AMERICAN RACE RELATIONS:

A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

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1972

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College
of the Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
July, 1974

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PREFACE

My main interest in this dissertation is theoretical. Therefore, most of my discussion consists of elaborating on what I consider to be the major theories of race relations, an analysis of their assumptions, and attempting to draw out the implications of each. The first school of thought, "mainstream" sociology, is discussed in chapter one. This school is broken down into four major models of race relations theory: the social pathology model, the assimilationist model, the vicious circle model, and the oulture of poverty model. In chapter two I discuss the "critical" school of sociology. Chapter three consists of a discussion of the roots of the radical and colonial models of race relations followed by a more detailed analysis of these two models as they apply to race relations. A model of the colonial theory is developed in chapter four, along with its major assumptions and the specific hypotheses to be tested. In chapter five a test of the colonial model of race relations is given, and a discussion of the conclusions is given in chapter six. In testing the colonial model I have not attempted to analyze race relations from the usual "empirical" means (that is, attitudinal surveys, questionnaire analysis, or some other variant), but have instead utilized census data in testing this model. In this regard, it is felt that this is the best way to grasp a structural view of race relations in the most objective sense possible. Thus, I have therefore kept to a fairly strict objective analysis, not emphasizing subjective variables to any significant degree. In keeping with this line of

analysis, I have dropped part of my original approach to this study, that of analyzing the subjective side of race and ethnic relations through Third World literature. I still fee that this would be a useful approach and could be incorporated into an analysis such as this one. I do feel, however, that my investigations into the phenomenon of race relations is just beginning, and I feel that I have provided an adequate theoretical orientation which is essential for any truly scientific endeavor.

In this project, I would like to thank my committee, consisting of Drs. Larry Perkins, Richard Dodder, George Arquitt, and Kenneth St. Clair. I truly appreciate the fact that I was allowed the freedom to explore and knock around on my own on this project.

Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my beautiful wife Cheryl for her encouragement and patience during this project.

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CHAPTER I

MAINSTREAM SOCIOLOGY

By mainstream sociology is meant that type of societal analysis which (1) is dependent on an "order" theory of society in its analysis of social phenomena, (2) maintains an "empirico-analytical" approach in its study of societal relationships and social forms, and (3) clings to "public" opinion to set the focus, direction, and tone of much of its research. In analyzing these three themes my concern is with the treatment of social problems, especially problems dealing with race and ethnic relations; however, it is my opinion that these three themes can be found in most all mainstream sociological theory. In analyzing mainstream sociology's four major models of race relations--social pathology, assimilationist, vicious circle, and culture of poverty--these three themes can be seen to be interdependent and interrelated in a continuous manner. Furthermore, it is also my opinion that the rise of mainstream sociology can be clearly seen in a close analysis of the social pathology model, and for that reason its roots have been treated in more detail than the other models. But before turning to that it is necessary to analyze these three themes of mainstream sociology briefly.

By "order" theory is meant several things. First of all, order theory takes the existing societal structure--with its established normative standards, goals or ends, and the means to attain these ends

--as a "given." The order theory is, in short, committed to the maintenance of the existing social order (explicitly or implicitly) and takes as its starting point of analysis an assumption of a shared consensus of values in relation to this social order.

> Order theories have in common an image of society as a system of action unified at the most general level by shared culture, by agreement of values (or at least on modes) of communication and political organization. . . System analysis consists of statics—the classification of structural regularities in social relations (dominant role and status clusters, institutions, etc.)--and dynamics--the study of the intrasystem processes: strategies of goal definition, socialization, and other functions which maintain system balance (Horton, 1966: 703).

All deviations, social disorganizations, and/or social problems are taken to be "breakdowns" in social organization "reflected in weakened social control, inadequate institutionalization of goals, inadequate means to achieve system goals, inadequate socialization, and so forth" (Horton, 1966:703). Hence, solutions generally revolve around "adjustment" definitions which stress the extension of social control, adjustment of individuals to system needs (better socialization), and administrative implementation of policies and procedures within the system.

Secondly, there is a very definite "health" and "pathology" conception of society and individual's within society. This is made concisely clear by Talcott Parsons:

> Health may be defined as the state of optimum capacity of an individual for the effective performance of the roles and tasks for which he has been socialized. It is thus defined with reference to the individual's participation in the social system. It is also defined as relative to his "status" in the society, i.e., to differentiated type of role and corresponding task structure, e.g., by sex or age, and by level of education which he has attained and the like (1963:176).

Health, then, refers to "social conformity" and is defined in terms of the legitimate values of the dominant social system and ". . .its requisites for goal attainment and maintenance." On the other hand, the opposite of social conformity, deviance, ". . .means the failure of individuals to perform their legitimate social roles; deviants are out of adjustment" (Horton, 1966:704). The implication of this sort of deviance is that it is somehow pathological; that is, the individual or his immediate milieu is seen to be implicitly or explicitly responsible for any failures or shortcomings in relation to the larger society.

Thirdly, society is given a transcendental nature. Society is seen to be an entity in-and-of-itself, or a social reality sui generis, to use Durkheim's phrase. As such the distinct impression is conveyed that change of the system is inconceivable and that reformist alternations within the existing social order are the only rational possibilities within man's grasp. The alleged inviolability of the existing order is one of the dominant motifs of mainstream sociology. For example, Harry Barnes (1928:349, 351) has noted that sociology, from Comte to William Graham Sumner, has made a conscious effort to convey and demonstrate to man his

> . . . inability to improve his social surroundings through conscious effort at an artificial reconstruction of the trend of social evolution. . . [and] the futility of social uplift.

Carrying this argument further, Blackburn (1969:182), in discussing modern-day "bourgeois" social science, expresses the idea that the most devastating effect of this science is ". . . to undermine the idea that men can ever transform society--its function is to induce a morbid paralysis of social will." The main upshot of this inviolable conception of society is that often mainstream sociologists become prisoners of

their own premises of society which they are sometimes combatting, to paraphrase Marx's criticism of Proudhon in The Holy Family (1956:60). Also contained within this transcendental conception of society, and clearly seen in the quote by Parsons previously given, is a very definite formulation of a hierarchy of spheres of action--or "roles and tasks," and "status" according to Parsons--given in reference to system needs and requirements.

Fourthly, mainstream sociology's "order" perspective posits a view of human nature which follows from the above three assumptions (although it is becoming increasingly difficult today to discern exactly how most sociologists view human nature). Horton (1966:705) lists three main observations of human nature common to order theory: (a) Homo duplex--". . . man half egoistic (self-nature), half altruistic (socialized nature), ever in need of restraints for the collective good." (b) Tabula rase--". . . man equated with the socialization process." (c) Homo damatus--". . . the division into morally superior and morally inferior men."

Fifthly, mainstream sociology, reflecting the order perspective, perceives social problems as paradoxical occurrences which arise within an otherwise smooth-running, near-perfect social order. (Paradox: "A tenet contrary to received opinion or opposed to common sense, but that yet may be true in fact"--Webster's dictionary). As paradoxical occurrences, social problems are seen to be ". . . aberrational defects which can be remedied by marginal adjustments." Also, problems are seen "as some accidental (paradoxical) occurrence which can be corrected by dealing with its surface manifestations. . ." (Wachtel, 1972:51). This is in contrast to the view that social problems are contradictions, or

results of ". . . some logical and necessary relationship between the basic system-defining institutions" of society and one of its consequences, such as racism or poverty, for example (Wachtel, 1972:51). This will be discussed later as one of the essential components of critical sociology. But the important point here is that the solution to a particular social problem, such as racism, derive in large part from the position taken initially on one of these two viewpoints. That is, if social problems are seen as paradoxes, change and amelioration will be recommended and pursued within a reformist spirit; if, on the other hand, social problems are seen as contradictions, reform within the existing system will be considered futile, and change of the system itself will be recommended and pursued.

The second assumption of mainstream social theory--its empirico-analytical approach--has been dealt with by many people from many different angles, but they all arrive at basically the same conclusions. My purpose here is to survey briefly these trends.

By empirico-analytic (a phrase used by Wellmer, 1970) is meant what Mills (1959) called "grand theory" and "abstract empiricism," the "aseptic" sociology of Rioux (1970), and "positive" sociology as used by The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research (1972). In my opinion all of these themes apply here, for all imply the same thing. This is summed up in the following quote which analyzes "positive" sociology:

> Positive sociology, in Comte's sense, saw as its task the recognition of natural laws, then still conceived as "unchanging." Its goal is "precision" and not absolute truth or the actualization of a just society. "At all times" it avoids "conscientiously every useless exploration of an inaccessible inner nature or the essential modalities in the generation of any phenomena." And as its means it employs exclusively "pure observation, the experiment in the true sense, and finally, the comparative method."

> It explicitly and quite dogmatically presupposes "that the social movement necessarily is subject to unchanging natural law, instead of being governed by this or that power of volition." Society becomes purely an object of observation, that is neither to be admired nor condemned. A doctrine is to be established, which "has no other intellectual ambition than to discover the true laws of nature," and which "is sufficiently rationally thought out, that during the course of its entire active development it can still remain completely true to its own principles," thus raising immanent freedom from contradiction as its criterion. Theory and practice are sharply separated, as "all intermixture or any links of theory and practice tend to endanger both equally, ... The new social philosophy must thus carefully protect itself from that tendency, only too general today, which would induce it to intervene actively in actual political movements; these must above all remain a permanent object of thorough observation for it." By the postulate of Comtian sociology "to always subordinate scientific views to facts, for the former are only intended to ascertain the real interconnections of these," science is committed to a fundamentally retrospective character. . . . Only when the collection of the recorded data has been completed is a comprehensive and binding theory to be formulated. But even where it speaks of a totality, this is conceived in the sense of a "composition of the world out of its elements." From the very beginning positive sociology dissects its subjects according to the sectors of society to which they simultaneously belong, such as family, profession, religion, party, habitat. It does not progress beyond classificatory enumeration (taxonomy), the interdependence of these areas is not comprehended (The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, 1972:3-5; hereafter cited as Frankfurt. All internal quotes are from Comte's Cours de Philosophie Positive, Vol. 4).

The choice of the term "empirico-analytic" is intended to convey the modern-day tendency in mainstream sociology to drastically bifurcate empirical research and analytical theorizing. Of course, Mills discussed this in The Sociological Imagination (1959:Chaps. 2-3) as the separation between grand theory and abstract empiricism. (Before Mills, Robert Lynd [1939] discussed this split as between the "scholar" and "technician"). More recently, Warshay (1971) surveyed the state of sociological theory and reports that ". . .most research does not use

explicit theory at all" and might ". . . better be called conceptual empiricism." Furthermore,

> Perusal of current publications suggests that most modern sociological research either gives theory only lip-service or treats it with hostility or disdain as unfounded or scientifically dangerous speculation. . . . most actual research using explicit theory relies on small theories applicable to circumscribed areas (Warshay, 1971:24).

However, at the same time modern sociology still clings to a few "large" theories:

> A few large theories, schools, or systems attract most of the attention but do not guide most of the empirical research that uses explicit theory. . . At most, theory is seen as untested hypothesis that should follow research as its product or summary rather than precede research as its subject, organizer, or background (Warshay, 1971:25).

This, in my opinion, characterizes the "crisis" in the social sciences, particularly sociology, today. That is, the growing recognition that the existing state of theory neither explains nor generates scientific answers to questions of particular social phenomena, and, therefore, is almost totally incapable of making meaningful predictions or innovative insights. "So many writings in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and religion now seem to me to be meaningless, without even attaining the charm of deliberate nonsense. . ." (Watts, 1972:4-5). One could safely add sociology to Alan Watts' list. However, the content of much of empirico-analytic sociology may be meaningless, but its forms may be very functional for the system as a whole in providing legitimizations and rationalizations for the existing state of things (Wellmer, 1970:15). This is also Rioux's basic argument in his discussion of modern sociology as "aseptic" sociology (1970:34).

The third part of my argument concerning mainstream sociology--that it depends largely on "public" opinion in setting the direction, focus,

and tone of its research--has not gone unexamined by critics of mainstream sociology. By "public" is meant not so much a public in a socially viable sense, but a "public" defined in terms of system maintenance requirements; more specifically, for modern sociology, a public in relation to corporate capitalistic interests. In the area of race relations, this has been pointed out by several writers (see, for example, Frazier, 1947:268; Hare, 1972:29, 31). However, mainstream sociologists always couch their definitions in terms which attempt to convey the message that these definitions reflect ". . . the voice of the people" (Manis, 1974:305). This causes problems for theoretical sociology, causing it to jump around from problem to problem, from perspective to perspective. In race relations, Hare refers to this as the "shiftiness" of the sociology of race relations:

> This shiftiness of sociologists is in large part a product of their preoccupation with whatever mode of black or "minority" reaction prevails at a given time. When blacks push for assimilation, sociologists study their tactics and failures; when blacks drift toward pluralism, sociologists begin to take a new look at assimilation and its place in the cycle of the "evolution" of races. . . . (Hare, 1972:29).

In their attempt to analyze whatever "reaction prevails at a given time" sociologists desire to reflect a "value-free" and "democratic" conception of social problems. The consequences of this are not only questionable for "neutral" sociology, but the results consist often "of a congeries of scattered categories difficult to relate to theory, method, or social significance" and leaves sociology with its attention focused upon ". . . trivial, surface, or spurious topics" (Manis, 1974: 305-306). However, in taking this approach, sociologists may be making an even greater error: the "shiftiness" may be even more profound, for in shifting one's analysis constantly from problem area to problem area

one concomitantly ensures that a serious, ongoing, and critical probe of the social structure--particularly the operation of corporate capitalism and its possible contribution to many of our social problems--is effectively deflected. Manis hints at this deflection:

> While social problems textbooks appear to make this assumption [concerning social problems as reflecting the "voice of the people"], they often note that public opinion is influenced by political leaders, pressure groups, advertising, and the mass media of communication. These influences upon the public's conceptions of undesirable social conditions suggest that the "voice of the people" may be, at times, only the echo of a society's opinion makers (1974:307).

From a much broader viewpoint, Wellmer explains how empirico-analytical knowledge, and the pursuit thereof, can effectively be integrated into the "system's utility structure" and at the same time keep a lot of sociologists busy:

> In the social sciences. . . the objectivist illusion [of empirico-analytic science] leads to a misrepresentation of the object under scrutiny and to an accommodating conformism on the part of the scientists. Because they no longer see exactly how, "in every act of perception" (Habermas), they remain imprisoned in and take their bearings from the process of social life, they misrepresent human history as a natural process and willingly act the role assigned them by the capitalist system as useful and "irresponsible" experts whose knowledge can be smoothly integrated in the system's utility structure (Wellmer, 1970:15).

Finally, Williams combines--apparently without intending to do so--the "shiftiness" of race relations research with its tendency to be integrated into the system's utility structure:

> When group relations are relatively stable, the central problems that tend to monopolize research have to do with conformity, social patterning, enduring prejudices, and stereotypes, and so on. When change becomes massive and rapid, one senses the lack of studies of leadership, political and legal processes, the exercise of power and authority, the sources of innovation, and the conditions generating collective protest (Williams, 1965:13).

All of the above assumptions of mainstream sociology can be seen in

the four models to be discussed in the following sections. It is my opinion, however, that the movement of these models--that is, from the social pathology model to the culture of poverty model--has only been significant in the sense of a few novelties and subtleties in regard to the basic assumptions of mainstream sociology. It is also my opinion that these assumptions can be seen quite clearly in the social pathology model, which will next be discussed. In other words, mainstream sociology has not moved very far.

The Social Pathology Model

The social pathology model takes many forms, but regardless of the form, one of the main purposes of this model is to transform a purposeful-rational policy into a duty or obligation. Particularly, a duty or obligation that is decreed by a "Supreme" power: God, Nature, or Science. The purpose is to shift the focus of attention away from concrete socio-historical periods to a mystical suprahuman timeless force which offers men and women no other alternative but to follow its inevitable course. In its cruder biological phase, the social pathology model put forth the ideology that the rulers and the ruled in society came into their positions through the incontestable ways of nature; in its milder, more "scientific" phase the social pathology model postulated that status positions were largely due to environmental conditions. The latter phase at least reduces the impossibility of change somewhat, but nevertheless still clings to what Blackburn called "methodological individualism"--"the bourgeois doctrine that all statements about society can be reduced to statements about individuals" (1969:203). But regardless of the particular phase a powerful ideological force is

forged, a force which imprisons the minds' of both the ruled and the rulers, the dominant and subordinate groups, with "mind-forged manacles," to use William Blakes' vivid phrase. However, this ideological force may initially have to be carried out with overt force and coercion on some members of the population since not all those who are to be "saved" by this omnipotent power are informed of its benefits. Hopefully, all members of the population will, in time, be "socialized" into the realm of things. If this socialization process is successful over time--that is, the dominant mores, values, norms, and prevailing "climate of opinion" (Becker, 1932:63) become internalized--overt uses of force and coercion can be disbanded except in extreme cases. "Therefore," according to William Graham Sumner, "it is a sign of ease and welfare when no thought is given to the mores, but all cooperate in them instinctively" (1904:80).

The social pathology model has been used quite effectively for the above purposes, especially in the area of race relations, for above all this model serves as a very convenient mechanism for the justification and legitimization of class and power arrangements. It does so in such a way as to, in Mandel's words, bring about a

> . . . mystification that consists in setting up immutable categories through abstraction, the result of which is that the given state of things is proclaimed eternal and all its fundamental wretchedness is thus preserved (1971:53-54).

Of course, this mystification is made all the more "real" when both the oppressed and oppressor internalize these eternal abstractions and take them over as their own.

These mystifications, and the assumptions of the social pathology model, begin with the "eternal abstraction" of society. "Society" was

imbued with so much moral input that it became reified into an abstract system so overpowering to men and women that it took on the characteristics of a living, "natural" organism. It was then only necessary for men and women to recognize this overwhelming system and adjust to its requirements. Anyone who failed to do so, anyone who was "unsocialized" obviously had to be dealt with, for they were maladjusted, sick, or pathological. Society, as a natural organic system, had to be protected, since too much internal sickness would bring about its decay and eventual death. Early sociologists, as the "medical model" of the sociology of pathology reflects, were shamen, the patient was society, and the diseases to be combatted were pathological people. This is the beginning of aseptic sociology, or "the protection of the organism against microbes" (Rioux, 1970:34). Microbe meaning in this context any pathological elements that could cause "disease" (or dis-ease, to convey the true implication of that term as it is used in the social pathology perspective). And, as any good doctor, sociologists and other social scientists took the health of their patient very seriously, for in order for growth (progress) to continue, health (order) was essential. Anything which impeded that health had to be dealt with and subdued or rooted out.

Many early social pathologists took the word "sociology" as a tool to analyze the sickness of society and, hopefully, bring forth a cure. The sickness was a disruption of the status quo--generally some threat or perceived threat to the powers that be--and the goal of health was to re-establish social harmony and order. These assumptions have a long history, but in sociology it is convenient to begin with Auguste Comte. Comte was above all else a philospher of order, or, as Aron describes

him, ". . . a sociologist of human and social unity" (1968:73, I). Comte himself described his goal as an attempt ". . . to co-ordinate everything while disturbing nothing" (Comte, 1875:364, III). It was Comte's continuing desire to bring all of man's powers under the aegis of the "Great Being," or ". . . the continuous whole formed by the beings which converge. . . . the whole constituted by the beings past, future, and present" which willingly cooperate ". . . in perfecting the order of the world" (1875:27, IV). The means to this end was through the distillation of the positive philosophy through every institution in society. By the acceptance of Comte's positive philosophy the fog of illusion which captured the minds' of men could be dissolved--this fog being metaphysical and theological thinking, thinking which went beyond the immediately given and observable world mediated through sense impressions. These pre-positivistic, or pre-scientific, ideas were clearly outmoded, in Comte's opinion; not only were they outmoded, but they prevented the formation of a harmonious social system. Hence, to bring about order, progress (that is, movement from pre-positivistic ideas to positivistic ones) is required in the world of ideas, for "Progress is the development of order" (Comte, quoted in Aron, 1968:104, I).

> Ideas govern the world or throw it into confusion; in other words, the whole social mechanism rests ultimately on opinion . . . . The great political and moral crisis of present societies stem, in the last analysis, from intellectual anarchy. Our gravest malady consists, in effect, in this profound divergence which now exists among all minds with respect to all those fundamental maxims whose permanence is the first condition of a true social order. So long as individual intelligences have not accepted, by unanimous consent, a certain number of general ideas capable of forming a common social doctrine, there is no escaping the fact that the state of nations will necessarily remain essentially revolutionary, despite all the political palliatives that may be adopted, and will actually be characterized only by provisional instit-

utions (Comte, 1875:26, I).

When all men attain a positive consciousness harmony will prevail; the mind of man, which reaches its highest stage in positivism, will be content to operate within the immutable given:

> In the positive stage, the human mind, recognizing the impossibility of arriving at absolute notions, renounces the quest for the origin and destiny of the universe and the attempt to know the underlying causes of phenomena, and devotes itself to discovering, by means of a judicious combination of reason and observation, their actual laws, that is, their invariable relations of succession and similitude. The explanation of facts, thus reduced to their real terms, is henceforth nothing but the relation established between the various particular phenomena and a few general truths whose number the advances of science tends to increasingly to diminish (Comte, 1875:2-3, I).

Hence, adjustment to an unalterable, unchanging social order is necessary for progress to take place. Comte was not so much a social reformer as he was a social reorganizer of ideas: he desired to bring order to a fragmented society, but the fragmentation resulted not so much from institutions as it did from misguided ideas and thinking. To tamper with institutions may disrupt existing power and class arrangements; if adjustment is to be made, it is the adjustment of people and their consciousness to the existing state of things. The problems brought into being with the Industrial Revolution--poverty, unemployment, the uprooting of communities and traditional ways of life --were also to be solved in such a manner. If only people would realize that existing evils of society are not due to the institutions of that society, but are due to misguided thinking on the part of individuals.

> When all political evils are imputed to institutions instead of ideas and social manners, which are now the real seat of mischief, the remedy is vainly sought in changes, each more serious than the last, in institutions and existing powers. . . . It is. . . evident that the remedy [to existing social problems] must arise from opinions, customs, and manners, and that political regu-

lations can have no radical efficacy (Comte, 1893:31-32).

Amelioration of existing social problems will come when all citizens of society are armed with a "moral education" and accept their assigned status and role within the existing framework based on the "sound hierarchical theory" of positivism (Comte, 1875:512, VI). This applies to all citizens, based on natural law. Notice in the following quote how Comte attempts to rationalize the concentration of capital for the good of the "social masses."

> After explaining the natural laws which, in the system of modern sociability, must determine the indispensable concentration of wealth among industrial leaders, positive philosophy will show that it matters little to popular interests in whose hands capital is habitually found, provided its normal use is necessarily useful to the social mass. . . . In vain would narrow views and venomous passions legally establish elaborate impediments against the spontaneous accumulation of capital. . . (Comte, 1875:357, VI).

Also, since the rich are only carrying out ". . . the great moral obligations inherent in their positions" all members must resign themselves to their role allotted through the wisdom of the positive philosophy. Thus, existing conditions are also accepted, once a true "moral reorganization" of society in accordance with the "sound hierarchical theory" is fully underway.

> A true resignation--that is, a permanent disposition to endure, steadily, and without hope of compensation, all inevitable evils, can proceed only from a deep sense of the connection of all kinds of natural phenomena with invariable laws. If there are (as I doubt not there are) political evils which, like some personal sufferings, cannot be remedied by science, science at least proves to us that they are incurable, so as to calm our restlessness under pain by the conviction that it is by natural laws that they are rendered insurmountable (Comte, 1893:37, I).

This is nothing more than ". . . a euphemism for the acquiescence of the lower classes to their social condition" (Zeitlin, 1968:74), and

must have been reassuring to those suffering from the consequences of being forced off their land and into the factories. In fact, this latter point seems to come closer to the truth of Comte's system than any of his pronouncements concerning "sociology." Comte says:

> Industrial life gives rise only to classes which are imperfectly associated among themselves, for want of an impulsion sufficiently general to coordinate everything while disturbing nothing; which constitutes the principal problem of modern civilization. The true solution will become possible only if it is based on civic cohesion (1875:364, III).

Since ". . . true liberty is nothing else than a rational submission to the preponderance of the laws of nature" (Comte, 1893:39, I) it follows that the individuals who have reached the highest stage of "moral education" (the scientific-industrial elite) are also the ones who determine these laws, and the degree to which ameliorative change can be affected within society. These changes, it seems clear, deal wholly with "adjustment" problems on the part of unenlightened citizens in regard to the benefits of the positive philosophy and society modeled upon this philosophy. Radical or revolutionary change avails nothing except moral degradation and internal chaos.

> The mass of our race, being evidently destined, according to their unsurmountable fate, to always remain composed of men living in a more or less precarious manner off the current fruits of their daily labor, it is clear that in this respect the true social problem consists in ameliorating the basic conditions of this immense majority, without removing their class status and disturbing the general economy, which is indispensable. . . . By dissipating irrevocably all vain pretensions and fully securing the ruling classes against all invasions of anarchy, the new philosophy is the only one which can direct a popular politics, properly termed, independently of this philosophy's dual spontaneous effects. . . either of diverting the purely political category from all that belongs under the category of the intellectual and moral, or else of inspiring a wise and steadfast resignation with respect to those evils which are ultimately incurable (Comte, 1875: 411, IV).

Since a "conception of an actual political system radically different from the one that surrounds us must exceed the fundamental limits of our feeble intelligence" (Comte, 1875:20, IV) it would certainly be absurd to attempt to make the world over, to use Sumner's phrase. In reality, then, Comte's sociology was an intellectual tool to neutralize, and eventually extirpate, any philosophy which could be called critical. By critical is meant a theory which exposes ". . . the power relations that are concealed by the veil of ideas or social forms which block a more adequate recognition of human possibilities" (Schroyer, 1973:82). What Comte leaves us with is a method which would not allow one to move beyond the observation and classification of social events within a given social form. It is the opinion of many writers that Comte was attempting, apparently quite successfully, to provide an ideology which could be used to entrench a new mode of production and a new social class (Zeitlin, 1968:84; Hartung, 1944). However, Comte found it necessary to freeze the new class and mode of production into an eternal mold since its own processual development threatened to become the fetters to its newly won position. That is, the philosophy of the Enlightenment and French Revolution base its main premises on a radical reconstruction of society through the principles of individuality, freedom, equality, reason, justice, the end to monarchical rule, and emancipation of man through the control of nature. These promises, though very useful for the rising bourgeois class to break the shackles of monarchical domination, came to be perceived by Comte and others as the very antithesis of the newly established industrial class. These ideas, in other words, had served their purposes, but with the new order ushered in, and with the new class firmly entrenched, these ideas were

now both disrupting and unnecessary. In fact, these ideas, in Comte's opinion, are impediments to the development of social unity; it is now necessary to strengthen the existing institutions with the new positive philosophy. Hartung summarizes this quite well:

> [Positivism] offered a scientifically-phrased rationalization for combatting the promises which the French Revolution made to society, and for negating the cultural development implicit in the philosophy of the French Enlightenment. . . [Comte's] work thus came to be an ideological statement, namely, that the Revolution and the philosophes had completed their mission of putting the middle class into power, and that they should now leave the stage of history to this class, as its rightful possession. This is why it became so necessary to restore the institutions against which the Enlightenment fought, stripped of their feudal trimmings. . . This also explains why it became necessary to substitute unchanging facts and invariable natural laws in the place of the rule of reason and the dialectic process of Hegel (1944:329-330, 333).

The ideas of Comte's system of positivism had far-reaching effects on man and society. This is especially true for the social sciences, and more specifically for American sociology, for virtually every mainstream textbook on social theory or sociology in general begins with Auguste Comte, the proclaimed "father of sociology."

In the United States the rising sociology profession was very strongly influenced by Comte and the above assumptions. The first sociological model to dominate the field--the social pathology model--quite easily integrated Comte's assumptions into its theoretical framework, since they are so closely related. Furthermore, these assumptions directly follow the founding fathers of American sociology; thus, Lester Frank Ward reflects the Comtian influence in an article written for the first issue of the American Journal of Sociology:

> The order [of society] is that of nature and not of man, and the several sciences. . . stand naturally in [relation] to this order. . . . Social science is largely a philosophy, and in these days philosophy no longer rests on assumptions

but on facts (Ward, 1895:25).

Likewise, the wish for acceptance by all members of society of the given state of society, or a "consciousness of kind" (Giddings, 1922:117), is very strong in early sociology, and especially in the social pathology model. Again, this reflects Comte's desire for the proper "moral" outlook necessary for progress and order. E. A. Ross sums up this ideal:

> Dreading a government not subject to the collective will of the governed, we wish a people to be like-minded enough to develop a common opinion upon political questions. When private conduct and public authority are obedient to public opinion, a nation is able to dispense with coercion (1922: 6).

The social pathology model is summed up by Rubington and Weinberg (1971:Chap. 1). According to Rubington and Weinberg, the early sociologists had many problems to work with: the aftermath of the Civil War, the ushering in of the Industrial Revolution, the mass wave of European emigration to, especially, the urban areas of America; the farm-city migration, and so forth. (There were few sociologists who felt that the American Indian situation was a "problem," since very few wrote about this matter; also, black-white relations were swept under the rug. The analysis of nonwhites was lacking, as opposed to white immigrants, and, in fact, not undertaken until the minority groups made themselves heard and thus became another "social problem." This reflects the long-standing "public" opinion bias of American sociology. See Manis [1974] for a recent discussion of this). The founding fathers of American sociology also had a strong belief in natural law, progress, social reformism, individualism, and the application of the methods and techniques of natural science to the sociological analysis of society. According to Rubington and Weinberg:

> The founding fathers of American sociology believed that

> human behavior was governed by natural laws and that it remained for sociology to discover these laws. Most early sociologists also believed in progress. In the course of social change, societies changed from simple to complex; in turn, men would become freer, more rational, and happier, for progress seemed inevitable. On the way to progress, however, industrialization and urbanization were bound to produce some undesirable conditions; once having discovered the natural laws that govern human behavior, sociologists could then apply their knowledge to ameliorating these undesirable conditions of social life. And, finally, the individualistic conception of social life informed the view of early sociologists. Though people belonged to groups, it was believed that ultimately their interests, motives, and personal characteristics determined their behavior (Rubington and Weinberg, 1971:16).

Also, society was seen as being analogous to a natural organism. "Writers employing this analogy," Rubington and Weinberg continue, "will consider persons, situations, or processes as socially problematic to the extent that they appear to interfere with or otherwise hamper 'normal' workings of the social organism" (1971:17). This viewpoint--that society was a natural organism with mass, structure, a complexity which increased with growth, interdependent parts, and a life longer than that of any of its parts--was a viewpoint taken over from Comte and Spencer and had an ". . . influence [that] is far-reaching" for American sociology (Rubington and Weinberg, 1971:17).

The early social pathologists regarded both institutional and individual adjustments as being potentially problematic, interfering with the forward march of progress. Thus, "Maladjustments, whether individual or institutional, became unnatural excrescences that had to be rooted out" (Rubington and Weinberg, 1971:17). However, it is interesting to note how "institutional" maladjustments were really treated. Rubington and Weinberg note that Charles Henderson and Samuel Smith, who both wrote texts with the title Social Pathology, looked at institutional maladjustments in terms of individual failures: personal mal-

adjustment ". . . such as economic dependency or institutional malfunctioning such as economic depressions were attributed to the action of individuals. . ." and not in terms of ". . . abstract physical or economic forces" (Rubington and Weinberg, 1971:18). This represents the "medical model" basis for the social pathology model:

> The pathology conception either explicitly or implicitly denotes "sickness" or "illness" (again whether institutional or individual). Thus a medical model. . . derived from the organic analogy shaped most of the thinking in this perspective. The slow and seemingly steady pace of social change lent support to the notion of social progress and similarly implied that most social troubles could be laid to a small band of trouble-makers and a somewhat larger group of "sick" individuals (Rubington and Weinberg, 1971: 18).

Thus, society is an organism, and the normal functioning of this organism was taken for granted ". . . as the state of health of this organism." So, "Social pathology then became preoccupied with classifying the 'ills' of society" (Rubington and Weinberg, 1971:19). A major source of many of society's "ills" lay in improper or inadequate socialization practices. Of course, these ills may also be caused by inbreeding within genetically inferior stock, but either way, these "causes" of social problems had to be rooted out.

In early social pathology we see also a functional aspect that came from looking at society's "ills," whether inadequately socialized or inherently defective people, that is probably more profound than Rubington and Weinberg rate it. This is in reference to the compensations which offset maintaining a legitimate social order:

> One compensation, however, was the idea that the fittest survive; the weaknesses displayed by the population of defectives, dependents, and delinquents testify to the correctness of established traditions and authority (Rubington and Weinberg, 1971:20).

Implicit in this is a subtle warning too, a warning which says that

there is indeed a bottom to the stratification ladder which every able person could and should avoid through competition and playing the rules of the game.

Turning now to the application of the social pathology perspective to race relations, it is necessary to begin with two of the earliest books written on the "Negro problem." These were George Fitzhugh's Sociology for the South: Or the Failure of Free Society (1854) and Henry Hughes' Treatise on Sociology: Theoretical and Practical (1854).

The essential themes of the social pathology perspective can be seen in both of these books, which were obviously written to reaffirm the South's right to maintain the system of slavery and to combat the challenges to this system from Northern writers. It is interesting that the science of sociology is thrown into this battle, for we see here that "sociology" is utilized in times of turmoil and social upheaval to restore "order" in much the same way as Comte used the term. As Fitzhugh says:

> The late invention and use of the word Sociology in free society, and of the science of which it treats, and the absence of such a word and science in slave society, shows that the former is afflicted with disease, the latter healthy (1854:222).

Fitzhugh throws everything he can think of into his analysis of a "sick" free society in order to justify a "natural" slave society. Thus, "Slavery has been too universal not to be necessary to nature, and man struggles in vain against nature" (Fitzhugh, 1854:71). Society under slavery is in a "natural, healthy and contented state. Such was the condition of society in middle and southern Europe two centuries ago, before feudalism disappeared and liberty and equality were established" (Fitzhugh, 1854:306). Of course, God saw fit to bless slavery,

since God ". . . ordains certain races of men for slavery. White men will not submit to be slaves, and are not fitted for slavery if they would" (Fitzhugh, 1854:253). Fitzhugh spends a lot of time describing the benefits of slavery for the slaves themselves. For example, slavery is the only method of enforcing temperence and self-control in the Negro, since the Negro ". . . is but a grown up child, and must be governed as a child. . . The master occupies toward him the place of parent or guardian" (Fitzhugh, 1854:77, 83). Also, society has the right to protect itself from the Negro's improvident behavior, since he

> . . . will not lay up in summer for the wants of winter. . . he would become an insufferable burden to society. Society has the right to prevent this, and can only do so by subjecting him to domestic slavery (Fitzhugh, 1854:83).

But far more importantly, slavery relieves the Negro from the

> . . . more cruel slavery in Africa, or from idolatry and cannibalism, and every brute vice and crime that can disgrace humanity; and that it [slavery] christianizes, protects, supports and civilizes him. . . [Indeed, it is a] blessing to the negro to be brought from Africa and made a slave and a Christian [and would be inhuman] to set him free and send him back to become a savage and a Pagan (Fitzhugh, 1854:84, 277).

When Fitzhugh discusses, however briefly, the absurd possibility that free Negroes may compete with whites in the labor market he becomes quite indignant:

> The free negroes corrupt our slaves and make them less contented with their positions. Their competition is injurious to our white laboring citizens. . . . it is as well the policy as the duty of the State to elevate the conditions of her citizens, not to send them in the labor market with negroes for competition. Let the negro always occupy a situation subordinate to the white man (Fitzhugh, 1854:271).

In short, Fitzhugh did not want anything to do with the so-called "free" society since he considered it an unnatural state of affairs.

The whole philosophy of Fitzhugh, according to Frazier (1947:265) closely ". . . resembled Fascist doctrines."

The analysis given by Hughes (1854) is very similar to Fitzhugh's, and there is little sense in repeating essentially the same argument. However, Hughes treated the concept "sociology" a little more thoroughly than did Fitzhugh. Sociology, the ". . . science of societary organization" (Hughes, 1854:47) is a science designed to illuminate the existing laws, rules, regulations, arrangements of power, class, and caste. The purpose of all of this is to show people the inevitable, unchanging workings of society, and for them to adjust to these workings. Sociologists, says Hughes, were not to question these arrangements, since this would obviously be unscientific and not in keeping with the responsibility (objectivity) of sociological analysis. The major goal of sociology is to help people find their place and fit into the scheme of things. Anyone who failed to do so was obviously sick, and had to be dealt with before this sickness spread like the plague.

In moving now to sociology in the early part of this century, we see the pathology model being used in much the same way as Fitzhugh and Hughes used it. During World War I, which for the first time opened up some opportunities for blacks in northern factories, many blacks migrated to urban areas to work. Unfortunately, these newly opened opportunities were short-lived, since technological expansion after the war rapidly contracted, and blacks were once more thrown out of the labor force (Willhelm, 1971:68-73). The relatively peaceful coexistence between whites and blacks during World War I, undoubtedly due to economic labor needs, the birth of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Urban League, and the fact that the

United States was fighting a war "to make the world safe for democracy," was to come to an end at the close of the war. In fact, the post-World War I years

> . . . introduced a reign of terror and caused the Negro to look inwardly for consolation. Negroes for the first time in their history began to accept the fact of white rejection and, under the tutelage of Marcus Garvey, embraced black nationalism (Willhelm, 1971:70).

Public opinion and the attitudes of whites toward blacks (and, on the west coast, attitudes toward Orientals) were very negative. In 1915 the Ku Klux Klan was revitalized, and in the mid-1920s claimed five to six million members. Also, Jim Crow legislation was widened and ". . . state legislature after state legislature continued approving the legal proscription against black citizens in the name of white preservation" (Willhelm, 1971:70).

With these background conditions in mind, it is little wonder that sociologists would take a pathological perspective in analyzing the thorny question of blacks in the midst of a theoretically democratic society. How did it come to pass that blacks occupied such a lowly place in American society? Obviously, the sociologists replied, it was due to something which inhered in the nature of the race, or in the personality of the blacks as a group, and so on. Many early social pathologists took great pains to explain this apparent anomaly.

Odum (1910) had already explained that the Negro would always be problematic in American society because, due to the social and mental condition of the Negro, he could never be assimilated. Ellwood (1910) also had explained that the Negro could not be assimilated, and held this to be so because of the Negro's racial temperament and his "shiftlessness and sensuality" due to heredity. However, Ellwood felt that

the white "superior" race should have the good will to assist the "inferior" black race whenever it could; however, this assistance was restricted to vocational and industrial education, reflecting ". . . one of the shiboleths at the time" due to the influence of Booker T. Washington, ". . . the advocate of capitalism for black salvation" (Willhelm, 1971:64-65).

Dow (1920) wrote that "Race hatred seems to be almost innate," and goes on to explain that in "race wars" whites are everywhere victorious:

> Even when outnumbered by the blacks 20 or even 100 to 1, the whites have come out victorious because of their superiority, their greater advance in civilization, and their greater will power, courage, ambition, and ingenuity (Dow, 1920:157-158).

Dow also tells us that the Negro in present day America cannot make any substantial gains in status on his own initiative, not only due to white superiority, but by clinging to his own culture and traditions which have produced patterns of living and thinking which are dysfunctional for black advancement:

> The docility of the negro, his easy-going attitudes toward life and his laziness and indifference to the future are likewise owing to natural selection, for those who are inclined to be nervous and excitable, who took life too seriously, were unable to survive the hot climate; those who took things easier did survive. . . Food was plentiful on every hand; so there was no incentive to provide for the future or even to work hard. . . in short, life tended to develop in the negro an easygoing care-free disposition. Because food was abundant the negro developed a large physique. But stimuli to mental development there were none. Mind is the product of necessity; man thinks only when forced to do so. . . . Since civilization is the cumulation of achievement, and since the negro did not achieve like the white man because he was not compelled to do so, he has not made any accumulation to compare with that of the white man; hence have resulted his mental inferiority, his ranking below the white in the scale of progress, and his falling victim to the superior cunning, courage, and fighting ability of the white. For this

> reason the black has become a subject race while the white has become a ruling race. So in our study of the negro in America we must remember his past history. . . It will take him many years, possibily hundreds, to catch up with the white--if he ever does. His past hangs upon him like a dead weight (Dow, 1920:164).

The family system of the Negro, an important institution for assimilation and socialization of children into the American mainstream, was totally inadequate, according to Dow and other social pathologists. Dow traces this inadequacy back to Africa and slavery:

> Immorality flourishes among the colored population far more than among the white, not only because of the conditions existing among the negroes during the times of slavery, but also because of their past history in Africa, where the climate tended to the preservation of those with a high birth-rate and thus caused the negro to inherit stronger passions than the white man (Dow, 1920: 182).

On the other hand, slavery had positive benefits: it taught the "American negro respect for and deference to the whites" and "taught him how to work." Though at the same time it ". . . taught him to hate work." It also taught the Negro to be ". . . contented to live on a much lower plane than the white. . ." (Dow, 1920:177-178).

In a similar vein, Ernest Groves (1925) contributes to the understanding of the "Negro problem" from the social pathological perspective. About the only thing different Groves adds to our knowledge is his use of the findings of the World War I intelligence tests (see Yerkes and Yoakum, 1920) to scientifically prove the "inferiority" of Negro intelligence and to point out the benefits of northward migration for blacks. The reason given for the latter point is the fact that northern Negro soldiers scored higher on intelligence tests than did their southern counterparts. However, in suggesting northward migration for blacks as being advantageous it is not clear whether or not this advan-

tage is for "Negro uplift" or for northern industrialists. He seems to opt for the latter, since in the North the Negro's labor power was much needed, since during the war the North was in

> . . . need of a sufficient supply of labor, chiefly unskilled workers, for the factories in the north producing war material at the time that immigration from Europe was decreased to practically nothing (Groves, 1925:312).

There is no need to continue this line of theoretical thinking, since Dow and Groves represent the social pathology school of race relations, and its assumptions, quite well. But we see that in the case of the social pathological conception of race relations, the racial oppression of one group over another was justified by pointing to the "obvious" pathological characteristics of the oppressed. The ascribed status of oppressed groups was described in terms of personal characteristics acquired through heredity, cultural heritage and tradition, and/or some other personal or immediately given (i.e., the family) structural weakness. Thus, the ongoing stratification system and its ideological underpinnings remain legitimized and rationalized, and, most importantly, largely unexamined. The social "problem" in this case was not one of racism, but one of keeping everything in order and everyone in his "place." The problem boils down to Comte's statement: the great problem of civilization is ". . . to coordinate everything while disturbing nothing" (1875:364, III). Nevertheless, these theories had ". . . considerable influence on thinking in regard to the Negro. . ." in American sociology (Frazier, 1947:267). About the same time as these theories were being put forth concerning the "Negro problem," America was experiencing an unprecedented wave of European emigration. Thus, many sociologists were focusing their attention on the problem of

assimilating these diverse immigrants into the mainstream of American life. The assimilationist theories also were to have a far-reaching impact on the study of American race relations, and in particular were to have an impact on Third World minority groups and their cultures.

The Assimilationist Model

The social pathology model was used to protect the "organism" and to remove, neutralize, or properly "place" all harmful or potentially harmful "elements." Hopefully, then, progress will continue and society will eventually reach its highest stage of development--that is, when only the "fittest" remain a perfect society can be the only result.

The assimilationist model is a benign extension of the mode of thought. The major goal of assimilationism was, as with the social pathology model, for system maintenance requirements. That is, the object of attention was still the larger social system and its needs, and the main duty of individuals was to live up to and adjust to these system requirements and needs. Assimilationism, like the social pathology perspective, worked hard to change people's ideas and traditional ways of life. However, the social pathologists desired to discourage blacks from moving out of their allotted position, thus the goal was to point out pathological defects which were postulated to be unchangable; thus upward mobility would come to be seen as impossible. But with the assimilationist model, the goal was to "Americanize" divergent racial and ethnic groups and integrate all into a harmonious indivisible whole. Thus, defects and shortcomings were pointed out with the goal in mind to change these defects and shortcomings in accordance with the prevailing American normative standards. Moreover, these

defects and shortcomings were in relation to cultural and social traditional modes of living, and therefore were changeable. Thus, sociologists began to drop their preoccupation with heredity and immutable biological characteristics and looked at social, cultural, and processual variables. However, as will be pointed out shortly, when the assimilationists came back to the problem of Negro assimilation, they ran into a problem and had to revert once more to physical and biological traits. But at any rate, change was the order of the day, and it was stressed heavily. Thus, one of the first definitions of assimilation--and one which remained basically unchanged among all assimilationist writings--pointed out the necessity of individual and group adjustment:

> Only when individuals or ethnic groups are emotionally dead to all their varied past, and are all responsible solely to the conditions of the present, are they assimilated people (Jenks, 1913:85).

Also, Park and Burgess wrote that assimilation ". . . implies a more thorough-going transformation of the personality. . ." and that assimilation

> . . . is a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons or groups acquire new memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life (Park and Burgess, 1921:510, 735).

The "change" that is required is the change of people's consciousness and cultural traditions to fit the mold set forth for them by the overriding requirements of American life. Sociological theory is used by the assimilationists as a mechanism through which this change can take place in accordance with the imperatives of the social system, couched in "natural law" language. This subtle but important shift in emphasis from social pathology to assimilationism is interesting in that we now

see stressed a cultural leveling with more importance placed on social and cultural homogeneity. This emphasis is perceived to be both rational and necessary for the needs of the socio-economic system; hence, the main emphasis is on ". . . denying cultural sovereignty and liberty to people to interpret their own needs" (Schroyer, 1973:22).

The term assimilation is heavily couched in natural science terminology; in fact, it is ". . . taken over from the physiological analogy" and means ". . . bringing to a resemblance, conformity, or identity" such that:

> Each suggestion of separate origin disappears, each new constituent entering harmoniously into relation with the others, new and old, and fulfilling its own functions (Fairchild, 1925:396-397).

Park, the dean of the assimilationist school, agrees with these definitions (see Park, 1930:281; 1950:209) and adds that the breakup of isolated and segregated groups is essential in the assimilation process. Of particular hindrance to the assimilation process is immigrant "self-consciousness," or the maintaining of "racial and national consciousness" by the immigrant groups (Park, 1930:281). These forms of consciousness have to be changed if assimilation is to be successful. The question of the needs of the immigrants themselves, their cultural sovereignty, and the right to interpret their own needs was scarcely raised; these questions were not raised until later, and then by the immigrants themselves. However, for the sociologists of assimilation, the process of assimilation was seen as a twofold process: ". . . it involves the abandonment of the original nationality as well as the adoptation of the new" (Fairchild, 1925:410). For the unfortunate caught between these two worlds, the concept of "marginal man" was coined, the man ". . . whom fate has condemned to live in two societies

and in two, not merely different but antagonistic cultures" (Park, 1950: 373). Nevertheless, adaptation to the the "host" culture is always the ultimate goal:

> The earlier in life an individual is removed from the environment from which he is deriving a certain nationality the more quickly and completely can he acquire the nationality of the new environment in which he is placed (Fairchild, 1925:411).

In as much as assimilation was a ". . . political rather than a cultural concept" (Park, 1930:281) we see an interesting role for the profession of sociology beginning at this time: sociologists acting as lackeys for state and industrial interests in that they are applying knowledge for system rather than public needs. Thus, the reasons why an individual must be removed from his "old" environment and placed in a "new" environment so he can acquire the new nationality can be seen in a new light. While sociologists tell us this is a "natural" process --even using physical science analogies to make it all the more scientifically sounding--a few writers (usually nonsociologists) lift the veil of scientism occasionally. For example, Francis Kellor states:

> The first responsibility of industry is to see that America has a sufficient supply of labor to maintain American production with a fair margin of profit, and at the same time keep prices low for the consumer. . . . Furthermore, it should provide for reserves to be called upon when needed and to be taken care of when idle. . . certain industries are almost wholly dependent upon immigrant labor, as it is impossible to secure for them a native supply at any price (quoted in Fairchild, 1925:443-444).

Fairchild makes a similar point, although he rejects the thesis:

> If the demand for immigration on economic grounds could be traced to its ultimate sources it would be found to emanate almost entirely from those individuals and classes who are the recipients of the surplus that the immigrants produce over what they consume (Fairchild, 1925:445).

However, these excursions were isolated, for very few sociologists

analyzed immigration at any length in the above manner. The job the sociologist cut out for himself was to characterize the process involved in assimilation; that is, how the newly arrived immigrant moved from initial "contact" with the new culture to full assimilation. In Park's words, the end result of assimilation is how the immigrant can "get on in the country" and is able to find a place in the community based on his ". . . individual merits without invidious or qualifying reference to his racial origin or to his cultural inheritance" (Park, 1930:281). This was later referred to by Gordon (1964) as structural assimilation, or when the immigrant has attained full entrance into the "core society" of social cliques, clubs, the institutional spheres of the core society at a "primary group" level, and, ultimately, intermarriage (Gordon, 1964:80). The "core" society, or "host" society, is made up of the "standard to which other groups adjust or measure their relative degree of adjustment" (Gordon, 1964:72). The "core" society's "master cultural world" or values to which all groups adjust consists of ". . . the middle-class cultural patterns of, largely, white Protestant, Anglo-Saxon origins" (Gordon, 1964:72).

However, the nonwhite minority groups in America proved to be difficult for the assimilationists to handle. They obviously did not fit Park's famous "race relations cycle" (1926) of contact, competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation, which he took to be a natural cycle. For the Negro, other factors had to be taken into account (though Park himself always stated that the Negro too will become assimilated, but at a much slower pace). These factors which retard the assimilation process arise if: (1) the immigrant is segregated geographically and only interacts with "like-members," and (2) if the immigrant is seg-

regated categorically, that is, his race or nationality is made to constitute a separate caste or class (Park, 1930:281; also, Gordon, 1964:78). These factors were especially true of the Negro, and Park felt for these reasons the Negro race

> . . . has not been assimilated [during 300 years in the country]. This is not because he has preserved in America a foreign culture and an alien tradition. . . . To say that the Negro is not assimilated means no more than to say that he is still regarded as in some sense a stranger, a representative of an alien race. This means a distinction which sets him apart from the rest of the population is real, but it is based not upon cultural traits but upon physical and racial characteristics (Park, 1930:282).

The Negro, and other people of color, posed a very paradoxical problem for sociologists. Again, sociologists had to explain why blacks and other nonwhite nonwestern minorities were not being assimilated into the mainstream of American life. As before, sociologists failed to critically probe the nature of the capitalistic system and/or analyze structural constraints which may hold back nonwhites; instead, American sociologists once more reverted to reductionism: the Negro was not assimilated because of some anomaly unique to his race. Thus, many assimilationists began to look at the family structure, subculture, psychological, and even physical traits of nonwhites to explain this anomaly. Park had suggested physical and racial characteristics set the Negro apart and made him a "stranger in a strange land," so to speak. But why? Because of prejudice due to "fundamental color antipathies" between the white, yellow, and black races (Park and Burgess, 1921:634). Furthermore, prejudice is "spontaneous, more or less instinctive" and is a "defense-reaction" (Park and Burgess, 1921: 623). Once more analysis of a potentially system-challenging contradiction is turned into a paradox which will disappear in time given

changes of certain individualistic factors, whether it be white prejudice or nonwhite adaptations. Exactly how the Negro could change his skin color was never made clear. Nevertheless, the assimilationist school remained optimistic regarding the future, and eventual, assimilation of the Negro and other nonwhites. Thus, this "new immigrant group" (even though they have been here prior to most immigrants, and came here by force, not choice) will be assimilated, and present discrimination and prejudice is only a ". . . delaying action. . . the quantitatively significant emergence of the middle-class Negro is already well on its way" (Gordon, 1964:78). In the mean time, the tenacity of the nonwhite position in society became more and more an object of analysis by, especially, liberal sociologists. Slowly but surely the situation of Third World people in the land of the free became institutionalized in the "social problems" curricula. The reason for this appears not to be due to the actual condition of nonwhites, but the fact that the oppressed people themselves began to move, and their message slowly sunk into the white psyche. Writing in 1966, Arnold Rose summed this up very well:

> Only during the last generation or so have relations between majority and minority groups been thought of as social problems. One reason for this is that social scientists of the majority group formerly believed that minorities were satisfied with their subordinate position (Rose, 1966:417).

Thus, white prejudice became the new shiboleth. The cumulation of this was the most massively funded research project of its day, Gunner Myrdal's <u>An American Dilemma</u>.

The Vicious Circle Model

There were many background conditions which, in my opinion, heavily

influenced the vicious circle model (or, as Myrdal sometimes called it, the "principle of cumulation") and the attention given to white prejudice. Following the influx of immigrants, and the flurry of studies this produced, there was an implicit understanding of the emerging pattern of white-nonwhite relationships which became all the more glaringly apparent in the eyes of the white liberal public. Oscar Handlin describes this pattern as follows:

> By the end of the century the pattern of racial practices and ideas seemed fully developed: the orientals were to be totally excluded; the Negroes were to live in a segregated enclave; the Indians were to be confined to reservations as permanent wards of the nation; and all whites were expected to assimilate as rapidly as possible to a common standard (Handlin, 1957:36).

Hence, mainstream sociologists began to move away from assimilationism and some of the offshoots of this school which looked at the "caste" and other accomodative patterns of American nonwhites (see especially Warner, 1936; Dollard, 1937; and Doyle, 1937). Interestingly, Myrdal seems to hold an ambiguous position on the matter of caste. He appears to unequivocally accept the caste hypothesis: "Practically the entire factual content of this book may be considered to define caste in the case of the American Negro" (Myrdal, 1944:669). However, later in his book he appears to reject the theory in his discussion of "The Decay of the Caste Theory" (1944:1002). Nevertheless, Myrdal's interest lies in analyzing the forces operating in American life which have together placed the Negro in a caste-like position. Moreover, with the decay of the caste theory this leaves Myrdal with only one explanation for Negro subordination: white prejudice. According to Myrdal, whites have no rationalizations left and are face-to-face with a glaring dilemma: the disjunction between the American Creed, which posits

equality, liberty, and freedom to all its citizens, and the practice of systematically denying these very same rights to a sizeable portion of the population. Thus, the main key to "Negro uplift" is to be found in the eradication of white prejudice, which is "irrational" and is the source of white guilt and moral uneasiness.

However, other background conditions should be briefly looked at before explaining Myrdal's theory further. First of all, the blacks themselves began to organize, move, and demand equal rights, especially in employment and the right to vote. This Myrdal acknowledges (1944:1003). Also, a war to defeat the system of Nazism and its accompanying system of racist ideology hit the white liberal establishment hard (see Myrdal, 1944:1004; Willhelm, 1970:73). Interacting with these two factors is a third, and possibily more important, factor: the technological-economic expansion due to war related industry which required workers. It is difficult to tell exactly from Myrdal's statements on the relation between war and racism (see Myrdal, 1944:654, 412-414), but it can be easily inferred that the concern with white prejudice was for its reduction and the easier transition of blacks into formerly all-white industries. Myrdal, for example, expresses concern for the ". . . open defiance of the President's Order of June 25, 1941, about abolishment of discriminatory practices in all defense work" (1944:412). Thus, if this inference is correct--that sociology is responding to the needs of corporate capitalism under the guise of value-free social science--we are able to see another subtle but important shift in sociology's "public" opinion approach to social problems. That is the bureaucratization of social science research for technical and administrative needs. This is best expressed by Myrdal

himself when he relates how sociology could benefit from economic theory:

> To use once more our parallel from modern economic theory: when the economists during the last two decades abandoned the classical static equilibrium approach and went ahead to construct a dynamic theory of causal interrelations in a process of change, what they actually did was to apply the pragmatic notions of bankers, businessmen, and labor leaders and try to systematize them. This revolutionized economic theory and had great importance for the scientific planning of economic policy. A rational strategy in the Negro problem also assumes a theory of dynamic causation (Myrdal, 1944: 1070).

The fact that Myrdal was an economist and his research was funded by the Carnegie Corporation sheds even more light on Myrdal's theoretical assumptions.

Myrdal's model reflects his academic economic background, and it is heavily steeped in physical science analogy; in fact it heavily draws ". . . on the notions and theories of the much farther developed natural sciences, particularly physics" (Myrdal, 1944:1065). Myrdal draws heavily on the concept of equilibrium, but he makes it clear he is not talking about "stable equilibrium," but he is talking about "dynamic" equilibrium (1944:1065). Thus, his dynamic equilibrium assumes an explanatory scheme premised on the notion of the cumulation of forces; hence, his "vicious circle" model. White prejudice leads to discrimination, this causes Negroes to adapt to lower standards of living, which also effects health, education, manners, and morals (1944:75). These Negro adaptations in turn support white prejudice and in fact act as fuel for the original "fire" of prejudice. So, "White prejudice and Negro standards thus mutually 'cause' each other" (1944:75). Now, if these two forces "balance each other" everything is in a state of "accommodation" or equilibrium. However, if a change in the "system" is effected, say white prejudice is suddenly eradicated, then cumulative

movement will take place, in this case Negro living standards will rise. Since this process is cumulative and acts in a reciprocal manner, it follows that as Negro standards rise white prejudice will tend to decline also, which will lead to further Negro advancement; on the other hand, if white prejudice intensifies, Negro standards will become lower, and so on. But the important point for Myrdal is that change in any one part of the system affects an interlocking set of other parts. As Myrdal says:

> . . . any change in any one of these factors [e.g., white prejudice or Negro living standards]. . . will, by the aggregate weight of the cumulative effects running back and forth between them all, start the whole system moving in one direction or the other as the case may be, with a speed depending upon the original push and the functions of causal interrelation within the system (1944:1067).

It is very important, though, to know how all of the elements within the system interrelate and what effects change in one element will have on all of the others. Thus,

> . . . a rational policy will never work by changing only one factor, least of all if it attempted suddenly and with great force. In most cases that would either throw the system entirely out of gear or else prove to be a wasteful expenditure of effort which could reach much further by being spread strategically over various factors in the system and over a period of time (Myrdal, 1944:77).

Myrdal was particularly opposed to "single factor" theories of economic change, and claimed that this approach had ". . . unwarrantedly acquired the prestige of being a . . . 'hard-boiled' scientific approach" (Myrdal, 1944:77; also, 1944:1069). Throughout his book, Myrdal reminds us of taking care not to rely on "narrow" and "unrealistic" approaches to the "Negro problem." Rather, the proper approach is the "dynamic causation" approach were there is ". . . no 'primary cause' but everything is cause to everything else" (Myrdal, 1944:78).

Throughout his book, Myrdal assumes white prejudice to be the final determinant in solving the problem of white-nonwhite relations. Further, he assumes adaptation and adjustment to white standards to be very important for nonwhites; this adaptation, it is argued, will lead toward the reduction of white prejudice and nonwhite advancement (1944: 1066). We have as a pre-condition for "advancement" the adaptation of nonwhites to white standards. As Myrdal puts it:

> This can be said positively: we assume that it is to the advantage of American Negroes as individuals and as a group to become assimilated into American culture, to acquire the traits held in esteem by the dominant white Americans. This will be the value premise here (1944:929).

In order to help solve the problem and assist in the process of Negro assimilation, Myrdal stresses the ". . . moral conflict in the heart of white Americans" (1944:215) which tears at the fabric of the American Creed. To solve the Negro problem the gap between American ideals, as embodied in the American Creed, and American reality, which consistently fails to realize these ideals, must be bridged. This requires moral persuasion through education, increased contacts between nonwhites and whites, and governmental and state action. The real battle, however, is in the minds of men:

> We started by stating the hypothesis that the Negro problem has its existence in the American's mind. There the decisive struggle goes on. It is there that changes occur. [The important changes in Negro status] do not consist of . . . "social trends" but are made up of changes in people's beliefs and valuations (Myrdal, 1944:998).

Since whites, Myrdal is implying, feel morally ambivalent about holding two sets of contradictory beliefs (the American Creed versus racial prejudice and discrimination) change will come about through moral uplift and moral education. (See Campbell, 1961 and Westie, 1965 for a refutation of this hypothesis). So, the problem of racial prejudice is

a moral problem:

> From the point of view of the American Creed the status accorded the Negro in America represents nothing more and nothing less than a century-long lag of public morals (Myrdal, 1944:24).

But what is the origin of this important moral problem of white prejudice? It is apparently not to be found in economic oppression or injustice, as the following suggests:

> There is nothing wrong with economic inequality by itself. The mere fact that the Negro people are poorer than other population groups does not per se constitute a social problem. It does not challenge the American Creed (Myrdal, 1944:214).

This follows Myrdal's assumptions that the problem of prejudice is to be found only in the minds' of men. Also, it follows his reformist assumptions: ". . . our study [is to be kept] within the conservative reformist limits of average American economic discussion" (Myrdal, 1944:214). Prejudice and racial subjugation, then, are mystical in origin; we are only left with the notion that prejudice is "irrational" and only ". . . scientific truth-seeking and education" will slowly rectify ". . . the beliefs and thereby also influence the valuations" people hold (Myrdal, 1944:xlix). Prejudice and racial subjugation is explained away as some sort of "original sin" which is almost totally disconnected from the ongoing social structure and historical realities. This is not to say that beliefs are not important; it is to say, though, that beliefs tell only one part of the story. Beliefs constitute the appearance, but not the essence of racial subjugation. An approach which deals with one without the other is delusion and serves only to mystify the problem under consideration. However, as will be seen shortly, later writers of a more critical vein have come back to at least the "belief" aspect of Myrdal's emphasis, but start from a more objective

economic base and stress more the functional aspect of beliefs. Finally, it is necessary to point out that Myrdal's text is very useful, even though his theory and assumptions seem to me to be inadequate and beg the question of racism. Cox's statement regarding Myrdal's work applies here:

> An American Dilemma, the most exhaustive survey of race relations ever undertaken in the United States, is, for the most part, a useful source of data. . . But it develops no hypothesis or consistent theory of race relations (Cox, 1948:538).

Myrdal's book generated a lot of research on American race relations, most of these investigating psychological variables and/or facts of specific milieu (see Simpson and Yinger, 1972:Chap. 3 for a useful summary of these studies). It became increasingly obvious, however, that simple moral persuasion would not alter the subjugated position of nonwhites in America. Hence, many studies shifted to minority adaptations and dysfunctions of minority cultures as far as "getting on" in the dominant culture was concerned. Due to the inability of mainstream sociology to critically probe the social structure and/or critically examine their own assumptions, the focus of attention once more was upon the victim of racial oppression. In the latter part of the 1950s and most of the 1960s sociologists spent a lot of time, money, and research on the circular argument "Poverty itself breeds the conditions which perpetuate poverty" (Myrdal, 1944:208).

The Culture of Poverty Model

In a sense, the culture of poverty model is a reflection of Myrdal's "cumulative causation" model: if indeed white prejudice and discrimination set in motion a "downward movement" of Negro living conditions, the

culture of poverty can be seen as the final result. However, as a "culture" of poverty, the idea conveyed is that white prejudice is not now considered a primary factor in keeping the living standards of the poor down, although prejudice was acknowledged to be a factor in the past. The very operation of a culture of poverty holds the poor down. This idea was, and is, very popular among liberal social scientists to explain the apparant anomaly of widespread, and persistent, poverty in the midst of plenty.

Most writers credit Oscar Lewis for generating an academic interest in the culture of poverty (although Lewis used the word culture for convenience sake only, he stated that a "subculture" is the more scientifically appropriate concept). However, Harrington (1962) really popularized the term and is credited with influencing the much vaunted "war on poverty." It is interesting, however, to see how Lewis' original concept was treated by mainstream sociology.

Lewis maintained that the culture (subculture) of poverty developed as ". . . both an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individualist, capitalistic society" (Lewis, 1965:xliv). The culture of poverty tends to "grow and flourish" in societies characterized by:

> (1) a cash economy, wage labor and production for profit; (2) a persistently high rate of unemployment and underemployment for unskilled labor; (3) low wages; (4) the failure to provide social, political and economic organization, either on a voluntary basis or by government imposition, for the low-income population; (5) the existence of a bilateral kinship system rather than a unilateral one; and finally, (6) the existence of a set of values in the dominant class which stresses the accumulation of wealth and property, the possibility of upward mobility and thrift, and explains low economic status as the result of personal inadequacy or inferiority (Lewis, 1965:xliii-xliv).

Furthermore, due to the above conditions, the culture of poverty tends to perpetuate itself from generation to generation through the family and socialization practices (Lewis, 1965:xlv). Some of the traits of the culture of poverty include hopelessness and despair, lack of effective participation and integration into the major institutions of the larger society. This is due primarily to lack of resources, segregation and discrimination, fear, suspicion, or apathy. Of course, the poor may "participate" in some institutions of society, such as the army, jails, and the public relief system. Other factors which operate in establishing and maintaining a culture of poverty include: minimum organization of the poor beyond the nuclear and extended family, and perhaps the neighborhood gang; the absence of childhood as a prolonged and protected stage in the life cycle. On the individual level some factors include: strong feeling of marginality, helplessness, dependence, and inferiority; also, a high incidence of maternal deprivation, of "orality" and "weak ego structure," confusion of sexual identification, lack of impulse control, little ability to defer gratification and to plan for the future, a sense of resignation and fatalism, widespread belief in male superiority, and a ". . . high tolerance for psychological pathology of all sorts" (Lewis, 1965:xlv-xlviii).

Unfortunately, of all of these factors, mainstream sociology tends to stress the latter traits, especially the individual traits. This stress on individuality is at the expense of what Lewis considered the cause of these traits, the first six characteristics discussed previously. These six characteristics are almost totally ignored by mainstream sociologists and other social scientists. In fact, the use of the

culture of poverty in much literature today very much resembles the old social pathology school; not only in outlook, but in suggested solutions as well.

The culture of poverty model has moved from an analysis of white discrimination and prejudice to an analysis of nonwhite adaptions to the latter. Thus, the culture of poverty theorists do not deny that prejudice and discrimination initially were the causal agents in the position of nonwhite minorities. However, instead of analyzing other causal forces, such as structural shifts in corporate capitalism, they instead focus on the "culture" of the subordinated themselves. Subsequently, this model moved to an individual level and the fact was forgotten that nonwhites were placed in their position initially via other forces. Hence, the central idea came to be simply that the poor perpetuate their own subordinate position through successive generations of socialization and, more and more popular today, through inbreeding. Whites, then, are removed from having anything to do with the continued subordination of nonwhite minorities in the United States. More importantly, the structure of white capitalist America is removed from analysis. The initial focus, which possessed at least the possibility of critical content, has, once again, been totally defused. This is not to say that the modern day culture of poverty model is not potentially explosive. Today we are beginning to see a resurgence of "scientific racism," complete with all the paraphernalia of "vulgar" racism: race-IQ debates, inherited intelligence, the possibilities of sterilization, and so forth.

Thus, what has been seen in this discussion of mainstream sociology is that this perspective, due to its major assumptions, ultimately falls

back on an individualistic explanation of social problems. At best the explanation utilizes a specific institutional form immediately given within the individual's environment, such as family, status, race, neighborhood, and so on. This is indeed strange for a discipline which purports to delve deeper than a psychological or biological definition of human behavior. But this is not strange in the sense that mainstream sociology has always been, and probably will always be, spokesmen for the power-that-be. As DuBois has pointed out:

> The social sciences from the beginning were deliberatly used as instruments to prove the inferiority of the majority of the people of the world, who were being used as slaves for the comfort and culture of the master. The social sciences long looked upon this as one of their major duties. History declared that the Negro had no history. Biology exaggerated the physical differences among men. Economics even today cannot talk straight on colonial imperialism. Psychology has not yet recovered from the shame of its "intelligence" tests and its record of "conclusions" during the first World War (DuBois, 1944: 455).

It is doubted that DuBois would recognize much change in the social scientific study of race relations even today.

CHAPTER TWO

CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY

My purpose in discussing critical sociology is not to delineate one particular brand of sociology, for example, the Frankfurt School, which is often simply called "critical sociology." My purpose is rather to indicate that perspective which has always opposed what has previously been discussed as mainstream sociology. Critical sociology has always been a perspective in opposition to, and on the periphery of, mainstream sociology. This tradition has often been labeled radical and/or "Marxist" and therefore immediately dismissed by mainstream sociology. To conjure up the word "Marxist" in relation to a theory is to summarily remove it from serious consideration. At least, this has been the case until recently.

A critical perspective begins with totally different assumptions concerning man and society in comparison to the mainstream sociologists. Any conception of an "order" theory, for example, is seen to be order only for the purposes of the ruling class and their needs. "Order" then is only a reification of social control, control which is intended to control behavior as well as thought. Any order theory, which assumes consensus on values and social organization, has as a consequence the decline of a self-reflective public. In other words, people are no longer able to make use of available resources to build a better life and better society which meets their needs. Instead, they are consigned

to adjust to the needs of the system. The needs of the system, more often than not, neatly coincide with the ruling class and/or corporate capitalists' needs. Reflection, especially critical reflection, is no longer encouraged, and in time the powers of self-reflection atrophy. Hearn (in discussing Marcuse) summarizes this:

> From the outset, his [Marcuse's] argument revolves around the observation that the new technological work-world of advanced industrial society enters into the realm of conscious reflection and thereby absorbs its once negative and critical functions. In so doing, it has prevented man from utilizing the productive forces of technology for the satisfaction of his basic needs. Indeed, when these productive forces are turned against man, a self-expanding and self-perpetuating vicious circle is created. Therein man "needs" only that which can be supplied by the established structures (Hearn, 1973:144).

The success of this "technological work-world" in imposing its world-view is not denied. But the fact that "order" theorists through use of their empirico-analytic methods serve to extend this process makes science no longer a search for truth, but the search for more efficient techniques of domination. Thus, the "order" which is described and classified represents only a particular form of social organization which is the result of a struggle between opposing groups with opposing world-views and interests. The notion of "cultural integration" or "consensus" represents only conceptual ideologies put forth by the dominant class and their hired "conceptive ideologists" who are paid to create illusions about the existing state of things (Marx and Engels, 1963:40). The severing of ideas from their socio-historical context, and thus giving them an independent existence, blocks self-reflection and the idea that men make history through their own activities, and therefore through their own activities men can alter history. The existing state of things is not a "natural," eternal, or unchangeable

order but is the result of particular social structural circumstances. "A Negro is a Negro," said Marx, "He only becomes a slave in certain relations" (1849; in Tucker, 1972:176).

Critical sociologists, moreover, do not view "deviations," breakdowns, and so forth to be individual failures but rather products of a particular society and its failures to meet basic human needs. As a matter of fact, social problems on a widespread scale are inevitable in a capitalistic society, according to the critical theorists, since capitalism by its own internal logic is inherently self-destructive. This point will be discussed later. But, nevertheless, critical sociology confronts society (and its spokesmen) with its own claims and purported ideas. It holds the "Ought" up to the "Is" and demands that society live up to its own self-proclaimed ideals. Mainstream sociology has inverted this critical confrontation: "The impulse of [critical] philosophy, to transform the Ought into the Is readily gave way to the sober acceptance of the Is as the Ought" (Frankfurt, 1972: 7). In this sober acceptance mainstream sociology has forgotten the critical roots of sociology, roots which begin with philosophy and stand for the ". . . perspective of a free society, a just state, and the full development of the human being" (Frankfurt, 1972:11). If the existing system of power, class, and ideological arrangements make the above impossible, the system must be changed. Unfortunately, mainstream sociology continues to perceive problems as being within the system, not with the system (Willhelm, 1970:180). In order to see problems as being with the system mainstream sociology must break away from serving the powers-that-be and regain a lost art of criticism and become the voice of human liberation and emancipation. A new order where human liberation

and emancipation can be realized is dismissed by mainstream sociologists as mere "utopia." However, critical sociology:

> . . . has no fear of the utopia that the new order is denounced as being. When truth cannot be realized within the established social order, it always appears to the latter as mere utopia (Marcuse, 1968:143).

However, the utopian spirit is meant to reflect real possibilities based on the potentialities that could be realized if a given system's resources were allocated in a "rational" manner--that is, in a manner which meets the needs of the people, and not just the needs of private property and power. Unfortunately, often the utopian element inverts critical analysis into a self-defeating vacuum. So much time is spent on describing the future utopia that serious analysis of the given social order is deflected and a truly critical process of theory building is shunted to one side. Marx constantly berated the "utopian" economic theorists of his day for this. This was while Marx himself held to a future classless society often called utopian. However, Marx was not content to dwell on this future society, instead he set out a ". . . ruthless criticism of everything existing" (quoted in Tucker, 1972:8). This criticism was, however, guided by a theory which possessed potential for action:

> Material force can only be overthrown by material force; but theory itself becomes a material force when it is seized by the massess. . . . Theory is only realized in a people as far as it fulfills the needs of the people (Marx, 1927; in Tucker, 1972:18-19).

In order for theory to be a material force to be grasped it has to unveil the hidden oppressive mechanisms of capitalistic society and reveal to the people that this situation need not be. According to the critical theorists, it has to show that the "poverty" existing for the mass of the people ". . . is not naturally existing poverty, but poverty

artificially produced" (Marx, 1927; in Tucker, 1972:22). Clearly, an empirico-analytic theoretical method that only records, classifies, and observes "given" social forms does not meet the needs of the people and thus cannot be grasped by them, argue the critical theorists. "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it" (Marx, 1888; in Tucker, 1972:109).

It follows, then, that critical sociology interprets "health" in a radically different way than do the mainstream sociologists. The latter equated health with social conformity, or the ability of an individual to adjust to his role-status requirements in meeting system maintenance needs. The former equates health with human freedom. Freedom and health imply, for the critical sociologists, that men and women are able to interact, work, and live in such a way that their true potentialities can be developed within the context of a non-exploitative, non-competitive society. Any society based on exploitation and competition blunts these possibilities and is therefore unhealthy. Capitalistic society, the critical theorists argue, is an unhealthy society, based as it is on competition and exploitation. Also, it is a society which mystifies "freedom" by hiding the fact that the majority of the population is compelled to enter into a social relationship where their only resource, labor power, is exchanged for wages. This exchange is posited to be "natural" by mainstream social and economic theorists. However, according to critical theory true freedom:

> . . . is not phantom or arbitrary inwardness that leaves everything in the external world as it is. Rather, freedom here means a real potentiality, a social relationship on whose realization human destiny depends (Marcuse, 1968:143).

Marx maintained that ". . . society is inhuman because labor in [capi-

talist] society is alienated labor" (Mandel, 1971:29). Alienated labor came about as a result of the system of private property and division of labor in capitalist society. The result of these two social forms was a mass of workers who had no control over the productive forces and were left with no other recourse but to sell their labor power to those who owned or controlled the productive forces.

In order to cloak the above socio-historical relationship between wage labor and capital the mainstream sociologists posited a "transcendental" conception of society. This conception of society, according to the critical sociologists, analytically separated actual social processes from their empirical base in such a way that they took on the appearance of a "natural" process that can not be mediated by man. The critical theorist takes as his task the critique of these appearances and the unveiling of the concealed forms of domination. As Schroyer puts this "critique of domination" the task is ". . . the reflective critique of socially unnecessary constraints of human freedom" (1973: 15). Unfortunately, many critical theorists, in my opinion, completely mystified the sources of domination in their writings and in their attempts to develop a theory. This is in contrast to Marx, who, especially in his later writings, steadfastly remained objective and empirical and always tried to ground his ooncepts in the actual working and living conditions of concrete reality. Many modern day critical theorists have moved away from this to other explanations. For example, many critical theorists of the Frankfurt School have gone deep into psychoanalysis to explain domination and exploitation. Brown (1973:119) more recently explains that the "authoritarian mass individual" in capitalistic society today is characterized by the "anal-obsessive"

personality type and is therefore unable to act. Or, Brown continues, the prevailing authoritarian system is enhanced (in males) by the "threatening specter represented by the disintegration of patriarchal authority with all its implications in terms of unconscious fears of castration. . ." (Brown, 1973:120). Now, undoubtedly much of this is meant to be taken in a metaphorical sense to explain the apparent "insufficiency of classical Marxism" and the fact that the working class can apparently be manipulated quite easily by the capitalist class and all their integrative mechanisms. There are many interesting and stimulating ideas in these various modern day critical theories and their attempts to explain the various forms of internalized domination. However, it does not seem to me that these modern day theories could be something which could "seize the masses" or even explain their concrete conditions. For example, it would seem very difficult to explain to a Third World ghetto dweller that his oppressive situation was due to "anal-obsession" or fears of castration. Moreover, solutions posed by modern day critical theorists also seem to me to miss the mark. Again, it would be very difficult to discuss solutions to domination as emanating through libidinal energy, revolutionary art, or the "Great Refusal." It is doubted that the objective conditions of poverty and unemployment of nonwhites, and whites, could be solved in the above manners. Thus, from a Marxian perspective, some of these modern day critical theories could be seen as deflections and hindrances to probing the existing structure of corporate capitalism in a critical manner. For these reasons, it was always very important for Marx to stress the one social fact which both enslaves the masses and provides for their possible liberation: the world of work.

This can be seen in the view of human nature held by most critical sociologists, especially those of a Marxian persuasion. However, it is also becoming increasingly difficult to discern exactly how most critical sociologists view human nature (on this see Sjoberg and Nett, 1968:28-38). Horton maintains that the most general view of human nature given by what he calls "conflict" sociologists is one of "Homo laborans," that is: ". . . existential man who is the active creator of himself and society through practical and autonomous social action" (Horton, 1966:705). This conception is implicit in most critical sociology, and explicit in Marxism. In fact, the expression of man as one of an active agent in creating his world, and in turn being created by it, runs through all of Marx's work. This conception of man is summed up thus:

> Man can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producting their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life. . . . The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production (Marx and Engels, 1963:7).

However, when the control over the means of production become separated from individual men and women, that intimate connection between life-production and life-expression becomes increasingly difficult to attain. Instead, when this separation becomes intensified and institutionalized

with the development of private property and the division of labor, a different subjective response emerges. This is alienation, the separation of man from the control over what he himself produces. This separation has both subjective and objective consequences. The separation is objective in the sense that a division of labor is established and extended to facilitate the production process in order to increase surplus value, which is appropriated by the owners of private capital. The separation is subjective in the sense that the worker, who is "free" only in the sense that he no longer has control over the means of production and is left with only his labor power to sell as any other commodity, is left to depend totally on the exigencies of the market place. His labor power is needed only if it can produce surplus value, if it cannot produce surplus value, man's labor power is not needed; thus, if man's labor is not needed, man is not needed. Therefore, man is left with the feeling of dependency, powerlessness, and impersonality in the face of a little understood but nevertheless "real" power. The subjective side, then, is a reflection of real objective social conditions, conditions which are both the source of livelihood and frustration:

> [The] crystalization of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up until now (Marx and Engels, 1963:23).

The active, creative essence of human nature can be suppressed, but only under certain conditions reflecting particular socio-historical circumstances. Mandel, speaking of alienation, indicates this: "Alienation is not rooted in 'human nature' or in 'man's existence,' but in specific conditions of labor, production, and society" (1971:182). The important

thing is that this is not posited to be some "eternal" state to which man must adjust, but it is seen to be only a transitory phenomenon rooted in specific social relations of production. This conception of human nature also moves away from the mainstream idea of human nature which set forth an individualistic aspect of human nature. These various forms of human nature reflect the nature and forms of social organization and their various ideologies: that man is by nature individualistic, egoistical, competitive, greedy, evil, and so forth. These arguments concerning human nature are usually applied in order to justify the domination of one class over another. Thus, the mainstream sociological definition of human nature reflects the needs of the given social order. The critical sociological definition, on the other hand, reflects the needs of people. By contrasting these two schools and their definitions of human nature and the "good" society, it can be seen how each will treat social problems. On the one hand, mainstream sociology will more than likely turn to an individualistic explanation of social problems since human nature is in part seen in relation to adjustment to system needs. Critical sociology, however, will more than likely turn to a societal explanation of social problems since society ideally is only to serve and meet the needs of the people, since it is a reflection of creative human labor and the corresponding social relations established in this process. Social problems are seen in the critical theory to be reactions toward an oppressive society, a society which does not allow for the full expression of human worth and potentiality. Thus, society should be changed, not individuals.

However, one can get a better picture of the contrasting views of social problems as used in these two schools by looking at critical

sociology's "contradiction" perspective of social problems. This is in contrast to mainstream sociology's "paradox" perspective. It will be recalled that a paradoxical view of social problems implied a tenet contrary to received opinion or opposed to common sense, but may in fact be true. A contradiction perspective looks at the latter part of the above statement: the so-called paradox may in fact be true. That is, social problems are seen as emerging out of the very contradictions of the social system and are seen, not as paradoxes, but as necessary and functional aspects of the system itself. To repeat what was said before concerning contradiction: they are the result of ". . . some logical and necessary relationship between the basic system-defining institutions of capitalism and one of its consequences. . ." (Wachtel, 1972:51). To approach a problem as a contradiction means to pry into the internal workings of the social system under investigation. One must not deal with surface manifestations, or appearances, but with essence. As Marx said: ". . . all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things co-incided" (1967:797). This is summed up succinctly in Marx's criticism of Feuerbach:

> Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-alienation, of the duplication of the world into a religious, imaginary world and a real one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. He overlooks the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be done. For the fact that the secular basis detaches itself from itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an independent realm can only be explained by the cleavage and self-contradictions within this secular basis. The latter must itself, therefore, first be understood in its contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction, revolutionised in practice (Marx, 1888; in Tucker, 1972:108).

This concept of contradiction is, in my opinion, an important one. Marx, it is felt by many writers, had an uncanny ability to reveal the

contradictions contained in apparently "smooth" running social systems. Smooth running, that is, from the public consensus angle which is heavily bolstered by system maintaining ideologies.

In order to show how Marx utilized the concept of contradiction, it seems useful to demonstrate how he actually analyzed social phenomena and social institutions. This will be put off until the next chapter, when the roots of the radical and colonial models of race relations will be discussed. Also at that time a discussion of critical sociology's "historico-critique" approach to the study of societal relationships will be discussed. This historico-critique approach is in contrast to mainstream sociology's empirico-analytical approach. The rest of this chapter will consist of looking at critical sociology's idea of "rational." A "rational" approach to the study of social problems, in contrast to mainstream sociology's "public" opinion approach, means to focus the direction and outcome of social scientific research so as to meet the concrete needs of people, and not the needs of administrative systems and/or private power interests who may desire manipulable information to extend their interests and control. Rational, then, is not to be confused with the "rationalization" process described by Weber, which detailed rationality for domination through the expansion and extension of bureaucratic forms of management and societal planning. In the critical sense rational implies the optimal use of society's resources to meet the needs of the people and at the same time to free them from the debilitating constraints of commodity production for the needs of private profit. Marcuse sums this up:

> A theory of society is rationalist when the practice it enjoins is subject to the idea of autonomous reason, i.e. to the human faculty of comprehending, through conceptual thought, the true, the good, and the right. . . . The

> necessity of acknowledging a fact or goal never follows from its pure existence; rather, acknowledgment occurs only when knowledge has freely determined that the fact or goal is in accordance with reason. The rationalist theory of society is therefore essentially critical; it subjects society to the idea of a theoretical and practical, positive and negative critique. This critique has two guidelines: first, the given situation of man as a rational organism, i.e. one that has the potentiality of freely determining and shaping his own existence, directed by the process of knowledge and with regard to his worldly happiness; second, the given level of development of the productive forces and the (corresponding or conflicting) relations of production as the criterion for those potentialities that can be realized at any given time in men's rational structuring of society. . . (Marcuse, 1968:14-15).

Many of the modern day critical theorists have stressed this idea of a "rational" society. This was clearly one idea which Marx stressed in most of his work. However, some critical theorists have today departed from Marx's original emphasis on a rational society and have especially departed on Marx's thesis that the proletariat would be the only objectively powerful group who could implement a rational society. That is, many modern day critical theorists have begun to seriously question the role of the proletariat as the most revolutionary force in society. Many critical theorists have abandoned the proletarian concept altogether. For example, the ability of modern day capitalism with its sophisticated technocratic integrative mechanism is being analyzed anew. Technology, some argue, represents a new "superstructure" in that it internally dominates virtually all members of society into unconsciousness and inaction. Marcuse's famous <u>One-Dimensional Man</u> (1964) is probably the best known example of this work. Habermas (1970) also discusses the inadequacy of Marxism for contemporary society and the realities of modern day technocracy. For example, Habermas states that the "labor power" of immediate producers plays a very small role in

producing surplus value today. "Thus technology and science become a leading productive force, rendering inoperative the conditions for Marx's labor theory of value" (Habermas, 1970:104). Since the worker is no longer the major force in changing society, who is the new vanguard of social change? Scientists and, especially, students are the newest forces of revolutionary change, Habermas informs us (1970:78, 120-121). Moreover, since the labor theory of value is rejected, the new tactics for change revolve around communication and discussion free from coercion and constraint (Habermas, 1970:118-119). This is how a society "free from domination and repression" can be established, and the scientists and students must take the initiative in freeing discussion (1970:61). The educational institution is where this is to take place. Only briefly are Third World peoples discussed (1970:110). This is undoubtedly because Habermas does not feel that Third World people are exploited today. Thus, ". . . no longer [do Third World underprivileged groups] coincide with exploitation, because the system does not live off their labor" (Habermas, 1970:110). Habermas, then, (1) makes an autonomous force out of technology and science; (2) sets up communication and discussion as the new forces of revolutionary change; and (3) dismisses almost completely the mass of oppressed Third World people. This sort of "critical" theory, in my opinion, has moved far away from the task of deeply and critically probing the internal workings of the social structure itself and has moved into an extremely dubious, if not conservative, position. It seems to me that Habermas has missed the issue concerning the Third World people he discusses, or rather dismisses. If any critical theory is really serious about answering the question "why have not the masses--the working class and

oppressed Third World people especially--acted to change what seems to be an unbearable condition?" They must first deal with the issues of poverty and unemployment, especially when this poverty and unemployment hits approximately one-third of the nonwhite minority group members. As Marx and Engels have pointed out:

> . . . we must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to "make history." But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life (1963:17).

If Habermas and his students and scientists would deal with these fundamental issues first, then they could begin communication and discussion.

This is not to imply that many of the critical school's analyses of internal forms of domination are not valuable. They are useful and provide an extension of some of the Marxian assumptions concerning domination. The sophistication and subtleties of modern day corporate capitalism and all of its integrative mechanisms obviously require an analysis which takes these various devices into account. However, it appears that nonwhites have been given short shrift, and instead the main audience of the critical school appears to be other than objectively oppressed groups. Thus, since this analysis is concerned with race relations, my discussions to follow will follow a fairly strict Marxian perspective in discussing nonwhite minorities in the United States.

CHAPTER III

THE ROOTS OF THE RADICAL AND COLONIAL MODELS OF RACE RELATIONS

Since both the radical and colonial models are indebted to Marx, it is necessary to briefly analyze the Marxian model and some of its major points as far as race relations are concerned. Also, the term "historico-critique" is used to describe Marx's perspective with the specific intention of contrasting his approach to the "empirico-analytic" approach of the mainstream school. The term "historico-critique" also implies that some "critical" theorists, unlike Marx, tend to retain only the "critique" element but often break away from a historical critique of social phenomena. That is, they often ignore or push to one side the analysis of concrete activities of real human beings within a particular historical-structural context. Often their analysis moves to some "nether world" and is difficult to relate to the real life-experiences of men and women, especially nonwhite nonwestern minority group members.

Marx sets our ". . . from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process" (Marx and Engels, 1963: 24). Moreover,

> . . . they are real individuals, their activities and the material conditions under which they live, both those already existing and those produced by their activity.

> These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way (Marx and Engels, 1963:7).

Marx begins his analysis with the human conditions of production (the "substructure") and moves from this to analyzing the "echoes" reflected from this process (the "superstructure"). Thus, according to Marx, the economic and non-economic cohere to structure social life in a definable form. Once a society develops its forces of production--that is, its tools, technology, buildings and equipment used in production, and the state of science and organizational techniques--it may reach such a level that a social surplus product is developed. This may entail a struggle between contending groups in society over how this surplus product is to be divided. The surplus produce (or surplus value if monetary) is simply the surplus over and above the total production of labor at a subsistence level. That is, when human beings produce just enough goods to keep them alive there is no surplus product; moreover, there is no true social division of labor. At the subsistence level all men are producers. Whenever production attains such a level to produce a surplus this makes for the possibility of a struggle over the division of this surplus. Under these conditions one group may appropriate a greater share of the surplus product than other groups. If this appropriation continues over time, some people can thus free themselves from the necessity of working to produce their own subsistence. In this case,

> From this point on, the total output of a social group no longer consists solely on labor necessary for the subsistence of the producers. Some of this labor output may now be used to release a section of society from having to work for its own subsistence. . . . Whenever this situation arises, a section of society can become a ruling class, whose outstanding characteristic is its emancipation from the need of working for its own subsistence (Mandel, 1970:7).

Under such conditions there is a rise of a division of labor, which consists of those who produce the surplus value (the working class or proletariat) and those who appropriate the surplus value (the ruling class or bourgeoisie). "Production of surplus value," says Marx, "is the absolute law of this [capitalist] mode of production" (1955:68). The social relations of production based on this division of labor was for Marx the key in the understanding of the capitalistic mode of production. It was because this was above all a social relation that Marx continually reminded those who tended to forget that capitalism was based on social relationships and was not some eternally "given" state of affairs. Also, upon this economic substructure arise a multitude of superstructural forms used by the ruling class to protect their interests and perpetuate their status. These forms are such things as ideologies, law, religion, education, intellectual perspectives, as well as police, armies, and other such institutional forms.

The important thing is that in order for capital to be produced through the appropriation of surplus value, the ". . . existence of a class which possesses nothing but its capacity to labour is a necessary pre-requisite of capital" (Marx, 1849; in Tucker, 1972:178). In the stage of "primitive" accumulation of capital there were various and sundry ways in which one class gained control over the means of production and "produced" another class that had nothing left but their own bodies which they sold in exchange for a subsistence wage. The appearance of a large mass who possessed nothing and a smaller group who possessed everything is explained, Marx said, by the "bourgeois" economists as some sort of "original sin."

> This primitive accumulation plays in Political Economy about the same part as original sin in theology. Adam

> bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the human race. Its origin is supposed to explain the past when it is told as an anecdote of the past. In times long ago there were two sorts of people; one, the intelligent, diligent, and above all, frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their subsistence, and more, in riotous living. . . Thus it came to pass that the former sort accumulated wealth, and the latter sort had at last nothing to sell except their own skins. And from this original sin dates the poverty of the great majority that, despite all its labour, has up to now nothing to sell but itself, and the wealth of the few that increases constantly although they have long ceased to work. Such insipid childishness is every day preached to us in the defence of property (Marx, 1867; in Tucker, 1972:311).

How this accumulation at one pole and loss at the other actually takes place can be seen as follows:

1. The separation of the producer from his means of production. If a worker can produce his own means of subsistence, there is no "economic compulsion to hire out one's arms, to sell one's labour power to a capitalist" (Mandel, 1970:31). This situation would obviously be disastrous for the capitalist, for the production of surplus value is dependent on a "free" labor force. "Free" in that:

> . . . neither they themselves form part and parcel of the means of production, as in the case of slaves, . . . nor do the means of production belong to them, as in the case of peasant-proprietors; they are, therefore, free from, unencumbered by, any means of production of their own" Marx, 1867; in Tucker, 1972:312).

2. A second origin is the concentration of the means of production in monopoly form and in the hands of a single social class, the bourgeoisie. Here a continual revolution in the productive forces is taking place, making the means of production more expensive and more complex. Thus, greater sums of money are required to gain control over some of the means of production.

> From this point on it may be said that access to the ownership of the means of production becomes impossible for the overwhelming majority of wage-earners and salaried

> personnel, and that such ownership became a monopoly in the hands of one social class, the class which possesses capital and capital reserves, and can obtain additional capital by virtue of the single fact that it already has some of it (Mandel, 1970:33-34).

3. The third origin of capitalism is the appearance of a class with no possessions except its labor power, but it is at the same time free to sell this labor power to the buyer. Here, says Mandel, we have ". . . the appearance of the modern proletariat" (1970:34). In summary:

> The capitalist system presupposes the complete separation of the labourers from all property in the means by which they realise their labour. As soon as capitalist production is once on its own legs, it not only maintains this separation, but reproduces it on a continually extending scale. The process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the process which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production. . . The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production (Marx, 1867; in Tucker, 1972:312).

When, in other words, the worker has no possessions left except his own body and no means of subsistence other than his labor power, then he (or a whole class) is "free" to exchange this on the market palce. The separation of the producer from his means of production (the first characteristic above) differs from the latter characteristic of capitalism in that it may be accompanied by force and violence. The history of this expropriation of producers from their means of production ". . . is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire" (Marx, 1867; in Tucker, 1972:313). But once this new social relation between wage labor and capital can stand on its "own legs" it comes to be seen after a period of time as a "natural" system. It comes to be, then, a dependency relationship: the worker is dependent on the capitalist, for he has no recourse but to sell his labor power in order to eat; the capitalist, on the other hand, is also dependent on the

worker or an available pool of workers, for the only way surplus value can be created is through the available labor power of the wage-earner. Thus, these "dialectical pairs" of wage labor and capital, though inherently opposite and always containing a potential for conflict, come together and form a social relationship which conceals the internal contradictions contained within the "appearance." Marx's analysis of "exchange value" and "use value" and how the above are used to increasingly accumulate more surplus value for the capitalist reveals the contradictions contained within capitalism even more clearly. This analysis also unveils the possibility that the system of capitalism is by its own logic a self-destructive system.

The labor power which the worker sells to the capitalist contains both an exchange value and a use value. The exchange value is simply what the worker receives in the form of wages, wages which are the value of the worker's own labor power. The value of labor power is determined, according to Marx, as that of any other commodity: its value is the quanity of labor socially necessary to produce and reproduce it, that is, it is equivalent to the living costs of the worker. The living costs of the worker, and thus the determining value of labor power, are not rigidly determined nor are they necessarily at the "bare" subsistence level. They are instead determined by a historical "standard of living" which is itself largely determined by advances in the productivity of labor (Mandel, 1970:24). Thus, ". . . the living cost of labor-power constitutes its value and that surplus value is the difference between this living cost and the value created by this labor-power" (Mandel, 1970:24). If, for example, the laborer produces in eight hours a value of eight hours of work, and his living costs (the equivalent of his

wages) are also equal to eight hours of work, there will be no surplus value created. But if the worker can produce in four hours, say, the equivalent of his living costs (wages), and assuming that he must work an eight-hour day, the extra four hours in which he produces more goods is "free" time to be appropriated by the capitalist without any equivalent offset. In other words, the worker produces more than makes up for his wages paid, and this extra produce is appropriated by the capitalist and sold or realized in some way as profit. Now, this will always be the case—that the living costs of labor are always less than the newly created value—for if this difference did not exist ". . . no employer would hire any worker, since such a purchase of labor-power would bring no profit to the buyer" (Mandel, 1970:25). When it is remembered that this is an accumulative process (many workers producing surplus values) the extent of capitalistic enrichment can be seen.

The use value of labor power is use value mainly for the capitalist who uses labor power in aiding the creation of surplus value. "The use value of a thing is as such of no concern to the person who sells it, but only to the person who buys it" (Marx, 1971:80). Moreover, since the worker can only receive exchange in the form of wages, which he usually consumes in order to subsist, he cannot "enrich himself," for ". . . he retains a right only to the price of labour, not to the product of his labour, nor to the value that labour has added to the product" (Marx, 1971:82). Thus, "He alienates his labour power as a power capable of producing wealth, and it is capital that appropriates that power" (Marx, 1971:80). The worker is also a purchaser of commodities, a consumer. Thus, he in fact produces goods with his labor power—part of which goes to the capitalist in the form of surplus

value--and he also buys goods with the wages he received for this production, and this purchase of goods also finds its way back to the capitalist in the form of profit.

Since the creation of surplus value is the generator of capitalism, and labor power is the key to this, more and more means of production must be appropriated by the capitalist as private property. The progress of this appropriation is that in time, due to competition, more and more means of production will be concentrated in fewer and fewer capitalist hands.

> In proportion as the bourgeoisis, i.e., capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the proletariat, the modern working class, developed--a class of laborers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labor increases capital (Marx and Engels, 1955:16).

Thus, it follows:

> More and more the bourgeoisis keeps doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralized means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralization (Marx and Engels, 1955:14).

Some very interesting contradictions take place in the constant desire to increase surplus value while at the same time concentrating capital in fewer and fewer hands. Marx's analysis of the organic composition of capital shows how constant accumulation of the means of production increases capital but lowers wages relative to this increase. At the same time there is a decrease for the need for workers and thus a "superfluous" population (the industrial reserve army) is produced. Obviously, however, this turns into the fetters of capitalism, for it cannot continually dismiss workers for there would be no one left to produce surplus value, at the same time there would be fewer people left

to consume if they had no wages with which to purchase products.

All capitalist production can be expressed in value by the formula C + V + S, where C equals constant capital (that part of capital transformed into machines, buildings, raw materials, and so on), V equals variable capital (the equivalent of wages, and constitutes that part of capital used to buy labor power and is the only part of capital which lets the capitalist increase his capital by means of surplus value), and S equals surplus value (part of which is consumed unproductively by the capitalist, part of which is accumulated and transformed into either supplementary constant capital, which is a supplementary quanity of raw materials, machines, buildings, and so on; and part of which goes into supplementary variable capital, or means provided to hire more workers). According to Marx, the surplus value can be increased in two ways: (1) absolute surplus value, that is, the creation of new value over the costs of labor power by extending the working day; or (2) relative surplus value, which is "revolutionizing" the means of production (improvements in technology, mechanization, specialization, and so on) which reduces the amount of labor power necessary but which still increases productivity (Marx, 1849; in Tucker, 1972:303). According to Marx, at a certain point in the development of capitalistic production and accumulation, the "productivity of social labor becomes the most power lever of accumulation." Marx seems to place more emphasis on the development of relative surplus value, even though he does not rule absolute surplus value out either. Thus, Marx (quoting Adam Smith) points out:

> The same cause which raises the wages of labor, the increase of stock, tends to increase its productive powers, and to make a smaller quantity of labor produce a greater quantity of work (Marx, 1955:71).

But at any rate, for the worker the situation becomes worse relative to

the situation of the capitalist. The main emphasis, nevertheless, is on increasing relative surplus value, a trend which Marx clearly predicted. That is, modern day capitalism attempts to increase productivity by revolutionizing the means of technical and mechanical production. As Mandel puts it, this is an attempt to constantly increase the weight of C, constant capital, with respect to V, variable capital. In the long term, total capital will expand, but wages (V) relative to this will tend to decline. This is not to say that the variable component of capital will not increase absolutely; it may very well increase, but always relative to the increase in constant capital. Marx puts it thus:

> . . . this growth in the mass of means of production, as compared with the mass of the labor power that vivifies them, is reflected again in its value-composition, by the increase of the constant constituent of capital at the expense of its variable constitute. . . [This] increase in the productiveness of labor appears, therefore, in the diminution of the mass of labor in proportion to the mass of the means of production moved by it (Marx, 1955: 72).

Thus, the plight of the working class gets relatively worse, since a rise in wages only means, ". . . in fact, that the length and weight of the golden chain the wage-worker has already forged for himself, allow of a relaxation of the tension of it" (Marx, 1955:68). However, there are other things going on beside this. First of all, the increasing outlay of expenditures due to the rise of the constant variable allows fewer and fewer individuals to enter the market as an owner of means of production. At the same time, the ". . . battle of competition is fought by the cheapening of commodities," and since this depends on the productivity of labor, ". . . the larger capitals beat the smaller" (Marx, 1955:76-77). So, there is developed a "centralization" of capital: "Capital grows in one place to a huge mass in a single hand, be-

cause it has in another place been lost by many" (Marx, 1955:76). Secondly, there is increasing unemployment of the workers due to the accumulation of capital, the increase of constant capital, and the diminution of labor needs. Given a certain level of productivity:

> An ever increasing part of the capital is turned into means of production, an ever decreasing one into labor-power. With the extent, the concentration and the technical efficiency of the means of production, the degree lessens progressively in which the latter are means of employment for laborers (Marx, 1955:78).

Here we see the coming together of another "dialectical pair" in a true dialectical sense. That is, the shift from a quantitative change to a qualitative change is clearly seen in this social relation of production.

> The accumulation of capital, though originally appearing as its quantitative extension only, is effected, as we have seen, under a progressive qualitative change in its composition, under a constant increase of its constant, at the expense of its variable constituent (Marx, 1955: 78).

What we now see is that capitalism, which depends ultimately on labor power to produce surplus value, is now by the very logic of the system "freeing" many of these laborers as a "relatively superfluous" population." Moreover, ". . . it does this to an always increasing extent" (Marx, 1955:81). More importantly, this superfluous population is functional for the system of capitalism:

> But if a surplus laboring population is a necessary product of accumulation or the development of wealth on a capitalist basis, this surplus population becomes, conversely, the lever of capitalistic accumulation, nay, a condition of existence of the capitalistic mode of production. It forms a disposable industrial reserve army, that belongs to capital quite as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its own cost. Independently of the limits of the actual increase of population, it creates, for the changing needs of the self-expansion of capital, a mass of human material always ready for exploitation (Marx, 1955:81).

Why this is so Marx continues to describe, and allow me to quote at length here, for this is important as far as some of the things already discussed and some things to be discussed concerning the situation of nonwhites in the United States. Marx continues:

> With accumulation, and the development of the productiveness of labor that accompanies it, the power of sudden expansion of capital grows also; it grows, not merely because the elasticity of the capital already functioning increases, not merely because the absolute wealth of society expands, of which capital only forms an elastic part; not merely because credit, under every special stimulus, at once places an unusual part of this wealth at the disposal of production in the form of additional capital; it grows, also, because the technical conditions of the process of production themselves--machinery, means of transport, etc.--now admit of the rapidest transformation of masses of surplus product into additional means of production. The mass of social wealth, overflowing with the advance of accumulation, and transformable into additional capital, thrusts itself frantically into old branches of production, whose market suddenly expands, or into newly formed branches, such as railways, and so on, the need for which grows out of the development of the old ones. In all such cases, there must be the possibility of throwing great masses of men suddenly on the decisive points without injury to the scale of production in other spheres. . . The course characteristic of modern industry, viz., a decennial cycle (interrupted by smaller oscillations) of periods of average activity, production at high pressure, crisis, and stagnation, depends on the constant formation, the greater or less absorption, and the reformation of the industrial reserve army of surplus population. In their turn, the varying phases of the industrial cycle recruit the surplus population, and become one of the most energetic agents of its reproduction (Marx, 1955:81-82).

Thus, the surplus population--surplus with regard to the needs of the expansion of capital--is not a "naturally" developed "culture of poverty." This surplus population cannot be seen as a paradox or accidental occurrence within society. It instead is an integral, functioning part of the social system based on capitalistic production. Marx also points out that the industrial reserve army occurs in no earlier period of human history, and was impossible to develop in the "childhood

of capitalism" (Marx, 1955:82). This was because capitalist accumulation was slower, and the growth in the demand for labor was able to keep pace. This is interesting for the analysis of American Race relations, for, as has already bee indicated, minority advancements, the forms of racial prejudice, and race theorizing coincide neatly with capitalistic expansion and contraction.

Furthermore, the relative surplus population tends to increase the more rapidly the means of production are revolutionized. Also, for the laborer who is in the working class, the constant competition exerted by the industrial reserve army forces him to become even more productive (compete with fellow workers) for fear of his job. This has the effect of the workers as a class to work against their own interests: the increased productivity of the single worker reduces the needs for increased labor power, thus other workers join the ranks of the industrial reserve army.

> The overwork of the employed part of the working class swells the ranks of the reserve, while conversely the greater pressure that the latter by its competition exerts on the former, forces them to submit to overwork and to subjugation under the dictates of capital. The condemnation of one part of the working class to enforced idleness by the overwork of the other part, and the converse, becomes a means of enriching the individual capitalists, and accelerates at the same time the production of the industrial reserve army on a scale corresponding with the advance of social accumulation (Marx, 1955:84).

Finally, the industrial reserve army is functional for capitalism because it has an effect of lowering wages:

> The industrial reserve army, during the periods of stagnation and average prosperity, weighs down the active labor-army; during the periods of overproduction and paroxysm, it holds its pretensions in check (Marx, 1955: 86).

It was Marx's continuing hope that the working class would learn this

"secret." Marx phrases this "secret" in the following manner:

> . . . how it comes to pass that in the same measure as they work more, as they produce more wealth for others, and as the productive power of their labor increases, so in the same measure even their function as a means of the self-expansion of capital becomes even more precarious for them (Marx, 1955:87).

It was always Marx's concern to point out the relative impoverishment of the working class and the fact that even though their absolute wages may rise, ". . . they rise much less than the wealth of capital" (Marx, 1972:150). But the fundamental contradiction is that as capitalism strives to reduce labor time necessary for production, on the other hand labor time is the only measure and source of wealth.

Marx, it is true, always admired the productive capacity of capitalism. However, he also held that this system was irrational and wasteful, not only wasteful of human lives but of produced goods. For example, in crises of overproduction not only are workers thrown into the ranks of the unemployed, but productive forces and goods are destroyed or simply wasted. Marx also noted that competition led ultimately to concentration or monopoly. This would apply not only to capitalists but also to workers. Thus, it would not be surprising to see a very definite pattern developed over the years concerning the composition of the poor, unemployed, and underemployed. In other words, the industrial reserve army should reflect definite emergent patterns over the years. As far as race relations, if it can be shown that the nonwhite minority groups no longer constitute a large percentage of this reserve army, we may assume that racial prejudice and discrimination has lessened. On the other hand, if a relatively unbroken pattern as far as racial composition can be discerned, we may assume that racism has not abated and that any movement in this sector

has been in response to normal economic fluctuations. This is also important to look at in order to find out whether or not any real group movement (as opposed to individual movement) has been made economically in the nonwhite nonwestern minority group population.

This is not to imply that the only thing holding down the nonwhite minorities in the United States is the economic system, although as far as causal factors are concerned it appears to me to be the most important. However, an economic system also interacts with non-economic factors at all times. There can be no real separation between the two. Marx, of course, was well aware of this. He wrote at length concerning the nature of ideology, false consciousness, and the State. The State, for Marx, was really a crystallization of ideology which reflected the interests of private property and capital. This fact has ". . . penetrated into the consciousness of the normal man" (Marx and Engels, 1963:76). Thus, ideas and psychological states of mind were very important for Marx. Thus, racism as an attitude or idea for the protection of ruling class interests could be seen to be a functioning part of the early development of white-nonwhite relations in America. This is a point the radical school of race relations stresses. This school, to be discussed next, is probably more indebted to Marxist ideas than is the colonial school. Moreover, the radical theorists stress the conscious actions of a ruling class much more than do the colonial theorists. For this reason, it appears that the radical school is more adequately describing the "primitive" or early phase of laissez faire capitalism than monopoly capitalism. The colonial theorists, on the other hand, indicate a lesser degree of interest in conscious activities of the ruling class, but instead describe patterned forms of relation-

ships between a dominant and subordinate group where racial privilege has become more or less institutionalized.

The Radical Model

The radical theorists are at complete variance with the mainstream sociologists. In the case of race relations, they reject the implicit assumption made by mainstream sociology that racism has no rational place in and is not endemic to American society. Also, they reject the mainstream assumption that racism is not directly linked to the material interests of white society. While the mainstream sociologists discuss race relations and allow it to constitute a major part of the "social problems" curricula, they do so as apologists for the existing state of things. Also, according to the radical theorists, mainstream sociologists are often engaged in "rewriting" history in that any potentially radical or critical concepts or theories are drastically neutralized. For example, "prejudice" is used by mainstream sociology instead of "racism." The use of the concept "prejudice" moves analysis down to the individual level and deflects analysis away from structural concerns. This, according to the radical theorists, moves one far away from the realities of social domination, oppression, and exploitation found in American life. Unfortunately, many radical theorists use the properly "radical" phrases, but, in my opinion, some fail to carry out a program of critically probing the social structure of capitalism in order to empirically ground their concepts. In this way some radical theorists are similar to some mainstream sociologists who classify a theory as "Marxist" in order to dismiss it. Many radical theorists classify a theory as "capitalistic" without dealing with it thoroughly.

The radical theorists also argue, correctly in my opinion, that mainstream sociology stops short of critically probing or confronting the existing social order in dealing with the important question: Who benefits from racism, and how are these benefits manifested? These questions are not even raised by mainstream sociologists. Often their analysis ends at seeking out the irrational attitudes of the white racist via questionnaires, or more recently they are engaged in looking at the "pathology" or character defects of nonwhites. Also, according to radical theory, the mainstream sociologists completely ignore the major assumptions of American society and capitalism. Mainstream sociology fails to deal with the possibility that the very values that are upheld so strongly in American life (individualism, ascetic morality, the success ethic, and even equality) may be the values that help uphold racism and prevent solutions to the "race problem" (Prager, 1972:118). Finally, the radical theorists totally reject the mainstream "solution" to race problems. This solution, an apparent holdover from assimilation days, entails a two-fold process: (1) ". . . the acquisitation on the part of black people of the proper cultural norms to be able to successfully operate in American life," and (2) ". . . the reduction of white prejudicial attitudes toward blacks" (Prager, 1972:122). These two assumptions, it is argued, chain both groups to the existing social order and gives a black "adjustment"-to-the-white world interpretation to the situation. This bias ". . . assumes that black Americans as a group should 'escape' from their habitat as an alternative to cohesively renewing and developing it" (Hare, 1972:28). Today this assumption takes on even more ominous dimensions. Since many liberals are announcing via the mass media that prejudice is a thing of the past, and that

true "equality before the law" has finally been established, if a nonwhite cannot "escape" from his environment the old social pathology assumptions creep back in: he must be either "sick" or genetically defective. Many radical theorists are beginning to look more closely at the concept of equality itself. "To enforce equal standards to unequal individuals is to perpetuate inequality in the name of equality" (Willhelm, 1970:91). Also, the historical origin of the word equality indicates that this term never really applied to nonwhites, especially Indians and blacks. Since the early historians of America spent a lot of time justifying the genocide and exploitation of people of color the word equality left them out at the beginning. That is, since slaves and Indians were considered non- or subhuman the phrase "all men are created equal" is empty. These attitudes, reflecting the ongoing material domination of nonwhites, have been steadily ingrained in the minds' of whites and nonwhites, and no matter how one wants to interpret it, they are hard to exorcise. Thus, some claim that racist attitudes will always remain with us:

> If there is any analogy in America's racial history relative to the Negro, it is with the Indian, not the immigrant. . . . American history of racial minorities is a tale of relentless passion to subdue, exploit, ignore, or liquidate --to remold into a surging mainstream, devour the labor potential to the extent of enslavement, disregard, or exterminate. . . [Racism] must be taken for one of the fundamental attributes of American society. Rather than vanishing, racism accounts for the vanquished; it flourishes as long as victims remain (Willhelm, 1970:271).

Most radical theorists take an exploitation view of racial subjugation and hold that racism is an attitude reflecting this process, which is based on, initially, material domination. This attitude of racism is initially carried out by the ruling class in order to have an exploitable labor reserve and at the same time create racial divisions

between white and nonwhite workers in order to keep wages low, working conditions as onerous as possible, and productivity and profits high. This racial division would foster a false consciousness among the white working class and thus prevent a proletarian unification, a unification which may cause class conflict, possible revolution, and certainly work disruption. Hence, for many, racism was for the perpetuation of the existing capitalistic system. The major proponent of this view is Oliver Cox, who writes:

> Race prejudice in the United States is the socio-attititudinal matrix supporting a calculated and determined effort of a white ruling class to keep some people or peoples of color and their resources exploitable. It is the economic content of race prejudice which makes it a powerful and fearfully subduing force. The "peonization" of Negroes in the South is an extreme form of exploitation and oppression, but this is not caused by race prejudice. The race prejudice is involved with the economic interest (1948:475).

In this view, whites and blacks (or nonwhites) lose, and the white ruling class gains. Thus, for Cox, this is a form of racial antagonism which ". . . is essentially political class conflict." Furthermore:

> The capitalist exploiter, being opportunistic and practical, will utilize any convenience to keep his labor and other resources freely exploitable. He will devise and employ race prejudice when that becomes convenient (Cox, 1948:333).

Cox summarizes his theory of American race relations as follows:

> 1. Capitalism, as a social system, is different from any other contempory or previously existing society.
> 2. In order for capitalism to exist, it must "proletarianize" the masses; that is, it must "commoditize" their capacity to work by reducing human beings to objects who react to the laws of the market in an inanimate fashion.
> 3. Labor becomes a factor of production to be bought and sold just like any other "non-sentimental" item on the market; that is, labor is to be bought and sold for profit.
> 4. To the extent that the entrepreneur operates within the capitalistic system, his sole purpose is to maximize profits. Thus, he cannot be concerned with human welfare.
> 5. To carry out the above, it becomes the immediate

> pecuniary interest of the capitalist to develop an ideology and "world view" which would facilitate proletarianization. The use of force is included in this ideology and world view.
> 6. So far as carrying out the ideology is concerned, the capitalist class proceeds in several ways. He may exploit "ethnocentrism" to show that some people are: (a) not human at all, (b) only part human, (c) inferior humans, and so on. This was especially needed in wresting land from whole groups of people and/or excluding them to the labor reserve force.
> 7. These ideologies are still being used to day, and are in fact deeply internalized in the working class. These attitudes are still exploited when needed by the ruling class, even though this is not really essential today, since these attitudes have taken on a life of their own (Cox, 1948:486-487; see also Boggs, 1970).

Thus, the radical theorists stress the origins of capitalism and the need of the ruling class to maintain an exploitable labor reserve, which, ultimately, is for the benefit of the ruling class and to the disadvantage of white workers and, of course, nonwhites specifically. The next theory, the colonial, takes issue with the last point. In so doing they place more emphasis on the developed pattern of white-nonwhite relations, and stress "racism" less. In the place of racism they see an elaborate system of white "privilege" which benefits the greater majority of whites, even those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. Thus, the colonial theorists argue, white privilege is more than economic. This is the major reason why the colonial theorists reject the "ruling class" division idea. Privilege entails long term accumulated gains to whites and in fact few whites have "lost" in upholding the racist socio-economic system. The colonialist perspective points out that long term gains, that is, accumulated gains over generations, are more important in measuring the "profit" or "loss" accruing to a particular sector of society.

The Colonial Model

The colonial theorists feel that the meaning of racism has changed from the overt laissez faire capitalism type of racism. This type of racism existed in the early phase of capitalist development when new labor and new markets were being expropriated. Undoubtedly racism did serve to drive a wedge between white and nonwhite workers, and also undoubtedly this did work against the short term interests of whites, especially in wage bargainning (witness the widespread use of Negroes as strike breakers during the early period of labor organization; see Brooks [1971:143]). Also, it is without question that the white ruling class gained substantially from this "driving wedge" of racism between white and nonwhite workers. However, a definite pattern has emerged through the years, and this pattern reveals that the accumulated gains of whites far exceed any losses due to the system of racial subjugation, though, of course, some whites have been left behind. Monopoly capitalism has shifted the need for overt, hostile racism in America. Instead, with the growing industrial labor reserve which has developed with the sophistication of the productive forces and the lessened need for human labor power, the social structure has remained fairly stable over time. This pattern includes a subproletariat (the industrial army reserve, including the seasonal, under- and unemployed, as well as the "working" poor), a proletariat (the working class in general, but also including many workers in the clerical and lower white collar positions), a strata of technocratic-bureaucratic elite (including various professional, the "conceptive ideologists," and other technocrats who have as their primary task system maintenance and system operational matters, even though they do not directly run the system), and a final strata of the ruling-

managerial elite (the men actually behind the scenes who run things [see the discussion of "absentee-controlled communities in Aiken and Mott, 1970], this includes the actual "captains of industry" and their top-level management). This can be conceptualized in a hierarchy of exploitation as follows, along with their objective relationship to the existing means of production:

1. Ruling-managerial elite - appropriates, controls, directs, and "realizes" surplus value.

2. Technocratic-bureaucratic elite - facilitates appropriation of surplus value.

3. Proletariat wage laborers - sellers of labor power and producers of surplus value.

4. Subproletariat colonized - industrial reserve army, chronically under- and unemployed, and "working" poor.

This pattern, which is my interpretation of what the colonial theorists seem to be saying, has become increasingly apparent since World War II. This is due to the growth of monopoly capitalism and the blooming of a relatively new class of technocratic-bureaucratic elites who have grown hand-in-hand with the increasing centralization of capital. Also, this group has grown due to the increase in state intervention which has entered into the production process in an attempt to neutralize some of the contradictions of capitalism, namely, to absorb surplus value (Baron and Sweezy, 1966:147). Thus, the colonial theorists argue, the major beneficiaries of this system are whites, who were already members of the dominant class. However, this monopoly capitalist system has also developed an increasingly widespread system of appeasements (welfare, foodstamps, and so on) which (in addition to creating jobs for more technocratic-bureaucratic elites) has the dual role of appeasing the subproletariat and making consumers out of them.

The point is, however, that a new form of racial subjugation has come in with monopoly capitalism: noncontiguous control, ". . . where the more powerful group maintains dominance of the other party at a distance (as in colonialism)" (Schermerhorn, 1956:55). Thus, just as Baron and Sweezy (1966:6) maintain that monopoly capitalism amends the "competitive model" upon which Marx based most of his work (though he fully realized the movement toward monopoly), so too must sociological theories of race relations take this into account. Nevertheless, "Much about capitalism is unchanged since Marx's day, . . . Classes, exploitation, class struggle--the forms change but the substance remains" (Sweezy, 1972:12). This is also stated by Fanon, one of the major proponents of the colonial theory:

> Vulgar racism, in its biological form, corresponds to the period of crude exploitation of mans' arms and legs. The perfecting of the means of production inevitably brings about the camouflage of the techniques by which man is exploited, hence of the forms of racism (1969:35).

Baron and Sweezy, in their analysis of race relations, posit three interlocking factors which operate in a monopoly capitalist society and which are directly related to the colonial model of race relations:

> First, a formidable array of private interests benefit, in the most direct and immediate sense, from the continued existence of a segregated subproletariat. Second, the socio-psychological pressures generated by monopoly capitalist society intensify rather than alleviate existing racial prejudices, hence also discrimination and segregation. And third, as monopoly capitalism develops, the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labor declines both relatively and absolutely, a trend which affects Negroes more than any other group and accentuates their economic and social inferiority. All of these factors mutually interact, tending to push Negroes ever further down in the social structure and locking them into the ghetto (1966: 263).

This model of colonialism obviously has historical roots, which began with vulgar racism and extends to the three interlocking factors

described by Baron and Sweezy. These historical roots, as far as the colonized are concerned, begin with how and where they entered the labor force in America. This is summed up in Blauner's "colonial labor principal":

> The question of how, where, and why newcomers worked in the United States is central, for the differences in the labor systems that introduced Third World and immigrant groups to America may be the fundamental reason why their histories have followed disparate paths. The labor forces that built up the Western hemisphere were structured on the principle of race and color. . . The key equation was the association of free labor with people of white European stock and the association of unfree labor with nonwestern people of color, a correlation that did not develop all at once but took time to become a more or less fixed pattern (1972:57).

Of course, says Blauner, this ". . . does not mean that all white people have power, all people of color have none" (1972:32), for even in a bureaucratic society such as today most people have little power. But what is important, and this is a crucial concept to the colonial theory, is that whites as a group have accumulated a vast system of privilege, while nonwhite nonwesterners as a group have accumulated very little or no privilege. Memmi states this as follows:

> However, colonial privilege is not solely economic. To observe the life of the colonizer and the colonized is to discover rapidly that the daily humiliation of the colonized, his objective subjugation, are not merely economic. Even the poorest colonizer thought himself to be--and actually was--superior to the colonized. This too was part of the colonial privilege (1967:xii).

The idea of culture is very important in understanding the concept of privilege, since any form of cultural domination plays a large role in the vitality and strength of a people. Although in a sense all white immigrants suffered a lost element in their culture due to the demands of assimilation, this loss was particularly acute, and total, for the nonwhite nonwesterner minority group member. "Colonialism

depends on conquest, control, and the penetration of new institutions and ways of thought" (Blauner, 1972:98). This, Blauner indicates, was especially true in the process of racial subjugation and vulgar racism, and it still applies, even if at a more subtle level, to what we are now referring to as colonialization. Hence, the four major characteristics of the colonial model of race relations, as stated by Blauner:

> Colonization begins with a forced, involuntary entry. Second, there is an impact on culture. The effects of colonization on the culture and social organization of the colonized people are more than the results of such "natural" processes as contact and acculturation. The colonizing power carries out a policy that constrains, transforms, or destroys indigenous values, orientations, and ways of life. Third is a special relationship to governmental bureaucracies or the legal order. The lives of the subordinate group are administered by representatives of the dominant power. The colonized have the experience of being managed and manipulated by outsiders who look down on them. . . . The final component of colonization is racism. Racism is a principle of social domination by which a group seen as inferior or different in alleged biological characteristics is exploited, controlled, and oppressed socially and psychically by a superordinate group (1972:84).

According to the colonial theorists, and reflected above, racism is a reflection of an ongoing process of domination. It is not a policy carried out consciously by the ruling class. It is instead a reflection of reality. Racist attitutes are also very functional in that they give to the lowest member of the white dominant group a "stake" in the system. This stake is more than merely "false consciousness" but is a definite reflection of cultural realities. But "racism" <u>per se</u> is not as central for colonial theory as the accumulated pattern of race relations between whites and nonwhites. As such, the colonial theory postulates a system of racial subordination predicated on the ". . . benefits received to whites as a result of that system and upheld by a dynamic racist mechanism" (Prager, 1972:134). Thus, privilege, although it is undoubtedly

economic, and economic in origin, is also psychological, social, cultural, and political as well.

However, for me the central underpinning of the colonial system of privilege remains with labor. As has already been indicated, nonwhites entered the labor force at a severe disadvantage, and initially this disadvantage was locked in place by white racism. However, due to the simple fact that the nonwhite minority groups entered the labor force in the least desirable occupations (unskilled) the logic of the capitalistic system soon made their occupations non-existent. Thus, nonwhites early in the history of capitalistic development, much earlier than any other group, found most of their group members in the reserve industrial army. Moreover, this industrial reserve army provides many useful functions for the system as a whole. In providing such functions, it constitutes the matrix upon which privilege for all other class members rests.

But the acceptance of this emergent pattern required not only (initially) racism and the inexorable unfolding of the capitalist system, it required as well the acceptance of the system's values also. Memmi states:

> In order for the colonizer to be the complete master, it is not enough for him to be so in fact, but he must also believe in its legitimacy. In order for that legitimacy to be complete, it is not enough for the colonized to be a slave, he must also accept this role. . . . Just as the colonizer is tempted to accept his part, the colonized is forced to accept being colonized (1965:88-89).

Thus, Memmi continues, if the dominated classes agree on the ideology of the system, they ". . . practically confirm the role assigned to them. This explains. . . the relative stability of societies; oppression is tolerated willy-nilly by the oppressed themselves" (1965:88). Obviously

this is not to imply that intensive struggles and resistence were not involved in the process of racial subjugation and colonialization American-style. But if a system's ideology is virtually surrounding an oppressed enclave who objectively see that "they" have everything and "we" have nothing, then that ideology may begin to be believed. Thus, with the system's ideology of material success, the success-ethic and individualism, if one does not "make it" he is perceived to be deficient in some necessary quality, and this deficiency may become internalized. This is what the recent surge of "black power" and "consciousness" raising by minority group members is attempting to neutralize or avoid.

In summary, the colonial model posits a system of white privilege built initially upon a nonwhite substructure. Over time this system has become a patterned set of superordinate-subordinate relationships. Whites come to "rule" indirectly at a distance and most nonwhites are locked in subordinate positions. These positions in which nonwhites are to be found conform to the "subproletariat" colonized positions: the under- or unemployed, the "working" poor, and other dead-end, non-expanding occupational levels. Change in this pattern has not significantly affected nonwhites as a group, although some individual mobility has been made upward. Also, nonwhite economic gains have largely been a result of the expansion of the economic system due to both the expansion of technology and industry into new markets (war related industry, for example) and state interference which has created a large number of new jobs, especially in government-military related areas. It has also been suggested that societal members in interacting with they system of colonization generally accept the system's values. It was suggested that both colonizer and colonized accept this pattern, al-

though it is apparent that acceptance will be less the farther down the socio-economic scale one goes. However, the important thing is that the majority of the population accepts the values of the system. The weight of that acceptance on the subproletariat will be so great that that sector of society may come to be forced to accept the dominant values of the system. Hence, this ties both the superordinate and subordinate groups into an interlocking dependency relationship where the logical conclusion is that neither can be free until both are free. "Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded," Marx pointed out long ago (quoted in Cruse, 1968:140). It was also pointed out that whites gain from the existing system of colonialization not only economically, but also socially, psychologically, politically, and culturally. Finally, it was pointed out that these gains are the result of accumulated privleges which come to be beneficial to whites as a group over the years.

CHAPTER IV

A MODEL OF THE COLONIAL THEORY OF RACISM

After reviewing the literature on the colonial theory of race relations, a model has been developed to test its major assumptions. This model is intended to be general in nature, and therefore is pertinent to other forms of social relationships, in particular those relating to a dominant-subordinate relationship. The basic assumptions underlying this model are as follows:

Assumptions

A_1 : United States society is characterized by a capitalistic form of production.

A_2 : Members of society generally accept the dominant values of capitalism.

A_3 : Groups have differential access to the dominant values.

A_4 : The group with greater access to dominant values will act so as to maintain greater access by utilizing protective devices.

A_5 : Groups with less access to dominant values will attempt to gain access by neutralizing protective devices.

The United States system of capitalism has evolved from laissez faire capitalism, where private ownership of capital was more widespread among those who possessed ownership or control over the means of production, to a system of monopoly capitalism, where private ownership of capital has been centralized into fewer and fewer hands. This has produced a tremendous amount of wealth for those who possess the means of

production, and a substantial income for those who directly or indirectly help facilitate the transformation of capitalist wealth into surplus value. Wealth here refers to resources available which could be converted into income. Control over this wealth, or, control over the means of production, constitutes tremendous power as far as national decisions are concerned. Income refers wages, salaries, personal fees, and so forth, which the majority of Americans depend on, since the concentration of wealth is in the hands of a very small percentage of the population. For example, data on corporate wealth reveals that ". . . 1 percent of the American adult population owns about 80 percent of all publicly held corporate stock" (Anderson, 1971:90). Moreover, the production of wealth has, in an absolute sense, raised the living standard (incomes) of the society as a whole to a significant degree, especially in comparison to other countries. This driving force to create and expand wealth has thus produced a tremendous ideological force. This system of ideology, which effectively veils the actual operation of the capitalist system from the general population, has made promises never before made by any economic system, according to Kristol. These promises include:

> First of all, capitalism promised continued improvement in the material conditions of all its citizens, a promise without precedent in human history. Secondly, it promised an equally unprecedented measure of individual freedom for all of these same citizens. Lastly, it held out the promise that, amidst this prosperity and liberty, the individual could satisfy his instinct for self-perfection--for leading a virtuous life that satisfied the demands of his spirit . . . and that the free exercise of such individual virtue would aggregate into a just society (Kristol, 1971:15).

In looking at the historical background of this country, we can see how these promises were used, and, in fact, how they were realized for many people. The "boom" of capitalist development came at a time when Northern Europe was experiencing economic and social difficulties (the

potato famine in Ireland, religious persecution in Germany). These economic and social factors together provided the "push" and "pull" which ultimately resulted in the largest wave of emigration the world has ever known (an estimated 38,000,000 between 1830 and 1930). These immigrants, initially from the British Isles and Northwest Europe, settled into the bottom rung of labor in rapidly expanding industries. Thus, these groups advanced socially and materially in a rather short time due to the tremendous growth in the capitalistic mode of production. Kristol's "three great promises" for them seemed to be fulfilled, and, as such, the dominant values of capitalistic America were widely accepted. However, prior to the widespread influx of European immigrants, the original settlers had already literally "cleared the land," that is, set the stage for the original "primitive" accumulation of capitalism by expropriating the land of the Indians by force. Also, around the same time or shortly before, the first Negro slaves were brought in to work the southern cotton fields. Hence, an elaborate and insidious ideology was already in operation for the purposes of legitimization and rationalization of an ongoing system of brutality and slavery. In short, vulgar racism at first was used to enslave and expropriate the land of large groups of people. The were kept "down" through an ideology which labeled them as non- or subhuman beasts of burden. This racism prevented nonwhites from entering the choice sectors of industry and they generally found employment in industry which was non-competitive with white workers. Of course, the advancement of capitalism and its concomitant decline of the need for unskilled labor quickly placed many nonwhites in the industrial labor reserve army. Hence, the combined forces of racism and the logic of capitalistic development confined them

to a subproletariat colonized enclave. Very early in the history of capitalism these two opposing groups--whites and nonwhites--were differentially located in the economic system in relation to the means of production. Most whites, if they did not outright own some of the means of production, were favorably located in relation to access to the products of this system. That is, they had better access to the dominant values of the system: jobs, material goods, wealth, income, power, and prestige. The "success ethic" and the ideology of individualism was easily accepted, since this appeared to be a reality in their case. Nonwhites, on the other hand, were in an entirely different position in relation to the prevailing means of production. In fact their access to the dominant values of the system were almost nonexistent except via the mediation of whites. However, it is also suggested that nonwhites accept the dominant values of capitalism, especially material values. By virtue of their position in the system, acceptance of the system's values was almost forced upon them. As Cruse puts this:

> The American Negro, caught in a social situation from which he cannot readily depart, retreat, or easily advance, resembles Jean Paul Sartre's existential man who is "condemned to be free" (1968:104).

The fourth assumption, that the group with greater access to dominant values will act so as to maintain greater access by utilizing protective devices, has already been intimated above. Racism was once the most powerful force to hold the nonwhite minority group "in their place." Even though this is still a powerful attitude, racial subjugation has become more and more subtle and institutionalized with the developing mode of production. In the stage of laissez faire capitalism, complete expulsion of nonwhites by whites from the dominant institutions used by

whites for economic advancement effectively protected white interests. Later, unequal standards (Jim Crowism) channeled nonwhites into jobs and occupations which did not directly challenge the interests of whites. Today, the colonial theorists argue, the utilization of protective devices is more indirect and subtle. The very mechanisms of monopoly capitalism have brought this about to a large degree. Economic expansion initially attracted millions of nonwhites into the cities, and concentrated them on the lowest rung of the industrial ladder. When economic expansion contracted or automation set them "free" of their unskilled job, they became literally locked into the inner city, and, according to the colonial theorists, surrounded by an occupying army of police and, if need be, the military. Unable or not desiring to return to the South due to the fact that they left the South for the very same reasons they are now unemployed in the ghetto (lack of work) they are no longer any threat to the white dominant class or their interests. This subtle and seemingly paradoxical problem is perhaps the most effective protective device white America has hit upon. Now white prejudice cannot be blamed for the problem, but now the victim can safely be blamed:

> . . . physical separation of the races is hardly less substantial now than it would be if the government of the United States, like the government of South Africa, were formally committed to a policy of permanent segregation. Nor are the ghetto walls high only on the ground; they rise unclimbable for all but a very few, in the mind itself. Whites in the United States, much like their English-speaking counterparts in South Africa, see the Negro not as a person but as a problem (Segal, 1967:263).

Furthermore, Willhelm states:

> The Negro doomed to the ghetto reservation by economic racism cannot be considered exploitable by national interests; with black labor expelled by the new tech-

> nology, the corporate giants of the country care little about the Negro's lot (Willhelm, 1970:302).

In short, the protective devices utilized by whites have also shifted from the days of vulgar racism, from the once personal form of racism between the white bigot and nonwhite to the modern-day impersonal racism set in motion and perpetuated by the invisible logic of corporate capitalism. Yet, we are back at the same place we started: with the assumptions of the social pathology model. Today we are beginning to see a rise in "scientific" racism which seriously discusses sterilization, genetic defects, and inherited stupidity. Moreover, these discussions are being conducted by people located at the most prestigious universities in the United States (Harvard, Stanford, and others).

Assumption five, that groups with less access to dominant values will attempt to gain access by neutralizing protective devices, is the most difficult assumption to pinpoint. It is obvious, on the one hand, that nonwhites have been struggling for hundreds of years to neutralize the protective devices thrown up around white social and economic interests. While legally it appears, on the surface at least, that these protective devices have been removed, in reality there have not been substantive gains for nonwhites as a group. On the other hand, some writers maintain that nonwhites will never break through the protective devices of monopoly capitalist America, not due to racism or even legal barriers, but due to the logic of the system itself. Cruse, for example, states that

> . . . full integration of the Negro in all levels of American society is not possible within the present framework of the American system. . . . The United States cannot and never will solve the race problem unless Americans change the economic, political, cultural, and administrative social organization of this country in various sectors (1968:100).

Cruse predicts that if drastic structural changes are not made, many blacks and other nonwhite minorities will turn "inward" and move more and more toward nationalism and align themselves with groups from other Third World countries. But, to repeat, it is very difficult for me to deal with this assumption. Since there appears to be no truly revolutionary group developing within the subproletariat colonized group, it can only be assumed that nonwhites will continue to attempt to neutralize white protective devices via the legal and political fronts. Of course, to say that at this time there appears to be no truly revolution-force among the subproletariat colonized does not mean that there never will be such a force. As a matter of fact, one could safely predict that such a force will reveal itself in the near future unless drastic structural changes in capitalistic America are not made soon.

However, in order to demonstrate my opinions, let me draw on a "management" model Mills (1970) developed in a study in industrial sociology. The following model, except for the role labels and a few of Mills' descriptive statements, is entirely my own. The model Mills developed was in reference to power relations in industrial settings; however, as a general conceptual description of power relations, it seems applicable to an analysis of white-nonwhite relations. The model is presented in Table I.

TABLE I

MODEL OF MORALE ANALYSIS

Subjective Condition of Individual	Objective Structure of Power	
	Participates	Does Not Participate
"Cheerful" and "Willing"	1	2
"Uncheerful" and "Unwilling"	3	4

Source: Mills, 1970:24

The following pattern of role-types can be placed in the boxes according to their structural location in relation to the means of production:

Box 1: Ruling-managerial elite

Box 2: Technocratic-bureaucratic elite

Box 3: Proletariat wage-laborers

Box 4: Subproletariat colonized

The subjective condition of the above, in relation to the means of production, can be further classified:

Box 1: Self-managing Non-alienated

Box 2: False Conscious Alienated

Box 3: Unadjusted "Deficient" Alienated

Box 4: Alienated Insurgent

The Box 1 role-type, it will be recalled, appropriates, controls, directs, and "realizes" surplus value. Thus, in relation to the means

of production he is classified as self-managing non-alienated and, of course, has no desire to dissolve the existing protective devices elaborated to guard his interests and those of his class. He clearly participates in the objective structure of power, and is cheerful and willing as a participant. The Box 2 role-type does not objectively participate in the objective structure of power, but his subjective condition is that he participates cheerfully and willingly anyway. This is the false conscious alienated type. It may be questioned that the technocratic-bureaucratic elite does not participate in the objective structure of power. The point is, they only serve the ruling-managerial elite in providing knowledge, research, know-how, and so on. They do not implement this knowledge. Sweezy, in criticizing Galbraith's notion of an independent "technostructure" in charge of corporate technology, points out (after quoting Paul Samuelson):

> What Samuelson is saying, in a nutshell, is that the technostructure is hired and fired by top management, and that what defines the boss precisely is the ability to hire and fire. This is a basic truth which one wishes all economists--and other social scientists as well--could firmly grasp and retain (1970:10-11; also see Baron and Sweezy, 1966:23-28).

Thus, the technocratic-bureaucratic elite does not participate in the objective structure of power as far as control over the surplus value of a society is concerned. However, his subjective consciousness is that of a cheerful and willing participant in this process. From the point of view of social control, the ruling-managerial elite would desire all societal members to take on the characteristics of this role-type. The Box 3 role-type does participate in the objective structure of power, but he does so with the subjective condition of an uncheerful and unwilling participant. This is in relation to the fact that the

only power he possesses is his labor power which is sold as a commodity in order to produce surplus value for the buyer. Now, as far as objective power is concerned this class of wage laborers as a whole possesses more power than any group listed in the table. After all, the only way surplus value can be produced is if there is an available supply of laborers willing to exchange their labor power for a wage. As Mandel has pointed out, this is even true in a totally automated factory where there is not a worker in sight: the fact remains that the automated machines, buildings, equipment, and so on, are produced by labor power somewhere. But the subjective condition of the Box 3 type in relation to their relation to the means of production is listed as unadjusted "deficient" alienated. What this means is that, to quote Mills, this group is ". . . deficient in understanding their situation, or at any rate they are not making the most of it" (Mills, 1970:25; my emphasis). This group, then, objectively possesses the most power in completely transforming the social order. The Box 4 role-type does not participate in the objective structure of power nor do they operate within the existing system in a cheerful or willing manner. This is the subproletariat colonized, the industrial reserve army. As far as their subjective condition in relation to the means of production they are listed as alienated insurgent. In short, they have no actual power as far as the creation of surplus value is concerned. They can be effectively disregarded by the powers-that-be since they pose no direct threat to their interests. However, as possible insurgents, there will be a little appeasement money directed down to that group, via the technocratic-bureaucratic elite and paid for by taxing the proletariat wage-laborers. Concerning this, Mandel has

pointed out:

> As to the hope of seeing the emancipating role of the proletariat carried out by "unintegrated minorities" (radical minorities, students, the infra-proletariat, or even elements which are plainly anti-social), this comes up against the same obstacle on whieh the slave revolts of ancient Rome stumbled and fell. These groups are capable, at best, of desperate outbreaks. They do not possess either objective social power (either to insure or to paralyze production as a whole) or the lasting ability to organize themselves collectively--two characteristics which are necessary if they are to transform present-day society (Mandel, 1971:25).

Thus, as far as present-day realities of the operation of the existing capitalistic system and the relation of minorities to this operation, the fact must be faced that until they are integrated into the production process and can realize objective power the existing system will continue to carry them along as an industrial reserve army. Of course, whites could (and other nonwhites within Box 3) realize the position they are in and its potential, and thus actualize the Marxian dream of a true proletarian revolution. However, this seems difficult to speculate on, and certainly seems a long way off. Nevertheless, just because today this seems to be the case, this does not mean to imply that it will never happen. There does seem to be some sort of working class movement (see Aronowitz, 1973) shaping up, but what form it will take is difficult for me to speculate on at this time. But it is still my opinion that the issue of poverty and unemployment must be settled and faced head-on before a true transformation of the existing structure of capitalism can be discussed seriously. Even though this applies to all the people classified in Box 4 above (white and nonwhite), it still remains an issue which has affected nonwhites as a group much more seriously and persistly than any other group in the United States.

Hypotheses

Based upon the previously given discussion of the colonial model of race relations the following hypotheses have been developed in order to test some of these assumptions:

H_1 : Relative to white economic gains, nonwhite economic gains have not increased to any significant degree.

H_2 : An accumulated system of privilege has evolved into a white-nonwhite patterned relationship which is beneficial to whites as a whole.

H_3 : Normal channels of opportunity made available to minority group members do not improve their relative position in relation to the dominant white group.

CHAPTER V

METHODOLOGY AND TEST OF THE COLONIAL MODEL

In this chapter the methodology discussion will be combined with the test of the colonial model due to the short length of my comments on methodology. In order to grasp a structural view of the relationship between whites and nonwhites in the United States it was decided that a secondary analysis of available official census data would be the most useful approach to this phenomenon. Thus, a probe of the objective conditions of nonwhites versus whites, using data which reflects trends, via census data is believed to be the most objective method possible in attempting to analyze the structural situation. It was felt that an attitudinal or questionnaire survey would not be adequate for these purposes. Census data would seem to reflect in a more empirical manner what it is that a structural analysis of race relations is trying to discern: the conditions of one group in relation to another, and the changes, if any, between these two groups over time.

The first hypothesis states that nonwhite economic gains have not significantly increased in relation to white gains. In testing this hypothesis, and the other hypotheses as well, most of the data utilized reflects income figures. However, as Table II indicates, wealth is concentrated more heavily in the white group; however, this table also indicates that overall wealth is concentrated in a relatively small percentage of the population:

TABLE II

SOURCE OF INCOME FOR WHITES AND BLACKS, 1972

Source of Income	White	Black
Wages and Salary	78%	84%
Self-employment	8	3
Dividends, Interest, etc.	5	1
Public Assistance	1	5
Social Security, Government Retirement	4	4
Private Pensions	2	1
Unemployment, Workmen's Compensation	2	2

Source: Ehrlich, 1973:16

Thus, while both blacks and whites derive most of their income from wages and salaries, fewer whites are dependent on strict wage labor (78%) for their livelihood than are blacks (84%); moreover, more whites than blacks derive their livelihood from self-employment and dividends and interest than do blacks. Blacks derive a greater percentage of their livilihood from public assistance than do whites (5% for blacks and 1% for whites). The general implication from Table II is that, even though both blacks and whites are heavily dependent on wages for their income, by virtue of the fact that fewer whites are dependent on this than are blacks, whites have more control over wealth. However, this is a very small group of whites who have such control.

In testing hypothesis one, it would seem appropriate to analyze the total income picture between whites and nonwhites. This is given

in Table III below:

TABLE III

TOTAL INCOME OF WHITES AND NONWHITES

Total Income (Billions)	Year	Nonwhites	Whites	Difference
154.1	1948	7.9	146.2	138.3
371.1	1963	23.6	347.5	232.9
695.0	1971	46.0	649.0	603.0

Source: Johnson, 1974:175

In Table III, taken alone nonwhites have made spectacular gains, going from $7.9 billion in 1948 to $46 billion in 1971. In comparison to white income gains, these gains do not look so spectacular. There is in fact a widening gap between the two groups. The difference between whites and nonwhites in 1948 was $138.3 billion, in 1971 the difference shot up to $603 billion. Although the total amount of income in society is rapidly growing (from $154.1 billion in 1948 to $695 billion in 1971), white total income is increasing in greater proportion than nonwhites income. According to Johnson:

> . . . any comparison of black to white income, whether in terms of aggregate income, or of median level, or of percent of total income compared to percent of total population, shows that blacks have not made much headway (Johnson, 1974:175).

Table IV shows the pattern of nonwhite-white median family incomes

over the years 1947 to 1972:

TABLE IV

MEDIAN FAMILY INCOMES FOR NONWHITE AND WHITE, 1947-1972

Year	Median Income		Ratio	
	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite to White	Difference
1947	$1,614	$3,157	.51	$1,543
1950	1,869	3,445	.54	1,576
1955	2,549	4,605	.55	2,056
1960	3,233	5,835	.55	2,602
1965	3,971	7,170	.55	3,199
1970	6,279	10,236	.61	3,957
1971	6,440	10,672	.60	4,232
1972	6,864	11,549	.59	4,685

Source: Ehrlich, 1973:15; Stencel, 1973:627

Table IV reveals that nonwhite median family incomes have fluctuated in the area of 50 to 60 percent of the white median family incomes since 1947. Also, the above reflects that the dollar gap is widening, in 1947 the difference between white and nonwhite median family incomes was $1,543, while in 1972 this gap widened to $4,685, almost tripling the 1947 figure. These figures also show that in 1970 fully 55.5 percent of the nonwhite family median incomes fell below the U.S. Departmen of Labor's estimates for a four-person urban family budget for

that year, which was $7,214. For the white families, 28.3 percent fell below that figure, and for all families for that year, 31 percent fell below that figure (Ehrlich, 1973:17). The situation appears to be about the same, or perhaps slightly worse, for nonwhite families in comparison to white families in 1972.

The trends in poverty of nonwhites in comparison to whites are given in Table V:

TABLE V

POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES,
1959-1972

	Number Below Poverty Level				Percent Below Poverty Level			
Year	Total	White	Nonwhite	Black	Total	White	Nonwhite	Black
1972	24.5	16.2	8.3	7.7	12%	9%	33%	33%
1971	25.6	17.8	7.8	7.4	12	10	31	32
1970	25.5	17.5	8.0	7.7	13	10	32	34
1969	24.3	16.7	7.6	7.2	12	10	31	32
1968	25.4	17.4	8.0	7.6	13	10	33	35
1967	27.8	19.0	8.8	8.5	14	11	37	39
1959	33.2	22.5	10.7	NA	17	13	47	NA

Source: Bureau of the Census; in Perkes, 1973:235

In Table V we see a fairly stable trend in the relationship between white and nonwhite poverty, with nonwhite and black poverty accounting for about one-third of their population whereas whites have con-

sistently held at about ten percent of their population. In total numbers, from 1959 to 1972, white poverty population decreased by 6.3 million, whereas the nonwhite poverty population decreased during this period by 2.4 million, and the black poverty population decreased during this same period by .8 million. Even more interesting, and supporting the industrial reserve army thesis described earlier, is that Table V shows that for nonwhites the actual number of poverty poor is increasing slightly beginning in 1970. For example, for blacks during the 1971-1972 period there is an increase of about 300,000 people who crossed into the poverty category, for nonwhites during this same period about 500,000 crossed over into this category. However, for whites during the period 1971-1972 about one and one-half million people moved out of the officially defined poverty category. Finally, Bryce (1973) indicates that fully twenty percent of the black population can be classified as "working poor," that is, those people who work on a full-time basis yet their yearly incomes still are less than the officially defined poverty level. Whites have a "working poor" population of about ten percent. In addition, says Bryce:

> Recent U. S. Department of Labor data [1972] suggest that a family of four needs at least $11,446 to support a middle-class life style in the United States. Half of black families, according to government figures, earn less than $7,000 a year (1973:60).

Also, during the period 1960-1972 the black labor force participation rate (those working and those unemployed but still hoping to find work) declined from 83 percent in 1960 to 73.7 percent in 1972 (Bryce, 1973: 61). In other words, in this period blacks have added about ten percent of their population to the "industrial labor reserve."

Data for America's most colonized group, the American Indian, is

even more dismal. For example, in 1972 fifty percent of the American Indians had cash incomes of $2,000 a year, while seventy-five percent had cash incomes below $3,000 per year (Perkes, 1973:241). However, data showing trends over the years of American Indian income as compared to white or other nonwhite minorities is not available.

Thus, in terms of strict economic trends, the economic gains for nonwhites as compared to whites has not significantly increased throughout the years. Therefore, on the basis of the available data shown here, hypothesis one will be tentatively accepted.

Hypothesis two states that an accumulated system of privilege has evolved into a white-nonwhite patterned relationship which is beneficial to whites as a whole. This is saying that a nonwhite subordinate group, which has evolved from a history of accumulated gains to whites and a corresponding "loss" to nonwhites, is "functional" (useful) for whites as a whole. This can be looked at from several angles. We can begin by citing several empirical points made by Herbert Gans (1972) concern- the positive functions of poverty. Since Gans uses poverty, his analy- can clearly be extended to all poverty members, regardless of race or ethnic status. However, since my interest is specifically with non- white groups, it is necessary to justify the use of his observations for my purposes. First of all, it must be shown that nonwhites consti- tute the greatest percentage of their population to poverty status than do whites as a group. This was already indicated in Table V, which shows that approximately ten percent of whites are in objective poverty, while about thirty three percent of the nonwhites are in this category. However, the extent of this is even greater when those individuals just above the officially defined poverty are taken into account. This is

indicated in Table VI below:

TABLE VI

RATIO OF INCOME IN 1969 TO POVERTY LEVEL

	Percent of Persons With Income:		
	Below 75% of Poverty Level	Between 75-100% of Poverty Level	Between 100-125% of Poverty Level
White	7.2%	3.2%	4.4%
Negro	24.9	10.1	9.1
Spanish	15.3	8.2	8.9
Total (under 65 years old)	9.3	4.4	4.9

Source: Census of Population, 1970

Table VI reveals that a large number of American citizens fall under, just at, or slightly above the poverty level in 1969. Of the total population a total of 18.6 percent fall into this category; among whites 15.3 percent, among blacks 44.1 percent, and among Spanish we find 32.4 percent in this category. Thus, even though poverty numerically hits more whites than nonwhites, percentage-wise a greater proportion of nonwhites suffer from conditions of poverty or near-poverty. This fact should be kept in mind in the following discussion of the "positive" functions of poverty.

Gans points out that his analysis of poverty is from the functionalist framework. This implies that poverty is useful (serves positive functions) for society as a whole, and specifically poverty is useful

for the non-poor or affluent. Furthermore, poverty persists because it is functional, and continues to persist because the removal of poverty would be ". . . quite dysfunctional for the more affluent members of society" (Gans, 1972:287). Gans lists fifteen functions of poverty, of which only nine will be discussed here.

1. The existence of poverty makes sure the "dirty" work gets done. "In America, poverty functions to provide a low-wage labor pool that is willing--or, rather, unable to be unwilling--to perform dirty work at low cost" (Gans, 1972:278). Even within labor unions nonwhites are consigned to the lowest positions. For example, the U. S. Equal Employment Commission reported that in 1969 in the building trades unions, blacks constitute 6.8 percent of the union membership; however, three out of every four blacks were members of laborers unions. Of course, laborers are the lowest paid (Perkes, 1973:180). Aronowitz reports that in Detroit and other auto centers as many as sixty percent of the workers on the assembly lines and working in parts plants, the least desired jobs, are blacks (Aronowitz, 1973:195).

2. The poor subsidize, directly or indirectly, many activities that benefit the affluent. For example, the poor have supported consumption and investment activities of private economy by virtue of the low wages they receive. The poor provide domestics which enable the more affluent to free themselves for various professional, cultural, civic, and social activities. The poorer, low income, class enables the more affluent to divert their income, or at least a higher proportion of it, to savings and investment. The poor subsidize the governmental economy through the existence of local property and sales taxes and ungraduated income taxes levied by many states which are regressive;

thus, the poor pay a higher percentage of their income in taxes than the rest of the population and in this way subsidize the many state and local governmental programs which more often than not serve the more affluent taxpayers (Gans, 1972:278-279). This is clearly shown in Table VII below:

TABLE VII

SOCIAL SECURITY AND STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AS PERCENT OF TOTAL INCOME

Income Level (1968)	Social Security Tax	State and Local Taxes		
		Total*	Property	Sales
Under $2,000	7.6%	27.2%	16.2%	6.6%
2,000 - 4,000	6.5	15.7	7.5	4.9
4,000 - 6,000	6.7	12.1	4.8	4.1
6,000 - 8,000	6.8	10.7	3.8	3.6
8,000 - 10,000	6.2	10.1	3.6	3.3
10,000 - 15,000	5.8	9.9	3.6	2.9
15,000 - 25,000	4.6	9.4	3.6	2.4
25,000 - 50,000	2.5	7.8	2.7	1.8
50,000 and over	1.0	6.7	2.0	1.1

Source: Upton and Lyons, 1972:21
*Total is all state and local taxes, including property and sales.

Thus, Table VII clearly shows that as one goes down the income ladder, a significantly greater proportion of income is taken in the form of taxes.

3. Poverty creates jobs and occupations for a number of professionals which serve the poor, ". . . or shield the rest of the population from them" (Gans, 1972:279). According to Gans:

. . . penology would be miniscule without the poor, as would

> the police, since the poor provide the majority of their "clients." Other activities which flourish because of the existence of poverty are the numbers game, the sale of heroin and cheap wines and liquors, pentecostal ministers, faith healers, prostitutes, pawn shops, and the peacetime army, which recruits its enlisted men mainly from among the poor (Gans, 1972:279).

4. The poor buy goods which others do not want and thus prolong their economic usefulness; ". . . such as day-old bread, fruit and vegetables. . . second-hand clothes, and deteriorating automobiles and buildings" (Gans, 1972:279). Others have documented the fact that the "poor pay more" in comparison to whites for such things for rent, food, clothing, and other such merchandise. Of course, not only is the cost higher, but the quality is generally lower (Caplovitz, 1963).

5. The poor can be identified and punished as alleged or real deviants in order to uphold the legitimacy of the dominant mores and norms.

6. The poor help guarantee the status of those who are not poor. Thus, the poor can function as a reliable and relatively permanent measuring rod for status comparison, particularly for the working class. James Baldwin has stated this quite well:

> One cannot afford to lose status on this peculiar ladder, for the prevailing notion of American life seems to involve a kind of rung-by-rung ascension to some hideously desirable state. If this is one's concept of life, obviously one cannot afford to slip back one rung. When one slips, one slips back not a rung but into chaos and no longer knows who he is. And this reason, this fear, suggests to me one of the real reasons for the status of the Negro in this country. In a way, the Negro tells us where the bottom is: because he is there, and where he is, beneath us, we know where the limits are and how far we must not fall. We must not fall beneath him (quoted in Blauner, 1972:47, footnote 28).

7. The poor help to assist in the upward mobility of the nonpoor. According to Gans, the poor have enabled countless nonpoor to obtain better opportunities, better educations, and so forth. This is because

the poor, by ". . . being denied educational opportunities or being stereotyped as stupid or unteachable, [have] enabled others to obtain the better jobs" (Gans, 1972:281).

8. The poor have played an unsung role in the creation of "civilization" through the supply of their labor power. The poor have played this unsung role by:

> . . . having supplied the construction labor for many of the monuments which are often identified as the noblest expressions and examples of civilization, for example, the Egyptian pyramids, Greek temples, and medieval churches. Moreover, they have helped to create a goodly share of the surplus capital that funds the artists and intellectuals who make culture, and particularly "high" culture, possible in the first place (Gans, 1972:282).

9. The poor, being powerless, are made to absorb the economic and political costs of change and growth in American society.

These functions, of course, are very similar to Marx's discussion of the industrial reserve army. However, Gans does not utilize a developmental or historical perspective to arrive at these various functions of poverty which he describes; nor does he analyze at any length the internal logic of capitalistic development as it relates to the functional poor. The colonial concept of privilege, it is suggested, which implies accumulated gains, would be a useful addition to Gans' discussion. This is because the concept of privilege demands that one analyze the origins of this privilege; the concept of function, on the other hand, can be easily abstracted from historical and structural concerns. Nevertheless, Gans' conclusions are very interesting:

> . . . social phenomena which are functional for affluent groups and dysfunctional for poor ones persist; that when the elimination of such phenomena through functional alternatives generates dysfunctions for the affluent, they will continue to persist; and that phenomena like poverty can be eliminated only when they either become sufficiently dysfunctional for the affluent or when the poor can obtain

> enough power to change the system of social stratification (Gans, 1972:288)

Of course, many of the functions of the poor, and especially of the nonwhite poor, are psychological. Thus, it appears that the existence of a nonwhite subproletariat has positive functions for whites as a whole. This includes positive psychological functions for whites included in the subproletariat population, for the benefits derived include many things which they can at least subjectively participate in as a member of the white superordinate group, even though they may not objectively participate. After all, the white subproletariat is embedded within a white culture, social, economic, and political system. However, the important thing is that only about ten percent of the white population is included in this subproletariat, while about one third of the nonwhite nonwesterners are included in this sector of society. Thus, for these reasons hypothesis two will be tentatively accepted.

Hypothesis three states that normal channels of opportunity made available to minority group members do not improve their relative position in relation to the dominant white group. This hypothesis will now be analyzed.

The Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity concluded in its report released in December, 1972 (cited in Stencel, 1973:629) shows fully 63 percent of the nation's 6.6 million black children are still located in predominantly black schools, with over ten percent of them in totally black schools. However, the real problem is not black schools. The main problem here, the report points out, is an increasingly concentrated mass of nonwhites, especially blacks, in the urban areas and the corresponding flight of whites to the suburbs. This trend of rural to urban migration among nonwhites

is shown in Table VIII below:

TABLE VIII

RURAL AND URBAN POPULATION OF WHITES, BLACKS, AND OTHER NONWHITES, AND PERCENT CHANGE, 1960-1970

Race	Urban (Millions)	Percent Change, 1960-1970	Rural (Millions)	Percent Change, 1960-1970
White	128.8	16.0	49.0	1.2
Black	18.4	33.0	4.2	-16.8
Other Nonwhite	2.2	NA	0.7	NA

Source: Census of the Population, 1970

Thus, we can see from Table VIII that a rather large number of blacks have migrated from the rural areas to the urban areas in the last ten years. The extent of the concentration of that population in the inner city is given in Table IX:

TABLE IX

NEGRO AND SPANISH URBAN-RURAL CONCENTRATION (MILLIONS)

Race	Total	Urban	Inner City	Urban Fringe	Rural
Negro	22,549,815	18,338,421	13,130,245	2,543,160	4,211,394
Spanish	9,294,509	6,846,946	4,652,923	2,234,023	1,137,926

Source: Census of the Population, 1970

Table IX shows us that while more and more nonwhites are migrating to the urban areas, they are concentrating in the central city. This, of course, is a well known fact and tells us a great deal about the movement of this "industrial reserve army" to where the jobs are to be found. Marx discusses this reserve army, indicating that as an industry "matures" only ". . . a very small number of workers continue to find employment in the same branches of industry, while the majority are regularly discharged." Moreover, this majority

> . . . forms an element of the floating surplus population, growing with the extension of those branches of industry. Part of them emigrates, following in fact capital that has emigrated (1955:88).

The following table, Table X, shows us how segregated nonwhites are in fact within residential areas:

TABLE X

RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION WITHIN REGIONS

Region	Index of Segregation* 1960	1950	1940
South	91	88	85
Northeast	79	84	83
Northcentral	88	90	88
West	76	83	83

Source: Taeuber; in Ehrlich, 1973:8
*This index has a value between 0 and 100. The higher the index number, the greater the degree of residential segregation; the lower the index number, the lower the degree of segregation.

Even though this data in Table X shows a rather high degree of residential segregation, it only goes to 1960. However, there has been recently a study on residential segregation using 1970 figures. Unfortunately, this study has not yet been made available to me except via mass media reports (New York Times, May 26, 1973). However, a glimpse of this study indicates that things have not changed markedly. For example, it is reported that residential segregation has not declined significantly in predomantly black urban areas; while some lessening in the degree of residential segregation is indicated in urban areas populated by Mexican Americans (such as San Diego and San Antonio). This mass media report gives the trend in the index of segregation for a few cities. For example, the index for Columbia, South Carolina went from 83 in 1940, 88.1 in 1950, 94.1 in 1960, and 87.7 in 1970. The index for Washington D. C. went from 81 in 1940, to 77.7 in 1970. Although these two cities show a slight decline in the index of segregation between 1960 and 1970, there is not enough information presented to warrant serious analysis.

Presumably, however, nonwhites have concentrated in the urban areas ("agglomerized" in Marx's terminology) to take advantage of new job opportunities. The well known facts are that these opportunities have been short lived. Nevertheless, how have nonwhites fared in terms of education, occupation, and employment? Presumably, with all of the various and sundry civil rights laws enacted in the past years, we should be able to discern some movements toward real change for nonwhites as a group in relation to whites.

Data for 1970, presented in Table XI, compares education and income for blacks and whites.

TABLE XI

EDUCATION AND INCOME FOR WHITE AND BLACK MALES (1970)

	Elementary or Less	1-3 Years High School	High School Graduate	1-3 Years College	College Graduate
White	$4,652	$7,591	$8,960	$10,048	$12,840
Black	3,422	5,617	6,380	8,083	9,290
Ratio	.73	.73	.71	.80	.72

Source: Ehrlich, 1973:13

Thus, from Table XI above we can see that in 1970 a black male who completes college can expect to make just slightly above the income level of a white high school graduate. At the college graduate level the income in relation to his white counterpart at that level does not change significantly for the black.

Table XII gives an overall general look at the relation between white and nonwhite incomes at different occupational levels:

TABLE XII

THE RELATION BETWEEN WHITE-BLACK INCOME AT DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONAL LEVELS (MALES)*

Occupation	White	Black	Ratio
Professional, Technical	$11,140	$7,926	.71
Managers, Officials	10,385	8,021	.74
Clerical	7,337	6,539	.89
Sales	7,384	3,969	.54
Craftsmen	8,483	6,138	.72
Operatives	6,632	5,216	.79
Service Workers	3,996	1,545	.58
Laborers	2,430	3,491	1.43

Source: Ehrlich, 1973:14
*These data refer to median salaries in 1970 of persons 14 years old and older.

Table XII reveals that blacks do not improve their position relative to whites at any level except laborers and as clerical workers. However, at the highest ranking professions and managerial levels the incomes of blacks as compared to whites are not much different than the incomes of black operatives and craftsmen as compared to white operatives and craftsmen. In short, as the black worker moves up the occupational ladder, his income relative to white income does not improve.

Another way to look at the comparative occupational picture of blacks is to note the percent change in the black occupational structure over the years. Table XIII shows this information for the periods 1940 through 1970.

TABLE XIII

PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF BLACKS IN OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE (MALES)

Occupation	1940	1950	1960	1970
Professional, Technical	2%	2%	3%	3%
Managers, Officials	1	2	2	4
Clerical, Sales	2	4	7	9
Craftsmen	4	8	11	14
Operatives	13	21	27	28
Service Workers	15	15	16	13
Laborers	22	24	22	18
Farmers, Farm Laborers	41	24	12	6

Source: Ehrlich, 1973:14

Overall almost four out of five black workers are still confined to the low skill and low paying jobs. However, there is some movement at the middle level occupations. Three job categories--service workers, laborers and farmers and farm laborers--show somewhat of a decline in black participation, especially at the farmer and farm laborer level. This reflects the decline in unskilled job categories and the concomitant decline in the job force participation rates for nonwhites discussed earlier.

A look at the trends in unemployment rates over the years is necessary in order to add to the above discussion, especially in relation to comments made in the preceding paragraph. Table XIV deals with the unemployment rates of whites and nonwhites through the period 1948-1972.

TABLE XIV

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE FOR NONWHITE AND WHITES
(PERCENT)

Year	Nonwhites	White	Ratio
1948	5.9%	3.2%	1.7
1950	9.0	4.9	1.8
1955	8.7	3.9	2.2
1960	10.2	4.9	2.1
1965	8.1	4.1	2.0
1970	8.2	4.5	1.8
1972	10.0	5.0	2.0

Source: Census of the Population, 1970; Stencel, 1973

Table XIV indicates that unemployment tends to increase for both whites and nonwhites, though at about the same proportion, with nonwhites showing unemployment rates about twice that shown for whites. The levels and trends of unemployment for persons 16 to 19 years of age is even worse, moving from unemployment rates of 10.3% in 1955 to 15.1% in 1971 for whites, and from unemployment rates of 15.8% in 1955 to 31.7% in 1971 for nonwhites (Ehrlich, 1973:21). Also, as has already been pointed out, the labor force participation rate for the period 1960-1972 has declined for nonwhites by about 10%, moving from a participation rate of 83% in 1960 to a rate of 73.7% in 1972.

Table XV gives an even more detailed picture of the situation for ghetto residents.

TABLE XV

INCOME, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND SUBEMPLOYMENT IN TEN URBAN GHETTOS

Ghetto and City	Unemployment Rate Ghetto*	SMSA	Ghetto Subemployment Rate*	Median Individual Weekly Wage*	Median Annual Family Income*	BLS Lower Level Family Budget**
Roxbury (Boston)	6.5	2.9*	24.2	$74	$4224	$6251
Central Harlem (New York City)	8.3		28.6	73	3566	
East Harlem (New York City)	9.1	3.7*	33.1	67	3641	6021
Bedford-Stuyvesand (New York City)	6.3		27.6	73	4736	
North Philadelphia	9.1	3.7*	34.2	65	3392	5898
North Side St. Louis	12.5	4.4*	38.9	66	3544	6002
San Antonio Slums	7.8	4.2**	47.4	55	2876	NA
Mission-Fillmore (San Francisco)	11.4	5.4*	24.6	74	4200	6571
Salt River Bed (Phoenix)	12.5	3.3**	41.7	57	2520	NA
New Orleans Slums	9.5	3.3**	45.3	58	3045	NA

Source: Harrison, 1972:797
*November, 1966
**March, 1967
NA refers to figures which are not available.

The "subemployment" rate mentioned in Table XV consists of:

> . . . the sum of those who are actually unemployed, those working part-time but seeking full-time work, heads of households under 65 years of age earning less than $60 a week full-time, nonheads under 65 years of age earning less than $56 a week full-time, half the number of male nonparticipants aged 20-64 (on the grounds that they have given up looking not because they do not want work but because of the conviction--whether right or wrong--that they cannot find a job), and half of the "unfound males" (Harrison, 1972:797).

This subemployment rate is compared with the official rates given by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Urban Employment Survey (shown under "Ghetto" and "SMSA"--Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas--rates in the table). This he compares to median individual weekly wage, median annual family income, and Bureau of Labor Statistice (BLS) lower level family budget, which is the estimated minimum family budget

> . . . just adequate to sustain an urban family of four in a cheap, rented apartment, with an eight-year old automobile, and subsisting on a diet consisting largely of dried beans (Harrison, 1972:796).

As Table XV indicates, the situation for the mass of nonwhites concentrated in the urban ghetto areas is very dismal indeed. Unemployment and, especially, subemployment is extremely high, and in all urban areas shown the median annual family income falls considerably short of the BLS lower level family budget. Harrison concludes his study by stating that these findings

> . . . call rather convincingly for a change in emphasis away from the concentration on the alleged defects of the ghetto poor themselves toward the investigation of defects in the market system which constrains the poor from realizing their potential (1972:811).

Concerning the actual increase of nonwhite incomes over the past years, many mainstream sociologists and social scientists have made a great deal over the fact that percentage-wise these increases appear to

be quite significant. Obviously, there has been an increase in the percent of income received by nonwhites; however, reliance on this percentage alone can be misleading. Table XVI shows the net percent increase of families, by region, for the period 1959 through 1969:

TABLE XVI

NET PERCENT INCREASE 1959-1969 IN MEDIAN INCOME OF FAMILIES BY RACE OF HEAD

Region	Nonwhite	White	Total
Total	99.6%	69.0%	69.4%
Northeast	69.5	69.7	68.9
North Central	80.4	71.8	71.7
South	112.6	74.1	80.9
West	70.9	61.0	61.1

Source: Census of the Population, 1970

Table XVI indicates that the most significant gains in net percent increase of nonwhite income have taken place in the South. Concerning this, Bryce indicates that nonwhite earnings in the South

> . . . was greater than that of the nation as a whole partly because black earnings in that region were so low that any increase appears quite large. Hence, while blacks in the South experienced the greatest of all groups they continue to have lower incomes than blacks or whites anywhere else in the nation (1973:61).

Furthermore, the net percent income increase in the South was also partly due to the ". . . greater economic advance of that region as compared

to other regions" (Bryce, 1973:61). Data presented in Table XVII lend support to Bryce's comments. Table XVII shows the median income level of families by race of head and by region of the country:

TABLE XVII

MEDIAN INCOME OF FAMILY BY RACE OF HEAD AND REGION

Region	Nonwhite	White	Difference
Northeast	$7,409	$10,721	$3,312
North Central	7,792	10,298	2,506
South	4,936	8,721	3,785
West	8,438	10,374	1,936

Source: Census of the Population, 1970

In Table XVII the median incomes for nonwhites, based on 1969 data, were lowest in the South; moreover, in the South the greatest difference between white median family income and nonwhite family income is also to be found. In short, nonwhite increases in income relative to white incomes do not appear as impressive when broken down into regions and showing actual income dollars as opposed to income percent increase.

One final item concerning the increases of nonwhite incomes as compared to white incomes has to do with the number of husbands and wives working. As Table XVIII indicates, the incomes of Negro families are more dependent on both the husband and wife working than are white families.

TABLE XVIII

HUSBAND AND WIFE WORK EXPERIENCE,
WHITE AND NEGRO FAMILIES

Family	Number (Millions) 1959	1970	1971	Percent 1959	1970	1971
White	36.5	41.1	42.0	100%	100%	100%
Husband Only Worked	17.1	14.0	14.5	47	34	34
Husband and Wife Worked	12.3	18.4	18.5	34	45	44
Negro	2.9	3.2	3.3	100	100	100
Husband Only Worked	1.0	.8	.8	35	24	25
Husband and Wife Worked	1.3	1.9	1.8	44	58	55

Source: Census of the Population, 1970

Thus, in Table XVIII above we see that both white and Negro families have had both husbands and wives working at an increasing rate since 1959. However, for the Negro families, more than half of these have had both the husband and wife in the work force since 1970. On the other hand, for whites the percent of husband-wife work force has been less than half, about forty-five percent. This fact should be kept in mind when discussing any increases of nonwhite income.

Based on the data presented here, hypothesis three will be tentatively accepted.

Concerning all of the data presented in this chapter, the indication seems to be that nonwhite incomes, relative economic gains, and/or occupational advancement do not show significant change for the nonwhite population as a whole. No doubt, there have been individual

nonwhite gains. However, these individual gains, as significant and important as they are, should not obscure the fact that an increasingly large mass of nonwhites are being left behind in the dregs of poverty. Brimmer, who notes that some gains were made by nonwhites in the 1960s, comments that:

> However, beneath these overall improvements, another--and disturbing--trend is evident: Within the Negro community, there appears to be a deepening schism between the able and the less able, between the well-prepared and those with few skills (quoted in Stencel, 1973:628).

Stencel (1973:626) that many gains made by nonwhites during the mid-1960s reflect the expansion of the economy, an expansion which benefitted both white and nonwhite groups. This "trend" may also reflect the fact that those entering the economic ladder at the bottom during times of economic expansion are also the first to be thrown out of the labor force in times of economic contraction. The evidence presented in several tables in this chapter suggest that this is in fact what many nonwhites are presently experiencing, and that no significant gains for nonwhites as a group are in the immediate future.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The evidence presented in the previous chapter indicates that there exists strong evidence in support of the colonial theory of race relations. Obviously, however, an analysis such as this one which has looked only at economic variables does not fully verify the colonial theory since this theory takes into account other non-economic variables as well, especially psychological variables. However, the economic data presented do seem to lend strong support to that aspect of the colonial theory, and it is my belief that the other variables of the colonial theory could be "proved" as well. Nevertheless, as a structural analysis this study reveals a quite stable patterned relation between whites and nonwhites in the United States, a pattern which has not changed to any significant degree over the years. The importance of the colonial theory, in my opinion, is that it shifts analysis away from purely attitudinal measures of "prejudice" which characterizes the "vulgar" racism phase of laissez faire capitalism. A serious analysis of the colonial theory demands that one probe the logic of capitalism and the emergent structural patterning of white and nonwhite workers as this society has moved toward a monopolistic capitalist society. However, other non-economic and psychological factors are not dismissed; in fact, a structural account of race relations makes it possible to ground subjective responses--for whites and nonwhites--to concrete realities.

The colonial theory of race relations, grounded as it is with the concrete dynamics and historical development of the American social and economic structure, allows one to grasp a more complete overview of the white-nonwhite picture in the United States. It also suggests that predictions can be made based on this theory. Some predictions may include the following: (1) Unemployment and subemployment for nonwhites will increase rather than decrease in the future. (2) Labor force participation rates for nonwhites will decrease. (3) There will be an increase in civil rights activism and militancy on the part of nonwhites. (4) There will be an increase of governmental assistence and aid (welfare, foodstamps, and other such programs) directed toward the subproletariat colonized. (5) There will be an increased interest in various types of social control devices and tactics directed toward the subproletariat colonized by representatives of the dominant class.

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