is hard to achieve within the decision making circle), to a stage of "fragmented authoritarianism 2.0", which is witnessing more actors in policy decisions in China, including "officials only peripherally connected to the policy in question, the media, non-governmental organizations, and individual activists."⁵⁶ With the participation of these new actors in China's policy making, the situation of policy being malleable to parochial interest has been further pluralized.

This trend of more open and plural policy making process has also been manifested in China's foreign policy. In 2011, Thomas Christensen from Princeton University addressed the issue of assertive foreign policy adopted by China recently (as of 2011). The empirical puzzle Christensen tried to solve was, "over the past two years, in a departure from the policy of reassurance it adopted in the late 1990s, China has managed to damage relations with most of its neighbors and with the United States."⁵⁷ Christensen rejected the speculation that this policy shift indicated that Beijing would change its grand strategy of foreign policy; rather, he argued these assertive policies were just responses towards China's "domestic insecurity." As Christensen argued,

"In fact, China's counterproductive policies toward its neighbors and the United States are better understood as reactive and conservative rather than assertive and innovative. Beijing's new, more truculent posture is rooted in an exaggerated sense of China's rise in global power and *serious domestic political insecurity*. As a result, Chinese policymakers are hypersensitive to nationalist criticism at home and more rigid -- at times even arrogant -- in response to perceived challenges abroad." [Emphasis mine]⁵⁸

In order to support his argument, Christensen highlighted the voices from

⁵⁶ Pp. 996 in Metha, Andrew. (2009). "Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process." *The China Quarterly* 200 : pp 995-1012.

⁵⁷ Christensen, Thomas. (2011). "The Advantages of an Assertive China Subtitle: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy." *Foreign Affairs* Pg. 54 Vol. 90 No. 2.

⁵⁸ Christensen (2011), pp. 54.

domestic side as the key factor that drives China's foreign policy towards more assertive end these years. But where does the "domestic political insecurity" come from? Christensen revealed that in China, there has been new development within the circle of foreign policy making, within which increasing numbers of bureaucrats have entered into foreign policy making, and their presence allows "nationalist pundits and bloggers in China find allies in high places."⁵⁹ In front of this changing constitution of foreign policy makers, the Chinese government seems to be "more nervous about maintaining long-term regime legitimacy and social stability than at any time since the period just after 1989...."⁶⁰

Therefore, Christensen gave policy advice to the United States that the best approach to respond to China's recent assertive foreign policy would be "persuasion, but not containment." With China's rise as an undeniable fact, Christensen emphasizes the importance of understanding the domestic factors and concern of the government in China's foreign policy making. According to Christensen, an assertive China "can pursue its own interests and, at the same time, reassure other actors."⁶¹

As an authoritarian state, China has also seen its media commercialized, and this change has facilitated public opinion to influence foreign policy. As Susan Shirk stated, China's media revolution has changed the "domestic context for policy making."⁶² Other than those societal factors mentioned by scholars above, Shirk highlighted the influence of more autonomous media in China. According to her, even though the Communist government nowadays still implements censorship upon the content of media, the commercialization of media has changed the context for foreign policy making by encouraging media to "compete for audiences, editors and

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Pp. 7 in Christensen, Thomas. (2011). "The Advantages of an Assertive China Subtitle: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy." *Foreign Affairs* Pg. 54 Vol. 90 No. 2.

⁶² Pp. 43 in Shirk, Susan. (2007). "Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 8 (1) 43-70.

journalists seek to provide the most exciting news they can from home and abroad, pushing right up to the limits set by the censors, and sometimes beyond them.”⁶³ More importantly, as Shirk analyzed, autonomous media inform the public and create a “new, well-informed public opinion on foreign policy.”⁶⁴ As a consequence, government officials are aware that they cannot keep people ignorant as before, and with more public attention given to foreign policy, government officials have to be attentive to public opinion on foreign policy, “given their anxieties about mass protest.”⁶⁵ In this way, when making foreign policy, the government is driven by public opinion, and “foreign policy is becoming a domestic political matter just as it is in other political systems.”⁶⁶ The consequence of the commercialization of media in China, therefore, is public opinion exercises more influence on Chinese foreign policy than before. Susan Shirk’s earlier book *Fragile Superpower* in 2007 offered an even detailed analysis of what the Chinese government is facing domestically. Even though the government does not face challenges from strong moderating institutions, it is concerned about its political survival facing the surging public opinion with media revolution.

In sum, when compared with liberal democracies, it can be concluded that an authoritarian China also reserves a role for public opinion to play in its foreign policy making. Although China does not have national free and fair elections which hold officials accountable for acting against public opinion, its foreign policy making has been more pluralistic than before. As David Lampton called the “thickening” of elites in foreign policy making,⁶⁷ more actors are participating in Chinese foreign policy

⁶³ Pp. 68 in Shirk (2007).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Pp. 69 in Shirk (2007)

⁶⁷ Pp. 4 David M. Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process: Is it Changing and Does It Matter?” in *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000*, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2001): 1-39.

making, other than the high-ranking leaders of Politburo. These societal forces, as Mertha phrased, demands Chinese foreign policy to reflect more parochial interests vertically, which include interests from provincial and local governments and civil interest groups below the national government.⁶⁸ During the meanwhile, with the commercialization of media, the public is more informed and attentive to foreign policy issues, and public opinion therefore puts a constraint on the Chinese government's foreign policy making.

These researches have uncovered and described the existence of public opinion's influence on Chinese foreign policy making, none the less, an undeniable fact is the absence of free elections in China. Although as Susan Shirk and authors in Hao and Su's book premised, the government is afraid of mass protests, let alone possible situations "getting-out-of-hand,"⁶⁹ such a constraint may not be as imminent for Chinese leaders as for their counterparts in democracies. In other words, the mass public may escalate into turmoil or even revolution, but the chances for it to happen are rare – comparing with votes in democracies, the concerns for possible turmoil in China may not influence its foreign policy making as much as, say the incumbent Democrat president facing protests during an election year.

However, this kind of situation the Chinese government is facing makes research on public opinion and foreign policy in China interesting. On one hand, the government is facing a more attentive public, who expresses and wishes to push for policy change with their "demands" (to use Easton's term); on the other hand, Chinese foreign policy makers do not face an imminent punishment for acting inconsistently with public opinion. So, to follow Easton's term, the Chinese government does not

⁶⁸ For societal forces in Chinese foreign policy making, see Hao, Yufan and Linsu. Eds. (2005). *China's Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy*. Ashgate.

⁶⁹ Pp. 69 in Shirk (2007).

lose any “support” when it suppresses the “demands” – actually, the authoritarian government is theoretically able to make decisions without considering public opinion.

Therefore, in light of public opinion, we can infer that the Chinese government is concerned with “managing” public opinion: on one hand, it cannot ignore a well-informed public; on the other hand, it does not want to see the form of expression of “public demands” to go beyond the limits and “backfire” on the government’s legitimacy and stability. Between these two concerns, it has to carefully balance – not to completely quell the public opinion, and not to let it escalate either. A wise way to do so is to make concessions to public opinion by answering to their “demands” in a way acceptable to the government.

Does Public Opinion Influence the Government or the Opposite?

Even though the existence of public opinion in China’s foreign policy making has been proved by scholars, the direction of the influence is still under debate. In other words, does the public opinion influence the government’s decision, or is the government’s decision strategically stirring up public opinion?

Public mobilization is one form of political participation, and it reflects public opinion. As Ginger L. Elliott-Teague stated, “individual voting in elections is not the only possible form participation may take.”⁷⁰ Citizen participation may involve speech, running for elected office, protesting in streets, or participation in associations. Although political participation usually focuses on individual’s participation in politics, group participation represents an important form of political participation.

⁷⁰ Elliott-Teague, Ginger L. (2007). “NGOS in policymaking in Tanzania: The relationships of group characteristics, political Participation and policy outcomes.” Dissertation.

Within the black box of domestic politics, the nature of public mobilization in China can be “astroturf,”⁷¹ fabricated by the government in order to harvest international gains. In the island disputes, the astroturf argument would indicate that the government and public not only cooperate in mobilization, but also share the similar views. More importantly, the government consented to, and supported the public mobilization since it will be able to serve the purpose of the government. This argument breaks into the discussion of top-down and bottom-up approaches in China studies, siding with the top-down approach. The astroturf argument would believe that the Chinese government strategically utilize the public mobilizations in order to harvest gains in negotiations with Japan. This argument has its validity: the government does allow some public mobilization in order to show Japan what pressure the government is subject to. However, the government does not necessarily share the similar view with the public: while the government strives to maintain stability in all incidents, the public wants government to be assertive against Japan. In the study of Chinese public mobilization and foreign policy, the astroturf argument can be integrated in the top-down approach, which argues that the government can and have been strategically utilizing the public opinion for gains in international arenas.

In China, with the absence of mature moderating institutions, the public participates in politics in the form of public mobilization. In his work about public opinion and China’s Japan policy, James Reilly from George Washington University introduces the concept of “waves of public mobilization” to explain why China sometimes takes assertive policies. Reilly tested his hypothesis using China’s Japan

⁷¹ Lyon, Thomas and John Maxwell. (2004). “Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy.”. *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*: 13-4: 561-597.

policy and found out that when “waves of public mobilization” take place, it is more likely for China to adopt assertive foreign policy towards Japan.⁷² Historically, China adopted assertive foreign policy between 1985 and 1987, and again from 2002 to 2005.

Reilly defines “waves of public mobilization” with three defining elements:

- An increase in the strength and prevalence of nationalist public opinion, particularly among urban youth.
- An increase in political activism by non-state actors, such as petition campaigns and public demonstrations.
- A rise in sensationalist, nationalist media coverage.⁷³

After investigating four cases of China’s Japan policy, including the high-speed rail line building in China, Japan’s abandoned chemical weapons, 2004 Diaoyu Islands dispute and Japan’s pursuit of a UN security council seat, Reilly found out that “if public mobilization is high, then moderate policy proposals are less likely to emerge, are more controversial, and are less likely to be adopted as policy.”⁷⁴

By revealing the connection between public opinion and foreign policy, Reilly proved the insufficiency of the “reciprocity” argument in China’s foreign policy, which posits that China’s foreign policy is responding to Japan’s policy. Rather, Reilly emphasizes the influence of public opinion on foreign policy from the domestic side, and in the realm of China’s Japan policy, he believes public opinion has greatly pushed for an assertive Japan policy through “public mobilization.”

However, Reilly also stated that the waves of public mobilization emerge when the government holds a “permissive attitude”, as he stated, “a wave of public mobilization will only emerge when the state adopts a permissive attitude; and it will

⁷² Reilly, James. (2008). “Public Mobilization and China’s Japan Policy.” A dissertation. George Washington University.

⁷³ Pp 21 in Reilly (2008).

⁷⁴ Pp. 30 in Reilly (2008).

end when the state reverses this permissive attitude.”⁷⁵ By this statement, Reilly implies that in an authoritarian state like China, waves of public mobilization actually happen when they are tolerated by the government, “initial signals of state tolerance create a structural opening for a wave of popular mobilization to emerge.”⁷⁶ In this sense, Reilly implies that the government creates the “atmosphere” for assertive policy, and public opinion, manifested in the form of public mobilization, legitimizes and pushes for assertive policy to be adopted.

Although Reilly emphasizes the impact from the public on foreign policy making in China, he treats the government as an entity managing and controlling public mobilization. As he stated, “leaders may initially tolerate, or even tacitly encourage, public mobilization as part of factional competition at home or to gain negotiating leverage abroad,” however, “permitting public protests is however a risky negotiating tactic, since it creates the potential for a bilateral conflict spiral.”⁷⁷ Therefore, this creates the backdrop for Chinese political leaders to manage the crisis in a dilemma between mass protests and the possible escalation of the mobilization.

Similarly, Jessica Weiss Chen argued that “by allowing nationalist protests against foreign states, non-democratic leaders can use domestic politics for international gain.”⁷⁸ Chen argued that “anti-foreign protests provide an alternative mechanism by which domestic politics can be leveraged in international bargaining.”⁷⁹ Chen tested her arguments on anti-Japanese and anti-American protests in China, finding that the government allows public protests, which may “turn against the government”, in order to demonstrate the government’s resolve in

⁷⁵ Pp. 29 in Reilly (2008).

⁷⁶ Pp. 3 in Reilly (2008).

⁷⁷ Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, (1997). Quoted in Reilly (2008), pp. 27.

⁷⁸ Chen, Jessica Weiss. (2008). “Powerful Patriots: Nationalism, Diplomacy, and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Foreign Protest.” Dissertation: UC: San Diego.

⁷⁹ Chen (2008), pp. xii.

international bargaining and show how costly it would be to make diplomatic concessions.

Peter Gries, and Susan Shirk, however, understand the Chinese public's nationalism in a different approach. Instead of viewing the public's sentiments as something strategically manageable by the government ("top-down"), they view the sentiments erupting in a bottom-up fashion.⁸⁰ According to this view, the government cannot mobilize or control public sentiment that has erupted from the bottom-up, rather, the government acts in response to public sentiment. Susan Shirk, especially, in addition to mentioning the importance of leadership, emphasized on how internal politics of China may "derail" its peaceful rise because the current Chinese leaders have to act following the public sentiments. These two approaches of understanding Chinese public's sentiments towards foreign countries, i.e. a top-down approach by Reilly and Weiss, and a bottom-up approach embraced by Shirk and Gries, compel researchers to study the Chinese public's sentiment either from the government or the public. However, all these scholars do not negate the fact that the Chinese government is inculcating patriotic and nationalist education for Chinese students and in its propaganda. What is also undeniable is the increasing influence from the public on the government's foreign policy making.

What previous research in either top-down or bottom-up approaches did not cover, however, was the substance of public opinion, and preferences of different actors in the disputes. Specifically, how policy narratives, reflecting the opinions of different actors, lead to policy actions of the Chinese government, who is facing the dilemma of satisfying the demands from a well-informed public and government's concern for mass protests. These narratives are the key to understand the interaction among

⁸⁰ See Shirk, Susan (2007). *Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal politics could derail its peaceful rise*. Oxford University Press. And Gries, Peter. (2005) *China's New Nationalism: Pride, politics and Diplomacy*. University of California Press.

different actors in Chinese foreign policy making, therefore, to explain why assertive policy is taken.

Acknowledging the validity of both sets of arguments, I strive to modify the Systems Theory framework to reflect the interaction of actors in Chinese foreign policy making, either in the directions of top-down or bottom-up. By revising Easton's Systems Theory, I can integrate these two approaches and show how the government "manages" after the public opinion has erupted from the bottom. This revised model allows for future research on further integration of both the top-down and bottom-up approach.

Turning to the Bottom-Up approach: Models of Chinese foreign policy making.

As Wang Shaoguang from Hong Kong Chinese University categorized, there have been six models explaining policy agenda setting in China.⁸¹ As he suggested, the traditional top-down model is being replaced with bottom-up approach in Chinese policy making in general. On foreign policy issues including the Diaoyu islands against Japan, where the public pays a great deal of attention and demonstrates negative sentiments, the models also help to explain how government responds to pressure from the public in foreign policy making.

⁸¹ Wang, Shaoguang. (2008). "Changing Models of China's Policy Agenda Setting." *Modern China*. Vol. 34, No. 1, *The Nature of the Chinese State: Dialogues among Western and Chinese Scholars*, pp. 56-87.

Figure 3.3 Models of the Policy Agenda Setting in China (Wang, Shaoguang 2008)

		Initiator of Agenda		
		Decision Makers	Advisers	Citizens
Degree of Public Participation	Low	I. Closed Door	III. Inside Access	V. Outside Access
	High	II. Mobilization	IV. Reach-Out	VI. Popular Pressure

According to Wang, the Closed Door model (I) prevailed in imperial China, when the policy issue came from the inner circle of decision makers and sought to exclude the influence from non-government actors like intellectuals or public opinion leaders. The mobilization model (II), according to Wang, was often adopted during the Mao era in China.⁸² The mobilization model, similar to the “closed door” model, is also initiated with the decision makers, however, it demands high degree of public participation. The mobilization model is adopted by decision makers to gain support from a public with strong sense of participation to legitimize the policy. The third model, “inside access” (III), however, was advocated by Wang to describe those scenarios when “official brain trust” advocates the policy adopted by the decision makers. Those “official brain trust” would include, for example, those military officers in the General Staff operations room or some reporters from the official newspaper. They were described by Wang as the “advisers” to the government: they are in the government, but outside of the decision making circle. Under this model, they advise to decision makers, and do not bother to win the support from the public. Also initiated by “advisers”, the fourth model “Reach-out” (IV) would require the policy to be publicized to common citizens. Wang stated that the reach-out model (IV)

⁸² Wang (2008), pp. 62.

is “by no means common in China.”⁸³ However, after the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis in 2003, China's Medical System Reform Study Group, an “adviser” per Wang’s definition, publicized their reports on the vulnerability of Chinese medical system, evidenced in the SARS crisis. This report aroused great interest among common citizens and the mass media, whose pressure forced the government to adjust its policy.

The last two models, the “outside access” (V) and “popular-pressure” (VI) are initiated by common citizens. However, they differ in their needs for public mobilization. According to Wang, the “outside access” model “refers to a situation in which a citizen or a group of citizens submits suggestions regarding public affairs in the form of a letter to central decision makers, excluding complaints or appeals about the interests of an individual or a small group.”⁸⁴ Under this model, citizens commence the policy agenda; however, it requires little attention from the public in general, because the communication between the citizen(s) and the government will be sufficient to set the agenda. The last model “popular-pressure”, however, demands the support from the masses to influence the decision making process. This model requires high level of public participation to place the issue on the agenda.

According to Wang, after the Deng Xiaoping era, what we witness is the rise of the “popular-pressure” model, in which the public initiates the policy agenda setting, accompanied with a high level of public mobilization. The other five models, however, would be replaced by the “popular-pressure” model. As Wang commented, the closed-door model (I) was popular in imperial China, the “mobilization” model was mostly used in era “with great men”, like Mao and Deng era, when the government needed public mobilization to support the implementation policy and the public had a

⁸³ Wang (2008), pp. 68.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

strong sense of participation. Both of these two models are now obsolete. Moreover, as Wang argued, “the inside access model is a normal practice, the outside access model and the reach-out model occasionally observed, and the popular-pressure model frequently used,” what is on its rise is the “popular-pressure” model. Why? Wang spent the latter half of his article arguing that the stakeholder consciousness, associational revolution, rise of mass media and popularity of internet has brought Chinese politics into an era of “popular-pressure”, in which the public is playing a more important role than ever before.

I would argue the six models analyzed by Wang also apply to *some* foreign policy issues. Wang’s models were raised to explain agenda-setting in China, however, empirical examples in the article were mostly domestic ones. However, foreign policy issues that can attract public’s attention domestically are obviously different from those issues far away from the public’s daily life. In this sense, Wang’s model offers a powerful explanatory tool for those foreign policy issues like the Diaoyu Islands disputes, upon which the public is easily agitated and therefore their participation will make it a domestic issue. With the ubiquitous contemporary anti-Japanese sentiments in China as the background, the Diaoyu Islands dispute straddles the boundary between foreign and domestic policies.

Due to these reasons, we are in an era when Chinese intellectuals’ and public opinions cannot be ignored by decision makers. This trend stands in the foreign policy sphere as well. Throughout history, domestic movements were initiated or sparked with China’s frustration in foreign policy: examples will include the military loss towards Manchu in the early 1600s; the loss of the first China-Japan war in 1898; Japan annexed Shan Dong after Germany in 1919; Japan took over Hebei province in 1935. Nowadays, the Diaoyu Islands, as another foreign policy issue, spark “domestic”

movements among the government, the intellectuals and the public.

In the bottom-up approach, the loose grip of the government on media serves to facilitate the influence from the public. Meanwhile, the Chinese government may also force the media (even the unofficial media) to not report on certain topics. For example, the *Southern Metropolitan Daily*, an official newspaper published in Guangzhou, was forced to not report President Obama's interview while he was visiting China. In this sense, the unofficial media is more accurately to be described as playing as a venue, rather than an independent actor. This venue informs the public about political events however, it may be blocked by the government even though in general the government is loosening its grips on media censorship. The next part, however, turns to view the interaction of domestic and foreign politics after certain foreign policy is taken. The two-level game is to be integrated to the Systems Theory to illuminate China's foreign policy making.

IV. The Two-level Game and the "Black Box"

Observing the international negotiation at the Bonn Summit Conference in 1978,⁸⁵ Putnam raised the question of how the negotiations were politically possible.⁸⁶ His research on the Bonn Summit revealed two things, "first, that the key governments at Bonn adopted policies different from those that they would have pursued in the absence of international negotiations, but second, that agreement was possible only because a powerful minority within each government actually favored on domestic grounds the policy being demanded internationally."⁸⁷

⁸⁵ The 4th G7 summit, with leaders from Canada, the European Commission, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States as participants. What Putnam focused on was coordination among seven states on energy and fiscal stimulus.

⁸⁶ Putnam (1988), pp. 428.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

According to Putnam, whether domestic politics and foreign politics entangle was not interesting, because the answer to that question is clearly, “both. Sometimes.”⁸⁸ What is interesting and important, however, is how and when does domestic politics entangle with foreign politics. In order to explain those deals reached by leaders at the Bonn Summit, Putnam believed that “neither a purely domestic nor a purely international analysis could account for this episode.”⁸⁹

In order to capture the entanglement between domestic and international politics, Putnam raised the “two-level game” “metaphor.”⁹⁰ The “two-level game” is a model that describes the interaction between negotiation at international stage and bargaining and persuasion in domestic sphere. It consists of two levels, including, “bargaining between the negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement” (Level I), and “separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement” (Level II).⁹¹ While the level I emphasizes international negotiations, level II focuses on domestic persuasion.

In the two-level game, Putnam introduced the concept of “ratification” to explain how international negotiations can reach agreement. Putnam defined “ratification” as a process “may entail a formal voting procedure at Level II, such as the constitutionally required two-thirds vote of the U.S. Senate for ratifying treaties,” but he used the term “generically to refer to any decision-process at Level II that is required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement, whether formally or informally.”⁹² By “ratification”, the government leaders obtain domestic support for negotiations at Level I, thus enhances the possibility of success in international negotiation.

⁸⁸ Putnam (1988), pp. 427.

⁸⁹ Putnam (1988), pp. 430.

⁹⁰ As for the usage of word “metaphor”, Putnam defended on pp. 435. He said, a metaphor is not a theory, however, without metaphor, the ideal outcome of research would not have been possible.

⁹¹ Putnam (1988), pp. 436.

⁹² *Ibid.*

Another concept Putnam introduced as an integral part of the two-level game was “win-set.” A “win-set” is defined as “for a given Level II constituency as the set of all possible Level I agreements that would ‘win’—that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents—when simply voted up or down.”⁹³ The concept of “win-set” explains the possibility of agreement at the international stage. Putnam further raised several conditions to explain when “win-sets” of a state can maximize, including (1) Level II preferences and coalitions; (2) Level II institutions and (3) Level I negotiators' strategies. According to Putnam, domestic coalitions and their influence impact the negotiator at international level, at the individual level, however, negotiators' strategies also matter for the possibility of agreement at Level I. Specifically, the design of institutions required for “ratification” also influences the size of the “win-sets,” generally, “the greater the autonomy of central decision-makers from their Level II constituents, the larger their win-set and thus the greater the likelihood of achieving international agreement.”⁹⁴

Putnam raised the framework in 1988 in an analogy of “metaphor”, and welcomed further exploration to enrich it. After 1988, there have been many scholars utilizing the “two-level game” for analysis. Peter Trumbore, for example, added public opinion as a domestic constraint on negotiation at Level I.⁹⁵ According to Trumbore, in the two-level game, there are three factors that are of great importance, “(1) the preferences of the public relative to those of decision makers and other domestic constituents; (2) the intensity of the issue under negotiation; and (3) the power of the public to ratify a potential agreement.”⁹⁶ With this analysis, Trumbore added public opinion as a constraint at Level II stage and influence the likelihood of

⁹³ Putnam (1988), pp. 437.

⁹⁴ Putnam (1988), pp. 449.

⁹⁵ Trumbore, F. Peter. (1998).” Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process.” *International Studies Quarterly* 42, 545–565.

⁹⁶ Trumbore (1998), pp. 548.

agreement at Level I. In 2007, Chien-peng Chung utilized the two-level game to analyze China's island disputes, including the Diaoyu Islands, Zhenbao/ Damansky, and the Spratly islands.⁹⁷ Chung used the two-level game to explain why some island disputes are "shelved" at preliminary talks while the others "were swiftly disposed of to the satisfaction of both sides, even after long years of intermittent and fruitless negotiations."⁹⁸ In this article, Chung highlighted the influence of "sub-state nationalist groups on the failure or success to negotiate or resolve a dispute settlement," not only in China but also in the other countries facing territorial disputes.⁹⁹

The two-level game offers a powerful framework for analyzing China's foreign policy actions. The government's actions at the international stage are constrained by its domestic politics, especially on territorial disputes, which can arouse strong public mobilization domestically. Meanwhile, the Chinese government does not face mature domestic moderating institutions, so it can make decisions at Level I and cite public mobilization as evidence without worrying about domestic punishment such as loss of votes in the next election. These two arguments on the relationship between government and the public opinion in China, raised by James Reilly and Jessica Weiss respectively, do not necessarily conflict. The two-level game may capture the nuances of interaction between government and the public over territorial disputes, while the government is influenced by public opinion, it also cites public opinion for its win-set in international negotiation.

In addition to fact that Chinese leaders are no longer able to ignore the opinion

⁹⁷ Chung, Chien-peng. (2007). "Resolving China's Islands Disputes: A Two-level Game analysis." *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, vol. 12, no. 1.

⁹⁸ Chung (2007), pp. 50.

⁹⁹ Chung (2007), pp. 65.

from a well-informed and attentive public, the reason why Chinese leaders tolerate mass protests on foreign policy issue can also be partially explained by their concern of “win-sets” in the two-level game. By allowing public protests and policy narratives from the public, the authoritarian government is showing to its counterparts that their hands are actually constrained by domestic public opinion on foreign policy issues.¹⁰⁰ In 1993, in a meeting with American delegation, a Chinese Politburo committee member responded to American suggestion of concession on human rights issues, “I do not think I can report what you told me to the Chinese people via television, because they would say[I am] making China’s policy based on the American president, and they would overthrow me. So all I can say to the Chinese people is that the Sino-American relationship is very important ...”¹⁰¹ The government’s emphasis of public opinion in foreign policy may explain the rising influence of public opinion on foreign policy from another aspect, i.e. the government’s desire to have some public opinion expressed to have more win-set in foreign negotiations.

However, both factors explain why public opinion has more influence on Chinese foreign policy, i.e. (1) well-informed public opinion and (2) government’s concern for maintaining stability at international stage in a two-level game, are evaluated against the government’s concern for stability. After all, the government does not want to see mass public over foreign policy issues to escalate and destabilize the society, in which, people’s protests have to be registered with the authorities before they march into the street. Reilly’s 2008 work has revealed the interaction between public opinion and China’s foreign policy making via policy mobilization, which is actually tolerated at the beginning by the government, but “satisfied” by the government’s adoption of the

¹⁰⁰ Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 42 (1988): 427–460.

¹⁰¹ Pp. 15 in Lampton, David. “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process: Is it Changing and Does It Matter?” in *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000*, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2001): 1-39.

policy demands. Again, as many China scholars implied, tolerating mass protests is risky for the Chinese government.

Conclusion

The Balance of Power may account for part of the story. With China's military power going up, the government has the capability to adopt assertive policies. However, this theory ignores the inside of the foreign policy making process, therefore it does not sufficiently address why China adopts assertive policy over the islands disputes against Japan, but not the one against Vietnam, for example. Therefore, this chapter turned to Easton's Systems Theory and investigate the foreign policy making in China.

Though researchers have been studying the influence of public opinion on foreign policy making in both democracies and authoritarian states, there remains a question how public opinion, which is manifested in political narratives, leads to specific types of foreign policy in authoritarian states. James' Reilly's work in 2008 was close to answering this question by revealing public mobilization as an indicator of assertive policy, however, the question remains on how public opinion influences the government's decision. After all, as David Easton originally explained, policy making can occur in a non-transparent "black box," however, the range of possible actions can be constrained by policy inputs that derive from the environment of the official policy actors. Likewise, the explanations used to justify policy actions are intended as signals to other actors within the policymaking environment.

"Words" used to convey policy inputs and explain policy outputs are important, they are expressed with different purposes and often have consequences. By

investigating what words are used and how an issue is narrated differently by different speakers using voices that are distinctive and often different from the voice of the Chinese government, we can better understand the story behind these words. In this project, political narratives from official and unofficial sources over disputed islands indicate the interaction among the public, intellectuals and the government, and how they lead to different policy actions. A research on their tones, which are to be analyzed out of their political narratives, allows to investigate the level of public mobilization and to explain the policy actions of China over disputed islands. Research on political narratives, or “words” over foreign policy is, therefore, worth studying.

CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the research method of this dissertation, and defines key concepts used in the following chapters. It is organized with the following parts. First I will present the four research questions of this project, which altogether contribute to an answer towards the central research question stated at the beginning of this chapter, i.e. the understanding of whether the Easton's System Theory can be utilized for analyzing assertive foreign policy in China. Second part defines those key concepts in this project. The third part presents the research methodology of this project. The fourth part reports data collection and data analysis method. The conclusion summarizes this chapter and also point out possible threats of validity towards this research.

I. Research Questions

This project tests the applicability of David Easton's Systems Theory in the context of Chinese politics. In order to determine its applicability, I utilize narratives from the government, intellectuals and the public as proxies to measure their opinions over incidents on the Diaoyu Islands. There are four sub-questions that need to be addressed.

First, is Chinese public opinion different from the state's position? In order to find out the divergence between narratives of the government and the public, narratives will be analyzed and labeled for their central arguments. By comparing the narratives of government, intellectuals and the public, I will demonstrate their different positions over the same incident.

Second, how does the government respond to public opinion and intellectuals'

narratives (“inputs”) on foreign policy making actions (“outputs”). By answering this question, I demonstrate the influence of mediating institutions on China’s foreign policy making. None the less, it is hard – if not impossible – to establish solid correlation between public opinion and government’s decisions with concrete evidence. As will be discussed in the last part of this chapter, I acknowledge this difficulty, however, narratives of actors are good proxies for estimating the arguments of actors; with analysis considering time lag and changes in policy actions during incidents, I can approximate and demonstrate the influence of public opinion on government’s decision.

Third, how does the state use its foreign policy actions to “answer” to the “inputs.” When the government adopts foreign policy actions, how well does the “output” “appease” the “input” as Systems Theory suggest? Is the public appeased immediately, or does the government have to spend extra resources on the domestic advocate? This question is crucial for testing the Systems Theory in the context of China. During the meanwhile, in Putnam’s two-level game, does the “output” of the government impact foreign relations as well? Whether does the government utilize public opinion to maximize its win-set at the international stage? As will be revealed, while the government cites public opinion, it also utilizes public opinion as a way to maintain long-term stability in bilateral relations with Japan,

Fourth, what does the future hold – are we witnessing the emergence of moderating institutions in China? To echo previous work on the topic of domestic influence on China’s foreign policy and Wang’s categories of foreign policy making models, in the last chapter of my dissertation, I will discuss what will happen in the future and emphasize the “stakeholder consciousness” to argue that the “closed model” and even the “black box” will be hard for the Chinese government to maintain in the

future with a more active public in political spheres, and the development of social media. Foreign policy making in China may be in a process of becoming more sensitive to public opinion than before, which will be type 5 or type 6 in Wang's categories as summarized in Chapter 3.

By addressing these four sub-questions, I develop a revised version of Systems Theory, which offers a more robust tool for capturing the nuances in Chinese foreign policy making.

II. Definition of Key Concepts

This part defines those key concepts utilized in analysis. These concepts are organized following the Systems Theory.

“Institutions” and “Regimes”

First, “institutions” are defined as “a general pattern or categorization of activity or to a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized.”¹ Institutions exist at all levels: they can be, as Hedley Bull famously defined, “institutions of international society,” which includes international law, balance of power, or, an institution can refer to “varied patterns of behavior as marriage and religion, sovereign statehood, diplomacy, and neutrality.”² In comparison, “regime” in this project is defined as the mode or system of the rule of the government. In this project, the word “regime” is referring to the government types (democratic or authoritarian governments), whereas the word “institution” is used in reference to

¹ Koehane, Robert. (1988). “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Dec., 1988), pp. 379-396.

² Koehane (1988), pp. 383.

formally or informally organized arrangements in politics, such as electoral institutions or propaganda institutions.

The word “regime” is defined by David Easton as “all those arrangements that regulate the way in which demands put into the system are settled and the way in which decisions are put into effect.”³ Regimes are also called the rules of game. With different “rules of games” in policy making, there can be two approaches of making policy: an up-down approach, which features the elites in government as the decision makers; and a bottom-up approach, in which public mobilization leads to decision making. What David Easton emphasized in 1957 was a mixture of these two approaches, in any society with “a minimum convergence of attitudes towards these fundamental rules – constitutional principles.”⁴ Easton’s Systems Theory integrates the two approaches of decision making by treating decision makers in a black box of “political system”, meanwhile, emphasizing the “input” from the public.

“Environment”

Second, “policy environment” was treated as monolithic in David Easton’s Systems Theory. It was introduced to refer to institutions beyond the “political system” and “inputs” and “outputs.” Easton mentioned that “environment” is the backdrop for the entire systems theory to process at, and the “output” can impact the environment and therefore create more opportunities for “inputs.”

None the less, as this dissertation argues, the political environment should also be understood with two levels, domestic and foreign. With the “outputs” from political systems, foreign and domestic environments are both impacted; however, the impacts

³ Easton (1957),pp. 392.

⁴ Easton (1957), pp392.

on foreign and domestic environments may be different.

“Policy Actors”

Third, “policy actors” include the “political system” in systems theory, the public and any other actors who can influence decision making process. In this project, however, policy actors include three major institutions. The first one is the government, in the black box of “political system.” Second, the “mediating institutions.” Examined by Berger and Neuhaus in 1977, mediating institutions in public policy feature “a way to empower citizens to play a greater role in public policy and, subsequently, make them feel less alienated from government.”⁵

Mediating institutions can function as a bridge between the government and the common citizens. Families, neighborhoods, churches, and volunteer associations, and arguably corporations, are all examples of mediating institutions in public policy. The third form of “policy actors” includes what I call “moderating institutions.” They are those institutions that promote compromise and power-sharing among political parties, “these institutions promote moderation in government policy outputs.”⁶ Such a form of institution, however, is not established in contemporary China. With the CPC dominating the decision making system, the moderating institutions in China are yet to be developed.

This dissertation therefore focuses upon the interaction between the government and the mediating institutions in China. Absence of moderating institutions is one

⁵ DeHart-Davis, Leisha, Randall Guensler. (2005). “Employers as Mediating Institutions for Public Policy: The Case of Commute Options Programs.” *Policy Science Journal*. 33-4: 675-697. See also, Berger, Peter L., and Richard J. Neuhaus. (1977). *To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

⁶ Merrill, Samuel III, James Adams. (2006). “The effects of alternative power-sharing arrangements: Do “moderating” institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs?” *Public Choice* (2007) 131:413–434.

reason why Easton's Systems Theory needs to be modified in order to be applied in the context of China. Without "moderating institutions," the "black box" of political system is able to make decisions directly answering to the demands from the "input".

Mediating institutions in this project are designed to include two major actors, the intellectuals and public opinion leaders (POLs). Intellectuals include college professors, scholars and members of think tanks affiliated with the Chinese government. Their opinions exercise influence over the government's policy making process by providing evidence and analyzing the possible impact of policy outputs on the foreign and domestic environment. Specifically, on the Diaoyu Islands dispute, intellectuals' opinions are important to both the government and the public. Their findings support (or reject) the government's claims of sovereignty, and educate the public about this dispute. Their existence links the government and the public with their intellectual contributions.

POLs, however, include those activists (DDM) and opinion leaders, including bloggers, retired PLA generals and influential commentators. After all, the dispute of the Diaoyu Islands in East China Sea is fairly far away from the public's daily life. Therefore, even though the public may have judgment and sentiment after incidents break out, it is the POLs who voice their sentiments first, and then they *sometimes* mobilize the public to hold protest and gatherings. In this project, those activists include members of DDM groups, who spend their time and money on "demonstrating sovereignty" over the islands. POLs also include those who organize protests in major cities. They include some college students and well-known authors who comment on the dispute. In this dissertation, I utilize POLs as a proxy to estimate the public opinion on the dispute, and when public mobilizations happen, they are seen as a direct manifestation of public opinion.

Free media will qualify as a “mediating institution” as well. However, they are participating in the policy making process more as a “venue” instead of an “actor.” They help the government to voice its opinions to the public and the environment (foreign government, for instance), also they help to inform the government about public sentiments. In China, we are seeing an increasing influence of the media with loose censorship from the government. In this project, media is utilized as a venue for transferring the opinions of the public, the intellectuals and the government.

“Policy Inputs”

Fourth, “policy inputs” were designed to include “support” and “demand” by Easton in his Systems Theory model. These two elements of policy inputs are followed in this project. However, in this project, it should be noted how these inputs are measured. An empirical obstacle in this project is that media are supervised by the government, and the government may force the media not to report certain news. Henceforth, in order to measure “policy inputs”, I have to turn to “unofficial” sources, which include those media with background or ownership from private owners or overseas (as defined below). I examined the protests and propaganda of the activists to offer estimation of public opinion. I also utilized the Google Trend and Baidu Index (similar to Google Trend, but on data from the biggest Chinese search engine Baidu.com)⁷ to investigate public’s and media’s interest over the dispute. Such a comparison offers perspectives for understanding what kinds of issues over the disputed islands “irk” the Chinese public. Please see the data collection section for more details about collecting data.

⁷ Google retreated from mainland China in 2010, therefore, its access by Chinese internet users was severely hampered.

“Policy Outputs” and “Policy Preferences”

Fifth, “policy outputs” are the products of the political system in Systems Theory. They are the outcome of inputs after being processed in the political system. Meanwhile, they also impact the environment and create opportunities for more inputs. Therefore the system theory will keep functioning permanently.

In this project, the policy outputs are the actions the Chinese government takes over the Diaoyu Islands against Japan. These policy actions may include, for example, protests, sanction or military actions. In this project, these actions are arranged according to the level of assertiveness by the Chinese government (0 means the lowest level of assertiveness, 5 is the highest), including,

0. *Status quo*: Maintaining *status quo*, no (re)action.
1. *Low-level protest*: Protests primarily by MFA spokespersons; does not involve high-ranking leaders (minister of the government or above)
2. *High-level protest*: Protests and negotiation by government leaders; no further actions.
3. *“Countermeasures”*: In addition to protests, the government undertakes actions to “countermeasure” foreign governments, which may include suspension of dialogue, and/or cancellation of government contact. Regularized patrols, will be considered as an action between “countermeasures” and the higher level.
4. *Trade sanctions*. In addition to “countermeasures,” the government undertakes punitive actions in forms of tariff and strict control on import/exports.
5. *Military Intervention*. As the highest possible action, the government deploys military means to initiate conflict over the disputed islands.

Figure 4.1 Hierarchies of Possible Actions of the Chinese Government /policy preferences of actors over the Diaoyu Islands




Figure 4.1 illustrates these five possible actions taken by the government. When reacting over the dispute, the Chinese government usually starts from the lowest assertiveness option and then *escalates* into higher ones.

Meanwhile, Figure 4.1 also demonstrates “policy preferences” of different actors. The five types of possible government “policy outputs” are also advocated by policy actors before the policy is made. For instance, while the public may advocate “military action” as their policy preference, eventually the government may end up adopting “countermeasures” as the “policy output”. In this sense, figure 4.1 serves dual purposes of presenting possible “policy output” and also options for “policy preference.”

“Demands”

Sixth, included in David Easton’s Systems Theory, the “demands” of “input” actually can have different arguments before the “policy outputs” are determined.

Table 4.1 summarizes all those possible “labels” for arguments indicated in narratives.

Specifically, arguments by all actors in China over the Diaoyu Islands can be summarized as follows:

Table 4.1 Labels of Arguments

Labels	Notes	
<i>“Sovereign argument”</i>	It emphasizes Chinese sovereignty over the disputed islands. It can be made based on two aspects	
	<i>Historical-based</i>	emphasis on China’s historical occupation, supported by historical documents/archives
	<i>Legal-based</i>	emphasis on the legal evidence for China’s sovereignty, citing international law (law of territory, and the law of the sea)
<i>“Economic Argument”</i>	Emphasis on the economic gains and losses over the Diaoyu Islands.	
<i>“Political Argument”</i>	It is not relevant in China since there is only one party in the government. However, a “political argument” is made when the government emphasizes on the challenge from domestic public mobilization. It shall be noted, however, some claim that a moderating actor (of the people/intellectuals) is emerging, my results understate the degree to which foreign policy decisions are top-down. But I do suggest that the narratives of the mediating actors are influencing the government to respond to domestic voices in foreign policy.	
<i>“Patriotic Argument”</i>	Emphasis on the national prides and feelings of the Chinese people.	

With these labels, the following chapters will compare the three incidents over the Diaoyu Islands in 1996, 2004 and 2010, and explain the variation of the government’s action in these three incidents, considering the influence from the intellectuals and the public. With such an analysis, we can demonstrate the

applicability of Easton's Systems Theory in Chinese foreign policy making.

“Feedback”

In Easton's Systems Theory, the policy outputs offer feedback to policy input. The feedback answers to the policy input. In the context of China, the feedback loop is broken down into three loops.

The first loop is appeasing. Appeasing indicates that the government uses “policy outputs” to satisfy the demands from the policy input box. As will be revealed below, with regard to the disputed islands, the government employs assertive policy to satisfy the public. Even though the POLs call for the most assertive policy, the government's assertive stances will decrease the likelihood that they criticize the government. With an appeasement policy, the government usually adopts a more assertive foreign policy to accommodate the public's call.

The second form of feedback is quelling. While “to appease” indicates that the government employs policy actions to satisfy the advocate of the public, “to quell” means the government actively confronts the public's advocates. By adopting “quelling” feedback, the government employs methods to force the public to reduce or stop their mobilization. As will be further discussed in Chapter 7, the government can either directly quell the input before taking any actions over the disputed islands, or to quell the public's demands after taking some foreign actions.

The third form of feedback is what I call “institutional memory.” This is the kind of feedback that goes across multiple incidents. After an incident happens, how actors (the government, intellectuals or the public) have acted and how the foreign country challenged the sovereignty will be memorized by all actors participating in the

incident. Therefore, in the next incident, the actors will act according to their memory of previous incident(s). The “institutional memory” links multiple incidents over the disputed islands and educates actors how to pursue their policy preferences. Such memory also facilitates the growth of mediating institutions in multiple interactions with the government.

III. Methodology: Narrative Analysis

This section presents the methodology of this dissertation. In order to measure the opinions of government, intellectuals and the public, and analyze their interaction at incidents of the Diaoyu Islands, I employ the narrative analysis as the method to estimate their opinions on the same incidents.

On Narrative Analysis

As Emery Roe stated at the very beginning of her 1989 article, “ narrative policy analysis provides a way of analyzing those highly uncertain and complex policy issues whose truth-value cannot be ascertained and about which the only thing practicing policy analysts know are the stories policymakers use in articulating these issues.”⁸ By undertaking analysis on different narratives over the same policy issue, we can better understand the influence of different actors on policy making and interpret policy actions as responses to collective environmental inputs. Likewise, policy actions can be interpreted to be “feedback” to other actors to signal possible avenues of resolving differences in preferred policy actions by creating a shared story that is mutually acceptable. As Roe stated, “by focusing on the differential risk

⁸ Roe, Emery. (1989) “Narrative Analysis for Policy Analysts: A case study for the 1980-1982 medfly controversy in California.” *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 251-273.

perceptions reflected in the stories, narrative policy analysis identifies an important area in which conventional policy analysis could have contributed to the controversy's resolution [emphasis mine]."⁹

Narrative analysis focuses on the comparisons of sets of narratives from different participants and identifies their perceptions. In Roe's case studies of medfly controversy in California between 1980 and 1982, she identified the "Areal Story" vs. the "Ground Story," which were two policy preferences for methods advocated to terminate the medfly crisis. Between these two sets of "narratives", the areal one was advocated by the bureaucracies, whereas the ground one was advocated as a criticism towards the "areal story." In this sense, as Roe stated, these two sets of story were in an "asymmetrical opposition."¹⁰ By revealing the asymmetrical positions of these two stories, Roe explained why the "Areal story" was eventually employed. She then, however, delved into a discussion of how such an asymmetrical position of two sets of narratives emerged. Drawing variables from political power [of speakers] and interest groups involved, Roe asserted that the two sets of narratives were asymmetrical at the very beginning.

Why should we care about narratives? As Roberto Franzosi from Trinity College of Oxford stated, the answer is simple, because "narrative texts are packed with sociological information, and a great deal of our empirical evidence is in narrative form."¹¹ As Franzosi argued, it is the "story", defined as "the chronological succession of events", that provides the basic building blocks for narratives.¹² Thus, it is crucial to analyze the story and the context of the story.

As a form of speeches, narratives have meanings and consequences. As Wayne A.

⁹ Roe (1989), pp.251.

¹⁰ Pp. 255 in Roe (1989).

¹¹ Franzosi, Roberto. (1998). "Narrative analysis - or why (and how) sociologists Should be interested in Narrative." *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 24:517-54

¹² Franzosi (1998), pp. 520.

Davis stated at the beginning of his book, *Meaning, Expression, and Thought*, “one of the most venerable doctrines in the history of philosophy, linguistics and psychology is the thesis that words are conventional signs of mental states, principally thoughts and ideas, and that meaning consists in their expression.”¹³ This doctrine is termed by Davis as an “expression theory of meaning.”¹⁴

Simply put, the expression theory of meaning explores the thoughts behind expressions. By studying what and how an actor expresses, scholars can understand the meanings and thoughts behind the expression. The philosophical roots for this theory can be traced back to Aristotle, who stated that “spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words.”¹⁵ However, modern research on speech acts began with John Austin.¹⁶ In his series of lectures, John Austin analyzed the usage of language in detail. Realizing that no specific attention has been paid to this topic, Austin tried to decipher the meaning of the sentences. According to Austin, sentences either describe, or report (“constative” statements)¹⁷. In addition, there are some sentences that are done by being said, “to say something is to do something” (“I bet”, and “I do” at weddings, for instance).¹⁸ These kinds of utterances are named by Austin “performative sentences.”¹⁹ This distinction offers a philosophical basis for securitization theory, especially since Ole Waever makes a very similar statement as Austin did: “the word ‘security’ is the act...by saying it something is done.”²⁰ Inspired by Austin, in the discipline of philosophy of language, statements, in both oral and written forms, are “distinguished

¹³ See pp. 1 in Davis, Wayne (2003). *Meaning, Expression, and Thought*. Cambridge University Press.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Aristotle. *De Interpretatione*, trans. J.I.Baere. (1941). In the *Basic works of Aristotle*, edited by Richard McKeon, pp. 607-617. New York: Random House.

¹⁶ As Balzacq (2011) stated in his introduction of speech acts, “it is widely recognized that the commitment of securitization theory to speech act is inspired by Austin and Searle”.

¹⁷ Pp. 3 Austin, John. (1955). *How to do things with words*. The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University.

¹⁸ Pp. 12.

¹⁹ Pp. 6.

²⁰ Waever (1995), pp 55.

by their possession of semantic content or meaning.”²¹ The use of languages and the meaning of languages have been the theme in the philosophy of language, including phenomenological and semantic analysis.

Analysis of a speech act actually involves multiple “acts”. According to Colin and Guldman, “it would be more accurate to speak of different aspects of one and the same act; most of these ‘acts’ cannot be performed separately but, given their nature, are performed as concomitants to some other types of speech act.”²² This statement actually indicates that the goal for speech acts analysis is to explore different aspects of the speech. As discussed, Colin and Guldman’s statement actually echoes the sociological understanding of securitization theory, which aims at exploring the socio-cultural context of the process.²³

What is explained by conducting speech act analysis? When analyzing the sentences in his lectures, Austin also mentioned the different “acts” in a single sentence. Generally speaking, speech act analysis serves the goal of exploring answers for questions from three aspects.

First, what is the message the speech maker is sending? By “articulating particular sounds capable of phonetic descriptions,”²⁴ the speech makers send messages containing semantic roles. When analyzing speech acts, the first thing we can tell is whether this speech is an utterance or a question. We may also know what items are being identified in the speech act and what tones are used.

Second, studying the speech acts reflects the character of the speech makers. As Colin and Guldman stated, our everyday conversation “is more implied than is

²¹ Collin, Finn and Finn Guldmann. (2005). *Meaning, Use and Truth: Introducing the philosophy of language*. Ashgate Publishing Company.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Balzacq (2011), pp. 19-28.

²⁴ Colin and Guldman (2005), pp. 178.

actually said.”²⁵ Therefore, analysts can read between the lines when analyzing a speech act to find out who said this, and why they said so in given context.

The third question that an analysis of speech acts addresses is explicitly phrased by Colin and Guldman as, “what did the speaker hope to achieve by saying what he did.”²⁶ By analyzing the speech acts, we can reveal the “intentions” and backgrounds behind the speeches. For instance, if we ask someone “When are you going to finish your homework?” After considering what the statement is about, and between whom the conversation takes place, we may find out the intentions of the speaker: has the listener postponed the homework for too long? Or is the speaker reminding the listener to do his/her homework so the speaker can have some private time/and space? By studying the speech acts, we can construct the story behind the speeches.

These three questions echo what Austin called locutionary, illocutionary and prelocutionary dimensions of speech acts.²⁷ While the locutionary speech acts decipher the meaning of speech acts in a given community, the illocutionary dimension of speech acts addresses the specific activity conducted at the speech acts (forces of the speaker), and the prelocutionary dimension of speech acts indicates the specific effects the speaker is trying to achieve upon the audience.²⁸

As vehicles of meanings and indicators of socio-cultural background, narratives are important for understanding actors’ stances on policy issues. In the Diaoyu Islands disputes, for example, the government’s narratives usually emphasize historical evidence (e.g. China has had the disputed islands for hundreds of years) or legal

²⁵ *Supra* note 20, pp. 179.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Austin (1962), *How to do things with words: The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University 1955*, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Searle, John R. (1969). *Speech acts: an essay in the philosophy of language*. Cambridge University Press.

²⁸ See Mueller (2004), pp. 397. And Searle (1969), Collin and Culdman (2005), pp. 177-180. See also Der Derian , James. “Review to *Rules, Norms, and Decision: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*” by Kratochwil, Friedric (1989). *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Feb., 1991), pp. 288-289

support from international law (e.g. China has undeniable sovereignty over the disputed islands according to law), whereas the public usually yells anti-Japanese slogans (e.g. boycott Japanese products, or occupy the Diaoyu Islands by military means) at incidents. Therefore, towards the same incident, influenced at the same external impetus, different actors have different arguments in their narratives.

Just like seeing a shape of triangle, different people have different interpretations of what the triangle symbolizes. The government, the intellectuals and the public have different interpretations of the dispute and use different narratives. To explore the socio-cultural and political implications behind these narratives in China will be an interesting topic to pursue, exploring the causes of different policy actions in China's foreign policy.

What this project will analyze is the interaction of these narratives. By presenting and synthesizing the narratives from different actors, I display them in a time line. With close analysis of when and how these narratives are expressed in or after incidents, I show how narratives from the public and the intellectuals influence the government's decisions, and also how government uses narratives from the other two actors for domestic control and international negotiations.

Data Collection

Narrative analysis is interested in the story told by actors. Such an interest dictates the central role played by speakers and their speeches. However, it is crucial to distinguish where the speeches acts come from and on what occasions they are expressed. In other words, other than "who said" and "what was said", "when" and "where" are other important elements for narrative analysis. Actually for this project,

“where” narratives are made is the most important element during data collection.

Typical narrative analysis relies on the speech acts of participants on policy issues, of governments’ speech acts and/or the narratives from interest groups, NGOs.

In this project, the ultimate criteria for selecting data sources when collecting data is to make sure the narrative is made by the speaker intentionally and carefully, therefore the narratives will reflect the position and stance of this actor. For example, when collecting government’s narratives over the disputed Diaoyu Islands, it is crucial to ensure the data is “official”, therefore, the ideal sources of data will point at those “official” media and government reports. These sources are directly issued and controlled by the government; therefore they offer credible and reliable information on where the government stands on this issue.

An obstacle of collecting political narratives in 1996 was the lack of electronic data available. MFA spokespersons’ speeches are collected on the *People’s Daily’s* website only since 2002 – anything before that year was not archived online.

Therefore, I collected the data by browsing reports on this dispute. These reports over the 1996 dispute mentioned the speeches of MFA and the Chinese government, so I collect the government’s words from these texts.

On public opinion, however, it offers a more abstract body of data than the government side for researchers. In order to capture the opinions of the public, I identify POLs as a proxy for measuring public opinion. In order to capture the narratives of POLs, I collect their narratives in interviews, protests and on websites to estimate their positions on the dispute. After all, the goal for collecting data is to make sure that these narratives reflect the arguments of the actor.

In this dissertation, possible venues for gathering the government’s narratives

over the Diaoyu islands include the following:

Official Media (Newspapers, TV channel and Magazines). The Chinese government and Communist Party of China have several official media, including the People's Daily (*Renmin Ribao*), Xinhua Daily (*Xinhua Ribao*), and Guangming Daily (*Guangming Ribao*), Qiushi magazine, and China Central Television (CCTV). They are all issued or controlled by the Chinese government (or the Communist Party). They are considered as the “tongues” of the Chinese government.

Government Statements. The Chinese government occasionally issue official statements on policy issues. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement after the release of Mr. Zhan Qixiong in 2010 incident. This statement reflects the official stance of the Chinese government.

Laws, rules and ordinances. The Chinese government's laws and ordinances about the disputed islands are considered as direct expression of the Chinese government's stance over the dispute. For instance, the Law of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (1992) was passed by the Chinese government, including the disputed Diaoyu Islands as part of China's territory. This will be considered official narratives.

MFA Press Conference. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains regular press conference, making official statements of the Chinese government on various topics. The statements made by MFA spokesperson are considered as official, reflecting the opinion of Chinese government.

Speeches of leaders. When the Chinese government leaders make speeches over a specific topic, the speeches are considered as official. For instance, Premier Wen Jiabao spoke about the Diaoyu islands dispute after Mr. Zhan was arrested. His speeches reflect official narratives (actually from the central decision makers).

These venues of official narratives may not be available in every incident. The presence of some actually indicates the severity of incident and level of Chinese government's response, for example, leaders made speeches in 2010, but not 1996 or 2004. The presence of leaders' speech actually indicates the high level of response towards the dispute in 2010.

With respect to intellectuals, there are also several possible venues for gathering their narratives on the disputed islands, including,

“Core Journals”. Chinese academia is featured with a system called “core journals” (*he xin qi kan*), which is a list including academic journals with high rates of reference. These are those articles with the biggest influence in Chinese academia. Articles published in “core journals” are included as credible narratives of the intellectuals. I use the database CNKI to search for articles published on “core journals.” CNKI offers an option for filtering out those journals beyond the list.

CNKI (*China National Knowledge Infrastructure*) is accessible through the Bizzell Library of the University of Oklahoma. As the world's largest research content database in Chinese, CNKI offers several search databases, providing dissertation, master's thesis, newspapers, magazines and government reports from China. Hosted by *East View Information Service* in the US, CNKI offers millions of articles published in Chinese each year. CNKI offers bilingual interfaces.

Books. Similar to “core journals”, academic books are considered as credible source for collecting narratives from intellectuals.

Conferences and Symposium. Intellectuals may also hold conferences and symposium over the disputed islands. These are also credible sources for collecting their narratives over specific policy issues.

Lectures and Classroom discussion. College professors, an important group of Chinese intellectuals, also make narratives demonstrating their positions and viewpoints of specific policy issues in classes. However, how to obtain their lectures notes and have their confirmation on using them in research are two obstacles.

Textbooks. Textbooks offer another source of credible narratives. However, Chinese textbooks are also authorized by the Chinese governments (national or provincial), thus, textbook demonstrates the opinion of the government more than that of intellectuals. However, intellectuals' efforts to add certain topics to the textbook will be a demonstration of the intellectuals' opinions.

The biggest challenge comes from gathering narratives from the public. Mostly, public opinion is so fragmented and amorphous that it is difficult to measure. Therefore, I use POLs as the proxy for estimating public opinion over the islands dispute. Venues for collecting their narratives include,

Websites. POLs, for instance, those DDM activists, maintain their websites for propaganda purposes. Their websites often post their own statements. These statements are good sources of narratives.

Interviews. Interviews of these POLs, if available, are good sources for understanding their logic and their own interpretation of the meaning of their actions.

Unofficial media. In contrary to official media, unofficial media are those not under the control of the Chinese government's influence. These "unofficial media" may include those newspapers or television channels with overseas backgrounds, or unofficial backgrounds. For example, the Phoenix TV based in Hong Kong has newspaper, magazines and TV channels in mainland China. Also, the *Nandu Weekly*, for instance, is another example unofficial media, which has made reports in efforts to

break the rein of government censorship. Protests are not reported on Chinese official media; however, those unofficial media dare to freely report public protests in mainland China. Thus, these unofficial media offers ideal source for understanding Chinese public opinion.

Slogans in protests. With access to unofficial media, I include public’s slogans in the dataset. The posters they hold during protests, the advocates they made during protests both offer narratives of POLs on the islands disputes.

Social media. Actually, social media will be a great source for analyzing the public’s responses on the dispute. However, it should be noted that Facebook, Twitter, Youtube are banned in mainland China, Chinese internet users have no direct access to these websites. Google also retreated from mainland China in 2010. Chinese social media include Renren.com and Microblog, plus numerous Bulletin Board Systems (BBS). It will be interesting to gather those data and comments on these sources what the public posted, which will be a good topic for future research on Chinese public opinion. On these three actors, narratives theoretically can be sourced from these venues, as summarized in Figure 4.2.

Table 4.2 Sources of Data Collected (Those venues not used are in bold)

	POSSIBLE VENUES	VENUES USED?
Government	<i>1. Official Media (Newspapers, TV channel and Magazines).</i>	Yes
	<i>2. Government Statements.</i>	Yes
	<i>3. Laws, rules and ordinances</i>	<u>No</u>
	<i>4. MFA Press Conference</i>	Yes

	<i>5. Speeches of leaders.</i>	Yes
Intellectuals	<i>1. “Core Journals”</i>	Yes
	<i>2. Books</i>	Yes
	<i>3. Conferences and Symposium.</i>	<u>No</u>
	<i>4. Lectures and Classroom discussion.</i>	<u>No</u>
	<i>5. Textbooks</i>	<u>No</u>
POLs (as proxy for public)	<i>1. Websites</i>	Yes
	<i>2. Interviews.</i>	Yes
	<i>3. Unofficial media</i>	Yes
	<i>4. Slogans in protests</i>	Yes
	<i>5. Social media</i>	<u>No</u>

As noted above in figure 4.2, several “possible” venues are excluded in this project.

First, laws, rules and ordinances are not used in this project because China has not issued any legislation over the Diaoyu Islands since 1996. However, it should be noted that regularized patrols by Chinese fishing bureaucracies are mentioned in this projects, but they are not included in the dataset for narrative analysis.

Second, for the intellectuals, conferences and symposiums are not used in this project, because there is not sufficient data available on conferences or symposium by intellectuals. Their findings on the disputed islands, however, have been published on

core journals. Therefore, it will be redundant to go to conference or symposiums.

Third, lectures and classroom discussions are not available for this research.

Fourth, textbooks are excluded in this project because textbooks for compulsory education (1st in primary to junior high) are also approved by the government. Therefore, the opinion of intellectuals in textbooks has been “trimmed” by the government.

Fifth, social media for public opinion has also been abandoned due to lack of availability. However, as noted in Chapter 8, it will be an interesting source for future research.

Narrative Analysis in Chinese Language

After the criteria for data collection are established, I collect data for analysis. I employed java software called *Yoshikoder* in the analysis.²⁹ *Yoshikoder* offers a strong tool for analyzing Chinese text. Developed by the Identity Project at Harvard's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, *Yoshikoder* offers a powerful multilingual analysis tool for creating dictionaries and counting the frequencies of texts input.³⁰ *Yoshikoder* has also been proved to be a powerful tool for analyzing a large amount of Chinese texts.³¹

However, despite of its multilingual interface for analysis, *Yoshikoder* does not break texts in Chinese. Mandarin Chinese is a language without space (word break)

²⁹ For more information, see <http://www.yoshikoder.org>. And also Laver, Michael and John Garry. (2000). “Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts”. *American Journal of Political Science*. 44(3): pp. 619-634. This software has been utilized in content analysis in multilingual contexts. Recently, *Yoshikoder* has been used by scholars to analyze content in Chinese media and government reports. See Carlson, Allen, Mary Gallagher, Kenneth Lieberthal and Melanie Manion. (2010). *Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and Filed Strategies*. Cambridge University Press.

³⁰ For more information, see <http://www.yoshikoder.org>. And also Laver, Michael and John Garry. (2000). “Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts”. *American Journal of Political Science*. 44(3): pp. 619-634.

³¹ See Sullivan, Jonathan and William Lowe. (2010). “Chen Shui-Bian : On independence”. *The China Quarterly*. 610-639. Also Chen, Yuwen. (2011). “Quantitative Content Analysis of Chinese Texts?: A Methodological Note.” *Journal of Chinese Political Science*. 16:431-443.

between phrases. Unlike English, a Chinese sentence has no space other than punctuations between words.³² Therefore, Yoshikoder's analysis of Chinese text is often "non-native", for example, it will consider two characters together as a word, even though there is no such usage of these two characters in modern Chinese language.

Therefore, the most important aspect of using the software to count word frequency in Chinese is word break. Yoshikoder assumes that the words in the text have been separated with space. This can be done, however, on a website called Hyland ([http://www.hylanda.com/product/fenci/tiyan/.](http://www.hylanda.com/product/fenci/tiyan/)) After checking for several times, this website separates Chinese phrases satisfactorily.

After "breaking" Chinese texts into understandable phrases, Yoshikoder is able to recognize the Chinese text the same as well as English text (with word breaks). In this way, Yoshikoder becomes powerful in analyzing Chinese language.

In order to illustrate the frequency of words used in texts, there is useful software and websites that allow generating word clouds. I used Tagxedo to generate word clouds in this dissertation, appreciating its outstanding capability in recognizing Chinese language to present visual illustration of the "tones" of those texts.

Here is an example of my analysis using Hyder, Yoshikoder and Tagxedo for narrative analysis. I choose the speech of Hilary Clinton on the South China Sea, with both Chinese and English texts.

In addition to showing how these methods are used in narrative analysis, I also plan to show the readers how I clear out the "noisy" narratives during analysis. For

³² For instance, two sentences expressing the same meaning:

English: I am studying in the library.

Chinese: 我正在图书馆学习。

Even though the words in Chinese sentence is exactly corresponding to those in English sentence, however, instead of the space between each two words in English sentence, the Chinese language does not have space between words. This trait of the Chinese language makes it difficult for computer to recognize exactly what words are used without spaces between.

example, in the Diaoyu Islands, the frequent mentioning of the word “Diaoyu Islands” is not surprising. Similarly, those prepositions in Chinese like “of” “at”, or words like “and” are also discarded since the purpose of this analysis is to find out the central theme and tone of these texts.

An Example of Analysis: Hilary Clinton’s Speech on the South China Sea

In order to exemplify my approach and method for analysis, I use the official press statement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on July 22, 2011 over the South China Sea as a sample for analysis. They are both collected from official websites. For the sake of comparison, I divide the page into two columns, with Chinese on the right, and English on the left.³³

STEP 1. Data Collection

Figure 4.2 TEXTS Sample

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesperson
July 22, 2011
2011/1230
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY CLINTON
The South China Sea

美国国务院
发言人办公室
2011年7月22日
2011/1230
国务卿克林顿发表声明
关于南中国海

We commend this week’s announcement that ASEAN and China have agreed on implementing guidelines to facilitate confidence building measures and joint projects in the South China Sea. This is an important first step toward achieving a Code of Conduct and reflects the progress that can be made through dialogue and multilateral diplomacy. We look forward to further progress.

美国赞赏东盟（ASEAN）和中国本星期宣布就执行有关指导方针达成一致意见，以促进建立信心的措施和在南中国海的联合项目。这是朝着达成行为准则的方向迈出的重要的第一步，反映了通过对话和多边外交能取得的进展。我们期待取得进一步进展。

The United States is encouraged by this recent agreement because as a Pacific nation and resident power we have a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime domain,

最近这项协议令美国感到鼓舞，因为作为一个太平洋国家和常驻大国，在南中国海的航行自由、自由进入亚洲海域、维护和平与稳定及尊重国际法涉及我们的

³³ The text can be retrieved from Department of State website at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168989.htm>. For Chinese version can be retrieved from Bureau of International Information Programs, under the Department of State, offering multilingual version of US statements(<http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/chinese/texttrans/2011/07/20110724091009x0.2711712.html#axzz1wfZ8KyKB>).

the maintenance of peace and stability, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.

We oppose the threat or use of force by any claimant in the South China Sea to advance its claims or interfere with legitimate economic activity. We share these interests not only with ASEAN members and ASEAN Regional Forum participants, but with other maritime nations and the broader international community.

The United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various disputes in the South China Sea. We also support the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. But we do not take a position on the competing territorial claims over land features in the South China Sea. We believe all parties should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in accordance with international law, including as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

The United States is concerned that recent incidents in the South China Sea threaten the peace and stability on which the remarkable progress of the Asia-Pacific region has been built. These incidents endanger the safety of life at sea, escalate tensions, undermine freedom of navigation, and pose risks to lawful unimpeded commerce and economic development.

In keeping with the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration, each of the parties should comply with their commitments to respect freedom of navigation and over-flight in the South China Sea in accordance with international law, to resolve their disputes through peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force. They should exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from taking action to inhabit presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features, and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.

The United States encourages all parties to accelerate efforts to reach a full Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

We also call on all parties to clarify their claims in the South China Sea in terms consistent with customary international law, including as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. Consistent with international law, claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from

国家利益。

我们反对在南中国海提出索求的任何一方为实现其索求以武力相威胁或使用武力，或干扰正当的经济活动。我们不仅与东盟成员和东盟地区论坛参与方，而且与其他海洋国家和更广泛的国际社会共同拥有这些利益。

美国支持提出索求的所有各方为解决在南中国海的各种争端采取相互合作的外交程序。我们还支持2002年东盟-中国的“南海各方行为宣言”。但对于涉及南中国海地貌特征的互有争议的各种领土争端，我们采取不偏向任何一方的立场。我们认为所有各方都应根据国际法，包括1982年海洋法公约体现的内容，寻求各自对领土的索求及附带海域空间的权利。

最近在南中国海发生的事件危及作为亚太地区取得显著进展之基础的和平与稳定，美国为此表示关注。这些事件危及海上生命安全，加剧紧张局势，破坏航行自由，并对合法、不受阻碍的通商活动和经济发展构成威胁。

根据2002年东盟-中国发布的宣言，有关各方都应遵守各自作出的各项承诺，根据国际法尊重南中国海的航行自由和飞越上空的自由，通过和平方式解决争端，不以武力相威胁或使用武力。对于进行可导致争端复杂化或升级并影响和平与稳定的活动，各方应自我克制，其中包括不采取行动占居目前无人居住的岛屿、礁石、浅滩、沙洲和其他特征的地物，并以建设性的方式处理相互间的分歧。

美国鼓励各方加速努力，达成全面的南中国海行为准则。

我们还呼吁各方根据习惯国际法，包括海洋公约法体现的内容，阐明各自在南中国海的索求。根据国际法，对南中国海海域空间提出的索求应完全派生于按地貌特征提出的正当索求。

legitimate claims to land features.

STEP 2. "Break" Chinese Texts.

By using Hyland, the Chinese text receives a "break" between every two words.

The outcomes are as follows.

“美国赞赏东盟和中国本星期宣布就执行有关指导方针达成一致意见，以促进建立信心的措施和在南中国海的联合项目。这是朝着达成行为准则的方向迈出的重要的第一步，反映了通过对话和多边外交能取得的进展。我们期待取得进一步进展。

最近这项协议令美国感到鼓舞，因为作为一个太平洋国家和常驻大国，在南中国海的航行自由、自由进入亚洲海域、维护和平与稳定及尊重国际法涉及我们的国家利益。

我们反对在南中国海提出索求的任何一方为实现其索求以武力相威胁或使用武力，或干扰正当的经济活动。我们不仅与东盟成员和东盟地区论坛参与方，而且与其他海洋国家和更广泛的国际社会共同拥有这些利益。

美国支持提出索求的所有各方为解决在南中国海的各种争端采取相互合作的外交程序。我们还支持2002年东盟-中国的“南海各方行为宣言”。但对于涉及南中国海地貌特征的互有争议的各种领土争端，我们采取不偏向任何一方的立场。我们认为所有各方都应根据国际法，包括1982年海洋法公约体现的内容，寻求各自对领土的索求及附带海域空间的权利。

最近在南中国海发生的事件危及作为亚太地区取得显著进展之基础的和平与稳定，美国为此表示关注。这些事件危及海上生命安全，加剧紧张局势，破坏航行自由，并对合法、不受阻碍的通商活动和经济发展构成威胁。

根据2002年东盟-中国发布的宣言，有关各方都应遵守各自作出的各项承诺，根据国际法尊重南中国海的航行自由和飞越上空的自由，通过和平方式解决争端，不以武力相威胁或使用武力。对于进行可导致争端复杂化或升级并影响和平与稳定的活动，各方应自我克制，其中包括不采取行动占居目前无人居住的岛屿、礁石、浅滩、沙洲和其他特征的地物，并以建设性的方式处理相互间的分歧。

美国鼓励各方加速努力，达成全面的南中国海行为准则。

我们还呼吁各方根据习惯国际法，包括海洋公约法体现的内容，阐明各自在南中国海的索求。根据国际法，对南中国海海域空间提出的索求应完全派生于按地貌特征提出的正当索求。”

It should be noted that these space between words are not used in Chinese language. The purpose for breaking these words is solely for the convenience of analysis with software.


STEP 3 – A. Analyze the Text

By putting them in Tagxedo, the outcomes are as follows before clearing out any redundant words.

Figure 4.3 English Word Cloud (Sample)



Figure 4.4 Chinese Word Cloud for Clinton’s Statement (Sample)



Putting them in Yoshikoder, the word frequency analysis yields the following result (The left column, “English”, is added manually).

Table 4.3 Yoshikoder Analysis of Word Frequency in Chinese (Sample)
(Excerpted words that appeared three times)

English	Word	Count	Proportion
“of”	的	36	0.087
“South China Sea”	南中国海	10	0.024
“and”	和	9	0.022
“We/us”	我们	8	0.019
“all parties”	各方	7	0.017
“demands”	索求	7	0.017
“at”	在	6	0.015
“and/with”	与	5	0.012
“ASEAN”	东盟	5	0.012
“International Law”	国际法	5	0.012
“according to “	根据	5	0.012
“freedom”	自由	5	0.012
“no/not”	不	4	0.010
“dispute”	争端	4	0.010
“based on”	以	4	0.010
“peace”	和平	4	0.010
“should”	应	4	0.010
“or”	或	4	0.010
“raise/advocate”	提出	4	0.010
“military power”	武力	4	0.010
“the United States”	美国	4	0.010
		Total:144	Total: 0.349

Note: Proportions do not add up to 1. Proportions are rounded to 3 decimals.

STEP 3 – B. Clear-out the “noisy” words.

As the Word Cloud and Yoshikoder frequency box showed, there are several words that are meaningless for us to understand what this text is about. For instance, the word “of” ranked the most frequently used word (36 times), however, it does not help the readers to understand the text. Similar, “and/with”, “at” “and” “according to” are all those words disposable for understanding this text. Also, the word “we/us” are removed because this text demonstrates the concern of the United States, therefore it is not unexpected to use first-person. Therefore, these words are cleared out from the Yoshikoder box. Meanwhile, Tagxedo allows removal of words and the regeneration of a new word cloud. Thus, we have a cleaned version of figure 4.6 and 4.7.

Figure 4.4 (1) Chinese Word Cloud for Clinton’s Statement– Cleaned



Similarly, Yoshikoder box is removed for those “noisy” words, which do not have meaning for analyzing the tone of this text.

Table 4.3 (1) Yoshikoder Analysis of Word Frequency in Chinese (Sample) (Excerpted words that appeared three times) - Cleaned

English	Word	Count	Proportion
“South China Sea”	南中国海	10	0.0242
“all parties”	各方	7	0.0169
“demands”	索求	7	0.0169

“ASEAN”	东盟	5	0.0121
“International law”	国际法	5	0.0121
“Freedom”	自由	5	0.0121
“Dispute”	争端	4	0.0097
“Peace”	和平	4	0.0097
“Raise/advocate”	提出	4	0.0097
“Military power”	武力	4	0.0097
“the United States”	美国	4	0.0097

Note: Proportions do not add up to 1. Proportions are rounded to four decimals.

As the clean version of the Yoshikoder table and word cloud indicate, there are several terms highlighted by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: international law, ASEAN, international law and freedom. Now what we need to do is to choose the phrase(s) relevant with the research and read the word in context to find out what the “story” is behind the words.

STEP 4. Analysis of the Words.

Take the phrase “international law” for example, we can find out the five places where Clinton mentioned “international law.” At this stage, it becomes crucial to translate the sentences back to English to analyze what the speaker is talking about.

Table 4.4 “International Law.” - Example

	Chinese Context for “int’l law”	English Translation
1.	…维护 和平 与 稳定 及 尊重 国际法 涉及 我们 的 国家 利益	It is to our national interest to maintain regional peace and stability and respect international law ...
2.	我们 认为 所有 各方 都 应 根据 国际 法	We believe all relevant parties shall comply with international law ...
3.	根据 国际法 尊重 南中国海 的 航行 自由 和 飞越 上空 的 自由…	each of the parties should comply with their commitments to respect freedom of navigation and over-flight in the South China Sea in accordance with international law ...

4.	我们还呼吁各方根据习惯国际法…阐明各自在南中国海的索求	We also call on all parties to clarify their claims in the South China Sea in terms consistent with customary international law ...
5.	根据国际法，对南中国海海域空间提出的索求应完全派生于按地貌特征提出的正当索求	Consistent with international law , claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features.

If a researcher is interested in the position of the United States on the South China Sea from a legal perspective, these five sentences can offer good evidence for investigating what relevant international law are in the South China Sea, what relevant with international law has been said before by the US government, and what are those arguments by, say, the Chinese government or the Philippine government, over international law in this dispute, etc. - depending on which direction the researcher is to follow.

None the less, from the clean version in Table 4.3(1), readers can tell from those high-frequency words that the United States was calling “all parties” to comply with international law, and the US wanted to maintain peace in this region. What is the US concerned about? The “freedom” of navigation and over-fly in the South China Sea. So who is threatening the freedom of navigation and over-fly of the US in this region? Starting from the table of high-frequency words, this research can go far.

At last, this finding from the Chinese text can be compared with the original English version by Hilary Clinton. Since the speech was made originally in English, comparing with the English text will help to make sure there are no words lost in translation (figure 4.3). If the original texts are in Chinese (which is the case in this project), such a comparison is not possible.

IV. Threats of Validity

As mentioned before, this project measures the stance of the government, intellectuals and the public in three incidents over the Diaoyu Islands. Following the method and approaches, are their stances measured correctly?

Validity is defined as “the adequacy of descriptive and causal inference.”¹ Specifically, it includes internal validity, external validity and measurement validity. This section focuses on threats towards internal and measurement validity. The external validity, which is also called generalizability, is to be evaluated in Chapter 8.

Measurement validity concerns the “scope to which the scores produced by a given measurement procedure meaningfully reflect the concept being measured,” and internal validity is defined as “the degree to which descriptive or causal inferences from a given set of cases are correct for those cases.”²

While this research may not be subject to severe threats in measurement validity, there are several serious threats to internal validity that need to be considered.

First, the Chinese government as a unitary actor in policy process is a threat. In other words, the opaque decision making process and the absence of debate of decision makers in China make the measurement of the Chinese government’s stance “homogenous”, therefore, the researchers can only estimate the government’s stances from multiple sources. The impact of public opinion on the government’s decision making is “estimated” instead of confirmed.

Second, as part two of this chapter stated, labeling actions of the government according to perceived severity of the government’s action is biased, and they are not uncontested. In this sense, these labels may also suffer from threats to “reliability” – another researcher may label them differently.

¹ Brady, Henry and David Collier. (2004). *Rethinking Social Inquiry*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

² Brady and Collier (2004), pp. 292 & 295.

Third, when analyzing the convergence of these narratives and making conclusions on how public opinion influences the government's actions, there remains "grey zones" which prevent researchers from drawing affirmative conclusions on the influence. These "grey zones", caused by the opaque decision making process and absence of effective moderating institutions in authoritarian state, cloud the interaction between the public and the government.

Internal validity, in comparison to external validity, is concerned about the strength of the causal mechanism. Unfortunately, the impact of public opinion on the government's policy making has been a topic hard to make affirmative assertions, especially in an authoritarian country like China. However, even though the approaches and measurements in this project suffer from these threats, they still offer a solid "proxy" for understanding public opinion, intellectuals' opinion and the government stance on the same issue. A comparison of them in three incidents allow us to advance our understanding of Chinese foreign policy making, and an analysis across time (1996 to 2010) enable readers to understand the changes in Chinese foreign policy making in the past two decades.

Conclusion

In the entire dissertation, Chapter 4 is designed to offer tools and define concepts for further analysis of cases. After presenting relevant background information and reviewing pertinent literature with topic for this project, Chapter 4 introduces the method of narrative analysis. By analyzing narratives of the government, intellectuals and the public over the same incidents, I compare their different arguments and analyze how they converge. This chapter also defines those key concepts in this

project. By offering a typology of Chinese foreign policy actions over disputed islands, I rank the possible actions of the Chinese government according to the government's assertiveness. In order to exemplify the method used in this project, I chose the speech of Hilary Clinton to demonstrate the approach of analysis in subsequent chapters.

The following four chapters are organized to conduct analysis on narratives in these three incidents. Chapter 5 analyzes the government's actions in the three incidents. Chapter 6 investigates the narratives of all three actors. Chapter 7 analyzes the findings in chapter 5 and 6. And finally, Chapter 8 concludes the entire dissertation.


At this stage, it should be highlighted that the purpose for analyzing narratives is to test the applicability of David Easton's Systems Theory in the context of Chinese foreign policy making, with the Diaoyu Islands as an example. Easton's theory does not specify narratives, but narratives are important. They indicate the opinion of actors, and when they are made and heard demonstrates the influence of actors. By analyzing narratives, we can better understand the interaction between "input" and the "political system", and also the "output" and "environment."

CHAPTER 5 DIAOYU ISLANDS – GOVERNMENT POLICY ACTIONS

I. On the Diaoyu Islands

The Diaoyu Islands consist of several uninhabited islands, covering an area of 7 square kilometers (1,700 acres) in total. However, as “islands”, they symbolize an area called the “Exclusive Economic Zone” (EEZ) as big as 200 nautical miles in diameter centering the island, where rich reserve of oil and natural gas was discovered in 1970s.¹ These islands locate in the middle way of Taiwan, mainland China and Japanese Ryukyu Island (Okinawa). With about 120 nautical miles to Taiwan, 230 nautical miles to Okinawa, and 330 nautical miles to Mainland China, the Diaoyu Islands occupy an important location. Because of the rich oil reserve and crucial geographical location, the Diaoyu Islands have been claimed by all three parties (Taiwan, Mainland China, and Japan) for economic and security concerns. Currently, the Diaoyu Islands are *de facto* administered by Okinawa, Japan.

Figure 5.1. Location of the Diaoyu Islands



¹ See Diaz, Leticia; Barry Hart Dubner and Jason Parent. (2007) “When is a Rock an Island – Another Unilateral Declaration Defies Norms of International Law”. *Michigan State Journal of Int'l Law.*: 519-555.

Table 5.1 Distances from Diaoyu Islands

From Diaoyu to	Distances
Mainland China	180 Nautical Miles (NM) / 330 Kilometers (KM)/ 205 Miles
Taiwan (ROC)	90 NM / 170 KM / 105.6 Miles
Isigaki Islands (Nearest Japanese island)	90 NM / 170 KM / 105.6 Miles
Okinawa	225 NM / 410 KM / 254.8 Miles

Note: 1 Miles = 1. 609 KM

The Diaoyu Islands dispute is of great importance to China-Japanese relations, and it is likely that this dispute might escalate into regional conflict considering frequent confrontations on these islands. At the transition of Chinese leadership in 2012, this dispute is a window for determining where Chinese foreign policy towards Japan and other neighbors will lead. A historical analysis reveals the root for current dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. The history of the Diaoyu islands dispute overlaps with the *hundred years of humiliation* as presented in Chapter 2. This overlap between these tiny islands and Chinese history perhaps partially explains why this dispute attracts so much attention from the China's point of view.

An important event in the history of the Diaoyu Islands dispute happened in 1895, when the Chinese government (Qing - *Manchu*) and Japan ended the *Jiawu* China-Japan war with the *Shimonoseki Treaty*. According to this treaty, the Chinese government (Qing) ceded to Japan the island of Taiwan and “all islands pertaining or belonging to it”; such an ambiguous language in traditional Chinese has been one explanation for the current dispute²: a key issue is whether the phrase “islands pertaining or belonging to Taiwan” was meant to include the Diaoyu Islands.

² Denk, Erdem.(2005) “Interpreting a Geographical Expression in a Nineteenth Century Cession Treaty and the Senkaku Island”. *The international journal of Marine and Coastal law* 20-1.: 97-117.

According to the Chinese government (including the Taiwanese government), Taiwan, along with pertaining and belonging islands, *inclusive of the Diaoyu Islands*, were ceded to Japan in 1895. With the end of the World War II, all ceded territory was returned to China and placed under Chinese jurisdiction under the provision of 1943 Cairo Declaration, 1945 Potsdam Proclamation and 1952 the Treaty of Peace with Japan.³

However, in 1972, the United States returned Ryukyu Islands to Japan, which had been under US trusteeship since the end of World War II. The Diaoyu Islands were also included to be “returned” to under Japanese jurisdiction the same year, which evoked protests of Chinese communities in the United States.⁴ In the same year, Japan established formal diplomatic relation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and derecognized the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taiwan. From then on, the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands has been between two states, Japan and China (inclusive of Taiwan).

Despite of the special relations between the PRC and ROC government in Taiwan, the claim of the ROC over the Diaoyu Islands has been supported by the PRC government by saying that “the Diaoyu Islands are inherent territory of China, and they belong to the Taiwan Province of China.”⁵ Considering the *de jure* sovereignty of PRC over Taiwan, the dispute could be seen as bilateral between China and Japan.

Three Eras in the History of the Dispute

With the signing of the *Shimonoseki Treaty* in 1895, and the abolishment of this

³ Pan, Zhongqi. (2007). “Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective”. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 12-1. Pp. 71-92.

See also the speech of current Taiwanese leader Ma Ying-jeou in 2005 when he was the mayor of Taipei, available at <http://youtu.be/sMO3s0IU3wU>.

⁴ Pan(2007).

⁵ Su Wei, Steven. “The Territorial Dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update”. *Ocean Development & International Law*, 36 (2005): 45-61.

treaty after the end of World War II (1945, when Taiwan was returned to China) as two milestones, the history of the dispute can be divided into three phases. The first phase is before 1895. The *Shimonoseki Treaty*, in which ambiguous words were used in ceding Taiwan and *pertaining islands to Japan*, started the second phase, from 1895 to 1945. The third phase is after World War II, when the *Shimonoseki Treaty* was abolished in 1945. China believes that the Diaoyu Islands were ceded to Japan in 1895, and were under the Japanese control from 1895 to 1945; and these islands should have been returned to China in 1945 along with those territories ceded in 1895.⁶

On the other hand, Japan interprets the history quite differently, claiming that the Diaoyu Islands were not part of the territory ceded to Japan in 1895.⁷ Rather, these islands had been *terra nullius* before 1885, when Japanese first landed on these islands and claimed them as Japanese territory. Japan justifies its sovereignty by citing international law over *terra nullius*, claiming that Diaoyu Islands had not been part of the islands ceded to Japan in 1895. Henceforth, its sovereignty is protected by international law and should not be contested by other states.⁸ On the contrary, by quoting historical documents showing the discovery of the Diaoyu Island much earlier, China firmly holds the belief that the Diaoyu Islands had been ruled by China before 1895 because of historical possession and international law recognition of effective control.

⁶ See the discussion of the Diaoyu Islands Dispute on The *People's Net*, at <http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/191606/202393/>.

⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands", available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/senkaku.html>.

⁸ *Ibid.*

Table 5.2: Three Eras and Key Events in the History of the Diaoyu Island

Dispute

	Years	Events
ERA I 1895	1895	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Jiawu</i> War between China (Manchu Government) and Japan. China lost. - <i>Shimonoseki</i> Treaty was signed. Taiwan, and “all islands pertaining or belonging to it” were ceded to Japan.
	1912	The Republic of China (ROC) was founded.
ERA II 1945	1920	The Chinese government wrote a letter to Japanese government, and thanked them for helping Chinese fishermen near “Japanese Diaoyu Islands.”
	1945	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Japan surrendered. World War II ended. - Taiwan was returned to China. - Okinawa (including Diaoyu Islands) was under the trusteeship, controlled by the US.
ERA III	1949	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded. - ROC moved to Taiwan.
	1952	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ROC signed the <i>Treaty of Peace</i> with Japan. - <i>Shimonoseki</i> Treaty (1895) was abolished.
	1970	Large reserve of oil was discovered near Diaoyu Islands.
	1972	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - China (PRC) normalized relationship with Japan. - Both sides agreed to “set aside” the Diaoyu Islands dispute. - Defense Diaoyu Movement (DDM) emerged among overseas Chinese.


Regarding the Diaoyu Islands, China (including Taiwan) and Japan have different interpretations of history as summarized above. China believes that the Diaoyu Islands were included as part of “all islands pertaining or belonging to Taiwan” in the *Shimonoseki Treaty* (1895), which were returned to China in 1945. Therefore, China has been reiterating its sovereignty “since ancient times” on many occasions. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has stated clearly via several spokespersons that the Diaoyu Islands had been Chinese territory before 1895, and Japan occupied them after they conquered Taiwan.

Japan however, does not agree. As their Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, they believe the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands in Japanese) were *terra nullius* before the *Shimonoseki Treaty*, and Japan discovered them and exercised effective control,

“these islands were neither part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores Islands which were ceded to Japan from the Qing Dynasty of China in accordance with Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki which came into effect in May of 1895.”⁹

The claim of sovereignty by China and Japan is illustrated in Figure 5.2 below.

Figure 5.2 - Decision Tree for Determining the Diaoyu Islands’ Sovereignty



As the decision tree above illustrates, if the islands were ceded in 1895, then they should have been returned in 1945, or they have always been Chinese territory since they were first discovered; if they were not, whoever had the sovereignty before 1895 has the islands now.

From the Chinese perspective, these islands were either ceded to Japan in 1895, or never ceded but occupied by Japan with force around 1895. Such an interpretation of history sets the tones for Chinese political narratives once bilateral clashes happen over these islands.

However, it shall be noted that the graph above is a purely legal argument about sovereignty in history. Even legal disputes seem to offer a suggestion on whom the disputed islands belong to, the dispute still arises frequently nowadays. In order to

⁹ “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands”, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/senkaku.html>.

understand the dispute and understand China's foreign policy actions, therefore, it is necessary to adopt narrative analysis as the approach.

II. Crises and Policy Actions of the Chinese government

Regarding the Diaoyu Islands, there have been three crises in the past 20 years. They happened in 1996, 2004 and 2010 respectively. In 1996, the Chinese government was most passive, in 2004, the Chinese government was more assertive than in 1996 and demanded Japan to release arrested Chinese activists. In 2010, China adopted the most assertive policy so far. The following paragraphs will elaborate China's actions in these three incidents.

1996: Japan demonstrated effective control, China reacts with low-level Protests

An important background before the 1996 incident was the crisis over the Taiwan Strait in March 1996. When Taiwan had its first democratic election, China held military tests over the Taiwan Strait to deter the Taiwanese leader from pursuing an independent path. Then Chinese president Jiang Zemin commanded massive missile test over Taiwan, pushing the Northeast Asia onto the verge of war. The crisis ended without a clear winner. Elected Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui did not explicitly advocate his independence proposition until 1999. Another important thread of fact was the signing of Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security in Tokyo.¹⁰ In the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Chinese leader demonstrated utter assertiveness: military actions. However, in the Diaoyu Islands dispute several months later, such assertiveness was not present.

In 1996, the crisis began with the Japanese Youth League (JYL) erecting beacons

¹⁰ "Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance in the 21st century." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>.

on the Diaoyu Islands. On July 14, 1996, a right-leaning group, the JYL landed on the Diaoyu Islands and erected a placard of a Japanese flag, to demonstrate Japanese sovereignty over the disputed islands. After their actions, on July 18, the Chinese government stated that it was deeply concerned with the situation over the Diaoyu Islands and such actions severely violated Chinese sovereignty. However, Japan responded with a more assertive stance over the Diaoyu Islands.

On July 20, the Japanese government announced the 200 NMs of water centering on the Diaoyu Islands as Japanese Exclusive Economic Zones. Later on the 28th, following this announcement, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned the Taiwanese government not to allow Taiwanese fishermen to enter the territorial sea of EEZ of the Japanese Diaoyu Islands.

On August 4, then Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto demanded the Japanese Coast Guard to defend the Diaoyu Islands. Two weeks later, on August 18 three Japanese individuals landed on the Diaoyu Islands from Okinawa, erecting a wooden Japanese flag.

On August 28, Japanese foreign minister, Yukihiko Ikeda, visited Hong Kong. He stated explicitly that the Diaoyu Islands are Japanese territory. Moreover, he refused to answer the request of Hong Kong labor unions for compensating World War II victims. On the same day, Hong Kong's Federation of Trade Unions organized mass protest for the Diaoyu islands, protesting against the blatant statements made by the Japanese foreign minister over the disputed islands.

On August 29, the Japanese Coast Guard, which had been demanded by the Prime Minister to guard the Diaoyu Islands, blocked and searched a Taiwanese fishing boat. During the meanwhile, mass protests in Hong Kong against the statements of the Japanese foreign minister continued, and the sentiment spread to mainland China. The

Chinese government took actions. Chinese MFA spokesperson, Mr. Sheng Guofang criticized the statements of Japanese foreign minister in Hong Kong, and claimed that the actions taken by Japanese rightist groups and individuals were “directly correlated” with Japanese official stance on this issue. In other words, on behalf of the Chinese government, Mr. Sheng pointed out that it was the Japanese official stance on the Diaoyu Islands dispute that encouraged Japan’s groups and individuals to land on the islands and demonstrate sovereignty.

On August 30, the Chinese official newspaper, the *People’s Daily* published an article titled as “Do not do stupid things, Japan!” In this article, the author summarized the agreement made by Deng and the Japanese government in 1972 and 1978 about setting aside the dispute, and warned affirmatively that Japan should not anger Chinese on the Diaoyu Islands disputes, “not a single Chinese will give up even just an inch of territory.”¹¹

On September 1, students from the Fudan University in Shanghai published “the letter to all students”, criticizing the government’s soft position towards Japan, and called for a gathering on September 18.

Meanwhile, a political activist named Tong Zeng wrote a letter to President Jiang Zemin, calling for more assertive actions against Japan. He requested President Jiang send troops to the Diaoyu Islands and destroy Japanese beacons. Mr. Tong Zeng was an attorney in practice, and he was famous for his strong position against Japan, including advocating the return of Chinese relics in Japan and compensations for Chinese victims during World War II. Weeks after sending his letter to President Jiang, Mr. Tong Zeng established the first Defend Diaoyu Movement Organization in mainland China, the China Federation of Defending Diaoyu (CFDD). Mr. Tong still

¹¹ “Do not do stupid things, Japan!” *People’s Daily* 1996-8-30.

remains active in 2012. His often-quoted dream of “flying a kite on the Diaoyu Islands” makes him the icon of Chinese DDM activists.

However, Japan was not deterred by mass protests in China and Hong Kong. On September 5, Japanese Consul in General in Hong Kong stated that Hong Kong residents would need a Japanese visa to visit Diaoyu Islands. On September 9, Japanese Youth League landed on the Diaoyu Islands again and erected a new beacon.

In September, Hong Kong and mainland China DDM escalated. DDM activists rented a boat and sailed to Diaoyu Islands, in an attempt to land on the Diaoyu Islands to demonstrate Chinese sovereignty over the islands. With waves of landing on Diaoyu Islands movements, the Chinese government on September 20 warned Japan that it should stop blocking the Chinese DDM boat, because “any casualty of Chinese protestors (including Hong Kong and Taiwan) will lead to mass anti-Japanese protests in China.”¹²

Obviously Japan did not agree with China. On September 26, Hong Kong DDM activist Mr. Chen Yu-xiang and other DDM activists jumped into water 200 feet from the Diaoyu Islands when their boat was blocked by the Japanese Coast Guard. They planned to swim to the islands to demonstrate Chinese sovereignty, unfortunately, Mr. Chen drowned. On the 29th, more than 50,000 people gathered in Hong Kong, commemorating Mr. Chen.

On October 1, Japanese Prime Minister stated that there was no dispute over the Diaoyu Islands for Japan, meaning, Japan has indisputable sovereignty over the islands.

These key events in the 1996 incidents are summarized below in Table 5.3.

¹² MFA Statement on 1996-9-20.

Table 5.3 Chronological Summary of 1996 Diaoyu Islands Crisis (Chinese Actions in Bold)

Dates	Events
7-14	Japanese Youth League (JYL) erected beacons on the disputed islands to demonstrate Japanese sovereignty.
7-18	In MFA statement, China is “deeply concerned about Japan’s actions over disputed islands,” claiming that is a violation of Chinese territorial sovereignty.
7-20	Japan announced 200NM water of Diaoyu Islands as Japanese EEZ,
7-28	Japan warned Taiwan not to allow fishermen enter the territorial water of Diaoyu.
8-4	Japanese Prime Minister commanded Japanese Coast Guard to guard Diaoyu.
8-18	Three Japanese from Okinawa landed on Diaoyu and erected a wooden Japanese flag.
8-28	1. Japanese foreign minister visited HK, stating that Diaoyu is part of Japan. 2. After the visit of Japanese foreign minister and his statement on sovereignty, HK Federation of Trade Unions waged a mass protest against Japanese occupation of Diaoyu.
8-29	1. A Taiwan fishing boat was blocked and searched by Japanese Coast Guard. 2. Chinese MFA spokesman, Sheng Guofang, on behalf of the Chinese government, commented on the statement of Japanese foreign minister, claiming it “irresponsible”. He also believed that those Japanese rightist groups had support from Japanese government.
8-31	1. “Do not do stupid things, Japan!” was published on the People’s Daily. 2. Tong Zen initiated a movement gathering supporter’s signature. In his letter to Chinese president Jiang Zemin, activists requested Chinese government to destroy the Japanese beacon on Diaoyu Islands with military force. Supporters included CCP members, students, veterans and workers.
9-1	Graduate Students from Fudan University in Shanghai posted “A letter to all Students”, criticizing the inaction of Chinese government and inviting participation of a gathering on 9-18. This movement was supported by college students nationwide.
9-3	1. Chinese premiere stated that “there was no wiggle room” on territorial disputes. 2. Japan Kyodo News reported the presence of Chinese exploration boat near the Diaoyu Islands.
9-5	1. Japanese Consul in General in Hong Kong stated that Hong Kong residents need Japanese visa to visit Diaoyu Islands. 2. In response, mass protest was held in Hong Kong, against Japanese Consul’s statement on the same day.
9-6	DDM Protest escalated in Hong Kong, with more participants. A global DDM was organized by HK DDMists.
9-8	Mass protests against Japanese occupation of Diaoyu Islands were held in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China. Formal DDM groups were organized in mainland China. Eight Taiwan media planned for landing on Diaoyu, one succeeded.

9-9	Japanese Youth League landed on Diaoyu and erected a new beacon.
9-10	Japanese government stated that erection of beacon is a “private business”, over which the government cannot interfere.
9-11	Chinese MFA reaffirmed that Diaoyu is part of China’s territory, and China’s action near the islands was perfectly legal.
9-14 15	More than 30,000 Chinese in North America signed for DDM. Another DDM in Hong Kong, with more than 15,000 participants.
9-18	65 th anniversary of Japanese occupation of Northeast China. Global mass protests in major cities.
9-19	Chinese MFA stated that Japan shall abide by the 1972 Communiqué of Establishment of Diplomatic relations and 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship
9-20	Chinese Foreign minister commented on the DDM, stating that any casualty of Chinese protestors (including Hong Kong and Taiwan) will lead to mass anti-Japanese protests in China.
9-22	Mass DDM protest in Hong Kong, Taipei, Vancouver, LA and NYC
9-23	Japanese government showed a letter from Chinese government in 1920, in which China recognized Diaoyu Islands were part of Japanese territory.
9-24	Chinese FM met with his Japanese counterpart in New York about the Diaoyu Islands. No agreement was made. Same day, Hong Kong DDM boat was blocked by Japanese coast guard.
9-26	Hong Kong DDM activists went to Diaoyu Islands, and they jumped into the water 3 NM from the islands. Chen Yuxiang drowned.
10-1	Japanese Prime Minister stated that Japan’s territorial disputes do not include Diaoyu Islands; reaffirming Japan’s sovereignty.
1997-4-23	Japanese government announced that they will arrest any DDMist in Diaoyu’s territorial sea.
1997-5-6	1. Three Japanese congressmen landed on Diaoyu. 2. In response to Japanese congressmen’s provocative landing, Chinese foreign minister summoned Japanese ambassador in China.


After China summoned the Japanese ambassador, the Japanese prime minister commented on the landing of Japanese congressmen on the Diaoyu Islands was “regrettable.” The Chinese government did not take further actions. The crisis of 1996 ended without a clear ending point.

A chronological summary of events in late 1996 demonstrates the excitements and sentiments among the Chinese at Japanese action over the islands. However, with the death of Mr. Chen Yuxiang, the DDM became an even more urgent issue between China and Japan. High-ranking government officials of China and Japan discussed this issue and the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands could not be “shelved” as it was planned to in 1978 between Deng and then Japanese Prime Minister – it requires the

Chinese government to act. However, facing waves of public mobilization, the Chinese government remained passive. With these events as raw data, I will proceed to analyze the Chinese government's policy actions.

Based on open and verifiable sources, the Chinese government's actions in the 1996 incident employed protests and negotiation primarily. Among all those incidents summarized in Table 5.3, there are several policy actions taken by the Chinese government (Figure 5.3, "Actions in Detail" are taken from Table 5.3).

Figure 5.2 Japanese government's Actions and Policy (Re) actions Taken by Chinese government in 1996 Crisis



No.	Date	Japanese Actions	No.	Dates	Chinese Actions in Detail	Policy Actions Label
1	1996-7-14	JYL erected beacon on Diaoyu	A	1996-7-18	In MFA statement, China is "deeply concerned about Japan's actions over disputed islands," claiming that is a violation of Chinese territorial sovereignty.	Low-Level
2	8-28	Japanese foreign minister visited HK	B	8-29	2. Chinese MFA spokesman, Sheng Guofang, on behalf of Chinese government, commented on the statement of Japanese foreign minister, claiming it "irresponsible". He also believed that those Japanese rightist groups had support from Japanese government.	Low-Level
3	9-5	"Visa required"	C	8-31	1. "Do not do stupid things, Japan!" was published on the <i>People's Daily</i> .	Low-Level to high-Level
4	9-9	New beacon	D	9-3	1. Chinese premiere stated that "there was no wiggle room" on territorial disputes.	High-level
5	9-10	"private business"	E	9-11	2. Japan Kyodo News reported the presence of Chinese exploration boat near the Diaoyu Islands.	Low-level
			F	9-19	Chinese MFA spokesperson reaffirmed that Diaoyu is part of China's territory, and China's action near the islands was perfectly legal.	Low-level
			G	9-20	Chinese MFA stated that Japan shall abide by the 1972 Communiqué of Establishment of Diplomatic relations and 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship	Low-level
					Chinese Foreign minister commented on the DDM, stating that any casualty of Chinese protestors (including Hong Kong and Taiwan)	High-level

6	9-23	Japan claimed sovereignty with a letter in 1920	H	9-24	will lead to mass anti-Japanese protests in China. Chinese FM met with his Japanese counterpart in New York about the Diaoyu Islands. No agreement was made. Same day, Hong Kong DDM boat was blocked by Japanese coast guard.	High-level
7	1997-5-6	Congressmen landing	I	1997-5-6	2. In response to Japanese congressmen's provocative landing, Chinese foreign minister summoned Japanese ambassador in China.	High-level

Figure 5.3 provides a chronological timeline with demarcations for the Chinese and Japanese actions and events. The letters in boxes denote the policy action taken by the Chinese government. Those circles on the vertical line, however, symbolize “actions” by the Japanese government. Looking at the actions from both sides, we can see a clear action-reaction relationship between those events. As the table illustrates, for instance, when the Japanese Youth League erected a beacon on the Diaoyu Islands (circle 1), the Chinese government was “deeply concerned” (square box A). Also, when the Japanese foreign minister affirmed Japanese sovereignty of the islands in Hong Kong (circle 2), the Chinese government reacted with an MFA statement (square box B), articles on *People’s Daily* (square box C), and the Premier meeting with his Japanese counterpart (square box D).

Also in the table of Figure 5.2, the far right column includes the nature of these policy actions. As shown, these policy actions were mostly in the form of protests and warning, without further supportive actions. The policy actions were peaceful in nature. There was no expression that strongly deters or threatens the Japanese government (even the article on the *People’s Daily*, as will be analyzed in the next chapter). To analyze these policy actions by China, China’s policy action in 1996 crisis was mostly, protesting.

At the beginning of this incident, on July 18, China stated that it was “*deeply concerned*” by the action of the JYL.

On August 28, when mass protests took place in Hong Kong, the Chinese MFA criticized the Japanese government as “*irresponsible*” for making such statements in Hong Kong.

September 3 and 11 witnessed the MFA making statement defending China’s sovereignty, words adopted were mild and demonstrated China’s determination.

September 19, 20, 24 also witnessed the Chinese government's statement, but no assertive policy was taken. Even after the death of Mr. Chen Yuxiang, China made no strong statements towards Japan.

It is worth noting, however, on September 3, the *Kyodo News* reported the Chinese exploration boat near the Diaoyu Islands. This can be seen as a strong pose for defending the Diaoyu Islands. However, there was no further report on this from the Chinese government. What can be inferred is, at least, the Chinese government does not want to show its strong position on this issue to its people. Rather, it wants to maintain the dispute "controllable" by simply making protests against Japan. There is no wonder some graduate students from Shanghai criticized the Chinese government being "too soft" towards Japan in the dispute.

As an article published on the website of an official academe, the anonymous author reported disputes over the Diaoyu Islands until 2004. This article reported that the Chinese government did not approve application on September 13, 1996, and Mr. Tong Zeng, the DDM activist, was indirectly ousted from Beijing, in the form of a job-related relocation, after his active participation in DDM. These records may tell something about the government's concern for domestic protests. However, their authenticity cannot be verified, therefore, say, Mr. Tong Zeng's relocation cannot be proved related with the DDM.

To sum up, in 1996, the government was challenged by both Japan and the domestic public. Japan was aggressively defending its sovereignty, and therefore, challenging China's claims. Meanwhile, the public criticized the government's weak stance against Japan. China was mostly passively responding to Japan's actions.

2004: China Demanded the Release with High-Level Protests and Japan Cooperated

In the history of the Diaoyu Islands dispute, 2004 was an important one in that it witnessed the first landing by Chinese on the islands. At 6:26 am on March 24, 2004 seven Chinese DDM activists landed on the Diaoyu Islands successfully. After staying on the islands for ten hours, they were arrested by the Japanese Coast Guard and detained in Okinawa. The seven DDM activists were released on March 25 after the Chinese MFA protested against Japan.

After the 1996 incident, the DDM boomed and their successful landing on the Diaoyu Islands was bound to happen sooner or later. Chinese government, however, did not intervene the incident until the seven DDM members were arrested by Japanese Coast Guard.

On August 25, 2003, the beacons erected in 1996 were repaired by the JYL, with the authorization of the Japanese government. Their landing aroused anger from China's side. On August 27, mass protests were held in Hong Kong to protest the landing of the JYL. In September, protests were held in North America to support DDM. The Chinese government did not make any comments on their protests.

Before the incident in 2004, on October 9, 2003, DDM members from mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan rented a boat and sailed to the Diaoyu Islands from Xiamen. Their boat was blocked by the Japanese Coast Guard several hundred feet from the Diaoyu Islands; they returned without successfully landing.

On December 26-28, the first conference of Chins's DDM was organized in Xiamen, on which they passed the "Declaration of DDM." With more than 30 participants from China, the North and South Americas, this conference was a gathering of global Chinese DDM members.

In January 2004, another attempt was made to land on the Diaoyu Islands. It failed with Japanese Coast Guard's block.

On March 24, 2004, the third attempt to land on Diaoyu Islands succeeded. After staying on the islands for ten hours and demonstrating Chinese sovereignty, they were arrested by the Japanese Coast Guard and detained in Okinawa. On the same day, in Beijing, mass protests were held outside of Japanese embassy. Hong Kong DDM groups also protested at Japanese Consulate in General.

On March 25, the Chinese government joined into the incident. Then Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Mr. Dai Bingguo summoned Japanese ambassador in China and protested Japanese arrest of seven DDMists. Also, in regular MFA Press, spokesperson Mr. Kong Quan criticized Japanese arrest of Chinese citizens for landing on the Diaoyu Islands.

On March 26, Japan released seven DDM activists. The incident ended.

The 2004 incident had the Defense Diaoyu Movement (DDM) come forward and become known to ordinary citizens. In this sense, the landing on Diaoyu Islands made the DDM well-known and enhanced the influence of DDM activists among the public.


Table 5.4 Key Events in the 2004 Incident

Dates	Events
2003-8-25	Japanese Youth League landed on the islands to repair beacons erected in 1996.
8-27	August 27, mass protests were held in Hong Kong to protest the landing of JYL.
10-9	October 9, DDM members from mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan rented a boat and sailed to the Diaoyu Islands from Xiamen. Failed with Japanese blocking.
12-26	December 26-28, the first conference of Chinese DDM was organized in Xiamen.
2004-1	Another attempt of landing on the islands failed with Japanese block.

3-24	Successful landing on the islands.
3-25	Vice Foreign Minister summoned Japanese ambassador in China. Protested.
3-26	Arrested DDM members were released.

The action and reaction of this incident between the Chinese and Japanese governments were fairly simple when shown on a timeline.

Figure 5.4 Japanese actions and the Chinese government's reaction in 2004 crisis.



No.	Dates	Japanese action	No.	Dates	Chinese Action	Policy Action Label
1	2004-3-24	Arrested DDM activists				
			A	3-25	Vice Foreign minister protested in person	High-level
2	3-26	Release.				

Despite of the simplicity of this incident and prompt solution, the 2004 incident is an important one because it marked the increasing salience of the DDM in China, and also the increasing influence of popular activist on the Chinese government. In 2004, however, China is more active than in 1996 and responded quickly to demand Japan to release the arrested Chinese citizens. The incident ended quickly.

2010 Japan Arrested Chinese Fisherman and China's "Countermeasure" Policy

On September 7, 2010, when fishing in the waters near the Diaoyu Islands, Mr. Zhan Qixiong and his crew were arrested by the Japanese Coast Guards. The Chinese captain resisted by ramming his boat against the Japanese Coast Guards' boat. Later that day, the local Okinawan government announced Mr. Zhan and his crew as "intruders to Japanese territory", and stated that Japanese domestic law would be applied onto Mr. Zhan.¹³

In the following sixteen days, the Chinese government responded to the arrest with unusually strong objections. On September 7, Chinese ambassador in Japan protested the arrests of Mr. Zhan. Two days after the arrest of Mr. Zhan, on September 9, China's MFA made remarks on this incident, reiterating the "undisputable sovereignty" China possessed on these islands, supported by the occupation of these islands as China's "inherent territory" "since ancient times." In addition, it strongly condemned the "illegal arrest" of Mr. Zhan, because China believed that Mr. Zhan was actually fishing in Chinese Diaoyu Islands' water. The Chinese MFA demanded the "unconditional release of Mr. Zhan."

On September 10, the Chinese foreign minister summoned Japanese ambassador twice a day. On the same day, China also announced suspension all high-level visits to Japan. Chinese State Councilor Dai Binguo summoned the Japanese ambassador at midnight, demanding unconditional release of the Chinese fisherman.

After criticizing Japan in the regular press on September 16, the Chinese government announced it would adopt a series of countermeasure policies if Japan not releases Mr. Zhan. On September 19, China adopted countermeasure policies against Japan, including the suspension of all provincial-ministerial level dialogue and

¹³ The *Telegraph*, "Tensions between China and Japan rise over disputed gas field", 2010-9-17.

meetings, pausing bilateral meetings on aviation cooperation, and postponing a conference on China-Japan cooperation over coals, and Chinese tourists to Japan were also impacted. China also denied visa to a Japanese cultural exchange group, who actually was invited by Chinese government months before.¹⁴ As Professor Gao Hong, Associate Dean of the Institute on Japan Studies, CASS remarked, such “countermeasures” against Japan were “unprecedented in the past 38 years”, since China established a formal diplomatic relationship with Japan in 1972.¹⁵

After the countermeasure policy was adopted, on September 21, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao made a speech in New York when he was meeting with overseas Chinese. He reiterated the official position of the Chinese government on the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, in addition, he made unusually strong objection to Japan, stating that Japanese holding of Mr. Zhan was “illegal and unreasonable” and it “aroused the anger of all Chinese people at home and abroad.” He urged Japan to release the detained captain immediately and unconditionally, and stated explicitly that China would “take further steps” if Japan did not release Mr. Zhan,¹⁶ because this incident was absolutely caused by Japan. This statement not only summarized the position of China on the dispute, and also elaborated what “indisputable sovereignty” means – Japan’s arrest of a Chinese citizen on the water near the Diaoyu Islands was illegal because these islands are Chinese territory. What is more important is that the Premier of China stated in public that “further steps will be taken if Japan does not release the Chinese captain.”¹⁷

¹⁴ See MFA Remarks on September 27, 2010. Also See MFA summary of China-Japan Relations at Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjw/zjg/yzs/gjlb/2721/>.

¹⁵ Several major Chinese media reported about the “Countermeasures.” See Reuter for neutral report, at <http://cn.reuters.com/article/CNTopGenNews/idCNCHINA-3040620100919>.

¹⁶ See “温家宝总理要求日方释放中方船长的讲话”. (Speeches of Premier Wen Jiabao asking for the release of the Chinese captain arrested by Japan), September 21, 2010. Video available at <http://youtu.be/IFHmXkpnhk0> and www.diaoyuislandschina.com. See the full text of Premier Wen’s speech, available at http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/wenjiabao65lianda/content-2/detail_2010_09/23/2609438_0.shtml.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

During the meanwhile, after the arrest of Mr. Zhan, mass protests occurred in China: September 8 in Beijing; and September 13, in Hong Kong. In the 16 days after the arrest, mass protests with more than 1,000 protestors took place in major cities of China, including Beijing, Tianjin, Xi'an, Hong Kong and Taipei. Ten days after Mr. Zhan was arrested, September 18 was the anniversary of the Japanese occupation of Northeastern China in 1931, which is remembered by the Chinese as the day Japan invaded China. Mass protests were held targeting against Japanese embassies, and Japanese stores in China, and participants burned the Japanese flag and yelled anti-Japanese slogans.

On September 24, Japan released Mr. Zhan and the Chinese government sent a private jet to bring him home. In major Japanese cities, mass protests took place after Mr. Zhan was released by Japan. Similarly to China, their logic was because the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were part of Japan's territory.

On September 27, China announced regular patrol of the Diaoyu Islands.


Table 5.5 Events in 2010 Crisis

Dates	Events
9-7	1. Chinese Fisherman, Mr. Zhan Qixiong and his crew were arrested for fishing in water near the Diaoyu Islands. 2. Chinese ambassador in Japan protested against this arrest.
9-8	Protest in Beijing, outside of Japanese embassy.
9-9	Chinese MFA demanded unconditional release of Chinese fisherman.
9-10	Chinese FM summoned Japanese ambassador in China. Chinese government leader postponed his plan of visit to Japan
9-12	Chinese State Councilor Dai Binguo summoned Japanese ambassador again at midnight, demanding unconditional release of Chinese fisherman.
9-13	In HK, mass protests were held to protest against Japan.
9-16	MFA spokeswoman criticized Japanese government in public.
9-19	Countermeasures were adopted. Bilateral political, economic and cultural exchange were suspended.

9-21	Chinese Premier made strong speech against Japan in NY.
9-24	Arrested fisherman, Zhan Qixiong was released.
9-27	China announced its plan for regular patrol around the Diaoyu Islands.

To summarize, the Chinese government's policy action in 2010 was highlighted by intensive protests, backed up by "countermeasures".

Figure 5.4 Japanese Actions and Chinese (re)actions in 2010 Crisis



No.	Date	Japan Actions	No.	Date	China Actions in detail	Policy Action Label
1	2010-9-7	Arrested Mr. Zhan	A	9-7	Chinese ambassador in Japan protested against this arrest.	High-level
			B	9-9	Chinese MFA demanded unconditional release of Chinese fisherman.	High-level
			C	9-10	Chinese FM summoned Japanese ambassador in China. Chinese government leader postponed his plan of visit to Japan	High-level
			D	9-12	Chinese State Councilor Dai Binguo summoned Japanese ambassador again at midnight, demanding unconditional release of Chinese fisherman.	High-level
			E	9-16	MFA spokeswoman criticized Japanese government in public.	Low-level
			F	9-19	Countermeasures were adopted. Bilateral political, economic and cultural exchanges were suspended.	<u>Countermeasures/punitive policy</u>
			G	9-21	Chinese Premier made strong speech against Japan in NY.	High-level
2	9-24	Released Mr. Zhan	H	9-27	China announced its plan for regular patrol around the Diaoyu Islands.	High-level

After the arrest, the situation reflects the long-term confrontation over these islands between the two governments and also the general public from two states. Chinese government also took much stronger stance against Japan after the incidents happened than in 1996 or 2004.

Comparing the events and actions in this table to those of 1996 reveals that Chinese government policy actions in 2010 were more systematic and assertive. In general, China takes the initiatives in 2010, whereas Japan did not make any further actions after arresting Mr. Zhan. Compared with Chinese government's policy action in 1996, its action to the 2010 crisis was more intensive in protests, involving MFA protests, and high-level officials protests and the summons of the Japanese government officials.

The policy actions in 2010 were more active: without many actions from the Japanese side, China adopted a series of actions towards Japan, most importantly; it employed the "countermeasure" punitive policy to protest against Japanese arrest of Chinese fisherman. To sum up, the Chinese government's policy action in 2010 was highlighted by intensive protests, backed up by "countermeasures."

Conclusion

To compare the policy actions of the Chinese government in the three incidents, it can tell that the Chinese government has made progress in managing the crisis towards Japan since 1996. As illustrated in 1996, the Chinese government was mostly reacting to Japanese actions. Japan was taking the initiatives in demonstrating its "effective control" over the disputed islands, while China was passively responding to each action Japan took. Also, in 1996, the government was mostly adopting the

approach of protesting. The protests were mostly low-ranking and passive in response to provocative actions. The government did not seem to have a systematic plan to react to Japan’s demonstrations of sovereignty.

As a continuation of the 1996 incident, the incident was abrupt and short. It started with the arrest of seven DDM activists who successfully landed on the islands. With Chinese government’s high-rank protest, these activists were soon released. Chinese government adopted high-level protests in this incident by starting with the Chinese vice-foreign minister summoned the Japanese ambassador nine times.

In the 2010 incident, however, the Chinese government was more active. It also protested, and after Japan refused to release the arrested fisherman, the Chinese government adopted the so-called “countermeasure” policy, which is more assertive than any previous actions. In other words, the Chinese government escalated in the policy action ladder to the third rank, where the countermeasures were taken.

Table 5.6 Summary of China’s actions in 1996, 2004 and 2010

YEAR	JAPAN’S ACTIONS	CHINA’S POLICY ACTIONS
1996	Demonstrated Effective Control	Low-level to high-level protests
2004	Arrested Landing DDM activists	High-level Protests
2010	Arrested Chinese Fishermen	High-level Protests to Countermeasures

In the language of the Systems Theory, in these three incidents, the “outputs” of these three incidents were different. Actually, they varied from low to high in assertiveness from 1996 to 2010. What accounts for this variation? The Systems Theory points at the “inputs” for explanation. But what are in the box of “inputs”?

CHAPTER 6 POLICY NARRATIVES

As I concluded in Chapter 5, the government's policy over the Diaoyu Islands in 1996, according to the categories of the reactions of Chinese foreign policy, was dominated by low-level protests: the government did protest against Japan, but the words used mostly emphasized on history, and the protests were not systematic or assertive. Compared with 2004 and 2010, the Chinese government's policy actions in 1996 were mostly reactive; in response, spurred by the narratives of individual POLs, the public demonstrated its anger and anxiety over the dispute.

However, what were the narratives of the government, intellectuals and the POLs in 1996, 2004 and 2010 respectively? An analysis of political narratives from these actors can more robustly explain variation in policy actions, and whether and how government's foreign policy making accommodates the public sentiments.

This chapter will analyze policy narratives over the Diaoyu Islands from three perspectives, the Chinese government, intellectuals, and Public Opinion Leaders (POLs), which include the DDM activists who give policy advice to the government. By displaying what they said and did in the three incidents over the Diaoyu Islands in 1996, 2004 and 2010, I explore their different arguments and policy action preferences on what China should do over the Diaoyu Islands disputes. After presenting their narratives, Chapter 7 will comparatively analyze the interactions among these three kinds of policy actors and summarizes different patterns of interaction among the government, the intellectuals and the POLs, following the framework of Easton's Systems Theory.

I. 1996: Passive Government and Active Public

The Diaoyu Islands dispute reached a peak in 1996 following a series of actions by Japan over the disputed islands. During the dispute, the Chinese government, as shown in previous chapter, passively reacted to Japanese actions. Lasting for more than one month, the 1996 dispute witnessed the public criticizing the Chinese government's foreign policy, and also the government's passive reactions - driven by Japanese policies over the Diaoyu islands.

I draw the data for the narrative analysis from available government statements and announcements, as well as articles on the official newspaper of *People's Daily*. As stated in Chapter 4, these narratives are to be analyzed for their "tone" by finding the high-frequency words and analyzing the texts behind these words. By exploring and analyzing the context of these words, I show the attitude of different actors in the dispute, and further compare the different roles played in the crisis in 1996, 2004 and 2010.

Government Official Narratives - "In history, Okinawa does not include the Diaoyu."

As summarized in previous chapter, the Chinese government's actions are excerpted below. Highlighted in text are key words that signal the narrative of the Chinese government.

Table 6.1 China's Actions in 1996 Crisis (in bold)

7-18	In MFA statement, China is “deeply concerned about Japan’s actions over disputed islands,” claiming that is a violation of Chinese territorial sovereignty.
8-29	1. A Taiwan fishing boat was blocked and searched by Japanese Coast Guard. 2. Chinese MFA spokesman, Sheng Guofang, on behalf of the Chinese government, commented on the statement of Japanese foreign minister, claiming it “irresponsible”. He also believed that those Japanese rightist groups had support from Japanese government.
8-31	1. “Do not do stupid things, Japan!” was published on the <i>People’s Daily</i>. 2. Tong Zen initiated a movement gathering supporter’s signature. In his letter to Chinese president Jiang Zemin, activists requested the Chinese government to destroy the Japanese beacon on Diaoyu Islands with military force. Supporters included CCP members, students, veterans and workers.
9-3	1. Chinese premiere stated that “there was no wiggle room” on territorial disputes. 2. Japan Kyodo News reported the presence of Chinese exploration boat near the Diaoyu Islands.
9-11	Chinese MFA reaffirmed that Diaoyu is part of China’s territory, and China’s action near the islands was perfectly legal.
9-19	Chinese MFA stated that Japan shall abide by the 1972 Communiqué of Establishment of Diplomatic relations and 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship
9-20	Chinese Foreign minister commented on the DDM, stating that any casualty of Chinese protestors (inlg Hong Kong and Taiwan) will lead to mass anti-Japanese protests in China.
9-24	Chinese FM met with his Japanese counterpart in New York about the Diaoyu Islands. No agreement was made. Same day, Hong Kong DDM boat was blocked by Japanese coast guard.
1997-5-6	1. Three Japanese congressmen landed on Diaoyu. 2. In response to Japanese congressmen’s provocative landing, Chinese foreign minister summoned Japanese ambassador in China.

These comments and responses towards Japan’s actions center on several key words, “deeply concerned” “irresponsible” “legal (for China to conduct exploration)”. These narratives criticized Japan’s actions over the Diaoyu islands and also held Japan responsible for the crisis over the Diaoyu Islands.

Another source of information that reflects the Chinese government’s official position during this crisis includes the two articles published in the *People’s Daily* on August 31 and October 18, titled as “Do not do stupid things, Japan!” (August 31, 1996) and “On the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands” (October 18, 1996). These two articles were published in the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China

(CPC), and they demonstrate the official position of the central leadership of the Chinese government.

The article “Do not do stupid things, Japan!” was published when the conflict over the islands was escalating, the tone of the article was more assertive than the other published on October 18. In this article “Do not do stupid things, Japan!”, the author started from the recent provocative actions of the Japanese Youth League (JYL) over the Diaoyu Islands and the support from the Japanese Prime Minister for JYL. These narratives lead to the conclusion that Japan was trying to occupy China’s Diaoyu Islands. Then it turns to the history of the dispute, claiming that China and Japan had agreed to “shelve” the dispute for future discussion. The main argument of this article, however, as indicated in the title, was to warn Japan not to anger neighboring states with provocative actions. As the article mentioned, “it is not a separate incident that Japan is acting provocatively over the Diaoyu islands. Rather, this is a consequence of recent trend in Japan’s rightist politics and eagerness to demonstrate its power.”¹ The article emphasizes the concern of China towards Japan’s reviving militarism, which had hurt the neighboring states during World War II. As a conclusion, the article reminded China and also the other countries in East Asia to be “aware of new trends of Japanese foreign policy” and try to prevent Japan from doing “stupid things” like its recent actions over the Diaoyu Islands.

¹ Original text as “日本在钓鱼岛问题上向中国主权挑战，决非偶然，而是日本国内政治右倾、对外炫耀实力的必然表现。” People’s Daily -1996 -8-31.

Figure 6.1 Word Cloud for Article about Japan and the Diaoyu Islands Dispute (Published on *People's Daily* 1996-8-30)



This article was written in a tone of caution and it linked this issue with other atrocities Japan committed during World War II. It ends up with reminding all Asian countries to be cautious of recent trends of Japanese foreign policy, which have been leaning towards the aggressive end. As the word cloud indicated, “territory” and “sovereignty” were most often mentioned, emphasizing the factual belief that China has the sovereignty over the territory. Not surprisingly, other than these two words, “Japan”, “China” and “Diaoyu islands” were often mentioned.

Table 6.2 Yoshikoder Analysis for Article on the People’s Daily ((Published on *People’s Daily* 1996-8-30).

English	Word	Count	Proportion
China	中国	23	0.035
Japan	日本	21	0.032
Diaoyu Islands	钓鱼岛	15	0.023
Territory	领土	13	0.020
Islands	岛屿	8	0.012
Issues/Problems	问题	7	0.011
Sovereignty	主权	6	0.009
Taiwan	台湾	6	0.009
People	人民	5	0.008
Relationship	关系	4	0.006
State	国家	3	0.005
Power	实力	3	0.005
Return	归还	3	0.005
Government	政府	3	0.005
Defense	防卫	3	0.005
Affiliated	附属	3	0.005
		Total:126	Total 0.195

Note: Proportions do not add up to 1. Proportions round to 3 decimals.

After the crisis in 1996 calmed down, another article was published in the *People's Daily*, titled as “On the Sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands” (October 18). This article has been mentioned again during the 2004 crisis by the MFA spokesperson Kong Quan and therefore can be seen as the official position of the Chinese government on the Diaoyu islands sovereignty dispute.² In this article, a historical argument was made again to reiterate that the Diaoyu Islands were not part of Okinawa.

This article comprises two main parts. The first is about the history of the Chinese discovery of the Diaoyu islands; the second, on the history of how Japan occupied the Diaoyu islands. A word cloud analysis of this article indicates that “Ryukyu [or Okinawa]” is the word that most frequently mentioned.

Figure 6.2 Word Cloud for Article about Japan and the Diaoyu Islands Dispute (Published on *People's Daily* on October 18, 1996)



As the word cloud indicated, other than “Japan” “China” and the “Diaoyu Islands,” the word “Ryukyu” was the most frequently mentioned words.

² On March 25, 2004, MFA spokesperson Mr. Kong Quan mentioned this article when addressing the question on the history of the Diaoyu Islands. He recommended to read this article published on the *People's Daily* in 1996.

Table 6.3 Yoshikoder Analysis for Article on the People’s Daily (Published on People’s Daily 1996-10-18).

English	Word	Count	Proportion
China	中国	38	0.024
Diaoyu Islands	钓鱼岛	37	0.024
Ryuku	琉球	30	0.019
Japan	日本	28	0.018
Territory	领土	19	0.012
Islands	岛屿	11	0.007
Issues/problems	问题	10	0.006
Sovereignty	主权	9	0.006
Taiwan	台湾	7	0.005
Then/at that time	当时	6	0.004
Government	政府	6	0.004
People	人民	5	0.003
Missionary for conferring titles	册封使	5	0.003
Ming Dynasty	明朝	5	0.003
Since	以来	4	0.003
Relations	关系	4	0.003
Archipelago	列岛	4	0.003
State	国家	4	0.003
Qing Dynasty	清朝	4	0.003
Record	记载	4	0.003
Diaoyu Islands	钓鱼岛	4	0.003
Affiliated	附属	4	0.003
		Total:248	Total:0.162

Note: Proportions do not add up to 1. Proportions round to 3 decimals.

With “Japan” mentioned 28 times in this article, the word “China” was mentioned 38 times, the “Diaoyu Islands”, 37 times, the word “Ryukyu” was mentioned 30 times. Considering this incident was about the Diaoyu islands, the high frequency of mentioning “Ryukyu” is interesting.

In this article, the ancient kingdom of “Ryukyu” was mentioned to emphasize the fact that the Diaoyu Islands never belonged to Ryukyu. Therefore, when Japan annexed the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1884, and changed its name to “Okinawa”, the Diaoyu Islands should not have been included.

The article then reviewed the history of Japan “stealing” the Diaoyu Islands since 1895. The main argument of this article was that China has historical evidence to

support its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Following the categories of different arguments mentioned in Chapter 4, government speeches in 1996 emphasized “history.”

According to the label of arguments arranged in Chapter 4, the government’s arguments were sovereignty-historical and sovereignty-legal, they also included some political arguments by reminding Japan about possible domestic protests in China.

Intellectuals: “Historical evidence”

While the government insists its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands in history, Chinese intellectuals focused on the historical evidence to support China’s sovereignty. A key word during and after the 1996 incident was the name of a Japanese scholar called “Kiyoshi Inoue.”


On October 10, 1996, Japanese historian Kiyoshi Inoue republished his book *On the Sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands*. In this book, Mr. Inoue reiterated that the Diaoyu islands had been Chinese territory since ancient times, and recently Japanese actions over the disputed islands indicated the revival of Japanese militarism. In 1997, China soon published this book and Professor Inoue was widely cited by Chinese scholars. After the 1996 incident, China published Inoue’s book, supporting China’s sovereignty over the islands. Chinese scholars have conducted research over the legal aspects of the Diaoyu Islands dispute, and supported the claim of the government.

Using CNKI Academics, I found 143 articles on “core journals” from 1995 to 2012 over the topic of “Diaoyu Islands”.³ After teasing out those articles about literature and announcements, I had 113 articles directly over the topic of Diaoyu

³ Core journals are those journals listed by Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China for their influence and citation. The latest list is available at <http://www.llas.ac.cn/upload/core%20journals.htm#shk>.

Islands. The number of these articles in different years is distributed as follows.

Figure 6.3 Number of Core Journal Articles on the Diaoyu Islands.




As the graph indicated, there were three peaks of articles on core journals in the past 18 years. One was in 1996, in which year the demonstrations of Japanese effective control led to mass protests among the Chinese. The second was in 2004, when the burgeoning DDM eventually led to a successful landing on the disputed islands and also the arrest by the Japanese government. The third peak happened in 2010, when the arrest of Chinese fisherman near the Diaoyu Islands caused mass protests in more than a dozen of Chinese cities and led to the “countermeasures” policy action adopted by the Chinese government.

I categorized those articles into four groups: *history*, *legal*, *politics* and *policy*. I used the following criteria when categorizing articles. Those articles about the historical evidence of Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu islands will be included in the “history” category; those emphasizing international law will be included in the “legal” category. An article studying the Diaoyu Islands in China-Japan relations will be included in the “politics” in category (example: the Diaoyu islands’ impact on bilateral relations); whereas those articles in the “policy” category are about the

governance of the Diaoyu Islands, including fishing, mining *etc.*

In general, all of these 113 articles share the agreement that China's sovereignty over the disputed islands is supported by historical and legal evidence. Then, those articles in the "politics" and "policy" categories move forward to analyze specific problems in politics or policy aspects. Articles in the "policy" category often convey economic arguments, emphasizing on the benefit of the disputed islands and how to manage them.

Figure 6.4 Number of different categories of Articles published in 1996



As the figure shows, historical articles were second to political articles which analyze the impact of the dispute on China-Japan policy in numbers. In 1996, Dr. Liu Jiangyong published an article in the *Journal of Japanese Studies*, presenting systematically the historical evidence supporting China's sovereignty over the disputed Diaoyu Islands. In this article, Dr. Liu endorsed China's official statements and echoed the articles in the *People's Daily*, arguing for China's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Different from the two articles published on the *People's Daily*, Dr. Liu rejected the sovereignty claims of Japan. He summarized the following Japanese

claims of its sovereignty, including, 1. The Diaoyu Islands had been *terra nullius* before 1898; 2. The Diaoyu Islands were never explicitly mentioned in the treaties to return to China; 3. China never objected including the Diaoyu islands within the Okinawa trusteeship; 4. Japan occupied these islands “first” as *terra nullius*, and 5. China had admitted that the Diaoyu Islands were Japanese territory in 1920 in a letter to the Japanese government, thanking them for rescuing Chinese fishermen trapped near the “Japanese Senkaku Islands.”⁴

Dr. Liu rejected all this evidences for Japanese sovereignty. By presenting historical evidence in the 14th century until the middle 19th century, Dr. Liu rejected the claim that the Diaoyu Islands were *terra nullius*. Moreover, by emphasizing the *Shimonoseki Treaty* and the cession of Taiwan to Japan in 1898, he rejected the validity of using a 1920 newspaper as evidence. Rather, he argued that this was a period Japan colonized Taiwan and occupied all its affiliates.

Dr. Liu’s article resembles the article published on the *People’s Daily* on October 18, 1996 in many ways, including the structure, evidence and central argument. However, Dr. Liu supported his argument by rejecting all the evidence Japan provides, emphasizing the lack of validity of Japanese claims over this islands. In addition, Dr. Lv Yiran and an anonymous article published in the *Beijing Archive* in October 1996 also summarized historical evidence supporting China’s sovereignty.

On the other hand, domestically, the Chinese government *may* have adopted some policy actions that tried to appease domestic DDM.⁵ However, due to the nature of this kind of ordinance, it is hard to find public reports or verify their authenticity. However, from an article by anonymous author on the website of “Modern China Studies” [近代中国研究], the records of the Chinese government’s appeasement of

⁴ Liu, Jiangyong. “On the issue of Diaoyu Islands’ sovereignty.” *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 1996-6. 13-28.

⁵ “历年保钓事件记载” (Chronological Record of DDM) available at website of Modern History Research of China Academe of Social Science . (<http://jds.cass.cn/Item/7454.aspx>).

domestic mass protests can be found. The website is owned by China Academe of Social Science (CASS), which is an official think tank.⁶

In sum, these academic articles offer support for the Chinese government's claim of sovereignty, believing that China has actually governed these islands in history.

When we consider the 1996 dispute, the narratives of the intellectuals do not differ from those of the Chinese government. The intellectuals used these narratives to serve and to expand the historical narratives of the government. Compared with the government's passive and reactive response to Japanese policies during this crisis, and academia's calm and systematic support of government's claims from historical perspective, the narratives from the public in 1996 were noisier and aggressive. According to the label for arguments in Chapter 4, the arguments of intellectuals in 1996 were mostly sovereignty-historical and sovereignty-legal. These narratives were very similar to those of the government and they offered support towards the government's claims.

POLs: Military Means

In 1996, after the incident took place, the voice of the POLs amplified the fury of the public towards Japan. The wave of public mobilization in 2004 developed the Defend Diaoyu Movement (DDM) in mainland China, and led to the successful landing of DDM on the Diaoyu Islands in 2004. In this sense, the 1996 incident offered an incentive for DDM in mainland China to emerge and grow.

The DDM can be traced back to a group of Chinese students from Taiwan in the United States in the 1970s. When the US announced the return of Okinawa along with

⁶ Modern China Studies (<http://jds.cass.cn/Item/7454.aspx>).

the Diaoyu Islands to Japan, a group of Chinese student held protests in Washington DC.

Figure 6.5 Protests in DC against “returning” Diaoyu Islands to Japan, 1971



According to the interview of DDM activists in the 1970s, Mr. Wang Xiaobo and Mr. Lin Xiaoxin, both of whom were doctoral students in physics in the US, learned about the planned return of the Diaoyu Islands with Okinawa to Japan. They published a special edition of “Defending the Diaoyu Islands” in the *Science Monthly Journal*, a journal published by Taiwanese students in the United States. These students called for a protest in Washington D.C. on January 30, 1971, against America’s return of the disputed islands to Japan. When they held the second protest in April 1971, they were told by the United States that the Diaoyu Islands were considered part of Okinawa, therefore, and should be returned to Japan. As Mr. Liu Xiaoxin said, “when we heard this news, we were very frustrated.”⁷ In 1971, when students heard about the possible change of American policy towards the People’s Republic of China,⁸ those students who supported the ROC regime and the PRC regime diverged and the Defense Diaoyu Movement in America diminished.

In Taiwan, however, the DDM continued without much divergence in ideology.

⁷ “The origins of Defense Diaoyu Movement.” 2010-12-03 on Sanlian Life Weekly [三联生活周刊].

⁸ Dr. Henry Kissinger visited China secretly in December 1970, and the US would support PRC joining the United Nations in late 1971.

As Mr. Wang Xiaobo recalled, in April, 1971, students at Taiwan University gathered to organize a DDM protest. Taiwan in 1971 was under the *Kuomintang* authoritarian government, the university authority refused to permit public protests. Students distributed posters on the campus of National Taiwan University, stating, “*the territory of China can be conquered, but never be surrendered; Chinese people can be slaughtered, but never be humiliated.*”⁹ Finally, the protest was consented by the authority, and the protests were held against the decision of US government to return Japan the Diaoyu Islands, one participant was Mr. Ma Yingjeou – then Taiwanese president from 2008 to 2012, reelected for his second term in 2012.

Figure 6.6 DDM protest in Taipei, 1971. (Slogan says, “Defend Diaoyu Islands”)



The DDM in Taiwan survived the authoritarian regime until 1996, with its patriotic advocates protected by the government. However, as Mr. Wang Xiaobo recalled, the Kuomintang government governing Taiwan in the 1970s, were also afraid to see mass protests, even for patriotic purposes like defending the Diaoyu Islands. Authoritarian governments seem to have similar logic. That was the case for ROC government in 1996, as evidenced by the ban on protests by college students in

⁹ “中国的土地可以征服，而不可以断送；中国的人民可以杀戮，而不可以低头。”

Beijing. Similar concerns exist nowadays in mainland China, and its interaction with DDM in mainland China has been complicated.

When the Japanese Youth League announced the erection of beacons on the Diaoyu Islands, the DDM in China developed following the government's reactions, and the DDM pushed the government to adopt more assertive approaches in response to Japan.

The earliest gathering of the DDM was in August 1996, in Hong Kong. When the Japanese foreign minister visited Hong Kong on August 28, he restated that the Diaoyu Islands were part of Japan, and refused to offer apologies for comfort women and victims during World War II, Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) organized a mass protest on the same day.

On August 31, Mr. Tong Zeng, a long-time activist with a dream of "flying kite on the Diaoyu Islands" organized a mass signing movement, petitioning Chinese president Jiang Zemin to send troops to the Diaoyu Islands, to tear down the beacons and "take back" China's Diaoyu Islands.

On September 1, graduate students from Fudan University, Shanghai hung posters on campus, denouncing the Japanese actions over the Diaoyu Islands and also criticizing the Chinese government's weak responses towards Japanese provocation. This poster called for a gathering on September 18, the day memorizing China's loss of the Northeastern three provinces in 1931. A poster on campus stated "*Beat the Japanese militarism.*" Students urged the government to adopt military methods to resolve the dispute. Also on September 1, Tong Zeng submitted a letter to the Chinese president calling for military actions over the disputed islands.

On September 6, 31 Chinese journalists petitioned the government, requesting the government send troops to the Diaoyu Islands. On September 7, ten anti-Japanese

heroes from Northern China's Helongjiang Province during the World War II petitioned the government, requesting China send troops to take back the Diaoyu Islands, swearing they were ready to fight against Japanese "once more."

On September 8, the China Federation for Defending Diaoyu Islands was founded in Beijing, with Mr. Tong Zeng as the president. It advocates *military means* for solving the Diaoyu dispute.

On September 11, 1996, several thousand Chinese citizens petitioned the Chinese government, urging it to send troops to take back the Diaoyu Islands.

On September 13, more than three hundred student of Peking University gathered on campus, urging the Chinese government to be more assertive over the Diaoyu Islands, urging China to send troops to tear down the lighthouse erected on the Diaoyu islands, and defend its sovereignty over the disputed islands.

On September 15, more than six thousand Hong Kong residents gathered in Hong Kong to protest Japanese actions over the Diaoyu Islands. On September 18, about six thousand Hong Kong residents gathered in Hong Kong, convocations of similar size were also held in major cities in mainland China. On September 20, Peking University forbade students' protesting. September 26, Mr. Chen Yuxiang drowned in water near the Diaoyu Islands.

After the death of Mr. Chen, the 1996 incident came to a pause. Public and large-scale protests did not take place until 2004, when Mr. Tong Zeng's China Federation of Defending Diaoyu Islands successfully landed on the disputed islands.

To sum up, a key argument of the DDM in 1996 was military means. They were asking for the Chinese government to be assertive and urging it to adopt military means to resolve the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. They held protests, signed petitions to urge the Chinese government to adopt military means to resolve the

dispute and “take back” the Diaoyu Islands from Japan.

According to the label of arguments as summarized in Chapter 4, the arguments of the POLs in 1996 were “patriotic”, with military actions as a preferred policy advocated by the DDM activists.

II. 2004: Increases in Assertive Foreign Policy

The incident in 2004 can be seen as a continuation of the 1996 crisis. After the crisis over the Diaoyu Islands in 1996, which was mostly initiated by Japanese provocations, Defense Diaoyu Movement grew in Hong Kong, mainland China and Taiwan. In mainland China, headed by Mr. Tong Zeng, the DDM made a plan to land on the disputed Diaoyu Islands. As a response to previous Japanese actions of building beacons, they wanted to demonstrate Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. As Mr. Li Nan, a long-time DDM activist stated in an interview, “what we are doing now will add bargaining chips for China in future negotiations over the Diaoyu Islands.”

In 2004, the activities of DDM forced the Chinese government to confront Japan over the Diaoyu Islands. The incident in 2004 can be viewed as a continuation of the 1996 crisis, which sparked the DDM in mainland China, and led to the successful landing of China Federation of Defending Diaoyu (CFDD) on the disputed islands in March 2004. When the Japanese Coast Guard arrested seven DDM activists, a diplomatic crisis happened between China and Japan. The arrest angered the Chinese public and also the Chinese government. After the Chinese government initiated intensive foreign negotiations, Japan released the arrested DDM activists two days after the crisis began.

This incident is far simpler than the ones in 1996 or in 2010. In 2003, the Japanese Youth League landed on the Diaoyu Islands again to repair the beacons they erected in 1996. This action stimulated the movement of defending Diaoyu Islands in mainland China. With the China Federation of Defending Diaoyu established in 1996, Mr. Tong Zeng and his members strived to land on the Diaoyu Islands and display Chinese sovereignty over the disputed islands. On October 9, 2003, DDM activists rented a boat and sailed from Xiamen to the Diaoyu islands; they were blocked by the Japanese Coast Guard in water about three hundred feet from the Diaoyu Islands. This attempted landing failed. Another attempt in January 2004 also failed. The third attempt on March 24, 2004 was successful: seven DDM activists landed on the disputed islands. In 2004, the DDMs initiated the actions of defending the sovereignty. Their actions were patriotic in nature. Unlike 1996, they did not challenge the government.

Government Narratives: “Chinese Territory.”

Shortly after the arrest of seven DDM activist on the Diaoyu Islands, on March 24 afternoon, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Yesui summoned *charge d'affaires* of Japanese embassy and protested against the arrest of Chinese citizens on Chines Diaoyu Islands. Vice Minister Zhang Yesui stated, “the Diaoyu Islands have been China’s territory since ancient times, China has indisputable sovereignty over these islands. The Chinese government and its people have determined resolve and willingness to defend its territorial sovereignty.” In addition, he also commented that the arrest of seven DDM activists was a severe violation of Chinese sovereignty and of the human rights of Chinese citizens, therefore, it is a very “serious incident”. “We

urge Japan to release detained Chinese citizens immediately and unconditionally.”¹⁰

On the same day, the Chinese ambassador in Japan, Mr. Wu Dawei also protested at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign affairs; he pointed out, “Japan should release the detained Chinese citizens immediately. If the situation worsens, Japanese government will have to assume the responsibility for worsened bilateral relationship.”¹¹

Again, on the same day, MFA spokesperson Mr. Kong Quan spoke at a regular MFA press event about this incident, after discussing the landing of seven Chinese citizens, he stated, “the Diaoyu Islands have been Chinese territory since ancient times. We always strive to solve the dispute through peaceful negotiation. We urge Japan to calm down when handling this incident, and not to harm these activists.”¹² The next day, March 26, 2004, seven activists were released by Japan. The incident ended almost as soon as it just started.

The government has two major arguments in the statements.

First, the Diaoyu Islands are part of China’s territory “since ancient times,” which is a sovereignty-historical argument. As mentioned before, this has been the Chinese government’s core argument since 1996. Second, Japan must release the arrested Chinese citizens immediately.

¹⁰ “China MFA negotiates with Japan for detained Chinese citizens on the Diaoyu Islands.” 2004-3-25, (<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zxxx/t80597.htm>)

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² MFA Spokesperson’s speech on 2004-3-24.

Figure 6.7 Word Cloud for Government’s Speeches after 2004 Incident



Yoshikoder’s frequency count yields the following result (after removing propositions and “China” “Diaoyu Islands” and “Japan”).

Table 6.4 Yoshikoder Analysis of Government’s Speeches after 2004 Incident

English	Word	Count	Proportion
“Territory/territorial”	领土	5	0.029
“Sovereignty”	主权	3	0.018
“People”	人民	3	0.018
“Citizens”	公民	3	0.018
“Islands”	岛屿	3	0.018
“Government”	政府	3	0.018
“Japanese side”	日方	3	0.018
“Severe/severity”	严重	2	0.012
“personnel”	人员	2	0.012
“inherent”	固有	2	0.012
“security”	安全	2	0.012
“that is/so”	就是	2	0.012
“strong”	强烈	2	0.012
“we/us”	我们	2	0.012
“detain/arrest”	扣留	2	0.012
“board on”	登上	2	0.012
“since ancient times”	自古以来	2	0.012
“demand/request”	要求	2	0.012
“affiliates”	附属	2	0.012
		Total 47	Total:0.281

Note: Proportions of frequent words do not add up to 1. Proportions round to 3 digits.

These statements do show an emphasis on “territory”, as shown in their speeches, the word “territory” is used as follows, “China’s inherent territory,” “defend China’s territorial integrity,” “China’s territory of Diaoyu Islands,” “China’s territorial integrity,” and “inherent territory since ancient times.”

In sum, opposed to 1996, the Chinese government had a much stronger sense of “territory” over the Diaoyu Islands. In 1996, the Chinese government emphasized historical evidence for its sovereignty, but in 2004, it is more explicitly stated that the Diaoyu Islands were China’s territory, assuming the historical evidence is true and self-explanatory. According to the label of arguments, the government’s narratives in 2004 were in the “sovereignty” category, without a clear emphasis on historical or legal evidence.


Intellectuals: “Historical and Legal evidence was undeniable.”

As the graph of the number of articles from 1994 to 2010 shows, the second peak appeared in 2004, when the DDM successfully landed on the Diaoyu Islands and government swiftly resolved the dispute in two days.

In 2004, quite a few articles were published in Chinese core journals. Within the 12 journal articles published in 2004, 3 were about history. Compared with 1996, we see a big increase in the “policy” category, with more scholarly interest on how to govern the Diaoyu Islands to exercise China’s sovereignty over these islands. Despite of the small number of articles in total, this change indicates a shift of interest on the dispute among Chinese intellectuals from history to the policy issue over the Diaoyu Islands. In 2005, a year after the 2004 incident over the Diaoyu Islands, this fad over the Diaoyu islands on core journals was soon replaced by the dispute between China

and Japan over the oil exploration the East China Sea, Chunxiao Gas and Oil Field.

Figure 6.8 Categories of Articles Published in 2004 over the Diaoyu Islands.



Within these articles, Dr. Shi Jiazhu from FudanUniversity’s research on the Diaoyu Islands and current Sino-Japan relations was very interesting in summarizing all the actions of the Japanese government since the end of World War II over the Diaoyu Islands and pointed out that Japan had been trying to demonstrate its legal sovereignty by emphasizing *de facto* control over the Diaoyu Islands. He warned the government to be aware of this trend in order to prevent Japanese government from achieving their goal regarding the Diaoyu Islands.¹³

Historical and legal analysis has been a theme of the Diaoyu Islands research since 1996 in Chinese academia. Inheriting Dr. Inoue from Japan, Chinese scholars support the government’s assertion of sovereignty by elaborating the “historical and legal” evidence supporting China’s sovereignty. However, the data and articles available in 2004 showed that Chinese scholars are more interested in “politics and policy”: articles were published on the China-Japan relationship and China’s Ocean Policy. These articles are related to the Diaoyu Islands, but gave more emphasis on practical issues of public policy and bi-lateral relations with Japan. However,

¹³ Shi, Jiazhu. “Diaoyu islands dispute and Sino-Japan relationship.” *Journal of Mao Zedong-Dengxiaoping theories*. 2004-4.

whatever topics Chinese scholars were working on, none were against China's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. According to the label of arguments in Chapter 4, Chinese intellectuals' narratives over the Diaoyu Islands in 2004 were "economic" and "sovereignty (historical/legal)".

POLs: Patriotism

A group of people from the general public answers the government's assertions of sovereignty with their actions. These people are distinguished by their enthusiastic and emotional actions over the Diaoyu Islands and they play a critical role in justifying China's sovereignty in the dispute. These people function as the "critical masses" in supporting China's claim over the Diaoyu Islands, and their actions invoke great concerns for both parties in the dispute. These people include those activists of the Defending the Diaoyu Islands Movement ("*Bao Diao Yun Dong*", "DDM" afterwards), activists who organized the protest against Japan after the arrest of Mr. Zhan, and also the "netizens" (net-citizens) steadfastly defending China's sovereignty by using the Internet to comment on this dispute. They support the government's assertions with actions, and believe that China has had the Diaoyu Islands "since ancient times," which is an argument emphasizing historical discovery and inchoate title in history.

Since the opening of mainland China in the late 1970s, the DDM boomed there. During and after the 1996 incident, DDM activists from mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan came together and began to demonstrate sovereignty near and on the Diaoyu Islands several times. An important goal for these activists to demonstrate Chinese sovereignty is to land on the Diaoyu Islands.

DDMs are organized by people with enthusiasm over the Diaoyu Islands, often they do not have support from the government nor any government background; rather, they raise funds by themselves, rent boats and plan for the trips to the Diaoyu Islands. In an interview with the DDM activists, the leader of the DDM in mainland China organized a trip to the Diaoyu Islands in June 2003, shortly after the Japanese government announced it “rented” the Diaoyu Islands from a Japanese citizen claiming the ownership of these islands.

According to Li Nan, a leader of the DDM in mainland China, they arranged a trip for landing on the Diaoyu Islands on June 22, 2003. They rented a fishing boat and had the captain take them to the Diaoyu Islands; however, 12 out of the 15 participants were not experienced sailors. Their plan of landing on the islands was interrupted by the blockade of the Japanese Coastal Guards, who circled Li Nan’s ship and announced that “this is Japanese territory.” Li Nan responded to them by shouting back that they were actually travelling in Chinese territory. However, they had no experience or technology to break through the blockade of the Japanese Coast Guard. When they returned to China, they were greeted with local people holding flowers, treating them as heroes, and “the authorities” affirmed their actions.¹⁴

The DDM activists’ third endeavor on March 24, 2004 led to a successful landing on the Diaoyu Islands. However, after ten hours, and making signs of “Chinese occupation” on the Diaoyu Islands, the 7 DDM activists were arrested by Japan, and they were detained for a day on Okinawa. According to Li Nan, when they were detained in Okinawa, they were asked whether they had governmental background,

¹⁴ This narrative comes from a secondary source, the interview of Mr. Li Nan, the organizer of the DDM landing on the Diaoyu islands in 2003. The interview and reports are available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2010-12-03/171321578935_3.shtml. Originally, this interview is published in Sanlian Life Weekly [三联生活周刊], on 2010-12-3, titled as “Landing on the Diaoyu Islands: the Glory and Hardship of DDM Volunteers.”

and they refused to answer, because Li believed that “they were illegally arrested by foreign military forces on Chinese territory.”¹⁵ Speaking of their expensive and dangerous actions, Li Nan made a statement on behalf of all activists in his DDM group,

“What we are doing now will add bargaining chips for China in future negotiations over the Diaoyu Islands.”¹⁶

Unfortunately, Li Nan did not specify how their landing would lend more credibility to the Chinese assertion of sovereignty in the future. During his interview, Li affirmed that the Diaoyu Islands have been Chinese territory, on the basis of history and international law.

What is interesting in Li Nan’s narrative is, when they landed on the Diaoyu Islands, they spent ten hours establishing signs of effective control. As analyzed, China’s assertions are not legally sound mostly because China does not have evidence that demonstrates effective control. The DDM activists’ actions are actually intentionally helping to defend China’s assertion by erecting signs of effective control. This might be what Li Nan meant when he said their behavior will add bargaining chips for China.

Figure 6.9 Successful Landing of the DDM on the Diaoyu Islands in 2004



Between 2003 and 2004, the mainland Chinese witnessed a lot of propaganda

¹⁵ In the interview of Mr. Li Nan, and his recall of their detain in Okinawa.

¹⁶ Original text as “通过自己的努力给国家增加未来谈判的砝码”。

about the DDM groups and read much about their efforts to land on the Diaoyu Islands, all activists were praised by the media for their patriotism. However, defending the Diaoyu Islands is just one mission of the DDM groups.

The act of landing on the Diaoyu Islands symbolized the peak of the Defending Diaoyu Islands Movement, however, it can also be seen as an ending of the DDM – after a successful landing, DDM activists found themselves hard to move forward. As Mr. Li Nan said in his interview, in 2003 and 2004, what DDM activists had was “the purest enthusiasm.”¹⁷ Another DDM activist, Mr. Li Yiqiang, who sold all his property and business to support 2003-2004 DDM activities, quoted a Taiwanese DDM activist, “if Defending Diaoyu Movement is TV series, successful landing on the islands is the end of the show.”¹⁸ Therefore, after the successful landing in 2004, DDM activities in Mainland China have become much “quieter” with much less radical activities.


After seven DDM activists were detained by Japan, protests were held in Beijing outside the Japanese embassy on March 25. On the same day, the Chinese government protested against Japan nine times on March 25. The incident ended soon with Japan releasing the detained DDM activists on March 26, 2004.

Due to the lack of interviews with the DDM, other than the one with Mr. Li Nan, who was interviewed in a report about the DDM in the past 40 years, there has not been sufficient text data for analyzing their key words. However, it is not hard to detect their patriotism from their website and their documents published. For instance, in the Declaration of DDM passed in December 2003, right before the 2004 crisis, a key words analysis yields the following word cloud

¹⁷ “Landing on the Diaoyu Islands: Dreams and Sufferings of the DDM Activists.” 2010-12-03 on Sanlian Life Weekly [三联生活周刊].

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Figure 6.10 Word Cloud for Declaration of DDM in December 2003.



The most often mentioned words are “China” “we/us” and “nation”.

Table 6.5 Yoshikoder Analysis for Declaration of DDM in December 2003.

English	Word	Count	Proportion
Chinese Nation	中华	15	0.015
We	我们	9	0.013
Declaration	宣言	8	0.012
Principles	原则	7	0.010
Movement	行动	7	0.010
Goal	宗旨	6	0.009
Japan	日本	6	0.009
mutual	相互	6	0.009
Diaoyu	钓鱼岛	6	0.009
Nation	民族	5	0.007
Decedents	儿女	4	0.006
Cooperation	协作	4	0.006
Initiator	发起人	4	0.006
Such as	此类	4	0.006
Position	立场	4	0.006
Actions	行为	4	0.006
		Total :99	Total: 0.136

Note: Proportions of frequent words do not add up to 1. Proportions round to 3 digits.

A close reading of their website and their statements shows that the nature of patriotism is clearly demonstrated from their speeches. On the website of the *Non-governmental Defending Diaoyu Islands Council*,¹⁹ the introduction of the Diaoyu Islands centers on the Chinese sovereignty of the islands, meanwhile, their

¹⁹ Their official website at www.cfdd.org.cn.

statement also specifies that this council has the responsibility to “reveal the evils Japan has conducted during the wartime.”²⁰ Also it can be noted from their website that the DDM is linked with other issues: the website of the *Non-governmental Defending Diaoyu Islands Council* also posts the memorial articles for the victims in Nanjing Massacre in 1937, Sichuan Earthquake in 2008, and comfort women during World War II. These elements indicate the patriotic nature of the DDM. On the website of another DDM group based in Hong Kong, the *Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands*, the actions of defending the Diaoyu Islands are also presented with the Nanjing Massacre, Compensation to comfort women and other issues relevant to Japanese atrocities during World War II.

These websites and the statements of the DDM groups deliver a message that defending the Diaoyu Islands is a way of demonstrating patriotism, and in addition, among many atrocities China has suffered from Japan, the Diaoyu Islands dispute is just one incident among many.

Such an issue-linkage of the Diaoyu Islands with the memory of sufferings during World War II sets a tone for the Diaoyu Islands dispute. That is, the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, like all the other incidents during World War II, is another example that the “other” of the dispute – Japan, is threatening “us” as Chinese. This tone for the dispute, as reflected from the DDM groups, suddenly erupted and materialized after the arrest of Mr. Zhan in September, 2010.

To sum up, the 2004 incident began with the DDM and forced the Chinese government to challenge Japanese occupation over the Diaoyu Islands. Before the incident, the DDM in mainland China has flourished and developed. After their

²⁰ Text available at <http://www.cfdd.org.cn/html/6/n-6.html>.

successful landing on the disputed islands, the 2004 incident broke out. However, with the Chinese government's swift response, the seven detained DDM activists were released two days after they were arrested on the Diaoyu Islands.

The narratives of the POLs in 2004, according to the label of arguments, are “patriotic” in nature. Different from what happened in 1996, POLs in 2004 did not confront the government directly in their narratives.

Aftermath of the 2004 Incident

As James Reilly recorded over the same incident, the Chinese government soon began to contain public sentiment after detained DDM activists were released. According to Reilly's interview with one of the seven activists in Shanghai, when they were sent back to China, they “were taken into custody immediately upon their return to China, denying them a public reception in Shanghai or Beijing,” even though there were hundreds of people welcoming them at the airport for their heroic actions on the Diaoyu Islands. Then, the Chinese government showed appreciation to Japan for releasing the detained Chinese citizens quickly. A bilateral relationship was then brought back to the path.

III. 2010: Arrested Fisherman and Assertive Government

The incident in 2010, sparked with the arrest of Chinese fisherman, Mr. Zhan Qixiong, crystallized the interaction of three streams of sentiments among the government, intellectuals and the public. With the swift response of the government, China took the initiative in handling the crisis, the public followed with mass protests against Japan, but no voices against the government. The intellectuals later aided the

Chinese government's claim with research and studies in legal and historical disciplines.

As shown in the past chapter, within this incident, what was not seen in the two previous incidents was the “countermeasures” policy taken by the government, which can be seen as a manifestation of Chinese assertive foreign policy. Compared with previous two incidents, the Chinese government took strong policy actions against Japan in 2010. What explained the countermeasure policy is one of the puzzles to be solved with this analysis. What roles have the political narratives played in pushing for such a policy is the other puzzle.

We can speculate when asking about why an assertive policy was adopted in 2010 might indicate that the Japanese government was more steadfast in 2010 than in 2004: in 2004, Japan released the seven DDM activists the next day after China protested. In 2010, however, Mr. Zhan had been detained by Japan for 12 days (from September 7) until China adopted the countermeasures policy on September 19. Therefore, it may lead to a conclusion that China's assertive policy was a reaction to Japan's unwavering stance in 2010. None the less, a counterfactual analysis of the 2004 incidents – if Japan did not release the DDM activists that soon - may also equally render consequences like the crisis in 1996, in which the Chinese government was reacting passively to Japanese initiatives. In this sense, a narrative analysis of the government's narratives becomes the key to distinguish any difference in the Chinese government's attitudes in these three incidents.

Official Narratives from the Government: “It is illegal!”

As presented in Chapter 4, data on the government's narratives are collected

from the following three sources, the MFA press, leaders' speeches (if any), and official newspapers. Texts from these sources are collected to reflect the official opinion of the government towards the crisis.

The MFA speeches after the 2010 incidents are summarized as follows. On the same day Mr. Zhan was arrested (September 7), MFA spokeswoman Jiang Yu responded that "China has been deeply concerned" with the situation, and protested against Japan. She also emphasized that the Diaoyu Islands have been Chinese territory since ancient times, and the Japanese Coast Guard should not have patrolled in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands.

On September 9, Jiang Yu was asked more questions on the incidents. She stated that "this incident is highly sensitive and serious" and China demanded the immediate release of the arrested Captain and his crew, "to prevent the issue from escalating."²¹ In addition, she makes three points in her press statement. First she warned the Japanese government that a failure to handle this issue properly will negatively impact the China- Japan relationship. When asked whether China will take further actions after this issue, she dodged the question by saying "we have protested formally against Japanese government." Second, she called it unacceptable, ridiculous, illegal and invalid to apply Japanese law to the case of Mr. Zhan. Third, she confirmed that Chinese government has sent patrolling boat to the Diaoyu Islands.

On September 10, Ms. Jiang lodged on official protest against Japan's refusal to release Mr. Zhan. In addition, she announced that the scheduled meeting between the Chinese and Japanese governments over the East China Sea would be postponed.

On September 12, when asked about undertaking Japanese jurisdiction over Mr. Zhan, Ms. Jiang again demanded the immediate release of Mr. Zhan. Also, she stated

²¹ 9-9- 2010 *the People' Daily*.

that “any actions taken by the Japanese government over Mr. Zhan and his boat are illegal, invalid and in vain.”

On September 13, when Japan released Mr. Zhan’s crew, but not Mr. Zhan, Ms. Jiang stated that the Chinese government had protested multiple times and China urged Japan to release Mr. Zhan as soon as possible.

On September 17, Ms. Jiang announced the Chinese government was sending more patrolling boats to the disputed waters to “protect the maritime interest of China.”

On September 19, another MFA spokesperson, Mr. Ma Chaoxu made the statement over possible “countermeasures” if Japan did not release the arrested Chinese fisherman.

On September 20, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya gave another notice to the Japanese ambassador over the possible “countermeasures” if Japan does not release Mr. Zhan. He emphasized that this incident had been initiated by Japan and has aroused a severe impact; how the incident will develop depends on the decision of the Japanese government.

On September 21, Ms. Jiang Yu affirmed her demand to release Mr. Zhan, in addition, she emphasized, China will never give up on issues related to territorial sovereignty, and China has firm and absolute resolve and willingness to defend its territory and sovereignty.

On September 22, Ms. Jiang Yu explained the “countermeasures” taken. She said, “the Japanese government insisted on applying its domestic jurisdiction over Mr. Zhan, which is a severe violation and challenge to Chinese sovereignty. This action has angered Chinese people and severely hurt China-Japan relationship. We have to

make necessary reactions.”²²

On September 25, one day after Mr. Zhan was released, Chinese MFA made an official statement reaffirming Chinese sovereignty over the islands and criticized Japan’s arrest of Mr. Zhan for fishing in water of the Diaoyu Islands. On the same day, the MFA demanded an apology and compensation from the Japanese government for arresting Mr. Zhan.

On September 28, the MFA spokesperson again, confirmed the Chinese regular patrol of the Diaoyu Islands, because “the Diaoyu Islands have been traditionally used by Chinese fishermen.”


By the end of September, the incidents came to a conclusion, though Japan refused to offer any apologies or compensation for Mr. Zhan.

With these statements in Chinese text, I conducted an analysis of these statements. By importing all these statements (excluding redundant words like “China” ,”Japan” or “Diaoyu islands”, the word cloud in Chinese appears as follows

Now, with this setup and the word cloud – equaling the argument of a more assertive foreign policy is sustained.

²² 2010-9-22, the *People’s Daily*.

Figure 6.11 Word Clouds for Chinese Official Statements in September 2010 (MFA statement and Announcement)



Meanwhile, analysis of Yoshikoder yields the following table in word frequency (after taking out words like “Japan”“China”“Diaoyu Islands” and propositions).

Table 6.6 Yoshikoder Analysis for Chinese Official Statements in September 2010 (MFA statement and Announcement)

English	Words	Count	Proportion (rounded to 3 digits_)
“Illegal”	非法	16	0.014
“Sea”	海域	14	0.013
“Fishing boat”	渔船	14	0.013
“Territory”	领土	14	0.013
“Fishermen”	渔民	12	0.011
“sovereignty”	主权	10	0.009
“immediately/immediate”	立即	10	0.009
“strong/strongly”	强烈	9	0.008
“captain”	船长	9	0.008
“serious/severe”	严重	8	0.007
“situation”	事态	8	0.007
“unconditional”	无条件	8	0.007
“relationship”	关系	6	0.005
“inherited”	固有	6	0.005
		Total:144	Total: 0.129

Notes: Proportions of frequent words do not add up to 1. Proportions round to 3 digits.

As revealed, in these texts, a key word is “illegal”[非法]. In these statements, this word has been used in the following combinations:

Table 6.7 Context for the Word “Illegal/Illegally” in Chinese official narratives.

Date	Context
9-7	China protests against Japan’s “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman.
9-9	Japan’s “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman has angered Chinese public.
	Japan’s attempt of applying its domestic law onto Chinese fisherman is unreasonable, “illegal” and invalid.
9-10	Japan’s attempt of hold Mr. Zhan under Japanese jurisdiction is ridiculous, “illegal” and invalid.
9-12	China strong objects the “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman ...
	China believes the arrest was “illegal” , invalid and in vain.
9-13	Since the “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman, the Chinese government has protested several times.
	Worldwide Chinese denounce the “illegal” action of Japan.
	Till today (9-13), Japan is still “illegally” detaining Chinese fisherman.
9-19	Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya expressed anger and concern over Japanese “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman.
9-21	Japan’s “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman has negatively impact China-Japan relations.
9-22	Japan’s “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman ... is blatantly violation of Chinese sovereignty.
	Japan’s “illegal” arrest of Chinese fisherman has violated the agreements between China and Japan on resolving disputes through dialogue and the spirit for mutual benefits.
	Till today, Japan is still “illegally” detaining Chinese fisherman.
9-25	<i>[In the official announcement of MFA]</i> Japan “illegally” arrested and detain 15 Chinese fishermen, and held the captain till September 24 has aroused anger of the Chinese government and also its public.
	Any arrest, detain, search and attempt to apply Japanese jurisdiction on Chinese fisherman is “illegal” and invalid. Japanese government must apologize and compensate China for this incident.

The other high-frequency words, like “territory” (12), “sovereignty” (10), “immediately” (9) are all directly related with the incident *per se*. In other words, the incident of the arrest of Chinese fishermen was about “territory” and “sovereignty”, the Chinese government’s demands were clear after the incident happened – Japan


should “immediately” release Chinese fisherman. However, the often-mentioned word of “illegal/illegally” indicates that the government believes the Japanese action was “illegal”. And this is a word that was not seen in the previous two incidents.

According to the label of arguments, as summarized in Chapter 4, the government’s narratives in 2010 were “sovereignty-legal” in nature. Different from in 1996 and 2004, the government has shifted its focus from historical evidence to legal claim over the disputed islands.

Intellectuals: “Historical Occupation” – China has the legal claim.

I analyze the topics found among the articles published in 2010 and 2011. Within the 33 articles published in 2010 and 2011 over the Diaoyu Islands, 3 were about the history of the Diaoyu Islands (2 about historical evidence, 1 about the DDM). 10 articles were about legal issues in the Diaoyu Islands dispute. 5 articles were about “policy”, within which, 3 were about the Chinese policy over the Diaoyu Islands (fishing policy, education policy, and islands governance). The majority (15) of those articles were about the politics behind the Diaoyu Islands.

Figure 6.12 Amount of Articles by Topics between 2010 and 2011



Among these 33 articles, I chose those directly related to the dispute in 2010, but

ignored those on policy and political analysis. They include all articles in the legal and historical category, and one article about the Japanese foreign minister, who was accused of being responsible for the confrontation near the Diaoyu Islands in 2010. By focusing on these articles, I wish to capture the opinion of Chinese intellectuals towards the dispute.

An analysis of the abstracts of these articles yields a word cloud as follows

Figure 6.13. Word Cloud for Academic Articles Abstracts Published on Chinese “Core Journals” in 2010 and 2011



Analysis of the word frequency in Yoshikoder offers result as follows.

Table 6.8 Word Frequency Count for Academic Articles Abstracts Published on Chinese “Core Journals” in 2010 and 2011

English	Words	Count	Proportion
“Sovereignty”	主权	10	0.013
“Effective”	有效	8	0.011
“Dispute”	争端	7	0.009
“Principles”	原则	7	0.009
“Control”	控制	7	0.009
“Islands”	岛屿	6	0.008
“China”	我国	6	0.008
“States”	国家	5	0.007
“International Law”	国际法	5	0.007
“Islands from continent”	离岛	5	0.007
“Territory”	领土	5	0.007
“Relationship”	关系	4	0.005
“Taiwan”	台湾	4	0.005
		Total: 79	Total: 0.103

Note: Proportions of frequent words do not add up to 1. Proportions round to 3

digits.

Among these high-frequency words, “effective” and “principles”, along with “international law” were most often mentioned. These words reflect the nature of these academic articles in vindicating the Chinese government claim by offering legal and historical analysis.

These articles are analyzed by a close reading. By closely reading these articles, three main central arguments can be categorized.

First, Japan’s claim is not legal. These academic journal articles discussed about the “effective control” principles, which was a key argument adopted by Japan to defend its sovereignty. China discovered these islands first, and China has exercised effective control over these islands. As Professor Qu analyzed, the “effective control” principle applies only when a state has continuous, uncontested and sufficient control over the territory. Testing against these requirements, he concluded Japan’s claim based on “effective control” does not stand.²³

Second, China’s claim is supported by historical evidence. Basically, China’s evidence and historical documents have established solid legal ground for its sovereignty. As the article published in *World Knowledge*, Japanese scholar Yasushi Inoue has conducted research and concluded that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China.²⁴ In another article, with the rediscovery of a famous book, “*Fusheng Liuji*”, the fashion of collecting evidence has come to its peak.

Third, these articles also agree that the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands is a key issue between China and Japan. Whether this issue can be resolved will have great impact on bilateral relations and regional stability. Almost all scholars agree that a

²³ Qu, Bo. “Effective Control in Islands disputes.” *Modern Legal Studies*. 2010-1: 144-151.

²⁴ “Yasushi Inoue: Diaoyu islands belong to China.” *World Knowledge* 2010-19: 21-23. See also KANG Yongqiu, (2010) “Preface of War of Taiwan Strait and Li Jingsong, Magistrate of Taiwa at the Time of Yiwei Period.” *Journal of Hunan University of Science & Technology* 13-6: 130-133.

peaceful resolution of the dispute will benefit both China and Japan – this is a position consistent with that of the government.

In sum, intellectuals are offering intellectual products to support the government's position. More scholarly work has focused on the "legal" issue behind the dispute. By conducting research on international legal principles, they revealed why Japan's arrests of Chinese fishermen and claiming sovereignty over the islands were "illegal", whereas the Chinese government's claim was perfectly legal, historically and legally. These findings are supportive of the Chinese government's claim of sovereignty and demands for releasing the arrested Chinese fisherman.

According to the label of arguments, the narratives of the intellectuals in 2010 were "sovereignty-legal" in nature.

POLs: Patriotism

Compared with statements from the government and intellectuals, political narratives from the public are more fragmented and require more creativity to gather. As stated in Chapter 2, I adopt several streams to measure the political narratives and attitudes from the public.

First, interviews and statements made by DDM activist, including interview about them, their statements available, any documents they offer, including the Declaration of Worldwide DDM passed in late 2003, which have been analyzed in two previous incidents.


Second, cyberspace: compared with 1996 and 2004, in 2010 personal usage of the Internet has developed in China and the public can express their opinions freely in cyberspace despite of the government's aversion towards mass protests in the streets.

Third, the slogans of the public during mass protests: this source of data is to be gathered mostly from media that report mass protests.

In 2010, however, the major source for data collection is from the slogans of the public during mass protests and their actions. The government actually constrained public mobilization after Mr. Zhan was arrested; on the other hand, public mobilizations in several major cities did turn violent riots that hurt the public.

After the 2010 incident took place, the Chinese public's interest over the Diaoyu Islands dispute skyrocketed. As shown in the Baidu Index²⁵, searches for the “Diaoyu Islands” in this Chinese search engine rose steeply.

Figure 6.14 Users' and Media Attention According to Baidu Index.




As the graph shows, in late 2010, the “level of users' attention” rose exponentially. Correspondingly, the lower tier reflects the “level of media attention,” in 2010 when this level also reached a high peak.

²⁵ Baidu Index is a service provided by China's biggest search engine company. In many ways, it resembles Google trends. However, it focuses on the Chinese search engine and is geared towards Chinese internet users. Google, however, has retreated from China since early 2010.

In the graph, however, it is interesting to note that in mid-2008, the level of media attention was high, however, the users' attention on this dispute was influenced only a little bit. In June 2008, the Japanese House of Representative announced a "watch" by Japanese congressmen in a plane over the disputed islands. Chinese media gave quite a few reports on the Japanese action, but it did not arouse the interest of the public. A possible reason for that is the public, after experiencing the high level of conflict in 1996 and 2004, had a lack of interest towards Japan's unilateral fly-over action, considering that action mostly symbolic.

Unfortunately, this feature of Baidu offers data only from July 1, 2006. Therefore, a comparison of 2004 was unavailable. However, Google Trends offers a good supplement before it retreated from China in 2010.

Figure 6.15 Users' and Media Attention over the Diaoyu Islands from Google Trends



While the low peak in 2010 can be explained by the retreat of Google from China in early 2010, another high peak in 2006 was interesting (this was omitted from Baidu Index because the Baidu Index begins in July 1, 2006). The label E, which is key

media reports identified by Google, was about the military exercises between Japan and America.²⁶ However, this report was made on April 4, 2006, and the report was made on a rarely-known media called E-north. Therefore, this may not be the cause of high peak in 2006. However, an analysis of the DDM reveals that in late 2006, the DDM from mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan waged another attempt trying to land on the Diaoyu Islands, but failed because of the intervention of both the Chinese and Japanese governments.²⁷ However, the plan to land did not escalate into any conflict or any arrests.

On the other hand, the DDM activists organized to protest against Japan. According to the post of China Federation of Defending Diaoyu on its website, on September 13, several DDM activists organized in Xiamen, calling for more participants to “fish in water near Chinese Diaoyu Islands.” However, other than several pictures in this post, no reports were found on their actions. According to a report of these DDM on BBC, Mr. Li Nan, the leader of DDM, said that their application was “very likely” to be rejected by the authorities.²⁸

Meanwhile, POLs enlarged to include more members in addition to those DDM activists. Mass protests were organized to support Mr. Zhan in major cities in China. However, they soon turned out to be a mass protest against the Japanese government and the Japanese atrocities during World War II. This negative sentiment reached its peak 11 days after Mr. Zhan was arrested – September 18, the anniversary of the Japanese occupation of Northeast China. It is believed that this protest was initially organized by college students online, and when it started in several major cities,

²⁶ 2006-4-4, “Japan may adopt military means to occupy the Diaoyu Islands by escalating its military plan.” At Enorth.com. <http://www.enorth.com.cn>

²⁷ See the website of Chinese Federation of Defend Diaoyu, at <http://www.cfdd.org.cn/html/75/125875-type-image.html>.

²⁸ “Defending Diaoyu Federation: Protest by sailing in the disputed water” BBC News 2010-9-16.

including Beijing, Shanghai, and Chengdu, the protestors displayed slogans including “*Return us the Diaoyu Islands*”, “*Release Chinese Captain*”, “*Diaoyu Islands are ours*” and “*Boycott Japanese products.*”²⁹ In Chengdu, protestors attracted new participants in the street. In Chengdu and Xi’an, however, a large amount of protestors later became rioters that wanted to destroy anything relevant to Japan.³⁰ They went beyond their cause of defending the Diaoyu Islands, throwing rocks towards supermarkets and department stores with Japanese names, even Japanese restaurants run by Chinese owners. Municipalities soon sent police to regulate the protests.³¹

In 2010, public narratives were a reflection of Chinese negative sentiment towards Japan, not only on the Diaoyu Islands, but also on all the memories the Chinese people have against Japan. Such an extremely negative sentiment is reflected in their slogans during the protest.

In Xi’an, protestors held the signs of “*Return us the Diaoyu Islands,*” and “*Boycott Japanese products.*”

In Chengdu, protestors burned Japanese flag and purposefully desecrated its flag (see Figure 6.7). In Hong Kong, protestors asked for the immediate release of Mr. Zhan Qixiong.

Other than calling for the immediate release and return of the Diaoyu Islands, these protestors linked this incident with the bad memory Chinese had against Japan. Therefore, “*Chinese people cannot be humiliated*” (in Hong Kong), “*Boycott Japanese Products*” (Figure 6.8), and “*Never give up an inch of territory*” or “*Never forget September 18*” (Figure 6.8). These slogans share the patriotism and the public’s negative sentiment towards Japan – a sentiment that can be traced back to 1898, when

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ 2010-10-17 *Wenwei Po*, published in Hong Kong, text available at <http://paper.wenweipo.com/2010/10/17/YO1010170001.htm>. Titled as “Tens of thousands held Anti-Japanese Protest in mainland China.” See also MFA remarks on these protest on 2010-10-16.

³¹ *Ibid.*

Japan defeated China for the first time and asked for Taiwan and its affiliates (arguably inclusive of the Diaoyu Islands) and an astronomical amount of compensation.

The public's narratives, according to the label of arguments, are still "patriotic" in nature. But they went beyond the disputed islands, including other issues China had and is having against Japan.

Figure 6.16 Protests in mainland China and Hong Kong, Taiwan after Chinese fisherman was arrested near the Diaoyu Islands (Reuter Pictures)



Other than DDM activists, there are other actors functioning as POLs, including

popular commentators and retired PLA generals. Retired PLA generals are, as always, standing against any possible encroachment of Japan on Chinese territory. A retired PLA general in an interview said he would be willing to fight against the Japanese to defend the Diaoyu Islands “at all expenses.”³² Popular commentators, however, make statements criticizing both Japan and also the Chinese government, emphasizing the latter. For example, Han Han, a young popular commentator, expressed feelings more towards the Chinese government than on the dispute. He commented that the government of China is actually much softer towards Japan than towards its own people. What the government is worrying about is domestic stability, and is always willing to censor any postings that may jeopardize the Chinese government’s legitimacy.³³ On Chinese cyberspace, numerous blogs have posted on why Japan and China are determined to fight another war. Mr. Shi Haibin, another famous commentator on social and political issues in China, mentioned in his own blog that the Diaoyu Islands dispute is a conspiracy of Japan, and the Chinese government, according to Mr. Shi, was wrong in deciding to “shelve” the Diaoyu Islands dispute.³⁴

These commentators are mostly critics on China’s social and political issues. Different from the DDM activists, who focus on the Diaoyu Islands dispute, these commentators often link the frustration of China in foreign policy issues with the social problems the Chinese people suffer, such as corruption, and the isolation of the government from the common people. Reading the blogs of Shi and Han clearly yields a satirical taste that colors the dispute while criticizing the government isolating itself from people in a “black box.” Therefore, their comments, while interesting in offering narratives on the islands dispute, can more accurately be described as

³² “*Jie fang jun jiang ling cheng baodiao shi erci kangzhan.*” See (http://news.ifeng.com/mil/taiwan/detail_2012_07/10/15909108_0.shtml) 2012-7-10.

³³ See this article at Han Han’s blog at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4701280b0100lcum.html (only Chinese version).

³⁴ See this article at Mr. Shi Hanbin’s blog at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4b02a21a0100m2q0.html.

critiques to Chinese social problems on the opportunities found in the islands dispute incidents.

Aftermath of 2010 incident: No Reports and Busy College Students

The attitude of the Chinese government towards mass protest was ambivalent. On one hand, China does not allow free protest; on the other hand, however, mass protests against foreign governments are often allowed – but only to an extent manageable by the authorities. After protests in 2010, none of the official newspapers reported these protests, even now, there is very limited information on these protests from the media in mainland China. On the other hand, Chinese authorities prevented students from participating in the protests. Universities in Sichuan and Xi'an told students to stay on campus during the weekends and register when they had to leave school.³⁵

However, these protests by the public have demonstrated their support for the Chinese government on the Diaoyu Islands. It is hard to conclude that their protest was “mobilized” by the Chinese government, however, it is safe to conclude that China’s consistent argument on the Diaoyu Islands has offered a solid legitimate background for the enthusiastic young “critical masses” to demonstrate their patriotism, which is necessarily against Japan in the dispute of the Diaoyu Islands. In 2010, the activists’ actions complemented and offered public support to China’s assertions after the government was assertive.

³⁵ “Control Anti-Japan Protest, Most Universities had ‘closed’”. Voice of America News, 2010-10-23. <http://www.voanews.com/chinese/news/20101023-school-anti-japan-105593108.html>

Conclusion

This chapter presents the narratives of three actors in three incidents over the Diaoyu Islands. By presenting and labeling their narratives, I strive to show the different attitudes of the government, the intellectuals and the POLs. Several preliminary conclusions can be drawn here.

First, the government has turned out to be more active in disputes after 1996. In 1996, the Chinese government's policy actions were mostly reactive and passive, driven by Japanese actions. In 2004, when Japan arrested Chinese activists, the Chinese government responded with strong voice. In 2010, China's government initiated the countermeasures against Japan when Japan did not release the detained Chinese fisherman. As an empirical fact, from 1996 to 2010, the Chinese government has been more active and assertive on islands disputes.

Second, the intellectuals are always supportive of the government – even though their narratives often come after the foreign policy has been taken due to the nature of academic publication. Moreover, between 1996 and 2010, their interest shifted from historical/legal evidence to political and policy topics, proved by the changing numbers of articles in each category in three periods. In 1996, intellectuals were conducting research on China's historical and legal evidence that supported the claim. Now they are more interested in how to govern these disputed islands and what possible impact these islands may have on China-Japan bilateral relations.

Third, the POLs' narratives are "patriotic" in nature, asking for military actions when the government is weak, but demonstrating patriotic sentiment when the government is assertive. They want to eradicate the humiliation China suffered from Japan during World War II. They demonstrated their patriotism in 1996, asking the government to be more assertive against Japan. In 2004 and 2010, POLs were mostly

quiet and supportive of the government, when the government was assertive.

While an incident may be initiated by the POLs or Japan, however, it should be noted that after an incident is initiated, it is the government who responds first, followed by the POLs, usually days or weeks after the government's action. Finally, the intellectuals respond, whose publications may take months to be read by the POLs and the government. The time-lag among the narratives of these actors therefore is an important factor when considering their interactions.

To connect the analysis with Systems Theory, it can be inferred that in the box of "input", the intellectuals are providing consistent "support" for the government's claims, whereas the public is making "demands" to push the government to be assertive against Japan. From 1996 to 2010, however, these "inputs" seem to be consistent: the intellectuals are always supporting, and the public are always demanding. If the content of "inputs" from these two actors remains the same, what explains the variation of the "outputs" in three incidents? In the following chapter, I am going to examine the interaction between the government and the public to demonstrate how the government has learned to appease the public with assertive policy.

CHAPTER 7 CONVERGENCE AND CONFRONTATION OF NARRATIVES

This chapter explores the degree to which China's policies on the Diaoyu Islands are motivated by both public mobilization and the actions of Japan. As part of the concept of "environment" in the Systems Theory, Japan's actions function as the external impetus for the systems theory to process; on the other, intellectuals and POLs, by providing demands and support to the government, pushes the government to adopt foreign policies that could accommodate these voices. If the government does not adopt foreign policies that can "appease" domestic public mobilization, it has to spend extra resources to "quell" them.

In this chapter, I propose a framework based on Easton's System Theory to model this nuanced interaction among government, the public and intellectuals in China's foreign policy making. Easton's Systems Theory provides a solid basis for this framework; however, the integration of two-level game in Systems Theory yields a more robust framework suitable for analyzing China's Japan policy.

Chapter 6 presented different narratives and policy preferences from the government, intellectuals and public opinion leaders in the incidents of 1996, 2004 and 2010. Over the same incidents, the government, intellectuals and public opinion leaders have different narratives. Their narratives led to different policy preferences, especially from the government side and the public. In general, the public usually demanded more assertive policy than the government is willing to accept.

Table 7.1 Labels of Policy Narratives (Different font sizes indicate the priority)

	Government	Intellectuals	Activists
1996	Sovereignty-Historical Sovereignty-legal Political	Sovereignty-History Sovereignty-legal	Patriotic Political
2004	Sovereignty-legal Sovereignty-Historical	Economic Sovereignty-Historical Sovereignty-legal	Patriotic Legal
2010	Sovereignty-Legal	Economic Sovereignty-Legal Sovereignty-Historical	Patriotic

Table 7.2 Actions of Government, Preferred Policy of Intellectuals and Policy Preference from POLs

	Government	Intellectuals	Public
1996	Low-level-High-level Protest	(Support Government)	Criticize, urge military
2004	High-level Protest-Countermeasures	(Support Government)	Patriotic support
2010	Countermeasures	(Support Government)	Patriotic support

As the Table 7.1 above shows, three actors offer different narratives on the same issue when a crisis happened. In addition, as Table 7.2 summarized, in three incidents, the government adopted different policy actions, while the intellectuals usually support government’s assertions, POLs usually have much stronger policy preferences than the other two actors.

In 1996, for example, when the government was unsystematically “responding” to Japan’s actions over the Diaoyu Islands, emphasizing China’s sovereignty based on historical evidence, POLs were arguing for “military measures” to solve the dispute. Their narratives centered on the necessity of adopting military means to resolve the dispute.

In 2004, in an incident that can be seen as the continuation of the 1996 incident, the government was much more active than in 1996 when DDM activists were arrested by Japan. After active protests of China, Japan released the arrested activists

the next day. However, after the release, the Chinese government soon turned to appreciate Japan's cooperation and constrain domestic public mobilization. While the government's narrative in this incident emphasized the fact that the Diaoyu Islands were "China's territory", and turn to maintain good Sino-Japan relations after the crisis, POLs were demanding the release of activists and believed that their actions were "patriotic" and deserve respect, as evidenced by their declaration.

In 2010, however, the government responded to Japan's arrest of Chinese fisherman with the most assertive policy among these three incidents. POLs still maintained their patriotic stance on this issue, and arguing for trade sanctions (a boycott of Japanese products). The government maintained a systematic response towards Japan's actions and adopted an assertive policy when Japan delayed the release. POLs continued to make patriotic statements on this issue and called for stronger stance against Japan.

These presentations of empirical facts in Chapter 6 reveal the different narratives from three actors. However, the Chinese government is able to decide what course of action to take on foreign policy matters without established "moderating institutions" checking its decisions. As reviewed in Chapter 3, however, scholars have revealed the increasing influence from the intellectuals and the public on Chinese foreign policy making in the past decade. None the less, in the Diaoyu Islands dispute, how do we explain the policy actions of China, especially, why did China adopt an assertive policy in 2010? There are two explanations accounting for the variation of Chinese foreign policy in these three incidents. First, the government has been trying to accommodate public opinion. However, when its policy does not sufficiently "appease" the public's demands, it has to spend extra resources to quell the demands. Second,

the government is responding to Japan's actions. When Japan's actions are strong, the Chinese government usually takes much stronger stances. Failing to do so, would again put the Chinese government facing strong public mobilization. These two explanations, from domestic and foreign sides respectively, explain why China is taking more assertive policies on islands disputes. China's assertiveness has been a tendency in Chinese foreign policy, and arguably it will continue to be so.

The rest of this chapter is organized to analyze these two explanations. The first part presents the domestic public opinion and evaluates its influence on foreign policy making. The second part presents the action-reaction model. In the third part, I would also argue that these two explanations are best captured in a framework that integrates Easton's System Theory and Putnam's two-level game. The Systems Theory *per se* is not sufficient for explaining the foreign policy making in China; by incorporating the two-level game, however, it captures the nuances of interactions between the government and public opinion, with the intellectuals providing evidence to support China's claims.

I. Responses to the Public: Appeasing vs. Quelling

The Chinese government faces a trade-off between "appeasing" and "quelling" when deciding to take actions over the disputed islands. On one hand, the Chinese government seeks to "appease" the POLs by adopting appropriate foreign policy; on the other hand, it also has to "quell" the POLs. The Chinese government tries to strike a balance between the "appeasing" and "quelling".

From 1996 to 2010, the Chinese government is getting more sophisticated in balancing the two aspects of "appeasing" and "quelling." After the POLs called for the assertive policy and criticized the government for not taking assertive stance in

1996, the government turned to be more assertively in the subsequent incidents. As the latest incident in 2010 showed, on one hand, the Chinese government followed the ladder of policy actions and eventually employed an “assertive policy” against Japan; on the other hand, with its assertive policy, the effort needed to “quell” domestic sentiments decreases. As a comparison, in 1996, however, when the government’s response to the crisis was undeveloped and unsystematic, the domestic sentiments waged against Japan demanded a lot of attention from the government to maintain its stability – this effort of “quelling” domestic demands lasted until 2004, when the protests of the DDM eventually caused the second crisis. In 1996, China had to face the challenge from domestic public activists criticizing the government for being “too soft” towards Japan. In the context of China with the memory of “one hundred years of humiliation,” this criticism undermines the legitimacy of the Chinese government.

Analysis of these narratives leads to two findings on China’s foreign policy on disputed islands. First, the Chinese government answers to its domestic public mobilization with “appeasement” in the form of assertive foreign policy, and also “quelling” domestic voices after the incidents are solved. The level of “appeasement” and “quelling” are negatively related: the more assertive policy the Chinese government adopts, the less resource needs to be spent on “quelling.” This is an interaction that will be summarized and captured in the revised version of Easton’s system theory, as shows in Part III.

Second, externally, the Chinese government reacts to Japan’s policy over the disputed islands. Specifically, the stronger position Japan takes on the disputed islands, the stronger Chinese domestic public mobilizations are, as a consequence, Chinese government has to either take a stronger policy against Japan as an “appeasement”

strategy, or spend more resources on “quelling” domestic public mobilization. Across these three incidents in the past 20 years, the Chinese government has learned to choose the former – i.e. to adopt much stronger, more assertive policies against Japan, instead of stricter domestic regulations on public mobilization.


These three incidents, however, do indicate a tendency in Chinese foreign policy making to “appease” public opinion and mobilization with stronger foreign policy, so the government can prevent the public from criticizing its being weak against Japan. Public opinion is always much stronger than what the government can adopt. Therefore, the government has to suppress the public mobilization if their policy does not help to “appease” the public. This finding, explains the phenomenon of a more assertive China Christensen described in 2010.

Appeasing

In 1996, the Chinese government reacted towards Japan’s actions over the Diaoyu Islands. However, the Chinese government’s actions were mostly passive and responsive. During the meanwhile, the public waged protests against Japan and also the Chinese government, criticizing it to be too weak towards Japan. The government then had to spend extra resources to quell the domestic public mobilization.

The criticism from the public on the Chinese government’s “being too soft” was strong. The Chinese government obtains its legitimacy by being nationalist, and had sworn to terminate the “hundred years of humiliation.” “Being soft” towards Japan was the issue that sparked the May 4 Movement or December 9 Movement under the ROC government, which were both waged by the people and the intellectuals.

Figure 7.1 1996 Time Lag and Willingness to embrace assertive policy as reactions



As Figure 7.1 shows, in 1996 when the government initiated the responses to Japanese actions, it started from low level of response – low-level of protest, emphasizing China’s historical sovereignty (symbolized in solid curve). However, days later, when the public mobilization was waged in mainland China on this dispute, they were advocating much stronger policy stances towards Japan (in dotted curve), including the use of military means to solve the dispute.

The expectation of the public was much “higher” than what the government did. In 1996, it was unlikely that China would wage a war against Japan considering China’s emphasis on stability in its foreign policy – and after a military crisis over Taiwan just months before. In that case, the government’s policy did not “appease” the public mobilization, therefore, while the government remains passive in responding to Japan’s actions, the public mobilization continued to surge (as the


figure 7.1 showed in dotted curve). Empirically, the surge of public mobilization was evidenced by mass protests in mainland China and Hong Kong, and also the foundation of an organization striving for the defense of the Diaoyu Islands, China Federation of Defending Diaoyu. In addition, a massive signing movement waged by POLs, like Mr. Tong Zeng and those World War II heroes' call of military methods from northern China's Helongjiang Province.

As the dispute developed in 1996, the government did not take any further actions against Japan. Therefore, its actions did not meet the demands of the public. To adopt the terminology from David Easton, the "output" of the black box was not sufficient to "appease" the demands from the "input" side. Therefore, what the government did was to quell the surged public mobilization and to bring the public mobilization into a controllable level after September 18 (as indicated in the circle in lower right of figure 7.1).

The intellectuals, however, were steady in providing "support" to the government. Their publications explored the historical evidence the Chinese government professed, and defended China's claims of sovereignty. Their analysis may have had an influence on the Chinese government, however, their publications indicate the attitude of Chinese intellectuals towards this dispute, i.e. China has indisputable sovereignty over the dispute, and meanwhile, this dispute is also a key issue in Sino-Japan relations. During the meanwhile, their findings are cited by both the government on official newspapers and the POLs, who made advocates citing the findings of the intellectuals. In this sense, the intellectuals are playing the role of mediating institutions, mediating the relationship between the public and the government with their research and findings defending China's sovereignty over the disputed islands.

The incident in 2004, however, was different from the one in 1996 in how it developed and then evaporated. As mentioned above, the public mobilization has been waged since 1996 over the Diaoyu Islands. The continual actions of DDM activists caused this incident. The government immediately responded to the actions of Japan (i.e. arrests) and by answering to the call of the public of releasing the DDM activists. As figure 7.2 shows, the government initiated strong policy towards Japan and when the public mobilization was waged against Japan, the incident already had ended. In David Easton's phrases, the political system generates "outputs" that appease the "demands" from the "input."

Figure 7.2 2004 Time Lag and Willingness to embrace assertive policy as reactions




The narratives of the Chinese government in 2004 were more accommodating of the public sentiment than in 1996. The Chinese government clearly demanded the

release of the arrested DDM activists, and before the public mobilized, Japan immediately released the seven activists. In this incident, China's policy was sufficient to "appease" the demands (or possible demands) of the public.

In Figure 7.2, the dotted curve indicates the activities of the public, in the form of several attempts to land on the disputed Diaoyu Islands. When the incident happened, almost immediately, the Chinese government (in solid line) responded with strong stance with nine times of protests in one day, demanding the release of Chinese citizens. After Japan agreed to the release, the public mobilization was immediately "appeased". In this case, David Easton's System Theory worked well. However, in reality, the Chinese government also spent some resources on subduing the public mobilization after the incident was solved.

In 2010, the government adopted the most assertive policy in these three incidents, and such an assertive policy prevented the necessity of quelling – after adopting the assertive policy, public mobilization, which came later, was mostly in the form of support to China's assertive foreign policy. This assertive policy of the Chinese government has "appeased" the demands of the public.

Figure 7.3 2010 Time Lag and the Willingness to embrace assertive policy as reactions



As figure 7.3 indicates, the government initiated strong stances, and increased its level of response gradually when Japan refused to release Mr. Zhan. This policy is so assertive that it did not even have any crossing points with the public mobilization. In other words, the policy had appeased the demands from the public with its assertive policy, and no resources needed to be spent on quelling any domestic public mobilization. The wave of public mobilization after the incident was started, but vanished soon in 2010 since the government has already resolved the dispute with it an assertive policy. However, the government also spent some time making sure mass protests would not turn into riots. Compared with 1996, however, this is less “political” since the government has already been strong towards Japan and achieved the goal of releasing arrested Chinese fisherman.

What the analysis above tells us is, while they have different narratives on the same issue, the government interacts with public opinion either through assertive

policy to “appease”, or to quell the domestic public mobilizations. In 1996, the government “quelled” instead of adopting a satisfactory policy to appease; in 2004, the government responded quickly to terminate public mobilization, in 2010, however, the government acted on its own and appeased the possible domestic mobilization quickly.

These three patterns of actions between the government and public opinion reveal several things. First, the public “demands” are for more assertive policy than the government. As Figure 7.1 and 7.2 revealed, while the government and the intellectuals’ narratives often emphasize historical and legal principles, the public narratives emphasize patriotism, and argue for strong policy actions including trade sanctions or military methods. However, by adopting assertive policy and being “strong” against Japan, the government prevents the public from criticizing it.

Second, from these texts and different policy preferences, we can tell that there is a time lag between the government policy and public opinion: when the incident happens, it is the government that first responds to the “actions” of the Japanese government. Public opinion usually explodes days or even weeks later, however, how the government responds directly influences the severity of the public opinion. How the government acts in an incident will create institutional memory that shapes how the public acts in incidents in the future.

Third, in China, appeasement may not be the only option that a policy system responds to “inputs”. Sometimes, the government may need to directly “quell” the input. When the government adopts assertive policy, the public is more likely to be appeased; on the contrary, if the government’s policy was low-level protests, it is likely that the public will wage much stronger mobilization, criticizing both Japan and the Chinese government.

Fourth, from 1996 till now, the government has learned to adopt assertive policy in order to appease domestic sentiments. By comparing these three incidents, we can tell that the Chinese government's action in 2010 was the most assertive one, and in this way, it successfully appeased domestic sentiments.

What this analysis suggests was that public opinion has an influence on China's foreign policy making – if the government does not listen to the domestic public opinion, it will have to spend resources on “quelling” them, as they did in 1996. However, such a role played by public opinion in Chinese foreign policy making towards Japan was “stagnant”. At least on the Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese government now knows about the public opinion, and understands how to act to prevent public mobilization from happening. In this sense, the government is striving to maintain its control by adopting assertive policies. This conclusion is supported by cross comparing the situations in these three incidents: China has the tendency of being more assertive on disputed islands. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, recent assertive policy on the Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal) dispute with the Philippines is more evidence showing this trend in Chinese foreign policy.

Quelling

What David Easton's System Theory is missing for the context of China, however, is another form of interaction between the political system and “inputs”. Other than using the policy “output” as a way to “appease” inputs, the government also quells the domestic public mobilization. This action of “quelling” is more likely to happen when the policy output was not sufficient to “appease” the public.

In Figure 7.1 – 7.3, those circles indicate the government’s direct interaction with the public, quelling the public mobilizations. Across these three incidents, however, the government adopted different quelling strategies.

On September 13, 1996, Mr. Tong Zeng, the DDM leader, was refused permission to protest when he applied for a permit protest on September 18.¹ On September 15, as the Institute of Social Science stated, Mr. Tong Zeng was sent out of Beijing to lessen his influence on mass protests. On September 20, 1996, the authorities refused to permit the protest in Peking University, and send police in several cities to watch the protestors. Therefore, in 1996, the government actively prevented the protests from happening.

In 2004, after the DDM activists arrived in Beijing and Shanghai on March 26, the authorities immediately took them into custody, denying a public reception which was planned by Chinese activists. The next day, Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxin met with the Japanese ambassador in China, Yoriko Kawaguchi, noting China’s appreciation for Japan’s immediate release of Chinese citizens and emphasizing the importance of Sino-Japan relations.² In 2004, the government’s quelling actions were less aggressive. Rather, with assertive policy, the public’s sentiments had been appeased (no massive protests criticizing the government as in 1996), therefore, the government made few efforts to manage social stability.

In 2010, however, after the government adopted assertive policies against Japan, the mass protests that came late were also quelled by the government. However, in this incident, the action of “quelling” was mostly to prevent them from turning into riots. Universities in major cities of China imposed curfews on their campus to

¹ “*Li Dai Bao Diao Shi Jian Ji Zai.*” Institute of Modern History. China Academy of Social Science. 2008-6-16.

² “Beiri feifa kouliude 7 ming zhongguo gongmin anxuan huilai” (Seven Chinese Activists who were Illegally Detained By Japan Return Home) Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) March 27, 2004. <<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/11645/1049678.html>>

prevent college students from protesting.³ Also in order to prevent students from participating in protests, the government required colleges and high schools in Changsha and Deyang to teach classes on the weekends.⁴ Similar to 2004, these quelling actions were not as aggressive as in 1996, but were adopted to serve the purpose of maintaining social stability.

These incidents all demonstrated the quelling of the Chinese government on public mobilization. Without powerful moderating institutions as in democracies, the government is able to adopt special strategies like imposing curfews on universities and changing school schedule to prevent mass protests from happening. The risk of allowing protests is risky for an authoritarian government.

The interaction of “quelling” was seen in all three incidents. The government does not want to see massive protests that may backfire the legitimacy of the government. However, the actions of “quelling” in these three incidents were different in nature: while in 1996, the “quelling” was towards domestic criticism on the Chinese government being too weak; in 2004 and 2010, after the government had solved the crisis, the actions of “quelling” were to manage the social stability and prevent the protests from going to extremes that could jeopardize social stability or challenge the government’s legitimacy – aversion towards public mobilization may be a trait of authoritarian states in China, either PRC or ROC government in the 1970s.⁵

At least three different techniques of “quelling” adopted by Chinese government can be documented, including using military police, “curfew” on campus, and relocating activists. Based on the government’s intention, they can be categorized into two main forms, one is the direct confrontation between the government and the

³ Shen Hua, “In order to Control Anti-japan protest, universities in China closed down” [*Kong zhi fanri youxing, zhongguo dabufen xuexiao fengxiao*] VOA News 2010-10-23.

⁴ “Deyang had massive anti-Japanese protests” BBC news (Chinese) , 2003-10-23.

⁵ As a DDM activist recalled, in 1971, the ROC government in Taiwan refused their application for protests against Japan’s actions on the Diaoyu islands. This description resembles what is happening nowadays in China. Taiwan, however, had its first democratic election in 1996.

public *when mobilizations happen* (use of military police), the other includes strategies that *prevent public mobilization from happening in advance* (curfew on campus, and relocating activists).

The existence of three quelling methods and the way the government adopted them in the three incidents indicate that the government is taking a position of permitting “moderate” level of protests. As the analysis reveals above, in 1996, the government dispatched police and relocated activists during and before the mobilization. In 2004 and 2010, however, the government adopted only “curfews” preventing students from participating in protests.

The government, however, does allow some public mobilizations to happen. For instances, China’s quelling did not happen until the happening of several major gatherings in major cities of China in 1996, and the burning of Japanese flag in 2004 and protest in major cities after 2010 incident. When the government is acting in response to public mobilization (as bottom-up theorists posit), the government also takes advantage of the public mobilization to achieve international gains. However, the government does not really play an active role in initiating protests against Japan as the top-down approach posits.

At the international level, these protests actually make the demand of Chinese government towards Japan more persuasive at the foreign policy level in a “two-level game.”

II. Memory of “Humiliation”: Japanese Action - Chinese Reaction model

The actions of Japan are the external impetus that begins the entire system of the policy making process. In this sense, the action-reaction model fundamentally

explains what policy China adopts policy. However, the actions of Japan impact Chinese politics with its influence exercised on both the government and the public. Therefore, the stronger Japan's action is, the stronger China's domestic public opinion is, and it pushes the Chinese government at a more difficult position of "appeasement" vs. "quelling."

To understand China's action towards Japan, it is good to start with a statement by Christensen: despite of more formidable US military force to China, Chinese analysts "view Japan with much less trust and, in many cases, with a loathing rarely found in their attitudes about the United States."⁶ According to Christensen, Chinese aversion towards Japan sprang from two aspects, one is the historical legacy and Japan's attitude towards historical issues; the other is a more imminent judgment on Japan's military power and potential.⁷

Context: "Japanese Side" as the Evil "Other"

Logically, in a dispute like this one over the Diaoyu Islands, China should blame the other party for the dispute, i.e. Japan. However, according to the data compiled from newspapers and remarks by MFA spokespersons, the subject of Chinese condemnation was usually "the Japanese side". More specifically, in the remarks by the MFA spokesperson, the term "Japanese side"[日方] seems to broadly include the Japanese government, the local Okinawan government (under which Japan claims the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are governed), the Japanese Coast Guard, or any interest groups from Japan. For example, these expressions are often mentioned: "the Japanese side shall correct their mistakes"⁸, "the Japanese side must apologize and

⁶ See pp. 52 in Christensen, Thomas. "Security Dilemmas in East Asia." *International Security* 23-4: 49-80.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 55.

⁸ 2010-09-22, MFA statement on the Diaoyu Islands.

compensate for what they have done to China”⁹, and “the behavior of the Japanese side has violated the territorial integrity of China and infringed the human rights of Chinese citizens.”¹⁰

Also, included in the “Japanese side”, the rightists of Japan are those who hold much stronger position on Japanese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. However, when they advocate Japanese sovereignty, or plan to land on the Diaoyu Islands, or suggest building beacons on the disputed islands, China’s response was a reiteration of the official position on the Diaoyu Islands, emphasizing its “indisputable sovereignty” over an “inherent territory of China” “since ancient times.”¹¹ However, what is interesting is a recent article published by the *People’s Daily* in 2012. After reporting the remarks by the MFA spokesperson, the *People’s Daily* analyzed the incident, pointing out that

“According to the police department of Okinawa, the Japanese government had been aware of the plan [of landing on the Diaoyu Islands], but it did not do anything to stop it, this inaction of the Japanese government caused noise and set obstacles for bilateral relations between Japan and China.”¹²

By saying this, China believes this incident of landing on the disputed Diaoyu Islands was actually consented to by the Japanese government. Therefore, the Japanese government shall be responsible for any actions that threaten the territorial integrity of China over the Diaoyu Islands.

In addition, it is interesting to note that when China makes statements against the action on the Diaoyu Islands by the “Japanese side”, the word “*anyone*” is often attached to the statement. On September 15, 2006, then MFA spokesperson Mr. Qin Gang responded to the comment by an American senator on the Diaoyu Islands, after

⁹ Official statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 25, 2010.

¹⁰ Remarks of the MFA spokeswoman, Ms. Zhang Qiyue on the Diaoyu Islands on September 25, 2010.

¹¹ 2012-1-3, Remarks by MFA spokesperson, Mr. Lu Lei.

¹² The *People’s Daily*, 2012-1-3, 03. Original text as “冲绳县警察本部3日发布的消息则证明，日本政府有关部门从事发开始就得到相关信息，明知登岛未经许可却听之任之，给中日关系大局再次平添噪音和障碍。”

presenting the traditional Chinese position on this dispute, Mr. Qin emphasized that

“*Anyone* who is attempting to challenge the Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands cannot change the basic fact that they are Chinese territory.”¹³

In 2010, then MFA spokeswoman, Ms. Jiang Yu also concludes her remark with this statement,

“The conspiracy by *anyone* to violate Chinese sovereignty on the Diaoyu Islands is in vain and invalid.”¹⁴

The usage of “*anyone*” here can be interpreted in two ways: first, it demonstrates the absolute determination of the Chinese government on the Diaoyu Islands. In this way, the spokespersons are speaking towards the existential threat, “the Japanese side”, which includes the Japanese government, and any Japanese groups. In addition, by emphasizing “*anyone*”, China reminds the Japanese government to be responsible for any actions conducted from “the Japanese side.” Second, the usage of “*anyone*” can be interpreted as an alert towards any other countries that are in territorial disputes with China (in the South China Sea for example). By reaffirming the absolute determination on sovereignty, China intends to deter anyone from contesting sovereignty over islands that China claims.

The Chinese people feel cold towards the “Japanese side”. Chinese intellectuals are usually more objective in assessing China and Japan relations than the public, who views Japan as the enemy. In late 2002, Ma Licheng, an editor of the *People’s Daily*, published an article “New Thinking on relations with Japan” (*Dui ri Guanxi Xinsiwei*). In this article, Ma described his trip to Japan, and advocated a rapprochement with Japan, criticizing Chinese “nationalist fanatics.” Ma believed that these irrational nationalist fanatics are the obstacles to a more cooperative relation with Japan.¹⁵

¹³ 2006-9-15, remarks by MFA spokesperson, Mr. Qin Gang.

¹⁴ 2010-12-18. Remarks of MFA spokeswoman, Ms. Jiangyu

¹⁵ Ma, Licheng, (2002) “New Thinking on the relation with Japan”. *Dui ri Guanxi Xin siwei*, published on

After this article was published, Mr. Ma soon received criticism, scolding, abusing, even life threat from the Chinese public. People called him “traitor”, net users posted articles denouncing his “new thinking” towards Japan, claiming that “Devils are devils” “we can never be friends with devils.”¹⁶

The word “devil” (*gui zi*) in the Chinese vocabulary is reserved for Japanese. The debate after Mr. Ma’s article reflects public opinion towards Japan. The “hatred” or extreme negative feeling the Chinese public has towards Japan seems to be a barrel of explosives that can be ignited by even a tiny, personal event.

The coldness of the Chinese towards Japan has also been supported by statistics. Lu Deping, in his survey on Beijing college students’ attitude towards Japan, reported that 93.5 percent of the participants agreed that Japan have “failed to face up sufficient to post wars.”¹⁷ Lu further concluded from the survey that China-Japan relation has “no cause for optimism,” because participants believed that Japan has not faced up history, rather, it acts arrogantly towards China in terms of historical issues. Worse still, participants believe that currently Japan has been trying to contain China.¹⁸

China’s anti-Japanese sentiment is so strong that it prevails in all aspects, not only political, but also in economic and cultural domains. In 2003 a famous Chinese actress Zhao Wei had a series of pictures taken for a fashion magazine, with her clothes decorated in a Japanese flag. Soon, the Chinese public waged a huge protest on cyberspace against Zhao Wei, who had been one of the most popular actresses in China in 2003. People asked her to apologize and radical nationalist even threw excrement on her. The public believed that a Chinese celebrity should never wear

Strategy and management 2002, 6.

¹⁶ Gries, Peter. (2005). “China’s ‘new thinking’ on Japan”. *The China Quarterly*, No. 184, pp. 831-850.

¹⁷ See pp. 57, Lu, Deping. (2003). “Japan in the Eyes of Beijing’s University Students.” *Chinese Education and Society*, vol. 36, no. 6, November/December 2003, pp. 55–65.

¹⁸ *Supra*, 64-65.

anything decorated with Japan's flag. Also in 2003, the explosion of a mustard gas bomb left by Japanese troops in World War II in Qiqihar, and a sex party organized by the Japanese on September 18 in Zhuhai both caused nation-wide protests and accusation of Japan.¹⁹

Economically, when political protests take place, a popular slogan asks the Chinese people to “boycott Japanese products” (*dizhi rihuo*). This has been a slogan used by patriotic protestors since the early twentieth century, however, it is still popular today. Using text messaging and social media, the slogan can transmit quickly. Though there is someone like Mr. Ma Licheng, and many more intellectuals who point out how infeasible and irrational, even naive it is to boycott Japanese products in the twenty-first century, these rational voices are soon submerged by the accusation of “traitors.” Mr. Ma Licheng, for example, had to leave Beijing shortly after his advocate of “new thinking” on relations with Japan, for the massive denunciation from the public calling him as a “traitor”. In 2003, when China was trying to build up bullet train system between Beijing and Shanghai, Chinese public waged another protest against Japanese-made products. A Chinese nationalist Feng Jinhua organized an online signature project to protest against the purchase of the Japanese bullet train (*Shinkansen*). Feng soon gathered about 100,000 signatures, and he sent them to Premier Wen Jiabao to demonstrate the opposition of the Chinese public against this possible billion-dollar contract with Japan. Feng believed his action made “significant influence”, which led to a Chinese government's official announcement stating the contract was postponed and China would listen to “the opinion of its people.”²⁰

¹⁹ Gries, Peter. (2005). “China's 'new thinking' on Japan”. *The China Quarterly*, No. 184, pp. 831-850.

²⁰ Li, Mujin. “Cyberspace nationalism led to a new chapter to Chinese nationalism” (*Wangluo minzuzhiyi xiankai zhongguo minzuzhiyi xinpianzhang*), published on *International Herald Tribune (Guoji xianqu daobao)*, Beijing. 2003-9-18.

Action-Reaction Model and the Two-Level Game

In this context, the actions of Japan over the Diaoyu Islands reminds the Chinese public of the “hundred years of humiliation,” when Japan committed massive atrocities against China. Therefore, the Chinese public reacts with their narratives and demands for strong policy; while the Chinese government has to react to Japan’s actions with strong policies, facing the trade-off of “appeasing” and “quelling” domestically.

The action-reaction model addresses China’s policies towards Japan over the disputed islands. After all, without the “actions” initiated by Japan, China would rather set aside the Diaoyu Islands dispute. As Mr. Deng Xiaoping said in the 1970s, China and Japan could “shelve” the dispute and focus on bilateral relations in the long term. With China’s diplomacy principle emphasizing “stability”, it is not hard to imagine the aversion of the Chinese government to see any incident on the Diaoyu Islands.

However, when Japan “acts” with respect to the disputed islands, China has to “react”. However, China’s “reaction” is proportionate to Japan’s action: the stronger Japan acts over the Diaoyu Islands, the stronger China will rebound. China’s possible “rebounds” are listed in the ladder of policy actions in Chapter 4, from the low-level protest to highest one of war. From the Japanese side, however, what is least tolerable for China seems to be “jurisdiction” issues with arrests, on the other extreme of “tolerable” would be the symbolic issues. For instance, in 2006 the Chinese public lacked interest for Japan’s unilateral symbolic actions of “flying over” the Diaoyu Islands. But when they do anything that changes the *status quo* of the islands situation, China is strongly offended. The “*status quo*” includes the ambiguity of sovereignty (per the consensus of shelving the dispute). However, when some citizens are arrested

for fishing, or landing on Japanese territory, and he/she will be trialed under the Japanese jurisdiction (in 2004 and 2010), China will be offended. These issues are what I call “jurisdiction” issues. China’s reaction will be much stronger on such issues. Nowadays, China has demonstrated more aversion towards Japan’s challenge on jurisdiction issues. For example, China’s frequent use of the word “legal” after the 2010 incident is an evidence of the Chinese government’s emphasis on its intact “jurisdiction” over the Diaoyu Islands.

Such a covariance between Japan’s actions and China’s reactions indicates the validity of the action-reaction model in explaining China’s foreign policy making. However, when China reacts to Japan’s actions, where would it stop at? This is like a strong teenager showing his fist to his friend, but would he really attack? To analyze this “limit” is crucial to understand how China will balance “appeasement” and “quell” in the future. I would argue, the Chinese government is testing Japanese actions and domestic pressure against its policy principle for stability. In 2010, China has realized that it has to sacrifice some “stability” for appeasing domestic public sentiments.

On the other hand, however, the Chinese government also uses domestic public mobilization as a win-set in its negotiations with Japan. As mentioned above, despite of the quell, the Chinese government also allows for some mass protests in China, and in their negotiations, the domestic pressure becomes an important reason why China has to take assertive policies, to show to their counterparts that the government is actually constrained by public opinion.²¹ In the context of China, however, it is less about a win-set; rather, the government wants to explain to Japan why assertive policies need to be adopted, so a peaceful bilateral relationship can be maintained in the long run.

²¹ Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 42 (1988): 427–460.

III. Framework: Integrating the Two-level Game in the System Theory


Table 7.3 Elements of the Systems Theory

Year	Public Demands	Support	Outputs	In the Political System	Response to Demands
1996	Military troops on the Diaoyu	From Intellectuals	Low-Level Protest	unsystematic	Quell
2004	Release detained activists	From Intellectuals	High-level Protest	swift	Appeasement/quell
2010	Release detained fisherman	From Intellectuals	Countermeasures	assertive	Appeasement

The previous version of the Systems Theory is “too abstract to be wrong.” For instance, the feedback loop in previous version was abstract, but it does not specify how the government interacts with support and demands from the “input” side. In order to capture the nuances of Chinese foreign policy making, I propose a revised version of David Easton’s System Theory, integrating the “two-level game”, which links domestic policy with foreign policy.

Figure 7.4 presents the framework.

Figure 7.4 Revised Systems Theory for Analyzing Chinese Foreign Policy Making



This revised version of the Systems Theory has several revisions that denote the interaction in China’s foreign policy making. First, I broke down the “feedback” loop into two, the “quelling (2)” and the “appeasing”. These two arrows symbolize that the Chinese government decide to either use assertive policy to appease the demands from the public, or to adopt quelling strategy to suppress the public’s demands. These two kinds of policy output cancel each other: when the government does not appease, it has to spend more resources on quelling, as happened in 1996; in contrary, if the government appeases the public, the quelling arrow shrinks – the government needs to adopt some quelling actions to prevent protests turning into riots, as happened in 2004 and 2010. While they both are “policy outputs”, quelling has more domestic implication than “appeasement”. Meanwhile, appeasement impacts the foreign environment more profoundly: assertive policy impacts the environment, causing a similar Systems Theory functioning in Japan for example.

Second, a small arrow, the “quelling (1)” arrow is added between “political

system” and “domestic environment”. This arrow symbolizes the policy of “quelling” public mobilization by the Chinese government before it makes any policy outputs. Theoretically, the government may decide to suppress the domestic mobilization before it takes any action over the disputed islands. It has not been observed in the disputed islands in the past two decades in China, however, in 1919, the May 4 movement was an example, when the government decided to quell domestic mobilization even before it took any foreign policies against Japan’s actions in Shandong province. This arrow symbolizes something that can happen, but in these three incidents over the Diaoyu Islands, it has not been activated yet.


The third arrow on the top of the figure 7.4 is symmetrical to the “appeasement” arrow in Easton’s original version of System Theory. This “reaction” arrow denotes the impact of China’s foreign policy (“output”) on the foreign environment.

When the government enacts a foreign policy, the output impacts the environment. This impact was believed by Easton to be the reason why the policy system continues endlessly: when the policy outputs impact the environment, it creates opportunities for new inputs to generate. In the context of Chinese foreign policy making, this interaction between “output” and “environment” needs to be highlighted. When China takes actions over the disputed islands, the actions impact the external environment, including Japanese domestic politics and other island disputes China is involved in. As discussed in the second part of this chapter, the actions of Japan are the external impetus that gets the entire process of system theory working. Therefore, the actions of Japan over the Diaoyu islands (including but not limited to arresting Chinese citizens and landing on the disputed islands) are what stimulate the “input” from domestic side of China.

This model repeats among multiple incidents. After an incident, what happened in previous incident will have impact on the next around of Systems Theory in the next dispute incident. Previous output and appeasement are remembered by the public, and also are integrated into the new “environment” by creating what I call “institutional memory.” Institutional memory includes those memory actors have about previous incidents, over the other actors’ actions, consequences and strategies adopted by actors. For example, after 1996, with the weak stance of the Chinese government and its quelling actions towards domestic mobilization as memory, POLs implemented plans to land on the disputed Diaoyu Islands, and their success eventually led to another incident in 2004. The consequence of institutional memory may entail more/less hostility between the public and the government, more/less trust among domestic actors, or more/less communication between states.

In this sense, each incident is not isolated; rather, it influences future actions of all actors in the incident. The accumulative nature of impact from each incident also indicates that there is possibility that the “institutional memory” may explode at other incidents, such as disputes over other issues. On the China-Japan relations, for example, 2005 protests in China was an example.

Figure 7.5 Repetition of the Systems Theory in Multiple Incidents.



When the Chinese government takes policy actions towards Japan, the policy actions (“outputs”) also impact the foreign environment, and may stimulate another Systems Theory to function in other countries. For example, in 1996, such an impact was increasingly aggressive Japanese policy on the disputed islands; in 2010, however, the impact was series of protests in major cities of Japan in October, with protestors

criticizing the Japanese government as “soft.”²² However, different from in China, they can demonstrate their sentiments in the next election.

Figure 7.6 Protests of the Japanese in October, 2010 in Tokyo



(Slogan written: “China has invaded Japanese Senkaku Islands.” “Japanese citizens must defend our territory.”)

During the meanwhile, however, this arrow also transfers messages between domestic and foreign actors in a way similar to Putnam’s “two-level game.” By allowing public mobilization and demonstrations of domestic sentiments, the Chinese government shows Japan that it is acknowledging its domestic public opinion. In this sense, it ameliorates the relations and confirms the government’s legitimacy. But when the demonstration has been “sufficient” to get Japan to step back, the Chinese government soon quells public mobilization. In the most recent case in 2010, the Chinese government implemented curfews on universities and controlled protests in major cities.

²² “Rally for Senkakus” *Japan Today*. October 3, 2010.

Conclusion

“The longer that China refrains from directly challenging Japan’s ‘effective control’ over the islands, the more consolidated and internationally recognized Japan’s title to the islands is likely to become through the legal principle of ‘acquisitive prescription.’”²³ Hagstorn’s concern may be true, the longer China remains quiet on the disputed islands, the more consolidated Japan’s *de facto* control over them is. And the Chinese government has not yet aggressively acted on the disputed Diaoyu Islands yet. However, from what we saw in the past twenty years over the Diaoyu Islands, this concern may ignore some important facts: Chinese policy activists never leave the disputed islands aside, and when Japan “acts”, the Chinese government always “reacts” promptly. Moreover, the Chinese government’s policy over the disputed islands has been more assertive in the past years, along with China’s foreign policy getting more assertive in general.

Between the bottom-up and top-down approaches, I acknowledge that they both have validity when addressing the Chinese foreign policy making. However, what I have revealed from the three incidents over the Diaoyu Islands dispute is more leaning toward the argument of bottom-up approach: the public sentiment against Japan has been there, and it ignites and erupts when the external factors irritate China. Nonetheless, the validity of top-down approach is also felt: at least, the government can control where the public sentiment is erupting towards. In this sense, the government can “manage” while acting towards the public opinion, which erupts from bottom to the top.

With the government’s assertive policy as the output, POLs and the public seem to be functioning as the causes. However, between POLs and the public, which is

²³ Linus Hagstrom, “Quiet power: Japan’s China policy in Regard to the Pinnacle Islands,” *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 18 No. 2 (June 2005): 176.

causing which? This remains a puzzle, however, I would point out two scenarios to understand the interaction: If the dispute is towards the salient ends (involving jurisdiction issues, for instance), the public will mobilize and then they lend strength to POLs; however, on those issues leaning towards non-salient issues (symbolic, for instance), it is the POLs who first mobilize, and they sometime can mobilize the public, but most of the time, they cannot.

These two forms of interaction are subject to many factors in domestic politics, including economic development, and government control. And these interactions allow future research on the domestic side of island disputes.

As I analyzed in this chapter, when Japan “acts” over the disputed islands, “the environment” gets the entire “system theory” in China to work. The impact from Japan is not only on the government, but also on Chinese public opinion. With the memory of the “hundred years of humiliation” and bad feelings towards Japan, public opinion explodes usually days or weeks after the Chinese government reacts to Japan’s action. With their demands almost always more assertive than the Chinese government can take, the Chinese government has to take assertive policy against Japan in order to “appease” its domestic public opinion. If China does not react, or reacts not strongly enough, the public will wage mobilization criticizes the government, which requires the Chinese government to spend extra resources on “quelling” domestic mobilization. Chinese intellectuals, however, almost always support the Chinese government’s positions and stances by providing their historical and legal findings.

During the meanwhile, the Chinese government lets some public opinion to prove its domestic pressure when negotiating with Japan. These public mobilization shows that Chinese government is under pressure to do so, so bilateral relations will not be

hurt severely. As in 2004, China immediately turned to Japan for appreciation and building up long-term bilateral relations. When the incident is solved by Chinese government, it soon quells any domestic mobilization that may turn into riots.

To compare the finding of this chapter to the System Theory of Easton, the connection between “input” and “output” in the original version needs to be elaborated. When the public and the intellectuals provide “input”, it is the government in the “black box” that decides what “outputs” to adopt. However, it should be noted that the government is subject to “inputs” from two layers of the environment: one domestic and the other foreign. These two sets of inputs do interact: the stronger the foreign impetus is, the stronger the domestic demands will be. When the Japanese government acts over the disputed islands, it provides an external impetus for the domestic “input” to start, and the domestic “input” will be activated. The government in the black box will have to decide what “outputs” to take in order to “appease” the domestic “input.” What if the government’s output cannot sufficiently appease the domestic input? The public’s demands will then turn towards the government in the black box, as in 1996, which threatened the legitimacy of the government in an authoritarian state. If that happens, the government has to spend extra resources to “quell” the domestic demands.

During the meanwhile, the “output” will also impact the foreign environment in an action-reaction model; strong reactions will impact the domestic politics of the foreign country as well. With an assertive output at the domestic pressure, however, the government is also able to demonstrate the pressure the government feels, therefore, it can repair the bilateral relations if necessary (as in 2004).

I have included these nuanced interactions between the government and the public in China in a revised version of System Theory, adding two arrows in the graph

(7.4). However, how does this graph apply to other islands dispute China is involved in, or even over Chinese foreign policy in general?

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION

China is more assertive than it was in the 1990s. Why is China more assertive? This is a question that has perplexed many scholars. Christensen (2010) for example, argued that this is a tendency explained by China's more nationalist public opinion from its domestic side: public opinion, reflected in public mobilizations, exercises its influence on Chinese foreign policy making. According to Christensen, this tendency is not necessarily a bad thing, because it allows China to express clearly what it wants.

To respond to the research questions stated in Chapter 4 in a nutshell, the Chinese government and the public do have different narratives, with the public asking for more assertive policies than what the government can produce. In a crisis, the government may either appease public demands with assertive foreign policy or directly quell the domestic demands. By adopting assertive policies against Japan, the Chinese government is more likely to appease the public's demands and have their sentiments erupted towards Japan rather than the Chinese government.

In previous chapter, I have illustrated these interactions in a revised model of the Systems Theory. Towards the discussion on bottom-up and top-down approaches in China's foreign policy making, the revised Systems Theory is designed to depict the overlapping area of top-down and bottom-up approaches of China's public mobilization, and offer a strong tool for depicting the Chinese foreign policy making process. It has specific emphasis on foreign policy issues that can agitate domestic public sentiments. While bottom-up is proved more valid in describing how the public mobilization of China erupts, top-down approach has its validity also. However, there does not seem to be powerful evidence to prove that the government really wanted

those public mobilizations. The government just takes advantages of those mobilizations after it can control them confidently.

However, the bottom-up approach may also be strengthened by integrating the role played by the government. Revised systems theory bridges the gap of these two approaches. However, it still needs future testing on various topics. As stated below, the generalizability of this model still needs work by applying it to more policy arenas.

I. Empirical Findings

In this dissertation I use narrative analysis to determine the right model that can describe and explain the increased assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy actions, with the Diaoyu Islands dispute as the case in question. This is important work because Easton presumes a unitary black box actor, but he applied it to American democracy regimes that have more than one actor and these actors are moderating forces. In this dissertation I test the Systems Theory in an authoritarian government, which has no established moderating forces – and weak mediating institutions. I found that the “black box” metaphor can still be applied in the Chinese context, and also the inputs are transformed into output by the opaque decision making process in the black box. In this sense, the Systems Theory has some explanatory power in an authoritarian state. However, I discovered that by integrating two arrows in the Systems Theory model, it functions as a more robust tool for explaining foreign policy making in the Chinese context. The first set of arrows denotes “quelling”, in addition to “appeasing” as another form of interaction between the “political system” and the “input”, replacing the feedback loop in original version of the Systems Theory.

The second arrow symbolizes the impact of “output” on the foreign government, and it entails a two-level game incorporating the domestic politics and foreign politics of China. With this arrow, the Chinese government is allowing domestic “input” to add some win-set for negotiation, and also it cites the “input” in order to maintain long-term stability in bilateral relations.

In order to support the necessity and accuracy of these arrows, I followed the following structure in this dissertation. The nature of the Chinese government, structure and the role and strength of mediating institutions is the focus of Chapter 2. Chapter 2 also provides the background information necessary to describe the historic relationships between China and Japan. The chronological review of the “hundred years of humiliation” in China (1842-1949) offers the background for understanding Chinese negative sentiments towards Japan. While the changes in political regimes in China can provide a partial explanation for more assertive foreign policy, history is a powerful path-dependent predictor, especially when one takes into consideration the effects of the collective psyche of the Chinese people following the 100 years of humiliation.

This is witnessed, in particular, by the increasingly contested relationships occurring since 1996 related to the Diayou Islands. I use temporal analysis in Chapter 5 to demonstrate that there are nuanced, but significant evolutions in Chinese narratives and policy action responses regarding to the three major Diayou Island crises (1996, 2004 and 2010).

The Chinese government is fortunate to receive the consistent support of the intellectuals, as demonstrated in Chapter 6. However, the analysis in Chapter 6 also reveals that the Chinese government has learned about public opinion, and actually has been accommodating public opinion with more assertive policies. Analysis of

public opinion narratives shows that the public usually asks for assertive policies from the Chinese government in front of Japan, and especially, POLs believe an assertive policy is the patriotic way to react to Japan. These narratives and calls for policy actions build upon nationalist and patriotic sentiment and frequently result in calls for escalated policy actions by the government. This finding actually indicates that the political system is responding to the “demands” in “input”, as the Systems Theory indicated.

How does the government respond? This is the focus of Chapter 7. First I conduct a side by side analysis of the policy narratives of government, intellectuals and POL’s showing where there are differences and the nature of the differences. Then I document the time lag that can explain differences, suggesting that the government takes foreign policy actions that are different at later points in time in 2010. With this evidence, I conclude that in order to maintain its legitimacy, the Chinese government’s policy actions are designed more to “appease” than to “quell” public demands for assertive foreign policy. In addition, I acknowledge the validity of the action-reaction model in Chapter 7. When Japan acts over the disputed Diaoyu Islands, China’s response is “proportionate” to Japan’s actions. Generally, the Chinese government and the public are likely to be irritated by Japan’s actions involving “jurisdictions.” Primarily, incidents featured by Chinese citizens being arrested are the top reason that upsets China. Following issues of arrest, those Japanese actions that change the “status quo” of the disputed islands, for instances, erecting beacons, displaying flags, are also concerned by the Chinese government and the public, with the intellectuals supporting the government’s claims.

After Japan acts over the disputed islands, the Systems Theory functions in Chinese domestic politics in addition to the bilateral foreign policy arena. *The*

stronger Japan's actions are, the stronger public opinion towards Japan is, and therefore POLs push for much stronger policy from the Chinese government, and the Chinese government has to take more assertive stance in order to "appease" strong domestic sentiment. During the meanwhile, whenever Japan acts, the public will respond with advocate for strong policies against Japan, who was the country blamed for China's "one hundred years of humiliation." The public's call pushes government for assertive policies. However, the public's demands are stagnant – the government knows what they would demand when an incident breaks out. Therefore, the best way to prevent public mobilization from happening, which can expand to other domestic policy actions by the government, is to adopt assertive policies against Japan and resolve the dispute as soon as possible.

Using a two-level game to enhance Easton's model's explanatory power, in Chapter 7 I suggest the overlay of a two-level game (drawn from Putnam's theory) in Easton's Systems Theory. Instead of the "ratification" at Level II (domestic) that unites constituents for more win-sets at Level I (foreign policy) as Putnam stated, in China, this "ratification" (which is inherently "consensus") between the government and the public is achieved through an interaction between the public mobilization and government's quelling: the ratification is eventually made at a point comfortable for both the government and the public. At the end of chapter 7, I presented my revised version of Systems Theory, with two more arrows denoting, respectively, the interaction between the Chinese government and the public, and interaction between Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy.

II. Theoretical Contribution of this Analysis

In his article proposing the framework of two-level games, Putnam said while the domestic politics and foreign politics entangle, “it is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determines international relations, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly ‘Both, sometimes.’”¹ What is more interesting question according to Putnam are “when?” and “how?” Therefore, Putnam proposed the “two-level game” to address the “when” and “how” question in the entanglement between domestic and foreign politics.

The entanglement between domestic and foreign politics is a topic that links discussions of public opinion with those of international relations. However, in authoritarian states, research on this entanglement remains insufficient. I aim at filling this gap by integrating the two-level game in a revised version of Easton’s Systems Theory. While either one of them is insufficient for explaining Chinese foreign policy making, an integration of them yields a robust model for addressing this gap of knowledge. This project therefore makes contributions in the following five aspects.

First, this dissertation applies Easton’s Systems Theory to an authoritarian country. Since the Systems Theory was proposed by Easton, it has influenced the discipline of public policy. However, its drawbacks are also often the subject of discussion about the remedies that could alleviate them. Kingdon’s multiple-streams theory, for example is one of those remedies. However, in this project, I reveal how the Systems Theory can be used to address policy process in an authoritarian state like China with some modifications. The concept of the “black box” in Systems Theory is useful and appropriate for policy analysis in an authoritarian state like China. What this dissertation contributes, therefore, is the endeavor for systematic analysis of an

¹ Pp. 437 in Putnam, Robert. (1988). “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games.” *International Organization* 42, 3: 437-460.

authoritarian state's policy using the Systems Theory.

Second, this project documents the rising influence of Chinese POLs as a mediating institution. By summarizing and analyzing narratives from the government, intellectuals and the public, I reveal their narratives as well as policy preferences at incidents. What the summary and analysis reveal, however, is the rising influence of the POLs. With the Internet and technology, POLs make themselves known to the public, and their advocates arouse the public sentiment towards “the others” in disputes. The government acknowledges their presence and has to quell their advocate when their advocates challenge the government's legitimacy. Their presence and activity demand the Chinese government to maintain an assertive stance towards Japan.

Third, I note that Chinese intellectuals are also mediating institutions, but they are not a domestic policy threat for the government. Their narratives expand the rationales that can be used by the Chinese government to leverage politics and policy. Their research is almost always supportive of China's claim of the disputed islands. In this research, which draws upon articles published on China's “core journals”, there is not a single one that objects to the Chinese government's claim of sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. By documenting their publications over the Diaoyu Islands since 1996, I present the attitude of Chinese intellectuals on this dispute. This summary also lays a foundation for future analysis of Chinese intellectuals' role in Chinese foreign policy making.

Fourth, I present a model that captures the nuances in Chinese foreign policy making. As my dissertation reveals, the Chinese government responds to island disputes in two dilemmas: one is “to appease” or “to quell”, the other is “to meet domestic demands” and “to maintain long-term relations at foreign policy aspect.”

Without nation-wide electoral institution, the Chinese government has to carefully “appease” public opinion, which asks the government to be assertive. On the other hand, the government still maintains its stability-oriented foreign policy principle established by Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s while it is adopting assertive foreign policy. These nuanced dilemmas are illustrated in the revised model of Easton’s Systems Theory, which shed light on policy analysis in the authoritarian state of China.

The enhanced Easton’s System Theory is the key product generated in this dissertation. I adopt Easton’s concept of the “black box” for the policy making process in an authoritarian state. I also believe that the “inputs” and “outputs” are useful concepts to describe policy process in China. While the intellectuals and the public offer “support” and “demands” as “input” for the black box, the policy actions taken by the Chinese government are best known as the “outputs”. “Outputs” impact on the environment and also appeases the “input”. However, I added two arrows in the original version to illustrate policy making in an authoritarian state, first, the government also directly “quells” the “input”. Second, the policy “output” has an impact on the foreign “environment” in a two-level game, impacting Japan’s domestic policy, and also by allowing public mobilization to a manageable extent, it demonstrates foreign government(s) the “dilemma” the Chinese government is facing so bilateral relations are not severely harmed. This model captures the nuanced interaction among the Chinese government, Japanese government, and the Chinese public. What this model reveals about Chinese policy making also leads to practical implications for policy makers of both China and other countries.

III. Practical Implications of this Research

What does the research reveal about democratization process in China? While this research is not sufficient to illuminate the trajectory of Chinese politics in the future, however, it lays the basis for future investigation.

First, the government is listening to the public. As many China scholars have found, this is happening due to the leadership change and technological development. And my research has revealed this trend.

Second, the government is adjusting its policy following the public. The government is adjusting its policy to appease the public's calls. My research reveals the existence of such a trend in islands disputes with Japan.

As those eras with strong leaders are gone, so are those days when the government made policy totally ignoring the public opinions. This is definitely a signal of being less authoritarian than before.

However, this does not indicate democratization will take place soon. Rather, it shows tendency towards that end. In order to reveal whether this trend will eventually lead China to democracy, we still need findings on many other issues, including social media, and Chinese government's behavior on domestic issues, and other foreign policy issues. But my approach has offered methods for investigating future government actions, for example, on the Spratly Islands with the Philippines and Taiwan, and other domestic issues.

Furthermore, my dissertation yields several implications for policy makers. I categorized them into two paragraphs, one is for China, the other for "the rest of the world," who are (or will be) interested or influenced by a more assertive China.

One thing that this research detects, but was not able to systematically analyze was the influence of social media during the last two incidents over the Diaoyu

Islands (the Internet was not popular in China in 1996). However, it is an undeniable fact that recently social media's influence has increased, and more and more people have learned about the Diaoyu Islands. In China, social media will include the *Microblog* (Chinese version of Twitter), *Renren* (Chinese version of Facebook) and numerous Bulletin Board Systems (BBS). While censorship may serve the government's purpose in quelling public mobilization, and by blocking posts on social media, the government may prevent mass protests from happening, nonetheless, it also undermines the government's legitimacy by blocking people's access to information. Assertive policies adopted recently by the Chinese government may secure its image as a nationalist government that can and will terminate China's humiliation in history. However, by blocking people's access to information, it undermines the public's perception of the government as a government willing to listen to its people. As revealed in my dissertation, public mobilization is often organized by POLs, including active college students. When the government controls social media and makes the official media as the only source of information, it allows people to question the validity of "official media." But do the official media have enough credibility among the public? It probably does not when all other narratives are censored. POLs, however, then become a narrow source that funnels the information to the public. Their possible distortions of the information may cause a bigger mobilization among the public. Therefore, it is wise for the government to stop censorship on social media and let all sources of information flow.

For the rest of the world, however, an assertive China is not necessarily a bad thing – if the government is influenced by public opinion, rather than a narrow group of hardcore nationalists. First, it should be acknowledged that more assertive foreign

policies do not indicate China has abandoned its pursuit of world stability in foreign policy; rather, the Chinese government is responding to its domestic pressure, mostly from the public. The Chinese government does not want to see radical changes in its foreign policy, therefore, it will utilize its resources to quell the domestic sentiment after it feels secure about its legitimacy in front of the public and makes sure it can control the public sentiment.

Second, for countries currently in islands dispute against China, for example, Japan, Philippines and Vietnam, what upsets China most are those actions that change the *status quo*. After the public gets upset, the Chinese government almost has to respond with assertive policies. Recently, sanctions of banana imports from the Philippines offer a good example, when Philippine stood against China over the Huangyan Island in South China Sea, China quickly responded with trade sanctions on imported Philippine bananas. The other countries may view China's actions as endeavors to change the *status quo*.

Therefore, it becomes necessary to understand whether the Chinese government's actions are pushed by its domestic politics, or whether the government has clear intentions to change the *status quo*. Though the task is hard, it must start with an investigation of the public's sentiments and evaluate the position of the Chinese government. This dissertation offers a framework that can be utilized to understand the interaction between the government and the public when a crisis happens.

Third, future foreign policy of China can be determined by the domestic call for assertive policies and the adherence of the Chinese government on stability-oriented policy. Since Deng established the principle for Chinese foreign policy, the Chinese government has sought to maintain regional stability for its economic development. Meanwhile, with its economic growth rate has been at double digits for the past two

decades, domestic calls for more assertive policies has pushed the Chinese government towards the assertive end. While China wants to maintain stability, it has also become more assertive than it was before (say in 1996). Future Chinese foreign policy will be dictated by a compromise between domestic pressure and the government's willingness to maintain stability. However, based on the research of these three incidents, domestic pressure is pushing this "compromise" towards a limit of what the principle of "maintaining stability" can tolerate.

Despite of these implications generated from this dissertation, this project faces several challenges in both internal and external validity.

IV. Threats to Internal and External Validity

I acknowledge several threats towards this research project that limit the validity and generalizability of the findings.

First, reliability of data: in order to replicate the research, researchers will need to gather narratives from the government, intellectuals and the public. Obstacles to replication may suffer from limits in two aspects: first, the language barrier. The Chinese language is more abstract than the English language; therefore, the exact same word may be interpreted differently to include different meanings, and a common usage of a phrase may have implications that are not easily caught by non-native speakers. For instance, in this project, the Chinese government mentioned the word "Japanese side" as the "other" in the dispute. This saying actually replaced a more common expression of "Japan", but includes local governments and interest groups in Japan. With this saying, China treats Japan as a homogenous entity. Therefore, when replicating, it is important to understand the cultural background and

idiomatic implications. Second, the narratives of the public are hard to replicate. Among the three actors, the government's official speeches are concise and carefully-drafted, the intellectuals' publications are well documented, the narratives of the public, however, are hard to capture. Measuring public opinion is a daunting task in all countries, and it is even more challenging in authoritarian states due to the censorship of media and control of protests. In this project, I relied on POLs as a proxy to gauge the public opinion. Their opinions and actions are posted on their website and interviews, their advocates are also recorded by media from outside China (VOA, BBC for example). However, when replicating the research, researchers may find it difficult to gather identical reports. In this project, I have noted the methods for gathering the data in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, which hopefully will facilitate research replication.

Second, as a dissertation on a current dispute, this project may suffer from inter-reader biases. Specifically, for example, some Japanese readers may find it hard to accept the saying that they were mostly responsible for China's memory of the "hundred years of humiliation," and they might be perplexed as to why China keeps demanding Japanese apology for what they did in World War II. Some Taiwanese (part of China) may view Taiwan as an independent country contesting the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands with mainland China and Japan. Despite of possible different viewers' bias at this project, I believe facts can best speak for the situation. Therefore, in this project I avoid using subjective adjectives – whenever I have to, I try to cite it from the description of other authors. In Chapter 2, for instance, I minimize my own bias when discussing the Nanking Massacre by citing the other authors who have worked on this topic, instead of making my own narratives.²

² This was one of the cruelest war crimes in human history, and Japan has yet to officially apologize.

Externally, generalizations of findings in this project may be limited. My findings may extend to other island disputes China is facing, other kinds of disputes China is involved in, or to other authoritarian regimes. However, the generalizability of findings is limited in two ways. First, this project is limited to certain background(s). For example, what has happened with the Diaoyu Islands may not be repeated in other disputes, where China does not have such negative sentiments towards Japan. However, such analysis is valuable for “generalizing” a specific pattern of narratives. For instance, speeches emphasizing national pride and historical sovereignty in the Diaoyu Islands will offer insights for understanding disputes with similar historical backgrounds in other countries. For example, findings on the dispute between China and Japan inform us why and how the Liancourt Islands³ dispute between Japan and Korea happened, and why Koreans waged massive protests against Japan.⁴

Second, to generalize findings in this project to other island disputes and other forms of disputes China is facing needs work. China adopted a different approach when solving territorial disputes in its northern border with Russia, for example. Other variables, including power ratios in a dispute, existence of institutions and perception of China towards its opponent all play a role in explaining how and why China adopts certain policy but not the others. In a word, policy analysis requires consideration and investigation on a case-by-case basis.

After all, this project offers a solid basis for future research on these topics including other islands disputes of China, and Chinese foreign policy making. What this project reveals is a model that integrates the domestic politics with foreign policy making in China, where the decision making process is still hidden in a “black box.” This enhanced model of Systems Theory reveals that foreign policy making in China

³ Korea calls them “Solitary Islands”, while Japan names them as “Bamboo Islands”.

⁴ Korea was annexed and colonized by Japan since 1910, until it gains its independence after Japan surrendered in 1945. .

is reactive to external impetus and also susceptible to its domestic public opinion. The external impetus, public opinion and government actions are in a positively proportionate correlation. In the domain of China's Japan policy, this correlation is especially robust considering the historical memory China has towards Japan. On the basis of this revised version of systems theory, future research can be conducted following several paths.

V. Future research

This revised version of Systems Theory lays the foundation for future research on topics including Chinese foreign policy and Chinese domestic policy, especially when international disputes involving China break out. Beginning with the findings of this project, I foresee three topics that can be further developed by testing the model.

First, China and other island disputes: China is currently facing another island dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. As opposed to the Diaoyu Islands, the dispute over the Spratly Islands is multilateral, directly involving China, Vietnam, Philippine, and indirectly involving the United States. Therefore, in order to conduct a thorough analysis of China's actions over the Spratly islands, my enhanced model of Systems Theory helps to analyze when and why China takes assertive actions towards these countries.

Recently, China adopted some assertive policies against the Philippines after the Philippine government announced that the Huangyan Island, which is 124 miles from the west coast of the Philippine Province of Zambales, was part of its territory. China refrained from direct confrontation, but adopted a series of actions criticizing the Philippine government, including public criticism by the MFA, and the banana

embargo. These actions and China's narratives can be tested using the revised model of Systems Theory produced in this dissertation.

In addition, the role played by the United States in the dispute over the Spratly Islands can also be addressed by referring to this model. Whenever the United States makes a comment over the Spratly islands, the Chinese public responds with comments expressing their sentiments. China's anti-America sentiment is by no means as strong as that towards Japan, but it is perhaps much stronger than towards the Philippines, which is a small state that has never been a target of Chinese nationalism in history.⁵

The multilateral relations over the Spratly Islands offer several dyads of international relations for research. In June 2012, China's confrontation of the Philippines is still ongoing. When the current crisis ends, an analysis of China's actions against the Philippines, and a comparison of China's actions in that dispute and in the Diaoyu Islands dispute against Japan will help to configure a bigger piece of the jigsaw puzzle of China's foreign policy making. Future research on China's actions in islands disputes, on the basis of the findings in this project, can be developed after the current dispute over the Spratly islands is settled.

Second, China in other policy arenas: beyond the islands dispute, China also faces many other foreign policy issues that can arouse domestic public sentiments, including US arm sales to Taiwan, the nuclear crisis in North Korea and Iran. These areas may also stir up China's domestic public sentiment and therefore, renders the revised Systems Theory advocated in this project useful for analysis of the reactions of the Chinese government. What this project strives to produce is a model useful for explaining China's foreign policy by drawing upon the influence from its domestic

⁵ As mentioned in Chapter 2, the United States was one of the earliest countries that forced China to sign those treaties in Qing Dynasty. In 1900, the United States were also one of the eight countries who sent troops to Beijing.

politics. Therefore, future research may test this model in other policy arenas beyond political and military ones, rather, for example, on environmental, commercial and human rights issues. To echo Putnam's words, what is interesting is not whether foreign and domestic policies entangle, but how and when do they interact. By expanding this model to more policy arenas, we will be able to systematically summarize the patterns, if any, of China's actions on the international stage.

Third, social media's influence on Chinese politics will be an interesting topic as well. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the development of social media enables the Chinese public to know more about international politics. The Chinese government has censorship of Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube. Without access to world-wide social media, how is the public opinion shaped by the Chinese government? How are those Chinese social media, including blogs, BBS, Microblog and instant messages, controlled by the government? How do their existence and the government's control influence Chinese public opinion on foreign policy issues? Do they influence people to be more nationalist or more cosmopolitan? These topics are worth further research to explore the interaction between the Chinese government and the public on foreign policy making.

Future researchers can test the mediating institutions and determine under what circumstances they would become "moderating institutions" in China. This will be a topic observing China's political reform to determine when mediating institutions will develop into mature moderating institutions checking the decision making of the Chinese government.

Last but not least, future research will address the question of "what is the upper limit of an 'assertive China'?" In other words, how much more assertive will China be? As summarized in part II of this chapter, China's future foreign policy will

comprise somewhere between the push from public opinion and government's willingness to maintain its stability-oriented foreign policy. Therefore, what is important for predicting future Chinese foreign policy is to what extent China is willing to give up its "stability-oriented" foreign policy. This change will be manifested by future assertive policies adopted by China in disputes. I do not foresee China going to a war in the near future; however, China will be more assertive towards its opponents in disputes, especially in territorial disputes. "More assertive policies" will include trade sanctions, including control of materials important for other countries, but it is hard to imagine China will wage conflicts with its neighbors in foreseeable future. But it is worth analyzing how much more assertive the Chinese government is willing to be, under the influence of its domestic actors.

After all, wars are not desired. As Carl von Clausewitz stated centuries ago, "wars are the extensions of politics." Studying the Diaoyu Islands dispute from the Chinese perspective, I find that the word "politics" involves different "images" of the same incidents: nationalism vented with posters in the street, policy actions in the form of high-ranking dialogue and also mountains of products and fruits stacked at ports as a result of the dispute.

A common understanding of the dispute and acceptable actions are constructed between the general public and government. In the past decades, China demonstrated a tendency to be assertive in defending its territorial integrity, and it has been trying to deter all the others who are contesting against China's territorial sovereignty. During this process, China's narratives are crucial for understanding its actions and also deciphering all the nuanced considerations inside and outside of the black box. These narratives also help to make predictions on how China will act in future disputes.

Narratives contain a lot of information.

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