THE ADAPTABILITY OF NATO
IN A CHANGING WORLD

By

Hoyt Robert Livingston

Bachelor of Science
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois
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[Signatures]

Thesis Adviser

Dean of the Graduate School

458135
PREFACE

A study of the North Atlantic Alliance is important to Americans in that the defense of the United States, and to a large extent the free world, depends upon its effectiveness. This thesis is concerned with what I consider to be NATO's most significant military and political problems which, if not solved to the mutual satisfaction of the pact's members, will reduce its usefulness as a medium for mutual security as well as for political and economic cooperation.

My interest in NATO goes back to 1949-1952, when as a captain serving with the American forces in Germany, I experienced at a very low level the problems of building a strong defense for Western Europe. During the intervening years, I have watched the development of NATO with the growing conviction that through this alliance the United States can help achieve its foreign policy objectives of peace, security and economic well-being.

My appreciation and thanks are gratefully extended to Dr. Glenn B. Hawkins, Head of the Political Science Department, and to Dr. Samuel C. Patterson for their critical reading of my thesis and for their many helpful suggestions which have been of invaluable assistance to me in developing its content and organization. I am also indebted to Dr. Guy Donnell and Dr. Robert Walker whose suggestions regarding chapters one and two were most helpful. Finally, to Dr. C. A. L. Rich goes my deepest gratitude for his encouragement and guidance which have been of the greatest help and inspiration over the course of my graduate work.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

If the world had not been made so skeptical by the abundance of conflicts and wars over the past half-century, the Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would be considered a near miracle. Twelve, later fifteen, sovereign nations have remained faithful to a military and political alliance although their respective interests often have clashed. A degree of military cooperation, indeed a fusion of military institutions, has been reached such as is possible otherwise only in time of war. The most important aspect of NATO, however, is that it constitutes a bridge by which the American people crossed from their original rejection of any permanent alliance to the firm association with the European people to whom they are related by a common ancestry and civilization.¹

The above sentiments were expressed in an editorial of a leading Swiss journal upon the tenth anniversary of NATO and are widely held by the non-communist peoples of Western Europe, but they do not reflect several serious underlying disagreements which have developed within the alliance during the past three years. Unless solutions are found to fundamental problems of military strategy and governmental policy the effectiveness of the North Atlantic Alliance will be threatened seriously. On the other hand satisfactory solutions would appear to require important changes in American foreign and defense policies.

As an instrument of United States foreign policy the defensive military alliance has been of unprecedented importance since the end of World War II. In these political agreements through which Americans have allied themselves militarily with over forty states, the motivating force has been primarily the traditional one of security. This alliance has provided the United States with a rapid increase in military power at less cost than would have to be expended to gain the same strength unilaterally. In his first report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program, President Truman presented one of the best statements about the United States' need for allies. He said:

Mutual security is not a one way street. It costs a small fraction of our expenditures for our own military forces. Yet it gives us strong allies with military manpower far in excess of our own and with an industrial plant vital to the free world. It gives us overseas bases for use in the common effort. It gives us sources of raw materials essential not only to our own military production but to the normal functioning of our civilian community. It gives us people who will be with us instead of against us in the years ahead.

Collective security has provided the United States with a quick adjustment in its power relationship with the Soviet Union, while at the same time it has provided weak and unstable states a protection against revolution, subversion, and aggression from stronger and unfriendly states.

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Successful international agreements and institutions are those that recognize and express underlying realities. The effectiveness and duration of such agreements and institutions depends upon the benefit each party receives from its participation. When the identity of interest, the reality, that created an agreement such as the North Atlantic Alliance is reduced, there is danger that this agreement will become a liability. An illustration of the inhibiting effect on the foreign policy of the United States that is possible when the objectives of alliance members are at cross purposes was provided by the Suez crisis of 1956. Throughout the complex negotiations before the United Nations, and in direct diplomatic and international conferences, American policy was at least partially governed by maintaining a common front with two of our NATO allies, Britain and France.

Every alliance must reconcile the requirements of external security with those of internal policy. Since it is difficult for allies even under pressure to agree completely, each member must be prepared to make concessions in order to hold the alliance together. Because America holds the preponderance of power within the alliances in which it participates, and because alliances have become an essential medium for establishing and maintaining the important foreign policy objectives of peace, security and prosperity, the delicate task of insuring that there is a balance of incentives among the alliance members falls upon the United States.

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6 Lerche, op. cit., p. 302.

It is reasonable to assume that the broad purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty as they are expressed in the Preamble, "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law," still are subscribed to wholeheartedly by the member states. The conditions that forced the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, however, have changed considerably over the past eleven years. Whereas the United States formerly enjoyed a monopoly in atomic weapons, there now exists nuclear parity with the Soviet Union. From 1945 to 1952, Germany was under military occupation, divided into an eastern zone controlled by the Soviet Union and three western zones governed by the United States, Great Britain and France in a cooperative effort. Today Germany is still divided, but the foreign troops on her soil are there as allies and not as occupation forces. Western Europe has, within a few years after World War II, developed a high degree of economy in which agricultural and industrial production are at an all time high. These developments have already created a change in emphasis and attitude by key European members of NATO toward policies on which a common approach is essential for the effective operation of the alliance.

The major hypothesis of this thesis is predicated upon the proposition that in order for the NATO alliance to be effective, it must be acceptable to its members. If, therefore, the United States is to continue to depend upon NATO for defense, the United States will have to make its foreign policies acceptable to the other members of the alliance. The purpose of this thesis is to determine if United States policies are

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sufficiently adaptable to effectively support its commitments to a security system that is heavily based upon the North Atlantic Alliance. The sub-hypotheses of this thesis are:

1. The adaptability of NATO for future use is conditioned in part by the factors that motivated its establishment in the first place. These factors were based upon the necessity to secure Western Europe against the dangers of aggression from the Soviet Union, the protection of legitimate governments from militant communist national minorities, the support of economic recovery and the promotion of cooperation among states with similar backgrounds and interests which might eventually lead to military, economic and political integration and union on the part of all or some of its members.

2. The rapid improvements in military technology by the Soviet Union have made previous strategical concepts of NATO outmoded. The two most important of these concepts are:
   a. The strategy which relies almost exclusively upon nuclear weapons for deterrence and for defense.
   b. The exclusive reliance upon the United States and to a lesser degree Great Britain's monopoly of nuclear weapons within the NATO alliance.

3. Diverse political forces and interests of member states threaten the solidarity of the NATO alliance. The most important of these political problems are:
   a. "Disengagement," the reduction and separation of military forces in Central Europe which would call for a reunified Germany outside the NATO alliance.
b. Nationalism among NATO members which has made negotiation with the Soviet Union less effective as well as detracted from the military effort of the alliance.

4. The North Atlantic Alliance has not proven adaptable to the unification of either economic or political institutions.

Within the body of the thesis that follows sub-hypothesis number one is discussed in chapter two, sub-hypothesis two in chapter three and sub-hypothesis three and four in chapter four. The conclusions are to be found in chapter five.
CHAPTER II

NATO: ORIGINAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST

Two years after the collapse of Nazi Germany, Winston Churchill described Europe as, "a rubble heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground of pestilence and hate." His observations reflected the need for economic rehabilitation which had proceeded but little beyond the needs of immediate relief as well as the inability of the Western powers to reach an accommodation with the government of the Soviet Union. Threatened with economic insecurity, the danger of Soviet expansion as well as the lack of internal stability, the Western democracies faced a challenge for survival. This chapter describes how this challenge was met in part by the defensive alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Redress for the Imbalance of Power

The North Atlantic Treaty was published in March, 1949 and signed in Washington by the seven original negotiators plus representatives of five other participating states on April 4, 1949. The United States

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2The original negotiators were: Belgium, Canada, France, Great Britain, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and the United States. Other signatories were: Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal. Greece and Turkey joined the alliance in February, 1952. The Federal Republic of Germany became the fifteenth member of the alliance in 1954.
Senate approved the treaty by a vote of 82 to 13 on August 24. This action by the United States was positive recognition that its security and welfare were intimately bound to that of the other North Atlantic States. It was also the end of the illusion that the United Nations could insure international peace by itself.3

Of the tasks that faced those charged with formulating the United States' foreign policy during the years 1947 to 1949, the restoration of the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States was fundamental for international security.4 The North Atlantic Treaty reflected three important elements of this security effort: To prevent an attack on the United States; to prevent Europe from being conquered by force; and to prevent Europe from being conquered by other means.5

The American position with respect to Europe was clarified by the end of 1947. By then American policy makers had realized that there could be no realistic settlement of the peace as long as Europe was not only weak but also the object of struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.6 The equilibrium of power at which United States

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5 Dean Acheson, "Statement on Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to duty in the European Area," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 82nd Congress, 1st session (February 1-28, 1951), p. 81.

policy was aiming, however, was not just a matter of greater stability and order in individual countries, it was an equilibrium which would prevent Soviet expansion and domination of Europe and Asia.  

The important relationship of the power and resources of Western Europe to the security of the United States has been amply demonstrated by the United States' participation in World Wars I and II. In the latter conflict, one of the basic strategic principles consistently followed was that priority would be given to the defeat of Germany. Among the reasons for this policy was the danger inherent in German consolidation of European resources.

The challenges of Soviet power and resulting American policies served to keep attention focused on Europe after the war. The day the text of the Atlantic Treaty was released to the press, Secretary of State Dean Acheson addressed the American people on the meaning of the pact. In his speech the Secretary of State emphasized the threat to the national security of the United States if a single unfriendly power

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7The United States in World Affairs, 1948-49, op. cit., p. 16. Balance of power is often used with two meanings. It can mean "equilibrium" of power which is the meaning used in this study or it is used to mean "preponderance," more accurately "imbalance of power." Objectively used the term "balance of power" is the application of the fundamental law of self preservation. For example, if one state attacks a second state, the third state cannot afford to see the second crushed to where it becomes threatened itself. It is, therefore, farsighted enough to support the second state. When one power grows dangerously strong others will combine against it.


were to control all of Europe. The United States, he noted, fought two
great wars to preserve the independence of Europe so that American in-
dependence would also be preserved.

Two years later, Secretary of State Acheson gave a more detailed
statement concerning the importance of a free and friendly Western
Europe to the United States. Speaking to the combined Armed Forces
and Foreign Relations Committees of the United States Senate during the
discussions over the augmentation of United States' ground forces in
Europe, he mentioned at length the assets of Western Europe which are
essential to the control of the seas and to the supply of raw materials
vital to American industry. Comparing a Europe that contributes the
skill, courage and resources of a free people to the common defense with
a Europe dominated by an aggressor that would force 200,000,000 people
to bend their energies to the destruction of the United States, Secretary
Acheson concluded that there were only two alternatives - either Europe
would be adequately defended, or it would fall under the control of the
Kremlin and add to the military might of the Soviet Union.

Hanson Baldwin, Military Editor of the New York Times, put the
importance of Europe to the United States in terms of political geog-
raphy. Today's long range and high speed weapons have transformed the
one-time continental strategic concept of North America so that we
occupy in terms of strategy roughly the same position that the British
Isles enjoyed in the 19th Century. If the Soviet Union should conquer

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11Acheson, _op. cit._, p. 81.
12Hanson W. Baldwin, "Atlantic Pact will Guard Western World from
the non-communist states in Europe and Asia, the North American continent would eventually become hopelessly isolated. In this sense, the strategic purpose of the North Atlantic Pact is to prevent domination of Europe and Asia by the same power.13

In the years immediately after World War II, the monopoly of the United States in atomic weapons acted as the major deterrent to the Soviet Union's overrunning Western Europe. Churchill, visiting the United States in the spring of 1949, stated that it is certain that Europe would have been communized like Czechoslovakia, and London would have been under bombardment some time ago but for the deterrent of the atomic bomb in the hands of the United States.14

An examination of land strength found the West as of 1948 exceedingly weak as opposed to the Soviet Union. One estimate reported that the Soviet bloc, as of the fall of 1948, had available 5,200,000 soldiers as opposed to 4,400,000 of anti-communist states which were not united and heavily committed in some cases to colonial requirements in the Far East.15 Another estimate credits the Soviet Union with having 4,000,000 under arms.16 An alliance to unite the anti-communist states seemed not only possible but also necessary at this time if the United States wished to check Soviet expansion.

In contrast to the Soviet Union which maintained and expanded its armed forces after the close of World War II, the United States, according

13Ibid., p. 82.
to its historic tradition of isolation and with the additional security
created by possessing a monopoly in atomic armament, rapidly demobilized
its wartime forces. By 1948, the total military strength of the United
States was but 11 per cent of that of 1945. British and Canadian dis-
armament was equally severe.17

The governments of Europe, however, could not feel secure as long
as their primary means of defense against attack was the dropping of
bombs on the Soviet Union by air from the United States. To the Western
European countries, it was of supreme importance that they be spared an
invasion and subsequent liberation. French Premier Henri Queuille ex-
pressed this thought by writing:

We know that once Western Europe was occupied, America
would again come to our aid and eventually we would again be
liberated. But the process would be terrible. The next time
you probably would be liberating a corpse . . . 18

The importance of defending Europe on the continent rather than of
liberating her was also recognized by the United States. This realiza-
tion was especially important if any resistance to Soviet aggression was
expected on the part of the non-communist European states.19 A blunt
appraisal of this fact by General Omar Bradley, Chief of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, went further in pointing out the necessity of holding
perimeter bases for military expediency, and also for the frank reason
that if a war has to be fought, it is much better to have to fight it
in some other part of the world.20

17Ibid., p. 68.
19"The United States Military Assistance Program," Department of
20Acheson, op. cit., p. 127.
One of the purposes of the North Atlantic Pact is to act as a deterrent. This view was shared not only by American officials, but by those of the other participants as well. Secretary of State Acheson, in a statement to the Committee on Foreign Relations which was considering the North Atlantic Treaty in April, 1949, replied to a question by the Committee Chairman, Senator Connally, regarding the deterrent effect of the treaty. He said, "that is the dominant and overwhelming purpose of this treaty." He also added that it would have a deterrent effect on the practice of one nation reaching out and grabbing little nations one at a time, incorporating them into its system. 21

This thought was voiced in a report of the Foreign Relations Committee in its hearings on the Vandenberg Resolution (Senate Resolution 239) in 1948. "The Committee is convinced," the report said, "that the horrors of another world war can be avoided only with certainty by preventing war from starting. The experience of World Wars I and II suggests that the best deterrent to aggression is the certainty that immediate and effective counter-measures will be taken against those who violate the peace." 22 President Truman was also in agreement and stated in his inaugural address on January 20, 1949, "If we can make it sufficiently clear, in advance, that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur." 23


22 Report of Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Senate Resolution 239, 80th Congress, 2nd session.

The hope that a clear statement of the United States' position in regard to further Soviet expansion in Europe might help prevent a war breaking out inadvertently was also voiced by British Foreign Secretary Bevin at the debate in the House of Commons over the North Atlantic Treaty on May 12, 1949. When the accusation was made that the Atlantic Pact is aggressive and will result in war, Foreign Secretary Bevin replied that the absence of the Atlantic Pact did not prevent war in either 1914 or 1939. He added that if the potential aggressors had known what the results of their aggression would be, these wars might have been avoided. The real purpose of the Atlantic Pact, he remarked, is to act as a deterrent.24

Cement for Economic Recovery

Confidence in the expectation of peace is most necessary to economic recovery. The North Atlantic Pact helped provide the Western European governments with security beyond their individual means of attainment without reduction in their already marginal standards of living.

The Europe of July, 1945, was physically devastated. Both agricultural and industrial production was seriously impaired. The United States, as one great power whose economy had not been seriously dislocated by the war, gave almost immediate assistance to the weary states. Through contributing the largest share to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) which was to assist in providing the necessities for domestic consumption, and through loans to individual

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countries to permit the purchase of goods essential to return their economies to working order, the United States hoped to assist many Western European governments in averting serious economic, social and political upheaval.\textsuperscript{25} But, by 1947, it became apparent that American loans to individual countries were not having the desired effect. The country-to-country approach appeared to have led to the dissipation of available resources in meeting a series of individual crises without getting at the roots of the problem.\textsuperscript{26} Complicating recovery efforts was the breakdown in wartime cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The policies of the Soviet government and of the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union opposed and obstructed efforts to bring about a general recovery.\textsuperscript{27}

In his historic commencement address at Harvard in June, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall proposed a better organized plan for European recovery based upon European cooperation wherein the individual states accepted joint responsibility for the solution and execution of an aid program that would be furnished by the United States.\textsuperscript{28} The purpose of combatting "hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos," as General Marshall had put it at Harvard, undoubtedly expressed the desires

\textsuperscript{25}M. Margaret Ball, \textit{NATO and the European Union Movement} (New York, 1959), pp. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., p. 6.


\textsuperscript{28}"A Program for United States Aid to European Recovery," \textit{Assistance to European Economic Recovery}, Department of State Publication \textit{3022 Economic Cooperation Series 2} (February, 1948), Annex pp. 10-11.
of the American people for the Foreign Assistance Act which laid the basis for the American obligation of the European Recovery Program was passed by Congress on April 3, 1948. 29

It was the national interest of security, however, rather than sentiment that dictated the unprecedented Marshall Plan for European recovery. President Truman expressed the point of view that sound economic recovery and adequate military defense must be carried forward together and balance. If the fear of military aggression is widespread, the President said, economic recovery will lag due to lack of investment and new industry. 30

The Marshall Plan had been America's way of recognizing that it was in the interest of the United States to encourage, guide and support Europe's recovery effort. The North Atlantic Treaty constituted the American answer to the parallel problem of military security. Within the text of the Treaty, the importance of a healthy economy as well as economic cooperation and collaboration by members of the pact is significantly emphasized in Article 2. 31

Force for Political Stability

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Pact provides a stabilizing force to participating governments, threatened by sabotage of their parliamentary institutions, economic chaos through political strikes, civil

29Ibid., pp. 2-3.


wars and guerrilla activities at the hands of the national communist minority groups. Under provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty, the member states are obliged to consult together when, in the opinion of any member, "the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened."32 The effect of Article 4 is to provide a means for the legal government of a party to the Atlantic Pact to request assistance from other members in order to maintain itself in power. Whether or not assistance would be forthcoming would depend upon the circumstances involved, ultimately upon the interests of the NATO governments.

The flexibility of the North Atlantic Pact to deal with threats by internal subversion as opposed to a direct armed attack of aggression was brought out during the hearings on the treaty by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate. In an exchange between Senator Fulbright and Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, was asked:

Would an internal revolution, perhaps aided and abetted by an outside state, in which armed force was being used in an attempt to drive the recognized government from power, be deemed an 'armed attack' within the meaning of article 5?33

In his reply to Fulbright's question, Dean Acheson replied that he considered the revolution an "armed attack," but he felt that each country would have to determine this fact for itself.34

The dangers of indirect aggression were, to many, more real and important than that of outright Soviet attack which would involve too

32Ibid., Article 4.
33Ibid., Article 5.
many risks. Among the people supporting this position were the late Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and career diplomats, George F. Kennan and Charles E. Bohlen. This position was supported by many Europeans who felt that the primary danger was non-overt in nature and that emphasis should be placed on the political, economic and psychological aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty.\textsuperscript{35}

The Soviet Union, aided by national Communist groups that had gained strength and prestige because of its resistance to the Axis powers, exerted pressure on non-communist countries, particularly throughout Europe, the middle East and Far East as early as 1944-45. In the states overrun by the Soviet armies, representative institutions became meaningless or were destroyed. Elsewhere, there was civil war and guerrilla activity such as in Greece, China, Burma, the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaya. Turkey and Iran were subject to threats of aggression. In Indonesia there were several attempted coups d'etat . . . . later, in Czechoslovakia, a successful coup d'etat. In Italy the Communists possessed large stores of arms against the day when they would seize power.\textsuperscript{36}

During the winter of 1947-48, there was fear of indirect aggression in Western Europe. The Communist parties in France and Italy were openly violent in protest over the proposed Marshall Plan. All vestiges of postwar collaboration between the communists and the government were over.


\textsuperscript{36}Salvadori, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 68-74.
In France, transportation and utilities workers struck. Three divisions of French troops were required to restore order in the coal fields.\(^{37}\)

Internationally, the Communist party clearly established its primary loyalty to the Soviet Union in a series of statements that were tantamount to an open declaration of treason.\(^{38}\) The Communists boasted openly that the Red armies were soon to come, thus gaining additional followers through fear and the promise that members would be safe from punitive action when the Soviet Union did take over.\(^{39}\) Reaction and resistance to Communist pressures increased as the objectives of the Soviet Union and the national Communist parties became more widely recognized. Because of the deftily of the non-communist states outside of the Western Hemisphere, an increasing share of the burden of resistance to communism fell upon the United States.

After the objectives of the Soviet Union and national communist parties were known, several pre-NATO pacts were initiated to combat world-wide communism. The first of these concerned the government of Greece. Since 1944, the British had been supporting the legitimate government of Greece; but in 1947 they were forced to notify the United States that they no longer could carry this responsibility. As a result, the Truman Doctrine was formulated and submitted to the Congress in March, 1947. Under the Truman Doctrine, military and economic assistance was given Greece and Turkey to help these countries maintain

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\(^{38}\)Ibid., p. 87.

\(^{39}\)Dulles, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-90.
their free institutions against both indirect and direct aggression which, if successful, would ultimately undermine international peace and the security of the United States. 40

In March, 1948, a year after the Truman Doctrine was submitted to Congress, the Brussels Treaty, the antecedent to the North Atlantic Treaty, was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. It pledged these states to set up a joint defensive system as well as to strengthen their cultural and economic ties. 41 The Brussels Treaty attempted to deal with the problem of internal subversion by agreeing to cooperate in raising living standards and bringing to the people a greater understanding of the principles of their common civilization. 42

To further solidify the security of the North Atlantic countries, the North Atlantic Treaty was ratified. This treaty, like the Brussels Pact, is an attempt to attain security through economic means as well as promoting greater understanding of the principles upon which the institutions of the member governments were established. 43

The initial effects of the North Atlantic Pact were felt primarily against indirect, internal aggression. Negotiations with Soviet leaders over Berlin moved rapidly to settlement after the North Atlantic Pact

40 Harry S. Truman, "Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey," House Document 171, 80th Congress, 1st session (March 12, 1947), pp. 1-5.

41 Ismay, op. cit., p. 8.

42 The Brussels Treaty, Articles 2 and 3. For text of the treaty see, Salvadori, op. cit., pp. 155-167.

was concluded. This was contrary to the expectations of many of the pact's critics who had expected negotiations with the Russians to become more difficult.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{Approach to Unity}

The community of interests that resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty thus far discussed have been directly concerned with furthering the national interests of security and economic well-being of the participating states. To many people, there was an even more important ideological reason for participation in the pact - that of promoting unity through the process of military, economic and eventually political federation. Many of the ardent advocates of world federation were hopeful that the North Atlantic Treaty contained the germ of federalism. The Atlantic Union Committee, with Justice Owen J. Robert as president and Clarence Streit, leader of the campaign for "Union Now," on the board of directors, was organized to press this point of view on Congress.\textsuperscript{45}

The ultimate success of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rests in the people's understanding of the concepts of the freedom of thought and being in an open and free society. The military organization of NATO can fulfill its function in the long run only if it is regarded as the starting point for closer cultural and social cooperation of the countries in the North Atlantic community and not

\textsuperscript{44}See statements of private witnesses before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate in consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty, 81st Congress, 1st Session (May 4-18, 1949).

as a goal in itself. 46 The idea that the nations that are a party to the North Atlantic Treaty share a common culture is a popular concept frequently expressed. One of the principal views is that Western culture is strongly identified with liberty, the dignity of the individual and individual responsibility. 47 Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, said upon the occasion of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty:

We are strong in our lands and in our resources, in industry and manpower. We are strong above all in our common tradition of liberty, in our common belief in the dignity of the individual, in our common heritage of social and political thought and in our resolves to defend these freedoms together. 48

The idea of unity of states, world government and regional federation has come up frequently since 1939. In that year Clarence K. Streit, in a widely published book, proposed a union of the Atlantic democracies which in turn would provide a nucleus for world government. 49 The common bond between the American and the European is expressed by Mr. Streit when he indicated that:

In the democracies of Europe - in the little democracies - in the danger zones; in the more fortunate democracies of Scandinavia; above all, in the great democracies of France and

47 Ibid., p. 12.
49 Clarence K. Streit, Union Now (New York, 1940), 15 ed. The union which Streit proposed would provide for a common defense, citizenship, customs free economy, money and postal communications system for the founder democracies comprising the American Union, the British Commonwealth, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Swiss Confederation, Norway, Sweden and Finland.
Britain - the average American finds a way of life which he knows instinctively to be the way of life which he himself has chosen.50

Again, in January, 1941, there was a cry for unity. Wendell L. Willkie, while still titular head of the Republican party, publicly advocated what he called an "economic and social" union of the United States and British Commonwealth. Winston Churchill, in the dark hours of the French defeat, proposed "an indissoluble union of our two peoples." The offer was sincere and acclaimed by the British people.51 After World War II, Churchill again proposed a fraternal association between the United States and the British Commonwealth in the form of a military alliance.52

While the framers of the North Atlantic Treaty were careful to avoid implication that one of the purposes of the pact was to lead to world federation,53 the hope that some degree of integration of military, political and economic institutions would result from participation in the alliance was a strong motivating force in favor of the pact.

The North Atlantic Treaty was born out of collective insecurity caused in part by the imbalance of power that developed when the Western democracies disarmed after World War II while the military forces of the Soviet Union were kept mobilized on a war time footing. The pact was created to bring not only security from external aggression, but to stabilize political institutions threatened by the internal subversion


53 Childs, op. cit., p. 584.
of a militant communist minority. While nations and people were insecure efforts to effect economic recovery were stifled. These conditions were NATO's heritage and it is against this background that the future of the North Atlantic Alliance will, in part, be determined.
CHAPTER III

THE MILITARY ISSUES

The greatest difficulties faced by the North Atlantic Alliance are those concerned with the problems of military strategy and the impact of these problems upon the national interests of the member states.\(^1\) The difficulty in developing a military strategy that will serve equally the defensive needs both of the European and American members of NATO has been greatly complicated by the rapid gain in the military technology of the Soviet Union.

The strategy of NATO has been primarily an "all or nothing" concept based upon the superiority of United States' nuclear weapons to deter aggression through the threat of "massive retaliation." Since 1955 when the Soviet Union exploded its first thermonuclear device, the strain upon the members of NATO has intensified with the increased realization that joint military action is likely to subject Western Europe to Soviet nuclear attack. As a result there is a demand within NATO for a strategy which will allow an alternative to total war.

It is not possible, however, to wish away the existence of nuclear weapons. It is only by having an effective nuclear deterrent that an alternative strategy may be considered. The reluctance of the United States, however, to share its nuclear capability with the other members

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of the alliance has created doubt within NATO that the United States will use nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe. As a result of this doubt there is a demand for nuclear sharing within the alliance.

The future effectiveness of the North Atlantic Alliance depends to a large degree upon agreement over military strategy. The burden, however, of developing a military strategy acceptable to all members of NATO depends upon the United States since it occupies the dominant position within the alliance.

The Dilemma of NATO Strategy

The United States and its allies are faced with two distinctive military problems. The first is to deter the Soviet Union from resorting to general atomic war; the second is to prevent the Soviet bloc from expanding its influence through the conduct of limited military, or quasi-military aggression against any areas of the non-communist world. The two problems are related and are interdependent, but are not one and the same and cannot be met effectively by the same means. One requires a highly effective nuclear striking force. The other requires mobile fire brigades able to use either conventional (non-nuclear) weapons, or so called tactical atomic weapons.2

The strategy of NATO has been based primarily upon the supposition that Soviet aggression would come in the form of some clear cut violation of some well-established boundary against which the NATO forces could react with nuclear weapons used tactically, or strategically, or both.

Yet Soviet military violence in Europe has been limited to suppressing uprisings in East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956, neither of which lent themselves to basic NATO strategy. As long as the West's nuclear capability continues to match that of the Soviet Union the type of conflict in which NATO is most likely to become involved is apt to arise over some issue, such as the Berlin controversy, where the use of nuclear weapons is not appropriate.  

The dilemma that faces NATO concerns how the alliance should react to limited aggression. The first alternative is to rely on massive strategic retaliation, or capitulation. The second alternative is to retaliate by using tactical nuclear weapons to compensate for numerically inferior forces while making an effort to limit the conflict to a local area. The third alternative is to retaliate by using conventional force for as long as the enemy does not utilize nuclear weapons. The second and third options together provide for meeting less-than-ultimate threats with less-than-ultimate responses. While the third alternative has become increasingly attractive to the European members of the alliance, it is the one which NATO capabilities are least able to support. The following analysis will deal with these three strategic alternatives.

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4 NATO Letter, February 1, 1957, pp. 27-30. As will be brought out later in this chapter the option to use strategic retaliation rests with the United States and Great Britain who possess within their national forces the necessary weapons and means of delivery.

5 Loc. cit.
The Development of American Military Strategy. The theory of the massive strategic air offensive is credited largely to Brigadier General Guilio Douhet, an Italian officer who presented his philosophy in 1921 with the publication of a book entitled, The Command of the Air. The broad outline of Douhet's thesis was that ultimate victory could be assured only through aggressive aerial bombing. This philosophy found ready support in the United States Army Air Corps, the Royal Air Force of Great Britain and the German Air Force in the years prior to the outbreak of World War II.

The World War II experience with strategic bombing provided a test of Douhet's ideas. The results were inconclusive, with conflicting claims made as to the contribution of strategic bombing to the allied victory. The revolution in weapons caused by the development of the atomic bomb, however, has given the philosophy of Douhet an efficacy which has made the doctrine of the strategic air offensive the basis of United States and NATO military strategy.

The emphasis on the atomic bomb in United States' military strategy developed soon after its initial use against the Japanese in

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7 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (U.S.S.B.S.) carried out its survey of the effects of United States and British bombing in Europe with the object of applying these lessons to the war against Japan. The results were published, but they had only limited distribution because of security classification. Statistics of the surveys show that German production in almost all categories increased between 1942 and 1944, but that the bombing prevented even greater possible increases. The effects of the bombing were felt the most during the last few months of the war when allied ground forces were on the continent in strength and victory was assured. "U.S.S.B.S.," The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the Germany War Economy, (Item 3 for European War), pp. 6-11.
August, 1945. General H. H. Arnold, a member of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commanding General of the Army Air Corps during World War II, maintained early in 1946 that the United States should capitalize on the bomb, if necessary, to assure world peace. Army Air Corps General Ira Eaker predicted later in 1946 that the next war would be a short one of unparalleled destruction with the first blows struck through the air. He argued that the United States should place primary reliance upon the long range bomber for security. This viewpoint soon dominated Western strategy with respect to Europe.

The reliance upon the United States Strategic Air Command (SAC), with its capacity to deliver nuclear weapons was widely credited with preventing Soviet aggression in Europe from 1946 to 1956. The European members of NATO were induced to make commitments to the alliance only upon the promise of the United States that SAC stood ready at all times to implement the defense of Europe.

The outbreak of war in Korea demonstrated that the deterring effect of the atomic bomb was less than had been anticipated. The lesson that should have been learned from the Korean fighting regarding the importance of well-trained, conventionally armed forces, was ignored, however, by American leaders with the result that during the months following the armistice greater reliance than ever was placed upon strategic bombing for defense and deterrence.

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9 Ibid., November 21, 1946, p. 10.

10 The Joint Defense of Western Europe, Department of State Publication 4126 (February, 1951), p. 5. This publication contains the statements of Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Marshall, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, February 15 and 16, 1951.
In 1954 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a widely publicized speech described American military strategy using the term "massive retaliation." Dulles stated that in the event of aggression the United States would depend upon its capacity to retaliate immediately "by means and at places of our own choosing." This would permit the development of a military establishment to fit our policy instead of having to meet the enemies plans. The policy of "massive retaliation," according to Mr. Dulles, would make possible greater security at less cost.\textsuperscript{11}

The United States has not hesitated to use the threat of massive retaliation during periods of international tension. In the Suez crisis General Alfred M. Gruenther, then commander of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, warned the Soviet Union of the consequences of its interference, and a year later Secretary Dulles remarked at a news conference that the American response to a Russian attack on Turkey, "would not mean a purely defensive operation . . .\textsuperscript{12} The latest warning occurred as recently as the spring of 1959 when President Eisenhower, in referring to the Soviet threats to alter the status of West Berlin through unilateral action, indicated that NATO would not fight a ground war in Europe, but might have to fight a nuclear war even though it would be so disastrous as to be "self-defeating."\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11}The New York Times, January 13, 1954, pp. 1, 3. The policy of "massive retaliation" as expressed by Secretary of State Dulles was reiterated in even more forceful terms by Vice President Nixon in March, 1954. See, The New York Times, March 14, 1954, pp. 1, 44.

\textsuperscript{12}The New York Times, November 14, 1956, pp. 1, 12; and, October 17, 1957, pp. 1, 9.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., March 12, 1959, p. 1.
Although the United States has maintained the policy of massive retaliation as a reaction to limited aggression, it has also accepted an alternative policy based on a limited use of nuclear weapons. This strategy envisions the use of nuclear weapons in the tactical rather than the strategic sense. It infers a limitation as to size, area of employment and nature of target. The use of nuclear weapons tactically was made possible by technological developments that has reduced the size and destructive capability of these weapons.\(^{14}\) Along with the new development in weapons, changes were made in the American military establishment that were designed to tailor the armed forces, particularly the army, to the nuclear strategy.

The armed forces began to be reorganized in late 1953. They were given what has been described as a "new look."\(^{15}\) The "new look" was based upon the superiority of American science and industry and upon the reduction of military manpower and expenditure.\(^{16}\) Under the policy of the "new look" the total number of American men in uniform was reduced from 3,450,000 in December, 1953, to 2,815,000 in 1955.\(^{17}\)


army suffered the bulk of this reduction. These losses were compensated for in part by the increase in fire power due to nuclear weapons which became available to the army for tactical use.

The doctrine of the use of nuclear weapons in limited war has been generally accepted by the highest civilian officials as well as by military officers.\textsuperscript{18} Perhaps the most important reason for its acceptance is that it is cheaper to prepare for and fight limited wars with nuclear weapons. As one expert put it, "the dog we keep to deal with the cat will be able to deal with the kittens."\textsuperscript{19} A second reason is that if nuclear weapons are not used by us in the next war it might prove disastrous.

The third alternative, that of fighting a limited war with the use of conventional weapons has not been accepted as a desirable course of action in the event the United States is faced with such a problem. Our refusal to interfere in Indo-China at Dien Bien Phu was based in part on the fact that the job would have required the use of conventional forces, since nuclear weapons were not tactically appropriate to that situation.\textsuperscript{20}

Due in part to an increased realization that there are many situations requiring the use of armed forces in which, nuclear weapons are of little military value or are impractical for political reasons, and in part to an awareness that with the use of nuclear weapons in limited

\textsuperscript{18}Dulles, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 31. One important author who has committed himself to the use of nuclear weapons in limited war is, Henry A. Kissinger, \textit{Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy} (New York, 1957).

\textsuperscript{19}Air Marshall Sir John Slessor as quoted in Brodie, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 331.

\textsuperscript{20}Gavin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 126.
wars may cause them to develop into total wars; there is some evidence of an increase of interest in conventional weapons and forces.\textsuperscript{21} The renewed interest in conventional forces has not, however, yet been reflected in any noticeable increases in the size of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{22}

The Development of NATO's Military Strategy. The strategy of NATO has reflected to a considerable degree the military policies of the United States. The first important strategic decision that had to be made after NATO was formed concerned whether Europe was actually to be defended. The answer to this question came quickly. The European members of the pact were unequivocal in their decision that Europe was to be defended, not liberated. This was recognized by the United States in 1949 and became implicit in NATO policy decisions which were predicated upon the defense of all member states.\textsuperscript{22} As a result of this decision the "forward strategy" concept was developed to hold the potential enemy as far to the East in Europe as possible.\textsuperscript{23}

The "forward strategy" did not receive much implementation until the Lisbon meeting of the NATO Council of Foreign Ministers in February, 1959.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{21}Secretary of State Herter in speaking of the Berlin Crisis tempered the President's threat of "massive retaliation" by saying that the United States would not be justified in conducting nuclear war until we were fully convinced that the Russians were carrying out their attack to the point of all out war. See, The New York Times, April 21, 1959, p. 1.


\textsuperscript{23}Lord Ismay, NATO, The First Five Years 1949-1954 (The Netherlands, 1954), p. 102. See also, Hans Speier, German Rearmament and Atomic War (Evanston, 1957), pp. 161, 168, for West German views on the importance of the "forward strategy."
1952. The military recommendation of this meeting of the Council, based in part on the fact that the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was now in existence as a controlling headquarters, was to create a strong defensive shield capable of withstanding the shock of aggression until reserve forces could be mobilized. To this end priority was given to the rapid establishment of the largest possible front line force. 24

During the remainder of 1952 and 1953 considerable progress was made in NATO's military strength. In 1953 it was decided to shift the emphasis from increasing the number of divisional type units to improving the combat efficiency of existing units. To that effect increases in strength were to come primarily in "support type" units. 25 In essence the force goals that had been established at the Lisbon conference were to be stretched over the "long haul" so that NATO would and could cope with a Soviet threat lasting many years. 26

The military commander of SHAPE, General Matthew B. Ridgeway was not satisfied with what he regarded as a dangerous slowing of the defense effort. 27 However, the reduction of tension between the Soviet Union and the Western nations that appeared to accompany the death of Stalin; the pressure to reduce national military expenditures; and the military

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24 Ismay, op. cit., p. 94. The Lisbon goal called for the establishment of 96 divisions of which 50 were to constitute a standing force between Switzerland and the Baltic.

25 Ibid., pp. 107-108. By "support type" units is meant engineer, signal, heavy artillery and logistical units that would provide support to the front line divisions in combat.

26 Ibid., pp. 104-107.

policy of the "new look" pursued by the United States had become overriding considerations in determining NATO's military effort. In 1955 the NATO Council adopted a resolution to equip its forces with the most modern weapons, noting the progress that had been made in this respect by the United States.\footnote{"North Atlantic Council Holds Ministerial Session," \textit{Department of State Bulletin}, Vol. 38 (December 26, 1955), pp. 1047-1048.} The result was a cut of approximately one-half in the force goals established at the Lisbon conference for the sake of economy. The "forward strategy" had not been abandoned, but its effectiveness in view of the reduction in forces must be seriously questioned.\footnote{See, Alfred N. Gruenther, "NATO - Our Greatest Instrument for Peace," \textit{Department of State Bulletin}, Vol. 34 (February 27, 1956), p. 333.}

Reduction in NATO's conventional forces continued. French units that had been withdrawn for service in Indo-China and North Africa were not replaced. The British government announced a ten per cent reduction in its military strength in 1956 and a year later proposed a drastic reorganization and reduction in its defense forces scheduled to begin in 1957-58.\footnote{The \textit{New York Times}, May 18, 1956, pp. 1, 6.} The British proposals called for reliance to be placed on nuclear weapons and flexible striking power. Cuts in strength that would reduce their forces by one-half were to be phased through 1962.\footnote{Great Britain, "Defense: Outline of Future Policy," (Cmd. 124; London: H. M. Stationary Office, April, 1957) as quoted by M. Margaret Ball, \textit{NATO and the European Union Movement} (New York, 1959), pp. 94-99.}

On July 16, 1957, President Eisenhower ordered a cut of 100,000 men in the armed forces of the United States of which approximately one-half
The effect of the reductions in conventional forces was to cause the German rearmament and contribution to NATO to be slowed. It was difficult for many Germans to see the need for twelve German NATO divisions when elsewhere reduction in forces was the order of the day. Within NATO local ground forces began to be spoken of as having primarily a "trip wire" or "plate-glass function" - that is, the function of signalling by their resistance, however brief, the fact that a major war had broken out, as well as forcing the enemy to send enough troops to make the aggression unequivocal.

With the reduction in its conventional forces, NATO strategy came to rely more and more upon nuclear weapons to deter and defend against limited threats. In December, 1957 the NATO Council decided to establish readily available stocks of nuclear warheads and to equip the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) with intermediate range ballistic missiles. Prior to this the United States representative to the NATO Council had informed it that advanced defensive weapons were being included in the mutual aid program for the coming year. In spite of the addition of nuclear weapons to the strength of NATO mounting criticism in Europe was developing over the existing strategy.

33 Speier, op. cit., pp. 13-17.
36 This thought was voiced at the Third Session of the Western Union Assembly. See, Ball, op. cit., pp. 403-404.
Some members of NATO believe the United States lacks an adequate conception of European problems. For example, in determining targets for atomic counter-attack the approach of the United States may differ sharply from that of their European allies. For the United States, the importance of turning back the Soviet advance would justify hitting any target short of provoking an all-out attack upon its own territory. To the continental members of the alliance any extension of the target area would result in greater atomic casualties and damage to them. What may seem limited to Americans may appear total in European eyes.37

The NATO military exercise, Carte Blanche, which took place in West Germany, Holland, Belgium and France in June, 1955, is perhaps the best illustration of the European point-of-view. The purpose of this maneuver was to test NATO forces under simulated conditions of atomic war. When during the course of the exercise many atomic bombs were presumably dropped on German soil, the West German Bundestag was moved to debate the implications of nuclear war to the Federal Republic. In the course of the discussions it was estimated that in reality such bombings would have killed 1.7 million Germans and incapacitated 3.5 million more.38 The reaction among the German population was so great that the Defense Ministry had to reassure the people that disaster was not imminent.39

A former German general expressed the viewpoint of European critics of the strategy which relies exclusively upon nuclear warfare. The

38Speier, op. cit., pp. 182-183.
39Ibid., p. 188.
base of such strategy, he pointed out, is economic. The NATO peoples hope that complete reliance upon atomic defense will reduce military expenditures and ultimately taxes. There is too much concern, he argued, that high military expenditures will lower the standard of living thus furthering the cause of communism. He is unable to understand why the West believes that despite a larger population it is incapable of mobilizing armed forces that will match those of the East. He argued further that to resort to atomic weapons as a response to non-atomic attack will cause the West to be considered as "atomic war criminals." Unless, however, strong conventional forces are available, there is no other choice, either atomic weapons must be used or the West will be forced to capitulate. 40

In May, 1957, during the NATO Council meeting, the foreign ministers of France, Germany and Norway pointed out the danger of too great a reduction in conventional weapons. The communists, relying on conventionally armed forces would be free (as in the case of Hungary) to overrun bits of territory, secure in the conviction that NATO could not be in the position to defend these areas with conventional weapons and would not unleash total war by resorting to nuclear weapons. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr. Lange, expressed this thought when he said, "The Western Alliance must not be obliged to choose between apocalypse and capitulation." 41

There are many who consider the use of nuclear weapons in a limited war simply unfeasible unless the enemy should use them first. A senior

40 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Helmet Staedke as quoted in Ibid., p. 224.
NATO commander expressed his concern on this question in 1958 by saying that he would not recommend the use of any atomic weapon no matter how small since even small atomic weapons would bring a nuclear holocaust.\textsuperscript{42} Public opinion in Europe appears to support this viewpoint.\textsuperscript{43}

Criticism of the military strategy of the West is beginning to be recognized in NATO policy statements which since 1957 have reflected greater interest in the ability of NATO to cope with limited or local attacks. The present commander of SHAPE, General Lauris Norstad, in an important speech discussed the advantages to political and military maneuverability by being able to meet, "less than ultimate threats with a decisive, but less than ultimate response."\textsuperscript{44} In support of this capability he has pressed for a ready force for central Europe of 30 divisions which would be adequate to meet a limited threat effectively by using conventional weapons.\textsuperscript{45} He has also remarked in speaking to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, that NATO would use conventional weapons whenever the situation so warranted.\textsuperscript{46}

In spite of increased recognition of the need for an effective deterrent and defense based on conventional forces, the military


\textsuperscript{43}Speier, \textit{op. cit.,} pp. 252-253.


\textsuperscript{46}"Hearings on the Mutual Security Act of 1959," \textit{House Committee on Foreign Affairs,} 86th Congress, 1st session, p. 466.
strategy of the West continues to rely almost exclusively upon nuclear weapons. With both the Soviet Union and the United States possessing almost unlimited destructive capabilities every effort should be made to keep any limited conflict from expanding to total war. The success in limiting war will probably be determined on whether or not nuclear weapons will be employed. If the North Atlantic Alliance is to continue to provide for all its members the security for which it was created, a military strategy and capabilities will have to be developed than can cope with limited threats with a less than ultimate response.

The Control of Nuclear Weapons

While the military policy of NATO is clearly based upon the use of nuclear weapons, the control of these weapons has become an increasingly important problem. Some aspects of this problem were discussed by Paul-Henri Spaak, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Alliance, in the April, 1959, issue of Foreign Affairs. Spaak cited the case of France to show the waste of effort, time and money because trust is lacking among the NATO members. France is duplicating, in developing its own nuclear weapons, what the United States and Great Britain have already accomplished. France is spending billions of francs and a wealth of effort to discover what her allies already know. If there is real community of interest among the alliance, would it not be better, asks Spaak, to spare France this effort and free her to devote her

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energies to the common good. The problem, of nuclear sharing is complex, however, with military and political factors which do not allow an easy solution.

The anxiety of the European members of NATO over the control of nuclear weapons is based primarily upon the danger of a limited Soviet threat against one or more members of the alliance. Where the nature of the threat is limited, it is felt that the United States might not risk destruction to support the alliance with nuclear weapons. If there is insecurity in Western Europe, there will be public pressure to escape from the horrible threat of destruction by seeking neutrality, disarmament and arms control, as well as political accommodation with the Soviet Union. Such pressures may well generate dissent and conflict within the NATO countries to the point where the existence of the alliance is seriously threatened.

The sharing of nuclear weapons by the United States with its allies would call for a major change of policy as well as Congressional legislation. The United States atomic energy program has been a closely controlled government monopoly relatively free from the control that affect most governmental agencies and programs. It was not until the end of World War II that the public learned of the top secret atom bomb project. Secrecy and security have remained as important factors in the atomic energy program, particularly in the military application of atomic energy. Any effort to release information pertaining to nuclear weapons to allied nations receives careful scrutiny by Congress,

48 Ibid., p. 361.
and the inclusion of nuclear weapons within the mutual aid program is forbidden by law.\textsuperscript{49}

Between 1946 and 1954 the sharing of atomic weapon information with foreign governments was limited to the British and Canadians on the basis of agreements that had been made by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt at their wartime meetings.\textsuperscript{50} Soviet espionage activities, the actions of Klaus Fuchs in supplying secret data to the Soviet Union, the Soviet act of exploding an atomic bomb, and the tensions of the "cold war" kept the United States from relaxing its control over nuclear military matters until 1954. Then the 1946 Atomic Energy Act was amended to facilitate the exchange of information on the defensive use of atomic weapons with other nations or regional defense organizations. All such agreements must be signed by the President and then must lie before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy for thirty days before they can take effect.\textsuperscript{51}

In 1958 the Congress passed additional legislation to facilitate cooperation with our allies on atomic weapons. Under this legislation, certain non-nuclear material plus additional data could be provided. In addition, information on weapons design and material for prefabrication could be provided to allies who had made "considerable progress" in atomic weapon development.\textsuperscript{52} Specific agreements under this legislation


\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., p. 39.

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., p. 98.

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., p. 155.
have been made with Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Turkey and Greece.

There is some indication that the United States may be considering a new approach to the question of sharing its nuclear weapons. During December, 1959, and January, 1960, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy was reported to have held secret hearings in consideration of this question. In February, 1960, President Eisenhower said that he would favor a change in the law to permit the United States to provide its allies with nuclear weapons. He said that the United States should not treat its allies as if they were "junior members" by denying them weapons that the enemy has.

In spite of this assertion it appears that neither Congress nor the administration is quite ready at this time to change the existing policy on nuclear weapons. On March 20, 1960, the President informed Soviet Premier Khrushchev, who had evidenced concern in this matter, that the United States had no intention of sharing nuclear weapons with its allies. A few days earlier Secretary of Defense Gates commented

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53"Considerable progress" is subject to interpretation that to date has limited this assistance to the British. After the explosion of the second atomic device by the French in April, 1960, Secretary of Defense Gates indicated that the United States does not regard two nuclear explosions as sufficient to admit France to the "nuclear club." This is interpreted to mean that France is not likely to get the atomic weapons information she has been seeking from the United States. The New York Times, April 22, 1960, p. 7.

54 Ibid., February 4, 1960, pp. 1, 12.

55 After the President's statement of February 4, 1960, endorsing the sharing of nuclear weapons with allies, members of Congress warned the administration not to transfer weapons without authority, Ibid., p. 12.

that despite our desire to see our allies strong there was no intention to ask Congress to change the atomic energy law to permit atomic warheads to be given to allies at this time.\footnote{Ibid., March 11, 1960, p. 1. It is possible that a misinterpretation of a NATO announcement concerning the integration of British, French and United States forces into brigades with nuclear capabilities under a single commander created this reaction. In the original announcement the statement was included that the formation would constitute greater NATO control over nuclear weapons previously kept in national hands. (See \textit{The New York Times}, March 3, 1960, pp. 1, 4.) Later General Norstad denied plans to turn over nuclear warheads to the newly planned NATO force. (See \textit{The New York Times}, March 11, 1960, p. 1.)}

From the concern shown by the Soviet Union over the possibility of United States' sharing its nuclear weapons, it would appear that Russia does not favor instituting such a procedure with its allies.\footnote{Ibid., March 20, 1960, p. 1. For the Soviet protest against a Swiss plan to develop nuclear weapons, also see, \textit{The New York Times}, August 9, 1958, p. 4.} Indeed there is little reason for her to do so. The Russians possess a decisive military advantage over all contiguous areas, and in view of the political unreliability of some of the satellite states it would be a logical objective for the Soviet Union to prevent any development of nuclear capability under local control on the European continent. A second consideration is that the absence of a Western European nuclear capability facilitates the Russian practice of nuclear blackmail, or political pressure backed by threats of nuclear power, that has been so evident in Soviet diplomacy since the Suez crisis in 1956.

Regardless of the attitude of the United States and the Soviet Union as to the diffusion of nuclear weapons it is evident that other states have the capability to develop these weapons without outside
That some states will find this desirable and feasible is confirmed by the French who exploded their first two atomic devices in February and April of 1960. The fact that other states have the capability of producing nuclear weapons is an important consideration to the United States position in this matter for it is logical that states which develop their own nuclear weapons without outside aid may be reluctant to share in the control of these weapons.

There are several important arguments voiced by those opposed to nuclear sharing. One compares the diffusion of nuclear weapons to the opening of Pandora's box. Multiplying the number of states that have the power to start a thermonuclear war can be dangerous. Some small states are controlled by aggressive men whose concept of international responsibility is limited by nationalistic fervor. Presumably neither the United States nor the Soviet Union relish the idea of being committed to a nuclear war by a third party. Another argument questions the effectiveness of nuclear sharing in that a limited capability of a small state can have only punitive rather than a strategic effect and that

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59 See, Klaus Knorr, "Nuclear Weapons: 'Haves and Have Nots.'" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36 (April, 1958), pp. 167-177. Mr. Knorr states that it is believed that without outside aid, Canada, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and India from among the Western-oriented or neutral states have the capability to begin nominal production of nuclear weapons by 1962-65. Of the Soviet bloc states, Czechoslovakia, Communist China and the German Democratic Republic also have such capability. Of the above states both Sweden and Switzerland are known to have considered a nuclear weapons program. See, "Sweden Between Two Worlds," The Economist (October 29, 1956) as quoted by Rodger Hilsman, Military Policy and National Security, ed. W. W. Kaufman (Princeton, 1956), p. 109. There are also reports that Communist China is also developing a nuclear capability. See, The New York Times, August 18, 1958, pp. 1, 13.
punishment can be dealt only at the cost of complete destruction. 60

Another point of view is that once all the states of NATO have possession of nuclear weapons the alliance will split apart, since it will no longer have dependence upon the United States. In the same vein, there is the possibility that further reliance on nuclear weapons will serve to decrease even further NATO's conventional forces in an effort to cut expenditures. A last argument is based on the difficulty of control. If each member has his own national deterrent there exists too much risk. On the other hand if nuclear weapons are given to the alliance each country would want its hand on "both the safety catch and the trigger." 61 The result would be intolerable indecision in the use of the alliance's most powerful weapons.

Those who support nuclear sharing have submitted important reasons for such a program. One of the arguments for the spread of nuclear capabilities to the continental members of NATO is to increase military efficiency and improve control and speed of reaction in the event of attack by the Soviet Union. As nuclear weapons become more available for ground use and as tactical doctrine is developed for fighting atomic battles on the ground, it will be necessary to integrate nuclear weapons more closely with the fighting units they support. Nuclear

60A good discussion of this point may be found in an article by, George W. Rathjens, Jr., "Notes on the Military Problems of Europe," World Politics, Vol. 10 (January, 1958), pp. 182-201.

sharing will enable our allies to integrate their own weapons within their own units thus being assured of timely nuclear support.\textsuperscript{62}

Another reason for giving each NATO nation a more independent power of retaliation is to offset the decline of credibility of the United States' use of its nuclear armed Strategic Air Command in the defense of these nations.\textsuperscript{63} With their own nuclear arsenals, even modest ones, our allies might feel more secure, less dependent and less fearful and critical of the United States. If the continental members of NATO are determined to develop nuclear weapons, assistance by the United States would save money and effort that by mutual agreement could be used at least in part to meet other critical defense needs. When one country uses a weapons system of another country, a military interdependence tends to develop between the two states. The increased security received by the allies through so called "nuclear diffusion" would, therefore, promote NATO cohesion as well as a better balanced strategy by allowing a greater contribution to conventional military resources.\textsuperscript{64} The failure to provide our allies with nuclear weapons, argued Secretary of State Dulles, may result in driving our allies toward neutralism without stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{65}

It is difficult to conceive of our European allies unleashing a unilateral attack upon the Soviet Union. It must be recognized, however,\textsuperscript{66}


\textsuperscript{63}Brodie, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 348.

\textsuperscript{64}Osgood, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 126.

\textsuperscript{65}"Hearings, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954," Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 156, 446 ff. 525-27 as reported in \textit{Ibid.}
that the ability to commit the United States to a nuclear war under circumstances with which we do not agree may in itself be the most important reason to share these weapons. If America permits a distinction to grow between its military establishment and that of Western Europe, it will be only a matter of time before the United States is excluded from the continent. And if the Soviet Union persuades Western Europe to avoid the dangers of a nuclear war through the exclusion of atomic weapons the next logical step would be to demand that United States forces withdraw from Europe since we will have the only nuclear force on the continent.

Methods of Nuclear Sharing. If there is a change in present United States policy regarding the diffusion of nuclear weapons, careful consideration must be given to the various alternatives which may be used in sharing our nuclear deterrent. Weapons could be given to selected allies that have demonstrated the capability of using and maintaining them. Perhaps more important would be the maturity demonstrated by that government in its foreign relations and the stability of its governmental institutions. Under such a system Great Britain would, as evidenced by past relationships in defense matters, undoubtedly have the highest priority to receive nuclear weapons. If, however, nuclear sharing is limited to the British and one or two selected allies, the problem of favoritism within the alliance arises and the alliance continues to be split between the "haves" and "have

66 Osgood, op. cit., p. 126.
nears." Yet differences in technology, population, economic ability to maintain an expensive weapons system and stability differ widely among the members of the alliance. This suggests an alternate system of nuclear sharing that can win wider support.

The alternative to sharing nuclear missiles with selected allies on the basis of bilateral agreements is to share them with a group of allies. This could be done by supplying the weapons to NATO or to the members of NATO who constitute the Western European Union (WEU), or to form an Atlantic Defense Union. Whatever solution is reached, the problem of efficiently integrating the control and use of nuclear weapons must be solved. There are some advantages in strengthening an integrated European nuclear capability rather than an integrated capability based on NATO. The chances of achieving a distinctive European foreign policy based on the common interests of all members are greater in a European defense union than in a grouping which includes the United States. With their own nuclear deterrent, Western Europeans could assume the risks of military action to protect their interests overseas and at the same time deter the Soviet Union without having to rely on American support. In the same way, American policies in Asia and the Pacific could be pursued with greater independence.

Within the Western European Union, there are controls already established over certain classes of armament to include nuclear weapons. Specifically these controls prohibit West Germany from manufacturing various military arms, provide control over weapon stock levels as

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68 For a detailed explanation of the advantages of nuclear integration within a European defense union, see Moore, op. cit., pp. 207-211.
determined by a majority vote and provide an inspection and reporting agency. The inspection agency does not have control over NATO forces and depots. NATO, however, is obliged to inspect its own facilities and pass the information received to the WEU Council. In addition, the United States and Canada have agreed to inform the Western European Union of all military aid furnished to WEU members on the Continent.69

Another alternative plan for sharing nuclear weapons is the development of an Atlantic Defense Union, integrating the strategic air and missile forces of the United States and Great Britain in a unified Atlantic command similar to SHAPE. Such integration would provide the European members of the Alliance with an element of control over the strategic nuclear deterrent and would eliminate any decline in confidence in the availability of American nuclear support. A union of this type would also eliminate duplication of nuclear build-up and ultimately provide greater efficiency in defense production. The success of this far reaching plan would depend on the degree of certainty with which all parties could be sure that the integrated force would be used in their behalf.70

In giving nuclear weapons to NATO as presently constituted, there is the problem of ceding to a military commander of an alliance the responsibility for the survival of the nations constituting the alliance. This is difficult for democratic nations to do. If, as is likely, the decision to use the weapons must be subject to the veto of

69"Protocol No. III and IV on Control of Armaments," signed at Paris by the WEU states on October 23, 1954 as summarized by Ball, op. cit., pp. 394-395.

70Moore, op. cit., pp. 200-207.
national governments, there could be indecision and resulting delay that would tend to neutralize the effective use of these weapons. Political decisions made ahead of time regarding the use of nuclear weapons by the alliance, could, however, cover some of the more clear cut contingencies that would allow effective use of these weapons.

A brief description of the present situation in regard to nuclear weapons within Western Europe will point up some of the difficulties being encountered in regard to nuclear sharing. Beginning in 1957 the United States began to include missiles which have a nuclear capability (less the nuclear components) in its mutual aid programs for the NATO countries. Allocations of these weapons were based in part upon the guidance of NATO military authorities. At the same time, a steadily increasing number of NATO military personnel have been and continue to receive training in the operation and maintenance of these weapons.71 It was planned originally to establish intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) bases in Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece or Cyprus, and Turkey. As of July, 1960, the only bases established have been in the United Kingdom, Italy and Turkey. At the end of October, 1959, the United States announced that it would not establish any more of the Thor IRBM bases in Europe.72

71 Ibid., p. 87.

72 The New York Times, October 31, 1959, p. 1. The Thor and Jupiter IRBM weapons are liquid fueled and employed from fixed bases. Because these weapons require a relatively long time to prepare for use, they are considered highly vulnerable to enemy destruction and are therefore considered as interim weapons. On April 22, 1960, Secretary of Defense Gates mentioned that the United States has proposed establishing mobile nuclear bases in Europe using the solid fueled Polaris missile that can be fired quickly. The New York Times, April 22, 1960, p. 7.
The establishment of missile bases in Europe has been a difficult and time-consuming process. In the matter of control over the missiles and warheads, there are two different arrangements, one of which includes NATO and the other which does not. The British-American agreement signed February 22, 1958, provides for British ownership and operation of missiles that the United States places on British territory; the United States owns the nuclear warheads and the decision to launch the missiles is taken jointly. NATO has no direct control over these missiles. Agreements with Italy and Turkey were negotiated in 1959 for the establishment of IRBM bases. In each case the United States controls the nuclear warheads, but the host government retains the veto over firing the missiles. In the case of missiles based in Italy and Turkey, however, NATO has command of the missile units and approval to launch the weapons rests also with the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Europe.

The United States has not been able to conclude any agreement with France for the establishment of nuclear bases. The French consider that they are discriminated against in the realm of nuclear weapons and appear determined to obtain equality. France feels that it is intolerable that the United States should monopolize the keys to the safe containing the weapons upon which European security rests. It was primarily because the United States would not make any concessions in this matter that the French Government refused to permit stockpiles of

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75 Ibid., February 8, 1960, p. 3.
American nuclear weapons on French soil. This in turn has recently forced United States air units within the NATO command to move from bases in France to bases in Great Britain.76

Whether desirable or not, strategic nuclear diffusion appears to be inevitable and only a question of time. The smaller allies may remain satisfied with inferior military capacities, but if France could not be prevented from its determination to join the nuclear "haves," it can be expected that Italy and West Germany will in time demand nuclear independence. Before this time arrives, American policy has the opportunity of helping its allies through its nuclear weapons know-how, as well as sharing our nuclear deterrent with them. The decision of the United States in the problem of nuclear sharing will be important to the future of the North Atlantic Alliance.

76 Loc. cit.
CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

In the opinion of some of the NATO members, the North Atlantic Alliance has passed from its military stage to a period of political and economic activity. The fear of Soviet military aggression no longer seems as urgent, in spite of occasional periods of tension, as it did during the early years when NATO was being created. As a consequence the pressure within the Western coalition to find political solutions to the outstanding issues that lie between the Soviet Union and the NATO states has steadily increased. The problem that NATO faces in its non-military relationship with the Soviet Union is to find bases for realistic negotiation that can be supported by the entire alliance. With diverse interests, and the pursuit of a nationalistic policy on the part of some members, it has been difficult for the alliance to face the Soviet Union united behind a common policy.

The Soviet Union has somewhat changed its emphasis in foreign affairs. There has been a decided shift of emphasis from military pressure in Europe to the less blatant forms of political and economic pressure. In addition there has been a shift of emphasis to the Middle East and Africa with the result that the cold war is being continued in lands far from Europe. This Soviet action has increased the difficulties of the North Atlantic Alliance, but at the same time has made cooperative effort even more essential. It is, in theory, possible for a single country
to defend itself against a single enemy near home, but it is difficult if not impossible for a single country to defend against multiple threats ranging from the Caribbean to the Sea of Japan.¹

In this chapter there will be a discussion of three important non-military issues that threaten the solidarity of NATO. The first is "disengagement," a political proposal which is especially attractive to the Federal Republic of Germany as a means of reunification. The second is the force of nationalism by which the independent policies of some NATO members have detracted from the effectiveness of the alliance, and the third concerns the lack of adaptability of NATO to the unification of either the political or economic institutions of the member states.

Disengagement

Of the political issues of major importance to NATO and to the relationship of the United States with Western Europe, none has more serious implications to existing policies than the concept of "disengagement."² This concept expresses the idea of the reduction and separation of military forces in Central Europe in the hope that tensions would be reduced, thereby facilitating eventual political settlement between the Soviet Union and the nations of NATO.

Although there have been various versions of the meaning of disengagement, each contains the first and usually one or more of the


²See George F. Kennan, Russia, The Atom and the West (New York, 1957), as well as his article, "Disengagement Revisited," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37 (January, 1959), pp. 187-210, for detailed explanation of the idea of "disengagement." The impetus of "disengagement" is credited in part to Kennan's writings.
following six elements: 1) The withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from East and West Germany; 2) the withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from some or all the remaining satellite states and West European states; 3) arms limitation and control over the territories from which forces have been withdrawn; 4) a political settlement concerning both East and West Germany; 5) the partial or complete breakup of the Warsaw Pact Alliance and the North Atlantic Alliance; 6) a guarantee of the agreements reached, by the United States, the Soviet Union, and possibly other states.\\footnote{3}

There are, of course, advantages and disadvantages of disengagement, but the military advantages appear to be outweighed by the disadvantages. Although the proponents of disengagement argue that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany and perhaps from Poland and other states of the Soviet bloc in return for a commensurate withdrawal of American and British military forces would be of military value to the West in that it would reduce the possibility of war by accident resulting from powerful opposing forces that are in close proximity, it is questionable that the creation of a buffer zone by the withdrawal of military forces of major powers actually reduces the danger of war. The withdrawal of American forces from South Korea prior to 1950 did not prevent aggression nor did the riots in East Germany and the revolt in Hungary result in war. As it has often been asserted both in and out of NATO conferences, that if an accident were to lead to war, someone would have to decide that the time had come to start a war.\\footnote{4} 


The proponents of disengagement suggest that another possible military advantage of disengagement is that it would reduce the Soviet capabilities for surprise attack on the ground. The validity of this argument would have been greater eleven years ago when Western forces were organized for occupation rather than defense. Withdrawal of Russian forces to the Bug River bordering Poland and the Soviet Union, a distance of 500 plus miles from their present positions, would have to be matched by a similar withdrawal of British and American forces. In effect this would mean withdrawal from Continental Europe. It is doubtful if American ground units could be returned in sufficient time to counter a Soviet ground thrust, since the time of return to present position has been estimated at from 12-18 to 72 hours. The greatest danger in disengagement to the North Atlantic Alliance is in the possibility that American military forces will be withdrawn from the continent. One eminent critic of disengagement points out that once withdrawal begins it will not be complete until all American, British and Canadian troops have departed Europe.

5Dean Acheson, "The Illusion of Disengagement," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36 (April, 1958), p. 376. The limitations of United States air lift capability were illustrated in the Lebanon crisis where it took maximum effort to transport one battle group plus supporting troops from Germany. For a report of air lift inadequacy see John B. Spore, "What About Air Lift," Army, September, 1958, pp. 2920. That the air lift situation has not particularly improved during the past two years is evident by Exercise Big Slam held in Puerto Rico during March, 1960, as reported in, The New York Times, March 16, 1960, p. 24.

One of the proposals for disengagement, the Rapacki Plan, is based in part upon a nuclear free zone in East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, but the denuclearization of a limited area, would not preclude the use of nuclear weapons tactically. It would only mean that the weapons could not initially be deployed forward. With the increased effectiveness of missile delivery systems and with air delivery, it is difficult to see how NATO could benefit from this plan.

Not all proposals for disengagement call for the withdrawal of United States troops from the European Continent. Neither George Kennan nor Hugh Gaitskell in their proposals for disengagement have suggested that the United States withdraw its forces entirely from Europe. Holding present force levels in Europe is possible, but it is more reasonable to assume that whatever remains of the NATO shield would be considerably smaller in size if disengagement was accomplished. The formal withdrawal of 12 West German divisions would not remove them completely as a factor in NATO defense, and it may be possible in the event of attack or threat of attack to re-establish liaison between the West German Army

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7Adam Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister, first proposed this plan in a speech at the United Nations in October, 1957. A year later he modified his plan to provide for a two stage approach to disengagement. During the first stage there would be a ban on production of nuclear weapons and these weapons would not be given to states that did not possess them at the time of the agreement. In stage two the Soviet Union and the United States would progressively eliminate nuclear weapons altogether in this area. See, The New York Times, March 22, 1959, p. E 5.

8Kennan, "Disengagement Revisited," op. cit., pp. 198-199. See also Hugh Gaitskell, "Disengagement: Why? How?", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36 (July, 1958), pp. 539-556. Kennan admits that NATO would be weakened militarily, but believes the possible political advantages to be worth this risk. Gaitskell, head of the British Labor Party, in proposing a plan not unlike the Rapacki Plan makes a special point of insisting that both American and British forces remain on the continent in order to convince both the Soviet Union and our NATO allies that Western Europe will not be abandoned and that the United States and Great Britain will continue to resist aggression.
and NATO.\textsuperscript{9} This point of view overlooks the difficulties of military operations of separate forces without prior close liaison or integration. Also ignored is the status of the present West German Army in a reunified Germany where integration with East German Forces may render any cooperation with NATO ineffective. An additional difficulty would be found in shifting present non-German NATO forces from West Germany to other NATO areas. In the low countries there is no room for troops; in France there is some room, but there is also an unsecure political situation. The most logical area to shift forces presently in West Germany would be to the Iberian Peninsula or North Africa. From this analysis it appears that, from the point of view of military strategy, the weight of argument is against disengagement.\textsuperscript{10}

In spite of its effect upon military strategy, the implications of disengagement are largely political. First of all, disengagement calls for the neutralization and reunification of Germany. This means the withdrawal of West Germany from NATO and from the Western European Union. For as George Kennan pointed out, the Soviet Union cannot possibly agree to terms that would allow a unified Germany to remain with the West.\textsuperscript{11} The Western policy, on the other hand, has pressed continually for the unification of Germany under one government chosen through free elections which would determine which obligations the united Germany would affirm or reject. This policy is based upon the belief that a freely elected all German government would be oriented to the West.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{9}Knorr, op. cit., p. 332.
\textsuperscript{10}This point is also expressed by some West German military experts. See, Hans Speier, \textit{German Rearmament and Atomic War} (Evanston, 1957), p. 240.
\textsuperscript{11}Kennan, \textit{Russia, the Atom and the West}, op. cit., pp. 37-39.
A German withdrawal from NATO would have serious consequences for the alliance. Since 1950, NATO's strategy has assumed that there would be a substantial defense contribution by West Germany. Without a German contribution to the alliance, there would be a shift of power politically as well as militarily away from the West. The difficulties of keeping a united Germany neutral would probably create greater world tension than has existed up to now. A vital and dynamic state such as Germany is bound to have ambitions and objectives that would push her either toward the East or toward the West. Although proponents of disengagement have not advocated that a united Germany sever economic as well as military ties with the West, it is again difficult to see the Soviet Union permitting the existing economic integration that has been established with West Germany and Western Europe to continue when such participation would surely draw Germany closer to the West. Without German participation the economic integration that has been so laboriously built up within Western Europe would be threatened, and French fears of Germany, so recently stifled, revived.

Of the members of NATO the greatest interest in disengagement is found in the last state to join the alliance, the Federal Republic of Germany. This is because disengagement offers a possible solution to the major problem within the Federal Republic, the reunification of Germany. The political party controlling the government is the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) lead by Premier Konrad Adenauer. In defense matters, the

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13 Acheson, op. cit., p. 377.

CDU has supported rearmament, the establishment of missile bases on German soil and participation in NATO. Politically, the CDU has supported integration with Western Europe and has sought reunification through cooperation with the West. Although the policies of the Adenauer government have been successful in rearming West Germany within the framework of NATO, it receives increased criticism on the matter of reunification. \(^\text{15}\) The principal minority part in Germany, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), has been extremely critical of West Germany's participation in NATO at what they consider to be the price of a united Germany. \(^\text{16}\) The SPD has opposed rearmament and participation in NATO. The only way to reunification, in their opinion, is through a policy of neutrality for which NATO is a stumbling block. \(^\text{17}\) Regardless of the criticism, however, the German contribution to NATO continues to grow and makes any future change in policy more difficult to implement.

Of the other NATO powers, disengagement is heard most frequently in Great Britain where the current minority Labor Party has officially committed itself to this program. \(^\text{18}\) Unlike the West German Socialist


\(^\text{16}\)Speier, op. cit., pp. 9, 16.

\(^\text{17}\)The material on the views of the principal German political parties is taken from interviews of members of West German legislature, the Bundestag by a public opinion research organization whose work was analyzed and tabulated by the Institute for International Social Research. The results were published in a book by, Lloyd A. Free, Six Allies and a Neutral (Glencoe, 1959), pp. 131-156. The political implications of both the SPD and the CDU as to disengagement cannot be overlooked. The minority SPD is primarily Protestant as is East Germany. In the event of free elections within a unified Germany the SPD would stand a good chance of winning power. On the other hand, the status quo party, the Catholic CDU, may well adopt its position of Western cooperation from similar considerations.

\(^\text{18}\)Gaitskell, op. cit., p. 540.
Party, the Labor Party supports the North Atlantic Alliance and refuses to consider any plan that calls for the total evacuation of British and American forces from the continent. The Conservative Party opposes disengagement by a substantial majority. In spite of the Conservative Party's official stand, the British are showing increased interest in the idea of basing the security of Western Europe on some form of cooperation with the Soviet bloc in the regional limitation and control of weapons and forces. It is believed, however, that negotiations with the Soviet Union can be taken only on the basis of unity and strength, and there is some doubt if the West has yet reached that position.

Of the two remaining major NATO powers, France and the United States, neither has evidenced any great degree of interest in disengagement. France, in particular, though highly critical of NATO in many areas, is strongly opposed to any withdrawal of British and American forces from the continent of Europe. Any plan that would tend to loosen the bonds that have tied the Federal Republic of Germany to Western Europe would undoubtedly be strongly resisted by France. In the United States, disengagement is not an issue. There is no indication that there is any political difference of opinion on this subject. There have been, however, several influential men who have made statements favorable to what would be, in effect, disengagement. While this point could become

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19 Free, op. cit., p. 58.


more popular when the United States' need for overseas bases diminishes, the current American viewpoint was summed up by General Alfred M. Gruenther when he said that "any plan calling for moving back of Allied and Soviet troops in Europe would contain tremendous bear traps for the United States".\textsuperscript{23}

Disengagement could strike at the very heart of NATO by the withdrawal of West Germany from NATO as well as setting the stage for the withdrawal of British and United States forces from the continent. It would force the complete revision of NATO's military plans and strategy, but the temptations of this political solution to the reunification of Germany and East-West tension in general has found wide acceptance in two important NATO states. Though not currently a critical issue within NATO, disengagement may become one of the most difficult issues that the alliance will have to face.

**Nationalism**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization appears to be increasingly beset with the nationalistic ambitions of some of its members. To one New York Times political observer, the early days of the alliance were typified by a sense of camaraderie, a unity of mission and a willingness to endure, that has slowly dissipated as Europe has become prosperous.\textsuperscript{24} Peace and prosperity have fostered national aspirations at the expense of collective security. The people of Europe seem to be less concerned with the Soviet threat in Europe and increasingly concerned about the

\textsuperscript{23} The New York Times, April 5, 1959, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., December 20, 1959, p. E 5.
Soviet threat of economic and political penetrations in the overseas possessions. Claims of hegemony have been revived in spite of the fact that they no longer have a real basis. Instead of concentrating on a common future, there is a tendency to look back. As a result of the revival of nationalism, the unity of the North Atlantic Alliance is threatened. 25

The importance of a united Western coalition in negotiating outstanding issues with the Soviet Union was developed in a recent analysis which pointed out that a division of Western Europe "into a rabble of ill-armed nationalisms" merely facilitates the Soviet diplomatic practice of making individual offers of treaties. 26 If a single European state wishes to pursue a purely nationalistic policy in its relations with the Soviet Union, the Russians would be delighted to oblige. On the other hand, a united Western alliance that knows exactly what it wants and where it is going, can realistically and effectively meet the Soviet Union's offensive moves, be they military, political or economic.

An example of how nationalism can weaken the North Atlantic Alliance militarily and politically is illustrated by the attitude of distrust that the British have evidenced toward West Germany during the past few months. The British press, which in this case appears to express a popular opinion, has expressed doubts that democracy has really taken root in Germany. The domination of Chancellor Adenauer over the government of the Federal Republic is cited as evidence of the German requirement


for a strong leader. In short, the British believe that the Germans of 1960 are but little different from the militaristic and nationalistic Germans of 1939, and that it is just a matter of time until Germany uses its geographical position between the West and the East to bargain for special advantages.\textsuperscript{27} The fact that West German policies over the past eleven years do not warrant the British fears does not alter them. The outbreak of anti-Semitism that took place in West Germany in late December, 1959, and early January, 1960, did nothing to discourage British opinion.\textsuperscript{28}

British doubts about West Germany came to a head over the report, at first unofficial but later confirmed, that the Bonn Government was seeking a bilateral agreement with Spain for military bases. The Germans, crowded for space and frustrated over the inability of NATO to integrate a military supply system, had been seeking to lease training areas and bases from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Spain. Unable to reach an agreement with NATO members, West German Defense Minister Strauss set out on the Spanish venture.\textsuperscript{29} When the news of these negotiations was made public, somewhat prematurely it might be added, there were immediate outcries in Britain condemning the German action.\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{28}"Germany's Notting Hill," \textit{The Economist}, Vol. 194 (January 9, 1960), pp. 85-86. It should be noted that isolated outbreaks of an anti-Semitic nature also occurred in the United Kingdom and the United States.
\bibitem{29}\textit{The New York Times}, February 28, 1960, p. 3.
\end{thebibliography}
There is no provision in the North Atlantic Alliance that precludes special bilateral military agreements with states outside the alliance. The United States has, in fact, concluded agreements with Spain for military bases. While there is no argument about the West German requirement for additional military facilities, there are political reasons that make agreement with Spain difficult. The British, and to a lesser extent the French, have never forgotten the support given by Germany to the forces of General Francisco Franco during the Spanish Civil War as well as the sympathetic neutrality of the Spanish government toward the Axis during World War II. The British Labor Party in particular feels strongly about this matter.

The results of the German efforts to obtain bases in Spain are mixed. The other NATO States were sufficiently stirred to offer additional bases to Germany. Though Britain indicated clearly that it would prefer German military negotiations and bases to remain within NATO, the House of Commons after debate voted full support for West Germany as a full and equal partner in the Atlantic Alliance. The British attitude, however, did not go unnoticed by the Germans who reacted with anger and indignation against the public scolding Germany had received.

The distrust of Germany can have a disastrous effect upon the military and political cooperation of NATO. The British attitude toward West Germany has a particularly serious effect on the Dutch, the Danes

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32 Ibid., March 2, 1960, p. 2.
33 Loc. cit.
34 Lewis, op. cit., p. 589.
and the Norwegians, who look closely to Britain for leadership. Most assuredly their sympathies toward West Germany do not match the French or American. The full military power of the alliance cannot be exerted as long as a powerful public opinion in the United Kingdom attacks the government and its support of NATO whenever there is any development of German military strength. For Germany to be wanted by some members of the alliance and rejected by others would undoubtedly encourage any nationalistic elements and certainly cause the Germans to look more closely at the possibility of separate negotiations with the Soviet Union over reunification of East and West Germany.

Although the syndrome of nationalism is expressed to some degree in the majority of the fifteen NATO states, it is the case of France that gives the greatest concern to the supporters of the North Atlantic Alliance. The fact that France is geographically important makes it essential to NATO for better or worse. France is the most important piece of real estate within NATO. When French political organization is weak, ineffectual and disorganized, NATO suffers. When France cannot cope with the nationalist aspirations of its overseas possessions, thus giving anti-western influence a chance to grow and forcing the employment of military units away from Metropolitan France, the alliance suffers. Most of the communicative installations, supply and maintenance depots and railroads that would nourish any Western defensive effort against a Soviet invasion are situated on French soil. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, located outside Paris, is the nerve center of the allied

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military effort, just as the headquarters of NATO in Paris is the political brain of the alliance. It is impossible to see the defense of Europe without the assistance and cooperation of France. As John Foster Dulles once remarked, "if France goes, Germany is a parachute operation."36

French nationalism is centered around the figure of President Charles de Gaulle, whose actions are dominated by the desire to restore France to the position of influence and greatness it enjoyed prior to World War II.37 From the beginning of the Atlantic Alliance, President de Gaulle has been critical of the NATO organization which in his opinion has further subordinated France to the United States. The United States' stand in the Suez affair was disillusioning to the French. Much bitterness developed toward the United States for its lack of support, which in turn has been a motivating force for the French to develop military independence from the United States.38

President de Gaulle and the French nationalists criticize the military role of NATO on several points. The first is based on the contention that the Atlantic Pact is directed toward the defense of Western Europe, which is not threatened, while neglecting Asia and Africa which are threatened.39 The French nationalists believe that the geographical boundaries of NATO are too limited and that the alliance

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38 Free, _op. cit._, p. 91.

39 _Ibid._, p. 108.
should deal with problems on a world-wide scale. The second criticism is based upon the belief that the United States and Great Britain have formed a two-power conclave, leaving France to tag along.\textsuperscript{40} The third objection concerns military integration within NATO. President de Gaulle firmly believes that troops fight better under their own national colors and this it is essential for each nation - France, at any rate - to control its own defense and have the capacity for independent action.\textsuperscript{41} A final contention is that France has been denied its fair share of important positions in the NATO command structure.\textsuperscript{42}

The most serious effect of the French nationalist attitude is upon the military integration of NATO forces. The principle of integration has been declared, by General Norstad, the present SHAPE Commander, to be vital to the military efficiency of the alliance.\textsuperscript{43} Because of the French point of view, there has been little or no integration of the various continental air defense systems or military supply systems. In addition the French have refused to stockpile missiles and atomic warheads on French soil under a joint control agreement with the United States. Some observers believe that France will compromise on the question of integration providing it is afforded a greater voice in NATO decision making.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{40}\textit{Furniss, op. cit.}, p. 464. The Near East crisis of 1958 during which the United States and Great Britain decided to take concerted action in Lebanon and Jordan is an example of the policy cited.


\textsuperscript{42}\textit{Furniss, op. cit.}, p. 465.


\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., See also, \textit{Furniss, op. cit.}, p. 466.
There are, however, difficulties in giving France the preponderant voice within NATO that many French leaders would prefer, or in accepting the French proposal that the United States, Great Britain and France combine to form a three-power directorate to consider problems in relation to global strategy. The other European members, particularly Italy and Germany, would most certainly object to such a plan, and the development of political consultation, which has improved steadily within NATO since 1956, would be threatened.

To some extent the French position on NATO is based upon a cultural anti-Americanism. The French, whose culture has had influence far out of proportion to its power in international politics, feel that their way of life is seriously threatened by the modern technological and social evolution that has been represented by the United States. The cultural fears of the French intellectuals carry strong political overtones, and since NATO has come to be thought of as representing United States policy, many French prefer to disassociate themselves also from it.

The French feel to a greater extent than the other European members of NATO that agreement is lacking as to the purposes of the North Atlantic Alliance. This in part probably reflects their own disagreement with NATO's policies. The problem, however, of French ambitions pressing for French 'grandeur' and international prestige poses a serious threat to the North Atlantic Alliance as it is presently constituted.

45 See Furniss, op. cit., pp. 465-466; and Free, op. cit., p. 110.
46 Ibid., p. 96.
47 Ibid., pp. 105-106.
Political and Economic Unification

In a speech commemorating the tenth anniversary of NATO, Lester B. Pearson, who had represented Canada on the occasion of the signing of the treaty, concluded that fear is the strongest motivating force for the coalition. He went on to question what would happen to the alliance when fear no longer exists. Of what use are the countless plans for NATO unity and non-military cooperation if they are never taken out of the pigeonholes of the various foreign offices and put to work.  

Since 1956, there has been an increased realization by some influential Western statesmen that a purely military alliance is not enough to cope with the political and economic challenge of the Soviet Union. The recent Secretary General of NATO believes it is necessary not only to explain to the NATO peoples that they might one day have to defend themselves in common against a common enemy, but also they must also learn to live together and understand what interests they have in common.  

The force of nationalism plus the different national interests of the NATO members appear, however, to have kept the alliance from being the medium of Western unity for which so many have hoped.

The difficulties in achieving political and economic unification within NATO are caused in part by a difference in emphasis regarding the nature of the Soviet threat. The contrast between the French and American opinion may be expressed thusly: American opinion tends to emphasize

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the military aspect of the alliance because it fears an attack by Soviet forces; whereas, French opinion is convinced that the essential battle between the two worlds is conducted with political, economic and psychological weapons. This is a crude generalization. Differences in interpretation regarding the world situation and the Soviet menace are found within every nation and within every party. It is probably that the differences between European and American statesmen on this question are only a difference in degree. At the present time American leaders are inclined to point out that military preparations are as indispensable today as yesterday. European leaders are inclined to take the opposite view. Perhaps this is because Americans are more preoccupied with military defense since they have the duty and means to provide it. The Europeans are less preoccupied with it because they have fewer resources and because they judge that their contributions can be more effective in other ways.50.

Even more important than the alternatives of military preparation or economic competition are the relationships between the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance and those countries which belong to neither the Western community nor the Soviet bloc of states. There is no disagreement on the necessity of keeping the peoples of Asia, the Near East and Africa outside the Soviet orbit; however, agreement on methods for maintaining freedom is not easily reached by the members of NATO. As has been frequently pointed out, American opinion remains generally faithful to the anti-colonialist tradition. American feeling that the

50 Raymond Aron and August Heckscher, Diversity of the World (New York, 1957) contains an excellent analysis of the differences between the United States and the French (European) points of view regarding the Soviet Union and nationalism in colonial areas.
movement of colonial populations toward independence is inevitable believe
that it is better to support and guide this movement so that these future
states will not abandon the West. The French, though not unanimous on
this subject (as witnessed by the various points of view regarding the
Algerian independence movement), reject American anti-colonial declarations
by pointing out that the United States has not solved its own racial problems
satisfactorily. 

One explanation of the difference in outlook between America on
the one hand, and France and Great Britain on the other, and an explanation
frequently accepted by Europeans opposed to American policies, is based
on the international rivalry for economic power. The desire on the
part of Americans to remove the French presence in North Africa is based,
according to this point of view, by a desire to see American business
interests in North Africa advanced. The economic importance of North
Africa to France is a matter of the gravest concern to the future of
France. The resources, markets and population of North Africa are
essential to maintain French status and standard of living. France has
invested heavily in its empire and feels that this investment is not
only for itself but ultimately for the entire North Atlantic Alliance.
The French point out that the Americans can afford to be idealistic
and urge the gift of freedom since the United States faces no economic
loss, but rather stands to gain by such change.

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51 Ibid., pp. 83-86.

52 In the debate in the House of Commons over the Marshall plan con-
siderable issue was made over American economic imperialism. See,
"Parliamentary Debates," (Hansard), House of Commons Official Report, 3rd
Session of the Thirty-eighth Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great
Also see, Furniss, op. cit., p. 307.
As seen from the above discussion, the differences among the United States and the members of NATO which have colonial interests are difficult to resolve. Americans are naturally reluctant to be drawn into a union that would bind them to sharing the commitments, for example, of France to North Africa. The French, on the other hand, wonder how any satisfactory partnership could exist if the things that the French regard as essential are not respected. Probably this lack of American support on French colonial issues more than anything else has driven a wedge between these two NATO countries over the past few years.53

While the lack of identity of interest and foreign policy of the NATO nations - as witnessed by controversies over Cyprus, Suez and North Africa - has placed difficulties in the way of an Atlantic union movement, there is evidence of increased political consultation and efforts to coordinate NATO policy in matters concerning negotiations with the Soviet Union.54 The North Atlantic Council meets frequently, and in spite of a tendency to settle problems among the larger states to the annoyance of smaller states who feel they have an equal interest although sharing less responsibility, there has been a remarkable unity on many problems.55 There are, of course, divergent positions at which time the press discusses the current crisis in NATO. But some disagreement is surely to be expected, particularly on matters of procedure.56

54 Pearson, op. cit., p. 5.
56 Spaak, op. cit., p. 4.
To NATO Secretary General Spaak the most essential need during the coming years is the coordination of Western economic policy. This is necessary because in the communist states all economic forces are at the disposal of political objectives and among non-communist states competition within the state and among states still remains the general rule. It is, according to Spaak, far easier to mobilize and coordinate military forces than to create the common economic policy that is essential for the economic struggle of co-existence with the Soviet Union.\(^\text{57}\) NATO's ambition to be an economic organization appears, however, to have been pre-empted by the creation of the economic trading groups.

In the economic field, NATO is both too large and not large enough for the development of special trade and economic arrangements among its members. The first economic grouping lies entirely within the North Atlantic organization. It is the Europe of the Six comprised of approximately 160 million people of France, Western Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg whose governments have experimented since 1950 with supranational institutions in the form of the well-established European Coal and Steel Community, the unfulfilled European Defense and Political Community plans, the new common market (European Economic Community) and the European Community for Atomic Energy.\(^\text{58}\) As seen by the number of common organizations, the six-nation grouping appears to be both natural and successful. It is, however, with regard to the common market that a split has developed which threatens the cohesion of NATO.

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\(^{57}\)Ibid., p. 6.

The common market has within it potentially bad economic consequences for the other states of Europe. These states, which include Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Portugal and Great Britain have established a seven-nation European Free Trade Association (Outer Seven) with the ultimate objective of building a Europe-wide trading community to include the common market. Instead of the eventual adoption of a single free-trading system, many experts see the danger of a permanent economic split which, if true, will divide NATO into two economic groups.

One solution proposed by Dean Acheson is to supersede NATO with a new association that would determine European economic and political policy. This grouping of states would include the fifteen members of NATO as well as countries from outside the alliance such as Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and Austria.

Regardless of what has not been accomplished, the desire for unification continues. Some see the solution in the creation of Western Europe as a political, economic and military unit which would work in close cooperation with Canada and the United States. Others urge the closer association, if not federation, of the Atlantic democracies. There is no denying either the reality of the movement for European unity or the reality of the Atlantic community. The two are not mutually exclusive. This position was reaffirmed in a report of NATO's Committee of Three in December, 1956, which states that the evolution of the Atlantic

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62 See, Moore, *op. cit.*, for a reference favoring European Union.
community through NATO should not prevent the formation of even closer relationships among some of its members. The move toward European unity and Atlantic cooperation, the report continued, should be "parallel and complementary, not competitive or conflicting."

Although NATO itself has not proven to be a vehicle for political and economic integration within the North Atlantic community, it has provided an organization for coordination and planning. Representatives of the fifteen NATO nations meet regularly to discuss common problems. It is entirely reasonable to assume that, through NATO, agreement can be reached concerning European economic integration. If so, the leadership of the United States will probably be necessary. As one of the most dispassionate of the NATO diplomats said recently, "We cannot surmount our European difficulties and differences without a strong lead from Washington. You alone have the detachment from intramural quarrels to arbitrate them."

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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

Conclusions

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been successful in preventing even the smallest gain by the Soviet Union on territory covered by the Atlantic Pact. This result has been achieved without recourse to force. The danger of Russian aggression, however, continues to exist though the nature of the threat is more complex than when the North Atlantic Alliance was organized over eleven years ago. The need and desire for security, therefore, continues to be one of the strongest motivating forces of the community of interests that brought the fifteen NATO nations together.

This thesis began with the major hypothesis that in order for the NATO alliance to be effective, it must be acceptable to its members. If, therefore, the United States is to continue to depend upon NATO for defense, the United States will have to make its foreign policies acceptable to the other members of the alliance. It is concluded as a result of this study that in some respects American policies are not sufficiently adaptable to obtain the full support and concert of effort among the European members of NATO. The result has been to decrease the effectiveness of the alliance.

In the introductory chapter a number of sub-hypotheses were set forth. My conclusions regarding these sub-hypotheses are as follows:

1. The factors that lead to the creation of NATO in the first
place are no longer completely tenable with the result that the alliance
has been weakened. This is due to the fact that:

a. The economic recovery of Western Europe from the results
of World War II has been attained.

b. The stability of West European governments has been
improved. The danger of overthrowing established governmental institu-
tions through indirect aggression at the hands of communist minorities
has lessened. This is due to improvement in the standard of living
which has made the communist ideology less attractive and to the
improvement of security against overt attack.

c. The Russian threat has changed so as to place greater
emphasis on other areas, such as Asia and Africa where the provisions
of the North Atlantic Treaty do not apply.

2. The concepts of military strategy that applied when NATO was
organized and for five or six years thereafter have been outmoded due
to rapid developments in Russian military technology. These concepts,
based to a large extent upon American doctrine, are:

a. The almost exclusive reliance upon nuclear weapons as a
deterrent and defense both against the threat of a general war and the
threat of a limited war.

b. The reliance upon the United States and to a lesser
extent Great Britain in the use of their nuclear weapons monopoly for
the protection of the other NATO states against aggression short of
general war.

3. The North Atlantic Alliance is threatened by diverse political
forces and interests in the member states which have tended to detract
from the over-all success of the alliance. This study has discussed
three such threats:

a. The various proposals for the alteration of military and political arrangements in Central Europe which are described by the term "disengagement".

b. The efforts of France to attain hegemony both within and outside NATO.

c. The tendency of some members of NATO to regard others as either unequal or untrustworthy.

4. The North Atlantic Alliance has not as yet justified the hope that it would prove adaptable to the unification of either the political or economic institutions of its members although this hope continues to exist. Indirectly, however, NATO has proved to have a cohesive effect among the member states as evidenced by:

a. The considerable amount of political cooperation and coordination that has been attained in matters regarding the relationship of NATO countries with the Soviet Union.

b. The considerable amount of economic integration that has taken place in Western Europe outside of NATO.

Prospects

The future of the North Atlantic Alliance depends upon the assumption that national differences existing among its members will continue to be outweighed by the community of interests they share in the furtherance of free institutions and in the value of mutual security. I believe that this assumption is sound.

It appears inevitable in the absence of general atomic disarmament that the forces of the European members of NATO must become equipped with nuclear weapons either; 1) through their own efforts, individually or
collectively, or 2) through the assistance of the United States. It is evident that nuclear weapons could be supplied more effectively by the NATO nations already producing them. In my opinion the United States must offer nuclear weapons to its NATO allies. Such an act would strengthen NATO, boost the confidence of Western Europeans in their capacity to resist Soviet threats, minimize the expense of weapons development and facilitate a weapons control system in which the United States could participate more effectively.

If NATO is to continue to provide security for all its members, there must be a greater understanding by the United States that the military threat posed by the Soviet bloc cannot be deterred without both nuclear weapons and strong conventional forces. The more successful the free world is in preventing a general war, the more likely the Soviet Union will continue to advance in ways that will avoid presenting the United States and its allies with an issue so clear and direct that a massive nuclear response could be employed. If the United States desires its European allies to have the will to defend themselves, the military strategy of the United States must clearly support the possibility of non-atomic and localized response when such action is appropriate.

The present American policies in regard to the sharing of nuclear weapons and the role of conventional forces have, in my opinion, little to recommend them. With the increased knowledge of the American public that in the event of a general war it would suffer millions of casualties as well as a paralyzing economic blow, it is believed that there will be a greater interest in a military strategy that offers an increased opportunity for limiting war. In addition, defense policies have received the increased scrutiny of Congress during recent months. It is, therefore,
quite possible that present military and nuclear policies will be modified with resulting benefits to NATO.

If NATO is to continue to prosper, there must be an expansion of its operations to provide a common approach to the military, political and economic problems of Asia and Africa. Restricting the area of NATO's operations to Europe does not make maximum use of the resources of the alliance to meet the threat of a potential enemy with global interests and activities. The limiting by NATO members of their freedom of action outside the alliance area, however, may prove to be one of the most difficult problems to solve.

For the immediate future at least, the primary objective of NATO must be to provide military security to its members. Ultimately, however, the adaptability and effectiveness of NATO will depend upon the unification of economic and political institutions of its members. Such unification could be either within NATO or outside of NATO. The important thing is that NATO continues to act as a stimulus to integration, for only in this way will the forces of nationalism and self-interest that tend to weaken the free world be countered effectively.

There is, in spite of the difficulties that lie ahead for the NATO nations, much to be found on the credit side of the ledger. An alliance has been created which has contributed to the prevention of Soviet aggression against its members. Economic recovery from World War II has been accomplished and the people of Europe are more prosperous than ever before. In general, the demands of the former colonial peoples for independence have been met peacefully. There is, in the light of what has been accomplished, every reason to be optimistic that present and future problems can and will be solved successfully by the nations comprising the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
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VITA
Hoyt Robert Livingston
Candidate for the Degree of
Master of Arts

Thesis: THE ADAPTABILITY OF NATO IN A CHANGING WORLD

Major Field: Political Science

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Evanston, Illinois, August 16, 1920, the son of Frank and Alma Livingston.

Education: Attended grade school and High School in Winnetka, Illinois; attended Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana, 1940-41; received the Bachelor of Science Degree from Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, with a major in Economics in 1947; completed requirements for a Master of Arts Degree, with a major in Political Science from Oklahoma State University, in August, 1960.

Professional Experience: Entered the United States Army in 1942 and is now a Major in the Infantry. Graduate of the following service schools: Officers Candidate School, Parachute School, the Armed Forces Information School, and the Advanced Infantry School. Assignments include: Platoon leader and Company Commander 509th Parachute Infantry during World War II, Battalion Executive Officer and Regimental Staff Officer 503rd Airborne Infantry, Chief, North Korean Section, G2 Division, Army Forces Far East, and Assistant Professor of Military Science, Oklahoma State University, 1957-1960.