

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL AND PERSONAL
SELVES OF THE COUNSELOR, THE VOLUNTEER,
AND THE NON-VOLUNTEER

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
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Every person has within themselves two selves at varying degrees of distinction from one another. One of these selves is a personal self, an individual, creative entity which may or may not coincide with the other self, which is a social self - a self developing exclusively out of a consideration of the reactions of others.

In Sociology, the term "role" is used to refer to the expected behavior of the social self. When a person plays a role, he is presenting a self based on his understanding of the perceptions of others. This role may or may not coincide with his own personal beliefs and desires, yet the individual presents himself as that social self.

On the other hand there is individual behavior - the spontaneous, creative, innovative action of the individual which does not seek definition through others. Personal identity is our contact with this self, and it is often through the loss of personal identity (i.e. induction into the military) that the social self (soldier, patriot, hero) becomes susceptible to exaggeration.

Indeed, such a cleavage has been struck between these two selves, the personal and the social, that two separate disciplines have evolved to study them separately: psychology for the individual, sociology for the social - with social psychology thrown in to keep them honest.

While this separation is certainly useful and oftentimes necessary, there is also fertile ground in the explanation of behavior based on the relative dominance of the personal self over the social self or vice versa. It is my belief that participation in many types of behavior may be interpreted by means of this typology.

Every person, then, not only contains within himself a continuum of potential behavior from total individual expression to total social reflection, but also may himself be placed upon that continuum according to particular behaviors.

Thus the politician, while engaged in representation, is a social reflection, his definition coming from others, and the artist, while painting, is expressing a separate self - individuality. Taken to the extreme, to be completely personal would be catatonic or feral, while the totally social person would be robot-like.

If we can accept that there is a direct relationship between personality and behavior - i.e. that personality is reflected in behavior and/or vice versa - then we are in a position to set up measures of personal and social self to see if there is, indeed, a relationship between the relative position of self and behavior.

As with any typology, this particular one, of a personal and a social self, is used with the understanding that all typologies are only approximations of reality and should be used only until knowledge frees us from them.

Purpose of the Study

The typology of a personal and social self is certainly not new, as this paper draws heavily from George Herbert Mead and his mentor William James, but I have attempted here to draw together the themes of several writers under a single, and measurable, heading. In fact, one of the major objectives of this paper has been to draw from a variety of sources a single typology of social and personal self. To do this, I have taken a certain amount of license with the interpretation of various authors, but I think the reader will find, as I have, an overriding consistency in their work.

The purpose of this study, then, is twofold; firstly, to draw together a composite idea of personal and social self from a variety of diverse sources, and secondly, to apply this concept to actual behavior.

In order to do the latter, I have chosen compassionate service towards others as the behavioral control. At the social end of this behavior I have selected the professional counselor, for not only is the counselor directing his behavior towards others, but he has socially defined himself as doing so. In other words, he has accepted the social and professional role of counselor for this particular behavior.

At the opposite end of this behavioral continuum, that of doing compassionate service for others, lies the individual who does not seek out such a role and, in fact, has little concern for such behavior. This is the type I have labeled the non-volunteer.

Finally, as a fulcrum, I have selected the voluntary worker as representing a kind of compromise between the two. The voluntary worker is unique in this respect, for he is in the marginal position of

wanting to do compassionate service for others, yet he is unwilling or unable to completely define himself as occupying that role, at least to the degree of making it a career. He is exhibiting a curious blend, if you will, of his social and personal selves in a single behavior.

For this reason, that the voluntary worker is manifesting behavior which mediates between the typology of social and personal self, he is a major focus of attention in this study.

What I have attempted to do in this study, then, is to isolate individuals acting primarily as a social self, the counselor; compare their personality structure to that of individuals acting primarily as a personal self, the non-volunteer; and finally to present the volunteer as one who is at once both and neither. This final condition I shall develop as an anomic state, a concept which is expanded and hopefully clarified at length within this paper.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

The Influence of Social Action Theory

The major theoretical schools under which the basis of this study lies may be loosely classified as the social-action school and the symbolic interaction school as described by Martindale (1960). Out of social action theory developed a recognition of and concentration on subjectively intended meaning as a causal component of behavior. It is from this school in sociology that the relationship between attitude and behavior has been developed.

Perhaps the most prominent figure in social-action theory was Max Weber. Weber, in contrast to the neo-kantian accent on 'forms', felt that sociology should scientifically study the content of social action itself. In order to do this, however, Weber rejected the idealistic method of "Verstehen" (empathy) as a complete method, and used instead the construction of typologies of behavior and the comparative method.

In developing his typology for the relationship between social action and intention, Weber (1947) distinguished four types of action: "Zweckrational" action is action which is "rationally purposeful, or based on efficiency"; "Wertrational" action is action which is rational "in terms of values"; "Affective" action is action which is based on emotional factors; and "Traditional" action is based on custom. In every case, there is the overriding concept that,

Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course (Weber, 1947:88).

Others in the social-action school reflect this same relationship between meaning and behavior. Veblen's "instinct of workmanship" corresponds with Weber's "Zweckrational" type of social action. According to Veblen (1914), it is a sense of merit, or service, that guides this type of behavior. John R. Commons (1950) saw social life as based on the attitudes and actions of persons and their "act of will". Merton's "self-fulfilling prophecy", (Merton, 1968:477) much like Thomas' "definition of the situation" (Thomas, 1923:42), is based on the belief that ideas, even when false, have consequences for action.

Karl Mannheim (1936), in his development of the sociology of knowledge stressed that knowledge has an adaptive function for man and his environment. Florian Znaniecki (1936:Chapter I), in his earlier work, also saw social actions as the basic unit for understanding social and cultural life. According to Znaniecki, the objects around which behavior centers are "values".

More recently there has been continuation of the social action school in men like White (1956), Riesman (1952, 1952), and Mills (1951, 1956), all of which lend support to the general social-action theory of meaning as a causal component of action.

In the assumption that subjectively intended meanings are a causal component of behavior, Weber and the other social-action theorists are by no means unique. This belief has a basic thread that runs through the various branches of social behaviorism. Tarde (1899) felt the causes of behavior were to be understood in terms of "beliefs" and "desires" which, in turn, were centered around imitation. James (1892),

in his "will to believe", felt that a belief will effect a behavior even when the validity of the belief is not established. W. I. Thomas (1966) stressed that in order to account for behavior, one must be aware of the subjective "definitions of the situation" by those involved. Charles H. Cooley (1956) treated the beliefs that people have of one another as the "solid facts of society", while George H. Mead (1934) stressed the influence on behavior of 'attitude' and 'meaning'.

The Influence of Symbolic Interaction Theory

While it is from the basic tenents of social-action theory that a relationship has been drawn between attitude and behavior, it is from Symbolic Interaction Theory that the basis for a personal and a social self arises. It is within this school that personality and self become a major focus, and it is largely from the theorists of symbolic interaction that a typology of personal and social self will be formulated.

Theoretically, it is the concept of "role" in symbolic interaction that serves as a reference between personality and social structure. It is precisely at that point where a person "takes on a role", or "plays a role", that he moves from a personal to a social level of self. The same relationship was identified by Weber (1947) as "calling", and by Simmel (1950) as "vocation".

A common beginning of symbolic interaction is associated with William James. It is from his brilliant formulation of the "I" and the "me" that much of the understanding of the symbolic structuring of human behavior evolved (James, 1892, 1899). It was from his beginning that many of the theories of personality developed. His main effort

was in describing the relationship between the selves of the individual. Each person, for James (1892), is two people,

. . .partly known and partly knower, partly object and partly subject... For shortness we may call one the 'Me' and the other the 'I'. . .(James, 1892:176).

George Herbert Mead (1934) followed James' use of "I" and "me" in his accounting for the structure of the self, as well as making the concept of role a major point of contact between personality and social structure. The ideas of both men will be expanded in my characterization of the personal and social selves.

Charles Horton Cooley (1956) also felt that ideas and beliefs were the facts of sociology:

I conclude, therefore, that the imaginations which people have of one another are the solid facts of society, and that to observe and interpret these must be a chief aim of sociology (Cooley, 1956:121).

But it is perhaps in his formulation of a "looking-glass self" (Cooley, 1956:184) that Cooley recognized a reflected, or social self. It is this self, the self we see through others, that is the social self.

W. I. Thomas, also among those counted in the formulation of symbolic-interaction theory, stressed the interrelationship of personality and social order:

There are two fundamental practical problems which have constituted the center of attention of reflective social practice in all times. These are (1) the problem of the dependence of the individual upon social organization and culture and (2) the problem of the dependence of social organization and culture upon the individual (Thomas, 1958:20).

So it is within the general framework of social-action theory and symbolic interaction that I have drawn two important foundations: the relationship of attitude to behavior, and the beginnings of a

distinction between social and personal self. It is now necessary to develop the latter in finer detail.

Personal and Social Self: the "I" and the "Me"

William James, in a combination of pragmatism and idealism, brought together his formal training in medicine, psychology, philosophy, ethics, and theology to formulate a concept of self and consciousness that has had a profound influence on the development of social thought.

In his masterful essay "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?", James (1904), in supporting the concept of free will over determinism, defended the mind as an independent reality. It is precisely this refutation of the subject-object relationship that allows the individual to be both knower and known; an "I" and a "me". For James, "... mental life is primarily teleological" (James, 1892:2).

Basic to James' description of the self is his development of the concept of the "I" and the "me". James was aware of the various hierarchies of self that had been constructed by a variety of thinkers, and sought to reduce them to a more simply duality. According to James (1892),

A tolerably unanimous opinion ranges the different selves of which a man may be 'seized and possessed', and the consequent different orders of his self-regard, in an hierarchical scale, with the bodily self at the bottom, the spiritual self at top, and the extracorporeal material selves and the various social selves between (James: 1892:313).

While James (1892) was not basically at disagreement with this ordering, he felt it referred to the social, rather than the individual, self. In fact, James devised such a hierarchy of the "me" into a pyramid of "material me", which was body, clothes, family, home; the

"social me", which was "the recognition which he gets from his mates;" (James, 1892:179) and the "spiritual me", with the "material 'me'" at the base, and the "spiritual me" at the top (James, 1892:190, see also p. 195).

For James (1892), the "me" was the basic source of empirical investigation, and, in fact, he accepted the term "empirical ego" as synonymous (James, 1892:176). According to James (1892),

In its widest possible sense...a man's me is the sum total of all he can call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, his yacht and bank-account (James, 1892:177).

In contrast to the "me", the "I", for James, is much more difficult to assess. The "I" is pure ego (James, 1892:176), which has only momentary consciousness. For James, the 'I' is a soul similar to the transcendental self or unity of Kant (Pfuetze, 1954:92). While the 'I' is consistent, it is not a constant stream of consciousness, nor is there any reason to believe in such a unity outside of metaphysics or theology (James, 1892:203). The "I" remains consistent regardless of the changes in the "me"; it is the potential which exists for the free will; it is a recognizable aspect of the self. As James (1892) puts it, the

. . .Me is an empirical aggregate of things objectively known. The I which knows them cannot itself be an aggregate; neither for psychological purposes need it be an unchanging metaphysical entity like the soul... It is a thought, at each moment different from that of the last moment, but appropriative of the latter (James, 1892: 215).

Sharing the pragmatic philosophy of James, and undoubtedly influenced greatly by him, George Herbert Mead set out to develop the concept of personal and social self and to isolate the mechanism

through which mind and self originate. It is fairly obvious that "Mead has accepted the distinction between the 'I' and the 'me' found in the transcendental philosophy of Kant and the post-Kantian idealists" (Pfuetze, 1954:92).

Mead was greatly impressed by James' ideas about consciousness, or the mind as selective, functional, and relational, and also his belief that thinking is a part of action, and that action finds its fulfillment, norm, and test in its own consequences (Pfuetze, 1954:41). From these beginning, Mead developed and refined the relationship between the "I" and the "me". Indeed, in some instances Mead was so specific about the "I" and "me" as correlates of mind and society that he isolated certain behaviors as representing one or the other.

While James had taken pure experience as the basis of self, Mead chose to begin with observable activity, social acts, and to analyze mind and society as discriminators in this process (Pfuetze, 1954:40). In his introduction to Mind, Self and Society, Morris stated the difference succinctly: "Philosophically, Mead was a pragmatist; scientifically he was a social psychologist" (Intro. by Morris, ix, from Mead, 1934b).

According to Mead, there are two kinds of social psychology:

The first type assumes a social process or social order as the logical and biological precondition of the appearance of the selves of the individual organisms involved in that process or belonging to that order. The other type, on the contrary, assumes individual selves as the presuppositions, logically and biologically, of the social process or order within which they act (Mead, 1934a:256).

While Mead himself leaned towards the first orientation, he managed to support both of them as consistent with each other as long as one was careful about the possible organicist interpretations. In

explaining the view of his own social psychology, Mead (1934a) states that it "...is our...view that mind presupposes, and is a product of, the social process" (Mead, 1934a:257).

Pfuetze (1954) explains Mead's position here by saying:

...Mead is saying that the individual belongs to a system which determines him in part, and at the same time to a system which he determines in part. He belongs to two systems at once; he is a social individual (Pfuetze, 1954:50).

From this general concept of social and individual control, Mead (1934a) leads us slowly to a more finely focused idea - that of the "I" and the "me".:

The 'I' is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others, the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes. The attitudes of the others constitute the organized 'me', and then one reacts toward that as an 'I' (Mead, 1934a:175).

With this transition from system to individual, Mead goes on to explain the social processes of social control and social change by means of the "I" and the "me". It is by this concept that Mead sees social control as the "me" limiting and checking the "I", while social change is seen as the "I" asserting itself within the limits imposed by society (Pfuetze, 1954:91). In Mead's words, "Social Control is the expression of the 'me' over against the expression of the 'I'" (Mead, 1934a:252). Stated another way, Mead explains this relationship by saying,

...it is that reaction of the individual to the organized 'me', the 'me' that is in a certain sense simply a member of the community, which represents the 'I' in the experience of the self (Mead, 1934b:198-99).

Thus we have gone from two types of social psychology, one originating from social process, the other from individual selves, to a description of self based on the same principle; the "me" representing the social, the "I" representing the personal.

Let us now take a closer look at Mead's formulation of the "I" and the "me" as it relates to personality. According to Mead (1934b),

The 'I' is always something different from what the situation itself calls for, so there is always that distinction, if you like, between the 'I' and the 'me'. The 'I' both calls out the 'me' and responds to it. Taken together they constitute a personality as it appears in social experience. The self is essentially a social process going on with the two distinguishable phases. If it did not have these two phases there could not be conscious responsibility, and there would be nothing novel in experience (Mead, 1934b: 178).

This is an important step, for not only does Mead imply that there is a clear distinction between the "I" and the "me", but he also implies that both of these selves are to be found within the personality. Mead goes on to say that "thinking is simply the reasoning of the individual, the carrying-on of a conversation between the 'I' and the 'me'" (Mead, 1934b:335). Again we have a conceptual separation of these two aspects of self - to the point where they converse in internal dialogue. In a further statement of this separation of the "I" and the "me", Mead states: "That movement into the future is the step, so to speak, of the ego, of the 'I'. It is something that is not given in the 'me'" (Mead, 1934b:177).

Although Mead (1934b) is convinced that "Both aspects of the 'I' and 'me' are essential to the self in its full expression," (Mead, 1934b:199) he also feels that "there are relative situations when a person acts as a "me", and other times when the individual acts as an "I", "as over against the 'me'" (Mead, 1934b:199). In fact, according to Mead, there are situations where "the 'I' is the dominant element over against the 'me'" (Mead, 1934b:252). It is important to consider this last idea carefully. We have gone from a concept of the relationship of the 'I' to the 'me' as an interdependent unity, to a separation

so distinct as to imply that the two selves could even come to conflict. It is precisely this possible separation that I wish to develop as a major theme of this paper.

Mead (1934b) himself was not indisposed to give examples of persons or behaviors that could be classified as dominated by the "I" or the "me". He saw the artist as an example of a person who is able to break away from convention (the form of the "me") (Mead, 1934a:251) and express a dominant "I" (Mead, 1934b:214). This same personality type, he felt, could also be seen in the inventor and the scientist in his discovery (Mead, 1934b:214).

Another example of a personality type which, according to Mead, was a reflection of the "I", was the genius, especially the creative genius (Mead, 1934b:216-217, see also footnote, p. 216). Religious genius, such as that reflected in Jesus or Buddha, and reflective genius, such as that seen in Socrates, is also, to Mead's mind, an example of the response of the "I" over the "me" (Mead, 1934b:217).

In a more general sense, Mead saw impulsive conduct as "I" behavior (Mead, 1934a:251), while at the same time recognizing the adaptive ability of such persons (Mead, 1934b:214). As Mead expresses it, "The situation in which one can let himself go, in which the very structure of the 'me' opens the door for the 'I', is favorable to self-expression" (Mead, 1934b:213).

While the "I" personality type can be seen in the creative, self-expressive individual, the "me" type of personality is reflected in the "conventional, habitual individual" (Mead, 1934b:197). To Mead's mind, the politician is an example of the social "me". Here is an individual whose behavior, profession, and identity is intentionally

geared to reflect the attitudes and wishes of others (Mead, 1934b:187). Taken further, Mead saw nationalism and ethnocentrism as expressions of the "me" attitude in individuals (Mead, 1934b:207-209).

Although Mead recognized certain types of behaviors and personality types as representative of "I" or "me" dominance in the self, he also recognized certain integrations of the two aspects of self. According to Mead (1934b),

It is where the 'I' and the 'me' can in some sense fuse that there arises the peculiar sense of exaltation which belongs to the religious and patriotic attitudes in which the reaction which one calls out in others is the response which one is making himself (Mead, 1934b:273).

In fact, Mead even saw religious conversion as bringing the "me" of spiritual community into focus with the "I" of individuality. Mead referred to this integration as an "enlarged experience" (Mead, 1934b: 219).

Sympathy is another example of the blending of "I" and "me" components of the self into a single emotion. As Mead (1934b) explains it,

Sympathy comes, in the human form, in the arousing in one's self of the attitude of the individual whom one is assisting, and taking the attitude of the other when one is assisting the other (Mead, 1934b:299).

In the same vein, Mead (1934b) also interprets the attitude of humanitarianism as a 'fusion' of the "I" and the "me":

In the conception of universal neighborliness, there is a certain group of attitudes of kindness and helpfulness in which the response of one calls out in the other and in himself the same attitude. Hence the fusion of the 'I' and the 'me' which leads to intense emotional experiences (Mead, 1934b:274).

Another example of the melding of "I" and "me" behavior may be seen in the various forms of collective behavior when the "I" of the individual is given over to the "me" of the collectivity which, in

turn, behaves as a group "I". Mead briefly alluded to this process and defined it essentially as a "me" reaction (Mead, 1934b:213).

Before leaving Mead, I should like to briefly consider the twin concepts of 'role-taking' and the 'the generalized other'. While these two concepts are interdependent with each other, they are also connected to the support of a measurable "me".

Mead saw role-taking as the basic reflexive process through which the self arises. Through the use of significant symbols the individual is able to assume the attitude of others and then to organize the responses called forth by others in the self. "It is through taking this role of the other that he is able to come back on himself and so direct his own process of communication" (Mead, 1934b:254). Mead goes on to say that "The immediate effect of such role-taking lies in the control which the individual is able to exercise over his own response" (Mead, 1934b:254). Role-taking, then, may be seen as a mechanism by which the individual develops self-understanding through the reflected appraisals of others; his development, if you will, of the "me" aspect of the personality.

Through this process of role-taking, Mead felt that we not only take the place of other selves, but in doing so we gain perspective and are in a position to sympathize with them and see their point of view (Pfuetze, 1954:86).

From this basic concept of role-taking, Mead developed the broader idea of a generalized concept of role-taking, which, according to Mead, is the development of an understanding of "the attitude of the group as distinct from that of a separate individual - getting what I have

termed a 'generalized other'" (Mead, 1934b:256). More specifically,

Mead states:

The organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self may be called 'the generalized other'. The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community (Mead, 1934b:154).

The generalized other is a corporate 'me'.

According to Pfuetze,

The generalized other is a kind of corporate individual, a plural noun, a composite photograph which a self composes of the other members of his society. It is the universalization of the process of role-taking... (Pfuetze, 1954:84).

Pfuetze goes on to explain that "Mead's 'generalized other' is no guest; he is the Landlord himself, a composite of all the roles which society has made available to each of its members" (Pfuetze, 1954:85).

For Mead, the existence of a "generalized other" was essential to the development of self. It is society's "me". In Mead's words,

One must take the attitudes of the others in a group in order to belong to a community; he has to employ that outer social world taken within himself in order to carry on thought (Mead, 1934b:199).

So it is that Mead has described two interlocking concepts, role-taking and the "generalized other". The first of these, role-taking, may be seen as the process by which the individual develops a self relative to others, a social self, a "me". The second, development of a "generalized other", may be seen as corporate "me", a composite social self of the society. If this latter self did not exist, there would be no social reference - no society.

We have then, by Mead's account, a self comprised of an "I" and a "me", the "me" developing out of a process of role-taking which is filtered, in varying degrees, by the "I". The "me", expanded to group

or social reference, becomes a "generalized other", and may then be applied to society.

Pfuetze states it all very clearly by explaining:

In Mead's account..., the 'I' is that part of the self... which we identify with impulse, freedom, creativity, subjectivity; those aspects of individual behavior and experience which are over against the social or objective situation and which can and do change society. The 'me' is all of the attitudes, roles, meanings, pressures and values of others organized and taken over into one's self through the agency of role-taking which is involved in the language symbol (Pfuetze, 1954:91).

Charles Horton Cooley, who taught along with Mead in the Philosophy Department at the University of Michigan, also fell under the influence of William James. Using, in some cases, the similar terminology of "I" and "we", Cooley applied to society, as did Mead, the same basic principles that James applied to the self.

In his approach to social order, Cooley recognized the duality of social and individual, and sought to present them as separate conceptualizations of a unified whole. Writing on this duality, Cooley (1956) states:

A separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience, and so likewise is society when regarded as something apart from individuals. The real thing is Human Life, which may be considered either in an individual aspect or in a social, that is to say a general, aspect; but it is always, as a matter of fact, both individual and general. In other words, 'society' and 'individuals' do not denote separable phenomena, but are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing... (Cooley, 1956:36-37).

Thus, while Cooley (1956) recognizes the duality of individual and social, he sees them arising as simultaneous concepts of the same process of social life. To Cooley, "Self and Society are twin-born, we know one as immediately as we know the other, and the notion of a separate and independent ego is an illusion" (Cooley, 1956:5).

Even though Cooley was perhaps more cautious than Mead in accepting a clear-cut distinction between the personal and the social, he did refer to a social self as being the awareness of the individual of others. This social self Cooley referred to as a "we", and saw it as a group self: "The group self or 'we' is simply an 'I' which includes other persons" (Cooley, 1956:209).

In the same manner that Mead described the method of developing a social self through role-playing, Cooley described the same method in his well-known use of the "looking-glass self". While essentially a reformulation of James' "social self", Cooley's "looking-glass self" breaks the same process of the development of self into three distinct segments: "...the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification" (Cooley, 1956:152-184). Thus, for Cooley, the "looking-glass self" was the means by which the individual develops a "we", while for Mead the same result was achieved through role-taking which produces a "me".

Both men, coincidentally, see the positive expression of sentiment as a unifier of the personal and social selves. According to Cooley (1956),

...sentiment flourishes most in primary groups, where, as we have seen, it contributes to an ideal of moral unity of which kindness is a main part. Under its influence the I-feeling becomes a we-feeling... (Cooley, 1956:189-190).

This statement is hauntingly similar to Mead's belief that the attitudes of "kindliness and helpfulness" lead to "the fusion of the 'I' and the 'me'" (Mead, 1934b:274).

The personal self or "I", as seen by Cooley, is also essentially the same as that formulated by James and enlarged by Mead. Cooley saw the "I" as basically intrinsic, and conceived of it as based on imagination and instinctive self-feeling: "Imagination cooperating with instinctive self-feeling has already created a social 'I' and this has become a principal object of interest and endeavor" (Cooley, 1956:167).

For Cooley, the "I" meant "primarily self-feeling, or its expression..." (Cooley, 1956:172). It is important to recognize, however, that for Cooley the self and self-feeling are not necessarily the same as egotism and selfishness (Cooley, 1956:211-212). Indeed, even humility is seen by Cooley as self-feeling (Cooley, 1956:243-244).

The "I" to Cooley (1956) was an essential aspect of the self, and if it does not find expression there will be disruption: "Each man must have his 'I'; it is more necessary to him than bread; and if he does not find scope for it within the existing institutions he will be likely to make trouble" (Cooley, 1956:258). Cooley goes on to state that the "'I' is a militant social tendency, working to hold and enlarge its place in the general current of tendencies" (Cooley, 1956:181). This characteristic of Cooley's "I" is similar to Mead's description of the "I" as basic to social change (Mead, 1934a:252).

William Isaac Thomas, like Mead, saw the relationship between personality and social order as the central question of social thought (Thomas, 1958:20; Mead, 1934a:256). Influenced by the pragmatic tradition which was dominant at the University of Chicago where he taught sociology, Thomas felt that the province of sociology was centered around behavior which demonstrated conscious control. For Thomas, the basic process of consciousness was "attention", which was

"the mental attitude which takes note of the outside world and manipulates it" (Thomas, 1909:17).

In Thomas' later work, however, he expanded the concept of attention into a larger, societal framework with his concept of the effect on individuals of "definitions of the situation". In The Unadjusted Girl, Thomas (1923) wrote:

Preliminary to any self-determined act of behavior there is always a state of examination and deliberation which we may call the definition of the situation. And actually not only concrete acts are dependent on the definition of the situation, but gradually a whole life-policy and the personality of the individual himself follows from a series of such definitions (Thomas, 1923:42).

There are striking similarities here to the processes described by Mead in his "role-taking" and "generalized other", and also to Cooley's "looking-glass self". It is through the individual's ability to see through social and individual eyes that he is able to redefine the situation in which he is found and then to behave accordingly.

Thomas takes this basic idea of various "definitions of the situation" leading to behavioral decisions, and then implies that there are both personal and social frameworks for making these decisions. In fact, according to Thomas, there is a kind of universal disjunction between the personal and social definitions:

There is therefore a rivalry between the spontaneous definitions of the situation made by the member of an organized society and the definitions which his society has provided for him (Thomas, 1923:42).

It is through an accumulation of such definitions that Thomas felt that personality developed.

It is also of importance to note that the "spontaneous definitions of the situation" made by the individual are essentially like James'

"I" aspect of the self, while the "definitions which his society has provided for him" incorporate the same process by which the "me" develops.

With the development of personality arising out of various definitions of the situation, Thomas then set out to construct a typology of personality which could be interpreted in this fashion. In order to do this, he classified personality into three major parts: the Philistine, the Bohemian, and the Creative Man. According to Thomas (1966),

The Philistine, the Bohemian, and the Creative Man are the three fundamental forms of personal determination toward which social personalities tend in their evolution (Thomas, 1966:30).

For Thomas (1966), the Philistine is essentially a conformist (Thomas, 1966:29). He is,

...the individual who adapts his activities completely to the prevailing definitions and norms; he chooses security at the cost of new experience and individuality (Thomas, 1966:172).

I would like to suggest at this point that Thomas' "Philistine" is essentially a prototype of the person with a dominant social self or "me". It is this type of person who defines himself through others - the type that Mead saw reflected in the politician (Mead, 1934b:187).

At the other extreme lies the bohemian. The bohemian, according to Thomas, "is unable to fit into any frame, social or personal, because his life is spent in trying to escape definitions and avoid suppressions..." (Thomas, 1966:172). It is this type of person that represents the dominance of the personal self, or "I" aspect of the personality. In essence, the philistine (me) accepts all definitions placed on him by others, while the bohemian (I) rejects them. In comparing these two personality types, Thomas (1966) states:

The philistine and the bohemian are produced by the social effort to impose upon the individual a life-organization and to mold his character without regard to his personal tendencies and the line of his spontaneous development (Thomas, 1966:172).

The third personality type, that of the creative man, falls somewhere in between the over-socialized philistine and the under-socialized bohemian. He is not, however, an example of the integration of the other two types. Essentially, the creative man is one who, like the bohemian, rejects the definitions imposed by society, but who is able to come up with substitutes and solutions for this dilemma. According to Thomas, both the creative man and the bohemian represent individualization, "...but the individualization of the creative man is an intermediary stage between one system of values and another..." (Thomas, 1966:173). To my way of thinking, Thomas' "creative man" is essentially the same as Mead's "creative genius" (Mead, 1934b:216-217) and his religious and reflective genius (Mead, 1934b:217).

We have, then, the formulation by Thomas of three universal personality types: the philistine, the bohemian, and the creative man. From our framework of social and personal self, the philistine seems to represent the personality type dominated by the social self, or 'me', while the bohemian and creative man seem to be dominated by the personal self, or 'I', with the creative man simply more able to resolve this dilemma than the bohemian.

Pitirim Sorokin, whose theoretical work is generally considered to center around idealistic organicism (see Martindale, 1960:116), has proposed a typology of personality types arising out of cultural systems which bears a good deal of resemblance to both Thomas' and Mead's typology. According to Sorokin (1947) these four types of personality

are ideational, sensate, idealistic, and eclectic, each of which reflects a varying degree of balance between society and personality.

The ideational personality type is reflected in individuals who define true reality and value in a supersensory and superrational God or its equivalent. The ideational personality overstresses spiritual needs and understresses sensory needs and values. The ideational personality is "preoccupied primarily with the inner, mystical, supersensory, and super-rational world" (Sorokin, 1947:663). According to Sorokin, the activities of the ideational personality "are mainly those of the 'introvert'" (Sorokin, 1947:633). It is fairly easy to see the similarity here between this type of personality and the phenomenon described by Mead as "enlarged experience" (Mead, 1934b:219), wherein the "I" of the individual is expanded into the "me" of spiritualness rather than the "me" of a particular society.

The second personality type described by Sorokin is that of the sensate personality, which is opposite in character from the ideational. To the sensate personality, "reality and values are sensate and largely material..." (Sorokin, 1947:634). In contrast to the introversion of the ideational personality, the sensate personality is "a noisy, active extrovert" (Sorokin, 1947:634). This type of personality would seem to conform to Thomas' "philistine" personality type, and would represent the dominance of the social self, or "me".

Falling somewhere inbetween the ideational and sensate personality types as described by Sorokin, is the idealistic type of personality. This type "...tries (with considerable success) to unite into one balanced whole the noblest traits of the sensate personality and the less extreme characteristics of the ideational type" (Sorokin, 1947:

634). This type of personality is somewhat analogous to Thomas' "creative man", although it does not imply the rejection of norms and values that Thomas' "creative man" does. In many ways, the idealistic type of personality is more closely aligned with Riesman's "autonomous" type of personality (Riesman, 1961).

Finally, the fourth type of personality described by Sorokin is that of the eclectic. According to Sorokin (1947),

This type... is unintegrated and inconsistent...his behavioral and material culture is a medley of disconnected incidental, inconsistent patterns of conduct and material vehicles (Sorokin, 1947:634).

Sorokin goes on to say that "since his ideological and behavioral cultures are unintegrated, his total behavior is largely incidental, determined chiefly by fortuitous external factors" (Sorokin, 1947:634). This type of personality is essentially what Thomas described as the "Bohemian" who "is unable to fit into any frame..." (Thomas, 1966:172).

What Sorokin has described with his typology of personality, then, is a concept of a cultural "I" - the ideational self; a cultural "me" - the sensate self; and two compromises - the well-balanced idealistic type and the imbalanced eclectic type. The implication here for a typology of personal and social self is manifest.

David Riesman, belonging primarily in the social-action school (Martindale, 1960:428-430), based his analysis of personality types as contingent upon industrialization and the societal utilization of leisure (Riesman, 1952, 1961). Although we are not concerned in this work with societal typologies or the effect on personality of different types of societies, Riesman did make use of a typology of personality which relates to the general framework developed here.

Personalities may be classified, according to Riesman, into three general types: the inner-directed person, the other-directed person, and the tradition-directed person. A fourth type of personality, that of the autonomous person, is also presented as a kind of optimum reaction to a social system of stress (Riesman, 1961).

The other-directed personality is a product of industrialization and mass society, and is particularly evident in the middle-class. The other-directed person is reliant on others for his sense of worth, and, in contrast to the individualism of less industrialized societies, the other-directed person seeks interaction with others to the degree that his behavior is controlled by those interpersonal relations. As Riesman (1961) explains it:

What we mean by other-direction...involves a redefinition of the self, away from William James' emphasis on the externals of name, dress, possessions, and toward inner or interactional qualities. The other-directed person wants to be loved rather than esteemed; he wants not to gull or impress, let alone oppress, others but, in the current phrase, to relate to them (Riesman, 1961:xx).

The tradition-directed person, in slight contrast to the other-directed person, is to be found in the type of society described by Tonnies as "Gemeinschaft" (see Tonnies, 1957). In the tradition-directed personality, the individual self is a priori defined by long-standing norms and values which apply to the whole society. In the same way that the other-directed person is defined by and through interaction with others, the tradition-directed person is defined by conformity. As Riesman (1961) describes him, "the tradition-directed person...hardly thinks of himself as an individual" (Riesman, 1961:17). Both types of personality, other-directed and tradition-directed, are reflective of the dominance of a social self or "me".

The inner-directed person, on the other hand, is directed more by internalized controls than externalized controls. His sense of value involves concepts of personal worth, both internal, such as goodness, and external, such as wealth. His personality is embodied in the Protestant Ethic. As Riesman (1961) describes him,

...the inner-directed person becomes capable of maintaining a delicate balance between the demands upon him of his life goal and the buffetings of his external environment (Riesman, 1961:16).

The inner-directed personality is dominated by an "I" which struggles against the threatening menace of social control.

The final solution to the threat of growing industrialization is not to be found, however, according to Riesman (1961), in inner-directedness. In many ways inner-directedness involves as great a dependence on society as does the other-directed and tradition-directed types of personality. The real hope, in his eyes, is to be found in the autonomous person, an adjusted blend of all possibilities (Riesman, 1961:60). I have already pointed out the similarity between this solution and Sorokin's "idealistic" type of personality (Sorokin, 1947:634).

It may serve us well at this point to recall Riesman's warning to those, such as I, who seek to draw a distinction between the social and personal self. Writing on the contrast between the inner-directed and the other-directed personality, Riesman (1961) states:

...no individual is ever entirely one or the other, particularly if his life is viewed as a whole, and not at any one moment. Thus, while it is interesting to compare individuals in terms of degrees of inner-direction and other-direction, such work can hardly be conclusive, and those who have called for a large-scale empirical test of these traits, applied to a whole population, have little appreciation of the complexity and scope of the theoretical analysis and empirical investigation that would be required before such work could even begin (Riesman, 1961:xviii).

In a short but conceptually fertile article on conformity, Richard Willis describes the self in terms which closely parallel aspects of the typologies presented by Thomas, Sorokin, and Riesman. According to Willis, the individual reacts to others in any one of four "basic response modes" which are defined as conformity, independence, anti-conformity, and variability (Willis, 1967:434-435).

The first of these responses - that of conformity - is seen by Willis as "a completely consistent attempt to behave in accordance with normative expectations as perceived" (Willis, 1967:434). Defined in such a way, it is easy to see the relationship between this type of behavior and behavior which is reflective of "me-dominance". In both cases, the individual shapes his behavior according to his perception of the attitudes and reactions of others.

Anticonformity, on the other hand, is described as intentionally antithetical to conformity, but nonetheless a reaction based on a consideration of the reactions of others (Willis, 1967:434). In this sense, anticonformity is as purely a "me" reaction as conformity. This is an important consideration, for it should not be felt that anticonformity, as purely a rejection of conformity, is an expression of the personal self or "I", but rather an expression of the social self or "me". Those who wear the uniform of the nonconformist are as reliant on the reactions of others as those who must conform.

As a third alternative response mode, Willis presents the behavioral typology of independence (Willis, 1967:434). According to Willis, the individual expressing independence behavior "perceives relevant normative expectations, but gives zero weight to these perceived expectations in formulating his decisions" (Willis, 1967:434).

This is essentially the typology expressed by Sorokin as the "idealistic" type of personality (Sorokin, 1947) and by Riesman as the "autonomous" type of personality (Riesman, 1961).

The final alternative response mode presented by Willis is the variability response. This response "reflects complete indecision" (Willis, 1967:435) and is characterized by the individual changing his response at any opportunity regardless of the existing norm. While Willis interprets this response as representing "the assignment of zero weight to the normative expectations of the group" (Willis, 1967:435), the same behavior could also be seen as a reaction to the pressure of incompatible normative expectations, which is one interpretation of the condition of anomie. It should also be pointed out that Willis' variability response contains distinct similarities to Thomas' "bohemian" (Thomas, 1966) and Sorokin's "eclectic" (Sorokin, 1947) typologies.

One obvious omission from Willis' "Diamond model" (see Willis, 1967:435) is any consideration of the effect on behavior of the personal aspect of the self. It must be granted that Willis nowhere states that he is developing a model of the complete self, but at the same time one cannot help but feel that he is trying to capture the full range of behavior as it relates to the perceived expectations of others. We are alerted to this limitation by Willis' usage of the concept of "response", which is not action, but merely reaction. Regardless of this limitation, however, Willis' model is a useful mechanism for understanding the relationship between conformity and self.

Ivan Chapman (1972), in expanding Mead's concept of the "I" and the "me" to the level of social action, has developed a model of self

he calls the "social action-self" (Chapman, 1972:31). Since it is precisely this combination of self and social action that is the focus of this paper, it becomes necessary to examine Chapman's approach in some detail.

Chapman (1972) begins his analysis of ongoing social action at the generic level of the dyad; "Two whole persons in reciprocal interaction mediated by a cultural symbol of some kind..." (Chapman, 1972: 5). Each person within this dyad, according to Chapman, has two aspects of self - an "I" and a "me" - either of which may be dominant at any given time, depending on the course of the social action in progress. As Chapman (1972) explains it,

...the individual as 'I' and 'me' retains both of these aspects, but in social exchange is capable of restraining either aspect of self, the 'I' aspect or the 'me', and is capable of acting in either capacity, that is, as an 'I' or a 'me'. This signifies that a social person interacting with another social person can act as an 'I' by initiating acts toward the other, then can shift from an 'I' to a 'me' to receive acts initiated by the other (Chapman, 1972:15).

When such social action is going on,

...the integrity of each person's 'I' and 'me' is fully retained and utilized in a social mix deemed appropriate by the persons themselves in their particular existential conditions (Chapman, 1972:21).

The self that results from such a balance of "I" and "me" is essentially as autonomous self (Chapman, 1972:16) similar to Riesman's formulation (Riesman, 1961:160).

There may, on the other hand, be various "unearned" social influences on the dyad (or society) which will upset the balance of appropriate social action (Chapman, 1972:4, 23), causing the individual (or society) to act as a non-reciprocal "I" or "me". Such "unearned"

social influence, that is to say influence which is imposed upon the social unit, may exceed the "rational threshold of society", or the "innovative threshold of society" (Chapman, 1972:23). An example of action exceeding the rational threshold of society is "total planning" of all kinds, whereas an example of social action exceeding the innovative threshold of society is "collective action" of all kinds (Chapman, 1972:23). The major force that Chapman describes as moving social action from reciprocity to imbalance is the ideology spawned by the typologist who reifys his typology as more than the temporary method it is.

It is also worthy to note that Chapman, unlike Riesman, recognizes that the imbalance produced by ideology is not population-based, but rather a "rational, 'ideal type' movement" (Chapman, 1972:23).

Observable social action, then, according to Chapman, is action which results from the individual integrating the "I" aspect of self, which is made up of reason, emotional reason, emotion, and hedonic needs, with the "me" aspect of self, which is composed of "other" directives (Chapman, 1972:31). Whenever this "social action-self" is dominated by the "I", or self-initiated action, or by the "me", or "other" initiated action, the self is out of balance and the resulting social action is indicative of that imbalance.

Other Influences

In the foregoing pages of this chapter I have attempted to bring together some of the more major theoretical works that have dealt in some way with a description of the social and personal aspects of the self. While in no way was this presentation meant to be inclusive, I

feel it has set a foundation on which I can base a practical measurement of personal and social self. Before moving on, however, I feel a need to briefly mention a few authors who should be among the counted.

One influence I felt was that of Martin Buber, who saw the attitudes that people have as essentially "I-thou" or "I-it" attitudes. For Buber, the "I-thou" attitude was an expression of personal self, which, when carried over to social or material levels became anthropomorphised into "I-it" attitudes. The ability to see and feel "from the other side" - (the 'thou' side) was a concept similar to Mead's role-taking (Pfuetze, 1954:158-159). According to Pfuetze, (1954),

Mead and Buber are social philosophers endeavoring to elaborate a social psychology and philosophy which will do justice to both the individual and society, individual freedom and the common welfare. They reject the extremes of both individualism and collectivism, of sociological nominalism and sociological realism, and seek instead a middle axiom in the social self in which self and society are correlative terms (Pfuetze, 1954:333).

Erich Fromm (1942), among other contributions, has given us the word "automaton", which is a vivid description of the extreme to which one may become a "me". Fromm referred to the "automaton" as the type of person who is completely dependent on the appraisals of others for his identity (Fromm, 1942).

Erving Goffman (1950) in his dramaturgical approach to interaction, has tried to explain the self as a "performance" of which the "actor" is in varying degrees of control and recognition. His "self" is primarily a social self.

Hans Gerth (1954) and C. Wright Mills borrowed from Mead the concept of the "generalized other", and reinterpreted it to refer not to the whole society, but rather only to those individuals that the person

defines as significant. Gerth and Mills also referred to the self as "unified" if the individual is consistent in his behavior, whether the behavior is subordinate or self-assertive (Gerth, 1954:106-107).

Similar descriptions of personality types may be found in Mannheim's (1936) "conservative" and "progressive or revolutionary" types; T. W. Adorno's (1950) "authoritarian personality"; and Gasset's (1932) and Heidegger's (1960) "mass-man".

In a more general sense, the duality of the self as expressed by Mead is reflected in the **social** psychology of Robert Faris (1952), Kimball Young (1930), Herbert Blumer (1970), and Charles Morris (1932). The same type of analysis is also found in the area of general psychology in works such as Gardner Murphy's (1947) Personality, Gordon Allport's (1937) Personality, Hadley Cantril's (1950) The Why of Man's Experience, and Charles Morris' (1948) The Open Self.

In the areas of biology and anthropology, Abram Kardiner's (1945) The Psychological Frontiers of Society, is an attempt to discover the various social forces which shape basic personality. Margaret Mead (1930) in her book Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies concludes that temperament and value judgments are the result of cultural conditioning and education which evolves in the order of the social. Ralph Linton (1936, 1945) and Ruth Benedict (1961) have also been concerned with the inter-relation of personality to culture, and stress that individual personalities and personality types cannot be understood without constant reference to their social and cultural environment.

In the field of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, Anton T. Boisen (1936) found Mead's point of view as the best key to the understanding

of personality disorders. He holds that social response is the basis of the personality. Karen Horney (1934, 1935) and her following have based their descriptions of personality in terms of interpersonal relations, explaining all neurotic reactions as conflicts between the tendencies to "move toward", "move away from", or "move against" people. Harry Stack Sullivan (1940) defines psychiatry as the study of interpersonal relations and the probable locus of social psychology. According to Sullivan, the focus of psychoanalysis is directed to the social basis and social morphology of the self. The person is seen as a dynamic "self-system" composed of the evolving sum of "reflected appraisals".

Erich Fromm (1941), a social psychologist, clearly sees the influence of society and culture on the character structure of the self, and shows how man's neurotic suffering in this age comes from the loneliness and estrangement which have seized him (Fromm, 1941, 1942).

According to Fromm:

...the fundamental approach to human personality is the understanding of man's relation to the world, to others, to nature, and to himself... In this sense, we believe that individual psychology is fundamentally social psychology or, in Sullivan's terms, the psychology of interpersonal relationships (Fromm, 1941:290).

So from many corners have we drawn a description of the self. The simple typology of a personal and a social self has had a profound influence on theoretical developments in both sociology and psychology, as well as in other fields and, in my opinion, will continue to do so. With this basic understanding of the duality of the self, it is now necessary to develop a theoretical understanding of what lies inbetween the polar concepts of personal and social self. In order to do this,

it is necessary to review the various orientations and interpretations of the theoretical concept of anomie.

Anomie

While I have, through the integration of various theoretical works, tried to lend support to the idea that individuals may express, through their behavior, a dominance of a personal or social self, it is fairly obvious that there should be individuals who, in their behavior, exhibit a blend or balance of these two selves. Therefore, while Fromm's "automaton" is a complete "me", and Mead's "artist" is a complete "I", there are obviously many people who fall in between.

In general, these people who fall "in between" have been referred to as either fairly integrated, adjusted individuals, such as Sorokin's (1947) "idealistic" type of personality (Sorokin, 1947:634) and Chapman's and Riesman's "autonomous" personality (Chapman, 1972:16, Riesman, 1961:160); or as malintegrated, unsettled individuals, such as Riesman's "anomic" individual (1961:287) and Sorokin's "eclectic" (1947:634). It is this latter state of malintegration between the personal and social selves that I should like to develop as a form of the condition known as anomie.

Emile Durkheim (1947) first sketched the idea of anomie in his Division of Labor in Society. It was through the deterioration of industrial relations in the nineteenth century that manager and worker, stripped of all sense of mutual obligation, became estranged. Durkheim's (1897) first mention of the term anomie, however, appeared in le Suicide as "L'etat de dereglement ou d'anomie," which is translated as "the state of unbridledness" (Lundberg, 1959:251).

In his book Suicide, Durkheim (1951) distinguished three types of suicide: egoistic, altruistic, and anomic. Powell (1970) points out the similarity in these first two types of suicide to the personality types described as the "I" and the "me". As Powell interprets Durkheim, "Egoism denotes psycho-social isolation, aloneness; altruism is its opposite, the submergence of the ego in the collectivity" (Powell, 1970:5). Here it is easy to see egoism, in the sense that Durkheim used it, as representative of the dominance of the personal self or "I", and altruism as representative of the social self or "me". Anomic states, by compromise, "...result from man's activities lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings" (Durkheim, 1951:258).

Dohrenwend, in an attempt to remove some of the ambiguity in Durkheim's description of the types of social environment which lead to suicide, distinguished anomie from egoism and altruism by describing it as "marked by the absence of norms altogether" (Clinard, ed., 1964:9).

Although Durkheim's anti-psychological orientation led him to resist the attempt to treat anomie as a state of mind as well as a social condition (Powell, 1970:252), there are many who now use the concept of anomie to refer to both a personal and a social condition. According to Powell, "Anomie is both a social condition and a psychic state. It is sometimes referred to as a 'social and emotional void' or 'separation-anxiety' (de Grazia)" (Powell, 1970:132, footnote 11) (see also Yinger, 1965:188-189).

In further support of both social and individual states of anomie, Rushing (1971) states:

There are two general conceptions of normlessness. One is the absence of consensus or a low degree of agreement on the dominant norms of society, such that we speak of a 'normless' culture or society; in this sense, normlessness

is a societal state. The other conception focuses on individual attitudes, so that persons who are psychologically alienated from the dominant normative order are viewed as normless (Rushing, 1971:859-860).

Robert K. Merton, while in his earlier work only conceding that "...anomie varies in degree and perhaps in kind" (Merton, 1968:217), later spoke favorably of the attempt to separate the concept of social and individual states of anomie. According to Merton (1964):

To prevent conceptual confusion..different terms are required to distinguish between the anomic state of individuals and the anomic state of the social system, for though the two are variously connected, they are nevertheless distinct. This is more, much more, than a "merely" terminological matter. It cuts deep into basic problems of extending the theory of anomie and of initiating a new phase in empirical research on anomie (Merton, 1964:227).

The separation which had influenced Merton's change in enthusiasm was the classification of anomie into "acute anomie" and "simple anomie". Acute anomie was generally used to refer to the psychological anxiety resulting from the deterioration and disintegration of value systems, while simple anomie referred to a group or societal state of confusion (de Grazia, 1948:72-74; Brooks, 1951:44-51, 1952:38-49). I myself find no value in this particular terminology, and will not refer to it further.

Merton, while using anomie in its societal context, did allow that "normlessness" did not necessarily mean without norms, but rather that the society or group was exposed to divergent or contradictory normative expectations (Merton, 1968:185-248). In Merton's (1964) words,

...the degree of anomie in a social system is indicated by the extent to which there is a lack of consensus on norms judged to be legitimate, with its attendant uncertainty and insecurity in social relations (Merton, 1964:227).

We have gone, then, from Durkheim's use of the concept of anomie as a purely societal condition to a fairly universal acceptance that anomie may also be used to refer to an individual state. It is this individual state that I will refer to within the context of this paper. I will also draw upon the concept that anomie results from exposure to contradictory values and norms. It is also worthy of note that while there has been stress upon anomie as a societal condition, there are those who view anomie as peculiar to the individual condition. MacIver (1950) saw anomie as a state of mind rather than a state of society. Leo Srole (1956a:63-67, 1956b:709-716) proposed the term "anomia" to designate an anomic state of an individual. According to Mizruchi, "Degrazia, MacIver, and Lasswell also suggest that disintegration associated with anomic processes reflects itself in degrees of pathological subjective detachment in society's members" (Mizruchi, 1964:49). Powell, while he saw anomie almost solely in negative terms, felt "every entry in the catalogue of human aberration can be linked to anomie" (Powell, 1970:preface).

In much the same way that Powell felt anomie was "the cancer of the body-social" (Powell, 1970:preface), de Grazia expanded Durkheim's concept of anomie to account for nearly all of the difficulties of contemporary society. According to Clinard, de Grazia attributed such widely diverse problems as infertility in women and schizophrenia to anomie (Clinard, 1964:9).

David Riesman, in addition to his typology of inner-directed, other-directed, and tradition-directed personality, has defined what he refers to as three universal character types: the adjusted, the

anomic, and the autonomous. Although, according to Riesman, no one is exclusively one or the other,

...we can characterize an individual by the way in which one mode of adaptation predominates, and, when we study individuals, analysis by such a method provides certain helpful dimensions for description and comparative purposes (Riesman, 1961:243).

According to Riesman (1961):

The 'adjusted' are those whom for the most part we have been describing. They are the typical tradition-directed, inner-directed, or other-directed people - those who respond in their character structure to the demands of their society or social class at its particular stage on the curve of population. Such people fit the culture as though they were made for it, as in fact they are. There is, characterologically speaking, an effortless quality about their adjustment... (Riesman, 1961:241-242).

The basis on which adjustment is made, Riesman explains, is not the individual's overt behavior conforming to social norms, but rather his character structure (Riesman, 1961:242). We are not told how this "character structure" is measured.

Riesman (1961) goes on to explain that,

In each society those who do not conform to the characterological pattern of the adjusted may be either anomic or autonomous. Anomic is English coinage from Durkheim's anomie (adjective of anomie) meaning ruleless, ungoverned. My use of anomic, however, covers a wider range than Durkheim's metaphor: it is virtually synonymous with maladjusted, a term I refrain from using because of its negative connotations; for there are some cultures where I would place a higher value on the maladjusted or anomic than on the adjusted. The autonomous are those who on the whole are capable of conforming to the behavioral norms of their society - a capacity the anomics usually lack - but are free to choose whether to conform or not (Riesman, 1961:287).

With this more generalized typology of Riesman's, it becomes more difficult to distinguish exactly where the difference between the autonomous person and the anomic person lies, except for the ability to

make choices. In fact, Riesman further characterizes the anomics as those who may also be "overadjusted, who listen too assiduously to the signals from within or without" (Riesman, 1961:244). This is the person Riesman refers to as "oversteered" (Riesman, 1961:244).

What we have, then, with Riesman's various typologies, is a representation of the personal self in the inner-directed person, a representation of the social self in the other-directed and tradition-directed persons, and two compromises: the maladjusted anomic and the adjustable autonomous individual. It is essentially the anomic individual that I wish to characterize as one of the major types in this study.

CHAPTER III

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Since the theoretical formulation of the basis of this paper has required an extensive, if not exhaustive, examination of the various works dealing with a social and personal self, as well as a review of the concept of anomie, this section will be confined to a review of the literature relating to the practical application of this theoretical foundation.

In order to implement the theoretical concepts outlined in this paper, I have selected three groups of people who represent different attitudes, through their behavior, relative to compassionate service toward others. The three groups are the counselor, the volunteer, and the non-volunteer. I have also included a review of the literature on voluntary associations as it relates to the general thesis.

Voluntary Associations

Weber (1911), de Tocqueville (1945), Bryce (1933), Bell and Force (1956:25-34), Beard and Beard (1946), Myrdal (1944), and Babchuk and Booth (1969:31-45), among others, have described the United States as a "nation of joiners". While this opinion has represented the general consensus about Americans belonging to voluntary associations, only Wright and Hyman (1958:284-294), Hyman and Wright (1971:191-206), and Hausnecht (1962) have presented detailed national survey data dealing

with this question. Hyman and Wright (1971:191-206), in analyzing the national trend over the seven-year period from 1955 to 1962 stated that:

American adults, whether studied in 1955 or in 1962, most frequently are not members of (non-union) voluntary associations. A majority (64% in 1955; 57% in 1962) report no membership whatsoever, and only a small percentage belong to many associations (Hyman and Wright, 1971:195).

It should be noted, however, that there was a seven percent increase in national participation in voluntary associations in that seven-year period.

One of the major difficulties that arises from a study of voluntary associations is that of determining an adequate definition. In fact, the definitional problem is probably the greatest reason for the differences in various explanations of the incidence of voluntary association membership. According to Tomeh (1973:89-122), "there is little consensus among researchers regarding the operational definition of voluntary groups" (Tomeh, 1973:93). Palis (1968:392-405) feels that one of the major difficulties is that the rationale behind the definition of voluntariness is not adequately stated. As a general rule of thumb, Tomeh (1973:89-122) points out that,

'Formal groups' and 'voluntary associations' have been used interchangeably to mean organizations in which membership depends on the free choice of the individual while severance rests at the will of either party (Tomeh, 1972:93).

In one approach to the definitional problem of voluntary associations, Gordon and Babchuk (1959:22-29) distinguished three types of voluntary groups according to the function they provide for individuals or social groups or both. The three types are expressive, instrumental, and mixed. Expressive groups are those which are organized to control

deviant behavior and provide constructive socialization and affectual support for those who belong to the group. Examples are hobby groups, recreational clubs, senior citizens groups, boy scouts, etc. Instrumental groups, on the other hand, are organized to deal with the external social environment in order to support or change it. Examples of instrumental groups are seen in business groups, labor unions, the P.T.A., etc. Finally, mixed groups are those which combine the affectual support of expressive groups with the external control of instrumental groups. Church groups, the American Legion, and the Masons are examples of mixed groups (Gordon and Babchuk, 1959:22-29).

With this classification of the types of voluntary groups in mind, there have been various efforts in its implementation. Babchuk and Gordon (1962), Jacoby and Babchuk (1963:461-471), and Moore (1961:592-598) have used this typology in the ranking of voluntary organizations in relation to each other. On a more theoretical level, Harp and Gagan (1971:477-482) feel that instrumental groups, because of their broader membership base and more inclusive goals, will have greater participation from community members. This position is supported by Babchuk and Edwards (1965:149-162), Smith (1966:483-491), and Clark (1958).

However, although there has been some interest expressed in the expressive - instrumental - mixed typology, it has been used in only a few research reports (i.e.: Moore, 1961:592-598); Jacoby, 1965:163-175); Dackawich, 1966:74-78; Ross and Wheeler, 1967:583-586, 1971; Booth, 1972:183-192). For similar typologies, see Rose (1954:52), Parsons (1951); Parsons et al. (1953), and Lundberg et al. (1934).

Another classificatory scheme of voluntary organizations is proposed by Warriner-Prather (1965). This typology distinguishes voluntary associations in terms of the rewards it provides for its own members. The rewards are generally classified as pleasure in performance, sociability, ideological symbolism, and production (Warriner and Prather, 1965:138-148). If nothing more, these typologies serve to point out the potential range of motivation behind participation in voluntary associations, and the lack of consensus as to description and definition of voluntary organizations.

Of greatest concern to this research, however, is not a typology of voluntary association, but rather the characteristics of those who participate in voluntary associations. Tomeh (1973:89-122) expresses this same interest when he states that "Perhaps the first question that needs to be answered concerns the motivations and personality characteristics of those who join groups" (Tomeh, 1973:110). Tomeh goes on to say that "Such efforts...have been inadequately treated in terms of a research strategy or a theoretical typology" (Tomeh, 1973:110). Along these lines, Jacoby (1966:76-84), Babchuk and Gordon (1962), and Booth and Babchuk (1969:179-188) have stressed the importance of personal influence in determining the extent of individual's voluntary associations, while Smith (1966:249-266), Booth et al. (1968:427-438), Blum (1964:195-207), Hausknecht (1964:207-215), Brager (1969:375-383), Axelrod (1956:13-18), Wilensky (1961a:521-523), Foskett (1955:431-438), and Phillips (1969:3-21) have stressed the relationship of personality and social psychological variables to voluntary associations. Although many have stressed the need for studies relating attitudinal and psychological factors to membership in voluntary associations, the

amount of research done in this area is comparatively small (Tomeh, 1973:110). According to Tomeh, "...there is a continuing lack of information on attitudinal factors in relation to formal (voluntary) groups" (Tomeh, 1973:103).

While there has been little research indicating the relationship between personality and membership in voluntary groups, there has been much research supporting the relationship of social class (education, occupation, income) to voluntarism. Among those who have stressed this relationship are Foskett (1955:431-438), Martin (1952:687-694), Gerstl (1961:56-58), Hagedorn and Lobovitz (1967:484-491, 1968:272-283), Scott (1957:315-326), Reismann (1954:76-84), Tomeh (1969:65-76), Grusky (1964:83-111), Komarouvsy (1946:686-698), Bushee (1945:117-226), Axelrod (1956:13-18), Phillips (1969:3-21), Wilensky (1961a:521-523), Wright and Hyman (1958:284-294), Hyman and Wright (1971:191-206), and Hodge and Trieman (1968:722-741). The general conclusion of these authors is that people of higher socio-economic status participate to a higher degree in voluntary associations.

There is not as much consensus on the relationship between length of residence and participation in voluntary associations, however, as on the relationship of voluntary association to social class. Freeman et al. (1957:528-533), Tomeh (1969:65-76), and Zimmer (1955:218-224) indicated a positive correlation between length of residence and voluntary association, while Wright and Hyman (1958:284-294) found no such relationship, and Scott (1957:315-326) indicated that length of residence was significant only when correlated with other variables such as age and marital status.

Although Hyman and Wright's study (1971:191-206) indicated that participation in voluntary associations generally increases with both income and education, others, such as Curtis (1959:67-71, 1960:315-319), Vorwaller (1970:481-495), Tomeh (1973:89-122), and Bruce (1971:46-55) have found no positive relationship between occupational mobility and voluntary association. According to Tomeh, "Occupational mobility... is only vaguely related to membership in voluntary groups" (Tomeh, 1973: 102). Litwak (1960:9-21) feels the reason for this lack of relationship between occupational mobility and voluntarism may be related to status insecurity and/or differential socialization.

When age is related to membership in voluntary organizations, research shows a tendency toward a linear relationship, i.e., an increase in participation from adolescence till around the age of fifty or sixty, when there is a gradual decline. This linear relationship has been described by Hausknecht (1962), Babchuk and Edwards (1965: 149-162), and Lane (1959). While this relationship between age and participation in voluntary groups is generally true, there are some inconsistencies according to Babchuk and Booth (1969:31-45), Axelrod (1956:13-18), Bell and Force (1956a:345-359), Scott (1957:315-326), and Foskett (1955:431-438), including the variable of sex (Babchuk and Booth, 1969:31-45).

From the perspective of role theory, the differences in participation in voluntary groups by age are explained by Foskett (1955:431-438) as reflecting one's position in the social system. Along the same line, those who support the integration theme see age as reflecting the integration of the young into society as they take on additional responsibilities, while, with old age, a gradual detachment from society

occurs. This perspective is expanded by Pihlbland and McNamara (1965: 49-73), Videback and Knox (1965:37-49), and Rose and Peterson (1965).

The various research on male-female differences in participation in voluntary groups as explored by Scott (1957:315-326), Palisi (1965: 219-226), Dotson (1951:687-693), and Babchuk and Booth (1969:31-45), fairly consistently shows a slightly higher affiliation rate for males than females, while the amount of time committed by males and females is about the same (Booth, 1972:183-192).

In terms of social adjustment many mass society theorists see voluntary groups as integrative mechanisms which supposedly reduce the amount of alienation in a society (Kornhauser, 1959; Arendt, 1951; Rose, 1954), and much of the research supports the idea that those who participate in voluntary organizations are less alienated (Erbe, 1964: 198-214; Rose, 1962b:834-838; Meier and Bell, 1959:189-202; Neal and Seeman, 1964:216-226). This research would seem to be consistent with the integrationist explanation of voluntary association. Rose (1962a: 316-330) maintains that voluntary organizations have the effect of counteracting the feelings produced by a mass society. Implied here is also the possibility that the alienated and anomic may seek participation in voluntary associations due to personal need. The functional position that voluntary organizations serve the needs of both society and the individual is supported by Rose (1954; 1962a:316-330; 1962b: 834-838), Greer and Orleans (1962:634-646), Rossi (1961:301-312), Erbe (1964:198-215), Babchuk and Edwards (1965:149-162), Jacoby (1965:163-175), and Tomeh (1969:65-76).

The Counselor

If there has been one overriding consistency in the comparison of counselors and volunteers, it is that both lack an adequate definition. In much the same way that "voluntary associations" may refer to anything from membership in labor unions to church groups, "counseling" may refer to anything from high-school academic counseling to professional emotional or marriage counseling. Because this work refers to compassionate service towards others, there is an understanding about the type of counseling referred to in this research that is not always clarified in the various literature. I have attempted, therefore, to review only that literature that refers to the compassionate type of counseling.

Interest in the personality characteristics of the counselor has been a focal point of researchers for some time. Cottle (1953:445-449), Cottle and Lewis (1954:27-30), Wehr and Wittmer (1972:255-262), Cottle, Lewis, and Penney (1954:74-77), and Cottle, Pownall, and Stimel (1955:374-378) have all suggested the need for establishing an approximate profile of personality traits which would characterize counselors as an occupational group. While this general need for a profile of the counselor has been expressed, much of the research dealing with counselor personality has been directed towards a comparison of effective and ineffective counselors. Truax (1970:4-15; 1963:256-263), Truax and Lister (1970:331-334), Reik (1949), Roemmich (1967:24-26), Canon (1964:35-40), and Arbuckle (1956:93-96), among others, have stressed the personality characteristics of the counselors as they relate to effectiveness in counseling.

Since the motivation to become a counselor is the only general characteristic of the counselor we are concerned with in this research, effectiveness in counseling really bears no relationship to the general thesis. Our concern is with the personality characteristics of those who choose to socially define themselves as one who performs compassionate service for others, regardless of their effectiveness or ineffectiveness.

Many theorists in this area, such as Rogers (1962:416-429), Vordenberg (1953:439-449), May (1958:82), Maslow (1959:83-95) and Tyler (1961:243-262), feel that many of the qualities that make up the counselor personality are basic, intrinsic characteristics of the individual; and research supporting this contention is provided by Murray (1933:310-329), Mueller and Abeles (1964:322-330), Sears (1936:151-163), and Bandura (1956:333-337). McArthur (1954:203-206) suggested that intuition was a quality basic to the counseling approach. On the other hand, some researchers such as Clark (1960), and Wehr and Wittmer (1972:255-262), imply that training is an important aspect of the development of counselor characteristics.

In comparing the characteristics of paraprofessionals with those of professional practitioners, Appelby (1963:8-21), Carkhuff and Truax (1965:426-431), Golann and Magoon (1966:81-85), Harvey (1964:354-357), Mendel and Rapport (1963:190-196), Rioch et al. (1963:678-689), and Carkhuff (1966:360-367) indicate that lay personnel have many of the same characteristics, such as warmth, genuineness, and empathetic understanding as do the professional counselors. Paraprofessionals represent behavior which lies somewhere between the volunteer and the professional, and their role in counseling is a source of debate and

confusion according to Gust (1968:152-154), Odgers (1964:17-20), Patterson (1965:144-146), and Toban (1970:308-313).

Donnan and Harlan (1968:228-233) have been among the few researchers who have listed traits which seem to be characteristic of the counselor. In general terms, these traits are tolerance for ambiguity, flexibility, ability to perceive self and others realistically, empathy, and emotional stability. In seeming contrast, Kemp (1962:155-157), using the Porter Interview Analysis Scale (Porter, 1943a:105-126; 1949:129-135; 1950:171-188), found a positive relationship between dogmatism and certain types of counselor verbal responses. This same Scale has been employed by others, such as Demos and Zuwaylif (1963a:125-128; 1963b:8-13), Hopke (1955:212-216; 1964:162-165), Munger and Johnson (1960:751-753), Munger et al. (1963:415-419), and Porter (1943b:215-238), with varying results. The only supportable position seems to be that expressed by Patterson (1967:69-101) and Myrick et al. (1972:293-301) that research on counselor personality has been sporadic, inadequate, contradictory, and often irrelevant.

In a research comparison of paraprofessionals and professional counselors, Wehr and Wittmer (1972:255-262) made use of the same instrument that is used in this research - the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16-PF) developed by Cattell (1967). Because of the nature of this comparison and the instrument used, it will be helpful to briefly describe this research.

For their sample, Wehr and Wittmer (1972:255-262) selected 55 counselor education students enrolled in a counseling practicum at the University of Florida as the professional group, and 34 counselor aides enrolled at the counselor aid training practicum at Santa Fe Junior

College as the paraprofessional group. The group of 55 counselor education students was comprised of 30 females and 25 males, with a mean age of 26.2 years. The paraprofessional group was made up of 24 females and 10 males, with a mean age of 25.6 years.

It was found, by t-testing the means of the group's scores for each of the sixteen factors measured by the 16-PF, that the counselor education students were significantly more intelligent (Factor B), more emotionally stable and mature (Factor C), more trusting and adaptable (Factor L), and more self-assured and confident (Factor O) than the paraprofessional group. The counselor education students were also found to be more conscientious and rule-bound (Factor G), tough-minded and realistic (Factor I), and more practical and careful (Factor M). The difference in intelligence (Factor B) was considered to be due to the much higher educational level of the counselor education group (Wehr and Wittmer, 1972:255-262).

One other significant finding was that there were no significant sex differences measured by the 16-PF within the counselor education group. According to Wehr and Wittmer (1972:255-262), "Our research implies that counselor education trainees have similar personality characteristics, regardless of sex" (1972:260). This same result was found by Myrick et al. (1972:293-301) in his comparison of effective male and female counselors.

In describing another relationship between counselors and personality characteristics, Bergin and Solomon (1963:393), Carkhuff (1966:360-367), Carkhuff and Berenson (1967), Lister (1970:33-39), and Rochester (1967:535-537) are in general agreement that student attitudes, values, and interpersonal functioning change very little after

admission to graduate school programs in counseling. In addition, Arbuckle (1968:244-251), Bergin and Solomon (1963:393), Wittmer and Lister (1971:293), and Myrick and Kelly (1971:330-336) have found there is little or no correlation between academic test scores and grade point averages with counselor effectiveness.

Above and beyond all else, however, the basic element stressed in conjunction with characteristics of the counselor is the importance of the interpersonal relationship between the counselor and client (Callis, Polmantier, and Roeber, 1957:119-123; Benjamin, 1969; Carkhuff, 1966: 467-480; Dreyfus and Nikelly, 1971:13-20). According to Wasserburger (1965),

Since counseling involves the interaction of two personalities through the medium of speech and other symbolic behavior, one may suppose the structure of each of these personalities will have a marked influence on the interaction. Within this framework of the counseling process the counselor's personality must operate (Wasserburger, 1965:26).

While there is some evidence to support the contention that counselors have similar personality characteristics, others maintain that no clear relationship can be drawn. According to Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka (1970), and Tyler (1961:243-262; 1969:196-238), there is no clear-cut or definitive set of personality characteristics which may be associated with the counselor. Hill and Green (1960:115-130) and Cottle (1953:445-450) emphasize that the complexity of personality and the lack of effective mechanisms for personality measurement make a concise description of the counselor personality a difficult, if not impossible, task.

The Volunteer

Much of the current literature dealing with the voluntary worker deals either with the longitudinal effectiveness of the voluntary workers, or with the social and personal characteristics of the voluntary worker, i.e., sex, age, social class, etc. (Schindler and Rainman, 1971:45-46, 68; Muro, 1970:137-141; Stenzel, 1968:1-23; Delworth et al. 1972:3-16). Many publications stress the need for volunteer services (Biddle, 1968:1-17; Ewalt, 1967; Muro, 1970:137-141; Stenzel, 1968:12-19) and the expanding role of the voluntary worker (Gottesfeld, 1970: 285-291; Heilig et al. 1968:287-295; Schindler and Rainman, 1971), but there has been little research into the social-self of the volunteer carried out in a scientific manner.

Some of the contemporary literature dealing with the volunteer worker recognizes the possible dynamics of the volunteer personality, but little has been done to scientifically study it. Schindler and Rainman state that,

Most volunteer activity not only represents a significant contribution of energy and skill and individual resources, ...but also makes significant contribution to the volunteer's own psychological health and self-actualization (Schindler and Rainman, 1971:5).

Hence, while there is some recognition that "the forces that influence and determine the decision to volunteer one's time and energy are located inside and outside the individual decider," (Schindler and Rainman, 1971:47) there is little specific understanding about exactly what those forces are. This same deficiency was pointed out by Heilig et al., when his research into volunteer service determined that "one significant, unanticipated problem emerged, the problem of identity and self-concept" (Heilig et al. 1968:294). Generalized statements such as

"To date, the most successful helpers have been individuals who possess...a well-balanced personality," (Muro, 1970:138) seem to be accepted as truisms without any real inquiry into the social-self of the volunteer.

There have also been many contradictory explanations as to the type of person the volunteer in compassionate service is. Since the selection of the volunteer is usually almost always up to the individual himself, there are generally few imposed criteria by which to compare volunteers with one another. Exactly what motivates a person to do voluntary service, then, is the object of some of the studies dealing with the volunteer.

According to some, the volunteer is an uncomplicated individual simply expressing a desire to help others. Carkhuff, writing on lay counselors (non-professional people engaged in simple counseling techniques); writes:

The lay person's motivation to help appears more simple and direct, unconfounded by needs to find position, status, prestige, money, and perhaps some 'handles' on his own psychological difficulties within the helping role (Carkhuff, 1968:89).

Others such as Gottesfeld, Rhee, and Parker (1970:285-291), McCarthy and Berman (1971:523-528), McCarthy and Michaud (1971:523-528), Muro (1971:839-841), and Pyle and Snyder (1971:259-263), have indicated the successful use of volunteers in a variety of roles, though little was said about selection and training procedures.

On the other hand, there is a good deal of literature indicating that the volunteer may not be so typical. Gallagher and Weisbrod (1970), Heilig et al. (1968:289-295), Resnik (1968), and Whittington (1971), have all cautioned against the use of paraprofessionals or have

provided data which would suggest caution in the use of volunteers. Pretzel (1970:27-34) described the typical volunteer as one who had experienced in their own background some suicidal behavior or mental health problem. The same study, however, revealed little pathology when the volunteers were compiled on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory profile.

Resnik (1968) reported a high percentage of neurotic and psychotic lay persons volunteering for work with an anti-suicide telephone service, the same type of service from which a part of this study's sample of volunteers was taken. Rioch et al. (1963:678-689) indicated a tendency toward psychotherapy or psychoanalysis in volunteers.

There has been one controlled study of volunteers which was extensive enough to describe, in some detail, the personality of the volunteer as compared to a more general population (Delworth et al. 1972). This study is believed to be relevant enough and isolated enough to be described in some detail here.

The initial study (Delworth et al. 1972) was of student volunteers at both the University of Northern Colorado (UNC) and at Colorado State University (CSU). The volunteers were engaged in an emergency telephone service. There were 91 University of Northern Colorado volunteers, made up of 40 men and 51 women. This ratio was explained by the fact that women at UNC outnumbered the men by about 5 to 4. The men had a mean age of 21.32, and the women a mean age of 21.22. They represented a variety of majors. There were 44 CSU volunteers - 26 men and 18 women from a variety of majors and having mean ages of 19.96 and 21.67, respectively. The control group was comprised of 94

randomly chosen Professional Teacher Education (PTE) candidates taken from the general sample of 251 students enrolled in PTE at UNC at that time.

Using the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) which yields scores on 18 different scales, it was found that all volunteer groups (UNC and CSU men and women) scored higher on the flexibility scale than did the control group men or women. According to Delworth et al. (1972),

This would suggest that the phone volunteers were more flexible and adaptable in their thinking and social behavior and less rigid and deferential to authority and tradition than the PTE candidates (Delworth et al. 1972:11).

Another difference between the volunteer and control group was found on the socialization scale. It was found here, also, that all volunteer groups were lower on the scale than the control group. As Delworth (1972) described the difference:

This would suggest a tendency for these lay mental health counselors to behave with less maturity, integrity, and rectitude...than their fellow students who are seeking teacher certification (Delworth et al. 1972:11-12).

Another tendency of the volunteers that was shown by the CPI was to be "more autonomous and independent rather than conforming in their mode of achievement..." (Delworth et al. 1972:12).

It was also found that the volunteers were apt to be less self-controlled than the prospective teachers, and, at the same time, they tended to manifest less self-regulation and more impulsivity than the control group (Delworth et al. 1972:12). This would lend support to Farsons' (1954:221-223) belief that the role of the voluntary counselor is that of being sensitive, gentle, and helpful, but often in a passive way.

One year after the study was completed, a follow-up of the UNC phone volunteers was carried out. The follow-up included, therefore, many of the same volunteers that made up the original UNC group. The instrument used this time was the Self Assessment of Attitudes Toward Suicide Scale, a 17-item test constructed by Klainer, Murray, and Beller, Inc., in consultation with the Center for Studies of Suicide Prevention of the National Institute of Mental Health.

The sample of volunteers for this study involved 60 UNC students - 28 men and 32 women - from a variety of majors, while the control group consisted of 71 UNC students - 31 men and 40 women.

The results of the study indicated that both the volunteer group and the control group were very similar in their attitudes toward suicide (Delworth et al. 1972:12-15). This would tend to eliminate an interest in suicide as a major motivation to volunteer. It was also found that by comparing the American College Testing Program (ACT) scores that were available on 84% of the 94 volunteers tested with the CPI with the ACT scores of that control group, there was no significant difference in scores. According to Delworth et al., "this would indicate there is no difference in academic ability between the two groups (Delworth et al. 1972:16).

The Non-Volunteer

While the various literature on the professional counselor and the compassionate volunteer has been somewhat inconsistent and certainly less than definitive, the literature on the non-volunteer as a personality type is virtually non-existent. This is understandable in view of the fact that the non-volunteer is a typology arising from this

study, and characterized by those who have expressed disinterest or non-interest in either counseling or voluntary compassionate service. Our only prior evidence dealing with the non-volunteer, therefore, is purely behavioral - he does not counsel, nor does he volunteer, and he expresses no desire to do so. Perhaps this description of the non-volunteer typology will serve as an impetus for further study.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH DESIGN

Introduction

As previously stated, the purpose of this research is twofold: first, to provide a theoretical foundation for the conceptual separation of the self into a personal and a social self; and second, to support the contention that some types of behavior may be viewed as exhibiting the dominance of one aspect of the self over the other aspect of the self. The first part of this research has been supported in the theoretical section of this paper, which is found in Chapter II.

In order to apply the theoretical concepts dealt with in Chapter II, the author has selected a single behavioral pattern - compassionate service towards others - and compared the personality structure of three groups, two of which represent each of the two aspects of self, and a third which represents a mediation between the other two. Compassionate service towards others was chosen for the behavioral control partly because of the contentions by Mead (1934b:274, 299) and Cooley (1956: 189-190) that sentiment, humanitarianism, kindness, and helpfulness have the seeds of a fusion between the "I" and the "me", and partly because voluntary compassionate service towards others represents a unique combination of the presentation of personal and social aspects of the self.

The Sample

The Counselor

For the first group which manifests behavior in regard to compassionate service towards others, I have selected the professional counselor. As explained in Chapter III of this work, it is not necessary to distinguish between effective and ineffective counselors because the intent to define oneself as accepting the professional role of counselor is sufficient for comparison with the other groups.

The professional counselor, in the opinion of this writer, is manifesting behavior which is indicative of a dominance of the social self over the personal self. This dominance of the social self is not reflected merely in the behavior of compassionate service towards others, for the volunteer also reflects this same behavior, but also in the counselor's manifest expression of that social role through his formal membership in the counseling profession. This formal definition of self through relationships with others has been theoretically supported as the dominance of the social self by Mead (1934b), Thomas (1966), Sorokin (1947), Riesman (1961), Durkheim (1951), and Cooley (1956), among others. Empirical support of this same position has been given by Donnan and Harlan (1968:228-233), Wehr and Wittmer (1972:255-262), and Myrick et al. (1972:293-301).

The professional counselor group used in this study is comprised of 85 individuals who either enrolled or expressed a written intent to enroll in the graduate program in counselor education at Oklahoma State University in Stillwater, Oklahoma, during the period 1971 to 1974. The group was composed of 29 males and 56 females ranging from the ages

of 21 to 48. The mean age for the group was 27 years. Due to the nature of the testing procedure, which was carried out by the counseling department, as well as the issue of confidentiality, no other general characteristics of the sample were available. This limitation, however, did not place any real restrictions on the research procedure.

The Non-Volunteer

The non-volunteer is presented here as a group-type which is antithetical to the professional counselor. While the counselor, through his behavior, is expressing a desire to serve others in a compassionate manner, the non-volunteer, through his attitude toward and avoidance of this type of behavior, is expressing the dominance of the personal self over the social self. This is not to say that the person who has a dominant personal self is "selfish", or "egotistical" (see Cooley, 1956:211-212; 243-244), but rather that he is self-assertive and/or self-expressive, and does not seek our compassionate conduct towards others for a definition of self. According to Mead (1934a:251; 1934b:214; 216-217), Cooley (1956:167, 172), Thomas (1966:172), Sorokin (1947), Riesman (1961), and Durkheim (1951), this aspect of self is variously described as the "I", the "bohemian", the "ideational" personality, the "inner-directed" personality, and the "egoistic" personality. Research supporting this description may be interpolated from Donnan and Harlan (1968:228-233) and Delworth et al. (1972).

For the initial non-volunteer group, this writer selected students from general requirement sociology courses at Oklahoma State University during the period 1973 to 1974. The initial group contained 151 people

from which a final sample of 84 persons was chosen on the basis of questions 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9 on the cover sheet which accompanied the 16-PF answer sheet (see Appendix A).

The fourth question on the cover sheet was designed to determine whether or not the individual was presently engaged in some type of voluntary work, and if so, the nature of that work. Those people who were presently engaged in some form of compassionate voluntary service were eliminated from the non-volunteer sample.

The fifth question was designed to determine whether or not the individual had ever been engaged in some form of compassionate service. Those who indicated that they had performed such service in the past were eliminated from the sample.

The seventh question on the cover sheet was designed to determine the effect of opportunity on the person's lack of voluntary compassionate service. Those who felt that they had not done voluntary work because they had not had the opportunity were eliminated from the non-voluntary sample.

The eighth question was designed to evaluate the individual's desire to do voluntary work. Those who expressed a "very high" or "high" desire to do compassionate voluntary service (see Appendix A) were eliminated from the non-volunteer group.

The ninth question on the cover sheet was designed to determine the individual's intended profession. Those individuals who expressed an intention to enter a counseling or counseling-related field were eliminated from the non-volunteer sample.

The cover sheet (see Appendix A) also determined the following characteristics of the sample. There were 43 females and 41 males

ranging in age from 18 to 33 with a mean age of 20 years. Of this group 45 were freshmen, 24 were sophomores, 10 were juniors, and 3 were seniors, with 2 graduate students. Because the courses from which these students were tested were general requirement courses, it is assumed that they came from a variety of majors.

The Volunteer

The third group selected for study in this research involves those who were actively participating in compassionate voluntary service. This writer has selected volunteers not only because, by their behavior, they appear to fall between the counselor and the non-volunteer, but also because of the theoretical support of this position given by Mead (1934b:273-274; 219, 299), Cooley (1956:189-190), Sorokin (1947:634), Durkheim (1951:258), Merton (1968:185-248; 1964:227), and Riesman (1961:287), among others. Empirical support for this placement has been provided by Farson (1954:221-223), Heilig et al. (1968:294), and Delworth et al. (1972), and implied by Rose (1962:316-330), Tomeh (1969:65-76), Erbe (1964:198-215), Rossi (1961:301-312), and others.

The sample representing the compassionate volunteer has been drawn from two separate organizations which make use of voluntary workers. The first of these is the Stillwater Personal Contact Service (CONTACT), a United Fund volunteer telephone crisis-referral service located in Stillwater, Oklahoma. Access to this group was provided by the author's position as Chairman of the Screening Committee for CONTACT, and this group was therefore given the same cover sheet as was given to the non-volunteer group (see Appendix A). Other than the characteristics provided by the first three questions on the cover sheet, questions

six and eight were used to eliminate those individuals who appeared to be participating for reasons other than compassionate concern. Question number 9 was used to eliminate those individuals engaged in volunteer work who intended to pursue a career in counseling or other similar compassionate service professions. It is of interest to note that only three of the volunteers were eliminated on the basis of this question.

Of the final CONTACT sample of 32 persons, 17 were male and 15 were female. The ages of the volunteers ranged from 16 to 66, with a mean age of 23 years. Because Stillwater is a University town, it was expected that there would be a high percentage of college students working for CONTACT. Of the 32 volunteers, 28 were students which were further characterized as 4 freshmen, 5 sophomores, 3 juniors, 8 seniors, and 8 graduate students. The sample was drawn in March, 1974.

The second volunteer sample was drawn from those who began training to do voluntary work for the Payne County Volunteer Program for Misdemeanants, Incorporated, located in Stillwater, Oklahoma. This is a group of volunteers who, after a period of training, do various types of group and individual counseling with misdemeanants referred to them by the county court system. Again, because of the importance of confidentiality, only the age and sex of the volunteers were released with their test scores. This limitation, as that with the professional counselor group, did not severely restrict this research procedure. The testing was done over the period 1972 to 1974. The misdemeanant group was comprised of 44 persons ranging in age from 20 to 68 years. Of this sample, 29 were females and 15 were males. The mean age of the group was 33 years.

The Instrument: The 16-PF

For an instrument which would allow the author a wide range of personality factors on which to compare the counselor, the non-volunteer, and the volunteer, the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16-PF) developed by Cattell (1956:205-214) was selected. This instrument has precedence in the study of counselor characteristics (McClain, 1968:492-496; Wehr and Wittmer, 1972:255-262; Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970; and Myrick et al. 1972:293-301) as well as para-professionals (Wehr and Wittmer, 1972:255-262).

According to Anastasi (1969), Cattell assembled all personality trait names occurring in the dictionary (as compiled by Allport and Odbert, 1936), as well as those occurring in the psychological and psychiatric literature, and reduced this list to 171 trait names by combining obvious synonyms. Factor analytical processes were then employed to reduce this initial list of traits to what Cattell (1956:257-278) described as the "primary source traits" of personality.

In commenting on Cattell's effort, Lorr (1965) states that,

...the development of the 16-PF represented, and indeed, reflects a high order of technical skill...at present it appears to be the best factor-based personality inventory available... (see Buros, ed., 1965:88).

Reflecting this same opinion, Kerlinger (1964) suggested that the 16-PF was perhaps one of the most promising personality measures developed in recent years (Kerlinger, 1964:500).

According to Cattell (1962:3-6), the 16 traits measured by the 16-PF are essentially independent. Each trait is measured by 10 to 13 questions (items), with a total of 187 questions on form A (the form used in this research). Three alternative answers are provided for

each question, with the answers in a general agree-uncertain-disagree form. While bipolar descriptions of each source trait (factor) are given in table form in appendices B through Q, it will prove helpful at this point to provide a brief description of each factor, as well as an association of each factor with personal and social characteristics of the self. The 16 traits as measured by the 16-PF, then, are in concise form, the following:

	<u>Low Score (-)</u>	<u>versus</u>	<u>High Score (+)</u>
Factor A:	Reserved, detached, critical, aloof	<u>versus</u>	Warmhearted, outgoing, easygoing, participating
Factor B:	Dull, low intelligence	<u>versus</u>	Bright, high intelligence
Factor C:	Affected by feelings, easily upset	<u>versus</u>	Emotionally stable, mature, calm
Factor E:	Humble, mild, easily led, accommodating	<u>versus</u>	Assertive, stubborn, aggressive
Factor F:	Sober, taciturn, serious	<u>versus</u>	Happy-go-lucky, gay expres- sive, enthusiastic
Factor G:	Expedient, disregards rules	<u>versus</u>	Conscientious, staid, moralistic
Factor H:	Shy, timid, restrained	<u>versus</u>	Venturesome, socially bold, uninhibited
Factor I:	Tough-minded, self- reliant, realistic	<u>versus</u>	Tender-minded, sensitive, clinging
Factor L:	Trusting, permissive, tolerant	<u>versus</u>	Suspicious, jealous, dogmatic
Factor M:	Practical, "down to earth" concerns	<u>versus</u>	Imaginative, bohemian, absent-minded
Factor N:	Forthright, genuine, socially clumsy	<u>versus</u>	Astute, polished, socially aware
Factor O:	Self-assured, secure, complacent	<u>versus</u>	Apprehensive, insecure, worrying

	<u>Low Score (-)</u>		<u>High Score (+)</u>
Factor Q ₁ :	Conservative, traditional ideas	<u>versus</u>	Experimenting, liberal, free-thinking
Factor Q ₂ :	Group dependent, a joiner or follower	<u>versus</u>	Self-sufficient, prefers own decisions
Factor Q ₃ :	Undisciplined, lax, follows own urges	<u>versus</u>	Controlled, socially precise
Factor Q ₄ :	Relaxed, composed, unfrustrated	<u>versus</u>	Tense, frustrated, fretful

It should be explained that some factors, such as D, J, and K, are intentionally not included in Form A of the 16-PF. Reasons for this omission are lack of interpretation, and design for source traits in children (Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970:84-85; 95-96).

It is now necessary to briefly describe each personality factor in terms of its relationship to personal and social self. While some theoretical and empirical support for this specific treatment has been given in Chapters II and III, there are some traits for which no existing judgment has been clearly made. In such cases, judgment has been made by this researcher on the basis of his understanding of the nature of the situation. Justification for this approach is provided by Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka (1970):

In the absence of the required profiles or available weighing formulae for the clinical or vocational criterion, the (researcher) can make an intuitive, purely "psychological" estimate, from knowing the nature of the personality source traits in the client and the nature of the situation. This amounts to "doing the calculation in one's head" and results in a partly intuitive judgment rather than an explicitly reached quantitative statement of fitness or probability. The (researcher) may prefer to proceed in this less explicit way even when computed outcomes are available; for the experienced (researcher) can enrich the purely statistical appreciation by judgments based on psychological knowledge of the factors and his understanding of the laws which describe how they will operate in the given circumstances (Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970:78).

Factor A

In questionnaire responses, the individual who scores low on factor A (A-) generally likes things or words (e.g., logic, machinery), working alone, hardheaded intellectual approaches, and rejection of compromise. The lowest ranking (A-) occupations are considered to be artists, electricians, and research scientists (Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970:81). This personality type appears to conform rather easily to the description of I-dominance as described by Mead and others (Chapter II). It is expected that the group composed of non-volunteers would score lower of factor A than either the volunteer or the professional counselor group.

A high score on factor A (A+) indicates an individual who expresses a marked preference for occupations dealing with people, enjoys social recognition, and is generally willing to "go along" with expediency. According to Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka (1970),

There is evidence that collections of A+ persons are natural "joiners", more readily forming active groups, and there is experimental proof that they are more generous in personal relationships, less afraid of criticism, better able to remember names of people, but possibly less dependable in precision work and more casual in meeting obligations (Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970:81).

It is expected that those persons belonging to the professional counselor group would score higher on this factor than either the volunteer or the non-volunteer group, as A+ scores indicate a dominance of the social self. For a bi-polar description of factor A, see Appendix B.

Factor B

Factor B is designed primarily to measure general mental capacity (see Appendix C) and not to add personality information as such (Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970:82). For this reason it is not expected to provide a basis for comparison of personal self and social self, although it may reflect the difference in the educational level of the graduate counselor group as compared with the mixed educational level of the non-volunteer group and the CONTACT volunteer group. The educational level of the misdemeanor volunteer group was not available.

The association of factor B to other personality factors was not highly loaded, indicating only a moderate tendency for persons of higher intelligence to have somewhat more morale, persistence, and strength of interest (Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970:82). This lack of association of intellectual ability to compassionate service interests was supported by Arbuckle (1968:244-251), Bergin and Solomon (1963), Wittmer and Lister (1971), and Myrick and Kelly (1971:330-336).

Factor C

Individuals scoring low on factor C (C-) tend to be easily annoyed by things and people, are dissatisfied with the world situation, their family, the restrictions of life, their own health, and they feel unable to cope with life. In the extreme, the low C- person shows generalized neurotic responses in the form of phobias, psychosomatic disorders, sleep disturbances, and hysterical and obsessional behavior (Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970:83-84). Low C- individuals are seldom leaders, and are more often found in occupations requiring little ego-strength (e.g., postmen, clerks, janitors). While a low C

factor is most often seen in connection with social and psychological "disorders" (neurosis, psychosis, alcoholism, drug addiction, etc.), it would also seem, in comparison to high C scores, to indicate more of a dominance of the personal self.

Persons with C+ tendencies, on the other hand, are named by more people in groups to which they belong as individuals they want to "keep close to" (Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970:247). High C individuals are more frequently leaders than those who have low C scores, which would indicate an accent on the social self of the individual. For a further description, see Appendix D.

Factor E

Factor E (see Appendix E) is essentially a measure of dominance as investigated by Maslow (1954) and Allport (1961). Groups with higher averages on factor E "show more effective role interaction and democratic procedure" (Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970:86) than do low E groups. High E groups feel more free to participate and deal with group problems, but at the same time they are more independent than low E groups and are not as integrating.

While the high E person is independent-minded, however, he also is competitive and admiration demanding, a combination which would indicate neither a definite classification into a personal nor a social self category. The same inconsistency is true for the low E person.

Factor F

Individuals with high F scores are more frequently called friends, rated as effective speakers, and get more votes as constructive people

in group contributions (Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970:247). A high F score is indicative of extraversion, while a low F score represents introversion. High F scores, then, would be more likely among those who exhibit a dominance of social self, while low F scores would indicate the dominance of personal self. For additional characteristics, see Appendix F.

Factor G

High G scores indicate a strong involvement with moral concerns of right and wrong, and is sometimes considered analogous to "superego strength". The G+ person is generally persevering, planful, able to concentrate, interested in analyzing people, cautious in statements, and prefers efficiency. A high G score, as contrasted to a low G score, is associated with higher group-task-oriented participation of all kinds, while low G scores represent more "radical" types of individuals. The G- individual tends to be self-indulgent and lacking in effort for group undertakings. One would suspect, therefore, a relationship of social self to a high G score, and a relationship of personal self to a low G score. See appendix G for additional characterization.

Factor H

The H- individual is shy, expresses some feelings of inferiority, is slow and impeded in expressing himself, dislikes occupations with personal contacts, and prefers one or two close friends to large groups. The H+ individual, by contrast, exhibits boldness in social situations, and generally feels free to participate. High H persons have a history

of being more frequently involved in organizing clubs or teams than low H persons. One would expect the H+ person to be more dominated by a social self than the H- person (see Appendix H).

Factor I

Individuals with low I scores tend to be self-reliant, practical, and aggressive, but, at the same time, are not overly concerned with self. High I scores indicate an imaginative, aesthetic mind, but also indicate those who seek attention from others. No clear correlation between this factor and the personal-social self dichotomy seems apparent (see Appendix I).

Factor L

Low L scores indicate individuals who are easygoing, friendly, and perhaps lack ambition. By contrast, high L scores indicate irritability and jealousy. Individuals with high L scores are scrupulously correct in their behavior, are annoyed by people putting on superior airs, and are skeptical of alleged idealistic motives in others. As might be expected, school counselors and social workers have low L scores (Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970:97), although a dichotomy here of personal and social self cannot be drawn (see Appendix J).

Factor M

The M+ person has an intensive subjectivity and inner mental life. In group situations, the high M individual feels unaccepted, but is unconcerned about it. He expresses more dissatisfaction with group unity than the low M individual, and is characterized by the artist and

the researcher. Low M individuals are more practical, realistic and alert. One would expect higher M scores to represent a dominance of personal self (see Appendix K).

Factor N

Individuals with high N scores, while being socially aware, are generally emotionally detached. This is in contrast to the gregarious, emotionally involved person described by a low N score. In group settings, high N's show significantly greater frequency in leading analytical, goal-oriented discussion, and in providing constructive group solutions than do their low N counterpart. While this is not a strong scale for indicating a distinction between the social and personal self, it would appear that those with low N scores would reflect more of a social self (see Appendix L).

Factor O

High O scores appear to distinguish those who feel they are unstable, report overfatigue from exciting situations, feel inadequate to meet the rough daily demands of life, and feel downhearted and remorseful. These individuals are not satisfied with group conformity to rules, and do not themselves feel accepted. A high O factor is strongly weighted against successful leadership in face-to-face situations and against tasks with sudden emergencies. High O people do, however, exhibit a sensitivity to approval and disapproval from others.

Low O scores, in contrast, depict individuals who exhibit self-confidence, cheerfulness, security, and an insensitiveness to the approval or disapproval of others. While there is no clear correlation

here to social and personal self, one would expect those with a dominant personal self to have lower scores on factor 0 than those with a dominant social self (see Appendix M).

Factor Q₁

Q₁+ persons are generally more well informed, more inclined to experiment with problem solutions, and less inclined to moralize. In group dynamics the Q₁+ person contributes significantly more to discussion, a high percentage being of a critical nature, and is considered less integrated in group dynamics than the Q₁- person. As a general characteristic, Q₁+ individuals tend to be radical and liberal, while the Q₁- individual tends to be conservative. While Q₁ does not appear to be a distinguishing characteristic of a personal and social self dichotomy, those with low scores may have a tendency toward a social self dominance, while those with high Q₁ scores may exhibit more personal self tendencies.

Factor Q₂

High scores on factor Q₂ indicate a person who is resolute and accustomed to making his own decisions, while the low Q₂ person is one who goes along with the group, depends on social approval more, and is conventional and fashionable. Occupationally, Q₂ is very high for farmers, writers, and scientists (Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970: 105). The high Q₂ person is significantly more dissatisfied with group integration, makes remarks which are more frequently independent solutions than suggestions, and tends to be rejected. As a general characteristic, those who are low on factor Q₂ are considered group dependent,

while those who score high on Q_2 are seen as self-sufficient. A rather clear parallel exists here between the low Q_2 score and social self, and between the high Q_2 score and personal self.

Factor Q_3

The person who scores low on factor Q_3 is generally uncontrolled, lax, and careless of social rules. The high Q_3 person is one who is controlled, socially precise, and exercises willpower. The Q_3+ person shows socially approved character responses, persistence, foresight, consideration for others, and regard for social reputation. In group dynamics, a high Q_3 is indicative of persons who will be chosen as leaders, but because of their effectiveness rather than their popularity. We would expect those with a dominance of social self to score higher on factor Q_3 than those with a dominance of personal self.

Factor Q_4

Factor Q_4 relates primarily to tension. The Q_4- person tends to be relaxed, tranquil, unfrustrated, and composed, while the Q_4+ individual is tense, frustrated, overwrought and fretful. High Q_4 's show general dissatisfaction with group rules, conduct, and unity, and do not feel accepted. Persons high in factor Q_4 rarely achieve leadership, and take a poor view of the degree of group unity and the quality of the existing leadership. It is to be expected that those high in factor Q_4 tend to be dominated by a personal self, while those low in Q_4 would tend to be closer to the social self end of the continuum.

In summary, then, it is expected from the various associations to the sixteen personality factors measured by the 16-PF, that the group

representing a dominance of the social self (the counselor) would score higher on factors A, C, F, G, H, O, and Q₃, and lower on factors L, M, N, Q₁, Q₂, and Q₄ than either the group representing the personal self (non-volunteers) or the group representing the marginal position (volunteers). In dichotomous contrast, the non-volunteer group is expected to score higher on factors L, M, N, Q₁, Q₂, and Q₄, and lower on factors A, C, F, G, H, O, and Q₃, than either the counselor or the volunteer group. The volunteer group, representing anomic confusion between the two aspects of self, should, in each instance, fall in-between the counselor and non-volunteer groups.

Statistical Treatment

Since the factors measured by Cattell's Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire are considered to be generally independent (Cattell, 1962:3-6), it was determined that the best approach to a comparison of the three groups (counselor, volunteer, and non-volunteer) would be by a single-factor comparison. By testing in this manner, it becomes possible to determine if there is a significant difference between the scores of the three groups on each personality factor. Because we have already drawn an association of each factor to personal and social self, we are therefore in a position to state that any differences found relate to a dominance of personal or social self.

The data used in this study will consist of the raw scores compiled for each factor on each subject within each group. Because of the nature of this study it was not necessary or practical to standardize individual raw scores to normative scales. Since there is, however, a fairly large difference in the mean ages for the three groups, an

analysis of variance shall be run for the raw data, and then again for the raw data with an age-sex correction included (see Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970:72; see also Appendix N). It is expected that the age-sex correction will have little effect on the factors to which it applies, and, if it does not, the analysis will be restricted to the raw data without the age correction.

In order to test for a difference between the three groups on each factor, this writer has elected to use a one-way analysis of variance (AOV). By use of a one-way AOV, it may readily and easily be determined if there is a significant difference between the mean scores of the three groups on each individual factor.

It is not, however, sufficient to determine levels of significant difference existing between the counselor, volunteer, and non-volunteer groups, for once a significant difference in the means has been established, it then becomes necessary to know the relative position of the three groups as well as which specific groups account for the difference. In other words, a significant F-score resulting from a one-way AOV may establish a difference in means, but it does not establish which means, nor does it establish whether or not these means lie in the expected relative position to one another. It might well be found that all of the difference in means between the groups could be accounted for by the difference in means between only two of the groups, and those groups might lie in converse position.

We could, of course, forego the one-way analysis of variance and simply pair off the three groups two at a time, running three t-tests on each factor. While this procedure would determine relative position and significance, it would also involve a lot of unnecessary statistical

procedure (Guilford and Fruchter, 1973:229-230) when applied to those factors which show no significant difference in means. A far better approach seems to be the initial use of a one-way AOV, and then, for those factors which disclose significance, the further application of the Neuman-Keuls Procedure (see Champion, 1970:124-127). The Neuman-Keuls Procedure is a simple, expedient, post-AOV procedure designed especially for this purpose.

Assumptions of the Study

Based on the theoretical position of this paper, the following assumptions have been made:

1. Man has a dualistic nature which is a blend of his personal and social selves.
2. It is possible to measure the degree to which man is directed by his social and/or personal self.
3. Personality and behavior have reciprocal influences.
4. A dominance of personal or social self may be manifested in attitude and behavior.
5. A dominance of personal self is manifested in inward, introspective concern and behavior.
6. A dominance of social self is manifested in outward, social concern and behavior.

Hypotheses of the Study

The following hypotheses are based on the factors measured by the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire. Each hypothesis has a general form which may be accepted or rejected on the basis of the analysis of

variance computed for each factor. This procedure allows for the elimination of further statistical analysis for those hypotheses which are accepted (in null form).

Each hypothesis also has three sub-cases which may be accepted or rejected on the basis of the secondary Neuman-Keuls Procedure which is applied to those hypotheses which are rejected (in null form).

The hypotheses of this study, in null form, are:

(1) There is no significant difference between counselors (group 1), volunteers (group 2), and non-volunteers (group 3) on factor 1 of the Sixteen Factor Personality Questionnaire (16-PF) nor between

- (a) counselors (group 1) and volunteers (group 2)
- (b) counselors (group 1) and non-volunteers (group 3)
- (c) volunteers (group 2) and non-volunteers (group 3)

(2) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3 on factor 2 of the 16-PF, nor between

- (a) groups 1 and 2
- (b) groups 1 and 3
- (c) groups 2 and 3

(3) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3 on factor 3 of the 16-PF, nor between

- (a) groups 1 and 2
- (b) groups 1 and 3
- (c) groups 2 and 3

(4) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3 on factor 4 of the 16-PF, nor between

- (a) groups 1 and 2
- (b) groups 1 and 3

(c) groups 2 and 3

(5) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3 of factor 5 of the 16-PF, nor between

(a) groups 1 and 2

(b) groups 1 and 3

(c) groups 2 and 3

(6) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3 of factor 6 of the 16-PF, nor between

(a) groups 1 and 2

(b) groups 1 and 3

(c) groups 2 and 3

(7) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3 of factor 7 of the 16-PF, nor between

(a) groups 1 and 2

(b) groups 1 and 3

(c) groups 2 and 3

(8) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3 on factor 8 of the 16-PF, nor between

(a) groups 1 and 2

(b) groups 1 and 3

(c) groups 2 and 3

(9) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3 on factor 9 of the 16-PF, nor between

(a) groups 1 and 2

(b) groups 1 and 3

(c) groups 2 and 3

(10) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3 on factor 10 of the 16-PF, nor between

(a) groups 1 and 2

(b) groups 1 and 3

(c) groups 2 and 3

(11) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3 on factor 11 of the 16-PF, nor between

(a) groups 1 and 2

(b) groups 1 and 3

(c) groups 2 and 3

(12) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3 on factor 12 of the 16-PF, nor between

(a) groups 1 and 2

(b) groups 1 and 3

(c) groups 2 and 3

(13) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3 on factor 13 of the 16-PF, nor between

(a) groups 1 and 2

(b) groups 1 and 3

(c) groups 2 and 3

(14) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3 on factor 14 of the 16-PF, nor between

(a) groups 1 and 2

(b) groups 1 and 3

(c) groups 2 and 3

(15) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3 on factor 15 of the 16-PF, nor between

- (a) groups 1 and 2
- (b) groups 1 and 3
- (c) groups 2 and 3

(16) There is no significant difference between groups 1, 2, and 3

on factor 16 of the 16-PF, nor between

- (a) groups 1 and 2
- (b) groups 1 and 3
- (c) groups 2 and 3

CHAPTER V

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

We have, thus far, given theoretical support to the assumption that every individual has both a social and a personal self which are in varying degrees of dominance, congruence, or incongruence with each other. We have also supported the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire as an instrument which will measure this relative placement on each of its sixteen factors. In Chapter IV of this research we described each factor on the basis of personal and social self, and then administered the instrument to three groups which represent attitudes, through their behavior, of the social self, and the personal self, and an anomic combination of the two. It is now necessary to determine if the three groups vary significantly in their personality in order to support the assumption of a personal and social self. It is further necessary to determine the relative position of each of the three groups on each factor that isolates a significant difference between the three groups.

In order to determine if a significant difference exists between the three groups, an analysis of variance was run between the three groups on each of the sixteen personality factors. When a significant difference was determined by the analysis of variance, a Neuman-Keuls Procedure was then run to isolate the particular groups which were significantly different. A study of the means of the three groups

placed them in respect to one another. This analysis of the results will begin with a separate discussion of each factor and conclude with a composite description of the distinguishing personality characteristics of each group.

It was found, when running the analysis of variance for raw scores as compared to raw scores corrected for age-sex, that the relative position of the means of the three groups were unchanged in all sixteen factors. It was further discovered that the age-sex corrections altered the significance level in only four of the sixteen factors, and then only slightly. The factors in which age-sex correction altered significance levels were factors E, F, H, and Q₄. Because the effect of age-sex correction was so small, it was decided to analyze the results of the uncorrected raw data, thereby avoiding standardization tendencies, and then including in the analysis of factors E, F, H, and Q₄, an analysis of the effect of the age-sex correction for that factor.

Individual Analysis of the Sixteen Factors

of the 16-PF

Factor A

As described in Chapter IV, factor A was expected to distinguish between social and personal self, with a high A score representing a dominance of social self and a low score representing a dominance of personal self. The group representing a social self is the counselor, while the group representing the personal self is the non-volunteer. Volunteers, representing anomic disjunction between the social and personal selves, were expected, in each case, to fall between the counselor and non-volunteer groups.

TABLE I
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR A OF THE 16-PF FOR
COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
(N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	13.0997	244		
Between	84.2949	2	6.737	.0018
Within	12.5113	242		

Since as seen in Table I, there is a significant difference between the three groups at the .01 level on factor A, it becomes necessary to apply a Neuman-Keuls Procedure in order to determine between which groups the significance lies. Because application of the Neuman-Keuls Procedure requires the ordering of means to determine mean difference, the groups always increase in mean score from left to right in the Neuman-Keuls table (see Champion, 1970:125).

TABLE II
NEUMAN-KEULS PROCEDURE FOR FACTOR A OF THE 16-PF (N = 245)

	Volun- teers	Coun- selors	0.05	0.01	S_t	$0.05 \times S_t$	$0.01 \times S_t$
Non-Volunteers	.8346	1.9890**	3.31	4.12	.4057	1.3429	1.6715
Volunteers		1.1544*	2.77	3.64	.4057	1.1238	1.4767

*indicates significance at the .05 level
**indicates significance at the .01 level

As may be seen from Table II, counselors scored higher on factor A than non-volunteers at the .01 level of significance. Also, counselors scored higher than volunteers at the .05 level of significance. The mean difference between volunteers and non-volunteers was not significant at the .05 level. Although the mean difference between volunteers and non-volunteers was not significant, it is important to note that the volunteer group did fall between the counselor and non-volunteer groups on this factor. It would appear from these results that factor A of the 16-PF is a good indicator of personal and social self. On the basis of the statistical analysis of the responses to this factor, hypotheses 1a and 1b are rejected, and hypothesis 1c is accepted. In each case, the relative placement of mean scores is appropriate to the thesis of this paper.

Factor B

Factor B was designed primarily to measure intelligence, and, as such, was not considered to be a discriminator of personal and social self. However, since the educational level of the counselor group was much higher than that of the non-volunteer group, it was expected that the counselor group would score higher on this factor.

TABLE III
 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR B OF THE 16-PF FOR
 COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
 (N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	4.0060	244		
Between	24.1621	2	6.293	.0026
Within	3.8395	242		

According to Table III, there is a significant difference between the three groups on factor B at the .01 level, therefore a Neuman-Keuls Procedure was run in order to determine where the difference lies.

TABLE IV
 NEUMAN-KEULS PROCEDURE FOR FACTOR B OF THE 16-PF (N = 245)

	Volun- teers	Coun- selors	Q.05	Q.01	S_t	$Q.05 \times S_t$	$Q.01 \times S_t$
Non-Volunteers	.4681	1.0668**	3.31	4.12	.2247	.7438	.9258
Volunteers		.5987	2.77	3.64	.2247	.6224	.8179

*indicates significance at the .05 level

**indicates significance at the .01 level

From Table IV it may be seen that there is a significant difference between counselors and non-volunteers on factor B at the .01 level of significance. This outcome is consistent with the known educational

level of the two groups. No other significant difference in the intelligence of the three groups was detected. From these findings, hypothesis 2a is rejected, while hypotheses 2b and 2c were accepted. As expected, the relative placement of the three groups was appropriate, with counselors scoring highest, non-volunteers scoring lowest, and volunteers falling in-between.

Factor C

Factor C was expected to be a discriminator of personal and social self, with counselors scoring higher than non-volunteers.

TABLE V
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR C OF THE 16-PF FOR
COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
(N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	15.7776	244		
Between	256.2539	2	18.582	.0000
Within	13.7902	242		

As can be seen, the difference between the means of the counselor, volunteer, and non-volunteer groups on factor C is significant at less than the .0001 level. It is now necessary to examine this difference in greater detail by use of the Neuman-Keuls Procedure.

TABLE VI
NEUMAN-KEULS PROCEDURE FOR FACTOR C OF THE 16-PF (N = 245)

	Volun- teers	Coun- selors	Q.05	Q.01	S _t	Q.05xS _t	Q.01xS _t
Non-Volunteers	2.4010**	3.3964**	3.31	4.12	.4260	1.4101	1.8952
Volunteers		.9990	2.77	3.64	.4260	1.1800	1.5506

*indicates significance at the .05 level
**indicates significance at the .01 level.

From these results it can be determined that counselors scored higher on factor C than non-volunteers at the .01 level of significance. It is also revealed that volunteers scored higher than non-volunteers at the .01 level of significance. Counselors did not, however, score higher than volunteers at the .05 level of significance. It would appear from these findings that factor C is a good indicator of personal and social self, and that again the volunteer falls in-between the other two groups. On the basis of these results, hypothesis 3a is accepted, while hypotheses 3b and 3c are rejected, with the relative position of the scores for the three groups in support of the main thesis.

Factor E

Factor E of the 16-PF was not expected to yield significant results as a discriminating factor of personal and social self. The reason for this expectation was due to the inconsistent characteristics measured by this factor in relationship to the characteristics of personal and social self described in Chapter II.

TABLE VII
 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR E OF THE 16-PF FOR
 COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
 (N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	15.9131	244		
Between	75.2891	2	4.882	.0085
Within	15.4224	242		

Even though factor E was not expected to yield significant results, a comparison of the means of the three groups in Table VII shows a significant variation existing at the .01 level. It is therefore necessary to apply the Neuman-Keuls Procedure in order to interpret this unexpected significance.

TABLE VIII.
 NEUMAN-KEULS PROCEDURE FOR FACTOR E OF THE 16-PF (N = 245)

	Coun- selors	Volun- teers	Q.05	Q.01	S _t	Q.05xS _t	Q.01xS _t
Non-Volunteers	.3557	1.8434*	3.31	4.12	.4504	1.4908	1.8556
Counselors		1.4877*	2.77	3.64	.4505	1.2476	1.6395

*indicates significance at the .05 level

**indicates significance at the .01 level

Analysis of Table VIII provides some very interesting results. First of all, factor E significantly differentiates between volunteers and non-volunteers, and also between volunteers and counselors, at the .05 level. This is the first instance in which a distinguishing characteristic of the volunteer has been isolated. Secondly, the volunteer scored higher on factor E than either the counselor or non-volunteer groups. These results lead this researcher to the conclusion that higher factor E scores are indicative of an anomic state. This conclusion is consistent with the description of factor E as an inconsistent measure of personal and social self. Also consistent with this conclusion is the fact that there is no significant difference between counselors and non-volunteers on this factor. These results lead to the rejection of hypotheses 4a and 4c, and the acceptance of hypothesis 4b. The mean placement of the three groups suggests that high E scores identify the volunteer.

As was noted earlier, factor E was one of the four factors that was influenced by including the age-sex correction. Adding this correction to factor E reduced the significance of this factor from the .01 level to the .05 level, with no other effects. This effect is not considered significant enough to warrant further analysis.

Factor F

On the basis of the description of factor F provided in Chapter IV, it was expected that counselors would score higher on factor F than non-volunteers. Analysis of the data provided the following results.

TABLE IX
 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR F OF THE 16-PF FOR
 COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
 (N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	16.4512	244		
Between	38.1621	2	2.345	.0959
Within	16.2718	242		

Since, as indicated by Table IX, there is no significance in mean variation between the counselor, volunteer, and non-volunteer groups at the .05 level, this factor was discarded as an indicator of personal and social self. These findings lead to the acceptance of hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c.

It should be noted that the inclusion of the age-sex correction values to factor F reduced the probability from .0959 to .0247 which is significant at the .05 level. Further analysis of this result revealed that the age-sex corrected non-volunteer scored significantly higher than both the age-sex corrected counselor and the age-sex corrected volunteer. These findings are contrary to what was expected for factor F.

Factor G

Factor G of the 16-PF was expected to distinguish between personal and social self. Because of the description of high and low G scores, it was anticipated that counselors would score higher on this factor than non-volunteers.

TABLE X
 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR G OF THE 16-PF FOR
 COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
 (N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	13.3066	244		
Between	20.5254	2	1.549	.2127
Within	13.2469	242		

Table X indicates no significant difference between the three groups on factor G, therefore it is discarded as descriptive of personal and social self. These results lead to the acceptance of hypotheses 6a, 6b, and 6c.

Factor H

Individuals scoring high on factor H are expected to represent a dominance of social self, while persons scoring low on factor H are representative of a dominance of personal self. As a group, counselors represent the social self and non-volunteers represent the personal self, with volunteers expected to fall in-between.

TABLE XI

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR H OF THE 16-PF FOR
COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
(N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	32.2597	244		
Between	135.9766	2	4.330	.0140
Within	31.4025	242		

As Table XI indicates, there is a significant difference between the three groups at the .05 level. In order to further analyze this difference, a Neuman-Keuls Procedure is applied.

TABLE XII

NEUMAN-KEULS PROCEDURE FOR FACTOR H OF THE 16-PF (N = 245)

	Volun- teers	Coun- selors	Q.05	Q.01	S_t	$Q.05 \times S_t$	$Q.01 \times S_t$
Non-Volunteers	1.9241	2.4099*	3.31	4.12	.6428	2.1277	2.6483
Volunteers		.4858	2.77	3.64	.6428	1.7806	2.3398

*indicates significance at the .05 level
**indicates significance at the .01 level

As shown by Table XII, the only significant difference between the three groups is that which exists between the counselors and the non-volunteers, with the counselors scoring higher, as expected. The

volunteer group, it should be noted, again falls between the counselor and non-volunteer groups. On the basis of these results, hypotheses 7a and 7c are accepted, while hypothesis 7b is rejected.

When the age-sex correction values were added to factor H, the probability was reduced from .0140 to .0033, with no other changes. This change lends further support to the description of the factor H as indicative of social and personal self.

Factor I

From the description of factor I presented in Chapter IV, it was expected that no clear picture of personal and social self would emerge from this factor. This conclusion was drawn because of the contrast between the characteristics of this factor as related to the theoretical description of social and personal self presented in Chapter II.

TABLE XIII
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR I OF THE 16-PF FOR
COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
(N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	13.0063	244		
Between	80.1484	2	6.437	.0023
Within	12.4514	242		

Since the analysis of variance for factor I was significant at the .01 level, a Neuman-Keuls Procedure was applied in order to interpret this unexplained variation in group means.

TABLE XIV
NEUMAN-KEULS PROCEDURE FOR FACTOR I OF THE 16-PF (N = 245)

	Volun- teers	Coun- selors	Q.05	Q.01	S_t	$Q.05 \times S_t$	$Q.01 \times S_t$
Non-Volunteers	1.2794	1.9158**	3.31	4.12	.4047	1.3396	1.6674
Volunteers		.6364	2.77	3.64	.4047	1.1210	1.4731

*indicates significance at the .05 level

**indicates significance at the .01 level

According to Table XIV, the difference between the three groups reduces to a difference between counselors and non-volunteers at the .01 level of significance. Contrary to what was expected, it would seem that factor I is a good indicator of personal and social self, with counselors scoring significantly higher than non-volunteers, and volunteers again falling in-between. This result would lend support to the characteristic of factor I of "seeking attention from others" (see Chapter IV). These results lead to the acceptance of hypotheses 8a and 8c, and the rejection of hypothesis 8b.

Factor I

An association of low L scores to those in counseling and related fields has already been drawn in research with the 16-PF (see Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka, 1970:97), so it was expected that this research would produce similar results. A clear description of personal and social self, however, does not relate well to the characteristics of this factor (see Chapter IV).

TABLE XV
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR I OF THE 16-PF FOR
COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
(N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	10.5328	244		
Between	127.0234	2	13.273	.0000
Within	9.5701	242		

Since the variance between the counselor, volunteer, and non-volunteer groups is significant at less than the .0001 level, a Neuman-Keuls Procedure was run in order to describe the nature of the variance.

TABLE XVI

NEUMAN-KEULS PROCEDURE FOR FACTOR L OF THE 16-PF (N = 245)

	Volun- teers	Non- Volunteers	Q.05	Q.01	S _t	Q.05xS _t	Q.01xS _t
Counselors	.7526	2.4024**	3.31	4.12	.3548	1.1744	1.4618
Volunteers		1.6498**	2.77	3.64	.3548	.9828	1.2915

*indicates significance at the .05 level

**indicates significance at the .01 level

As shown by Table XVI, there is a significant difference at the .01 level between non-volunteers and counselors, and between non-volunteers and volunteers. While this factor does not discriminate between volunteers and counselors, it appears to be a good indicator of the counseling personality as compared to the non-volunteer personality. Again, it is important to note that the counselors scored lowest, as expected; the non-volunteers highest, as expected; and the volunteers in-between, as expected. These results lead to the acceptance of hypothesis 9a, and to the rejection of hypotheses 9b and 9c.

Factor M

Factor M of the 16-PF was expected, on the basis of its description, to distinguish between personal and social self. The high M person was expected to describe the personal self as represented by the non-volunteer, while the low M person was expected to represent the social self or counselor personality.

TABLE XVII

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR M OF THE 16-PF FOR
COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
(N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	13.5515	244		
Between	266.3828	2	23.241	.0000
Within	11.4620	242		

Since the analysis of variance on factor M established a significance of less than .0001, a Neuman-Keuls Procedure was applied in order to interpret the specific groups accounting for the variation.

TABLE XVIII

NEUMAN-KEULS PROCEDURE FOR FACTOR M OF THE 16-PF (N = 245)

	Coun- selors	Volun- teers	Q.05	Q.01	S_t	$Q.05 \times S_t$	$Q.01 \times S_t$
Non-Volunteers	2.3386**	3.5752**	3.31	4.12	.3883	1.2853	1.5998
Counselors		1.2366*	2.77	3.64	.3883	1.0756	1.4134

*indicates significance at the .05 level

**indicates significance at the .01 level

While Factor M very clearly separates the volunteer, non-volunteer, and counselor groups, the relative positions are contrary to expectation. According to Table XVIII, the volunteer group scored higher than

the non-volunteer group at the .01 level of significance, and also scored higher than the counselor group at the .05 level of significance. Further, the counselor group scored significantly higher than the non-volunteer group at the .01 level. It is also worthy of note that this factor is the only factor other than factor E wherein the volunteer failed to fall between the counselor and non-volunteer groups. Since counselors scored significantly higher than non-volunteers, however, it is not reasonable to assume that factor E could be used as a measure of anomie. While this factor seems a good indicator of a difference between the counselors, volunteer, and non-volunteer groups, its description does not appear to place that difference within the context of a personal and social self. On the basis of these results, hypotheses 10a, 10b, and 10c are rejected, with placement of the means contrary to expectation.

Factor N

Although Factor N was not expected to be a strong indicator of social and personal self, it was expected that a lower N score would indicate a dominance of social self, while a higher N score would indicate a dominance of personal self.

TABLE XIX

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR N OF THE 16-PF FOR
COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
(N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	8.3230	244		
Between	18.0176	2	2.186	.1124
Within	8.2428	242		

Factor N, as seen in Table XIX, did not isolate a significant difference between the counselor, volunteer, and non-volunteer groups, therefore further statistical analysis was not applied. It should be noted, however, that the mean placement for factor N was highest for the non-volunteer group, and lowest for the counselor group, with volunteers falling in between, as expected. These results lead to the acceptance of hypotheses 11a, 11b, and 11c.

Factor O

Factor O of the 16-PF was not clearly associated with a description of personal and social self, but, based on the description of factor O, it was assumed that counselors, expressing the social self, would score higher than volunteers who represent the personal self.

TABLE XX
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR O OF THE 16-PF FOR
COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
(N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	15.7176	244		
Between	134.6055	2	9.136	.0003
Within	14.7342	242		

As Table XX indicates, there is a difference in mean score between the three groups at the .001 level of significance. Because of these results, a Neuman-Keuls Procedure was applied in order to determine between which specific groups this difference exists.

TABLE XXI
NEUMAN-KEULS PROCEDURE FOR FACTOR O OF THE 16-PF (N = 245)

	Volun- teers	Non- Volunteers	Q.05	Q.01	S_t	$Q.05 \times S_t$	$Q.01 \times S_t$
Counselors	.7656	2.4711**	3.31	4.12	.4403	1.4574	1.8140
Volunteers		1.7055**	2.77	3.64	.4403	1.2196	1.6027

*indicates significance at the .05 level
**indicates significance at the .01 level

According to Table XXI, there is a difference between non-volunteers and counselors, and also between non-volunteers and

volunteers, both at the .01 level of significance. There is not, however, a significant difference between volunteers and counselors. Contrary to expectation for this factor, it is found that non-volunteers scored higher than counselors. This finding leads us to discard factor 0 as an indicator of personal and social self. Once again, it should be noted, the volunteer group feel in-between the counselor and non-volunteer groups. Results on factor 0 lead us to accept hypothesis 12a, and to reject hypotheses 12b and 12c, with the relative position of the scores contrary to expectation.

Factor Q₁

While factor Q₁ was not expected to be a good indicator of personal and social self, it was expected that the social self would result in somewhat lower scores than the personal self.

TABLE XXII

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR Q₁ OF THE 16-PF FOR
COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
(N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	8.5377	244		
Between	15.6738	2	1.849	.1575
Within	8.4787	242		

Since the difference in mean scores between the three groups was not significant at the .05 level, no other statistical procedures were run. A comparison of the mean scores for the three groups, however, showed the counselor scoring lowest, the non-volunteer scoring highest, and the volunteer again scoring in-between. The relative positions of the means were all as expected. Based on the analysis of variance, hypotheses 13a, 13b, and 13c were accepted.

Factor Q₂

Based on the description of factor Q₂ given in Chapter IV, it was expected that this factor would clearly separate between personal and social self, with counselors scoring lower than non-volunteers.

TABLE XXIII

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR Q₂ OF THE 16-PF FOR
COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
(N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	11.8647	244		
Between	5.5117	2	.462	.6362
Within	11.9172	242		

As may be seen from Table XXIII, there is no indication of any significant difference between the counselors, volunteer and non-volunteer groups. This finding leads to the acceptance of hypotheses 14a, 14b, and 14c.

Factor Q₃

It was expected, from an analysis of the characteristics of factor Q₃, that counselors would score higher on this factor than non-volunteers, with volunteer scores falling between the two.

TABLE XXIV

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR Q₃ OF THE 16-PF FOR
COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
(N = 245)

Variation	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	9.6746	244		
Between	53.4160	2	5.736	.0041
Within	9.3131	242		

Since significance exists at the .01 level for factor Q₃, a Neuman-Keuls Procedure was applied to isolate this significance.

TABLE XXV

NEUMAN-KEULS PROCEDURE FOR FACTOR Q₃ OF THE 16-PF (N = 245)

	Volun- teers	Coun- selors	Q.05	Q.01	S _t	Q.05xS _t	Q.01xS _t
Non-Volunteers	.5997	1.5757**	3.31	4.12	.3500	1.1585	1.4420
Volunteers		.9760*	2.77	3.64	.3500	.9695	1.2740

*indicates significance at the .05 level

**indicates significance at the .01 level

As may be seen from Table XXV, there is a difference in means between the counselor group and the non-volunteer group at the .01 level of significance. There is also a significant difference between the counselor group and the volunteer group at the .05 level. Although the mean scores for the volunteer group again fall between the scores for the counselor and non-volunteer groups, the difference between the volunteer group and the non-volunteer group is not significant at the .05 level. These findings support the expectations for this factor and result in the acceptance of hypothesis 15c, and the rejection of hypotheses 15a and 15b.

Factor Q₄

Factor Q₄ of the 16-PF was expected to distinguish between personal and social self, with counselors scoring lower than non-volunteers.

TABLE XXVI

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FACTOR Q₄ OF THE 16-PF FOR
COUNSELORS, VOLUNTEERS, AND NON-VOLUNTEERS
(N = 245)

Variance	Mean Square	D.F.	F-Ratio	p
Total	23.9041	244		
Between	99.0508	2	4.254	.0150
Within	23.2830	242		

From Table XXVI it is determined that there is a difference in means between the counselor, volunteer, and non-volunteer groups at the .05 level of significance. For this reason, a Neuman-Keuls Procedure was applied in order to determine between which groups the difference lies.

TABLE XXVII
NEUMAN-KEULS PROCEDURE FOR FACTOR Q_4 OF THE 16-PF (N = 245)

	Volun- teers	Non- Volunteers	Q.05	Q.01	S_t	$Q.05 \times S_t$	$Q.01 \times S_t$
Counselors	.1046	1.9417*	3.31	4.12	.5535	1.8321	2.2804
Volunteers		1.8371*	2.77	3.64	.5535	1.5332	2.0147

*indicates significance at the .05 level
**indicates significance at the .01 level

Table XXVII shows a significant difference at the .05 level between the non-volunteer and counselor groups, and also between the non-volunteer and volunteer groups. As expected, the non-volunteers scored highest and the counselors scored lowest, with the volunteers scoring in-between. There was no significant difference between the volunteer and counselor groups. These findings lead to the acceptance of hypothesis 16a, and the rejection of hypotheses 16b and 16c.

Adding the age-sex correction values to factor Q_4 reduced the probability from .0140 to .0096 with no other changes. This correction merely adds to the support of factor Q_4 as a measure of personal and social self.

Summary of Statistical Analysis

The following three tables involve a summary of the personality characteristics of the counselor, the non-volunteer, and the volunteer, respectively. Each table also includes a statement as to whether or not each factor is in support of the main thesis of personal and social self.

It is important to note from Table XXVIII that of the ten factors which distinguished a significant difference between the counselors and non-volunteers (factors A, B, C, H, I, L, M, O, Q₃, and Q₄), only two of those factors (M and O) ran contrary to the thesis of personal and social self. Of the four factors which distinguished a significant difference between counselors and volunteers (factors A, E, M, and Q₃), only one factor (M) ran contrary to the thesis of personal and social self. Further, in all but four factors (E, F, M, and Q₂), the volunteer group mean fell between that of the counselor and non-volunteer groups. Of those four, factor E is explained as a factor which seems to measure anomic characteristics and would therefore be expected to have a higher value for the volunteer group.

TABLE XXVIII

DESCRIPTION OF THE COUNSELOR PERSONALITY AS MEASURED BY THE 16-PF
 NS = NOT SIGNIFICANT - IRP = GROUP IN EXPECTED
 RELATIVE POSITION

Factor	Relative Counselor Score	Level of Difference from Non-Volunteers	Results Conform to Expectation	Level of Difference from Volunteers	Results Conform to Expectation	Thesis Supported
A	high	.01	Yes	.05	Yes	Yes
B	high	.01	Yes	NS	Unknown	NR
C	high	.01	Yes	NS	IRP	Yes
E	middle	NS	Yes	.05	No	*1
F	middle	NS	No	NS	No	No
G	high	NS	No	NS	IRP	No
H	high	.05	Yes	NS	IRP	Yes
I	high	.01	No	NS	IRP	*2
L	low	.01	Yes	NS	IRP	NR
M	middle	.01	No	.05	No	No
N	low	NS	No	NS	IRP	No
O	low	.01	No	NS	IRP	No
Q ₁	low	NS	No	NS	IRP	No
Q ₂	low	NS	No	NS	No	No
Q ₃	high	.01	Yes	.05	Yes	Yes
Q ₄	low	.05	Yes	NS	IRP	Yes

*1 - indications are that this factor is a good indicator of anomie

*2 - appears to be an unexpected indicator of personal and social self

NR - Not Relevant

TABLE XXIX

DESCRIPTION OF THE NON-VOLUNTEER PERSONALITY AS MEASURED BY THE 16-PF
 NS = NOT SIGNIFICANT - IRP = GROUP IN EXPECTED RELATIVE POSITION

Factor	Relative Counselor Score	Level of Difference from Non-Volunteers	Results Conform to Expectation	Level of Difference from Volunteers	Results Conform to Expectation	Thesis Supported
A	low	.01	Yes	NS	IRP	Yes
B	low	.01	Yes	NS	Unknown	NR
C	low	.01	Yes	.01	Yes	Yes
E	low	NS	Yes	.05	No	*1
F	high	NS	No	NS	No	No
G	low	NS	No	NS	IRP	No
H	low	.05	Yes	NS	IRP	Yes
I	low	.01	No	NS	IRP	*2
L	high	.01	Yes	.01	Yes	NR
M	low	.01	No	.01	No	No
N	high	NS	No	NS	IRP	No
O	high	.01	No	.01	Yes	No
Q ₁	high	NS	No	NS	IRP	No
Q ₂	middle	NS	No	NS	No	No
Q ₃	low	.01	Yes	NS	IRP	Yes
Q ₄	high	.05	Yes	.05	Yes	Yes

*1 - indicates a descriptive factor for anomie

*2 - unexpected indicator of personal and social self

NR - Not Relevant

As seen in Table XXIX, there are 10 factors (A, B, C, H, I, L, M, O, Q₃, and Q₄) which distinguish between non-volunteers and counselors. Of these 10 factors, only two (M and O) ran contrary to the general thesis. Of the six factors which distinguished a significant difference between the non-volunteer and the volunteer (C, E, L, M, O, and Q₄), only one of those factors (M) ran contrary to expectation. In all but four cases (factors E, F, M, and Q₂) the mean for the volunteer group fell between the means for the counselor and non-volunteer groups.

According to Table XXX, there are four factors which distinguish between volunteers and counselors (factors A, E, M, and Q₃). Of these four factors, only one (factor M) is contrary to the thesis of personal and social self. Further, there are six factors (C, E, L, M, O, and Q₄) which distinguish between volunteers and non-volunteers. Of these six factors, only one (factor M) runs contrary to expectation. The volunteer falls into expected relative position between the counselor and non-volunteer in all but four cases (factors E, F, M, and Q₂).

TABLE XXX

DESCRIPTION OF THE VOLUNTEER PERSONALITY AS MEASURED BY THE 16-PF
 NS = NOT SIGNIFICANT - IRP = GROUP IN EXPECTED
 RELATIVE POSITION

Factor	Relative Volunteer Score	Level of Difference from Counselors	Results Conform to Expectation	Level of Difference from Non-Volunteers	Results Conform to Expectation	Thesis Supported
A	middle	.05	Yes	NS	IRP	Yes
B	middle	NS	Unknown	NS	Unknown	NR
C	middle	NS	IRP	.01	Yes	Yes
E	high	.05	No	.05	No	*1
F	low	NS	No	NS	No	No
G	middle	NS	IRP	NS	IRP	No
H	middle	NS	IRP	NS	IRP	No
I	middle	NS	IRP	NS	IRP	No
L	middle	NS	IRP	.01	Yes	NR
M	high	.05	No	.01	No	No
N	middle	NS	IRP	NS	IRP	No
O	middle	NS	IRP	.01	Yes	Yes
Q ₁	middle	NS	IRP	NS	IRP	No
Q ₂	high	NS	No	NS	No	No
Q ₃	middle	.05	Yes	NS	IRP	Yes
Q ₄	middle	NS	IRP	.05	Yes	Yes

*1 - indicates a descriptive factor for anomie

*2 - unexpected indicator of personal and social self

NR - Not Relevant

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Theoretical Summary

Through the course of time and pages, this writer has felt the consistency of a single thought - that of the self being both personal and social. This thought did not originate in sociology or psychology, but is found in the various philosophies and theologies of the world. It was with the early sociologists and psychologists, however, that this thought began to take on form and scientific meaning, began to find definition in the light of social relationships, and began to provide explanations for social phenomena.

From the writings of William James who saw the "I" as a transient guest in a reflective house, through George Herbert Mead who gave the "I" character and poise distinct from the "me", to this paper which has joined the various explanations into a single concept of personal and social self, comes a typology which can, at best, only approximate reality. There are, after all, not really two "selves", but only one "self" which may be defined in any of a variety of ways.

One way the "self" may be defined is by behavior. In fact, to some people, behavior is self. For our purposes, however, we need only to assume that behavior is reflective of some aspect of the self. In our simple typology, "social self" is that aspect of self which is developed through a concern for the opinions and actions of others.

"Personal self", on the other hand, is that aspect of self which is uncensored and expressive and does not rely on others for definition. Neither of these selves is the "real" self, nor is either an "artificial" self; they are both reflections of the individual's own identity as it shapes, and is shaped by, his own behavior.

If the assumption that self is reflected in behavior is a valid one, it should be possible to compare individuals engaged in different types of behavior in order to determine if their personalities are at variance with one another. In order to do this, three groups, each representing a different behavioral approach to compassionate service towards others, were selected. Compassionate service towards others was chosen as the behavioral control because it is both personal and social, both inner and outer, representing both the "I" and the "me".

Those who expressed an intent to enter the profession of counseling were seen by this writer as approaching compassionate service towards others from a self dominated by a social self. This is not to say that their compassion is any less or any greater; it is to say that the counselor has also embraced a social definition of compassionate self for his identity.

At the opposite pole of this typological dichotomy of self is the individual who is unconcerned with compassionate service towards social others. This is not to say that this type of person, referred to herein as the "non-volunteer", is dispassionate or unconcerned, but rather that he does not seek out this social type of behavior for a definition of self. His compassion may well be as intense as others, but it is not defined in a social manner. It is the non-volunteer that represents dominance of the personal self.

Finally, as a kind of fulcrum, we have the volunteer. In respect to compassionate service toward others, the volunteer represents a very singular type of behavior. The volunteer does not appear to be dominated by either a personal or social self, but rather seems to be marginal - trying to keep the personal social and the social personal. He is contributing only personal time to social service, careful to avoid the social definition of compassionate worker - careful not to sacrifice his personal identity to that role. For this reason, that the volunteer seems to be caught between his personal and social selves in a personal-social type of behavior, the volunteer is described as representing an individual state of anomic confusion between his two aspects of self.

Methodological Summary

We have already identified, from the theoretical position of social and personal self, two groups of individuals who represent different dominant aspects of the self, and a third group that represents an anomic position between the two. It was then necessary to determine some means to measure personal and social self in order to discover if the three groups did, indeed, differ in dominance of personal or social self.

Cattell's Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire was selected as the instrument by which to measure personal and social self for two reasons: it had been used in the study of people involved in compassionate service, and it measured a wide range of personality factors which could be related to personal and social self.

Prior to the analysis of test results, each of the sixteen factors measured by the 16-PF was analyzed on the basis of the theoretical descriptions of social and personal self. Each factor that appeared to measure an aspect of self relevant to this study was then related to personal and social self on the basis of higher or lower scores for that factor. In some cases a higher score indicated a dominance of social self with a lower score thereby indicating a dominance of personal self, and in some cases this relationship was reversed. Of the sixteen factors measured by the 16-PF, only four did not appear to relate to the typology of personal and social self. Those factors were factors B, E, I, and L.

For each factor measured by the 16-PF, a one-way analysis of variance was run to determine if a significant degree of difference existed between the three groups. Each time a difference was discovered to exist at the .05 level, a Neuman-Keuls Procedure was applied to determine between which specific groups the difference existed. Because the Neuman-Keuls Procedure requires an ordering of means, it was a simple matter to determine if the scores on each factor were appropriately high or low or in-between for each group.

Since there was an age difference of some nine years between the volunteer group and the non-volunteer group, with the mean age for counselors in-between, a second analysis of variance was run for each factor with the appropriate age correction value added to the non-volunteer and counselor groups. Because the inclusion of this age correction value had no effect on the mean placement of the three groups for any factor, and affected the level of significance in only

four cases, it was decided to restrict the discussion of the age correction to those factors which it affected.

The only other known variable difference in the three groups was sex. Of the non-volunteer group, 51% were female, while in the volunteer and counselor groups, females comprised 58% and 66%, respectively. From the perspective of this paper the explanation for the higher percentage of females is found in the cultural tendency in the United States for females to more easily define themselves socially as compassionate.

Summary of Statistical Analysis

It was found from running the various tests and procedures that the counselor was verified as representing dominance of the social self by factors A, C, H, Q₃ and Q₄. Of the ten factors which distinguished a significant difference between counselors and non-volunteers, only two of those factors (M and O) ran contrary to the thesis of personal and social self. Of the four factors which distinguished a significant difference between counselors and volunteers (factors A, E, M, and Q₃) only one (factor M) ran contrary to expectation. One unexpected factor, factor I, appeared to be a good indicator of personal and social self, and one other factor (factor E) appeared to isolate the volunteer.

From the various tests and procedures, the non-volunteer was supported as representing the dominance of personal self by factors A, C, H, Q₃, and Q₄. Of the ten factors which determined a significant difference between non-volunteers and counselors, only two (factors M and O) ran contrary to the thesis. Of the six factors which distinguished a significant difference between the non-volunteer and the volunteer

(factors C, E, L, M, O, and Q₄), only one (factor M) ran contrary to the typology of personal and social self.

The volunteer was identified as occupying the anomic position between social and personal self in all but four factors (E, F, M, and Q₂). Of these four, factor E is considered to be an index of anomie and it is therefore expected that the volunteer would score higher on this factor. The volunteers were significantly identified as falling between social and personal self by factors A and Q₃ in respect to counselors, and by factors C, L, O, and Q₄ in respect to non-volunteers.

In summary, the counselor group was distinguished from the non-volunteer group by five factors that support the concept of personal and social self (factors A, C, H, Q₃, and Q₄). Only two of the sixteen factors (M and O) ran contrary to expectation. Of the five supporting factors, four of them (factors A, C, Q₃, and Q₄) also distinguish the volunteer as significantly isolated between the social and personal self.

Conclusions and Recommendations for

Further Study

It appears that the typology of a personal and social self is a defensible position from both a theoretical and an empirical standpoint. There is a common thread of thought that runs through much of the literature in sociology to support a concept of a social and personal self, and it appears that Cattell's Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire distinguishes this separation in at least five of its sixteen factors.

Further analysis of factors M and O would be appropriate for further study in order to explain their divergence from the general consistency experienced in the other fourteen factors. Other recommendations would include the control of, or at least description of, major social variables such as age, sex, occupation, race, religion, occupation, etc.

A number of ideas presented themselves during the course of this study that were tempting side roads to the thesis presented herein. I would like to take this opportunity, therefore, to mention a few of these thoughts as they may provide some possible direction for future study and further application of the typology of personal and social self.

From a general base, there is fertile ground in the analysis of societies, either from an evolutionary or a comparative standpoint, in terms of their stress on personal or social characteristics of the individual. It may well be defensible that industrialized societies which encourage the development of socially defined bureaucratic hierarchies breed individuals dominated by a social self, while gemeinschaft-type societies encourage the personal-self characteristics of the individual. On the other hand, it may well be, as Mead (1934b) intimated, that primitive societies have far less scope for individuality (original, unique, or creative thinking) than "civilized" societies. In either case, the typology of personal and social self provides one possible avenue for the description of the various types of societies.

Another application of this typology may be directed toward the societal condition of anomie. If voluntary service is indeed an index

of anomie existing within a cultural setting, various cultures could then be analyzed in terms of their incidence or encouragement of voluntary-type service. In other words, societies experiencing a high or increasing incidence of voluntary service may also be experiencing a high or increasing degree of the societal condition of anomie. This may be especially true of societies sponsoring major compassionate voluntary services such as the Peace Corps or Volunteers In Service to America (VISTA).

Because there appears to be a relationship between the dominance of the social self and social control (see Mead, 1934a:252), one could also approach an explanation of those societies and institutions which rely on a high degree of altruism (dominance of the social self) in order to function. In fact, it is through the destruction of personal identity in basic military training that this accent on the social self is achieved. This very same relationship exists within the various types of penal institutions. It seems to be a common assumption that to bring the self to the point of social control, one must break down the vestiges of personal identity. It is of little wonder, then, that revolution is often led by the charismatic individual representing the suppressed personal selves of the revolting masses.

On a less general level, the typology of personal and social self could be used to explain action of the group or the individual. For example, the various forms of collective behavior may be seen as resulting from a process by which the personal selves of the individuals involved are fused into a group personal self. In a more conventional sense, group counseling or group therapy may be seen as a process by which the individual can successfully bring his personal self into a

personal group-self context, thereby allowing him insight into his personal and social selves.

On the individual level, the typology of personal and social self could be used to analyze various occupational positions for dominance of either aspect of self. Obvious examples of social-self occupations might be politicians and performers, while examples of personal-self occupations might include creative artists of various kinds and those who seek occupational solitude, such as forest rangers and truck drivers.

As should be increasingly obvious, the typology of personal and social self is intended as a universal type of generic model for the understanding and description of a wide range of social and individual behavior. It is hoped that this effort has done justice to the theoretical potential of the concepts provided by those who have given me the inspiration for this work.

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APPENDIX A

16--PF COVER SHEET

THIS COVER SHEET PERTAINS TO YOUR DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION IN VOLUNTARY WORK. IN GENERAL, 'VOLUNTARY WORK' REFERS TO NON-PAID SERVICE IN WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL WORKS WITH OTHER PEOPLE IN AN ADVISING, COUNSELING, OR COMPASSIONATE MANNER. EXAMPLES MIGHT BE TELEPHONE CRISIS CENTERS, 'BIG BROTHER' OR 'BIG SISTER' PROGRAMS, RIGHT TO READ PROGRAMS, PROGRAMS FOR VISITING THOSE IN INSTITUTIONS, ETC.

PLEASE INDICATE YOUR:

1. SEX:
 - MALE
 - FEMALE
2. AGE:
 - YEARS
3. CLASS:
 - FR.
 - SOPH.
 - JR.
 - SR.
 - GRAD.

PLEASE ANSWER THOSE QUESTIONS WHICH APPLY TO YOU:

4. ARE YOU PRESENTLY ENGAGED IN SOME KIND OF VOLUNTARY WORK?
 - YES
 - NO
 - IF YES, PLEASE SPECIFY: _____
5. IF YOU ARE NOT PRESENTLY ENGAGED IN SOME KIND OF VOLUNTARY WORK, HAVE YOU EVER DONE ANY TYPE OF VOLUNTARY WORK?
 - YES
 - NO
 - IF YES, PLEASE SPECIFY: _____
6. IF YOU ARE DOING OR HAVE DONE VOLUNTARY WORK, DID YOU RECEIVE ANY TYPE OF COMPENSATION? (EXPENSES, COURSE CREDIT, ETC.)
 - YES
 - NO
 - IF YES, PLEASE SPECIFY: _____
7. IF YOU ARE NEITHER PRESENTLY ENGAGED IN, NOR HAVE EVER DONE VOLUNTARY WORK, DO YOU FEEL IT IS BECAUSE YOU HAVE NOT HAD THE OPPORTUNITY?
 - YES
 - NO
8. HOW WOULD YOU RATE YOUR DESIRE TO DO VOLUNTARY WORK?
 - VERY HIGH
 - HIGH
 - AVERAGE
 - LOW
 - VERY LOW
9. PLEASE INDICATE YOUR INTENDED PROFESSION: _____

APPENDIX B

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR A

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR

FACTOR A

Low Score	versus	High Score
SIZOTHYMIA, A-		AFFECTOTHYMIA, A+
(Reserved, Detached, Critical Aloof, Stiff)		(Warmhearted, Outgoing Easygoing, Participating)

Critical vs. Good Natured, Easygoing

Stands by His Own Ideas vs. Ready to Cooperate, Likes to Participate

Cool, Aloof vs. Attentive to People

Precise, Objective vs. Softhearted, Casual

Distrustful, Skeptical vs. Trustful

Rigid vs. Adaptable, Careless, "Goes Along"

Cold vs. Warmhearted

Prone to Sulk vs. Laughs Readily

APPENDIX C

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR B

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR

FACTOR B

Low Score LOW INTELLIGENCE, B- (Crystallized, Power Measure, Dull)	versus	High Score HIGH INTELLIGENCE, B+ (Crystallized, Power Measure, Bright)
---	--------	---

Low Mental Capacity vs. High General Mental Capacity

Unable to Handle Abstract Problems vs. Insightful, Fast-learning,
Intellectually Adaptable

The measurement of intelligence has been shown to carry with it, as a factor in the personality realm, some of the following ratings; the correlations, however, are quite low.

Apt. to Be Less Well Organized vs. Inclined to Have More Intellectual Interests

Poorer Judgment vs. Showing Better Judgment

Of Lower Morale vs. Of Higher Morale

Quitting vs. Persevering

APPENDIX D

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR C

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR

FACTOR C

Low Score	High Score
EMOTIONAL INSTABILITY or EGO WEAKNESS, C-	HIGHER EGO STRENGTH, C+
(Affected by Feelings, Emotionally Less Stable, Easily Upset, Changeable)	(Emotionally Stable, Mature, Faces Reality, Calm)
Gets Emotional when Frustrated	Emotionally Mature
Changeable in Attitudes and Interests	Stable, Constant in Interests
Easily Perturbed	Calm
Evasive of Responsibilities, Tending to Give Up	Does Not Let Emotional Needs Obscure Realities of a Situa- tion, Adjusts to Facts
Worrying	Unruffled
Gets into Fights and Problem Situations	Shows Restraint in Avoiding Difficulties

APPENDIX E

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR E

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR

FACTOR E

Low Score SUBMISSIVENESS, E-	versus	High Score DOMINANCE OR ASCENDANCE, E+
(Obedient, Mild, Easily Led, Docile, Accommodating)		(Assertive, Aggressive, Competi- tive, Stubborn)
Submissive	vs.	Assertive
Dependent	vs.	Independent-minded
Considerate, Diplomatic	vs.	Stern, Hostile
Expressive	vs.	Solemn
Conventional, Conforming	vs.	Unconventional, Rebellious
Easily Upset by Authority	vs.	Headstrong
Humble	vs.	Admiration Demanding

APPENDIX F

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR F

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR

FACTOR F

Low Score DESURGENCY, F- (Sober, Taciturn, Serious)	versus	High Score SURGENCY, F+ (Enthusiastic, Heedless, Happy-go-lucky)
Silent, Introspective	vs.	Talkative
Full of Cares	vs.	Cheerful
Concerned, Reflective	vs.	Happy-go-lucky
Incommunicative, Sticks to Inner Values	vs.	Frank, Expressive, Reflects the Group
Slow, Cautious	vs.	Quick and Alert

APPENDIX G

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR G

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR G

Low Score	versus	High Score
LOW SUPEREGO STRENGTH or LACK OF ACCEPTANCE OF GROUP MORAL STANDARDS, G- (Disregards rules, Expedient)		SUPEREGO STRENGTH or CHARACTER, G+ (Conscientious, Persistent, Moralistic, Staid)
Quitting, Fickle	vs.	Persevering, Determined
Frivolous	vs.	Responsible
Self-indulgent	vs.	Emotionally Disciplined
Slack, Indolent	vs.	Consistently Ordered
Undependable	vs.	Conscientious, Dominated by Sense of Duty
Disregards Obligations to People	vs.	Concerned about Moral Standards and Rules

APPENDIX H

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR H

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR

FACTOR H

Low Score THRECTIA, H-	versus	High Score PARMIA, H+
(Shy, Timid, Restrained, Threat-sensitive)		(Adventurous, "Thick-skinned," Socially Bold)
Shy, Withdrawn	vs.	Adventurous, Likes Meeting People
Retiring in Face of Opposite Sex	vs.	Active, Overt Interest in Opposite Sex
Emotionally Cautious	vs.	Responsive, Genial
Apt to be Embittered	vs.	Friendly
Restricted, Rule-bound	vs.	Impulsive
Restricted Interests	vs.	Emotional and Artistic Interests
Careful, Considerate, Quick to See Dangers	vs.	Carefree, Does Not See Danger Signals

APPENDIX I

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR I

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR

FACTOR I

Low Score HARRIA, I- (Tough-minded, Rejects Illusions)	versus	High Score PREMSIA, I+ (Tender-minded, Sensitive, Dependent, Overprotected)
Unsentimental, Expects Little	vs.	Fidgety, Expecting Affection and Attention
Self-reliant, Taking Responsibility	vs.	Clinging, Insecure, Seeking Help and Sympathy
Hard (to point of cynicism)	vs.	Kindly, Gentle, Indulgent, to Self and Others
Few Artistic Responses (but not lacking in taste)	vs.	Artistically Fastidious, Affected, Theatrical
Unaffected by "Fancies"	vs.	Imaginative in Inner Life and in Conversation
Acts on Practical, Logical Evidence	vs.	Acts on Sensitive Intuition
Keeps to the Point	vs.	Attention-seeking, Flighty
Does Not Dwell on Physical Disabilities	vs.	Hypochondriacal, Anxious about Self

APPENDIX J

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR L

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR L

Low Score ALAXIA, L- (Trusting, Accepting Conditions)	versus	High Score PROTENSION, L+ (Suspecting, Jealous)
Accepts Personal Unimportance	vs.	Jealous
Pliant to Changes	vs.	Dogmatic
Unsuspecting of Hostility	vs.	Suspicious of Interference
Ready to Forget Difficulties	vs.	Dwelling upon Frustrations
Understanding and Permissive, Tolerant	vs.	Tyrannical
Lax over Correcting People	vs.	Demands People Accept Responsibility over Errors
Conciliatory	vs.	Irritable

APPENDIX K

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR M

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR

FACTOR M

Low Score	versus	High Score
PRAXERNIA, M-		AUTIA, M+
(Practical, Has "Down to Earth" Concerns)		(Imaginative, Bohemian, Absent- Minded)
Conventional, Alert to Practical Needs	vs.	Unconventional, Absorbed in Ideas
Concerned with Immediate Interests and Issues	vs.	Interested in Art, Theory, Basic Beliefs
Prosaic, Avoids Anything Far-fetched	vs.	Imaginatively Enthralled by Inner Creations
Guided by Objective Realities, Dependable in Practical Judgment	vs.	Fanciful, Easily Seduced from Practical Judgment
Earnest, Concerned or Worried, but Steady	vs.	Generally Enthused, but Occa- sional Hysterical Swings of "Giving Up"

APPENDIX L

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR N

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR N

Low Score NAIVETE, N-	versus	High Score SHREWDNESS, N+
(Forthright, Unpretentious)		(Astute, Worldly)
Genuine, but Socially Clumsy	vs.	Polished, Socially Aware
Has Vague and Injudicious Mind	vs.	Has Exact, Calculating Mind
Gregarious, Gets Warmly, Emotionally Involved	vs.	Emotionally Detached and Disciplined
Spontaneous, Natural	vs.	Artful
Has Simple Tastes	vs.	Esthetically Fastidious
Lacking Self-insight	vs.	Insightful Regarding Self
Unskilled in Analyzing Motives	vs.	Insightful Regarding Others
Content with What Comes	vs.	Ambitious, Possibly Insecure
Has Blind Trust in Human Nature	vs.	Smart, "Cuts Corners"

APPENDIX M

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR 0

CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SOURCE TRAIT OR
FACTOR 0

Low Score UNTRoubLED ADEQUACY, 0-	versus	High Score GUILT PRONENESS, 0+
(Self-assured, Placid, Secure, Complacent)		(Apprehensive, Self-reproaching, Insecure, Worrying, Troubled)
Self-confident	vs.	Worrying, Anxious
Cheerful, Resilient	vs.	Depressed, Cries Easily
Impenitent, Placid	vs.	Easily Touched, Overcome by Moods
Expedient, Insensitive to Approval or Disapproval	vs.	Strong Sense of Obligation, Sen- sitive to People's Approval and Disapproval
Does Not Care	vs.	Scrupulous, Fussy
Rudely Vigorous	vs.	Hypochondriacal and Inadequate
No Fears	vs.	Phobic Symptoms
Given to Simple Action	vs.	Lonely, Brooding

APPENDIX N

AGE CORRECTION FOR RAW SCORES FROM FORM A

AGE CORRECTION FOR RAW SCORES FROM FORM A

SOURCE TRAIT AND DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE	MEN		WOMEN	
	(1) Correction per year	(2) Applied Up to:-	(3) Correction per year	(4) Applied Up to:-
B <u>Crystallized Intelligence.</u> Falls slightly in women's group	----	----	+0.025	Any age
C <u>Ego Strength.</u> Rises moderately	-0.05	45	-0.1	45
E <u>Dominance.</u> Falls slightly in women	----	----	+0.05	Any age
F <u>Surgency.</u> Falls at first steeply, later more slowly	+0.15	After 40	+0.15	40
G <u>Superego.</u> Rises in early adulthood	-0.1	35	-0.025	After 40
H <u>Parmia.</u> Rises in men	-0.10	50	----	----
L <u>Protension.</u> Falls slightly	+0.05	40	+0.05	40
M <u>Autia.</u> Rises markedly in men	-0.1	Any age	----	----
N <u>Shrewdness.</u> Rises slightly in men	-0.05	35	----	----
O <u>Guilt Proneness.</u> Falls slightly	+0.05	45	+0.025	45
Q ₁ <u>Radicalism.</u> Rises moderately	-0.05	Any age	-0.025	35
Q ₃ <u>Self Sentiment Strength.</u> Rises slightly	-0.025	Any age	-0.025	Any age
Q ₄ <u>Ergic Tension.</u> Falls slightly	+0.05	30	+0.025	30
No change on personality Factors A, I, and Q ₂ .				

VITA

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Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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