

DECONSTRUCTING TRUST AND DISTRUST IN  
THE WORKPLACE: A FOUCAULDIAN  
ANALYSIS OF LABOR RELATIONS  
IN AN ELECTRIC UTILITY

BY

MARVIN LEE COOKE

Bachelor of Arts  
Central State College  
Edmond, Oklahoma  
1970

Master of Divinity  
Phillips University  
Enid, Oklahoma  
1975

Submitted to the Faculty of the  
Graduate College of the  
Oklahoma State University  
in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for  
the Degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
December, 1993

COPYRIGHT


by


Marvin Lee Cooke



December, 1993


DECONSTRUCTING TRUST AND DISTRUST IN  
THE WORKPLACE: A FOUCAULDIAN  
ANALYSIS OF LABOR RELATIONS  
IN AN ELECTRIC UTILITY

Thesis Approved:

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Thesis Adviser

  
\_\_\_\_\_

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
  
\_\_\_\_\_

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dean of the Graduate College

## PREFACE

This dissertation was born through preparation, rejection, and opportunity.

First, my course work and preparation for comprehensive examinations prepared me for this topic. Dr. Larry Hynson's course on industrial organization and Dr. John Cross' course on complex organizations prepared me to deal with the topic of labor relations. Both courses gave me a grounding in the literature on the different theories of organizations as well as a familiarity with the current process of deindustrialization associated with changing global product markets and the reorganization of labor markets. Through Dr. Larry Perkins' course on qualitative research methods, I had my first opportunity to engage in qualitative research and to use theoretical sampling strategies, triangulation, grounded theory approaches to data analysis, and analytic induction approaches to data analysis. Along with Dr. Chuck Edgley, he also introduced me to the literature on the idealist and realist debate in social science.

By having manuscripts rejected and then successfully reworked for publication, I came to adopt Foucault's analysis of practices as a framework for doing sociology. As I was preparing for comprehensive examinations and taking a directed reading course with Dr. David Knottnerus, I submitted a paper on Max Weber that I had prepared for Dr. Cross to Dr. Michael Katovich for review for publication in the *Social Science Journal*. Dr. Michael returned the paper with a suggestion that I might want to use the work of Michel Foucault to develop a theory of organizations. After consulting with Dr. Knottnerus, I did concentrated reading on Michel Foucault and Anthony Giddens and developed a paper which was the beginning of the theoretical and methodological foundation for this dissertation. At the suggestion of Dr. Knottnerus, I submitted the paper to one journal. It came back rejected with suggestions for further reading regarding antifoundationalist approaches to social science. After further reading and revision, the paper was published in another journal (Cooke, 1993).

The first topic for a dissertation that I developed was an application of

Foucault's approach to the analysis of social practices to the process of secularization in England and the United States. This particular topic would require archive research in England and in New Jersey and Texas. Even though I was a finalist for a national fellowship to study this topic, I failed to be awarded the fellowship and the necessary funding to carry out the research.

After failing to receive funding to pursue my first research topic, I began a dissertation to apply Foucault's approach to examine the relationship between technologies of property assessment and the construction of urban ecologies. Then, a phone call from an acquaintance who worked for the electric utility studied in this dissertation opened the door to examine the deterioration of labor relations in this utility.

To apply Foucault to study a topic, one must discover how people make relationships problematic. Since trust was the way that both the company and the union made their relationship problematic in this study, the principal research question was: What had changed in the relationship between the union and the company in this study to cause the relationship between them to deteriorate? Since Foucault's genealogy of power examines the reversals of practices, his approach seemed appropriate to explore this issue.

I wish to express my gratitude to the individuals who assisted me with this dissertation and my graduate work at Oklahoma State University. First, I wish to thank my spouse, Mary Lou Albitz Cooke. She was a willing listener as I talked through ideas and a helpful editor. Her love and support enabled me to make a significant mid-life career change.

Second, I wish to thank the Faculty of Sociology at Oklahoma State University. I wish to thank my major advisor, Dr. Larry Hynson, for his guidance and support through out my graduate program. Besides being an excellent professor and mentor, he was also a colleague with whom I would explore ideas. I am indebted to him for his editorial assistance on papers that I have published. I am also grateful to the other committee members -- Dr. John Cross, Dr. Larry Perkins, Dr. David Knottnerus, and Dr. Richard Batteiger -- for their advice, tutelage, and collegueship. Their suggestions were especially helpful in a revision of the chapter on research method, "Method as Ruse."

Third, I wish to thank the people in the company and in the union in this study for their cooperation. It is my deepest hope that they one day devise practices for relating in which they can trust.

Finally, I wish to thank my extended family for their support in my

academic journey over four decades. Joe and Mary Lee Cooke, my parents, have always encouraged me in the face of adversity. My son, Francis, inspired me through his persistence in wrestling through years of his own adversity as he finally became a regional contender. My uncle, Nicholas Francis Cooke, was my role model. He was one of the few people I knew who was able to step out of his own culture into a radically different point of view.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
The Ruse of Agency: A Brief Exploration of Foucault's Analysis of Social Practices . . . . .	4
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: TRUST, OTHER TECHNOLOGIES OF CONTROLLING RELATIONSHIPS, AND THE LABOR RELATIONS ARENA . . . . .	11
Introduction . . . . .	11
Trust as a Technology of Managing Relations . . . . .	12
A Critique of Concepts of Trust . . . . .	12
The Assumed Secondary Relationship and Subject- object Dichotomy in the Conceptualization of Trust . . . . .	18
Practices Used to Construct Relationships . . . . .	20
Trust in Primary and Secondary Relationships in the Work Place . . . . .	23
Distrust: A Technique for Managing Relationships Which is More than the Absence of Trust . . . . .	27
Other Technologies of Controlling Relationships . . . . .	30
Technologies of Sovereignty . . . . .	31
Authority and Partisans . . . . .	31
The Contract . . . . .	34
Punishment and Degradation . . . . .	35
Techniques of Discipline . . . . .	37
Dividing Practices . . . . .	38
Techniques of Market . . . . .	40
Exit and Options . . . . .	40
Labor Power and Labor . . . . .	40
Techniques of Confession . . . . .	41
The Labor Relations Arena: More than Negotiations and Arbitrations . . . . .	45
Conclusions . . . . .	49
III. METHOD AS RUSE . . . . .	52
Introduction . . . . .	52
A Critique of the Realist and Idealist Epistemologies . . . . .	52
Method as Ruse . . . . .	57
An Application of Method as Ruse . . . . .	60
Defining the Research Question . . . . .	63

Chapter	Page
Constructing a Sample by Following the Problematic . . . . .	64
Constructing Data by Eliciting the Problematic . . . . .	70
Constructing an Analysis of the Problematic . . . . .	74
 IV. FROM FAMILY TO ENMITY . . . . .	 80
Introduction . . . . .	80
Family . . . . .	80
Enmity . . . . .	83
Practices for Making Things "Problematic" . . . . .	92
The "Problematic" and the Internal Labor Market. . . . .	93
The "Problematic" and Management Practices . . . . .	100
The "Problematic" and Labor Relations Practices . . . . .	103
Trust and the "Problematic" . . . . .	107
 V. PRACTICES CONSTITUTING THE COMPANY AS FAMILY LIKE . . . . .	 111
Introduction . . . . .	111
Practices Used to Constitute the Company as Family Like . . . . .	111
Extended Family . . . . .	112
Friendship . . . . .	113
Unencumbered Relations . . . . .	116
Distrust and Practices Which Discourage Family Like Practices . . . . .	116
Dividing Practices Which Discourage Family Like Practices . . . . .	122
 VI. PRACTICES WHICH INFLUENCE THE INTERNAL LABOR MARKET . . . . .	 127
Introduction . . . . .	127
Practices Which Influence the Internal Labor Market by Working on the Strategic Level of Management . . . . .	128
The Threat of Exit . . . . .	128
The Use of the Market Study . . . . .	129
The Past Test Year Method of Rate Making . . . . .	131
Practices to Increase Conservation and the Variability of Costs . . . . .	132
Practices Which Affect the Construction of the Internal Labor Market at the Work Group Level . . . . .	133
Practices Which Work on the Value of a Position . . . . .	134
Practices Which Work on the Number and Distribution of Positions . . . . .	138
Practices Which Work on Converting Labor Power into Labor. . . . .	140
Practices That Work on the Externalities of Family Life and Safety . . . . .	145
Practices That Work on Mobility . . . . .	147



VII.	MANAGEMENT PRACTICES . . . . .	153
	Introduction . . . . .	153
	Management Rights . . . . .	154
	The Use of Appeals to Management Rights to Take Unilateral Action . . . . .	155
	Techniques for Cutting Off Lines of Action and for Diverting Criticism . . . . .	156
	Unilateral Action and the Appearance of the Arbitrary . . . . .	158
	Tactics to Ameliorate the Appearance of the Arbitrary . . . . .	160
	Participatory Practices at the Edge of the Practice of Management Rights . . . . .	163
	Command . . . . .	167
	Command Through Role Taking . . . . .	167
	Incomplete Technological Control . . . . .	169
	Surveillance . . . . .	171
	Evaluation . . . . .	172
	Hierarchy, Rules and Regulations, Training and Accountability . . . . .	175
	Punishment . . . . .	176
	Using Responsibility and Punishment to Construct the Person as the Problem . . . . .	176
	Four Uses of the Practice of Responsibility and Punishment . . . . .	178
	The Problem of Dually Embedded Elements of a Practice . . . . .	180
VIII.	LABOR RELATIONS PRACTICES . . . . .	182
	Introduction . . . . .	182
	Arbitration . . . . .	183
	Practices Utilized in Arbitration . . . . .	184
	"Teflon" Agreements, Conflict Aversion, and Personal Relations . . . . .	188
	Tactics Used in the Fight over Rights . . . . .	191
	The Problem of Dually Embedded Elements of Problem Solving and Contract Construction . . . . .	199
	Representation . . . . .	199
	The Use of Discontent and Involvement by the Union and Workers . . . . .	200
	Discontent . . . . .	200
	Involvement . . . . .	203
	Effects . . . . .	205
	Management Practices to Counter Union Practices Developed Around Representation and Involvement . . . . .	205
	Countering Practices Developed Around Representation . . . . .	205
	Countering Union Involvement and Encouraging Management Involvement . . . . .	207

IX. A GENEALOGY OF DISTRUST (AND TRUST) . . . . .	211
Introduction . . . . .	211
Distrust and the Reversal of Practices . . . . .	211
Distrust and Dually Embedded Practices . . . . .	223
Recasting the Issue of Trust . . . . .	228
NOTES . . . . .	231
REFERENCES . . . . .	232

## LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
I. Average Levels of Employment, Wages, and Hours in the 1970s and 1980s for the Principal MSA Served by the Company in This Study . . . . .	85
II. Percent Changes in Kilowatt-hours Sold, Residential Customers, Commercial Customers, and Industrial Customers . . . . .	89
III. Reversals of Practices Structuring the Internal Labor Market and Practices Used by Workers and Management to Make Them "Problematic" . . . . .	93
IV. Reversals of Management Practices and Practices Used by Workers and Management to Make Them "Problematic" . . . . .	100
V. Reversals of Labor Relations Practices and Practiced Used by Workers and Management to Make Them "Problematic" . . . . .	104
VI. Analogies of Distrust and Reversals of Practices . . . . .	213
VII. Analogies of Distrust and Dually Embedded Practices . . . . .	214

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

A person who supervised a unit of a midwestern electric utility once told me how the company had sent her<sup>1</sup> to a sensitivity training which was set up to force her to deal with feelings and with sharing. She came to realize that trusting meant that you had to be open with people and that they had to be open with you. She said that trust and open communication worked well at home, at church, and with friends. But, trust seemed impossible at work. You always know that you are holding something back from the workers as a manager. And you always know that the workers are holding something back from you as a manager. The purpose of this study is to develop a method of study based on Foucault's (1965, 1972, 1979, 1980, 1982a, 1982b, 1984, 1988a, 1988b, 1990, 1991a, 1991b) genealogy of power to explore the problem of trust and distrust voiced by this manager in the labor relations of an investor owned, midwestern electric utility.

To use Foucault's approach, one must discover how things are made problematic by members of an organization and use that to define the research question. I was hired as a labor relations consultant by the human resources department of an investor-owned, midwestern electric utility company because management perceived that the relationship between management and the union had become strained. After initial interviews with several managers at the strategic level of the company (vice presidents and higher and members of the central business planning group), at the human resources level of the company (the specialized department dealing with personnel issues, individual and organizational capacity development, remuneration, benefits, and labor relations), and at the work group level of the company and after interviews with several leaders of the union, they all seemed to agree that the relationship between the company and the union was once fairly good but had been growing increasingly problematic and conflictual over the last two years. *Thus, the principal research question is: What had changed in the relationship between the union*

*and the company to cause the relationship between them to deteriorate?*

If one now applies Foucault's framework to begin to elaborate -- and regulate -- the discourse, one must ask: What practices were used by the union and management to construct a relationship which both took to be good? What practices were adopted by one or both parties to begin to make the relationship problematic? The chief way that managers and union members seemed to make their relationship problematic was around the practice of trust. This caused me to elaborate the research question by focusing on trust: Did a practice or practices of trust exist among the practices used to construct a good relationship? If so, what did it look like and how did it work? What other practices were employed by the union and the company to construct a relationship perceived as good? How did they work? What practices were adopted which seemed to contribute to the deterioration of the relationship? How did they work? How did these practices affect the practice or practices of trust? What practices regulated the consideration of these practices by those who eventually adopted them?

Before turning to develop some initial considerations, let me first endeavor to briefly note why this approach to the study of labor relations might be of interest. First, if one examines all eighteen computerized social science indices and abstracts, one notes that trust with respect to labor relations is a relatively unstudied area. Out of 3,492 citations involving labor relations among all eighteen files, only forty-six citations dealt with trust and labor relations. Of these, thirty-seven were dissertations. Second, if one examines all eighteen files, one finds seven studies in which Foucault was used in some way to examine labor relations. There were no items in the eighteen files in which Foucault was used to analyze trust or trust in the context of labor relations. Even though there is no way that the lack of the use of a perspective or a concept guarantees that their use will produce research results with relevance, this cursory glance does indicate that the proposed topic of study represents a relatively unplowed field.

With respect to the area of complex organizations, this study could be considered to be an approach similar to what Powell and DiMaggio (1991) have called the new institutionalism in organizational analysis. According to Powell and DiMaggio, the new institutionalism rejects the rational-actor model, treats institutions as independent variables, places cognitive and cultural explanations at the center of analysis, and explores the properties of

supraindividual units of analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations of individual acts. By focusing on social practices (Foucault, 1980, 1984), by treating rules and symbols as having power effects (Foucault, 1972), and by demonstrating how the individual in both objective (Foucault, 1979) and subjective (Foucault, 1982a, 1982b, 1988a, 1988b, 1990) forms are constructed by various social practices, Foucault rejects the rational-actor model. By focusing on social practices as technologies of power which set up certain lines of action and inhibit others, Foucault (1980, 1984) treats institutions -- understood as social practices -- as independent but not as variables. By utilizing the concept of power/knowledge to explore how social practices are used to establish truth and how truth is used in social practices, Foucault (1980) places an emphasis on cognitive and cultural explanations. Finally, by placing an emphasis both on how social practices are effective at the individual application level and on how social practices as technologies both circulate and are colonized by others, Foucault (1979, 1980, 1984) treats social practices as supra-individual entities which are both seen at the level of individual acts and yet transcend a simple aggregate of individual acts.

In addition to the potential academic significance of this topic, there are at least two points of practical significance for this study. First, Freeman and Medoff (1984), Gilbert (1989), and Whyte (1991) have noted that, with good labor relations, unionized companies are more productive than nonunionized companies. However, such is not the case if labor relations are strained. They all note that trust is an important factor in good labor relations. Or again, Friedman (1991) has pointed out that trust profoundly affects economic performance by making exchange and collaboration possible. When economic participants fear each other's motives, they move to protect themselves by specifying every detail in work rules or contracts. Thus, if one could discover how various practices by which management and labor relate to each other either set up the possibility of trust or make it problematic, one could enhance the trust factor and, by doing so, increase productivity. Last, but not least, the issue of trust is the way in which both the union and workers covered by the labor contract and the management of the company studied made their relationship problematic. If one is to apply a Foucauldian analysis to a situation, one must examine the actual practices and discourses used by actors in a situation to understand how it works.

Before beginning the analysis of labor relations in the electric utility

studied, I will first outline in this introduction Foucault's understanding of power and social practices. Then, recognizing that Foucault (1988b) identified academic disciplines as one of the forms that a technology of social practices could take, I will explore in chapter one the social practice of trust, other technologies of controlling work relations, and the labor relations area as these are described by academic disciplines. In chapter two, I will develop an analytic or method of study based on Foucault's own analytic and describe how I will carry out the study. Finally, in the following chapters I will explore social practices associated with the use of the techniques for controlling relations as found in practical manuals and in actual social practices carried out in the industrial setting studied to explore how those techniques either make possible or inhibit trust in labor relations.

### The Ruse of Agency: A Brief Exploration of Foucault's Analysis of Social Practices<sup>2</sup>

When one thinks of power, most of our concepts are rooted in the intentions and capacities of actors or in the resources and constraints of society. Social practices as such tend to be the place where these antecedent aspects of actors or scenes have their effects. Even theorists such as Giddens (1984) who focus on social practices tend to rely on the nature of the actor or the scene as the unmoved mover which affects social practices while acknowledging the affect of social practices on scenes (Cooke, 1993).

If one begins to look at various concepts of power in the context of normal science as competing paradigms, one finds that the location of the unmoved mover shifts with the way in which the problem is framed. For example, Weber (1978) identified charisma, the unique qualities of a leader, as one source of power. Given this line of inquiry, power to affect practice lies in the essential qualities of an actor. Yet, Collins (1982) has noted that the norms and values of an institution define what characteristics a leader must have. Here, power is exerted by the scene -- the institution -- to affect practices. Even practices themselves have been the location from which power emerges. Wasielewski (1985) has demonstrated how framing rules used in social interaction affect whether or not a person is seen as charismatic. As Cooke (1990) has noted, most social scientists treat this situation by using the unique solution

requirement from the concept of truth in traditional logic (Copi, 1978) to sort out concepts and levels with data and reasoning to find the right answer from alternative possibilities.

However, Berndtson's (1970) phenomenological analysis of power makes a unique solution problematic. He observed that power has no antecedent and therefore is a self-caused cause. The appearance of permanence and the endurance of being is created by overcoming the novel from moment to moment. One does not know power except as change is observed and as power is inferred as a source of that change. Thus, as Cooke (1990) noted, power is ubiquitous. Using the unique solution of logic with any theoretical framework forces one to ignore most of that which is everywhere with a frame which cannot ask beyond itself. "Thus, any attempt to compare frames, or notions of power, to find the unique answer about cause with respect to power is doomed to failure" (Cooke, 1990: 123).

While Cooke (1990) concluded that the search for power in terms of causality as understood by normal science is doomed, Foucault does provide one with a way to think about power in terms of agency -- the means or instruments used in practices themselves (Burke, 1969) -- without relying on the need for unmoved movers located in actors or scenes while at the same time acknowledging the power effects of the frameworks and methods of inquiry and the ubiquitous nature of power. Foucault began by creating an analysis couched in terms of the symbolic domain of the signifying structures with the archaeological approach of his works prior to the May 1968 events in Paris (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982; Smart, 1985; Phelan, 1990). Here, Foucault tended to use the Platonic idea that symbolic structure is the unmoved mover of practices. His later genealogical approach shifted analytic reference away from the model of language and signs to that of war and battle (Foucault, 1980). With the genealogical approach, conflict plays the central role in dissolving and reconstituting order against a background of change. The focus of the genealogical analysis is on treating social practices as tactics and strategies of conflict by which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others, as subjects of knowledge, and as moral agents (Foucault, 1984). Since truth is established by the tactics and strategies of conflict, one cannot say that any particular theory of human action is true or mistaken. One can only describe the tactics and strategies used to establish and resist. With his turn to examine the genealogy of the subject (Foucault, 1990), Thiele (1986) has pointed out that



Foucault replaced the metaphor of war with that of governance. Thus, Foucault is interested in tactics which encourage and incite as well as those which are used to overcome resistance.

By focusing on social practices as techniques of power or governance, Foucault recognizes that the practices which are often rendered in terms of power neutral rules or descriptions (Giddens, 1984; Agar, 1988; Geertz, 1988) are in fact not power neutral. For example, I see white stuff falling to the ground in the middle of winter, and I have a rule which assigns the term "snow" to it. If that rule is a metaphor -- A is B -- it tends to encourage me to call it snow. If the rule is a simile -- A is like B -- it encourages me to have some doubt about the adequacy of the term "snow" for the white stuff falling. An Eskimo would have as many as twenty words to apply to the scene. The rules for appropriately identifying white stuff falling in winter -- in the words of Goffman (1967) -- set up certain lines of action and inhibits others. Rules are not power neutral for Foucault (1972). The production of discourse is governed by various procedures. Foucault (1972) classified such procedures as rules of exclusion -- including prohibition, division and rejection, and the opposition between true and false -- or as internal rules concerned with principles of classification, ordering, and distribution.

By focusing on social practices as techniques of power or governance, Foucault recognizes that the practices which are often rendered in terms of objectivity and subjectivity are constructed by practices such as discipline and confession. In *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1979), Foucault demonstrates how the techniques of discipline are used to fabricate the individual as an object with objective characteristics. For Foucault, discipline constructs the individual as an object through enclosure, partitioning, the functional coding of sites, and the ranking of individuals. Ranking individualizes bodies, distributes them, and circulates them in a network of relations. Activity is controlled through the use of time tables, the temporal elaboration of acts, the correlation of the body and gesture, the articulation of the relationship between the body and objects, the exhaustive use of the body and acts, and a system for signaling commands. Once the relationship between various aspects of the individual, acts, space, objects, and time are marked out, discipline proceeds by training, which utilizes hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination. Normalizing judgment is not aimed at expiation or repression. It relates individual acts to a field of comparison in terms of minimal thresholds or in terms

of an optimum toward which one must move. As individuals are ranked in a field of comparison, they are marked with respect to a hierarchy of qualities and skills and are rewarded and punished by the ranking itself. The examination combines the observing hierarchy and normalizing judgment to make individuals visible in a way to differentiate and judge them.

Subjectivity emerged from the technology of the confession. The confession is analyzed by Foucault (1990) as a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement. The confession is told in the presence of an authority who requires, prescribes, appreciates, and intervenes in the confession to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile. In the confession, truth is confirmed by the obstacles and resistance which it must overcome to be formulated. The process of expression independent of its external consequences produces intrinsic modifications in the person who tells it. It exonerates, redeems, purifies, unburdens, liberates, and promises salvation. In the nineteenth century, the sexual confession came to be constituted in scientific terms. By combining the confession with examination and interrogation, the procedure of confession was placed in the field of scientific observation. The postulation of a general and diffuse causal power of sex justified having to tell everything. The principle of latency made the ways of sex obscure and elusive. In the one who spoke, truth was incomplete and blind to itself. Therefore, truth could only reach completion in the one who assimilated and recorded it. The revelation of the speaker required the interpretation of the hearer for truth to be complete. The purpose of confession through medicalization was health instead of redemption. Thus, Foucault was able to account for meaning and subjectivity by way of the technique of confession.

Foucault's perspective which renders social practices in terms of tactics and strategies or techniques of governance which encourage certain lines of action and inhibit others has been criticized by many. Most of these criticisms rely on realist assumptions which posit either the essential nature of the actor, scene, or both. For example, Giddens (1984) criticized Foucault for turning the subject into an epiphenomenon of the tactics of power. As noted earlier, Giddens must do this because he needs a source of motivation in the actor to utilize power neutral rules. In a similar fashion, Taylor (1984) criticized Foucault for attributing strategic patterns to a context without attributing such strategic patterns to anyone's conscious plan. Again similarly, Bhaskar (1986) has

pointed out that actors intentionally create contexts which contain both the intended and unintended consequences of the actor such that the strategic patterns of the actor could continue through the strategic patterns of the context even in the absence of the actor. Yet, in a critique of Taylor, Patton (1989) has noted that Taylor's concept of power is built on the exercise of power while Foucault's concept of power is built on capacities. Patton demonstrated that power as capacity is prior to all other senses of power. In other words, agency stripped of purpose is prior to exercise. Realists, such as Giddens, Taylor, and Bhaskar, require purpose to motivate agency. In fact, Bhaskar (1986) claimed that purpose is caused by good reasons. However, good reasons are parts of apparatuses and are themselves replete with asymmetries which encourage certain lines of actions and discourage others. The only way that power can be separated from the asymmetries of apparatuses is to locate a principle of decision making in some essence which is not modified by the apparatuses by which distinctions are made and by which actions are executed. This is precisely what Foucault refuses to do. By focusing on social practices from a tactical viewpoint, he renders actors, purposes, acts, and scenes in terms of agency.

Realists attack Foucault's epistemology by pointing out that practice implies a reality separate from the practice. Margolis (1986) noted that there can be no practice without a recognition of a reality within the life of a practice. That is, one is always searching for the necessary within the contingent. Shapiro (1990) has pointed out that science assumes a causal mechanism that operates independent of our ability to perceive it. Bhaskar (1986) has observed that there are three levels of reality: the real, the actual, and the apparent. While our research practices affect what is apparent, there is a reality that makes it possible to refine the efforts of our research practices to more accurately approximate the real. Unlike the realists, Foucault is unwilling to privilege any picture of reality as true because there is no way to separate knowledge from the practices used to establish it. At the same time, Cooke (1993) has pointed out that Foucault at least avoids solipsism by the minimal realism of recognizing sources of recalcitrance and asymmetries set up by the practices of other actors. While one cannot claim a truth transcendent of the apparatuses used to establish it as the realist would have one do, one can use Foucault to describe the apparatuses and resistance involved in social action and the consequences associated with those apparatuses and resistance.

Now that Foucault's perspective has been briefly outlined and his critics have been briefly answered, consider his perspective again in relation to the new institutionalism in organizational analysis. If one looks at Foucault's development of the idea of social practices as techniques of power, one can see similarities and differences between Foucault's conceptualization of social practices and those used by those engaged in the new institutionalism in organizational analysis. According to Powell and DiMaggio (1991), the cognitive and cultural model used by most new institutional analysts are those of the limited rationality perspective of Simon and March (Simon, 1945; March and Simon, 1958), phenomenology (Schutz, 1962, 1967), or ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Cicourel, 1974). In so far as these perspectives attend to the asymmetric aspects of limited cognitive capacities, typifications, and acts with respect to setting up of inhibiting lines of action, they are similar to Foucault's perspective. For example, Simon (1945) noted that habits direct one to attend to selected aspects of a situation. Or again, drawing on Schutz (1962, 1967), Garfinkel (1967) has demonstrated how the assumption that your taken-for-granted reality is the same as mine makes possible lines of action consistent with that assumption. However, to the extent that habits, rules, and typifications are rendered descriptive without attending to how these elements set up asymmetries with respect to action, new institutional analysis departs from Foucault's perspective. For example, Meyer and Rowan (1991) noted that taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications rather than norms and values are the elements that constitute institutions. But, if I cannot see these scripts, rules, and classifications in terms of the asymmetries they set up for action, they just sit there and do not help one to understand how things work. By attending to actors, acts, scenes, and purposes in terms of the agency of social practice, Foucault gives one a ruse which allows one to look at how things work.

To use Foucault's perspective to study labor relations is not to enter the research arena with a new theory. Rather, it is to enter the research arena with a particular perspective. All situations are treated as practical systems which concentrate on what people do and on the way they do it. By treating social practices as techniques, one can concentrate on the asymmetries of the deployments used. That is, one can concentrate on how certain lines of action are enticed or inhibited. Rather than starting with practices as a system, Foucault (1984) starts with how practices actually work at the micro level of

control over things, actions upon others, and actions upon oneself. Once one has identified how things work at the micro level, one can then explore how the techniques identified emerged, circulate, and are colonized by others in other practices.

## Chapter II

### PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: TRUST, OTHER TECHNOLOGIES OF CONTROLLING RELATIONSHIPS, AND THE LABOR RELATIONS ARENA

#### Introduction

There are three issues which must be considered before developing the actual analytic to conduct this study. First, if one is to apply Foucault's approach to an analysis of trust, one must understand trust as a technique for managing relations. This perspective tends to fly in the face of our understanding of trust as a natural, nonmanipulative approach to interaction. However, remembering that all social practices set up asymmetries with respect to different lines of action, trust as a technique will be explored. Second, Bradach and Eccles (1989) have noted that trust is one of three types of mechanisms -- price, authority, and trust -- that govern economic transactions between actors. Given Foucault's (1979) work on discipline, Taylor's (1939) work on scientific management, Braverman's (1974) work on deskilling, and Edwards' (1978) work on the control of the labor process, discipline as well as other mechanisms at work in labor relations should be added to the list with market, authority, and trust. On the one hand, Bradach and Eccles (1989) have suggested that these different techniques of managing relations are not mutually exclusive but can be used in combination. On the other hand, Sackmann (1991) found that the beliefs and strategies used by firms need to be aligned. Is it possible to train work groups and first line supervisors in the ways of participatory management and trust while practicing union avoidance and suppression in official labor relations and cost containment and flexibility with changing labor requirements at the strategic level of a company? In other words, are practices of trust and other practices of managing relations compatible and reinforcing of each other or are they problematic for each other? Finally, labor relations studies have

traditionally been conducted exclusively around practices connected with how a company and a union relate: elections, arbitration, grievance procedures, negotiations, strikes, and lock-outs. However, it will be argued with Kochan et al. (1986, 1991) that the strategic, industrial relations, and work group levels all must be considered to understand labor relations in a company.

### Trust as a Technology of Managing Relations

For one to apply Foucault to the issue of trust, trust must be understood as a social practice which can be analyzed as a technique for governing relationships. While Bradach and Eccles (1989) in a review article claim that trust can be seen as a control mechanism along with price and authority to govern economic transactions among actors, most analyses of trust do not treat trust as a mechanism in the sense of social practice as technique. Instead, they root trust in some aspect of the actor or scene in various ways. In this section, I will begin by outlining and criticizing trust understood as a natural state, as the taken-for-granted nature of the natural attitude of actors, as expectations generated from social learning, as an organizational climate, and as a social practice. Then, I will make a general criticism of most of the literature on trust by noting that it assumes a situation of secondary relationships and totally ignores the situation of primary relationships. I will also note that it is built on the subject-object dichotomy set up by technologies of discipline and confession. Then, I will argue that relationship itself is a social fiction which is built on social practices which must be examined with respect to trust rather than the fictions of self, other, risk, or goals in the first instance. I will show how relationship involves a set of practices, can become an object to be worked on in interaction, and has implications for defining the self and the other for both primary and secondary relationships. I will then explore the problem of trust as it appears in the academic literature in the context of primary and secondary relations.

### A Critique of Concepts of Trust

*One understanding of trust roots trust in the natural, unfettered state of an actor.* "Trust can be and often is instinctive; it is unstrategized and freely given. It is something very much like love . . ." (Gibb, 1978: 14). When Gibb contrasts trust with defensiveness, he contrasts "being me" with "playing a role." While he did

not make such an approach central to his analysis of trust, Luhmann (1979) similarly relates willingness to trust to inner security. Foucault makes such a viewpoint problematic. In his work on sexuality (Foucault, 1990) and subjectivity (Foucault, 1982), Foucault demonstrates that the assumed identity required to "be me" is tied to a conscience or self-knowledge which cannot exist independent of the devices by which such self-knowledge is created. Knights and Willmott (1989) tie the development of self-knowledge to technologies of work which separate people from each other, which make these separated individuals more directly and intensely responsible as persons for their own actions, and -- as a result -- which make people's sense of what and who they are more problematic. Yet another line of inquiry which makes "being me" and "trust" problematic is presented by Zurcher (1986). Here, "being me" is part of a script that is marketed through awareness-training organizations. Trust is one of the "stages" one can reach through self-awareness training. So, does the training unfetter me to trust or does it simply use trust as a way to mark and define me or to create an open-ended process to keep me coming back for more training?

*Another way of looking at trust is rooted in the taken-for-granted nature of the natural attitude of actors.* Schutz (1967) points out that an actor has an expectation about situations, assumes that the other with whom the actor is interacting has the same expectation, and assumes that the other assumes that the actor has the same expectations as the other. For Garfinkel (1963), interaction within this set of assumptions constitutes trust. Several researchers use some or all of Garfinkel's basic notion. Even though they move beyond the consistency of expectations to include issues of risk in their understanding of trust, Luhmann (1979) and Barber (1983) both recognize that trust is fundamentally the expectation that the natural order will persist and be realized. Williams (1988) is even more careful to adopt Schutz's (1967) description of the natural attitude with respect to trust by claiming that trust means knowing each other's preference schedule and knowing that each other knows that each other knows the preference schedule. In one way, Garfinkel's equation of the natural attitude with trust seems tautological. What keeps it from being so can be seen in Cicourel's (1974) and Collins' (1981) specification of this notion of trust by placing the issue of trust in the midst of acts which breach or violate the natural attitude which Garfinkel equates with the natural attitude. For Cicourel (1974) and Collins (1981), trust means that participants in an interaction are willing to



do accommodative work to normalize interactions that seem to violate the expectations of the natural attitude. In other words, trust means that people are willing to continue to rely on the natural attitude and to continue to act as if the assumptions were true to keep the interaction within the bounds of the natural attitude. But, what happens if the accommodative work does not work or if the breach is such that it cannot be normalized? Garfinkel (1963) claims that the result is confusion. The real question is what kind of attributes are made about the breach. Is the person who breaches the taken-for-granted assumptions crazy? Zucher (1986) notes that, in addition to the perspective of the natural attitude, one must consider a specific assumption of interaction: The other person will put self-interest aside in favor of an "other-orientation." In other words, for trust to be an issue, the violation of the taken-for-granted expectations of actors must be attributed to opportunism on an actor's part and not to mental illness or to some other motive. Thus, placing the issue of trust only in the natural attitude of the actor is not a totally satisfactory way to understand the issue.

One final way in which Garfinkel's understanding of trust can be criticized is to raise problems with the adequacy of the use of the taken-for-granted nature of the natural attitude as causal agent. That is, the unmoved mover in Garfinkel's model is the natural attitude. If I have expectations and ways of acting taken from the typifications in my stock of knowledge (Schutz, 1967), my natural attitude is adequate for me to use these and for these to prevail. If there is a challenge to my actions, I use my assumption that we are acting as if we are sharing a common definition of reality and keep on acting to fulfill that assumption. Simon and March (Simon, 1945; March and Simon, 1958) create a similar situation by placing the unmoved mover in a limited stock of knowledge rather than in the natural attitude. While acknowledging that the natural attitude and a limited stock of knowledge do have an asymmetry to them, the typifications and rules in one's stock of knowledge are not power neutral.

Second, as Goffman notes (1959), actors use various devices to maintain a single definition of a situation. They do so by what they express, and this expression must be sustained in the face of disruptions. From Goffman's perspective, trust is created in interaction rather than interaction being created by the "trust" of the natural attitude.

*Yet another perspective which places the issue of trust in some aspect of the actor is*

*social learning theory*. Here, Rotter (1967) defines trust as an expectancy that one party that can rely upon the word or promise of another party. Similarly Dasgupta (1988) and Gambetta (1988) define trust as a particular level of subjective probability or expectancy about the actions of other people whose actions affect the truster without the ability of the truster to monitor or to monitor before hand the actions of those on whom the truster must rely. While Rotter (1967) and Braun and Foddy (1988) are interested in how generalized an attitude of trust is toward various types of actors, Dasgupta (1988) and Gambetta (1988) tend to focus on expectancy in terms of probability.

Two lines of criticism have been raised against these lines of analyzing trust. First, Luhmann (1979) notes that decision makers often do not have knowledge about others on whom they must depend at the time of a decision. Furthermore, such knowledge is rarely in the form of calculable probability. Dasgupta (1988) notes the difficulty of assessing probabilities with respect to trust. So, he suggests that trust be assessed in terms of the cost that has to be paid by each party to trust. Of course, the problem here is that expectancy theories rely on a scheme which multiplies probabilities of events with values of outcomes to make decisions. With Dasgupta's suggestion, one term is missing in the calculation. Most likely -- given the dichotomy of trust/distrust -- judgments about trusting are a dividing practice with all or nothing designations and consequences rather than any kind of continuous probability function. Second, in an attempt to validate his Interpersonal Trust Scale, which is designed to explore the generalizability of trust to various types of actors, Rotter (1967) used a two-person non-zero-sum game with people who had various levels of trust in terms of generalizing a trusting attitude to various classes of actors. He found that the game was reacted to by many if not all subjects as a competitive game regardless of instructions to ameliorate the competitive affects of the game. This would suggest that the practices actually involved in interaction have more to do with the practice of trust than do responses to a questionnaire about whom people trust which are designed to mark the tested as trusters or nontrusters.

Whereas the previous approaches to studying trust utilize devices to plant trust in some aspect of the actor, other approaches construct a way to attribute trust to some aspect of the scene. Blyton et al. (1982) *utilize the concept of organizational climate to talk about trust in an organization*. "Organizational climate is generally viewed as a variable, or set of variables, that represent the norms,

feelings and attitudes prevailing at a workplace . . ." (Blyton et al., 1982: 208). In a way similar to how Rotter (1967) uses the Interpersonal Trust Scale to get responses on a five point scale to rate statements about the types of people that one trusts, the organizational climate approach of Blyton et al. (1982) gets responses on a five point scale to statements about an organization's norms and atmosphere. One variant (Zett-Otte, 1989/1990) to this approach is to ask people to respond to items about organizational behavior rather than about organizational climate. If one examines the organizational climate factors found by Blyton et al. (1982) as compared with the organizational behaviors found by Zett-Otte (1989/1990), one finds several similarities: Hostility is similar to power plays and conflict, mutual regard and trust are similar to trust, joint participation and cooperativeness are similar to cohesiveness, and apathy is similar to motivation.

A most obvious criticism to this approach to studying trust in the work place is that of reification: How can an "organization" have behaviors or beliefs? One way out of this problem is to unhinge culture from the measuring device in order to identify elements of culture. Then, one can explore how they work in interaction. This was what Rice (1986) did as he explored how differences between American and Japanese cultural attributes found in individual and social identities affected intra-firm conflicts. However, the whole reification argument is finally built on a realist perspective with the actor constituting that which is real. Foucault (1980) might instead encourage one to recognize that those questionnaire devices used to "measure trust" as "an individual attribute" or as an aspect of "an organization" are actually used and are treated as if they were measuring something real. He would encourage one to explore how they are used. For example, the organization in which this study was done hired a management consultant firm to assess the company's organizational climate. The purpose for this study was to identify problematic work groups so intervention strategies -- such as team building and active listening skill training for management -- might be implemented to deal with labor-management and management-management problems. As Gamson (1968) noted, persons in authority need the trust of those over whom they exercise authority to more effectively and efficiently have their commands carried out rather than questioned or fought. The "knowledge" about "trust" with each work group set up different treatments on different work groups. While not done in the company in this study, one could use Rotter's (1967) Interpersonal

Trust Scale, correlate it with various "critical behaviors" associated with a job classification (Landy, 1985), and use it as a barrier to job entry. Again, "trust" has differential effects on workers. And, the "objective," "quantitative" methodology of the questionnaire and correlation in test construction helps to erect the appearance of "truth" while hiding the managerial decisions regarding "critical behaviors" and questionnaire construction.

In yet another vein, *trust can be understood as a social practice*. The situation of trust according to Griffin and Patton (1971) seems to contain three elements: reliance upon another, risk, and goal achievement. With respect to risk, Luhmann (1979) similarly points out that risk is present in situations of trust because the future contains more possibilities than have been realized in the past or present. Powell (1990) observes that our "bounded rationality" does not allow us to foresee all possibilities. Trust is an alternative to rational prediction (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). As Luhmann contends, trust handles risk by tolerating it rather than by monitoring, developing contingencies, socializing through insurance or other such mechanisms, etc. With respect to reliance upon another, Luhmann (1979, 1988) claims that reliance upon another is what differentiates mere familiarity from confidence and trust. Similarly, Williams (1988) distinguishes between cooperation and dependence. Cooperation is a symmetrical relationship which does not really require trust. However, dependence is asymmetrical in that what X gets out of a venture depends on Y doing her part, and Y does not depend on X. Good (1988) extends the analysis of reliance by pointing out that Y also displays trust in X's representation of the conditions of the request made by X. Finally, with respect to goal achievement, Luhmann (1988) uses goal achievement to differentiate trust from confidence. If one has to rely on others but considered other alternatives, one is in a situation of trust. Reliance on others with no consideration of alternatives is what Luhmann (1988) terms confidence.

To deal with being in a situation of relying on someone in a risky situation to achieve a goal, Griffin and Patton (1971) point out that a person must assess the other, assess the risk, and assess the value of the goal. In earlier discussions of trust and social learning theory, it was shown how social learning theory is built on devices for assigning probability with respect to risk and for assigning values to goals. It was also noted that this is a difficult task which may be done by deployments used by the economist, the accountant, or the actuary, but it probably is not done by the average person. So, most of the average

person's efforts go into an assessment of the other. Simmel (1978), Luhmann (1979), and Lewis and Weigert (1985) claim that the problem of trust with respect to the other is whether or not the identity of the other is what it appears to be. Practically, Good (1988) observes that people use reputation to assess trustworthiness. Cantrell (1984) claims that we try to determine the integrity, competence, consistency, and loyalty of the other. Similarly, Barber (1983) observes that we look at whether or not the other is "technically competent" and can be relied on with respect to "fiduciary obligation and responsibility."<sup>3</sup>

### The Assumed Secondary Relationship and Subject-object Dichotomy in the Conceptualization of Trust

As one glances at trust as a social practice, one is struck by how the setting is put together. First, the "other" is turned into an object who has instrumental value but who cannot be controlled and therefore represents a risk. So, one is left with a dichotomous decision -- trust or distrust. To decide whether one should trust or distrust, one can work on the meaning of the other -- again, treating the other as an object -- with respect to the other's trustworthiness in terms of reputation. While Griffin and Patton (1971) carried out experiments with this theoretical framework in the context of interpersonal relations, it seems to me that the theoretical framework rests more on secondary relations than on the primary relations usually implied by interpersonal relations. For Cooley (1962), primary relationships are like those found among friends and within families. Here, the welfare of the other is more important than the achievement of goals. In fact, one wonders if "other" is an appropriate term to mark a friend or family member. Primary relations are based on affection and face-to-face interaction. Secondary relationships (Cooley, 1962) focus on goal achievement. Here the other is "other" and the other has instrumental value for goal achievement. Feelings of affection are replaced with rational considerations of self-interest. Thus, one can see that *almost all theorization about trust rests on the assumption of secondary relations even when they are applied to scenes of primary relations.*

Just as Foucault (1965) traces how the separation of reason from folly linguistically emerged from the physical confinement of the undesirables from

the rest of the population, Zucker (1986) traces the effect of changing social organization on the nature of trust as trust moved from process trust to trust based on characteristics or to institutional trust. When communities were small, migration was low, and business was conducted with a stable set of actors, past experience or expected future exchanges made trusting relatively unproblematic.<sup>4</sup> Then, there were high rates of immigration with a resulting disruption in the stability of transactions. Here, trustworthiness was assessed by ascribed characteristics. Once exchange involves crossing group boundaries, geographic distance, and non-separable elements, institutional trust arose through such devices as credentials and escrow accounts. At this point, one has the full blown conditions on which trust has been theorized on the assumption of secondary relationships. Anderson (1971) identifies a similar development in England by identifying four variables which can be used to theorize about trust with respect to changes in social organization: (1) a positive relation between group homogeneity and trust levels, (2) a positive relation between connectedness of social networks and trust levels, (3) a negative relationship between the size and complexity of a community and trust levels, and (4) a negative relationship between the rate of social change the trust levels.

*Not only does most theorization about trust rest on the model of secondary relationships, it also rests on the subject-object dichotomy* which is built on techniques of discipline (Foucault, 1979) and on techniques of confession (Foucault, 1990) as discussed in the introduction. Here, even Foucault (1984) tends to be trapped into this dichotomy by focusing on techniques of social practices with respect to objects, others, and the self. Yet, a glance at the treatment of trust by a few academics suggests that relationship is the fictional substance on which one must concentrate rather than objects, others, and the self. Here, relationship can be seen as a set of practices for constructing trust, an object to be worked on in interaction, and a device for defining the self and the other. For example, relationship was made central in Macneil's (1978) theory of relational contracting which makes the maintenance of a relation of central importance. Relationship is suggested by Lewis and Weigert (1985) when they define trust as a property of a collective unit and applicable to relations rather than to psychological states. Relationship is raised by Coleman (1984) as he reacts to models which "measure" trust and then aggregate it instead of defining trust as a relationship between two actors. Relationship is pointed to by Granovetter

(1985) when he places trust in social relations and obligations inherent in them instead of placing trust in generalized morality or institutional arrangements. Relationship is hinted at by Powell (1990) as he gives place to relationship as a social practice for constructing social organizations through social networks. Thus, I claim that *relationship itself is a social practice which one must examine with respect to trust as well as the self, the other, risk, or goals.*

### Practices Used to Construct Relationships

*Let us first look at a few examples of how relations might be constructed and objectified in primary relationships.* Consider the practice of *tutoiement* in France (Hagiwara and de Rocher, 1977). In French, a distinction is made between the formal you (*vous*) and the informal you (*tu*). Such a distinction also existed in English once. *Tu* is used when speaking to children, animals, and with family members. To decide to use *tu* with someone outside of this context requires some discussion. Thus, Hagiwara and de Rocher (1977) develop a French conversation exercise around two acquaintances -- Jenny and Jean-Paul -- as they decide to use *tu* instead of *vous* with each other. In the conversation, Jean-Paul explains to Jenny that the majority of French students today use *tu* to denote their camaraderie, even between men and women. Since Jenny and Jean-Paul are good friends, she agrees. Here, the fictional substance being worked on in the first instance in the meaning of the relationship between Jenny and Jean-Paul -- *tu* or *vous*. The relationship is constructed and reconstructed by using *tu* with each other instead of *vous*. It redefines who they are and what is acceptable with each other and with others.

Or again, consider the conversation between Jesus and Simon Peter in Christian scripture in the gospel according to John. In Jesus' third appearance to his disciples after his death (John 21:1-14), Simon Peter fails to recognize Jesus until others first recognize him. Jesus then asks him (John 21:15-17) -- and I will use the language used in many English translations -- "Simon, do you love (root: ἀγαπάω) me more than the others?" Simon answers that Jesus knows that Simon loves (root: φιλέω) him. This same question and response is then repeated a second time. The third time, Jesus asks, "Simon, do you love (root: φιλέω) me?" The text records that Simon Peter was sad because Jesus asked the question a third time. Peter responds, "Lord, you know I love (root:

φιλέω) you.” First, as with *tutoiement*, Jesus and Simon Peter are working on the meaning of their relationship. If you were to translate ἀγαπάω and φιλέω more accurately into English, the words would translate roughly into love and friend. So, Jesus asks twice if Simon Peter loves him, and Simon Peter responds that they are friends. Then, Jesus ask if they are really friends. Simon Peter is hurt by this question. He replies that Jesus knows that they are friends. Clearly, the use of the terms love and friend are a large part of what constitutes and reconstitutes the relationship. And again, which type of relationship they have clearly has meaning for whom they are to each other and to the other disciples.

*The use of relationship as a fictional substance constructed and objectified by social practices in secondary relationships can be seen in the assumptions of other sociological approaches.* For example, Weber (1978) recognizes that social relations are often asymmetrical in that one person in the relationship has the ability to command another with the expectation that the command will be followed. Because Weber defined social relationship as “the behavior of a plurality of actors insofar as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these terms” (Weber, 1978: 26), he was forced to explore asymmetry from the perspective of the legitimacy of the asymmetry of the relationship. Can one think about the issue of “legitimacy” apart from a hierarchical relationship and all of the practices that go into its construction: parent-child, employer-employee, master-disciple, master-servant, king-subject, etc.? In a bureaucracy (Edwards, 1984), one substitutes a set of rules for a person in the hierarchical relationship: job description/company goals/manuals of procedures - employee. So, issues of legitimacy are cast in terms of the legal/rational rules which construct the relationship. By focusing on the issue of legitimacy, Weber assumes but does not address the assumed relationship because of his focus on the subjectivity of actors.

Because relationship in and of itself is not theorized, one might be tempted to add the element of material dependence as an adequate explanation of hierarchy. For example, Weber (1978) notes several dependencies in hierarchy. Additionally, theories of exchange and network analysis link dependency and hierarchy (Turner, 1991). But, consider the following two examples which indicate that hierarchy as a method of constructing a relationship and material dependency are not necessarily linked. First, it is often the case that one spouse is economically dependent on the



other in a marriage. Traditionally, there has been a hierarchical relationship between men and women in marriage. Yet, as Milton (1951) noted in the seventeenth century, companionship can -- and should from his point of view -- be the nature of the marital relationship. Companionship -- literally meaning breaking bread together -- is not hierarchy even if one spouse is materially dependent on the other. Second, in studying ownership in the work place, Russell (1985) notes that workers can be economically dependent on an organization while cooperatively controlling work and strategic decisions in cooperatives. Again, this is not hierarchy even though it is dependency.

Another type of theorizing ignores the social practices of relationship by using the model of social structure. For example, Parsons (1951) used the status-rule complex as the basic unit of the social system. But, what makes it possible to look at statuses as positions in a system? What makes it possible to specify expected behaviors of a person who occupies a status as a role? If one recognizes relationship as a social practice, one can identify the practice upon which the notion of structure is built. A second example of ignoring the social practices of relationship by using the model of social structure is network analysis. Here, Anderson (1971) notes that the greater the connectedness of social networks, the greater the level of trust. Would this be the same if it were a network of people who have been close friends since childhood instead of a network of actors with no relation beyond work in a highly competitive, changing order (Griffin and Patton, 1971)?

Finally, another line of social research into trust pays attention to the behaviors which engender trust without attending to the relationship itself. Deutsch (1958) and Gibb (1978) observe that trust can be encouraged by exhibiting the acceptance of the other or by revealing oneself and thus risk acceptance or rejection. Besides risking rejection, abuse, or misuse of shared information about feelings or the self, one can extend trust and risk opportunism on the part of the other by discharging obligations in advance (Luhmann, 1979), by discussing problems fully (Gibb, 1961; Tjosvold and Chia, 1989), or by openly and willingly sharing ideas and information (Butler and Cantrell, 1984). One can exhibit a refusal to opportunistically use information about the other's self or about the situation at hand by exhibiting spontaneity rather than strategic calculation (Gibb, 1961), by trying to understand each other's perspective (Tjosvold and Chia, 1989), or by integrating each other's ideas (Tjosvold and Chia, 1989). Such integration and communications of mutual goals and

benefits helps to create a common line of behavior and to avert opportunism (Tjosvold and Chia, 1989). While such behaviors are an integral part of tactics of trust, such an approach which does not explore the relationships within which these behaviors occur cannot distinguish between face-to-face situation which occur between friends and those that occur between employer and employee or seller and buyer.

### Trust in Primary and Secondary Relationships in the Work Place

*With respect to primary relationships*, Maculay alerts one to the possible power effects of friendship and techniques of trust when he notes that relationships carefully worked out through devices such as contracts " . . . indicate a lack of trust and blunts the demand of friendship" ( Maculay, 1963: 64). Here, Maculay illustrates how this works with sales representatives and purchasing agents who have done business for years. Because they see each other as friends, they can call each other and solve problems because they can openly share information and problems. One's boss might want one to act opportunistically. But, because two people are friends, one cannot do so. Instead, one must level with one's friend and try to find a solution that does not hurt the friend or the relationship. Thus, friendship constrains opportunistic behavior.

What happens when trust is broken and yet the maintenance of a relationship is important? Here, the literature is silent. Yet, a reflection on one's own personal relations and on experiences in faith communities reveal rituals by which broken trust is restored: forgiveness, repentance, reconciliation, restitution, etc. In his work on the confession, Foucault (1991) totally ignores the relation repairing effects of the confession. Instead, he is interested in the effects of the confession on the teller and on the construction of subjectivity from the confession. Yet, confession is first a ritual for restoring and repairing a relationship. Primary relationships do not guarantee trust. But, if trust is broken, the valuing of the relationship and techniques for restoring and repairing trust make it possible to maintain the relationship.

Even though two actors might act in a face-to-face situation, what happens when the relationship between them is not constructed as a friendship but as employer and employee or as seller and buyer? Here, there is no friendship which would be destroyed by opportunistic behavior. There is no

mutual intrinsic valuing of each other and our feelings and fates. There are no rituals for repairing and restoring relationships. Hierarchy, market, discipline, and the confession turn the person into an instrument, a scientific object, a commodity, or a combination of them through the deployment of a number of devices. Another look at the literature on trust assumes such a situation -- a situation of secondary relationships.

The *first type of secondary relationship which appears in the literature on trust assumes a division of actors into closed groups* (Lansberg, 1989) *such that relationships are across boundaries* (Zucker, 1986). Groups and boundaries set up the possibility of front and back regions of interaction (Goffman, 1959). Such a division into groups utilizing physical or social distance is an integral part of hierarchy and discipline (Foucault, 1979) and of the market (Appadurai, 1986). How is one to assess a command, the execution of a command, or a potential transaction in this situation? Since one knows that something is going on in the back region, one is left trying to decide whether or not the "identity" and "order" presented in the front region is what it appears to be (Luhmann, 1979; Lewis and Weigert, 1985). Thus, one attends to the reputation of the actor or organization with whom one is interacting (Good, 1988). Since trust is a reputational issue in this situation, it can be acquired and lost (Dasgupta, 1988; Gambetta, 1988) through such devices as ethnic or cultural characteristics, brand advertising, self aggrandizing speech, policies of standing behind goods and services, advertising such policies, corporate responsibility ideologies, etc. In addition to examining the reputation of the actor to be trusted, one can also assess the opportunity for the other to cheat. For example, one can assess whether or not to trust the other by focusing on the other's motivational structure (Luhmann, 1979). Or again, one can explore whether or not the other's interests coincide with one's interest (Gamson, 1968). Regardless of how one assesses reputation or opportunity to cheat, there is no relation of friendship on which one can rely. One is left with the problem of tolerating risk.

There are at least three approaches to managing trust in this first type of secondary relationship which do so by injecting elements of primary relationships into the secondary relationship. First, Shea (1984) recognizes that people in the work place live in a system of hierarchy in which the supervisor assigns work, provides information, appraises performance, rewards and punishes behavior, and controls opportunities for advancement. Given this relationship, Shea (1984) proposes seven guidelines to build trust between the

supervisor and the subordinate. The first three guidelines -- analyze the work to assign work which is challenging, train subordinates in one acceptable method but give them freedom to innovate, and focus on what gets done rather than on how it gets done -- create the potential for risks by giving workers a realm for acting in ways that either exhibit incompetence or opportunism. At the same time, these guidelines are an act of extending trust on the part of management. Yet, they do so in a way that limits risk: a manager trains workers in at least one acceptable method of working and audits what gets done. The next guideline -- avoid using coercive power -- substitutes self controlling methods for command through delegating authority, through using "I" messages in communications, and through using Rogerian listening. As Knight and Willmott (1988) observe, making individuals more directly and intensely responsible as persons for their own actions is a very effective means of self control. The next two guidelines -- concentrate on solving the problem and skip the search for who is guilty -- replaces punishment and degradation leading toward ending the work relationship with techniques for dealing with the work itself. By doing so, a manager does not threaten the relationship they have or the worker's security. In other words, the manager acts out a valuing of the worker and refuses to act opportunistically toward the worker. The final guideline -- support your subordinates and help them to come out winners -- are acts confirming the trust put in workers by supervisors and the relationship between them.

Second, Levering (1988) recognizes that work is a commodity exchange of work for pay. If taken to its logical conclusion as a commodity exchange, both employers and employees give up as little as possible while trying to maximize their own position. Yet, Levering (1988) acknowledges that work places can be more like a family or a partnership than merely a job. The key for building trust for Levering (1988) is to recognize that work can be a gift like exchange as well as a commodity like exchange. Often, people do more in work than is narrowly required. In doing do, they are being creative and are giving a part of themselves -- a gift -- to the company. There are two things that a company can do to build trust through such exchanges. First, a company can acknowledge work as a gift by acknowledging and supporting suggestions from workers by giving them the equipment and resources to carry out their suggestions and by extending appreciation for the gift offered. Second, the company can respond by giving away some of its power to workers. As with Shea (1984), Levering (1988) suggests limiting the company's risk by trusting workers only after they

have exhibited technical competence in doing a job.

A third approach for managing trust in the secondary relationship by injecting elements of primary relationships is that of contractual relations. According to Macneil (1978), classical and -- to a large degree -- neoclassical contracts are composed of a number of devices which make them very discrete and which assume all relevant aspects of a promise and its fulfillment are fully represented in the contract. Thus, what is constructed as a relationship in an exchange is a one-time event. A look at some of the elements of a classical contract reveals a whole set of apparatuses that help to set up the secondary relationship nature of the contract. Macneil (1978) describes how lawsuits are set up as a bipolar situation with two sides forced into a winner-take-all contest. Litigation in this situation focuses on completed events and is seen as a self-contained event. All future relational considerations are excluded. Rights and remedies are explicit and interdependent and are based on the discrete and assumed fully defined terms of the contract at the time of its execution. However, "no such model will do when the relation is supposed to continue in spite of the dispute, and where a main goal must always be its successful carrying on after the dispute is resolved . . ." (Macneil, 1978: 891). As an alternative to the classical or neoclassical contract, Macneil (1978) proposes the contractual relation which is designed to preserve a relation and which develops devices for harmonizing conflict within the internal matrix of the relationship. As noted earlier, the intrinsic valuing of a relationship is a key element in the construction of trust in the primary relationship. In the contractual relation, the scope of a dispute is shaped by both parties and the resolver of a conflict rather than exogenously given by a contract. Party structure is not bipolar but is amorphous. The dispute mechanism attends more to negotiating a viable future rather than imposing judgments on past events.

*A second type of secondary relationship in which trust has been identified as a relevant issue is the agency relationship.* Agency relationships are those in which individuals or organizations -- the agent -- act on behalf of a principal. "Trust is used here . . . as a social relationship in which principals . . . invest resources, authority, or responsibility in another to act on their behalf for some uncertain future return" (Shapiro, 1987: 626). Perrow (1990) distinguishes agency from hierarchy because hierarchy puts the agent in a command relation rather than a contractual relation with the principal. Shapiro (1987) differentiates the agency relationship from a simple market relationship by noting the specialization

which requires agents to be entrusted. The idea of specialization could be seen as similar to asset specificity or to small-number bargaining (Perrow, 1990). Small-number bargaining gives a supplier or customer more experience with each other. But, it does not mean that the supplier is acting on behalf of the customer in a setting for which the customer has no ability. Asset specificity gives specific skill advantages to a supplier. Again, this does not mean that the supplier is acting on behalf of the customer in a way that the customer could not act on behalf of herself. What really constitutes agency relationships as a separate class with respect to trust is not specialization or acting on behalf of others in and of themselves. Hierarchy involves acting on behalf of others. Specialization is another device for differentiating products and drawing boundaries of social distance across which one must trade. What really constitutes an agency relationship as a separate class is specialization *and* professionalization. Agents are created both by specialized knowledge *and* by a set of devices to certify competence and disinterested concern for the client's welfare. This second aspect of the creation of the agent both sets up the possibility of the agency relationship and facilitates it by defining the agency as a trustworthy person. But, as attested to by the increasing rate litigation and the rising cost of malpractice insurance, a principal still has the problem of assessing reputation and the risk of opportunism with respect to the agent.

#### Distrust: A Technique for Managing Relationships Which is More than the Absence of Trust

Conceptualizations of trust tend to treat distrust as the absence of trust. From the perspective of social learning theory, distrust is simply a particular level of subjective probability or expectancy about the actions of other people with respect to their trustworthiness. Various perspectives of organizational climate make trust and distrust part of a continuous variable in a scaling technique. Luhmann (1979) relates a willingness to trust to inner security. Here, distrust would be an absence of inner security. Bradach and Eccles (1989) treat trust as one of three mechanisms for governing economic transactions between actors: trust, price, and authority. If trust is not utilized, price, authority, or a combination is utilized. Distrust as a mechanism is missing. Similarly, Maculay (1963) observes that the trust of friendship is an

important factor that governs economic transactions. Again, he also attends to market and authority as methods which interfere with and destroy trust. But, he does not explicitly deal with distrust. For Garfinkel (1963), distrust is a rupture in the taken-for-granted assumptions of the natural attitude of actors which cannot be easily normalized. While such ruptures have consequences for continuing interaction, Garfinkel is interested in the necessity of trust to sustain interaction. Finally, trust as a social practice is related to tolerating uncertainty by devising various schemes of assessing the trustworthiness of the other. But, is distrust simply a matter of deciding that you cannot tolerate the uncertainty given the assessment of the other? Or, is distrust a practice that posits with certainty that the other or a situation cannot be trusted?

To get at the practice of distrust, consider Fox's (1974) analysis of distrust. From Fox's (1974) perspective, managers begin by distrusting workers. For example, Taylor (1939) argues for scientific management by noting that the initiative and incentive system of management does not work because workers believe that it is against their interests to give their employers their best initiative. Thus, managers impose work roles and rules, methods of policing, and methods of pacing. In response to the application of techniques of discipline, workers perceive that managers believe that they cannot be trusted to deliver the work. In response, workers who feel they are not trusted respond with distrust. In response to the distrust of workers, managers utilize more techniques of discipline. The spiral of distrust continues. Here, the opportunity for both workers and managers to act in a way that can be interpreted by one or the other party as opportunistic is set up by the purchase of labor power which must be converted into labor (Edwards, 1984). The problem of tolerating uncertainty is created when both workers and managers are embedded in their own back regions and front regions such that the back regions cannot be easily monitored.

Fox (1974) implies that the application of techniques of discipline alone evoke distrust. But, techniques of discipline and the application of "untrustworthy" to a person or situation may not be one and the same thing. For example, the ultimate application of techniques of discipline in the work place for Edwards (1984) is bureaucratic control. In Edwards' assessment of the Lordstown Vega plant, distrust was not so much a problem as boredom and anger over a lack of control. In Weber's (1978) analysis of legal-rational authority and bureaucracy, techniques of discipline would actually be

necessary to create the appearance of legitimation used as the vocabulary of motives accompanying a command. From Weber's (1978) perspective, the problem with a command and techniques of discipline occurs when a command is issued which does not fit what is considered legitimate as constructed by the technique of discipline. Thus, it seems that distrust is constructed more by the application of a label of untrustworthy to a person or to a situation as part of the dividing practice of separating persons or situations into the trustworthy or untrustworthy. So, in situations which are deemed trustworthy, a worker would accept technologies of discipline. In situations which are deemed untrustworthy, any technique of relating will be deemed untrustworthy and will be treated as such with certainty.

The importance of seeing trust and distrust as distinct techniques which emerge from a common dividing practice and as techniques which are separate from but can be combined with other techniques of relating can be seen in the differential treatment of participative management schemes by Whyte (1989, 1991) and by Banks and Metzgar (1989). On the one hand, Whyte (1989, 1991) discusses how the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union and Xerox worked together in a jointly controlled participative management program to reorganize work to become more productive in the face of global competition. Whyte (1991) observed that both the union and Xerox trusted each other before the process began. This trust made it possible for both the union and the company to expose themselves to more opportunistic behavior by the types of information they shared and by sharing control of decisions. As a result, the joint union-Xerox management teams developed strategies for increasing productivity and for saving jobs that were scheduled to go to Mexico. On the other hand, Banks and Metzgar (1989) begin with an analysis of how companies have used participative management programs to get workers to expose special knowledge about work processes to improve productivity in order to reduce labor. Here, participative management programs are simply devices used by management to act opportunistically toward labor. Thus, management and company controlled participatory programs are placed among the untrustworthy. On the basis of this placement, Banks and Metzgar (1989) develop a strategy for how unions can develop their own participative program by identifying strategies for increasing productivity and by then using contract negotiations to place a value on the strategies for increasing productivity and to construct work rules to keep managers from using the new



strategies to eliminate jobs. The difference between Whyte's (1989, 1991) analysis and Banks and Metzgar's (1989) analysis is the starting point of trust or distrust. Once the starting point is established, one then acts on that starting point. If it is trust, one accepts commands. One is open. If it is distrust, one questions commands. One masks one's line of action and tactics and strategies. Both trust and distrust have their effects.

### Other Technologies of Controlling Relationships

The current emphasis on techniques of managing relations in economic life had its beginning with Coase (1937) and its rebirth with Williamson (1975). Since their initial emphasis on market and hierarchy as the two techniques used to manage economic relations, trust as a technique rather than just a problem to be managed has emerged as a third technique for managing economic relations. For example, Coleman (1984) observes that the benefits of a hierarchy without its disadvantages has been achieved by the Japanese through a high level of trustworthiness. Or again, Powell (1990) and Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) argue that a third ideal type of organization or decisional structure to parallel markets or hierarchies is needed to capture informal social relations of trust and mutual dependency. Or yet again, Walton and McKersie (1965) identified how integrative bargaining and attitudinal structuring tactics are used in labor negotiations to build relations along with the long recognized distributive and intraorganizational bargaining tactics used to struggle over wages in a bipolar, zero-sum fashion.

As one attempts to explore the problem of trust in labor relations, one must immediately attend to the relationship between different techniques for creating and managing relations and explore their effects on trust. On the one hand, Bradach and Eccles (1989) note that conventional approaches see various techniques of relating as being mutually exclusive of each other. For example, Walton and McKersie (1965) argue that distributive and intraorganizational bargaining tactics threaten the continuation of the relationship between two parties while integrative bargaining and attitudinal structuring tactics draw two parties into a relationship and integrate their lines of behavior such that hard distributive bargaining becomes problematic. On the other hand, Bradach and Eccles (1989) argue that price, authority, and trust are independent and can be combined in a variety of ways. For example, Gibb

(1978) notes that a level of trust and hierarchy -- or authority -- are combined in the paternalistic organization. To initially explore this question, consider the academic literature on trust and its relationship to techniques of sovereignty, discipline, dividing practices, market, and confession.

### Technologies of Sovereignty

*Technologies of sovereignty* are "the conception of power as an original right that is given up in the establishment of sovereignty, and the contract, as a matrix of political power, provides its point of articulation" (Foucault, 1980, p. 91).

While sovereignty is built on rights and duties which allow some to command and require others to obey, Gamson (1968) notes that it is the capacity to enforce a decision that makes it binding. However, in giving up the right to act at will, the king traded his ability to do what force would permit for a reign within the limits

of rights and duties (Foucault, 1980). Once one completely replaces the king's rights and duties with a set of rules and procedures in a hierarchical command structure, one has Weber's (1978) ideal-type of bureaucracy created and supported by the fictional person, the corporation (Coleman, 1982). What is the relationship of technologies of sovereignty and trust?

Authority and partisans. One relation between technologies of sovereignty and trust is drawn out by Gamson (1968) in his analysis of trust in the context of government. For Gamson, trust is the perception or belief that the governmental authority's decisions are in one's best interest. Looked at in another way, "the trust dimension refers to their perception of the necessity for influence" (Gamson, 1968, p. 42). Such trust is important because it helps members of a society to tolerate decisions to which they are opposed. However, if people come to see that the decisions of authorities affect them negatively in some significant way, they can become partisans. That is, they may try to exercise influence on authorities.

As partisans form interest groups to influence authorities, trust in the government makes influence and constituency building problematic. On the one hand, a lack of trust in the government makes constituency building possible. In fact, both Gamson (1968) and Alinsky (1971) observe that the defeats of interest groups may be preferred to victories if they occur in ways that decrease trust in authorities and increase group solidarity. On the other hand, if

interest groups are too successful, interest groups may not be seen as needed and authorities may be seen as trustworthy (Gamson, 1968). Issues of trust also apply to interest groups. If leaders of such groups are held responsible for failures or if they are seen as seeking personal power, they may not be trusted by their constituencies. Thus, Walton and McKersie (1965) argue that negotiators -- leaders in a negotiation -- on both the union and management sides have the problem of aligning the expectations of their constituencies with what is going on in negotiations in order to maintain their constituencies' trust in them.

Gamson (1968) identifies three possible places for the placement of the issue of trust in the context of government: authorities, the regime, and the political community. In the context of labor relations, the question of trust probably gets asked by workers in terms of the trustworthiness of particular managers or in terms of the company as a whole. Likewise, managers probably raise the trust issue in terms of particular union leaders, a particular union, or unions in general. Thus, efforts on the part of both interest groups and authorities to make their offending decisions or actions "the exception to the rule" or the fault of a particular person who can be removed are important tactics in the management of reputation of persons and organizations with respect to the attributions process regarding trustworthiness.

From the perspective of authorities, Gamson (1968) argues that the basic problem is one of preventing parties injured or neglected by decisions from trying to change the decision, the authorities, or the system. To do this, authorities limit the resources of interest groups and their ability to bring resources to bear on them, make rewards or punishments dependent on attempts at influence, and try to alter attitudes toward them. In the work place, Kumar and Ghadially (1989) describe similar tactics. One can increase the chances of the failure of a partisan group by removing leaders of partisan groups through cooptation. Threats result in fear, the loss of security, and the withdrawal of social and emotional support. Troublesome people can be transferred to a place which lessens their influence. Such tactics have a negative effect on interpersonal trust (Kumar and Ghadially, 1989).

Thus, from Gamson's analysis of sovereignty in the arena of government, distrust is inherent because authorities make decisions which help some, are neutral to some, and hurt some. The distributive decisions made by authorities may be legitimate from the allocation of rights and duties but are harmful and thus are seen as opportunistic to some. Distrust is multiplied as interest groups

try to influence authorities and is multiplied again as authorities try to neutralize interest groups.

One could question whether or not Gamson's analysis of trust and government is applicable to the work place. To explore this, consider Freeman and Medoff's (1984) analysis of a union as a collective voice mechanism. Building on Hirshman (1970), Freeman and Medoff (1984) note that the market provides the worker with the possibility of exit to deal with problems and issues at work. In Gamson's model, there is no exit as an option for an unhappy citizen. A second way for a worker to deal with a problem in the work place is voice. "'Voice' refers to the use of direct communication to bring actual and desired conditions closer together" (Freeman and Medoff, 1984:8). Voice as direct communication also does not fit Gamson's model of government. However, the National Labor Relations Act creates the possibility for a union to collectively represent workers' voices. Unions are political institutions with elected leaders (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). The union acts as an interest group for workers. Thus, Gamson's model probably can be applied to the unionized work place.

If the unionized work place fits Gamson's model of government, is distrust inherent in the unionized work place? On the one hand, unions can organize by galvanizing workers discontent in order to make a strong case in negotiations and in order to gain membership. Because of this, Freeman and Medoff (1984) observe that unionized workers are paradoxically often unwilling to leave their jobs even though they are more dissatisfied with their work conditions and relations with supervisors than nonunionized workers. While the political nature of the union can be seen as encouraging the fanning of the flames of distrust, the union is based on the winner-take-all form of election. As Freeman and Medoff (1984) note, this tends to moderate union positions by making the positions of the "median" member more important in elections than those to either extreme.

One might be tempted to think that the tactic of encouraging distrust of the other side is only of value to unions. However, Walton and McKersie (1976) point out that intraorganizational bargaining -- that is, organizing the troops behind a position -- is a problem for management as well as for the union. In an hierarchical command structure, this might be puzzling at first glance. But, consider the fact that most first line supervisors are often former union members. While they have to execute commands that can create some of the distrust on

the part of employees, they have relations with people who have been fellow workers and union members. So, they have the potential to have divided loyalties. Fainstein and Fainstein (1974) demonstrate the danger of divided loyalties for a command structure in case studies of social action in which an important tactic for partisans is to find allies in the command structure. Thus, anything that management can do to create distrust of unionized employees by first line supervisors would help to create solidarity among managers and first line supervisors.

While the inevitability of distrust described by Gamson (1968) in the governmental arena would seem to apply to the unionized work place, Walton and McKersie (1965) note several ways in which trust can be encouraged. First, to the extent that workers and managers or the union and management work to solve a problem together, they employ the tactics of integrative bargaining which encourage communication and openness as well as develop a common line of behavior. Second, if the union and company negotiators have a good relationship and trust each other, they can tolerate and properly read the posturing each other must do for his or her own constituency. However, the real key to whether or not the authority-interest group mechanism of the unionized company results in distrust or trust depends on how each values their relationship. "Clearly to the extent that Party's interests center on the relationship and the importance of improving it, he (or she) is willing to invest himself (or herself) in the process of building trust and assume whatever risks are associated with this process" (Walton and McKersie, 1965:357).

The contract. Another technology of sovereignty which seems to have an affect on trust in the work place is the contract. First, Brown (1987) outlines how labor law basically incorporates the industrial, mass production model of shop floor control. This model includes management rights to make decisions as to how the company will be run, grading jobs around component tasks, and the use of formal rules in a stepwise grievance procedure. The point of Brown's study is that the inclusion of the industrial, mass production model of shop floor control in labor law makes any other model of labor relations very problematic. She observes that the craft based, potentially collegial situation of the university faculty is forced into the industrial model by the elements involved in labor law. For example, when one looks at the grievance process, the legal contract and processes protract and subvert the real resolution of issues. If the grievance

procedure makes it difficult to substantially resolve issues after they have been procedurally resolved, Gamson's (1968) analysis of trust in the political process would cause one to expect a continual partisan response to authority or attempts at exercising authority over partisans regarding issues that were procedurally but not substantially resolved. Furthermore, if labor law makes it difficult to develop the relationship aspects that seem to make trust possible -- a issue not explored by Brown (1987) -- then the labor contract itself can have a negative effect on the development of trust.

Second, it is worth noting once more Macneil's (1978) discussion on the classical contract. Again, the contract is built on a bipolar model with a fixed-sum established by promises. All rules, rights, benefits, and burdens are established by the promise. The time commitment and involvement is punctiliar. There is a short time between agreement and performance and a short time of performance. A contract is sharply entered into by clear agreement and sharply completed by clear performance. If a contract is held to be breached by one of the parties, the resulting litigation is a bipolar organized zero-sum game following a strict set of rules regarding issues and their development established by the contract. Once the litigation has been adjudicated, the contract is resolved. While Brown (1987) locates the problematic nature of labor relations in labor law, Macneil's argument would place the problem more precisely in the nature of the classical contract itself. Management rights are the rights of the contract whether on the shop floor or in the market. The formal rules and stepwise procedure are borrowed directly from the litigation process. The labor contract stipulates that management acts and, if the contract or labor law -- which is assumed to be an explicit part of the contract -- is felt to be violated by such action, workers grieve. Here, the shop floor defines some of the content of rights and duties in labor law, but the contract itself is the set of rules which has asymmetries with respect to power effects and with respect to trust. The contract itself constructs secondary relationships. It makes opportunism possible by the way it structures parties, promises, and remedies. The strong external system of sanctions provided by the contract destroys the basis for voluntary cooperation (Yamasahi, 1988). Thus, the technique of the contract might make trust in the work place problematic.

Punishment and degradation. A third technology of sovereignty is alluded to but not developed in practical works on trust in the work place. For

example, Shea (1984) notes that one must focus on problem solving rather than on evaluation and assigning blame to foster trust in the work place. Deming (1986) notes that management needs to drive out fear, eliminate slogans and targets, and eliminate work standards to develop teamwork and productivity. In each of these examples, the replacement of traditional techniques of control such as evaluation, rewarding, and punishing directed at the person rather than the problem is urged.

The roots of punishment and degradation can be clearly seen in the way the king acts directly on his subjects' bodies in punishment. For example, Foucault (1979) describes how a person who killed a member of the royal family was punished. It begins with a public confession of his crime at the cathedral. It moves to a ritual torture and execution at the town square. His crimes are read again. During parts of the torture, he repeats his guilt and sorrow. Tongs are used to tear away flesh. Boiling oil and lead are poured into the wounds. He is then drawn and quartered. Since the horses cannot get him torn apart, cleavers are used to finish hacking his limbs from his body.

If one replaces fists with words (Burke, 1954), one gets Garfinkel's (1956) degradation ceremony in which the identity of the person being denounced is ritually destroyed. To be successful, Garfinkel found that such rituals must remove the event and the perpetrator from the arena of their everyday character and place them within a scheme of preferences such that the event and the perpetrator are seen as essentially opposed in their character to the proper order of things. The denouncer must be identified as a publicly known person and not merely a private person. The denunciation must be in the name of the collective and rhetorically based on the values of the collective. The denunciation must separate the person being denounced from the denouncer, the collective, and the proper order of the collective. Excommunication is such a ritual.

Personnel policies and procedures are essentially based on such rituals of degradation. Here, the person who is the worker is having his or her self -- both the personal and collective definition of the person -- worked on in performance evaluation by a public person, the supervisor. Rules and performance goals are stated and related to the work effort to make the ritual marking of the worker a "disinterested" and "objective" act. The worker is given a chance to improve. If he or she does not, the worker has in effect made a confession of guilt. Once the worker has been appropriately marked and

denounced through several "get well" plans, he or she can be ritually separated, that is, fired, fined, reduced in rank, reduced in pay, etc. It should be noted that such procedures, if focused on marking a person's behavior rather than self or nature, can be a part of what Foucault (1979) calls discipline. Here, the marking is part of a set of devices, including training, to bring behavior back to a norm. However, since both behavior and the person are marked with the potential of punishment, such policies and procedures present a threat to the employment relationship or to the potential for promotion as well as to a worker's identity. Therefore, they have significant potential for evoking distrust.

### Techniques of discipline

*A second class of techniques for controlling relations in the work place are based on discipline.* In Foucault's (1979) analysis of discipline, discipline constructs the individual as an object through enclosure, partitioning, the functional coding of sites, and the ranking of individuals. Ranking individualizes bodies, distributes them, and circulates them in a network of relations. Activity is controlled through the use of time tables, the temporal elaboration of acts, the correlation of the body and gesture, the articulation of the relationship between the body and objects, the exhaustive use of the body and acts, and a system for signaling commands. Once the relationship between various aspects of the individual, acts, space, objects, and time are marked out, discipline proceeds by training, which utilizes hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination. Normalizing judgment is not aimed at expiation or repression as in sovereignty. It relates individual acts to a field of comparison in terms of minimal thresholds or in terms of an optimum toward which one must move. As individuals are ranked in a field of comparison, they are marked with respect to a hierarchy of qualities and skills and are rewarded and punished by the ranking itself. The examination combines the observing hierarchy and normalizing judgment to make individuals visible in a way to differentiate and judge them.

The same set of technologies of discipline borrowed from the army and the church and applied to penal reform in nineteenth century France (Foucault, 1979) were applied to the work place by Taylor (1939). The first principle of scientific management for Taylor was to develop a science of each person's work to replace the worker's rule-of-thumb method of working. Taylor's method



of going about this fits very much into Foucault's analysis of discipline. In his analysis of handling pig iron, Taylor describes how different weights of pig iron were used with different techniques of carrying and with different schedules of work and rest. Using this technique, he simultaneously identified the maximum possible output and developed a method for elaborating work behavior so it could be more easily observed and evaluated.

The potential for these techniques to evoke distrust by exposing actions to surveillance is identified by Foucault as he observes that Bentham's Panopticon -- a circular prison in which the behavior of each person is visible to one guard in the middle -- is an apparatus of "total and circulating mistrust" (Foucault, 1979:158). The way in which technologies of discipline and trust interact is outlined by Fox (1974) and confirmed by Roche (1987/1990). Managers begin by distrusting workers. For example, Taylor (1939) argues for scientific management by noting that the initiative and incentive system of management does not work because workers believe that it is against their interests to give their employers their best initiative. Thus, managers impose work roles and rules, methods of policing, and methods of pacing. In response to the application of techniques of discipline, workers perceive that managers believe that they cannot be trusted to deliver the work. In response, workers who feel they are not trusted respond with distrust. In response to the distrust of workers, managers utilize more techniques of discipline. The spiral of distrust continues.

### Dividing practices

*A third class of techniques for controlling relations in the work place with implications for trust* can be found in the background practices not directly explored in the literature on discipline and trust: *the dividing practice*. As noted earlier, the dividing practice involves linguistic, ritual, and physical practices of dichotomously separating groups into in-groups and out-groups. Once the mad, the ill, the criminal, the racially or ethnically different, the other gender, the differently educated, etc. have been separated and confined, discipline can be applied to control and to create discourses with their own power effects. If one looks at Taylor (1939), one notes in his description of his discussion with Schmidt -- who is obviously a recent immigrant from his accent and is noted as such by Taylor's use of his accent in the text -- that Taylor recommends rough

talk and the application of scientific management on "mentally sluggish" types such as Schmidt. However, one would not treat "an educated mechanic" or "an intelligent" laborer in such a fashion. In a similar vein, Bauman (1982) observes that the first factories in England were continuations of poor-houses populated by a large, destitute population who had been uprooted from the country side. This population included large numbers of women and children. Discipline and reinforcing machine technology was used to force work from these populations into closely watched, repetitive routines. Discipline and machines were not initially applied to craft situations. Thus, before the distrust of applying discipline to the trustworthy craftsperson, there was the distrust of the "other" who was the target of discipline. Here, trust and distrust are a part of the dividing practice of in-group and out-group.

Another dividing practice Foucault (1979, 1980, 1984, 1990) identifies is that of distinguishing the true from the false. As noted in the Introduction, truth is not an objective or subjective transcendental or transcendent reality. Rather, truth is produced by a series of devices and rules used to divide the true from the false. There is evidence that the worker has a system of dividing the true from the false different from that of the manager. For example, Taylor (1939) distinguishes the "rule of thumb" knowledge of the worker from the knowledge of the manager gained by applying the principles of scientific management. The use of the two different systems of dividing the true from the false can make trust in the work place problematic in at least three ways. First, it is a part of dividing the in-group from the out-group. For example, one sometimes will hear a manager complain that another manager who came out of the ranks of unionized workers still "has the union in him or her." That is, he or she still uses the workers' rules of thumb rather than the rules of managers. Second, Garfinkel (1963) notes that violations of the taken-for-granted nature of the natural attitude raise the issue of trust in interaction. So, if two different groups are trying to interact and to build a line of action with different rules of dividing the true from the false, it is easy for distrust to emerge as actions are confronted which are not divided into the true and the false in the same way. Finally, the dividing of the true from the false takes place along side of and within techniques of sovereignty and market. If managers want to set up a series of studies to distinguish the true from the false that makes the true grounds for the elimination of jobs, the true and the false coincide with exit and opportunism on the part of management with respect to workers.

## Techniques of market

Exit and options. *A fourth mechanism for controlling relations in the work place is market.* While exchange is the purpose of market, it is controlled through exit (Hirshman, 1970; Freeman and Medoff, 1984). To increase the value of an exchange, sellers try to restrict the number of parties that buyers have. That is, they try to control the buyer's options to exit. This is essentially what a union does when it organizes workers or what a company does by paying executives more money than they could get if they were to look for a new job. Buyers try to increase the number of sellers in order to play them off against each other. That is, buyers try to increase their ability to exit. This is one of the consequences of the application of scientific management to the work place such that work is deskilled to increase the potential number of workers of any one job (Braverman, 1974). Since the increasing or the decreasing of opportunities for exit affect the distribution of value in an exchange, techniques of market are opportunistic on their face and, therefore, have a potentially negative affect on the maintenance of trust.

Labor power and labor. When it comes to the labor market, Edwards (1984) notes that one must distinguish between purchasing labor -- work completed -- and labor power -- the potential to do work. When one out sources a job or pays workers on the basis of a completed job, one is buying labor. The positive side of this strategy for the buyer is that any problems, delays, or miscalculations of how long a job will take is borne by the worker. The negative side of this strategy for the buyer is that a fixed cost has gone into the final product. With this technique, there is little room for opportunism on the part of the worker and some room for opportunism on the part of the buyer. The buyer has the opportunity to alter the unspecified aspects of the job until it meets what she or he wants. When one hires a worker for a wage, one is buying labor power. One is agreeing to pay a worker so much per unit of time for a yet to be produced outcome. The positive side of this strategy for the buyer is that -- if he or she can apply effective management technologies to the worker -- more work per unit of cost can be obtained than by the fixed cost method of buying labor. The negative side of the strategy for the buyer is that any problems, delays, or miscalculations of how a job is done is borne by the buyer. With this technique, the potential for opportunism shifts to the worker. As noted earlier, this potential

for opportunism has serious potential for evoking mistrust of the worker by the manager (Taylor, 1939).

To understand how market works in the work place, it is necessary to place it in the context of technologies of sovereignty and discipline. Edwards (1984) does this by arguing that technologies of sovereignty and discipline -- directing, evaluating, and rewarding and punishing through simple, technological, and bureaucratic control -- are required to take advantage of the strategy of purchasing labor power. Here, the use of the labor power market techniques makes possible the opportunistic behavior by workers and the sovereignty mechanism of authority sets up the possibility of decisions which evoke resistance. As a result, one finds opportunistic behavior such as workers cooperating together to impede production in response to decisions by authorities which are problematic to workers (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). Or again, one finds companies divesting themselves of old unionized plants and opening new plants in areas which have few unions, low wages, and right to work laws (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). These new plants employ human resource management strategies which replace union mechanism of voice with participatory management strategies and which pay higher than locally prevailing wages in order to further resist unionization (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Kochan et al., 1986). Here, the threat to exit can now be used as an excellent tactic to get workers to alter work rules and to make wage and benefit concessions in negotiations, a technique of voice. In the case of an electric utility, it is all but impossible for the company to move away from its union. But, the utility can exercise the same strategy through out sourcing work. Here, one can take advantage of cost competition and of buying labor rather than labor power (Friedman, 1988; Case, 1989; Morgan, 1989). Once again, the threat to do away with workers with out sourcing is a good political tactic used by authorities to get their way. While such tactics may be effective in a narrowly framed market situation, they can lead to a spiral of distrust and resistance which has a long term, negative impact on productivity (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).

#### Techniques of confession

*A fifth technique for controlling relations in the work place is the creation and use of subjectivity through the confession and its group expression borrowed from John*

Wesley's Methodist Society Class (Davies, 1963). Subjectivity emerged from the technology of the confession. The confession is analyzed by Foucault (1990) as a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement. The confession is told in the presence of an authority who requires, prescribes, appreciates, and intervenes in the confession to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile. In the confession, truth is confirmed by the obstacles and resistance which it must overcome to be formulated. The process of expression independent of its external consequences produces intrinsic modifications in the person who tells it. It exonerates, redeems, purifies, unburdens, liberates, and promises salvation. John Wesley took this same process and put it in a group context such that the members of the Society Class became the confessors for each other. However, instead of the agency relationship between parishioner and priest, the members of the class probably constructed their relationship more as primary relations. In the nineteenth century, the sexual confession came to be constituted in scientific terms. Then, by combining the confession with examination and interrogation, the procedure of confession was placed in the field of scientific observation. The postulation of a general and diffuse causal power of sex justified having to tell everything. The principle of latency made the ways of sex obscure and elusive. In the one who spoke, truth was incomplete and blind to itself. Therefore, truth could only reach completion in the one who assimilated and recorded it. The revelation of the speaker required the interpretation of the hearer for truth to be complete. The purpose of confession through medicalization was health instead of redemption. As also noted, the small group experience is simply a collective, primary relationship extension of the confession.

Knights and Willmott (1989) suggest that technologies of discipline create subjectivity at the work place. By separating people, marking and elaborating their behavior, and marking them as individuals under the gaze of a supervisor, individuals must make their own behavior problematic for themselves. While there is no doubt that technologies of discipline can make one's actions more problematic for one's self, they are not really the same thing as subjectivity as constructed by confession. Consider again Foucault's (1979) analysis of the panopticon. Here, the prisoner is always exposed as an individual to the gaze of the guard who is hidden from the prisoner's view. Thus, the prisoner makes his or her own behavior problematic for him or her self. But, the self as a substance is not the focus of the prisoner's concern. As

Foucault notes (1979), the panopticon is simply organized malevolence.

This is similar to Weber's (1958) analysis of the Protestant ethic. The position of the person is very similar to the prisoner in the panopticon. The hidden God always has one in His/Her gaze. One makes one's own behavior problematic because of being exposed to the gaze. But, there is an additional critical element here: the identity of the self. Am I among the elect or the damned? In Weber's understanding of Calvin, the decision had been made and was hidden. So, the Protestant ethic is still sort of a religious panopticon. However, once one replaces the hidden issue of election with a principle of assurance -- the "strangely warmed heart" -- and change the issue to sanctification or the perfection of the self, one reaches the point of the technology of the confession. So, while discipline makes the individual's behavior problematic to the individual, a different focus is needed to make the perfection of the self the object of problematization.

There are two places where the technology of confession seems to be applied in the work place: performance appraisal and the work team. With respect to performance appraisal, Bowen (1982) outlines a problem-solving approach to performance appraisal in a book of exercises used for training managers. This approach assumes that people are capable of growing in a climate that permits and encourages growth. In an organization, people grow when they can achieve their own goals by achieving the organization's goals. The technique involves helping people to identify areas in which they want to grow, how the organization's goals fit the individual's goals, and the problems which the individual is encountering which need to be solved in order for the individual and the organization to grow. Performance appraisal then becomes problem solving with personal growth and organizational efficiency as a goal.

With respect to the work team, Itoh (1984) identifies a similar technology in the small group management techniques used in Japan. Again, it is assumed that people will work hard when they know that they are responsible for their own destinies. When a person's destiny is tied to the company's destiny, the person will sacrifice himself or herself for the company. In addition, by dividing into groups of five to ten persons, each person is asked to link his or her own aims to those of the group. By controlling the group's information and values (Simon, 1945; Whalley, 1990), the company can use a worker's efforts to reach his or her own goal and the work group's goals. A classic example of this is outlined by Whyte (1991) in his study of participative management at Xerox.

Here, Xerox worked with a union representing their employees to come up with some innovations to save the jobs of the employees. On the one hand, the company released control by creating a joint union-management committee with access to production, marketing, and accounting information. Thus, it appears that the company is giving up or sharing management rights with workers. On the other hand, the company can control the scene by framing the choice and the relevant information for making the choice: Come up with innovations within these parameters to make the company competitive or the company will close down the plant and open it in a country with cheap labor. Thus, the goals of the workers and those of the company were merged such that the workers efforts on their own actions and selves were loosely controlled by the company.

On the one hand, it is difficult to see how techniques which enable me to work on myself to become what I want to be and to feel good about myself can evoke distrust. There appears to be concern for the worker and a lack of opportunity for management to act opportunistically. But, if one recognizes that these techniques are techniques of labor control in the context of technologies of sovereignty and market, one can see how something that appears to evoke trust can evoke distrust. For example, Freeman and Medoff (1984), Itoh (1984), Banks and Metzgar (1989) all document how technologies of confession are used in human resource management strategies to resist unions. In Itoh's (1984) analysis of the development of management through small groups in Japan, he traces the steps through which groups created and controlled by the union are supplanted by those created by the company. First, the company selects group leaders and sends them through a training on small group process. Then, on company time, group activities begin with uncontroversial issues such as studying regulations, procedures, and manuals. The direct presence of management is absent. But, management controls the training of the group leaders and -- through the training -- the agenda. Eventually, issues of efficiency, of competing with other groups, and of the competitive position of the company begin to emerge. Since management rights allow this process to proceed on company time without involvement from the union, it is relatively easy to begin to replace union involvement and loyalty with company involvement and loyalty. In addition to the issue of union resistance, Banks and Metzgar (1989) point out that quality improvement groups make it easier to carry out the task of separating knowledge from the worker. Under scientific

management, it was relatively easy to hide knowledge from the industrial engineer. However, when one is working with fellow workers in a groups which "appears" to be autonomous, one is likely to reveal knowledge. Thus, quality improvement groups can get at knowledge which will eventually lead to improvements which could eliminate jobs or increase profit margins without increasing wages. Banks and Metzgar's (1989) solution is for the union to create its own quality improvement groups to identify improvements which then could be negotiated over with respect to improved salaries and job security for workers. Thus, putting confession into the context of other technologies of managing relations expose how confession can be seen as opportunistic with respect to the worker, the union, and management.

### The Labor Relations Arena: More than Negotiations and Arbitrations

Labor relations studies that focus on trust are traditionally conducted exclusively around one setting. Many are conducted around practices connected with how a company and a union relate through the official machinery established by labor law. A number of such studies have been built on Walton and McKersie's (1965) behavioral of theory of labor relations. For example, Davis(1982/1983) identifies four phases in the labor negotiations process in addition to Walton and McKersie's typology of bargaining tactics: presentation of demands, deliberation, hard bargaining, and coming to agreement. Caldarelli (1984/1985) traces deteriorating relations in negotiations as negotiations moved from integrative bargaining to distributive bargaining. Turner (1988/1989) focuses on the role of the negotiator as a representative of constituents and on intraorganizational bargaining. In a different vein, Glasser (1989), Struck (1990/1991), and Hardin (1991) look at alternatives to the traditional positional approach to bargaining such as the use of collaborative bargaining, Goldaber's Win/Win technique, and a variety of home grown devices. In addition to the negotiation process, the issue of trust has been studied in the grievance procedure (Briggs, 1981) and in the relationship between collective bargaining and factors such as strikes (Dufalla, 1990), attitudes of supervisors and workers (White, 1990/1991), salaries (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Kochan et al., 1986; White, 1990/1991), and organizational



environmental factors (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Kochan et al., 1986).

Trust has also been studied at the level of the work group and at the strategic level of a company. At the level of the work group, Gabarro (1978) finds that trust has a different meaning for a supervisor than for a subordinate. The integrity, competence, and consistency of the subordinate are most important to the supervisor. The integrity, loyalty, and openness of the supervisor are most important to the subordinate. Anton (1990) finds that the perception of a worker's right to respect and voice, to feedback on performance and prospects, and to meaningful work affected the worker's satisfaction, trust in management, conflict, and intention to turn over. At the strategic level, both Watson (1989/1990) and Trunfio (1990) find that trust and confidence in others appear to run from top down in an organization.

Kochan et al. (1986, 1991) argue that the strategic, industrial relations, and work group levels must all be considered to understand labor relations in a company. Therefore, *a study of trust in labor relations must also attend to all three levels rather than to just one level as is the rule in most studies of trust and labor relations*. For example, it has been noted earlier that strategies of participative management are often aimed at the level of the work group to engender trust and cooperation. However, Mohrman (1979) finds that participation involving recurring organizational decisions or decisions already framed by others has little impact on trust. Instead, workers need a system of political access to the strategic level of the company to raise issues for the organization in a collective fashion. With political access to the strategic level of the organization, Mohrman notes a strong relationship between participation in political access and the level of trust and organizational effectiveness. In a similar fashion, Kochan et al. (1986) and Gilbert (1989) find that the success of quality of work life programs depends on the ability of an organization to reinforce trust. But, the maintenance of trust depends on the degree to which the strategic levels of the company and the union adopt lines of action linked to the development and reinforcement of trust. Kochan et al. (1986) note that it is ironic that management continues to closely guard issues which they traditionally have controlled through management rights while trying to implement quality of work life programs. Thus, any study which focuses only on trust at the level of the work group would totally miss the importance of the strategic level.

There are several practices which both discourage and at the same time make imperative the inclusion of all three levels in an analysis of trust and labor

relations. For example, labor law -- and therefore the labor contract -- recognizes and reinforces management's right to run a business and workers' right to negotiate or grieve over the consequences of those decisions (Thompson, 1974; Bowles and Gintis, 1982; Gold, 1989). Thus, labor law itself discourages linking industrial relations and the strategic level of a company. At the same time, the strategic level of companies has both grown in distance from the work group and the union scene and has increased its arsenal of strategic options. Both of these developments can have dire consequences for workers and can therefore be problematic with respect to trust.

With respect to the growing distance between workers and the strategic level of the company, Chandler (1988) notes that the traditional business enterprise was composed of a single unit with a single or few owners. Here, Edwards (1984) observes that the owner was often a worker as well as owner and could directly control work. The three levels -- work place, industrial relations, and strategic -- were tied together and were undifferentiated. Then, the adoption of a number of practices began to define and pull the three levels apart. Through the introduction of scientific management (Taylor, 1939), technical control (Edwards, 1984), and accounting and inventory control techniques (Nelson, 1988), the supervisor and the worker were separated, the worker became a replaceable part and the object of technical manipulation, and the supervisor became the supervisor/engineer who devised more productive ways of combining and controlling labor and machines. Through vertical and horizontal integration and conglomeration, a hierarchy of middle and top salaried managers was set apart to supervise units. Units were treated now as profit centers to be bought, sold, or maximized. Ownership was disassociated from control through the creation of the corporation and stock ownership (Coleman, 1982; Chandler, 1988). With the ability to exit associated with stock rather than actual ownership, stock holders look to maximize short term gain as rentiers rather than interested owners.

This disassociation of levels not only leads to the organizational and spatial separation of people in each level, it creates at least four discourses. At the level of the shop floor, workers create a discourse around their own ways of working and of relating to each other and managers. Supervisors create discourses around their relations with workers and managers in the context of managing work. The struggle between workers and managers was institutionalized in labor law. As Brown (1987) notes, this creates another set of

discourses around the labor contract, the rights defined in labor law, and the procedures for administering the contract. Finally, the strategic level of the company -- unable to have a direct feel for the work group level, subject to pressure for short term gains from stock holders, and unfettered by direct constraint from the other two levels -- creates yet a fourth discourse around markets, strategies, and profits and losses (Hayes and Abernathy, 1988). As noted earlier, trust requires an ability to hear and understand each other, an ability to build a common line of behavior, and an ability to reinforce and value a relationship for itself. The organizational and spatial separation of the three levels and four discourses make understanding, common efforts, and relationship very difficult.

While the adoption of organizational, financial, and engineering technologies has helped to create the three levels of a company, the internal labor market of a company can accentuate or depress the effects of this differentiation on trust. The internal labor market consists of the ways of matching people to jobs after people are in an organization (Kalleberg and Berg, 1987). For example, the president of Trumpf, a machine tool company in Germany, began as a machine apprentice and worked his way through the company. This company moves people up career ladders such that they have a hands-on feel for all levels and have networks of relations at all levels. On the other hand, a company might hire people with an MBA and no experience or extensive relations at different levels in the company to manage the strategic level, people with an engineering degree but no actual shop floor experience to manage production, and specialist from human relations schools to manage labor relations. This strategy would obviously accentuate the distance and differences in discourse among the three levels. This would make trust more difficult to establish and maintain.

If one looks at the arsenal of strategic options available to the strategic level, one finds that almost all of them are problematic for both workers and union organizations. Bluestone and Harrison (1982) note how improved transportation and communication technologies make it easy to manufacture anywhere. Thus, companies can play cities, states, and nations against each other to get the least cost deal. If a company cannot move, it can look at outsourcing products and services to again set up a competition to drive down prices. A company can decide to reposition itself in a market by shedding some services or products and by adding others. A separation of management rights

from workers' voice prevents workers from influencing decisions that really make a difference to their security and future. Yet, they clearly have an impact on workers and on the ability of a union to negotiate or to grieve. Thus, the separation of the strategic from the industrial relations levels makes for potential distrust.

Human resource management systems in academic literature discourage one from looking at all three levels by framing all issues at the work place level. Lewis (1991) notes that the employee involvement and participation programs used in human resource management focus on team building as a way to build a goal congruence between workers and work organizations. This team building and participation takes place at the work place level. It is virtually always nonfinancial participation. The human resource management system also incorporates voice procedures through complaint and appeal procedures and ombudsmen programs. Lewis (1991) points out that unions as participatory mechanisms are totally ignored by human resource management system literature even though unions are participatory mechanisms. Despite Michels' (1964) "iron law of oligarchy," unions elect their leaders and committees. They vote on issues to grieve and on terms of contracts. In the employee involvement and participation programs in human resource management literature, management controls the team building, the construction and approval of goals and procedures, and the outcome of all grievance like procedures. Since workers through the union have legal standing, management cannot as easily control the worker's agenda. While most labor contracts block unions from direct access to influencing strategic decisions, human resource management systems would eliminate all of the devices used by the union to create alternative definitions of workers' rights and value. Thus, the definition of which level one must examine to study trust in the work place takes place in a struggle between defining participation in human resource management terms or in union representation terms. This struggle itself engenders distrust.

### Conclusion

One might ask why an examination of academic literature should be relevant to this study. After all, Foucault encourages the researcher to examine social practices at their actual point of application. But, Foucault also

recognizes that techniques circulate and become a common set of practices for a range of settings. Otherwise, an academic discourse about them could not be established. From Foucault's perspective, academic literature could be considered one way that techniques of relating are developed as a discourse. For example, Nelson (1988) explores how technologies of scientific management, engineering, accounting, and inventory control become used and, as a consequence, affect industrial organization. Or, Hayes and Abernathy (1988) describe how portfolio management as a technique is taught in business schools and then is used to contribute to the short-term perspective at the strategic level of management. Or again, Lewis (1991), Banks and Metzgar (1989), and Kochan et al. (1986) all attend to the development and spread of human resource management strategies in efforts to suppress unions. Once social practices are established, knowledge can be built on them and can become a part of the practice itself.

From the discussion in this chapter, what can be observed about social practices in the work place?

First, the practices used to construct primary relations make trust intrinsic to them. Rituals such as *tutoiement* are used to mark off and establish a friendship. Such a relationship is reinforced by listening to and valuing the view of the other, empathizing with feelings shared by the other, and accepting the other in a nonjudgmental manner. The relationship is further reinforced by exposing one's own self and feelings to the other. Nothing is kept from each other. Lines of behavior are continually being integrated. When challenged, the relationship is valued and maintained rather than sacrificed. Rituals such as repentance and reconciliation make the maintenance of the relationship possible in the face of breaches of trust.

Secondary relationships have their birth in the dividing practice between the in-group and the out-group in which distrust is an intrinsic element. While technologies of relating such as sovereignty, discipline, and market were devised as ways of relating across boundaries, the examination of these technologies reveals that the techniques themselves set up the divisions and the distrust implicit in the scene of their birth. Thus, the question of trust --and distrust -- only genuinely emerges with the application of techniques of relating which establish and reinforce secondary relations.

In the context of secondary relationships, trust is fundamentally a dividing practice: trustworthy or untrustworthy. Reputation and motives of persons,

organizations, or other identities are constructed and read as an integral part of the dividing practice. But, regardless of how one assesses the reputation of the other or the other's opportunity or motivation to cheat, the techniques used to relate leave no room for friendship on which one can rely. One is left tolerating risk in trust or positing distrust with certainty. When trust is broken, there are no rituals of restoration. Instead, there are techniques for punishing, exiting, objectifying, subjectifying, and stigmatizing.

Are practices of trust and other practices of managing relations compatible and reinforcing of each other or are they problematic for each other? This review of literature on technologies of sovereignty, discipline, market, dividing practices, and confession suggests that the capacity for opportunism is intrinsic to those very technologies. Furthermore, the differentiation of the work place into the work group, the labor relations level, and the strategic level is created by these technologies and enhances the problem of opportunism by establishing different discourses about what constitutes opportunism and by decreasing the ability to assess whether or not people are acting opportunistically in a level or setting different from one's own level. While opportunism is set up by these technologies, the discussion on trust and distrust suggests that trust and distrust as practices in and of themselves are separate from those technologies but have an effect on what lines of action can be set up by those technologies.

Finally, some have argued that one can incorporate elements of primary relationships into secondary relationships to manage trust. For example, managers can listen to and value workers. One can eliminate the judgmental and blame finding aspects of appraisal. One can give workers freedom to act. However, in the context of secondary relations, these acts are constructed as instrumental acts. No friendship or intrinsic valuing of the relationship is involved. No rituals of restoration are involved. Thus, one is left thrown back on issues of reputation and intention which are a part of the technologies of trust and distrust.

## CHAPTER III

### METHOD AS RUSE

#### Introduction

Since most social science is built on either the realist or the idealist model of epistemology (Smith, 1983; Smith and Heshusius, 1986), these perspectives will be first outlined and criticized from the perspective of Foucault. Then, Foucault's method of study will be outlined. Finally, the specific procedures used to conduct this study will be described.

#### A Critique of the Realist and Idealist Epistemologies

The aim of the realist model is to match one's descriptions of the world to the actual conditions of the world. Here, there is an independent source of reality against which one's models can be judged. In order for a knower to successfully carry the role of observer of an independently existing reality, the knower must be neutral. That is, the knower must eliminate all bias and preconceptions, must not be emotionally involved in the knowing process, and must use value-free, neutral language. Devices used to insure and measure reliability, internal validity, and external validity are procedures used to eliminate bias and preconceptions. If contradictory statements arise, the existence of an independent reality provides a point of comparison and arbitration against which contradictory statements about the reality can be adjudicated. By using the appropriate procedures, one should be able to develop and refine laws of association and causal laws which are isomorphic with reality.

While the realist view of social science posits a distance between the knower and the known, Foucault's (1979) analysis of the application of discipline in the prison reveals immediately that the neutral, objective relation

between the knower and the known assumed by the realist model rests on devices such as hierarchical observation, the panopticon, and the examination. The neutrality and objectivity assumed is created by these asymmetric devices. Thus, they are not neutral. Similarly, Emerson (1988) exposes this use of power relations to create objectivity in his analysis of the emergence of self-consciousness in field work. Colonial regimes in which much early field work was conducted were built on the power relation between the colonial rulers and the native population. The power of the ruler guaranteed access to and cooperation from the natives. Thus, conditions could be manipulated to test hypotheses. The power and cultural differences between the colonial researcher and the natives provided the exterior, detached subjects necessary for the construction of the appearance of neutrality and objectivity. Yet, this again is hardly a neutral situation. In a different vein, Duncan (1984) notes that most methods of measure in the realist model of social science have their social roots in methods of voting, levying taxes, valuing goods, labeling social ranks, bestowing honors, and drawing lots. Again, all of these are rooted in nonneutral, asymmetric relations. With respect to the issues raised in this study, these methods of measure outlined by Duncan (1984) are also rooted in devices which create and are used in relating across boundaries. That is, the realist model presupposes and creates secondary relationships.

A second line of criticism against the realist model which can be drawn from Foucault focuses on the foundationalist notion of an independent, knowable reality. Cooke (1993) observes that, while Foucault avoids solipsism by the minimal realism of recognizing sources of recalcitrance and asymmetries set up by other practices, Foucault is unwilling to privilege any model of reality as true because there is no way to separate knowledge from the asymmetries of the practices used to find truth. For example, Alwin and Krosnick (1985) observe that the ranking of values is altered by the use of a rating or a ranking methodology. Is the difference they found rooted in the method, did they discover two different aspects of a reality, neither, or both? Is the invariant aspect located in the tool constructed to produce a measure or in some reality independent of the tool? Similar questions can be raised about Smith's (1987) finding that attitudes toward a public policy change when survey respondents are asked questions using the word "poor" instead of "welfare." One can describe the apparatuses and resistance involved in social action and the consequences associated with those apparatuses and resistance. But, can one



claim a truth transcendent of this codetermined situation?

A third line of criticism against the realist model is suggested by Foucault's (1980) criticism of global, totalitarian theories. The realist model assumes that there is one, universal reality which one can discover and reduce to laws of association or causation. While these global theories have provided useful tools for local research, the very notion of global theories forces all local, non-centralized practices either into a common mold or discounts them as the accidental and therefore inadequate. If reality is codetermined by social practices and if social practices and resistance are local in their application, then global theories blind one to what is going on. Furthermore, global theories are enfeebling (Cooke, 1993). Global theories broadly conceive of overall strategies for change. But, such strategies usually do not offer practical means for their realization in the local scene, which is the only scene in which any of us live. In addition, such schemes often commit one to a particular idea of emancipatory practice based on a global theory such as human rights in spite of how the actual practice of the emancipatory practice is carried out. For example, Shapiro (1990) contends that a democratic ethos -- a global theory -- is desirable independent of whether the ideas of representation or participation can be realized in local practice. At the same time, Shapiro (1990) ironically notes that the very practices recommended by a global theory get subverted in local practices as voting procedures are manipulated, influenced by the order of voting, influenced by the control of agenda, and influenced by interest groups.

A fourth line of criticism against the realist model is suggested by Foucault's (1980, 1984) analysis of truth. As noted earlier, the realist model is built on the correspondence theory of truth. Here, there is a source of reality against which contradictory models can be judged and which can be known by using methods which guarantee objectivity and neutrality. However, Foucault claims that truth is ". . . a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements" (Foucault, 1980: 74). Truth is what is produced by a set of rules and procedures. That is, the rules for producing truth have a power effect by governing which statements are acceptable or unacceptable (Foucault, 1984). Also, truth has a power effect by virtue of its rhetorical effect (Cooke, 1993) and by virtue of the location and status of the intellectual in society (Shiner, 1982).

To see how the assumptions of the realist position have an effect on governing the acceptability of statements, consider Smith and Heshusius'

(1986) analysis of how attempts to adopt realist concerns to idealist methods subvert the aim of the idealist epistemology. Since the idealist model of knowing recognizes that the mind with its attending emotions and intentions is involved in the construction of reality in investigation, inquiry can only be a never ending process of interpretation. "All that can be done is to match descriptions to other descriptions, choosing to honor some as valid because they 'make sense,' given one's interests and purposes" (Smith and Heshusius, 1986, p. 9). If one applies the aims of the realist model to idealist methods -- which are methods designed to get at the meaning of things as the other sees it -- one subverts the indeterminism of the idealist epistemology with the determinism of realism. The realist requirements of isomorphism between data and an independent reality is imposed on the idealist model such that the codetermination of interpretation is broken apart into subject and object. Now, interpretations can be judged by an isomorphism between the researcher's interpretation and the subject's interpretation. For example, Agar (1988) and Denzin (1983, 1989a, 1989b) propose that the validity of interpretations can be determined by submitting the interpretations to review by those being studied or by using the interpretations as a rule book to anticipate interaction with the subjects being studied. Another strategy for breaking apart the codetermination of the interpretation with realist assumptions is analytic induction (Agar, 1986; Denzin, 1989b). Here, one creates an interpretation, checks it against further examples of the behavior under study, modifies the interpretation, checks it against more examples of behavior, and continues until the interpretation can account for all behavior and until no further examples can be found which would counter the interpretation. As Smith and Heshusius (1986) argue, the application of a realist set of rules for determining truth to a set of procedures which do not assume an independent reality *force* the creation of an independent reality and *force* the separation of the true from the false on the basis of that independent reality rather than by "honoring" some interpretations and not others as "making sense."

Unlike the realist, the idealist epistemology does not posit a strict separation of the knower from the known. It does not posit an independent reality which can be know by a neutral observer. Instead, the idealist epistemology recognizes that the object of study is not known apart from the knowing subject. What is known is a product of mind with its attendant emotions and values. There is no independent reality available as an arbitrator of

interpretations. The process of understanding involves a constant movement with no beginning or ending. Since the viewpoint of the other in social context is the object of study, one attempts to understand the meaning that others give to their situations. Here, truth can only be understood as a socially and historically conditioned agreement. With no external reference, two contradictory interpretations are simply different ways of constituting reality. Agreement is reached through a process of justification that is inescapably bound up with values and interests. All one can do is match interpretations to other interpretations and choose to honor some as valid because they make sense given one's interests and purposes. There are no rules or procedures to produce truth.

Before moving to criticize the idealist epistemology from Foucault's perspective, it is important to note that Foucault and the idealist epistemology both see phenomena as constituted in a codetermined fashion with the act of knowing. Thus, both are unwilling to engage in claims of procedures which offer to produce truth independent of the practices of knowing. In this way, they both break the social and rhetorical power of truth claims rooted in the realist epistemology.

Having recognized these affinities between Foucault and the idealist epistemology, there are significant and critical differences. First, the subject or mind exists for the idealist as a real, transcendental reality that acts to give meaning. As such, it is an unmoved mover which can be an object of study (Cooke, 1993). Thus, Denzin (1990) notes that underneath the textual orders created by social scientist, journalist, novelist, etc. , there is the subject -- the man, woman, or child -- who has her or his words and stories to tell. Here, the researcher aims to see the organizational world as a member would see it, to learn the meaning of actions from the viewpoints of members, and to portray these as accurately as possible (Smircich, 1983). As noted earlier, the main congruence set up by this scheme is between the interpretations of those studied and the interpretations of the researcher (Jones, 1983). Against the transcendental subject, Foucault (1990) argues that the subject is constructed by techniques used to elicit hidden truth drawn from the confessional and, as noted earlier, the class meeting. As Denzin (1990) observes, the meaning of experience is in its telling. Such meaning itself eludes the teller and listener. But, as Foucault (1990) notes, the telling is elicited by specific techniques and in specific relations of power. The telling itself elicits further interpretation and

emotions by the listener and by the teller after the fact. The transcendental fiction called subject is an artifact posited by techniques or rituals of relating and by the myths about the situation. Thus, Foucault encourages one to examine the relations, rules, and techniques for interacting rather than subjects themselves to understand what people do and how they do it.

In addition to the subject as the transcendental author of meaning, the idealist epistemology contains a concept of the subject as a transcendental ethical subject. For example, Denzin (1990) posits the right of the subject to interpret his or her own story, and Habermas (1984) posits an equal right among story tellers. Yet, Foucault (1980, 1984) argues that such rights are a part of technologies of sovereignty. While the king gives up certain rights with the concept of natural rights, natural rights ensnare actors in asymmetric devices such as contracts, bureaucracies, and different methods of voting. At the same time, Foucault (1980, 1984) objects to concepts of power grounded in sovereignty because they entirely miss technologies of power derived from techniques of discipline, confession, etc. For example, I as a researcher might give someone who was a subject a right to review my interpretation to see if in fact I understood her or him. Yet, if one were to actually examine the interaction during the review, one would see all sorts of accounts, postures, gestures, etc. on the part of both of us as we struggled over an acceptable interpretation. Furthermore, life in an organization is replete with the asymmetries of hierarchy and dividing practices. I might give both a worker and a manager a chance to review interpretations. Both will work to eliminate interpretations which make them look bad or which reveal strategies which they are trying to keep hidden. The worker has much less ability to keep her or his interpretations from managers -- who most often engage in studies -- than the manager has to keep her or his interpretations from workers. Thus, asymmetries of power which are totally missed by the concept of rights have an effect on the construction of interpretations. All of these techniques for relating do serious damage to the idea of a transcendental subject so critical to membership validation and to validation through recognition and honoring.

#### Method as Ruse

A ruse is a gimmick or device used as a strategy or instrument. For Foucault, method can best be understood as a ruse rather than as a method

which promises truth. In fact, truth from Foucault's viewpoint is produced by rules and relations for separating or dividing statements into the true or the false. The rules and relations of the idealist and of the realist epistemologies are disciplines and as such tame and normalize as surely as does discipline applied to prisoners. Truth itself is a ruse in the game of power/knowledge. By recognizing truth in this way, Foucault (1984:46) is able to raise his principle question: "How can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the intensification of power relations?" Because of his attempt to explore the capabilities in social practices without resorting to the power effects of truth about those capabilities, Foucault's method has been called an anti-method (Shiner, 1982). As Keeley (1990) notes, Foucault is not interested in theorizing or in hypotheses. Instead, Foucault encourages a researcher to adopt an attitude of contestability, to apply analytic devices, and to explore possibilities.

In addition to bracketing the issue of truth with the use of ruse as method, Foucault adopts other strategies which are designed to unhinge the realist and idealist frameworks of truth. First, Foucault (1984) concentrates on specific instances with historical investigations in order to separate out from the contingencies that which makes us what we are and what we are no longer capable of being. By focusing on the historical and the specific, Foucault intends to reject the search for formal structures with universal value. Second, Foucault (1980) encourages one to concentrate on practices, that is, to concentrate on how things work at the on-going point of application. By focusing on practices, Foucault intends to reject inquiry at the level of conscious intentions or decisions. Third, Foucault (1980) encourages one to begin the analysis of power at the local level in the application of various practices to things, to the actions of others, and to actions on one's self. Only then can one conduct an ascending analysis by exploring how local practices are invested, colonized, and utilized by other practices. By focusing on the infinitesimal applications of techniques of relation, Foucault intends to reject an exclusive focus on large, centralized mechanisms as an explanation for phenomena. While Foucault (1980) encourages one to begin with the infinitesimal and then explore their colonization in an ascending analysis of power, Donnelly (1982) observes that Foucault fails to follow his own advice by showing how technologies such as discipline in the prison are analogous to the industrial setting without actually tracing the process of diffusion. Finally, Foucault (1980) claims that one cannot achieve a perspective for fully knowing our historical

limits. Theoretical and practical experience is always limited and determined. With no independent reality or transcendental subject which can be used as a measure, one is always in the position of beginning again. While each new study with realism and idealism represents a new approximation, each new study with method seen as ruse represents a new perspective. By recognizing method as perspective, Foucault intends to reject the foundational assumptions of idealism and realism.

Even though Foucault rejects foundational assumptions, he (Foucault, 1984:47) claims that his approach to method does not mean that “. . . no work can be done except in disorder and contingency.” His method has its homogeneity, its systematicity, and its generality. By homogeneity, Foucault (1984) means that one studies what people do and how they do it. In order to do this, Foucault examines practices as if they were techniques or devices. For example, one could look at a practice as if it were an apparatus (Foucault, 1980). That is, one could look at a practice as being an ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, law, administrative measures, scientific statements, moral propositions, etc. Then, one could try to identify the nature of the connections that can exist between the elements. Finally, and to the point, one could explore how these elements and their relation to each other set up or discourage certain lines of behavior. Foucault deals with this last point by claiming that an apparatus has a strategic function (Foucault, 1980) or is conditioned by strategy just as the apparatus also conditions strategy (Foucault, 1990). For this reason, Donnelly (1982) has criticized Foucault for engaging in functional arguments or in denying but requiring a transcendental subject to give meaning. However, as Cooke (1993) demonstrates, if one stays on Foucault's horse and attends to the asymmetries in the apparatuses involved in practices, one can explore differential outcomes set up by practices without resorting to functions or needs or without needing a transcendental actor with a purpose. Another way Foucault explores practices is to focus on discourse with the idea of the episteme (Foucault, 1972, 1980). The episteme is the apparatus which makes possible the separation of what may be taken to be true from that which may not be characterized as true. Again, one is interested in exploring what discursive and non-discursive elements are related in what way to separate statements taken to be true from those not taken to be true.

By systematicity, Foucault (1984) identifies three broad areas of practical

systems: relations of control over things, relations of actions upon others, and relations with oneself. For example, with respect to constituting ourselves as moral agents of our own actions, Foucault (1984, 1988a, 1990) begins by looking at what part of the self or action is conceived as ethical substance. He then moves to explore modes of subjection by which people are invited or incited to recognize moral obligations and means by which people can change themselves in order to become ethical subjects. Foucault -- while recognizing relations as apparatuses -- does not recognize relations as a fictional substance which can be constructed, objectified, and acted on just as can be things, others, and the self. Thus, Foucault does not attend to rituals of relationships except as they affect others or the self. One can also explore relations themselves as the fictional substance which are constituted by practices and on which practices work.

Finally, by generality, Foucault (1984:49) means that his investigations are specific and ". . . bear upon a material, an epoch, a body of determined practices and discourses." Here, Foucault (1990) is not only interested in identifying and analyzing strategic unities, he is interested in examining critical changes which reflect a reversal of relationships of forces. Since such a reversal is a complex restructuring of apparatuses, it must be described comparatively. Thus, Lewert and Gillan (1982) observe that Foucault structures his text with a "then" and a "now." First, Lewert and Gillan (1982) note that Foucault begins every text and most sections with the description of an exceptional case which anchors what follows. For example, in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault begins the book with the description of a torture and execution as a case to analyze the technology of punishment used by the king. Foucault (Lewert and Gillan, 1982) then employs an opposite structure -- e.g., then . . . now -- to organize a comparison of the two different apparatuses that mark the reversal of relationship of forces. This comparison aids in the exploration of the apparatuses and how they evoke or inhibit different lines of action. Again, in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault's analysis of the use of punishment on the body of the condemned *then* is compared with the emergence and application of techniques of discipline borrowed from the military, the school, and the church and applied to the prison *now*. He finally explores how social science could emerge from the application of discipline to a confined population but could not emerge with the use of punishment on the body of the condemned by the king. Thus, Foucault's analytic is applied to analyze how one set of apparatuses are

displaced by another.

### An Application of Method as Ruse

Studies in labor relations which utilize Foucault's perspective do not provide one with much assistance with the task of operationalizing a research method. Hollway's (1986) study of the mediation between the contradictory requirements of workers and peasants in Zimbabwe and of foreign and multinational interests doing business in Zimbabwe draws on Foucault's (1979) analysis of discipline and punishment as a framework for interpretation. But, Hollway does not utilize Foucault to develop a method of study. In a similar fashion McDonnell (1987) draws on Foucault's idea of the archaeology of knowledge (Foucault, 1972) and strategies of power (Foucault, 1980) to interpret the patterning of the transportation industry in New South Wales and laws associated with it. Again, Foucault's approach is not central to the method of the study. Knights and Willmott (1989) draw on Foucault's (1990) exploration of how subjectivity is brought forth from the confession to explore how deskilling (Braverman, 1974) makes an individual's behavior problematic to the individual and thus develops the individual's subjectivity. Again, Foucault provides a framework for interpretation but is not used to construct method.

Only Brown (1987) clearly attends to methodology. However, she uses Foucault's concept of archaeology (1972) to interpret how the shop floor -- with its emphasis on management rights, grading jobs according to component tasks, and grievance procedures which focus on the formal interpretation of rules -- is incorporated into labor law. Since Foucault claims that the law as practical manual can construct a scene, Brown (1987) then hypothesizes that the application of labor law in a situation that should be collegial -- the university faculty -- should force the provost into the non-participatory management style of industry. She then utilizes ethnomethodology and conversation analysis to explore her hypothesis. Here, Foucault is used to make a historical interpretation and as a theory. But he is then dropped when it comes to method. Brown's (1987) use of Foucault as theory to generate a hypothesis to test is clearly antithetical to Foucault's approach.

Since Foucault's analysis leads one to set aside method as an establisher of truth in any foundationalist sense, what is the point of any description of method at all? First, to look at a set of practices using Foucault's approach is to apply a systematic research device. So, a description of method



can be rendered. However, the method makes no claims to truth. Second, even though Foucault continues his effort to unhinge the truth claiming business of method by avoiding extensive documentation of his research (Lewert and Gillan, 1982), documentation is an important technology for constituting trust in the secondary relationship of agency between the researcher and the reader. While a description of gathering and disseminating information does not generate truth in any foundational sense, Shapiro (1987) notes that they do provide the reader with the conventions by which the study was done so the reader can evaluate the work done by the researcher. In other words, a description of method is a disclosure.

On another level, research method is a ruse. It is an apparatus which regulates what is discovered and the discourse about what is discovered. If one adopted the traditional realist strategy of reviewing literature, deducing hypotheses, and creating and implementing a research design to answer a series of yes or no questions, one would have to know the apparatuses used in an organizational setting and the distribution of those apparatuses. One would also have to use a series of devices to reduce actors to subjects and to control the scene in particular ways. It is highly unlikely that such power and control would be available to a researcher in an organizational setting. Since Foucault recognizes that the realist perspective sets up potential conclusions and limits all other views before one ever begins a study, he encourages one to explore social practices at the point at which they are made problematic. This does not mean that one is engaged in a method which avoids regulating discovery and discourse. It simply means that one cannot know what practices exist and how they are being made problematic before the fact of exploring the practices.

This approach is similar to both the grounded theory approach to qualitative research (Strauss, 1987; Charmaz, 1988) and the participatory action research approach to the study of organizations (Whyte, 1991). With grounded theory, one begins with the data and looks for what can be defined and discovered in the data rather than deduced from theory and then tested with data. Since one does not know in advance exactly what needs to be sampled, one explores, analyzes through developing theoretical categories and the relationships between those categories, and then uses theoretical gaps to decide what needs to be sampled next to extend and fill in theory development. In a similar fashion, Foucault encourages one to begin by exploring where and how things are made problematic. However, he has a framework for exploring

the problematic. What practices are involved in making things problematic? What substance do they create and work on? The actions of others? The self? Things? Relationships? How do they work on them? What lines of behavior are encouraged or discouraged? While theory development drives sampling in grounded theory and can drive sampling in exploring practices, Foucault would also recognize that a researcher in an organizational setting is working in a set of practices. In other words, practices implicit in the organization drives sampling. Different groups are on the receiving end or applying end of practices. They experience them as problematic from these different angles. The practices themselves close or open access to viewpoints and settings.

With the participatory action research approach, one actively works with members of an organization throughout the research process. Like Foucault, one begins by discovering the problems existing in the organization. The viewpoints of actors are not avoided but used to construct the picture of what is occurring. Unlike Foucault, one tests perceptions with members of organizations to clarify perceptions. For Foucault, such testing involves organizational practices that must be explored rather than transcendental actors that can be relied on for verification. In participatory action research, one develops with members of an organization a strategy to address the problematic through such a process. In other words, the research strategy itself can help to set up a new line of cooperative behavior. Foucault himself was very much interested in exploring practices with an eye to new ways of acting. However, unlike participatory action research, the articulation of a set of values or social policy -- such as cooperation -- probably inhibits effective political and ethical action from Foucault's (Gandal, 1986) viewpoint. Since all practices are built on asymmetric apparatuses, all practices are dangerous. While Whyte's (1991) analyses of several case studies of participatory action research focused on two potentially conflicting groups coming together in cooperation, such approaches, while setting up new lines of cooperation, represent potential danger to the union or to management. There are no utopian solutions.

### Defining the Research Question

To use Foucault's approach, one must discover how things are made problematic by members of an organization and use that to define the research question. I was hired as a labor relations consultant by the human resources

department of an investor-owned, midwestern electric utility company because management perceived that the relationship between management and the union had become strained. After initial interviews with several managers at the strategic level of the company (vice presidents and higher and members of the central business planning group), at the human resources level of the company (the specialized department dealing with personnel issues, individual and organizational capacity development, remuneration, benefits, and labor relations), and at the work group level of the company and after interviews with several leaders of the union, they all seemed to agree that the relationship between the company and the union was once fairly good but had been growing increasingly problematic and conflictual over the last two years. *Thus, the principal research question is: What had changed in the relationship between the union and the company to cause the relationship between them to deteriorate?*

If one now applies Foucault's framework to begin to elaborate -- and regulate -- the discourse, one must ask: What practices were used by the union and management to construct a relationship which both took to be good? What practices were adopted by one or both parties to begin to make the relationship problematic? The chief way that managers and union members seemed to make their relationship problematic was around the practice of trust. This caused me to elaborate the research question by focusing on trust: Did a practice or practices of trust exist among the practices used to construct a good relationship? If so, what did it look like and how did it work? What other practices were employed by the union and the company to construct a relationship perceived as good? How did they work? What practices were adopted which seemed to contribute to the deterioration of the relationship? How did they work? How did these practices affect the practice or practices of trust? What practices regulated the consideration of these practices by those who eventually adopted them?

### Constructing a Sample by Following the Problematic

In order to answer these questions, one has to construct a sample, a method for objectifying what one will take as data, and a method of analyzing.

How does one select settings to explore? From a traditional realist point of view, one begins with the assumption that one can discover where practices are made problematic by devising a sampling procedure which uses the device

of randomness. This a procedure for constructing the unbiased claim of the detached observer of realism. It is also a device for economizing when there are large numbers of settings while claiming to accurately represent the totality of the settings. The company studied had about 2,000 employees. Over 600 employees were covered by the union contract in settings which were separated by many hours of driving. Additionally, different practices probably got acted out at different times, during various events, and on different shifts. Whether one used the realist model or not, some sort of economizing sample had to be made.

The traditional sampling approach also assumes that a set of practices would be distributed in a normal fashion. There are statistical tests for testing this assumption. Basically, these tests are devised by constructing a normally distributed population, by drawing a random series of samples of a specific sample size, and by developing a distribution of a specific parameter such as standard deviation. These tests assume a condition and use it to construct a conditional statement: If the population is normally constructed, then any sample of a given size should fall within a given parameter with a given probability. Even though every student of logic and scientific method knows that this scheme guarantees nothing because the converse of a conditional statement is not necessarily true, the practical use of the test is to rely on the truth of the converse. Unless one can survey 100 percent of practices over all time under consideration, one is left with the assumption of the nature of the distribution of practices. Thus, even with sampling, explanation precedes discovery and establishes -- i.e., governs -- the discourse about it.

A second assumption of traditional sampling is that one has the apparatus available to obtain a random sample. That is, it assumes that one has the power to gain access to get a sample which is representative of the population as theorized. However, if one is studying an organization, one will be embedded in numerous practices which direct, block, and reorganize that to which one can gain access. For example, the company in this study employed a management consulting firm to survey all of the employees of the organization. To get the surveys completed, the company had to require as well as to encourage employees to take the survey. In response to this, several employees were found who cooperated to answer the same or answer neutrally to either "send a message" or to "hide" in fear of the consequences if they revealed their feelings. So, the tactics adopted by the respondents rendered

the total population survey problematic by introducing totally unknown characteristics into the population from those theorized. Here, no *a priori* construction of the population could have included the practices actually used by workers because the workers devised the practices in response to the survey.

The sampling procedure adopted for this study in some ways contains elements of theoretical sampling from the grounded theory approach of qualitative research (Strauss, 1987; Charmaz, 1988) and elements of participatory action research (Whyte, 1991). Since practices are identified only by going out and exploring situations, one does not know in advance exactly what will be sampled. How managers and union leaders defined what was problematic in their situation certainly contained a distribution even though neither exact practices nor their distribution could be stipulated *a priori*. While theoretical sampling decides what needs to be sampled next through the process of theoretical development and the need to sample more data to elaborate a category, I entered the scene and was governed by sets of practices that made things problematic. So, it was practices themselves rather than the transcendent theorization of the researcher which largely governed my sampling.

The sample for this study was governed by three practices: management practices, union practices, and academic practices. Thus, the study employed triangulation by using data constructed by managers, union leaders and members, and academic concerns to bear on the analysis of the various practices by which managers and union members relate. While Marshall and Rossman (1989) note that multiple sources of data can be used to corroborate, elaborate, or illuminate situations, Fielding and Fielding (1986) point out that such a strategy does not necessarily lead to stronger claims from a realist point of view. Foucault does not directly address triangulation. He does note that different methods and data sources are apparatuses and parts of different apparatuses. The data from different sources are a part of different practices. One cannot just treat different sources as reflective of a common phenomenon. One must analyze the mechanisms which generate the data itself as part of the practices which construct the relationship between management and the union.

*The sample obtained was conditioned by attempting to follow the trail of where different members suggested that I could find the problematic. First, it was defined by the practices of human resource management practiced in the company. I was hired by the*

human resources level of the company to explore what might be done to improve the relationship between the union and the company. This purpose conditioned what scenes I was directed to explore. I was also embedded in a consultant employee-employer relationship. The person who hired me laid out a series of concerns: (1) There had been a change in human resources personnel which may have resulted in the company dealing with the union in a different way; (2) there had been a change in union leadership to leaders who appeared to utilize conflict with the company to enhance union solidarity, to increase the appeal of the union to nonunion employees, to discredit the company and its management in the eyes of the community and the parent company as a negotiation tactic, and to enhance their personal position in the union; (3) the new participatory culture which was implemented company wide may not be practiced company wide by managers at the work place level; (4) the U.S. Department of Transportation was requiring a new universal Commercial Drivers License which required testing and physical examinations, and this had become an issue between the company and the union; and (5) most problems between the union and the company seemed to happen in the operations area where the company and the union both had headquarters and in a nearby power plant. Again, operations involves the construction, maintenance, and repair of the electricity distribution system. The company had four main operations divisions and six operational power plants across the state. Also, my employer met with me to develop a list of persons whom I should interview. These included managers at the strategic level (again, vice presidents and above and the strategic planning staff of the company), managers in human resources (including labor relations), managers of operational areas and power plants, labor lawyers employed by the company, first line supervisors of work groups, the business agents of the union, and members of the union's executive committee. It is interesting to note that my employer's sense of the problematic included the exact three levels of organization which Kochan et al. (1986, 1991) identified as critical to the study of labor relations.

As I observed and interviewed in the human resources department, various practices defined the problematic for the staff in that department which, in turn, directed my sample. Several staff people were in charge of dealing with various types of employee complaints. Some were in charge of dealing with the union contract and with grievances and negotiations. A committee of company

managers was established to address problems with interpretations of the labor contract. Forms soliciting issues for this group were routinely circulated at all levels of management. Union communications were monitored. Others were responsible for organizational development and training. Training sessions provided places for making things problematic. Still others dealt with testing and with pay and benefits. These areas also contained problematic practices. The department conducted employee surveys which were designed to identify the problematic.

*Second, the sample was defined by practices of the union's leadership.* In the process of trying to identify the location and nature of various new management practices and policies in order to grieve the practices or to negotiate over the practices, the union had developed a series of materials and lists of places and persons where things were problematic for them. They gave me the use of materials and lists of settings and encouraged me to interview people associated with these problematic settings. As I observed and interviewed the union leadership, various practices defined the problematic for them and, in turn, directed my sample. Trips were made by union leaders to the various work places on a systematic basis to talk with union stewards and members. Union stewards called the union office for clarification of work rules when union members had questions about management actions. Union members called the union hall with concerns. The union leadership would analyze grievances called in from various areas and consult stewards to see if the new problematic management practices existed in other areas.

*Finally, two academic concerns contributed to my selection of sites to investigate.* First, Kochan et al. (1986, 1991) identified the study of the strategic, labor relations, and work place levels of a company as critical to the study of labor relations. As already noted, these three levels were included in the study as a result of the direction of my supervisor. Second, as early as Weber (1958, 1978), academic sociology has used the ruse of comparison to try to identify differential effects set up by various conditions. Knowing the settings that management made problematic and those that the union made problematic, some work groups which were not identified by either group as problematic were selected to interview and observe. The purpose for doing so was to see if the practices defined as problematic extended beyond either the union's or management's sense of the problematic and to try to find alternative practices for purposes of comparison. The specific sites investigated were chosen by not

being on the list of sites either managers or union leaders urged me to investigate, by the availability of personnel, and by the convenience of travel. By convenience of travel, I mean that I tried to string a series of visits together on my line of travel. Of the sites enumerated below, seven operations sites and two power plants were not on either management's or the union's list of important sites for me to visit.

To summarize the actual sampling activity, all areas of the company made problematic by management and the union were covered as well as other areas not mentioned by either as a source of comparison. On the management side, five interviews were conducted with persons at the executive or strategic planning level, fourteen interviews were conducted with human resources and labor relations personnel, thirty-six interviews were conducted with managers in operations over the four areas in which the company is divided, and twenty-eight interviews were conducted with managers involved with power generation in six sites. To get another view of the strategic level, a person who was a member of the state's utility board for several years in the 1970s and 1980s was also interviewed. On the union side, the business managers, the union executive committee, one work group in power generation, one work group in operations, twenty-five union members in operations over three areas of the four areas into which the company was divided, and twenty-one union members in power generation in six sites were interviewed. The interviewing was done on a daily basis over a four month period.

In addition to the interviews, a variety of meetings were observed. At the human resources and labor relations level, one arbitration session, one negotiation session, one strategic planning session, one labor relations protocol meeting, one meeting reviewing a promotion decision, and ten other brief meetings between various persons were observed. At the operations and power generation level, a central safety committee meeting, an operations safety meeting, a power generation safety meeting, three daily meetings, a strategic meeting to plan for the negotiation of work rules, and a meeting to negotiate work rules were observed.

Finally, two flip charts used for training managers, fifty-three letters or memos, twenty-one newsletters or newspaper clippings, twenty-eight grievances, eleven training or procedure manuals, and seven studies or evaluations regarding labor relations which had been conducted by the company were examined for content. Additionally, following the suggestion of



Marshall and Rossman (1989) to use multiple sources of data to corroborate, elaborate, or illuminate situations, the company annual reports from 1976 to 1990, local news articles on the company going back to the 1950s which were found in historical files in the local library, and information from the U. S. Census and the local state employment commission from the 1970s and 1980s were analyzed.

*Finally, note carefully how this sampling procedure affects the picture constructed of this situation.* As noted earlier, the sample obtained for this study was conditioned by attempting to follow the trail of where different members suggested that one could find the problematic. Second, the method of constructing data outlined below was designed to elicit the problematic. Thus, it will create an impression of the problematic. If one adopted a method which had as its intention to develop an impression of the average or the representational, a less problematic picture of the scene would probably emerge.

#### Constructing Data by Eliciting the Problematic

Now that sampling has been discussed, what approach does one use to objectify practices? First, Foucault (1980, 1984) observed that manuals and other written sources for directing practices play a key role in regulating social practices. Thus, *manuals and other written sources for directing practices such as labor contracts, labor law, union policy and procedures, and company policy and procedures must be and were considered in this study both as a tool for constructing practices as well as an objectified practice.*

A limitation of exclusively relying on manuals and other such devices is that one is not able to know how the manuals are actually used in practices or to know actual practices which are not included in the manuals. Foucault probably ignored or overlooked this because his studies are historical studies and because he emphasized the importance of manuals as the crystallization of power and knowledge. Therefore, in addition to examining manuals and written sources for defining and directing practices, other devices must be deployed to objectify practices as they seemed to occur in the organization.

Loftland and Loftland (1984) have noted that data actually used in an analysis is always some sort of record which is constructed by some practice. What sort of device would be appropriate given that one does not know the scene *a priori*? The use of tightly framed devices such as questionnaires and

structured interviews are problematic on at least two levels. First, since this study does not presume to know the nature of practices used to make the relationship between management and the union problematic, it is not really possible to adequately frame such regiments. Second, a survey constructs a practice based on certain *a priori* assumptions about actual practices in the work place which may force an interpretation of those practices which are not warranted. As noted above, it was learned that the company hired a management firm periodically to assess employee attitudes by work group for the whole company. The assumptions of the survey treat the constructed attitude measurement of individual respondents as an independent measure of some aspect of the individual. Some people responded to the survey as individuals as constructed by the survey and by the instructions for administering the survey. But, others responded in some collective way. Management interpreted the survey results using the assumptions of the measurement device. There was a great disparity between how managers interpreted the survey based on *a priori* assumptions and how those trying to collectively "send" a message intended their response to be interpreted.

*In order to try to understand how various actors made things problematic, a very open ended interview process was used to allow them to use their own devices and practices.* I would share with the interviewee that I had been hired by the company to conduct a labor relations study and that this study would be the basis for my dissertation as well as input for trying to improve the relationship between management and the union. Then, I would share with them that I would keep their identity confidential by not revealing their names and by focusing on practices in my analysis. If the person indicated that they did not want to talk with me, the session ended, and I thanked them for their time. Otherwise, I would tell them that management and union officials perceived that labor relations in the company had become strained over the past few years. Could they help me understand why this perception might exist and how the current situation came to be? While I would occasionally ask questions for clarification or elaboration, I reasked the question until the respondent could no longer think of a response which they would share. I recorded the responses as close to verbatim as I could by taking notes. The interviews ranged from twenty minutes to three hours. The average interview lasted forty-five minutes to one-hour fifteen minutes.

While my purpose in using an unstructured interview was to allow the

respondents to describe practices and consequences as they experienced them and made them problematic, one should not conclude that my research strategy was itself a practice without discourse governing effects. For example, Hall et al. (1982) suggest that one can enable minority viewpoints to emerge in a group decision making process by setting aside the first solution a group identifies and by requiring the group to identify additional solutions. Similarly, by continuing to repeat the question until a respondent could no longer come up with a response, a responses beyond the first reaction was evoked.

Respondents also engaged in strategies to govern discourse. For example, respondents offered accounts to instruct me as to how I should read a situation. I would sometimes get a description of various events and practices which were connected to deteriorating relationships between the union and the company. The respondent would then say, "But, we really have good relations." Then, the respondent would continue with practices contributing to the deteriorating relationship. I also noted occasions on which respondents omitted items which latter came out. Finally, some persons openly lobbied me on how to take accounts offered by other persons.

*Second, data was constructed through the observation of meetings and through taking notes as close to verbatim as possible on what transpired at the meetings.* In all meetings observed, I identified myself as a consultant hired by the company to study labor relations. In these meetings, I tried to play the role of observer more than participant. I did this by not sitting where the interaction was taking place or -- if it were necessary to sit where the interaction was taking place -- by sitting away from where the interaction was focused by the architecture of the table or room. Even though I tried to minimize the effect of my presence in meetings observed, there are no guarantees that I was effective in doing so. In one of the first meetings I observed, I wore blue jeans and a work shirt because I was planning on making my initial contact with union members at that meeting. Because of my dress and because most managers did not know my role during the first part of the meeting, I was taken to be an unknown union observer. Managers were cautious of me at that meeting until I was introduced to them by a human resources staff person. They then laughed, said that they took me for a union member, and began discussing elements of the meeting. In other settings, I was not taken into the circle of the in-group as easily. One day I had the opportunity to travel with a line crew all day. I was held at arms length by many crew members. The supervisor of the crew was careful and guarded his

speech as compared to how I had seen him from afar just days earlier. Toward the end of the day, several crew members had begun to share more openly with me. Then, a couple of men came in from another crew and began to accuse me of being a spy and a hired gun to help destroy the union. Rather than assume that I was a factor in some settings and not in others, I treated all situations in which I acted as a consultant for the company as an observer. That is, I recorded the practices used on me and by me and their consequences for my actions and for the actions of those around me.

*Finally, practices were objectified by unintentionally breaching various practices.* While Garfinkel (1963) developed specific breaching experiments to test various hypotheses about the natural attitude and the taken-for-granted nature of social reality as theorized by Schutz (1962, 1967), such breaching events happen in an unplanned course of events. One need not adopt Schutz's phenomenological viewpoint to usefully employ breaches. Rather, one can adopt Berndtson's (1970) and Foucault's (1980, 1984) notion that power only becomes apparent in resistance and recast a "break" in the taken-for-granted as a practice which is met by another practice which sets up an alternative line of action.

Such breaches occurred on at least two occasions. First, at a meeting in which high level managers met to review my findings, most of them felt that my findings were pro-union because I had focused on how the use of management rights had created a series of events which affected the union worker's trust in the company's strategic level and human resource level of management. There was a general agreement among the managers that the company could not give up any more rights to the union. Thus, even though there was a lot of talk about the new company culture of openness and participation, control through the practice of management rights and hierarchy was what was being practiced.

Second, after this meeting and after clarifying that the company's management seemed to want me to address a way to improve relations with union members without working through the union organization, I wrote a second analysis in which I analyzed practices by which the union used discontent created at the work group level by management decisions taken at all levels of management. In particular, I noted how the resistance by management to substantially resolving grievances from the perspective of workers in order to not give up any more management rights in fact resulted in increased discontent and made it easier for the union to organize and to press

for demands in negotiations. At the meeting in which my first findings were reviewed by management, it came out that the number of persons in unionized units of the company who were members of the union had increased from sixty percent to eighty percent over the two years in which grievances were continually not substantially resolved from the viewpoint of the union but were procedurally pushed to arbitration. Since I was told by the human resources department that training had been given to first line managers on the contract so they could make decisions with respect to grievances in the new participatory culture, I recommended that first line supervisors be encouraged to resolve issues rather than resist them and force them to arbitration. Record numbers of grievances made it to the human resources level in the year that I began this study. In a meeting to review this second study, I was shown a note from a person in human resources which indicated that the training was to ensure that work group supervisors followed management's interpretation of the contract. The person who wrote the note indicated that she had hated being told what to do when she was a work group supervisor by labor relations specialist in the human resources department. So, she was using training. If it did not work, then the training at least provided the background for work group supervisors to understand her orders. In other words, she substituted training for command as a way to work on work group supervisor's behavior. This was a significant revelation. Before, it looked like first line supervisors had some latitude because of the emphasis on participation in the new corporate culture. Thus, I, as a participant in the scene, made things problematic in an unintended way but in a way which clarified practices.

### Constructing an analysis of the problematic

Now that the method of sampling and the method of objectifying practices into data have been disclosed, what method does one use to analyze practices from Foucault's perspective? First, Foucault (1984) encourages one to focus on what people do and how they do it. In order to examine practices, Foucault (1980) views them as if they were techniques or devices. Second, Foucault (1984) encourages one to explore what substances the practices posit and work on as a practical system. Specifically, Foucault contends that practices posit and work on things, the actions of others, and relations with oneself. Additionally, I observed earlier that relations themselves are objectified and worked on by social practices for constructing relationships. Third, Foucault

(1991a, 1991b) encourages one to break down practices into the elements which constitute them. The number of such elements is not given in advance but can be taken to be finite. Thus, "one has to proceed by progressive, necessarily incomplete saturation" (Foucault, 1991b:77). Fourth, Foucault (1991a, 1991b) encourages one to identify the nature of the connections that can exist among the elements and the lines of activity they set up or inhibit. For Foucault (1991b), practices have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done and codifying effects regarding what is to be known. Fifth, Foucault (1984, 1991a, 1991b) encourages one to examine critical changes in practices which constitute a reversal of relationships of force. Since such a reversal is a complex restructuring of apparatuses, it must be described comparatively. Thus, Lemert and Gillan (1982) observe that Foucault structures his text with a "then" and a "now." Finally, Foucault (1979, 1980, 1984) encourages one to examine how practices circulate and are colonized by other practices.

Before moving to describe how Foucault's methodological points will be operationalized, Foucault's anti-essentialist, "polymorphous" approach to correlation will be contrasted with the essentialist, exclusive partitioning approach to causality. First, the normal way of doing social science relies heavily on the requirements from logic that reality be partitioned into mutually exclusive categories based on an essential aspect of the phenomena under consideration. This might be done through such devices as ideal types (Weber, 1958, 1978), categories (Strauss, 1987; Charmaz, 1988), or definitions (Best, 1981; Babbie, 1986). Foucault (1991b) criticizes such a partitioning and reducing because such categories are created by the researcher in order to reduce potentially important differences into commonalities. Such reductions further become *a priori* judgments which restrict the field of consideration of the researcher. While it is never possible to know if one has enumerated all elements of a practice, normal social science presupposes such a possibility. Furthermore, the categories are probably not present in the thought of the individuals whose concrete behavior is to be understood on their basis. Finally, definitions, categories, and rationalities are all parts of practices whose power effects can only be understood by relating them to other elements of practices.

In the place of essential reduction, Foucault (1991a, 1991b) encourages one to break down practices into their elements. While one attempts to "saturate" the break down and while the elements can be taken as finite, one can never presume to know that the break down is complete. Furthermore, the

breakdown is a construction of the researcher. Thus, one cannot claim to exhaustively or essentially categorize some reality.

Second, ideas of causality in naturally occurring settings rely on the conditional statement and on some accounting of covariation. As noted earlier, conditional statements only give one the ability to reject some theorized necessary condition. They cannot be used to affirm necessary conditions without relying on the practice of affirming the converse of the conditional, which is a fallacy within the discourse of conditional statements. When it is applied to an accounting of covariation, the slope becomes even slicker. Whether one uses cross classification, correlation, regression, factor analysis, or some other measure of covariation, the procedure forces a reduction of phenomena to the variables under consideration and constructions an accounting of variation in the dependent variable in terms of the currency of the independent variables.

To demonstrate the indeterminacy of conjecturing relations between variables and then using covariation to demonstrate the relation, consider Cooke's (1992) examination of the relationship between relative cohort size of persons in an internal labor market and the rate of survival of members of a cohort in an organization from one time period to another. Cooke used Reed's (1978) findings that an individual's chances for promotion are greatly affected by relative cohort size in a system in which all promotions are made from within and in which few leave for other employment to predict that, as the ratio of younger to older clergy rises, the number of younger clergy remaining in the ministry in the next period will decrease. When Cooke examined this relationship for all members of the Oklahoma annual conference of the Methodist Church who were in the ministry from 1940 to 1980, he found the predicted linear relationship between relative cohort size and survival in the ministry which accounted for forty-four percent of the variation in the proportion of clergy surviving to the next period. However, when he considered only clergy who were actually in the internal labor market of the annual conference, the predicted linear relationship only accounted for one percent of variation in the proportion of clergy surviving to the next period. So, by changing definitions -- which were all mutually exclusive within their scheme -- one came up with different results. While the discourse of causality would cause one to begin to look for other variables, one is always left in the position of not knowing if one has enumerated all elements or if one has appropriately related the elements as one forces the accounting of variation into the enumeration one has created

with a discourse about causation which claims more than it can ever deliver.

In the place of allocating causality on the basis of classification and variation accounting, Foucault (1991a, 1991b) relies on exploring the interplay and relation of elements of practices and how they work on things, actions of others and relations with oneself. He is interested in exploring how some elements displace others and the effects of such displacements. By doing so, Foucault does not claim a better argument for causality. Instead, he intends to explore how things work while suspending the privilege of arguing cause.

To operationalize Foucault's method, the six principles of analysis outlined above were applied to the data constructed as outlined above to answer the research questions outlined above. First, a "before" and "after" picture of labor relations was created by identifying practices used in a period when respondents of both management and the union judged that relations between them were comparatively good and in a period when they judged that relations between them were comparatively troubled. Then, practices that union members and managers used to judge their relationship as "good" or "problematic" were explored. Since practices for judging the "good" and the "problematic" seemed to be part of practices that could be categorized as family like practices, practices for structuring the internal labor market, management practices, and labor relations practices, practices used by union members and managers to judge their relations were related to these four complexes of practices. This first step of analyzing the deterioration of the relationship between the union and management is contained in chapter four, "From Family to Enmity."

Second, a more complete analysis of practices was developed. After classifying observed practices as family like practices, practices for structuring the internal labor market, management practices, and labor relations practices, practices in each of these four categories were further classified using the general description of practices of trust as part of primary relations, trust as part of secondary relations, distrust, sovereignty (including the political process, contract, punishment, and command), discipline, dividing practices, market, and confession (including small group practices) from the review of literature. These practices were further broken down into the different practices which were used in trust in primary relations, trust as part of secondary relations, etc. Then, these practices were broken down into the elements which seemed to constitute them. This was done by identifying an element, what substance the element seemed



to posit and work on (such as the other, things, oneself, and relationship), how it posited and worked on the substance, how it was related to other elements, and how elements and their relations to other elements either set up or discouraged a line of action. The results of this analysis is reported in chapters five through eight.

Finally, practices that replaced others and, in doing so, made possible the adoption of practices that made relations between the union and management problematic for both were identified and analyzed. Additionally, practices by which practices circulate or are colonized by other practices and how these contributed to changing the situation from a "good" one to a "problematic" one were identified. The results of this analysis is reported in chapter nine.

To conclude this section on method as ruse, ethical considerations with respect to this study will be briefly explored. According to Marshall and Rossman (1989), the basic question of ethics with respect to a study in a natural setting is whether or not people are putting themselves at risk by participating in the study? As noted elsewhere (Cooke, 1993), the idea of rights -- the basis of most ethical thinking about social science research -- are rooted in the practice of sovereignty. So, any ethical argument is constructed and replete with asymmetries. The concepts of individuals and natural rights are themselves methods for controlling behavior. They have the same limitations of any foundationalist approach. So, if one developed an ethic based on membership validation -- a concept of rights -- as a basis for including observations in a study, both the union and management would surely want to eliminate or recast observation to give a different account of their practices. Surely both will find other accounts to discount the accounts of those included. Since both sides in this study have concepts of rights which attack the other side's view of rights while establishing their own, where is there any transcendent place to stand to sort out rights? By using membership validation, both sides would be engaging in a practice which would modify the study in some particular way. By not using such a membership validation scheme, the study will be modified in some other way. Neither scheme can guarantee or define in a transcendental way the protection of rights or the people involved. They just result in different interpretations.

When I was interviewed before being hired to do this study, I told a company manager that I would only do the study if I could use the data gained

for my dissertation and if the company was interested in improving relations with the union. My proposal -- including the stipulation of using the information for my dissertation as well as my vita -- was circulated widely among managers and union members. The union agreed to participate in the study. As noted earlier, I told persons interviewed that I would not use their names or their individual positions in order to try to protect their identity. There are so few persons in some positions that this will be difficult at points. However, people in these particular positions kept telling me that they would tell anyone what they were telling me. Nonetheless, I will try to protect their identity. Furthermore, there are so few women in many areas studied that gender identification would identify individuals. Therefore, I will use female pronouns throughout the study to refer to both males and females. I also will not use the name or the location of the company. However, as Vidich and Bensman (1958) found, with any research done with a relative small group -- even the size of a town or of a company of about 2,000 employees -- readers can use their own background knowledge to possibly figure out who some of the actors are. This is true even with survey research. As noted earlier, this company hires a management firm every three years to conduct an employee attitude survey. While workers were assured and researchers believed that identities were protected, enough demographic data was included on the survey to be able to identify problematic work groups in order to take measures to improve the groups. On at least three occasions, I found strong evidence that managers could use their knowledge of the scene with the survey information to identify who had brought the attention of upper management on them.

Finally, whether or not respondents put themselves at risk in this study rests with what the readers decide to do with the information. On the one hand, I could see managers and union members reading this study, beginning an open and frank discussion on how to improve their relationship, and deciding together on strategies for improving their relationship. On the other hand, I could also see managers and union members reading this study, caucusing among their own groups, and trying to figure out how to use the information against each other. On hind sight, I would only have agreed to do this study if both the company and the union jointly funded and controlled the study and the development of recommendations for action. This apparatus would certainly have enhanced the first possibility and inhibited the second.

## CHAPTER IV

### FROM FAMILY TO ENMITY

#### Introduction

This chapter begins the analysis of practices with an analysis of accounts given in interviews and documents that contain explicit, comparative references to practices used in two periods. First, in a period before 1970, respondents of both management and the union felt relations between them were comparatively good. Second, in a period after 1990, they felt that relations between them grew problematic. The relation between unionized workers and the company in the first period can be described as family like. The relationship between unionized workers and the company in the second period reflects enmity. It will be seen that judgments about "good" and "problematic" relations are a part of the practices used by union workers and by managers.

#### Family

Before 1970, the company under study was run like a family. According to interviewees, districts tended to be self-contained entities. There were monthly family dinners at which the manager talked on a personal level with employees and their family members. If anyone in the community needed tables and chairs for an event, the company was only too pleased to oblige. At Christmas time, there were separate parties for children and for adults. Each child had a gift with his or her name on it. At work, a manager would take time to talk with workers about their families and their work. A worker was valued as a person. On a hot day, a manager might come by the work site, pick up the crew, and go for a soda.

The company took care of workers. Workers had a secure job, half-rate electricity, all benefits paid, and a retirement plan with an extension of the benefits and half-rate electricity into retirement. There were enough workers

such that excessive overtime was not required. Workers could count on a stable schedule and could plan for a social life outside of work. If positions were reduced in an area or if a worker had an injury, other work would be found for the worker. There was room for promotions. Since promotions were based on seniority, a worker could anticipate a career path. A worker in a demanding job such as line work or shift work in power plant operations could look forward to some point in her career when she could fill a less demanding position. There were no higher education requirements for promotions. Jobs were learned on the job. A line worker could conceivably become the president of the company.

During this period, just as different practices of relating are used in different families, four different practices could be identified between managers and workers. First, some managers practiced favoritism. Since supervisors came out of the ranks of workers, they had established relationships with workers. A boss' friend might get easy assignments and fast promotions. If a worker fell out with the boss, she would get the dirty jobs. Some managers would hold a grudge. Favoritism left bitterness and resentment with some workers. Second, some supervisors were authoritarian. As the most experienced worker, supervisors would direct work by "show" and "close supervision." Workers were not encouraged to speak their minds. Orders were given with little justification beyond the quip, "Because I said so." Third, there was a laissez faire attitude of supervision toward workers. One did not have to direct work because workers were craftspersons who already knew the job and performed adequately. In fact, direction to a person who already knows a job is often experienced as an affront. A supervisor would not want to offend a friend. Also, one did not critically evaluate workers because they were one's friends. Finally, since supervisors' workers were coworkers and friends, some supervisors practiced a participatory management. Problems would be discussed before decisions were made. Solutions which emerged in discussions would be adopted as decisions. Communication was frequent.

Since the company was divided into semi-autonomous districts, the coordination of work between work groups was directly between manager and manager and manager and worker. Each department could prioritize work and coordinate how work would be done directly with other departments. If a worker saw something that needed attention, she could give it immediate attention without an elaborate prioritizing and planning system.

From 1928 to 1973, the utility company continued to increase its customer base and lower electricity rates. Even though the company was owned by another company, the holding company maintained a "hands off" approach to the management of the company. The focus of business was on the retail level of electricity sales rather than on the wholesale level. With an emphasis on the retail level and on customer satisfaction, line personnel worked everything "hot" -- with active electric current -- in order to avoid service interruptions. During this period, company crews used five person crews and A-frame truck technology to engage in outside construction as well as maintenance and emergency service. Power plant maintenance -- including major maintenance -- was also done by company crews. With the emphasis on the development and maintenance of an expanding retail service base, the line worker had a high status within the company.

Labor relations as defined by the National Labor Relations Act -- passed by congress in 1935 -- began between the company and the union with their first agreement or contract in late 1940s. From these early days, the contract contained a no strike clause and the corresponding grievance and arbitration procedures to deal with differences over administering the contract. Before 1970, the practices used to negotiate and administer the contract were informal. Rather than having formal contract negotiations, the business agent of the union and an executive from the company would meet for a few days, discuss the contract, and shake hands. Even though the company executive might tell the union "how poor they were" in these discussions, these were basically growth times for the utility. So, there was no reason for the company or the union to push or pull. There was plenty for all. There was no specialized labor relations department. Though personnel practices were specialized before 1970, there was no human resources department with an emphasis on increasing labor productivity. Whereas the contract was worked out in the meeting between the union business agent and a company executive, the day-to-day administration and application of the contract was informally conducted through verbal agreements between supervisors and union officials. Verbal agreements were based on a number of practices. Most supervisors came out of the unionized work force and related more to the work force than to management over them. As noted earlier, this did not necessarily mean that managers were not authoritarian in their supervisory practices. But it did mean that one could talk out issues and come to an agreement that both parties would remember and

honor even though the discussion was accompanied by anger and "hard headedness." Stewards, business agents, and supervisors had confidence that each party would listen to and hear each other's viewpoint and that each party would be open and honest in communicating about the problem at hand. The issue was discussed and explored to the extent that, if a grievance moving toward binding arbitration had to be filed by the union, every avenue had been exhausted and a real impasse had been reached. One manager summarized labor relations before 1970 as paternalistic. Workers and the union expected the company to take care of them and to do right by them.

### Enmity

Every three years, the company conducted a work force attitude survey. By 1991, the attitudes among unionized workers had become steadily worse for ten years. Since the late 1970s, there had been two major work force reductions which cut into the ranks of unionized workers. Issues of trust are raised by union members around perceived promises of no layoffs followed by layoffs which occurred during contract negotiations. Christmas parties for all employees and their spouses and for the children of employees are no longer held. Christmas festivities now seemed to be a part of the "front office" only. Company facilities are now surrounded with fencing and security systems. Half-rate electricity for employees and retirees is a thing of the past. An announcement was about to be made that retirees would have to now pay for a significant portion of their insurance if they retired after 1992. For the first time in the history of the company, the union had utilized an information picket, a media campaign against the company, and flyers with polarizing language in the work place during negotiations. During negotiations, an executive level manager is overheard by union officials telling another manager during a break, "F \_ \_ \_ what the union wants." Record number of grievances are heading toward binding arbitration. Managers rarely associate with workers. Workers are instructed by union leadership to not participate in voluntary company activities. Practices similar to those used to construct family had been replaced with enmity.

Having experienced two major force reductions and a significant increase in the use of outside contractors to do power plant maintenance and outside construction, workers feel insecure about job security. Company executives claim that there is more job security since they are working at

minimum work force. But, first line supervisors continually threaten workers with bidding out their work if they do not improve their productivity. Periodically, such work is out sourced to a contractor. There are few light duty jobs to take care of persons who are injured. The size of a line crew has been reduced from five to three through the use of the newer bucket truck technology. Districts have been staffed with service persons, and line crews are consolidated in central locations serving large areas. The company is looking for ways to split up the three person line crews and to eliminate craft distinctions in power plants in order to recombine workers in different ways.

Required overtime has mounted as the company has tried to do more work with fewer people. The company has changed scheduling procedures to work more flexibly with the parent company's new control of the dispatching of electrical production. With the disruptions of off work time inherent in the new scheduling procedures, it has become more difficult to plan for family life. The divorce among shift workers has increased. The company's response to this change in working conditions which sets up role conflict at home is counseling.

Seniority as a method for advancement has been replaced with testing and educational requirements. It is no longer possible for union workers to move into supervisory positions without a college education. While the company pays for its workers to attend college, required overtime and changing shift schedules do not provide the consistency required to schedule college work. Even though there is a larger number of non-line work positions in the company, testing and educational requirements have placed a barrier in the way of worker mobility. Additionally, with layoffs by seniority which eliminated new workers and with early retirement plans which encouraged the early retirement of older workers, most workers and managers from the top to the bottom of the company are of a similar age cohort.

To compound matters, the region in which this company does business experienced a significant loss of industrial and construction jobs which would have provided alternative employment for line workers and power plant mechanics and operators. To explore changes in the labor market in the principal Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) served by the company in this study that would affect alternatives for line workers and power plant workers, employment information from the state employment commission by industrial category from 1975 through 1990 was used to estimate an average job creation rate by industrial category for the 1970s and the 1980s. This information is

Table I

**Average Levels of Employment, Wages, and Hours  
in the 1970s and 1980s for the Principal MSA  
Served by the Company in This Study**

Industrial Category	Mining	Manufac-turing	Construc-tion	Trans &Wholesale Pub Util	Trade	Retail Trade	FIRE*	Services	Govern-ment
Average change in jobs/year (in 1,000)									
1970s	1.36	2.40	0.60	1.12	1.38	2.2	0.60	3.70	1.82
1980s	-1.08	-0.68	-0.51	0.20	-0.27	0.55	0.21	2.25	0.42
Average weekly hours worked									
1970s	45.20	40.17	37.27	N/A	40.65	35.23	N/A	N/A	N/A
1980s	43.13	40.68	37.80	N/A	39.81	32.00	N/A	N/A	N/A
Average hourly wage									
1970s	12.83	11.90	16.38	N/A	10.93	9.17	N/A	N/A	N/A
1980s	12.66	12.16	13.51	N/A	10.78	7.50	N/A	N/A	N/A
Average weekly wage									
1991	773.00	569.00	433.00	665.00	Combined trade 313.00		492.00	391.00	415.00

\*Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate

contained in Table I. Information from 1970 through 1974 was not available from this source. Wage and hour information for the MSA was available only for manufacturing. Additional wage and hour information for the state was available for mining, construction, wholesale trade, and retail trade and was used to estimate the wage and hour information for the MSA for these industrial categories. The average wage rate by industrial category was adjusted by the Consumer Price Index to get a comparable wage rate over time. The Consumer Price Index establishes a baseline for the cost of goods and services in 1982-1984. Then, all wages were expressed in terms of 1990 dollars. This



information is also contained in Table I. Finally, a different report from the state employment commission contained weekly wage information by industrial category for 1991 in the MSA principally served by the company in this study.

Throughout the 1970s, all industrial categories were adding employment in the MSA. Employment grew during this period by an average of over 15,000 jobs per year. But, in the 1980s, employment grew by only an average of over 1,000 jobs per year. During this period, mining, manufacturing, construction, and wholesale trade were losing employment while the other industrial sectors were adding employment at a rate slower than in the 1970s. The jobs which were being lost in the 1980s tended to be the jobs which paid higher wages in the 1970s: manufacturing, mining, and construction. The only sector which paid higher wages and continued to marginally add jobs was transportation and public utilities. Since the only electric utility in this area for whom workers could work was the company in this study and since employment in the alternative industrial areas in which their skills could apply were shrinking, workers had no place to exit. It would be difficult to find a less demanding position after a worker gets too old to easily do line work.

With the consolidation of work into larger areas and with the increased control of the company by the parent company, management decisions are taken in places and with considerations far away from the work group. The manager no longer has the ability to engage in directly identifying and addressing production and service problems or the problems of employees. Problems have to be referred up the line of command for decisions. Command is still used to direct work. But, instead of coming from the authority of the work group supervisor -- "Because I said so" -- it comes from the authority of upper management. Now, the work group supervisor "just delivers the news." Furthermore, with the requirement of college education for supervisory positions and with the recent policy by the parent company to move upper managers around its various electric utility companies, the history of involvement with the work group is broken.

Human resources techniques are applied to workers as substitutes for "Because I said so," "show," and "close supervision," which would often offend workers who were as experienced as the supervisor and who were "adults and not children." Training is now used to set expectations, which requires less "show" as a personal act between the supervisor and the worker. Extensive rationalizations accompany commands to replace "because I said so." By using

such techniques as problem solving, accountability is more focused toward the expectations elaborated in training than toward personal degradation. Problem solving gets the worker to monitor and critique her own behavior rather than having the supervisor be in the role of monitoring and critiquing the worker's behavior. While many supervisors use the new techniques of supervision, many still use the old techniques. Even with the new techniques, reward and punishment are still employed.

The company had also experimented with versions of participatory management. Initially, some managers felt that worker participation in management would be helpful because employees are closer to the actual outcomes and situations being addressed and because these managers believed that ownership in work is better if workers are a part of the decision making. This was met by a cry from most managers that the actual decision is management's responsibility. Thus, strategies were worked out to give workers "voice" but not "vote." For example, the company's central safety committee includes a few union workers chosen by management. Workers are encouraged to say what they think and feel. Task forces are used to gather information. Managers are trained in active listening.

When the first participatory training sessions were held, workers got the impression that they would have a say as well as a voice. A company-wide task force on half-rate electricity recommended that the company retain the half-rate. When the issue of retaining half-rate electricity for employees and retirees came before the state utility board and failed, many workers felt that management either ignored the recommendation or did not fight hard enough for it. Other task forces were created, came up with recommendations, and had recommendations ignored, reversed, or alternatives decided by management. Some times, it appeared to workers that managers used task forces to sell decisions already made. Other times, it appeared to workers that managers used task forces to find out information from workers to use it to increase productivity in ways that threatened job security. Yet other times, managers would use the fact of the inclusion of a few union members on committees as a basis of legitimating unpopular decisions with workers.

After attending workshops conducted by a local state university on the use of participatory management as a union busting tactic, the union instructed workers not to participate in participatory or voluntary activities unless ordered and paid to do so. They also trained their workers in a list of "signs" to look for

in the participatory activity if it was being used adversely against the union. As a counter tactic, the union developed its own safety committee to analyze safety problems and safety procedures. It shared its findings with the company. The recommendations were said to be too costly by management and were not adopted. Additionally, the union included a proposal for a joint union-management safety committee with half of the members appointed by the union, with half of the members appointed by management, and with decision making power with respect to safety issues as an alternative model of participation. The meaning of participation had become an issue of contention.

With the centralization of operations and decision making, face-to-face interaction as a method for coordinating work has been replaced with a variety of technologies. Communication is much more likely now to take place through a log book, a folder, bulletin boards, or electronic mail than by face-to-face encounter. As a consequence -- as one supervisor noted -- it is hard to develop a relationship when you only see a worker a few hours out of every month. With more levels of authority in the company and with less authority at the work group level, there is more "checking" that has to be done. In an attempt to control inventory, to maximize the life of equipment, and to order work to deal with the most critical issues first, more work is controlled through computerized work analysis systems and a central planner. As both workers and supervisors put it, "you use to be able to see something broken and fix it." Now, it must be reported, analyzed, prioritized, split apart into its component parts, assigned out, and checked.

Strategically, the company went through drastic shifts. With the oil crisis and resulting regulations and legislation in the 1970s, the company found itself in the position of having 100 percent of its generation capacity fired by natural gas and, at the same time, being required to be totally off of natural gas by 1990. At the same time, the region was going through an economic boom. In order to cope with this untenable situation, the company adopted two strategies. First, it built coal fired capacity. But, uncontracted coal which was low in sulfur content was difficult to find. They eventually entered into an expensive, multiple year, take-or-pay contract for coal. With this contract, the coal would have to be taken or paid for if not taken. Thus, the plant would have to be base loaded. Second, the company decided to build a large nuclear power station. What looked like a relative inexpensive option in the early 1970s looked very expensive by the late 1970s. What looked like a politically feasible option in the

early 1970s looked politically impossible after the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident in 1979.

By the early 1980s, several conditions totally reversed themselves. First, the rising cost of nuclear power coupled with serious political problems with the licensing process lead to a decision to not build the plant. But, the company had already spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the project. With the collapse of oil prices in 1982 and again in 1986, the mandatory requirements to replace all gas fired capacity by 1990 were rescinded. As a result, the company had an excess of capacity and newly capitalized plants. At the same time, the region suffered one economic down turn in the early 1980s and another in the mid-1980s. Legislation was passed which allowed industrial concerns to engage in the cogeneration of electricity. With an excess of generation capacity set up by events in the 1970s, municipalities began to consider taking the electricity franchise away from tradition electrical utilities and to provide electrical service themselves by buying electricity rather than generating it. Industrial concerns could begin to directly contract for electricity from any company. Thus, rural electric coops and generation authorities began to compete against traditional electric utilities for industrial customers. Again, the company was in an untenable situation. From the company's annual reports, one can calculate percent changes in total kilowatt-hours sold, the number of residential customers, the number of commercial customers, and the number of industrial customers to see how the company's market had changed. Such calculations for changes that took place between 1976 and 1980, 1980 and 1985, and 1985 and 1990 are presented in Table II.

Table II

Percent Changes in Kilowatt-hours Sold, Residential Customers, Commercial Customers, and Industrial Customers

Year	Kilowatt-hours	Residential Customers	Commercial Customers	Industrial Customers
'76-'80	14.7	12.2	15.7	15.2
'80-'85	-20.9	8.7	12.6	14.0
'85-'90	1.8	0.5	2.3	9.9

Even though the number of customers increased during the period (1980- 1985) just prior to the layoff, the company experienced a significant decrease in the number of kilowatt-hours of electricity sold. Thus revenue decreased over the period. To address this situation, the company attempted to reposition itself by trying to capture part of the heating market and by engaging in conservation programs. Here, the company was trying to increase the average use of the system while decreasing the peak use of the system. Additionally, the company committed itself to no new rate increases for ten years. Internally, the company laid off workers in the late 1970s as the nuclear project costs increased, and it laid off workers in the mid 1980s to cut increasing operations costs against a loss of revenues. It also engaged in outsourcing work which was periodic enough to require excess work capacity if it were internalized. The company turned to examining how work was put together to see if it could be more effectively organized. This meant examining issues such as how shifts were organized, how crews were organized, how work was prioritized, etc.

The parent company also began to become more involved in directly managing the company. Strategically, the parent company took over dispatching power generation for the companies it owned. This means that power plants that the parent company owns are treated as costs and revenue centers such that it is possible to load plants to maximize profits. However, this positioning of dispatching required that some plants be shut down and that others be placed on economic shut down. Plants that were shut down no longer needed crews. Plants on economic shut down did not need as large of a crew on a full time basis. The parent company also operates all of the benefit programs. This means that the parent company has greater buying power for insurance and other benefits than the company in this study alone would have. It also means that staff at the parent company level decided to handle the new federal regulations (FAS 106) requiring benefits to retirees to be accounted for as they are obligated rather than when they are collected by requiring retirees to pay for such benefits. The company paid for them before. The parent company is attempting to standardize procedures in all companies it owns. These procedures may or may not fit the company in this study well. Finally, the parent company is cross pollinating leadership in the different companies it owns by taking potential leadership from one company and promoting it to leadership in another company. This obviously brings new perspectives to the

strategic level of a company. It also brings in persons with no long term relations with the work force or the community.

In 1990, a senior executive noted that labor relations had "gone to hell in a hand basket all of a sudden." From the viewpoint of management, the company had the best union one could ask for until two years ago. Then, the union started pushing with the election of a new group of radical leaders. The union began to try to turn informal agreements worked out between workers and supervisors or between the old union leadership and management into the binding forms of formal side agreements or the contract. Instead of accepting management's findings of "no violation of the contract" with respect to management decisions which were challenged by workers as violating the labor contract, the union began to push grievances from verbal discussions between a worker and supervisor with a steward present to a written grievance to be addressed by the supervisor in writing, to an appeal to the supervisor's manager, to an appeal to the manager of labor relations, and finally to binding arbitration.

The union engaged in a campaign of noncooperation with respect to volunteering to be involved with company activities after hours and with respect to actively engaging in quality of work life and quality improvement programs. Organizing campaigns were undertaken with new categories of workers. Membership campaigns resulted in an increase from about sixty percent membership among workers in organized units to about eighty percent membership. Before 1990, contract negotiations required only five or six proposals to get an agreement. In 1990, it took over fifteen proposals to reach agreement. The negotiations were conflictual to the point that a federal mediator was called in to assist with negotiations with little effect. In 1991, it took twenty or more proposals to reach an agreement. During negotiations, the union engaged in information pickets, information media campaigns, and bulletin board and newsletter campaigns for the first time in the company's history. It was widely felt by management that the union could no longer be trusted. They would take advantage of you if they could.

From the union's perspective, a group of older senior managers and new senior managers brought into the company by the parent company from nonunion companies had installed new labor relations personnel to engage in a war on the union. The new labor relations personnel took office during negotiations in 1990. New labor relations training was instituted which was

designed to keep first line supervisors from working out agreements with workers which could not be supported by a narrow interpretation of the contract. The training also instructed supervisors how to avoid defining a practice as a past practice which could be a basis for the union to win an arbitration, encouraged supervisors to identify with and close ranks in solidarity with management to protect management's right to decide and act unilaterally, and encouraged a definition of the motive of the worker and the union as more pay for less work. Over one-hundred agreements which had been worked out between workers and supervisors and which could be unilaterally canceled by management were canceled by management. Letters were discovered in which upper managers encouraged lower managers to find ambiguous areas of the contract which could be contested through management decisions. Electronic mail messages were discovered in which newly appointed managers pledged to "get" the group of workers over whom they had been appointed. Grievances are no longer discussed and solutions sought. Instead, grievances are met at every level with the standard "no violation of the contract found." A supervisor who had been a union business agent said that he would be afraid if the company had done this when he was a union business agent. He would think that the company was trying to break the union. Managers deny that they want to break the union even though they would like to be rid of the union. Union members widely voice that they no longer trust management.

### Practices for Making Things "Problematic"

The interviews with managers and union members regarding how relations between them deteriorated contain distinct but often related assessments of the "good" and "problematic." These assessments involve the use of different practices of assessment by union members and managers to assess reversals in practices. Reversals of practices are instances in which one practice is replaced by another practice. In this section, reversals in practices structuring the internal labor market, management practices, and labor relations practices and their relation to the practices for making them "problematic" will be explored.

## The "Problematic" and the Internal Labor Market

First, one finds a complex of practices for assessing the "good" and the "problematic" built around restructuring the internal labor market. These practices and their relation to reversals of practices instituted by the company or the union are contained in Table III.

Table III

### Reversals of Practices Structuring the Internal Labor Market and Practices Used by Workers and Management to Make Them "Problematic"

	Reversal of Practices		Practices for Making Things Problematic	
	Before	After	Worker/Union	Management
Lifetime Employment and Benefits	Layoffs and Reduction of Benefits		No options in the job market  Perceived promises of no layoffs	Maintaining Profitability of Company
All work done by company work force	Outsourcing work historically done by company work force		Safety and quality of outsourced work  Threat to employment	Cutting costs by matching work force to changing work demands
Plants staffed for full operation	Plants staffed for flexible operation		Past agreements on schedule changes  Ability to plan for a life outside of work  Control role conflict by restructuring schedule	Matching production to demand  Control role conflict by giving workers skills to better cope with it
Promotion by seniority	Promotion requires passing tests  Promotion requires college education		Work itself qualifies a person to enter the apprentice program  Work itself qualifies for one for promotion  Supervisors should know the work and are dangerous if they do not	Testing predicts who will do well in the job  Education qualifies one for promotion  Supervisors supervise people more than work



From a union member's perspective, the company's management and union members began to grow apart around 1970 when the five person crew and associated A-frame truck technology of line work was replaced by the three person crew and the growing use of bucket truck technology. Later in the early 1970s, the company did away with doing outside construction with company crews. Instead, large jobs of constructing the electrical transmission and distribution system are done by contracting with other companies. In the late 1970s, the company was preparing to construct a nuclear power station while having the licensing process indefinitely delayed in the wake of the Three Mile Island nuclear power station accident. The company dealt with this by laying off mainly unionized workers in the line department. Between this layoff and the layoff in the mid-1980s, several district offices were closed and reorganized into centralized locations. This entailed workers moving or commuting and the creation of new crews and new seniority rankings with respect to layoffs. In the early 1980s, the company began to contract out more line work beyond the large construction jobs. In the mid-1980s after instituting an early retirement program to encourage a work force reduction of over seven percent, the company laid off an additional seven to eight percent of its work force, including the elimination of the work force of one whole power station and other reductions in power plant workers and line workers. The entire line apprentice program was terminated.

Several practices intensified the "problematic" nature of these force reductions for union members. By using seniority to effect layoffs and by using early retirement programs to entice older workers to leave, the oldest and the youngest workers were all but eliminated. Thus, any further reductions in the work force would begin to affect persons who were thirty-five to fifty-five years of age with significant years of seniority. Furthermore, the economy of this area had significantly worsened for persons trained as outside electricians, mechanics, millwrights, and machine operators. Between 1980 and 1990, the proportion of construction jobs making up the work force decreased by thirty-four percent, and the proportion of manufacturing jobs decreased twelve percent. The over all loss of jobs for persons who were thirty-five to forty-four years of age in 1990 was so severe that the major metropolitan area in this region lost over four percent of this age cohort in net migration between 1980 and 1990. More than one percent of the age cohort who was forty-five to fifty-four years of age in 1990 were lost in net migration during this period.

Union members perceived that their ability to exit to another job which would support the financial and family obligations of a person earning union wages with high seniority had significantly decreased. Any potential layoff now was much more "problematic" than in periods when seniority was an effective protection against a layoff or when one could easily find a job outside of the company.

Another strategy adopted by management which affected the internal labor market and made things problematic for unionized workers out sourcing a variety of jobs. From accounts by executives, the strategy was designed to reduce the permanent work force to that necessary to cover work that had to be done all of the time. In other words, outside contractors were employed to cover the periodic maintenance and construction jobs. This would also allow the company to build cost flexibility into the system to cover revenue shocks due to centralized dispatching, fluxuations in temperature from year to year, and economic conditions. The executives claim that the union should not worry about this practice since remaining jobs are now more secure. With the use of outside contractors, the company can now look at nonunionized companies and put downward pressure on wages by threatening to outsource more work if the union members cannot do a job as cheaply as outside contractors. On a daily basis, one hears some manager say, "If you cannot get this work done more productively, we will have to look at letting it out to a contractor." All of this is problematic to job security, income potential, and benefit retention to unionized workers.

The internal labor market was also "problematic" for the company's management. In the late 1970s, the company had incurred hundreds of millions of dollars of obligations on the unlicensed nuclear power plant. An executive announced to lesser executives that the company would reduce the work force a certain amount across the board. Some executives had hired the unused nuclear work force and felt obligated to protect their jobs. So, they turned to the unionized work force to effect work force reductions to cut costs.

If one turns to the layoffs in the mid-1980s, one finds on the one hand a letter from the executive level to the work force in which it was observed that operations and maintenance expenses had been increasing over sixteen percent per year. The executive writing the letter claimed that force reductions were the only way to deal with the problem. On the other hand, the parent company had just taken over dispatching and, in the process, pooled and

controlled a larger number of power plants. These power plants are now treated as cost and revenue centers. With excess capacity, older plants which are paid for and which are not encumbered with take-or-pay fuel contracts can be closed or placed on economic shut down. The nature of fuel contracts and the depreciation schedules of new versus old plants seems more relevant to determining a judgment about "productivity" than any real sense of productivity of the work force.

The economic shut down of a plant is made problematic for managers because it requires the remaining work force at plants on economic shut down to adopt new work rules to continue to operate the plants with more varied shift and maintenance requirements than when the plants were fully operational. Many studies in the company now focus on how job boundaries, crew size, job classifications, work rules regarding call outs and overtime, work rules regarding meals, and work rules regarding shift work made it difficult to take actions to reduce costs or to increase productivity. Attempts on the part of management to change job boundaries, crew size, job classifications, and various work rules begin. About one year later, one finds a labor relations document in which the company decides to be more "business like" and less paternalistic with respect to the union. Specifically, a concerted effort will be made to reassert management's rights to unilaterally make decisions and to talk up cost and productivity issues. A few years later, one finds managers making things problematic for workers: "If you can't increase your productivity, we will have to look at contracting out this work." One finds managers unilaterally changing work rules: "Here's my decision. If you don't like it, do what you need to do."

One of the issues which had come to the front of negotiations and grievances involved changes in how shifts were managed in power plants which were on economic shut down and, thus, were operating and not operating much more frequently than base loaded plants. At hand was a practice giving workers a five day notice before changing a work schedule before being required to pay overtime. The company wanted to be able to change the master shift schedule by giving workers a five day notice before the event. Such changes had become more frequent because of the practice of economic shut down as well as because of changes in human resources practices such as giving workers extra days off for good attendance and requiring more days to be spent in training. The union wanted the company to

continue to observe what they claimed was a past practice of giving five days notice before the work week in which the schedule change was to be made. The union claimed that such changes made it difficult to schedule their lives outside of work. This group of workers had experienced a higher divorce rate since the practice of economic shut down.

Here, two different practices emerge for dealing with work practices which interfere with a workers life outside of work. Management believes that, if workers had better problem solving skills, they could manage the role conflict created by changing shifts every two weeks and by changing these scheduled shifts with little notice. So, they cast about for more training programs to help workers cope with role conflicts set up by the structuring of work. Workers want to manage the role conflict by stabilizing the work schedule. They feel the only way to get the company to listen is to make schedule changes costly. The company feels that the union only wants more overtime for its workers.

In general, the human resources department works out of the counseling models which assume that individuals are responsible for their fates. When management takes decisions that complicate the life of a worker, it is the worker's problem to cope with their situations. It is the responsibility of the human resources department to create programs to empower workers to take responsibility for their lives. The union works out of a model which focuses on work practices. It recognizes that the practices established by management sets up their situation at work. Therefore, they use the grievance mechanism and contract negotiations to empower workers. This is problematic for human resources because they work from the assumption of management rights to set conditions and worker's responsibility to cope with the conditions. Human resources sees the union system as a "crutch" for poor workers who will not take responsibility for their work actions. Such workers would rather rely on "third party" intervention than take responsibility for their own lives.

Prior to the mid-1980s, promotions across the company had been made by seniority and within certain lines of promotion. There were no educational requirements. In the mid-1980s with the strategic changes of centralized dispatching of power generation, with strategic commitments to shift to marketing and conservation while holding the number of employees and the price of electricity constant, and with the resulting layoffs, the human resources department begins to cast around for practices to increase productivity among workers to do more with fewer. The company decided to participate in a study

with the national electric utility trade organization to identify qualifications to do various jobs if those jobs were reorganized around increasing productivity through self learning and improvement. A trade test and an attitude test were developed to qualify for craft positions.

Workers participated in the tests to standardize testing and qualifications. But, the exact nature of how the tests were to be used was not clearly communicated to the rank and file workers. So, workers who had constructed an expectation based on the past practices of seniority and lines of progression were met with a new series of standards that made promotion "problematic." The company had begun a new apprentice program for the first time since the layoffs in the mid-1980s. Over twenty persons went through the preapprentice school. During this time, they were involved with hands-on training experiences involving actual tasks that had to be performed in doing line work. At the end of the preapprentice school, a committee of union journeymen and company supervisors and managers judged a handful to be good enough to enter the training program. Then, the human resources department administered the battery of standardized test and failed one of the workers who had been passed by the committee. She was not allowed to progress until she passed the test.

This situation became "problematic" for all involved. The worker had passed the actual work tests that the journeymen and supervisors conducted. This raised serious questions for workers about the validity of the company's other tests. It was problematic for the human resources department because it stood in the way of the practice of selection which they were trying to establish. None of the workers or the union had been a part of deciding the criteria for the human resources testing program or how the testing program would be used. Union journeymen and many supervisors could not see how a worker who had demonstrated skill in the actual performance of work was not qualified for the work just because of responses on a pencil and paper test.

The union and the human resources department both quickly moved to try to establish the practice they took to be valid. The union filed grievances to establish the past practice of demonstrating skill through actual work as part of the contract. Managers denied the grievance and began to make changes to diffuse the crisis and to prevent further questioning of the practice. To diffuse the crisis, managers tried to work with the worker who had filed the grievance to enable her to pass the test when it was given again. The union encouraged the worker to stay with the grievance and to refuse to take the test in order to

establish the demonstration of skill in work as the criteria for entrance into the apprentice program. To reduce the chance of future crises, managers decided to administer the test before workers were admitted to the preapprentice school. This would prevent workers from experiencing a confirming judgment from the committee of journeymen and supervisors and then risking rejection by the test.

From the side of the traditional practice of testing by working, validity was in the outcome of work. Judgment about the work was by workers and supervisors who had demonstrated skill. From the side of the human resources department, validity was in the work studies used to select relevant criteria and in the validating of test to predict success on those relevant criteria. Judgment about a worker was established by a set of methods which placed workers in comparative fields and by human resources staff.

In addition to the establishment of pencil and paper testing as the first screen for allowing workers into craft progressions, college education standards were established for supervisory positions. From the point of view of human resources practices, the problems set up by needing to do more work with fewer people in the craft areas, the problems which had arisen from the application of authoritarian management practices by first line supervisors, and the problems set up by challenges to management decisions by the union could be solved by requiring college for supervisory positions. It was felt that college graduates would bring different problem solving and human relations practices to the supervisory position.

This move was problematic for union workers from two perspectives. First, it obviously made advance much more problematic than before. Second, it introduced supervisors who had no demonstrated skill or job knowledge from the union worker's perspective. This led to situations of having managers order workers to execute jobs which -- from the perspective of workers -- were unsafe. For example, one worker related an incident in which a manager who was not on the work site and who had no experience with line work ordered a foreman to energize a line during a rain storm. When the execution of the order was attempted, there was severe arcing of electricity down the insulated pole used to close the switch. The foreman backed off. The supervisor pushed her to close the switch. The foreman refused. The manager began to complain about insubordination. Or again, a supervisor who did not have work experience ordered a worker to use a crane to lift a piece of equipment which was near the maximum rated weight for the crane. The worker knew that she did not know

to do it. She went to another worker who did. The worker confronted the supervisor about how only certain well trained persons should be allowed to make such lifts. The discussion degenerated into a fight over job classifications and featherbedding. In addition to safety issues, the lack of having the most knowledgeable worker as a supervisor often left workers without a resource person to do infrequently done or particularly complicated jobs.

### The "Problematic" and Management Practices

Second, one finds a complex of practices for assessing the "good" and the "problematic" built around management practices. These practices and their relation to reversals of practices instituted by the company are contained in Table IV.

Table IV

#### Reversals of Management Practices and Practices Used by Workers and Management to Make Them "Problematic"

Reversal of Practices		Practices for Making Things Problematic	
Before	After	Worker/Union	Management
Work Group Leaders plan and coordinate work	Centralized planner and computer plan and coordinate work	Priorities are derived from work experience	Priorities are derived from operations research
Management discretion at work group level	Management discretion at middle and upper level	Supervisors are just the "finger of management"	Upper management wants supervisors to be the front line of the management team
Workers do work and control quality	Contractors do work and quality by management inspection	Quality and safety of outsourced work	Outsourcing is a means of cost control. Union complaints are "sour grapes" over jobs lost
Experiment in participatory management	"Voice not vote"	Participation is just a ploy to sell management decisions  Union training indicates participatory management is ploy to weaken union	Management must have final say because they are responsible  Participation is a union avoidance tool

As the company centralized decisions and the deployment of resources, the use of face-to-face communication in the work group to coordinate activity gave way to other practices which made communication and the coordination of work problematic. In response to measures required by the Internal Revenue Service to improve inventory control, the company adopted a centralized, computer driven inventory and planning system. This becomes problematic to workers and supervisors because work which they could identify, prioritize, and coordinate with other required crafts to do a job now are prioritized and coordinated by the planner and computer. It is problematic because the sense of priority is different between the workers and supervisors and the planner and the computer. The planner is now effectively made the director and evaluator of all work. The planner is disassociated from the actual work. The sequence of doing a job often conflicts with the ways that the supervisors use to work out the sequence of doing a job. As some workers, supervisors, and lower level managers put it, "It's like a Chinese fire drill."

The centralization of decisions has changed the role of supervisor from that of director and planner of work and arbiter of work rules to the deliverer of news from managers higher up the ladder. This creates problems for work group supervisors because they must now do a lot of checking up the ladder that they did not have to do. They cannot directly deal with things. They also have to carry out orders which they may not understand or with which they may not agree. It makes it possible for work group supervisors to role distance themselves from their own decisions as well as from their manager's decisions by claiming that all decisions are their manager's decisions. This is problematic for upper managers because they become the nameless, faceless "they" that are disliked by workers. They deal with this by trying to get supervisors to "own" decisions by claiming to workers that the decisions are their own. This also lets upper managers role distance themselves from decisions which are problematic to workers by claiming that decisions were taken by supervisors. This creates problems again for supervisors. For example, a supervisor who was a former union member was told by a manager who was an engineer and had never been a union member to take down flyers attacking management's position during negotiations. The supervisor did not think she should since she remembered that such communications were protected by labor law. But, wanting to be a good team player and wanting to "own" the decision, she ordered the flyers down as her decision. A few days latter, management



decided that they made a mistake and reversed the decision. Now, it was the supervisor who had angered the union members with her actions which were owned by her as her actions who was stuck with the relationship problem with her workers.

The removal of the design of work from lower levels and the contracting out of such work also set up safety problems for workers. Engineers and managers would design jobs, create job specifications, and let out work to contractors. Union members would claim that this work was poorly done by contractors. As a result, they claimed that they would often use plans from the engineering department to go out to work a job and find a "mess" that was dangerous and did not resemble the work specifications. Managers would dismiss such claims on the basis that the union was just angry about having work given to outside contractors instead of to them. This would anger union members. Union members accused managers of not caring about safety. This would anger managers. One management study was found in which it was claimed that the managers studied often failed to use the quality of work clause in the contract with an outside contractor to inspect work and to hold contractors accountable for their work.

The introduction of attempts to use participatory management also set up practices which were problematic for both union workers and managers. Early participatory practices were drawn from training at ivy league business schools to which various executives were sent by the company and from the human resources and organizational development vendors that would walk through the door of the human resources department from time to time looking for contract work. One of the early participatory experiments was the development of a company wide task force to make a recommendation about keeping half-rate electricity as one of the employee benefits. The half-rate benefit had been a long standing practice of the company. The half-rate was eventually rejected by the state utility board. This was problematic for workers because they felt that the company did not really fight for the benefit. Their anger was problematic for managers. But, what was more problematic was the expectation set up by the practice that participation meant that workers might have a say in setting company wide policies. One then finds evidence of managers attempting to modify the practice by distinguishing between having a say as having a voice but not a vote. Slogans to this effect could be found in the offices of several managers. One could often hear the litany, "Workers have a voice but not a

vote." Thus, workers were encouraged to be open and to say what they feel on issues. But, such encouragement became problematic for managers when what workers said hurt the feelings of managers and -- at times -- degraded managers. As one manager said, "It makes you want to get even."

As the company shifted the development of participatory management practices from the quality of work life to productivity issues, union leaders attended training provided by the union and a local state university on how participatory programs oriented toward productivity could be used to destroy unions. The union began to instruct workers to not volunteer for training or programs on such participatory practices. They were only to attend if ordered and paid to do so. Even then, they were armed with sets of questions to evaluate whether or not the training might be an attempt to undermine the union. This angered managers because it blocked the effectiveness of the productivity improvement training. At the same time, the union included proposals in negotiations to create a joint safety committee with decision making power. Half of the committee would be appointed by the union. Half of the committee would be appointed by management. They were attempting to join voice and vote. This was problematic for the company because the company had the legal liability for safety decisions and because it infringed on management's right to take unilateral action.

#### The "Problematic" and Labor Relations Practices

With respect to labor relations practices, one finds distinct but related assessments of the "good" and "problematic" with respect to identifying practices which contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between management and the union. These practices and their relation to reversals of practices instituted by the company or the union are contained in Table V.

Essentially, there are two practices of rights embedded in labor law (Gold, 1989). On the one hand, one finds the reserve rights doctrine: All rights not explicitly given up by management in the contract are reserved by management. The reserve rights doctrine is reiterated in the specific labor contract between the union and the company and in the training manuals used by the company with supervisors. In fact, the training manual specifically states that managements' rights -- the right rooted in the reserve doctrine -- is the cornerstone practice of management: The right of management to take unilateral action. To the extent that management stipulates explicitly or

Table V  
Reversals of Labor Relations Practices and  
Practices Used by Workers and  
Management to Make Them  
"Problematic"

Reversal of Practices		Practices for Making Things Problematic	
Before	After	Worker/Union	Management
Encourage supervisors to avoid grievances	Encourage supervisors to carry out management policies regardless of grievances	Duty to meet and confer	Manager's right to take unilateral action
Continue to negotiate over grievances informally until resolved	Resist all grievances not explicitly in the contract	Past practices extend the contract	Reserve management rights limit the contract
Paternalistic labor relations policy	Look out for the company's financial interest		

implicitly with the union with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, management has limited its ability to take unilateral actions. Thus, practices which limit management's ability to take unilateral actions tend to be seen as "problematic."

On the other hand, labor law defines collective bargaining as the duty to meet and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. As Gold (1989, p. 38) notes with respect to good faith: "It is not enough that they meet and say no to each other; they must genuinely try to reach agreement." From the union's perspective, this means that management should confer when decisions are taken which would alter wages, hours, and other terms of employment. In fact, as Gold (1989) notes, it is a refusal to bargain if one party changes the terms of employment without bargaining with the other party. In this study, the union considered all conditions established by past practices as terms of employment. As noted in the management labor relations training manual, management considered only those things explicitly given to the union as constituting the terms of employment: "If it's not explicitly in the book (the contract), it is a part of management's right to take unilateral action." The definition of good or

problematic relations for management and for the union come out of their own practice of rights defined in labor law. And, these rights are semi-exclusive and semi-opposed. That is, the exercise of one sets up to some degree the negation of the other.

During most of the 1980s, the company had one labor relations management team, and the union had one business agent. Labor relations tended to be deemed good by both parties during this period. If a grievance was filed against a supervisor, it was considered poor supervision by labor relations management. The number of grievances filed against a supervisor was included in job performance evaluations of supervisors. Thus, supervisors were encouraged to accommodate various requests by workers or to become very good at negotiating differences. The labor relations personnel during this period worked at creating a good relationship with the business agent of the union. They would travel to trouble spots together. They would discuss issues over drinks. They could share viewpoints with each other and could see each others viewpoints. Grievances that were filed were first worked out by the labor relations management and the business agent. Then, labor relations management would get the necessary legal backing for the solution to sell it to higher management. If a solution could not be found such that the labor relations personnel had to find that management's decision had not violated the contract, the labor relations personnel would continue to discuss the problem until an informal solution could be found. This practice protected management's rights by averting an official, legally binding decision about a condition of employment. At the same time, good relations were maintained by informally and unofficially finding a solution acceptable to the union business agent.

Following the strategic decisions taken in the mid-1980s and the resulting layoffs and attempts to reorganize work, both management and union members began to find this set of labor relations practices problematic. From the side of management, it is difficult to reorganize work if supervisors are encouraged to avoid grievances. It is difficult to reorganize work if grievances are denied in order to go protect a new work practice unilaterally established by management and then informally negotiated in order to modify the new work practice in a way not acceptable to management. One begins to find the term "distrust" applied to labor relations personnel by management for practices that encouraged the relationship deemed as good by management. One begins to

find managers wondering whose side the labor relations personnel are on when they wear union symbols and when they seem to be too friendly with union leaders. From the union side, grievances began to be dropped by the business agent because they were not acted on in a timely fashion. The business agent began to neglect meeting with units of the union in outlying plants and districts. Union workers felt that the business agent was not acting on their concerns. Again, one begins to find the term distrust applied to the business agent by union workers.

In the late 1980s, the union elected new leadership and the company changed labor relations management personnel within a period of less than two years. Having recently experienced layoffs, the increased use of outside contractors, and significant efforts to reorganize work in ways that were problematic to union members, the union elected persons who brought a new set of practices to labor relations. Since the former business agent had engaged in a series of informal arrangements to establish practices that were now being attacked by attempts by management to reorganize work, the new business agents began to file grievances to try to make the informally established practices part of the recognized contract or official side agreements. By doing so, the business agents were acting to limit management's right to take unilateral action. Thus, the business agents are seen by management as "pushing" and as "radical." Distrust is now a term that managers applied to union officials instead of labor relations management personnel. Since the business agents are acting on the concerns of union members, they are now trusted by union members. The new labor relations management personnel are hired to end paternalistic labor relations practices and to become more business like. Supervisors are now told to act as they wish to manage their areas under the direction of managers and to not worry about grievances. As grievances are filed by the union to resist the reorganization of work that violates the informally agreed to past practices, there is no legally binding record of the past practices. Thus, the unilateral action taken by management is not seen by them as a violation of the terms of employment since the past practices in question are not a part of the official contract or side agreements. Over one-hundred such past agreements are unilaterally revoked by management. Now, grievances are not found in violation of the contract by labor relations personnel and are continually forced to binding arbitration instead of resolved by informal agreement. It appears to union members that



the company wants to break the union. The duty to bargain seems to be ignored by the company. Distrust is now a terms union members apply to management instead of union officials.

### Trust and the "Problematic"

Finally, the union and management made their relationship problematic with respect to trust. The issue of trust seems to be raised whenever a person or organization breaks with practices that the trusting party feels she could count on or whenever the trusted party resorts to acts which would be unacceptable or problematic to the trusting party. As seen above, the two different definitions of rights in labor law make the acts of the opposing parties opportunistic for each other. If the union is successful in negotiating to resolve the concerns of its members, managers walk away with new areas in which they cannot take unilateral action. If managers take unilateral action without consulting or negotiating, it appears that they are not willing to fulfill their duty to bargain. For example, one finds managers making the issue of safety problematic by claiming that the union cannot be trusted because they turn every safety issue into attempts to address work rules in ways that become part of the contract and limit their arena of unilateral action. One finds the union making the issue of safety problematic because the company unilaterally alters safety rules in ways the union considers unsafe.

If one examines the ways in which the union and management made their relationship problematic with respect to practices used to construct the internal labor market, management practices, and labor relations practices, there are numerous incidents of changes in practices on which one party or another thought they could count. Union members thought they could count on a stable job progression and job security. The company reduced the craft work force several times in twenty years and altered the rules of advancement. The company reorganized how work was done to reduce the numbers of workers needed to do it. The company began an extensive use of contractors to out source work which had been done by union members. Workers thought that they could count on the paternalistic labor relations practices. The company moved to reclaim disputed areas of unilateral action. The company thought that they could count on union leadership which would hold the concerns of workers in check. A new group of leaders were elected which acted on the concerns workers.

The issue of trust in these reversals of practices was made even more problematic by circumstances accompanying them. Even though executive management instituted an early retirement plan to try to reduce the work force by attrition and held open the possibility of further layoffs, there are numerous accounts from managers, supervisors, and workers of good will tours and discussions with upper managers in which the possibilities of layoffs were denied right up to the day they happened. Workers in power plant operations and maintenance from the entire company were called to the plant which was to be closed for a meeting. At this meeting, all of them were terminated with no warning other than the vague hints of layoffs modified by numerous promises of no layoffs. When the layoffs occurred, the company had engaged scores of contract workers to do the same work of workers laid off. Almost daily, workers are reminded that their jobs could be done by contract workers.

The company offered the possibility of participatory management. Then, it was significantly curtailed. When a few workers chosen by managers are included on management committees and decisions are made which go against past practices on which workers have counted, workers are told that they had a say by virtue of the small representation chosen by management on the committee. When workers voice their concerns, they are sometimes aimed at questioning the concern and integrity of managers. The chance for voice by workers has turned into a chance to publicly degrade managers. Techniques of active listening taught to managers become rituals for communicating closed channels of influence for workers. As one worker put it, "When you hear, 'I hear you, I share your concern, and let me see what can be done about it,' you know you have just been ignored."

The issue of trust raised by reversals of practices was also made more problematic by an increase in practices which reduced the personal relations that could mediate such reversals. By moving management control outside of the actual work group and by recombining workers in work groups, it is hard to build relationships. As one manager put it, "It's hard to build relationships with workers when you only see them once in a while." With the centralization of decisions, there is more distance between workers and management as the supervisor becomes "someone else's finger." With the parent company more involved in the strategic positioning of the company, there is more distance and less involvement of executives at the work group and individual community level than when strategic positioning was closer to the work group and

individual community level.

An example of the consequences of the loss of personal relations with workers set up by such practices can be found in an interview with an executive level manager. She had once been heavily involved with the training of line personnel. During this period, she became friends with several workers and knew them to be reasonable people. That is, they could see her viewpoint and she could see their viewpoint. So, it came as a shock to her when, years later, those workers with whom she used to have an active relationship now were on information picket lines protesting the unreasonableness of the company. It came as a shock to her when she would visit power plants and they would criticize the concern of management over safety.

Distrust also becomes a way of making the relationship between the union and management problematic. It would anger managers during negotiations when the business agent would lean over the table and say, "We don't trust you any more." Distrust made it difficult to get unilateral decisions accepted by workers. As one worker put it, "When a manager asks you to do something, you're first question to yourself is, 'What is she up to?'" Instead of going along with the company's new participatory program on improving the quality and productivity of work, the union instructs its members not to participate voluntarily. The union questions the motives and effects of the program in its newsletter. The company sees such tactics as groundless and simply as strategies to organize more workers. On the one hand, distrust has been used as an organizing tool by the union. Union membership has increased from about sixty percent in organized units to about eighty percent in organized units over three years. On the other hand, participatory management practices have been adopted by the company as a union avoidance devices. As a senior executive put it, "If workers can get what they want through participation, why would they want a union?"

Distrust is also problematic for the union. Management does not want to engage in serious discussions over safety issues because they distrust what the union will do with the discussions. They are afraid that the union will use them to get into changing work rules in ways that they do not want them changed. Management might be willing to try to figure out ways to accommodate the concerns of workers in specific settings. But, they are afraid that they will become part of past practices that will limit their ability to take unilateral action.

Management also engages in practices that encourage distrust of



workers. In training manuals, workers are portrayed as only interested in more work for less money. The union is pictured as attempting to try to take management's rights away from them at every turn possible. In management meetings, the union is talked about as being radical and irrational. Managers brag about baiting union officials into anger. Friendships between managers and workers are discouraged because they may lead managers into compromising management rights. Training manuals encourage supervisors to see themselves as part of the management team against the union.

CHAPTER V  
PRACTICES CONSTITUTING THE COMPANY  
AS FAMILY LIKE

Introduction

Some company practices encourage a family like atmosphere; other practices do not. As one analyzes sources of data for practices that constitute the company as family like, one can identify three sets of practices: (1) practices used to involve the employee and her family in the company as if the company were an extended family, (2) practices used to relate to employees as friends, and (3) practices that leave local managers unencumbered enough to respond to workers as friends and family. These practices are examined first. Then, the analysis will turn to explore practices that discourage family like practices. References to the replacement of family like practices with practices associated with enmity show an increase in distrust. Thus, the analysis will proceed by exploring how various practices set up distrust, how distrust is enacted by the application of analogies about past breaches of trust to current situations, and how distrust is encouraged by threats of repeating past events that broke trust. A key element in analogies of distrust is perceived deception. So, various management and union practices are classified according to their potential to set up the perception of deception and -- in doing so -- encourage distrust. Finally, a number of dividing practices will be explored to see how they discourage family like practices.

Practices Used to Constitute the Company as Family Like

Workers and managers recall a time in company history when the company borrowed a number of practices found in family and friendship settings and construct the relationships between management and the work force. Three sets of practices became apparent.

### Extended Family

First, one can identify practices which involve the employee and her family in the company as if they were part of an extended family. There were monthly family night dinners. The act of inviting people to participate in an informal meal offers a relationship between managers and workers by making them companions in the event. A quick glance at the term companion in a dictionary reveals the ritual that establishes the relationship: Companion is Latin for "with bread." The event was objectified as family by calling it a family night dinner. Families, rather than simply employees, were invited and participated. Managers knew family members by name and knew information about their concerns, family events, and community involvement. Such knowledge and the use of it construct the relation as personal and not simply as business. Managers engaged in informal conversations about the company's business and family member's business. In doing so, family business and company business mix and merge. During the winter holidays, there would be separate parties for adults and for children. At the children's party, each child would have a gift with her name on it. Again, the practice constitutes workers and their families as persons who are personally known and valued. Managers and workers would visit each other in each other's homes. This extended the relationship between supervisor and worker as friendship beyond the relationship offered through official events such as family night dinners and holiday parties.

In the company as family like, parent-child type relations would be used to construct the supervisor-worker relationship. A supervisor would treat workers as a child. Adopting the practice of parent, a boss would protect employees from dangerous work conditions and from problematic decisions from other managers. Or a boss would push upper managers until the wishes of her workers were met. On the other hand, bosses could become the authoritarian father who was always right, who offered no explanation for orders, and who punished those who did not obey or who got on their bad side.

Beyond the devices used to construct personal relationships between managers and workers as family like, workers could sometimes use the resources of the company in their personal lives as if company resources were family resources. If a worker needed to use a company facility or equipment in a community organization in which she was involved, she could. If equipment was needed for a personal project, it could often be used. The involvement of

workers in community activities was seen by the community and the company as company involvement. Workers would be recognized in family night dinners and in company publications for their community involvement. They would identify themselves as a part of the company in their community activities.

The benefits extended to workers placed the company in the role of taking care of workers and of putting the employees and their families ahead of other considerations. The company provided reduced rates for electricity and paid benefits. These were extended into retirement. If a worker was injured, light duty would be found. If permanent injury or the reorganization of work threatened a worker's job, other work would be found. Workers responded to such loyalty with loyalty of their own. As one worker put it, "You knew the company cared about you; so you stayed near the phone on weekends in case they needed you."

### Friendship

Second, employees were treated as friends. Friendship would be offered through acts such as giving workers extra time off for family emergencies without negative consequences, dealing with mistakes without becoming punitive, seeking forgiveness for transgressions and granting forgiveness for transgressions, being the first to do a dirty, unpleasant, or dangerous job, listening to the concerns of workers and acting to address them, and giving workers breaks in bad weather or working conditions. It should be noted that these practices sometimes set up situations that were problematic for some workers. Friends got better jobs and promotions than workers not in the circle of friends with the supervisor.

The importance of certain acts in the construction of friendship was emphasized by one worker with an analogy. You get married. You tell each other that you love them. You believe it. Then, you begin to neglect telling them that you love them. You find one day that you don't love them. In the above list of practices associated with the manager-worker relationship as friend, many practices act on the other in a way that assumes and constitutes the other as valuable. A boss goes out on a hot day and takes the crew for a soda, asks how things are going, and listens. The complaints of workers become the concerns of a supervisor as she advocates for those concerns with her manager. A supervisor knows that a job will be dirty or dangerous; so she exposes herself to

the risk with the workers.

Several of these techniques have been taken up in various training programs currently provided to supervisors by the company. For example, it has been noted that the company has provided supervisory training that includes a listening technique built around the litany: "I hear you; I share your concern; let me see what can be done about it." On its face, this could be a valuing of the worker. Yet, one will hear a worker ask: "Is it the person or is it the program?" When a practice is known or suspected to be a part of management training, it makes it possible for a worker to pose this distinction. A manager could use this technique simply to allow a worker both to express a concern and to show concern back without acting on the concern. This often seems to happen. Workers seem to remember whether or not something was done about a concern. This is especially true when a concern is persistent. Under these conditions, the litany is sometimes seen as a hypocrisy and evokes anger.

The discussion above assumes that the valuing that takes place is the valuing of the worker by the supervisor. There were some instances of the valuing of supervisors by workers. These instances often included such practices as taking workers into the managers confidence by sharing frustrations, pressures, and issues that go on behind the scene with other managers and workers. While friendship always includes this kind of sharing, such sharing did not necessarily set up friendship. For example, one worker was assigned light duty of helping a supervisor while the worker was getting over an injury. During this time, the worker got to see all of the pressures and conflicts that the manager had to address. By talking these issues over, the worker was taken into the confidence of the manager. Yet, in this instance, neither the worker or the manager used the term friend to objectify their relationship. Instead, the worker could now see the manager's point of view and -- from the manager's point of view -- had become a better employee. In fact, a good employee from a manager's point of view is one who can see things from the manager's point of view. And a good manager from the worker's point of view is one who can see things from the employee's point of view. While such "seeing" is a part of valuing the other, it is not necessarily valuing the other. Only a handful of instances were found in which both a union worker and a manager valued each other and their relationship by objectifying it as friendship.

An important ritual of friendship is forgiveness. Several workers

suggested that the company and the union could solve their problems if management would admit mistakes, apologize, and ask for help in moving forward together. Without exception, those that expressed this felt that the union would be astonished, would admit their mistakes, apologize, and also ask for help. As one worker put it, "This would start the long road to trust, rededication, remoralization, quality, and profits." This ritual helps to salvage a friendship by defining that which was offending as a mistake, by expressing regret over the offense and pain caused to the other and thereby valuing the other, and by inviting the other to continue the relationship -- thereby valuing the relationship.

However, offering an apology is problematic on several fronts. First, it requires one to value the relationship more than the offending line of action. If management rights, a particular management strategy, worker's rights, a particular union strategy, or whatever is more important than a continuing relationship, then the ritual of forgiveness is moot because it will require defining the offending line of action as a mistake. Second, if the party who opens the ritual of forgiveness is rejected, enmity will probably be deepened. Third, the party who opens the ritual may do so because they value the relationship more than the other party. If this becomes apparent to the other party, it may be used to squeeze more out of the party who opens the ritual. Fourth, an apology is an asymmetric act. If one party offers an apology and ask for forgiveness, the other party now must consider accepting the apology and offering a counter apology if the party wants the relationship to move forward. Otherwise, they risk deepening enmity. Fifth, the opening act of the ritual of forgiveness -- admitting a mistake and offering an apology -- is also the opening act of punishment (Foucault, 1979). For example, one worker said that she had "popped off" and hurt the feelings of her boss. After she cooled off, she admitted that she had been wrong by talking to her boss as she had and was sorry. The boss indicated that she had better not do it again because the incident was being placed in her personnel file along with a note observing that she had admitted to the event. Once a mistake is admitted, it becomes a confession verifying guilt in the practice of punishment. Sixth, and last, admitting a mistake and offering an apology also make it easier to engage in rituals of degradation (Garfinkel, 1956). If managers admit to mistakes, it is possible for the union to degrade them with workers as a tool to increase membership and to create support for negotiations. If union leaders admit to mistakes, it is possible for management to degrade them with workers as a tool



to decrease the support of union leadership among union workers and to decrease the appeal of the union to nonunion workers. Evidence of both of these tactics could be found in union newsletters, management memos, and notes of observations of interactions. While trust might be enticed from a completed act of confession on the part of two parties as suggested by the worker above, the act is so replete with potential opportunism that a certain Kierkegaardian leap of trust, valuing of the relationship, or having nothing else left to lose is required to initiate the ritual of forgiveness in the first place.

### Unencumbered Relations

Finally, an important device which enabled friendship and family practices was the small, independently operated district. Everyone in the small district knew each other and worked with each other. Managers were once workers and were a part of the continuous group of employees in the district even though their position changed from worker to supervisor. In the small districts, line workers had more direct contact with the public and had to play the role of "the company." The independent nature of district operations also made friendship possible. The boss could set her own agenda. So, she was capable of responding to the concerns of workers. There was no push from the top. Thus, there were no devices such as pushing productivity or holding people accountable to turn the supervisor into an evaluator and punisher or rewarder and to turn the worker into a work device and an object of punishment. There was less centralized management handing down decisions which could threaten relationships, job security, and work practices and which could not be controlled by the local manager.

### Distrust and Practices Which Discourage Family Like Practices

It is striking to note that many accounts in the interviews and notes on observations of interactions that include references to the replacement of practices associated with the company as family with practices associated with enmity are also accounts with reference to distrust. A key element in establishing distrust with respect to a current situation is an analogical application of an incident which was defined as breaking a trust to interpret and

act on the current situation. For example, one worker was told that she could be open and frank when talking with a person studying her work group. Later, things she spoke about were placed in her personnel file and used against her. Thus, she said that one cannot trust such promises from management. Once an analogy of distrust is applied, it blocks or makes problematic communication, interaction, and relationship because the other is considered as potentially opportunistic. When asked to participate in this study with guarantees of confidentiality, the worker repeated the analogy and declined. She said that she could no longer trust such promises.

Here, the term analogy rather than a term such as stereotype is used with respect to the practice of distrust because stereotype often implies an oversimplification or an inaccurate interpretation of a reality. Since Foucault's approach does not allow one to claim a reality apart from the device or practice, analogy is used.

Probably the main event that is used in most analogies of distrust by workers was the layoff in the mid-1980s. A reading of interviews with workers and most supervisors and lower level managers reveals the following analogy: The company had never had a serious layoff. Even in the depression in the 1930s, arrangements were made to keep workers at fewer hours of work and lower wages. One felt that one had a job that one could count on until retirement. This, it will be remembered, is an important element in the practice of the company as family like. Before the layoffs, managers kept claiming that there would probably be no layoffs and that things were fine. As one manager put it, "One day my boss was sitting in that chair telling me that there would be no layoffs; the next day, large numbers of people were terminated." This event occurred during contract negotiations and angered the union because of the lack of advance notice before the layoffs. At the time of the layoff, most interviews containing the analogy reveal that the impression of no layoffs followed by layoffs created an atmosphere of mistrust. After that, most workers felt that one has to question every decision management makes. As one worker said, "It makes you question the decision and probably see it the wrong way." Even in locations in the company not affected by this layoff, workers and managers are anxious about their jobs and question the impact of new technologies, changes of work rules, and the use of outside contractors on job security.

As this analogy is evoked and applied to question and resist



management decisions, managers become angered and frustrated. They claim that the work force is now at a minimum level and that jobs are relatively secure. Thus, they see that such distrust is either irrational, rooted in some kind of blue collar emotional insecurity, rooted in a lack of problem solving skills, or encouraged by union leadership. A glance at union newsletters and flyers reveals that such analogies of distrust are used in appealing for solidarity in negotiations. At the same time, one can hear managers threaten workers with outsourcing their work. Technologies and work rules are being adopted by managers that utilize fewer workers. The executive level of management had adopted a general policy of no new rate increases, no new plant construction, and no new hires. Officially, more must be done with less. Whenever a worker hears a manager say, "Do more with less," the worker often evokes an analogy including the executive's policies and questions the decision.

An element of the layoff which is denied by most senior level management but which is in most accounts given by workers and managers is deception. By deception, it is simply meant that the appearance of one line of action seems to mask another line of action that eventually becomes apparent. Intentionality of actors is not implied. As for layoffs, managers gave the impression of no layoffs. They maintained this position until the actual layoffs. That impression, as much as the violation of the practice of job security, is at the core of the distrust analogy.

Six practices were found in various analogies of distrust around deception that both encouraged the perception of deception and made friendship and family like relationships problematic.

First, local control of decisions, in the period when the company was like a family, was replaced with centralized control. After the change, the supervisor or local manager could not make a decision without checking with their superiors. This situation sets up a number of problematic practices. Sometimes a supervisor can create distance from decisions and thereby maintain relations with workers by claiming that she is just "delivering the news" or that "my boss wants you to do this unpleasant task." It is problematic to upper managers because they are removed from the scene and are offered as targets for anger and frustration. It helps to set up managers as the untrustworthy "they." Other times, a supervisor will use the distance to set up a manager as the punisher or enforcer: "So-and-so wants this done!" What is implied here is that the worker must answer to the enforcer if the act is not done. Again, this is a role distancing

strategy. It allows the local supervisor to use a distant manager to deliver a threat that the local manager might want to deliver so as either to protect the relation or to mask her inability to carry through with the threat on her own. Again, this is problematic for upper managers because they are the source of punishment and are therefore feared.

As a strategy to deal with this problem when decisions are handed down, the first line supervisors are encouraged by managers to make the decision look like their own. Managers want supervisors to "own" the command as their own decision. As one supervisor lamented, "This puts me in the position of lying if I don't really agree with the decision." So, the strategy of having supervisor's "own" management decisions by representing them as their own creates a potential deception. When decisions are reversed, the potential for perceiving deception increases. It should be noted that deception may not be intended. Decisions are changed. In the case of the mid-1980s layoffs, managers may have felt that there would likely be no layoffs. But when the decision was reversed, it is hard to tell if the first line of action was designed to deceive especially both when a worker is outside of the decision making setting and when a worker cannot tell if a decision is not a supervisor's actual decision.

Second, some actors are in the position of taking decisions that they know will be problematic to some. This requires a sell in which some aspect of the decision is emphasized, other aspects are diminished or recast in terms of other motives, and yet other aspects are masked. While deception is not necessarily intentional, the use of strategies to sell decisions sets up the perception of deception. For example, one worker related one pattern of selling in the area of safety that creates the potential to perceive deception. According to this worker, managers do not overtly force a violation of safety rules. In fact, they maintain a strong public face in their concern over safety. Yet, a manager will send an understaffed crew with respect to safety rules. The manager will say that she will send help when it is needed. Then, when help is required, none is available. If a work crew returns to the office rather than works in violation of safety rules, the manager will ask, "Couldn't you do this?" A worker knows this and wants to please her supervisor. So, she violates the safety rules.

This example contains an element of a third strategy that sets up the possibility of perceiving an act as deception: deniability. In the example above, workers are defined by safety rules as being responsible for managing the risk

of their acts. In other words, if there is a problem, it is their fault unless they were specifically ordered to do the act which violated the safety rules. The little procedure reported above by a worker makes it possible for a manager to get work done that violates the safety rules while denying responsibility for commanding the unsafe practice. It invites a perception that the manager is deceiving the worker to get her to engage in unsafe acts. Another strategy that creates the possibility of deniability and sets up the perception of deception is the refusal to put decisions in writing. In the labor relations arena, both the union and managers are careful not to put things in writing that could be used against them in their legal proceedings or in campaigns designed to degrade the other side. This leaves actors in the awkward position of living with agreements and with conversations while denying them.

Fourth, the practice of dividing the company into different management groups both who use different tools for analyzing and acting and who are judged by different audiences sets up the potential for perceiving deception. Not only does a supervisor of a work group have to check upward, but there are several different groups applying different devices to the same decision. The financial groups put decisions into the context of budgets and begin to work by applying various accounting practices to the decision. Operations and power generation engineers begin to examine the design and the cost of the design of the decision. Safety staff analyze risk factors and safety rules associated with the decision. Labor relations staff evaluate how the decision affects the labor contract. From a different view point, the union staff does the same things. Few of these devices value the worker in and of themselves. A worker is a cost, an element in a technical-organizational design, a score on a test, an element of safety risk, and a party to a labor contract. With all of the devices working on decisions, they are held in limbo.

If being caught in conflicting practices from above enables limbo, so does a variety of supervisory practices. With an increased use of meetings as a technique for coordinating management decisions and commands, supervisors are involved in more meetings and have less time to attend to emerging problems. At other times, a supervisor will continue with a practice to get along with the work group. In both cases, a practice is allowed to develop with tacit, if not explicit, approval which can be reversed when it comes to the attention of the appropriate manager. For example, a supervisor created a special job classification that did not seem to be in the contract to deal what she perceived

was a pay and job responsibility discrepancy. This seemed to be approved by managerial staff in the area where this supervisor worked. But, this was problematic for human resources because it did not fit the contract. It set up line of progression problems. Steps were taken by management to try to put the worker back into the original job classification scheme. Nevertheless, the worker had done some work which could put her into a different classification scheme. The union leadership pushed the issue for the worker. Two elements here set up the potential for perceiving deception. First, a multitude of perspectives get applied to the scene: supervisor, managers, labor relations staff, and union staff. Some of them lend themselves to judging the situation one way and others lend themselves to judging the situation in another way. Second, as the issue is worked on over a period of time, several reversals of decisions and reworking of sells pitches for a decision are elaborated.

A fifth set of practices which set up the possibility of perceiving deception were the mutual analogies of distrust applied by managers and workers to each other around the issue of safety. The company in this study had increased its focus on safety because of a growing number of more serious injuries. A strategy used by the more senior management was to attend the local monthly safety meeting. Managers perceived that workers used this fact to combine nonsafety issues with safety issues to get the nonsafety issues resolved. Thus, managers often approach safety with an analogy of distrust toward the union. As one manager said, "It's hard to tell if their safety concerns are legitimate or if they are simply a cover to keep from changing work rules or to featherbed." Similarly, workers apply an analogy of distrust to managers. Workers perceive that managers dismiss their safety concerns out of hand if they will cost anything. During one safety meeting, workers pushed a safety engineer to test some safety equipment. The engineer resisted because she said that the equipment was safe, and it would cost too much to test it. At the insistence of the senior manager present, the test was run. During a different safety meeting, workers raised issues about the safety of reducing the number of workers to do a particular task. Immediately, one of the senior executives present cut the workers off with a comment about featherbedding. These analogies of distrust make problematic open communication and the valuing of perspectives on safety.

Finally, and sixth, the use of written policies and procedures about how things are to be done by the company contributes to the perception of deception

and distrust. Employees are exposed through training, meetings, and written communication to company policies and procedures. They become a basis for judging what happens at work. To the extent that actions of managers and official policy are identified as divergent, it becomes possible for managers to be perceived as deceptive. As one worker stated, "If you look at this company on paper, it's a great company to work for; but there is a big difference between what is said and what is done."

### Dividing Practices Which Discourage

#### Family Like Practices

In chapter one, dividing practices were defined as symbolic, ritual, and physical practices of dichotomously separating groups into in-groups and out-groups. In addition to the practice of distrust which makes practices of friendship with distrusted parties problematic, four other dividing practices were found to make the valuing of others, open communication, and objectifying a relationship as friendship problematic.

First, as already noted, the centralization of command has removed the latitude of decision making open to the local supervisor. As the union has engaged in resisting the attempts of management to alter work rules and the internal labor market, the control of union members has also become more centralized. Now, neither the local manager or the local union steward nor the worker can easily work things out without checking above. As one manager interviewed said, "The company and union have reached down into the work group and taken away the relationship between the supervisor and the worker."

Second, techniques of team building and the use of teams have been applied to coordinate management. While some teams include persons from several levels of the company hierarchy of command, most teams are composed of one level of the hierarchy. Thus, the most executive level of managers are a team which works together to set policy and to work on all other levels. The managers at the operational or plant level work as a team to work on workers. Within a team, there seems to be relatively open communication and some valuing of each other and of each other's opinions. However, what goes on in the team is hidden from those outside of the team. Teams develop policies and take decisions which become positions to be sold to others. Training manuals for supervisors encourage managers to be a part of the

management team and to identify with the objectives of managers rather than with unionized workers. All of this tends to set up a them-and-us analogy, blocks open communication between them-and-us as we try to sell our position to them, and blocks the valuing of them because doing so would be disloyal to us.

Third, the practice of requiring a college education enhances the division between managers and workers. The very act of requiring higher education discounts the noneducated and the craft knowledge of the noneducated. It is not uncommon to hear managers attribute problems between workers and managers to a "blue collar mentality" and to a lack of education. By requiring a college education for managers, new lower level managers do not have the actual experience of the actual work being done. So, one will often hear workers comment on how their supervisors are "as dumb as a post" when it comes to the actual work.

One place where this duality of experience and viewpoint can be seen with problematic consequences is in the area of safety. Consider the following interview with a manager who came up through the craft ranks:

Most managers out there are new. They have an education. But, they have no real first hand experience on the job. We've moved away to a type of education that is school based rather than work based. A good manager can manage. But, not many people can really do this without work based experience. Being a line man is a high risk job. . . . danger is the issue. You can do a job safely. You have to control risks. We are getting managers who have never really done this work. They may have some demonstration experience, but very few have had to go out under adverse conditions when people are out of power.

Here, managers tend to apply engineering, risk management, and accounting practices to problems to construct a statistical distribution of outcomes. Costs are assigned to outcomes so a monetary amount can be assigned to safety measures for various designs. The least cost combination will more than likely have some measurable chance for an accident that has been included in the cost. If there is an accident, the cost of it to the company has already been included in the cost of a project through estimated legal fees and insurance costs. On the other hand, the worker faces an actual loss of a limb or life from the accident which is a probability and a cost for a manager. Many line workers will tell you that the goal is to walk away from the job with both hands and all ten fingers.

One of the continual struggles between managers and the union is over

safety. As managers configure tasks or change work rules in ways that appear to workers to increase the chance of accidents in order to cut costs, they adopt new rules and procedures which load the problem of risk management onto the worker. Workers would rather have the work and the work force configured to make the work less risky in the first place as they see the work. If managers came up from the craft ranks and had experience with actually confronting dangerous situations in adverse conditions such that their life and limbs were exposed directly to the risk, they might have a view of safety more similar to workers.

During this study, workers who were injured, had been injured, or had just missed injury were encountered. One worker made contact with an energized line a few days after being interviewed and lost part of both arms.

Another place where this duality of experience and viewpoint can be seen is in the area of disciplinary problems. From a manager's point of view, workers are like children who are always testing the limits of management. They seem to abuse lunch hours and breaks. They can be found loafing on the job. They push the sick leave policy to the maximum allowable days off of work. Interviews with workers and observations made in this study would tend to confirm that these behaviors do occur. Given this judgment about workers, managers devise surveillance schemes such as hiding to watch workers, conducting surprise inspections, listening in on radio communications, and claiming to workers to randomly listen to outgoing phone calls. On the other hand, workers see layoffs, outsourcing of work, and changes in work rules as attacks on job security and as attempts to drive them. They experience all of the surveillance strategies as harassment. As managers devise strategies to alter work rules or to carry out surveillance, workers devise strategies to resist without appearing to resist. For example, with the increased need for overtime with the reduced work force, managers want workers to remain near a phone on their time off without paying them standby wages. Workers are angry both about the layoffs and about the request to alter their extra work life with no compensation. So, workers buy answering machines to screen phone calls on their off hours.

Fourth, the labor contract and associated mechanisms of arbitration and negotiations are replete with practices that divide. Labor law establishes two parties with responsibilities for representing different interests. It establishes two, mutually exclusive sets of rights in management rights and worker rights.

By focusing on rights, arbitration and negotiations become a zero sum game. Rights acquired by one group are rights lost by the other group. By focusing on costs, arbitration and negotiations are forced into a zero sum game. Every dollar management can cut represents one more dollar of profit against a given revenue. Every dollar management can cut represents one less dollar the union employee does not get. It was interesting to note that, while managers and the union seemed to know the costs of various proposals in negotiations and to talk about wanting a win-win situation, no one analyzed proposals in terms of costs and benefits to both parties which would be necessary to construct a win-win option rather than just a zero sum option.

The union is a political organization in that elections determine leadership. Union members judge leaders based on how well they represent their interests. This acts on union leaders to be sensitive to and push worker issues. An earlier union leader in this study was defeated because workers perceived that she did not attend meetings of workers, did not follow up on grievances such that time limitations lapsed, and worked far too closely with labor relations personnel at their detriment. Additionally, union leaders need support from the membership in negotiations. Negative campaigns seem to elicit more support than positive campaigns. This encourages a confrontation with managers.

Management is a different type of political organization. Promotions, salaries, team management, training, and command structures are used to maintain solidarity with respect to workers. Managers can "make names" for themselves by cutting costs and by not being afraid to hold workers accountable. This encourages a confrontation with workers. Training encourages managers to be in solidarity and consensus with the management team in preserving and exercising management rights. This discourages working differences out with workers unless it is on management's terms. It encourages practices such as telling workers why things are done rather than listening to workers' concerns about how things are done.

These union and management practices make it dangerous for anyone to practice friendship across the divide. The previous labor relations personnel and union leadership had something of a friendship. They had an ability to listen to each other, to modify each other's viewpoint, and to try to get an agreed upon decision passed through their respective organizations. Union members ended up distrusting the leader because they felt she did not actively push their



issues. Managers ended up distrusting the labor relations personnel because they felt they sold out to the union. As one senior manager said, "Such-and-such would rather switch than fight." Union members are chastised by fellow members if they are too friendly with managers. If they are too friendly and open with union members, the loyalty of managers is questioned.

CHAPTER VI  
PRACTICES WHICH INFLUENCE THE  
INTERNAL LABOR MARKET

Introduction

Marxists (Edwards, 1984), structuralists (Kalleberg and Berg, 1987), and institutionalists (Farkas and England, 1988) tend to agree that internal labor markets rather than the auction market determine the value of labor within firms. On the one hand, structuralists and institutionalists see the value of labor attached to the evaluation of positions rather than to individuals who happen to occupy the positions. The circulation of individuals among positions is influenced more by seniority, transaction costs, authority structures, politics, or social networks than by any real evaluation of the productivity of an individual. On the other hand, Marxists often focus on the devices used by managers to enhance the conversion of labor power -- the potential to do work -- into labor -- work actually done. Since a wage is associated with a position, the better labor power is converted to labor, the more value management is able to get for the wage spent.

In this chapter, practices which influence the internal labor market by working on the strategic level of management will first be analyzed. Specifically, it will be seen that the threat of exit by industrial customers, the use of market study techniques to determine "reasonable" costs in regulatory hearings, the use of a past test year method of rate setting, and the adoption of methods for increasing conservation and the variability of costs affect the wages of workers and the number and distribution of positions in the company. As one turns to the work group to explore practices which affect the internal labor market and how it works, practices which work on the value of positions, the number and distribution of positions, converting labor power into labor, the externalities of family life and safety, and rules for mobility will be explored.

Practices Which Influence the Internal Labor Market  
by Working on the Strategic Level of Management

As one turns to explore practices that work on the internal labor market, one can find several practices which regulate the regulators and -- in doing do so -- work on the internal labor market by working on the strategic level of the company.

The Threat of Exit

First, since an electric utility is a monopoly, the state established a regulatory board to review the costs of the utility and to set rates to protect consumers from monopoly market power. To set the rate, a test year is used to capture all costs. The costs are normalized for shocks such as weather. For example, a wide spread ice storm could inflict a large, unexpected cost on the company. Then, costs are explored for their legitimacy to include in the rate base. For example, the utility board felt that a corporate jet for a different utility in the state was extravagant. So, it was not included in the rate base.

Once the costs are defined to include in the rate base, the utility board is then not free to set the rate at any level above the rate base. On the one hand, a regulator interviewed stated that the Hope and Bluefield court case states that, if investors do not get a fair return because of regulation, the state has confiscated their property. On the other hand, regulators are required by law to protect the consumer. Furthermore, they must periodically face election. Thus, their regulatory activity is open to influence by corporate, municipal, and individual expressions of discontent.

A regulator interviewed stated that the most problematic threat was not the ballot box but the threat of exit. When rate increases are proposed, companies threaten to leave the state and take their jobs and taxes with them. As companies began to leave the state or threaten to leave the state with the downturns in the economy in the 1980s, regulators began to load rates on residential customers to try to keep businesses and their jobs and taxes. Before, rates were loaded on industrial and commercial customers. It is interesting to note how this practice effectively devalues labor as a class by forcing workers as residents as a class to bear a part of the costs which would have been borne by the specific workers, stockholders or owners, and customers of companies who use to have rates loaded on them through the

industrial rate. This practice is consistent with deindustrialization practices documented by Bluestone and Harrison (1982).

The problem of exit with respect to downward pressure on rates worked directly on the company as well as indirectly through regulators. First, regulations were passed which allowed industrial concerns to cogenerate electricity. Not only did this remove a customer, it also required the utility to buy excess generation at a rate which -- according to a regulator interviewed -- may actually subsidize the industrial concern. Second, several cooperatives and hydroelectric authorities did not engage in the same building programs in response to the Fuels Use Act as did the company under study. Thus, after the OPEC price floors collapsed and utilities were no longer required to convert from oil and natural gas fired capacity, these organizations emerged with less costly capacity. So, they could directly compete for industrial customers. Finally, with the excess generation capacity created by the Fuels Use Act, it was possible for municipalities, cooperatives, and hydroelectric authorities to buy power cheaply in order to compete in franchise elections against large utilities who build new capacity. The company under study had lost one of the larger towns in the state in a franchise election and was facing a franchise election in another town. The increased threat of exit by industrial customers puts direct pressure on the company to hold its rates and, therefore, its costs in check. This encourages the company to also hold the costs of labor in check. The company adopted goals of no new rate increases, no new plant construction, and no new positions.

### The Use of the Market Study

One of the chief devices used to negotiate these conflicting practices at the regulatory level is the market study. To establish what a "fair" return to investors might be such that their property is not confiscated, there is testimony on the value of common stock. Here, the value of the company's common stock and the dividends paid on the stock is placed in a field of similar sized electric utilities in the region. If the change in stock value and dividends are below the mean of the distribution of similar sized electric utilities in the region, it will be easier to argue for a rate increase than if the value and dividends are above the mean. Similar arguments are constructed with respect to credit ratings. The wider the spread between the cost included in the rate base and the rate set and the more the rate base includes all costs incurred by the company, the

better will be the credit rating and the cheaper the company will be able to borrow money. Again, the regulators use comparisons with other similarly situated companies to get rates as low as possible without negatively affecting credit ratings, which would increase costs. Finally, rates are compared with rates in the region and with similar regions. Given threats to exit by industrial concerns, if rates are too high when compared to other regions, it will be difficult to argue for a rate increase.

The market study is also used to determine the legitimacy of labor costs. The wages of various occupations and benefit packages are again placed in the context of similarly situated electric utilities. Again, wages and benefits which are too far above the mean for those companies included in the study may be seen as "unreasonable" and not allowed in the rate base.

A regulator interviewed cited an interesting case in another state in which a union had negotiated a contract with a utility which included wage and benefit items which the utility board considered "unreasonable" when placed in the context of similarly situated electric utilities. Therefore, they refused to include the additional "unreasonable" costs in the rate base. As a result, the "unreasonable" portion of the labor contract has to be paid out of the difference between allowable costs and the rate rather than included in allowable costs. That is, it came out of the amount designated to be paid to the stock holders. This ruling was appealed on the basis that the regulators were interfering with negotiations by not allowing negotiated items to be counted as reasonable costs. After rulings and reversals on appeal, the courts ruled that negotiated items in a labor contract could be counted as "unreasonable." This makes negotiated contracts problematic for management if wages and benefits exceed what the market study technology would establish as reasonable. It means that stock holders will not be able to earn the allowed rate of return.

One would expect that the use of the market value technology by regulators would encourage the same technology on the part of the management of the company to keep labor costs in the rate base as "reasonable" costs. If one examines the interviews with managers and notes on observations from negotiations, one finds that a similar technology is used to set the salaries of positions for both union and nonunion workers. The bench mark for the salaries of both union and nonunion workers in the market method of both regulators and management is the salary of the journeyman lineman. With respect to union workers, managers point out that the salary for a journeyman

lineman has been in the top quartile of the regional salary distribution for journeyman linemen. So, the company is putting back pressure on wages during negotiations. With respect to nonunion workers, wages are established by a large regression equation for predicting salaries based on internal and external factors. Internally, the equation includes education, work experience, decision making, effect on the bottom line, customer service impact, etc. Externally, salary surveys are used. But again, the principal external salary survey comparison is the position of journeyman lineman.

### The Past Test Year Method of Rate Making

Another regulatory practice which encourages practices which can become problematic for workers is the use of a past test year to set rates. First, inflation tends to drive up costs over time. Thus, as time passes, costs go up against a fixed rate and cut into the profit margin. Inflation has not been a very big factor in the late 1980s as compared to the 1970s.

Second, shocks of unexpected cost increases and revenue decreases can occur. As noted in an earlier chapter, two downturns in the economy in the 1980s unexpectedly reduced revenues. Revenues can also be affected by cool summers and warm winters when compared to the test year method of averaging for temperature variations. Whereas revenues are essentially not controllable over the short run, costs are. But, costs are also subject to shocks. For example, the federal government recently instituted the Financial Accounting Standard 106 which required companies to prefund retiree medical liabilities. This very standard resulted in General Motors charging off 22 billion dollars to its stockholders. Since this cost was not in the rate base, the company could not immediately deal with it without either losing money for stockholders or going to the state utility board for a rate increase. Since medical and pension benefits were not in the labor contract, the company could turn to reducing retiree benefits to deal with this problem. Managers observed that not having this benefit in the labor contract made this action possible. It will be remembered that the loss of retirement benefits are seen as a breach of trust by workers and is a departure from family like practices of taking care of retirees. As this is being written, the company has requested a rate increase in part to offset the cost incurred because of this accounting rule.

Third, the problem of balancing costs and revenues after a test year could leave the company in a position of underspending against the projected

costs and fixed rates. This could leave the company in the problematic situation with regulators of earning more than the allowed rate. It could also leave the company with a lower cost structure for a test year. A lower cost structure could be problematic for managing cost against revenue shocks if a lower rate base were established.

This general problem of balancing costs against revenues is complicated by the technical nature of the electrical system. An electrical system is built to meet maximum requirements. With respect to power generation, enough capacity must be built to meet the maximum demand of the hottest day of the year with all air conditioning systems running. With respect to operations, enough capacity must be obtained to meet the worse storm which would inflict damage to the electrical distribution system. At the same time, revenue for the system is generated by the number of kilowatt hours of electricity sold. The larger the difference between the average use of the system and the peak use of the system, the larger will be the costs that must be covered by the rate. If the system is built with fixed capacity to meet peak demand with respect to both power generation and operations, this problem is accentuated. For example, if one builds an operations work force to meet the challenges of the worse storm of the year while continuing normal repair, service, and construction work, one has a relatively large costs to load on the number of kilowatt hours sold. But, if one can build a work force which can just exactly match the current demand but no more than the current demand, one will have a much lower cost structure. In addition to finding ways to convert operations and power generation costs from fixed to flexible to match wide swings in demand, one could also take steps to increase the average use of the system while decreasing the peak use of the system. This would increase the general level of revenue while decreasing costs needed to meet peak demand.

#### Practices to Increase Conservation and the Variability of Costs

The company adopted two sets of practices in responses to regulatory practices and market conditions which had an effect on the internal labor market. First, the company instituted conservation programs to reduce the peak load for electricity in the summer time. While this reduces the absolute amount of electricity a consumer would use, it also increased the length of time between the operation of air conditioning equipment. To increase the average use of the system, the company aggressively marketed electric heat pumps to capture part

of the heating market. Given the earlier noted policy of no new positions, this necessitated shifting more positions into marketing functions and, in doing so, began to reorganize the kinds of employees needed to fill positions.

Probably the most important practices adopted with respect to union workers were practices adopted to increase the variability of capacity. About the same time of the layoffs in the mid-1980s, the parent company centralized dispatching for power generation. This required reducing the number of power plants and the number of workers in plants which were not base loaded. It required attempts to change work rules to use fewer workers to do more things. It required reducing the number of full time workers and contracting more work which could be used when needed and not used when not needed. And it required more overtime. A similar set of practices were also applied to operations and line work. In the early 1970s, large construction jobs were outsourced. Now, every job that was not done all of the time was being outsourced. This gives the company the capacity to match variable costs with variable demand. Now, contingencies are built into budgets. If storms do not materialize which require significant repair work, the company can contract to do less critical maintenance and service work. These two strategies used to match capacity to demand by converting fixed costs to variable costs resulted in the loss of hundreds of union positions over a twenty year period, with most of the losses occurring in the layoff and early retirement program in the mid-1980s. This significantly altered the internal labor market directly by reducing the number of positions for linemen and for power plant workers. It will also be seen that these "flexibility" strategies also introduced a number of other practices which directly affect rules for mobility among positions and which are used in the struggle over the conversion of labor power to labor.

#### Practices Which Affect the Construction of the Internal Labor Market at the Work Group Level

As one turns to the work group to explore practices which affect the internal labor market and how it works, one can identify practices which work on the value of positions, the number and distribution of positions, converting labor power into labor, the externalities of family life and safety, rules for mobility, and the ability to exit the organization to another opportunity.



### Practices Which Work on the Value of a Position

With respect to the value of positions, it has already been noted that the utility board works on rates with market studies and that this encourages the adoption of such methods by managers. With this method, positions which are not in the labor contract are evaluated with respect to whether they fall in the first, second, third, or fourth quartile of wages of positions deemed to be similar. If positions fall in the first or second quartile, the percent of wage increase is likely to be highest in order to move those workers toward the mean. If positions fall in the third or fourth quartile, the percentage of increase is likely to be marginal to none in order to slow the movement of the salaries of these workers away from the mean.

Most nonunion positions in the company fall below wages for comparable union positions. Thus, nonunion workers have tended to receive larger percent increases than those negotiated in the contract by the union. Furthermore, since union workers make salaries in the upper quartiles, managers are putting back pressure on union wages.

Union members use a different scheme in evaluating the "fairness" and "reasonableness" of wage adjustments. Interviews with both managers and union members reveal that a "fair" and "reasonable" wage adjustment is a common percent change across the board. Union flyers compare the small percent raise being offered by management while managers are giving themselves larger increases and claim that the union workers are being treated unfairly. Union members look at the larger percentage raises given to nonunion members and feel that they have been given "a slap in the face" for being union members.

A different criterion of "fair" and "reasonable" was offered by supervisors who were told that the market type study indicated that they should not receive a very large raise. The supervisors who used this criterion made the following argument: The company's prices for electricity are among the lowest in the nation. The employee to customer ratio is the lowest in the region. The stock price has been going up. Yet, the market study tells us we are over paid. The union is being told the same thing. Why should not we also get a share of the profit? What is wrong with both employees and stockholders both winning? Here, rather than using a straight percent increase as a standard of "fair" and "reasonable," they made a judgment based on the company objectives laid out

by the executive level of the company: low prices, low employee to customer ratio, and increasing stock price. Since the company seemed successful by those standards, it seemed "unreasonable" and "unfair" to have a market study device which moves everyone marginally upward toward a common mean dictate salary adjustments in the face of corporate success.

In the nonunionized arena, there appeared to be something of an additional merit raise system which works on the individual. There were two practices found which seemed to militate against assigning a wage to a worker different from workers in similar positions. First, one worker interviewed got a merit raise. A person who had been in a comparable position for a longer period of time did not get a merit raise. The worker pointed out that this caused jealousy which interfered with relating and work. "I caught the spur from her." So, rather than deal with anger set up by differential treatment, it is easier for managers to give everyone the same raise. Additionally, merit raises make it problematic to stay within the parameters of the budget for a department. So, as one worker put it, "They give you an 'average' rating." If managers give one a below average rating, they are required to discipline a worker. That can create hard feelings. If managers give one superior ratings, they are required to give a worker a raise. This is hard to justify to upper managers, affects the budget, and creates jealousy. So, workers just get average ratings.

In addition to the different practices used to construct different reasons for valuing positions and occupants of positions, labor relations practices work on the value of positions. The labor contract specifies certain wages for certain positions. The journeyman lineman is basically at the top of the ladder of pay, promotion, and seniority for union workers. By having the wage structure of union and nonunion classified personnel pegged to the union position, it makes union negotiations a key place for holding the general wage structure for classified personnel in check.

Several practices adopted by the company have worked on the perception of union members with respect to how far and hard they can push a bargaining position. First, by outsourcing significant portions of power plant maintenance and line work, the company has built a large alternative work force which could be used by the company to weather a strike. Second, supervisors are always reminding union workers that the value of doing work with union workers is always being compared to the value of doing work with contractors. If their wages get too high, they will not be competitive. This ruse is not used as

much with nonunion employees. Third, the company and the union have become less willing to modify their positions. This pushes negotiations into more sessions over longer periods of time. The company has more economic resources to play out this game than does the union. This favors the company in obtaining its objective to hold back labor costs.

In addition to practices adopted by the company, external labor market factors give workers who are laid off, fired, or quit fewer options to exit. As noted earlier, the proportion of manufacturing jobs in the main metropolitan area served by the company under study decreased from 20.9 percent of jobs to 18.4 percent of jobs between 1980 and 1990. During the same period, the percent of construction jobs dropped from 5.6 percent of jobs to 3.7 percent. The overall loss of jobs for persons who were thirty-five to forty-five years of age in 1990 -- the age of most union members -- was so severe that the main metropolitan area served by the company lost over four percent of this age cohort in net migration between 1980 and 1990. Union members perceive that their ability to exit to another job which would support the financial and family obligations of a person earning union wages with high seniority had significantly decreased. These conditions also increase the company's ability to push for concessions. As one manager exclaimed, "Let them work for Wal-Mart!"

While these practices and conditions have improved the ability of the company to hold the union in check in terms of negotiations, the union has engaged in more organizing efforts with other groups in the company such as customer service representatives and vehicle mechanics. While these groups have not voted to go union, they have used the threat of unionization to improve wages and working conditions. Some of the larger increases in wages have been given to groups who were targets of unionization. On the worker's side, several persons interviewed indicated that workers intentionally left union materials lying around to worry managers. Managers indicated that higher raises than normal and modifications in authoritarian supervisory practices were implemented in some of these groups to keep them from unionizing. It seems that the groups that have the best ability to use the union to enhance the wages of their positions are workers who use the union as a threat but are themselves not unionized.

Finally, there is a class of practices which work on the value of all positions regardless of the position or its occupant: benefits. Benefits are not a part of the labor contract in the company studied even though the union had

periodically tried to get them included in the contract. As noted earlier, managers claim that this allows them to act unilaterally to control this particular type of wage.

There are several factors which make benefits problematic for managers who are trying to hold costs down. First, the costs of health care are increasing faster than other sectors of the economy. Second, the average age of the company's work force is increasing as the baby boomers work their way into middle age. This increases the cost of health care. Third, the new Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 106 required that health benefits for retirees -- which had been fully paid by the company -- must now be funded as the benefit is obligated rather than as it is collected. The company has dealt with these increases by loading portions of increases in health costs on workers. As workers get raises, they also have the amount they must pay for insurance increase. The first response to FAS 106 was to require newly retiring employees to pay over \$1,000 per year for insurance that had been provided to retirees for free.

Even though managers have the right to unilaterally decide about this issue, employees did seem to have ways of working on the decision. Employees responded to announced cuts in retiree benefits with numerous calls of complaint. One human resources manager said that she had received more calls over this issue than any other issue during her tenure. There seemed to be concern on the part of some managers over this response from workers. It is important to note that managers do not respond to complaints uniformly. Managers discount complaints if they are seen as simply encouraged by the union. They also discount complaints if they are few in number or if they come from persons labeled as troublemakers or unreasonable. Such discounting inhibits concerns from being taken as real employee concerns. Finally, friendship with upper managers seems to be a tool that a worker can use in dealing with attempts by other managers to discount claims with respect to benefits. For example, one worker had a heart attack and was applying for disability. The human resources department resisted granting the disability. The worker called an upper manager with whom he had a relationship. The manager promised him the disability, and he was granted the disability.

### Practices Which Work on the Number and Distribution of Positions

Both changes in technologies and changes in methods of organizing have an effect on the number and distribution of positions in the company studied. A glance at the interviews reveals that the shift from A-frame to bucket truck technology made it possible to reduce the size of a line crew from five to three linemen. One manager pointed out that, if the company would use standardized fiberglass poles, the company could work with a line crew of one. Power plants are continually designed and updated with more automated systems requiring fewer people to control the plant. Plants in the 1950s required the hand operation of valves and switches located all over a plant. With automation and new control technologies, a plant operating with two units in the 1950s operated with three units in 1990 with 190 percent more generation capacity and with thirty-six percent fewer employees.

Numerous organizational strategies have had an effect on the number and distribution of positions. In more rural areas, line crews were based in towns in the early 1970s. During the 1970s and 1980s, the number of line crews were decreased and centralized. Single servicemen were left in many of the small towns. This configuration enabled the company to recombine crews as needed to do work that required a full line crew. When line crews were dispersed, one could have several crews with less than a full complement of workers on any one day. This would prohibit them from doing certain work. They may also have less than a full day of work that needed to be done. But, with centralized crews and with local servicemen, it is almost always possible to make up a crew, and there is almost always work to do.

The one organizational practice that had a large impact on decreasing the number of workers in line and power generation work during the twenty year period explored in this study was outsourcing. When the layoffs and early retirements occurred in the mid-1980s, the company employed numerous outside contractors to do power plant maintenance and line work as it reduced its permanent work force by several hundred positions. Since then, other areas of the company have come under consideration for outsourcing.

Two strategic decisions affected the redistribution of positions at the time of the study. First, with the problems that developed with licensing nuclear power plants after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, a decision was made to shed workers to deal with the millions of dollars spent on the proposed power

plant which was not in the rate base. The nuclear staff was kept. The work force was reduced mainly by decreasing the number of line workers. This forced some of the reorganization of line workers to cover work with fewer workers. Second, with the company's decision to engage in conservation strategies and in strategies to penetrate the heating market, more positions were added in these areas.

If one examines management studies conducted by the company after the layoffs, changes in qualifying procedures for entering craft positions, and the implementation of a total quality management program, one can piece together further practices which could have an impact on the number and distributions of positions in the company. First, as noted earlier, management studies made after the layoffs made an issue of craft boundaries and past practices as impediments from organizing work to be done more efficiently. The study recommended that these boundaries be challenged. Second, the implementation of standardized testing programs to admit persons into craft apprentice programs is a part of a larger strategy to create a labor force which is flexible and can do many tasks. Here, rather than build separate capacities into separate positions such that different positions are needed in any one job, one can build capacities into people such that they can do the tasks of many positions. This enables a job to be done more quickly with less coordination and with fewer people. Third, the company is implementing a total quality management program based on the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award. Such programs are designed to lower costs, raise revenues, create highly satisfied customers, and empower workers. Some of the ways quality programs affect productivity are by reducing redundancy in procedures, by reducing the need to rework jobs, and by discovering more efficient ways of organizing work. These strategies reduce the need for labor over time. All of these tactics work to create a universal line worker and a universal mechanic who would not be encumbered by the division of labor. Similar results could be achieved by redesigning equipment and tasks such that a worker could be trained to work on a broader spectrum of problems.

The main tactic used by the union to work on this scene is rigorously to enforce distinctions in what work is appropriate for various job classifications. This is practically done by refusing or resisting to do a job if it appears to belong to another classification. Also, workers will enforce distinctions with each other if one worker feels that another is doing work in her classification. If managers

force a worker to do a job, workers grieve the issue toward arbitration. To resist the grievance machinery, managers refuse to create job descriptions. Such descriptions are too easily used to define what is and is not one's work. Since the company participated in studies used to validate tests to be used in the selection of personnel, a definition of critical behaviors and -- in effect -- a job description must exist for the testing technology to work. Many analogies of distrust found among managers are built around this practice. For example, if a worker claims that a safety problem is created by the small size of a line crew, managers claim that they cannot trust that union members are not just trying to increase jobs for them.

### Practices Which Work on Converting Labor Power into Labor

As Edwards (1984) has noted, the problem of management is the problem of converting labor power into labor. This problematic is fundamentally set up by paying a worker a wage for time rather than for a finished product. If managers can get more labor power converted into labor with a fixed cost per unit of time for wages, they can increase their profits. This also sets up a place for workers to work on management by increasing the amount of time it takes to do a job. To work on converting labor power into labor, Edwards (1984) observes that managers must direct work, evaluate workers, and reward and punish workers.

A number of practices work on the direction of work. The direction of work in the construction of new equipment begins as engineers and planners outline schematics and specifications for a job. Equipment used to do a job -- such as a bucket truck or an A-frame truck -- makes certain ways of working possible and other ways problematic. Since most union positions in the company studied are craft positions, methods of work are embedded both in the apprentice program and in the work practices of journeymen. These set up certain ways of working. If a piece of equipment needs to be repaired, manuals are consulted if the equipment is not familiar. So, equipment manuals direct work. In craft areas, little actual hands-on supervision of work by managers took place. Managers tended to work on directing work by simply assigning jobs and by getting reports on work in progress. Periodically, the progress of work might be inspected. But work itself was seldom inspected. Foremen and workers usually conducted a "tailgate" session in which they discuss how a job will be done and which persons will do which jobs.

Occasionally, a supervisor was found who would direct work by "showing" and by close supervision. These supervisors tended to be resented by workers. Workers tended to report that such tactics implied that workers either were incompetent or could not be trusted. To get back at such supervisors, workers would engage in such tactics as extending lunch breaks, extending coffee breaks, and slowing the work process. These tactics, in turn, angered supervisors and encourage them not to trust their workers. They would often respond by increasing efforts to "catch" workers in such acts.

Most work done by craft workers is not easily amenable to scientific management techniques because such work involves repair or construction work in which different factors are present in each job. It is only possible to apply scientific management when one can break a standardized, repetitive job into its component parts. Thus, evaluation of work itself can only be conducted in rough parameters. A job seems to take too long or it does not. A job costs more than is expected in terms of parts and equipment or it does not. When the job is completed, things work or they do not. Since the actual efficiency of the work itself is difficult to evaluate, non-work factors which add to the time it takes to do a job become the focus of evaluation. Workers spend too much time talking, too much time getting to the job site, too much time loafing on the job, too much time on a break or a meal, too much time cleaning up, and too much time getting ready to leave for the work site. Again, these actions would not be problematic if the payment for work was for work completed rather than for time and if the timeliness of work competition was not a problem.

Much of the day to day effort of managers to improve the conversion of labor power into labor is built around the time issue. First, practices are applied to keep workers on a time frame. Workers are reminded if they are slow in leaving for a job site or if they return too soon. Before a lunch period is over, managers will remind workers that the lunch period is almost over. Breaks are treated in a similar way. Managers make surprise visits to work sites and listen to radio transmissions to determine if workers are working or loafing.

Second, managers work on practices that involve time which is paid for but not worked on a specific job. For example, a clause was put in the labor contract to specify when workers are relieved for meals when kept past their normal quitting time on overtime. This was put in the contract during a time period when the company required little overtime because of short staffing. Now, managers would like to move the meal time to the end of the overtime



period even if it required workers to work two or more hours beyond normal quitting time. This would, in effect, extend the work day by two or more hours and allow certain jobs to be completed. If the meal is taken during the overtime period, it increases the amount of clean-up and start-up time since the interruption of the meal would add a clean-up and start-up time to the normal flow. Workers resist this move. They point out that the meal clause was not designed to move to a ten-hour work day. It was designed to deal with call-outs. They also evoke analogies of distrust with respect to layoffs and claim that this would just give the company an excuse to lay off more workers. Managers evoke analogies of distrust in response. They believe that the union just wants to make more work and get more overtime.

Third, the very act of decreasing the size of the labor force without decreasing the amount of work to be done forces workers and managers to handle more work. As several managers noted, "They now have a full plate." While this practice encourages overtime, budgets are used to put back pressure on the use of overtime. In fact, breaking the budget seemed to be one event which drew negative attention to a manager from a superior. Again, this is not a refined technique for examining productivity. It is a gross technique that measures costs only against a budgeted amount.

In addition to time as a substance to work on to increase productivity, an examination of training manuals used to teach supervisors procedures for evaluating work and for punishing poor performance reveals another set of substances on which managers work with respect to workers. Initially, the procedures look like they might actually work on work. The manual states that all that is necessary to justify job performance counseling is the ability to show a difference between job performance standards and the employee's present performance. Yet, how is a job performance standard to be established? The manual is relatively silent on the matter. It simply applies the rule of the reasonable person from law:

What reasonable men, mindful of the habits and the customs of industrial life and the standards of justice and fair dealing prevalent in the community, ought to have done under similar circumstances . . . .

The company is unwilling to spell out expected behavior in a job description because to do so would limit the right of unilateral action of managers. So, the argument is thrown back on past practice. At the same time, the very same

manual schools supervisors in tactics to keep from creating evidence which could be used to establish a past practice. This makes it very difficult for evaluation beyond informal evaluation to take place. Once evaluation moves toward corrective action and punishment, the necessary tools to establish a job performance standard and grounds for punishment are extremely difficult to establish.

It is little wonder that the evaluation and corrective action process works on substances which are not directly related to productivity: insubordination, severe safety violations, fighting, alcohol or drug misconduct, violations of procedural requirements, violations of the no strike-no interference covenant, etc. These are items that can be and are stipulated. Thus, they can be determined. While they do not work directly on converting labor power into labor, they do work on establishing and maintaining a particular type of relationship between workers and managers.

The final set of tactics used to work on converting labor power to labor involves the use of contractors. First, one can find numerous accounts and observations in which workers are threatened with having their work contracted out if they cannot do the work quickly and cheaply. As noted earlier, these tactics reenact the layoff of the 1980s in which more contractors were being used as workers were laid off. It evokes analogies of distrust, fear, and anger with workers. As several managers noted, "It might affect morale, but it lets them know that there is an alternative."

Second, contractors are used to substitute for failed supervision. It might be difficult to supervise employees. Or a particular job might be particularly difficult. So, a supervisor decides to use contractors rather than face the problems. Contractors come with built-in supervisors who work at converting labor power into labor with a different game. Contractors have a firm bid. So, they push foremen to be productive, and foremen push workers to be productive.

Third, as noted earlier, it is difficult to discipline workers with respect to productivity. It is also difficult to fire workers without breaches of rules not related to productivity. Large scale layoffs are problematic to the morale of the whole company and are hard to justify when profits are being made. So, work is reorganized or contracts are let for a new set of services such that a whole work group can be laid off. After a several month waiting period, the labor contract no longer requires the company to hire back based on seniority. So,

the company can hire back whom they will. While company senior executives suggested this as a tactic that is used in other industries, they claimed that they did not use this tactic. Yet, several persons interviewed pointed out that the company did not recall until after the waiting period and that select persons were hired back.

Contractors are not without their problems to management. While they do come with a fixed cost for a job, the value of the work is complicated by the quality of work. Both supervisors and workers complained about the quality of some contract work. A management study was done which found that work completed was not closely monitored to see that it was done to specifications. Furthermore, there are other factors which complicate the comparability of the cost of a job done internally with a job done by a contractor. Are workers hired by a contractor the same quality as those internal to the company? Work done by company employees is often interrupted with higher priority work. A contractor can work a job completely through from start to finish. Contractors sometimes use company equipment and supplies without factoring such use into the cost comparison. Finally, there were instances of sole source vendors. Here, the real value of using contractors to bid against each others as well as against internal workers in order to drive down the cost of a job is minimized if not lost.

Union workers also have a set of tactics to negatively work on the conversion of labor power to labor. If one examines the notes on interviews and observations, almost all of the description of tactics to be described are accompanied with accounts of motives of anger over how they, fellow workers, or the union has been treated. The resistance to management tends to happen around time and work rules. These are precisely where the workers could do damage without flagrantly breaking rules which would result in disciplinary action. So, lunch hours and breaks are marginally extended to slow down work to get back at managers. Managers want workers to be close to a phone during off hours without being paid stand-by pay. Workers do not want to flagrantly disobey. So, they buy answering machines to screen calls. These tactics do not add to the wages of the worker. They only add to the costs of the product or service.

Analogies of distrust used by managers often focus precisely on this type of behavior. This helps to set up scenes in which managers get angry with all workers -- both offenders and nonoffenders. As noted earlier, this angers

workers and is met with the assessment that managers do not trust them. In turn, this encourages workers to engage in more of the offending behavior to get back at the manager. Human resources personnel have devised several strategies to intervene in this set of mutually reinforcing practices. Managers are taught to specifically deal with specific individuals and specific behavior. They are trained in problem solving and active listening skills to get the worker to make an object of their own behavior from the point of view of the manager. For example, a worker was asked to pretend that she was the manager and the manager was the worker. Then, the manager played out the role of the worker and tried to get the worker to see what she saw in the worker. While these tactics seemed to meet with some success, some workers began to see them as simply ruses to reduce anger without really dealing with issues. One could find analogies of distrust build around several of these practices. As noted earlier, a worker commented that, "when you hear, 'I hear you, I share your concern, and let me see what can be done about it,' you know that your concern has just been dismissed."

#### Practices That Work on the Externalities of Family Life and Safety

A number of practices which work on converting labor power to labor also involve the creation of negative externalities for workers. Specifically, a number of practices increase the problematic nature of family life for workers and increase the chance of accidents. These are externalities in that these costs are not made explicit by any practice even though the problematic nature of the practice is identified by the worker.

The main practices which negatively affect family life are shift work, overtime, and threatening job security. As one worker noted, "normal family life is based on an 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. job, five days a week." To be able to use fewer workers to cover more shifts, the company wants to change some workers from shift to shift with little notice. To be able to handle emergencies with minimum staffing and costs, the company wants workers to be near a phone and available for call out without paying stand-by wages. To be able to maintain minimum staff, more overtime is required. To put pressure on workers to work faster with less dead time and to demand less wages, they are threatened with having their work contracted out such that their positions will no longer be needed.

One can find several descriptions from workers and supervisors on the

effects of these practices. Divorces have become more common place as workers cannot move out of shift work and as shift work becomes more erratic. Deposits on vacations have been lost because of last minute schedule changes. The opportunity to participate in the school and athletic activities of children is impaired. More family responsibilities are loaded on the spouse who does not work changing shifts. Long term economic commitments associated with purchasing homes or cars are more carefully considered as jobs are threatened. As noted earlier, workers were somewhat willing to tolerate these negative externalities if they could see some point in the future when they would be relieved of them. But, with the changes in practices affecting their mobility within the company and with increasing externalities with new practices aimed at increasing productivity, such willingness is growing thin.

Again, the union works on these conditions by grieving changes in shift assignment procedures, by trying to change the procedures in the contract, and by making such changes costly in terms of overtime. Since the budget is one of the principal tools used by the company to assess such matters, its tactics are directly aimed at the budget. Managers who had experienced shift work tended to be sympathetic to the situation of workers set up by the new practices. Others were much less sympathetic and pointed out that such workers knew the conditions of employment when they took the job. But, as has been documented, such conditions changed.

There are several practices which seemed to decrease explicit costs to the company while increasing risks as perceived by workers. Several workers and managers described how extended overtime increases fatigue and the chance that an accident could happen. As managers attempt to use workers more universally, several incidents were found in which workers unfamiliar with the operation of equipment in extreme situation increased the chance of an accident by operating the equipment in extreme situations. Accounts were found in which workers encountered equipment which they felt was dangerous because of its age and disrepair. Some instances were found in which such dangerous equipment situations were corrected as a strategy to get workers to modify work practices. Other times, new configurations of equipment were being proposed which workers felt were unsafe and which reduced the number of workers required to work a job. Managers countered with new procedures to work on the equipment which they claimed were safe. Accounts were found of managers passing a dangerous job from work group to work group until one

could be found to do the job. As noted earlier, if workers did not complete a job because they deemed it to be too dangerous, incidents were found in which supervisors would question the workers as to why they could not complete the job. With the threats to employment implicit in contractors and often made explicit by threats of outsourcing work, workers are encouraged to take short cuts that might not be safe. Finally, one situation was observed in which a group of managers discussed how to get union workers to do a job that they knew violated Occupational Safety and Health standards. It would have been very expensive to have done the job by the standards.

It should be noted that company safety manuals encouraged work to be done safely even at the expense of productivity. Safety meetings were systematically held. Senior executives attended these safety meetings and encouraged local managers to listen to safety concerns. Yet, if one examines every day interactions, such safety meetings often involve resistance to safety issues by managers if the resolution of the issue involves costs. While practices which focus on safety are periodic events, practices which focus on limiting costs and increasing productivity are focused on every day. The priority of practice among managers was reflected in the company wide survey when managers emphasized productivity more than safety.

The union tried to address safety issues by getting the company to agree to a joint safety committee with equal numbers of management and union appointees. This arrangement is used with the committee which conducts the line workers apprentice program. Managers resisted this proposal. Managers claimed that they must have control since they have the legal responsibility for accidents. If one examines the interviews and observations, managers usually evoke analogies of distrust with respect to safety issues raised by union members. Many safety issues are raised around the issue of the size of a work crew. Managers do not trust that the safety issues are real. In this analogy of distrust, the issue of productivity and cost containment overrides a concern for safety.

### Practices That Work on Mobility

If one examines the interviews and documents, one finds a number of practices that are used to circulate workers among positions. Some are a part of the labor contract and others are not. Different practices put different parties in the position to work on defining persons as qualified for positions or not.

Different practices use different techniques for qualifying persons at different places on the job ladder. The job ladder itself is part of a practice of training and qualifying. Some practices utilize work itself to qualify persons for positions. Other practices utilize extra-work education in schools to qualify persons for positions. Some practices work on persons as they move from position to position. Others relate a terminal position to a beginning position.

In the labor contract, different positions are strung together in a line of training progression and wage increases for different craft skills. In each position, one learns the requisite skills for future positions while engaging the work and training required in a current position. Most job classifications are broken up into steps based on time in the classification and on skills learned during the period. For example, if one examines the apprenticeship standard for electrical line workers -- the most formalized training program among the crafts in the company studied -- the apprenticeship program is spread over four years. Wages increase each year until one reaches the journeyman level. A specific number of hours of training are to be covered in specific areas of skill in specific time periods. Each year, a committee made up of equal number of union and management representatives judge whether or not an apprentice has made adequate progress.

If one returns to the labor contract, one finds a specific practice set out for promotion to another job classification. First, employees must have suitable qualifications. Second, the worker with the most seniority among those qualified is to be promoted to the next higher classification. Qualifications of the employees are to be determined by the company and the representative of the union. However, if one switches back to the apprenticeship standards for electrical line workers, one can find the specification of a practice which puts management in the position of establishing the qualifications which are first used to screen applicants. Specifically, management first selects applicants for the pre-apprentice school. Then, a committee made up of equal number of company and union representatives judge the qualify of applicants as a result of their performance in the pre-apprentice school.

One can find a multitude of practices used by managers to first select applicants. Historically, seniority was one of the principal practices used by managers to determine the most qualified person for positions in both union and non-union areas and for both classified and managerial positions. Additionally, one can find personal relations, reputation, risk management, and

union resistance as other practices for establishing qualifications. For example, one manager pointed out how qualified people would be eliminated from consideration because they were associated with a work location or a network of people who had a bad reputation. With respect to risk management, one manager chose to offer a position to one person whom she had interviewed and knew rather than open the position to other applicants because the person hired was a known and acceptable quantity to the manager. While other applicants might be more qualified, they were unknown quantities to the manager. Another risk management strategy for selecting staff was to hire a person as a temporary employee. If the employee worked out in the actual work situation, they were offered a permanent position. In both of these risk reducing strategies, qualifications were established by job performance itself as judged by the supervisor. Finally, effective union leaders would be promoted to get them out of the bargaining unit.

The most important changes in practices used by managers to qualify persons for positions was the institution of a testing program for entering craft lines of progression and the establishment of higher education requirements and personality testing for entering management lines of progression. The testing program modified the practice for constituting a qualified person for a position in a number of ways. First, the party determining who is qualified with the testing program is the human resources staff. Historically, this determination was made by the immediate supervisor and manager alone. While immediate supervisors still made final determinations for hiring or promoting persons, the test was used as a required screening device. If it was not passed, a person was not qualified. During this study, several managers found themselves in the position of selecting a person as qualified based on their interviews and criteria only to find their selection overturned by the testing program.

Second, practices used by managers are based on assessing actual performance demonstrated by a worker as judged by either first hand experience or by reputation. Practices used in the testing program are designed to predict a future rather than a demonstrated work outcome based on a non-work performance such as a pencil and paper achievement, aptitude, intelligence, or personality test. Such testing programs begin by analyzing jobs for critical components and adequate performance standards as judged by some segment of management. They use these criteria to determine good workers and problematic workers who currently hold positions for which testing



is to be developed. Then, tests are administered to determine which testing elements can distinguish between workers judged to be good and workers judged to be problematic. These tests are then used to admit persons to those job ladders on the basis that such testing predicts a final outcome.

Third, testing is combined with a different strategy for correcting inadequacies. If the pencil and paper test is failed, workers are encouraged to attend remedial class work to prepare them to retake the failed test. This remediation process is usually the responsibility of the worker and is usually done outside of the work context. It should be noted that the company did pay for educational courses. If a person is not qualified through demonstrated work, they must continue in the work until they learn it well enough to qualify. Here, no extra responsibility or time commitments outside of work are involved.

If the testing program put a hurdle in front of workers to enter craft lines of progression, the establishment of college degree requirements put a wall in the way of being promoted out of the ranks of workers. This requirement devalues work experience and values classroom learning in its place. While a worker could go to college and be paid by the company to do so, it is a difficult and lengthily task to accomplish while one is working full time and raising a family. If one is engaged in shift work when shifts rotate frequently, it is all put impossible to take college classes. Yet, a person who went through college and never worked a day in a craft could be hired to supervise craft workers. With this act, the company bifurcated the internal labor market.

At the same time, this bifurcation opens the supervisory labor market. Before, one could become a supervisor only by working her way up the ranks beginning with entry work positions. Thus, only a few people with seniority could qualify for supervisory positions. When workers were promoted on the basis of seniority and from the work group itself, the market for a supervisory position with such qualifications was one: the person with the most seniority in the work group. This promotion practice would probably discourage college educated persons from entering the company. Many college educated persons may not be willing to spend ten years as a worker to reach their goal when they could hire on with another company as a supervisor and do so right out of college. College graduates have been worked on in college by practices of testing to demonstrate skill. Craft programs tend to be based on demonstrated skill and on proficiency. With enough time, most people can reach proficiency. On the other hand, college grades tend to be based on one-time, all-or-nothing

exams. This might also tend to discourage college graduates from working their way through the ranks to supervisory position.

Within the ranks of management, another practice was instituted which again bifurcated the management labor market. Beginning a few years before this study, the parent company began to replace senior management with managers from other companies which the parent company owned. Before this practice was instituted, promotions had been made from within the company. Many of the managers who would have been moved up were moved up in a different company that the parent company owned. This would indicate that the parent company rather than the executive level of the company being studied established qualifications and chose managers to fill positions. So, there seemed to be a change in practice of who selects upper managers and of qualifications: One must change companies owned by the parent company to qualify for an upper management position.

Whereas the company had a ladder of progression that would literally allow a worker to work their way from the lowest job to the president of the company, the new systems of qualifications encourage workers to stay in their current levels. If one wants to change lines of progression or work locations, one probably has to take a test. If one wants to be a supervisor, one has to go to college while working and maintaining a household. If one wants to move into upper management, one must be willing to relocate to a different company owned by the parent company.

As with other changes in practices, one can find numerous analogies of distrust and accounts of anger related to these mobility limiting practices. Several workers were chosen for a position only to be foiled by a test. Managers interviewed considered many of them to be good workers who were loyal employees. Now, they no longer feel loyalty toward the company and harbor anger. Most accounts of anger include the test itself and how specific individuals used it to deny the worker a promotion or engage in perceived deceit about how the test was used. Workers who looked forward to a possible supervisory position and were now blocked by the college requirement indicated that they would do the minimum job and bide their time since there was nothing to which one could look forward. Middle aged workers working shift work or physically taxing jobs now see no exit from what is becoming a problematic existence.

The company responds to these concerns by providing rationales for why

an educated work force is necessary to try to get workers to see the legitimacy of their actions. They also train workers in problem solving tactics to help workers cope with the new conditions. Finally, they offer resources so workers can take classes on their own time to try to qualify for new positions. Workers counter through the union to try to modify the problematic practices themselves.

## CHAPTER VII

### MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

#### Introduction

Three principal practices were used by management to construct relationships with workers: (1) management rights, (2) command, and (3) punishment.

As an overview before turning to a more detailed analysis, management rights are practices used to establish and reinforce *who* may set up a line of action rather than *what* line of action is set up. Management rights practices allow managers to take unilateral action on any matter not limited by such devices as the labor contract, labor law, or policy and procedures that the company has established. It will be seen that unilateral action from the perspective of a person affected by the action often appears as arbitrary action. A number of practices that aggravate or ameliorate the appearance of the arbitrary will be explored. Finally, participatory practices that develop at the edge of the practice of management rights will be explored.

Command refers to strategies by which managers direct work. These techniques vary with respect to how they elaborate and direct action. Here, the practices of command, role taking, technological control, surveillance, evaluation, hierarchy, responsibility and accountability, rules and regulations, and training will be explored.

Next, strategies used to evaluate and to deal with the problematic will be explored. Here, punishment refers to a complex of practices borrowed from the court scene to gather evidence, gain confessions, assign guilt, and punish offenders. Specifically, the use of the practices of responsibility and punishment will be explored to see how they make the person rather than work itself the problem when things become problematic.

Finally, several management practices explored in this chapter were problematic because they contained elements which were common to several practices that either set up conflicting lines of action or posited and worked on different substances. Some of these dually embedded elements of practices

will be analyzed.

### Management Rights

Management rights are practices that establish a fundamental asymmetry between the owners and managers of a company and its workers. They fundamentally work on *who* may set up a line of action. Law is the principal practice used to establish management rights. It is in labor law (Gold, 1989), in the labor contract between the company and the union in this study, and in training manuals used to train supervisors that the doctrine of management rights gives managers the right to take unilateral action in the management of the business organization. Management rights are set up in the grievance process: managers act and workers work and then grieve the action. Here, managers are the party setting up the line of action. The grievance proceeds up the chain of command of management. This reinforces management again as the party setting up the line of action.

Though law fundamentally establishes managers as the party who can take unilateral action, law also establishes other parties who can limit such unilateral action. Laws such as utility regulation, environmental regulation, health and safety regulation, civil rights, and labor law all limit unilateral action. With respect to labor law (Gold, 1989), managers are required to negotiate over wages, hours, and working conditions in good faith. But, they are not required to accept any item set forth by the union. While grievance procedures must be followed during a contract, managers can continue to find no violation of the contract and force a grievance to arbitration. Even though there is an avenue for workers through the union to resist the unilateral action of managers, the rights and procedures tend to favor management rights by giving them priority to establish the situation.

While law sets up the fundamental asymmetry between managers and workers with respect to initiating action, managers use numerous practices to continually reinforce themselves as the locus of decision and action. In this section, tactics which use appeals to management rights or which cut off or divert competing lines of action to enable managers to take unilateral action will be explored. Unilateral action, by nature of being unilateral, has the ability to appear arbitrary. Practices that aggravate the appearance of the arbitrary will be explored. Managers use tactics to ameliorate the appearance of the arbitrary to appeal to workers to accept their unilaterally taken action. These

practices will be examined. Finally, participatory practices that develop at the edge of the practice of management rights will be explored.

### The Use of Appeals to Management Rights to Take Unilateral Action

If one examines the notes on interviews and observations, one can find several instances in which managers appeal to management rights to limit the ability of workers and lower managers to set up their own line of actions.

First, such appeals are used as a criterion in the development of policies, procedures, and programs. For example, in one interview, a person described how the company initiated the development of a participative management plan because it was felt that "ownership in decisions" is better if workers are a part of decision making, especially since workers are closer to the actual outcomes and situations being decided. This proposal was greeted with a cry from management that the actual decision is management's responsibility. Thus, a definition of participation was worked out which put ultimate decisions in management. As a consequence, one finds the slogan indicating that participation means having a voice but not a vote. And one finds a practice of soliciting ideas, concerns, and possible solutions from workers followed by referring the decision up the organization for a decision. In a similar way, a senior executive pointed out that training was being used to teach managers proper procedures and participative management styles because "it's not your liberty to decide how to relate." In yet another instance one manager wanted to modify management rights to give workers more say in how work was done. She was reminded that, if the company did that, there would come a time when managers would have no right to say.

Second, appeals to management rights are used as part of a command to close off appeals or discussion of the command. For example, a study done by lower level supervisors in one location described how the more senior managers were friendly and open when dealing with non work related activities. But, when it came time to deal with work, they became autocratic, reduced communications, and issued orders. Once the work was over, they would again become open. In another instance, one found that managers issued decisions with the instructions, "Here is what we are going to do and why, but we aren't going to discuss the decision."

Third, appeals to management rights are used as an argument of last resort when discussions of issues are not leading to a decision which the

manager wishes to take. One can find numerous accounts in which questions or suggested alternative actions raised by workers are eventually met with the assertion, "Because I said so." For example, in an account of negotiations in an earlier year, a union representative described how they were trying to point out areas where the company was -- from their perspective -- wasting money. The observation from the union representative was met with an assertion that the company had the right to run its business however it wanted. It could throw money away if it wanted.

### Techniques for Cutting Off Lines of Action and for Diverting Criticism

In addition to using direct appeals to management rights to limit the ability of workers and lower managers to set up their own line of action, managers sometime degraded expressions of concerns and alternatives expressed by workers and lower managers as complaining or as nonconstructive criticism. For example, several stories were related by workers and lower managers in which a worker or lower manager would be sharing a concern with a work group. Then, a manager would get up and tell the person to stop complaining. As one position paper developed by a group of lower level managers noted, managers treat expressions of concerns and alternatives with sarcastic mannerisms, short responses with dead pan expressions, threatening phraseology, abusive language, and talking down or "preaching." The paper went on to describe how the company initiated a type of participative management in which a few workers would be put in the position of having to participate in a committee or having to give in depth responses to problems. Then management would study the issue and make a decision behind closed doors. Finally, more meetings would be held with workers to give them a chance to respond to the decisions that managers now had made. When workers would respond with concerns or alternatives, they could expect a response: "Well, you had your chance to speak your piece. So, don't start complaining after the fact!"

A second tactic used to limit the ability of workers to set up their own lines of action was active listening. The human resources staff and upper managers recognized the problem of hurt feelings and anger evoked by degrading tactics. So, they developed training in techniques to allow a worker to express or vent concerns while not degrading the worker with abuse and while not

relinquishing management control. The previously cited litany -- "I hear you; I share your concern; let me see what can be done about the problem" -- allows the worker to express a concern, affirms the workers concern as valuable, and leaves the resolution of the concern in the hands of management. From the perspective of several workers and lower managers interviewed, their concerns -- once expressed -- are usually dropped. As one manager stated, "At least they can vent their anger." As one worker stated it from a different viewpoint, "It is the school of blow off steam."

A third tactic identified in the interviews and observations of interactions was a recognition and affirmation of a concern expressed by a worker followed by a redirection by the manager. In one meeting observed, two union members were participating in a committee of fourteen persons. The other twelve persons were managers. A senior executive was leading the meeting. In one instance in this meeting, a concern that was raised twice by a union member was ignored by the leader. Later, the union member made another suggestion. The executive leading the meeting said, "Good." Then she directed a manager to carry out a totally unrelated task and did not return to the suggestion. In a different meeting of a work group, a union member raised a policy issue. The manager responded by pointing out that everyone had concerns about this issue but that their work group could not decide about it. So, the manager suggested dealing with the work at hand rather than an issue not appropriate for them to decide. In yet another situation, a management trainer who was working on a quality management program pointed out that the training team listens to union criticisms as a first step. Then, they put those concerns aside and work on the quality management process. Finally, a manager wrote a memo to a union steward thanking her for her concern and then redirected how that concern should procedurally handled in the future. The steward had written an open letter to the manager, copied it to the union business agent, and posted it in the break room for all workers to see. The grievance procedure referred to by the manager required that the steward personally communicate the concern with the manager. In all four cases, the concern expressed was affirmed rather than punished. The redirection by the manager placed the issue in management's hands and out of the hands of the worker or the union.

While these practices work on cutting off the lines of action being set up by workers and lower level managers and on redirecting control to managers in



a direct fashion, these practices have an indirect effect on lines of action set up by workers and lower managers. Consider the following quote from the previously cited position paper developed by some lower managers:

The typical employee feels that (management) only hears what they want to hear and dismisses opinions that are negative or are not easy to handle. . . . Employees have lost the desire to give input to (the company) because they have developed the perception that Management listens but does not hear.

This analogy that management listens but does not hear is widely found in the interviews of workers and lower managers. The position paper indicates that this analogy would discourage employees from giving input. There was concern expressed from upper managers that employees were no longer participating in the processes designed to elicit information from employees for decision making purposes.

While one might conclude that workers thus stopped trying to influence the outcome of management decisions because such input was not perceived to be heard, one finds that workers simply developed different and -- from the perspective of management -- more troubling tactics. Consider the case cited above in which a steward wrote an open letter to a manager over an issue, posted it, and sent a copy to the union business agent. According to the labor contract and management procedures, she should have taken her concern to her manager. The analogy that management listens but does not hear was contained in her interview. If one cannot trust managers to hear and act on worker concerns in a sympathetic fashion, workers work to find alternative methods to influence decisions.

#### Unilateral Action and the Appearance of the Arbitrary

The labeling of a managerial act as arbitrary by workers and the use of management rights by managers as a practice of governing are directly linked in the unilaterally taken act. If one examines the interviews, one can find workers using the term "arbitrary" to describe management decisions and actions in five situations. First, managerial acts were labeled as arbitrary by workers when workers were not consulted or when their views were not incorporated in a decision as they expected them to be. For example, several workers pointed out that there had been changes in safety rules and that such changes were arbitrary because workers had no say in the changes. It should be noted that managers would point out that input was solicited from some

workers. But, how this input was used and the decisions with respect to new rules was determined by management. Second, managerial acts were labeled as arbitrary by workers when the acts seemed to violate the rules that management set up for evaluating a situation. For example, workers pointed out that the safety manual was developed from accident and near miss reports and from federal and state laws. So, when safety rules were modified or eliminated, managers appeared to violate the very conditions indicated by the accident and near miss reports. Third, managerial acts were labeled as arbitrary by workers when explanations were not given for decisions. For example, a worker noted that management may be working with information that workers do not have about reducing the number of people at a power plant to extend the life of the plant. The worker noted that it would help workers understand if managers would share the information with workers. Fourth, managerial acts were labeled as arbitrary by workers when they were attributed to specific managers. One worker described how she and some of her fellow workers had calculated that it would be less expensive to leave a work crew deployed as it had been before a reorganization. But, she noted, it will not change until two specific managers die or leave. Fifth, managerial acts were labeled as arbitrary by workers because of the doctrine of management rights itself. As one worker noted, "The biggest rub with management is the right they have to run the business as they wish in the contract."

Several managerial practices tend to increase the chance that managerial actions will be labeled as arbitrary by workers. First, the practices described in an earlier chapter that increase the perception of deception also tend to increase the chance that an act will be labeled as arbitrary by workers. Centralized control removes decisions further away so workers cannot be easily consulted and informed regarding reasons for decisions. Also, when one involves different functional departments -- such as accounting and human resources -- in the review of local managerial decisions, the reversal of locally made decisions by the central office staff tends to increase the chance that these decisions will be labeled as arbitrary by workers.

Second, the practices which seemed to most aggravate the perception of the arbitrary nature of managerial decisions were associated with labor relations practices which were initiated or intensified in a two year period leading up to this study. Rather than discuss and negotiate issues that were being contested by union members, labor relations staff would work with

managers to formulate a position based on their interpretation of the contract. Then, they would announce the decision to the worker and union officials by asserting that this is management's position and the reason for it. However, they would point out that management does not intend to discuss the decision. The union could grieve the decision if it wanted to do so. This practice seemed to increase the labeling of managerial decisions as arbitrary by workers. Furthermore, rather than recognize various memos and letters as part of the labor contract and rather than leave in force informal letters of agreement, the company unilaterally canceled over one-hundred such agreements. Finally, a management training manual was adopted which instructed managers not to create any consistent evidence of a practice which could be used to argue for a past practice as the basis for an arbitration case. Both of these practices seemed to increase the labeling of managerial decisions as arbitrary by workers.

#### Tactics to Ameliorate the Appearance of the Arbitrary

One of the practices instituted by managers to ameliorate the labeling of acts as arbitrary was giving reasons for actions being taken. Or as one worker observed, "Explaining things so people understand is crucial."

But, more important than explanation is casting commands as requests. By request it is meant that workers are given the opportunity to modify or reject the request. Consider the earlier cited example when labor relations staff announced a decision, gave an explanation for it in terms of management's interpretation of the contract, and concluded by stating that management was not open to further discussion. Such acts are usually labeled as arbitrary by workers even though they contain explanations. As a counter example, one manager described the following strategy:

We tell workers that we know that this might be against the contract, but we need this done. Will you do it? You'll get more cooperation than when you just tell them and not recognize the contract.

Other interviews with lower level managers were found in which similar practices of a request associated with a recognition that the request probably violated the contract but was needed and why were met with compliance without being labeled as being arbitrary or deceptive.

Another practice to amelioration the labeling of acts as arbitrary is an appeal to conditions portrayed as uncontrollable as a reason for an action. The

letter which announced the potential layoffs which eventually occurred in the mid-1980s was filled with explanations of business conditions and with all possible alternatives other than layoffs that had been exhausted to try to deal with the business conditions. Thus, the managers of the company were not free actors but were themselves being controlled by economic forces. At a work group level this tactic can be seen as managers substitute the command of higher managers, the constraint of the budget, rules and regulations, productivity, work procedures, or the labor contract for unilateral action in constructing reasons for actions taken. These practices break down and become ineffective if workers are able to either identify the portrayal of the uncontrollable as the handy work of a manager or if they could identify other alternatives which managers had not considered. For example, a manager claimed that her hands were tied with respect to changing a practice unless all of the other workers would go along with the change. Workers had seen the manager make changes without the approval of all persons in the work group. Her condition was seen as arbitrarily imposed.

Rules, regulations, and work procedures take the place of an actual *who* as well as work on *what* gets done. As already noted above, such rules were labeled as arbitrary when they could be associated with unilateral actions taken by management. When the rules and regulations were agreed to and recognized as such by both workers and managers, these regulatory devices in and of themselves become the *who* and the *what* for controlling work. One manager described how this practice worked in a way that was found in several interviews:

The union does a lot for me as a manager. There is no argument over rules because they are set by the union in the contract. There's no personal involvement. I just enforce the contract. There is no arguing over what they get paid or the rules.

In one work group, the work group manager, the work group union steward, and the workers would meet each year and develop a document which specified how issues which emerged during the year would be worked out. In this situation, the manager could actually go to the steward and enlist her help in the enforcement of the rules. Neither the rules nor the manager was labeled as arbitrary by workers.

As also noted earlier, the centralization of decisions and the consequent distance of the decision makers increase the chance that decisions will be

labeled as arbitrary by workers. As a part of a program of participatory management, the company developed a policy of moving decisions to the lowest possible level of management. Yet, as a senior executive noted on several occasions, senior management does not want lower level managers to take unilateral action. Senior executives want all managers to act uniformly. Thus, the company developed and executed extensive training programs for lower level managers on how to manage workers to encourage uniform action while at the same time encouraging lower level managers to make decisions and act.

As long as lower level managers act consistently with the training and as long as their actions do not become problematic to some party, it appears that they are making their own decisions. But, once a lower level manager violates one of these two conditions, the regulatory nature of the training appears. One can find several accounts from workers in which a middle manager encourages lower level managers and workers to develop personal, individualized solutions to problems with workers. Then, a training program is initiated which encourages every lower level manager to do things alike. If the result of the training is not satisfactory from the perspective of upper management, it is repeated or different training is applied. The uniformity effect of the training was recognized by workers. However, it was not labeled as arbitrary by them.

Another practice which ameliorated the labeling of management as arbitrary was the upper management rescue. Several unionized employees of the company were also a part of U.S. Army reserve units. When Desert Storm occurred, they were activated and deployed to the Middle East. Originally, a policy was announced which would have terminated employees when they were deployed. They would have to go through a rehire process when they returned. An arrangement was made through a senior executive that allowed workers to return to their jobs after Desert Storm and that maintained benefits while the workers were away.

It could have been possible that senior executives did not know about the first policy before it was announced. If that were the case, it would run counter to most major personnel policies explored in this study. However, it appears that -- since senior executives can take unilateral actions -- they took such an action to reverse an unpopular policy. As a result, workers labeled senior managers as concerned and reasonable. This practice of going to more senior executives to reverse decisions was associated with attributing arbitrariness to

the managers in the middle who were charged with upholding the policy that got reversed. One could find similar examples of this same practice used by different levels of management. It should be noted that the lower level managers who carried out unpopular decisions made by upper managers and who had the decisions reversed on them felt unsupported by upper management in such situations.

Finally, the unilateral nature of managerial action was ameliorated through practices which put workers in the position to see things from the perspective of managers. In one situation, a worker who was injured was assigned to help her manager for a period of several weeks while she was recovering from the injury. During this period, this worker watched the manager work to deal with problematic workers and with the demands of higher level managers. At the end of the period, she apologized to her boss for some of her actions as a worker because she did not know how much trouble such actions created for her boss. Given this experience, a higher level manager decided to rotate all workers in this work group through a similar assignment and to apply the practice to other work areas. As this manager observed, "When you walk in the other fellow's shoes, you can better understand him."

#### Participatory Practices at the Edge of the Practice of Management Rights

As observed earlier, the company in this study had developed a participatory management program designed to elicit information and address criticism while carefully retaining management's right to take unilateral action. The failure of this process has been seen as workers have gone through frustration, anger, and finally withdrawal and passive aggression in response to a practice which elicits information and concerns while producing decisions by managers which workers do not recognize from the input given by them. At the same time, managers struggle to counter the "misconception by craft people that the final decision should look like their input" with slogans, by carefully framing participation as having a voice or brainstorming, and by reminding workers that decisions are made further up the organization.

While management rights take away the influence promised by calling a practice participatory, various participatory practices were found exactly at the point at which a manager abandoned the practice of unilateral action.

First, several practices modified the work group supervisor as unilateral actor with respect to the work group. When a person is put in charge of a work

group -- which is an act in and of itself which defines one person as the unilateral actor -- and that person is not the most technically competent person in the group, that person is now in the position of making decisions without the most adequate information or evaluative practices. This asymmetry encourages a supervisor to rely on the advice and judgments of workers. While the supervisor's position constitutes her as a unilateral actor, her lack of competence encourages a reliance on the worker for decisions. Several instances were found in which college educated supervisors who had no craft experience consulted workers and took their advice more than supervisors who were the most expert worker in the group. Both workers and supervisors in these situations recognized that the asymmetry of knowledge helped to create the openness in the relationship.

A similar scene was set up when the company did away with the larger line crews with a nonworking foreman. With larger crews, the nonworking foreman was the most skilled person in the work group. This person's job was to direct work. As one worker observed, "You didn't know what you were doing until the foreman started assigning tasks." When the crew size was reduced to three with the new bucket truck technology, the foreman was now also a worker. Here, there emerged the "tailgate" session as a way to manage. As one worker defined it, "'Tailgating' is when crews go out to a job, sit around and plan it, and do it." In every interview of both supervisors and workers in which "tailgating" was mentioned, the interviewee described the practice similarly and defined it as a shared decision making. This activity is confined to the work group level of line crews. All interviewees indicated that management above this level still "tell us how it will be done."

Friendship also modified the supervisor as an unilateral actor. In one work group interviewed, one worker and supervisor described in separate interviews how they were friends. They described strong disagreements they periodically had. But, they also described apologizing to each other and valuing each other as friends. They both also described relationships between this supervisor and other workers which were unilateral and hostile. In another work group, a manager related an incident in which a worker who was a friend confronted her by asking her how she liked it when her boss told her, "Because I said so." The friend did use a technique which appealed to a common experience to give the supervisor a viewpoint from which to judge an act. But, friendship enabled the confrontation and its outcome.

A second practice which generally erodes the practice of unilateral action is problem solving. Several situations were observed in which a manager or group of managers would take a decision and then try to get workers to go along with the decision. In each situation observed, the ability of a manager to take a unilateral action was made problematic either because of the presence of the union or because of the presence of a higher level manager who was encouraging participation. The managers all took a tack of announcing their decision, enumerating reasons, and then either expressing disinterest in entertaining worker's objections and questions or continuing to enumerate reasons in response to questions and objections. Some workers would then begin to ask questions to elicit information about the problem behind the decision and about the managers concerns and values with respect to the problem. Eventually, the problem and a reframing of the problem became the focus of the discussion rather than the position originally taken by the manager. A new solution would begin to emerge. Then a break would be called in the meeting. Both parties would retire to another room and formulate a position or reinforce the original position. Problem solving tended to end with the retirement to a back region and with the taking of a position again before engaging each other again. In fact, it would be difficult to formulate and maintain two different viewpoints in the face of problem solving without the dividing practices of back regions and position taking.

The one place in which problem solving seemed to be most consistently used was within different levels of management teams. Here, all managers on the team are on similar levels. Their actions are oriented toward problems and projects. One could identify attempts to reframe issues and to gain allies in decisions. With no ability to take unilateral decisions with respect to each other, tactics other than command were required. But, if a committee was composed of multiple levels of managerial authority, the nature of the interaction tended to change. Such committees were usually lead by the most senior manager present. The interaction shifted from the give-and-take of the meetings composed of one level of management to interaction lead by the senior manager. Senior managers tended to initiate the lines of discussion, make pronouncements of judgment about the value of proposals and discussions, and cut off problematic lines of action. Participants shifted from initiating lines of discussion to responding to lines of discussion initiated by the senior manager.

A third set of practices which utilized practices other than the unilateral



action of management rights were associated with interaction between management and the union. In a few locations found in this study, one could find one of two practices. First, some locations used a negotiating model to work out formal procedures and policies. Here, union and company labor relations officials would meet with their members involved in the work group before the negotiations and develop a position and alternative positions to use as bargaining ploys. Then, they would meet in a formal bargaining session. As noted earlier, often one side or the other would stop arguing for a position and begin a problem solving line of inquiry which tended to dissolve the positions. Breaks for consultation would be called. Again, a position would be reestablished and the session would begin again. Neither union members nor managers saw this as participation. They identified the activity as bargaining. Yet, it is participation in the sense that one side cannot take unilateral action with respect to the other side.

The second practice for working out work group rules and practices was described by two managers from one work group:

We sit down with union stewards and here's how we approach it. Resolve issues before the fact rather than management behind closed doors make decisions and then act. This has done us a world of good. . . . We have a set of working rules in which the crew negotiated how they would work. Supervisors check off on this. Contract provides lots of latitude. 100 percent agreement with workers. Any changes require 100 percent agreement. Our involvement is as an umpire in working out rules as workers work out rules. Union steward writes up the rules worked out.

Both union members and managers involved in this work group describe this activity as participation. It differs from bargaining in several respects. First, neither the union business agent nor the company's labor relations staff are involved until the process is finished or unless the process reaches an impasse. As a manager noted:

There are rare occasions when we can't come to an agreement. I tell them to call their business agent and I call (name of labor relations staff). If irresolvable, then the company goes ahead with its plans and the union can grieve.

Second, the process involves consensus. This means that all workers, the stewards, and work group managers agree with the outcome. It also means that they can all initiate proposals with respect to modifying the development of work rules. Third, it involves the abandonment of a back room and the establishment

of a position by both parties. Fourth, bargaining assumes and constructs two parties. Here, parties are not well defined.

Finally, the presence of the union and due process with respect to disciplining and terminating employees make possible the expression of voice. Several union members observed that union members will be the only employees vocal about issues because they have security because of the contract. Several workers cited examples of how employees in nonunion areas of the company had serious problems but were afraid of losing their jobs if they voiced their problems. The state in which the company in this study is located has an employ at will law. Instances of terminating supervisors and managers after limited warning was noted in conversations with managerial staff. These employees were not covered by the labor contract.

### Command

Whereas the practice of management rights posits and works on *who* can initiate action in an organization, command refers to practices used to work on directing *what* is done. Simple command -- as noted by Edwards (1984) and as described in interviews -- involves a person giving instructions to workers on a job-by-job basis, showing workers how a command is to be carried out if necessary, and directly monitoring the work by observation. This method of controlling what is done could be found with the five person line crew with a nonworking foreman using the old A-frame truck technology.

As noted earlier, command tended to be resented by workers. As one worker observed, "They treat us like dogs." Workers reported that such tactics imply that they are incompetent or untrustworthy. Command tends to bring the unilateral nature of management rights to the surface of interaction with assertions such as, "Because I said so." The senior executive level of management and the human resources department recognized this problem. Thus, various human relations and participatory management strategies were devised as substitutes for command. In this section, these practices will be explored.

### Command Through Role Taking

Role taking (Mead, 1934) is the process of mentally assuming the perspective of another, thereby enabling one to respond to that imagined

viewpoint. While Mead theorized this activity as a voluntaristic activity emanating from the actor, imagining a viewpoint of another requires some sort of analogy or practice. Such analogies or practices encourage one to see the view point of the other in particular ways. Furthermore, analogies are offered as part of practices in various asymmetric relationships. Managers engaged in the practices to be described below in order to get workers to go along with the manager's point of view. While managers use these practices to give workers a way to "walk in the manager's shoes," there was no concern on the part of management to deploy practices which would give managers a way to "walk in the worker's shoes." As noted in an earlier chapter, sympathy toward the view point of a worker on the part of a manager is enough to make the motives of a manager suspect among other managers. Role taking is less of a voluntaristic activity that an activity encouraged by specific management practices. Therefore, it can substitute for command by encouraging lines of acting from analogies offered.

One practice of encouraging a particular way of looking at things was discovered quite by accident. As noted earlier, a worker who was injured was assigned to help her manager for a period of several weeks while she was recovering from the injury. During this period, this worker watched the manager deal with problematic workers and with the demands of higher level managers. At the end of the period, she apologized to her boss for some of her actions as a worker because she did not know how much trouble such actions created for her boss. In this case of "walking in the other fellow's shoes," the practice of helping the manager as an observer made a manager's performance of the daily acts of a manager, workers' performance of the daily acts of workers, and higher managers' performance of their daily acts visible to a worker as an audience rather than as an object or subject of the acts. This practice constituted role taking. In other words, the worker came away with another way for imagining the viewpoint of the manager based on the practice of helping the manager as an observer. Now that the worker has another analogy for imagining the viewpoint of the manager, different lines of action are possible between the manager and the worker than were earlier possible.

Another analogy for role taking with respect to managers was offered through a total quality management program. In this program, the manager was portrayed as a customer to be served by the worker. By using the analogy of the customer, the worker is encouraged to think about what the needs of the

manager as customer are and about how those needs can be satisfied. Here, the worker is no longer the object of command. She is the subject of role taking and makes the needs of the manager her object of concern. Even though she is the subject in that she is the one engaged in a practice of imagining a viewpoint and adjusting her activity in response to the imagined viewpoint, she is the object of the managerial practice of making the manager the customer and the worker the server. It does not appear as command to the worker because the worker is the subject of the activity. Yet, the implementation of the command of the manager is the purpose of the practice.

Yet another practice for encouraging role taking was through setting expectations. This practice usually involved a verbal reframing of a command with a phrase, "Here is what we expect . . . ." This device explicitly elaborates what a manager wants from a worker without ordering the worker or explicitly placing the worker in a subordinate position. Rather than simply being the object of command, the worker retains some latitude of initiation to adjust her behavior to the expectation. The expectation is defined in the expectation exercise as a manager's "need" rather than what the worker "must" do.

A final practice used to encourage role taking was role reversal. Here, a manager tells a worker that the manager will be the worker and the worker will be the manager in a role play. Then, the manager -- in the role of the worker -- acts out the behavior which is problematic to her as a manager. The worker -- in the role of the manager -- has to deal with her own behavior as acted out by the manager from the perspective of the manager. The manager used this practice to let the worker see how the manager sees the worker's behavior.

The offering of analogies through various practices to encourage certain ways of imagining the viewpoint of the other does not only occur in the practices of management. From what has been seen with respect to analogies of distrust and of arbitrariness, stories told about past events and about managerial or union actions are the tools with which people imagine the viewpoint of the other. In fact, the very stories told in the interviews for this study and the performances observed are analogies offered for imagining viewpoints of others.

#### Incomplete Technological Control

Technological control was a term used by Edwards (1984) to denote the use of machines and assembly lines to direct work as a substitute for direct

personal command. As noted earlier, such techniques of control are difficult to develop in situations in which jobs vary from job to job. Line work, power plant maintenance, and transient situations in power plant operations all present variety and complexity from situation to situation.

Innovation is often laid at the door of economic conditions, technological discovery, or the struggle between labor and management. With the company in this study, the application of a form of technological control to power plant maintenance was encouraged by the Internal Revenue Service. The company was called into question over the issue of inventory control. In the process of looking at computer programs to utilize in inventory control, a program was suggested by a vendor which could also be used to coordinate work in a fashion to optimize expenditures on materials. Software was also available to compare the efficiency of work groups and work methods. But, according to several managers interviewed, this part of the software was rejected because of the anxiety it evoked in the work force. There was a fear that the computer would become "big brother."

Before the use of the inventory control/operations software system, supervisors of mechanics, electricians, and technicians would get repair cards and decide what work needed to be done and now to do it. They would coordinate with each other when a job involved mechanical, electrical or technical aspects. Crews could address problems which they identified as well as assigned problems.

With the new computerized system, a central planner was required to operate the computer to set work priorities, assign jobs, and coordinate crews. Supervisors of work crews lost much of the arena over which they could take decisions. Now, the central planner handed out jobs and coordinated work. The ability of supervisors and workers to take direct action to fix problems was eliminated.

While it is clear that the computer program had a particular way of assessing work, it is also clear that this way was different from the way used by most supervisors and workers who mentioned the program. As one supervisor observed, the computer programs deals with the costs of repairs and ignores the consequences of failure. While neither the program's or the supervisor's methods of assessment were revealed, the comment does indicate a perceived difference in how the computer and the supervisor would assign work priorities. The comment also fits the emphasis on the budget and cost containment noted

by most managers.

What the computer program and the planner did seem to work on was the motivation to improve work:

People don't do anything if you don't have a card. Before, if you saw something, you attacked it.

It takes you're motivation away.

Once supervisors and workers were made the objects of specific commands, they were no longer embedded in a position of being responsible for identifying and solving problems. To be responsible for a set of machinery is to view it as a set of problems to be discovered and solved. When something becomes a problem, the fact that it is a problem encourages attention until it comes to resolution or closure. Commands make very specific tasks and their resolution problematic. One is not encouraged to look beyond the command. In fact, if workers went out and worked on things which they saw on their own without first reporting it and waiting for the planner to assign the problem a priority and devise a plan to address the problem, they could get in trouble.

### Surveillance

Surveillance was identified by Foucault (1979) as an element of the panoptican structure of prisons by which prisoners were exposed to observation by a guard at all times. At the same time, the guard could not be seen by the prisoners. This arrangement encouraged prisoners to act as if they were being monitored.

At the company in this study, surveillance was attempted or used to check to see if workers were complying with commands or not. Line crew supervisors would listen to the communication radio to assess how a job was going. Maintenance supervisors would make surprise visits to work sites or sneak around to observe workers. On several occasions during this study, a supervisor would enter the room where an interview was being conducted and appear to be examining a wall chart. When workers would be absent for medical treatment or for a funeral, calls from managers would sometimes occur to check if workers were there and to encourage them to hurry back to work. Such tactics were described by workers as "hounding." Workers described such acts as distrust on the part of managers. Sometimes, workers would

retaliate in ways that deepened the mistrust of managers: "(The manager) keeps checking up on us. So, we don't stay busy in defiance."

Unlike Foucault's (1979) prisoners in the panopticon, surveillance here does not result in workers monitoring their own behavior in response to the surveillance. Unlike the prisoner who cannot observe the guard but cannot escape the gaze of the guard, workers often are aware of when they are being observed and when they are not being observed. They can slow down work in defiance without easily being caught with enough evidence for disciplinary action. Yet, enough evidence is left to anger the manager. Of course, this was part of the intended effect of the practice.

The other form of surveillance carried out by management is a part of record keeping and data collection. Accountants review overtime, travel, meals, and other expenditures and compare them to company averages. Studies such as this one and the periodic employee survey are conducted to identify trouble spots that need attention. Safety audits are conducted to see if work procedures are in compliance with safety rules. In each of these cases, no identifiable surveillance is taking place. Instead, workers are simply filling out the necessary paper work to do business or are participating in a study. Workers are not necessarily encouraged by the practice to monitor themselves because they do not know that they are being observed. However, once an action is taken in a way that exposes the surveillance devices, workers tend to modify their behavior to avoid detection or to counter the evidence being collected rather than monitor their own behavior to stay in compliance. For example, one foreman went through a dispatching procedure in great detail and identified exactly the practice that would erroneously result in a visit from an auditor inquiring why the dispatcher's log did not match a time sheet. The foreman knew exactly how to challenge the auditor. In this study, the persons who chose not to participate did so because they claimed that such studies in the past had been used against them in disciplinary proceedings. Workers are not locked into the gaze of the manager in a panopticon once they discover how the method of observing works.

### Evaluation

Most personnel evaluation schemes involve command in that they work on time and how it is used or rules and whether or not they are followed. However, one finds in evaluation a set of practices which posit and work on the

worker as a self. That is, they work on a definition of the worker as a person rather than on work itself. The formal system of evaluation is built on procedures for gathering evidence for conviction from the court room and on procedures for constructing a perception of fairness. Here, one counsels a worker about a problem. If the worker does not adequately respond, more counseling is given. If the worker still does not adequately respond, verbal and then written reprimands are given. All such interaction is to include a reminder that disciplinary action up to and including termination is possible. This process of stepwise discipline constructs a perception of fairness because persons being disciplined are given chances to conform. At the same time, as this process continues, the worker is having her essential self defined by the process as an employee unworthy of employment. Finally, the process provides evidence for justification for termination which would hold up in a court of law if the termination decision is challenged in court.

This process is not evenly applied to all employee problems. If the problem is minor and if an employee alternates between compliance and noncompliance, the process will most often stay at the counseling level. If the problem involves insubordination, the violation of a serious safety rule, or criminal activity, the process can go immediately toward termination of employment. Since the process takes many steps for more minor problems, it is not very effective. One can find complaints from managers in the interviews that a manager has no real power or incentive unless a worker "gets way out of line." One manager complained that workers seem to know exactly how many absences they can get before the process moves to the next step of seriousness.

While this type of formal evaluation is conducted to deal with situations defined as problematic, there is an evaluation process which formally occurs once or twice a year in which a manager must evaluate the strengths and weakness of a worker. It is in this evaluation process that too many "strengths" lead to a necessary but problematic promotion and too many "weaknesses" lead to a necessary but problematic disciplinary action. While this evaluation procedure is not a part of the disciplinary procedure in which termination is the ultimate goal and threatened at each step, it still works on the worker rather than the work. "Strengths" and "weaknesses" may relate to what a worker does. But, the very fact that they are the strengths and weakness of a worker mean that the definition of the self of the worker is the substance which the practice posits and



defines. This definition is officially recorded in company personnel files. Such definitions of a person are used to decide on that person's worthiness with respect to promotion or disciplinary action. The actual behaviors of the worker which are problematic are not what is recorded apart from how they define the worker.

A reliance on these technologies of evaluation that essentially work on the self of a worker set up a number of problems. First, there is a perception found in some interviews that evaluation can do no good for a worker and can only penalize them. This perception is consistent both with the use of stepwise discipline to evaluate workers to move them toward termination and with the inclusion of negative definitions of the self in both methods of evaluation. Second, these forms of evaluation turn evaluation into confrontation. One is not interacting with a worker to solve a problem. One is interacting with a worker to negatively work on the definition of the self of the worker. Thus, one is not surprised to find friendship getting in the way of evaluation when managers do not want to offend or hurt the feelings of workers who are their friends. Or again, one is not surprised to find managers who become upset with the behavior of workers but do not confront them until the manager's anger and the worker's behavior make the situation serious.

A different method of evaluation was suggested by a wall poster found on the wall of the office of a human resources staff person. According to this poster, managers are to evaluate by focusing on issues, practices, and problems, not people. Managers are to guard worker's self esteem. They are to focus on what can be done positively to resolve situations. The general thrust of this second practice of evaluation is to work on what is done by a worker by engaging the worker in problem solving. As noted earlier, problem solving posits issues, problems, and practices as a substance to be jointly worked on by participants in the problem solving session. Further, the goal of the process is the positive resolution of problems rather than the termination of an employee if discipline fails. The self esteem of a worker is protected -- or even enhanced -- by working on the problem with the manager and by working on the problem rather than having her self threatened with negative definitions. By calling this practice evaluation, the practice is threatened by the potential use of other evaluation practices. Perhaps the practice should just be called problem solving rather than evaluation. If the results of this practice are used in any way with the other practices of evaluation, the practice will be once again rendered a

practice which attacks self esteem. Neither manuals nor training embodied this practice.

### Hierarchy, Rules and Regulations, Training, and Accountability

As with all bureaucracies (Weber, 1978), the company in this study relied on hierarchy as a practice through which to command. Using management rights rooted in property rights, representatives of the stockholders appoint executives who are given the management right to take unilateral action. A chain of command -- a technique that Foucault (1979) notes was borrowed from the church and the military -- is established through which the chief executive officer could command every worker. But, with 2,000 employees located over a major portion of a state engaged in numerous and varied activities, command as an activity of directing workers breaks down. Yet, as a senior executive noted, employees are not free to act on their own. All employees are to act uniformly as management wants them to act.

Instead of direct command through the hierarchy to direct each worker, managers create rules, procedures, and standards, place them in manuals, train managers and workers in these, and sample behavior to insure that the procedures, rules, and standards are being followed. The labor contract itself represents such a manual. Various groups or departments in the company are charged with developing various rules and procedures, training, and auditing. The effect of rule establishment and training can be seen from remarks from managers:

(The training) has caused me to move more responsibility to the first line supervisors. We all have policies and the same flow of information. So we can all make the same decisions.

(The training) was the most useful stuff I got. It gave me a frame work for functioning. It gave me procedures.

Another aspect of training with respect to command is the fixing of responsibility. Managers and workers are required to go to various training. Once they have received the training and a record of the event has been created, the manager or worker is now responsible and accountable for the rules, procedures, and standards covered in the training. No one will necessarily command the trained person about the content of the training. But, if there is a violation of the rules, procedures, or standards, those trained are now in the position of having blame fixed to them for purposes of punishment.

This encourages persons to monitor their own behavior if they know they will be held accountable and if there are devices to audit or sample deviations.

### Punishment

If you have poor performers, you need to retrain, transfer, or fire them.

It's almost easier to fire them than to discipline.

(Two different managers)

Punishment refers to any practice which works on the problematic aspects of a person's performance by directly working on the person's body or its socially created substitutes of the self, position, or salary rather than on specific aspects of the performance itself. In other words, punishment makes a person the problem rather than the person's performance.

There are several elements of this practice which will be explored. First, a person is set up as the problematic element by the practice of responsibility. Once responsibility is set in place, it is used to connect problematic events to persons so the person can be punished. After exploring these elements of the practice of punishment, four ways in which this practice was used will be explored: stepwise discipline, retaliation, deterrence, and scapegoating. Finally, the problems set up by combining elements of other practices such as training and problem solving with the practice of punishment will be explored.

#### Using Responsibility and Punishment to Construct the Person as the Problem

Responsibility essentially involves the elaboration of a controlling relationship between a person and a set of duties. This involves defining duties by such devices as command, job descriptions, training, and rules, procedures, and standards. Through these devices, a person's expected conduct is outlined. More important, the person has now been given charge for carrying out these expectations. As noted earlier, these devices do work on what is done. But, by making the expectations a duty, the connection of the person with the set of duties now makes the person the problem if a problem associated with duties develops.

An essential element in these connecting processes is an acknowledgement on both the manager and worker's part -- or on the senior manager and junior manager's part -- that a person has been assigned a

responsibility. For example, workers were trained in a sexual harassment policy. Once trained, workers and managers recognized that the workers now bore responsibility for duties outlined in the policy. So, if sexual harassment occurred, the worker would be the target of punishment rather than the company or higher managers. Or again, workers are trained in safety rules. The safety rules themselves define the worker as responsible for carrying out safety rules. Thus, if an accident occurs and a worker can be found in violation, the worker is now the responsible agent. In several interviews, both workers and managers recognized that, unless expectations were clearly outlined and acknowledged or unless there was a training or some other formal way of acknowledging the assignment of duties, it was difficult to claim that a party was responsible for a realm of actions.

Training and fixing responsibility alters legal liability. For example, if the company did not train workers in sexual harassment policies, it would be easy for an employee to sue the company for the actions of another employee. But, if employees are trained and a document of the fact is created, it is now easier to fix responsibility for the act to a particular individual in terms of liability. The individual knows about the policy and indicates that she has been informed about the policy in the training.

Another device used to connect persons with duties and consequences is the hierarchical device of the chain of command. A hierarchical command structure works by making one layer of persons responsible for all actions of persons and activities under their charge. Each level of command has duties outlined for them. So, if a problem occurs, the trail of duties and responsible parties can be traced up the chain of command to find a responsible party. If a worker has an accident, the investigation looks at safety rules and duties assigned to involved workers, managers, and other managers up the chain of command. Persons are identified as responsible for the accident if rules were not followed or if inadequate procedures were used to communicate, acknowledge, and monitor the rules. Here, responsibility and accountability do not work on actual work practices and working conditions. Responsibilities set up persons as the causal agent of the problem.

While punishment itself is not necessarily an element of responsibility, the use of punishment requires the identification of a responsible party on whom to administer the punishment. On the one hand, investigations of accidents and other problematic events could proceed by looking at what

workers do and at working conditions. The company in this study does look at what is done and tries to change problematic practices. But, punishment is a key element in addressing the problem. From the interviews, managers point out that -- from their perspective -- training does not work unless workers are held accountable. They point out that consequences are important for holding persons accountable for their actions. While the practice of responsibility links a person in a causal manner with consequences through duties and thereby makes the person the problem rather than work practices and working conditions, punishment is not the only device that could be used to work on the person. In fact, training works on what a person does. But, by using punishment, a person is required to be the problem.

#### Four Uses of the Practice of Responsibility and Punishment

The practice of punishment outlined in the training manual for stepwise discipline does begin as discipline in that it works on what a worker does. First, a manager counsels a worker about what the manager expects from the worker, about how the worker's performance does not meet this expectation, and about steps that need to be taken to improve the worker's behavior to an acceptable level. While such sessions were often experienced by workers as rituals of degradation, at least one practice was identified which, if used, would work on behavior while minimizing the degradation of the workers. If such counseling is not satisfactory, then it becomes formal in that documentation about the problem is created and put in the worker's personnel file. The worker's personnel file is a potentially legally binding definition of the worker's self. Furthermore, the threat of action to reduce a person's pay or rank or to terminate employment is communicated. Now, the act of discipline -- working on a worker's performance -- becomes punishment -- working on a worker's self. The very process of counseling, verbal reprimands, and written reprimands prior to punishment defines the person as the problem behind the performance. It becomes the worker's unwilling confession of her inadequacy as a person. The process also works on the definition of the company's management. It portrays the company as fair and reasonable rather than arbitrary and capricious.

The second use of the practice of responsibility and punishment as retaliation can be found in several interviews with managers. Here, workers seem to be adequate to good at performing their actual work. The real problem with workers is their attitude toward management. Behaviors that tended to be

labeled as antimanagement included complaining about or criticizing management decisions, challenging management commands as violations of the labor contract, verbally degrading managers in front of other employees, and using procedures from the labor contract or safety rules in ways that make the manager's job more difficult. Since these behaviors are done by workers who are adequate to good at their work, it is difficult to find adequate grounds to use in the stepwise discipline procedure.

Once a worker has been labeled as a trouble maker, some managers begin to search for violations of rules and procedures to begin a formal disciplinary action to get rid of the worker. Inspections increase to find safety violations. Surveillance increases to catch workers who abuse breaks or lunch periods. Rumors are spread about the inadequacy of the worker's work or character. Small problems and infractions are now noted in evaluations. Workers who were the object of such practices tended to keep documentation of their own to counter that of supervisors. As one worker noted, "You have to document everything because they are going to come back on you."

A third use of the practice of responsibility and punishment is deterrence. Here, punishment is threatened for the next person who violates a rule. For example, one manager indicated that her work area had experienced several accidents of one particular type. Upper managers threatened that the next person in the work group who had such an accident would be made an example. In this case, the behavior itself triggers the practice of punishment. The person who received the punishment does so on a somewhat random basis.

Fourth, the practice of responsibility and punishment encourages the search for a scapegoat. Interviews with both managers and workers use similar language to describe the practice:

Upper management sees (name of a problem) and looks at the first line supervisors for a scapegoat. The company looks for "who can we blame" rather than "how can we solve the problem."

Since a problem with a serious consequence requires someone to hold responsible, various practices are used to assign or avoid responsibility. First, to avoid being identified as the problem, cases were found in which a manager redefined her actions to normalize them within acceptable procedures. For example, a supervisor tripped a boiler feed pump. Fortunately, a worker caught it and reset it. The supervisor covered for the mistake by saying that she was

just testing it. Second, other cases were found in which middle managers ordered lower managers to take an action without leaving a documentary trail of the order. When the action resulted in a serious problem, the middle manager would deny issuing the order. Third, the general practice of encouraging first line supervisors to make decisions and of making each worker responsible for safety shifts blame to the lower levels. Several supervisors and workers noted incidents of being encouraged to make decisions only to be reprimanded when problems arose. Fourth, some managers intentionally take the blame for upper managers to curry favor for promotion.

### The Problem of Dually Embedded Elements of a Practice

To say that an element of a practice is dually embedded in practices is to say that an element of a practice is common to several different practices that either encourage conflicting lines of action or posit and work on different substances. Several management practices are problematic because they are dually embedded.

If one examines attempts to use participatory management practices, one sees participation being modified with management rights. Initially, workers were hopeful when task forces composed of workers and managers were established to address various issues. But, when recommendations were referred to the executive level of the company for review, revisions, and decision, disillusion set in as decisions did not resemble recommendations. Participatory practices encouraged the generation of alternative viewpoints and judgments with an expectation of control. Management rights precisely foils this by giving managers the right to take unilateral action regardless of what workers and lower managers devise through participatory practices. It is interesting to note that workers were disillusioned with participatory schemes and felt them to be a ruse while upper managers who have the right to make decisions tended to like the participatory practices used among themselves.

If one examines the company's combination of discipline with punishment, one sees the practice of punishment foiling what the practice of discipline attempts. A supervisor often interacts with workers to examine how work is being done and how it can be improved. Here, the supervisor is practicing discipline by working on work itself. But, once this interaction is

framed as disciplinary action, the worker and her position and reputation is being officially defined for purposes of punishment. Defensiveness rather than behavioral change is evoked.

Similarly, when one looks at how problem solving is combined with the documentation for punishment in safety, one finds workers and supervisors not reporting accidents or near misses to avoid punishment. The valuable information which could limit accidents and save money and human suffering is withheld. Furthermore, the very practices of responsibility and punishment make who is responsible more of a solution than what is the problem. Finding a person to punish to solve the problem blocks finding a solution to the problem in terms of work practices and working conditions.

The focus on rules, procedures, and standards as a duty block an examination of work practices and working conditions as the cause of problems. When an accident occurs, it is investigated in terms of whether or not safety rules were broken. It was apparent that the company did investigate work practices and conditions with respect to accidents. But, rules and procedures narrow and define what constitute relevant conditions and practices.

Finally, the framing of working conditions and practices both in terms of costs of production and safety often block each other. In its most obvious form, this conflict is apparent in such situations as cleaning up an asbestos spill in a way that is not safe by federal safety standards to cut costs. Here, workers are being exposed with no appearance to the contrary. In its less obvious form, working conditions are changed in a way that increase the chance of an accident or increase the chance of death or serious injury from an accident. For example, the company was proposing to reconfigure how electrical lines were configured. Here, the configuration of an electrical line was both a part of a cost accounting practice and a safety assessment practice. Workers complained that the reconfiguration increased the danger of working on the lines by decreasing their window of escape in case of a problem. The company responded by revising safety rules and work procedures to "control the risk." This strategy shifts the burden of the risk to the worker.



## CHAPTER VIII

### LABOR RELATIONS PRACTICES

#### Introduction

Two principal complexes of practices are established in labor law on which labor relations practices seemed to be built in this study: arbitration and representation.

Just as the National Labor Relations Act contains two conflicting sets of rights -- management's right to operate its business as it decides and the requirement to bargain with workers over wages, hours, and working conditions -- arbitration also contains two conflicting practices used to define the scope of the collective bargaining agreement -- the "reserved rights" doctrine of management rights and the "past practices" implied in a contract. In this chapter, the practices used by arbitrators to determine whether a "past practice" contractually exists will be explored. Then, the practices adopted by management and the union to establish or to resist the establishment of past practices will be examined. During the period when labor relations appeared to be relatively unproblematic from the viewpoint of management, the labor relations staff of the company and the business manager of the union utilized "teflon" agreements, conflict aversion, and personal relations to work out problems. During the period when labor relations were problematic, the union used the grievance/arbitration process to attempt to create binding agreements. The company countered by forcing grievances to arbitration and by adopting practices that made it difficult to establish a "past practice" in an arbitration hearing.

The practice of representation in labor law involves voting. Workers vote on whether or not they wish to be represented by a union, on policies and contract ratification, and on who will represent them as union business managers. In this chapter, ways in which the union used the discontent of workers evoked by managerial actions and methods of involving workers as

union members will be explored. Since management is effected by the voting activity set up by labor law, they developed tactics to counter voting and other practices of representation. Even though labor law prohibits companies from interfering with the concerted activity of workers in various ways, management in this study devised tactics to ameliorate or redirect worker discontent, developed alternative avenues to the union to address discontent, and engaged in practices to involve managers in enacting labor relations policies.

### Arbitration

Before World War II, St. Antoine (1984) notes that approximately ten percent of all collective bargaining agreements in the United States provided for arbitration. During the war, the National War Labor Board encouraged the use of arbitration clauses in contracts to provide an alternative to strikes to deal with disagreements over the interpretation and application of collective bargaining agreements. These contracts also tended to include no-strike clauses. In this study, the first collective bargaining agreement was struck between the union and the company in 1947. Thus, it is not surprising that the agreement contains both a no-strike clause and a provision for final and binding arbitration as the last step in the grievance procedure. Now, St. Antoine (1984) notes that ninety-five percent of major collective bargaining agreements contain clauses requiring final and binding arbitration as the last step in the grievance procedure.

The legal status of arbitration was enhanced by the Supreme Court's decisions in the Steelworkers Trilogy in 1960 (St. Antoine, 1984). Before the Taft-Hartley Act, agreements between unions and employers were enforceable only under state law as contracts between parties. Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley authorized federal district courts to establish a substantive body of law for the interpretation and enforcement of contracts between unions and employees. This gave the Supreme Court the final say on law governing collective bargaining agreements. With this authority, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines on the arbitrability of contract issues and on the review and enforcement of arbitration awards in the Steelworkers Trilogy. Specifically, the court held that, in the absence of the clearest and most unequivocal kind of exclusion, an issue in dispute is to be held subject to arbitration if it is covered by the language of the arbitration clause of the contract. Thus, the grievance and arbitration process became the basic formal practice to resolve differences

between workers and management.

To understand the practices devised by both management and the union in this study to build a relationship, one must first explore the practices used in arbitration. To do this, arbitration practices as defined by texts used to train arbitrators (Zack, 1984; Gold, 1989) will be analyzed. Then, two different systems of labor relations found in this study will be examined. During the period that both workers and managers found relatively harmonious, the union business agent and the company's labor relations staff utilized a personal relationship, problem solving, and "teflon" agreements to minimize the involvement of workers and managers, to protect management rights, and to resolve worker grievances. During the period in which relations became more conflictual and filled with distrust, the union leadership and the company's labor relations staff utilized formal agreements, two different approaches to past practices, and dividing practices to increase the involvement of workers and managers, to fight over management and worker rights, and to force grievances to arbitration.

#### Practices Utilized in Arbitration

The need to examine the practices used in arbitration presents an initial problem because only one arbitration session was observed. However, Jones (1984) has noted that arbitrators tend to be people with legal training. Thus, they tend to be trained in the same practices of analysis and reasoning with no variation from region to region. Furthermore, they are all embedded in the same judicial system in the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts. Thus, manuals used to train arbitrators probably provide one with a picture of the practices used in arbitration.

Zack (1984) has edited such a volume for the expressed use as a training tool for new arbitrators and as a continuing education tool for experienced arbitrators. The articles that compose the volume were adapted from speeches made during a training program for new arbitrators conducted at the University of Michigan Law School in 1975 under the auspices of General Electric Company and the International Union of Electrical Workers and with cooperation from the American Arbitration Association and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The collective bargaining agreement between the union and the company in this study used one of these arbitration services. Thus, articles from this volume will be analyzed as a manual of

practices reflective of those used in the setting studied.

As noted earlier, the National Labor Relations Act contains two conflicting sets of rights. On the one hand, management has the right to run its business as it sees fit. On the other hand, management is legally obligated to bargain with a union if the business' workers vote for such representation. Management cannot change the terms of employment without bargaining with the union. But, management is not required to accept proposals put forth by the union in bargaining.

In a similar fashion the practice of arbitration contains two conflicting practices used to define the scope of the collective bargaining agreement. Mittenthal (1984) -- the essay in Zack's (1984) volume which deals with past practice in arbitration -- notes that management reads the contract in a very restricted way. Relying on the "reserved rights" doctrine of management rights, management claims that all rights not explicitly limited by the collective bargaining agreement are retained by management. This very doctrine was outlined by the lawyers interviewed for this study who represented the management of the company. The doctrine was also found in the company's labor relations training manual. It is even contained in a clause in the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the company in this study:

It is understood and agreed that the functions of management listed herein are not all-inclusive and that all such rights, powers or authority possessed by the company prior to the signing of this Agreement shall be retained by the Company, subject only to such limitations as provided in this Agreement.

The union reads the contract in a much broader fashion. Mittenthal (1984) notes that unions claim that an agreement is struck in light of practices of the working environment. Thus, it is assumed that existing practices will remain in effect. To the extent that these practices are unchallenged, the parties must have adopted them as part of the agreement. This understanding of a contract is similar to Mcneil's (1978) analysis of a contract. All elements in effect when the contract is struck that are relevant to the contract are implied by the contract. The union officials interviewed for this study expounded this broader understanding of the collective bargaining agreement. For them, past practices which exist but are not enumerated by the collective bargaining agreement are still a part of the agreement.

This broader reading of the collective bargaining agreement has been upheld in court cases regarding arbitration in collective bargaining agreements.

In *United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.*, 36 U.S. 574 (1960), Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court held that the labor arbitrator's source of law is not limited to the expressed provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The past practices of an industry and work place are equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in it. Mittenthal (1984) notes that most arbitrators view past practices that are in existence when an agreement is negotiated and that are not discussed during negotiations as binding on the parties for the life of the agreement. With respect to the collective bargaining agreement itself, past practices are used to give specific content to what is general in the agreement, to clarify what is ambiguous, and even to modify or amend what appears to be unambiguous in the agreement. If one of the parties challenges a practice in a timely fashion, the other party must then have the practice written into the agreement if it is to continue as binding.

One of the chief problems facing an arbitrator is how to establish that a past practice exists. Mittenthal (1984) develops six tests to be used by arbitrators to establish a practice as a past practice. First, a practice must exhibit clarity and consistency. If a practice being argued is vague or if it has been contradicted as frequently as followed, it cannot qualify as a practice. Second, a practice must be repeatedly used over a period of time. Isolated incidents do not establish a practice. Third, a practice must exhibit acceptability. Employees and supervisors must have knowledge of a particular practice and regard it as the customary way of addressing a situation. Acceptability may be implied from a long acquiescence in a known course of conduct. When a party protests a practice, acquiescence cannot be implied. Fourth, a practice is only as broad as the circumstances out of which it developed. Thus, practices must be related to their origins and purposes. This is particularly important when the consequences of a practice are argued as a practice itself. For example, if an equalization of overtime was a consequence of how workers were assigned to different tasks, the equalization of overtime cannot be claimed as a practice. Fifth, a practice must exhibit mutuality. A strong case can be made for the existence of a practice if a joint understanding exists in the creation or application of a practice. A case which only relies on managerial action is a weak case to demonstrate mutuality. Finally, the scope of a practice must be defined. Was a practice intended for all levels of an organization or just some levels?

Mittenthal (1984) notes that arbitration cases based on past practice are difficult to win. It is difficult to establish that a past practice exists. Union witnesses will remember things one way. Company witnesses will remember them another way. In the face of such conflicting testimony, Mittenthal (1984) observes that arbitrators tend to rely on written records. Such records are not often either made or retained.

Before a problem of interpreting, applying, or operating the collective bargaining agreement reaches binding arbitration, it proceeds through a grievance procedure which is outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. According to the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the company in this study, a worker first discusses a complaint with her immediate supervisor in the presence of a representative of the Union. The supervisor and the aggrieved worker attempt to reach a satisfactory settlement. If the grievance is not settled, the worker submits the grievance in writing to the supervisor for a written judgment. If this resolution is not satisfactory to the worker, the grievance is submitted to the union for appeal to the appropriate company manager. If this manager's resolution is not satisfactory to the union business manager, it may finally be appealed to the company's labor relations manager. If this manager's resolution is not satisfactory, the matter goes to binding arbitration. In this process, the role of the union is defined by the duty of fair representation in labor law (Gold, 1989, p.7):

. . . this duty requires a union to represent each worker fairly; that is, the union must always have good reasons for what it does. The duty of fair representation applies both to negotiating contracts and to enforcing them.

In other words, the union is legally bound to act as the worker's advocate.

Grievance settlements are very important. Mittenthal (1984) observes that such settlements result in understandings that are more durable than the terms of the contract itself. Thus, the grievance/arbitration process becomes more critical in working out labor relations between the union and the management of a company than negotiations over the contract. It is not surprising to find in the company's labor relations training manual for managers in this study a series of tactics to avoid the appearance of past practices. It is not surprising to find the union filing grievances to demonstrate that a change in work practices has not been accepted by acquiescence. It is not surprising to find the company avoiding written commitments and to find the union requesting written commitments. As the practices used by the company and the union in

this study to work out labor relations are explored, it will be seen that the practices adopted are encouraged by the practices of arbitrators and the courts.

### "Teflon" Agreements, Conflict Aversion, and Personal Relations

It is not surprising that work force reductions, increased overtime, and out sourcing would raise the concerns of workers over job security and work conditions. Nor is it surprising that attitudes of unionized workers worsened over a period when these activities were happening. What is interesting is that it took four years from the major work force reduction, from the initiation of increased out sourcing of line work and power plant maintenance, and from the initiation of the economic shut down of several of the company's power plants before labor relations became definably more problematic to management. If one were to relate the appearance labor relations problems to economic conditions and organizational policy, one would have a difficult time exactly correlating these events.

Both the company and the union in this study identified new leadership in the opposing camp as the cause of the deterioration of labor relations. Given the use of punishment and the resulting definition of persons rather than practices as problems, this is not surprising. However, one can see that the relationship between the company and the union did not become fully problematic until new labor relations practices were adopted by both the union and the management of the company. Given the aggravating conditions of layoffs, out sourcing, and changes in working conditions, what practices were used to maintain the appearance of relatively unproblematic labor relations for so long?

The first complex of practices which one can identify were used by the company's former labor relations manager and the former union business manager to maintain personal control of the resolution of grievances and complaints. One practice by which this was done was direct intervention in the resolution of grievances at the lower level of the grievance process. If one reads the collective bargaining agreement, the grievance has to be judged not to be in violation of the agreement by a worker's immediate supervisor and by a company manager before it is officially appealed to the company's manager of labor relations. If the grievance follows this process, at least two persons in management have judged and taken a position on the grievance. The manager of labor relations now has to take a management position held by several

managers into account. By intervening at the level of the immediate supervisor, the labor relations manager could avoid having other managers take a position. This enabled the company's labor relations manager to work out solutions rather than to defend a position taken by other managers.

The union business agent and the company's labor relations manager would further eliminate the judgment and interference from their respective audiences by working out a solution in private. Once they resolved the grievance or negotiated the issue, they would garner the necessary legal opinions and develop the necessary rationales to explain the resulting resolution to their constituents. Sometimes, they would simply tell the immediate parties the resolution of the grievance but would not share it with other parties who might question it. Some accounts include descriptions of a practice of telling concerned parties one thing and then doing another.

The importance of the practice of maintaining personal control over the resolution of issues to the company's former labor relations manager during this period can be seen in a labor relations policy document developed after the layoffs. According to this document, the company would take a less paternalistic stance toward the union and would press for increased productivity. The document also states that the resolution of all labor issues would remain the purview of the company's labor relations manager. Until this labor relations manager left the company and the labor relations practices changed, labor relations appeared to be relatively unproblematic.

The second set of practices used to encourage relatively unproblematic labor relations were friendship like practices. The labor relations manager would carry a brief case and wear a pin with the union logo. The labor relations manager and the union business manager would drive to places together to conduct business and work out problems. They would go out for drinks and exchange views on matters. As a management associate of the company's labor relations manager observed, "They could say to each other, 'I think you are making a mistake here.'" This type of exchange happened both ways.

A series of practices which had the effect of conflict avoidance constituted the third group of practices. Business conditions contributed to conflict avoidance. Before the layoffs, the company was in relatively good financial condition. As one person stated, "No one cared what you did." So, there was little encouragement to resist grievances or to alter conditions in ways that would encourage grievances. Furthermore, there was a policy of evaluating



managers on how many grievances were filed against them. This encouraged managers to accommodate worker concerns rather than resist them.

The labor relations manager and the union business manager engaged in conflict avoidance practices with each other. These two parties engaged in compromise. They would use problem solving to find a solution that would be acceptable to both of them. One of the principal practices used by the company's labor relations manager was an open-ended grievance process. If a resolution of a grievance could not be reached, the official letter sent by the labor relations manager to the union business manager would indicate that the company's action did not violate the contract. But, the letter would also indicate that discussions would continue on the matter until an acceptable solution could be found. Thus, rather than closing interaction and taking a position, further interaction was encouraged. The union's business agent would sometimes avoid conflict by not representing the views of the union membership.

Both the labor relations manager and the union business manager practiced conflict avoidance by hiding or redefining the resolution of issues which would be problematic to their constituents. In other words, they kept issues from becoming issues for others. Union members would not be informed about the resolution of a grievance if it was not entirely satisfactory to union members. As noted earlier, legal opinions were obtained to close issues such that they could not longer be issues for constituents.

"Teflon settlements" constitute the fourth complex of practices which contributed to relatively unproblematic labor relations. A company lawyer defined "teflon settlements" as the settlement of disputes in nonbinding language. For example, a clause could be added to the letter of agreement which gave either party the right to terminate the letter of agreement with a few months notice. A slightly different definition of "teflon" was offered by a management colleague of the labor relations manager of this period:

Lot's of deals were made which were not written down. Nobody could remember how it went. (Name) was good at being "teflon."

In short, "teflon settlements" were settlements which resolved a problem but which contained language which would allow parties to unilaterally revoke the settlement or which left little evidence which could be used to establish a past practice in an arbitration hearing. Thus, "teflon settlements" fundamentally protect management rights.

If one examines the principles used by arbitrators (Mittenthal, 1984) to

establish that a past practice exists compared to practices used to make "teflon settlements," one can see that principles used to establish past practices in arbitration correspond to practices used in "teflon settlements." First, the settlements struck between the labor relations manager and the union business agent were often verbal. If they were changed or revoked by management, there would only be two parties' testimony against each other with no written documentation. As Mittenthal (1984) noted, in the absence of written documentation and in the face of conflicting testimony, it is almost impossible to establish a past practice. Second, since agreements were made between the labor relations manager and the union business manager, they were not widely known or approved. This makes it difficult to argue the acceptability of a practice. To successfully argue acceptability, one must show that employees and supervisors have knowledge of a particular practice and regard it as the customary way of addressing situations. Third, since settlements were not written down, no one could really remember exactly to what the parties agreed. This makes it difficult to argue for the clarity of a practice. Finally, issues were often settled differently from place to place. This makes it difficult to argue for the consistency of a practice.

#### Tactics Used in the Fight over Rights

Just as a number of practices contributed to the appearance of good relations in one period of time, a different set of practices were adopted by both the union and the company which encouraged conflict.

The earlier labor relations manager and union business manager had utilized a system of verbally and informally resolving issues while formally either incorporating nonbinding language in grievance settlements or officially finding no violation of the contract. Such a record is difficult to use to establish past practice in an arbitration case. The new union leadership adopted a practice of getting binding settlements and of holding the company to informally adopted settlements. Otherwise, the company could continue to take unilateral actions that threatened job security, promotion, etc. if such actions were not covered by the exact language in the collective bargaining agreement. The new union leadership also began to challenge what had been done in earlier grievance settlements. Both Mittenthal (1984) and the company's labor relations training manual note that past practices become part of the collective bargaining agreement if they are officially resolved through binding language in the

grievance procedure or through arbitration. Since such practices challenge management rights, one would expect them to encourage conflict.

It was exactly this type of activity that executive level managers identified in interviews as the beginning of their labor relations problems. As an executive stated, "We're making them realize what it could really be like if it were a true union-management situation." Thus, management adopted a number of strategies designed to protect and reinforce management rights that also encouraged conflict.

In response to grievances based on past practice filed by the union, management used the "reserved rights" doctrine and a narrow reading of the contract to continually find that managerial action did not violate the contract. Furthermore, they were not interested in finding a compromise. If the union did not like the finding, they could appeal it to arbitration. Thus, most grievances were forced toward arbitration. Given past relations with the company's former labor relations manager, union officials had expected managers to continue to engage in negotiation and compromise over grievances.

The very act of forcing most grievances to arbitration itself encourages conflict because negotiations over the resolution of grievances was one of the few real avenues open to the union to address issues. The contract has a no-strike clause. So, the union cannot strike over the application of the contract or over a past practice while the contract is in force. Even if the contract did not contain a no-strike clause, a number of factors would discourage a strike. The union in this study had an open shop contract. This means that only union members pay dues. It also means that employees are not required to join the union to work in the company. This combination makes defection from the union and free riding relatively easy. Additionally, the company had demonstrated a willingness to lay off workers. A significant amount of out sourcing of line work and power plant maintenance had been done and was being planned. Consequently, there was a capacity to replace workers by contracting their work out if they went on strike. From the union's own newsletter, outside construction electrical work was scarce. Under these conditions, the union would also be discouraged from striking during negotiations after the contract lapsed to press for items in the contract. Thus, the only real route for resolving grievances was the grievance process. Now, the company's resistance to binding settlements forced all settlements toward arbitration.

Arbitration is expensive. Each party incurs a filing fee of \$125, \$1,500 to \$2,000 in arbitration expenses, wages for witnesses for each case, and legal fees. The company has vast resources. The union has limited resources. Furthermore, it is hard to win an arbitration on past practice with little written evidence and with no binding settlements. So, the arbitration process favors the company. As a result, the company can adopt new policies and procedures which are not obviously covered by the contract. According to a company attorney, the collective bargaining agreement in this study is small and limited when compared to the agreements of other companies. Then, the company can claim "reserved rights" and resist grievances over the changes. If the company wins the resulting arbitration, its new policy or procedure is now binding. If it loses, the company has not lost ground. In an interview, a supervisor who used to be a business manager of the union in this study indicated that, if she were the current union business manager, she would be afraid that the company was trying to destroy the union with these tactics. Even though the company claims that it is not out to destroy the union, these tactics encourage distrust and conflict.

Forcing grievances to arbitration encourages conflict in one other way. There are work practices and wage and benefit issues which are not covered by a narrow reading of the contract. Yet, workers and supervisors need ways to work these issues out in an agreeable way. When issues are met with a managerial judgment of "no violation of the contract," it does not mean that the issue has gone away. Company management tends to claim that the issue is resolved if the union drops the grievance or fails to process it in a timely fashion. If the union continues to push an issue over and over again, this tends to encourage conflict with managers. Yet, in the interviews for this study, several workers had issues that had not been resolved in a way agreeable to them. They were still angry over the issue and told the story of the problem again and again. These analogies give hearers an unfavorable analogy to interpret the motives and actions of management. Thus, they encourage conflict and perpetuate issues over time and among workers.

In response to the company forcing grievances to arbitration and to no real ability to strike, the union adopted other tactics to increase pressure on the company to negotiate rather than to take unilateral action on grievances. In an interview with a supervisor, she observed that, with an open shop and a no-strike clause, the grievance process is about the only avenue available to

solve problems. What can the union do if grievances are forced to arbitration? What levers does the union have? "These are it: refusing to participate, dragging things out, not cooperating." If one examines the union newsletters published soon after the company began to resist grievance resolution, one finds the union requesting that members not participate in voluntary activities, not participate in participatory management meetings unless ordered and paid to do so, and not carry pagers or take trucks home unless the company pays a stand-by wage. Furthermore, the union mounted a negative advertising campaign against the company for the first time in the company's history through information pickets of the company's headquarters, radio spots, newspaper advertisement, and flyers. Finally, negotiations and arbitration issues were carried back to the work group level. Workers confronted supervisors over these issues. Such resistance, noncooperation, degrading, and confrontation encouraged more conflict.

Other new approaches to labor relations adopted by the company were incorporated in a training manual developed by a management consultant firm. One can find conflict enhancing practices embedded in this manual. The manual defines the relationship between the company and the union as adversarial. On the company's side, economic pressures are claimed to encourage management to eliminate inefficiencies and to maintain the ability to unilaterally do so. On the union's side, political pressures are claimed to encourage the union to attempt to constantly better the terms and conditions of employment of its constituents. The labor contract is portrayed as a compromise of management rights. While union members are entitled to the benefits outlined in the contract, they are entitled to no more. Thus, any grievance filed represents a potential right or benefit gained or lost.

One can see this definition of labor relations reflected in interviews with supervisors who went through the training. One supervisor noted that this training manual tried to make the relationship with the union more adversarial than it was. Other supervisors tended to use the analogy of relations offered by the manual. One supervisor interpreted the union as wanting more wages and benefits for less work and the company as wanting more work for fewer wages and benefits. Using language from the manual, another worker stated, "Everything in the contract is theirs; everything else is the company's."

Additionally, the manual defines the supervisor as management's front line representative in dealing with the union. Top-level management provides

the interpretation of the contract. Supervisors must represent top management by following the interpretation. There is no room for the first line supervisor to deviate from the established interpretation. All management must stand together. This analogy encourages dividing the organization into those who stand together around one position against those being supervised. One supervisor who went through the training in which this manual was used indicated that the trainer discouraged supervisors from forming or maintaining friendships with workers because it might compromise their loyalty to management.

By virtue of obligating first line supervisors to maintain upper management's interpretation of the contract, not only did the practice implemented by management and included in the training manual encourage conflict, it also eliminated the ability to compromise at the supervisor-worker level. As the manual notes, "There can be no middle of the road for front-line supervisors, and there can be no conciliation in order to obtain the cooperation of the employees working directly for the supervisor." In interviews with workers and managers, instances were found in which a supervisor and local manager would try to work out a settlement over a grievance. Then, higher levels of management would intervene to stop the settlement. Both the company and the union define the supervisor's role and the steward's role as a representative of the company or union. Neither are authorized to settle grievances without getting approval from their superiors. As several workers and supervisors noted, this effectively reaches down and takes away the supervisor-worker relationship.

While this conflictual period did not utilize "teflon settlements," one can still find a correspondence between the practices adopted by management and by the union and the principles used to establish past practices in arbitration.

First, the company avoided creating evidence of a past practice while the union attempted to establish evidence of past practices. For example, the company would not provide written job descriptions for union positions. When questions of intent behind the contract arose, the company would informally discuss intent but would not commit such understandings to writing. The union tried to get job descriptions, letters stipulating understandings of the intent of the contract, etc. to create evidence of a past practice.

Other strategies for avoiding the appearance of a past practice are outlined in the company labor relations training manual. One practice

described to avoid the appearance of past practices involved the type of language used by supervisors in resolving grievances:

The supervisor is advised to refrain from using those types of words which indicate that management's actions are based upon its previous actions or past practice. Supervisors should avoid using words such as "usually," "customarily," "normally," "routinely," "ordinarily," "regularly," "historically," "similarly," "habitually," "as previously," "in the past," "traditionally," "accustomed," "as in previous instances," "as in similar instances," "according to past relationships," etc.

Another practice outlined in the manual is the reaffirmation of an old rule. Here, through neglect or acquiescence, a practice other than an established rule has emerged. By reaffirming the old rule by stating that it will again be followed, the emerging practice can be eliminated. Yet another strategy outlined in the manual is the introduction of new methods or equipment to eliminate the circumstances which the past practice addressed.

Second, one can find descriptions in the interviews of practices by which one party or the other will try to extend an element of the contract to a new set of circumstances and thereby modify the meaning of the contract. For example, there is a complex set of rules in the contract as to how overtime pay, holidays, and shift work interact. Over a period of time, one particular work group utilized these rules to maximize their incomes through overtime. When upper management realized this, they intervened to apply the same clauses in the contract in a way that significantly reduced overtime and holiday pay. In another case, there was a rule about giving workers a meal within a specified time if they were held over to complete a job. A manager wanted to wait beyond the specified time and give the meal to the workers at the end of the work. In effect, this manager was creating a longer work day. The union intervened before this practice was implemented. They pointed out that the overtime and meal practices were put in the contract to apply to emergencies. Normal work is to be done in an eight-hour day.

Third, one can find descriptions of practices in which the work circumstances are changed by the company to attempt to alter the contract that applies to existing circumstances. For example, the company has tried to get workers to work with a line crew smaller than that stipulated in the contract. The union filed a grievance and won the arbitration case. Then, the company changed the technology from one size and use of a line pole to a smaller size and different use of a line pole and worked the job with a smaller crew again. Even though the contract stated one minimum size for a line crew, the company

won the arbitration due in part to the changed circumstances. Now, the company has the legal ability to do line work on the changed technology with a smaller crew. Following this decision, one can find in the interviews examples of attempts to work with a reduced crew size on the old size and use poles.

Fourth, one can find descriptions of practices in which the work circumstances have changed but the union continues to resist changing practices because the practices are contained in the contract. For example, language about not working in wet weather except in an emergency was put in the contract when all line work was done from the line pole and was usually done while the lines were energized. Working in wet weather under those circumstances, according to a person who was a supervisor and had been a line worker, would be very dangerous. The new bucket truck technology is much safer. Also, much line work done now is done on de-energized lines. Yet, the union continues to insist on the same rules in the contract that were incorporated in the contract under different circumstances.

Finally, one can find numerous descriptions in the interviews of practices by which the company tries to get workers to acquiesce to a practice and by which the union resists such attempts. One tactic used by management is to try to find a crew who will work under conditions or using practices different from those stipulated in the contract. For example, a crew might be encouraged to do a job with less than the minimum crew size stipulated in the contract. These attempts are usually carried out in areas of the company which are geographically remote from the union hall and company headquarters or which do not have strong union members. Another tactic is to involve a few union members on company task forces or committees to address various issues. If questions are raised by the union or workers about the outcomes of those committees, the company often claims that workers had a say. Finally, the company established a total quality management program to get workers to redesign work in participatory group settings controlled by management.

Since the appearance of acquiescence can be used by either the union or the company to establish past practice, the union instituted practices to challenge officially and practically the changes in working conditions being instituted by the company on a unilateral basis. As noted earlier, when a party protests a practice, acquiescence cannot be implied. First, the union increased its communication with bargaining units in areas geographically remote from the union hall. Changes in practices were challenged through the grievance



process in every instance found by the union. This would prevent the company from claiming the practices were accepted in some places and not in other places. Since the company was forcing most grievances to arbitration and since over thirty grievances had been filed in a year, the union had to drop many grievances because of financial constraints. Yet, they filed such grievances to leave a written documentary trail of evidence of challenging rather than acquiescing to managerial changes in work practices. Second, the union instituted a campaign of noncooperation in areas where noncooperation could be done. From the union newsletter, one can see the union instructing workers to not carry pagers or take company vehicles home. To do so would be to acquiesce to performing stand-by work with no stand-by pay. Workers were encouraged to not voluntarily participate in the total quality management program. To do so could imply acquiesce to changes in working conditions made by these committees. Third, stewards would -- on their own -- devise strategies to prevent or resist changes in work practices. For example, one steward shared her understanding of work practices with a new supervisor to set expectations for the supervisor. Another steward wrote open letters to all work groups in an area questioning changes imposed by the local manager.

#### The Problem of Dually Embedded Elements of Problem Solving and Contract Construction

In the chapter on management practices, it was argued that combining participation practices with management rights, discipline with punishment, and cost cutting with safety sets up contradictory lines of action. The very acts used in one practice become problematic in the other practice.

Here, similar problems emerge with combining problem solving at the work group level with contract construction through past practices and grievances. On the one hand, workers and supervisors engage in discussions to work out differences over work practices. If this practice did not potentially modify the labor contract, it could occur with no problem. But, through the use of past practice to implicitly construct a contract and the use of the grievance to make the practice explicitly a part of the contract, such work group problem solving becomes contract construction. Instead of simply making an object of some work practice and working on the practice, contract construction turns such work practices into rights and obligations which are enforceable through

the government's legal apparatus. As long as neither the union or the company try to use problem solving over work practices in the work place to argue for or against a past practice, such problem solving appears to be unproblematic. But, if either party tries to use such problem solving as evidence regarding a past practice is a grievance, the other party engages a set of tactics to resist the move.

It should be pointed out that problem solving to reach nonbinding agreements is not unproblematic for the union. With no legally binding side agreements, clauses in the collective bargaining agreement, or adequate evidence of a past practice, the company can take unilateral actions which may damage the well being of workers.

### Representation

The practice of representation is built into labor law (Gold, 1989). Workers vote to determine who will represent them. Once a work unit elects to be represented, the union is obligated to represent the interests and concerns of all workers in the unit. Workers vote on whether or not to ratify the terms of a contract. They vote on who will represent them as union officials.

Given the practice of voting to determine representation and as a tool to adopt policies and contracts, Michels (1964), Walton and McKersie (1965), Gamson (1968), and Freeman and Medoff (1984) note that voting encourages practices of influence. Workers can always take their vote away from supporting particular union leaders, a proposed labor contract, or the union itself. In this particular study, the collective bargaining agreement contained an open shop clause. That is, no worker in a unit represented by the union is either required to join the union or pay union dues unless they are a member of the union. In an agency shop, all workers in a unit represented by a union must pay union dues whether they are union members or not. The practice of the open shop gives workers the additional ability to exit with their union dues. This would probably encourage the union to encourage workers to join the union more than the agency shop.

Since workers are involved in voting on whether or not to have a union, on union leadership, and on collective bargaining agreements, the company is affected by the outcome of such voting. The National Labor Relations Act bars companies from interfering with concerted activity. As Gold notes (1989), the company is prohibited from restraining or coercing workers as they engage in

organizing. However, the company and the union enjoy the right of free speech. Also, managers may engage in one-on-one, occasional discussions. The company can also alter conditions which are problematic to workers before workers turn to the union for collective bargaining.

In this section, the various practices by which the union and the company work at encouraging workers and managers in some way with respect to representation will be explored.

### The Use of Discontent and Involvement by the Union and Workers

Discontent. One can find a series of management practices in stories told in interviews or meetings that opened problems for workers. The layoffs and the perceived deception around them are the most prominent practices which open the question of trust in management. These stories tended to be told throughout the company by workers and many supervisors. Other management practices included in stories of discontent were the institution of testing for entry into jobs that had been filled by seniority and demonstrated craft skill, the use of college requirements for promotion into management instead of seniority and demonstrated craft skill, out sourcing work that had been done by the company's unionized workers, and various changes in work rules which altered overtime, the scheduling of shift work, and the size of line crews. While these stories involved company wide practices, they tended to be told by work groups that were specifically involved in the practice.

The object of discontent associated with these problematic actions tended to be dependent on a variety of practices. As noted earlier, the former union leadership would work out an issue with the former labor relations staff and either not widely inform the union membership or would tell union members what they wanted to hear. At some point, union members made the union leadership an issue because they felt that they were not being represented. There are stories about the former union leadership "selling out" the union membership by not following through with grievances, by not visiting outlying areas on a regular basis, and by agreeing to grievance settlements and company actions with which union members did not agree. These issues included testing to qualify for positions and reducing the number of days of notice necessary to change shift schedules. Here, the practice of representation constructed the union leadership as the problem. The practice of representation designates an elected person to act on behalf of the elected.

If the elected agent is seen to fail to represent members of the union, the practice of representation makes the election of a new person the immediate solution to the problem.

The new union leadership tried to address concerns that had been neglected or resolved in ways unacceptable to union members. As noted earlier, this included revisiting issues which had been unsatisfactorily resolved and resolving issues in more contractually binding ways. At this point, the former labor relations staff was still in place and utilized practices of problem solving and compromise which made the mutually agreeable resolution of a problem the object of interaction. However, from letters exchanged between an even earlier set of union leadership and the former labor relations staff, the former labor relations staff did not begin its tenure using problem solving and compromise. In these letters, it appeared that the labor relations staff had closed off negotiating over issues. Here, the former labor relations staff was made the issue. Similarly, the new union leadership seemed to make the new labor relations staff and the new executive level management the issue only after management adopted the practice of taking unilateral action and closing further negotiations over grievances: "Here's our decision; here's why; we're not interested in discussing it; do what you have to do." It would seem that the *ad hominem* practice of making management the issue is used more often after the practice of making working conditions the issue breaks down.

Once the management of the company adopted practices to make it difficult to argue for past practices and closed off problem solving and compromise, the audience of the conflict was widened by the union. The union told stories which elicited discontent through its newsletter, flyers posted on bulletin boards, radio spots, newspaper ads, and an information picket. If one examines the content of these items, they mainly have to do with current items included in negotiations, issues involved in grievances, and practices used by the company in relating to the union. The appeals used in these communications reflected a sensitivity to audience. The advertisements in the public media portrayed the negative consequences of a reduced work force on customer response time and the unfairness of practices such as changing work schedules such that family life is difficult to sustain. When the publication shifted to the union newsletter and flyers used on work place bulletin boards, content became more technical with respect to labor relations practices, work practices, and the contract. It also became more directly degrading of

management: "Ask your supervisor if COMPANY labor relations and employee shaft relations 'are the same.'"

These analogies of discontent are used by workers in a number of ways in the work setting. First, some are used to degrade managers. One worker told of a manager who said, "The best system is to catch it five minutes before it fails." Everyone in the work area used this phrase in arguments for years. This worker observed that both managers and workers take each other's mistakes and use them in rituals of degradation.

Second, analogies of discontent are related in work discussions in a way to elicit the cooperation of other workers in challenging a management decision. For example, one worker would try to bring up issues that were being negotiated when work practices related to them were discussed in the morning meeting to discuss the work to be done for the day. In another situation, rather than privately discuss a management decision with a supervisor to try to work out a solution before filing a formal grievance, a worker wrote a letter to the manager stating what should be done according to past practice, posted the letter for all other workers to see, and sent a copy of the letter to the union business agent.

Involvement. As one turns to examine practices used to involve union members in union actions, one can identify a shift in practices which either place the union member in the role of an actor or in the role of a spectator with respect to the union itself. Under the former union leadership, it was earlier observed that union members tended to be excluded by the former union leadership in the resolution of grievances and in the striking of agreements in negotiations. Contract issues were sometimes worked out between the labor relations staff and the union business manager away from the negotiating table. The resolutions of issues were not widely shared. As a former labor relations staff person observed, the former union leadership was not involved with the union membership enough to take things to them to get them approved. Outlying areas were neglected. Other than voting, there were few practices by which union members were actually involved in acting out being in the union. During this period, a comment by a labor relations staff person indicated that about sixty percent of persons in units represented by the union were members of the union. As several union members noted, the union during this period of time did not seem to care about them.

The new union membership engaged in numerous tactics to involve the union membership. Systematic visits were made to all units of the company served by the union to solicit problems and to share information about union activities. Proposals for annual contract negotiations were actively solicited from the membership.

The more effective practices to engage union members in acting out their union membership emerged in response to new practices used by management in response to the union's attempts to revisit issues that had been inadequately resolved by the former union leadership with practices that would contractually bind the company. As noted earlier, the union began a resistance campaign in response to company practices to make it difficult to establish past practices and to resist any resolution of grievances other than management's decision or arbitration. The union leadership discouraged workers from carrying pagers or taking trucks home to make call outs easier for management without receiving stand by pay, from voluntarily participating in company sponsored activities during or after work hours, from voluntarily participating in participatory management programs, from going to work early or staying late without over time, and from voluntarily changing classifications, working hours, or days off. Additionally, the union conducted concerted activities such as an information picket at the general offices of the company during negotiations. These acts gave union members a way to participate in every day acts that put them in the role of acting out their union membership. Such acts were defined by union members as acts of solidarity.

These acts encouraged by the union leadership did not work uniformly with the membership. One of three other practices seemed to be needed. One practice was peer pressure. This involved such acts as some workers pointing out to other workers what is expected, degrading workers who do not conform to expectations, and shunning workers who do not conform. For example, one line crew had a person to whom others would not speak because she went along with some of the activities which the union discouraged. In general, as one union steward observed, "If you don't do your job as a steward, you're going to catch hell." Here, it is evident that the practice of representation in labor law sets up the expectation that the steward will represent the views of workers. Such a practice would invite more peer pressure tactics than would probably otherwise occur. Such acts by which one catches "hell" for not conforming become analogies for role taking that block the worker even when

others are not present to give a person "hell." As one worker said, "When your boss asks you to do something that is against the contract, you wonder if you are going to piss the others off."

A second practice which encouraged workers to carry out the union's resistance tactics was set up by the presence of workers who felt that they had been unfairly treated by some of the new management practices. Several work groups whose members were interviewed contained workers who had not been promoted because of the new testing system and education qualifications. These workers were constantly comparing their skills with the new persons in the position to show fellow workers how wrong the company's decision was. In carrying out its representation role, the union filed grievances in some of these cases. Having such an avenue for attempting to change management practices probably encourages the continuation of such practices of discontent.

The most potent practices which encouraged union members to act out their union membership occurred when management decisions challenged the worker's understanding of the contract or past practice, when managers closed off discussions to resolve grievances with the litany ending with the phrase, "Here's our decision; do what you have to do," when managers tried to pit workers against each other over overtime or classification boundaries, or when managers challenged union involvement or concerted activity. An example of this developed when a manager from a nonunion background forced workers to remove the union logo from their lockers, hard hats, and clothing. Now, everyone wears them. This practice was also a ritual of loyalty and a demonstration of rights. As a supervisor noted, "This forced people to choose sides."

Effects. A measure of the combined effects of these practices of involvement can be seen in increased union membership among the unionized units in the company. Over an approximately two year period, a labor relations staff member stated that union membership had increased from about sixty percent to about eighty percent in represented units. Another measure of the effects of these practices was noted by a senior executive of the company. During the information picket of the company's general office, she was surprised to see union workers on the picket line whom she had know for a long time to be reasonable people and not union radicals.

## Management Practices to Counter Union Practices Developed Around Representation and Involvement

Countering Practices Developed Around Representation. Just as managers adopted practices to make it more difficult for the union to use the grievance process to contractually bind management to practices, managers also adopted practices to counter the practices developed by the union around representation. With respect to managing discontent, practices were adopted to provide avenues for addressing discontent which placed managers in the role of showing concern while allowing for an expression of discontent by the worker, to offer explanations and analogies for interpreting events as alternatives to those offered by workers or the union, to resolve issues with the nonunionized work force to discourage votes for representation, and to drive a "wedge" between workers.

Most of the practices used to give workers a chance to express discontent while putting managers in the role of showing concern have already been discussed. Whether it is a manager listening to the complaint of a worker or a group of workers raising an issue in a meeting, the practice is the same. Listen to the concerns without being critical of them. Indicate sympathy by stating that the concern is shared by the manager who is listening. Then, move on to the next issue. Managers often do take the concern to their superiors. But, between the delay in time between an expression of concern and a decision and the lack of correspondence between the workers' expectation and the manager's decision, it appears as if the concern has simply been set aside.

The most dominant practices used to address discontent involve offering explanations or analogies for interpreting the actions of managers from the point of view of managers. As noted in a management report on negotiations, the principal strategy used to counter discontent is a "participative management style." Here, employees are allowed to raise wage and benefit issues in company meetings or in one-on-one sessions with managers. But, rather than expressing sympathy for the worker's concern, managers try to reframe the managerial decision causing discontent such that it is seen as "reasonable" and "right." If one examines company newsletters, interviews with managers, and notes on observations, the company's position is consistently framed with the market devices described in an earlier chapter. The workers



wages are among the highest in the region. They have comparable benefits to other companies. Costs must be kept reasonable when compared with other companies. As also noted earlier, these are the devices by which utility regulators judge the reasonableness of costs. In light of such reasons, the union's proposals are framed as "demands." Rather than working from reasons, the union is framed as working from "emotion" or "politics." The company used newsletters and an electronic mail system to continuously communicate its viewpoint to supervisors and workers.

The company also has special "coaches" and trouble shooting teams to address specific cases of discontent with the above strategies. Several strategies used by these coaches or teams involve the practices of command through role taking described in the last chapter. These practices are designed to get a worker to see things from the point of view of management. Sometimes coaches take the role of showing concern for the actions of a supervisor which cause discontent among workers. Here, the coaches often take the workers in as "insiders" and enlists workers in "helping" their manager to become more participative and less authoritarian.

While locations of discontent came to the attention of the human resources department through its everyday work, the company conducted a survey every few years to systematically identify trouble spots. Additionally, the company had begun to select supervisors based on tests which were designed to find people who already used these "participatory" practices. They further trained supervisors in "participatory" practices. Thus, these strategies to address discontent could be systematically spread through out the company.

In the locations which were not unionized but which were threatened by organizing efforts or by expressions of discontent linked with threats to unionized, efforts were made by the company to work more directly on the issues associated with expressions of discontent rather than mainly on venting discontent or rhetorically reframing how conditions are viewed. As the nonunionized workers expressed discontent, not only did managers exhibit more concern, but salaries were raised, tools and uniforms were purchased for workers, and working conditions were altered.

In addition to devising tactics to manage discontent, managers used tactics to encourage discontent between workers and between workers and the union. As already noted, the "wedge" is a practice by which a difference in pay, overtime, or a work practice or a difference in judgment about a management or

union practice is identified and compared in a way that encourages a conflicting definition of interests among workers. For example, managers will engage in a practice which is liked by some union members but is opposed by other union members. Here, a management practice is combined with differing judgments by unionized workers to set up a "wedge." In one situation, the union distributed flyers and newsletters pointing out how participatory management practices had been used to destroy unions. At the same time, managers would "talk up" how union workers who had actually gone through the participatory program liked it. As already noted, "wedges" change the focus of discontent from between management and workers to between workers and workers or workers and the union. "Wedges" also make it more problematic for the union to take action. A vote to authorize an action around which a wedge has developed becomes questionable. Finally, with an open shop, workers who become discontented with the union through a "wedge" can leave the union and take their dues with them.

Countering Union Involvement and Encouraging Management Involvement. Some management practices reduce worker representation by reducing the union's influence in managerial areas.

One group of practices work on the resources of the union to make it difficult to carry out representation. By forcing more grievances to arbitration and by resisting proposals in negotiations, the company drove up the expenses of the union. At some point, the union drops grievance cases or negotiation proposals because of a lack of the money required to pursue them. In addition to working on financial resources, the company worked on leadership resources in the union. Historically, the company hired union members who were seen by management as effective union leaders to remove them from the bargaining unit. In the case of the new union leadership, the company removed them. The collective bargaining agreement in this study made provisions for employees who were elected as union business managers to return to work after serving one term. The agreement also provided that -- at the company's discretion -- the union business managers could return to the company after more than one term. In the case of the new union leadership, they were not allowed to return if they served more than one term. This was the first time in the history of the agreement that this had been the case. While this move removed the union business managers from the company, it also removed the

potential to return to work as a device to encourage cooperation.

A second group of management practices reduced representation by reducing the opportunities to negotiate over working conditions. Gold (1989) and Mittenthal (1984) note that the practice of arbitration was devised to avoid strikes over the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement during its effective life. However, since past practice was established as a basis for a common law interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the resolution of grievances effectively modify the labor contract. By first consulting with union officials and workers before implementing new decisions, there was an opportunity to negotiate in the grievance process. This was the practice carried out by the former labor relations staff and the former union business managers. But, by using the provision in the contract to work then grieve, by resisting grievances to arbitration, by the asymmetry in funds available to pursue grievances, and by the probability that most of the grievances will be resolved in favor of the company because of the difficult procedures required to establish past practice, the company could unilaterally change past practices without negotiating. It is ironic that this management practice seemed to be evoked by the new union leadership as they tried to use the grievance process to make binding or to change the "teflon" agreements made by the former union business managers and the former labor relations staff.

A third group of practices utilized various participatory practices to provide an alternative to union representation for managers to resolve issues with workers. These practices varied from information sharing sessions in which the company clarified decisions for workers to brainstorming sessions in which workers share work related information with managers, area or company wide task forces or committees created and controlled by managers but which included nonmanagerial employees to propose actions to senior management, and a total quality management program established and controlled by managers but which included nonmanagerial employees to devise changes in how work gets done and to propose such changes to senior management. While the management of the company tried to get the union to go along with these programs, the union was excluded from the creation and control of these committees, groups, and task forces.

Some of these participatory practices have been made problematic by two recent rulings by the National Labor Relations Board. In 309 NLRB 163 (1992) and 311 NLRB 88 (1993), some types of participatory management

schemes were declared illegal because, according to the Board, they constituted labor organizations as defined by Section 2 (5) of the National Labor Relations Act and they constituted a company union, which is an unfair labor practice as defined by Section 8 (a) (2) of the Act. The opinions in these cases reasoned that, if these participatory committees included nonmanagerial workers and are established by the company to come up with proposals from representatives of employees and if management on the committee or outside the committee can reject such proposals, then the participatory committees are a labor organization and are illegal company unions. The NLRB ruled that this is the case for both a nonunionized company (309 NLRB 163 (1992)) and a unionized company (311 NLRB 88 (1993)).

The use of testing and education requirements as a means of promotion constitute a fourth group of practices which provide a practice of promotion which is an alternative to representation practices of negotiations and grievances. With the practice of representation, increases in salaries and benefits are negotiated. By establishing the testing system and education requirements as a method of promotion, the company established a system which evaluates persons as individuals. It provides workers with ladders of mobility which only they as individuals can use. To the extent that individuals use this ladder, they can improve salaries and working conditions for themselves as individuals. The company makes available financial resources for personnel to attend college and other training. To the extent individuals are successful with this method of changing their own salaries and working conditions, the union and representation is not needed by them. This has potential to work as a "wedge." If the system works for a worker, it makes union membership less inviting.

While the above series of practices utilized by managers make it difficult for workers to use representation or encourage other means of dealing with discontent, a second series of practices were used to organize and involve managers to carry out the company's labor relations practices. Whereas former labor relations practices tended to exclude managers from a role in labor relations practices, the new labor relations practices put managers in the role of carrying out management policy. As already noted, the labor relations training manual put supervisors in the position of guarding management rights by adopting practices which make the establishment of past practices difficult. Furthermore, the manual clearly placed supervisors on the manager's side as

management's local agent. Finally, the manual defined the union and management as having two, mutually exclusive purposes.

It should be noted that various practices used by the union encouraged supervisors to identify with management and to see the union as other. Flyers, newsletters, the information picket, and media appeals which degraded supervisors angered many supervisors. Furthermore, the act of taking the fight outside of the company to degrade the company angered many managers. They questioned the appropriateness of these actions since they were not done when they were in the union. They questioned the motivation of union leadership. The practices noted above by which workers challenged managers in the work group in ways that brought other workers against a manager also encouraged managers to work together to counter the workers. It is difficult to see the viewpoint of the other when one is under attack.

Finally, the new labor relations staff developed practices which encouraged management participation in developing the labor relations policies of the company. Supervisors were polled about what they wanted in the contract. They were consulted about what problems they had with proposals set forth by the union in negotiations. A group of middle and senior managers was formed to elicit and address problems which arose with interpreting the contract. These practices involved many managers in coming to a position. The development of a widely held position supports the duty outlined in the supervisor's training manual to support such positions in solidarity with management.

## CHAPTER IX

### A GENEALOGY OF DISTRUST (AND TRUST)

#### Introduction

If one examines the analogies of distrust summarized in Table VI and Table VII, one finds that the content of each these analogies contains two different practices. In Table VI, one finds analogies which elaborate reversals of practices. On the one hand, a practice on which workers or managers relied or in which they trusted can be found in the analogies. On the other hand, the analogies also contain the elaboration of another practice which replaced the expected practice and, by doing so, evoked distrust. Thus, the analogies of distrust themselves are the principal tool for identifying what changed in the relationship between the union and the company to cause the relationship between them to deteriorate. Once two practices are identified in an analogy, one can then explore what practices changed and in what ways to facilitate the shift from the practice counted on to the practice evoking distrust.

After exploring the emergence of distrust based on reversals of practice, distrust based on dually embedded practices will be explored. Unlike the analogies found in Table VI, the analogies found in Table VII do not contain historical reversals of practices. Instead, they contain references to two practices which either utilize common elements of different practices or two practices which simultaneously work on actors to encourage different lines of action.

Finally, the interpretation of trust and distrust made in this study will be placed back into the context of the review of literature on trust to recast the issue of trust in social relations.

#### Distrust and the Reversal of Practices

To explore how reversals in firm internal labor markets take place, more

TABLE VI  
ANALOGIES OF DISTRUST AND REVERSALS OF PRACTICES

Analogy of Distrust	Reversal of Practices	
	Before	After
Stories relating distrust to practice of no layoffs and perceived promise of no layoffs	Workers counted on lifetime employment	Workers can be laid off to meet profit goals
Stories relating distrust to testing and educational requirements to advance	promotion by seniority	testing to qualify for positions
	promotion by seniority	educational qualifications for supervisor positions
	Promotion within company	"Cross fertilization" by promoting to executive level from parent company
Stories relating distrust to the failure of the company to take care of workers as they did in the past	Workers count on company to accommodate worker's problems	Managers use worker's problems as occasion to evaluate retaining workers
	Workers count on company for benefits through retirement	Benefits reduced to maintain profits in face of rising costs and new regulations
Stories of distrust of new union leadership by managers related to "being radical"	Compromise of membership's concerns, "teflon" settlements	Advocating membership's concerns, binding settlements
Stories of distrust of new labor relations staff and company executives by union members related to "union busting"	Compromise of manager's concerns, paternalistic	Advocating manager's concerns, resisting compromise

TABLE VII  
ANALOGIES OF DISTRUST AND DUALY EMBEDDED PRACTICES

Analogy of Distrust	Dually Embedded Practices	
	First	Second
Stories of distrust of former union business manager by membership related to representation	Duty to represent	Compromise and problem solving
Stories of distrust of former labor relations staff by managers related to representation	Duty to represent	Compromise and problem solving
Stories of distrust of company by union related to company's unwillingness to engage in binding grievance settlements <u>and</u> stories of distrust of union by company related to union's attempts to engage in binding grievance settlements	management's rights "reserve rights" contract construction	duty to bargain past practices problem solving
Stories of distrust of participatory management practices by workers and first line supervisors	Problem solving, soliciting ideas of workers, developing proposals	Management rights, all proposals referred to upper management for approval
Stories of distrust of management by workers over modification of work rules <u>and</u> stories of distrust of workers by management over raising staffing and work practice issues with safety issues	Safety	Productivity



TABLE VII  
(Continued)

ANALOGIES OF DISTRUST AND DUALY EMBEDDED PRACTICES

Analogy of Distrust	Dually Embedded Practices	
	First	Second
Stories of distrust of workers by management over featherbedding	Job security	Productivity
Stories of distrust of workers by management around time and work rules	Expressing discontent	Productivity
Stories of distrust of management by workers over being told to share openly only to have it negatively effect them at a later date	Punishment	Discipline

traditional institutionalists, such as Kalleberg and Berg (1987), would encourage one to examine how changes in product or service markets -- such as electricity -- affect labor markets. From Table II in Chapter IV one can see that, even though the number of customers increased during the period (1980-1985) just prior to the layoff, the company experienced a significant decrease in the number of kilowatt-hours of electricity sold. Thus revenue decreased over the period. At the same time, several executives noted that the operations and maintenance budget of the company was growing at about sixteen percent per year. Thus, the company took action to cut costs to maintain profitability by reducing the work force by fifteen percent to just over 2,000 employees. About half of the work force reduction was achieved through a special early retirement program for employees in their late fifties. The other half was achieved through layoffs.

While models that relate product or service markets to labor markets can show that environmental conditions make things problematic for a company, how the company responds is a matter of a number of practices that such models ignore. From interviews, it was learned that, during the Great Depression in the 1930s, the company reduced wages or hours or both to keep the work force employed. This was a strategy that could have been used but which was not discussed with the work force. Additionally, it may have been possible for the company to have gone to the state utility board for rate adjustments. However, the company had adopted low rates and other marketing strategies to attract industry to the state. Finally, the company could have reduced earnings paid to stockholders. According to a report on National Public Radio aired in August 1993, the parent company of the company in this study was among the top companies in the nation with annual increased earnings each year for the last ten years.

The exact ways in which layoffs beyond the special early retirement plan were made can only be understood in light of competitive strategies adopted by the company. Competitive strategies represent the practices that link the product market to the firm internal labor market. As noted earlier, the practice of providing electricity on demand interacts with the use of refrigerant air conditioning to set up the problem of building a system to deliver peak demand while earning revenue on a much lower average demand. In the early 1980s, the company adopted a marketing strategy of conservation combined with increasing the share of the heating market to both decrease peak demand and

to increase average demand. According to one company annual report, this program led to the constraint of almost 100 megawatts of peak demand over a period of a few years.

If one examines the company's annual report from the year of the layoff in the mid-1980s, one can see another round of strategies adopted which now work on the electrical production and delivery system itself to match the production and operations capacity of the company in a flexible way to the seasonal changes in the demand for electricity and services. Thus, two plants were base loaded. One was closed. Four plants were put on a stand-by status. Additionally, line workers in the company's largest areas were laid off and operations were reorganized to meet average demand. Peak demand for line service and for plant maintenance was now met by out sourcing. Finally, the company adopted a pricing strategy to become one of the lowest cost electrical utilities in order to attract new industrial customers.

The executives in the company studied tried to reduce the impact of the work force reduction by creating the special early retirement plan. Some executives shared that they did not think that the president of the company in this study could sell this plan to the parent company. Executives hoped that necessary work force reductions could be achieved by the early retirement plan. But, when people had to be laid off, the way in which the layoffs were deployed and the restriction of union seniority protection to work units combined to have an impact on the union much larger than the seven to eight percent of the work force that was laid off in addition to the seven to eight percent of the work force who took advantage of the early retirement plan.

If layoffs had been made equally in every unit, the line workers in the company's largest area would have had seven to eight percent of the newest workers laid off. Instead, the early retirements and the layoffs resulted in a work force reduction of about thirty-five percent. The power plant that was closed was also located in this same area. A traveling power plant maintenance crew based out of this same area lost about sixty percent of its work force. Collectively, these three groups lost over fifty percent of their work force. So, the cut into seniority for these groups was much more significant than the seven to eight percent that would have occurred if layoffs had been effected equally across the company.

The work force in this area made up one-fourth to one-third of the union membership at the time of the layoffs. The union office was located in this area.

Most of the union leadership came from this area. Thus, the layoffs happened to a group of workers who had a position in the union to make their distrust of the company evoked by the layoffs more effectively the whole union membership's distrust of the company.

While the layoffs had an immediate impact on trust in the company among the unionized work force, the implementation of the economic shutdown of four power plants created other reversals of practices. First, one of these plants did experience a reduction in work force of about twenty percent. Second, the schedule of plant operations were subject to frequent and impromptu changes as these power plants were put on line or shut down as demand changed. Such schedule changes not only reversed previously used practices, but they also made family life more problematic for the workers effected. This set up a continual, chronic reinforcer of the distrust initiated by the layoffs for a different fifteen percent of the unionized work force from those most directly effected by the layoffs.

Subsequent to the layoffs, decisions to employ industrial/organizational psychology practices to restructuring the work force reversed the use of seniority as a practice for advancement on a company wide basis and replaced it with testing schemes and college educational requirements. This would effect all persons in the company with seniority who were waiting to enter an apprentice program and all union members with seniority who were waiting for a supervisory position or a union position in a different line of progression. Both in places effected by layoffs and by changes in work practices and in places relatively unaffected by the strategic restructuring described above, persons were found who had been passed over because of a test or educational requirement who would have been promoted on the former practice of seniority. In an interview with the union member who was the most sympathetic with management of any worker interviewed, she said that not receiving the promotion to supervision that she expected would be the one event which would cause her to lose trust in the company.

Thus, the effect of the layoffs, changes in work practices, and changes in promotion practices was much more extensive on union members with significant seniority than a simple seven to eight percent work force reduction effected through voluntary early retirement followed by a seven to eight percent work force reduction across the board would be. It is therefore not surprising that the attitudes of unionized workers toward management deteriorated after

the layoffs nor is it surprising that they elected leadership which would try to reverse the effects of strategic decisions. Since management was continuing to try to strategically restructure various aspects of the company, it is not surprising that they adopted practices to resist any contractual entanglements which would impede their efforts. Again, compared to a labor relations practice of compromise and accommodation, such a practice represented a reversal of practices which set up further distrust of management on the part of union members.

As noted earlier, these reversals made the practice of compromise and accommodation on the part of the union leadership unacceptable to the union membership because, in the face of a management adopting new practices, accommodation means going along with the management practices that are now problematic to union members. As also noted earlier, strikes were prohibited during the life of the contract by the contract itself, and strikes were dangerous once the company engaged in out sourcing to the extent that workers could be replaced with contractors. Furthermore, the parent company could lend workers from other utilities that it owned to weather a strike. The practice of increasing the degradation of management and of engaging in passive aggressive tactics which increase the costs of doing business and the effort required to manage were about the only avenues open to the union to put pressure on management to address their concerns.

The very economic conditions that made the electricity product and service market problematic to the company also affected the labor market in the areas served by the company in a way that made exit problematic for workers. Throughout the 1970s, all industrial categories were adding employment in the MSA. Employment grew during this period by an average of over 15,000 jobs per year. But, in the 1980s, employment grew by only an average of over 1,000 jobs per year. During this period, mining, manufacturing, construction, and wholesale trade were losing employment while the other industrial sectors were adding employment at a rate slower than in the 1970s. The jobs which were being lost in the 1980s tended to be the jobs which paid higher wages in the 1970s: manufacturing, mining, and construction. The only sector which paid higher wages and continued to marginally add jobs was transportation and public utilities. Since the only electric utility in this area for whom workers could work was the company in this study and since employment in the alternative industrial areas in which their skills could apply were shrinking, workers had no

place to exit.

The lack of a place to which workers can exit in the face of layoffs, changes in work rules, and changes in rules for advancement probably intensifies distrust of the company for at least two reasons. First, workers cannot easily exit the organization without losing a significant source of support. Thus, they cannot escape the constant source of threat which constantly evokes distrust. With no place to go, layoffs, out sourcing, and reorganization represent a continual threat to the destruction of one's source of support and associated life style and family commitments. Changes in the use of seniority leave workers in the position of being middle age with additional burdens for advancement added with no assurances that obtaining further education will lead anywhere. Second, if workers who distrust management cannot exit the organization without serious consequences, they will stay in the organization and perpetuate the practice of distrust.

Having explored how management's strategic restructuring of the company involved the reversals of practices for particular work groups which evoked distrust on a broader scale than one might expect from a simple across the board work force reduction, now consider how the company adopted such practices rather than other practices in the first place to deal with its economic problems. On the one hand, practices adopted as competitive strategies became available through a number of practices. Before the person who was the president of the company in this study for most of the 1980s took office, the company sent her to a nationally known business school for a semester. In fact, the parent company sent many of the senior executives in the company in this study through this program. During the period when the company's president was in the one semester program, the faculty of the school had recently published works on competitive strategy, participative management, and worker empowerment. In addition to business school, electric utility trade organizations provided training and workshops on various practices used to manage an electric utility. In fact, the testing program which was developed was developed as a part of an industry wide effort organized by an electric utility trade group. Management consulting firms and human resources management firms were involved in various projects.

The very fact of learning new practices gives people new ways of thinking about things and, thereby, encourages change. Yet, the reversal of practices which evoked distrust involved eliminating workers' sources of

support, limiting workers' careers, and effecting workers' family life. If the company employed family like and friendship practices on a broad scale in the 1980s, could the executives have chosen layoffs rather than income or hour reductions, rate increases, dividend decreases, or some other practice that protected workers? For example, one manager entered the work force in an entry level position along with other workers. At the time of this study, she occupied one of the upper management positions in the company. One worker who entered the company about the same time and who was a friend of this manager had health problems that forced her to quit work. She applied for disability. The persons in charge of disability denied the request. These persons represented a latter cohort of workers who were college trained and who did not enter the company through entry level jobs. Here, the judgment of those applying rules about what constituted a disability followed the rules. The manager intervened and reversed the decision. What would have happened if this worker did not have a relationship with this manager? Again, the senior executives of the company developed a special, one-time early retirement plan for workers in their late fifties as the first phase of the layoffs. Coincidentally, this was also about the same age as most of the senior executives. This plan had to be "sold" to the parent company. One senior executive did not believe that the president of the company in this study would be successful with the parent company. Would such a plan have been developed if the parent company were dictating the reductions? Or finally, a senior executive had once been a part of the team training apprentice line workers. She found it disturbing to see workers on the information picket line whom she had known and had know to be "reasonable." Without such relations, would the information picket have given her pause to question the company's position?

Friendship practices also seemed to modify labor relations. The labor relations staff in the 1970s came out of the ranks of the union workers. Even while this person worked as a manager, she maintained her union membership. From the interviews, it appears that this labor relations staff would make informal agreements and would honor those agreements. It appears that there was a general practice of working out issues before they were implemented. From the historical file of news articles from the local library, one can find stories from the 1970s in which agreements were worked out with unions about craft boundaries before work began on a power plant. Friendship also worked to allow the labor relations staff to influence union members on issues. The labor

relations staff could get the union membership to go along with company plans.

To understand how practices were adopted which reversed job security, mobility, and working conditions, it is important to trace practices that would have eliminated or made ineffectual practices of friendship and family like practices that made it difficult to ignore the consequence of actions on the other party.

One can find three basic practices which the company used prior to 1970 which would encourage the friendship practices sited in the interviews. First, the family night dinners and holiday parties were a strategy adopted by the company as a training strategy. In the local library's historical file, an article was found from the 1950s in which a representative from the local chapter of the American Society of Training Directors indicated that business leaders over the nation began to seek organized methods in 1947 to provide employee education in human relations and in what it takes to operate a business.<sup>5</sup> According to the article, the purpose of such training was to "fight socialism and communism."

The program of the company in this study was described in this article. It began in the late 1930s. The corner stone of the training program was a monthly area level educational meeting which were open to families, children, and friends of employees as well as to employees themselves. While the purpose of the meeting was to inform employees about company activities, it was also a time of recognizing employees and of hearing the concerns of employees and their families.

The helpful clarification made by this article was that the family like practices were a particular adaptation of practices being circulated by professional training groups to work on workers' definitions of management decisions. As the article notes, ". . . people need to know the why of things instead of just how." Thus, family like practices are management practices. In effect, family practices and management practices are dually embedded in this situation. While evidence was not found to exactly identify how family practices either became problematic or unimportant to management, they could be reversed since they were controlled by management.

The second practice which made the practice of friendship possible was local control. As already noted, everyone in the small district knew each other and worked with each other. Managers had more latitude to set their own agenda. Managers were capable of responding to the concerns of workers. It



is not really possible to value the other and the relationship with the other unless one can take the other into account in ways to maintain the relationship. As also earlier noted, control over the company became more centralized. Local managers became more the instrument of the central controllers. This blocked local managers from taking the concerns of workers into account in the same way when they could do something about the concerns.

The centralization of control seemed to be less a matter of a group of individuals deciding to control things than a matter of deploying devices to build systems. Again, the historical file from the local library contained stories of personnel being brought from various local operations to the central office to start groups to devise uniform practices to be used company wide. For example, around 1970, a group was brought together in the central office to develop a technical operations section to standardize various systems involving relay engineering, communications engineering, metering, relay, and control field activity. Once this group was established, they would then centralize control by simply creating a centralized group who developed and implemented approaches. Throughout this study, one can find examples of arenas over which local persons had control that were centralized by an effort that is usually academic, e.g., applying computerized operations research to power plant maintenance and inventory control or applying industrial/organizational psychology to identify critical behaviors involved with various jobs to validate tests to predict success in those jobs. The very business of bringing a group together to create and implement a standardized way of doing things removes latitude from the local manager and puts it somewhere else.

The third practice which made friendship possible was the promotion system. When workers began worktogether, they created relationships as peers. Some rose up through the ranks of management. Thus, the potential for continual relationship was present. Even the engineers hired by the company tended to work extensive periods in the field. Part of this was enabled by each local area doing most tasks. Once an area of work was centralized through a standardization effort, it became possible for engineering, accounting, planning, and personnel staff to have less extensive relations with workers in the field during their careers. With the changes implemented in the late 1980s of promotion by testing, college education requirements for management, and selection of senior management from other companies owned by the parent company, the process of developing systems to standardize things established

dividing practices which effectively break the opportunity of lifetime work relations that begin as peer relations.

Thus, even though the reversal of relations which evoked distrust were encouraged by economic conditions and strategic reorganization, were made possible by new practices circulated through business schools and other devices, and were made more problematic by how they affected workers with significant amounts of seniority, it is still doubtful that the exact practices would have been adopted if the earlier training program, decentralized control, and the promotion system based on seniority that supported and utilized friendship and family like practices had not been earlier abandoned or displaced.

### Distrust and Dually Embedded Practices

If distrust were only evoked by reversals of practices, it would be difficult to reestablish trust. Once distrust is evoked, analogies of distrust are available to interpret scenes and, thereby, perpetuate distrust. Analogies of distrust are a useful political tool for those running for union office. There are few practices such as forgiveness available to repair the definition of the distrusted. With little opportunity for exit, workers who know and use the evoked analogies of distrust remain in the organization. Yet, if reversals or practices were the only practice which created a potential for distrust, one might look forward to some point in the future when trust might be reestablished. When executives leave or retire, those identified as responsible for the reversals of practices will be gone. Thus, the object of analogies will no longer be present. The credibility of analogies of distrust with the newer workers may be low in the face of consistent practices after the reversals. Once the number of newer workers exceed older workers, alternative analogies of trust may be easier to apply and sustain with less peer pressure from older workers.

As one examines the analogies of distrust found in Table VII, one sees that the company and the union themselves use dually embedded practices as a part of their ongoing relationship which evoke distrust. Thus, the capacity to evoke distrust is endemic to the scene and cannot be solved by simply replacing actors. One must operate on the practices themselves.

The potential for distrust is principally set up by combining management rights with some other practice. Management rights make it possible for an owner or manager to take unilateral action with respect to anything owned: capital or labor. It is rooted in property rights. Once labor power is purchased,

an owner can do with it as she pleases. It implies no further consideration than the labor power purchased. If it is no longer needed, it is no longer purchased.

Rather than replacing management rights, other practices have been added to modify management rights or the effects of using management rights. If one looks at labor law, one sees management rights *affirmed* and the rights of workers *affirmed* in the right to representation and the duty of the company to bargain. If one stands inside the practice of management rights, any limitation put on the right to use one's property can only be seen as opportunistic. If one stands inside the practice of the rights of workers, unilateral action by management without bargaining can only be seen as opportunistic.

The purpose of collective bargaining is to establish a contract which limits the unilateral action to which workers are exposed. However, the practice of contract construction does not solve the problem. One has the problem of interpreting the contract. Once again, the "reserved rights" doctrine of contract construction is combined with the "past practices" doctrine of contract construction. If one stands inside the practice of "reserved rights," any attempt by the union to limit unilateral action of the company beyond the company's interpretation of the contract is seen as opportunistic. Inside the practice of "past practices," any attempt to change any practice without first bargaining is seen as opportunistic.

Most dually embedded practices involving management rights become dually embedded through the practice of compromise. The practices of representation and compromise in negotiations seem to encourage dually embedded practices. Consider an observed negotiation session to negotiate work rules at a power plant. Before the negotiation session began, the company managers met to decide what position they would push for and which positions they would first offer to later discard when moving to compromise. The union leaders also met with workers and decided what position they would take. During the negotiation session, various positions were offered, questioned, and advocated. Breaks were taken for the union to consult with members. During the break, managers would consult. After the agreement was struck, one union member involved in the work unit complained that their position was not obtained by the negotiation team. However, many elements of the union members' position and some elements of the management position were in the final compromise. Here, the position of a represented group frames the options open to the negotiation team. It is possible to eliminate or modestly

modify elements. But, having to represent a position taken by other actors makes it very difficult to develop totally new practices which might address what is problematic to both union members and managers. The practice of representation encourages compromise around elements of positions already taken by the group represented rather than totally new positions.

The problem with such compromise solutions which combine contradictory practices can be seen in the problem of trust faced by labor leaders and company labor relations staff. By law, labor leaders have a duty to represent the members of the union. Practically, they will be voted out of office if they do not. By management rights, a labor relations staff that does not represent senior management will probably be fired. Yet, labor law requires that they bargain over wages, hours, and working conditions. To bargain is to reach a compromise which is neither what the union members nor management want in the first instance.

Furthermore, compromise also tends to contain and perpetuate the differences in positions between the two groups. For example, in the negotiations that took place during this study, the compromise reached over shift language contained elements of the union's proposal and elements of the company's proposal. Managers felt that the language would allow them to carry out the practices to which the union was objecting. Union members felt that the compromise would prevent the practices to which they objected. One could see the very language of the compromise enabling managers to act in ways that the union would see as a violation of the contract.

The practice of compromise can also be seen as a group of managers attempt to solve problems set up by management rights while, at the same time, preserving management rights. For example, managers believed that unilateral action is not adopted as well by workers as decisions made by workers themselves. Also, managers recognized that they are often removed from situations and work group information that would be necessary to make a good decision. So, a planning group was set up to develop a participatory management plan to involve workers to get better solutions and to get workers to adopt decisions. As the plan was circulated for review, managers criticized the plan because it took the right to decide -- i.e., to take unilateral action -- away from managers and put it in the work group. So, it was modified to engage work groups in the development of ideas and proposals which management would then judge or modify. As a result, workers who participated

in a "participatory" program in which their idea and proposals were solicited were less than pleased when they found out that senior managers would they do with their ideas what they wanted. Thus, one finds the compromise slogan, "Voice not Vote," develop and spread to modify the expectations of workers about the meaning of participation. Ironically, the very tactic became a part of analogies of distrust.

A second practice which sets up dually embedded practices is contract construction. Here, the intertwining of practices is created by using the contract to work out legal relations while using other practices to work out problems on an informal basis. One problem lies with the potential to bring the practice of contract into the situation at any time through past practice. If workers and managers work out a new solution, it potentially modifies the contract through the application of past practice arguments in arbitration. A second problem lies with the application of workers rights and management rights to the contract. Managers use tactics to try to work out issues without leaving a trail of evidence to prove past practice. The union uses tactics to create an evidence trail to prove past practice.

The third practice which sets up dually embedded practices is the dividing practice. As noted earlier, dividing practices involve linguistic, ritual, and physical practices of dichotomously separating groups into in-groups and out-groups.

Several practices already discussed encourage the dividing of the organization into different groups with different perspectives. Management rights divides managers and the managed by virtue of the right of the buyer of labor power to do with it as she pleases. One group takes as its basic task to objectify and work on the other group.

The contract and labor law contain devices to establish the independence of the two parties. In the earlier cited NLRB cases on participatory practices (309 NLRB 163 (1992), 311 NLRB 88 (1993)), it was argued by Board members that the ability of managers to unduly influence workers through the participatory groups damaged the ability of workers to act as an independent agent with respect to management. Thus, the NLRB intervenes to reinforce two groups who are parties to the collective bargaining agreement. As one observes negotiations, they are replete with devices to divide the parties into two groups. Both groups represent different groups in a representational relationship. Both groups meet separately and talk only to

each other to establish positions for bargaining. The negotiation setting is divided into two tables facing each other with opposing sides at each table. There are legal ramifications if one side works with the other outside of this context.

The practice of constructing a system by creating a centralized group to standardize practices contains several aspects which encourage dividing the organization into different groups. When the centralized groups were created, people and their capacities and ways of looking at things were withdrawn from the local work group. This changed their problematic by shifting from solving problems that were made problematic for them by local workers and customers to solving problems that were made problematic by the task of creating a system. In the 1980s, this centralization was taken one step further by making a system of all of the utilities owned by the parent company. Most of the reversals of practices earlier described can be traced back to actions to operate the parent company and its utilities as a system. Such centralization divides the central management from the work level even further.

Various personnel practices encourage the division of the organization into different groups. Whereas it was possible with the seniority system for persons at the work groups level to progress with time and job experience, the use of academic and psychological testing and of college education requirements discouraged mobility for workers without extensive academic backgrounds. It differentiated those in management from workers. It broke lines of friendship and experience across the management-worker boundary. By centralizing the circulation of senior management among the companies owned by the parent company, it differentiated those in senior management from the remainder of management and the work force as well as again breaking lines of friendship and work experience across the management-worker boundary.

These dividing practices set up dually embedded practices by creating different groups who use and are embedded in different practices but who must work on common issues. In the language of social phenomenology, this constructs different life worlds for the different groups as they interact. What creates the potential for distrust is the use of practices by one group that set up lines of action which are seen as opportunistic from the perspective of the other group. For example, a manager who has never worked on a line crew who orders a foreman to close a circuit during a rain storm sees no problem. The foreman who has almost been caught in an arc in a similar situation sees a

problem. The manager cannot easily hear the problem because there are consequences for her if she does not get the line energized. Again, an engineer who is not exposed to coal dust every day objects to testing a respirator because she does not think it is necessary and such testing is not in her budget. The worker exposed to coal dust and who is now having pulmonary abnormalities is concerned about the respirator. Or again, a manager who finds a way to combine jobs and increase earnings sees no problem with reorganizing jobs and reducing the number of people working. In a weak labor market and at middle age with family and financial obligations, such a move represents the destruction of a worker's life. Or finally, a college educated manager who has no experience in the union or with the labor contract or past practices discounts concerns of workers regarding the contract. A supervisor who came out of the ranks of the union backs off of a decision when workers raise issues regarding the contract.

#### Recasting the Issue of Trust

From what has been discovered in this study, distrust is not merely the absence of trust. Analogies of distrust are used to interpret situations and -- by doing so -- replicate distrust. By replicating distrust, analogies of distrust block the development of mutual lines of action. For example, one's boss asks one to do something out of the ordinary. If one has an analogy of distrust of bosses who use new situations to force future changes in work rules, one questions the motives of the boss and looks for ways out of the request. Or again, a union worker raises questions about the safety of working with fewer workers than is the normal practice. If one has an analogy of distrust of union members using various tactics to maintain the number of available positions, one questions the motives of the worker and discounts the safety concern.

Analogies of distrust contain within themselves the genealogy of distrust. While one can periodically find distrust defined in terms of reputations in this study, one also finds practices of punishment widely used which make persons rather than practices the problem. What one can find consistently contained in analogies of distrust are either reversals of practices or dually embedded practices. One set of practices establishes what was counted on or trusted. The other practices -- either replacing the trusted practice or placed in relation to the trusted practice -- represents an opportunistic act when compared to the trusted practice. This would suggest that the issue of trust should be recast in terms of

the potential for trust or distrust created by practices and the relation of practices.

The practice of trust was not readily exposed in this study. First, changes had taken place to evoke distrust of the union by management and of management by the union. Second, by theoretically and methodologically following the trail of the problematic, it reduces the chance that the unproblematic will be exposed. Thus, the practice of trust was not as easily surfaced. However, a few instances of trust were uncovered because trust made certain actions problematic for actors. This offers a view on the practices that evoke trust. Once again, the analogies contain the practices and their genealogy.

The principal practice that seemed to set up trust was friendship or a history of working together and respecting each other. One can find instances of how such friendships or histories of personally working together made it difficult for managers to take unilateral actions. As noted earlier, a senior executive was taken back by the presence of persons on the union's information picket line whom she had known and trusted as reasonable persons. She could not simply dismiss their actions as just "union radicals." When she attended a safety meeting at a power plant and heard workers whom she again knew to be reasonable criticize safety issues, she could not just dismiss the criticism as simply "complaining." A different senior executive intervened in an earlier set of layoffs because she felt personally responsible for the workers whom she had hired and who worked for her. She did not want to see them laid off. Another upper manager found it difficult to announce a reduction in retiree benefits that was decided by the parent company when her friends called and complained about the historical reversal. A union steward was friends with a manager in her area of responsibility. When workers would complain about the managers, the steward felt compelled to explain and defend her friend's position.

The second set of practices that seemed to set up trust were the family like practices that the company had adopted. The company family -- as workers referred to the company as it used to be -- was made such by the training programs adopted in the late 1930s. While the genealogy of the benefits programs that constituted family like practices could not be identified by the sources available for this study, it is probable that they were adopted during World War II as a strategy to compete for scarce labor during a period of



regulated wages. A National Public Radio broadcast on September 23, 1993, noted that the current health care crisis was in part set up by the use of health, retirement, and other benefits to compete for scarce labor during World War II. This interpretation tended to be confirmed by interviews with older managers and executives who indicated that salaries tended to be lower when all of these benefits were extended. Finally, older managers and executives involved with labor relations through out their careers indicated that, until the layoffs in the mid-1980s, the company was paternalistic toward the union and tended to look out for the interests of workers. These practices were the principal practices on which workers relied in the reversals described in the analogies of distrust.

With these two practices, trust is not simply tolerating a risky situation in which one must depend on another (Griffin, 1971; Luhmann, 1979, 1988; Williams, 1988; Powell, 1990). Nor is trust simply an assessment of the other's self (Griffin, 1971; Baker, 1983; Cantrell, 1987; Good, 1988; Lewis and Weigert, 1988). Rather, it is a reliance on practices that inhibit opportunistic lines of action. In this study, it was a reliance on friendship and family-like practices to inhibit both unilateral action of management rights and the use of the contract and past practices on the part of the union.

As suggested in the conclusion to Chapter II, the review of literature, the differentiation of the work place into the work group level, the labor relations level, and the strategic level did involve the establishment of different discourses about what constitutes opportunism. But more important with respect to trust, the very practices which differentiated the levels by developing the capacities to treat the company as a system also broke the friendship and personal relations that workers tended by rely on to modify unilateral action and that managers relied on for "reasonable" action from union members. The layoffs and other reversals of practices represented a move of the strategic level of the company to the parent company from the company in this study. They also represented the final end of the family like practices that workers counted on as the meaning of their relationship with the company.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The feminine pronoun will be used in this study to counter the traditional use of the masculine as standard and to help protect the identity of persons interviewed or observed.

<sup>2</sup> Significant portions of this section are drawn from my articles, "A Critical Analysis of the Concept of Power: An Interactionist Revelation of Its Moral Nature," *Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology* 18 (1990), pp. 121-126, and "Emancipatory Practice and the Use of the Ruse of Agency and the Ontology of Actors and Scene in the Analysis of Structure," *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 19 (1993), pp. 31-72.

<sup>3</sup> It is interesting to note that "technical competence," a visible performance with appropriate "credential" props, corresponds to the phenomenologist's and ethnomethodologist's common background expectations of the ability to perform (Zucker, 1986) and that "fiduciary obligation and responsibility," a visible performance with appropriate "licensing" or "professional membership" props, corresponds to constitutive expectations regarding independence from self-interest (Zucker, 1986). As noted earlier, the taken-for-granted may be more a result of a good performance than a result of an assumption about the other.

<sup>4</sup> One notes that Zucker applies the secondary relationship assumption even with process trust by focusing on reputation and brands as a way of signaling trustworthiness.

<sup>5</sup> 1947 was the year in which organized labor carried out several very effective strikes and in which the Taft-Hartley Act was passed to reduce the avenues available to unions to carry out effective strikes.

## REFERENCES

- Agar, Michael H. 1986. *Speaking of Ethnography*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1988. "Ethnography and Cognition." Pp. 68-77 in *Contemporary Field Research: A Collection of Readings*. Edited by R. M. Emerson. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.
- Alinsky, Saul. 1971. *Rules for Radicals*. New York: Random House.
- Alwin, D. F. and J. A. Krosnick. 1985. "The Measurement of Values in Surveys: A Comparison of Ratings and Rankings." *Public Opinion Research* 49:535-552.
- Anderson, Michael. 1971. *Family Structure in 19th Century Lancashire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Anton, Ronald Joseph. 1990. "Emerging Employee Rights: Their Existence and Their Effects of Attitude and Behavior in the Workplace" (Doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 51:2082A.
- Appadurai, Arjun. 1986. "Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value." Pp. 3-63 in *The Social Life of Things*. Edited by A. Appadurai. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Babbie, Earl R. 1986. *The Practice of Social Research*. 4th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Banks, Andy and Jack Metzgar. 1989. "Participating in Management: Union Organizing on a New Terrain." *Labor Research Review* 8(2):1-55.
- Barber, Bernard. 1983. *The Logic and Limits of Trust*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. 1982. *Memories of Class*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Berndtson, Arthur. 1970. "The Meaning of Power." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 31:73-84.
- Best, John W. 1981. *Research in Education*. 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Bhaskar, Roy. 1986. *Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation*. London: Verso.
- Bluestone, Barry. 1989. "Goodbye to the Management Rights Clause." *Labor Research Review* 8 (2): 66-72.

- Bluestone, Barry and Bennett Harrison. 1982. *The Deindustrialization of America*. New York: Basic Books.
- Blyton, Paul, Ali Dastmalchian, and Raymond Adamson. 1982. "Developing the Concept of Industrial Relations Climate." *The Journal of Industrial Relations* 29:207-216.
- Bowen, Donald D. 1982. "Developing Effective Managers: Performance Appraisal." Pp. 64-67 in *Experiences in Management and Organizational Behavior*. 2nd ed. Edited by D. T. Hall, D. D. Bowen, R. J. Lewicki, and R. S. Hall. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 1982. "The Crisis of Liberal-Democratic Capitalism: The Case of the United States." *Politics and Society* 11:51-93.
- Bradach, Jeffrey L. and Robert G. Eccles. 1989. "Price, Authority, and Trust: From Ideal Types to Plural Forms." *Annual Review of Sociology* 15:97-118.
- Braun, Peter and Margaret Foddy. 1988. "Trust and the Consumption of a Deteriorating Common Resource." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31:615-630.
- Braverman, Harry. 1974. *Labor and Monopoly Capital*. New York: Monthly Review Books.
- Briggs, Steven Stambaugh. 1981. "The Municipal Grievance Process in California" (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 42:1815A.
- Brown, Nancy Louise. 1987. "Cooperative Efforts for Maintaining Irresolution in Argumentation: Co-in-ercion" (Doctoral Dissertation, Boston University). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 47:3577A.
- Burke, Kenneth. 1954. *Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1969. *A Grammar of Motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Butler, John K. and R. Stephen Cantrell. 1984. "A Behavioral Decision Theory Approach to Modeling Dyadic Trust in Superiors and Subordinates." *Psychological Reports* 55:19-28.
- Caldarelli, Cesare. 1985. "A Descriptive Case Study of Behavior and Attitudes in Open Negotiations" (Doctoral dissertation, George Peabody College for Teachers of Vanderbilt University, 1984). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 46:561A.
- Case, John. 1989. "Growing Large While Staying Small." Pp. 132-138 in *Creative Organization Theory*. Edited by G. Morgan. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

- Chandler, Alfred D., Jr. 1988. "The United States: Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism." Pp. 34-45 in *The Transformation of Industrial Organization: Management, Labor, and Society in the United States*. Edited by F. Hearn. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Charmaz, Kathy. 1988. "The Grounded Theory Method: An Explication and Interpretation." Pp. 109-126 in *Contemporary Field Research: A Collection of Readings*. Edited by R. M. Emerson. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland.
- Cicourel, Aaron. 1974. *Cognitive Sociology*. New York: Free Press.
- Coase, R. H. 1937. "The Nature of the Firm." *Economica* 4:386-405.
- Coleman, James S. 1982. *The Asymmetric Society*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1984. "Introducing Social Structure into Economic Analysis." *American Economic Review* 74:84-88.
- Collins, Randall. 1981. "On the Micro-Foundations of Macro-Sociology." *American Journal of Sociology* 86:984-1014.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1982. *Sociological Insight*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cooke, Marvin L. 1990. "A Critical Analysis of the Concept of Power: An Interactionist Revelation of Its Moral Nature." *Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology* 18:121-126.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1992. "The Transformation of Clergy Markets in the Methodist Church: The Oklahoma Annual Conference from 1940 to 1980." *Sociological Spectrum* 12:183-216.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1993. "Emancipatory Practice and the Use of the Ruse of Agency and the Ontology of Actors and Scene in the Analysis of Structure." *The Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 19: 31-72.
- Cooley, Charles H. 1962. *Social Organization*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Copi, Irving M. 1978. *Introduction to Logic*. 5th ed. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
- Dasgupta, Partha. 1988. "Trust as a Commodity." Pp. 49-72 in *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*. Edited by D. Gambetta. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Davies, Rupert E. 1963. *Methodism*. Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books.
- Davis, William Lewis. 1983. "Communication at the Table: A Case Study of Collective Bargaining Negotiations" (Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 1982). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 43:3152A.
- Deming, W. Edwards. 1986. *Out of the Crisis*. Cambridge, MA: MIT, Center for Advanced Engineering Study.

- Denzin, Norman K. 1983. "Interpretive Interactionism." Pp. 129-146 in *Beyond Method*. Edited by G. Morgan. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1989a. *Interpretive Interactionism*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1989b. *The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods*. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1990. "The Sociological Imagination Revisited." *The Sociological Quarterly* 31: 1-18.
- Deutsch, M. 1958. "Trust and Suspicion." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2:265-279.
- Donnelly, Michael. 1982. "Foucault's Genealogy of the Human Sciences." *Economy and Society* 11:363-380.
- Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Paul Rabinow. 1982. *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dufalla, Ronald Wayne. 1990. "The Negotiations Process as a Precipitator of Teacher Strikes: An Analysis of Districts with Repeated Strikes" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 51:1456A.
- Duncan, Otis Dudley. 1984. *Notes on Social Measurement: Historical and Critical*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Edwards, Richard C. 1984. "Forms of Control in the Labor Process: An Historical Analysis." Pp. 109-142 in *Critical Studies in Organization and Bureaucracy*. Edited by F. Fischer and C. Sirianni. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Emerson, Robert M. 1988. "Introduction." Pp. 1-16 in *Contemporary Field Research: A Collection of Readings*. Edited by R. M. Emerson. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland.
- Fainstein, Norman I. and Susan S. Fainstein. 1974. *Urban Political Movements: The Search for Power by Minority Groups in American Cities*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Fielding, Nigel G. and Jane L. Fielding. 1986. *Linking Data*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Foucault, Michel. 1965. *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*. Translated by R. Howard. New York: Random House.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1972. *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*. Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books.

- \_\_\_\_\_. 1979. *Discipline and Punish, the Birth of the Prison*. Translated by A. Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1980. *Power/Knowledge, Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*. Edited by C. Gordon. Translated by C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham, and K. Soper. New York: Pantheon Books.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1982a. "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress." Pp. 229-252 in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. By H. C. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1982b. "The Subject and Power." Pp. 208-226 in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. By H. C. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1984. *The Foucault Reader*. Edited by P. Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1988a. "Technologies of the Self." Pp. 16-49 in *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*. Edited by L. Martin, H. Gutman, and P. Hutton. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1988b. "The Political Technology of Individuals." Pp. 145-162 in *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*. Edited by L. Martin, H. Gutman, and P. Hutton. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1990. *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*. Translated by R. Hurley. New York: Vintage Books.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1991a. "Politics and the Study of Discourse." Pp. 53-72 in *The Foucault Effect*. Edited by G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1991b. "Questions of Method." Pp. 73-86 in *The Foucault Effect*. Edited by G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Fox, Alan. 1974. *Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Freeman, Richard B. and James L. Medoff. 1984. *What Do Unions Do?* New York: Basic Books.
- Friedman, David. 1988. "Beyond the Age of Ford: Features of Flexible-System Production." Pp. 254-265 in *The Transformation of Industrial Organization*. Edited by F. Hearn. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1991. "School for Scandal: Why Japan Might Lose Its Competitive Edge." *Tulsa World* (Nov. 19): Section A, Page 7.

- Gabarro, J. J. 1978. "The Development of Trust, Influence, and Expectations." Pp. 290-303 in *Interpersonal Behavior: Communication and Understanding in Relationship*. Edited by A. G. Athos and J. J. Gabarro. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Gambetta, Diego. 1988. "Can We Trust Trust?" Pp. 213-237 in *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*. Edited by D. Gambetta. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Gamson, William A. 1968. *Power and Discontent*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.
- Gandal, Keith. 1986. "Michel Foucault: Intellectual Work and Politics." *Telos* 19(2):121-134.
- Garfinkel, Harold. 1956. "Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies." *American Journal of Sociology* 61:420-424.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1963. "A Conception of, and Experiments with, 'Trust' as a Condition of Stable Concerted Actions." Pp. 187-238 in *Motivation and Social Interaction*. Edited by O. J. Harvey. New York: The Ronald Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1967. *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1988. "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture." Pp. 37-57 in *Contemporary Field Research: A Collection of Readings*. Edited by R. M. Emerson. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.
- Gibb, Jack R. 1961. "Defensive Communication." *Journal of Communication* 11:141-148.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1978. *Trust: A New View of Personal and Organizational Development*. Los Angeles: The Guild of Tutors Press.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1984. *The Constitution of Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gilbert, Beth. 1989. "The Impact of Union Involvement on the Design and Introduction of Quality of Working Life." *Human Relations* 42:1057-1078.
- Glasser, John. 1989. "Alternative Labor Relations Practices: A Second Look." *Thrust for Educational Leadership* 18(5):32-37.
- Goffman, Erving. 1959. *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life*. New York: Doubleday.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1967. *Interaction Ritual*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Gold, Michael Evan. 1989. *An Introduction to Labor Law*. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, Cornell University.



- Good, David. 1988. "Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust." Pp. 31-48 in *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*. Edited by D. Gambetta. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Granovetter, Mark. 1985. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." *American Journal of Sociology* 91:481-510.
- Griffin, Kim and Bobby R. Patton. 1971. "Personal Trust in Human Interaction." Pp. 375-391 in *Basic Readings in Interpersonal Communication*. Edited by K. Griffin and B. R. Patton. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1984. *The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*. Translated by T. McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Hagiwara, Michio P. and Françoise de Rocher. 1977. *Theme et Variations*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Hall, Douglas T., Donald D. Bowen, Roy J. Lewicki, and Francine S. Hall. 1982. *Experiences in Management and Organizational Behavior*. 2nd ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Hardin, Linda Jane Rosenbrock. 1991. "An Analysis of the Collaborative Process in Public School Collective Bargaining in an Urban Setting" (Doctoral dissertation, Miami University). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 52:1149A.
- Hayes, Robert H. and William J. Abernathy. 1988. "Managing Our Way to Economic Decline." Pp. 129-139 in *The Transformation of Industrial Organization: Management, Labor, and Society in the United States*. Edited by F. Hearn. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hollway, Wendy. 1986. "Management and Labour in Transition: The Case of Zimbabwe." *The International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 6 (2): 83-102.
- Howe, Kenneth R. 1985. "Two Dogmas of Educational Research." *Educational Researcher* 14(8): 10-18.
- Itoh, Eichi. 1984. "Labor Control Through Small Groups: Japanese Labor Today." *Radical America* 18(2-3):27-36.
- Jones, Edgar A., Jr. 1984. "Selected Problems of Procedure and Evidence." Pp. 48-67 in *Arbitration in Practice*. Edited by A. M. Zack. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, ILR Press.
- Jones, Gareth R. 1983. "Life History Methodology." Pp. 147-159 in *Beyond Method*. Edited by G. Morgan. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

- Kalleberg, Arne L. and Ivar Berg. 1987. *Work and Industry: Structures, Markets, and Processes*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Keeley, James F. 1990. "Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes." *International Organization* 44:83-105.
- Knights, David and Hugh Willmott. 1989. "Power and Subjectivity at Work: From Degradation to Subjugation in Social Relations." *Sociology* 23:535-558.
- Kochan, Thomas A., Harry C. Katz, and Robert B. McKersie. 1986. *The Transformation of American Industrial Relations*. New York: Basic Books.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1991. "Strategic Choice and Industrial Relations Theory: An Elaboration." Pp. 104-115 in *The Future of Industrial Relations*. Edited by H. C. Katz. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
- Kumar, Pramod and Rehana Ghadially. 1989. "Organizational Politics and Its Effects on Members of Organizations." *Human Relations* 42:305-314.
- Landy, Frank J. 1985. *Psychology of Work Behavior* (3rd ed.). Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.
- Lansberg, Ivan. 1989. "Social Categorization, Entitlement, and Justice in Organizations: Contextual Determinants and Cognitive Underpinnings." *Human Relations* 41:871-899.
- Levering, Robert. 1988. *A Great Place to Work: What Makes Some Employers So Good (And Most So Bad)*. New York: Avon Books.
- Lewert, Charles C. and Garth Gillan. 1982. *Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lewis, David. 1991. "The Contemporary Human Resource Management Challenge to Industrial Relations." Pp. 82-99 in *The Future of Industrial Relations*. Edited by H. C. Katz. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
- Lewis, David J. and Andrew Weigert. 1985. "Trust as a Social Reality." *Social Forces* 63:967-985.
- Luhmann, Niklas. 1979. *Trust and Power*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1988. "Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives." Pp. 94-107 in *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*. Edited by D. Gambetta. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Macneil, Ian R. 1978. "Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neo-classical, and Relational Contract Law." *Northwestern University Law Review* 72:854-906.

- Maculay, Stewart. 1963. "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study." *American Sociological Review* 28:55-67.
- March, James G. and Herbert A. Simon. 1958. *Organizations*. New York: Wiley.
- Margolis, Joseph. 1986. *Pragmatism without Foundations: Reconciling Realism and Relativism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Marshall, Catherine and Gretchen B. Rossman. 1989. *Designing Qualitative Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- McDonell, Gavan. 1987. "The Razorback blockades: Power, knowledge and action in the New South Wales freight transport industry." (Doctoral Dissertation, University of New South Wales, Australia). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 48:2991A.
- Mead, George H. 1934. *Mind, Self and Society*. Edited by C. W. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Meyer, John W. and Brian Rowan. 1991. "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony." Pp. 41-62 in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Edited by W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Michels, Robert. 1964. *Political Parties*. New York: Free Press.
- Milton, John. "The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce." Pp. 451-459 in *Paradise Lost and Selected Poetry and Prose*. Edited by N. Frye. New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc.
- Mittenthal, Richard. 1984. "Past Practice and the Administration of Collective Bargaining Agreements." Pp. 181-208 in *Arbitration in Practice*. Edited by A. M. Zack. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, ILR Press.
- Mohrman, Susan Albers. 1979. "The Effects of Political Access and Participation in Decision Making on Trust and Organizational Effectiveness" (Doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 40:3568A.
- Morgan, Gareth (Ed.). 1989. *Creative Organization Theory*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Nelson, Daniel. 1988. "The Foreman's Empire." Pp. 20-33 in *The Transformation of Industrial Organization: Management, Labor, and Society in the United States*. Edited by F. Hearn. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Parsons, Talcott. 1951. *The Social System*. New York: Free Press.
- Patton, Paul. 1989. "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom." *Political Studies* 37:260-276.

- Perrow, Charles. 1990. "Economic Theories of Organizations." Pp. 121-152 in *Structures of Capital: The Social Organization of the Economy*. Edited by S. Zukin and P. DiMaggio. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Powell, Walter W. 1990. "Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization." *Research in Organizational Behavior* 12:295-336.
- Powell, Walter W. and Paul J. DiMaggio. 1991. "Introduction." Pp. 1-38 in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Edited by W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Reed, Theodore L. 1978. "Organizational Change in the American Foreign Service, 1925-1965: The Utility of Cohort Analysis." *American Sociological Review* 53:404-21.
- Rice, Douglas Scott. 1986. "Cultural Conflicts: The Dilemma of Japanese and Managers in America" (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Irvine). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 47:1897A.
- Roche, William K. 1990. "Social Integration, Union Policies and Strategic Power: The Development of Militancy Among Electricity Generating Station Workers in the Republic of Ireland, 1950-1982" (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oxford, 1987). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 50: 3756A.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1991. "Trust Dynamics and Organizational Integration: The Micro-sociology of Alan Fox." *British Journal of Sociology* 42:95-113.
- Rotter, Julian B. 1967. "A New Scale for the Measure of Interpersonal Trust." *Journal of Personality* 35:651-665.
- Russell, Raymond. 1985. *Sharing Ownership in the Workplace*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Sackmann, Sonja A. 1991. *Cultural Knowledge in Organizations: Exploring the Collective Mind*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- St. Antoine, Theodore J. 1984. "Arbitration and the Law." Pp. 9-22 in *Arbitration in Practice*. Edited by A. M. Zack. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, ILR Press.
- Schutz, Alfred. 1962. *Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1967. *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. Translated by G. Walsh and F. Lehnert. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Shapiro, Ian. 1990. *Political Criticism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Shapiro, Susan P. 1987. "The Social Control of Impersonal Trust." *The American Journal of Sociology* 93: 623-58.

- Shea, Gordon F. 1984. *Building Trust in the Workplace*. New York: American Management Associations Membership Publications Division.
- Shiner, Larry. 1982. "Reading Foucault: Anti-Method and the Genealogy of Power-Knowledge." *History and Theory* 21:382-397.
- Simmel, Georg. 1978. *The Philosophy of Money*. Translated by T. Bottomore and D. Frisby. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Simon, Herbert A. 1945. *Administrative Behavior*. New York: Free Press.
- Smart, Barry. 1985. *Michel Foucault*. London: Tavistock.
- Smircich, Linda. 1983. "Studying Organizations as Cultures." Pp. 160-172 in *Beyond Method*. Edited by G. Morgan. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Smith, John K. 1983. "Quantitative Versus Qualitative Research: An Attempt to Clarify the Issue." *Educational Researcher* 12(3): 6-13.
- Smith, John K. and Lous Heshusius. 1986. "Closing Down the Conversation: The End of the Quantitative-Qualitative Debate Among Educational Inquirers." *Educational Researcher* 15(1): 4-12.
- Smith, T. W. 1987. "That Which We Call Welfare by Any Other Name Would Smell Sweeter." *Public Opinion Research* 51:75-83.
- Strauss, Anselm L. 1987. *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Strunk, Robert Jon. 1991. "A Study of Agreements Negotiated in Pennsylvania School Entities Using Goldaber's Win/Win Style of Integrative Bargaining" (Doctoral dissertation, Temple University, 1990). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 51:2598A.
- Taylor, Charles. 1984. "Foucault on Freedom and Truth." *Political Theory* 12:152-183.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1989. "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom: a Reply." *Political Studies* 37:277-281.
- Taylor, Frederick W. 1939. *Scientific Management*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Thiele, Leslie Paul. 1986. "Foucault's Triple Murder and the Modern Development of Power." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 19:243-260.
- Thomson, A. W. J. 1974. *The Grievance Procedure in the Private Sector*. Ithaca, NY: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.

- Tjosvold, Dean and Lai Cheng Chia. 1989. "Conflict Between Managers and Workers: The Role of Cooperation and Competition." *The Journal of Social Psychology* 129:235-247.
- Trunfio, Edward James. 1990. "Corporate Cultures and the Institutionalization of Business Ethics" (Doctoral dissertation, Boston University). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 51:1308A.
- Turner, Dudley Barlow. 1989. "Intraorganizational Bargaining: The Effect of Goal Congruence and Trust on Negotiator's Strategy Use" (Doctoral dissertation, Purdue University, 1988). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 50:573A.
- Turner, Johathan H. 1991. *The Structure of Sociological Theory*. 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Vidich, Arthur J. and Joseph Bensman. 1958. *Small Town in Mass Society: Class, Power and Religion in a Rural Community*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Walton, Richard D. and Robert B. McKersie. 1965. *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Wasielewski, P. L. 1985. "The Emotional Basis of Charisma." *Symbolic Interaction* 8:207-222.
- Watson, Alexander R. 1990. "A Study of Supervisor-Manager Relationships in Manufacturing Industry: An Analysis of the Effect of Supervisor-Manager Interpersonal Relationships on the Amount of Authority and Influence Experienced by First-line Supervisors in Manufacturing Industry" (Doctoral dissertation, Brunel University, United Kingdom, 1989). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 51:2093A.
- Weber, Max. 1958. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Translated by T. Parsons. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1978. *Economy and Society*. 2 vols. Edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Whalley, Peter. 1990. "Markets, Managers, and Technical Autonomy in British Plants." Pp. 373-394 in *Structures of Capital: The Social Organization of the Economy*. Edited by S. Zukin and P. DiMaggio. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- White, Frances Lavonne. 1991. "Thirteen Years Later: Perceived Effects of Collective Bargaining on Selected Faculty-Management Relationships in California Multi-Community College Districts" (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1990). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 51:2955A.

- Whyte, William Foote. 1989. "Value of Joint Programs Underestimated." *Labor Research Review* 8(2): 87-91.
- \_\_\_\_\_. (Ed.). 1991. *Participatory Action Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Williams, Bernard. 1988. "Formal Structures and Social Reality." Pp. 3-13 in *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*. Edited by D. Gambetta. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. *Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications*. New York: Free Press.
- Yamagishi, Toshio. 1988. "The Provision of a Sanctioning System in the United States and Japan." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 51:265-271.
- Zack, Arnold M. (Ed.). 1984. *Arbitration in Practice*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, ILR Press.
- Zett-Otte, Mary Louise. 1990. "Technology Transfer Effectiveness: Organizational Behavioral Variables and Product Quality Management Decisions" (Doctoral dissertation, The Fielding Institute, 1989). *Dissertation Abstracts International* 51: 221A.
- Zucker, Lynne G. 1986. "Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 1840-1920." *Research in Organizational Behavior* 8: 53-111.
- Zukin, Sharon and Paul DiMaggio. 1990. "Introduction." Pp. 1-36 in *Structures of Capital: The Social Organization of the Economy*. Edited by S. Zukin and P. DiMaggio. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zurcher, Louis A. 1986. "The Bureaucratizing of Impulse: Self-Conception in the 1980s." *Symbolic Interaction* 9:169-178.

2  
VITA

Marvin Lee Cooke

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

**Thesis:** DECONSTRUCTING TRUST AND DISTRUST IN THE  
WORKPLACE: A FOUCAULDIAN ANALYSIS OF LABOR  
RELATIONS IN AN ELECTRIC UTILITY

**Major Field:** Sociology

**Biographical:**

**Personal Data:** Born in Elkhart, Kansas, December 9, 1947, the son of Marvin Joel and Mary Lee Cooke.

**Education:** Graduated from Texhoma High School, Texhoma, Oklahoma, in May, 1966; received Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology from Central State College at Edmond in May, 1970; received Master of Divinity degree from Phillips University in April, 1975; completed requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree at Oklahoma State University in December, 1993.

**Professional Experience:** United Methodist Clergy, Oklahoma Annual Conference, 1971 to 1985; Associate Director and Executive Director, Tulsa Metropolitan Ministry, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 1978 to 1988; Adjunct Instructor, Tulsa Junior College, 1987 to present; Teaching Assistant, Department of Sociology, Oklahoma State University, 1989 to 1990; Adjunct Professor, Phillips Graduate Seminary, 1992; Program Planner, Urban Development Department, City of Tulsa, 1992 to present.