

THE ROLE OF CATHOLICISM IN THE 1924 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

By

BEN GENE RADER

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Southwest Missouri State College

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Thesis Approved:

*O. A. Hilton*

Thesis Adviser

*Homer L. Knight*

*James MacVee*

Dean of the Graduate School

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## PREFACE

The study that follows concentrates on the campaign of a Catholic, Alfred E. Smith, for the Democratic nomination for the presidency in 1924. This investigation is aimed primarily at considering the weight and role of anti-Catholicism in the months before the convention and in the 1924 convention itself. For this reason, the reader will find little space devoted to the economic and political factors associated with Smith's candidacy. Also, concomitant social implications of the anti-Catholic sentiment are considered secondary to this study.

I have found that two principal social problems seem to emerge simultaneously in studying Smith's candidacy, namely prohibition and anti-Catholicism. The prohibition factor is much easier to discern, since men felt free to discuss the issue publicly. The religious factor was indeed the "silent issue." It was considered bad taste for politicians and the press to discuss the question, thereby leaving the investigator with only the outward and often indirect manifestations of anti-Catholicism. These outward manifestations were prevalent in the activities of the revived order of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. In this study, therefore, the Klan's activities in 1923-1924 are traced in considerable detail. Also, special attention is paid to the important Ku Klux Klan plank which was submitted to the 1924 Democratic Convention.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN PERSPECTIVE. . . . .	1
II. PROHIBITION OR CATHOLICISM? . . . . .	7
III. THE HIDDEN MENACE. . . . .	15
IV. PREJUDICE IN THE GARDEN. . . . .	37
CONCLUSION. . . . .	56
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . .	58

## CHAPTER I

### ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN PERSPECTIVE

Since Alfred E. Smith's candidacy for the Democratic nomination in 1924 involved the unique problem of his religious affiliation, it is necessary to note the social and intellectual climate from which this problem emerged. Also, the historical roots of anti-Catholicism in the United States, which took form from a partially latent state in the nineteen-twenties, are significant to this thesis.

Anti-Catholicism, as it appeared in several complex forms, was by no means a new phenomenon on the American scene in the Twenties. The first American settlers had brought with them the same hatred and fear of Popery which was rampant in Seventeenth century England. Ever since the break with Rome, in the reign of Henry VIII, English Protestants had lived in a constant fear -- almost a mania -- of Catholic intrigue. Attempts to reestablish the Roman Church by "Bloody" Mary, and the exposure of several Catholic plots during the reign of James I, had served only to lend credence to these fears. These fears had been given further impetus by a growing English nationalism, which had been continually challenged by the Catholic nations of France and Spain.

In America this anti-Catholic heritage did not appreciably abate. Before 1763 anti-Popery had found a rallying point around the threat of the Catholic colonies that had been established by France and Spain.

These threats to security plus the anti-Catholic heritage soon reflected itself in legislation. Colonial legislatures consistently restricted Catholic suffrage and rights to hold public office. But anti-Catholicism was not restricted to political rights alone. Social discriminations, exemplified in the American version of Guy Fawkes Day -- Pope Day -- were also in evidence throughout the colonies.<sup>1</sup> In this annual festivity, the Pope, after a long parade was inevitably hung in effigy.

The Declaration of Independence, the French alliance, and the ratification of the federal Constitution in 1789 somewhat relieved anti-Catholic tension, though this same tolerant attitude did not appear in the newly written state constitutions. Seven states specified that all office holders must be Protestants.<sup>2</sup> After 1789 these states gradually began to drop their restrictions on Catholic office holders. However, nativism continued to exist, emanating especially from the pulpits of minor religious sects plus a considerable quantity of anti-Catholic literature.

Due in part to the rapid influx of the Irish Catholics and the Catholic South Germans, American nativism reached its high tide in the eighteen-fifties. Constant propaganda supposedly exposing the "debaucheries" of priestdom, the "horrors" of convents, and the attempts at political subversion by the Pope alarmed many Americans, especially those of the lower socio-economic class. Moreover, America's traditional economic, political, and social structure seemed, to the nativist, to be

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<sup>1</sup>Ray Allen Billington, The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938), pp. 18-19.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

threatened by a new flood of immigration from Europe. Of these fears which were embodied in the Know-Nothing Party, Professor Ray Allen Billington has found "far more fear of the Papist than the foreigner."<sup>3</sup> Although no-Popery politics soon collapsed in the face of the larger national problems engendered by the sectional-slavery strife, anti-Catholicism still existed in socio-economic group relations.

The eighteen-eighties saw a new wave of immigrants arrive from Southern and Central Europe as well as Ireland. These immigrants were largely Catholic, did not speak English, and were often of a darker skin. Since the new immigrant would accept lower wages, he also, posed an economic threat to the old American stock. To stem the tide of these unwelcome immigrants several nativistic organizations sprang up; the largest being the American Protective Association. Though not as strong as the earlier Know-Nothing movement, the A.P.A. possessed considerable political influence in several Northern and Western states.<sup>4</sup>

Catholic-Protestant relations seemed to promise a happier future at the turn of the twentieth century. The A.P.A. passed from the scene; but the organizational gap was soon filled with a number of smaller organizations such as the Covenanters, the Guardians of Liberty, and the Knights of Luther. All directed their charges against Popery. These organizations were assisted by others not directly concerned with Catholicism. For example the Prohibitionist Party of Florida pledged that, "No one shall be qualified to hold office who owes allegiance to

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 386.

<sup>4</sup>See John Higham's Strangers in the Land. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1955).



any foreign sovereign, potentate or ecclesiastic. . . ."<sup>5</sup> World War I temporarily delayed the forces of anti-Catholic politics.

After the first World War there appeared in the United States a new form of intense nationalism. Instead of possessing the traditional unified or "total" emotional attachment to the state as opposed to other states, the new form of nationalism was directed inward. In general Americans apparently felt they had been duped by the English and French at the Versailles Conference. The press and partisan politicians often depicted President Woodrow Wilson as the "fallen Messiah" and the League of Nations as a foreign instrument designed to bring the nation into an "entangling alliance." Furthermore, the Bolsheviks, who were pledged to an international revolution of the proletariat, apparently frightened many Americans after their success in Russia in 1917. Perhaps, these factors explain in part, the intolerant nationalism that followed.

Immigration once again emerged as a problem. Nordic superiority was emphasized. The question often arose as to whether a Catholic alien who had had little experience in democratic government could assimilate into the American democratic system. Apparently many Americans thought not. The immigrants themselves often accentuated this feeling by settling in clannish groups in large cities and by attempts to retain their cultural heritage.

The organizational functions of the Catholic Church alarmed many citizens of the Twenties. They argued that "one-hundred per cent Americanism" was impossible to achieve as long as the Knights of Columbus and

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<sup>5</sup>As quoted in Michael Williams, The Shadow of the Pope. (New York & London: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill, 1932), pp. 115-116.

separate parochial schools existed. Moreover, it was difficult for American Protestants to understand how a Catholic could possibly owe allegiance to the United States politically and to Rome spiritually.

To many Americans, liquor consumption, bootlegging, gangsterism, immoral living in general, seemed to characterize in their totality the bulk of urban dwelling aliens. In reaction to this threat to traditional American institutions appeared the revived Ku Klux Klan (1915) which fed on latent nativism and the new demand for conformity to the "one-hundred per cent American" culture.<sup>6</sup> "Americanism," explained the Imperial Wizard of the Klan, H. W. Evans, "is a thing of the spirit, a purpose, and a point of view. . . . He [the Klansman] believes also that few aliens can understand that spirit."<sup>7</sup> Evans, also, significantly noted that the Klan of the Twenties was less concerned with the Negroes than the post Civil War one. "The Negro is not a menace to Americanism in the sense that the Jew or Roman Catholic is a menace," wrote Evans, for the Negro was simply incapable of understanding what Americanism was.<sup>8</sup>

Smith's candidacy was, also, affected by the establishment of prohibition. Nationwide prohibition had resulted from the gradual adoption of a series of dry laws, at the local level, then by the state, and with the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, by the nation. Congress sought to define and enforce this Amendment by the enactment of the Volstead Act in

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<sup>6</sup>See C. Lewis Fowler, The Ku Klux Klan Its Origin, Meaning and Scope of Operation. (Atlanta, Georgia: n. p., 1922).

<sup>7</sup>H. W. Evans, "The Klan's Fight for Americanism," North American Review, 213 (1926), p. 53.

<sup>8</sup>H. W. Evans, The Klan of Tomorrow and the Klan Spiritual. (n. p.: Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 1924), p. 14.

1919. (All beverages containing over .05% alcohol were defined as illegal). But many Americans, especially those of the urban areas, did not allow the Volstead Act to interfere with their bacchanal thirsts. They redistilled industrial alcohol, made "moonshine," and smuggled alcoholic beverages across the borders.

Prohibition had been achieved largely through strong political organizations such as the Anti-Saloon League, which continued to function in the Twenties under the capable leadership of Wayne B. Wheeler. The League found ample assistance in its drive for enforcement of prohibition among the newly enfranchised women and among Protestant ministers. Strict enforcement often was identified by the Ku Klux Klan and the dry forces as one technique of preserving the American way of life against Catholic alien influence.<sup>9</sup> (See pp. 12-13)

The stage was set for a protagonist who represented in many respects the antithesis of all these feelings -- Alfred E. Smith.

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<sup>9</sup> John Moffatt Mecklin, The Ku Klux Klan: A Study of the American Mind. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1924), p. 35.

## CHAPTER II

### PROHIBITION OR CATHOLICISM?

Alfred E. Smith's meteoric rise from a "fishboy" of New York City's East Side to the governorship of the Empire State in 1918, exemplified in more ways than one the American tradition of opportunity limited only by individual initiative. Smith was somewhat unique as an urban politician in that he had risen above his extremely modest environment. Furthermore, he represented the opportunities for advancement in the new world by recent immigrants, regardless of their religious faith.

Running for governor for a second term in 1920, Smith met his first political defeat. But even in defeat Smith garnered 32% more of the popular vote in New York State than James M. Cox, who was the Democratic presidential candidate in the same year.<sup>1</sup> While garnering a massive 73% of the popular vote in 1922, he became governor for a second time by defeating the Republican incumbent, Nathan L. Miller.<sup>2</sup> This resounding victory of 1922 left little doubt in any experienced politicians' mind that Smith would be a candidate for the presidential nomination in the 1924 Democratic Convention. Moreover, Charles F. Murphy, boss of Tammany Hall, had placed Smith in nomination in 1920 in order to familiarize his

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<sup>1</sup>The World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1924. (New York: New York World, Publishers, 1924), p. 863.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 862.

name with Democratic Party leaders across the nation. From then on till his death in April, 1924, Murphy continued to work for Smith, contacting and lining up delegates for the next convention.<sup>3</sup>

But considerable opposition to Smith's presidential aspirations appeared almost immediately after his second election to the governorship. In part, this opposition was based on his political, economic, and social philosophy. But some of the opposition arose out of the patent fact that Smith was a member of the Roman Catholic Church and favored modification if not the abolition of the Volstead Act and the 18th Amendment.

Smith's opposition to the Volstead Act was fairly well known in the State of New York. It was not until 1923 when he signed, as Governor of New York, the Culliver Bill that his stand was catapulted into the national scene. Earlier in 1920 the New York legislature had followed the pattern of other states by passing the Mullan-Gage Act designed to assist federal liquor control agencies by the use of state courts and enforcement agents. Governor Nathan L. Miller had signed the measure. But almost immediately opposition, especially from the recent immigrant population, had begun to appear to the rigid enforcement of the act. Objections culminated in the Culliver Act of 1923 which repealed the old Mullan-Gage Act.<sup>4</sup>

Although the repeal of New York's prohibition enforcement act did not theoretically relieve state authorities from an obligation to enforce the

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<sup>3</sup>New York Times, April 24, 1924. Hereafter cited as N. Y. Times.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., June 3, 1923.

the federal law, it did, in reality, weaken enforcement of the Volstead Act. First, local courts were relieved by the Culliver Act from handling cases of prohibition violation, thereby throwing the complete responsibility of trial on the inadequate facilities of the federal court system. Secondly, local enforcement agents could, in reality, if they wished, ignore the federal law since there were no longer any state laws calling for their enforcement.<sup>5</sup>

Undoubtedly Smith was fully cognizant of the results that would come from the repeal of the Mullan-Gage Act. But, probably due in large part to a belief that there was wide-scale popular support of prohibition in other sections of the nation, the Governor hoped to ward off criticism by announcing in a memorandum accompanying his signature to the Culliver Act, that he would encourage local authorities to enforce the federal law stringently.<sup>6</sup> Again, almost a year later, in March of 1924, (only three months before the Democratic Convention was to convene), Smith in a speech before a conference of district attorneys, sheriffs and police commissioners asked for "strict enforcement of the Volstead Act," regardless of what the local official's personal opinion was concerning the federal statute. This statement by Smith was viewed by most observers as a political maneuver to allay the political thunder of the dries before the 1924 convention convened.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>"A Dry Edict from a Moist Governor," Literary Digest, LXXX (March 15, 1924), p. 13.

Yet the dry forces were not at all convinced of Smith's sincerity on enforcement and were, of course, bitterly critical of his objections to prohibition in principle. Numerous officials of the politically powerful Anti-Saloon League belligerently expressed the opinion that the Culliver Act was in defiance of the Constitution. Wayne B. Wheeler, General Counsel for the Anti-Saloon League, declared in his typical oratorical style that the Culliver Act was designed to abrogate the Eighteenth Amendment and to aid bootleggers. "The action of Governor Smith," Wheeler erroneously predicted, "will stir the nation as did the shot on Fort Sumter."<sup>8</sup> The huge Southern Baptist Convention, which reputedly represented 4,500,000 members, had (before Smith signed the bill) already declared that the guilty politicians who foisted the repeal bill on the citizens of New York would receive their "just reward." From Kansas City, Missouri, the Convention had resolved that, "The recent action of New York . . . is a disgrace to the state and an insult to the federal government."<sup>9</sup> The Presbyterian General Assembly, meeting at Indianapolis, Indiana, joined in the chorus by calling upon their members to sign total abstinence pledges.<sup>10</sup> Evidence seems to indicate, however, with the exception of William Jennings Bryan,<sup>11</sup> few other nationally known politicians were concerned with Smith's position on the prohibition question.

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<sup>8</sup>N. Y. Times, June 3, 1923.

<sup>9</sup>Annual of the Southern Baptist Convention of 1923. (Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman Press, 1923), p. 103. Hereafter cited as Annual of Southern Baptist.

<sup>10</sup>"Presbyterians called upon to sign the pledge," Literary Digest, LXXVII (June 9, 1923), p. 33.

<sup>11</sup>N. Y. Times, June 10, 1923.

With the exception of the evangelical Protestants it does not appear that public opinion was organized or even felt strongly about Smith's stand on prohibition.<sup>12</sup> Many Americans had probably never heard of Al Smith, at least not before the convention. In addition, we must remember that large classes of American citizens ignored the Eighteenth Amendment, and that in some instances the Amendment seemed actually to encourage drinking. Many prominent Americans such as Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, advocated the abolition of the entire amendment.<sup>13</sup> Apparently Smith's campaign managers were not unduly worried. Perhaps, they felt the loss accruing from the criticism by dries would be more than offset by delegates gained from the predominately wet states. Nevertheless in order not to lose dry support Franklin D. Roosevelt, who became Smith's campaign manager following the death of Murphy in April, 1924, assured the delegates of the convention that the Smith supporters would not propose a wet plank in the Democratic platform.<sup>14</sup>

From the time Smith signed the Culliver Act, the criticism leveled at the Governor's position on the prohibition question was strongly intertwined with opposition to his religious faith. This fact was especially evident among the fundamentalist denominations. For example

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<sup>12</sup>In an article surveying the merits and liabilities of Democratic presidential candidates in July, 1923, journalist Mark Sullivan did not mention at all the wet issue with respect to Smith's candidacy. On the other hand he wrote, "If Governor Al Smith were not a Catholic, neither this nor any other of the articles on the Democratic Presidential possibilities would need to be written." Mark Sullivan, "The Democratic Dark Horse Pasture." World's Work, XLVI (July, 1923), p. 288.

<sup>13</sup>N. Y. Times, May 9, 1924.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., June 4, 1924.



the 1924 Southern Baptist Convention passed a fiery resolution in Atlanta, Georgia, aimed directly at Smith without specifically naming him. In part, the resolution read:

Some very unworthy men are aspiring to the Presidency and have had publicity in the press as possible nominees. No political party can ride to the White House on a beer keg. Southern Baptists will not support any candidate who is wet, or about whose Americanism there can be any question.<sup>15</sup>

In the last sentence of this resolution the Southern Baptist significantly linked, as if they were interchangeable, the terms "wet" and "Americanism."<sup>16</sup> This statement seems to indicate that the Baptists were using a definition of Americanism similar to that of the Ku Klux Klan (an organization to which many Southern Baptists belonged). The Klan generally held that un-Americanism was found among all Catholics, all Jews and recent immigrants. Tacitly agreeing with this definition the Southern Baptists also, observed that, "The 'melting pot' has largely ceased to melt and almost before we are aware of it our American ideals were menaced by floods of aliens."<sup>16</sup> The generally inoffensive language used by the Southern Baptists to express their preference of presidential candidates was largely a front for a more fundamental objection to Smith's membership in the Catholic Church.

The closely knit political relationship between the Klan, the dry forces and the fundamentalists in the Twenties further complicated the religious question. This group leveled a steady stream of criticism at Smith for his association with Tammany Hall, his stand on prohibition,

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<sup>15</sup>Annual of Southern Baptist of 1924., pp. 116-117. Underlining in this quotation was added by the author for emphasis.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 116.

and his religious affiliation. Criticism for his religious affiliation always seemed to linger in the background as a "silent issue", not to be spoken of publicly. Senator Oscar W. Underwood of Alabama, recalled in 1928 the political power of this relationship:

The close political alliance between the leaders of the Ku Klux Klan and the prohibition forces in many States of the Union have been common knowledge to all. . . . Organized religion, and organized prejudice associated in one political effort for national control have been an almost irresistible force in American politics, and the office holder has seldom been able to resist the combined attacks.<sup>17</sup>

In these astute comments, danger loomed large for the future of Al Smith.

The significance of the wet issue in Smith's campaign is not entirely clear. Though Smith as Governor of New York spoke strongly for prohibition enforcement his signature on the Culliver Act had laid enforcement in the lap of the federal government. Franklin D. Roosevelt's assurance to the delegates prior to the convention that the Smith managers would not support any modification of the Volstead Act was evidently based on political expediency. This attempt to nullify the prohibition question as a political issue was not entirely successful, since the drys still focused on Smith's basic position on prohibition.

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<sup>17</sup>Oscar Underwood, Drifting Sands of Party Politics. (New York: The Century Company, 1928), p. 409. The popular lecturer, U. S. Representative William Upshaw, illustrates the dual nature of Smith's opponents. Besides being a vocal dry, Upshaw was a member of the Resolutions Committee of the Southern Baptist Convention and had received Klan support in the Congressional race of 1922. Annual of Southern Baptist of 1924., p. 116. Marion Monteval, Pseud., The Klan Inside Out. (Claremore, Oklahoma: Monarch Publishing Company, 1924) p. 134.

It is evident that opposition to Smith for religious reasons was obfuscated by the prohibition question. For those anti-Smith groups, who claimed to oppose the Governor because he was basically a wet, the prohibition question furnished an excellent front for opposing a Catholic candidate and avoiding unfriendly epithets such as "bigots" and "anti-democrats."

### CHAPTER III

#### THE HIDDEN MENACE

Objections to Al Smith's religious faith took shape in several forms. Ministers of evangelical Protestant denominations warned their congregations in many instances of the Catholic "menace," which they felt was epitomized in the political aspirations of Al Smith. The popular New York governor's political destiny was threatened by another anti-Catholic force, the Ku Klux Klan.

On November 19, 1923, the Oklahoma State Senate found Governor Jack Walton guilty of misconduct while in public office. Walton was convicted of payroll abuse, misuse of pardoning and parole powers, illegal interferences with grand juries, and restrictions of free elections. By convicting their flamboyant chief executive, the Klan controlled state legislature had led a successful "moral crusade" against graft and corruption in the Sooner State.<sup>1</sup>

Other states too felt the political hand of the Invisible Empire. Texas in 1922 elected Klan supported Earle Mayfield by a write-in vote to the United States Senate.<sup>2</sup> In the far West Oregon elected both a

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<sup>1</sup>"The Conviction of Governor Walton," Outlook, 135 (November 28, 1923), pp. 519-520.

<sup>2</sup>John W. Owens, "Does the Senate fear the K.K.K.?" New Republic, XXXVI (December 26, 1923), pp. 113-114.

legislature and a Klan governor. Upon assembling the Oregon legislature immediately introduced a bill for the closing of every private and parochial school in the state. Supplementary to this measure, which was directed at the small Catholic Church in Oregon, was a bill designed to eliminate the usage of sacramental wines.<sup>3</sup>

The Klan had entered politics. In the South and Midwest organized opposition to Catholicism and Al Smith was directed to a large extent, by the revived order of the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan took an increasingly larger role in Southern politics and was gaining strength in Northern states in 1923-1924. Journalist L. C. Speers, after a trip through the South in November of 1923, wrote a special article regarding the political power of the Klan for the New York Times. Speers concluded that the Kluxers politically controlled or held the balance of power in Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Indiana. In California, Arizona, New Mexico, Kansas, Missouri, Illinois, Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, West Virginia, and Maryland the Klan was gaining in strength. In the Southern "Black Belt" Speers found the Kluxers were strangely losing ground.<sup>4</sup> Conceivably this could be construed to indicate that at this time the Klan directed its efforts not primarily against the Negro but against a different type of "menace" to Americanism, namely Catholics and foreigners.

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<sup>3</sup>Waldo Roberts, "The Ku-Kluxing of Oregon," Outlook, 133 (March 14, 1923), pp. 490-491.

<sup>4</sup>L. C. Speers, "Klan's shadow falls on national politics," N. Y. Times, November 18, 1923.

The Klan appealed to a relatively broad array of the American populace. Prejudices unique to different geographic areas as well as general discontent were exploited by the Kluxers. To many Americans of the lower socio-economic class the Klan provided an opportunity, previously not accessible, to rise in stature within their community.<sup>5</sup> The elaborate ritual and secrecy of the Invisible Empire appealed "to those who love ritual. . . ."<sup>6</sup> In many areas the Klan was also considered to be an appropriate agency to lead moral crusades - often concomitant with evangelical Protestantism.<sup>7</sup> Demonstrations, parades, burning of fiery crosses, and intimidation, if not actual "flogging" were used to discipline local "slackers" and non-conformists. These techniques were, of course, impossible within the framework of law.

Organizational skill was significant in accounting for Klan growth. After the Imperial Wizard of the Klan, William Joseph Simmons, had contracted with Edward Young Clarke and Mrs. Elizabeth Taylor to direct promotional activities for the Empire, the Kluxers membership increased from 50,000 members in 1920 to an estimated 4,000,000 members in 1924. To expand membership Clarke and Taylor implemented an elaborate system of incentives. By allowing each local organizer, the Kleagle, to

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<sup>5</sup>Robert L. Duffis, "Ancestry and end of the Ku Klux Klan," World's Work, XLVI (September, 1923), p. 528.

<sup>6</sup>A Klan spokesman admitted this appeal. "Its ritual is the most beautiful, the most sublime, and the most inspiring in the world. It has in it all that those who love ritual may enjoy." C. Lewis Fowler, The Ku Klux Klan - Its Origin, Meaning and Scope of Operation. (Atlanta: n. p., 1922), p. 17. Hereafter cited as Fowler, Klan.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

retain four dollars of each ten dollar initiation fee they were able to give considerable impetus to expansion. The King Kleagle, head of the regional organization - the Realm - received fifty cents. Fifty cents also went to the Grand Goblin of the Dominion, and the remaining four dollars were retained by the Imperial Wizard, Clarke and Taylor.<sup>8</sup>

Perhaps, to attempt delineation of the causes behind the growth of Ku Kluxism is doing an injustice to a clear understanding of the organization. The Klansman himself seldom attempted to define precisely why he joined the Empire. When a backwoods Baptist preacher spoke of drink, Tammany, and threats to American institutions in almost the same breath,<sup>9</sup> what did he mean?

The Klan's growth rested upon certain conditions that were only called into existence by skillful organization. Moreover, these conditions varied according to geographical location. Yet sophisticated contemporary observers of the Klan pointed out in almost every state the role of anti-Catholicism as a basis for Klan propaganda. John Moffat Mecklin, a professor of sociology at Dartmouth College, concluded in a study published in 1924 "that the Klan's anti-Catholic propaganda has won for it more members than anything else."<sup>10</sup> The Klan of Indiana

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<sup>8</sup>See Hearings: The Ku Klux Klan (House Committee on Rules, 67 Cong., 1 Sess., Washington, 1921), pp. 67-69, and Robert L. Duffis, "Salesman of Hate: The Ku Klux Klan," World's Work, XLVI (May, 1923), pp. 31-38.

<sup>9</sup>N. Y. Times, June 23, 1924.

<sup>10</sup>John Moffatt Mecklin, The Ku Klux Klan: A Study of the American Mind. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.), 1924, p. 28. Hereafter cited as Mecklin, Klan: A Study.

based almost its entire campaign effort on the exploitation of the deep-rooted anti-Catholic bias.<sup>11</sup> Contemporary observers agreed that the center of antagonism in the Klan controlled states of Oklahoma<sup>12</sup> and Oregon<sup>13</sup> was anti-Catholicism.

The national headquarters of the Klan, located at Atlanta, Georgia, denied that the organization opposed Catholics as such. They insisted the Klan believed in complete religious freedom for both Protestant and Catholic. On the other hand these statements seemed to be more platitudes when compared with other statements appearing from the same source. C. Lewis Fowler, a Baptist clergyman, and an official Klan spokesman wrote in 1922: "It [the Klan] believes that Roman Catholicism is both a menace and a curse. . . ."<sup>14</sup> "It eliminates Roman Catholics," wrote the clergyman, "because all Catholics owe first allegiance to a foreign power. They have not and cannot have a first allegiance to our flag. They are not and cannot be true Catholics and 100 per cent Americans."<sup>15</sup> Other speakers and publications often echoed the same charge against Catholics; Catholics owed a dual allegiance, the primary one being to

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<sup>11</sup>Frank H. Bohn, "The Ku Klux Klan Interpreted," The American Journal of Sociology, (January, 1925), pp. 285-407. Also, see Lowell Mellett, "Klan and Church in Indiana," Atlantic Monthly, 132 (November 23, 1923), pp. 588-589.

<sup>12</sup>"About Politics and Politicians," Harlow's Weekly, XXIII (July 5, 1923), pp. 490-491.

<sup>13</sup>Waldo Roberts, "The Ku-Kluxing of Oregon," Outlook, 133 (March 14, 1923), pp. 490-491.

<sup>14</sup>Fowler, Klan, p. 11.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 12.



Rome.<sup>16</sup>

If these were the true views of the national organization those of the local Klans were even more bigoted. The 1924 Indiana Republican primary presents a good local case study of the Klan's exploitation of deep rooted anti-Catholic stereotypes. In a sensational exposé for the Atlantic Monthly in 1923, Lowell Mellett found anti-Catholicism had not subsided since his boyhood days twenty years before. Mellett recalled a boyhood incident in which he and some chums were watching a parade of a Catholic boys society when one of the older boys confided:

'Ever<sup>o</sup> one of them is bein<sup>o</sup> trained to be soldiers when they grows up. That's what them Cath<sup>o</sup>lics is doin.<sup>o</sup> Soon's they get'em all trained and they're goin<sup>o</sup> to seize the whole country and take charge of it an 'ever<sup>o</sup> thing!

'How kin they do it,<sup>o</sup> someone asked.

How kin they do it? Don<sup>o</sup>t ja know that ever<sup>o</sup> time a boy baby is born in a Cath<sup>o</sup>lic fam<sup>o</sup>ly they take and bury a gun under the church for him to use when he grows up? And they bury enough am<sup>o</sup>nition fer him to kill fifty people with.<sup>17</sup>

Mellett found several other reasons why Hoosiers feared the Catholic Church. They evidently believed the Catholics were out to destroy the public school system and overthrow the existing government.<sup>18</sup> Mellett reported that Catholicism had found an agency of expression in the Ku Klux Klan.

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<sup>16</sup>Another example of this type of charge was a speech given by the Imperial Wizard, H. W. Evans, at the Second Imperial Klonvokation held in Kansas City, Missouri, September 23-26, 1924. H. W. Evans, The Klan of Tomorrow and the Klan Spiritual. (n. p. Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 1924), p. 15.

<sup>17</sup>Lowell Mellett "Klan and Church in Indiana," Atlantic Monthly 132 (November 23, 1923), p. 587. Hereafter cited as Mellett, "Klan."

<sup>18</sup>This position was substantiated by Stanley Frost, "The Klan Shows its Hand in Indiana," Outlook, 137 (June 4, 1924), p. 188. Hereafter cited as Frost, "Klan Shows its Hand."

Men actually join the Klan because they believe that a magnificent home (a million dollar palace is the term generally used) is being built in Washington, D. C., to house the pope, and that the Vatican is soon to be moved to the American capitol!

I heard little concerning the Jews and Negroes. I heard much concerning the Catholics.<sup>19</sup>

The reporter found the people who composed the Klan "were old friends of mine; folks I'd known all my life; just some of the best citizens in Indiana, that was all. . . ."20 Mellett concluded, "Very clearly the crux of the Klan problem in Indiana is the Catholic Church."<sup>21</sup>

As the campaign progressed, the Klan distributed hundreds of leaflets throughout the state such as the following:

REMEMBER

EVERY CRIMINAL, EVERY GAMBLER, EVERY THUG, EVERY LIBERTINE, EVERY GIRL RUINER. . . EVERY PAGAN PAPIST PRIEST, EVERY SHYSTER LAWYER, EVERY K. OF C. . . . EVERY ROME CONTROLLED NEWSPAPER, IS FIGHTING THE KLAN. THINK IT OVER. WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?<sup>22</sup>

Also appearing in the Indiana campaign and frequently thereafter was a spurious Knights of Columbus membership oath which stated in part:

I do further promise and declare that I will have no opinion or will of my own or any mental reservation whatsoever. . . but will unhesitatingly obey each and every command that I may receive from my superiors in the militia of the Pope and of Jesus Christ.

I do further promise and declare that I will, when opportunity presents, make and wage relentless war secretly and openly, against all heretics, Protestants and Masons, as I am directed

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<sup>19</sup>Mellett, "Klan.," p. 588.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Quoted from Frost, "Klan Shows its Hand," p. 188.

to do, to extirpate them from the face of the whole earth; and that I will spare neither age, sex or condition, and that I will hang, burn, waste, boil, flay, strangle and bury alive these infamous heretics; rip up the stomachs and wombs of their women, and crush their infants' heads against the walls in order to annihilate their execrable race. . .as I at any time may be directed so to do by any agents of the Pope. . . .

That I will in voting always vote for a K. of C. in preference to a Protestant especially a Mason. . . .

That I will provide myself with arms and ammunition that I may be in readiness when the word is passed. . . .<sup>23</sup>

The election of the Klan candidate, Edward Jackson, by 100,000 votes more than his nearest rival seemed to give the Klan a "solemn referendum" of confidence. Jackson had won the Indiana Republican gubernatorial nomination in spite of opposition from the Republican machine and the established anti-Klan vote. The Klan had evidently appealed to Democrats as well as Republicans in their evangelic crusade to restore morality and destroy Catholic influence in Indiana State government.<sup>24</sup> Repercussions of this Klan victory were felt elsewhere on the political scene. The Literary Digest reported that: "Mr. McAdoo's supporters believe that the Klan victory in Indiana puts Governor Smith and Senator Underwood practically out of the running since only

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<sup>23</sup>United States Congressional Record, 62d Congress, 3d Session, February 15, 1913, Vol. 49, part 4, p. 3216. This false oath was originally read into the Congressional Record by a losing candidate for the House of Representatives in 1912. Since the oath was in an official government publication some evidently assumed it to be true. Reportedly The Menace of Aurora, Missouri, in 1914 could not print the oath in sufficient quantity to keep up with the demand! Knights of Columbus vs. Criminal Libel and Malicious Bigotry. (n. p. Issued by the Supreme Board of Directors of the Knights of Columbus, 1914.), pp. 1-5.

<sup>24</sup>Frost, "Klan Shows its Hand," pp. 188-189.

Mr. McAdoo is favored by the Klan."<sup>25</sup>

Charges similar to those made in the Indiana campaign concerning the "horrors" of nunneries, and lustful priests were frequently made in other states. The source of these charges seemed to have been a whispering campaign and the Klan press. A leading Catholic layman, Michael Williams, editor of the Commonweal, noted in an article for Forum the difficulty of ascertaining the "anti-Catholic state of mind, or mood, more or less common to a great multitude of respectable and worthy people. . . ." Anti-Catholicism lacked "clear or precise utterance. It lacks its literature."<sup>26</sup>

One of the most prominent Catholic-baiting newspapers was The Menace, published in a small Missouri town. According to its editors, "The Menace was launched in the belief that the Roman Catholic Political Machine, in its political intrigues and its interference with established American institutions, is the deadliest enemy to our civilization."<sup>27</sup> Issue after issue blasted the Catholic Church. The Oklahoma Baptist Association even went so far as to "recommend The Menace, of Aurora, Mo., and The Rail Splitter, of Milan, Ill., as the best means known to us for keeping posted on the doings of these Dago Romanists."<sup>28</sup> The old 19th century nativistic

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<sup>25</sup>"A Klan shock in Indiana," Literary Digest, LXXXI (May 24, 1924), p. 14.

<sup>26</sup>Williams also noted the prevalence of Klan newspapers, nunnery stories, Knights of Columbus oaths and Jesuit oaths. Michael Williams, "The Roman Catholic Church - An American Institution," Forum, LXXIII (March, 1925), p. 296.

<sup>27</sup>The Menace, December 2, 1911.

<sup>28</sup>Minutes of the First Annual Session of the Baptist Association (Oklahoma), (n. p., n. p., 1925.), p. 9.

publication, Maria Monk's Awful Disclosures of the Hotel Dieu Nunnery of Montreal (1836), was placed back into circulation by The Menace.<sup>29</sup> Books and pamphlets flowed in large quantities from the pens of supposed ex-priests and nuns in the employ of The Menace.<sup>30</sup> Jeremiah J. Crowley, a self-proclaimed ex-Catholic priest, wrote several scandalous books published by The Menace, such as The Pope: Chief of White Slavers, and Romanism - A Menace to the Nation.<sup>31</sup> The Menace reached its peak circulation in 1914 with 1,519,000 subscribers. After this circulation steadily declined; principally due to poor and corrupt management.<sup>32</sup>

The declining circulation of The Menace was more than offset by the proliferation of Klan newspapers that appeared in the early twenties.

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<sup>29</sup> Maria Monk claimed she was a nun who had escaped from the Hotel Dieu Nunnery of Montreal after being forced to carry on illicit sexual relations with a Catholic priest at the Nunnery and becoming pregnant. Children born from such relations, according to Maria Monk, were, after baptism, murdered. Maria Monk's mother declared that her daughter was mentally deranged. Investigations of the Convent by a group of "impartial" Protestants failed to substantiate the girl's charges. Further discredit fell on her integrity, when, several years later, she again became pregnant. Despite Maria Monk's unreliability, over 300,000 copies of her book were sold in the nativistic decades preceding the Civil War. The book continued to be published after the War, as well as several books closely resembling Maria Monk's work. For a detailed discussion of this publication and similar ones see Ray Allen Billington's, The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938.), pp. 99-108.

<sup>30</sup> Perhaps the fantastic stories that were circulated concerning the mores of the Church hierarchy were due in part to the use of supposed ex-nuns and priests by the Klan in political campaigns in both Oregon and Indiana. Waldo Roberts, "The Ku Kluxing of Oregon," Outlook, 1932 (March 14, 1923), p. 491.

<sup>31</sup> Jeremiah J. Crowley, The Pope: Chief of White Slavers, High Priest of Intrigue, (Aurora, Missouri: The Menace Publishing Co., 1913). Romanism. . . was written sometime earlier by Crowley.

<sup>32</sup> Personal Interview, Zeph H. Boswell, former typesetter for The Menace, April 25, 1959.

These newspapers often followed the pattern of The Menace by making broad scathing accusations, without proof, and depended upon reading prejudices to uphold their journalistic integrity. Although any sort of estimation of circulation is highly problematical, a contemporary observer estimated that Klan or Klan controlled newspapers had a circulation of well over one million.<sup>33</sup>

The following titles and places of publication of Klan newspapers encountered by the author illustrate to some extent their nature and wide geographical dispersion: The Good Citizen, Zarepath, N. J., The American Standard, New York, N. Y., The Protestant, Washington, D. C., The Searchlight, Atlanta, Ga., The Yellow Jacket, Indianapolis, Ind., The Fiery Cross, Chicago, or Indianapolis, The Dawn, Chicago, Ill., The Fiery Cross, Oklahoma City, Okla., The One-Hundred Per Cent American, Dallas, Texas, and Colonel Mayfield's Weekly, Houston, Texas.

Fairly typical of the attacks made by the Klan organs on Catholics and politicians friendly to the denomination, was an article in Colonel Mayfield's Weekly, which was reputedly the leading Klan publication in the Southwest.<sup>34</sup> The Weekly declared that Al Smith, Oscar Underwood, and Henry Ford were unsatisfactory candidates for the Democratic nomination in 1924. Senator Underwood was objectionable because of his outspoken opposition to the Kleagles and his "wetness." "He [Underwood] will probably get Al's two Romanized states after Al is cast into disregard," predicted

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<sup>33</sup>L. C. Speers estimated that the official Ohio-Indiana Klan newspaper alone had a circulation of 400,000. L. C. Speers, "Klan's shadow falls on national politics." N. Y. Times, November 18, 1923.

<sup>34</sup>N. Y. Times, November 4, 1923.

the Weekly. Ford was out as a potential candidate because he had supposedly given an unnamed archbishop a new Lincoln. Governor Smith: "Al-Cohol Smith is a Catholic, and he will go into the convention with two New England states wrapped up in his strap, and he won't get any further. The nation will not stand for him or any other Catholic. That disposes of Al." The Weekly, also, predicted that: "McAdoo will get the democratic nomination. The solid south will line up behind him, and so will the labor vote. The southern Klansmen will vote a straight ticket, provided no Catholic is nominated."<sup>35</sup>

Charges of "un-Americanism" came at Smith from another direction: ministers. Shortly after the Governor's second election victory, several ministers, even in the urban area of New York City, began to attack him on the basis of his religious affiliation. "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion" was the title of an editorial written by the Reverend Edwin D. Bailey, pastor of the Prospects Heights Presbyterian Church of Booklyn.<sup>36</sup> In the

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<sup>35</sup>Colonel Mayfield's Weekly, November 3, 1923. Another illustration of the Klan's publications concerning politics is an article in the official organ of the Oklahoma Klan, The Fiery Cross. The Fiery Cross, after the 1924 general election, gloated over the defeat of "Tammany Hall and Brennan [Indiana party leader] and the Irish Catholics of the North and East. . . ." "So long as the Democratic Party tries to carry water on both shoulders, cater to both Catholics and Protestants. . . it is always going to play second fiddle to the G. O. P. [s] first violin." As quoted in "Klan victories and defeats," Literary Digest, LXXXIII (November 22, 1924), p. 16.

<sup>36</sup>The phrase "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion" was used by the Reverend Samuel D. Burchard as being typical of the Democratic Party before a group of "obscure clergymen" in the campaign of 1884. James G. Blaine, the Republican candidate, who was in attendance evidently failed to catch the remark. Democratic headquarters used the phrase to arouse the numerous Irish Catholic voters in New York. Although other factors such as charges that Blaine was corrupt counted heavily, resentment over Burchard's remark played a part in accounting for Grover Cleveland's victory over Blaine in New York by only eleven hundred votes. Ironically enough, these three

Church bulletin of June 10, 1923, Bailey charged that Smith was a Catholic out to destroy prohibition and the Constitution; furthermore: "With a Roman Catholic President in power, Rome will become the winner and America will be run by Rome. . . . Rum and Romanism are leagued together. . . . It is liable to succeed unless steps are taken immediately to counter-act it."<sup>37</sup> On the same Sunday morning that Bailey's editorial appeared, the well known Unitarian minister, the Reverend Charles Francis Potter, implied criticism of "fundamentalist" ministers who would use "every live pulpit" as "a political rostrum and every soap box as a pulpit." Potter feared the election of William Jennings Bryan "would be a catastrophe," and bemoaned "puritanic, Blue Law Fundamentalist either in the President's chair or smiling close by."<sup>38</sup> By using his pulpit to criticize Bryan and other ministers for injecting religion into politics, Potter actually appeared to be guilty of the same charges that he leveled against "fundamentalists."

It was not uncommon for the "fundamentalist" churches to welcome members of the Ku Klux Klan to make special addresses upon such subjects as "Americanism" and the "Catholic menace." Pastor William McDonald of the Queens First Presbyterian Church introduced a Klan speaker in his Sun-

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words were leagued together often by the critics of Smith. These words probably appealed, when used together, to a wider group of prejudices than any one of them would have, if they had been used individually. See Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage, New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1934, pp. 181-182, for a more complete analysis of The Burchard statement.

<sup>37</sup>Quoted in N. Y. Times, June 11, 1923. It is perhaps noteworthy that this editorial was published eight days after Smith had signed the Culliver Bill, which repealed New York's prohibition enforcement law.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., June 11, 1923.



Sunday morning service of December 16, 1923 as the "Human Dynamo" who was ready to protect America from Al Smith, who was "the one big example of the gum-shoe politician, who knows the history of Catholicism but not of America." The masked Klansmen warned the worshipers of Catholic political power: "But, thank God, there are 6,000,000 people in the United States who have pledged their lives that no son of the pope of Rome will ever sit in the Presidential chair."<sup>39</sup> In his regular sermon of November 25, 1923, the Reverend A. E. Plue, pastor of the Green Street Baptist Church of New York,<sup>40</sup> defended the Ku Klux Klan as protector of the "Bible of our Puritan Fathers." The pastor added that Catholics were responsible for Bibles not being used in public schools.<sup>41</sup>

The extent that similar sermons and church publications were used by various churches is difficult to determine, but from the more overt evidence and taking due consideration of the nature of rural churches in the South and Midwest, it seems likely that such practices toward Catholics (not always Smith specifically) were prevalent.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>Ibid., December 17, 1923. The author found in several public statements figures of from 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 people pledged to oppose Catholic candidates for the presidency.

<sup>40</sup>In the same service, a Klan speaker and former Baptist minister, Oscar Haywood, said Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy, would receive the backing of the Ku Klux Klan. Ibid., November 26, 1923.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., Charges that Catholics were responsible for Bibles not being used in public schools were frequent. "They have largely driven the Bible from the schools," was the opinion of the Imperial Wizard of the Klan. H. W. Evans, The Klan of Tomorrow and the Klan Spiritual, (n. p. Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 1924), p. 15.

<sup>42</sup>The author perused Oklahoma church publications of the evangelical variety; principally minutes of annual association meetings. These meetings showed considerable fear of the Catholic Church. Most of these meetings passed resolutions warning their members of Catholic political power.

Other opposition appeared to Catholics - especially those running for political office - besides evangelical Protestants and Klansmen. Well educated groups demonstrated in some instances antagonism toward Catholics. The rigidity of Church structure, historical and contemporary examples of Catholic interference in matters that most Protestant groups considered to be secular, such as public schools, aggravated latent prejudices. It was difficult for many to see how spiritual action and political action could always be separated. Even though the Protestants themselves participated in legislation such as prohibition that might be considered religious in nature, they argued that the Catholic Church was different because of a more rigid and centralized hierarchy and the doctrine of Papal infallibility.<sup>43</sup>

All of these anti-Smith feelings among various segments of the American people were so interwoven with obfuscation that it was difficult to determine its actual basis. The complexity of this negativism toward Smith was evidenced by the attacks of Main Street on their urban cousin. Mcken's "Bible belt" which was composed in many instances of economically depressed farmers with a streak of populism looked upon New York City as a bewildering conglomeration of "modernists," Jews, and Catholics. Urban government appeared to the rural Midwest and South to be clearly in the hands of corrupt city machines such as Tammany Hall. It was not difficult to paint Smith as the epitome of all these characteristics of urban areas,

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<sup>43</sup>For a series of articles written by both Catholics and Protestants concerning the questions raised in the above paragraph see "America and Roman Catholicism; symposium," Forum LXXIII: pp. 289-301, pp. 449-457, pp. 670-678, pp. 859-868; LXXIV: pp. 64-75, pp. 300-307, (March - August, 1925).

both real and imagined. A perusal of secular newspapers and periodicals shows that journalists were more prone to approach Smith's candidacy from the rural versus urban conflict than any other. Obviously this simplified explanation leaves much to be desired.

Although several of the leading periodicals completely overlooked the religious issue, one journal of opinion in particular followed the religious controversy: the New Republic. This "progressive" journal frequently noted the irony of a high calibre candidate (Smith) possessing the religious liability. In an editorial of March 19, 1924, the New Republic listed the merits of Governor Smith. "Against such a case as this, what have the opponents of Governor Smith to urge. That he is a Roman Catholic." The journal weighed the religious issue heavily. They, then, came to a novel conclusion. It was a mistake to elect Smith, because it would force the nativistic South out of the Democratic Party into the Republican Party, resulting in an economic alliance between the rural Protestants and the urban "capitalists." Because of the nature of the electoral system this alignment would lead to a Catholic urban president struggling against a rural Protestant legislature. Government would be in a stalemate. Tensions would increase.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>"The problem of the Smith candidacy," New Republic, XXXVIII (March 19, 1924), p. 88. Again in the 1928 campaign the New Republic was dubious of Smith as a candidate. In this campaign the journal raised the old questions of public versus private schools and divided loyalties. They speculated as to how Governor Smith would act on certain international problems such as the one in Mexico where the Church was struggling for survival with the secular state. "A Catholic President?," New Republic L (March 23, 1927), pp. 128-131.

Two questions of primary importance faced Smith supporters as a result of Klan political activities and anti-Catholic sentiment. They were; first, could Smith gain any delegates from strong Klan states, secondly, could he, if nominated, carry the "solid" south. The first question was answered by almost all politicians and observers in the negative. The second question was wide open for debate. Many Democratic leaders seemed to be convinced that if the Governor were nominated, he could not carry some of the strong pro-Klan Southern states and such Northern states as Indiana and Ohio. The persistent rumor of the Klan's support of William G. McAdoo and the Klan's threat to bolt the Democratic Party, added to the party leaders fears.<sup>45</sup>

Some political leaders were apparently afraid Smith's religious affiliation alone was enough to prevent his being seriously considered as a Presidential prospect. Political party leaders Charles F. Murphy of New York, Thomas Taggart of Indiana, and George Brennan of Illinois met in closed sessions at French Lick, Indiana, in November of 1923. The "big three," who were supposedly vacationing, discussed the question of religious faith. The New York Times said the party bosses secretly admitted that Smith's only drawback was the fact that he was "Catholic and wet."<sup>46</sup>

Frank H. Simonds wrote an article for the January 25, 1924, New Republic expressing skepticism as to whether the Democratic Convention would nominate Smith. Simonds maintained that despite the fact Smith:

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<sup>45</sup>Open collusion between McAdoo and the Klan was suggested by one author. Marion Monteval, Pseud., The Klan Inside Out. (Claremore, Okla.: Monarch Publishing Co., 1924, pp. 140-143.

<sup>46</sup>N. Y. Times, November 14, 1924.

has come from the people. . . understood them, represented them . . . the politician doesn't trust the people. He doesn't know what they might do and he has before him the statistics of the Anti-Saloon League and the Ku Klux Klan.

If Alfred E. Smith were anything but a Roman Catholic, the Democratic nomination would be as little a matter of debate as the Republican. Not even Smith's alleged "wetness" would have any bearing. But, Washington, the national politicians and several parochial workers have examined the state of mind . . . and they have concluded that the country would not - at least might not - "stand for" a Roman Catholic in the White House, and they expect the Democratic National Convention to act accordingly.<sup>47</sup>

The Springfield [Massachusetts] Republican essentially agreed with Simonds that; "The fact that Governor Smith is a Roman Catholic attracts much attention in current political discussion for the tendency is general to assume that his religion is the severest handicap he must overcome."<sup>48</sup> A Democratic newspaper, the Baltimore Sun, was optimistic about Smith as a potential candidate but warned that the Governor's friends "must not underestimate the persistence of these taboos [alcohol and religion]."<sup>49</sup> William H. Woodhouse, mayor of a small Connecticut village, stated that an editor of a large Southern newspaper admitted that: "Al Smith would sweep the country, but the delegates don't dare to nominate him."<sup>50</sup> The Literary Digest noted that, "these taboos seem to carry weight in varying degrees throughout the country."<sup>51</sup> It is evident that the various social

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<sup>47</sup>Frank H. Simonds, "Could Al Smith Win?" New Republic XXXVII (January 25, 1924), p. 9.

<sup>48</sup>As quoted in "Al Smith's hat in the ring," Literary Digest LXXXI (May 3, 1924), p. 9.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>N. Y. Times, June 27, 1924.

<sup>51</sup>"Al Smith's hat in the ring," Literary Digest LXXXI (May 3, 1924), p. 9.

characteristics of Al Smith, namely Catholicism and prohibition, were used effectively by the Klan leaders and political leaders to persuade neutral delegates that Smith was "an impossible candidate."

Some of Smith's friends, aware of his religious liability, attempted to defend the Governor's religious faith. Frank P. Walsh, former member of the War Labor Board, in an address on April 5, 1924, to the National Democratic Club in New York stated that Governor Smith would easily destroy the belief that "a man of a certain religious faith could not be President of the United States, I am firmly of the belief that Governor Smith will dissipate the prejudice and wipe out the unwritten law."<sup>52</sup>

The next day County Judge J. Harry Tiernon, angered by the claim of a Republican that a Catholic could not possibly become president, challenged: "We defy the American people to defeat him solely because of his religion."<sup>53</sup> Two metropolitan New York newspapers, the Times and the World, swung into the defensive. The World in an editorial on the eve of the convention challenged: "Who is the best judge. . . of Al Smith's Americanism? Here in the Eastern states the rank and file of the Democratic party ask their friends from other parts of the country to apply on the religious issue the test not of the Imperial Wizard but of Thomas Jefferson."<sup>54</sup>

Franklin D. Roosevelt as Smith's campaign manager worked under several

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<sup>52</sup>N. Y. Times, April 6, 1924.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., April 7, 1924.

<sup>54</sup>As quoted in the N. Y. Times, June 23, 1924.

liabilities in his attempt to line up delegates for the Governor. "The trouble," Roosevelt noted after the convention, "was of course, that Governor Smith positively forbade anything being done for his candidacy prior to May 1st. . . . He, Smith himself, vetoed many suggestions that were made in regard to statements by him on the farm question and other national issues."<sup>55</sup> Roosevelt found that Smith's religious affiliation and stand on prohibition in their parts and in their entirety handicapped his campaign. Roosevelt "received quantities of letters. . . belaboring Smith for being a Catholic. These letters came to Roosevelt from persons of high position and low; "You are being criticized by your old friends in your class for bring(ing) out Smith, a Romanist. . . !" Again: "Keep the Pope out of the U. S. He is bad enough where he is. Yours, KKK."<sup>56</sup>

The Governor's friends asked what American could possibly object to "such names as Al and Smith?" In answer to Smith's critics on his stand on prohibition and Catholicism, Roosevelt sent a stock letter to some of the delegates of the National Convention in May in which he stated:

Governor Smith is the most wonderful votegetter that I have ever seen. This state is roughly divided in its views between the City of New York and the rest of the state, and has given tremendous Republican majorities, particularly in presidential elections. Speaking in general upstate is exceedingly dry, and until Governor Smith was nominated it was always considered impossible to elect a Catholic, owing to upstate prejudice on the religious issue, yet after he had served a term as Governor, he so won the confidence of the people throughout the state

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<sup>55</sup>Franklin D. Roosevelt to Marc W. Cole, August 5, 1924. As quoted in Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1954), p. 173.

<sup>56</sup>As quoted in Friedel, Roosevelt, p. 172.

generally as to receive one million one hundred thousand votes more than Governor Cox and myself, running on the national ticket.<sup>57</sup>

On the eve of the 1924 Democratic Convention two articles by prominent Catholics speculated on the power of the anti-Catholic movement. Paul L. Blakely, S. J., a Catholic priest, noted that the politics of Cranberry Corners still existed: "Ain't there a law agin' Cath'lics bein' President? If there ain't, there order be."<sup>58</sup> "Can a Catholic be President?" was the blunt title of an article by a well known New York Catholic layman, Martin Conboy. Conboy felt religious prejudice had decreased markedly. He, then, concluded by "intuitive" reasoning that a Catholic candidate would be opposed only by Methodist and Baptist denominations.<sup>59</sup>

As the delegates assembled for the 1924 Democratic Convention, the religious issue began to emerge as the central problem of the Smith candidacy. Leading the opposition to the New York Governor was the Ku Klux Klan, an organization which exploited old latent Catholic prejudices. Others, somewhat in sympathy with the objectives, but opposed to the

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<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 170. Roosevelt exaggerated Smith's margin over the national ticket in 1920. Smith actually ran 480,574 votes ahead of the Cox-Roosevelt ticket. World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1924. (New York: New York World, Publishers, 1924), p. 863.

<sup>58</sup> As quoted and discussed in "Problem of a Catholic candidacy," Literary Digest, LXXXI (May 24, 1924), p. 33.

<sup>59</sup>Martin Conboy, "Can a Catholic be President?" Forum, LXXII (July, 1924), pp. 76-83.



techniques of the Klan, objected to Governor Smith's Catholicism. The Governor's friends had come to his defense. The 1924 Convention would, to a large degree, serve as a political barometer for measuring a man's religious faith as a test for the nation's presidency.

## CHAPTER IV

### PREJUDICE IN THE GARDEN

Nineteen twenty-four seemed to be a promising year for Democrats. The Harding administration had been racked by scandal and corruption. The Democrats had almost gained control of both houses of Congress in the 1922 elections. Agriculture was depressed and labor uneasy. Other factors were at work, however, that relieved some of the burden from the Republican Party. First, it seems likely that President Warren G. Harding's death had come at a propitious moment. The new president, Calvin Coolidge, appeared to personify virtue. Continued prosperity after a short readjustment depression following the war added to the Republican following. Lastly, but not the least insignificant question facing the Democrats, was the quadriennial problem of finding a candidate who could capture the popular imagination.

The field was full. James E. Cox had lost in 1920. This left two men with significant national recognition; Al Smith, New York's reforming governor, and William G. McAdoo, Wilson's former Secretary of the Treasury. McAdoo had added a major liability to his candidacy by serving as an attorney for Edward Doheney in the Tea Pot Dome scandal. Also, former President Wilson had failed to give the nod of approval to his son-in-law. With the two-thirds rule still in existence favorite sons entered the race in an unusually large number, many apparently believing a deadlock would ensue, with the mantle possibly falling to them by default.

Al Smith was left.

Smith by all traditional considerations of political strategy was the most logical candidate. He had demonstrated unusual skill at evoking popular enthusiasm in New York State among both Republicans and Democrats. Despite Smith's background the more sophisticated politicians and observers could not deny his thorough knowledge of state government and his personal integrity. Above all Smith was from New York, a pivotal state, which would cast a huge forty-five electoral vote block in the coming general election. Smith strategists pointed out that if Smith would carry the "solid South," and the border states plus New York, he would be within sixty electoral votes of the presidency.

But Smith did not fit the mold of availability in other respects. One traditional rule of availability was that a candidate must possess as few negative characteristics as possible. In other words his position on issues or his personal characteristics must not automatically alienate segments of the public. Translated into real terms this often meant that the candidate should be colorless. As we have seen Smith did not place well in this crucial test.

The growing strength of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1923-1924 political scene alarmed many progressive Democratic leaders. Despite his personal interest in the 1924 nomination, Senator Oscar W. Underwood, Senate minority leader, was among the first to openly declare the Klan would be an issue in the 1924 convention which should not be avoided. In a special article for the New York Times on June 8, 1924, Underwood wrote that the Democratic party should adopt a strong religious freedom plank because of the Klan's attempt "to decree that no man should hold office

with their consent unless his religious faith conforms to the denomination approved by them."<sup>1</sup>

While Smith's friends such as Norman E. Mack, Democratic National Committeeman from New York, did not hesitate to denounce the Klan and advocate the specific naming of the organization in the platform, Governor Smith never seemed to be fully aware of the ramifications of his religious faith. When asked about the Klan by reporters he generally answered in ambiguous terms, although he stoutly denied that he feared the Klan by saying, "There is no committee. . . [which] will prevent me from giving free expression to just what I think about any question."<sup>2</sup>

The New York World in its editorial of May 14, 1924, departed somewhat from the traditional line of criticism with respect to the Klan. Unless the Democratic Party specifically names the Klan, "It will not be free. . . . The party may, for example, have good grounds for not wishing to nominate Gov. Smith," argued the World. "But unless it has first made its record perfectly straight on the Underwood resolution the country will never believe that Gov. Smith failed for any other reason than the religious one."<sup>3</sup> This line of reasoning was used frequently by Smith supporters during the convention.

Patent political considerations also, motivated Smith supporters and favorite son candidates to use the Klan issue. The political objective

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<sup>1</sup>Oscar W. Underwood, "Underwood sees Klan as chief issue." N. Y. Times, June 8, 1924.

<sup>2</sup>N. Y. Times, June 9, 1924.

<sup>3</sup>Quoted from "Editorial Comment," Catholic World 119 (June, 1924), p. 412.

for naming the Klan in the platform was to force William G. McAdoo, Smith's strongest contender for the nomination, to take a definite stand. McAdoo had gained the pledged support of several Southern delegations and won several primaries in states where the Klan was a strong pressure group. If Smith could force McAdoo to publicly denounce the Klan it was possible if not probable that he would lose these delegations. On the other hand if McAdoo publicly favored a "watered down" plank which did not specifically name the Klan as antagonistic to religious freedom, Smith supporters could hope to gain delegates from states which were not unduly under Klan influence and favored a bold plank. The press was unsuccessful in gaining McAdoo's opinion on the crucial Klan issue before the convention.<sup>4</sup>

On the eve of the convention the New York Times welcomed the delegates supporting the Ku Klux Klan in a scathing Sunday editorial:

But it is doubtful if in all our history the spirit of religious intolerance was ever carried to our political life as the attempt is made to carry it today. Religious intolerance. . . is expected to be a subject of discussion and perhaps of party decision in the Democratic National Convention. Within the Democratic Party the issue for obvious reasons is more vital and pressing than Republican.

For, on its own showing, and dismissing every charge of criminality that has been made against it, the Klan proceeds on the theory that certain classes of American citizens must be put under ban. It would carry into public life a spirit of ruthless proscription, mainly based upon religion. It would, for example, take and maintain the position that no Catholic, however well qualified, however admirable and attractive in his personality, should ever be allowed to become President of the United States.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Catholic World, while praising Underwood for his "flat-footed" stand against the Invisible Empire, accused McAdoo of "cowardly silence." Ibid., 119 (May, 1924), p. 265.

<sup>5</sup>N. Y. Times, June 22, 1924.

The two large metropolitan newspapers, the Times and the World, both Smith supporters, received their rebuttal on Sunday night by William G. McAdoo. In an address to his newly assembled delegates the former Secretary of the Treasury assured his friends that "the great mass of the delegates are at least equally as well informed on the issues of the campaign as those editors." But he warned, "You meet here in a great city. . . . Here is the seat of that invisible power. . . . This invisible government is reactionary, sinister, unscrupulous, mercenary and sordid. It is wanting in national ideas and devoid of conscience. . . ."

McAdoo attempted to salve the conscience of the Klan delegates by an attack on Smith and his supporters for their attempt to inject into the convention "straw man issues to divert the people's attention from the real problems of the day. . . . Invisible government has attempted to divert the public wrath by raising the racial and religious issue to prejudice popular judgement. This deceit should not be allowed to continue."<sup>6</sup>

McAdoo was able to gain complete control of the convention's organization including the Committee on Platform and Resolutions. This committee was not usually considered to be a very significant one. But in the 1924 convention the delegates were fully aware of the impending significance of the committee's report on the religious liberty plank. Then the subcommittee, when a plank had been approved, would submit their recommendations to the entire committee under the chairmanship of Homer S. Cummings of Connecticut. (The recommended plank will be discussed later; when the committee submitted it to the convention floor for approval.)

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., June 23, 1924.

Nominating and seconding speeches began Tuesday afternoon of June 25. Very little enthusiasm was exhibited by the delegates seated in the hot sultry Madison Square Garden, which still smelled from the circus held there in the previous week. Nineteen candidates were placed in nomination in a long series of boring speeches. Portents of the convention's future action became apparent in the first nominating speech. The delegates awoke to sudden consciousness as Forney Johnson spoke of Senator Underwood's bold stand on religious freedom and opposition to the Ku Klux Klan. With these three words Johnson initiated a spontaneous demonstration. Anti-Klan delegates seized their standards and paraded around the Garden. Scrambles occurred. John Keegan of St. Louis raised the Missouri standard. While "shrieking" protests fellow Missourians were able to wrest the standard back into Klan control with the help of Frank H. Farris, a McAdoo floor leader. A tussle started in the Colorado delegation which was successfully broken up by the police. The demonstrators marched around and around the Garden shouting in unison to the seated sullen delegates, "Get up, you Kleagles!" The galleries "shouted and jeered" McAdoo's seated California delegation. Fifteen minutes later permanent chairman Senator Thomas Walsh was able to restore order to the strife ridden convention.<sup>7</sup>

The next day Alfred E. Smith was placed in nomination by Franklin D. Roosevelt who gave an appealing speech for party unity. The delegates and even the balcony listened attentively as Roosevelt portrayed Smith as a man of Progressive ideals who was "first in the affections of the people

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<sup>7</sup> Eighteen delegations, all McAdoo supporters, remained seated during the demonstration. Ibid., June 26, 1924.

of the State." Pandemonium once again broke loose in the Garden. In a well-organized demonstration with the assistance of sirens and brass bands the Smith supporters supposedly hoped to stampede the convention for the Governor. The demonstration lasted one hour and fifteen minutes. It impressed Will Rogers, "You would have thought somebody had thrown a wildcat in your face."<sup>8</sup> However, many of the delegates seemed to be on the verge of disgust with what appeared to be in many respects an "artificial" demonstration of allegiance to Smith.

Within New York City there was little question of Smith's popularity. Baseball's hero of the of the Twenties, Babe Ruth, was overjoyed to serve on a Smith committee. He wrote Roosevelt:

Sure, I'm for Al Smith. There is one thing about your letter, Mr. Roosevelt, that went across with me good and strong, - that was the talk about the humble beginning of Governor Smith.

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No poor boy can go any too high in this world to suit me  
 . . . I'm telling you that most everybody I talk to is with  
 him.<sup>9</sup>

Perhaps Ruth's letter symbolized the respect which Smith enjoyed from members of the lower socio-economic classes and newly arrived immigrants, a respect based upon Smith's rise above his modest background.

The New York Police openly and enthusiastically encouraged delegates to support the Governor. "In scores of instances they informed delegates that 'Al Smith is a regular guy.'<sup>10</sup> Smith's pictures were placed in

<sup>8</sup>The inimitable Will Rogers noted that Roosevelt missed an opportunity for unparalleled popularity by simply saying, "Delegates, I put in nomination Alfred Smith: try and find out something against him." Ibid., June 27, 1924.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., June 14, 1924.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., June 25, 1924.



taxicabs, store windows, subways and in all the downtown motion picture theatres.<sup>11</sup> The bands of the local clubs played "East Side, West Side" and "From the Sidewalks of New York." Newspaper boys "chipped in" from two cents to five cents each to raise a Smith banner at Seventh Avenue and Forty-third Street.<sup>12</sup> Entertainment was lavish for all delegates to the convention.

The activities of these Smith boosters irked many of the rural delegates, some of whom were visiting New York for the first time.<sup>13</sup> William A. Casey, a delegate from Iowa, objected to the bullying of Smith backers. He said, "Why it's awful! Everywhere you go people ask why you're not backing Smith." He continued, "They [women of the Iowa delegation] say that if they go anywhere with McAdoo buttons on they're not allowed in."<sup>14</sup>

Much more vicious charges came from the McAdoo camp. George F. Milton, Jr., editor of the Chattanooga News and connected with McAdoo's publicity staff, accused Smith's backers of using "whiskey and women" to influence delegates. "There is not a McAdoo delegate who has not been overwhelmed with offers of one or the other or both. . . . Many of the delegates have been kept drunk. . . ."<sup>15</sup> These accusations were

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., June 24, 1924.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., June 20, 1924.

<sup>13</sup>Stanley Frost, "Klan's  $\frac{1}{2}$  of 1 per cent victory," Outlook, 137 (July 9, 1924), p. 386. Several of the weekly journals and newspapers felt Smith supporters were overly enthusiastic. See Christian Century, July 5, 1924.

<sup>14</sup>N. Y. Times, June 28, 1924.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., June 27, 1924.

substantiated by some newspaper reporters,<sup>16</sup> and denied by others.<sup>17</sup>

In Convention Hall itself the galleries were often unruly and bored with the long drawn out speeches and parliamentary procedure. They would frequently shout at the speakers to "Sit down!" or "Louder!" Since the galleries were dominated by "Happy Warrior" supporters they would often shout at the mention of McAdoo's name "Oil" and "Ku Ku McAdoo." The behavior of the balconies added to the mounting tension between two forces in the convention. Compromise between these forces became more unlikely as the convention progressed.

Outside the convention, Klan leaders, Walter F. Bossert, "boss" of the Indiana Klan, Nathan B. Forrest of Georgia, U. S. Senator Earle B. Mayfield of Texas and Imperial Wizard Hiram W. Evans worked to stave off a minority report coming from the Resolutions Committee specifically naming the Kluxers as diametrical opposed to religious freedom. The Klan attempted to influence delegates by distributing their usual spurious propaganda. For example on June 26, Jacob Alschuler filed a complaint against the Reverend Charles Lewis Fowler, a Baptist clergyman, for libel. Alschuler said he bought a copy of the American Standard outside of Madison Square Garden for ten cents. The article which was read in court said Smith was unfit for the presidency because he was a Catholic and a member of the Knights of Columbus which "was dictated by Rome."

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<sup>16</sup>See for example Stanley Frost, "Klan's  $\frac{1}{2}$  of 1 per cent victory," Outlook, 137 (July 9, 1924), p. 386.

<sup>17</sup>The New York Times consistently denied such reports and on occasion demanded specific information of such occurrences. N. Y. Times, June 29, 1924. Several bootleggers and club owners were arrested during the convention. No delegates were arrested for drinking or drunkenness.

Captain Gegan of the New York Police swore that Fowler was a member of the Klan working for Evans.<sup>18</sup> Bulletins were mailed to each delegate by the Reverend O. A. Miller of Albany, New York. Miller, in his "Reform Bulletin" claimed Governor Smith had "demoralized" New York and furthermore was a Catholic out to destroy the existing government.<sup>19</sup>

In the convention the Resolutions Committee reported each day that they were unable to agree on two issues: the religious freedom plank and the League of Nations plank. Finally, after the convention had been in session for nearly a week, Saturday morning, June 28, Chairman Homer S. Cummings reported the reasons for delay. He explained that the debate on the League was long, but "entirely amiable." On the second point of dispute, Cummings regretted to report "that as time went on the discussion became more heated. . . ." The Committee's deliberations had been completed at about 5:30 a.m. Saturday morning. The sun was beginning to creep over the New York skyline when "one of the members arose and recited the Lord's Prayer (applause), and we all united in it, and then at the close Mr. Bryan lifted up his voice (great applause). . . for guidance and for divine help in this hour of stress."<sup>20</sup> Cummings, then, made a motion for adjournment until 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon. The motion carried by

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid., June 27, 1924. It will be recalled that Fowler was the author of several Klan publications such as The Ku Klux Klan - Its Origin, Meaning and Scope of Operation. (See p. 19).

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., June 22, 1924.

<sup>20</sup>Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention of 1924. (Indianapolis: Bookwalter-Ball-Greathouse Printing Co., 1924), pp. 225-226. Hereafter cited as Proceedings. Will Rogers observed that the Committee should have prayed before the convention began. N. Y. Times, June 29, 1924.

a voice vote.<sup>21</sup> A minority plank was to be submitted to the convention floor which would specifically name the Ku Klux Klan in the Democratic platform as opposed to religious freedom.

Many of the delegates and spectators held their seats in anticipation of the possibility that the mob that milled around the Garden would attempt to crash the gates. Despite the efforts of the police to hold non ticket-holders out of Convention Hall, the New York Times estimated that the largest crowd in Madison Square Garden history assembled on this hot afternoon.<sup>22</sup>

The afternoon session began with a reading of the long majority report of the Committee on Platform and Resolutions. Cummings became fatigued after completing only the extended preamble to the proposed platform. Senator Key Pittman of Nevada resumed the task. The yellow pages continued to be laid aside as P. J. Haltigan relieved Pittman and finally completed the massive document. Newton D. Baker followed with a minority report on the League of Nations which received respectful applause. The former Secretary of War under President Wilson was followed by William R. Pattangall of Maine, who read the minority report on the religious freedom plank. Pattangall asked the convention to add to the majority report.

We condemn political secret societies" --- (Great applause.) I ask the Secretary to read it."

THE READING SECRETARY: Won't you be quiet until you hear it? (Laughter) (Reading:) "We condemn political secret societies of all kinds (cheers) as opposed to the exercise of free government. . . . We pledge the Democratic Party to oppose

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<sup>21</sup>Proceedings, p. 226.

<sup>22</sup>N. Y. Times, June 29, 1924.

any effort on the part of the Ku Klux Klan ---  
 (Resounding cheers, applause, rising demonstration. . .the  
 chairman vainly rapped his gavel for order; disorder in the  
 galleries; cries of "Get out," "Say it again.")<sup>23</sup>

Several minutes later Walsh was able to restore order with the aid  
 of extra police stationed on the convention floor. Debate began on the  
 majority and minority reports on the League of Nations which was soundly  
 defeated in an official roll call vote.<sup>24</sup>

The Garden frequently resounded with a combination of booing and  
 cheering as each speaker discussed the tense religious plank. The first  
 demonstration occurred when Andrew Erwin, a delegate from Georgia,  
 blasted the Klan as "un-American and un-Christian." As Erwin returned  
 to his seat he was hoisted on the shoulders of anti-Klan demonstrators  
 who paraded around the Georgia delegation while the band played "While  
 We Go Marching Through Georgia." After about ten minutes had elapsed  
 the band swung into "The Star Spangled Banner" which the convention joined  
 in singing with enthusiasm. Walsh rapped for order while the Sergeant-  
 at-Arms attempted to clear the center aisle.<sup>25</sup>

The debate on the religious liberty plank shows in a lucid fashion  
 the ramifications of the religious issue. Differences in approach to the  
 problem by various segments of the convention are noteworthy.

Variation of viewpoints were apparent about the real purpose and  
 nature of the Ku Klux Klan. For example Senator Robert L. Owen of

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<sup>23</sup>Proceedings, p. 248.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 248.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 277-278.

Oklahoma argued that the Klan was "occasionally" guilty of violating the law and the spirit of the Constitution.<sup>26</sup> The convention should not, however, name the organization in the platform without a proper hearing and proof of guilt.<sup>27</sup> William R. Pattangall of Maine rejoined, "We do not condemn unheard members of the Ku Klux Klan of some crime." Pattangall pointed out that the proposed change actually read that the Democratic Party opposed "any effort on the part of the Ku Klux Klan or any organization to interfere with religious liberty or the political freedom of any citizen."<sup>28</sup> In defense of the organization Governor Cameron Morrison of North Carolina admitted that a few of its members practiced "misguided religious intolerance."<sup>29</sup> The Klan was an "organization founded upon religious bigotry and intolerance," objected Edmund A. Moore of Ohio, "which undertakes to control the Democratic Convention."<sup>30</sup> The proponents of naming the Klan specifically in the platform generally pointed out that the Klan restricted individual freedom in both the political and the religious sphere.

The religious test for public office arose during the Klan plank debate. "Is anybody. . .so ignorant of what is going on in American life today," asked William R. Pattangall, "that he does not know that the Klan. . .lays down as part of its fundamental principles that no man who

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 280.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 282.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 283. Underlining was added by the author for emphasis.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 288.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 295.

is of the Catholic or Jewish religion. . .is eligible for public Office?"<sup>31</sup>  
 No one can be forced to vote for a Catholic, argued Governor Cameron Morrison. The convention must recognize realities. The North Carolina governor added that he would, personally vote for Senator Thomas Walsh, a Catholic, if he were nominated.<sup>32</sup>

Edmund H. Moore, manager of James M. Cox's 1920 campaign, discussed the central problem of this thesis. Moore, while assuring the delegates he was, again, for nominating the Ohio Governor, admitted, without specifically naming Smith, that Smith's religious faith was the only factor barring his nomination. He spoke:

If that man had not learned his faith at his mother's knee, a faith different from that of mine and a majority of the Convention, nine-tenths of you would admit in conversation that it would not be five ballots until, on account of his power as a vote-getter, because of his distinguished public service, his unspotted public record and his private virtues, he would be the nominee of this Convention.

If you beat this minority plank for the reasons I have suggested and do not name this candidate - I hope you do not, for I am for another candidate - I would not give a penny for the nomination for anybody.<sup>33</sup>

The last speaker to arise was William Jennings Bryan. With the convention's first moving picture lights glaring upon the balding "commoner's"<sup>00</sup> head, he resembled a Biblical prophet of old. Booming and jeering met the orator who had once held his brother Democrats spell-bound.<sup>34</sup> Bryan, in effect, admitted that political expediency should

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 283.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 288.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 296.

<sup>34</sup>N. Y. Times, June 29, 1924.

be first priority concerning the Klan issue.

I have spoken to you on many themes, never on themes more important than this today, and since they take applause out of my time, and since I am speaking to your hearts and heads and not your hands, keep still and let me speak to you. (Cries of "We'll do it.")

And both the Catholic Church and the Jewish Faith have their characters today who plead for respect for them, and whose pleading is not in vain. It is not necessary, and, my friends, the Ku Klux Klan does not deserve the advertisement that you give them.

The Democratic Party has never been a religious organization. The Democratic Party has never taken the side of one Church against the other.

My friends, Jew and Gentile, Catholic and Protestant, stand for God. . . . It is possible that now, when Jesus is more needed. . . we are to have a religious discussion and religious warfare?<sup>35</sup>

Chairman Walsh sought in vain to obtain order. Delegates stood up. Standards were raised. Hundreds shouted protests. Others demanded that the roll call of states begin. Even playing the "Star Spangled Banner" failed to restore order.<sup>36</sup> Walsh called a five minute recess.<sup>37</sup>

After several minutes, order was restored and the crucial roll call of states began. Frequent demonstrations by both sides delayed the proceedings. Delegates demanded that their states be polled individually. Several changed their vote. It was 2:00 a.m., Sunday morning before Walsh, finally, announced the final vote on the religious freedom plank: 541 3/20 for the minority plank to 542 3/20 for the majority plank.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>Proceedings, pp. 303-309.

<sup>36</sup>N. Y. Times, June 29, 1924.

<sup>37</sup>Proceedings, p. 309.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 333. This figure was later found to be in error. The actual vote was 541.85 for the minority plank to 546.15 for the majority plank. N. Y. Times, July 1, 1924.



Apparently a large portion of the delegates did not favor adjournment, although Walsh ruled the convention adjourned by a voice vote.<sup>39</sup>

**CORRELATION BETWEEN SMITH-McADOO VOTE  
AND THE MINORITY REPORT**

<u>STATE</u>	<u>YES</u> (For naming the Klan)	<u>NO</u> (Against nam- ing the Klan)	<u>McADOO</u>	<u>SMITH</u>
Alabama	24	-	-	-
Arizona	1	5	4½	-
Arkansas	-	18	-	-
California	7	19	26	-
Colorado	6	6	-	-
Connecticut	13	1	-	6
Deleware	6	-	-	-
Florida	1	11	12	-
Georgia	1	22	28	-
Idaho	-	8	8	-
Illinois	45	13	12	15
Indiana	5	25	-	-
Iowa	13½	12½	26	-
Kansas	-	20	-	-
Kentucky	9½	16½	26	-
Louisiana	-	20	-	-
Maine	8	4	2	3½
Maryland	16	-	-	-
Massachusetts	35½	½	1½	33
Michigan	12½	16½	-	-
Minnesota	17	7	5	10
Missouri	10½	25½	36	-
Montana	1	7	7	1
Nebraska	3	13	1	-
Nevada	-	6	6	-
New Hampshire	2½	3½	-	-
New Jersey	28	-	-	-
New Mexico	1	5	6	-
New York	90	-	-	90
North Dakota	10	-	10	-
Ohio	32	16	-	-

<sup>39</sup>Proceedings, p. 334. The day's proceedings led Will Rogers to write, "Saturday will always remain in my memory as long as I live, as being the day I heard the most religion preached and the least practiced, of any day in the world's history." N. Y. Times, June 30, 1924.

(Continued)

<u>STATE</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>McADOO</u>	<u>SMITH</u>
Oklahoma	-	20	20	-
Oregon	-	10	10	-
Pennsylvania	49½	24½	25½	35½
Rhode Island	10	-	-	10
South Carolina	-	18	18	-
South Dakota	6	4	10	-
Tennessee	3	21	24	-
Texas	-	40	40	-
Utah	4	4	8	-
Vermont	8	-	1	7
Virginia	2½	21½	-	-
Washington	-	14	14	-
West Virginia	7	9	-	-
Wisconsin	25	1	3	25
Wyoming	2	4	-	-
Alaska	6	-	1	3
District of Columbia	6	-	6	-
Hawaii	4	2	1	1
Philippine Islands	2	2	3	3
Puerto Rico	2	4	-	-
Canal Zone	2	4	6	-
<b>Totals<sup>40</sup></b>	<b>541.85</b>	<b>546.15</b>	<b>431½</b>	<b>241</b>

A significant correlation exists between the vote on the Klan issue and the two principal contestants to the convention, Alfred E. Smith and William G. McAdoo. For four primary reasons an absolute correlation, does not exist. First, some of the states voted by the unit rule which does not allow us to tabulate the opinions of the delegates on either issue. Secondly, states supporting favorite son candidates voted in different ways on the Klan issue. Thirdly, a few delegates did not vote at all on the religious liberty plank. Lastly, it is, of course, possible

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<sup>40</sup>N. Y. Times, July 1, 1924.

for the states following the unit rule or who voted as a bloc on both issues to make an absolute correlation. But where a delegation is split between McAdoo and Smith and perhaps also the Klan issue, it is impossible to know definitely whether or not, for example, a Smith supporter voted for naming the Klan. Nevertheless, these limitations are not serious in making approximations.

The Klan vote and the vote between the two principal contestants reveal some interesting data. First we shall ignore all states who voted for neither Smith nor McAdoo, that is states supporting favorite son candidates. If we assume that in all the states split between McAdoo and Smith, the vote for naming the Klan and the Smith vote are identical then we find that of the 241 delegates voting for Smith on the first ballot 240 voted to name the Klan while only one voted not to name the organization in the platform. On the other hand if we make the same assumption concerning McAdoo then we find that of McAdoo's  $431\frac{1}{2}$  votes on the first ballot 335.15 were cast against naming the Klan while 94.35 were cast to name the organization and five did not vote on the Klan issue.

The relationship between the Klan and the McAdoo forces and the reverse relationship to the Smith group plus the two-thirds rule complicated political maneuvering in the convention. The allegiance that was retained by both candidates during the convention was due in large part to the animosities aroused over the Klan issue. Standing behind the Klan issue was the religious test for public office.

Balloting for the presidential nomination began Monday morning, June 30. Before the day ended fifteen ballots were taken. Day after day the

vote remained essentially the same.<sup>41</sup> Tempers became shorter as the delegates began to feel financial strain as well as the oppressing heat. Neither candidate would release his delegates. The supporters of McAdoo and of the favorite son candidates were determined to block the candidacy of Al Smith. The Smith supporters, partly in reaction to the anti-Catholic sentiment directed at the Governor, were just as determined to block McAdoo.

Sixteen days passed and 103 ballots were cast before the convention chose a candidate. The choice of John W. Davis of West Virginia illustrates to some extent the strong animosity that had accumulated during the convention. Davis was a staunch conservative and an attorney for the Morgan interests. As the November election amply proved, he was not at all the sort of figure who captured the popular imagination.

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<sup>41</sup>A rumor appeared in Oklahoma that, Governor M. E. Trapp, chairman of the Oklahoma delegation to the national convention, was attempting "to 'deliver' the Oklahoma votes to the Al Smith leaders." The Muskogee Times Democrat reported that, "Scores of telegrams were being fired by Klansmen from Muskogee. . .urging them to swing the Oklahoma delegation 'anyway but in Smith's direction' and if necessary abolish the unit rule."<sup>00</sup> Telegrams were "sent to all Klan cyclops in the state"<sup>00</sup> suggesting that the cyclops have each local Kleagle send telegrams to their delegates in New York. "About Politics and Politicians," Harlow's Weekly, XXX (July 5, 1924), p. 8.

## CONCLUSION

Catholicism obviously was not the only explanation for Smith's defeat for he was nominated, although under somewhat different circumstances, in 1928. Smith possessed several liabilities, some which were outside the realm of blind prejudice. Prohibition, which was often intertwined with the religious issue, played a significant role in his campaign. In addition, he was accused at times, of being ignorant of international affairs and not taking a definite stand on the farm question. Furthermore, the two-thirds rule and pledged delegations made political maneuvering difficult in the convention. These factors, plus McAdoo's initial strength in the convention cannot be overlooked in evaluating the Governor's defeat.

Catholicism, however, remained an omnipresent shadow hanging over Smith's entire campaign. The religious test for the nation's highest office seldom found expression except by a bigoted minority. In the heated debate involving the Klan issue, Edmund H. Moore, Cox's campaign manager, perhaps overstated the central problem of this thesis. If it were not for the fact that Smith was a Catholic, he opined, "nine-tenths of you would admit in conversation that it would not be five ballots until . . . he [Smith] would be the nominee of this Convention."

It is, of course, impossible to ascertain with finality the degree to which opposition to Smith in the convention stemmed from a sincere appraisal of his purely political shortcomings and to what extent

attacks on these shortcomings were but a screen to hide an anti-Catholic prejudice or a feeling that the voters would defeat a Catholic candidate. A study such as this surveying the literature of the time seems to point strongly to the latter alternative, namely that Smith's Catholicism was indeed the major issue and the underlying basis for his defeat in the 1924 convention.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Hearings: The Ku Klux Klan. House Committee on Rules, 67 Congress, 1. Session, Washington, 1921.

These hearings by the House Committee on Rules exposed many of the activities of the Ku Klux Klan previous to 1921.

United States Congressional Record, 62d Congress, 3d Session, February 15, 1913, Vol. 49, part 4, p. 3216.

Probably the most common of the spurious Knights of Columbus' oaths is reprinted herein.

### NEWSPAPERS

Colonel Mayfield's Weekly (Houston, Texas), November 3, 1923.

This strictly Klan newspaper is devoted completely to editorialization concerning local and national politics. Therefore, it is of value as an expression of a Klan organ with respect to the candidacy of Al Smith.

The Menace (Aurora, Missouri), December 2, 1911.

The Menace, perhaps the most vitriolic of all the Catholic baiting newspapers had 1,591,000 subscribers in 1914. This newspaper also published Knights of Columbus' oaths and anti-Catholic books. It is of value as a source for the nature of anti-Catholic propaganda.

New York Times.

The New York Times was used throughout this study. Generally, the Times was objective in its detailed accounts of the news. It also frequently published speeches, letters and pamphlets verbatim. Editorially, the Times consistently supported Alfred Smith and opposed the Ku Klux Klan.

Tulsa Tribune.

During the Nineteen-Twenties this newspaper exhibited considerable anti-Catholic sentiment in its editorials. Some of these editorials seemed to be directly referring to Smith, but Smith was never named specifically in them. The newspaper is also of value as representing a general bias toward the urban East.

## PERIODICALS

"Al Smith's Hat in the Ring," Literary Digest, LXXXI (May 3, 1924), pp. 7-9.

"America and Roman Catholicism; symposium," Forum, LXXIII: pp. 289-301; pp. 449-457; pp. 670-678; LXXIV: pp. 64-75; pp. 300-307, (March-August, 1925).

This series of articles by prominent Catholics and Protestants explored several facets of the relationship between Catholicism and traditional American institutions. They were written with much more detachment than Klan publications and were of value as representing a more sophisticated approach to the problems of church and society.

Bohn, Frank H., "The Ku Klux Klan Interpreted," The American Journal of Sociology, XXX (January, 1925), pp. 285-407.

Possible causative factors which resulted in the formation of the Ku Klux Klan in Indiana as well as other phases of the Klan movement are explored in this contemporary study. The study is of value in that Bohn paints a fairly objective picture of how a Klansman viewed Catholics and the whole question of "Americanism."

"A Catholic President?" New Republic, L (March 23, 1927), pp. 128-131.

Conboy, Martin, "Can a Catholic be President?" Forum, LXXII (July, 1924), pp. 76-83.

A prominent Catholic layman observed the American mind and concluded it was possible to elect a Catholic president in 1924. This article was of value as representing a Catholic's opinion on the religious issue in politics.

"The Conviction of Governor Walton," Outlook, 135 (November 28, 1924), pp. 519-520.

Duffis, Robert L., "Ancestry and End of the Ku Klux Klan," World's Work, XLVI (September, 1923), pp. 527-536.

This article was one of a series which exposed much of the internal workings of the Klan. The factual material is generally accurate when compared with the Hearings by House Committee on Rules in 1921. The article was a valuable aid in tracing the formal history of the Klan.

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\_\_\_\_\_, "Salesman of Hate: The Ku Klux Klan," World's Work, XLVI (May, 1923), pp. 31-38.

"Editorial Comment," Catholic World, 119 (May, 1924), p. 265.

The editorials of the Catholic World were of value as an expression of Catholic opinion concerning Smith and the Convention.



"Editorial Comment," Catholic World, 119 (June, 1924), pp. 411-412.

Evans, H. W., "The Klan's Fight for Americanism," North American Review, 213 (1926), pp. 33-63.

This article by the Imperial Wizard of the Klan was used to provide a basis of how a Klansman approached Catholicism. His definition of the goals of the Klan are inadequate in explaining the real goals of Klansmen in general and their attitude toward Catholics.

Frost, Stanley, "Klan's  $\frac{1}{2}$  of 1 per cent victory," Outlook, 137 (July 9, 1924), pp. 384-387.

Stanley Frost wrote several articles for Outlook which explored the religious issue, especially in respect to the Ku Klux Klan. Frost, however, must be used with care since his articles are sometimes wrenched out of proper perspective and balance.

\_\_\_\_\_, "The Klan Shows its Hand in Indiana," Outlook, 137 (June 4, 1924), pp. 187-190.

"The Klan and Democrats," Literary Digest, LXXXI (June 14, 1924), pp. 12-13.

"A Klan shock in Indiana," Literary Digest, LXXXI (May 24, 1924), p. 14.

"Klan Victories and Defeats," Literary Digest, LXXXIII (November 22, 1924), p. 16.

Mellett, Lowell, "Klan and Church in Indiana," Atlantic Monthly, 132 (November 23, 1923), pp. 586-592.

Mellett has, in this article, studied the relationship between the powerful Klan and the Catholic Church in Indiana. The study is of value as an illustration of the nature and strength of the anti-Catholic sentiment.

Owens, John W., "Does the Senate fear the K.K.K.?" New Republic, XXXVI (December 26, 1923), pp. 113-114.

"About Politics and Politicians," Harlow's Weekly, (Oklahoma City, Okla.), XXXIII (July 5, 1923), pp. 490-491.

Editorial sampling of Oklahoma newspapers in the Weekly was used in noting anti-Catholic sentiment in that state. This magazine is an especially valuable source for all religious activity in Oklahoma.

"About Politics and Politicians," Harlow's Weekly, XXX (July 5, 1924), p. 8.

"Presbyterians Called upon to Sign the Pledge," Literary Digest, LXXVII (June 9, 1923), p. 33.

"Problem of a Catholic Candidacy," Literary Digest, LXXXI (May 24, 1924), pp. 33-34.

"The Problem of the Smith Candidacy," New Republic, XXXVIII (March 19, 1924), pp. 87-88.

Roberts, Waldo, "The Ku-Kluxing of Oregon," Outlook, 133 (March 14, 1923), pp. 490-491.

Simonds, Frank H., "Could Al Smith Win?" New Republic, XXVII (January 25, 1924), pp. 120-121.

Observation of anti-Catholic sentiment and its effects on politicians' attitudes toward Smith were noted by Simonds. This discussion is of value as an expression by a "progressive" magazine on the religious issue in politics.

"Smith enforces Volstead Act," Literary Digest, LXXX (March 15, 1924), p. 13.

Sullivan, Mark, "The Democratic Dark Horse Pasture," World's Work, (July, 1923), pp. 285-292.

"A New 'Whiskey Rebellion' started in New York," Literary Digest, (June 16, 1923), pp. 5-7.

Williams, Michael, "The Roman Catholic Church--An American Institution," Forum, LXXIII (March, 1925), pp. 289-301.

In this essay, Williams, editor of the Commonweal, attempted to show that Catholicism was consistent with American institutions. This article is of value in showing a reaction of a Catholic to Protestant criticism of the Church.

#### PERSONAL INTERVIEW

Boswell, Zeph H., (Aurora, Missouri), April 25, 1939.

In this interview the author obtained much information of interest concerning the history of The Menace. Mr. Boswell, former typesetter for The Menace, also graciously extended information concerning other publications by this newspaper.

#### PAMPHLETS

Evans, H. W., The Klan of Tomorrow and the Klan Spiritual. n. p. Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 1924.

This reprint of two speeches made by the Imperial Wizard at the Imperial Klonvokation held in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1924 provided the author with some of the philosophical concepts of Evans and the Klan. However, Evans' speeches do not represent the response that he individual organization always had to specific problems.

Fowler, C. Lewis, The Ku Klux Klan Its Origin, Meaning and Scope of Operation. Atlanta, Georgia: n. p. 1922.

This pamphlet was useful as a short history of the Klan by a Baptist minister. The objectives of the organization were also presented.

Knights of Columbus vs. Criminal Libel and Malicious Bigotry. n. p.

Issued by the Supreme Board of Directors of the Knights of Columbus, 1914, pp. 1-5.

This was one of a series of pamphlets published by the Knights of Columbus which discussed anti-Catholic literature and libel charges brought by this organization against various publishers. It is of value in noting the prevalence of anti-Catholic propaganda of the most bigoted variety.

#### REPORTS, ANNUALS AND PROCEEDINGS

Annual of the Southern Baptist Convention of 1923. Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman Press, 1923.

This Annual contained resolutions concerning contemporary questions which were passed by the Southern Baptist Convention. However, the Annual must be used with care, since it did not necessarily represent the real opinion of its 4,500,000 members.

Annual of the Southern Baptist Convention of 1924. Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman Press, 1924.

The Anti-Saloon League Yearbook for 1924. Westerville, Ohio: American Issue Press, 1924.

Resolutions passed by various denominations concerning prohibition were used. Also, statements made by Anti-Saloon League leaders were of value. These resolutions, however, were in general passed by conventions which may not have been truly representative of their members.

Minutes of the First Annual Session of the Baptist Association (Oklahoma). (n. p.) 1925.

These minutes as well as the records of other church publications in Oklahoma were perused by the author. They contained numerous examples of anti-Catholic sentiment. One gains the impression from the frequent use of the same resolutions from year to year that the anti-Catholic statements may have been in some instances more formality than real concern with Catholicism.

Official Report in the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention of 1924. Indianapolis: Bookwalter-Ball-Greathouse Printing Co., 1924.

This is a complete stenographic account of every action occurring in the 1924 convention. Included is the stenographer's reaction to the activities of the delegates and the audience. The Official Report was of especial value when supplemented with the accounts of the New York Times.

## GENERAL

Billington, Ray Allen, The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938.

This objective scholarly treatment of the nativistic movement prior to the Civil War was used as anti-Catholic background material.

Crowly, Jeremiah J., The Pope: Chief of White Slavers, High Priest of Intrigue. Aurora, Missouri: The Menace Publishing Co., 1913.

This absurd piece of anti-Catholic propaganda illustrates the nature of much of the anti-Catholic publications by The Menace.

Friedel, Frank, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal. Vol. II, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1934.

Volume II of Friedel's Roosevelt series presents an interesting sketch of Roosevelt's participation in the 1924 convention. Also, letters to Roosevelt quoted by Friedel were of value in noting anti-Catholic sentiment.

Higham, John, Strangers in the Land. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1955.

Higham has in this study supplemented Billington's Protestant Crusade by tracing the history of nativism from 1860-1925. This book is a must for the student of early 20th century nativism.

Mecklin, John Moffatt, The Ku Klux Klan: A Study of the American Mind. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1924.

This work by a contemporary sociologist is an important study of the Klan. Mecklin has as objectively as possible explored the Klan philosophy and the receptivity of the American mind to the organization.

Monteval, Marion, Pseud., The Klan Inside Out. Claremore, Oklahoma: Monarch Publishing Co., 1924.

This contemporary exposé of the Klan is of value for its discussion of the Klan's political activities. However, some of the material is of questionable veracity.

Underwood, Oscar W., Drifting Sands of Party Politics. New York: The Century Co., 1928.

Underwood, who was personally involved in the 1924 convention, has in this book, a short frank discussion of the religious issue and the Ku Klux Klan in American politics.

Williams, Michael, The Shadow of the Pope. New York & London: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill, 1932.

This work by a Catholic layman is a somewhat sketchy survey of anti-Catholic history in the United States. Reprints of cartoons and posters used in the Nineteen-Twenties were of value as one facet of anti-Catholic propaganda.

## VITA

Ben Gene Rader

candidate for the degree of

Master of Arts

Thesis: THE ROLE OF CATHOLICISM IN THE 1924 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

Major Field: History

Biographical:

Personal data: Born near Delaware, Missouri, August 25, 1935,  
the son of Lowell L. and Lydia Eddings Rader.

Education: Attended grade school in Delaware and West Plains,  
Missouri; graduated from West Plains High School in 1953;  
attended Municipal University of Wichita 1953-1956;  
received Bachelor of Arts degree from Southwest Missouri  
State College 1958; completed requirements for the Master  
of Arts degree in July, 1959.

Professional experience: Served as a graduate assistant in the  
History Department in 1958-1959.

Professional organizations: Member of Mississippi Valley  
Historical Society, and the honor societies: Phi Alpha  
Theta and Pi Gamma Mu.