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“THE SEA OF TROUBLE WE ARE SWIMMING IN”: PEOPLE OF THE
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“THE SEA OF TROUBLE WE ARE SWIMMING IN”: PEOPLE OF THE DAWNLAND AND THE ENDURING PURSUIT OF A NATIVE ATLANTIC WORLD

A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

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For Allison
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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .............................................................................................. iv

List of Figures ........................................................................................................ viii

Abstract ................................................................................................................ ix

Introduction – Charting a Course and Weighing Anchor ........................................ 1

Chapter One – “On some rocks where the breakers were most violent”: Uniting and Reuniting Dawnlands and Oceans ................................................................. 18

Chapter Two – “With all sails set”: Steering the Course of Transition in an Expanding Atlantic World ......................................................................................... 66

Chapter Three – “To go to all the fishing ilandes and so to drive all the contre before them”: Contesting Atlantic Colonialism and Regenerating Atlantic Autonomy ......................................................... 112

Chapter Four – “His Majesty’s livery,” “the King’s presents,” and a “Sea of trouble”: Manipulating Power and Prestige in an Imperial World ........................... 166

Chapter Five – “Not to be under the command of any party”: Navigating the Shifting Winds of Imperial Conflict ................................................................. 211

Chapter Six – “Ye last & only door”: Struggling to Secure a Fleeting Vision .............................................................................................................................. 254

Conclusion – Taking Soundings ........................................................................... 296

Bibliography .......................................................................................................... 299
List of Figures

Figure 1 – New England and the Canadian Maritimes .................................................. 6

Figure 2 – Major River Systems of Wabanakia .......................................................... 41

Figure 3 – Seventeenth-Century Wabanaki, French, and English Settlements .................. 117
Abstract

This dissertation explores the active engagement of an American Indian culture with the early modern Atlantic world. It argues that the Wabanaki of the American northeast were a quintessentially maritime-oriented people who time and again looked to the Atlantic as an essential means of mitigating the quotidian rigors of their society and enhancing its overall welfare. This process had sustained native life long before the arrival of Europeans, and afforded it valuable cultural and material resources to assuage the disruptive effects of colonialism from the early sixteenth through the mid-eighteenth centuries. In their exchanges with Euro-Americans, these people increasingly cultivated an array of novel Atlantic opportunities to enrich, augment, and protect their vision of this pelagic world in the face of increasing pressures to redefine its meaning and significance. By shrewdly engaging in trans-Atlantic gift-giving networks, astutely exploiting European imperial conflicts, carefully manipulating economic exchange complexes, respectfully invoking European monarchical authority, and strategically appropriating Euro-American sailing technology, Wabanaki consistently reinforced their presence on the high seas and elaborated their longstanding notion of the Atlantic world: the ocean was a profoundly generative and life-sustaining locus of power.

Yet over the course of the colonial period, Wabanaki came to recognize that their Atlantic vision did not stand alone. As it ran up against European – and later primarily British – efforts to forcefully consolidate the Atlantic into a coherent and far-flung imperial network, Indian marine-warriors decimated and plundered the Euro-American maritime presence to fortify their conception of the Atlantic’s opportunity and their command of its waves. Countless imperial and colonial architects struggled
relentlessly to rationalize and reign in this corner of the world, but the economic, diplomatic, and martial pursuit of a Wabanaki Atlantic constantly defied their efforts at cohesion. Ashore and afloat, a brutal contestation of oceanic spaces ensued in the northeast, and endured throughout much of the colonial era. British attempts to render the native Atlantic amenable to their own imperial designs gradually made headway in the middle decades of the eighteenth century. By the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763, the imperial equilibrium that long afforded Indians control of their seas, and nourished so much of their Atlantic vision, had dissolved, and with it the world that sustained their culture for countless generations.
Introduction
Charting a Course and Weighing Anchor

In Spring 1759, a familiar supplicant stood before the legislature in Boston’s State House. As royal governor of Massachusetts during the Seven Years’ War, Thomas Pownall envisioned a lasting victory for his empire through the conquest of the Penobscot River Valley on the colony’s northeastern frontier, the very heart of the Wabanaki Indians’ ancestral homeland. “For many Years a Den for Savages,” he reminded his lawmakers, a “Rendevouz of the Eastern Indians when they come against our Frontiers,” circumstances in the region now necessitated the appropriation of assets for a strong garrison. The moment to act was at hand since “the Enimy have now no Outlet to ye sea but thro this River Penobscot; The Door being Shutt upon them in every other Part.” Pownall’s incessant agitation of the General Court to slam shut this final door eventually paid dividends. Bolstered by British military victories throughout this borderland in early 1759, and by the subsequent allotment of funds for the construction of Fort Pownall, the jubilant governor could finally declare in a victory speech that “this River was ye last & only door That the Enimy had left to ye Atlantic & I hope this is now fairly shutt upon them.” Equally confident of the strategy’s success, the legislature lauded him with congratulations on his defeat of the Indians now, they affirmed, “deprived of the only Opening they had left to the Atlantick.” Pownall also attempted to infect his superiors at Whitehall with the same enthusiasm, boasting in a letter later
that month of his triumphant closure of “the last & only Door which the Enimy had left to ye Atlantic.”¹

The curious anxieties embodied by Boston’s political elite over the perilous consequences of Indian access to the ocean, and their faith in the new fortification on the Penobscot River that aimed to sever that connection, point to a peculiar facet of the Wabanaki experience in the early modern world. The strength and vitality of this native culture ashore was predicated on its relationship to the Atlantic. Yet what colonials like Pownall did not always recognize was that these ties bound Indians to far more than a small corner of the Atlantic Ocean; they also connected them in profound ways to a wider and more complex world of processes circulating around the Atlantic basin in the early modern period. Throughout the colonial era, Wabanaki came to understand that the preservation of their autonomy in the American northeast necessitated an aggressive command of this Atlantic world, a mastery of its manifold opportunities and pressures. When we pry open and peer back through Governor Pownall’s door we can survey the development of this Atlantic power, and the vista is arresting.

This dissertation is that survey. It argues that the Wabanaki were a quintessentially maritime-oriented people who time and again looked to the Atlantic as an essential means of mitigating the quotidian rigors of their society and enhancing its overall welfare. This process had sustained Wabanaki life long before the arrival of Europeans, and afforded it valuable cultural and material resources to assuage the

disruptive effects of colonialism from the early sixteenth through the mid-eighteenth centuries. In their exchanges with Euro-Americans, these people increasingly cultivated an array of novel Atlantic opportunities to enrich, augment, and protect their vision of this pelagic world in the face of increasing pressures to redefine its meaning and significance. By shrewdly engaging in trans-Atlantic gift-giving networks, astutely exploiting European imperial conflicts, carefully manipulating economic exchange complexes, respectfully invoking European monarchical authority, and strategically appropriating Euro-American sailing technology, Wabanaki consistently reinforced their presence on the high seas and elaborated their longstanding notion of the Atlantic world: the ocean was a profoundly generative and life-sustaining locus of power.

At other times and under other circumstances, Wabanaki responded to the most threatening aspects of colonialism with carefully-orchestrated acts of maritime violence. When their conception of the Atlantic ran up against European – and later primarily British – efforts to forcefully consolidate it into a coherent and far-flung imperial network, Wabanaki marine-warriors decimated Euro-American ships and sailors to reinforce their command of the waves. Countless imperial authorities subsequently decried Indians’ seemingly-incessant devastation of the north Atlantic fishery, their serial impressment of British seamen, their commandeering of British sailing vessels, and their destructive method of naval warfare they often waged with them. Indian land-based violence also stymied the Crown’s exploitation of Wabanaki forests for ship stores slated for the Royal Navy, an enterprise that was alleviating Britain’s dependence on Scandinavia and the Baltic States for such commodities. Native power ashore and
afloat thus wreaked havoc on Britain’s ongoing struggle to integrate the northwest Atlantic into a seamless imperial economy.

Over the course of the colonial period, Wabanaki came to appreciate Britain’s maritime presence as much more than a target of their retributive violence. Its sheer vulnerability also increasingly rendered it a valuable extractive economy for native communities. This floating warehouse offered plundering Indian marine-warriors convenient access to British sailing vessels, maritime labor, and material goods, fruits that were quickly incorporated into Wabanaki communities or pressed into further service for their interests on the native Atlantic. The soft underbelly of the British imperial economy came to function as an object of native retaliatory violence as well as a cache of lucrative resources. For nearly two centuries, Wabanaki creatively engineered the northwest Atlantic into a conduit for enhancing their ancient maritime identity and extending its autonomy through violence and theft. This seaborne tenacity filled the pages of a letter from panic-stricken settlers in Maine to their colony’s London agents in 1690, a plea begging officials to “see the Sea of trouble we are Swimming in.”

While imperial and colonial architects struggled relentlessly to rationalize and reign in this world, the economic, diplomatic, and martial pursuit of a Wabanaki Atlantic constantly defied their efforts at cohesion. The native Atlantic vision – an idea that the ocean and its variegated opportunities functioned to serve native interests – frequently interrupted and fiercely contested that of newly-arrived imperial neighbors. Thomas Pownall’s ambitious plan in 1759 was the latest recognition of the incompatibility and hostility enveloping these competing worlds, and indicated the striking marine violence with which Wabanaki pursued their unique vision. Cracking
open the governor’s door thus affords us both a glimpse into the salty past of these People of the Dawnland – a culture carefully cognizant of the potentiality of their eastern horizons – and a more holistic understanding of the contestation and plurality fracturing the Atlantic world.

The colonial-era Wabanaki were a northeastern Algonquian cultural group comprising numerous hunter-gatherer peoples in what are now northern New England and the Canadian Maritimes. The Wabanaki sub-cultures central to this dissertation are those today referred to as the Eastern Abenaki, Penobscot, Maliseet-Passamaquoddy, and Micmac peoples. By the mid-eighteenth century, most Eastern Abenaki had migrated from southern Maine to the French Jesuit mission villages along the St. Lawrence River or joined their native neighbors in communities on the Penobscot River. The Penobscot, Maliseet-Passamaquoddy, and Micmac tribes reside today on reservations in Maine, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. In the spring, summer, and fall of the early historic period, these migratory people inhabited coastal and island settlements where they harvested numerous marine resources including large sea mammals such as grey and harbor seals, porpoises, and even baleen whales. From late fall to early spring, they dispersed to interior camps where they hunted terrestrial quadrupeds including moose, white-tailed deer, and beaver. Their ancestral homeland, what I periodically refer to as Wabanakia or the Dawnland, consisted of nearly all present-day Maine, eastern and northeastern New Brunswick, the Gaspé Peninsula, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia.²

The implications of this maritime history, however, range well beyond Wabanakia. Conceptually it problematizes certain foundational principles undergirding Atlantic and Native American history, two of American history’s most prominent subfields. In light of Atlantic world studies’ prolific stature and the extraordinarily creative

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ways it has made good on its mantra of geographic and cultural inclusivity, the absence of American Indians from its collective consciousness remains all the more glaring. The few attempts by Atlanticists to test their model’s applicability to native history have resulted in a nearly unanimous consensus: the vast instances of Indian autonomy and cultural continuity in early America proved that these people sought desperately to prevent the Atlantic’s functioning in any meaningful way in their societies. Thus, from “an Indian perspective, it might well seem that nothing good came from the Atlantic,” a destructive sphere that prompted an “avoidance strategy” to fortify their “authority structures.” An Atlantic perspective of native America, moreover, will simply acknowledge “the stiff resistance at times” encountered by British newcomers from “Amerindian nations” and other non-English peoples “who resisted assimilation.”

Given the sheer expansiveness of North America, another skeptic argues, “[t]he domain of the Atlantic world ended where that of the autonomous peoples began.” Even the

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most sustained engagement with several theoretical possibilities for integrating Indians and the Atlantic ultimately concedes “that the Atlantic is not the appropriate paradigm with which to pursue Amerindian history.”

Such scholarly reticence to stretch the parameters of Atlantic studies into Indian country is further sustained by a seemingly paradoxical orthodoxy at the very heart of the model itself. That the Atlantic world was a fundamentally European construction is explicitly accepted as a largely unchallenged tenet among the field’s ardent supporters. Europe’s merchants, sailors, cartographers, and intellectuals, the established precept maintains, were the first to integrate the ocean’s trade winds and currents into a coherent early modern superhighway connecting its adjacent and disparate landmasses.

This study contends, by contrast, that Atlanticists have too quickly acceded to a singular and coherent Atlantic space, and too frequently dismissed non-Europeans’ roles in shaping its contours. Wabanaki did not simply yield their vast watery frontier to the dominion of others or accept that frontier as an impediment stifling cultural

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dynamism. Indian sagamores, naval warriors, mariners, traders and diplomats instead viewed the ocean as a powerful catalyst for extending political and cultural autonomy and enriching material life. The Dawnland’s pelagic world could retain this recognizable distinction in the cosmos of its native inhabitants through their careful cultivation of its potential and aggressive command of its spaces. In short, the Atlantic assumed as prominent a role in native configurations of their social, political and economic identity as it did among Europeans’ in the early modern era. When Indian efforts to accordingly define and defend their ocean’s significance disrupted Britain’s struggle to do the same, a profoundly contentious and brutally violent Atlantic space surfaced.  

Beyond the methodological conundrums posed by current assumptions about the Atlantic world, scholarly ambivalence towards a red Atlantic stems in large part from popular and academic conceptions of native culture itself. Put simply, we commonly envisage American Indians as a quintessentially terrestrial people. Contemporary political conversations involving Indian country nearly always accentuate land rights and the inextricability of sovereignty and territoriality. Native peoples’ unique and intimate communion with their natural landscapes is well documented, and serves as further justification of the land’s indispensible quality to indigenous identity.

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7 Maritime historian W. Jeffrey Bolster has encouraged Atlanticists to think more critically about the ways humans have interacted with the living ocean. This Atlantic study of the Wabanaki is also an attempt to engage with his challenge: W. Jeffrey Bolster, “Putting the Ocean in Atlantic History: Maritime Communities and Marine Ecology in the Northwest Atlantic, 1500-1800,” American Historical Review (February, 2008), 19-47.

Classroom treatment of Indian history invariably covers critical topics like land dispossession, forced migration from ancestral homelands to new territories, the Dawes Severalty Act, the Indian New Deal, the termination of reservations, and urban relocation. A fascination with natives’ indelible attachment to land has even shaped our scientific understandings of their origins. How did Paleoindians first arrive in the Americas? They walked, and then they walked across the Bering Land Bridge, and then they walked some more, at least according to the long-held archaeological consensus dominating the subject. New paradigm-shifting research, however, is beginning to suggest that these Pleistocene migrations may have been wetter than previously supposed. Instead they likely relied on watercraft to drift along the continental coastlines or perhaps island-hop across the Pacific prior to the accessibility of a land bridge.\(^9\) If indeed native America was born by gusty currents and salty corridors, the maritime heritage of the New World and its first settlers is much richer, and much older, than historians have ever imagined.

Fixations with the terra firma Indian have also been assiduously reified by trends in Native American historiography. The most influential and enduring theoretical constructs preoccupying the field’s collective concern and orienting much of its scholarship over the last two decades sustain this familiar trope. Middle grounds, native

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grounds, divided grounds, crossroads, borderlands, and backcountries, to name a few, while providing the fruitful impetus for the field’s tremendous efflorescence, have also served to rivet its gaze on the continental interior and focus its attention on adjoining processes. The dictatorship of these models also explains how one of today’s most innovative and influential Native Americanists can reduce “the Native American experience in the Atlantic world” to not much of an experience at all, other than “one of loss: of life, of land, of autonomy, and of culture,” or how another can posit that “for many Indians the challenge of the Atlantic world” was “to hold on to the land” that preserved recognizable identities.  

It likely explains too why modern historians have generally neglected the Wabanaki experience in early America. Anthropologists and archaeologists, in fact, have produced the lion’s share of this historiography. The work of such prolific authorities as Bruce J. Bourque, Harald E.L. Prins, and Willard Walker continues to represent the leading edge of Wabanaki scholarship. Along with Frank G. Speck,

ethnographer and folklorist Fannie Hardy Eckstorm, Dean R. Snow and other of their predecessors, these social scientists have illuminated our understanding of the political character, social life, and material culture of the native northeast. But this important work, particularly when it arrives at the historic period, is dominated by landlocked portrayals of native society. A maritime-centered Wabanaki culture certainly prevailed before the advent of European colonization, this scholarship often implies, but quickly dissolved in its wake.11

While the corpus of work from historians of early Wabanakia is not nearly as corpulent, it is equally terrestrial and continental in nature. Earlier generations of Roman Catholic religious figures produced detailed histories of Wabanaki tribes, much of which focused on their rich Catholic heritage dating back to encounters with Europeans in the sixteenth century. More recently, scholars like Kenneth M. Morrison and L.F.S. Upton were among the first to apply the native-centered, and often land rights-focused, interpretive framework of the New Indian History to Wabanaki. Upton’s study of Indian-white relations in the early Canadian Maritimes touched on the Micmac’s maritime presence, though the majority of it was given over to their gradual dispossession of ancestral homelands at the hands of Euro-Americans. Since that time, a small number of unpublished doctoral dissertations have examined themes such as gender, family and violence within certain Wabanaki cultures. An article by Emerson T. Baker and John G. Reid, as well as Christopher John Bilodeau’s informative

dissertation, have explored in insightful ways the ascendancy of native violence and warfare in colonial-era Wabanakia, but do not mention the Atlantic’s indispensible role in that phenomenon. An entire historiographic discourse on Indian military tactics in early New England also overlooks Wabanakis’ striking nautical prowess.  

Considering these prevailing perceptions of Indians – and Wabanaki, specifically – inside and outside academia, it is little wonder that scholars have ambled past Governor Pownall’s door, and been disinclined to explore what lies beyond. We are left with the assumption, as one Atlanticist asserts, that Indians simply “turned their back on the Atlantic world” and gave “it no more than myopic glances.” An image of Wabanaki pirates hijacking European sailing ships and plying the rough waters of the north Atlantic consequently risks consignment to a surreal realm of the fantastical. A picture of native marine-warriors at ship’s helm successfully laying siege to colonial garrisons is naturally confined to the level of the absurd. And the notion of an Indian navy pressing British seamen into its ranks can be instinctively relegated to a world of the fanciful. Yet history indeed is often stranger than fiction.  


This project speaks to scholars of the Atlantic world, European empires, and native and colonial America. I ask them not simply to acknowledge the active presence of Indians beyond the terrestrial confines of North America and in the Atlantic, but more significantly to consider and explore their role in defining the contestation and plurality that increasingly fractured this watery realm into a myriad of competing visions. I urge Atlanticists and scholars of empire to rethink the conventional Euro-dominated applications of their models in order to encompass a wider array of non-European peoples who not only maintained their autonomy outside of European control, but conditioned the possibilities Europeans conceptualized in the Atlantic. Scholars of Native America are also encouraged to consider the Atlantic as a dynamic locus of change shaping Indian country and continually offering its inhabitants opportunities to refashion themselves and their worlds. A decade ago, historian Daniel K. Richter illuminated early America from the perspective of native people “facing east from Indian country.” We ought to take seriously this indigenous posture as it extended beyond North America to the processes and pressures carried west on Atlantic waves.¹⁴

This dissertation accordingly positions the Wabanakis’ pelagic world at the center of their early modern experience. From the heart of this world these People of the Dawnland experienced Gluskap’s life-giving touch in the beginning, and received each successive new day. Chapter One, “Uniting and Reuniting Dawnlands and Oceans,” traces the sea’s ancient prominence in the native northeast by exploring mutually-reinforcing scientific records and native oral traditions. It demonstrates that

the ocean had long been valued as a profoundly generative and sustaining locus of power, and was thereby inextricable to Wabanaki welfare in their terrestrial communities. This native understanding of the Atlantic also colored the interpretive lens through which Indians perceived their earliest encounters with Europeans. Yet this Atlantic vision was neither static nor rigid. Chapter Two, “Steering the Course of Transition in an Expanding Atlantic World,” explores its dynamism during the first wave of colonization in the early seventeenth century. The evolving Atlantic became a conduit for extensive economic exchange networks linking the native northeast to foreign markets, and a source of valuable sailing technology increasingly coveted by Indian communities. This bounty enhanced Wabanakis’ command of their waves while simultaneously ushering in significant socio-political changes to their communities.

The Atlantic’s expanding fecundity also introduced hostile new pressures into the native northeast that threatened to disorder Wabanaki society and disorient their relationship to the ocean. Chapter Three, “Contesting Atlantic Colonialism and Regenerating Atlantic Autonomy,” analyzes the disruptive effects of Euro-American trade practices, seaborne violence and environmental exploitation. When coupled with a concerted effort by New England governments to undermine and police the Wabanaki maritime presence, these dangerous forces marked the emergence of an unmistakable pattern. To Indians, nothing short of the native Atlantic world was in jeopardy. This chapter also explores the Atlantic solutions Wabanaki sought out to mitigate these threats, and the campaign of naval warfare they executed against New England as King Philip’s War raged to their south.
By extending King Philip’s War to the northeast and into the sea in 1675, Wabanaki succeeded in reordering their world and renewing their authority in it. But these advances proved ephemeral, and Wabanaki again explored new Atlantic opportunities to manage the revived colonial pressures eroding their relationship to the Atlantic. The following two chapters examine Indians’ creative cultivation of these increasingly imperial solutions. Chapter Four, “Manipulating Power and Prestige in an Imperial World,” explores how Wabanaki embarked on long-distance migrations to forge connections with another nexus of Atlantic power in New France. It also analyzes how native interests became enmeshed in European political affairs, particularly England’s Glorious Revolution in 1688 and the subsequent imperial war it spawned. Wabanaki strategically exploited both conflicts in order to again strike at the English Atlantic economy and plunder it of considerable wealth. Chapter Five, “Navigating the Shifting Winds of Imperial Conflict,” traces the persistence and elaboration of this strategy through Queen Anne’s War, another Anglo-French contest enveloping the northeast in 1703. Native participation in this war thus emerged as the latest phase in a developing pattern. The power politics of European courts, Indians recognized, afforded lucrative opportunities to augment a native Atlantic constantly disordered by its imperial counterpart.

By the end of Queen Anne’s War in 1713, Wabanaki were experiencing the limitations of this approach. New England’s land-based military campaigns decimated several of their communities in southern Maine and compounded the problem of France’s wavering assistance, a development stemming from Louis XIV’s dire economic straits. When French imperial authorities unilaterally relinquished much of
the northeastern Dawnland to Britain at the Treaty of Utrecht, Wabanaki began to reassess their relationship with this nexus of Atlantic power and rethink their dependence on colonial wars to undermine and plunder the British imperial economy. Chapter Six, “Struggling to Secure a Fleeting Vision,” analyzes how Indians refashioned their Atlantic vision from these difficult lessons of Queen Anne’s War. After receiving word of the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion in Britain, Nova Scotia Wabanaki aimed to extend the uprising to the northwest Atlantic by orchestrating another campaign of maritime violence against the British fishery. And when rampant colonial speculation in native lands culminated in war in 1722, Indians advanced their cause without French cooperation for the first time since King Philip’s War in 1675. Yet this change of course eventually proved limited in its capacity to forge a durable and meaningful native Atlantic. The buffeting waves of persistent colonial encroachment against the Wabanaki presence ashore and afloat, and the unraveling of the imperial equilibrium in the Seven Years’ War, ultimately wore away native ties to their saltwater world. The construction of Governor Pownall’s fort at the mouth of the Penobscot River in 1759 not only slammed shut their last door to the ocean but also consummated the final dissolution of the Wabanaki Atlantic.
Chapter One

“On some rocks where the breakers were most violent”: Uniting and Reuniting Dawnlands and Oceans

The Atlantic Ocean obtained its ubiquity in native northeastern history long before it conveyed foreign people and material to the Dawnland. This sea-centered past, moreover, has retained such salience that ways of remembering it too are saturated with saltwater. As late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century students of native American culture traveled to Wabanakia to capture whatever vestiges of its primordial character remained, they recorded a complex of oral traditions steeped in a maritime consciousness and positioned in an aquatic world that hardly resembled its peoples’ contemporary confinement on land-based reservations. These stories of the native past include intricate portraits of the Dawnland’s earliest days, when the Wabanaki culture hero emerged from the east, breathed life into its first People, and ultimately departed into its depths. Others describe the amicable and devious forces lurking just beneath the surface of the waves. Still others portray a watery world tamed and harnessed in the beginning to ensure the Peoples’ welfare and happiness. This corpus of folklore rationalizes and centers the ocean in the historical memory of a people since removed from their quotidian relationship with it.

The connection of the People and their Atlantic world is an ancient one. Anthropologists and archaeologists of the northeast believe that humans began utilizing the ocean’s resources in varying ways as early as ten thousand years before the present. During the middle to late Archaic Period – about five thousand years B.P. – people constructed more elaborate and durable watercraft to harvest deepwater marine life and
populate offshore islands. The more recent Ceramic Period – about two thousand to six hundred years B.P. – saw year-round habitation of coastal and island sites grow in frequency and size, along with adaptations to newer resources introduced from the ocean’s ongoing ecological changes. Pre-contact northeasterners also venerated the sea’s life-giving power by constructing large marine mammal effigies in their communities. In short, the extant remains of boat-building tools, island encampments, fish, seal and whale bones, and even a Norse coin indicate that the Wabanaki and their ancestors were deeply enmeshed in the possibilities and processes of a larger maritime world that extended far beyond the Dawnland’s rocky shoreline.

This chapter explores the primordial saltwater-saturated past of the native northeast. Taken together, it argues, oral traditions and scientific representations afford us a glimpse into the imaginative context within which Wabanaki understood a strange phenomenon increasingly common on their sixteenth-century horizons. The foreign sailing vessels that emerged from their watery eastern frontier were approached with the same spirit of cautious opportunism that had long shaped native attitudes toward the sea’s valuable but potentially hazardous offerings. While these European explorers and fishermen often provided lucrative trade goods that enriched Indian culture and facilitated their modes of production and consumption, they sometimes harbored deceitful and destructive motives. More than a few Wabanaki endured trans-Atlantic voyages in captivity as a result, while their kin left on the shores of the Dawnland returned to communities robbed of goods esteemed in foreign markets. The earliest native experiences of European contact, this chapter asserts, thus sprung out of the paradoxical duality that long lay at the heart of the Wabanaki ocean; it was at once a
profoundly generative and sustaining source of life while also a mysterious, perilous and destabilizing threat.

Indian involvement in these pressures and processes now circulating throughout the Atlantic ironically reoriented their attention away from it. In their meetings with French, English, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch explorers and fishermen possessing a myriad of ambitions, Wabanaki learned that the valuable material goods these visitors transmitted were most easily acquired with the furs of inland mammals their hunters occasionally harvested during the winter season. By way of nascent fur trade relationships, and as periodic victims of theft, Wabanaki and their natural resources were being drawn into an extensive network of material exchange that stretched throughout and across the Atlantic. Valued in this system were not the fruits of their marine economy but the furbearers that inhabited the dense inland forests opposite the sea. Participation in this Atlantic complex encouraged many Indian communities to move away from their Atlantic ocean.

The same body of water that extended this network and its human agents to the northeast also introduced new technology into Wabanaki society that allowed Indians to manage the changing dynamics of their maritime world. Near the turn of the seventeenth century, Indians were frequently commanding European sailing vessels and plying the waters of the northwestern Atlantic. The nautical competencies developed over centuries of interaction with the ocean now grew more elaborate and extensive with their utilization of sailing technology often seized violently from European newcomers. Wabanaki-commandeered ships permitted Indians a more conspicuous presence in their diversifying pelagic world, as well as a more aggressive stance against
the potentially disruptive forces that accompanied European explorers. Some Indians also took advantage of these ships and the ocean’s corridors to forge an intermediary role in the emerging fur trade. They sailed Dawnland waters accumulating native goods from neighboring communities that were later transferred to European ships. The same seafaring skills that grew out of Indians’ longstanding maritime identity were increasingly strengthened with this novel technology in order to fortify and enhance that identity amidst a sea of strangers struggling to shape it with their own vision.

When renowned ethnographer Charles G. Leland journeyed to the Dawnland in the summer of 1882, he hoped to assemble a collection of native folklore from often- unrecognized and frequently-overlooked Indian communities in the northeast. A stark ambivalence, though, pervaded his mission from the beginning. Like many of his contemporaries, Leland doubted the cultural and ethnic authenticity of eastern Indians at the time, particularly in relation to the more numerous and recognizable native people of the American West. “Few in number, surrounded by white people, and thoroughly converted to Roman Catholicism,” he lamented, the Wabanaki most likely retained scant traces, if that, of an unadulterated Indian heritage. But what Leland discovered in his interviews shocked him. Countless native informants from communities scattered across Maine and New Brunswick related a complex of legends and histories more elaborate, evocative and “far grander” than he, or any other American of the time, anticipated. “I soon ascertained that these were very ancient,” he later marveled, many
of which were sung by elders in times past to facilitate their transmission through the
generations.¹

Regardless of Leland’s desire to encounter and convey their primordial nature,
these oral histories also reveal a pattern striking to modern sensibilities that view
Indians—past and present – as fundamentally terrestrial people. Wabanaki
understandings of their origins, and of the varied roles Gluskap, their mythical culture
hero played in them, are saturated with saltwater. The ocean is a central motif in this
historical consciousness and it assumes such an unmistakable prominence in the self-
identity of this people that any analysis of Wabanaki history must consider its formative
influence. These aquatic accounts are rendered even more peculiar and remarkable
considering that their exponents by the time of Leland’s visit were largely relegated by
imperial and state governments to confined inland territories where the native
relationship to the ocean was only a fragment of its former complexity.

When the first dawn came to Wabanakia, its inhabitants were raw and lifeless
beings wandering in a dark abyss and awaiting an enlivening energy. This
transformative and life-giving power was personified by Gluskap who emerged from
the watery expanses of his peoples’ eastern horizon in a stone canoe covered with trees.
Defying obvious laws of nature and human reason to manifest his supreme authority,
the hero paddled his vessel ashore and embarked on his mission among the Wabanaki.
The animals were first summoned and given names, and then bestowed with an
instinctive fear of humans. To the Wabanaki he bequeathed an intimate knowledge of
the natural world, teaching them to make use of the earth’s resources for food and

medicine and for the construction of huts, canoes, and equipment to harvest fish and game.

Other folklorists, linguists and ethnographers who succeeded Leland in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century recorded subtle variations on this account. Synthesizing Christian and native origin stories, Micmac related how God landed on the shores of their country after first creating the white people across the sea. He then crafted their ancestors from the untouched sand softened and smoothed by the ocean’s turbulent waves. Still others believed that their first people washed ashore in the froth created by the waves’ perpetual ebb and flow. The singular event of these slightly varied landings, however, bridged the cognitive chasm hitherto separating the mysterious unknown of this pelagic world from the Dawnland, the birthplace and home of its People. Their quickening ashore stemmed from attendant forces afloat. By imbuing the ocean with spiritual and material meaning, and by respecting its profoundly generative and life-giving power, the Wabanaki effectively imbricated their marine and terrestrial worlds in the very beginning.²

The conjugation of sea and land is so prominent in Wabanaki folk life that it resonates elsewhere in their traditional belief system, particularly in attitudes toward animal life. Micmac have long anthropomorphized their ocean and land environments as kingdoms each ruled by a headman-type figure; the moose oversees the terrestrial world while the whale governs the water. These chief species, moreover, are capable of

reincarnating as one another when advanced in age, thereby avoiding natural death.

One will thus never find a moose, or other subservient animals like the bear or caribou, dead in the forest because of old age since they simply walk into the sea and transform into whales in the autumn of their lives. The near identical brackish taste of both moose and whale flesh, such folklore maintains, is proof of this symbiotic metamorphosis. The fluidity of these two environments and their governing creatures is reflected in the story of Indians tracking a moose along the coast. After killing and butchering the game they discovered seaweed in its stomach rather than ordinary woodland forage.³ Such tales, and the sacred belief systems they embodied, rendered the Wabanaki’s marine and terrestrial worlds fungible and their natural distinction ambiguous.

After first conjugating the ocean and land, this culture’s oral traditions proceed to reflect an understanding of the sea as an invaluable resource positioned for manipulation. A plethora of Gluskap’s subsequent exploits among the ancestral Wabanaki are predicated on his successful exploitation of the oceanic world. Once while residing on a faraway island at sea, Gluskap became aware of mainland creatures who acquired strength and wisdom that rivaled his own, but who disparaged his absent and distant authority. To assist his continental return to reestablish social order, Gluskap looked out onto the sea and chanted a magical song that the whales obeyed. Many emerged enchanted, and offered their assistance to the hero. Gluskap chose the mightiest female, whom he rode close to shore before she expressed worry about running aground. Gluskap, however, did not wish to wet his feet and pushed on until she beached. Before embarking on foot to the Wabanaki, he pushed the whale back into

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the sea and obliged her request for a pipe of tobacco to compensate her efforts. On another occasion, Gluskap chased a number of evil witches to the nether regions of the sea on the backs of whales again summoned with his magical song.⁴

In addition to facilitating mobility and broadening spatial reality, the ocean also functioned as a repository of nutritional and material sustenance for Wabanaki’s culture hero, as it would continue to do for generations of descendents. After Gluskap received an invitation from the magician-giant, Kitpooseagunow, to accompany him on a whale-hunting expedition, the two set out in a boat by torchlight carrying harpoons that resembled lightening bolts when thrust into the sea at their game. The two proceeded to enjoy a rich seafood feast from their labor. When his feeble grandmother expressed her frustrating inability to catch fish, Gluskap came to her aid by cruising the ocean, rounding up abundant schools of fish, and herding them up a river and into his grandmother’s trap. Elsewhere in Wabanaki lore, a young warrior wished to pursue the attractive daughter of a great chief, but their people inhabited a land somewhere along the distant reaches of the ocean. Gluskap came to the aid of the discouraged youth and transported him in his canoe to a large island of granite and enormous pine trees. This rock was transformed into a magnificent sailing ship replete with multiple masts, which the warrior plied over the waters to his remote love. The vast opportunities afforded by the sea, such lessons conveyed, could mitigate the quotidian rigors and pressures faced by people in every age. Additionally, they worked to familiarize a seemingly foreign

⁴ Charles G. Leland, *The Algonquin Legends of New England*, 31-33, 41-42. The explicit gender dynamics in many of these legends is largely reflective of the historic gender roles central to most hunter-gather societies like the Wabanaki.
and expansive emptiness, in turn tempering and ordering an otherwise uncontrollable
and chaotic world.\(^5\)

Yet the ocean simultaneously figured as a precarious and potentially sinister
realm, in whose shadowy recesses lurked bizarre and menacing forces, constantly
scheming to wreak havoc on the unwary. On his homeward journey with the great
chief’s daughter, the young warrior’s ship encountered stormy seas and was bombarded
by tremendous waves. Out of the murky depths emerged the giant beaver Quahbeet, a
formidable nemesis of Gluskap. Quahbeet furiously attacked the boat with his tail in an
attempt to sink it and kill the crew, but Gluskap came to the assistance of the young
man and together they slew the dreadful beast. The same watery chasm that initially
impeded the young man’s pursuit of his desire posed a more deadly hazard later on his
voyage, though both obstacles were overcome with material and supernatural power.\(^6\)

Gluskap too experienced the sea’s malevolent forces while captivated by a
young girl. This maiden, however, was a disguised witch whose real identity was not
discovered until she accompanied Gluskap in his canoe on the calm ocean waters. After
the frightful epiphany, he jumped overboard, pushed the witch out into the open sea and
swam safely to shore. She was subsequently transformed into *keegunibe*, a vicious
serpent with a fin resembling a sail protruding from the water, who some Wabanaki
believe continues to stalk the seas today. Gluskap was also known to have once
harnessed the ocean’s violent weather. After extreme wind thwarted his plans to hunt

Transformer Tales,” *International Journal of American Linguistics* Vol. 1, No. 3 (August, 1918), 193;
Thomas A. Green, ed. *Native American Folktales* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2009), 133-137.

seafowl in his canoe, he sought out and subdued the giant bird whose beating wings created the gusty waves, thereby forging a maritime environment more hospitable to Indian use. The paradoxical duality of the sea in Wabanaki oral tradition – at once life-sustaining and life-threatening – did not force this watery realm to the fringes of their cosmology. Instead it served to stabilize it. Like the spiritual power animating the Dawnland’s forests, mountains, rivers and lakes, the ocean perpetually exhibited a power capable of both ameliorating and destabilizing human life.7

The material and spiritual potential that characterized the very nature of the sea in the Wabanaki ethos was also indefinite and ongoing. When Charles Leland inquired of his native informants regarding the whereabouts of their culture hero, they noted that everyone believes him to reside somewhere out at sea. After instilling life in Wabanakia and instructing its denizens in the ways of their terrestrial and maritime world, Gluskap’s departure from his peoples’ oral tradition mirrored his appearance in it; he simply sailed his stone canoe into the ocean’s immense and boundless expanses. From his undefined residence in the east, the Wabanaki believed, Gluskap would again enter their lives as the rising of the sun daily enlivens the Dawnland. Both his emergence and leave-taking were thus impermanent phenomena that signaled to natives the interminable potentiality bound up in their eastern horizon. If Gluskap’s incarnation from a murky abyss and subsequent adventures in it served to rationalize an otherwise

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unknowable void, his temporary exit into that now recognizable milieu marked it as a locus of indefinite power demanding ongoing anticipation.  

The dynamic and adaptive nature of American Indian oral history adds a level of peculiar complexity to these renditions of the Wabanaki’s saltwater-saturated folklore. While offering up insights into native understandings of their relationship with the ocean, such stories also implicitly reflect the evolution of those perceptions by way of the constantly-changing concerns they are intended to address in Indian country. Leland and other cultural voyeurs desperately hoped the legends they heard were “very ancient” and antedated the corrupting influences of contemporary American society. In reality, they were the most recent manifestation of native attempts to rectify their place in a changing and seemingly irrational world. What, then, does this body of knowledge reflect in Wabanaki culture at the time – a culture long since distanced spatially and materially from the Atlantic by the pressures of Euro-American colonization? What does this elaborate marine mythology suggest about a people now retaining only remnants of their former maritime identity and command of an Atlantic world? Just as many oral traditions of the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chicksaw and Seminole peoples aim to preserve elements of their pre-Removal societies, these Wabanaki stories represent the distant echo of a past so formative in their collective sense of self that they were unwilling or unable to forget it. Such an inescapable legacy was perpetually reified through these tales, which additionally served to express a profound anxiety

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about its potential deterioration on nineteenth- and twentieth-century reservations exhibiting few other reminders.\textsuperscript{9}

Wabanaki maritime heritage, as well as that of native America more broadly, is likely more complex and more ancient than antiquarians and scholars of the native past have acknowledged. Perhaps influenced by popular conceptions of Indians as fundamentally terrestrial peoples, anthropologists and archaeologists have long maintained that the first inhabitants of the Americas arrived on foot. Walking from modern-day Siberia across the Bering Land Bridge, the Beringia consensus argues, Paleoindians subsequently trekked south via a corridor along the Rocky Mountains and dispersed throughout the American continent with incredible alacrity. New paradigm-shifting research, however, is beginning to suggest that these Pleistocene migrations may have been wetter than previously supposed. Instead, some now believe, the first settlers relied on watercraft to drift along the continental coastlines of the north Pacific or perhaps island-hop across the southern reaches of this body of water prior to the accessibility of a land bridge. These arguments would also provide a viable explanation for the speed with which the southernmost regions of South America were populated.

A fringe school of anthropologists have asserted an even more jarring possibility. According to their controversial new evidence, the first discovery voyages were not only afloat, but also Atlantically-centered with origins in the Solutrean culture of Western Europe where the Clovis tradition experienced its genesis.\textsuperscript{10}


If indeed Wabanaki’s paleo-era ancestors were borne by watercraft and an accompanying nautical competence, their descendants’ oceanic folklore ought to be situated in a cultural context much richer and more primordial than scholars have suggested. It is highly doubtful, of course, that the legends recorded by nineteenth- and twentieth-century folklorists and ethnographers were conceived in these prehistoric cruises and bequeathed in toto through succeeding generations. But less improbable is that such monumental journeys retained some enduring salience in the historical memory of a people who continued to preserve and utilize the maritime competencies acquired from them.

A similar intimacy with marine environments and an associated skill set for nautical mobility existed among many pre-Columbian cultures of the northeast. In the land that the Wabanaki inhabited during the historic period, several societies including those of their ancestors came to depend in varying degrees on marine resources for their physical and material sustenance, some even leaving traces of their spiritual centrality to the native ethos. This longstanding cultivation of the ocean’s resources was also predicated on an equally-longstanding nautical aptitude, a knowledge that would grow more sophisticated to meet the changing needs of human cultures and the changing dynamics of the ocean itself.

Understanding the role of the ocean across the broad span of the Dawnland’s prehistoric past, including those cultures from which the historic-era Wabanaki were not

direct derivatives, illuminates the wider context of the northeast’s human and
environmental history. From this primordial world emerged Wabanaki culture, part and
parcel of an aged record of human interaction with the sea and its resources. Exploring
the long duration of the Dawnland’s maritime past also unearths certain characteristics
that transcended the region’s prehistoric societies and cultures, and were by no means
unique to the historic-era Wabanaki. Since the ocean functioned so prominently in
nearly every facet of the regional environment, its ecological shifts directly shaped the
cultural formation of local human populations. Those that more thoroughly integrated
the maritime world into their patterns of production and consumption generally proved
more successful at sustaining their culture over longer periods. Those that instead relied
more exclusively on their terrestrial environment experienced less longevity and
migrated south to more habitable environs. The Wabanaki and their ancestors were able
to thrive after their arrival in the region, and through their encounters with Europeans in
the sixteenth century, when they shaped their economy directly around the ocean’s
productivity. In sum, by taking a wider lens to a study of Wabanaki maritime identity,
we can discern the ocean’s perennial ubiquity in this corner of the world and the
profound consequences of this presence for the diverse human beings who called it
home.

The earliest record of human occupation in this maritime region is from the
early Archaic era, about 10,000 to 8000 years ago. Most settlements from this period
have been found on inland waterways, locales that positioned them to harvest the
numerous saltwater fish species that spawned on their riverine migrations. Such
anadromous marine life included the alewife, shad and Atlantic salmon, all species that
would continue to supply a large part of the Wabanaki diet in the historic period. Non-anadromous ocean life including other fish, shellfish and sea mammals were also likely utilized, though sparse evidence remains of these people’s coastal presence and the ocean’s productive capacity because of subsequent fluctuations in sea level. These settlements constructed dugout canoes and fish weirs to assist in their acquisition of such resources and increase their range of mobility, judging from extant remains of woodworking tools discovered in local sites.11

Watercraft construction became more elaborate by the middle Archaic period (8000 to 6000 B.P) as evidenced by the confluence of numerous technical and ecological developments. The types of woodworking tools periodically used in the early Archaic period now became abundant among more numerous inland and coastal habitations and were increasingly supplemented with modified styles introduced from the southeast. The sustained settlement of islands off the coast of present-day Maine also became more frequent, and was likely induced by an increase in productivity levels of adjacent waters. Because of ocean levels now more conducive to a regularized maritime economy, marine life including oysters and quahogs were widely accessible to these communities. An increase in the number, size and durability of seafaring watercraft capable of augmenting the exploitation of these opportunities was thus required. This period provides the earliest evidence for an emerging maritime aptitude

in the region that included seaborne exploration and settlement accompanied by a more active engagement with ocean life.\(^{12}\)

The archaeological record is more abundant from the late Archaic period around 5000 B.P., and indicates the continuation of these trends. Meager evidence points toward early and middle Archaic peoples’ systematic cultivation of their maritime environments, but subsequent and possibly derivative cultures left conclusive indications of their common use of marine resources. Named for the type of projectile point upon which they relied, the Small Stemmed Point Tradition predominated throughout much of the northeast. In Maine these communities were situated primarily along coastal regions where they regularly harvested large saltwater fish including cod and swordfish, a practice that later endured among the Wabanaki according to reports of several European explorers and colonists. These species became increasingly accessible to coastal and island populations around 5000 B.P. as local water temperatures warmed and forced these large predators to follow their schools of smaller prey nearer to the coast. Despite the increased facility with which they could be hunted, the formidable size of cod and swordfish at the time demanded fluency with larger and more durable watercraft and a level of competence with mobility on the open sea. The evidentiary basis of these growing practices surfaced at numerous sites throughout Maine in the 1970s and 1980s, and continue to push back the conjectured age of a predominantly maritime northeast.\(^{13}\)


By 4000 B.P., a descendant culture of the Stemmed Small Point Tradition occupied coastal sites throughout Maine and continued to elaborate on the marine economy of their forebears. Among the most defining characteristics of this people were their decorated ceremonial tools interred in peculiar human burial grounds with significant amounts of red ochre. These “Red Paint People” also enriched their spiritual customs with the construction of large effigies that often depicted marine creatures. Because of their apparent symmetry with practices of the Maritime Archaic Culture further north in Labrador and eastern Quebec, Red Paint societies have been depicted as southern expressions of this broader saltwater culture by many scholars. Evidence of extensive sea mammal effigies and slate spears used to hunt large marine life such as seals also abounds. Others, however, argue that while its explicit maritime orientation resembled components of the Maritime Archaic Culture, this culture was an entirely separate tradition locally confined to the Gulf of Maine, and consequently ought to be understood as the Moorehead Phase. The elaborate mortuary practices present in both are typical of maritime societies that depend on hazardous deepwater travel and hunting for procuring food. Regardless of discrepancies in nomenclature, humans in the northeast were now integrating their lifeways and the Atlantic to a degree previously unseen.¹⁴

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The rising specialization and magnitude of deepwater swordfish hunting and cod fishing, as well as the species’ dietary importance for these people, far surpassed its tangential status in their predecessors’ societies. In some locales, certain scholars assert, swordfish and cod now became so critical to this maritime way of life and its harvest so intensive, that certain marine ecosystems were nearly exhausted.\textsuperscript{15} Other resources increasingly central to these people included soft-shell clams and quahog accessible near shorelines, as well as seals, walrus, and sea fowl hunted from island and offshore locations. A diverse marine resource base permitted these people to occupy many coastal and island sites year-round while also embarking on short forays into the inland forests for deer and moose hunting in the winter. The late Archaic period also included the occupation of Monhegan Island off the south-central coast of Maine, a prime position in a particularly rich marine environment. This valuable stage would consequently be a site of violent contestation between Wabanaki inhabitants and English fishermen in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The architectural styles of northeastern Algonquians in the early historic period can also be traced as far back as the Moorehead Phase.\textsuperscript{16}


Sometime between 4000 and 3500 B.P. this maritime culture vanished from the northeast, leaving little trace of its economic system in the succeeding tradition. Its abrupt and seemingly mysterious departure, like its emergence and maintenance, has been attributed by archaeologists to concurrent ecological changes in the north Atlantic that effectively closed off the availability of vital resources. Declining water temperatures similar to those of today combined with alterations in sea level and salinity, for example, forced swordfish to seek warmer environments further south. Human populations in the region including Maritime Archaic Culture groups to the north, long since accustomed to and reliant on recognizable patterns in their marine environment, consequently declined and eventually disappeared. In Maine and the Canadian Maritime provinces, a new population migrated from the southwest as far as Kentucky and replaced this waning culture. Known as the Susquehanna Tradition, these people exhibited little of the maritime character of their predecessors, and instead developed tools to assist their cultivation of inland forest resources. Few Susquehanna Tradition coastal settlements have been uncovered, and those nearest the sea possessed no substantial remnants of harvested marine life. When the local woodland ecology underwent significant changes that ushered in flora and fauna dissimilar to that of their southern origins, these peoples were severely affected. The northeast accordingly experienced another ecologically-induced dispersal as this terrestrial society retreated south. Thus by the late Archaic period, populations who had come to rely too heavily

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or sparsely on the Atlantic’s productive capacity were consequently unable to maintain cultural continuity beyond the drastic changes that periodically refashioned their natural world. In order to successfully manage such disruptive forces, a more equitable integration of maritime resources was needed.17

The southward migration of the Susquehanna Tradition to more habitable woodland environments marked the end of the Archaic Period in the northeast. By about 2700 B.P., a new human occupation emerged along the region’s coasts that possessed the strongest linkages yet to modern Algonquian populations. Known as the Woodland Period in other areas of North America, the Ceramic Period in the northeast was principally characterized by its peoples’ decorated clay pottery used for food preparation, an innovation that replaced older bark and wooden vessels unable to sustain heating from fire. The labor-intensive manufacturing of this technology and the fragility of the final product made it quite impractical for highly mobile hunter-gatherer groups. In the northeast, extant remnants of pottery are more abundant in seaside settlements than in the interior, and therefore indicate a sedentary lifestyle among these coastal people. The increased productivity of the ocean during the development of the Ceramic Period, moreover, provided an environment conducive to a nearly year-round habitation of coastal and island locations.18

When coupled with artifacts of novel cooking equipment, remains of dietary trends among Ceramic Period peoples further suggest that this culture mirrored and


perhaps surpassed the maritime-centeredness of many Archaic era peoples. Humans along the northeastern coast now diversified their consumption patterns in response to the proliferation of new oceanic resources. Baleen whalebones dating from this era have been uncovered at a few archaeological sites in Maine, as has a large harpoon point developed for their harvest. The tremendous material and nutritional value of this mammal would undoubtedly have been sufficient to serve multiple communities, though the great risk, effort and technology involved in their hunting likely made whaling a marginal activity. More probable is this culture’s periodic utilization of beached whales. Other large sea mammals including the grey and harbor seal assumed unprecedented levels of importance to Ceramic people, particularly closer to the historic period. Coldwater shellfish such as soft-shell clams, mussels, snails and sea urchins, ancillary in prior times, now increased in population and use as both a human food source and bait for larger deepwater fish. Crabs and lobsters also likely constituted a vital component of the diet, though the quick disintegration of their skeletons would make them absent in the archeological record. Flounder, sculpin and sturgeon replaced the previous centrality of swordfish and cod, the former since retreating with warming temperatures and the plenitude of the latter perhaps diminishing from frequent over-harvesting. Marine waterfowl including the now-extinct great auk, a terrestrial-bound bird resembling a penguin, required little effort to hunt and their eggs were also easily accessible. The maritime ecosystem of the Ceramic Period, in sum, fostered the development of a human culture attuned to its varied and sustainable resource base. The long-term growth of this population was largely predicated on the successful balance of its oceanic and terrestrial ecosystems.19

19 Arthur E. Spiess and Robert A. Lewis, The Turner Farm Fauna: 5000 Years of Hunting and Fishing in
An exotic piece of evidence uncovered by archaeologists reveals a more peculiar aspect of the Wabanaki’s connection to their larger maritime world. In 1957 at the Goddard Hill Site on Blue Hill Bay in Maine, a small medieval Norse coin was discovered alongside several nonlocal Indian artifacts dating from the late-Ceramic Period. Though much of its history remains obscure, the coin was likely minted in the eleventh century A.D. and traveled with a Viking expedition to North America shortly thereafter. These European explorers were not known to have traveled as far south as Wabanakia, but were active throughout the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Labrador where they encountered local people who were likely the initial recipients of the coin. Its transmission southward to Wabanaki ancestors is discernible when collaborated with the recent discovery of other contemporaneous materials originating with these northern cultures at various sites in Maine. The exchange of such an exotic article through native trade networks could also have been accompanied by oral descriptions of its unusual origins and acquisition, accumulating into legends that rationalized the ever new potentiality of the sea from whence its progenitors appeared. Regardless of the circumstances surrounding the coin’s journey, its arrival in the Dawnland initiated a trend that would continue to unfold throughout the early historic period. Through their Penobscot Bay, Maine, 157-159; Russel Lawrence Barsh, “Netukulimk Past and Present: Mikmaw Ethics and the Atlantic Fishery,” Journal of Canadian Studies 37, no. 1 (Spring, 2002), 15-42; David R. Yesner, “Island Biogeography and Prehistoric Human Adaptation on the Southern Coast of Maine (USA),” 56-57; Bruce J. Bourque, Diversity and Complexity in Prehistoric Maritime Societies, 214-221; Bruce J. Bourque and Harold W. Krueger, “Dietary Reconstruction from Human Bone Isotopes for Five Coastal New England Populations,” 204-205; Bruce J. Bourque, Beverly J. Johnson, and Robert S. Steneck, “Possible Prehistoric Fishing Effects on Coastal Marine Food Webs in the Gulf of Maine,” 178-181; Bruce J. Bourque, Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine, 83-85.

extensive and carefully-cultivated trade networks, Wabanaki participated in a trans-Atlantic web of material exchange that afforded them opportunities to enhance their aesthetic culture and augment the social standing of their communities and its leaders.

The socio-political structure of Wabanaki society in the Ceramic Period would persist into the historic era. These semi-nomadic hunter-gatherers lived in bands of extended kin characterized by a strong degree of egalitarianism. Their scattered settlements and seasonal migratory pattern precluded the formation of a rigid authoritarian hierarchy. In late fall, bands left behind their maritime economy and departed coastal encampments for the interior forests, but carried with them the fruits of the sea to assist them in their time apart. They spent the winter hunting game such as moose, deer, elk and beaver. The harsh climate combined with the unpredictability of the hunt, often made this “starving time” a season of deprivation and immense hardship. In early spring, bands moved back to the sea in time to harvest its more plentiful and dependable resources. Thus for nearly ten months out of the year, their economy was directly tied to the maritime world which comprised upwards of ninety percent of their diet.21

Wabanaki bands also inhabited semi-permanent villages overseen by leading men in the community. These band-centered settlements were primarily situated along the major riverine systems of Maine and eastern Canada, though anthropologists continue to debate whether these river-centered peoples were the direct antecedents to historic-era polities. The headmen, or sagamores, of such villages generally achieved

their prestige not through hereditary rights but by an ability to materially provision their community and build consensus among its members.\textsuperscript{22}

By the conclusion of the Ceramic Period and the transition to the historic era, the Wabanaki believed themselves quite literally to be surrounded by saltwater. Their ancestral homeland had become Ketakamigwa – “big land on the seacoast” – and was conceived as one parcel of a large island, a macrocosm of each tiny island settlement

scattered throughout northeastern waters. Yet the ocean did not mark the edge of a landlocked cosmology, or serve as a barrier confining them to a continental vision. It was not an alien abyss tangentially positioned in the quotidian world of native people. Its spiritual and material meaning was not unfathomable, intangible or extraneous, nor was it only reflected on from a terrestrial posture. This native ocean was not an aberration of nature where human presence was taboo. It was instead a world in which to expand, settle, and colonize, a world whose fecundity could be harnessed, harvested and cherished. Human interaction with and dependence on the living ocean – and a resultant comprehension of its generative, life-giving and sustaining capacities – substantially defined much of the native northeastern past prior to the arrival of Europeans. The material record of this maritime orientation, rich with the remains of aquatic fauna and megafauna, marine effigies, sea-hunting implements, offshore habitations and even European currency, reflects a series of profoundly dynamic, interconnected and adaptive cultures, attuned to ever-changing opportunities afforded by their eastern horizon.

This longstanding pelagic heritage also shaped the context of possibilities within which the Wabanaki comprehended their earliest encounters with seaborne strangers from the east. As a locus of material and spiritual nourishment, a dwelling place of forces both menacing and amiable, and the doorway through which Gluskap had emerged and departed, the ocean’s variegated and oftentimes unpredictable character framed in the collective native imagination Europe’s early entrance into the Dawnland.

Thus when Wabanaki from the Kennebec River region in Maine witnessed the materialization of a massive sailing vessel from their vast watery horizon one day in 1524, their reaction reflected a profound degree of ambivalence about its potential.

The foreign watercraft entering Wabanaki waters was the *Dauphine*, a ship commanded by Giovanni da Verrazzano, an Italian navigator in the midst of an exploratory expedition for the French monarch Francis I. The European crew caught glimpses of the Indians’ rich maritime culture as the two groups drew together for a closer look near Casco Bay. Clothed in skins of the “sea-wolf” (seal or walrus), as well as other animals, the local Wabanaki came down “to the seashore on some rocks where the breakers were most violent,” thereby utilizing their familiarity with the sea’s natural features to manage the instability of this encounter. Even after Verrazzano’s men expressed their desire to trade European for native goods, the Indians stood their ground, “continually shouting to us not to approach the land.” European sailing technology and material culture did not imbue these native people with an overwhelming sense of awe or respect. Along the Maine coast in 1524 it rather elicited extreme caution and ambivalence over its potentially threatening power.24

But the Wabanaki ocean was also a source of life-enriching bounty. Those apprehensively watching the French boat’s approach from shore decided to seize a valuable opportunity to enhance their material well-being and “sent us what they

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wanted to give on a rope,” according to Verrazzano. Shrewd, demanding and eager to deal quickly, the Indians curiously took “in exchange only knives, hooks for fishing, and sharp metal,” revealing their acquaintance with European wares and an appreciation of their cultural and practical utility. This first recorded encounter between the Wabanaki and Europeans proceeded in a terse and unceremonious fashion, only lasting until the strangers’ coveted goods were exhausted. Trading with an alien people drifting in on waves from the east evidently demanded a departure from customary modes of native exchange that involved more lengthy and formalized rituals to cement social bonds, in addition to the simple transference of material goods. On these Atlantic shores, Wabanaki wished to dispense with the former in order to ensure the safety of the latter. At the conclusion of this abbreviated process, the Indian men “made all the signs of scorn and shame that any brute creature would make, such as showing their buttocks and laughing” in celebration of their mastery of an initially-precarious maritime phenomenon. By standing guard on the treacherous and wave-battered rocks jutting out from the coast, the Indians carefully positioned themselves in and claimed the liminal space that yoked their Dawnland to its rich and indispensable marine sphere. Their collective decision to set out and confront the Atlantic’s unfamiliar offering before it approached them, and to assertively manipulate it to their own satisfaction, allowed the Wabanaki to effectively harness the boundless potential of their ocean. This event exhibited once again the deep cultural resonance of their maritime identity.²⁵

²⁵ Giovanni de Verrazzano, “Cèllere Codex,” in The Voyages of Giovanni da Verrazzano, 1524-1528, 140. These Europeans later succeeded in pushing “against their wishes…two or three leagues inland,” reaffirming in native minds the unpredictability and aggression that accompanied this novel trade opportunity.
Though Giovanni da Verrazzano’s foiled landing served as a watershed moment for Indians near Casco Bay, his crew were not the first Europeans encountered by natives in the region. The cautious ambivalence and unilateral negotiation that marked this cultural encounter indicate that Wabanaki conceptions of the Atlantic were already assimilating some level of knowledge about European newcomers. By the early sixteenth century, Basque and Breton fishermen were beginning to interact with native communities near the increasingly popular Grand Banks fishery off the coasts of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. These unrecorded experiences most likely centered on the exchange of European metal goods for native furs, sexual relationships between fishermen and native women, and the inevitable misunderstandings and tensions that accompanied both. These fishing voyages, however, were not known to have extended south into the Gulf of Maine where Wabanaki met Verrazzano in 1524, though information about them would have passed through Indians’ extensive trade networks. The Kennebec River Indians who attempted to stave off the novel pressure from the east near Casco Bay were thus likely encountering Europeans for the first time. Rumors originating from Wabanaki and other native people to the far northeast would have prepared these people for the possibility that their maritime world was more diverse, productive and malevolent than previously imagined. To Europeans like Verrazzano, the resulting defensive opportunism embodied by Indians came across as “full of crudity and vices” in a people “so barbarous” and “devoid of manners and humanity” that “we found no courtesy in them.”

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The following year, Wabanaki elsewhere in the northeast endured a traumatic experience that sharply reminded them of the Atlantic’s menacing and destructive potential that often accompanied its life-giving fruitfulness. In 1525, Portuguese navigator Estevão Gomes set out from Spain in the employ of Emperor Charles V to find a route to the East Indies said to lie somewhere between Florida and Newfoundland. Consisting of only a single ship, Gomes’ expedition eventually reached the northwestern Atlantic somewhere between Penobscot Bay and Nova Scotia where he found an extensive country home to “excellent martens of the sable kind, and other find fur-bearing animals,” according to European chroniclers who described his detailed report to the Spanish government. The expedition arrived in the Dawnland’s waters sometime after late spring, since they encountered coastal Indians well into their seasonal fishing and clamming practices. Gomes’ mission to discover a route to Cathay, however, met with failure. Unwilling to return empty-handed to Europe after just ten months, he “filled his ship with innocent people of both sexes, half naked” who he believed would turn a large profit in the Iberian slave markets. The crew sailed back to Seville directly from the northeast where the fifty-eight Indian slaves who survived the voyage were unloaded, housed and prepared for sale. Unimpressed with the navigator’s exotic gifts, and angered at his callous disregard of official orders not to agitate indigenous populations, Charles V ordered the Indians’ freedom though they never returned to their home across the Atlantic.27

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How, precisely, these Wabanaki were enslaved to the number of about one hundred is not revealed in the travel accounts, though some combination of deception through trade and force of arms likely aided Gomes’ men. In contrast to their neighbors’ successful, and profitable, repulsion of Verrazzano’s boat a year earlier near Casco Bay, unfortunate Wabanaki to the northeast learned once again that the pressures emanating from their maritime frontier demanded constant vigilance and careful management. Those left on the shores of the Dawnland and forced to watch their kinsmen and friends fade into the watery horizon shackled aboard a stranger’s ship undoubtedly marked the Atlantic now as a disruptive and disabling force in native society. The instinctive hope to again see their kidnapped relatives re-emerge from the eastern sea joined with the ongoing anticipation of many Wabanaki that Gluskap’s departure in his stone canoe was transitory and would ultimately result in a reunification with his people. Those forced on this trans-Atlantic journey elaborated too their conception of the ocean’s threatening and unfamiliar character, buttressed with their discovery of the Wabanaki Atlantic’s immense and unrecognizable contours. As they approached their final destination of Seville later that year, now watching the sun’s setting over the Atlantic rather than its rising, the realization that their maritime world was as transformational as it was productive and perilous would have slowly set in. These Indian slaves no doubt realized that their seaborne journey into captivity – in the same wake of Gluskap’s leave-taking – had ushered them into an Atlantic world more exotic and alien than the one they had long known. Their voyage, and the knowledge achieved from it, also foreshadowed the later experiences of Wabanaki mariners, diplomats, and captives. 

Other Wabanaki to the north demonstrated a more sanguine attitude toward these evermore frequent opportunities radiating from the eastward. Northern Micmac who experienced a more prolonged and sustained engagement with fleets of European fishermen than their southern neighbors came to believe that the benefits of trade often outweighed its potential hazards. Jacques Cartier encountered such sentiments among the Wabanaki near Chaleur Bay during his first voyage to modern-day Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and the Gaspe Peninsula in 1534. Under the auspices of the French crown, Cartier sailed west to find a route to the Far East, but terminated his mission near the mouth of the St. Lawrence River. As they did with Verrazzano and Gomes, the Wabanaki encountered the French explorers in the summer of that year while camped at their seasonal coastal settlements for the customary harvest of marine life. Likely a member of Verrazzano’s crew in 1524, Cartier now characterized these coastal natives as a people “who go from place to place… catching fish in the fishing-season.” After spotting them in a fleet of some forty to fifty canoes crossing the open water of the bay en route to the opposite shore, Cartier drew closer as the Indians “set up a great clamour and made frequent signs to us to come on shore, holding up to us some furs on sticks.” After being refused the opportunity, the more persistent Indians boarded their canoes, and joining “five more of those that were coming in from the sea,” pursued the ship and continued to express their desire to trade. Denied once more, the Indians returned to the ship the following day and “held up some furs of small value, with which they clothe themselves,” and finally procured Cartier’s acquiescence. Traders were sent ashore with several iron tools “and a red cap to give to their chief.”

229, 242-243.
After parting with everything they possessed, the Indians promised to return the next day with more furs.  

In contrast to their reticent treatment of Verrazzano’s ship along the Maine coast, these Wabanaki were steadfast in their insistence that the foreigners come off the water and into their community to conduct this exchange. Such an approach demonstrated their increasingly benign perception of an Atlantic experience growing in frequency and familiarity, one that could be effectively managed and exploited to enhance their culture. Both instances also indicate, however, that Wabanaki wished to dictate this customary procedure according to their terms and within their chosen marine or terrestrial setting. The more personalized barter afforded to Cartier’s party, in addition, permitted the gifting of a red cap to the local sagamore, thereby crowning with novel European apparel a perceived political leader in the mold of emerging nation-states across the Atlantic. In sum, while these Indians strove to dictate the terms of engagement with Cartier’s traders, they were also subject to pressures, ideas, and goods that drew them away from their known ocean and closer to a Europeanized Atlantic world.

The Wabanaki rationalized and participated in this quintessentially-Atlantic encounter by conforming it to their own recognizably native custom of trade. A striking aspect of this elaborate process included reconciling a still unfamiliar maritime opportunity with their own longstanding comprehension of the ocean’s bountiful

potential. Perhaps because Cartier had participated in the Verrazzano-Wabanaki meeting ten years earlier, he accentuated the divergence in each native group’s incorporation of European trade. Clearly exhibiting a “marvelously great pleasure” at the material exchange, these northern Micmac normalized the customary process with alien others by “dancing and going through many ceremonies” as the European newcomers curiously looked on. This ritual then culminated with the Wabanaki “throwing salt water over their heads with their hands,” thus sprinkling and sanctifying the entire experience with the waters that they knew facilitated it. And when the Indians paddled out to the anchored ship the next day, their gifts of thanksgiving to the strangers were not more furs, venison, berries, or fresh water, but “some strips of cooked seal” accompanied by “signs to us that they were making us a present.” The women, Cartier related, “danced and sang” while “standing in the water up to their knees,” as a swelling crowd of over “300 persons” congregated on shore eager to dispense with more furs. Rite made right in this native cosmology, and by imbuing European men and material culture with their pelagic vision, the Wabanaki effectively situated this seaborne process – with a people ironically exercising their own ambitions for an Atlantic world – in a familiar locus of spiritual power.  

Alongside native efforts to carefully police the ocean’s new and occasionally precarious opportunities emerged a conspicuous pattern of European consumption. Countless encounters with explorers and fishermen in the waters of the northwest Atlantic indicated to Wabanaki that these people of the eastward consistently sought a product of their terrestrial-based economy. By the mid-sixteenth century, Indians came

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to understand that furs were the key to these European goods, and consequently to a productive manipulation of this emerging Atlantic process. Periodically, the escalating commodification of Wabanakia even encouraged theft by increasingly audacious Europeans disembarking in Indian society, as it did with Estevão Gomes in 1525. English seaman and adventurer John Walker landed at the mouth of the Penobscot River with an exploratory expedition in 1580, and boldly penetrated a Wabanaki community along the Penobscot River where “he and his company did finde in one Cottage above 240 Hides.” Walker stole the goods and transported them back to European markets, where they were “solde in Fraunce” for considerable sums, according to Sir Humphrey Gilbert, an English booster for the exploration and colonization of the northeast. 31

The steady stream of trade opportunities of the sixteenth century continued a gradual restructuring of the native economy. Of mounting value in this maritime world were the furbearing creatures of the inland forests, whose skins were capable of driving European consumers to aggression and deceit. The marine resources and sustaining spiritual power bestowed by Gluskap subsequently declined in economic importance. Atlantic pressures were thus encouraging Wabanaki to focus their efforts away from the sea. Referring to the region’s coastlines, an aged Micmac sagamore recalled in 1610 that in his youth Wabanaki were “as thickly planted there as the hairs upon his head,”

but now “very sparsely populated.” Economic pressures were inducing demographic alterations.\(^{32}\)

Three years after John Walker’s brazen venture into the Dawnland, Wabanaki in the same region encountered another European party that likewise attempted to force its claim to the resources of the native northeast. The sailing vessel they watched approach on waves from the east in 1583 was the *Chardon*, a fifty ton bark carrying twenty men and commanded by a French merchant from Rouen, Étienne Bellenger. This expedition was sponsored by the Cardinal of Bourbon and the Duc de Joyeuse in order to investigate opportunities for a joint mission settlement and fur trade station somewhere in the northeast. Bellenger’s voyage surveyed the coast of Nova Scotia into the Bay of Fundy and as far southwest as the Penobscot River, where Wabanaki received his eager traders at their coastal camps in spring of that year. “In many places he had traffique with the people,” according to the narrative of Englishman Richard Hakluyt, who bartered “divers beastes skynnes” including seal, beaver, otter and deer, typical goods they knew had attracted shiploads of men like Bellenger from tremendous though unknown distances. The crew of the *Chardon* celebrated their good fortune, and hoped to ensure its permanency, by erecting their patron’s coat of arms high on a tree near the entrance of the Bay of Fundy.\(^{33}\) Installing a familiar symbol of European authority and

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civility in the heart of Wabanakia signaled the intentions of this nation to lay claim to its natural and human commodities and draw them into French material and spiritual markets. The Atlantic could thus serve to extend Europe’s post-Reformation religious and financial economies to new sources of wealth.

Micmac along the southern coast of Nova Scotia quickly spoiled the confidence exuded by Bellenger’s party over the region’s fruitful prospects in a French Atlantic world. After spying their coastal settlement and noticing its vast stores of furs, Bellenger ordered the ship’s pinnace sent in to take advantage of yet another lucrative trade opportunity. The Wabanaki on shore, aware now of the belligerence and treachery that often accompanied such ships eyed the approach of Bellenger’s sailboat in a much different light. Emerging from a native maritime world frequently dotted by non-Wabanaki watercraft, the vessel posed a serious threat to the community’s collective security. As their neighbors had done in the past, the Indians went out to meet the unsolicited ship and dictate the exchange according to their terms. They subsequently attacked the crew, killed two sailors, and decoyed the others in some way until they seized the sailboat. The Wabanaki clearly did not destroy his “smale Pinesse,” Bellenger later related, but confiscated it and presumably used it to enhance their mobility and economic productivity, as subsequent Euro-American accounts would indicate. The survivors in the French party fled in haste to Cape Breton and were luckily discovered by a fishing crew who transported them back to Europe. Bellenger salvaged some benefit from his tumultuous voyage by selling his furs for exorbitant sums in France. The native community that dismantled his plans for trade and settlement, however, now enjoyed a new watercraft and the valuable trade goods it
conveyed. The French crew’s misfortune demonstrated that Wabanaki continued their successful manipulation of the opportunities emanating from their oceanic world, even through force. In so doing, they again succeeded in conforming Atlantic trade processes to their longstanding maritime authority in the region.34

Étienne Bellenger and Richard Hakluyt, his chronicler, attributed the loss of his party’s sailing ship to “their owne follye in trusting the salvadges to farr.” This self-blame, however, papered over the coherence and potency of Indian nautical power that developed through a historical presence in and around the ocean. Centuries before they encountered Bellenger, Wabanaki ancestors constructed and modified dugout and birchbark canoes durable enough to enhance their harvest of deepwater marine resources. These vessels constructed from material of the northeast’s hardwood forests also made possible their societies’ expansions into the sea and settlement of its offshore islands. According to native oral accounts, pre-contact Micmac migrated north across the Gulf of St. Lawrence into Newfoundland from their ancient territory in Nova Scotia and carried on frequent contact with their continental relatives through a carefully-engineered aquatic transportation and communication network. At night when the unpredictable waters were calmest, the older and more experienced seafarers paddled their canoes rapidly ahead of their party and lit enormous beacon fires on the cliffs of islands to guide the followers.35 By so spreading their culture over tremendous distances of open water, and networking its subsequent far-flung communities, these


people utilized the ocean for their expansion projects. Out of pragmatism in their patterns of subsistence and settlement, Indians thus honed their nautical aptitude and applied it in creative ways to facilitate mobility, augment their colonization efforts, and ensure the welfare of their communities. Wabanaki seafaring prowess that cohered in a natural extension of their maritime identity was now relied on to fortify and protect that identity.

As Bellenger’s relation indicates, native efforts to retain a recognizable vision of their maritime world involved co-opting European sailing technology through violence. By the time of his ill-fated expedition in 1583, Wabanaki marine-warriors were already proving incredibly adept at hijacking sailing vessels belonging to an ostensibly more powerful and advanced seafaring culture, one possessing an altogether different conception of a coherent and productive Atlantic world. Throughout ensuing decades, Indians continued to elaborate their nautical aptitude with this novel opportunity offered up by their ocean. Other explorers and colonists around the turn of the sixteenth century were surprised to witness the Wabanaki’s creative incorporation and accumulation of European sailing ships, and seldom failed to remark on the peculiarity of these native peoples’ command of foreign modes of seaborne transportation.

Native dexterity with European sailing craft was likely reinforced further by the nautical skills absorbed by Wabanaki travelers in Europe. Messamoet, a Micmac sagamore who accompanied a French fishing crew on its return voyage, lived in southern France for two years before returning to the Dawnland around 1570. Another Micmac leader named Semcoudech was referred to as “Paris” by European visitors to Nova Scotia in the early seventeenth century because of his extensive time spent living
there. Both men would have observed first-hand the intricacies and complexities involved in the command of large ships on lengthy trans-Atlantic journeys. Since they spent time learning French during their stays on the continent, they would have also had ample opportunities to study European navigational arts. As headmen of societies with a longstanding maritime presence in the northwest Atlantic, such information would have been appealing and culturally useful for their communities, particularly after their first experiences with seaborne travel of this extent. After returning to their homeland, the valuable knowledge cultivated abroad could augment Wabanaki command of these increasingly prevalent sailing ships and strengthen Wabanaki presence on the Dawnland’s waves.36

By the early seventeenth century, Wabanaki were frequently sailing out in their own ships to confront exploring Europeans. Englishman Bartholomew Gosnold steered the *Concord* to the northwest Atlantic in 1602 on a mission to investigate the potential for a colony of English Catholic refugees. After they “came to an anker” near Cape Neddick on the Maine coast in late spring of that year, his party was shocked when “sixe Indians, in a Baske-shallop with mast and saile…came boldly aboard us,” equipped with “an iron grapple.” Determined to express their rightful occupation of the region’s waters, the native mariners also desired to know the newcomers’ intentions and take advantage of a trading opportunity. Compounding Gosnold’s incredulity, and perhaps assisting the Indians’ effortless boarding, was the physical appearance of the native seamen. Though they were “of tall stature” and exhibited “a broad and grim

visage,” one among them was distinctly “appareled with a waistcoat and breeches of blacke serdge, made after our sea-fashion,” and even donned “hose and shoes on his feet.” Another of the commanders “had a paire of breeches of blue cloth.” The rest of the crew “were all naked.” After a lengthy exchange of thoughts and goods, the two groups parted company.37

It was unclear to Gosnold exactly how these Wabanaki sailors procured their ship, the skills to navigate it and the mariner’s clothing that accented it, all of which permitted them a conspicuous maritime presence and unopposed access to the Concord. But to the crew of explorers, the entire spectacle was bewildering in the way it conflated European and native maritime identities. In an age of rigid sumptuary laws throughout Europe that aimed to entrench social distinction, the striking appearance of sailing Indians adorned in a hodge-podge of European garb considerably undermined these laws’ intended effects, and the cosmological hierarchy they were predicated on. When Gosnold’s chronicler accentuated such cultural blurring in detail, he expressed a collective alarm that permeated their ship. This aesthetic ambiguity, however, is precisely what Wabanaki sought to exploit.

Yet Europeans too had a vested interest in reshaping natives’ physical appearance through material mediums. The red cap Jacques Cartier’s men lavished on a sagamore in 1534 bolstered the native leader’s public stature and connected his community to a trans-Atlantic exchange network. English explorer Martin Pring had

similar intentions for his voyage to the Maine coast in 1603. The commander ensured that his ships the *Speedwell* and *Discoverer* were well provisioned with “Hats of diuers colours, greene, blue and yellow, apparel of course Kersie and Canuasse [canvas] readie made, Stockings and Shooes” for the “people of the Countrey” they would likely meet. The Indian sailors who boarded Gosnold’s ship exhibited comparable effects of involvement in the same economic, political, and material processes extending throughout the Atlantic. “By some words and signes they made” to Gosnold, the Indians indicated the regular presence of several European fishing vessels that carried on extensive trading relationships with local Wabanaki. Such encounters explained the physical disparity plainly visible aboard the Indian ship. The two mariners clad in European seafaring attire achieved their distinguished appearance by way of gifts intended to consolidate and enhance the authority they already garnered in their native community. Those distributing gifts themselves benefited materially from a centralized leadership capable of commanding the obedience of a diffuse population in order to accumulate and dispense valuable goods into their ships.  

The seaborne Indian crew of two exotically-adorned men alongside four who “were all naked” was thus more unconventional than Gosnold’s party recognized. Not only did it surprisingly contradict European expectations of Indian culture, but it also represented a slight departure from the native authority structure that customarily governed Wabanaki people. Traditionally, sagamores oversaw the material and political welfare of their local communities who subsequently deferred to them in

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important economic, diplomatic and military matters. These leaders emerged from large families which equipped them with the resources and prestige to function as first-among-equals with their kin. By realigning this structure to more familiar power arrangements, European gift-givers in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries privileged social hierarchy based on coercive power and material accumulation rather than consensus-building and collective guardianship.\(^{39}\)

These seafaring Indians were also utilizing the ocean’s corridors to forge and solidify their position in an emerging trans-Atlantic exchange network. As the first Wabanaki to experience sustained contact with foreign fishermen in the sixteenth century, Micmac learned to cultivate their strategic position to assume an intermediary role linking other Wabanaki and Algonquian peoples to European traders. Along with the nautical technology it transported to them, the sea allowed Micmac to extend their presence throughout the Gulfs of Maine and St. Lawrence and acquire furs from native communities that they in turn channeled to the fishermen-traders who often came ashore in Micmac country to dry their catch and mend their equipment. The Atlantic thus continued to exert an ironic dual pressure on the Dawnland by the early seventeenth century. It furnished northeastern Wabanaki with the vehicles and avenues of mobility to strengthen their status in an economic system that simultaneously began to reorient native patterns of subsistence away from the sea and toward the productivity of its interior woodlands.\(^{40}\)


The early stages of the transformation in Wabanaki modes of production and consumption proceeded sporadically and unevenly in the northeast. Some Indians were simply uninterested in exploiting the arrival of European ships on their horizons, instead relying on the more familiar harvest of their marine environment. In 1605, Captain George Waymouth succeeded Bartholomew Gosnold’s mission to locate an English Catholic refuge in North America. After anchoring near Monhegan Island off the Maine coast, a native site occupied for centuries because of its convenient access to rich oceanic resources, one of Waymouth’s crewmen noted “three Canoes coming towards us” full of Indians on a fishing excursion. The native party casually bypassed the ship and “went to the island adjoining, where they went ashore” and built a fire. Some of them stood by on the island watching the stationary vessel, to whom the curious English “made signes with our hands and hats” to persuade them back into the water and aboard their boat. The Indians eventually responded by sending their sagamore in a canoe with two other paddlers, who “spoke in his language very loud and very boldly” after coming within earshot of the ship. The native leader evidently wished to know why the strangers were stationed in this prime fishing and sealing location. “By pointing with his oar towards the sea” he issued a stern command for the ship to depart from whence it came, indicating some understanding of the foreigners’ origins and exerting a unmistakable command over his people’s pelagic world. It was not until the English persisted further in their solicitation of trade and revealed their metal goods that the

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Indians grew more “desirous to entertain our friendship,” according to one sailor’s account.  

Other Wabanaki in the area similarly demonstrated the strength and endurance of their maritime culture amidst a sea of foreign processes and pressures. George Waymouth’s 1605 expedition offered a rare description of native whaling practices in the early contact period, further supporting an archeological record that indicated the occasional presence of this immense sea mammal in the Wabanaki subsistence economy. “In company of their King,” the Indian whalers embarked on their hunts “with a multitude of their boats” equipped with bows, arrows and harpoons constructed from bone. James Rosier, narrator on board the Waymouth voyage, chose different terminology that distinguished these whaling boats from more common birch bark canoes, suggesting a craft larger, more durable and demanding a sophisticated nautical competence for its command on deeper offshore waters. When a whale was spotted coming up for air, “all their boats come about him” while every hunter exhausted his supply of arrows shooting it, producing a frenzied and dangerous scene. After the kill the whale was harnessed and dragged to shore with their boats where communities celebrated the bounty while their sagamores “divide the spoil, and give to every man a share.” The tremendous quantity and diversity of resources that whales provided

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sustained communities for extended periods and were valued as the supreme offering from their maritime world.42

The coastal Indians who interacted with Waymouth’s men in 1605 would ultimately have their suspicions about European traders reaffirmed. Before they agreed to trade with the stubbornly insistent English, the Indians were certain to secure their women far away from the strangers’ ship on the island, further indicating their knowledge of such foreigners’ ulterior intentions. While Waymouth’s crew recorded no involvement with native women, they kidnapped members of their community in spite of the amiable nature of their interaction and the Wabanaki’s “tokens of much thankfulness” for the goods they were given. “Thus we shipped five Salvages, two Canoes, with all their bows and arrows” back to England as human and material curiosities for their patrons, despite numerous attempts by their kinsmen to ransom them onboard before the ship disappeared to the east. Once comprehending that “we intended them no harm,” Rosier related, the native prisoners ceased their resistance and “never since seemed discontented with us, but very tractable, loving, and willing by their best means to satisfy us in any thing we demand of them.” The Wabanaki evidently rationalized their experience of captivity in the Atlantic as an extension of familiar native captive-taking customs that usually resulted in either the prisoner’s death or his or her ritual adoption into the captors’ community. When the potential for physical harm subsided aboard Waymouth’s boat, the prisoners likely believed they were now being incorporated into this foreign culture, and acquiesced to their fate. As their Wabanaki neighbors experienced with Estevão Gomes decades earlier, those left

behind watching the departure of their kin over the watery horizon were once again reminded of the ocean’s malevolent power.\textsuperscript{43}

Treacherous experiences with European forces in the Atlantic did not distance the Wabanaki from their maritime world, but instead demanded a careful and visible presence in it. Four years after Waymouth’s ship sailed to England with its kidnapped cargo, Dutch explorer Henry Hudson arrived off the coast of the Dawnland and navigated much the same area as his predecessors. After the first sight of land, Hudson’s men soon “saw two sayles on head off us,” a spectacle that would have certainly erased their anticipated sense of discovery and mystery as they drew close to shore, though they did not yet know the identity of the sailors. This changed when a few days later the crew traveled into Penobscot Bay to mend their sails, cut a new foremast on shore and trap a number of lobsters abundant throughout the bay. As the ship lay at anchor, the men astonishingly “espied two French shallops full of the country people” sailing into the harbor after them. Though “they offered us no wrong, seeing we stood upon our guard,” Hudson’s chronicler observed, the authority exuded by their command of the waves, and of European nautical equipment, impelled the explorers to quickly offer trade.\textsuperscript{44}

The Indian mariners boldly confronted and boarded the Dutch ship with a spirit of cautious opportunism, an attitude that when coupled with their tremendous sailing skills instilled fear in the European newcomers. Prepared for trade with “many beaver


skinnes and other fine furres,” the Indians confidently expressed their aesthetic preferences to Hudson, including a particular attraction to “redde gowns,” and indicated their longstanding interaction with French fishermen in the region “who trade with them for red cassocks.” Yet these and other Wabanaki who encountered this expedition also kept the exchanges short, fully cognizant of the destructive potential bound up in them. As a result, Hudson’s men felt on more than one occasion that “we could not trust them,” and subsequently kept their distance too. A significant source of this anxiety was Indian fluency with European sailing equipment. One evening, the Dutch party made certain that they “kept good watch for fear of being betrayed by the people, and perceived where they layd their shallops.” After later conspiring they armed themselves and “tooke one of their shallops” during a larger offensive that drove the Indians from their shoreline settlement “and tooke the spoyle of them, as they would have done of us.” In their paranoid attempts to sever Wabanaki from convenient access to their ocean and cripple their commanding presence in it afforded by sailing technology, these explorers continued a century-long project of rendering an Atlantic world amenable to the extension of European markets and empires.45

The ocean’s novel contributions to the Dawnland in the sixteenth century, however, also unleashed disruptive and destabilizing effects among its native residents. European fishermen and explorers focused much of their missions on the mass accumulation of furs from Indian hunters, and in the process subtly reoriented the native economy away from the ocean and into the inland forests. Native people themselves, along with their resources, were also confiscated and deposited in a trans-Atlantic

network of exchange that valued such goods as both curiosities and commodities. To facilitate their role in this budding network, and to maximize their material acquisition, Europeans also began reorganizing the structure of native authority along lines more familiar to them. The Wabanaki vision of their oceanic world that sustained their culture for centuries had begun to encounter efforts to render that world compatible with an unimaginably different one.

After the first wave of European strangers made landfall in the northeast, the People of the Dawnland were discovering that their ocean possessed a level of complexity previously unimagined. The strange and unpredictable forces washing up on their shores revealed the water’s new character, yet Wabanaki situated them in a familiar cultural context that normalized the sea’s looming presence in their society and incorporated its generative power into their lives. For countless generations, Indians learned that the ocean offered a perpetual supply of resources that demanded a careful awareness of this realm to ensure their successful, and secure, utilization. The sea was also the locus of spiritual power from whence Gluskap emerged to quicken the lifeless bodies of their first ancestors and to which he afterward departed. The culture hero taught his People that their watery world was rife with amiable and evil creatures alike, and therefore necessitated vigilance and apprehension as well as reverence. The Wabanaki’s longstanding Atlantic-orientation thus provided them with an important cognitive framework with which to make sense of the changing dynamics of their pelagic world.
Chapter Two

“With all sails set”: Steering the Course of Transition in an Expanding Atlantic World

In the early decades of the seventeenth century, the Wabanaki maritime world continued to serve as the gateway for numerous transformative pressures in the native northeast. The myriad economic, material and political processes circulating in the Atlantic and penetrating the Dawnland over the previous century now regularly shaped the quotidian life of the region’s native communities. The most destructive effect of these transitions was the growth of internecine violence that progressively defined relations between Wabanaki ethnic groups along the northeastern seaboard. Though it is difficult to discern the presence of these tensions prior to European contact, it is likely that the steadily mounting flow of foreign trade goods in Wabanaki waters exacerbated historic enmities that had long characterized Indian society on a local level. The intra-native violence spurred by Atlantic pressures was also fueled by the concomitant, albeit more gradual, centralization of authority in increasingly powerful headmen. This shift away from a more egalitarian power structure at the band level was also induced by the potency of new economic and material networks. Sagamores such as the Micmac Membertou, the Penobscot Bessabez and the Kennebec Sasinou simultaneously garnered power from and contributed energy to native tensions in their efforts to manipulate exchanges with European settlers and enhance their status and their communities’ welfare.

To suggest that European settlement patterns and economic networks fostered considerable change in native socio-political life is, of course, no longer all that revelatory. But this chapter demonstrates that those transformations ought to be
conceived as the extension of quintessentially Atlantic phenomenon. It argues that the
Atlantic Ocean functioned as the primary catalyst of these Atlantic processes in
Wabanakia, and dictated the uneven ways native people experienced them on the
ground. This understanding of the sea as an omnipresent natural space introducing a
profoundly dynamic nexus of foreign power to Indian country forces us to reassess
assumptions about the fundamentally terrestrial and continentally-oriented character of
native culture. To more fully illuminate the Wabanaki experience in the early modern
world we must indeed focus our gaze east from Indian country.

By taking up such a vantage, this chapter traces the manifold changes and
continuities forged through Indians’ engagement with their Atlantic world. Before the
mid-seventeenth century, Wabanaki nearly always interacted with the extensive
complex of material exchange touching their world on or alongside the sea. Micmac
communities effectively forged the most prominent role as intermediaries between
Wabanaki and Europeans in the northeast because of their strategic geo-political
position at the nexus of this maritime trade and by solidifying a visible and sweeping
presence on the waters of the northwest Atlantic. Other native communities under the
guidance of local sagamores developed a similarly entrenched position around and in
their saltwater world in order to tap into the same valuable networks and subsequently
enrich their wellbeing and augment their prestige. Such maritime jockeying also
stemmed from a desire to undermine the powerful Micmac monopoly that mediated so
much of Indians’ economic and material interface with these networks.

In other ways too, Wabanaki demonstrated that their society would not simply
be subject to the disruptive and unmanageable effects of a changing Atlantic world.
The nautical prowess that had long been critical to this maritime-oriented culture, and that functioned as an increasingly-central asset for Indians’ successful participation in Atlantic trade, did not go unnoticed by foreign visitors. Conceding their largely inadequate understanding of both the region’s waterways and native cultures, European newcomers came to see Indian mariners as a valuable source of epistemic power capable of facilitating their designs. As a result, Wabanakis’ knowledge of the seascape and their superior navigational skills became highly-esteem commodities for many European architects of colonization. Several Indian seamen, for their part, subsequently exploited the demand for their coveted skills to further their own interests and secure fates that once seemed impossible. Natives could also marshal their seafaring expertise to save the lives of wayward, and economically valuable, European castaways desperately lost and utterly inept in the Wabanaki Atlantic. By the middle of the seventeenth century, then, Indians learned to carefully cultivate, strategically promote, and shrewdly apply their enviable nautical fluency within a corner of the ocean rendered mysterious and perilous by European metropolitans’ limited Atlantic vision.

The renowned nautical proficiency that Indians exploited in their relations with outsiders was neither static nor rigid in character. Their successful execution of this strategy, in fact, derived from an equally-innovative elaboration of their maritime strength with new and more efficient marine technology. As they demonstrated in the previous century, Indian mariners secured access to European sailing ships through violence. Yet they also obtained the new equipment by again resorting to the networks of material exchange that linked their communities to recently-arrived visitors and settlers in the region. Of escalating worth in these economic relationships were not only...
the metal goods conveyed by Euro-American traders, but sailing tackle and vessels transported from Europe and anchored in the harbors of Wabanakia. Indians also sensibly aimed to circumvent dependence on violence and trade in their acquisition of these foreign modes of mobility. By mid-century, many were utilizing a variety of familiar resources native to northeastern forests to construct sailing craft themselves, and subsequently conformed their creations to native culture with recognizably Wabanaki material and totemic symbols. Equipped with both native and European manufactured ships, Indians proved time and time again that they were eager to seek out new methods of augmenting their longstanding nautical expertise. Euro-Americans who witnessed this dynamic maritime culture, moreover, and who attempted to employ it in order to ameliorate the shortcomings of their own, indicated that Wabanaki were the indisputable masters of their Atlantic world.

When native efforts to manipulate economic networks and colonization projects were undermined by Euro-American traders and settlers, Indians responded by engaging in carefully orchestrated acts of marine violence and shrewd trans-Atlantic diplomacy. Physical abuse combined with the occasionally devious and seemingly capricious dealings of foreign traders in Wabanakia frequently elicited retaliatory aggression at what Indians perceived to be the font of these threats. As a result, the Euro-American maritime presence, embodied most conspicuously by fishermen, became a common target of Wabanaki’s violent reprisals. Yet Indians also attempted to allay certain threats to their interests by invoking the supposedly paternalistic authority of European monarchs. Via the avenue of long-distance diplomacy, natives learned they could manipulate Euro-American presumptions of their political loyalty and
deference. By thus consistently resorting to Atlantic solutions to mitigate a variety of socio-economic disruptions, Indians indicated their understanding of the fundamentally-Atlantic dimensions to the myriad phenomena accompanying the early stages of European colonization. As astute negotiators, experienced seafarers, and savvy maritime traders, Wabanaki continually grasped for the helm and steered the course of change in their corner of the Atlantic.

In May of 1604, Wabanaki began encountering European colonists with more sedentary and permanent goals. Firmly situated in coastal settlements by this time in their seasonal cycle, Indians in the northeastern Dawnland now discovered a French colonizing expedition in their waters headed by Pierre du Gua, Sieur de Monts. De Monts, along with his associate Samuel de Champlain, received a trading monopoly from their monarch earlier in the year, and proceeded to Acadia where they settled at St. Croix Island in Passamaquoddy Bay, likely among ancestors of the modern-day Passamaquoddy tribe of Wabanaki. Spending a winter among these people allowed the French settlers a glimpse into significant aspects of the native inhabitants’ annual life cycle previously unnoticed or unrecorded, most important of which were their hunting forays away from the coast that provided communities with moose, beaver and other furbearers later processed into clothing by native women. When not hunting, or when unsuccessful at it, the Indians “live on a shellfish called the clam,” Champlain observed, a more reliable and less labor-intensive food source. By early spring they were already leaving their small hunting camps and migrating to a more dependable marine environment, as Champlain detailed how one of their parties came to the French island.
colony “in the month of March” and “shared with us their game.” To the settlers, these sparse and “very wretched” people thus appeared at most tangentially involved in the material exchange network circulating through much of the region’s waters. De Monts evidently recognized the poor business partners they made, and following the brutal winter of 1604-1605, decided to seek a more hospitable location for his settlement across the Bay of Fundy. By the following June it was transferred to a site he named Port Royal on the southwestern coast of Nova Scotia.¹

By moving off the water and establishing sustained year-round settlements in Wabanakia, de Monts’ colonists were exposed to other subtle characteristics of native society that did not find their way into preceding travel accounts. One in particular posed a serious problem to the colony’s longevity. During their first summer together in 1604, Champlain and members of the Wabanaki community near St. Croix Island departed on an exploratory mission down the northeastern coast. Upon arriving at the Penobscot River they encountered a large party of Indians who enjoined the crew to treat with their regionally-renowned leader, Bessabez. These Penobschts, Champlain noted, possessed a nearly identical culture and language to those Passamaquoddy and Micmac to the northeast. At a formal ceremony, Champlain informed Bessabez that he came to build amity with local Indians, and also to “reconcile them with their enemies, the Souriquois,” or Micmac. Bessabez reciprocated by expressing his desire for tranquility and the opportunity to establish trade relations with the French. After this

conversation, the two satisfied groups bartered for furs and the French gifted them with “rosaries and caps” and other trinkets.²

As Champlain’s remarks indicated, the French were becoming aware of latent tensions between Wabanaki groups in the northeast, and subsequently endeavored to broker peace in a region they hoped to profitably draw into their network of exchange. When Champlain’s fleet pushed on to the southwest, he was alarmed when his Passamaquoddy guides suddenly abandoned the crew before they arrived at the Kennebec River, because “the Indians of that place are their great enemies.” On a similar voyage along the coast the following summer, the French continued their pacifying mission when they met Marchin, a sagamore of the Saco River region in southern Maine. After receiving numerous gifts from Champlain, Marchin returned the favor by giving him “a young Etechemin [Penobscot] boy whom he had captured in war,” and whom the French subsequently returned to his home to the northeast. En route, Champlain stopped near the Kennebec River to treat with the local headman, Sasinou, and to negotiate the release of “a young Etechemin man and girl whom he held prisoners.” The Dawnland was rife with more hostility and factionalism than prior European visitors recognized or related. Such pressure posed serious obstacles for the stability of de Monts’ colony and the successful extension of France’s trans-Atlantic market.³


Champlain’s men were not the only outsiders witnessing the bitter divisions that enveloped the native northeast by the early seventeenth century. French adventurer Marc Lescarbot arrived at the Port Royal settlement in summer of 1606, and sailed down the coast with another exploratory party led by Micmac. Lescarbot noted how the Wabanaki in southern Maine were exceedingly “treacherous and thievish” when they noticed the French were carrying their Micmac enemies on board, and therefore “one must be on one's guard against them.” A few years later, he pointed out that “there has always been war between these two nations,” suggesting that the seeds of such animosities long predated the arrival of Europeans but were now exacerbated by sustained contact. One member of George Popham’s English colonial venture in 1607 reported the ship’s encounter with a Micmac community in Nova Scotia who they determined “to be the tarentines and these people as we have learned since do make wars with Sasanoa the Chief Commander to the westward” near Kennebec River. When Englishman John Smith explored the Maine coastline in spring 1614, he was struck by the congruencies in language, fashion and political structure among these native groups, while adding that “their mortall enemie” are the Tarrantines. Shortly after Smith’s voyage, Sir Ferdinando Gorges, proprietor of an English colony in Maine, described the continuing hostility that plagued relations between Bessabez’s Penobscots and their Tarrantine neighbors to the northeast. English sailor Christopher Levett similarly indicated the stubborn persistence of these hostilities as late as 1623 when he enjoined Indians near Casco Bay in Maine to “kill all the Tarrantens they should see (being enemies to them) and with whom the English have no commerce.” The Indians reportedly showed tremendous enthusiasm at this directive.4

4 Marc Lescarbot, The Conversion of the Savages who were Baptized in New France during this Year,
The nascent fur trade that was drawing Indians into an extensive trans-Atlantic exchange network proved to be the progenitor of this divisive atmosphere in Wabanakia. Bessabez’s receptivity toward Champlain’s peace proposal in 1604 stemmed from his desire to trade directly with the new French settlers, and thereby forge a prime position in this material nexus. The Penobscot people desired peace, he revealed to Champlain, “in order that in the future they might hunt the beaver more than they had ever done, and barter these beaver with us.” Rather than operate through other Wabanaki intermediaries, Bessabez envisioned a more prosperous lifestyle for his community if the Micmac’s regional monopoly could be circumscribed. Thus “they were well satisfied” with Champlain’s visit and, the French explorer added, “desired us to settle in their country.” When Jesuit missionary Pierre Biard scouted the region for a potential mission site a decade later, a still persistent Bessabez “came to persuade us, with a thousand promises, to go to his place, having heard that we had some intention of making a settlement there.” De Monts’ Micmac hosts at Port Royal, however, encouraged his colony’s current location, and stood to gain much from preserving such an arrangement. By securing their proximity to the gateway of this exchange network, a position that also permitted them widespread access to the larger maritime world of the

northwest Atlantic and to the goods of other coastal Wabanaki less geographically privileged, Micmac aggressively aimed to enhance their lucrative economic position.\(^5\)

By extending an elaborate material exchange network to the Indian northeast, and by facilitating long-distance native mobility to cultivate that network, the Atlantic introduced pressures that continued to reshape Wabanaki political structure. The subsequent concentration of greater degrees of power in local sagamores signaled a departure from customary political formations. By the advent of European contact, these native northeasterners were organized into small hunter-gatherer bands headed by leaders whose status was typically temporary and confined to particular goals such as material provision. Among the Micmac and Penobscot, for example, such an arrangement can be termed a “bilocal extended family,” consisting of a headman, his married children’s families, and other relatives as well as some non-relatives. Leaders enjoyed a level of prestige through the consent of their extended kin, and sometimes augmented it with shamanistic powers obtained through the divination and coercion of supernatural forces.\(^6\)

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But the socio-political effects of a century progressively punctuated by European gift-giving, the influx of trade goods, and colonial settlement all served to consolidate and undergird an unprecedented level of authority in Wabanaki community leaders. By the early seventeenth century, Indian polities were gradually coalescing around prominent headmen who proved adept at mediating their communities’ interaction with European exchange networks and managing the steadily-mounting flow of native and European goods. The successful execution of these critical tasks was largely predicated on a leader’s exploitation of his peoples’ geographic proximity to and visible presence in the ocean. Micmac such as those sagamores who with their outfitted shallop confronted Bartholomew Gosnold’s party off the Maine coast in 1602 secured a prominent role as intermediaries in this network, but other Wabanaki leaders too used their privileged status to secure its wealth from more distant locations along northeastern coasts. If they could not deal directly with the suppliers of coveted goods, these sagamores’ access to Micmac intermediaries also necessitated an unencumbered and carefully-sustained access to the ocean. In sum, while European-native interaction began to reorient the economy of many Wabanaki away from the Atlantic and toward the interior forests, Indians’ successful cultivation of these exchanges hinged on the preservation of their familiar maritime identity. Those who occupied customary leadership roles in native society consequently experienced a new and enhanced source of authority.

These complex and paradoxical Atlantic pressures continued to grab the attention of several European travelers and settlers in Wabanakia. When Samuel de

_Northwest Coasts of America_ (Simon Frasier University, Department of Archaeology, Occasional Publication 11, 1983).
Champlain explored the coast in 1604, he encountered the Penobscot sagamore Bessabez by way of the headman’s seaborne hunters who “came alongside our pinnace,” and persuaded the French crew to follow them up the Penobscot River to their leader. These Indians, Champlain noted, “had come to hunt beaver, and to catch fish,” some of which they shared with the visitors. In 1612, Jesuit Pierre Biard described his journey to the same location where were assembled some three hundred Indians with “80 canoes and a boat.” “The most prominent Sagamore was called Betsabès,” Biard related, “a man of great discretion and prudence.” Two years later, the Penobscot leader still retained his regional prestige. John Smith explained how every riverine Indian community along the Maine coast was “Lords of themselves, yet they hold the Bashabes of Pennobscot, the chiefe and greatest amongst them.” This sagamore, he continued, was also capable of commanding armed incursions against the Massachusetts Indians far to the south. Ferdinando Gorges also depicted Bessabez as a powerful military leader who “had under him many great Subjects,” and was consequently capable of orchestrating large-scale raids against the Micmac.7

Authority structures in Wabanaki communities elsewhere in the northeast exhibited similar patterns. In 1605, Champlain accompanied another exploratory party to the south that once anchored in sight of a native settlement near the mouth of the Saco River. Soon thereafter Honemechin, their sagamore, confronted them “with two canoes, and went circling round and round our pinnace,” attempting to negotiate with

the newcomers on his peoples’ behalf. During the same voyage, the crew gifted Marchin, sagamore of the Kennebec River region, who “had the reputation of being one of the mighty men of his country.” Asticou succeeded Bessabez as Penobscot sagamore upon his death and, according to Marc Lescarbot, was “a man grave, valorous, and feared, who in the twinkling of an eye will gather together a thousand Indians, as would also Olmechin and Marchin,” two neighboring leaders. Lescarbot claimed to witness this military authority first hand, when “on a sudden,” at their command, “the whole sea was seen covered with their canoes manned with agile warriors, who stood straight up therein.” After George Waymouth’s voyage encountered coastal Maine Indians in 1605, crewmember James Rosier described how “they show great reverence to their King, and are in great subjection to their Governours.” Upon meeting the sagamore of a Micmac community in 1607, the Popham colonists from England determined him to be “the Chief Commander of these people” whose adversary was “Sasanoa the Chief Commander to the westward.” European newcomers almost always comprehended Indian polities through the lens of their familiar and more rigidly stratified societies, and usually overemphasized the degree of centralized power native headmen commanded. Yet the prominent mediating position sagamores assumed in these recorded material exchanges would indeed have augmented to some degree the prestige they enjoyed in a culture that valued collective guardianship via material provision and astute diplomacy.8

Wabanaki too recognized parallels between the deferential authority of Europeans and the centralizing power in their own communities. Waymouth colonist James Rosier believed that Indians “will show a great respect to any we tell them are our Commanders,” so strong was their regard for authoritarian structure. English explorer-settler Christopher Levett similarly observed a crystallizing socio-political hierarchy among the southern Wabanaki near Casco Bay in 1623. “The Sagamores will scarce speake to an ordinary man,” he related, “but will point to their men, and say Sanops, must speake to Sanop, and Sagamors to Sagamors.” Among Indians elsewhere in the region, Levett noted that “they call all masters of ships sagamores, or any other man that they see have a command of men.” French and English colonists were not alone in projecting their social and political norms onto others when perceiving only the slightest similarity; Indians also interpreted such congruencies as universal cultural traits.9

By the early seventeenth century, Micmac leader Membertou occupied a status similar to other Wabanaki sagamores, one that directly rivaled that of his southwestern neighbors. He achieved much of his socio-political standing by carefully exploiting both his community’s proximity to French fishermen-traders off the Nova Scotian coast, and by 1605, its location adjacent to the French colony at Port Royal. Few visitors to the settlement failed to note, and perhaps slightly overstate, the imposing stature of this “great Sagamos,” as Marc Lescarbot titled him. Lescarbot also related that this “man of

great age” claimed to have witnessed Jacques Cartier’s voyage in 1534, though he still retained a vigorous and youthful constitution. “He has been a very great and cruel warrior,” Lescarbot added, while Champlain believed he likewise possessed “the reputation of being the worst and most treacherous man” in the region. Membertou had “under him a number of families whom he rules, not with so much authority as does our King,” Lescarbot recorded on another occasion, “but with sufficient power to harangue, advise, and lead them to war.” Father Pierre Biard understood the influence this “good old man” wielded within his community and consequently concentrated his catechizing efforts on him, anticipating that if the Micmac sagamore chose baptism, many others would follow.  

Membertou’s commanding reputation was not confined to land. Much of his prestige in the eyes of French and Indians alike, in fact, was augmented by his tremendous nautical prowess and the subsequent material and diplomatic benefits it afforded his community. After acquiring a European shallop from Basque or Breton fishermen off his coast, Membertou assimilated the new technology into his culture and marked it as distinctly Micmac by decorating it with totems of animals native to Wabanakia. The marine sagamore subsequently sailed the craft throughout northeastern waters, extending his peoples’ monopoly as mediators of the trans-Atlantic trade. Once in 1607, Membertou approached the French garrison at Port Royal and alerted its oblivious occupants to “a great ship which was arriving” on the horizon and making its

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way into the harbor. The settlers scrambled to ready themselves and secure better positions, though eventually “it proved only to be a small merchant vessel.”

Membertou’s prominent maritime presence allowed him to cultivate and police the lucrative French colony at Port Royal, while also permitting him access to the steady flow of unfamiliar though potentially valuable European vessels.11

Like their coastal Indian neighbors, Wabanaki sagamores near Casco Bay in Maine exploited a strategic geo-political presence in their maritime world in order to enhance their own status and their communities’ welfare. When English sailor and trader Christopher Levett arrived in the area to investigate sites for a trading settlement in 1623, for example, he claimed to have little problem ingratiating himself with local inhabitants. At the mouth of the Presumpscot River, he encountered “the Sagamore or King of that place” accompanied by “two Sagamors more, their wives and children, in all about 50” who bid him welcome and expressed interest in forging economic and kinship bonds with the stranger. As a token of their new relationship, “the great Sagamore of the East country, whom the rest doe acknowledge to be chiefe amongst them, hee gave unto me a Bevers skin” which Levett interpreted as a promising endorsement of his commercial venture. Equipped with his “store of Beaver coats and skinnes,” another distant headman communicated through the captain of a passing English ship his desire to barter with Levett’s post. Upon their meeting, Levett noted, “they told me I must be their cozen,” and therefore assume an honored kinship position in order to legitimate trade and conform its process to Wabanaki protocol. When Levett later attempted to barter with some members of this community, they declined his offer

until Somerset, the sagamore, intervened and said “his cozen Levett should have all, and then they began to offer me some by way of gift.” Though the native leaders with whom Levett parleyed wielded a level of authority differing considerably from contemporary English monarchs, their role as prime mediators in a material exchange network indicated to him the emerging, and subtle, parallels between Indian and European political organization. In addition, native efforts to legitimize and familiarize these centralizing pressures of Atlantic exchange demanded their grounding in Wabanakia and realignment along the lines of its customary practices.¹²

One southern Wabanaki sagamore aimed to peremptorily manipulate this Atlantic exchange before it penetrated the Dawnland. Upon meeting Christopher Levett’s exploratory party off southern Maine, Cogawesco, another of the region’s principal headmen, immediately encouraged the Europeans to establish their settlement nearby, assuring him that he “should be very welcome” if he decided on a close location. To assist him in scouting the coast for ideal sites, Cogawesco promised Levett “that he and his wife would goe along with me in my boate to see them.” The sagamore thus utilized his intimate natural knowledge of the coastal waters to exploit this valuable opportunity to benefit himself and his extended kin. After escorting aboard “the King, Queene, and Prince, bowe and arrowes, dogge and kettell in my boate,” Levett’s crew navigated the maze of offshore islands and shoals with their native hosts, all the while marveling at Cogawesco’s “noble attendance rowing by us in their canoes.” The mixed Wabanaki and English party eventually settled on a site Levett would later call York. Though his pride swelled with the belief that he had “obtained the consent of them” for

his land claim, Cogawesco’s acquiescence was directed more to the solidification of his new exchange relationship.\footnote{Christopher Levett, \textit{A Voyage into New England, Begun in 1623, and Ended in 1624} (1628), in George Parker Winship, ed., \textit{Sailors Narratives of Voyages along the New England Coast, 1524-1624}, 272-274.}

Over the next year, several other ascendant Wabanaki leaders forged productive relations with Levett’s tiny coastal plantation. “Sadamoyt, the great sagamore of the east country, Manawormet, Opparunwit, Skedraguscett, Cogawesco, Somerset, Conway and others” traveled to York to inquire of rumors that Levett was leaving his settlement and returning to England. Such a departure would not only signal Levett’s abandonment of his new kinship obligations, but also detrimentally effect native leadership and community welfare. Though confirming the veracity of the rumors, Levett reassured the Indian neighbors of his eventual return by evoking imagery strikingly congruent with Wabanaki maritime lore. If “every one at the place where he lived would looke to the Sea,” he enjoined, foretelling his return, “and when they did see a Ship they wold send to all the Sagamores in the Countrey, and tell them that poore Levett was come againe.” Thus mirroring Gluskap’s leave-taking from the earliest Wabanaki ancestors, Levett’s departure to the eastward was to be comprehended as impermanent, and therefore demanded an ongoing anticipation of his return.\footnote{Christopher Levett, \textit{A Voyage into New England, Begun in 1623, and Ended in 1624} (1628), in George Parker Winship, ed., \textit{Sailors Narratives of Voyages along the New England Coast, 1524-1624}, 280; Charles G. Leland, \textit{The Algonquin Legends of New England}, 130-131.}

When attempts by increasingly-empowered Wabanaki sagamores to manipulate Atlantic exchanges compromised those of their counterparts elsewhere in the Dawnland, the results could be explosive. In 1606, the warrior-sagamore Iouaniscou led a Micmac war party against Wabanaki in southeastern Maine, likely to retaliate for
threats to his peoples’ economic power in the region. Iouaniscou’s warriors captured a number of men and women in their raid and, after a seaborne retreat to Mount Desert Island, executed them. Southern Wabanaki launched their own retributive assault that also aimed to cripple the Micmac trade monopoly. Their raid targeted and killed a prominent Micmac fur trade middleman named Panonias, who was also the son-in-law of Membertou. Panonias’ lifeless body was sailed back to Port Royal from the Maine coast in “a shallop in which were some Indians,” according to Champlain. “The Indian in command of the boat was called Ouagimou,” a Passamaquoddy sagamore, who related to Membertou the events surrounding his kinsman’s death. The maritime trader had been killed in Bessabez’s Penobscot territory, thus prompting a plea of innocence and a promise of cooperation from the Penobscot leader. Ouagimou, now a mediator in a maritime network of diplomacy, was charged with conveying Bessabez’s olive branch accompanied by Panonias’ remains in order to restore peace to the Dawnland and its bloodied waters.15

The Atlantic’s processes and potentialities thus were not only fostering economic and political metamorphoses in the Indian northeast, but also facilitating native violence that stemmed from those changes. Membertou’s response to the death of his son-in-law and chief trader sought to reassert his command of the region’s waves by harnessing the sea to exact the retaliatory justice that had long been customary in Wabanaki culture. During the period of ritual mourning, Membertou negotiated with the French for a “red coverlet…handsome and large” for the burial ceremony. This he

presented to Panonias’ relatives who shrouded his body and decorated it with ornaments and paint. Membertou thus reaffirmed his social status by way of European goods and the violent animosities the Atlantic exchange of that material engendered. All warriors in attendance, many from surrounding Micmac, Passamaquoddy and Maliseet communities, subsequently vowed to join the leader in war against the perpetrators the following spring. In June of 1607, Marc Lescarbot watched as a three to four hundred marine-warriors launched a tremendous seaborne assault from their base at Port Royal in a fleet of “canoes and shallops.” Under the direction of Membertou, the Indian navy eventually made landfall and disembarked in southern Maine near the Saco River. The entire operation took over a month to execute, and when Membertou’s party returned to Port Royal in August, the French learned that a number of southern Wabanaki had been killed, including their most prominent headmen.16

The exploits of Wabanaki sea raiders in the war of 1607, and in other related native conflicts over ensuing decades, demonstrated that the Atlantic did not simply function as a catalyst for destructive and uncontrollable change in the Dawnland. It instead operated as a generative and recognizable resource that could be manipulated in order to rationalize and manage the changes it was unleashing in native society. By the early seventeenth century, this strategic cultivation of the sea’s material and martial advantages was largely an elaboration of Wabanaki’s previous experiences in a maritime-centered world. The composition of the Micmac navy spearheaded by

Membertou embodied their innovative synthesis of the ocean’s familiar and foreign qualities. By setting forth from the shores of Nova Scotia with a brigade of birch bark canoes on an extensive seaborne expedition “of about eighty leagues” across the Bay of Fundy and through the Gulf of Maine, the Wabanaki proved to be quite competent maritime navigators with their traditional medium of transportation alone. The ocean’s corridors, they long knew, could assist their extension of violence and preservation of authority. Neither their wide ranging geo-political scope nor their long-range mobilization of warriors was entirely predicated on the new opportunities that attended their changing world. But when Indians enhanced that nautical aptitude with European sailing technology, introduced and incorporated into Wabanakia over the course of the preceding century, they expressed a dynamic capacity to develop their command of the sea by way of the foreign equipment it offered up to them. Wabanaki maritime identity was not simply acted upon by Atlantic processes, but continued to be enriched and enlivened by Indians’ exploitation of Atlantic possibilities.17

Wabanaki’s navigational acquaintance with the seascape served as another valuable asset. Already by the early seventeenth century, Indians’ sophisticated nautical expertise was so impressive that several European newcomers endeavored to extract and appropriate it for their own colonial projects. Gabriel Archer, crewman aboard Bartholomew Gosnold’s exploratory voyage in 1602, was among the first to marvel at this geographical knowledge. After encountering eight Indian mariners at the helm of a “Biscay shallop with saile and Oares,” Archer explained how they on the deck of their vessel “with a piece of Chalke described the Coast thereabouts,” and even “could name Placentia of New-found-land.” It was quickly apparent that the native

sailors “seemed to understand much more than we.” Not long thereafter such abilities began affording Indians a central role in colonial explorations of the region. After the Sieur de Mont’s French expedition reached land at Port Mouton on the east coast of Nova Scotia in May of 1604, he immediately “dispatched a shallop, wherein, with some Indians as guides, he sent one of our men carrying letters,” Champlain recalled. The native-led reconnaissance mission was instructed “to search along the coast of Acadia” for a French trade ship loaded with supplies for de Mont’s crew. As they sailed further west to scout a suitable place for their colony, the French commander ordered Champlain to investigate rumors of a rich native copper mine nearby. “To this end he sent me with an Indian named Messamouet,” Champlain related, “who said he knew the site well.” Messamoet was a Micmac sagamore and Atlantic traveler who had returned to the Dawnland in 1570 from a two-year stay in France. Guided by the Indian headman, Champlain “set out in a small pinnace of five or six tons’ burden” outfitted with nine sailors, and eventually discovered the copper mine. Later that fall, the French navigator received similar instructions for a more extended exploration of the Maine coast. Commanding “a small vessel of seventeen to eighteen tons” with twelve sailors, Champlain procured the services of “two Indians to serve us as guides to the places with which they were acquainted.” Such native navigators not only familiarized the European crews with the hazards and advantages of travel in the northwest Atlantic, but also acted as indispensable translators among Wabanaki settlements along the seaboard.18

Over the course of subsequent years, the tiny French colony and its successors continued to rely directly on Wabanaki’s superior maritime skills in the northeast. De Monts and Champlain set out from their settlement at St. Croix Island in June 1605 to learn more about their native neighbors’ enemies far to the southwest. The exploratory crew consisted of “some gentlemen, twenty sailors, and an Indian named Panonias,” the prominent Micmac trader later killed in the south, as well as Panonias’ wife, “whom the Indian was unwilling to leave behind.” The French, as was by now customary, “took along these Indians to serve as guides…in the hope of discovering and learning more exactly by their aid what kind of a country it was.” Panonias’ wife was a particularly indispensable asset since “she was a native thereof,” likely captured in a former conflict and assimilated into Panonias’ northern Wabanaki community. Nearing the mouth of the Kennebec River, they anchored and encountered a native party hunting seafowl in their canoes. De Monts and Champlain “made friends with them and with the Indians of that river who acted as our guides,” and navigated them to their sagamore who came out to the pinnace and expressed his desire to establish trade relations. After Isaac de Razilly was commissioned to succeed de Monts and Champlain at the head of a new Acadian colony in 1632, crewman Nicolas Denys related how the expedition managed to navigate the waters off Nova Scotia only with “some Indians who were guiding us.”

While Wabanaki mariners actively and quite literally steered the course of early European ventures around the northwest Atlantic, those who endured captivity in the

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ocean were also relied upon for their exceptional nautical knowledge. The five coastal Indians captured by Englishman George Waymouth during his colonizing expedition in 1605 were taken to England where their valuable potential for future colonial projects could be carefully cultivated. These native captives became the first known Wabanaki in England, and their presence did not go unappreciated. Three of them, Sassacomoit, Maneddo and Skidwarres were taken into custody by Sir Ferdinando Gorges at Plymouth, while the other two were transported to London. Gorges believed them to be “all of one Nation, but of several parts, and several families,” and thus possessing an extensive and diversified knowledge of the area. As a shareholder in the Plymouth Company and a financer of Waymouth’s failed voyage, Gorges knew a lucrative investment opportunity when he saw one. Over the next two years, he and fellow speculator George Popham pressed the Indians into the service of their latest business scheme, a colony near the mouth of the Kennebec River in the heart of the Dawnland, for which they would secure a royal charter in 1606.20

From its earliest inception, Ferdinando Gorges’ proposed settlement of Wabanakia was shaped by Indian knowledge of its waters. “The longer I conversed with them,” the colonial booster noted of his Indian informants, “the better hope they gave me of those parts where they did inhabit, as proper for our uses, especially when I found what goodly Rivers, stately Islands, and safe harbours those parts abounded with.” While Sassacomoit, Maneddo and Skidwarres likely played to the economic fantasies of their captors, their familiarity with the region was deferred to as

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authoritative. Perhaps sensing an opportunity to return home or assist their community in the establishment of a nearby trade partner, the three exploited their perceived expertise in these coastal waters and obtained a level of power despite their unfree status.21

By 1606, such a strategy began to pay dividends, as English colonial architects continued to trust in the Indians’ carefully-crafted knowledge. In that year Gorges turned over Sassacomoit and Maneddo to Captain Henry Challoons, who was given command of the ship Richard to transport the colony’s first settlers to the Kennebec River. Based on native information, Gorges instructed Challoons to “keep the northerly gage, as high as Cape Britton,” until they learned “by the Natives they were near the place they were assigned unto.” This highly unconventional route, Gorges acknowledged, contradicted the navigational orthodoxy of the best seamen of his age, yet “I understood the Natives themselves to be exact Pilots.” Their aptitude had been developed over countless generations of sustained use, Gorges trusted, “both as Fishermen and in passing along the shore to seek their enemies, that dwelt to the Northward of them.” Through firsthand conversations with his native captives, Gorges recognized what many explorers, settlers, and fishermen witnessed before him: the Wabanaki possessed a unique and dynamic command of their oceanic world that existed outside the purview of emerging European empires. And by deferring to Indians’ nautical authority, even if it meant disregarding Europe’s most experienced and sophisticated Atlantic seafarers, Gorges revealed a striking reality. The productive and accessible Atlantic world that England envisioned faded into that of the Wabanaki

somewhere in the sea’s northwestern reaches. Native fluency in this alien maritime world could serve to illuminate its recesses and thereby facilitate the extension of England’s colonial ambitions.\textsuperscript{22}

The Richard and its crew were ultimately captured by Spanish privateers in the West Indies while en route to the northeast, but unwavering supporters of the colonization project continued to rely on Wabanaki knowledge in England. A year after its first failed attempt, two more ships carrying George Popham and about one hundred settlers arrived safely near the Kennebec River, owing much to the skill of Skidwarres, one of the Wabanaki captives who had remained in England. Like his kin the year before, Skidwarres was employed to navigate this Atlantic journey. After their safe landfall in Maine, Raleigh Gilbert, another of the colony’s leaders, explored local waters “by skidwarres Direction.” Skidwarres also mediated the colony’s contact with Wabanaki neighbors. Later the English “sailed towards the river of Pemaquid and Carried with us the Indian Skidwarres” in order to establish relations with an unfamiliar native community there. While interceding at one of the many parleys between the Popham colonists and nearby Wabanaki, Skidwarres carefully made his escape with the assistance of his kin who recognized his intentions.\textsuperscript{23}


Sassacomoit achieved his own homecoming seven years after Skidwarres’ return to Wabanakia. Following his time in a Seville prison alongside the English settlers captured by Spanish forces in the West Indies in 1607, Sassacomoit either escaped or was returned to Ferdinando Gorges in England by 1611. Three years later Gorges pressed him into the service of Captain Nicholas Hobson, along with two other Indians captured from southern New England, where he assisted Hobson’s voyage to the northeast. During the journey, the crew “were Pilotted from place to place, by the Natives themselves, as well as their hearts could desire.” Somewhere along the way, Sassacomoit left Hobson’s expedition and rejoined the Wabanaki. Incredibly, his tumultuous and far-flung experience in bondage – from Wabanakia, to England, to the West Indies, to Spain, to England – landed him back in the native northeast where he continued to serve as an intermediary between Wabanaki and the struggling Popham colonists. By shrewdly manipulating the demand for their coveted knowledge of the northwest Atlantic’s waterways and people, and by exploiting the geo-cultural blindness of England’s most prominent colonial architects in this maritime world, Sassacomoit and Skidwarres secured their trans-Atlantic return home.24

Europeans depended on Wabanaki nautical expertise for more than its navigational utility. In the case of Marc Lescarbot’s misfortune in 1606, it likely proved the difference between life and death. On a journey to Port Royal, Lescarbot’s crew became lost at sea in several days of severe weather, drifting about “four leagues off shore,” according to his estimations. One day they noticed two boats “with all sails

set” on the horizon, at whom they proceeded to wave and shout for assistance. The lost
adventurers were soon astonished to see “one manned with savages, who had a moose
painted on their sail.” The other was filled with French fishermen. “The savages
showed the greater diligence,” however, “for they arrived first” and immediately
relieved the distressed settlers. The native rescue team was compensated generously
“for coming with such good courage to tell us where we were, for thereafter we sailed
with constant assurance,” an appreciative Lescarbot described. Though Wabanaki
mariners and their nautical aptitude provided an indispensable means to Europeans’
accumulation of local knowledge, it could also ameliorate the treacherous ineptitude of
European mariners in a native maritime world.25

While Wabanaki labored as navigators for European exploratory and settlement
projects, they also possessed highly-esteemed seafaring skills. Dawnland travelers
evidently did not anticipate these proficiencies, and often deemed them unparalleled
among native societies. One member of George Waymouth’s colonial expedition in
1605, for example, found it remarkable when a contingent of Wabanaki confronted and
proceeded to outpace an English shallop in their canoe. With only three paddles to
propel them, the Indians “would at their will go ahead of us and about us, when we
rowed with eight oars strong; such was their swiftness.” English sailor John Josselyn
first encountered Wabanaki mariners in 1638 when visiting his brother’s settlement in
Maine, and later described (incorrectly) that while they did not possess ships, they “do
prettily imitate ours in their Birchen-pinnaces” constructed from native materials. In
these canoes, which could transport upwards of six people in addition to a “considerable
fraight,” the Indians often “swim to sea twenty, nay forty miles, keeping from the shore

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a league or two.” When traveling, trading, fishing or making war, “they will indure an incredible great Sea,” Josselyn maintained, their canoes “mounting upon the working billows like a piece of corke.” The range and agility of Indians’ oceangoing watercraft was so extensive as to seem natural and effortless, “but they require skilful hands to guide them in rough weather, none but the Indians scarce dare to undertake it.” The sheer courage of Wabanaki mariners, and the nautical skill that stemmed from it, Josselyn contended, were simply unsurpassed by other seafaring peoples in the waters of the northwest Atlantic.26

That Wabanaki were the unassailable masters of their maritime world was becoming axiomatic by the middle decades of the seventeenth century. English adventurer and settler William Wood returned to London after living four years in New England, and while promoting the region’s perceived bounty to Old World audiences, also issued a synopsis of Indian nautical prowess. Wabanaki bravery combined with the dexterity of their watercraft contributed to a powerful command of the high seas that exceeded even the capacities of English sailors. “In these cockling fly-boats, wherein an English can scarce sit without a fearful tottering,” Wood marveled, “they will venture to sea when an English shallop dare not bear a knot of sail.” Indian mariners also commanded their vessels at tremendously high speeds, and could be seen “scudding over the overgrown waves as fast as a wind-driven ship, being driven by their paddles.” “If a cross wave (as is seldom) turn her keel upside down,” Wood noted, “they by swimming free her and scramble into her again.” The ocean’s periodically

treacherous and unpredictable power, like the disruptive and destabilizing rigors it increasingly introduced to Wabanaki society, was effectively mitigated by a people long accustomed to life in and around this saltwater world.27

As Marc Lescarbot’s nearly disastrous experience at sea in 1606 indicated, Wabanaki were also continuing a now familiar strategy of supplementing and enhancing their nautical acumen with sailing technology. With the appearance of non-Indian vessels and colonists growing more and more frequent on the Dawnland’s waterways by the early seventeenth century, sailing craft permitted Wabanaki a valuable means of reinforcing and extending their presence on these salty waterways, thereby ensuring that their maritime world retained some semblance of its recognizable character. That is to say, the incorporation and appropriation of foreign modes of transit stemmed not only from Indians’ longstanding mobility in and intimate relationship with the ocean, but also from a desire to dictate to some degree the changes that were enveloping it and consequently compromising its quintessentially Wabanaki character.

Thus while European visitors like Bartholomew Gosnold, Henry Hudson, and Marc Lescarbot expressed astonishment at the spectacle of Indian-commanded sailing ships, what they witnessed was not so much an aberration of Wabanaki culture but an increasingly typical component of their dynamic maritime identity. By 1605, for instance, Indian sailors had evidently become commonplace in the waters adjacent to Port Royal. As soon as its French settlers one day noticed “a shallop coming from Cape Sable,” Samuel de Champlain noted, they instinctively “thought it contained Indians who were leaving Cape Breton or the island of Canso,” though it eventually proved to

be a French supply vessel. Later that summer, however, the settlers’ presuppositions were affirmed when they “caught sight of a shallop in which were some Indians” who related the troublesome news of the murder of Micmac trader Panonias. In July of 1607, the Gift of God and the Mary and John carrying George Popham, Raleigh Gilbert, and a large contingent of English colonists arrived at the steep cliffs of Cape Le Heve in Nova Scotia. One surprised crewmember related how they “had not been at an anchor past two hours before we spied a bisken [Biscayan] shallop Coming towards us having in her eight Savages and a Little savage boy” who, after inspecting the ships and colonists, “came near unto us and spoke unto us in their Language.” The English immediately showcased their supply of trade goods, but the Indian seafarers were hardly impressed. “The next day,” though, “the Same Savages with three Savage women…returned unto us bringing with them Some few skins of beaver in an other bisken shallop.” Curiosity and conspicuous self-presentation were the priorities of these Wabanaki mariners, for when the Popham colonists attempted to drive a better bargain for their goods, the Indians simply “went into the shallop and so they departed.”

Wabanaki also honed their command of sailing technology by continually employing it in campaigns of violence against native enemies. As the organization of Membertou’s navy in 1607 indicated, European-style watercraft could enhance Wabanaki nautical prowess and aggressively extend it against longtime Indian adversaries. The Micmac “of these coasts were at war with the Esquimaux” during the 1650s, one missionary recorded, and sailed as far as “the extreme Northeastern end of

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New France, at about 52 degrees of latitude and 330 of longitude” to execute their amphibious assaults. Another observer detailed how “two Shallops were prepared” for Wabanaki warriors who were concluding the ritual feasting and council talks that preceded warfare. This particular coastal community also constructed docks for their warships consisting of a “Bridge of wood to enable them to embark dry-shod in these Shallops, which were held for them ready-launched.” As these marine-warriors concluded their preparatory customs, they emerged “well armed after their fashion, singing, dancing, and then running quickly to their Shallops,” which subsequently embarked for the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Once a foreign mechanism of transport in the Wabanaki maritime world but now a successfully consolidated addition to the native technological lexicon, the sailing vessel had become a powerful medium through which Wabanaki pursued their economic and political interests in the northwest Atlantic.29

Native northeasterners not only obtained and operated sailing vessels with increasing regularity in the early decades of the seventeenth century, but also developed a commanding proficiency with them. French colonists who witnessed Wabanaki marine-warriors marshal seaborne assaults against their native neighbors frequently lauded their sailing skills and naval strength. So effortless did this nautical acumen appear, in fact, that by 1659 Jesuit missionaries believed native seafarers were simply “trusting to instinct for guidance” while “crossing vast seas without compass, and often without sight of the Sun.” “It is wonderful how these Savage mariners navigate so far in little shallops,” the priests marveled. French settler Nicolas Denys similarly noted the remarkable efficiency with which Wabanaki sailors plied their waters. If aided only

by “a favourable wind,” he maintained, “they went as swiftly as the throw of a stone.” Jesuit Pierre Biard indicated that Wabanaki’s admirable sailing proficiencies even rivaled those of Europeans. Expressing awe at their adroit command of the deep-sea with shallops, Biard asserted that “they handle them as skillfully as our most courageous and active Sailors of France.” When such observers described Wabanaki’s oceangoing aptitude as simply instinctive and organic, they hinted at the intimate and life-sustaining connection these people long maintained with their marine world. This maritime heritage fostered the growth of their dynamic, adaptive and imposing nautical power.  

Native northeasterners strategically pursued a number of avenues to acquire sailing ships from Europeans, each of which could be aided by their rich corpus of knowledge about the ocean itself. As the disastrous fate of French explorer Étienne Bellenger in 1583 clearly proved, Wabanaki were quite adept at hijacking foreign watercraft considerably larger than their traditional birch-bark canoes, a tactic they would come to perfect throughout the colonial period. But violence was not their only method of acquisition, and until the latter half of the seventeenth century was seldom even mentioned by European seamen. Instead, Indians again resorted to an exploitation of the very exchange networks that transmitted ships and their crews to Dawnland waters, utilizing their kinship bonds and trading relationships with fishermen and settlers to enrich their own supply of sailboats and enhance their visible maritime presence.

The European traders who linked this Atlantic network to the native northeast thus found themselves increasingly engaged in a local market that valued far more than trinkets, metal and cloth. Indeed, the very vehicles relied on to extend this material network from Europe were becoming highly esteemed in the Wabanaki maritime world. When French adventurer Nicolas Denys settled among the Micmac in the 1630s, he noted that while the Indians possessed canoes for navigating the maze of inland rivers, streams and lakes, they “all have boats for the sea” that supplemented canoes ill-suited for deeper and rougher sea waters. These they oftentimes “buy from the Captains who are about to leave after having completed their fishery.” With his supervisor looking the other way, a single fisherman also “trades or bargains with the Indians using biscuit, lead, quite new lines, sails, and many other things at the expense of the said owners,” Denys continued. Father Pierre Biard also described the ordinary presence of shallops in the coastal Wabanaki communities of Acadia by the mid-seventeenth century, “which they buy of the French who frequent their shores for the sake of fishing.” These ships, Biard marveled, the Indians cruise “with incredible celerity.”  

Native conceptions of the fluidity and adaptability of material ownership also permeated this quintessentially Atlantic merchandise, and in the process conformed it to customary Wabanaki economic practices. When they could not or chose not to exchange native material for French sailing technology, Indian mariners often furtively seized those boats left behind by the same fishermen who “had them hidden on the coast…in order to make use of them on another voyage.” If they returned in subsequent

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years and recognized their boats under native command, the fishermen “make no more ceremony of taking them back than the Indians do in making use of them.” The possession or custody of shallops was thus not always clearly definable, and their utilization on an as-needed basis became at least tacitly accepted in the region. Unlike the furs, ornaments, iron kettles and other trade goods increasingly valued by European measurements of worth, and whose ownership was arbitrated by similar standards, sailing technology assumed an ambiguous economic status when native and French societies converged in the Wabanaki maritime world.  

Yet Indian efforts to procure sailing craft did not always depend on the presence of European traders. By the early seventeenth century, and perhaps before, many began manufacturing it themselves. Traditional watercraft construction techniques were modified to create larger-scale sailing vessels that allowed Wabanaki to not only solidify a more active presence in and around their ocean, but also avoid dependence on the network of material exchange that threatened to disorder their relationship with the Atlantic. Through their creative pursuit of still another method to meet the evolving demands of their maritime world, Wabanaki turned to the natural resources of their interior woodlands. Ironically, then, just as the Atlantic process of material exchange began to reorient Indian patterns of production and consumption away from the ocean, so too did Wabanaki efforts to preserve and enhance their commanding maritime presence necessitate a more intensive and diversified reliance on terrestrial resources.

The familiar mixed hardwood forests of northeastern New England supplied Indians with valuable raw material necessary to synthesize native and European

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oceangoing watercraft designs and construct vessels suitable for their own needs. Bark from the paper birch tree, long a key ingredient for Wabanaki canoes, dishes, and even moose calls, combined with parts of other trees and the skins of inland mammals were innovatively recast for the manufacture of sailing craft. John Josselyin encountered the tremendous range of one such specimen tacking off the coast as far south as southern New England in 1638. “We had the sight of an Indian-Pinnace sailing by us made of Birch-bark,” he detailed, “sewed together with the roots of spruce and white Cedar (drawn out into threads) with a deck, and trimmed with sails top and top gallant very sumptuously.” Around the same time, Nicolas Denys described the increasingly-ordinary presence of native-hewn birch bark boats that “also went with a sail” formerly comprised of bark but “oftener of a well-dressed skin of a young Moose.” Wabanaki thus possessed suitable natural resources to construct sailing technology long before the arrival of Europeans. If such craftsmanship was not part of their pre-contact culture, its development in the seventeenth century indicates that Wabanaki aimed to circumvent dependence on trade or violence by utilizing familiar game resources to construct these commodities themselves.33

Through symbols and skins, moose occupied a peculiarly prominent position onboard Wabanaki sailing ships. The conspicuous presence of these woodland megafauna on the ocean’s waves is at first glance unbefitting, but actually offers a telling insight into the creative ways Wabanaki understood and managed their changing Atlantic world. Moose skins could function as sails for Indian boats, as Nicolas Denys’ observed. Totemic representations of the terrestrial mammal, by far the largest and

most prized, could also serve a more immaterial purpose and symbolize its spiritual importance in native societies. The Wabanaki shallop that rescued Marc Lescarbot’s wayward crew in 1607 “had a moose painted on their sail,” and Micmac sagamore Membertou commanded a similarly adorned sailboat along the coasts of Acadia. When corroborated with more recent ethnographic evidence, such patterns reflect Wabanaki’s deeply held understandings about their terrestrial and aquatic worlds. Twentieth-century anthropologists in the Dawnland recorded a common native belief in the dual character of moose who, they noted, always limped into the sea in their advanced age and subsequently transformed into whales. This marine metamorphosis thus symbolized the fungible nature of both the moose’s habitats and Wabanaki’s maritime and terrestrial worlds. When Indian mariners wielded sailing technology on their ocean beneath the symbols and skins of moose, they indicated the longstanding heritage of these convictions. By grafting onto foreign devices representations of their own cosmology – of the intimate interdependence of the Dawnland and its sea – Wabanaki effectively consolidated, modified, and conformed this invaluable opportunity to their culture.34

The conjugation of sea and land, however, was not an intangible notion confined to the abstract realms of native cosmology; it permeated the quotidian life of Wabanaki society. As a result, Indians could harness the productive potential of this relationship to enhance their material welfare. In 1622, English colonial proprietor Sir Ferdinando Gorges described the amphibious moose hunting tactics of Indians on Mount Desert Island off the central Maine coast. First, “by making of several fires, and setting the

country with people,” the hunters were able to “force them into the sea, to which they are naturally addicted,” Gorges detailed. “Then there are others that attend them in their boats with bows and weapons of several kinds, wherewith they slay and take at their pleasure.” By exploiting these animals’ natural addiction to the ocean, as Gorges understood, or their ultimate destiny as aquatic creatures, as Wabanaki envisioned, Indians positioned the ocean at the center of their production and consumption of even terrestrial mammals. The fruits of these labors were subsequently appropriated for the construction of sailing craft or for the manipulation of material exchange networks. Each pursuit aimed to extend and augment native command of their maritime world.35

Wabanaki were also beginning to associate the sailing ships that increasingly frequented their waters with the extensive economic networks those vessels conveyed. As the population of foreign fishermen, settlers and traders increased along the northern and southern limits of Wabanakia in the early decades of the seventeenth century, Indians recognized the Euro-American maritime presence as the operative vehicle of trans-Atlantic trade. This cognizance was most glaring when Euro-American and Wabanaki attempts to manipulate these Atlantic networks collided. When Indians identified the periodic misconduct of Euro-American traders, they sought retribution by invariably targeting what they perceived to be the progenitor of this coercion: the growing Europeanization of their maritime world. As a result of these developments, native northeasterners grew more conscious of the quintessentially Atlantic dimensions of material exchange.

Indians orchestrated their retributive acts of violence against the Euro-American maritime presence when their strategies for manipulating trade relationships were undermined by traders’ perceived deception, greed, or unfair practices. Nicolas Denys noted the savvy bartering tactics of Micmac traders who emerged from the woods in the spring and immediately secreted away their best furs from the sight of undesirable French traders. By only dealing their second-rate stores, the Indians were able to acquire quantities of food, liquor and tobacco from the desperate traders. But “as soon as they have departed,” Denys continued, “they go to recover the skins which they have hidden in the woods, and go to the routes of the fishing ships and keep watch.” After sighting these more lucrative opportunities, Indians proceeded in their fur-laden canoes to meet the passers-by, “where they are well received.” With their coveted and handcrafted decorative pouches, Wabanaki women too learned to play the system, and “fix the price to the fishermen according to the kind of skin and its fantastic ornamentation.” Both Indian men and women also regularly solicited fishing vessels en route to their anchoring places whose crews showered them with goods in attempts to entice the Indians to later meet them at sea with their furs. “But they do not go there at once, but remain still on shore, waiting for other ships to come past” in order to receive each of their bountiful offers of food and brandy. The native traders were careful not to over-consume the alcohol, “for they would not then be able to preserve the judgment which is necessary for making dupes of the sailors and captains.” But upon discovering a decreasing demand for their material and traders stringently unwilling to supply goods with which Wabanaki were growing accustomed, Indians were not timid about using their power in the region to secure an advantage. In response to traders’ intransigence,
“they have plundered boats which were at the distant fishery,” Denys recorded, including “a little ship, which they found alone in a harbor.”

Micmac power on the seas likewise had its way with the uncooperative, and perhaps deceitful, French fisherman Captain Savalet in 1606. In the midst of a tremendously fruitful harvest “worth 1,000 pounds” with his ship of “80 tons, which could carry 100,000 dry fishes,” Indian mariners “boldly and impudently went into his ship and carried away from him” whatever they pleased. Through their extensive experience with the ocean’s rich resource base, Wabanaki had evidently developed highly selective tastes, and their authority on the waves permitted them to satisfy such predilections with the goods they routinely confiscated. Whenever “the fishermen came with their shallops full of fish, they did choose what seemed good unto them and they did not care for cod,” Marc Lescarbot reported after his encounter with Savalet, but instead preferred “a kind of very great turbots, which might be worth here in Paris above four crowns a-piece...for it is a marvellous good meat.” Reaping the fruits of Euro-American maritime labor allowed Indians to not only even scores with dishonest traders and fishing crews, but also assert their presence on the ocean while redirecting Atlantic economic processes to serve native interests.

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The tremendous success of these aggressive strategies, and the sheer force of Indian maritime prowess, could evidently foster an air of impunity among Wabanaki mariners. Father Pierre Biard complained of Micmac’s incessant and “exceedingly vainglorious” boasts about their superior strength, ingenuity and bravery compared to European sailors and colonists. Many bragged that “they have killed Basques and Malouins, and that they do a great deal of harm to the ships,” Biard noted, since “no one has ever resented it…from a lack of courage.” Little doubt existed in both native and Euro-American minds that Indians continued to retain a considerable degree of authority over the processes of their maritime world, and were accordingly capable of dictating the terms of engagement with its foreign visitors.38

Further to the southwest, Wabanaki similarly resorted to maritime aggression in order to better manage trade operations and ensure the welfare of their communities. From his small settlement at York on the Maine coast, Christopher Levett reported in 1624 that a deceptive English trader had abused local Indians by stealing a large quantity of their furs. The Indians traveled in canoes to the harbor where the trader’s ship was anchored and first attempted to peacefully negotiate the return of their goods. After the trader refused them outright, the Indians reportedly “told him againe that he was a Roague, with some other speeches,” at which the seaman and his crew attacked and beat the Indians. Though they retreated to Levett’s settlement “in a great rage,” the Indians remained confident that justice would ultimately be served since “they would be revenged on his Fishermen at sea.” Wabanaki in southern Maine similarly targeted Dorchester fisherman Henry Way who went missing at sea in the summer of 1631.

After the following winter, his shallop was discovered “bulged against the rocks…in the beating surges” and still containing the corpses of the crew “all killed treacherously by the eastern Indians.”

Englishmen who attempted to colonize offshore islands, long utilized as valuable staging grounds for Wabanaki sea hunting expeditions, were also objects of native suspicion if their dealings undermined Indian interests. Under Ferdinando Gorges’ royal patent from King James I, the Trelawny family of Plymouth obtained ownership of Richmond Island off southern Maine in 1620 and subsequently established there a small trading post and fishing operation. John Winter, a local agent for the family and settler on the island, complained repeatedly to the Trelawny family in England during the summer of 1634 of local Indians’ skillful manipulation of trade, much to the detriment of the colony’s economic interests. In response to the trade goods being shipped to him from England, Winter explained to suppliers that “the coats are good, but somewhat of the shortest, for the Indians make choice of the longest.” In addition, “the coverlets are not for this country” as the Indians will not accept them “for they must have them soft and warm.” And if “the hats are sent without bands, or lined in the brows,” the Indians will refuse them too. Even other local traders were experiencing adverse trade relations in which natives held the upper hand. “They put away their goods at so low rates to the Indians,” Winter reported, “that they get but little by it.” Relations grew considerably hostile over the next two years, however, when fierce competition from Mr. Cleeves, a rival trader and settler, encouraged deception.

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and fostered suspicion among native and English alike. Indians were now coming to view Richmond’s Island as more invasive and threatening to their economic interests, and as a result targeted the site for retaliation. By June 1636, island settlers were decrying “a great loss” sustained by Indian attacks on their livestock. Narias Hawkins complained of his “sustained loss of a great many hogs,” while Robert Trelawny similarly described how he “lost above 200 hogs, & some goats.”

Aside from securing a far-ranging and aggressive command of their ocean and carefully manipulating material exchange networks, Wabanaki also learned to shrewdly exploit trans-Atlantic power structures to more effectively manage the disruptive pressures emanating from their eastern horizons. Recourse to royal authority, and its capacity to allay even the most distant grievances of royal subjects, was not an option exclusive to French or English colonials, Indians realized. When Euro-Americans lauded the beneficence and paternalism inherent in their monarchs, they also forged congruencies with the affective values dwelling within the most esteemed native sagamores. From his Maine colony in 1607, George Popham thus echoed the sentiments of other proprietors and settlers when he extolled James I’s “admirable justice and incredible constancy, which gives no small pleasure to the natives of these regions.” These loyal inhabitants, Popham waxed on, profess “that there is no God to be truly worshipped but the God of King James, under whose rule and reign they would gladly fight.” Out of this wistful optimism, Wabanaki came to realize that they could

invoke the charity of distant royalty and exploit a dutiful and loyal posture in order to advance native interests. Natives’ carefully-crafted Atlantic diplomacy would be refined and perfected throughout the colonial period.41

Wabanaki’s astute engineering of imperial fidelity assumed a myriad of expressions, each adapted to local circumstances. When Sieur de Monts’ and Samuel de Champlain’s men abandoned their Port Royal colony in 1607, much to the dismay of Micmac neighbors, local Indians made certain to cement stronger bonds with the colony’s successors a few years later and thereby avoid the same misfortune. A ship bearing news of the death of King Henry IV to the Sieur de Poutrincourt’s settlement in 1610 offered Indians an opportune moment to forge such relationships. Upon hearing the reports, the Indians reportedly “all began to weep, even the Savages joining in after they had heard about the catastrophe.” The expressions of anguish were not perfunctory, according to the French, as “they continued to mourn for a long time, just as they would have done for one of their greatest Sagamores.” By deploying their mourning rituals, Micmac cultivated an emotional solidarity with their grief-stricken European neighbors in order to claim a position alongside colonial subjects in a trans-Atlantic network of power and deference. This status, Indians hoped, would endow them with the social capital and economic advantages needed to augment Micmac prestige in the region.42

41 “A Letter from George Popham, President of the Sagadahock Colony, to King James I,” December 13, 1607, in Collections of the Maine Historical Society, V: 359.

Other Wabanaki believed they could appeal to the paternal guardianship of
monarchs to ameliorate injustices sustained at the hands of malevolent royal subjects.
The Indians near Christopher Levett’s post in southern Maine who were robbed of their
furs and beaten by English sailors in 1624 not only vowed revenge on English fishing
boats at sea, but also promised that they were “going into England to tell King James of
it.” Such a strategy blended customary native notions of retributive justice with
European methods of imploring an adjudicative authority. Both correctives demanded a
mastery of Atlantic opportunities. Upon another occasion, Levett questioned what he
saw as the grueling servitude of women in Wabanaki society as well as the polygamy of
a respected sagamore. The native leader defended himself and his community’s
customs by demanding to know “how many wives King James had.” When Levett
responded that “he never had but one, and shee was dead,” the reportedly incredulous
sagamore “wondred, and asked mee who then did all the Kings worke.” If English
colonists proved hostile to Wabanaki customs, the sympathetic consideration of their
monarch could still be trusted. By thus invoking supposedly universal gender norms
and marriage practices that united both native and English figures of authority in
common cultural bonds, the Indian leader aimed to trap and defuse this challenge to his
prestigious stature.43

The initial stages of Euro-American colonization in the northeast precipitated
considerable socio-political change in Wabanaki society, and conditioned the quotidian
life of its people. Structures of authority and understandings of power were undergoing
gradual transformation along the lines of newly-arrived Europeans. Patterns of

43 Christopher Levett, A Voyage into New England, Begun in 1623, and Ended in 1624 (1628), in George
production and consumption too were being refashioned by the Atlantic’s repulsive and attractive forces. The material life of the native northeast was also being reshaped by valuable European goods, the most conspicuous of which were foreign vehicles of transportation. Yet Wabanaki actively and continually sought out means to manage the seemingly unpredictable and destabilizing effects of their changing world. That the most favorable and efficacious of these avenues were believed to demand an exploitation of Atlantic opportunities testified to the strength and resilience of Wabanaki’s maritime identity. As it had for generations, the ocean afforded native people countless opportunities to remake themselves and forge some semblance of cultural continuity.

When Indians utilized their proximity to the ocean to secure access to and maximize the value of European networks of exchange they typified a culture long acquainted with the generative power of the Atlantic. When native mariners manipulated the demand for their coveted nautical skills and intimate knowledge of their ocean’s waterways and peoples, or developed that acumen with new sailing technology, they demonstrated a sophisticated command of their maritime world and an earnest desire to augment and enhance it. And when Indian warriors aggressively targeted the Euro-American presence in their ocean, or when native diplomats beseeched the names of socio-political powers residing somewhere in the distant reaches of the ocean, they illustrated their dynamic conception of an expansive Atlantic world and its ever-new possibilities. If the Wabanaki ocean brought forth instability and swift change, it could also be trusted to supply the tools necessary to placate its attendant disorder and exploit its life-enriching potential.
Chapter Three

“To go to all the fishing ilandes and so to drive all the contre before them”: Contesting Atlantic Colonialism and Regenerating Atlantic Autonomy

In much the same way as their ancestors before them, early-seventeenth century Wabanaki continued to depend on the productive power of their pelagic world to mitigate the quotidian rigors of a coastal hunter-gatherer society. By utilizing the ocean as an avenue for mobility, a conduit for the extension of power and violence, and a source of life-sustaining food and material, native northeasterners sustained a maritime identity marked largely by continuity through the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Yet this cultural persistence was predicated on a dynamic understanding of the Atlantic world. It demanded, in other words, that Wabanaki learn to cultivate the prolific and uniquely new opportunities conferred by their saltwater world to carefully manage its novel, transformative and occasionally disruptive pressures. By way of new material exchange networks, captivity voyages, nautical technology and paternal authority, Indians also began to expand their conception of both the geographic scope and generative potential of their Atlantic world. The notion of the sea as a dynamic and expansive locus of power had always been a hallmark of Wabanaki’s longstanding maritime-oriented culture, but the particular permutations of that dynamism were always in flux. The Atlantic was, and always had been, saturated with an ever-new potentiality.

The ancient binary conception of the ocean as bountifully nurturing and dangerously disrupting also endured into the mid-seventeenth century. After the first wave of European colonization efforts in the northeast, Dawnlanders continued to
confront new pressures that demanded ongoing socio-cultural adjustment. As they had for over a century, the most significant and transformative of these forces extended from impulses touched off by European involvement in and around the Wabanaki’s eastern horizons, impulses that were becoming quintessentially Atlantic phenomenon. As Indians themselves were discovering, their recognizable ocean, its relationship to their communities, and their struggle to maintain both were constantly susceptible to the tumultuous effects of these saltwater pressures. The Great Migration of religious non-conformists to New England in the 1620s and 1630s and the proprietary settlement of the Maine coast as well as other Europeans’ perpetual quest for northeastern North America’s natural resources, for example, unleashed a profound demographic change in Wabanaki homelands and waters throughout the middle decades of the seventeenth century. Small French and English settlements, situated primarily along the coast and on offshore islands, now dotted land- and seascapes with increasing regularity. From these points of access, Euro-Americans began an unprecedented exploitation of the region’s economic potential through an extension and implementation of pastoral agriculture and the creation of countless fishing stations, sawmills, and fur trade posts. Spatially, environmentally and economically, then, colonial intrusions into Wabanakia continually threatened to disorder and reconfigure the native maritime world into one more amenable to Euro-American Atlantic visions.

The precise expressions of these new pressures in the terrestrial and aquatic worlds of Wabanakia, and the ways its native inhabitants effectively managed them, is the focus of this chapter. It argues that, through the middle decades of the seventeenth century, Wabanaki increasingly confronted an array of demographic, environmental and
economic stresses that were fundamentally Atlantic-centered. These processes, moreover, were both an outgrowth of colonials’ mobility in and around Indians’ eastern horizons and an indispensable contributor to the project of consolidating and augmenting a Euro-American Atlantic. Such developments thus possessed implications extending far beyond northeastern forests and coastlines. Indian people themselves gradually came to understand as much as they experienced and made sense of these pressures alongside more direct assaults against their own Atlantic vision. When traders attempted to fraudulently manipulate material exchange networks, for example, or when seamen assaulted, murdered and enslaved native families, or when colonial government policies aimed to undermine and police the Wabanaki maritime presence, an unmistakable pattern emerged. Native grievances over this Atlantic colonialism, and their periodic acts of retributive aggression against it, eventually erupted in war in 1676 and 1677, and both Indian and English alike recognized that nothing short of the Wabanaki Atlantic world was at stake. This reality was so palpable in Indian society that its marine-warriors orchestrated the most destructive naval campaign the northwest Atlantic had hitherto seen.

Yet as Atlantic tensions mounted in the Dawnland by mid-century, Wabanaki society underwent significant internal transformations. This chapter also traces these adjustments, and asserts that they were critical native responses to the most disruptive and disorderly elements of Atlantic colonization encroaching on their communities. Just as an English Atlantic world was coalescing from and gradually defined by the long-distance migration of Europeans in search of economic and religious opportunity, so too did this phenomenon induce similar mobility among Wabanaki. To meet the
ever-changing needs of trans-Atlantic exchange networks, Indians broadened their geographic range on sea and on land in order to cultivate and integrate new sources of material and spiritual wealth into their economy. And just as Atlantic colonization and imperialism were central instruments in the nation-building efforts of European states during the seventeenth century, so too did they encourage Wabanaki ethnic groups to coordinate and centralize their interests and actions in the face of colonialism’s aggressive forces. Indians continued to explore new ways of positioning the sea at the core of these strategic adjustments, and consequently employed its navigational, material, martial and diplomatic advantages in their struggle to retain a recognizable vision of their Atlantic world.

That the northeast’s tremendous supply of natural resources could stand at the center of extensive imperial economies was long recognized by Atlantic explorers and adventurers. After initial periods of settlement, the common refrain continued to spring from the pens of Euro-American opportunists who extolled the region’s abundant aquatic and terrestrial flora and fauna, as well as their accessibility from the ocean. Englishman John Smith marveled at the fruitful shoreline between Penobscot and Sagadahoc in Maine, for example, a coast “overgrowen with all sorts of excellent good woodes for building houses, boats, barks or shippes.” By the 1630s, Sir Ferdinando Gorges wholeheartedly concurred. Enjoining his deputies and commissioners “to make Trade the Common Interest of the whole Province,” the colonial proprietor eagerly anticipated the possibilities awaiting industrious settlers in Maine. This enterprise would be spurred on to enhance the Atlantic economy with abundant stores of “Fish &
other Food as also Tymber for Barbadoes & those other hot Places.” “Boards for Spayne,” Gorges further explained, “are the most considerable Trade” fostering prosperity in his trans-Atlantic colonial project. Indians had long since grown accustomed to the networks of material exchange that prized chiefly the furs of terrestrial mammals, but were now confronted by a troubling reality. The economic complex that linked distant stretches of the Atlantic ascribed tremendous value to ever more resources native to their lands and waters, and, most alarmingly, Wabanaki guardianship of that material base grew increasingly precarious.¹

The growth of seventeenth-century English settlement on the Maine frontier proceeded sporadically along a line stretching from the Piscataqua River in the south to the Penobscot River to the northeast. Most hamlets and farms were confined to the coastal region or to major rivers not far from the head of tide, thus facilitating the region’s contributions to Atlantic markets and maritime industry. Some settlers were transient employees for Ferdinando Gorges’ royal land grant and arrived directly from England in the 1620s. Many more migrated from southern New England after the founding of Plymouth Colony in 1620. Regardless of their point of origin, colonists were engaged in a number of recently-established fishing enterprises at Damariscove, Piscataqua, Cape Newagen, and Monhegan Island, the latter a long favored jumping-off point for Wabanaki sea-hunting expeditions. Among the largest and most successful of these operations was that at Pemaquid between the Kennebec and Penobscot rivers.

founded by fishermen in the late 1620s. Though their population is difficult to ascertain, Maine’s early fishing settlements were dominated by seasonal male laborers and consequently lacked the conditions necessary for stable growth as communities in the mold of Puritan-dominated southern New England.²

Other outposts of English colonization established on the heels of fishing operations were fur trade stations. Similar to the population employed in the nearby

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fisheries, traders working out of these locations were often single men whose occupational tasks necessarily conformed to the seasonal hunting patterns of their Wabanaki counterparts. Posts opened in the late 1620s and early 1630s at Machias, Pejepscot, Penobscot and Richmond’s Island. Among the region’s more successful traders was Thomas Purchase, who by 1630 had a well-established trading house on the lower Androscoggin River. The commercial firm of Clark and Lake likewise settled Arrowsic Island and planted a truckhouse near the mouth of the Kennebec River. Plymouth Colony in southern New England obtained a land grant to erect the Cushnoc trading post on the Kennebec River in 1629, and began bartering corn to the Kennebec Wabanaki for beaver pelts shortly thereafter. The foothold secured in this region by Plymouth Colony traders to the south facilitated the introduction and proliferation of wampum in the Dawnland. These strings of coastal shells from southern New England and beyond became greatly esteemed by Kennebec Indian communities, and assisted the local growth of English material exchange networks. The ascendant “wampum revolution” thus reverberated throughout the northeast via underlying Atlantic economic and migratory processes, serving again to bring new goods to Wabanaki shores.\(^3\)

Despite the growing presence of colonial fishermen and traders along the Maine coast, achieving stability and longevity in an orderly northeastern settlement demanded substantial environmental manipulation. Not long after their arrival, settlers began the long process of reconstituting the Wabanaki landscape according to familiar English

modes of production and consumption. The successful implementation of pastoralism and other agrarian practices historically central to rural English society became a key component of sustainable colonial communities in the region. English breeds of cattle, swine and sheep increasingly accompanied colonial men and women off ships and into cleared coastal hamlets southwest of the Penobscot River, and by the 1640s livestock of this sort were commonly exported with wheat and corn into Atlantic markets. In locales where one commercial pursuit was insufficient to sustain the community, a diversified economy developed that mixed small-scale trading, fishing and farming. The settlement at Pemaquid, for example, established as a fishing stage in the late 1620s, soon after became a prominent exporter of English livestock. The coastal inhabitants of southern Maine, traveler John Josselyn remarked in the 1660s, could be classified as “Husbandmen, or Planters, and fishermen…of which some be planters and fishers both, others meer fishers.” From Pemaquid to the northeast, the offshore islands and rocky promontories are “all fill’d with dwelling houses and stages for fishermen, and have plenty of Cattle, arable land and marshes.”

The steady emergence of sawmills in English settlements by the mid-seventeenth century signaled the further environmental restructuring of the Dawnland and its adjacent waterways. The northeast’s seemingly limitless stands of virgin white pine captivated the attention of nearly all European explorers, and figured prominently in the economic prospects of colonial projects. Not until the dizzying array of competing jurisdictions in Maine was disentangled later in the century would the

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English Crown attempt to exert domain over these lucrative “king’s woods,” reserving them for the production of masts for the Royal Navy. Royal subjects arrived first, however, and by the 1650s were processing significant swaths of forests into boards and ship stores for local and foreign consumption. Numerous land transactions typified this growing trend, such as settler Henry Sayward’s petition to the General Court of Massachusetts in 1669 for “a quantity of land & meadow with liberty of Tymber” near the Cape Porpoise River in Maine. The legislature acquiesced and granted him “liberty for the Cutting of Tymber upon the said River above mentioned for the Improvement of his Saw mill.” John Wadleigh and son Robert deeded land in the same area to Daniel Eyres of Ipswich that included “free use & right to use whole River, for a Saw Mill, or Mills.” It was not long, then, before portions of coastal Wabanakia mirrored the heavily deforested regions of southern New England. Already by 1676, summer lumbering operations on Arrowsick Island off southern Maine alone stored one hundred thousand board feet for export.5

The expansion of the French colonial presence in mid-seventeenth century Wabanakia both paralleled and diverged from its English counterpart. The two burgeoning developments demonstrated similar geographic patterns of settlement insofar as each confined their plantation activities to coastal regions or rivers as far as the head of the tide. Immediate proximity to the larger Atlantic networks of

5 Emerson Woods Baker, II, “Trouble to the Eastward: the Failure of Anglo-Indian Relations in Early Maine,” 81-82; Charles E. Carroll, The Timber Economy of Puritan New England (Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 1973), 102-109; “Att A Generall Court held at Boston,” 12 October 1669, American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, MA (hereafter AAS), Curwen Family Manuscripts Collection, Box 1, Folder 2; “Land Deed from John Wadleigh and his son Robert Wadleigh to Daniel Eyres of Ipswich,” no date, AAS, Curwen Family Manuscripts Collection, Box 1, Folder 2; William Hubbard, A Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New-England, from the first planting thereof in the year 1607, to this present year 1677. But chiefly of the late Troubles in the two last years, 1675, and 1676 (Boston, 1677), 71.
communication, exchange and transportation were vital requirements for the successful exploitation and extraction of local resources. Such positioning was particularly critical for French settlement which, unlike its English rival to the south, relied almost exclusively on a fur trade economy. Because of the relatively sparse and overwhelmingly male French colonial population, their establishment of sustainable communities based on mixed economic pursuits such as farming, timbering, fishing, and trading was virtually impossible during this period. Instead, the French presence was represented by distant trading posts directly dependent on relationships with native inhabitants.⁶

French traders covered an area stretching from the shores of southern Nova Scotia, around the Bay of Fundy and south to the Penobscot River, a natural landmark that would eventually serve as the unofficial and contested border separating French and English imperial jurisdictions. After their monopoly was dissolved by French royal officials in 1607, Sieur de Monts and Samuel de Champlain abandoned their settlement at Port Royal and returned to Europe. Nearly three years later, however, the Crown’s policies again changed and Jean de Poutrincourt received royal permission to reestablish the trading colony at Port Royal. His successor, Charles de Biencourt, traveled southwest and constructed a similar fort at the mouth of the Penobscot River. Numerous other French traders followed close behind these early leaders and took up residence in Acadia. Among the most prominent were Claude de Saint-Étienne de La Tour and his son Charles who managed successful operations throughout the region, including Fort Lomeron at Cape Sable in 1624. The miniscule French population,

combined with its nearly complete economic dependence on local Wabanaki generally precluded distrust and aggression and fostered equitable relationships between French and native communities. Charles de Biencourt and Charles La Tour each boasted of their status as a “grand Sagamo” of the Micmac and Penobscot. Biencourt, in addition, was believed to have spent the end of his life living with the Micmac, and La Tour was married into a Micmac community by the 1620s.7

The dearth of French colonists, combined with the proximity of their trade interests to New England, also encouraged competition from English colonists to the south. This, in turn, ushered in a more belligerent and adversarial atmosphere to Wabanaki lands. Three years after Poutrincourt resuscitated the French presence at Port Royal, Virginia seaman Samuel Argall raided the Acadian coasts and destroyed most French trading settlements, including those at Port Royal and Saint Croix Island. The Plymouth Colony similarly backed the English confiscation of Biencourt’s lucrative trading station at the mouth of the Penobscot River. The tensions of Europe’s Thirty Years War also reverberated in a progressively-belligerent Wabanakia. Scotland used the occasion to assert a claim to French Acadia and subsequently occupied Port Royal for five years. From this strategic location, Scottish settlers raided the trading post recently established by Charles La Tour at the St. Johns River in 1631, prompting La Tour’s swift counterattack against nearby Machias, a new English settlement erected earlier that year. After Acadia was officially returned to French possession the

following year, officials at Versailles concentrated a renewed level of attention on the
colony’s future and appointed Isaac de Razilly its governor. After first ousting the
Scottish settlers, Razilly ordered his officer, Charles de Menou d’Aulnay to drive out
the Plymouth traders from Penobscot and reoccupy the post, a directive which he
accomplished with minimal opposition in 1635.8

The relentless Anglo-French antagonism over access to land and resources
introduced an unprecedented degree of imperial contention to Wabanakia. Indians were
now exposed to volatile and periodically violent European enmities that often
accompanied wide-ranging economic networks into their world. Just as it had for
generations of their ancestors, native participation in the Atlantic’s unpredictable and
disruptive complexes would continue to necessitate caution, careful management, and
shrewd manipulation. Wabanaki accordingly pursued a variety of avenues to rationalize
and manage the extensive demographic and environmental transformations spreading
along their coasts. That these permutations were the direct extension of Atlantic
processes was readily apparent to Indian communities by the early 1600s, as they
orchestrated acts of maritime aggression, adapted to new marine technologies and
cultivated a peculiar trans-Atlantic diplomacy to mitigate their most threatening effects.

But the accelerated development of these forces in subsequent decades
necessitated further measures. One such response involved a development and
integration of other more remote Algonquian economies beyond the familiar limits of

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8 Huia Ryder, “Biencourt de Saint-Just, Charles de,” in George W. Brown, ed., Dictionary of Canadian
Biography, I: 99-102; W.J. Eccles, The French in North America, 1500-1783 (East Lansing, MI:
Michigan State University Press, 1998), 16-19; Marcel Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 1524-
1603, 107-112; Kenneth M. Morrison, The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in
Abenaki-Euramerican Relations, 26; Bruce J. Bourque, Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in
Maine, 120-121.
Wabanakia. The proliferation of year-round Euro-American settlements and trading posts in close proximity to native seasonal encampments ensured greater numbers of Indian communities more convenient access to coveted trade goods. Yet a wider accessibility to European exchange relationships also eroded the longstanding trade monopoly enjoyed by many native mariners, including the Micmac. These northeastern Wabanaki subsequently aimed to reinforce their prominent position in exchange networks by extending the geographic reach of their maritime prowess.\(^9\)

Beginning in the 1630s, seaborne Indians were exploring and soon consistently exploiting with impunity new reserves of Euro-American trade goods and foodstuffs as far away as southern New England. To facilitate their long-range mobility, these marine-warriors continued to depend on “the conveniency and opportunity of the Rivers and Sea, which afforded a speedy passage” across northwest Atlantic waters, as Sir Ferdinando Gorges described native naval aggression by mid-century. By way of these salty corridors, Wabanaki frequently stormed the shores and plundered the communities of Massachusetts Indians and other Algonquians to the south. Such economically-driven amphibious assaults also had historical antecedents in the period before English colonization. During the earliest years of Plymouth Colony, for example, Governor William Bradford’s colonists were quickly learning from native accounts that the Massachusetts “were much afraid of the Tarentines, a people to the eastward which

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used to come in harvest time and take away their corn, and many times kill their persons.”

These Vikings of the early modern northeast had since become quite proficient at exploiting valuable extractive economies. And not only did their nautical command and extensive seafaring range facilitate these economic and martial enterprises, but the legendary status they achieved among the broader native northeast also worked to their advantage. This maritime power was so conspicuous that it had long garnered the respect of European explorers and settlers seeking assistance on Wabanaki waves, but its reputation had also grown to mythical proportions among other Algonquians to the south. The notion that this destructive armada resided somewhere in the nether regions of the northwest Atlantic, yet was capable of frequently surmounting this distance and exacting such effective violence by harnessing the sea, only served to amplify the terror spreading throughout southern New England. Even English settlers, Massachusetts Bay puritan Edward Johnson noted in 1650, were “being kept in awe” by their native neighbors’ horrifying “report of a cruel people, not far off called the Tarrantines.”

Upon one occasion the fretful Indians “came quaking and complaining of a barbarous and cruel people called the Tarratines who they said would eat such Men as they caught alive, tying them to a Tree, and gnawing their flesh by piece-meales off their Bones.” William Wood of Massachusetts Bay similarly detailed the impending doom that the looming specter of “the Tarrenteens” struck in the hearts of local Indians, who

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subsequently “do fear them as their deadly enemies.” As such this seafaring Wabanaki
danger was reputed to be “little less savage and cruel than...cannibals.”

So damaging were Wabanaki maritime raids in southern New England, and so
vulnerable were the region’s Algonquian inhabitants, that native victims consistently
depended on the nascent English settlements for protection. As early as 1621,
Plymouth governor William Bradford noted, nine Massachusetts sachems led by
Chikataubut signed a submission to King James for his paternal protection against the
Tarrentines. Such fears of the predatory Wabanaki had not abated by 1634, when
William Wood related a disconcerting occasion when “our Indians being busy about
their accustomed huntings, not suspecting them so near their own liberties, were on the
sudden surprised by them, some being slain, the rest escaping to their English asylum.”
Their esteemed sachem was among those gravely wounded in the assault, though he
was later “cured by English surgery.” The Indians who “came quaking and
complaining” about approaching Wabanaki warriors to colonist Edward Johnson in
Massachusetts likewise described them as “a strong and numerous people, and now
coming, which made them flee to the English.” The colonists, “who were but very few
in number at this time, and could make but little resistance, being much dispersed,”
Johnson continued, were also shaken by these hysterical reports, “yet did they keepe a
constant watch.”

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(Delmar, NY: Scholars’ Facsimiles & Reprints, 1974), 20, 50; William Wood, New England’s Prospect
(1634), ed. Alden T. Vaughan, 79.

Historical Society, 1912), I: 227; William Wood, New England’s Prospect (1634), ed. Alden T. Vaughan,
The lucrative trading partnership that southern New England Algonquians enjoyed with their English neighbors was, in fact becoming an extremely fruitful font of wealth for Wabanaki communities far to the northeast. It was precisely this new material exchange network that Micmac aimed to exploit and integrate into their own economic nexus. English fishermen-traders and Massachusetts Indians were cohabitating in native settlements near Ipswich by 1631, which in turn functioned as a vulnerable warehouse for Micmac raiders. In August of that year, Governor John Winthrop reported, “the Tarentines, to the number of one hundred, came in three canoes, and in the night assaulted the wigwam of the sagamore of Agawam.” After the headman’s possessions were pillaged, the marine-warriors then “rifled a wigwam where Mr. Cradock’s men kept to catch sturgeon” and “took away their nets and biscuit, etc.” Seven men were killed, several others wounded including Indians “John Sagamore, and James,” and many later died of wounds incurred in the raid. William Bradford’s Plymouth colonists frequently relied on the trade and good will of local native agriculturalists for much of their sustenance in the earliest years of settlement. When these Indian suppliers were raided “in harvest time” by Wabanaki aiming to “take away their corn,” the security of both native and English communities was seriously jeopardized.13

The amphibious assault of Agawam in 1631 provides certain telling insights into the assailants’ dynamic understanding of the Atlantic and its capacity to enrich and sustain their maritime world. Most notably, Indians continually enhanced their marine technology to facilitate the extension of economic and martial authority in the northeast.

Winthrop’s peculiar estimation of one hundred warriors storming the Massachusetts shore in only three canoes points to the likelihood that Wabanaki were constructing large-scale warring vessels that resembled smaller traditional canoes in material composition and structural design. English sailor John Josselyn encountered a similar specimen tacking off the southern New England coast in 1638, replete with “a deck, and trimmed with sails” atop the birchbark hull, and perhaps conveying another raiding party. The watercraft that landed at Agawam thus further typified Wabanaki’s ability and desire to manufacture large-scale oceangoing vessels outside the context of Euro-American trade, and utilize such technological advances to augment their command of Atlantic waters. Similarly indicative was their booty. Nearly a century and a half of contact with European fishermen acquainted Micmac seafarers with common deep-sea tackle, and their plundering of English fishing nets from Mr. Cradock’s wigwam reflected that familiarity. Such technology presumably returned with the Indian raiders to their communities where it was put to use in the Indians’ own maritime economy. The Wabanaki exploitation of increasingly distant material exchange networks, in sum, was directly sustained by their evolving nautical proficiencies, and in turn could enrich their longstanding harvest of the ocean’s natural resources.14

Yet Indians also pursued fundamentally terrestrial solutions in their response to the northeast’s demographic permutations and the economic reorientation that followed in their wake. The increasing Euro-American population in Wabanaki homelands presented native communities with wider access to the material advantages of Atlantic exchange networks. But successful participation in those complexes also demanded a

native economy centered on a more intensive harvest of inland furbearing mammals. This paradox of the Wabanaki Atlantic – an Atlantic that encouraged spatial and productive disconnection from it in order to successfully exploit its new economic opportunities – placed tremendous ecological pressure on the region’s natural resource base. Already by the 1650s and 1660s, the population of furbearers most valued in European markets began to dwindle in the Wabanaki interior. The escalating pace of colonial settlement and development of woodland habitats only exacerbated the emergent ecological and economic dilemma facing Indian communities, particularly in southern Maine where the English presence was most heavily concentrated. Wabanaki hunters and traders subsequently embarked on long-distance migrations to exploit newer and more reliable fur sources.

The English Atlantic world was at this time cohering from and chiefly characterized by the extensive mobility of Europeans, many of whom were motivated by economic and material opportunity. As one historian asserts, the experience of migration “secured, created, and ultimately defined the English Atlantic world.” The demographic transformations unleashed by this phenomenon in the native northeast, however, also functioned as the impetus driving Wabanaki migration to distant locales seldom if ever before experienced. This very process would ironically facilitate Indians’ manipulation, exploitation and contestation of that same English Atlantic world.\(^{15}\)

The nascent French settlements dotting the St. Lawrence River, entrepôt for the rich fur trade of the northern hinterlands, began attracting Wabanaki traders from Acadia and Maine shortly after their establishment. Enjoying a royal monopoly on the trade at the time, the Company of One Hundred Associates oversaw all operations related to the exchange of beaver with such partners as the Montagnais and Algonquins. The company was both curious and suspicious, then, when in 1637 twelve newcomers from an obscure Indian group appeared in Quebec inquiring of trade opportunities. The travelers were Wabanaki from the Kennebec River region, interested in cultivating new relationships with local Algonquians and French in order to divert their surplus of furs to Wabanaki traders far to the southeast. This more reliable, albeit distant, supply line would compensate for the deficiencies in fur production throughout the Dawnland, allowing native communities there to continue their now longstanding trade with New England. The Wabanaki visitors at Quebec instead encountered an entirely uncooperative and obstinate opposition. Both Governor Montmagny and Associates officials immediately feared that these people would “carry off the Beavers of these countries, to take them elsewhere.” The governor was visibly “displeased that these peddlers should come trafficking in the footsteps of the French,” and was not shy about conveying these sentiments to a local Montagnais sagamore and the leader of the Wabanaki delegation. The Indian newcomers, however, ignored the disobliging official and proceeded to Three Rivers where they hoped to enjoy more success with Algonquin traders. The exasperated governor accordingly informed the French commander at Three Rivers, who confiscated the Wabanaki’s firearms and ordered them to return home.  

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16 “Le Jeune’s Relation, 1637,” in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Jesuit Relations, XII: 187; Marcel Trudel,
Despite the unfavorable outcome of this initial exploratory mission, the prospects for future success were enough to encourage several more Wabanaki journeys over ensuing decades. In 1640, twenty more Kennebec Indians arrived by canoe in Sillery, this time transporting an Englishman from southern Maine in search of “some route through these countries to the sea of the North.” As ostensible guides for a vainglorious New England colonist, the large Kennebec party successfully forged ties with the Algonquian residents settled in this growing Jesuit reserve community. Governor Montmagny, however, prohibited the explorer’s journey of discovery, again complicating Wabanaki efforts. Not long after the Englishman was commanded to return to New England, several of the Indian guides had suddenly “fallen sick” and proved incapable of the long arduous journey back to the southeast. The governor was subsequently forced to procure the adventurer’s “return to England by way of France” while the Kennebecs lingered in Sillery.  

During the 1640s, Wabanaki travelers in New France modified their approach to this economic pursuit and soon expressed their desire for a resident Jesuit priest in their homelands. By clarifying their interest in establishing non-material bonds between their people and the French colony, the Wabanaki believed that dependable economic relationships would necessarily accompany them. In addition to this material pragmatism seemingly driving the desire for religious instruction, Indian faith in their own traditional spiritual and healing practices possibly began eroding in the wake of earlier epidemics that swept through northeastern communities with deadly force. The

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Kennebecs succeeded in acquiring a missionary by August, 1646 to assuage these multifaceted needs. Father Gabriel Druillettes, “the only frenchman with two canoes of Savages,” departed from Quebec for Wabanakia where he proceeded to learn the native language, establish a mission on the Kennebec River, and accompany Indian hunting parties on their strenuous winter forays. Druillettes consequently won the favor of many Kennebecs, who also trusted him to negotiate with Massachusetts authorities in Boston from 1650 to 1652 for protection against Iroquois incursions. The priest’s diplomatic efforts were in open violation of Massachusetts statutes which, beginning in May 1647, strictly outlawed the presence of any “Jesuite or spirituall or ecclesiasticall person, (as they are tearmed,) ordained by ye authority of ye pope or sea of Rome.” The Kennebec Wabanaki thus solidified religious ties to New France by exploiting the Jesuit order’s proselytizing fervor, itself born out of Europe’s post-Reformation religious pluralism, and in turn employed their missionary as an ambassador for native interests.  

The strategy of synthesizing material and non-material relationships with New France met with a level of success in the 1640s. Wabanaki visits to the St. Lawrence River settlements became commonplace throughout the decade, and not only resulted in regular kinship ties with other Algonquian peoples but also in the redirection of furs to the southeast. In July 1649, a contingent of thirty Indian traders from the Kennebec region again disembarked at Quebec. Though initially “notified that they are not to come again, and that their goods will be plundered if they return,” the Wabanaki

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remained for nearly a week and upon their eventual departure managed to “carry away 20 bundles of Beaver.” By 1672, this native presence about the French colony had hardly abated. In autumn of that year, “several Wabanaki” gathered near Quebec to observe Governor Frontenac administer an oath of fidelity and obedience to a crowd of colonial traders and merchants. The native onlookers were “so touched” by the ceremony, and the opportunity to further cement reciprocal socio-economic bonds, that they demanded the governor administer the same oath to them, a request which he obliged.19

Just as Micmac tapped into the rich trade partnership among Algonquians and English in southern New England, so too did southern Wabanaki aim to cultivate another access point to Atlantic exchange networks along the St. Lawrence. Supplies of European goods and native agricultural products pillaged from Massachusett and Narragansett settlements were regularly shipped far to the northeast where they sustained and enhanced Micmac communities. By the middle decades of the century, Wabanaki were also ameliorating their increasingly-depleted terrestrial economy by carefully cultivating vital economic and spiritual relationships with the French, all of which allowed them to divert greater quantities of furs to their homelands near the sea. Here these stores could be utilized to secure more favorable terms among English merchants in another exchange network.

While some Indians coped with the Dawnland’s changing demographics by expanding their terrestrial and seafaring range to exploit more distant sources of material wealth, others opted to ameliorate challenges closer to home. English settlers and fishermen who increasingly occupied Maine’s coastline and offshore islands not only disrupted native peoples’ economic relationship with their maritime world, but also undermined their terrestrial patterns of production and consumption through deceitful and belligerent trade practices. By aggressively confronting such disorder and dishonesty in their homelands and waters, Wabanaki could effectively retain their spatial and cultural proximity to the ocean while simultaneously redirecting material exchange networks to benefit native interests. This management strategy in large part marked a continuation of earlier efforts to maintain economic and cultural autonomy under new Atlantic pressures. Throughout the remainder of the seventeenth century, however, such goals were aggressively countered by colonial ambitions to dictate an exclusively Euro-American Atlantic world. Indians who targeted the detrimental effects of demographic and environmental transformations increasingly struggled to exert a degree of control over the changing character of their maritime world.

Wabanaki plans to mediate Euro-American coastal colonization necessitated a direct involvement in the initial settlement of English farmers, traders, and fishermen. Just as they had actively steered the course of Europe’s exploratory and colonizing ventures in the northeast, so too did they exploit opportunities to control the influx of English migrants in the 1620s. As early as 1625, Kennebec sagamores Samoset and Unongoit coordinated the settlement of English colonist John Brown from New Harbor, granting him permission to establish a homestead near Pemaquid that extended out to
“Muscongus Island, taking in the island.” In recompense for this tract of land, Brown paid the headmen “fifty skins,” reportedly to the full satisfaction of all parties involved. Incongruent conceptions of land ownership and the legitimacy of authority deeding such titles of course troubled relations between Euro and Native Americans throughout the colonial period. Despite confusion over technical understandings of property and usage, Samoset and Unongoit’s grant served as a means of managing demographic change in their country and directing the tangible benefits of trade that would likely stem from Brown’s proximity to native communities. This opportunity was immediately affirmed in their reception of the English settler’s furs.20

Positioning themselves at the center of these demographic developments also permitted Wabanaki to enhance the material welfare of their communities in the midst of their changing economic culture. By 1628, Indians were traveling as far as the Isles of Shoals ten miles off southern Maine to investigate and trade with the burgeoning fishing settlements now occupying the familiar archipelago. The eagerness of these southern Wabanaki to traverse such significant expanses to establish economic relationships with Euro-Americans indicated both the sophistication of their nautical aptitude and their successful cultivation of direct access points to trans-Atlantic material networks. Such trends further undermined the once impenetrable monopoly enjoyed by their northeastern Wabanaki neighbors.21


When Euro-American colonization of the Dawnland’s seaboard proceeded outside the purview of native inhabitants, circumventing Indian efforts to mediate its course and harness its potential, Wabanaki pursued measures to ensure equitable relations along the coast. Notorious English traders such as Walter Bagnall, who frequently cheated Indians from his post on Richmond’s Island off Cape Elizabeth in Maine, were eventually subject to the retaliatory aggression of Wabanaki warriors. After three years of dishonest dealing and “many abuses,” Bagnall and his family were killed in a raid on his island truckhouse in 1631. Massachusetts governor John Winthrop evidently believed that native justice had been properly served, as he chose not to pursue, or exacerbate, the matter any further. Not long thereafter, English colonists responded with their own method of justice, and an Indian named Black Will was found hanged on the island. Unsurprisingly, Richmond’s Island continued to be a bloody and contested site over ensuing years. When the fiercely competitive Cleeves and Trelawney factions embroiled native traders here in 1636, Wabanaki responded with further armed incursions that destroyed significant quantities of settlers’ property.²²

The influx of colonial settlement elsewhere along the Maine coast, accompanied by further incidents of English trading fraud, encouraged Wabanaki to continually adopt a more forceful defense of their economic and cultural interests. Sir Ferdinando Gorges

complained repeatedly in the 1620s of the corrupting influence of English fishermen on native relations. In 1632, trader Nicholas Frost of Damariscove off Cape Newagen faced the ire of Massachusetts authorities for stealing furs from nearby Indians. Five years later, John Cosens was similarly ordered to make amends for his dishonest ways, and “give full satisfaction to an Indian for wrongs don to him.” It was little wonder, then, that by 1642 Sir Ferdinando Gorges’ nephew Thomas Gorges dreaded the collapse of his tenuous settlement in the same region. The “money is quite gone,” Gorges lamented, with “the trade of beaver utterly lost,” a predicament caused by “the Indians understanding the valew of things as well as the Inglish” and refusing to settle for any terms failing to meet their demands. Not helping matters was one local merchant’s “great loss” a few months prior “in a barke that was cast away at that time in a harbor in the bay” loaded with “the Trade commodityes for the Indians.” By September of 1642, local English traders experienced more urgent problems from “divers Insolencies” exacted by cheated Wabanaki warriors. “Mr. Purchase house they broke up” near the mouth of the Pejepscot River, whence they “came and toke his goods before his wifes face,” Gorges reported. From other settlements they “stole a quantity of fish.” Colonists’ inequitable manipulation of exchange networks not only worked to entrench the English presence between Wabanaki communities and their sea, but also threatened native interests now being served by new Atlantic opportunities. Indians’ responses to these unsettling pressures aimed to counter the disorder that they unleashed.23

Despite the aggressive course of action forged by Wabanaki to correct the injustices of trade, circumstances largely failed to improve through the middle decades of the century. Rather, the extensive web of material exchange that long served as a valuable opportunity emanating from the Atlantic increasingly functioned as a wedge with which English settlers penetrated Wabanakia, colonized its coasts, and undermined native power. Kennebec Indians, in particular, bore the brunt of these invasive pressures as trading posts gradually spread northeastward after epidemics and a deteriorating resource base displaced Indians from the southern Maine coast. From their distant seat of governance, concerned authorities from Plymouth Colony were aiming by 1659 to rein in their traders in the region. After receiving “good information that things are in such a posture att Kennebecke” as to foster both a total collapse of the industry and widespread native hostility, leaders were demanding answers. Such “troubles amongst the Indians” were caused by “some of them being slayne, some carried away, and therby alsoe discurraged,” consequently resulting in “a present desisting from theire hunting, and soe a sessacion of the trad.” Compounding the problems were the plethora of settlers “trading wine and other strong liquors with the Indians,” who “in theire drunkenes committ much horred wickednes.” Other anxious provincial authorities whose jurisdiction included Casco Bay extended the reach of previous laws forbidding “the trayding of any liquors to the Indeans” to encompass “all the lymitts of this Province” in 1666.24

Wabanaki’s relationship with their maritime world faced mounting pressure not only from traders’ illicit manipulation of Atlantic economic networks, but also from the same governmental agencies that occasionally endeavored to curb them. Indeed by the 1650s, New England authorities were growing quite cognizant of a profoundly dangerous combination; troublesome English-Indian relations plaguing the northeastern frontier, coupled with Wabanaki’s seafaring presence, was a calamity in the making for the budding colonial projects. This striking nautical prowess, in fact, was fresh in the minds of Massachusetts leaders after one Indian mariner from distant Cape Sable arrived in Boston in 1646 having “received & pylated our men home after they were left on shore” by French settlers in Acadia. Legislators promptly voted to compensate the native seaman generously for his efforts. Shortly after laying claim to coastal Maine settlements in 1653, Massachusetts likewise passed a statute forbidding the cross-cultural exchange of valuable English marine technology. After “takeinge into consideration the necessitie of restrayninge from the Indians whatsoever may be a means to disturbe our peace & quiet,” the colony declared, no one shall “in any way give Sell barter or Dispose of any boate Skiff or any greater vessel unto any Indian or Indians…upon penalty of fifty pounds.” A similar law was jointly passed by colonies enjoying trading rights along the Kennebec River, ordering that “noe boates barques or any tackling…bee sould to any Indian.”

New England’s early statutory attempts to police the potentially catastrophic dissemination of European nautical equipment testified at once to Wabanaki’s maritime reputation as well as to English anxieties over its dire potential. But in the eyes of native northeasterners, a troubling pattern continued to unfold. The implementation of such colonial policies, concurrent with the increasing saturation of southern coastal Maine with Euro-American fishermen, farmers, lumberers, and traders who exploited or displaced Indian communities, signaled a confluence of threatening pressures. Now, more than any time in their past, Wabanaki faced concerted efforts to disorder and reorient their longstanding relationship with their Atlantic world.

By the 1670s, mistrust and misunderstanding had come to define native-colonial relations throughout the wider region. Many Algonquians to the south of Wabanakia, motivated by grievances nearly identical to their northeastern native neighbors, joined Wampanoag leader Metacom in armed incursions against English colonialism in 1675. More was required, however, to incite open war in the Dawnland. Most historians now understand the conflagration that would engulf northeastern New England from 1676 to 1677 as an entirely separate incident from King Philip’s War. Indeed while congruent pressures related to land dispossession and fraudulent colonial trade practices plagued nearly all northeastern Algonquian communities at the time, these injustices elicited divergent responses in the north and south.27

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A series of renewed and unmistakable assaults against the Wabanaki’s Atlantic relationship served as the impetus finally compelling them to pursue a strategy similar to Metacom’s. Among the most intolerable of these violations was a colonial policy that prohibited Wabanaki from possessing firearms. Massachusetts hoped to contain the conflagration of King Philip’s War in southern New England, and orchestrated a concerted campaign to disarm all northeastern Indians shortly after the war’s commencement. By 1675, firearms had become critical to Wabanaki’s changing economy that now functioned as a component of larger trans-Atlantic networks of material exchange. This Atlantic economy valued the resources of the interior forests above those of the ocean, and thereby encouraged native adaptation to European guns to facilitate their participation in new exchange complexes. When Massachusetts banned Indian ownership of firearms, the results were thus devastating. Shortly after its implementation, Pemaquid trader Thomas Gardner foresaw the disastrous consequences of this policy for colonists and Indians alike, warning Governor Leverett in September 1675 that “these Indians Amongst us live most by Hunting” and questioning “how we Can Take Away their Armes whose livelihood depends of it.” “These Indians in these parts did never Appear dissatisfied until their Arms were Taken Away,” he further stressed. By the following year, Gardner’s suspicions were confirmed after a particularly severe winter hunting season. “Divers the last winter for want of Powder

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died in the Country,” he and other concerned Pemaquid residents explained to Boston officials, “having nothing to kill.”

Wabanaki, too, issued stern warnings to colonial leaders about the injustice of their arms control policy. In a letter to the “Govanaur of boston” written on behalf of his people in 1677, Kennebec sagamore Moxes informed the colony that “we are willing to trad with you” but “we want powder.” “Because there was war at naragans [Narragansett],” Moxes protested, “you com here when we were quiet & took away our gons” and “for want of our gons there was severall starved” over the preceding winters. Despite these distressing setbacks, the headman still wished to dictate Indian terms from a position of power, and reminded the governor that “we are owners of the country & it is wide and full of engons & we can drive you out.” Moxes’ ultimatum thus struck to the heart of the Wabanaki economic quandary by the 1670s; English colonization reoriented Indians’ productive efforts away from the Atlantic to conform with exchange networks in it, but now destabilized that new economy by outlawing its chief mode of production.

If any Wabanaki as yet remained skeptical that the disturbing trends coalescing throughout the seventeenth century were fundamentally Atlantic-centered or that they represented a grave and irrevocable danger to their pelagic autonomy, their doubts were

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allayed by further colonial acts of maritime aggression. In July 1676, a crew of English seamen led by Captain Laughton approached a coastal Wabanaki community near Machias under pretence of trade. Several of the Indians, many of whom were Micmac visiting with one of their sagamores, came aboard the ship to exchange goods with Laughton’s men when suddenly they were “most perfidiously and wickedly” captured and taken out to sea. As they had multiple times in the past, those Wabanaki left on shore watched as several of their kin were enslaved and forced to endure another Atlantic voyage at the hands of Euro-American sailors. Laughton’s vessel disappeared into the eastern horizon “to lands beyond the Sea,” eventually sailing to the Azores Islands where his native cargo was unloaded and sold into slavery. Two Indians somehow managed to procure their freedom and return home. These fortunate few certainly proceeded to relate stories of their experiences to kin, contributing once again to Wabanaki’s ever-expanding understanding of their boundless and mysterious Atlantic world. Years later, colonial authorities in Boston would acknowledge the calamitous fallout from the deceit, “which the Indians in those Parts look upon as an Injury done to themselves.” This “perfidious & unjust dealing of som English,” inhabitants of Pemaquid in Maine likewise wrote to colonial officials, was the chief “Cause of the Indians Rising.”

The slave raid along coastal Wabanakia was not an isolated incident of English maritime hostility. While the northwest Atlantic was periodically the locus of tension

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and violence since the earliest days of native-European contact in the sixteenth century, it also served Indians with valuable exchange opportunities linking disparate worlds. Native participants in these economic complexes understood their benefits as outweighing the cultural threats occasionally accompanying them. Indeed this dual and ambivalent perception of the Atlantic had long been present in native northeastern society. But by the middle of the seventeenth century, the risks began to overshadow the rewards. As early as the 1620s, colonial proprietor Ferdinando Gorges was regularly decrying the detrimental effects of Euro-American seamen on Wabanaki communities, and foretelling the impending doom such relations would spell for the future stability of colonial ventures. By 1675, Indians were now retreating from their coastal settlements at the first sight of Anglo-American seafarers. Thomas Gardner of Pemaquid informed Massachusetts governor John Leverett in that year that the Wabanaki so strongly associated the English maritime presence with violence and disorder that they “only fly for fear from Any boats or English they see & good Reason for they well Know it may Cost them their Lives if the wild fishermen meet with them.” When Massachusetts Captain Sylvanus Davis shortly thereafter ordered a community of Kennebec Indians to remain encamped within sight of the English garrison at Casco Bay, the Indians responded by sending messengers “abroad to Johns River and to the Sea Side to get all the Indians they could together to come up Penobscot River.” Despite its longstanding status in the Wabanaki cosmology as a progenitor of life-sustaining opportunity, the ocean had become an unmistakably dangerous stage of foreign aggression and violence.³¹

Within a few months of the amphibious assault at Machias, Saco River Wabanaki down the coast suffered an equally egregious attack from the east. Like their neighbors, these Saco Indians were one day surprised and assailed by a “rude and indiscreet Act of some English Seamen.” The sudden hostility involved a number of sailors who accosted a native party traveling on the sea. Reportedly curious to determine “whether the Children of the Indians as they had heard, could swim as naturally as any other Creatures,” the English singled out a mother in one of the canoes and “wittingly cast her Child in the Water.” Nearby Indians struggled desperately to save the drowning boy, but to no avail. Retribution for the murder would not go unheeded according to Wabanaki justice, particularly since the native woman and her dead child were, unbeknownst to the English seamen, the wife and son of Squando, principal sagamore of the Saco River. The aggrieved headman consequently assumed a prominent role in the ensuing war with New England. As one Kennebec sagamore indicated to the Massachusetts government two years later, it was “Squando Ingons that did all the hurt.” The same menacing forces that once afflicted Gluskap’s seaborne journeys, it seemed, still lurked among the salty waves, retaining their malevolent power.32

To avenge these maritime assaults, and ensure the protection of their communities from similar threats, Indian marine-warriors targeted what they perceived to be the locus of this danger. From 1676 to 1677, Wabanaki launched repeated attacks against New England’s Atlantic presence in the northeast, transforming the waters of a

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lucrative colonial fishery into an extraordinarily perilous and occasionally bloody maelstrom. In the immediate wake of King Philip’s War, this strategic violence also exposed the costly frailties and precarious existence of colonial and imperial regimes in this corner of the ocean, and the continuing authority of Wabanaki maritime culture and nautical force.

Campaigns of native seaborne violence against the English Atlantic were carefully coordinated and skillfully executed by Indian leaders and experienced Indian marines. Mogg Heigon, sagamore from the Saco River region, accumulated a formidable Wabanaki navy and spearheaded multiple amphibious assaults in fall of 1676, boldly declaring to one English captive “how they do in tend to take veseles and so to go to all the fishing ilandes and so to drive all the contre before them.” With their vision of a native Atlantic world then fully restored, Mogg believed that his Wabanaki forces “hath found the way to burn boston” and deal the coup d’état to English maritime colonialism in the Dawnland. The native headman’s confidence in his nautical prowess and naval strategy likely stemmed from his earlier upbringing in close proximity to colonial fishing settlements and intimate interactions with coastal traders and fishermen. In their histories of colonial Massachusetts, chronicler William Hubbard and royal governor Thomas Hutchinson both asserted that Mogg “had from a Child been well acquainted with the English” since “He had lived, from a child, in English families.” By melding his culture’s rich maritime heritage with a sophisticated knowledge of European seafaring technology, the Saco River sagamore enhanced southern Wabanaki culture with the proficiencies to enforce and augment their Atlantic vision.33

The conspicuous though militarily vulnerable colonial presence in northeastern waters offered Mogg Heigon’s warriors a lucrative opportunity to both rectify past English misdeeds and confiscate valuable sailing ships. “Captain Mog,” as colonial officials soon titled him, accordingly split his force of one hundred Indian marines into two companies, sending one to attack Jewels Island in Casco Bay, while he proceeded with the other to the mouth of the Kennebec River where they attacked and seized an English fishing shallop. His crew then sailed to nearby Damaras Cove, “for they had intelligence of a catch and a sloop” also anchored there. The Indians succeeded in defeating the English crews, though they were only able to hijack the sloop. On October 12, a month after these initial victories, Mogg’s quickly growing fleet succeeded in laying siege to the English garrison at Black Point, the strongest colonial fortification on the northeastern frontier. Later that day, in the campaign’s culminating victory, they commandeered a hefty thirty-ton ketch docked at Richmond’s Island to load the supplies of fleeing settler, Walter Gendal. This island, once a valuable sea-hunting and fishing stage for Wabanaki, had since become a bloody and contested site between Indian traders and dishonest and competitive colonial settlers such as Bagnall, Cleeves and Trelawney.  

Far from a haphazard ambush, the successful apprehension of Gendal’s large cargo ship required a considerable degree of forethought and coordination with the ocean’s natural rhythms. Waiting until they observed “the Wind blowing in hard upon”

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the English so that “they could not get out of the Harbour,” the Indians commenced their attack by pouring heavy gunfire at the ship’s crew. Meanwhile, some “manned out a Canoo with several Hands to cut their Cable” while others continued their bombardment of the vessel. The boat drifted ashore where waiting Indians boarded it and procured the surrender of the English. They then sailed their latest prize up the coast. By enhancing their nautical culture with the acquisition of powerful sailing vessels, the Wabanaki force continued an increasingly customary strategy of staving off the most invasive aspects of colonialism with Euro-American marine technology. “I know not the cause of your so cruel Irruption upon our people,” an alarmed Massachusetts government wrote, pleading with the Indian leader to call off his warriors. Mogg was unwavering, English captive Francis Card later testified, and “doth make his brag and laf at the english and saith that he hath found the way to burn boston.” Though his plans for the destruction of Massachusetts never reached completion – he was persuaded to sail to Boston to make peace with colonial authorities – the tenacity of Mogg’s seafaring exploits further demonstrated the resiliency of this maritime power along what was nominally New England’s coast.  

By the following year, Micmac Wabanaki with ambitions congruent to Mogg’s Saco River warriors were similarly targeting the English maritime presence. This retributive violence was launched in the immediate wake of the troubling events at Machias, where dozens of Indian men, women and children were captured and sold into overseas slavery. Robert Roules, crewman on board the Salem fishing ketch William

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and Sarah, experienced this retaliatory aggression firsthand, realizing too the utter ineptitude of his colony’s authority beyond the shores of southern Massachusetts. Off the coast of southern Nova Scotia, a canoe of ten Micmac quietly approached Roules’ ship laying at anchor laden with fish and “came suddenly on board of us” in the early morning hours of one July day in 1677. “With their arms ready fixed, loaded and cocked,” the Indians took the entire crew prisoner and bound them together on the deck of the ketch, informing them that “they intended to kill all of us, and all the Englishmen, being in number twenty six, including boys.” After rendezvousing the next day with four vessels taken by another native naval force, the warriors “commanded us and the other ketches to sail together for Penobscot,” Roules related. Adroitly orchestrating the operation was a regional sagamore who ordered his marines – “there being seventy or eighty of them” – to disperse themselves evenly throughout the vessels to more effectively implement their strategy. After spotting another English fishing vessel the pressed colonial seamen were ordered to come up alongside her, while an oblivious Mr. Watts, its captain, noticed nothing alarming about the English crews. At the right moment, the Indians in Roules’ boat suddenly “rose up and told Capt. Watts if he did not strike they were all dead men.” The captain did not hesitate to comply, and his ketch was then boarded by a number of Indians who quickly “divided and mixed the Englishmen in the different vessels with themselves,” weakening the numerical strength of each crew and allowing themselves to more easily maintain control over their growing navy. In this position, Roules recounted, the captive sailors were again “commanded to give chase” to another unsuspecting fishing boat passing on the
horizon. Such skillful tactics indicate that Wabanaki continued to resort to a militaristic management of their maritime world through properly executed naval strategies.36

Similar native efforts toward a reclamation of the Atlantic had become commonplace in New England waters during the summer of 1677. Wabanaki seafarers took “no less than thirteen Ketches of Salem” alone in this season, captivating and pressing the crews into their navy’s service, and subsequently striking “great consternation into all people” in the colonial port. Another chronicler lamented the surprise of “near twenty of those fishing Ketches” away on voyages to the eastward. Once hardy and rugged fishermen now returned to Salem reduced to broken and battered casualties clinging to life, like Captain Ephraim How of New Haven, “the only survivor of his crew” taken by Micmac warriors, or the “19 wounded men” teetering on the brink of death who arrived at the docks one day. So devastated had the regional economy become this summer that John Higginson, Jr. and other residents of Salem petitioned the Governor’s Council that “a Vessell with forty or fifty men well-fitted” be sent to “recapture their fishing vessels taken by the Indians and to prevent further loss.” This plea was hastened by rumors that the “Indians purposed to pursue four more of our Ketches.” In addition to the government’s acquiescence, another “Ketch with 40 men was sent out of Salem as a man of war” to recover a number of ships still in Indian possession.37


Wabanaki marines went to great lengths to preserve their prize ships seized during this war for the Atlantic, and continued to utilize them to enhance mobility and maintain a commanding maritime presence. Commandeering, acculturating and conserving foreign sailing technology, furthermore, was often aided by Indians’ intimate knowledge of their natural marine environment, including the region’s rugged coastal landscape. In their siege of Richmond’s Island in 1676, for example, Captain Mogg’s squadron harnessed an oceanic weather system to successfully coordinate the attack. Such sophisticated nautical skills permitted another crew of Wabanaki seamen to elude an English reconnaissance mission prowling the waters around Mount Desert Island in summer, 1677. This force of Salem men – likely defeated fishermen aiming to recover their boats and employment – one day “spied a saile coming downe ye river” and “made her to be a Ketch” commanded by Indians. But when the colonists “bore up upon her…she claped close upon a wind & shott into a Cruell & most formidable place” where the English sailors dared not venture in their larger craft. Thomas Cobbit and John Abbot, English prisoners pressed into service aboard one of Captain Mogg’s warships, likewise described how “the Indians made them to sayl for them” up the coast and into the mouth of the Sheepscot River, where the vessel “was moored for all the Winter” and thus hidden for future use. Sailing vessels were not incidental spoils of war to Wabanaki warriors more focused on terrestrial motives and tactics, but rather assets of tremendous importance for maintaining and augmenting a native maritime world. Technology of such significance not only demanded strategic targeting but also careful protection after its acquisition.38

Indians also valued the maritime labor that often accompanied their prize ships during the war, and took steps to guarantee the long-term retention of both. After forcing Thomas Cobbit and John Abbot to anchor Mogg’s newly acquired ship in the Sheepscot River for the winter, their Indian captors later “caused the said Abbot to fit up the Vessel (being a Pinnace of about thirty Tun)” in preparation for their next expedition. With their English prisoner providing the manpower, the Wabanaki force intended to travel back out to sea and up to the Penobscot River, making Abbot “to sayl up that River as far as they could and then leaving their Vessel to proceed on with their Canooes” to Canada. Robert Roules’ men were similarly “commanded” by Micmac marines “to sail our vessel towards Penobscot” in the summer of 1676. After they first rendezvoused with four other Indian-captured vessels, the native seamen again “commanded us and the other ketches to sail together for Penobscot.” Later, Roules was “compelled…to haile” another English ship on the horizon. Indian mariners had by this time not only developed a routine practice of confiscating English ships and appropriating their labor, but also sought measures to ensure the longevity and productivity of both.  

The intensive efforts of Wabanaki mariners to retain their confiscated ships were often so successful that they confounded English authorities, settlers and fishermen reconnoitering Atlantic waters in search of them. Gravely concerned with their colony’s deteriorating fishing economy in an increasingly turbulent native Atlantic, Boston leaders in early 1677 organized a scouting mission to coastal Maine in hopes of

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recouping the staggering number of lost fishing boats. The authorities also assured one distraught fisherman that they were “sensibly Affected with the Losse of your sonne, together with the takeing of your Ketch” by Indian mariners, and promised to determine precisely “what they doe with your Vessels.” During winter of the same year, Major Richard Waldron received vague directives from clueless superiors ordering him to root out “the enemy at Kinnebeck or elsewhere,” who were likely residing at inland hunting camps during this season, and “with all silence & secresy” secure the “delivery of all the Captives & Vessels in their hands.”

To Wabanaki, sailing ships were also coveted as lucrative bargaining chips able to advance native interests during the formulation of peace agreements. At a conference in Maine in 1677, Indian delegates led by the Saco River sagamore Squando willingly acquiesced to certain minor concessions regarding English land usage, but grew irritated and intransigent when the Massachusetts commissioners repeatedly insisted on the return of their watercraft. Revealing just how indispensible sailing ships had become to their native counterparts, the English officials subsequently complained to their superiors in Boston that “the greatest difficult[y]” they ran up against with Squando’s diplomats concerned “the Restoration of the Ketches.” It was “contrary to our Expectation,” the astonished commissioners announced, when the boats were eventually released by Penobscot sagamore Madockawando, but only after tenacious negotiations. Seaborne acts of native violence were thus neither chance encounters nor frivolous diversions from land-based aggression in 1676 and 1677, but rather calculated and

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sustained conflicts with unambiguous objectives. To Wabanaki, nothing short of their maritime world was at stake.\textsuperscript{41}

Colonial authorities and settlers understood as much, and continued ramping up their efforts to sever Wabanaki relationships to their ocean. While native proximity to landed sites of English habitation such as farms and lumbering operations also posed a tremendous threat to the future security of New England, an Indian command of the adjacent saltwater world proved a more pressing problem. Indeed a successful incorporation of the northeastern frontier into larger imperial networks was directly contingent on its secure and unimpeded access to the Atlantic and sustained protection of the fishery. Military officers stationed in Maine were thus persuading the Massachusetts government by January, 1676, to fortify the coast against Wabanaki settlement. “If the shoare were in some places garrisoned,” Captain Silvanus Davis argued, “the fishery (which is the staple comoditie of the country) may be continued.”

Even long after the quelling of land-based hostilities in early 1678, Salem fishermen continued to implore the government to stabilize their threatened fishery. John Price along with “Several other owners of fishing Ketches,” were alerting the Massachusetts legislature as late as 1681 that “ye Indians designe to Surprize said Ketches fishing neer Cape Sables” in Nova Scotia. The alarmed mariners, perhaps still reeling from the destruction of their trade a few years prior, asked the General Court to direct “ye

Comitty of militia of Salem...to press both vessels [and] men to send into those parts” to scour the waters for Indians.\textsuperscript{42}

The official course of action mandated by colonial leadership during the war also took direct aim at the Wabanaki Atlantic. Just as the statutory patterns of the 1650s endeavored to immobilize and police the native maritime presence, so too did New York governor Edmund Andros now pursue a strategy to displace Wabanaki from the sea and confine them to land. Andros was granted jurisdiction over much of the Maine frontier on behalf of James, Duke of York, to whom a patent to the region had been granted in 1665. When Massachusetts proved unable to effectively manage the spreading conflagration by 1677, Andros intervened and quickly implemented a marine stratagem. His chief officer, Lieutenant Anthony Brockholtz, was ordered in September to first “secure the Open Sea Coasts and Islands,” carefully ensuring that “no Coasters or Interlopers” be allowed on the seas. Those discovered were to be made prize, Andros declared. “The Indians,” furthermore, were “not to go to ye fishing Islands,” nor were any of Brockholtz’s sailors “to trust any Indians.” Two weeks later, the commanding officer at Pemaquid garrison was similarly instructed to allow “no Indians to go to the fishing Islands” so as to “prevent all Inconveniencies or occasions of difference.” While Wabanaki relied on the network of offshore islands as stages for fishing and hunting expeditions at this time in their seasonal cycle, Mogg Heigon and other marine-warriors throughout the region’s waters had also incorporated them in

their naval strategy. To both Andros and Indians like Mogg, safety ashore demanded security afloat.43

By the war’s conclusion in 1678, then, a distinctive pattern of government action had coalesced, and its ominous design was not going unnoticed in Wabanaki circles. Buttressed with both state-sponsored and extralegal acts of aggression by colonial settlers, sailors, and soldiers, this scheme aimed to cleanse the northwest Atlantic of its longstanding native presence. Only then could the seas be rendered hospitable to New England’s vision of the Atlantic world, one more amenable to regional and imperial networks of communication and trade.

When the conflagration of land and seaborne violence erupted in northern New England in late 1675, the previously localized interests of Wabanaki communities underwent a process of reorientation. The disorderly pressures of English colonialism, which chiefly included the struggle to contain and redefine the native Atlantic, increasingly confronted distinct Indian groups and fostered the transformation of Wabanaki concerns into a more widespread and unified response. Kennebec warriors elected to abandon their settlement on the Kennebec River “and went Eastward” in September, 1675 to garner support and unite their efforts with the Penobscots, a group that had thus far been tangentially effected by Euro-American settlement. Kennebec envoys were accordingly “sent abroad to [St.] Johns River,” the residence for Maliseet Wabanaki far up the Acadian coast, “and to the Sea Side to get all the Indians they could together to come up Penobscot River.” An ancient epicenter of native cultures,

the Penobscot region was emerging as both a refuge for southern Wabanaki groups exposed more directly to the ambit of colonial English power, and a diplomatic center for the advancement of goals increasingly linking those neighboring native communities.\textsuperscript{44}

The Atlantic Ocean itself, coupled with Euro-American sailing ships co-opted by Indians in it, also facilitated the centralization of Wabanaki interests during wartime. As they had for generations, Indians continually adapted their use of the sea as an avenue of mobility and a conduit for extending authority beyond the confines of their shores. In so doing, they retained a dynamic, though familiar, connection to the ocean by modifying its function to meet new challenges confronting their society. Before launching their naval campaign in fall of 1676, for example, the Indians in Captain Mogg’s squadron initially “cam down cenebeck reuer [river],” but after securing a number of victories at sea retreated up the coast to the Sheepscot River. From there, one contingent of native seamen sailed back out to sea, ultimately “intending for Penobscot,” and “from thence to sayl up that River as far as they could.” Another party proceeded via land and rivers “in a Canoo about fifty five Miles farther to Penobscot.” Farther out to the northeast, Micmac mariners also aimed to transport their prize ships and captive maritime labor up the Penobscot for a rendezvous with Indians there. After commandeering a Marblehead fishing ketch in summer of 1677, Indian warriors ordered the pressed English crew “to sail our vessel towards Penobscot,” though plans were later amended in order to join other Micmac ships encountered en route. The following day the newly-mustered convoy was “commanded…to sail together for Penobscot.”

\textsuperscript{44} William Hubbard, \textit{A Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New England}, 36; Bruce J. Bourque, \textit{Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine}, 153-154.
Perhaps because of its near equidistance to far removed Kennebec and Micmac centers of power, the Penobscot was emerging not simply as a place of refuge for disaffected southern Wabanaki, but also as an isolated waterway ideal for secreting away large oceangoing vessels.\footnote{Francis Card’s Declaration,” in James Phinney Baxter, ed., \textit{Baxter Manuscripts} VI: 149; Horatio Hight, “Mogg Heigon – His Life, His Death, and Its Sequel,” in \textit{Collections of the Maine Historical Society}, V: 350-351; William Hubbard, \textit{A Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New-England}, 57-58, 65.}

The ascendant political leader of this coalescing conglomeration was himself somewhat of a cosmopolitan traveler throughout Wabanakia. Madockawando was originally born along the far northeastern coast of Maine near Machias, likely to Maliseet parents. Machias was also the location of the egregious violation of trust during the summer of 1676, when English seamen captured thirty-two native men, women and children and sold them into slavery in the Azores. Madockawando achieved his prominent position as sagamore, however, not among a community there but far to the southwest as an adopted son of Assiminisqua, sagamore of the Kennebec Wabanaki. When the pressures of English colonization in southern Maine turned violent, Madockawando migrated with several Kennebecs to the northeast, where he was believed by the English to be “chief Commander of the Indians Eastward about Penobscot.” Indeed the sagamore acquired tremendous respect in the region, and earned the allegiance of other Kennebecs who had remained in the south with Squando, their headman. “The cheife Sachems name of kennebeck with whom wee have made the peace,” Massachusetts commissioners believed by the end of the war, “is head of all the Indians from Piscataqua to Ponobscutt. Squandos men & all ye Rest having put themselves under him.” The Penobscot sagamore also successfully exercised influence
over the Wabanaki navy in 1676, persuading Captain Mogg to travel to Boston to secure a favorable peace “in the Name of Madockawando, the Chief of all the Indians in the Eastern Parts about Penobscot.”

Madockawando’s authority among the diversifying community at Penobscot also extended to the quickly growing cache of prize sailing ships, an asset of invaluable worth to native mariners. After losing several schooners and sloops to Indians in 1676, one fisherman was promised by Massachusetts officials in January 1677 that they would get to the bottom of the matter by “goeing to penobscott” to determine exactly “what they doe with your Vessells.” “Wherefore at the said penobscott,” the bewildered authorities hoped, “wee shall have full Intelligence of said matters.” The cocksure reconnaissance mission evidently failed, since later that summer English officials were still baffled as to the whereabouts of the boats. When a persistent Lieutenant Anthony Brockholtz attempted to secure the return of the vessels at a peace conference in August, he was stonewalled by an intransigent Squando. Days later, however, Madockawando arrived and acquiesced to “a Surrender of the Ketches &c. which hee with his Indyans assented unto, almost contrary to our Expectation, Wee having but slender hopes thereof, & no great Grounds.” Brockholtz remained so dubious that he promised the Andros government “to give notice of the Ketches at their Arrival.”


This transformation of Wabanaki socio-political structure, however, did not suddenly emerge during wartime without historical antecedents. It was instead the latest expression of a trend developing for decades. As early as the 1640s, the confluence of native ambitions in the northeast, and the subsequent collaboration of distinct Wabanaki ethnic groups, targeted the ever more frequent and increasingly insufferable inequities of exchange. Those Indians who launched retributive raids against colonial traders along the southern Maine coast in 1642 were, according to trader Thomas Gorges, “noe other…but Kinnebecke Indians” who were joining their efforts with other native communities as distant as the Penobscots. “They have all combined themselves together from Penobscot to the [South] to cut off the English,” an anxiety-ridden Gorges complained to colonial proprietors in England. “These meetings are often, dangerous words have they vented,” he continued, resulting in “divers Insolencies” including the theft of “a quantity of fish” from another trader’s home. By coordinating acts of aggressive resistance in southern Maine with diffuse native communities throughout the northeast, Kennebec Indians aimed to ameliorate colonists’ unjust manipulations of exchange networks and reassert their longstanding claim to coastal Wabanakia. Such interests were assuming a universal salience among Wabanaki people.48

While Indians themselves worked past former animosities in order to augment their security and sovereignty, colonial leaders at times reinforced this centralizing tendency in Wabanaki society. Rawandagon, principal headman of the Kennebec Indians by the 1650s, enjoyed his authority in part from his geographic proximity to the

ocean near the mouth of the Kennebec River, and consequently to English traders, fishermen and settlers. Robin Hood, as he became known to local colonists and distant officials, not only enhanced his prestige with the economic fruits of these valuable relationships, but was also endowed with a privileged authority from a colonial government striving to enforce its own agenda. After receiving complaints from several frontier settlers concerning the destruction of their livestock in the summer of 1667, the Massachusetts General Court directed their efforts to exact restitution to “Robin Hood Chief Sachem of the Indians about Kenibeck.” Numerous settlers observed “Some of your men,” the legislators pointed out, “Shooting, wounding, and killing sundry of their Swine and Cattle, and in Cutting the flesh from the bones and carrying away the flesh of their Cattle so killed.” To rectify these misdeeds, Rawandagon was ordered to make “Speedy Satisfaction” and ensure that “his subjects” committed nothing of the sort again. If any English colonist were to act unjustly in the future, the General Court further added, the sagamore was to “be assured of Our justice” instead of pursuing customarily Wabanaki methods of preserving equity. By regarding Rawandagon as chiefly culpable for the violent actions of nearby warriors, colonial authorities effectively exploited and enhanced his power in order to fashion a singular figurehead with regional accountability.49

Both French and English colonists also employed European material goods, including sumptuous gifts, to promote favored sagamores into prominent and stable

leadership positions benefiting colonial designs. Though well over a century old by the
1670s, the struggle to Europeanize Wabanaki political structures via European material
culture now assumed a greater urgency. The expansion of colonial settlement, the
emergence of competing imperial claims to the northeast, and a growing recognition of
the need for tranquil Indian relations in this borderland region encouraged Euro-
Americans to centralize native authority. “The leader and chiefs” of the northern
Micmac of Gaspé, for example, were regularly invited by French officials “for a meal in
order to show to all the Indians of the nation that they are esteemed and honoured,”
according to Catholic missionary Chrestien LeClercq. At other times, sagamores were
gifted with “something like a fine coat, in order to distinguish them from the
commonalty.” To Wabanaki headmen, such prestige goods originating from exotic
sources were imbued with tremendous power, “especially if the article has been in use
by the commander of the French.” Before authorizing the release of an English captive
aboard Mogg’s fleet in 1676, Penobscot sagamore Madockawando demanded “a fine
Coat, which they had for him aboard the Vessel” and which he subsequently insisted on
inspecting. “Upon sight of the said Coat” the headman “seemed very well satisfied”
and offered the prisoner in exchange.50

Yet the exchange of mundane material objects esteemed as prestigious or
aesthetically appealing in the moral economy of the recipient was not a unilateral
phenomenon. As various native producers would continue to demonstrate over the next
century, the practice could also extend from the Indian communities of Wabanakia to
Europe, bonding the cultures of each via non-pecuniary channels. Not long after his

50 Chrestien LeClercq, *New Relation of Gaspesia: with the Customs and Religion of the Gaspesian
arrival among the Micmacs in 1675, Father LeClercq marveled at the Indians’
utilization of various plant dyes to stain “their quills of porcupine a beautiful brilliant
red.” With these tools the Indian artisans “ornament their canoes, their snowshoes, and
their other works which are sent into France as curiosities.” Native-manufactured
maple syrup, too, achieved a coveted status in the metropole. LeClercq detailed its
“very remarkable” genesis in the hardwood forests and camps of the northeast, thereby
accentuating its fundamentally primitive and native development, before noting that “it
is formed into little loaves which are sent to France as a curiosity.” By way of their
customary cultivation of natural resources unique to the Dawnland, Wabanaki thus
procured for themselves a level of diplomatic and social prestige in an imperial network
of aesthetic taste and material culture.51

Native responses to the colonial forces of Atlantic dispossession and
disorientation thus cohered into a discrete pattern by 1678. Over the course of the
seventeenth century, as the disruptive pressures of Euro-American traders, fishermen,
settlers and governing authorities threatened to realign the Indian maritime world,
Wabanaki communities increasingly coordinated their adaptive – and sometimes
resistant – strategies in order to mitigate the disorder and disarray that accompanied
these developments. This centralizing trend in the native northeast, furthermore,
emerged and developed as a direct response to a native maritime identity progressively
imperiled by colonial efforts to disconnect and distance Indians from their Atlantic.
When Indians realigned their communities’ local interests to augment a more
widespread collective response to Atlantic colonialism, furthermore, they marked a

51 Chrestien LeClercq, New Relation of Gaspesia: with the Customs and Religion of the Gaspesian
Indians, 96, 122-123.
significant disjuncture from the ways Atlantic processes were hitherto functioning in the Dawnland. Whereas the economic competition engendered by new material exchange networks once wrought division and antagonism between Wabanaki sagamores intent on securing access to and maximizing the benefits of these systems, the fraudulence, expansionism, and belligerence that oftentimes accompanied these opportunities now encouraged cohesion and a common collective course of action. Formerly a source of factionalism, by the end of the war in early 1678 the Atlantic had become the powerful impetus for centralizing Wabanaki interests.

The truce brokered by Madockawando and the Andros and Massachusetts commissioners in August, 1677 was confirmed at a formal treaty conference the following spring in Casco Bay. By that time, Wabanaki’s wartime strategy culminated in success; the English colonial presence on the lands and waters of Maine had been essentially eradicated, its settlers expelled and driven far to the south. Yet the striking native concessions in the peace-making process revealed a more complex and prescient Wabanaki vision for their post-bellum world. Indians’ “Surrender of the Ketches” coupled with their permission of colonial resettlement in southern Maine, for example, would afford them once again a more equitable, secure and profitable role in Atlantic exchange networks. Equally vital to native interests was an additional stipulation requiring all returning English families to give in tribute one peck of corn each year to local sagamores. This customary symbol of subjection would accordingly mark colonial resettlement as a process fundamentally dictated and managed by Indians. The peace, in sum, signaled Wabanaki’s quest not for a northeast purged of English occupation, or even an Atlantic world purified of foreign influence, but a Dawnland and
ocean that would once again serve to sustain, enhance and enliven its People. Ashore and afloat, the regeneration of Wabanakia would be the prerogative of Wabanaki.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{52} Jenny Hale Pulsipher, \textit{Subjects unto the Same King}, 235-237; Bruce J. Bourque, \textit{Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine}, 153-156.
Chapter Four

“His Majesty’s livery,” “the King’s presents,” and a “Sea of trouble”: Manipulating Power and Prestige in an Imperial World

The Wabanaki and English signatures on the Casco Bay peace treaty in 1678 did not simply mark the formal cessation of hostilities. In the minds of native delegates, the agreement laid forth their vision of a post-war world where the Atlantic would once again serve as a locus of spiritual and material nourishment for their communities. Expunged from Wabanakia’s terrestrial and saltwater worlds was the disorder unleashed by English colonial encroachment on native resources, violence against native coastal and inland communities, and restricted native access to the sea. These cumulative pressures threatened to redefine and reconfigure a Wabanaki maritime identity forged over generations of contact with the ocean and its generative power. When native sagamores sketched their marks on the parchment along the wave-swept shores of Casco Bay in spring of 1678, they did so knowing that they themselves successfully dictated the terms of that longstanding identity. In the future, the treaty stipulated, English settlers would be allowed to return to southwestern Wabanakia, but only if they paid an annual tribute to the region’s sagamores.

But this new postbellum status quo proved ephemeral. Renewed pressures of English colonialism in the Dawnland after 1680 reintroduced many of the same problems that Indians confronted earlier in the century. This chapter explores the brief regeneration of a native Atlantic amenable to Wabanaki interests in the wake of warfare in 1678, a development that was soon endangered by revived English efforts to disrupt and realign this world’s structure. It argues that Indians once again looked to both
familiar and novel Atlantic opportunities to mitigate these disruptions, this time by embarking on long-distance migrations, elaborating a trans-Atlantic diplomatic strategy, exploiting an escalating imperial conflict, and orchestrating another campaign of maritime violence.

Native refugees fleeing their war-ravaged homelands in southern Wabanakia before and after the peace settlement in 1678 sought out another conduit to Atlantic processes along the St. Lawrence River. Through their newly-forged relationships with French settlers and colonial authorities, Indians participated in more equitable material exchange networks while preserving connections with their kin who chose to remain near the sea. These bonds, along with older ones maintained with New England, also provided the structure through which Wabanaki cultivated an affinity with European monarchs that they hoped would extend royal benevolence to their communities. By invoking the paternal affection of English and French royalty, Indians hoped to achieve a measure of socio-economic capital in a growing imperial system. When their affective ties to England’s Stuart dynasty were severed by the Glorious Revolution, Wabanaki compensated for the loss by developing kinship bonds to France’s King Louis XIV. Indians also shrewdly manipulated the imperial conflagration touched off by the Glorious Revolution to strike at the English maritime presence and plunder its ships, sailors and wealth. This campaign of aggression, often augmented with Louis XIV’s material and emotional support, wreaked havoc on the English fishing economy and the Royal Navy’s dependency on Dawnland forests for ship stores. Wabanaki power ashore and afloat threatened to undermine the English imperial system that stretched throughout the Atlantic.
These developments once again pointed to the ingenuity and dynamism that lay at the heart of the Wabanaki Atlantic vision. Their understanding of the sea and its manifold opportunities was neither static nor rigid. This native maritime world was not resistant to changing pressures unleashed by Euro-American movement around the ocean and in their homelands. Like that of their ancestors, Indians at the turn of the eighteenth century possessed an evolving perception of a materially-, geographically- and culturally-expansive Atlantic. Only by maintaining such a dynamic conception of their eastern world could Wabanaki hope to manage the disruptive forces that emerged from it and that threatened to disorient their longstanding relationship to it. Indians thus engaged in an ongoing struggle to control the pressures redefining their maritime identity and refashioning the ocean’s significance for them.

The Wabanaki signatures on the Casco Bay treaty in 1678 revealed a striking native strategy to circumscribe the forces threatening their Atlantic vision. The vast majority of signatories represented Indian communities far to the northeast of Kennebec River, in locales tangentially disrupted by English settlement far to their southwest and the fierce hostilities that decimated several neighboring native groups. This concentration of political authority away from the colonial presence and around the Penobscot River region under the sagamore Madockawando had begun in the years leading up to war in 1675, and would exert a commanding influence over subsequent peace talks throughout the next century. The emerging regional primacy of the Penobscots was also strengthened by their growing immigrant population. Fearing a reoccurrence of colonial violence and disorder that would inevitably accompany
returning New Englanders, southern Wabanaki refugees fled their shattered homeland to join the increasingly-powerful Penobscot communities to the northeast. Here they could sustain their longstanding relationship to the ocean further removed from colonial pressures to the south. Yet they also embarked on a long-distant exodus to establish more permanent relations within another trans-Atlantic nexus along the St. Lawrence River. To these native communities, insulation from the stresses of colonial aggression and a deteriorating land and maritime resource base necessitated movement away from the ocean itself, but also a cultivation of more favorable Atlantic opportunities.

Wabanakia’s shifting demography by 1678 thus explains the generous terms offered to recent enemies who wished to reoccupy lands up to their former line of settlement.¹

Like the Wabanaki peregrinations from the northeast to New France earlier in the century, these migrations to the St. Lawrence Valley were prompted by a desire to widen and diversify their access to trans-Atlantic exchange networks. Native communities who determined that the risks associated with English neighbors outweighed their rewards found a viable and more secure alternative. Beginning in 1677, Indians from southern Maine were regularly settling in the village of Sillery outside the city walls of Quebec. The pioneers were certain to bring with them “great quantities of furs” with which they immediately assessed the benefits of this foreign exchange network, while also fostering stable and long-term socio-economic relationships in a new society. These transactions and diplomatic maneuvers, however, were likely also intended to paper over the ambivalence native newcomers felt about severing their ties to English trade networks and native kin who remained behind in their ancestral homelands close to the sea. French colonial leaders were evidently

attuned to this by 1679, and expressed apprehension over engaging too closely with people who also enjoyed a “great market” and a “very advantageous” postwar treaty with New England. Exacerbating these worries was the abject poverty and meager agricultural conditions that were coming to define Sillery, a reality officials feared could quickly drive fickle Wabanaki refugees back to the southeast.2

Despite the anxieties of French authorities, the embarkations of war-ravaged refugees from the Dawnland resulted in a more permanent demographic transformation of the region. Southern Wabanaki who in increasing numbers took up residence in mission villages along the St. Lawrence River after 1675 did not simply seek to divert locally-abundant resources to English markets in southern New England, as did their speculating predecessors in the 1630s and 1640s. Their migrations instead culminated in a more lasting, albeit oftentimes tenuous, settlement that regularized relations with civil and religious powers in the French colony. Much of this association was precipitated by Quebec’s changing attitude toward Dawnland immigrants. In the early 1680s, Jesuits invested more resources to improve and expand the growing mission at Sillery, a decision that coincided with Governor La Barre’s diplomatic policy of sending Wabanaki dispatches to their southeastern kin “to carry thither his gifts, and to Invite all the abnaquis who remain in Acadia to come to Join those whom we have Here.” Displaced native communities in southern Maine consistently took advantage of the favorable environment emerging from these developments, and by 1685 the number

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of migrants to the St. Lawrence River hamlets exceeded fifteen hundred. “Still others are expected every Day, who are to arrive from Acadia,” a buoyant Father Jacques Bigot wrote, “and they themselves say that soon all the rest who are in acadia will come.”

When Indians felt that their new colonial neighbors were neglecting their kinship obligations to them, they creatively sought to rekindle French hospitality and remind colonists of the indispensability of their native alliances. By 1685, many of the same problems involving liquor and fraudulent trading that plagued Wabanaki-English relations to the southeast were beginning to jeopardize relations in New France. Disaffected Indians subsequently voiced their anger to a familiar arbiter. Black Robes, they by now understood, could be marshaled to advocate for their interests as was Gabriel Druilletes with New England authorities in the 1650s. Wabanaki accordingly warned Father Bigot of their intentions to depart Sillery for the Dawnland in the early 1680s, explaining that they left “the English solely because they tormented us too much” but now the French “get drunk here” and “are as wicked as the English.” The nervous Jesuit quickly reassured them of their earlier decision to settle in New France, and implored them to consider the spiritual and physical danger of returning to the neighborhood of the English in the southeast. “Thou are more miserable here than in Acadia, I know,” Bigot pleaded, “but here thou prayest.” “Every one there will try to make thee intoxicated…thou wilt die, without being able to return hither; thou wilt cast

thyself into the underground fire.” To Bigot, such crafty persuasion successfully quelled native concerns when they decided to stay put. Yet the disaffected Indians cleverly elicited the affirmation they desired. In a similar way they also played on the spiritual fears of the religious leader to maintain an unfettered mobility in the region without severing ties to either their new French hosts or their relatives in the Dawnland. When a native contingent approached Bigot desiring to restore kinship bonds with those remaining in their former communities, the missionary “consented to their return to Acadia” only after they vowed to “seek out the rest of their kinsmen, – in order, as they say, to pray for their return.”

Religious sectarianism emanating from Europe thus functioned as an important avenue by which Wabanaki cultivated new imperial relationships and accessed more equitable Atlantic exchange networks. By learning to navigate the post-Reformation marketplace for souls that had been superimposed on their homeland, Indians carefully manipulated European anxieties to secure a more stable, fruitful and unfettered presence in the French colony, one that conformed to their own interests yet was valued by the colonial regime’s civic and religious leadership. This status subsequently afforded Indians a more extensive and diversified access to Atlantic opportunities than was available in the Dawnland.

Through extensive networks of communication established by native travelers, Indians along the St. Lawrence were simultaneously discovering what they already feared to be true concerning their ancient homelands. The opportunities for more stable

kinship bonds with Euro-Americans were increasingly impossible for relatives and neighbors who remained near the sea in the southeast, a declining population that now numbered roughly fifteen hundred in the 1680s. This reality cut to the very heart of southern Wabanaki’s cultural identity, forcing them to make a stark choice about their future. The outlook of their longstanding Atlantic vision – their relational understanding of the ocean and its processes in the Dawnland – appeared entirely different when cast alongside English colonialism in northern New England and French colonialism along the St. Lawrence River Valley.5

The great postwar migration of southern Wabanaki into the 1680s was precipitated not only by their efforts to exploit lucrative socio-economic networks via New France, but also by pressing concerns over the revival of English Atlantic colonialism in their devastated homelands near the sea. Not long after the ink was dry on the peace treaty at Casco Bay in 1678, colonial authorities in Boston embarked on a joint economic and military strategy to secure once again the waters of the northwest Atlantic and reintegrate their productivity into a larger imperial economy. This enterprise necessarily entailed renewed efforts to dislocate natives’ maritime presence and prevent their convenient access to the ocean and its resources. After Governor Andros’ commissioners first obtained “a promise of returning several vessels the Indians had surprised,” the Massachusetts General Court ordered “that a Small fort be erected about Casco bay” along with military barracks for its defense. The impetus for this security measure was news in Boston that “several fishermen settled and returned to inhabit there.” In order to avoid the debacles at sea that plagued New England during

the 1670s, fishermen were now “forced to have Arms & Ammunition” by direct order of the colony’s governing leaders. New England’s resettlement of the southern Maine coast provided colonial officials with a precious opportunity to reassert their claim to regional waters, and fortify the seamless transference of its productivity into England’s imperial economy.⁶

Andros’ scheme to forge a sudden and sturdy coastal presence in Maine eventually paid dividends. Into the mid-1680s, settlers cautiously trickled in from the sea and returned to their former farms and estates. The governor responded to this encouraging news by ordering a further line of coastal garrisons to extend northeast beyond Casco Bay. Several “Good Forts” accordingly sprung up at “several Convenient places” like Pemaquid and Pejepscot Falls, and were “Garrison’d with Stout Hearts…[so] the Indians might be kept from their usual Retreats, both for Planting, and for Fishing, and lye open also to perpetual Incursions from the English.” By ensuring the “well governing and protection of the people there & prevention of trouble by Indians,” the new fortifications from Casco Bay to Pemaquid thus breathed new life into a former strategy doomed by native campaigns of violence ashore and afloat in the 1670s.⁷

When New England colonists began to reoccupy their former settlements elsewhere in the ashes of southern Wabanakia in the 1680s, they gradually resumed

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their environmental transformation of the region to meet the economic demands of growing communities. This exploitation of Dawnland resources involved a reintroduction of familiar English modes of production and consumption, and impinged directly on Wabanaki communities’ economic relationship with the ocean. English fishermen did not confine their work-related tasks to the open sea or even to the coast, but often ascended the river systems into the Maine interior to harvest alewives, a staple bait fish used in Atlantic fisheries. From these rivers fishermen also consumed sturgeon, salmon and other anadromous fish migrating up the region’s countless rivers from the ocean. Riverine estuaries were also harnessed for renewed timbering operations in southern Maine. When colonists’ began constructing nets and seines in the Saco River in the 1680s, Wabanaki communities upriver were subsequently deprived of vital Atlantic resources upon which they had relied for generations. Indians were soon quite vocal in maintaining that absolutely no fishing rights had been granted to returning settlers in the Casco Bay treaty of 1678. Resentment and suspicion began saturating the post-war northeastern borderlands.8

So too did English pastoralism. The same quadruped agents of empire that frequently represented the avant-garde of colonial settlement to nearby native communities again reappeared with their owners. As southern Wabanaki learned during the preceding decades, English livestock not only embodied the spirit of boundless and intrusive persistence that lay at the heart of their owners’ imperial designs, but also reinforced that imperialism by ensuring physical sustenance and cultural entrenchment. Domestic creatures assuaged colonists’ hunger pangs as well as their anxieties over the

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successful replication of English husbandry in Wabanakia. By the 1680s, cattle were also allaying their own appetites on offshore islands inhabited by Indians communities who long valued them for their convenient access to deepwater maritime resources. To livestock owners, the same islands provided ideal enclosures for grazing their meandering property. Angered by this threat to their economy by the end of the decade, as well as by the perpetual colonial neglect of their grievances, Wabanaki would strike back at “the English, in Suffering, if not Turning, their Cattel over to a certain Island,” as one English observer noted.9

The renewed environmental exploitation of Indian land in southern Maine thus further signaled the troubling return of problems purged in the war of 1675. Native maritime culture in the region now confronted another coastal line of English settlements, livestock and fortifications that collectively structured a renewed campaign to displace Indians from their saltwater world and confine them to a less threatening presence in the landlocked interior. To Indians long dependent on the sea as a critical environmental resource, the revival of these problems continued to strain their marine economy and restrict their seafaring mobility. The Wabanaki maritime identity in southern Maine was, of course, already undergoing modification as new economic pressures focused native productive capacities away from the ocean by encouraging the mass harvest of terrestrial furbearing mammals. Yet the sea’s longstanding, albeit now attenuated, centrality to native culture was too powerful to simply dissolve under the buffeting of these waves. It instead found ways to endure. Indians struggled evermore

diligently to sustain their seasonal harvest of the sea and their visible presence on its waves, both of which could maintain their maritime identity. The troubling colonial developments since 1675 thus represented an ongoing threat to reorient adjacent waters away from the Wabanaki Atlantic and into the English.

The native Atlantic vision secured in the violence and peacemaking of the mid-1670s, whereby the sea and its productive capacity sustained and enriched Indian culture, continued to unravel over the course of the following decade. Just as colonial resettlement quickly obstructed the flow of maritime resources to native communities in southern Maine, so too did it reintroduce trade relationships fraught with violence, liquor and fraud and designed to manipulate networks of economic exchange to serve English colonial interests. Throughout the 1680s, settlers increasingly amplified their complaints about the pervasiveness of alcohol among neighboring Indians, who now regularly visited their homesteads and committed drunken acts of violence. With the luxury of hindsight, Massachusetts leaders came to understand the troubling effects of these interactions. Even Puritan minister Cotton Mather lamented the “Common Abuses, in Trading; viz. Drunkenness, Cheating, &c. which such as Trade much with them are seldom innocent of,” and whose devastating effects increasingly elicited aggressive Wabanaki responses. Thus, the threats that imperiled the restored native Atlantic world stemmed from the very same pressures that soured English-Wabanaki relations earlier in the century.10

Settler abuse of material exchange networks, systems that by now functioned as longstanding catalysts integrating Wabanaki into a larger Euro-American Atlantic

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world, revived as early as the summer of 1678, just months after the signing of the Casco Bay peace treaty. In July, Nathaniel Maisters presented trader Benjamin Trustrum to authorities at Wells, at which point it was determined that Trustrum “sould 8 gallons of wine at one tyme to the Indeans” in addition to profiting from “a great deale of Trade” with them. Similar tactics became increasingly common over the next three years. By 1681, the Duke of York’s new government in the Province of Maine was troubled to learn “that severall persons do let the Indeans have lyquors and other strong drinkes.” Their response to this escalating problem was to strengthen previous statutes prohibiting the trade of alcohol by requiring violators to “forfitt their whole Estate.” Such legal muscle-flexing failed to deter Richard Seacomb, who in May 1682 was “Convicted for selling of Lyquors to the Indeans” by a Court of Pleas at Wells.11

Such contaminating beverages emerged quite literally in the Dawnland from Atlantic waters. English ships docking at the region’s tiny port hamlets were frequently loaded with alcohol, and their seamen were among the most egregious transgressors of local laws. The General Assembly at York accordingly targeted in June 1682 “any vessell Comeing into any harbour, Cricke or port that shall bring in her any strong water, wine, or any other kind of strong drinke.” If “any person Comeing in her or belonging to the vessel…shall presume to sell or give from aboard said vessel…any kind of strong drinke to any Indean or Indeans whatsoever,” the legislators declared, “the vessel, appurtenances & all her Cargoe shall bee forfeited.” Despite such efforts, the situation at Wells continued to deteriorate by 1685. Court officials there were informed that cheated Wabanaki “have beene seene to ly Drunke almost at every doore,

& that there hath beene frequent abuses that way.” Fearing the tremendous threat this posed to the security of their weak and sparsely populated communities, beleaguered authorities decreed that “it shall bee taken for granted that those houses nearest Adjacent to any Indeans lying in any such drunken Capacity, shall be Accounted the very places where those Indeans have received there Lyquors.” The extralegal exploitation of Indian trade through alcohol trafficking had again become commonplace in the coastal towns and forests of southern Maine, and the inability of New England authorities to stem its tide signaled to Indians and colonists alike the return of antebellum tensions.12

The disturbing confluence of these Atlantic colonial pressures in the Dawnland was amplified by English settlers’ increasing disregard of a symbolic gesture mandated by the Casco Bay treaty. Returning families were permitted to reoccupy their former settlements only if they made an annual tribute payment of a peck of corn to local sagamores. The Indian victors of 1678 intended this yearly ritual to reorder Wabanaki-English relations in a way that permitted a colonial presence yet facilitated the maintenance of a distinctly native Atlantic vision, one in which the ocean and its variegated processes were put to the service of Indian interests. John Boden of Black Point, for example, described how Penobscot sagamore “Madokawando made it his Practice for many years to demand a Peck of Corn yearly of the English Planters there,” and that Boden’s family along with “many of the said English Planters used to give him a Peck of Corn accordingly.” Richard Webber, another compliant resident of that town, similarly noted “that several of the English Planters there used to pay the said

Madokawando a Peck of Indian Corn yearly by Way of Acknowledgment, That he was the Sachem of the said Tribe.” Yet with the influx of English men, women and livestock and the mass construction of coastal fortifications to re-secure their fishery, the attitude of the Bodens and Webbers of postwar Maine was gradually replaced by that of colonials who “refused to pay that yearly Tribute of Corn.” When the same settlers further violated the treaty by pushing beyond the former line of settlement, the disregard of their symbolic obligations represented an even more egregious defiance.13

These troubling developments affected most acutely the diverse Wabanaki community beginning to cohere under Madockawando at Penobscot in the 1670s. Representatives of these communities including Madockawando himself, largely removed from the ambit of New England’s presence in southern Maine, dictated most of the treaty’s terms. When resettlement proceeded in open violation of these terms and encroached ever closer to their nexus of authority, the Penobscot communities unsurprisingly assumed the mantle to enforce these promises. Significant support for an aggressive and meaningful response to a revived Atlantic colonialism came also from a recently-adopted kinsman who provided a direct link to French imperial interests. Baron Jean-Vincent d’Abbadie de Saint-Castin, a young French military officer from the landed aristocracy in France, was sent as second-in-command of a mission to the Penobscot region in 1670. His decision to remain behind and settle there after his regiment departed for Quebec would produce a long lineage of Métis and contributed to

solidifying local French-Wabanaki bonds. Madockawando adopted Saint-Castin into his community through the marriage of the sagamore’s daughter, and the resultant kinship ties channeled French goods, including weapons, from Port Royal and other Acadian fortifications into the Penobscot River communities. The singular figure of Saint-Castin thus joined Wabanaki immigrants as valuable liaisons to French exchange networks and diplomatic alliances.\(^{14}\)

The Penobscots’ regional ascendancy in the social and political life of Wabanakia positioned their warriors to play a critical role in fortifying its interests. As a rendezvous for native marines and their ships throughout northeastern waters during the 1670s, and as the burgeoning center for displaced Wabanaki peoples and their adopted kin, the extensively-networked Penobscot community now orchestrated an aggressive response to the reemerging threats again endangering their maritime vision. Madockawando’s guidance was central to this corrective campaign. When Moxes, principal sagamore of the Kennebec River in 1684, reluctantly acknowledged that “all his men have left him, and that he has no control over them,” he testified to the local renown of Madockawando’s leadership and its enduring attraction to native refugees from southwestern Maine. Through his recent diplomatic overtures with Saint-Castin, Madockawando solidified his prestige in the Penobscot River valley, and subsequently

wielded this authority to allay the disorder expanding northeastward from New England’s resettlement.¹⁵

With the support of his communities, the Penobscot sagamore executed this goal by appropriating a proven strategy of verbal harassment accompanied, if necessary, by violence against intrusive symbols of English Atlantic colonialism. Indians who vocalized their threats to nearby colonists in the winter of 1683-1684, for example, emphasized their intentions “to attack Pemaquid Fort first,” one of Governor Andros maritime defense projects aimed at protecting the colonial presence on the northwest Atlantic. Casco Bay, also fortified to augment the fishery, was similarly threatened by Indians to the point where “the inhabitants have laid aside all business to strengthen their defences.” One prominent farmer in the same region was likewise unnerved to discover “a token left at his house by an Indian, warning him to fly with all speed.” Near the coastal town of Wells, colonists were shocked by certain “bould Attempts of the Indeans in killing & wounding of severall Cattle,” a tactic that proved effective when authorities there suspected “that they intend some further Mischeefe.” These threats, colonial authorities came to believe, were “instigated by one Casteen, a Frenchman, by whom they have been promised a shipload of goods,” while “Medockawanda, a great Sagamore…is said to be the chief person” spearheading the operations and “again raising insurrection.” In desperation and anger, authorities made

repeated attempts in spring of 1684 to summon the Penobscot sagamore and his French kinsman, a plea to which the Penobscot leaders were in no hurry to acquiesce.\textsuperscript{16}

Wabanaki themselves were becoming aware of their new ethnic identity under Penobscot leaders like Madockawando. This consciousness was also heightened in verbal and physical acts of violence. Though Atlantic socio-economic pressures initially engendered competition and hostility between Wabanaki communities in the earliest years of their encounters with European seafarers, the violence and aggression that often accompanied those processes gradually fostered a common identity among these formerly divided communities. The interests of disparate Micmac, Passamaquoddy, Penobscot and Kennebec Wabanaki around the maritime northeast cohered around a loose idea of Indianness in the face of English efforts to redefine these peoples’ relationship to the ocean. When native warriors congregated by sea and land at Madockawando’s ascendant Penobscot River headquarters during the belligerent 1670s, and used it as a strategic staging ground for naval raids against English ships, they revealed just how potent this racial identity was becoming. After warfare returned to the native northeast in 1688, this emergent identity again united regional Wabanaki forces. When Indians near Pemaquid ignored the summons of an officer at the garrison in September 1688, it was because “they are all to be sure gathered together at Penobscott,” a place where they enjoy “Encouragement from all ye rest of ye Indians of these parts.” Two years later, a redeemed English captive reported to Major Benjamin

Church that most Indian warriors around Androscoggin River “were gone to Winter-
harbour, to provide provisions for the Bay of Fundy Indians, who were to come and join
with them to fight the English.” Their best beaver furs accompanied the warriors, the
captive also noted, and were “carried away to make a present to the Bay of Fundy
Indians, who were coming to their assistance.” The notion of a coherent Wabanaki
interest, defined principally in opposition to colonial Englishness, thus continued to
frame Indians’ increasingly binary outlook when confronted with the same forces that
threatened their security in decades past.¹⁷

The power of Wabanakis’ crystallizing ethnic outlook to shape and animate
native responses to renewed colonial incursions was evident in the verbal harassment of
New England colonists throughout the 1680s. In brief and disturbing meetings with
Indian messengers heralding their violent intentions, farmers, traders and other settlers
who believed themselves innocent of native accusations realized that they were deemed
complicit in the larger transgressions of Atlantic colonialism because of their
Englishness. In early spring of 1684, Indians near Casco Bay and Cape Porpoise in
Maine robbed a settler’s house before ominously voicing their “intention of killing all
the English.” Near his house on the Kennebec River a month earlier, James Dennes
was notified by Indians that their sagamore’s “hart would never Be well tell he had killd
some of the English againe.” The native envoys continued “threatening that he would
Burne the English houses and make the English Slaves to them as they ware Before.”
John Hornibroke was likewise visited by four Indians, one of whom informed him that

¹⁷ “Letter from J. Pipon from Pemaquid 10th of Sept, 1688,” in James Phinney Baxter, ed., Baxter
Manuscripts VI: 424-425; Thomas Church, The History of King Philip’s War; also of Expeditions against
the French and Indians in the Eastern Parts of New-England, in the Years 1689, 1690, 1692, 1696, and
1704 (Boston, 1716), edited by Samuel G. Drake (Boston: Howe & Norton, 1825), 155-156.
they “will have wars againe” and “that he would Stab a English man with his knive and Run away when he had dun it.” Another of the four “did threaten to burne English houses and make them Slaves as they ware Before,” while another warned “that the hachet hung over our heads and he did not know how sonne it might fall.” One familiar Wabanaki neighbor alerted John Voanny and Will Bacon to the disquieting news that “ye Indones was Minded to Rise in Rebellyon againe & Cutt of ye English but how sone hee could not yett tell.” A more aggressive stance was taken against John Molton, perhaps because he was encountered while clearing timber from a field near his homestead. “[W]ithout speaking one word,” an Indian came toward the busy settler “with his knife in his hand and profered to stab” him, prompting Molton to quickly reach for his axe while “threatining ye said Indon to Cut out his braynes.” The standoff ended without bloodshed when the Indian departed “towards Mr Samuell Boles his house.” Though such encounters stopped short of physical violence, their intended message was made painfully clear: all colonials, regardless of their direct participation in the widespread offenses against the Wabanaki vision secured in the treaty of 1678, were collectively culpable for violations to that peace by virtue of their English identity.18

Yet Indians also supplemented their oral and corporal threats by manipulating trans-Atlantic bonds of affinity in a now-familiar diplomatic strategy. When anxious New England officials summoned to a conference “all the Sagamores for nearly a

hundred miles around” the southern Maine coast in late 1684 to address the recent turmoil, they proved to native leaders that their aggressive harassment had indeed been effective. Accompanied by men and women from the communities they represented, Indian diplomats at the subsequent conference appropriated the paternal affection of the English King as their forebears had learned to do in years past. Now Wabanaki aimed to secure a measure of socio-political status within the colonial system, while simultaneously assuring colonial administrators that the native vision for the Dawnland did not necessarily preclude a properly ordered English presence. Several of the Indians present accordingly “expressed the great honour in which their ancestors had always held the Kings of England,” and judiciously recited specific “instances of their kindness to them.” This reverence of royal benevolence, the Indians promised the inquisitive commissioner, would also be enshrined in posterity as they would “charge their children to yield cheerful subjection to the King of England…and to endeavour to make his name great among the remoter Indians.” Wabanaki’s carefully crafted rhetoric accentuated the timeless regard of monarchical prestige in their communities, thereby quickly dispelling any doubts that this was merely an opportunistic or politically-expedient gesture. By casting royal authority as profoundly effectual and intensely revered in the Dawnland, and by situating that esteem outside the present moment, Indians carefully mimicked the filiopietism of imperial English subjects, thereby staking claim to a measure of socio-political capital that necessarily accompanied this status in an extensive power network spanning the Atlantic. So powerfully effective was this self-posturing that after cloaking themselves in their new gifts of English clothing, the sagamores appeared utterly transformed – as if they had indeed put on
“His Majesty’s livery.” The gleeful colonial official hoped that this remarkable native comportment signaled political submission to the King and to English colonialism, but Wabanaki knew that their men like Madockawando wielded far greater authority on their shores. This recognition, however, did not prevent them from exploring and exploiting other fonts of power.¹⁹

The heady optimism of English officials was an unintended consequence of this brand of native diplomacy. Wabanaki delegates did not wish to leave their striking words and actions open to misinterpretation, but were rather quite clear about their implications. Rather than granting license to imperious colonial authority in the region, their affective bonds with English royalty functioned to safeguard native sovereignty and enhance its interests. Only “when the King should send persons of worth” to treat with us, the Wabanaki spokesmen informed the official, would their communities then “submit all differences to his determination.” Spoken from a posture of certitude and strength, these words at once derided the New England commissioner and the interests he represented, while also displaying native faith in the King’s trustworthiness and benevolence. To his superiors the official noted how he subsequently assured the Indians of his intention to “procure some of King Charles his men, as their phrase is” before any further settlement would occur in Indian country. Such a pledge, fashioned according to Wabanaki’s choice reference to English royal authority, revealed not only

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the salience of royal paternalism in these native communities but also their effective manipulation of it.  

Notwithstanding the wishful thinking of New England commissioners, Wabanaki did not consider their affective bonds with “King Charles” exclusive. Native regard for English royalty, rather than closing off additional Atlantic diplomatic opportunities, in fact created other such kinship relations and augmented existing ones. The Stuarts were the sole English dynasty familiar to the Wabanaki thus far in the seventeenth century, and as such, Indians learned to repeatedly invoke its name to serve their interests. Royal subjects had always questioned this dynasty’s commitment to a genuine English Protestant national identity, however, chiefly because of its ties to continental Catholic powers. The latter two Stuart monarchs, particularly the openly-Catholic James II, former Duke of York and architect of the Andros regime in New England, had in fact become firm allies of France’s King Louis XIV. When Wabanaki “drank the health of the King and the Duke with all the honour and ceremony” at the 1684 meeting, thereby authenticating their kinship with the Stuarts, their diplomatic strategy was not necessarily incompatible with their growing relationship to the French; both could be mutually reinforcing. Native commitment to Stuart paternal authority thus was not a decision to firmly ally with England in a burgeoning imperial conflict, but a dual reaffirmation of royal kinship bonds that spanned from Wabanakia to London and to Quebec and Paris.  

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Indian migrants also continued to fortify networks connecting the Dawnland to French power along the St. Lawrence River in the 1680s. By the end of the decade, Jesuits stationed at native communities in Maine and mission villages in New France admonished Indians to leave behind their homelands near New England and join their kin in Quebec. French officials including the colony’s governor, Marquis de Denonville, sweetened the proposals by offering ammunition and firearms. Throughout the decade, though, such material enticements increasingly trickled out of the French ambit along the St. Lawrence, carried south by native parties now traveling quite freely and regularly between their native and French kinsmen, between the Atlantic ocean and their new Atlantic socio-economic network. In winter of 1684, for example, ten Wabanaki departed to Canada “for ammunition as is supposed,” an alarmed New England military officer reported, and are “expected back from Quebec in ten days more.” In the same year, settler James Dennes was visited by a neighboring Indian woman who warned him that “the Ingans are going to Canada and say they will be Back againe in apreill,” news that so disturbed the farmer that it was immediately reported it to a local justice of the peace. The following month, colonist John Hornibroke’s native source informed him that nearby Indians were on their way to New France to “fetch strength to fall on the English.” Even “some of the Chefe of them is gon to Canada all Ready,” Hornibroke related, “to fetch guns and amanition and they said that they would make the greatest armie that [was] ever yet among them.” Whether or not this arms trafficking was as extensive as anxious English colonists feared does not obscure a critical reality: throughout the 1680s the pathways connecting Wabanaki near the sea to kin and webs of material exchange on the St. Lawrence were becoming well trodden.22

22 “Resumé des Lettres sur les Sauvages Abenauquis,” 1689, in Collection de manuscrits contenant letters,
In summer of 1688, the delicate network of socio-economic power that Indians were forging within Atlantic imperial structures endured a shocking blow. English subjects’ grudging toleration of their monarch’s conspicuous continental alliances with feared Catholic powers, coupled with his own avowed and unabashed Catholic faith, dissolved in a massive political upheaval that embroiled much of Europe. The nation’s decision to overthrow James II in June, 1688 was spurred by widespread fears that his treasonous policies, and his personal piety, directly jeopardized England’s Protestant character, and thus its national security. Anyone harboring serious doubts that a second coup d’état of the Stuart dynasty in recent memory was in the best interests of the state had their fears allayed when the Dutch prince William of Orange and his English wife Mary, whose Protestantism was beyond dispute, positioned themselves to rescue the kingdom and its throne.23

Though seemingly distant and inconsequential to the native northeast, this colossal transition of power directly shaped the region’s subsequent development. Wabanaki perceived the Glorious Revolution as a profoundly salient force in their communities, in turn revealing just how interconnected the Atlantic had now become to their perspective. To them, James II’s forced abdication was not the glorious triumph of true, benevolent, monarchical authority over an arbitrary and tyrannical regime, but a

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troubling and disruptive process that disordered their kinship bonds and compromised their interests and security.

In the Anglo-French imperial war that subsequently ignited in 1688, Indians discovered a valuable opportunity to not only stave off the disorderly effects of the Glorious Revolution, but to manipulate it to their own advantage. Wabanaki warriors adroitly exploited a power vacuum exposed when Governor Andros’ administration was overthrown by Puritan-dominated Massachusetts during the conflagration’s early disorganized stages in the northeast. The colony’s religious and civil leaders long resented the regime’s connection to the Stuart monarchy. As Andros and several of his chief administrators and military officers sat shackled in Boston prisons, news of Europe’s tumultuous political and military affairs circulated among Wabanaki communities. Madockawando was a prime catalyst for this transmission of intelligence. In spring 1689, the Penobscot sagamore had traveled to Boston to meet with Andros, but discovered upon arrival the governor’s incarceration and a flimsy regime erected in his place. The colony’s new leadership, cognizant of the disarray that accompanied their coup, endeavored to placate Madockawando by lavishing him with gifts and procuring a safe passage back to Penobscot aboard the province galley. Despite these overtures, the sagamore recognized a lucrative opportunity, and with his warriors seized the moment and laid waste to the open defenses of Maine.24

Wabanaki understood their wartime violence as also contributing to the settlement of larger imperial questions regarding hereditary kingship and royal

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succession. It was conceived, that is to say, as a means of dictating in some degree the outcome of European political conflict. With the assistance of a few French soldiers near Falmouth in early 1689, Indians captured a number of English settlers, including trader Sylvanus Davis, who were subsequently informed “that we were all rebels, and also Boston, against our king, in that we had proclaimed William and Mary king and queen, and that they were usurpers to the crown.” After endeavoring to correct colonial misunderstandings of authentic royal authority, this Wabanaki party, accompanied by their French kin, declared that “they did fight for King James.” Such striking savoir-faire regarding imperial politics across the ocean emerged from the dense and extensive communication networks that Indians themselves were constructing. These webs of information tied the Dawnland to Quebec, Acadia, and France, and continued to shape Wabanaki’s dynamic sense of their Atlantic world and its ever-evolving opportunities.  

Indians proceeded to carefully target Maine’s colonial farmsteads, communities and garrisons left exposed by England’s political turmoil. The ensuing campaign of native violence represented a powerful Wabanaki desire to manage the rapidly-changing power dynamics that lay at the heart of their Atlantic world, and simultaneously to exact retribution for the colonialism that reemerged since the purifying conflagrations of the mid-1670s. The Atlantic political consciousness of Wabanaki communities, and the piercing destruction of the colonial presence that it afforded, were readily apparent to terrified New Englanders. In the fall of 1689, leaderless Bostoners informed their colony’s representatives in London that the Wabanaki “are an intelligent enemy” who

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“understand our condition” and will “prove troublesome.” Since the recent political upheavals, the colonists continued, “the barbarians have taken heart and done us much mischief.” So successful was this native strategy that colonists throughout New England imagined “the cries of the distressed will doubtless reach England.” These hopeful pleas mirrored the Atlantic supplications of Wabanaki before them, who time and again appealed to the same locus of affective power.²⁶

Later in 1689, similar colonial lamentations emerged from the eastward. There panic-stricken inhabitants of Maine petitioned the Crown for assistance after neighboring Indians “tooke new Courage & resolution” from the “Change of ye Government” spawned by the “most unhappy insurrection or Rebellion [that] broke forth at Boston.” “The pulling down of Sir E. Andros’s Government has done no good,” another settler similarly acknowledged, “but the contrary, since they called home the army…the Indians have since made great slaughter and destruction.” The collective native response to England’s reconfiguration of authority heavily relied on the leadership of Madockawando. After “seeing the Governor in prison and the land in confusion,” the sagamore’s Penobscot warriors spearheaded several assaults, and continued to draw strength from the assistance of several southern Wabanaki displaced by the mounting violence. Though the Stuarts’ paternal benevolence had been severed from Indians who long invoked its prestige, the resulting circumstances could be harnessed to mitigate its most detrimental effects in the Dawnland. To these people, the

Glorious Revolution served as yet another instance of the pressures and processes constantly working to reorder their Atlantic vision.\textsuperscript{27}

Indians’ wide-ranging networks of communication linking them to imperial Europe had grown so elaborate that valuable news occasionally bypassed New France altogether. Indeed, the extensive interconnectedness that Wabanaki cultivated with Europe, and the remarkably reliable intelligence it conveyed, could confound French authorities who found themselves reliant on native networks for the most current news from across the Atlantic. These critical conduits of information emerged from Wabanaki’s strategic geo-political position, an advantage that allowed them to continue exploiting the imperial conflict that erupted in 1688. Shortly after Massachusetts major general William Phips was driven from Quebec following his disastrous naval attack there in May 1690, a native cadre from Wabanakia arrived in the capital with pressing news, “announcing that the English had been beaten at sea in Europe.” The Indians referred to the Battle of Beachy Head where Comte de Tourville’s command destroyed a joint Anglo-Dutch fleet and captured some fifteen ships. The rout became memorialized as the most significant French naval victory in the war. Much to joy of incredulous French colonists and officials at Quebec, the stunning news “proved to be true,” and was followed by further intelligence that the Penobscots “had defeated a party of seventy Englishmen and thirty Mohegans.” The War of the League of Augsburg, as the contest became known in Europe, was a vast hemispheric clash

\textsuperscript{27} Petition from the Present and Late Inhabitants of the Province of Maine & County of Cornwall, 25 January 1689/90, MSA, Massachusetts Archives Collection – SC1-45X – Vol. 35: 184; Benjamin Davis to Edward Hull, Boston, 31 July 1689, in W. Noel Sainsbury, et. al., eds., \textit{Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies}, 1689-1692: 120; “Extracts from two letters sent to Mr. John Usher, Boston,” 10 July 1689, in W. Noel Sainsbury, et. al., eds., \textit{Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies}, 1689-1692: 81-82.
encompassing European and non-European peoples. To American colonists, the conflict was King William’s War and centered largely on a contest of power in the northeastern borderland. To the People of Dawnland, when perceived through their elaborate information networks, that difference of perspective was immaterial.28

Natives’ carefully constructed web of communication, and their valued geopolitical position from which this system emerged, were not solely employed to assist New France. Such an asset first and foremost served Wabanaki interests. More specifically, it made accessible another trans-Atlantic locus of paternal power, one that could fill the void left in the aftermath of the Stuart dissolution. Though native diplomatic structures were dislocated by English political unrest, they could be reorganized and augmented through the manipulation of a similar royalist prestige in the French empire. By 1691, Wabanaki had successfully forged kinship bonds with Louis XIV, and were regularly profiting from his benevolence in the form of material goods and promises of perpetual affinity. Informed of the “good will of the chiefs” of the Penobscots, the king sent aboard the African Sun gifts of firearms, ammunition and “other necessary things” that he hoped would encourage hostility against his imperial enemies. Two years later, this initial supply of war materiel grew into a more elaborate supply of presents that aimed to satisfy particular native tastes, some of them quite cosmopolitan. Included now were Brazilian tobacco, Rouen blankets, plums, thread in “all sorts of colors,” and blue cloth. Two hundred Spanish-made shirts were added to the “King’s presents” by 1694. Astute French officials in Quebec and Acadia had by now come to recognize the high esteem with which Wabanaki held monarchical

authority. French gifts to Indian allies were accordingly bestowed not from the colony, its governors, intendants, or any other local leaders, but directly from the king.\footnote{“Instruction au Sieur de Villebon Commandant a l’Acadie, au camp devant Mons, le 7 avril, 1691,” in Collection de manuscrits contenant letters, mémoirs, et autres documents historiques relatives à la Nouvelle-France, II: 45-47 (author’s translation); “Memoire du Roy au Sieur Comte de Frontenac, au camp devant Mons, le 7 Avril 1691,” in Collection de manuscrits contenant letters, mémoirs, et autres documents historiques relatives à la Nouvelle-France, II: 54-55; “Estat des Presens a Envoyer aux Sauvages Abenaquis dans lesquels les Chefs auront Part,” 1693, in Collection de manuscrits contenant letters, mémoirs, et autres documents historiques relatives à la Nouvelle-France, II: 56 (author’s translation); “Estat des Munitions et Marchandises Embarquez en France sur la Fregate ‘La Suzanne’ en 1693, pour estre Portez a l’Acadie,,” in Collection de manuscrits contenant letters, mémoirs, et autres documents historiques relatives à la Nouvelle-France, II: 129-130; Bruce J. Bourque, Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine, 167.}

The unique spiritual and material power that resided in Europe and emanated through kinship bonds across the sea to Wabanakia could be cultivated in other ways. From the trans-oceanic journeys of ancestors, native northeasterners understood the Atlantic ocean itself as a conduit to this power. French ships regularly departing the St. Lawrence River and Acadian settlements for France served Penobscot sagamores with the means to take advantage of this opportunity. They accordingly sent several of their sons aboard them under the guardianship of trusted French colonials. Their children, it was hoped, would one day return possessing invaluable knowledge of a distant people and a measure of the power from which French wealth flowed. By 1693, however, native leaders, including most prominently Madockawando, had begun wondering when exactly their children would be returning home. Pressure for answers was felt as far away as Versailles, where officials at Court scrambled desperately to formulate a response. “His Majesty did not want to expose them to the danger of being taken by their English enemies” in the Atlantic, they reassured the sagamores in a letter, and decided it was in everyone’s best interest to keep them in France for awhile longer. Wabanaki regard for monarchical power was thus appreciated and manipulated even in
the metropole, where the King’s tender compassion and prudent judgment could be
craftily deployed to allay native fears. But even royal paternalism could not paper over
what increasingly appeared as kidnapping to Indians. By the following year, officials
were still struggling to minimize the fallout from the missing children, though the
French had now lost their status as trustworthy guardians. At least one of the children, a
son of Penobscot leader Moxus, died in France before he could fulfill the wishes of his
community. The transfer of their youth into and across the Atlantic now
obtained acquired a certain unexpected permanency profoundly troubling to native
notions of equitable and reciprocal kinship. These misfortunes instead were reminiscent
of their ancestors’ forced Atlantic passages at the hands of deceptive slavers and
adventurers. When presented with a similar opportunity eight years later, this time
among the English at a conference in Casco Bay, still-distraught Wabanaki “concluded
not to send any of our Children to England, because Moxus his son when he was sent to
France, he died there.”

Indians’ diplomatic cultivation of European power was only one avenue, albeit
an indispensable one, to a properly-ordered Atlantic world. King William’s War offered
Wabanaki an opportunity to secure and enhance other critical elements of their Atlantic
vision, and make right the disorder that had again threatened their home since the
1670s. Thus while France and England’s imperial contest permitted natives more

30 “Memoire pour Servir D’Instruction au Sieur de Bonnaveture, Commandant le Vaisseau que le Roy
Envoye a l’Acadie et de la a Quebec, a Versailles, le xi févier, 1693,” in Collection de manuscrits
contenant letters, mémoirs, et autres documents historiques relatives à la Nouvelle-France, II: 105;
“Relation du Voyage faict par le Sieur de Villieu, Capitaine d’un Destachement de la Marine, a la Teste
des Sauvages Abenakis, Kanibats et Malecoites de l’Acadie pour faire la Guerre aux Anglois de Baston,
aux printems de l’an 1694,” in Collection de manuscrits contenant letters, mémoirs, et autres documents
historiques relatives à la Nouvelle-France, II: 135-138; “A Memorial of the propositions treated between
those Commissioners of Lt. Gov. Stoughton and the sachems of the Eastern Indians, Casco Bay, June 3,
convenient and profitable access to European power and prestige, it also allowed them to more effectively concentrate on problems closer to home. The struggles of colonial English leaders and settlers to once again sever Indian access to the ocean, render the native northeast amenable to English economic interests, and reintegrate the northwest Atlantic into the imperial economy all became prime targets of Wabanaki retaliation. King William’s War provided ample pretext, and material resources, to regenerate themselves and their world.

Indians formulated and executed their campaigns of retributive violence in the 1690s with a proven strategy that had brought them a significant measure of success in the mid-1670s. The maintenance of Wabanaki authority in the northeast, they recognized, necessitated a reclamation of adjacent Atlantic waters. Native grievances against the obstruction of anadromous fish in their rivers, for example, or the mass construction of coastal garrisons, or Governor Andros’ recently-ordered blockade of Wabanakia in 1688 that nearly starved entire communities were all inextricably tied to New England’s resurfacing as a dominant and aggressive power on and around the northwest Atlantic after 1680. As they had in the 1670s, Indians accordingly concentrated much of their effort on the source of this threatening presence – the English fishery – by targeting the vehicles of that enterprise – English ships. Indeed as early as summer 1689, New England’s terrestrial frontier in the northeast had already broken up, as most settlers retreated southward shortly after hostilities began. Wabanaki boasted to a colonial military officer that they “no care for the New England people” and “have all their country by and by.” By that fall, it was well-known that Indians had consequently amplified their maritime presence, prompting one prudent
English privateer to sail through Wabanaki waters under French colors. Indians there informed him that “not an Englishman was left in these parts,” and upon detecting the crew’s guise launched an attack of the vessel. King William’s War, and each subsequent imperial conflict that Indians exploited in the eighteenth century, was thus to Wabanaki a principally-maritime contest of competing Atlantic visions. 31

The alacrity with which Indians began their destruction of the English fishery almost immediately after the outbreak of war in 1688 illustrates just how critical control of maritime space was to their Atlantic vision. It also suggests that they continued to understand the fishing economy as an Achilles heel of a larger imperial economic system. Within a few months of the Glorious Revolution, Falmouth resident Edward Tyng noted that the coastal town’s inhabitant began “exspecting more mischief dayly” after seeing Wabanaki in “their Birch Canoes passing & Repassing between our Islands.” The following year, another local settler likewise indicated that “about 200 or more of Indians are Seen now upon [Palmer’s] Island, and we do Expect a Speedy assault by them.” By early 1692, a large brigade of Indians coasted to “ye Eastward of Pascattaqua in their Canoos upon ye sea,” a sight so alarming to locals that they were quickly struck with “great fear of an Attack every day.” Fortunately for Wabanaki marine-warriors, such portentous spectacles often failed to prepare, or were ignored by, English settlers. Those of a nearby fishing village in southern Maine, for example, informed colonial authorities of their new ship “which was Launched & almost Ready to Sayle,” but “had the Misfortune Notwithstanding all the Defence the Master and

Company belonging to her Could Make, To be taken by the Indyans.” Emboldened by this success over experienced English seamen, a squadron of Indian mariners near Damaris Cove in May of 1689 “indeavoured with their Canoos to take a Shallop,” but were ultimately “repuls’d with the loss of one of their men.” With their primary target out of reach, the warriors resorted to land where they “burnt some houses there abouts.” In September, Indians did “some damage lately at Blue Point Garrison,” the most prominent of which consisted of torching “a small vessel.” By striking at New England’s maritime presence early and often after the outbreak of imperial war in 1688, Wabanaki implemented once again a proven strategy of resistance and regeneration.  

As it did in the past, the success of this wartime method depended on Indians’ intimate acquaintance with the region’s natural environment, including the rugged coastal landscape. By synthesizing this natural knowledge with their dynamic maritime culture, Wabanaki effectively expanded and strengthened their naval acumen. In spring 1689, this advantage was paying dividends for Indians secreting away their prize ships. Elisha Andrewes reported from the fort at Sagadahoc near Casco Bay that an officer “went up the River from New Towne Garrison…to fetch Downe the Vessell ye Indians had taken and carry’d up the River,” but was driven off by a “parcel of Indians.” After encountering the anchored ship of Denis and Benard Godet during peacetime in 1714, a salty Micmac crew along the Nova Scotia coast apprised the sailors of “four Rivers

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from Menchique to Bay Verte fit to hold Shallops.” Such valuable information, obtained over countless generations of contact with the maritime world, was coveted and trusted by Euro-Americans unfamiliar with the local seascape. A battle for the coastal town of Wells in southern Maine similarly incorporated natives’ natural knowledge. There, in 1688, Indian forces opted to lay siege to two English sloops not in an open water engagement, but by tactically positioning their armed warriors at “a Turn of the Creek.” This posture allowed them to “ly out of danger, so near ‘em, as to throw Mud aboard with their Hands” while simultaneously making it “impossible for any of the Garrisons to afford ‘em any relief.” After making little headway with this plan, the Indians took the fight to the ships, launching a more aggressive scheme that still permitted them to retain their entrenched position. The assailants constructed “a Great Fire Work, about Eighteen or Twenty Foot Square, and fill’d it up with Combustible matter, which they Fired” and carefully arranged “it in the way, for the Tide now to Floate it up, unto the Sloops.” Though an unexpected shift in the wind narrowly diverted the flaming barge, Wabanaki demonstrated that colonists’ oceangoing property was susceptible to confiscation from both sea and land.33

The ingenuity and dynamism that characterized Indian maritime violence generated another means of exploiting the imperial rivalry embroiling the northeast. As King William’s War progressed beyond its initial stages, Wabanaki began supplementing their maritime strength with French naval assistance. This alliance strategy allowed Indians to coordinate their seaborne attacks against the most powerful

symbols of English Atlantic colonialism with French ships, supplies and men. Yet the assimilation of an imperial neighbor’s naval aid was managed according to Wabanaki terms, allowing Indians to stave off dependency on foreign maritime power. The native response to New England’s Fort William Henry at Pemaquid was a prime example. The garrison had been constructed by colonial authorities in the 1680s to protect the fishing economy and obstruct local Indians from access to the ocean, both of which were accomplished successfully. Shortly after the war began, Wabanaki unsurprisingly targeted Pemaquid for destruction, first attempting to turn the English strategy on its head by cutting off the community from the sea. During the frigid winter of 1692-1693, soldiers stationing the garrison grew desperate after their “wood sloop with thirty men in her at a miles distance from the Fort was seized by the Indians.” With “the Master slayn” and “several wounded,” the rest of the shattered crew “fled by the boat and left their Sloope in ye Indians hands.” With their presence made known, native warriors proceeded to “frequently shew themselves at ye Garrison,” effectively besieging the freezing soldiers and cutting off their only other egress. Two years later, the fort still stood, though it was continually targeted by Indians who in September destroyed another boat set out “to fetch wood for the Supply of the Fort; which they had lately cut out.” By 1696, vehement native complaints about Pemaquid’s damaging effect on their vital fishery were now regularly voiced to French officials at Fort St. Jean in Acadia. Finally in August, a colossal amphibious force of “six hundred Indians” descended on the English stronghold in “two French Ships” commanded by Pierre LeMoyne D’Iberville and accompanied by “one hundred french with Bombs, Mortars and field-pieces and other Impliments of War.” The annihilation of Pemaquid became a source
of tremendous pride to French colonials who triumphantly proclaimed it as one of the
greatest routs of the war. But to the Wabanaki indispensible to its success, the entire
campaign had been waged over several years and was shrewdly spearheaded by their
strategists.\textsuperscript{34}

Indians also appropriated French aid during the war to enhance their aggressive
cmdand of Atlantic spaces and frequent theft of English nautical technology. En route
to its sacking of Pemaquid in 1696, the massive French-Wabanaki convoy succeeded in
capturing “the Newport Galley,” an official ship of Massachusetts conducting colony
business. A year later, another international naval force targeted English fishing
shallops that were “Lying at anchor on sabbath day night and being too careles…not
keeping a Watch.” Under the cover of darkness, “the indians and french came on them
at unawares” and after killing one and taking the rest prisoner, succeeded in
commandeering “all the shallops being 6 in number.” A similar joint effort aboard “a
Sloop & a Ketch chased a boat” belonging to York fisherman Rowland Young off the
cost of southern Maine. After coming up alongside Young, the hijackers “fired a great
gun at him, & made him Strike & took him,” at which point “the Sloop gave chase to
the other boat which did escape in to York” with the rest of Young’s bewildered crew.

\textsuperscript{34}“1692/3 Concerning Sir Wm. Phips Proceedings,” MHS, Frederick Lewis Gay transcripts, 1632-1786 –
Ms. N-2012 – Chippens Papers, Vol. II: 136; Letter from Stoughton to Gov. Fletcher, 21 September 1695,
MSA, Massachusetts Archives Collection – SC1-45X – Vol. 30: 373-374; “Resume d’un Memoire du
Sieur de Villebon,” a Fort St Jean, le 7 Juillet, 1694, in Collection de manuscrits contenant letters,
mémoirs, et autres documents historiques relatives à la Nouvelle-France, II: 157; Extract of a Letter
dated at Boston in New-England, 15 August 1696, British National Archives, Kew, UK (hereafter BNA),
Colonial Office Papers (hereafter CO) 5/907, f. 52; Another eyewitness to the battle described how “the
whole body of Indians that appeared at Pemaquid when all was added to them out of the Ships did not
make up full three hundred,” see “Copy of a Letter to Col. Gedney August 17 1696,” in James Phinney
Though astonished witnesses could “give no account of their Strength,” they were able to conclude “that they sail Incomparably well.”

Over the course of King William’s War, both Indians and English witnessed with evermore clarity the sheer vulnerability of New England’s fishing economy in the face of Wabanaki campaigns of maritime violence. Though this reality had been jointly recognized during the warfare of the 1670s, the inability of colonial authorities and fishermen to rectify the problem in the 1690s signaled to Indians the utter ineptitude of English authority much beyond the confines of southern New England. It also exposed further the soft underbelly of colonialism in the northeast. As early as the beginning of hostilities in 1688, Massachusetts fishermen were opting to relinquish their employment and take their chances pleading with the colonial government for compensation rather than risk their lives and equipment in the turbulent Wabanaki Atlantic. The Indian threat at sea forced these desperate men to be “shut up in Garrison,” one supplicant wrote to the Andros authorities, “and not permitted to go to Sea or to bring their Fish about to Boston, which Lyeth there upon Spoyle.” One official consequently declared “the fishery lost” in a report to superiors in England. Two years later, Wabanaki enjoyed even greater fruits from their labors. “All the fishery on the coast is deserted for many leagues,” beleaguered residents in northern New England wrote to officials, “the inhabitants not daring to stay for want of protection.” Descriptions of impending doom made their way to Boston in 1691 from fishing communities on the Isles of Pemaquid Papers, “Notice of Capture of Pemaquid by French and Indians, at a Council held at his Majesty’s fort in New York the 23th of August 1696,” in Collections of the Maine Historical Society, V: 134; John Marshal’s Diary, 1697, in Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 2nd series (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1901), XIV: 27; Letter of Elisha Hutchinson to the Governor and Council, in James Phinney Baxter, ed., Baxter Manuscripts V: 338.
Shoals, an archipelago some ten miles off the coast of southern Maine. The settlements here, “whose men being almost all at Sea every day & sometimes a whole week together,” were left exposed as easy targets for Indians “both from Sea & land to shoot their malevolent arrows against.” Such places were on the verge of becoming “Receptacles and lurking places” for Wabanaki marines.36

Yet more than the fishery was at the mercy of Indians during King William’s War. Northern New England’s stands of enormous red and white pines were increasingly valued by imperial agents as masts for the Royal Navy. Integrating this supply base into the imperial economy alleviated the crown’s dependence on Scandinavia and the Baltic states for ship stores. But when Wabanaki violently obstructed this flow, it was readily apparent to English leaders that the Indians occupied a dangerous and unprecedented position at the very heart of the empire’s trans-Atlantic economy. “The Indians have overrun the greatest part of the Eastern Country from the St. Croix to the Piscataqua, two hundred miles of coast,” an imprisoned official of the Andros government wrote to the Lords of Trade at Whitehall in 1689. As a result, “the fisheries and lumber (our principal commodities) are quite destroyed” while “all the great masts for the Royal Navy are in the hands of the French or Indians.” Andros himself declared to the same superiors later that year that “the fishery and the trade in masts and lumber is consequently almost wholly ruined.” Captain John Holmes, employed in harvesting and shipping the mast trees aboard his vessel America, related

in 1690 that the Indians “have Burnt and Distryed by fire and sword 150 miles in
Length Eastward of Wells in the Province of Maine,” a line of destruction that
swallowed “all the Sea Ports in those Parts.” The conflagration, Holmes forecasted,
would inevitably mean that “all the trade for Masts Timber Boards and fishing will be
wholey Lost from the English.” By 1696, New England official John Nelson confirmed
that “we have in a measure lost our mast, timber and fishing trade” as Wabanaki
completed their reclamation from retreating colonial settlers. When Indians and French
sacked Pemaquid and besieged the fort at Saco later that year, colonial leaders deemed
the loss particularly calamitous because it was “from whence the Naval Stores do
chiefly come.”37

The disastrous trans-Atlantic repercussions of Indian violence ashore and afloat
did not go unnoticed by frantic imperial agents. A member of Edmund Andros’
beleaguered government reminded Whitehall in 1689 that “our enemies are Eastern
Indians,” and our “country will be in danger of being overrun” if left unchecked. “Then
farewell to the West Indian plantations, which cannot subsist without our provisions,”
Edward Randolph pointed out to superiors. As Wabanaki intensified their violence
against the fishery and on land a year later, Massachusetts agents in London read a letter
dripping with irony from their panic-stricken colonists, begging them to “see the Sea of

37 Richard L. Bushman, King and People in Provincial Massachusetts (Chapel Hill, NC: University of
North Carolina Press, 1985), 140-142; Edward Randolph to Lords of Trade and Plantations, 5 September
1689, in W. Noel Sainsbury, et. al., eds., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the
West Indies, 1689-1692: 140-141; Sir Edmund Andros’s account of the State of New England, in W. Noel
Sainsbury, et. al., eds., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1689-
Frederick Lewis Gay transcripts, 1632-1786 – Ms. N-2012 – Phips Papers, Vol. I: 58; Memorial of John
Nelson to the Council of Trade, 23 September 1696, in W. Noel Sainsbury, et. al., eds., Calendar of State
Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1696-1697: 134-136; “Representation of the State
trouble we are Swimming in.” According to the damage assessment of royally-
commissioned agent John Nelson in 1697, an increased security presence was
absolutely necessary if the crown wished to save “the fisherie,” upon which “depends
the chiefest of the Trade of New England.” Bidding adieu to the bountiful waters of the
northwest Atlantic, and the equally-fecund West Indian islands, amidst an Indian sea of
trouble was not exactly the imagery metropolitan officials wished to evoke when
envisioning their Atlantic world.38

Regardless of whether or not their warriors participated in the crippling of New
England’s north Atlantic economy, Wabanaki communities experienced a coordinated
campaign to displace them from the ocean and sever them from its resources. Though
this colonial strategy was nothing new, its amplification now signaled the increasingly
violent incompatibility of Indian and English visions of the Atlantic. Native power on
the northwestern seas, Indians and imperial officials alike recognized, threatened to
destroy England’s incorporation of the region into a larger nexus of authority. Likely
because of Massachusetts’ shattered government, Wabanaki decimated the fishery with
impunity for nearly two years before the colony began formulating a coherent response.
In spring of 1690, desperate Massachusetts leaders turned to recruiting able-bodied
seamen to harass oceangoing Indians. Captain Noah Wiswall was ordered to visit “the
Enemy’s usual fishing places where in probability they now are,” while John Hathorne
and Jonathan Corwin were directed to muster crews to “disrest and Attack the Enemy,

38 Copy of a letter from Boston, October 24, 1689,” in W. Noel Sainsbury, et. al., eds., Calendar of State
Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1689-1692: 163-164; “Letter to the Agents of the
Manuscripts V: 167-172; “Copy of Mr. Nelson’s Memorial relating to Nova Scotia and parts adjacent
at their usual fishing places or Elsewhere, as there may be opportunity.” Near St. Johns in Acadia, a brigade of forty Micmac warriors in canoes engaged with one of these forces headed by Boston mariner Cyprian Southack, losing two of their own and wounding four English.39

By June 1691, Massachusetts leaders were ramping up their efforts. In a measure engineered “to prosecute the Indian enemy,” officials informed the governor of New York that “We are now equipping of a Ship of War and another Vessel to cruise upon the Coast for defence thereof and Securing of Navigation.” A month later, army officers from the colony were similarly organizing an “Expedition by water to Saco to visit the Indian fishing places in Expectation of Surprising some of them there.” In the same year, Massachusetts commissioned another officer to take command of the sloop Mary, a vessel “mounted with fourteen guns,” for the better “guarding and defending of the Seas and Coast” against “piratical Sea Rovers” plaguing the fishery. These Indian outlaws of the waves possessed such a sophisticated nautical expertise with Euro-American sailing technology that they could be easily mistaken for veteran English sailors. Cyprian Southack was accordingly instructed to scour Wabanaki waters while taking care to clearly communicate his identity. “As you meet with any Coasters or Fishing Vessels make a Signal that they may know you when you come near to, or are minded to speak with any of them,” officials reminded him, “that they be not driven out of there course or from their employment for fear of your being an Enemy.”

colony’s response to the frantic pleas of fishing communities on the Isles of Sholes included sending Captain Willey there in winter of 1692 “for the defence of the said Islands and repelling any attack of French or Indian Enemies.”

Despite the persistent struggle to eliminate their Atlantic presence and sever their access to the ocean, Wabanaki realized that their campaign for control of their sea had once again proved effective. By 1695, the state of New England’s coastal settlements in Maine was so deplorable that most colonists simply retreated southward. “The people on shore are in extreme misery,” French officials at Acadia boasted, and “have not, since the war, had so much power at sea.” In the midst of such desperation, all efforts by distant authorities in Boston to clear the ocean of Indians and their French allies were hopelessly inadequate. Indeed by the regional conclusion of King William’s War in 1699, the entire coast of Maine was virtually devoid of English habitation, a sight that to Wabanaki mirrored the post-bellum status quo in 1678. By the end of the century, then, native northeasterners had come to recognize another critical maxim regarding their ever-expanding Atlantic world. The imperial rivalry between England and France – a contest that in large part stemmed from a desire to incorporate and dominate the Atlantic – offered Indians a lucrative opportunity to secure their own

vision of this world. Only by cultivating an Atlantic amenable to Wabanaki interests could their security ashore be ensured.⁴¹

Chapter Five

“Not to be under the command of any party”: Navigating the Shifting Winds of Imperial Conflict

While the Treaty of Ryswick settled the Anglo-French imperial conflagration in 1697, the terms of peace were concluded with Wabanaki at another conference along the familiar shores of Casco Bay in January 1699. The parallels between the outcome of this war and its predecessor in 1678, however, extended far beyond the locale of peacemaking. To native participants, both wars served to correct the disorder and destruction unleashed by New England’s Atlantic colonialism in the northeast after countless complaints about its poisonous effects were repeatedly swept aside by Massachusetts leaders. Campaigns of maritime violence, Indians recognized by the end of King William’s War, once again rejuvenated a Wabanaki Atlantic world compromised by colonial aggression. English ships, sailors, coastal fortifications, and trans-Atlantic commodities were all routinely targeted in a collective native effort to reorder their maritime world amenable to native interests. When Wabanaki convened on the wave-swept shores of Casco Bay in 1699, they did so under very familiar circumstances.

Yet the Atlantic vision which Indians regenerated through maritime violence again proved ephemeral. In the precarious postbellum status quo that surfaced in its wake, King William’s War further mirrored its predecessor in 1678. And this unmistakable parallel was not lost on native people. This chapter explores the incongruent Wabanaki responses to, and their eventual collaborative participation in, another imperial conflict emanating from the Atlantic after a brief interlude of peace.
from 1699 to 1703. It argues that while Indians initially differed considerably in their willingness to exploit once again European political affairs, they very quickly coalesced around a familiar and proven strategy of seaborne aggression when neutrality became untenable. This unifying approach, moreover, aimed not simply to stem the most threatening aspects of English maritime colonialism in the northeast, but also to cripple the trans-Atlantic economy that fostered its growth. Wabanaki participation in Queen Anne’s War thus emerged as the latest phase in a developing pattern. Imperial conflagration, Indians believed, afforded an opportunity to reorder a native Atlantic constantly disordered by its imperial counterpart.

But Indians were not the only people attuned to the lessons of earlier wars. Almost instantly after peace returned to the northeast in 1699, New England embarked on a massive project to resuscitate and augment the fishing and masting sectors of their Atlantic economy, a task that could not meet with success without first displacing Indians from the sea and confining their mobility on land. Massachusetts authorities subsequently commissioned and subsidized the construction of several coastal fortifications, commercial fishing stages, and river dams, all of which would foster a rebirth of the imperial economy by dismantling the Indians’ maritime presence. At the first sign of Wabanaki violence in Queen Anne’s War, the colony immediately ramped up these efforts, knowing full well what lay ahead. Convoys of massive frigates patrolled the waves alongside fishing vessels, fishermen armed their sloops and shallops with artillery, and colonial troops targeted well-known Indian fishing grounds. The emergent pattern of native-imperial violence, of which Queen Anne’s War was the
latest component, thus fundamentally represented a clash for Atlantic spaces, resources and visions.

Southern Wabanakia’s transition from guarded cooperation with the English in the immediate wake of King William’s War to total war after 1704 was personified in the remarkable Atlantic exploits of Nescambiouit. At the behest of the Massachusetts governor in 1699, this warrior-leader from the Saco River region apprehended and turned over to the English two notorious pirates wanted for their depredations against the imperial Atlantic economy. But when his people joined with their northeastern Micmac and French kin a few years later in Queen Anne’s War, Nescambiouit gained further notoriety by spearheading a number of assaults against English settlements and soldiers in Maine. French officials lauded his deeds as a valiant defense of empire, and rewarded him with a trans-Atlantic victory tour that included a rather lively royal audience with the Sun King. The sagamore thus engaged on his own terms a large network of authority and prestige, one that stretched from the Dawnland to the elite power circles of metropolitan London and Versailles. His kin in southern Maine would likewise move from cautious peace to outright war once the opportunities bound up in imperial conflict outweighed those of nonviolence.

As with the gains made during warfare in the mid-1670s, the native victories achieved in King William’s War were accompanied by a tremendous cost. Most Indian communities in southern Wabanakia experienced significant casualties from disease and warfare throughout the 1690s. The conflict also took a shocking toll on France’s economy, and the king’s paternal benevolence in the native northeast consequently
languished. As the quantity and quality of Louis XIV’s presents dwindled, Indians realized that the material benefits of royal power waxed and waned, a pattern often dictated by forces beyond their control. To the vexation of French colonial officials at Quebec and Acadia, southern Wabanaki subsequently cultivated English gift-giving in New England even before the conclusion of King William’s War. The governor of New France chided Indians for their fickle loyalties by invoking their royal kinship bonds. Moxus, principal sagamore of the Kennebec River, received one such reprimand in 1700, “threatening him what the King his master would do to punish him and his Indians if they held any intercourse” with the English. Wabanaki were thus now restructuring their economic relationships in significant ways. The speed and impunity with which New Englanders resettled their northern frontier after 1678 also prepared Indians to expect a similar rebound in 1699.¹

The confluence of these factors at the turn of the century forced Indians in Maine to adopt a posture of accommodation with New England. But socio-political forces from the west were also encouraging this new diplomatic tack. Several Wabanaki representatives joined nearly eight hundred other Indian delegates from the Great Lakes and northeast at the Great Peace of Montreal in 1701, a meeting that formalized native neutrality between imperial neighbors. The postwar change of course in the Dawnland was thus part and parcel of concurrent developments among Algonquians and Iroquoians in the broader northeast. Later that year, Kennebec River Indians were according Massachusetts a prominent role in their Atlantic communication networks, imploring New England treaty commissioners in that year to “give us notice

¹ Bellomont to Board of Trade, 16 July 1700, BNA, CO 5/909, f. 230; Bruce J. Bourque, Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine, 175.
of the likelyhood of a War between the French and the English.” The transmission of such news would preserve amicable relations, the Indians assured them, because “we desire to keep ourselves free, and not to be under the command of any party.” To Wabanaki, the imperial contest of the 1690s provided an effective opportunity to refashion their Atlantic world, but it also forced them to reconsider and restructure their relationships with the English if they wished to avoid paying a similar price in the future.²

The spirit of accommodation that surfaced from Wabanaki’s attenuated victory in King William’s War functioned as a catalyst for the peculiar and remarkable Atlantic adventures of Nescambiouit. This prominent sagamore of the Saco River region in southern Maine was born around 1660 and first gained notoriety for his martial prowess against the English during King William’s War. The Wabanaki title “Naskâmbi8it,” according to the French who so highly revered him, described one “who is so important and so highly placed because of his merit that his greatness cannot be attained, even in thought.” His longtime English alias, Tom Sabaccoman, suggests that he had forged a unique status in English colonial society as well. Nescambiouit’s astute manipulation

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of English and French Atlantic worlds, and his subsequent development of a Wabanaki Atlantic, amplified his prestige among three cultures and across two continents.3

The genesis of Nescambiouit’s odyssey around the Atlantic lay in the Dawnland’s shifting postwar alliances. As they did in 1678, accommodationist Wabanaki communities proposed exceedingly generous terms for New England’s resettlement of Maine. In this spirit of conciliation, Nescambiouit traveled to Boston accompanied by other regional sagamores to assure the recently appointed Massachusetts governor Richard Coote, First Earl of Bellomont, that “King William Englishmans King is their King.” After invoking royal authority to once again authenticate their intentions and express a desire to reestablish ties to the English monarchy, the Indians promised to allow “all Fishermen [to] improve and enjoy the Fishery and rights of ye shore for making their fish.” The native delegates proceeded to express their desire for certain English concessions in the region. An equally-conciliatory Bellomont, believing “the fishery on the Eastern Coast [to] be the staple of this Province,” acquiesced to native demands, promising them the convenience of a truck house at Casco Bay staffed by a gunsmith and stocked with goods at low rates. Such allowances proved unpopular in the Massachusetts legislature, but were deemed necessary by the governor for the best interests of his colony and empire. The Boston conference in 1699 thus signaled the desires of Wabanaki and English officials to refashion a more equitable relationship in the northeast, one responsive to the economic and political interests of each society.4


4 “A Memorial humbly presented by Tom Sabaccoman otherwise called Scambeovyt,” 8 September 1699, BNA, CO 5/860, f. 233-234; Governor the Earl of Bellomont to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 28 August 1699, in W. Noel Sainsbury, et. al., eds., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and
After forging a tenuous postbellum status quo, Bellomont took advantage of the convenient gathering to address one final matter weighing heavily on his mind. The disquieting issue concerned Captain Joseph Bradish and his one-eyed associate Tee Wetherley, ringleaders of a pirate crew whose villainy had become legendary throughout the empire. Both outlaws, the Kennebec sagamores were informed, remained at large after recently escaping from a Boston jail. Born in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1672, Bradish had remained close to the sea for most of his life, entering into service on merchant ships destined for ports around the Atlantic and beyond. By the mid-1690s, he was employed by commander Thomas Gulleck aboard an interloper bound for the island of Borneo near India. While watering at an island en route, the officers went ashore leaving Bradish and the other mariners aboard the ship, a decision they would later regret. In the officers’ absence, the crew cut the ship’s cables and made off with their new prize. Bradish was chosen by the fugitives to captain the three hundred-and-fifty ton vessel equipped with twenty-two guns, an appointment that spoke to his respected nautical skills.5

After provisioning their ship at Mauritius and dividing the new wealth, the band of pirates proceeded to the New England coast where several of them disembarked for new lives in the colonies. Bradish, Wetherley and about twenty of their crewmembers were eventually recognized, captured, and incarcerated in a Boston jail. Unbeknownst to authorities, the jailer was a relative of Bradish, and after two months he and

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Wetherley disappeared in the night. Bellomont recognized the rugged and remote coastline to the eastward, largely devoid of colonial habitation at the time, as an ideal and convenient haven for the outlaws, and thus turned to the inhabitants he knew were most fluent in the region’s intricate sea- and landscape. By “promising him 200 pieces of Eight for Bradish and a 100 for Wetherley,” a desperate Bellomont acknowledged that cash rather than affinity or loyalty would most effectively procure the cooperation of Nescambiouit and his colleagues. The Massachusetts leader thus aimed to exploit the sagamores’ conciliatory posture in order to appropriate their peoples’ natural knowledge and strategic geographic position in his campaign to eliminate a growing economic threat to England’s Atlantic empire. This effort would in turn secure his, and his nation’s, ascendancy in a rapidly-rising imperial contest.

Bellomont’s commitment to recapturing Bradish and Wetherley was not a simple duty-bound desire to bring common criminals to justice or to uphold the rule of law in his colony. Rather it was part and parcel of a much larger obsession that came to define much of his professional career. His willingness to go so far as employ Wabanaki sagamores to hunt the fugitives pointed to his near neurotic compulsion with eradicating piracy in the English Atlantic. This war against the pirates was too an essential component of his wider passion for metropolitan status-seeking and Atlantic empire-building. Letter after letter to the Board of Trade detailed a relentless pursuit of oceangoing outlaws and a commitment to ensure that the right people were paying attention. In fall of 1699, for example, Bellomont informed superiors that “Pyracy grows everyday in this part of the world” as pirates frequently “Robb us on the Coast

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here and the other plantacions.” The governor accentuated the gravity of this danger by noting that their “Ships that have 30 Guns and 150 men; and there men being all generally choise men.” Bellomont followed up his description of these threatening particulars three months later with a personal account of his heroic apprehension of several pirate bands, encouraging superiors to rest assured of his unyielding commitment to the imperial cause. “I hope your Lordships will please to represent to the King the extraordinary pains and vigilance I have used in taking these severall Pyrates,” he stressed to the Board, hoping that his efforts were duly noted in circles beyond Whitehall. Notoriety and prestige, however, did not suffice; also critical for the governor was that his superiors saw to it “that I may have my proportion of the said Gold & Jewels.”

Where pirates were not lurking in Bellomont’s world, Catholics were. As joint governor and military commander of several northeastern colonies after the Glorious Revolution, and as one of the first royally appointed governors of Massachusetts, Bellomont believed he occupied a decisive position within William III’s new English Protestant imperial system. His chief responsibility in this new order, he imagined, was the seamless integration of the northeast into England’s larger Atlantic empire, an accomplishment he hoped would catapult him into the elite power circles at court. The adhesive that would bind his colonies – and his reputation – to the empire was anti-popery, a particularly virulent national crusade after the coronation of William and Mary. Indeed William became the figurehead of this campaign to safeguard the far-

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8 Robert C. Ritchie, *Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 169-173; Bellomont to Board of Trade, 7 September 1699, BNA, CO 5/860, f. 314; Bellomont to Board of Trade, 27 October 1699, BNA, CO 5/860, f. 381; Bellomont to Board of Trade, 29 November 1699, BNA, CO 5/908, f. 310.
flung kingdom’s Protestant purity, an image that Bellomont went so far as to deify while seeing his own person as the king’s sanctified surrogate in New England. “There is Something that is Godlike in what the King has done for us,” he reminded the people of Massachusetts in his first public address as governor. By playing into common fears of yet another Catholic conspiracy threatening to undermine England’s Atlantic world, the governor carefully worked to unite the persistent distress of colonists and metropolitans under the paternal protection of the crown. Specters of popish plots loomed everywhere in the governor’s mind, as they did for many imperial officials and subjects throughout the empire.9

Bellomont’s curious supplication to the Kennebec sagamores thus dripped with irony. Nescambiouit’s reputation as a notorious adversary of the empire was by now cemented in New England society. One prominent military officer at York in 1700 explained to superiors how the sagamore “is said to have been very active in Comitting of murder and rapine dureing the time of the late Rebellion.” Wabanakia in general, all New Englanders now believed, was a fertile seedbed of popish plotting. Throughout his governorship Bellomont expressed perpetual angst about “some mischief hatching between the Jesuits and those Indians,” and advocated for Protestant ministers to be sent eastward to displace the priests, “who of all men living are the least admired by me.” The Iroquois were even encouraged to round up the treasonous agents of Rome from their homelands and bring them into Albany for prosecution. Before long, the governor had riled his council in Boston into a frenzy about the “Popish Missionaries” who “poison the Indians with their gross idolatry and superstition,” a crime “derogatory to

English laws and government.” The Governor’s Council in New Hampshire, another of Bellomont’s colonies, praised King William as the liberator of Europe from popish tyranny and oppression, but whose efforts, they informed the monarch, were being thwarted among the Wabanaki by “Popish Emissaries” shrewdly “poysoning them with their Hellish doctrines.” Before his speedy retreat from the Wabanaki in southern Maine in 1700, one of Bellomont’s Protestant missionaries wrote to him regarding “the activity of the priests and the concealment of some design.”

The suppression of piracy, coupled with the foiling of ubiquitous popish scheming, was thus Bellomont’s ticket to metropolitan fame and fortune, all the while facilitating the consolidation of an English Atlantic empire. When the governor implored the aid of Indians notoriously complicit in these popish machinations, and in the recent maritime depredations against the imperial economy, he revealed just how desperate he had become to secure these lofty ambitions. But the ends evidently justified the means, a reality with which Bellomont quickly came to terms while fearing his London superiors would not. Nescambiout and his attendant headmen – representatives of people equally-resolute to consolidate an Atlantic world and define its character – were subsequently presented with a unique and ironic opportunity in Bellomont’s imperial design and effort at self-promotion.

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It was thus in an undoubtedly wild amalgam of relief, ecstasy, and astonishment that Governor Bellomont received news in late October, 1699, of Bradish and Wetherley’s capture at the hands of Nescambiouit. With the assistance of several Kennebecs, the sagamore apprehended the pirates somewhere on the waves or in the forests of southern Wabanakia, and brought them in to English authorities at the Saco garrison. “Tis Escambuit that has taken them,” a slightly embarrassed Bellomont acknowledged to imperial officials, unsure how much of the full story to unveil. The cash reward – his own diplomatic scheme – “has prevail’d” far “more than Affection or principle” on the part of the Indians, the governor emphasized, and Nescambiouit accordingly “has receiv’d the 300 pieces of eight I promis’d him.” And to further assuage the fears of metropolitan officials still questioning Bellomont’s competency as an imperialist and pirate-hunter, the governor added that “I have order’d ‘em to be well secur’d with Irons.” Such efforts though were again bungled when the crafty and persistent pirates both “fil’d off their fetters” and “broke the floor of the prison & thought to escape that way.” After their retreat was thwarted, “I ordered them to be mancled and chained to one another,” Bellomont explained, adding further that “this new Goaler I have got is honest otherwise I should be very uneasey, for fear these Pyrates should escape.”  

Over the next few months, the governor carried on his anxious struggle to transform Nescambiouit’s apprehension of Bradish and Wetherley – the first pirates brought to justice under Bellmont’s watch – into a more palatable account where he himself, rather than a notorious imperial enemy, was the central protagonist. This

11 Bellomont to Board of Trade, 22 October 1699, BNA, CO 5/908, f. 279-280; Bellomont to Board of Trade, 26 October 1699, BNA, CO 5/860, f. 333-334; Bellomont to Board of Trade, no date, BNA, CO 5/908, f. 322.
clever recasting of events soon began to pay dividends. By the end of November, in a boast of his tally of several captured pirates including Captain William Kidd, Bellomont was reminding superiors of “my taking Joseph Bradish and Joe Wetherby” through the “extraordinary pains and vigilance I have used.” When His Majesty’s Ship Advice departed from Boston to London that winter carrying Bradish, Wetherley, Kidd and about thirty other seafaring outlaws, it transported the effects of Bellomont’s ambitious self-posturing and the refuse of his struggle to structure an Atlantic world amenable to his empire. After the arrival of the criminals in England, their trial before a Court of Admiralty, and their execution on the docks of Newgate “for several piracyes and Roberies,” the governor began to witness the fruits of his labors. An impressed Board of Trade, ignoring completely the indispensable role of the Wabanaki sagamore, lauded “Your Lordships care in seizing the Persons and securing the Effects” of the pirates, a feat that “deserves great Commendations, and it has been accordingly represented to his Majesty.” Bellomont, however, quietly understood the troubling and contradictory secret of his success. But the ends justified the means, the governor again convinced himself, as he continued to co-opt the sagamore’s valuable natural knowledge to further enrich the colony. By the end of that year, he was busy instructing his officers at Saco fort “to try to Ingage Essacambuit to fetch you Some of the Lead ore” in the neighboring forests, “and Send it to me as Soon as you Can.”

12 Bellomont to Board of Trade, 29 November 1699, BNA, CO 5/908, f. 310; “Examination of Tee Weatherly,” 26 April 1700, BNA, High Court of Admiralty Papers (HCA) 1/14, f. 201, 216; Board of Trade to Bellomont, 11 April 1700, BNA, CO 5/908, f. 429; Robert C. Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates, 175; George Francis Dow, The Pirates of the New England Coast, 1630-1730, 43; “Bellomont to Captain John Hill, Commander of his Majestys Fort Mary At Saco,” 1 December 1699, Maine Historical Society, Portland, ME (hereafter MeHS), Richard Coote Bellomont; L.S. 1699, Collection S-927, Miscellaneous Box 35/26.
Nescambiouit had his own motives for participating in this trans-Atlantic game of power and prestige. His interests, moreover, ironically paralleled those of the governor in striking ways. When Bellomont broached his proposal during an official peace conference with the Indian headmen in Boston, its implications were situated in an immediate context of diplomacy and imperial negotiation. The bounty on Bradish and Wetherley’s heads thus presented the Wabanaki sagamores in attendance with a lucrative opportunity to curry favor with New England officials in the wake of another destructive colonial war in the northeast, thereby permitting them to play off one imperial regime against the other. Nescambiouit’s apprehension of the notorious villains of the English Atlantic, and his surrender of them to Massachusetts authorities, thus afforded a significant degree of prestige and power within English imperial structures.

Though Governor Bellomont accentuated the efficacy of his pecuniary reward in procuring the pirates, Nescambiouit and those Indians he spoke for were far from cash-hungry market-driven consumers. This diplomatic opportunity to augment Wabanaki authority in the northeast was far more valuable than any European currency. Yet the substantial sum of three hundred pieces of eight also offered Nescambiouit a chance to enhance his prestige within Wabanaki society, and that of his people within the wider northeast, through material channels. His new purchasing power in the trans-Atlantic exchange networks that now permeated Wabanakia could direct the flow of more and better trade goods into native communities throughout southern Maine, reinforcing Nescambiouit’s revered status among his own people. Underlying Joseph Bradish and Tee Wetherley’s remarkable saga, then, lay multiple quests for freedom, material gain,
and esteem that stretched far beyond the northeastern coast. The pirates’ ultimate failure cost them their lives, the governor’s attenuated victory hinged on dubious imperial allies, and the sagamore’s striking success dictated both.

Nescambiouit’s role in the pirate affair proved to be only the beginning of his astonishing odyssey in the Atlantic. After another imperial conflagration enveloped Europe in 1702, this time over fears of a continental French-Spanish alliance, the sagamore accompanied by most Wabanaki communities exploited the opportunity to once again strike back against the further encroachment of English colonialism in the region. By now, Nescambiouit’s military prowess throughout the northeastern borderlands had become so renowned among New Englanders that it earned him such colorful titles as “Bloody Devil” and “insulting monster” by such charitable Puritan figures as Cotton Mather and Samuel Penhallow, respectively. Later Massachusetts governor Thomas Hutchinson referred to him as “a notable chief, much dreaded by the English upon the frontiers.” Though Wabanaki warrior-leaders like Nescambiouit spurred the divine supplications of countless English colonists, to the French they were the answer to their prayers. Indeed authorities in New France came to see the sagamore as their dependable ally, as a native empire-builder laboring under the fleur-de-lis in the forests of North America. In 1705, for example, Nescambiouit led a contingent of Wabanaki warriors along with six to seven hundred French soldiers and inhabitants against the distant English fishing settlement of St. John’s, Newfoundland. Within hours, the community was ransacked and all English were taken prisoners. The native
headman was rewarded for his exploits with a trip to France in 1705, a tour that culminated in a memorable royal audience with Louis XIV at Versailles.  

Like the trans-oceanic peregrinations of Wabanaki before him, Nescambiouit’s journey to France was understood as another valuable Atlantic opportunity, and consequently as a chance to entrench native authority in the northeast. Traveling as a guest of honor through the homeland of his French neighbors and meeting the font of paternal benevolence whose affection stretched to Wabanakia presented the sagamore with access to a rich and exotic knowledge that would enrich his own people upon returning home. Yet to maximize the yield of this unique occasion Nescambiouit knew he must embody the strong fidelity that bound his society to that of his hosts. This necessitated playing into French expectations of native affinities.

The sagamore’s subsequent performance at the Sun King’s court was thus a carefully engineered spectacle aimed at manipulating a rare opportunity. Standing before the royal audience at Versailles, adorned in full native regalia, Nescambiouit boasted of his battlefield prowess deep in the American wilderness. While slowly lifting his arm before Louis and his courtiers, he proclaimed that “this hand of mine has slain one hundred and fifty of your Majesty's enemies, within the territories of New-England.” The monarch was so enamored by the warrior’s apparent commitment to the empire that he knighted him and bestowed an annual pension of eight livres for life. Upon returning to Wabanakia the following year, Nescambiouit continued his

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aggressive resistance in the war against English colonialism, now bolstered by the ornate saber given to him by King Louis.¹⁴

The native celebrity’s trans-Atlantic tour in France, particularly the spectacle of his legendary meeting with the king, was also carefully orchestrated by French colonial officials anxious about their increasingly tenuous alliance with the Wabanaki. By lavishing one of their headmen with gifts, and lauding in the royal palace at Versailles, the French tapped into traditional Wabanaki customs of diplomacy and kinship-building. But this cross-cultural manipulation was by no means unilateral. By playing into European fascinations with Indians and exhibiting the fearless devotion Wabanaki supposedly felt for their French colonial neighbors, Nescambiouit shrewdly positioned himself and his people as indispensible components of Louis’ imperial vision. Because of the sagamore’s performance, the Wabanaki solidified their role as critical cogs in a larger Atlantic machine, and thereby secured the respect and rewards that such a position offered.

Nescambiouit’s wartime exploits, and his performative narration of them at Versailles, belied the cautious neutrality that pervaded southern Wabanakia in the immediate wake of King William’s War. As in 1678, the war had taken a tremendous toll on native populations closest to northern New England, and the seeming inevitability of colonialism’s return to the region prompted Wabanaki to readjust their management strategy. It was hardly surprising, then, that when further political turmoil in Europe spawned another imperial contest in 1702, a spirit of ambivalence rather than

opportunism circulated among their communities. With their coast and sea removed of any debilitating threats, southern Wabanaki at the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession, or Queen Anne’s War, understood the risks of outright involvement to far outweigh its potential rewards.

Prevailing attitudes among northern Wabanaki contrasted starkly with those of their southern kin. Far removed from the locus of English power in southern New England, and neighboring the French in Acadia, Micmac shunned any hint of the neutrality that dominated among their Wabanaki kin to the south. To them, Europe’s incessant imperial rivalry offered an open door to a stronger and more secure native Atlantic. Their response to the declaration of war in 1702 was swift, and their target was again the English fishery. By the end of that year, Micmac marine-warriors had successfully hijacked upwards of twenty fishing vessels off the coast of Nova Scotia, and news of their exploits circulated throughout southern New England. In late summer of the following year, settlers grew increasingly terrified when “about 200 Cape Sable Indians…came round the bay of Fundee” and “debauched all the Eastern Coast from St. Croix to the Province of Main, and with the greatest profidy and secrecy scatter’d themselves to the Length of 100 miles.”

The return of Wabanaki maritime violence not only revived the threat to England’s imperial economy, but also compromised the fragile metropolitan status of Massachusetts Governor Joseph Dudley. Dudley succeeded the Earl of Bellomont after his death in 1701, inheriting not only the governorship but also Bellomont’s neurotic

15 Mr. Bradbury to Josiah Cotton in Plymouth, from Salisbury July 27, 1702, AAS, Curwen Family Manuscripts Collection, Box 2, Folder 1; “Governor Dudley to the Council of Trade and Plantations,” 15 September 1703, in W. Noel Sainsbury, et. al., eds., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1702-1703: 689-690.
self-consciousness. In fall 1702, the governor found himself backed into an impossible corner when the renewal of Wabanaki seaborne assaults coincided with a request from the Board of Trade to ship soldiers and materiel to the war effort in Jamaica. After carefully considering the conundrum and its repercussions for both his social standing and his colony, the governor reminded his superiors in September that “in every War we have been attack’t by the Indians… and Expect the same everyday now.” If that was not enough to merit exemption from his quota, Dudley intimated that “we are the most distant Government on the Shoar of America from Jamaica being more than 500 Leagues.” The officials, however, remained obstinate. In November, the governor grudgingly acquiesced and informed the Lords of his compliance “if this new motion of the Indians do not prevent me.” Eager to get in the last word, he closed his correspondence on the matter by pointing out that now “there will be no Ship of War left for the Guard of Our Coasts here.”

Fortunately for Dudley, the Micmac’s southern Wabanaki neighbors continued to maintain their neutrality in the conflict into the following spring. The persistent desire of Maine Indians to carefully navigate a nonviolent course with New England was economically expedient. Native communities compensated for the waning quality and quantity of French goods in the region by negotiating with the English for more convenient access to their more profitable trade networks. When Massachusetts’ galley sailed to the southern Maine coast with trade goods in summer of 1700, the Kennebec sagamore Moxes divulged to the captain a recent letter he had received from Quebec officials. The letter, Moxes explained, detailed King Louis’ displeasure regarding

Wabanaki intercourse with Massachusetts authorities, and threatened punishment if the headman failed to suppress it. The amicable Wabanaki-Anglo diplomacy so heartened New England leaders that they launched their first concerted campaign of religious conversion in the region. By the following December, officials in Boston managed to muster two English ministers to instruct neighboring Indians near the garrisons at Saco and Casco Bay. Coastal Wabanaki also came to expect regular exchange opportunities from Boston sailor Cyprian Southack’s trading ship as it sailed throughout regional waters over the next two years. By 1702, Wabanaki had also successfully persuaded Governor Dudley to construct more truck houses northeast of Casco Bay with better terms of exchange, and thereby secured more convenient and dependable access to the colony’s new mercantile trade policy. As Queen Anne’s War spread throughout the Dawnland, socio-economic circumstances in southern Wabanakia necessitated a course of action altogether different from that of their northeastern kin.17

The profitable socio-economic relationships Indians forged and maintained with New England were placed at the service of native interests in another critical way. They could also function as conduits for the communication of valuable trans-Atlantic intelligence. The extensive Wabanaki information networks that linked their communities to the metropoles of their imperial neighbors throughout King William’s War maintained a critical function during the subsequent interlude of peace, and increased in importance as another conflict loomed across the ocean. After expressing

their satisfaction with being “so well supplied with what we want from the English” during a treaty conference at Casco Bay in June, 1701, Wabanaki from the Kennebec implored the Massachusetts agents to “give us notice of the likelyhood of a War between the French and the English.” Such diplomatic intelligence was critical to the maintenance of native sovereignty in the borderlands, the native delegates assured their counterparts, since “we desire to keep ourselves free, and not to be under the command of any party.” By making explicit their autonomy from French control, Wabanaki delegates endeavored to use their socio-economic relationships with New England to better position themselves within England’s extensive information networks.18

The increasingly amiable rapport between southern Wabanaki and English also afforded Indians a measure of power in their relationship with Quebec. The native attempt to compensate for the plummeting supply of French goods with English alternatives was no secret among French colonial officials, and by the middle of King William’s War Versailles was regularly enjoined to ameliorate the problem by shipping more presents. By 1700, increasingly desperate French leaders aimed to exploit the powerful kinship ties that continued to bind Wabanaki to the crown. The governor of Quebec chided Moxes in 1700 for his correspondence with Massachusetts by warning the headman “what the King his master would do to punish him and his Indians.” When threats of royal wrath failed to modify Indian behavior, reinforcing royal benevolence with material support did. Two years after the governor’s fear-mongering, southern Wabanaki were migrating to Quebec for more convenient access to the presents that “the King through his kindness” sent them. In a heartfelt letter addressed

in 1705, the same Indians praised Louis’ paternal “kindness” – “a compassion so great” – after receiving renewed supplies of gifts and war materiel. And in case this sincere expression of gratitude was not sufficient to augment the king’s benevolence, reminding him of their relationship’s fragility could. Indians accordingly concluded their letter by subtly informing Louis of the persistent English struggle to sever their affective bonds with him.19

Aside from accentuating the mutual obligations of their kinship with the French monarch, the Wabanaki letter of 1705 also indicated troubling developments in the Dawnland. The pacific course pursued by native communities in southern Maine since King William’s War had since become untenable, and several joined northeastern Micmac campaigns of land-based and maritime violence during Queen Anne’s War. The rather rapid dissolution of Wabanaki neutrality from 1700 to 1705 was precipitated by certain renewed colonial pressures on Indians’ longstanding relationship to the ocean. These threats had by now become all too familiar to southern Wabanaki, mirroring those that had surfaced in the aftermath of King Philip’s War and the return of a belligerent English colonialism in Maine.

Like Edmund Andros before them, Massachusetts leaders at the turn of the century assumed command of a colony recently emerged from a destructive, costly and largely maritime war against its native neighbors to the north. Like Andros too, various governors embarked on a remedial campaign to sever native access to the ocean, a move that aimed to prevent another naval conflagration in the future and secure the

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northwestern contours of the ocean for England’s Atlantic empire. As early as January 1700, the colony commissioned the construction of a line of fortifications along the southern Maine coast, including the rebuilding of Pemaquid, sacked by a joint-naval force of French and Indians during the previous war. This militant presence was absolutely “necessary for the Securing of the Timber and Fishery on that Coast,” officials deemed, “and to encourage the resettling the Province of Main and the more Eastern parts which have been destroyed and laid waste in the late War.” A strong redoubt was similarly ordered for nearby Johns Island, “for its better defence in Case of an Attack from the sea.” As they had after 1678, Wabanaki aimed to forge more equitable relations with New England, but increasingly encountered a heated competition to lay claim to the ocean and reintegrate its productive capacity away from the Dawnland.20

Governor Dudley ramped up these efforts to fortify an English Atlantic by aggressively policing the ocean’s accessibility to Indians in early 1703. Prominent Boston seaman Captain Cyprian Southack was accordingly commanded to lead a vessel “equipped, armed and manned” to the eastward “for guarding of the coast.” Later that year, Dudley supplemented Southack’s mission by manipulating the ancient animosities between southern New England’s Algonquian neighbors and the Wabanaki. A polyglot force bound by a common hatred of Wabanaki was accordingly recruited “of English and Indians with Sloopes to attend the Coast Eastward” in order “to keep the Indians from the benefit of the sea.” By October, the governor acquired the support of his colony to sever Maine Indians from the other trans-Atlantic socio-economic network

sustaining their communities. Wabanaki shortly thereafter discovered the Massachusetts “Galley and two Sloops well fitted Cruising upon the Eastern Coast to prevent any french Trade” with their settlements. Such a strategy, Indians well understood, was by no means unprecedented, and its seventeenth-century antecedents were unmistakable. Governor Dudley also comprehended the crippling effect of his disruptive policies on native authority in the region, boasting to the Earl of Nottingham, his primary connection at Court, that the Wabanaki “are in good order, I Having carefully guarded their coast.”

Indians also encountered colonial infrastructure projects in the interior that targeted their utilization of the ocean. The extensive riverine systems spread throughout Wabanakia linked the sea to the inland forests in a system that long sustained native communities with various anadromous marine life during their seasonal periods away from the ocean. And as English learned over the course of two wars, rivers also provided quick and convenient access to the sea from locations far inland. In 1700, Massachusetts thus formulated a project based on the recommendation of Colonel William Romer, His Majesty’s Chief Engineer in America. The strategic design consisted of “a good redoubt made a mile and halfe from the Cascade or Fall” on Saco River, a fortification further strengthened by “a Boom cross the river to hinder the Indians in their Canoes from coming round about the said Falls, and so to the Sea for which reasons we ought to be Masters of the river.” This scheme’s congruence with the damming of the Saco River in the 1680s with “Nets, and Sains [seines]” which “Stop’d

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the Fish” was an unmistakable affront to Indians’ longstanding maritime economy. And as in 1688, this blatant offense was one in a confluence of colonial injuries that would impel Wabanaki to violently strike back.22

In addition to a renewed pressure on access to their eastern frontiers, Indians also experienced colonial efforts to restrict their movement to the northwest. Native migration routes to the St. Lawrence forged over the preceding half century had not only allowed southern Wabanaki to escape their war-ravaged homelands, but also linked those who remained to a valuable socio-economic nexus that served as a viable alternative to that of New England. Yet through King William’s War the English also witnessed the violent implications of these connections for their own regional security. While they simultaneously maneuvered to remove Indians from the ocean in the east, Massachusetts leaders thus moved with an equal sense of urgency to cut off access to New France. In a treaty council at Casco Bay in summer, 1701, Massachusetts commissioners admonished all Indians present to metaphorically “cut down trees” in the paths to Quebec, and stop the flow of migrants to and from the French. The Wabanaki delegates quickly voiced their displeasure at this injunction, informing the colonial leaders that “many of our Brethren would be hindered from coming over to us” if these connections were severed. “Besides,” they continued, “many amongst us care not to be deprived of the liberty of going whither they please.” The trajectory of these colonial policies, Wabanaki were coming to learn in the wake of another conflict, was

to confine the Dawnland to an evermore narrow space, geographically, economically, socially and diplomatically. 23

Indians’ steadily-mounting disillusionment with their colonial English neighbors was fueled by more than the environmental and diplomatic pressures threatening their Atlantic relationships. As was developing in their exchanges with French officials, the troubling trans-Atlantic fates of Indian children profoundly disrupted familial structures in Indian communities. Native children willingly sent or unwillingly taken abroad with English travelers were by 1700 often failing to return home, and Wabanaki consequently began to comprehend with greater clarity a dangerous English Atlantic world locked in competition for ascendancy over their own. Rather than affording native society a valuable cultural knowledge through the travels of their children, this threatening and increasingly unpredictable world severed Wabanaki from both their ocean and their children.

By 1702, one of these unsettling Atlantic journeys was severely complicating diplomatic relations with Massachusetts. Sometime during King William’s War, a Wabanaki boy came into the custody of Sir William Phips, perhaps during one of Phips’ military excursions to the eastward. After assuming the Massachusetts governorship during the war, Phips was summoned to London by the Board of Trade in 1694 over the concerns of a faction who wished to see him replaced. The Wabanaki youth accompanied Phips on his trip, and like the governor, never returned to New England. He continued to occupy the minds and hearts of his native kin, and by 1702 Governor Dudley was struggling to manage the fallout. “If I had known it in England,” Dudley

23 “Copy of the Heads and Propositions treated on by the Commissioners form the Massachusetts Bay and the Eastern Indians, Cascobay,” 3 June 1701, in W. Noel Sainsbury, et. al., eds., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1702: 119-123.
scrambled to assure Wabanaki delegates at a conference that summer, “I would have brought him, but since I arrived I have written to pray the Queen that he may be sent to me, and if my letters do not miscarry and he be living, I have no doubt but to restore him to you.”

By the following summer, the missing boy had still not been returned. Indians then tried to expedite matters by using a few of their English captives acquired in King William’s War as bargaining chips. Dudley subsequently marshalled his chief contact at Court, the Earl of Nottingham, to undertake a fact-finding mission, informing him that “the Sachims of these Indians have alwaies in their Treaties urged that an Indian boy carried into England by Sir William Phips might be returned, and I pray it on their behalf. It would be a great benefit to us in our Treaties.” Sir Henry Ashurst was likely the key to the child’s successful return, Dudley continued, given his earlier friendship with Phips in England. Regardless, the governor wished Nottingham to know that “there are two or three Christian captives of the last war that I cannot get without the return of this Indian boy.” Nottingham’s subsequent investigation revealed that the child had indeed been “in the service” of Ashurst for the past fourteen years. Though Nottingham endeavored to negotiate the boy’s release, the outcome of his efforts went unrecorded. The ongoing disappointment and anger in Wabanakia engendered by their native son’s unknown fate in England continued to sour relations with the Massachusetts leadership. After southern Wabanaki joined their northeastern Micmac neighbors in arms against the English in late 1703, Dudley fumed to the Board of Trade the following spring that “the Indian boy mentioned in that letter will now be uselesse,

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the Indians having broken all faith with me, and I should not returne him if he were here.”

The mysterious fates of Indian children given over by their communities in good faith to English patrons were also a point of contention corrupting Wabanaki-New England relations. And as they did with the boy kidnapped by William Phips, Indians used treaty negotiations to secure their return. At a conference in Casco Bay in summer 1701, Massachusetts proposed to take a few native youth to England for religious and academic instruction. Wabanaki carefully considered such opportunities in the not-so-distant past, but they had since become fraught with peril and dishonesty. The native delegates respectfully declined the offer, relating how one of their sons, “when he was sent to France, he died there.” They also reminded the English that they still possessed two of their children “called John & Robin, which we believe have by this time learned to read & write English enough, and they never yet have been returned amongst us.”

The English, scrambling for a diplomatic rebuttal, explained to them that one of the children in question had since died while the other was sent to London, where he remained well provided for, though “he hath lost his Language” and “will not incline to return.” Indians found this rejoinder anything but pacifying. A year later, at a meeting to negotiate the release of English prisoners held at Penobscot, Wabanaki leaders agreed to hand over their captives only “for our chield in England which wee all soe much Desier to see.” Though the outcome of this custody rights battle was left out of the

council minutes, Indian communities were learning difficult lessons about the inequitable nature of their relationship to English colonialism. After 1704, Wabanaki children were seldom if ever sent abroad again. When Protestant minister Samuel Moody requested the son of prominent Kennebec sagamore Bomazeen in 1715, so that he might be “instructed in the Christian Religion,” the headman and father simply “could not find in his heart to agree.”

The accumulating pressures poisoning southern Wabanaki relations with New England made neutrality in Queen Anne’s War less and less feasible. But it was not until a violent spark touched off this combustible mass in spring 1703 that Indians abandoned their policy of nonviolence and joined the Micmac in war against the English. As in 1676, this final impetus emerged quite literally from the English Atlantic in a bloody maritime “act of horrid cruelty and injustice.” In March 1703, privateer Samuel Chadwell accompanied by his crew aboard the *Flying Horse* anchored off Naskeag Point in Maine, near the home of French settler Philip Meneer. Meneer was married to the daughter of Saint-Castin and Madockawando’s daughter, and thereby related through kinship to neighboring Wabanaki communities. The Penobscot sagamore Wanungonet later related that Chadwell’s crew came to the homestead and “prompted meneer to Pilot them into a french place which they were designed to plunder” and “threatened to carry him on board.” When Meneer refused, “Chadwell struck him forward with the butt end of his gun” at which point the other privateers “immediately fired att him, and shott him through ye body.” Kenegoeto, a Wabanaki

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neighbor, was taken aboard the ship while some of the crew “then abused meneers wife and rifled his hous,” robbing him of large quantities of beaver furs, “7 pistols, 5 pieces of eight, and 20 new Engd shillings.” After leaving Meneer on shore to die, raping his wife and “most barbarously treating an old squaw that lived there,” the assailants set sail with their plunder.27

News of the “unhappy Infraction” at Naskeag Point spread quickly through Wabanakia and inflamed native communities. A few weeks later, three Indians accompanied by three French settlers in two canoes “Came a Perposs from the Estward to Ballance what Capt: Chadwall had Committed in those Parts,” hijacking a sloop and killing one of the crewmen. In April, several Kennebec sagamores including Moxes approached Cyprian Southack’s ship near the mouth of the Kennebec River, and commanded him to sail on further “to Penobscott to Make Satisfaction to all Indians for what Captain Chadwell Took from Them.” Around the same time, Samuel Penhallow and Theodore Atkinson’s colony-commissioned voyage to the Penobscot Indians encountered a general feeling of terror among local English settlers near Sagadahoc. Neighboring Indians’ “different carriages” and “frequent threatnings” led colonists to believe another war was eminent, and was “occasioned by ye late Infraction of Chadwell and his Company att Naaskeag.” Moxes also approached Penhallow and Atkinson’s ship at Kennebec River, and when they assured him of their intention to take supplies to his aggrieved friends at Penobscot, he expressed much satisfaction “accounting that to bee the principall river,” and its leader the “ancientst and most

Because of the Penobscot region’s preeminence as the nucleus of Wabanaki social and political life, Chadwell’s atrocities there were an attack on all of Wabanakia, from southern Maine to northeastern Acadia. Indians stole and plundered another sloop near Kennebunk later that summer, and English settlements throughout the region were similarly targeted for retribution.28

Governor Dudley quickly comprehended the catastrophic potential of Chadwell’s raid, and traveled to Casco Bay that summer to confer personally with sagamores from Kennebec and Penobscot. There the governor lavished “all the Sachimes of Penobscot,” as well as “the three Tribes” under Moxes, with presents and assurances that the late “Mischeif doen upon them was without my knowledge.” Dudley and his associates sailed back to Boston confident that their careful diplomatic maneuvering successfully quelled the alarm pervading Wabanakia. Yet the benevolent and bountiful treatment Wabanaki experienced at the peace council was counterbalanced by Dudley’s belligerent posturing that same summer. As a preemptive measure after first hearing of the Chadwell incident, the governor mobilized two companies of ground troops which he “march’d into the Province of Mayne.” “I have all things in readiness,” he informed superiors at Whitehall, and will “be not surprised if they rise.” Dudley’s earnest words would prove ominous by the end of the summer.

Confronted with a renewed campaign to aggressively police their access to sea, troubling incidents of trans-Atlantic kidnapping, a bloody atrocity from colonial

privateers, and the buildup of New England troops on their doorstep, southern
Wabanaki pursued a proven recourse to mitigate these pressures. The ongoing imperial
war afforded them ample pretext to reorder their increasingly tenuous position in the
northeast.29

The dissolution of native neutrality in southern Maine was also propelled by
ongoing Micmac and French violence against New England. When northeastern
Wabanaki and their French allies renewed familiar methods of maritime aggression
early in Queen Anne’s War, and experienced striking successes with it, they encouraged
the participation of their increasingly disillusioned southern kin in the Kennebec and
Penobscot regions. As it had in earlier colonial conflicts, the cohering locus of
Wabanaki socio-political life at Penobscot served as a headquarters for disparate
communities from northeastern Nova Scotia to southwestern Maine. In mid-summer of
1703, “a great French ship” with several “Cape Sables Indians” arrived from Nova
Scotia at Mount Desert Island near the mouth of Penobscot River to join Maine Indians
and launch their campaigns against English settlements to the south. In September, an
additional two hundred Micmac “came round the bay of Fundee and…debauched all the
Eastern Coast from St. Croix to the Province of Main,” striking as far south as Saco and
Wells with southern Wabanaki warriors.30

29 Joseph Dudley to Board of Trade, 5 August 1703, BNA, CO 5/911, f. 177-185; Governor’s Speech,
1703, in James Phinney Baxter, ed., Baxter Manuscripts IX: 134; Joseph Dudley to Board of Trade, 4
April 1703, BNA, CO 5/911, f. 77.

30 “Minutes of Council in Assembly of the Massachusetts Bay,” 8 July 1703, in W. Noel Sainsbury, et.
al., eds., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1702-1703: 542-543;
“Governor Dudley to the Council of Trade and Plantations,” 15 September 1703, in W. Noel Sainsbury,
et. al., eds., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1702-1703: 689-
690.
By the end of 1703, native communities in southern Maine had all migrated to Penobscot under the realization that their homelands would again be consumed in the intensifying conflagration. Samuel Penhallow and Theodore Atkinson’s expedition up the coast reported that there “was not an Indian to bee seen” northeast of Sagadahoc. After encountering a colonist in a canoe offshore, the crew learned that “the Indians were all fled 10 days before wee came,” and “most of them did retire att Penobscot fort.” When Governor Dudley mobilized six hundred soldiers on snowshoes to range the region’s forests for Indians and prove to them that “we can beare the frost” as heartily as they, the troops discovered that their targets had “early before Christ masse gone Eastward as far as Penobscot.” The Wabanaki coalescence at the site of the “ancientst and most Principall Sagamore,” as Moxes referred to it, signaled not only their attempt to reinforce its integrity after Chadwell’s defilement, but also an intention to shore up their forces and renew a proven maritime strategy.31

The native struggle with New England throughout Queen Anne’s War was largely a contest over Atlantic hegemony, over control of Atlantic spaces and resources. It thus mirrored prior colonial conflicts in the northeast not only in the long-term causes but also in its subsequent development. As fighting broke out along New England’s northeastern frontiers, ashore and afloat, Wabanaki experienced a concerted English plan to ramp up earlier efforts to displace Indians from the sea, integrate marine and terrestrial resources into the English Atlantic economy, and augment colonial authority on the region’s waves. This imperial crusade to redefine Indians’ maritime world until amenable to incorporation into a larger and more coherent English Atlantic world thus

surfaced as the fundamental problem threatening Wabanaki authority during the war. Indians responded by pursuing a familiar and historically-successful course.

Queen Anne’s War in the northeast rapidly transitioned into a contest for the Atlantic shortly after disparate Wabanaki communities closed ranks and assembled at Penobscot. To English colonial leaders familiar with native actions during the imperial war just a few years prior, this development portended the renewal of maritime violence that would again jeopardize the empire’s economic and political ambitions. New England officials accordingly implemented a preemptive campaign that quickly struck at the native seafaring presence. In early spring 1704, Governor Dudley ordered “about seven hundred men to Range the coast from casco bay for to St. Croix the extent of this Government to keep the Indians from their fishing,” a move designed “to distresse them farther against winter, which will demand twenty sloops with provision to attend.” By that summer, the formidable sea-ranging force was bolstered by the presence of two frigates, the Gospir and Jersey, on loan from New York. Indians discovered this formidable fleet lurking on the waves as far northeast as “L’accadia and all along the coast, on both sides the bay of fundee.” Over the ensuing weeks, it successfully “Ranged all the coast from Kenebeck River as far as Saint Johns, and taken considerable plunder and burnt all the Setlements,” much to the joy of leaders in Boston. Such naval measures were designed to further supplement Massachusetts’ earlier commissioning of six hundred men to “range the Coast” of Maine and “insult the Eastern Coast of Nova Scotia, & Port Royal.” To entice volunteers for this effort, the colony established a bounty of one hundred pounds for each Indian scalp obtained. The plan also made provisions to ensure that “the Fishery & Coasters may be guarded with a
Sloop or two suitable for their Security.” A favorable outcome to Queen Anne’s War, Indians and English alike recognized, would be predicated on an immediate fortification of their maritime world.32

After convening at their base of operations along the Penobscot, Indians from the farthest reaches of Wabanakia formulated a strategic response to the breakdown of native-English relations. The reclamation of a distinctly native seascape would be forged through another campaign of maritime violence targeted not only at English sailors and their equipment, but also at the very heart of their imperial economy. The victories achieved with this strategy again reverberated far beyond the northeast and aroused the worst economic fears of imperial leaders. After his diplomatic tour of French Acadia earlier in the war, Boston merchant Samuel Vetch alerted officials in London of the miserable state of New England’s fishing economy in 1708. Thanks to Wabanaki seafaring assaults, and the French support they often enjoyed, “their fishery is quite ruined,” Vetch alerted the Board of Trade. “[W]hereas they had many hundreds of vessells, who formerly both catched and made their fish along this shore,” he continued, the English are currently “almost wholly debared this trade, to the unexpressible loss of New England in particular, and all the English Islands in generall,

who used to be supplied from thence with codd and mackerel, in great quantities, and att low rates for the subsistance of themselves and slaves.”

Other alarming reports were reaching Queen Anne herself. She learned from Governor Dudley in November 1709 that the Wabanaki “make Inroads upon us on the Land Side” and “Infest us to the last Degree on the Sea-part, in a great Measure to the Obstructing of Commerce & Navigation from Great Britain, and your Majesties Plantations in America.” Royal assistance to combat this imperial crisis, the governor hoped, would ameliorate the inadequacies of his earlier strategy to arm Captain William Pickering’s fleet of ships “to attend and Guard the Fishing Vessells” against the incursions of “the Indian Enemy & Rebels.” Pickering’s vessels were commissioned, at his own expense, to “Convoy the Fishing Vessells in a Fleet, both out and home and attend them on the Fishing Grounds, and in the harbours; Keeping them…together as their Fishing may allow, that you may be the better able to cover and Protect them.” Considerable resources at home and at Court, already stretched thin in this hemispheric war for empire, were thus cultivated and expended to mitigate the potential catastrophe looming over the imperial economy.

On the ground, and on the sea, there was ample cause for this collective panic. Andrew Robbinson, captain of a Gloucester fishing crew, applied to the governor’s office in August 1709 for a commission to arm his “good large Sloop” in a “warlike manner” to defend himself and his neighbors against the assaults of the “barbarous

33 Captain Vetch to England, 27 July 1708, in W. Noel Sainsbury, et. al., eds., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1708-1710: 341-49.

“Salvages” off the coast of Cape Sables. The Indians, Robbinson complained, “frequently interrupt them in their Fishery, and commit outrages upon them.” Emboldened with his robust new force, the fisherman was bound and determined to “make Reprizal for the loss of his Vessell taken from him the year past, and to do other Spoiles upon the Enemy.” Near the end of the war, “Indians sett on some fishermen watering their sloops” just off the Nova Scotia coast, wounding three and carrying two others into captivity. Wabanaki warriors forced a mass evacuation of English fishermen and their families to a nearby offshore island at the mouth of the St. John’s River in spring 1705. From there, the settlers watched helplessly as “the Indians burnt all their Stages and Boats.”

The garrison at Casco Bay in southern Maine, long a prominent symbol of English maritime colonialism in Wabanakia, also became a regular target of Indian seaborne violence throughout the war. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, a massive force of nearly five hundred marine-warriors, accompanied by French allies from Acadia, launched an extensive amphibious assault of the bay that resulted in the capture of “one sloop, two shallops, and much plunder.” Over the following two days and nights, Indians mobilized their new prizes to lay siege to the garrison from the water. Their plans were foiled, however, with the arrival of Captain Cyprian Southack who effectively “shattered the navy, which was upwards of 200 canoes.” Wabanaki had not entirely relinquished command of the region’s waters by 1707, when a fleet of their mariners successfully “intercepted a fishing boat as she was sailing between the islands,” killing three of the crew and capturing two more. Terror spread through the
Casco Bay fishing community in summer 1710 after a number of shallops fired on Indians “some where about Penobscut” after trading bread to them under a flag of truce. Given the well-known efficiency of native maritime prowess, the colonists believed that the Indians undoubtedly “will indeavour to revenge themselves upon some fishermen…ye first oppunity they have.” A year later, three Wabanaki slipped into the harbor of nearby York under the cover of darkness and “carryed away a Sloop” with “Sundry goods on Board Her” belonging to William Hinton.36

Their marine-warriors’ ongoing command of the technical aspects of sailing indicated the perserverence of a sophisticated nautical acumen. Euro-American witnesses of and participants in naval skirmishes with Indians found this expertise particularly alarming since it rivaled that of their own sailors. To the horror and shock of settlers at a coastal community in southern Maine, “one hundred and fifty Indians in fifty canoes beset Winter Harbor, where were two shallops riding at anchor” in September 1707. A heated three-hour clash ensued. Indian marines leveled a furious barrage of gunfire at the vessels, forcing the English to abandon one and retreat into the other. Shortly after this success, the Indians stormed aboard the abandoned shallop and “immediately hoisted the sails before our men could hoist theirs half-way atrip.” Those warriors remaining in their canoes, meanwhile, continued to shower the British vessel with their firepower and drove it out to sea, providing ample cover for the Wabanaki-commandeered boat to escape up the coast. Even when completely confined to their ancient form of watercraft, Indians could outmaneuver English sailing vessels. While

making “Dilligent Sirch for ye Enemie, on all ye Islands and Likely places on ye Sea Shore as far as pinnobscut” in 1711, Colonel Thad Walton’s naval brigade encountered “sum Conoos which we Chast but our boats Cum not up with.” The dejected crews continued to scour local waters to “drive the Indian Enemy from their fishing,” but did so “without any Sucksess.”37

Yet the fishery was not the only cog in England’s Atlantic wheel compromised by Wabanaki violence. The emergent masting industry in northern New England’s dense red and white pine forests was still critical for alleviating the empire’s economic dependence on Scandinavia and the Baltic States for ship stores. But as it had in King William’s War, the extractive and invasive enterprise at the heart of the Dawnland again became a target of Indian violence. Though the inhabitants of Berwick, Maine were happy to report to the Board of Trade early in the war that the “masting of this Province is Secured” because “the Indians in all the parts near us are beaten & burnt out of their Forts,” circumstances quickly changed. A contingent of warriors ambushed Colonel Hilton of Exeter and seventeen men employed in his service, “who being deeply engaged in the masting affair,” went to retrieve “several trees of value that were felled fourteen miles up the country.” Shortly thereafter, Governor Dudley commissioned a great number of guards to protect the masting enterprise in Maine. When he received word that a freighter had been diverted while en route to load a freshly-cut supply in January 1710, he immediately notified superiors that “other Ships Must be gotten least

ye Masts be hurt by the Indians.” Such fears were realized the following year when a substantial quantity of prime masts “were all destroyed by the Enemy” in Nova Scotia. The adverse economic impact of these depredations was made clear to the Board of Trade in February 1710. John Bridger, Royal Surveyor of the King’s Woods, reported from Nova Scotia that “the Charge thereof will be thereby very greatly increased” due to the “more Difficult, hazardous and Precarious” nature of the business, and “by the great distance those Masts… must be Cutt from the Waterside up in the Woods, the abode of the Indians.”

Micmac Wabanaki continued to target this vulnerable segment of their imperial enemy’s economy even after the British conquest of Acadia in 1710. Native violence in the region still fettered British access to the most valuable stores of mast trees, and thus prevented the sort of maximized environmental exploitation imperial architects envisioned would accompany military conquest. Circumstances were hardly improving a year later, when Samuel Vetch, first governor of the new colony, detailed plentiful stores of prime mast trees of “a much larger sise” throughout Nova Scotia, but that necessitated a “greater expense” for their harvest because “wee are verry much infested by sculking partys of Indians.” That same summer, recently arrived British authorities at Annapolis Royal, nervous about “the considerable risque from the lurking Indians,” pressed local French inhabitants into service to harvest the pines in the interior for them. Such efforts to exploit the French-Indian alliance proved ineffective, though, when

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Wabanaki destroyed significant quantities of “the sparrs and beams as well as plank and boards” before they reached the garrison. The timber was customarily fastened into floats to facilitate movement on area rivers, but “the Indians had frequently cut lose those floats and turned them adrift as well as threatened the inhabitants if they either cut or brought us any more.” The new nominal British authority in Nova Scotia, and the cordial relationships Indians long experienced with French settlers in Acadia, were insufficient to deter native violence when Wabanaki saw their own interests under attack.39

The Wabanaki experience from the conclusion of King William’s War to the conclusion of Queen Anne’s War was the latest phase of a wider pattern developing since the mid-seventeenth century. When an accretion of colonial pressures threatened their Atlantic, Indians consistently exploited larger conflicts rooted beyond their homelands in the northeast to assuage the disruption such problems engendered. King Philip’s War in southern New England offered Wabanaki a valuable opportunity to restructure increasingly inequitable material exchange networks, stem rapid English encroachment on their hunting grounds and fishing stages, and strike back at callous acts of maritime violence perpetrated by unscrupulous English seafarers. Identical crises returned to Indian communities in the wake of war, compounded now by the development of colonial infrastructure that endeavored to prevent Indian mobility on the ocean and disrupt the use of its material resources. The European political turmoil that became King William’s War dismantled Wabanaki kinship ties to the Stuart

39 Colonel Vetch to Mr. Popple, 15 June 1711, Annapolis Royal, in W. Noel Sainsbury, et. al., eds., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1710-1711: 551-552; Colonel Vetch to Lord Dartmouth, 18 June 1711, in W. Noel Sainsbury, et. al., eds., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1710-1711: 552-554.
dynasty, but also afforded Indians a timely opportunity to mitigate the disruption’s
damaging effects and undermine the pressures that had revisited their communities.
Their success with this strategy again proved fleeting, however, and after four years of
ambivalent cooperation with New England, Wabanaki again seized imperial exigencies
to reorder their world ashore and afloat. By 1713, the native Atlantic had been violently
regenerated by manipulating wider socio-political developments. This unambiguous
trend had come to define the previous half century in the Dawnland.

Perhaps most striking of all was another native strategy resonating through
Wabanaki conflicts. Indians swiftly and systematically entered each colonial contest by
extending it to the sea. This approach reflected not only native confidence in their
nautical prowess against that of the English, but also their longstanding belief that the
pressures and processes at the heart of the Atlantic Ocean had a direct bearing on the
security and welfare of their communities. Launching seaborne raids against the
English maritime presence, wreaking havoc on the imperial Atlantic economy,
commandeering ships and plundering them of their cargo and men became critical
components of a much larger struggle to reclaim native power. That English authorities
undertook equally persistent and aggressive measures to police the ocean’s accessibility
and displace Indians from its waves is testament to exactly what was at stake by 1713.
Queen Anne’s War was the most recent manifestation of a violent and ongoing
contestation for the Atlantic, and the spaces, resources and opportunities that comprised
two competing visions of its utility.

Yet the distinctiveness of these cyclical patterns ought not to obscure the
adaptation and evolution that simultaneously distinguished Wabanaki society. Their
experience between 1699 and 1713 also demonstrated the dynamism and expansiveness continuing to characterize the native Atlantic. Nescambiouit’s remarkable engagement with – and widely-renowned successes in – a trans-Atlantic game of power and prestige linked the Dawnland to the elite power circles of London and Versailles, and revealed just how imbricated his society had become in a world far beyond its ancient homeland. The Atlantic exploits of Nescambiouit thus personified the nature of the Wabanaki Atlantic world by the turn of the century. In the midst of boundless colonial pressure, it served as a locus of ever-expanding possibilities and resources with which to sustain a recognizably native culture.
Chapter Six

“Ye last & only door”: Struggling to Secure a Fleeting Vision

Despite the victories secured by Wabanaki marine-warriors on the sea during Queen Anne’s War, the conflict’s outcome in the native northeast represented a subtle though noticeable departure from earlier patterns of warfare. In 1675 and 1688, Wabanaki responded to the most threatening aspects of maritime colonialism by exploiting larger conflicts, extending conflagrations to the sea and, in King William’s War, employing French assistance. And in both instances these wars for the native Atlantic met with a striking victory. But by 1713, in the wake of Britain’s Acadian conquest, Indians were finally experiencing the limits of their involvement in colonial wars and their ability to fashion positive and lasting changes through them. The sheer resilience of British colonialism on the northeastern frontier, the tenuous nature of French assistance to contain it, and France’s unilateral transfer of authority over enormous tracts of Wabanakia at the Treaty of Utrecht all indicated to Indians the distant, unpredictable and arbitrary nature of imperial rivalry.

This chapter traces the legacy of these realizations beyond 1713 by exploring the transformative effects of Queen Anne’s War on the new world that Wabanaki forged for themselves. It argues that postwar Indians came to terms with the conflict’s difficult lessons by reordering their relationships to the Atlantic processes that had developed over the past century but that no longer addressed the demands of their contemporary world. By rethinking and reconfiguring their position within trans-Atlantic exchange networks, by abandoning their dependence on colonial wars to strike at and plunder the British Atlantic economy and by more carefully manipulating another colonial
governor’s quest for metropolitan fame and fortune, Indians struggled to overcome the obstacles of Queen Anne’s War that endangered their Atlantic world.

This change, of course, continued to demonstrate the dynamism and pragmatic elasticity of the Wabanaki Atlantic vision. Much to the dismay of French civil authorities, Indian refugees from southern Maine re-migrated to their ancestral homelands after the war, where they enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy and more favorable terms of trade with New England. To the northeast, Micmac forces sustained their relentless seaborne assaults against the British fishery, executing them now during interludes of European peace. After receiving intelligence in 1715 of a Jacobite Rebellion in Britain, their communities anticipated another imperial war but resolved to begin it themselves. On their own extra-imperial terms, they took this fight to the sea to secure their Atlantic spaces, resources, and relationships. And when a series of Indian-British raids and counter-raids concerning land ownership and trading rights culminated in Governor Dummer’s War in 1722, Wabanaki from all corners of the Dawnland waged war without French assistance for the first time since King Philip’s War in 1675. Taken together, developments such as these signaled a shift in the ways Indians aimed to maintain their Atlantic world.

Yet over time the capacity of this new tack to regenerate and fortify the native Atlantic proved limited, a troubling reality cast into sharp focus by the end of Dummer’s War in 1726. Buoyed by the destruction of Indian communities during Queen Anne’s War, growing numbers of powerful land proprietors from southern New England filtered into Maine and speculated in Wabanaki lands. New coastal towns increasingly displaced ancient native fishing stages and further constrained Indian
access to the ocean. In addition, New England’s destructive land-based campaigns during Dummer’s War easily offset Wabanaki conquests at sea, compounding the pressures experienced by nearly all native groups in Maine. In response, most Indians retreated permanently to the Penobscot and St. Lawrence rivers, and by mid-century the Penobscots had emerged as the primary spokesmen through which nearly all communities in the northeast aired their concerns to British authorities. The locus of native maritime power had also shifted northeast, where geo-political circumstances in Nova Scotia allowed for its precarious survival. But by the end of the French and Indian War, the imperial equilibrium that had long sustained Indians’ control of the seas, and upon which so much of their Atlantic vision had now come to depend, was quickly dissolving. The British construction of Fort Pownall at the mouth of the Penobscot River late in the war, a project Governor Thomas Pownall trusted would slam shut “ye last & only door That the Enimy had left to ye Atlantic,” consummated the final defeat of the Wabanakis’ Atlantic world. The advances achieved in decades prior through an adaptive and dynamic Atlantic vision had proven ephemeral.¹

Once a critical access point to non-British Atlantic processes and opportunities, French Acadia was now primarily confined by the Treaty of Utrecht to Île Royale (Cape Breton Island), a small corner of France’s former maritime territory. The empire as a whole was also fraught with economic problems. The quantity and quality of the king’s presents to his native allies continued to deteriorate in the immediate aftermath of the war, a disconcerting trend made more unpalatable by Wabanaki exclusion from imperial

¹ Governor Pownall to Board of Trade, June 14, 1759,” BNA, CO 5/889, f. 236.
peace negotiations. New England officials aimed to exploit this apparent royal betrayal by informing Indians in early 1713 that “all the negotiation of peace in Europe as well as here is at the Instance of the french king.” Even more alarming to native interests was that “all the Articles are in favour of the English Interest Everywhere.” When the British deployed this outcome to justify claims to Wabanaki lands a few years later, Indians shot back that they were “not subjects of the French, but only their allies,” thereby indicating their continual claims to equity within this coalition.²

At the end of Queen Anne’s War, the native-French relationship was thus undergoing significant transformation. Indians recognized with evermore clarity the fragility and imbalance that had come to mark their French kinship networks. The disastrous effects of this perception for French imperial interests were not lost on Quebec officials, whose near-neurotic anxieties about cordial Wabanaki-English relations grew more acute. When a contingent of Kennebec Indians arrived at Casco Bay garrison to “express a great deal of joy & Satisfaction at ye news of peace,” they professed that “ye French had deceivd & drawn them in & they now Saw their Folly.” Thenceforth, they assured British officials, they would “wholly renounce the French Interest.”³


Wabanaki responded to these difficult postwar realities by restructuring their diplomatic and economic alliances with imperial neighbors. Relationships fashioned in prior years with French and British societies no longer served native interests. Indians began to rethink and modify their associations to account for the sporadic fluctuations in French exchange networks and gift-giving patterns, French imperial officials’ betrayal of native land claims during peace negotiations, and Britain’s enormous colonial expansion after the conquest of Acadia. Those Wabanaki refugees who fled southern Maine for the St. Lawrence during the war, for example, returned to their former war-ravaged homelands when peace seemed imminent, ignoring the persuasive pressures of French civil authorities in Quebec. In the Dawnland they could enjoy a level of autonomy increasingly unavailable in the mission villages of Canada, as well as a familiar hunting and fishing economy. The Jesuit priest Sebastian Rale, to the aggravation of civil leaders, encouraged Wabanaki to return southeast after experiencing countless problems from the corrupting influence of liquor-plying French settlers. Accompanied by priests, Indians abandoned the French villages in Quebec in growing numbers after 1713 and returned to the lands of their ancestors near the sea.⁴

But Father Rale and his colleagues soon discovered more complex Wabanaki motives spurred their parishioners’ homecoming. The French monarch’s heart, a seemingly-boundless font of benevolence in decades prior, had since hardened and grown cold, and the equitable trade opportunities that attracted Indians to Quebec in the past had also deteriorated. French goods had become notoriously expensive, while the free trade policy of Massachusetts made British goods an increasingly attractive

alternative. In 1716, Wabanaki at Penobscot and other communities along the coast pressured their kin still remaining in the St. Lawrence mission village of Becancourt to join them in their trade with the English “if the French continue to sell merchandise as expensive as they have in the past several years.” Increasingly-assertive Indian traders “declared clearly” to the French that “if they are not provided for,” they will keep their beaver until the spring and “search out better markets.” French leaders at Île Royale in Acadia encountered similar difficulties with formerly dependable, and progressively bolder, Indian allies.⁵

Despite their weakened status, postwar Wabanaki refugees returning southeast actively sought to manage the terms of exchange they enjoyed with the English. At a Portsmouth, New Hampshire, conference with Governor Dudley in summer 1714, Kennebec and Penobscot Indians confronted Massachusetts authorities about certain unfulfilled promises made in the peace treaty a year earlier. In it, Dudley guaranteed a closer regulation of the trade and the establishment of truck houses in more accessible locales near native communities. By summer 1714, these assurances appeared to be nothing more than empty gestures, and Indians promptly sought to hold the colony accountable.

Penobscot headman Querrebenuit spearheaded native efforts to reform Dudley’s inept mercantilist policy. He argued that the prices of trade goods had become too unsettled throughout the region, and requested that the “prices as formerly for Beaver” be restored. “Whereas formerly wee had Two Yards of Broad Cloth for two skins,” the sagamore complained, “now it is three Skins.” The diminishing beaver population in

the northeast, his traders had now come to recognize, ought to have encouraged an increase rather than a decrease in its value according to the economic laws of Euro-American exchange networks. The officials subsequently reminded Querrebenuit, and other like-minded native delegates present, of the impersonal and extensive nature of trans-Atlantic commercial forces. “The price of Beaver is not halfe so much in Great Britain and Europe as some years past,” Dudley informed the Indians, a reality stemming in large part from the fact that “Europe has been along time in a flame with Warrs which has made goods very dear.” Like the troubling outcome of Queen Anne’s War, the value ascribed to Wabanaki goods was determined by seemingly arbitrary and unpredictable factors in distant centers of European power.6

However volatile and unmanageable Atlantic exchange networks seemed to Wabanaki, they were made doubly so by emergent political conflict among the Massachusetts leadership. Governor Dudley always believed in the power of trade to ingratiate the colony to its northeastern native neighbors and draw them away from the ambit of French influence. From his first days in office, he accordingly endeavored to implement and enforce a strict oversight of the Indian trade. Ideally, this strategy would regulate the terms of exchange with Wabanaki traders and provide them with convenient access to trading houses and licensed merchants prohibited from selling alcohol. The House of Representatives, conversely, often pressured by free trade interests among their constituents, actively opposed Dudley’s mercantilist plan despite its purported benefits to the security of the empire. The legislature’s hard-line agenda effectively voided the Wabanaki peace treaty ending Queen Anne’s War. The governor

thus found himself crippled by the local commercial interests and downright intransigence of his political opposition at the Portsmouth conference in 1714. Abandoning his impossible stance, Dudley hoped a new policy of open trade would at least appease the younger factions of Wabanaki traders who preferred dealing with unlicensed agents outside the strictures of colonial oversight. Though the terms of English exchange networks often appeared to Indians to be dictated by unpredictable circumstances not always within their control, they were still more favorable than those of the French in the mid-1710s.\textsuperscript{7}

Other Wabanaki managed the difficult consequences of Queen Anne’s War by pursuing a more militant course. After the imperial regime change in Acadia in 1710, Micmac communities throughout Nova Scotia experienced a new proximity to British power at Annapolis Royal, and the subsequent confinement of the French to Île Royale. Though the regional British presence would remain quite tenuous for decades to come, it served as a conspicuous reminder of the French betrayal at the Treaty of Utrecht. Throughout the late spring and summer of 1715, some Micmac in southeastern Nova Scotia revived their proven strategy of maritime violence to plunder the British fishery, commandeer sailing ships and cripple the imperial economy. The decision to launch another campaign of seaborne aggression, executed now during an interlude of inter-imperial peace, signaled a critical change in the way northeastern Wabanaki understood their relationship to both the English and French. No longer would Indians wait for another arbitrary and unpredictable European political conflict to spill over into their homelands and waters. Nor would they rely on wavering assistance from French

authorities. Now they were determined to seize the initiative and execute war on their own terms.

The Micmac formulated these terms from their own carefully-cultivated information networks that continued to link them to metropolitan Europe. In August, Indians from communities scattered along Nova Scotia’s southeastern coasts and islands confronted commissary Peter Capon’s reconnaissance expedition and informed him of the reasons for their recent depredations. Capon had been commissioned by the colony’s lieutenant governor to probe the “Divers Hostillitys committed by ye Indians, and Seizures made of divers Vessells.” Indians from Pubmacoup, Le Have, Chibucto, Marlegash and Mackadome invariably responded to Capon’s inquiry “about ye Sloops ye Indians had taken from ye fishermen” with the same startling information. From “some of ye fishermen,” the Indians related, they had learned of the “great Tumults in Great Brittain, and Warr expected to be proclaimed Speedily,” but which they “resolved to beginn first.” Capon and other colonial officials deemed such unmonitored communications profoundly dangerous to the welfare of the nascent British colony. But native trans-Atlantic information networks allowed Wabanaki to remain acutely attuned to the political affairs of Europe outside the oversight of imperial administrators. Imperial war- and peacemaking was, by 1715, no longer the exclusive expression of European interests as it had been in the recent Treaty of Utrecht; Micmac were now prepared to instigate conflict by asserting an independent role in imperial politics. A force of Indian marine-warriors accordingly declared that “ye Lands are theirs and they
can make Warr and peace when they please,” as they commandeered several fishing vessels and took the crews hostage near Cape Sables in July 1715.8

The return of political strife to Britain in 1715 was much more than an opportune moment for Wabanaki to initiate another war for Atlantic spaces and resources. It was also part of an ongoing contest whose intimate salience in their communities resonated since the Glorious Revolution three decades prior. The “great Tumults” to which Indians made mention in their exchanges with Peter Capon referred to Britain’s first major Jacobite Rebellion. “The ‘Fifteen” involved a coordinated invasion of Scotland, and plans for the subsequent takeover of England, by Stuart sympathizers at home and abroad. The mission was to overthrow the Hanoverian dynasty and reinstate the Old Pretender, son of James II, to the throne. Wabanaki communities never forgot their historical relationship with the Stuarts dating back to the seventeenth century and the war that had been waged in the Dawnland over its dissolution. Some of this was kept fresh by periodic reminders from Jesuit missionaries. Indians from Father Rale’s mission at Norridgewock in 1719, for example, tried to convince local settler John Minot that “King George was not the right King” and that “he came in at the back doar, and that there was another who was the right heir to the Crown.” Even as late as 1764, “a verbal Jacobitism” was alive and well among the Penobscot who still insisted on referring to the British monarch as “King James,” since, they believed, it was “from James 1st in whose reign New England was first peopled.” The “great Tumults in Great Brittain” in 1715 thus breathed new life

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into the affective bonds that once knit Wabanakia to the Stuart line and that had
continued to flicker dimly ever since. Micmac certainly marshaled their campaign of
maritime violence to plunder wealth and strike at the fishing economy, but also to bear
their share of a much larger coup d’état, an uprising that held out hope of restoring lost
native power in an imperial system.9

By breaking with precedent and launching their amphibious assaults during
peacetime, Micmac first surprised and then wreaked havoc on Britain’s fishing
economy. The implications of their destructive exploits, though, were not confined to a
remote corner of the northeast, but reverberated throughout the Atlantic as they had in
past conflicts. Indians from the Cape Sables region had become “so incensed against
the English, that they seise and plunder what fishing vessells they can come at,” former
Nova Scotia governor Samuel Vetch alerted the Board of Trade, “and commit the same
hostilitys as in open war.” Such violence was orchestrated “in order to ruin that so
noble and valuable fishery upon that coast, which is of so great consequence to the
Crown.” “Unless some speedy and effectual methods are taken for protecting and
encouraging the English fishery,” Vetch concluded, the entire imperial project was in
serious peril. While on his fact-finding mission along southeastern Nova Scotia, Peter
Capon similarly discovered at Chibucto “a great deal of damage done to my Vessells,
Stages Warehouses &c by ye Indians,” and from “which Damage have lost all this
yeares fishing.” In Boston, too, the alarm had yet again been sounded. An
increasingly-exasperated Governor Dudley received word that Cape Sables Indians had

9 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009),
24-25; Daniel Szechi, 1715: The Great Jacobite Rebellion (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2006), chapters four and five; Deposition of John Minot, 27 November 1719, BNA, CO 5/867, f. 233;
“seized Eleven Vessels of ours fishing on that Coast…and made Prisoners most of the fishermen belonging to the said Vessels.” Consequently, he informed the Board of Trade, they must “secure the Settlements on the Shoar Eastward, and the fishery the whole length of the Coast from Newfoundland to Cape Cod.” French officials at Quebec received news of the chaos with approbation, and eagerly informed metropolitan superiors of the twenty-some British fishing vessels recently hijacked by Indians.10

With the advantage of surprise on their side, Wabanaki mariners easily overpowered seasoned British seamen and quickly reasserted their command of the region’s waves. After a force of Indian warriors attacked the crew of “Captain Wright” near Mackadome Island that summer, they “killed ye Doctor of ye Ship” and cut “ye Shipps Rigging and Sailes in peices.” The surviving castaways washed up on the island, “narrowly escaping in there boat,” where they “took up the remains that ye Indians left” before eventually being discovered, destitute and clinging to life, by Peter Capon’s expedition. Captain Cyprian Southack, who crushed the Indian navy at Casco Bay during Queen Anne’s War, received an ungracious welcome when he attempted to establish a fishing base in southern Nova Scotia in summer 1715. Headed by their sagamore, a party of local Micmac approached with alarming news that their kin had captured several fishing vessels in the area, “and now would come to take me & all I

had & would kille me.” Southack abandoned his untimely venture and departed for southern New England. Three years later, he had evidently recovered from his experience enough to launch another attempt, but his ship ran aground in the same area, which the “Indians discovering they set the Sloop on Fire, & burnt her up.”  

Other Wabanaki boldly insisted on the payment of monetary ransoms for their new human and material prizes, thereby diverging from customary Algonquian protocol governing captive diplomacy. During wartime, Indians often exchanged British captives for their own in colonial custody, assimilated them into their societies, or subjected them to elaborate execution rituals. But rarely if ever were they deployed to accumulate pecuniary rewards. In July, a contingent from Cape Sables “seized upon Two ffishing Shallops and kept some of ye Crew Hostages till paid of a Demand they have made of £40,” a puzzled Major Paul Mascereene described to superiors in Boston, adding that “I don’t hear what reason they give for this Violence.” Shortly thereafter, Indians from the same area hijacked several fishing ships and “kept one Vessell and some men as Hostages (and have sent home ye others) untill they return and bring them Such a Value as they have Sett which we think is about 30 pounds,” two Boston merchants detailed to a business partner. The overwhelming successes of native marine-warriors were particularly dreadful for merchant William Pepperrell, who was granted the protection of his colony’s frigate by the Massachusetts Governor’s Council.

so he could sail to Cape Sables and “Use all proper Methods to regain his Men & Vessels out of the Indians Hands.”12

Almost as suddenly as the Micmac launched their naval war, they called it to a halt. This abrupt end could have been due in part to further news regarding the Jacobite Rebellions doubtful progress, or at least its failure to ignite another Atlantic conflagration. But Wabanaki also knew a mismatch when they saw one. As it circulated among the native settlements of coastal Nova Scotia, Peter Capon’s sloop was escorted by an enormous British man-of-war dispatched from the garrison at Annapolis Royal. Around the same time, William Pepperrell arrived in the same waters accompanied by Massachusetts’ frigate. After Capon’s crew dropped anchor at Le Have, “some Indians came on board and said they had returned all ye Vessells and Hostages they had taken.” Micmac at Marlegash similarly placated Capon by explaining that they “were sorry for ye Hostillitys they had committed & said they would never do ye like againe, and that for ye future they would not hearken to any Storys that should be told them, but would come directly to Annapolis Royall to know ye truth.” In August, other nearby sagamores expressed remorse by confessing that they too “were inform’d ‘twas War between the English & the ffrench,” and as a token

of their sincerity “dismiss’d all the…Vessels & Prisoners which are every Day coming in,” much to Governor Dudley’s relief.\textsuperscript{13}

Other Wabanaki to the southwest joined the Micmac in their carefully-measured mea culpas. By late fall 1715, Penobscot and St. Johns Indians were also eager to prove their transparency to British officials, assuring Lieutenant Governor Caulfield at Annapolis Royal that they would keep him in their Atlantic loop. “Wee promised to Inform you of what News wee Should recieve from Europe,” they explained in a letter. “I Can acquaint you with None farther Then That The Kings Live Togeather in perfect peace,” the Indians continued, adding that “if on ye Side you Know any farther Inform me.” After the destructive events of the past few months, Indians realized, British imperial administrators wished above all else to believe that they were vigilantly policing Wabanaki information networks.\textsuperscript{14}

Yet when the men-of-war and frigates departed over the horizon and the seas were left to Indians, Wabanaki continued to aggressively assert their authority on the waves. And, unsurprisingly, this power continued to fester in the sides of British officials. Already by summer 1716, “twelve Canoe loads” of Penobscot and Micmac had joined together for a meeting with southern Wabanaki at Pemaquid, a development that quickly generated a swirl of suspicions and rumors in Boston and Annapolis Royal. In early 1719, an Indian named Jo Muse along with a French settler bragged to Cyprian Southack near Port Rosway, Nova Scotia about their scheme to “head one hundred


Indians to destroy all the English Fishery on that Coast.” There proved to be more substance than braggadocio in such saber-rattling when the following year a group of Indians attacked several British traders at Canso, “where they did in a most Clandestine and Salvage manner take us out of our beds,” pillaged the cabins and fishing vessels, and “drove several of us into the sea so that one of us were drown’d in hast of getting off,” one escapee recalled. In summer 1721, Indians from the same region “plundered severall Vessells in the Bay and the ffishery at Cancoe Insomuch as the loss is computed to 10000£.”

Just as Wabanaki developed a new means of asserting power over their Atlantic world by commodifying British captives during the violence of 1715, so too did they begin to commodify rights to their Atlantic spaces and resources. With an audacity that shocked colonial fishermen and officials alike, Indians along the central Maine coast “at Damaras Cove demand money of the English for fishing there,” a bewildered Lieutenant Governor George Vaughan of Massachusetts learned in 1716. After Jonathan Alden’s trading sloop dropped anchor near Minas, Nova Scotia in September 1720, Micmac sagamore Peter Nunquaddan led eleven Indians on board to apprise the crew of a new local policy. The Indians immediately “demanded fifty livres for liberty to trade saying this Countrey was theirs, and every English Trader should pay Tribute to them.” Five days later Nunquaddan’s men were still unsatisfied, at which point they

returned to the vessel with a larger force and “came on board in a Hostile manner,” drove Alden and his crew ashore, and “Plunder’d his Sloops cargoe to the value of Two hundred and Sixty pounds at least, without any provocation, or difference between them in the least.” Native claims to their ocean, to the resources it offered and the enterprises it permitted, had by 1720 resounded with a bold new aggression.16

New Wabanaki claims to their spaces, resources and captives through commodification paralleled an identical and concurrent colonial trend emerging in their homelands, and perhaps ought to be understood as a response to it. The decade after Queen Anne’s War witnessed an unprecedented degree of land speculation throughout Wabanakia. Individuals and newly-organized land companies from New England, emboldened by the destruction of Indian communities in the last war, moved into Maine, surveyed native lands, and established settlements quickly populated by new waves of immigrants from the south. By 1720, the new surge of colonial land speculation in Indian country thus intensified a market-driven commodification of native space.17

Among the most savvy businessmen invading Wabanakia in the 1710s were Protestant missionaries sent by the Massachusetts government. After troubling reports of Jesuit achievements on the colony’s frontier circulated in Boston, the legislature commissioned a salary for Reverend Joseph Baxter of Medfield to bring the light of the reformed Gospel message to Indians at the eastward. Most of Baxter’s subsequent tenure in Maine, however, was dedicated not so much to the marketplace of souls but to


17 Bruce J. Bourque, Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine, 184-186.
that of real estate. He and his wife developed a keen speculative eye for properties in and around the burgeoning settlements of Georgetown, Brunswick, Augusta, and Topsham. Their spare time was evidently spent preaching to Euro-American settlers in the area rather than ministering to Indians. Wabanaki in southern Maine were also reckoning with speculators from the New England Company, a Protestant missionary society funded by members in America and Britain. Indians’ aggressive opposition to the company’s land deals forced one of its most prominent commissioners, Samuel Sewall, to abandon plans to settle an offshore island in Casco Bay. Instead he would lease it, Sir William Ashurst of London was informed, because of “so many Rumors of Trouble from the Eastern Indians, and it being a lonesom place; it is difficult to settle it to purpose, or to prevent the Waste they make, who lay claim to it.” A group of private land developers from southern New England known as the Muscongus Company compounded these pressures on native resources, particularly after they began to organize settlements east of Pemaquid.18

Accelerated colonial land speculation from the south, coupled with the British conquest of Acadia to the north, convinced Indians throughout Wabanakia that their mobility on land as well as on sea was in ever greater peril. As their Micmac kin launched seaborne raids against the fishery nearby, Indians of Minas, Nova Scotia,

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posed a hypothetical question to Governor Phillipps in October 1720. “If we wished to
go and dwell in England, what would you do but order us to retire,” they stated,
deploying a trans-Atlantic counterfactual argument to express their frustration with the
intrusive new government. “[F]or the same reasons we do not wish the English to
inhabit our country, which we hold only from God, and which we will dispute with any
men who wish to inhabit it without our consent.” To the southwest, Jesuit Sebastian
Rale voiced the objections of Indians at Norridgewock to the new wave of land
speculators and British settlements. When Massachusetts promptly responded by
banishing him from their province, Indians retaliated by killing the livestock of
neighboring colonial communities and plundering a sloop anchored in Casco Bay.
Some Kennebecs pursued a different course when Terramugus, son of a local sagamore,
delivered a letter from Norridgewock to Governor Shute indicating that residents there
were “dissatisfied that people should settle in a body.” Terramugus’ people amplified
their grievances by expressing “threatening language to a Tennant of Coll. Winthrops,”
one of the most successful of the Pejepscot Proprietors.19

The tensions saturating the Dawnland since 1715 continued to escalate into the
1720s. After an expedition sponsored by the Massachusetts government and
spearheaded by Colonel Thomas Westbrook failed to capture Father Rale at
Norridgewock in spring 1722, Indians responded by intensifying their assaults on local
British settlements. The subsequent series of raids and counter-raids culminated shortly

19 “Indians of Les Mines to Governor Philipps,” 2 October 1720, in W. Noel Sainsbury, et. al., eds.,
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1720-1721: 156-157; “Letter
Manuscripts IX: 446-447; “Conference with Indians at Georgetown,” 25 November 1720, in James
thereafter in open war between Wabanaki and British forces throughout Maine and Nova Scotia. In what became known as both Governor Dummer’s War and Father Rale’s War, Indians once more leveled their attacks against familiar colonial threats with an unconventional method. For the second time in a decade, Wabanaki waged war independent of a French alliance. Indeed Dummer’s War saw no official French involvement whatsoever. Their critical decision reflected the changing face of Wabanaki-Franco relations since the end of Queen Anne’s War, and signaled their desire to initiate violence on their own extra-imperial terms.

While concerns over land rights resonated in their grievances throughout the late 1710s, Indians ironically took to the seas during wartime to correct the troubling course of dispossession. This seemingly paradoxical strategy pointed to Wabanakis’ historic understanding of cultural preservation; the welfare of their society ashore necessitated a properly ordered world afloat. As they had in every preceding conflict, Indians resorted to their naval prowess to confiscate nautical equipment and damage the foundation upon which the threat of British colonialism rested. Dummer’s War, like all earlier conflicts that Wabanaki exploited with their seafaring strength, was not an exclusively maritime conflagration. But it did witness Wabanakis’ most extensive and sustained commitment to seaborne violence in the colonial period.

When Indians took the fight to the sea in Dummer’s War, they again set their sights on the fishery and quickly intensified their assaults on this vital component of Britain’s Atlantic economy. By 1724, Indians off the coast of Maine had become “very bold in Enterprizing & boarding the fishing vessels on the Eastern Shore,” according to one nervous military officer stationed there. The following year, Boston officials
warned garrisons in Maine that “the Indians of Penobscot will speedily be out in the Vessels they took last Summer from the English, & will infest the Eastern Coast to the great Disturbance & Loss of those concerned in the Fishery,” indicating too that Wabanaki continued to preserve their prizes over winters for long-term use. So regular and destructive had these assaults become that Massachusetts formulated a strategy for luring native marine-warriors into open waters where they could be engaged in battle. Captain Durrell was accordingly instructed to “decoy them by Sounding for Fish & Concealing their Men” below deck until the Indians were persuaded into firing range. By “sounding for Fish, Concealing your Men & Appearing in all Respects in such a Manner as may most probably decoy the Enemy,” Captain Sanders was likewise advised, he could draw out Indians lurking amongst Maine’s coastal islands.20

The devastating success of Wabanaki raids on the fishing economy was so pervasive that colonial officials and fishermen alike scrambled franticly to muster an effective response. Governor Philipps of Nova Scotia fitted out armed ships and volunteers in 1722 because “the Fishery became Impracticable from the Attacks and Barbarities the Indians made on all Vessels that were a Fishing,” therefore threatening what little commercial value his colonial outpost possessed. Massachusetts adopted an analogous approach when it encouraged Samuel Hinckes’ party of volunteers to hunt “indian pirets” in 1724 after learning “that the fishermen don’t go East of this place or scarce to sea.” Lieutenant Governor William Dummer issued similar orders to an

officer after receiving news “of severall Vessels man’d with Indians infesting the Eastern Coast to the great Disturbance & Loss of those concern’d in the Fishery.” By the following year, such strategies had proved woefully inadequate when frantic Marblehead merchants notified Boston of the “Deplorable Surcomstances” of their fishery, now in danger “of being wholly Destroy’d & Broken Up.” Whatever affluence Britain enjoyed from this segment of their trade network, it was also the empire’s Achilles heel when Wabanaki reasserted their command of the northwest Atlantic.21

Indian naval engagements with British forces were often extensive and protracted ordeals, and colonial underestimations of native maritime power frequently enhanced its overall destructiveness. After Indians seized “a large schooner with two swivel guns” from the Isles of Shoals, for example, Governor Dummer saw fit to commission only a modest sloop- and shallop-full of Maine and Ipswich men to sail in pursuit. Not long after their departure, the dejected crews “returned with their rigging much damaged by the swivel guns,” and able to “give no other account of the enemy than that they had gone into Penobscot.” British volunteers from Piscataqua likewise encountered “the indian Privateer” in July 1724 plying the waters off coastal Maine in “a sconer once of marble head” but now “full of indians Extraordenary well fitted who Chased them 3 hours & shee Takes all she Can Come up with.” Thomas Cox of Dorchester was on board one of two schooners anchored off Mount Desert Island where his crew spotted another schooner sailing into the harbor and “found them to be Indians,

Who ask’d us where we were going.” A melee ensued for “about 4 Hours” as Cox’s ship “fired upon them very briskly.” John Elliot of Topsham boasted to royal officials at St. James’s Court about a similar “engagement of several hours” with northeastern Wabanaki seamen while in the employ of the governor of Nova Scotia. Elliot reportedly encountered “an Indian King who Commanded seven Sloops and Scooners Manned with many Indians well provided,” and ultimately killed the sagamore while rescuing ten English captives. The intensity of the clash, Elliot emphasized, was such that he endured “9 Shott in his body” with “some of his wounds so dangerous that his life was for a time much dispaired of.”

By Dummer’s War, Indians were accustomed to harvesting the abundant fruits of the British maritime presence. Over the course of several colonial wars, the fishery had become much more than the soft underbelly of Britain’s imperial economy; it also functioned as a valuable extractive economy whose wealth could enhance Wabanakis’ customary method of maritime production and consumption. The assimilation of commandeered sailing technology into this system both expanded the range and enhanced the efficiency of the ocean’s harvest. Saccaristis, sagamore of the Penobscots in 1725, admitted to Colonel Thomas Westbrook that “ye Indians fitted out two of the Scooners that they took last Summer & went a fishing & getting Seils [seals] off at Grand Menan and the Mouth of St. Johns River.” The Indian seamen embarked on their excursion during “the latter end of May,” which customarily followed Wabanaki’s

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annual migration to coastal settlements from their inland winter hunting camps. At other times, Indians streamlined their yield by exploiting the labor of British fishermen. Wabanaki near Norridgewock employed a more efficient fishing method when they stocked their community “full of codd fish out of 15 or 16 vessels they have taken” in 1724. The British maritime presence had thus become a convenient locus of wealth that Wabanaki confiscated and strategically incorporated to enhance their longstanding patterns of production and consumption.  

Indians also continued to extract maritime labor from this floating warehouse. Much to the consternation of imperial authorities, Wabanaki impressments of British fishermen severely detracted from the productivity of the imperial economy. Very early in the war, Governor Phillips of Nova Scotia was so distraught over the success of Indian press gangs that he issued a public proclamation denouncing their increasingly-frequent harassment of the fishery with “the Assistance of the prisoners whom thy take for Sailors.” The announcement evidently did little good, as three months later Philips was still in a rage when “Indians cruised upon the Fishing Ships with the Sloops and Prisoners they had first taken who they Compelled to serve as Mariners which Alarmed the Fishery at Canco.”

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Even high ranking imperial agents were humbled to servitude in the Indian navy. In Nova Scotia, one customs collector – a royally-appointed position – was appalled by the callous disregard of his prestigious title when a Wabanaki force pressed him and his vessel into service in March, 1722. “There came two Cannows with Thirteen Indians on board of me,” ten of which were hidden beneath furs, the agent testified. After being seized and restrained, they “commanded me to go up the River St. Johns with my Sloop,” where they took on more Indians. Now with forty-five warriors on board, the collector was compelled to sail to various native settlements throughout the Bay of Fundy where they “forced me to Anchor in uncommon places,” resulting in the loss of “two Cables and two Anchors.” The mission was carefully premeditated, the collector comprehended, “in Order to joyne more and go and Surprize the Governour and Garrison of Annapolis Royall.” Though this ambition was never realized, the mariners succeeded in plundering the vessel and finally forcing the collector to purchase it back from them “for One Thousand Livres.”

While Wabanaki experienced prolonged exposure to labor pressed by their colonial British neighbors and to the omnipresent fear of impressment among seamen in the area, their own execution of this tactic was not simply imitative. Exercising physical domination over prisoners taken in battle and subsequently employing them in servile tasks to benefit the community were central to the Algonquian protocol of captive-taking. Though seen as enslavement by outsiders who had the misfortune of experiencing it, Wabanaki understood it as a necessary method of dispelling the danger wrought by foreign enemies and cohesively incorporating them as productive and useful.

members of native society. The productive value of this new labor source was highly valued, and could be bestowed on an individual or family who recently experienced the loss of a close relative. Wabanakis’ naval strategy of impressment is perhaps best understood as an extension of this practice to Atlantic waters.\(^26\)

Sailing ships seized in this extractive economy obtained a cultural importance in native society commensurable to that of captive labor. These vessels became so integrated into Wabanaki culture, in fact, that their new Indian owners were quite unwilling to relinquish them after the war. The Penobscot sagamore Espequit chartered his ship to three prisoners so they could sail home to Marblehead during the conflict and retrieve a ransom. When the men failed to return by the war’s conclusion in 1727, an irate Espequit issued an ultimatum to the Massachusetts government, declaring that he “Expectes his Vessel to be Returnd by ye furst, or satisfaction for her” made instead.

After hearing rumors of the arrival of Wabanaki delegates in Boston in 1725, Marblehead fisherman Samuel Stacey informed the governor’s office “That they have one of my Schooners in their Hands, which they took from me some Time ye Summer before last.” Stacey and a neighbor with a similar request endeavored to negotiate their ships’ release in person at an earlier conference in Boston, but were discouraged by the

Massachusetts commissioners who feared the poisonous effects such requests might have on docile Indians suing for peace.27

Colonial authorities often attempted to retake their ships by force, but Indians went to great lengths to preserve and conceal them from their enemies. A quite perplexed Colonel Thomas Westbrook informed his supervisors in 1724 that he “diligently Searched after the Vessells belonging to this Province (that were taken by the Indians) but Could find none.” John Minot expressed similar frustrations to the Massachusetts governor that year after learning that Indians in Maine “have hal’d up our Vessells into the Countrey” where it was virtually impossible to discover them.

Another Massachusetts military officer received orders instructing his men to “endeavour to find out the Vessles the Indians have taken & if practicable secure & bring them off.” In July 1725, Captain Edward Winslow described how “two Shallops & a Scooner were…taken by a Scooner man’d with Indians” who immediately sailed it “in to the Harbour on the North Side of Monhegan [Island], which is the Place of their Rondezvouz.” The retreat to Monhegan Island further indicated the ongoing centrality of the Penobscot region as both a nucleus of socio-political affairs as well as a wartime entrepôt. Most of the ships lost forever to their British owners were quickly ensconced among the maze of rivers, bays and harbors linking the inland forests to the ocean, a natural network with which Wabanaki were most fluent. The indispensability of sailing

vessels to their captors’ communities meant that they were seldom scuttled or abandoned.28

As Captain Mogg’s crew demonstrated at Black Point in 1676, Indian-commandeered sailing vessels were also pressed into action against land-based symbols of British authority in Wabanakia. In July 1724, a native squadron laid siege to Fort St. George, Massachusetts’ northeastern-most garrison in Maine at the time, and attempted to negotiate its surrender with an explosive display of naval force. One evening, five ships blockaded the fort while an Indian approached the gates requesting a parley. By simply “pointing to the Vessels coming up,” the Indian confidently anticipated a quick surrender from experienced military men who respected the destructive capacity of armed warships. When the officer refused to comply with his demands, the negotiator promised just treatment of prisoners and a safe retreat to Boston aboard one of the native-held schooners. A stalemate ensued after two days of offers and counter-offers, at which point the irritated Indians fell back to their ships and executed a tactic long popular among European naval strategists. After “they put into a cove with one of their Vessels out of our Sight,” the British commander noted, the Wabanaki warriors proceeded to load it with “Wood and Combustible stuff” and, together with another vessel similarly prepared, “set it on fire designing to burn the Block House.” The Indians launched this inferno “round the Point with her sails full” and watched it bear down on the British stronghold while they “kept firing on all sides.” But the British, with the assistance of “a great Gun,” bombarded the Indian ships and sheared off the

masts of the approaching fire ships, narrowly averting disaster. When the native forces saw “their design frustrated, they left us and went away very silently.”

Throughout Dummer’s War, British colonists began appropriating a discourse of piracy in their ongoing efforts to disparage native maritime power, a move that also implicitly acknowledged its brutal effectiveness. A volunteer squadron was recruited from the eastward in July 1724, not to engage a credible naval force, but to go scouting “after indian pirets.” Unable or unwilling to negotiate with Wabanaki mariners in August 1725, British authorities in Nova Scotia instead sought the assistance of a vilified, albeit legitimate, French government at nearby Cape Breton. Notifying them of “a Marblehead Shallop piratically taken from the Subjects of Great Brittain by the Indians,” the Nova Scotia diplomats cast aside imperial enmities rather than confer directly with the Wabanaki. The influx of accusations of Wabanaki “piracy” at this time corresponds to what maritime historians see as the “golden age” of piracy saturating the broader European Atlantic world. This outbreak of seaborne crime thus afforded imperial architects a timely discourse to rationalize and discredit Wabanakis’ destructive naval strength. Casting Indian maritime violence as the desperate and unprincipled acts of outlaws, as flagrantly “Illegall and Contrary to the Law of Nations,” permitted colonial authorities to rationalize their losses without acknowledging Wabanaki seafaring power as structured, coherent, systematic, and rivaling that of their own.

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Yet despite discrete efforts by British colonists, constructions of Indians-as-pirates also signified the continuing dynamism and potency of native seaborne violence and the perpetual obstacle it posed to the entrenchment of colonial authority in the northeast. As late as October 1743, Indian naval attacks near Nova Scotia flourished to the point where the colony’s governor, Paul Mascarene, issued a public proclamation to all English and French inhabitants who considered abetting them. Furiously denouncing “the Indians in these their Piratical Villanys,” particularly those “guilty of the like Piracies in time of serene Peace,” Mascarene decreed, anyone who provided an outlet for any goods “from the Indians so Piratically by them Robbed and taken” would themselves risk prosecution for piracy. And for good measure, the governor vowed his continued “suppression of all Piratical Robberys and Villanys.” Mascarene’s carefully-crafted language at once rendered Indian maritime power illicit and tacitly declared its profound efficacy and resilience.31

Wabanaki, conversely, understood their operations at sea as defined by continuity rather than a sudden transition to piracy. Their pattern of naval aggression since the earliest period of European contact revealed a consistent joint-execution of resistance and plundering strategies in order to maintain and augment their relationship to the Atlantic. Some of this approach was likely shaped by frequent Wabanaki interactions with various Euro-American pirates from the earliest days of colonial

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settlement. The legendary Dixey Bull, for example, “first pirate in New England waters,” traveled from London to the Maine coast in 1631 and cultivated an extensive trading relationship with local Indians while simultaneously preying on New England shipping. The crew of Dutchman Jurriaen Aernouts and Boston seamen John Rhoade, similarly, plied the Gulf of Maine and Acadian coastline in the 1670s, pillaging traders and attempting to conquer the sparsely colonized territory. In September 1723, the notorious Captain “Lowder the Pyrate” commandeered some twenty French vessels near Cape Breton with his crew along with several other English crafts, “particularly a Schooner belonging to Boston.” Such cultural exchanges colored the potentiality Wabanaki communities envisioned in their Atlantic world and equipped them with new avenues for maintaining control of it.32

The cultural maxims that governed pirate life were also strikingly compatible with Algonquian customs that dictated attitudes toward economic subsistence, the role of the individual in the community, power and justice. Material collectivism, an aversion to personal acquisitiveness, authority through communal consensus, and retaliatory notions of justice were values that permeated the ethos of both Indians and pirates, and would have considerably blurred native and pirate societies in the northeast. Regardless of colonial rhetoric, then, Wabanaki warriors did not suddenly assume the guise of piracy after Queen Anne’s War; they had always been “pirates” in their attempts to sustain an Atlantic world under siege from dangerous new forces.33


33 Robert C. Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 123-125; Marcus Rediker, Villains of all Nations, 45, 62; Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, 263, 269, 279.
Far from an objective categorization, it is also worth noting, “pirate” was an ideologically-laden label deployed, in this case, by a victimized majority to authenticate the suppression of an illegitimized threat. What precisely comprised piracy, of course, depended on one’s perspective. In the face of increasing land dispossession, a deteriorating natural resource base, and attempts to sever Wabanaki bonds with the ocean, Indian communities had entirely different conceptions of whom, exactly, the real pirates were.

The repercussions of this rhetorical development during the golden age of piracy stretched far beyond the pens and mouths of colonial officials. When shored up with legal implications, as it was in a spectacle that shocked and infuriated the native northeast in October 1726, the juridical rhetoric of Indian piracy served as another attempt to regulate and restructure the Wabanaki Atlantic. In that month, three Indian warriors stood trial before the Vice-Court of Admiralty in Boston, indicted for piracy. The accused were among a native force that nearly hijacked Captain Doty’s vessel “as he lay at Anchor in an Harbour at the Eastward” in Nova Scotia. Behind a Frenchman who boarded the ship and immediately “snap’d a Pistol at one of” Doty’s men, the “Indians fell upon them with their Cutlasses” and captured the English crew. Now pressed into service, Captain Doty was made to chase down a vessel on the horizon as the native captors vowed “they would take her, and kill all the Hands on board and then give him his Vessel again,” according to later depositions. One of Doty’s men, though, had earlier escaped undetected to a small chamber below deck, from which he emerged at this point with his guns blazing. Doty joined him, and “three of the Indians jumped out of the Cabbin Window, they being then a Mile or two from the Shore, and the rest
immediately submitted.” Three Wabanaki prisoners, along with “a Squaw, and two Papooses,” were transported to Boston and ordered before the Court of Admiralty on October 4. At the conclusion of the trial, newspapers decreed to Bostoners that the Indian pirates “were found Guilty” and “received Sentence of Death.” Days later they hung from the public gallows.³⁴

The reaction in Wabanaki communities was explosive. Rather than succeeding as a deterrent, the public trial and execution of Indian warriors orchestrated by an imperial judicial system in distant Boston escalated native fears of Britain’s maritime colonialism. Retributive violence consequently spread throughout northeastern waters. As per the orders of Nova Scotia’s Lieutenant Governor Armstrong, “a Copy of the Tryal of the...Indians that were hang’d in Boston for piracy was read in the Church” at Chignectou in March 1727, in order to quash any backlash from the community’s French and Indian inhabitants and cement their loyalty to the British crown. Despite such efforts, less than two months later Massachusetts’ Lieutenant Governor Dummer received desperate news from the garrison at Annapolis Royal of impending Wabanaki violence against “our Fisher Men in Revenge of ye Justice doen to ye French & Indian Pirates the last Fall.” John Gyles, commander of the fort at St. George’s River in Maine and interpreter for the Penobscot Indians, shortly thereafter notified an already tense Dummer of a debate within Wabanaki communities “Concerning ye...Indian Pirotrs that wear hanged Last fall.” The fears of British authorities were soon realized when “some Indians of Cape Sables,” as Dummer explained to his supervisors in London, “committed divers barbarous acts of hostility upon an English vessel…and some other

fishermen that were at anchor at Cape Sables.” An enraged Lieutenant Governor Armstrong launched a frantic fact-finding mission as he wrote to the French governor at Cape Breton. Condemning the “Robbery & Seizeure of the English Sloop,” Armstrong promised justice for the Indian culprits who attacked the master and crew in such “a piratical Manner Contrary to the Law’s of all Nation’s.” If the “Authors of this Robbery are justly to be deem’d Pirats,” the governor fumed, the French were bound by honor to assist in their apprehension. Such efforts ultimately proved futile. The Boston piracy trial and its violent aftermath typified the ongoing contest to consolidate and define the contours of the Atlantic world, a struggle of incompatible and exclusive visions.35

Despite the destructive advances made by Wabanaki violence on the sea during Dummer’s War, the conflict also left many of their communities ashore obliterated and their people destitute. The most significant of these losses was the destruction of the most prominent village and Jesuit mission in southern Wabanakia. Norridgewock was burned in August 1724 by a joint force of British soldiers and their Algonquian and Iroquois allies, who returned victorious to Boston with Father Rale’s scalp. As a result of these successful raids, most southern Maine Indians fled northwest to join their extended kin in French mission communities along the St. Lawrence River, and this time chose to stay permanently. This demographic transformation was exacerbated by

swelling colonial settlements along coastal Maine, most of which displaced ancient native fishing encampments. These mutually-reinforcing trends psychologically, economically, and spatially distanced southern Wabanaki from the ocean to an extent previously unseen. Their seasonal migratory pattern linking the inland forests and the Atlantic – an annual cycle that defined native life for generations – was increasingly interrupted by dammed rivers, sawmills, and commercial fishing stages. The sparse native population that remained in the southern borderlands now experienced a greater proximity to the locus of British power in New England which, when coupled with limited access to the ocean, further undermined their maritime culture.

As the dislocation and destruction marring the native northeast subsided after Dummer’s War, the Penobscots assumed the role of liaison between the British and Wabanaki communities throughout the northeast. Their headmen, most notably Loron Sagouarrab, occupied a leading position in peace negotiations with New England in 1726. Other Indian leaders as far away as the St. Lawrence communities ratified the resulting settlement shortly thereafter. The rising authority of the Penobscots, and their relationship to the colonial government, became so pronounced in the ensuing years that British officials attempted to secure their cooperation to hunt down their northern Wabanaki kin implicated in the piratical exploits of November 1727, “and bring them to justice.” Into the 1730s, their sagamores also became the mouthpiece through which several Indian communities in the region addressed grievances to colonial leaders
concerning trade abuses, the availability of truck houses, and newly-constructed river
dams that once again obstructed the flow of Atlantic marine life to their settlements.36

Like the Saco River sagamore Nescambiouit after King William’s War, the
growing postwar authority of Penobscot leaders such as Loron afforded them a lucrative
opportunity in another trans-Atlantic network of power and prestige. A few years after
assuming the governorship of Massachusetts in 1730, Jonathan Belcher conjured a
peculiar scheme to shore up his increasingly precarious and beleaguered reputation in
the aristocratic circles of London. There a strong opposition faction had emerged at
court in the wake of Belcher’s highly unpopular pro-Indian policies in Maine. Samuel
Waldo, a wealthy proprietor of native lands at the eastward, mobilized the faction
through his own trans-Atlantic connections. But the governor aimed to undercut these
threats to his status by appropriating the exotic material culture of his Wabanaki
neighbors and deploying its novelties to dazzle the most powerful figures in Britain.
Military commanders and traders stationed in Maine subsequently received a steady
stream of letters from Belcher beseeching them to send “the most curious, rare Furrs
you can pick up among the Indians,” with little clarification other than “I intend ‘Em for
Presents.” After several months lapsed, the impatient and still empty-handed governor
reminded trader and translator John Gyles of “those Small Things I wrote for, especially
Some curious Furrs.” “[Y]ou must take Pains in the Matter Whatever the Cost may
be,” another officer was ordered.37

36 “Lt. Governor Dummer to the Council of Trade and Plantations, November 7, 1727,” in W. Noel
Sainsbury, et. al., eds., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1726-
1727: 391.

Belcher, Colonial Governor (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 71-72, 93, 126;
Yet Belcher’s first-hand encounters with Wabanaki in their homeland and in Boston also familiarized him with the distinct diplomatic protocol enmeshed in native material exchange customs. John Gyles was accordingly instructed to “Greet the Indians very kindly in my Name, and assure them of the Continuance of the good will & Friendship of this Government.” Coupled with this oral extension of peaceful intentions was Belcher’s promise of material compensation to the Indians for their troubles. So strong was the governor’s desire to abide by Wabanaki kinship and gift-giving codes that he traveled to their territory to personally confer with them in the summer of 1732. As a sign of his peoples’ gratitude for the council, one prominent Wabanaki sagamore gifted Belcher with a rare white otter. Later, he ordered it made into a fashionable muff and sent overseas to the Duke of Argyle where Belcher hoped it would “Serve to cover your Grace’s Hands when you travel into Argyle Shire.” Prime Minister Robert Walpole, Lord Wilmington, and the Duke of Newcastle were also frequent recipients of Belcher’s chronic gifts.38

Like Nescambiouit in 1699, however, Wabanaki in the 1730s would not be passively pulled into this trans-Atlantic game of power and prestige. Most of Belcher’s attempts to enhance his own credibility overseas were frustrated and manipulated by Indian headmen at home equally concerned about their own status within Wabanakia. At their conference with the governor in 1732, Penobscot headmen Edewakenk, Espequit, Captain Lewis and Loron obliged Belcher’s request to “make a fine Cannoo” and send it to Boston. Yet at the conference they also demanded reciprocal gifts of

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powder and shot, corn, and more convenient access to trading houses near their communities. Five months after the sagamores’ pledge, an ever-anxious Belcher inquired into the canoe’s status, telling Captain Gyles to let them know “I expect a very fine Cannoo that will carry Six Padlers & a Steersman.” “[T]he Paddles,” Belcher specified, ought “to be very Handsome.” Nearly a year later, Belcher was at wits-end. “I thank you for the fine White Beaver,” he told Gyles, but I “shou’d be glad to know what Toxus has done about my Cannoo.” The albino furbearer did, though, temporarily appease the governor’s appetite for Wabanaki curiosities and metropolitan fame. Belcher promptly shipped the fur to a relative in England, describing it as “a great Rarity in this Part of the World” that “might perhaps make a nice White Hatt” that could be laced “with Gold for a young Lady.”

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The delay of the highly anticipated birchbark canoe undoubtedly stemmed from the colony’s own tardiness in a much more pressing matter. Throughout the mid-1730s, Loron leveled numerous complaints to neighboring authorities about Massachusetts’ inadequate fulfillment of earlier promises made in the Dummer’s War treaty.

Sagamores were also likely irritated with Belcher’s persistent and unabashed acquisitiveness. Though he went to great strides to rectify some of these problems, the governor’s efforts were often stymied by powerful land companies in the region. So in July 1733, the governor tried a different tack to secure his present. Gyles was ordered to “Tell ‘Em the Cannoo & Paddles must be very fine, because I design to send them to the great King George.” Captain John Minot was likewise instructed to “remind them & tell ‘Em the Cannoo & Paddles must be very handsome & fine, Because it is to go to the great King George.” Within the next few months, Belcher not only had his canoe,  

but received a regular supply of them over the course of his tenure as governor. He, in turn, shipped them overseas to his brother-in-law and son studying law at the Inns of Court, urging them to carefully bestow the gifts only among the most influential and prestigious of London society. The Wabanaki novelties indeed proved enormously popular with their recipients, much to the governor’s long-awaited satisfaction.\(^{40}\)

Through Jonathan Belcher’s anxious social positioning, Wabanaki were drawn toward another valuable opportunity to forge a measure of status and authority in an imperial system. Yet they again creatively managed this trans-Atlantic network of material curiosity and political power by contributing to it on their own terms and according to their own timeline. When the name of the British monarch was eventually invoked, the full scope of Belcher’s petulant requests, and the far-flung implications of obliging them, was suddenly disclosed to the Wabanaki gift-givers. Only then did they become cognizant of the unmistakably Atlantic nature of this game. The Penobscot headmen, eager as any colonial official to cultivate and solidify the approbation of their peers, exploited Belcher’s scheme as another opportunity to achieve these goals, but only after its efficacy was made manifest in the full disclosure of its Atlantic dimensions. Defeated and demoralized by his adversaries at court, Belcher was eventually recalled to London in 1741, reaping little of what he struggled so hard to sow throughout his tenure in Massachusetts. But as Wabanaki society continued to grow politically-centralized around Penobscot during the eighteenth century, their sagamores

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emerged as the real beneficiaries of this Atlantic exchange. Their careful cultivation of these connections again enhanced their position in multiple circles.42

Since the conclusion of Dummer’s War, the geo-politics northeast of Penobscot continued to diverge considerably from those in Maine. The relatively weak position of the British in Nova Scotia, the numerical strength of French inhabitants, and the French stronghold at Cape Breton fostered an environment in which Micmac and other Wabanaki refugees from the southwest could sustain their extractive economy through maritime violence. Southern New England merchants and fishermen continued to pay the price. In 1737, Stephen Jones was plundered of goods worth fifteen hundred pounds when his “Sloop was Boarded in an hostile manner by six or seven Indians armed with Guns, Hatchets & Knives &c.” When Jones offered resistance, he later noted, one of his captors “presented a Pistoll to his Breast several times” and “threatn’d to knock his Brains out.” Mr. Trefry, another ship master, endured a similar experience in 1742 when near Mines he encountered a number of “Indians who surprised his Sloop and Cut her Cables,” most likely after noticing that he was sailing without anchors on board. Trefry was reportedly “very Ill used By the said Indians,” who proceeded to confiscate the entire cargo. The adroit exploitation of the British maritime presence, increasingly executed during interludes of official imperial peace, indicate that northeastern Wabanaki had long since abandoned their dependence on European imperial wars to strike at the British economy and plunder it of goods. Instead they forged their own retributive and economic opportunities. And with their cognizance of the Wabanaki

42 Michael C. Batinski, Jonathan Belcher, Colonial Governor, 130-131; Bruce J. Bourque, Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine, 197.
Atlantic’s ongoing dissolution in Maine, Nova Scotia Indians desperately sought to circumvent the fate of their southern kin.\textsuperscript{43}

Northeastern Wabanaki were not averse, however, to exploiting further imperial conflicts in the 1740s and 1750s. By participating in these wars, Indians aimed to maximize the potential of their plundering economy and stymie British colonial efforts in the region. With the arrival of King George’s War to Wabanakia in March 1744, Micmac and other Wabanaki revived their attacks on New England fishing vessels off the Nova Scotia coast. Even after the war ended in 1748 and peace was settled between Wabanaki and Massachusetts the following year, these marine-warriors extended their seaborne campaigns against the British fishing station at Canso, taking several prisoners to the French fortress at Louisbourg to collect a ransom. When another European conflict was declared in 1754, northern Wabanaki would again seize the exigencies of war in a final attempt to fortify their maritime world. In 1758, a joint force of Maliseet and Penobscot continued to rely on Mount Desert Island at the mouth of the Penobscot River as their place of rendezvous. From there, they planned “to proceed in the two Sloops (which they had lately Taken)” to attack British garrisons as distant as south-central Maine. But by the war’s regional conclusion in 1760, the opportunities bound up in the northeast’s imperial equilibrium had disintegrated, thereby marking the closure of a milieu that had allowed for the survival of the Wabanaki’s seafaring power.

Gone now were the markets for commandeered ships, the sources of material aid, and the presence that checked British land encroachment in Acadia.  

While the end of the imperial status quo eliminated the conditions nourishing a Wabanaki Atlantic, the task of severing Indians from their ocean demanded a more culturally destructive strategy. Not coincidentally, British efforts to dislodge the French from the northeast during the Seven Years War were executed concomitantly with renewed schemes for thwarting Wabanaki access to the ocean. This longstanding policy had been most recently articulated in 1748 by Governor William Shirley who advocated Massachusetts’ construction of a blockhouse along the northeastern Maine coast “as a means of keeping them from the Sea Shore,” though his plans never materialized. But when his successor, Thomas Pownall, triumphantly announced the construction of Fort Pownall to finally slam shut “ye last & only door That the Enemy had left to ye Atlantic,” he finally succeeded in accomplishing what his predecessors could not. The dynamic longevity of Wabanaki power in the northeast, so damaging to British Atlantic designs, could not be uprooted simply by obliterating its communities or imperial allies. Required, too, was a dismantling of Indians’ essential relationship with the Atlantic.


45 “Governor Shirley’s Speech, May 26, 1748,” in James Phinney Baxter, ed., *Baxter Manuscripts XI*: 401-402; Governor Pownall to Board of Trade, June 14, 1759,” BNA, CO 5/889, f. 236.
Conclusion

Taking Soundings

In early summer 1797, the Wabanaki community at Old Town, Maine welcomed a traveler to their small island in the Penobscot River, some thirty miles up from the sea. Stephen Peabody, Jr., a prominent Bucksport lumberman from a prestigious New England family, appreciated the warm hospitality as he passed through the area on business, yet could not help but notice the abject poverty and destitution he encountered among all Indians in the area. Some lead lives of drunkenness and violence as they wandered the roads of the now numerous white lumbering towns at the mouth of the Penobscot, Peabody was appalled to report, while others removed further upriver where they lived in nearly-equal squalor. In the midst of this misery, however, was a surprising “civility” and a “great politeness” on Indian Island, Old Town. Peabody recorded very few characteristics of the hamlet as he toured it with his Penobscot hosts, except for a sight he must have deemed just as peculiar and unbefitting as the Indians’ cordial welcome. Conspicuously “suspended near ye door” of the modest Catholic chapel at the center of their community was a “small ship’s bell,” which was used to summon villagers to Mass and other communal gatherings.¹

By the end of the eighteenth century, the dissolution of the Wabanaki Atlantic had reduced native communities to a status they struggled so long to avoid. The debilitating effects of alcohol and poverty were derivatives of a much larger socio-economic transformation that dispossessed their people of the ocean and its manifold opportunities sustaining them for generations. From the church door at Indian Island

¹ Entry for Wednesday, June 21, 1797, AAS, Stephen Peabody, Jr. Diary, 1796-1797, 1799; for accounts of alcoholism and crime see numerous entries for October and November, 1796 and February 6, 1797.
loomed a vestige of this former world, of what once was. Its prominent position at the center of the community’s social life typified the ancient centrality of that world to a people intimately bound up in its ebbs and flows. The tolling bell beckoned the salty waves that once carried warriors at ships helm, transported goods to and from faraway places, and conveyed critical information about distant sources of power. Its location at the portal to the Catholic chapel also invoked former connections to the French and to the Atlantic’s imperial competition born out of the religious turmoil of early modern Europe. This spiritual legacy, which Wabanaki had long since integrated into their culture, now constituted the sole vestige of the native Atlantic world. The ship bell thus stood as an enduring reminder to all passers-by and to all who heard its peals of an extraordinary past, and the unwillingness of a people to part with it.

The Wabanaki experience in the early modern world stands outside the narrative of so many other indigenous peoples who bid farewell to ancestral homelands and endured forced migrations across vast expanses of the American landscape. Theirs instead was one of removal onto land. The Atlantic opportunities, maritime traits and nautical power that defined so much of their culture and gave meaning to the Dawnland for centuries ultimately eroded with their peoples’ coerced relocation from the waters of the east and subsequent terrestrial confinement. This transformation was completed by a fundamental deconstruction of their Atlantic vision. By 1760, Wabanaki too had witnessed their pelagic world slowly drift into a sea of trouble. Unlike the troubled sea of the frantic Maine settlers in 1690, theirs became irretrievably confined to the past.

Yet for over two centuries, the enduring pursuit of a native Atlantic afforded Wabanaki critical material and cultural resources to manage colonialism’s most
destructive and disorderly colonial pressures. In so doing, Indians not only sustained a
recognizable identity but frequently enhanced it, and aggressively engaged efforts to
suppress and restructure their vision. The result, more often than not, was a Euro-
American northeast terrifyingly helpless, pathetically weak and periodically teetering on
the precipice of destruction. Indian tenacity afloat is powerful testimony that the
Atlantic was far from an organic and lucid formation facilitating the construction of
European empires and their ascendant global economies.\(^2\) To the region’s native
inhabitants and colonial newcomers, this extraordinarily generative and lucrative corner
of the northwest Atlantic was a profoundly contested space, not only as two European
empires frequently declared it so in the war rooms of London and Versailles, but also
when Britain’s struggle to normalize and incorporate its productive capacity
encountered Wabanaki attempts to secure and enhance their rich maritime heritage.
The rationalization of a British Atlantic world in the American northeast never
progressed systematically, but instead ran up against the hostility, disarray and
devastation unleashed by a people equally determined to define the Atlantic’s
significance and profit from its opportunities.

\(^2\) One historian has recently voiced apprehension with an Atlantic model, arguing that conventional
applications of it tend to naturalize the origins of modern-day global capitalism and its attendant social
relations in a coherent early modern Atlantic world: Brian Connolly, “Intimate Atlantics: Toward a
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