

AN EMERGENT FORM OF EXISTENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS
THROUGH A DIALECTICAL PROCESS OF
ACT AND AGENCY

By

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"Gradually it has become clear to me what every philosophy so far has been; the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; also that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant has grown" (Nietzsche, 1968:203).

This inquiry essentially represents an attempt to understand myself in relation to others and the environment. I have focused on the development of consciousness, for without understanding how people may become conscious and how they may construct reality, I would have little understanding for topics concerning social change and radical movements.

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CHAPTER I

FOCUS OF THE INQUIRY

Overview of the Inquiry

This study is an inquiry into the structural condition which may give rise to an existential mode of consciousness. A theoretical model is constructed in an attempt to account for such a formation. The variables of the model are consciousness, act and agency. The format of this inquiry will be to develop first the theoretical foundation for each of these concepts. Chapter II is a consideration of consciousness from a perspective of Hegel and Marx. The latter part of the chapter develops the foundation of an existential mode of consciousness as it is interpreted from Nietzsche's writings. Chapter III focuses on the theoretical foundation from which the variable of agency is developed. The major focus in this chapter centers on Weber's either/or evaluation which basically presents the alternative of an increased ability to meet human needs which would be accompanied by an increase of bureaucracy and, hence, domination or a decrease in bureaucracy or domination, hence the ability to meet human needs. This either/or appraisal is evaluated and other alternatives are suggested. Chapter IV is a theoretical consideration of the variable of act. The primary focus is directed toward a dialectical perspective which enhances one's realization and power of transformation. After these variables of

consciousness, agency and act have been considered, the theoretical model will be presented.

The model in its general form presents three levels of consciousness which are sensual consciousness, self-consciousness, and universal self-consciousness. For purposes of this study only the first two levels of consciousness shall be considered. At each of these levels there exists four types of intraconsciousness. In the general model there will be a total of eight ideal types of consciousness.

As a test of the general model, a particular model is devised to be tested in two educational institutions. In this testing model the variables, act and agency, were dichotomized into a high and a low form. The first concern of the research project was to operationalize the variables of a low act so that it could be represented by an educational institution which was open and flexible in meeting the interests of its students. A high agency was to represent an institution which modeled itself after a tightly structured bureaucratic form. After these designations are made, the variable of act is operationalized into majors. Within each institution there will be a high and a low act. Without going into further detail, this should give the general impression of the structural character of the research design.

To measure the variable of an existential consciousness a questionnaire was written which focused on the major existential concepts of freedom, choice and the will to power. This questionnaire, along with the PIL and other newly devised scales, was administered to various groups of students within the low and high agencies. Additional information was gained through interviews and researching the written rules and regulations of the various agencies. The format of Chapter V

will present the theoretical model and discuss the eight modes of emerging consciousness, while Chapter VI will present the testing model and the research methodology. In Chapter VII the data will be presented in the form of a consideration of the criteria used in selecting the variable of act and agency. Chapter VII will also involve a consideration of the propositions. The final chapter will focus on the central thesis of the model which states that for those who are engaged within a situation characterized by a low act and low agency will on the average exhibit the greatest amount of existential consciousness.

Significance of the Problem

At present a major school of influence in organizational life in general and Sociology in particular is the belief that the individual is not capable of making decisions for himself. This assertion is argued from on basically two levels. First, it is believed that most individuals are not capable of making the proper decision. And secondly, that even if individuals are capable of making the proper decision, they will not be able to know the decisions of others, and thus could possibly, in the act of choosing, embark upon courses of duplication and not make the most efficient choice. The central concern within a perspective of this type evaluates "proper" and "efficient" as to how well it serves the ideal of a secure state. Security and safety for one class is often based upon the struggle of another class. This study is intended to inquire into the types of consciousness that may emerge from various combinations of acts and agencies. The primary form of consciousness studied is existential consciousness. Existentialism tends to place the actor in the middle

of the stage where he is held responsible for his decisions. Contrary to this belief is the perspective that regards individuals to be appendages of a larger external order that must be manipulated and managed into position.

Throughout society today, institutional structures seem threatened at their very core. We are confronted with this basic premise: Institutions are in the process of transformation. Through various structural combinations of acts and agencies, what type of transformation can we envision? If we are to actively support situations where individuals become the central focus of concern, then situations leading to a developing existential consciousness will be a primary consideration.

CHAPTER II

CONSCIOUSNESS: A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical basics from which the variable of consciousness shall be defined in this study. Consciousness shall be interpreted in a transcendental sense with a major emphasis on purposeful, self-directed action. When consciousness is considered from this perspective, two prominent theorists quickly come to mind: They are Hegel and Marx. In regard to Hegel, particular attention will be devoted to the path of consciousness as it evolves through its stages of sensual-consciousness, self-consciousness and a universal self-consciousness. The particular format which will be followed in the section on Hegel will be to consider his analysis of consciousness as it was developed in the Phenomenology of Mind and then to consider the means to obtain this mode of consciousness as he expressed it in Geist.

Marx shall be considered for his analysis of the means through which one becomes conscious. In many ways Marx may be thought of as reacting in a dialectical manner to the system Hegel had developed. In Marx's analysis Hegel's concept of the Universal was applied to a class formation, and Hegel's concept of Geist was brought into a materialistic perspective through his concept of praxis.

A third aspect of consciousness will be considered from the theoretical foundation developed by Nietzsche. It is his conception of consciousness and the means Nietzsche expressed to obtain a self-mastery or to experience a will to power that will act in this study as the theoretical foundation for the meaning of an existential mode of consciousness. The first concern will be to state the core meaning of consciousness as it will be used in this study and then to consider how it was interpreted by Hegel's predecessors and contemporaries. Particular attention will be given to Descartes and Kant concerning their analyses of consciousness.

Consciousness: Prior to the

Phenomenology of Mind

To be conscious is to be conscious of something. If this something is of the same element or condition, then the process of consciousness will not change. That something is assumed to be something different. The question of how one becomes conscious has been a central point of concern throughout history. Consciousness throughout this study will be defined as the mediation process which occurs between the in-itself and the for-itself or the representation of the thing and the concept of the things or a mediation of what Kant referred to as the phenomena and the noumena. The focal point of this inquiry has been well expressed by Hegel: "Consciousness, we find distin-
guishes from itself something, to which at the same time it relates
itself; or, to use the current expression, there is something for
consciousness..." (1967:139).

For Descartes consciousness was a process where the objects

impressed their forms upon the mental process. This aspect of philosophy developed into various forms of empiricism of which a most notable strand was developed by Berkely. From this perspective man was viewed as a unit who received impressions from external objects.

Kant, in partial reaction to Descartes, quickly set out to correct the belief that objects impress forms upon the consciousness in Critique of Pure Reason. From the preface to the second edition Kant states:

Hitherto it has been assumed that all of our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore, make trial whether we may not have more success in the task of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge (1958:16).

The mode of analysis or path of mediation by which objects become known falls upon the path of experience which undergoes a process of understanding. This process of understanding, for Kant, followed a set form of a priori rules.

For experience is itself a species of knowledge which involves understanding; and understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects being given to me, and therefore as being a priori (1958:16-17).

Kant's mode of analysis allowed him to reformulate Descartes' question. For Kant everyone knew the real world as a unity for themselves. The phenomenon was a construction of reality as it was for that person through a field of experiences. What was left unknown to the subject and which one had no control over the material of the outside world was expressed as noumena. Kant had thus placed man in the position of knowing the world in its phenomena form but not being capable of knowing the world in its noumena form. What Kant had

achieved in philosophy was basically to bring man, the subject, back into a mediating relationship with the environment. From this development, Hegel was particularly aware of this reflective act of a transcendental position.

Two other contemporaries which Hegel carefully studied were Fichte and Schelling. Fichte posited the absolute Ego as the starting point of all knowledge. In opposition to this absolute Ego, he contracted a non-ego which, through the opposition, knowledge was possible. Schelling tried to improve on the subjectivism of Fichte by positing institution as the unifier of knowledge.

In so doing, he suppressed the opposition between subject and object and asserted their unity beforehand, without tracing back in a reductive thinking process the cognitional experiences of consciousness to their original ground (Novickas, 1968:91).

Hegel

The environment and influences which Hegel was participating in during his life were centered upon the issues which Kant, Fichte, Schelling and others considered to be a worthy endeavor. Their mode of analysis was directed to the act of consciousness and the relationships man engaged in to become aware of himself and his world.

Hegel quickly goes to his contemporaries in the preface to the Phenomenology of Mind to state that their contentions, however popular, are misdirected. Those who have used an absolute in the determination of the thing in-itself as being incapable of being understood or as forms of the absolute ego or a purely subjective basics are for Hegel short of the task of science. What these views share are a fear of the truth.

It starts with ideas of knowledge as an instrument, and as a medium and presupposes a distinction of ourselves from this knowledge. More especially it takes for granted that the Absolute stands on one side, and that knowledge on the other side, by itself and cut off from the Absolute is still something real; in other words, that knowledge, which, by being outside the Absolute, is certainly also outside truth, is nevertheless true—a position, which, while calling itself fear of error, makes itself known rather as fear of the truth (1967:133).

The task which Hegel has set before him to "bring philosophy nearer to the forms of science—that goal where it can lay aside the name of love of knowledge and actual knowledge" (1967:139).

The Phenomenology of Consciousness

The central thesis of this section states that for Hegel the mode of domination develops from the process of work from which objectifications and reifications emerge with the resulting observation that an elimination of this domination cannot be overcome, Aufheben, in other acts of works but can only be transcended through the process of Geist. Consciousness then is a process which evolves through this process first realizing itself in its immediate forms and then enters into a struggle of desires which culminate in a struggle of domination which is most commonly referred to as the master-slave relationship and can only find its fulfillment in the unification of subject and object in the mode of a universal self-consciousness.

The Phenomenology of Mind did much in bringing philosophy closer to the state of being transformed. It acted as a unifier or rational thought as it attempted to synthesize all previous philosophies. It had noted the essential character of science and philosophy to be a self-transcendental act. In this process Hegel noted the following:

Man appropriates knowledge and understanding and becomes conscious through the unifying act of his own direction and in this act of mediation the object of contemplation or experience enters into this mediation with self as the whole process takes on a different meaning.

For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what to it is true, and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth (1967:141).

The first stage of consciousness Hegel referred to as sensual consciousness which consisted of sense certainty, perception and understanding. All three of these modes of consciousness were only partial truths. They were found in their immediate state which is to say they lacked a unification of subject and object.

The second stage of consciousness notes the distinction of self and in this stage of self-consciousness, Hegel developed the theme of a master-slave relationship. This section is probably one of the most often quoted and has served as a source of revolutionary understanding (Marx, 1972; Sartre, 1971; Memi, 1965; Fanon, 1968). At the beginning levels of this consciousness the self conceives of itself as a mere object and treats others as mere objects. As it becomes aware of itself, it must also realize that there are other selves. In this recognition there is an ensuing struggle for domination. "Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness—that is to say, it is only being acknowledged or 'recognized'" (1967:229).

History for Hegel moved in a dialectical process which remains in an ongoing movement through man's desires. Desire is not a singular universal theme but is composed of several competing components which

bring out the total engagement of man. Desire brings to the front what it is that man is willing to engage in; and through this process man becomes aware of what type of engagement he will become a part of. From this desire action is the expression of man's negation. "The individual, who has not staked his life, may, no doubt, be recognized as a Person; but he has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness" (1967:233).

The master engages in this fight to be recognized by others (slaves) as being superior. This recognition is illustrated through the slave's work which is performed for the master. Within this context the master attempts to be recognized by slaves and have others work for him which becomes the restricting and denying relationship for further growth. The master is encased within his own tomb. If the master is to be recognized by slaves, then one must determine the nature of the relationship. It must be clear by now that the master has contempt for his slaves and surely thinks less of them for their inability to enter into the fight. Thus, the recognition that the master receives is the very recognition he demands but cannot consider worthy of his status because it comes from slaves. If the master would be recognized by other masters, then it would not be a master recognizing another master, which would call for one performing the other's work because this relationship is found only between masters and slaves and not between master and master. The master would prefer death rather than recognize another superiority. For Kojève, "mastery is an existential impasse" (1968:46).

The slave is one who preferred work for another rather than death. The slave is placed in an inferior position where he suppresses his

his desires for another and, in so doing, comes to a point of nothingness. From this realization of nothingness, the slave begins to live for himself. What seems to be the tomb for the slave becomes the expression of life. Work is the motion whereby man engages in the act of expressing himself through a becoming process which will bring to his own an understanding (self-consciousness) and freedom.

Labour, on the other hand, is desire restrained and checked, evanescence delayed and postponed; in other words, labour shapes and fashions the thing...The consciousness that toils and serves accordingly attains by this means the direct apprehension of that independent being as its self (Hegel, 1967:238).

From this relationship of the master-slave scenerio the foundation of Hegel's conception of work as an objectification process which he considered as a process of alienation is developed and the dialectical process of transformation is outlined. The stages of this process are developed first through a struggle of desire which occurs in the realm of the immediate and is followed by the struggle of domination. Domination, as it is expressed here, is performing work for another. The dialectical process is developed as the slave first becomes an object or thing external from self and through this objectification a concomitant process of reification occurs. The point at which Hegel leaves us within the stage of self-consciousness is that the means of transformation are present for the slave to overcome his condition of a thinghood. The actual overcoming process for Hegel does not occur in the working process but through the further development of an inward self-consciousness.

The third stage of consciousness as Hegel described it was the stage of a universal self-consciousness which was obtained through the

mediation of dependent and independent relationships. This process was generally referred to by Hegel as Geist. It is the unification of subject and object without a process of domination. For Hegel this was achieved through the unification of spirit and reason.

Geist

Solomon (1972) has succinctly focused his attention on the development of this concept. He argues that Hegel's development of Geist was directly concerned with replacing Kant's conception of the individual ego. Solomon attempts to support this contention by pointing out the use of a technique referred to as methodological solipsism, which Descartes, Kant and Hegel all used as a starting point of their philosophies.

For Hegel, the transcendental ego, as Geist, is a literally general or universal consciousness, as it ought to have been for Kant. Hegel's Geist is Kant's ego without the unwarranted claim that there is one ego per person. Geist is simply the underlying unifying principle of consciousness and, at the same time, the underlying rational will 'behind' all practical reason and action (Solomon, 1972:148).

For further clarification of this concept one should understand the meaning which Hegel assigned to reason. Baille (1967), in his introduction, outlines the meaning as consisting of a reflective and intuitive process consisting along side of each other. Reason involves a cognitive process of full awareness but only in the general sense. Reason is inseparable from the person.

It (reason) can be reflective when we consider the aspect of distinguishing and relating elements involved; and intuition when we consider the aspect of uniting these differences into a single whole. But there are, after all, aspects; the function is one and individual. Reason is therefore 'mediate' and immediate in its operation and wherever it operates this holds true. This means, however, that as a function it is

self complete; directing itself and determining itself (1967:42).

As Bernstein (1971) has so clearly pointed out, we must not blur Hegel's conception of reason with the Humean terminology that has managed so well to permeate our understanding of the term. For the meaning Hume gave to reason, "separates it from experience and the passions, and conceives of reason as a faculty of individual men that has no inner contaus or dynamic force of its own" (Bernstein, 1971:15). For Bernstein Geist is a process of development which people gain through experience and action.

For the development of Geist to reach absolute truth, it would have to encounter self-negation which emerges from objectification and which is considered by Hegel in turn to cause alienation. Through this process of the dialectic, Geist is a negative power of self-activity. The unity of reason and spirit gives rise to a universal self-consciousness. And, in achieving this movement, one has come full circle, which is to say, consciousness fully understands itself.

Marx

In the master-slave relationship the critique of domination for Hegel occurred through the working process. This section will develop the thesis that Marx considered the process of domination occurring through an alienated working environment that was purposefully created by a minority, the bourgeois class, in an effort to appropriate surplus value. Work for Marx was not an alienating process in-itself but a transforming process that developed one's consciousness. The vehicle of transformation was not to be found in a Geist of an inward movement

but through an outward movement of revolutionary change. This was to be achieved, as Marx understood it, through the process of a praxis. The first concern of this section will be to explore how Marx came to view the proletariat as the universal class and then to consider the process of praxis.

The Proletariat: The Vehicle of Transformation

Marx's early development may be generally referred to as a period of intense study through which he came to a point where he was able to critique Hegel and, as he thought, go beyond him. To do this Marx would have to transform philosophy from a speculative task to a mode of action. While he completed his degree at the University of Berlin, Marx continued to study philosophy and maintain his associations with the Young Hegelians. Through this association he came into contact with groups within the Young Hegelians who wanted to take the study of philosophy out of the past, or what had occurred, and project it into the future. Cieszkowski, a member of the Young Hegelians, firmly spearheaded this attempt of applied philosophy. To do this he had to reinterpret Hegel's conception of matter. "In Cieszkowski's system matter can no longer remain, as in Hegel, the opaque expression of spirit in self-alienation, its opposite negation" (Avineri, 1968:128). Cieszkowski's vision of an applied philosophy clearly was in tune to what Feuerbach and Marx would later develop in their concept of praxis. At this time, however, the Young Hegelians lacked a vehicle to express the realization of the forthcoming transformation. For the moment this group was at an impasse. While the Young Hegelians practiced their critique, Marx attempted to complete his understanding of philosophy.

When philosophy reached the point of realizing itself, it in turn abolished itself in the expression of reality. This is achieved when philosophy is able to represent reality for it is based upon the assumption that in recognizing reality a dialectical process involves a change in reality and also a change for those who witness it. "This philosophy is, according to Marx, the Hegelian system, and therefore before Marx could move into praxis, he had to perfect philosophy only in order to transcend it" (Avineri, 1968:137).

To achieve this end Marx strove to attain an adequate knowledge of reality in order to change it. The vehicle that would emit this change was developed in the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. In this critique Marx testified to the insights of Hegel in describing the rise of the modern state.

The criticism of the German philosophy of right and of the state, which was given its most logical, profound and complete expression by Hegel, is at once the critical analysis of the modern state and of the reality connected with it, and the definitive negation of all the past forms of consciousness in German jurisprudence and politics, whose most distinguished and most general expression, raised to the level of a science, is precisely the speculative philosophy of right (O'Malley, 1970:xxviii).

In this Critique Marx analyzed Hegel's work using three techniques. The one that probably gave him the most insight into this analysis was the transformational method that was so well utilized by Feuerbach in "Provisional Theses for the Reform of Philosophy". Feuerbach simply describes the method of criticism of Hegel's speculative philosophy as the need "to make the predicate into the subject...in order to have the undisguised, pure and clear truth" (1970:xxix). This could be easily illustrated in speculative philosophy where the statement might be made that God made man in the likeness of himself. When the transformative

method is applied, the statement would read: Man makes God in the likeness of himself. Another technique Marx used in the Critique was a textual analysis where he would cite paragraphs from Hegel's work and then analyze them. This process, in part, accounts for the rather lengthy critique. The third technique was the use of a historical approach which essentially analyzed what was being said to the actual record of history (Avineri, 1968).

With the publication of the Critique, many of Marx's concepts and outlines of his later works were already present in their essential forms. By this time he had outlined his concepts of the proletariat as representing the universal class and had called for the abolition of private property. This is to suggest that Marx's concept of socialism and communism were not developments of his later writings. In response to Hegel's treatment of bureaucracy as the representative of the universal class, Marx adopted the concept of a universal class and associated it not with a bureaucracy but with those who sought to work towards the universal interests of society. In dialectical fashion the particular class is a group who attempts to gain satisfaction not for universal needs and objectives but for particular needs and objectives. Speaking of the universal class, Marx saw that their:

...aims and interests must genuinely be the aims and interests of society itself, of which it becomes in reality the social head and heart. It is only in the name of general interests that a particular class can claim general supremacy (Avineri, 1972:8).

Marx's analysis of the development of classes points out that, up until that time, classes existed as particular classes and that it was not until that time a universal class appeared. He associates the attributes of the general interest of all, the universal, with the

proletariat. Avineri's (1972) discussion of this point is extremely enlightening as he points out that Marx's original contention of class did not emerge from an economic consideration but emerged from a confrontation with Hegel's use of the concept of universal class. In regard to property Marx simply called for the abolishment of private property, or for the particular class to come to realize what was already a reality for the universal class.

The call for an overcoming of the state may be found as early as 1844 in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts. Engels did call for a "withering away," but Marx acted from his own conceptions and Hegelian influences and called for an aufheben of the State. While Hegel viewed the state as an outgrowth from the Spirit, Marx viewed the state as an organizational structure that came into being to appropriate surplus value. The state acted to protect the interests and privileges of a particular class who owned the means of production and who controlled private property. For Marx the social division of labor and inequality through society sprang from the need for this particular class to protect its interests. In regard to the term aufheben, it is a primary concept utilized by Hegel. "This Hegelian term is, of course, the crux of the dialectical system: it implies not only abolition but also transcendence and preservation" (Avineri, 1972: 13). Avineri sees this response by Marx as a direct aufheben of Hegel's position.

Only by abolishing the state as a particular institution can the ultimate aim of the Hegelian state, i.e., universality be truly realized. Marx's abolition of the form of the state is aimed at preserving the universalistic content of Hegel's idea of the state, and Marx's socialism is nothing else than Hegel's political theory ultimately aufgehoben-abolished and preserved (Avineri, 1972:13).

With the publication of the Critique the germinal seeds for Marx's future thought and course of scholarship became firmly grounded. No longer could there be any doubt that Marx had radically broken from the Hegelian paradigm. By this time the anomalies that Marx had personally experienced and observed could no longer be accounted for within the system as Hegel had written it. As editor of several journals and newspapers, he personally experienced censorship and closure. He witnessed that the state fined peasants for using dead wood from the forests to burn during the winter months. His personal life and encounters kept him abreast of social strife and the concerns of daily life. He was cognizant of the conflicts within society. While the Young Hegelians had brought their critique as far as it would go, they stood at an impasse trying to fit Hegel's method into an active encounter of ongoing events. Feuerbach, using the transformation method, masterfully critiqued the state of existing speculative philosophy. At this time Marx set himself the task of analytically noting those points of agreement and disagreement with Hegel. This scholarly exercise has been the point of many recent accounts on the relationship and contribution Hegel had on Marx (Hook, 1936; Marcuse, 1969; Lichtheim, 1971; Dupre, 1966; Hyppolite, 1969; Avineri, 1968, 1972; Schroyer, 1973). Marx understood the need to first embark on a study of philosophy and then realized the need to implement it. By 1844 he had the essentials of his philosophical basis, the vehicle for transformation, an outline of social change and now proceeded to critique the existing conditions. Marx was firmly engaged in the pursuit of a praxis. "We have begun to see how Marx's concept of praxis is a dialectical transformation of Hegel's Geist; it would be impossible to make sense of praxis without

the Hegelian background" (Bernstein, 1971:50).

Praxis: The Method of Transformation

Through the development of praxis, Marx had created a revolutionary concept. Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach," especially the last three, testify to this revolutionary insight. For Marx the major obstacle, confronted by both idealistic and materialistic philosophies, was the inability to bridge the gap between subject and object.

Marx argues that all epistemological theories hitherto propounded either held that ultimate reality is impenetrable to human cognition, or suggested that consciousness is a mere reflection of reality (Avineri, 1968:148).

Through the development of praxis Marx believed that man became both a subject and an object. The process in which this was brought about, or the aufheben, is not through the development of self-consciousness as it is realized in the formation of a Geist but is brought about through the human endeavors of man through his labors. Praxis for Marx centered in human activity. The distinction between Geist and praxis also explains the different conceptions each man developed toward the process of alienation. Briefly stated, Hegel saw the development of alienation as a process occurring from labor. He regarded labor as being alienated because man was always out-pacing the available economic resources by his ever-expanding needs. More essential to his conception of alienation was the process of externalization which implied that man became separated from his products. For Hegel, if alienation was to be overcome, it would not be in the forms of work or the resulting social relations but through the process of attaining self-consciousness which has been expressed in Geist.

Marx regarded the inability of philosophy to understand or overcome alienation because it had, up to that time, regarded alienation in some form or another as a theoretical problem. In so doing, the only recourse left open for them was to resolve alienation through a mental process which ended in the development of consciousness. The implication clearly was that one should change one's consciousness. The casual factor in the development of alienation for Hegel was the objectification process. Marx regarded this as a necessary process but not the casual factor. The focal difference between Hegel and Marx resulted in the development of estrangement which was for Marx the casual factor producing alienation. Estrangement was firmly placed in the social-historical arena of man's environment. Although alienation sprang from the economic conditions, its manifestations were vibrated through the social and psychological composition of man. The concept of praxis is central to understanding what Marx considered to be alienation. It was not merely objectification that caused alienation but rather a breach in the ability of man to express himself.

It is not the fact that the human being objectifies himself inhumanly in opposition to himself, but the fact that he objectifies himself in distinction from and in opposition to abstract thinking, that is the posited essence of the estrangement and the thing to be superseded (Marx, 1972:8).

Marx acknowledges his debt to Hegel for understanding labor as an essential aspect of man and is appreciative of his development of the master-slave relationship but simply sees Hegel as staying within the realm of modern political economy. Through this shortcoming, Hegel only focused on positive aspects of labor. The mystique that ties the essential composition of a commodity and the resulting transitions that ensue in a capitalistic economy is the central point of concern in

Marx's analysis of political economy. At various times the charge has been made that Marx can be divided into early and late Marx, usually indicating that he drastically changes from a philosopher to an economist. This does not seem justified, as it has been indicated, Marx first felt it necessary to bring philosophy to a close so that it would transform itself. This mode of development or praxis is further based upon the intention of understanding the ongoing transaction of society which, for Marx, centered in the division of labor as he sought to determine who acquires the surplus value of the labor process. The task of Capital was to demystify the realm of political economy. The earlier themes were germinated in The Critique and Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and the German Ideology and were also present in Capital. Another work that actually served as a preparation for Capital, and which took approximately 13 years of research, was Grundrisse. This work, which was approximately 1000 pages, was not discovered until the outbreak of the Second World War.

The unmasking of this mystique of commodities was thoroughly undertaken in Capital and may be seen as a further development and articulization of Marx's radical scholarship. In this unmasking Marx develops the concept of fetishism, which suggests that the value of the commodity does not originate in its use value but in the psychological conception of the work to be performed, the amount of time spent on the production of the product and the resulting social forms and interactions that take place. The mystique originates when the social relationships of work are replaced by the relationships of men via their products.

A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because

in it the social character of men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labor is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. This is the reason why the products of labour become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses...There is a definite social relation between, and that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the products of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities (Marx, 1967:72).

Labor for Marx was not an alienated activity in itself as it was for Hegel but rather an essential expression of the species in which a transformation process occurred. "By this activity on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his way" (Marx, 1967:177). When this process is divorced from the worker, estrangement occurs in which man becomes divorced from the products he produces, from other men he works with and from himself. This is achieved through the appropriation of labor through the installment of wages, when the laborer sells his labor for a determined period of time and, by so doing, relinquishes his control over the product. Also, influencing the nature of the working process is the accompanying state of technology. Marx saw alienation arising from the social conditions of the working process where those who owned the means of production directed the various organizations of the society to appropriate the surplus value of the commodities for themselves.

To alleviate this condition, Marx advocated a restructuring, a revolution of the existing structures, of society. Marx's conception of history was different from Hegel's conception of Spirit.

It has not, like the idealistic view of history in every period to look for a category, but remains constantly in the real ground of history; it does not explain practice from the idea but explains the formation of ideas from material practice; and accordingly it comes to the conclusion that all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticisms, by resolution into 'self-consciousness' or transformation into 'apparitions', 'spectres', 'fancies', etc., but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations which give rise to this idealistic humbug, that not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history, also of religion, of philosophy, and all other types of theory (Tucker, 1972:128).

The mode of expression one utilizes is of primary importance in forming one's consciousness. For Marx one of the most vital modes of expression was the working or labor process. It was through this mediation that one changed nature and, in turn, changed oneself. Marx believed it was not the consciousness of men that determine their being, but on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness. Social being constituted those modes of expression which occurred in human interaction. Alienation was that process which interfered with the full unfolding and active creative processes that man undertook in his ongoing projects. The point of concern Marx focused on was to understand those conditions in which labor manifested itself. From this view he saw the inequality in society being perpetuated through the alienating labor process that was constructed to benefit the particular interests of the few.

Nietzsche

To conclude the chapter on consciousness, Nietzsche will be considered for his insightful analysis of 20th century man and the means he prescribed to become conscious of self. Nietzsche diagnosed the forthcoming age as one of nihilism. While for Hegel the means of realizing a universal self-consciousness was through Geist and for Marx it was developed through a praxis, Nietzsche proposed another means of transformation. He expressed the vehicle for aufheben as occurring through the process of a re-evaluation of morals. The means through which this would be achieved, as declared by Nietzsche, was through the will to power. The format of this section will be to consider the prognosis of nihilism, the corresponding psychological traits of dependency and independency as Nietzsche described them in his re-evaluation of morals and finally the means to self-mastery which he described as the will to power.

Nihilism: The Inability to Experience Self

Nietzsche diagnosed his age as losing the ability to experience self. He saw this process eroding away through the inability of man to mediate his own experiences. Directly related from this loss was the growing fragmentization of life, which for Nietzsche, stood at the brink of nihilism. Through this realization he believed that men shrank from the task of self-responsibility and slid into the herd for comfort where they would be cuddled by blinders.

Previous forms of mediation were guarded in other historical times with a guiding ideology to which Nietzsche referred. In the 17th

century man searched for universal laws to account for his own being and purpose. The 18th century witnessed self-expression where man was held to have dignity in himself and where he would construct social settings for the betterment of man. At the close of this century Condorcet's statement of a continual chain of progress announced a well integrated ideology of progress. Hegel developed his system of rational thought in the early part of the 19th century and Marx spoke of scientific socialism. Nietzsche observed this as the state of nihilism where what had once stood as a various foundation for belief and justification of action was swept out from underneath man. It is as though man was supporting himself with the aid of crutches. These crutches can be labeled a belief in universal laws, the idea of man as having a purpose or mission, the theme of special progress and evolution ascending to greater heights, and the last crutch which man was resting on in hopes of maintaining his posture was based on the faith of various religions. These crutches were removed from man and this is one way of viewing nihilism.

The illusion of continual progress was challenged by Nietzsche's principal of eternal recurrence. Rational systems were challenged as he directed his analysis to the unconscious. Socialism was viewed as a mass movement of the herd. The final support which man rested upon was religion and Nietzsche described this as the death of God. When man believes he lacks the means of self-expression, he is at the heart of nihilism. This principle of nihilism is the counterpart of Hegel's as well as Marx's alienation.

Nihilism as a psychological state will have to be reached, first, when we have sought 'a meaning' in all events that is not there: so the seeker eventually becomes discouraged.

Nihilism, then, is the recognition of the long waste of strength, the aging in vain, insecurity, the lack of any opportunity to recover and to regain composure-being ashamed in front of oneself, as if one had deceived oneself all too long...What all these motions have in common is that something is to be achieved through the process-and now one realizes that becoming aims at nothing and achieves nothing (Nietzsche,1968:12).

Nihilism asserts itself in three manifestations. The first is the realization that the universe can go on existing without man's direction, which is at the heart of the transition of what has been described as the shift from the Ptolemaic world, where man stood at the center of the world and the sun revolved around the earth to a perspective of the Copernican world where man and the earth took their place in relation to a larger Universe. This realization has been further expanded by Einstein's world of relativity. Formerly held aims and purposes which man had elevated as guiding laws collapsed with the realization that "man (is) no longer the collaborator, let alone the center of becoming" (Nietzsche, 1968:12). A second principle is the shattering of a formerly unified constructed belief system. For such attempts to build a system upon certain basic assumptions is subjected to close scrutiny where "the well being of the universal demands the devotion of the individual-but behold, there is no such universal" (Nietzsche, 1968: 12). A third manifestation of nihilism comes to be displayed as a "disbelief in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any belief in a true world" (1968:13). Nihilism is characterized by a state of nothingness where once held belief systems and constructions of reality are shattered. Morgan describes a nihilist as:

...man who judges of the world as it is, that it ought not to be, and of the world as it ought to be, that it does not exist. Accordingly, existing (acting, suffering, willing, feeling) has no sense: the passion of 'in vain' is the

nihilists' passion... (Morgan, 1943:53).

Nihilism as a psychological state is brought about when the ideals which man has can no longer be practiced. It is a void between the attainment of a praxis. This is but another illustration of the concept of alienation. It is a form of separation between the concept and the experience; and for Nietzsche man could begin to bridge this gap by calling for a re-evaluation of morals.

Re-Evaluation of Morals: The Master and
Slave Morality

The history of morals as Nietzsche saw them consisted of three stages. The first or premoral stage was primarily characterized by the consequences of an act which is to say it relied upon the consequences of the act. In this stage men generally live in close knit groups where the survival and social organizations centered around dependency. Thus, the consequences of the act as to its beneficial or harmful effects was the primary criteria of its morality.

It was rather the way a distinction or disgrace still reaches back today from a child to his parents, in China it was the retroactive forces of success or failure that led men to think well or ill of an action" (Nietzsche, 1968:234).

This stage of moral engagement was referred to as the "morality of mores" where customs and tradition served as the guiding concerns. The succeeding period was characterized by the intention of the act which marked an early attempt at self-knowledge.

Instead of the consequences, the origin: indeed a reversal of perspective! ...The intention as the whole origin and prehistory of an action almost to the present day this prejudice dominated moral praise, blame, judgement, and philosophy on earth (Nietzsche, 1968:234).

From this perspective of intention the focus was centered on the conscious realization of the act. This is the period which man has been engaged in since the beginning of history. To break this hold of the ongoing morality, Nietzsche called for an extra moral perspective which would again call for a reinterpretation of value.

...we immoralists have the suspicion that the decisive value of an action lies precisely in what is unintentional in it, while everything about it that is intentional, everything about it that can be seen, known, 'conscious,' still belongs to its surface and skin-which, like every skin, betrays something but conceals even more. In short, we believe that the intention is merely a sign and symptom that still requires interpretation-moreover a sign that means too much and therefore, taken by itself alone, almost nothing. We believe that morality in the traditional sense, the morality of intentions, was a prejudice, precipitable and perhaps provisional-something on the order of astrology and alchemy but in any case something that must be overcome. The overcoming of morality, in a certain sense even the self-overcoming of morality-let this be the name for that long secret work which has been saved up for the finest and most honest, also the most malicious conscience of today, a living touch-stone of the soul (1968:234-235).

The question becomes: What is the origin of the characteristics of a good and bad morality?

From the pre-moral period various acts which were considered to be effective and "good for the group" came to be established. And when violations occurred, one was treated with misgivings and revenge. From this encounter violations were treated as outcasts who were expected to repent; and in so doing, a sense of guilt was said to exist. As Morgan has commented "men mistook the sequence of guilt and punishment for those of cause and effect" (1943:147) In organized religion interpreters or guardians of these moral principles acted as overseers and inflicted guilt on their members. Nietzsche inquired into the source of these moral characteristics. His first point was that "there are no moral phenomena, there is only a moral interpretation of these

phenomena" (1968:149). Those who outlined the characteristics of good morality depend upon the position and occupation one held in society. The two major divisions he noticed in society were a morality existing for the masters and a different one for the slaves.

The master morality sets itself apart from the others and elevates the principles which ensure their position as being "good" and those which conflict as being "bad". It should be noted immediately that in the first type of morality the opposition of "... 'good' and 'bad' means approximately the same as noble and contemptible" (Nietzsche, 1968:394). Those primary characteristics of master morality involve an externalization and an assertive force from which the master projected himself over others. Those principles that cause one to be feared and respected, such as a striving for power, control or self-directiveness, are those which are morally good.

The other type of morality is one built around the herd where "good" moral characteristics are those which support the existence of the masses or herd. These virtues, which for the most part are absent such as a striving for power and other characteristics which support the impotent herd, as Nietzsche saw them, are submission and an inward drive to control and submit to others.

Those qualities are brought out and flooded with light which serve to ease existence for those who suffer: have pity, the compaisant and obliging hand, the warm heart, patience, industry, humility, and friendliness are honored—for here these are the most useful qualities and almost the only means for enduring the pressure of existence slave morality is essentially a morality of utility (1968:397).

Obedience, ability to complete tasks assigned, willingness to work with others, following directions, punctuality, not disturbing other, and expressing patience and putting in a hard days work are

characteristics of the good morality of the herd. A single word to describe this class of morality would be mediocrity. Nietzsche was careful to point out these two types of morality are seldom, if ever, found in their pure types. He used this scheme to illustrate his contention that those who were to experience themselves as the composer of their own reality were of one type while others lacked the force to experience self. This driving force was referred to as the will to power. Hegel saw the creative force coming out of a relationship between the master and slave as residing in the power of the slave. Hegel's justification was that in learning to control one's creative forces in the act of working for another, one also learns how to direct oneself and to realize the act of transformation which is involved in the act of work. Both Hegel and Kojève noted that a basic characteristic of the slave was the willingness not to enter into a dangerous struggle but to submit to another. Nietzsche, on the other hand, saw the process of transformation residing within the Master, for it was he who had the initiative to experience self through his outward movement. What both perspectives share is the recognition that one has to be the organizer and director of their own creations. This is what Marx called for as a basic criteria in overcoming alienation and the commodity form of fetishism in work and social relations. To experience self comes through a will to power.

Nietzsche's question, "What is Life?" is answered in his formula, "Life is the will to power" (1968:148). A major assumption of this concept is that within each person there are a host of competing desires, instincts, wills, interests, and experiences, and it is for the individual person to give orders to these competing forms which

entails assignment of a rank order. "The world viewed from inside, the work defined and determined according to its 'intelligible character'- it would be 'will to power' and nothing else" (1968:238). To be able to experience oneself, one would have to exercise the will to power. A mastery of the self is a necessary pre-requisite.

One has to test oneself to see that one is destined for independence and command-and do it at the right time. One should not dodge one's tests, though they may be the most dangerous game one could play and are tests that are taken in the end before no witness or judge but ourselves (1968:241-242).

A predominant trait of existentialism and one which Nietzsche outlines as necessary to achieve the will to power is a process of praxis where one experiences and practices what one believes. Nietzsche's method of experimentation called for a testing or a living and experiencing of what one thought life should be. The testing is a process of one acting out one's ideals in order to realize them. Nietzsche's life exemplifies this commitment. Thus Spoke Zarathustra is, in many ways, an amplification of Nietzsche's solitude and contemplation as he attempts to diagnosis the conditions of society. "Lo! I am weary of my wisdom, like the bee that hath gathered too much honey; I need hands outstretched to take it" (Nietzsche, 1971:3). There were few hands while Nietzsche was still in possession of all his faculties to receive his analysis. He had few close relationships for he thought that in order to achieve self-mastery he needed time for serious study, isolation and the ability to experience what he was writing.

In himself he has to suffer to the end the after effects of the social organisms, he has to do penance for the unsuitableness of existence condition, judgements and experience that were fitted for a whole, and finally he gets so far as to create in himself the possibility of his existence as an individual, by reorganization and assimilation, and by excretion of urges (Morgan, 1943:202).

This form of self-mastery that would emerge from this struggle in this extra-moral stage of valuation would be the overman or superman, one who would exhibit the will to power in order to experience self. Kaufmann has noted this in Nietzsche's writing as the "ultimate power... in controlling, sublimating, and employing one's impulses-not in considering them evil and fighting them" (1967:235). Frustrated attempts in the struggle to gain self-mastery can be seen by those who attempt to master others and also by those who submit to others. The will to power was illustrated in Nietzsche's writings in the confrontation between Dionysus and Apollo. One does not completely control the other but rather assists the other in an every-expanding relationship.

Nietzsche realized the ongoing dialectic of social change and valuation for the process of nihilism was eminent and yet there was ongoing attempts to camouflage nihilism which he recognized in the development of a different kind of philosopher clothed in the guise of science. In several instances Nietzsche classified philosophers into horizontal and vertical. Such philosophers who espoused adaptation, equilibrium and regarded man as a passive vehicle as expressed in a Darwinian-Spencerian manner were referred to as horizontal in their perspective. Another classification he sometimes used was to distinguish between philosophers and laborers. Laborers were those who worked from the past as exemplified in Kant and Hegel. These laborers were also similar to the horizontal philosophers in that both sought to conform to an established principle. Vertical philosophers were those who attempted to lift man from the herd into an exploration of oneself. Nietzsche clearly regarded himself as a vertical philosopher.

Hegel stood at the end of a paradigm and, in so doing, he acted as

the synthesizer of previous philosophies. His most fundamental assumption throughout his writing is that each philosophy had aspects of validity in themselves and it was for Hegel to bring all these partial immediate propositions into a well-integrated system of rational thought.

If Hegel can be a representative of the god Apollo, the counterpart may be found in Nietzsche as he represented the god Dionysus. Nietzsche observed the paradigm of Hegel and strove to counteract it. Hegel saw the development of his system in the rising up of the Spirit. Nietzsche formalized his efforts as the will to power. Hegel represented his force of change in his system in the word of aufheben which has caused much consideration and various interpretations. There are, however, three components that are most often associated with this concept which are: (1) the process of preserving, (2) the process of cancelling, and (3) the process of lifting up.

Nietzsche, in writing on the will to power, observed the process of change to occur when self-mastery was achieved. This process emerged as one could sublimate other competing wills and, in so doing, achieve an ordered rank. Through the process of sublimation other wills were not destroyed or omitted but were yet part of the composition of the will to power. The similarity between Hegel's aufheben and Nietzsche's sublimation has been noted by Kaufmann.

Nietzsche's 'sublimation' has imposed no similar hardship on his translators, who could use the English 'sublimating' which goes back to the same Latin root. The Latin root in question, 'sublimare' however, means in German-aufheben, and Nietzsche's sublimation actually involves, no less than does Hegel's aufheben, a simultaneous preserving, cancelling, and lifting up (1967:236).

Kosok also notes the relationship and use of aufheben in Hegel's writings and sees it as an essential component in non-linear logic.

However, unlike a simple identity logic, the mediation or negation of a term as a second term must have reference to the immediacy of which it is a mediation negation or result. Otherwise it would merely be another immediacy and not a mediation (1970:124).

The relationship of Nietzsche to existentialism for this paper may be briefly summarized. He was an individual who engaged himself in a process which he thought was necessary to achieve self-mastery. His life was a praxis characterized by a will to power which demanded a new re-evaluation of the existing moral conditions of society.

Through the process of re-evaluation of morals, Nietzsche withdrew from the mainstream of society and analytically stripped himself of the cultural symbols. In this stripping process, he came to question the obvious and the sacred for he believed it was necessary for the person to go through this in order to experience self. This process of re-evaluation of morals and the will to power is the underlying theme of what this study considers to be an existential consciousness.

Summary

For Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche consciousness was a process through which one could come to realize self as an independent and dependent being who is in the process of becoming. In the act of becoming there are various forms of domination which obstruct this process of consciousness. There are, however, means to go beyond this obstruction to gain a full consciousness. Hegel saw the development of consciousness residing in a universal self-consciousness and the means to go beyond the mode of domination which occurred from the working process, or objectification process, via Geist. For Marx the development of consciousness called for a recognition and enactment of all man's

species powers and the means to overcome the mode of domination, or the fetish of commodities, was through a praxis. Nietzsche expressed his path of consciousness to be realized when one could experience self and gain self-mastery. Consciousness for all three men involved: (1) the recognition that consciousness was an active process that must be directed by the individual person, (2) a mediation between the immediate and determinate, and (3) the unifier of these mediations was the active subject.

CHAPTER III

AGENCY: A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

Introduction

As the 19th century came to a close, there developed many challenges to the rational paradigm that was so well constructed by Hegel and Marx. Nietzsche may be viewed as a transition from the rational to the irrational perspective that developed in the early part of the 20th century. A few of the alternatives that were developed in response to the rational paradigm centered around (1) an existential perspective which focused on the individual rather than a system, (2) an environmental perspective which focused on the biological aspects of man and the environment, and (3) a perspective that concentrated on the irrational aspects of man. These three perspectives have been analyzed by Hughes and it will be his discussion with which this chapter will begin.

This chapter will essentially attempt to develop the theoretical perspective from which the variable of agency will be drawn. Agency will be drawn from Weber's analysis of bureaucracy. Once this has been developed, Weber's analysis will be treated as a critique of domination. Weber basically saw the increase of rationalization in an either/or aspect; i.e., either rationalization will increase with its ability to provide for greater human needs and, thus, domination will also increase or rationalization and the ability to meet increasing human needs will

decrease along with its domination. This either/or analysis will be examined in view of the developments occurring in Russia and a suggestion will be made that there are other alternatives to Weber's analysis.

Alternatives to a Rational Paradigm

The portrayal of consciousness which had emerged from Germany during the first half of the 19th century was firmly rooted in a rational perspective. The ability of man to consciously direct his actions and evaluate his experiences was fundamental to the general environment of the time. Hegel and Marx were supportive of the idea that man could rationally direct his own transformation.

In partial response to this engagement, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, who were contemporaries of that era, challenged the belief in the rational process. Sartre, in another way, challenged the ability of man to bridge the gap between the in-itself and for-itself. On the eve of the 20th century there had developed another challenge to the rational paradigm, as exemplified in the writings of Hegel and Marx. At this historical moment nation states were experimenting with holistic ventures of imperialism as they rushed to stake their claims on foreign soil. The rising forms of consciousness that were expected to occur among the proletariat, as Marx had written about it, did not occur. While the revolution did not materialize, there was a strong realization that Marx's critique could no longer be ignored.

The ability of man to direct his rational process was being questioned by another group who stressed environmental factors as a major casual factor in man's development. Various mutations of Darwin's theories emerged. For example, Spencer's "survival of the

fittest" meant that man must be left unregulated so that a natural process of selection would ensure the survival of the most valuable qualities for society.

Within all this there arose a notable and very influential group of thinkers who, on the one hand attempted to redirect Marx's analysis into a more conservative means and who on the other hand attempted to jar man loose from the confining and pre-determining confinements of his environment. Such is the interpretation of Hughes (1961) who has, in his portrayal of this epoch, constructed a valuable account of how this group of thinkers attempted to analyze their own epoch. It is a work concerned with how these analysts viewed human nature and how the process of reality formation occurs. Hughes viewed these thinkers as being concerned with the irrational not so much as to support this conception of man but more with the intention to control them.

Unquestionably the major intellectual innovators of the 1890's were profoundly interested in the problems of irrational motivation in human conduct. They were obsessed, almost intoxicated, with a rediscovery of the nonlogical, the uncivilized, the inexplicable...The social thinkers of the 1890's were concerned with the irrational only to exorcise it. By probing into it, they sought ways to tame it, to analyze it for constructive human purposes (1961:35-36).

Hughes considers this epoch from 1890-1930 as a major movement in intellectual thought. The major concerns of this epoch for these thinkers were in the area of inquiring into what the relationship between the conscious and unconscious might be, the relationship between consciousness and time, which were ultimate concerns in the area of epistemological inquiry and which were very much concerned with unmasking the ideological fibers of their time. These areas of interest are certainly evident in the individual interest of these men.

To come to terms with Marxism, then, was the first and most obvious task confronting the intellectual innovators of the 1890's. Some, like Freud dealt with Marx only by implication by extending social thought to new areas undreamed of in the socialist ideologies. Others, like Pareto, offered highly skeptical refutations of the central arguments of dialectical materialism. Still others, like Croce and Sorel, while maintaining the Marxist terminology, were to transmute it into something so different from the original intention as to leave little standing but a hollow framework—within which the earlier categories of thought had ceased to be actualities and had become mere symbols and methodological conveniences. Finally, a decade later than the rest, Max Weber was to propose a view of society that brought Marx's to the deepest spiritual values of mankind (1961:42).

The primary concern will be to understand Weber's position in regard to the formal organization of institutions and the effects it has on participating actors.

Weber: Characteristics of a Bureaucracy

Weber described the characteristics of a bureaucracy as a routine administration of duties based on a written body of rules that are carried out by officials. These officials are appointed to their office on the basis of their preparation and certification. These officers are regarded as experts of a specialized task and are placed in a hierarchial structure which is monocratically organized. As the position of the office matures, the person holding the office must change his activities from a part-time endeavor (avocation) to a full-time working capacity (vocation).

Weber saw the development of a bureaucratic structure dependent upon several contributing factors. The need for a consistent source of revenue was extremely important. The development of a money economy and the use of wages as a source of buying power helped to prepare the way for taxation and a continued source of funds. The idea of demos...

...in the sense of a shapeless mass, never governs larger associations, but rather is governed...Bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern mass democracy, in contrast to the democratic self-government of small homogenous units (1968:983-985).

Weber referred to this as a "leveling of the governed". Also important in the movement towards a bureaucracy is removing the means of production away from the workers, thus impeding individual action and making them more dependent upon the bureaucracy.

The person who enters the bureaucracy does not enter into a relationship as he may have done in past history. It is not a relationship of a noble and a king where personal charisma or a flexible schedule may be agreed upon. The person no longer enters and performs work as a part-time, non-encompassing environment. The bureaucracy calls the person to his office not on a part-time basis but on a full-time basis. One enters an office that has prescribed duties, responsibilities and expectations. The power of this position due to rank and status comes not from the person but from the office. And to relieve the office from the concerns of the masses, one should be appointed by a superior. From his position in the bureaucracy of the office, one is to serve it as a vocation.

For the bureaucracy to maintain its power, discipline was needed. Weber saw this in the form of money used as a salary, a position of rank and status, and tenure which clearly would outline one's career.

Taut discipline and control which at the same time have considerations for the officials sense of honor, and the development of prestige sentiments of the status group as well as the possibility of public criticism...With all this, the bureaucratic apparatus functions more assuredly than does legal enslavement of the functionaries (1968:968).

From this structure the bureaucracy was thought to be an efficient means of performing tasks assigned. For Weber it was the "means of

transforming social action into rationally organized action" (1968:987).

Further benefits from bureaucracy would, in essence, be "technical superiority".

Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material personal cost—these are raised to the optimum point in the strict bureaucratic administration, and especially in its monocratic form (1968:974).

To achieve these benefits, Weber stated that it must purge itself of human factors.

Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is 'dehumanized,' the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business, love, hatred, and all purely personal irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation (1968:975).

Fully recognizing the bureaucratic structure and its potential benefits for a modern state, one must also consider the relationship this type of structure has on individual social action. Weber was clearly cognizant of both and chose the form "efficiency" and bureaucratic order.

Under otherwise equal conditions, rationally organized and directed action (Gesellschaftshandeln) is superior to every kind of collective behavior (Marsenhandlen) and also social action (Gemeinschaftshandeln) opposing it (1968:987).

A Critique of Domination: Rationalization

In many ways this is a typical presentation of Weber's account of the bureaucratic structure. Its focus is on the ever-increasing demand for further rationalization of the social and economic order. In such a view what is implicitly assumed is that Weber was responding to the Marxian analysis; and further analysis generally supports an interpretation that develops their point of disagreement. There would be

little argument with the statement that Marx was concerned with a critique of domination. In this discussion of Weber, the assumption from which this presentation will begin is that Weber was concerned also with a critique of domination. From this initial assumption both Marx and Weber will be analyzed at their points of agreement which should add to our understanding of domination in the economic and political spheres. Cohen views Weber's development of rationality as fundamental to his central thesis.

That social relations of domination can no longer be adequately expressed through the categories of political economy and socio-economic class, but rather through analysis of political forms of domination and the state. (1972:65).

The major difference that separated these two men were their basic assumptions from which they proceeded to construct their critique. For Marx, alienation could be overcome through the revolutionary universal class struggle leading to a socialist system. Weber based his critique on the assumption that labor was an objectification of self; and at the point of objectification, labor becomes alienated. To Weber labor was not a means of liberation but was actually a mode of alienation. In addition, Weber stated that further rationalization was inevitable. Whereas socialism would alleviate the oppressed conditions of society for Marx, it would, for Weber, only achieve greater domination. Weber understood the essence of socialism to be built on the even greater need for centralized planning and coordination. The vehicle that would accomplish this would be the bureaucratic mode of organization.

To both Hegel and Marx the concept of mediation and the dialectic of transformation was of fundamental importance. The dialectical movement will be discussed in greater depth in the next chapter, but for

the present analysis the process of becoming is the movement from the immediate to the mediate. This is to suggest that the immediate state of the given is not the total process and has been often referred to by Marx as the second nature of things. His critique in Capital is an attempt to go beyond the given state of appearances where commodities are only a partial aspect of the total working process. Marx developed his critique on the premise that labor was a dialectical process which entailed both a subjective and objective transformation. Through the mode of capitalism Marx saw the development of commodities take on the aspect of the total process. This process of commodity fetishism came to represent the whole or total process. For Weber the dialectical process of transformation was not accepted and this is partially why he could not envision any alternative other than a continued and increased growth of the bureaucratic mode. He saw this process being achieved through an increase of rationalization. Without a mediation between the immediate and mediate, Weber followed a one-way directive. These are major points from which both men conceived their overall critique.

Weber's critique of domination centered on the development of the bureaucratic mode of organization which came to view people as an aspect of a larger whole. People came to be viewed as role players performing specified tasks to which they had no involvement or opportunity to direct their own activities. "Weber considered bureaucracy the most striking problem of modern social reality" (Cohen, 1972:71). Through his analysis he pointed out that a bureaucratic order was dependent upon a mode of calculation of quantifiable things which could be accounted for in various forms of rational bookkeeping. Furthermore, he believed an available surplus of social labor was needed and that it

was essential to divest the person of their means of production, which is to say, to have them working not for themselves but for the organization. To accomplish this, the use of the wage or salary was a necessary technique of domination. Weber interpreted this process as the leveling of the governed where the bureaucratic mode eventually came to dominate all facets of life. In an attempt to become objective, formal rationality is extended throughout the social structure of society. This critique certainly corresponds quite favorably with Marx's development of capitalism. His analysis of the rise of capitalism focused on a calculatable form of accounting, the army of the unemployed, separation of the means of production, wage labor and loss of control over one's creations.

Weber's critique of domination underscored the increasing amount of rationalization which manifested itself in the attitude that anything could be rationally accounted for in a given calculable system. Weber saw this process being brought on through a continual form of formal rationality which acted as a "principle of orientation of action to abstract, formal rules and norms to an impersonal order such that calculations can be made 'without regard for persons'" (Cohen, 1972:66). Through formal rationality Weber saw the displacement of means over ends. Thus, what started out as an effort to carry on transactions in the market place for commodities became a struggle to carry on transactions not for commodities but for profit. With further calculations of abstract forms, the drive for profit became an end itself. Marx's corresponding analysis was C-M-C' and M-C-M'. Further continuation of the means-over-ends displacement was noticed by Weber in the stress of efficiency over other aspects and the constant drive to quantify things.

Weber basically saw the social-cultural values of other historical eras being displaced by the drive for rationality. His disagreement with Marx on the class struggle and socialism as a means for transformation brought him to the concept of ethical responsibility for individual action. Weber acted from the given position that an increased amount of domination would follow through the auspices of the bureaucratic mode of organization. Weber dichotomized his analysis into trying to account for increased human needs through greater production and distribution techniques which in turn would have an increase in the amount of domination or a decrease in the ability to meet increased human needs and a concomitant decrease in domination.

According to Weber's analysis, however, the satisfaction of human needs would entail increased industrialization and centralized planning and this would have the unintended consequence of tremendously increasing bureaucratic domination (Cohen, 1972:78).

Increased Centralization: The Drive For Specialization

The critique of domination which Weber has offered could serve to sharpen the analysis of domination and its relationships to social organizations. Certainly in the 20th century we can see evidence of Weber's insightful analysis. Russia stands before us as a case in point. She attempted to adopt the technological means of production as they were being developed in the United States in an attempt to direct them to their own ends.

Consider the Bolshevik Revolution and its abortive attempt to transform the state from an organ of bureaucratic control to an organizational structure representing the needs of the people. Lenin's

program of "revolution", as outlined in the State and Revolution, called for a program that would debureaucratize its institutions. His plan called for bringing the decision-making process down to lower levels which could be partially achieved by elections and the power of recall. Lenin attempted to decrease the distance between the workers and the bureaucrats by instituting equal wages for both. Lenin thought this might level the distance between them "so that all may become 'bureaucrats' for a time and that, therefore, nobody may be able to become a bureaucrat" (Fleron and Fleron, 1972:72).

The organizational efforts to achieve the withering away of the state has for the U.S.S.R. yet to be achieved. The premise of transformation as directed by Lenin attempted to seize power away from one form of external authority and replace it with another mode of authority. Although the Bolshevik Revolution attempted to transform the state, it in fact supported another repressive bureaucratic structure. Fleron and Fleron have attributed this to three causes:

1. The conspirational, hierarchial nature of the party in pre-revolutionary led it to take on the forms, techniques, and mentality of the secret-police bureaucratic system which it sought to overthrow...
2. The process of role reversal during the dictatorship of the proletariat, according to which the proletariat would seize the reins of the bourgeois capitalist state apparatus in order to exploit their former exploiters, led to increased bureaucratization of the party.
3. ...the central core of the cultural revolution would be full-scale industrialization and expansion of machine technology of a capitalist model (1972:76-77).

Other programs which were initiated by Stalin and his successors still continue to act from the assumption that through the adoption of a technological means they can redirect it to their stated goals. From the Stalin era there was an increased amount of centralization

which was accompanied by further developments in the bureaucratic mode of social organization. The Russian government continues to implement a policy of bureaucratic growth and supports a policy of competition to increase its productivity.

The Soviet response to competition with Western Capitalism is two-pronged; it involves not only competition to produce, but also competition to consume (Fleron and Fleron, 1972:85).

Weber's critique of domination cited the ever-increasing repressive form of the bureaucratic organization. The alternatives, as he saw them, certainly pointed to the indication that Russia chose to attempt to meet her needs through the adoption of a bureaucratic mode of social organization. This is not to suggest that Weber's alternatives are the only ones to choose from. Before analyzing this confinement of Weber's analysis, attention will first be turned to the mode of technology called Taylorism as it developed in the United States and how it was supported in Russia. This is to serve as another illustration of the compatibility of organizational restraints and how they easily disregard national boundaries. Paul Piccone has commented on the similarity between Russia and the United States.

With respect to their attitude toward social change, although for different reasons, there is no difference between the two systems: both the Soviets and the Americans are under the ideological illusion of self-perfection. Even their accounts of each other are strikingly similar. While (enlightened) technocratic Western thought analyzes the repressive political system of the U.S.S.R. as essentially a function of economic and technological backwardness—a temporary state of affairs that will gradually disappear in proportion to the technological and industrial advancement of the country—in terms of the Stalinist logic the West also is to be left alone, for only then will the capitalist economy necessarily reach its unavoidable self-destruction in virtue of the working out of the internal contradictions of the system (1970:39).

In the United States the time-motion studies of F. W. Taylor were

refinements of task specialization which were originated by the management and then used to direct the activities of the laborer. In his principles of Scientific Management (1947) the essential foundation of his system began with the distinction between management and labor. Decisions related to planning the work activity were the responsibilities of the management and the laborer was expected to follow the routines prescribed by the manager. Taylor considered the enactment of the task idea the most important single element in modern scientific management.

The work of every workman is fully planned out by the management at least one day in advance, and each man receives in most cases complete written instructions, describing in detail the task which he is to accomplish, as well as the means to be used in doing the work (1947:39).

As an illustration of the principles of scientific management in action, Taylor describes the innovations which were applied in the Bethlehem Steel Company. When he entered the plant, the average amount of pig iron being moved by one man per day was twelve and one-half tons. Taylor studied the situation and through minute calculation believed he could have men loading approximately four times that amount per day. His first concern was to find the ideal man, train him and, for incentive to work harder, increase his salary and have him serve as an example for the other men. After watching the pig iron crew of 75 men, they chose one man who "had been observed to trot back home for a mile or so after his work in the evening, about as fresh as he was when he came trotting down to work in the morning" (1947:43-44). ~~This~~ man they referred to as Schmidt. It was also known that he was building his own home and was an exceptionally "close man", which is to say, he saved his money. To entice Schmidt to accept the offer of being a first-rate

man, which meant he would attempt to meet their requirements, was their first concern. After some persuasion, Schmidt accepted and indeed moved 47 tons of pig iron per day. In the course of persuading and instructing Schmidt the scientist used rather blunt and rough language. Taylor, however, explains his reasons.

This seems to be rather rough talk. And indeed it would be if applied to an educated mechanic, or even an intelligent laborer. With a man of the mentally sluggish type of Schmidt it is appropriate and not unkind, since it is effective in fixing his attention on the high wages which he wants and away from what, if it were called to his attention, he probably would consider impossibly hard work (1947:46).

Taylor viewed his system as one that would combine the interests of the laborer to that of the management. Under the auspices of the task assignment and piece rate for incentive pay, he thought that all would strive to achieve higher rates of production. An additional incentive, as he understood it, was that it would lessen any potential conflict between management and labor and thus be a means of social control.

The means of a bureaucratic mode of organization for the purposes of obtaining increased production was not rejected by Lenin. His concern was with increased production with the implicit assumption that as long as the workers shared in the increased products, it would be rewarding in itself.

The task that the Soviet government must set the people in all its scope is—learn to work. The Taylor system, the last word of capitalism in this respect, like all capitalist progress, is a combination of the refined brutality of bourgeois exploitation and a number of the greatest scientific achievement in the field of analyzing mechanical notions during work, the elimination of superfluous and awkward motions, the elaboration of correct methods of work, the introduction of the best systems of accounting and control, etc. The Soviet Republic must at all costs adopt all that is valuable in the achievements of

capitalism. We must organize in Russia the study and teaching of the Taylor system and systematically try it out and adopt it to our own ends (Fleron and Fleron, 1972:81).

Hegel, Marx and Weber: Critique of Domination

Domination occurs in many forms and effects men in different ways. To be dominated by one mode rather than another is still domination. If these three modes of analysis of domination are viewed as critiques of a form of obstruction to man's process of becoming, then perhaps a more penetrating analysis toward liberation may be forthcoming.

Hegel's analysis of the master-slave relationship points to the premise that domination occurs when another attempts to treat one as an object devoid of a subjectivity in an attempt to subjugate the others to a predetermined pattern or order. This is an effort to freeze an aspect of the total process into a rigid form. When this happens there is little attention directed to becoming which involves a mediation, which is to say, a transformation. Hegel's mediation occurred through a Geist. As we have noticed, this was an unacceptable tenant for Marx.

At this point it would be helpful to review a primary concern of the Marxian analysis and to evaluate its effectiveness for a critique of domination. A focal point of this analysis asks the question: Who owns the means of production? This has been a primary criteria used in helping to define class division and is assumed by some that if the "people" own the means of production, it will eliminate class division and will ultimately eliminate alienation. It seems that a principle of Marxian analysis states that the contradictions which arise between the productive force and the social relations of production will bring on the downfall of the capitalist system. Marx referred to this as a

basic contradiction within the capitalist system.

At a certain stage of their development the material forces of production in society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or-what is but a legal expression for the same thing-with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution (McLellan, 1971:196).

In view of Weber's analysis and the compatibility of the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. in adopting a bureaucratic mode of organization, Marx's analysis in this regard should be reconsidered.

Nor can we any longer assume that the autonomy of productive forces is sufficient for them to enter spontaneously into contradiction with the capitalist relations of production. On the contrary, developments during the last two decades rather lead to the conclusion that the productive forces are shaped by the capitalist relations of production and that the imprint of the latter upon the first is so deep that any attempt to change the relations of production will be doomed unless a radical change is made in the very nature of the productive forces, and not only in the way in which and in the purpose for which they are used (Gorz, 1972:27).

The awareness of this critique has caused much attention since the time of Weber. A former student of Weber's, G. Lukacs, noticed this development and drew from Marx's concept of commodity fetishism and Weber's concept of rationalization to develop his central thesis of reification (1968). Reification was a process in which society comes to view all its needs in terms of a commodity exchange. Through this calculated procedure social relations are subsumed into a rational bureaucratic mode of organization. Rationalization as a process of viewing the world and social relations has been a major concern of the Critical School.

Probably one of the most well-known members of this school in the U.S. is Marcuse. Recently there has been an historical study on the

Critical School or Frankfurt School from its origin in 1923 to 1950. This study is quite helpful in explaining the organizational structure and major concerns of this institute. Schroyer's account (1973) is an informative analysis of the various modes of domination as they are viewed from a Critical School perspective. His particular analysis is interesting as he points out that critical theory has reached an impasse that must now turn upon itself to regain its link with a political practice. Schroyer sees J. Habermas's analysis of cognitive interest and meta-communication as a vital ingredient in regaining its praxis.

Another alternative Weber failed to consider to this process of rationalization was the possibility that a mode of production could be utilized that would meet human needs and not be oppressive. For further consideration of this alternative one may gain a different perspective in studying the path the Chinese have embarked upon. Their attempt to debureaucratize social institutions and bring the productive forces into harmony with the needs of their people may be viewed as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Through the experiences of the Great Leap Forward the following four points were attempted.

1. The Stalinist mode of 'one man management' was rejected.
2. A development of the 'two-participation' was enacted to bring the worker and the administrator into a closer relationship where both elements participated in and with the other in decision-making situations.
3. The mode of 'triple combination' consisting of workers, technicians, and administrators was further developed to bring these factors of production into closer relationship. From this team aspect, they were responsible for making decisions in regard to technical and innovative matters.
4. The incentive system was rearranged to decrease material incentives and the accompanying competition and antagonism among workers (Fleron and Fleron, 1972:87-88).

When Weber is regarded in the light of a critique of domination, many of his insights help to develop an analysis of social organization. Although Weber presented his alternative in an either/or structure, it is hoped that through this discussion it is evident that we have a multiple of choices for our consideration. A vehicle that may serve to broaden our consideration from a linear mode of either/or though may be advanced through a dialectical analysis. The process of the act through a dialectical mediation will be the focus for the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

ACT: A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FROM A DIALECTICAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

In this chapter the dialectic will be discussed in relation to three aspects: (1) consciousness, (2) the relationship a dialectic establishes between self and the world, and (3) the basic assumptions on which a dialectic rests, which is to say, the logic of the dialectic. The dialectic is being studied in this paper for primarily two reasons: (1) to attempt to make the case that the dialectic is an integral part of a praxis through which one gives meaning to self and the world and (2) to state a few of the principles of the dialectic on which the rationale of the model ultimately rests. The discussion of the logic of the dialectic is presented in a wide scope to suggest the possible application and relationships a dialectical perspective may have on the various disciplines of logic, physics and psychology. The section will end with a statement on what it means for an act to be considered in a dialectical perspective and the implications this has for a sociological perspective.

The Dialectical Perspective:

A Process of Mediation

As Hughes (1961) pointed out, the decade of the 1890's and the intellectual theorists of that time could no longer ignore Marx. Although the influence of Weber has been great and realizing that the functionalist school exerted a great deal of influence in the academic areas, the Marxian challenge again threatens the consensus paradigms of American mainstream sociology.

A particular aspect of this challenge is emerging from those who believe that the process of consciousness occurs along a dialectical movement where people are at the center of their own reality construction. This active, ongoing process occurs within a social environment involving others and is located within a particular historical epoch with its concomitant modes of production. Particular emphasis has been placed on the dialectic and the revolutionary concepts of becoming. This dialogue has been sharply developed in the Eastern Communist countries, especially Czechoslovakia. Telos, under the editorship of Paul Piccone who has also written several articles on the dialectic (1970), Marxism (1971), and Phenomenology (1972), is also an active transmitter of eastern European thought. In a recent article which was translated for the Journal, Karel Kosik (1970) clearly and succinctly outlines the function of philosophy based upon a commitment to Marx and the dialectic.

Praxis Via Acts: View of Consciousness

The premise that Kosik starts with is the realization that there is

a separation between the phenomena and the essence. He refers to this as the representation and the concept. The assumption is that the thing-in-itself does not stand by itself or do we comprehend it as a thing-in-itself in its immediate form. What is needed is a critical analysis that studies the internal structure of the thing and how it relates and interacts with other components. He is insistent on not becoming a victim to misplaced concreteness or to view the world through a fetishized process. He develops his analysis along similar lines that Marx used in Capital. Reality construction for Kosik is not a one-way directive where people work to obtain goals that are independent of their creations and praxis. He believes that one comes to mediate one's reality through the modes of personal expression.

In the practical-utilitarian relationship with things—where reality reveals itself as the world of means, ends, tools, exigencies, and efforts to satisfy them—the individual creates for himself, in concrete contents, his own representation of things and elaborates a whole correlative system of notions which catch and fix phenomenal aspects of reality (1970:21).

The foundation of the dialectic attempts to understand how man transforms nature, the environment, himself and others and how in this process he comes to change himself. To understand this process, realizing Kosik's basic assumption that the given state of appearances are representations and not things-in-themselves, a detour must be made in order to go beyond their immediate state. It is through this detour that man often mistakes the representation for the thing-in-itself and comes to live in a world of "pseudo-concreteness". This is a realm that some people operate in and which Kosik refers to as a "world of chiarosuro of truth and fraud" (1970:22).

The dialectic brings the process of reality construction into a

personal encounter where the destruction of the pseudo-concrete reality becomes an actuality. This is achieved through the realization of a human praxis where reified representations are dissolved as each person comes to realize his own truth. "Each individual must-personally and without the possibility of someone else substituting for him-give-himself an education and live his life" (1970:28).

Within this realm transactions and manipulations occur through which they are portrayed through ideological filters and where "the world of fixed objects that give the impression of being natural conditions and are not immediately recognizable as the result of man's social activity" (1970:22). In realizing the importance of man's social activity, this human praxis becomes a vehicle of transformation in which there are no predefined givens which man attempts to initiate. The process of reality construction is a mediated activity arrived at through social relations.

The dialectic does not consider the fixed products, the configurations and the objects, and the whole of the reified material world as something original and independent. Similarly, it does not consider the world of representations and common sense to be so. It does not accept them in their immediate aspect. Instead, it submits them to an analysis in which the reified forms of the objective and ideal world are dissolved. Thus they lose their fixity, their natural character and pretended originality in order to show themselves as divorced and mediated phenomena, as sedimentations and products of the social praxis of humanity (1970:26).

Kosik is attempting to understand how humans acquire knowledge of the external world and themselves. He is in agreement with Marx for he believes we appropriate the world through praxis. Kosik's praxis involves the creation of an idea or form at which time the person acts upon that form and observes the resulting changes. He refers to this process as an "overcoming of naturalism".

The dialectic of the activity and passivity in human knowledge manifests itself first of all in the fact that man, in order, to know things in themselves, must first of all transform them into things for himself. In order to know things as they are independently of himself, he must first submit them to his own praxis. Man knows reality only to the extent that he creates human reality and behaves primarily as a practical being (1970:30).

When the dialectic is recognized as the focal point of man's activity, predefined structures and givens begin to lose the aura of a misplaced concreteness and enter into a relationship of personal encounter. Being is no longer a state of conformity but becomes a process of becoming.

A Dialectical Psychology:

The Self and the World

For Carl Ratner (1971) a dialectical psychology refers to a process of human activity that is based upon the world and in which "social orders are formed by people in coping with material conditions, and the individual born into this order rely on it for the basis of their activities" (1971:109). He regards this as a process of mediation occurring through material and social conditions. A dialectical examination of reality construction would consider the individual acting from a content of being-in-the-world within a particular historical epoch. The individual and the world environment are viewed as two co-determinate agents, i.e., to speak of one is to imply the other. Both are a part of a personal active, ongoing process of perception and reflection. Ratner basically believes the universe is generally portrayed through three conceptualizations: a mechanistic, an individualistic and a dialectic conception. His consideration of these perspectives are

interesting for it illuminates how a dialectical psychology may perceive its subject-object field of relations.

Considering the mechanical orientation Ratner sees this as a one-way directive usually consisting of a major casual factor which directs the outcome of the interaction. "If the latter owes its entire existence to the former it isn't anything in its own right; it has no substance or individuality, it is purely an extension of the cause" (1971:81). In the case of behaviorism the resulting reification centers on the world or the existing environment as the causative factor in producing man's consciousness or, as behaviorists might prefer, producing one's orientation.

The element of time within this perspective regards the present as the point of reference. What presently exists is regarded as that point of order with which other activities should be directed to comply. The historical development of such a reference point is often regarded as that point which has evolved from a long and tedious spiral of ever-increasing refinement.

The form of interaction emitting from this process becomes a one-way directive from the environment to the person.

One view-that of mechanical determinism-is that one aspect predominates over all others which are merely adjuncts of it. This aspect is said to determine the nature of the others which are subsumed in it (Ratner, 1971:83).

"Whatever we do, and hence however we perceive it, the fact remains that it is the environment which acts upon the perceiving person, not the perceiving person who acts upon the environment" (Skinner, 1972: 179). With this as his basis of behaviorism, Skinner illuminates the course of this one-way directive.

As a science of behavior adopts the strategy of physics and biology, the autonomus agent to which behavior has traditionally been attributed is replaced by the environment—the environment in which the species evolved and in which the behavior of the individual is shaped and maintained (Skinner, 1972:175).

A mechanistic perspective attempts to establish a set of pre-defined directives from which individual actors are regarded as receivers and imitators of a previously defined reality. The individual is not considered as an organizer or as an interpreter of the environment. Even less is he considered to be capable of redefining his reality through an interchange with his world and others.

As is often the case in trying to combat forms of a mechanistic perspective, a variant of individualism is used to express the freedom and aloftness of the person from the environment. Ratner considers this occurrence as an unacceptable attempt to understand the process of consciousness. As the individual becomes the predominant agent, Ratner sees the focus on individual interaction and formation of self as a projection of self over others and the existing environment. Essence and phenomenon are considered to emerge from personal interaction without recognizing the base or the world from which it rested. This point is oftentimes stressed to where the cultural vehicles of one's milieu is neglected in an attempt to highlight the freedom of the individual. Ratner points out that while mechanism ties the person to only the objects and stimuli of the environment, individualism does not consider the ties which bind man to his historical, materialistic world.

The weakness is that no basis is provided for the subject's activity which is considered to be a purely personal choice. This activity is wholly determined by the individual alone and is not influenced by any factor beyond himself (1971:94).

Ratner considers the individualist view of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre

to be representative of this perspective. For Merleau-Ponty there are no causes which can impress themselves upon a consciousness. Sartre states that the given conditions of society cannot restrict one's freedom.

While the mechanistic perspective takes these given conditions as the transmitter of consciousness, the individual perspective has a tendency to consider very lightly the existing historical framework and its developing process. This permits members of this perspective to construct their observation as if it would be the same irregardless of time and space. In so doing, a hazardous tendency might be to assume these conditions are ever present in all situations; and for some this may be interpreted as a component of human nature. If this becomes the case, attempts to eliminate these a priori forms would seem to be beyond the ability of man. To illustrate this point, Ratner cites from R. D. Laing's, The Divided Self, the technique of clinical biography.

We put the larger sociological issues in parenthesis as not of direct and immediate relevance to the understanding of how this girl came to be psychotic. Thus, I think the clinical biography that I shall present could be a working class girl from Zurich, of a middle class girl from Lincoln or a millionaire's daughter from Texas (Ratner, 1971:98).

For the individualist the given immediate world provides the pre-existing conditions from which a host of components and relationships are formed. It is the individual that rearranges the components and gives meaning and particular relevance to one's own reality. The underlying question becomes: How is the decision-making process enacted? Ratner recognizes this as defining, in general, the limits of a phenomenological and existential perspective.

For individual, then personal freedom always presupposes and relies upon a foreign impersonal setting which set the boundaries of action but does not intrude on the details. This

leaves the general quality of our acts fixed but also unexplained, unexamined, and vague, and it leaves the details of our acts capricious and inexplicable (1971:96-97).

Ratner sees this as the reason why existentialism and phenomenology "study how consciousness is organized but never what it is dealing with or why" (1971:97). In this way the forms of consciousness are studied but not their contents.

From a dialectical perspective where the individual and the world are co-determinates, the individual mediates his world through an active process that is able to transcend the world and himself. The person, through mediating the world, himself and others, changes himself and gives meaning to his life. A fundamental concept for dialectical psychology is praxis. In such a perspective the given conditions are ones to be negated in order to express vital life-flowing structures that correspond to growth and individual praxis. Ratner believes it is necessary to overcome the given structures, situations and confining orientation to achieve a praxis. Working in or conforming to the given puts constant pressure on the person not to explore or "to expand himself and see himself in new circumstances..." (1971:106).

Assumptions of the Dialectic

A brief overviewing of the dialectic is in order. Kosik centered his attention on the active acquiring powers of subjective mediations and the relationship it has to a dialectical process of praxis. Ratner illustrated what can happen when the initial discussion proceeds from a position holding that the individual and the world occupy two distinct positions external to each other. At this time the power of the dialectic may be brought into sharper focus through a discussion of its

logic. The first topic will be to analyze a distinguishing feature that separates classical from dialectical logic. To further illustrate this distinction, the writing of a notable living dialectical scholar and the implications a dialectical logic may have for the sciences of logic, physics and psychology will be considered. Writing primarily in an Hegelian fashion, Michael Kosok masterfully analyzes the explosiveness of the dialectic in a non-linear perspective.

The Logic of the Dialectic: The Fringe

Lenin has said the unity of opposites was the most important principle of the dialectical process. This principle basically affirms that the element is determined through its internal opposition. This has generally been regarded as a process of becoming. McGill and Parry believe the major distinguishing factor between classical and dialectical logic is the ability of dialectical logic to allow for the fringe which is that space in which opposites occur such that the two overlap. For the purpose of their exposition McGill and Parry clarify their meaning of opposites. "In this paper A and -A always stand for strict opposites, i.e., properties which cannot both be true of the same event E (except where E lies in a borderline or transitional range)" (1948: 420). This exception is precisely one of the principle differences distinguishing dialectical from classical logic. The implication of re-organizing this fringe area (borderline or transitional) calls into question two fundamental laws of formal logic: the law of the excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction. The concept of contradiction as the authors are concerned with it, implies a conflict which cannot be resolved or an engagement of two opposing forces which in a logical

sense generally implies that an impasse has been reached in which one position must give way to the other. McGill and Parry are interested in the latter meaning.

Two interpretations of the Unity of Opposites principle which cause classical logic some difficulties are:

1. In any concrete continuum, whether temporal or non-temporal, there is a middle ground between two contiguous opposite properties A and -A, i.e., a stretch of the continuum where it is not true that everything is either A or -A.
2. In any concrete continuum, there is a stretch where something is both A and -A (1948:421).

To illustrate this fringe area they use an analogy similar to the mathematical expressions developed by Black (1948). Let us imagine "we have a series of colors which can be divided into 10 segments which can be numbered successively from 1-10" (1948:429). The area 1-4 can be designated as red and the area 7-10 would be not-red. At what point does this transition occur. The area between 5-6 is generally thought of as overlap or fringe area. It is clear on this line that sections 1-4 excludes not-red and that 7-10 excludes red but the overlap represents an area of vague boundary lines and distinction. Attempts have been made to attribute this area of vagueness to the inadequate state of our measuring devices or, as Russell attempted to attribute other similar areas of vagueness, to an inadequate use of clear conceptual language symbols. Black has pointed out however that this vagueness may not be due to an inadequate state of scientific precision but is endemic to the process itself. McGill and Parry quote from Black's findings.

A symbol's vagueness...in the existence of objects concerning which it is intrinsically impossible to say if the symbol in question does, or does not, apply. The set of all objects about which a decision as to the symbol's application

in intrinsically impossible is defined as the 'fringe' of the symbol's field of application (McGill and Parry, 1948: 433).

Black seems to highlight the aspect of subjective vagueness through the use of vague symbols. However, various experiments conducted with animals to distinguish between an illuminated circle and an ellipse shared an area of vagueness or an area that could not be clearly distinguished. To a direct application of scientific instruments McGill and Parry point out that "even the best instrument would fail to discriminate a mathematical line dividing A from -A, since mathematical lines cannot be disorientated, and by all accounts, do not exist in nature" (1948:435). Another way of looking at this phenomenon is to imagine trying to reach the next highest number to the left of the decimal point by adding nines to the right of the decimal.

McGill and Parry ask what are the options available for us if we recognize the dialectical implication of the principle of the unity of opposition. As they see it, there are four available options: retain formal logic for all applications with the exception of the fringe areas, develop quantitative techniques similar to those used by Black, impliment a three-stage logic of truth values, 1, $\frac{1}{2}$, or to adopt some form of the Heyting logic.

The point at which McGill and Parry leave us is with the recognition of the fringe area and how formal logic tends to regard this as an exception. The unity of opposites as it is approached in dialectical logic recognizes that this interaction of opposites has an influence on the future becoming a state of the element. Furthermore, what has been implied and which will be explicit by Kosok is that the ensuing interaction commences from aspects essential to each other and

are not viewed as external separate entities as sometimes is the case in formal logic. Kosok amplifies this implication as he moves toward a non-linear logic.

Dialectical Logic: A Non-Linear

Field of Relationships

Kosok was introduced to the intricacies of dialectical logic and its implications for a dialectic of nature by his father, the late Dr. Paul Kosok. With this introduction he has continued to consider the possibility of formulating a unified field theory of the sciences from a dialectical perspective (1971). The process of Kosok's inquiry may be depicted in his own words.

The path leads from the initial perspective of a dialectics of nature as levels of matter in motion, to a concrete formulation of dialectics as a phenomenology of subject-objectivity capable of formalization to the development of a theory of consciousness in terms of a self-world dialectics of inter-subjectivity, to a re-formulation of Hegel's encyclopedia according to a dialectical-phenomenology of self-world interaction, within which, lastly, the dialectics of nature as a level-structure of matter in motion finally appears as a necessary component (1971:87).

The implications which are inherent in the logic of the dialectics may best be brought out through a comparison to the fundamental tenets of Logic, Physics, and Psychology as they were developed for Western thought in the early formative stages. Before doing this the nature of a paradox and its relationship to a non-linear logic should be explored. On the content of McGill and Parry the concept of contradiction implied an impasse where one of the opposite positions had to be released. In classical logic this is an attempt to remain faithful to Aristotle's system. Through the realization of a paradox, which Kosok interprets

from the Greek "para-doxes" to mean "to appear beside," contradictions are not viewed as an attempt to eliminate one position or the other but are regarded as a necessary and fundamental relationship that clarifies each component and, as such, must be considered in a field of events. In the pre-categorical stage of immediacy an event or element is posited. Once reflection and the resulting stage of a categorical process occurs, distinctions are counter posited. This relationship of a paradox where "two elements appear as one, but the unity in turn appears as mutuality of two" is what Kosok (1971:31) considers to be a non-linear relation.

This is a relation in which no distinction or element can be separated from its content of co-distinctions relative to which it is defined and relative to which it functions, without thereby introducing a perturbation and distortion, which on another level is but a higher order non-linearity, this time between system and perturbation-or between object and subject, observed and observer. In a non-linear paradoxical field, all formation is at once transformation-for each is what it is only through its relation to what it is not yet; in non-linear paradoxical awareness there is neither observer nor observed as such, but only the dynamic state of observing (Kosok, 1970b:31-32).

To conceive of mediations in a non-linear fashion, one must face contradictions as an inevitable occurrence. Kosok describes the process of dialectical logic in the forms of paradox, paradox lost, and paradox revisited. This is to indicate that contradictions are not suppressed but are recognized in higher orders. This is another way to express the movement of consciousness from a pre-categorical condition of immediacy where distinctions or negations that occur are viewed as co-determinates of the original paradox. The implication is that the original state is not externally negated but undergoes a self-negation which gives rise to a higher order paradox. Self-consciousness means

"consciousness or contradiction appearing as self-contradictions and hence self-consciousness" (Kosok, 1970b:35).

The aspects of a dialectical phenomenology recognizing the dynamics of a paradox "...generates its own ontology in the forms of a cycle moving from essence to existence to reality, where all three are in parably distinct, but are not categories of being" (Kosok, 1970b:35). For each of these sciences, Logic, Physics and Psychology, Kosok views the core development of the disciplines through a dialectical perspective and, in so doing, illustrates how these classical forms are unable to account for the fringe areas which, as has been said, calls into question the validity of the law of the excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction. Essence, as it is used here, is an attempt by each discipline to set out in clear terms what it considers the identity of its subject of study to be. It is the beginning point from which it builds and consequently refers back to. The foundation of these disciplines has been developed from Aristotle. Logic as it was developed by Aristotle began with a statement of essence as the law of identity which is to say that an element A can only be A and not something else. It can also be substituted into other situations to represent that same element: $A + C = D$ and $A + F = G$ where in both cases the A is the same. Kosok views this law as a statement of identity.

Thus 'A is A is a delineation of A into self-identity as distinguished from other-identity dependency, and as a result, the law of identity is a 'conservation of identity' statement, in effect making each element by itself a state of unchanging and static equilibrium with regard to its essence of meaning (1970b:37).

From this initial position of essence an element is defined only in relation to itself in an attempt to establish clear boundaries of

independent being. This same basic principle of essence is developed in the discipline of physics as Newton expanded his law of inertia which contends that every element in space will maintain "a constant momentum unless acted upon by an external force or contact relation" (1970:37). In the discipline of psychology, Freud advanced his principle of essence through the pleasure principle of the Id, which is to say, that the Id will attempt to maintain its position of pleasure or to restore itself back to a given static condition. This is the case for each basic element in the respective disciplines as expressed in symbolic form, the atom or the Id, as they are regarded as being separate and distinct elements. The principle of indeterminacy is absent. The initial conditions for static, equilibrium-seeking entities, is to seek to maintain or to return to an independent state.

The attempt to maintain clear determinate boundary values between elements in all cases leads to a host of difficulties as was pointed out in the recognition of the fringe areas. In the area of logic, Goedel's undecidability theorems enters and challenges the very core of Aristotle's system and linear logic. (Goedel's Theorem is defined by Kosok as a "relation such as 'A implying and being implied by not A', which is expressive of such a boundary coupling between 'A' and 'not A' can be validly constructed, but must of necessity lead either to inconsistency if accepted into the system, or incompleteness if rejected" [1970b:39]). The question becomes how are we to account for the fringe areas. Kosok offers his alternative by "redefining 'A' and 'not A' in terms of a singular boundary value between them, will the coupling between 'A' and 'not A' express a paradoxically complete and consistent relation" (1970b:39). This is to say that the trans-category trans-

action which does not return to itself as essence but achieves a higher unification which can be illustrated as A'. Kosok refers to this as the principle of Non-Identity which can be expanded into a matrix form (1970a).

The next stage which these disciplines turn their attention to is the axioms of existence. "Existence is the domain of pure matter in space and time..." (Kosok, 1970:36) which Kosok regards as an attempt to account for the process of change or mediation. Aristotle previously stated the essence to be a law of identity; and for existence, he extended the first law into the second which, as Kosok notes, was the law of contradiction which simply implied that something cannot be both A and not A. "Thus, negation enters as the morality of mediation, for the negation of A is regarded as an operator which refers to all that which is other than A" (1970b:38). For Newton and the discipline of physic, mediation occurred through a movement of force, which is to say that changes occurred when forces interacted.

Kosok interprets Freud's concept of essence as represented by the Id. For Freud the Id continually was on guard to maintain a state of equilibrium which was separate and distinct from other Id's. Kosok refers to the Id as "an a-moral collection of individual atoms, each, as it were, constituting itself as a microcosm or monad individually defined and independent of the needs of other such monads" (1970b:37). In all three disciplines the process of mediation is encountered through negation, force and the Ego which for each discipline views the mediation process occurring between two distinct elements which were separately conceived.

How these three disciplines attempt to account for reality, which

Kosok considered to be "the domain of the mind-matter co-relation which manifests itself most visibly in the study of the psyche, i.e., what is simultaneously material and mental" (1970b:36), will be the next concern. In dialectic logic this is referred to as the point of synthesis; and Aristotle's response was the law of the excluded middle.

Therefore, the law of the excluded middle simply states that 'A' and 'not A', are a complete division of space, for no third term exists between A and not A, all negation being neutral (1970b:38-39).

This is an attempt in classical logic or linear logic to account for a system being both consistent and complete. This is the case if the fringe area is overlooked along with Goedels' Theorems. This is what Kosok refers to as obtaining a "well formed system identity for A and not A, or A and B (calling not A, B), together form a singular identity, A plus B, or A' that has no under-or-over lappings" (1970b:39).

Newton developed his response to a synthesis in much the same manner. In reviewing his system when an element in space and time that is at rest or in a state of equilibrium meets another element or force, a change occurs which continues until another state of equilibrium is achieved. A synthesis in this account, as it is for the others, involves a bringing together of several parts into a larger whole or unit; and then this unit is considered as a unit distinct from other units. Through this process of development or emergence, the Newtonian outlook perceives a host of parts that are not interrelated to each other but, can now be regarded as a system. This system is then regarded in its initial state, inertia, where parts may be out of equilibrium but when considered as an entity, is in a state of equilibrium. Just as Goedels' Theorems played havoc with Aristotle's logic, the principle of indeter-

minancy plays havoc with Newtonian physics. Kosok sees this principle as another expression of boundary vagueness "...which declares the impossibility of clearly defining the boundary of any one object to begin with let alone the nature of internal boundaries" (1970b:40). In physics, developments along a non-linear perspective are presently being developed as is evident in the ongoing research of wave-particle studies and the theory of relativity. This development for Kosok is still inadequate as it stands today for they both refer back to a constant point of reference in standard linear logic. For quantum mechanics, the essential element or essence becomes the proton and for relativity it becomes the speed of light.

Once freed of such limitation, present day relativity can be derived from electro-magnetism, and, present day quantum mechanics then appear as a necessary co-relative aspect to the dynamics of the electromagnetic field. This leaves room for the development of relativity and quantum mechanics in terms of particles or energies not dependent upon the speed of electro-magnetic light, e.g., for sub-electronic or curphotonic interactions (1970b:41).

Freud's attempt to account for aspects of reality was suggested, as Kosok points out, in the sublimation process of the Super-Ego. Through this relationship, then, for every ego action there is an anti-Ego reaction from which the Super-Ego structure is created with the Id. Through this resulting construction there is a movement toward equilibrium which is simultaneously a movement back to the three principles which view the entities as being distinct and separate.

The basic problem for all three disciplines as they were developed by Aristotle, Newton and Freud lies in their attempt to construct explanations in a logical framework which views relationships from a boundary maintenance system which experiences change through opposing

forces and which attempts to return to a state of equilibrium at another level. This is an attempt to return to a state of equilibrium at another level. This is an attempt in linear logic to ignore contradictions and build complete, closed-ended systems. To view relationships in a dynamic, ongoing process of becoming a non-linear logic offers many viable possibilities. The principle of non-identity, as developed by Kosok and the realization of what it means to be self-conscious in the sense that Hegel described in his Phenomenology, would not view reality as a system of opposing forces which ultimately meet and where an impasse is reached resulting in one to be eliminated or sublimated in order to make a consistent system. Aufgehoben is a process for Geist, praxis and dialectical logic which transcends and recognizes the independence and interdependence of co-determining elements in a Gestalt or a non-linear process of becoming.

A Dialectical Sociology: Act as a Dialectical
Concept of Praxis

The relationship a dialectical perspective may have for sociology can be illustrated through the concept of act as it serves as a vehicle for the transformation between the individual and the external environment consisting of other humans and the natural environment. Praxis is the mode of activity which transforms oneself and the view of the world. To place the dialectical perspective more firmly in the realm of sociology, it can be generally asserted that sociology, as it is used here, is a study of the relationships which people share with each other. This study must go beyond the given appearances, as Kosok points out, as it seeks to understand the structure which gives rise

to human relationships.

Sociology, as expressed in a mainstream perspective which finds its heritage in Comte's vision of an industrial social order and an empirical positivistic methodology, attempts to account for its essence, existence and reality in a linear logic. The idea of the state, as developed by Plato, is a conservative conception that holds the essence of the state to be a reified concept which its members attempt to achieve. The laws of identity also have the relationship in mainstream sociology where individuals are viewed as role players whose function is to perform this assigned role for the good of a stable order.

The concept of existence or the modes of interactions which occur between independent elements are represented by concepts of the Hobbesian struggle of all against all. For the functional sociologists this has been represented by the principle of insatiable wants bounded by the principle of scarcity. Human beings are viewed as being driven by the pleasure principle, similar to the Id conceptualization by Freud. The modes of interaction between such an encounter are a contradiction or struggle for power. The means used to control such a struggle are through ascribed roles, norms, stated and accepted goals, common symbols and pure force.

The reality principle for such a perspective is viewed through the struggle of non-compatible entities which are seen in an either/or perspective. In such a view elements exist either within a larger entity which then attempts to maintain its state of equilibrium or they become external to the system. A linear perspective of social reality is shared by members of the conservative and liberal forces of the mainstream perspective. The left has repeatedly voiced the opinion that

one is either part of the solution or part of the problem.

Ratner illustrated that a one-sided perspective, regardless of its base, does little to add to a fruitful analysis of social reality. This is also the case for sociology. When the functionalists are replaced by the individual con-games of Goffman, the struggle of exclusive elements continue.

A dialectic perspective for sociology can find a fruitful base in the writings of Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche. This dialectical base views the relationships of elements or society and individuals not as separate entities acting in a process of contradiction but rather sharing points of interrelationship in a paradoxical field of events. Consciousness in such a perspective is regarded as an active process through which one transforms self and the world. The individual, as posited by Descartes, Kant and Fichte, is not regarded as a separate entity but rather as an element that is both dependent and independent of others. Existence is not viewed as a struggle but as a mediation between the particular and the universal which does not cancel one or the other but rather gives way to an aufgehoben. Reality in such a perspective is a process of transformation based upon the dialectical principles of Non-Identity.

Summary: Act as a Dialectical

Concept of Praxis

In closing, the relationships which act has in the dialectical process shall be considered. An act is a vehicle for transformation between the individual and the external world which may be composed of objects, humans and spiritual matters. It is a mode of activity

through which one becomes aware of self and of the world. An act does not occur in a one-way mechanistic model; not does it occur as an act of a single individual apart from the world. From a dialectical perspective, an act is viewed as an active process of mediation which occurs in a paradoxical field of relations. From this encounter, the act of observation is an act of participation involving a field of relations where both elements of subjective and objective aspects come into an interaction where both affect each other.

When an act is viewed in a dialectical process, a particular element of either the actor or the agency cannot be viewed apart from the other. To say that one only works here, i.e., to merely punch the time clock and not be effected by the mode of activity that is performed or the structural composition of the agency for which one may be working within, is a shortcoming that is not accepted within a dialectical perspective of the act. On the other hand, to use the ethos of some agencies, e.g., give us a boy and we will make a man out of him, is to assume that one enters a relationship devoid of any past experiences. When an act is viewed in a dialectical perspective, it is not presented as an either/or alternative of choosing the act or the agency. When such alternatives are offered, the underlying relationships which exist are glossed over and the means for a transformation are easily forgotten. From a dialectical perspective the modes of relationships and transformation are brought out as interacting elements which effect each other and, in turn, places the emphasis not on a given state of being but on a process of mediation of becoming. This perspective recognizes that the activity to be performed has a subjective aspect from which an act is directed and an objective aspect

from which objects of creation appear. The relationship this has for a dialectical process of act and agency is well stated by the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research.

...the institutions themselves are merely the epiphenomena of the living labor of human beings. Sociology becomes a critique of society as soon as it does not merely describe and weigh institutions and processes of society, but confronts them with what underlies these, with the life of those upon whom these institutions have been imposed, and those of whom these institutions themselves are to such a great extent composed (1972:23).

For this study the variables of act and agency are also viewed in a dialectical perspective, which is to say, that both components enter into a process of mediation. This is to suggest that agencies or organizational structures even as they may become institutions do not, however, take on a life of their own. Institutions are not considered to exist apart from the individuals who compose them. From the process of mediations, then, a component of change or transformation is ever present. The institutions or the individuals are not to be viewed apart from each other but are viewed as existing in a field of relationships. The following chapter will present the relationships between the three variables of consciousness, act and agency from a dialectical perspective. An attempt will also be made to account for the emergence of an existential mode of consciousness.

CHAPTER V

CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODEL: CONSCIOUSNESS, ACT AND AGENCY

Introduction

It is the purpose of this chapter to present the construction of the model. In its broadest format this chapter will consist of four major divisions: (1) a definition of the variables, (2) a consideration of how the variables interact with each other, (3) a listing of the assumptions of the model, and (4) a presentation of the modes of consciousness which emerge from the interaction of these variables.

The ectoskeleton of the model, which may be found in The Phenomenology of Mind and The Philosophy of Mind, will be the first consideration. In an attempt to further develop the process of consciousness, attention will then be directed to the internal aspects of how one becomes conscious, which will be primarily drawn from the Marxian concept of praxis. After the three variables have been defined, the internal mechanism of the model will be considered from the aspect of a dialectical-phenomenological field of interrelationships. At this point the assumptions of the model will be stated. In its full form the model has within it eight types of consciousness which will be briefly considered. The primary concern of this model is to inquire into what effects various working conditions have on the formation of

one's consciousness. The working process has been constructed in the form of three variables of consciousness, act and agency. The inclusion of variable of consciousness is to suggest from the outstart that one does not enter into a situation denuded of one's being. The working process is further structured into the form of mediations which occur between the persons expressing themselves through tasks or work experiences and the interaction these tasks have with the organizational structure. In its broadest form the working process will have these three variables related in interaction. This model is an attempt to designate those conditions which would lead to the formation of a greater existential mode of consciousness.

The Variables of the Model

Consciousness

In considering the first variable, the analogy to be made is that Hegel, in The Phenomenology (1967) and Philosophy of Mind (1971), essentially posed three levels of consciousness which were sensual consciousness, self-consciousness and universal self-consciousness. For purposes of this model only the first two levels of consciousness will be developed. Consciousness from a dialectical process is a reflective act in which the individual mediates the in-itself and for-itself. As the resulting mediation process occurs, the interpretation and understanding gained from this process will depend upon what level of consciousness is being considered. The first task should be to make clear the distinguishing features and characteristics of these two levels of consciousness.

At the first level of consciousness, sensual consciousness can be characterized by the general concept of immediacy as it has been consistently identified by Hegel. Immediacy is that characteristic which refers to the event or element as occurring now. It refers to those points of consciousness as occurring in distinction to the self. This concept of immediacy is also that state of consciousness which appears at the beginning of each level of consciousness. In a dialectical motion of consciousness, this unity is quickly dispersed as it becomes conscious of other objects or recurring objects of experience. The forms of mediations within this level of consciousness perceive events occurring in the present particular form. Attempts to generalize or to draw inferences to a much larger pattern are infrequent. Within this movement of immediacy, the particular uniqueness of that object is now structured and referred to as its. With the lack of ability or concern to infer to larger occurrences, all that can be said is that other elements exist independently of each other. Relationships of self to self, to others, to the world and to elements occurring with these contexts simply occur. This form of contradiction is regarded as only normal and is frequently expressed as: There will always be conflicts. It can be said of this state that events or elements occur and are mediated within the given conditions. These given conditions occur within a social-cultural-historical field that serves to act as the unifying thread of the experienced world. To go beyond the realm of the given is not seriously considered. Experiencing is an ongoing event with little articulation to looking for the patterns or Gestalt. The world is viewed as existing in a given situation and the self is viewed as existing in its own given conditions. While this level of

consciousness is one of experimental encounters, the second level of consciousness may be thought of as existing in the form of ideality.

The second level of consciousness, self-consciousness, begins with a Gestalt of abstract, pure ideality in which objects in the immediate state are not considered. This brief unification can be maintained as long as one remains in the forms of abstract concepts which are void of concrete experiences or analysis. Hegel's conception of self-consciousness involves this concept of pure ideality.

Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness; the latter is a consequence of the former, all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine, and thus in it I am aware of me. The formula of self-consciousness is $I = I$: abstract freedom, pure Ideality; and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is its own object, there is strictly speaking no 'reality': for as it is its own object, there is strictly speaking no object, because there is no distinction between it and the object (1971:165)

In this process of giving content to these abstract forms a contradiction occurs which can be described as a fitting process or matching process in which the contents do not seem to coincide with the form. The resulting struggle or contradiction is primarily experienced as competing elements of desire among objects or as a struggle for self-recognition. As this movement of conscious attempts to satisfy one's desire, one becomes engaged in a negative act which can only temporarily appease this insatiable appetite.

Desire and the certainty of its self obtained in the gratification of desire, are conditioned by the object, for the certainty exists through cancelling this other; in order that this cancelling may be effected, there must be this other. Self-consciousness is thus unable by its negative relation to the object to abolish it; because of that relation it rather produces it again, as well as the desire (Hegel, 1967:225).

While the contradiction of desires culminates in a destructive act

of consumption which negates that particular desire, the struggle for recognition is based upon the premise that the other cannot be absolutely obliterated. Hegel refers to this process as lordship and bondage or the master-slave relationship.

Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or recognized (Hegel, 1967:229).

This struggle for recognition is in its initial appearance a struggle for life and death. This struggle demands from the other the recognition of superiority and dominance. This form of mediation is again an expression of a negative counter-positing element which cannot be satisfied. The struggle engaged in at this level begins from the initial assumption that subject and object are two distinct and separate elements. At this level of consciousness, one does not see the interrelationships among the elements.

The third level of consciousness is one that is primarily characterized by ability to recognize these interconnecting patterns of relationships and still be aware of the uniqueness of the particular objects. Another unique characteristic of this tier of consciousness is that one also is aware of the motion and the resulting path which was engaged in. This process of consciousness could also be described as a meta-consciousness, that is, being aware of what factors have been most predominant in forming one's consciousness and having the ability to freely communicate that process.

The form of mediation which occurs at the level of universal self-consciousness is one where the notion or subjectivity coincides with objectivity. When this process occurs in interpersonal relations, one becomes aware of one's self in another and, consequently sees aspects

of the other which are independent of one's self.

Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in another self; each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence, yet in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective; each has real universality in the shape of reciprocity, so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman, and is aware of this in so far as it recognizes the other and knows him to be free (Hegel, 1971:176).

For Hegel this form of consciousness was to be experienced from within an environment where the universal would ensure the free expression of the particulars. This form of Spirit would truly express the nature of experiences.

This last form into which Spirit passes, Nature, in its living immediate process of development. Nature-Spirit divested of self (externalized) is, in its actual existence, nothing but this eternal process of abandoning it (Nature's) own independent subsistence, and the movement which reinstates Subject (Hegel, 1967:807).

Absolute truth, as described by Hegel, is obtained in the universal self-consciousness, which is the process of obtaining total knowledge. "The terminus is at that point where knowledge is no longer compelled to go beyond itself, where it finds its own self, and the notion corresponds to the object and the object to the notion" (Hegel, 1967:137-138). As is the case in each beginning tier of consciousness, this wholeness at first seems to be a primary quality. And as is the case for other forms of consciousness, if there is believed to be no further action inside the notion or outside in the object, then in fact it would represent a state of stability where change is absent. When this wholeness is placed in the realm of the immediate, however, this once held unity splinters off into particular unique qualities. Through this process reification is challenged and is forced to account for new

occurrences. If this stability is reified, then a primary characteristic of consciousness would be interpreted through a static non-life particular form that no longer interacts in a dialectical fashion of an active ongoing consciousness.

The concept of consciousness, as it has been developed thus far, implies that it is an active process engaged in by the person who attempts to pull together some form of a pattern from this field of interacting elements. Throughout the history of philosophy there has been much debate concerning whether or not one can ever know the thing in-itself. Marx, Sartre, Nietzsche, Kosok, Ratner and Kosik have considered this question. Although there are several points of major disagreement among these men, they could be said to agree on the following: (1) at some point, there is a noticeable distinction between the in-itself and for-itself, (2) once these distinctions are noticed there ensures an active process and (3) the variable that is negotiating this mediation process is the self. From this basis, consciousness will be defined as an active ongoing process of mediation where the self is primarily responsible for the mediation process between the in-itself and for-itself. In the model all variables will be dichotomized into a low and a high form. A low mode of consciousness would indicate that this mediation process is not being actively engaged by the self. This mode of consciousness is analogous to Hegel's sensual consciousness. The high form of consciousness indicates that the self has accepted the responsibility for this mediation process and is actively engaged in it. This mode of consciousness is analogous to Hegel's self-consciousness.

Act

Marx viewed the formation of consciousness to be primarily influenced by the various modes of expression one utilized to gain knowledge. The primary mode of expression that was fundamental to Marx's critique was the working process. As has already been mentioned, work was a vital and necessary mode of expression through which one encountered self, others, and the environment. Through this encounter one comes to understand one's own power of transformation and the resulting influences on self and on other elements. At times this basic form of expression, which Marx described as work, has been interpreted to mean that Marx was a proponent of a mechanical materialism where an external environment impressed itself upon the subject. Although the tendency may be there to make this assumption, a closer look at the first thesis of Feuerbach should reveal that this is not the case.

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectivity. Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism—but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. Hence in Das Wesen des Christentums, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judicial manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of 'revolutionary' of practical, activity (Tucker, 1972:107).

Human activity as a mode of objectification was for Marx an expression of one's own subjectivity. The objective and subjective co-determination were developed through one's purposeful directed

activity. Kosok interprets the first thesis of Feuerbach to be a vital aspect of Marx's dialectical-phenomenology which fully recognizes the intersubjectivity of the subjective and objective components and their resulting circular dialectic relation. This relationship of the phenomenological field event is what is referred to as a non-linear field of relations.

Subjectivity is a field of presence, i.e., an immediate non-localized gestalt, 'opening' or 'awareness' whose content is constituted by events of mediation or determination-by 'objects' of awareness, such that the field or 'consciousness-in-itself' and the events within a field, content, or gestalt of presence (and never abstract or detached 'things-in-themselves') (Kosok, 1971:49).

Marx attributed the development of alienation to those structural aspects of the working process which acted to separate the subjective and objective elements into separate and distinct features. This is achieved, in part, when the laborer sells his services for a wage and the wage is reified to represent the product of the social conditions of the working process. The implication this has for social relations is that people come to regard their acts of creation through a fetishized concept of price or money.

Kosok (1970a) has further analyzed this mode of expression to be essential in man's construction of reality. His essential thesis is that people, through their relationships with things, come to realize their own selves. Essential to this process is that one comes to understand and direct one's own praxis which is an active process of thought and action. Kosok is explicit that knowledge is not gained through contemplation but through a praxis.

The dialectic of the activity and passivity in human knowledge manifests itself first of all in the fact that man, in order to know things in themselves, might first of all transform them in things for himself (Kosok, 1970a:129).

Modes of expression, which man uses to express himself, act as projections or bridges from himself to others. It is not enough that some kind of activity exists, but for one to realize a praxis, activity must be initiated, directed and controlled by the person. The second variable of this model is referred to as act which may be defined as the degree to which a task has been self-initiated, directed and evaluated by the individual person. This variable also will be dichotomized into a low and a high aspect. A low act is that activity or task in which the individual person is able to express the origin, development and evaluation of the task. A high act is that activity or task which has been previously originated and has with it a predetermined course of activity to be implemented and that has pre-existing external standards to which it is to be evaluated.

Agency

The third variable for this model is agency. In its broadest context agency may be representative of the external organization which one continually encounters. An agency is that form of external organization which attempts to pattern a course of ongoing activity. A high agency is a tightly knitted hierarchial structure which formulates tasks and sets in motion directives to ensure that the task is carried through. A low agency is characterized by a flexible structure which is not organized in a tightly knitted hierarchial structure and which seeks to accommodate a variety of tasks. A high agency is characterized by Weber's description of the monocratic form of bureaucracy where the structure is hierarchially constructed, where orders or tasks are assigned to specified role players, and where it is the function of the

role players to act as objectively as possible in the execution of the powers of their office. The intention of such a system is to construct a rationally determined course of action in which role players will come to execute their functions without much concern with broader issues. In this format a dialectical relationship between subject and work is not viewed as an act of transformation of self and product, but is rather viewed as a task to be completed. The focus shifts from the process of doing it to the context of meeting established external standards.

The Mechanism of the Model

The internal structure or mechanism of the model rests on the premise of a dialectical conception of transformation. The foundation of a dialectical transformation, as it has been developed by Kosok, can be basically said to occur in a non-linear field of relations where the principle of non-identity takes into consideration the fringe area which is not interpreted as a contradiction but as a relation occurring in a paradox. From this positing and counterpositing, elements are seen from a relationship which they share with each other. Other aspects of a dialectical-phenomenology have been expressed by Kosok as the principle of concrete presence which has been alluded to in the discussion of Marx's first thesis of Feuerbach. Applied to a dialectical-phenomenology this principle regards the process of experiences as occurring prior to its products. The mode of relationships that occur within the non-linear field of relation is expressed as the principle of dialectic necessity. "Thus any relation between two elements X and Y is productive not only of a direct relation between them (XY) but of

a counter relations (the Y within X relating to the X within Y)" (Kosok, 1971:56). From this basic format a dialectical relationship is one that manifests itself from a paradoxical relationship where elements act to distinguish one from another so as to clarify and inquire into their existing relationship. Careful consideration is taken to recognize that the act of separation is a self-imposed process made in the effort to help clarify those elements. In a paradox these seemingly inconsistent elements share in a basic relationship to each other, illustrated through the principle of a dialectic-necessity. The awareness of these distinctions are then mediated into a new synthesis which contains both aspects of co-determinate elements. In a process of mere contradictions, where X and Y enter into a conflict, it is generally assumed that X and Y start from a separate point of origin. In a paradoxical relationship the point of separateness is recognized as being self-imposed and existing alongside of each other. When these co-determinate elements are viewed as starting from separate spheres, they are often regarded as one attempting to conquer the other; or in the event that an impasse is reached, one element must take an inferior position. This is not the case in a dialectical-phenomenology. The process of transformation recognizes the interacting matrix as developed by Kosok. For our purposes the act of transformation focuses on the mediation between the act and agency.

The model in its full dimensions is an attempt to account for an emergent existential consciousness through a dialectical process of act and agency. Of the three levels of consciousness we will be concerned only with sensual consciousness and self-consciousness. Within each level of consciousness there exists four intra modes of orientation

which are developed to express the form of consciousness that may emerge from a dialectical process of act and agency. Considering the two levels of consciousness, there will be a total of eight modes of consciousness. The three variables are consciousness, act and agency, all of which have been dichotomized into a high and a low form. The model with its eight cells may be viewed in Figure 1.

Level of Consciousness	Act	Agency	Mode of Consciousness
Sensual			
Low	High	High	1. monastic
Low	High	Low	2. one-dimensional
Low	Low	High	3. traditional
Low	Low	Low	4. nihilistic
Self-Consciousness			
High	High	High	5. missionary
High	High	Low	6. individual
High	Low	High	7. corporate
High	Low	Low	8. existential

Figure 1. Diagram of the Model: Consciousness, Act and Agency.

The first mode of consciousness which will be considered is characterized by a high act and a high agency. Here the activity to be performed has been specified into a task assignment which allows for little input or contribution on the part of the participant. A high act further denotes that the conception of the task and the standards

for evaluation have been previously defined. Within the environment of a high act the person is confronted with what seems to be an already accomplished fact. The specification of the task has been previously determined; and one is confronted with a series of specifications to be followed. In such a situation one quickly learns that it is not what you think of the task but how well you can complete it. The emphasis is not on the process of doing or creating or experimenting but on following a set of procedures. The emphasis is placed on the final product. This could be illustrated by classrooms in which children rush through the exercises to get the "right" answer. The procedural process is regarded as a minor aspect of the activity. Work books are quickly filled in with the right answers with little regard to how the process was initiated or how it could be expanded upon. The transformation process of creating and experimenting with one's own uniqueness is, in this case, not encouraged. If such is to be encouraged, there is a time set aside for creative acts which, in most instances, is relegated to outside the classroom. When one is locked into such a structure, one learns how to give the expected results. The task to be completed has been already defined and the criteria as to its evaluation have been stated. Prisoners, students, patients and employees in a high act quickly learn how to respond to the "vernacular of expectations". If a successful student is one who is evaluated as a docile, cooperating, polite student, then if the student wants to succeed within that particular environment, he will manifest those expectations. Within a high act one learns how to become a passive object. The subjectivity of exploring, initiating, directing and evaluating one's task is not related to the person for his own deliberation but is

compared to pre-existing criteria.

A high agency denotes a tightly-knitted hierarchial structure which has previously determined that task to be carried out and has set in motion the means to ensure its end product. In such an agency, individuals are viewed as role players who are expected to perform the task assigned. Within such an organization the criteria is usually placed on how well the end product is achieved. The means or modes of expression that are used take on a secondary importance. From this process the tendency is to view the resulting social relationships in their end product and thus reify an aspect of that total process into an object. The ongoing social relations are simply not discussed or evaluated. Attempts to point out the advantages of such a system present their arguments along the following lines. Work is conceived as a necessary endeavor to gain the means of securing a living. The living standard changes periodically as do the needs. Through the process of work one acquires the means to participate in the style of life that one chooses. Work, in this instance, is not viewed as a total process in-itself. Through approaching one's work as a role player one is expected to perform a certain task which does not have to be or is often thought not to be a fulfilling expression in itself. The statement is often made that freedom is the ability to buy the luxuries of life to which one is accustomed. The means to acquire this life are through acquiring more dollars.

When dollars are reified as the function of work, it is not hard to understand why some confuse money and wealth. Money is an abstraction to facilitate the exchange of the various modes of wealth. Wealth is the plentitude of natural and social materials. Watts uses the

analogy of laborers coming to their job in the morning and before they can start work, the foreman says, sorry boys--no work today or in the near future; we ran out of inches. The men are standing there ready to go to work with their tools in their hands and the raw materials at their feet, and they are told "there are no inches". When inches or money take on a reified form it redirects the focus from the wealth of the community and its social relations to a sterile abstraction.

Other agencies may choose to use a different abstract symbol and when they are structured in a tightly-knitted hierarchial fashion, the tendency is greater to reify some particular aspect over the total process. We can see this process of reification occurring at the level of churches who send missionaries who destroy the social fabric of cultures and social groups in the process of instituting their reified form of a god. Other forms of reification which occur in high agencies may be viewed in the military services. The Vietnam War provides an example. One officer expressed his task assignment in this way: "We have to destroy the village to save it". Mei Lai, Ben Su, free-fire zones and concentration camps are other forms of reification where the end product is elevated into a position of dominance to which other activities are compared.

A high agency is more prone to achieve this process of reification for several reasons. When the person is regarded as a role player, he is evaluated on the performance of that particular task. The person is not to associate himself with the total process but only with the task assigned. Perhaps this can be illustrated in the case of soldiers who plot the bombing raids over Southeast Asia but disavow any responsibility of supporting the war because they did not personally drop the

bombs. A high agency attempts to present its case as being the most efficient means of carrying out the assigned task. In this case, technical superiority is used as a defense of its organizational composition. The position of objectivity is often used to describe a high agency. This is interpreted to mean that the agency is actually neutral towards its function and is merely executing its task. Although personal responsibility for particular tasks can be passed over, overall responsibility is harder to locate. These are a few of the reasons why a high agency has a higher tendency to reify a particular aspect of the total process.

Before going directly into the first mode of consciousness, the concepts of a low act and a low agency will be reviewed. A low act is structured in a flexible manner so that one can originate, develop and evaluate one's own work. This can be easily illustrated in some of the "free schools" that have been initiated within the last decade. In most instances, these free schools act outside the auspices of the public school system and are usually considered to represent an anti-thesis to the dominant culture. In these schools children are encouraged to develop and explore areas that have meaning to them. The curriculum is derived from the experiences and interests of the children, and the mode of evaluation is primarily determined by the standards of the participating students. The major thrust of such an activity is to have the student become the author of his own actions, and in so doing, it is hoped they will accept the responsibility for their acts. Relationships are sought out and the students are encouraged to direct their own learning experiences and seek out their own relationships. The thrust is not to make them dependent on an

external source but to provide them with the opportunity to become self-directive.

A low agency attempts to supplement the basic activities that are encouraged in the low act. The organizational structure is not hierarchical nor are decisions made at the top and passed down to be implemented. A low agency attempts to involve members of the institution or group in the decision-making process. The emphasis is on interaction with the directive to gain an open form of communication. Participants are not departmentalized into specialities. A low act and low agency has a lower tendency to foster reification. This is primarily the case due to the structure of the situation where one has to assert some form of order on the field of events so as to give it some meaning. In a situation that is characterized by an openness of structures, the self will have to account for new experiences. The emphasis is toward an ongoing field of events rather than a performed sequence of linear events as is often the case in a high act and a high agency.

Modes of Consciousness

In order to briefly review the characteristics of a low consciousness and yet not repeat what has already been said, Buber's discussion of the I-IT relationship (1970) will be reviewed. Buber also speaks of the process of alienation in the form of experience where the I comes to know other objects in their it relationship and, in so doing, separates the object from the I. To only construct reality in this fashion would be to see it in a reified separate form. The time sequence for this relationship is static. Buber considers this time

sequence to be of the past where there are dead things or objects to be manipulated. "The I of the basic word I-IT, the I that is not bodily confronted by a you but surrounded by a multitude of 'contents', has only a part and no present" (1970:63).

Monastic

Beginning at the level of sensual consciousness, the first mode of consciousness which emerges from a situation of a high act and a high agency will be considered. This situation is characterized by a low consciousness, which is to say, the person is not actively engaged in the mediation process. He would rather let this deliberation process take its own course. This is the case for all modes of sensual consciousness. Within this particular situation of a high act and a high agency there is little room for deliberation between the act and the agency. The task has been previously specified and the agency has set in motion directives to insure that the task will be carried out. The criteria and the form of evaluation has also been previously established. For one who stays within this situation the initiative of new actions would have to be minimal. The type of consciousness which emerges from such a situation may be referred to as a monastic type. Monastic is used in reference to the formal orders which have been formulated by a tightly-knitted bureaucratic type social organization and where the daily tasks are well specified. The social hierarchy stands in a rigid pecking order. The acts are well defined and sometimes a specified time schedule is used for organizing the day around thought, word and leisure activities. The monastic type may be found in religious settings or in the business world. The type of person that emerges from

such a situation may envision conflicts or struggles, but they are not actually related to one's own ongoing activities. Deliberations over these matters are not one's concern for low consciousness can always refer back to the daily task or agency for guidance or assurance.

One-Dimensional

A situation of a high act and a low agency generates a consciousness characterized as one-dimensional. Characterized by a low consciousness, participants within this setting find themselves confronted with a well-designed task that has been previously defined for them. The type of agency is structured in a low profile which is adaptable to the varied tasks that may be performed. This situation can be most easily depicted by the analogy of various "open educational" modes which are currently being operationalized. The agency is flexible and is not built upon a rigidly defined bureaucratic structure. Decisions are not passed down in a hierarchial order but are encouraged to be formulated on the "team level" by those teachers who are closer to their subjects. The agency generally attempts to create a broad enough atmosphere for individual "input" within those agreed upon boundaries. The type of consciousness at this level does not actively engage in mediations toward a synthesis of conflicts. The implication this has toward the agency and act is that the general atmosphere in which they work is regarded as adequate.

On the level of the act where the task has been previously specified as to the creation, direction and mode of evaluation there is little room left for deliberation on the part of the participants. Within the open education model the student is within a system that

seeks to meet the many different, unique and valuable interests of the students. These tasks have, however, been already specified. Realizing that students are a diverse group, the educational agency attempts to diversify the structure to meet student needs. The objective in such a situation is to bring the students into a well-integrated system of uniformity. Within other settings this illusion of freedom of being able to choose a predefined alternative has been in operation for a number of years. Marcuse (1966) has described this type of consciousness as one-dimensional. The form of mediation which occurs between the act and agency is primarily a one-way directive of learning the importance of a predetermined course of action. The level of consciousness is low, the agency is low and the act is high. Organization, direction and evaluation have been previously determined and are constantly impressed upon the participants. One-dimensional refers to the lack of envisioning anything different. The power of negation to deny those pre-existing alternatives as not an act of freedom is not envisioned by the participants. The process of negative thinking or analysis is lacking. Marcuse envisions the technological alternatives which should act to offer people a multiple of choices to enlarge their own freedom as the very means of limiting their freedom. These alternatives act not to serve man but become a situation where man serves the alternatives. Marcuse describes this as a transference of power from the person to the technical and bureaucratic structures of society. This form of mediation does not involve nor does it encourage an active involvement on the part of the participant.

Traditional

The third mode of consciousness that emerges from the sensual level of consciousness within an environment of a low act and a high agency may be characterized as traditional consciousness. Once again it is important to note that the level of consciousness is low which does not see conflicts or struggles to be germane to self or the situation. The act is low which indicates that one has the opportunity to envision, create and express one's self in his ongoing tasks. The agency is high which indicates that there is a tightly-knitted hierarchical structure which formulates tasks to be completed. Within this situation the participants, via their low consciousness, generally leave the deciding factors for resolving mediation with the social forms of established organizations. In the past this social system has been described as a homogenous society where their tasks were well understood and were filled by the members of the group or society. The participants in such a situation feel that their environment is conducive to their needs and interests and can refer back to the type of activity they are engaged in as an example of their sense of fulfillment. A struggle of mediation on the surface does not seem to exist. Norms are important in establishing a sense of boundary for the community. Critical analysis or negative thinking is not prevalent in this situation for to envision anything that would be beyond the acceptable standards of the community would be considered as an infringement upon their traditional society. Laws, customs and modes of interaction are accepted on the premise that they have been in existence for a considerable amount of time. The major criterion for new patterns would be to explain them as a source of continuing on with the traditions of the

past. The homogenous society of the past where there was a common interest or agreement on social standards of expectation is seldom the case in larger industrialized centers today. Specifications, diversification of interest and the social glue that now is trying to act as the cohesive force holding members together has been developed as the technological imperative. Jacques Ellul (1964) has described this form of consciousness as the continuing development of techniques.

He has been shaped by his work, used by it, mechanized, and assimilated. Imparted psychological investigations reveal that the workers have been deprived of initiative and responsibility; they are 'adapted' to the degree that they have become inert, unable to take risks in any area (1964: 396).

Within this situation the profile of low consciousness is encouraged from tightly-knitted bureaucratic structures which attempt to provide participants with the form of social expression and encourages them to fill in their own contents.

Nihilistic

The fourth mode of consciousness to emerge from the level of sensual consciousness from within a situation of a low act and a low agency is the nihilistic mode of consciousness. All three variables are low. It is paramount to discover how this type attempts to create some organizational pattern for its acts. The mode of consciousness is low which is to say this type is not actively engaged in the mediation process. The task to be performed is left relatively open for one to imitate and carry through; and the agency is not setting in motion directives to have tasks carried through. The form of mediation seems to dissipate for this type of consciousness. Within such a situation of this type a sense of being overwhelmed is experienced. Attempts to

anchor to some pattern or source of direction is missing. While mediation is experienced, a sense of nothingness is experienced. A sense of separation from self and organization are the primary characteristics. The focal question becomes who or what is the organizing force for this type. Perhaps if there were a high agency present to set in motion a pattern which one could easily fill, it would act as the organizing force; but this is not the case. If one had a well-organized pattern of behavior to keep going through the motions, it might give one a sense of activity; but this is also lacking. The process of the individual's own reflection also is inefficient. Hence, the person gradually comes to see nothing worthwhile. If this was followed to its end, the end would be suicide. Many times, however, diversions are entertained so as to avoid this consideration. Detours for this mode of consciousness may be experienced in excessive use of alcohol, drugs, inactivity, or sleeping; whatever the form, the major characteristic is one of withdrawal. This may occur from what one believes to be one endless encounter of contradictions where nothing really seems to hold together. This type is unable to reflect on consciousness, agency or act. There is simply a void for which there is a loss to know what or how to do something. At this point, it may be referred to as the negation of the negation without any motion from this impasse being realized. The act as a confirmation of one's self and others is unable to hold or suggest a meaning to seemingly unrelated environments. Camus has described this as a confrontation with the absurd.

A man is talking on the telephone behind a glass partition; we don't hear him, but we see his unintelligible dumb show: we wonder why he is alive. This uneasiness before the non-humanity of man himself, this incalculable fall before the

image of what we are, this 'nausea' as a contemporary writer calls it--this too is the absurd (Barnes, 1962:166).

An encounter with nothingness, the absurd, or experiencing nausea is for this level of consciousness a state of disorientation. At a higher level of consciousness, this form of expression may lead to an existential mode of consciousness.

The next stage or level of consciousness represents a high mode of consciousness. At this level of consciousness, there are four interior modes of consciousness. Four types of agency-act situations exist where the person enters with high consciousness.

The second tier of consciousness, or self-consciousness is primarily characterized by an active engagement by the person in the ongoing forms of mediations. The form of mediation which occurs at this level is one of a struggle of competing desires or a struggle for self-recognition where others are viewed in opposition to self. At this level of consciousness, one component attempts to dominate the others. The art of reflection illuminates the flow of opposition as independent components separate and apart from one another. In such an environment the four modes of intra-consciousness will give way to modes of consciousness which may be referred to as the missionary zeal, the individual type, the mass man, and the existential.

Buber has described the "it world" as one of experience. "Standing under the basic word of separation which keeps apart the I and IT, he has divided his life with his fellow man into two neatly defined districts: institutions and feelings. It-district and I-district" (1970:92). In such a situation, characterized by a separate end, the person is unable to gain from the aspects of both and thus lives at the expense of the other. The level of self-consciousness experiences

the ego in the sense of emotions and feelings. What was lacking in the realm of sensual consciousness was the realization of the organizing force being the ego. In the realm of self-consciousness the overpowering force becomes the I independent from the other I's and objects. "The I of the basic word I-IT appears as an ego and becomes conscious of itself as a subject (of experience and use)" (Buber, 1970:111). In realizing this experience the "egos appear by setting themselves apart from other egos" (1970:111). Buber described this process as the "purpose of setting oneself apart is to experience and use, and the purpose of that is 'living' which means dying one human life long" (1970:111-112).

Missionary

The situation of a high act and a high agency within the level of self-consciousness is one primarily characterized by consensus. This type of consciousness is actively engaged in the process of mediation where the act has been highly formulated and the agency acts to ensure that these tasks will be carried through. This form of consciousness usually interprets self as being called into some form of active duty. The form of mediation on an internal level between the three variables is interpreted to be in agreement. The struggle of this form of consciousness is viewed not as an internal conflict but as a conflict between self as represented by the act and agency and those who are not a part of that same system. When this form of consciousness is fully realized, we can witness missionaries "saving souls," nation states assisting "underdeveloped countries," and perhaps in its blinding immediate form as conqueror, nation states making the world safe for

their own particular form of consciousness.

The form of mediation that occurs in this situation is one of a struggle between one's self and all others. This form of consciousness becomes more aggressive for within this situation comes a sense of confidence that has been instilled through a high agency and a high act which seems to reinforce this sense of purpose. With each continuing success the participants are encouraged to try harder. As failures or difficulties are encountered, this type of consciousness can always relate back to the act or agency or personal consciousness to regain momentum to mount another attempt in fulfilling one mission. From this type of situation consciousness instills within its participants a sense of purpose which should be achieved. The Jesuits worked from such a framework during the Inquisition. Some have manifested this form of consciousness in the fighting of wars. The resulting action is directed in an outward movement in an attempt to make others in the same image as they are or at least to control them in such a manner so that they would not be a potential challenge to this reified form of consciousness. Through a constant reinforcement of a unilateral form of environment which exists apart from others, this form of consciousness thrives in a sterile, uniform constant situation as one attempts to make others in the image of one's self.

Individual

The mode of consciousness emerging from a situation characterized by a high act, high consciousness, and a low agency is the individual type. The mode of consciousness is high which indicates that one is actively engaged in the mediation process. The act has been previously

specified for the participant; but yet the agency is loosely constructed to accommodate a variety of tasks and ongoing activities. Through the act of working for another, the participant comes to realize his powers of transformation and begins to see himself as the arbiter of his reality. The resulting mode of consciousness attempts to understand or see through a seemingly contradictory situation where one's act has been specified but yet there seems to be no controlling agency which directs it. The participant attempts to understand the relationships accounting for this but is unable to go beyond the immediate social-cultural environment. Confronted with such a situation, the individualist motif is played out. This mode of consciousness was most prevalent in the laissez-faire stage of capitalism where the participant viewed himself in a fierce competitive struggle. The motif was well expressed by the Robber Barons and by Cornelius Vanderbilt who was determined to buy social prestige and power. At times this motif appears in the advertising media with the Marlboro commercials and the thinking man's filter.

Under similar circumstances a low mode of consciousness responded in the motif of the one-dimensional man. The tyranny of technology and pre-existing work patterns were not questioned. However, as a high mode of consciousness confronted a similar situation, the awareness of this tyranny came closer to being understood. Even though it understands, this type of consciousness fails to see alternatives and thus responds in a take-what-you-can attitude. The contradictions are realized but alternatives are not forthcoming. In this attempt to use the system, success is often measured in the forms of materialism and possession of objects. The pleasures that can be acquired from the

system are a sign of one's own ingenuity. This form of relationship lends itself very well to a continuance of the very same patterns where one can work in the system but yet not be part of it.

Corporate

The individualist mode of consciousness is functional for various stages of economic conditions. This may have been a successful mode of consciousness for laissez-faire capitalism but is not in keeping with the directives of monopoly capitalism. At the stage of monopoly capitalism a closer integration is called for and the competing individual is encouraged to yield to the mode of consciousness of the mass man or the company man. This mode of consciousness emerges from a situation of a low act and a high agency. The form of consciousness is again high and the resulting forms of mediation are to be able to reflect one's consciousness in the working process. The act or tasks are not predefined but are receptive to the participants' initiatives and interactions. On the larger circumference of this situation is the agency which is structured in bureaucratic form where tasks are specified and directives are set in motion to ensure the completion of the task. The participants are able to investigate and create various modes of expression in the working situation. At this point a decision is called for. The participant will act within the limits of the prescribed situation or will interpret the situation as limiting his potential and will thus leave. In a situation where the level of consciousness was low the situation presented itself as a pleasant community of similar interests. With the interaction of a high consciousness, however, the forms of mediation are engaged in as a struggle

where it comes to be interpreted as the group or companies against other groups or companies. The underlying force of the struggle is characterized through this level of consciousness. It is not directed inward, in the case of the individual mode of consciousness but is manifested in an outward movement. In the case of the missionary mode of consciousness, the ability to continually interpret new situations into a pre-defined pattern was much easier. For the individualistic and mass modes of consciousness, however, it is more difficult to interpret experiences in a static form. The primary explanation in both cases is the separation of act from agency; and, in particular, the mass mode of consciousness has to guard continually against new interpretations that may be experienced through the low act. The mass man attempts to reify once-and-for-all a pattern of mediation, but the low act serves to keep this reification process from taking over completely.

Existential

The last mode of consciousness to be considered is in part a response to the other modes of consciousness, particularly to the company or mass man. The mode of consciousness which is at the high level of consciousness and within a situation of a low act and a low agency must, therefore, serve as the arbiter of one's world and reality construction. Possessing a high mode of consciousness infers that one actively seeks to engage in the mediation process. The environment is such that one can express oneself in the work situation through the initiation, development and evaluation of one's modes of expression. There is no bureaucratically structured agency at hand to overlook and orchestrate action towards its end. From this environment

the mediation process is intense. In the case of a low consciousness within a similar situation the struggle or conflicts which were experienced were not related to self as in fact the whole situation was characterized by a direction of nothingness. The difference between the nihilistic and the emergent form of existential consciousness in this situation is that one has encountered the state of despair and has realized it. Kierkegaard (1970) was extremely perceptive of the many forms of despair, but the most essential distinction he made was between despair for those who failed to realize it and despair for those who realized it.

In order to will in despair to be oneself there must be consciousness of the infinite self. This infinite self, however, is really only the abstract form, the abstract possibility of the self, and it is this self the man despairingly wills to be, detaching the self from every relation to the power which posited it, or detaching it from the conception that there is such a power in existence. By the aid of this infinite form the self despairingly wills to dispose of itself or to create itself, to make itself the self it wills to be, distinguishing in the concrete self what it will and what it will not accept (1970:201).

The despair which is experienced unknowingly is the type experienced by the nihilistic mode of consciousness. Despair which is experienced by a self-consciousness leads to the desire to create oneself; and to do so one actively seeks situations which will foster this activity.

The only major philosophical problem of any significance for Camus was to decide if one should choose to commit suicide. If the choice of suicide was taken, then the mode of consciousness would be that of a nihilistic type. For those who decide not to commit suicide but yet have little assurance of the future and what it might bring, this type of consciousness actively seeks to experience self. An existential

mode of consciousness is encouraged to develop in a situation of a low act, and a low agency for it is here that one can come to terms with one's self through the process of organizing and creating one's own structures. Existentialism is the attempt to gain self-mastery over one's self on one's own terms. Being still at the stage of self-consciousness, struggles and conflicts are interpreted as a fight for recognition. This recognition is interpreted in part as a struggle against the encroaching consciousness of the masses with their continual efforts to make life "easier". The existentialist reacts strongly against this movement and believes that it is necessary to remain aloft from this encroaching conformity. The importance of existence preceding essence is a fundamental tenant of existentialism as this mode of consciousness searches to express one's self in one's work and social relationships. This expression is not encouraged at the level of sensual consciousness or within a situation characterized by either a high act or a high agency.

Summary

The eight modes of consciousness discussed above are intended only as ideal types that may serve as a conceptualization of thought. This is not to say that there are only eight types of consciousness. Within this model there are various conditions which serve to foster stability, change, revolt and independent action. Cells one and five which are characterized by a high act and a high agency would foster conditions for stability. Within this situation the development and enactment of the task has been previously defined and at the organizational level there is an overseeing, tightly-knitted hierarchial

structure which attempts to enforce the enactment of tasks. There is little room for experimentation and the mediation process is tightly constructed. In such a setting the participant is fitted into the existing ongoing structure. The format of this environment attempts to model itself after the assembly line model of interchangeable parts. It is a mechanistic model with emphasis on stability. Parts may be taken out or eliminated without threatening the viability of the structure. Within this model equilibrium and controlled change in the mode of a gradual character are encouraged. Constructing limits and predefined standards are essential to this system. As this model attempts to stabilize itself, it may very well attempt to build another Maginot Line to protect itself from any external danger. However, as is the case of a Maginot Line, it is always a simple matter to go around it. And once this happens, the ability to adapt or to quickly react has vanished as quickly as the line has lost its power to defend.

Cells two, three, six and seven carry within them the potential for change. Although the level of sensual consciousness does not attempt to relate these struggles to a personal sense or to a larger periphery, there remains the ongoing opposition between act and agency. This ongoing struggle is more noticeable in cells six and eight as the form of high consciousness attempts to mediate this struggle. The potential for change lies in the disparity the participants may experience in their working conditions. In the case of a low act and a high agency the participant is able to experiment or explore one's potential within the performance of one's work. Once this exploration is engaged in, it is a simple matter to continue to explore until the participant will arrive at the boundary lines of the institutional

agencies. At this point one will evaluate the situation. For those situations characterized by a high act and a low agency the participant quickly learns that he is working for another and in the process comes to realize his own powers of transformation. Realizing the powers of transformation the participant will have to evaluate the situation to determine if the protection provided by the agencies at large are sufficient enough for him to continue to work for another or if one should work for one's self. Within both situations one element helps to clarify the other. This is not the case for cells one and five where they act to define one another in common terms which does not focus on their differences but on their similarities. The disparities between act and agency help to draw out the differences which in turn brings into sharper focus where the participants must personally decide what their relationship is to be with their working process. If nothing else, the recognition of these differences stands ready to be analyzed.

The relationship between the situation of a low act and a low agency at the level of sensual consciousness emerges in a nihilistic mode while for a high consciousness it emerges as an existentialist mode of consciousness. The nihilist mode acts in the form of a revolt. There seems to be nothing worthwhile to create or to attempt. This mode is perhaps the most transitional of all eight cells. If this revolt is carried through to its end, it may end in suicide or, as in most cases, end in a refusal to comply. In the attempt to refuse to comply, there may develop a sense of awareness or analysis through the act of negation. Another way to mediate this situation is to generally drift from one situation to another. When this situation is confronted by a high consciousness, the resulting form of consciousness becomes

existential. Through the continual attempts to make some form of order or relationship from the low act and low agency, the participants come to realize their own powers of creation. By being able to evaluate their own creations the tendency to become aware of the dialectical relationships of change between the subjective and objective spheres begin to draw attention away from the independence of relationships to their interdependence. From this awareness the potential to move from the level of self-consciousness to a universal self-consciousness comes through the experiencing and awareness of conflicts and struggles..

When continual attempts are made to disassociate the participant from the larger whole, as in the case of presenting man as a series of role players, the ability to relate and infer to a larger condition is generally impeded. Those who experience conflicts at some point may have to assert themselves regarding their relationship to the situation. The movement from sensual consciousness to self-consciousness is fostered through the awareness of conflict. And the movement from self-consciousness to a universal self-consciousness is promoted through the realization that conflicts must be mediated by self. And through mediation the interdependence of relationships is realized. At the level of universal self-consciousness there is a recognition of dependence and interdependence which can exist in a paradoxical relationship without being subjected to a struggle for domination.

CHAPTER VI

THE TESTING MODEL AND THE RESEARCH DESIGN WITHIN THE ENVIRONMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Introduction

This chapter will outline the procedure used in constructing a test of the general model. In the first section, the assumptions, proposition and definition of the variables will be offered. The remaining part of the chapter will focus on how the research design was implemented. A profile of the characteristics of the respondents involved in this inquiry will be presented in the sample section. In the following section the variables operationalization of the agency and act will be outlined. The PIL will then be briefly discussed in regard to its basic assumptions. In the following section the theoretical conception and item analysis of the constructed questionnaire will be discussed. The chapter will close with a section concerning the socialization and student body profile scales.

The Testing Model

The model in its entirety may be tested in a host of situations and conditions. As a test of the model in this study only a certain aspect was considered. The major thrust of this test was to examine the extent to which a low act and a low agency contributes to the

development of an existential mode of consciousness. The test of the model was enacted within the arena of higher education.

Assumptions

The model rests on the following assumptions.

1. A higher unity than self is a unity of self with the universal and the particular within a field of paradoxical relations.

2. The act of mediation is a personal process for which there are no ultimate assurances.

3. Wisdom or science is the realization of the differences and unity that exists between the states of the immediate and the determinate.

4. Higher states of consciousness or growth occur when there is an awareness and active involvement in the mediation process.

5. The educational experience is a meaningful form of self-expression.

Propositions

There are four major propositions which this inquiry will focus toward.

1. Those students engaged in a low act will on the average have a higher existential consciousness than those in a high act.

2. Those students engaged in a low agency will on the average have a higher existential consciousness than those engaged in a high agency.

3. The order of existential consciousness from the least to the most will be in the following order: high act and high agency; high

act and low agency; low act and high agency; and low act and low agency.

4. Upper division students will on the average have a higher mode of existential consciousness than those lower division students. The order in which they appear is from the lowest to the highest mode of existential consciousness; high act and high agency; high act and low agency; low act and high agency; and low act and low agency.

Definition of Variables

Low Act: That activity or task which the individual person is able to express the origin, development and evaluation of the task.

High Act: That activity or task which has been previously originated and has with it a predetermined course of activity to be implemented and that has pre-existing external standards to which it is to be evaluated.

Low Agency: Characterized by a flexible structure which is not organized in a tightly-knitted hierarchial structure and which seeks to accommodate a variety of tasks.

High Agency: Tightly-knitted hierarchial structure which formulates tasks and sets in motion directives to ensure that the task is carried through.

The Sample

To test the model two educational institutions were chosen to represent the variables of a high and a low agency. The high agency, which shall be referred to as High U, was selected on the basis of its adherence to a formularized pattern of uniformity. I have had personal experience within High U and noticed its concern with implementing its

regulations. A short description of this agency may help in placing this variable in perspective. It is a large state university with approximately 18,000 students, located in the southwest region of the country. The greatest percentage of the students reside within a two-hour drive of the campus which provides an easy escape value on weekends. The campus is notably active in crusades for Christ of one form or another. The campus is not preoccupied with crusades to end the war, impeachment movements against Nixon, nor other social or radical movements of our era. If one were to ask where's the action, one would probably be referred to "the strip" which is a three-block long area populated with several 3.2 beer parlors. During the fall and winter months the center of attention is focused on the football, basketball and wrestling teams. The spring months usually provide a beautiful climate to begin the phasing-out process which occurs during the second week of May.

To represent the low agency, a well-known, small, private liberal arts college was chosen. This institution shall be referred to as Low C. It has a national reputation for experimentation. During the Spring quarter of 1973 it drew additional national attention because of the student strike which almost closed down the school. This was not the first student strike, but it was the longest one and the most damaging one. The main campus is located within the eastern central section of the country. It draws approximately half of its total student population of 2,200 from the same region while the other half is drawn from the remaining part of the country which adds to a diverse student enrollment.

The students are considered to think of themselves as intellec-

tuals who are self-directive in their own pursuits. The campus is active in the political movements of the time. Impeachment posters are quite noticeable; there is a gay liberation office and a women's radical caucus center which are both housed in the student union. The campus is not active in competitive sports. The activities of the campus are not restricted to the classroom but may be thought of as a meeting place where students relate their personal work-study experiences and perhaps their year of study which they conducted abroad.

The characteristics of the respondents to the questionnaire in regard to sex, size hometown, religious preference, political orientation, ethnic composition, age and prior socialization may be viewed in Table I.

Of the respondents of High U it may be said that they are orientated toward mainstream social structures. Approximately eight out of ten belong to either the Protestant or Catholic faith; and approximately nine out of ten belong to either the Republican or Democratic parties. The sample was heavily biased toward the female sex and approximately forty percent of the respondents are from a hometown of less than 25,000. The ethnic composition is composed of approximately eighty-five percent Anglos.

At Low C a general statement in regard to the respondents to the questionnaire may be said to be orientated away from the established mainstream social structures. Less than five percent preferred the Protestant faith while a fifth preferred the Jewish faith and a quarter preferred an informal orientation. Half of the sample checked the "Other" category for religious orientation. A fifth of the sample preferred the Democratic party while approximately forty percent preferred

TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE

Characteristic	Categories	High U	Low C
Sex	Female	80.5*	45.8
	Male	19.5	54.2
Size of Hometown	Farm	13.4	.0
	100-1,000	4.7	8.3
	1,001-10,000	16.5	4.2
	10,001-25,000	9.5	12.5
	25,001-100,000	22.0	33.3
	101,000-300,000	6.3	16.7
	301,000-1,000,000	22.1	12.5
	In excess of 1,000,000	5.5	12.5
Religious Preference	Protestant	69.5	4.2
	Jewish		20.9
	Catholic	13.2	
	Bahai		
	Moslem	.8	
	Buddhist		
	Unitarian	.8	
	Informal	7.0	25.0
	Other	8.6	50.0
Political Orientation	American Party	.79	.0
	Republican	35.1	.0
	Democratic	56.3	20.8
	Communist		4.2
	Socialist	.8	12.5
	Progressive Labor Party		
	New American Movement		4.2
	I prefer not to associate with political parties	4.7	41.7
	Other	2.3	16.7
Ethnic Composition	Anglo	86.7	70.8
	Black	1.6	4.2
	Native American Indian	6.2	
	Mexican-American		4.2
	Japanese-American		
	Semitic		12.5
	Other	5.5	8.3
Age		21.10**	21.30
Socialization		22.59**	24.33

*Numbers are percentages.

**Numbers are means.

not to associate or participate with political parties. Approximately twenty percent were associated with political parties other than Democratic or Republican. The composition between the sexes is well matched and approximately seventy percent were Anglos who came from a hometown in excess of 25,000. The mean age for both groups of students was similar.

The variable of act was to be represented by the various majors within the corresponding high and low agencies. Act was dichotomized into a high and a low component. The main criteria that was used to designate a low act was the degree of flexibility a student had in originating, developing and evaluating one's own plan of study. At High U the low act was chosen to be sociology and at Low C it was communications. A high act represented a more tightly controlled plan of study. In High U this was well represented by Family Relations and Child Development (FRCD). In this major there were virtually no electives to be chosen and the plan of study had been developed in full. In the case of Low C a high act was not a common characteristic of the school. However, in relation to the low act, it could be said that history had more requirements and stated objectives to be followed than did communications. History did not correspond to FRCD in its tightly controlled structure but for the campus of Low C it did incorporate more structure.

The sample selection involved representing the variables of agency and act. To do this, two educational institutions or agencies were chosen. Within these institutions a high and a low act were chosen and within each of these acts a further division between upper and lower classmen was made. In all, there was a total of eight cells. These

cells and their corresponding numbers may be viewed in Figure 2. This figure may be useful in indicating the number of responses received and the labels which were used throughout the study.

Data Collection

High Agency

The principle mode of activity utilized in gathering data was composed of participation and observation, interviews, study of the written regulations, reports and documents, and the administration of a questionnaire.

I have repeatedly drawn from my own experiences in the designation of High U as the high agency. At the High U, I interviewed Deans of Schools, the head of the high act, students from both acts and the editor of the student newspaper. During my four years at High U, I served as a representative to the Graduate Student Council for a year and as the representative of the graduate students to the corresponding departmental meetings. I also utilized an informal means of interviewing other students and faculty members. The documents used in this study were the minutes from the Graduate Student Council, Faculty Council, the catalog of requirements, and the student newspaper.

In the process of administering the questionnaire at High U, varying procedures were utilized. The first course of action was to record on 3 x 5 cards all persons representing low acts. On this card I also recorded telephone numbers, if listed; and, for those not listed, I checked the telephone directory. I then asked a select group of professors who were most likely to have those designated students in their classes to hand out the questionnaire, have the students complete

High Act				Low Act			
High Agency		Low Agency		High Agency		Low Agency	
Under Classmen	Upper Classmen	Under Classmen	Upper Classmen	Under Classmen	Upper Classmen	Under Classmen	Upper Classmen
21	36	34	37	4	10	4	6

Figure 2. Representation of the Variables of Agency and Act and Their Corresponding Cell Size.

them and return them to the professors. I then started calling these students on the phone to introduce myself and the nature of the research project. If the students previously received a questionnaire, I asked them to fill it out and hand it back to their professor. For those who had not received a questionnaire, I asked them if they would cooperate and told them they could pick one up by going to their counselor's door where they would find an envelope containing the questionnaire. After they had completed the questionnaire, they could return it to the office. While I was making these calls, I would randomly choose every eighth student and ask him if he would consent to having an interview which would take approximately forty-five minutes. As soon as I filled up my interview schedule for one day, I stopped asking for any additional interviews.

A different procedure was followed in administering the questionnaire to students in a high act at High U. During the course of the interview with the Head of the department of the high act the professor advised me of the program I should study which would definitely give me a more valid representation of that major. From the description given, I concurred. I was impressed with the means of organization which surrounded the office. After describing the means of administering the questionnaire I used for the low act, the head of the department responded with her plan. I thought it would be best to agree for I was seeking assistance and had every intention of working at her convenience. My general impression was that I should leave this matter of handling the questionnaire to the discretion of the professors because they had assured me that their students were responsive. I interpreted this to mean that I would receive a good return. I was also

advised that generally speaking, freshmen did not declare their major until their sophomore year. Hence, for the low act category, the sample contains sophomores and seniors rather than first year and senior year students.

I then listed all sophomore and senior students who had declared their major to be high act. I contacted the professor and asked them to hand out the questionnaires. I followed the same procedure as in the low act in arranging for the interviews. In view of what seemed to be quite an efficient organization, I did not oversee their activity but left feeling assured that when I returned in ten days the questionnaires would be filled out.

Upon returning I found the return rate to be low. I then proceeded to mail a questionnaire to every sophomore and senior of a high act. The return rate from this mailing was not impressive. Of the 120 questionnaires mailed out, 34 were returned. Of these 34, seven had previously completed the questionnaire, thus realizing a net return of 27. In an attempt to make one more effort to gain responses, particularly from the sophomore level, I inquired at the FRCD office as to the possibility of approaching the classes that were in session. I was informed that due to the summer term there were very few sophomore students who were enrolled. In view of this the search for additional responses was ended.

Low Agency

Arriving at Low C, I announced my presence at the office of the Dean which is actually the Office of the President and was advised to speak with the Assistant Dean. He advised me to draw up a letter of

introduction stating my purpose and he would sign it. After writing the letter, I searched for an available typewriter and entered the Information Office which was the first office I found. I approached a young woman and asked if I could use her typewriter. As it turned out, she typed the letter and introduced us to the Information Director. After giving us a valuable overview of the school, the young woman introduced us to the Editor of the alumni paper. These contacts became essential to the process of gathering the data. They served as a "home base" and a constant supply of information and friendship.

Visitors to the campus are generally watched as to how well they react to the immersion process. Our process began immediately. Within an hour I was interviewing a faculty member and my assistant was gathering course requirement sheets, catalogs, documents, faculty meeting notes, books and anything that might help us. Through the course of our week's stay, we interviewed professors from the low and high acts, the Deans and Assistant Deans, students, the coordinator of the work-study program, "drop-outs", alumni and community people. We were especially privileged to gain an hour's interview with a former president of Low C. This meeting was greatly facilitated by our original contacts in the Information Office.

Once the high and low acts were designated I inquired at various offices for a list of the students who were currently on campus and who were majoring in communications and history. The quarter was in its fourth week and the Registrar's Office was in the process of completing the list. In view of this we went to the classes of the respective majors and handed out the questionnaires. To gain a broader impression of the school we conveniently stationed ourselves in the cafeteria

during the morning and lunch feeding times. We found the students most cooperative in discussing their plans of study. Through our discussions it became rather evident that at this institution social drill or uniform regimentation would be resisted at every attempt. The implication this had in administering the questionnaire was quite important. The students were not going to complete a questionnaire without knowing the author's purpose or intention of the study.

Interviews lasted between one and four hours. Both students and Deans freely offered their time and devoted their full attention to our inquiries. This was quite evident as I spent the entire morning talking with an Assistant Dean. Midway through our interview the Assistant Dean advised me that I really needed to see the Dean to gain a fuller understanding of the situation. At that particular time the Dean was teaching a class, but I was assured that he would be most happy to talk with me. I returned after lunch to interview the Dean. This interview lasted for over two hours. The techniques that were used at High U to gather data and administer the questionnaire did not work well at Low C.

The next day, which was Friday, I received a list of the majors. Questionnaires, along with letters of introduction, were sent to the designated students through the campus mail and they were informed they could deposit the completed questionnaires in a box at the end of the mailroom. The return rate was extremely low. Of these questionnaires mailed out and distributed to classes and through the cafeteria, which numbered approximately 100, only 18 were returned. After returning to High U, a second attempt was made to gain more questionnaires. I mailed 75 questionnaires to the Information Office and asked the Assistant

Editor for her assistance. Through our discussion we organized another plan. She personally handed out all questionnaires to students majoring in the low and high act. By this time I had made provisions to include the division of students into lower and upper classmen which was an extension of the original intention of sophomores and seniors. Questionnaires that were left over were personally handed out to people whom she thought might respond to them. Ads were placed in the student paper, Baha, and the school radio station gave it an extra plug.

Purpose in Life as a Measure of Existential Consciousness

To measure the variable of consciousness two scales were administered in the questionnaire. One was the Purpose in Life (PIL) and the other was the Existential Consciousness Questionnaire (ECQ). The PIL was used in this study for essentially two reasons: (1) it was the only measure of a purported existential consciousness that I was aware of and (2) it's construction and reliability are well known which could lend itself as one measure of a variant of existential consciousness.

Crumbaugh and Maholick designed the PIL "to measure the degree to which the subject had found meaningful goals around which to integrate his life" (1963:47). The theoretical foundation from which they developed this scale relied on Frankl's conception of existentialism. Fundamental to Frankl's conception of existentialism is that man is free to make choices and his freedom carries with it a responsibility to a higher entity. This is expressed by Frankl as "there is no such thing as responsibility to oneself, we can only be responsible to an entity higher than ourselves" (1955:25-26). Frankl's mode of existen-

tialism is within the motif of a religious orientation. This is clearly brought out in his interpretation of suffering and the importance he placed on the major thesis of the will to meaning.

Frankl shares a basic concern with other existentialists which may be viewed in the following: (1) there is a mediation process through which the individual must become engaged in to determine one's own reality, (2) man must ultimately decide for himself, and (3) there is a confrontation with the "existential vacuum". For Frankl, Crumbaugh and Maholick this is expressed in the ability of man to find a will to meaning. For them this will to meaning has heavy overtones of a spiritual realization through which one can become committed to a goal or process. For Crumbaugh (1963) the two most important influences which alter life patterns in any significant way are love and religion. Through this realization, Crumbaugh stresses the importance of being able to find "positive values which can attract full devotion and serve as a nucleus for reorienting one's entire life" (1965:405). The overtones of a religious commitment become even more apparent as he affirms the need to find a cause one can "passionately believe in" (1965:406).

The PIL is intended to measure the will to meaning. The will to meaning "represents a striving to find purpose in one's own existence to find a cause or sense of mission that is uniquely one's own and that gives direction to life and makes it understandable" (Crumbaugh and Maholick, 1963:43).

The PIL suggests that the mode of existential consciousness moves through three stages. The first stage is characterized by the given social situation within which one is located. This, in effect, is the dominant reference point for the person's action and considerations.

The second stage is a process through which one begins to question the given social situation. If one continues to question or search for new meanings and is unable to find any, the resulting condition will be noogenic neurosis. This has been expressed as a confrontation with the existential vacuum or existential frustration which "is created by a vacuum of perceived meaning in personal existence, and manifested by the symptom of boredom" (Crumbaugh and Maholick, 1964:200). The impasse through this vacuum is found in the ability to create values which act to foster responsibility via freedom and, as was previously noticed, this responsibility must be to a higher entity than self. At this point of recognizing the higher entity, the second stage has been completed which is essentially a confrontation with the spiritual aspects of man. At this point of finding a will to meaning, one is able to direct one's life. The third stage is a point of transition from the spiritual realms back to the given state. It is characterized by a renewed sense of purpose. The PII is a measurement of this stage of consciousness. This variant of existentialism is somewhat different from the conception of existential consciousness which was developed for this research.

The mode of existential consciousness, as it is constructed in this questionnaire and the meaning it represents for this model, can be thought of as a tenuous position through which one is constantly confronted with a mediation process through which one must continually give meaning to self, others and the environment. There are no moral commandments upon which one can rest nor are there beliefs or passions to which one can attach a sense of final commitment. It is tenuous in the respect that once you think you have it, a finality of judgement

that will meet all conditions, then you can be assured you do not have it. It is as though one was to attempt to catch or to contain running water. To confine a stream of running water into a container is to negate the very existence of the running water.

For Frankl, Crumbaugh and Maholick the existential vacuum was a state of boredom to be overcome through the will to meaning which involved a commitment to a higher entity. The mode of existential consciousness does not recognize a higher external entity. This variant of existentialism is expressed by Nietzsche, Sartre and Camus. Facing the existential vacuum in this perspective is interpreted as confronting the existential condition which has been described as nihilism by Nietzsche, the struggle to be the for-itself by Sartre, and a confrontation with the absurd for Camus. The stages of development suggested by this interpretation of existentialism are similar to the stages of development as they are found in The Phenomenology of Mind. The first stage of sensual consciousness one is thought to be a process of adaption, play, imitation, and inquiry. As a result one acquires a repertoire with self, others, along the path of a mediation that attempts to go beyond the appearances of the given state of affairs. When this inquiry proceeds to inquire without finding any meaning, it results in a state of noogenic neurosis for Crumbaugh and Maholick. A somewhat similar state is suggested in this model but is referred to as a state of nihilism. Up to this point there are some similarities between the PIL and the ECQ. A major point of distinction occurs in the means utilized to gain self-mastery. For Crumbaugh, Maholick and Frankl the means lie in the will to meaning which ultimately suggests a belief in a higher entity to which one can find some

assurance. The interpretation suggested by this model is that through the confrontation with the absurd one comes to realize one's freedom and responsibility. The concern is not to negate the absurdity of indifference by a leap of faith but to confront the situation with the realization that there are no final absolute assurances which can ease the existential condition. The second stage of the path of consciousness as suggested by this model involves a struggle through which the individual encounters himself and his relationship to others and to the environment. The third stage involves the process of re-entry into the given state of appearances and the world of cultural meanings and symbols. For religious existentialists this process is guided by a foundation of religious belief. For the mode of existentialism in this model, re-entry is of a different nature. The essential question of re-entry is itself a question that must be mediated, which is to say that one must decide for oneself if it is a desirable course of action. For some re-entry is not a viable path as they choose to act on the periphery of the mainstream of society. For others it may be only a partial encounter. Re-entry for an existential mode of consciousness does not imply a process of assimilation or accumulation but a process of mediation which implies continual change and transformation.

An item analysis of each of the scales used in the questionnaire was analyzed through a computer program (TESTSTAT) which yielded means, sigmas, and point-biserial correlations between items composing the scales. The results of this program on the PIL may be viewed in Table II. This program also presented the total scale means, sigmas, and an alpha coefficient of internal consistency. Of particular interest from this computer program is the alpha coefficient.

TABLE II
PIL SCALE BY ITEMS

Items	Scale							R Value (N = 152)
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
76.* I am usually	completely bored			exuberant, enthusiastic				.60
77. Life to me seems	always exciting			completely routine				.55
78. In life I have	no goals or aims at all			very clear goals and aims				.58
79. My personal existence is	utterly meaningless, without purpose			very purposeful and meaningful				.75
80.* Every day is	constantly new and different			very purposeful and meaningful				.56
81. If I could choose, I would	prefer never to have been born			like nine more lives just like this one				.53
82.* After retiring, I would	do some of the exciting things I have always wanted to			loaf completely the rest of my life				.54
83. In achieving life's goals I have	made no progress whatever			progressed to complete fulfillment				.52
84. My life is	empty, filled only with despair			running over with exciting good things				.71
85.* If I should die today, I would feel that my life has been	very worthwhile			completely worthless				.66
86. In thinking of my life I	often wonder why I exist			always see a reason for my being here				.75
87. As I view the world in relation to my life, the world	completely confuses me			fits meaningfully with my life				.60

TABLE II (Continued)

88.	I am a	very irresponsible person	very responsible person	.48
89.*	Concerning man's freedom to make his own choices I believe man is	free to make all life's choices	completely bound by limitations of heredity and environment	.35
90.*	With regard to death, I am	prepared and unafraid	unprepared and frightened	.41
91.	With regard to suicide, I have	thought of it seriously as a way out	never given it a second thought	.48
92.*	I regard my ability to find a meaning, purpose, or mission in life as	very great	practically none	.68
93.*	My life is	in my hands and I am in control of it	out of my hands and controlled by external factors	.26
94.*	Facing my daily tasks is	a source of pleasure and satisfaction	a painful and boring experience	.75
95.	I have discovered	no mission or purpose in life	clear-cut goals and a satisfying life purpose	.71
		Mean	103.65	
		Sigma	14.05	
		Alpha	.88	

Another way of looking at coefficient alpha will serve to further its importance. It will be remembered that the reliability coefficient of any test is the estimated average correlation of that test with all possible tests with the same number of items which are obtainable from sampling a domain. Thus coefficient alpha is the expected correlation of one test with another of the same length when the two tests purport to measure the same thing. Coefficient alpha can also be derived as the expected correlation between an actual test and a hypothetical alternative form, one that may never be constructed (Nunnally, 1967:197).

The PIL is comprised of 20 items which are scored on a one to seven basis. The highest possible score would be 140. The mean score for this sample was 103.65 and the sigma was 14.05. All items are numbered as they appeared on the questionnaire. The items all correlated beyond the necessary .16 level to be statistically significant at the .05 level. The alpha value of .88 indicates that a very high degree of internal consistency is present among the items comprising the scale.

Developing a Measure of Existential Consciousness

From the beginning of the construction of this questionnaire a primary goal which the writer attempted to achieve was to write the questions in a novel form so as to gain the interest of the respondents and at the same time to try to make an enjoyable experience for them. With this in mind, the usual one line short statements were used from which one could choose a response on a one to seven scale. In addition to the short stem statements, a statement of a situation was given with a few alternative choices listed below them. The paragraph form was used in an attempt to express somewhat complicated ideas and to attempt to draw the respondent into a closer relationship to the

questions.

The format which will be followed in this section will center on three topics of discussion. The first one is to complete the theoretical foundation of the concept of existential consciousness as it is used in this model. This will include a brief analysis of Sartre's ontological position and how it challenged Hegel's conception of a universal self-consciousness. This distinction which Sartre has pointed out serves as a basis of the meaning attributed to this model of existential consciousness. The human condition, as Nietzsche and Sartre viewed it, expressed a continuing struggle. This concept of struggle in the human condition will be explained through the mediation of the in-itself and for-itself. The second topic of discussion will attempt to implement or operationalize a foundation of existential concepts which were primarily taken from Nietzsche and Sartre. The operationalization of these concepts will involve the actual construction of the questions. The third topic to be discussed is an item analysis of the original questionnaire and indicates those items that were selected to represent the final draft of the questionnaire.

Sartre's Conception of the Human Condition

Sartre is primarily concerned with rejecting Hegel's basic assumption that being in-itself and being for-itself are integral aspects of each other and thus can be brought together in a unity. Although the path of Geist, as described in the Phenomenology, encountered moments of separation in the movement through the unhappy consciousness, they were reconciled in the development of the self-consciousness. These assumptions are more clearly developed in Hegel's Logic as he begins to

build his case from the very beginning of the work. Essential elements from which this development rests on are the concepts of Dasein and Ideality. Bernstein has noted this development with great clarity (1971:26-40).

For Hegel to suggest that aufgehoben can be achieved between the in-itself and for-itself he must show that these elements are in some way related. He attempts this by developing a relationship between Pure Being as simply indeterminate and through its opposite component Nothingness. From this encounter a relationship develops which is referred to as Becoming, and this is the first major category of the Logic and is commonly referred to as Dasein.

In Becoming the Being which is one with Nothing, and the Nothing which is one with Being, are only vanishing factors; they are and they are not. Thus by inherent contradiction Becoming collapses into the unity in which the two elements are absorbed. This result is accordingly Being Determinate (Being there and so) (Dasein) (Bernstein, 1971:128).

Becoming is founded on the basis of a process that starts from an indeterminate being which is related to its opposite, nothingness. The importance of this assumption is that the emergent form of Becoming has within it the aspect of the negation. The implication as it is developed is the unfolding of this negation from an internal process.

The relationship of being in-itself is then compared to its opposite of being for-itself, as we saw in the development of Dasein which carried within it elements of its opposites, the resulting relationship between being in-itself and being for-itself will also carry within it elements of each other. This is developed by Hegel in his Logic and is referred to as Ideality.

Being for-itself (Fursichsein) may be described as ideality, just as being there and then (Dasein) was described as real-

ity. It is said that besides reality there is also an ideality. Thus the two categories are made equal and parallel. Properly speaking ideality is not somewhat outside of and beside reality; the notion of ideality just lies in its being the truth of reality. That is to say, when reality is explicitly put as what it implicitly is, it is at once seen to be ideality (Bernstein, 1971:129).

Through this development "the introduction of ideality holds forth the promise that the deepest divisions in being or the deepest divisions in consciousness will be successfully mediated, reconciled, aufgehoben" (Bernstein, 1971:130). This is at the very core of Hegel's premises concerning how the unity can occur. For Sartre this is an untenable position which must be criticized. Sartre's basic assumption is that this gap cannot be overcome, which gives substance to the human condition. Sartre is very much indebted to many of Hegel's ideas and expositions but is adamant in rejecting this assumption. For Sartre the human condition is characterized by freedom in which the person continually attempts to be that which one is not. If the human condition was supposed to have an essence preceding existence, it would for him limit the concept of freedom.

Sartre's development of the being in-itself rests upon the formulations of the concept of Being in-itself; Being is in-itself and Being is what it is. This is to say Being simply is. Sartre considers the in-itself as being "full of itself, and no more plenitude can be imagined, no more perfect equivalence of content to container" (1971: 120-121).

The for-itself is in relation to the in-itself but it can never achieve the in-itself. "The for-itself is the in-itself losing itself as in-itself in order to bound itself as consciousness" (1971:130). The for-itself is that negative act which separates itself and

distinguishes itself apart from the in-itself; and in so doing, consciousness is conceived as a lack of being or that which it is not. The implications this has for the freedom of individual praxis is simply put as: "I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it" (1971:68). As this is related to the future, it brings out a common concern which many existentialists share.

It is through my horror that I am carried toward the future, and the horror nihilates itself in that it constitutes the future as possible. Anguish is precisely my consciousness of being my future, in the mode of not-being (1971:68).

Living within this condition of attempting to mediate the in-itself and for-itself places the individual in the center of freedom and responsibility for personal acts. Praxis in Being and Nothingness is an individual act of becoming. Bad faith is described as attempting to deny personal freedom and responsibility. In an attempt to illustrate and clarify these concepts of in-itself and for-itself we can observe how Sartre develops patterns of bad faith. To deny one's freedom is in a sense denying the for-itself in an attempt to be an in-itself. When people portray themselves and come to regard themselves only as those portrayals, they are attempting to be an in-itself. Some may say they have achieved this; but for Sartre they would be acting in bad faith. As in the case of the writer in a cafe who tries so hard in his movements

...a little too precise, a step a little too quick, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automation while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-rope walker by putting it in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium which he perpetually re-established by a light movement of the arm and hand (1971:101).

However hard one may try, one is not reducible to an in-itself.

The existential condition as evaluated by Sartre is an attempt to base a praxis upon the foundation of personal freedom with responsibility for such acts resting on the person. For Sartre essence does not precede existence; there are no assurances and man can only exercise his freedom in the act of choosing. Nietzsche's concern with freedom revolved around the necessity that one must experience self in order to experience freedom. The development of the Existential Consciousness Questionnaire has been drawn primarily from the works of Sartre and Nietzsche.

The Construction of the Questionnaire

The focus of this section is to develop a common core of agreement among several key existentialist writers. These conditions will revolve around the concepts of the human conditions which center on existence, responsibility, choice, negation, freedom, anguish, the absurd, involvement, estrangement, rules and nothingness. Through focusing on a conceptual approach, it is believed that various essential themes may be chosen from particular writers, primarily Sartre and Nietzsche, which also have applicability to other existential writers.

This method of presentation has been deliberately chosen for several reasons. If one was to focus on one writer, e.g., Sartre as the representative of the existential perspective, than other variations of existentialism can be considered in relation to how well they coincide with Sartre's perspective. This method has not been chosen for the meaning of existentialism is not limited to any one particular writer. Although this model of existentialism relies primarily upon the concepts developed by Nietzsche and Sartre, it does, however,

incorporate other concepts.

Another reason for this type of presentation is the realization that it is not essential to evoke a school of consensus among existentialists but to let them develop their own particular aspects. To look for complete agreement among a field of writers who have repeatedly stated their concern that each person must inquire for themselves and act on that inquiry as they interpret it would be from the very outset a violation of a common concern among existentialists. In utilizing a conceptual approach one can draw out common concerns of various writers and yet recognize each one's particular variation. In this manner both the general and the particular concepts are left intact for further analysis. Realizing this as a common concern of the existentialists and in an attempt to represent these writers as validly as possible, several other notable approaches other than a conceptual one have been undertaken which are most evident in two popular accounts.

One such approach has been that employed by Walter Kaufmann in his account Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (1969). Concerning these writers Kaufmann states that,

The refusal to belong to any school of thought, the repudiation of the adequacy of any body of beliefs whatever, and especially of systems, and marked dissatisfaction with traditional philosophy as superficial, academic, and remote from life—that is the heart of existentialism (1969: 12).

The mode of presentation utilized in this work is to present a selection from those existentialist writers who have been of primary importance in developing and influencing a movement that focuses on the contrast between the unauthentic life and authentic life. To accomplish this objective Kaufmann has chosen a selection from Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Rilke, Kafka, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, and Camus. It

should also be noted that Kaufmann has also written on Nietzsche (1968) and Hegel (1965) and has translated several of Nietzsche's works.

A similar approach utilized by William Barrett in Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy focuses on the major themes developed by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre. In this work additional attention is directed to its foundation and emergence from the European countries. Barrett points out two trends in existential thought. He sees the ability to analyze our ongoing events as diminishing due to the ever-increasing encroachment of technology and bureaucracy "since it aims at the rational control and ordering of social life; and the two-technology and bureaucracy-have come more and more to rule our lives" (1962:269). A second tendency of our time is the ever-increasing abstractness where people prefer the reflections or image on the wall (or tube) rather than the real event. Barrett views existentialism as a movement that "seeks to bring the whole man-the concrete individual in the whole context of his everyday life, and in his total mystery and questionableness-into philosophy" (1962:275).

There have been numerous books which have sought to offer a collection of secondary sources on the various themes found in existentialism. One such account assembled by the editor, George Alfred Schrader, entitled, Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty (1967), seeks "to acquaint the reader with the main versions of current existentialist philosophy" (1967:vii). The first article which is written by Schrader focuses on the many common themes of existentialism and clearly states what he considers to be the focal point of this movement.

Existential philosophy from Kierkegaard to the present has been especially concerned to analyze the peculiar conditions

and structures of human existence. It is this concern rather than any general metaphysical or epistemological interest in the substance-essence issue that lies at the center of their reflection (1967:11).

In an attempt to develop a common center through the employment of a conceptual approach which most existentialists could feel comfortable with, let us first begin by turning our attention to Sartre. In a brief, but analytical essay, Sartre has taken the opportunity "to defend existentialism against some charges which have been brought against it" (1970:31). In the process of answering three particular charges, Sartre has this to say,

You see that it cannot be taken for a philosophy of quietism, since it defines man in terms of action, nor for a pessimistic description of man—there is no doctrine more optimistic, since man's destiny is within himself; nor for an attempt to discourage man from acting, since it tells him that the only hope is in his acting and that action is the only thing that enables a man to live. Consequently, we are dealing here with an ethics of action and involvement (1970:50).

A fundamental tenant of existentialism as Sartre interprets it and one which would act as a condition for other existentialists is the premise that existence precedes essence. From this premise two major corollaries follow which serve to further develop the foundation of existentialism. What Sartre calls the first principle of existentialism is that "man is nothing else but what he makes of himself" (1970:36). Further implied in this statement is that man is not confined to a set essence or composition that guides man along a predetermined path. This is not to deny the obvious importance of one's factivity but it is of major importance to realize man's ability to transcend himself. A second corollary of this premise is that "man is responsible for what he is. Thus, existentialism's first move is to make every man aware of what he is and to make the full responsibility of his existence rest on

him" (1970:36).

A number of questions were written to relate to this major premise and two accompanying corollaries. This set shall be referred to as "acceptance of responsibility" and consists of the following questions.

To indicate an existentialist response a line will be drawn under the available alternatives. For those questions that will be inverted in their scoring an asterik (*) will be used to the front of the question.

- 1-7 I am solely responsible for my own acts.
The human condition is primarily characterized by:
 - a. A fixed (stable) human nature.
 - b. A universal force.
 - c. Heredity and gene structure
 - 1-7 d. The ability to say NO.
- 1-7 *I believe there is little one can do in forming one's own reality, for we are all part of a greater force (beyond our control) which sets in motion our actions.
- 1-7 Things will be as man decides for them to be.

From this awareness that man is responsible for his own acts, the underlying foundation of existentialism begins to appear that man is not confined to a fixed human nature in terms of making decisions. Sartre clearly states that "man is condemned to be free" which asserts that man being created by others, not of his own decisions, enters the world and once there through his existence comes into contact with oneself, others and various situations which call for an ever-demanding process of decision making. Sartre's point is that man continually chooses and even in the event of not choosing, has still made a decision. For this concept of choice the following questions were constructed.

- 1-7 Whatever the situation, choice is always possible.
- 1-7 It is impossible for mankind not to make choices.

The realization of choice is not by itself enough to indicate an

existential consciousness. What is needed is the further realization and analysis of the meaning of freedom. Freedom to choose between existing alternatives is not the concept of freedom used in this model. Freedom involves the ability of the person to go beyond the given alternatives, which is to say, one is free to create alternatives for oneself. Freedom within the given is similar to one slave declaring he has a kinder master than the other and hence is free. An existential concept of freedom declares that one possess the power of negation and in the process of recognizing things or states in their process of being in-itself, also has the responsibility and necessity of making that being in-itself a being for-itself. Through this process of negation and formulation, freedom involves a personally self-constructed act that is neither confined to existing conditions or absolute values or standards. This is further based upon the assumption that man has the power to negate himself. Freedom in existential literature is not judged on the basis of how successful an act becomes in a utilitarian or pragmatic sense; nor is freedom confined to the ability to achieve a goal. Sartre clearly sees man's freedom to negate.

Under these conditions freedom can be nothing other than this nihilation. It is through this that one for-itself escapes its being as its essence; it is through this that the for-itself is always something other than what can be said of it...Freedom is precisely the nothingness which is made-to-be at the heart of man and which forces human reality to be as to choose oneself, nothing comes to it either from the outside or from within which it can receive or accept (1971:567-569).

Freedom involves the negation of the in-itself where the action and negation is directed by the person with the focus on the for-itself.

Although one may not immediately place Krishnamurti with other existentialists, his concept of freedom coincides with an existential

formulation. It is not uncommon for Krishnamurti to discuss many of the central concepts of existentialism. An example of his acicular form of writing may be viewed in the following discussion of freedom.

These two things are essential: freedom and the act of learning. One cannot learn about oneself unless one is free, free so that one can observe, not according to any pattern formula or concept, but actually observe oneself as one is. That observation, that perception, that seeing, brings about its own discipline and learning; in that there is no conformity, imitation, suppression or control whatsoever-and in that there is great beauty (1971:9).

To illustrate this concept of freedom the following subset of questions were written.

- 1-7 *Freedom is the ability to engage in forms of actions which have been previously conceived.
 Suddenly freedom swooped down upon me and chilled me through and through. Nature leapt back, I was ageless, and I found myself all alone in the midst of your benign little world, like someone who has lost his shadow. And there was nothing left in the sky, no good, no evil, nobody to give me orders. This can be said to describe a situation where man:
- a. Cannot accept anybody else's interpretation of freedom but his/her own.
 - b. The person realized the magnificance of God who is greater than he is.
- 1-7 *Freedom is the ability to choose between existing alternatives.

Freedom is not merely an abstract concept where a slave declares his freedom as merely an inward state. Existential freedom recognizes this as an aspect of freedom and also recognizes the necessity of choosing acts that will foster freedom. "One may choose anything if it is on the grounds of free involvement" (Sartre, 1970:60). The type of undertakings one chooses to be involved in defines the concept of freedom. Sartre is very much concerned with the type and sum of the undertakings one becomes involved in. "We define man only in the relationship to involvement" (1970:56). Realizing the concept of freedom as an expression of the for-itself and with the idea of involvement,

the core of action which one becomes involved in is reflective as the type of action being committed and the type of person committing the action. The following set of questions shall be termed "involvement".

In response to reading "Is Life Worth Living" the following statement has been made: It concludes in favor of voluntary optimism. Life has meaning if we really wish to give it one. First of all we must act, throw ourselves into some enterprise. Then if later we reflect of it, the die is already cast; we are committed. I wonder what you would think of that monsieur.

1-7 a. Life may be meaningful only if one is willing to engage in action where everything is at stake and without any guarantee either of outcome or of any essential rightness.

b. One must be committed to something with a stated goal or purpose so that one knows what to aim for.

1-7 *I often feel that what I have been and done does not show my true worth.

If man/woman can be said to have a center it would be found in the:

a. Heart

b. Mind

c. Nature

1-7 d. Action

A common concern of existentialism as it is being used in this paper involves the estrangement motif. This concept of estrangement does not imply a condition of alienation which is sought to be surpassed; but one where it is sought to develop itself. This is based upon prior discussion of having no absolute to which we can turn. This state has been further described as a condition of nihilism which will be analyzed when we discuss Nietzsche. The conditions of awareness, choice, freedom and action brings us closer to the startling realization that perhaps the universe can go on without our presence. The sudden realization of this encounter brings us into the absurd, and as Camus has stated, the fundamental problem of philosophy is to decide if life is worth living. At this juncture of realizing the indifference of the universe, the absurd conditions resulting from this

realization often brings on states of anguish and despair. To hold one responsible for their own acts and to consider for a moment Sartre's statement of responsibility can quite easily bring on states of anguish. "Therefore, I am responsible for myself and for everyone else. I am creating a certain image of man by my own choosing. In choosing myself, I choose man" (1970:37). The following subscale of estrangement has been written to develop these concepts of indifference, the absurd and anguish.

Before this night heavy with stars and constellations, for the first time I opened my heart to the tender indifference of the world. Finding it so like myself, so fraternal even, I felt that I had been happy and that I was still happy. What do you attribute this happiness to.

- 1-7 a. The person has found peace with himself and God.
 1-7 b. Through the realization of indifference one realizes their own freedom.
 c. He is not really happy but is in a sad state of depression.

Sisyphus (a mythical figure) is the absurd hero. He becomes so as much through his passions as through his torment. His scorn of the gods, his hatred of death, and his passion for life got him that unspeakable punishment in which all one's being is spent in accomplishing nothing. This is the price which must be paid for the passions of this earth.

- 1-7 a. The very struggle toward the summit is enough to fill a man's heart.
 b. For defying the gods this is a just punishment. There is only one really serious philosophical problem: that is suicide. To judge whether life is or is not worth the trouble of being lived is to answer philosophy's fundamental question. The interpretation that I most agree with is:
 1-7 a. Man confronted with his own freedom must accept the responsibility of conducting his own life.
 b. There is nothing to become concerned about because there is a purpose in life.

Another component which constitutes a basic foundation of existentialism for this paper concerns the realization that norms, mores, structures and traditions are not of a decree beyond man but are the embodiments of men. Sartre uses the analogy of a game to illustrate

this point. We may be involved in various games which entail rules and regulations; but what must not be lost sight of is that we have consented to play by these rules and that we know they have been invented. Of this very point, Hazel Barnes has noted, "One has to play 'the game', but one is never given a book of rules" (1962:49). The following question was written with this in mind.

Some have said that life is like a game in which actors must play by the rules so that we can anticipate the action of others which in turn gives us some semblance of order:

- a. These rules (norms-mores-customs-legitimizations) have been institutionalized and are necessary so as to avoid anarchy.
- 1-7 b. These rules have been invented and each person must decide for themselves if they are to follow them regardless of the consequences.

Camus' basic philosophical question is central to the above discussion which sometimes is formulated in: Does one choose to live in good faith or bad faith? Stated in this form the question becomes: Once man has faced the realization of the absurd what are the possible alternatives? Camus has answered this question through his writings and most directly in The Rebel (1951) as a statement that when one says no more, one has defined the limits of which one will go. The concern to live one's life for oneself in search of freedom without deceiving oneself is the essential conditions of good faith. Bad faith, so to speak, permits one to soften the awareness of one's own freedom.

To be sure, the one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a pleasing untruth. Bad faith then has in appearance the structure of falsehood. Only what changes everything is the fact that in bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth (1970:150).

Hazel Barnes (1962) in her study of Sartre, de Beauvoir and Camus clearly states in the first paragraph of her book the accompanying

reorientation that is called for when the human condition is based upon a psychology of freedom. She refers to this as the "Literature of Possibility."

For almost a century now, prevailing psychologies and the literature written under their influence have agreed that men cherish the illusion of freedom while being in fact determine by heredity, by environment and by early childhood experiences. Humanistic existentialism challenges this doctrine and claims that exactly the reverse is true: every man is free, but most men, fearing the consequences and the responsibility of freedom, refuse to acknowledge its presence in themselves and would deny it to others (1962:3).

Humanistic existentialism as it is developed in this paper is concerned with various concepts which places one in the very center of one's own action. It calls for the acceptance of responsibility for oneself and others and can be said to have the following characteristics. Freedom is perhaps the most central concept which, as we have noted, involves the realization that one is engaged in the process of being what one is not, which is to say, man possesses the ability to negate oneself while being engaged in the process of the for-itself. Through this process various states are encountered which have been most frequently described in existential literature as anguish, despair, forlornness, dread and nausea which are encountered as one goes through a process of negation. In existential literature this movement from the given condition may be described as the following through to a state of nothingness. It is as though at various times in one's life a stripping process is called for in which those values, modes of behavior, mental constructions and structural patterns which one has organized his life around is called in for an inspection. Other people have referred to this process as discharging the concepts. In forms of mediation various exercises call for a stripping away of those

associations which one most commonly thinks of oneself. At the center of this process comes the realization that one is responsible for their own acts. This realization may be too alarming or disturbing and thus this responsibility is cast off to some external source other than oneself.

Another possibility exists and that is one accepts the responsibility for one's actions and works toward the engagement of freedom for oneself and others. Choosing not to live in bad faith and facing the constantly changing relations with others calls for a pattern or existence based upon commitment and passion. Hazel Barnes notes a common concern of existentialist writers in their "challenge to conventional moral codes, a sense of urgency in matters of conscious, an interest in the private introspection of the individual" (1962:155).

To express a few of the concepts which have been discussed in Nietzsche's writings, three subsets of questions concerning the death of God, re-evaluation and the will to power were composed.

The death of God has caused much concern. At the heart of the question, as Nietzsche described it, would be the recognition that we have killed God ourselves and stand alone as the interpreter of our acts. This is at the foundation of nihilism, that man no longer supported with his various crutches must accept the responsibility for his acts. These acts are neither totally good nor bad but are both. For this idea the following question was written.

1-7 *Without a god, everything would be possible, and in realizing this it is necessary to have a god or a form of external authority to keep some semblance of order.

Upon further inquiry the realization of the death of God and a confrontation with nihilism brings one to the point of asking if there

are no absolutes to which we can turn or to which we can invoke so as to relieve us from making our own decisions, then what are we left to do? Nietzsche clearly presented his views on this matter with a call for a re-evaluation of morals with each person mediating these concerns. This can be illustrated in the following two questions.

- 1-7 1-7 Morality is a way of turning one's back on the will of existence.
- 1-7 1-7 There are no moral phenomena; only moral interpretations of phenomena.

From a re-evaluation of morals, one comes in direct contact with those competing wills, desires, loyalties and various concerns that are in multiple forms within each one of us. A central concern of Nietzsche was his development of the will to power. He believed that as one becomes engaged in this struggle to give an order to these competing wills, one will learn self-mastery. With self-mastery one can learn to live in a state beyond the level of sensual consciousness and beyond the level of self-consciousness. The will to power is a vital process of an existential consciousness which holds within it the transitional seeds to other levels of consciousness. For this concept the following two questions were written.

- 1-7 1-7 For one to develop their own self-mastery, it is necessary to reject all those structures and norms regardless of their origin which impedes one's self integration.
- 1-7 1-7 *I find that what others consider to be true has a strong influence on my own construction of truth.

Pre-Test of the Questionnaire

The major concern in the pre-testing situation was to determine if the respondents could understand the questions and attempt to judge how they reacted to it. The Existential Consciousness Questionnaire

was administered to three sections of an Introductory English course, numbering approximately 25 students per class. The predominant composition of these classes were freshmen who were between the ages of 17 and 19. The questionnaire was administered by the instructor and the writer of the questionnaire sat in the back of the room and observed how they responded to it. It took approximately 20 minutes for the class to complete the questionnaire. It was noted that the students seemed to devote their full attention to the questions. Every question was read and some were re-read. After the students completed the questionnaire the instructor introduced the writer, and in two of the sections, a 20-minute discussion ensued. The general impression from this pre-testing situation was the questions could be understood by almost all of the students. There was some difficulty with the term "eunuch" and through the discussions it was evident that few were aware of the existentialist perspective per se.

Another pre-testing situation occurred in a very informal setting. The questionnaire was administered to three senior students who were willing to cooperate. Each person read the questionnaire with a great deal of deliberation. In the discussion that followed the subjects noted that they had never taken a questionnaire like this before and said they found it to be particularly interesting. Other comments were that they liked the paragraph statements which required some serious consideration.

From these pre-testing situations it was generally believed that if an attempt was to be made to write a novel and interesting questionnaire which would attract both the interest of existentially-oriented people and underclassmen in general, the questionnaire, as it stood,

would be appropriate. The questionnaires were administered and the following section will present the results.

Item Analysis of the Questionnaire

From the construction of the questionnaire it is evident that the paragraph statements were followed by at least two alternative statements. The first intention was to have the respondents choose only one of the statements and respond to it on a one to seven basis. After further deliberation it was felt that additional information could be gained if the respondents were able to respond to all the alternatives. The underlying assumption in making this decision was that a reconstruction back to the original intention would be more feasible than attempting to speculate what the result might have been if the respondents had the opportunity to respond to all alternatives. In the final analysis of this scale, the single-choice alternative was selected. This was achieved by the writer choosing only the existential response and only scaling the paragraph on this basis. In scoring the questions a seven was used to indicate the most existential response. The highest possible score for the final scale of 15 items was 105.

A computer program (TESTSTAT) was used in an item analysis of the Existential Consciousness Questionnaire. The total scale means, sigmas and alpha coefficient of internal consistency are presented in Table III. The original R will be given for all items and only the R will be given for those which were included in the final scale. For both scales the mean, sigma and alpha coefficient will be stated. All items will be presented with the number as they appeared in the original questionnaire. The items which were retained in the final R scale

TABLE III
EXISTENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS SCALE BY ITEMS

Items	Original R Value (N = 152)	Final R Value (N = 152)
36. Whatever the situation, choice is always possible.	.19	.43
37. I am solely responsible for my own acts.	.14	.38
38. I find that what others consider to be true has a strong influence on my own construction of truth.	.22	
39. I believe there is little one can do in forming one's own reality for we are all part of a greater force (beyond our control) which sets in motion our actions.	.30	
49. It is necessary to reject all those structures and norms which hinder one's self expression.	.33	.51
50. Freedom is the ability to engage in forms of actions which have been previously conceived.	.23	
53. The realization of one's own freedom most often is accompanied by anguish.	.15	
54. Things will be as man decides for them to be.	.43	.47
55. It is impossible for mankind not to make choices.	.26	.39
56. I often feel that what I have been and done doesn't show my true worth.	.22	
59. Freedom is the ability to choose between existing alternatives.	.16	
62. Without a God, everything would be possible and in realizing this it is necessary to have a God or a form of external authority to keep some semblance of order.	.31	
70. Morality is a way of turning one's back on the will of existence.	.29	.52
71. There are no moral phenomena, only moral interpretations of phenomena.	.37	.41
40-A. These rules (norms-mores-customs-legitimizations) have been institutionalized and are necessary so as to avoid anarchy.	.34	

TABLE III (Continued)

41-A.	These rules have been invented and each person must decide for themselves if they are to follow them regardless of the consequences.	.31	.37
42-B.	Life may be meaningful only if one is willing to engage in action where everything is at stake and without any guarantee either of outcome or of any essential rightness.	.13	.43
43-B.	One must be committed to something with a stated goal or purpose so that one knows what to aim for.	.24	.35
44-B.	For one to develop their own self-mastery, it is necessary to reject all those structures and norms regardless of their origins which impede one's self integration.	.39	.44
45-C.	A fixed (stable) human nature.	.34	
46-C.	A universal force.	.42	
47-C.	Heredity and gene structure.	.34	
48-C.	The ability to say NO.	.09	
51-D.	Cannot accept anybody else's interpretation of freedom but his/her own.	.23	
52-D.	The person realized the magnificance of a God who is greater than he is.	.38	
57-E.	The very struggle toward the summit is enough to fill a man's heart.	.06	.42
58-E.	For defying the gods this is a just punishment.	.40	
60-F.	Man confronted with his own freedom must accept the responsibility of conducting his own life.	.29	.43
61-F.	There is nothing to become concerned about because there is a purpose in life.	.29	
62-F.	Without a God, everything would be possible and in realizing this it is necessary to have a God or a form of external authority to keep some semblance of order.	.42	
63-G.	The person has found peace with himself and God.	.47	
64-G.	Through the realization of indifference one realizes their own freedom.	.27	.39
65-G.	He is not really happy but is in a sad state of depression.	.23	
66-H.	Heart.	.34	
67-H.	Mind.	.24	
68-H.	Nature.	.01	
69-H.	Action.	.29	.42

TABLE III (Continued)

	Original Scale		Final Scale
Mean	154.16	Mean	65.0
Sigma	16.82	Sigma	10.85
Alpha	.64	Alpha	.69

met the criteria of .16 or greater to be statistically significant at the .05 level. The lowest correlation value did not go below .35. The final alpha value of .69 suggests a high degree of internal consistency for items comprising the scale. The mean value for the scale was 65.0 and the reported sigma was 10.85.

Remaining Scales

Socialization

To gain some perspective on the degree to which the respondents experienced a few of the primary social institutions, a socialization scale was devised. The scale consists of six items of which two refer to the educational process, one to the home environment, one to religious affiliation, a question concerning the learning appropriate behaviors, manners, customs and tradition and the sixth concerning association with other people. These questions correspond to questions 16 through 21 on the questionnaire. The respondents were asked to rate the degree of flexibility they had within these six situations. A one response was to indicate a situation of tight control and a seven to represent a wide open situation. In Table IV the means of the respondents from the two agencies are presented. A computer program (TEST-

STAT) analyzed the scale item construction of the socialization scale. The maximum score for the six items was 42, the reported mean score was 22.80 and the sigma was 5.25. The alpha value of .64 indicates that there is a high degree of internal consistency among the items. The individual items all correlated beyond the .16 level which is to say they were statistically significant beyond the .05 level. The lowest level for the individual items was .50 with half of the items ranging in the mid .6 level. The means do not represent a wide divergence (High U = 22.56, Low C = 24.33) which seems to indicate that the students from the two institutions experienced a similar degree of flexibility in their pre-college socialization process.

TABLE IV
PRE-COLLEGE SOCIALIZATION

Items	Original R Value (N = 152)
16. Education: K-8.	.50
17. Education: 9-12.	.64
18. Home environment.	.68
19. Religious affiliation.	.66
20. Learning appropriate behaviors: manners, customs, traditions.	.60
21. Associations with other people.	.53
Mean	22.80
Sigma	5.25
Alpha	.64

Student Body Profile

Table V presents the data for the student body profile. The purpose of this scale was to assess the students' view of their other fellow students. The primary concern was to determine if they viewed their classmates as willing to direct their own source of action or education. In one way this may serve as an indication of the students perception of the degree to which other students enacted an existential mode of consciousness. The original scale consisted of 10 items. Through a later examination, question number 29 was omitted from the scale because it was not clearly stated and did not add to the conceptual overview for which the scale had been devised. On the remaining eight items a computer program (TESTSTAT) analyzed the item construction and correlation of the individual items. The original R values and the final R values will be given for the questions. Through this analysis one item, number 26, was omitted from the scale. The question numbers of the items are those that appeared on the questionnaire. The respondents were asked to respond on a one to seven scale. The maximum score of 56 would indicate that these students were most willing to direct their own course of action which is another way to say they had a high mode of existential consciousness. Items which were reversed in scoring are indicated with an asterik (*). The mean score of the final scale was 30.80 and the sigma was 7.08. The eight items were statistically significant beyond the .05 level. The alpha value of .73 indicates a high degree of internal consistency among the items comprising the scale. The mean score reported for High U was 29.34 and for Low C it was 38.58. This indicates that the respondents from Low C perceived their fellow students to be more willing to direct their

own educational experiences than did those students at High U.

TABLE V
STUDENT BODY PROFILE

Items	Original R Value (N = 152)	Final R Value (N = 152)	
22.* General disinterest or apathy	.42	.46	
23. Willingness to confront social issues.	.63	.66	
24.* Willingness to follow rules.	.58	.58	
25.* Preference for an assigned text in their classes.	.46	.44	
26.* Have stated objective in their courses.	.24		
27.* Following guidelines formulated by others.	.66	.65	
28. Support total control for making one's own decisions.	.60	.63	
30. Each student, by himself/herself, creating their own educational experience.	.66	.69	
31. Participate in radical overthrow of undesirable institutions.	.60	.61	
Original Scale		Final Scale	
Mean	22.80	Mean	30.80
Sigma	5.25	Sigma	7.08
Alpha	.64	Alpha	.73

CHAPTER VII

CONSIDERATION OF THE VARIABLES AND PROPOSITIONS

Introduction

This chapter is basically divided into three sections. It is the purpose of the first section to state the criteria that was used in designating various majors and educational institutions to represent the variables of act and agency. The second section will begin with a brief statement of the limitations of the study and then proceed to present the data concerning the propositions. The third section will present the responses to a single item on the questionnaire which asked the student to pick one of the following which best typified their feeling as a result of being within their perspective institutions: a eunuch, an imitator or an explorer.

A Consideration of the Variables of Act and Agency

Criteria for Low Act

The two college majors that were operationalized for this study to represent a low act were sociology in one university and communications in the other. When sociology is considered in relation to the other majors which are offered within High U, it appears to be a good representation. There is a relative degree of freedom in choosing electives

and there is a relatively wide range of courses to choose from within the discipline itself. The format of the courses for the most part is fairly structured which is evident by a series of standard texts which are used in the teaching of the courses. The introduction of new courses must be approved by the Board of Regents and in general student-initiated courses within the department are not a common event. The most often used type of evaluation is through written exams which are made up by the instructor. In some cases these exams are of a take-home type. Quoting from the High U's catalog the discipline and relevance it has for the individual student is viewed in the following manner.

A bachelor's degree in sociology is not a professional degree as it is in education or engineering. Sociology is a basic academic discipline. However, employment opportunities are many for those who, in consultation with their advisors, develop a special sequence of courses. For example, there is a growing demand for undergraduate sociology majors in public and private agencies dealing in human relations (i.e., correctional agencies, social welfare agencies, urban planning agencies, community relations agencies). For those with earned graduate degrees, professional career opportunities include such fields as teaching, business and industry, community relations and development, urban affairs, corrections, health, civil service, and a large number of private and public agencies.

At the undergraduate level, the department offers four learning areas: sociology, anthropology, human resources and urban studies. Academic training at the MS and PhD level is based upon six fields of concentration: anthropology, social problems and deviance, methods-statistics, social organization, social psychology and theory.

All sociology majors may have their programs tailored to their individual needs by the department advisors.

In comparison to other majors within High U, sociology seems to be a fair representation of a low act. In regard to the broader conceptual framework of a low act, sociology is not a good example.

The criteria for choosing communications at Low C illustrates quite well the meaning of a low act. There are no stated requirements

of how many hours or what sequence one should follow in the program. This major is considered an interdisciplinary major which has come into being through the demand and interests of the students. The mode of evaluation most often used is through projects. These projects may range from composing a community based film or setting up lights for a rock concert. The standard set of criterion that is most often seen in the mass media is not taken as an example of what to do but serves as an example of control and manipulation by large corporate interests.

A glimpse into the structure of this discipline may be gained through a consideration of who decides the structure of the program (self-determined) and who makes the decisions within the program (student governed). The following two descriptions are taken from the communications catalog.

Self-Determined: The student is responsible for designing, carrying out and evaluating his or her program. The flexibility in combining various experiences and course work in other disciplines allows the student to build a curriculum appropriate to his or her personal, career or graduate school needs. Students have developed majors in everything from Dance-Video to Pre-Med Communications, from Urban Communications to General Systems Theory.

Student Governed: The growing body of communications studies center represents a radical departure from traditional departmental structures in that students take a majority decision making status in matters of academic, budgetary and administrative policy making. In addition, students advise faculty on matters of curriculum, and CSC makes wages available to students for student initiated courses.

The variable of a low act was well represented by communications for it offered the students the ability to initiate, explore and evaluate their own acts.

Criteria for Low Agency

The criteria for the category low agency was well represented by

the institution Low C. It is characterized by an active ongoing concern among its members which included people on the janitorial staff, students, officers of the institution, professors and administrators. A point of focal concern among members of the community of Low C centered around the future of the school. The future, as it was defined, relied upon how well the community would be able to meet three of its most threatening challenges. In reviewing these challenges various features of a high agency become apparent. These features will be discussed before pointing out the major elements of why Low C is a good representation of the criteria for a low agency.

These challenges are all interrelated and are not presented in the order of their importance. One challenge is to decide what the relationship of the main campus will be to its network colleges. The rapid growth which the network experienced within the last five years has now leveled off. The major question seems to be if the main campus can afford to offer continual support to its members. A major criterion of this challenge is to stabilize its growth and not have the members continue to drain the resources from the main campus. The mode of debate on this question is quite open. During faculty meetings, various members have asked that the President resign because of his apparent inability to lead the community. This call for resignation is a response by the members of the faculty who feel that the President is a primary supporter of the network system. The student newspaper on its front page has on various occasions demanded that the President resign. The President is, however, still acting through his office, for only the Board of Trustees can replace him.

A second challenge that is in the process of being decided is what

to do regarding the commitment the President and a few board members have made to the model of pluralism. Pluralism was a directive to bring in minority students or New Direction Students. These students, for all practical purposes, can be thought of as third world people who live in the ghettos of the United States. Although the great majority are non-white, there are a few white students who are considered in this class. A primary requisite for this classification is a low financial status. The pluralism model attempted to bring the many segments of the society into the environment of a rich liberal arts college. This movement has generally been recognized as a failure from almost all concerned. One of the most damaging strikes in the schools history occurred in regard to this matter. The school is still attempting to recover. Low C increased its debt as a direct result of the strike from the damage sustained and more seriously from a loss of student enrollment. The projected student enrollment for the fall quarter of 1974 is estimated to be one third lower than it was a year ago. The challenge Low C faces in its failure to meet the pluralism model of education is but a reflection of the society's failure to meet its diversity commitments. The outcome of this challenge may be the most challenging issue for all of us. The various outcomes and alternative courses of action which resulted in this struggle has been focused on a strike and the resulting firing and expulsion of faculty and students which were all reinstated at a later time. It should be noted that 25% of the faculty, however, was cut in response to the financial strain the college was experiencing. Although it cannot be said that the Institute for the Solution of Social Problems was cancelled due to its involvement in the strike, a general statement may be that its involvements in the strike did not enhance its

acceptance among other members of the community who did not support the strike. The challenge of pluralism was met by competing components which attempted to redefine the power structure.

A third challenge which involves the immediate security of the college is to develop a course of action that will bolster its dwindling enrollments. The basic ongoing finances of the school are approximately 90% dependent upon student tuition. In an attempt to meet this challenge the tuition was lowered in hopes of attracting more students. All students are requested to live on campus in an effort to meet the mortgage payments of the dorm. Other measures being taken are to redefine management policies.

The power structure of Low C is in a vertical arrangement, with the Board of Trustees at the top, followed by the President who is to direct and provide leadership for the community. Although this arrangement exists, office holders are not able to act solely from the authority of their office. The decisions of the various components of the school are subject to review and debate among other members. In comparison to High U, students have a great deal of power and are involved in the decision-making procedures which concern their immediate interests. A major difference between Low C and High U is that the students of Low C believe that if the matter under consideration affects the school in any way, it is therefore subject to their own immediate interests and thus they should be involved in the decision-making process. This can be illustrated in reference to a recent action of the faculty when they voted to abolish the Institute for the Solution of Social Problems. The students were enraged that the faculty would take such action.

The challenges confronting Low C cannot be resolved by authori-

tarian decision-making given the low agency profile. When various components are represented in the decision-making process, there may occur a series of conflicts which ultimately lead to force and violence. Diffusion of power sometimes leads to an active process of struggle. The resulting measures being introduced at Low C are pointing to a tightening up of its structure. Concern for survival is the first problem they are facing. At this time there is still evidence that its various components recognize the need to gain an existing order and for the most part are willing to support measures to ensure their survival.

Weber has commented that a sure means of control can be exerted through the payment of wages. When the faculty size was reduced in an effort to economize, a group of professors suggested that members of the faculty could elect to receive two-thirds of their wages and a corresponding reduction of teaching duties. This measure was proposed to allow the released faculty members an opportunity to stay within the community and draw a living wage. This was not a new precedent for Low C. During the depression of 1929-1940 the President of Low C paid the members of the faculty according to need and not according to rank. It was not uncommon for the President to be taking home a lower wage than junior faculty members. Weber's means of discipline through rank, salary, tenure, and status does not find a strong base at Low C.

In regard to its flexibility, Low C attempts to meet the many varied tasks which are developed within its community. Students can initiate courses. There is an adult degree program which seeks to meet the needs of those older people who for various reasons would like to complete a degree but are unable to attend a campus site. The network college program which is attempting to diversify itself and provide

various oppressed members of the society with experience, knowledge and the credentials of a college education.

A distinct aspect of Low C is its work-study or co-op program. This involves a working experience for the students in such areas that will make their education a more meaningful experience. This program was introduced and developed in the early 1920's by the President of the college. When the students were asked why they chose Low C, the co-op plan was mentioned frequently. In report Number Four which appeared in March of 1973 from the Office of Educational Evaluation and Research, the co-op program was viewed as an integral aspect of their education. In response to the question, What features of Low C most appeal to you now? by far the largest number (76%) named the co-op plan as highly appealing. The co-op plan helps to meet the individual needs and interests of the members of Low C. From a publication reporting these co-op experiences the following excerpts are taken to illustrate another aspect of a low agency as it attempts to meet the many different tasks or acts within its structure.

1. One development at the Low C campus is an increasing number of situations in which students work and study simultaneously. For example, a psychology major may spend six months at the Menninger Foundation in Topeka (Kansas), working half-time, taking part in seminars-frequently graduate level-the other half, and getting the equivalent of one quarter's study and one quarter's work credits in the six month period.
2. One student has parlayed the academic possibilities of co-op into what will be the College's first immunology degree. Student X has done research work through co-op at Stanford University's Medical Micro-Biology Laboratory, at an adjacent V.A. hospital and, on the strength of those experiences, in an immunology program offered by the University of New Mexico's Medical School that is usually reserved for graduate or medical students. Research efforts certified by Stanford as the equivalent of actual course work formed the core of his degree plan, which was filled out with science credits earned at the Low C campus.

Although the ten-member delegation to China was not per se a co-op program, it is listed here to cite the flexibility and willingness on the part of the Low C to support such learning experiences. This account was written up in the alumni paper of Low C which appeared in May, 1974.

The group prepared for its 25 days in the People's Republic first by course work and Chinese language study done at the Low C campus, and then, beginning in January, in Hong Kong, where they spent six weeks in the study of modern China with the aid of China scholars, resident in Hong Kong and in intensive language study.

The language study was under the direction of Professor Y, assistant professor of Chinese at the Low C campus. Delegation members emphasized that the professor was a former resident of the People's Republic, was instrumental both in helping organize the China trip and readying the group for its visit.

Low C is flexible in its structure; it is neither tightly bureaucratically organized nor mainly emphasizing efficiency; and it is responsive to the many varied tasks within its structure.

Criteria for High Act

The two variables which were selected to represent a high act are history and Family Relations and Child Development (FRCD). History was chosen to represent a high act at Low C. This is not a particularly good example of a high act. This is the case because within Low C there is a major emphasis on student involvement and decision making. When other majors were considered in the area of liberal arts, history seemed to represent a high act more than the other majors. The character of the discipline itself permeates a great deal of its structure. History has often served as the foundation within a liberal arts perspective. It calls for a rigorous program of disciplined reading and analysis. To achieve such ends, a department would normally provide

some structure to involve the students in such a task. This is the case at Low C. Its program on campus has a reputation for excellence. The History Field syllabus states three requirements of a history major. The two questions that should be asked are who decides the structure of the program and how are the decisions made.

Plan of Study: There are three specific expectations of all history majors: the History Tutorial with some member of the history department/faculty, as soon as possible after entry in the department; History Seminar given by the department staff every Winter Quarter; and Senior Project taken during six consecutive months senior year, preferably Winter and Spring. During the Summer Quarter of your senior year, you must file a brief statement notifying the department of your choice of advisor and topic for your senior project. The History Office gets two copies of each student's senior project, one to be graded and returned, the other for the permanent files.

There are no other department requirements although there are qualitative expectations.

Decision Making: Students are encouraged to contribute to the policy making, administration, teaching and development of the department, so that the department members may respond to one another's changing interests and needs.

Student involvement includes:

1. Election by history majors of three student members to the Department of Executive Committee. The faculty also selects three members, one of whom is the department chairman. The members share equally the right to determine department policy.
2. Department, teaching, and research assistantships are available for academic or co-op credit.
3. Student-initiated courses on topics having to do with historical study, especially in areas not covered by the teaching faculty.

History is not a particularly good example of a high act but it can be said that it does offer more structure than communications.

At High U, FRCD represents quite well the definition of a high act. The plan of study for this major consists of 136 semester hours in which there are no electives. The complete plan of study has been pre-arranged for the student. In many of the lower level courses the exams are made on the departmental level. The students often expressed a

strong dislike over this measure of control. Many of the exams are multiple choice which call for a detailed and specific awareness of the possible responses.

At some time in the latter half of the junior or senior year the female students are required to live in the Home Management House. This is to prepare the student in the art of learning self-responsibility. Meals are planned, materials are bought and duties are assigned in an effort to teach students how to live on a fixed budget. Often times this requirement calls for a financial strain upon the student who is financing two living arrangements.

The stated objectives of this act may be found in the general catalog of High U.

Courses in family relations and child development assist students in developing the attitudes and skills which are fundamental to satisfying relationships in the home and community.

The department has three major goals:

- (1) to offer professional preparation in fields related to child development, early childhood education, and family relations and human development;
- (2) to improve the student's opportunities for a wholesome and satisfying family life through an improved understanding of concepts of growth and of relationships;
- (3) to make available to all college students, men and women, some general education for family living viewed as the basic human relationship.

FRCD acts from the basic assumption that the staff is capable of providing a structural format that will lead the student to accept responsibility as a contributing member of the society.

Criteria for High Agency

The variable of a high agency is well represented by the institution of High U. The first impression which may be received upon

viewing the campus is its neat and ordered appearance. The lawns are manicured and the bicycle paths are marked with white lines and arrows pointing to the appropriate flow of traffic. Occasionally one can detect worn paths across the grass which were probably made by wondering students who strayed off the approved paths. Within a few months these paths will be blocked off by inserting bushes with sharp thorns near the points of entrance and exit and/or the insertion of metal poles and a chain fence.

The level of administration is arranged in a vertical fashion from the State Board of Regents to the President of the university and down through his staff. In regards to the relationship of administrators to the faculty and students it is arranged in a vertical flow of power and commands. The administration formulates policies which are expected to be carried out. "The President is responsible for the total aspect of the University. He oversees its policies." This statement was repeatedly made by several high-ranking officials. To cite an example of this vertical flow of power may serve to illustrate one aspect of a high agency. The following incident was related to me by a high-ranking official who held the rank similar to that of a head of a department. After receiving a call from a board member, the President called one of his Vice Presidents to investigate the matter in question. In this particular instance it involved the requesting of funds for a school service. The Vice President then called the head of the appropriate department who in turn called the students who were involved in the matter. After investigating the matter, appropriate action was taken to assure the board member that it would not happen again. This course of action was then related back, through channels, to the Vice

President.

To illustrate the point that the President is never far away from the power to control aspects of the university, the following statement is taken from the student handbook. This matter concerns the student newspaper. While it is a stated objective that in a democracy the press shall be free from governmental influence, the government of High U is never far away. The student handbook states:

The Board of Directors of High U Student Publications is accountable to the President for policies and procedures of student publications, for approval of student personnel and for approval of budgets of the 'O'Dolly', the 'Bluenut' and of such other student publications as the board deems advisable. The board consists of four student members, three faculty members and the director of the School of Journalism and Broadcasting. Two student members are journalism majors, and two non-journalism. The term of office is two years for student members and three years for faculty members. The Director of Journalism and Broadcasting is a voting ex-officio member.

While this may be a common practice for a high agency, this is not the practice at Low C. The editor of the student newspaper, darkroom manager, student bulletin director and other chairpersons are appointed by the Community Manager. The Community Manager is in turn appointed by the Community Council (Comcil). This organization is composed of 11 members of which six are students, three non-students, the Community Manager and a representative from the Dean of the Community Services offices.

Without belaboring the point, but yet to illustrate how Low C represents a low agency and how High U represents a high agency, a quick glance at the policy of grades may prove to be interesting.

High U states in its handbook for faculty members the rather extensive overseeing powers of a bureaucratic agency.

Reports of the final grades of all students are prepared

and released each semester by the Registrar's Office. These reports are made available to the student, the student's parents, the student's advisor, the student's dean, the Dean of Students, the student-counselors in the dormitories the draft boards throughout the country, and the ROTC department.

Six week grade reports for all freshmen and sophomore students are made available to the students, the student's parents, the student's advisor, the Dean of Students, student-counselors in the dormitories, and the student's dean.

Low C has provisions for giving letter grades but most often resorts to written evaluations and provides a space on the same form for the students to evaluate the professor. The following description is taken from their bulletin.

Grades are not given for courses unless requested. Evaluation goes on continuously in a course as teacher and student inform each other critically and creatively of what they think they are learning, with suggestions for future direction. At the end of a course, the instructor reports in summary the work required in the course and the number of credits the student has earned (or No Credit if none has been earned). In addition, if there are fewer than 20 students in the course (or in any event if the student requests an evaluation), the instructor assesses the quality of the student's work and how well the student has understood the materials of the course; he includes also the student's own estimate of his achievement. The Registrar enters the credits earned on the transcript part of the student's cumulative record. The student may use copies of the detailed evaluations to accompany his transcript if he wishes to include them.

Low C does not send quarterly grade reports to parents. Students should share with their parents the reports of their educational progress.

In closing this discussion a final point of comparison between Low C and High U will be made in regard to their philosophies. High U primarily views students as a functional component who are expected to support the ongoing order or structure. As it is stated in the general catalog:

High U is a community whose members include its students, faculty, and administrators. The basic purposes of the University are the enlargement, dissemination, and appli-

cation of knowledge. One of the most basic necessities for the achievement of these purposes is freedom of expression and communication. The University always must strive to achieve that balance between maximum freedom and necessary order which best promotes its basic purposes by providing the environment most conducive to the many-faceted activities of research, teaching, and learning.

Each right of an individual places a reciprocal duty upon others: the duty to permit the individual to exercise his rights. The student, in his status as a member of the academic community, has both rights and duties. Within that community, the student's most essential right is the right to learn. The University has a responsibility to provide for the student those privileges, opportunities and protections which best promote the learning process in all its aspects. The student, for his part, has responsibilities to other members of the academic community; the most important of which is to respect those rights of others which are equally essential to the purpose and processes of the University.

Low C regards education as a fulfilling process where students are responsible for integrating and creating their own meaningful educational experiences. The following statements are taken from the Low C bulletin.

The competence that should result from a liberal education, Lloyd J. Averill has recently written, will mean increased capacity for meaningful and discriminating experiences, access to varied avenues into experience, an increasing repertoire of thoughtful responses to experience, and growth toward a livable wholeness-integrity-of experience. Thus life should not be divorced from work, nor the historical and theoretical from the vocational or applied. The aim is human wholeness.

There are some 2200 Low C educations in progress at Jello Creek...

Each individual embodies an adventure of existence, Whitehead has written. The art of life is the guidance of this adventure. Low C tries to help students, as needed, to learn how to run their own lives responsibly and to develop significant life purposes-not to do for students what they should do for themselves.

Consideration of the Propositions

Limitations of the Study

Three of the obvious limitations of this study are the questionnaire itself, the interviewing procedures used and the small number of respondents. In regard to the first limitation, the questionnaire was generally felt by many to be too long. Perhaps the most trying part of the questionnaire was the existential consciousness section. Repeated remarks from students at High U indicated that they had some difficulty with a few of the questions. Everyone that was interviewed mentioned that they had never taken a questionnaire quite like that one. Some found it interesting but many tired rather quickly. In the administration of the questionnaire at Low C it became evident that the students would not respond to completing the questionnaire. There are several apparent reasons. It was quite long and needed approximately 45 minutes to complete. The student would not respond to a questionnaire without knowing the intention and how the information would be used. The students were quite willing to devote their attention and offer assistance on a personal level but generally disregarded attempts to regiment them into quick responses. The most frequent remark concerning the questionnaire was that they were not capable of making such generalizations. In regard to the students from High U, the concepts of anguish and negative freedom were generally not considered.

In the process of interviewing the students the following comments need to be stated. I was ably assisted by a good friend who gathered some valuable information from interviewing students from the communications department. He taped his interviews and I carefully listened

to them, read his accompanying notes and discussed the interview with him. I conducted the greatest percentage of the interviews. I feel that I brought a bias into this procedure which should be noted. In interviewing the students at High U, I feel that I was able to gain a good rapport and response from the sociology majors. While interviewing the students from FRCD I feel that I was unable to conduct a complete and in-depth interview. I generally found these students to be quite willing to cooperate which was probably part of the difficulty. The main hinderance in our interaction was that I was unable to draw out their personal responses. In the case of interviewing administrators and faculty members, I generally believe I was able to gather an accurate representation.

Interviewing the students at Low C I found rather easy and enjoyable. The students were willing to talk and were not concerned with pleasing the interviewer. Generally speaking the students were highly involved in their program of education and liked the attention afforded them during the interview. They were quite happy to relate their personal experiences. All the interviews, however, were not this easy. In the course of interviewing a young Black woman, I found her quite responsive. Later that evening I attempted to probe into various matters with a group of Black students. This interview, which lasted several hours was quite worthwhile. Throughout the interview there was a slight feeling of distrust on their part and mine. If I were a Black, I am quite confident the interview would have been more rewarding.

In interviewing the faculty and administrators and other members of the community, I feel that I was able to gain a good representation

of my points of inquiry. The interviewing procedure was used for a number of reasons: (1) to offer a check to assess the extent to which the questionnaires were really asking and gaining information they had been designed to obtain, (2) to gain experience in the technique of interviewing and (3) because I find interviewing quite enjoyable. Overall, I think this technique is a valuable aid in assessing one's data. It adds a mode of human interaction from which I have gained a great deal.

A third major limitation is in part directly related to the first in that the return rate was extremely low. In evaluating the results it should be kept in mind that the questionnaire analysis is primarily the result of High U. The low number of respondents from Low C is heavily outweighed by the larger number of respondents from High U. It is difficult at best to infer from such a small return rate. This is due in part to the nature of the research design. In designating Low C as the low agency there were several drawbacks. The student population of approximately 2200 of which not more than half of this population attended the main campus at one time immediately reduced the total number of students from which a sample could be drawn. Of the students that were on the campus, the enrollments in the designated majors were small. In history there was approximately 36 and in communications there was approximately 15. Declaring majors at this institution was not a major concern of the students or of the registrar. In many cases one's major was declared at the point one was filing for graduation. I talked with many students who had graduated with a history major simply because they had accumulated the necessary hours. Although their major may be in one field, it was certainly not a positive indication

that the student considered that to be his primary interest nor the type of activity he would pursue after graduation. Majors were not considered as a criteria for putting together an educational experience. In most cases a major was a mere formality that allowed one to gain a diploma.

For those students who received the questionnaire, there was little guarantee that it would be completed and returned. This was partially realized before the research was designed. It was generally believed that the excellence and innovative manner of the agency was worth the challenge in gaining the data.

In the case of the return rate from students at High U the moderate return rate was due primarily to the lack of experience in distributing questionnaires. I believe that if the questionnaires were passed out earlier in the semester and if more supervision had been applied, the return rate would have been higher.

Another limitation of the study concerned the representation of the various classes of students. In drawing the sample there was no attempt made to draw a random sample of these categories of students.

Consideration of the Propositions

Proposition 1: Those students engaged in a low act will on the average have a higher existential consciousness than those engaged in a high act.

In regard to the measurement as devised in the Existential Consciousness Questionnaire (hereafter this questionnaire will be referred to as ECQ) the means indicate that there is a high degree of existential consciousness for those students who are engaged in a low act. The reported means for students in a high act was 63.66 while

students in a low act had a reported mean of 66.19. The PIL measurement indicates a lower mean score for those who were engaged in a low act. For the PIL the reported mean for those students in a high act was 108.14 while it was 99.99 for those in a low act. These two scales seem to indicate in this instance an inverse relationship. The ECQ does not attempt to measure a commitment to a goal or purpose because its basic concept of freedom and responsibility demands an ongoing mediation which does not lend itself to a stated policy or purpose. In this sense the inverse relationship seems to support the contention of the first proposition.

The mean score of the Student Body Profile (hereafter it will be referred to as SBP) which is a scale to indicate how the respondents perceived their fellow students in regard to their willingness to direct their own activities indicates an inverse relationship to the direction of the ECQ. Students who were engaged in a low act generally perceived their fellow students as having a lower willingness to direct their own activities. To say it another way, students in a high act regarded their fellow students as being more willing to direct their own activities. The mean score for those students in a high act was 32.46 while for those in a low act it was 29.35.

Proposition 2: Those students engaged in a low agency will on the average have a higher existential consciousness than those engaged in a high agency.

The mean score on the ECQ lends support for the confirmation of this proposition. Those who were engaged in a high agency reported a mean of 64.77 while those in a low agency reported a mean of 66.29. A word of caution should be said in regard to placing a great deal of weight on the mean scores. It is obvious that the number of respondents

from Low C is small. It can be said, however, that the direction of increase toward a higher mode of existential consciousness is higher for those who attend Low C.

TABLE VI
RELATIONSHIP OF ACT AND EXISTENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Existential Consciousness	Act	
	High	Low
ECQ		
Mean	63.66	66.19
Sigma	11.40	10.35
N	71	81
PIL		
Mean	108.14	99.99
Sigma	13.04	14.02
N	71	81
SBP		
Mean	32.46	29.35
Sigma	6.11	7.61
N	71	81

An analysis of the PIL indicates again that the mean score is lower for those students involved in a low agency (mean = 94.5) than those who attended High U or a high agency (mean = 105.54). This relationship supports the same inverse trend that was reported in proposition one. It may be said again that the inverse relationship is not contradictory but rather lends support to the confirmation of the proposition. The means and corresponding N of the ECQ and PIL as well

as the means for the profile may be found in Table VII.

TABLE VII
RELATIONSHIP OF AGENCY AND EXISTENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Existential Consciousness	Act	
	High	Low
ECQ		
Mean	64.77	66.29
Sigma	10.61	12.42
N	128	24
PIL		
Mean	105.54	94.5
Sigma	13.69	13.03
N	128	24
SBP		
Mean	29.34	38.58
Sigma	6.35	5.81
N	128	24

When the Student Body Profile is analyzed in regard to the variable of agency it indicates that the mean score is higher for those students who are engaged in a low agency. Students engaged in a high agency reported a mean of 29.34 while those in a low agency reported a mean of 38.58.

Proposition 3: The order of existential consciousness from the least to the most will be in the following order: high act and high agency; high act and low agency; low act and high agency; and low act and low agency.

The mean differences of the ECQ certainly do not represent a great

deal of difference. Perhaps the only noticeable degree of difference in regard to mean scores may be viewed in the scores from the low act and low agency and those of the high act and high agency which are 63.56 and 69.40 respectively. The other categories of a high act and low agency and a high agency and a low act reported means of 64.07 and 65.73. The data concerning this proposition may be viewed in Table VIII. From an overview of the means it may be said that the general direction of increase as stated in the proposition is supported in the data.

TABLE VIII
RELATIONSHIP OF ACT AND AGENCY TO EXISTENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Existential Consciousness	High Act		Low Act	
	High Agency	Low Agency	High Agency	Low Agency
ECQ				
Mean	63.56	64.07	65.73	69.40
Sigma	11.09	13.04	10.19	11.42
N	57	14	71	10
PIL				
Mean	111.18	95.79	101.01	92.70
Sigma	10.86	14.23	14.10	11.62
N	57	14	71	10
SBP				
Mean	30.77	39.36	28.20	37.50
Sigma	4.71	6.48	7.24	4.83
N	57	14	71	10

When the variables of act and agency are considered together, the direction of increase in regard to the ECQ may be said to be attributed

to the act, which is to say, of the four cells the lower cells are represented by students from a high act while the upper two cells are represented by students from a low act. This would indicate that the direction of increase may be due more to the influence of the act than the agency. This indication would serve to strengthen the proposition under consideration as well as proposition one.

The mean scores of the PIL seem to indicate a partial continuance of the inverse relationship to the ECQ. In the case of the high act and high agency the mean of 111.18 was the highest while the lowest reported mean of 92.70 was reported by those students who were engaged in a low act and low agency. The second highest PIL score of 101.01 was reported by those students who were engaged in a low act and high agency while the next to lowest of 95.79 was reported for those students engaged in a high act and a low agency. These two middle cells did not follow an inverse relationship with the ECQ.

In regard to the SBP those students who were engaged in a low act and a high agency reported the lowest mean score of 28.20. They were followed in ascending order by the categories of high act and high agency (30.77), low act and low agency (37.50) with the highest mean score of 39.56 being reported by those students who were engaged in a high act and low agency.

Proposition 4: Upper division students will on the average have a higher mode of existential consciousness than those lower division students. The order in which they appear is from the lowest to the highest mode of existential consciousness; high act and high agency; high act and low agency; low act and high agency; and low act and low agency.

The data that will be discussed in relation to this proposition may be found in Table IX. When means are considered for the ECQ, the

TABLE IX

RELATIONSHIP OF ACT, AGENCY AND CLASS RANK TO EXISTENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Existential Conscious- ness	High Act				Low Act			
	High Agency		Low Agency		High Agency		Low Agency	
	Underclass Students	Upperclass Students	Underclass Students	Upperclass Students	Underclass Students	Upperclass Students	Underclass Students	Upperclass Students
ECQ								
Mean	62.43	64.22	66.25	63.20	66.47	65.05	67.00	71.00
Sigma	11.49	10.96	19.52	10.74	9.11	11.18	10.23	12.82
N	21	36	4	10	34	37	4	6
PIL								
Mean	110.90	111.33	94.25	96.40	99.03	102.84	96.25	90.33
Sigma	10.21	11.37	13.25	15.25	13.80	14.31	13.57	10.76
N	21	36	4	10	34	37	4	6
SBP								
Mean	31.10	30.58	38.00	39.90	29.82	26.70	40.75	35.33
Sigma	4.93	4.63	9.80	5.24	6.75	7.44	3.40	4.59
N	21	36	4	10	34	37	4	6

direction of increase is not supported by the mean scores. The first cell (high act and high agency, mean = 62.43) and the fourth cell (low act and low agency, mean = 71.00) indicate that upperclass students do have a higher mean score on the ECQ. However, the two middle cells which are high act and low agency (underclass students reported a mean score of 66.25 while upperclass students reported a mean score of 63.20) and low act and high agency (underclass students reported a mean score of 66.47 while upperclass students reported a mean score of 65.05) do not indicate a higher mean score for upperclass students. In both of these cells, the mean score of upperclass students was lower. The initial mean scores in cells two and three are close enough to allow us to consider them as representing a similar base. The amount of decrease is less in the case for those students who were engaged in a low act. The highest mean score was reported by those students who were engaged in a low act and a low agency. This seems to be consistent with the findings throughout the data that for those students who are engaged in a low act the score will be higher on the ECQ.

The mean scores on the PIL for the categories of high act and high agency (underclass students = 62.43 and upperclass students = 64.22) and high act and low agency (underclass students = 99.03 and upperclass students = 102.84) indicate that the upperclass students reported a higher mean score. It should be noted the amount is minimal. For those students engaged in a low act and low agency the underclass students reported a mean of 96.25 while the upperclass students reported a mean of 90.33. If the mean score reported for a high act and high agency for the underclass students and upperclass students can be regarded as a stable condition, then the trend that had been observed in proposition

one and two and partially in three of an inverse relationship between ECQ and PIL is again evident. In general the amount of difference between underclass students and upperclass students for mean scores on the ECQ and PIL are minimal.

The SBP indicated that underclass students in a high act and a high agency (31.10), in a low act and high agency (29.82), and in a low act and low agency (40.75) all reported a higher mean score than the upperclass students for the same categories (30.58, 26.70, 35.33). Those students who were engaged in a high act and low agency reported a mean score of 38.00 for underclass students while upperclass students reported a mean of 39.90.

Student Characterization of Self

This chapter will close with the reporting of the responses to question number 75 as it appeared in the questionnaire: As a result of being in this institution, I can best describe my state of feeling as: (1) a eunuch, (2) an imitator, or (3) an explorer.

The responses may be found in Table X. It is evident that the only group of students who saw themselves as explorers were those who were engaged in a low act and a low agency. With the exception of one student who regarded himself as an imitator, the remaining 13 students of the high act and low agency regarded themselves as explorers. Of the total number of 54 students who were engaged in a high act and high agency, 17 indicated they felt like imitators while 37 reported they viewed themselves as explorers. Of those 71 students engaged in a low act and high agency the following responses were given: seven responded with eunuch, 26 felt like imitators and 38 felt like explorers.

TABLE X
HOW THE STUDENTS VIEWED THEIR MAJOR

Categories	High Act		Low Act	
	High Agency	Low Agency	High Agency	Low Agency
Eunuch	0	0	7	0
Imitator	17	1	26	0
Explorer	37	13	38	10
Total N	54	14	71	10

CHAPTER VIII

CONSIDERATION OF THE MAJOR THESIS AND POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INQUIRY

Introduction

This final chapter will focus on two topics. The first section will comment briefly on the four possible situations of act and agency as they have been discussed in the testing model. The major focus will be directed to the category of a low act and a low agency. In this section the position will be taken that a low act and a low agency do lend itself toward an emergent form of an existential consciousness. The second section will consider a possible contribution of the study which may be the form of a questionnaire which is able to measure a mode of existential consciousness as it was developed in this model.

Consideration of the Major Thesis

By way of introduction to the consideration of the major thesis of the model, the three categories of a high act and high agency, low act and high agency, and a high act and a low agency will be considered in view of a few general observations concerning how they relate to the general model.

Students who were engaged in a high act and a high agency exhibited a great sense of purpose or direction. The head of the department referred to this group as "knowing what they wanted". This certainly

seemed to be the case. They experienced a great amount of structure to gain the credentials to enable them to teach or to help them in their personal lives. Their mean score of 111.18 on the PIL was the highest of all the groups. Their mean score on the ECQ of 63.56 was the lowest of all the groups. In regard to the general model it can be said that this cell of a high act and a high agency was expected to offer the least amount of transition. The process of mediation was considered to be the lowest where participants act from a preconceived notion or purpose which involves a sense of direction. Conflict or negative thinking is not a major characteristic of this type. I generally found this to be the case for this group. Students seemed to go through a predetermined course of events without vigorously questioning the existing structure or looking for alternatives. It should be noted that in such a situation there might have been more students characterizing themselves as eunuchs or imitators. Two reasons are offered to explain this. One is that in such a smooth running program, doubters or rebels might tend to leave the program. The other reason which suggests the great importance of a praxis is that these students may have experienced situations in which they could relate and apply their theory into practice. The various modes of observation, laboratory school settings and student teaching programs may have greatly helped to support the feeling of an explorer.

In regard to the group of students who were within a situation characterized by a low act and high agency, there are several observations to be made. The students seemed aware of the high structure of their environment and expressed their concern toward wanting more opportunity to experience or work in their fields of interest. Yet

only 38 students viewed themselves as explorers while 26 viewed themselves as imitators and seven saw themselves as eunuchs. It was noted earlier that when sociology was compared to other majors within High U, it was considered to be a good representation of a low act. It was noted, however, that in regard to the conceptual scheme of a low act, it was not a particularly good representation. Through the interviews, observation in the classroom situation, a mean score on the PIL of 101.01, and a mean score of 65.73 on the ECQ, it seemed that these students were looking for a creative means to express themselves in which approximately 55% of the respondents felt like they were able to explore their own acts. Within such a situation of a low act and a high agency there was an environment of mediation occurring in which the seeds of a transformation were present. I believe there is an indication that this group is actively looking for means to become more actively involved in their own acts.

In regard to the category of a high act and low agency, as was generally stated before, this is not a particularly good representation of this category. The history major did not offer a good representation of a high act. In this situation the agency exhibited a greater amount of influence and direction over the entire situation. This is also the case for the situation of a low act and high agency, which is to say that the agency exhibited a greater degree of influence. Of all the categories considered, the one characterized by a low act and low agency exhibited the greatest amount of existential consciousness.

It is the central thesis of the model that the mode of existential consciousness would be highest for those who engaged in a situation characterized by a low act and a low agency. The theoretical foundation

of this statement states that acts serve as the transmitter or means of exploring one's own potential and creative fulfillment. This is to say that consciousness is formed through the acts in which one is involved. These acts are not regarded as occurring in a vacuum but within an environment which operates to facilitate or impede the movements of the acts. Acts are the means through which one gains consciousness. When the act is low, which is to say when it does not impede the initiation, development or evaluation of the activity or task to be pursued, one must then experience the influence and power of one's own direction. When the agency is low, which is to say, when it does not impede the act through attempts of control by providing predetermined alternatives or measures to enforce directives to predefined ends, the resulting dialectical process between act and agency will give rise to an existential mode of consciousness providing the level of consciousness is high. Within the testing model as it was operationalized, the data suggest that this may be the case. From my own observations and study of the situation, I believe this proposition is supported.

Students who were engaged in a low act and a low agency showed an exuberance in regard to their own form of involvement in their own educational pursuit. This expression of involvement is well typified by a comment made by a second year communication major.

There is like a real clique of common people. There is a group that does things and when we are all in courses and places it all kind of meshes together. So you don't know where a course work ends and playing begins because it is all in the same area. Everybody is just into it and doing it. Like theatre people who are always acting, they are getting credit for acting and putting plays. We are getting credit for our total involvement. Everything you do is related to communications.

Another communications underclassman expressed his feelings toward

the manner in which the communications program was structured.

The video department says here is a bunch of toys: There is how they work and you are free to play with them however much you want. It makes for a really live creative atmosphere. You can really do whatever you want.

Through this mode of activity I believe one is able to express one's self as an artist which is to say one is able to conceive the idea and see it take form and shape under the direction of one's own guidance. Art in the sense I am using it here assumes that the creation of an element is an act of creativity and as such is not practiced as a technique. Students who were involved in this program were quite perceptive and I think exhibited the highest mode of existential consciousness.

One student in particular expressed himself in what I would consider to be an example of a high mode of existential consciousness. His radical insights cut through the surface layers of planned choice and freedom. In describing his relationships to Low C, he considered it to be a highly structured institution. In his train of thought it would be considered a high agency. He made the following statement to illustrate his point.

There are two real important things you must consider: where do people live and what type of food do they eat. When they are interfered with, they act as a source of manipulation and hinderance to freedom. Unless you get those two things taken care of, you can't do anything. These are the two most important structured aspects of the school; like everybody is forced to live in the dorms and the food service is a continual problem. We are forced to buy a certain number of food tickets-that is pretty fucked-that is pretty bad.

In view of the living arrangements at Low C, they would be considered wide open at High U. There were few regulations existing in the dorms at Low C. There is free access to all rooms, at all times, and by all people. Couples may live together and groups may petition

to live together. This particular student, however, viewed the mere fact that he was required to live in a dorm and buy food tickets as oppressive. "Yes, the living arrangements keep me from living my life the way I want to. These two things are a basic part of my life."

His awareness of the situation and the ability to notice pre-defined alternatives as limiting one's freedom is essential to an existential mode of consciousness. It is my opinion that he was not acting in a state of rebellion to authority or power but analytically appraising the essential elements of freedom.

It is really important for somebody to choose their own life style in terms of personal growth, finding out what is most comfortable for you. Once you establish a firm base on that level you could do a lot of other things—in terms of your work and relationships with other people.

The communications program at Low C provided an atmosphere where the students could originate their own ideas, put in practice their ideas; and in conjunction with their fellow students, a faculty and others, they could evaluate their own work. A fourth-year communications student expressed his major as total access. "Here I can do anything I want, which is like total access. It is like the closest thing to owning my own system which is why I like communications."

It is my opinion that students who were majoring at Low C in communications exhibited the highest amount of existential consciousness than other groups of students. Through this experience, it is suggested that the person can more easily recognize the transforming aspects of the work process. This process involves recognizing and realizing the subjective elements of the self being projected into the object of creation and also realizing the transforming aspects of the objective elements of the working process which leads to higher modes

of consciousness. "For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what is true, and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth" (Hegel, 1967:141).

Through this mode of consciousness which is facilitated through low acts one realizes the importance of the working process of the act of labor.

Labour, on the other hand, is desire restrained and checked evanescence delayed and postponed; in other words, labour shapes and fashions the things...The consciousness that toils and serves accordingly attains by this means the direct apprehension of that independent being as its self (Hegel, 1967:238).

Another contributing factor to an existential model of consciousness is the organizational structure of a low agency. Low C provides an environment which is supportive of many different tasks or acts. A basic assumption from which Low C acts is that students learn through making their own decisions. A dean of the school said: "Education must be an active process where the students are involved in making their own decisions." Low C continually tried to keep an open environment where students could plan their own educational program. The co-op plan is essential in involving students in an action-orientated program. This aspect of the program lends itself in support of a praxis. A praxis in the general model and the testing model has been suggested as the vehicle of transformation where one directs and experiences one's own acts. When the act and agency are of a low profile, they tend to support an open flow of communication between the person directing the action and the environment which facilitates a reflexive movement back to the person. When a high level of consciousness is mediating this process of a low act and a low agency, it will generally

give rise to an existential mode of consciousness.

The testing model did not attempt to evaluate the various levels of consciousness among the respondents. In the general model, however, it was suggested that a high level of consciousness is one that is actively engaged in the mediation process. A few comments concerning the variable of consciousness should be offered. I am assuming that to acquire an existential mode of consciousness one becomes involved in the process of ego detachment from self and the given mode of the situation. Through this process of detachment, one undergoes a questioning of the obvious. What seemed to be only natural or to represent a common sense construction of reality are analytically scrutinized in a meta-analytical fashion. To engage in a radical meta-analysis is in effect calling for a questioning that will go to its roots. In the process of this questioning one may come to confront reified structures. When the environment is supported by a low act, a low agency and a high level of consciousness, it is suggested that this type of situation will lead to viewing the life process as existing in a field of relations which are in a paradox. It is further assumed that the detachment process is enhanced when one undergoes experiences which support a process of involved mediations. This is to say that if one primarily experiences or is educated to think of experiences in a linear contradictory fashion of support or denial of a basic superstructure, then one tends not to see oneself as the center of the mediation process to either act or agency. In doing so, the mediation process takes on a low profile. When the mediation process is actively centered on the self, then one must determine for oneself the relationship that exists between and among the various elements. Many times

this active process of mediation, when it is directed by oneself, is brought about through conflicting interpretations. What is needed at this point is the freedom to experience these seemingly conflicting assertions. An environment of a low act and a low agency supports this freedom; and through the mediation process, it is suggested that such a situation will give rise to an existential mode of consciousness. When the mediation process is viewed as existing in a field of relations characterized by a paradox, the dialectical aspect of self and the world is accentuated. Through the realization of a dialectical process, one realizes the equilibrium state of being and chooses to act in a dialectical process of becoming where one is actively involved in the act of transformation.

The theoretical construction of the model suggests that a low act and a low agency will give rise to an existential mode of consciousness. My observations and the indication gained from the data lends support, I think, to the confirmation of the central thesis of the model. This inquiry may have two major findings. One may add to the confirmation of the central thesis of the model and the other could be a development of a scale which could measure an existential mode of consciousness.

Existential Consciousness Questionnaire

The literature in sociology and psychology has a multitude of scales that in one way or another attempt to measure anomie, alienation, self-concept and, in the case of the PIL, attempts to measure a variant of existentialism. Among all these scales there is lacking one which attempts to measure an existential mode of consciousness as it was developed in this inquiry. A possible contribution of this study might

exist in the development of such a measurement. The central aspect of this questionnaire focuses on one's ability to perceive a concept of freedom which is based upon one's ability to negate a given situation. This implies that one must be at the center of the mediation process which will unify and give meaning to the relations that exist between the immediate and the determinate. The components of this questionnaire basically focus on the concepts of freedom, choice and the will to power.

Through an analysis of the means of this questionnaire there seems to be little difference between the groups of respondents. The direction, however slight, did follow the suggested pattern. That is, students who were engaged in a high act and a high agency exhibited the lowest mode of existential consciousness as it was measured by the ECQ (mean = 63.56) which was followed by the high act and low agency (mean = 64.07), low act and high agency (mean = 65.73), and the highest mean score of the ECQ was reported by the respondents in a low act and low agency (mean = 69.4). When the nature of the data is considered, in this case consciousness, slight changes as represented by numbers may indicate a rather insignificant amount of difference. What may seem rather insignificant in quantitative measures may be significant in qualitative measures. Statistical analysis and quantitative measures may not always detect ongoing qualitative changes. This point may be illustrated in the case of the shrewd gambler who has loaded the dice. He may only use the loaded dice one out of ten throws. On the statistical face value of such an analysis one out of ten would seem to indicate mere chance. However, when using the loaded dice, he only needs to bet approximately on one out of ten throws to win large amounts of money. Quantitatively, it may be attributed to chance; qualitatively,

he is using loaded dice and taking home the money. The point to be brought out is that the amount of qualitative difference may be small in measuring such a concept.

Although the difference among the reported mean scores on the ECQ and less so for the PIL indicate a small variance, this is not unusual when considering other educational studies. One reason has already been suggested by way of only detecting small but important changes. Another reason which should be noted is the possibility that educational institutions for the most part do not cause a considerable amount of difference one way or the other. My personal feelings on this are one of immediate doubt because I would like to think of my mode of work as contributing toward a change which would foster a praxis. My second thought on this matter is that the educational process is but an extension of the socialization process in which students for the most part pick or are placed in situations which will be supportive of their prior socialization. This question has raised some interesting points for further consideration.

When the ECQ is viewed alongside of the PIL there is some evidence to suggest that there is an inverse relationship between the two scales. This point will be more thoroughly analyzed, I hope, in other research projects. If this tendency continues to appear, I think it will make a stronger case for the ECQ in measuring what it purports to measure. If this does materialize, then it could be a valuable contribution to the field of sociology and psychology and other interested disciplines.

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VITA

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