UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

PARATEXTUAL RELATIONSHIPS, AESTHETIC MEANING, AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTELLIGIBILITY IN FRANZ LISZT'S *SONATA IN B MINOR*.

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of

DOCTOR OF MUSICAL ARTS

By
K. DEREK LAWRENCE
Norman, Oklahoma
2009

PARATEXTUAL RELATIONSHIPS, AESTHETIC MEANING, AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTELLIGIBILITY IN FRANZ LISZT'S *SONATA IN B MINOR*.

A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE SCHOOL OF MUSIC

BY

____
Dr. Irvin Wagner, Chair

____
Dr. Sanna Pederson

____
Dr. Ed Gates

____
Dr. Sarah Reichardt

____
Dr. Timothy Murphy

© Copyright by DEREK LAWRENCE 2009
All Rights Reserved.

Table of Contents

List of Illustrations ……………………………………………………..v
Abstract ……………………………………………………………...vi

Part I **Rationale For Study** ………………………………………………1
Chapter 1: Introduction: Determining Absolute and Program Music
The Three-Dimensional Liszt
Chapter 2: Schopenhauer: Program Music and the Question of Primacy ………...9
Paratexts: Programs at Large
Purpose and Procedure of Study
Chapter 3: Literature Review ……………………………………………………17

Part II **Limitations of Truth and Meaning** ………………………………..30
Chapter 4: Introduction
Is There Artistic Truth?
Truth: A Pragmatist Rendering
Chapter 5: Truth and Experience: Music in Performance ………………………40
Truth and Knowledge: Music in Analysis

Chapter 6: Meaning: Propositional Assignment ………………………………....49
Meaning: Performance and Aesthetic Response
Chapter 7: Meaning: Analysis and Phenomenological Intelligibility …………...59
Meaning: Programs and Phenomenological Intelligibility
Conclusions: Limits of Truth, Meaning, and Aesthetic Response

Part III **Analysis: Franz Liszt, *Sonata in B minor*** ………………………....68
Chapter 8: Background
The Interface between Paratext and Music
Chapter 9: *Faust*: Major Characters and Paratextually Correspondent Themes
in Liszt's *Sonata in B minor* ……………………………………….....74
Mephistopheles
Faust
The Almighty
Gretchen
Chapter 10: Thematic Relationships and Dynamic Tension:
Conceptual Implications of Sonata Design…………………………...94
Chapter 11: Form …………………………………………………………...101
Cyclical Forms: Cause and Effect
Chapter 12: Conclusion…………………………………………………………..114

Bibliography ……………………………………………………………118
Appendix I ………………………………………………………………124
Appendix II ……………………………………………………………...139
Appendix III ……………………………………………………………140

List of Illustrations

Example 3-1: *Liszt-Wittgenstein Cipher*……………………………………………...24

Example 9-1: *Mephistopheles Theme mm. 1-17*……………………………………...75

Example 9-2: *Mephistopheles Material mm. 141-152*………………………………..80

Example 9-3: *Mephistopheles Material mm. 319-330*………………………………..81

Example 9-4: *Mephistopheles Mocking of Almighty Material mm. 297-305*………...81

Example 9-5: *Mephistopheles Material mm. 553-569*………………………………..83

Example 9-6: *Mephistopheles Material mm. 749-754, 760*…………………………..84

Example 9-7: *Faust Theme mm. 153-170*…………………………………………….86

Example 9-8: *Mephistopheles Material mm. 179-190*………………………………..87

Example 9-9: *Almighty Theme mm. 105-106*…………………………………………89

Example 9-10: *Sursum Corda mm. 6-15*……………………………………………..90

Example 9-11: *Gretchen Theme mm. 124-139*………………………………………92

Example 10-1: *Mephistopheles/Faust Material mm. 262-276*………………………96

Example 10-2: *Faust Tremolo mm. 278-285*…………………………………………97

Example 11-1: *Cadence/Arrival mm. 31-32*…………………………………………...107

Abstract

When a performer approaches a score with the goal of crafting an interpretation, certain values are invariably assigned. The performer determines which edition of a score he will use, tempo relationships, dynamic ranges, and the meaning he will assign to the composer's notation. While composers have sought for all of recorded music history to make notation ever clearer, the truth remains that *music* is highly resistant to confinement in dots, lines, squiggles, and expressive terms. The performer must assign meaning to the notation based on his personal experience and knowledge every time he crafts an interpretation. This meaning encompasses aesthetic elements, musical gestures, and phrasing decisions. Thus, when performers discuss interpretation, there remains little of the score that has not been affected either consciously or unconsciously by the performer's *subjective decisions*. In music that includes extra-musical meaning, the situation becomes even more difficult. The performer must make decisions about musical notation, extra-musical programs, paratexts, performance practice, performance traditions, and what constitutes the "score" his performance must conform to.

Franz Liszt's *Sonata in B minor* resides at the crux of arguments over absolute and program music, aesthetic judgment, and interpretation. In order to negotiate between competing philosophies and interpretive traditions, one must construct a more nuanced description of the relationships between score, interpretation, performance, paratext, and aesthetic response. This study approaches the Sonata from a Faustian perspective using codes of aesthetic response to match major thematic and formal ideas with major characters and formal constructions in Goethe's *Faust*.

PART I

RATIONALE FOR STUDY

CHAPTER 1

Determining Absolute and Program Music

When a performer approaches a score with the goal of crafting an interpretation, certain values are invariably assigned. The performer determines which edition of a score he will use, tempo relationships, dynamic ranges, and the meaning he will assign to the composer's notation. Generally, notation is not absolutely specific. While composers have sought for all of recorded music history to make notation ever clearer, the truth remains that *music* is highly resistant to confinement in dots, lines, squiggles, and prosaic terms. The performer has to assign meaning to the notation based on his personal experience and knowledge every time he crafts an interpretation. This meaning encompasses aesthetic elements, musical gestures, and phrasing decisions. Thus, when performers discuss interpretation, often there remains little of the score that has not been affected either consciously or unconsciously by the performer's *subjective decisions*.

The nineteenth-century saw a concerted effort to increase the meaningfulness of the musical experience by incorporating extra-musical elements with the score in program music. This led to a debate about music's meaning in general, and how program music should be analyzed.

Vera Micznik, in discussing traditional analytical models for program music, states,

> Traditionally, studies of programmatic works separated analytical issues from those of history, taxonomy, aesthetics or genre. On the analytical side, discussions generally followed two main approaches: the formalist (or absolutist) approach, which took no account of programs, thus implicitly fostering the idea of programmatic pieces as "pure musical" structure; and the programmatic approach, which took agreement between the programmatic and musical ideas as its premise, thus endeavoring to bring to light the flawless workings of this equivalence.[1]

While these traditional models distinguish between an "absolute" approach to analysis and a "programmatic" approach to analysis, it does not necessarily follow that the composers were drawing the same distinctions in their works. In fact, at the beginning of the nineteenth-century, these distinctions were not generally made.

> The historical reality that any music, programmatic or not, was perceived as expressing larger, extramusical ideas led Dahlhaus (and others) to speculate that 'absolute and program music do not form two classes in which one can divide instrumental music; rather, they represent opposing extremes . . . [of the] musical reality [which] widens itself in numerous transitional forms between the ideal types of absolute and program music'.[2]

As these distinctions generally served later attempts to either validate or denigrate program music in some way, the polemical tendency of such analyses often pushed the interpreter's agenda to the fore. For Liszt, music served as a bridge between both realms with strict absolute and program music serving as boundary markers.

While perhaps composers such as Babbitt (with his emphasis on computer-produced music) could lay claim to truly absolute music, practically speaking, "absolute

---

[1] Vera Micznik, "The Absolute Limitations of Programme Music: The Case of Liszt's 'Die Ideale'," *Music & Letters*, Vol. 80, No. 2 (May, 1999): 207.
[2] Ibid., 209.

music" remains a theoretical idea (akin to absolute zero) when referring to Liszt's music. Music was still very much linked to the listener's emotional response and therefore could not be considered purely absolute. At the same time, since one could often point to a strong formal logic governing specifically musical relationships independent of any program, the music could not be considered purely programmatic either.

Because Liszt's music exists between these two extremes, employing a one-dimensional analysis (either analyzing the program music along the same lines as vocal music, or dispensing with the program and focusing on purely musical considerations) cannot do justice to the relationship between the two. In order to do so, the analysis must account for the different dimensions of Liszt's music.

The Three Dimensional Liszt

When analyzing Liszt, in addition to dealing with musical relationships and any programmatic relationships, one must also account for the idea of sublime beauty: an important issue for nineteenth century composers. In his article "Schumann and Romantic Distance," Hoeckner references Jean-Paul Richter's claim that

> The Romantic is beauty without limit, or *beautiful* infinity, just as there is a *sublime* infinity. . . . It is more than an analogy to call the Romantic the undulating hum of a vibrating string or bell, whose sound waves fade away into ever greater distances and finally are lost in ourselves, and which, although outwardly silent, still sound within.[3]

Sublime beauty, or beauty that sublates the listener to a higher, more ennobled state, was the antithesis of the mere titillating beauty found in much of the philistine virtuosity that

---

[3] Berthold Hoeckner, "Schumann and Romantic Distance," *Journal of the American Musicological Society,* Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring, 1997): 60.

Schumann especially abhorred.[4] While Liszt was not above playing to the gallery, he remained concerned that his serious works communicate something more meaningful than mere kitsch. Indeed, while Liszt perhaps compulsively employed "charlatan" virtuosic tricks even in his serious works, one still finds a transcendence of charlatan virtuosity to sublime beauty. In his own way, Liszt was an heir to Beethoven's use of extraordinarily simple materials for profound effect. Rather than transcending "simple" tonal materials, Liszt used his "charlatan" virtuosity to transcend meaningless brilliance into profound significance.

For Liszt, program music was conceived as a means of providing a more powerful means of sublation and a stronger link to profound poetic ideas. Dahlhaus, in discussing the genesis of Liszt's symphonic poems, describes the fusion of poetics with music:

> The "poetics" of the symphonic poem came about as a solution to three interrelated problems. First, Liszt attempted to adopt the classical ideal of the symphony without yielding to a derivative dependence on its traditional formal scheme. Second, he wished to elevate program music, which he regarded, in Franz Brendel's phrase, as the "forefront of historical evolution," from a base, "picturesque" genre to poetic and philosophical sublimity. And finally, he was obsessed by the thought that it had to be possible to unite the expressive gestures of his earlier piano pieces, inspired by French romanticism, with the tradition of thematic and motivic manipulation.[5]

The three-dimensional aspect of Liszt's B minor Sonata becomes clear when viewed through the lens of the symphonic poem. The formal structure, while not entirely original,

---

[4] As Schumann states in his Aphorisms, "People say 'it pleased,' or 'it did not please.' As if there were nothing higher than the art of *pleasing* the public!"
Robert, Schumann, "Aphorisms" in *Composers on Music: Eight Centuries of Writings*, 2nd edition, edited by Josiah Fisk (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1997), 96.

[5] Carl Dahlhaus, *Nineteenth-Century Music*, translated by J. Bradford Robinson (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 238.

was specifically titled a sonata. While Schumann (and Schubert) had already used a similar structure in composing Fantasies, the distinction in formal labeling demonstrates a difference in conception.[6] For Liszt, the importance of creating new, non-derivatively dependent models for sonata design was extremely important. The sonata's stagnant state in the mid-nineteenth century vexed both Schumann and Liszt, but whereas the former attempted to conserve classical sonata design, Liszt attempted to retool the form more liberally.

While some might view Liszt's inclusion of programmatic material as compulsive, his inclusion of programs was most often meant to convey greater insight into musical relationships rather than apologize for a lack of specific musical cogency. Dahlhaus writes:

> Liszt sought recourse in programs from a hybrid notion that music should inherit the legacy of… literature; this was part of his attempt to give music, conceived as a language, a distinctness lacking in absolute music with its vague intimations and allusions.[7]

Programs, in other words, were meant to describe more completely the musical relationships of a particular work. Programs were not meant to supersede musical relationships, or intercede on behalf of musical relationships.[8] In sum, the programs were not fanciful labels for musical effects, but rather meaningful aesthetic descriptions of the musical experience.

Finally, Liszt's aim of reconciling the German tradition of thematic and motivic

---

[6] In *The Romantic Generation*, Charles Rosen describes Schumann's *Fantasy for Piano and Orchestra*, Schubert's *Wanderer* Fantasy, and the Finale from Beethoven's Symphony no. 9 as models of formal structures that combine four-movement and single-movement forms.
Charles Rosen, *The Romantic Generation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 480.
[7] Carl Dahlhaus, *Nineteenth-Century Music*, 241.
[8] One must forgive Liszt's tendency to view music as a universally understood language. While a popular notion before the twentieth-century, it became a viewpoint that ethnomusicologists have disproved.

manipulation with French Romanticism offers insight into Liszt's inclusion of both dramatic effect and thematic organicism in his sonata. The pursuit of effects, rather than being lamentable moments where Liszt devolves into cheap, charlatan immaturity, is every bit as important as the pursuit of rigorous motivic and thematic organicism. Liszt's writing was never meant to be "in the manner of Beethoven" nor was he particularly interested in being the savior of German music. More alchemist than chemist, Liszt was attempting to create new paradigms of musical thought and expression.

In conclusion, Liszt's use of programmatic material was neither haphazard nor compulsive. Liszt was very clear about what he intended program music for and proposed a model for program music that applied to both proactively and retroactively designed programs.[9] Liszt wrote,

> In program music… the return, change, modification, and modulation of the motives are conditioned by their relation to a poetic idea… All exclusively musical considerations, though they should not be neglected, have to be subordinated to the action of the given subject. [10]

Liszt's program music exists in three dimensions: the relationship of the music to itself; the relationship of the music to the poetic idea; and the transcendental sublimation of both musical and poetic boundaries. Micznik writes,

> According to the metaphysical concept of musical poetics which characterized the first half of the nineteenth century, instrumental music was 'purely poetic' precisely because it lacked a definite subject, object and purpose, an absence that let the music speak out by itself, pure and unclouded.[11]

Because music was already considered capable of conveying meaning even without a

---

[9] Proactively designed program refers here to a program that spawns a musical piece. A retroactively designed program refers to one applied to a piece of music already written.
[10] Quoted in: Frederich Niecks, *Programme Music in the Last Four Centuries: A Contribution to the History of Musical Expression* (New York, NY: Novello and Company Ltd., 1907), 280-81.
[11] Vera Micznik, "The Absolute Limitations of Programme Music: The Case of Liszt's 'Die Ideale,' 210.

definite subject, object, or purpose, the specific articulation of these poetic ideas did not lower music to the level of mere descriptive language (a misunderstanding of many future programmatic composers), but rather allowed music to transcend the poetic idea – the poetic idea acting as a point of origin for musical meaning. Therefore, as the poetic idea did not "create" the music (but only conditioned the interpreter's understanding), programs could be applied either proactively or retroactively and still retain the features of Liszt's programmatic ideal. Schumann's piano cycles therefore (where titles were added afterwards to the music) employ programs in the same meaningful way as Liszt's programmatic works.[12]

Given Liszt's penchant for programs and metaphor (regardless of a piece's "absolute" or "programmatic" designation), the interpreter must determine how each dimension exists in tension with the others. Only once each dimension has been fully explored can the interpreter be certain of a truthful rendering.

[12] It is important to draw a clear line however between programs that composers associate with music and programs later associated with music by listeners. While any listener-associated program will still condition a listener's perception of the piece, it will have changed the listener's objective phenomenal perception of the score. Any further attempt to sublimate that poetic idea through the music based on this corrupted perception cannot be considered in any way part of the compositional process.

CHAPTER 2

Schopenhauer: Program Music and the Question of Primacy

Schopenhauer, in his work *The World as Will and Representation*, offered a view of music that at once dispelled the notion that music was secondary to text or drama, and set music above all other arts in its direct communication of the Will.[13]

> Music is in no way, like the other arts, an image of Ideas, but *an image of the very will* of which Ideas are also the objectivization. Just for this reason, the effect of music is so very much more powerful and penetrating than that of the other arts. For the latter speak only of shadows; it, rather, speaks of the essence of things.[14]

Schopenhauer's view of the creative continuum was thus broken into two distinct groups: WILL → IDEA → ART; and WILL → MUSIC. In art, the IDEA is the representation of the WILL but remains abstract and intangible. ART, as the tangible image of the IDEA, may communicate the WILL but only indirectly. It remains twice removed from the WILL, only a reflection of the IDEA. Schopenhauer describes music on the other hand in direct connection to the WILL. MUSIC is a composite, both abstract and tangible. As a spontaneous representation of the WILL, MUSIC requires no middle stage. Rather, MUSIC retains the unique property among the arts (according to Schopenhauer) to sublimate the WILL directly into tangible reality. Through describing music as being the sole expression of the Will, Schopenhauer endowed nineteenth-century instrumental musicians with the responsibility of being the guardians of the Will's purest possible expression. While this

---

[13] Schopenhauer defines the Will as the essential, inner substance that creates life. Life is merely an objectivization of the Will.

[14] Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World As Will And Representation,* vol. 1, 1819, translated by Richard E. Aquila, David Carus (Boston, MA: Pearson Education Inc., 2008), 308.

new authority provided immediate philosophical legitimacy for purely instrumental music, it proved problematic for program music.

> [Music] cannot be imitation mediated by conscious intention, through concepts. Otherwise, music does not express the inner essence, will itself, but only imitates its phenomenon in an unsatisfactory way, as is done by all strictly representational music…which is altogether objectionable.[15]

On the one hand, the idea of music as representing (something) implies that all music is program music. However, the nineteenth century perhaps offers the most (good and bad) examples of explicitly representational music. According to Schopenhauer, such consciously illustrative music loses its primacy of place as immediately expressive of the Will. Any music composed for the purpose of representing an extra-musical program forms part of a new creative continuum: WILL → IDEA → ART → (PROGRAM) MUSIC. This new continuum removes music from the Will by a factor of three. As such, MUSIC is no longer in immediate relationship to the WILL, but instead becomes only a copy of the reflection (ART) of the representation (IDEA) of the WILL. All program music therefore must be summarily rejected as being a mere imitation of true music.

Franz Liszt, no stranger to controversy, was the foremost champion of program music in the nineteenth-century. As such, he was dogged by attacks on his compositional ability that frequently implied he needed programs for his music in order to supplement a dearth of creative gifts.

---

[15]Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World As Will And Representation*, 314-15.

Mendelssohn wrote in 1840,

> I have never seen a musician whose feeling for music filled him to the very fingertips and flowed directly out from them, as it does with Liszt; and with this directness and his immense technique and practice he would leave all others far behind were it not that, for all that, original ideas are still the most important thing; and these nature appears – so far at least – to have denied him, so that in this respect most of the other great virtuosi equal or even surpass him.[16]

While Mendelssohn seems to have been referring primarily to Liszt's interpretations, the same charge would subsequently be leveled at Liszt regarding his compositions when he sought to recast his image as a serious composer. Liszt did indeed write music that must fall within the definition of mere illustrative music. To take these works as exemplars of his program music, however, would be a mistake. His concept of program music remained much more complex than samples of his "gallery" music might otherwise suggest.

For Liszt, program music was not an attempt to buttress weak compositions with textual illustration, but rather an attempt to employ music in transcending the poetic idea and communicating more directly with the listener. As stated previously, Liszt's opinion was that:

> In program music… the return, change, modification, and modulation of the motives are conditioned by their relation to a poetic idea… All exclusively musical considerations, though they should not be neglected, have to be subordinated to the action of the given subject. [17]

As such, music does not become a mere copy of the art providing the program, but instead transcends the original poetic idea by becoming a composite of both musical

[16] Felix Mendelssohn "Letter to his mother, Frankfurt, June 2, 1837" *Composers on Music,* ed. Josiah Fisk (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1997), 86.
[17] Quoted by: Frederich Niecks, *Programme Music in the Last Four Centuries*, 280-81.

relationships to each other, and musical relationships to the poetic idea. Thus program music could transcend both the program and the music. The result was that an explicit program ceased to be necessary to the original conception of the music and could be applied both proactively and retroactively without diminishing the score. Composers could either offer or withhold the program (as in Mendelssohn's *Songs Without Words)*. In writing program music in which the program served to add extra-musical meaning to musical meaning, Liszt side-stepped Schopenhauer's position that program music must be merely imitative. The program, rather than serving as the impetus for a composition, instead became a paratext to the music.

Paratexts: Programs at Large

In his book *Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation*, Genette defines paratexts as follows:

> More than a boundary or sealed border, the paratext is, rather, a *threshold* or…a "vestibule" that offers the world at large the possibility of either stepping inside or turning back. It is an "undefined zone" between the inside and the outside, a zone without any hard and fast boundary on either the inward side (turned toward the text) or the outward side (turned toward the world's discourse about the text), an edge, or, as Philippe Lejeune put it, "a fringe of the printed text which in reality controls one's whole reading of the text."[18]

In music, a paratext may thus be defined as: that text which, while not part of the original score, may be associated with the score and may thus come to inform one's interpretation of the score. A paratext is different from a program inasmuch as the program must be referenced by the original score either in the score itself or as an approved supplement to the score (as with a preface). Titles, literary quotations, dedications, indeed anything

[18] Gerard Genette, *Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation,* translated by Jane E. Lewin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1-2.

implying more than musical relationships, may invest a score with a program.[19] The paratext however, is less rigorously defined and functions more as a useful atmosphere in which to interpret the text rather than a method of procedure.

Since the paratext does not reside in the score itself, there remains the problem of assigning lineage and therefore value to any particular paratext. Genette writes, "By definition, something is not a paratext unless the author or one of his associates accepts responsibility for it, although the degree of responsibility may vary."[20] In regard to music, two types of paratext prove most useful: The *official* paratext, and the *unofficial* paratext. Genette states,

> The *official* is any paratextual message openly accepted by the author [composer] or publisher or both – a message for which the author or publisher cannot evade responsibility ….The *unofficial* (or *semiofficial*) is most of the author's epitext: interviews, conversations, and confidences, responsibility for which the author can always more or less disclaim with denials.[21]

In general, almost all legitimate theoretical analysis regarding historical interpretation, associated extra-musical content, and performance practice falls under the official category of paratext. The titles of Schumann's piano cycle *Carnaval* for instance form an official paratext for both individual pieces and the work as a whole. The titles are placed within the score by Schumann himself, and therefore satisfy the requirements of an official paratext.[22]

---

[19] While on the surface this definition of programmatic content works, it must be noted that this premise is not rigorous as expressive indications often use extramusical imagery (for example *allegro con fuoco*), thus creating a rather undefined zone.
[20] Gerard Genette, *Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation*, 9.
[21] Ibid., 10
[22] While Robert Schumann later in life attempted to remove all paratextual elements from his works – part of his campaign to classicize his compositions – the original forms including paratexts have been determined by mainstream history to be authoritative.

The designation of Beethoven's Sonata Op. 31, No. 2 as the *Tempest* refers to a remark of Beethoven "recorded" by Schindler[23] linking the sonata (however ambiguously) with Shakespeare's play. While the veracity of the comment has never been determined, the remark was publicized through Schindler's biography of Beethoven and the designation "Tempest" to Beethoven's Sonata Op. 31, No. 2 has stuck. The paratext of Shakespeare's *Tempest* with this particular sonata provides an example of an unofficial paratext. While the point may be argued that this paratext became established through hearsay, Schindler's affiliation with Beethoven has never been in doubt (although his motives may have been questionable), and the fact remains there exists no proof that Schindler invented this comment. The rather murky nature of the comment's origins is typical of an unofficial paratext as a clearer attribution would most likely place it within the realm of official paratext.

The paratext, whether official or unofficial, thus serves more as the environment for interpretation than a narrative or sequential program determining interpretation. In light of Schopenhauer's schema, the distinction between paratext and program takes on renewed significance in redeeming program music from exile. Schopenhauer, while he may only have been referring to the worst kind of illustrative music (music wholly dependent upon an extra-musical text), nonetheless includes all extra-musical associations in his rejection. If the extra-musical associations are viewed as paratext however, the music remains intact as an *a priori* representation of the Will without sacrificing those extra-musical elements that were clearly factors in the genesis of certain nineteenth-century compositions. Categorizing such extra-musical material as paratext

[23] Anton Felix Schindler, *Beethoven As I Knew Him*, edited by Donald W. MadArdle, Translated by Constance S. Jolly [from Schindler's *Biographie von Ludwig van Beethoven, 1860*] (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 406.

should also provide clearer points of connection between non-narrative, non-sequential extra-musical material and the associated musical compositions. For Liszt especially, the incorporation of paratext was not an attempt to buttress weak compositions with textual illustration and meaning, but rather an attempt to employ music in transcending the poetic idea and communicating more directly with the listener. His finest compositions therefore were fully functioning pieces relying upon purely musical relationships that nonetheless retained a paratext. While Liszt certainly accepted Schopenhauer's claim that music was the greatest of all the arts, he refused to divest his music from paratextual associations.

Purpose and Procedure of Study

The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) To provide a philosophical and aesthetic foundation for constructing interpretations that include paratextual elements; (2) To determine connections of form, thematic design, and thematic character between Goethe's *Faust* and Liszt's *Sonata in B minor*. Based on these observations, conclusions will be drawn regarding paratextual meaning and musical interpretation.

Part I, having briefly discussed existential problems of program music in Chapter 1 and value in Chapter 2, will conclude with the Literature Review in Chapter 3 of major scholarly analyses to provide some context for the subsequent analysis in this study.

Part II will consist of a philosophical and aesthetic discussion of the limitations of truth and meaning as regards musical interpretation. Chapter 4 will consist of an introduction of the question "is there artistic truth?" and will follow with a discussion of Pragmatist perceptions of truth. Chapter 5 will compare the different viewpoints of truth one gains from both performance and analysis. Chapter 6 will discuss philosophical and

aesthetic assignments of meaning to truth. Chapter 7 will apply concepts of phenomenological intelligibility to both the analytical process and extra-musical programs. Chapter 8 will then conclude with limitations on truth, meaning, and aesthetic response.

Having arrived at an understanding of the limits of the score and the responsibilities of the interpreter, Part III will proceed to analyze Liszt's *Sonata in B minor* through the application of the paratext *Faust* to major thematic areas and formal design. The paper will conclude with a discussion of performance suggestions.

CHAPTER 3

Literature Review

> No other work of Liszt has attracted anything like the amount of scholarly attention devoted to his Sonata in B Minor. Everybody appears to think that he is entitled to hold an opinion about it. And since many of those opinions are mutually exclusive, the literature has become a minefield through which both player and teacher proceed at their peril.[24]

The controversy surrounding the many descriptions, analyses, and interpretations of Liszt's *Sonata in B minor* is at least as old as the controversy surrounding the work itself. Although it was dedicated to Robert Schumann (perhaps in gratitude over Schumann's dedication of his *Fantasy* to Liszt), the Schumanns were never enthusiastic about the piece. Clara went so far as to write of the sonata, "merely a blind noise – no healthy ideas anymore, everything confused, one cannot find one clear harmonic progression – and yet I must now thank him for it. It is really too awful."[25]

While subsequent discussions of the piece have balanced Schumann's criticism with enthusiastic accolades, polemical tendencies remain a part of many analyses. Generally analysis takes one of three shapes: a strict bar-by-bar musical analysis; a performance-based interpretation (often including some vague programmatic descriptors); or a strict programmatic interpretation.

Rey Longyear, in his book *Nineteenth-Century Romanticism in Music*, offers a measure-by-measure chart of the sonata including musical examples of five major

[24] Alan Walker, *Reflections on Liszt* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 128.
[25] Nancy B. Reich, *Clara Schumann: The Artist and the Woman* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 201.

thematic and motivic elements.[26] The chart includes descriptions of the "double form"[27] of the sonata and discusses how the formal structure maintains cohesion over the course of the work. No mention is made of any programmatic associations within the work either by scholars or those within Liszt's circle. Longyear provides a purely musical analysis, albeit one prefaced by his opinion that the sonata is "the most influential piano composition for the second half of the nineteenth century."[28]

In his book *The Sonata Since Beethoven*, William Newman offers an extensive discussion of Liszt's formal procedure as well as a chart mapping the piece's double form in detail, both as a single-movement sonata form and a four-movement cycle. He notes,

> curiously enough in view of its wide renown – writers seem generally to have preferred to discuss the Sonata in b only briefly, sketchily, or subjectively, rather than attempt to pin down the specific divisions that define the double function.[29]

In addition to a formal map, Newman discusses principal tonal, tempo, and metrical changes. His opinion of the sonata's five major thematic elements are also included as part of his chart.[30] A comparison with Liszt's *Dante* Sonata is mentioned but not dealt with in any detail. No other discussion is made regarding other scholars' analyses, but Newman does list a number of other works by contemporaries and students that share similar formal traits and may have been influences on or influenced by Liszt's work.

---

[26] See Appendix I, Example 1.
[27] "Double-Form," or "double-function" have been the terms used for the idea that Liszt's *Sonata in B minor* exists simultaneously as a single-movement sonata form, and as an unbroken three or four-movement cycle.
[28] Rey M. Longyear, *Nineteenth-Century Romanticism in Music*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), 162.
[29] William S. Newman, *The Sonata Since Beethoven,* A History of the Sonata Idea (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 373.
[30] See Appendix I, Example 2.

Ben Arnold, in his article “Piano Music: 1835-1861” found in *The Liszt Companion*, provides a chart comparing scholars Newman, Longyear, Winklhofer, Searle, Walker, Watson, and Hamilton’s formal measure-by-measure analyses of the sonata covering the years 1969-96. [31] He discusses at some length the problems inherent in describing such a large-scale form in such detail and then provides his own formal measure-by-measure chart,[32] including musical examples of what he considers the five major thematic elements. While Longyear did not discuss even the existence of programmatic elements, in this regard, Arnold is far from mute. He states, “Liszt presents his Sonata without any program or extra-musical thought whatsoever. Its dramatic and evocative nature has led numerous writers, nonetheless, to insist on creating their own programs for the work.”[33] While Arnold may perhaps be convinced of the work’s absolute purity, he nevertheless gives an extremely useful account of different scholars’ programmatic scenarios, as well as a list of performers who thought of the sonata in Faustian terms.[34]

Sharon Winklhofer’s book *Liszt’s Sonata in B Minor: A Study of Autograph Sources and Documents* actually deals with much more than manuscript studies. Part I deals with Liszt’s life in Weimar and the conception, publication, and early performance of the sonata; Part II provides a study of autograph sources and manuscripts; Part III deals specifically with the autograph of the Sonata; and Part IV discusses the compositional process, analytical approach, and formal characteristics. While Winklhofer

---

[31] See Appendix I, Example 3.
[32] See Appendix I, Example 4.
[33] Ben Arnold, “Piano Music: 1835-1861,” *The Liszt Companion*, ed. Ben Arnold (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 119.
[34] The discussion of Bertrand Ott’s article and my subsequent analysis of the sonata will provide more details regarding the parallels between *Faust* and Liszt’s *Sonata in B minor*.

offers no discussion of programmatic approaches, she insists on a slightly different approach to charting the sonata from Longyear and Newman.

> A new interpretation of the Sonata depends upon recognition of the following general characteristics. The Sonata was conceived as a one-movement sonata form, and not as an instrumental cycle of several movements strung together. Many related compositional problems were solved in the symphonic poems and other instrumental works in one-movement sonata form, all of which were drafted before the Sonata. Liszt's Sonata was in fact the logical culmination of his other structural experiments, and not the reverse. There is no evidence to support the view that Liszt ever attempted to superimpose multiple movements over a large sonata form.[35]

Generally, formal analyses at least mention the superimposition of a cyclical form on Liszt's one-movement design. This superimposition serves a dual function: it legitimizes the sonata designation with a traditional three- or four-movement design, and emphasizes cyclical elements providing cohesion to the work as a whole. Because this sonata flows similarly to more cyclical forms, the breaking up of the work into clearly defined units can be nearly irresistible. Winklhofer rejects this tamer conception of a multi-movement work, and instead posits that Liszt's *Sonata in B minor* represents the culminating triumph of his formal experiments in both orchestral and piano works. The one-movement sonata form meant that Liszt managed to completely subsume the prevalent cyclical forms of the day within the sonata principle: simultaneously achieving the paradoxical goals of creating a sonata steeped in traditional legitimacy that revolutionized the very conception of sonata design. Winklhofer offers perhaps the most extensive charts of anyone describing the formal details of the sonata offering a thematic chart, table of symbols, analytical formal chart, a chart describing structural proportions, and a

[35] Sharon Winklhofer, *Liszt's Sonata in B Minor: A Study of Autograph Sources and Documents*, (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1980), 127.

chart describing tonal design.[36]

Kenneth Hamilton, in the Cambridge Handbook *Liszt: Sonata in B Minor* offers a comparative chart (although somewhat less exhaustive than Arnold) of the analyses by scholars Newman, Longyear, and Winklhofer.[37] Hamilton then points out the controversy existing among these scholars regarding the large-scale division of the single-movement form into three or four "movements" corresponding with different sections.

> Both Newman and Longyear agree that the Sonata can be considered either as a single movement in sonata form or as a multi-movement unit, with a slow movement and a scherzo. They differ over whether the sections fall into four movements (Newman) or three (Longyear). Winklhofer remains aloof from this bone of contention, for she sees the Sonata only as one single movement, and rejects the double-function view as false. She admits that there is a 'slow sub-movement' in the centre, but refuses to identify the fugue with a scherzo.[38]

While Hamilton finds this difference of opinion "negligible," the discrepancy clearly demonstrates the hazards in describing the sonata's single-movement form in the context of a multi-movement "double-form." Hamilton carefully points out that all three scholars are in agreement "that the Sonata is not a programmatic work, and that as a result analysis of it can only proceed on purely musical terms."[39] He then discusses the sonata extensively, describing formal, thematic, and motivic elements in the context of historical and contemporaneous precedents, with other scholars' analyses and interpretations. The musical analysis represents just one section of the book, with programmatic elements being discussed in other sections. Hamilton offers no measure-by-measure chart but

---

[36] See Appendix I, Example 5.
[37] See Appendix I, Example 6.
[38] Kenneth Hamilton, "*Liszt: Sonata in B minor*," Cambridge Music Handbooks, general editor Julian Rushton (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 32-33.
[39] Ibid., 28.

rather weaves his formal analysis into his larger musical discussion. As the book is meant to be a more-or-less complete guide to the piece, other sections include: orchestral sonata forms, programmatic interpretations, manuscript and printed text discussions, performance practice, and compositional legacy.

While these examples represent purely theoretical discussions, other scholars discuss interpretation based on performance practice. Alan Walker's *Reflections on Liszt* provides precisely this type of analysis. Typical of such analyses, formal discussion of the piece is interspersed with suggestions and comments to the pianist regarding performance details (like fingering), commentary on aesthetic taste and trends, and admonitions to play the piece artfully rather than for the sake of cheap applause. For example, in discussing the final octave passage in the coda, Walker states "it is the thematic integrity of the passage, not the vanity of the player, that calls for expression. Liszt's sounding sense must not be turned into senseless sound."[40]

Charles Rosen, in his book *The Romantic Generation*, also provides an analysis dedicated to a performance interpretation. First establishing the sonata in the tradition of Beethoven and Schubert, Rosen allows a certain narrative design to the sonata but remains wary of any attachment of programmatic ideas.

> The Sonata in B Minor is not program music, but by its manipulation of clearly defined early nineteenth-century genres, it constructs something like a narrative (the fluid relations among the themes display their effectiveness here). The mysterious and sinister opening and the satanic statement of the main theme quoted above lead, after a powerful stretto, to the hero as Lucifer; the satanic theme then turns into a brilliant demonstration of virtuosity.[41]

---

[40] Alan Walker, *Reflections on Liszt*, 140.
[41] Charles Rosen, *The Romantic Generation*, 486.

While Rosen certainly uses extra-musical content to describe and advise the pianist on the "character" of particular themes, he remains extraordinarily reluctant to discuss the details of his narrative. He employs thematic discussion to compare the sonata to others of Liszt, Schumann, and Beethoven in his bid to establish the sonata within the hierarchy of great nineteenth-century works.

Rosen's awkwardness when offering programmatic models (he writes, "A literal and naïve interpretation is inescapable,")[42] is hardly unique. Programmatic discussions are often rife with embarrassment about including "corruptive fantasy" in a serious musical discussion. Hamilton, beginning his discussion of scholarly musical analysis with "When we return from this land of programmatic make-believe…,"[43] demonstrates yet another example of programmatic disdain. Nevertheless, performers and scholars do exist who have seriously ascribed (with varying degrees of success) different programs to the sonata.

In his article "The B Minor Sonata Revisited: Deciphering Liszt," David Brown mentions the connection between opening material of the Sonata and the *Faust* symphony.

> The second of the two descending scales with which the Sonata opens had not only been based on one of the ciphers to be used the following year in the Faust symphony, but had also exemplified the same process of linkage and overlapping to generate melodic growth.[44]

Brown however contends that the sonata is autobiographical, its themes being ciphers of both Liszt's and Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein's names.

---

[42] Charles Rosen, *The Romantic Generation*, 491.
[43] Hamilton, "*Liszt: Sonata in B minor*," 31.
[44] David Brown, "The B Minor Sonata Revisited: Deciphering Liszt," *The Musical Times,* Vol. 144, No. 1882 (Spring, 2003), 6.

retrograde inversion

inversion

F E(r) E(n) C (L)is(zt)

Franz (Ferenc) Liszt Cipher version 1[45]

retrograde inversion

(K)A(ro - lin) - A (von S)A(yn Witt)G - E(n - st)E(in)

Karolina von Sayn-Wittgenstein Cipher[46]

Example 3-1: *Liszt-Wittgenstein Cipher*

Brown contends that the musical material of the sonata and the interaction between major themes draws from the private relationship between Liszt and Wittgenstein. He offers a parallel view of thematic content; describing parallel love themes based on each cipher. In this way, Brown applies a biographical program to the four major thematic areas present in the sonata.

Tibor Szász, in his article "Liszt's symbols for the Divine and Diabolical: Their Revelation of a Program in the B Minor Sonata," describes how musical elements in Liszt's sonata must be heard as programmatic. While he links the program to Milton's *Paradise Lost*, the symbols are conventionally Christian and his musical proofs are drawn from Liszt's specifically sacred music.

Szász begins his study by drawing a parallel between the crucifixion music of Liszt's *Via Crucis* and mm. 297-310 of the sonata.

[45] David Brown, "The B Minor Sonata Revisited: Deciphering Liszt," 7.
[46] Ibid..

He writes,

> Musically the two passages could hardly be more alike. Their chords are identical in tonality, harmony, register, dominant pedal, dynamics, and are followed by recitatives that begin alike….In Via crucis, the chordal blows symbolize the nailing of Jesus to the Cross, and the recitative sets Christ's words from the Cross, "My God, my God, why has thou forsaken me?" The Sonata's chords and recitative had become two separate Stations of the Cross.[47]

Szász then identifies the *Grandioso* theme from the sonata (mm 105-8) as "The Cross Symbol"[48] and ties the three-note motive made up of a major second and minor third with Liszt's "Cross" theme from his oratorio *St. Eliszabeth*. He notes that Winklhofer found this three-note theme in seven additional works and describes it as a common recurrence in Liszt's compositions. However, he also notes that "When the *Grandioso's* melodic contour reappears in the other works, it is always with a Christian connotation."[49] Dolores Pesce, in her article "Expressive resonance in Liszt's piano music," also identifies the *Grandioso* theme with the *St. Eliszabeth* oratorio. [51]

In contrast to the Christ theme, Szász identifies the falling seventh interval in the first theme with Lucifer.

> The falling seventh interval, characteristic of the Lucifer motif in the Sonata, is immediately featured in Bells of the Strassburg Cathedral. The Luciferic spirits are identified by Lucifer's opening sentence in which the word "spirits" is set to a descending interval that has the identical pitch span as the falling diminished seventh of the Sonata's Lucifer motif.[52]

---

[47] Tibor Szász, "Liszt's Symbols for the Divine and Diabolical: Their Revelation of a Program in the B Minor Sonata," *Journal of the American Liszt Society*, vol. 15 (1984): 39.
[48] Ibid., 43.
[49] Ibid..
[51] Dolores Pesce, "Expressive Resonance in Liszt's Piano Music." *19th Century Piano Music*, 2nd ed. edited by R. Larry Todd (New York, NY:Routledge, 2004), 384.
[52] Tibor Szász, *Liszt's Symbols for the Divine and Diabolical: Their Revelation of a Program in the B Minor Sonata*, 50.

Szász also identifies the falling seventh interval with Adam's fall from grace, offering a parallel program for the same material (which proves rather confusing). The repeated notes in the primary theme are identified with Lucifer.

> While the falling sevenths of the Lucifer motif symbolize the fall itself from above to below, the evenly spaced, sharply marked chain of repeated notes symbolize the already fallen devil known as Satan, or to use his medieval personification, Mephistopheles. Liszt's symbolic use of the repeated notes in the Sonata can be deduced because in other works they are consistently used as a symbol for the satanic.[53]

Szász cites examples of other satanic repeated notes: the "Mephistopheles" movement of the *Faust* symphony, and *Mephisto Waltz* Nos. 1-3. The article concludes with a description of mm. 120-254 as the physical love between Adam and Eve, and mm. 255-276 as "the eruption of violence between Cain and Abel."[54]

Szász does identify some useful motivic parallels between musical elements of the sonata and musical elements in other definitively programmatic works. However, the general lack of any musical examples, his broad assumption of the reader's sympathy for his ideas, and his attempt to simultaneously assign two programmatic realities (*Paradise Lost,* and Genesis 3:1-4:11) to the sonata generate a fair amount of confusion. While one might draw parallels between Adam and Christ, Cain and Lucifer, simultaneously doing so only compounds the difficulty of creating compelling links to extra-musical content. The programmatic waters are murky enough. However, his most useful points – (1) that certain motivic elements in the sonata find clear programmatic description in other works, and (2) that these programmatic associations may be fairly used in determining meaning

---

[53] Tibor Szász, *Liszt's Symbols for the Divine and Diabolical: Their Revelation of a Program in the B Minor Sonata*, 50.
[54] Ibid., 54.

within the sonata – are both well taken and prove useful to any serious attempt to determine paratextual meaning.

Probably the most influential and enduring program associated with Liszt's B minor sonata is the Faust model handed down by a number of his students. While not incompatible with the Szász program, there are enough differences to make each one distinct. Bertrand Ott, in his article *An Interpretation of Liszt's Sonata in B Minor*, suggests that the Sonata forms a symphonic poem. He is careful, however, to note that

> unlike the Faust-Symphony, the Sonata does not describe the characters by episodes – Faust, Marguerite [Gretchen], and Mephisto. It weaves them into an intricate web which closely follows the events of Goethe's play, without indulging in childish transliteration.[55]

Ott conceives of the sonata as representative of a grand struggle between Mephistopheles and Faust, assigning the opening *Allegro Energico* theme to Mephistopheles and ascribing the *Grandioso* Theme to Faust as representative of his "youth, pride, and sensuality."[56]

In contrast to most analyses that delineate four or five themes across the sonata, Ott rather perceives all musical material as specifically derived from these two thematic forces. While none would argue that the thematic material in the sonata is actually four different musical ideas (as all bear a resemblance to the opening thematic material), Ott stands on thin ice by claiming that other major thematic events are merely variations.

Although Ott begins his analysis with a protestation that the program cannot "indulge in childish transliteration,"[57] his subsequent linkage between *Faust* and musical

[55] Bertrand Ott, "An Interpretation of Liszt's Sonata in B Minor," *Journal of The American Liszt Society* 10 (1981), 30.
[56] Ibid., 33.
[57] Ibid., 30.

events takes the following forms:

> Meas. 32-54: Mephisto's physical and psychic development; vv. 1238-1321 in G.'s F.
> Meas. 255-96: Accelerated ride expressed with meanness, and built upon the theme of Faust's desire and passion; Mephisto is mocking; vv. 1851-67 in G.'s F.[58]

While Ott indeed stays clear of strict episodic narrative, he seems to create instead a narrative sequence based on a sentimental reading of the text. Rather than link events or characters, he attempts to connect characteristic moods with the musical score. This interpretation makes dual demands on the reader as it requires that the reader not only agree with Ott's interpretation of the score, but also Ott's interpretation of the play. The precarious task of describing extra-musical parallels without a program is made even more so by Ott's use of a highly individual interpretation of *Faust* as his paratext. In spite of his best intentions, Ott does appear to be "transliterating" his interpretation of Mephisto's and Faust's moods to the score.

While Ott's analysis may run to the melodramatic, it remains as fair a programmatic description as any other, the more fantastical elements are simply indicative of the inherent programmatic problem. Without an explicit program to follow, one may simply pull fistfuls of lines from the play and ascribe them to musical events. The question of Liszt's intentions, his students' contentions, and subsequent interpretations becomes moot as none can address specific instances specifically described by Liszt as retaining specific meaning. While Claudio Arrau claimed the Faust scenario was "taken for granted among Liszt pupils,"[59] the question of *which* components of the scenario and *how* the scenario was linked to the interpretation remain contentious

[58] Bertrand Ott, "An Interpretation of Liszt's Sonata in B Minor," 35.
[59] Joseph Horowitz, *Arrau on Music and Performance* (Mineola NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 1992), 137.

issues. Too broad an interpretation of the Faust legend and relevance becomes difficult to establish. Too detailed and one quickly becomes reduced to fanciful text-painting.

Each analysis of Liszt's *Sonata in B minor* falls along a spectrum. Some scholars deal only with the score, others range farther afield. The conservative end of the spectrum provides a measure of safety and legitimacy (but perhaps less help to the performer). The liberal end of the spectrum provides nearly unlimited potential for imagination (but almost no rigorous connections to the score). If Liszt's *Sonata in B minor* was indeed inspired by *Faust*, that inspiration should be evident in thematic events and relationships – the foreground. However, the fact that Liszt never went on record as having assigned *Faust* as a specific program to the sonata also indicates that the inspiration may function on a background level – affecting formal and interpretive decisions but without declaring manifest authority over the music.

Establishing a paratext and connecting those elements to the score lies decidedly toward the more liberal end of the analytical spectrum and therefore becomes more vulnerable to an interpreter's mere fancy. Because any paratext associated with Liszt's *Sonata in B minor* must be an *unofficial paratext*, the discussion must be rigorously grounded in something more firm than opinion. By first setting philosophical and aesthetic boundaries, one may subsequently move more securely into discussing paratextual connections between Goethe's *Faust* and Liszt's *Sonata in B minor.*

PART II

LIMITATIONS OF TRUTH AND MEANING

CHAPTER 4

Introduction

The performer attempting to interpret a given score must first admit the existence of certain problems confronting him in regard to interpretive decisions. First the performer must assign performance values to certain notational variables including dynamics, tempo, rhythm, and pacing. While these variables are almost always indicated by the composer, specific values (outside of computer programs) are almost never assigned. Second, the performer must in some way describe the musical relationships in the score in terms of aesthetic variables. If music were simply notes on the page, then determining the value of an interpretation would simply be a matter of accuracy. Third, the performer must prescribe meaningful values to the aesthetic variables. Historically, music has always been seen as engaging listeners' emotions on some level for better or worse. Allowing that composers intended their music to engage listeners more viscerally than only at the level of pure intellectual contemplation, aesthetic meaning must be at least broadly determined by the performer.

Because the performer is responsible for assigning a great deal of subjective meaning in his interpretation, and because the interpretation necessarily must be truthful in its rendering of the score, the performer will assign interpretive values based on his own analysis and technical training that are consistent with his individual experience. If no score existed, then any interpretation could be seen as meaningful and truthful as it would accurately reflect the performer's experience. The interpretation, however, must be

representative of the score. The fundamental dilemma may be posed thus: how can the performer know whether his interpretation is truthful and meaningful in regard to the score, or truthful and meaningful only within his own experience?

This question, difficult enough to answer in regard to absolute music, becomes even more problematic when applied to program music. Pieces that include programs, either explicitly or implicitly linked to the score, prove especially resistant to analysis as they involve interpreting meaning beyond purely musical relationships. Traditional interpretive models have either disregarded the programmatic elements (in favor of a simple model involving only indisputable musical relationships), or have described the musical relationships in terms of the program (in favor of a simple model involving obvious or explicit aesthetic relationships). In only allowing one or the other, traditional interpretive models have failed to offer a truthful rendering of the score as in each case meaningful notational and aesthetic variables have been discarded in favor of a more streamlined approach. One redeems these variables, however, at his own peril as the questions that subsequently arise must be addressed to avoid a slide into complete subjectivity.

Is There Artistic Truth?

Kingsley Price, in his article "Is There Artistic Truth?" sets up certain boundaries for the question:

> Some have contended that all works of art are true or false in the correspondence sense; and others, rejecting this view, have contended or suggested that all works of art are true or false in the sense that they do or do not afford insight into reality. If the first view is correct, it is easy to hold that truth in the correspondence sense is a criterion for aesthetic excellence; if the second, that the conveyance of insight acts as such a criterion.….If all works of art were true or false, each would be meaningful, i.e., would contain propositions or be constituted by them. This is to say that each work would refer to something other than itself in such a way that if that other thing existed, the work would correspond to it. But not every work of art can contain propositions or be constituted by them. Consequently not all works of art are true or false.[60]

The question of artistic truth seems especially important in discussing music and specifically the interpretation of music. The judging of an interpretation as good or bad, correct or incorrect, is a responsibility musicians accept every day. Often the discussion takes the form of "religious" warfare where truth and meaning are malleable quantities to further one's own ideology. However, what is really meant by artistic truth? When musicians speak of music being "meaningful," to what are they referring? One might try to define musical truth as a correspondence with some extra-musical truth (or ideal quantity), but it becomes difficult to definitively state precisely how the music translates in a corresponding way the original truth's meaning. Conversely, if one denies any correspondence of extra-musical truth and instead maintains that either the score or some accepted performance practice embodies an idealized absolute truth, one also finds

[60] Kingsley Blake Price, "Is There Artistic Truth?" *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLVI, No. 10 (1949): 285.

persistent problems in both the ability to fully perceive that truth and then apply it musically in any meaningful way.

Aesthetically, does a widely held opinion labeling a work of art as “true” or “false” determine its value? If program music is considered “false” music, is it still valuable? Often in discussing canonical masterworks the words “true” and “valuable” are used interchangeably. However, equating truth and value involves a number of profound problems: How does the performer determine what is true? How far must one agree with canonical truth (for example performance practice) in order to form a “true” interpretation? How much freedom does the performer have in interpreting notation? How does the performer approach music previously determined to be “false” music?

In analyzing and performing music, one must either wrestle with some exceedingly thorny issues, or else assign values to performance and analysis so narrow that any potential hazards involving truth and meaning remain excluded from the discussion. Both the analytical process and the performance process maintain extensive traditions, practices, techniques, and lineages. All analytical traditions and performance practice traditions claim to (at least partially) describe artistic truth. Regarding interpretation, however, how can one distinguish what is true from *that which one prefers over the alternative*? If interpretive analysis remains the description of musical relationships *for the purpose of* performance, how does one distinguish between manifest musical relationships and possible musical relationships? Specifically, can extra-musical programs, characters, and formal models legitimately be ascribed to musical relationships when no reliable, extant source unequivocally identifies those as conditional influences? Indeed, music has always been more than notes on a page. Musical truth and meaning can

only be realized when the complex relationships of performance, analysis, and compositional genesis are fully explored. As Pragmatist discussions of problems relating to absolute truth offer striking parallels to discussions of problems regarding musical truth, a basic understanding of Pragmatist principles should provide a starting point. While Pragmatist principles are not relevant to Liszt in a historical sense (he most certainly did not have them in mind when composing), the Pragmatist models can provide the twenty-first century musician with a basic philosophical reasoning for incorporating paratexts into a work's interpretation.

Truth: A Pragmatist Rendering

In *A Companion Guide to Pragmatism,* Margolis mentions a discussion between Rorty and Putnam during the second phase of 20th century Pragmatism. This discussion regarded

> the propriety of reading Dewey along the lines of Rorty's so-called 'postmodernist' account of pragmatism and of Putnam's counter-effort to reject such innovations in favor of a more canonical picture of realism – cast in metaphysical and epistemological terms strong enough to escape the charge of relativism.[61]

Margolis then posits that

> Rorty's intention was to retire metaphysics and epistemology altogether, on the plea that such would-be disciplines, essential to canonical philosophy, were actually sham undertakings: there is, and could be he claimed, speaking as a pragmatist, no science of knowledge as such; hence no way to demonstrate that (say) realism was true.[62]

[61] Joseph Margolis, "Introduction: Pragmatism, Retrospective, and Prospective," in *A Companion Guide To Pragmatism*, eds. John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis (Malden, Massachussetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 4.
[62]Ibid..

Tellingly, neither side of Pragmatists ever convinced the other. However, the questions raised have an immediate bearing on both the nature of truth and methods of approaching truth.

Rorty's concern – that relying on metaphysics and epistemology to describe truth requires an acceptance of the premise that these disciplines are in fact true – seems valid. Describing truth in terms of canonically accepted *a priori* ideas is similar to children describing "rules" governing reality in imaginary games – neither description needs to retain any real truth in order to appear functionally valid to the participants. Putnam's position, however, that discarding such traditional reference points amounts to intellectual vertigo, is also well taken. Thus, in defining truth, one must recognize the necessity of framing any discussion within historical precedents, while at the same time recognizing that appealing to historical precedent relies heavily upon canonical inviolability for credibility rather than any demonstrably intrinsic truth. As such, definitions of truth either deny the possibility of any canonically accepted *a priori* ideas as necessarily being true (thus inducing intellectual vertigo by eliminating historical points of reference), or rely on arguments built substantially on the relative quicksand of historical precedent.

Peirce, generally regarded as the first Pragmatist, followed Kant's model in insisting that "the limits of experience define the limits of knowledge."[63] He also "conceived experience in such a way as to be capable of aiding us in discovering to some degree the way things are (not simply the way they appear to us)."[64] Peirce thus

[63] Vincent M. Colapietro, "Charles Sanders Peirce," in *A Companion Guide To Pragmatism*, eds. John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis (Malden, Massachussetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 16.
[64] Ibid., 16.

determined Kant's idea of the *Ding an sich*,[65] the thing-in-itself, as being impossible. Colapietro writes,

> Whereas Kant maintained that things in themselves are conceivable but unknowable (since we are able to think them without contradiction but not able to know them by recourse to any experience), Peirce argued they were incognizable, meaning that they are not even conceivable.[66]

While admitting to a cosmos larger than our experience, Peirce maintained,

> Over against any cognition, there is an unknown but knowable reality; but over against all possible cognition, there is only the self-contradictory…Nothing can be more completely false than that we can experience only our own ideas."[67]

Herein Pierce describes an additional difficulty in ascertaining truth: if knowledge is limited to experience, then one's attained knowledge of truth can only be evaluated through one's own experience. If truth maintains an infinite existence independent of phenomenal perception, then even if one can know certain parts of truth through experience, one can never completely comprehend the entire truth as one cannot ever experience an infinite noumenal truth. Without phenomenally experiencing an infinite truth, one cannot comprehensively evaluate his own knowledge of truth.

Of course, if the discovery of the way things are (not simply as they appear to be) is limited by one's experience, one cannot determine whether his understanding of the truth is simply a flawed (or lacking) experience confusing the appearance of truth with actual truth. Because reality (experience) does not necessarily equal truth, one may gain knowledge through his experience without necessarily gaining a greater understanding of truth. While Peirce did think that given an infinite number of resources an infinite truth

---

[65] Kant's description of a noumenal world independent from man's perception of the world (phenomenal).
[66] Vincent Colapietro, "Charles Sanders Peirce," 17.
[67] Ibid..

could be discovered, the inherent danger of using the (realistic) limits of experience to determine truth still applies.

The problem may be summed up thus: because one's understanding of truth is defined through experience, and because truth exists outside of one's experience, there always remains the danger that one's understanding of the truth remains subject to one's experience. Any phenomenal understanding of noumenal truth will forever remain in question as one can never determine whether or not the objective truth actually connects with the subjective experience.

The work of pragmatists in trying to explain the concept of truth contains certain parallels to musicians explaining and evaluating nineteenth century music. While works of the Classical period – most notably of the Viennese school – usually serve as supreme examples of form determining interpretation (truth and meaning determined through purely musical relationships), some view the music of the early and mid-nineteenth century as bogged down in interpretive relativism, myopic formal structures, and virtuosic egotism. The formal clarity, dramatic large-scale uses of dissonance, and contextually appropriate virtuosity of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven had run its course and left early nineteenth-century composers with no clear wellspring from which to draw their inspiration. Without a clear hierarchy of traditional musical relationships in the score upon which to defend the "truthfulness" of interpretations (or even of the work itself), and with the additional baggage of a decidedly subjective and individualistic performance tradition, twentieth-century performers were left with a similar dilemma to twentieth century Pragmatists: either to try to cast their interpretation in strong enough

epistemological[68] and metaphysical terms to escape the charge of interpretive relativism, or to follow Schenker's practice of relegating such music to the trash heap as sham constructions.

In trying to determine truth within musical interpretation, one must first clarify the boundaries between truth and meaning within music. Through drawing parallels between (a) the pragmatic "experience" and musical performance (either actively performing or actively listening), and (b) pragmatic "knowledge" and analysis of the musical score, both the usefulness and inherent obstacles represented by both performance and analysis may be better defined. Once these limitations are in place, the pitfalls in determining truth can be defined, and meaning better described.

[68] Here transformational theory has been particularly useful.

CHAPTER 5

Truth and Experience: Music in Performance

The Pragmatist discussion divided truth into noumenal (an unknowable, infinite quantity) and phenomenal (that truth which may be experienced as a knowable finite quantity) categories. In applying these principles to music, similar categories can prove extremely useful. Eduard Hanslick conceived of a "division of music into composition and reproduction."[69] Music may thus be divided into two categorical realities: the score (abstracted music or potential music), and the performance (actualized music or kinetic music). Hanslick notes that the division "makes itself felt preeminently in the investigation of the subjective impression of music."[70] This subjective impression of music refers primarily to the phenomenal experience of music – the interpretation. Hanslick writes,

> To the performer it is granted to release directly the feeling which possesses him, through his instrument, and breathe into his performance the wild storms, the passionate fervour [sic], the serene power and joy of his inwardness.[71]

The performer's direct experience of the musical score releases the musical score from objective abstraction to subjective actuality.[72] The score's objective truth lies in its potentiality. A musical score remains free from any subjective experience as no interpretive decisions need be made for the score to exist. Just as certainly, however, the

[69] Eduard Hanslick, *On the musically beautiful,* trans. Geoffrey Payzant (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1886), 48.
[70] Ibid., 49.
[71] Ibid..
[72] Performance here is meant to describe the aural phenomenal experience. While the musical score may indeed be interpreted by means apart from an aural performance, this section will refer to the specific difficulties encountered by the performer. The problems of interpreting analysis will be dealt with in a later section.

potential music contained in the score cannot come into being without the performer making subjective decisions in regard to interpretation. The composer therefore in notating a score is not crafting an interpretation, but rather crafting a piece of music as an objective abstraction. While the composer may attempt to notate interpretive features, their very notation ensures their inclusion as an abstract quantity of the score and therefore subject to interpretation. If both knowledge and meaning are defined by and through experience, then the subjective experience of a musical performance acts as the defining quality determining both the performer's "knowledge" of the score and the meaning therefore assigned to the score – the "reproduction" of the work defining the "composition." So, the performance of a score offers the phenomenal experience so necessary to the Pragmatist's conception of truth.

Performance, however, lies fraught with danger when used to determine musical truth. The Pragmatists' difficulty in determining philosophical truth (i.e. how to determine one's arrival at truth rather than just the appearance of truth) likewise finds a parallel in the performer relying on his experience to determine musical truth. Hanslick writes,

> Of course the performer can deliver only what is already in the composition… In the instant of re-creation, however, this very assimilation, is the work of his, the performer's, spirit. The same piece disturbs or delights, according to how it is animated into resounding actuality, just as one and the same person is at one time seen as full of rapture, and at another time, dull and despondent.[73]

The primary obstacle to using performance as a determinant of truth lies in the subjective quality of the performer's application of phenomenal experience to the score. In performance, the objective musical score and subjective interpretation become one.

[73] Eduard Hanslick, *On The Musically Beautiful*, 49.

In his book on Schnabel's interpretation, Karl Wolff writes,

> He [the performer] will only be able to perform his task if he makes music quite spontaneously, or as Heine says, if the presentation 'reveals the performer standing on the same free spiritual heights as the composer, if it convinces us that he too is free.'[74]

A strong performance of a weak composition may ennoble the composition in the minds of the listener. The weak performance likewise degrades the listener's opinion of the composition. Additionally, the same performer (given different performances) may convey different or even contradictory interpretations of the same material; the same piece disturbing or delighting "according to how it is animated into resounding actuality."[75] If experience determines truth, then multiple interpretations of a piece may each be musically true (according to the performers' phenomenal experience of the score) while at the same time exhibiting different features. If the only point of reference regarding the truth of an interpretation is the performer's phenomenal experience, then any decision based on his experience must be seen as musically true. The problem thus becomes one of perspective. While an interpretation may perhaps be true within the context of an individual's experience, that interpretation must adhere to the higher standard of remaining true within the context of both subjective historical models of interpretation and the objective score.

The position PERFORMANCE = MUSICAL TRUTH demonstrates the subjective extreme possible when negating any point of reference. One performer's interpretation may be regarded as charlatan by a critic or teacher; but as it reflects the experience of that performer, it therefore must be judged as "true." Every composition's worth thus lies at

---

[74] Konrad Wolff, *Schnabel's Interpretation of Piano Music*, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1972), 15.
[75] Eduard Hanslick, *On The Musically Beautiful,* 49.

the mercy of the performer. As William James notoriously formulated, “The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, good, too, for definite, assignable reasons.”[76] One might similarly describe musical truth (in the context of performance) as *whatsoever proves itself to be useful in eliciting a desired response from the listener*. Such relativism, while perhaps in fashion during certain times in the nineteenth century, offers no stable ground upon which to discuss basic interpretive decisions like tempo, dynamics, phrasing, articulation, and various other subjective aspects of musicianship. While one may admit the validity of contradictory interpretations, one must subsequently appeal to a larger truth of which the interpretations are each merely partial reflections rather than full representations. Without being attached to a larger truth, interpretations become relegated to the local decisions of the performer and cannot be judged “true” beyond that performer’s subjective decisions. As using only performance or experience as a truth determinant threatens to become a relativistic quagmire, perhaps the addition of the more intellectually rigorous “composition” or “knowledge” can offer the necessary reinforcement needed to interpret the objective score.

Truth and Knowledge: Music in Analysis

While experience certainly informs our perception of truth, it is not a given that experience necessarily represents truth. Because experience does not necessarily equal truth, relying entirely on experience to determine truth proves inadequate. One must buttress this subjective experience with something more objective in order to test whether

[76] Joseph Margolis “Introduction: Pragmatism, Retrospective, and Prospective,” in *A Companion Guide To Pragmatism,* 7.

or not the experience is indeed valid. Using the score as an absolute determinant immediately establishes a certain immutable plumb line in determining an interpretation's truthfulness. First, however, one must determine the nature of one's own perception of the score. The avenue chosen to perceiving a score has implications for the score's objective veracity. If a score cannot exist as an aural phenomenon without being affected by the exigencies of performance, then in order to retain its "absolute" quality, the score must exist solely as an abstraction in the mind. Hanslick writes,

> The auditory imagination however, which is something entirely different from the sense of hearing regarded as a mere funnel open to the surface of appearances, enjoys in conscious sensuousness the sounding shapes, the self-constructing tones, and dwells in free and immediate contemplation of them.[77]

The score holds tremendous potential in purifying interpretations of both relativism and personal ego. Indeed, many performers go so far as to invoke the law of *sola composito*, allowing only notated elements of the printed score as truthful.[78] Hanslick seems to agree.

The auditory imagination remains unaffected by either the listener's emotive response or the performer's personality. Acoustical considerations are likewise banished from the musical experience as is the quality of instrument, performer's technique, and ambient audience noise. The musician is thus freed to perfectly perceive the score and therefore conceive the perfect performance through his auditory imagination. In addition, Hanslick implies that "hearing… open to the surface of appearances"[79] may misrepresent the musical truth of a score. Since perceiving the score via auditory imagination frees the

[77] Eduard Hanslick, *On The Musically Beautiful*, 30.
[78] Of course this position presupposes a perfected "urtext" score that completely preserves and communicates the musical intentions of the composer.
[79] Ibid..

musician from both the shackles of performance realities and personal ego, the score or "knowledge" must be seen as objectively true.

While a score remains an abstraction, it remains objectively true.[80] The application of that "knowledge" however poses a difficult problem. Although a score itself may be objectively true, one must describe the score (either through prose or one's auditory imagination) through an interpretive analysis.[81] Based on a composer's notation, decisions are made reflecting the interpreter's understanding of the score's meaning. As long as the interpretive analysis remains abstractly stated, it may claim ties to objective truth as the interpretive meaning remains grounded in the objectively true score. All theory, however, proves vulnerable once applied to reality. If an interpretation cannot realistically be performed, then one must consider the possibility that such an interpretation does not accurately reflect the composition and is therefore not wholly true. Alasdaire Macintyre writes in his book *Ethics and Politics* that

> Experience may really or apparently be discordant with a… theory in a way that falsifies that theory, if one condition is satisfied: that the reasons for redescribing and reclassifying the experience, so that it no longer falsifies the theory, are outweighed by the reasons for treating it as a genuine counterexample to the theory.[82]

This point – that experience may falsify a theory by imposing certain conditions rendering the theory realistically impossible – certainly applies to purely theoretical interpretive analysis. If an interpretation cannot be accurately rendered in performance

[80] The objective component of the score not having been affected by the subjective experience of the interpreter.
[81] Interpretive analysis refers to the analysis of a score with the goal of understanding it *for the purpose of* interpretation as opposed to analysis (an examination of a complex form, its elements, and their relations), attempting only to describe the musical relationships in the score without applying these to interpretation.
[82] Alasdaire Macintyre, *Ethics and Politics: Selected Essays,* vol. 2, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 89.

because of certain conditions of reality, then the interpretive analysis cannot be true insofar as being an authentic representation of the score.

An example of experience falsifying theory may be found in David Lewin's discussion of Amfortas's Prayer:

> *The nature and logic of Riemannian tonal space are not isomorphic with the nature and logic of scale-degree space.* The musical objects and relations that Riemann isolates and discusses are *not* simply the old objects and relations dressed up in new packages with new labels; they are essentially different objects and relations, embedded in an essentially different geometry. That is so even if in some contexts the two spaces may coexist locally without apparent conflict; in this way the surface of a Mobius strip would *locally* resemble the surface of a cylinder to an ant who had not fully explored the global logic of the space.[83]

Lewin's concept of an enharmonic seam allowing both Riemann tonal space and scale-degree space to exist simultaneously proves extremely useful in his description of Wagner's magical effects in *Parsifal*. While a highly engaging interpretation, it requires performers and listeners to readily distinguish between the enharmonic equivalents (C-flat) and (B). Realistically, the listener cannot aurally distinguish that enharmonic seams define the boundaries of Riemann tonal space and scale-degree space. While listeners with an excellent ear might be able to hear the difference between a (C-flat) and (B), the ability to aurally perceive that pitch as an existential seam between two different geometric tonal realities necessitates one's possessing aural capabilities more commonly associated with super-heroes. While Lewin's analysis certainly can help the performer understand the work better, it remains extraordinarily difficult to translate this understanding into the listener's experience of the work.

---

[83] David Lewin, "Amfortas's Prayer of Titurel and the Role of D in 'Parsifal': The Tonal Spaces of the Drama and the Enharmonic C♭/B, *19th-Century Music*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (April 1984): 345.

If the listener's experience is that of the ant on the Mobius strip, then analyses depending on drawing a distinction between the cylinder and Mobius strip become problematic. The ant's local experience traversing the Mobius strip is essentially identical to the experience of traversing a cylinder. Simply understanding that the object is a Mobius strip or cylinder does not change (in any essentials) the ant's local experience. As music exists in time, marginalizing the local experience in favor of macro-formal abstractions disenfranchises the listener from the reality of how the music actually sounds. Once an analysis determines that the actual notes in the score sound "false," (according to an abstract analysis), the interpretation becomes dangerously irrelevant.[84]

If the score cannot guarantee a useful applied interpretation, and performance offers too many relativistic hazards to be authoritative, it appears that the pure pursuit of truth in regard to interpretation must arrive at an impasse. While one cannot dispense with the truthful elements each contains, neither may lay claim to offering an unassailable monopoly on truth. It cannot be disputed that both the score and performance variables must be considered in order to form an artistically true interpretation. However, without assigning some larger meaning to these independent elements, no large-scale understanding of musical truth within interpretation may be established. Indeed it is precisely through understanding how meaning is assigned to both audible music and abstracted music that a useful paradigm can be employed to determine interpretation.

Truth exists outside of assigned meaning yet one must assign meaning in order to apply truth. Truth is an infinite quantity and therefore remains true whether meaningfully

---

[84] While certain chords and notes may be used ambiguously (and therefore may "sound" different from their spelling), the dependence upon the listener to hear these ambiguities (in real time) as enharmonic seams demands the separation of these ambiguities from all contextual moorings.

interpreted or not.[85] However, erroneously assigned meanings to truthful elements can falsify one's perception of the original truth. Although the musical score's objective truthfulness remains intact, without assigning meaning, the objective truth of the score cannot be applied to the interpretation. In other words, "knowledge" must inform "experience" through the interface of meaning.

[85] Or, truth, as a noumenal quantity, will not be disturbed by falsely assigned meanings from phenomenal experience.

CHAPTER 6

Meaning: Propositional assignment

If the score is considered true (as it must be for the purposes of analysis), and experience is considered true insofar as it allows one to know the score, there remains the problem of assigning meaning to that truth. Generally speaking, musicians assign meaning to music through either of two perspectives: 1) that any meaning is the result of *a priori* elements of some fundamental truth in purely musical relationships, and 2) that meaning is the result of *a priori* elements of truth in the relationship of music to emotional response. These two assignments of meaning may be divided into the realms of theory (1) and aesthetics (2). Before discussing these categories in depth, however, some basic premises need to be defined.

Recall Kingsley Price's argument that

> If all works of art were true or false, each would be meaningful, i.e., would contain propositions or be constituted by them. This is to say that each work would refer to something other than itself in such a way that if that other thing existed, the work would correspond to it.[86]

The first part of the argument may be paraphrased to describe musical truth as follows: the score that is musically true must contain propositions or be constituted by them.[87] Music then, in terms of musical relationships, may be defined as meaningful only as far as those relationships are indeed proportionally logical. John Collins, in his article "Truth or Meaning? A Question of Priority," offers some basic propositional schemas that

---

[86] Kingsley Blake Price, "Is There Artistic Truth?" 285.

[87] This idea refers to the argument that music can mean something other than itself. That an "A-E" relationship means something other than a simple change in frequency.

describe both sentential and propositional Deflationist theories of the relationships between truth and meaning. While Collins deals with language-based meaning, the schemas he describes provide useful constructs in defining meaning in music as well.

> Those deflationists who favor sentences as primary truth bearers…reflect this common theme by their appeal to the schema (T):
>
> *X* is true (in *L*) iff *p*,
>
> Where each instance is formed by the substitution of '*X*' for a quotation (or structural description) of an *L*-sentence, and '*p*' for a translation of the substitute of '*X*'. The truth predicate here is language relative, i.e., '*L*' is a dummy letter designating a particular language (inclusive of idiolects), it is not a variable ranging over languages. Thus, an instance of (T) is
>
> (1) 'Snow is white' is true (in English) iff snow is white.
>
> Here the truth of 'Snow is white' is accounted for by the concepts therein expressed: the sentence is true just if snow *is* white.[88]

While deflationist theory may suffer philosophically for trying to "explicate truth in terms of meaning,"[89] it serves very well to describe meaning in musical relationships. One may use a quotation or structural description for *X* and may use musical language for *L*. For example,

> **(T): 'V-I is a cadence' is true (in Music/) iff V goes to I at the cadence.**

The usefulness of such a sentential definition of meaning in engaging Price's propositional definition of artistic truth, however, remains doubtful as, according to Price, music must contain propositions in order to be artistically true. Therefore, propositions

[88] John Collins, "Truth or Meaning? A Question of Priority" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Nov., 2002): 499.
[89] Ibid., 497.

must be true in order for *X* to be true. Fortunately, Collins offers an analogous schema for describing propositional truth (PT).

> Those deflationists who favor propositions as primary truth bearers…appeal to the schema (PT) as an analogue of (T):
>
> (PT) the proposition that *P* is true iff *p*.
>
> That is that both hold that '*P* is true' and '*P*' are definitionally equivalent where 'P' is a dummy for the respective truth bearers appealed to.[90]

This further explanation of meaning allows musical relationships to be fully explained as propositions. Therefore,

> **(PT) 'V-I is meaningful as a perfect authentic cadence' is true iff V has been established as a polarized dominant in a hierarchical relationship to I.**

So for instance, V-I at the end of a Classical era sonata is both true as a cadence: [V-I = V-I], and as a proposition: [V-I is meaningful as a final cadence because V has been established as a polarized dominant in a hierarchical relationship to I]. Conversely, a V-I final cadence cannot be either sententially true or propositionally true in an atonal work. The atonal work lacks the ability to define either '*X*' or '*p*' as V-I and therefore cannot describe the musical relationship as true. Likewise, the atonal work lacks the proposition that a major triad built a perfect fifth away from a tonal center exists as part of a meaningful hierarchical relationship to that tonal center. All musical relationships therefore can only be meaningful according to the truthfulness of propositional relationships established by the conditions of musical language within individual works.

While these schemas prove helpful in determining meaning as part of musical language, they do not quite address Price's concern that artistic truth would entail each

[90] John Collins, "Truth or Meaning? A Question of Priority," 499-500.

work referring to something other than itself. The hazards in assigning meaning to interpretations lie also in the tendency of musicians and listeners to assign extra-musical meaning (usually in terms of emotional response) to the purely musical propositions in the score. Herein resides the crux of Price's contention that if a work was true, "each work would refer to something other than itself in such a way that if that other thing existed, the work would correspond to it." Price maintains that a musical proposition cannot be made to meaningfully correspond to "something other than itself." The propositional schema of truth and meaning (PT) likewise fails to offer a useful method in describing the tendency of listeners to respond emotionally to music.

Meaning cannot unerringly be assigned to rational truth in music precisely because of the simple fact that music is bound up in emotional response. Describing emotional response as a model across a group (or as a musical proposition) remains notoriously difficult. The idea that great music may be described as artistically true based on its effectiveness in eliciting a similar emotional response from listeners of the same culture, experience, and historical period, cannot presume to describe anything other than popular trends. Likewise, the idea that music is a universal language, and as such will necessarily retain the same meaning across culture, experience, and history, also proves problematic. The main point – that music is universally assigned meaning through emotional response even if that meaning differs from person to person and culture to culture – still remains valid. In order to describe assigned meaning beyond purely musical relationships, one must incorporate aesthetics. While propositional schemas cannot describe how emotional response assigns meaning to musical language, aesthetics can.

Meaning: Performance and Aesthetic Response

Any aesthetic meaning assigned to music is by nature extra-musical. By describing a performance as "expressive" or "moving," one has ceased to discuss the objective truth of the score, the subjective truth of performance variables in interpretation, or the subjective truth of interpretative analysis. Instead the performer has assigned certain meaningful values to the musical experience in attempting to describe its effect in aesthetic terms. Aesthetically, features of the emotional response to the phenomenal experience of music must be determined before any discussion of extra-musical meaning may take place.

Emotional responses to art and life take a number of different forms including cognitive, sympathetic, empathetic, and associative forms. When discussing music as the object of the response, the field narrows to two: sympathetic and associative. Aaron Ridley in his book *Music, Value, and the Passions* defines a sympathetic response as:

> one elicited from a person in virtue of the expressive features of an object perceived – features that, however, the person does *not* think of as standing in significant relation to anyone else's passions (or to none but those of persons similarly placed *vis-à-vis* the object). So that when, for example, I am made melancholy by the sight of a weeping willow, I do not suppose the willow to experience any passion, and (unless I know or believe it to have been planted for such reasons) neither do I suppose it to be the outward manifestation of someone else's passion. Rather, I recognize in the willow features reminiscent of melancholy expressions (its trailing drooping qualities) and respond to them by becoming melancholy myself.[91]

[91] Aaron Ridley, *Music, Value and the Passions* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 11-12.

The sympathetic response is inherently vague. Ridley states that one responds to features "reminiscent" of a particular emotion rather than any direct association of emotion with the feature itself. While vague, the sympathetic response fills an important role in categorizing that emotional response occurring without a material object.[92] A foggy or rainy day may cause someone to respond by feeing gloomy. Yet (unless a picnic was planned), he is not specifically responding to the weather itself, but to certain features of the weather that remind him on an unconscious level of being sad. One becomes sad when listening to "sad" music not because the music itself is sad, but because of certain features reminiscent of sadness (minor modes, descending motives, slow tempi, suspensions, etc.). While certain tropes and clichés often provide formulas for the formal expression of sadness, their inclusion within a work cannot make the music itself sad, any more than the music can manifest any other emotion. Although the composer may well be expressing personal or dramatic sadness, the appearance of sad codes in music does not inevitably mean the composer himself is sad. Additionally, one must keep in mind that music can only express sadness in conjunction with the sympathetic response of the listener. Given a different set of cultural codes (or a change in the listener's mood), the same music may elicit a different response. The sympathetic response therefore categorizes the emotional response in the listener created by musical features without requiring the assignation of specific meaning to those features. When listening to late Beethoven for example, one may feel a sympathetic response to tragic and sublime features of the music without needing to assign meaning to specific musical phenomena. So, while music cannot truly correspond to or represent an extra-musical emotion, it can

[92] See following discussion of material and formal objects and their connections with sympathetic and associative responses.

exhibit features reminiscent of that emotion. These features are then assigned meaning through the sympathetic response of the listener.

The associative response in music bears some similarity with the sympathetic response (most notably in terms of elicited feelings) but retains distinct differences. Ridley states,

> I respond to music associatively when it elicits the passion in me that it does solely in virtue of the association that the music has, for me, with something else, which would by itself elicit that response.[93]

Thus the sadness one may feel when listening to the third movement of Chopin's *B minor Sonata* has everything to do with the funereal associations of the music rather than the music itself. The music does not reflect features of sadness as much as it associates itself with a sad event. Chopin's music, while not occasional, becomes associated with funeral music (and therefore grief and loss) through its use of distinctive rhythms used in functionally occasional funeral marches. When a piece references a specific experience, the associative response then assigns meaning through associating a correspondent reality (i.e. funeral marches with funerals).

The distinction between the sympathetic and associative responses may be seen more clearly in relation to the objects of each response. Ridley posits, "When we experience emotion, we always experience emotion *about* something. This something is the object of our emotion."[94]

---

[93] Aaron Ridley, *Music, Value and the Passions,* 14.
[94] Ibid., 27.

Objects of emotion are then divided into two categories: material objects and formal objects.

> When I am afraid of your dog, or relieved by your failure, your dog and your failure are the *material objects* of my emotions. Any particular episode of emotion will take a material object; and as fear of your dog and fear of, say, botulism are apt to be dissimilar experiences, the character of each instance of emotion is logically dependent upon the nature of the material object taken.[95]

The material object thus exhibits some useful characteristics. The material object is concretely defined, ensuring that any emotional response may be traced back to a specific source. Additionally, each episode of emotion can be distinguished by its material object. The Baroque Doctrine of Affections was predicated on precisely this idea; music could act as a material object to emotion. Therefore, through creating rhetorical formulas, one could employ music as a material object correlating a specific emotional response with a specific meaning. The problem, of course, is music's ephemeral nature. What may elicit one type of response today cannot be counted upon to inevitably elicit that same response tomorrow (or, more relevantly, 300 years later). This inconsistency prevents music from functioning as a specific material object.

Cast in terms of the associative response, however, the material object may remain a constant outside of music yet still affect the music. If one feels sad at funerals, the material object of that sadness is the funeral. Sadness at hearing a funeral march simply expands the equation. The material object is still the funeral. However, instead of the phenomenal experience of a funeral eliciting the response, the response is elicited through a musical reference to that experience. So the associative response may be linked

---

[95] Aaron Ridley, *Music, Value and the Passions*, 27.

with the material object in the following way: The associative response to a musical reference will create the same emotional response as the material object being referenced.

Ridley continues his example to describe the formal object.

> Fear of your dog and fear of botulism do, however, have this in common: in both cases the fear is a response to a perceived threat. 'The threatening,' then, is the *formal object* of fear, as 'the welcome but not inevitable' is the formal object of relief.[96]

The formal object thus represents the reason behind an emotional response. With all due respect to President Roosevelt, the emotion of fear arises from a formal object (a perceived threat) that may or may not apply to a material object. Thus, one needs no material object in order to experience fear. Walking down a dark alley at night in a bad section of town may not employ a material object (one is not necessarily afraid of darkness, alleys, or buildings) but rather the perceived threat implied by the particular context (robbery, assault, etc.). Fear in this case needs only the formal object of a conceivable threat to one's safety to function as an emotional response.

Colin Radford connects the formal object with the sympathetic response:

> My contention is that although the sadness of pure music can make us sad, i.e. we are saddened *by* it, we are not sad *about* the music or its sadness…. The music is the focus of our attention, its perceived sadness … makes us feel sad …, but we are not sad … about or for the music or its perceived emotional tone or property….These feelings … lack objects, i.e. are not *about* anything."[97]

One might add to Radford's point "These feelings… are not *about* anything" *in particular.* Sadness in music exists only as a response. The music itself is not sad, even when explicitly expressing a composer's emotional state of mind. Music inhabits the

---

[96] Aaron Ridley, *Music, Value and the Passions,* 27.
[97] Colin Radford, "Muddy Waters," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer, 1991): 249-50.

same realm as the formal object; one where the emotional response is based upon the perceived emotional implications of the music.

Aesthetically then, emotional responses to music may be divided into two categories with corresponding objects: ASSOCIATIVE RESPONSE – MATERIAL OBJECT, and SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE – FORMAL OBJECT. One assigns meaning, therefore, as a result of specific aesthetic responses. One does not assign meaning through either haphazard moods, or through the music propositionally corresponding to some emotion. By tracing meaning through the objects of associative and sympathetic responses, one may clearly describe aesthetic meaning as a function of truth. A true interpretation therefore interprets the performance variables of the score through exploring how the score and performance variables function within the context of the aesthetic response. What is meaningful musically should create a correspondingly meaningful response in the listener. The final step in the process of assigning meaning is to determine how the propositional relationships in the score fit together with the emotional response in the listener.

CHAPTER 7

Meaning: Analysis and Phenomenological Intelligibility

Phenomenological intelligibility refers to that arrangement of sound shapes (phenomena) which fit together to communicate meaning (intelligibility). Price, in his article on music and meaning, describes intelligibility thus:

> Consider the pieces of a picture puzzle in relation to the picture. Some of the pieces put together in one way make a branch, but put together in another make nothing at all. Others put together in one way make a squirrel but put together in another nothing at all. The branch and the squirrel put together in one way make a branch supporting a squirrel but put together in another nothing at all, again, except the branch and squirrel in separation. The shapes of the pieces enable the intelligible outcomes; they enable the pieces to fit together into a branch, a squirrel, and the whole picture of squirrel on branch. But those very shapes explain, also, the unintelligibility of the collections that result from putting the pieces together differently—the unintelligibility of the collections that make nothing at all.[98]

To determine meaning, puzzle pieces have to be correctly fit together. The pieces taken alone can have no truthful meaning outside of the context of the corresponding, surrounding puzzle pieces. Once the pieces are fit together in an intelligible construction (shapes fit together with corresponding shapes), the resultant structure may achieve at least partial meaning (as a squirrel or tree branch), but only after all the pieces have been correctly fit together does each shape demonstrate completed meaning within the context of the picture as a whole. The intelligibility of each piece thus only manifests itself within the completed context of the puzzle. Of course, all of the pieces must be both considered

[98] Kingsley Price, "Does Music Have Meaning?" 203-4.

and appropriately matched together within the puzzle in order for the picture to be complete.

Likewise, to determine musical meaning, one must first include and consider every aspect of a musical work. Ridley states,

> it is essential to understand that what one is hearing is music – to hear what one hears, in other words, *as* music, and not merely as an auditory stimulus of some unspecified kind, or as noise.[99]

Understanding that what one hears is music is akin to realizing that the pieces of a puzzle form a coherent whole. While one might try to fit random noises together, and may even be successful enough to assign meaning in a manner similar to Rorschach tests, musical meaning and phenomenological intelligibility depend on recognizing that music is not random.[100]

Price, in describing the specific phenomenological intelligibility inherent in coherent music, describes musical sound and shape as being specifically temporal in nature.

> A melody is a succession of notes that is coherent. Think of the notes that correspond to 'My country 'tis of thee, Sweet land of liberty, Of thee I sing' etc. These notes do not merely follow one another in time; they cling together in a single aural structure. You can hear that coherence easily by contrast. Change the temporal order of the notes in any way you please. Now you have notes that, following one another in time, do not make a single aural structure.[101]

---

[99] Aaron Ridley, *Music, Value and the Passions,* 51-2.
[100] Randomness is an intended component of Aleatoric music. The random expression, however, is still controlled as part of a musical work specifically intended by a composer. So, while the details may indeed be randomly expressed, that random expression still falls under the phenomenological intelligibility of the score as *music*.
[101] Kingsley Price, "Does Music Have Meaning?" 207.

Whether the music is tonal or not, Price ascribes the intelligibility of a particular melodic shape (one may also include harmony or specific pitches) to a specific temporal context. In doing so, Price simply provides a philosophical construct for Schoenberg's description of motivic cohesion. Such coherence preserves essential parts as motivic identifiers across a work.[102] In this way, one "remembers" a melodic shape even as specific details of that motive are varied.[103] As the tonal composer chooses certain musical shapes within the context of tonality, so also do atonal and serial composers choose certain shapes within the correspondingly specific contexts of their music. Musical phenomenological intelligibility requires that the pitches, harmonies, melodic shapes, and formal structures all fit together in some meaningful way over the temporal existence of a given work.

Ridley, in discussing Price's usage of phenomenological intelligibility, states

> "Phenomenological intelligibility" is thus *distinctive* of music and allows it to be separated off from the other possible objects of auditory experience. Tonality is the condition of the "demanding" characteristic of music, so that within tonal music the satisfaction or frustration of such demands (of tones for each other) is what makes a melody coherent or incoherent. To hear a pitch as the seventh in the scale is to hear a tone which demands that the tonic should follow soon, a demand which does not lapse when the tonic fails so to follow, but rather persists, spanning whatever tones succeed the seventh to yield an entire succession that without the tonic is incoherent, and that with the tonic *is* coherent.[104]

[102] For example, a tonal answer found in a fugue is recognized primarily by its preservation of the rhythm and melodic contour of the subject. While not being an exact transposition, the listener hears it in all essentials as the subject.
[103] Arnold Schoenberg, *The Musical Idea and the Logic, Technique, and Art of its Presentation*, edited and translated by Patricia Carpenter, Severine Neff (New York, NY: Colombia University Press, 1995), 21-43.
[104] Aaron Ridley, *Music, Value and the Passions,* 52-53.

So, according to Ridley and Price, what makes music different from random sound is precisely the meaning assigned to each sound by the surrounding context.[105] An E pitch will sound differently depending on the tonal (or atonal) context and therefore may have different meanings depending on the context. Only by analyzing the surrounding context can one hope to determine the meaning of that specific statement of E. One may thus describe phenomenological intelligibility as the meaningful relationships of component parts (either micro or macro) to the whole.

Music is fundamentally phenomenologically intelligible. This intelligibility exists on every level. Since music exhibits phenomenological intelligibility on every level, the interpreter excludes certain relationships at his peril. Interpretation must meaningfully engage macro relationships in order to assign meaning to the micro relationships, while ensuring the micro relationships fit together appropriately to create the macro relationships.

Meaning: Programs and Phenomenological Intelligibility

If music demonstrates phenomenologically intelligible shapes on a micro level (for example, the coherent shape of a melody), then it will also be intelligible on a macro level (the coherent shape of one part within a multi-part work). In dealing with music with extra-musical references, exploring how these extra-musical references become part of the music's phenomenological intelligibility should allow a more rigorous vetting of how those extra-musical elements exert influence over the score's musical relationships.

[105] It is important to note that Ridely is not attempting to describe music as being the sole possessor of phenomenological intelligibility, but is attempting to distinguish music (with its meaningful sound structures and shapes) from random non-phenomenologically intelligible auditory experiences. Any sound structure or shape that retains meaning may be considered phenomenologically intelligible.

Thus, instead of relying on primary extant sources describing how the composer adds a program to the score (insert programmatic element A into musical event B), one may instead determine the musical elements' programmatic meaning by extending the phenomenologically intelligible elements of musical relationships within the score to include the program.

Regarding the score, any extra-musical program will exist as part of the broader "paratext" of the work. Gerard Genette in his book *Paratexts* states,

> Indeed, this fringe [the paratext], always the conveyor of a commentary that is authorial or more or less legitimated by the author, constitutes a zone between text and off-text, a zone not only of transition but also of *transaction*...of an influence on the public, an influence that – whether well or poorly understood and achieved – is at the service of a better reception for the text and a more pertinent reading of it.[106]

The program therefore acts as a guide to the composer's desires regarding assigned meaning. The paratextual elements of a program also act on the phenomenological intelligibility of the work by providing a more focused lens through which to study the more intricate musical relationships.

Programs in music generally function in one of two ways: either by providing a specific narrative meaning (and often formal structure), or by providing a broader poetic meaning to an arguably independent formal structure. For example, the program of Beethoven's sixth symphony provides a poetic program striving to create the proper atmosphere in which to understand and respond to the music. Berlioz's *Symphonie Fantastique* on the other hand (with the music mimicking the artist's severed head) demonstrates a more narrative program.

[106] Gerard Genette, *Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation*, 2.

Aesthetically, a narrative program functions as the material object of an associative response. When one listens to the "galloping" motives in *Mazeppa*, one will associate the horse in the program with that particular rhythmic pattern. One's emotional response need not be similar to another's (the response will depend upon a number of other associative variables), however the emotional response will always be tied to the material object – the program's reference to a galloping horse. The narrative program serves the listener by identifying precise events where the program and music synchronize. The program thus provides formal structure and meaning to the musical gestures as well as enabling the listener to assign meaning to his emotional response.

The poetic program, however, serves as a formal object eliciting a sympathetic response. Thus Johannes Kreisler is not mimicked in Schumann's *Kreisleriana* by a particular motive, nor can one trace literary phenomena in Hoffmann's narratives to corresponding musical phenomena in the score. Indeed, even the question of which Hoffmann narrative should be referred to as a program remains ambiguous. The goal of the poetic program is not to provide meaning to specific musical gestures, but rather to describe more fully "ideal, poetic content, which is the goal of music in general."[107]

While the narrative program provides concrete evidence of relevance and value in terms of ascribing meaning to the score, it can imply that the musical relationships retain less musical meaning because of their obvious illustrative relationship to the program.[108] The poetic program allows the musical relationships to retain more of their purely musical meaning, but presents many of the same relativistic dangers exhibited when

---

[107] H. Ch. Koch, "Tonmalerei," in *H. Ch. Koch´s Musikalisches Lexicon*, ed. Arrey von Dommer (Heidelberg: Academische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J.C.B. Mohr, 1865), 873-75. Special thanks to Sanna Pederson for referring this source.

[108] This illustrative purpose of music is exactly what Schopenhauer decries when it uses an extra-musical text to provide formal coherence for the musical relationships.

determining meaning through performance. Because of the dearth of explicit paratextual relationships, any analysis attempting to illuminate interpretive meaning through a poetic program becomes vulnerable to charges of eisegesis.[109] If a poetic program is to be useful, it must meaningfully connect with the objective score in a logically coherent way without slipping into subjective illustration.[110]

Since a poetic program cannot provide explicit meaning, determining that an auditory experience is indeed music remains of primary importance. A poetic program set over random noise might yield surprisingly "fruitful" interpretive analyses as most anything heard might be correlated with most anything in the program. One must beware of assigning meaning (by no means intended by the composer or performer) yet failing to increase truthful understanding. If, by virtue of music's phenomenological intelligibility, one can recognize that sounds are indeed meaningful to one another (and therefore musical), then paratextual poetic programs (whether official or unofficial) should enhance the overall phenomenological intelligibility of those sounds. Applying paratextual programmatic meaning to abstract music as part of a larger consideration of the piece's phenomenological intelligibility allows the performer to assign extra-musical meaning to a musical score. One may then avoid subjective extremes in one's interpretation by maintaining paratextual meaning according to the phenomenological intelligibility of the score.

The usefulness of any poetic program to a musical work will remain directly proportional to the degree that it increases the score's phenomenological intelligibility.

---

[109] Eisegesis refers here to the interpreter "reading into" a text, or attributing meaning to a particular text that is not borne out by the textual elements themselves.

[110] While interpretation remains subjective (as with performance), one's recognition of the subjective decisions inherent in applying the poetic program should help prevent a wholesale appropriation of the score for purely arbitrary musical ideas.

By applying the paratextual poetic program to the score, one assigns truthful meaning to the work. By denying the poetic program its intended role, the interpretation is cut adrift from its contextual moorings and thus becomes even more subject to the whims of the interpreter. One cannot ignore his responsibility as a performer to work out the paratextual implications of a poetic program, but must clearly define his position in order to provide a stable foundation from which to determine how the poetic program increases the phenomenological intelligibility of the score.

Conclusions: Truth, Meaning, and Aesthetic Response

Before progressing to a discussion of interpretation, the interpreter's fundamental positions must be declared and boundaries of truth and meaning described. There are three components to an interpretation, ranging from the abstract objective truth of the score to the subjective phenomenal meaning assigned by the performer.

The musical score forms the first component of an interpretation and manifests three distinct qualities:

1. The musical score exists as an abstraction.
2. As an abstraction, the score remains objectively true because it remains free from any subjective influences of phenomenal reality.
3. The score requires no assigned meaning in order to be true.

The musical performance forms the second component of an interpretation and likewise manifests three distinct qualities:

1. The musical performance exists as an actualization.
2. As an actualization of an abstract objective truth, the musical performance is subjectively true.
3. As an actualization of the musical score, the musical performance is limited by the score and cannot represent any meaning beyond the phenomenological intelligibility of the musical relationships within the score.

Finally, in the phenomenal experience of music, the interpreter assigns aesthetic meaning to the musical relationships to elicit a desired emotional response in the listener. This assigned aesthetic meaning, the third component of interpretation, represents the final three qualities:

1. Aesthetic meaning is relative to the interpreter’s phenomenal experience and therefore a subjective truth.
2. Although the phenomenal experience of the interpreter conditions the interpretation, it in no way determines either the objective truth of the score, or the subjective truth of the performance. Rather, the breadth and sophistication of the interpreter’s phenomenal experience will only determine the degree to which he is able to accurately convey both the objective truth of the score, and the subjective truth of the performance.
3. Both the score and the phenomenal intelligibility of the musical relationships remain intact whether the interpretation accurately represents them or not.

PART III

ANALYSIS: FRANZ LISZT, *SONATA IN B MINOR*

CHAPTER 8

Background

Georg Faust (c. 1480-1540)[111] described himself as

> Demigod from Heidelberg, Philosopher of Philosophers, Magister Georgius Sabellicus, Faustus junior, wellspring of necromancers, astrologer, second magus, chiromancer, aeromancer, second in the art of hydromancy.[112]

History, however, has been somewhat less impressed. In his commentary, John Williams writes,

> Nevertheless, there are no reliable contemporary judgments on Faust that cast him in a remotely favorable light, and it was no doubt his very notoriety that led, in the forty or so years after his death, to the accretion of the most sensational and scandalous anecdotes and superstitions around his name.[113]

While Goethe's Faust may bear only a passing likeness to the actual historical character, Franz Liszt knit at least a few of the original's characteristics together in himself (not the least of which being a knack for marketing).

Goethe's portrayal of Faust resonated strongly with Liszt, an affinity which found expression in a number of his compositions. Much in Goethe's *Faust* appealed to Liszt's gothic imagination and taste – diabolical pacts, supernatural powers, duels, seduction, damnation and redemption – all of which provided excellent theatrical fodder for musical inspiration. However, apart from Liszt's residency in Weimar in the second half of his life, what other connections exist to demonstrate that Goethe's *Faust* should be

---

[111] According to John Williams, the dates are widely accepted but the evidence is meager. John R. Williams, *Goethe's Faust* (London, UK: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 4.
[112] Ibid., 4.
[113] Ibid., 5.

considered as paratext to the *Sonata in B minor*? *The Faust Symphony* provides an obvious example of Liszt's attempts to capture the play in music. Connecting *Faust* to the Sonata, given the lack of any explicit reference to the play in the score, proves a bit more challenging.

Liszt's practice habits in his youth were and still are legendary. Rather than merely run his fingers exhaustively over technical exercises, Liszt used his time at the keyboard to serve a dual purpose. According to the lesson diary of Mme. Auguste Boissier, "He [Liszt] does all this [extensive finger exercise at the keyboard] for hours on end, while at the same time reading to avoid boredome [sic]. This is the time, as he exercises his fingers, that he meditates over his readings."[114] While Liszt's command of the instrument might lead one to believe his reading was merely casual, Arnold writes,

> From the beginning to the end of his life, Liszt remained actively engaged in the literary, philosophical, and religious thought of his day. He read a minimum of 240 different authors and hundreds of volumes of poetry, prose, essays, history and scholarship. It is nearly impossible to separate adequately his music from the intensity of his reading.[115]

Indeed, while Liszt's writings and research frequently come under fire for lax scholarship, bias, and some overtly racist overtones (most likely inserted by his editor), they represent quite a notable accomplishment for a man who was almost completely self-taught.[116] Additionally, he pursued his education and research while heavily invested in a host of other professional and private activities. Arnold sets forth and cross-references a number of lists describing Liszt's reading repertoire and charting the frequency with which Liszt

---

[114] Auguste Boissier, "Liszt Pedagogue: A Diary of Franz Liszt as Teacher 1821-32," in *The Liszt Studies*, translated and edited by Elyse Mach, (New York: NY, 1973), xiii.
[115] Ben Arnold, "Liszt as Reader, Intellectual, and Musician," In *Liszt and his World: Proceedings of the International Liszt Conference held at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 20-23 May 1993,* edited by Michael Saffle, (Stuyveasant, NY: Pendragon Press, 1998), 48.
[116] Alan Walker, *Franz Liszt: The Weimar Years 1848-1861*, vol. 2 (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1981) 380-390.

read or referenced books more than once.[117] According to Arnold, Liszt spent far more time with Goethe's *Faust* than any other work – either reading or referencing the work across twelve years of his life.[118] While Liszt did read a number of other works, any of which might possibly be an influence on his Sonata, *Faust* was a dominant, recurring theme throughout his life and reading.

The Interface Between Paratext and Music

If *Faust* was indeed a recurring theme throughout Liszt's life, how does that relate to his music? The *Faust* Symphony of Liszt consists of three character studies (Faust, Gretchen, and Mephistopheles) but does not represent a comprehensive parallel work to Goethe's play. Indeed, no work of Liszt's may be said to be narratively representative of Goethe's *Faust*. If the play is to be related to the musical score as a paratext in a phenomenologically intelligible way, the interface must be more subtly designed.

Through understanding the lingua franca of poetic-musical trends in song cycles, a reference point can be established for understanding the interface between paratext and music. In her article "The Early 19th Century Song Cycle," Ruth Bingham discussed two models composers used when setting poetry to music: External-plot cycles, and Internal-plot cycles.

[117] See Appendix II.
[118] Including the years: 1830, 1837-41, 1844, 1849, 1854, 1857, 1876-77, 1885.

The external-plot cycle refers to

> sets of songs excerpted from a narrative context….Their structures vary widely, from quasi-dramatic settings of every poem in the novel to a few lyric moments excerpted haphazardly….In general, however, the weaker the literary connections, the stronger the musical ones, which relates back to the unity and diversity aesthetic: music does not mirror the text, but balances it."[119]

Two crucial points to note: an entire narrative may be conveyed through "a few lyric moments," and the "music does not mirror the text, but balances it." Because music exists in time and employs time as an integral feature of its existence, common narrative devices do not necessarily translate. Whereas one may write a short poem describing fifty years worth of life experience, one cannot similarly mature a musical theme in such a short time-span. Generally, the real-time reading process is not a factor in creating literary distance. In music however, one needs real-time, that is, duration, to establish key and harmonic relationships, and to hear central motivic and melodic elements as familiar. In listening to J. S. Bach's *Goldberg Variations* for example, the difference in the final statement of the theme has everything to do with the thirty variations (generally ranging between sixty and seventy minutes duration) separating it from the original statement. A formal model allowing the excerpting of specific moments from a literary narrative allows the composer to choose certain dramatic or lyrical moments to describe the narrative arc within a real-time experience.

Secondly, the idea that music may balance the text rather than merely mirror it,frees true programmatic music from the spurious charge of mere mimicry. Music mirroring a text at best remains somewhat unoriginal and at worst becomes emotionally

[119] Ruth O. Bingham, "The Early 19th Century Song Cycle," *The Cambridge Companion to the Lied*, Edited by James Parsons, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 108.

manipulative. Music designed to balance a program, however, to complement and transcend the program, remains truly music. So the External-plot model creates a rubric accomplishing two things it allows composers to frame a musical work with a few excerpted literary moments, and eliminates any need for merely imitative music.

The Internal-plot cycle refers to "cycles in which the poetry relates a narrative…the idea of conveying a drama through a series of lyric poems."[120] Here the drama, to a certain extent, takes place outside of the actual poetry. For example, Ernest Hemingway's famous six-word short story "For Sale: baby shoes, never worn" allows all its drama and tragedy to take place outside of its actual words. Internal-plot cycles likewise allow much of the dramatic impetus to take place outside the bounds of the actual poetry.

Whereas the External-plot cycle excerpts dramatic and lyrical moments from an existing (complete) narrative, the Internal-plot cycle creates narrative structure through a series of lyric poems. Put another way, the External-plot cycle determines its measure of drama or lyricism based on the materials excerpted from the narrative. The Internal-plot cycle creates drama and narrative through the sequence of lyric poems.

The model that seems most useful in describing the interface between the *Sonata in B minor* and *Faust* is the External-plot model. Liszt's music generally depends on thematic material for organization and cohesion. *Faust* likewise depends on its characters to provide dramatic drive. The characters of *Faust* are not beset by fate; rather, the characters retain the freedom to determine their fate through their choices. While dramatic events certainly do take place, they are always predicated by the internal dramas of the characters themselves.

---

[120] Ruth Bingham, *The Early Nineteenth-century Song Cycle*, 110.

Liszt's Sonata does not seem to function simply in terms of dramatic events excerpted from *Faust.* Even in his *Faust* Symphony, a piece clearly linked to the play, Liszt does not employ a narrative series of dramatic events. Rather, Liszt's focus on the characters offers the listener a glimpse into Liszt's interpretation of their inner world through a musical distilling of their fundamental identities. Just as the characters in *Faust* shape events through their personalities, so also do Liszt's themes, in both the symphony and the sonata, shape their surrounding formal structures. Since *Faust* is a character-driven drama, and Liszt's *Sonata in B minor* is a thematically driven piece, fruitful parallels may be drawn between the characters of *Faust* and the major themes of the Sonata.

CHAPTER 9

Faust: Major Characters and Paratextually Correspondent Themes in Liszt's *Sonata in B minor*

Mephistopheles

Example 9-1: *Mephistopheles Theme mm. 1-17*

As the most powerful force in the sonata, the Mephistopheles theme (mm 1-17) must be considered the primary thematic material. Although not reiterated in its entirety (after the

opening), nor developed through classical variation/fragmentation technique, its diabolical nature still recognizably cuts through the different textures. If Mephistopheles is indeed connected to this theme, his characteristic qualities must be evident in the different manifestations of the theme. If so, one can describe them as being legitimate analogues of literary material. After identifying the theme with its paratextual character, one can draw meaningful conclusions about the formal functions and interpretation of the theme.

Goethe's antagonist Mephistopheles appears in six different guises throughout the course of the narrative. Far more than mere disguises, or a tour de force for the costume designers, each represents a specific attribute of Mephistopheles as well as demonstrating the true nature (on a large scale) of both temptation and the Devil. In other words, the use of disguise is not the key to Mephistopheles' deception. Even Mephistopheles states:

> I am quite accustomed to go incognito
> But one wears one's orders on gala days you know[121]

His true deception lies in the fact that he quite freely and candidly presents his true nature, knowing others will disregard that truth and assign him better motives. As Mephistopheles observes of Gretchen at one point,

> She reads some hidden sense behind my little mask
> She feels that I am assuredly a genius –
> Maybe the devil if she dared to ask.[122]

Again, Mephistopheles is not trying to disguise his true nature and seems quite willing to be completely forthcoming with Gretchen if she dares to ask the truth. Mephistopheles sees no need to reconcile his cavalier attitude with his diabolical power. Even Faust

---

[121] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust*, translated by Louis MacNeice, edited by Victor Lange (New York, NY: Continuum Publishing Company, 1994), 129.
[122] Ibid., 107.

exclaims in frustration, “You are and remain a Sophist and a liar”[123] as well as “You spirit of contradiction!”[124] Mephistopheles does not deliberately deceive others, but rather allows others’ own vices and desires to misrepresent his intentions.

If Mephistopheles is not trying to deceive through disguise, why does he seem to take great pleasure in donning various characters? Each character represents the fundamental dualism inherent in Mephistopheles: namely, the tension found between relatively absolute powers confined within pre-determined limits.[125] The six guises Mephistopheles assumes – a traveling scholar, a young squire, a noble Baron, a Demon (although this guise proves more self-reference than pseudonym), a Foreman, and Phorcys –fall into two distinct categories.

The scholar, squire, and Baron all have a distinguishing measure of freedom to move about the world and through different social strata. As Williams states, “[Mephisto] has become secularized with the times and now moves incognito among humanity, no less dangerously or effectively for all that.”[126] Additionally, these guises all exert some control over their environment through either education or social standing. Each is beholden to a societal order, however, and is powerless to change its destiny as regards that system. The scholar may not readily venture into the realm of the practical without gaining experience further than what may be learned in a book. (A military scholar may not necessarily make a good General even though he can list and define military strategy.) The squire is part of the aristocratic (and at Faust’s time, feudal) hierarchy and a Baron (while socially, politically, and militarily powerful) is still subservient to a King. Indeed,

[123] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust*, 83.
[124] Ibid., 127.
[125] Mephistopheles, while not omnipotent, is allowed to be nearly so in regard to Faust’s desires.
[126] John Williams, *Goethe’s Faust*, 96.

the play begins with the conditions and boundaries set forth by the Almighty on Mephistopheles regarding the temptation of Faust.

> So long as he [Faust] walks the earth alive,
> So long you may try what enters your head;[127]

It is these limits that keep Mephistopheles from manifesting the complete corruption hinted at by Gretchen: "He gives me a horror I cannot tell."[128] So the guises of squire, Baron, and scholar represent the limitations placed on Mephistopheles' freedom.

The other three guises, Demon, Phorcys, and Foreman, represent the (nearly) absolute power of Mephistopheles on this earth. While he does have boundaries on what he may do *to* Faust, he reigns supreme in what he may do *for* Faust and manages to warp time and space, this world and the netherworld, in relation to Faust's desires. The witches in *Faust* are extremely powerful. As their Demon ruler, Mephistopheles certainly must be more powerful. The association with Phorcys evokes a pagan deity as well as a certain virility in begetting other powerful beings.[129] The Foreman represents a managerial authority (in this case over lesser demons) with the power to make decisions on his own behalf free from the chain of command. These dual aspects of Mephistopheles, the freedom to move about and affect events both perceptibly and imperceptibly, as well as the power to change the fabric of reality as he wills, offer a striking resemblance to the functions of the primary theme in the *Sonata in B minor*. The primary theme generally operates in one of these two categories (absolute power/incognito-freedom). These

---

[127] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust*, 5.
[128] Ibid., 105.
[129] A Greek god, father of the Gorgons (including Medusa) and the Dragon Ladon.
Robert J. Lenardon, Mark P. O. Morford, *Classical Mythology*, 8th edition (New York NY: Oxford University Press Inc., 2007), 162.

different qualities of Mephistopheles can be observed in the sympathetic responses created by the primary theme in different contexts.

The exposition or first "section" of the Sonata is dominated by the primary theme.[130] Indeed, the impetus for much of the Sonata's virtuosity is derived from this primary material. The opening, as well as the octave passage in mm. 8-12, revel unequivocally in their own power.[131] However, the rolled diminished chords at the end of the opening (mm 15, 17) remain controversial.[132] Even a cursory sampling of recorded interpretations reveals a wide divergence of opinion as to the character of these chords. Are they ironic, seductive, or just flat out evil and ugly? It would seem from the Goethe text that Mephistopheles (even under extreme duress) never loses his wit or charm. Therefore, to play the chords in the bravura manner of the preceding material seems a bit out of character. To interpret them sarcastically or seductively (as Liszt often uses the diminished seventh chord to indicate) seems a better choice. During mm. 141-152 the question becomes one of prominence.

---

[130] See Appendix III for formal diagram.
[131] See example 9-1
[132] See example 9-1

Example 9-2: *Mephistopheles Material mm. 141-152*

As the Mephistopheles material from mm. 141-152 is transitional (a new thematic idea occurs at m. 153), the Mephistopheles thematic event should not be overemphasized. Here an excellent opportunity arises to show the dark character of the theme incognito, a premonition rather than a climactic event. The climactic thematic event finally happens during the close of the first section at mm. 319-330 . Here the figure repeats in the bass but this time leads decisively into a strenuously assertive example of the demonic power of Mephistopheles in mm. 319- 321 before dying away to a murmur and a rather ambiguous harmony in m. 324 (Mephistopheles's spirit of contradiction).

Example 9-3: *Mephistopheles Material mm. 319-330*

Another example of possible ambiguity as to interpretation arises in mm. 297-300, and again in mm. 302-305.

Example 9-4: *Mephistopheles's Mocking of Almighty Materia mm. 297-305*

Arrau mentions that,

> The important thing here is the staccatissimo. This is never done – separating the chords. I don't know why… The six-four chord, which always creates tension, here sounds ironic. Whereas next, in the first position, the chords are *drohend*, threatening.[133]

While mm. 297-305 are in fact the Almighty material, here they are being aped by Mephistopheles. The "threatening" quality therefore is altogether appropriate.

While the "development" second section of the sonata takes place without Mephistopheles, the beginning of the third section (recapitulation) serves up a different vision of Mephistopheles, this time terrifying through its quietude. Indeed, the *piano* nature of this fugue allows one to imagine the diabolical laughter having been going on far longer than has been perceived by the listener. This time, no moderating influence tempers his authority. Mephistopheles ushers in both the third section and the exact return of the "Exposition" (first section) material. The *Più Mosso* serves to further tighten the tension, as the texture begins to gallop out of control.

[133] Joseph Horowitz, *Arrau on Music and Performance*, 140.

Example 9-5: *Mephistopheles Material mm. 553-569*

The ultimate triumph of Mephistopheles however, is not to be. Beginning at m 750 the opening material of the primary theme is heard cut loose from the closing material, fading down into the abyss.

Example 9-6: *Mephistopheles Material mm. 749-754, 760*

Faust

The power of Mephistopheles contrasts with his general state of ennui. He has walked the earth for generations and seen everything. Faust's character, however, is a study in violent covetousness and despair. In a sense, Faust becomes an "anti-Midas," corrupting and destroying all he touches. Gretchen is destroyed mentally, morally, and physically as well as nearly being lost spiritually. His love child with Helen of Troy presumably inherits Faust's desires and falls to his death attempting to fly (Icarus, Adam, and the tower of Babel provide similar studies), Faust's effort to evict an old couple off their land ends in a triple homicide, yet throughout all these tragedies, Faust continues to desire more even while lamenting his own loss and corruption. Indeed Faust's unflinching desires are what attracts Mephistopheles to him in the first place.

> Long live the man who does not flinch!
> But you've a devil in you, somewhere there.
> I know of nothing on earth more unattractive
> Than your devil who feels despair.[134]

Mephistopheles regards Faust's despair (rather than his covetousness) as his fundamental weakness and this despair is what Mephistopheles exploits. Before they meet, Faust despairs because he does not have, and then despairs because he does not have more. Mephistopheles, however, gives him all that he desires, hoping that eventually Faust will despair even of his own desire. Mephistopheles may then claim victory and Faust's soul. Faust's yearning, rather than being assuaged by the unlimited satiation of his desires, is actually exponentially increased. This yearning ultimately defines Faust's character.

The original statement of the Mephistophelean theme may be divided into three parts: the opening chromatic descent from g, the statement in double octaves (beginning at the *Allegro energico*), and the ascending statement in the bass mm. 13-17.[135] The final cell, an embellished stepwise progression from d-f$^{\#}$, provides the material for the Faust theme mm. 153-174.

---

[134] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust*, 99.
[135] See example 9-1.

Example 9-7: *Faust Theme mm. 153-170*

In creating a new thematic character out of material previously associated with Mephistopheles, Liszt (through thematic transformation) retains musical cogency while vividly contrasting the pathos of the Faust theme with the diabolical intensity of Mephistopheles. The new theme, set in major and achieving a certain lilt through the

accompanying triplets, offers both a change in mode and rhythmic drive.

Example 9-8: *Mephistophelse material mm. 179-190*

The individual ascending statements are connected through chromatic scales, giving the entire section an anguished sense (a sympathetic response) of reaching for the unattainable. The background presence of the Mephistopheles theme continues to be demonstrated through its capacity for interruption and its propensity for warping the Faust material into itself. Additionally, the lack of real direction toward a cadence in this section proves a stark difference to the driving power of the Mephistophelean passagework. As seen in Example 9-7, the much-anticipated arrival at m. 169 proves frustratingly circular as D major heralds the new statement at m. 171.

The kaleidoscopic variation and modulation offer another contrast with the character of Mephistopheles. Whereas Liszt directs the energy of the Mephistophelean theme toward a single diabolical goal, the energy of the Faust theme, although derived from the same material, constantly evaporates through its lack of closure. The Faust theme, with its half-step creep, lack of satisfying cadences, and circular arrival points, elicits a sympathetic response reminiscent of the yearning, unsatisfied nature of Faust.

The Almighty

If Mephistopheles and Faust represent one side in the drama, the two characters representing the other are the Almighty and Gretchen. Given the subject matter of the play, the role of the Almighty is surprisingly small (limited to the opening prologue when determining the limits of Mephistopheles's power).[136] The Almighty subsequently remains very much in the background of the drama. However, it would be a mistake to assume that the lack of speaking lines implies a reduced role in determining the eventual outcome. The Almighty, in *Faust*, simply prefers to work through proxy.

[136] See previous discussion of Mephistopheles's limits and compare to Job 1: 6-12.

In her article “Expressive Resonance in Liszt’s Piano Music,” Dolores Pesce comments on the relationship between the theme presented at m. 105 and the “cross motive” in Liszt’s oratorio, *St. Elisabeth:*[137]

> We do know that Liszt labeled the opening motive of theme 2 [the *Grandioso* theme: mm. 105-6, *Sonata in B minor*] the ‘Cross motive’ in its appearance in the oratorio *St. Elisbeth.* Furthermore, the same motive can also be found in several other Liszt works concerned with Christian subjects.[138]

Example 9-9: *Almighty Theme mm. 105-106*

This theme demonstrates the strongest associative link with extra-musical content in the entire piece. However, one cannot claim the theme in Liszt’s sonata creates an associative response with Christian imagery in the listener. While some scholars place Liszt’s first work on his *St. Elisabeth* oratorio as early as 1854, the Sonata was completed in 1853. Therefore, listeners would have had no way of making the associative connection

[137] The “cross” motive is defined by Pesce as the motive (C-A-G).
Dolores Pesce, “Liszt’s sacred choral music,” *The Cambridge Companion to Liszt*, edited by Kenneth Hamilton (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 231.
[138] Dolores Pesce, “Expressive Resonance in Liszt’s Piano Music,” 384.

between the oratorio and the sonata. In terms of the composition, however, Liszt may very well have associated the two in his mind and listeners today may associate the two together. Ultimately, if one views the theme in the context of Liszt's oeuvre, the association certainly appears valid for Liszt.

Additionally, the late Liszt work *Sursum Corda* of 1877 uses nearly identical textures, sonorities, and voicing to elicit a sympathetic response of reverence and awe.

Example 9-10: Sursum Corda mm. 6-15

While there is no hard evidence to justify tracking Christian symbolism in the Sonata, the striking similarity between the textures surrounding the "Almighty" theme and the texture of *Sursum Corda* circumstantially demonstrates a sympathetic association with some transcendent higher power. So, both associatively and sympathetically, the *grandioso* theme retains links to the Almighty. While the theme is not a driving force in

the Sonata, it appears in all three sections and is extensively interwoven with Faust and Gretchen material in the second section (*Andante sostenuto*).

Gretchen

Although the Almighty and Mephistopheles are supernatural beings clearly in opposition to one another, Grethcen and Faust's relationship is more complicated. While they remain tied to their respective supernatural hosts, they do both truly love each other. Gretchen, perhaps the least complicated character in the play, becomes the only hope for Faust's redemption. At first, Gretchen represents a pure ideal of Catholic womanhood – innocent of all evil. Faust's seduction of her (aided by Mephistopheles) initiates a moral descent of dire consequences: Gretchen accidentally poisons her mother, sees her brother killed in a duel with Faust (again aided by Mephistopheles), gives birth to an illegitimate child, commits infanticide, and is driven nearly insane by her own guilt and Mephistopheles's demons. When Faust tries to save Gretchen from prison before her execution for murder, she refuses and regains her faith subsequently dying in a state of grace. Gretchen then spends the rest of the play praying for Faust's soul in Heaven and eventually is the reason for Faust's redemption. In effect, Gretchen assumes the role of the Virgin Mary in Catholic dogma and successfully intercedes on behalf of Faust. Faust, for his part, never loses his love for Gretchen and is eventually redeemed by it.

Claudio Arrau claims the "Gretchen" theme is the thematic material stated in mm. 124-140.

Example 9-11: *Gretchen Theme mm. 124-139*

The theme is set in the manner of a recitative with its rhapsodic character, dynamic hue, and rhythmic structures all set in contrast to the Mephistopheles and Faust themes. Whereas the Mephistopheles theme uses chromatic inflection, dissonant tritone intervals, sharp dynamic shifts, and double-dotted rhythms to sympathetically reference menace, the Gretchen theme transforms the basic outline of the Mephistopheles theme through augmented rhythms, melodic ornamentation, and consonant harmonies. In addition, Liszt modifies the contradictory Mephistophelean *Lento assisi – Allegro energico* tempo marking to the gentler *dolce con grazia*.

Regarding pacing, the Gretchen theme offers more freedom to linger than any other theme in the piece. The freedom to linger marks a dramatic shift in the use of rhythmic drive for the thematic material. In fact, no other theme allows anything of the sort. The Mephistopheles theme is too rhythmically and harmonically unstable, the Almighty theme is set against a kinetic harmonic rhythmic support, and the Faust theme

with its duple melody against a triplet accompaniment never quite gets settled. The rhythmic structure for the Gretchen theme, while arguably a simple augmentation of the Mephistopheles theme, merely references earlier material and is no longer a driving force. Arppeggiations in the left hand and minimal accompanying textures maximize the vocal nature of the melody. The *pianissimo* marking at m. 124 (Example 9-11) is the first explicit indication of this particular dynamic hue in the score thus far. These aspects, taken together with the expressive marking *dolce con grazia* at m. 125, indicate a complete atmospheric change from the rather titanic forces at play previously to a far more vulnerable and human element. The overall musical effect engenders a sympathetic response of innocence and freedom in the listener

In sum, both human themes (Faust and Gretchen), although stated sequentially, are really connected respectively to supernatural themes (Mephistopheles/Almighty). Each theme, in turn, references at least one defining characteristic of a paratextual character.

CHAPTER 10

Thematic Relationships and Dynamic Tension:

Conceptual Implications of Sonata Design

Using *Faust* as a paratext can certainly spice up discussions of musical character and interpretive meaning. Indeed, this appears to be the goal of many analyses that include extra-musical discussions. Using a paratext to increase the phenomenological intelligibility of the themes represents the foreground of the *Faust*-paratext application. However, if the discussion ends there, it limits the paratextual meaning to mere character-sketches. In his *Sonata in B minor*, Liszt uses the *Faust* paratext to serve a more important background function.

The polarity in *Faust* between the desires of the world (represented by Mephistopheles) and redemptive transcendence (represented by Gretchen) offers the dramatic tension necessary to sustain Faust's yearning. Brown writes,

> Once he is recognized to be a part of Nature, we can also see the sense in which Mephistopheles is truly an opponent. As the opponent of light he is the opponent of transcendence; he is the "world" pole in our Neoplatonic dialectic of world and mind, the realist in our real-ideal dichotomy.[139]

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Classical tonic-dominant polarity had already been superseded by a more dissonant tonal language.[140] In addition, the concept of simple polarity had also become more nuanced. Nineteenth-century composers shied away from linear absolutes, preferring instead the circular conundrum. The tension

[139] Jane K. Brown, *Goethe's Faust: The German Tragedy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 68.
[140] Indeed, Beethoven had already substituted chromatic mediants for dominant key areas in his sonatas Op. 31, No. 1, and Op. 53.

created by placing irreconcilable desires in dynamic tension with one another proved far more useful to composers who were not aesthetically invested in the necessity of resolving oppositional forces. For his Sonata, Liszt needed to access a conceptual division that would create the massive tension needed to sustain a piece of such length and breadth. At the same time, he also needed to ensure that the conceptual division did not simply become mere polar opposition.

The sonata contains four main thematic groups stemming from the opening material.[141] In this way, all the themes are connected (and therefore part of one another) but are still set in tension with one another. While the Faustian theme and Mephistophelian theme have been previously discussed, any model simply trying to engender polarity between them does not take into account their symbiotic nature. In the first section of the Sonata, the Faust theme is stated in organic conjunction with the Mephistopheles theme. The clearest example is the passage mm. 263-318. The Mephistophelean identity (seen in the octave virtuosic styling and staccato articulation) begins to influence the Faust theme at m. 263 while maintaining its diabolical accompaniment underneath.

[141] For the purposes of this paper, the term Sonata is defined as: Sonata design as represented by Classical aesthetics.

Example 10-1: *Mephistopheles/Faust Material mm. 262-276*

From mm. 263-296 the themes become knit together in the passagework and displaced by octave (mm. 270-276) until the only real vestige of the yearning Faust is in the harmonic and rhythmic stasis of the tremolo at m. 278. [142]

[142] The rhythmic stability of the quarter-note/eighth-note values in the original statement in m. 157 (see example 9-7) stand in sharp contrast to the more syncopated, Mephistophelian rhythmic values in mm 8-13 (see example 9-1).

Example 10-2: *Faust Tremolo mm. 278-285*

As the themes are symbiotic, the conceptual tension in the Sonata does not stem from the relationship between the Mephistopheles and Faust themes, but rather from their relationship with the Almighty and Gretchen themes. The resolution of that tension is not accomplished in a Classical manner (the resolution of all thematic material to the tonic), but rather in the separation of the Faust theme from the Mephistopheles theme and subsequent attachment to the Gretchen-Almighty pairing. In this way, the resolution of the Faust theme parallels the redemption of Faust.

In the first section, the Mephistopheles-Faust statement stands in contrast to the Gretchen-Almighty statement however, during the second section the Gretchen/Almighty material is paired with the Faust material (with no appearance of Mephistopheles's material). The much more sensual music in this section has been compared to a love scene between Faust and Gretchen (which, by the way, offers another example of a

lyrical excerpt from the play). In terms of dynamic tension, the second section serves to separate Faust's material from Mephistopheles's material (albeit without any real resolution of Faust's constant harmonic yearning). The third section begins with a prominent diabolical display of virtuosity to reassert the primacy of the Mephistopheles material. After the Almighty thematic statement, however, the Faust theme is heard in place of the Gretchen material. The pairing has been changed to Almighty-Faust. Furthermore, there are no fresh statements of the Gretchen theme. The Gretchen material is not heard again until its restatement (out of the *Andante sostenuto* material) in the coda.

Why this particular use of the thematic material in the third section? Why not bring the Gretchen material back for the recapitulation? While the necessity of restating thematic material from the exposition had become (by this point in sonata aesthetics) much less urgent, the absence of the Gretchen material offers another link to Goethe's *Faust*. Once Faust seduces Gretchen, she descends precipitously into madness as a result of the following events: her role in her mother's murder, Faust's murder of her brother, the demonic torment set upon her at her realization of her illegitimate pregnancy, and her subsequent murder of her illegitimate child. Indeed, she is redeemed by her faith only hours before her execution. Subsequently, she is only heard from again in Act V at the end of the play (her death closes Part I of the play) when through her prayers she is enabled to redeem Faust from Mephistopheles. If the second section of the sonata is viewed as the love scene/affair between Faust and Gretchen, her role in any subsequent dramatic material must be severed to allow for her dramatic, transcendent redemption of Faust at the end of the work. The nearly exact restatement of the Faust-Gretchen material (from the middle section) during the coda at the end of the piece along with the final

resolution of the Faust material in the final measures, may be perceived as a direct correlation with Goethe's plot.

While one might assume a tidy set of oppositional relationships (Mephistopheles – Almighty, Faust – Gretchen), this is not the case. If the Gretchen theme is affecting the Faust theme so profoundly as to first tear it from the grasp of its Mephistopheles-Faust pairing, then place it into the Almighty-Faust pairing seen in the recapitulation, and finally to enable a resolution to Faust's inherent, insatiable yearning, the Gretchen material must be seen as the pivotal thematic material around which the other themes orbit. The pairings thus do not split along supernatural and natural lines, but rather radiate out from their relationship to the Gretchen material. As Mephistopheles and Gretchen both bear the most direct influence on Faust, their thematic outlines retain the most similar shape. The Mephistopheles theme, however, does not really interact with the Gretchen theme (theirs is a proximal association) in the way it interacts with the Faust theme. The intense interaction among the Almighty, Faust, and Gretchen themes in the *Andante sostenuto* represents a sea change in the relational pairings and is the source material for the final resolution of the Faust theme. The relationships, when viewed over the course of the sonata, thus form something of a palindrome reflecting around Gretchen:

Mephistopheles – Faust – Almighty – Gretchen – Faust – Almighty – Mephistopheles.

Faust only gains redemption from the Almighty through Gretchen, who in turn is only ever corrupted by Mephistopheles through Faust. It is Gretchen's ability to in effect redeem herself (through returning to her original state) after her corruption that makes her unique. She in turn is able to bring about Faust's redemption and banish Mephistopheles from Faust once again to the realm of the supernatural.

In sum, the musical relationships reflect the paratextual relationships. The initial tension in the first section between the Mephistopheles-Faust pairing and the Almighty-Gretchen pairing, is redrawn in the second section to allow the Faust theme to resolve in the fourth section.

CHAPTER 11

Form

A theme with extra-musical connotations requires the responsibility to maintain fidelity to both specifically musical considerations and the myriad qualities of the theme's character. To repeat once more Liszt's statement:

> In program music… the return, change, modification, and modulation of the motives are conditioned by their relation to a poetic idea… All exclusively musical considerations, though they should not be neglected, have to be subordinated to the action of the given subject.[143]

As argued in the previous chapter, the themes in Liszt's *Sonata in B minor* are identifiable not only as thematic material, but also as characters in Goethe's *Faust*. The musical relationships between themes parallel the *Faust* characters' relationships to each other. According to Claudio Arrau (whose teacher was Martin Krause, a Liszt student), the Faustian scenario was "taken for granted among Liszt's pupils."[144] If the character relationships condition the thematic relationships, the large-scale structure providing the context for thematic/character development must also be similarly conditioned by the poetic idea. The macro-organization of form and time should reflect the micro-organization of themes and characters.

Many Liszt aficionados prefer to view the Sonata from the more abstract (and artistically defensible) perspective of absolute music. Many excellent analyses have been offered that reveal Liszt's keen, sophisticated sense of compositional form and structure.

[143] Quoted in: Frederich Niecks, *Programme Music in the Last Four Centuries: A Contribution to the History of Musical Expression*, 280-81 .
[144] Joseph Horowitz, *Arrau on Music and Performance*, 137.

Indeed, the Sonata has become something of a counterweight for Liszt's more aesthetically controversial works. Yet the purer structural debate over Liszt's compositional rigor and the existence of a "double-form" perhaps misses the mark when it comes to interpretation. While the Sonata may be analyzed according to rigorous, architectural sonata models, do such models account for the highly emotional (indeed melodramatic) character of the piece? The tone of the Sonata certainly is not soberly philosophical and is light-years away from the traditional harmonic-thematic drama of sonata form.

The assignment of paratextual meaning implies a certain narrative. Liszt's sonata, however, does not take a traditionally sequential narrative shape. At first glance, the chimerical form of the piece defies any comprehensive paratextual analysis (leaving one to a strict study of compositional tools and procedures). Any paratextual analysis of the *Sonata in B minor* must account for inherent formal contradictions, among which are: cyclical sonata design, a heavily revised score prone to spectacular effects, multiple thematic groups, and a cellular, non-linear thematic design. If one accepts the influence of Goethe's *Faust* both formally and metaphysically, however, the formal structure begins to demonstrate remarkable parallels.

The formal organization of the Sonata, while retaining some classically traditional formal elements, does not take a conventional shape. The formal structure as described by Rosen is "four movements – allegro, adagio, scherzo, and finale – compressed into a single sonata movement with exposition, development, and recapitulation."[145] (Others have divided the sections into three parts: Allegro-Adagio-Allegro.)[146] While the one-

---

[145] Charles Rosen, *The Romantic Generation*, 480.
[146] The controversy of the double-form analysis was previously mentioned in the Literature Review.

movement-sonata concept does eliminate the need to maintain a specific continuity throughout disparate movements, there are certain formal consequences in doing so. The lack of strong sectional contexts (separate movements) for the musical material threatens to weaken the thematic elements' formal organization. The dissolving of sonata boundaries greatly increases the possibility that the sonata form will simply disintegrate into a fantasy. A cyclical form also potentially negates formal and emotional direction, as no linear formal move from dissonance to consonance can take place. In a cyclical form, the exposition need not necessarily be worked out through development and resolved through recapitulation: the expositional material may be simply restated after an absence.

Interestingly, the sonata-within-sonata (double-form) device inherent to Liszt's one-movement forms bears a striking resemblance to the play-within-play device established in *Faust*. The play-within-play strives to displace perception through the paradoxical placement of its characters in the role of actor and audience. In a play, the contrived reality of the actors is bound by the conditional reality allowed by the audience. One of these conditions is that the line between actor and audience remain firmly established. Otherwise the experience of the contrived reality by the audience becomes the experience of reality. The perceptual quandary of an actor playing an actor, or the actor playing an audience member (onstage), can be useful in providing additional bulwarks to the audience's willing participation in the contrived reality necessary to sustain the conditional reality.

At first glance the sonata-within-sonata seems to parallel the play-within-play. However, Liszt's sonata-within-sonata form does not demonstrate the sleight-of-hand necessary to diffuse the listener's pre-established perspective of the piece as a sonata.

Because the listener is not granted sufficient formal delineation to make the quantum leap between formal macro-elements and micro-elements, the lines distinguishing the large-scale form (exposition-development-recapitulation) from the small-scale cyclical form (allegro, adagio, scherzo, and finale) become blurred. The resulting formal twilight serves to further dissolve conventional sonata architecture. The sonata is not heard as a double-form, which would require an interrelated construction of both micro and macro formal structures, but rather as a series of episodic events organized according to sonata principles.

To gain profitably from an architectural model for the *Sonata in B minor*, one must take into account its construction through episodic, non-narrative elements. Fortunately, the structure of *Faust* provides a precedent.

Jane Brown observes:

> In the same way, plot structure does not involve the standard Aristotelian categories of peripety (or reversal), catastrophe, or unity. Not only the unities of time and place but also the more fundamental unity of action are frequently ignored. Such drama is, in other words, episodic, and the connection between episodes is more at the level of theme than at the superficial level of story line.[147]

The classical sonata before Beethoven maintained a necessary diatonic tension across the space-time of sonata movements while providing large-scale patterns organizing the collected movements into a cohesive entity. In first movement sonata form, the dominant-tonic[148] dissonance driving the exposition through the development to the

---

[147] Jane Brown, *Goethe's Faust: The German Tragedy*, 22.
[148] While many composers sought to substitute different harmonies for the dominant once it had lost its potency as a polarizing factor, new harmonies were still in effect *substitutions*.

culminating recapitulation was a fundamental force.[149] The polarity of dissonant key areas (catastrophe) needed to be reconciled to the tonic (unity). Additionally the large-scale four-movement pattern (Allegro-Adagio-Scherzo-Rondo) provided character dissonance reconciled by symmetrical balances. The dramatic (potential) drive of the Allegro was generally countered by a largely kinetic drive in the Rondo. The serious, introspective Adagio (sobriety) often balanced an extroverted, lighter Scherzo (levity). The audience of the time recognized these forces and the meta-cognition of these events provided formal landmarks in both philosophically abstract and emotionally theatrical material. With Beethoven, these formal landmarks served as both narrative elements and organically unifying devices providing perceptual boundaries as well as definitions of time and space. These formal elements offered the audience reference points within the dramatic atmosphere of the work. As Liszt both revered Beethoven and studied with Beethoven's most prominent pupil Carl Czerny, he must have been aware of these forces. Yet he was also part of the generation of post-Beethoven Romantics wanting to forge a different path.

Liszt's attraction to the *Faust* formal model was threefold. The episodic nature of the plot freed potential musical representation from any sequential chronology. Such freedom offered him complete expressive license in creating thematically represented characters without the baggage of narrative events or preexisting laws of cause and effect. Goethe places his protagonist and antagonist against the constantly shifting sand of history as well as maintaining a very flexible contemporaneous reality. While both Faust and Mephistopheles may be involved in surrounding events, these events are never

[149] For a more complete discussion of energetics as a metaphor see: Lee Rothfarb, "Energetics," *The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory*, ed. Thomas Christensen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 927-55.

allowed to fundamentally alter either their identities or destinies. Rather, the events and places revolve around the focal point of Faust's relationship to Mephistopheles.

Secondly, because Faust's and Mephistopheles's relationship serves as the focal point of their reality, their narrative loses any linear, chronological grounding. This kaleidoscopic approach to episodic form diffuses any sense of return, progress, or distance. Instead of the characters being defined by their journey from a particular point to a particular goal (tension-resolution), the characters become defined simply through their consistency against constantly changing contexts. Liszt's tendency to use thematic transformation techniques as developmental offers a similar musical design. In the play, the audience gains insight and perspective on Faust through the shifting contexts of time and space. While Liszt does not use thematic transformation techniques to signify a movement from the diabolical to the sacred, he does use thematic transformation to give the listener perspective and insight into the nature of the theme through shifting musical contexts. Lastly, Liszt's use of the Sonata's opening thematic material as not only a unifying device, but also the fundamental material from which all subsequent themes are created points to an understanding and appreciation of thematic organization in *Faust*.

Faust's pact with Mephistopheles also provides insight into the sonata's formal design. Faust receives anything he wants provided he continually desires more than he receives. The instant his desire is sated (or he asks relief from his desire), he will die and Mephistopheles will collect his soul. This pact becomes an inversion of the conception of death as a cessation of striving. The insatiable desire of Faust is rather an antidote to death – a format for immortality – and is the driving force behind not only the drama's events but also the very fabric of time and space. Liszt capitalizes on this driving desire

and creates a sonata without formal breaks between movements or sections. Formal arrival points (such as the introduction of new themes) are mixed with the downbeat of the next phrase so the harmony performs double duty as both resolution and new beginning (as seen for example at m. 32).

Example 11-1: *Cadence/Arrival mm. 31-32*

Any fermatas in the piece are destabilized either through their placement over rests or a dissonant harmony. The refusal to allow any true harmonic respite generates a sense of insatiable yearning in sharp contrast to a Beethovenian organic, linear tension. Through both minimal thematic ingredients and a continuous redefining of the harmonic atmosphere, Liszt manages to keep the sonata in a paradoxical state of static movement. Because any new themes are built from previous material, all subsequent themes after the opening have the ring of déjà vu. All points of arrival are instantaneously morphed to points of departure through both chromatic modulation and ambiguous shared chords. Indeed, in the entire Sonata, the only definitive movement from tension to resolution occurs in the final measures.

Aside from the fundamental elements of the cyclical episodic form, there still exists the problem of resolving opposing elements within a cyclical form. Once the formal (tonic-dominant) dissonance of thematic key areas is dissolved, so also is the ability to reconcile the two themes. Arguably one might achieve nothing more than an endless thematic prizefight. Cyclical forms are comfortable with multiple themes and create no need to reconcile their existence into a tonicized, linear entity. As cyclical arguments create no solution, a cyclical form needs to create no resolution. Sonatas are fundamentally linear constructions however, and must achieve some end to the matter through a resolution (usually worked out through the development) of the dissonant material. Liszt's solution in this sonata lies in his unifying device of thematic transformation. For Liszt, the idea of thematic transformation involves far more than a theme masquerading through different contexts. Unique to Liszt is the use of thematic transformation to reveal inner truths about the theme. Thematic transformation generates a sense of revelation. The true nature of the theme is revealed through the systematic exploration of its character in relation with the surrounding contextual music. Seldom is a Liszt theme ill dressed for the occasion. Indeed, the thematic inner nature is better perceived through its comfort with a wide variety of musical textures, emotions, and landscapes than through either distillation (as in Beethoven) or an intuitive perception of a sub-conscious, unifying spirit (Schumann). Through thematic transformation, Liszt redefines the development by shifting contexts around the theme. Thus the demands of both cyclical stasis and linear progress are satisfied. The thematic material is not fundamentally altered (recapitulation does not define a point of linear arrival), yet the audience's perception of the theme does change (satisfying the necessity of thematic

development). *Faust* demonstrates a parallel inasmuch as Mephistopheles and Faust do not change either, while the audience's understanding of them does.[150]

Cyclical Forms: Cause and Effect

If the *Faust* model resolves conceptual difficulties in both episodic formal construction and thematic nature and development, what might it say about the cyclical aspects of Liszt's form? While first movement sonata form maintains some cyclical elements, these elements tend to remain subservient to the large-scale linear movement from tension to resolution. The formal ambiguity of Liszt's Sonata, however, blurs these boundaries considerably.

Goethe's description of *Faust* as a tragedy reflects a similar problem. Brown writes,

> Thus the term [tragedy] immediately evokes a series of categories that are still in common use: hero, innocent suffering, fate, tragic flaw, guilt and repentance, reversal, catastrophe. . . *Faust* contains, without doubt, such a tragedy of passion in the Gretchen sequence; but what is strange is that *Faust* contains so much besides that is often difficult to connect to this quintessential love tragedy, not least the ultimate salvation of the hero.[151]

The reversal of categories that would allow for Faust's redemption mirrors the dramatic problem of the sonata recapitulation. A standard recapitulation takes themes that had previously been categorized as being in disagreement and re-categorizes them as being in agreement. However, as Brown points out, *Faust* contains a great deal more than the sequential exploration of categories that would mark a linear tragedy.

---

[150] Excluding, of course, Faust's final redemption.
[151] Jane Brown, *Goethe's Faust: The German Tragedy*, 15-16.

A linear conception of tragedy requires a certain link between cause and effect. The recapitulation in sonata form employs rules of cause and effect as well. As Liszt does not concern himself with providing a sequential narrative of thematic events, the linear drive required to produce a dramatic effect at the Recapitulation is missing. Likewise, as God demands no account of Faust's actions and he is redeemed from his pact with Mephistopheles by the prayers of Gretchen, the actions of Faust prove to have no bearing on his eventual end. This lack of large-scale, moral consequence for Faust proves to be one of the more tantalizing links between the play and sonata.

In Beethoven, especially during his middle and late periods, a moral quality to his sonatas and symphonies emerges and changes over time. The grand heroic striving of the *Apassionata* and the Fifth Symphony give way to the transcendent late works such as the late piano sonatas and the late string quartets. All may be described as containing a moral compass rewarding the heroic striving with transcendental peace.

Faust has no such moral compass to his actions, however, as his main aim according to Brown "is not to avoid sin; it is to accept the temptations of the devil as fast as he can."[152] This is not to say his decisions do not have moral consequences; the consequences are simply deferred to others. Gretchen's forfeited life and near damnation, the deaths of Gretchen's brother and the old couple are directly due to Faust's hand, as well as many other deaths Faust causes indirectly. These events, however, are micro-results of Faust's striving and in no way alter the macro-result, Faust's ultimate redemption. Indeed, one could reorder all the events or even cut many of them out and still retain the same ultimate result. There is no moral sum to be found in Faust's actions as they have no bearing on his eventual salvation.

[152] Jane Brown, *Goethe's Faust: The German Tragedy*, 80.

In Liszt's sonata, the *Andante sostenuto* exists apart from the Mephistopheles material both in the middle section and the final coda. This disjunctive property enables the Faust material to break free of the Mephistophelean moorings without coming to any self-awareness. Neither the reassertion of Mephistolean virtuosity (the primary catalyst) in the recapitulation nor developmental striving or thematic transformation brings about the final transcendent resolution. Rather, the musical reminiscence in the coda of material from the *Andante sostenuto* simply changes the existing parameters and becomes the new reality. Faust's unhinged moral license ensures the play remains free from any burden of relational cause and effect. In the Sonata, this translates to a formal freedom from reconciling expositional dissonances in the recapitulation.

Freedom from moral consequence is only possible if Time does not exist as a continuous sequential stream. In *Faust*, Time reveals itself to be an extremely variable commodity. Not only does Faust freely unfetter his desire from the shackles of time (as regards his affair with Helen of Troy), but the nature of his bargain with Mephistopheles ensures there is no chronological stacking of events ultimately leading to a foregone end. Faust is not undone by some subtle character flaw; he leaps toward his doom with reckless abandon. His redemption comes as a surprise to all (not least Mephistopheles) and ignores the consequences of Faust's behavior.

On a macro level, time is measured in events. The rise and fall of empires, cultures and ideas as well as physical birth and death all become mileposts by which life is measured. These macro events in turn are measured in terms of linear micro-events progressing towards a predetermined end. Age is measured through the biological processes of maturation and decay. Good and Evil are measured through specific actions

towards a given goal (circumstances for example decide whether death is considered murder, manslaughter, accidental, natural etc.). The perception of time in music works in a very similar fashion. In sonata form the exposition is measured through the advent of primary and secondary themes and the establishment of dissonant tonal centers. The development is generally tracked through a linear progression of modulation, fragmentation, and augmentation to the defining event of first movement sonata form: the recapitulation. The exposition leads logically to the development, development to recapitulation, recapitulation to final resolution. In *Faust*, *s*ince there are no personal repercussions to Faust's actions, no moral debits or credits, no accumulation of events towards a particular goal, Time ceases linear existence and becomes cyclically defined by Faust's perpetual-motion machination of desire.

The formal implications for the Sonata regarding time are directly correlated to the use of time in *Faust*. The sonata is a one-movement, cyclical work. As the four main thematic centers are all derived from the opening material, there are no true thematic contrasts and therefore the introduction of "new" thematic areas cannot stand as true measures of time. The recapitulation, instead of offering a resolution, merely reasserts the dissonance of the opening material and the control of the Mephistopheles theme. Nothing has fundamentally changed regarding the status quo. This is not to say there are no differences, but the recapitulation event does not arrive through an inexorable, linear stacking of events within the development just as the development did not arrive through a linear event series within the exposition. The sonata is non-narrative and as such the episodes within the sonata morph into one another rather than traversing a predestined

formal path. The formal events in this sonata do not follow a linear dramatic track but instead become landmarks against the horizon of Time.

CHAPTER 12

Conclusion

Much has been written of Liszt's reckless virtuosity, élan, and technical bravura. As Dana Gooley writes, "[Liszt] made virtuosity an agonistic spectacle of domination and triumph that invited listeners to imagine the performance as a battle, the virtuoso as a valiant warrior."[153] If the *Faust* paratext can provide interpretive inspiration, perhaps it can also offer suggestions on virtuosic character.

If Liszt viewed virtuosity as "battle," then intensely virtuosic textures in the sonata may correspond to violence in *Faust*. As the Mephistopheles theme is given the most virtuosic textures in the sonata, one might additionally conclude that the episodes of virtuosity (opportunities for an "agonistic spectacle of domination and triumph") in the sonata may coincide with episodes of Mephistophelean violence in the play. Mephistopheles, however, only personally engages in one episode of physical violence. Furthermore, while the nature of that physical violence may indeed offer the performer an approach to the virtuosic demands, the approach may be quite different from the one advocated by Gooley.

The episode in question concerns a duel between Gretchen's brother Valentine and Faust. An honorable soldier, Valentine defends his sister's lost chastity by attacking Faust and Mephistopheles as they approach to seduce Gretchen for a second night. Mephistopheles calmly parries the attacks of Valentine, prompting him to cry out:

---

[153] Dana Gooley, "Warhorses: Liszt, Weber's 'Konzertstück,' and the Cult of Napoléon," *19th-Century Music*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer, 2000): 62.

Is he the devil or what?
What's this? My hand's already lamed.[154]

Faust then strikes at Mephistopheles's command, dealing a mortal wound to Valentine. In this duel Mephistopheles, whose technical mastery requires not the slightest exertion, outclasses both Valentine's anger and (presumably prodigious) physical prowess. Indeed, the imperative violence of Valentine's lines (Then parry that!)[155] is the polar opposite of the bemused response of Mephistopheles (Why not, why not?).[156] While Valentine employs strength, Mephistopheles's reliance on finesse provides possibly the most immediately applicable literary parallel between *Faust* and the sonata – the nature of Mephistopheles' virtuosity.

The *Maitre d'Armes*[157] Raoul Clery writes, "Sometimes in the past they characterized the talent of the great [fencing] masters by the expression, "hand of iron, arm of rubber.""[158] In an attempt to express the supreme diabolical power of Mephistopheles, many performers rely on sheer muscular domination of the sonata's virtuosic passagework. While the physical approach does achieve a certain effect, it does so at the expense of expressing the surreptitious deviltry of Mephistopheles. Mephistopheles, however powerful he may be, never merely overwhelms his opponents. Such crude behavior would be akin to Iago merely challenging Othello to a duel in the first act. Mephistopheles rather delights in devious subterfuge to achieve his ends. Any performer who allows a Mephistophelean meaning to the primary theme would do well to

---

[154] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust*, 115.
[155] Ibid., 114.
[156] Ibid..
[157] Title held by a classical fencing master.
[158] Raoul Clery, *A Propos d'un Accident*, Trans. Mary Anne Stevens (Reprint, http://www.classicalfencing.com/articles/A_Propos.shtml), accessed September 3, 2005.

also let the character of Mephistopheles' virtuosity inform his decisions regarding virtuoso demands within the sonata.

Franz Liszt was known for being a man of many paradoxes: iconic virtuoso, aspiring musicological scholar, world traveler, Master-teacher, charlatan, Abbé, alleged playboy, and philanthropist. With such a variety of paradoxical descriptions of the man, it remains no wonder that his music should enjoy the same polarized opinions. Whether a biography polemically favors or derides Liszt, his compositions and especially the *Sonata in B minor* often bear an Atlas-worthy responsibility. Declare his major works pinnacles of the literature, establish them as heralds of a new conception in music, and one must absolve Liszt the man of the rather embarrassing Jolly Roger flying from his standards. Conversely, strip the major works of their worth by focusing on examples of vulgarity, paucity of invention, and swashbuckling élan, and unfairly relegate Liszt and his music to the grab bag of nineteenth century virtuosi whose legacy left little more than a sour taste in the mouths of most contemporary scholars, critics, and composers.

The great paradox of Liszt's music stems from the comfortable duality of certain vulgarities within his best and most important major works. These licenses are balanced by a tremendous restraint and refinement in many of his late, minor works. Rosen writes, "Liszt may be compared to an old ancestor who built up the family fortune by disreputable and shameful transactions in his youth and spent his last years in works of charity."[159] Liszt's additional propensity for programmatic elements offers yet another balancing act. While scholarly musical analysis is imperative in understanding Liszt's output, theoretical descriptions and analyses seem to offer little help in addressing the

[159] Charles Rosen, *The Romantic Generation*, 474.

more abstract (but just as conceptually important) forces of both literature and Liszt's own personality on his work.

The *Sonata in B minor* has assumed a prominent place among Liszt's piano works and indeed remains a prime example of his innovations with one-movement sonata form. Liszt heavily revised the sonata and the compositional carelessness evident in some of his other works is noticeably lacking. While there are certainly theatrical effects present, Liszt was careful to keep theatrical effect from transcending substance. However, while carefully knit together, the final product remains conceived on such an epic scale it can leave the listener (as well as the performer) skeptical at best and suspicious at worst. Indeed, the performer must often guard against the sweeping tumult of passagework as the music continually threatens to degenerate into a tawdry spectacle of virtuosic, emotional display. The argument over whether the piece falls under the auspices of absolute or program music perhaps misses the point. Labeling a piece of music "absolute" or "programmatic" involves making a value judgment. Liszt's *Sonata in B minor*, whatever its absolute or paratextual bonafides, resides solidly within the realm of serious music written for serious pianists and musical connoisseurs. As such, all of the elements involved in the composition must be considered in determining the truth of one's interpretation.

Bibliography

Arnold, Ben. "Piano Music: 1835-1861," in *The Liszt Companion*, ed. Ben Arnold, 73-137. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002.

Arnold, Ben. "Liszt as Reader, Intellectual, and Musician," in *Liszt and his World: Proceedings of the International Liszt Conference held at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 20-23 May 1993,* ed. Michael Saffle, 37-60. Stuyveasant, NY: Pendragon Press, 1998.

Bingham, Ruth O.. "The Early 19th Century Song Cycle," in *The Cambridge Companion to the Lied*, ed. James Parsons 101-119. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Boissier, Auguste. "Liszt Pedagogue: A Diary of Franz Liszt as Teacher 1821-32," in *The Liszt Studies*. translated and edited by Elyse Mach, iii-xxvi. New York: NY, 1973.

Brown, David. "The B Minor Sonata Revisited: Deciphering Liszt," *The Musical Times*, Vol. 144, No. 1882 (Spring, 2003): 6-15.

Brown, Jane K. *Goethe's Faust: The German Tragedy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986.

Clery, Raoul. *A Propos d'un Accident*. Trans. Mary Anne Stevens. Reprint, http://www.classicalfencing.com/articles/A_Propos.shtml, accessed September 3, 2005

Collins, John. "Truth or Meaning? A Question of Priority,"*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 65, No. 3. (Nov., 2002): 497-536.

Colapietro, Vincent, M.. "Charles Sanders Peirce," in *A Companion Guide To Pragmatism*, eds. John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis, 13-29. Malden, Massachussetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

Dahlhaus, Carl. *Nineteenth-Century Music*. translated by J. Bradford Robinson. Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1989.

Elliot, Robin, and Siobhán, Donovan, eds.. *Music and Literature in German Romanticism*. Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2004.

Ellis, Katharine. "Female pianists and their male counterparts in nineteenth century Paris," *Journal of the American Musicological Society,* Vol. 50, No. 2/3. (Summer-Autumn, 1997): 353-85.

Genette, Gerard. *Paratexts: thresholds of interpretation.* Translated by Jane E. Lewin. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Goethe, Johann, Wolfgang von. *Faust*. Translated by Louis MacNeice. Edited by Victor Lange. New York, NY: Continuum Publishing Company, 1994.

Gooley, Dana. "Warhorses: Liszt, Weber's 'Konzertstück', and the Cult of Napoléon," *19th-Century Music*, Vol. 24, No. 1. (Summer, 2000): 62-88.

Hamilton, Kenneth. "Liszt: *Sonata in B minor*," *Cambridge Music Handbooks*. General editor Julian Rushton. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Hanslick, Eduard. *On The Musically Beautiful.* Translated from the 8th Edition (1891) of Vom Musikalisch-Schönen by Geoffrey Payzant. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1986.

Hoeckner, Berthold. "Schumann and Romantic Distance," *Journal of the American Musicological Society,* Vol. 50, No. 1. (Spring, 1997): 55-132.

Horowitz, Joseph. *Arrau on Music and Performance*, Mineola NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 1992.

Kelley, Abner Wellington. "Literary Theories about Program Music," *PMLA*, Vol. 52, No. 2. (Jun., 1937): 581-95.

Koch, H. Ch.. "Tonmalerei," in *H. Ch. Koch´s Musikalisches Lexicon*, ed. Arrey von Dommer Heidelberg: Academische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J.C.B. Mohr, 1865, 873-75.

Lewin, David. “Amfortas’ Prayer to Titurel and the Role of D in ‘Parsifal’: The Tonal Spaces of the Drama and the Enharmonic C-flat/B,” *19th-Century Music,* Vol. 7, No. 3 (April 1984): 336-49.

Liszt, Franz. *Sonata in B minor*. ed. Antal Boronkay. Budapest, Hungary: Edito Musica, 1983.

Liszt, Franz. *Sursum Corda*. ed. Joseph Prostakoff. Milwaukee, WI: G. Schirmer Inc., 1968.

Longyear, Rey, M.. *Nineteenth-Century Romanticism in Music*. 2nd ed.. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969.

Macintyre, Alasdaire. *Ethics and Politics: Selected Essays,* vol. 2. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Margolis, Joseph “Introduction: Pragmatism, Retrospective, and Prospective,” in *A Companion Guide To Pragmatism*, eds. John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis, 1-10. Malden, Massachussetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

Maiko, Kawabata, “Virtuoso Codes of Violin Performance: Power, Military Heroism, and Gender (1789-1830),” *19th-Century Music*, Vol. 28, No. 2. (Autumn, 2004): 89-107.

Mendelssohn, Felix. “Letter to his mother, Frankfurt, June 2, 1837.” *Composers on Music*. ed. Josiah Fisk. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1997.

Micznik, Vera. **“**The Absolute Limitations of Programme Music: The Case of Liszt's 'Die Ideale',” *Music & Letters*, Vol. 80, No. 2. (May, 1999): 207-40.

Morfor, Mark P.O., Lenardon, Robert J.. *Classical Mythology*. 8th edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press Inc., 2007.

Niecks, Frederich. *Programme Music in the Last Four Centuries: A Contribution to the History of Musical Expression*. New York, NY: Novello and Company Ltd., 1907.

Newman, William S.. *The Sonata Since Beethoven,* vol. 3 of *A History of the Sonata Idea*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1969.

Ostwald, Peter. *Schumann: The Inner Voices of a Musical Genius*. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1985.

Ott, Bertrand. "An Interpretation of Liszt's Sonata in B Minor," *Journal of The American Liszt Society*, vol. 10, (1981): 30-38.

Pesce, Dolores. "Expressive Resonance in Liszt's Piano Music." *19th Century Piano Music*. 2nd ed. Edited by R. Larry Todd, 355-410. New York, NY: Routledge, 2004.

Pesce, Dolores. "Liszt's sacred choral music." *The Cambridge Companion to Liszt*. Edited by Kenneth Hamilton, 223-248. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Price, Kingsley Blake. "Does Music Have Meaning?" *British Journal of Aesthetics 1988,* 28 (3): 203-215.

Price, Kingsley Blake. "Is There Artistic Truth?" *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLVI, No. 10, (May 12, 1949): 285-291.

Radford, Colin. "Muddy Waters," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer, 1991): 247-252.

Rehding, Alexander. "Liszt's Musical Monuments," *19th-Century Music*, Vol. 26, No. 1, (Summer, 2002): 52-72.

Reich, Nancy, B.. *Clara Schumann: The Artist and the Woman*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001.

Ridley, Aaron. *Music, Value and the Passions.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995.

Roesner, Linda Correll. “Schumann's ‘Parallel’ Forms,” *19th-century Music*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Spring, 1991): 265-78.

Rosen, Charles. *The Romantic Generation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.

Rosen, Charles. *Sonata Form*. Revised edition. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988.

Rothfarb, Lee. “Energetics.” in *The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory*. ed. Thomas Christensen, 927-55. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Satyendra, Ramon. “Conceptualising Expressive Chromaticism in Liszt’s Music,” *Music Analysis*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Jul., 1997): 219-252.

Schindler, Anton Felix. *Beethoven As I Knew Him*. Edited by Donald W. MadArdle. Translated by Constance S. Jolly [from Schindler’s *Biographie von Ludwig van Beethoven, 1860*]. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1966.

Schoenberg, Arnold. *The Musical Idea and the Logic, Technique, and Art of its Presentation*. Edited and translated by Patricia Carpenter, Severine Neff. New York, NY: Colombia University Press, 1995.

Schopenhauer, Arthur. *The World As Will And Representation*. vol. 1 Translated by Richard E. Aquila, David Carus. Boston, MA: Pearson Education Inc., 2008.

Szász, Tibor. “Liszt’s Symbols for the Divine and Diabolical: Their Revelation of a Program in the B Minor Sonata,” *Journal of the American Liszt Society*, vol. 15 (1984): 39-95.

Walker, Alan. *Franz Liszt: The Weimar Years 1848-1861*. Vol. 2. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1981.

Walker, Alan. *Reflections on Liszt*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.

Williams, John, R.. *Goethe's Faust*. London, UK: Allen & Unwin, 1987.

Winklhofer, Sharon. *Liszt's Sonata in B Minor: A Study of Autograph Sources and Documents*. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1980.

Wolff, Konrad. *Schnabel's Interpretation of Piano Music.* 2nd edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1972.

Appendix I

Example 1: Longyear's measure-by-measure chart of the *Sonata in B minor*.[161]

"MOVEMENT"	SECTION	MOTIVE	KEY CENTER
"First Movement" (mm. 1–330)	Slow Introduction (1–7)	A	g
	Exposition (8–178)		
	First theme-group (8–24 + 25–31)	B, C	b
	Transition (32–104)	B, C, A	b to V of D
	Second theme-group (105–119)	D	D
	Second transition (119–152)	B, C	around D
	Closing group (153–178)	C′	D
	Development (179–459)		
	Continuation of allegro (179–300)	B, C′, D	Tonal flux
	Recitativo (301–310)	D	c♯, f
	Transition (311–330)	B, C, B/C	to B pedal
"Slow Movement" (331–459)	Andante sostenuto (331–346)	X	F♯
	Quasi adagio (347–396)	C, D, B	A, F♯, g, to V of F♯
	Retransition (397–459)	X, C, A	F♯
"Finale" (460–769) "Scherzando" (460–532)	Recapitulation (460–649)		
	Fugue = first theme-group (460–522)	B + C	b♭–E♭
	Correspondence to mm. 25–31 (523–532)	B, C	E♭–b
	Transition (533–565)	B, C, A	b
	Second theme-group (600–615)	D	B
	Second transition excised		
	Closing group (616–641)	C′	B
	Transitional close (642–649) (parallels 179–196)	B	to V of g♯
Coda (650–769)	Stretto quasi presto (650-672); (parallels incalzando, 255–276)	C′	g♯–V of B
	Presto (673-681)	A	to B
	Prestissimo (682-699)	B	B
	Apotheosis (700-710)	D	B
	Peroration, andante sostenuto (711-728)	X	B
	Epilogue, allegro moderato (729-760)	C, B, A	B

[161] Rey Longyear, *Nineteenth-Century Romanticism in Music*, 163-5.

Longyear's main thematic and motivic elements



C′ Cantabile espressivo

X Andante sostenuto

B Fugue
Allegro energico
p

C

Transformation of motive A in coda:

Presto

Example 2: Newman's Chart of Franz Liszt's *Sonata in B minor*.[162]

Newman describes his labels as follows:

> M., T., S., and K. [stands] for main theme, transition, second theme, and closing theme; the arrow, again, for tonal flux; and the symbols v, w, x, y, and z, for the thematic elements and their transformations (with the horizaontal spaces indicating thematic extension and the symbols w/x or x/w meaning the interplay of two elements. "Sonatina form" refers to "Sonata Form" in which a simple retransition ("T.") replaces the development section.[163]

[162] William S. Newman, *The Sonata Since Beethoven,* A History of the Sonata Idea 374-5.
[163] Ibid., 374.

Franz Liszt's Sonata in B Minor

Ms. nos.	25	50	75	100	125	150	175	200	225	250	275	300	325	350	375	400	425	450	475	500	525	550	575	600	625	650	675	700	725	750	760
One-mvt. "sonata form"	Exposition: M.	T.		S.		K.						Coda	Development (sectional): new (z)					fugue (w/x)			Recapitulation: M.	T.		S. K.			Coda (return of all themes)				
Four-mvt. cycle	i (incomplete "sonatina form"): Exposition M.	T.		S.		K.		Recapitulation T. M.		K.		Coda‖"A"	ii (A-B-A slow mvt.):	"B"	T."A"		Coda‖fugue	iii (scherzando fugue)			iv (finale: incomplete "sonatina form"): M.	T.		S. K.			Coda (return of all cyclic themes)				
Main tempos and meters	S/F ¢, ¢			3 ¢ 2									S 3 4					F ¢			(F) (¢)			3 ¢ 2			VF	F/S 3 3 2, 4	F ¢	S	
Main tonal centers	→b			D		D			D	(B/b)———			→F♯					b♭		———	→b			B B			B				
Main thematic elements (see Ex. 45)	vw/x	vw	v	y	v	xx	wxw			wx	vwy	x/w	z	x y		z	zv	w/x		w	w/xvvv &w			xy		w	vw	yz	xwv		

Newman's main thematic and motivic elements

Example 3: Arnold's comparative chart of the *Sonata in B minor*.[164]

Table 5.7[84]
Liszt, Sonata in B minor
One-Movement Sonata Form Comparison by Selected Authors

Measures	Section	Newman 1969	Longyear 1969, rev. 1973, 1988	Winklhofer 1978	Searle 1980	Walker 1989	Watson 1989	Hamilton 1996
1	*Lento assai*	Expo. 1st.	Intro.	Expo. 1st	Expo. Intro.	Intro.	Intro.	Intro.
8	*Allegro energico*		Expo. 1st.		1st			
32			Trans.	(tonal pres.)		Expo. 1st	Expo. 1st	Expo. 1st
45		Trans.		Trans.				Trans.
105	*Grandioso*	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd		2nd
153			Closing	Cadential Area	3rd			
171								
179			Dev.					
205	*Allegro energico*			Dev. 1	Dev.		Dev.	Dev.
277				Trans.				
331	*Andante sostenuto*	Dev.		Dev. 2		Dev.		
453				Recap.				
460	*Allegro energico*		Recap.					
531					Recap.		Recap.	
533		Recap.	Trans.	(tonal pres.)		Recap.		Recap.
555	*Più mosso*							Sec. Dev.
600		2nd	2nd					2nd
650	*Stretta quasi presto*		Coda	Coda 1				
673	*Presto*				Coda		Coda	Coda
682	*Prestissimo*	Coda				Coda		
711	*Andante sostenuto*			Coda 2				
729	*Allegro moderato*							
750	*Lento assai*							

[164] Ben Arnold, "Piano Music: 1835-1861," 121.

Example 4: Arnold's measure by measure chart of the *Sonata in B minor*.[165]

Liszt, Sonata in B minor

Measures	Key	Section	Themes	Tempo markings
1	G minor	Introduction	1	*Lento assai*
8	---		2, 3	*Allegro energico*
32	B minor	Expo: 1st-Theme Area	2, 3, 1	
105	D major	2nd-Theme Area	4, 2	*Grandioso*
123	---		2, 3	*dolce con grazia*
153	D major		3	*cantando espressivo*
179	---	Closing Area	2, 3	
205	---	Development	2, 1	*(Allegro energico)*
255	---		3	
277	---		2, 1	
297	---		4	
301	C♯ minor—		3	*Recitativo*
302	---		4	
306	F minor—		3	*Recitativo*
310	---		3, 2	
331	F♯ major		5	*Andante sostenuto*
349	A major		3, 2	
363	F♯ major		4	
376	G minor		4, 2	
397	F♯ major		5	
433	F♯ major		3	
453	F♯ major		1	
460	B♭ minor- E♭ major (fugue)		2, 3	*Allegro energico*
533	B minor	Recap: 1st-Theme Area	2, 3	
555	E♭ major, E minor		1	*Più mosso*
569	---		2, 1	
582	V/B (F pedal)		2, 3	
600	B major	2nd-Theme Area	4	
616	B major		3	*cantando espr. senza slentare*
642	---	Closing Area	2	
650	---		3	*Stretta (quasi presto)*
673	B minor-B major	Coda	1	*Presto*
682	B major		2	*Prestissimo*
700	B major		4	
711	B major		5	*Andante sostenuto*
729	B major		3, 2	*Allegro moderato*
750	B major		1	*Lento assai*

[165] Ben Arnold, "Piano Music: 1835-1861," 122.

Arnold's main Thematic Areas[166]

Liszt, Sonata in B Minor, Theme 1, mm. 1–3

Liszt, Sonata in B Minor, Theme 2, mm. 8–11

Liszt, Sonata in B Minor, Theme 3, mm. 13–15

[166] Ben Arnold, "Piano Music: 1835-1861," 123-4.

Liszt, Sonata in B Minor, Theme 4, mm. 105–110

Grandioso

ff

fff

sf

Liszt, Sonata in B Minor, Theme 5, mm. 329–338

ppp

una corda

dolce

Example 5: Winklhofer's measure by measure chart of the *Sonata in B minor*.[167]

Section	Location	Function/ Themes	Meter	Key	Remarks
Exposition					
Thematic Presentation	1-17				
Introduction	1-7	*a*	4/4	(g) = (vi)	
Continuation	8-13	*b*		(g, b)	
	13-17	*c*		(g)	
Bridge	18-31	*t/b + c*		xyz	
Tonal Presentation	32-44	*P/b + c*		b	Tonic arrival
Transition	45-54	T^1/b		xyz	
	55-66	T^2/b			
	56-81	$T^3 b$			
	81-104	$T^4 K/a$		*A = V/III*	Modulation to relative major. *D III*
Secondary Area	105-19	*S/d*	3/2		
Tonal deflection	120-40	"*b*"	4/4	(b,f,d)	
Bridge	141-52	*t/c*			
Cadential Area	153-70	K^1/"*c*"		D	Return to key of *S*.
	171-78	K^2"*c*"			
	179-90	K^3/"b"→ *T*		xyz.	Becomes modulatory; prepares for development but uses texture of $K^{1\text{-}2}$
	191-96	$K^4 T$/"*c*"			
	197-204	$K^5 T$/"*b*"			
Development # 1					
	205-20	DV^1/b		(C,B)	Volatile material
	221-38	DV^2/b		xyz	
	239-54	DV^6"*b*"		(D)	Begins tonal chain of thirds
	255-76	DV^4"*c*"		(b)	
Transition	277-96	$T^5/a + b$		(g,E♭)	Begins preparation for 2d dev.
	297-310	T^6/"*d*" + "*b*"	3/2	(c♯,f)	
	310-18	$T^2 K/c$	4/4		
	319-27	$T^8 K/c$		(b)	Enharmonic modulation
Development # 2					
(slow sub-movement in sonata form, *Andante sostenuto*)					
Exposition:					
Principal Area	328-46	*p/e*	3/4	F♯ ; V = I	Presentation of new tonic delayed; cf. 1-44
Transition	347-48	*t/e*	4/4		
Secondary Area	349-55	*s*/"*c*"		A = III	Derived from K^1 (153-60)

[167] Sharon Winklhofer, *Liszt's Sonata in B Minor: A Study of Autography Sources and Documents*, 131- 42.

Winklhofer's measure by measure chart continued.

Cadential Area	356-62	k^1/"c"		xyz	Derived from end of K^1 (161-64). Modulates: cf. K^3 above.
Development:	363-75	dv^1/"d" + "e"	3/4 + 4/4	(F♯)-->xyz	
	376-84	dv^2/"d" + "e"	3/4	(g)	
Retransition	385-92	rt/"e" + "b"			Chromatic modulation
Recapitulation:					
Principal Area	393-414	p/e		F♯	
Transition	415-32	t/e			Expansion of 347-48
Secondary Area	433-40	s/"c"	4/4	F♯	
Cadential Area	441-52	k^1/"c"		F♯	
	453-59	k^2/a		F♯ = G♭	Enharmonic modulation; acts also as onset of thematic recap.

Recapitulation

Thematic Presentation:					
Introduction	453-59	a		F♯ = G♭	
Fugato	460-508	b + c		b♭	
Retransition	519-32	rt/b		xyz to F♯	Derived from expo. 25-31
Tonal Presentation					
	533-45	P/b + c		b = i	Tonic return; quoted from expo., 32-44
Transition	546-54	T^1/b		xyz	Quoted from 45-54
	555-68	T^4/a + b			Derived from 81-104. $T^{2\text{-}3}$ omitted
	569-81	T^5/b + a			New
	582-99	T^6/b + c		to F♯	New
Secondary Area	600-15	S/d	3/4	B = I	Tonic major. Deflection and t/c omitted
Cadential Area	616-33	K^1/"c"	4/4		Derived from 153-70
	634-41	K^2/"c"			Derived from 171-78
	642-49	K^3/"b"		B to xyz	Derived from 179-90. $K^{4\text{-}5}$T omitted

Coda #1

Transition	650-72	T^7/"c"		xyz	Preparation for S-return. Derived from DV^4/"c"
	673-81	T^8/a			New
	682-99	T^9/b		To F♯ = V/B	New
Secondary Area	600-10	S/d	3/2	B = I	

Coda #2

Cadential Area	711-28	K^6/e	3/4	B = I	Tonic confirmation. Cyclic return of primary motives in reverse order
	729-36	K^7/c	4/4		
	737-48	K^8/b			
	748-60	K^9/a			

Winklhofer: Major Thematic Areas

a, mm. 1-7

Lento assai

p sotto voce

b, mm. 8-13

Allegro energico

f

c, mm. 13-17

f marcato

d, mm. 105-113

Grandioso

ff

"*b*" mm. 120-24

p

"*c*" mm. 153-60

cantando espressivo

l'accompagnamento piano

pp

e, mm. 328-34.

Andante sostenuto

pp

ppp

Example 6: Hamilton's comparative chart of the *Sonata in B minor*.[168]

Newman [Double function: four movements in one]	Longyear [Double function: three movements in one]	Winklhofer [One-movement sonata form]
Exposition (1–330?) [*first movement* in 'incomplete sonatina form']	Introduction (1–7) Exposition (8–178)	Exposition (1–204) comprising: *Thematic presentation* (1–17) Bridge (18–31) *Tonal presentation* (32–44) Transition (45–104) 2nd-subject area (105–19) Tonal deflection (120–40) Bridge (141–52) Cadential area (157–204)
Development (331–525): 1st part (331–459) [*Slow movement*] 2nd part (460–525) [*Scherzo*]	Development (179–459) [1–330 is *first movement*, 331–459 is a *slow movement*]	Development (205–452): 1st section (205–76) Transition (277–327) 2nd section (328–452) [Slow sub-movement in sonata form]
Recapitulation (525–681) [with coda forms *Finale* in 'incomplete sonatina' form]	Recapitulation (460–649) [with coda forms *Finale*]	Recapitulation (453–649): *Thematic presentation* comprising: Introduction (453–9) Fugato (460–508) Retransition (519–32) *Tonal presentation* (533–649)
Coda (682–760)	Coda (650–760)	Coda (650–760): 1st part (650–710) 2nd part (711–60)
(N.B. All bar numbers for Newman are approximate)	(N.B. This is according to Longyear's chart (p. 163). In the text he identifies bar 600 as the beginning of the 'proper "recapitulation"' (p.165))	

[168] Kenneth Hamilton, *Liszt: Sonata in B minor*, 32.

Appendix II

Selection from Arnold's TABLE 3: Liszt's Reading in German.[169]

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	**Chor der Engel [Faust]* (1849)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	*Correspondence between Goethe and Schiller* (1857)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	**Der du von dem Himmel bist* (1842)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	*Egmont* (1854, 1856)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	**Es war ein König in Thule* (1842)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	**Es war einmal ein König [Faust]* (1845)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	*Faust* (1830, 1837-1841, 1844, 1849, 1854, 1857, 1876-1877, 1885)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	**Freudvoll und leidvoll* (1844)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	*Gedichte* (1847)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	**Gottes ist der Orient* (1842)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	*Letters from Italy* (1837)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	**Mignons Lied* (1842)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	*Ratt' im Kellernest* (1856)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	**Soldatenlied [Faust]* (1844)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	**Studentenlied [Faust]* (1841)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	*Tasso* (1849)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	**Über allen Gipfeln ist Ruh* (1842, 1848, 1849)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	**Wer nie sein Brot mit Tränen aß* (c. 1845)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	*Werther* (1833, 1836?, 1855)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von	*Wilhelm Meister* (1837, 1856)
Gregorovius, Ferdinand	*Histoire de Rome au moyen âge* (1867)
Gregorovius, Ferdinand	*Lucrezia Borgia* (1874)
Gregorovius, Ferdinand	*Ruhigen Höhen* (1868)
Gregorovius, F. & A. Stern	**Zur Säkularfeier Beethovens* (1869-70)
Griepenkerl	*Ideal und Welt* (1854)
Grün, Anastasius	*Die Niebelungen im Frack* (1857)
Hagn, Charlotte von	**Was Liebe sei* (c. 1843)
Halm, F.	**Vor hundert Jahren* (1859)
Hanslick, Eduard	*On Beauty in Music* (1857)
Hartmann, Eduard von	*Philosophie des Unbewussten* (1871)
Hase, Carl von	*Franz von Assisi* (1868)
Hebbel, Friedrich	*Agnes Bernauer* (1852)
Hebbel, Friedrich	**Blume und Duft* (1854)
Hebbel, Friedrich	*Judith* (1857)
Hegel, Georg W.F.	(Refers to in 1876)
Heine, Heinrich	**Am Rhein* (c. 1840)
Heine, Heinrich	**Anfangs wollt' ich fast verzagen* (c. 1849)
Heine, Heinrich	**Die Loreley* (1841)
Heine, Heinrich	**Du bist wie eine Blume* (c. 1843)
Heine, Heinrich	**Ein Fichtenbaum steht einsam* (c. 1845)
Heine, Heinrich	*Im Oktober 1849* (1849)
Heine, Heinrich	"Lettres confidentielles" in *Revue et gazette musicale* (1838)
Heine, Heinrich	**Morgens steh' ich auf und frage* (c. 1843)
Heine, Heinrich	*Tragödie* (1875)
Heine, Heinrich	**Vergiftet sind meine Lieder* (1842)

[169] Ben Arnold, "Liszt as Reader, Intellectual, and Musician," 56.

Appendix III

Lawrence Chart of Liszt's *Sonata in B minor*.

EXPOSITION (First Section)			DEVELOPMENT (Second Section)	RECAPITULATION (Third Section)		CODA (Fourth Section)	
Allegro energico			*Andante sostenuto*	*Allegro energico*		*Andante sostenuto*	
exposition	development	rhetorical recapitulation[170]	slow movement	scherzo	finale	reprise of *Andante Sostenuto*	coda
(1-178) M, A, G, F	(179-285) M, F,	(286-329) M, MA	(330-453) G, F, A	(460-530) M	(531-710) M, A, F	(711-728) G, F	(729-end) M

M: Mephistopheles material

MA: Mephistophelean parody of Almighty material

A: Almighty material

G: Gretchen material

F: Faust material

[170] While this is a return of the Mephistopheles material, it is not a full recapitulation. Rather, it describes a rhetorical event in keeping with the formal outlines of first-movement sonata form. The full, formal recapitulation is a structural event taking place in the third section.