

THE ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY, SANCTIONING
BEHAVIOR, AND THE ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION FOR
A NEGATIVE EVENT: A METHODOLOGICAL
AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

By

HAROLD DEAN WHITESIDE

Bachelor of Arts
University of Miami
Coral Gables, Florida
1967


Master of Science
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, North Carolina
1973

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College
of the Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
December, 1973


MAR 14 1975

THE ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY, SANCTIONING
BEHAVIOR, AND THE ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION FOR
A NEGATIVE EVENT: A METHODOLOGICAL
AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS


Thesis Approved:




Thesis Adviser











Dean of the Graduate College

902260

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the members of my advisory committee for their advice and guidance in the design of this research. The idea was born in interaction with Dr. William Scott and developed and refined through the very helpful evaluations of Dr. Edgar Webster, Dr. Bob Helm, and Dr. Donald Fromme.

To Don Fromme, my chairman, I have a very special thanks for his time, scholarly contributions, and his understanding. The benefits of having worked with him will last far beyond the pages of this study. Special thanks are also due for Bob Helm, my unofficial co-chairman, for his helpful thoughts, insightful ideas, and especially for listening to all my frustrations. He taught me to question my ideas and see social psychology in a different light. My education under these two was far too short.

I owe Tom and Betty Poling a great debt for their time and effort in running my data through the computer.

Another special thanks is due for Brenda Cook for typing everything for me at the last minute, and always being polite about it, and for handling all of the work while I moved away.

To my wife Greta, my eternal thanks for her help and encouragement throughout all the efforts toward this goal. I wouldn't have done it without her.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. THE LITERATURE REVIEW.	1
The Purpose of the Study.	1
History of Responsibility Attribution	4
Sanctioning and Responsibility.	8
Attribution of Emotion.	9
Individual Differences.	10
Foreseeability.	12
Methodological Problems	13
Statement of the Problem.	19
II. METHODOLOGY.	23
Subjects.	23
Instruments	23
Procedure	25
III. RESULTS.	28
Attribution of Responsibility	28
Sanction Assignment	32
The Attribution of Emotion.	41
Locus of Control.	47
Dependent Variable Correlations	49
IV. DISCUSSION	50
The Attribution of Responsibility	50
Sanction Assignment	54
The Attribution of Emotion.	59
Foresight	62
Locus of Control.	63
Dependent Variable Correlations	64
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.	65
VI. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.	68
VII. APPENDIX A	72
VIII. APPENDIX B	81

Chapter	Page
IX. APPENDIX C	89
X. APPENDIX D	93
XI. APPENDIX E	101
XII. APPENDIX F	108
XIII. APPENDIX G	115

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
I. Summary of Analysis of Variance for Attribution of Responsibility	29
II. Mean Level of Responsibility Attribution as a Function of Story Method and Responsibility Level . . .	30
III. Mean Level of Responsibility Attribution as a Function of Negative Outcome Intensity and Responsibility Level.	33
IV. Summary of Analysis of Variance for Sanctions Assignment.	35
V. Mean Level of Sanction Assignment as a Function of Story Method, Story Outcome, and Responsibility Level	36
VI. Summary of Analysis of Variance for Attribution of Emotion.	42
VII. Mean Level of Attribution of Emotion as a Function of Story Method, Story Outcome, and Responsibility Level .	43

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Mean Sanction Assignment for Outcome Levels as a Function of Story Method and Level of Responsibility	37
2. Mean Sanction Assignment for Story Method as a Function of Outcome Level and Level of Responsibility.	39
3. Mean Emotional Attribution for Outcome Levels as a Function of Story Method and Level of Responsibility.	44
4. Mean Emotional Attribution for Story Method as a Function of Outcome Level and Level of Responsibility	48

CHAPTER I

THE LITERATURE REVIEW

The Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to evaluate and extend the literature on the attribution of responsibility. Heider's (1958) levels of responsibility are extended, and their relationship to responsibility attribution, sanction assignment, and the attribution of emotion with moderate and intense negative outcomes is investigated. The effect of an observer's locus of control on these attributions and assignments is also explored. In addition, two methods of investigation are examined to determine if they have differential effects on these processes.

A very significant aspect of our daily interactions are the characteristics that we attribute to other people. Some of the characteristics we attribute are enduring states, popularly called personality characteristics. Other attributions deal with temporary or momentary phenomena. Perhaps the most important of these is the attribution of causality. When an individual is seen to be associated with an event, there is a tendency to attribute the causation of that event to him. When this happens responsibility becomes an issue. The attribution of responsibility for an action is not always assigned to the individual who acted (Heider, 1958). Responsibility is sometimes attributed, at least in part, to environmental factors.

Understanding the attribution of responsibility is a necessary and important task for psychology. It holds implications both for our judicial system, and in our everyday behaviors. The extent to which we hold individuals responsible for their actions will affect our future and current interactions with them. If an individual harms us, intentionally, we respond differently to him than if he dealt us the same harm accidentally. The harm is the same, what is different is the extent of responsibility we assign the person for the action. This in turn affects our future dealings with him.

The literature on the attribution of responsibility is filled with contradictory results, and alternative explanations which appear to be independent of each other. Investigators have used several different methods, and have at times appeared to be unaware of the work of others and its consequences for them. The purpose of this investigation was to clear up some of these inconsistencies.

First, this study examined two methods that have been used indiscriminately in the attribution of responsibility. Both methods involve the presentation of short stories to the subjects. One method employs contextual stories which involve actual situations. The other method uses more abstract stories which do not describe a particular situation, but represents a class of situations. The possible consequences of the distinction between these two methods has not been previously investigated.

Another purpose of this study was to examine and extend Heider's (1958) levels of the attribution of responsibility. Heider's level of "Foreseeable Commission" was broken down into "Careless Commission," where foresight is never consciously considered, and "Selfish

Commission" where foresight is considered but dismissed. The "Selfish Commission" level appears to be a necessary conceptual step between "Foreseeable Commission" and "Purposive Commission."

The third purpose of this study was to examine the manner in which individuals assign sanctions to others as a function of their responsibility level.

The fourth purpose of the investigation was to examine the attribution of emotion to individuals who have performed actions at different levels of responsibility. This phase examines how individuals perceive the feelings of an actor at different levels of responsibility.

The effect of the intensity of a negative action outcome was also investigated in this study. Both moderate and severe negative outcomes were investigated as to their effect on the assignment of responsibility, sanctions, and the attribution of emotion. This factor was expected to operate differentially at the different levels of responsibility.

Finally, the study investigated the effect of an individual's perception of the locus of control of behavior on his perception of the responsibility of others. Rotter's (1966) Internal-External Locus of Control Scale was used to differentiate those individuals who viewed themselves in control of their own behavior from those who saw external factors as playing the determining role. This kind of personality factor was expected to affect the attribution of responsibility, sanctions and emotions.

History of Responsibility Attribution

Attribution theories have been quite popular in recent social psychological research. This area, while now diverse, received its heuristic thrust from the work of Fritz Heider. Heider was interested in the phenomenology of social behavior. The basis of Heider's position was the proposition that man perceives behavior as being caused. Michott (1963) performed several experiments which demonstrated that individuals do perceive causality immediately upon witnessing an event.

Two major attribution theories appeared in the mid 1960's. These theories can be traced to Heider though both deal with different aspects of the attribution process. In 1965 Jones and Davis proposed their Theory of Correspondent Inferences. They were concerned with attributions to the individual and thus were concerned with internal causality. The theory deals with the attribution of dispositional traits to an actor. This attribution will occur when the action differs from normative expectations. When an action follows the norm an observer cannot be sure of the cause of the action. It could be due to the desires of the actor, or the constraints of the situation. An act which violates normative expectations can only have its source within the individual. Jones and Davis simplified their analysis by dealing with only part of what Heider proposed (1958). Only situations where the actor was aware of what effects would result from his actions, and where he had the ability to perform the actions were examined.

Kelley (1967) proposed a Theory of External Attribution. Jones and Davis had been concerned with internal causality, the attribution to the person. Kelley was concerned with examining external causality

and thus complemented the earlier theory. He was interested in investigating the non-personal variables that determine a choice. In general he hypothesized that if an individual responds differentially when an entity is present than when it is absent, if he responds to it in a consistent manner, and if this same entity causes the same effect in everyone else, then it is the entity to which the causal attribution is made. To the extent that these conditions are not met, the causal attribution will be made to the individual. So, Kelley's theory is oriented toward ruling out personal sources of causal attribution while Jones and Davis' theory is oriented toward the ruling out of environmental or situationally determined causal attributions.

The attribution of responsibility is both narrower and broader in scope than the theories of Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967). It is narrower in scope because it deals with only one type of attribution, the attribution of responsibility. It is broader in scope because it deals with both internal and external attributions of causality. Attributions of responsibility can be shared by the person and his environment. The attribution of responsibility is more broad in scope than Jones and Davis' theory as the former deals with all of Heider's (1958) levels of responsibility while the latter is concerned with only one level, foreseeable commission.

Heider (1958) reported that the location of perceived causality must reside either in the individual or in the environment. "Personal responsibility...varies with the relative contributions of environmental factors to the action outcome; in general, the more they are felt to influence the action, the less the person is held responsible. (1958, p. 113)" He then went on to suggest five stages or levels in which

attribution to the person decreases as attribution to the environment increases.

These levels begin with the most "primitive," and progress to more "sophisticated" levels. Level 1 is "Global Association." Here an individual is held responsible for any action that he is connected with in any way, and he does not need to personally act. With "Extended Commission," Level 2, an individual is held responsible for any effect that he produced by his actions, even though he could not possibly have foreseen that outcome. Here, however, the individual is a necessary condition for the happening because he does need to act. "Foreseeable Commission," Level 3, is where an individual is responsible for any foreseeable effect that he produced by his actions, even though the effect was not a part of his goals or intentions. Level 4 is "Purposive Commission." This is where an individual is held responsible for any effect that he produced by his actions, when he foresaw and intended to produce the outcome. The fifth level is "Justified Commission." At this stage an individual is held only partly responsible for actions that he intentionally produced. This happens when circumstances are such that most individuals would have felt and acted as he did. Here there are mitigating circumstances which reduce personal responsibility.

Walster's (1966, 1967) work in the attribution of responsibility appears to have developed independently of Heider (1958). Walster (1966) found that adults tend to hold others more responsible for "accidents" that have severe consequences, than for accidents that have more moderate outcomes. In her study, subjects' ratings of responsibility were for an action that occurs at the level which

Heider (1958) would call extended commission. That is, there was no way that the acting individual in Walster's study could have foreseen the outcome of his behavior. It is possible, therefore, that greater attribution of responsibility with severe as opposed to moderate outcomes may not occur at other levels of attribution (Heider, 1958) where foresight, intentionality, justification, or the absence of commission are involved.

There is some evidence that this may be the case. In another study, Walster (1967) found that subjects did not attribute more responsibility to the acting agent for severe as opposed to moderate outcomes. In this study, however, the acting agent had foresight of all possible outcomes of his behavior. So this situation involved a more "sophisticated" level of attribution, foreseeable commission, than the first study. Thus the different results may be due to shifting the level of attribution, a possibility Walster failed to consider. Shaver (1970b) also reports finding no increase in the attribution of responsibility with severe as opposed to moderate outcomes. His study also involved a situation where the acting agent had foresight of possible outcomes and thus involves foreseeable commission.

It may be that Walster's (1967) and Shaver's (1970b) findings are not due to the foreseeability factor alone. It is possible that their results are due to the idiosyncracies in their story situations, as indicated by the evidence that an increase in outcome intensity does lead to an increase in the attribution of responsibility. Several investigations (Shaw & Sulzer, 1964; Shaw, 1967; Sulzer & Burglass, 1968; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Shaw & Schneider, 1969a, 1969b) have demonstrated this increase in studies which did use Heider's (1958)

five levels of attribution. However, these studies did not report the effect of increased intensity of outcome on attribution of responsibility at each level. This leaves open the possibility that this relationship is due to an outcome intensity difference at just a few of the levels, but not necessarily all of them. It is also conceivable that lack of foresight is sometimes excusable and other times most inexcusable.

Sanctioning and Responsibility

Once an individual is assigned responsibility for an action he becomes open to sanctions for that action. Very little work has been reported on sanction assignment. Shaw and Reitan (1969) report an investigation of sanctioning assignment as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. In their presentation they refer to an earlier, unpublished work by Sulzer (1964). Sulzer had stated that the attribution of responsibility to a person provides the basis for sanctioning that person. He also stated that sanctioning behavior, just as responsibility attribution, was influenced by both responsibility level (Heider, 1958) and outcome intensity. He presented some evidence that the attribution of responsibility for an action and the assignment of sanctions were correlated but not identical.

Shaw and Reitan (1969) investigated some of Sulzer's (1964) propositions. They stated that attribution of responsibility should be a necessary but not sufficient condition for sanctioning. If an individual is not responsible for something, he should not be sanctioned for it. If he is responsible, then he may or may not be sanctioned for it. According to Shaw and Reitan if these propositions are true, then the level of sanction assignment should sometimes be

less than the level of responsibility attribution, but never more. Their investigation of the discrepancy between the attribution of responsibility and the assignment of sanctions indicated that sanctioning behavior was never more than the attribution of responsibility. The discrepancy between responsibility attribution and sanction assignment was found to be the least at Global Association and Purposive Commission. They concluded that the attribution of responsibility was the basis for the assignment of sanctions. They also found sanctioning behavior to be more sensitive than the attribution of responsibility to outcome intensity. When the outcome was more intense, more sanctioning occurred. Similar sanctioning behaviors were anticipated for the present study.

Attribution of Emotion

No work has been reported on the emotional state attributed to an actor as a result of his attributed action. One could reasonably expect an observer to attribute positive affective feelings to the individual who is associated with or responsible for positive things occurring. It is possible that the relationship is not so simple when negative outcomes are involved. Individuals who have justifiably, intentionally, or selfishly caused negative outcomes may be seen as feeling less bad about the occurrence than individuals at the other responsibility levels. The individual who has justifiably caused a negative outcome will feel less bad because the environment shares the blame. He has some degree of normative approval for what he did. Individuals who cause a negative outcome either intentionally or through overt negligence have performed a socially unacceptable act.

According to Jones and Davis (1965), when an act is socially inappropriate, observers are more likely to use it to infer a dispositional characteristic of the actor. Following this, an individual who has intentionally caused a negative outcome or who was consciously aware that this negative outcome might accrue if he acted should be seen by observers as a more selfish or debase person. They should therefore attribute less negative feelings to this person for what he did because of their perception of his heartlessness as a rather stable personality trait. It is also reasonable to expect that individuals who have been associated with or caused severe negative outcomes should be attributed more negative emotions for their actions than individuals who caused or were associated with more moderate outcomes.

Individual Differences

Concepts of individual differences present a relatively unexplored area in studies of the attribution of responsibility. Most of the literature in the attribution of responsibility has dealt only with the characteristics of the stimulus situation. Only three studies have investigated the effect that personal differences might have on the attribution of responsibility.

Sulzer and Burglass (1968) investigated the effect of empathy and punitiveness on the attribution of responsibility. Their research indicated that more punitive and less empathetic individuals were more likely to hold others responsible for carelessly produced outcomes and justified outcomes. They claimed that the attribution of personal responsibility thus depends on both the perceived characteristics of the stimulus situation, and the personal characteristics

of the attributor. However, in another study, Shaw and Schneider (1969) found no evidence to support the contention that intelligence was related to the attribution of responsibility. They concluded that only a minimum amount of ability was necessary to learn the culturally prescribed method for appropriate responsibility attribution and sanction assignment.

A personality variable that might be expected to affect both the attribution of responsibility and sanctioning behavior is the attributor's perceived locus of control. Rotter (1966) and his associates designed a scale to measure the degree to which an individual believes he can intentionally affect certain consequences (internal locus of control) as opposed to those consequences occurring beyond the individual's control (external locus of control). This scale is called the Internal-External Locus of Control Scale. A substantial body of literature (reported by Lefcourt, 1966a and 1966b; Joe, 1971; and others) indicates that the personality variable assessed by Rotter's scale can have predictable consequences for behaviors and social expectations. With regard to responsibility attribution, Phares and Wilson (1972) investigated the effect of Internal-External locus of control and the attribution of responsibility in ambiguous and structured situations. Although an expected interaction between I-E and story ambiguity failed to materialize, the results indicated that internals attributed greater levels of responsibility than externals. Thus Phares and Wilson found that internally oriented people tend to see not only themselves as responsible for events, but also hold others responsible for their own behaviors. Conversely, externals tend to attributed less responsibility to themselves and

to others. Therefore, an individual's own locus of control orientation might provide a basis for predicting his beliefs concerning the locus of control of others, and hence others' level of responsibility for outcomes.

Foreseeability

Heider (1958) says that the third attribution level (foreseeable commission) is where an individual is held responsible for any after-effect that he might have foreseen even though it was not a part of his own goal. He goes on to say "That he was not deterred from pursuing his goal by the thought of harm to others is taken as a sign that he is ruthless...A nicer person would not have carried out the action. The moral restraining forces were lacking in actor. (p. 113)" No distinction is made as to whether or not "foresight" ever consciously occurred although this is a potentially important factor.

An individual who has foresight of alternative outcomes and who acts anyway is likely to be held more responsible for that outcome than an individual who could have foreseen it but failed to. Heider (1958, p. 113) says that this is the stage where an individual is held responsible for any after effect that he might have foreseen. This implies that the individual did not foresee the outcome. He goes on to say, however, that the individual was not deterred from pursuing his goal by the thought that he might harm another (p. 113). This implies that the individual foresaw the outcome but dismissed the possibility of its occurrence and acted in a selfish manner. These are thus two distinct situations which in this paper will be separated into two distinct levels. The first will be called "Careless Commission."

Here the alternative possible outcomes were never even considered by the actor, although he might have foreseen them had he attempted to do so. The second level will be called "Selfish Commission." Here there was conscious consideration of the alternative possible outcomes or by-products of acting. These were, however, dismissed or ignored and the action was pursued anyway. With oversight commission, the individual is guilty only of not being more vigilant. With selfish commission the individual is guilty of being ruthless or inconsiderate. Therefore, although this study investigated the attribution of responsibility using Heider's (1958) levels as a general guide, Heider's third level was separated into two levels. Personal responsibility for an action could be expected to be higher for selfish commission than for oversight commission.

Methodological Problems

As previously mentioned, studies in the attribution of responsibility have used two different types of stimulus items. Walster (1966, 1967); Shaver (1970b); Shaw and Sulzer (1964); Shaw (1967); Shaw and Reitan (1969); Sulzer and Burglass (1968); and Phares and Wilson (1972) have all used contextual stories. These stories each involved a particular situation to which the subject must attribute responsibility. A second method, used by Shaw and Schneider (1969a, 1969b), involved abstract stories which merely represent a class of situations, but which did not provide descriptive contextual content.

An example of a contextual story is provided by Shaw and Sulzer (1964):

Perry opened the door so that the wind would blow the children's papers all over the room. Is Perry responsible for the scattered papers?

The abstract story, lacking contextual description, is illustrated by the following example from Shaw and Schneider (1970a):

Steve caused something to happen that was a little bit bad. He intended to cause it. Is Steve responsible for the bad thing that he caused?

Both of these stories represent a negative outcome at the level of purposive commission.

It is possible that these two types of stories may lead to different results. Before they continue to be used interchangeably, their equivalence should be demonstrated. Conceptually, at least, it is possible that they deal with different levels of processing. With the contextual stories, the subject must decide what "factors" are present. It is up to him to decide whether or not there was foresight, intent or justification. This is acceptable if perception of these variables is being studied. The literature on the attribution of responsibility, however, has used these stories to investigate the manner in which individuals assign responsibility when these factors are present. Whether or not they are indeed "present" is left up to the perception of the subject. If subjects differ in their perception of foresight, intent, or justification factors, then the investigator has potentially serious error variance in his study. With the more abstract stories, the individual is told what factors are present. Thus, the mediating factor of the subjects' perception is eliminated. One should then be able to investigate the effect of the various levels of foreseeability, intent, and justification more accurately with the abstract stories. However, this remains to be determined.

As part of this investigation, it was decided to examine both of these methods. Constructing the abstract stories was a fairly simple task. They were similar to examples provided by Shaw and Schneider (1970a). The form of these stories can be seen in Appendix B.

Constructing contextual stories was more difficult. Previous investigations, such as by Shaw and Sulzer (1964), had constructed stories to represent Heider's (1958) levels and received agreement from three independent judges that these stories were at the appropriate level of responsibility and had the appropriate outcome. The present investigator replicated this procedure in a preliminary (pilot) study. Agreement was obtained from three independent judges. The story development was then taken a step further when the stories were presented to 39 subjects in an attempt to see if they could ascertain the level of the story and its outcome. Subjects were given instructions and examples of Heider's (1958) levels and then asked to rate the level to which they felt each story belonged and the outcomes of the story. An 80% agreement level was arbitrarily selected as acceptable. On only five of the 20 stories did the subject agree with the three independent judges at the 80% level on both levels of responsibility and outcome intensity. The range of agreement was from 21.2% and 92.3% for outcome intensity, and from 21.2% to 100% for responsibility level. Thus, in tests conducted on the prospective subject population, perceptions of the factors (foreseeability, intent, justification) that were present in a given contextual story varied tremendously.

A second generation of stories was developed in an attempt to derive stories that would lead to better agreement. With 17 subjects, again only five stories of the 20 tested reached the 80% level of

agreement on responsibility level and outcome intensity. Only two of these were new stories. Two stories which had reached acceptable agreement in the first attempt failed to reach agreement upon replication. The range of agreement here was from 5.9% to 100% for outcome intensity, and from 41.2% to 94.1% for responsibility level.

A third generation of 20 stories was developed. With 18 subjects only three of these reached the 80% level of agreement. Here the range of agreement was from 72.2% to 100% for story outcome intensity, and from 22.2% to 100% for level of responsibility.

The level of acceptability was then lowered to 70% agreement on story level and outcome. With this new arbitrary criterion, generation number four produced 12 usable stories, one for each of the two possible outcomes (slightly bad and very bad) at six levels of responsibility in a pilot test with 19 subjects. These stories were used in the present study and appear in Appendix A along with their percentages of agreement.

With situational stories, one becomes involved with subjects' perceptions. What is not foreseeable to one subject may be judged as foreseeable by another. What is seen as justified by one subject may not be seen as justified by another. It is tenuous indeed to study the effect of a justified act on the attribution of responsibility when in fact a large percentage of subjects may not view it as justified.

There are several "rules of thumb" an investigator should keep in mind in designing contextual stories. The major problem areas in obtaining interjudge agreement on story levels were in distinguishing between extended commission and careless commission, and in eliciting judgments of justified commission. The critical factor in distinguishing

between extended commission and careless commission is the possibility of foresight. There appeared to be a tendency for subjects, at least with negative outcomes, to perceive those negative outcomes as foreseeable. To obtain agreement on extended commission, the investigator must be sure to impart all possible due caution to the actor in the story. Careless commission, of course, does not involve all due caution and therefore neglect is important here.

What distinguishes justified commission from purposive commission is the idea of justification for the intended action. Therefore it is important for the investigator to emphasize situational constraints when he wishes to communicate a justified commission situation. Situational constraints should be eliminated when purposive commission is desired.

Obtaining subject agreement on story level was not the only problem. There was also difficulty in getting subject agreement on what constituted a severe outcome. Some stories led to considerable interjudge variability as to whether the outcomes were slightly bad or very bad. This alone could account for the fact that some studies report that severe outcomes lead to more responsibility (Walster, 1966) while others (Walster, 1967; Shaver, 1970b) have not found that relationship. Perhaps the subjects in the latter studies did not view the outcome as serious. Rather extreme outcome examples were needed to reduce variability with respect to perception of an outcome's severity, especially with extremely negative outcomes. There appeared to be a comparison process at work with the determination of an outcome's severity. Subjects seemed to compare the actual outcome with possible outcomes in their judgment of an outcome's severity.

Subjects may not see a broken back as serious if they think the subject escaped being killed and was lucky to be alive. An outcome that ends in death should be avoided since it can create a comparison process with other story outcomes reducing the perception of their severity.

There are some further factors an investigator needs to consider when using contextual stories. There is the possibility that individuals assign responsibility in a different manner when there is property damage involved and when there is bodily harm. There is also the possibility that individuals assign responsibility differently when the story's actor is the affected party than when a third person is affected. It is also possible that there are sex and cross sex differences in responsibility attribution.

Another problem noted was the difficulty of attaining proper levels of agreement with stories that had a legal tone to them such as assigning responsibility for a car accident. Perhaps when a situation is used which involves some sort of legality, other factors become involved in the attribution of responsibility. These ideas were tested with 18 pilot study subjects. They were asked to judge the level of responsibility for Walster's (1966) story about Lennie's car rolling down the hill. 17% rated it as global association; 17% saw it as extended commission; 28% said it was careless commission; 34% saw it as selfish commission; and 6% said it was justified commission. This illustrates the possible danger of using situational stories that are not properly developed. Each story has its own unique characteristics. This is certainly a possible explanation for the contradictory results in the literature.

Most of the problems are avoided when the abstract stories are used. The subjects are told what factors are present, and told the intensity of the outcome. In this way the study of the effect of these factors is enhanced. Without empirical determination these factors may not even be present in contextual stories. If this happens the investigation may not be dealing with what it says it is.

Statement of the Problem

The literature on the attribution of responsibility and related topics contains many unresolved and unexplored areas. Since it appears that responsibility attribution, sanction assignment, and the attribution of emotion play important parts in our day to day interactions, this investigation examined some of the factors related to these behaviors.

First, the two story methods were examined. Half of the subjects received pretested contextual stories which described a particular episode. The remaining subjects received abstract stories which contained only the basic elements needed to represent a particular level of responsibility. There was no reason to expect either similarities or differences between these methods. An empirical determination of their relationship was, however, necessary.

Heider's level of foreseeable commission was broken down into careless commission and selfish commission. With careless commission an individual has no foresight of the outcome of his actions although foresight was possible with more care, awareness, or vigilance. Selfish commission occurs when there is conscious foresight of an outcome. The person acts regardless of this foresight, however, and though not intending to, produces the outcome. It was expected that

selfish commission would lead to a greater attribution of responsibility, larger sanction assignment, and an attribution of more affectively positive feelings than careless commission.

With the addition of a new level of Heider's (1958) levels of responsibility it was also desirable to replicate the pattern of responsibility attribution through all the levels and demonstrate that selfish commission fit into the pattern between careless and purposive commission. Personal attribution of responsibility should increase from global association through purposive commission, and decrease at justified commission. Sanction assignment was expected to follow the same pattern.

The relationship between the attribution of responsibility and the intensity of a negative outcome was also examined. As previously mentioned, there are several inconsistent findings on the interaction of these variables. It was argued here that outcome severity would affect responsibility attribution at only some of the levels (Heider, 1958) of responsibility. To the extent that an individual's guilt or innocence for an action can be clearly determined, the severity of an outcome will not affect the attribution of responsibility to the person. Thus, at global association, where the individual is innocent of any action, and at purposive commission where his intention to act is obvious, no increase was expected in the attribution of responsibility as an outcome increased in severity. One is either guilty or he isn't at these levels.

In those situations where there is some doubt as to the individual's culpability, more intense outcomes should lead to a greater attribution of responsibility. Here the tendency to hold others more responsible

for more serious outcomes can operate because of the vagueness of the situation. When individuals are unsure of the level of responsibility, the tendency should be to assign more responsibility as outcomes increase in intensity. Thus there should be an increase in the attribution of responsibility with severe as opposed to more moderate outcomes at extended commission, careless commission, selfish commission, and justified commission. These are the levels where blame is shared by the individual and the environment to the greatest extent. The increase at these levels was expected in this study.

As with the attribution of responsibility and outcome intensity, the assignment of sanctions was expected to be affected by outcome severity at some but not all levels of responsibility. The predictions were the same here, as with the attribution of responsibility. Again, where there is little doubt as to an individual's innocence or guilt (global association and purposive commission, respectively) an increase in the severity of an outcome should not lead to an increase in sanctions. In the situations where an individual's culpability is vague a more serious behavioral outcomes should lead to an increase in sanctioning behavior. This relationship was expected at extended commission, careless commission, selfish commission, and justified commission.

With the attribution of emotion, it was expected that subjects will assign increasingly more negative feelings to individuals as the level of responsibility increases from global association to careless commission. However, less negative affect would be attributed to individuals at selfish, purposive, and justified commission. Individuals acting at the purposive commission level should be attributed the least negative feelings for their actions since they have achieved an intended

action. Individuals were also expected to attribute more negative feelings for serious outcomes than for more moderate outcomes at global association, extended commission, and careless commission. However, they should attribute less negative feelings as outcome intensity increases at selfish, purposive and justified commission.

Individuals showing internal locus of control were expected to attribute greater responsibility to others for their actions than were individuals with an external locus of control. Individuals with an internal locus of control should also assign more sanctions and attribute more extreme affective states than those with an external locus of control. These effects should be most apparent at those levels where there is some uncertainty as to the extent of personal responsibility (extended, careless, selfish, and justified commission).

Finally as an exploratory and explanatory phase, the relationship between the attribution of responsibility, sanction assignment, and the attribution of emotion was determined at each of the levels of responsibility and outcome intensities.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Subjects

The subjects were 23 female and 17 male Oklahoma State University students who were enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses. For their participation in the study, subjects received extra credit in the courses they were taking.

Instruments


Subjects were administered the Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale (1966) along with one of two different sets of 12 short stories. One set of stories described a particular situation, while the other set consisted of stories that were in an abstract format. Each set of 12 stories consisted of all possible combinations of the six levels of attribution of responsibility and the two intensities of negative story outcome (moderate and severe). Half of the stories in each set were concerned with a female principle while the remaining stories had a male principle (See Appendices A and B).

Each story was followed by three rating scales on which the subject recorded his responses. Each story and its three rating scales were reproduced on a separate 8½" by 5½" separate piece of paper.


The abstract story format and the rating scales that followed them can be seen in the following example:

Greta caused something to happen that was very bad. She intended to cause it.


Who is responsible for this very bad thing?



Greta should be



Greta feels




This example represents a story at the level of purposive commission with a severe negative outcome.


An example of the situational stories is:

Charles deliberately picked up one of his brother's empty soft drink bottles and threw it against the sidewalk where it shattered.


Who is responsible for the shattered soft drink bottle?



Charles should be



Charles feels



This example represents a story at the level of purposive commission with a moderate negative outcome.

Procedure

The subjects were tested individually and in groups of no larger than five. A male experimenter met the subjects and took them into a small classroom where they were seated facing a blackboard. On the blackboard were examples of each of the three rating scales that followed each story.

The experimenter told the subjects that he was interested in studying the ways in which individuals assign responsibility. Subjects were told that responsibility was a factor that could be shared; individuals can be held completely responsible for what happened or they can share the responsibility with others, or the situation in which they find themselves. The experimenter also made the following comments:

We are all familiar with sayings such as "He didn't mean to do that," "She didn't know any better," "He had a right to do that," and so on. Each of these has the effect of reducing the personal responsibility of the individual. As another example, let's take the situation where a mother tells her 10 year-old son to make his bed, which he does. How responsible is the child for the fact that the bed gets made? If left entirely up to him the bed probably would not get made at all. So here the mother takes some of the responsibility for getting the bed made.

Subjects were then told that they were going to read 12 very short stories and were going to answer three questions about each story. Examples of the three questions they were to answer could be seen on the board in front of them.

The first rating scale example was the following:

Who is responsible for ?

!.....!.....!.....!.....!

The Person	Both	The Circumstances
---------------	------	----------------------

The subjects were given the following instructions:

If you think an individual is completely responsible for what happened, you would put a vertical slash mark through here (Experimenter points to the scale above "The Person"). If you think the individual has no responsibility for what happened, you would put your vertical slash mark here (Experimenter points to the scale above "The Circumstances"). By circumstances I mean anyone or anything else besides the individual himself. That includes other people, and the situations in which individuals find themselves. As you move along the scale to the left, you are assigning more and more responsibility to the individual. Here in the middle where it says "Both," this is the point where the individual and the circumstances share the responsibility evenly. To the right of this point the circumstances are more responsible than the individual. To the left of this point the individual is more responsible than the circumstances. You may put your vertical slash mark through any dot that you feel represents the proper assignment of responsibility in each story.

The second rating scale was demonstrated on the blackboard by the following example:

The Person should be ?

!.....!.....!.....!.....!

Punished a lot	Nothing should be done	Rewarded a lot
-------------------	---------------------------	-------------------

In explanation of this scale, subjects were told that their next task was to decide what should be done to the individual for what happened. They were to place their slash mark at the place along the scale that indicated what they thought should be done to the person. The Experimenter then explained to the subjects how they

would mark the scale if they felt the individual should be punished "a little" or given a medium reward."

The third rating scale was represented by:

The Person feels

!.....!.....!.....!.....!
 |.....|.....|.....|.....|
 Very bad Indifferent Very good

The subjects were told that the last question dealt with how they thought the individual felt about what happened. They were to place their slash mark at the place along the scale that they felt best described how the person felt. The experimenter then demonstrated how one would mark the scale if he felt the person felt "moderately bad" or "slightly good."

The experimenter then told the subjects that the other part of the study involved 29 pair of statements. They were to choose which one of each pair they felt to be more true as far as their own experience was concerned. It was pointed out to them that they might not feel that either item was true, or that both items were true. In either case, they were to choose the one that they felt was the more true.

Each subject's booklet contained 12 stories and the I-E scale. Half of the subjects, selected at random, received the story booklet first, and the remaining subjects received the I-E scale first. Half of the subjects in each of these groups randomly received the abstract stories, and the others received the situational stories. When the subjects were finished, they handed in their materials and left. The experimenter informed them that he would be coming into their classes to explain the purpose and results of the study.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Attribution of Responsibility

The pattern of responsibility attribution across the levels of responsibility was affected by story method. This is reflected in the significant M x A interaction in Table 1, ($F = 22.62, p < .001$). The mean levels of attribution of responsibility as a function of story method and responsibility level are reported in Table II. Simple effects tests (Appendix E) performed on the M x A interaction indicated that story method made a difference on the attribution of responsibility at all levels of responsibility except purposive commission. Contextual stories led to a significantly larger attribution of personal responsibility than the abstract stories at global association ($F = 101.60, p < .001$), careless commission ($F = 5.95, p < .02$), and selfish commission ($F = 19.98, p < .001$). Contextual stories led to less attribution of personal responsibility than the abstract stories at extended commission ($F = 11.09, p < .001$), and justified commission ($F = 87.68, p < .001$).

Heider's (1958) levels of responsibility were expected to lead to a greater attribution of personal responsibility as the levels increased from global association through purposive commission. The degree of personal responsibility was expected to drop between purposive commission and justified commission. This pattern has been

TABLE I
 SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR
 ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY

Source of Variation	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Between <u>Ss</u>			
Story Method (M)	1	92.75	0.22
M x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	38	431.90	
Within <u>Ss</u>			
Story Level (A)	5	10379.87	88.61**
M x A	5	2659.88	22.62**
A x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	190	117.15	
Outcome Intensity (B)	1	71.30	1.51
M x B	1	123.02	2.61
B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	38	47.20	
A x B	5	135.53	3.40*
M x A x B	5	58.56	1.47
A x B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	190	39.89	

* $p < .01$

** $p < .001$

TABLE II

MEAN LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTION AS A FUNCTION OF
STORY METHOD AND RESPONSIBILITY LEVEL *

	Global Association	Extended Commission	Careless Commission	Selfish Commission	Purposive Commission	Justified Commission
Contextual Stories	19.05	4.90	29.50	33.50	35.60	10.85
Abstract Stories	1.80	10.60	25.35	25.90	37.65	26.85

*The larger value indicates a greater attribution of personal responsibility

demonstrated before. The replication here was for the purpose of demonstrating that selfish commission would fit as a new level of responsibility between careless commission and purposive commission. Newman-Keuls (Weiner, 1971) tests (Appendix D) were performed on the means of responsibility attribution at the six levels of responsibility for both story methods. The abstract stories resulted in a theoretically patterned distribution of personal responsibility. With the exception of a non-significant increase in personal attribution of responsibility between careless commission and selfish commission, all other differences between levels were significant ($p < .05$) and in the expected direction. The difference between careless commission and purposive commission was also significant ($p < .05$). So, conscious, but dismissed foresight - selfish commission - was not distinct as a level of responsibility from careless commission.

With contextual stories there was a significant decrease in the attribution of responsibility between global association and extended commission ($p < .05$). This is in the opposite direction from the theoretical prediction and from past findings. The difference is also quite extreme. The increase in personal attribution of responsibility between extended commission and careless commission is significant ($p < .05$). The differences between careless commission and selfish commission, and between selfish commission and purposive commission were not significant. There was a significant decrease in the attribution of personal responsibility between purposive commission and justified commission ($p < .05$). Again, the addition of selfish commission as a distinct level of responsibility between careless commission and purposive commission failed to be functional. With

contextual stories, however, the difference in responsibility attribution between careless commission and purposive commission also failed to reach significance.

The significant A x B interaction reported in Table I indicated that responsibility level (A) was differentially affected by outcome intensity (B), ($F = 3.397, p < .01$). Severe negative outcomes were expected to lead to a greater attribution of personal responsibility than moderate negative outcomes at all levels of responsibility except global association and purposive commission. The mean levels of responsibility attribution as a function of outcome intensity and responsibility level are presented in Table III. Simple effects tests (Appendix E) performed on the interaction indicate that outcome intensity, as expected, made no difference at global association or purposive commission. Outcome intensity, however, also failed to produce a significant difference in the attribution of responsibility at careless commission and justified commission. The attribution of responsibility was affected by outcome intensity at extended commission ($F = 7.38, p < .01$) and selfish commission ($F = 7.24, p < .01$). At selfish commission, the more severe the outcome, the more personal responsibility was attributed to the individual. At extended commission, however, the more severe negative outcome resulted in a lesser attribution of personal responsibility. This difference is in the opposite direction to the expected effect.

Sanction Assignment

Sanction assignment was also differentially affected by story method. The significant M x A x B interaction ($F = 10.37, p < .001$)

TABLE III

MEAN LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTION AS A
 FUNCTION OF NEGATIVE OUTCOME INTENSITY
 AND RESPONSIBILITY LEVEL*

	Global Association	Extended Commission	Careless Commission	Selfish Commission	Purposive Commission	Justified Commission
Moderate Outcome	10.95	9.5	28.4	27.8	36.5	19.75
Severe Outcome	9.90	5.8	26.45	31.6	26.75	17.95

*The larger value indicates a greater attribution of personal responsibility.

reported in Table IV indicates, however, that story method interacted jointly with both outcome intensity and responsibility level in the assignment of sanctions. The mean levels of sanction assignment as a function of story method, outcome intensity, and responsibility level are reported in Table V. These means are also graphed in Figure 1 according to outcome intensity.

The three way interaction is due to the fact that sanction assignment differences between contextual and abstract stories, at a given level of responsibility, were differentially affected by outcome intensity. Simple effects tests (Appendix E) indicate where these differences occur. There were no significant sanctioning assignment differences between story methods at either outcome intensity with extended commission and purposive commission. At global association, contextual stories led to the assignment of more punishment than abstract stories. This difference was only significant for moderate intensity outcomes ($F = 7.4, p < .01$). At careless commission, contextual stories led to the assignment of less punishment than abstract stories. This difference was only significant with severe intensity outcomes ($F = 9.5, p < .01$). At selfish commission there was a direction difference in sanction assignment between story methods as a function of outcome intensity. Contextual stories resulted in significantly less punishment assignment than abstract stories (when outcomes were moderate in intensity, ($F = 13.8, p < .001$). With severe outcome intensity, contextual stories resulted in more punishment assignment than abstract stories ($F = 9.02, p < .01$). Justified commission resulted in less punishment assignment with contextual stories at both outcome intensities. This difference was only significant, however, with severe outcome intensity ($F = 71.37, p < .001$).

TABLE IV
 SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR
 SANCTIONS ASSIGNMENT



Source of Variation	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Between <u>Ss</u>			
Story Method (M)	1	235.20	3.64
M x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	38	64.64	
Within <u>Ss</u>			
Story Level (A)	5	2164.63	85.81*
M x A	5	169.56	6.72*
A x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	190	25.23	
Outcome Intensity (B)	1	750.00	46.63*
M x B	1	3.33	0.21
B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	38	16.08	
A x B	5	287.31	18.42
M x A x B	5	161.73	10.37*
A x B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	190	15.60	

*p < .001

TABLE V
 MEAN LEVEL OF SANCTION ASSIGNMENT AS A FUNCTION
 OF STORY METHOD, STORY OUTCOME,
 AND RESPONSIBILITY LEVEL*

		Global Association	Extended Commission	Careless Commission	Selfish Commission	Purposive Commission	Justified Commission
Contextual Stories	Moderate Outcome	21.90	19.30	21.30	19.60	29.60	24.20
	Severe Outcome	21.00	19.50	21.40	31.50	37.70	18.60
Abstract Stories	Moderate Outcome	18.50	20.50	22.00	24.20	31.80	25.80
	Severe Outcome	19.20	20.80	25.30	27.80	37.00	29.20

*The larger value indicates the assignment of more negative sanctions.



Outcome intensity was expected to affect the assignment of sanctions at all levels of responsibility except global association and purposive commission. The significant $M \times A \times B$ interaction ($F = 10.37, p < .001$) reported in Table IV qualifies the interpretation of the effect of outcome intensity on sanction assignment. There are story method differences in the effect of outcome intensity on sanction assignment across the levels of responsibility. The mean levels of sanction assignment as a function of story method, outcome intensity, and responsibility level are reported in Table V. These means are also graphed in Figure 2 according to story method.

Simple effects tests (Appendix E) indicate that there were no significant sanctioning assignment differences between outcome intensities with either story method at global association or extended commission. The differential effect of story method on the relationship between outcome intensity and responsibility level was due to differences at the remaining levels of responsibility. At careless commission, severe outcome intensities led to more punishment assignment than moderate outcome intensities. This difference was only significant for abstract stories ($F = 6.98, p < .01$). Severe outcome intensities also resulted in more punishment assignment than moderate outcome intensities with selfish commission. This difference was significant for both story methods although it was larger for contextual stories ($F = 96.3, p < .001$) than for abstract stories ($F = 8.31, p < .01$). At purposive commission, severe outcomes led to more punishment assignment than moderate outcomes with both story methods. This difference was significant for both methods, but larger for contextual stories ($F = 43.12, p < .001$) than for the abstract stories. With justified

Figure 2 a. M₁ (Contextual Stories)





Figure 2 b. M₂ (Abstract Stories)



commission there was a direction difference in sanction assignment between outcome intensities as a function of story method. With contextual stories, severe outcome intensities led to the assignment of less punishment ($F = 19.71, p < .001$) than moderate outcome intensities. With abstract stories, severe outcome intensities led to more punishment assignment than the moderate intensities ($F = 7.4, p < .01$).

Heider's (1958) levels of responsibility were expected to lead to greater punishment assignment as the levels increased from global association through purposive commission. The degree of punishment assignment was expected to drop between purposive commission and justified commission. This pattern has been demonstrated before. The replication here was for the purpose of demonstrating that selfish commission would fit as a distinct level of responsibility that affected sanctioning. Selfish commission was expected to lead to more punishment assignment than careless commission, but less than purposive commission. Newman-Keuls tests (Appendix D) were performed on the means of sanction assignment for both story methods.

With abstract stories, the only significant progressive differences in sanction assignment were between selfish commission and purposive commission, and between purposive commission and justified commission ($p < .05$). Purposive commission resulted in the greatest punishment assignment and differed from every other level of responsibility in degree of sanctioning ($p < .05$). Selfish commission also differed from every other level in sanctioning assignment ($p < .05$). There were no other significant differences.

With contextual stories selfish commission and purposive commission differed significantly ($p < .05$) from each other and all other levels.

There were no other significant differences. So with contextual stories, selfish commission resulted in different degree of sanction assignment than careless commission or purposive commission. An orthogonal comparison between careless commission and selfish commission which failed to attain significance with respect to the attribution of responsibility, ($F = 1.79$) was significant with sanction assignment ($F = 17.004$, $p < .001$). Selfish commission resulted in more punishment assignment. This provides some evidence for its distinctiveness as a level of responsibility.

The Attribution of Emotion

As with responsibility attribution, and the assignment of sanctions, emotional attribution was also affected by story method. The significant $M \times A \times B$ interaction ($F = 2.83$, $p < .05$) reported in Table VI indicates that, like sanction assignment, story method interacted with both outcome intensity and responsibility level in the attribution of emotions. The mean levels of emotional attribution as a function of story method, story outcome, and responsibility level are reported in Table VII. These means are also graphed in Figure 3 according to outcome intensity. Simple effects tests (Appendix E) indicate where these differences occur. With the exception of purposive commission with moderate outcomes, the mean level of emotional attribution was always lower for abstract stories, indicating more negative emotional attributions. Story method made no difference at extended commission or purposive commission with either outcome level. Story method did make a significant difference for both moderate and severe outcome levels at global association ($F = 31.9$, $p < .001$; $F = 20.7$, $p < .001$,

TABLE VI
 SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
 FOR ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION

Source of Variation	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Between <u>Ss</u>			
Story Method (M)	1	2895.92	19.64***
M x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	38	147.43	
Within <u>Ss</u>			
Story Level (A)	5	1649.67	32.94***
M x A	5	150.66	3.01**
A x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	190	50.08	
Outcome Intensity (B)	1	808.60	19.46**
M x B	1	40.25	0.97
B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	38	41.56	
A x <u>B</u>	5	299.94	9.60***
M x A x B	5	88.21	2.83*
A x B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	190	31.26	



* $p < .05$
 ** $p < .01$
 *** $p < .001$

TABLE VII

MEAN LEVEL OF ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION
AS A FUNCTION OF STORY METHOD, STORY
OUTCOME, AND RESPONSIBILITY LEVEL*

		Global Association	Extended Commission	Careless Commission	Selfish Commission	Purposive Commission	Justified Commission
Contextual Stories	Moderate Outcome	34.9	28.2	31.6	24.3	18.9	30.7
	Severe Outcome	33.3	32.7	37.4	36.4	19.9	28.0
Abstract Stories	Moderate Outcome	24.9	25.2	27.5	23.0	19.9	22.0
	Severe Outcome	25.2	29.0	32.1	27.6	16.9	23.8

*The larger value indicates the attribution of more negative emotions.



respectively), careless commission ($F = 5.3, p < .05$; $F = 8.8, p < .01$, respectively), and justified commission ($F = 24.2, p < .001$; $F = 5.8, p < .05$, respectively). At extended commission and selfish commission there were no differences in emotional attribution for story method with moderate outcomes. However, with severe outcomes, story method did make a significant difference at both extended commission ($F = 4.4, p < .05$) and selfish commission ($F = 24.5, p < .001$). In both cases less negative emotions were attributed with the contextual stories. These were the major factors in obtaining the significant three way interaction.

Individuals were expected to attribute increasingly more negative emotions to individuals as the level of responsibility increased from global association through careless commission. Less negative affect was expected to be attributed to individuals at selfish, purposive, and justified commission than at the other levels. Purposive commission was expected to receive the least negative attribution of emotion. Newman-Keuls tests (Appendix D) were performed on the means of emotional attributions for both story methods.

With abstract stories, purposive commission differed significantly ($p < .05$) from all the other levels except justified commission. In all cases purposive commission led to a more negative attribution of emotion and did result in the least negative attribution of emotion. The only other significant difference was between careless commission and justified commission ($p < .05$). So, while the means were in the expected direction with the abstract stories, the expected progressive differences in the attribution of emotion across the levels of responsibility were not significant, with the exception of selfish versus purposive commission.

With the contextual stories the mean levels of attribution of emotion did not follow the expected pattern although purposive commission did receive the least negative attributions of emotion as expected. The results of a Newman-Keuls test performed on this data (Appendix D) indicated that purposive commission differed significantly from every other level ($p < .05$). Careless commission also differed from justified commission ($p < .05$). Again, with the exception of the significant step between selfish and purposive commission, and the difference between purposive and justified commission, the expected progressive differences in the attribution of emotion across responsibility levels failed to materialize. An orthogonal comparison between careless commission and selfish commission with respect to the attribution of emotion was significant ($F = 14.94, p < .001$). Selfish commission resulted in the attribution of less negative feelings than careless commission. This is further support for the proposition that these are two distinct levels of responsibility.

Outcome intensity was also expected to affect the attribution of emotion. Severe negative outcomes were expected to lead to the attribution of more negative emotions than moderate negative outcomes at global association, extended commission, and careless commission. Decreased negative attributions of emotion were expected at selfish, purposive, and justified commission. The significant $M \times A \times B$ interaction reported in Table VI qualifies the interpretation of outcome intensity on emotional attribution. There are story method differences in the effect of outcome intensity on emotional attribution across the levels of responsibility. The mean levels of emotional attribution as

a function of story method, outcome intensity, and responsibility level are reported in Table VII. These means are also graphed in Figure 4 according to story method.

Simple effects tests (Appendix E) performed on this interaction indicate that outcome intensity affected the attribution of emotion for both contextual and abstract stories at only extended commission ($F = 6.5, p < .05$; $F = 4.5, p < .05$, respectively), careless commission ($F = 10.8, p < .01$; $F = 6.8, p < .01$, respectively), and selfish commission ($F = 46.5, p < .001$; $F = 6.9, p < .01$, respectively). In all cases, more moderate outcomes led to attributions of more negative emotions than did the severe outcomes. The three way interaction, here, appears to be due to the fact that the differences between the moderate and severe outcomes were more pronounced with the contextual stories.

Locus of Control

Within each story method subjects were divided by means of a median split into either "internals" or "externals" with respect to their perception of the locus of control. With the contextual stories the median was a score of 11 and the range was from 3 to 21. With abstract stories the median was 11.5 and the range was from 7 to 17. Analyses of variance were performed on the attribution of responsibility, sanction assignment, and the attribution of emotion for internals versus externals within each method of story presentation. The results reported in Appendix F indicate that an individual's perceived locus of control had no significant effect on his attribution of responsibility, assignment of sanctions, or his attribution of emotion.

Figure 4 a. M₁ (Contextual Stories)





Figure 4 b. M₂ (Abstract Stories)



Dependent Variable Correlations

Pearson Product Moment correlations were performed between the three dependent variables of responsibility attribution, sanction assignment, and the attribution of emotion. The correlation between responsibility attribution and sanction assignment was .361. This is significantly different from zero at the .05 level ($df = 38$). The correlation between the attribution of responsibility and the attribution of emotion was .111, not significantly different from zero. Sanction assignment and the attribution of emotion also resulted in a non-significant correlation of .084.

With responsibility attribution and sanction assignment there was a non-significant correlation of .252 when the story outcome intensity was moderate. With a severe negative outcome, the correlation between the attribution of responsibility and sanction assignment was .462. This is significant at the .01 level.

Results of correlations between the dependent variables at each level of responsibility and for each story method are reported in Appendix G. In general, the correlations are higher, though non-significant, with abstract stories than with contextual stories.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

The Attribution of Responsibility

The attribution of responsibility was affected by story method. Contextual and abstract stories resulted in different patterns of responsibility attribution across levels of responsibility, and in different degrees of attribution of responsibility within levels.

With the exception of a non-significant increase between careless commission and selfish commission, the abstract stories resulted in a theoretically perfect pattern of attribution of responsibility. The least attribution of personal responsibility occurred with global association. The degree of personal responsibility increased significantly at every level, with the exception of selfish commission as mentioned, through purposive commission and decreased significantly at justified commission. Contextual stories did not result in this expected pattern of responsibility attribution. The general pattern is present but there are two significant deviations. First, there is a significant decrease in the attribution of personal responsibility between global association and extended commission. Second, there is no significant increase in the attribution of responsibility between either careless or selfish commission and purposive commission.

The discrepancy in the pattern of responsibility attribution between contextual and abstract stories may be due to the possibility that the subjects may have been able to identify more with the stories that involved a "real world" situation, that is, the contextual stories. The abstract stories present a less concrete situation and thus offer the subject little with which to identify. The contextual stories, though indicated by pretesting to represent the desired level of responsibility, may have resulted in atheoretical attributions of responsibility because of the particulars of the situation offered in the story. With abstract stories there is no question as to the presence or absence of the relevant factors since they are presented forthright with no other extraneous information. They offer no situational particulars to alter the perception of personal responsibility. With contextual stories the factors of foresight, consideration, intention, or justification may be weighed against the particular aspects of the situation in the attribution of responsibility. This makes the attribution of responsibility a more complicated process than the present theories are equipped to handle. Thus the surprisingly high personal responsibility level attributed at global association with the contextual stories may be due to the particulars of the situations presented by the story. Likewise, the pretested extended commission stories may have resulted in a lower than anticipated attribution of personal responsibility because of situational particulars. The lack of an increase in the attribution of personal responsibility between careless or selfish commission and purposive commission indicates that once foresight was possible the addition of intent made no difference. This is at variance with expectations and past findings.

There were also story method differences in the degree of responsibility attribution at every level of responsibility except purposive commission. Contextual stories resulted in a greater attribution of personal responsibility at global association, careless commission, and selfish commission. Abstract stories produced greater attribution of personal responsibility at extended commission and justified commission.

With careless, selfish, and justified commission it is possible that the contextual stories, with their real world examples allowed the subject to project himself into a similar situation. He is then able to conceive of these things happening by him or to him. This greater identification with the situation may cause him to judge individuals more harshly for their associations (global association) and acts of negligence (careless and selfish commission), but less harshly when there are mitigating circumstances (justified commission). This identification with the situation may also lead to the smaller attribution of personal responsibility with extended commission. According to Shaver's (1970b) defensive attribution theory, when the individual perceives himself as similar to the perpetrator of an act, and the situation is one that he might encounter unexpectedly, there may be no way that the individual can keep from admitting to himself that such a thing could happen to him. He therefore attributes all due caution (foresight) to the individual, and decides that the occurrence is due to chance. This explanation appears to apply to the extended commission situation where there was no way the individual could have foreseen the unexpected outcome that his behavior produced.

Outcome intensity was expected to affect the attribution of responsibility at all levels of responsibility except global association and purposive commission. As outcome intensity increased, more attribution of personal responsibility was expected. With global association and purposive commission there should be less doubt as to the extent of an individual's culpability. He has little responsibility with global association, and maximum responsibility with purposive commission. At these levels the intensity of an outcome should not affect the attribution of responsibility. When you are guilty, you're guilty, and when you're not, you're not! At all the other levels of responsibility there is more ambiguity as to the extent of personal responsibility. Here outcome intensity was expected to affect responsibility attribution. The results indicated that outcome intensity did not affect the attribution of responsibility at either global association or purposive commission. Outcome intensity, however, also failed to affect responsibility attribution at careless commission and justified commission. The only levels of responsibility where attribution of responsibility was affected by outcome intensity were extended commission and selfish commission. It appears that with lack of foresight (careless commission), or with mitigating circumstances (justified commission) outcome intensity does not affect the attribution of responsibility. Where there is conscious consideration of possible outcomes (selfish commission), and the individual's behavior results in the foreseen but unintended outcome, the more severe the outcome, the more the individual is held to be personally responsible for that outcome.

At extended commission, more severe negative outcomes led to less attribution of personal responsibility than moderate outcomes. This is the opposite of what was expected. Again this can be explained by defensive attribution theory. Extended commission is a level of responsibility where the outcome is unforeseeable. When the individual conceives that a similar situation could happen to him, regardless of all caution, he attributes the responsibility for the outcome to non-personal factors. As the outcome increases in its undesirability he should feel more need to attribute the responsibility to factors other than himself. If this were the case, then one would expect that contextual stories should enhance this phenomenon since they produce more identification with the situation than the abstract stories. An inspection of the mean levels of responsibility attribution at extended commission for moderate and severe outcomes for both story methods supports this proposition. With abstract stories there was an average decrease of attribution of personal responsibility of 1.8 units (11.5 to 9.7) from moderate outcomes to severe outcomes. The average decrease for contextual stories was more than three times as large, 6.0 units (7.9 to 1.9) between moderate and severe outcomes. It appears that outcome intensity only affects the attribution of responsibility at some levels of responsibility but not others.

Sanction Assignment

Story method also affected sanction assignment. This effect was modified, however, by the effect of the intensity of the outcome. In general, contextual stories led to the assignment of less negative sanctions. This is in line with what would be expected with the

subject's easier ability to identify with the situations presented in the contextual stories. Feeling these situations could happen to him, he is less likely to assign severe punishments for the action. There are two exceptions to this. First, with severe outcomes subjects assigned more severe sanctions with contextual stories than with abstract stories at selfish commission. This result is consistent with the findings on responsibility attribution where the contextual stories resulted in a greater attribution of personal responsibility at selfish commission. The subjects appeared to be intolerant of negligence. The selfish commission situation presents them with the information that the subject was aware of the possible unintended outcome of his action. So he did have the opportunity to avoid the outcome. The subject therefore cannot attribute all due caution to the actor and thus cannot attribute the action to non-personal factors. Therefore the actor is held more personally responsible for the outcome at severe outcomes, and is punished more harshly.

The other exception is that at global association, contextual stories also led to more negative sanction assignment than the abstract stories. This same directional result is present with severe outcomes but is not significant. This finding is also consistent with the findings on responsibility attribution. At global association, contextual stories resulted in a larger attribution of personal responsibility than the abstract situations. The greater identification with the contextual stories apparently causes the subject to judge individuals more harshly for their associations. The more responsible the individual is, the more he should be sanctioned.

Outcome intensity was expected to affect sanction assignment at all the levels of responsibility except global association and purposive commission. Since no difference in personal responsibility as a function of outcome intensity was expected at these levels, no differences in sanction assignment with outcome intensity were expected. In all other cases a more severe outcome was expected to result in more negative sanctions. The effect of outcome intensity on sanction assignment across the levels of responsibility was also affected by story method. In general, the more severe outcomes led to greater sanction assignment. As expected, however, outcome intensity did not affect sanction assignment at global association with either method. More intense outcomes did, however, affect the assignment of sanctions at purposive commission with both methods. So although outcome intensity did not affect the attribution of responsibility at purposive commission, it did affect the sanctions that one assigned for an action. Outcome intensity failed to affect the assignment of sanctions at extended commission with both methods, and at careless commission with contextual stories. With extended commission allowing no possible foresight, individuals attributed responsibility for the outcome to non-personal factors. Since responsibility did not lie primarily in the actor, the intensity of the outcome should not affect the assignment of sanctions to him. This same explanation holds for the lack of outcome effect on careless commission with contextual stories. Abstract stories do not produce this identification with the situation and so outcome intensity does lead to more negative sanctioning at careless commission although it did not result in more personal responsibility.

More negative sanctions were handed out for severe outcomes than for moderate outcomes at the selfish commission level. This difference, as expected with an identification explanation, was more pronounced with contextual stories as subjects could attribute conscious foresight to the individual, and thus hold him more responsible and deserving of more sanctioning when the effect of his actions was more intense.

At justified commission there was a direction difference in the effect of outcome intensity as a function of story method. Again, as expected from the identification hypothesis, there was less sanctioning assigned to the individuals for severe outcomes with contextual stories at justified commission. With abstract stories, with less chance for identification with the situation on the subjects' part, more negative sanctions were assigned for severe outcomes than for moderate outcomes.

Sanction assignment was expected to follow the same pattern as responsibility attribution. As more responsibility was assigned to the individual for the action, the more negative sanctions were expected to be assigned to him. Negative sanctions were expected to be the least at global association where the individual should be attributed least responsibility. Negative sanction assignment should then progressively increase through purposive commission and then decrease at justified commission. This expected pattern of sanction assignment across the levels of responsibility was only partially supported. With abstract stories, there were no progressive differences in sanction assignment between global association, extended commission, careless commission and selfish commission. Selfish commission did produce less negative sanctioning than purposive

commission, which in turn resulted in more negative sanctioning than justified commission. So the expected pattern of sanctioning appeared at only the three highest levels of responsibility.

With contextual stories the expected pattern of sanction assignment across the levels of responsibility was even less apparent. There was a significant increase in negative sanction assignment between careless and selfish commission, partially supporting the prediction of these two levels as distinct. There was also a significant increase in negative sanction assignment between selfish commission and purposive commission. There were no other significant differences between the levels.

It appears that sanctioning behavior is not as affected by the levels of responsibility at which the action occurs as was at first thought. Sanctioning appears to be due to other factors. Increases in sanctioning assignment do not appear until the level of responsibility where there is a conscious consideration of the possible outcomes. Once this consideration takes place, sanctioning can be affected by intent and sometimes justification. It is interesting to note that with the contextual stories, where the individual can identify more easily with the happening, there is no decrease in the level of negative sanctioning between purposive and justified commission. This occurs even though the individual is seen as less personally responsible for the action at justified commission than at purposive commission. Thus it appears that while sanctioning assignment and the attribution of responsibility are related, the relationship is not as close as it would at first seem.

The Attribution of Emotion

Subjects were expected to assign negative affective states to those individuals who were involved with a negative outcome at global association, extended commission, and careless commission. The least negative affect was expected to be attributed at global association, and the most at careless commission. Subjects were expected to attribute less negative emotions to individuals involved in selfish, purposive, and justified commission, with purposive commission receiving the least negative attribution of emotion.

The degree of attribution of emotion for the levels of responsibility was also affected by story method. Like sanction assignment, however, this effect was modified by the intensity of the outcome. In general, contextual stories led to attributions of more negative emotions than did the abstract stories. In no case did an abstract story result in the attribution of more negative emotions than the corresponding contextual story. The three way interaction was due to the fact that the differences in emotional attribution, as a function of story method, were more widespread with severe outcomes. At purposive commission, story method made no difference regardless of outcome level. In all cases the individual perpetrating an intentional act was seen as feeling rather "indifferent" about it. With severe outcomes, all levels of responsibility except purposive commission resulted in significantly larger attributions of negative emotion with the contextual stories. This can again be explained by the greater potential for identification with the contextual stories over the abstract stories. When one can project himself into the situation, he should be more likely to attribute negative affect to

the actor for the unpleasant outcomes since he knows that he, himself, would certainly feel bad if he were involved. With moderate outcomes, besides no difference at purposive commission, there were also no differences due to story method at either extended commission or selfish commission. When there was no possible foresight (extended commission) and only a slightly bad outcome, more identification with the story did not lead to attributions of more negative emotions. Likewise with selfish commission, identification with the contextual stories did not lead to attributions of more negative emotions with moderate outcomes. Evidently an individual who acts selfishly is not attributed negative emotions for his selfishness unless the outcome is serious, and is one which readily lends itself to identification.

The attribution of emotion was expected to be affected by the intensity of the outcome. More intense emotions were expected to be attributed as outcomes increased in severity at global association, extended commission, and careless commission. Selfish, purposive, and justified commission were expected to result in less negative affect as outcomes increased in intensity. The effect of outcome intensity of the attribution of emotion was differentially affected by story method. Regardless of story method, outcome intensity only affected attributions of emotion at extended commission, careless commission, and selfish commission. Thus the predictions were only partially supported. In all cases severe outcomes led to the attribution of more negative emotions. With contextual stories, the significant differences between moderate and severe outcomes were more pronounced with contextual stories than with the abstract stories. Again the greater potential for identification with the

contextual stories led to attributions of more negative feelings for the resultant effects of the situation.

Evidently outcome intensity affects the attribution of emotion only for actions occurring without intent, whether or not those intended actions are justified. With intent, justification, or for mere association with the outcome (global association) more severe outcomes do not lead to attributions of more negative emotions. The increase in the attribution of negative affect with increased intensity of outcome at selfish commission was the opposite of what was predicted.

There were few significant progressive differences in the attribution of emotion between the levels of responsibility. With contextual stories, purposive commission did result in the lowest attribution of negative affect. Actors at this level were rated as feeling indifferent about their intended negative outcome. They were attributed less negative emotion than actors at either selfish or justified commission. With abstract stories the only significant progressive difference in the attribution of emotion between levels of responsibility was a decrease from selfish to purposive commission. So, like sanction assignment, the attribution of emotion was not as affected by the levels of responsibility as was originally thought. Individuals were attributed moderately negative emotions for their negative behavioral outcomes at all levels of responsibility except purposive commission. At purposive commission they were attributed indifference for their actions. Apparently subjects decided that an individual would not perform an intentional negative act if he expected to feel bad about it. Even when the action was justified individuals were attributed negative emotions. Perhaps the subjects

attributed the actor the feeling "this will hurt me more than it does you" as he performed his action on the target. So even when the environment shares the responsibility, the individual is still perceived as feeling "bad" about what he caused.

Foresight

Heider's (1958) third level has been called foreseeable commission. Heider defined this level as one where an individual is held responsible for any aftereffect of his behavior that he might have foreseen, that the individual was not deterred from the pursuit of his goal by the thought of harm to another. The present investigation proposed that there were two distinct levels of responsibility proposed in Heider's third level. One level was called careless commission. This is where there was no conscious foresight of the possible aftereffect. The second level was called selfish commission. This is where an individual consciously considers the possible alternative outcomes or byproducts of his action, but dismisses them and acts anyway. There is an absence of intent with both of these levels. Selfish commission, however, represents a more inconsiderate or ruthless behavior. It appears, therefore, that a consideration of the consciousness of foresight could be an important and necessary theoretical distinction in levels of responsibility. One should expect an individual who was aware his behavior might result in an unintended negative outcome to be held more responsible for that outcome, be sanctioned more, and be attributed less negative affective feelings for his behavior than the individual who merely failed to demonstrate appropriate vigilance. The data indicate that careless and selfish commission may indeed be

distinct levels of responsibility. With the attribution of responsibility, there was no difference between the two levels with respect to the extent of responsibility attribution. However, other differences did emerge. Outcome intensity failed to affect careless commission stories but led to a significant increase in personal responsibility with increased outcome intensity at selfish commission. With sanction assignment, selfish commission did result in more negative sanction assignment than careless commission with contextual stories. An orthogonal comparison between careless and selfish commission with respect to the attribution of emotion resulted in significantly less attribution of negative affect to the actor with selfish commission.

These results seem to indicate that conscious consideration of foresight, as compared to no consideration, does not affect the attribution of responsibility unless the outcome is severe. Regardless of outcome severity, however, there is a tendency to assign more negative sanctions and attribute less negative affect to the individual when he has consciously considered the possible unintended outcomes of his actions.

Locus of Control

An individual's orientation toward the locus of control of behavior did not affect the manner in which he attributed responsibility, assigned sanctions, or attributed emotional states to another person. This result is in direct contradiction to Phares and Wilson (1972) who found that internals attributed more responsibility than externals. The stimuli used by Phares and Wilson to elicit responsibility attribution were scenarios of traffic accidents. These involve a

legal determination of responsibility. This is possibly different from a non-legal determination of responsibility. Perhaps individuals with internal and external orientations toward the locus of control of behavior respond differently in determining a legal question of guilt. The present study attempted to avoid legal type issues to avoid the possibility of a biasing effect. The stories used by Phares and Wilson also presented the subject with more information than did the stories in the present study. Perhaps internals and externals don't differ in their attributions of responsibility until a certain degree of background information is available, greater than that provided by the contextual stories in the present study.

Dependent Variable Correlations

Correlations between the dependent variables revealed them to be fairly independent of one another and thus worthy of separate investigation. The only significant correlation was between the attribution of responsibility and sanction assignment. While significant, this correlation (.361) tells us that just 13% of the variance in each of these processes can be accounted for by knowledge of the other. So while they are related, they do have considerable independence as processes.

The data would indicate that there is a relationship between the extent of an individual's responsibility and the degree of sanctioning he is assigned. However, responsibility is attributed, and sanctions are assigned, regardless of perceptions of the actor's feelings about what he has done.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The results of this study indicate several things with respect to the study of the attribution of responsibility. Foremost is that investigators must take more care in the development of the stimuli they use to elicit the attribution response. More care must be taken to insure that the variables of interest are indeed present in the eliciting stimuli.

Much work remains to be done in the determination of the factors that affect responsibility attribution. The specifics of the situation and the subject's perception of relevant factors must be investigated further. The pilot work for this study demonstrated the difficulty of creating situations which resulted in uniform perceptions of the variables of interest. Subjects differed considerably in what they perceived as foreseeable or justified. The different pattern of responsibility attribution with contextual stories as compared to the abstract stories indicates that the particulars of the situation used in the example may interact with the variables of interest in determining the extent of an individual's responsibility. The additional information provided the subject, perhaps in his ability to identify with the situation, is affecting the attribution. These factors need to be investigated.

One can isolate the present theoretical factors and see their effect on responsibility attribution by using the abstract stories. This reduces the chance for differential perceptions of the situation, and the effect of situational particulars that may be involved when contextual style stories are used. However, while allowing more access to the theoretical factors, the abstract stories may result in an unrealistic pattern of responsibility attribution. The results of this study indicated that these theoretical factors can interact with more information about situational particulars to produce different patterns of responsibility. Since our attributions rarely occur in the abstract, the effect of these other variables on the present theoretical variables must be identified.

The intensity of an outcome does not always affect the attribution of responsibility. When it does, a more severe outcome does not always result in an increased attribution of responsibility. When the outcome is bad and totally unforeseeable, individual's hold others less responsible for the outcome if they can identify with that other. Only when the actor had foresight of what might happen but acted unintentionally did a more severe outcome lead to a greater attribution of personal responsibility.

Sanction assignment is related to the attribution of responsibility, but is not as affected by the levels of responsibility. Sanctioning appears to be more severe once conscious consideration of possible outcomes takes place. Sanctioning assignment is also more affected by outcome intensity than is the attribution of responsibility. More intense outcomes led to more sanction assignment once foresight was possible, but to less sanctions when the act was justified.

The attribution of emotion also appears to be independent of the levels of responsibility. In general, individuals are attributed negative emotions for negative behavioral outcomes. When the individual purposely caused a negative outcome, however, he was seen as feeling indifferent about what he had done. Outcome intensity affects the attribution of emotion only in those situations where intent was not present.

Whether or not attributors think the individual had consciously considered a foreseeable outcome affects their reactions to him. While they do not in general hold him more responsible, they do hold him so when the result of his action is severely negative. If an individual consciously considers a foreseeable outcome, and this outcome occurs unintentionally, the individual is seen as feeling less negative about what he did, and is assigned more punishment than if he did not consciously consider the possible outcomes. Therefore, there sufficient evidence to warrant the separation of what was previously foreseeable commission into careless and selfish commission in order to investigate the effects of foreseeable outcomes.

An understanding of responsibility attribution, sanction assignment and emotional attribution appears to be a worthy field of study for psychology. These processes affect our day to day interactions, and reach their culmination of specific importance in a legal trial. A better understanding of the factors affecting these processes could be most important.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Briscoe, M. E., Woodyard, H. D., & Shaw, M. E. Personality impression change as a function of the favorableness of the first impressions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 35, 343-357.
- Chailin, A. L., & Darkley, J. M. Victim or perpetrator?: Defensive attribution of responsibility and the need for order and justice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 25, 268-275.
- Fishbein, M., & Agzen, K. Attribution of responsibility: A theoretical note. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1973, 9, 148-153.
- Heider, F. The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley, 1958.
- Joe, V. C. Review of the internal-external control construct as a personality variable. Psychological Reports, 1971, Monograph Supplement, 3-U28, 28, 619-640.
- Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. From acts to dispositions: The attribution process in person perception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.) Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Vol. 2. New York: Academic Press, 1965, 219-266.
- Kelley, H. H. Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, University of Nebraska Press: 1967, 192-238.
- Krulanski, A. W., & Cohen, M. Attributed freedom and personal causation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 26, 245-250.
- Lackey, L. L. Attribution of responsibility as a function of perceived similarity, outcome intensity, and locus of control. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 1971, University of Florida.
- Landy, D., & Aronson, E. The influence of the character of the criminal and his victim on the decision of simulated jurors. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5, 141-152.
- Lefcourt, H. M. Internal versus external control of reinforcement: A review. Psychological Bulletin, 1966, 65, 206-220 (a).
- Lefcourt, H. M. Belief in personal control: Research and implications. Journal of Individual Psychology, 1966, 22, 185-195 (b).

- Lerner, M. J. Evaluation of performance as a function of performer's reward and attractiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 355-360.
- Lerner, M. J., & Simmons, C. H. Observers reaction to the innocent victim: Compassion or rejection. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 4, 203-210.
- Likert, R. A. Technique for the measurement of attitudes. Archives of Psychology, Columbia University, 1932, 140.
- Maselli, M. D., & Altrocchi, J. Attribution of intent. Psychological Bulletin, 1969, 71, 445-454.
- Michotte, A. Perception of causality. New York: Basic Books, 1963.
- Pastore, N. Attributed characteristics of liked and disliked persons. Journal of Social Psychology, 1960, 157-163.
- Phares, E. J., & Wilson, K. G. Responsibility attribution: Role of outcome severity, situational ambiguity, and internal-external control. Journal of Personality, 1971, 40, 392-416.
- Robinson, J. P., & Shaver, P. R. Measures of psychological attitudes. Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1969.
- Rotter, J. B. Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 1966, 80, Whole No. 609.
- Schneider, F. W., & Shaw, M. E. Sanctioning behavior in Negro and in White populations. Journal of Social Psychology, 1970, 81, 63-72.
- Shaver, K. G. Defensive attribution: Effects of severity and relevance on the responsibility assigned for an accident. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 14, 101-113 (a).
- Shaver, K. G. Redress and conscientiousness in the attribution of responsibility for accidents. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1970, 100-110 (b).
- Shaw, M. E. Some cultural differences in sanctioning behavior. Psychonomic Science, 1967, 8, 45-46.
- Shaw, J. L., & Skolnick, P. Attribution of responsibility for a happy accident. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1970, 6, 100-110.
- Shaw, M. E., & Reitan, H. T. Attribution of responsibility as a basis for sanctioning behavior. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 1969, 8, 217-226.

- Shaw, M. E., & Schneider, F. W. Intellectual competence as a variable in the assignment of sanctions. Journal of Social Psychology, 1969, 78, 31-39, (a).
- Shaw, M. E., & Schneider, F. W. Negro-White differences in attribution of responsibility as a function of age. Psychonomic Science, 1969, 289-291, (b).
- Shaw, M. E., & Sulzer, J. L. An empirical test of Heider's levels in attribution of responsibility. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1964, 69, 39-46.
- Sherman, S. J. Attitudinal effects of unforeseen consequences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16, 510-520.
- Silverman, I. On the resolution and tolerance of cognitive inconsistency in a natural occurring event: Attitudes and beliefs following the Senator Edward M. Kennedy incident. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 17, 171-178.
- Sulzer, J. L. Attribution of responsibility as a function of the structure, quality, and intensity of the event. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 1964, University of Florida.
- Sulzer, J. L., & Burglass, R. K. Responsibility attribution, empathy, and punitiveness. Journal of Personality, 1968, 36, 272-282.
- Walster, E. Assignment of responsibility for an accident. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 3, 73-79.
- Walster, E. "Second guessing" important events. Human Relations, 1967, 20, 239-250.
- Winer, B. J. Statistical principles in experimental design. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A
CONTEXTUAL STORIES

AGREEMENT PERCENTAGES FOR CONTEXTUAL STORIES

	<u>Story Level</u>		<u>Story Outcome</u>	
	<u>N</u>	<u>Agreement</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Agreement</u>
Global Association				
Moderate Outcome	17	82.4%	17	100.0%
Severe Outcome	18	94.4%	18	94.4%
Extended Commission				
Moderate Outcome	19	73.0%	18	94.4%
Severe Outcome	19	73.0%	19	100.0%
Careless Commission				
Moderate Outcome	18	77.7%	18	100.0%
Severe Outcome	18	77.7%	18	77.7%
Foreseeable Commission				
Moderate Outcome	18	100.0%	14	72.2%
Severe Outcome	18	100.0%	18	77.7%
Purposive Commission				
Moderate Outcome	18	88.8%	18	94.4%
Severe Outcome	18	100.0%	18	100.0%
Justified Commission				
Moderate Outcome	18	77.7%	18	94.4%
Severe Outcome	18	72.2%	18	83.3%

KEY SHEET FOR CONTEXTUAL STORIES

<u>Principal</u>	<u>Level</u>	<u>Outcome</u>
Charles	Purposive	Moderate
Judy	Careless	Severe
Brenda	Selfish	Moderate
Jean	Extended	Moderate
Bob	Justified	Severe
Rick	Purposive	Severe
Ray	Careless	Moderate
Peggy	Global	Moderate
Phil	Extended	Severe
Margareta	Selfish	Severe
Harvey	Global	Severe
Lisa	Justified	Moderate

Charles deliberately picked up one of his brother's empty soft drink bottles and threw it against the sidewalk where it shattered.

Who is responsible for the shattered soft drink bottle?

!.....!.....!.....!.....!
Charles Both The
Circumstances

Charles should be

!.....!.....!.....!.....!
Punished Nothing Rewarded
a lot should be done a lot

Charles feels

!.....!.....!.....!.....!
Very bad Indifferent Very good

Judy finished shaving her legs and without thinking left the razorblade on the side of the bathtub. Her two-year old daughter walked into the bathroom, picked up the razorblade and cut herself very badly. She severed a tendon and lost the use of her index finger.

Who is responsible for the little girl's severed tendon?

!.....!.....!.....!.....!
Judy Both The
Circumstances

Judy should be

!.....!.....!.....!.....!
Punished Nothing Rewarded
a lot should be done a lot

Judy feels

!.....!.....!.....!.....!
Very bad Indifferent Very good

Brenda hadn't finished her soft drink yet when she put it down on the counter next to the kitchen sink. The thought occurred to her that her mother might think that she was through with it and throw it out, but she left it there anyway. When Brenda went back to get her drink, her mother had already thrown it down the sink.

Who is responsible for the loss of the soft drink?

!.....!	!.....!	!.....!
Brenda	Both	The Circumstances

Brenda should be

!.....!	!.....!	!.....!
Punished a lot	Nothing should be done	Rewarded a lot

Brenda feels

!.....!	!.....!	!.....!
Very bad	Indifferent	Very good

Jean saw her friend walking on the other side of the street. Jean yelled at her, and when her friend turned to look at who was yelling, she tripped on a crack in the sidewalk and fell. She scraped her elbow.

Who is responsible for the friend's scraped elbow?

!.....!	!.....!	!.....!
Jean	Both	The Circumstances

Jean should be


!.....!	!.....!	!.....!
Punished a lot	Nothing should be done	Rewarded a lot

Jean feels


!.....!	!.....!	!.....!
Very bad	Indifferent	Very good

Bob had been a policeman for three years. He was ordered to the scene of a violent family argument. Upon his arrival he was shot in the chest by the woman's drunk husband. The man was about to shoot Bob again when Bob shot him severing his spinal cord and causing paralysis.


Who is responsible for severing the man's spinal cord?



Bob should be




Bob feels




Rick was careful that no one was looking, then he fed some poison to the neighbor's baby.


Who is responsible for poisoning the baby?



Rick should be




Rick feels



Ray was going to cook some hotdogs for his family on the outside grill. He went out back with his dog then realized that he had forgotten his matches. Without thinking, he put the hotdogs down on the porch steps while he went back inside. When he returned he found that his dog had eaten half of the hotdogs.

Who is responsible for the dog eating the hotdogs?




Ray

Both

The
Circumstances

Ray should be



Punished
a lot

Nothing
should be done

Rewarded
a lot

Ray feels



Very bad

Indifferent

Very good

Peggy's girlfriend borrowed her iron in order to press her mother's good white dress. While ironing the dress, her girlfriend slightly scorched the back of the sleeve.

Who is responsible for scorching the dress?



Peggy

Both

The
Circumstances

Peggy should be



Punished
a lot

Nothing
should be done

Rewarded
a lot

Peggy feels




Very bad

Indifferent


Very good

Phil was delivering packages for the grocery store. He rang the doorbell on one delivery, and as the lady came to open the door, she slipped on a loose rug and fell. She hit her head hard and it caused her to lose her sight.


Who is responsible for the lady's loss of sight?



Phil should be




Phil feels




Margareta borrowed her neighbor's brand new \$12,000 sports car and drove it to the drug store late one night. She was in a hurry and left the car running while she went inside the store. It had occurred to her that it wasn't a good idea to leave the car running as someone could steal it and there were several suspicious looking people standing outside the store. But she was in a hurry and left the car running anyway. While she was in the store, the expensive sports car was stolen and never seen again.


Who is responsible for the loss of the \$12,000 car?



Margareta should be




Margareta feels




Harvey's brother took his car without Harvey knowing about it. He took the car out to see how fast it would go. While going around a curve he lost control of the car and suffered a broken back.


Who is responsible for the broken back?



Harvey should be




Harvey feels




Lisa's older brothers told her that they would beat her up if she didn't throw a rock through the only unbroken window of the old abandoned house. Lisa knew that they meant it and so she threw the rock and broke the window.


Who is responsible for the broken window?



Lisa should be



Lisa feels



APPENDIX B

ABSTRACT STORIES

KEY SHEET FOR ABSTRACT STORIES

<u>Principal</u>	<u>Level</u>	<u>Outcome</u>
Harold	Extended	Moderate
Peggy	Selfish	Moderate
Ray	Justified	Severe
Rick	Careless	Moderate
Lisa	Global	Severe
Greta	Purposive	Severe
Bill	Extended	Severe
Jean	Justified	Moderate
Tim	Purposive	Moderate
Brenda	Careless	Severe
Lynn	Global	Moderate
Phil	Selfish	Severe

Harold caused something to happen that was slightly bad. He did not intend to cause it, and there was no way that he could have known that what he did would cause the slightly bad thing.

Who is responsible for this slightly bad thing?

Harold	Both	The Circumstances

Harold should be

Punished a lot	Nothing should be done	Rewarded a lot

Harold feels

Very bad	Indifferent	Very good

Peg caused something to happen that was slightly bad. She did not intend to cause it, but she was aware that she might cause the slightly bad thing if she acted.

Who is responsible for this slightly bad thing?

Peg	Both	The Circumstances

Peg should be


Punished a lot	Nothing should be done	Rewarded a lot

Peg feels


Very bad	Indifferent	Very good

Ray caused something to happen that was very bad. He intended to cause it, but the circumstances were such that most persons would have done the same thing.


Who is responsible for this very bad thing?



Ray should be




Ray feels




Rick caused something to happen that was slightly bad. He did not intend to cause it, but if he had been more alert he would have known that what he did might cause the slightly bad thing.


Who is responsible for this slightly bad thing?



Rick should be




Rick feels




Something happend that was very bad. It was caused by a group of which Lisa is a member. Lisa was not involved in the action.


Who is responsible for this very bad thing?



Lisa should be




Lisa feels




Greta caused something to happen that was very bad. She intended to cause it.


Who is responsible for this very bad thing?



Greta should be



Greta feels



Bill caused something to happen that was very bad. He did not intend to cause it, and there was no way that he could have known that what he did would cause the very bad thing.

Who is responsible for this very bad thing?

!.....!
|.....|.....|.....|.....|
Bill Both The
Circumstances

Bill should be

!.....!
|.....|.....|.....|.....|
Punished Nothing Rewarded
a lot should be done a lot

Bill feels

!.....!
|.....|.....|.....|.....|
Very bad Indifferent Very good

Jean caused something to happen that was slightly bad. She intended to cause it, but the circumstances were such that most persons would have done the same thing.

Who is responsible for this slightly bad thing?

!.....!
|.....|.....|.....|.....|
Jean Both The
Circumstances

Jean should be


!.....!
|.....|.....|.....|.....|
Punished Nothing Rewarded
a lot should be done a lot

Jean feels


!.....!
|.....|.....|.....|.....|
Very bad Indifferent Very good

Something happened that was slightly bad. It was caused by a group of which Lynn is a member. Lynn was not involved in the action.


Who is responsible for this slightly bad thing?



Lynn should be




Lynn feels




Phil caused something to happen that was very bad. He did not intend to cause it, but he was aware that he might cause this very bad thing if he acted.


Who is responsible for this very bad thing?



Phil should be



Phil feels



APPENDIX C

ROTTER INTERNAL - EXTERNAL

LOCUS OF CONTROL SCALE

For each of the following items, read through both sentences. Then decide which statement is more true, as far as your own experience is concerned. If you think statement "a" is more true for you, fill in space "a" on the answer sheet on the appropriate line. If you think statement "b" is more true, fill in space "b" on the answer sheet.

I more strongly believe that:

1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much.
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with them.
2. a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck.
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.
3. a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics.
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.
4. a. In the long run, people get the respect they deserve in this world.
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.
5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.
b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by accidental happenings.
6. a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities.
7. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you.
b. People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get along with others.
8. a. Heredity plays a major role in determining one's personality.
b. It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're like.
9. a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a definite course of action.
10. a. In the case of the well-prepared student, there is rarely if ever, such a thing as an unfair test.
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is really useless.

11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it.
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.
12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.
b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do about it.
13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.
14. a. There are certain people who are just no good.
b. There is some good in everybody.
15. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.
16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who is lucky enough to be in the right place first.
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has little or nothing to do with it.
17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand, nor control.
b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control world events.
18. a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental happenings.
b. There really is no such thing as "luck."
19. a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes.
b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.
20. a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.
b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are.
21. a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness or all three.
22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.
b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office.

23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give.
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get.
24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.
25. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance of luck plays an important role in my life.
26. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly.
b. There's not much use in trying hard to please people, if they like you, they like you.
27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school.
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
28. a. What happens to me is my own doing.
b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking.
29. a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do.
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as well as on a local level.

APPENDIX D

NEWMAN - KEULS TEST RESULTS

KEY FOR NEWMAN - KEULS TESTS

GA = Global Association
EC = Extended Commission
CC = Careless Commission
SC = Selfish Commission
PC = Purposive Commission
JC = Justified Commission

The larger values mean:

- ...with responsibility attribution - more personal responsibility
- ...with sanction assignment - more negative sanctions
- ...with attribution of emotion - more negative emotions

ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY -
CONTEXTUAL STORIES

	EC	JC	GA	CC	SC	PC
\bar{X} =	4.92	10.87	19.07	29.52	33.55	35.60
EC	---	5.95	14.15*	24.60*	28.63*	30.68*
JC		---	8.20*	18.65*	22.68*	24.73*
GA			---	10.45*	14.48*	16.53*
CC				---	4.03	6.08
SC					---	2.05
PC						---

*p < .05

q2 = 7.52

q3 = 9.02

q4 = 9.88

q5 = 10.53

q6 = 11.01

ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY -
ABSTRACT STORIES

	GA	EC	CC	SC	JC	PC
\bar{X} =	1.82	10.62	25.35	25.90	26.90	37.67
GA	---	8.80*	23.53*	24.08*	25.08*	35.85*
EC		---	14.73*	15.28*	16.28*	27.05*
CC			---	.55	1.55	12.32*
SC				---	1.0	11.77*
JC					---	10.77*
PC						---

* $p < .05$

q2 = 6.03

q3 = 7.24

q4 = 7.93

q5 = 8.44

q6 = 8.83

SANCTION ASSIGNMENT -
CONTEXTUAL STORIES

	EC	CC	JC	GA	SC	PC
$\bar{X} =$	19.40	21.40	21.42	21.47	25.60	33.65
EC	---	2.00	2.02	2.07	6.20*	14.25*
CC		---	.02	.07	4.20*	12.25*
JC			---	.05	4.16*	12.23*
GA				---	4.13*	12.18*
SC					---	8.05*
PC						---

* $p \leq .05$

q2 = 2.99

q3 = 3.59

q4 = 3.93

q5 = 4.18

q6 = 4.38

SANCTION ASSIGNMENT -
ABSTRACT STORIES

	GA	EC	CC	SC	JC	PC
$\bar{X} =$	18.87	20.65	23.65	26.00	27.75	34.42
GA	---	1.78	4.78*	7.13*	8.88*	15.55*
EC		---	3.00	5.35*	7.10*	13.77*
CC			---	2.35*	4.10*	10.77*
SC				---	1.75	8.42*
JC					---	6.67*
PC						---

*p \leq .05

q2 = 3.41

q3 = 4.09

q4 = 4.48

q5 = 4.77

q6 = 4.99

ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION -
ABSTRACT STORIES

	PC	JC	GA	SC	EC	CC
\bar{X} =	18.45	22.90	25.10	25.32	27.12	29.85
PC	---	4.45	6.65*	6.87*	8.67*	11.40*
JC		---	2.20	2.42	4.22	6.95*
GA			---	.22	2.02	4.75
SC				---	1.80	4.53
EC					---	2.73
CC						---

* $p < .05$

q2 = 4.95

q3 = 5.93

q4 = 6.50

q5 = 6.92

q6 = 7.24

ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION -
CONTEXTUAL STORIES

	PC	JC	SC	EC	GA	CC
\bar{X} =	19.40	29.37	30.37	30.45	34.12	34.50
PC	---	9.97*	10.97*	11.05*	14.72*	15.10*
JC		---	1.00	1.08	4.75	5.13*
SC			---	.08	3.75	4.13
EC				---	3.67	4.05
GA					---	.38
CC						---

* $p \leq .05$

q2 = 3.70

q3 = 4.44

q4 = 4.87

q5 = 5.18

q6 = 5.42

APPENDIX E

SIMPLE EFFECTS TEST RESULTS

KEY FOR SIMPLE EFFECTS TESTS

M = Story Method

M₁ = Contextual Stories

M₂ = Abstract Stories

A = Level of Responsibility

A₁ = Global Association

A₂ = Extended Commission

A₃ = Careless Commission

A₄ = Selfish Commission

A₅ = Purposive Commission

A₆ = Justified Commission

B = Outcome Intensity

B₁ = Moderate Outcome

B₂ = Severe Outcome

SUMMARY OF SIMPLE EFFECTS TESTS ON THE
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY

M x A Interaction

Source	df	MS	F	
M at A ₁	1	11902.50	101.60	**
A ₂	1	1299.60	11.09	**
A ₃	1	697.23	5.95	*
A ₄	1	2340.90	19.98	**
A ₅	1	172.23	1.47	
A ₆	1	10272.03	87.68	**
A at M ₁	5	12775.43	109.05	**
M ₂	5	13284.11	113.40	**
Error	190	117.15		

*p < .02

**p < .001

SUMMARY OF SIMPLE EFFECTS TESTS ON THE
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY

A x B Interaction

Source	df	MS	F	
B at A ₁	1	22.05	0.55	
A ₂	1	294.45	7.38	*
A ₃	1	74.11	1.86	
A ₄	1	288.8	7.24	*
A ₅	1	1.01	0.03	
A ₆	1	66.61	1.67	
A at B ₁	5	4506.37	112.97	*
B ₂	5	6009.04	150.64	*
Error	190	39.89		

*p \leq .001

SUMMARY OF SIMPLE EFFECTS TESTS ON
SANCTION ASSIGNMENT

M x A x B

Source	df	MS	F	
A at B ₁ M ₁	5	255.45	16.38	**
B ₁ M ₂	5	1216.97	78.04	**
B ₂ M ₁	5	444.73	28.52	**
B ₂ M ₂	5	822.81	52.72	**
M at A ₁ B ₁	1	115.6	7.41	*
A ₁ B ₂	1	32.4	2.09	
A ₂ B ₁	1	14.4	0.93	
A ₂ B ₂	1	16.9	1.08	
A ₃ B ₁	1	4.22	0.27	
A ₃ B ₂	1	148.22	9.50	*
A ₄ B ₁	1	207.00	13.80	**
A ₄ B ₂	1	140.62	9.02	*
A ₅ B ₁	1	52.9	3.39	
A ₅ B ₂	1	5.62	0.36	
A ₆ B ₁	1	25.6	1.64	
A ₆ B ₂	1	1113.02	71.37	**
B at A ₁ M ₁	1	7.23	0.46	
A ₁ M ₂	1	5.63	0.36	
A ₂ M ₁	1	0.4	0.03	
A ₂ M ₂	1	0.9	0.06	
A ₃ M ₁	1	0.1	0.00	
A ₃ M ₂	1	108.9	6.98	*
A ₄ M ₁	1	1502.3	96.30	**
A ₄ M ₂	1	129.6	8.31	*
A ₅ M ₁	1	672.4	43.12	**
A ₅ M ₂	1	265.23	17.01	**
A ₆ M ₁	1	308.03	19.75	**
A ₆ M ₂	1	115.6	7.41	*
Error	190	15.595		

*p < .01

**p < .001

SUMMARY OF SIMPLE EFFECTS TESTS ON
SANCTION ASSIGNMENT

M x A x B

Source	df	MS	F	
BM at A ₁	1	148.05	9.49	*
A ₂	1	32.55	2.08	
A ₃	1	210.25	13.48	**
A ₄	1	740.137	47.46	**
A ₅	1	949.64	60.89	**
A ₆	1	1161.74	74.49	**
AB at M ₁	5	1496.19	95.94	**
M ₂	5	1358.29	87.10	**
AM at B ₁	5	299.72	19.22	**
B ₂	5	2069.23	132.69	**
Error	190	15.595		

*p < .01

**p < .001

SUMMARY OF SIMPLE EFFECTS TESTS ON
ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION

Source	df	MS	F	
M at A ₁ B ₁	1	1000.00	31.9	***
A ₁ B ₂	1	648.02	20.7	***
A ₂ B ₁	1	86.75	2.8	
A ₂ B ₂	1	136.90	4.4	*
A ₃ B ₁	1	164.03	5.3	*
A ₃ B ₂	1	275.63	8.8	**
A ₄ B ₁	1	18.20	0.6	
A ₄ B ₂	1	765.62	24.5	***
A ₅ B ₁	1	11.03	0.4	
A ₅ B ₂	1	87.03	2.8	
A ₆ B ₁	1	756.90	24.2	***
A ₆ B ₂	1	180.63	5.8	*
B at A ₁ M ₁	1	27.23	0.9	
A ₁ M ₂	1	0.90	0.03	
A ₂ M ₁	1	202.50	6.5	*
A ₂ M ₂	1	140.62	4.5	*
A ₃ M ₁	1	336.40	10.8	**
A ₃ M ₂	1	211.60	6.8	**
A ₄ M ₁	1	1452.03	46.5	***
A ₄ M ₂	1	216.23	6.9	**
A ₅ M ₁	1	10.00	0.3	
A ₅ M ₂	1	90.00	2.9	
A ₆ M ₁	1	70.23	2.3	
A ₆ M ₂	1	32.40	1.1	
Error	190	31.26		

*p < .05

**p < .01

***p < .001

APPENDIX F

LOCUS OF CONTROL TEST RESULTS

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR
 ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
 WITH CONTEXTUAL STORIES

Source of Variation	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Between <u>Ss</u>			
Locus of Control (C)	1	144.15	0.27
C x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	18	525.64	
Within <u>Ss</u>			
Story Level (A)	5	6387.71	44.29
C x A	5	160.97	1.12
A x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	90	144.24	
Outcome Intensity (B)	1	190.82	3.64
C x B	1	70.42	1.34
B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	18	52.48	
A x B	5	171.10	4.02
C x A x B	5	42.44	.99
A x B <u>Ss</u> w. groups	90	42.52	

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR
 ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
 WITH ABSTRACT STORIES

Source of Variation	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Between <u>Ss</u>			
Locus of Control (C)	1	495.94	1.42
C x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	18	350.58	
Within <u>Ss</u>			
Story Level (A)	5	6642.05	71.52
C x A	5	23.03	0.25
A x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	90	92.87	
Outcome Intensity (B)	1	3.50	0.08
C x B	1	2.60	0.06
B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	18	43.12	
A x B	5	23.03	0.59
C x A x B	5	8.14	0.20
A x B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	90	38.99	

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR
SANCTION ASSIGNMENT WITH
CONTEXTUAL STORIES

Source of Variation	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Between <u>Ss</u>			
Locus of Control (C)	1	1.07	0.02
C x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	18	52.83	
Within <u>Ss</u>			
Story Level (A)	5	1091.40	47.82
C x A	5	13.69	0.60
A x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	90	22.82	
Outcome Intensity (B)	1	326.67	17.65
C x B	1	8.82	0.48
B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	18	18.51	
A x B	5	415.52	20.36
C x A x B	5	36.73	1.80
A x B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	90	20.41	

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR
SANCTION ASSIGNMENT WITH
ABSTRACT STORIES

Source of Variation	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Between <u>Ss</u>			
Locus of Control (C)	1	281.67	4.15
C x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	18	67.93	
Within <u>Ss</u>			
Story Level (A)	5	1242.80	42.06
C x A	5	2.19	0.07
A x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	90	29.55	
Outcome Intensity (B)	1	426.67	28.55
C x B	1	.15	0.01
B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	18	14.95	
A x B	5	33.54	3.70
C x A x B	5	25.46	2.81
A x B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	90	9.06	

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR
 ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION WITH
 CONTEXTUAL STORIES

Source of Variation	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Between <u>Ss</u>			
Locus of Control (C)	1	2.20	0.02
C x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	18	99.22	
Within <u>Ss</u>			
Story Level (A)	5	1198.67	34.30
C x A	5	71.61	2.05
A x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	90	34.95	
Outcome Intensity (B)	1	604.84	12.38
C x B	1	71.50	1.46
B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	18	48.85	
A x B	5	298.71	8.30
C x A x B	5	25.95	0.72
A x B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	90	35.97	

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR
 ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION WITH
 ABSTRACT STORIES

Source of Variation	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Between <u>Ss</u>			
Locus of Control (C)	1	1.35	0.01
C x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	18	211.82	
Within <u>Ss</u>			
Story Level (A)	5	601.65	9.63
C x A	5	77.70	1.24
A x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	90	62.48	
Outcome Intensity (B)	1	244.02	7.17
C x B	1	16.02	0.47
B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	18	34.03	
A x B	5	89.55	3.47
C x A x B	5	49.87	1.93
A x B x <u>Ss</u> w. groups	90	25.81	

APPENDIX G

DEPENDENT VARIABLE CORRELATIONS

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS ACROSS LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY
AND OUTCOME INTENSITY WITH BOTH METHODS COMBINED

Level of Responsibility	Outcome Intensity	R - S	R - E	S - E
Global Association	Moderate	.263	.185	.535 * *
	Severe	.400**	.295	.153
Extended Commission	Moderate	-.023	-.046	-.035
	Severe	.109	.225	.075
Careless Commission	Moderate	.235	.476**	.163
	Severe	.374**	.650**	.163
Selfish Commission	Moderate	.107	-.332	-.08
	Severe	.449**	.371**	.143
Purposive Commission	Moderate	.379**	.038	.033
	Severe	.694**	-.041	.050
Justified Commission	Moderate	.503**	-.326*	-.007
	Severe	.622**	-.325*	-.245

*p < .03
**p < .01

R = Responsibility Attribution
S = Sanction Assignment
E = Attribution of Emotion

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS ACROSS LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY
AND OUTCOME INTENSITY WITH CONTEXTUAL STORIES

Level of Responsibility	Outcome Intensity	R - S	R - E	S - E
Global Association	Moderate	.101	-.499*	.150
	Severe	.427	-.086	.014
Extended Commission	Moderate	-.174	-.426	.129
	Severe	.081	.075	.072
Careless Commission	Moderate	.204	.408	-.001
	Severe	.419	.704**	.321
Selfish Commission	Moderate	.419	-.506*	-.509*
	Severe	.328	.319	-.104
Purposive Commission	Moderate	.363	.244	-.031
	Severe	.697**	.174	.389
Justified Commission	Moderate	.426	.117	.189
	Severe	-.120	.027	-.137

*p < .02

**p < .01

R = Responsibility Attribution
S = Sanction Assignment
E = Attribution of Emotion

CORRELATIONS COEFFICIENTS ACROSS LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY
AND OUTCOME INTENSITY WITH ABSTRACT STORIES

Level of Responsibility	Outcome Intensity	R - S	R - E	S - E
Global Association	Moderate	.118	-.006	.664**
	Severe	.174	.299	.947
Extended Commission	Moderate	.056	.560**	-.166
	Severe	-.019	.462*	.214
Careless Commission	Moderate	.391	.425	.469*
	Severe	.489*	.654**	.456*
Selfish Commission	Moderate	.371	-.294	.176
	Severe	.428	-.047	-.097
Purposive Commission	Moderate	.430	-.209	.046
	Severe	.791**	-.332	-.316
Justified Commission	Moderate	.565**	-.355	-.012
	Severe	.717**	-.309	-.100

*p < .04

**p < .01

R = Responsibility Attribution

S = Sanction Assignment

E = Attribution of Emotion

VITA ²

Harold Dean Whiteside

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis: THE ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY, SANCTIONING BEHAVIOR, AND
THE ATTRIBUTION OF EMOTION FOR A NEGATIVE EVENT: A METHOD-
OLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

Major Field: Psychology

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in East Liverpool, Ohio, September 23, 1945,
the son of Mr. and Mrs. Harold Dean Whiteside.

Education: Graduated from Christopher Columbus High School,
Miami, Florida, in May, 1963; received an Associate of
Arts degree from the University of Florida in April, 1965;
received a Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology from the
University of Miami in 1967; received a Bachelor of Arts
degree in Sociology from the University of Miami in 1968;
received a Master of Science degree in Social Psychology
from North Carolina State University in 1973; completed
the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree at
Oklahoma State University in December, 1973.

Professional Experience: Graduate teaching assistant, North
Carolina State University, 1968-1970; graduate teaching
assistant, Oklahoma State University, 1970-1973.