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PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

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Dedication Page

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my committee, family and friends. My committee has been unparalleled in their support encouraging me to continually move towards completion of my degree while providing perfect examples of faculty members and representatives of academia.

My friends have supported me at every turn of this process. I thank them for the continued support and friendship during this arduous process. They have provided moments of levity and laughter when most needed and have played a stronger role than they would take credit.

My family has always been the foundation of any endeavor I have pursued. The guidance and motivation you have all provided me has given me the strength and fortitude to complete a dream of becoming a lifelong learner and student of the world. I would be nowhere without your unwavering, unconditional love.

“A civilization and its people will flourish when they plant trees under whose shade they will never sit.”

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Peacekeeping and International Relations: The Literature	8
Early Approaches	
Peacekeeping Operations/Case Studies	
Regional and State Centric Approaches	
Peacekeeping Functions, Failures and Future	
The Role of International Relations Approaches and Peacekeeping Research	
International Relations Approaches	
Synthesizing Peacekeeping and IR Approaches and Shaping State Interests	
What Shapes States Interest	
Chapter 2: Hypothesis Development, Data and Methods	78
Case Selection	
Regression Analysis/Models	
Tables and Graphical Analysis	
Results Expectations and Testing Approaches	
Chapter 3: Regression Model, Tables and Graphical Results	109
Overall Model Results	
State Participation Model Results (a)	
Total Contribution Model Results (b)	
Table and Graphical Analysis	
UN and State Contributions Over Time	
Chapter 4: Theoretical Approaches and Implications	143
Overall Regression Model	
State Participation Models	
Total Contribution Models	
Regression, Table and Graphical Results	
Total UN Personnel versus Total Contributions Over Time	
Hypothesis Confirmation and Rejection	
Chapter 5: Application, State Motives and Future Research	169
Approaches and Applications	
State Motives	
Policy Prescriptions	
Future Research and Implications	
References	185
Appendix A	196
Appendix B	198

List of Tables

Table 1	International Relations Theoretical Tenants
Table 2	UN Peacekeeping Operations for Analysis
Table 3	Independent Variables
Table 4	Independent Variable Regression Expectations
Table 5	Independent Variable Statistical Average Expectations
Table 6	Stepwise Regression Results
Table 7	Incidence of Peacekeeping Participation – State Values
Table 8	Frequency of Peacekeeping Operations Percent Difference of Independent Variables
Table 9	Total Contributions to Peacekeeping Participation – 1991-2007
Table 10	Total Troop Contribution 1991-2007 Percent Difference of Independent Variables
Table 11	Regression, Table and Graphical Results
Table 12	Hypothesis Confirmation

List of Illustrations

Graph 1	Frequency of State Participation: 1991-2007
Graph 2	Overall Troop Contributions by Member States: 1991-2007
Graph 3	Total Uniformed Personnel in UN Peacekeeping 1991-2006
Graph 4	Total French Contributions
Graph 5	Total British Contributions
Graph 6	Total United States Contributions
Graph 7	Total Russian Contributions
Graph 8	Total Chinese Contributions
Graph 9	Total Pakistani Contributions
Graph 10	Total Bangladeshi Contributions
Graph 11	Total Indian Contributions
Graph 12	Total Jordanian Contributions
Graph 13	Total Ghanaian Contributions
Graph 14	Total Nepalese Contributions
Graph 15	Total Nigerian Contributions
Graph 16	Total Uruguayan Contributions
Graph 17	Total Polish Contributions
Graph 18	Total Kenyan Contributions
Graph 19	Total Canadian Contributions
Graph 20	Total Ethiopian Contributions
Graph 21	Total Argentinian Contributions
Graph 22	Total Ukrainian Contributions
Graph 23	Total Austrian Contributions
Graph 24	Total Irish Contributions
Graph 25	Total Italian Contributions
Graph 26	Total Norwegian Contributions
Graph 27	Total Senegalese Contributions
Graph 28	Total Finnish Contributions
Graph 29	Total Malaysian Contributions
Graph 30	UNAVEM III(a) – Contiguity versus Troop Index
Graph 31	UNMEE(a) – Contiguity versus Troop Index
Graph 32	UNAMSIL(a) – Contiguity versus Troop Index
Graph 33	UNPREDEP(a) – Contiguity versus Troop Index
Graph 34	UNAVEM III(a) – Freedom versus Troop Index
Graph 35	UNAVEM III(a) – Military GDP versus Troop Index
Graph 36	UNAVEM III(b) – Contiguity versus Troop Index
Graph 37	UNIKOM(b) – Contiguity versus Troop Index
Graph 38	UNMEE(b) – Contiguity versus Troop Index
Graph 39	UNAMSIL(b) – Contiguity versus Troop Index

List of Illustrations (continued)

Graph 40	UNPREDEP(b) – International Memberships versus Troop Index
Graph 41	UNPROFOR(b) – International Memberships versus Troop Index
Graph 42	UNAVEM III(b) – Military GDP versus Troop Index
Graph 43	UNAVEM III(b) – Freedom versus Troop Index
Graph 44	UNPROFOR(b) – Trade versus Troop Index

Abstract

This dissertation examines states and their motivations in contributing troops to UN peacekeeping operations through the three primary International Relations approaches of realism, liberalism and constructivism. Current literature and research provide minimal application of IR approaches and their explanations of peacekeeping. Examining peacekeeping operations from 1991-2007, state contributions are measured for the overall time period and for each individual peacekeeping operation through a number of independent variables that represent each approach. Regression analysis combined with table and graphical analyses provide results that develop a deeper understanding of peacekeeping and IR approaches. The geographic relationship a state maintains from the host peacekeeping state is suggested to have the most significant relationship with troop contributions in this analysis. For the permanent five members of the UN Security Council there have been significant changes in their pattern of troop contributions to UN peacekeeping operations over time compared to overall contribution patterns. These discoveries provide a deeper understanding of peacekeeping as a tool for mitigating conflict in the international system through international relations approaches.

Introduction

The global dynamic that has emerged since the end of the Cold War has created a new world environment with a multitude of and unique opportunities to view international relations and state behavior. While the threat or possibility of World War should never be completely ignored, security topics such as nuclear proliferation, piracy, terrorism, resource wars and human rights violations are considered major pieces of a new security dilemma that has emerged for states. In addition, what makes these topics unique and challenging is that the vast majority of them are not strictly contained within the borders of one particular state, and solutions to these topics often require collaboration and development of policies that encompass transnational discussion. The emergence of these new “cross-border” security topics has created a world where states must collaborate economically, militarily and diplomatically with much more frequency to secure their own borders, policies and people.

Traditional theoretical explanations of security concerns, cooperation and state behavior have been championed to be “realistic” in nature reflecting self interested states that only cooperate when the situation or outcome can best be determined to secure their individual policy proclivities with little concern for international enhancement of other states. Yet, as the aforementioned security concerns have emerged, the possibility of diminished singular state behavior has become a topic of international debate, creating different policies and organizations that have been formed to help deal with such concerns and provide the opportunity

for new theoretical lenses to emerge that move away from “self interested” state behavior.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations was developed within the United Nations apparatus to provide states an avenue to use international cooperation, international legitimacy and international policies to help alleviate some of these security concerns for states and groups of states. Since 1946, U.N. peacekeeping has become a common practice of international intervention for individual states and U.N. members to use for mediation and prevention of security threats to states and their people. Peacekeeping operations are important tools for the international community as they represent the only security apparatus available to an international organization that is inclusive of all states in the international community. Although organizations such as NATO and the African Union pursue military solutions to international crises, they are not inclusive of the majority of states in the international system. Peacekeeping operations have maintained legitimacy in the international arena as they are perceived as representing the interests of the international community as a whole. While there is not consensus to their use at all times, peacekeeping operations have shown over time to be the most effective tool in collective international intervention. If international intervention is a condition to help mitigate violent behavior or war, UN peacekeeping operations are often the only solution that can be collectively approved through the international community.

Yet from a theoretical perspective the motives for individual state participation in peacekeeping operations are not well researched and there is little understanding if these peacekeeping operations and interventions are altruistic or simply the continual adherence to “self interested” practice among states. The development of cooperation in security matters and the continued progress in peacekeeping operations depends on discovering the motives or perspectives that states possess with respect to peacekeeping operations.

The chief question for examination is why do states participate in UN peacekeeping operations? This question lies at the center of how peacekeeping operations can continue to be successful from an operational perspective and how the international community can implement policies that can be managed politically. Naturally, corollaries to the primary question of interest will contribute to the overall understanding of this analysis. What are the motivations for states to use personal resources to support multilateral peacekeeping operations? Do states only use these missions as an extension of their foreign policy? Are peacekeeping operations at the mercy of the large, dominant powers or is there a role to be played for all U.N. member states? Do states only contribute personnel and support operations due to financial opportunities they may experience? These questions and their analysis may provide new insights to peacekeeping operations theoretically and practically.

This analysis is valuable for two primary reasons. Studying this phenomenon may contribute to our theoretical understanding of international

politics by uncovering current international dynamics of states and their behavior/perceptions of international peacekeeping. Understanding perceptions of peacekeeping and state commitments to their success and implementation can provide important insight into security and state concerns for an international relations political theorist. International peacekeeping practitioners will benefit from a better understanding of individual state behavior and collective security which can provide important foundations for the continued development and policies of peacekeeping operations.

The purpose of this study is to further develop our theoretical and practical knowledge with respect to individual state motives and perspectives on international cooperation in relation to United Nations Peacekeeping development and practice. Using current statistical and research methods, it is expected that a better understanding of what motivates individual states to participate in U.N. Peacekeeping operations can be developed. We can also study whether traditional IR approaches and their explanations of security continue to be a reflection of self interested states or a greater advancement towards international cooperation for more international altruistic means.

The plan of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 1 a thorough review of the peacekeeping literature and the relation that the literature currently maintains with international relations approaches will be explored. The literature review will serve to recognize the deficiency of current peacekeeping literature and the application of peacekeeping studies to international relations approaches.

International relations literature will also be explored to assist in developing a synthesis of the two literatures and what potential outcomes could be reasonable to expect when examining theoretical assumptions of international relations approaches to peacekeeping operations. A detailed review of these subjects will aid in the development of states' interest in the international community, particularly in security matters, and how this may influence participation in peacekeeping operations.

In Chapter 2 the methodology will be developed and presented to examine peacekeeping operations from 1991-2007. Standard stepwise regression and basic table and graphical examinations will be used for this research. The dependent variable for analysis will be a percentage developed by dividing the troops a state contributes by the total number of military personnel a state maintains at the inception of the peacekeeping operation. The total number of troops divided by a states total military personnel during this same time period will also be used for a single regression analysis to measure state participation during the overall time period. Characteristics of each state during the individual peacekeeping operation will be used to measure theoretical claims to achieve some descriptive understanding of international relations approaches and the application of these approaches to state participation in peacekeeping operations. The independent characteristics used for this analysis will consist of regime type, economic indicators, military strength, international integration and geographic measures. Standard tables and graphing techniques will be used to test individual variables

over the selected time period. The standard stepwise regression model results in combination with table and graphical results will be used to determine the aforementioned independent variables and their potential explanatory power. SPSS software will be used to operate the regression model. Each case will be examined individually and then the data from the individual cases will be pooled to measure the included variables over time.

Chapter 3 will present the results from the regression models, tables and graphical analysis. The results from these methods will then be examined to observe if any of the included independent variables show any level of variance, positive or negative in each individual case or in the combination of cases over time. This chapter will be used to report the findings of the methods in their entirety before applying the findings to the theoretical approaches.

Chapter 4 will determine the confirmation or rejection of the presented hypothesis. The provided results will assist in verifying or rejecting noteworthy claims of each approach and their appropriate application to peacekeeping operations and state behavior. The results from the regression models, tables and graphs will be examined and applied in combination to develop the most appropriate explanation for the confirmation or rejection of the hypotheses.

Chapter 5, the final chapter, will apply the results to understand in more detail state motives, policy prescriptions and future research opportunities. Developing policy recommendations that could broaden our understanding of peacekeeping and the future potential of peacekeeping is vital to the long term

success of peacekeeping and the mitigation of conflict. Recognizing why and when states participate in UN peacekeeping operations can assist in developing policies that recognize state motivations and enable policy developers and the UN the opportunity to create processes that can be successful logistically and politically. Recognizing the future research opportunities that emerge from this research has the potential to add more depth and breadth to continued theoretical and practical discussions.

Chapter 1 - Peacekeeping and International Relations: The Literature

Hans Morgenthau once commented that social science often resembles “a deaf man answering questions which no one has asked him” and that academics often hide in the “trivial, the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical, the remotely historical – in short, the politically irrelevant.”¹ Despite the attempts of theorists to provide thoughtful and comprehensive work, practitioners are all too often inclined to dismiss the work of theorists as purely academic, with little value to real world practice. While issues and events of the day often influence their research agendas, theorists frequently regard practitioners as being too concerned with the immediate, short term future, rather than long term trends and analysis. This has created a gap where the two sides of generalized approaches and real world practice rarely meet, let alone inform one another.

The research on UN peacekeeping is not immune to this phenomenon. There is an obvious gap between policy development and implementation, and the application of international relations approaches. A thorough review of the literature on peacekeeping reflects this disjoint and encourages the pursuit of research that places peacekeeping in the broader themes of international relations approaches.

When the United Nations (UN) formally approved the first UN peacekeeping mission, the UN Truce Supervision Organization in 1948, a new global security dynamic began. The post World War II environment that emerged

¹ Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. London: Cornell University Press. Van Evera discusses Hans Morgenthau’s preference for research that answers real questions relevant to the real world.

was different than any previous international environment and international stability was a primary objective of the UN and the international community. The UN was created to save the world “from the scourge of war”² and peacekeeping, while developed after the inception of the UN, was intended to be a tool for the organization to mitigate violence in the international community.

Sixty years later and over 60 UN peacekeeping operations later, the practice of international intervention through peacekeeping is still a viable and useful apparatus of the United Nations and the international community. While the practice of UN peacekeeping operations has continued for over half a century, the sustained presence of their use in the international system has allowed the academic community to weigh the numerous topics of interest from differing perspectives. These pursuits have created a body of literature that ranges from speculative investigations, historical analysis, individual case studies and policy prescriptions for the future of UN peacekeeping. This literature has substantive breadth and depth and has taught the academic community and the world much about the phenomenon of peacekeeping.

Yet there are some important gaps that exist within the literature that fail to take account of broad theoretical applications and practical knowledge of peacekeeping operations. Of particular interest in this area is why over time do states contribute troops and resources to peacekeeping operation? Such support being voluntary by current UN standards, recognizing and understanding the

² The United Nations Charter can be found at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml>.

motivations behind continued support for UN peacekeeping missions offers the potential to inform international relations approaches and state behavior in the international system. And while there are attempts to bridge this gap of state practice to inform theory, more work and understanding of this behavior is needed.

The literature on peacekeeping has seen an exponential increase in the past 20 years. It has been widely cited that peacekeeping articles in academic journals have increased by approximately 350 percent from the 1980s to the 1990s. Several journals now regularly include articles on peacekeeping to include *International Security* and *World Politics* while new journals focus strictly on this issue – *International Peacekeeping* being one example.³ A quick look at the online database www.scholar.google.com reveals 347 articles, books, reports, and hearings from 1980-1989, 4,130 from 1990-1999 and 12,000 from 2000-2009 on the topic of U.N. peacekeeping. Analysis of United Nations peacekeeping is clearly a topic of academic interest. And while examinations concerning United Nations peacekeeping have clearly expanded over time there are serious issues within the literature that offer opportunities for further examination and can move the literature further than the traditional descriptive and historical approaches. To find these opportunities it is important to note the chronological nature of the U.N. peacekeeping literature and how it has developed.

³ Paris, Roland. 2000. "Broadening the Study of Peace Operations." *International Studies Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3. p. 27-44.

Early Approaches

Before the end of the Cold War the amount of literature on United Nations peacekeeping was minimal at best. Fortna and Howard note that “a few classics works on peacekeeping were written during the Cold War, but one could hardly call the body of work a “literature” until the explosion of interest in the 1990’s.”⁴ Peacekeeping studies according to their research “focused on the prospects for improving or developing peacekeeping as an effective tool of conflict resolution... most of these classics primarily consist of detailed case histories.”⁵

Works before and during the Cold War time period (1960-1990) were informative, but relatively atheoretical. Highlighting 1946-1967 peacekeeping operations Higgins includes a multitude of historical commentary and documents that are case specific, laying out the details of descriptive information for each specific case. David Wainhouse also provides a thorough compendium of peacekeeping, but again looks strictly at each peacekeeping case and the minutiae associated with each case.⁶ Providing analysis from a former military officer perspective Harbottle provides two works that highlight the challenges that peacekeeping will experience in terms of functionality and development and also lessons learned from the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.⁷

⁴ Fortna, Virginia Page and Lise Morje Howard. 2008. “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature.” *The Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol. 11. p. 284.

⁵ Fortna, Virginia Page and Lise Morje Howard. 2008. “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature.” *The Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol. 11. p. 283-301.

⁶ Higgins, R. 1969-1981. *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary*. Oxford, UK. Oxford University Press and Wainhouse, David. 1966. *International Peace Observations: a History and Forecast*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

⁷ Harbottle, Michael. 1972. *The Blue Berets*. Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books and 1974 “Lessons in UN

Recognizing that peacekeeping will continue to be relevant to international security after the World Wars, Cox presents an examination of peacekeeping history from an American perspective and how American policy should embrace peacekeeping from a policy standpoint.⁸ In this work he provides policy recommendations but they are American centric and offer no theoretical applications. Reviewing the first ten years of peacekeeping, Bloomfield discusses the viability of peacekeeping through concerns of financing and decision making.⁹ Presenting an early analysis of host state consent and the role that host state consent will play in future peacekeeping operations, Garner provides an investigation with respect to the continued developed and approval of future peacekeeping operations.¹⁰ His analysis is constructed chiefly through the lens of international law and the opportunity for peacekeeping's consistent application over time.

Some works during this period approached the theoretical possibilities of peacekeeping analysis but fell relatively short in the application of peacekeeping to theoretical assumptions. While the title of Rikhye's *Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping* gives one the assumption that theoretical developments or assumptions may be examined his work offers insight into the managerial aspects of peacekeeping operations. He again follows the route of previous authors by providing thorough analysis of the included case studies and how effective or

⁸ Cox, Arthur. 1967. *Prospects for Peacekeeping*. Washington D.C. The Brookings Institution.

⁹ Bloomfield, Lincoln. 1966. "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 44, No. 4. p. 671-682.

¹⁰ Garvey, Jack. 1970. "United Nations Peacekeeping and Host State Consent." *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol. 64, No. 2. p. 241-269.

ineffective peacekeeping operations were at keeping peace.¹¹ The *Peacekeeper's Handbook*, written by the International Peace Academy, has been used by numerous states as a guide to peacekeeping and related operations.¹² While this work does espouse some theoretical application, the definition provided of theory in this case is more closely related to principles or guidelines for peacekeeping. Though this handbook achieves the chief goal of creating foundational recommendations for peacekeeping operations, the handbook falls significantly short of any strong theoretical premises.

After the Cold War and through today peacekeeping literature has expanded significantly but has not moved too far from the traditional descriptive purpose since 1990. The literature continued to represent an inductive approach concerned more with informing policy and developing lessons that were arrived from examining past practices. The vast majority of peacekeeping studies were concerned with three primary subjects: case studies, regional or state specific approaches and functions/viability of peacekeeping operations that include discussions of high profile failures and pessimistic outlooks on peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping's place in greater international relations approaches was and continues to maintain a relatively minimal place in the academic literature.

¹¹ Rikhye, I.J. 1984. *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*. London: C. Hurst.

¹² Harbottle, Michael. 1978. *Peacekeeper's Handbook*. International Peace Academy.

Peacekeeping Operations/Case Studies

United Nations peacekeeping case studies come in two forms. Individual case studies concerning particular missions or states and edited or comparative works that aggregate missions by typology, time periods, successes, failures and regions. Edited and comparative works during this time offer a rich anthology of cases and how particular unique characteristics of each case plays into a larger understanding of peacekeeping operations. These characteristics can be particularly important when attempting to produce valuable insights into the understanding of peacekeeping operations across cases. Durch provides an excellent edited volume that includes a lessons learned section (based on past historical observations) and then includes descriptive analysis on over 20 individual case studies.¹³ He divides the analysis into peacekeeping operations undertaken in the Mediterranean/Middle East, in South and Southeast Asia, Africa and the Western Hemisphere. Also using multiple case studies and lessons learned from these past peacekeeping experiences, Thakur and Schnabel offer another edited volume that highlights cases from Africa, Kosovo, Timor and Cambodia and offers insights into the challenges that peacekeeping may experience as mandates evolve and how peace can be properly maintained.¹⁴ Using cases from Haiti, Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia and El Salvador, Cousens and Kumar examine each individual operation and connect each case to challenges or particular subjects associated with peacekeeping

¹³ Durch, William J. 1993. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

¹⁴ Thakur, Ramesh and Albrecht Schnabel, eds. 2001. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Mission, Permanent Engagement*. New York: United Nations Press.

development.¹⁵ The topics included are the sovereignty of states in relation to peacekeeping, the legitimacy of peacekeeping, the power of the UN in relation to individual states and its peacekeeping actions and if sustainable peace can be the norm or an uncommon occurrence.

Individual case studies include a multitude of examinations from past and current operations. Case study analysis has been provided on Angola, Cambodia, The Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, El Salvador, Kosovo, Lebanon, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and The Solomon Islands.¹⁶ This list is not all inclusive, but represents what makes up the large majority of the literature on peacekeeping after the Cold War. Single case study approaches attempt to examine one case in its entirety and consistently offer remarkable details on specific cases from their inception to conclusion. Most offer historical insights as to

¹⁵ Cousens, Elizabeth and Chetan Kumar. 2001. *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

¹⁶ Dzinesa, Gwinyayi. 2004. "A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia." *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 11, No. 4. p. 644-663; Peou, Sorpong. 2005. "Collaborative Human Security? The UN and other Actors in Cambodia." *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 12, No. 1. p. 105-124; Doyle, MW. 1995. *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner; Ginifer, J. 2002. "Eyewitness: Peacebuilding in the Congo: Mission Impossible?" *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 9, No. 3. p. 121-128; Chesterman, Simon. 2002. "East Timor in Transition: Self Determination, State Building and the United Nations." *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 9, No. 1. p. 45; Martin, Ian and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh. 2005. "The United Nations and East Timor: from self determination to state building." *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 12, No. 1. p. 125-145; Johnstone, Ian. 1995. *Rights and Reconciliation: UN Strategies in El Salvador*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner; Naarden, Gregory and Jeffrey Locke. 2004. "Peacekeeping and Prosecutorial Policy: Lessons from Kosovo." *American Journal of International Law*. Vol. 98, No. 4. p. 727-743; Murphy, Ray. 2003. "UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia and the Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*. Vol. 8, No. 2. p. 71-99; Howard, LM. 2002. "UN Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success." *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 9, No. 1. p. 99-132; Barnett, M. 2002. *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press; Samuels, Kirsti. 2003. "jus Ad Bellum and Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of the International Community's Approach to Violence in the Conflict of Sierra Leone." *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*. Vol. 8, No. 2. p. 315-338; Clark, W. and J. Herbst, eds. 1997. *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*. Boulder, CO: Westview; Ponzio, Richard. 2005. "The Solomon Islands: The UN Intervention by Coalitions of the Willing." *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 12, No. 2. p. 173-188.

the viability of these missions, where failures emerged or how success was achieved. The topic of “lessons learned” much like the edited and comparative works, is the crux of the vast majority of these examinations and from a historical perspective, contributes significantly to our understanding of logistical and policy concerns of peacekeeping.

Regional and State Centric Approaches

Regional and state centric peacekeeping studies are also prevalent within the growth of peacekeeping studies. The majority of these examinations deal with larger developed states and what role these states play in peacekeeping operations, funding, and development and how peacekeeping operations assimilate to particular states’ interests. Studies in this area have focused on individual states such as the United States, Japan, China, Canada, The United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Russia. These studies have also provided significant analysis on particular regions that include Africa, Europe, Nordic States, and other various pairings of states, some with no regional association yet often share other characteristics such as government type/regime. These examinations provide a vast amount of information, policy and assumptions about peacekeeping operations and the application, or lack thereof, to individual states.

Analysis concerning the United States has been the most extensive in number and subject. Examining American interests in peacekeeping and the role that traditional American idealism plays in shaping these interests, Ruggie

concludes that as peacekeeping moves forward, the United States must continue to respect idealistic tendencies, but with a cautious eye to the realities of the international community.¹⁷ Presenting an argument that the United States squandered an opportunity to expand and promote national interests abroad after the Cold War, Fleitz examines failed peacekeeping operations (fiascoes in his terms) and recommends that the US encourage scaled back peacekeeping operations that reflect national interests.¹⁸ Recently *International Peacekeeping* devoted an entire journal to the United States perspective, role and history in peacekeeping operations.¹⁹ Subjects that are covered include U.S. doctrine, historical analysis from Middle Eastern, European, Latin America and Africa peacekeeping operations, the evolving nature of American support and a theoretical cut at US participation after 9/11. MacKinnon examines American peacekeeping policy from Bush Sr. through the Clinton years and discusses the decrease in support from the United States towards the end of the Clinton Administration that he claims reflects an environment of caution after several recent failed missions.²⁰

Studies examining Japan's position in peacekeeping have been offered by Dobson and Mulgan. Mulgan notes that Japan's involvement in peacekeeping creates a policy dilemma and opportunity. Noting the constitutional constraints that limit Japan militarily, Mulgan recognizes the unique balance of military and

¹⁷ Ruggie, Jon. 1994. "Peacekeeping and U.S. Interests." *Washington Quarterly*. Vol. 17, No. 4. p. 175-184.

¹⁸ Fleitz, Frederick. 2002. *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990's: Causes, Solutions and US Interests*. Westport, CO: Praeger.

¹⁹ See *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 15, No. 1. 2008.

²⁰ MacKinnon, Michael. 1999. *The Evolution of Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton: A Fairweather Fan?* London: Frank Cass.

non-military support that Japan can contribute understanding that militarily speaking, Japan may be limited until the international community is ready to see an increase in Japan's military reach.²¹ Dobson looks at Japan's involvement in peacekeeping operations as an opportunity for Japan to integrate into the international community following World War II and the government's ability to use "international norms" during this period to convince the public of the value of peacekeeping.²²

Chinese attitudes towards peacekeeping are provided by Gill and Reilly and Zhongying. Gill and Reilly present an analysis of the Chinese perspective on sovereignty, intervention and peacekeeping. The authors inspect the changing nature of Chinese willingness to move towards more liberal definitions of state sovereignty and intervention, and how change in these areas creates more opportunity for the Chinese to be involved in peacekeeping.²³ Zhongying presents further contribution to this idea of a greater role for the Chinese in peacekeeping as more flexibility has entered Chinese foreign policy and how leaders perceive that increased involvement in peacekeeping operations as one way to increase a more pluralist approach to international intervention and policies.²⁴

²¹ Mulgan, Aurelia. 1995. "International Peacekeeping and Japan's Role: Catalyst or Cautionary Tale?" *Asian Survey*. Vol. 35, No. 12. p. 1102-1117.

²² Dobson, Hugo. 2003. *Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping: New Pressures, New Resources*. London: Routledge.

²³ Bates, Gill and James Reilly. 2000. "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing." *Survival*. Vol. 42, No. 3. p. 41-59.

²⁴ Bates, Gill and James Reilly. 2000. "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing." *Survival*. Vol. 42, No. 3. p. 41-59.

Russia's experience in peacekeeping operations is covered in rich detail in an edited volume by Mackinlay and Cross.²⁵ This volume is divided into several peacekeeping operations, with chapters on UN mandated operations and peacekeeping operations the Russian Federation developed among former territories of the Soviet Union. The authors examine Russian peacekeeping policy and how legally and constitutionally Russia has developed into a supporter of peacekeeping operations. MacKinlay and Cross conclude that while Russian support for peacekeeping may have initially been developed with regional and strategic interests at the core, as international peacekeeping has developed, the opportunity to further Russian strategic gains through this endeavor has diminished.

Writing about Pakistan and India and the large role that they each play with respect to troop contribution, Krishnasamy comes to the conclusion that while both these states have consistently contributed a significant number of troops to peacekeeping operations, each has a minimal role in higher level decision making and policy developmental matters.²⁶ Support from an operational perspective has not translated to a larger role in peacekeeping decision making for India and Pakistan. Krishnamasy also examines Pakistan and the motivations that have led Pakistan to the current role of a substantive contributor. While he mentions that economics may play a role, he notes that this would not recognize the political

²⁵ MacKinlay, John and Peter Cross, eds. 2003. *Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping*. Tokyo: United Nations Press.

²⁶ Krishnasamy, Kabilan. 2001. " 'Recognition' for Third World Peacekeepers: India and Pakistan." *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 8, No. 4. p. 56-76.

interests that Pakistan also maintains that have aided in developing the optimistic attitude of Pakistan towards peacekeeping.²⁷

Examining historical Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway) contributions, Jakobsen recognizes the longstanding tradition that this region has played in providing support for peacekeeping operations from a logistical and troop perspective and how they could continue to perform in this role through a recommendation of deploying civil-military groups.²⁸ Berman reviews lethal material contributions from the United States, the United Kingdom and France to African states that are intended to support ongoing peacekeeping operations or the immediate to moderate time after operations conclusions.²⁹ Berman reports that it is more important for regulation of these lethal materials in these regions due to the possibility of these materials ending up in unexpected regions and/or the hands of unintended groups. If stricter regulations are not in place and viable, then the exchange of these materials may decrease due to security concerns of the donor states with respect to management of these materials and threats to the stability of the region.

Africa serves as an important reference point in peacekeeping literature due to the number of operations that take place in this continent. Providing a substantive analysis of where African peacekeeping has been, where African

²⁷ Krishnasamy, Kabilan. 2002. "Pakistan's Peacekeeping Experience." *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 9, No. 3. p. 103-120.

²⁸ Jakobsen, Peter. 2007. "Still Punching Above Their Weight? Nordic Cooperation in Peace Operations after the Cold War." *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 14, No. 4. p. 458-475.

²⁹ Berman, Eric. 2003. "The Provision of Lethal Military Equipment: French, UK and US Peacekeeping Policies towards Africa." *Security Dialogue*. Vol. 34, No. 2. p. 199-214.

peacekeeping is now and where African peacekeeping can be, Berman and Sams consider peacekeeping as vital to African stability and recommend that outside or Western nations provide more timely support and that outdated policies and practices by the UN must be updated in order to create more lasting relationships and commitments.³⁰ Supplying a scathing view of Western peacekeeping practices after 9/11, Cilliers makes note of Africa's importance concerning the war on terror and other security concerns, but recognizes that the former colonial states have decreased their commitment and only commit when such commitment is minimal and unobtrusive to individual security concerns.³¹

It is again important to note that these state and regional specific studies are not all inclusive, but represent one area of peacekeeping studies that continues to be well researched, documented and analyzed. These examinations offer immense historical depth and breadth but much like operational case studies they do little to place peacekeeping in the larger field of international relations approaches and practice. While these works at times move closer to theoretical application, they are individually state specific and do not offer broad theoretical approaches.

Peacekeeping Functions, Failures and Future

The third area that contributes to the peacekeeping literature consists of studies of the functions of peacekeeping, the future viability of peacekeeping

³⁰ Eric Berman and K. Sams. 2000. *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

³¹ Cilliers, Jakkie. 2003. "Peacekeeping, Africa and The Emerging Global Security Architecture." *African Security Review*. Vol. 12, No. 1. p. 111-114.

operations and failures of peacekeeping operations and policies. The function and characteristics of peacekeeping operations is a topic that consists of several subtopics that deal with specific characteristics of peacekeeping. The subjects for consideration are considerable and research is derived on subjects such as the sovereignty of individual states, the constraints that exist within the international community and the UN and other options as alternatives to peacekeeping and evaluation.

Widely regarded as the most important work during the post Cold War period on the topic of peacekeeping functions, the future of peacekeeping and policies of peacekeeping is the Brahimi Report. Lakhdar Brahimi led a team of UN officials at the request of then Secretary General Kofi Annan to examine UN peacekeeping practices and activities to include post conflict peace building, peacekeeping and enforcement. The report that followed in 2000 covered wide ranging peacekeeping aspects and was the first serious step towards achieving reforms in UN peacekeeping operations. The report covered the following foundational subjects with respect to peacekeeping:

1. Responds to the concern that the UN does not have adequate management and financial systems to support the sharply increased number of peacekeeping operations and peacekeepers now deployed. To alleviate this concern the report promotes the importance of member state willingness to provide political,

personnel, material, and financial support to UN peacekeeping missions

2. Takes an historical look at past peacekeeping activities to improve the structure and management of UN response. Clarifies what UN peacekeeping is trying to accomplish, what kinds of forces are required, and what conditions might necessitate different kinds of missions.
3. Makes recommendations to enhance the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' (DPKO) capacity for completing its core mission of performing integrated civilian and military planning and management of multi-dimensional peace operations.
4. Aims to improve the UN's rapid deployment posture; strengthens the surge capacity for planning, preparing and deploying missions.³²

As the UN continued to increase the number of peacekeeping operations in the late 1990s UN administrators and world leaders recognized that change needed to be made pertaining to their operational capacity and reach. The Brahimi report served the purpose of recognition and recommendation and did so without moving significantly away from past practices and beliefs to incur substantive political opposition.

Providing an overarching examination of the capacity and function of UN peacekeeping operations and their development post Brahimi report, Durch, Holt,

³² Brahimi, Lakhdar. 2000. *The Brahimi Report*. New York: The United Nations.

Earle and Shanahan provide a thorough and complete analysis of how the seminal report has influenced peacekeeping operations. They divide the progress of peacekeeping into three categories: doctrine and strategy, capacity for peace operations and rapid and effective deployment.³³ The authors find mixed results when analyzing some of the key recommendations of the report three years later, yet are quick to note that the organization has moved forward with positive results with respect to operational challenges where the organization holds the most influence. The key challenges that continue to exist arise chiefly from member states' desires and commitment to support more vigorous missions that need more personnel and logistical requirements. Diehl discusses the mixed results of peacekeeping operations and that the entire process is a value laden decision for the international community and the UN should decide on the merits of each situation.³⁴ He continues when recognizing that peacekeeping must become more creative, inclusive and effectively managed to determine the long term success of currently successful development.³⁵

Personnel needs and the gap that exists in supply and demand are covered by O'Hanlon and Singer.³⁶ The primary concern for the authors is that even though the world is experiencing the war in Iraq and terrorism, the needs for humanitarian

³³ Durch William, Victoria Holt, Caroline Earle and Moira Shanahan. 2003. *"The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Operations."* Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center.

³⁴ Diehl, Paul. 1988. "Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace." *Political Science Quarterly*. Vol. 103, No. 3. p. 485-507.

³⁵ Diehl, Paul. 1993. *International Peacekeeping*. Baltimore. The Johns Hopkins University Press.

³⁶ O'Hanlon, Michael & Peter W. Singer. 2004. "The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention Capacity" *Survival*. Vol. 46, No. 1. p. 77-100

intervention in failed states and the ability of the global community to respond are miles apart. The authors note that estimates of military expenditures and personnel in the world are \$800 billion on spending and over 20 million individuals in military service. The needs for peacekeeping to be successful would be approximately 200,000 new personnel to add to the current 180,000-200,000 in the field. The authors conclude that solutions to peacekeeping operational needs for financial support and personnel are available, but this would require shifts in military resources from member states, a practice that would be very challenging to achieve.

Expressly related to personnel, logistical and financial concerns, literature on the use of private military groups or companies for peacekeeping purposes has been widely examined. Looking toward the future with respect to private security (PSCs) or military companies (PMCs) and their role in peacekeeping, Brooks makes note of the substantial reduced costs of using private military companies, the importance of perception of these groups (legitimate operations versus mercenary activities) and the current demand for their services. While Brooks sees an important role for PSCs and PMCs in the future, he does recognize the short history of private security and military companies in peacekeeping operations and the challenges that these groups will face if states and international organizations see them as viable options for peacekeeping.³⁷ Supporting the development and use of PMCs, Bures promotes the use of these groups as alternative options to

³⁷ Brooks, Doug. 2000. "Messiahs or Mercenaries: The Future of International Private Military Services." *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 7, No. 4. p. 129-144.

peacekeeping, especially when the other option is to do nothing as in the cases of Rwanda and Darfur. He admits that there exist numerous concerns related to legal issues, regulation and moral hazards for private companies to alleviate, but the international community should minimally engage this option as a plausible alternative in situations that may call for this type of action. Bures does recommend that policies on peacekeeping and private companies be ameliorated before turning operations over to private enterprise.³⁸ A final and significant point concerning “incorporating” peacekeeping operations when needed is made by Singer. He mentions two fronts that are important to recognize and make private firms attractive. The first is that the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping and the future of UN peacekeeping have been under debate for the greater part of the 1990’s and 2000’s and in order to serve the needs of the world and enhance operations to the degree of internal recommendations, then private companies may be the best alternative, financially and logistically. If peacekeeping is to be a goal of the UN, then actions must be taken to enhance this goal. Secondly, if the UN fails to act in cases of gross acts of human rights violations and genocide, which Singer believes is next to impossible with current media outlets, then finding solutions prior to these concerns and events must be developed, instead of consistent use of ad hoc missions during points of crisis.³⁹

Ideas on sovereignty and the role that the UN plays within states borders have also been at the center of peacekeeping operational and functional discussions.

³⁸ Bures, Oldrich. 2005. “Private Military Companies: A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?” *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 12, No. 4. p. 533-546.

³⁹ Singer, P.W. 2003. “Peacekeepers, Inc.” *Policy Review*. Vol. 119. p. 59-70.

Concerns by member states over sovereignty were a key point in the Brahimi report with respect to fact finding missions and other early methods of investigation used by the UN for discovering potential problematic situations. Traditional views of Westphalian sovereignty have been at the center of the debate of peacekeeping operations and whether the UN has any authority to intervene with little or no state consent. Yet these traditional views of state sovereignty have come into question as peacekeeping has continued to develop, especially in failed states or states with consistent intra-state conflict. Helman and Ratner write that “The traditional view of sovereignty has so decayed that all should recognize the appropriateness of U.N. measures inside member states to save them from self-destruction. At the same time, though, the United Nations cannot simply begin to involve itself in the affairs of member states as if they were suddenly part of the trusteeship system. The irreducible minimum of sovereignty requires some form of consent from the host state. Whether that consent must be a formal invitation or simply the absence of opposition would seem to depend upon the circumstances. The only exception to the principle ought to be rare situations involving major violations of human rights or the prospect of regional conflict where warring factions oppose an international presence.”⁴⁰ This idea of diminished sovereignty, despite being a principle of early UN foundations, is paramount on the debate to the functionality of peacekeeping operations.

Other scholars have echoed the importance of some level of diminished sovereignty as important to successful multilateral peacekeeping operations and the

⁴⁰ Helman, G. and S. Ratner. 1993. “Saving Failed States.” *Foreign Policy*. Vol. 89. p. 12.

importance of the idea of shared sovereignty between states and international organizations such as the UN. Also recognizing that the the principle of sovereignty is eroding due to the new generation of peacekeeping operations, Bertram discusses the opportunities that this presents for mitigating violence and ongoing conflicts but that it is not always evident when this is necessary.⁴¹ Marginalizing state sovereignty by the UN for peacekeeping operations must be perceived as unbiased and in situations where gross human rights violations are occurring or in the absence of recognizable government. Continuing on the subject of failed and collapsing states, Krasner develops the idea of shared sovereignty further, concluding that an acceptance of transcending rules of shared sovereignty by states, international organizations like the UN or coalitions led by stronger states is the most effective managerial option for these states.⁴² The recommendations Krasner advocates, trusteeships, protectorates and diminished adherence to Westphalian ideals of sovereignty have helped move the debate forward on exactly the role sovereignty plays in peacekeeping and how the UN can effectively navigate this delicate balance of state's rights and intervention. While the debate on sovereignty is not concluded, these works continue to support the legitimacy and manner in how peacekeeping can and may operate.

Evaluating peacekeeping operations in order to measure success, failure, meeting objectives and other various administrative goals also serves as an

⁴¹ Bertram. 1995. "Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United Nations Peace Building." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 39, No. 3. p. 387-418.

⁴² Krasner, Stephen. 2004. "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States." *International Security*. Vol. 29, No. 2. p. 85-120.

important topic of peacekeeping operations literature. While there is no consensus on evaluating peacekeeping operations the discussion on what indicators to measure and how evaluation policies should be developed is a divided issue in the literature. The different perspectives that scholars maintain in this area are evident in Druckman and Stern's work highlighting five prominent peacekeeping authors: Paul Diehl, A. Fetherston, Robert Johansen, William Durch and Steven Ratner. All the authors agree that evaluation and competent research designs should be developed but how to go about evaluation and what benchmarks research designs should examine are points of contention. Druckman and Stern develop a few key themes that are consistent by all the contributors that highlight the challenges that exist in creating foundational evaluative practices: the types of peacekeeping operations, setting reasonable expectations, setting short term and long term objectives (recognizing long term objectives pose more challenges), developing some level of baseline principles and recognizing that context matters for peacekeeping operations.⁴³ And while there is no one way to go about evaluating success or failure, this academic pursuit has been pursued consistently.

The topic of peacekeeping failure and the causes of such failures have been widely examined since the mid 1990's to today. Examinations of failures of peacekeeping operations are policy and operationally laden works with significant emphasis on learning from these past failures where UN mandates and operations have not succeeded. Comparing two peacekeeping operations, Jett presents a case

⁴³ Druckman, Daniel and Paul Stern. 1997. "The Forum: Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions." *Mershon International Studies Review*. Vol. 41. p. 151-165.

of success, ONUMEZ, and a case of failure, UNAVEM II, to look at particular characteristics that made these operations a success or a failure.⁴⁴ In hindsight, Jett believes that causes of failed operations can be identified and separates the two cases by particular variables that assist in recognizing why missions turned out as they did. His conclusion as to why peacekeeping fails ultimately falls on a premise of situational analysis – sometimes factors out of control for all parties can make or break the success of the operation.

Providing a significant achievement of the overarching conditions for failure Shawcross discusses the permanent members of the Security Council as the main offenders to allowing peacekeeping operations to expand into the necessary operations for success.⁴⁵ While also recognizing the administrative and bureaucratic failures of UN personnel, he concludes that in order for UN peacekeeping to continue as a viable endeavor, the dominant, powerful states must play a large role, potentially even at times unilaterally since the UN has proven to be lethargic and difficult to manage when responding to security concerns and conflicts. While he maintains faith in the UN, he recognizes the weakness the organization has politically and militarily.

Analysis on failures also comes from operational specific analysis as well. This is the case in two works on the Congo and Sierra Leone. Presenting an investigation into the peacekeeping operation UNAMIR in the Congo, Emizet notes the massive failure that the UN experienced with respect to the displaced peoples in

⁴⁴ Jett, Dennis. 2000. *Why Peacekeeping Fails*. New York: St. Martins Press.

⁴⁵ Shawcross, William. 2000. *Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

the Great Lakes region.⁴⁶ Delayed response and action towards warnings from humanitarian groups and the UN's own administrators combined with a failed commitment to protecting human rights caused Emizet to encourage the UN to be firm in the response to the ideals that the organization champions as foundational principles in order to achieve some semblance of success in protecting displaced and affected peoples. With respect to Sierra Leone, Reno recognizes the difficulties that UN peacekeeping forces and separate British forces experienced with local militia groups in enforcing cease fire agreements and achieving victory in the region.⁴⁷ Reno argues that without better administration, occupation and the ability to use force at levels that are prohibited by current international law then success is marginalized.

Advocating the "virtues of war" Luttak encourages the UN and other states to allow for the process of war to fully exhaust itself and to intervene in situations that call for supporting displaced refugees, not in multilateral interventions.⁴⁸ By allowing war to run its course conflict is not prolonged, a victor eventually emerges and war and loss of life eventually diminishes. Peacekeeping should be directed towards managing post conflict environments and not mitigating violence.

While scholarly research on peacekeeping failures is well documented, studies concerned with the success of peacekeeping operations emerged in the early 2000s and moved away from the considerable pessimistic mood associated with

⁴⁶ Emizet, Kisangani. 2000. "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: A Case of UN Peacekeeping Failure and International Law." *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 38, No. 2. p. 163-202.

⁴⁷ Reno, William. 2001. "The Failure of Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone." *Current History*. Vol. 100, No. 646. p. 219-225.

⁴⁸ Luttwack, Edward. 1999. "Give War a Chance." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 78, No. 4. p. 36-44.

UN peacekeeping. Fortna has provided significant analysis on the subject with several works during this time. Observing peacekeeping operations in both interstate and civil wars, Fortna develops a hazard ratio that shows that peacekeeping is just as effective in civil conflicts as interstate conflicts. Furthermore, peacekeeping has had at least the same impact as efforts absent of UN peacekeeping. She states that in general, “peace lasts longer when peacekeepers are present than when belligerents are left to their own devices.”⁴⁹ Fortna also examines how peacekeeping keeps peace by measuring the duration of peace in conflicts where UN peacekeeping was present, and in conflicts where peacekeeping was absent. The results are positive, particularly after the Cold War, when some of the most difficult tasks of peacekeeping have been undertaken. Fortna reports that peacekeeping tends to make peace last, and last longer.⁵⁰ Most recently, Fortna looks at how peacekeeping can help sustain and improve peace after civil wars. She notes four ways that the presence of peacekeepers can help to prolong peace:

1. Change the incentive for parties to abide by peace,
2. Reduce uncertainty for all parties,
3. Prevent accidental return to war,
4. Prevent political abuse.

Through these measures, peacekeeping is an effective policy according to Fortna, reducing the likelihood of a return to violence, conflict and war.

⁴⁹ Fortna, Virginia. 2003. “Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars.” *International Studies Review*. Vol. 5, No. 4. p. 111.

⁵⁰ Fortna, Virginia. 2004. “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War.” *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 48, No. 2. p. 269-292.

The short and long term success of peacekeeping operations has also been examined by Doyle and Sambanis. Providing a rigorous qualitative approach intended to discover broad factors that apply to success in peacekeeping, Doyle and Sambanis determine that multilateral UN peacekeeping has a positive effect on the democratization process and mitigating violence. By examining over 124 civil wars post World War II, the authors determine that when peacekeeping operations are strategically designed for higher order peacekeeping, or peacekeeping that facilitates treaties, post conflict development and limiting local capacities, the operations are successful in achieving significant peace, especially in short term periods.⁵¹ Using this analysis as a springboard for further research, Sambanis finds that participatory peacekeeping, peacekeeping that enhances economic development, assists in creating institutions and commits to long term troop presence, maintains significant influence on short term peace. While his findings do not provide significant positive results for peacekeeping operations in the long term, the analysis provided by Sambanis shows that economics is one of the key components of post-conflict peacekeeping operations in combination with mandates to monitor cease fires and rebuild infrastructure.⁵²

The historical development of the UN and peacekeeping, and the various functions that it maintains, has also been thoroughly examined. Among the historical works that provide thorough analysis of internal UN development in

⁵¹ Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." *The American Political Science Review*. Vol. 94, No. 4. p. 779-801.

⁵² Sambanis, Nicholas. 2008. "Short- and Long- Term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations." *The World Bank Economic Review*. Vol. 22, No. 1. p. 9-32.

peacekeeping includes Ziring, Riggs and Plano, Fasulo, Ryan, Hoopes and Brinkley and the U.N. Department of Public Information webpage and annual *Basic Facts About the U.N.* publication.⁵³ These works provide the important backdrop of the creation of the U.N. in response to state security concerns and the development of peacekeeping operations from the institution. The United Nations website has also proved to be a valuable resource for information regarding resolutions, documents and other sources pertinent for understanding peacekeeping from an institutional development perspective (www.un.org).

The Role of International Relations Approaches and Peacekeeping Research

The breadth and depth of peacekeeping analysis has clearly expanded since the Cold War to provide substantive analysis on the vast majority of topics and challenges to peacekeeping. Scholars, policy makers and students understand a significant amount of the history of UN peacekeeping operations and the challenges that exist for peacekeeping in the international community. Yet through all the growth and expansion of peacekeeping studies, the substantive grievance regarding work on peacekeeping studies comes from several sources that note the lack of coherent theoretical analysis and the missing connection concerning international relations approaches and peacekeeping. One of the earliest complaints of the lack of theoretical development comes from Galtung in his research on peace studies.

⁵³ See Ziring, Lawrence, Robert Riggs and Jack C. Plano. 2005. *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics*. United States. Thomson; Fasulo, Linda. 2004. *An Insider's Guide to the United Nations*. London. Yale University Press; Ryan, Stephen. 2000. *The United Nations and International Politics*. New York. St. Martin's Press and Hoopes, Townsend and Douglas Brinkley. 1997. *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.* London: Yale University Press.

He claims “the theory of peace, the concept of peace, are both relatively rich, and empirical glimpses here and there will tend to give too special images of more complex conceptualizations. One cannot build a general theory of peace for the world on relations between Nordic countries alone, or a theory of disarmament on the basis of Costa Rica.”⁵⁴ 20 years after Galtung’s comments Paris reports that “apparently preoccupied with the practical problem of improving the effectiveness of future missions, we have neglected broader macro theoretical questions about the nature and significance of these operations for our understanding of international politics.”⁵⁵ Featherston also observes that “in essence, we are still largely in the dark in terms of improving analysis effectiveness and successes of peacekeeping. This can be attributed directly to the lack of theoretical underpinnings for the field.”⁵⁶ Diehl, Druckman and Wall report that peacekeeping literature has primarily been a pursuit “of a single case study, in which description is the primary goal.”⁵⁷ Sorenson and Wood continue this theme by noting that peacekeeping literature has focused on unorganized case studies that describe only the

⁵⁴ Galtung, Johan. 1985. “Twenty Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses.” *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 22. p. 141-158.

⁵⁵ Paris, Roland. 2000. “Broadening the Study of Peace Operations.” *International Studies Review*. Vol. 2, No. 3. p. 44.

⁵⁶ Featherston, AB. 2000. Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution, and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks. In *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*. Eds. Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Portland: Frank Cass. p. 191.

⁵⁷ Diehl, Paul, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall. 1998. “International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 42. p. 33-55.

“operational aspects of PKOs, specific PKOs and lessons learned, and/or discussions of broader themes, such as humanitarian intervention.”⁵⁸

Bures mentions that in light of the growth in literature one would “expect that there now would exist a well-developed theory of international peacekeeping.”⁵⁹ Yet this endeavor may be one step too early for the theoretical debate. This literature represents not only a dearth of theoretical attempts to understand peacekeeping, but lacks “a serious effort to engage the central theoretical debates of IR.”⁶⁰ While Bures calls for a mid-range theory of international peacekeeping the first step should be to place peacekeeping in the broader themes of international relations approaches, chiefly how states interact and participate in this phenomenon and if particulate trends can be discovered from their involvement.

The aforementioned perspectives display the need and desire to look at UN peacekeeping through a broad theoretical lens. Placing peacekeeping in the greater volume of international relations theory and why states interact in this practice can offer insights that may help to develop our understanding of state motivations with respect to security and multilateralism and can inform policy makers how best to create operations and policies that reflect needs of security concerns, but are supported politically and logistically. Previous research attempting to bridge the

⁵⁸ Sorenson, D.S. and P.C. Wood, eds. 2005. *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Frank Cass. p. 4.

⁵⁹ Bures, Oldrich. 2007. “Wanted: A Mid-Range Theory of International Peacekeeping.” *International Studies Review*, Vol. 9. p. 407-436.

⁶⁰ Paris, Roland. 2000. “Broadening the Study of Peace Operations.” *International Studies Review*. Vol. 2, No. 3. p. 29.

gap in peacekeeping operations and theoretical assumptions has been pursued but fallen relatively short in provided overarching application. Shortcomings of literature concerning peacekeeping and approaches suffer from small sample sizes (focusing on large, middle or small powers), limited variable inclusion, reduced timeframes of examination and prescriptive abilities

A large number of studies that approach theoretical topics focus significantly on the characteristics of contributor states but the application to international relations approaches and literature are under developed. Interested in UN peacekeeping operations contributions and regime type, Andersson looks at UN peacekeeping from 1990-1996 to determine if the type of regime influences participation. She concludes that strong democracies represent the most consistent contributors to peacekeeping operations. Andersson adds that most recipients of UN peacekeeping operations are non-democratic states and are experiencing conflicts that deal with governmental change or chaos.⁶¹ She supports this finding as important to the theoretical debate of state participation in peacekeeping, offering an alternative to *realpolitik* assumptions of national interests, reflecting greater representative of liberal notions of democratic peace theory. Yet Andersson notes that greater inclusion of variables of interest that apply a more comprehensive analysis than regime type offers would prove valuable. Her examination is meant to provide “observations for discussion and further research” and only looks at one

⁶¹ Andersson, Andreas. 2000. “Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-1996.” *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 7, No. 2. p. 1-22.

primary topic of interests for states, type of regime.⁶² Examining peacekeeping operations from 2001-2004, Daniel and Caraher, discover that “democratic, rich and middle income, stable and highly and lesser developed states constitute the majority profile of the peace operations community.”⁶³ This sheds some light on the potential motivations of states (democracies building new democracies) much in the same manner as Andersson, but does not consider any theoretical underpinnings or applications. In the defense of the authors, this is not a goal of their research. Daniel and Caraher do note that for peacekeeping operations to grow in contributions, states already contributing will be the most appropriate avenues for more personnel as there are few non-contributing states that fit their profile.

Recognizing the growth of contributors since the end of the Cold War, Bobrow and Boyer examine peacekeeping support through public goods, which have significantly increased after the Cold War, but recognize that consistent and new contributors may be experience monetary private goods in the form of net revenues for the dispatch of forces. The authors also recognize that the comprehensive group of contributors continues to be “a small band of overwhelming politically and economically Western and Northern Countries” which mirrors previous analysis of Andersson, Daniel and Caraher.⁶⁴ The theoretical aspect of Bobrow and Boyer’s approach relates to hegemonic stability

⁶² Ibid. p. 2.

⁶³ Daniel, DCF and Leigh Caraher. 2006. “Characteristics of Troop Contributors to Peace Operations and Implications for Global Capacity.” *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 13, No. 3. p. 297-315.

⁶⁴ Bobrow, Davis and Mark Boyer. 1997. “Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 41, No. 6. p. 723-748.

theory and whether there would be a decline in public goods upon US withdrawal of personnel and finances. In the unlikely occurrence that the US would withdrawal all personnel and finances, due to the dominant position that it maintained during the late 80's and early 90's, the authors conclude that the system would remain stable due to recent declines in financial and personnel support where the UN continued to operate peacekeeping operations, even at a operational disadvantage. Bobrow and Boyer's work, recognizes the importance of measuring financial, personnel and logistical as support for peacekeeping operations but is relatively void of traditional international relations approaches.

Providing one of the most overt theoretical treatments of peacekeeping, Neack looks at UN peacekeeping and whether this practice is in the interest of the international community or selfish state interests. Supporting the self interested, realist paradigm, Neack concludes that Western states participate due to their interest in maintaining the status quo and the few non-Western states that participate due so in order to gain the international prestige that comes with participation. Canada provides an excellent example for Neack, arriving at their support for peacekeeping as a middle power that desires to increase Canadian influence in the international arena which reflects a self interested perspective.⁶⁵ The primary problem with the analysis that Neack provides is the time period she used for analysis, 1948-1990. This time period represents peacekeeping during the Cold War era, which is widely cited to be foundationally separate from post Cold

⁶⁵ Neack, Laura. 1995. "UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?" *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 32, No. 2. p. 181-196.

War peacekeeping, when peacekeeping expanded significantly and more states began participating.⁶⁶ Applying her work to future and current peacekeeping operations is thus relatively difficult.

Shimizu and Sandler offer analysis on the economic motivations and costs states incur by contributing to UN and NATO peacekeeping operations. Developing a model that measures the correlation between peacekeeping burdens and GDP for UN peacekeeping missions the authors recognize indications of a return to hegemony by the US and other wealthy European states.⁶⁷ The authors' conclusions that there is a disproportionate burden for rich states in peacekeeping contributions and that rich states may be taken advantage of by poor states to provide this public good is arrived at with some qualifiers. Shimizu and Sandler, while accurate in the assumption that richer nations do contribute more financially, will always find some relative discrepancies in spending from rich states to poor states. Due to the manner in which states are assessed by the UN for peacekeeping operations is one important aspect. While change may be needed, under the current method of payment and the foundational fact that some states have larger economies than others, there will always be the potential for public goods to be guaranteed by the developed states in the international system. Where the conclusions do offer some potential theoretical implications is if these contributing

⁶⁶ For a discussion on the distinction of peacekeeping time periods see Chapter 4 in Mingst, Karen and Margaret Karns. 2000. *The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era*. Boulder, CO: Westview and the Introduction to Ratner, Steven. 1995. *The New UN Peacekeeping*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

⁶⁷ Shimizu, Hirofumi and Todd Sandler. 2002. "Peacekeeping and Burden Sharing, 1994-2000." *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 39, No. 6. p. 651-668.

states are motivated to participate in peacekeeping operations that benefit their interests militarily and economically in the long term.

Recognizing the growth of new peacekeeping contributors after the Cold War and new challenges that exist for peacekeeping, Findlay presents an edited volume that examines motivations for participation, understanding that new motivations may have emerged with the influx of contributors. In Chapter 1 of the volume, he provides one of the most distinct lists of potential motivations that may exist for states. Altruism is important to the states like Canada, Sweden and Norway. Peacekeeping can maintain some level of international prestige, particular when humanitarian concerns are involved. Other states that may be considered for permanent membership to the Security Council may see participation as mandatory to be considered for the prestigious opportunity of permanent member. Some states may see peacekeeping in their national security interests or even see participation as a “down payment” for when they may need peacekeeping intervention. From a military perspective, states could use peacekeeping operations as opportunities to enhance their militaries perspective and experience overseas and gain training that domestic institutions cannot provide. A final reason for Findlay is the economic incentive for troops who would receive greater financial reward for service to the UN versus domestic service. He finds this an unlikely sole contributor for motivation, due to the slow nature of payments from the UN and that only poorer states can take advantage of economic incentives.⁶⁸ While the motivations Findlay

⁶⁸ See chapter 1 for a thorough discussion on this motivations in Findlay, Trevor ed. 1996. *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*. Stockholm: Oxford University Press.

provides are legitimate assumptions that are made concerning state participation in peacekeeping operations, his analysis of these motivations stops there. These issues clearly have the opportunity to be analyzed through international relations lenses but this analysis is not provided by Findlay or the chapter authors.

Advocating critical theory as the appropriate lens to examine peacekeeping operations Pugh and Bellamy provide two of the more theoretical approaches to peacekeeping. While both studies do not explicitly examine motivations for states to contribute to these operations, they are both grounded in placing peacekeeping operations in the broader theme of international relations approaches. Pugh advocates the use of critical theory as the most advantageous theory for application to peacekeeping, noting that “structural transformation based on the social struggles immanent in globalization processes will introduce new forms of democratic peacekeeping in the short term, if not rendering it largely obsolete in the long run.”⁶⁹ Pugh believes that adherence to liberal and realist frameworks have promulgated the current international structure, to their advantage, rather than allowing nature to run its course. Bellamy echoes this perspective, also supporting the use of critical approaches to understanding peacekeeping, discounting realist assumptions concerning national interests and desiring to move away from problem solving theory. Bellamy deems critical theory as the only theory that can “broaden and deepen the theory and practice of peace operations.”⁷⁰ These studies again

⁶⁹ Pugh, Michael. 2004. “Peacekeeping and Critical Theory.” *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 11, No. 1. p. 54.

⁷⁰ Bellamy, Alex. 2004. “The Next Stage in Peace Operations Theory.” *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 11, No. 1. p. 17-38.

approach theoretical challenges and potential directions, but do not attempt to measure state behavior in peacekeeping operations.

Upon review of these attempts to help situate peacekeeping in broader theoretical themes, the literature falls significantly short. Past research provides some basic assumptions of potential theoretical motivations that may play a significant role in states deciding to support peacekeeping operations: economics, prestige, shared norms of behavior, military self interest, international pressure and regime type. These potential explanatory variables have not been examined in combination significantly nor have they been applied to international relations approaches and the foundational tenants that theory espouses. Thus, the important question still to be pursued is why do states choose to participate or not to participate in peacekeeping operations? What are the key motivations for states, states that differ economically, militarily, domestically, in governmental structure and in individual interests, and are there consistent motivations across time and operations that provide some reasonable explanation, theoretically, to continued support of multilateral UN operations. To develop testable hypothesis concerning the application of participation in peacekeeping operations, the literature on international relations theory must also be examined.

International Relations Approaches

In order to test the assumptions of international relations approaches, each approach must be clearly understood conceptually and in application. This provides a substantive challenge when attempting to apply particular theoretical tenants to

real world events and/or circumstances. Different theoretical frameworks offer very different explanations of cooperation internationally, peacekeeping notwithstanding, and each can offer perspectives as to the development of policy and practices. Understanding the different theoretical treatments of peacekeeping can help develop better practices and policies to best represent current state preferences and motives.

The field of international relations covers a significant number of subjects to include economics, human rights and governmental structure. Yet historically, security is the paramount subject of interest. “International war is among the direst of the perennial problems that plague world affairs. With respect to the central issue of international security, then, it is legitimate to ask how and why international organizations respond to war and threats of war.”⁷¹ The underpinnings of international relations initially focused its analysis on security issues with respect to the individual state.⁷² Yet even in this initial analysis the formation of states to strengthen coalitions and individual states was apparent. As international relations approaches have evolved, the recognition of the role international collaboration plays is highly debated. This movement away from states as individual actors now includes analysis with respect to international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and also domestic policies and their influence

⁷¹ Pease, Kelly Kate S. 2000. *International Organizations: Perspectives on Governance in the Twenty-First Century*. New Jersey. Prentice Hall. p. 99.

⁷² Traditionally the first account of international relations comes from Thucydides *History of the Peloponnesian War*, particular the Melian Dialogue that focus around the alliance of states for war.

on state relations vis-à-vis another.⁷³ The breadth and scope of international relations approaches also have much to contribute in other areas of concern, such as environment, economics and human rights, but to deny the primary role that security issues play in international relations theory and application is to omit its historical and primary function or purpose. Thus it is possible to find a substantial amount of discussion and debate as to the role of international organizations and the peacekeeping mechanism from previous approaches, and how we can explain the potential reasons for states participation in these collective activities.

The history and tradition of realism in international relations reaches further than other traditions or approaches. Realism has traditionally dominated the international relations landscape from the first signs of international interaction though strong alternatives have been developed since its rise to prominence. Realism is derived historically from Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian War*, in particular his "Melian Dialogue," Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Prince* and Thomas Hobbes *Leviathan*, but in its contemporary form is best attributed to Hans Morganthau. Perhaps no more famous description exists to place historical realism among state behavior than Thucydides account of the discussion between the Athenians and the Melians when the Athenians noted that "the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept".⁷⁴ His account

⁷³ Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger. 1997. *Theories of International Regimes*. Cambridge University Press.

⁷⁴ Thucydides. 1998. *The History of the Peloponnesian War*. Hackett Pub. Co. p. 402.

of power as the basis for political action and will is the foundation of historical realism. Machiavelli further contributes to the early development of this power based, self interested tendency noting in Book 17 of *The Prince*, that it is better to be feared than loved, as men love of their own free will but fear by the will of the Prince. The Prince must then rely on what he can control, and this is to rule with fear.⁷⁵ Hobbes contribution to the realist paradigm relates to his description of nature being “continued fear and danger of violent death...the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”⁷⁶ This description of human nature adheres to the realist notion that the international system is anarchic, with no higher government, institution or collective that has the ability to insist states behave in a particular manner or curb aggression. Hobbesian philosophy purports that the lack of a leviathan, or grand authority, requires states to act in a self interested manner as relations between states are ones of conflict and war. The state is a reflection of man’s self interest. Clausewitz’s “just war” principles continue this belief that nature is inherently conflictual and war is the continuation of policy by other means.⁷⁷ For Clausewitz, war is governance. States wielding power and force use these to govern policy, manage disputes over governing policy, and secure interests domestically and abroad.

Contemporary realism is best defined by Hans Morganthau and his *Politics Among Nations*. His six principles of political realism help to develop realism into the modern international theoretical landscape.

⁷⁵ Machiavelli, Niccolò. 1984. *The Prince*. Bantam Classics. p. 89-91.

⁷⁶ Hobbes, Thomas. 1996. *The Leviathan*. Oxford University Press. p. 84.

⁷⁷ Clausewitz, Carl von . 1908. *On War*. London. Dryden House.

1. Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.
2. The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.
3. Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all.
4. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action.
5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.
6. The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound. The political realist is not unaware of the existence and relevance of standards of thought other than political ones. He cannot but subordinate these other standards to those of politics.⁷⁸

For Morgenthau, politics are an extension of human nature – selfish and aggressive. States reflect this human condition since states are products of human creation. This is a constant in international relations. States must always be aware the aggression is not only a possibility but a probability in an anarchic system with respect to which states hold the power relative to one another. Aron echoes this

⁷⁸ Reproduced from Morgenthau, Hans J. 1993. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Boston. McGraw Hill. p. 4-16.

sentiment, particularly in the idea that states are competitive creatures and will pursue national self interest militarily and diplomatically, but chiefly through military means to ensure the avoidance of war, or the means to be victorious if war is unavoidable.⁷⁹ Since states are autonomous creations, their individual security and success is of the utmost importance, with little to no deference to the security and development of other states.

In summary, the authors that have contributed to the development of realism see human nature as essentially evil, power seeking, selfish and antagonistic. This human nature is constant, and very difficult to change, creating a consistent environment. The main actors in the international system are states and regimes or international organizations are negligible at best. The state, operating as the reflection of man is power seeking, autonomous and pursues only national self interest. The international system is anarchic, with an uneven balance of power. This causes inevitable conflict between states since the focus is on a states relative gain vis-à-vis other states. Power is at a premium for the realist tradition and foreign policy must always take into account security concerns above all other state concerns.

The primary theoretical development fromr includes the structural realist, or neorealist paradigm. While neorealism espouses a significant portion of realism's tenants there are a few important differences to note. Neorealism deemphasizes the role of human nature and contends that the anarchic structure of the international

⁷⁹ Aron, Raymond. 1966. *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*. Garden City, NY. Doubleday & Company

environment is most responsible for the self interested behavior and action of states. Kenneth Waltz, the preeminent neorealist, notes that this anarchic environment influences all states to be self interested with respect to their security interests. This is the case whether human nature is inherently self interested or not. All state leaders must recognize that they must always balance power vis-à-vis another state in order to maintain power in the international system or gain power relative to other states.⁸⁰ There is a constant balance of power struggle occurring in the international system. Walt, another prominent neorealist argues that there is not a balance of power struggle, but a balance of threat so that states are not always balancing against the strong but whomever is perceived to be the strongest threat to the state at the time.⁸¹

A key difference between neorealism and realist thought is that association among states or cooperation is at times preferred, but only when the cooperation benefits the participating states relative to others. Yet this international cooperation for neorealism is cooperation that is sporadic and can change frequently. Gilpin speaks to this as well, noting that “a global community of common values and outlook has yet to displace international anarchy. The fundamental problem of international relations in the contemporary world is the problem of peaceful adjustment to the consequences of the uneven growth of power among states, just as it was in the past.”⁸² For Gilpin, as with Waltz, international cooperation occurs, but not as the substitute of longstanding power politics. Gilpin also examines the

⁸⁰ Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Relations*.

⁸¹ Walt, Stephen. 1990. *The Origins of Alliances*. Cornell University Press

⁸² Gilpin, Robert. 1983. *War and Change in Politics*. Cambridge University Press. p. 230.

slow change that occurs in the international system. There is a cost imposed by the system of any behavior that attempts to change the status quo which also influences the existing order among the states that support the status quo. Thus, states prefer the status quo as expectations of the system and the stability of the system remain more constant. Jervis recognizes this characteristic of the international system and cooperation as well. He notes that “because there are no institutions or authorities that can make and enforce international laws, the policies of cooperation that will bring mutual rewards if others cooperate may bring disaster if they do not. Because states are aware of this, anarchy encourages behavior that leaves all concerned worse off than they could be, even in the extreme case in which states would like to freeze the status quo.”⁸³ Analyzing the stag hunt game theory matrix he effectively shows that even though a clear choice may be present that would benefit each state involved, the fear that a nation may choose a different path encourages states to act individually to ensure their individual safety instead of choosing the most benefit for the collective. The fear of another state not participating outweighs the good that could be achieved if all states involved chose to do so.

Mearsheimer’s critic of traditional realism reflects the same beliefs as other neorealist authors who discount the role of human nature and the influence human nature has on state behavior and the international system. His theory of offensive realism contends that what drives great power motives and behavior is the desire for states to survive. For Mearsheimer, the system is still anarchic but “Great

⁸³ Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” *World Politics*. Vol. 30. No. 2. p. 167.

powers behave aggressively not because they want to or because they possess some inner drive to dominate, but because they have to seek more power if they want to maximize their odds of survival."⁸⁴

The neorealist approach sees human nature as potentially evil, but deemphasizes the role of human nature. There exists slow structural change in human nature but the anarchic environment is continual. The state is a rational, unitary apparatus that is power seeking where outcomes are constrained by the system structure. States are the main actors in this approach but the system as a structure also plays a role. International institutions and participation in regimes are used only to promote state interests. Neorealism, much like realism sees the international system as possessing an uneven balance of power that creates a security dilemma of relative gains, but neorealism recognized that while conflict is inevitable, deterrence can potentially limit conflict or war. An equal distribution of power can then aid in conflict prevention as a state is “checked” vis-à-vis another.

The liberal tradition in international relations emerged from historical works during the 16th and 17th centuries. Locke’s *Second Treatise on Government* is by most accounts the first influential liberal political work and has since been extended to the international political realm. Locke was not expressly discussing international relations in his work but his beliefs concerning human nature and the opportunities for cooperation in the international system are key components of the liberal theoretical tradition. Locke believed that the individual was a key component to political society and that human nature was not conflictual, but

⁸⁴ Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York. W.W. Norton Co.

cooperative. He emphasized the democratic principles of participation by citizens and limited government intervention.⁸⁵ These principles are the basis for recognizing state sovereignty in the international system.

While Locke's contributions to the liberal tradition are significant, Hugo Grotius wrote directly on the subject of international relations and international law and is credited with the early developments of liberal international relations theory. Grotius asserts that states interacting in the international system develop norms, practices and rules of behavior.⁸⁶ This creates a level of cooperation where states recognize the formal and informal norms that enhances a states ability to predict how other states will act in the international system. One of the most important tenants of Grotius's work is his recognition of the international system being anarchic, but that cooperation can and does exist in this environment. This cooperation is a direct result of the formal and informal norms that states have created and expected from each other through historical and current interaction. This idea is key to the liberal tradition. Change can occur in the system and is preferred.

Immanuel Kant's three definitive articles in *Perpetual Peace* continue the development of liberalism and describe his conditions for peace between states.⁸⁷ His first article addresses the need for governments to be republic in their creation. This republic would guarantee the equality of all citizens legally. The second article presents the idea of a treaty among nations that agree to the republican

⁸⁵ Locke, John. 1990. *Questions Concerning the Laws of Nature*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

⁸⁶ Grotius, Hugo. 2005. *The Rights of War and Peace*. Ed. Richard Tuck. Liberty Fund.

⁸⁷ Kant, Immanuel. 1983. *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*. Hackett Publishing Company.

principles. These liberal nations would steadily expand, eliminating war between liberal states, and gradually reduce war between non-liberal and liberal states to the point where non-liberal states would fade away. The third article calls for a cosmopolitan law, or universal hospitality towards all foreigners while in another country. This article does not guarantee the right to citizenship or the right for long term settlement, but would protect foreigners who would risk death or execution if returned to their home countries. Liberal states that adhere to these three articles maintain peace between each other through interaction and continued development of relations among each other; each state develops mutual respect for each other through these practices.

Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points helped to contribute to the modern development of liberalism and stems from Kantian beliefs. While the fourteen points was given in the context of the post World War I environment and covered several specifics of the current international situation, 6 key points of the fourteen relate specific to liberal theoretical principles (points 1-5 and 14).

1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.
4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest points consistent with domestic safety.
5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.
6. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.⁸⁸

Wilson's beliefs echo those of previous liberal thinkers and contribute to the foundational assumptions of liberalism with respect to cooperation among states, the importance of international institutions and the maintenance of peace.

⁸⁸ Recreated from Wilson, Woodrow. *The Fourteen Points*. Delivered January 18, 1918

In *The End of History and the Last Man* Fukuyama develops a key component of the liberalism, particularly the development of liberal democracies. Reflecting a strong relation to Kantian beliefs and tenants Francis Fukuyama supports the idea that liberal democratic states do not fight one another. Due to the development of democratic ideals in these states and the influence that these states place on human rights and the rule of law, there are few points of disagreements between these like-minded liberal states.⁸⁹ This political liberalism is a preeminent political achievement and has and perhaps, will always, supplant any other form or construct of government. Fukuyama supports the Kantian theory that nations that agree to republican, or democratic principles, will foster cooperation, both economically and politically. This would reduce war and conflict between these states as they would interact more consistently, develop an understanding and recognition of some foundational legal precedence and develop further opportunities for international interaction and association.

Overall, liberalism departs from realism and neorealism as it views human nature as essentially good, capable of learning, changing and cooperating. Change is desirable as it is seen as developing towards peace and makes cooperation possible. States are still central actors but it non-governmental organization (NGOs) and international organizations (IGOs) also play viable roles. Regimes create norms of behavior such as democracy and liberal economics. The state is not autonomous and but can be constrained by the interest of domestic politics. Thus, liberalism views the international system as anarchic, but changeable through its

⁸⁹ Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York. The Free Press.

environment, through interdependence and international society. There exists the opportunity of cooperation because of certain shared norms thus states do not focus on relative gains, rather absolute gains. Conflict is preventable through the idea of collective security due to the assumptions that war is bad, aggression or imperialism is wrong, and morality is shared from states democratic or economic ties.

Neo-liberalism departs from classical liberalism by recognizing that there are multiple channels, domestic and foreign that influence states and their ability to cooperate. Karl Deutsch was an early contributor to this line of political thought in *Political community and the North Atlantic area: international organization in the light of historical experience*.⁹⁰ Deutsch and others developed the idea of a “pluralistic security community” which describes the international community as being more interested in solving disputes through negotiation, diplomacy and other means instead of aggression and/or physical means. Keohane describes this succinctly by noting how states achieve mutual gains through international agreements and institutions. Mutual gains for states diminish the cost of doing business and often provide greater opportunity for success or growth.⁹¹ Conflict can be avoided not through moral obligation or shared values, but through institutions that constrain those outside this shared system. Keohane and Nye describe this concept of “complex interdependence” in their 2001 work *Power and*

⁹⁰ Deutsche, Karl et al. 1957. *Political community and the North Atlantic area: international organization in the light of historical experience*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

⁹¹ See Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony*.

Interdependence.⁹² When states are connected through multiple channels and collaboration is high, norms are developed and individual states behavior becomes more predictable and consistent with the common set of values most prevalent in the international community. Economic agreements, international institutions, military agreements and even social phenomena are all channels that encourage states to act within these developed norms and move towards greater collaboration.

Rosecrance continues with the neo-liberal tradition, particularly economic interdependence and the effects that economic interdependence between states has on diminishing conflict, in both *The Rise of the Trading State* and *The Rise of the Virtual State*.⁹³ Rosecrance focuses on one of the most important theoretical tenants of neo-liberalism – that economic integration and cooperation trumps classic territorial aggression and expansion. States that are perceived as being open economically will be trusted in the international community and like minded states will continue to form economic coalitions to gain mutually. For Rosecrance conflict will surface in the international community, but will be between states that are outside the economic associations, and the states that maintain the economic and political order will form coalitions to constrict rogue states. This allows like minded states to create associations and agreements that then encourages particular norms and standards of behavior.

⁹² Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. 2001. *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd Ed. New York: Longman.

⁹³ Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. *The Rise of the Trading State*. New York. Basic Books and Richard Rosecrance. 199. *The Rise of the Virtual State*. New York. Basic books.

An important addition to neo-liberal theory is provided by Charles Kindleberger and his hegemonic stability theory (HST). Kindleberger's HST centers on large powerful states and their ability to provide an open and stable economic environment. The hegemon has the ability to govern, or create rules and norms of practices for other states in an open economy that eventually encourages these individual states to practice and standardize these rules and norms due to the security, both militarily and economically that the hegemon provides.⁹⁴ Incentivizing economic cooperation allows a hegemon to provide relative stable environments that promote a liberalization of individual states economic pursuits, if this is the goal of the hegemon.

Thus the overall neo-liberal framework describes the international system as anarchic, but it can provide the opportunity of cooperation and interdependence that allows states to be joint maximizers. This inevitably leads to less conflict as previous realist assumptions. Regimes and IOs are large actors in this approach and their presence confirms that cooperation and collaboration exist in the international community. Regimes and IOs help to mitigate violence and help to create norms that these states follow and encourage others to follow. This focus allows states to constrain one another due to the process of interaction being more important than the cost. A primary and key difference for Neo-liberalism is the emphasis placed on the economic exchange between states and the functionalism of these economic

⁹⁴ Kindleberger, Charles. 1973. "The Benefits of International Money." *Journal of International Economics*. Vol. 2. p. 425-442.

agreements and other institutions such as mail and phone services. Cooperation on these issues can represent cooperation on other issues in the future.

Social constructivist theory, builds on the recognition of the English school traditions and carries the ideas of common rules and shared norms further. One of the first applications of constructivism to international relations is credited to Friedrich Kratochwil in his *Rules, Norms and Decisions, On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Society*. Kratochwil is concerned with how norms work in the international system. His most valuable assertion comes from the idea that norms often precede the decision making process of a state – he is particularly interested in the separate styles of decision making that accompany norms in diverse international areas.⁹⁵ This is an important foundational assumption of constructivism. Norms and interests that have developed over time influence the decisions of states currently and in the future. Alexander Wendt takes the constructivist argument and applies the theoretical tenants in response to what he sees as weaknesses in current international approaches.⁹⁶ While recognizing that the international community is anarchic, his distinction for constructivism is that this anarchic environment is determined by what the state makes of it. Identity and interests are not necessarily given – the anarchic international environment can influence identity and interests.

⁹⁵ Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1991. *Rules, Norms and Decisions, On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Society*. England. Cambridge University Press.

⁹⁶ See Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power in Politics." *International Organization*. Vol. 46, No. 2. p. 391-425.

Other key distinctions of constructivism are also offered by John Ruggie. He explains that constructivist theory ascertains that the “building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material...that they express not only individual but collective intentionality.”⁹⁷ He notes that constitutive rules exist that have been developed by states in the international system. And while these rules can be associated with security or cooperation, and could be weak or strong in their application, they can constrict or loosen state action. Keck and Sikkink continue with this idea in their work concerning transnational advocacy networks. These networks, which share norms, values and information, serve as important vehicles to shape and determine state actions. Transnational advocacy networks can then “carry and reframe ideas, insert them into policy debates, pressure for regime formation, and enforce existing international norms and rules, at the same time that they try to influence particular domestic political issues.”⁹⁸ The networks then have the ability to shape the perspectives, beliefs and understanding of states not only inside the networks, but also those outside the network to determine what is acceptable or unacceptable practice in the international community.

Barnett and Finnemore also address the issue of the socialization of international organizations, referring to them as bureaucracies that create norms of behavior and how business will be done at the international level.⁹⁹ This aids to

⁹⁷ Ruggie, John. 1998. “What Makes the World Hold Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge”. *International Organization*. Vol. 52, No.4. p. 878-890.

⁹⁸ Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. London. Cornell University Press. P. 199.

⁹⁹ Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. 2004. *Rules of the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*. New York. Cornell University Press, Cambridge University Press

explain how the diffusion of these norms and behavior help to institutionalize IO's in the international arena, but also how they support and guide the practices of states internationally.

Constructivists argue that ideas, norms and identities are created through social interaction. It is the inter-subjective ideas that influence behavior, not just the material aspects of structures and institutions. The state is thus interconnected to other states and states' interactions can create a set of institutions and agreements that the participating states can agree on or model for themselves. Ideas such as sovereignty, economic agreements, human rights, culture and war/conflict are all determined by the interactions that a state has within the international system or institutions.¹⁰⁰ One states experience must be shared among other states participating in the system.

Each of these approaches describes and accounts for international cooperation and state behavior and arrives at the aforementioned, separate outcomes. While these approaches address the important functions and role of international organizations and their functions, realism, liberalism and constructivism have each been applied distinctly to international organizations and regimes by Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger.¹⁰¹ While their typology is slightly different in name the principles are relatively the same. They divide theoretical descriptions of international organizations and regimes as power-based (realism or

¹⁰⁰ See Fierke, and Jorgensen. 2001. *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*. London. M.E. Sharp.

¹⁰¹ While previously mentioned authors writing on international relations theory place their own individual value on IO's these authors develop application to international organizations from the three distinct approaches of Realism, liberalism and constructivism.

neorealism), interest based (liberalism or neoliberalism) and knowledge based (cognitivism or constructivism). Applying these three schools of thoughts towards international regimes supports the previous theoretical assumptions of realism, liberalism and constructivism. For Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger the central variable of note for realism is power, for liberalism it is interests and for cognitivism it is knowledge. Institutionalism is weak for realism, medium for liberalism and strong for cognitivism. Realism is again concerned with relative gains, liberalism is concerned with absolute gains and cognitivism concerns itself with role-players. The meta-theoretical orientation is rationalistic for realism and liberalism and sociological for cognitivism.¹⁰² The application the authors provide to international regimes contributes to a greater understanding of how broad theoretical tenants in international relations approaches can describe international associations and relationships. While the authors are examining primarily the institutions and regimes individually, states still make up these institutions and regimes and can provide a very thorough understanding of how international relations approaches explain application. The analysis of the authors also provides a valid and important dichotomy of the three primary international relations approaches that will be the basis for the methodology of this research. While international relations approaches have developed significantly through years of research, there are distinct and clear boundaries with realism, liberalism and constructivism. For this reason the three approaches of realism, liberalism and

¹⁰² This is reproduced from Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger. 1997. *Theories of International Regimes*. Cambridge University Press. p. 6.

constructivism will be used as the theoretical lenses to look at peacekeeping operations and branches of each, such as neoliberalism and neorealism, will be excluded. Table 1 offers a synopsis of the aforementioned approaches and an explanation of particular facets of international relations.

Table 1 – International Relations Theoretical Tenants

	Realism	Neorealism	Liberalism	Neoliberalism	Constructivism
<u>Human Nature</u>	Essentially Evil, power seeking, selfish, antagonistic, conflict-prone (immutable)	Possibly evil, importance of human nature deemphasized	Essentially good, capable of learning, changing and cooperating	Essentially good, capable of learning, changing and cooperating	Emphasis on constructed identities
Change	Change is minor/slow	Slow Structural change, but anarchy is unchanging	Desirable as development toward peace/cooperation	Possible via institutions	Result of change in social norms, identities
<u>Main Actors</u>	States	States, system as a structure	States, NGO's, IGO's, Supranationals	States, IGO's, NGO's, Supranationals	Individuals, collective identities
Institutional Role	Negligible at best	Promote state self interest	Central	Central	Socially Constructed
<u>The State</u>	Autonomous, power seeking, national interest, reflection of man	Autonomous, power seeking, national interest, reflection of man	Not autonomous, interests determined by domestic politics	Not autonomous, interests determined by domestic, international politics	Behavior shaped by elite beliefs, collective norms, social identity
<u>International System</u>	Anarchic, with uneven distribution of resources. Balance of power.	Anarchic, with uneven distribution of resources. Balance of power	Anarchy as changeable environment: via interdependence, international society	Anarchy, but mediated by international institutions	System itself (including anarchy) is social construct
Interstate Relations	Conflictual because of the security dilemma, focus on relative gains	Conflictual because of the security dilemma, focus on relative gains	Potentially cooperative because of shared norms or liberal ties, thus focus is on absolute gains	Potentially cooperative because of shared norms or liberal ties, thus focus is on absolute gains	Defined by social constructivism
Conflict	Inevitable (human nature)	Inevitable (human nature)	Preventable (liberal ties)	Preventable (institutions)	Caused by social constructs
<u>Conflict Prevention</u>	Balance of Power	Balance of Power or Deterrence	Collective Security	Collective Security	Socially Constructed
Preventative Force	Equal Distribution of Power	Equal Distribution of Power	Morality, shared democracy, economic ties	Institutional constraints	Belief therein
<u>Political Economy</u>	Economics – low politics. Subordinate to/function of power accumulation	Economics – low politics, subordinate to/function of constraints imposed by system	Economics can motivate politics, promote peace, particularly via liberal economic ties	Utility maximization, Economics can motivate politics, promote peace and stability via institutions	Socially constructed

Synthesizing Peacekeeping and IR Literature and Shaping State Interests

The purpose of this research is to test current international relations approaches and its application to state participation in peacekeeping operations to answer “Why do states participate in UN peacekeeping operations?” Testing international relations approaches in this manner can provide potential insights into current security concerns and state perspectives on international peacekeeping and cooperation. Reviewing current peacekeeping and international relations literature provides a thorough backdrop for analysis.

The peacekeeping literature clearly has experienced unprecedented attention in the past 15 years. While this attention has brought much needed conversation and debate concerning the viability and development of operations there does exist a significant area that needs more analysis. Peacekeeping literature maintains a substantive weakness in the application of approaches, not only to the development and presence of peacekeeping, but in other theoretical topics, to include the topic of interest concerning why states choose to participate in peacekeeping operations. States have no obligation to offer services, troops or support of any manner to peacekeeping operations. How does this participation, or lack thereof, help inform the world concerning theoretical descriptions of the current international environment?

One of the more unique aspects of peacekeeping operations is that research can measure and observe support for these operations from a troop contribution and frequency perspective. Data and information concerning peacekeeping operations

exists for a significant number of peacekeeping operations and can be used in a much deeper and meaningful direction than case study or operational reports or studies. The ability to measure certain aspects of peacekeeping as a direct or indirect action of states can allow some level of measurement of how states are behaving in the international arena and how these actions can reflect their perception and understanding of the international environment. The most meaningful direction in which to take peacekeeping studies is within the greater context of international relations. International relations approaches have not been significantly engaged by peacekeeping scholars and the opportunity is ripe for analysis.

International relations approaches have also experienced significant development since the first theoretical debates concerning state behavior in the international system. The theoretical lenses to examine state participation in peacekeeping operations that will be used for this analysis are realism, liberalism, and constructivism. These three approaches make up the primary traditions of international relations and constitute the starting point for any international relations research or study. The study of international relations has revolved around the separate theoretical tenants of realism, idealism and constructivism as evident through an examination of international relations readers or texts.¹⁰³ This is not to discount other theoretical endeavors, branches or directions concerning international relations. This recognizes the deepest research traditions and

¹⁰³ See Jackson and Sorenson's *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, Brown and Ainsley's *Understanding International Relations, 3rd Ed.*, Griffith's *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*, and Mingst's *Essentials of International Relations*.

foundational understanding of international relations approaches that is currently available. Realism and liberalism are the traditional, positivist approaches in international relations and until the early to mid nineties, were the dominant approaches to studying international relations. Realism and liberalism offer very different explanations of state behavior, international cooperation and security. Constructivism offers a critical, post-positivist approach that moves away from the traditional approaches and offers new rationale to how states interact and learn behavior in the international community. Thus, these three approaches will be the frameworks that are used for examining state participation in UN peacekeeping operations and in developing testable hypotheses.

What Shapes State Peacekeeping Interests?

A small amount of literature exists that is concerned with this gap of international relations approaches and peacekeeping. Examining the peacekeeping and international relations literature that does exist allows some level of understanding of what interests exist for states with relation to their commitment to peacekeeping and the international community.

Abbott and Snidal discuss state commitments to international organizations through an examination of the theoretical underpinnings of the Gulf War and the role of the Security Council, the UN and member states. Examining the Gulf War the authors conclude that we can describe the interests of states in this instance as realist, constructivist and rational-regime (liberal leaning description) in nature.

One can apply these approaches in different manners according to the “eye of the beholder” and there may not be a significant winner.¹⁰⁴ Interests then may be individual for each state and the context may be the most important factor for states for determining their level of participation globally

Finnemore argues that state perceptions come from socialization of international organizations and that they accept new norms and values through interaction in these international organizations. She even goes as far as to note that states do not always know what they want.¹⁰⁵ Thus involvement in peacekeeping for a state through an international organization, the UN, is a series of interactions that are learned from the organization and other states that are involved in this organization or system. A state could potentially participate in peacekeeping based on their individual definition of the international environment or a developed interest the state holds individually or collectively.

Paris examines the practice, participation and development of peacekeeping operations as a reflection of two major international phenomena. The first is the role of key parties, primarily states and other international organizations and the influence that each carries in preventing or restricting peacekeeping operations development. Choosing not to support or participate in peacekeeping operations can limit effectiveness and possible success. His second tenant is that the norms held in global culture and the international environment can also restrict

¹⁰⁴ Abbott, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 1998. “Why States Act Through Formal International Institutions.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 42, No.1. p. 3-32.

¹⁰⁵ Finnemore, Martha. 1996. *National Interests in International Society*. Cornell University Press, New York.

peacekeeping operations and productivity by limiting what is considered appropriate actions by peacekeeping operations. These values have been developed over time by states interacting in the system and developing these norms which actually may hinder the ability for peacekeeping operations to be successful.¹⁰⁶ These conclusions arrive at different motivations of states and how interests differ. The first brings light to individual self interest. A state could limit participation in peacekeeping operations if there were no relative gain for their interests vis-à-vis another state in the international system. This reflects a substantive realist approach with respect to state participation. The second tenant reflects a significant adherence to the theoretical assumptions of constructivism. Learned behavior is prevalent for states and their commitment to international peace and order but that learned behavior may also potentially detract from states and the UN's ability to create lasting and effective peacekeeping operations.

This snapshot of current conversations and research offers a starting point for what motivations may drive states to participate in peacekeeping while others do not. This research also provides some idea to why further analysis is still needed in this area. The current literature with respect to defining state interest in the peacekeeping arena and the greater arena of international relations is a small, disparate and competing literature. There is no clear determination of the motivations of states in international peacekeeping and while it would be naïve to assume a panacea exists for this topic, peacekeeping operations and state support

¹⁰⁶ Paris, Roland. 2003. "Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture." *European Journal of International Relations*. Vol. 9, 441.

for these operations continues to need further development analytically and anecdotally. The possibility may be that developing strong theoretical tenants from a singular perspective cannot fully define the nature of state interest in the international community with respect to peacekeeping.

The international relations literature can provide significant insight with respect to state interest concerning peacekeeping operations and what motivations would and should exist when examining this phenomenon. Understanding the key arguments of the three approaches of realism, liberalism and constructivism and their application to state perspectives on peacekeeping internationally allows relevant and testable hypotheses to be developed to potentially gain more understanding of how and why states participate in peacekeeping operations.

Realism, liberalism and constructivism differ significantly in their description of states and their viewpoints concerning the international system, state collaboration and security. This allows this research to develop significant areas for examination that would reflect interest's related to each of the theoretical paradigms presented and what expectations exist for each of these paradigms concerning peacekeeping.

Realism

Describing the motivations of a state with respect to international peacekeeping from the theoretical perspective of realism requires recognition of a self-interested state and relative gains. What would motivate a state to participate in international peacekeeping if the state is most concerned with self-preservation, its

relative power among other nations and views international institutions as negligible?

The realist description of peacekeeping would center on the idea that states would only participate if there was a way to increase their individual sphere of influence or power relative to other states in the international system. A realist state would thus participate in peacekeeping if by doing so; it would protect or serve the state's interest. Yet while participation could potentially only serve as an extension of a state's foreign policy or interests, states *do* participate in peacekeeping operations. Even if this participation in peacekeeping is participation based on self-interest, it is still participation.

Participation in peacekeeping for a realist state is concerned with several theoretical assumptions. The first and primary reason would be for security. Security maintains primacy for a state in the realist tradition. Does a conflict threaten the security of the state and is peacekeeping an option to diminish or eliminate this conflict? Does this conflict also threaten a close ally of an individual state, both militarily and economically? If a state contributes personnel to a peacekeeping operation, does it weaken their military capabilities domestically and abroad? Does contributing personnel to peacekeeping operations provide stronger and more developed training than an individual state can provide on their own – does a state contribute just to have access to more developed military practices?

A state with significant military capabilities could possibly provide more personnel to peacekeeping as their military is further developed and they could

continue to maintain a strong military presence outside of UN peacekeeping operations. The expectation could be that only states that have significant military resources and capabilities would contribute to ensure that their individual security is not marginalized through the contribution of troops to peacekeeping. Overall military strength and capacity would need to be measured over time to ascertain to whether only militarily well-developed states, minimally developed states or a confluence of both contributed more frequently and in greater number.

Member states with fewer military resources would be less likely to contribute as it would potentially diminish their individual security and capacity. Yet if states with limited military and economic resources had little to no domestic military threats then it is possible to ascertain that UN peacekeeping training could potentially provide further developed training and support to states military personnel than the individual state could perform them. Thus the expectation could also be that states with severely limited military resources and capabilities would contribute troops more readily to gain much needed training and development to provide greater security when troops return to their native states. This would most likely need to be measured as an additive term of military strength and economic strength.

Security concerns could also center on the geography of peacekeeping operations. Any conflict that has the potential to “spill” into a surrounding state or an area of strategic significance would be cause for intervention, if this intervention can create stability. If a conflict existed that threatened the border or immediate

geographic stability for a state, then intervention would be expected from the concerned state to protect their individual borders, or perhaps the borders of allied or neighboring states. Using geographic location of states that donate troops to a particular peacekeeping operation would measure whether states that are close geographically are donating at a higher level.

Overall economic strength would be a concern for states in the realist paradigm, although secondary to security. For states with more robust economies, the ability to contribute troops more readily, without losing relative power to other states would remain an important realist assumption. States with fewer resources would be less likely to contribute as concerns over these resources would potentially harm power and influence internationally and domestically while more developed nations could use the troops as extensions of foreign policy and goodwill more readily without risk to these concerns. Analyzing economic indicators and troop contributions from individual states could be used to understand the role of stronger and weaker economies.

Liberalism

The motivations for state participation in peacekeeping from the liberal tradition are developed from a perspective of an increased value on international institutions, norms of behavior, cooperation and economic integration. First and foremost, the existence of international institutions and organizations lends the liberal framework to potentially maintain primacy in describing collective

international action. Extending this framework to conflict and conflict mitigation through international organizations becomes less clear.

One primary expectation for a liberal state would be related to integration into the international system. A state that was integrated into the international system through a larger number of international organizations could be assumed to support larger global views that are shared by a number of states. This includes security, economic/trade, human rights and environmental associations that promote shared governance and cooperation. States more integrated and committed to global principles could be assumed to support peacekeeping operations more frequently and with larger personnel support. Using international memberships as a variable of interest could help to determine if states that are more integrated are contributing to peacekeeping operations more frequently and with larger number of troops.

States that have traditionally supported the development and protection of democratic principles and human rights could be hypothesized to support peacekeeping more consistently. The practice of peacekeeping reflects the shared principles of the UN and a vast majority of basic human rights and norms that represents a liberal approach to international relations. These shared norms through international institutions are central to the liberal framework. If states that contribute more often possess governments that rank as more open and transparent with a commitment to human rights and democratic norms then some level of dedication to liberal principles and practice could be present.

Economics plays a more vital role in the liberal framework. If a conflict upset the economic balance between two states, a state could intervene to ensure long term economic relationships stayed consistent. If significant trade existed between states then the potential donor state would have a strategic interest in supporting peacekeeping operations that could move towards stability for the state affected by the conflict. Economic relationships are foundational for the liberal paradigm in promoting peace and security. This could be measured by examining bi-lateral trade between the host peacekeeping state and contributing and non-contributing states.

Constructivism

The constructivist application would apply mostly to interaction in the international system over time for states and if there exist any development or change in norms for states as behavior is modified. States could modify behavior through interaction in the international system and the United Nations as this interaction could modify what states see as important. The entire structure of peacekeeping operations could be a reflection of what states see as important in the international system and what norms exist to guide the development and continuation of peacekeeping operations.

States that have the longest tenured memberships in the U. N. could desire to contribute troops at a higher incidence and number. As states interact within the institution the expectation to participate more frequently and contribute more resources to peacekeeping could be a learned or constructed behavior. The

developed identity of “peacekeeping supporter” and sharing like interests with other member states through interaction in the U.N. system serves the constructivist framework well. Examining a state’s length of membership and contribution levels could explain the presence of learned behavior for member states.

It is also possible to look over time to measure if significant or gradual changes exist in states patterns of contribution. If the process of contributing to peacekeeping is a potentially learned behavior then variations in giving patterns could also reflect learned behavior during membership. Recognizing a state’s pattern of giving compared to individual states and the overall pattern of contributions collectively could help to develop the idea that states are potentially developing or changing their individual perspectives on peacekeeping contributions, or even peacekeeping as a whole.

Economically speaking, states that have limited ability to offer military training and development could contribute troops more frequently and in higher numbers as they use the training these troops are offered through the U.N. to develop their individual forces. If there are no significant threats to a state’s individual interest domestically then states that have smaller economies and military forces could use this collective opportunity to enhance their individual military capacities at little to no cost to the state. They could also use this as a “paying it forward” opportunity recognizing that the collective identity of peacekeepers in the international system could help to illicit support from other

states if ever needed, providing greater security than they could individually provide on their own.

A thorough understanding of the peacekeeping and international relations literature and a synthesis of this literature serves as the starting point to understanding state motivations with respect peacekeeping operations. Developing a research design and methodology that is appropriate begins with historical assumptions concerning state behavior and international institutions. Developing testable hypothesis and methods to measure and report findings that can support or detract from previous provided theoretical explanations is the next step.

Chapter 2 – Hypothesis Development, Data and Methods

Developing testable hypotheses for this analysis must examine state behavior, or actions, in response to the peacekeeping operational needs and mandates. To arrive at any substantive theoretical conclusions, the development of hypotheses must be concerned with the individual state actions and how these actions could be applied to assumptions of international relations approaches. The individual state will be the unit of measurement for hypothesis development with a number of independent variables that can measure the theoretical assumptions. Hypotheses for each approach will be developed to test for the application of realism, idealism and constructivism.

The assumptions of realism within international relations are that states are power seeking, selfish and are concerned with relative gains and the balance of power in the international system. One would assume that a state would contribute to peacekeeping with personnel only if the state was able to gain power relative to other states or if a strategic, self-interest for the individual state exists. Economies would play a minimal role in the states' behavior and participation would be inconsistent over time and operation. States would be more interested in participating in peacekeeping operations if conflicts could potentially threaten their individual assets, borders or power relative to other states. Cooperation only exists if it serves the state interests. From these basic tenants, a hypothesis can be developed for testing the realist framework:

REALISM – UN Members states that contribute to peacekeeping operations would maintain a geographic interest in the peacekeeping operation, states would sustain a stronger commitment to military expenditures and capabilities, and states would possess larger economies that would enable more consistent and greater contributions.

Liberalism maintains that international organizations play a vital role in the international system and that regimes can promote a particular set of norms such as democracy and liberal economies. Cooperation is possible due to the states' interest in absolute gains versus relative gains and collective security can help to mitigate conflicts and violence in the international system. The economic exchange between states also plays a vital role as cooperation on issues like economics and telecommunications can help to develop cooperation in other areas such as security. The hypothesis that can then be developed to test liberalism's assumptions is as follows:

LIBERALISM - UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations will maintain a larger number of international associations, have similar government systems (primarily democracies) and possess larger amounts of bi-lateral trade between the host state and contributors.

The assumptions of constructivism are that states learn behavior, norms and ideas from interaction in the system and maintain the opportunity to use the anarchic international environment in their own image. This allows for states interacting in

the international system to create institutions and practices that states can agree on such as sovereignty, human rights, culture and security. The experience of one state is contingent and influenced by the experience and interaction of other states in the international system. Hypothesis for testing constructivism is as follows:

CONSTRUCTIVISM - UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations will have longer tenured membership in the United Nations, could experience variance over time of their individual peacekeeping commitments, and maintain limited economic and military capabilities.

To measure the aforementioned hypotheses I will apply statistical methods to analyze state participation in peacekeeping operations to determine how these findings can be best be applied to international relations approaches. Since this study is an empirical study that researches empirical experiences or phenomena concerning states contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, post quantitative assessment will be required in the form of theoretical assessment of the results.

To empirically test state behavior two quantitative methods will be used. Standard tables and graphing techniques will be used to test individual variables over the selected time period and the frequency that states contribute to peacekeeping operations. Standard stepwise regression models will also be developed with the state's contribution levels as a percentage of their total military capacity as the dependent variable that will test multiple independent variables and their potential explanatory power. Stepwise regression is best suited for discovering

the variables most influential in a model within data sets that are multi-dimensional. In testing hypotheses, stepwise regression is beneficial if the research has already determined specific independent variables that have the potential to explain variance on the dependent variable. Challenges that exist with stepwise regression include a tendency to over fit the model and some diminished capacity to consider all interactions. SPSS software will be used to operate the regression models. This software is appropriate for testing a large number of variables across a large number of cases. I will first explain the selection of the peacekeeping cases that will be used for this analysis followed by a discussion of the development of the regression model, the dependent variable, the independent variables for inclusion and the sources of these data. I will conclude the section with a description of the table and graphical analysis that will be combined with the regression analysis to finalize all of the included research.

Case Selection

Peacekeeping operations, mandates and practices have changed significantly during the course of their history. A large majority of scholars distinguish UN peacekeeping operations into two primary categories: peacekeeping before the Cold War and peacekeeping after the Cold War. Diehl observes that there is considerable evidence that the end of the Cold War ushered in a new era for international organizations and provided an opportunity for the UN to re-emerge as

a force for international peace.¹⁰⁷ Dedicating an entire chapter to peacekeeping after the Cold War, Fetherston notes that peacekeeping has increased in number, dimensions, and functions and that the underlying question for peacekeeping scholars is what can be done to improve the UN's capacity to effectively manage the post Cold War environment.¹⁰⁸ Durch believes that the UN could not do the job that it was created for during the Cold War but also identifies that a new era has arrived in the international community that will significantly change peacekeeping development, contributions and mandates.¹⁰⁹ Peacekeeping after the Cold War is widely considered the peacekeeping model for the future and the complexity of these missions are considered to be the rule of thumb versus the exception. Mingst and Karns recognize three generations of peacekeeping history: Cold War/First Generation, Transition Period/Second Generation and Post Cold War/Third Generation.¹¹⁰ Peacekeeping after the Cold War grew significantly in scope, number and contributors and represented a more consistent representation of multilateral operations. Recognizing the key differences that these authors note in UN peacekeeping evolution, the peacekeeping operations that will be used for this analysis will be operations that have been undertaken after the Cold War concluded. The peacekeeping operations since this time provide the multilateral,

¹⁰⁷ Diehl, Paul. 1993. *International Peacekeeping*. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press. p. 1-3.

¹⁰⁸ See chapter 2 in Fetherston, AB. 1994. *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

¹⁰⁹ Durch, William, ed. 1993. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*. New York: St. Martin's Press. p. 1-12.

¹¹⁰ Mingst, Karen and Margaret Karns. 2000. *The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. p. 84-91.

multi-dimensional operations that are most representative of the current and future type of peacekeeping operations.

In order to accurately measure troop commitments from states, operations also should be completed and measured for correct reporting post conclusion of the operation or mandate. Operations that have not been completed, or are ongoing, would not provide the full scope and duration of state peacekeeping commitments and would not offer an entire explanation of the level of support from states.

Examining the total number of completed UN peacekeeping operations (missions) from 1991 to 2007 provides a total number of 35 peacekeeping operations available for analysis. Examining these operations for their overall scope and measure is also necessary to ensure the selection of operations that provide appropriate and complete data and are substantive operations in scope and mandates. Peacekeeping operations have three primary components for personnel contributions: military personnel, military observers and civilian/UN police forces. Operations that maintain only military observers and civilian or UN police forces typically represent operations that are scaled back in size, are used for observation of truce or treaty compliance and verification of election processes and results. There are 15 operations that fit the observer, verification or civilian/UN police force description. Of those 15 operations, only one operation, UNAVEM III, mandated the use of military support personnel. The other 14 operations used only military observers and civilian/UN police personnel. Due to the limited scope and mandate of these operations, they will be excluded for this analysis. UNAVEM III

will be included due to the unique characteristic that it possesses as a verification operation, the use of military personnel. The UNTMIH operation will also be excluded due to the low number of military personnel that were approved for support, 50. The total number of personnel mandated for UNTMIH is far below the typical operational request and approval, which ranges from 893 to 37,122 in other UN peacekeeping operations.

By excluding peacekeeping operations that were developed before the end of the Cold War, operations that are ongoing, all observer and verification operations (excluded UNAVEM III) and removing UNTMIH, the final number of UN peacekeeping operations is reduced to 20 operations. Yet of the twenty operations, viable troop contributions for each individual state during the peacekeeping operation exist only for 11 of these operations, with one operation (UNCRO) of the 20 absent of any data available for use regarding state participation. That leaves 19 peacekeeping operations available for analysis concerning frequency of participation and total number of troop contributions by state and 11 operations that maintain the appropriate data (state troop contributions) for use in a regression model. These 11 operations will be used to examine state participation in peacekeeping operations by examining troop contributions to each operation.

Each peacekeeping operations selected maintains a unique capacity and function. UNIKOM was established in 1991 following the forced withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. UNIKOM's task was to monitor the demilitarized zone

along the Iraq-Kuwait border, deter border violations and report any hostile action. UNPROFOR was initially established in Croatia to ensure demilitarization of designated areas. The mandate was later extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the delivery of humanitarian aid, monitor no-fly zones and safe areas. Table 2 lists the operations, their timeline, the number of personnel contributed to the operations and the overall financial cost for each peacekeeping operation. They are ordered sequentially from the initial date of approval. ONUMOZ was established to help implement the peace agreement, signed by the President of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana. The mandate included facilitating the implementation of the agreement; monitoring the ceasefire; monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces and providing security in the transport corridors; providing technical assistance and monitoring the entire electoral process. UNOSOM II was established in March 1993 to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by the Unified Task Force for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. UNAVEM III was established to assist the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation on the basis of the Peace Accords for Angola, signed on 31 May 1991, the Lusaka Protocol signed on 20 November 1994, and relevant Security Council resolutions. UNPREDEP was established on 31 March 1995 to

replace UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The mandate of UNPREDEP remained essentially the same: to monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and threaten its territory.

UNAMSIL was created to develop cooperative efforts with the government and the other parties in implementing the Lome Peace Agreement and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan in Sierra Leone. UNTAET was established on 25 October 1999 to administer the territory of East Timor, exercise legislative and executive authority during the transition period and support capacity-building for self-government. UNMEE was created to maintain liaison with the parties and establish a mechanism for verifying the ceasefire in Ethiopia and Eritrea. In September 2000, the Council authorized UNMEE to monitor the cessation of hostilities and to help ensure the observance of security commitments. UMISET provided assistance to East Timor over a period of two years until all operational responsibilities were fully devolved to the East Timor authorities. Subsequently, the Council extended mission's mandate for another year to permit the new nation, which had changed its name to Timor-Leste, to attain self-sufficiency. ONUB was established to support and help to implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about national reconciliation, as provided under the Arusha Agreement.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ The description provided of each peacekeeping operation was taken directly from the UN peacekeeping website. See <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml>.

The operations included have a significant range of function, location and total personnel. Table 2 includes the peacekeeping operations title (abbreviated and expanded), the start and closing date, the total personnel contributed and the total cost of the operation. The personnel numbers are divided as military support personnel (MSP), military observers (MO) and civilian police officers (CPO).

Table 2 - UN Peacekeeping Operations for Analysis

Acronym	Mission name	Start Date	Closing Date	Personnel	Cost (mil)
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	Apr-91	Oct-03	933 (MSP), 254 (MO) = 1187 Tot	\$ 600.00
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force	Feb-92	Mar-95	37,122 (MSP), 684 (MO), 803 (CPO) = 38,599 Tot	\$ 4,616.73
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique	Dec-92	Dec-94	6576 (MSP), 1087 (CPO) = 7,663	\$ 486.70
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II	Mar-93	Mar-95	28,000 (MSP) = 28,000 Tot	\$ 1,600.00
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III	Feb-95	Jun-97	3649 (MSP), 283 (MO), 288 (CPO) = 4220 Tot	\$ 134.98
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force	Mar-95	Feb-99	1049 (MSP), 35 (MO), 26 (CPO) = 1110 Tot	\$ 147.50
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	Oct-99	Dec-05	17,368 (MSP), 87 (CPO) = 17455 Tot	\$ 2,800.00
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor	Oct-99	May-02	6281 (MSP), 118 (MO), 1288 (CPO) = 7687 Tot	\$ 476.80
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	Jul-00	Jul-08	3940 (MSP), 214 (CPO) = 4154 Tot	\$ 1,320.00
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	May-02	May-05	4776 (MSP), 771 (CPO) = 5547 Tot	\$ 565.50
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi	Jun-04	Dec-06	5400 (MSP), 168 (MO), 97 (CPO) = 5665 Tot	\$ 678.30

Regression Analysis/Models

For this analysis, standard OLS stepwise regression models will be used for each of the peacekeeping operations included in the case selection section. The unit of analysis will be the state. An overall regression model will be used to measure contributions from member states for the entire time period from 1991-2007. This will contribute an aggregate analysis from the selected time period. For each individual peacekeeping operation, two regression models will be developed. This will produce 22 additional regression outputs, totaling 23 total regressions for the entire analysis. The two regression models for each peacekeeping operation will differ only in the number of states that are included for each peacekeeping operation. For both models the dependent variable will be the same. The first model will include only the states that contributed to the peacekeeping operation through the peacekeeping operations entirety. The second model will include every UN member state that was fully recognized as a member state at the inception of the peacekeeping operation, even if the state did not contribute to the peacekeeping operation. The two models will test the variations between contributing states for each peacekeeping operation while also testing the variance between all member states of the UN. Each of the regression models will be designated a and b, for each peacekeeping operation, and will be labeled by the abbreviated name of the operation and the corresponding letter (ONUBa, ONUBb).¹¹²

¹¹² For each of the regression models, a number of states have been removed due to absence of reliable data. These states are listed in Appendix A, for each peacekeeping operation.

The dependent variable that will be included for analysis is a calculation that measures a percentage of a state's troop contributions as a portion of the total military personnel a state maintains at the inception of each peacekeeping operation. This dependent variable will measure the overall military personnel a state contributes as a portion of their overall military capacity concerning troops. This will allow for a deeper understanding and provide results that measure state's capacity versus a raw number. In the overall model the number will be calculated by dividing the total of all personnel contributed from 1991-2007 by the total troop capacity for each state during the same time period. For the additional peacekeeping operations the dependent variable will be the total number of personnel contributed for the duration of the peacekeeping operation divided by the total personnel a state maintains during the year of the peacekeeping operations creation. The value for this number in the overall model and individual peacekeeping operations model can range from 0 to .99 (0 or 99%). The creation of a percentage, or index value, provides a much more thorough understanding of a state's capacity and commitment to peacekeeping operations. With approximately 165 to 190 state contributions being measured, the total number of troops contributed over time and in each peacekeeping operation provides an appropriate value to examine through the regression analysis. Yet recognizing the state's capacity and how much the state is providing as a percentage of their total capacity is appropriate for this analysis. This provides a more fitting description than other options which could include a raw number. A raw number does not give context

with respect to how much a state is willing to contribute as a percent of their total military personnel. If state A provides more troops than state B, but state A's contribution is a lower percentage of their overall military troop capacity versus state B, then a raw number is misleading in this analysis. A dependent variable based on this percentage provides a deeper value for comparative purposes.

There will be a total of 9 independent variables included in the overall regression model for each peacekeeping operation. The variables first will be tested for correlation and entered stepwise into the regression to test for validity and variance. Variables will be removed from the equation if high levels of correlation are discovered through the regression models. The first independent variable for inclusion will be a regional variable that delineates the location of the peacekeeping operations with respect to the host state or state where the peacekeeping operation takes place. Regional stability is a primary concern for states and their allies and participating in peacekeeping operations where the spillover effect of civil and intrastate wars is possible can represent a self interested concern of intervention if doing so diminishes threats to your security. These are available through the COW (Correlates of War) direct contiguity database and are categorical data that is divided into five categories. This variable will be abbreviated as CONTIGUITY.

The second variable for analysis will be the GDP/capita of each state during the onset of the peacekeeping operation. The measure of the economy of states can provide significant results to determine whether states choose to send troops to peacekeeping operations and if the economic situation of states provides any

indication of economic differences of contributors. These data will be obtained from the Earthtrends database. This variable will be named GDP.

The third independent variable that will be included is the amount of bi-lateral trade between member states and the host state of the peacekeeping operation takes place the year prior to the approval of the mandate for the peacekeeping operation. The measure of bi-lateral trade can offer explanations of economic ties which can potentially explain peacekeeping support for the state experiencing the conflict if UN member states have an economic interest or previous historical economic relationships with the state in need. The date for this variable will be taken from the COW bi-lateral trade database. This variable will be designated as TRADE.

The fourth variable of interest is the length of time that a UN member state has been a recognized member of the UN at the time of the mandated peacekeeping operation. Do states contribute more readily as they become more integrated into the UN system? If contributing states commit at a greater incidence and give more personnel and financial support as their length of service increases, then states may be experiencing learning or sharing of norms and ideas by interacting in the system. The length of membership at the onset of a peacekeeping operation will be taken from the UN website and historical research databases. This variable will be abbreviated as UNMEMBERSHIP.

The number of international memberships maintained at the onset of the peacekeeping operation by a contributing state is the fifth independent variable of

interest. If a contributing state maintains a greater number of international memberships in comparison to other states then commitment to international order and the idea of international associations and organization may offer explanations to concerns of international security and conflict as well. States that are more integrated may be more supportive of international security concerns than ones that are less integrated. The data for this variable will be obtained through the Earthtrends database. This variable will be abbreviated as INTMEMBERSHIPS.

The sixth and seventh independent variables of interest will measure the regime type and the recognition of basic human rights of the peoples of the contributing member state and the host state. If some variations are discovered for contributions that reflect a particular type of government, whether, democratic or authoritarian, and the incidence of participation increases for that type, then state motivations may reflect a need to “spread” their governmental model to states that are experiencing these conflicts (which typically have diminished government institutions or are being challenged). This may also reflect a desire to respect and promote human rights abroad. The data for this variable will be collected from the Freedom House database and the CIRI Human Rights Project. The Freedom House measure ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 representing free and 7 representing not free for each state. The CIRI Human Rights Project ranks each state from 0, no respect of their aggregate human rights indicator, to 14, a premiere respect for the human rights of a state’s citizens. These variables will be abbreviated as FREEDOM and HUMANRIGHTS respectively.

The eighth variable for analysis is the military expenditures as a percent of GDP for each UN member state. This variable will help to determine if contributing states that spend more or less on military expenditures as a percent of their total GDP contribute at a greater incidence or lower incidence. These data will also be obtained through the databases provided by Earthtrends. This variable will be abbreviated as MILITARYGDP.

The national material capabilities of member states will be the ninth and final independent variable of interest. This variable, provided by the Correlates of War database, is an aggregate measure that combines military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population and total population in one measurable term. This variable will assist in developing an understanding of the types of states that contribute to operations – only states of particularly strong military capabilities, limited capabilities or a wide range of both. This variable will be abbreviated as TOTALMILITARY.

Using one case, UNAMIC, I will provide one example of the regression analysis which will be repeated for each analysis. UNAMIC was mandated in 1991 by Security Council resolution 717. At the time of the UN mandate there were 164 states that the UN recognized as member states and 24 states that contributed personnel to the peacekeeping operation. The first regression model will include the 24 states that contributed personnel to the peacekeeping operation. The second regression model will include all 164 UN member states. The dependent variable for both regressions will then include the percentage of personnel contributions

each state contributed divided by their current levels of military personnel to the total peacekeeping operation. There were a total number of 1090 military personnel deployed for this operation from 24 states. The data for each of the independent variables will then be developed and mined for the year 1991 to include in the analysis of the peacekeeping operation and if variance in contributions can be explained by the independent variables. This will produce two regression models, one for contributing states, and one for all member states.

Table 3 – Independent Variables

Variable Abbreviation	Variable	Theoretical Approach	Source
CONTIGUITY	Regional Variables State location, Relations to Host State	Realism	Correlates of War Direct Contiguity Database
GDP TRADE	Economic Variables GDP Bi-Lateral Trade	Realism, Constructivism Liberalism	Correlates of War Bi-Lateral Trade Database, Earthtrends
UNMEMBERSHIP INTMEMBERSHIP	Level of International Integration Length of membership in United Nations Number of memberships in international orgs	Constructivism Liberalism	United Nations Website, Database, Correlates of War Intergovernmental Organizations Database, Earthtrends
FREEDOM HUMANRIGHTS	Regime Type Type of governmental structure Political Rights	Liberalism Liberalism	Freedom House, CIRI Human Rights Project
MILITARYGDP TOTALMILITARY	Troop/Military Indicators National Material Capabilities Military Expenditures as a Percent of GDP	Realism, Constructivism Realism, Constructivism	Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Database, Earthtrends

Table and Graphical Analysis

Basic tables and graphical analysis can also offer a significant understanding of the variables of interest and potential explanations related to the developed hypotheses and will add further layers of description in addition to the regression models findings and results. Tables and graphs will examine the incidence of participation and total contributions during 1991-2007 and for each year of the same time period for individual states. This will include personnel contributions and the level of frequency of participation for each state delineated by the independent variables.

The first table included will look at the frequency of state participation in the total number of peacekeeping operations for the UN during the 1991-2007 time period. During this time period the total number of operations for analysis is 19. The total number of operations that a state participated in will be aggregated from the 19 peacekeeping operations. The total number of peacekeeping operations that a state participated in will be divided by the overall total number of 19 to create a percentage value to measure the incidence of participations. Each state that reported an incidence value over 50% of total participation will be measured to provide averages for independent variable analysis. Measures for states that were below the 50% threshold will also be examined for independent variable comparisons. Selecting the over/under 50% threshold is intended to represent a dichotomy of states that contributed to over half of the peacekeeping operations versus those that did not. It is important to note that certain states in the over 50% frequency group may only differ in one case versus certain states in the under 50% frequency group,

it is common practice to delineate groupings for frequency studies at the over/under 50% dichotomy.

The total number of troops that a state has committed during 1991-2007 will also be included in table and graph format to examine total contributions over time. The total number of troops contributed over time will serve as a dichotomy to measure the independent variable values of states that contributed over 6,500 troops during this time period and for states that contributed fewer than 6,500 for the same time period. A mean was calculated for all member states that were current members of the UN during this the 1991-2007 time period and the value calculated was slightly over 6,500. Each of these two categories and the independent variable values will also be examined for comparative purposes.

The number of troops contributed on a yearly basis will also be included on a state by state basis. This will be a graphical analysis that will represent individual state contributions over the 1991-2007 time period. Comparisons of contributions by each individual state versus other states and the overall troop levels contributed to all UN peacekeeping operations will provide analysis of contribution patterns from each state. This will allow the research to measure contributions over time for each state to note any significant change in giving patterns.

The final two tables will measure the incidence and total troop contributions data in their respective categories (over/under 50% and over/under 6,500 troops) to measure the difference of the independent variables over the average of states in each category. The average values for each independent variable in the incidence

and total troop allocations data allows a percent difference to be calculated between the states with higher incidence and troop contributions and the states with lower incidence and troop contributions. This analysis will measure if there are any significant differences between states that contribute at a higher incidence than those that do not and if significant differences exist between those states that contribute more personnel than those with lower contributions.

Results Expectations and Testing Approaches

The potential findings and acceptance or rejection of proposed hypotheses for this research have theoretical and policy implications. Theoretically, recognizing why states participate in peacekeeping operations could potentially offer new insights on security concerns and international cooperation. As security concerns have moved away from World War to topics like genocide, human rights, nuclear proliferation and resource wars/conflicts, state perceptions and interest's may also have changed. The potential for more international cooperation and fewer adherences to strict self interested motives could arise. Interaction in the system over time could also reflect changes in state behavior that is reflective off "learned behavior" in the international system. It is the hope of the author that the graphical and regression analysis can provide further understanding of state participation in peacekeeping operations and some answers as to why states do participate can be explained further. The previous hypotheses offered for examination are the following:

REALISM – UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations would maintain a geographic interest in the peacekeeping operation, states would sustain a stronger commitment to military expenditures and capabilities, and states would possess larger economies that would enable more consistent and greater contributions.

LIBERALISM - UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations will maintain a larger number of international associations, have similar government systems (primarily democracies) and possess larger amounts of bi-lateral trade between the host state and contributors.

CONSTRUCTIVISM - UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations will have longer tenured membership in the United Nations, would maintain smaller economic and military capabilities and would experience significant change over time of their individual peacekeeping commitments.

Each independent variable in the regression model relates to one or more of the proposed hypotheses and will be accepted or rejected based on the results and data. The included tables will also examine each independent variable for additional analysis.

The implications for accepting or rejecting each hypothesis could help develop our understanding of theoretical motivations for states in UN peacekeeping

operations. The regression models, graphs and tables should help to develop our understanding of these motivations.

The regression models could have significant influence on the hypotheses developed from the three theoretical paradigms and an overall understanding of states characteristics that contribute to peacekeeping operations and their motivations. Expected direction of each independent variable and significance will allow the research to reject or confirm previous hypotheses. Overall, if the regression models are underspecified then it may support the notion that peacekeeping operations are extremely contextual in nature and are difficult to examine as a wide selection of cases. The potential milieu that exists for each operation may be significantly unique and operations may not be able to be quantified to understand the foundational motivations for peacekeeping operations.

The individual variables from the regression model could inform the understanding of state motivations significantly. The chief variables of interest for the hypothesis realism are TOTALMILITARY, MILITARYGDP, GDP and CONTIGUITY. For realism, if TOTALMILITARY shows a positive relationship and significance then it can be confirmed that states with stronger material capabilities are contributing more troops. Likewise, a positive relationship and significance for the independent variable MILITARYGDP would confirm states that spend a greater percentage of their GDP on their militaries contribute troops in greater number and incidence. Both of these premises center on the tenant of realism of power and security. GDP is expected to maintain a positive relationship

as stronger economies have more power and resources to participate in peacekeeping if so desired. Independent variable CONTIGUITY relates to geographic concerns and threats to their individual security. For states further away, a negative relationship would be expected as threats are diminished for the participating state.

For the liberal hypothesis the independent variables INTMEMBERSHIPS, FREEDOM, HUMANRIGHTS and TRADE are of chief interest. INTMEMBERSHIPS is the number of international organizations of which a state is a member. This relationship should be positive as the more organizational memberships, the more committed to liberal ideals. FREEDOM and HUMANRIGHTS represent regime types. For FREEDOM, the relationship should be negative as a smaller number represents more democratic societies. HUMANRIGHTS is expected to show a positive relationship as the value for this variable increases for more democratic societies. Liberal approaches posit that like-minded democratic societies would be more likely to contribute. TRADE measures bi-lateral trade, an economic relationship that represents the connectedness of the host peacekeeping state and the contributing state. This relationship is expected to be positive as more trade represents greater economic ties, a premise of liberal thought. Significance for this variable could suggest that states are contributing to peacekeeping operations in the interest of economic relationships.

Constructivism will be tested through the independent variables UNMEMBERSHIP, GDP, MILITARYGDP and TOTALMILITARY.

UNMEMBERSHIP is expected to represent a positive relationship; the longer a state has been a member of the United Nations, the higher the frequency and number of contributions. Learned behavior through association would confirm identity development. A negative relationship with GDP would confirm that states that were less developed economically could be using peacekeeping as an economic option to increase viability locally and globally. Under the authority of the U.N. these states are protected and enjoy continued payment of their troops. MILITARYGDP and TOTALMILITARY would also be expected to maintain negative relationships to confirm constructivism theoretically. States less developed militarily could contribute more often and in greater number to develop, enhance and support their own military personnel and capabilities. Using peacekeeping in this manner provides support to the idea of learning through the system for personal development, particularly if it has changed over time.

Table 4 – Independent Variable Regression Expectations

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Expected Direction</i>	<i>Theoretical Assumption</i>
TOTALMILITARY	Positive or Negative	Realism Constructivism
MILITARYGDP	Positive or Negative	Realism Constructivism
INTMEMBERSHIPS	Positive	Liberalism
GDP	Positive or Negative	Realism Constructivism
FREEDOM	Negative	Liberalism
HUMANRIGHTS	Positive	Liberalism
TRADE	Positive	Liberalism
UNMEMBERSHIP	Positive	Constructivism
CONTIGUITY	Negative	Realism

In addition to the regression results, the graphical analysis can support or detract from potential theoretical assumptions and application. Each graph, frequency of contributions and total contributions is looking at state characteristics with respect to frequency of participation, total troop contributions over time and troop contributions for each year during the 1991-2007 time period. By examining the frequency and the total number of peacekeeping contributions by each state, averages can be examined of those states that participate more frequently and in greater number. If we look at states that have contributed to greater than 50% of the operations during this time period and compare those states to the states that have lower incidence levels, then a comparative analysis of each independent variable is possible that is related to the same theoretical claims as the regression models.

To compare the states that contributed more frequently and in greater number a percent difference of the averages for each independent variable will be calculated. The average value for each independent variable for states that contributed to over 50% of the peacekeeping operations will be used to calculate the percent difference of each independent variable from the states that contributed to less than 50% of the peacekeeping operations. This will be repeated for states that contributed over 6,500 troops versus those that contributed less than 6,500. The calculated percent difference will report whether there exist a significance difference between the two groups of contributing states and non contributing states. Calculating a percent difference for each group will report if there are any substantial numerical differences in the values of the independent variables for each

group. This numerical value will help to delineate any differences between the state groupings for frequency of contributions and total contributions.

For instance, if the higher incidence states report significantly greater values for GDP, then it can be possible to predict that states with significantly stronger economies are more likely to contribute to peacekeeping operations. At the very least it would be possible to describe these contributing states as maintaining stronger economies as a whole than those states with lower incidences. This can be accomplished with all of the independent variables and can provide further depth and analysis of each independent variable. In the same manner that the independent variables have an expected direction, positive or negative, the higher or lower the aggregate values of the independent variables from the graphical analysis will provide further findings that could contribute to our theoretical analysis of state peacekeeping contributions.

For each independent variable there is any expectation of value for each statistical average that is related to the theoretical approach. Theoretically, they assume the same directional value as the regression results in Table 4. With respect to states that provide troops more frequently and in greater number the reported values will be averages of those states versus those states that contribute less frequently and in smaller numbers. TOTALMILITARY and MILITARYGDP are independent variables that measure military strength and spending. To confirm a realist approach, the expectation would be that troop contributors would maintain a higher average for the independent variables TOTALMILITARY and

MILITARYGDP versus those that contribute less. To confirm the constructivist argument, the inverse would be expected. GDP is also related to realist explanations, with contributing states expected to report higher averages with respect to their GDP versus those states that contribute troops less frequently and in smaller numbers. Again, the inverse is expected to confirm constructivist descriptions.

The expectation of FREEDOM and HUMANRIGHTS will report different directional values from each other due to the nature of their measurements but represent the same liberal assumption. To support the liberal framework, FREEDOM will report lower averages for contributors and HUMANRIGHTS will report higher averages for contributors versus those states that are non-contributors. INMEMBERSHIPS would be expected to report a higher average for contributing states versus the less frequent contributing states to confirm liberal explanations. The independent variable UNMEMBERSHIPS is expected to report higher averages for troop contributing states than for those states that do not to confirm constructivist descriptions. Table 5 reports the expected results for each independent variable and the assumed statistical average to confirm or reject the theoretical approaches and their descriptions.¹¹³

¹¹³ CONTIGUITY and TRADE will not be included in statistical average expectation analysis due to the characteristics of their data. CONTIGUITY can only be calculated from two points in each individual case and TRADE can only be measured between two states during one time period.

Table 5 – Independent Variable Statistical Average Expectations

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Expected Statistical Values</i>	<i>Theoretical Assumption</i>
TOTALMILITARY	Higher or Lower Average	Realism Constructivism
MILITARYGDP	Higher or Lower Average	Realism Constructivism
INTMEMBERSHIPS	Higher Average	Liberalism
GDP	Higher or Lower Average	Realism Constructivism
FREEDOM	Lower Average	Liberalism
HUMANRIGHTS	Higher Average	Liberalism
UNMEMBERSHIP	Higher Average	Constructivism

Individual state contributions can also provide analysis of behavior over time for state contributions. Do patterns emerge for multiple states? If we can compare overall troop levels in peacekeeping operations to individual state contribution levels, do particular states follow those patterns? Particular states may be responsible for the overall patterns of peacekeeping contributions and total numbers contributed to the UN. Individual state analysis will allow snapshots of contributions over the 1991-2007 time period and enable the analysis to focus on contributions at the individual state level. This will contribute to the understanding of the theoretical assumption that interaction over time can change contributions patterns and state's interests.

The overall scope of the provided analysis could provide significant depth of current practical understanding of the theoretical motives of states with respect to international peacekeeping. It is plainly obvious the international environment has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. The examination of how

individual states support international peacekeeping efforts offers perhaps a more thorough understanding of how security related goals of states in the international system are developed and when, or if, cooperation is inherent, self-interested or learned. While this analysis is no way can offer a complete assumptive analysis of state security goals in the international system, it can offer a more nuanced knowledge of the theoretical approaches of international relations, and if states adhere to the traditional realist paradigms, or more dynamic explanations are more appropriate.

Chapter 3 - Regression Models, Tables and Graphical Results

The results of each regression model and the independent variables that reported significant values are included in Table 6 in this chapter. Table 6 provides the adjusted r square values, the independent variables that were included in each stepwise model, the unstandardized coefficient for each independent variable included, if the expected direction for each independent variable coincides with the predicted direction, the t values for the included independent variables and the significance value for each independent variable. Appendix B includes the descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) and correlation tables for each regression model. Appendix B also includes the unstandardized coefficients, t values, significance values for all of the excluded variables in the regression models that reported findings.

Before reporting the results from the regression models it is important to note that the independent variable HUMANRIGHTS was correlated with FREEDOM at a range of -.766 to -.868 in each Pearson correlation matrix. In each case HUMANRIGHTS was removed from the equation to measure the interactive effects it potentially possessed with the FREEDOM variable. In each case the adjusted R² value remained constant or increased due to the removal of HUMANRIGHTS. FREEDOM was then removed from the regression models while HUMANRIGHTS remained and the adjusted R² value remained constant or decreased. Through this analysis, it was determined that HUMANRIGHTS should be removed from the regression models and the FREEDOM variable would remain.

This was the only independent variable that reported significant correlation values.

Several of the regression models exclude all of the independent variables, including the overall model. The overall model reported included 0 of the independent variables in the regression analysis. The following peacekeeping regression models reported 0 independent variables as significant as well: ONUMOZ(a), ONUMOZ(b), UNMISSET(a), UNMISSET(b), UNOSOM II(a), UNOSOM II(b), UNTAET(a), UNTAET(b), ONUB(a), ONUB(b). Two models reported significant variable results in the total contribution models(b), but not in the state participation models. These peacekeeping models were UNIKOM(b) and UNPROFOR(b). Four of the models reported significant variable results in both the state participation and total contribution models. These peacekeeping models were UNAVEM III(a), UNAVEM III(b), UNMEE(a), UNMEE(b), UNAMSIL(a), UNAMSIL(b) UNPREDEP(a) and UNPREDEP(b). Of the nine independent variables, three were not reported significant in any of the regression models.¹¹⁴ GDP, TOTALMILITARY and UNMEMBERSHIP were not included in the overall, state participation or total contributions models.

¹¹⁴The inclusion of HUMANRIGHTS would have increased this number to four but was removed due to high correlation.

Table 6 – Stepwise Regression Model Results

<i>Model Name</i>	<i>Independent Variable(s)</i>	<i>Expected Direction</i>	<i>Adj. R²</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>sig</i>
OVERALL	None	-	-	-	-	-
ONUMOZ(a)	None	-	-	-	-	-
ONUMOZ(b)	None	-	-	-	-	-
UNAVEM III(a)	CONTIGUITY	Yes	.952	-.004	-23.563	.000
	MILITARYGDP	Yes		.001	6.532	.000
	FREEDOM	Yes		-.001	-5.026	.000
UNAVEM III(b)	CONTIGUITY	Yes	.742	.003	-18.802	.000
	MILITARYGDP	Yes		.000	-4.245	.000
	FREEDOM	Yes		.000	3.412	.000
UNIKOM(a)	None	-	-	-	-	-
UNIKOM(b)	CONTIGUITY	Yes	.032	-.002	-2.114	.037
UNMEE(a)	CONTIGUITY	Yes	.711	-.003	-10.087	.000
UNMEE(b)	CONTIGUITY	Yes	.212	-.001	-6.021	.000
UNMISSET(a)	None	-	-	-	-	-
UNMISSET(b)	None	-	-	-	-	-
UNAMSIL(a)	CONTIGUITY	Yes	.158	-.009	-2.747	.010
UNAMSIL(b)	CONTIGUITY	Yes	.127	-.007	-4.460	.000
UNOSOM II(a)	None	-	-	-	-	-
UNOSOM II(b)	None	-	-	-	-	-
UNPREDEP(a)	CONTIGUITY	Yes	.266	-.002	-2.937	.008
UNPREDEP(b)	INTMEMBERSHIPS	Yes	.075	1.9E-7	3.274	.001
UNPROFOR(a)	None	-	-	-	-	-
UNPROFOR(b)	INTMEMBERSHIPS	Yes	.191	4.2E-6	4.363	.000
	TRADE	No		-2.9E-6	-2.965	.004
UNTAET(a)	None	-	-	-	-	-
UNTAET(b)	None	-	-	-	-	-
ONUB(a)	None	-	-	-	-	-
ONUB(b)	None	-	-	-	-	-

Table 6 presents the stepwise regression model results for the overall model (1991-2007), state participation and total contribution peacekeeping operations. The model fit (adjusted R²) for the regression models reports a significant range. The lowest reported adjusted R² value is UNIKOM(b) at .032 and the highest reported adjusted R² values is UNACEM III(a) at .952. While there is no accepted baseline for adjusted R² values in social science pursuits, the results from these models represent a large range of results, but inconsistent. Significant findings and non-findings in one or more model could assist in determining differences that exist within each peacekeeping operation that could affect the descriptive and theoretical applications presented in this analysis. Explanations for the lower model fits and non-findings could be attributed to a small number of independent variables included for analysis. Recognizing that a large number of interactive terms and variables may be at play internationally, inclusion of 9 independent variables may not represent a deep enough examination of potential interactive variables. Yet this was the goal of the design - to minimize variable inclusion to examine some of the principled pieces of traditional theoretical claims in international relations approaches with respect to peacekeeping. This wide range of values does create inconsistent results in the models overall fit across all of the peacekeeping operations, but still allows the individual independent variables to be examined for significance.

In all of the regression models that report significance, the adjusted R² values decrease in the total contribution models(b) versus the contributing states

models(a). This decrease is expected as a greater number of states are included in the analysis of the overall models. As the number of cases in the dependent variables expands, yet the independent variables stay constant, the values are expected to decrease. This is typical of regression analysis. As more cases are entered into each peacekeeping operation, the potential for the same number of independent variables to explore the variance decreases.

The positive and/or negative directions of all but one of the independent variables reported in each model were in the anticipated direction. In the regression model UNPROFOR(b), TRADE is the only instance where a negative coefficient is reported when the predicted direction is positive.

Overall Model Results

The overall model measures the total number of troop contributions divided by the total military personnel contributed by each state for all of the peacekeeping operations included during the 1991-2007 time period. This model reports no significant findings for any of the independent variables. There can be no verifiable theoretical claims developed from the overall model in this analysis concerning the time period from 1991-2007 through the regression analysis.

State Participation Model Results (a)

The state participation models, a, measure only the states that contributed to the peacekeeping operations. This analysis allows for the distinction of states that

contribute, but at different levels in each peacekeeping operation. Examining the results from the regression models from the contributions model produces a wide range of results and independent variable significance. There are 11 total regression models for this analysis, with 7 models reporting no significant findings; ONUMOZ, UNIKOM, UNMISSET, UNOSOM II, UNPROFOR, UNTAET and ONUB. The adjusted R² values range from .158 (UNAMSIL) to .952 (UNAVEM III). The fit for these models is higher than the overall results for the 1991-2007 time period and the total contribution models (b). The state participation results for UNAVEM III reports a high adjusted R² in comparison to other state participation model.

The independent variable CONTIGUITY is significant in four of the eleven models (36%). FREEDOM and MILITARYGDP are each significant in one of the eleven models (9%). No other independent variables report any level of significance in any of the state participation models. Only one regression model, UNAVEM III, reports more than one independent variable as significant. The remaining three models, UNMEE, UNPREDEP and UNAMSIL only report one variable as significant. All of the state participation models report findings that are in the assumed direction for each variable from the theoretical approaches analysis.

Total Contribution Model Results (b)

The total contributions stepwise regression models (b), analyze every member state and their contribution levels, included those states that contributed

zero troops during the peacekeeping operation. This allows for the independent variables to contribute to a deeper understanding of motivations for all states, contributors or not. The results for the 11 stepwise regression models report a wide range of values, resembling the results from the state participation models (a). As mentioned previously the adjusted R^2 values are lower in these models than the state participation models(a). The reported adjusted R^2 values for the total contributions models (b) range from .032 (UNIKOM) to .742 (UNAVEM III). Comparing these values to the state contributions models (a), .158 to .952, the total contributions models are considerably underspecified. Six of the regression models report significant findings for the independent variables in the total contribution models.


The independent variable CONGUITTY is significant in four of the eleven models (36%). INTMEMBERSHIPS is significant in two of the eleven models (18%) while FREEDOM, MILITARYGDP, and TRADE are significant in one of the eleven models (9%). UNAVEM III reported the highest adjusted R^2 value at .742. UNAVEM III and UNPROFOR are the only models that report more than one independent variable as significant in the model. UNAVEM III reports CONTIGUITY, MILITARYGDP and FREEDOM as significant and UNPROFOR reports INTMEMBERSHIPS and TRADE. The remaining All of the independent variables are in the assumed direction except TRADE. TRADE reports a negative coefficient value and the predicted relationship was positive.

Table and Graphical Analysis

Examining the frequency of contributions and the total number of troops during the 1991-2007 time period provides an opportunity to survey the states that provide peacekeeping troops and measure commonalities and/or differences exist between states with higher incidences and more contributions versus states with lower incidences and fewer contributions.

Graph 1 includes the frequency of state participation with respect to the 19 peacekeeping operations from 1991-2007. The frequencies of contributions provide an excellent starting point to examine how often a state provides troops to a peacekeeping operation and will assist in creating a dichotomy of states that contribute to more than 50% of the peacekeeping operations during this time period versus states under the 50% value.

Graph 1 – Frequency of State Participation: 1991-2007



Graph 1 displays a visual representation of the incidence level of participation for individual states. Table 7 provides the number of operations of the 19 that each state contributed troops and the resulting percentages. The states included are those states that contributed troops at higher incidence than 50%. This dichotomy is valuable as it distinguished the states that contribute more frequently versus those states less frequently. While there are some minor differences in the frequency patterns of contributing states close to the 50% value, in some cases only one case difference, the line is drawn to represent states who contributed in more than half of the peacekeeping operations, versus those states that contributed in less than half.

Table 7 – Incidence of Peacekeeping Participation – State Values

	Number of Contributions	Percentage of Participation
Pakistan	18	94.74
Bangladesh	17	89.47
Canada	15	78.95
Egypt	14	73.68
Ghana	14	73.68
Jordan	14	73.68
Nigeria	14	73.68
Russian Federation	14	73.68
United States	13	68.42
India	12	63.16
Kenya	12	63.16
Malaysia	12	63.16
Nepal	12	63.16
Argentina	11	57.89
Austria	11	57.89
Ireland	11	57.89
New Zealand	11	57.89
Sweden	11	57.89
Uruguay	11	57.89
Australia	10	52.63
Indonesia	10	52.63
Netherlands	10	52.63
Norway	10	52.63
Senegal	10	52.63

Of the entire UN membership, only 24 states contributed troops to more than half of the peacekeeping operations. There are several important items of note upon initial examination. Only two of the permanent five members of the Security Council contributed more than 50% of the time, the United States at 68.42% percent and the Russian Federation at 73.68%. There is representation from every major continent. Pakistan contributed to 18 of the 19 peacekeeping operations with

a value of 94.74% with Bangladesh as the second most frequent contributor, participating in 17 of the 19 peacekeeping operations for a value of 89.47%.

These examinations serves as a starting point to produce a more informative dichotomous picture of states that are contributing troops more frequently versus those states with lower incidence rates with respect to the independent variables of interest. To compare the two groups, percent differences can be calculated for each independent variable for the states that contributed over 50% versus those states under 50%.


Table 8 - Frequency of Peacekeeping Operations Percent Difference of Independent Variables

	FREEDOM	GDP	INTMEMBERSHIPS	MILITARYGDP	HUMANRIGHTS	TOTALMILITARY	UNMEMBERSHIP
Incidence Greater than 50%	2.817	532750.1	2371.91	2.096	9.413	.01517	54.79
Incidence Lower than 50%	3.375	167170.4	1423.99	2.154	9.377	.00572	45.23
Percent Difference	18.0%	104.5%	49.9%	-2.7%	0.3%	90.5%	19.1%

Table 8 shows significant differences between the states based on their incidence of participation, particularly for three independent variables: GDP, INTMEMBERSHIPS and TOTALMILITARY. States that contribute to over 50% of the peacekeeping operations represented a percent difference of over 104% for GDP to those states that contributed to fewer than 50% of the peacekeeping operations. This represents a significant difference in GDP of those states that are giving troops more frequently than those that are less frequent in their contributions.

Military capabilities, TOTALMILITARY, reports over 90% difference for states that contribute above the 50% threshold. TOTALMILITARY measures the total material capabilities of a state. States with larger material capabilities contribute more frequently than those with smaller material capabilities. INTMEMBERSHIPS reports approximately a 50% difference for states that maintain more international organizational memberships. States with higher incidences of participation maintain a greater number of international memberships, almost 50% more than those under the 50% incidence of participation levels. UNMEMBERSHIP reports a 19% difference while FREEDOM reports an 18% difference. HUMANRIGHTS reports the lowest positive difference at .3% and MILITARYGDP reports a -2.7% difference.

Graph 2 – Overall Troop Contributions by Member State: 1991-2007



Graph 2 displays a visual representation of the total troop contribution for individual states. Table 9 provides the total number of troop contributions that each state contributed and the corresponding. The states included are those states that contributed troops above 6,500 for the 1991-2007 included peacekeeping operations. The dichotomy of states that contributed over and under 6,500 troops was the mean of the contributions for all states. The total number of troops contributed during this time and the resulting mean provided the appropriate value to create dichotomous groups that represent states that contributed more troops during this time period, versus states that contributed fewer troops during this time period.

Table 9 – Total Contributions to Peacekeeping Participation – 1991-2007

Country	Total Contributions
Pakistan	84508
Bangladesh	72592
India	54849
France	35758
Jordan	35010
Ghana	31339
Nepal	29655
Nigeria	27390
United Kingdom	27244
Uruguay	19417
Poland	18797
Kenya	17201
Canada	16906
United States of America	16129
Argentina	13889
Ethiopia	13642
Ukraine	11825
Austria	11564
Ireland	10661
Italy	10602
Russia	10531
Norway	10284
Senegal	10282
Finland	10079
Malaysia	10048
Morocco	9996
Zambia	9409
Egypt	9359
Spain	9182
Netherlands	9041
Fiji	8832
South Africa	8411
Brazil	8055
Sweden	7905
Denmark	7161
China	7148
Germany	6978
Belgium	6669

39 states contributed more than 6,500 troops during this time period. The list of states that contributed more troops is closely related to the states that contributed over 50%. 20 states contributed to more than 50% of the possible peacekeeping operations and more than 6,500 troops during the 1991-2007 time period. Yet there are a few key differences from the incidence group compared to the total contributions list. Of the 24 states that contributed to over 50% of the peacekeeping only four states did not contribute over 6,500 troops during this time period: New Zealand, Sweden, Australia and Indonesia. This result is to be expected as the more frequently a state contributed troops the more likely the number of troop contributions would rise. All permanent members of the Security Council contributed more than 6,500 troops; The United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, The United States of America, France and China Pakistan, Bangladesh and India all contributed over 50,000 troops while Poland, Ukraine, Italy, Ethiopia and Finland all contributed over 6,500 troops but contributed in less than 50% of the operations examined. The dichotomy based on the total number of contributions will look at those states that have contributed over 6,500 troops during the 1991-2007 time period versus those states that have contributed under the 6,500 troop threshold. Each independent variable will again be included to measure the percent differences between the states above/under the 6,500 dichotomy.

**Table 10 - Total Troop Contribution 1991-2007
Percent Difference of Independent Variables**


	FREEDOM	GDP	INTMEMBERSHIP	MILITARYGDP	HUMANRIGHTS	TOTALMILITARY	UNMEMBERSHIP
Total Contribution over 6,500	2.802	549574.7	2737.18	2.163	9.760	.01776	54.24
Total Contribution under 6,500	3.412	89846.7	1053.22	2.187	9.032	.00271	42.86
Percent Difference	19.6%	143%	88.9%	1.1%	7.7%	147%	23.4%

Table 10 shows significant percent differences with three of the independent variables. The three independent variables, GDP, INTMEMBERSHIPS and TOTALMILITARY are the identical independent variables that reported significant differences in the level of incidence analysis. States that contributed over 6,500 troops during this time period had a percent difference of over 143% with respect to GDP. This represents a significant difference in the GDP of states that gave more troops during this time period. Military capabilities or TOTALMILITARY, represents a 147% difference for states that contributed more than 6,500 troops compared to those below this mark. The percent difference for states on the higher end of contributions concerning the international organizations variable, INTMEMBERSHIP, shows a 89% difference in favor of higher contributing countries. FREEDOM reports a 20% difference while UNMEMBERSHIP reports a 23% difference. HUMANRIGHTS and MILITARYGDP report the lowest percent difference values at 7.7% and 1.% respectively.

UN and State Troop Contributions Over Time

The incidence of participation and the total number of contributions over time to peacekeeping operations allows for an important and valuable examination that provides distinct analysis of those states that contribute more often and in greater number to peacekeeping operations. Related to this analysis is the change over time that a state may experience with respect to the total number of troops that are being contributed on a yearly basis. Change over time allows for further depth and understanding of individual state contributions and understanding if particular trends emerge. Graphing each state and their contribution levels in comparison to the total number of troops active in peacekeeping operations and in comparison to other states will help inform a more thorough understanding to peacekeeping contributions over time.

Graph 3 – Total Uniformed Personnel in UN Peacekeeping 1991-2006¹¹⁵




The uniformed personnel in peacekeeping table provides the total number of troops that were serving in UN peacekeeping operations from 1991-2006. The variations in troop contributions are apparent with significant growth in contributions from 1991 to 1995. From this point forward peacekeeping personnel experienced a significant drop off until 2000. From 2000 to 2006 peacekeeping personnel maintained slow and steady growth, with a dip in 2004, to reach the largest number of active peacekeepers since the inception of peacekeeping operations.


¹¹⁵ This graph is reproduced from the United Nations website at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/chart.pdf

As overall peacekeeping contributions have experienced significant variations in total number, it is important to examine individual states that have contributed troops during this time, as troop contributions are the primary driving force behind the variations. Military observers and police personnel had remained constant during the same time period. The following tables display individual state contributions from the same time period with respect to troop contributions. Graphs 4 through 8 represent the permanent 5 members of the security council, France, Russia, The United Kingdom, The United States and China. The next 26 graphs examine those states with contributions over 6,500 from 1991-2007 in descending order of total contributions.


Graph 4 – Total French Contributions



Graph 5 – Total British Contributions




Graph 6 – Total United States Contributions




Graph 7 – Total Russian -Contributions




Graph 8 – Total Chinese Contributions




Graph 9 – Total Pakistani Contributions




Graph 10 – Total Bangladeshi Contributions




Graph 11 – Total Indian Contributions




Graph 12 – Total Jordanian Contributions




Graph 13 – Total Ghanaian Contributions




Graph 14 – Total Nepalese Contributions



Graph 15 – Total Nigerian Contributions




Graph 16 – Total Uruguayan Contributions




Graph 17 – Total Polish Contributions




Graph 18 – Total Kenyan Contributions




Graph 19 – Total Canadian Contributions



Graph 20 – Total Ethiopian Contributions




Graph 21 – Total Argentinian Contributions




Graph 22 – Total Ukranian Contributions




Graph 23 – Total Austrian Contributions




Graph 24 – Total Irish Contributions




Graph 25 – Total Italian Contributions



Graph 26 – Total Norwegian Contributions




Graph 27 – Total Senegalese Contributions



Graph 28 – Total Finnish Contributions



Graph 29 – Total Malaysian Contributions



The contribution graphs of the permanent members of the Security Council offer important initial insights when comparing each to the total number of contributions during the same time period. From 1991-1996, the trends of 4 of the 5 permanent members, France, Great Britain, The United States and Russia show an increase of contributions in the early 90's with a significant reduction after 1996 moving forward. Each of these four Security Council members contributes early in the time period, but decrease contributions significantly after 1996. Only France reports a significant increased after the 1996 year. China is the only permanent member whose contribution levels gradually increase, eventually achieving the highest level of contributions in its history in 2007. Yet their total contribution total and frequency are below the levels of the other 4 Security Council members. The contribution trends are clear; four of the permanent five members, once

significant contributors to peacekeeping operations, diminish their contribution levels significantly, with other states emerging as the key contributors as the number raises beginning in 2000.

An examination of the other states contributing more than 6,500 troops also provides valuable analysis. Several other states display similar trends as the four Security Council members. Malaysia, Norway, Austria, Canada, Poland, Finland, Argentina and Italy all maintain their highest level of contributions during the 1991-1996 time period, never returning to those levels during the next decade. Only Italy displays a significant contribution change over the 1997-2007 time period, with an increase during 2006 and 2007.

Senegal's contributions match closest to China's contribution level of a gradual increase over the time period. The remaining states have contribution levels that represent trends from the overall contributions levels from 1991-2007. While Ukraine, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya and Uruguay present contributions level that are related to the levels over the 1991-2007 time period, Nepal, Ghana, Jordan, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India represent contributions level that look to be the backbone of the overall contribution levels, driving the peaks of the overall graph. This is particularly accurate when looking at the contributions levels of Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. These three states have the most consistent contribution patterns with respect to the number of troops being contributed to peacekeeping operations. The pattern of individual years from these states also matches very closely to the overall yearly pattern for the overall contribution model.

The regression analysis, table and graphical results reported in this chapter will be used to confirm or reject the theoretical approaches and their assumptions. The different methods used in a collaborative manner can provide a layered examination of each hypothetical claim and will enable the research to arrive at the most appropriate and viable conclusions. Each method provides distinct results and using multiple methodological approaches helps to ensure that results from the analysis are not over or under stated.

Chapter 4 – Theoretical Approaches and Implications

The results from the regression models, tables and graphical analysis provide significant data to examine the validity of the previously provided hypotheses. Individually, the regression analysis provides some noteworthy results which provide insights but falls short of producing a full picture of state's motives and characteristics. Aligning the results from the regression analysis with the table and graphical data provide a much deeper understanding of the potential motivations for state's with respect to peacekeeping contributions. This combination of results provides substantive evidence which can inform our understanding of state's actions and motivations and how they fit into the theoretical framework.

The previously provided hypotheses were narrowed into three primary theoretical frameworks; realism, liberalism and constructivism:

REALISM – UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations would maintain a geographic interest in the peacekeeping operation, states would sustain a stronger commitment to military expenditures and capabilities, and states would possess larger economies that would enable more consistent and greater contributions.

LIBERALISM - UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations will maintain a larger number of international associations, have similar government systems (primarily democracies) and possess larger amounts of bi-lateral trade between the host state and contributors.

CONSTRUCTIVISM - UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations will have longer tenured membership in the United Nations, would maintain smaller economic and military capabilities and would experience significant change over time of their individual peacekeeping commitments.

The verification or rejection of the provided hypothesis is not an easily achievable endeavor. The most important aspects of this process is that a) model results are not assumed to represent more significant results than they provide and b) that consistency of results will provide a greater theoretical understanding over time and state's contributions.

Overall Regression Model

The overall regression model measures troop contributions as a percent of total military personnel from 1991-2007. This regression model provided no significant findings for any independent variable. Thus, the application of any theoretical approaches and verification or rejection of hypotheses using this model cannot be confirmed. As this model was intended to measure contributions over time and the independent variables interacting effects on troop contributions, the overarching application of international relations approaches over time will be limited.

State Participation Models


The state participation regression models examine only the states that contributed troops to each peacekeeping operation while the total contribution models examine all states that were current members of the UN at the inception of the peacekeeping operation, contributions or not. Theoretically this difference is key in looking at the overall assumptions that can be made.

The state participation models are examining the actions and motivations between the states that have contributed, while the total contribution models are examining the actions and motivations of all member states that have, and have not contributed. The total contributions model will provide the most valuable results and assumptions as all states are examined. To make overarching assumptions concerning the theoretical motivations of state's and their contributions then every UN member state must be examined. Yet the state participation models can provide additional analysis to see motivations for states that are consistent providers of troops.


The eleven state participation models report varied results. In four of the nine state participation models, CONTIGUITY is reported as significant. FREEDOM and MILITARYGDP are reported significant in one of the nine regression models. These variables are only present in the UNAVEM III model. The remaining variables do not report significant findings in any of the regression models. CONTIGUITY in the state participation model is the only variable that reports significant findings in more than one peacekeeping operations. The graphs

for the four CONTIGUITY, one FREEDOM and one MILITARYGDP models are included:


Graph 30 – UNAVEM III – Contiguity versus Troop Index




Graph 31 – UNMEE – Contiguity versus Troop Index




Graph 32 – UNAMSIL – Contiguity versus Troop Index




Graph 33 – UNPREDEP – Contiguity versus Troop Index



Graph 34 – UNAVEM III – Freedom versus Troop Index



Graph 35 – UNAVEM III – Military GDP versus Troop Index



CONTIGUITY represents location of a state with respect to the host peacekeeping state can be assumed to have a negative impact on the number of troops that are contributed. From a geographical perspective, for states that contribute to peacekeeping operations, as the distance increases between the contributing state and the host state, the number of contributions decreases. This finding cannot be applied with significant confidence. This data merely suggests that a relationship exists, it is not consistent over all of the peacekeeping operations and cannot be applied as an overarching result.

FREEDOM and MILITARYGDP report significant findings in one model, the same model UNAVEM III. The data suggests that FREEDOM and MILITARYGDP have a statistical relationship with the troop index variable but only in this peacekeeping operation. These variables cannot be deemed as possessing powerful explanatory findings due to the absence of any significant findings in the other ten regressions models.


Collectively, the independent variables that reported significance in the state participation model are of important to note, but can not be applied theoretically to all peacekeeping operations. The results and analysis provided gives the research some idea of the differences that exist among states that are contributors. This analysis does not compare and include states that did not provide troop contributions for each peacekeeping operation. Yet understanding the differences in states that are providing troops provides valuable information into what independent variables influence the states that contribute. From this analysis,

it can be reported that among states that are contributors, location is the only variable that maintains any significant interactive effect with peacekeeping troop contributions.. The further a state is geographically from the host peacekeeping state and the longer a state's tenure in the UN, the greater likelihood that a states contributions decrease.


Total Contribution Models

The eleven total contribution regression models report results significantly different from the results of the state contribution regression models. The total contribution models examine every UN member state at the inception of the peacekeeping operation. These models are intended to look primarily at what separates contributors versus non-contributors whereas the state participation models are measuring characteristics of only contributors. This distinction is vital to the theoretical application of actions and motivation's of states. Five of the independent variables are reported as significant in the total contributions models with two variables, CONTIGUITY and INTMEMBERSHIPS reporting multiple significant values. CONTIGUITY reported significant results in four of the eleven total contribution regression models and INTMEMBERSHIPS reported significant results in two of the eleven models. MILITARYGDP, FREEDOM and TRADE each reported significance in one of the eleven models. The following graphs are the CONTIGUITY, INTMEMBERSHIPS, MILITARYGDP, TRADE AND FREEDOM graphical results.


Graph 36 – UNAVEM III – Contiguity versus Troop Index




Graph 37 – UNIKOM – Contiguity versus Troop Index




Graph 38 – UNMEE – Contiguity versus Troop Index




Graph 39 – UNAMSIL – Contiguity versus Troop Index




Graph 40 – UNPREDEP – International Memberships versus Troop Index




Graph 41- UNPROFOR – International Memberships versus Troop Index




Graph 42- UNAVEM III – Military GDP versus Troop Index



Graph 43- UNAVEM III – Freedom versus Troop Index



Graph 44 - UNPROFOR – Trade versus Troop Index



CONTIGUITY is reported as significant in four of the total contribution results. It was also reported significant in four of the state participation models. CONTIGUITY is clearly the independent variable that represents the most consistent and useable findings across both the state and total contribution models. Two other variables report significant findings in more than once instance. FREEDOM is reported significant in one of the eleven state participation models and one of the eleven total contribution models. INTMEMBERSHIPS reports significant findings in two of the eleven total contribution models but is not reported as significant in any of the state participation models. CONTIGUITY is significant in two of the models, one less than the state participation regression model results.

CONTIGUITY is the only variable that reports significance in multiple peacekeeping operations for both the state participation models and the total contributions models. The distance from a contributing state to the host state has a negative relationship with the number of troops that a state contributes. For all UN member states, if a state maintains a greater distance from the host state, the individual state is less likely to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations. The data suggests for states that move further away from the host peacekeeping state, a negative relationship with troop contributions exists.

The results for the CONTIGUITY variable represent significant findings but a caveat must be added. Upon examination of each of the four CONTIGUITY graphs there are noticeable outliers in the data. The exclusion of any states from the model may reduce the theoretical application of any findings, particularly CONTIGUITY as the theoretical premise is that states closest to the operation would have the most interest in mitigating violence and reducing conflict. Yet it is important to see if these cases are driving the model. In each CONTIGUITY case the outliers were removed from the analysis.

In UNAVEM III(a), Namibia and Zambia were removed from the equation. The adjusted R^2 value decreased to .838 and the CONTIGUITY variable dropped out of the equation. It is clear the Namibia and Zambia were affecting the regression model, but it is important to note that both states border Angola, the hot peacekeeping state. In the case of UNAVEM III(b) when Namibia and Zambia were removed the adjusted R^2 value dropped from to .742 to .230 but

CONTIGUITY was still reported as significant in the model. In UNIKOM(b), Bahrain was removed from the model and the variable CONTIGUITY dropped out of the model. Again, it is important to note that Bahrain is geographically located next to Kuwait, the host peacekeeping state in UNIKOM.

In the peacekeeping operation UNMEE, Kenya was removed from both the state participation(a) and total contribution model(b) and the result was identical - CONTIGUITY dropped out of the equation. Again it is important to note that Kenya borders Ethiopia, one of the host peacekeeping states. UNAMSIL offers a unique case in comparison to the other results after outlier removal. Ghana and Zambia were removed from both UNAMSIL models and the results was that CONTIGUITY remained significant and the adjusted R² values increased. For UNAMSIL(a) it rose from .158 to .405 and for UNAMSIL (b) it rose from .127 to .272. UNPREDEP(a) maintained four outliers; Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark. These four states were removed from the model and CONTIGUITY dropped out of the regression. While these countries do not border Macedonia, the host peacekeeping state, they are all regionally located together. It is not a reach to say that the these Nordic countries may have had a collective interest as the the four primary outliers among all of the contributors.

Removing these outliers does diminish some of the statistical findings of the state participation and total contribution models. Yet the outliers consist primarily of states that are regionally located along the borders of the host peacekeeping

state. This characteristic is valuable in understanding the overall explanatory goal of the CONTIGUITY variable.

Regression, Table and Graphical Results

Combining the table and graphical results with the state participation and total contribution regression results provides another layer for the theoretical analysis. When we examine Tables 8 and 10 and all of the included variables the results report some significant dichotomies that produce valuable characteristics of states that contribute more frequently and in greater numbers than states with lower participation rates and fewer troop contributions.

Tables 8 and 10 report significant differences in the same independent variables. Table 8 reports a 105% difference in GDP for states that contributed to more than 50% of the peacekeeping operations versus those that contributed to less than 50%. Table 10 reports a 143% difference in GDP for states that contributed more than 6,500 troops during the 1991-2007 time period versus those states that contribute fewer than 6,500. While these differences are stark, GDP reporting no significant findings in any of the regression models, these values can only serve as descriptors. It can be determined that states that contribute troops more frequently and in greater number have larger economies, but it cannot be suggested that this has a positive or negative effect on a state's peacekeeping troop contributions.

The number of international memberships, or INTMEMBERSHIPS, reports significant differences in Tables 8 and 10. For states that contribute more

frequently there is a positive 49.9% difference in the number of international organizational memberships a state is a member. For states that contributed more than 6,500 troops there is a 88.9% difference in international organizational memberships versus those that contributed under 6,500.00. INTMEMBERSHIPS does report significant findings in two of the total contribution models. These results suggest that there may exist a relationship between international organizational memberships and troop contributions by states but this relationship can not be confirmed to have a strong, definitive effect.

Tables 8 and 10 also report strong differences in the TOTALMILITARY measurement between states that contributed to over 50% of the peacekeeping operations or over 6,500 total troops. States that contributed to over 50% of the peacekeeping operations reported a 90.5% difference in TOTALMILITARY versus those states that contributed to less than 50% of the peacekeeping operations. States that contributed more than 6,500 troops versus those states that contributed less than 6,500 troops reported a 147% difference with respect to TOTALMILITARY. Yet TOTALMILITARY was absent from all of the state participation and total contribution models. It can be reported that states the contribute more frequently and in greater number maintain greater military capabilities, but this variable does not possess a positive or negative relationship with peacekeeping contributions.

HUMANRIGHTS reports minimal differences in Tables 8 and 10, with a percent difference of .3% in Table 8 and 7.7% in Table 10. HUMANRIGHTS was removed from both the state participation and total contribution model. There are

no significant positive or negative relationships with the HUMANRIGHTS variable and peacekeeping contributions.

FREEDOM was reported as significant twice, once in the state participation model and once in the total contribution model. The percent differences for the FREEDOM variable in Tables 8 and 10 are reported as a 18.0% and 19.6% for states that contributed to over 50% of the peacekeeping operations and over 6,500 troops. These findings in combination cannot verify a significant positive or negative relationship with the FREEDOM variable and a state's contribution patterns.

Tables 8 and 10 report minimal differences with respect to the MILITARYGDP variable. For states that contributed to more than 50% of the peacekeeping operations, Table 8 reported a negative -2.7% difference versus states that contributed to less than 50% of the peacekeeping operations. For states that contributed more than 6,500 troops, a 1.1% difference was reported versus those states that contributed fewer than 6,500 troops in Table 10. MILITARYGDP reported significant findings in one state participation model and one total contribution model. These findings provide results that do not verify any positive or negative relationship with MILITARYGDP and a states commitment of troops to peacekeeping operations.

UNMEMBERSHIPS is not reported as significant in any of the regression models and Tables 8 and 10 provide minimal percent differences for the two dichotomies of states. States that contributed to over 50% of the peacekeeping

operations reported a 19.1% difference versus states that contributed to less than 50%. States that contributed more than 6,500 troops reported a 23.4% difference versus states that contributed less than 6,500. The absence of any regression results and the lower percent difference values from Table 8 and 10 cannot confirm a positive or negative relationship with UNMEMBERSHIP and state peacekeeping troop contributions.

Due to the nature of their measurements, CONTIGUITY and TRADE were not included in Tables 8 and 10. CONTIGUITY is reported significant in four of the state participation models and four of the total contribution models and is the only independent variable that reports multiple significant results in both models. Location of a state vis-à-vis the host peacekeeping state suggests a negative relationship with a state's contribution levels. The further a state moves from the host peacekeeping state, the fewer troops as a percentage of their total military a state will contribute. Those states that are closest in proximity to the host peacekeeping state are more likely to contribute troops than those states that maintain a further distance geographically.

TRADE is reported as significant for the total contribution model UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR is the only regression model where TRADE is reported as significant. This finding cannot verify a positive or negative relationship with TRADE and peacekeeping troop contributions for UN member states.

Total UN Personnel versus Total Contributions Over Time

Graphs 4 through 29 examine the pattern of giving for the permanent members of the Security Council and states that contributed over 6,500 troops from the selected timeline. Examining if significant change exists over time with respect to the levels of total contributions compared to individual state contributions over this same time should provide results concerning change in contribution behavior. The overall number of peacekeeping troops for the UN, Graph 3, provides the baseline for state comparisons.

Comparing the total UN personnel graph to the provided graphs for other states allows the research to see which states are “driving” the contribution levels. By examining the overall time period there are three states that contributed troops during this time that are very similar to the overall model – Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. While there is change over time for these states and their contributions, the change over time reflects the changes over time for all UN peacekeeping personnel. While not as pronounced, Jordan, Ghana, Nepal, Nigeria, Uruguay, Kenya and Ethiopia also report contributions that follow the same general pattern as the overall personnel graph. This change does not necessarily reflect a change in the individual state behavior, but in the overall peacekeeping priorities and missions. By examining these states it can not be confirmed that a state has changed patterns of giving.

Investigating the patterns of the permanent five members of the Security Council reports different results. By looking at graphs 4 – 9 and comparing the

patterns of troop contributions, it is apparent a significant change occurs for France, Great Britain, The United States, Russia and China. From 1991 – 1997 the contributions of France, Great Britain, The United States and Russia rise during the same time period as the total personnel graph. China maintains a relatively flat pattern, reflecting a minimal contribution of troops during this time period. After 1997 the contributions for France, Great Britain, The United States and Russia drop significantly, mirroring the drop in overall peacekeeping personnel. Yet unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, the patterns of giving for the four Security Council members does not increase during the peacekeeping personnel surge beginning in 2000. By examining all five members of the Security Council, only China reports a general increase to arrive at the largest contribution levels it has experienced during this time period. After matching the patterns of giving for the first half of the time period, France, Great Britain, The United States, and Russia give a significantly reduced percentage of troops, even as peacekeeping personnel arrive at their highest levels in UN history. Poland, Canada, Austria, Norway and Malaysia report similar results. China reports a change as well, although in the opposite direction, ending at their highest level of contributions during the time period in 2007. After examining the top contributors of troops during this time period, there are 10 states that do not follow the pattern of the overall personnel graph, five of which are permanent Security Council members and four of the remaining five are close Western allies of three of the permanent members. Malaysia is the primary outlier of this group.

Considering that the five security council members make up half of the states that have changed their patterns of giving in relation to overall UN personnel it can be confirmed that changes over time exist with respect to peacekeeping contributions. The change cannot be said to be widespread. It is limited to a small number of states that contribute troops frequently and in greater numbers. The presence of Canada also creates an interesting result as Canada and their leadership are considered to be one of the most vital states with respect to peacekeeping development and support. This finding suggest that patterns of troop contributions have changed over time as a percent of total UN personnel committed to peacekeeping operations.

Table 11 – Regression, Table and Graphical Results

	Overall Model	Significance in State Participation Models	Significance in Total Contribution Models	Percent Difference (%)
Realism				
Contiguity				
CONTIGUITY*	Insignificant	4	4	
Military Strength				
GDPMILITARY	Insignificant	1	1	-2.7, 1.1
TOTALMILITARY	Insignificant	0	0	90.5, 147
Economic Strength				
GDP	Insignificant	0	0	104.5, 143
Liberalism				
International Memberships				
INTMEMBERSHIPS	Insignificant	0	2	49.9, 88.9
Like Governments				
FREEDOM	Insignificant	1	1	18.0, 19.6
HUMANRIGHTS	Insignificant	0	0	.3, 7.7
Bi-Lateral Trade				
TRADE**	Insignificant	0	1	
Constructivism***				
UN Tenure				
UNMEMBERSHIP	Insignificant	0	0	19.1, 23.4
Military Strength (Low)				
GDPMILITARY	Insignificant	1	1	-2.7, 1.1
TOTALMILITARY	Insignificant	0	0	90.5, 147
Economic Strength (Low)				
GDP	Insignificant	0	0	104.5, 143

*CONTIGUITY could not be measured as a collective term due to the host peacekeeping state changing for each peacekeeping operation.

**TRADE could not be measured as a collective average as the host peacekeeping state's trade values change for each peacekeeping operation.

***Change over time was measured from Graph 3, Total UN Peacekeeping personnel, and compared to graphs 4-29 to analyze change.

Hypothesis Confirmation and Rejection

Confirming or rejecting the hypothesis must be consistent with the data that is provided from the regression models, tables and graphs. The collective results offer the most appropriate method to examine if the hypotheses can be confirmed or rejected. The most significant challenge with interpreting the results from the analysis is ensuring that the previously presented results are not over or under confirmed. For this reason there will be three categories provided for the confirmation or rejection of the hypothesis – strong confirm, moderate confirm and reject. The moderate confirm category is for those results that represent some confirmation of their influence on troop contributions, but more analysis may be needed to associate a strong positive or negative relationship on contributions.

The realist hypothesis is concerned with the results from CONTIGUITY, GDPMILITARY, TOTAL MILITARY and GDP. CONTIGUITY reports significance in four of the state contribution models and four of the total contribution models. The results for CONTIGUITY confirm the assumed directional value and this independent variable is the only variable present in multiple cases for both regression models. The challenge for strongly confirming CONTIGUITY relates to its absence from the overall model, as there is no collective average term to measure as peacekeeping operations are located in various locales in the world. This also prevents a percent difference from being calculated. The results from the state participation and total contribution models

does suggest that the further a state is geographically from a host peacekeeping state, the fewer troops that state will contribute to the peacekeeping operation.

MILITARYGDP, TOTALMILITARY and GDP produce minimal, insignificant results. These variables cannot be confirmed as possessing a positive association with a state's troop contributions of peacekeeping troops. Thus the Realist hypotheses that states there are positive relationships between MILITARYGDP, TOTALMILITARY and GDP on state's peacekeeping contributions must be rejected. CONTIGUITY is the only component associated with the Realist approach that provides results that suggest a relationship exists between geographic distance and state contributions.

The results from MILITARYGDP, TOTALMILITARY and GDP are related to several tenants of the constructivist hypothesis. The constructivist hypothesis was the inverse of the realist hypothesis with respect to these three variables. Through the absence of these variables producing significant positive or negative associations with the state's peacekeeping contributions, the constructivist hypotheses must be rejected.

The liberal hypothesis is tested through INTMEMBERSHIPS, FREEDOM, HUMANRIGHTS and TRADE. INTEMEMBERSHIPS reports some significant findings in the total contribution regression models but not at an incidence level to confirm a positive or negative relationship. FREEDOM, HUMANRIGHTS and TRADE report minimal findings in the regression models and in Tables 8 and 10. Thus the liberal hypotheses that posit that international organizational

memberships, liberal government and increased trade will increase a state's contributions levels to peacekeeping operations is rejected.

The constructivist hypothesis is concerned with GDPMILITARY, TOTALMILITARY, UNMEMBERSHIP and change in contributions over time. GDPMILITARY and TOTALMILITARY results were previously included for analysis. UNMEMBERSHIP is not reported significant in the overall, state participation or total contribution models. Tables 8 and 10 also report minimal differences among states that contribute more frequently and in greater number with respect to UNMEMBERSHIP versus states that contribute less frequently and in fewer numbers. As the regression and table results are concerned with all UN member states, the hypothesis that longer tenured UN membership has a positive effect on troop contributions is rejected.

Measuring individual state contributions versus the overall UN troop contributions provided limited, but valuable results concerning change over time in contribution patterns. After an examination of the top contributors during the 1991-2007 time period it is clear that a change in giving patterns were apparent, but only for a small number of states, half of those permanent Security Council members in the UN. The data suggest change over time thus the constructivist hypothesis that states could change their giving patterns over time can be moderately confirmed but for a limited number of UN member states.

Table 12 – Hypothesis Confirmation

	Strong Confirm	Moderate Confirm	Reject
Realism			
Contiguity		X	
Military Strength (High)			X
Economic Strength (High)			X
Liberalism			
International Memberships			X
Like Governments			X
Bi-Lateral Trade			X
Constructivism			
UN Tenure			X
Change Over Time		X	
Military Strength (Low)			X
Economic Strength (Low)			X

Chapter 5 –Application, State Motives and Future Research

The confirmation and rejection of the provided hypotheses aims to provide a better theoretical understanding of UN peacekeeping from an individual state prospective. The results and data move this endeavor forward and deliver potential new explanations while also supporting previously posited theoretical assumptions. The results do not deliver an all-encompassing answer to the primacy of any particular approach, yet can strengthen claims of international relations concerning the three primary approaches. The results from the realist, liberal and constructivist hypotheses permit generalization concerning the characteristics and motivations of individual states. Yet before this application is pursued, an examination of each theoretical statement that was strongly or moderately confirmed should be included. The confirmed hypotheses include the following:

1. The results suggest there is a negative relationship on a state's troop contributions and the distance a contributing state maintains geographically from the host peacekeeping state.
2. Change does exist in a state's contribution patterns, but this is limited to a number of states that possess significant influence in the UN system.

These overarching statements, which constitute the basis for theoretical application, report findings that are related to tenants from two of the three theoretical paradigms. This creates significant difficulty in championing a particular approach as possessing more explanatory power than others. While limited in the overall

description and definition of one approach, the results do provide the opportunity to emphasize the key points of discovery and their theoretical application.

Previous theoretical research and approaches concerning peacekeeping and international institutions and state motivations were provided by a limited number of authors and are important to re-examine before moving forward. Abbot and Snidal concluded there existed three theoretical frameworks that describe state interests and participation in international institutions; realist, constructivist and rational regime (liberal leaning).¹¹⁶ Finnemore argued that state's interests are developed from socialization of international norms, noting that state interests are not always clear and determined representing a constructivist explanation.¹¹⁷ Paris suggests that participation in peacekeeping is a reflection of both realist and constructivist tendencies, recognizing states limit their behavior intentionally and learning occurs as states interact in the system and adhere to norms of behavior.¹¹⁸ The differences that are prevalent in these three research pursuits reflect the difficult nature of measuring state actions and motivation and appropriately applying these to theoretical frameworks. Each piece confirms differing perspectives and ideology. Comparing the results from the previously provided research with this current analysis does provide further understanding of the

¹¹⁶ Abbott, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act Through Formal International Institutions." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 42, No.1. p. 3-32.

¹¹⁷ Finnemore, Martha. 1996. *National Interests in International Society*. Cornell University Press, New York.

¹¹⁸ Paris, Roland. 2003. "Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture." *European Journal of International Relations*. Vol. 9, 441.

notions posited in these research approaches and develops particular aspects even further.

Approaches and Applications

The most significant result related to the realist approach is contiguity. The geographical location of a state vis-à-vis the host peacekeeping state has a negative correlation with individual state troop contributions. The realist statement that as a state moves further from a peacekeeping operation, there exists less incentive to contribute troops as the threat begins to be removed from their borders reports some significance in the findings. A state has less incentive to act if their individual borders or security are not threatened. Individual security is supreme in the realist paradigm. If states that are further removed from a peacekeeping operation contribute less, then it can be surmised that states are less concerned with committing troops to international missions that do not threaten their security. In this instance, why a state would participate in peacekeeping operation is related to the geographic threat that a conflict maintains in relation to its own borders.

Despite the premises of constructivism reporting minimal, verifiable claims, the change in contributions over time for the permanent members of the Security Council provides one of the more intriguing results for examination and represents the strongest claim of the constructivist arguments. States with significant influence and power have the ability to use the international system and an anarchic international environment as they see fit. States with limited power and influence in

the system could be developing their role within the international community per their own desires as long as it fits in the framework of powerful states. Thus states that have the ability to formulate their own path can do so, while states with minimal influence and power must choose a path amenable to powerful states. Change in behavior is central to the constructivist argument. This tenant is particularly interesting if a state committed to an action or endeavor and then discontinued or removed their support after years of support. Why would a state contribute to peacekeeping operations – they determine that this may increase their international capacity and influence, but determine the right to change if they have the power to do so.

State Motives

When examining the outcomes from the methodological examination and the theoretical applications it may seem to be a challenging pursuit to try and deliver any consistent statements concerning state motives for contributing troops to peacekeeping operations. These findings are expected to some degree. With respect to international relations, the existence of significant theoretical debate concerning state behavior is prevalent as there are no concise answers. The development of research paradigms concerning international relations and state actions in the international system verify there exists current debate among many scholars as to the application of approaches and the usefulness of each in describing state behavior. The review of the literature with respect to international relations

represents the multitude of perspectives that have been historically presented. Nevertheless the theoretical application from this research provides direction to guide a more complete understanding of states motives concerning troop contributions to UN peacekeeping operations.

What then can we make of the aforementioned assumptions – is theoretical application according to the “eye of the beholder” with no significant winner as Abbot and Snidal believe? Perhaps Finnemore’s assertion that states may not even know what they desire through their individual involvement in international institutions is relevant – consistency is not present. Does Paris provide the most appropriate description when positing that states, through their participation or absence, contribute the most to peacekeeping operations success or that norms and culture restrict or promote state participation? More recent studies suggest that states that commit troops to peacekeeping operations are more likely to have foreign and defense policies that are assimilated.¹¹⁹

Applying the theoretical assumptions from the hypotheses that were confirmed and rejected to individual state behavior and motives must start with the first assumption of the all the theoretical paradigms. All three theoretical paradigms agree that the international environment is anarchic and there is no overarching authority that guarantees rights, security and force of law. The main actors in the system do vary but the environment is absent of overarching authority. States

¹¹⁹ Velazquez, Arturo. 2010. “Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Other Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America’s Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations. *Security Studies*. Vol. 19. p. 160-195.

contribute troops to peacekeeping operations – this much is clear. The why is much more difficult to discover through theoretical lenses.

For realism, the anarchic environment allows states to pursue commitments that increase their power relative to other states and secure their interests. In the absence of a global institution to enforce behavior or acquiescence to preferred policies, states that have the power to operate in their own self-interested manner have the ability to do so with little fear of reprisal.

The motive for a state to contribute to peacekeeping operations where the geographical location of the operation maintains an immediate threat to the livelihood of the potential donor state is apparent in the realist tradition. The realist tradition concerns itself with security first, and conflict and instability directly contiguous to a state border creates an immense threat for a state to maintain safety and security. As the distance increases from the host state to the donor state, the incentive to participate decreases. Distance from a host peacekeeping state to a donor state has a negative impact on a state's contributions. As the threat is minimized, the motivations to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations minimize as well.

The findings also suggest that the overall economic and military strength of a state does not influence, positively or negatively, a state's contributions to peacekeeping operations. These variables that represented states with material power, important tenants of the realist approach, do not promote the idea that states

with less to lose economically and militarily will support peacekeeping operations in greater number or frequency.

The number of international organizations a state maintains membership in does not effectively predict troop contributions to peacekeeping operations. States that maintain more international memberships do not contribute more frequently and in greater number so integration into the international community does not create motivation for states to contribute. These organizations may promote shared values of transparency and norms of behavior, but a positive or negative relationship with peacekeeping troop contributions is not reported in this analysis.

Regime type is not a significant predictor of state contributions, so there is not a type of government, democratic included, which serves as an effective descriptor of states that contribute to UN peacekeeping contributions. Andersson looked at peacekeeping operations from 1990 to 1996 and noted that strong democracies represent the most consistent contributors to peacekeeping operations.¹²⁰ Daniel and Caraher reported democracy as an important characteristic of contributors as well.¹²¹ The data provided here shows little to no significant correlation between regime type and contributions. One of the challenges of this statement is that as the 1990s concluded and into the 2000s, a vast majority of states in the international system were democratic or pursuing democratic government. Thus states that contribute may be more democratic, but

¹²⁰ Andersson, Andreas. 2000. "Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-1996." *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 7, No. 2. p. 1-22.

¹²¹ Daniel, DCF and Leigh Caraher. 2006. "Characteristics of Troop Contributors to Peace Operations and Implications for Global Capacity." *International Peacekeeping*. Vo. 13, No. 3. p. 297-315.

there is little to no relationship with this type of government and peacekeeping troop contributions. States cannot said to be significantly motivated to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations due to democratic ideals and norms.

Bi-lateral trade does not report significant findings concerning a positive association with increased trade and higher troop contributions. The absence of this economic incentive providing motivation for states to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations is counter to a foundational principle of the liberal tradition. Economic interests should encourage states to pursue efforts to provide stability and development in the international community, eliminating threats to trade and commerce. The absence of these two primary tenants of the liberal tradition creates immense difficulty in applying this approach with respect to state motivations for contributing troops. While integration into the international community is apparent, states that contribute to UN peacekeeping operations cannot be described as being motivated by a shared understanding and commitment to a set of norms and ideals that have been developed through international institutions.

The change in behavior of a few powerful states provides meaningful opportunity to examine one piece of the constructivist hypothesis. Tenure of a UN member state does not display a positive association with peacekeeping troop contributions. States with underdeveloped economies and militaries do not contribute more frequently or in greater number. If states are learning behavior in the international system concerning peacekeeping operations, only a few distinct

states have changed their patterns of peacekeeping troop contributions. The largest contributors, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan have maintained consistent contributions from 1991-2007 with respect to total UN troop personnel.

Krishnamasy describes India and Pakistan's role in peacekeeping as one of support operationally, but very limited in higher decision making policy and developmental matters.¹²² All five permanent members of the UN Security Council changed their patterns of contributions during this time period as a share of contributions. Perhaps only those states that maintain primacy in the UN and have the power to choose when to change have the ability to do so. Alexander Wendt's statement that "Anarchy is What States Make of It" should be updated to "Anarchy is What States with Power Make of It". State motivations can change over time with renewed understanding and interaction in the international system. However the states that can manage this change more effectively are the states with power.

Historically China has been a minimal supporter of peacekeeping operations while the United States, Great Britain, and France have supported operations consistently. During the 1990's the United States, Great Britain and France experienced significant growth and influence in the international community with the fall of the Soviet Union. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War peacekeeping may have been perceived to be an excellent extension of foreign policy across the international community to build good will and favor. As time continued and this need diminished, the motivations of the powerful Security

¹²² Krishnamasy, Kabilan. 2001. " 'Recognition' for Third World Peacekeepers: India and Pakistan." *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 8, No. 4. p. 56-76.

Council members may have waned. Now, as China's strength and global reach has increased, the number of peacekeeping troops China contributes has risen. While this is only an estimation of potential motivations, it is clear that these few powerful nations have the ability to change their contributions with little fear of diminished power within the UN system.

The motives for a UN member state to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations are thus suggested to relate to two theoretical premises from the Realist and Constructivist approaches. This may also help verify the contextual nature of peacekeeping and international relations and the appropriateness of developing overarching explanations that intend to explain state behavior in this endeavor.

Policy Prescriptions

For the theoretical implications to have value and inform international relations approaches there must be some application of these findings to UN peacekeeping and policy. Recognizing why and which states are contributing helps achieve consistent and long term success for UN peacekeeping operations. While the analysis does not provide significant overarching themes, there is potential to inform policy from these findings. Understanding which independent variables explained the most variance in behavior and the theoretical claims could allow peacekeeping policy makers to develop operations that are more effective and more reflective of what states consider viable operations and policies. This could

increase overall effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and contribute to greater participation from the international community.

The first and most apparent finding that can inform policy is the absence of consistent, overarching results from the included variables for analysis. The lack of findings hints at the contextual nature of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping policy should recognize two things from these results: More analysis of the broad themes of peacekeeping are needed and the interacting variables for each peacekeeping operation may be so disparate that grand policy solutions may be challenging to develop and implement. Yet recognizing the role contiguity of states may play and the change in patterns of giving over time can provide some assistance to some policy development. Three areas stand out for potential areas of improvement that could be informed from the findings in this analysis:

1. Troop allocation
2. Training
3. Peacekeeping Expansion

Developing balanced approaches to troop allocation and disbursement are vital to the long term success of peacekeeping operations. If states contribute troops more frequently and in greater number to their immediate geographic surrounding, then developing relationships with states that can continue to be significant contributors to particular regions in the world could be vital to sustaining long term peace. If a state has already developed a history of contributing troops and the conflict or violence is located geographically close to the state, then obtaining the

necessary troop commitments could be procured in a much more efficient manner. This includes not only developing support in the international community, but through the domestic environments of contributing and noncontributing states. As security issues continue to develop as cross border threats, collaboration and support is mandatory for success. States must take more ownership concerning peacekeeping operations in and around their borders to ensure success.

Current UN practice does encourage troop commitments from surrounding states but a more overt approach to developing state(s) as regional centers of peacekeeping support could reduce the time to effectively respond to peacekeeping needs and perhaps reduce casualties and destruction from violence that requires a collective international response.

Training peacekeeping troops and personnel is perhaps the most important aspect of peacekeeping operations to ensure success. Effective boots on the ground are the greatest mitigating factor in reducing violence and conflict. Again, states that can serve as regional training centers or locations can help to develop consistency of skills concerning troops who can be then dispersed to support the UN with respect to conflicts that are geographically close to the contributing state. These states must maintain support and assist with developing training programs and regimens that ensure the abilities of peacekeepers are sufficient for the task at hand. States with strong military capacities could serve as the basis for troop development and training to ensure that peacekeeping troops have the latest methods and practices available.

As the international environment continues to change, recognizing the motivations of states to contribute is vital to the continued development of new peacekeeping operations or the contraction of the practice in the international community. Peacekeeping operations have expanded significantly since 1991 and have developed to their highest levels in the 2000's. To ensure the success of peacekeeping operations and their ability to mitigate and reduce violence and conflict, consistent support over time will be paramount. If over time states have become more supportive/less supportive of operations, or there is an increase/decrease of state participation over multiple types of peacekeeping operations than developing operations to deal with current and potential threats to global security may need to be addressed. Discovering the trends that exist in the international community, such as change in contribution behavior, are important to recognizing the needs of peacekeeping operations.

Future Research and Implications

It would be impossible to tell the complete story of the theoretical implications for states and their motivations to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations in this single endeavor. The results from this research add a deeper understanding to these motivations theoretically but cannot provide a complete and overarching analysis. Further questions and answers to the future of state support for peacekeeping and the continued attempts of theoretical prescription remain.

There are several additional research paths that could provide additional data to further our theoretical understanding of peacekeeping and state's motivations. The first method would be to perform case studies for each peacekeeping operation that was included in this analysis. The results from this analysis provide significant variation across each of the included peacekeeping models. While aggregating these operations to examine general theoretical assumptions is valuable, each operation is unique in its scope, capacity, stakeholders and dimensions. The uniqueness of each operation offers an opportunity to examine these operations in full detail for comparative purposes. Developing methodology that permits measurement of each individual peacekeeping operation through the international relations approaches could support the already rich literature that exists that details peacekeeping operations from a logistical and historical perspective.

For each theoretical approach, a further examination of the independent variables that reported moderate results should be examined in more detail. A deeper look into CONTIGUITY and change over time should be pursued as the data for these variables did not permit their presence in the overall regression model or the percent difference tables. Additional data could strengthen the understanding of the influence location and trade maintain with respect to peacekeeping operations. Investigating change of contributions over time could also provide a better understanding how the international environment and events could influence contributions over time. Domestic and international events could

have an influence on the actions and motivations on individual states and their desire to contribute troops to UN peacekeeping. Recognizing the root causes for change in behavior could aid help determine what instances would influence a state change contribution patterns.

The individual states that demonstrate a willingness to contribute troops at a higher frequency and greater number should also be examined individually through additional methods to dig deeper into their own individual claims and actions concerning UN peacekeeping support. Analyzing states that do not contribute frequently or in large numbers would be relevant as well. One method to consider is a content analysis of state department communications, media outlets and elected or appointed officials could provide an additional layer of data that could provide further understanding of a state's position on UN peacekeeping. How a state messages the public with respect to UN peacekeeping, both domestically and internationally, could provide an analysis of perception versus action. Particular states may be very clear with their individual intentions to contribute or not to contribute troops for peacekeeping operations.

These approaches are a few of the additional steps that could be pursued to enhance the current understanding of peacekeeping operations and individual state support. Currently the practice of peacekeeping is a prominent apparatus to attempt to stabilize the international community and solve international crises. Continuing to examine peacekeeping operations and how states perceive these operations, and how they support these operations, is paramount to developing effective practices

and long term viability. Understanding the place that UN peacekeeping maintains theoretically in the international community allows the field of international relations and scholars an opportunity to apply our historical understanding of state behavior to new phenomena. The importance of continued application of approaches to current world events cannot be overestimated.

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Appendix A – States Removed from Each Regression Model

UNIKOM – Afghanistan, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Estonia, Grenada, Iraq, Liechtenstein, Laos, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Qatar, Samoa, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, Ukraine and Vanuatu

UNPROFOR - Afghanistan, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Iraq, Liechtenstein, Libya, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, and Vanuatu

ONUMOZ - Afghanistan, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Iraq, Liechtenstein, Libya, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, and Vanuatu

UNOSOM II - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Iraq, Liechtenstein, Libya, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, and Vanuatu

UNAVEM III - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Iraq, Kiribati, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Libya, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, Vanuatu and Yugoslavia

UNPREDEP - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Iraq, Kiribati, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Libya, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, Vanuatu and Yugoslavia

UNAMSIL - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Yugoslavia

UNTAET - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Yugoslavia

UNMEE - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Yugoslavia

UNMISSET - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Yugoslavia

ONUB - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Myanmar, Nauru, Palau, Qatar, San Marino, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Somalia, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Yugoslavia

Appendix B

Overall Model

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.008453182022	.023275871601	117
Gdp	245695.2744	9.68673E5	117
Intmemberships	1654.9231	1403.28178	117
Militarygdp	2.2047	1.47445	117
Totalmilitary	.00773583	.021339657	117
UNmemberships	47.44	14.938	117
Humanrights	9.4029	3.35328	117
Freedom	3.2523	1.67426	117

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables)

	Gdp	Intmemberships	Militarygdp	Totalmilitary	Unmemberships	Humanrights	Freedom
Gdp	1.000	.414	.052	.730	.127	.188	-.225
Intmemberships	.414	1.000	-.081	.339	.308	.486	-.627
Militarygdp	.052	-.081	1.000	.098	.056	-.476	.367
Totalmilitary	.730	.339	.098	1.000	.207	-.086	-.006
UNmemberships	.127	.308	.056	.207	1.000	.031	-.073
Humanrights	.188	.486	-.476	-.086	.031	1.000	-.901
Freedom	-.225	-.627	.367	-.006	-.073	-.901	1.000

ONUMOZ(a)

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	4.14315579731	16.3687476756059	29
Militarygdp	3.110	3.2990	29
Intmemberships	1525.86	1291.586	29
Gdp	327742.34	845977.325	29
Trade	18.9648	52.70204	29
Freedom	2.62	1.656	29
Humanrights	9.72	3.918	29
Totalmilitary	.01098359	.016620502	29
UNmembership	36.24	13.450	29
Contiguity	6.62	1.147	29

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables)

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Trade	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000	-.140	-.159	-.084	.248	-.331	-.186	-.152	.045
Intmemberships	-.140	1.000	.475	.224	-.552	.506	.494	.339	.141
Gdp	-.159	.475	1.000	.188	-.328	.306	.696	.011	.108
Trade	-.084	.224	.188	1.000	.139	-.025	.154	.184	-.869
Freedom	.248	-.552	-.328	.139	1.000	-.754	-.269	-.037	-.417
Humanrights	-.331	.506	.306	-.025	-.754	1.000	.191	-.084	.206
Totalmilitary	-.186	.494	.696	.154	-.269	.191	1.000	.211	.138
UNmembership	-.152	.339	.011	.184	-.037	-.084	.211	1.000	-.022
Contiguity	.045	.141	.108	-.869	-.417	.206	.138	-.022	1.000

ONUMOZ(b)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	1.01823320442	8.20551690931	118
Militarygdp	3.077	3.6200	118
Intmemberships	1194.89	1095.858	118
Gdp	141842.93	456825.623	118
Trade	9.5372	30.07187	118
Freedom	3.59	2.089	118
Humanrights	8.81	4.123	118
Totalmilitary	.00680445	.015208874	118
UNmembership	34.09	14.152	118
Contiguity	6.43	1.435	118

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Trade	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000	-.116	-.071	-.047	.190	-.334	-.001	-.038	.078
Intmemberships	-.116	1.000	.488	.382	-.580	.465	.330	.442	.182
Gdp	-.071	.488	1.000	.310	-.269	.218	.536	.101	.111
Trade	-.047	.382	.310	1.000	-.106	.092	.246	.153	-.290
Freedom	.190	-.580	-.269	-.106	1.000	-.808	-.060	-.155	-.280
Humanrights	-.334	.465	.218	.092	-.808	1.000	-.090	.026	.179
Totalmilitary	-.001	.330	.536	.246	-.060	-.090	1.000	.210	.133
UNmembership	-.038	.442	.101	.153	-.155	.026	.210	1.000	.160
Contiguity	.078	.182	.111	-.290	-.280	.179	.133	.160	1.000

UNAVEM III(a)

Description Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.002487494020	.006159575250	30
Militarygdp	2.887	3.2466	30
Intmemberships	1618.50	1186.388	30
Gdp	125104.97	234844.917	30
Trade	37.0410	115.24619	30
Freedom	2.90	1.807	30
Humanrights	9.37	3.935	30
Totalmilitary	.00916570	.015905551	30
UNmembership	38.40	13.607	30
Contiguity	6.33	1.516	30

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Trade	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000								
Intmemberships	-.065	1.000							
Gdp	-.036	.730	1.000						
Trade	-.009	.614	.712	1.000					
Freedom	.221	-.425	-.292	-.310	1.000				
Humanrights	-.152	.401	.239	.284	-.839	1.000			
Totalmilitary	.036	.232	.500	.121	.035	-.148	1.000		
UNmembership	-.169	.567	.401	.177	-.154	-.072	.394	1.000	
Contiguity	.039	.346	.225	.141	-.138	-.004	.224	.493	1.000

Coefficients:

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	.028	.001		23.185	.000
Contiguity	-.004	.000	-.970	-23.563	.000
Militarygdp	.001	.000	.273	6.532	.000
Freedom	-.001	.000	-.212	-5.026	.000

Excluded Independent Variables:

	Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation
Intmemberships	-.002 ^c	-.041	.967	-.008
Gdp	-.016 ^c	-.363	.719	-.072
Trade	.021 ^c	.478	.637	.095
Humanrights	.015 ^c	.189	.851	.038
Totalmilitary	.017 ^c	.403	.690	.080
UNmembership	-.032 ^c	-.660	.515	-.131

UNAVEM III(b)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.0005922604809	.003151764094492	126
Militarygdp	2.771	3.0940	126
Intmemberships	1212.72	1171.035	126
Gdp	142348.52	462753.874	126
Trade	20.9461	70.64856	126
Freedom	3.58	2.118	126
Humanrights	8.88	3.963	126
Totalmilitary	.00635159	.015798695	126
UNmembership	35.07	15.457	126
Contiguity	6.67	.839	126

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Trade	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000	-.127	-.077	-.047	.294	-.346	-.036	-.162	.007
Intmemberships	-.127	1.000	.489	.591	-.547	.409	.301	.480	.196
Gdp	-.077	.489	1.000	.400	-.245	.194	.546	.130	.117
Trade	-.047	.591	.400	1.000	-.273	.205	.341	.111	.113
Freedom	.294	-.547	-.245	-.273	1.000	-.799	.005	-.209	-.102
Humanrights	-.346	.409	.194	.205	-.799	1.000	-.105	.144	.053
Totalmilitary	-.036	.301	.546	.341	.005	-.105	1.000	.199	.133
UNmembership	-.162	.480	.130	.111	-.209	.144	.199	1.000	.169
Contiguity	.007	.196	.117	.113	-.102	.053	.133	.169	1.000

Coefficients:

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	.023	.001		18.917	.000
Contiguity	-.003	.000	-.859	-18.802	.000
Freedom	.000	.000	-.203	-4.245	.000
Militarygdp	.000	.000	.162	3.412	.001

Excluded Independent Variables:

	Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation
Intmemberships	.032 ^c	.585	.560	.053
Gdp	.016 ^c	.329	.743	.030
Trade	.057 ^c	1.198	.233	.108
Totalmilitary	.065 ^c	1.431	.155	.129
UNmembership	-.039 ^c	-.817	.415	-.074
Humanrights	.080 ^c	1.035	.303	.094

UNIKOM(a)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.003989361188	.019176802374	26
Militarygdp	3.986	3.9609	26
Intmemberships	1503.85	1200.281	26
Gdp	473899.69	1397760.781	26
Freedom	3.73	2.359	26
Humanrights	8.27	4.846	26
Totalmilitary	.01372542	.028526470	26
Trade	119.5815	248.08475	26
UNmembership	33.81	12.192	26
Contiguity	6.31	1.408	26

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	Trade	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000								
Intmemberships	-.134	1.000							
Gdp	.009	.487	1.000						
Freedom	.102	-.835	-.373	1.000					
Humanrights	-.261	.691	.334	-.763	1.000				
Totalmilitary	.004	.491	.921	-.376	.281	1.000			
Trade	.203	.444	.844	-.238	.133	.862	1.000		
UNmembership	-.007	.268	.180	-.274	.444	.221	.273	1.000	
Contiguity	-.452	.291	.132	-.372	.544	.033	-.283	-.167	1.000

UNIKOM(b)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.000978522555	.009514919675	106
Militarygdp	3.005	2.6521	106
Intmemberships	1235.07	1023.936	106
Gdp	220455.72	819857.608	106
Freedom	3.48	2.179	106
Humanrights	9.10	4.280	106
Totalmilitary	.00853811	.020951801	106
Trade	43.7606	143.50076	106
UNmembership	35.25	11.554	106
Contiguity	6.67	.801	106

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	Trade	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000								
Intmemberships	-.120	1.000							
Gdp	.002	.417	1.000						
Freedom	.206	-.610	-.244	1.000					
Humanrights	-.328	.510	.213	-.804	1.000				
Totalmilitary	.052	.334	.723	-.097	-.047	1.000			
Trade	.180	.380	.870	-.147	.087	.652	1.000		
UNmembership	-.080	.408	.117	-.253	.211	.203	.137	1.000	
Contiguity	-.453	.161	.000	-.274	.421	-.147	-.333	-.051	1.000

Coefficients:

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	.017	.008		2.227	.028
Contiguity	-.002	.001	-.203	-2.114	.037

Excluded Variables:

	Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation
Militarygdp	-.019 ^a	-.177	.860	-.017
Intmemberships	-.060 ^a	-.614	.541	-.060
Gdp	-.027 ^a	-.279	.781	-.027
Freedom	.067 ^a	.668	.505	.066
Humanrights	-.012 ^a	-.116	.908	-.011
Totalmilitary	-.070 ^a	-.719	.474	-.071
Trade	-.111 ^a	-1.091	.278	-.107
UNmembership	-.142 ^a	-1.488	.140	-.145

UNMEE(a)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.001231882452	.0038101097354	42
Militarygdp	2.020	1.1555	42
Intmemberships	2590.31	1690.218	42
Gdp	202920.12	327636.297	42
Freedom	2.69	1.944	42
Humanrights	9.60	3.768	42
Totalmilitary	.01059102	.026224555	42
Trade	16.6319	34.00743	42
UNmembership	43.50	13.897	42
Contiguity	6.62	.987	42

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmembership	Gdp	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	Trade	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000	-.101	-.009	.186	-.329	.118	.096	-.029	.182
Intmemberships	-.101	1.000	.655	-.621	.614	.089	.477	.383	.297
Gdp	-.009	.655	1.000	-.151	.169	.614	.778	.347	.218
Freedom	.186	-.621	-.151	1.000	-.837	.298	-.035	-.070	-.406
Humanrights	-.329	.614	.169	-.837	1.000	-.371	.033	.153	.351
Totalmilitary	.118	.089	.614	.298	-.371	1.000	.515	.255	.129
Trade	.096	.477	.778	-.035	.033	.515	1.000	.232	.067
UNmembership	-.029	.383	.347	-.070	.153	.255	.232	1.000	.167
Contiguity	.182	.297	.218	-.406	.351	.129	.067	.167	1.000

Coefficients:

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	.023	.002		10.546	.000
Contiguity	-.003	.000	-.847	-10.087	.000

Excluded Variables:

	Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation
Militarygdp	.142 ^a	1.704	.096	.263
Intmemberships	.040 ^a	.453	.653	.072
Gdp	.023 ^a	.259	.797	.041
Freedom	-.002 ^a	-.026	.979	-.004
Humanrights	-.057 ^a	-.626	.535	-.100
Totalmilitary	.006 ^a	.069	.945	.011
Trade	.046 ^a	.544	.590	.087
UNmembership	-.049 ^a	-.571	.571	-.091

UNMEE(b)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.000391962598	.002207985248	132
Militarygdp	2.668	3.3056	132
Intmemberships	1683.02	1545.583	132
Gdp	158220.29	491510.202	132
Freedom	3.47	2.174	132
Humanrights	8.95	4.020	132
Totalmilitary	.00594437	.016359017	132
Trade	11.8214	34.99126	132
UNmembership	39.86	15.807	132
Contiguity	6.58	.950	132

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	Trade	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000	-.166	-.075	.339	-.330	-.015	.023	-.184	-.051
Intmemberships	-.166	1.000	.516	-.586	.470	.289	.433	.362	.235
Gdp	-.075	.516	1.000	-.234	.197	.545	.599	.139	.124
Freedom	.339	-.586	-.234	1.000	-.830	.025	-.109	-.144	-.335
Humanrights	-.330	.470	.197	-.830	1.000	-.117	-.010	.183	.388
Totalmilitary	-.015	.289	.545	.025	-.117	1.000	.447	.199	.107
Trade	.023	.433	.599	-.109	-.010	.447	1.000	.164	-.228
UNmembership	-.184	.362	.139	-.144	.183	.199	.164	1.000	-.013
Contiguity	-.051	.235	.124	-.335	.388	.107	-.228	-.013	1.000

Coefficient:

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	.008	.001		6.287	.000
contiguity	-.001	.000	-.467	-6.021	.000

Excluded Variables:

	Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation
Militarygdp	-.062 ^a	-.798	.427	-.070
Intmemberships	.093 ^a	1.162	.247	.102
Gdp	.015 ^a	.196	.845	.017
Freedom	-.062 ^a	-.757	.450	-.066
Humanrights	.040 ^a	.477	.634	.042
Totalmilitary	.011 ^a	.144	.886	.013
Trade	-.092 ^a	-1.158	.249	-.101
UNmembership	-.055 ^a	-.706	.481	-.062

UNMISSET(a)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.002023890833	.008723156304	35
Militarygdp	2.140	1.2386	35
Intmemberships	2455.14	1518.775	35
Gdp	361860.11	838493.344	35
Freedom	2.94	1.814	35
Humanrights	9.51	3.951	35
Totalmilitary	.01312820	.029536307	35
Trade	1630.6074	3550.05745	35
UNmembership	46.63	13.410	35
Contiguity	6.54	.561	35

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	Trade	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000	-.171	-.156	.539	-.549	.069	-.072	-.083	-.350
Intmemberships	-.171	1.000	.445	-.498	.432	.339	.288	.465	.070
Gdp	-.156	.445	1.000	-.213	.205	.492	.897	.102	-.174
Freedom	.539	-.498	-.213	1.000	-.915	.327	-.056	-.277	-.287
Humanrights	-.549	.432	.205	-.915	1.000	-.319	.021	.283	.322
Totalmilitary	.069	.339	.492	.327	-.319	1.000	.554	.176	-.275
Trade	-.072	.288	.897	-.056	.021	.554	1.000	-.038	-.420
UNmembership	-.083	.465	.102	-.277	.283	.176	-.038	1.000	-.058
Contiguity	-.350	.070	-.174	-.287	.322	-.275	-.420	-.058	1.000

UNMISSET(b)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.000524712438	.004483280357	135
Militarygdp	2.468	2.4964	135
Intmemberships	1750.19	1561.697	135
Gdp	163885.86	495606.456	135
Freedom	3.37	2.058	135
Humanrights	8.75	3.897	135
Totalmilitary	.00596534	.016945743	135
Trade	572.8881	1944.46638	135
UNmembership	41.76	16.100	135
Contiguity	6.70	.670	135

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	Trade	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000								
Intmemberships	-.157	1.000							
Gdp	-.073	.518	1.000						
Freedom	.368	-.585	-.232	1.000					
Humanrights	-.461	.472	.199	-.865	1.000				
Totalmilitary	.003	.360	.544	.046	-.119	1.000			
Trade	-.028	.331	.864	-.102	.061	.591	1.000		
UNmembership	-.113	.310	.133	-.119	.156	.189	.073	1.000	
Contiguity	-.156	.049	-.096	-.180	.297	-.219	-.214	-.044	1.000

UNAMSIL(a)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.009225650177	.022206257703	36
Militarygdp	2.236	1.2109	36
Intmemberships	2155.39	1716.269	36
Gdp	182825.39	357955.350	36
Freedom	3.36	2.031	36
Humanrights	8.61	3.789	36
Totalmilitary	.01141503	.027505279	36
Trade	3.5997	12.70764	36
UNmembership	41.56	15.419	36
Contiguity	6.56	1.054	36

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	Trade	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000	-.013	.003	.175	-.207	.051	.003	-.080	.165
Intmemberships	-.013	1.000	.770	-.563	.504	.125	.578	.369	.308
Gdp	.003	.770	1.000	-.210	.132	.532	.658	.373	.206
Freedom	.175	-.563	-.210	1.000	-.846	.226	-.185	-.176	-.403
Humanrights	-.207	.504	.132	-.846	1.000	-.360	.100	.062	.263
Totalmilitary	.051	.125	.532	.226	-.360	1.000	.191	.283	.155
Trade	.003	.578	.658	-.185	.100	.191	1.000	.197	.082
UNmembership	-.080	.369	.373	-.176	.062	.283	.197	1.000	.077
Contiguity	.165	.308	.206	-.403	.263	.155	.082	.077	1.000

Coefficients:

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	.068	.022		3.139	.003
Contiguity	-.009	.003	-.426	-2.747	.010

Excluded Variables:

	Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation
Militarygdp	-.289 ^a	-1.905	.066	-.315
Intmemberships	-.146 ^a	-.894	.378	-.154
Gdp	-.120 ^a	-.753	.457	-.130
Freedom	.071 ^a	.412	.683	.071
Humanrights	-.015 ^a	-.093	.927	-.016
Totalmilitary	-.082 ^a	-.519	.607	-.090
Trade	-.050 ^a	-.314	.755	-.055
UNmembership	-.051 ^a	-.325	.747	-.056

UNAMSIL(b)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.002535293178	.012241527681	131
Militarygdp	2.782	3.6925	131
Intmemberships	1729.70	1594.200	131
Gdp	224875.10	939163.530	131
Freedom	3.47	2.178	131
Humanrights	9.10	3.936	131
Totalmilitary	.00687363	.019930966	131
Trade	2.1453	8.88543	131
UNmembership	39.03	15.860	131
Contiguity	6.68	.671	131

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	Trade	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000	-.159	-.033	.353	-.350	-.017	-.041	-.166	-.077
Intmemberships	-.159	1.000	.462	-.584	.476	.356	.537	.390	.270
Gdp	-.033	.462	1.000	-.203	.193	.728	.320	.150	.109
Freedom	.353	-.584	-.203	1.000	-.853	-.037	-.217	-.185	-.313
Humanrights	-.350	.476	.193	-.853	1.000	-.036	.140	.142	.225
Totalmilitary	-.017	.356	.728	-.037	-.036	1.000	.277	.229	.129
Trade	-.041	.537	.320	-.217	.140	.277	1.000	.190	.085
UNmembership	-.166	.390	.150	-.185	.142	.229	.190	1.000	.070
Contiguity	-.077	.270	.109	-.313	.225	.129	.085	.070	1.000

Coefficients:

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	.047	.010		4.691	.000
Contiguity	-.007	.001	-.366	-4.460	.000

Excluded Variables:

	Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation
Militarygdp	-.116 ^a	-1.417	.159	-.124
Intmemberships	.017 ^a	.199	.843	.018
Gdp	-.007 ^a	-.090	.929	-.008
Freedom	-.021 ^a	-.245	.807	-.022
Humanrights	-.003 ^a	-.038	.969	-.003
Totalmilitary	-.004 ^a	-.048	.962	-.004
Trade	.007 ^a	.081	.936	.007
UNmembership	.019 ^a	.233	.816	.021

UNOSOM II(a)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.004064955857	.005932304426	17
Militarygdp	2.241	1.3721	17
Intmemberships	1723.82	1185.449	17
Gdp	158196.24	238403.848	17
Trade	4.6012	9.54159	17
Freedom	3.18	1.811	17
Humanrights	9.12	3.689	17
Totalmilitary	.01027718	.015085271	17
UNmembership	35.94	13.493	17
Contiguity	6.71	.470	17

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Trade	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000	.055	.080	.041	.110	-.257	.277	.006	.010
Intmemberships	.055	1.000	.790	.616	-.514	.544	.328	.364	.445
Gdp	.080	.790	1.000	.836	-.423	.410	.487	.068	.393
Trade	.041	.616	.836	1.000	-.481	.463	.230	-.159	.307
Freedom	.110	-.514	-.423	-.481	1.000	-.752	.033	.064	-.450
Humanrights	-.257	.544	.410	.463	-.752	1.000	-.064	-.005	.166
Totalmilitary	.277	.328	.487	.230	.033	-.064	1.000	.142	.351
UNmembership	.006	.364	.068	-.159	.064	-.005	.142	1.000	.204
Contiguity	.010	.445	.393	.307	-.450	.166	.351	.204	1.000

UNOSOM II(b)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.000544127949	.002529790667	127
Militarygdp	2.974	3.2513	127
Intmemberships	1221.14	1145.637	127
Gdp	134207.28	443089.207	127
Trade	2.5668	11.29927	127
Freedom	3.63	2.107	127
Humanrights	9.08	3.661	127
Totalmilitary	.00615360	.014873123	127
UNmembership	33.85	14.970	127
Contiguity	6.59	.894	127

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Trade	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000								
Intmemberships	-.141	1.000							
Gdp	-.071	.488	1.000						
Trade	.217	.085	.101	1.000					
Freedom	.280	-.540	-.211	.059	1.000				
Humanrights	-.370	.462	.214	-.150	-.780	1.000			
Totalmilitary	-.031	.325	.555	.072	.009	-.105	1.000		
UNmembership	-.159	.459	.118	.100	-.185	.086	.211	1.000	
Contiguity	-.100	.212	.129	-.251	-.338	.245	.140	.040	1.000

UNPREDEP(a)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.000668594803	.001666532567	22
Militarygdp	2.214	1.3403	22
Intmemberships	1927.95	1136.023	22
Gdp	142209.95	162272.972	22
Trade	21.2900	42.01312	22
Freedom	2.59	1.764	22
Humanrights	9.77	4.140	22
Totalmilitary	.00935027	.013349448	22
UNmembership	44.86	7.428	22
Contiguity	6.68	.477	22

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Trade	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000								
Intmemberships	-.219	1.000							
Gdp	-.036	.453	1.000						
Trade	.507	-.146	.132	1.000					
Freedom	.284	-.627	-.224	.209	1.000				
Humanrights	-.547	.690	.265	-.267	-.868	1.000			
Totalmilitary	.454	-.140	.420	.829	.193	-.342	1.000		
UNmembership	.336	.374	.451	.346	-.103	.042	.331	1.000	
Contiguity	.186	-.517	.117	.029	.517	-.424	.204	-.215	1.000

Coefficients:

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	.013	.004		3.082	.006
contiguity	-.002	.001	-.549	-2.937	.008

Excluded Variables:

	Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation
Militarygdp	-.022 ^a	-.110	.913	-.025
Intmemberships	.216 ^a	.990	.335	.222
Gdp	-.003 ^a	-.015	.988	-.003
Trade	-.164 ^a	-.871	.395	-.196
Freedom	-.084 ^a	-.378	.710	-.086
Humanrights	.204 ^a	.985	.337	.220
Totalmilitary	-.121 ^a	-.626	.539	-.142
UNmembership	-.104 ^a	-.531	.601	-.121

UNPREDEP(b)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.000121562691	.000743697345	121
Militarygdp	2.754	3.1096	121
Intmemberships	1163.41	1123.347	121
Gdp	135161.50	464386.080	121
Trade	19.5207	73.70645	121
Freedom	3.56	2.029	121
Humanrights	8.94	3.859	121
Totalmilitary	.00628416	.016050123	121
UNmembership	35.08	15.767	121
Contiguity	6.65	.989	121

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Trade	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000								
Intmemberships	-.136	1.000							
Gdp	-.071	.469	1.000						
Trade	-.006	.332	.282	1.000					
Freedom	.330	-.498	-.220	-.218	1.000				
Humanrights	-.366	.353	.167	.086	-.766	1.000			
Totalmilitary	-.032	.292	.540	.204	.029	-.135	1.000		
UNmembership	-.179	.488	.123	-.033	-.192	.131	.193	1.000	
Contiguity	.036	-.227	-.013	-.410	.277	-.104	.041	-.022	1.000

Coefficients:

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	-9.987E-5	.000		-1.064	.289
intorg	1.903E-7	.000	.287	3.274	.001

Excluded Variables:

	Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation
Militarygdp	-.011 ^a	-.119	.906	-.011
Gdp	-.181 ^a	-1.842	.068	-.167
Trade	-.148 ^a	-1.599	.112	-.146
Freedom	-.071 ^a	-.704	.483	-.065
Humanrights	.117 ^a	1.248	.215	.114
Totalmilitary	-.139 ^a	-1.520	.131	-.139
UNmembership	-.045 ^a	-.449	.654	-.041
Contiguity	-.035 ^a	-.391	.697	-.036

UNPROFOR(a)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.011764103260	.012897285257	33
Militarygdp	2.383	1.5600	33
Intmemberships	2022.39	1240.712	33
Gdp	194569.09	277573.580	33
Freedom	2.45	1.641	33
Humanrights	9.79	4.106	33
Totalmilitary	.00941100	.012662286	33
Trade	203.9630	433.54294	33
UNmembership	40.61	9.994	33
Contiguity	6.58	.502	33

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	Trade	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000	.023	.149	.051	-.254	.364	.376	.315	.118
Intmemberships	.023	1.000	.682	-.641	.680	.112	.416	.436	-.619
Gdp	.149	.682	1.000	-.389	.327	.511	.583	.339	-.297
Freedom	.051	-.641	-.389	1.000	-.783	-.012	-.197	-.179	.621
Humanrights	-.254	.680	.327	-.783	1.000	-.222	.121	.117	-.500
Totalmilitary	.364	.112	.511	-.012	-.222	1.000	.743	.325	.040
Trade	.376	.416	.583	-.197	.121	.743	1.000	.274	-.204
UNmembership	.315	.436	.339	-.179	.117	.325	.274	1.000	-.016
Contiguity	.118	-.619	-.297	.621	-.500	.040	-.204	-.016	1.000

UNPROFOR(b)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.003346684548	.008642991924	116
Militarygdp	3.010	3.6124	116
Intmemberships	1213.48	1095.925	116
Gdp	144424.91	460361.559	116
Freedom	3.53	2.083	116
Humanrights	8.84	4.145	116
Totalmilitary	.00690977	.015318858	116
Trade	201.8666	873.48286	116
UNmembership	34.61	13.692	116
Contiguity	6.55	1.189	116

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables)

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	Trade	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000	-.099	-.067	.181	-.320	.007	-.029	.004	.027
Intmemberships	-.099	1.000	.488	-.580	.457	.326	.514	.426	-.200
Gdp	-.067	.488	1.000	-.266	.216	.535	.393	.094	-.046
Freedom	.181	-.580	-.266	1.000	-.802	-.054	-.232	-.142	.280
Humanrights	-.320	.457	.216	-.802	1.000	-.096	.191	-.001	-.292
Totalmilitary	.007	.326	.535	-.054	-.096	1.000	.281	.204	-.027
Trade	-.029	.514	.393	-.232	.191	.281	1.000	-.006	-.260
UNmembership	.004	.426	.094	-.142	-.001	.204	-.006	1.000	.079
Contiguity	.027	-.200	-.046	.280	-.292	-.027	-.260	.079	1.000

Coefficients:

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	-.001	.001		-1.003	.318
Intmemberships	4.158E-6	.000	.527	5.392	.000
Trade	-2.869E-6	.000	-.290	-2.965	.004

Excluded Variables:

	Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation
Militarygdp	-.012 ^b	-.139	.889	-.013
Gdp	-.152 ^b	-1.567	.120	-.146
Freedom	-.088 ^b	-.846	.399	-.080
humanrights	-.037 ^b	-.392	.696	-.037
Totalmilitary	-.152 ^b	-1.714	.089	-.160
UNmembership	-.067 ^b	-.691	.491	-.065
Contiguity	.029 ^b	.336	.738	.032

UNTAET(a)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.005431902544	.014712575706	41
Militarygdp	2.207	1.2980	41
Intmemberships	2477.41	1708.811	41
Gdp	441248.15	1477648.840	41
Freedom	2.90	1.882	41
Humanrights	9.76	3.583	41
Totalmilitary	.01397383	.031927193	41
Trade	1205.2090	2544.82228	41
UNmembership	44.34	12.864	41
Contiguity	6.63	.536	41

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	Trade	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000	-.088	.088	.376	-.393	.095	.231	.035	-.330
Intmemberships	-.088	1.000	.501	-.514	.478	.277	.346	.368	.210
Gdp	.088	.501	1.000	-.198	.212	.722	.789	.180	.105
Freedom	.376	-.514	-.198	1.000	-.894	.154	-.018	-.105	-.234
Humanrights	-.393	.478	.212	-.894	1.000	-.186	.007	.116	.343
Totalmilitary	.095	.277	.722	.154	-.186	1.000	.732	.218	-.133
Trade	.231	.346	.789	-.018	.007	.732	1.000	.014	-.244
UNmembership	.035	.368	.180	-.105	.116	.218	.014	1.000	-.018
Contiguity	-.330	.210	.105	-.234	.343	-.133	-.244	-.018	1.000

UNTAET(b)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.001687181851	.008512395375	132
Militarygdp	2.782	3.6783	132
Intmemberships	1732.50	1588.429	132
Gdp	226744.48	935818.564	132
Freedom	3.42	2.148	132
Humanrights	9.11	3.921	132
Totalmilitary	.00701463	.019920728	132
Trade	602.2887	2019.66877	132
UNmembership	38.80	16.028	132
Contiguity	6.70	.676	132

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	Trade	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000								
Intmemberships	-.159	1.000							
Gdp	-.033	.463	1.000						
Freedom	.346	-.579	-.203	1.000					
Humanrights	-.350	.477	.193	-.851	1.000				
Totalmilitary	-.018	.356	.727	-.037	-.034	1.000			
Trade	-.016	.376	.819	-.144	.120	.681	1.000		
UNmembership	-.164	.380	.144	-.158	.137	.212	.096	1.000	
Contiguity	-.060	.087	-.008	-.200	.366	-.154	-.149	-.023	1.000

ONUB(a)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.001629123757	.004603580069	38
Militarygdp	1.882	1.0915	38
Intmemberships	1415.29	1090.494	38
Gdp	115166.71	305090.812	38
Freedom	3.79	1.663	38
Humanrights	7.63	3.157	38
Totalmilitary	.01041876	.031594816	38
Trade	.7342	1.85980	38
UNmembership	48.42	10.171	38
Contiguity	6.50	.507	38

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	Trade	UNmembership	Contiguity
Militarygdp	1.000	.068	.095	.254	-.542	.160	.177	.186	.369
Intmemberships	.068	1.000	.560	-.320	.137	.370	.438	.394	.494
Gdp	.095	.560	1.000	.144	-.247	.950	.648	.292	.330
Freedom	.254	-.320	.144	1.000	-.792	.271	-.018	.018	-.096
Humanrights	-.542	.137	-.247	-.792	1.000	-.359	-.050	-.076	-.118
Totalmilitary	.160	.370	.950	.271	-.359	1.000	.675	.288	.290
Trade	.177	.438	.648	-.018	-.050	.675	1.000	.310	.169
UNmembership	.186	.394	.292	.018	-.076	.288	.310	1.000	.556
Contiguity	.369	.494	.330	-.096	-.118	.290	.169	.556	1.000

ONUB(b)

Descriptive Statistics:

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Troopindex	.000445371962	.002492628698	139
Militarygdp	2.127	1.7368	139
Intmemberships	1776.40	1604.794	139
Gdp	170481.58	513621.068	139
Freedom	3.39	2.097	139
Humanrights	8.63	3.871	139
Totalmilitary	.00584122	.017695590	139
Trade	1.3376	4.12807	139
UNmembership	44.07	15.576	139
Contiguity	6.59	.946	139

Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables):

	Militarygdp	Intmemberships	Gdp	Freedom	Humanrights	Totalmilitary	Trade	UNmembership	Contiguity
Troopindex	1.000	-.107	-.054	.362	-.459	.032	-.058	-.039	.040
Militarygdp		1.000	.508	-.566	.507	.262	.487	.280	.256
Intmemberships			1.000	-.222	.194	.549	.465	.135	.134
Gdp				1.000	-.845	.058	-.172	-.070	-.237
Freedom					1.000	-.131	.118	.090	.210
Humanrights						1.000	.272	.183	.104
Totalmilitary							1.000	.115	-.213
Trade								1.000	.052
UNmembership									1.000