

POLITICAL INFORMATION AND CONSTRAINT:  
METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL  
IMPLICATIONS

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

A recent emphasis in the research areas of beliefs, attitudes, and public opinion has been the examination of various structural characteristics of the cognitive systems in which such evaluative phenomena are organized. The importance of such structural characteristics is assumed to derive from the possibility that cognitive organization at least partially determines regularity and predictability in behavior, and conversely, that changes in attitudes occur within the context and limitations of the prevailing attitude structure.

The term constraint has been used to identify one of the structural properties of attitude systems. Specifically, constraint refers to the magnitude of interrelationship existing among individual attitude elements within a cognitive system; that is, the degree to which specific attitude evaluations are linked together into a meaningful whole.

The constraint variable is of interest to the social scientist for basically two reasons. First, it makes possible an analysis of attitude systems and processes which is more dynamic in nature than conventional content oriented investigations. An understanding of the manner in which specific attitudes are linked together would, furthermore, contribute to existing theories concerning the origin,

development, and change of specific attitudes. Secondly, and perhaps more important, is the fact that constraint has been found to be related to other cognitive and behavioral phenomena of considerable political and social relevance. Thus, the general purpose of the present investigation was to examine the nature of constraint as it relates to a variety of variables presumed to have political and social implications. The level of constraint has been found to vary as a function of the amount of information available to support a system of social attitudes. Therefore, the interaction between information and constraint and their respective influences on political phenomena such as voting, party identification, political participation, etc. were considered.

#### Attitude Organization and Change

By far the phenomena most extensively investigated by social psychologists has been the development, content, and change of social and political attitudes. Although a variety of definitions of this concept have been proposed, the term attitude is generally taken to denote a psychological predisposition to respond favorably or unfavorably to the object of the attitude (e.g. see Fishbein, 1967; Insko, 1967). Attitude referents or objects can include a variety of entities such as people, ideas, events, etc. Of special concern to attitude theorists is the manner in which attitudes are changed and the way in which they are organized into systems of beliefs. Many contemporary statements of attitude change and organization express the assumption that individuals strive toward a maintenance of consistency among the various cognitive elements relevant to attitudes

(Abelson, et. al., 1968). The unifying characteristic among what might be called the balance theories is the idea that cognitive imbalance, inconsistency, dissonance, etc. are psychologically disturbing states which provide motivation to change attitude elements in the direction of consistency (e.g. Heider, 1946; Newcomb, 1953; Festinger, 1957; Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955; and Abelson and Rosenberg, 1958). Thus, it is implied that the tendency toward such homeostatic balance is a universal principle of cognitive organization which explains both the organization of and change within systems of attitudes. These theories, however, have been generated primarily from experiments of rather simplified, experimentally induced attitudes and have rarely examined actual positions on complex social and political issues.

By contrast, non-experimental studies of attitude systems have produced little support for the consistency formulations. For example, Kerr (1953) compared several domains of liberalism-conservatism (e.g. religious, political, economic, etc.) and reported an average correlation of only .15. Olsen (1962) found that only approximately 1/4 of the subjects investigated could be classified as evidencing attitude crystallization (consistency) as determined by a Guttman scaling procedure. Similarly, Robin and Story (1964) in a study of ideological consistency reported coefficients ranging from .05 to .70 for various groups of subjects and only a moderate correlation of .43 for the total sample. Moreover, a few experimental studies have been recently reported which indicate that the tendency to resolve attitude inconsistencies or dissonance may be related to various individual differences in personality and cognitive structure

(e.g. Harvey and Ware, 1967; Epstein, 1969; Stenitz, 1969; and Steiner and Rogers, 1963). In other words, there is some evidence to suggest that notions of cognitive balance have been unduly emphasized and that other factors mediate the tendency of subjects to resolve attitude inconsistencies. It seems reasonable to assume that one such mediating factor might be the overall coherence and structure characteristic of an individual's attitudes as indicated by levels of constraint.

#### Attitude System Constraint

In the present study, the term constraint is used to refer to the dimension of interrelatedness existing among individual attitudes or idea elements in a system of social attitudes. Interrelatedness implies that a functional relationship exists among attitudes which link the content, strength, stability, and salience of each individual evaluation with others in the system. A system of attitudes is simply the combination of several evaluations all pertaining to the same object of evaluation or referent domain. Thus, for example, the higher the level of constraint among the political beliefs of a given individual the more closely that individual's opinions approximate a coherent ideology or belief system in that what an individual holds to be true or correct in one sphere of political activity would be related to their evaluations of other aspects of politics. The person who is said to subscribe to a conservative political ideology is expected to behave conservatively in response to, for example, issues of foreign trade as well as issues involving other foreign and domestic

policies.<sup>1</sup> By contrast, low levels of constraint would be found in individuals who manifest inconsistent and unpredictable responses to a given set of attitudinal stimuli. Presumably the behavior of such individuals would be better explained by the temporary salience of environmental factors than by conventional attitude system concepts which assume the existence of relatively stable dispositional characteristics. Low constraint individuals (i.e. non-ideologue) might be conservative on some issues and liberal on others. Moreover, they would be more likely to respond to political stimuli in a compartmentalized and fragmented manner. Such individuals often endorse what appear to be logical absurdities with considerable fervor, e.g. favoring a reduction of federal taxes and, at the same time, an expansion of social welfare services. The above descriptions, of course, are intended to represent theoretical extremes of the constraint factor. One would expect that constraint would vary along some continuum in actual subject populations.

Constraint then refers to the commonly perceived tendency of some individuals to evidence ideological consistency while others are illogical and confused about politics. Also, implicit in this definition is the notion that constraint derives from a set of abstract generalizations which do not refer directly to attitude

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<sup>1</sup>The concepts of liberalism and conservatism are used to denote divergent attitude systems concerning the nature of political, economic, and social order. Liberalism refers to attitudes which favor or emphasize change, social experimentation, rationality, and the essential goodness of human nature, while conservatism is defined as endorsement of the status quo, tradition, religion, orderliness, etc. (see e.g. McClosky, 1958; Key, 1961; Wilson, 1973). Although widely used in the literature these concepts probably have particular relevance and applicability only when the level of constraint is relatively high.

objects. Instead, the ideological person adheres to a set of assumptions concerning broad political categories and these assumptions are brought to bear in the interpretation of concrete events and entities. Therefore, constraint implies more than superficial consistency between attitude elements (although operational definitions and hence statistical indexes of constraint are often limited to this restriction). Constraint also includes the notion of structural cohesion based on logical derivations from basic principles.

The concept of constraint occupies a central position in theories of political behavior, especially at the sociological and political science levels of analysis. Despite its importance, the number of empirical studies of constraint is relatively meager. The most extensive exposition of the concept has been presented by the Survey Research Center group (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960) and, in particular, by Converse (1964). Converse presents a dynamic definition in which constraint is seen as:

the probability that a change in the perceived status (truth, desirability, and so forth) of one idea-element would require from the point of view of the actor, some compensating change(s) in the status of idea-elements elsewhere in the configuration (p. 208).

Converse hypothesizes several sources or causal factors which determine constraint such as personal dispositions to be objective and logical in the classical sense; a desire to adhere to some universal first principle; as well as more socially based motivations including the tendency of persons occupying similar niches in a social order to develop similar explanatory principles for beliefs because of the congruity between their life styles and social positions. Crucial to the definition of constraint proposed by Converse is the

concept that constraint also derives from the natural social processes by which ideologies are created and dispersed throughout a social system. It is argued that belief systems are created by that small segment of a social population which by virtue of its education, interest, opportunity and intelligence generate the connecting assumptions which, in turn, create constraint. Such "packaged ideologies," as Converse refers to them, are then diffused among the general public which comes to believe in the appropriateness and naturalness of these assumptions without experiencing the initial process of analyzing, synthesizing, and imposing logical organization on the idea-elements or attitudes involved. One implication of this source of constraint is that social or ideological consensus emerges since the "masses" of society learn and adopt a prefabricated ideological framework through which to evaluate political events. Thus at the societal level there exists at least some semblance of agreement as to the meanings and implications of various political events, terminologies, philosophies, etc. As Converse notes:

Any set of relatively intelligent consumers, i.e., the mass public who are initially sympathetic to the crowning posture turns out to show more consensus on specific implications of the posture as a result of social diffusion of 'what goes with what' than it would if each member were required to work out the implications individually without socially provided cues. (p. 212)

Despite such tendencies favoring consensus, Converse concludes that true ideological positions (i.e. highly constrained belief systems) are almost exclusively a phenomenon evidenced by political elites, e.g. politicians, political observers, etc. Thus, while some degree of constraint would be expected to characterize the

political beliefs of the general public, high levels of constraint are typical only of a politically active and aware minority.

More specifically, Converse argued that constraint varies as a linear function of political sophistication. Sophistication basically refers to knowledge about politics, but the concept, as employed by Converse, also includes the ability to correctly articulate the abstract terminology used to describe political sentiments and orientations (e.g. liberalism and conservatism). Hence a continuum of political knowledge was hypothesized with the higher levels of information being associated with highly constrained ideologies and decreasing levels of knowledge implying less integration among beliefs. Converse further suggested that since the level of sophistication would be substantial only for a minority of the general public, then the degree of interrelatedness among the attitude systems of the vast majority of individuals would be expected to be only slight.

In order to test these assumptions a stratified, random sample of adult registered voters was interviewed. Subjects were asked to respond to a series of open-ended questions concerning an upcoming presidential election (e.g. What do you like or dislike about the candidates, political parties, platforms, etc.?). Responses were classified according to several criteria including the amount of information, amount of issues content and the appropriateness of the political terminology used to answer the questions.

The results appeared to support Converse's contentions in that only a scant minority (2 1/2%) of the subjects were judged to have evidenced the degree of information and sophistication thought to be associated with constrained ideologies. A second group (near-ideologues)

of subjects which comprised 9% of the sample were judged to have manifested a degree of knowledge and sophistication similar to the ideological subjects. However, the remaining subjects were characterized as possessing only minimal or vague knowledge of political affairs, in that they used political terms incorrectly or inconsistently. Moreover, a substantial portion of these remaining subjects (22 1/2% of the total sample) were judged as having no interest in nor awareness of politics! Converse also reported that objective measures tapping the degree of political information, taken independently, confirmed the validity of the subjective ratings.

To further support the contention that constraint varies as a linear function of information or sophistication, Converse reported data obtained from a group of political candidates (elite group) and a random sample of adults (masses group). Constraint was defined as the magnitude of tau-gamma (i.e. a measure of association in ordered classes; e. g. see Hays, 1963) coefficients between responses to questions concerning eight foreign and domestic policy issues (e.g. aid to education, federal housing, military aid to foreign countries, etc.). The coefficients for the elite group ranged from .05 to .68 with averages of .53 within domestic issues, .37 within foreign issues, and .25 between domestic and foreign issues, while the masses group yielded a range of -.04 to .45 and averages of .23, .23, and .11 respectively. As a result, Converse concluded that the level of constraint existing among the beliefs of most people is rather low and that it decreases with decreasing levels of political knowledge.

Although Converse's seminal work has served its heuristic purpose, in the view of the present author, its conclusions have been

widely accepted without sufficient examination. For example, many of his conclusions rest solely on a theoretical discussion wherein data is incidentally brought to bear on substantive contentions, as opposed to a more direct, empirical investigation of these phenomena. For example, Converse's claim that constraint varies as a linear function of political sophistication in part derives from the elites vs. masses data cited above. Since only two levels of sophistication were involved a linear relationship was thereby imposed on the data. It is therefore conceivable that the relationship between political knowledge and constraint may be more complex than Converse has suggested. Also, much of Converse's work has involved assessing information and constraint simultaneously by scoring the responses to open-ended questions. Thus, it is also possible that he has confounded the effects of information and constraint and that again more objective and direct procedures would yield different results.

The studies investigating constraint have reported mixed findings relative to the model proposed by Converse. For example, Brown (1970) used a Q-sort technique to estimate the level of constraint for articulate (elites) and inarticulate (masses) subjects. With repeated measures over time he found that the belief structures of inarticulate subjects persisted, as did those of articulate subjects. Brown concluded that some constrained belief systems may be based on "populist" ideology with less emphasis on information and political sophistication.

Luttbeg (1968) also found little support for Converse's contention that the belief systems of leaders and followers would differ significantly. Using items tapping specific political issues Luttbeg

reported the intercorrelational matrices derived from factor analytic procedures as an index of constraint. He found that the estimates of commonality of five factors explained 74% of the variance for leaders and 65% for the citizens group. Luttbeg concluded that such a difference is not as substantial as would be expected from Converse's hypothesis. Moreover, within the citizens group itself, he found that the five factors which emerged accounted for 69% of the variance for those most politically involved, 65% for those intermediately involved, and 67% for those least involved in politics. Thus a linear relationship between political sophistication and constraint was not observed. Using procedures similar to those of Converse and data from the same source (i.e. Survey Research Center interview protocols) Field and Anderson (1969) found that modest but significant changes in the percentage of voters manifesting constrained ideological evaluations occurred from one election year to the next. They concluded that constraint is therefore at least partially determined by transitory political stimuli (e.g. the ideological distance between presidential candidates) rather than exclusively a dimension of individual personality.

Axelrod (1967) used cluster analysis to examine the structure of public opinion on policy issues and reported that no well defined ideology exists among the general public except for very weak traces of populism and liberalism-conservatism. However, supporting Converse, Axelrod did find that groups who were more politically sophisticated (e.g. political participants, the wealthy, college graduates, individuals who were politically concerned, and informed subjects) manifested somewhat greater coherence than did less sophisticated

groups (e.g. the total population, the poor, the uneducated, and non-voters).

Supporting Converse, Bowles and Richardson (1969) reported that the tendency toward constrained ideologies varied as a function of interest in politics (as determined by combining estimates of political information level and political participation) and the ability to use abstract concepts. However, these observers concluded that constraint and opinion consistency were not synonymous, arguing instead that ideological conceptualization precedes attitude consistency.

Similarly, Kessel (1965) reported that estimates of logical consistency and political information showed a significant rank order correlation coefficient of .62. The relationships between constraint and several other variables were also significant; for example, a correlation of .55 was found between constraint and differentiation (i.e. the number of arguments used to support a belief), while a coefficient of .56 indicated the association between constraint and time span (i.e. use of historical and future perspectives to defend beliefs).

Several additional studies at a broader level of analysis may also be interpreted as confirmation of Converse's theory. For example, it has been found that ideological consensus (i.e. agreement on democratic norms among the adult electorate) is a characteristic found only among the more sophisticated and politically active minority (McClosky, 1961; Key, 1961). Similarly, studies examining the flow of information among mass publics have emphasized the role of certain strategic individuals in the dissemination of information and opinion (e.g. Katz, 1957; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1948).

These key individuals or opinion leaders are similar to Converse's high constraint subjects in that they are better informed, more active, and possess greater personal power and influence in the determination of public opinion. Thus, several sources of data support Converse's contention that ideological consistency is rare and that most people are best characterized as inconsistent, unsystematic, and chaotic in their evaluation of and participation in political affairs.

While most theorists see this distinction as deriving from the interplay of personal and social phenomena, e.g. amount of information, social cross-pressures, etc., it is also possible to conclude that ideological inconsistency is universal and derives from the lack of order in the political system itself. Such an iconoclastic view, however, would fail to account for the examples of consistency that are observed regardless of their rarity, and the often replicated finding, discussed above, that consistency and indexes of political knowledge, involvement, sophistication, etc. are closely related. All observers agree that as a person becomes more involved in and familiar with politics the degree of consistency increases. Thus, inconsistency is most closely associated with a relative lack of understanding or knowledge and under such restrictions it would not be surprising to find that political events appear to be chaotic and confusing. In the view of the present author, the issue is not so much a question of whether or not political knowledge and sophistication leads to consistency, but whether ideological consistency is possible under any other set of circumstances. As indicated above, some studies have been reported which suggest that a "populist" form of constraint is

often manifested in non-elite groups (e.g. Brown, 1970). There remains also unresolved questions such as the effects of constraint or consistency on related phenomena, e.g. attitude change.

Previous research by the present author (Jones and Rambo, 1973) has concentrated on the relationship between the level of constraint in the liberalism-conservatism domain and the amount of political information available to support this system of attitudes. Average interitem contingency coefficients between responses to the Social Attitude Scale (SAS, Rambo, 1972) were employed as the index of constraint. Results differing from Converse's model were reported in that subjects who scored both high and low on the political information scale yielded significantly higher levels of constraint than did subjects with intermediate levels of information. These results were interpreted as suggesting that the impact of incoming information on attitude structure varies with the existing level of information and the degree of constraint present in the system of attitudes. For example, individuals with high constraint but little information to support the unique configuration of their attitude relationships may endure a breakdown of attitude structure if new information contradictory to their attitudes is assimilated. By contrast, persons characterized by higher levels of information and high constraint can more easily accept new and possibly dissonant information in that sufficient knowledge is available to balance or explain apparent contradictions. These two groups were designated intuitive and cognizant respectively, because both styles of belief represent highly organized and structured attitude systems, but one

apparently results from information seeking behavior while the other is information avoidant.

Subjects in this study with intermediate scores on the information test yielded an index of constraint which was significantly lower than that of the above two groups. It was suggested that these subjects had acquired sufficient political information to disrupt and challenge the intuitive style of belief but not enough to provide for a reorganization of attitudes in a manner typified by the cognizant group.

Thus, a new model depicting the relationship between information and constraint was proposed in which constraint varies as a nonlinear function of information. It was further hypothesized that this relationship represents a developmental sequence in which individuals shift from the uncritical and intuitive attitude systems of adolescence which are learned by modeling socialization agents and authority figures to a transitional period of disorganization, confusion, and unpredictability, followed by an intellectual reorganization of attitudes supported by information relevant to the system. It is interesting to note that the majority of subjects were classified as belonging to the transitional group, i.e. low constraint. This suggests that while a developmental process may be operating it is by no means the only factor effecting the logical coherence of the respondents' belief systems. The developmental interpretation was, however, supported by the fact that political orientation, as measured by the SAS, changed from more conservative to less conservative to more liberal in conjunction with the information continuum, that is, the intuitive group on the average responded in a conservative

direction to the attitude scale, the transitional group yielded moderate attitudes, while the cognizant group showed more liberal orientations.

Related research by Rambo, Jones, and Finney (1973) elaborated on the development interpretation by suggesting that attitude change might be better characterized as a reorganization within the attitude system than the conventional concept of movement along a unidimensional scale. These researchers reported data tentatively supporting this hypothesis in that subjects who reported recent shifts in attitudes manifested higher levels of constraint than did subjects not reporting recent changes in their attitudes.

#### Political Information

Research concerning political information has centered primarily on the amount, content, and manner in which information is disseminated in mass publics. The overwhelming conclusion offered by researchers in this area is that most individuals possess a paucity of political knowledge. Data reported by Greenstein (1963) serves as an example. A large cross-section sample of adult American subjects were able to respond correctly to the following questions in the following proportions: number of U.S. Senators from each state (55%); the length of a U.S. Representative's term of office (47%); the number of U.S. Supreme Court Justices (40%); and one provision of the Bill of Rights (23%). Since such fundamental knowledge as the provisions of the Bill of Rights is lacking in over three quarters of the population, it would be expected that little of the constant flow of political information contained in daily newspapers and news broadcasts would be retained by the majority of adults, which is not to mention the more complex

and esoteric aspects of political knowledge as exemplified by news analysis and editorial opinion. In his discussion of information about world affairs, Robinson (1967) cites a dozen studies confirming this contention. In addition, from a review of such studies he estimates that 80% of the adult American public apparently see no connection between their personal affairs and political events at the national and international level as reflected by surveys of public information about politics.

Studies assessing the impact of educational campaigns directed toward the mass public yield similar results. For example, an attempt to acquaint residents of a large metropolitan area with the United Nations produced only negligible gains in public awareness (Star and Hughes, 1950).

Despite the general lack of knowledge, political information has been found to cluster in some respondents, i.e. if a person knows several of the correct answers to a survey information quiz the probability that all the answers are known exceeds chance. Thus, political information seeking behavior is cumulative as it is the better informed among the electorate who expose themselves more to sources of political information (Milbrath, 1971).

A number of sociological and demographic variables also relate to observed levels of political information. For example, Robinson (1967) reports that greater amounts of knowledge are associated with the first of each of the following group comparisons: whites vs. blacks; males vs. females; older vs. younger; residence in cities vs. residence in smaller communities; higher income vs. lower income; more education vs. less education; professional occupations vs. skilled or "blue collar" employment.

### Political Effects of Information and Constraint

Several studies (e.g. Campbell, et. al., 1964) suggest that the principal behavioral result of political sophistication (e.g. knowledge as well as ideological conceptualization) is active involvement in political affairs, e.g. registration, voting, campaigning, etc. Similarly, Campbell and his associates (1954) have found that interest in politics, perceived importance of politics and partisanship, all vary as a function of political sophistication. As previously noted, however, a possible difficulty arises when information and constraint are assessed simultaneously, in that it is possible that these two factors differentially effect the rates of various forms of political involvement. When political information is determined independently there is a strong relationship between knowledge and political participation (Milbrath, 1971). However, research to date has failed to examine the effects of constraint on participation directly, or the effects of information and constraint separately. One exception is the study by Rambo, Jones, and Finney (1973) which suggested that variables indicating active political involvement such as registering to vote and campaigning were associated with higher constraint, while indexes of affiliation (e.g. political party preference) failed to significantly discriminate between levels of constraint. Thus, while there is a general assumption that political knowledge and constraint among attitude elements leads to political involvement, this contention has been inadequately researched.

### Statement of the Problem

The purpose of the present investigation was to evaluate the theoretical status of attitude system constraint and political information. This was achieved by pursuing four research objectives. First, the literature examining the effects of constraint has suffered from a lack of reliable and economical measurement techniques. A wide variety of methods have been used all of which limit the researcher in one fashion or another. For example, the subjective interview technique employed by Converse (1964) is costly and time consuming. In addition, despite the guidance provided by scoring criteria, there is always the danger that results derived from the subjective judging of interview protocols will be influenced by extraneous factors. It is possible, for example, that intelligence or some other dimension of individual differences between subjects could have figured in the assessment of political sophistication although not directly related to it. On the other hand, the calculation of interitem contingency coefficients (Jones and Rambo, 1973) is also complex and time consuming as it ordinarily would involve computerization of the data. This method is further limited by the fact that estimates of constraint are made for groups of subjects rather than individuals and thus it is difficult to use constraint as an independent variable, thereby restricting the number of studies examining constraint in this fashion. Other methods cited in the literature have similar deficiencies. Moreover, the fact that constraint has been assessed in a different manner by

each researcher suggests the possibility that at least some of the theoretical differences and contradictory results have been determined by differences in measurement techniques.

Therefore, one possible contribution of the present study is the development of a constraint measure which can be individually determined, which avoids the shortcomings of previous methods, and which is validated to the point that there exists some possibility that other researchers will adopt, or at least consider its use. The initial phases of the development of such a scale were accomplished as part of this investigation and are described in the next chapter.

A second research objective concerns constraint and information as they relate to the phenomena of attitude change. No research has been conducted examining the possibility that the overall coherence and structure of a person's attitudes mediate attitude change in response to experimental manipulations. Similarly, no references to the effects of information on attitude change could be found in the literature. As a result an experiment was performed in which constraint and information served as independent variables. Subjects were asked to indicate their approval of several social issues as well as their attitude toward President Nixon. In a later experimental session, the subjects were confronted with observed inconsistencies in these responses, asked to explain, and then given the opportunity to evaluate Nixon and the issues a second time. Changes in the degree of inconsistency between the evaluations of Nixon and the social issues were calculated as the index of attitude change. This manipulation was selected because of evidence which suggests that

being confronted with inconsistent values or beliefs stimulates especially powerful motivations to change such values or beliefs (Rokeach, 1968).

The experiment was designed to test a central theoretical implication of constraint. Important to the concept is the notion that a constrained ideology involves an interrelated cognitive network in which the status of one attitude is effected by change in another attitude. Thus the constrained ideology would be expected to be resistant to change because individual attitudes are linked to, and hence bolstered by, the rest of the system. Moreover, what might qualify as an inconsistent pair of attitudes by experimental definition may nonetheless be an integral part of a constrained set of beliefs; that is, even the apparently inconsistent attitudes of the highly constrained person are more likely to be derivations from some set of presuppositions which structures the entire system. As was noted earlier, the concept of constraint implies more than internal consistency and therefore the anchoring and connecting properties of constraint should "protect" individual attitudes from external influence and attack.

By contrast, the subjects who possess little or no structural cohesion among separate attitudes would be expected to be more vulnerable to the experimental manipulation. This expectation does not derive from any suggestion that the low constraint subject has a dispositional need to amend attitudes in the direction of homeostatic consistency, nor is it implied that such subjects will be more easily changed because their attitudes are only marginally supported in the sense of ego-involvement (although this latter

condition may be at least partially true). Instead, the low constraint subject lacks the interconnections and ideological perspective to resist change. Since the belief systems in these subjects consist of compartmentalized, fragmented, and loosely connected conglomerations of ideas and evaluations, change would be easier, and hence preferable than resistance to the experimenter. It should be recognized that the experimenter's question "What explains this contradiction?" contains a subtle, yet compelling implicit suggestion to the effect that the subject should rearrange or alter his evaluations on these issues, i.e. make them consistent.

In the view of the present author, the notion that higher levels of constraint lead to resistance to attitude change and lower levels are associated with persuasibility derives directly from theoretical statements of constraint and represents the most probable outcome of the experiment.

On the other hand, it might be argued that, in this particular experiment, high constraint subjects would be more likely to change their attitudes. It follows that persons who evidence more logical and consistent ideologies would be especially motivated to resolve inconsistencies made salient by the experimenter. The use of attitude inconsistencies therefore provided an especially powerful test of the concept in that, all other things being equal, one might indeed expect the constrained person to be motivated to remove or balance inconsistent attitudes. Thus, the experiment provided a test of two theoretical assumptions pertaining to constraint which in this instance are contradictory.

Similarly, well informed subjects should manifest greater resistance to attempted attitude manipulation because of the availability of resources to counteract the confrontation. Political knowledge could be used to rationalize or explain away the inconsistency as well as perhaps reinforce a certain kind of assurance that would be expected to occur when one is knowledgeable in a certain area of discourse. It is also probable that the very possession of information implies that a person has considered, discussed, etc. these issues before and thus perhaps even the inconsistency itself. As a result, the informed subject is less susceptible to manipulation in that a practiced "routine" of arguments in defense of attitudes and their relationships to one another is available. Furthermore, as information decreases vulnerability to attitude change should increase as lower information subjects would possess fewer resources for resisting the confrontation. The fact that the experiment includes a face-to-face confrontation should minimize the extent to which lower information subjects (and low constraint subjects) exercise their normative procedure for resisting persuasion, i.e. avoidance of dissonant communications.

Given the above considerations, the following hypotheses were proposed:

1. Attitude change will vary as an inverse function of the level of constraint.
2. Attitude change will vary as an inverse function of the level of information.

Although no precisely worded theoretical statement was made to this effect, the experimental procedure was designed with the general expectation that systematic individual differences in susceptibility

to the attitude manipulation would occur. This is mentioned because the basic thrust of the balance theories briefly discussed above would seem to suggest that the tendency toward the maintenance of attitude consistency is a first principle of cognitive motivation and thus inconsistencies are resolved whenever they occur. By contrast, this experiment sought to demonstrate that dispositional characteristics of subjects mediate the tendency to seek balance even when inconsistencies are made the focus of interpersonal interactions.

Finally, several aspects of subject behavior during the confrontation interview itself were monitored, but these variables were considered ancillary to the major concern of attitude change and therefore specific hypotheses were not generated. Also, these interview content variables were measured subjectively, without the benefit of validation or reliability procedures. Thus, they were included as more or less a subjective check on the "operating characteristics" of the instruments used to classify subjects and to gain an intuitive "feel" for the hypothesized relationships.

The third objective concerned political correlates of information and constraint. In both studies several indexes of political behavior and decision making were assessed in relation to information and constraint levels. Extrapolating from the available data and the theoretical definition of constraint the following relationships are expected:

1. Political participation will vary as a direct function of information and constraint (i.e. higher levels of these variables will be associated with greater participation, and so on).

2. The perceived importance of voting will vary as a direct function of information and constraint.
3. The tendency to vote a straight as opposed to a split ticket will be greater for higher levels of information and constraint.
4. Voting decisions will be earlier for higher levels of information and constraint.
5. Rates of voter registration and voting will vary directly as a function of information and constraint.
6. The tendency to use formal as opposed to informal (e.g. friends) sources for political news and opinion will be greater for higher levels of information and constraint.
7. Political party identification will vary as a function of information but not constraint.
8. Males will yield significantly higher constraint and information scores than females.
9. The perceived degree of recent attitude change will vary directly as a function of constraint and information.

Although of secondary importance to the present investigation, data concerning these hypothesized relationships will aid in completing a conceptual model of ideological types in relation to combinations of information and constraint. Hypotheses one through five represent restatements of the observed relationships between constraint and these variables reported by Campbell, et. al. (1964). In addition to the ever present need for replication, these hypotheses extend the investigation of Campbell and his associates by including corresponding expectations for constraint. As indicated, previous research in this area has failed to examine the effects of information and constraint separately, that is, the two variables are either confounded or information is omitted entirely. Although there are strong suggestions

in the literature that both information and constraint lead to similar manifestations of political involvement these assertions have not been tested directly.

Similarly, hypothesis six was derived from an empirical base. The relationship between political information and media usage has been well established (e.g. Robinson, 1967) but no studies could be found relating this variable to constraint.

The remaining three hypotheses were generated from the study reported by Rambo, Jones, and Finney (1973). Their importance stems from the need to clarify the manner in which constraint and information interact with other personal characteristics (i.e. sex and party affiliation) related to political behavior. In addition, these researchers discovered a curious and provocative relationship between the report of recent attitude change and the level of constraint. Thus, hypothesis nine suggests that persons characterized by constrained and informed political beliefs will perceive greater attitude reorganization than lower information and constraint individuals. This expectation derives from the fact that the former group possesses an internal "yardstick" (i.e. a constrained ideology) by which to measure (i.e. perceive, be aware of, etc.) changes in political attitudes. It is not suggested that such individuals do in fact experience more change. Instead, it is probable that low constraint and information subjects lack the cognitive structure and organization which would render attitude changes meaningful.

The study also included a preliminary investigation of personality differences associated with levels of information and constraint. Factors including need to help people, need for people, anomie,

interpersonal aggression, need for structure and order, and devine fate control were assessed by the conceptual systems test (Harvey, et. al., 1966). Since this portion of the study was essentially exploratory, specific hypotheses as to eventual outcomes were not generated.

The final objective of the study was an attempt to resolve conflicting data concerning the exact nature of the relationship between information and constraint. Since hypothesized combinations of these variables have been employed in the development of models of ideology and political behavior, it seems especially important that the relationship between them be specified and understood. Therefore, an effort was made to replicate the nonmonotonic relationship reported by Jones and Rambo (1973) using a new sample and more precise instrumentation.

## CHAPTER II

### INSTRUMENTS

Both studies required the development of instruments to measure information and constraint. As previously indicated, it was intended that these instruments be objective and easily administered. For the constraint variable an instrument capable of estimating consistency on an individual subject basis was desired. As a consequence, the following scaling procedures were performed.

#### The Individual Measure of Constraint

In order to develop a measure of constraint from which a single subject's score could be derived, it was assumed that constraint would be best represented by consistent responses to attitude items which are related or similar in terms of the sentiment reflected in each. Similarity was construed to mean a connection between the items based on a consideration of the underlying issues and orientations contained in the items. This definition does not imply similarity based solely on the particular referent objects or subject matter involved (e.g. belief in God), but rather an association derived from basic attitude positions (e.g. liberalism-conservatism). Thus, if two items both espouse conservative views toward their respective referents, one would expect the highly constrained subject to endorse, reject, or respond neutrally to both items. On the other hand, the low constraint

individual would not be as likely to respond consistently due to the ambivalence inherent in such a person's typical stance on matters of opinion. It is recognized that response consistency does not, by itself, indicate a logical process in the connotation of formal definitions of that term where beliefs are derived in a prescribed fashion from certain presuppositions. Inconsistent responding would seem, however, to imply one of two alternatives: either the subject's beliefs are indeed inconsistent and possibly illogical, or the items are not actually related.

It was assumed that the best indicator of item similarity would be a statistical index of interrelatedness or association between pairs of attitude items computed for a substantial number of subjects. Data estimating intercorrelations among responses to attitude items for 753 subjects was available from the Jones and Rambo study (1973). Constraint in that instance was defined as the average interitem contingency coefficient of pairs of items from the Social Attitude Scale (Rambo, 1972). The coefficient was derived by constructing a 5 x 5 matrix of the response categories of Strongly Agree, Agree . . . etc. for any given pair of items, and calculating the contingency coefficient from the observed frequencies in the matrix. This procedure was followed for each possible pair combination and means were computed for both forms of the Scale (A and L) and for each of five subject groups separately. Hence for all possible pairs on each form, five estimates of the degree of association were available. The magnitude of the coefficients varied of course from one information group to another, as indeed, this was the principal finding of the

study. Nonetheless, the average of the coefficients for a given pair would provide an index of the relative association of that pair versus any other pair of items.

The first step in developing an individual measure of constraint was to inspect these coefficients to determine a representative degree of association. After an initial survey, the value of  $C = .45$  was arbitrarily established as a minimally acceptable coefficient magnitude.<sup>1</sup> Since the five information groups provided five estimates of the degree of association for any pair of items, the number of groups for which coefficients exceeding  $C = .45$  were obtained was determined for each pair. This procedure, as well as all others in this section was performed for both forms of the SAS. Table I presents the results of this analysis. Item pairs were then selected for further consideration in the manner outlined in Table II. To determine the overall level of association for the item pairs thus selected, the five coefficients per pair were summed and means were calculated.

It was also desirable to determine the extent to which a given pair of items could discriminate between groups with discernably different levels of constraint. It was assumed that an adequate test of the discriminability of an item pair would be provided by the total magnitude of differences between the coefficients of the given information groups. This would hold so long as the observed differences for an item pair were in the same direction as the total sample. In the Jones and Rambo study the highest (I) and lowest (V)

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<sup>1</sup>The maximum value of this statistic is equal to the square root of  $1 - \frac{1}{n}$ , in this case .86.

information groups obtained higher average contingency coefficients than the three middle information groups. Also, the second highest (II) and next to the lowest (IV) groups yielded a greater index of constraint than did the middle information group (III). This was true for both forms of the SAS. Thus, for each remaining item pair (i.e. those not eliminated by the procedure outlined in Table II) the algebraic sum was then calculated for the following six coefficient comparisons: I - II; I - III; II - III; IV - III; V - III; V - IV. Means were computed as the measure of discriminability with higher means indicating greater discriminability. Appendix D summarizes the results of these analyses.

TABLE I  
 FREQUENCY OF ITEM PAIRS WITH CONTINGENCY  
 COEFFICIENTS EXCEEDING  $C = .45$

Form	Number of Coefficients $> .45$					
	0	1	2	3	4	5
A	691	208	62	17	8	4
L	559	264	109	36	12	10

Forty-four item pairs from each form were selected beginning with those possessing the highest mean contingency coefficient and discriminability scores simultaneously. The average contingency

coefficient (i.e., the mean of the means) for the item pairs selected was .4601 for form A and .4880 for form L. Mean discriminability scores were 39.2272 and 41.2500 respectively. Hence form L constitutes the better measure of constraint as regards the obtained indexes of association and discriminability.

TABLE II  
INITIAL CONSTRAINT ITEM PAIR SELECTION PROCESS

Criterion	Number of Pairs Selected	
	Form A	Form L
All pairs with 5 coefficients exceeding .45	4	10
All pairs with 4 coefficients exceeding .45	8	12
All pairs with 3 coefficients exceeding .45	17	36
All pairs with 2 coefficients exceeding .45 with the following limitations: (1) only if one of the coefficients was obtained by an information group with high overall constraint, or (2) if one of the items in the pair showed a pattern of high coeffi- cients in its pairings with other items	55	97
All pairs with at least 1 coefficient of .55 if not previously selected	24	4
Total Number of Pairs Selected	108	159

To determine the comparability of scores from the individual constraint scale to previous measures of constraint, the data of the Jones and Rambo study (1973) were reanalyzed with the new individual constraint procedure. Specifically, responses to the SAS item pairs selected above were compared for each subject. If the responses to both items were identical or similar, 1 point was added to the

constraint total. The following item pair combinations were considered indicative of constraint and scored accordingly; any combination of strongly agree and agree, any combination of strongly disagree and disagree; and two undecided responses. This scoring procedure was reversed when the item pair contained both a liberal and a conservative item, e.g. responses of agree and disagree would be scored as constraint. Means were calculated for each information group and are presented in Table III, as well as the average contingency coefficients reported by Jones and Rambo. Table III indicates that the relative ranks among the five groups has remained the same (i.e.  $I > II > III < IV < V$ ) for both forms of the scale. Figure 1 suggests that the essential U-shaped nature of the information and constraint relationship has not been altered. The primary difference between these functions and those reported in Jones and Rambo is that the individual measure of constraint appears to create greater and more equivalent separations between the five groups. This is not surprising since the new method of determining constraint possesses the advantage of being based only on comparisons between items with demonstrated association and discriminability, while the previous method consisted of means of all possible comparisons. However, the principle gain of this technique is the possibility of assigning constraint scores to individual subjects. As previously noted, this allows for a more flexible experimental use of the constraint concept, in which it can be used as either an independent or dependent variable and more precise comparisons can be made with related concepts and behaviors.

TABLE III  
MEAN CONSTRAINT AS A FUNCTION OF INFORMATION

Information Group	Form A		Form L	
	Mean Contingency Coefficient (Original Estimate)	Mean Individual Constraint (New Estimate)	Mean Contingency Coefficient (Original Estimate)	Mean Individual Constraint (New Estimate)
I	.384	21.85	.402	24.10
II	.376	20.72	.401	22.76
III	.337	19.21	.342	21.89
IV	.347	19.95	.356	23.30
V	.362	20.32	.378	24.30

At the beginning of the present study it was decided that comparability of the two methods of deriving constraint would serve as an adequate demonstration of validity for present purposes and this was achieved. This of course does not exhaust all of the procedures which could be employed to demonstrate validity, not to mention the question of reliability. For example, further investigations are needed in order to test the underlying assumption that individual constraint scores are indicative of a tendency toward logical thinking.

#### Political Information Scale

A 50-item multiple choice test was used to establish the level of information. Each item had five alternative answers only one of

which was correct. The test was conceived as an objective measure of a subject's knowledge of current events in the areas of national and international affairs, thus items were constructed so as to measure the amount of information about recent events or their consequences. An attempt was made to limit item content to essentially factual material.




Figure 1. Mean Individual Constraint as a Function of Information

Initially, 103 items were generated requiring that the subject correctly respond to questions concerning political figures, events, symbols, and parties, as well as legislation, judicial decisions, and political philosophy. These items were administered to a sample of 110 University of Tulsa undergraduate students enrolled in general psychology and other lower division psychology courses.<sup>2</sup> As indicated in Figure 2, the distribution of information scores showed that the majority of subjects answered about half of the items correctly. The obtained scores varied from 33% to 84% correct with a mean of 55.51% and a median of 54.5%.

In order to select items which would discriminate between subjects actually possessing different amounts of political knowledge the information scores were divided into three approximately equal groups. The resultant groups were as follows: high information group (H), 61% - 84%, (N=39); middle information group (M), 50% - 60%, (N=35); and low information group (L), 33% - 49%, (N=36). All subjects with the same information score were placed in the same group, thus accounting for the slight discrepancies in size. The percentage of those subjects passing each item was then calculated for each group and the total sample. The first criterion of retention was based on these percentages. An item was retained if the percentage of passing was highest for the H group, next

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<sup>2</sup>This was a unique sample which did not overlap with other samples in the study. When it was determined that 5 of the subjects participating in the information test validation had also participated in other phases of the study, data collected from them in other phases were discarded.

highest for the M group and lowest for the L group. This procedure resulted in the elimination of 28 items, or 27% of the original set of items.




Figure 2. Distribution of Information Scores: Validation Sample

To further determine the discriminability of the remaining items a line was plotted between a point representing the percent passing for the H group and for the L group of each item. The M group was

also located on each graph mid-way between the H and L points. The ability of each item to discriminate between the three groups was thus the distance (in percentage points) between the H and L groups and the relative closeness of the M point to the H-L line. Both procedures were performed for each item and the resultant scores were ranked according to discriminability (i.e., from most to least discriminating items). The rank scores from both procedures were then summed to provide an index of overall discriminability among the three groups. Table IV represents the location of each item according to the combined discriminability ranks and item difficulty (percentage of total sample passing the item). Fifty items for the final version of the scale were selected from this matrix according to the criteria of high discriminability (i.e. low combined rank scores) and representation of the observed range of item difficulty. The average item difficulty of those selected was 59.36%. The information scale is reproduced in Appendix E, and Appendix F contains the item analysis data.

Previous writers have cautioned against the cavalier use of objective tests of political knowledge such as the one described above (e.g. Redford, et. al., 1968). Generally three arguments are proposed to suggest the limitations of such instruments. First, while many subjects may lack the ability to correctly identify objective characteristics of a given political leader or event, this does not necessarily mean that this subject does not know anything about the leader or event. For example, Robinson (1967) has suggested that political information may be retained by most people in evaluative terms, i.e. while perhaps unable to identify

TABLE IV

## INFORMATION ITEM SELECTION MATRIX

Item Difficulty	Combined Discriminability Ranks												
	11 - 20	21 - 30	31 - 40	41 - 50	51 - 60	61 - 70	71 - 80	81 - 90	91 - 100	101 - 111	111 - 120	121 - 130	131 - 140
91-100								16	59				
81-90				28*		75*	68*	40*					
71-80	62*			98*		5* 72* 80* 94*	18* 64* 73*						
61-70	53*		36* 39*	49*	22* 24*	17* 20*	19* 65* 32* 92*	76	41	43			
51-60		25* 48*	63*	14*	87*100*		95*	23* 37*		102	57		42
41-50	96*			13*	14* 30*	88*	51*101*	61	4 66	46 84			
31-40			81*			69* 70*		97* 60	85				
21-30							31* 83		12 77	21	89		
11-20													
0-10												34	

\*Items selected for final scale.

the official title of Henry Kissinger, a subject may be quite able to indicate whether or not he likes Mr. Kissinger. Secondly, a problem of specificity may be involved. Continuing the example, a subject may be able to recall what Mr. Kissinger does or the events with which he is associated without remembering a title designation. Finally, tests which limit responses may be biased against some subjects in that the level of information should be expected to increase as a function of the perceived relevance of the subject matter of the item to the subject. Thus questions concerning seemingly distant international events or vague distinctions of political philosophy may be perceived to have little relevance to many subjects, thus lower information scores might result.

While the validity of these considerations is not questioned, it was deemed appropriate to use an objective multiple-choice test for several reasons. First are the obvious advantages of objective tests such as the ease of construction, scoring, administration, etc. Secondly, while evaluative and relevance dimensions should indeed be related to the amount of information possessed by a subject, there is no reason to believe that the "true" level of information would not be highly correlated with an objective estimate of information. This is especially the case since the present instrument samples a wide variety of topics. Also, as with any other test, the information test was construed as a sample of, in this case, political knowledge which could yield relative differences between subjects, and it was not assumed that such a test could exhaust the information possessed by a given subject.

## The Social Attitude Scale

Since the development and validation of the SAS has been thoroughly described elsewhere (Rambo, 1972) it is sufficient to indicate its essential characteristics. The SAS is a Likert-type scale which was used to assess constraint in the present study. Originally it was constructed to measure the liberalism-conservatism domain. The scale consists of alternate forms containing 44 items each. Form A contains 33 items worded in a conservative direction and 11 liberal items, while form L has 38 and 6 items, respectively. The standard response categories (e.g. strongly agree, agree, undecided, disagree, and strongly disagree) are provided. The SAS is scored by assigning weights 1 - 5 to the above categories (higher scores indicate more conservative responses) and calculating the sum. The weighting procedure is reversed for liberal items.

Item content consists of general propositions concerning the nature of man, social order, social change, and traditions. The author argued that specific attitudes represent derivations from such basic assumptions and judgments. Thus the SAS is thought to measure more central and enduring underlying values than do scales consisting of questions concerning specific political or social issues. Such a scale lends itself to the measurement of constraint in that responses to these basic considerations should be expected to reflect greater logical consistency as compared to responses to more specific items which are often time bound due to developing events and changing social custom. By measuring general orientations to the nature of human interaction the SAS also provides an index

of the extent to which subjects have molded their impressions and feelings into a consistent and stable belief system as opposed to a fragmented, transitory view of social life.

Validation procedures exceeding the usual practice for attitude scales were performed in the process of item selection. Following the standard Likert internal consistency analysis three sets of liberal and conservative affiliation groups were identified and tested. These groups consisted of college and adult samples as well as both black and white subjects. Items were selected on the basis of discriminability scores between the pairs of liberal and conservative groups. Factor analytic procedures suggested that the factor structure of the items was stable across samples, and that three or four factors, including a general factor labeled liberalism-conservatism, account for the major proportion of variance. When the surviving items were separated into alternate forms various items statistics such as factor loadings, mean scale values, variances and item discriminability values were equalized as closely as possible. A subsequent administration of both forms to the same sample confirmed the comparability of the two forms.

Additional research by Rambo (1973) investigated the predictive validity of the scale. Liberal and conservative groups were constructed on the basis of the SAS scores and predictions were made concerning differences between these groups on four personality variables. All predictions were realized as conservatives manifested significantly greater status concern and rigidity, while liberals obtained higher external control and social alienation scores.

The Conceptual Systems Test (CST, Harvey, et. al., 1966) was also administered to determine cognitive and personality differences between subjects manifesting various amounts of information and constraint. This test was originally developed to measure salient aspects of cognitive style. The CST consists of 49 items which are scored using the conventional 5-point Agree-Disagree response categories. Six sub-areas may be scored including divine fate control, need for structure and order, need to help people, need for people, interpersonal aggression, and anomie. These six scores were used to assess personality and cognitive differences in the present study.

## CHAPTER III

### METHOD

#### Subjects

The sample for the principal study consisted of 253 subjects recruited from undergraduate psychology courses at the University of Tulsa. Forty-four percent of the subjects were male and 56% female. The mean age was 22.5 years and the respective class standings were as follows: freshman 34.4%; sophomore, 25.7%; junior, 27.7%; and senior, 12.2%. Political party affiliation was almost evenly split between the major parties as 41.5% indicated that they supported the Republican Party, 41.4% identified with the Democrats, while 16.6% of the subjects classified themselves as Independent. Political involvement was extensive for a college sample in that 83% of the subjects reported that they had registered to vote; 79% had voted, and 34.5% reported that they had participated in one form or another of campaign activity. The largest major area of study consisted of the social sciences which comprised 32% of the sample. The proportions of other majors were as follows: technical and vocational (e.g. criminal justice and nursing), 16%; physical and biological sciences, 12%; education, 11%; art and humanities, 10%; business, 8%; undeclared majors, 6%; and engineering, 3%. Additionally, 55% of the subjects were local residents and the mean grade point average was 2.97 for the total sample.

In the second study data was collected for 84 subjects enrolled in two sections of the Introductory Psychology course at Tulsa Junior College. The sample consisted of 64.3% males and 35.7% females. Surprisingly, upperclassmen were represented (e.g. summer term special students) and the college class proportions were as follows: freshman, 41.7%; sophomore, 29.8%; junior, 21.4%; and senior, 7.1%. Eighty-one percent of the sample reported having registered to vote, while 84.5% had actually voted and 27.4% had participated in political campaigning. This sample was somewhat older than that of the first study as was reflected in the average age of 25.39. Again, the social sciences accounted for the largest group of majors, 35.7%, followed by technical and vocational, 22.6%; business, 17.8%; art and humanities, 11.9%; undeclared, 4.8%; and both biological sciences and education with 3.6% each. Also as before, both the Democrat and Republican parties commanded equal support (45.2% each) while 9.5% of the subjects described themselves as Independents.

#### Procedure

##### Study No. 1

The principal study consisted of two distinct phases. In the first phase constraint and information levels were determined by administering the Social Attitude Scale (Rambo, 1972) and the political information test (the 50-item, objective information test described above) to 370 undergraduate psychology students. These subjects were also given a social issues questionnaire which elicits like-dislike responses to 10 political figures and favor-

oppose responses to 35 social and political issues. These scales were administered during a week long series of out-of-class testing sessions. The subjects received minor course credit for their participation.

For both parts of the social issues questionnaire the subjects were required to respond on a six-point scale defined at the end points by either like-dislike or favor-oppose depending on the item (see Appendix A). The middle category had been omitted to prevent noncommittal responses. However, five subjects insisted that their evaluations properly required an undecided response to one of the key items. These subjects were allowed to finish and received credit for participating, but were disqualified from further consideration in the study.

Responses to the evaluation of President Nixon and twenty of the issue items were checked to determine inconsistencies. The remaining political figures and issues contained in the social issues questionnaire were considered "filler" items. Inconsistencies were defined prior to the experiment as any one of the four combinations presented in Table V.

Table VI represents the four issue-Nixon inconsistencies which were observed among subjects who indicated that they liked Mr. Nixon as well as the four most common inconsistencies for those who disliked him.

Sixty-one subjects were eliminated because they responded with three or fewer of the above inconsistencies. After an interval of one week the remaining 304 subjects were contacted to participate in the second phase of the study. Subjects who had participated

early in the week in the first phase were contacted first so that an approximately equal separation of time between the phases was true for all subjects. Additional minor course credit was offered for participation in phase two.

TABLE V  
DEFINITIONS OF INCONSISTENCY

Evaluation of Nixon	Evaluation of Issue
Like	Oppose issue favored by Nixon
Like	Favor issue opposed by Nixon
Dislike	Oppose issue opposed by Nixon
Dislike	Favor issue favored by Nixon

The second phase of the study consisted of a personal interview conducted by a psychology graduate student with each subject not previously eliminated. During the initial portion of the interview each subject was asked to provide demographic and background information. The data collected at this point included age and sex of the subject; grade point average and college classification; whether or not the subject had registered to vote, voted, or participated in political activities (e.g. campaigning and fund raising); the political party, if any, with which the subject most

TABLE VI  
OBSERVED INCONSISTENCIES

Issues	Evaluation Group			
	Like		Dislike	
	Nixon	Subjects	Nixon	Subjects
Reduce aid to science research	Favor	Oppose		
Increase medicare	Favor	Oppose		
Increase aid to education	Oppose	Favor		
Devaluation of dollar	Favor	Oppose		
Revenue sharing			Favor	Favor
Improved relations with China			Favor	Favor
Capital punishment			Favor	Favor
Federal aid to private schools			Favor	Favor

closely identified; hometown; and the subjects' estimate of the relative impact of various news sources on their attitudes and information.

Next, the subjects were reminded of their responses to one of the four social issues which was inconsistent relative to their evaluation of Nixon. For example, the interviewer might say . . . "I see you oppose improving relations with Red China, can you tell me why?" Following the subsequent response the interviewer would confront the subject with the inconsistency, e.g. "But you also indicated that you like President Nixon, and yet he has traveled to China and has publically stated his affirmation of rapproachment with China. How do you account for the apparent contradiction?" Although the exact language used by the interviewer changed from issue to issue and across subjects, two essential elements were always included. That is, for each issue the interviewer would elicit the subjects' position and then present the inconsistency vis à vis President Nixon. The order of presentation of the issues for which inconsistencies existed was randomized.

Each of the four verbal responses of the subject to the confrontations was subjectively scored by the interviewer to discern several aspects of the response. First, numerical tallies were kept of the number of probes required and requests for information by the subjects. Probes referred to any prompting the interviewer used to elicit a response such as . . . "can you tell me more? . . . go on . . . can you explain more fully?" Probes were used only when the subjects failed to say anything or when the answer was vague, unintelligible, etc. Requests for information referred

to the incidents in which the subject asked a question of the interviewer, e.g. . . . "What do you mean? . . . what's the purpose of that question?" This category was also scored when the subject requested substantive information concerning the issue under discussion, e. g. . . . "When did the President say that? . . . what do you mean devaluation of the dollar?" The interviewer referred all questions concerning the purpose of the experiment to the debriefing to be held later. Substantive questions were answered only to the extent that it insured the credibility of the confrontation, e.g. "The President announced his views of this in a televised speech last March."

The interviewer also scored the subjects' explanations according to three variables developed by Kessel (1965) to judge the cognitive components of political interview data. These variables were as follows:

1. Information support (categories: high, medium, low). An estimate of the amount of information employed by the subject to explain the original position relative to the issue and to resolve or explain the contradiction. Examples: high information would be scored when the subject offered detailed and correct information to support his contentions; medium information was indicated when some information which bore directly on the question was emitted; the low information category was used to denote either a subject who offered little or no information, e.g. one who relied extensively on feelings or intuition, or a subject who employed erroneous, vague, or confused information.
2. Time perspective (categories: immediate, intermediate, long range). An estimate of the temporal frame of reference used to justify the subject's position. The present, weeks or months, years, generations and historical perspectives exemplify applications of the categories. If more than one time perspective

was indicated, the one of longer duration was scored. This dimension was, in some cases, inferred from the subject's verbalizations rather than being directly emitted. It must also be noted that issues would be expected to differ inherently concerning the duration of consequences stemming from the issue. However, the measure was obtained in an attempt to estimate the extent to which a subject tends to conceive of political events and issues in relatively long or short term perspectives.

3. Geographical perspective (categories: local, national, international). An estimate of the breadth of consequences employed to justify the position of the subject. The categories are self-explanatory with the exception that local was conceived to mean everything up to and including state-wide perspectives. Again, these estimates were often inferences and the more inclusive category was scored when two or more were emitted. The basic thrust of these judgments was an attempt to discover the subject's geographical anchors or "political life space" when discussing the impact of an issue.

To test subject sensitivity to the face-to-face dissonance or inconsistency arousal provided by the confrontation, an attempt was made to measure the subject's tendency to resolve or deny the suggested inconsistency. At the same time the sophistication of the resolution or denial was taken into account. This was achieved by scoring each of the four responses as one of the following:

- a. Supported resolution. This category was scored if the subject resolved the inconsistency by shifting one of the evaluations of either Nixon or the issue and giving explanations of the change or arguments supporting the change.
- b. Unsupported resolution. If the subjects resolved the inconsistency by summarily changing his view of either Nixon or the issues without indicating the reasons involved, this category would be checked. Unsupported resolution was also indicated when the subject manifested a lack of understanding or interest but changed one of the evaluations anyway.

- c. Support denial. This designation was used to denote a case in which the subject disagreed that an inconsistency was contained in the two evaluations, and went on to explain why, or supplied additional information or arguments to support the denial.
- d. Unsupport denial. This category was appropriate when the subject claimed that no inconsistency existed without elaborating, or when the subject erroneously or without support denied the President's public position on a particular issue.

Since most of the subjects who participated in the principal study were students of the present author, debriefing was conducted collectively during class periods. An attempt was made to integrate the study into the course content concerning theoretical and experimental aspects of psychology. Although the debriefing dealt mostly with theoretical concerns, questions about the purpose, design, or results (insofar as they were available at the time) were entertained. Subjects not enrolled in the author's classes were notified by announcement of the opportunity to discuss the study with the experimenter. Also, subjects who were interested were given individual feedback concerning the scores they obtained on the political information and constraint tests.

Since the only deceptions required to perform the study were the withholding of information concerning what the tests measured (although in all cases but one this is obvious), what the purpose of the study was, and the author's role as experimenter, it was felt that the subjects would not feel exploited. A questionnaire distributed during the debriefing indicated that this was so (see Appendix B). For example, 100% of the respondents indicated that they did not feel exploited, pressured, or stressed, 82%

claimed that their attitudes had not been manipulated or changed, 87% reported that they thought their participation and the subsequent debriefing was worthwhile and informative for them and although 79% said that their chief motive for participating was the extra course credit which had been tendered, 65% reported that they would participate in a similar experiment again whether or not credit was offered. Also, all but two of the respondents (99%) indicated that they believed the project to be worthwhile from the standpoint of the experimenter.

In the response to an open-ended question requesting the subjects' guesses concerning the intent of the experiment, most of the subjects indicated only marginal awareness as suggested by such references as "opinion survey," "testing political attitudes," and "the ability to stand up for one's beliefs," etc. Curiously, only 17 subjects (6.7%) mentioned any concept related to attitude consistency. These responses were elicited from the subjects at the beginning of the debriefing so their hypotheses concerning the purpose of the study were made without the benefit of feedback.

From the responses to the debriefing questionnaire it can be argued with reasonable assurance that the subjects were not harmed by the experience and that, in their perception at least, their time was not wasted in a meaningless exercise. The debriefing also suggested that the credibility of the experimental manipulation was not jeopardized by the subjects' awareness of the exact nature of the study. Although these post-experimental subject impressions were solicited with a guarantee of anonymity, it must be acknowledged that such requests from a "prestigious source" might conceivably

yield self-fulfilling results. However, since the post questionnaire results suggested substantial consensus and since no discernable sign of disenchantment was detected, it was concluded that the post questionnaire accurately reflected the subjects' true feelings.

### Study No. 2

Data for the second study were collected during the class periods of two sections of the Introductory Psychology course at Tulsa Junior College. In addition to the SAS and the political information test, the subjects completed the Conceptual Systems Test. Following the administration of these scales in the order presented above, self report questionnaires were distributed which requested the following information: age and sex of subject, college classification; whether the subject had registered to vote, voted, or participated in political campaigning; an estimate of the importance of one's vote in determining the outcome of a Presidential election, and voting regularity; an estimate of the extent to which the subjects perceived a recent shift in attitudes concerning political affairs; use of political information sources; and the party, if any, with which the subject personally identified. Additionally, subjects who voted in the 1972 Presidential election were asked to indicate whether or not they had voted a straight party ticket and the time at which they reached their decision concerning their presidential choice. Appendix C presents this questionnaire.

Eighty-five subjects participated in the second study with one subject eliminated due to the failure to properly complete all

of the testing forms. Debriefing was not conducted for the subjects in this study because no experimental manipulation was involved and due to time limitations. Instead, subjects were assured of the anonymity of their responses (names were not required to collate test forms) and were simply told that the experimenter was interested in comparing the results of the various tests. As before, the purpose of each test (except the SAS which was scored for constraint rather than liberalsim-conservatism) was rather transparent.

## CHAPTER IV

### RESULTS

#### Study No. 1

The information test was scored and the scores were converted into percentages. The distribution ranged from 16% - 96% correct with a mean of 61.42 and a median of 62. As Figure 3 indicates, a majority of the subjects (69%) answered half or more of the items correctly. Three groups were constructed by dividing the information scores into approximately equal thirds. Both forms of the SAS were scored for constraint and the resulting sums were combined for each subject. The combined constraint scores varied from 25 to 86 within the possible range of 0 to 88. The mean was 46.79 and the median was 43. Figure 4 represents the frequency of constraint scores at various magnitudes. Subjects scoring above and below the middle constraint value (i.e. the middle score of the range of possible constraint scores, 44.5; not the observed median) were dichotomized within the information ranges created above, resulting in the six experimental groups outlined in Table VII.

To determine whether the various levels of the two independent variables represented subjects who actually differed in terms of information and constraint, tests of significance were performed.

The information score means of the three information groups were as follows: high information, 81.88; middle information, 61.31; and low information, 40.05. An analysis of variance was calculated and the resulting F ratio equaled 18.51 ( $p < .01$ ). Summing across information groups, the high constraint subjects achieved an average constraint score of 59.36 while low constraint subjects showed a mean of 36.29. The uncorrelated t difference between means was highly significant ( $t=21.76$ ,  $p < .01$ ). Thus the procedure used to delineate the six experimental groups appeared to have segregated subjects possessing differential amounts of the two variables.




Figure 3. Frequency of Information Scores




Figure 4. Frequency of Combined Constraint Scores

TABLE VII  
 EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS CONSTRUCTED FROM  
 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE COMBINATIONS

<u>Group</u>		<u>n</u>	<u>Information</u>		<u>Constraint</u>	
<u>Information</u>	<u>Constraint</u>		<u>Range</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Range</u>	<u>Mean</u>
High (H)	High (H)	55	72-94	81.7	45-86	64.1
High (H)	Low (L)	27	72-96	82.2	29-43	37.4
Middle (M)	High (H)	28	54-66	61.6	45-72	56.2
Middle (M)	Low (L)	65	52-70	61.2	25-44	34.9
Low (L)	High (L)	33	24-48	41.3	45-70	53.6
Low (L)	Low (L)	45	16-50	39.2	31-43	37.6

It is interesting to note that the mean information score for high constraint subjects was 65.38 and 58.08 for the low constraint subjects. This difference was significant ( $t=3.28$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The average constraint values for the high, middle, and low information groups were 55.30, 41.31, and 44.37 respectively. These differences were also significant ( $F=3.27$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Figure 5 represents mean constraint as a function of information. The shape of the curve provides further confirmation of the U-shaped information and constraint relationship reported by Jones and Rambo. This appeared especially significant since these results were obtained with a new information test, a different sample, and a different method for calculating constraint. Although Figure 5 also indicates that the low information group obtained a substantially lower mean constraint

score than did the high information group, this result nonetheless supports the contention that the relationship is nonmonotonic and that constraint does not vary as a linear function of information, regardless of the exact shape of the curve.




Figure 5. Average Constraint as a Function of Information

In order to examine the effects of the inconsistency confrontation the degree of inconsistency was determined for each subject. This was achieved by calculating the separation, in scale units, between the evaluation of President Nixon and the inconsistent attitude as

measured by the social issues questionnaire. Weights of 1 to 6 were assigned to the individual scale items beginning at the unfavorable pole (i.e. dislike or oppose) of the item. For example, if a subject responded with maximum approval of Nixon (score: 6) and maximum opposition to revenue sharing (score: 1) the inconsistency score would equal 5 units for that item. The inconsistency scores were summed across the four items for each subject and had a possible total range of 4 - 20 for the first administration of the social issues questionnaire. Inconsistency scores were obtained in the same manner for the post-manipulation administration in which the possible range was 0 - 20. The truncated range of the pre-test scores resulted from the fact that items and subjects were selected on the basis of the presence of inconsistencies, and thus a score below the value of 4 was unattainable. It should be noted that a post-test score of 3 or less necessarily resulted from a reversal of the responses to either one or more of the issues or President Nixon.

Changes in the inconsistency score represented attitude change. The inconsistencies made salient by the confrontation would be expected to arouse dissonance and result in significant shifts in attitudes. Table VIII presents the mean pre-post inconsistency scores for the six experimental groups as well as means for each level of information and constraint. From Table VIII it would appear that subjects characterized by higher levels of information and constraint resisted the experimental manipulation more than did lower information and constraint subjects, as hypothesized. However, Table VIII also suggests the possibility that there are pre-test

differences in inconsistency scores among the experimental groups. Significant differences between the average original inconsistency scores of each group would render significant pre-post changes difficult to interpret and such differences were not anticipated. As a result before any pre-post analysis was performed a 3 x 2 factorial, weighted-means analysis was calculated for the pre-test inconsistency data alone. Unfortunately, this test proved to be significant for both information ( $F=12.85$ ,  $p < .01$ ) and constraint ( $F=12.87$ ,  $p < .01$ ).

TABLE VIII  
MEAN INCONSISTENCY SCORES

Group		n	Pre	Post	Difference
Information	Constraint				
H	H	55	14.04	13.35	.69
H	L	27	9.52	8.22	1.30
M	H	28	13.18	11.18	2.00
M	L	65	13.60	10.92	2.68
L	H	33	16.03	12.54	3.48
L	L	45	14.44	10.11	4.33
H	-	82	12.55	11.79	.76
M	-	93	13.47	11.00	2.47
L	-	78	15.06	11.14	3.92
-	H	116	14.36	12.69	1.67
-	L	137	13.07	10.12	2.95

Thus, the six groups differed in original inconsistency scores. Table VIII indicates that much of the discrepancy derives from one group (high information-low constraint). Furthermore, Table VIII indicates that at both the high and low information levels the high constraint group shows a greater degree of inconsistency than does the low constraint group. This pattern is surprising and a simple, persuasive explanation is not available. It is possible that either the individual measure of constraint or the SIQ were inadequate in some fashion. It is also possible that there exists some inherent inconsistency in the SIQ item comparisons. For example, some subjects argued during the interview that the inconsistencies were Mr. Nixon's and not theirs. This idea seems at least plausible since these arguments were most often made by the high constraint-high information group. Again, however, it must be acknowledged that the pre-test inconsistency score differences represent a weakness of the design the reasons for which are not easily discerned.

Because some sort of statistical test of the effects of the confrontation was needed despite this problem, the decision was made to divide the intended 3 x 2 x 2 repeated measures design into three separate analyses. A 2 x 2 analysis (two levels of constraint x pre-post) was performed for each information group. This procedure provided a test of the differential effects of constraint, and indirectly the effects of information level. For example, significant pre-post differences would confirm the ability of the confrontation to elicit attitude change within a given information group. The pattern of pre-post differences across the three groups would suggest the relationship between information level and

attitude change. Attitude change associated with levels of constraint would be found in the interaction term, while significant differences in constraint would indicate that the inconsistency scores varied as a function of constraint.

Tables IX through XI present the results of these analyses. As may be seen, only one of the principal hypotheses was supported by the data in that the high information group failed to show significant pre-post differences, while both middle and low information levels yielded significant pre-post differences. It is interesting to note that the F ratio is twice as large for the low group as compared to the middle information group. The hypothesis that attitude change to resolve inconsistency would vary as a function of the level of constraint was not confirmed due to the lack of significance of any of the interaction terms. Also, Tables IX through XI suggest the extent of inconsistency score differences between constraint groups in that both the high and low information analyses indicated significant differences associated with levels of constraint.

At this point, a significant departure from the usual practice of data analysis was made. This resulted from the fact that the summary data presented in Table VIII conveyed the strong impression that both of the major hypotheses had been confirmed and yet subsequent analysis revealed that differences in attitude change as a function of constraint were not significant. While the present author would agree that continued analysis which seeks only to confirm original hypotheses is inappropriate, it was felt that in this instance sufficient justification was available for further examination of the data. In other words, the data were not manipulated to "create"

statistical significance where important relationships obviously were absent. Instead, the analysis was continued "as if" the constraint x pre-post interactions were significant since the pattern of results indicated that greater amounts of attitude change were associated with decreasing levels of both information and constraint. For example, Figure 6 graphically indicates that at each level of information the low constraint group showed greater attitude change (i.e. mean pre-inconsistency score minus mean post-inconsistency score) than did the high constraint group. Although differences in attitude change are obviously greater as a function of information level, the constraint factor was also related to the average degree of change. In fact, the constraint effect was quite consistent across levels of information.

TABLE IX  
CHANGES IN INCONSISTENCY SCORES BY TWO LEVELS  
OF CONSTRAINT: HIGH INFORMATION GROUP

Source	df	Analysis of Variance		
		SS	MS	F
Constraint	1	885.98	885.98	61.96**
Pre-Post	1	9.06	9.06	.63
Interaction	1	3.32	3.32	.23
Error	160	2,287.97	14.30	

\*\*p < .01

TABLE X  
 CHANGES IN INCONSISTENCY SCORES BY TWO LEVELS  
 OF CONSTRAINT: MIDDLE INFORMATION GROUP

Source	df	Analysis of Variance		
		SS	MS	F
Constraint	1	.28	.28	.02
Pre-Post	1	284.42	284.42	19.92**
Interaction	1	4.48	4.48	.31
Error	182	2,598.43	14.28	

\*\*p < .01

TABLE XI  
 CHANGES IN INCONSISTENCY SCORES BY TWO LEVELS  
 OF CONSTRAINT: LOW INFORMATION GROUPS

Source	df	Analysis of Variance		
		SS	MS	F
Constraint	1	153.85	153.85	10.23**
Pre-Post	1	616.03	616.03	40.95**
Interaction	1	6.79	6.79	.45
Error	152	2,286.70	15.04	

\*\*p < .01




Figure 6. Mean Attitude Change as a Function of Information and Constraint

Therefore, tests of simple effects were performed, i. e. pre-post differences for each of the six independent variable groups separately. Table XII presents t values for these comparisons as well as correlation coefficients for the relationship between pre and post inconsistency scores. Table XII indicates that decreasing levels of information and constraint yield increasingly significant pre-post attitude change differences with but one inversion of this pattern. This analysis also indicated that pre-post inconsistency changes were significant for all groups except one (high information-high constraint). Similarly, the correlation coefficients show a descending trend

with one inversion. Thus while higher information and constraint groups yielded less significant but more predictable pre-post changes, lower levels of these variables were associated with increasingly significant, but less predictable attitude shifts.

TABLE XII  
CHANGES IN INCONSISTENCY SCORES BY SIX  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE GROUPS

Group		Mean	Mean	Difference	t	r
Information	Constraint	Pre	Post			
H	H	14.04	13.35	.69	1.22	.80
H	L	9.52	8.22	1.30	2.72**	.66
M	H	13.18	11.18	2.00	3.51**	.68
M	L	13.60	10.92	2.68	7.24**	.61
L	H	16.03	12.54	3.48	5.29**	.57
L	L	14.44	10.11	4.33	5.76**	.22

\*\*p < .01

These results suggest two conclusions which were not totally apparent at the conclusion of the initial analysis. First, information was a better predictor of attitude change than was constraint. This could have resulted for at least two reasons. Either information was "in reality" more closely associated with the responses to the inconsistency confrontation, or, as previously suggested, the

technique of measuring constraint was less than entirely satisfactory. The complexity of the constraint concept renders efforts to measure it quite difficult. Therefore, it is possible that the individual measure of constraint which attempts to differentiate on the basis of the similarity in responses to pairs of items simply does not reliably tap the more basic concept of functional interdependence among attitude elements. Therefore further work examining the validity and reliability of this technique is needed. It is also possible that the procedure of dividing the constraint distribution failed to adequately separate subjects into groups which differed in constraint in a meaningful fashion. For example, Figure 4 suggests that the observed distribution of combined constraint scores was skewed in such a way as to indicate a possible "floor" effect for this variable. Moreover, the cutting point of 44.5 was determined prior to the experiment and thus without knowledge of this fact. Therefore, it is conceivable that the lack of significant results was due to the manner in which the constraint groups were formed, and that alternative procedures (e.g. using only the upper and lower thirds of the distribution, use of three levels of constraint instead of two, etc.) might have yielded differing results. The fact that non-significant but consistent differences in attitude change as a function of constraint were observed lends credence to this interpretation.

Secondly, Table XII indicates that the inconsistency confrontation was more effective in eliciting attitude change than was originally expected. Apparently this manipulation created strong pressures for change regardless of the information and constraint level of the

subject. Therefore it is possible that the strength of manipulation masked the effects of constraint. This conclusion would be tenable if the following two assumptions are valid: (1) if information and constraint were both related to the degree of change in inconsistency scores and (2) if, as appears to be the case, the information test was simply a more efficient instrument in this instance than was the individual measure of constraint.

In conclusion, the analysis was hampered by shortcomings in the experimental design. In the view of the present author there is reason to believe that, as hypothesized, attitude change and response to the confrontation varied as an inverse function of the level of constraint. Supporting evidence for this contention was also found in the analysis of SIQ reversals, which is presented below. Therefore, while it has not been statistically demonstrated, discussion of the study reflects the conclusion that both of the major hypotheses were supported.

It was also advisable to test changes in inconsistency scores for subjects who indicated that they liked Mr. Nixon vs. those who did not. This was deemed necessary because two different sets of inconsistency confrontations were presented depending on the evaluation of Nixon. Therefore, it was possible that the tendency to resolve the inconsistency might have depended on the relative importance of the particular issues involved. Table XIII shows the mean pre-post inconsistency scores for subjects favoring and opposing Nixon. Table XIII indicates that greater changes were observed among subjects who initially preferred Nixon; there were substantial differences in the overall inconsistency scores of Like vs. Dislike

subjects; and both groups yielded lower inconsistency scores in the post-test administration. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance (like-dislike x pre-post) indicated that pre-post ( $F = 14.70, p < .01$ ) and evaluation group ( $F = 11.54, p < .01$ ) differences were significant. However, the interaction term was not significant ( $F = 0.55$ ) suggesting that the particular set of issues with which the subject was confronted had a negligible effect on observed changes in inconsistency scores.

TABLE XIII  
MEAN INCONSISTENCY SCORES FOR SUBJECTS  
WHO LIKE AND DISLIKE NIXON

Evaluation of Nixon	Mean Inconsistency		
	Pre	Post	Difference
Like	13.00	10.29	2.71
Dislike	15.02	13.29	1.74

The subjects' behavior during the interview itself was also of interest and is summarized in Table XIV, which presents percentages, by group of the tendency to resolve or deny the suggested inconsistencies. Also included in Table XIV are proportions for the remaining interview content variables. These variables were analyzed with three Chi-square tests each to enable a more definitive determination of the effects of information and constraint. This was achieved by analyzing the effects of information for low and

TABLE XIV

## INTERVIEW CONTENT EVALUATION

Group I C	$\bar{X}$ Probes	$\bar{X}$ Requests Information	Information Support			Time Span			Geographical Perspective			Resolution-Denial Tendency Denial Resolution			
			%H	%M	%L	%L-R	%Int.	%Imm.	%Int.	%Nat.	%Loc.	%Un.	% Sup.	%Un.	%Sup.
H H	.4500	.2700	22.72	60.45	16.81	13.63	81.36	5.00	44.54	41.81	13.63	18.63	8.18	30.45	44.72
H L	.2962	.5185	33.33	43.51	23.14	9.25	84.25	6.48	39.81	49.07	11.11	6.48	2.77	49.07	45.37
M H	.5000	.2857	16.96	56.25	26.78	10.71	71.42	17.85	33.03	41.07	25.89	17.85	15.17	42.85	24.10
M L	.3692	.4461	13.84	55.00	31.15	13.46	70.76	15.76	35.00	46.53	18.46	20.07	8.84	30.69	35.32
L H	.4848	.3030	4.54	39.39	56.06	5.30	86.36	8.33	30.30	43.18	26.51	35.60	4.54	48.48	11.36
L L	.8888	.6888	1.66	47.77	50.55	3.33	62.22	34.44	15.00	43.88	41.11	39.44	2.77	40.00	7.77
H -	.4024	.3536	26.21	54.87	18.90	12.19	82.31	5.48	42.98	44.30	12.80	14.63	6.40	36.58	43.59
M -	.4086	.3978	14.78	55.37	29.83	12.63	70.96	16.39	34.40	44.89	20.69	21.50	10.75	35.75	31.98
L -	.7179	.5256	2.88	44.23	52.88	4.16	72.43	23.39	21.47	43.58	34.93	37.82	3.52	49.35	9.29
- H	.5258	.2844	16.16	53.44	30.38	10.56	80.38	9.05	37.71	42.02	20.25	23.27	8.83	38.57	29.31
- L	.5255	.5401	13.68	50.36	35.94	9.30	70.62	20.07	29.37	46.16	24.45	25.18	5.65	41.60	28.28

high constraint subjects separately. Differences between high and low constraint subjects (summed across information groups) comprised the third test. To illustrate, Table XV presents the cell frequencies for the three tests performed to assess group differences in geographical perspective. The procedure was followed for all Chi-square analyses in the two studies.

Table XVI which presents Chi-square totals for the interview content variables, provides evidence that the tendency to resolve the inconsistencies was related to information level, but not to constraint. In order to determine whether or not the significant Chi-square totals for the tendency to resolve the issue during the interview were confounded with the sophistication of the answer (which was scored simultaneously), the supported vs. unsupported categories were collapsed and the three tests were recalculated. The resulting Chi-square totals were as follows: information (high constraint subjects),  $X^2 = 6.79$  ( $p < .05$ ,  $v = 2$ ); information (low constraint subjects),  $X^2 = 23.68$  ( $p < .01$ ,  $v = 2$ ); and constraint,  $X^2 = .19$ . Thus, while the sophistication of the response did apparently influence the judgment of the experimenter, especially for high constraint subjects, the basic pattern of results remained the same. That is, the tendency to resolve was significantly greater for lower vs. higher information levels, while no significant differences were observed for different constraint groups. Table XVI also suggests that, as predicted, both high information and high constraint subjects tended, to a significant degree, to conceptualize political events in broader geographical and temporal units; that is, these subjects more frequently made reference to

TABLE XV

OBSERVED CELL FREQUENCIES FOR THREE CHI-SQUARE  
TESTS OF GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE

Factor Levels	Information						Constraint			
	Test #1			Test #2			(All Subjects)			
	(High Constraint Subjects)			(Low Constraint Subjects)			Variable			
	Variable Categories			Variable Categories			Category			
	Int.	Nat.	Loc.	Int.	Nat.	Loc.	Factor Levels	Int.	Nat.	Loc.
H	98	92	30	43	53	12	H	175	195	94
M	37	46	29	91	121	48				
L	40	57	35	27	79	74	L	121	253	134

long range international consequences in discussing their attitudes, while lower information and constraint subjects expressed greater concern for the immediate and local impact of political events. Not surprisingly, information level was significantly related to the amount of information support perceived by the interviewer, while the constraint factor was not.

TABLE XVI  
CHI-SQUARE VALUES FOR INTERVIEW  
EVALUATION DATA

Variable	v	Information (High Constraint)	Information (Low Constraint)	v	Constraint
Tendency to Resolve	4	56.7385**	88.0844**	2	4.4622
Information Support	4	66.4710**	68.9728**	2	3.8881
Time Span	4	20.8128**	47.2353**	2	23.9225**
Geographical Perspective	6	14.445**	112.0956**	3	20.3451**

\*\*p < .01

Differences in the number of probes and requests for information occurring during the interview were analyzed using a 3 x 2 weighted means analysis. The number of probes failed to significantly differ either as a function of information ( $F = 1.9753$ ,  $p > .05$ ) or constraint

( $F = .0639$ ,  $p > .05$ ) and the interaction term was not significant ( $F = 3.0893$ ). By contrast, high constraint subjects manifested significantly fewer requests for information as compared to low constraint subjects ( $F = 6.2250$ ,  $p < .01$ ), while the  $F$  ratios for information level ( $F = .6237$ ,  $p > .05$ ) and interaction ( $F = .4456$ ,  $p > .05$ ) were not significant.

Upon completion of the above analyses an additional test of major hypotheses was performed. It was initially intended to measure attitude change solely by the total degree of change in response to the social issues questionnaire. At this point it was realized that a less subtle, but perhaps more important index of the differential responses of the experimental groups to the inconsistency confrontation was contained in pre-post reversals on the social issues questionnaire items. A reversal was defined as a shift from, for example, one of the three favor or like categories to one of the oppose or dislike positions (or vice versa) on either the evaluation of Nixon or any of the four issues. Hence a reversal can be best conceived as a total reorientation of the subject's attitude toward the referent in question, as opposed to the relatively minute changes reflected in the inconsistency scores. Table XVII represents the percentage of subjects who reversed one or more responses to the social issues questionnaire items for each group, while Table XVIII shows the Chi-square totals for the information and constraint comparisons. As Table XVIII indicates, the percentage of subjects who changed one of their responses to a diametrically different position was significantly greater among low as compared to high constraint subjects, while significant differences were not observed

among levels of information. Thus, information would appear to be most closely related to quantitative attitude changes in response to the confrontation, while the constraint variable is a better predictor of qualitative changes.

TABLE XVII  
PERCENT OF REVERSALS BY INFORMATION  
AND CONSTRAINT GROUPS

Information	Constraint	% Reversals on Nixon Item	% Reversals on Issue Items
H	H	10.90	9.09
H	L	18.51	14.82
M	H	10.71	10.71
M	L	16.92	16.92
L	H	9.09	9.09
L	L	28.88	17.78
H	-	13.21	10.98
M	-	13.97	15.05
L	-	16.66	14.10
-	H	9.48	9.48
-	L	21.16	16.79

TABLE XVIII  
 CHI-SQUARE VALUES FOR FREQUENCY  
 OF REVERSALS

Variable	v	Information		v	Constraint
		High Constraint	Low Constraint		
Reversals (Nixon)	2	.31	.24	1	6.44**
Reversals (Issues)	2	.06	.30	1	5.78*

\*p < .05

\*\*p < .01

Summary data concerning reported political identification, involvement, and the use of various news media is presented in Table XIX. Table XX indicates the Chi-square values for these variables. As predicted, high information and constraint groups reported greater participation in political affairs than did low information and constraint groups. Also consistent with expectation subjects possessing higher levels of information and constraint differed significantly from the lower groups in terms of media usage, with the former relying more heavily on established news media, especially newspapers and magazines, while the latter groups reported relatively less influence from printed and broadcast media and relatively greater reliance on personal and face-to-face sources of news and opinion (e.g. parents, family and friends). As predicted, the results indicated that higher levels of information were associated with a greater percentage of reported registration and

TABLE XIX

POLITICAL IDENTIFICATION, INVOLVEMENT,  
AND MEDIA USAGE BY INFORMATION  
AND CONSTRAINT GROUPS

Group		Party ID			Political Involvement			Media Usage			
I	C	%D	%R	%I	%Reg	%Voted	%Part	$\bar{x}$ Print	$\bar{x}$ Broad	$\bar{x}$ Parents	$\bar{x}$ Other
H	H	60.00	34.54	5.45	96.36	87.27	56.36	59.89	33.93	1.45	4.54
H	L	33.33	40.74	25.92	70.37	70.37	33.33	40.15	49.48	0.00	10.37
M	H	35.71	64.28	0.00	100.00	89.28	25.00	30.71	57.50	0.00	11.79
M	L	24.61	56.92	18.46	90.76	87.69	27.69	44.75	32.22	11.09	12.22
L	H	54.54	24.24	21.21	57.57	57.57	42.42	35.36	41.97	4.85	17.82
L	L	35.55	31.11	33.32	71.11	71.11	17.77	27.56	42.89	7.56	22.00
H	-	51.21	36.58	12.19	87.80	81.70	48.78	53.59	39.05	0.98	6.62
M	-	27.95	59.13	12.90	93.54	88.17	26.88	40.53	39.83	7.75	12.09
L	-	43.58	28.20	29.20	65.38	65.38	28.20	30.86	42.50	6.41	20.23
-	H	52.58	38.79	8.62	82.75	79.31	44.82	45.87	41.90	2.07	10.07
-	L	29.92	45.25	24.80	80.29	78.83	25.54	38.20	39.12	7.74	15.07

voting. Surprisingly, however, constraint was not related to these variables. Also, differences in the distribution of political affiliation across information and constraint groups were unexpected and conflict with earlier findings reported by Rambo, Jones, and Finney (1973).

TABLE XX

CHI-SQUARE VALUES FOR POLITICAL  
IDENTIFICATION, INVOLVEMENT,  
AND MEDIA USAGE

Variable	v	Information		v	Constraint
		High Constraint	Low Constraint		
Registration	2	32.93**	8.59	1	1.56
Voting	2	13.35**	5.83	1	.01
Participation	2	7.48*	2.35	1	10.36**
Party Identifi- cation	4	17.98**	7.64	2	18.09**
Media Usage	6	32.79**	23.95	3	8.25*

\*p < .05

\*\*p < .01

One additional variable was of interest. The mean information and constraint scores for male subjects were 67.54 and 47.66 respectively, while the female subjects had an average information score of 56.28 and a constraint mean of 45.33. The difference for

information groups was significant ( $t = 3.19, p < .01$ ) as predicted. However, conflicting with previous reports, male and female subjects did not differ in constraint ( $t = 0.79, p > .05$ ).

#### Study No. 2

The purpose of the second study was to examine whether constraint and information were related to measurable properties of personality and various aspects of political decision making. To accomplish this, independent variable groups were again constructed by dividing the observed information distribution into approximately equal thirds, while the constraint continuum was split at the middle of all possible scores. Table XXI presents the range and means of each group for information and constraint as well as for each level of the independent variables. It has been previously demonstrated that this procedure adequately separates subjects into discernably different groups relative to the independent variables, thus tests of significance among the six groups were not necessary. However, differences in constraint as a function of information were of interest as possible further confirmation of the non-monotonic relationship reported by Jones and Rambo. Figure 7 indicates that a U-shaped function again characterizes the relation between the two variables, providing the second replication of this finding. Again, the differences were significant ( $F = 6.34, p < .01$ ).

Personality differences associated with differential amounts of information and constraint were tested using  $3 \times 2$  (information  $\times$  constraint) analyses of variance. Table XXII represents raw score means for the six scales of the Conceptual Systems Test, and Table XXIII

contains F ratios for these variables. As Table XXIII indicates, information level was significantly related to the extent of divine fate control, with high information subjects manifesting less religious concern. High constraint subjects yielded significantly greater indexes measuring the needs for people and to help people, while also showing lower interpersonal aggression and anomie scores. Significant interactions were obtained for the interpersonal aggression and need for people scales. Thus distinct personality differences were observed primarily in conjunction with levels of constraint, with high constraint subjects indicating what might be called more adaptive or socially acceptable dispositional characteristics.

In addition to personality differences four self-reported aspects of political decision making were assessed in the second study. Table XXIV presents the proportions for these variables by independent variable groups. For the time of candidate selection, importance of voting and attitude change indexes the 5 point scales originally used (see Appendix C) were combined into three categories to facilitate the analysis. Table XXV contains Chi-square totals for these variables. In each case the hypothesis was confirmed in that high constraint subjects manifested more straight ticket voting, perceived the importance of their vote to be greater, decided on a Presidential choice earlier, and reported greater attitude change than did low constraint subjects. Higher information levels were related to earlier candidate choice decisions and greater perceived importance of voting, although these results were confined to low constraint subjects.

TABLE XXI  
 EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS CONSTRUCTED FROM  
 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE CATEGORIES:  
 STUDY #2

Group		n	Information		Constraint	
Information	Constraint		Range	Mean	Range	Mean
H	H	13	72-90	80.31	47-82	63.38
H	L	15	72-92	79.00	27-42	35.20
M	H	7	48-66	54.86	48-55	51.86
M	L	20	48-64	57.00	20-44	33.50
L	H	12	20-40	31.50	45-60	57.00
L	L	17	20-44	32.00	31-43	36.59
H	-	28	72-92	79.93	27-82	48.29
M	-	27	48-66	56.44	20-48	38.26
L	-	29	20-44	31.79	31-69	45.03
-	H	32	20-90	56.44	45-82	58.47
-	L	52	20-92	55.35	20-44	35.00




Figure 7. Mean Constraint as a Function of Information Study #2

TABLE XXII  
 MEAN PERSONALITY VARIABLE SCORES BY INFORMATION  
 AND CONSTRAINT GROUPS\*

Group		Variable					
Information	Constraint	DFC	NHP	IA	NS-O	NFP	AN
H	H	23.54	34.08	8.92	33.54	39.00	17.38
H	L	26.20	27.93	10.60	34.13	36.27	16.93
M	H	34.29	32.56	11.29	34.00	44.14	15.14
M	L	30.40	27.35	10.45	35.60	32.70	18.40
L	H	33.08	32.08	8.17	35.08	39.08	16.00
L	L	34.24	29.53	11.88	37.35	43.06	19.76
H	-	24.96	30.79	9.82	33.86	37.54	17.14
M	-	31.41	28.70	10.67	35.18	35.67	17.56
L	-	33.76	30.59	10.34	36.14	41.41	18.21
-	H	29.47	33.00	9.16	34.22	40.16	16.38
-	L	30.44	28.23	10.96	35.75	37.12	18.42

\*(DFC, Divine fate control; NHP, Need to help people; IA, Interpersonal aggression; NS-O, Need for structure-order; NFP, Need for people; AN, Anomie).

TABLE XXIII  
 SUMMARY OF F<sub>s</sub> ASSOCIATED WITH CONCEPTUAL  
 SYSTEMS TEST VARIABLES

Variable	Information	Constraint	Interaction
Divine fate control	15.20**	0.00	1.99
Need to help people	0.36	18.94**	1.02
Interpersonal aggression	1.36	7.05*	5.29**
Need for structure-order	0.99	1.14	0.12
Need for people	2.35	6.28*	10.82**
Anomie	0.66	7.53**	2.77

\*p < .05

\*\*p < .01

TABLE XXIV

POLITICAL DECISION VARIABLES BY  
INFORMATION AND CONSTRAINT  
GROUPS

I	C	%Straight Ticket Voting	Time of Decision			Importance of Vote			Attitude Change		
			%Early	%Middle	%Late	%Not Impt.	%Some Impt.	%Very Impt.	%Little	%Some	%Much
H	H	90.90	81.82	18.18	0.00	0.00	15.38	84.62	7.69	53.85	38.46
H	L	69.23	23.08	61.54	15.38	13.33	53.85	46.15	66.67	13.33	20.00
M	H	80.00	60.00	40.00	0.00	0.00	28.57	71.43	14.29	14.29	71.43
M	L	47.35	5.26	31.58	84.21	50.00	30.00	20.00	70.00	15.00	15.00
L	H	85.00	25.00	62.50	12.50	8.33	25.00	66.67	25.00	8.33	66.67
L	L	53.33	33.33	20.00	46.67	76.47	0.00	23.53	64.71	23.53	11.76
H	-	66.67	50.00	41.67	8.33	7.14	32.14	60.71	39.29	32.14	28.57
M	-	54.17	16.67	33.33	66.67	37.04	29.63	33.33	55.56	14.81	29.63
L	-	52.17	30.43	34.78	34.78	48.28	10.32	41.38	48.28	17.24	34.48
-	H	66.67	58.33	37.50	4.17	3.12	21.88	75.00	15.62	28.12	56.25
-	L	53.19	19.15	36.17	53.19	48.08	25.00	26.92	67.31	17.31	15.38

TABLE XXV  
 CHI-SQUARE TOTALS FOR POLITICAL  
 DECISION VARIABLES

Variable	v	High Constraint	Low Constraint	v	Constraint
Straight Ticket	2	.89	1.53	1	5.46**
Time of Decision	4	7.00	13.88**	2	18.36**
Importance of Voting	4	2.40	15.28**	2	23.14**
Attitude Change	4	7.66	.97	2	24.45**

\*\*p < .01

## CHAPTER V

### DISCUSSION

The two studies resulted in what might be called mixed findings. Despite the failure to confirm all hypotheses however, a number of general conclusions may be drawn. For the purpose of clarity the results will be reorganized into the following two discussions: (1) the effects of the inconsistency confrontation; (2) the effects of information and constraint.

#### The Effects of the Inconsistency

##### Confrontation

First, the general thesis that a tendency toward the resolution of attitude inconsistencies would reflect individual differences among subjects was supported. All independent variable groups attempted more resolutions of the inconsistencies than denials during the interview, although there was a significant tendency for the lower information subjects to manifest unsupported denials in greater frequency. For the high information subjects these resolutions appeared to represent compliance behavior (i.e. temporary, socially induced, adherence to a norm, in this case the norm of consistency communicated by the experimenter). Paradoxically, the relatively greater resistance to the interview manipulation of the middle and low information subjects was associated with significant

attitude changes suggesting eventual conformity (i.e. assimilation of the consistency communication).

This result appeared to derive from the differential cognitive abilities implied by the different levels of information. For example, the experimenter's subjective impression of the high information subjects during the interview was that they employed their superior knowledge to bring both more factual information and reasoned opinion to bear on the question, and in many cases, to respond to the inconsistency by explaining it away. For some this was achieved by noting the superficial nature of the proposed inconsistencies and by arguing that one's political philosophy need not be consistent relative to each and every mundane comparison of specific beliefs or by suggesting that the complexity of political affairs necessarily renders many political judgments inconsistent due to rapid changes in political and social realities. Other high information subjects attributed the inconsistency to Mr. Nixon himself by documenting ideological discrepancies between Mr. Nixon's foreign and domestic policies. By contrast, middle and low information subjects more frequently resolved or denied the inconsistency by appealing to vague, ill-defined, and sometimes defensive absolutisms, e.g. "That's just the way things are . . . I don't think the President really believes that . . . etc." The relative inability of these subjects to defend with fact and opinion their initial SIQ responses appeared to make them more vulnerable to subsequent changes in attitudes.

It may be that the second administration of the SIQ represented the response of each subject to their "performance" during the

interview. Perhaps the high information subjects recognized the logic and persuasibility of their own arguments and thereby resisted any attitude reorganization, while middle and low information subjects became painfully aware of their lack of information and cognitive skills. Thus, the interview might have served as a rehearsal of each subject's attitudes to which they later responded according to their ability to articulate adequate explanations for their beliefs.

In this connection, McGuire (1964) has proposed a theory of resistance to persuasion derived from an analogy to biological resistance to disease. Innoculation theory, as it is called, suggests that subjects can more easily resist attempted attitude manipulation if an attack on their beliefs is preceded by refuted counterattitudinal arguments. Basically this involves presenting the subject with "watered-down" versions of the subsequent attacking communication accompanied by persuasive and logical refutations of these arguments. According to the theory, this form of counter-attitude inoculation is effective because it provides the subject motivation to defend the beliefs in question and practice at doing so. It is argued that such motivation and practice are especially crucial in the defense of attitudes which are rarely challenged (e.g. cultural truisms).

The importance of inoculation theory in this context stems from the fact that the level of information would be expected to vary directly in relation to exposure to alternative points of view and dissonant arguments. Thus the high information subjects subjectively appeared undisturbed by the inconsistency confrontation

perhaps because they had previously considered such interpretations and had arrived at their respective attitudes in light of contradictory evidence and arguments. Indeed, the ease with which high information subjects resolved the inconsistencies during the interview (despite their subsequent SIQ responses) suggests previous exposure and hence familiarity with contradictory fact and opinion. The fact that the resolutions of these subjects were largely judged to be supported, reinforces this contention. Thus, when confronted by the experimenter with pressures to comply to the implicit manipulation (i.e. to make the two discrepant attitudes consistent) these subjects experienced little or no difficulty in doing so and when the pressure was removed, they simply returned to their earlier evaluations. By contrast, the middle and low information subjects attempted more frequently to maintain their attitude positions in the interview despite the presence of the experimenter and the presumably strong pressure for compliance. If, as is being assumed, the middle and low information subjects had experienced few previous attacks on their attitudes the interview served not only to challenge these beliefs, but also as a laboratory to test the adequacy of each subject's defense. Since, as the information scores suggest, the middle and especially the low information subjects are typified by the avoidance of dissonant fact and opinion then the attitudes of these subjects would be analogous to McGuire's cultural truisms, i.e. beliefs that are acutely vulnerable to change because they are never questioned nor bolstered by reasoned consideration of available information.

The relationship between constraint and attitude change was not established with certainty. However, the pattern of greater attitude change among low as compared to high constraint subjects was sufficiently consistent so as to raise some doubt concerning the applicability of the statistical analysis which was performed. In any event, constraint was found to be related to what might be called substantial attitude change as exemplified by reversals on the SIQ, i.e. the level of constraint was significantly associated with attitude changes in which the subject manifested a complete "about face" in their orientation toward either Nixon or the issue. Although the percentage was small for all groups, approximately twice as many low as compared to high constraint subjects responded with reversals while the level of information was not related to the reversal index.

As noted previously, it could be argued that reversals represent a more meaningful example of attitude reorganization than the pre-post inconsistency scores per se, in that the former suggests a qualitative change (e.g. from like to dislike) while the latter might possibly indicate little more than momentary and minute qualitative differences. Several authors (e.g. Secord and Backman, 1964) have suggested that the frequent failure of survey studies to confirm laboratory findings derives from differential interest values of the attitude referents involved, i.e. the "artificiality" of the controlled experiment vs. the fact that field surveys typically investigate "real" attitudes which are not easily altered. It is assumed that the use of actual political figures and issues increased the ego-involvement of the present

task and hence it is not likely that reversals constitute laboratory artifacts. Thus, it may be the case that the reversals denoted a magnitude of attitude reorganization similar to that evidenced in the non-laboratory setting. Such reorganization would be expected to lead to actual differences in behaviors of considerable consequence, e.g. voting. If this interpretation is correct, then the results of the principle study would seem to suggest that "meaningful" attitude reorganization is difficult to produce in the laboratory, but with the minority of subjects for which change occurs, it is associated with the level of constraint.

The difference in resistance or susceptibility to the attempted attitude manipulation for the two groups stems from the respective consequences of attitude change. For high constraint subjects an alteration in one attitude would most likely result in subsequent changes in other attitudes. Since massive attitude reorganization can be assumed to be discomfoting, then the high constraint individual possesses greater motivation to avoid the disorientation and dissolutionment which would be expected to accompany such change. By contrast, the compartmentalization of the low constraint subject makes possible independent and isolated changes without requiring alterations in other evaluations. As suggested earlier, this does not imply that the low constraint individual lacks affective attitudes. Instead, since evaluations are only loosely connected in the nonconstrained belief system, then complex readjustments are not required.

By the same token, the lack of relatedness between attitude elements renders the low constraint person more vulnerable to

change. Even assuming that the particular attitude under attack is of major importance it must stand, in effect, by itself without support from related attitudes and beliefs. The high constraint person, by contrast, more likely possesses an intricate set of attitudes in which one serves to validate another, which is commensurate with a third attitude, and so on.

It is interesting to note that high constraint subjects report significantly more attitude change of recent origin. One interpretation of this finding is that high constraint subjects more frequently experience shifts of their attitudes. However, it may also be viewed as confirmation of the above arguments. The high constraint person is perhaps better able to detect attitude changes when they occur because the structural cohesion of their beliefs make such changes salient, i.e. a constrained ideology serves as a stable background against which cognitive changes are interpreted. In all probability, the low constraint individual simply is not aware of the changes that do occur, since there is little or no basis for comparison.

Therefore, while not impervious to change, individuals characterized by constrained systems of attitudes are less vulnerable to attitude manipulation for at least the following three reasons: (1) the consequences of change are more severe in terms of the total system; (2) single elements are bolstered by related attitudes; and (3) there exists a framework in which changes are more readily perceived.

### The Effects of Information and Constraint

The two studies succeeded in extending the conceptual framework for evaluating political ideologies by examining several variables related to information and constraint. The results very strongly implied that higher levels of both information and constraint were associated with greater commitment to political affairs. Commitment in this context is used to connote not only behavioral manifestations of involvement (e.g. political participation), but also, the tendency to perceive politics as an appropriate and effective arena for social change as well as allegiance to particular candidates, political parties, or ideologies.

Several aspects of the data supported this conclusion. For example, the rate of participation in campaigning, fund raising, and other forms of volunteer political activity was almost twice as great for subjects among the higher levels of information and constraint when compared to the remaining subjects. It is not surprising that political participation should increase as a function of information in that knowledge of politics would seem to be both a prerequisite for and a consequence of involvement. Similarly, the association between lack of participation and lack of knowledge is a plausible relationship as either apathy or defensiveness could determine both patterns simultaneously. The lack of political involvement among low constraint subjects probably stems from the ambivalence inherent in the designation. Such subjects would lack motivation to actively support a particular candidate or party because their attitudes are inconsistent and

contradictory, lacking the structure necessary for decisive action. By contrast, high constraint subjects have an ordered perception of political events and it is quite likely that part of such a structure consists of prescriptions for action. Therefore, since the high constraint subject is consistently liberal or conservative he is more likely to support a candidate or party representing these sentiments than the low constraint subject who is torn between conflicting views and shifting loyalties. When the two variables were at a maximum (i.e. the high constraint-high information group) the level of participation is quite high (56%) despite the fact that the subjects were college students who would not ordinarily be expected to be extensively involved in political affairs. Thus the contention that information and constraint facilitate active political involvement was well supported by the data. It is important to note that the tendency for high constraint subjects to be politically active and involved constitutes a replication of earlier findings (even though different methods were used) and hence appears to be a stable relationship.

Also supporting the commitment interpretation was the pattern of usage of various sources of information and opinion. Generally, high information and constraint subjects reported greater influence from established sources of news such as radio, television, newspapers, news magazines, and books than did their low constraint and lower information counterparts. It should be recognized that the low information and low constraint subjects also reported greatest reliance on such printed and broadcast media, but that the basic difference was derived from their relatively greater use

of parents, family, and friends as informal sources of information and opinion. It follows that attention to established and formal sources of news would lead to more thorough knowledge of politics and increase the probability that beliefs would be organized into an ideological whole. It also seems reasonable to assume that such information gathering is indicative of a greater commitment to the ideal of an informed electorate who makes reasoned political decisions. Reliance upon family and friends would seem to suggest either a lack of concern, since such sources could not be expected to provide a variety nor depth of information about current events, or again defensiveness, in that such sources might be expected to more likely agree with one's preconceived attitudes.

The results also indicated that higher levels of constraint and information were associated with the tendency to perceive one's vote as more important (although for information this effect was confined to low constraint subjects). More precisely, high information and constraint subjects tended to feel that their vote made a difference in the outcome of an election. By contrast, low constraint as well as middle and low information subjects seemed to believe that a single vote (their own) carried little impact on election results. These results would seem to suggest that the former groups were affirming some sort of basic trust in the electoral system; i. e. again manifesting a belief in the ideals of a citizenship and the responsible electorate which exercises control and makes its desires known through the electoral process. Further extrapolation from these results suggests that low constraint and information subjects are significantly more pessimistic, cynical

and/or apathetic about the extent of their own political power. Such attitudes imply a basic distrust of the "system" and perhaps a rejection of the democratic model as a vehicle for social change. Whether the lack of information and constraint produce distrust and apathy or such suspicions lead to a lack of constraint and an avoidance of information is of course a matter of conjecture.

Further confirmation of the commitment hypothesis is found in the results indicating the period of time during which subjects reported deciding how to vote in the 1972 Presidential race. Basically, high constraint and information were associated with earlier presidential choice decisions, although again the effect for information was restricted to low constraint subjects. The commitment dimension in this instance is to be found in terms of loyalty or commitment to a particular candidate or ideology. Using the high constraint-high information group as a model, it is easy to surmise the factors influencing early presidential candidate selections: (1) Such subjects were characterized by a systematic ideology which suggests a logical candidate for support; (2) they were better informed relative to the candidates and the issues, and thus in a better position to make selections commensurate with their attitudes; (3) and many had already been involved in campaigning, thereby manifesting behavioral commitments to a particular candidate or party. Low constraint-low information subjects, of course, would postpone selections for the opposite reasons; i.e. they were ambivalent, ill-informed, and uninvolved.

With the above results, the level of commitment was found to increase with simultaneously increasing levels of information and

constraint. Three additional aspects of commitment were found to vary as a function of either information or constraint considered separately. As hypothesized, high constraint subjects reported significantly more straight ticket voting than did low constraint subjects, while an effect for information was not observed. The commitment implications of straight vs. split ticket voting derive directly from the definitional nature of constraint. High constraint subjects are committed to what more closely represents a unified ideology. If the slate of candidates nominated by a particular political party represents the basic orientation of that ideology, then, not surprisingly, the high constraint subject voted for the entire slate while the ambivalence of the low constraint subject yielded cross-party selections. By contrast, conventional wisdom traditionally assumes that straight ticket voting is a pattern based on a poorly informed and apathetic electorate which acts on its loyalty to one party without knowing the candidates nor the issues involved, while split ticket voting is supposedly more indicative of an enlightened approach. The latter assumption includes the notion that voting for "the man and not the party" derives from a thorough consideration of each candidate, an examination of the issues, etc. In light of the present study, it is quite likely that this general conceptualization is in error because it is an oversimplification and because it confuses the effects of political knowledge and ideology.

Thus, it may be concluded that the straight ticket voter is simply more ideological, regardless of the level of awareness of politics and the effort expended in making political decisions.

Moreover, it is interesting to note that, while not significant, the results did indicate an increasing percentage of straight ticket voting in conjunction with increasing levels of information.

Finally, significantly higher rates of voter registration and voting itself were observed among high information subjects (although for voting the effect for information was confined to high constraint subjects). In this instance, the results suggested a greater commitment to even the "mechanical" duties of citizenship as a function of information, while, consistent with expectations, a difference between constraint groups was not found.

In sum, the pattern of results clearly indicated that the prominent consequence of the various levels of information and constraint was the degree to which the subject reported involvement in or commitment to some aspect of political activity. Closer inspection yields a refinement of this conclusion. It is possible to classify the seven variables discussed above according to the extent to which they imply commitment to some specific or partisan element of political life as opposed to commitment to the political process itself. For example, the time of decision and straight ticket voting indexes indicate support or lack of it for a particular candidate, political party, issue or program. By contrast, the perceived importance of one's vote and the media usage variables more clearly suggest adherence to or rejection of an abstract conceptualization concerning the validity of the democratic process based on an actively informed and reasoned electorate. The three remaining variables (rate of registration, rate of voting, and participation) could conceivably be representative of either loyalty

to specific candidates and parties, or a belief in the abstract ideals of participatory democracy.

By combining the results discussed so far it is possible to generate a theoretical model depicting the relationship between various combinations of information and constraint and the degree and type of political commitment associated with them. Figure 8 is based on the obtained data and an expansion of the model originally proposed by Jones and Rambo (1973). The basic implication portrayed in Figure 8 is that while commitment increases as a function of increasing levels of both information and constraint, the type of commitment associated with each is different. The model suggests that constraint considered alone determines commitment to specific elements of political affairs (e.g. a candidate or point of view) without a general involvement in the political process itself as reflected in the high percentage of straight ticket voting and the relatively low rates of registration and voting for the low information-high constraint subjects. On the other hand, information by itself apparently leads to involvement in the activities and institutions of political life without creating strong and consistent loyalties to particular ideologies, candidates, or issues. For example, the high information-low constraint group showed high rates of registration and voting, with a low straight ticket voting percentage. Only with the high information-high constraint group are all of the various manifestations of commitment to be found at high levels. Thus, the consequence of informed ideology is a genuine political orientation characterized by commitment to both general processes and specific elements of




Figure 8. Political commitment as a theoretical function of information and constraint

politics. The absence of information and constraint very clearly denotes an apolitical person for whom political events have minimal salience leading to only casual and sporadic political involvement. The model also suggests that moderate amounts of information in conjunction with high or low constraint implies moderate degrees of specific or general commitment respectively. Again, the observed data basically conforms to this theoretical expectation in that the middle information-high constraint group and the middle information-low constraint group were located at intermediate points along the distributions of the various indexes of commitment. It must, of course, be acknowledged that the subjects in the present study were college students and thus these generalizations may not hold with other groups differing in age, occupation, education, etc.

Three types of belief systems were identified in the Jones and Rambo (1973) study which may now be expanded due to the development of an individual measure of constraint with the resultant capacity to measure constraint on an individual subject basis. The present study has reinforced the earlier contention that the assumed drive for homeostatic balance among attitude elements is a characteristic of only some individuals and not a first principle of cognitive behavior. Those subjects who manifest high constraint among their attitudes have been designated as ideologues because the presence of a system of interrelated and consistent political evaluations necessarily implies an ongoing, viable, and coherent political philosophy. Different types of ideology may occur however depending upon the level of information associated with it. What has been designated as the cognizant ideologue represents a

person who is well informed, logical, and committed to political affairs. Such a person is able to maintain an ideological perspective because they actively seek information and also perhaps because they possess the conceptual organizational ability to do so. In relation to political events (e.g. debates, campaigns, etc.) the cognizant ideologue is flexible and attentive as well as perhaps "open-minded" because of the magnitude of specific considerations which can be managed via the orderly thinking imposed by an ideology. At the same time, however, the person possessing this type of belief system would be expected to be relatively resistant to political persuasion in that constraint implies that change in one set of attitudes carries a high probability of creating change in other parts of the system. This description is similar to what other observers identify as the "true ideologue" who is ordinarily conceived of as representing a small segment of the American adult population (e.g. Converse, 1964). In this connection it is interesting to note that in the two samples studied the cognizant ideologue combination also is found in only modest proportions (i.e. 22% and 15%).

With descending levels of information, the type of ideology associated with high constraint becomes less cognizant and logically based. What has been designated as the intuitive ideologue (i.e. high constraint-low information) represents the extreme form of a person who possesses ideological consistency which is based on external sources. In the Jones and Rambo study (1973) the degree of constraint manifested by these subjects was attributed to sources of authority (e.g. parents, school, church, etc.) as

opposed to experience with or consideration of the issues involved in such attitudes. Most likely, these subjects model or learn a set of values which specify rules and opinions which, in turn, favor a particular candidate or political party, without supplying underlying explanations. The intuitive ideologue, therefore, is committed to those aspects of politics which he has been taught to support. As opposed to the more cognizant form of ideology, this type of person would be expected to be defensive and rigid. Information, political discussions, etc., are avoided because contradictory fact and opinion threaten the internal structure of the system of attitudes in that the system is built on "faith" in the sources of authority, rather than familiarity with the issues.

The non-ideologue designation refers to those persons who fail to show substantial constraint among attitude elements. This does not necessarily suggest that such individuals are totally lacking political opinions. Instead the non-ideologue is either ambivalent or apathetic relative to political affairs. What has been called the intuitive non-ideologue does represent a cluster of subjects who manifested such meager political information and participation scores that it is difficult to draw any conclusion other than the notion that politics are of virtually no concern to them. In addition to an interpretation of apathy, however, it is also possible that such combinations of low constraint, low information, and low commitment reflect a general disenchantment with political processes. In other words, at least a portion of such subjects may be better characterized as possessing feelings

which actively reject conventional political mechanisms and institutions, than simply lack of concern.

The most frequent pattern of ideological inconsistency occurs in conjunction with moderate information levels. Jones and Rambo (1973) identified this combination as the transitional belief system due to the possibility that these subjects were in a temporary state of ambivalence and indecision. It was argued that what is now called the mixed non-ideologue represents a form of cognitive "breakdown" that might be expected to occur as the structure of intuitive ideologies deteriorates in the face of persuasive facts and opinions. The fact that the subjects in that study as well as the present investigation were primarily college students who are being exposed to new interpretations of political and social events, lends credence to this hypothesis. It is assumed that the moderate level of information plays a crucial role in the determination of this pattern. For example, the moderate non-ideologue, unlike the intuitive ideologue, is not able to construct an ideology in the comfort of ignorance where disconfirming information is not present to disrupt the links between attitude elements. At the same time, however, the moderate non-ideologue does not have the abundance of political knowledge which could allow for a cognizant ideology, although it is likely that continued education and political involvement results in the formation of more logically consistent belief systems. What is not yet clear is whether or not such a developmental sequence (i.e. from intuitive ideologue to moderate non-ideologue to cognizant ideologue) is typical of most individuals. While the present

studies do not provide the appropriate longitudinal data for interpretation, it is possible that the moderate non-ideologue position is the most common among the adult electorate. If this is the case, then the frequent references to general ideological shifts in the "minds of a majority" of Americans are simply inappropriate. That is, if the preponderance of the electorate is best characterized by the moderate information, non-ideological designation, then the outcome of any particular index of public opinion (e.g. elections, opinion polls, etc.) is most likely a transitory environmentally determined effect.

The Jones and Rambo model also suggested that a nonmonotonic and possibly U-shaped function best describes the relationship between information and constraint. That contention was in conflict with Converse (1964) and others who have argued that constraint varies as a linear function of cognitive sophistication (e.g. information) found in the general electorate. For Converse, high levels of information is presumed to be found with subjects who also manifest considerable internal consistency among beliefs with decreasing levels of constraint being associated with decreasing levels of information. From the results of the present studies, however, it has become increasingly clear that the relationship between information and constraint is nonmonotonic. This finding has been replicated three times with three different subject populations, two different methods for determining constraint, and two different information tests and thereby appears to be a relatively stable function.

Although such results are clearly at variance with those reported by Converse and his colleagues, at least two considerations temper unqualified acceptance of the U-shaped function. First, as with previous studies by the present author, the data was collected using college students, primarily from 18 to 21 years of age. It may be argued that such subjects should not be expected to accurately reflect political behavior processes as found in the general electorate due to their youth, their relative inexperience with political affairs, and also because of their educational level with all of the attendant attitudinal and intellectual correlates of high education.

The effects of such a restriction on the composition of the sample cannot readily be determined without additional research involving samples which are more heterogenous as regards age and education. It should be noted, however, that the second study did include a number of subjects older than is usually the case for college students and the nonmonotonic function is obtained.

Secondly, an examination of the raw data reveals that there is a wide variety of constraint scores among low information subjects and that the relatively high constraint mean for that group results primarily from a minority of subjects who score substantially higher than other low information subjects on the constraint test. By contrast the constraint scores of the high information subjects were more uniformly high, i.e. homogenous. This was true for both of the present samples. Hence, it is possible that the present results depended, in part, on a biased sampling procedure.

The second major trend in the data concerns the tendency of the higher level of constraint to be associated with more socially acceptable or adaptive patterns as measured by the Conceptual Systems Test. Constraint was found to be related to higher scores on the need for people and need to help people scales with significantly lower scores for interpersonal aggression and anomie. Taken together, these results suggest that high constraint subjects are more socially concerned and perhaps more comfortable with themselves. Moreover, these results are not inconsistent with the model presented above. For example, it is reasonable to conclude that one of the resultant effects of ideological cognitive organization is a sense of assurance that seemingly complex and diverse political events are interpretable. This is not to suggest that the ideologue is pleased with all that transpires in the political arena, but rather, that an ideology provides the tools by which such events may be understood and perhaps predicted.

This assumption is similar to the underlying principle of the balance theories, i.e. that attitude inconsistencies are psychologically disturbing. The balance theories, however, conceive of such discomfort in a temporal sense where inconsistencies create sufficient motivation for attitude change. In the present context, attitude inconsistency (i.e. lack of constraint) implies a long term cognitive condition analagous to a personality disposition. Therefore an habitual state of consistency or inconsistency might be expected to lead to relative stable personality differences.

Thus, since high constraint subjects are more secure and less confused relative to their own political identity it is not

surprising that they are able to reflect a greater need to help others, for example. Further non-ideologues might be expected to manifest greater anomie, in that they do not possess stable attitudinal anchors to guide their behavior.

It was surprising to find that the political party with which the subjects identified was related to both information and constraint, although for information this effect was restricted to high constraint subjects. The results indicated that identification with the Republican Party were proportionally greater at the middle level of information and among the lower constraint group. By contrast, Democratic subjects accounted for the majority of both the high and low information group as well as the high constraint group.

Since these results conflict with earlier findings it is conceivable that they reflect the transitory influence of contemporary political events, i.e. the study was conducted during the initial disclosures of the "Watergate scandals." Accordingly, subjects characterized by strong Republican sentiments might be expected to yield moderate to low information and constraint scores due to an avoidance of distasteful news and the probable confusion associated with such disturbing revelations. Subjects identifying with the Democratic Party may have found confirmation of previously held attitudes in the same events, the effects of which might have been to facilitate the organization of such attitudes into a more highly constrained ideology. This interpretation does not account, however, for the frequency of Democrats among the low information group. It is quite likely that poorly informed Democrats represent

the best example of the intuitive type of system outlined above. An examination of the raw data revealed that these subjects, almost exclusively lower division students, were predominately from Oklahoma. Thus it is probable that the high constraint-low information combination observed for this group denotes the residue of adolescent beliefs developed independent of substantive information in historically Democratic Oklahoma. Such subjects maintain their attitudes, not because recent evidence appears to validate those attitudes, but rather, because they were always told to believe in this or that fashion.

Interestingly, the highest proportion of subjects who classified themselves as Independents were found among the low information and low constraint groups suggesting that this category is more indicative of a lack of interest in politics than independence of political judgment.

## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The present investigation sought to clarify the respective influence of political information and constraint on attitude change, self-reported political behavior, and personality. The two studies were preceded by scaling procedures performed to develop tests of information level and constraint. The results from the two studies suggested that the information scale was the more effective of the two measures although numerous differences in relation to constraint scores were observed. The difference between the two instruments probably derived from the fact that information represents a more direct and simple concept, thus it is more easily scaled. Also, previous research had demonstrated the efficacy of the procedures used to develop the information scale, while an individual measure of constraint was attempted for the first time.

One obvious direction for future research is the continued validation of the constraint scale. Of particular importance would be indications that the scale actually assesses the tendency toward logically related attitudes, as opposed to attitude consistency simply defined. Comparisons between scores derived from the individual measure of constraint and the interview procedures

employed by Converse would also be of interest. Finally, a double-cross validation procedure should be attempted to more firmly establish the relationship between the new scale and the method of determining average interitem contingency coefficients used in the Jones and Rambo (1973) study. More specifically, groups could be constructed from individual constraint scores on one form of the SAS in order to determine the group mean contingency coefficients on the other form.

The first study was designed to determine the effects of information and constraint on an experimentally induced attitude manipulation. Statistical and experimental design problems prevented a definitive test of the hypotheses. Nonetheless, it was found that attitude change varied as an inverse function of information. Some support for the hypothesis that attitude change would vary as an inverse function of constraint was also observed, especially in relation to reversals (i.e. qualitative changes) on specific SIQ items. Thus both information and constraint may be conceptualized as cognitive dimensions which mediate attitude change phenomena.

Also substantial stylistic differences were observed in the responses of subjects to the inconsistency confrontation. Basically, individuals characterized by higher levels of information and constraint tended to use broader explanatory principles to defend their beliefs. These results, in part, may be taken as confirmation of the notion of a "true ideologue" as described by Converse and others, in that the high information-high constraint subjects were in fact aware, articulate, logical, informed, actively involved, and self assured. Thus both the results of the interview content

variables and the subjective impressions of the experimenter tended to validate the information and constraint measures.

Additional research and replication are required to overcome the difficulties in the present investigation. In particular, care should be exercised to equate different information and constraint groups on initial attitude. Depending on the outcome of future attempts to validate the constraint scale, a different method of assigning subjects to constraint groups may also be advisable. For example, since the constraint scale is apparently less discriminating than is desirable, it may be necessary to separate constraint groups by eliminating subjects who score at the middle of the distribution of constraint values. Alternatively, less homogenous populations (i.e. subjects other than college students) may yield a more adequate distribution of constraint scores.

It would also be interesting to study the effects of information and constraint on attitude change using alternative methods of attitude manipulation, e.g. forced compliance, persuasive communication, incentive paradigms, etc. It might also be advisable to use less robust manipulation procedures that would not elicit near universal attitude change in the sample. This might be accomplished by delaying the post-test administration for a longer period of time. Such a design would also provide for an analysis of the extent to which attitude changes in relation to information and constraint are persistent or transitory. Additionally, a longitudinal design would enable a more definitive assessment of the theoretical assumption of interrelatedness among attitudes. That

is, the concept of constraint could be further substantiated if, for example, minor attitude changes induced experimentally with high information-high constraint subjects lead to more extensive attitude reorganization over time. Similarly, the Jones and Rambo model depicting the relationship between information and constraint predicts that increasing the level of information for intuitive ideologues results in a reduction of attitude system constraint. This and related hypotheses generated by the U-shaped model warrant further examination.

The present investigation did provide two additional replications of the U-shaped relationship between information and constraint reported by Jones and Rambo. As before, however, additional studies measuring these variables in differing populations (especially older adults and non-college educated subjects) are required before generalizations may be confirmed.

What perhaps constitutes a unique contribution to the literature concerning political behavior was the finding that increases of both information and constraint apparently lead to increasing levels of commitment to political affairs. Furthermore, the evidence suggested that constraint was most closely associated with commitment to specific entities (i.e. candidates, political parties, issues, etc.) of political life, while information, by itself, more clearly implies involvement in the general process of politics, e.g. registering, being informed, voting, etc.

The data also offered a tentative hypothesis concerning the long term effects on personality of various levels of constraint. Generally high constraint was associated with more positive, adaptive,

and socially acceptable personality dimensions. On the other hand, lower constraint subjects showed a pattern of aggressiveness, isolation, apathy, and anomie. Since the methods used in this part of the investigation were exploratory and less than precise (e.g. hypotheses were not generated) further work is needed to establish the stability of the personality differences associated with constraint.

Finally, the investigation furthered the development of a theoretical model which attempts to explain political behavior. This conceptual framework can be best described by the two types of belief systems located at the extremes of the principle axis of the model. The cognizant ideologue (high constraint-high information) is a person who is characterized by ideological consistency, information seeking, political commitment, and socially adaptive personality traits. By contrast, the intuitive non-ideologue (low constraint-low information) person is more often inconsistent, uninformed, uninvolved, and characterized by negative personality traits. Thus, it is possible that other personality dimensions, e.g. self concept, intelligence, internal-external controls, anxiety, dominance-submission, etc. vary along this axis in a fashion similar to commitment. An examination of such variables and their respective influences on political behavior would be of value.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

SOCIAL ISSUES QUESTIONNAIRE

Part I

George McGovern

: : : : : :  
Dislike \_\_\_\_\_ Like

Ronald Reagan

: : : : : :  
Dislike \_\_\_\_\_ Like

John Connally

: : : : : :  
Dislike \_\_\_\_\_ Like

Hubert Humphrey

: : : : : :  
Dislike \_\_\_\_\_ Like

Richard Nixon

: : : : : :  
Dislike \_\_\_\_\_ Like

Edward Kennedy

: : : : : :  
Dislike \_\_\_\_\_ Like

Edmund Muskie

: : : : : :  
Dislike Like

Spiro Agnew

: : : : : :  
Dislike Like

George Wallace

: : : : : :  
Dislike Like

Nelson Rockefeller

: : : : : :  
Dislike Like

## Part II

Legalization of marijuana.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Granting of amnesty to AWOLS and draft evaders.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Providing federal aid to private schools.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Revenue sharing.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

The rationing of gas to conserve energy.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Implementation of no-fault automobile insurance rather than liability.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Freezing appropriated funds deemed inflationary by the President.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Immunity of news reporters from requirements to reveal sources of information.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Economic aid for the rebuilding of North Vietnam.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Increase in expenditure for medicare.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Capital punishment for certain crimes.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Nuclear arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union (SALT).

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Cutting back federal aid to scientific research in areas not immediately relevant to the public good.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Increasing expenditures for national defense.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Forceful ousting of the Indians occupying Wounded Knee, South Dakota.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Increasing use of nuclear power for the generation of electricity.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Mandatory severe sentences for narcotics peddlers.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Military aid to Israel.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

An independent congressional investigation of the Watergate breakin  
 and related matters.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Wage and price controls.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Publication of secret government documents such as the Pentagon  
 Papers.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

The use of import tariffs.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

School busing to achieve racial balance.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Federal aid to private companies, e.g. railroads, aviation  
 manufacturers, etc.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

"No knock" laws for law enforcement officers.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Expansion of the Common Market.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Mandatory search of airline passengers to prevent skyjacking.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Economic support for Greece.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Military intervention should hostilities resume in South Viet Nam.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Increasing price supports for dairy products.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Executive privilege of White House officials to not testify before congressional committee.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Increased financial support of the United Nations.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

Relaxation of regulations against pornographic material.

: : : : : :  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Oppose Favor

APPENDIX B

DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE

1. In your estimation, what was the purpose of the experiment?
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
2. Did you feel exploited, pressured or stressed as a result of the experiment? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ (If yes, please elaborate on back.)
  
  
3. Do you feel that your attitudes changed as a result of participating in the experiment? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
  
  
4. Do you feel your participation in the experiment and this seminar was worthwhile from the standpoint of learning about psychology? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
  
  
5. What was your motivation for participating in the experiment?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  
  
6. Would you participate in a similar experiment again without receiving extra credit? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
  
  
7. Do you feel the experiment was worthwhile from the standpoint of explaining behavior? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

APPENDIX C

SELF REPORT QUESTIONNAIRE

Subject No. \_\_\_\_\_ Age \_\_\_\_\_ Sex \_\_\_\_\_ College Class \_\_\_\_\_

Have you registered to vote? \_\_\_\_\_

Have you ever voted? \_\_\_\_\_ If yes, in what type of election? \_\_\_\_\_

Have you ever participated in political activity? (e.g. campaigning, volunteer work for candidates, etc.) Explain. \_\_\_\_\_

Estimate the importance of your vote in determining an election.

Not important : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Very important

To what extent have you experienced a change in your political attitudes recently?

No change : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : Much Change

Estimate the relative contribution of these sources of news to your knowledge of politics and opinions:

Radio \_\_\_\_\_ TV \_\_\_\_\_ Newspapers \_\_\_\_\_ News Magazines \_\_\_\_\_

Friends \_\_\_\_\_ Parents \_\_\_\_\_ Others (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Did you vote in the 1972 Presidential election? \_\_\_\_\_ If yes, did you vote for either all Democrats or all Republicans (i.e. a straight party ticket). \_\_\_\_\_

At what time did you make your decision as to your preferred Presidential candidate? before conventions \_\_\_\_\_ during conventions \_\_\_\_\_ between conventions and election day \_\_\_\_\_ in the voting booth \_\_\_\_\_.

With which political party (if any) do you most closely identify?

Republican \_\_\_\_\_ Democrat \_\_\_\_\_ Independent \_\_\_\_\_ Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

APPENDIX D

CONSTRAINT ITEM PAIR ANALYSIS

Form A

Item Pair					Total	Mean	Discrimination		
	.45	.50	.60	.70	.45	Coefficient	Total		
1-44	0	1	0	0	1	.3802	24		
2-42	2	1	0	0	3	.4428	-36		
3- 6	2	0	0	0	2	.4508	26	**	
3-19	1	2	0	0	3	.4746	-25		
3-23	1	1	0	0	2	.4398	6	**	
3-24	0	1	0	0	1	.3752	20		
3-33	1	1	0	0	2	.4390	54	**	
4- 5	0	1	0	0	1	.3955	62		
4- 6	3	1	0	0	4	.4857	20	**	
4-22	2	0	0	0	2	.4063	26		
4-30	2	0	0	0	2	.3842	54		
4-34	3	0	1	0	4	.4971	18	**	
4-36	1	2	0	0	3	.4549	56	**	
6 -9	0	1	0	0	1	.3627	38		
6-13	2	0	0	0	2	.3889	62		
6-19	2	0	0	0	2	.3800	52		
6-22	0	1	0	0	1	.3843	30		
6-23	2	0	0	0	2	.4077	34		
6-30	2	0	0	0	2	.4117	36		
6-33	2	0	0	0	2	.4433	6	**	
6-34	1	1	0	0	2			*	
6-40	3	1	0	0	4	.4813	10	**	
6-43	3	1	0	0	4	.4622	- 2		
7-11	0	1	0	0	1	.3564	54		
9-30	0	1	0	0	1	.3726	60		
9-37	1	1	0	0	2			*	
9-44	0	2	0	0	2	.4474	44	**	
11-16	2	0	0	0	2	.4251	16	**	
11-19	0	4	0	0	4	.4967	2	**	
11-25	1	1	0	0	2	.4505	50	**	
11-26	1	2	0	0	3	.4511	112	**	
11-28	2	2	0	0	4	.4954	84	**	
11-31	1	1	0	0	2	.4094	44		
11-33	1	4	0	0	5	.5292	28	**	
11-34	1	1	0	0	2	.4349	10	**	

11-37	1	2	0	0	3	.4965	46	**
13-18	1	1	0	0	2			*
13-19	2	0	0	0	2	.4152	24	
13-25	1	1	0	0	2	.4107	56	
13-26	2	1	0	0	3	.4328	48	**
14-19	1	1	0	0	2	.3757	80	
15-16	2	0	0	0	2	.4268	58	**
15-25	0	1	0	0	1	.3849	46	
16-17	2	0	0	0	2	.3930	48	
16-19	2	1	0	0	3	.4831	36	**
16-23	1	1	0	0	2	.4324	56	**
16-26	1	1	0	0	2	.4249	70	**
16-32	3	1	0	0	4	.4478	-18	
16-33	2	0	0	0	2	.4379	-6	
17-19	1	1	0	0	2			*
17-25	5	0	0	0	5	.4698	-16	
17-37	2	0	0	0	2			*
18-19	1	1	0	0	2	.4413	38	**
19-25	2	0	0	0	2			*
19-26	1	1	1	0	3	.4805	54	**
19-28	2	2	0	0	4	.4960	30	**
19-29	2	0	0	0	2	.4055	12	
19-30	1	1	0	0	2	.4215	69	**
19-31	3	0	0	0	3	.4022	56	**
19-32	2	1	0	0	3	.4540	10	**
19-33	2	3	0	0	5	.5269	4	**
19-37	0	1	0	0	1	.4413	44	**
19-43	1	1	0	0	2	.4293	42	**
21-34	0	1	0	0	1			**
21-36	0	1	0	0	1	.3654	86	**
22-30	0	1	0	0	1			*
22-32	3	0	0	0	3	.4556	16	
22-40	0	1	0	0	1			*
22-43	0	1	0	0	1	.3670	66	**
23-24	0	1	0	0	1	.4005	20	*
23-26	0	0	1	0	1	.3828	108	
23-28	2	0	0	0	2	.4185	48	
23-32	3	0	0	0	3	.4091	-36	
24-30	3	2	0	0	5	.4893	6	**
24-40	2	0	0	0	2	.4046	6	
25-26	2	0	0	0	2			*
25-29	0	0	1	0	1			*
25-33	2	1	0	0	3	.4744	70	**
25-34	2	0	0	0	2			**
25-37	0	1	0	0	1	.4265	44	**
26-28	1	1	0	0	2	.4668	42	**
26-31	0	1	0	0	1	.4310	34	**
26-33	1	2	0	0	3	.4774	44	**
26-34	0	1	1	0	2	.4191	46	
26-39	0	1	0	0	1	.4184	44	
26-42	2	0	0	0	2	.4036	18	
27-37	2	0	0	0	2			*
28-30	0	1	0	0	1	.4012	32	

28-31	1	1	0	0	2	.4033	32	
28-33	0	3	2	0	5	.4920	8	**
28-34	2	0	0	0	2	.4218	34	**
28-37	2	1	0	0	3	.4494	- 2	
30-34	1	1	0	0	2	.4221	82	**
31-34	1	1	0	0	2			*
31-42	1	1	0	0	2			*
32-33	1	1	0	0	2			*
32-38	2	0	0	0	2			*
32-43	0	2	0	0	2			*
33-37	1	2	0	0	3	.4794	28	**
33-43	2	1	0	0	3	.4338	- 6	
34-36	0	0	1	0	1	.4354	78	**
34-39	1	2	0	0	3			*
34-42	2	0	0	0	2			*
34-43	1	1	0	0	2			*
35-44	0	1	0	0	1	.4151	18	
38-44	0	1	0	0	1	.4111	32	
39-40	2	0	0	0	2			*
40-43	0	2	0	0	2	.4414	37	**

## Form L

2-13	2	2	0	0	4	.4885	38	**
2-14	2	0	0	0	2	.3971	26	
2-16	2	0	0	0	2	.4288	10	
2-18	0	0	0	1	1	.3817	21	
2-19	2	0	0	0	2	.4072	22	
2-20	2	0	0	0	2	.4284	56	
2-21	1	2	0	0	3	.4646	68	**
2-22	2	0	0	0	2	.4015	16	
2-36	2	0	0	0	2	.4194	- 9	
2-38	2	1	0	0	3	.4404	70	**
2-43	1	3	0	0	4	.4894	0	
2-44	0	2	0	0	2	.4898	48	**
3-17	2	0	0	0	2	.3703	26	
3-20	1	1	0	0	2	.4037	96	
3-21	1	1	0	0	2	.4373	22	
3-26	2	0	0	0	2	.4066	36	
3-36	0	0	1	0	1	.3871	-10	
3-37	2	2	0	0	4	.4584	24	**
3-38	0	2	0	0	2	.4015	68	
3-40	1	1	0	0	2	.4366	24	
3-44	2	1	0	0	3	.4553	28	**
4-6	2	0	0	0	2	.4001	8	
4-8	2	1	0	0	3	.4330	66	
4-27	3	0	0	0	3	.3947	82	
4-28	2	0	0	0	2	.4354	46	
4-30	2	0	0	0	2	.3883	60	
5-11	1	1	0	0	2	.3802	78	
6-18	1	1	0	0	2			*

6-25	1	1	0	0	2	.3898	98	
6-31	2	0	0	0	2	.3982	9	
6-37	1	1	0	0	2	.4353	22	
6-42	2	0	0	0	2	.4297	28	
6-44	2	0	0	0	2	.4049	34	
7-14	3	1	0	0	4	.4692	9	**
7-16	1	2	0	0	3			*
7-29	1	0	0	0	2	.3947	113	
7-43	1	2	0	0	3	.4593	58	**
8-21	2	0	0	0	2	.3974	-10	
9-24	1	1	0	0	2	.4118	84	
9-44	1	1	0	0	2	.3865	20	
10-14	0	2	0	0	2	.4504	42	**
10-23	1	2	0	0	3			*
10-25	1	1	0	0	2	.4419	28	**
10-29	2	0	0	0	2	.4142	22	
10-37	1	1	0	0	2	.4162	42	
10-38	3	0	0	0	3	.4484	10	
10-43	2	0	0	0	2	.4019	50	
11-27	2	0	0	0	2	.3764	-20	
12-22	3	0	0	0	3	.4052	110	
12-24	3	0	0	0	3	.3814	75	
13-20	0	3	0	0	3	.4853	30	**
13-29	1	1	0	0	2	.4001	71	
13-26	2	0	0	0	2	.3746	41	
13-28	2	1	0	0	3	.4513	42	**
14-19	2	0	0	0	2	.4226	72	**
14-21	3	0	0	0	3	.4323	32	
14-23	1	1	0	0	2			*
14-26	1	1	0	0	2			*
14-38	2	0	0	0	2	.4132	34	
14-44	1	2	0	0	3	.4730	36	**
15-16	1	1	0	0	2			*
15-29	0	2	1	0	3			*
16-17	2	0	0	0	2			*
16-23	2	0	0	0	2			*
16-25	2	0	0	0	2			*
16-27	2	0	0	0	2			*
16-29	2	0	0	0	2			*
16-43	0	2	0	0	2			*
17-21	1	1	0	0	2	.4151	53	
17-36	1	2	0	0	3			*
18-25	1	1	0	0	2			*
18-36	2	0	0	0	2			*
19-20	3	1	1	0	5	.5008	34	**
19-35	1	1	0	0	2	.4285	36	
19-36	1	1	1	0	3	.4911	32	**
19-38	2	0	0	0	2	.4387	46	
19-41	2	0	0	0	2	.4031	46	
19-44	2	1	0	0	3	.4641	8	
20-21	1	2	1	0	4	.5183	34	**
20-23	2	1	0	0	3			*
20-35	2	1	2	0	5	.6068	42	**

20-36	2	0	0	0	2	.4187	24
20-38	0	0	3	2	5	.6810	- 4
20-44	0	3	2	0	5	.6056	32 **
21-22	0	3	0	0	3	.4989	118
21-24	1	1	0	0	2	.4132	28
21-25	3	1	0	0	4	.4820	44 **
21-26	1	1	0	0	2	.4242	62
21-27	0	2	0	0	2	.4254	10
21-33	2	0	0	0	2	.4261	61
21-34	1	2	0	0	3	.4615	0
21-35	0	3	0	0	3	.5192	54 **
21-36	1	2	0	0	3	.4756	- 5
21-37	1	2	0	0	3	.4747	48 **
21-38	0	2	0	0	2	.4631	64 **
21-40	1	2	0	0	3	.4799	32 **
21-41	1	2	1	0	3	.4732	28 **
21-44	2	2	0	0	5	.5656	69 **
22-25	0	2	0	0	2	.4278	46
22-35	2	0	0	0	2	.3845	51
22-40	1	1	0	0	2	.4298	72 **
23-35	2	0	0	0	2	.3845	72
23-37	2	0	0	0	2		*
23-38	1	2	0	0	3		*
23-43	0	0	1	0	1		*
23-44	1	1	0	0	2		*
24-25	0	0	1	0	1	.4205	46
24-28	0	2	0	0	2	.4516	24 **
24-29	1	1	0	0	2	.3901	14
24-30	2	0	0	0	2	.3907	52
24-37	0	2	0	0	2	.4235	25
24-39	1	1	0	0	2	.3830	22
24-40	1	0	1	0	2	.4187	58
24-42	1	1	0	0	2	.4301	10
25-27	2	0	0	0	2	.4160	28
25-34	2	1	1	0	4	.5275	22 **
25-35	2	1	0	0	3	.4217	60
25-37	1	3	0	0	4	.4977	52 **
25-41	1	1	0	0	2	.4336	-16
25-44	2	2	0	0	4	.5026	- 6
26-28	2	0	0	0	2	.4052	74
26-30	0	0	1	0	1	.3918	71
26-34	2	1	0	0	3	.4574	8
26-36	2	1	0	0	3	.4339	6
27-28	1	2	0	0	3	.4695	44 **
27-34	0	2	0	0	2	.4355	58
27-37	1	1	0	0	2	.4196	48
27-41	0	0	1	0	1	.4279	103 **
28-29	0	2	0	0	2	.4314	64
28-33	3	0	0	0	3	.4446	0
28-34	2	1	0	0	3	.4456	42 **
28-36	1	1	0	0	2	.4138	- 6
28-39	3	0	0	0	3	.446	-22
28-40	1	1	0	0	2	.3998	44

29-35	2	0	0	0	2	.4070	26	
29-36	2	0	0	0	2	.3909	68	
29-39	1	1	0	0	2	.3866	60	
31-35	2	0	0	0	2	.4037	34	
31-37	2	1	0	0	3	.4509	42	**
31-41	1	1	0	0	2	.4257	-26	
31-42	2	2	0	0	4	.4778	22	**
32-41	0	2	0	0	2	.4183	100	
33-37	1	1	0	0	2			*
34-41	0	2	0	0	2	.4332	26	
35-36	1	2	0	0	3	.4804	34	**
35-38	0	3	2	0	5	.5868	42	**
35-40	3	0	0	0	3	.4028	38	
35-44	1	2	1	0	4	.5174	36	**
36-37	0	1	1	0	2			*
36-38	1	1	0	0	2			*
36-44	2	1	0	0	3	.4657	30	**
37-40	2	0	0	0	2			*
37-41	2	2	0	0	4	.5027	26	**
37-42	3	1	1	0	5	.5124	22	**
37-44	2	1	0	0	3	.4706	52	**
38-44	0	2	3	0	5	.5999	38	**
40-41	1	3	0	0	4	.5142	-12	
41-42	0	3	2	0	5	.5764	-28	
43-44	0	5	0	0	5	.5297	6	**

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\*Pairs excluded due to the failure to meet minimum contingency cell requirements.

\*\*Pairs selected for constraint test.

APPENDIX E

INFORMATION SCALE

1. Which of the following is not a member of the Women's Political Caucus?
  - a. Gloria Steinem
  - b. Shirley Chisholm
  - c. Bella Abzug
  - d. Betty Freidan
  - e. All of above are members
  
2. The current Vice-President of the U. S. is:
  - a. John N. Garner
  - b. Hubert H. Humphrey
  - c. Richard M. Nixon
  - d. Spiro T. Agnew
  - e. John Connally
  
3. Which of the following is not a power or job of the President?
  - a. power to veto
  - b. power to levy taxes
  - c. appointment of judges
  - d. commander-in-chief of armed forces
  - e. enforcement of laws
  
4. How many members are there in Congress (house and senate)?
  - a. 435
  - b. 100
  - c. 535
  - d. 475
  - e. 575
  
- \*5. Who is the leader of the Senate?
  - a. Vice-President
  - b. Majority Whip
  - c. Minority Whip
  - d. Majority Leader
  - e. Minority Leader
  
6. Those theories and political movements espousing "the reconstruction of the capitalistic system of a society by democratic and parliamentary methods, with the aim of establishing state ownership and control of the most fundamental means of production and distribution of wealth" describes:

- a. liberalism
  - b. capitalism
  - c. democracy
  - d. communism
  - e. socialism
7. An individual with a conservative political philosophy would be most likely to favor which of the following:
- a. men are naturally created equal and therefore society requires classlessness for the good of all
  - b. order, authority, and community are the primary defense against the impulse to violence and anarchy
  - c. progress is the root of society, tradition is worthless
  - d. man is ruled by reason rather than emotion
  - e. if something develops over a long period of time it is likely to be outmoded and useless
8. Who is chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee:
- a. Senator Kennedy
  - b. Senator Stennis
  - c. Senator Fulbright
  - d. Senator Javits
  - e. Senator Humphrey
9. Who is the Senate Minority Leader?
- a. Gerald Ford
  - b. Hugh Scott
  - c. William Rogers
  - d. John Connally
  - e. John Erlichman
10. Which of the following confirms presidential appointments?
- a. State Department
  - b. House of Representatives
  - c. Senate
  - d. Pentagon
  - e. the Cabinet
- \*11. Who is currently the Prime Minister of England?
- a. Wilson
  - b. Philby
  - c. Trudeau
  - d. Brandt
  - e. Heath
12. Who is the Israeli Foreign Minister?
- a. Golda Meir
  - b. Gandhi
  - c. Abba Eban
  - d. Yigal Allon
  - e. Moshe Dayan
- \*13. Who is the Chairman of the Senate's Committee on Government Operations (which is currently conducting an investigation into the Watergate incident)?
- a. Mike Mansfield
  - b. Sam Erwin
  - c. Hubert Humphrey
  - d. George McGovern
  - e. Ted Kennedy

- \*14. What does the A in SEATO stand for?
- a. African
  - b. atomic
  - c. alliance
  - d. American
  - e. none of these
- \*15. Who is Chile's President?
- a. Franco
  - b. Gonzales
  - c. Allende
  - d. Marcos
  - e. Peron
16. Who is the governor of California?
- a. Edmund Brown
  - b. Richard Daley
  - c. Joseph Alioto
  - d. Ronald Reagan
  - e. Pete McCloskey
- \*17. Which of the following was responsible for the release of the Pentagon Papers?
- a. E. Howard Hunt
  - b. Jack Anderson
  - c. William Safire
  - d. Daniel Ellsberg
  - e. Ronald Ziegler
- \*18. What state is Spiro Agnew from?
- a. North Carolina
  - b. South Carolina
  - c. Maryland
  - d. Virginia
  - e. West Virginia
- \*19. Which state does George McGovern represent in the Senate?
- a. North Dakota
  - b. Massachusetts
  - c. Nebraska
  - d. South Dakota
  - e. New York
- \*20. How many justices are there presently on the Supreme Court?
- a. 7
  - b. 5
  - c. 12
  - d. 9
  - e. 13
21. James Buckley could be characterized as a:
- a. liberal Democrat
  - b. liberal Republican
  - c. conservative Democrat
  - d. conservative Republican
  - e. liberal Independent
- \*22. The unfair apportionment of political districts for election purposes is called:
- a. boondoggling
  - b. moonlighting
  - c. feather bedding
  - d. port barreling
  - e. gerry mandering

- \*23. The Speaker of the House of Representatives is:
- a. Rep. Boggs
  - b. Rep. Albert
  - c. Rep. Waldie
  - d. Rep. McCormick
  - e. Rep. Downing
- \*24. Which of the following is true:
- a. representatives serve 4-year terms
  - b. senators represent the state as a whole, while representatives are elected from districts
  - c. representatives serve 6-year terms
  - d. representatives represent the state as a whole, while senators are elected from districts
  - e. both senators and representatives are elected from districts
- \*25. The term of office for the U. S. Senate is:
- a. 6 years
  - b. 2 years
  - c. 4 years
  - d. 8 years
  - e. 5 years
26. The statement "our society is so complicated that if you try to reform parts of it you're likely to upset the entire system" expressed the views of which type of ideology:
- a. liberalism
  - b. radicalism
  - c. socialism
  - d. conservatism
  - e. communism
27. The chairman of the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee is:
- a. Rep. Ford
  - b. Rep. Albert
  - c. Rep. Byrnes
  - d. Rep. Stratton
  - e. Rep. Mills
- \*28. Which of the following is true:
- a. there is a Republican majority in Congress
  - b. the current Democratic majority in Congress is the first since the Kennedy Administration
  - c. the current Republican majority is the first since the Eisenhower Administration
  - d. currently there is an equal number of Republicans and Democrats in Congress
  - e. there is presently a Democratic majority in Congress
29. George McGovern could be characterized as a:
- a. liberal Republican
  - b. conservative Democrat
  - c. conservative Republican
  - d. liberal Democrat
  - e. conservative Independent

- \*30. John Connally could be characterized as a:
- a. liberal Democrat
  - b. conservative Republican
  - c. liberal Republican
  - d. liberal Independent
  - e. conservative Democrat
- \*31. The Bureau of the Budget is part of the:
- a. House of Representatives
  - b. Treasury Department
  - c. Executive Office of the President
  - d. State Department
  - e. Interior Department
- \*32. The Supreme Court decision which reversed the separate but equal policy for school integration was:
- a. McLauren vs. Oklahoma State Board of Regents
  - b. Avery vs. Midland, Texas
  - c. Brown vs. Topeka, Kansas Board of Education
  - d. Plessy vs. Ferguson
  - e. Colebrow vs. Green
33. A political philosophy which advocates a strategy of seizure of power by the proletariat and the establishment of a transitional socialist state with state control of industry, labor, distribution and credit would best be described as:
- a. Socialist
  - b. Liberal
  - c. Conservative
  - d. Anarchist
  - e. Communist
34. A Writ of Habeas Corpus requires that:
- a. a pre-trial prisoner must be given bail opportunities
  - b. a body must be entered as evidence of murder
  - c. an individual has to be formally charged for an offense in order to be held by authorities
  - d. an individual must be advised of his rights when arrested
  - e. an individual cannot be required to testify against himself
- \*35. Who is the Prime Minister of Canada?
- a. Heath
  - b. Trudeau
  - c. Pompidou
  - d. Udall
  - e. Wilson
- \*36. What was the name of the conference held recently between the U. S. and USSR to limit nuclear weapons?
- a. SAC
  - b. NATO
  - c. SALT
  - d. ABM
  - e. SEATO

- \*37. Who is the President of the Phillipines?
- a. Pompidou
  - b. Franco
  - c. Peron
  - d. Marcos
  - e. Allende
38. Where is Dien Bien Phu?
- a. Korea
  - b. Cambodia
  - c. Laos
  - d. China
  - e. Vietnam
- \*39. Where did the Bay of Pigs incident occur?
- a. South Vietnam
  - b. North Vietnam
  - c. South Korea
  - d. Israel
  - e. Cuba
40. Which of the following was recently acquitted of supplying guns in the murder of a judge in California?
- a. Huey Newton
  - b. Bobby Seale
  - c. Elridge Cleaver
  - d. Angela Davis
  - e. Jesse Jackson
41. Madeline Murray is most closely associated with which of the following Supreme Court decisions?
- a. school desegregation
  - b. abortion
  - c. capital punishment
  - d. school prayer
  - e. one man, one vote
42. Which of the following is most closely related to political liberalism:
- a. property rights
  - b. big business
  - c. individual freedoms
  - d. laissez faire capitalism
  - e. nationalization of basic industry
43. Where do appropriation bills originate?
- a. Treasury Department
  - b. President
  - c. House of Representatives
  - d. Senate
  - e. Pentagon
- \*44. Which of the following is not true of Shirley Chisholm?
- a. She is a member of the House of Representatives
  - b. She is a women's rights advocate
  - c. She was a candidate for the Democratic nomination for President in 1972
  - d. She is a leader of the Women's Political Caucus
  - e. All of the above are true

45. Which of the following was adopted as the most recent amendment to the Constitution?
- a. 18-year-old vote
  - b. women's rights amendment
  - c. legalized abortion
  - d. ending prohibition
  - e. none of the above
46. John Lindsay could be characterized as a:
- a. liberal Democrat
  - b. liberal Republican
  - c. conservative Democrat
  - d. conservative Republican
  - e. liberal Independent
- \*47. What does the A in NATO stand for?
- a. armament
  - b. Atlantic
  - c. American
  - d. atomic
  - e. alliance
- \*48. Which of the following ran against Richard Nixon for the Republican nomination in 1972?
- a. Spiro Agnew
  - b. Pete McCloskey
  - c. Nelson Rockefeller
  - d. Ronald Reagon
  - e. John Connally
- \*49. Who is governor of New York?
- a. John Lindsay
  - b. Edmund Muskie
  - c. Richard Daly
  - d. Ronald Reagon
  - e. Nelson Rockefeller
50. Who is the Communist party chief in the U.S.S.R.?
- a. Kosygin
  - b. Gromyko
  - c. Khrushchev
  - d. Stalin
  - e. Breshnev
- \*51. Who is the President of Egypt?
- a. Sadat
  - b. Arafat
  - c. Hussein
  - d. Meir
  - e. Nassar
52. Under President Nixon's reorganization of the Cabinet, how many "Super-Cabinet" members or Presidential Counselors are there?
- a. 1
  - b. 2
  - c. 3
  - d. 4
  - e. 5

- \*53. The President of South Viet Nam is:
- a. Nguyen Van Thieu
  - b. Ho Chi Minh
  - c. Phom Van Dong
  - d. Chou En-lai
  - e. Chui Hui-tso
54. Which of the following was not a nominee of President Nixon's to the Supreme Court in 1972?
- a. Powell
  - b. Rehnquist
  - c. Haynsworth
  - d. Black
  - e. Carswell
55. What is the job of the FTC?
- a. regulation of the communication industry
  - b. regulation of business practices and consumer protection
  - c. regulation of the stock market
  - d. regulation of prices and wages
  - e. regulation of utilities
56. How many states must approve a constitutional amendment for it to be adopted?
- a. 34 (2/3 of all states)
  - b. 25 (1/2)
  - c. 37 (3/4)
  - d. 50 (all)
  - e. none of above
57. By what vote must both houses pass a bill in order to override a presidential veto?
- a. 1/2
  - b. 3/4
  - c. unanimous
  - d. 2/3
  - e. none of above
58. How many Senators does each state have?
- a. 1
  - b. 2
  - c. 3
  - d. 4
  - e. varies by population
59. How many Representatives does each state have?
- a. 1
  - b. 2
  - c. 3
  - d. 4
  - e. varies by population
60. Whose approval is required by the Constitution of all formal treaties?
- a. House of Representatives
  - b. State Department
  - c. Senate
  - d. President only
  - e. the entire Congress
61. Who has the power to declare war, according to the Constitution?
- a. House of Representatives
  - b. Senate
  - c. President
  - d. Congress only
  - e. only a, b, & c together

- \*62. Where was the 1968 Democratic Convention held?
- a. Miami
  - b. Chicago
  - c. San Diego
  - d. New York
  - e. Los Angeles
- \*63. Which of the following did not run for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1972?
- a. McGovern
  - b. Humphrey
  - c. Jackson
  - d. Lindsay
  - e. Kennedy
- \*64. Who is Gloria Steinem?
- a. head of the League of Womens Voters
  - b. Women's rights advocate
  - c. congresswoman from New York
  - d. former Chairwoman of the Democratic National Committee
  - e. former Democratic candidate for president
- \*65. Which of the following is the former Teamsters president, arrested in 1967 for jury tampering and pension-fund fraud?
- a. Mean
  - b. Fitzsimmons
  - c. Woodcock
  - d. Dunlop
  - e. Hoffa
66. Which of the following is not a member of NATO?
- a. Great Britain
  - b. Spain
  - c. West Germany
  - d. Netherlands
  - e. Belgium
67. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is:
- a. Earl Warren
  - b. Warren Burger
  - c. Abe Fortas
  - d. Harry Black
  - e. William Rehnquist
- \*68. Which of the following fled to Algeria to avoid a return to prison?
- a. Huey Newton
  - b. Bobby Seale
  - c. Elridge Cleaver
  - d. Angela Davis
  - e. None of the above
- \*69. Who is Bella Abzug?
- a. Representative from New York
  - b. Senator from New York
  - c. President of the League of Womens Voters
  - d. Former Chairman of the Democratic National Committee
  - e. A candidate for the democratic nomination for president

- \*70. Which of the following countries is not a member of the International Control Commission supervising the truce in Vietnam?
- a. Poland
  - b. Canada
  - c. Indonesia
  - d. Hungary
  - e. India
71. Who is Richard Nixon's advisor for Domestic Affairs?
- a. Earl Butz
  - b. Caspar Weinberger
  - c. William Rogers
  - d. John Connally
  - e. John Ehrlichman
- \*72. The Bureau of Indian Affairs is part of which Cabinet Department?
- a. Transportation
  - b. Health, Education and Welfare
  - c. Justice
  - d. State
  - e. Interior
- \*73. What is the capital of North Vietnam?
- a. Haiphong
  - b. Hanoi
  - c. Peking
  - d. Saigon
  - e. Phnom Pen
74. Who is the Special Security Assistant to President Nixon?
- a. Spiro Agnew
  - b. William Rogers
  - c. Henry Kissinger
  - d. Alexander Haig
  - e. John Connally
- \*75. Who is President of France?
- a. DeGaulle
  - b. Pompidou
  - c. Pinay
  - d. Messmer
  - e. Mitterrand
76. Who was the chief negotiator for the North Vietnamese in Paris?
- a. Phom Van Dong
  - b. Ho Chi Minh
  - c. Chou En-lai
  - d. Nguyen Van Thieu
  - e. Le Duc Tho
77. Who of the following is the Air Force general retired for ordering unauthorized bombing raids on North Vietnam?
- a. Ryan
  - b. Herbert
  - c. Henderson
  - d. Lavelle
  - e. Abrams

78. Which of the following was recently defeated in Ireland in an election for Prime Minister?
- a. Winchester-Clark
  - b. Heath
  - c. Craig
  - d. O'Neil
  - e. Lynch
79. Which of the following cities was recently the scene of racial strife in connection with the integration of housing?
- a. Chicago
  - b. Brooklyn
  - c. Newark
  - d. Washington, D. C.
  - e. Cleveland
- \*80. With which of the following did the U.S. recently sign an anti-hijacking pact?
- a. U.S.S.R.
  - b. Egypt
  - c. Red China
  - d. Cuba
  - e. Algeria
- \*81. What country was the scene of the recent murders of two U. S. ambassadors?
- a. Sudan
  - b. Saudi Arabia
  - c. Libya
  - d. Jordan
  - e. Egypt
82. Which of the following towns was recently taken over by members of the American Indian Movement (AIM)?
- a. Custer
  - b. Little Big Horn
  - c. Commanche
  - d. Wounded Knee
  - e. Sioux Falls
83. Who of the following recently came out in favor of legalizing marijuana?
- a. George McGovern
  - b. William Buckley
  - c. Benjamin Spock
  - d. Robert Dole
  - e. James Buckley
84. How many of those convicted in the Watergate case actually went to trial (didn't plead guilty)?
- a. 1
  - b. 2
  - c. 3
  - d. 4
  - e. 5
85. Who is the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee?
- a. Larry O'Brien
  - b. George McGovern
  - c. Robert Strause
  - d. Jean Westwood
  - e. Richard Daley

86. Who of the following is not a Senator?
- a. Sam Erwin
  - b. Gerald Ford
  - c. Hubert Humphrey
  - d. Edward Muskie
  - e. Hugh Scott
- \*87. Which of the following is not true for Richard Nixon?
- a. he ran for President in 1960
  - b. he was Vice-President to Eisenhower
  - c. he lost the election for governor of California in 1962
  - d. he is a lawyer
  - e. he was a member of the Senate but not the House
- \*88. Which of the following judges was recently convicted of taking a bribe in Illinois?
- a. Hoffman
  - b. Black
  - c. Warren
  - d. Kerner
  - e. Hanrahan
89. Who is the head of the Environmental Protection Agency?
- a. Melvin Laird
  - b. William Ruckelshaus
  - c. William Rogers
  - d. Earl Butz
  - e. John Ehrlichman
90. Which of the following companies was accused last year of trying to block the election of Chile's President Allende?
- a. General Electric
  - b. Dow Chemical
  - c. American Fruit
  - d. ITT
  - e. Standard Oil
- \*91. Which of the following changed his party affiliation from Republican to Democrat last year?
- a. Eagleton
  - b. Wallace
  - c. Lindsay
  - d. Thurmond
  - e. Connally
- \*92. Who of the following is the black congressman censured by a vote of Congress in 1967?
- a. Powell
  - b. King
  - c. Cleaver
  - d. Gallagher
  - e. Dodd
93. Who was the Roman Catholic priest indicted with six others in 1972 for conspiring to bomb draft boards?
- a. Cook
  - b. Ellsberg
  - c. O'Sullivan
  - d. Berrigan
  - e. Jackson

- \*94. Who of the following was convicted for shooting George Wallace?
- a. Ray
  - b. Sirhan
  - c. Jackson
  - d. Ruby
  - e. Bremer
- \*95. When were the SALT accords signed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.?
- a. 1969
  - b. 1970
  - c. 1971
  - d. 1972
  - e. 1973
- \*96. Which of the following was the company commander at My Lai?
- a. Medina
  - b. Eckhardt
  - c. Abrams
  - d. Caley
  - e. Henderson
- \*97. What is the job of the IMF?
- a. enforcement of the wage-price controls
  - b. regulation of international tariffs
  - c. regulate international currencies
  - d. regulation of bank interest rates
  - e. regulation of stock exchange practices
- \*98. What is the name of the new nation created after the India-Pakistani War?
- a. Kashmir
  - b. Bangladesh
  - c. Biafra
  - d. Nepal
  - e. Bengall
99. With which of the following countries does the U.S. have diplomatic relations?
- a. Red China
  - b. Chile
  - c. North Vietnam
  - d. Cuba
  - e. Egypt
- \*100. What is the job of NATO?
- a. provide economic aid to Europe
  - b. defense of South East Asia
  - c. control of trade
  - d. defense of Western Europe
  - e. regulate the Common Market
- \*101. How many devaluations of the dollar have there been during Nixon's administration?
- a. 1
  - b. 2
  - c. 3
  - d. 4
  - e. 5

102. Which of the following is a reason for the dollar's loss of value?
- a. too few imports
  - b. too many dollars in the U.S.
  - c. too much foreign currency in the U.S.
  - d. not enough U.S. production
  - e. too many dollars in foreign countries
103. Which of the following was not convicted in the Watergate case?
- a. McCord
  - b. Segretti
  - c. Liddy
  - d. Hunt
  - e. Gonzalez

\*Items selected for final scale.

VITA

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