

A COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES OF NEGOTIATORS AND  
NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS BETWEEN NEA  
AFFILIATED SCHOOL DISTRICTS  
AND AFT AFFILIATED SCHOOL  
DISTRICTS

By

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Teachers' organizations are mobilizing collective strength and their concerted voices are becoming more articulate in their demands to be heard. The teachers, through the auspices of their organizations, demand an opportunity to help in the decision-making processes which ultimately will improve their professional economic status as well as conditions under which they aspire to teach.

Teachers want a collegial voice in determining educational policies (Bridges, 1965). Teachers are no longer satisfied to petition the board of education for a chance to be heard. They now insist on a full right to bargain and use this bargaining power to reach settlements including threats of strike, sanctions, and the employment of other techniques to effect a written contract encompassing their wants and demands (Shils and Whittier, 1968).

Charles Cogen (1963, p. 5) contends:

The essential merit of collective bargaining is that it involves teachers in such a way as to assure the acceptability of policies and practices which are finally adopted. Collective bargaining has created at least in elemental form, a new climate of freedom and professionalism in our schools. The spirit of freedom is the outcome of procedural innovations. Its components are emancipation, self-expression, and self-determination.

The NEA and the AFT have both renounced their pre-1961 positions about the use of extreme bargaining power in the negotiation of contracts. The strike or sanction, or professional holiday, by whatever

euphemism the organization wishes to call it, has the same result; i.e., a work stoppage.

There has been a steady increase in the number of school districts throughout the United States which are adopting formal negotiations procedures for the solution of educational problems.

Normally, there are two main processes of negotiating. One is to reduce and perhaps resolve the differences between the two parties to the negotiations, the other is to develop ways of advancing the interests which the two parties have in common (Horvat, 1968, p. 19).

In support to the two processes proposed by Horvat, Walton and McKersie add: When two parties enter into negotiations, the interaction of the parties to the process shapes the outcome of the produce of their joint efforts. The interaction processes also facilitate the resolution of joint problems and the integration of the interests of the parties. A third result of the interaction of the parties involved in the negotiations process is the maintenance or restructuring of the attitudes of the participants toward each other. "The attitudes of each negotiating party, toward the other, taken together, define the relationship between them" (Walton and McKersie).

It is felt that the attitude of professionalism will influence the types of items brought to the negotiating table; the attitude of militancy will influence the volume of items brought before the negotiating bodies; and labor-management orientation will influence, through the presence or absence of degrees of polarization, the tone and thus the final outcome of the negotiations process. The attitudes expressed by both parties to the negotiations process are important to the possible outcomes of the deliberations. Negotiations involve a great deal more

than the rational consideration of opposing views in a joint decision-making situation.

External factors do not necessarily predetermine the nature of a collective bargaining relationship. Within the environment created by some combination of external factors there is a relationship bounded by the attitudes of the negotiators (Deeber, Chambers, and Stagner, 1960, p. 71).

While the importance of environmental factors on the outcome of negotiations cannot be denied, the particular approach that one or both of the parties will take to negotiation sessions, and the relationship-behavior patterns that occur therein, are influenced by the belief systems of the negotiators (Horvat, 1968, p. 21).

When two parties enter into negotiations, the processes involved shape the outcome of their deliberations. The processes facilitate the resolution of joint problems and the integration of mutual areas of interest. The need is present for concern in regard to attitudes coloring the relationship between the two parties.

The issues in negotiations involve important human values; fulfillment of the contract terms is strongly contingent upon attitudes; instruments in the contest involve social ideologies and psychological tactics as well as economic sanctions (Walton and McKersie, 1965, p. 184).

These factors suggest that attitudes expressed by negotiators will play an important part in resolution of conflict and final agreement between the negotiating parties.

The addition of empirical data relating to similarities and differences in the attitudes of militancy, professionalism, and labor-management orientation between NEA negotiators and AFT negotiators and similarities and differences in selected categories of contracts as negotiated by NEA and AFT form the basis for this study.

The lessons learned during the last five years by teachers ... is that threatening employees with injunctions, or calling them disloyal or unprofessional has little if any impact on the prevention of strikes or withdrawals of work. 'No contract -

no work' is their ready answer to school administrators and boards of education (Shils and Whittier, 1968, pp. 18-19).

#### Statement of the Problem

There has been little empirical evidence to date which has focused upon the similarities and differences between NEA and AFT negotiations. The problem investigated in this study involves measures similarities and differences in attitudes of negotiators and similarities and differences in negotiated contracts.

In attacking this problem, an attempt will be made to answer these questions:

Are the attitudes of militancy, professionalism, and labor-management orientation similar between negotiators for the National Education Association affiliates and negotiators for the American Federation of Teachers affiliates?

Do the negotiators representing the boards of education which negotiate with the National Education Association affiliates express attitudes of militancy, professionalism, and labor-management orientation similar to negotiators representing boards of education which negotiate with the American Federation of Teachers affiliates?

Are the similarities or differences in attitudes as expressed by negotiators representing their respective groups, reflected in the contracts which are negotiated?

### Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to: (1) Determine if there are differences in attitudes as expressed by (a) negotiators for local union affiliates as opposed to negotiators for the local educational association; (b) negotiators representing boards of education which recognize the local teachers union as opposed to negotiators representing boards of education which recognize the local teachers educational association; (2) Determine if there are differences in contracts which are negotiated in districts recognizing affiliates of the National Education Association and contracts which are negotiated in districts recognizing affiliates of the American Federation of Teachers.

### Assumptions

It is assumed that the scores which are reported on the Professional Orientation Scale, the Initiative-Compliance Scale, and The Labor Management Attitude Questionnaire, will represent the true attitudinal dispositions of the subjects in relation to these scales.

It is further assumed that the process of randomization will result in an accurate representation of the population.

### Definitions

Negotiator: A teacher or consultant or administration representative who is either elected by the membership or appointed by the leadership of the organization or administration, to negotiate.

Negotiations: "A process whereby employees as a group and their employers make offers and counter-offers in good faith on the conditions

of their employment relationship for the purpose of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement" (Lieberman and Moskow, 1966).

Organization: The term organization, when used in the context of this study will refer to either the National Education Association and its state and local affiliates or the American Federation of Teachers and state and local affiliates, unless otherwise specified.

Professionalism: Corwin (1970) states the professional educator is one who seeks to control and monopolize his vocation. The basis for these efforts to control stems from the belief that educators are professional. Lieberman and Moskow (1966, p. 136) offer the following definitions of a professional:

Any employee engaged in work ...

- (i) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performances;
- (ii) predominately intellectual and varied in character;
- (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time;
- (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of study in an institution of higher learning.

The operational definition as used in this study will indicate a score on the Professional Orientation Scale. Corwin, in the development of the scale, indicated that the "high" professional group, used for validation of the scale, had published, had participated actively in a professional organization, and had remained in teaching at least five years. "High" professionalism is indicated by a score above the mean. The "low" professional group had not published, were not active in the organization, and had not been in the teaching field for a minimum of



five years. This group scored below the mean (Corwin, 1966). Therefore, in this study a score above the mean on the Professional Orientation Scale will indicate high professionalism, while a score below the mean will indicate low professionalism.

Militancy: Militancy can take a number of forms. Militancy is frequently evidenced through work stoppages, strikes, sanctions, mass resignations, and other withdrawals of services. These overt actions are the most visible indications of a more prevalent course of action taken by unions and associations. Militancy is a posture of challenge to the established authority in educational decision-making.

The operational definition for militancy in this study will be the score on the Initiative-Compliance Scale (Corwin, 1966). This score will show the tendency for the subject to take the initiative or show compliance in hypothetical conflict situations between teachers and administrators. Scores above the mean will indicate a higher degree of militancy.

Labor-Management Attitude: An individual's actions in interpersonal relations are a reflection of his beliefs. The character of the negotiations process is influenced by the beliefs of the negotiators representing the teachers' organization and the negotiators representing the school board.

Management's approach to collective bargaining has typically been characterized by an ideology that places emphasis on management's mission to manage. The ideology points to executives as the best equipped and best situated to balance the conflicting interests of the enterprise. Labor's approach, on the other hand, is inimical to the managerial position. The argument over management's rights and prerogatives is evidence of this ideological conflict (Walton and McKersie, 1965, pp. 196-197).

The Labor-Management Attitude Questionnaire was developed by

Helper (1953) to measure the attitudes and beliefs of individuals toward labor and management. A score below the mean on the Labor-Management Attitude Questionnaire will indicate an attitude favorable to management. A score above the mean will indicate a pro-labor attitudinal orientation.

Attitude: "An attitude is a readiness to act in one way rather than another" (Murphy, 1966, p. 980).

An attitude as used in this paper will designate a personal orientation or propensity toward an idea or value or goal held, by an individual negotiator.

NEA: National Education Association.

AFT: American Federation of Teachers.

Sample District: A school district which has recognized a local affiliate as the exclusive representative of the teachers' bargaining unit.

Teacher Negotiators: The negotiators who represent the local affiliate in face-to-face negotiations.

Board Negotiators: The negotiators who represent the board of education in face-to-face negotiations.

Contract: A contract is a written agreement between an employee organization which represents the teachers and the employer, the board of education. For the purposes of this investigation, the following provisions form a foundation for contract analysis.

- I. Organizational Security: Provisions within the agreement which protect the status of the employee organization.
  - A. Exclusive Recognition: The board of education's acceptance of an organization as authorized to

represent members of the negotiating unit.

- B. Rights of Exclusive Representation: The right and obligation of the organization representing the teachers to bargain collectively for all employees in the negotiations unit.
  - C. Dues Check Off: A procedure whereby the employer agrees to deduct the organizational dues from the employee's check. The employer also agrees to transfer these dues to the employee organization.
  - D. Negotiations Unit: A term describing the occupational group which the employee organization represents in negotiations.
  - E. Availability of School Facilities: Provisions for the use of school facilities for employee organizational purposes.
  - F. Elections Procedures: The procedures used to elect an organization to represent the employees in negotiations with the employer.
- II. Exchange of Facts and Views: Provisions which insure the exchange of information which is pertinent to the negotiations process.
- III. Conditions of Employment:
- A. Educational considerations. Any provision set forth in the contract which deals with the teaching-learning relationship, curriculum, student evaluation, teacher evaluation, or the fulfillment of duties as an educator.

1. textbook selection
  2. curriculum committees
  3. teaching assignment
  4. student discipline
  5. faculty meetings
  6. administrator conferences
  7. faculty evaluation
  8. sabbatical leave
  9. professional improvement
  10. student evaluation
  11. employment requirements
- B. Employee Considerations: Any physical, temporal, or financial conditions set forth in the contracts which deal with the members of the teachers negotiating unit as employees.
- Such considerations include:
1. length of the school day
  2. length of the school year
  3. supervision of students
    - a. during lunch time
    - b. between classes
    - c. in co-curricular activities
  4. room assignments
  5. seniority
  6. salary
  7. fringe benefits
    - a. sick leave

- b. insurance
- c. personal leave
- d. death leave
- e. tax sheltered annuity

IV. Impass Resolution: Provisions within the agreement which prescribe the procedures for resolving deadlock situations during negotiations.

A. Steps

- 1. Formal notification of Impass
- 2. Mediation
- 3. Fact-finding

B. Agency used for Final appeal

C. Binding final step

D. No strike provision

E. Good faith bargaining

V. Grievance Procedures: The formalized process for dealing with any complaint or expressed dissatisfaction by an employee in connection with the terms of his employment.

A. Steps

- 1. Submission to principal
- 2. Appeal to superintendent
- 3. Appeal to board of education
- 4. Arbitration

B. Agency used for arbitration

C. Binding arbitration

### Limitations

The subjects in this study are geographically and occupationally restricted to region Five in the State of Illinois (Figure 1). Due to the method of selection any generalizations made beyond the present sample should be done with caution.

### Significance of the Study

Lieberman and Moskow (1966), Shils and Whittier (1968), Hazard and West (1970), Muir (1968), and Carlton (1968) speak to the convergence of ideas, actions, and attitudes espoused by the National Education Association (NEA), and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT).

Until recently, it was possible to distinguish between the actions of the teachers' union and the professional organization. That distinction is no longer easy to make. Since the AFT won the election for exclusive representation of New York City's teachers in 1961, the position of the NEA and the AFT have been converging to a point somewhere between unionism and professionalism. The AFT has shown, with its More Effective School Program and demands for smaller classes, that they are not pushing "bread and butter" issues exclusively (Cole, 1969), (Muir, 1969). The NEA, with its salary and working conditions demands, plus the invoking of sanctions against Utah, and Oklahoma, and a strike in Florida, indicates that its position has shifted to allow utilization of union methods which in 1961 were against the NEA policy line (Muir, 1968).

The significance of this study lies in the addition of empirical evidence regarding similarities and differences in attitudinal orientations of negotiators for the NEA and the AFT. Further significance lies

in the comparison of contracts negotiated by NEA and AFT. Horvat, Campbell, and Walton and McKersie contend that divergence of attitudes of negotiators between negotiations teams may lead to a conflict situation or "hard-nosed bargaining". It is hoped that the data gained, which compares selected attitudes of negotiators and selected contractual provisions, will enable the parent organization to choose negotiators who will best represent the attitudinal disposition expressed by the constituency. Thus, the negotiators will tend to be more functionally representative of the organization during the negotiations process.

Neil Chamberlain states that the process of examining the parts of the negotiations process; i.e., the negotiators and the contracts which they negotiate, will hopefully lead to the discovery of generalizations in relation to the structure of contract bargaining.

The putting of pieces together so that their interrelationships are made clear and the bargaining structure as a whole begins to emerge, demands investigation .... The character of the bargaining structure is responsive, in a broad sense, to forces that may reveal a variety of patterns about which generalizations can be made (Chamberlain, 1961, p. 19).

## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Chapter II is divided into seven parts. Part one is the introduction in which negotiations in education are discussed. Part two is a discussion of the negotiations relationship. Part three is a discussion of attitudes in the negotiations relationship. Part four is a discussion of militancy and a presentation of hypothesis one. Part five is a discussion of professionalism and a presentation of hypothesis two. Part six is a discussion of labor-management orientation and a presentation of hypothesis three. The final part is a discussion of contracts and a presentation of hypothesis four and six sub-hypotheses relating to hypothesis four.

#### Introduction

As face-to-face negotiations, between the representatives of the teachers' organization, which may be affiliated with either the American Federation of Teachers or the National Education Association, and the representatives of the board of education become more common and the contracts which are negotiated by these representatives become more comprehensive, there is doubt that the superintendent and the school board will continue to exert unilateral control over the decision-making processes in the public schools.



Teachers within most school systems have been power-dependent for some time on the established authority structure in education, which has been represented by the administrative hierarchy. In order to free themselves from a completely dependent position, they have moved to restore a balanced relationship by organizing and bypassing the administrative structure through the raw coercive power of the strike or walkout (English, 1972, p. 193).

It appears that the administration of the public school system is undergoing a change. This change indicates that the governance of the public schools is shifting toward bilateral decision-making with the teacher's organization having input to the formation of the basic tenets upon which the school is run. Administrators fear that as teachers' organizations gain the power to veto important administrative actions, the administrators will be in the position of having a legal responsibility for the decisions which affect the school system but not having the authority to make the necessary decisions to run the school (Shils and Whittier, 1968).

The differentiation between the American Federation of Teachers as a labor union and the National Education Association as a professional organization is disappearing. As the two competing teachers' organizations are viewed in light of local affiliates' actions at the negotiations tables and at the picket lines, and as the tactical planning at the national headquarters of both organizations are viewed, the distinction between the NEA and the AFT seems negligible.

Both the NEA and the AFT train organizers, employ strikes, and threats of strikes, aim at contracts that are highly complex and whittle away at traditional staff and board prerogatives, advocate firm grievance procedures ending in final and binding arbitration. The NEA at the local level, like the AFT, is driving principals, supervisors, and administrators out of the bargaining unit. Both organizations press hard for exclusive representation and the NEA is getting as tough in the infighting as the AFT (Shils and Whittier, 1968, p. 540).

The once wide substantive differences regarding the industrial relations approach of the AFT and the professional relations approach of the NEA have now settled on procedural differences, such as, whether third parties in disputes should be the state labor conciliator or the commissioner of education (Williams, 1968, p. 572).

Lieberman and Moskow (1966) state that both the AFT and the NEA are interested in the entire program of the school. The two organizations feel that the agenda for negotiations should include all topics which are of professional concern to the faculty of that school district; i.e., "anything to do with the operation of the school."

Professionalism in the public schools is exemplified by the faculty member who, as an individual practitioner and as a member of an organization which represents his interests, has an interest in all decisions which effect the pupil clientele and the effectiveness of his work. This concern reaches far beyond the narrow self-interest in economic gains. This does not mean that a professional is not interested in self gain, but merely places monetary gain in its proper perspective in relation to the well-being of the clientele served.

It is precisely at the point of making difficult decisions based upon budget allocations as well as assigning priorities to the immediate and future needs of the total educational program, that the professional educator and the organization which represents him, offer maximum assistance to the boards of education (Wallett, 1968, p. 502).

In view of the militancy engaged in by both the NEA and the AFT, and the tactics and results of the negotiations process as practiced by the local affiliates of the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers, the differences between the NEA's professional negotiations and the AFT's collective bargaining appear to be a matter of nomenclature.

Both the NEA and the AFT appear to be practicing a militant type of unionism and each organization will press for a contract not far apart .... Essentially there is no difference in what the two organizations demand at the local level (Shils and Whittier, 1968, p. 502).

### Negotiations Relationships

Edward McMahon, writing for the American Management Association in 1969, states that he feels that it is important for the parties to contract negotiations to put the negotiations process in its proper perspective. To reach an equitable agreement in a bilateral adversary situation, such as contract negotiations, compromise on the part of one or both parties is necessary. It is necessary that both parties to the negotiations desire to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. A commitment from each party to maintain the negotiations procedures as the foundation from which issues may be raised and resolved is required. Unless the parties to the contract negotiations are willing to maintain this perspective, successful negotiations will be difficult or even impossible to maintain (McMahon, 1969).

Walton and McKersie (1965, p. 206) delineate their criteria for a constructive negotiations relationship as follows:

A constructive relationship is one based on full recognition of the mixture of distributive and integrative aspects in negotiations. Therefore, such a relationship is one (1) in which the parties do not have attitudes which prevent them from fully exploiting the integrative possibilities but (2) does not make them lose sight of their primary responsibility to the separate interests of their respective organizations.

Neil Chamberlain (1951) states that neither party to the negotiations process can secure the objectives of its parent organization without a joint working relationship. The terms of that joint relationship define the extent to which each party uses the power which they bring

into the negotiations process to attain its objectives. The terms of the collective bargaining relationship relate to matters of divergent interest and each party secures or makes an effort to secure its interests in relation to its bargaining power.

Bargaining power is the ability to secure another agreement on one's own terms. Bargaining power is not simply a reflection of personal powers, but is a reflection of all circumstances surrounding the negotiations teams (Chamberlain, 1951, p. 97).

Under distributive bargaining, coercion is the principal ingredient of bargaining power. The resolution of divergent interests as a basis for operation of the enterprise, and nothing more, defines the negotiations relationship. The bargaining relationship comes into being because it is inescapable and neither party to the negotiations grants more than its lack of power forces it to grant. This is contrasted with integrative bargaining in which each party to negotiations defines the relationship as a continuing state of union-management relations which springs from a relationship which satisfies divergent interests sufficiently to evoke a joint effort to improve performance in the endeavor in which the parties engage.

#### Attitudes in the Negotiating Relationship

Attitudes, as expressed by negotiators while in the negotiations process, provide a mechanism by which transactions at one point in time can be related to transactions at another point in time. It is through the mechanism of attitudes and the resulting relationship pattern that developments in negotiations are translated into contract provisions which define the employment relationship between the organization which

represents the employees and the representatives of the employers (Walton and McKersie, 1965, p. 143).

When the system of emotional control is constant, groups with a primary valency to fight differ from other groups in their ability to dig into a problem, to raise issues, and to settle them. Groups which strive to engage in integrative bargaining show the widest range of ideas employed in problem solution, a high level of flexibility within the organization, and a high amount of emotional involvement and commitment to act toward solution of joint problems.

Shils and Whittier (1968) state that the most important element in a constructive negotiations relationship is a "warm, pleasant atmosphere at the bargaining table". If a pleasant atmosphere and attitudes which engender cooperation are present, the negotiations sessions will be an approach to bilateral solution of joint problems.

Negotiations are a contest and like any contest put a strain on the participants. The 'union' and the 'company' are abstractions, but their representatives at the bargaining table are human beings. Human beings have knowledge, skills, attitudes and endurance, all of which have a profound influence on his actions during the negotiations process (Beal and Wickersham, 1968, p. 175).

Honzik (1969) states that the personal attitudes of negotiators are most important. Their perceptions of the relationships between the employer and the employees have an influence upon their actions and decisions at the negotiations table.

Walton and McKersie (1965, p. 223) supply the following summations of the bargaining relationship:

Several characteristics of negotiations sessions serve to increase the likelihood of agreement--agreement which may be beneficial or harmful depending upon the skill and sensitivity of each negotiator. Perhaps the most vital of such characteristics is that during contract negotiations, interpersonal interaction between negotiators of the two organizations is frequent and intense; hence, the increased salience of each party's attitudes.

## Militancy

Spokesmen for the National Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) have charged that the decision-making structure in public education needs to be revised. Boyan (1969) states that one effect of the personal, interpersonal, intraorganizational, and extraorganizational association and interaction between and among large numbers of teachers has resulted in a search, through extra-school organizations, primarily NEA and AFT, for an expanded role in the government and governance of schools.

Adams (1965) contends that teachers, after being systematically left out of the educational decision-making process, are making increased demands on their employers for what they believe to be their rightful place in matters of policy making.

Teachers do not want the power to be heard and then turned down: they have long been listened to and consulted. No matter how hard teachers have argued and demonstrated and reasoned, there has always been a point at which the principal could say, 'No'. If they then appealed to the superintendent and the school board, the power to affirm or reject has again been in the administration. Now teachers are demanding for themselves the equivalent power of saying, 'No'. This power intends to insure decision-making in consort, by working things out together (Shanker, 1969, p. 79).

The NEA in a 1969 publication by the Division of Field Services states:

The local association is the members' advocate. It promotes his interests. It defends him. It attempts to provide a teaching environment that will permit him to practice his profession effectively.

One of the basic functions of a local association in carrying out these responsibilities is to secure the right to negotiate with the board of education on all matters which effect the terms and conditions of a teacher's professional services (NEA, 1969, p. 1).

It is well that boards of education do not deceive themselves about the issues being raised by teachers. They are not what they appear to be on the surface. The real issues are not wages, hours, and conditions of employment. Very few boards or administrators will deny the need for vast improvement in all of these areas. The bedrock issues are concerned with bi-lateral policy determination between boards and teachers' organizations. They are concerned with the dilution of the delegated authority of the administrative staff. They are concerned with the extent to which a board can give away its ability to respond to the wishes of the community (Young, 1969).

Through the utilization of organizations at the local, state, and national levels, today's teachers are becoming increasingly active in seeking participation regarding the development of the policies, rules, and regulations which effect their working conditions (Corwin, 1970).

Williams, Robinson, and Walden (1970) agree in that they state that various groups have charged that the existing structure for decision-making in today's public educational institutions is undergoing a change. One direction of change has been the tendency of some groups who represent teachers to force their way into the decision-making structure. "These groups have seized on militant action as one way to secure for themselves positions of authority in the decision-making structure" (Williams, Robinson, and Walden, 1970, p. 28).

Carlton (1969) states that the beginnings of the escalation of NEA and AFT militancy were marked by the AFT-sponsored teachers' strike in 1961 and the subsequent representation election in 1962.

The timid, somewhat docile, teachers' committee of the past is now being replaced by a knowledgeable, hungry negotiation team which is

headed by an extremely well trained, aggressive, full-time executive of the local federation or association (Bendines, 1969). Boyan (1969) concurs by stating that as members of extra-school organizations, both unions and professional associations, the behavior of teachers has changed from a position of relative docility to one of aggressive militancy.

"The image of the teacher is changing from the unselfish, dedicated schoolmarm, to the hard-nosed negotiator or strike leader" (Lieberman, 1971, p. 719). Corwin (1970), Boyan (1969), and Bendine (1969) state that the current militancy in teaching indicates that the days of sentimentality for the poor teacher are finished. Teachers are no longer content with their present level of authority and input to decision-making in their areas of expertise. They want respect for their positions as professional educators and want to play a larger role in finding the answers to educational problems. The collective militant action on the part of teachers through their union or association is representative of their search to achieve an equalization of power in schools and school systems.

Teacher militancy can take a number of forms. While the term "militancy" is frequently used to designate overt actions such as work stoppages, strikes, sanctions, mass resignations, and other withdrawals of services, which are only the most visible indicators of a much more prevalent course of action taken by unions and associations, militancy is actually a posture of challenge to the established authority in educational decision-making (Corwin, 1963).

The widespread idea that defiance is shown primarily by unions is not accurate. Twelve of thirty-six strikes called between 1960 and 1966



were called by affiliates of the NEA (Corwin, 1970).

Teacher organizations struck 131 times during the 1968-69 school year. The strikes were shorter and involved fewer large groups than was previously the case. This is primarily a result of the fact that smaller suburban and rural school districts began to feel the effect of spreading teacher militancy (Corwin, 1970, p. 47).

"NEA affiliates called 99 of the year's strikes, locals of the AFT called twenty-four and eight independent groups struck" (Phi Delta Kappan, 1970, p. 432).

Teachers expect the organization, which has been designated to represent them, regardless of nomenclature used, to bring about fundamental changes in the relationships between teachers and their employers. Teachers also expect their elected representatives to press, with vigor and enthusiasm, in all areas of welfare and conditions of employment (Adams, 1965). Muir contends that teacher leaders, backed by one of two powerful organizations, the NEA or AFT, are:

... trained, financed, organized, determined, and in a fighting mood to win higher salaries, improved working conditions, and a strong say in what boards of education think is their responsibility, policymaking (Muir, 1969, p. 34).

Corwin states that both professional associations and unions are insisting upon the right of representatives to negotiate with, thus, participate with, boards of education in determining the policies of common concern (Corwin, 1968). Shils and Whittier (1970) contend that teachers have become so "restive" that it does not matter whether they belong to a labor union or a professional organization. In 1965, the 7,000 delegates to NEA's Annual Convention unanimously withdrew the NEA's written restriction against teachers' strikes. In 1967, the NEA Board of Directors stated that the NEA in the future will give full support to local affiliates which go out on strike.

The NEA and the AFT have both abandoned their earlier positions about the use of extreme bargaining power in the negotiation of contracts. Whether the technique is called a strike or sanction, the results are the same (Shils and Whittier, 1968, p. 18).

Morris Shanker (1969, p. 79), President of the AFT affiliate in New York City, states:

The conflict between the teachers' representatives and the administrators cannot avoid some unpleasantness .... The possibility that both parties may not be able to agree raises the matter of the strike. I believe that there is not a substitute for some form of withdrawal of services, whether this means a strike, or resignations, or something else.

The NEA, while at the same time employing many of the union tactics which it so fervently decried, "tried to frighten teachers away from unionism". Yet, semantics seemed to provide the only tactical difference in bargaining power which was applied by either the NEA or the AFT (Shils and Whittier, 1968).

It is rather difficult to perceive any difference between the NEA officers telling its members not to sign contracts in states where sanctions are in effect and the New York affiliate of the AFT instructing its members not to report to school on opening day (Shils and Whittier, 1968, p. 47).

Corwin (1970), reporting a 1966 study, contends that much of the leadership for militant action by teachers comes from officers of established teacher's organizations as well as "behind-the scenes informal leaders". He also found that there was no significant difference in militancy between NEA and AFT officers.

As the militant actions of teachers' organizations become more similar and the differences in tactics and ideologies converge, the NEA and the AFT as organizations become indistinguishable. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis One: There will be no significant difference in

militancy between the negotiators for the NEA and the negotiators for the AFT.

### Professionalism

Corwin (1970) states the professional educator is one who seeks to control and monopolize his vocation. The basis for these efforts stems from the belief that educators are professional. Since the late 1800's, American educators have tended to band together in order to discuss common problems, to exchange viewpoints in relation to common concerns, and to formulate strategies for bringing about needed changes in the educational programs and organizational structures with which they were associated. Most of today's educators recognize the need for, and encourage the greater professional development of the teaching staff and their representative organizations which serve public and private educational institutions. What aspiring professionals seem to require are new ways of approaching the issues of developing teacher professionalism. Corwin states that today's teachers, through their organizational framework, are becoming increasingly active in such matters as academic freedom, professional rights, responsibilities to students and to administrators, and their role in the development of the policies, rules, and regulations which effect their status as professional educators (Corwin, 1970).

Teachers' organizations are stirring. They are organized pressure groups who, as a result of bargaining power through unified effort, bring about changes in the governance structures in the schools (Shanker, 1969).

Cogen (1963, p. 22), states that:

Collective bargaining has created, at least in elemental form, a new climate of freedom and professionalism in our schools. The spirit of freedom is the outcome of the procedural innovations. Its components are emancipation, self-expression, and self-determination. These have instilled a new sense of professionalism in our halls of learning.

Batchelder (1969) contends that although teachers in general are dedicated to their profession, this does not indicate that they are content to make do with what input into governance they are given. Teachers, through organizational efforts, strive for the things which their expertise as educators dictate are needed for themselves and their students. Teachers are being frustrated by a lack of freedom to teach, by a lack of adequate teaching conditions, and by a lack of status which coexists with one of the lowest salaries in the professions.

To be effective today, our profession must be unified and strong. We must enroll those teachers who are not yet enrolled. We must involve them in the planning and operation of a profession. In designing a professional program we must consider the judgment and expertise of those who will be instrumental in the implementation of the programs which the interests of the students demand (Batchelder, 1969, p. 139).

Teachers have pressed and will continue, through newly developed organizational procedures, to press for improved teaching standards (Shanker, 1969). Batchelder lends support to Shanker's contention by stating that in many states teachers' organizations are saying to the public and to the lay boards and their administrative representatives, when educational standards are too low or teaching-learning conditions too poor, services rendered by professionals may not be provided. "By setting decent educational standards and holding to them, we as teachers are developing professional autonomy" (Batchelder, 1969).

Corwin (1955, 1966, 1969), Batchelder (1969), and Robinson (1967)

agree that as schools have increased in size and complexity of function, the need for more specialization has caused the majority of teachers to believe that they, through their organizational leaders, should exercise the ultimate authority over major educational decisions. The teachers' organizations are attacking the causes of their professional frustrations through efforts to initiate procedures for negotiations, sound local, state, and national legislation, and the firm belief that the quality of education depends upon the extent to which teachers' organizations give primacy to the welfare of students.

Boyan (1969, p. 201) assesses the professionalization of teachers in the following statement:

The aspirations of teachers as professionals in public bureaucracies and the militant behavior of teachers as members of extra-school organizations have brought sharp confrontations with the traditional authority structure of the school .... It is at the point of difference between the administration's social control of organizational discipline and their social control of the supervisory dimension of authority that the emergent role of the teacher as an aspirant professional thrusts him into confrontation with the authority structure. The confrontations have focused on achieving two aspirations. The first is establishing an acceptable or collegial base for decision-making as an expert endeavor. The second aspiration springs from challenges to the competence of administrators to assess teaching performance.

Norman Robinson, in a 1967 study, reported that teachers are achieving increased professional status. They are receiving longer periods of pre-service training, have formed tight-knit organizations for representation, and that they are demanding more and more control over their work environment (Robinson, 1967).

Corwin (1970), in a report of a 1966 study, stated that the most important basis of the teacher's sense of power is the growth of specialization in teaching areas. Many teachers, through their

organization, are beginning to assert that they must be afforded the right to significant input to the decision-making process which controls their professional situation. Both the professional association and the union are insisting upon the right of teachers to participate with boards of education and their administrative representatives in determining the policies of common concern and conditions of professional service.

Colombotas, in a study reported in Corwin (1970), examined how the sociological backgrounds of teachers are associated with their professional orientations. Among his was the presence of a relationship between men teachers and their participations in the AFT, though not with their participation in NEA. More salient to the study at hand was the fact that there were no significant differences in professionalism between members of the AFT and the NEA.

Corwin (1970) compared officers of NEA with officers of AFT and found no significant differences in professionalism.

The preceding section of the review of literature suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis Two: There will be no significant difference in professionalism as shown by the negotiators for the NEA as compared with professionalism as shown by negotiators for the AFT.

#### Labor-Management Orientation

The goals of teachers' organizations which are engaged in collective bargaining or collective negotiations are multi-dimensional. These goals include, as a minimum: (1) surviving as an organization;

(2) improving the conditions of employment; (3) promoting education as a profession; (4) raising salaries to a point which is on par with other professions; (5) providing a superior educational opportunity for the youth; (6) controlling jobs for the membership of the organization; (7) formulating and jointly administering, with the administration, a system for the adjudication of grievances and the resolution of disputes arising during the contract period; (8) having a part in the decision-making processes (Darland, 1971), (Schmidt, Parker, and Repas, 1967).

The primary function of any employee organization is to improve the wellbeing of its membership and to enhance their established rights. Collective negotiations should not provide employees with the power to 'write their own ticket', but to provide for their effective participation in the establishment of terms and conditions of employment (Taylor, 1969, p. 158).

Doherty and Oberer (1967, p. 22) state that it is rare that two organizations, the NEA and the AFT, which were, "so markedly dissimilar in origin, structure, and style should come to pursue identical objectives in a similar fashion". Collective bargaining has created circumstances which have forced a great many affiliates of the NEA to adopt functions and even an outlook more typical of trade unions than of professional organizations. "The AFT has veered from its appointed course. The AFT's interest in problems of education, distinct from the employment relationship, indicates an effort to achieve professional respectability."

By 1970 teacher organizations had undergone a transformation. They had shed their faith in the benevolence of boards of education and the rhetoric of liberalism. They had become classroom-teacher oriented and extremely tough-minded about economic status and the right to engage in negotiations to influence the policies which most affect them (Darland, 1971, p. 64).

Hipp (1967, p. 257) reinforces Darland by stating:

The insistence on the part of the organized teacher that the circumstances of teaching must be favorable and that teacher's own personal interests should be advanced, has led more and more teacher groups to demand formal professional negotiations agreements. Teachers' organizations, whether NEA or AFT, want boards of education to sit down and give teachers a voice in the determination of policy.

The NEA, espousing the position of a professional organization, has felt that it should be as much, if not more, concerned with the competence of its members as about their economic welfare and other conditions relating to job performance. By 1966, however, faced with pressures to win representation elections and the duty to represent teachers, NEA seems to have shifted from the obligation of the profession to judge performance, to a more vigorous push for teachers' rights. "The lesson, evidently, is that if one competes with a union, one ends up playing by the union's rules" (Doherty and Oberer, 1967, p. 28).

Lavine, Doherty, and Scanlon state that the successes of the AFT in negotiations with New York City in 1961-1962 substantially influenced the NEA in its policies toward collective bargaining. The NEA could either play the union's game of collective bargaining-- professional negotiations - and exclusive representation or be faced with a loss of power in the urban and large suburban areas. The NEA chose to play the union game and in doing so adopted many union practices in the process. Salary requests became salary demands. Consultation became professional negotiation. Teachers who had never dreamed of "bilateral determination of employment conditions" were becoming acquainted with the jargon of trade unionism (Doherty, 1969), (Lavine, 1970), (Scanlon, 1968).

In terms of policy and outlook, the NEA and the AFT are moving ever closer together: (1) The AFT has always been a unified membership



organization and in recent years a vigorous NEA campaign has resulted in twenty-eight states adopting unified membership plans; (2) Both organizations take a serious interest in the improvement of instruction, as evidenced by the More Effective School Program of the AFT affiliate in New York and the Center for the Study of Instruction developed by the NEA; (3) Both organizations, NEA through work for professional practices boards and AFT through its Quality Educational Standards in Teaching (QUEST) program, are emphasizing the drive to become a profession; (4) Three substantial locals of AFT and NEA have voted to merge, those in Flint, Michigan, Los Angeles, and the State of New York; (5) Both the NEA and the AFT publish major periodicals. NEA publishes: the NEA Reporter, Today's Education, and the Journal of Teacher Education, among many, and the AFT publishes the American Teacher and Changing Education (Darland, 1971), (Jamison, 1969), (Stinnett, 1969), (Scanlon, 1968), (Lavine, 1970).

The challenge of the AFT has produced drastic changes in the NEA: The development of the NEA's Urban Project which is responsible for teachers' negotiations; over 10 per cent of the NEA's budget is now being spent on teacher negotiations; and in districts where representation elections were held and eligibility to vote was determined by an impartial person, principals and other administrators have been excluded from the unit of representation (Moskow, 1967).

Doherty and Oberer (1967, p. 41), reporting an analysis of the differences between AFT and NEA contracts, state:

Our conclusion, then, guided solely by the scope of the collective agreements negotiated by both teacher organizations, is that there is very little difference between the two when it comes down to the manner in which teachers are to be represented at the local level. In a great many cases NEA affiliates are beginning to act very much like trade unions. When an NEA

affiliate participates in a representation election, wins the election and assumes the role of exclusive bargaining agent, enters into negotiations with the employer over comprehensive agreement, goes out on strike when its terms are not met, wins the strike and administers the agreement with vigor and determination--when an affiliate does all of this, it does not seem right to speak of it as anything but a union. The struggle between NEA and AFT has become not a contest between rival ideologies, 'professionalism' and 'trade unionsim', but between rival unions.

William T. Lowe (1967) reports a study of 531 teachers from a school district which has AFT and NEA members on its staff. The study consisted of a comparison of NEA, AFT, and unaffiliated teachers' responses to a detailed questionnaire to attempt to determine whether any significant differences occurred between the teachers who joined NEA or AFT or chose to remain unaffiliated. Some of the conclusions were: NEA and AFT members could not be distinguished on the basis of tenure in their present assignment; there was no relationship between amount of experience and membership in AFT or NEA; marital status was not related to membership in NEA or AFT; AFT members were lower in morale than NEA members; there were no significant differences in the perceptions of NEA and AFT members as to whether the board of education helped in improving staff competence; the objective for teaching for NEA and AFT teachers seemed to be identical.

On the basis of conversations with teachers and local leaders of NEA and AFT affiliates, the NEA, AFT, and unaffiliated teachers in this community are identical in terms of their educational backgrounds, their sincere interest in children and their dedication to the profession (Lowe, 1967, p. 254).

The review of literature leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis Three: There will be no significant differences in labor-management orientation as expressed by negotiators

for the NEA as opposed to orientations expressed by negotiators for the AFT.

### Contracts

In the 1960's, the NEA was forced to re-evaluate its position toward professional negotiations. It could either "play the union's game", the two chief rules of which were exclusive recognition and collective bargaining, or it could face the possibility of being eased out of the picture as an organization which looked after the teachers' interests. The NEA chose "to play". Sometimes the NEA has demanded representation elections before the union could muster sufficient strength to win. Once elected as the exclusive bargaining agent, the association negotiated comprehensive very "union-like agreements" (Doherty and Oberer, 1967, p. 33).

The National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers have, at the national and state level, a staff of individuals who work full-time with the local affiliate in the negotiation of contracts with boards of education. These national and state employees of the NEA and the AFT gain extensive experience in the negotiation of contracts in different districts. When they arrive at a district to assist in the negotiations, they are loaded with comparative information which may be of great help to the local association or union.

As a result of the convergence of attitudes by the NEA and the AFT, many of the formerly non-negotiable subjects are now items which are commonly found in negotiated contracts. The NEA booklet, Professional Negotiations: Selected Statements of School Board, Administrator, Teacher Relationship, first published in 1963, was designed as a guide

for local associations which were contemplating formalizing relationships with their school boards. In the 1963 and 1964 editions, the majority of examples of professional agreements consisted of Level I and Level II types of agreements. Level I agreements provided for recognition of the local association. Level II agreements provided for recognition plus an outline of procedures to be used during negotiations. In the 1965 edition, there was only one example of Level I agreements and one example of Level II agreements. The remaining examples were Level III agreements. Level III agreements are comprehensive labor-management contracts. "It needed only to be said that by 1965 the NEA had come around to accepting the same type of elaborate document the AFT had long been advocating" (Doherty and Oberer, 1965, p. 36).

In its 1969 publication, How to Negotiate, the NEA does not mention Levels I and II. Instead, information and suggestions as to how the local association should negotiate a comprehensive agreement are given.

The proposal should be so written that if the board accepted it in its entirety, the teachers' desires would be fulfilled and their frustrations terminated .... The association should propose everything that the teachers wish to achieve and for which legitimate argument can be provided (NEA, 1969, p. 17).

Charles Cogen, in a speech given to the National Institute on Collective Negotiations in Public Education in 1965, stated:

We place no limit on open negotiations--the items which are subject to the bargaining process. Anything on which the two parties can agree should become part of the agreement; anything on which they cannot agree will, of course, not appear. I look for a great expansion in the effective scope of negotiations. Anything having to do with the operation of the school is a matter for professional concern and it should thus be subject to collective bargaining.

Lieberman and Moskow (1966, p. 416) describe a typical contract as would be negotiated by either the American Federation of Teachers or

the National Education Association in the following manner:

A typical contract is a written agreement between an employer and a employee organization, usually for a definite term, defining conditions of employment (wages, hours, vacations, overtime, working conditions), rights of employees and employee organization, and procedures to be followed in settling disputes or handling issues that arise during the life of the agreement.

Shils and Whittier (1968) state that the AFT insists on contracts which include the following subject areas: recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent; specified working conditions; grievance procedures with binding arbitration; dues checkoff; fringe benefits; and conditions affecting education as a profession.

Dashield, in a 1969 NEA publication, lists appropriate articles for a comprehensive agreement. The articles are taken from contracts currently in effect and reported to the NEA. Local associations should negotiate in the areas below, but should not limit themselves to this list.

Article 1	Definitions
Article 2	General Provisions
Article 3	Recognition
Article 4	Negotiation Procedure
Article 5	Grievance Procedure
Article 6	Rights of Teachers
Article 7	Rights of Exclusive Representation
Article 8	Teaching Hours and Teaching Load
Article 9	Class Size
Article 10	Teacher Assignments and Relief From Non-Teaching Duties
Article 11	Vacancies and Promotions

Article 12	Transfers (Voluntary and Involuntary)
Article 13	Leaves of Absence
Article 14	Group Insurance and Hospitalization
Article 15	In-Service Education
Article 16	Protection for Teachers
Article 17	Academic Freedom
Article 18	Employment Standards
Article 19	Curriculum Improvements
Article 20	Teaching Conditions
Article 21	Student Discipline
Article 22	Teacher Evaluation and Teacher Files
Article 23	Student Teachers
Article 24	Paraprofessionals, Teacher Aides, Teaching Specialists
Article 25	Salary Policies and Payroll Procedures
Article 26	Summer and Evening Schools
Article 27	School Calendar
Article 28	Equal Educational Opportunity
Article 29	Payroll Deductions
Article 30	Duration and Amendment

(NEA, 1969).

The essence of the formalized employer-employee relationship is the collective agreement or contract. This contract or agreement sets forth in detail employment conditions which have been bilaterally determined between the teachers or their representatives and the board of education or its representatives.

The National Education Association recommends to its state and

local affiliates a process which is called "professional negotiations". The American Federation of Teachers advocates "collective bargaining". The differences between professional negotiations and collective bargaining, when viewed in light of these approaches, tend to be differences in semantics. Shils and Whittier (1968, p. 125) list the similarities between the approaches of the AFT and the NEA:

1. Both NEA and AFT seek provisions for direct, face-to-face, relationships between teachers or their duly elected or appointed representatives and the board of education or their duly elected or appointed representatives.
2. Both NEA and AFT seek legislation at the state level in order to formally establish this face-to-face relationship.
3. Both NEA and AFT seek written contracts which specify the means and terms of the relationship.
4. Both NEA and AFT, in the event of an ultimate decision which is unsatisfactory to the teachers, will employ the strike as a bargaining weapon.

In the representation elections held thus far in education, the associations and the federations have repeatedly tried to include or exclude groups on organizational grounds. One such case involved representation proceedings for the Milwaukee Board of Vocational and Adult Education. The Milwaukee Vocational Teachers Union (AFT) requested a representation election, whereupon the Milwaukee Vocational and Adult Schools Education Association (NEA) requested that it be placed on the ballot. The union objected, on the grounds that the association was not a "labor organization" within the meaning of the Wisconsin statute providing that public employees shall have "the right to be represented by labor organizations of their own choice." Thus, the NEA affiliate had to prove it was a labor organization, which it did to the satisfaction of the WERB. The Board emphasized that the important issue was the

nature of the organization, not its label, and that the activities of the association were very similar to those of the federation (Lieberman and Moskow, 1966, pp. 132-133).

The negotiation of agreements between an association representing the teachers and the board of education or its designated representative is becoming more common. Shils and Whittier (1968) list one purpose of their book is to alert the boards of education and their superintendents to the fact that both the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers mean business in their respective approaches to negotiations. They further contend that there is very little if any difference in the impact on school administration whether their association which organizes the teachers is the NEA or the AFT.

Lieberman and Moskow (1966) state that "some people" feel that the crucial distinction between professional negotiations as practiced by the local affiliates of the National Education Association, and collective bargaining as practiced by the local affiliates of the American Federation of Teachers, is professionalism. Collective bargaining as a process is inherently limited or should be inherently limited to bread and butter issues; whereas, professional negotiations is thought to encompass a much wider range of teacher concerns. This view is questionable since "the scope of contracts negotiated by local affiliates of the AFT are very nearly the same as the scope of agreements reached by the NEA."

The 1966 agreement reached between the New Haven Teachers League and the New Haven Board of Education, illustrates the similarities of the NEA versus the AFT approach to negotiations. An article-by-article analysis of the contract reveals nothing significantly different from agreements reached through collective bargaining. The similarity illustrates the fallacy of assuming that agreements reached under one procedural label are



different from agreements reached under a different procedural label (Lieberman and Moskow, 1967, p. 9).

Doherty and Oberer (1967, pp. 38-39) reviewed negotiated contracts and concluded that there was little difference in the scope and subject matter of bargaining whether the local affiliate of the NEA or the AFT was responsible for the negotiations.

The subject matter of agreements in Rochester, New Haven, and Newark, where Associations are the bargaining agents, is in the main no less comprehensive than it is in the contracts negotiated by the Federation in New York City, Boston, and Philadelphia ....

Our conclusion, then, guided solely by the scope of the collective agreements negotiated by both teacher organizations, is that there is very little difference between the two when it comes to the manner in which teachers are to be represented at the local level.

The preceding review of selected literature leads the writer to state the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis Four: There will be no significant difference in contracts negotiated by negotiators for the NEA as opposed to contracts negotiated by negotiators for the AFT.

For testing purposes, Hypothesis Four will be divided into six sub-hypotheses identified by the contract categories as defined in Chapter I.

Hypothesis Four (a): There will be no significant difference in provisions for Organizational Security between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts.

Hypothesis Four (b): There will be no significant difference in provisions for Exchange of Facts and Views between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts.

Hypothesis Four (c): There will be no significant difference in the number of Professional Considerations between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts.

Hypothesis Four (d): There will be no significant difference in the number of Employee Considerations between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts.

Hypothesis Four (e): There will be no significant difference in provisions for Impass Resolution between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts.

Hypothesis Four (f): There will be no significant difference in Grievance Procedures between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts.

## CHAPTER III

### METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

This chapter presents the selection of the sample, the instrumentation, the collection of data, the treatment of data, and the statistical analysis used in the present investigation.


#### Sample Selection

##### Population

The population from which the sample was drawn consisted of all school districts in the Region Five of the State of Illinois (Figure 1) which conduct face-to-face negotiations between representatives of the faculty organizational unit and the governing board of the school district or its representatives.

These face-to-face negotiations must result in a written agreement which satisfies the following criteria (Doherty and Oberer (1967), Shils and Whittier (1968)):

- (1) Organizational security;
- (2) Exchange of facts and views;
- (3) Conditions of employment;
- (4) Impass resolution;
- (5) Grievance procedure.



**The Office of the  
Superintendent of  
Public Instruction  
State of Illinois**

**Michael J. Bakalis  
Superintendent**

Figure 1. Map of the Regions of the State of Illinois

Region Five of the State of Illinois was selected as the geographical area from which the sample would be drawn for the following reasons:

- (1) The writer had been employed in this region and was familiar with many school district administrators. It was felt that this familiarity would enhance the possibilities for cooperation in the study.
- (2) Region Five contained a variety of sizes and types of school districts.
- (3) The researcher had relatives in the area. If visits to the participating school districts became necessary, the financial burden could be lightened.

The first step in securing the population from which the sample was drawn was to contact the state office of the Illinois American Federation of Teachers and the state office of the Illinois Education Association. The purpose of contacting these two organizational headquarters was to obtain a list of those school districts in Region Five of the State of Illinois which are engaged in face-to-face negotiations with the elected representatives of the faculty unit. The Executive Secretary of the Illinois Federation of Teachers indicated that he would be happy to supply the names and addresses of those school districts in Region Five of the State of Illinois which are engaged in face-to-face negotiations with an affiliated local of the American Federation of Teachers. The information was sent within the week.

The researcher contacted the state office of the Illinois Education Association. Following instructions received from an official of the Association, the writer spoke with the Field Representative for Region Five. The writer was informed that the names and addresses of those

school districts in Region Five which are engaged in face-to-face negotiations with a local affiliate of the Illinois Education Association would be supplied.

The Illinois Education Association listed twenty-one (21) school districts in Region Five which were engaged in face-to-face negotiations with local affiliates of the National Education Association. The Illinois American Federation of Teachers supplied a list of eleven (11) school districts in Region Five which were engaged in face-to-face negotiations with local teachers unions affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers.

#### Sample Districts

Six school districts were randomly selected from the list supplied by the Illinois Education Association. Six school districts were randomly selected from the list supplied by the Illinois American Federation of Teachers.

The superintendents of each of these twelve (12) school districts received a letter asking them to participate in the study (see Appendix A). Two affirmative responses were received during the two weeks waiting period. At the end of the waiting period, the first follow-up letter was mailed to those districts which did not respond. Three affirmative responses were received during the three-week period. At the end of the waiting period, the second follow-up letter was mailed to the remaining districts. After three weeks, no affirmative responses were received. The writer then drove to Illinois where interviews regarding participation in the study were held with three superintendents. Telephone conversations regarding participation in the study

were conducted with the remaining four superintendents. All twelve of the districts agreed to participate in the study. One school district which negotiated with a local of the American Federation of Teachers was dropped at a later date because of an insufficient number of respondents among the negotiators.

The districts comprising the sample indicate a varied economical base. The predominate economic base of each school district used in the study is presented in Table I. The letter "A" designates a National Education Association affiliate. The letter "B" designates an American Federation of Teachers affiliate.

TABLE I  
ECONOMIC BASE OF SAMPLE DISTRICTS

District	Base
A1	Residential
A2	Residential-Agricultural
A3	Residential-Military
A <sup>4</sup>	Agricultural
A5	Agricultural
A6	Residential-Agricultural
B1	Residential
B2	Industrial-Residential
B3	Mining-Agricultural
B <sup>4</sup>	Industrial-Residential
B5	Industrial

The school districts in the sample range from primarily residential through primarily agricultural to primarily industrial. The NEA districts tend to be more residential-agricultural in economic base; whereas, the AFT districts have a tendency toward a residential-industrial base.

The eleven districts vary somewhat in wealth. In the following table (Table II), the assessed valuation, assessed valuation per student, and rank in per pupil wealth of unit districts in Illinois for the 1970-1971 fiscal year are shown.

TABLE II

THE ANNUAL EXPENDITURE PER STUDENT, THE ASSESSED VALUATION PER STUDENT AND DISTRICT RANK IN ASSESSED VALUATION PER PUPIL FOR UNIT DISTRICTS IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS FOR THE 1970-71 SCHOOL YEAR

District	Annual Expenditure Per Student	Assessed Valuation Per Student	District Rank by Assessed Valuation Per Pupil (high = 1; low = 419)
A1	\$712	\$ 7,726	413
A2	849	17,334	314
A3	801	7,161	416
A4	738	16,153	327
A5	809	14,509	354
A6	825	22,075	223
B1	836	12,246	380
B2	871	11,839	385
B3	730	9,911	401
B4	923	16,182	326
B5	760	55,756	8



The eleven districts ranged in wealth from an assessed valuation per pupil of \$7,726 which is ranked 413 to an assessed valuation per pupil of \$55,756 which is ranked 8th. The Mann-Whitney U Test (Siegel, 1956) was used to test whether the school districts negotiating with the AFT affiliate differ significantly in wealth from school districts negotiating with NEA affiliates. The results of the Mann-Whitney U Test indicate that the two distributions are from the same population; the groups do not differ significantly in wealth.

The per pupil expenditures of the eleven districts ranged from a low of \$712 to a high of \$923. The mean expenditure per child among the districts is \$804. The Mann-Whitney U Test (Siegel, 1956) was used to test whether the school districts which negotiated with an American Federation of Teachers affiliate differ significantly in per pupil expenditure from school districts which negotiated with an affiliate of the National Education Association. The results of the Mann-Whitney U Test indicate that the two distributions are from the same population; therefore, do not differ significantly in per pupil expenditure.

The eleven districts vary in student population. In the following table (Table III) the student population for each of the districts used in the study is presented.

TABLE III  
THE AVERAGE DAILY ATTENDANCE PER DISTRICT

District	Average Daily Attendance
A1	3,365
A2	4,869
A3	3,742
A4	1,708
A5	971
A6	2,477
B1	7,692
B2	19,815
B3	1,644
B4	13,366
B5	618

The eleven districts which were used in the study ranged in Average Daily Attendance from a low of 618 in District B-5 to a high of 19,815 in District B-2. The mean Average Daily Attendance for the sample was 5,479. The Mann-Whitney U Test (Siegel, 1956) was used to test whether the school districts which negotiated with an affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers differs significantly in Average Daily Attendance from school districts which negotiated with an affiliate of the National Education Association. The results of the Mann-Whitney U Test indicate the two distributions are from the same population; therefore, do not differ significantly in Average Daily Attendance.

### The Sample

The sample used in this study included all of the negotiators who represented the eleven boards of education in face-to-face negotiations and all of the negotiators who represented the eleven teacher's organizations in face-to-face negotiations.

In the following table (Table IV), the total number of negotiators per district who represented the board of education in face-to-face negotiations; the number of board of education negotiators per district who responded to the instrument packet, the total number of negotiators per district who represent the local teachers' organization in face-to-face negotiations, the number of local teacher's organization negotiators per district who responded to the instrument packet, and the total number of negotiators per district who responded to the instrument packet are presented.

The range in total number of negotiators was from American Federation of Teachers District B-2 with two negotiators, one board of education negotiator, and one teacher's union negotiator to American Federation of Teachers District B-1 with thirteen negotiators, six board of education negotiators, and seven teacher's union negotiators. The range in per cent of negotiators responding was from American Federation of Teachers District B-1 with a 54 per cent response to four districts with a 100 per cent response. The total number of negotiators was 96. The total number of respondents was 77. The rate of return among the negotiators in the eleven districts was 80 per cent.

TABLE IV

THE NUMBER OF NEGOTIATORS PER DISTRICT AND THE NUMBER OF  
NEGOTIATORS WHO RESPONDED PER DISTRICT

District	Negotia- tors Total	Total Board Team	Board Team Responding	Total Team Teachers	Teacher Team Responding	Total Negotiators Responding
A1	9	5	4	4	3	7
A2	6	3	1	3	3	4
A3	8	4	4	4	3	7
A4	7	4	4	3	3	7
A5	10	5	5	5	5	10
A6	10	5	5	5	5	10
B1	13	6	2	7	5	7
B2	2	1	1	1	1	2
B3	11	6	6	5	3	9
B4	13	7	3	6	6	9
B5	7	4	2	3	3	5

#### Instrumentation

##### Measuring Professionalism

Corwin (1963) developed The Professional Orientation Scale as an instrument to be used in the investigation of staff conflicts in public schools. This instrument, which measures the teachers' professional orientation, consists of sixteen items which use a Likert-type scale for scoring purposes. These sixteen items are divided among four sub-scales. The sub-scales will not be utilized. The total score, "professionalism" will be used (Corwin, 1963), (Oborny, 1970).

In the development of the instrument, Corwin selected sixteen items from a large number of items which were constructed. This selection process included judgment of face validity by a panel of sociologists and testing of discrimination power in relation to total score. Corwin then randomly assigned the items to two groups. The reliability of the instrument was estimated by applying the Spearman-Brown formula. The split-half correlation of the two sets of items was .65 corrected.

Corwin used the known group technique for validation of the scale. Teachers who had five or more years of teaching experience, had published two or more articles, had held an office in a professional association, or had been professionally active were considered the high professional group. The low professional group consisted of full- or part-time teachers who subscribe to a maximum of one professional journal, had not published, were not active in professional organizations. Since the mean scores of the two groups differed significantly at the .01 level, the Professional Orientation Scale was judged to discriminate between groups who have high professional orientation and groups who have low professional orientation (Corwin, 1963).

For the purposes of the current study, it was felt that the word "professional" may have "emotionally charged meanings" for some of the negotiators in the sample. The title of the scale was changed to "Views of the Teacher's Job" (Oborny, 1970).

The reliability of "Views of the Teacher's Job" was estimated for the sample used in this study by applying the Spearman-Brown formula. The items in the scale were randomly assigned to two groups. The split-half correlation of the two sets of items when corrected was  $r_n = .76$ .

### Measuring Militancy

Corwin (1963) developed the Initiative-Compliance Scale (The Way I See It) as a part of an investigation of staff conflict in the public schools. This scale, which may be considered a measure of militancy, consists of twelve hypothetical situations which have the potential for producing conflict situations between teachers and administrators (Fairman, 1970), (King, 1972). These hypothetical situations were based on real incidents which were found in case studies, legal cases, and literature on role conflicts (Corwin, 1963). One sample of the hypothetical situations used in the scale follows:

The assistant principal told a teacher that he was too 'outspoken' in criticizing certain policies of the school and that this was causing unrest among faculty members. Imagine yourself as the teacher (Corwin, 1963, p. 192).

The respondent was asked to put himself in the place of the teachers in this situation and to respond on a Likert-type scale to a question.

The question is: 'What would you do in this situation?' The possible alternatives are: Comply with superior's request; try to compromise; seek support of colleagues; ask for an investigation by a professional organization; refuse to comply with the request (Corwin, 1963, p. 192).

Corwin (1963) further indicates that the set of responses was weighted from one to six in the order given. The reaction to the question: "What would you do in this situation?" would indicate an index of the amount of initiative or compliance which the respondent is willing to assume. The lower the respondent's score on this question, the more compliance he displays to the administration. The higher the respondent's score on this question the more initiative the respondent is willing to assume.

Corwin established the validity of the scale by comparing the actual number of conflicts which were reported by teachers during interviews with their scores on the instrument. The difference between the mean scores of the group with a high number of conflicts and the group with a low number of conflicts was statistically significant beyond the .01 level. The instrument was judged to discriminate between groups which show initiative and those who show compliance.

The split-half reliability was  $r = .74$  and when corrected with the Spearman-Brown formula was  $r_n = .85$ .

The reliability of The Way I See It was determined for the sample used in this study by applying the Spearman-Brown formula to the obtained scores. The items in the scale were randomly assigned to two groups. The split-half correlation of the two sets of items when corrected was  $r_n = .75$ .

#### Measuring Labor-Management Attitudes

The Labor-Management Attitudes Questionnaire was developed by Helper (1953) to measure "deep-seated, long range attitudes and beliefs of individuals toward labor and management." One hundred-eighteen statements, about which people who are oriented toward labor might disagree with people who are management oriented were constructed. A panel of experts judged the items as to labor or management orientation. The items were administered to 120 students at the Ohio State University. The scores on the items were subjected to item analysis. The forty items showing the strongest discrimination were selected as the final form of the questionnaire.

This finalized form was administered to a group of individuals who

were members of a local Junior Chamber of Commerce and another group of men who were union leaders and shop stewards. Helper then computed a "t" test for groups with different n's. The difference between group means was significant beyond the .01 level. The test was judged to discriminate between groups which have a "deep-seated, long range orientation toward labor" and groups which have "deep-seated, long range orientations toward management" (Helper, 1953).

The reliability of the questionnaire was determined by the test-retest method. The questionnaire was readministered to fifty of the original respondents ten weeks after the first administration. The reliability was found to be .85 (Helper, 1953).

The reliability of the Labor Management Attitudes Questionnaire was determined for the sample used in this study by applying the Spearman-Brown formula to the obtained scores. The items were randomly assigned to two groups. The split-half correlation of the two sets of items when correlated was  $r_n = .96$ .

The validity of the Labor Management Attitudes Questionnaire was determined for the sample used in this study by computing a "t" test for groups with different n's. The sample was split into management negotiators and employee negotiators. The mean scores for the two groups were computed. The difference between group means was statistically significant beyond the .001 level. The test was judged to discriminate between the two groups in the sample.

#### Data Collection

Upon agreeing to participate in the study, each superintendent was given the option of either receiving the instrument packets and



instructions by mail or having the writer deliver the packets and information personally (see Appendix B for instrument packet and instructions). Nine superintendents opted to receive the instrument packets and instructions by mail. Two superintendents chose to have the instrument packets delivered by the writer.

The instructions and instrument packets were identical whether they were mailed or delivered. The superintendent was requested to distribute the packets to all individuals who are engaged in face-to-face negotiations between the board of education and the teachers' organization; the superintendent was asked to supply the number of negotiators for each of the two negotiating teams; and to mail a copy of the finished contract to the writer.

The instrument packet contained instructions to the negotiator, a copy of the Labor-Management Attitudes Questionnaire, Views of the Teachers' Job, The Way I See It, answer sheets, and a demographic questionnaire. The instructions requested the negotiator to respond to the instruments in the order which they are found, insert the finished instruments, answer sheets, and demographic questionnaire into the self-addressed, stamped envelope, then place the envelope in the mail (see Appendix B).

The eleven sets of instrument packets were either delivered or mailed to the participating school superintendent who distributed them to the negotiators as per instructions. After one month, a follow-up letter was mailed to the superintendent, asking him to urge the negotiators to respond to the instrument packet and return it to the writer. After three weeks, a second follow-up letter was mailed to the superintendent. Two weeks later a third follow-up letter was mailed, it was

decided that due to the low rate of return a more personal appeal to the negotiators was warranted. A letter was sent to the superintendents of the eleven participating districts asking for a list of the names and addresses of the individual negotiators. After waiting three weeks, all superintendents who had not responded with the requested list were contacted personally by telephone.

Using the names and addresses supplied by the superintendent, an instrument packet with instructions was mailed to each negotiator. The instructions stated that the negotiator was to disregard this instrument packet if he had previously responded. The first follow-up letter was mailed three weeks after the packets were sent to the negotiators. After three weeks, the second follow-up letter was mailed to the negotiators. After three weeks, a personal telephone call was placed to each negotiator. The negotiator was urged to respond to the instrument packet if he had not previously done so. If the returns from a particular district were low enough, i.e., less than 50 per cent, a second telephone call was made to all negotiators in that district. Each negotiator was urged to return the instrument packet if he had not done so.

Efforts seeking additional responses from negotiators ceased after a return rate of 80 per cent of the total number of negotiators was reached (see Table IV).

A letter was then sent to each superintendent expressing gratitude for the cooperation received and requesting the following information: A copy of the contract which was negotiated by the negotiators used in the study; and the number of years which the board of education had been engaged in face-to-face negotiations with the teachers' organization.

After two weeks, a personal telephone call was made to those superintendents who had not responded. All eleven contracts were received.

### Treatment of Data

#### Scoring the Instruments

Responses to the Labor-Management Attitudes Questionnaire, Views of the Teachers' Job, and The Way I See It were hand scored by the writer. These scores, along with the information from the demographic questionnaire were transferred to score sheets. These sheets were presented to the Oklahoma State Computer Center where the information was transferred to IBM cards and verified to be correct.

#### Analyzation of Contracts

The contracts which were negotiated in each of the eleven sample districts were analyzed in relation to the presence or absence of specific provisions within each of the six individual categories as outlined in Chapter I of this study. The following discussion relates the procedures of analyzation in detail. Each of the five categories was treated individually. The category scores were achieved by summing the provisions which were included.

I. Organizational Security: This category contains those provisions which protect the status of the employee organization.

A. Exclusive Recognition: The acceptance by the board of education of an organization as the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit. Scored as one point.

- B. Rights of Exclusive Representation: The right and obligation of the employee organization to bargain collectively for all employees in the negotiations unit which they represent. Scored as one point.
  - C. Dues Check Off: The employer agrees to deduct the organizational dues from the employee's wages and reimburse the organization. Scored as one point.
  - D. Negotiating Unit: Defines the occupational group or groups which the employee organization represents in negotiations. If administrators are excluded, this provision is scored as one point.
  - E. Availability of Facilities: Provides for the use of district or building facilities for employee organizational purposes. Scored as one point.
  - F. Election Procedures: The procedures used to elect a rival organization to represent the employee unit in negotiations. Scored as one point. If the percentage of the negotiating unit needed on the petition for election exceeds thirty and percentage of negotiating unit needed for election of rival organization is above fifty, add one extra point.
  - G. Length of Agreement: The number of years the contract is in effect. Scored as one point for each year the contract is in effect.
- II. Exchange of Facts and Views: A provision which insures

the exchange of information which is pertinent to the negotiations process. Scored as one point.

III. Conditions of Employment: Provisions which affect the members of the Negotiations unit as employees or as professional educators. This category was divided into two parts; the teacher as an educator and the teacher as an employee. Each provision within each part is scored as one point.

A. Educational Conditions: A provision which deals with the teaching-learning relationship, curriculum, student evaluation, teacher evaluation, or the fulfillment of duties as an educator. Each provision is scored as one point.

1. Teacher evaluation
2. Teacher assignment
3. Curriculum committees
4. Textbook committees
5. Administrator-faculty conferences
6. Employment requirements
7. Student discipline
8. Educational planning committee
9. Professional growth (academic)
10. Preparation period
11. Student evaluation
12. In-service training
13. Faculty meetings
14. Maximum class size

15. Sabbatical leave
  16. Scope of negotiations
  17. Professional consultation (outside experts)
  18. Student orientation
  19. No unnecessary classroom interruptions
  20. Parent conferences
  21. Released time for department chairmen
  22. Program improvement
  23. Assignment of remedial classes (rotation)
  24. Administrator search committee
  25. Teaching conditions committee
  26. Availability of student's cumulative folders
  27. Varied teaching experiences within areas of expertise
  28. Academic freedom
  29. Teacher's aids
- B. Employee Considerations: Any physical, temporal, or financial condition which deals with the member of the teachers' negotiating unit as an employee. Each provision is scored as one point.
1. Length of school year
  2. Length of school day
  3. Salary schedule and conditions
  4. Sick leave
  5. Maternity leave
  6. Bereavement leave
  7. Personal leave
  8. Hospitalization insurance

9. Placement on salary schedule (credit for service outside of district)
10. Payroll procedures
11. Extracurricular activities (assignment to)
12. Seniority
13. Legal assistance to teachers in case of assault
14. Fringe benefits
15. Complaint procedure (not a grievance)
16. Notification of vacancies prior to release to general public
17. Personnel files open to individual teacher
18. Protection against assault
19. Promotion policies
20. Substitution pay scale for covering individual classes
21. Compensation for teaching extra class (above 5 per day)
22. Leave of absence
23. Budgetary planning committee
24. No custodial duties
25. Teachers' lounge
26. Length of faculty meetings
27. Publication of all teachers salaries
28. Permission to leave building and grounds during lunch and non-scheduled time
29. Administrative job descriptions
30. Inter-faculty cooperative class substitution in case of emergency absence of teacher

31. Job description for coaches
32. Emergency leave
33. Transfer policies
34. Teacher parking
35. Identification cards
36. Release from non-teaching duties
37. Duty free lunch period
38. Room assignment (criteria for)
39. Procedures for being assigned to summer school
40. Merit pay for punctuality
41. Athletic passes
42. Notification of supervisor's visit
43. Teacher work room
44. Separation of teachers' lunch and toilet facilities  
from students'
45. Tax sheltered annuity
46. Disposition of accumulated earned absences
47. Cost of living increases
48. Severance pay
49. Teacher's mailboxes
50. Credit Union

IV. Impass Resolution: Provisions which prescribe the procedures for resolving deadlock situations during negotiations.

A. Steps

1. Formal notification of impass. Scored as one point.
2. Mediation. Scored as one point.
3. Fact-Finding. Scored as one point.



- B. Agency Used for Final Appeal: If the agency is outside of the school district's or bargaining agent's control, score as one point.
  - C. Binding Final Appeal: If the final decision by the mediator or fact finder is binding, score one point.
  - D. No Strike Provision. Score as one point.
  - E. Good Faith Bargaining. Score as one point.
- V. Grievance Procedure: The formalized processes for dealing with any complaint or expressed dissatisfaction by an employee in connection with the terms of his employment as set forth in the agreement.
- A. Formal Steps:
    - 1. Submission to principal. Score one point.
    - 2. Appeal to superintendent. Score one point.
    - 3. Appeal to board of education. Score one point.
    - 4. Arbitration. Score one point.
  - B. Agency Used for Arbitration: If the agency is outside the control of the board of education and the bargaining unit, score one point.
  - C. Binding Arbitration: If arbitrator's decision is binding, score one point.

#### Statistical Analysis

The total sample consisted of seventy-seven negotiators. These negotiators were divided into four categories. The forty-four NEA negotiators were divided into twenty-one teacher negotiators and twenty-three board negotiators. The thirty-three AFT negotiators were

divided into eighteen teacher negotiators and fifteen board negotiators. The size of the four categories led to the selection of the Mann-Whitney U Test of significance for the analyzation of the responses to the three instruments. Siegel (1956) states that the Mann-Whitney U Test is the most powerful of the nonparametric tests and is a very useful alternative to the "t" test. The Mann-Whitney U Test was used to determine whether two independent groups were drawn from the same population.

The total number of contracts which were analyzed in the current study was eleven. Six contracts were negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and five contracts were negotiated in AFT affiliated districts. The size of the two groups of contracts led to the selection of the Mann-Whitney U Test of significance for the analyzation of these contracts.

The demographic data were divided into two groups according to the same affiliation criteria as presented for contracts. These data were analyzed for differences by applying the Mann-Whitney U Test of significance. The demographic data and the contract category scores were analyzed for relationships by applying the Spearman Rank Correlation technique (Siegel, 1956).

The .05 level of significance was selected prior to the analysis of the data as the level which must be attained before the null hypothesis would be rejected. Since the hypotheses do not indicate direction, all probabilities reported will be two-tailed.

## CHAPTER IV

### PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

#### Introduction

The presentation of data as they pertain to the previously stated hypotheses will be reported in this chapter. The researcher adopted the .05 level of significance for acceptance of hypotheses. Since the hypotheses which have been stated are non-directional, the probability values presented in this chapter will be two-tailed.

#### Hypothesis One

H.1. There will be no significant difference in militancy between negotiators for NEA and negotiators for the AFT.

A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if a significant difference in militancy existed between the NEA teacher negotiators and the AFT teacher negotiators. The calculated U was 90.5. The calculated U-prime was 287.5. The resulting Z score was -2.78, which has a probability of occurrence of .005. The difference in militancy between the NEA teacher negotiators and the AFT teacher negotiators was statistically significant beyond the .05 level. The hypothesis was rejected. Data relevant to this test are presented in Table V.

TABLE V

MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF MILITANCY BETWEEN NEA  
TEACHER NEGOTIATORS AND AFT TEACHER NEGOTIATORS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Teacher Negotiator	21	90.5	287.5	-2.78	.005
AFT Teacher Negotiator	18				

Corwin (1963) stated that a score above the mean indicated a higher degree of militancy than a score below the mean.

The mean militancy score for all teacher negotiators was 41.41. The mean militancy score for NEA teacher negotiators was 37.76. The mean militancy score for AFT teacher negotiators was 45.06. Data analysis indicated the AFT teacher negotiators tended to be higher in militancy than did the NEA teacher negotiators. Data pertinent to this discussion are presented in Table VI.

TABLE VI

## MEAN MILITANCY SCORES FOR TEACHER NEGOTIATORS

Sample	Mean	N
Total Teacher Negotiators	41.41	39
NEA Teacher Negotiators	37.76	21
AFT Teacher Negotiators	45.06	18

## Hypothesis Two

H.2. There will be no significant difference in professionalism as shown by negotiators for the NEA as compared with professionalism as shown by negotiators for the AFT.

A Mann-Whitney Test was computed to determine if there was a statistically significant difference in professionalism between NEA teacher negotiators and AFT teacher negotiators. The computed U was 188. The computed U-prime was 190. The resulting Z score was -0.028, which has a probability of occurrence of .977. The difference in professionalism between NEA teacher negotiators and AFT teacher negotiators was not statistically significant. The hypothesis was accepted. Data pertinent to this test are presented in Table VII.

TABLE VII

MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF PROFESSIONALISM BETWEEN  
NEA TEACHER NEGOTIATORS AND AFT TEACHER NEGOTIATORS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Teacher Negotiators	21	188	190	-0.028	.977
AFT Teacher Negotiators	18				

Corwin (1963) stated that a score above the mean indicated a higher degree of professionalism. A score below the mean indicated a lower degree of professionalism.

The mean professionalism score for the teacher negotiators in the sample was 56.86. The mean professionalism score for NEA teacher negotiators was 57.05. The mean professionalism score for the AFT teacher negotiators was 56.67. Analyzation of the data indicated that both groups of teacher negotiators tended to score near the mean. The groups did not differ significantly in professionalism. Data pertinent to this discussion are found in Table VIII.

TABLE VIII  
MEAN PROFESSIONALISM SCORES FOR TEACHER NEGOTIATORS

Sample	Mean	N
Total Teacher Negotiators	56.86	39
NEA Teacher Negotiators	57.05	21
AFT Teacher Negotiators	56.67	18

### Hypothesis Three

H.3. There will be no significant difference in labor-management orientation as expressed by negotiators for the NEA as opposed to orientations expressed by negotiators for the AFT.

A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if there was a statistically significant difference in labor-management between the NEA

negotiators and the AFT negotiators. The computed U was 360.5. The computed U-prime was 1091.0. The resulting Z score was -3.763 which has a probability of occurrence of .0016. The difference in labor-management attitude between the NEA negotiators and the AFT negotiators was statistically significant. The hypothesis was rejected. Data relevant to this test are presented in Table IX.

TABLE IX

MANN-WHITNEY TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE  
BETWEEN NEA NEGOTIATORS AND AFT NEGOTIATORS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Negotiators	44	360.5	1091.0	-3.7630	.00016
AFT Negotiators	33				

Helper (1953) and Horvat (1968) stated that a higher score, above 128, indicated an identification with labor. The higher the score became the stronger the identification with labor. A score between 120 and 128 indicated a neutral identification. A low score, below 120, indicated an identification with management. The lower the score became the stronger the identification with management. The mean labor-management attitude score for all negotiators in the sample was 125.72. The mean labor-management attitude score for the NEA negotiators was 116.36. The mean labor management attitude score for the AFT negotiators

was 137.42. Data analysis indicated that the NEA negotiators tended to identify with management while the AFT negotiators tended to identify with labor. The difference in labor-management attitude between the two groups was statistically significant. Data relevant to this discussion are found in Table X.

TABLE X  
MEAN LABOR-MANAGEMENT SCORES FOR THE NEGOTIATORS  
IN THE SAMPLE

Sample	Mean	N
Total Negotiators	125.72	77
NEA Negotiators	116.36	43
AFT Negotiators	137.42	33

A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if there was a statistically significant difference in labor-management attitude between NEA teacher negotiators and AFT teacher negotiators. The computed U was 49.50. The computed U-prime was 328.5. The resulting Z score was -3.93, which has a probability of occurrence of .00008. The difference in labor-management attitude between the negotiator groups was statistically significant. Data germane to this test are presented in Table XI.



TABLE XI

MANN-WHITNEY TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT  
ATTITUDE BETWEEN NEA TEACHER NEGOTIATORS  
AND AFT TEACHER NEGOTIATORS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Teacher Negotiators	44	49.50	328.5	-3.93	.00008
AFT Teacher Negotiators	33				

The mean labor-management attitude score for the teacher negotiators in the sample was 141.94. The mean labor-management attitude score for NEA teacher negotiators was 129.38. The mean labor-management attitude score for AFT teacher negotiators was 154.50. Data analyzation indicates that the two groups identify with labor but the AFT teacher negotiators have a significantly stronger identification with labor than do the NEA teacher negotiators. Data pertinent to this discussion are presented in Table XII.

TABLE XII

MEAN LABOR-MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE SCORES FOR THE TEACHER  
NEGOTIATORS IN THE SAMPLE

Sample	Mean	N
Total Teacher Negotiators	141.94	41
NEA Teacher Negotiators	129.39	21
AFT Teacher Negotiators	154.50	18

A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if there was a statistically significant difference in labor-management attitude between NEA board negotiators and AFT board negotiators. The computed U was 87.0. The computed U-prime was 258.0. The resulting Z score was -2.55 which has a probability of occurrence of .001. The difference in labor-management attitude between NEA board negotiators and AFT board negotiators was statistically significant. Data relevant to this test are presented in Table XIII.

TABLE XIII

MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT  
ATTITUDE BETWEEN NEA BOARD NEGOTIATORS  
AND AFT BOARD NEGOTIATORS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Board Negotiators	23	87.0	258.0	-2.55	.001
AFT Board Negotiators	15				

The mean labor-management attitude score for the board of education negotiators was 111.84. The mean labor-management attitude score for NEA board negotiators was 103.35. The mean labor-management attitude score for AFT board negotiators was 120.33. Data analysis indicates that NEA board negotiators tended to have a significantly stronger identification with management than do the AFT board negotiators. Data pertinent to this discussion are presented in Table XIV.

TABLE XIV  
 MEAN LABOR-MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE SCORES FOR THE BOARD  
 NEGOTIATORS IN THE SAMPLE

Sample	Mean	N
Total Board Negotiators	111.84	38
NEA Board Negotiators	103.35	23
AFT Board Negotiators	120.33	15

#### Hypothesis Four

H.4. There will be no significant difference in contracts negotiated by negotiators for the NEA as opposed to contracts negotiated by negotiators for the AFT.

For testing purposes, hypothesis four will be divided into six sub-hypotheses. These six sub-hypotheses are identified by the contract categories as defined in Chapter I.

#### Hypothesis Four (a)

H.4(a). There will be no significant difference in provisions for organizational security between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts.

A Mann-Whitney U test was computed to determine if a significant difference in provisions for organizational security existed between contracts negotiated in NEA districts and contracts negotiated in AFT

districts. The computed U was 11. The U-prime was 19. The resulting Z score was -0.75 which has a probability of occurrence of 0.45. The difference in provisions for organizational security between contracts in NEA districts and contracts in AFT districts was not statistically significant. The hypothesis was accepted. Data pertinent to this test are presented in Table XV.

TABLE XV  
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF PROVISIONS FOR  
ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY BETWEEN NEA  
CONTRACTS AND AFT CONTRACTS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Contracts	6	11	19	-0.75	0.45
AFT Contracts	5				

All sample contracts included provisions for exclusive recognition and exclusive representation. Three NEA contracts and three AFT contracts contained provisions for dues check off. Four AFT contracts and three NEA contracts excluded administrators and supervisors from the teachers' bargaining unit. Eight contracts, four NEA and four AFT, contained provisions which made district facilities and buildings available to the teacher's organization. Six contracts, four NEA and two AFT, contained procedures by which a rival teachers organization may be elected to replace the organization currently recognized. Two contracts,

both AFT, were negotiated for a two-year period. The remaining nine contracts were negotiated for a one-year period. Data relevant to this discussion are presented in Table XVI.

TABLE XVI

PROVISIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY IN SAMPLE CONTRACTS

	Score	Rank	Exclusive Recognition	Exclusive Representation	Dues Check Off	Negotiations Unit Excludes Administrators	Availability of School Facilities for Org. Purposes	% Needed for Petition	% to Win	Tenure of Election	Length of Agreement in Years
A1	6	6	X	X	X	X	X	None			1
A2	6	6	X	X	X	X		None			1
A3	7	9	X	X	X	X	X	30%	Majority	Term of Contract or 1 year	1
A4	6	6	X	X		X	X	30%	Majority	Term of Contract or 1 year	1
A5	5	3.5	X	X				30%	Majority	Term of Contract or 1 year	1
A6	4	1.5	X	X				30%	Majority	Term of Contract or 1 year	1
B1	4	1.5	X	X		X		None			1
B2	7	9	X	X	X	X	X	None			2*
B3	5	3.5	X	X		X	X	None			1
B4	8	11	X	X	X	X	X	30%	Majority	Term of Contract	2*
B5	7	9	X	X	X		X	50%*	66%	Term of Contract or 1 year	1
Subtotal A			6	6	3	4	4	4			6
Subtotal B			5	5	3	4	4	2			5
Total			11	11	6	8	8	6			11

\* Scored as 2 points.

## Hypothesis Four (b)

H.4(b). There will be no significant difference in provisions for exchange of facts and views pertinent to negotiations between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts.

A Mann-Whitney Test of significance was computed to determine if a significant difference in provisions which insure exchange of facts and views which are pertinent to the negotiations process existed between NEA contracts and AFT contracts. The computed U was 40. The U-prime was 45. The resulting Z was 0.0, which has a probability of occurrence of 1.0. The difference in provisions for the exchange of facts and views which are pertinent to negotiations was not statistically significant. The hypothesis was accepted. Data pertinent to this test are presented in Table XVII.

TABLE XVII

MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF PROVISIONS FOR THE EXCHANGE OF FACTS AND VIEWS PERTINENT TO NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN NEA CONTRACTS AND AFT CONTRACTS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Contracts	6	40	45	0	1.0
AFT Contracts	5				

All sample contracts contained provisions for the exchange of facts and views pertinent to negotiations.

## Hypothesis Four (c)

H.4(c). There will be no significant difference in the number of educational considerations between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts.

A Mann-Whitney U Test of significance was computed to determine if a significant difference in the number of provisions which deal with the teacher as an educator or the fulfillment of his duties as an educator existed between NEA contracts and AFT contracts. The computed U was 0. The U-prime was 25. The resulting Z score was -2.76 which has a probability of occurrence of .005. The difference in the number of educational considerations between NEA contracts and AFT contracts was statistically significant. The hypothesis was rejected. Data pertinent to this test are presented in Table XVIII.

TABLE XVIII

MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NUMBER OF  
EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS BETWEEN NEA  
CONTRACTS AND AFT CONTRACTS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Contracts	6	0	25	-2.76	.005
AFT Contracts	5				



The 11 sample contracts contained 29 separate provisions which deal with the teacher as an educator or the fulfillment of his duties as an educator. The score for this category was calculated by summing the number of professional provisions in the contract. The data pertinent to the following discussion are presented in Table XIX.

The range in number of educational provisions in the sample contracts was from a NEA contract with one to an AFT contract with fifteen. The mean number of provisions for the sample was eight. The mean number of provisions for the NEA contracts was four. The mean number of provisions for the AFT occurrence was 12. Five contracts, two NEA and three AFT, contained provisions for teacher evaluations. Eight contracts, five AFT and three NEA, contained provisions which stated that a teacher must be qualified in a subject area to teach classes in that field. Three AFT contracts and two NEA contracts provided for the inclusion of teachers on curriculum committees. Six contracts, three NEA and three AFT, provided for administrator-teacher conferences. Eight contracts, five NEA and three AFT, required that all teachers have state certification before they are employed. Three contracts, all AFT, provided for faculty meetings. Three AFT contracts and one NEA contract had provisions which dealt with maximum class size. Four AFT contracts and no NEA contracts provided for sabbatical leave. Four AFT contracts and no NEA contracts specified that unnecessary classroom interruptions were prohibited. Only one contract, AFT, provided for academic freedom. Only one contract, NEA, provided for teacher aides.

TABLE XIX

EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN SAMPLE CONTRACTS

	Score	Rank	Teacher Evaluation	Teacher Assignment	Curriculum Committee	Textbook Committee	Administrator- Faculty Conferences	Employment Requirements	Student Discipline	Educational Planning Committee	Professional Growth	Preparation Period
A1	4	3	X	X			X		X			
A2	4	3	X					X				
A3	7	6		X	X	X		X	X			
A4	3	3		X			X	X				
A5	1	1						X				
A6	6	5			X	X	X	X		X	X	
B1	15	11		X	X	X	X					X
B2	14	10	X	X		X			X	X		X
B3	9	8		X				X	X			X
B4	8	7	X	X	X		X	X			X	
B5	10	9	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	
Subtotal A			2	3	2	2	3	5	2	1	1	0
Subtotal B			3	5	3	2	3	3	3	1	2	3
Total			5	8	5	4	6	8	5	2	3	3

TABLE XIX (Continued)

Student Evaluation	In Service Training	Faculty Meetings	Maximum Class Size	Sabbatical Leave	Scope of Negotiations	Professional Consultator	Student Orientation	No Unnecessary Classroom Interruptions	Parent Conferences
			X		X	X			
X	X	X	X	X				X	X
X		X	X	X				X	
	X		X				X		
				X				X	
		X		X				X	
0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
2	2	3	3	4	0	0	1	4	1
2	2	3	4	4	1	1	1	4	1

TABLE XIX (Continued)

Released Time for Depart. Chairman	Program Improvement	Assignment of Remedial Classes	Administrator Search Committees	Teaching Conditions Committee	Availability of Student Files	Varied Teaching Experiences	Academic Freedom	Teacher Aids
								X
X	X	X						
			X	X	X			
						X	X	
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

## Hypothesis Four (d)

H.4(d). There will be no significant difference in the number of employee considerations between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts.

A Mann-Whitney U Test of significance was computed to determine if a significant difference in the number of provisions which effect the teacher as an employee existed between NEA contracts and AFT contracts. The computed U was 0.5. The U-prime was 29.5. The resulting Z score was -5.44 which has a probability of occurrence of .00003. The difference in the number of employee considerations between NEA contracts and AFT contracts was statistically significant. The hypothesis was rejected. Data pertinent to this test are presented in Table XX.

TABLE XX

MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEE CONSIDERATIONS BETWEEN NEA CONTRACTS AND AFT CONTRACTS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Contracts	6	.5	29.5	-5.44	.00003
AFT Contracts	5				

The 11 sample contracts contained 51 separate provisions which deal with the teacher as an employee. The score for this category was calculated by summing the number of employee provisions in the contract.

The mean number of employee provisions for the 11 contracts in the sample was 13. The mean number of employee provisions in the NEA contract was seven. The mean number of employee provisions in AFT contracts was 19.

Five AFT contracts and one NEA contract provided for the length of the school year. Nine contract, five NEA and four AFT, contained salary schedules. Five AFT contracts and no NEA contracts provided that supervision of extracurricular activities would be on a voluntary basis and when the teacher volunteered, he would be reimbursed for the time involved. Five AFT contracts and one NEA contract provided for the publication of vacancies within the school district before the information was released to the general public. Three contracts, two AFT and one NEA, provided for protection of the teacher against physical assault. Four AFT contracts and one NEA contract stipulated the length of faculty meetings. Five AFT and no NEA contracts stipulated that faculty members may leave the buildings and grounds during unassigned periods. Four AFT and no NEA contracts contained transfer policies. Three AFT contracts and no NEA contracts contained seniority provisions. Three AFT contract tracts and one NEA contract provided a formula by which teachers would receive summer school teaching assignments. Data relevant to this discussion are presented in Table XXI.

Table XXI

## EMPLOYEE CONSIDERATIONS IN SAMPLE CONTRACTS

	Score	Rank	Length of Year	Length of Day	Salary Schedule	Sick Leave	Maternity Leave	Berevement Leave	Personal Leave	Hospital Insurance	Placement on Salary Schedule	Payroll Procedure
A1	14	5	X		X	X	X			X	X	X
A2	16	6.5		X	X	X	X			X	X	X
A3	3	2			X	X			X			
A4	5	3.5			X		X		X			
A5	5	3.5			X			X	X			
A6	2	1										
B1	22	10	X		X	X	X	X		X		
B2	26	11	X	X	X	X			X	X		
B3	16	6.5	X		X	X			X			
B4	17	8.5	X			X		X	X	X		
B5	17	8.5	X		X	X	X	X	X			
Subtotal A			1	1	5	3	3	1	3	2	2	2
Subtotal B			5	1	4	5	2	3	4	3	0	0
Total			6	2	9	8	5	4	7	5	2	2

TABLE XXI (Continued)

Extra Curricular Activities Shall be Voluntary and Reimbursed	Seniority	Legal Assistance to Teachers	Fringe Benefits	Complaint Procedure	Publication of Vacancies	Open Personal Reports	Protection Against Assault	Promotion
					X	X	X	X
						X		
			X					
			X	X				
				X				
X	X	X			X			X
X	X	X			X		X	X
X	X				X		X	
X					X			
X		X			X			
0	0	0	2	2	1	2	1	1
5	3	3	0	0	5	0	2	2
5	3	3	2	2	6	2	3	3



TABLE XXI (Continued)

Substitution Pay for Individ. Classes	Extra Class Compensation	Leave of Absence	Planning Committee (Budgetary)	Custodial Duties	Teacher's Lounge	Length of Faculty Meetings	Publication of Teacher's Salary
X	X	X					
X						X	X
		X					
			X				
X				X	X	X	X
	X				X	X	
X				X	X		
						X	
						X	
2	1	2	1	0	0	1	1
2	1	0	0	2	3	4	1
4	2	2	1	2	3	5	2

TABLE XXI (Continued)

Permission to Leave Building	Administrative Job Descriptions	Cooperative Class Substitution	Job Description for Coaches	Emergency Leave	Transfer Policies	Teacher Parking	I.D. Cards
X	X	X	X	X	X		
X					X	X	X
X							
X					X		X
X				X	X		
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	1	1	1	2	4	1	2
5	1	1	1	2	4	1	2

TABLE XXI (Continued)

Release From Non-Teaching Duties	Duty Free Lunch Period	Room Assignment	Point System for Summer Assignment	Merit Pay for Puncuality	Athletic Passes	Notification of Supervisor's Visit	Private Telephone
X	X		X				X
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
	X		X				
X			X				
	X						
1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
2	3	1	3	1	1	1	0
3	4	1	4	1	1	1	1

TABLE XXI (Continued)

Teacher Work Room	Separation of Student and Teacher Facilities	Tax Sheltered Annuity	Pay for Accumulated Earned Absences	Cost of Living Increase	Severance Pay	Teacher's Mailboxes	Credit Union
			X				
X	X						
		X	X	X	X		
		X				X	X
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1

## Hypothesis Four (e)

H.4(e). There will be no significant difference in provisions for impass resolution between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts.

A Mann-Whitney U test was computed to determine if a significant difference in provisions for impass procedures existed between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts. The computed U was 30. The U-prime was 0. The resulting Z score was -2.91 which has a probability of occurrence of .003. The difference in impass procedures between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and AFT affiliated districts was statistically significant. The hypothesis was rejected. Data relevant to this test are presented in Table XXII.

TABLE XXII

MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPASS PROCEDURES  
BETWEEN NEA CONTRACTS AND AFT CONTRACTS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Contracts	6	30	0	-2.91	.003
AFT Contracts	5				

Six NEA contracts contained procedures to be followed when a deadlock occurs in the negotiations process. No AFT contract contained such procedures. The first formal step in impass procedures in the six NEA contracts was a notification to the board negotiations team that an impass situation existed. The second step was mediation by an outside agency. The outside agency is usually the Federal Mediation and Conciliations Service. In the six contracts the findings are binding. Three of the NEA contracts contained "no strike" provisions. All six NEA contracts contained provisions which guarantee that bargaining will be conducted in good faith. Data relevant to this discussion are presented in Table XXIII.

TABLE XXIII

## IMPASS PROCEDURES IN SAMPLE CONTRACTS

	Score	Rank	Step 1 Notification of Impass	Step 2 Mediation	Step 3 Fact-Finding	Agency Used for Final Appeal	Final Appeal Binding	No Strike Provision	Good Faith Bargaining
A1	4	6.5	X	X		Federal mediation and consultation service			X
A2	6	11	X	X	X	Federal mediation and consultation service		X	X
A3	5	9	X	X		Office of Education State of Illinois		X	X
A4	5	9	X	X	X	Federal mediation and consultation service			X
A5	5	9	X	X		Federal mediation and consultation service		X	X
A6	4	6.5	X	X		Chief Justice 4th circuit State of Illinois			X
B1	0	3	None						
B2	0	3	None						
B3	0	3	None						
B4	0	3	None						
B5	0	3	None						

## Hypothesis Four (f)

H.4(f). There will be no significant difference in grievance procedures between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts.

A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if a statistically significant difference in grievance procedures existed between NEA contracts and AFT contracts. The computed U was 27. The U-prime was 3. The resulting Z score was 2.33 which has a probability of occurrence of .02. The difference in grievance procedures between NEA contracts and AFT contracts was statistically significant. The hypothesis was rejected. Data relevant to this test are presented in Table XXIV.

TABLE XXIV

MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES  
BETWEEN NEA CONTRACTS AND AFT CONTRACTS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Contracts	6	27	3	2.33	.02
AFT Contracts	5				

All sample contracts contained grievance procedures. Ten contracts, six NEA and four AFT, contained three formal appeal steps. Step one was the building principal; Step two was the superintendent of



schools; Step three was the board of education. Six NEA contracts and two AFT contracts provided for arbitration as the fourth and final step. Eight contracts, six NEA and two AFT, used an outside agency for the selection of the arbitrators. Six contracts, three NEA and three AFT, stipulated that the arbitrators' decision was binding. One AFT contract had no formal grievance procedure. All grievances were handled on an informal basis through the union grievance committee. The final disposition of the grievance was decided by a vote by the unit membership. Data relevant to this discussion are presented in Table XXV.

TABLE XXV

## GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES IN SAMPLE CONTRACTS

	Score	Rank	Step 1 Principal	Step 2 Superintendent	Step 3 Board of Ed.	Step 4 Arbitration	Final Step	Agency Used for Final Step	Final Step Binding	
A1	5	6	X	X	X	X	Arbitration	Fed. mediation and consultation service		
A2	5	6	X	X	X	X	Arbitration	AAA		
A3	6	10	X	X	X	X	Arbitration	AAA	X	
A4	5	6	X	X	X	X	Arbitration	AAA		
A5	6	10	X	X	X	X	Arbitration	AAA	X	
A6	6	10	X	X	X	X	Arbitration	Chairman chosen by Chief Justice of 4th judicial circuit of Illinois	X	
B1	4	2.5	X	X	X		Decision	Board of Education	X	
B2	5	6	X	X	X	X	Arbitration	AAA	X	
B3	4	2.5	X	X	X		Decision	Board of Education	X	
B4	5	6	X	X	X	X	Arbitration	Union and board arbitration panel outside Chairman		
B5	3	1	- no formal steps* -					Vote	Local union membership	

\*Contract B5 has no formal grievance procedure; however, the grievances are processed by the union grievance committee. The informal steps consist of appeals to the building principal and the board of education.

Supplementary Data

A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if a statistically significant difference in age existed between NEA negotiators and AFT negotiators. The calculated U was 18. The U-prime was 12. The resulting Z score was 0.155 which had a probability of occurrence of .59. The difference in age between negotiators in NEA affiliated districts and negotiators in AFT affiliated districts was not statistically significant. Data pertinent to this test are presented in Table XXVI.

TABLE XXVI

MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF AGE OF NEGOTIATORS  
BETWEEN NEA NEGOTIATORS AND AFT NEGOTIATORS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Negotiators	44	18	12	0.55	.59
AFT Negotiators	33				

The age of the negotiators in the sample ranged from a minimum of 24 years to a maximum of 59 years. The mean age of all negotiators in the sample was 39.2 years. The ages of the NEA negotiators ranged from 24 to 59, with a mean of 39.9. The NEA teacher negotiators ranged in age from 24 to 56 with a mean of 35.8. The NEA board negotiators ranged from 29 to 59 with a mean of 43.6. The ages of the AFT negotiators ranged from 24 to 55 with a mean of 38.3. The AFT teacher negotiators

ranged in age from 24 to 46 with a mean age of 33.1 years. The AFT board negotiators ranged from 32 years to 55 years with a mean age of 44.6 years. There tended to be little difference between AFT negotiators and NEA negotiators in relation to age. Data pertinent to this discussion are presented in Table XXVII.

TABLE XXVII  
AGE OF NEGOTIATORS

	Mean	Max.	Min.	Range
All Negotiators	39.2	59	24	35
All NEA Negotiators	39.9	59	24	35
NEA - Teacher	35.8	56	24	32
NEA - Board	43.6	59	29	30
All AFT Negotiators	38.3	55	24	31
AFT - Teacher	33.1	46	24	22
AFT - Board	44.6	55	32	23

A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if a statistically significant difference existed in the number of years of experience in education between negotiators in NEA affiliated districts and AFT affiliated districts. The computed U was 20. The U-prime was 10. The resulting Z score was 0.91 which has a probability of occurrence of .36. The difference in age between negotiators in NEA affiliated districts

and negotiators in AFT affiliated districts was not statistically significant. Data pertinent to this test are presented in Table XXVIII.

TABLE XXVIII  
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  
BETWEEN NEA AND AFT NEGOTIATORS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Negotiators	44	20	10	0.91	.36
AFT Negotiators	33				

The number of years of experience in education for all negotiators in the sample ranged from 0.0 years to 37.0 years. The mean number of years of experience for all negotiators in the sample as 10.3 years. The range in years of experience for all NEA negotiators was from 0.0 to 37.0 with a mean of 11.8. The range in years of experience for NEA teacher negotiators was 3.0 years to 26.0 years with a mean number of years of experience of 10.3. The range in years of experience for NEA board negotiators was from 0.0 to 37.0 years with a mean of 13.1 years of experience. The range in years of experience for all AFT negotiators was 0.0 to 23.0 years. The mean years of experience for all AFT negotiators was 8.3. The number of years of experience for AFT teacher negotiators was 3 to 21 years with a mean of 9.0 years of experience. The range in years of experience for AFT board negotiators was 0.0 to 23.0

years with a mean of 7.5 years of experience. The difference between NEA negotiators and AFT negotiators in regard to the number of years of experience as educators was not statistically significant. Data relevant to this discussion are found in Table XXIX.

TABLE XXIX

## NUMBER OF YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN EDUCATION FOR NEGOTIATORS

	Mean	Max.	Min.	Range
All Negotiators	10.3	37	0	37
All NEA Negotiators	11.8	37	0	37
NEA - Teacher	10.3	26	3	23
NEA - Board	13.1	37	0	37
All AFT Negotiators	8.3	23	0	23
AFT - Teacher	9.0	21	3	18
AFT - Board	7.5	23	0	23

A Mann-Whitney U Test was computed to determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the degrees held by negotiators in NEA affiliated districts as opposed to negotiators in AFT affiliated districts. The computed U was 22. The U-prime was 8. The resulting Z score was 1.28 which has a probability of occurrence of .20. The number and type of degrees held by NEA negotiators was not significantly

different from the number and type of degrees held by AFT negotiators. Data relevant to this test are presented in Table XXX.

TABLE XXX  
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF DEGREES HELD  
BETWEEN NEA NEGOTIATORS AND AFT NEGOTIATORS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Negotiators	44	22	8	1.28	.20
AFT Negotiators	33				

The degrees held by negotiators in the sample ranged from no degree to a doctorate in Education. Thirteen negotiators, all board of education, held no degree, 22 negotiators held a Bachelor's degree, 38 negotiators held a Master's degree, 3 negotiators held a Educational Specialist degree, and one negotiator held a Doctor of Education degree. Five NEA negotiators held no degree, 11 held a Bachelor's degree, 25 held Master's degree, two held Educational Specialist degrees, and one held a Doctor of Education degree. Nine NEA teacher negotiators held Bachelor's degrees, and 12 held Master's degrees. Five NEA board negotiators held no degrees, two held a Bachelor's degree, 13 held Master's degrees, two held Educational Specialist degrees, and one held a Doctor of Education degree. Eight AFT negotiators held no degree, 11 held Bachelor's degrees, 13 held Master's degrees, and one held an Educational

Specialist degree. Ten AFT teacher negotiators held Bachelor's degrees and eight held Master's degrees. Eight AFT board negotiators held no degree, one held a Bachelor's degree, five held Master's degrees, and one held an Educational Specialist degree. Data relevant to this discussion are found in Table XXXI.

TABLE XXXI  
DEGREES HELD BY NEGOTIATORS

	None	B.S.	M.S.	Ed.S.	Ed.D.
Total	13	22	38	3	1
NEA	5	11	25	2	1
Teacher	0	2	13	0	0
Board	5	9	12	2	1
AFT	8	11	13	1	0
Teacher	0	10	8	0	0
Board	8	1	5	1	0

The sample districts have been involved in a total of 10 strikes. The mean number of strikes in which a negotiator has been a participant is 0.42. The minimum number of strikes in which a negotiator has participated has been 0.0. The maximum number of strikes in which a negotiator has participated is 6. The negotiators from one NEA district have participated in one strike. The negotiators in two AFT districts



have participated in a combined total of nine strikes. One AFT district has experienced six strikes; the other AFT district has experienced three strikes. The total number of strikes which have occurred in NEA districts was one. The total number of strikes which have occurred in AFT districts was nine. The total number of NEA districts involved in strikes was one. The total number of AFT districts involved in strikes was two. Data pertinent to this discussion is presented in Table XXXII.

TABLE XXXII  
NUMBER OF DISTRICTS EXPERIENCING STRIKES

	Total Number of Districts Involved in Strikes	Number of Strikes Per District	Total Number of Strikes
AFT Districts	2	3	9
NEA Districts	1	1	1

A Mann-Whitney U Test of significance was computed to determine if a difference in the number of years of experience as a negotiator existed between NEA negotiators and AFT negotiators. The computed U was 4. The U-prime was 26. The resulting Z score was 2.0 which has a probability of occurrence of .045. The difference in tenure as negotiators between NEA negotiators and AFT negotiators was statistically significant. Data germane to this test are presented in Table XXXIII.

TABLE XXXIII

MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF TENURE AS NEGOTIATORS  
BETWEEN NEA NEGOTIATORS AND AFT NEGOTIATORS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Negotiators	44	4	26	2.0	.045
AFT Negotiators	33				

The negotiators in the sample range in experience as a negotiator from a minimum of one year of experience to a maximum of 25 years of experience. The mean number of years of experience as negotiator for all negotiators in the sample was 3.6 years. The NEA negotiators ranged in years of experience as negotiators from one to seven, with a mean number of years of experience of 2.6. The NEA teacher negotiators ranged in experience from one year to three years with a mean of 1.7 years of experience as a negotiator. The NEA board negotiators ranged in experience as negotiators from a minimum of one year to a maximum of seven years. The mean number of years of experience as negotiators for NEA board negotiators was 3.3. The range in experience as negotiators for AFT negotiators was from a minimum of one year to a maximum of 25 years. The mean experience as negotiator was 4.9 years. The AFT teacher negotiators ranged in experience as negotiator from one to 12 years with a mean of 3.6 years. The AFT board negotiators ranged in experience as negotiators from one to 25 years with a mean of 6.5 years. The districts which recognize the AFT affiliate as exclusive bargaining

agent had more experienced negotiators on their negotiating teams. Data pertinent to this discussion are presented in Table XXXIV.

TABLE XXXIV  
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS NEGOTIATORS

	Mean	Max.	Min.	Range
All Negotiators	3.6	25	1	24
All NEA Negotiators	2.6	7	1	6
NEA - Teachers	1.7	3	1	2
NEA - Board	3.3	7	1	6
All AFT Negotiators	4.9	25	1	24
AFT - Teachers	3.6	12	1	11
AFT - Board	6.5	25	1	24

A Mann-Whitney U Test of significance was computed to determine if there was a difference in the number of memberships held in teacher organizations between NEA negotiators and AFT negotiators. The computed U was 18. The U-prime was 12. The resulting Z score was 0.55 which has a probability of occurrence of .58. The difference in the number of memberships held in teacher organizations between NEA negotiators and AFT negotiators was not statistically significant. Data relevant to this test are presented in Table XXXV.

TABLE XXXV

MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBER OF MEMBERSHIPS  
HELD BETWEEN NEA NEGOTIATORS AND AFT NEGOTIATORS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Negotiators	44	18	12	0.55	.58
AFT Negotiators	33				

The negotiators in the sample held memberships in various teachers' organizations. The range was from 0.0 to seven organization memberships. The mean number of teacher organization memberships held by negotiators was 1.8. NEA negotiators ranged in memberships held from 0 to 6 with a mean membership held of 2.1. NEA teacher negotiators ranged in memberships held from one to six. The mean number of memberships in teacher organizations for NEA teacher negotiators was 3.4. The range in memberships held for NEA board negotiators was from 0.0 to 5.0. The mean number of memberships held in teacher organizations by NEA board negotiators was 0.9. AFT negotiators ranged in number of memberships held in teachers organizations from a minimum of 0.0 to a maximum of seven. The mean number of memberships held by AFT negotiators was 1.5. The AFT teacher negotiators ranged in memberships held in teachers' organizations from 0.0 to seven. The mean number of memberships held was 2.0. The AFT board negotiators ranged in memberships held in teacher organizations from 0.0 to 4.0. The mean number of memberships held was 0.8. There seemed to be little difference in memberships held in

teachers' organizations between NEA negotiators and AFT negotiators.

Data relevant to this discussion are presented in Table XXXVI.

TABLE XXXVI  
NUMBER OF MEMBERSHIPS HELD IN TEACHER  
ORGANIZATIONS BY NEGOTIATORS

	Mean	Max.	Min.	Range
All Negotiators	1.8	7	0	7
All NEA Negotiators	2.1	6	0	6
NEA - Teachers	3.4	6	1	5
NEA - Board	0.9	5	0	5
All AFT Negotiators	1.5	7	0	7
AFT - Teachers	2.0	7	0	7
AFT - Board	0.8	4	0	4

A Mann-Whitney U Test of significance was computed to determine if a difference in the number of years the sample districts had been negotiating existed between NEA affiliated districts and AFT affiliated districts. The computed U was 0.0. The U-prime was 30. The resulting Z score was  $-2.74$  which has a probability of occurrence of .006. The difference in the tenure of negotiations between NEA affiliated districts and AFT affiliated districts was statistically significant. Data pertinent to this test are presented in Table XXXVII.

TABLE XXXVII

MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF TENURE OF NEGOTIATIONS  
BETWEEN NEA DISTRICTS AND AFT DISTRICTS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Districts	6	0	30	-2.74	.006
AFT Districts	5				

The sample districts vary in the number of years in which they have been negotiating with the representatives of the teachers' organization. The range was from an NEA district which had been negotiating for three years to an AFT district which had been negotiating for 36 years. The mean for the sample was 11.0 years. The NEA affiliated districts ranged from three to seven years with a mean of 4.5 years. The AFT districts ranged from 10 years to 36 years with a mean of 18.8 years. Data pertinent to this discussion are presented in Table XXXVIII.

TABLE XXXVIII

TENURE OF NEGOTIATIONS RELATIONSHIPS FOR THE SAMPLE DISTRICTS

Sample	N	Mean	Minimum	Maximum
Total	11	11.0	3	36
NEA Districts	6	4.5	3	7
AFT Districts	5	18.8	10	36

A Mann-Whitney U Test of significance was computed to determine if a difference in provisions for the scope of negotiations existed between NEA contracts and AFT contracts. The computed U was 0.0. The U-prime was 30. The resulting Z score was -2.91 which has a probability of occurrence of .003. Data pertinent to this test are presented in Table XXXIX.

TABLE XXXIX

MANN-WHITNEY U TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS  
BETWEEN NEA CONTRACTS AND AFT CONTRACTS

Sample	N	U	U-prime	Z	Probability
NEA Contracts	6	0	30	-2.91	.003
AFT Contracts	5				

Five NEA contracts contained a provision which limited negotiations to specific areas. None of the AFT contracts contained a provision which limited negotiations to specific areas.

Table XL presents the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients,  $r_s$ , which were computed when the six categories of contracts and the six areas of supplemental data were correlated with the negotiator scores on two attitudinal instruments, militancy and professionalism. Two significant relationships were found. Negotiator militancy correlated significantly and positively with the number of employee considerations in

the contract and the number of years the district had been engaged in the negotiations relationship.

TABLE XL

SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN TEACHER NEGOTIATOR ATTITUDE SCORES OF MILITANCY AND PROFESSIONALISM AND CONTRACT CATEGORY SCORES AND SUPPLEMENTARY DATA

Contract Categories and Supplemental Data	Attitude Scores	
	Militancy	Professionalism
Organizational Security	.06	-.29
Exchange of Facts & Views	.00	.00
Professional Considerations	.51	.25
Employee Considerations	.81*	.36
Impass Procedure	-.38	.02
Grievance Procedure	-.52	-.28
Age	-.51	-.11
Experience	-.30	.09
Degree	-.49	-.30
Tenure as Negotiator	.36	-.28
Number of Memberships	.21	.51
Tenure of Negotiations	.48	.07

\*Statistically Significant



Table XLI presents the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients which were computed when the six contract categories and six areas of supplementary data were correlated with the negotiator scores on the Labor-Management Attitude Questionnaire. Five significant relationships were found. Labor-management attitude correlated significantly and positively with the number of educational considerations in contracts, the number of employee considerations in contracts, and the number of years the district had been engaged in the negotiations relationship. Negotiator labor-management attitude correlated significantly and negatively with grievance procedures in contracts and the degree held by the negotiator.

TABLE XLI

SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN NEGOTIATOR  
SCORES ON THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE  
QUESTIONNAIRE AND CONTRACT CATEGORY  
SCORES AND SUPPLEMENTARY DATA

Contract Categories and Supplementary Data	Labor-Management Attitude Scores
Organizational Security	-.20
Exchange of Facts and Views	.00
Educational Considerations	.67*
Employee Considerations	.75*
Impass Procedures	-.51
Grievance Procedures	-.61
Age	-.28
Experience	-.43
Degree Held	-.58*
Years as Negotiator	-.13
Number of Memberships	.24
Number of Years District Has Been Negotiating	.64*

\*Statistically Significant.

## CHAPTER V

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This final chapter is divided into four parts. The first part is a summary of the study and findings. The second part contains conclusions drawn from the findings. Part three is a discussion of the study. Part four is a presentation of suggestions for further research.

#### Summary of the Study and Findings

The focus of this study was on negotiations as found in public education. Specifically, the study was designed to determine the similarities and differences in attitudinal orientation of negotiators and the similarities and differences in negotiated contracts between NEA and AFT affiliated districts. To measure the level of negotiator militancy, The Way I See It was administered. To measure professionalism as exhibited by the negotiators, Views of the Teacher's Job was administered. The negotiators' level of identification with labor or management was measured with the Labor-Management Attitude Questionnaire. The agreements which were finalized by the negotiators in the study were perused, categorized, and analyzed.

The sample school districts in this study were randomly selected from two lists. One list of twenty-one school districts affiliated with NEA. The second list contained the names of eleven AFT affiliated districts. The districts on both lists were geographically located in

Region five in the State of Illinois (Figure 1, page 42). The districts were also engaged in face-to-face negotiations with the teachers' bargaining unit. These negotiations concluded with a written agreement.

The respondents were members of the teams which represent their respective party to negotiations. The two parties to the negotiations were the teachers' bargaining unit and the board of education.

Of the twelve districts which were initially selected, six NEA and six AFT, eleven actually participated. Ninety-five negotiators were members of the various negotiating teams. Seventy-seven negotiators, eight per cent of the total, returned the completed instrument packet. Finalized contracts were received from each of the sample districts.

A Mann-Whitney U Test of Significance was used to statistically test the nine hypotheses. Adhering to common practice, hypotheses were accepted if " $p$ "  $\geq$  .05.

The following hypotheses were tested:

- H. 1. There will be no significant difference in militancy between negotiators for the NEA and negotiators for the AFT. After analyzing and testing the data which are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis One was rejected.
- H. 2. There will be no significant difference in professionalism as shown by the negotiators for the NEA as compared with professionalism as shown by the negotiators for the AFT. After analyzing and testing the data which are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis Two was accepted.

- H. 3. There will be no significant difference in labor-management orientation as expressed by negotiators for the NEA as opposed to orientations expressed by negotiators for the AFT. After analyzing and testing the data which are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis Three was rejected.
- H. 4(a). There will be no significant difference in provisions for organizational security between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts. After analyzing and testing the data which are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis Four (a) was accepted.
- H. 4(b). There will be no significant difference in provisions for exchange of facts and views pertinent to negotiations between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts. After analyzing and testing the data which are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis Four (b) was accepted.
- H. 4(c). There will be no significant difference in the number of educational considerations between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts. After analyzing and testing the data which are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis Four (c) was rejected.
- H. 4(d). There will be no significant difference in the number of employee considerations between contracts

negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts. After analyzing and testing the data which are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis Four (d) was rejected.

H. 4(e). There will be no significant difference in provisions for impass resolution between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts. After analyzing and testing the data which are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis Four (e) was rejected.

H. 4(f). There will be no significant difference in grievance procedures between contracts negotiated in NEA affiliated districts and contracts negotiated in AFT affiliated districts. After testing and analyzing the data which are presented in Chapter IV, Hypothesis Four (f) was rejected.

#### Conclusions

Hypothesis One was rejected. The AFT negotiators expressed a significantly higher degree of militancy than did the NEA negotiators. These findings do not appear to support the rationale for Hypothesis One.

Hypothesis Two was accepted. The difference in professionalism between the NEA negotiators and the AFT negotiators was not statistically significant. These findings tend to support the rationale for Hypothesis Two.

Hypothesis Three was rejected. The AFT negotiators indicated a

significantly stronger identification with labor than did the NEA negotiators. All of the teacher negotiators indicated an identification with labor but the AFT teacher negotiators expressed a significantly higher identification with labor than did the NEA teacher negotiators. The AFT board negotiators tend to show a neutral identification while the NEA board negotiators tend to identify with management. The difference in the strength of identification with management was found to be significant. These findings do not appear to support the rationale for Hypothesis Three.

Hypothesis Four (a) was accepted. The differences in provisions for organizational security between NEA contracts and AFT contracts were not statistically significant. The provisions were similar in content and in number. These findings appear to support the rationale for Hypothesis Four (a).

Hypothesis Four (b) was accepted. Provisions insuring the exchange of facts and views pertinent to negotiations were present in all contracts; therefore, no significant difference was found. These findings appear to support the rationale for Hypothesis Four (b).

Hypothesis Four (c) was rejected. The AFT contracts contained a significantly higher number of educational considerations than did the NEA contracts. These findings do not appear to support the rationale for Hypothesis Four (c).

Hypothesis Four (d) was rejected. The AFT contracts contained a significantly higher number of employee considerations than did the NEA contracts. These findings do not appear to support the rationale for Hypothesis Four (d).

Hypothesis Four (e) was rejected. The NEA contracts contained

provisions which deal with impasse resolution. None of the AFT contracts contained such provisions. The findings did not appear to support the rationale for Hypothesis Four (e).

Hypothesis Four (f) was rejected. The NEA contracts contained grievance procedures which differed significantly from the grievance procedures in AFT contracts. The NEA contracts differed in the number of steps; the number of contracts having arbitration as the final step; and the use of an outside agency for the selection of the arbitrators. The findings do not appear to support the rationale for Hypothesis Four (f).

Data presented in Chapter III tend to indicate that there are no significant differences between the sample districts in wealth, per pupil expenditures, and average daily attendance.

Supplemental data presented in Chapter IV tend to indicate that NEA and AFT negotiators do not differ significantly in the following areas: age; tenure as educators; degree held; tenure as negotiators; number of organizational memberships held.

Supplemental data presented in Chapter IV tend to indicate that NEA and AFT negotiators differ significantly in tenure as negotiators. The AFT negotiators appear to have a significantly higher number of years of experience in negotiations than do the NEA negotiators.

Supplemental data presented in Chapter IV tend to indicate that a significant difference in the tenure of the negotiations relationship exists between the NEA affiliated districts and the AFT affiliated districts. The AFT districts tend to have been conducting negotiations for a significantly longer period of time than have the NEA districts.

Supplemental data presented in Chapter IV appears to indicate that



NEA and AFT contracts differ significantly in regard to provisions which outline the scope of negotiations. The NEA contracts tend to attempt to restrict the scope of negotiations to employee considerations. The AFT contracts do not contain provisions which attempt to restrict the scope of negotiations to employee considerations.

A correlation matrix, Table XL in Chapter IV, presents the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients between the teacher negotiator attitude scores of militancy and professionalism and the contract category scores and supplementary data. The table presents twenty-four correlations, two of which are significant. Militancy correlates significantly with the number of employee considerations in a contract and the number of years the district has been engaged in the negotiations relationship. Professionalism does not correlate significantly with any of the twelve factors.

A correlation matrix, Table XLI in Chapter IV, presents the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients between the scores of all negotiators on the Labor-Management Attitude Questionnaire and the contract category scores and supplementary data. Labor-management attitude has a significant and positive relationship with the number of professional considerations in the contract and the number of employee considerations in the contract. Labor-management attitude has a significant and negative correlation with grievance procedures in contracts, the degrees held by the negotiator, and the number of years the district has been engaged in the negotiations relationship.

## Discussion

It would appear, after testing and analyzing the data which was collected in the course of this study, that the findings do not agree with the rationale for six of the nine hypotheses, while they do in three of the nine.

There appeared to be a significant difference in militancy between the teacher negotiators for NEA and the teacher negotiators for AFT. Corwin (1963) states that taking a posture of challenge to established authority in decision making rather than showing compliance was in fact militancy. Analysis of the contracts tends to indicate that AFT teacher negotiators take the initiative in wanting to be included in the decision making process. The AFT teacher negotiators have negotiated more specific articles dealing with educational considerations and employee considerations than have their NEA counterparts. On the other hand, the NEA teacher negotiators have agreed to provisions which limit the scope of negotiations; therefore, limiting their inclusion in the decision making process.

It may be speculated that the specificity of the AFT contracts and the scope restrictions in the NEA contracts tend to retard discussion and lead to routinization. Rather than face the filing of grievances, the supervisor may tend to treat similar cases in a routine manner. This could have the tendency to impersonalize the environment in which the educator functions. Further implications appear to be the routinization of professional applications with which the educator is faced. The scope restrictions in the NEA contracts appear to attempt to eliminate areas of professional decisions from the negotiations process; therefore,

denying teachers input into deliberations which effect the performance of the educator.

The AFT affiliates have been engaged in the negotiations process for a longer period of time than have the NEA affiliates. The AFT negotiators have more negotiating experience than do the NEA negotiators. The significant differences between NEA and AFT negotiators in these two areas may lead one to conclude that at least some of the difference in the number of employee and educational considerations in contracts can be attributed to tenure of the negotiations relationship and tenure of negotiating experience.

Corwin (1963) in the development of the professionalism instrument, defined a professional as one who had published, had participated actively in a professional organization, and had remained in teaching at least five years. The number of negotiators who had published was so small, one, that it did not seem worthy of discussion. The AFT and NEA negotiators did not differ in the number of memberships held in organizations. The AFT and NEA negotiators did not differ in experience in education. The AFT and NEA negotiators did not differ significantly in professionalism, as measured by Views of The Teachers Job. It appears that a professional educator would be equally at home as a negotiator for either the NEA or the AFT.

It does not appear that the similarities in measures of professionalism were translated into similar numbers of educational considerations in contracts. The AFT contracts tended to contain a significantly higher number of educational considerations. When the professionalism scores on the instrument were related to the six contract categories and the six areas of supplementary data (see Table XLVIII), it was found

that no significant correlations were present. Analyzation of this data would lead one to speculate that the professional would tend to be involved in the decision making process to a higher degree in the AFT affiliated districts than in the NEA affiliated districts.

The AFT negotiators appeared to express a significantly higher identification with labor than did the NEA negotiators. This finding tends to be at odds with the rationale. It may be important to consider the fact that the NEA teacher negotiators do identify with labor. Their identification is not as strong as is the identification of the AFT teacher negotiators. The rationale in Chapter II speaks to the convergence of NEA and AFT views on negotiation to a point somewhere between professionalism and unionism. It may be speculated that the NEA teacher negotiator is continuing that attitudinal shift toward labor.

The AFT negotiators express a significantly stronger identification with labor than do the NEA negotiators. The AFT board negotiators express an identification with management.

Horvat, Campbell, Watton, and McKersie, Chamberlain, and Carlson discuss the polarization of attitudes of negotiators and its effects upon negotiations. These authors also discuss the movement of the negotiations relationship from distributive bargaining to integrative bargaining. This movement or shift in relationships appears to occur over time. The AFT districts have been engaged in the negotiations relationship for a significantly longer period of time and the AFT negotiators have significantly higher tenure as negotiators. It may be speculated that a tendency exists for the board negotiators to weaken their identification with management. It may also be speculated that this tendency for increased identification with labor on the part of the

board negotiators reduces the adherence to the idea of management prerogatives, thus, increasing the scope of negotiations and adding to the specificity of contracts.

Labor-management orientation correlates significantly with five of the twelve variables listed in Table XL. It seems that a high identification with labor correlates with the number of educational and employee considerations in contracts. Labor-management correlates significantly but negatively with the degree held by the negotiator. A high identification with labor correlates positively with the tenure of the negotiations relationship. It may be speculated that as the identification with labor increases and as tenure of the negotiations relationship lengthens, the negotiators tend to press for more involvement in the decision making process through the increased utilization of labor tactics for goal attainment.

The findings from data relating to provisions for organizational security appear to support the rationale. NEA and AFT contracts do not differ significantly in provisions for organizational security. There seems to be little difference in effort to insure the survival of their organization as the exclusive bargaining agent for the teachers unit. The lack of procedures for the election of a rival organization as the exclusive representative for the teachers unit in some AFT contracts may be partially attributed to the AFT's alliance with the AFL-CIO and the umbrella of labor law and the National Labor Relations Board's decisions under which the parent organization functions.

It may be speculated that the significant differences in impasse procedures between NEA and AFT contracts tend to be a result of a reliance upon labor law and labor tradition on the part of the AFT

affiliates. In a telephone conversation with the Executive Secretary of the Illinois Federation of Teachers, the researcher was advised that the philosophy of the AFT and its affiliated locals was that a formal impasse procedure in a contract was restrictive and would tend to rule out alternative avenues for impasse resolution. The Secretary further contended that, if an impasse situation was reached, the union affiliates utilized those impasse procedures which are specified in labor law. These procedures, for all practical purposes, appear to be similar in nature and import to those which were found in the NEA contracts. The procedures provided for mediation, fact-finding, and advisory arbitration. Labor law also provides for bargaining in good faith. When taken in the light of actual practice rather than contract provisions, the difference in impasse procedures utilized by NEA affiliates and impasse procedures utilized by AFT affiliates seems to disappear.

The grievance procedures in NEA contracts appear to differ significantly from the grievance procedures in AFT contracts. The NEA contracts tended to contain one additional appeal step in the procedure. The NEA contracts rely more often upon arbitration as a final step than do AFT contracts. The NEA contracts rely upon outside arbitrators while the AFT contracts tend to conduct the final step with personnel from within the district. The use of outside arbitrators tends to be a stronger and more equitable practice in that an impartial third party advises both sides of the dispute of possible solutions for the grievance. The NEA contracts appear to be stronger and have a more equitable procedure for the adjudication of grievances.

It would appear after analyzing the findings of this study that differences in the area of negotiations do exist between NEA affiliates

and AFT affiliates. The AFT contracts contain more employee considerations and more educational considerations. This tends to indicate a more comprehensive contract. It could be speculated that a more restrictive atmosphere in which the educator must function is also indicated. These findings could also indicate that some of the decisions which deal with the performance of professional responsibilities tend to be predetermined. The militancy and high identification with labor which were expressed by the AFT negotiators may tend to be translated into rigid procedures which may retard change and innovation. The lower identification with labor and the lower level of militancy expressed by the NEA negotiators may tend to be contributing factors to the presence of provisions which restrict the scope of negotiations in NEA contracts.

With the passage of additional state statutes which enable boards of education to enter into negotiations relationships with teachers' organizations, the choice of an organization to represent the teachers' bargaining unit becomes more significant. It appears that the NEA affiliates and the AFT affiliates in this sample negotiate contracts which differ in some areas. The negotiators which represent the teachers' unit also differ in some attitudinal orientations. It seems that teachers are not forced to choose between two identical organizations.

#### Suggestions for Further Research

One function of an empirical study is the suggestion of further research. Several possibilities for future studies were generated from the present investigation.

- (1) Walton and McKersie (1965) describe a phenomenon in negotiations which they call attitudinal structuring

Through this process, the utility value of negotiators for items being negotiated are changed. Specifically, a study might be conducted which investigates the changes in utility value of negotiators during the negotiations process.

- (2) Because of the lack of generalizability of this study, a similar study with a larger and more representative sample should be undertaken.
- (3) Chamberlain (1951) speaks to the longitudinal change in the negotiations relationship between the employer and the employee organization. This change is from distributive or "hard-nosed" bargaining toward integrative or cooperative bargaining. Studies could be conducted to determine if such movement is present in negotiations in the public sector.
- (4) This study deals primarily with a quantitative evaluation of contracts. A qualitative analysis of contracts to determine if a difference in the types and content of provisions exist between NEA and AFT contracts is suggested.
- (5) Blau and Scott (1960) discuss group dynamics. They indicate that the group leaders tend to reflect the views of the group. Specifically, do the negotiators reflect the views of the bargaining unit and are these views negotiated into contracts?



### A Methodological Consideration

The professionalism measure as developed by Corwin (1963) had not been validated on a population similar to the sample used in this study. No significant differences were found in scores between NEA and AFT negotiators. No significant differences were found in data gathered dealing with the criteria which was used to compute the initial validation of the instrument (e.g., having been a teacher for at least five years; having published; having been an officer or active in an association; having been a member of two or more teachers' organizations). The scores on the professionalism measure did not correlate significantly with any of the twelve variables presented in Table XL in Chapter IV. Analysis of the preceding led the writer to question the discrimination capabilities of the instrument for the sample in the current study.

In order to further examine the discrimination capabilities of the instrument, the current sample was divided into two groups. The criteria for division were similar to the criteria used by Corwin (1963) when he divided his groups for validation of the instrument. Those teacher negotiators who met three of the following four criteria were placed in the high professional group: if he had published; had been in education for five or more years; held an office in a teacher's organization; or held memberships in more than two teachers' organizations. If the teacher negotiator had not met three of the four criteria, he was placed in the low professional group. Twenty-nine negotiators were placed in the high group and ten negotiators were placed in the low group. A "t" test for differences between means for groups with different N's was computed. The resulting "t" value of 0.25 was not

statistically significant beyond the 0.05 level. It was concluded that the instrument did not discriminate between the high professional group and the low professional group in the current study. It is felt that data reported, analysis made, and conclusions drawn from the responses of negotiators to this instrument should be viewed with care. For this sample, for the purposes of this study, the professionalism instrument does not seem to be appropriate. Further usage of this instrument in inquires in the field of negotiations, when using similar populations, should be preceded by additional validation.

Negotiations appear to be a primary vehicle by which teachers are being afforded input to the decision making process in education. Legislation is being passed which enables representatives of teachers' organizations to bargain collectively with boards of education. The boundaries of the relationship which develops between employees and the employer are a function of the attitudes of the parties to negotiations. It is hoped that the foundations upon which the relationship between faculty and administration are laid will be based upon genuine efforts to improve education. The negotiations process, by defining the atmosphere in which professional educators must function, has a critical effect upon the teaching-learning relationship. This teaching-learning relationship is the primary concern of all educators. It is hoped that the negotiators will function with the best interests of the students foremost in their minds.

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APPENDIX A

INITIAL AND FOLLOW-UP LETTERS TO SUPERINTENDENTS  
AND NEGOTIATORS



OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY — STILLWATER

**OKLAHOMA PUBLIC SCHOOL RESEARCH COUNCIL**  
STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074

AFFILIATED UNIVERSITIES  
The University of Oklahoma  
Oklahoma State University

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
Gunderson Hall, Room 302 C  
Phone 372-6211, ext. 6245

March 17, 1972

Mr. R. Mason Holmes, Superintendent  
North Green C. U. #3  
318 West Clay  
Roodhouse, Illinois

Dear Mr. Holmes:

I am currently a Research Associate with the Oklahoma Public Research Council which is affiliated with Oklahoma State University. The subject of my study is "An Investigation of the Relationship Between the Attitudes of Militancy, Professionalism, and Labor-Management Orientation of Negotiators as Related to Selected Provisions of Negotiated Contracts."

The subjects to be used are the negotiators for the teacher's group and the negotiators for the Board of Education.

I wish to insure you that the names of the individual negotiators and the school district will be held in the strictest confidence.

The total testing time will be approximately one hour, not including some demographic data which is needed.

Through a process of random selection your school district has been selected to represent the Professional Association in the study.

The testing can be accomplished in two manners: 1) I can come to your school district and administer the instruments, or 2) the instruments and the instructions can be mailed to you and an envelope addressed to me will be furnished so that the results can be returned to me when completed.

Enclosed is a form which I hope that you will fill out, place in the self-addressed envelope, and mail.

Your cooperation in this study is vital.

Sincerely,

Thomas Larry Thacker  
Research Associate

TT:hjb  
Enclosure



OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY — STILLWATER

**OKLAHOMA PUBLIC SCHOOL RESEARCH COUNCIL**

STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074

AFFILIATED UNIVERSITIES  
The University of Oklahoma  
Oklahoma State University

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
Gunderson Hall, Room 302 C  
Phone 372-6211, ext. 6245

April 7, 1972

Mr. R. Mason Holmes, Superintendent  
North Green C. U. #3  
318 West Clay  
Roodhouse, Illinois

Dear Mr. Holmes:

We are very distressed that you have decided not to participate in our proposed study at this time. Your assistance in this study will, hopefully, add much needed information about the negotiations process in the public educational setting. Writers dealing primarily with the negotiations process in the private sector have stated that the attitudes of the negotiators have an effect upon the contracts which they negotiate. The study at hand will try to add support to the contention, on the part of the writer, that the negotiators which represent the local affiliate of the National Education Association and the negotiators who represent the local affiliate of the American Federation of Labor express similar attitudes, therefore, the contracts which are negotiated by these negotiators will not be significantly different.

The success of this study and therefore the addition of needed information about the negotiations process depends upon your cooperation. Your participation in the study is essential to the fulfillment of the proposed outcomes. We implore you to reconsider your participation in the study. As was stated in the preliminary letter, the names of the school and the individual participants will be held in the strictest confidence.

Sincerely,

Thomas Larry Thacker  
Research Associate



OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY — STILLWATER

**OKLAHOMA PUBLIC SCHOOL RESEARCH COUNCIL**

STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074

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OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
Gunderson Hall, Room 302 C  
Phone 372-6211, ext. 6245

May 9, 1972

Mr. R. Mason Holmes, Superintendent  
North Green C. U. #3  
318 West Clay  
Roodhouse, Illinois

Dear Mr. Holmes:

We hope that this letter finds you relaxing at your desk with no problems and very little to do. I know this is not the case but I do hope that the closing of school will be non-traumatic.

We want to thank you for the assistance you have rendered us by distributing the instrument packages to the individual negotiators. The returns thus far have been fair. With people being people and with the end of the school year rapidly approaching, some gentle reminders are needed. We would appreciate your mentioning the instruments to the negotiators in case they have forgotten.

If it were possible for you to send us the names and addresses of the negotiators, we could contact each by mail. There is no way that we can know which negotiators have returned instruments so we will need all of the names and addresses.

Your cooperation, especially at this busy time of the year, will be greatly appreciated.

Enclosed is a self-addressed stamped envelope for your convenience.

Professionally,

Thomas Larry Thacker  
Research Associate

TT:jt  
Enclosure



OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY — STILLWATER

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STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074

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Oklahoma State University

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
Gunderson Hall, Room 302 C  
Phone 372-6211, ext. 6245

Dear Negotiator:

You have recently received a packet of instruments from your superintendent. Along with the packet came a request to respond to the three instruments and place them in the mail. May is, of course, an extremely busy time of the year and there are many things on your mind. It would be extremely helpful to the OPSRC and to the research associate if you would take the time to dig up the instrument, respond to it, and mail it to me.

If you have already responded to the instrument and have mailed it, please disregard this letter. Due to the nature of the instrument, there is no way that I can or need to know who has responded, therefore, it is necessary to write to all of the negotiators who are a part of the study.

We hope that your school year has been a successful one.

Professionally,

Thomas Larry Thacker  
Research Associate

TT:hjb



OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY — STILLWATER

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Gunderson Hall, Room 302 C  
Phone 372-6211, ext. 6245

Dear Negotiator:

Sometime within the past month and one-half, packets of instruments were distributed to each of the negotiators who comprise both the teachers' team and the board's team. The researcher, in his infinite wisdom, could not have chosen a more inconvenient time to deliver these instruments. With the closing of school at hand, many of the individual negotiators concentrated their energies on their professional duties as educators and set the instruments aside. Now that the school year has ended, it is hoped that you will take the time to complete the enclosed instrument packet and mail it in the self-addressed, prepaid envelope.

If you have completed and mailed an instrument packet, please disregard this letter. There is no way that the researcher can know who has responded to the questionnaire, therefore, it is necessary to write all of the negotiators who are a part of the study.

Again, it will be greatly appreciated if you will participate in the study.

Professionally,

Thomas Larry Thacker  
Research Associate

TT:jt  
Enclosures





OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY — STILLWATER

**OKLAHOMA PUBLIC SCHOOL RESEARCH COUNCIL**

STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074

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The University of Oklahoma  
Oklahoma State University

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
Gunderson Hall, Room 302 C  
Phone 372-6211, ext. 6245

Dear Negotiator,

We at the research council, wish to thank you for taking your time to answer these instruments. We hope that you feel that the time you use is well spent. You will notice that the instruments are fastened with a paper clip. This is to keep them in the prescribed order. It will be helpful if you will answer them in the order which they are placed. First, LABOR-MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE; Second, VIEWS OF THE TEACHER'S JOB; and Third, THE WAY I SEE IT. The answer sheets for each are either provided on the instrument, as in the case of the first two or provided in addition to the instrument as in the case of the third. Please mark your answers in the appropriate place.

When you finish answering the three instruments and the demographic sheet, please place them in the self addressed envelope and place them in the mail. You can see that there is no opportunity for anyone but the researcher to see your answers. You can also see that your name is not on the instrument, therefore, there is no way that anyone but yourself can know how you answered the questions.

We wish to take the time to reiterate our thanks for your cooperation in the study.

Sincerely,

Thomas Larry Thacker  
Research Associate

Name of School District \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ YES we will participate in the proposed study dealing with  
Negotiations in Education.

\_\_\_\_\_ Number of negotiators for the teacher's group.

\_\_\_\_\_ Number of negotiators for the Board of Education.

\_\_\_\_\_ We wish for you to mail the instruments and the instructions; we  
will administer the instruments, place them in the self-  
addressed envelope, and mail them to the researcher.

\_\_\_\_\_ We wish for the researcher to come to our school district and  
administer the instruments.

\_\_\_\_\_ We do not wish to participate in the proposed study at this time.

APPENDIX B

INSTRUMENTATION PACKET

Name of School District \_\_\_\_\_

(Circle One) Board Negotiator      Teacher Negotiator (Circle One)  
Union Professional

Sex    Male\_\_\_ Female\_\_\_

Age\_\_\_\_\_

Years in Teaching\_\_\_\_\_

Degree\_\_\_\_\_

Number of Publications\_\_\_\_\_

Number of Work Stoppages Participated in\_\_\_\_\_. Were you in  
sympathy with the work stoppages? Yes\_\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_\_

Number of Teacher's Organizations to which you belong\_\_\_\_\_.

Number of offices You have held in the Various teacher's organizations  
of which you have been a member\_\_\_\_\_.

Number of years that you have been a negotiator\_\_\_\_\_.

## LABOR-MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE

### Preliminary Remarks

The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine the importance of some of the issues in the field of labor-management relations today, as well as to determine the position that various groups will take on those issues.

In filling out the questionnaire, it is extremely important that you answer them according to your own ideas on the subject and not as someone else thinks about it or the way that you think it should be answered.

### Marking the Questionnaire

On the following pages you will find various statements concerning one phase or another of an issue of present day labor-management relations. Before each statement are columns marked from 1 to 5. If you mark in column:

- 1-Strongly disagree - it means that this statement reads opposite to your attitudes on this issue or that you definitely disagree with the statement.
  
- 2-Disagree - it means that you partially disagree with the statement or that you believe it to be more wrong than right.
  
- 3-Undecided - it means that you are undecided about the statement or that you stand in the middle-of-the-road on this issue.
  
- 4-Agree - it means that you partially agree with this statement, that you agree with the statement with reservations or that this statement is more right than wrong.
  
- 5-Strongly agree - it means that you fully agree with the statement or that this statement expresses your attitude on the issue involved.

Please mark a check in the column which best clearly represents your attitude about the statement. Be sure that you have placed one and only one check mark beside each statement.













Strongly 1 Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Undecided	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree

VIEWS OF THE TEACHER'S JOB, p. 2.

11. Teachers should be evaluated primarily on the basis of their knowledge of the subject that they teach and on the basis of their ability to communicate it.
12. Schools should hire no one to teach unless he holds at least a 4 year bachelors degree.
13. In view of the teacher shortage, it should be permissible to hire teachers trained at non-accredited colleges.
14. A teacher should be able to make his own decisions about problems that come up in the classroom.
15. Small matters should not have to be referred to someone higher up for a final answer.
16. The ultimate authority over the major educational decisions should be exercised by professional teachers.

THE WAY I SEE IT

ANSWER SHEET

PLEASE PUT ALL ANSWERS TO THE INSTRUMENT ON THIS SHEET!!!!!!!

PART A. What would you do in the situation described above? (Check only one)

- 1. Comply with superior's request
- 2. Try to compromise
- 3. Seek the support of colleagues
- 4. Ask for an investigation by a professional organization
- 5. Refuse to comply with the request
- 6. Quit the job

PART B. What do you anticipate will happen to you if you do not comply with the above request? (Check only one)

- 1. No disapproval or mild disapproval from the principal
- 2. Strong disapproval but no formal action from the principal
- 3. Loss of reputation
- 4. Loss of deserved promotion or deserved salary increase
- 5. Transferred to a less desirable position
- 6. Dismissal from the school system

1. Part A.	3. Part A.	5. Part A.	7. Part A.	9. Part A.	11. Part A.
<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1
<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2
<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3
<u>    </u> 4	<u>    </u> 4	<u>    </u> 4	<u>    </u> 4	<u>    </u> 4	<u>    </u> 4
<u>    </u> 5	<u>    </u> 5	<u>    </u> 5	<u>    </u> 5	<u>    </u> 5	<u>    </u> 5
<u>    </u> 6	<u>    </u> 6	<u>    </u> 6	<u>    </u> 6	<u>    </u> 6	<u>    </u> 6
Part B.	Part B.	Part B.	Part B.	Part B.	Part B.
<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1
<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2
<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3
<u>    </u> 4	<u>    </u> 4	<u>    </u> 4	<u>    </u> 4	<u>    </u> 4	<u>    </u> 4
<u>    </u> 5	<u>    </u> 5	<u>    </u> 5	<u>    </u> 5	<u>    </u> 5	<u>    </u> 5
<u>    </u> 6	<u>    </u> 6	<u>    </u> 6	<u>    </u> 6	<u>    </u> 6	<u>    </u> 6
2. Part A.	4. Part A.	6. Part A.	8. Part A.	10. Part A.	12. Part A.
<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1	<u>    </u> 1
<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2	<u>    </u> 2
<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3	<u>    </u> 3
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THE WAY I SEE IT

Below is a list of incidents which have occurred in different schools throughout the country. We are interested in getting your reactions to these situations. There is no right or wrong answer. Just imagine yourself as the teacher in each situation. Indicate (1) what you would do in each of these situations, and (2) what is likely to happen to you if you do not comply when a situation arises at your school.

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1. The assistant principal told a teacher that he was too "out-spoken" in criticizing certain policies of the school and that this was causing unrest among faculty members, suggesting that he refrain from further outspoken criticism..... IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER.....
2. A mathematics teacher was told by the principal that he was not presenting his subject in the most effective way, and that he should revise his course content and the methods of teaching it. He maintained that his professional society had recommended these procedures ..... IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER.....
3. A teacher planned to invite a well-known author to speak for his class but the principal advised against it because of the speaker's alleged "socialistic leanings". The teacher felt the allegations were unfounded, and that his students would benefit by hearing what he had to say..... IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER.....
4. The school board rules explicitly stated that teachers should not participate in the local school board elections. One teacher made a public statement that one of the present board members was a professional politician, and otherwise actively engaged in the campaign. .... IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER.....
5. A principal occasionally changed the grade given by one of his teachers, if a student's complaint to him seemed to justify a higher grade. One teacher protested; she was told by the principal that he had the final responsibility for whatever happened in the school, he asked her to understand..... IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER.....
6. The administration requested teachers not to use a standard textbook in American Government because it was "socialistically inclined". A history teacher felt that the book was the best available and proceeded to submit an order for it..... IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER.....
7. The administration changed a course of study which had included philosophy and music appreciation to one which was based almost completely on the sciences and mathematics. A committee of teachers went to see the principal and voiced disapproval. They were told that the administration was in a better position to make the decision. .... IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER.....

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8. A chemistry teacher took an active public stand in favor of water fluoridation in a community that was divided on the issue. The superintendent requested him to avoid becoming further involved in the issue..... IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER.....
9. The superintendent insisted that all teachers live in the district in which they presently teach. One teacher continued to live in another section of the city..... IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER.
10. The administration issued a directive that teachers should help to improve parent-teacher relations. A parent-teacher committee was established to help select textbooks. One math teacher refused to participate, stating that members of such a committee are not qualified to select textbooks..... IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER.....
11. One school system did not permit students to read several American literature classics by Faulkner, Hemmingway, Steinbeck and others. One English teacher actively sought to have the policy repealed by soliciting the support of certain influential citizens in the community. The principal asked her to desist in her campaign against the policy because she was stirring up trouble for the school. She said that her action had the support of the National English Teachers' Association..... IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER.
12. In one school, male teachers received preference in promotions. A group of women teachers at the school complained to the school board. They were told that the situation would be changed, but it was not. One woman who was passed over for a promotion wrote a letter to the NEA and State Department of Education. The principal ordered her to stop stirring up trouble..... IMAGINE YOURSELF AS THE TEACHER.....

VITA

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Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Education

Thesis: A COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES OF NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATED  
CONTRACTS BETWEEN NEA AFFILIATED SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND AFT  
AFFILIATED SCHOOL DISTRICTS

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