

WEST GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES

AND THE

REUNIFICATION ISSUE

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PREFACE

The problem of German reunification has become a sensitive issue affecting international peace. Wartime understandings between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union on the reconstruction of Germany broke down under the clash of divergent national interests of the condominium powers. The Western decision to integrate part of Germany into the Atlantic alliance resulted in Germany's partition into two separate states. This division of the German nation to eliminate a dangerous power vacuum in Europe and stabilize the balance of power was not accepted as definitive by the Germans, particularly in the Federal Republic. The West German political parties cooperated with the Western powers in the establishment of the Federal Republic and in its integration into the Atlantic alliance. In return the Western powers supported West German aims of European revisionism.

Since the restoration of independence and sovereignty to the Federal Republic in 1954, the West Germans have two alternative paths to national reunification. They can persist in support of the Western bloc policy of applying relentless pressure on the Soviet Union in order to force the Soviet Union to restore German unity as the price for ending the Cold War. Or they can seek a rapprochement with the Eastern bloc by direct negotiations with the East German authorities and the Soviet Union. The Christian Democrats have pursued the former policy, whereas until recently the Social Democrats inclined towards a diplomatic detente with the Communists. Should Adenauer's "hard" policy become manifestly unpopular, or

the Western powers waver in their determination to support West German goals of revisionism, there is nothing that would prevent the Federal Republic from shifting to a "soft" policy to effect the reunification of Germany. However, this would presumably take place only if the CDU felt that its position of leadership would not be endangered by a rapprochement with the Eastern bloc.

The international aspects of the German reunification problem have been analyzed in considerable detail in order to present the necessary terms of reference for the positions of the West German political parties on national reunification. After a summary of the complex legal status of Germany under the four-power condominium, the policies of the Western powers and of the Soviet Union are analyzed. Then, since the West Germans have evolved an effective two-party system of government, the principal subjects of this study are the Christian Democratic and the Social Democratic parties. Both parties have made the restoration of German unity the goal of their foreign policy proposals to the German electorate. Each party has made reunification a major political issue in successive elections. In the impending election campaign the two parties are nearly in agreement for the first time on the policy of German reunification. The Social Democrats have, in effect, abandoned their former "soft" policy approach. Ironically, now that Adenauer has achieved apparent consensus in West Germany on CDU foreign policy, power realities may force him to modify the "hard" characteristics of the traditional CDU reunification approach.

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CHAPTER I

FOUR POWER DIPLOMACY AND THE QUESTION OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION

The Legal Status of Germany

Legal Basis of the Four-Power Condominium: The military objectives of the Allied powers in World War II were intended to bring about the total defeat of Germany and to evidence this defeat by requiring an unconditional surrender. Faced with the impending power vacuum in Europe which would be created by such a defeat, the principal Allied powers sought to establish certain arrangements which would govern their move into this vacuum. Consequently, the Western powers and the Soviet Union contracted certain legal rights and obligations with respect to Germany in numerous conferences which were held during and immediately after World War II. The legal bases of the occupation condominium were established by these conferences and an analysis of them is required in order to indicate the present involvement of the great powers with respect to German reunification.

The first important agreements concluded by the Allied powers were the protocols of September and November, 1944. Meeting in London in September, 1944, the governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union agreed on the division of Germany into three zones of occupation.¹ Provision was likewise made for the joint occupation of the

¹Subsequent agreements at Yalta sanctioned certain exceptions to the

city of Berlin. The occupying forces in the respective zones were to be under the control of the Commanders-in-Chief and provision was made for an Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Komendatura) to "direct jointly the administration of the Greater Berlin Area."

An amending protocol of November 14, 1944, defined the limits of the American and British zones, such delimitation having been postponed in September. Specific mention was made of the American right of transit facilities through the British zone, a matter which had been most conspicuously omitted in the September protocol with respect to American and British rights of transit through the Soviet zone. This omission has since constituted a constant source of friction between the Western powers and the Soviet Union.²

In addition to this amending protocol, the three powers also concluded on November 14, 1944, an Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany. Referring to the duties of the Commander-in-Chief of the occupation zones, Article 3 of this protocol provided for the establishment of a supreme organ of control, to be called the Control Council. The functions of this Control Council were to be as follows:

1937 boundaries. The Soviet Union and Poland were authorized to undertake certain annexations of territory belonging to the Third Reich. Definitive recognition of these annexations was, however, to await the conclusion of a peace treaty.

²Moreover, there is the possible legal view that the Western powers still possess no concrete rights of transit regarding access to and egress from West Berlin. There has never been any normative agreement concerning these rights. The Berlin Blockade was terminated in May, 1949, at a four-power meeting held in New York. A subsequent conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers agreed that the New York agreement was to be maintained, but such a provision, being purely contractual, would not seem to retain validity in the event of a separate Soviet peace treaty with East Germany. The United States maintains its rights of transit on other bases; however these may also be legally questionable.

- (i) to ensure appropriate uniformity of action by the Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of occupation;
- (ii) to initiate plans and reach agreed decisions on the chief military, political, economic and other questions affecting Germany as a whole, on the basis of instructions received by each Commander-in-Chief from his Government;
- (iii) to control the German central administration, which will be responsible to it for ensuring compliance with its demands;
- (iv) to direct the administration of "Greater Berlin" through appropriate organs.³

The Yalta Conference, February 4-11, 1945, further affirmed the principles of unconditional surrender and the division of Germany into occupation zones. An agreement was reached at this time regarding the allocation of an occupation zone to France, to be formed out of the British and American zones. France was also admitted to the Allied Control Council. Likewise agreed on at Yalta, although not officially released until two years later, was a secret amendment to the German surrender terms. It provided that:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."⁴

³U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1944-1959, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959 (hereafter referred to as Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1959), p. 6. Although this Control Council was never to achieve any significant degree of coordination of occupation policies, the original occupation rights and powers of the condominium states remained legally unimpaired. Each retained from the right of conquest and the agreements which allocated the zones of occupation, governing powers within its occupation territory. See Hans Kelsen, "The Legal Status of Germany according to the Declaration of Berlin," American Journal of International Law, 39 (1945), pp. 518-26.

⁴Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1959, pp. 8-9. With slight modification (the word "dismemberment" was omitted) this paragraph was inserted as Article 13(a) of the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by the Allied Powers, June 5, 1945.

From the foregoing it is evident that the only limitations on the rights agreed on would be those of individual self-limitation. If the Yalta signatories had later been able to act in accord and pursue common policies affecting the whole of Germany, such authority would have enabled the Control Council to act decisively and with efficacy toward a purged, but intact Germany. This point illustrates the fact that there can be no question of the rights which both East and West possess in Germany. The main block to German unity has been that the Western powers and the Soviet Union are exercising, for the most part, the same valid legal rights toward totally different political ends. German reunification has consequently been lost in the middle of this political lineation.

At the end of the war in May, 1945, the Allied powers had already agreed on many aspects of the division and occupation of Germany. The Tripartite Conference of Berlin (Potsdam Conference) was convened in July to discuss and attempt the settlement of the many outstanding problems created by the final collapse of Germany. The agreements made at Potsdam have been the source of considerable controversy, insofar as the Western powers and the Soviet Union have engaged in mutual charges and criticism regarding the prolongation of a divided Germany. The provisions of the Potsdam Protocol affecting Germany, however, were largely restatements of previous agreements and did not constitute a new and comprehensive statement of Allied policies and aims regarding the treatment of Germany. Despite this fact, the legal positions that are currently maintained by the East and the West regarding the German question are in large part based on a fundamental disagreement as to whether the Potsdam Protocol did, in fact, constitute a de nova avowal on the part of the Allies (the position of the Soviet Union) or whether it was but a restatement of previous agreements

(the Western position).⁵

There were, to be sure, statements in the Potsdam Protocol which set forth more clearly what had previously been sketched or assumed. Such items as "uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany," and a provision that "during the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit," were enumerated without qualification and therefore stand out as blatant examples of the disunity which ensued.

The nonfulfillment of these principles has formed the basis of recent Soviet policy. The Soviet Union maintains that its conclusion of a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic would be legally justified in view of the violations which have occurred with respect to the political and economic principles of the Potsdam Protocol. The Soviet Union disclaims any further responsibility under the aegis of the Potsdam agreements, charging the West with having unilaterally repudiated the validity of the entire protocol.

The Western powers, however, base their legal rights to a large extent on the protocols which preceded the Potsdam agreements. Although the West does not accept the Soviet view that the Potsdam agreements have been invalidated, it has based its legal rights on the preceding protocols rather than attempt to merely counter the Soviet Union's interpretation of the Potsdam Protocol.

⁵For the respective positions of the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the relationship of the Potsdam Protocol to the legal and political rights in question: Ibid., pp. 317-31, "Note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American Ambassador at Moscow," November 27, 1958, and pp. 336-47, "Statement by the Department of State on Legal Aspects of the Berlin Situation," December 20, 1958.

The 1944 protocols and the Yalta and Potsdam conferences essentially cover the agreements which established the occupation condominium. The legal status of Germany was clearly established by these agreements. Political differences between the East and the West, however, have destroyed the original aims and purposes of the condominium, viz. the establishment of a unified democratic German state.

Breakup of the Condominium and Emergence of Separate German States (German Federal Republic and German Democratic Republic): Although the institutions of condominium control were generally well-formulated, they were predicated on the one factor which was never actually achieved, that of cooperation. Difficulties developed soon after the German surrender due to the divergence of political and economic interests between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. The many facets of disagreement cannot be enumerated fully, but among them were such issues as the dismantlement of German industry, zonal exchanges of food and goods and, most important, mutual suspicion of one another's political aims. Disagreement over specific policies, of course, resulted from the efforts of both the East and the West to consolidate their power in Europe and to deny to the other any positional advantage. The division of Germany, which had been agreed on by the Allied powers, foreshadowed what was to be the dual nature of world politics in the post-war period. East and West Germany arose from the division of Europe into Anglo-American and Russian spheres of interest.

The Soviet Union's distrust of the Western powers increased as it became evident that the Western powers were not disposed to recognize the Russian interpretation of the understandings which had been reached at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. Specifically, the Soviet Union was disturbed by the Western hostility toward the Soviet consolidation

of power in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union had taken for granted its right to establish "friendly" regimes in Eastern Europe and feared, perhaps correctly, that the Western powers were attempting to restore the cordon sanitaire and once again isolate the Soviet Union from Europe.

Aside from fears of Western dominance, the Soviet Union was clearly interested in all that it could obtain by fiat of military conquest. Soviet forces were in control of Eastern Europe at the close of the war and a swift and efficient consolidation of Soviet power occurred throughout the occupied areas. The blunt tactics of the Soviet Union in carrying out this policy hastened the demise of Allied unity and the Western powers steadied themselves to counter the onrushing tide of Soviet imperialism. In view of the deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, the Soviet blockade of Berlin, as a means of testing Western determination, followed logically.

The various details of the blockade cannot be discussed within the limited scope of this presentation. The fact, however, that the Soviet Union failed in an outright attempt to force the Western powers from their advanced position in Berlin determined, in part, the subsequent course of Soviet policy. In short, the Soviet Union had to recognize that the Western powers would not tolerate or acquiesce in the consolidation of Soviet control over the whole of Germany. The tentacles of open Soviet hegemony were withdrawn and a period of "trench warfare," in the German campaign of the Cold War, ensued.

Thwarted in its attempt to force the Western powers out of Berlin, the Soviet Union efficiently prosecuted the extension of control over East Germany. The Soviet Union originally exercised far more political initiative in its occupation zone than did the Western powers.

Experienced and reliable German Communists were placed in key positions of the reconstituted apparatus of civil administration. A German People's Congress was established by the Soviets, although its activities were largely carried out for it by the Presidium of the German People's Council. This Council was essentially a front organization of the German Communist Party. Wilhelm Pieck, Chairman of the Presidium, and Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Congress, served to execute many of the dictates of the Soviet occupation officials, who wished to impart an air of legality and popular support to their policies.

The 1948 petition of the People's Congress for a plebiscite on German unity was indicative of the early Soviet policy to appear as the champion of German unity. An appeal was directed to the Control Council by the Presidium of the People's Council, requesting that the Commanders-in-Chief honor the millions of signatures collected on the unity petition. The letter to the Control Council from the Presidium stressed the legal conformity of the petition to the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter and the Potsdam Protocol.⁶

Although of no lasting significance regarding reunification, the effect of the petition was to further East German claims of validity. Walter Ulbricht quickly declared that the circulation of the people's petition had "confirmed the legal basis for the activity of the German People's Council."⁷ The growing assertions of East German legitimacy prompted Western action.

⁶See Beate Ruhm von Oppen, Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945-1954, (London, 1955), p. 285.

⁷Ibid., p. 292.

Faced with this increasing consolidation of power in East Germany, the Western powers decided to combine their occupation zones into a single civil government. The occupation zones of the three Western powers had previously been combined, first on a bi-zonal basis and later into tri-zonia. The formation of a central German government in the West meant that German political parties would be given the opportunity to operate on a wider scale and the Land headquarters of the various parties intensified their efforts to bring about cohesive and effective national organizations.

The decision to establish a West German government was reached at the London Six-Power Conference, held February 23 to June 2, 1948. The delegates to the Conference (United Kingdom, United States, France, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands) authorized the establishment of a federated German state in the Western zones of occupation and provided for meetings of the military governors with the Ministers-President of the zones. The framework was erected for the drafting of a federal constitution and its approval by a constituent assembly. A communique issued on June 2, 1948, was careful to state that the recommendations of the Western powers were in no way prejudicial to the eventual accomplishment of German unification through four-power agreement.⁸

The Soviet Union responded quickly to this action of the Western powers. In June, 1948, subsequent to the London Six-Power Conference, the Communist Bloc countries held a conference at Warsaw. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Foreign Ministers of the Eastern Bloc issued

⁸M. E. Bathurst, Germany and the North Atlantic Community, (London, 1956), p. 70.

a statement charging the West with responsibility for the division of Germany. Declaring that the establishment of a West German state would inevitably foster "chauvinism" in Germany, the Communist Foreign Ministers stated their intention to "take more effective measures to combat the instigators of a new war." The Warsaw declaration further held the actions of the Western powers to be in violation of the Potsdam Agreement and destructive of quadripartite control machinery in Germany.⁹

Such "more effective measures" were soon taken. Soviet concern over the separate Western action eventually culminated in the establishment of the Communist-controlled German Democratic Republic on October 7, 1949, with Otto Grotewohl as Minister-President. The Western powers immediately took the position that the East German government was illegitimate and charged the Soviet Union with having established a puppet regime, not based on free elections. The Soviet response to these charges was that the Bonn government was the puppet regime and that the Democratic Republic was legitimate.¹⁰

The Soviet Union, however, was already prepared to recognize the

⁹Oren Poage, "The Creation of a Western German Federal Republic as a Result of the Cold War," (unpub. M.A. thesis, Georgetown University, 1950), p. 209.

¹⁰Von Oppen, pp. 422-3: Statement by General Chuikov, Supreme Chief of the Soviet Military Administration, October 8, 1949. Chuikov charged that West Germany had fallen into "the hands of yesterday's inspirers of the Hitler regime." The legitimacy of the Democratic Republic was justified on the contrary basis. Chuikov stated that, "Under such conditions one cannot help but recognize as legitimate the striving of German democratic circles to take into their own hands the restoration of the unity of Germany and bring about the renaissance of the country on democratic and peace-loving principles. Precisely in this respect does the Soviet Government see the essence of the decisions of the German People's Council on putting into operation the Constitution of the German Democratic Republic and on the formation, in Berlin, of a Provisional Government of the German Democratic Republic."

de facto existence of two German states and proposed quite early that the East and West German authorities should negotiate directly on the question of reunification. An early agreement in this respect would have worked to the advantage of the Soviet Union during the ensuing period of East-West deadlock.¹¹ Otto Grotewohl, the Minister-President of the Democratic Republic, made several appeals to the West German officials regarding mutual efforts toward settling the reunification problem. Such overtures were rebuffed by Chancellor Adenauer and his Government.

The original position of the United States Government that the German Democratic Republic lacked democratic legitimacy has been maintained by the Federal Republic. Secretary of State Acheson charged in a statement of October 12, 1949, that the German Democratic Republic lacked popular support and was a creation of "Soviet and Communist fiat."¹² The United States refused to recognize the Democratic Republic as a legitimate government representing the people of the Soviet zone and flatly denied that it could claim any validity as a "true" government of Germany as a whole.

The Federal Republic subsequently echoed this policy and countered the Democratic Republic claim of all-German representation with a statement by Chancellor Adenauer before the Bundestag, repudiating the contention of the Democratic Republic and claiming sole legitimacy for the Federal Republic as the representative of the German nation.¹³ Adenauer's statement did not appear until some two weeks after Secretary of State

¹¹Cf. Alistair Horne, Return to Power, (New York, 1956), p. 349.

¹²Von Oppen, p. 424.

¹³Paul Weymar, Adenauer: His Authorized Biography, (New York, 1957), p. 292. See also von Oppen, p. 432.

Acheson's remarks, indicating the reluctance of the Federal Republic to precede the Western powers in a policy declaration relevant to the question of German unity.

The Petersburg Protocol of November 22, 1949, closely followed the Soviet announcement of the establishment of the Democratic Republic. This convention conferred de jure recognition of the Federal Republic by the Western powers and defined the status of the Western occupational authorities in West Germany.¹⁴

The ultimate status which the occupation powers imposed on Germany in 1949 was thus vastly different from the intentions of the victorious Allied powers in 1945. Although difficulties pertaining to the reconstruction of a mutually acceptable Germany had no doubt been envisaged, the creation of two separate German states was clearly the unforeseen result of discordant actions taken between 1945 and 1948. Thus the partition of Germany, which had been discussed and rejected by the Allies during the war, occurred because of their failure to agree on how one Germany was to be reconstituted.

Western Policy and Germany

Political Aims and Objectives: The Western decision of 1948 to create an independent German state within its occupation zones was motivated by balance of power requirements in Europe. The Soviet consolidation of power in Eastern Europe and its efforts to spread Communist influence in

¹⁴The Petersburg Protocol was the first bilateral agreement between the Western powers and the new West German state. It conferred prestige upon the Adenauer regime by recognizing it as an equal before the German state had been restored complete sovereignty. See Richard Hiscocks, Democracy in Western Germany, (London, 1957), p. 51.

Germany threatened the political and military equilibrium in Europe. If the Western powers were going to forestall Soviet hegemony in Europe they had to enlist the active collaboration of the nearly fifty million Germans who resided in their occupation zones. German power was of vital importance to the Western effort to contain the Soviet drive for European domination. Western diplomacy has aimed consistently since 1948 at the re-generation of German power within the framework of the Western bloc, and at the assumption by the German Federal Republic of increasing burdens and responsibilities as part of the Western alliance system.

The immediate consequence of the Western decision to build that part of Germany which was under its control into an integral unit of the emerging Western bloc was the de facto partition of Germany. The Soviet creation of the German Democratic Republic in the territory under its control was the Russian response to the West. The integration of Eastern Germany into the Communist bloc has proceeded pari passu with the integration of Western Germany into the Western bloc. German hopes for national unity have declined year by year as the de facto partition of Germany became the basis for the maintenance of an equilibrium of power between the Western and Communist blocs in Europe. In compensation, West Germany has been raised to respected status and ever-increasing influence within the Western bloc, and the Western powers have agreed to support German national aspirations vis-a-vis the Communist bloc. The price which the Communist bloc has been called upon to pay for a negotiated modus vivendi in Europe that will relieve it from Western pressures, and which constitutes the quid pro quo of West German collaboration within the Western bloc, is the liquidation of the Communist regime in East Germany, the restoration to the German inhabitants of East Germany of political

liberty, and the evacuation by the Russians and the Poles of those territories which formed part of Germany under the Versailles Treaty. Thus, the Western powers exchanged a promise to make common cause with the West German state in applying relentless pressure upon the Communist bloc until West German territorial aspirations have been achieved, in return for a West German commitment to join the Western alliance and share the burden of containing Soviet power in Europe. This agreement between the West German state and the Western bloc, which mobilized German power to serve Western interests in the Cold War, was not regarded as essentially incompatible with the goals of the containment policy, particularly after containment was interpreted to achieve the eventual expulsion of Soviet power and influence from Eastern Europe and restore the status quo ante bellum to that region.

Western espousal of West Germany's revisionist aspirations coincides with the revisionist orientation of Western bloc policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in Europe. It is difficult to say whether the major Western powers, particularly the United States, realize that should such a policy goal be successful and a powerful united Germany be re-established, the Western powers might be faced again with an uncontrollable Germany. It is likewise difficult to ascertain whether American policy is "really" bent on "rolling back" Soviet power and influence in Eastern Europe, or in terminating the de facto partition of Germany. It is obviously necessary for the United States and its Western allies to assert the aim of restoring to the West German state the boundaries which existed prior to 1938 in order to keep the West Germans within the Western alliance. Should the Western powers openly abandon this commitment to the West Germans, the latter might seek a direct accommodation with the Soviet bloc on terms which

could imperil the viability of the European balance of power.

Proposals and Policies: The first three years following the end of the war (1945-1948) may be characterized as the early formative period of Western policy regarding the restoration of German unity. Also during this period, American efforts to achieve the reconstitution of democratic government in Germany as a whole, and in the American zone of occupation in particular, greatly influenced the future character of political parties in West Germany. Along with these efforts came some of the first pronouncements of United States and Allied policy regarding German reunification, many of which have found their way into the programs of certain political parties in the Federal Republic. In analyzing certain of these pronouncements, attention will be drawn to their adoption or elaboration by the German party leaders.

Following the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in April and May, 1946, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin pointed out the growing divergence of Soviet and Western policies in Germany. He emphasized the economic and political problems which were resulting from the lack of cooperation and the failure of the Soviet Union to participate in a common policy.¹⁵ Such comments grew in number as policy coordination was increasingly subordinated to power politics.

Secretary of State James Byrnes made the first major restatement of United States policy toward post-war Germany in Stuttgart, Germany, a few months later. Byrnes' address warned against the danger of allowing Germany to become a "pawn in a military struggle for power between the East and the West" and called for the restoration of self-government to

¹⁵Von Oppen, p. 141.

the German nation as a whole.¹⁶ This latter request was backed up with an outline of the recommended procedure to be followed in establishing a central German government.

The United States plan contained reference to the establishment of a provisional government for Germany, composed of representatives from the various states and provinces. This projected German National Council was to take charge of governmental affairs on an ad hoc basis and draft a federal constitution for Germany. The constitution was to be submitted first to a constituent assembly and then to the people for final approval.¹⁷

No mention was made of the one item which later proved insurmountable in conferences between the East and the West. This issue, the conduct and supervision of elections, has since become the sine qua non of Western and Federal Republic reunification proposals and has been further qualified by the CDU position that there must be a period of adjustment to new conditions before elections can be held. This advocacy of a breathing spell is designed to afford the "terrorized population" of the Soviet zone an opportunity to acquaint itself with the changed situation and create the right "atmosphere of freedom" in the Soviet zone before holding elections.¹⁸

At the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in November and December, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall further set forth

¹⁶Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1959, pp. 35-42.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Bundesministerium fuer Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, Die Bemuehungen der Bundesrepublik um Wiederherstellung der Einheit Deutschlands durch gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, (Bonn, 1952), pp. 30-1: As phrased by Chancellor Adenauer in his speech before the Bundestag of March 9, 1951, ". . . die rechtlichen und psychologischen Voraussetzungen fuer die Abhaltung freier Wahlen."

the Western position. Marshall connected German unity with the "free movement of goods, persons and ideas throughout Germany" and pointed out the futility of negotiating an agreement on Germany in the absence of such freedom.¹⁹ The United States statement concluded by attributing the disruption of German unity to the "policies and practices of the occupying powers."²⁰ Such self-criticism as this was not overlooked by German political leaders. Several years later Chancellor Adenauer stated that "the partition of Germany has come about not because of any internal German dissension, but because of a conflict among the four great powers."²¹ The same argument has been used by the other German political parties as a convenient political mattress to justify their paucity of accomplishments in German reunification.

At the conclusion of the London session, British Foreign Secretary Bevin commented on the danger of establishing an overly centralized German government, and announced that Britain would not support any plan for unity which would result in an "unrepresentative and bogus" German government.²² In this connection the CDU, in 1946 and 1947, stressed the fact that its program was firmly in support of a federalized all-German state. During the same period the Social Democratic Party (SPD) generally seemed to favor a unitary system of government, although it was willing to make

¹⁹Von Oppen, p. 263.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Cf. Konrad Adenauer, World Indivisible, (tr. Richard and Clara Winston), (New York, 1955), p. 105: Adenauer went on to say that, "It follows therefore that Germany is vitally interested in an easing of the East-West conflict and the establishment of conditions under which the four great powers can come to an agreement concerning German unity."

²²Von Oppen, p. 267.

concessions to Bavarian federalism.²³

On June 9, 1948, Secretary of State Marshall issued a statement of United States policy regarding the recommendations of the London Six-Power Conference. He expressed the belief that the problem of German unity could be resolved expeditiously if the recommendations were accepted by the Soviet Union and applied to Germany as a whole. This attitude was later reflected at the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers which met in May and June, 1949. It was proposed by the West that the East zone accept the Basic Law of the Federal Republic and the subsequent establishment of a four-power occupation statute. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky rejected this proposal and countered with a plan designed to allow various organized groups in the East zone more participation in the formation of all-German government. Secretary of State Acheson dismissed this counter-proposal with a restatement of the Western view that the Basic Law could and should readily be extended to Germany as a whole.²⁴

Although he advocated this extension, Acheson had made it quite clear a month earlier that any solution to the German problem would have to conform to arrangements prevailing in West Germany at that time. He stated that:

"The people of West Germany may rest assured that this Government will agree to no general solution for Germany into which the basic safeguards and benefits of the existing Western German arrangements would not be absorbed. They may rest assured that until such a solution can be achieved,

²³United States War Department, Office of Military Governor of Germany, Political Activity, (Monthly Report of the Military Governor, US Zone), No. 12 (July 20, 1946).

²⁴Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany, (New York, 1959), pp. 251-2.

this Government will continue to lend vigorous support to the development of the West German program."²⁵

It appears obvious that the "benefits of the existing arrangements" were and are totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union. As for continuing the "development of the West German program," it is likewise worth noting that this policy has been exercised to the fullest advantage of the CDU. That party has occupied the fortuitous position of political leadership which helped carry out the policy and profited from its execution.

The policy of the Western powers toward the newly-created Federal Republic was again set forth on September 19, 1950, at a meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers. The statement of policy closely paralleled the official view of the Federal Republic. It emphasized the legitimacy of the Federal Republic vis-a-vis the Democratic Republic, declaring the former to be "the only German government freely and legitimately constituted."²⁶ The Foreign Ministers also gave pledges that any attack upon the Federal Republic would be considered an attack upon the Western powers themselves.

The Communist bloc countries, including the German Democratic Republic, met at Prague in October, 1950. A set of proposals were drafted regarding the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the achievement of German unity, in that order. Secretary of State Acheson commented on the Communist proposals of October 25 by rejecting any conclusion of a peace treaty prior to the establishment of a "unified democratic national government" for Germany.²⁷ Acheson's statement

²⁵United States Department of State (hereafter referred to as U. S. Dept. of State), The Current Situation in Germany, Publ. No. 3506, European and British Commonwealth Series (May, 1949).

²⁶Cf. Bathurst, pp. 111-12.

²⁷Von Oppen, p. 534.

specifically stated that Western support was firmly behind the views of Chancellor Adenauer and the Federal Republic.²⁸ This Western attitude of referring to the Federal Republic on matters relating to reunification worked to the political advantage of the Government party. CDU politicians could point to the fact that the Western powers were fully cognizant of and in sympathy with the views of the Federal Government.

The attitude of the United States during the period between the Petersburg Protocol and the Berlin Conference of 1954 was mainly one of holding the line in Germany by reiterating the Western position set forth on the occasion of the Prague Resolutions. More and more emphasis was placed on the role of the Federal Republic in bringing about reunification, usually revolving around the theme that the strength of the Federal Republic lay in its acceptance of democratic principles which would triumph in the end. United States policy also became more assertive regarding the security issues at stake in Germany and stressed the "alert and uncompromising" position of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.²⁹ During the same period the Soviet Union also began to emphasize the role of the Democratic Republic in achieving reunification, but the means it proposed, direct negotiations between East and West Germany, were much less naive than the moralistic Western line that "democracy would triumph."

In view of Soviet propaganda charging the United States with perpetuating the division of Germany, American policy became more vocal in defending its position. Blaming the Soviet Union for the failure to conclude

²⁸Ibid., p. 534.

²⁹U. S. Dept. of State, The Future of Germany, Publ. No. 3779, European and British Commonwealth Series (February, 1950).

a definitive peace treaty, the United States openly stated its intention to give the Federal Republic increased support in offsetting the pressure of communism. Western policy also became concerned with launching appeals to the Germans in the Democratic Republic. The United States stated its intention and obligation to "restore to these people, by peaceful means, the same rights and liberties which their fellow citizens in the West enjoy today."³⁰ When Chancellor Adenauer visited the United States in 1953, the Chancellor and President Eisenhower issued a joint communique which called for "sustained common efforts" and reiterated the Western demand for free elections in the Democratic Republic.³¹

Seeking to break the deadlock on German unity, the four-power Berlin Conference was held January 25 to February 18, 1954. From the standpoint of accomplishments the conference was of little significance. However, the positions taken by the Western powers and the Soviet Union, respectively, set forth the limits of compromise which persist to the present. The Western proposals were set forth by British Foreign Secretary Eden. Eden's plan of German reunification proposed five steps:

- I. Free elections throughout Germany.
- II. The convocation of a National Assembly resulting from those elections.
- III. The drafting of a Constitution and the preparation of peace treaty negotiations.
- IV. The adoption of the Constitution and the formation of an all-German government responsible for the negotiation of the peace treaty.

³⁰U. S. Dept. of State, Germany Today and Tomorrow, Publ. No. 4655, European and British Commonwealth Series (July, 1952).

³¹Press Office, German Diplomatic Mission, Washington, D. C., Collected Speeches, Statements, Press, Radio and TV Interviews by Dr. Konrad Adenauer, (New York, 1953), p. 46: The material herein stems from the Chancellor's visit to the United States and Canada, April 6-8, 1953.

V. The signature and entry into force of the peace treaty.³²

Eden stressed the importance of free and impartial elections. A uniform electoral law was to be prepared by the four occupying powers along the lines of the existing electoral laws of the Federal Bundestag and the East German Volkskammer.

Eden's plan was not a serious departure from previous Western proposals, although it did drop certain qualifications which had previously been placed on the supervision of any all-German elections; the plan did not insist on the participation of neutral supervisors. Instead, the four powers were to form a Supervisory Commission and admit neutrals at their discretion. The Commission was to draft the all-German electoral law and supervise the resulting elections. Significantly, the Eden plan provided for decision by majority vote in the Supervisory Commission. Such a procedure, allowing no use of a veto, was obviously unacceptable to the Soviet Union in view of the three-to-one Western majority.

The Eden plan was careful to clarify the international rights of the envisaged new all-German government. The plan provided that:

The all-German government shall have authority to assume the international rights and obligations of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone of Germany and to conclude such other international agreements as it may wish.³³

Again, such a provision was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, since the greater influence of the West German parties would presumably cause an all-German government to favor membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

³²Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1959, pp. 115-17.

³³Ibid.

In replying to the Eden proposals, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov made little mention of free elections and, in fact, refused to recognize the Eden plan.³⁴ Molotov proposed that the two German states enter into direct negotiations and work out their own solution of the unification problem. He was concerned mainly with blocking German participation in the proposed European Defense Community.

The United States position at the Berlin Conference was succinctly stated by Secretary of State Dulles. Dulles backed the Eden reunification proposals and stressed the unequivocal position of the United States on the necessity of free elections. The Soviet proposal that East and West Germany negotiate directly was categorically rejected. Dulles' statement drew a comparison between Germany and Korea and emphasized the point that there would be no American withdrawal of forces from Germany under the prevailing situation. The disruption of German unity was described as "a division between those who have been absorbed and the others who do not want to be absorbed."³⁵ The statement by the Secretary of State also indicated the increasing participation of the Federal Republic as a "silent partner" at great power negotiations. Dulles stated that:

"We were constantly in contact with the Government and political leaders of the Federal Republic and we knew that they did not want us to buy German unity at the price of making Germany a Soviet satellite."³⁶

CDU campaigning in the 1957 election by no means overlooked such remarks,

³⁴Cf. Horne, pp. 341-2.

³⁵U. S. Dept. of State, Our Policy for Germany, Publ. No. 5408, European and British Commonwealth Series (March, 1954), p. 24.

³⁶Ibid., p. 28.

and Government leaders were quick to exploit the resultant strengthening of the Federal Republic's position.³⁷

After the dreary conclusion of the Berlin Conference events moved rapidly. Western restoration of German sovereignty followed as a logical outcome of the Western admission of the reunification deadlock. The Nine-Power Conference held in London from September 28 to October 3, 1954, followed by a conference of the Western Foreign Ministers held in Paris, October 20-23, paved the way for the restoration of West German sovereignty in May, 1955. France, Great Britain and the United States declared on October 3, 1954, as they had previously stated in 1949 when the Federal Republic was created, that the restoration of West Germany sovereignty in no way sanctified the permanent division of Germany. Ostensibly, the question of German reunification was to remain a responsibility of the original occupying powers.³⁸ The restoration of West German sovereignty, however, clearly destroyed the fiction that Germany (except for Berlin) remained a responsibility of the former occupying powers. The changed legal status of West Germany, followed by a Soviet clarification of East German prerogatives, resulted in the definitive de jure partition of Germany into separate independent states.

The Heads of Government of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France met at Geneva in July, 1955, but were unable to reach any concrete agreement on German reunification. A directive was issued to their respective foreign ministers, expressing four-power

³⁷Cf. U. W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, (Oxford, 1960), pp. 249.-51.

³⁸Cf. Bathurst, pp. 170-1.

recognition of a "common responsibility"³⁹ with respect to the German question. Several conferences were held during the succeeding years but no new policy was officially promoted by the West.

Evaluation: An official United States 1955 summary of American policy for the preceding decade attributed the continued division of Germany to the Soviet Union's desire to make reunification a "bargaining point and a political bomb," and reaffirmed the United States policy of "negotiation from strength."⁴⁰ The recent preoccupation of Western leaders with the Berlin issue has tended to further emphasize the relationship of the entire German question to the balance of power situation in the world today. Soviet reunification proposals seek the military neutralization of any united German state and the Western powers adamantly refuse any plan which would weaken the NATO shield.

The various ramifications of United States policy toward Germany, such as the refusal to accord de jure recognition to the Democratic Republic, are in agreement with and stem from the general policy of containment.⁴¹ Regarding recognition, American spokesmen have maintained

³⁹This expression of "common responsibility" has since been held by the Western powers to constitute implicit Soviet recognition of its incumbent responsibilities and obligations regarding German reunification and, specifically, the Berlin situation. The Soviet Union's interpretation of this responsibility has apparently differed from that of the Western powers. The Soviets have sought to discharge this responsibility by continuing to urge direct negotiation between East and West Germany, on the assumption that the existence of two sovereign German states makes such negotiation a necessity and a prerequisite to reunification. The political refusal of the Western powers to recognize the East German state has kept their interpretation of this phrase in line with traditional policy. See the note of the British Government to the Government of the Soviet Union, December 31, 1958: Great Britain, Foreign Office, Germany No. 1 (1959), Cmnd. 634.

⁴⁰U. S. Dept. of State, The United States and Germany, 1945-1955, Publ. No. 5827, European and British Commonwealth Series (May, 1955).

⁴¹Cf. Franz L. Neumann, "Germany and World Politics," Behind the Headlines, 14 (March, 1954), pp. 5-6.

that such action would constitute a step away from reunification.⁴² Certainly it would be quite incompatible with present Western policy objectives to accept the Soviet proposal that East and West Germany negotiate directly. However, that policy could and perhaps should be changed in view of the serious consequences that would result from an open conflict over disputed rights. The policy of Chancellor Adenauer and the CDU stands adamantly opposed to any such recognition and, in the case of Yugoslav recognition, the West German Government has displayed open hostility toward the recognizing state by severing diplomatic relations.

Regarding the involvement of the present West German Government in such policies as nonrecognition of the Democratic Republic, it appears that the current attention given by the United States to the prevailing attitudes in Bonn has severely bound American policy with respect to German reunification. Since the Western powers have not reciprocated the Soviet Union's recognition of the Democratic Republic, their policy has, at best, been a static one which has resulted in a reduction of the Western political position vis-a-vis that of the Soviet Union. It is difficult enough to negotiate on the German question as a "free agent." It becomes virtually impossible when the limits of compromise are further restricted by political considerations within the Federal Republic.⁴³

⁴²See, for example, James B. Conant, Germany and Freedom, (Cambridge, 1958), p. 103. From the Godkin Lectures at Harvard, 1958.

⁴³For an opinionated, but plainly stated analysis of the current German situation, see Field Marshal Montgomery (of Alamein), An Approach to Sanity, (New York, 1959), pp. 89-94. Montgomery largely attributes to Great Britain the role of mediator and promoter of compromise in offsetting this growing stratification of positions.

United States policy obviously cannot disregard the views of West Germany in any settlement which might be made. There is a strategic need, however, for the Western policy which takes into consideration those objections of the Federal Republic, which are in reality the particular objections of political cliques in the government.

The Western position that the reunification of Germany must precede any general disarmament agreement seems to have been brought about, in part, by the insistence of Chancellor Adenauer.⁴⁴ Similarly, the emphasis on the creation of a "United Europe" going hand in hand with the reunification of Germany has been heavily influenced by the policy of Adenauer. The personal feelings of the Chancellor notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that if the unification of Europe must precede or accompany the unification of Germany, there will be a divided Germany for a long time to come. CDU political leaders, however national-minded they might be, cannot fail to see the advantages in perpetuating this aspect of the Chancellor's philosophy after his departure from the Government, if they are unable to achieve reunification on their terms.

There is, further, the possibility that United States policy regarding German reunification is really a negative one, that is, desiring the preservation of the status quo.⁴⁵ The practical effects of Western policy give some validity to this cynical conclusion, although no responsible Western statesmen have ever even intimated this publicly. The consequences of any such admission would be extremely detrimental to the

⁴⁴Cf. Karl Deutsch and Lewis Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers, (Stanford, 1959), pp. 185-6.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 185: "Both sides have certain positive stakes in keeping Germany divided."

Western alliance and to the participation of the German Federal Republic in it. The prestige of the CDU would be seriously undermined by Western repudiation of German national unity.

The persistent Western refusal to compromise with the Soviet bloc on the postwar status quo, and its intransigent demand that the West German state be restored the territories of the Third Reich as of 1937 at the expense of Soviet and Polish national interests, is totally unrealistic when one considers the present balance of power in Europe and the world. A similar indictment can also be raised against the Adenauer Government and the CDU. If the Western powers and the Adenauer Government are, in fact, only pursuing the policy of European revisionism verbally in order to beguile the German electorate and utilize the Germans as an instrument of the containment policy in Europe, then Western diplomacy must be credited with outstanding brilliance and success.

Soviet Policy and Germany

Political Aims and Objectives: The primary objective of Soviet policy towards Germany has been the same as that of the Western powers in principle. Like the West, the Soviet Union has adamantly opposed the re-establishment of a powerful German state which might affect the current balance of power to its disadvantage. The Soviet Union, naturally, would prefer a "friendly," i.e., pro-Soviet all-German state. This could be accomplished by the extension of the prevailing economic and social system in East Germany to a reunified Germany. Since the imposition of Communist rule on the whole of Germany is presently impossible, the Soviet Union proposes to first neutralize Germany, and thereby reduce the relative power position of the Western bloc in Europe. The neutralization of Germany and the weakening of the West would give preponderance in Europe to the

Communist bloc and permit it to achieve in time the absorption of Germany into its system of power. By dominating all of Germany, the Communist bloc would be able to finally achieve total hegemony over Europe. Thus, the neutralization of Germany constitutes the first step of the Soviet's objective of achieving European hegemony. The minimal objective of current Soviet policy vis-a-vis Germany, in the event neither of its other goals can be achieved within the near future, is to force the West to recognize the partition of Germany and the legitimacy of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. If the Soviet Union can extract Western recognition of the de facto status quo in Germany and Eastern Europe, the Western alliance would be seriously undermined by the inevitable popular reaction against the CDU leadership in the German Federal Republic. Popular disenchantment with the Western powers and the CDU would certainly result from any "betrayal" of German national aspirations. The Soviet Union could then offer to restore unity to the German nation at a price which would guarantee Germany's neutralization and friendship. In time, the Soviet Union could hope to absorb Germany into its own bloc in consequence of the weakening of the Western bloc. Soviet aims toward Germany bear great resemblance to those of the United States--they seek to revise the European balance of power and establish hegemony by securing political control over Germany. In exercising the means to accomplish such objectives, the Soviet Union has been far more aggressive and pragmatic than the Western powers.

After the emergence of separate German states the Soviet Union de-emphasized four-power action in favor of direct negotiations between the East and West German states on the basis of equality. The Soviet Union has consistently upheld the principle of German reunification but has, since 1954, taken the position that the two German states must reach their

own modus vivendi. Soviet advocacy of direct German negotiations is, of course, designed to insure Communist participation and influence in any all-German government which might be established by an East-West agreement on Germany. These proposed negotiations are in keeping with Soviet policy since 1955, for the Soviet Union recognizes the German Federal Republic as well as the German Democratic Republic. Soviet support of German reunification through four-power negotiation was maintained only so long as this could be fitted into Soviet security policy in Europe and did not endanger the post-war balance of power.

The Soviet Union, unlike the Western powers, may unilaterally grant reunification at any time it chooses. That it has not chosen to do so is indicative of the fact that the Western proposals have been completely contrary to Soviet security requirements.⁴⁶ The most desirable outcome of German reunification for the Soviet Union would be the inclusion of Germany in the Eastern bloc. Fears of continued West German membership in the NATO alliance have prompted the Soviet Union to compromise on this ideal objective. Recent Soviet proposals have sought to obtain the complete military neutralization of an all-German state. These have usually taken the form of a peace treaty provision to prohibit the participation of Germany in any alliance directed against one of the former Allied powers.

The Soviet Union has generally been more forthright than the Western powers in its policy approach. There exist, after all, two sovereign

⁴⁶For an excellent analysis of the political factors inherent within the German problem, see Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Problem of German Reunification," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 330 (July, 1960), pp. 124-32. Morgenthau well illustrates the advantageous position of the Soviet Union in this respect and goes on to state that, "Germany cannot, at present, be unified."

German states which cannot be dismantled as easily as they were created. Soviet policy has realistically proceeded from this basis and the Soviet reunification proposals, although intended to obtain optimum results for Soviet security and power standing, have been geared to utilize the situation as it is.

Proposals and Policies: The period between the creation of the German Democratic Republic and the Berlin Conference of 1954 was essentially one of further consolidation of power in East Germany by the Soviet Union. The fear of some Western and German statesmen that Germany might suffer the same fate as Korea does not seem to have been justifiable under the circumstances. The Soviets had become well aware of the limits of Western patience during the Berlin Blockade. There could have been no doubt as to the consequences of an East German war of "liberation." The Soviet Union, at that time, was not in a position to accept those consequences.

While the "hot" war raged in Korea, the deadlock over German unity was largely limited to propagandistic statements and Communist avowals of the "peace-loving" policy of the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union.⁴⁷ At the same time the Federal Republic was bitterly assailed in the Soviet press. It was, for example, depicted as the government of a "fascist-type clique placed at the head of the so-called West German state by Anglo-American imperialism."⁴⁸ Chancellor Adenauer was subjected to considerable personal abuse, and was characterized as a "puppet," kept in power only by the use of American force.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Pravda, November 7, 1949. Cited in the Communist Perspective (Anonymous publication), p. 592.

⁴⁸Pravda, January 24, 1950: Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, Current Digest of the Soviet Press (hereafter referred to as Current Digest), 2, No. 5 (March 18, 1950), p. 28.

⁴⁹Pravda, March 30, 1950: Current Digest, 2, No. 13 (May 13, 1950), pp. 24-25.

A major indication of Soviet policy during this period was contained in the Prague Resolutions of October, 1950, which were mainly concerned with preventing the rearmament of West Germany.⁵⁰ The Soviet draft treaty of 1952 further set forth this objective of removing Germany from any possible anti-Soviet coalition. The draft treaty contained a provision that Germany was not to enter any coalitions or military alliances "directed against any power which took part with its armed forces in the war against Germany."⁵¹ The reply of the United States to this proposal clearly indicated the incompatibility of Soviet and Western policies:

"The United States Government considers that the all-German Government should be free both before and after the conclusion of a peace treaty to enter into associations compatible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations."⁵²

The Soviet attitude toward West German political parties during this period was extremely critical, repudiating their validity and programs, and relegating them to the status of mere "mouthpieces" for the Western powers. The CDU, naturally, received the heaviest criticism as the Government party. Also severe, however, was the Soviet attitude toward the SPD. The large number of Social Democrats who had refused to cooperate

⁵⁰Cf. von Oppen, p. 527. Given first priority in the recommendations of the Communist Bloc conference was a request that the Western powers, together with the Soviet Union, publish a statement that they would not "permit the remilitarization of Germany, nor permit it to be drawn into any kind of aggressive plans"

⁵¹Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1959, pp. 85-87, "Note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American Embassy, Enclosing Draft for a German Peace Treaty, March 10, 1952." See also Pravda, March 12, 1952: Current Digest, 4, No. 8 (April 5, 1952), p. 3.

⁵²Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1959, pp. 87-88, "Note from the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Regarding the Soviet Draft of a German Peace Treaty."

with the Socialist Unity Party of East Germany were denounced as traitors to the cause of socialism, and the SPD was accused of desiring the continued division of Germany. A 1952 editorial in Pravda well illustrated the Soviet attitude by the title alone: "The Schumacherites--Miserable Flunkeys of the Warmongers." The article accused Schumacher and his followers of only pretending to oppose the Adenauer Government when they were actually in full agreement with Adenauer's intentions to "suppress the patriotic movement of the people . . . for a German peace treaty."⁵³ The West German Social Democrats, quite experienced in verbal warfare, replied in kind.

The position that the Soviet Union took at the Berlin Conference in 1954 was already indicated in 1953 by a joint communique issued following negotiations between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. This communique stated that:

"For the restoration of the national unity of Germany on the basis of peaceful, democratic foundations, a provisional all-German government must be set up by means of a direct agreement between Eastern and Western Germany. Its main task will be the preparation and carrying out of all-German free elections, as a result of which the German people alone, without interference from foreign states, will settle the question of the state regime (the social and administrative structure) of a united, democratic and peace-loving Germany."⁵⁴

Clearly, the Soviet Union envisioned a proto-Communistic or "people's democratic social and administrative structure" to insure a "democratic and peace-loving" reunified Germany.

The Berlin Conference of 1954 represented for the Soviet Union, as

⁵³Pravda, June 16, 1952: Current Digest, 4, No. 24 (July 26, 1952), pp. 17-18.

⁵⁴Von Oppen, pp. 592-4.

it did for the Western powers, the final positions on the German question; subsequent proposals have been either a repetition of the 1954 discussions or only a slight modification of these. Irrespective of whether the Soviet Union actually intended at the Berlin Conference to achieve German reunification, the Conference was greatly publicized by the Soviets and was utilized as a propaganda sounding board. Various mass appeals were organized within East Germany, and petitions were circulated among the populace, evidencing "support" for the Soviet proposals.⁵⁵

The proposals of the Soviet Union were largely similar to those incorporated in the Soviet draft treaty of 1952. In view of the agreements made by the Western Foreign Ministers in Paris the previous October, Molotov's proposals were primarily concerned with preventing the inclusion of the Federal Republic in the Western alliance. As in 1952, the Soviet Union wanted assurances that an all-German state would not participate in any alliance directed against any of the former Allied powers. Unlike the Eden plan, the Soviet proposals provided for the withdrawal of all armed forces of the occupying powers within one year after the conclusion of a peace treaty. All foreign military bases were to be given up simultaneously. The Molotov proposals also differed from the Eden plan regarding the formation of a provisional all-German government and the method of conducting elections. The Soviet plan called for the provisional government to be formed by fusing the East and West German parliaments, and also provided for the "wide participation of democratic organizations."⁵⁶ The Soviet Union made no provision for either a four-power electoral commission

⁵⁵Cf. Horne, pp. 335-6.

⁵⁶Heinrich von Siegler, The Reunification and Security of Germany, (Bonn, 1957), p. 86.

or a commission of neutrals. It left the preparation of an electoral law to the provisional government, as well as the supervision and control of the elections. Both of these provisions were completely unacceptable to the Western powers. They feared that the Communists would engineer the elections in favor of an all-German "people's democracy."

It should be pointed out, however, that the Soviet Union later indicated its willingness to reconsider the Eden proposals. This occurred on October 23, 1954, at the conclusion of the Paris Conference. The Soviet statement to this effect was obviously intended to forestall Western implementation of the Paris Agreements and prevent the accession of the Federal Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Soviet note to the three Western powers specifically warned that the execution of the Paris decisions would "render the re-establishment of Germany's unity impossible for a long time to come."⁵⁷

Shortly after the termination of the Berlin Conference, the Soviet Union clarified the status of the German Democratic Republic. The Democratic Republic was given the freedom to decide on internal and external affairs, including the matter of relations with West Germany.⁵⁸ The Democratic Republic immediately proclaimed its willingness to negotiate with representatives of West Germany. Such apparent readiness on the part of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic to negotiate directly with West Germany has served valuable propaganda aims. The adamant refusal of the Federal Republic to recognize or negotiate with the Democratic Republic unavoidably creates, especially in certain neutralist areas subjected

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 87.

⁵⁸Von Oppen, pp. 597-8.

to Soviet "peace dove" propaganda, the impression that the Bonn Government is not sincerely interested in reunification.

Soviet policy toward West Germany was abruptly changed in 1955, when the Soviet Union extended an invitation for Chancellor Adenauer to visit Moscow. Adenauer's visit in September, 1955 resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, and also secured the release of several thousand German prisoners of war. The Soviet press generally commented favorably on the visit of the West German Chancellor and openly stated that the establishment of relations would "help settle" the problem of German unity.⁵⁹

The Soviet willingness to establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic was in sharp contrast with its earlier position, which had held the Bonn Government to be no more than a "puppet" regime. The change in policy can possibly be attributed to the Soviet desire to "finalize" the division of Germany by recognizing both the East and the West Governments. Also, the Soviet Union could appear as the "true" promoter of German reunification and evidence the Soviet desire to meet the Western powers halfway. These two factors are not as contradictory as they seem, since the Soviet Union, by recognizing both governments, could more effectively urge direct negotiation between them. It is doubtful whether the Soviet Union expected the Western powers to follow its lead and recognize the Democratic Republic.

The rapprochement between West Germany and the Soviet Union did not, however, bring about a corresponding modus vivendi between the two Germanies. Neither did it detract from the Federal Republic's reliance

⁵⁹Cf. Pravda, September 14, 1955: Current Digest, 7, No. 37 (October 26, 1955), p. 32.

on the Western powers. An exchange of notes between Bulganin and Adenauer in 1957 indicated Soviet dissatisfaction with the still uncompromising West German policy. Bulganin stated that: ". . . a reunification of Germany presupposes negotiations and agreements between the two German Governments and, in fact, there is no other way to achieve this end."⁶⁰

The position of the Soviet Union remained unchanged at the Geneva "Summit" Conference of 1955, despite Western speculation that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic was a harbinger of possible Soviet compromise. The Western proposals were essentially a restatement of the 1954 Eden plan and, as before, were unacceptable to the Soviet Union. An evaluation of the Geneva Conference which appeared in the Soviet press well illustrated the position of the Soviet Union and is a forthright statement of the current Soviet attitude:

"The representatives of the three Western powers supported the Paris agreement providing for the remilitarization of West Germany and her inclusion in the Western military grouping. Thus they did not hide the fact that they see a united Germany only as a part of this grouping. It is clear that the Soviet Union could not and cannot agree to such a point of view for it is quite clear that it does not meet the interests of European security, or of the security of the Soviet Union."⁶¹

The Grotewohl Plan for the creation of a German Confederation was enunciated in July, 1957, but contained nothing that was a departure from the broad Soviet policy of promoting direct East-West negotiations. Grotewohl's plan was essentially one of retaining the two separate economic and political systems of East and West Germany, while providing

⁶⁰Edgar Alexander, Adenauer and the New Germany, (New York, 1957), pp. 254-5.

⁶¹Pravda, August 5, 1955: Current Digest, 7, No. 29 (August 31, 1955), pp. 13-20. Emphasis mine.

for certain mutual policies and a loose all-German confederation. Such a confederation was to receive the sanction of an international agreement.⁶² The plan specifically provided for the withdrawal of West Germany from NATO and of East Germany from the Warsaw Pact. In August, 1957, Soviet Premier Khrushchev supported the Grotewohl proposals in an address before the East German Parliament in Berlin. Neither the Federal Republic nor the Western powers considered the proposals.

Evaluation: The policy of the Soviet Union may be divided historically into two periods. The first period, from 1945 to 1949, was one of aggressive consolidation of power in East Germany and open attempts to force the Western powers from their position in Berlin. Confronted with strong Western resistance during the Berlin Blockade, the Soviet Union relaxed its employment of forceful means and resorted to a more subtle policy based on the utilization of the status quo, namely the two German states. There are presently indications that the Soviet Union may be returning to the policy pursued during the first phase. The actions of the Soviet Union since 1958 have grown increasingly more aggressive, especially with respect to the Western presence in Berlin.

Soviet attempts to bring about direct negotiations between East and West Germany have met with no success. This has occurred despite the fact that the Soviet Union unilaterally accorded de jure recognition to the Federal Republic in 1955. Unable to successfully promote an East-West German rapprochement, the Soviet Union, by virtue of its steadily

⁶²See Heinrich von Sieglar, Dokumentation zur Deutschlandfrage, (Bonn, 1959), p. 668. According to Grotewohl, his plan was a "concrete" way to accomplish "die Bildung eines Staatenbundes zwischen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der Deutschen Bundesrepublik auf der Basis eines voelkerrechtlichen Vertrages."

increasing position of power vis-a-vis the United States, may conclude a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic and declare itself absolved of all further responsibilities with respect to Germany which were incurred during and after World War II. Separate action by the Soviet Union would presumably be taken only if it were felt that such a step would not ipso facto mean war with the Western bloc.

Maintenance of the status quo in Germany is for the Soviet Union, as it is for the Western powers, a static policy which makes the best of an uneasy situation. Neither side would prefer the perpetuation of a divided Germany if it were possible that one or the other, by virtue of a preponderance of power, could dictate reunification terms which would bring a fully reunified Germany into its alliance system. So long as the present equilibrium in Europe continues, four-power diplomacy will postpone the solution of the question of German reunification.

CHAPTER II

THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (CDU) AND THE REUNIFICATION ISSUE

The Formulation of Party Policy

Party Characteristics: The end of World War II found the political structure in Germany in a state of utter chaos. Quite apart from the disastrous effects of the war, the twelve years of Nazi rule had resulted in the proscription of all political parties in Germany other than that of the National Socialist Party itself. Political leadership was thus diffused and disrupted. The Western occupation powers at first found it exceedingly difficult to enlist the support of responsible political groups. The United States Military Government in Germany did not actively promote and sanction the organization of political groups and parties until after the Potsdam Protocol in August, 1945.¹ Between May and August the Soviet occupation officials had already sanctioned the zonal organization of four political parties.² The Western occupational amalgamation

¹Article II.9.(ii) of the Potsdam Protocol provided that "all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany." The first authorization by the United States for the formation of political parties in the American zone of occupation was given in a directive issued on August 27, 1945. For a description of political evolution in West Germany during this early period, see U. S. Dept. of State, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany (hereafter referred to as U. S. High Commissioner), State and Local Government in West Germany, 1945-1953 (1953).

²These four were the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic Party. In 1946 the Communist and Social Democratic parties were fused into one, the Socialist Unity Party.

programs of bi-zonia and tri-zonia compensated somewhat for this early Soviet lead in political organization, as the operation and efficacy of parties in West Germany were geographically facilitated.

The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was organized in 1946. Although partially a descendent of the old Catholic Center Party, which had been dissolved in 1933, the CDU was organized on a broader basis and designed to afford more of an appeal to a heterogeneous electorate. Established as a Christian party, the CDU encompassed Protestants as well as Catholics. The latter, however, have constituted a preponderant majority of the membership, especially in certain areas of southern Germany. A Bavarian affiliate of the party is known as the Christian Social Union (CSU), accounting for the official dual designation of the party, the CDU-CSU. Inasmuch as the affiliate CSU is highly parochial and largely limited to Bavarian domestic politics, this Chapter is hereafter concerned only with the CDU.

Certain factors peculiar to the founding of the CDU have had considerable influence on the party's foreign policy approach. As early as 1946, the broad outlines of the party's Western orientation were already established. The present Chancellor of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer, was most influential in determining the framework within which the CDU, as the Government party after 1949, formulated its Aussenpolitik. There was no disagreement among party leaders in 1946 as to the desirability of cooperation with the Western powers. Despite the fact that a CDU group was organized in the Soviet zone in June, 1945, party officials unanimously rejected any orientation of Germany to the East. There were, however, differences of opinion as to which of the Western powers should be most courted. Dr. Schlange-Schoeningen, an influential party leader, favored CDU reliance on Great Britain, especially with respect to foreign

policy matters. On the other hand, Dr. Adenauer and his group stressed the necessity of reaching an immediate accord with France, the traditional enemy, in order to insure continental solidarity. Prominent in Adenauer's thinking was the rectification of outstanding Franco-German enmities. To this end, the "concept of Europe" appeared in 1946 and has continued to dominate CDU foreign policy in general and reunification proposals specifically.³

In contrast to early foreign policy assertions by the Social Democrats, the CDU generally appeared to take more of a realistic viewpoint and recognized the impossibility of accomplishing any foreign policy objectives while Germany still remained under stern occupation. The main emphasis of the CDU was on "peaceful cooperation" with other nations to overcome the exigencies of the times.⁴ This early advocacy of European accord and consensus has been consistently maintained in the bases of CDU policy on the reunification question.

For CDU leaders the issue of reunification was already a cause for concern by 1947. A meeting held in Berlin prior to the London Conference of Foreign Ministers was attended by several prominent Christian Democrats who later received positions in the Adenauer Government. A resolution issued at the conclusion of the meeting contained the following demands:

". . . the participation of responsible and expert representatives of the German people in the preparation and conclusion

³Cf. Hans G. Wieck, Die Entstehung der CDU und die Wiedergruendung des Zentrums im Jahre 1945, (Bonn, 1953), p. 225.

⁴Cf. Wolfgang Treue, Deutsche Parteiprogramme, 1861-1956, (Goettingen, 1956), p. 185. From the Programm der Christlich-Demokratischen Union der britischen Zone, Neheim-Huesten, March 1, 1946.

of a peace treaty is indispensable. The German people demand that they be regarded as a political entity. They demand that a statute be adopted to regulate the relationships between the occupation powers and Germany as a whole."⁵

CDU participation in making such "demands" was, of course, entirely informal. On the whole, the Christian Democrats were officially quiescent with respect to Western policy and actions.

It should be pointed out, however, that political party restraint was not entirely a matter of comity. The United States Military Government in Germany had always been ill-disposed toward political criticism. Shortly after the conclusion of the London Conference in 1948, several policy directives were set forth which affected the actions of political parties in West Germany. Political parties were given the right to participate in free discussion of issues relevant to the German people and the world as a whole but were forbidden to engage in criticism of Allied decisions as set forth in conferences and in the Control Council. Perhaps the most stringent of these prohibitions did not long stand the test of time: members of German political parties were required to refrain from statements which "spread rumors aimed at disrupting unity amongst the Allies, or which caused distrust and a hostile attitude on the part of the German people toward any of the occupying powers."⁶ The CDU position in this respect was generally cast in a favorable light due to the party's pro-Western orientation. The SPD, on the other hand, did not hesitate to engage in criticism under the leadership of the

⁵Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison, eds., West German Leadership and Foreign Policy, (Evanston, 1957), pp. 16-17.

⁶U. S. Dept. of State, Germany 1947-1949, The Story in Documents, European and British Commonwealth Series, Publ. No. 3556 (March, 1950), p. 160: Title 3, Part 4, Military Government Regulations.

vociferous Kurt Schumacher, who often castigated Allied occupation policies and the divisions they created.

By 1949, then, the Christian Democrats were equipped with a body of viable general principles which were flexible enough to accommodate specific policies when they became the Government party. Under the de facto leadership of Konrad Adenauer⁷ the party was well regarded by the Western occupation authorities and was considered to be democratic and stable. Moreover, the CDU was seen as a party which could be relied on for responsible leadership in the event that reunification could be achieved by four-power agreement. Especially amenable to the Western authorities was the CDU advocacy of a federal state, rather than a unitary or confederated form of government.⁸ The "Christian" characteristics of the party and its distinctly pro-Western orientation were likewise considered to be valuable factors in furthering Western policy aims in Germany. In view of these attributes, the CDU, by 1949, was clearly accorded the "most-favored-party" accolade by the Western powers.

Effect of Electoral Success: The Christian Democratic Party secured approximately 31 percent of the votes cast in the 1949 elections, only slightly more than the support received by the Social Democrats (29 percent). The subsequent election years of 1953 and 1957 greatly increased the CDU vote but the SPD remained approximately the same (only 32 percent in 1957).

⁷The CDU was organized only on a Land level until the first general party congress held at Goslar in October, 1950. Adenauer was elected chairman of the CDU at this congress, thus becoming only at that time the recognized leader of the "national" party organization. Party claims of all-German legitimacy were furthered by the presence of delegates from East Germany and the eastern territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line. Cf. Weymar, pp. 346-7.

⁸See U. S. High Commissioner, Information Bulletin, No. 170 (September 20, 1949), pp. 19-21.

In 1953 the Christian Democrats increased their plurality by approximately 15 percent and, in 1957, they secured a simple majority for the first time (50.2 percent).⁹ Although elected Chancellor by the slim margin of one vote in 1949, Dr. Adenauer was decisively retained in that office after the two succeeding elections. CDU control of the Federal Government, despite temporary setbacks, had obviously met with approval on the part of the electorate. Twelve years of Christian Democratic Government have not, however, brought about the reunification of Germany. Such failure can, from an objective point of view, be attributed to the East-West deadlock and the mutually unacceptable reunification proposals of the Soviet Union and the Western powers. But, quite naturally, the analysis of political opponents rarely attains any degree of objectivity. The CDU has been subjected to bitter criticism by members of the Opposition, chiefly the Social Democratic Party.

Considering the extreme importance of the reunification issue in West German political life, the fact that the Government party has been unable to achieve concrete results necessarily means that the CDU must constantly justify its lack of accomplishment. Even in view of circumstances which have made it virtually impossible for a pro-Western party like the CDU to carry out any acceptable plan of reunification, there can be no carelessness or flippancy in the face of this criticism. However, opposition to the Government's policies has not been entirely detrimental to the CDU.

Despite the possibility of arranging a CDU-SPD Government coalition, the Christian Democrats have not been especially desirous of doing so. Attributing the slim electoral victory in 1949 to a rejection of a planned economy by the people, Chancellor Adenauer stated that it would be thus

⁹Percentages given have been taken from Kitzinger, p. 6.

"undemocratic" to criticize the Government for not including the SPD. Adenauer further stated in 1949 that there was a definite need for an organized opposition.¹⁰ Although SPD criticism has caused the CDU considerable discomfort, it would appear that this same opposition has often facilitated the successful formulation of Chancellor Adenauer's foreign policy. This is especially true in the matter of reunification policy. The CDU has stood exceptionally close to the position of the Western powers and this has sometimes restricted the sphere of CDU action. The SPD, much more free in proposing reunification means, has striven to place its alternative proposals before the German public. In occasional periods of Government flexibility, the CDU has found the electorate acquainted with these other policy means and has had the opportunity to offer its own variation of them, claiming the credit for any resulting success.¹¹ Consequently, it is with good reason that Chancellor Adenauer has stated that "a coalition with the Social Democrats would only increase the difficulties of the Government."¹²

Apart from unsolicited stimulation by the Social Democrats, the CDU coalition partners have sometimes departed from the Government reunification policy. Again, the smaller parties have been less rigid than the CDU and have sometimes supported variations in policy. In the case of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) too much variance resulted and they eventually left the Government coalition in 1956 for a combination of reasons.

CDU electoral success has been qualified. Even the CDU majority

¹⁰See Foreign Radio Broadcasts, No. 182 (September 21, 1949), Section QQ.

¹¹Cf. Speier and Davison, p. 54.

¹²Foreign Radio Broadcasts, No. 65 (April 4, 1950), Sect. QQ.

obtained in the 1957 election has not been without its drawbacks. Always characterized as authoritarian, the Adenauer Government was increasingly attacked by Opposition members who feared that the Chancellor would utilize his party majority in the Bundestag to force through any and all measures. Conversely, the CDU was no longer able to readily charge off policy failure to the "opposition threat."¹³ The Christian Democrats were to fall or rise on their own in the elections of 1961.¹⁴

The alignment of the CDU with the Western reunification position has also benefited the party's political fortunes. The propaganda organs of the Soviet Union have consistently directed torrents of abuse toward West Germany, and the Government party in particular. Far from wilting under this onslaught, the Christian Democrats have profited from it. A successful party image has been constructed which proclaims that "we are the particular enemy of your enemy." The Social Democrats, too, have been subjected to considerable abuse by the Soviet Union, but they have not projected as clear a reflection to the German public. Adenauer's personal image has done much for the party in this respect, as he has become the personification of West German reunification hopes through his constantly reiterated phrase of "Einheit in Frieden und Freiheit" (unity in peace and freedom). The Chancellor's morally pitched reunification slogans have contrasted favorably with the blunt language used by Soviet spokesmen. The wild epithets hurled by the Soviet Union have been described as influencing many Germans to see a "confirmation of Adenauer's

¹³Cf. Speier and Davison, p. 54: ". . . the success of the CDU . . . weakened the bargaining power of the Chancellor."

¹⁴For an account and analysis of the 1953 and 1957 elections, respectively, see James K. Pollock, ed., German Democracy at Work, (Michigan, 1955), and U. W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, (Oxford, 1960).

claim that he was defending the faith against the infidels."¹⁵

The reunification position of the CDU vis-a-vis the SPD has generally been more substantive in its appeal to the voters. Despite occasional ambiguities, CDU reunification policy has been far more positive in content than that of the SPD and has been forthright and readily understandable. The strong identification with the Western powers and their position has created no doubt as to what the policies of the CDU have been. Unlike the Social Democrats, the CDU has had the great advantage of standing firmly and consistently with a bloc of nations who constitute half of the bi-polar distribution of power. Although free from such entanglements, SPD reunification policies have nevertheless been more negative in character. It is an apparent fact that CDU policy has not resulted in constructive steps toward reunification, but it must be pointed out that half of the world shares this policy and stands ready to justify its continued application. The SPD cannot claim such wide acceptance of its proposals and must therefore be highly defensive in promoting them.

The original electoral success of the CDU has been perpetuated by an Opposition which appears indecisive and isolated to the voters. The most bitter policy protestations of the Social Democrats have therefore bounced off the shield of assurance held by the CDU. And, although of declining importance, they have enabled the Christian Democrats to piously assert that "the CDU has had to struggle against an embittered opposition

¹⁵Grant S. McClellan, The Two Germanies, (New York, 1959), p. 52: "Stumping the country, Adenauer kept telling the people he was crusading for Christianity against communism. At the same time Nikita Khrushchev was touring East Germany under the auspices of the Red government there and shouting that Adenauer was a warmonger and an American stooge."

on every stretch of its foreign policy."¹⁶

The Party Position on Reunification

Dependence on the Western powers: The strong pro-Western orientation of the CDU has brought about a full commitment of party policy to Western reunification policy in general. Politically, economically and militarily, the CDU is firmly bound to the fate of the Western alliance, specifically the United States.

During its first years as the Government party, the CDU could do little more than echo the pronouncements of Western statesmen. However, the increasing political stability of the party vis-a-vis its chief opposition, the Social Democrats, produced a change in this role of mere repetition. Although the lines of entanglement have not allowed substantial CDU policy divergence, the Adenauer Government has emerged as the most revisionistic spokesman for German reunification in the Western Bloc. This did not evolve as naturally as it might seem.

Obviously, the German people are most intimately committed to their own reunification. However, in view of the original four-power responsibility for achieving a reconstituted all-German state, a less vigorous leadership could have deemphasized Government activity relating to reunification and left the matter to be an exclusive concern of the Western powers and the Soviet Union. The CDU has been principally responsible for building the issue of reunification into a national obsession of the first magnitude. Retrospectively, Chancellor Adenauer possessed unusual foresight in leading this buildup. The German people had been subjected to countless manufactured "issues" during the Nazi regime and were wholly

¹⁶See Treue, p. 252.

disenchanted with political spectaculars after World War II. Even at the time of the creation of the Federal Republic in 1949, political apathy was widespread.

Adenauer's Government had necessarily found itself to be a de nova political entity to the German people and prospects for continued CDU leadership appeared marginal. If the Federal Government had merely concerned itself with the burgeoning domestic problems, and had pursued a vicinal policy approach, it is entirely possible that political vicissitudes would have ended the CDU exercise of power. The extreme fervor with which Adenauer immediately moved fully behind the question of German unity appears to have been a Realpolitik maneuver of the first order. Before the elections of 1953, Konrad Adenauer had come to symbolize the principle of self-determination to the people of Germany and to the nations of the world. This transference was extended to include the CDU as a party and the results of the 1953 elections attested to its success.

The original reliance of the CDU on Western policy has become partially converted to a reliance of the Western bloc on the power potential of West Germany. This has enhanced the status of the Federal Republic and CDU leadership has been quick to exploit this increased prestige. This efficacious stimulation by the Western powers brought the CDU to a new pinnacle of electoral success in 1957 and the trend has continued.

Despite the successful CDU prosecution of Western ties, and the attainment of near equal status on matters relating to German reunification and the Berlin issue, the aggressive character of Christian Democratic reunification policy may have run its full course. The power position of the Soviet Union has evolved to a point where the revisionist policy

of the CDU may well become an unwelcome liability to the Western powers in their attempts to reach a face-saving and peaceful solution of the German question. Any significant deviation of Western policy from the present course would have serious political repercussions in the Federal Republic. The CDU has staked its very existence on the continuance of the containment policy and it can be assumed that it would consider drastic measures to maintain its position of leadership in the Federal Republic.

Party Objectives:

"I should at any time prefer a free united Germany, with the Socialists as the strongest party, to a Federal Republic separated from the Soviet Zone, with the CDU as the strongest party. In this issue the fatherland and the nation really stand above party issues, and the statesman begins where the party politician ends. Regarding the all-German issue, there is no such thing as a CDU policy or a Catholic policy."¹⁷

This statement was made by Chancellor Adenauer shortly before the 1953 elections, in response to allegations that the CDU had everything to gain and nothing to lose from the continued disruption of German unity. The Christian Democrats have been extremely sensitive to such criticism and the amount of party verbiage which exists with respect to the aims and objectives of the Government bears out this concern. It is precisely this that makes an analysis of the real objectives of the CDU a difficult task of separation. No political party or aspirant to public office in the Federal Republic could afford to slight the goal of German reunification. As indicated, this has been the antithesis of CDU actions since 1949.

Any Government tract on reunification affords an ample view of the party's official position with respect to reunification. There are several points of emphasis which are constantly reiterated. First, the CDU

¹⁷Quoted in Weymar, p. 467.

wants the reunification of Germany in "peace and freedom." Often accompanying this is the stated requisite that reunification can only be secured in a "unified and free" Europe. The use of force as a means of accomplishing reunification has been rejected repeatedly by Adenauer, but this has been necessitated by the fear of the growing military and economic power of the Federal Republic. This increase of West German power has created misgivings about a possible recourse to arms by the Germans. The key position of West Germany in the NATO alliance has been a relished accomplishment of the CDU, carried out in the face of obstinate political opposition. The Western powers provided the impetus for German rearmament and the CDU has vigorously executed it.

The special problem created by a divided Berlin has likewise been constantly thrust before the German public by the CDU, as well as the Opposition. Chancellor Adenauer stands adamantly opposed to the Soviet proposals to make an "international free city" out of West Berlin and has again and again stated that there can be no solution to the Berlin problem without a "general relief of tension."¹⁸ CDU appeals to the Berlin and East German populaces have been ardent and frequent. Through the activities of the Federal Ministry of All-German Affairs, the Adenauer Government directs a constant stream of propaganda eastward and courts the thousands of refugees who have fled to the Federal Republic.¹⁹ Although some Germans have become comfortably complacent about reunification,

¹⁸See Press Office, German Diplomatic Mission, Washington, D. C., Collected Speeches, Statements, Press, Radio and TV Interviews by Dr. Konrad Adenauer, p. 86.

¹⁹For examples of some particular concerns of this Ministry, see Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government (hereafter referred to as German Information Office), The Bulletin, 9 (April 1961), pp. 1-2.

the enormous number of refugees, who find it difficult to become settled in steady circumstances, have been most restless and demanding with respect to reunification.²⁰

The original success of the CDU in projecting itself as the champion of German unity has created a problem of explaining why this paramount objective has not been realized. The CDU has generally been quite skillful in parrying such questions. The most widely used means has been to attribute the failure of German reunification to the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister von Brentano stated in 1957 that:

"The fact that the Federal Government has so far been unable to effect the reunification of Germany does not prove that our policy is wrong. So long as the Soviets refuse to grant reunification at a price other than freedom, there exists no practical way toward national unity."²¹

Pointing to the Soviet intransigence, the CDU has added a note of caution to its reunification position. The familiar slogan of "reunification in peace and freedom" has been lengthened to include the requirement that "our way requires a great deal of time and patience, faith and persistence."²² This has been rather easily accomplished since the CDU has never decelerated the reunification buildup. Even in the face of current uneasiness about the outcome of the Berlin situation, the recent CDU party congress held in Cologne, April 24-27, 1961, again proclaimed its traditional creed: "the right of self-determination for all Germans, the

²⁰Although the refugees organized a political party of their own, the Gesamtdeutscher Block/Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (G.B./B.H.E.), the CDU and the SPD have largely won their support. The G.B./B.H.E. received no seats in the 1957 Bundestag. The party has mainly constituted an interest group and it is the CDU desire to appeal to their reunification desires, including repossession of the eastern territories past the Oder-Neisse line.

²¹Quoted in Alexander, pp. 274-5.

²²Ibid., p. 178.

freedom of the German capital, Berlin, and the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom."²³ The maintenance of peace, however, is not insured by the present intransigent position.

The stated reunification aims and objectives of the Government party are but one side of the coin. It is quite true that many members of the CDU, especially the party rank and file, earnestly believe in and labor strenuously to perpetuate the party position on reunification. The top leadership of the party, however, may not be as sincere in its motives.

The basis of the CDU reunification position has been its uncompromising moral posture. The reunification issue has become a great humanitarian movement in the eyes of the world and the Federal Government has striven to maintain that character. Cynical criticism of the real political motives of West German politicians has been countered with a moral rebuttal by Government spokesmen. The present ambassador of the Federal Republic to the United States recently stated that, "The assumption that the prolonged division of Germany finds widespread sympathy in Western Germany is wrong."²⁴ Such a denial was explained as follows:

"It is the fundamental conviction that a nation which would be prepared to abandon its own parents or children, its brothers or sisters in a state of brutal slavery, in order to safeguard its own prosperity and security, would be contemptible . . . Such a nation would lose its honor."²⁵

Irrespective of lost honor, it appears that there are more basic political reasons for the course of CDU reunification policy.

As a successful political group, the Christian Democratic leaders

²³ See German Information Office, The Bulletin, 9 (May 2, 1961), p. 3.

²⁴ Wilhelm G. Grewe, "The Unification of Germany," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 324 (July, 1959), pp. 10-11.

²⁵ Ibid.

are naturally desirous of continuing their domination of the Federal Republic. But their situation is quite distinct from that of leadership cliques in other countries. Unlike the other leading nations of the world, the Federal Republic is a recent creation of international fiat. More precisely, it owes its existence to the East-West struggle for power and was therefore instituted amidst international disharmony. The CDU, as the Government party, chose to identify itself to the German people as a symbol of protest against this disharmony. There have been formidable domestic problems to face and overcome in West Germany since 1949. The CDU, of course, has devoted considerable attention to reconstructing the shattered face of post-war Germany. But even the economic approach of the party, such as the highly successful soziale Marktwirtschaft program of Ludwig Erhard, has been subordinated to the party's preoccupation with the reunification issue.

The CDU has obviously been successful in appearing as the "savior" of the German people. Despite the opportunity to support the vastly different reunification views of the Social Democrats, the West German voters have consistently returned the CDU to an increasing preponderance of political power. By doing so they enable the CDU to claim a "mandate" from the people for its objectives of strong Western ties, continued rearmament and European unification.

In summary, then, the CDU has turned the reunification issue into a national obsession and has furthermore succeeded in perpetuating its electoral supremacy by purporting to be the panacea of the disunity sickness. It is correct to assume that the Christian Democrats would solidly support the actual achievement of German unity if this were to be obtained on the basis of the current Western position. A position of leadership in an all-German state would be vastly superior to that occupied by

the party in West Germany alone. It is with this in mind that the party has intended its ardent support of German reunification to be a factor of influence on the East Germans as well as the West Germans. The CDU is well aware of the fact that East Germany is predominantly Protestant and might afford millions of additional votes for the SPD in the event of reunification. However, the expanded sphere of power which would result from the reunification of Germany would be worth the electoral risk incurred. The CDU, in its passionate appeals to the "savagely oppressed" people of East Germany, has sought to minimize this risk. The Germans residing in the Democratic Republic have, since 1949, constantly received the full attention of CDU political leaders. On occasions of West German accomplishment, the "brothers" to the East have not been forgotten. One example suffices to indicate the fervid nature of such remembrances. On the occasion of the restoration of West German sovereignty in 1955, Adenauer's address included the following:

"Together with the Federal Government, fifty million free citizens of the Federal Republic are at this hour thinking in brotherly love of millions of other Germans who are still forced to dwell, separated from us, in thralldom and lawlessness. We call to them: you are part of us and we belong to you. Our joy at having regained our freedom will be overshadowed as long as this freedom is denied to you. You may forever rely on us, for, together with the free world, we shall not rest until you too have regained your human rights and live peacefully united with us in one state and as one nation."²⁶

The eastern territories past the Oder-Neisse line are similarly courted.

Despite the advantages of occupying a position of power in an all-German state, the CDU will never agree to any reunification proposal which does not allow the free exercise of that power. It is thus unalterably opposed to those reunification plans of the Soviet Union which

²⁶Weymar, p. 488.

have sought the complete neutralization of a reunited Germany. For the same reason, Chancellor Adenauer and the leaders of the CDU have opposed any change in Western policy which would endorse "disengagement" and seek to make a buffer state out of a reunited Germany. Such a policy would necessarily mean mutual proscription of German power by the East and the West. Consequently, the CDU objective of enhancing its power position could not be realized and, in fact, the political leaders of a neutralized Germany would enjoy even less power than they now possess in the Federal Republic.

Such conclusions with respect to the Realpolitik objectives of the CDU are, of course, interpretive. The Government leaders have not openly stated such aims. To do so would necessarily constitute political suicide for the party. On at least one occasion, however, Chancellor Adenauer's position seemed to substantiate these conclusions. Alarmed by the prospects of a Western acceptance of a neutralized all-German buffer state, the Chancellor indicated the following at a press conference in 1957:

"The neutralization of a reunified Germany, . . . and the setting up of an international control body, would make Germany a mere pawn. Germany . . . [is] not interested in becoming a second rate power."²⁷

Whatever its real objectives, the CDU has relentlessly continued to utilize a highly effective political formula which wraps the potent issue of national reunification in a blanket of righteous moralism. The CDU will not compromise on the present Western position regarding German reunification.²⁸ This would jeopardize political objectives of long standing.

²⁷Cf. Siegler, The Reunification and Security of Germany, p. 182. Emphasis mine.

²⁸For a recent restatement of the Government position, see German Information Office, The Bulletin, 9 (June 13, 1961).

The Adenauer Government is firmly committed to all aspects of current Western policy and, irrespective of endangered objectives of increased political power, any change would have serious repercussions for the CDU. Western recognition of the German Democratic Republic alone would constitute an enormous defeat for the Christian Democrats. Although the SPD has accepted the main lines of the Government's reunification position, it remains a highly vocal Opposition which would not hesitate to capitalize electorally on any breach in the present policy framework.

The CDU is fully aware of the untenable position which it would occupy if the Western powers compromised on Soviet proposals. The extent of its intransigence is well indicated by a recent policy statement of Chancellor Adenauer. Returning to the Federal Republic from a visit to the President of the United States, the Chancellor stated on April 27, 1961, that:

"Germany and Berlin can--and of this I am certain, rely on the pledges which the Americans have given to protect the freedom of Berlin. The foundations on which the Federal Government's policy with regard to Germany has rested since 1949, a policy with which our allies solemnly associated themselves in the Paris conventions, remain unaltered. A just and enduring solution for the problem of Germany, including Berlin, is possible only on the basis of the right of self-determination. The restoration of Germany's unity in peace and freedom remains the goal of our joint policy."²⁹

Proposals and Policies: The primary point of emphasis in this Chapter has been the political objectives of the CDU. The close relationship of the Adenauer Government to the Western powers has meant that the reunification proposals and policies of the Christian Democrats have necessarily paralleled those of the West. The main distinction to be noted is the vigorous way in which the CDU has promoted the Western

²⁹Press Office of the German Embassy, News from the German Embassy, 5 (April 21, 1961), p. 1.

proposals. Of special concern is the CDU espousal of safeguards and qualifications to these proposals, rather than a presentation of complete reunification plans set forth by the party.

The Christian Democrats have been most aggressive in promoting the Western policy of "negotiation from strength." The rearmament of the Federal Republic and its inclusion in the NATO alliance have been "sold" to the German people by the CDU. Adenauer has constantly maintained that the Soviet Union "would negotiate on the question of German unity only with a strong partner."³⁰ Such a policy stands in glaring contrast to the position of the SPD in this respect, but it has apparently been more appealing to the electorate in its positive approach.³¹ As seen, neutralism has nothing to offer the CDU in its desire to increase the power status of Germany. It has, therefore, gladly championed the military participation of West Germany in the Western alliance. The constant admonishments of the CDU that the West must "stand firm" seem quite inconsistent with its equally repetitious blandishments that Christian Democratic policy "has no aggressive character."³²

The CDU, together with the SPD, has adamantly refused to recognize the Oder-Neisse line as a final boundary between Germany and Poland.³³ The Western powers, in repudiating East German legitimacy, have been less concerned with the Polish and Russian annexations of the eastern territories than the Christian Democrats. Adenauer, of course, denies the validity of the East German regime as such, but has specifically castigated its recognition of the eastern boundaries as a permanent situation. Understandably, direct negotiations between East and West Germany would be highly complicated by this sensitive issue alone. The Federal Bundestag has been particularly vocal with respect to the eastern territories and CDU and SPD plans of reunification must necessarily deal with

³⁰Quoted in Weymar, p. 342. Adenauer went on to say that ". . . a weak partner in negotiation would merely be an invitation to the Soviets to take aggressive action."

³¹Cf. Horne, p. 221.

³²See Treue, p. 251. Contained in Programm der CDU, Hamburg, April 22, 1953.

³³For an early statement of the party's policy regarding the Oder-Neisse line, see Wilhelm Mommsen, Deutsche Parteiprogramme: Eine Auswahl

their restitution.³⁴

The CDU has consistently upheld the essential points of reunification contained in a Bundestag resolution of June 10, 1953, as follows:

1. The holding of free elections throughout Germany;
2. the formation of a free Government for the whole of Germany;
3. the conclusion of a peace treaty that has been freely negotiated with that Government;
4. the settlement of all outstanding territorial questions by that peace treaty;
5. the guaranteeing to an all-German Parliament and an all-German Government of freedom of action consistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.³⁵

As is evident, this reunification outline corresponded to the proposals later made by British Foreign Secretary Eden at the Berlin Conference in 1954. Adenauer's response to the outcome of the Berlin Conference was to urge further consolidation of Western power in Europe. Attributing the failure of the conference to the lack of agreement on world problems in general, Adenauer also stated that the Federal Government would welcome "every attempt to eliminate the sources of conflict in other parts of the world since such easing of tension would inevitably have its effect on the German question."³⁶ Again, these two comments were somewhat inconsistent.

vom Vormerz bis zur Gegenwart, (Munich, 1952), p. 154. This is an account of the Grundsätze der CDU/CSU Deutschlands, 1950, Mitteilung des Generalsekretariats der CDU/CSU. Also see Weymar, p. 292, and Adenauer's speech before the Bundestag of October 21, 1949, contained in Bundesministerium fuer Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, Die Bemuehungen der Bundesrepublik um Wiederherstellung der Einheit Deutschlands durch Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, pp. 7-9.

³⁴ For an early Bundestag pronouncement on the Oder-Neisse line, see Heinrich von Siegler, Wiedervereinigung und Sicherheit Deutschlands, (Bonn, 1958), pp. 176-7.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 188.

³⁶ See Adenauer, World Indivisible, pp. 105-6.

Two aspects of CDU policy have received detailed attention. These are insuring free elections and the connection established by Adenauer between German reunification and European unity and security. The former appears to have caused some alarm for the Adenauer Government with respect to possible Western compromise on the safeguards involved. Adenauer has frequently referred to the guarantees required in various notes to the Western powers.³⁷ The Molotov proposals at the Berlin Conference in no way placated the CDU suspicions of rigged elections and intimidation. The CDU has stressed the necessity for a period of East German adjustment before conducting free elections. The party has been vague on the means of carrying this out. Chancellor Adenauer's own description of this requirement is highly naive and unrealistic: "Several months would have to elapse to give those poor people in the Soviet zone a chance of feeling free again so that they could vote as free people."³⁸ The Soviet Union would obviously reject the implications of this qualification.

On repeated occasions, the Adenauer Government has linked German reunification with the prerequisite or accompaniment of European unity. This has been, as indicated, a concept which formed the basis of the original CDU policy approach in 1946. The entire course of West German foreign policy since 1949 has adhered to this original emphasis, especially with respect to the Franco-German accord.³⁹ Federal Republic

³⁷See, for example, Bundesministerium fuer Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, pp. 17-18; Note des Bundeskanzlers an die Alliierte Hohe Kommission vom 1. Oktober 1950.

³⁸Cf. Press Office Diplomatic Mission, Washington, D. C. Collected Speeches, Statements, Press, Radio and TV Interviews by Dr. Konrad Adenauer, pp. 166-7.

³⁹Adenauer's emphasis on friendly relations with France has been quite pronounced. The Chancellor has stated that, "Without a Franco-German understanding, we shall not attain the unification of Europe, and

participation in the Western European Union, NATO, the European international agencies and the European Common Market, to name but a few, illustrate the continentalism of CDU policy.

Although created by the Western powers, the Federal Republic could have been content with a highly supervised version of "splendid isolation." That is, German political leaders could easily have directed the course of West Germany away from further European entanglements, in reaction to the havoc wrought by the Third Reich's aggressive policy of European consolidation. The fact that the Adenauer Government has chosen to foster a new brand of European solidarity, based on peace and economic-political-military interrelationships, illustrates the positive approach of the CDU. Any reunified German state could never engage in a systematic power buildup unless its immediate neighbors gave their approval and assistance. With this in mind, the present Government of the Federal Republic has striven to create a favorable environment for the wider exercise of political prerogatives in the future. This did not necessarily require an attachment of the Federal Republic to the Western powers. The same effect could possibly have resulted from a rapprochement between Germany and the East. Factors peculiar to the origin of the West German Government, however, determined the former. Despite the present emphasis on the compatibility of German and western European interests, there yet remains the possibility of a reversal. If the Federal Republic, or a future reunified Germany, felt that a Western orientation would no longer further its power aspirations and national security, it is quite possible that an eastern European orientation would result.

without the unification of Europe there will be no unification of Germany." See Adenauer, World Indivisible, p. 51.

As noted, a neutralized Germany is unacceptable to the CDU. Such a situation would sterilize the power ambitions of the political leaders. This opposition to neutralization has been justified quite easily by the party, usually with reference to the "dangerous" implications involved. The party leaders have seldom indicated openly their total rejection of neutralization because it would imply a loss of power. The reunification plans of the SPD, which have frequently envisaged some sort of general "supervised neutrality" for a reunified Germany, have been ridiculed by the CDU as utopian nonsense and detrimental to national security. The CDU has been hesitant to reject categorically the possibility of a neutral Germany under "other prevailing conditions," but has made it quite clear that the present situation and that of the foreseeable future are not conducive to a change in Western policy.⁴⁰

Appraisal

The course of CDU reunification policy has been in conformity with the general position taken by Konrad Adenauer at the time of the party's formation in 1946. Despite its growing revisionist tendencies, the CDU position has been steadily consistent between 1949 and 1961. This rigidity has constituted a positive appeal for the West German electorate and has enabled the party to maintain its position of leadership in the Federal Republic.

The CDU has been highly successful in amplifying the reunification issue to a place of primary importance and has identified itself to the

⁴⁰Cf. Treue, pp. 250-1. The party program of 1953 clearly indicated the CDU rejection of neutralization: "Der Glaube an die Moeglichkeit einer neutralen Existenz Deutschlands ist irreal, solange die gegenwaertige Weltspannung fortbesteht."

electorate as the true guardian of unification aspirations. The party has established itself as the "watchdog" of Western policy regarding German reunification. Unable to actually participate in the East-West negotiations on the German problem, the CDU has nevertheless begun to influence Western proposals and policies and has been partially responsible for bringing the issue of reunification to a point of intransigence.

The leadership of the CDU is adamantly opposed to any plan of reunification or change in Western policy which would restrict its exercise of power and make German security dependent on continued accord between hostile blocs. The well-intrenched position of the Federal Republic under the status quo will not be readily exchanged for an innocuous all-German state subject to the aegis of the great powers.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SPD) AND THE REUNIFICATION ISSUE

The Opposition Role of the Party

Party Characteristics: At the end of World War II the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) was in a more effective position than any other residual political organization. Severely persecuted by the Nazi regime, the Social Democrats envisaged a new and brighter future for the post-war era. Ironically, however, the party has been losing support since the end of the war and has become the anachronism of West German political life.

Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the party until his death in 1952, struggled strenuously, but vainly, to bring about an SPD government for the West German state. Schumacher's integrity and support of democratic government were above reproach, but the means he utilized were those of the past. The SPD had always based its party program on time-honored tenets of socialism which had their antecedents in such historical events as the Gotha and Erfurt Congresses of 1875 and 1891. Essentially a Marxist party, the SPD had, however, adopted much of the early revisionism of Bernstein and Bebel. Well before the triumph of the Bolsheviks in Russia there was a definitive split between the German Social Democrats and the Communists. In view of Social Democratic strength during the Weimar Republic, it is correct to assume that the

party's failures in the period after World War II have not been attributable to its "leftist" orientation. Indeed, considering the reaction which occurred with respect to the excesses of the Nazi regime, the SPD had every reason to unpretentiously await its investiture as the Government party of the Federal Republic.

The SPD was one of the first parties to be licensed in the Western zones of occupation after the ban on political activity was lifted by the Potsdam agreements. Unlike the CDU, the Social Democrats were faced with severe competition from their counterparts in the Soviet zone. The leader of the original SPD in East Germany, Otto Grotewohl, met with Schumacher and Erich Ollenhauer in October, 1945. Clearly representing the interests of the Soviet authorities, Grotewohl attempted to get the support of Schumacher for the proposed merger of the Communists and the Social Democrats into one party, the Socialist Unity Party. Schumacher and Ollenhauer were totally opposed and, consequently, the division of Germany claimed one of its first victims. Grotewohl returned to Berlin to consummate the merger of the Communist and Social Democratic parties and Schumacher remained in West Germany, declaring for an independent SPD.¹

One particular aspect of the policy approach taken by the SPD between 1945 and 1949 severely damaged the party's efficacy. The Social Democrats had traditionally been ardent supporters of international cooperation and mutual endeavor. Quite in contrast to this heritage, the party, subsequent

¹Cf. Alfred Grosser, The Colossus Again, (New York, 1955), p. 191: ". . . on 10 May the SPD congress at Hanover elected Schumacher president and Ollenhauer vice-president of a party which now existed only in the West." Also see Speier and Davison, pp. 13-14: "Thus the SPD acquired a special status among the political parties, in that it had no East German branch."

to 1945, proceeded on more of a nationalistic tangent. During the same period the CDU was formulating its policy within the "concept of Europe" approach championed by Adenauer. The reason for the sudden change in SPD philosophy with respect to "internationalism" appears to have been the fear of party leaders, particularly Schumacher, that a continuation of party opposition toward nationalism would run counter to the post-war mentality of the German people.² Such an assumption was fundamentally wrong. Quite apart from any desire to "atone" to the world for the Nazi crimes, the German people were only too ready to cooperate internationally and thus ease the painful ignominies of foreign occupation. The leaders of the CDU were well aware of this. By taking such an approach the SPD occasionally incurred the disapproval of the Western occupational authorities, who were highly suspicious of any nationalistic pronouncements, however mild.

Aside from this tendency toward nationalistic emphasis, the SPD did not openly court the favor of the Western authorities, as did the CDU. Western occupation policy was frequently denounced by the party and Schumacher specifically spoke out against the growing division of Germany. Such criticism was prompted in part by the fact that the SPD had itself suffered from the East-West split, but it would appear that the party hoped to curry favor with the electorate by taking a definite anti-occupation stand. The West German populace was, of course, not enjoying the prevailing privations of occupation, but it was fairly obvious that further

²Cf. Hiscocks, p. 83: "He [Schumacher] was also convinced that the parties of the Right should no longer have a monopoly of appealing to national sentiment, as had been the case in the past." Also see Franz Neumann, "German Democracy, 1950," International Conciliation, No. 461 (May, 1950), p. 277.

antagonism would only beget more privations. Again, the CDU strived to appear cooperative and bided its time until the reconstitution of a central civil government. The subsequent successes of the CDU in arranging the cessation of punitive Allied measures attested to the wisdom of its original policy of cooperation.

The SPD did well in various local elections conducted between 1946 and 1948. The decision of the Western powers to establish a separate West German state was received by the party with few misgivings as to SPD electoral prospects. Always program conscious, the Social Democrats endeavored to formulate precise policies applicable to the wider sphere of West Germany as a whole. The drafters of the party platform did their job well. All of West Germany knew the SPD position before the elections were held. Likewise aware of the Social Democratic program, and basically opposed, were the Western occupation powers. In brief, the SPD specifically rejected the Marshall Plan and the Ruhr Statute, categorically repudiated any possible rearmament plans applicable to West Germany, made a series of demands on the Western powers and called for the "cessation of Allied interference in German internal affairs."³ In addition, Schumacher became quite hostile about alleged Western interference with respect to the drafting of the Basic Law, specifically over certain amendments requested by the Western authorities. The Social Democrats were generally critical of the Basic Law and this may have stemmed from their desire to keep the West German constitution relatively sketchy and utilize simple legislation to fill in the gaps in a plurality-dominated Bundestag.⁴ It is further possible that Schumacher desired to put

³Henry L. Bretton, "The German Social Democratic Party and the International Situation," American Political Science Review, 47 (1953), p. 983.

⁴Cf. Hans J. Morgenthau, ed., Germany and the Future of Europe, (Chicago, 1951), p. 125.

the SPD on record as being "skeptical" of the West German constitution and thus avoid accusations of "collaboration" when the SPD became, as he hoped, the Government party.⁵ Irrespective of political aims at the time, the Social Democrats later regarded Western influence on the form of the Basic Law as an attempt to insure the inclusion of any future all-German state in the NATO alliance.⁶

Decline and Stagnation: The elections of 1949 did not result in a Social Democratic Government. Furthermore, the elections of 1953 and 1957 kept the party in a static political position while its arch rival, the CDU, increased its strength to more than 50 percent in the 1957 Bundestag. The precise niceties of the SPD party programs had obviously failed to rally the support of the West German voters. Since the elections of 1957 the SPD has finally begun to dispense with such rigidly definitive positions and, in fact, the change in the party's approach has moved it extremely close to the foreign policy and open objectives of the CDU.

The opening session of the 1949 Bundestag well illustrated the SPD's intention to truly carry out the role of the Opposition party by opposing the Government at every point. Various facets of CDU policy were vehemently castigated and disharmony was rampant between the two parties.⁷ The decision of Schumacher to oppose the Government on practically all aspects of its foreign policy was executed vigorously. The reliance of

⁵Bretton, American Political Science Review, 47 (1953), p. 983: "It was feared that unqualified acceptance of the Basic Law would lead to the charge that the party shared responsibility for the East-West split of Germany."

⁶Cf. A. A., "Germany and World Peace: a German Social Democrat View," The World Today, 9 (April, 1953), pp. 157-8.

⁷For a description and account of the opening session of the Bundestag, see U. S. High Commissioner, Germany's Parliament in Action: The September 1949 Debate on the Government's Statement of Policy, (1950).

the CDU on the Western powers came in for constant criticism. Schumacher himself once described Adenauer as the "Federal Chancellor of the Allies" and was consequently expelled from the Bundestag for twenty days. As the East-West deadlock persisted, and the Western powers proposed West German rearmament, the SPD became hysterically abusive of the Government and widely proclaimed that continued compliance with Western policies would make reunification impossible. The defense debates in the Bundestag became extremely explosive.⁸ But the passionate speeches of the Social Democrats were of no avail as electoral appeals. The 1953 elections seemingly endorsed the CDU's rearmament policy and the SPD grudgingly acquiesced in the face of such support. Although faced with a fait accompli regarding rearmament, the SPD later made the issue of atomic weapons on German soil its particular obsession. There was also continued opposition toward the "concept of Europe" policy pursued by Adenauer. A 1953 campaign poster of the SPD hopefully proclaimed that "Schuman's gone, De Gasperi's gone--Adenauer will soon be gone too--and then the whole European bogey will be gone."⁹

In general, the opposition of the SPD to the policies of the Adenauer Government netted the party nothing. The CDU continued to enhance its electoral appeal by defiantly prosecuting the very policies that the SPD so vehemently denounced. As an Opposition, the Social Democrats declined steadily from the standpoint of effectiveness. The death of Schumacher in 1952 brought little change. Erich Ollenhauer succeeded Schumacher as

⁸For a description of Erich Ollenhauer's participation in one such debate concerning the proposed European Defense Community, see Walther Oschilewski, et.al., Erich Ollenhauer: der Fuehrer der Opposition, (Berlin, 1953), p. 54.

⁹Weymar, p. 466.

the chairman of the SPD and continued to uphold the past. Although perhaps somewhat less intransigent, Ollenhauer did not seriously attempt to facilitate a common SPD-CDU foreign policy. The so-called Ollenhauer plans of reunification proceeded on the basis of a rather vague formula whereby the NATO and Warsaw alliances would be dropped in favor of some type of general security system which would then be applied by the Soviet Union and the Western powers to a reunified Germany.¹⁰ Although these plans were an earnest attempt on the part of the SPD to break the reunification deadlock, they met with derision from the CDU and apparent rejection by the electorate.

The SPD frequently made allegations with respect to the "real" intentions of the Government's reunification efforts. Chancellor Adenauer usually received the brunt of such attacks and was accused of being apathetic toward reunification. The fact that Adenauer was a Catholic and a Rhinelander was pointed out to illustrate the Socialist charges. East Germany was, of course, predominantly Protestant and would presumably afford more votes for the SPD than the CDU in the event of reunification. In addition, Adenauer's fond attachment to the Rhineland was held up as indicative of his accompanying dislike of East Germans. Shortly before the 1953 elections, an official SPD election statement charged that:

"It is the whole nature and character of the Chancellor that he is rooted in the West and has no understanding for the East--the far side of the Elbe. To him Berlin is a pagan city, and Koenigsberg is more alien to his whole mental outlook than anything in the West. It is a disaster for Germany that it should be governed by a Chancellor who regards everything lying beyond the Elbe as no more than colonial territory."¹¹

¹⁰See Siegler, Dokumentation zur Deutschlandfrage, pp. 650-2.

¹¹Weymar, p. 469.

Such statements or insinuations, however, merely served to perpetuate the negative image of the SPD. The CDU had identified itself with the reunification issue to an extent that the critical remonstrances of the SPD were of no avail.

As the opposition effectiveness of the SPD declined, younger members of the party urged that the entire policy approach be revised. The main concern of such reform recommendations was the need for a common foreign policy with the CDU.¹² This would have obviously required a complete departure from the past for the SPD since the Christian Democrats were clearly in a well-intrenched position from which they would not move to accommodate even the most sacred SPD viewpoint. Minor concessions were later evidenced at the SPD party congress which met prior to the 1957 elections but the attempts were too half-hearted to divert support from the CDU.¹³ The sweeping victory of the CDU in 1957 proved conclusively that the SPD would have to change its entire philosophical approach to foreign policy before the stagnation of the party brought about its virtual demise as an effective political organization.

The Party Position on Reunification

Inadequacies of a Weltanschauung: The explicit opposition of the SPD proved to be worthless as a means of displacing the CDU as the Government party. The carefully formulated party programs did not generally appeal to the West German electorate. The CDU quite early presented itself

¹²Cf. Hiscocks, p. 96.

¹³Hans Kohn, "West Germany: New Era for German People," Foreign Policy Association Headline Series, No. 131 (September-October, 1958), p. 37. Also see "SPD Conference in Munich," The World Today, 32 (August, 1956), pp. 308-10.

to the voters as more of an "all things to all men" party and consequently gained the support of voters who appreciated and needed this elasticity. The CDU, of course, made its position with respect to reunification quite clear. Its reunification policy, however, was geared to the larger arena of Western power and security objectives. The painful efforts of the SPD to keep its foreign policy within the more restricted sphere of an outmoded ideology invoked a negative reaction from the electorate.

In March, 1959, the SPD made one last supreme effort to rally the support of the voters around its Deutschlandplan.¹⁴ Well publicized and widely proclaimed as the solution to the division of Germany, this plan of unity seemingly represented the foreign policy program of the SPD for the 1961 elections. However, some eight months later the party completely changed its position, discarded the Deutschlandplan and moved almost fully behind the policy of the CDU. Such an astounding metamorphosis was clearly indicative of the changing character of the party; the old guard had finally crumbled. An indication of the new SPD policy approach was the nomination of Willy Brandt, the Governing Mayor of Berlin, as the party's candidate for Federal Chancellor. Ostensibly remaining the chairman of the party, Erich Ollenhauer stepped aside. His connections with the past were apparently considered detrimental to the electoral prospects of the "new" SPD. In 1957 Ollenhauer had described his party's foreign policy as the "substitution of a policy of understanding for a policy of strength."¹⁵ However, the German electorate had neither

¹⁴See below, p. 76.

¹⁵H. G. L., "Elections in the German Federal Republic," The World Today, 13 (September, 1957), p. 371.

"understood" nor appreciated the SPD policy.

The sweeping Bad Godesberg Program of November, 1959,¹⁶ has opened the way for a common CDU-SPD foreign policy. It is somewhat doubtful whether the CDU would desire to include the SPD as a coalition member of the Government, but the Social Democrats will become much more of an electoral opponent than before. The "opposition threat" technique used by the CDU will have no more validity when the SPD reunification policies parallel the main lines of the Christian Democratic position. The Social Democrats may have made a decisive change in the West German political scene by rejecting their traditional Weltanschauung for a policy approach based on Realitaet.

Proposals and Policies: The SPD has been in essential agreement with the CDU regarding such policies as the repudiation of East German legitimacy, the need for insuring free elections in any reunification referendum and the threat presented by possible Communist infiltration of any all-German government. There has never been any question of the loyalty of the SPD to democratic government and free political expression. The open hostility between the Democratic Republic Socialist Unity Party and the West German Social Democrats has definitely precluded any rapprochement between the two. It can safely be assumed that the SPD would never agree to an amalgamation of the two parties considering the present character of the East German Socialists. Soon after the establishment of the Federal Republic the SPD declared "unconditional war" on the Socialist Unity Party and publicly warned the East German Socialists that terrorist measures would be reciprocated by the SPD on the basis of "an eye for an

¹⁶See below, p. 78.

eye, a tooth for a tooth."¹⁷

The primary emphasis of SPD policy between 1949 and 1959 has revolved around its very opposition to the CDU. The Christian Democrats pursued a policy of full cooperation with the Western powers; the SPD viewed this as perpetuating the division of Germany and advocated more of a "free agent" type of policy. The CDU supported the rearmament of the Federal Republic and its inclusion in various regional security pacts; the SPD totally rejected such measures, again because of the effect on reunification. The party, in short, was highly negative in its policy approach and consequently offered little in the way of pragmatic alternatives.

The most comprehensive set of proposals enunciated by the SPD grew out of its rejection of the NATO alliance. While adamantly opposing the participation of the Federal Republic in NATO, the SPD had to offer a substitute. For some time this was satisfied by merely advocating the withdrawal of West Germany from the Western alliance on the basis of a quid pro quo by the Soviet Union, viz. reunification. Such proposals were ridiculed as "utopianism" by the CDU and, in fact, were highly improbable. The Soviet Union was not interested in allowing the reunification of Germany simply on the guarantee that an all-German state would then not reenter the Western Bloc. Later reunification proposals of the SPD suggested the substitution of a general "security system" which would replace both the NATO and Warsaw alliances.

Prior to the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference in 1955, the SPD drafted a set of proposals which indicated its conception of this somewhat vague, encompassing security system:

¹⁷Foreign Radio Broadcasts, No. 25 (February 6, 1950), Sec. QQ.

The Federal Government must do its utmost to see that the provisions in the Paris Agreements affecting Germany on the one hand, and the Warsaw Treaty, on the other, are replaced, step by step, by agreements on military positions and rights, which form the basis of a security system embracing the whole of Europe, within which a unified Germany would have rights and obligations. This assumes agreement on the military status of a unified Germany acceptable to all Four Powers, which guarantees security for the German people at the same time.¹⁸

In 1956, this concept of a general security system was connected with world disarmament. SPD member Fritz Erler pointed out the necessity of reunifying Germany prior to any agreement on disarmament at large.¹⁹ This was in contrast to the efforts of Adenauer to make general disarmament a prerequisite or accompaniment of German reunification.

There were numerous proposals and declarations with respect to the SPD policy of achieving German reunification on the basis of mutual guarantees by the Soviet Union and the Western powers. These cannot be enumerated fully and it suffices to say that the total efforts of the SPD toward this goal culminated in the 1959 "Plan for Germany," or Deutschlandplan. The plan was presented by the party and hailed as the only feasible substitute for the Government's "policy of strength." Essentially, it contained four stages in the reunification of Germany: (1) The formation of an all-German Conference with equal representation from the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic. Certain economic consolidations were to be effected within the scope of this stage. (2) The election of an all-German Parliamentary Council. This would again be on the basis of equal representation. Decisions of the Council with respect to such

¹⁸ Siegler, The Reunification and Security of Germany, pp. 107-8.

¹⁹ Cf. Siegler, Wiedervereinigung und Sicherheit Deutschlands, pp. 158-9.

considerations as common economic policy, transportation and mail service could be vetoed by either Government's parliament, but could be repassed by the Council with a two-thirds majority vote. (3) The Council was to draft and have the authority to pass all-German laws. Provision was made for all-German referenda on certain matters. (4) Either on the initiative of the Council or a referendum of the people, a National Constituent Assembly was to be called for the purpose of drafting an all-German Constitution.²⁰

The Deutschlandplan envisaged the withdrawal of the two German states from the NATO and Warsaw alliances and the implementation of a mutual security pact to be guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States. In addition to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the remaining national forces were to be prohibited from possessing atomic weapons.²¹ Essentially, then, the SPD plan resurrected the Rapacki Plan of 1958 with respect to a European nuclear-free zone.

Whatever its shortcomings, the plan was comprehensive. It was supposedly formulated to constitute the backbone of the party's program for the 1961 Bundestag elections. The fact that the plan was discarded in November, 1959, at an extraordinary session of the SPD held in Bad Godesberg, indicated the dissatisfaction that it aroused among certain

²⁰For a complete presentation of the 1959 "Plan for Germany," see Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, Deutschlandplan der SPD, (Bonn, 1959). Pp. 4-11 describe the steps and aims of the plan and the remainder of this party publication is a question and answer "analysis" of the proposals.

²¹Uwe Kitzinger, "West Germany: A Pre-Election Survey," The World Today, 17 (March, 1961), pp. 110-22. Kitzinger offers a concise summary of the Deutschlandplan and relates it to the current party position.

party leaders. It was, in the final analysis, merely a continuation of the past approach. It is highly unlikely that the plan would have furthered an SPD electoral victory, yet the abrupt turn-about of the party was an unexpected development. The Bad Godesberg program did not present an item by item cancellation of the previous party position but it did leave the way open for pronounced changes which, for all practical purposes, swung the party into line with CDU foreign policy.²² In sharp contrast to earlier views held by Schumacher and Ollenhauer, Willy Brandt stated shortly after the Bad Godesberg Conference that:

"Our Manifesto underlines the fact that we stand firmly in the Western Community, and work for the Europe that is coming into being. German policy today, and in the years that lie ahead, can be shaped only on this basis. We are no wanderers between the fronts. We know where we belong."²³

Such remarks as these definitely implied a latent acceptance of the Government's pro-Western position and, in fact, a continuance of Federal Republic participation in the Western alliance.

The party declined to insert a provision in the Godesberg Program calling for "struggle against military conscription," but did provide a sop for opponents of conscription by indicating a disapproval of conscription while Germany remains divided.²⁴ This one item alone represented a drastic change in the party's policy. Following this up,

²²For the complete program, see Social Democratic Party of Germany, Basic Programme of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, (Bonn, n.d.). A good analysis of the Godesberg Conference is presented in The Economist (London), November 21, 1959, p. 737.

²³See Social Democratic Party of Germany, A Policy for Germany, (Bonn, n.d.), p. 6. From an address by Willy Brandt before the SPD party congress in November, 1960.

²⁴Cf. analysis of Godesberg Program by J. E. Williams, "Western Germany before the Summit," The World Today, 16 (February, 1960), pp. 63-70.

the Godesberg Program explicitly stated that "the SPD affirms the need to defend the free democratic society and it is in favor of national defense."²⁵

The actions of the Social Democrats themselves have borne out the changed position of the party. The recent foreign policy debates in the Bundestag have been characterized by a degree of orderliness and mildness previously unknown. Prior to adjourning for the summer recess in 1960, ex-Communist Herbert Wehner, a respected leader of the SPD, set forth six principles of foreign policy which he claimed were now shared by both the SPD and the CDU:

1. The present status of Berlin, virtually a part of the Federal Republic, must be preserved.
2. Opposed to any kind of dictatorship, the German people had decided they belonged to the Western community of nations.
3. All responsible forces in West Germany rejected communism.
4. All agreed that the living conditions of the East Germans must be alleviated.
5. Already divided by communism, Europe must not allow itself to be divided any further and must collaborate as extensively as possible.
6. All agreed that the demands of military security must be satisfied, and that the necessary measures should be concerted in such a way as to preserve peace.²⁶

Some of these principles were, of course, agreements of long standing, but Wehner's entire presentation seemed calculated to probe the receptivity of the CDU. Wehner also stated that the SPD "no longer questioned the necessity for Federal Germany to be committed unequivocally to NATO and rearmament and that ideas such as military disengagement and thinned-out zones must be buried with the past."²⁷ The most recent SPD congress

²⁵Social Democratic Party, Basic Programme . . . , p. 8.

²⁶The Economist, July 9, 1960, p. 179.

²⁷Ibid.

(April, 1961) fully reaffirmed the Godesberg approach. Willy Brandt, outlining the Government program of the SPD, completely endorsed Western alliance ties and emphasized the role of the German Bundeswehr in European defense. He supported European unification and, specifically, announced his intention to amplify existing relations with the Western powers.²⁸ In short, the SPD is not trying to oppose the CDU policy approach but has, finally, started to exceed that approach by using the same bases.

Appraisal

It remains to be seen whether this fundamental change in the party's foreign policy approach will enhance its electoral appeal. The CDU, as the original author of such a position, has the advantage of twelve years of delivering it to the German electorate. If the SPD continues to align itself with all that the CDU has stood for regarding foreign policy, it could very well be that the CDU will find itself more and more concerned with its domestic program. And, on this subject, it cannot be denied that the Social Democrats present a formidable challenge. Closely related to the British Labor Party in its economic program, the SPD may drain off support which was previously given to the CDU by virtue of its more realistic foreign policy. It must be assumed that the leadership of the party had exactly this in mind when the drastic change was made at Bad Godesberg. This would seem especially valid in view of the fact that a great deal of excess Marxian "baggage" was similarly discarded by the party in November, 1959. The SPD is making every effort to become a mass appeal party and the traditional ties of ideology have been sacrificed to

²⁸See Brandt's presentation of the Government program in Vorstand der SPD, Das Regierungsprogramm der SPD, (Bonn, 1961), especially pp. 34-41.

this effect.

The Godesberg Program may represent a tacit recognition by the Social Democrats of the final division of Germany.²⁹ The Soviet Union is obviously not interested in granting reunification at present, except on terms which would amount to the virtual communization of an all-German state. Until 1955 the SPD foreign policy approach might have succeeded. Subsequently, however, the Soviet Union, like the Western powers, has been completely intransigent and the Social Democrats have apparently realized this fact at last. The position of the SPD between 1945 and 1959 was essentially based on hazy ideals which would not accommodate to the possibility of an indefinitely disunited Germany. The proposals of the party seemed almost desperate in their fervid content. The CDU recognized the status quo and was able to proceed rationally, if stubbornly, with its reunification policy. It was, after all, the Government party and if reunification did not come about immediately the party was, in the meantime, enjoying a comfortable position of power. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, were quite naturally willing to endorse reunification proposals with less restriction, if this would somehow bring in the millions of East German votes so badly needed by the party. In short, the objectives of the SPD were primarily focused on a reunified

²⁹For an excellent presentation of this viewpoint, see Lewis J. Edinger and Douglas Chalmers, "Overture or Swan Song: German Social Democracy," Antioch Review, 20 (Summer, 1960), pp. 163-75: "The more its [Godesberg Program] proponents stressed its design for the present situation in the Federal Republic, the less convincing seemed their professions to the cause of German reunification. If the program is indeed to be considered 'fundamental,' designed to last for decades like former such programs, one must either assume that it would survive a review by delegates from Eastern Germany after reunification--not a very convincing prospect in view of their totally different experiences---or that such a review is not likely to take place because reunification is not."

Germany, rather than a West Germany. Therefore, the most strenuous efforts of the party were for naught. By attempting to accomplish a most improbable task, the party's efficacy in the Federal Republic itself was severely undermined.

If the Godesberg Program represents a permanent change in the SPD's policy orientation, it can be assumed that the CDU will find its majority control of the Government threatened, but not necessarily destroyed. In the final analysis, the CDU has suffered the same fate as frequently befalls successful majority parties--the best portions of its policy approach have been appropriated by the opposition party. Despite this, however, the Christian Democrats are presented with an excellent opportunity to capitalize on the theft. The party may now claim to have been the "guiding light" since the beginning. The opposition party will afford the CDU incontrovertible proof of its "wisdom." Consequently, in the face of any skepticism as to the permanence of the SPD Godesberg Program, it could well be that the CDU will, for a time, receive the overwhelming endorsement of the West German electorate. To counteract this reaction the SPD will have to focus every effort on presenting a continued unified front. Any relaxation of or disenchantment with the new foreign policy approach will open the Social Democrats to fatal charges of political opportunism and create a persistent doubt as to just what the SPD would do if it became the Government party.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The present division of Germany into two separate states is indicative of the post-war dichotomy of power between the West and the East. Victorious allies in 1945, the Western powers and the Soviet Union were unable to act in accord on the reconstruction of an all-German state. The power vacuum caused by the fall of the Third Reich created a situation which was fraught with dangerous implications for both blocs. Neither could allow the other to achieve a preponderance of power over Germany and in Europe. Various agreements concluded during and after World War II established the legal bases of occupational authority in Germany, but the conflicting political objectives of the West and the East made a common policy toward Germany impossible. Consequently, the efficacy of the four-power condominium was totally undermined.

Faced with the deterioration of the status quo, Western diplomacy sought to re-establish an independent German state in the Western zones as an integral component of the Western bloc. The de facto partition of Germany was the consequence of this action. To obtain the necessary support from the West Germans, the Western bloc has had to assert certain revisionist aims, viz. the restoration to West Germany of the boundaries existing prior to 1938. The political leadership of the Federal Republic has thus been promised just compensation for its active role in support of the Western containment policy. At a time when the Soviet Union is steadily increasing its position of power vis-a-vis the Western bloc, it

appears that the revisionistic aims of the Adenauer Government have contributed to the present deadlocked situation with respect to the German problem. Although a change in the present Western policy would likely produce severe political repercussions in the Federal Republic, the Western bloc should avoid encumbering its prerogative of compromise.

The Soviet Union has likewise tended to staticize its position with respect to the German problem, but this is based on the status quo, i.e., the existence of two German states. Soviet reunification proposals since 1955 have invariably sought to promote direct negotiations between the two German states as a prerequisite or accompaniment of four-power consummation of German reunification. This qualification has been consistently rejected by the West, in view of its policy of non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic. The fact that the Soviet Union, since 1955, has recognized both German states, gives its proposals a practical leverage which is not possessed by the West. Soviet security aims will never be sacrificed willingly in order to reunify Germany. The Western proposals invariably seek to give an all-German state the prerogative of participating in military alliances. Equally consistent are the Soviet attempts to achieve the neutralization of a reunified Germany, on the assumption that such a status would inevitably cause a neutral Germany to gravitate toward the Eastern bloc, either as a "friendly" neighbor or actual participant.

The Christian Democrats have profited from the East-West split by closely identifying their foreign policy with that of the Western bloc. By intensely prosecuting this policy of Western cooperation, in line with the original "concept of Europe" approach favored by Konrad Adenauer, the CDU has emerged as the foremost spokesman of German reunification

aspirations. The "nationalist" approach taken by the SPD ran completely contrary to the post-war mentality of the German people. The foreign policy approach of the CDU constituted a positive appeal which has consistently won the support of the West German people. Despite the recent conversion of the Social Democrats to a policy similar to that of the CDU, it is probable that the Christian Democrats will continue to receive the overwhelming support of the German voters, due to their successful accomplishments and long-time identification with Western policy and European revisionism. The Government party does not favor any plan of reunification which would result in the curtailment of German power, such as the neutralization of a reunified Germany. The present Federal Government enjoys a prestigious and powerful position in the Western bloc and this status will not readily be surrendered for a power-diluted all-German state.

The Social Democrats have until recently pursued a rather negative foreign policy which has resulted in the party's stagnation and ineffectiveness. It has been assured of a steady bloc of votes from the working class which supports it, but the CDU has consistently won the support of marginal groups which were attracted to its more realistic and successful foreign policy. Although pursuit of the Godesberg Program may counteract this policy of negativism to some extent, the CDU is expected to retain its position of leadership until such time as its reunification policy becomes unrealizable, due to any future Western recognition of the status quo. If the Western powers should cease their support of the revisionistic objectives of the CDU, popular disenchantment would adversely affect the CDU position of leadership in the West German Republic. Such action by the Western powers could be effectively countered by the West German Government. There is always the possibility that the CDU leadership

might seek an accommodation with the Eastern bloc if the party's objectives were repudiated by the Western bloc. A change in orientation could presumably be accomplished without imperiling the political leadership of the CDU. A preliminary step in this direction might be the formation of a German confederation, such as proposed by Grotewohl in 1952. Since a German withdrawal from the Western bloc would destroy the effectiveness of NATO and undermine American interests and the balance of power in Europe, there is not much likelihood of a Western "betrayal" of the CDU and the German Federal Republic.

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