THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON METROPOLITAN TULSA 1929-1932

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THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON METROPOLITAN TULSA 1929-1932

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PREFACE

The Great Depression of the 1930's was international in scope. lxon Wecter's Age of the Great Depression, 1929-1941 has already de- ıiled its ramifications for the American people. The present study ɜss ambitiously attempts to deal with the few particulars of Tulsa's ɔcial life and institutions which the economic crisis most likely af- ɛcted. This monograph is also limited to a lesser number of years, ıose from 1929 through 1932; the theory being that the depression's ıitial impact was greatest.

In focus throughout are those Tulsa people which the business de- ine actually deprived of material necessities. But a host of others ay leading parts at various stages of the narrative. Of great im- rtance are those who tried to help the impoverished, whether they be ected or appointed public servants, or men and women assuming the avy burden of the good deed.

After a summary look at the causes of the economic collapse, an at- mpt is made to establish the degree of hardship suffered by Tulsans. e balance of the first six chapters is devoted to the efforts of local, ate and federal officials to aid those distressed, and to the attempts the unemployed to alleviate their own condition through organization. e remainder of the study delves into the institutional impact of the pression, thereby bringing the family, the schools and the churches to e front.

My principal adviser has been Dr. Theodore L. Agnew of the Oklahoma

ıte University History Department. Without Dr. Agnew's continued confi·
ıce in my ability, I could never have reasonably concluded the study.
offered many suggestions and made several requests, but gave no orders
ı laid down no demands. Others who, in an official capacity, have
ıd all or portions of the manuscript and given invaluable constructive
ltıcism include Dr. O. A. Hilton, Dr. LeRoy Fischer, Dr. Homer L.
ıght and Dr. H. J. Henderson.

Dr. John J. Beer loaned me a photocopy machine which enabled the
ɜembling of much data that otherwise might have been missed. Oklahoma
ıte University's library staff assisted in the location of beneficial
ːuments. Officials in Tulsa at the Chamber of Commerce, Public Library
ınty Courthouse, Public Schools, Ministerial Alliance, and the City Of-
ːes opened their files, and provided desks to work at and materials to
ːk with. Several churches and numerous individuals extended long-term
ıns of useful documents. Close friends and relations offered over-
ght lodging, transportation, and aid in the collection, arrangement
ı classification of statistical information. Mrs. Molly Reid, as she
ːurately typed the text, exercised her considerable experience and good
ıgment to prevent several mistakes.

CHAPTER I

FROM PROSPERITY TO DEPRESSION

Although numerous factors produced the Great Depression of the)'s, the regional and local importance of each cause varied widely. Tulsa the most significant causes were rooted in the city's twentieth :ury economic development.[1] At Red Rock, across the Arkansas River n Tulsa, oil was discovered in 1901. This first oil well in the area not set any production records, but it did indicate the possibility ı great new oil field. Only a slow and unreliable ferry connected ;a with the oil activities. Several citizens of the town, therefore, .t a bridge across the Arkansas and erected a modern hotel in order ıttract the petroleum business.[2] The oil men took advantage of these ımmodations, and Tulsa thus began an accelerated period of development :h continued for nearly thirty years.

Tulsa offered ample facilities for the traditional "boom town" .vities of the "roughnecks." It was to the "titans," however, that city fathers directed their special appeal. They foresaw that the :ers would soon be gone, but they hoped that the owners and producers .d be enticed to establish permanent residences and corporation offices.

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[1]The best single account of the early history of Tulsa is: Angie , Tulsa: From Creek Town to Oil Capital (Norman: University of homa Press, 1943).

[2]Workers of the Writers Program of the Works Progress Administration, homa: A Guide to the Sooner State (Norman: University of Oklahoma s, 1941), p. 208.

sa thus never became an oil town in the traditional sense of the m. Drilling rigs gradually disappeared from the surrounding area. ore they were gone, however, the city's special zoning laws, easy dit, reasonably priced building sites and excellent transportation ilities had gained some of the leading names in oil for the ranks of permanent citizenry.[3] As a logical result of the presence of the es and company headquarters of these men, Tulsa became the center of hority for the execution of oil operations in a five-state area.

The speculative fibre of the oil industry's commercial network led turn to the development of special financial institutions which could would handle business propositions that other banks would not con- er. Profits far exceeded losses, and these institutions were soon passed only by the banks of New York City in the financing of oil rations. No small part of the gains were used in the attraction of itional oil concerns to the city. Petroleum refining became Tulsa's ding industry, and the manufacture and distribution of products used the oil industry constituted its most important other enterprises. The y's importance as an oil center was increased by the acquisition of home offices of such organizations as the Mid-Continent Oil and Gas ociation, the Natural Gasoline Association of America, the Western Pe- leum Refineries Association, and the American Association of Petroleum ineers. It also became the site for the annual International Petroleum osition. By 1929 Tulsa was internationally famous as the oil capital the world.

This era of tremendous development caused a great population boom in

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[3]General Commercial Engineering Department, Southwestern Bell Telepho pany, Economic Survey of Oklahoma (St. Louis: Bell Telephone Company, 9), p. 258.

lsa. In 1900 it was a town with only 1,390 residents, but by 1929 it s a bustling city with 140,000 inhabitants.[4]

Year	Population	Increase
1900	1,390	.....
1907	7,098	6,308
1910	19,500	12,042
1920	76,966	57,466
1923	101,904	24,938
1929	140,000	38,096

Despite its colossal achievements in the first three decades of e twentieth century, the continued progress of Tulsa depended upon an stable set of factors. It was, to be sure, an oil metropolis, but its tural advantage for substantial growth in other industries and commer-al areas had been largely ignored. The city was confined to a single-dustry economy, and, therefore, the possibility of a setback was never y more or less remote than the likelihood of a crisis in the highly eculative oil industry as a whole.

An industry-by-industry analysis of Tulsa business activity during e 1920's reveals the precariously balanced nature of such an oil-pendent economy.[5] Oil, of course, set the pace, the oil men enjoying e profits of a series of booms, which were, however, divided by an almo ually frequent number of declines. A large portion of the profits from ese periods of prolific oil production were regularly being converted

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[4]Workers of the W. P. A. in the State of Oklahoma, Tulsa: A Guide to e Oil Capital (Tulsa: Mid-West Printing Company, 1938), p. 24.

[5]The analysis which follows is based upon data in: United States partment of Commerce, Industrial Employment Survey Bulletin (Washington S. Government Printing Office, 1921-1930), Vols. I-IX. This bulletin, sued monthly, summarizes the industrial activity in each state and in ery major city. Taken together, therefore, they provide a rough out-ne of the history of industrial activity in Tulsa for the entire cade.

to investments in other local industries. Tremendous expansion, there-
re, was usually taking place in these other industries at the same time
at declines were becoming noticeable in the oil industry. By the time
other spurt had taken place in oil production, the other industries--
ich by now had expended most of the investments made by the oil men--
re beginning to decline. The economic expansion of the 1920's in Tulsa
n thus be best characterized as a series of off-setting alternating
oms.

This unusual economic situation thus provided an unemployment safety
lve. The bulk of the labor surplus consisted of unskilled and semi-
illed workers. Such workers, because of the very nature of their work,
uld easily switch from job to job, and such alternate employment was
ually available. Many workers dislocated by a decline in the oil in-
stry were, therefore, readily absorbed by another industry which was
ing oil capital to carry out expansion. By thus making a transition
om one industry to another, in tune with the alternation of the booms,
ny workers were able to maintain their membership in the active labor
rce of the city. The relationship between oil and construction industr
s particularly close.

Even though the economy of the city rested on this rather uncertain
undation, the outlook for the future seemed to be good. Large scale
oduction in the Mid-Continent Oil Field was expected to continue for
ny years. Additional manufacturers of oil field equipment would probab
cate branch manufacturing plants in Tulsa in order better to serve the
st producing area of which the city was the recognized metropolis. Tul
d not, however, have to rely upon the rise or fall of production in nea
fields. The transactions of the oil titans were not limited by state
en national boundaries. The city's oil business was drawn from the ent

uthwestern United States and also from foreign countries such as Mexico d Venezuela.[6]

Large numbers of the unemployed, particularly the hard-hit farmers, re attracted to Tulsa by each successive boom. Labor had soon far outripped the number of available jobs, even during the booms. The unemoyment safety valve soon began to falter. The climax came in 1929, e year of the great stock market crash, when over-production drasticall wered prices in the oil industry. This resulted from the opening of th eat fields at Seminole, at Oklahoma City and in East Texas. With crude l selling for one cent per barrel, the oil companies attempted systemically to reduce output. The curtailment of expansion in other city terprises followed naturally, and Tulsa's economy collapsed.[8]

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[6]Tulsa Chamber of Commerce, Industrial Survey of Tulsa (Tulsa: amber of Commerce, 1929), p. 88.

[7]Debo, Tulsa: From Creek Town to Oil Capital, p. 111.

[8]The author is well aware that no one single factor was the cause this depression, and that such explanations are rightfully regarded th suspicion. The explanation here differs in emphasis rather than viewpoint from these more general interpretations. See Frederick vis Allen, Only Yesterday (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931), pp. 2-343 for a full list of causes.

CHAPTER II

RELIEF: THE FIRST WINTER

Unemployment had been increasing in Tulsa since early in 1929. Litt
:tention had been given to it, however, either by local officials or by
ıe public in general. The very nature of Tulsa's economic institutions
:obably played a part in concealing the true state of the city's unem-
.oyment situation. In 1929 only one-half of one percent of Tulsa's
ıctories employed more than 1,000 wage earners.[1] Those employing more
ıan 500 workers were only 1.4 percent of the whole, and but 3.4 percent
ıployed more than 250. The numerically small group employing more than
000 workers each, while including the largest employers, accounted for
.ightly less than 25 percent of all wage earners. Plants which em-
.oyed 500 or less had 61.9 percent of all the workers on their payrolls.
ıctories employing fewer than 100 workers constituted 87.2 percent of
.l manufacturing institutions and employed 28.8 percent of all the
ırkers. None of the large plants, those employing more than 500 workers
.ut down completely, but rather they let employees go slowly. The small
ants did not employ, as individual units, enough workers for layoffs in
.y one plant to affect appreciably the total employment picture.

City and county officials may have been unaware at first that an

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[1]These percentages are calculated from basic data found in: United
ates Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of
e United States: Manufactures, 1929 (Washington: United States
vernment Printing Office, 1933), p. 431.

ergency existed. At any rate, they took no steps to aid those affected it. When charity agencies of the city and county began to report increased loads, city officials did little more at first than to suggest e institution of a placement bureau for the unemployed. While they deted the means of obtaining funds for such a program, on October 26, 30, the Tulsa Tribune launched an Odd Job Bureau. The decision to open e agency followed a minor labor disturbance in the downtown district. lsa authorities believed that false rumors were responsible for the ief trouble. Some local unemployed men thought that the labor involved demolishing a half-block of buildings on the site of a new federal ilding were "out-of-towners."[2]

An alliance between city authorities and private enterprise was erefore created, with the Tribune supplying funds and advertising and e city providing an office for the project and a staff of city workers. e Bureau stressed that it could not promise work to the hundreds of rsons expected to register. Registration lists were to be given to ntractors and they would be asked to use them if possible. The Tribune on announced that there were 2,300 persons in the city who were out of rk.[3] Approximately seventy percent of the names listed in the unemoyed roles were those of white men, twenty-five percent Negro men, ree percent white women, and two percent Negro women. The majority the men registering were common laborers. Some, however, were seeking erical office work and others semi-skilled work. Between 72 and 73

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[2] Tulsa Tribune, October 26, 1930, p. 1.

[3] Ibid, November 25, 1930, p. 1.

ercent were married.[4] A month later the Tribune revealed that jobs had en found for 3,208 persons.[5] These were in the majority of instances, wever, temporary positions.

Mayor George L. Watkins was convinced by early November that unemoyment was so drastic that it demanded a more aggressive public policy. therefore requested Harry H. Rogers, a prominent local banker, to ad a mayor's committee on unemployment.[6] This administrative system s based on a suggestion made by President Hoover's Committee for Emoyment. The President's Committee had suggested that such local comttees be staffed with representatives of labor and industry as well as th public officials and welfare administrators.[7] This suggestion was llowed closely in selecting personnel for the Tulsa committee. The dy was made responsible for fund raising, the administration of work lief, the coordination of direct relief, and for publicity and research

A cautious spending policy was developing among employed laborers as result of their observations of heavy layoffs. If businessmen were de aware of this, Mayor Watkins was convinced that they would "stop ring and start hiring."[8] The mayor's committee tried to get all

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[4]Tulsa Tribune, November 25, 1930, p. 1. A federal census taken at is time, but not published until several years later, reveals that ther re actually 4,317 persons in the city without employment: United States partment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the ited States: Unemployment, 1930. (Washington: United States Governmen inting Office, 1933), p. 816.

[5]Tulsa Tribune, November 25, 1930, p. 1.

[6]Tulsa World, November 3, 1930, p. 1.

[7]The President's Emergency Committee for Employment and the Presint's Organization on Unemployment Relief, Community Plans and Actions, mbers 1-3 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931-32).

[8]Tulsa World, November 3, 1930, p. 1.

ɔssible Tulsa employers to agree that no reduction in the wage scale or ıe number of persons employed would take place in their establishments tcept for inefficiency. Favorable replies were quick in coming. The ld-Continent Petroleum Company endorsed the committee's continuous em- loyment resolution, thus assuring its approximately 1,600 Tulsa em- .oyees of permanent positions with no salary cuts during the winter. ıe Tulsa offices of the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company restored ɔnfidence to its 600 employees by approving the plan a few days later. ' Thanksgiving Day it was estimated that some 12,000 Tulsans had re- ɨived pledges that their jobs were secure in this movement.[9]

In early December, 1930, a city employment bureau was established. : differed from the earlier Tribune-sponsored organization in that it ɔught jobs of a more permanent nature for the applicants it received. 'ulsa jobs for jobless Tulsans" was the motto of the new concern, but ıough the plan seemed to be working at first, a shattering fact soon ıs apparent. There simply were more jobless Tulsans than there were ılsa jobs. Spending slumped after Christmas, and, in the early days of .nuary, the unemployment problem reached its most acute proportions yet.

Ever greater numbers of people were forced to turn to the county for .d. By January, 1931, some 2,000 people were regularly visiting the ɔunty Humane Society to obtain grocery orders or a check to pay rent, .s, light or medicine bills.[10] The lines were so long on some days that .e relief seekers flooded the corridors and spilled over onto the court ɔuse steps. It was soon obvious that county funds could not outlast the

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[9]Tulsa Tribune, November 26, 1930, p. 2.

[10]Tulsa World, January 7, 1931, p. 3.

nter charity needs. Under an agreement which existed between Community nd directors and the county, those agencies of the Fund which furnished od and shelter to families had concerned themselves with persons who d been in Tulsa for less than six months, while those qualified as lega sidents were handled by the county.[11] Under the stress of emergency, wever, the Community Fund agencies did not stand on the letter of this ipulation. They gave aid to all they could.

County officials believed that their funds would last until January . The Family Welfare Society, foremost of the Fund agencies, agreed to ke over the county's load on that date. It was oiling its machinery to so when, on January 9, the money was gone. The next morning the chari ne was sent to the red brick house at 206 South Cheyenne Avenue, where ny of the city's relief agencies had their headquarters. There the ne wound so far back from the entrance that people called the head- arters of the Family Welfare Society asking whether a mob was attemptin loot its offices.[12]

Overwhelmed by this onslaught of the unemployed, the directors of e Family Welfare Society had to find some way to distinguish the needy om the "deadbeats." An organization was needed, it was believed, to vestigate "real" need and to prevent the spread of voluntary indigency. ss Margaret Woodson of Kansas City, therefore, was brought to Tulsa to chairman of a special relief organization.[13] She was a professional cial worker trained in the case work principle. Before relief was anted, the home of each applicant was visited and the actual condition

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[11] Tulsa Tribune, January 10, 1931, p. 2.

[12] Tulsa World, January 10, 1931, p. 2.

[13] Tulsa Tribune, March 15, 1931, p. 3.

the family observed. The workers sought out those whose ills stemmed om involuntary unemployment, and then attempted to find the way they uld be relieved permanently and economically. Men applying for relief, aiming to be unemployed, and maintaining that they had made an honest fort to correct this condition, were asked to work for the Society in turn for relief. The Society, with fifteen volunteers aiding Miss odson, assumed, investigated and aided 419 cases in the first four days ter it took over the county load.[14]

In January of 1930 the case load of the Family Welfare Society had en 450 cases. By January of 1931 its case load had increased to approximately 1,500 cases. The budget of the Society from November 1, 1930 November 1, 1931 had been set at $38,000. By March, 1931, the agency d already expended $36,000. From November 1, 1929 to November 1, 1930 e Family Welfare Society had aided 1,700 cases. From November 1, 1930 July 1, 1931, it aided 3,415. This was twice as many in eight months it had aided in a year before.[15]

Families Cared For	1930	1931
January.....	673	1,506
February.....	621	1,900
March.....	637	1,772
April.....	553	1,532
May.....	457	1,275
June.....	417	1,200

On the subject of the increased activities of the Family Welfare :iety, the Secretary of the organization, Mrs. Grace Cone, commented: ıe moral of the story seems to be that we have more applicants who have :en our time, but to each we have been forced to give less relief than

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[14] Tulsa World, January 15, 1931, p. 3.

[15] (Tulsa) Family Welfare Society, Report of the Year's Work, 1931, 4.

would have in normal times."[16] The Society had special reasons for
ıting to do a good job. If increased contributions to carry them throug
: emergency were to be secured, they would have to prove their capacity
handle relief problems adequately. They were endeavouring to prove,
line with the lofty ideas of social work, the efficacy of investigatior
discriminating between the needy and imposters. They wanted to
ıonstrate through the flexibility and economy of their work that the
ıation of emergency agencies, which was being discussed, would be un-
ıessary. Perhaps the most extreme opponents of private charity in
ısa were the labor groups, and it was largely due to criticism from
'kingmen that the Family Welfare Society felt it needed so badly to
ıve itself. Extreme labor elements felt that charitable agencies were
ıt "an aristocratic concession to poverty."[17]

Meanwhile, the Tulsa County Humane Society awaited additional funds
ıh which to work. Private enterprise cooperated in the interim. The
ıtern States Grocery Company and Safeway Stores loaded a truck with
.00 pounds of beans, 3,600 pounds of flour, 12,500 pounds of corn meal,
) pounds of rice, 15 large cases of peanut butter, 17 cases of sandwich
'ead, and a large collection of miscellaneous groceries and delivered
ım to the Humane Society.[18] The Banfield Packing Company gave a large
ıply of salt pork and pigs feet.[19] The bakeries of Tulsa were doing
ıir part in supplying 1,000 loaves of bread per day.[20] These foods

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[16] Tulsa Tribune, January 15, 1931, p. 1.

[17] Tulsa Unionist-Journal, February, 1931, p. 5.

[18] Tulsa World, January 17, 1931, p. 2.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Tulsa Tribune, March 15, 1931, p. 2.

re distributed in unprepared form rather than as sandwiches. W. L. rth, chairman of the county commissioners, had firmly declared his position to needy families being forced into "living out of a sack."[21]

County officials made an effort to transfer funds from other depart- nts of the government to the aid of the Humane Society. The idea was opped, however, when North was told by the state Supreme Court in an formal advisory opinion that it would be unlawful to transfer funds propriated for other causes.[22] With it appearing that the county would stymied in its relief efforts until the adoption of a new budget in ly, a month-long series of conferences of city officials and other terested citizens ensued in an effort to find some way of easing the ffering of the unemployed. The atmosphere of these discussions was ise. Already there had been at least two minor demonstrations by the employed. Both of these attempts to attract attention had failed due a lack of response by the proposed participants. Some Tulsa officials ired that not a few among the unemployed would resort to force and olence rather than to submit to the humiliation of relief from public private charity.

Tulsa authorities were thus convinced that more extensive and fferent methods of relief were needed in order to preserve the public ice. This feeling was perhaps best expressed by a local officeholder n he declared:

> The situation is acute, but I am confident that we will get relief somehow, somewhere. We must have it. We don't want anything to happen in Tulsa like they had over there in Oklahoma City Friday when an army of unemployed persons stormed the city hall making demands for relief.[23]

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[21] Tulsa World, January 17, 1931, p. 2.

[22] Ibid.

.sa officials became even more alarmed a short while later when another :ident, more drastic than the one referred to, took place at the .ahoma capital. Three hundred members of the Oklahoma City Unemployed ıncil marched on a grocery store there demanding food. It had taken) officers to put down the trouble, and the incident attracted nation-le attention. What was particularly disturbing to Oklahoma City of-:ials, and to Tulsa leaders as well, was the fact that though the march l been made by an obviously radical element, some 3,000 persons had :hered to watch, and many had cheered the group on.[24]

From the conference of civic leaders there finally emerged an im-.iate relief measure. The mayor's committee had advanced a plan where-some $10,000 would be made available to put 550 unemployed Tulsans to k on public works projects.[25] The plan evolved from the theory that was better for men to work for their keep than to receive charity, and m a desire to prevent the burden on relief agencies from growing any vier. It was also felt that this type of program would be more bene-ial to the community. The city would receive some return on the money ested. The program, however, immediately drew the heavy criticism of organized private philanthrophy groups. These elements questioned assumption of the committee that such made-work was all that was neede do away with pauperism and unemployment. These charity organizations o feared that funds procured through what they called "high pressure licity" would not offset the decrease that could be anticipated in

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[24]Oklahoma City Times, January 20, 1931, p. 1. See also: David A. nnon, The Great Depression (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-l, Inc., 1960), pp. 119-120.

[25]Tulsa Tribune, January 28, 1931, p. 2.

rect contributions to the existing agencies.[26]

Those Tulsans who had been fortunate enough to maintain their jobs re called upon to participate in the financing of this project. Em-oyees were asked to authorize their employers to deduct a minimum of fty cents a week from their salaries during the next three months. Em-oyers were then to match their employees' contributions, and the money ıld be turned in weekly to the city finance department. Since, however : all citizens could be reached in such an employer-employee canvass, committee mailed some 5,000 letters to other citizens asking for oscriptions that would pay a man for three days work on public works ojects arranged by the city engineer.[27] Trusting in the people of lsa to respond, a group of bankers advanced an interest-free $10,000 the committee so that work could begin immediately.[28]

According to the provisions of this plan, those employed would work ree days a week, receiving $3 per day for their time.[29] In addition to practical economic considerations, this rate of pay was agreed upon ause it was believed that normal wage rates would tend to attract kers away from regular industry. Many industries had cut their wages ing the depression in order to enable the continuation of work for all ıds. It was also felt that fewer of the "undeserving" would be drawn the program if the rate of payment was kept low. Although the committe l not define the term, it can probably be assumed that they were re-ring to migratory workers. Not only low pay, but the method of payment

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[26]Tulsa World, January 30, 1931, p. 7.

[27]Tulsa World, January 28, 1931, p. 3.

[28]Tulsa Tribune, February 1, 1931, p. 2.

[29]Tulsa World, January 31, 1931, p. 4.

to be used to safeguard against such abuses. Workers were to be paid scrip, a special form of credit slip, to be issued by the city finance artment. Apparently this plan was adopted at least partly out of a r that the money paid the workers would be misspent. It is to the dit of the committee, however, that they devised a plan whereby the ker would receive greater value for his pay when paid in scrip than did when he was paid in cash.

The scrip was to be redeemable only at a central commissary to be ned by the committee on unemployment.[30] In order that the funds paid unemployed would have increased purchasing power, food and clothes e to be sold at wholesale prices in the commissary. To avoid infringe-cs of this privilege, no sales for cash were to be made. Workers were be allowed to convert their scrip into checks at this distributing ter, but these checks could be cashed only at the city finance depart-, by landlords and by gas and electric offices. None of the executive harge of the commissary were to receive pay. Clerks at the commis- were to be selected from the ranks of the unemployed and paid in p.

This combination made-work and commissary plan did not meet with un-nous approval. Labor groups criticized it both because the wages were regular and because the participants were not to be paid in cash.[31] of the small merchants protested that the city had no right to engage trade at their expense.[32] And some of the unemployed later protested

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[30] Tulsa Tribune, February 1, 1931, p. 2.

[31] Tulsa Unionist-Journal, March, 1931, p. 2.

[32] Tulsa World, February 1, 1931, p. 4.

lack of courtsey on the part of clerks selected from their own
cs.[33] But none of these protests were more than weak murmurs at
st.

At daybreak on the morning of Tuesday, January 27, 1931, a long
jue of men formed at the entrance to the office of the city's
:ral employment bureau on Cincinnati Avenue.[34] It had been an-
ıced that manpower utilized in the new made-work program would have
st to be investigated by the unemployment committee or by one of the
ıcies of the Community Fund. Those obtaining work were supposed to
:esent the neediest families in Tulsa. These men now waited an op-
:unity to get inside and place their applications for jobs which
city administration had promised would be ready. This was the his-
:c date for the launching of Tulsa's first work relief program.

Almost every type of man, it was reported, was found among the first
ıp of workers. Administrators of the program made every effort to put
ı available man to work. One man with a wooden leg was given a job
:ping out a warehouse.[35] Work relief for men consisted chiefly of
y outdoor work. Two hundred men were put to work leveling hillocks,
ning up river banks, and moving rockpiles in Newblock Park. Another
hundred men were dispatched in crews of a dozen to repair ruts beside
pavement, sweep the streets, clean up the backyards of West Tulsa,

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[33] Ibid.

[34] Tulsa Tribune, January 28, 1931, p. 3.

[35] Ibid., January 27, 1931, p. 2.

in dumps, build roads and clean out lakes.[36] Exactly 1,480 jobs were
en Tulsa residents by the plan during the first week. The men working
4,676 dependents, making of total of 6,156 persons benefiting.[37]
With emergency relief measures now taken to correct the unemployment
ation, Mayor Watkins announced that any labor disturbance growing out
he problem would be dealt with summarily by police:

> Information has come to city officials that certain individuals whose prime purpose in life is to destroy government, incite riot, and create havoc among the people are now at work in Tulsa. In view of the fact that arrangements have been made and are now in operation for caring for the needy citizens... such persons will not be tolerated nor allowed to ply their trade in this vicinity. The police have instructions to arrest any person or persons who attempt by word of mouth, act or deed to incite the populace and such persons will be dealt with summarily.[38]

The mayor's committee had estimated that for the approximately
0 unemployed Tulsans, a made-work payroll of $10,880 per week would
equired for twelve weeks. This meant, figuring $9 a week for each
that 10,000 Tulsa employees had to authorize their employers to de-
at least fifty cents a week from their wages with the employers
hing these contributions in the same amount.[39] Response of firms and
viduals to appeals for cooperation in the employer-employee financing
s were at first considered good. Among the early 100 percent sub-
bers were six oil companies, thirteen merchants, and all the city's
s. The Tulsa Retail Merchant Association rallied to the support of
plan. Most of the firms which quickly delivered funds reported that

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[36] Ibid.

[37] Tulsa World, January 28, 1931, p. 2.

[38] Tulsa World, January 26, 1931, p. 2.

[38] Tulsa Tribune, February 1, 1931, p. 2.

average contribution of their employees was more than the fifty cents eek suggested as a minimum. One company gave a unique twist to the n. Payroll contributions of $120 per week were taken out in scrip by company and used to hire back persons formerly employed by the pany but released during the depression.[40]

The hiring of large numbers of men for public works stimulated the loyment of individuals to work about homes and business houses on odd s. The reason was that sales of scrip to private individuals and firms begun. Individuals were urged to purchase the scrip and pay off kers with it, or turn it back to the city so that it could be used to e additional workers for public projects. An indication that the $9 week earned by the men was sufficient was seen in the fact that more a $9,000 in scrip was outstanding on February 19. Thus it seemed that money earned by the men had not only fed their families but also pro-ed a little surplus. It had, incidentally, been decided that scrip ld be stamped "negotiable" at the city commissary and then used for le with merchants anywhere in the city.[41]

Foreign immigrants to this country have at times had cause to com-in about the reception they received. Such immigrants, however, have er known a more persistent scorn than the Tulsa officials had for rants from other cities and other states who arrived in the city during depression. Committee members had noticed an apparent influx of ters soon after they announced the new made-work program and empha-ed that only Tulsa residents would be cared for. But, as knowledge he new plan spread, transients came in ever greater numbers hoping

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[40] Ibid.

[41] (Tulsa) Report of the Mayor's Committee on Unemployment, February 1931, p. 1

rash the gates. It seemed to one committee member as if: "the en- Mexican population of the Adamson Coal Mining Company, east of Tulsa now shut down migrated.[42] The problem created here, however, was ly solved. The committee required naturalization papers before giving Mexicans jobs. Mayor Watkins in the meantime ordered a police drive lear all the transients out of town. Falsification of the records itted by workers were sometimes discovered and compensation denied. The insistence of the mayor's committee on its right to investigate oughly every man placed on a job through the employer-employee fund to a clash with state authorities. A letter from E. N. Ellis, state oyment officer in Tulsa, to state labor commissioner W. A. Murphy ged the committee with refusing to accept men whom Ellis had recom- ed without further investigation. The letter also stated that the ittee was not allowing a fair share of men to the office of Ellis to mployed.[43] The committee refused to yield. It unanimously adopted solution which bluntly declared that all men hired to do scrip work d have to be cleared through the city central employment bureau or of the agencies available in the Community Fund. To ensure an even vigorous enforcement of the rule, a special group was appointed to d up investigation procedures. Pending more complete financial reports the perfection of the investigation system, the mayor reduced crews on ic works for a limited period.[44]

Although the committee's research did not reveal that unemployment on the decrease, H. C. Tyrell, chairman of the employer-employee fund,

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[42] Ibid.

[43] Tulsa Tribune, February 8, 1931, p. 2.

[44] Ibid.

ed his belief that the original estimate of 5,000 unemployed heads
milies was too high. On his recommendation, therefore, the committee
ed its goal of an income of $45,000 weekly for the employment of such
lents to $20,000 a week, which for a time they believed would meet the
of the Tulsa citizenry. At the same time Tyrell declared:

> The response of firms and individuals to our appeal is highly gratifying. I don't know of more than two instances in which an organization has failed to cooperate and in both cases it was a branch office with headquarters outside the state. I am confident that our $20,000 weekly income will be subscribed within ten days.[45]

By February 15th, however, it was evident that the number of men
employed would have to be curtailed if more funds were not received.
receipts at this stage under the plan amount to about $5,000 a week,
as $13,000 a week was necessary to keep the program in minimum oper-
.[46] Believing that a large number of firms had started subscription
, and therefore, that additional funds would shortly materialize, the
ttee allowed its expenditures to exceed weekly income by about $18,000.
Additional funds did not, however, immediately develop. In view of
fact, the committee decided that a special campaign was necessary to
trimming the number of jobs being supplied. Nearly 2,000 individuals
een given three days of work at $3 a day during the three weeks the
had been in operation, but the unemployment problem was far from
d. A direct appeal was thus made to the citizenry to subscribe funds
nemployment relief at once. The petition issued by the mayor's com-
e read:

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[45] Tulsa World, February 10, 1931, p. 3.

[46] Tulsa Tribune, February 15, 1931, p. 2.

[47] Ibid.

No movement in the history of Tulsa has done more to stabilize business and prevent panic than the present system of providing work for the deserving unemployed residents of the city.

The employees of a large number of concerns have pledged amounts of fifty cents a week over a period of twelve weeks to finance the issuance of scrip for this purpose. Many employers are matching the contributions of employees. The response has been generous and gratifying, but sufficient funds have not been pledged to take care of all the deserving applicants for work.

In fact, the committee faces a deficit and must immediately curtail, to some extent, the number of men to be employed daily unless, and until, additional contributions are received. This is a responsibility of every citizen whether he be an employee or employer, a business or professional man.[48]

Although the public response was never as good as the committee had nally hoped it would be, sufficient contributions were received to the program going. By March 1 scrip had been issued in the amount 5,641, with five thousand employable persons receiving approximately ach from this source.[49] Three thousand and twelve men were paid in for work done in March of 1931, which with dependents meant that an ated 10,000 persons benefited.[50] In addition many men and women were temporary outside jobs. The scrip program was scheduled to expire r 1, but because an estimated 3,000 were still unemployed, many of vith dependents, employment relief was extended for as long as the available would last.[51] In April the committee was spending $8,500 ek paying men working on public projects.[52]

y the late spring of 1931, however, it was evident that unemployment

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[48] Tulsa Tribune, February 20, 1931, p. 3.

[49] (Tulsa) Report of the Mayor's Committee on Unemployment, March, p. 1.

[50] (Tulsa) Report of the Mayor's Committee on Unemployment, April, p. 1.

[51] Ibid., May, 1931, p. 1.

[52] Ibid.

ıd consequent demands for relief were constantly increasing. Local ınds would soon be exhausted. With summer coming, the city abruptly ıncluded its special emergency efforts, leaving permanent public and ·ivate relief agencies to carry on as best they could. Tulsa's ten- ıncy to limit its emergency relief to the winter inspired some criticism representatives of private agencies. These groups were not satisfied th the spasmodic, seasonal character of charity work carried on by ecial committees.

On May 15, citizens of Tulsa holding the balance of the scrip issued the relief effort were asked to turn it in. The city commissary was be closed. Approximately $2,500 worth of scrip was still in the hands individuals who had either worked for it or purchased it to pay for e services of persons working under the unemployment organization.[53] all $93,623 in scrip was sold during the campaign, resulting, so the mmittee said, in 32,000 jobs for the unemployed.[54] Roy B. Hinkle, ecial agent for the Federal Department of Labor for Missouri, Kansas, lahoma, Arkansas, and Tennessee, gave Tulsa credit for handling the tuation more effectively than any other city in the country.[55]

The partial success of the city's made-work program during the winte 1931 indirectly created friction between Tulsa officials and state thorities. Indiscriminate soup lines had never been popular with the lsans in control of relief. Such aid had been of greatest benefit for ɜ transient population, in one day and out the next. Yet, just at the

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[53](Tulsa) Report of the Mayor's Committee on Unemployment, May, 31, p. 2.

[54]Ibid.

[55]Tulsa World, May 17, 1931, p. 3.

lme that the Tulsa depression problem had been curtailed, Governor lliam H. Murray ordered the establishment of state soup kitchens in ıe city.

Opposition quickly developed to the Murray order. This criticism ıs strongest among the directors of Tulsa's private philanthropic ;encies, who had gained a great deal of influence when they rescued the)unty during the winter. These leaders maintained that the poor should : aided not in promiscuous masses at public distributing points, but by .sits to their homes. They believed that indiscriminate relief would ıdermine the self-respect of the recipient, since individual capacity ıd responsibility were not taken into consideration. They, in short,)posed any kind of aid which did not take into appraisal its effect upor ıe receivers.[56] City officials were, on the other hand, not so much ncerned with the idealistic side of the issue. In fact, they had rlier, before the adoption of the new program, requested a state soup tchen for West Tulsa. But they did fear that relief distribution with- t proper investigation would draw undesirable persons to the city to are with the unemployed the funds available. Mayor Watkins, therefore, ntacted Murray requesting that the state not interfere in local relief ministration by the establishment of the free food camp he proposed. e governor replied that the reports of his state relief workers indi- ted that "in one of the outlying districts food is necessary to be spensed free."[57] The governor went on to declare that he would not re- ll the soup kitchens until the city furnished provision for feeding

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[56]Tulsa Tribune, March 15, 1931, p. 3.

[57]Tulsa World, February 1, 1931, p. 5.

ese persons.[58]

The loose handling of the state relief organization brought the ath of Tulsa down on Murray more than once. The governor had left the pression with those whom he commissioned to spread the state relief nd over Oklahoma that they had authority to feed all they found hungry. rray's Tulsa representative Colonel L. W. Rook authorized J. P. Gal-gher, manager of the Light House Mission, to charge purchases to the ate relief fund. Gallagher fed hundreds with the aid of this credit, ly to find his bill disallowed. The governor claimed that Gallagher ver had official sanction, and that nothing but personal subscriptions uld liquidate the debt. Tulsa wholesalers were forced to take the ss.[59]

When the intensity of the relief crisis was temporarily alleviated the spring of 1931, Richard Lloyd Jones, editor of the Tulsa Tribune, ok a belated slap at the governor. His editorial apparently reflected rong local sentiment against the meddling of Murray:

> Tulsa has been able to take care of its own. That was the decision by the representatives of relief and civic agencies... when it was announced that Governor Murray planned to send soup kitchens into Tulsa.
>
> The unemployment situation in the state was serious. With characteristic lack of discrimination Governor Murray jumped into the breach. It meant little to him that some communities could care for their own while others were robbed of all self-support.
>
> Tulsa did well when it declined state aid for its needy. Confidence in its local agencies prompted it to decline with thanks. And, again, the sufficiency of one centralized body to administer local relief is established.[60]

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[58] Ibid.

[59] Tulsa World, May 1, 1931, p. 2.

[60] Tulsa Tribune, May 1, 1931, p. 10.

At approximately the same time that the made-work program was put o operation in Tulsa, a group of physicians and health workers repre- ting the city, the county, the Public Health Association and the nty Medical Society had drawn up plans for a free medical service for unemployed. Medical expenses for the impoverished were reduced by enlargement of the City Health Bureau. City hospital student nurses e detailed to the Bureau, and various physicians agreed to donate ir time. A group of druggists agreed to fill prescriptions issued by clinic at wholesale prices. Hospitalization, including minor surgi- work, was provided in some cases.

Only persons recommended by the city's relief agencies were admitted the clinic. Special equipment for the clinic, as well as the actual t of the drugs used, were paid from the employer-employee fund of the or's committee on unemployment. In the first two months of its opera- n, 2,309 persons were treated in the clinic and thirty-two homes were ited.[61] The doctors participating in the clinic also agreed to continu care for their own patients who had become dependents.

Some Tulsa families were deprived completely of shelter. Many of n took residence in the crudest kind of shacks at the outskirts of city or merely lived in the open. Believing that it was foolish to people be evicted from one house only to have to find another for them, county asked many landlords to help by reducing the rent of needy llies, and in some cases it was reportedly cut in half. The problem finding new housing for relief families became more difficult as llies were forced to move more frequently. Many landlords seem to preferred to leave their properties vacant rather than accept relief

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[61] Tulsa Tribune, March 15, 1931, p. 7.

ilies as tenants. The classified advertising section of the city's major daily newspapers indicate a constant growth in the number of ilable rental units while at the same time Tulsa's relief organizations ducted a persistent search for such housing. The problem of adequate sing was never really satisfactorily solved. The situation became so tical, in fact, that Governor Murray later asked the department of the y for tents to provide shelter for squatters.[62]

One of the most disturbing outgrowths of the great depression was the blem of a migratory population. Men, great numbers of small boys, some eless women and girls, and sometimes entire families left their homes wander about the country. The reluctance of Tulsa officials to extend ilar benefits to these persons has already been discussed. This at- ide was quite in contrast to that which prevailed in Oklahoma City. the latter city a temporary village for non-resident families, with e rudimentary conveniences and with a public school for children, was ablished.

As a consequence of the hostile Tulsa attitude toward migrants, its isient problem soon became acute. Some revelations of drastic poverty ig these groups finally prompted the city to provide food and shelter the transients until they could get out of town. The adoption of this policy was prompted by the discovery of nearly twenty persons near the er in Newblock Park where they had been living in crude shanties and tents.[63] A sociologist making a national study of the transient

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[62](Tulsa) Report of the Subcommittee on Transients, Mayor's Committee Unemployment, February 15, 1931, p. 1.

[63]Ibid., p. 2.

blem wrote:

> One woman, camped near Tulsa at the edge of a swamp, told me as she scratched away at the boils on her face, how healthy it is camping out of doors. Three hundred feet away, eight out of twelve in two families were sick with malaria.[64]

y officials arranged for these people and others to be transferred to rch basements and to the fairground buildings during the winter.

Private agencies such as the Salvation Army and the local rescue sions provided food and shelter for men. In Tulsa these agencies ob- ned some aid from the Community Fund in their operations. The Mission Redeeming Love, the Salvation Army, the Hiland Home, and the Light se Mission, all, at one time or another, handled the transient problem the Fund. During its tenure as the Fund's official agent, the Salva- n Army maintained transient men for a maximum of three days during ir stay in the city. Such an arrangement, it was felt, gave the men ficient time to find jobs in Tulsa if any were available, and if not move on to some other place. While at the home they were served two ls per day.

Children who had an insufficient or unbalanced diet at home were bled to stay in school through an expansion of school lunch funds. ent-Teacher Associations participated actively in relief programs in individual schools. Although the Independent Party, an organization the unemployed, was unsuccessful in its efforts to secure free lunches city schools, the installation of the ten cent lunch was arranged to in with the opening of the 1931-1932 term. The lunch included a sand- h filled with meat or a meat substitute, two hot vegetables and milk.[65]

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[64] Robert Wilson, "Transient Families," The Family, XVI (December, 0), pp. 243-251.

[65] (Tulsa) Report of the Central Clothing Dispensary, Mayor's Com- tee on Unemployment, April, 1931, p. 1.

lan to aid children who could not go to school because of a lack of table clothing was begun by the Parent-Teacher Association Council.

A central clothing dispensary was established on Bundle Sunday, ember 5, 1930, when Tulsans laid thousands of bundles of clothes on ir front porches. By June of 1931 at least one thousand adults and ldren had received 30,910 garments from this dispensary.[66] And there e many other relief services of a varied sort. The city water depart- t extended credit to needy persons under an established policy. The ahoma Natural Gas Company cooperated with the Mayor's Committee in ex- ding credit and giving free service. Between November, 1930 and May, 1, more than $5000 worth of free gas was furnished to more than 500 dy families, with more than 6,000 persons benefiting.[67] A recreation gram for the unemployed which stressed citizenship was carried on by YMCA at various locations in Tulsa.

Unfortunately for the cause of an effective permanent relief program, Mayor's Committee on Unemployment failed to consolidate the gains it made during the winter of 1931. It relaxed its efforts as soon as initial crisis was passed. It now turned to stop-gap measures for the ner of 1931 after its made-work program had come to an end. The com- tee had learned that there were many unemployed persons under its ervision who intended providing their families against hunger during summer by cultivating a garden. Aware of the potentialities of such lon, the committee authorized a city-wide canvass of vacant lots to ain plots for the use of Tulsa's registered unemployed. The committee

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[66](Tulsa) Report of the Central Clothing Dispensary, Mayor's Committe Jnemployment, April, 1931, p. 1.

[67](Tulsa) Report of the Subcommittee on Free Public Utilities, Mayor' nittee on Unemployment, May, 1931, p. 1.

also hopeful that thousands of owners of vacant lots could be perded to rent them on a share basis and furnish the necessary garden lements and seeds. In some cases free use of land was offered, and the unemployed were unable to take advantage of it due to their ancial condition. The committee therefore worked out a plan whereby ls were provided and seeds obtained through the free-seeds fund set by the state legislature.[68]

The garden project put hundreds of families back on the basis of at st partial self-support within the few weeks required for the maturing garden crops. In some cases these gardens offered a means of suppleting low wages with early morning labor. Crops included potatoes, ns, cabbage, corn, beets, squashes, and pumpkins for the most part. nips were produced where the soil was unsuitable for anything else. plus produce was sold by the gardeners to private consumers. The preent for this program was the city's endeavor during World War I when re was a speecial need for the growing of all kinds of fruits and vegeles. During 1917 and 1918 hundreds of vacant lots had been cultivated Tulsa. Real estate board officials worked closely with the sub-comtee appointed by Mayor Watkins in working out plans for listing ilable lands.[69] All in all, however, this program proved too small too scattered to make much of a dent in relief needs. The failure the city to provide a more complete program of relief during the summer ld mean another panic effort the following fall.

For various reasons unemployment had not been considered a serious

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[68](Tulsa) Report of the Subcommittee on the Cultivation of Vacant s, Mayor's Committee on Unemployment, June, 1931, p. 1.

[69]Ibid., p. 2.

lem by officials until late in 1930. Once its severity was recog-
d, efforts to correct it were, at least initially, clumsy and mis-
cted. City officials persisted in viewing the troublesome situation
temporary condition. Tulsa authorities in the beginning tried
ly to correlate an over-estimated number of jobs with an under-
mated number of workers. No thorough measures were taken until the
ustion of the county's relief funds forced a more realistic view of
situation. Partly because of the social theory of these officials
partly because of the fear of disorder among the unemployed, a made-
program and other activities were entered into by the city under
direction of a new, aggressive Mayor's Committee on Unemployment.
ort for the program was not what had been expected, but there was
icient response to enable considerable alleviation of the ills of un-
oyment.

There appeared during the winter the first signs of several differ-
s of opinion which were in the future destined to curtail the ef-
iveness of relief efforts. Sharply opposing points of view grew
the matter of the purpose of relief and the method of distributing
City officials tended to take a practical, economic view, while pro-
ional social workers in the charity agencies viewed relief as a re-
litation process. A combination of these views, as well as Governor
ay's loose handling of the state relief program, led to a quarrel
een state and local officials. They had already quarreled once over
stigation procedures, a problem which could be directly traced, at
t in part, to the deep resentment of Tulsans for transients.

The failure of the county to provide sufficient funds for charity
s had led to a position of new respect for the Family Welfare Society.
was to result in the future in a more independent line of action by

Society. There also resulted from this episode a big interest by public in just how the county appropriated its funds. The winter closed with mere stop-gap measures being taken for the summer by the y, a course of action which would result in a similar state of unpre-edness the following winter.

CHAPTER III

RELIEF: THE STRUGGLE FOR FINANCES

Prior to the great winter emergency, the Family Welfare Society had
d only for transients, non-residents and a small percentage of the
l residents of Tulsa. Then, in January of 1931, the Society had been
ed to take over most of the cases formerly handled by the County
ne Society with county funds. The task had been a difficult one. The
ety had neither adequate manpower nor sufficient funds to continue the
ect for very long. It depended for the most part on volunteers to carr
its work, and on contributions to provide finances for it. Now that
depression had eased, therefore, the Society both expected and desired
turn to its previous arrangement.

The county commissioners favored the new arrangement. The laws of the
e made them responsible for a large portion of public charity, and this
they did not deny. The commissioners maintained their complete willin
to provide the funds necessary, but they wanted desperately to transfe
task of administration. The handling of the charity funds by the count
traditionally been rather loose. Demands were not heavy in ordinary
s, and for this reason the commissioners had never worked out an ef-
tve system of administration. The county had usually appropriated for
ity whatever was left over from the general fund after the other de-
ments of government had been provided for. These funds were then dis-
ited by the semi-public County Humane Society. The county was thus
ved when it was able to turn the administration of charity funds over

he Family Welfare Society in the winter of 1931, and now attempted to
steps to make that arrangement permanent.

Before the Family Welfare Society's reluctant new role could be made
cial and definite, however, a legal avenue had to be found for the
sfer of county funds to an agency of the Community Fund. The new fisc
was to begin on July 1. The Commissioners hoped to find authorizatio
their proposed action before that date.[1] With one brief announcement,
ver, the directors of the Family Welfare Society suddenly put an end t
e plans. The Society served notice that after July 1, when the new
ty funds were to be available, they would turn back to the county the
ion of its cases which they had taken over. The Society thus made it
n that it had no interest in the County's proposal. Nor did any of the
r family welfare agencies of the Community Fund announce an interest.

The County Commissioners had no choice but to begin preparations for
care of the 2,500 needy families the Family Welfare Society was sending
. The first step taken was to tighten controls over relief expenditure
those cases of direct immediate need were to be considered during the
er months. Where any other type of aid was felt to be available, cases
to be weeded out. This, it was hoped, would prevent serious strain on
ty charity funds before winter arrived with its heavy load of cases.
grocery orders were to be written at first, the payment of rents, gas,
ts and other utilities being halted during the summer to make charity
s meet more important needs.[2]

Most of the charity groups in Tulsa approved of the county's summer

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[1] Tulsa Tribune, June 15, 1931, p. 3.

[2] Ibid., June 28, 1931, p. 5.

›my movement. The way in which the expenditures were reduced, however, ›d some strong protests. County widows were the first group to suffer the new rigid standards of economy. Since February of 1931 they had receiving only $2.70 per month due to the exhaustion of county charity ;. The widows were ordinarily paid $10 per month. Much unhappiness wa› ›d by this reduction. The county's deficiencies had a way of becoming liately painful for the private relief agencies of Tulsa, for when ›iduals were unable to obtain enough to satisfy their needs from the ›y, they frequently attempted to obtain additional help from one of the ıte organizations. Many of the widows had now been thrown back on non-ic agencies in this manner.

This shifting of cases generated discussion as to whether the county ›een paying the widows a sufficient amount to begin with. And right ıe midst of this talk came the announcement by the commissioners that › only $8,000 was available for the care of the widows, and since that ıt could not possibly be apportioned among the 130 who were on the roll› ıch a way as to provide them with their normal pension, no aid at all ›o be given them.[3] Of course, this is not exactly what the commissione› , but it was the impression they left. In reality the county was adopt› ›ity's opinion that relief is unnecessary in the summer, and therefore ›ostponing any further payments until September. What possible justifi› ›n there was for this belief it is hard to see, but it does seem to hav‹ the predominant viewpoint in the summer of 1931. Whereas the city had ›ed with only mild criticism when it abandoned its made-work program, ›ounty did not prove to be so fortunate. And it is interesting to note among the strongest critics of the county action were some of the city

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[3]Tulsa World, July 1, 1931, p. 4.

icials who had satisfied themselves with stop-gap summer measures.

The county's agents in the Humane Society now turned to the serious
: of handling the influx of cases from the Family Welfare Society.
iaps the relief recipients had grown accustomed to the professional
itment of social workers. At any rate they made their return to the
ine Society noisily. Many of the applicants for aid there quickly re-
ied to the Community Fund agency, declaring that they had been refused
and had been told to "come back in a week and we will see what we can
for you."[4] Some asserted that they could not wait a week to get milk
their babies and went to the Public Health Association for aid. One
ig woman claimed that she had been denied aid because "they told me they
.dn't do anything for us young people, that we would have to fend for
elves."[5] Allegedly she then explained that the aid was not for her but
her parents, and was told in reply that she would have to look out for
i herself.[6] The Community Fund agencies with funds depleted could only
l the applicants back to the court house.

The county agent explained that only those people for whom the agency
no case record were turned away, then politely, and only for a couple
i while a file was prepared on them.[7] He further replied to his critics

> ...it is the least deserving who cry the loudest when things don't go just to suit them. Many of those who have gone back with the report that we had refused to help them came in here with chips on their shoulders. They expected us to give them money and food right on the minute. When we didn't they left in a huff.[8]

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[4] Tulsa Tribune, July 3, 1931, p. 2.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Tulsa World, July 3, 1931, p. 3.

[8] Ibid.

Family Welfare Society, he said, had refused to allow the use of its ca
rds, thereby making it necessary for the county to send out its own in-
igators. The executive secretary of the Family Welfare Society took
nse. She said the case records of the Society were at the complete dis
l of the county workers, adding that there had not been a single reques
them.[9]

It is barely possible that all these charges and counter-charges posse
validity. There is little doubt that the county was reluctant to take
its cases from the Family Welfare Society. This may well have affecte
spirit with which it conducted the investigation of the original re-
ees. It is equally likely that some of the relief seekers were a
le tense, a bit quick to criticize. Being herded about from agency to
cy to accomplish what at best must have been an uncomfortable process
many on relief at this time was probably disconcerting. And certainly
could not deny that there are those among relief seekers at any date wh
repellent personalities. The fact that no more planning had been done
the return of the relief recipients was first and foremost a failure of
county, but the Family Welfare Society could have done much more than i
o facilitate this process. The net result of it all was that admini-
ive unity broke down on the Tulsa relief scene.

Conditions had no more than settled down to an uneasy normalcy when
al once again disrupted relief matters. The chairman, members of the
tive committee, and the treasurer of the Tulsa County Humane Society
ned. The resigning members claimed that during their tenure on the
ttee they had found it necessary to take action to curb certain practic
respect to the funds of the Society. In particular they referred to th

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[9] Tulsa World, July 3, 1931, p. 3.

tices of checks being drawn on the bank account of the organization pay to some officer or employee with no explanation as to the expenditure uch funds except to designate it as petty cash.[10]

The committee had sought to correct this situation. It had passed a lution requiring that all bills against the Society be presented to the ittee for approval before they were paid. Checks, it had been ruled, d no longer be drawn to petty cash. Certain officers and employees, th ittee claimed, had resented this restriction and had continued to try ecure checks designated as petty cash. In addition, the committee had ned that the president of the Society was engaged in some devious vities as an attorney.[11] Feeling that he was therefore not qualified t ct the affairs of the society and to handle its funds, they had demande he offer his resignation. The president, they held, had retaliated by ing a special meeting of the society at which he submitted and secured passage of a new constitution. This constitution had divested the exec committee of its authority to handle the affairs of the society. The ittee, therefore, resigned.[12]

When this story was revealed to the press, the president of the Societ ged that it was merely a matter of the personal animosity of the member ne executive committee toward him. He further maintained that the man of the executive committee had been unsuccessful in his attempts in the Society and had thus launched a personal attack on him.[13]

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[10] Tulsa Tribune, August 10, 1931, p. 1.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

:ever the true story was, the seed of doubt had been planted. Hereafter, commissioners announced, they would maintain direct supervision over distribution of county charity funds. The commission saw the need, it l, to discard slack methods and thereby eliminate loose access to the ls. They planned to employ trained workers to institute the case work :em.[14]

These statements had hardly been made, however, before the commissioner :tted that they were unable to handle the cases that had been turned back :hem by the Family Welfare Society. Maintaining that it was unable to sufficient investigators, the county urged that the Community Fund take : its work once more. Reference was made to the fact that the Family :are Society had case records on 2,500 families which it had taken care luring the first six months of the year. Because these records would materially in avoiding duplication in charity work, it was proposed that Society take over the county load.[15]

The President of the Community Fund offered a qualified proposal to ıme the county's case load. It would do so provided the county furnished ıdequate budget, and provided that the Family Welfare Society could re-ıblish its budget.[16] But the Family Welfare Society rejected the move. :in its directors saw the opportunity to obtain a professional social : character for Tulsa charity permanently. The directors, therefore, de-·ed that the organization could not assume any responsibility for pre-.ng a temporary form of charity relief. It was, however, willing to

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[14]Tulsa World, August 15, 1931, p. 2.

[15]Tulsa Tribune, August 21, 1931, p. 3.

[16]Ibid., August 28, 1931, p. 3.

tiate with Community Fund officials and the county commissioners re-
ing a permanent plan to take over the work. They felt that the county's
e had been handled too slipshod in the past, and that a definite under-
ding with county officials was desirable before they went into the work
n.[17]

In line with these statements and proposals the Community Fund finally
ed to assume the county's charity relief on a budget to be supplied by
county. The commissioners agreed to give the Fund a monthly budget to
nd until October 1 or until some permanent relief organization could be
ed out. It was felt that the Family Welfare Society could probably take
work on in the fall on a county budget even though it would not, perhaps
d not, do so temporarily. The Fund officials, however, made it clear
their own family relief funds were nearly exhausted and that the county
d have to furnish a budget immediately.[18]

A new organization, the County Welfare Department, was created by the
unity Fund to handle the county's charity cases. Under their arrangemen
the Fund the county commissioners appointed Harold M. Vaughn, Pontiac,
igan welfare worker, as the agent to direct relief work.[19] The county
ished a budget of $4,000 per month for this new department's work, at
same time urging that it be dispensed with the strictest economy.[20] The
ling of the cases of persons residing outside the city was at first left
he commissioners, but this was finally also turned over to the Welfare
rtment with a $1,000 per month increase in the budget resulting.

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[17] Tulsa Tribune, August 29, 1931, p. 2.

[18] Tulsa World, September 2, 1931, p. 4.

[19] Ibid., September 11, 1931, p. 6.

[20] Ibid.

At the same time the commissioners discharged the remaining workers i
ıe County Humane Society and ordered the court house offices of the
:ganization closed at once. In order to make sure that the money for the
ılfare Department's budget would be available, the commissioners slashed
ılaries among workers in other departments. The county also furnished th
ılfare Department with four automobiles. Gasoline for the cars, a big
:em in the investigation work, was purchased through the highway depart-
ınt in order to obtain the benefit of a low price.[21]

One of the first acts of the Committee of Five, organized in the fall
: 1931 to handle the over-all administration of relief, was to call upon
ıunty commissioners with the request that the county budget include an
ıpropriation of not less than $150,000 for charity and relief work. That
ıount, they declared, should be exclusive of expenditures for the county
ırm, county hospital, widows' pensions fund and other state welfare ex-
ınses. The committee cited the laws of the state of Oklahoma as authorit
ır making the request. This law provided that:

> Every county shall relieve and support all poor and indigent persons lawfully settled therein, whenever they shall actually need assistance and shall allow such temporary relief to persons not settled therein as shall be actually necessary pending the ascertainment of their settlement or removal thereto.[22]

.e committee stressed that the law said the county shall provide such rel
.aving no alternative.

Only $56,000 had been set aside for relief by the county, and more th
.lf of that was already gone. The commissioners claimed that they were
ırced to stay within the four mill limit and therefore could not make

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[21]Tulsa World, September 15, 1931, p. 2.

[22]Oklahoma Department of State, Revised Laws of Oklahoma (St. Paul: T
.oneer Company, 1912), p. 1159.

litional appropriations.[23] With only $26,000 remaining in the county re-
ef fund, and with that amount being rapidly exhausted as welfare cases
creased by over fifty a day, the directors of the Family Welfare Society
eed to take over part of the county load immediately. Thus, for the
ond consecutive year the Society found it necessary to go to the rescue
the county when the commissioners failed to provide enough money to care
the legal residents who were indigents. The county's failure to do so
aroused considerable indignation. The manner in which most of the re-
nsible county officers had failed to cooperate with the city charitable
ncies in planning for the winter had been most disappointing.[24]

The Committee of Five also asked the commissioners to apply to the
ernor for road work and to use as much labor drawn from the unemployment
istration lists in this work as possible. The county commissioners had
viously been asked by a committee representing the governor's unemploy-
t relief program to make available funds which would be matched dollar
dollar by the state to provide work, presumably on highways, for unem-
yed men. About $1,000,000 was available in state funds to match county
ds in this work.[25]

The county commissioners claimed that they could not make such an
propriation without endangering charity funds which were expected to be
ly needed. In the face of their failure to do so the agents of the
ernor became sharply critical. One called the fact that the county was
nding twenty-five per-cent of its tax revenues for charity purposes "a

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[23] Tulsa Tribune, September 24, 1931, p. 4.

[24] Tulsa World, September 28, 1931, p. 2.

[25] Ibid., October 14, 1931, p. 7.

ıme." The state urged the county to base its charity on a "work-or-starv
.icy.[26]

W. L. North, chairman of the county commissioners, was particularly
:ong in his opposition to the state's plan, recalling that:

> ...last year $700,000 was raised by the state for relief work of which Tulsa paid at least ten per-cent and received back just $3,500, a part of which was in free seed, so worthless it would not grow.[27]

ın B. Means, chairman of the County Excise Board, dispproved of any levy
:ch would further tend to burden the taxpayers for charity purposes:

> To make jobs through government as is proposed is all wrong. You are simply educating the people to look to the government for support. The American people have always supported their poor by public subscription and can continue to do so.[28]

Meanwhile full responsibility for any breakdown in the emergency relie
:k during the upcoming winter was placed upon the county commissioners by
: Central Emergency Committee of Five. If the commissioners failed to
:e adequate provision in the budget to finance the necessary relief work,
: committee threatened to recommend that the existing and wholly inade-
ıte funds then available for charity be dispensed as rapidly as needed,
l then when the funds were exhausted to let the entire charity load re-
:t to the county.[29]

Ernest H. Cornelius, chairman of the Committee of Five, advanced two
:hods by which pressure could be brought to bear upon the county to force
to live up to its charity responsibility. Full details of the charity

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[26] Tulsa Tribune, October 18, 1931, p. 5.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid., December 3, 1931, p. 2.

uation could be aired through newspaper publicity, and a mass meeting taxpayers could be held at which public opinion could be engendered to ng the county commissioners into line.[30] At the invitation of the missioners, Cornelius, with the assistance of auditors, began an examiion of county departmental records and the county budget. He sought to m the appropriations and reduce the budget so that additional funds coul made available for emergency poor relief. Cornelius emerged from the dy convinced that additional funds could be made available for charity.

At this point in the controversy a test case was filled in the distric rt. The object was to obtain a legal opinion as to the extent to which county was responsible for the care of indigents. The petition was ered by a Mrs. Tom Baker. Said A. F. Sweeney, who prepared the petition Mrs. Baker:

> This woman, her husband and three children are living in a garage with a dirt floor, no ventilation except for the open door, a wood stove. I think it a disgrace to the city that such a case exists.[31]

Mrs. Baker stated in her petition that she had applied for relief but been denied it by the county. The provision of the law under which the ition was filed read:

> If any person shall suppose that he is entitled to benefit of the laws for the relief of the poor, and the overseers of the poor in the county in which he resides shall refuse to give such person the benefit thereof, upon application of such person, the judge of the district court may, if he shall think proper, direct said overseers...to receive such persons on the poor list....[32]

Here were the roots of a possible crisis for the entire county relief

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[30] Tulsa Tribune, December 3, 1931, p. 2.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Oklahoma Department of State, Revised Laws of Oklahoma, 1910, pp. 53-1164.

ram. If Mrs. Baker were granted relief on the order of Judge S. J. dinning, all other rejected relief seekers would be given inspiration ollow suit. Regardless of the merit of Mrs. Baker's case, there were ain justly restricted aspirants amidst the potential throng. Aware of Clendinning continued the case on the grounds that:

> A judgment of this kind is like a judgment of any kind when there is no money to support it--no good. That's why I want to check into the county's poor funds and see if the money is available. Then we will see if this family is entitled to aid, and if none is available, we'll see why not.[33]

was available, the county commissioners saw to that, and no decision was reached in the case.

The clubwomen of Tulsa, 10,000 or more strong, now massed their forces a campaign to induce the county commissioners to comply with the law by opriating sufficient money for relief. The Tulsa Federation of Women's s made a thorough study of conditions in Tulsa and emerged from it con- ed that a crisis existed in the administration of charity by the county. ing the county commissioners that their system was at the point of a lete breakdown, the Federation drafted a resolution containing the owing points:

> The amount which you have set aside for general charity of which only $26,000 remains for emergency relief during the coming months is only one-sixth the amount necessary to meet the emergency....
>
> ...the Revised Statutes of Oklahoma specifically state that it is your duty to make appropriations of sufficient funds to meet relief needs.
>
> ...we recommend that an appropriation of not less than $150,000 be set-up and the balance divided as you deem best among the other departments of government.[34]

Federation recognized in its resolution that the county was handicapped

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[33] Tulsa Tribune, December 16, 1931, p. 2.

[34] Ibid., October 3, 1932, p. 6.

ıe four-mill limit, but maintained that the $150,000 charity appropria-
could still be made.

The commissioners made no move to increase their charity budget. The
ʏomen, therefore, demanded that they abide by the law or get out of
:e. This ultimatum was presented to the county commissioners by a
ittee representing the Tulsa Emergency Council, a new organization of
:lub women of Tulsa. If the commissioners did not obey the law, the
ɜs announced their intention of asking the attorney general to start
ɜr proceedings. The resolutions addressed to J. Berry King, attorney
:al, stated in part:

> You are hereby notified that the Tulsa county commissioners have been guilty of wilful negligence of duty.
> They have been guilty of opposion/sic/ in office to wit: They have and are oppressing the poor in Tulsa county and propose to further oppress poor and indigent persons who are not in public charitable institutions in the county and are now being supported by the county.
> They are guilty of wilful misconduct, wilful maladministration in that they have refused to make this necessary appropriation to care for the poor. We regretfully request that your office investigate the facts concerning the misconduct of the county commissioners and that you forthwith institute proceedings in the Supreme Court of the state of Oklahoma to oust them from office.[35]

Presentation of the petition to the attorney general was to depend upon
ıction the county commissioners took upon the council's request that
be permitted to study the county budget. The commissioners gave in to
iemands of the ladies, and the Emergency Council appointed a special
ittee for the purpose of the budget inspection. The committee reported
in almost every instance maximum amounts allowable by law had been
ɔpriated by the county for its various departments. The Emergency Counci
iemanded to know why these maximum appropriations had been made for

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[35] Tulsa Tribune, October 8, 1932, p. 2.

er departments while relief was slighted.[36] A resolution was adopted ing the commissioners four days in which to increase the appropriations charity to $150,000. If they did not do so, the women announced that ir resolution asking for ouster proceedings would go forward to Attorney eral King. The Emergency Council further announced that it had searched county records only four days and found where $63,000 could be added to charity funds by effecting governmental economies, and promised that if commissioners will "give us ten more days, we will find more than the 0,000 that has been requested."[37] The committee then made eight specific ommendations as to how the reductions could be made.

For three days the commissioners did not comment. Then, on the fourth , they promised to place all funds saved by salary reductions or other nomies effected into the county welfare fund.[38] But they neglected to tion a date when they would take action. The club women were not satis- d. They replied that if the commissioners failed to take action by mid- nt, coercive measures would be applied.[39] The county's answer was a sed budget which called for little change from the original. At the rt they had planned to make available $211,004 for all charity purposes, luding the maintenance of the County Home and the County Farm, salaries the operators of these institutions, compensation for widows and orphans other items. The budget they now submitted to the Excise Board called $221,963.99.[40] What the county's critics had demanded was $150,000 for

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[36] Tulsa World, November 4, 1931, p. 2.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Tulsa Tribune, November 8, 1931, p. 3.

[39] Ibid., January 14, 1932, p. 3.

[40] Ibid., January 15, 1932, p. 2.

r welfare alone, and they had in mind benefits for those in need as a ılt of the depression, not the normal indigents.

The Emergency Council now decided to go direct to the Excise Board ı its plea that changes be made in the county budget. They allied themres with other organizations for the purpose of carrying out the fight. ıps included with the club women in the Amalmagated Charity Council were Central Emergency Committee of Five, the American Legion, the Veterans Foreign Wars, the Chamber of Commerce and the Community Fund. The new ıcil presented a report indicating that there were 12,276 registered unloyed persons in Tulsa county, 11,908 without any income at all.[41] They ıtained that family relief work in Tulsa would fail if more money was not ə available by the county. They pointed to the fact that the Family fare Society was carrying more than fifty per-cent more cases than it in the previous year. The Council spokesmen also suggested that, at the ailing rate of daily increase, the Family Welfare Society's total would ıt to 1900 cases before the end of the month. The County Welfare Departt, they stated, was caring for 2,200 families, more than the total of all ıcies for the year before.[42]

The commissioners attempted to stir up resentment against the adminiation of the Community Fund. Their hope apparently was to divert public ention from their own negligence in failing to provide adequate funds for rity. They may also have been motivated by threats of the Emergency ief Council's investigators to make revelations of political waste in the rt house. The commission's charges of extravagance in the administration the Community Fund were, however, quickly refuted. Fred Insull, Fund

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[41] Tulsa World, January 19, 1932, p. 3.

[42] Ibid.

sident, produced figures which revealed that salaries paid by the organi-
ion compared favorably with those paid in other cities for the same work.[4]

The Emergency Relief Council then accused the commission of functioning
tly for the benefit of job hunters. In support of this contention, an
torial in the Tulsa Tribune compared the organization of Tulsa county
ernment with that of Tammany Hall, contending that political workers were
vided with jobs on the public payrolls before any other expenditures from
lic funds were made:

> For years Tammany has.../maintained/ that whatever the short-comings of its leaders, they were good to the poor. If it paid--and they saw to it that it did pay--they were good to poor. Tammany can't forget it is a political machine, even though men and women starve and children go poorly clad in the midst of want and suffering. The relief provided by the taxpayer was first withheld and then sold for political support....Tammany methods are just as contemptible in Tulsa as in New York City.[44]

The Excise Board moved slowly in its deliberations. Veiled threats
s directed at it by the county commissioners. It was rumored that if any
stic changes were made in the budget a court test of the Excise Board's
ıority might be resorted to. On the day of decision, the court room of
ge John B. Means was packed to capacity. For two hours tense and silent
and women listened to the reading of statistical findings.[45] The dis-
ıion of the budget by the Board was brought to a close with its announce-
: that the County Highway Police Department was to be abolished. This
precisely one of the departments for which the commissioners were em-
:ically opposed to altering allotments. The commissioners, however, did
challenge the authority of the Excise Board. It is ironical that only

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[43]Tulsa Tribune, January 13, 1932, p. 14.

[44]Ibid., January 16, 1932, p. 16.

[45]Ibid., January 18, 1932, p. 8.

ew months later the state Supreme Court ruled that equalizing boards had authority to alter budgets that came within legal limits. The Tulsa nty commissioners, by not demanding the right to make their own budget, effect acquiesced in the cuts made by the Excise Board.[46]

In finally approving the budget, the Excise Board added $48,200 to the ginal charity budget.[47] The final 1931-1932 county budget carried an ropriation of $270,133.99 for charity, subdivided as follows:[48]

Purpose	Appropriation
ary, Superintendent of County Farm and ounty Home	$ 2,400.00
ntenance of County Farm	$ 10,000.00
ntenance of County Home	$ 33,000.00
ntenance of the poor:	
rugs, hospital and burial	$ 93,700.00
ounty Welfare	$ 23,000.00
ity Welfare	$ 92,033.99
lothing and food for school children	$ 8,000.00
ompensation for widows and orphans	$ 8,000.00
AL	$270,133.99

Despite this small victory for the club women and the committee of five, relief situation did not improve. The county commissioners limited ex- ditures in the County Welfare Department for February, 1932 to $10,000. January $35,000 had been required for family relief work, half of which been provided by the county. The county relief load at this time in- ded 4,100 cases of which 2,400 were under the care of the County Welfare artment and 1,700 under the Family Welfare Society.[49]

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[46]Tulsa World, May 16, 1932, p. 2.

[47]Ibid., January 28, 1932, p. 3.

[48]John E. Brindley, Survey Report on the Present Administration of the sa County Government (Tulsa: The Public Affairs Association, 1932), p. Dr. Brindley, of the Oklahoma Tax Economy Association, drafted this re- t for a group of Tulsans interested in tax reduction.

[49]Tulsa Tribune, April 19, 1932, p. 2.

On February 26, 1932, the county commissioners announced that their rity appropriations for relief within the city were exhausted. The munity Fund directors determined to carry on the work with their own rces. The relief load being carried by the County Welfare Department and Family Welfare Society was showing little decrease. In mid-April the nty cases still numbered 2,529, while the Family Welfare Society providing relief for 1,900. Since July 1 the Community Fund has spent ,107.08 on family relief alone. Of this amount $71,107.08 had been ex- ded through the County Welfare Department.[50] In the same period the county spent $92,000.[51]

The end of county contributions to the financing of the work of the nty Welfare Department came abruptly with the rejection by the county nissioners of claims for charity totaling $5,997.24. The commissioners d this amount was in excess of the $92,033.99 that they had set aside to disbursed through the city's relief program.[52] Some confusion had arisen : the assertion of Community Fund officials that they understood than an ltional $6,000 was to be allowed by the commissioners. The commissioners sent a letter to the County Welfare Department in March indicating that r were increasing the original amount available by another $6,000 and that :ants could be issued to that amount.[53]

The Community Fund was forced into a $40,000 deficit because it had n necessary to assume all of the county load. This forced a curtailment

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[50] Tulsa Tribune, April 19, 1932, p. 2.

[51] Ibid., April 27, 1932, p. 3.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Tulsa World, May 1, 1932, p. 2.

funds apportioned among the various affiliated agencies for charity. Fund had expended all its surplus and was operating on collections as y came in weekly. With a case load of 4,000 families, upwards of 20,000 sons were on the rolls of the Fund agencies.[54] The Community Fund di- tors now advised the county that unless an agreement could be reached on udget to be furnished by the county for relief work, the entire welfare d would be returned to the county on July 1, 1932.[55]

With the Fund agencies operating on a "starvation" schedule it was de- ed that the "bum" must go. The agencies felt that they had been carrying fessional charity seekers for several years. Now that they had deserving nployed people who, because of the county's inefficiencies, were hungry needed help, they were not going to be allowed to suffer because of ie who had always relied upon charity. Only enough aid, it was decided, d be given physically able men to prevent acute suffering. Dependency not to be encouraged. A "work test" was drawn up to apply to all able- ed adults before they could receive aid from the agencies. Those who not willing to work for what they received would not get anything. Of first 250 men who took the city's new test about 50 failed to appear the work that had been assigned to them. Unless they had acceptable ons for failing to show up, these men were cut off the case lists of agencies. Men who qualified were given one day's work a week and were by the agency concerned.[56]

Definite steps were now taken to place relief work in the city on a so- ed "war-time" basis for the next year. Consolidation of all emergency

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[54]Tulsa World, May 1, 1932, p. 2.

[55]Tulsa Tribune, June 26, 1932, p. 2.

[56]Ibid.

lief work done by the Community Fund agencies under one organization was horized. The movement was partly prompted by the action of oilman Wait llips in allowing the Community Fund to use the Tidal Building for one ır free of rent. All Fund agencies could move their offices into the one lding, and $10,000 in rent saved.[57]

The plan of the executive committee of the Community Fund to force a solidation of all relief agencies, however, did not win the immediate roval of all the agencies concerned. The Family Welfare Society and the holic Charities continued to operate as usual and made it clear that they not decided to go along with the new venture. The opponents of the solidation plan maintained that it would, in effect, set up the dole tem, that it would be more costly and less efficient than the old form administration, and that it would retard the raising of the annual fund alienating the separate agency supporters. They said, in addition, that would mean greater costs because of the addition of numerous salaried itions for all forms of charity work then being carried out by volunteers.

The Family Welfare Society had an additional, special reason for ob- ting to consolidation. It was believed that such a plan would cause sa to lose its membership in the Family Welfare Society of America. One the rules of the national society was that trained social workers must in charge of the distribution of charity in order that waste could be pre- ted, to provide for family rehabilitation along the way, and to prevent creeping of political control into charitable affairs. The consolidation ı did not include a trained social worker in charge.[58]

In view of these facts the Family Welfare Society decided to withdraw

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[57] Tulsa World, June 29, 1932, p. 1.

[58] Ibid., July 1, 1932, p. 3.

)m the Community Fund rather than lose its membership in the national
:iety. In their statement of withdrawal, the Society's directors pointed
: that the plan had been hastily formulated and that it was not apparent
/ any large savings could be made. They further protested that they were
: told anything about it until they were forced to the decision of joining
withdrawing. It would be a step backward, they said, to put Tulsa on
: dole system of charity relief again. The directors of the Society ad-
:ted that there could be some savings in executive salaries and from
ısolidation of clerical work and filing. But they felt that such savings
were claimed for the plan could be derived only from the abolition or
luction of case workers and the granting of relief without investigation
follow up. Such a course of action, they maintained, could only lead to
: dole and pauperization by developing chronic cases out of reasonably
l-intentioned persons, who might otherwise have returned to normal life
a result of careful study and guidance. The dole, they said, removed
incentive toward self-help.[59]

The executive board of the Community Fund bitterly criticized the
iety. They declared that consolidation was the demand of many of the
ge givers to the Fund, because they desired a reduction in the expenses
operation. An emergency existed, they thought, in the relief work of
sa which required the action being taken in the interest of economy. Most
all they objected to a "group of professional social workers dictating to
citizens of Tulsa on a question of business administration."[60] The
ily Welfare Society thus found itself accused of ungratefully placing
elf above the interests of the city.

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[59]Tulsa Tribune, July 7, 1932, p. 1.

[60]Tulsa World, July 8, 1932, p. 2.

The directors of the Family Welfare Society agreed to rescind their ›ignations only if they were provided, in writing, three assurances by : President of the Community Fund. First of all, each of the family re- :f agencies in the proposed coordinated structure had to be given the ;ht to retain its complete individual identity if it so chose. It must 're the right to retain all its properties including records and office ıipment. Second, an advisory committee consisting of members of each of : boards of directors of the various agencies involved had to be formed to : with the executive committee of the Community Fund in the consideration all matters of policy, procedure and personnel. It conceded final au- ›rity, however, in all cases but one to the Community Fund's executive mittee. It demanded that a trained social worker be designated as di- tor of relief under the proposed organization from a list of names to be mitted by the advisory committee. Finally, all agencies must be given right to withdraw from the organization at any time that the final de- mination of policy by the executive committee was not satisfactory to it.[61]

In a letter of reply, the Community Fund directors stated that they had attempted in any way to determine what the Family Welfare Society would concerning a retention of its identity and general activity. They said t any question of property rights, if one should arise, was a question be decided by a court of law, and not by either of the parties concerned the controversy. They agreed to the establishment of the type of committe t the Family Welfare Society proposed. They did not agree, however, to selection of a relief director in the manner asked by Family Welfare kesmen. Instead, they pointed out that no other agency except the Family fare Society had made such a demand, and added that if that agency was

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[61]Tulsa Tribune, June 8, 1932, p. 1.

ɔt willing to proceed on the basis of the good faith of Tulsa citizens, could add no further comment."[62] The Community Fund directors also ıted that they certainly did not presume that they had the power to hold the new agency any organization that decided it wanted to withdraw.[63]

It seems probable that the Family Welfare Society had from the be- ıning seen the necessity to conform. Under the principle of collective d raising upon which the organization of the Community Fund had been lt, those organizations not participating, and who had thus to depend on untary contributions, were not likely to be very successful. Whatever cause, the Society now announced that it was willing to cooperate, and was only a short time later that the plans for consolidation were carried . All family relief, including the distribution of food and clothing, thereafter handled by the United Family Relief and Service Association, onsolidated agency taking over the work formerly handled by the Family fare Society, Catholic Charities, Jewish Charities, and County Welfare artment.[64] Five district stations were established in order to de- tralize relief distribution. Each district had a supervisor and workers m the existing Fund staff.[65]

Meanwhile the city's charity situation had threatened to turn tragic. re were at least 20,000 persons in the city asking for relief, and the ources of the Community Fund were virtually exhausted. Johnson D. Hill, president of the Community Fund, called upon the county commissioners act immediately to help meet the charity load of the Fund, which was

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[62] Tulsa Tribune, July 10, 1932, p. 1.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid., October 2, 1932, p. 2.

[65] Tulsa World, October 1, 1932, p. 3.

ghted down with 1,500 cases which rightfully fell under the commission's ponsibility. In a meeting with three commissioners and the members of Excise Board, Hill asked that $20,000 be made available for July. When approval was voiced to this, he asked for $10,000 for July and an ntical amount for August.[66] The commissioners, while not immediately eeing to that figure, did promise to prepare tentative budgets for the ise Board and to include in them an appropriation for charity. They de-ed in doing so, however. This caused one member of the Excise Board to ment:

> I waited around here for three days this week in the belief that the commissioners intended to ask for an appropriation. I was really ashamed when we finally approved expenditures for the fair which opens this month, and then took no action on the charity question.[67]

Again the county commissioners had defaulted in their relief obligation, again citizens of Tulsa organized themselves for more effective protest. new agency was the Public Affairs Association, originally the idea of a up attempting to promote lower taxes. As its initial action the Associ-on employed Dr. John E. Brindley of the Oklahoma Tax Economy Association survey the economic aspects of Tulsa county administration. The objective making the survey was to point out any reductions in expenditures or ings which might be effected, without crippling the functions and services the Tulsa county government. If such savings could be made, they would e possible the retention of an appropriation to assist and feed the poor. might also make possible a substantial lowering of taxes.[68]

The salaries of elective officers and their deputies were considered.

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[66] Tulsa Tribune, September 4, 1932, p. 2.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid., p. 6.

was found that several elective officials and most deputies in the county ɔk a ten per-cent reduction in their salaries for 1932-1933 as compared :h the 1931-1932 schedule. However, no appreciable reduction in the ıber of deputies or other employees was made. Nor was any attempt made adjust salaries in line with the qualifications for deputies or the :ies necessary to be performed. Where salaries were not fixed by law ɛy were apparently fixed by political expediency.[69]

Some questionable procedures were found also in a check of the records 'ering the feeding of prisoners during 1931-1932. The county had spent ɔ,096.80 for this purpose. The total number of prisoner days was 51,408, :ing the average cost per day to the county 48.8 cents. The federal 'ernment paid the county fifty-five cents per day for the feeding of these ıates. The considerable profit involved for the county was going to the :riff. Dr. Brindley contended that the daily charges were unreasonable to ;in with, for food costs had taken drastic declines. It was estimated tha: ɛding expenses could be reduced by the commissioners to around twenty-five ıts per day, with a conservative saving of $10,000 to the county.[70]

The Brindley report recommended that livestock on the county farm be .d and the property rented. This rather drastic proposal followed the dis· 'ery that the farm had suffered a net loss of $6,480.21 during 1931-1932. : report pointed out that when the county farm had been established it had ɔn assumed that it would be maintained in part with some of the county hom: ıates and furnish gainful employment for them. Its produce was supposed t: turn contribute to the support of the county home. Neither of these

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[69]Brindley, Survey Report on the Present Administration of the Tulsa ınty Government, p. 1.

[70]Ibid.

jectives, of course, had been realized.[71]

Evidence of inefficient practices was also found in connection with purchase of drugs by the county. During the fiscal year of 1931-1932 gs were bought and prescriptions were filled, by one company only, in amount of $12,087.33. A check of prices charged for standard drugs and plies indicated that the county was being charged approximately thirty -cent above standard retail charges and was then being allowed a discount fifteen per-cent. Dr. Brindley's report suggested that a large saving ld be secured by calling for bids on the purchase of drugs.[72]

The report also asserted that certain persons on the county payroll e being over-paid. The county physician was receiving a salary of $500 month. This was the highest appointive salary in the county, and one of highest in the state. It was therefore considered an unnecessary ex- vagance. Janitors, it was also found, were receiving a salary which was ce those of custodians in downtown buildings, and they did only half work generally performed by such workers. Dr. Brindley recommended that janitors be put on a half-time basis, reducing their pay by fifty per- t without putting any of them entirely out of work.[73]

The investigation also revealed lax methods in the handling of details cerning expenditures for the maintenance of roads and bridges. Payrolls e made out showing the money due each employee, but not signed by the ker. After the claim was passed, warrants were issued to the engineer, erintendent or supervisor who paid the men and secured their signatures osite the amount supposed to be due them on the payroll. The signed

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[71]Brindley, p. 1.

[72]Ibid., p. 2.

[73]Ibid., p. 3.

opy of the payroll was then transmitted through regular channels to he county clerk. But many of these signed copies could not be located. here was room for doubt that the men actually received the total amount ue them; in fact, it was possible to question whether they received any f it. And there was, on the other hand, no certainty that the individual erformed the work covered by the claim.[76]

Payroll frauds were just a possibility, but Brindley proceeded to rove that waste and political favoritism did exist in other areas of oad construction administration. Men were employed as patrolmen at ertain stipulated wages and then allowed to hire someone else at a smaller age to do the work. For heavy work men were paid $2.50 per day for the se of their team, and another $2.50 to drive them. In fact, however, the eam owner usually hired his drivers as cheaply as he could, frequently aying $1 per day. In order to eliminate outside competition, the county dvertised contracts for only two or three culverts or structures at a ime. But if a favored contractor was a successful bidder, the contract as often extended to cover several times the original work. In such ases the prices paid were greatly in excess of what bid prices would ave been had the entire work been advertised for letting. The same ractice prevailed in regard to paving contracts.[77]

These practices were obviously costly for the Tulsa taxpayer, but ie greatest extravagance of all possibly related to expenditures for the ounty fair. Although the fair operated only ten days during 1931, it ost the county more than $88,000. A high salaried force for the event is maintained throughout the year although they had no reason to function

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[76]Brindley, p. 4.

[77]Ibid., p. 5.

re than a few months annually. Of the total amount spent for the fair, rl W. Ellmore was paid $13,199.75 for grading the grounds. His claims re not supported by any payroll showing the forces he employed, the days rked, or the work accomplished. Nor was there any reference in the of-cial documents examined by Brindley to any contract or any stipulated te of pay upon which Ellmore's claims were based. An inspection of the ir grounds led Brindley to believe that the work could have been done r $3,000. This same Carl Ellmore, incidentally, appeared on the county yroll for three other jobs, for which he received a total of more than 5,000.[78]

Dr. Brindley's report to the Public Affairs Association, therefore, pported the charges of political favoritism and extravagance which had en heard repeatedly since the Tulsa women had undertaken the winter be-re to find out why the county commission could not make an adequate propriation for charity. He gave the civic groups of Tulsa enough gures to enable them to go to the court house and demand that the charity oblem be handled out of the existing budget. County Commissioner W. L. rth, however, branded the report "biased." He contended that it was ased on conditions of two years ago." North continued:

> ...if I was an auditor and couldn't get out a better statement of facts than that report of Dr. Brindley, I wouldn't get out anything. It is a mass of gross exaggerations. The people who sent him here don't want to get at the truth. They are just a bunch of organized tax dodgers. I've said my little say, and that's all. We'll try to run our business, and Dr. Brindley can run his.[79]

rth's "little say" could well have been taken as an official statement the county position, for the extent of county cooperation with the

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[78]Brindley, p. 5.

[79]Tulsa Tribune, September 7, 1932, p. 5.

ty's relief program was not destined to increase. The county finally d ask the Excise Board to approve a $15,000 grant for relief, but the thod announced for the distribution of funds left out the Community Fund. ch distribution was to be through the office of the county juvenile of- cer, who worked under the county court in checking and providing for digent cases there.[80] It thus became necessary for the city to institute program to fill the breach temporarily.

If the Great Depression offered any lessons for Tulsa concerning the ministrative organization for relief, one of the most profound was a cognition of the fact that the existing machinery did not suffice for e institution of emergency measures. County officials had never con- dered the handling of charity to be one of their major functions. Tra- tionally they had given it only slight consideration. When they found emselves with legal responsibility to cure a great social ill at a time en that ill was most pronounced, they reacted in a way which was not in e best interests of the effective handling of that problem. Constantly ey refused to appropriate sufficient funds for relief. The fumbling y in which they used the public revenues aroused the antagonism of relief cipients. And, just as important, the inadequacies of the county arpened the hostility between public and private charity, and damaged pes for the effective centralization of relief.

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[80] Tulsa World, September 8, 1932, p. 4.

CHAPTER IV

RELIEF: THE COMMITTEE OF FIVE

A movement got underway in the fall of 1931 for the consolidation of agencies which had been set up to relieve the poor and unemployed. This attempt to centralize resulted from several factors. The repeated conflicts between private and public agencies, the seeming inability of the county to provide enough funds to carry the load, the steady increase of the number of those on relief, and the realization that there had been much duplication of effort were all sources of the desire to consolidate.

By this time Oklahoma City had developed a centralized relief organization which appeared to be functioning very effectively. The Tulsa officials turned for advice to C. C. Day, one of the organizers of the former city's program. Day suggested that Tulsa make each one of its agencies clear its work through one bureau, eliminating any agencies that proved ineffective. He added: "If American businessmen do not think and act now, we certainly will go under the dole and then the businessmen who did not act will squawk to high heaven."[1]

In response to Day's advice, a fact-finding committee was set up by the coordinating committee of the Chamber of Commerce to make a survey of charity and unemployment conditions in Tulsa. The committee's task was to survey conditions throughout Tulsa, take into account the work of the

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[1] Tulsa Tribune, September 14, 1931, p. 4.

roposed winter programs of the various relief agencies and determine hat steps should be taken to relieve suffering and unemployment. A inancial campaign which was to follow would be predicated upon their indings.[2] Immediately after its authorization the fact-finding committee ent out a questionnaire to all agencies doing any charity work. The relies were checked and tabulated. The records of the Better Business ureau, the City Solicitations Committee, and the Community Fund were hecked. Many individuals were interviewed, and plans which had been dopted in other communities were studied.[3]

The fact-finding committee emerged from its study convinced that the uccess or failure of the administration of relief in Tulsa depended on ıe measure of cooperation between the Governor's Committee, the county, ıe city administration and the established relief and charitable organiıtions. In order to insure such cooperation the fact-finders proposed ıe establishment of a Central Emergency Committee of Five. The aim of ıis committee would be to see that there was no duplication in ither work relief or direct relief. The committee was not to actually ırry on any of the work of the employment or charitable agencies but to ɜrve only in an advisory and directive capacity. The committee of five, ɜld the fact-finders, should have as its ultimate end the substitution of ıployment for charity in so far as possible for all able-bodied bona-fide ılsa residents.[4]

The fact-finding committee recognized that such an organization as the

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[2]Tulsa Spirit, September 21, 1931, p. 8.

[3]Report of the Fact-Finding Committee, Tulsa Chamber of Commerce, :tober, 1931, p. 2.

[4]Ibid., p. 1.

entral emergency committee of five it proposed was unnecessary in normal imes because the several agencies for relief and social welfare had a egular group of contributors. Under the emergency circumstances prevailing, however, they felt that some extraordinary body was needed to oordinate the efforts of these agencies.[5] The recommendations of the act-finding committee were adopted by the board of directors of the namber of Commerce and subsequently won the approval of the other agencies nvolved. The fact-finders proposed that the committee be made up of one epresentative each from the Community Fund, the Chamber of Commerce, the ity administration, and the county commissioners, with the fifth member o be selected by the other four.[6]

The five Tulsans thus entrusted with the power of control over the ctivities of the city's charitable agencies in their campaigns to reduce nemployment were Ernest Cornelius, president of the Oklahoma Steel Casting ompany, and chairman of the committee, H. O. McClure, president of the ulsa Industrial Finance Corporation, Major John Leavell, president of the eavell Coal Company, Harry Schwartz, president of the Tulsa Labor Council, nd municipal judge G. Ed Warren. Cornelius was appointed by the Community und as its representative, McClure represented the Chamber of Commerce, eavell was the delegate of the city administration, Schwartz was named y the county commissioners, and Warren was chosen by the other four.[7]

The Committee of Five decreed that as a general rule charity was to e confined to aged or infirm men and women and to families without adult

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[5]Report of the Fact-Finding Committee, Tulsa Chamber of Commerce, ctober, 1931, p. 2.

[6]Ibid., p. 3.

[7]Tulsa Spirit, October 16, 1931, p. 6.

ale members. Before giving any charity, the agency concerned should obain proper information as to the applicant's needs. The committee insisted upon absolute impartiality in the giving of both charity and mployment. The sole test was to be the relief need of a legal resident f Tulsa.[8]

The Community Fund was ordered by the Committee of Five to prevent ny unnecessary duplication in the work of its participating agencies. ne committee announced its intention to appraise all other agencies doing elief work, and require inefficient agencies to discontinue operations in rder that there might be no waste of funds. The committee gave the Social ervice Bureau the task of passing on all cases of approved agencies doing elief work. All agencies were required to present their cases to the ureau for clearance. Failure to do this was grounds for disapprovel of ne agency. In order to insure a fair distribution of combined relief hrough charity and employment, the central committee required coordination etween the unemployment registration lists and the lists of the Social ervice Bureau.[9]

One of the first acts of the Central Emergency Committee of Five, ne prompted by public protests, was to attempt to bring "panhandling" to end in Tulsa. The committee established a community rooming house to re for all transients and emergency cases. The committee also authorid the establishment of the city's first overnight home for Negro men.[10] ring the winter of 1931-32 the rooming house fed approximately 200 men

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[8](Tulsa) General Order Number One, Central Emergency Committee of ve, October 25, 1931, p. 1.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Tulsa Tribune, December 8, 1931, p. 2.

ly, and provided 125 beds nightly, but panhandling did not cease.

In its recommendation that a committee of five be established in sa the fact-finding committee of the Chamber of Commerce had declared: suggest to the committee of five that it give earnest consideration the suggested means of providing revenue as well as to any other sug-tions that may be advanced, and arrange to make effective the means eed upon with the least possible delay."[11] During the summer of 1931 h thought had been given by Tulsans to special plans for effecting re-f during the winter to follow. Although the city administration re-tedly expressed its desire that the made-work program be renewed, there e many who did not agree that it should. Some Tulsans were of the nion that the relief burden from a financial point of view could be sened by a switch to direct relief.

M. C. Hale, a Tulsa hardware dealer, was one of several citizens to pose agrarian-flavored alternative plans. Hale advocated a program reby, he said, more than 10,000 could be fed at a cost not to exceed),000. Maintaining that the county would, in any event, appropriate e than $40,000 for relief, he suggested that this amount be used to foods wholesale and 2,500 families of four persons each fed substantial ions for a five month period.[12] His plan included as a daily ration a family of four: two pounds of Irish potatoes, one pound of sweet atoes, one loaf of whole wheat bread, one pound of corn meal, one pound t pork, one-third pound of beans or peas, one quart of skim milk, one-rth pint of sorghum, and one-fourth pound of lard. All of the supplies

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[11]Report of the Fact-Finding Committee, Tulsa Chamber of Commerce, ober, 1931, p. 3.

[12]"The Hale Plan," Relief Plans Under Consideration, Central Emergency mittee of Five, p. 1.

ıld be bought from farmers of the Tulsa area except the wheat, which ıld be obtained through the Federal Farm Board at no cost to the com- ıity under the plan whereby the Board would release the wheat on a credit .p to be later cancelled by Congress. Wheat and corn could be ground :ally, Hale contended, thereby saving the cost of regularly milled flour l meal. Hale even offered to donate the mill and corn shellers for the ·k.[13]

A plan proposed a short time later would have taken advantage of some :ential provisions of the Hale plan, but would have continued the city's .sting work relief program. This plan suggested that several carloads wheat, which could be purchased in the western part of the state at an :remely low price, be obtained with charity funds. This wheat could be .pped to small mills around Tulsa where it could be ground into graham ıur at small cost and turned over to the central commissary. Corn could provided for the commissary in the same fashion. Heavy hogs, which ·e not bringing top price on the market, could be bought, and slaughtered. ·weet potato curing plant could also be established.[14]

Arthur F. Antle, pioneer Tulsa cattleman, proposed that the city ·elop a cooperative farm where unemployed men might work to provide ıd for their families. It was suggested that Tulsa acquire a tract of ıd, possibly eighty acres in size, for this purpose. The plan included : construction of a canning factory, which would, Antle maintained, make possible not only to preserve the products of the farm but to secure ıations of food and vegetables which might be canned and distributed.[15]

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[13]"The Hale Plan," Relief Plans Under Construction, Central Emergency mittee of Five, p. 2.

[14]"The Grain Plan," Ibid., p. 1.

[15]"The Antle Plan," Ibid., p. 1.

A fourth plan proposed was to create a committee composed of repre-
tatives of all agencies for relief to buy food supplies direct from
ducers in the area around Tulsa. The object was to eliminate the
fits of the middleman in supplying the needy of Tulsa. The plan would
e taken advantage of the surplus of vegetable and fruit products,
reby making savings possible, and at the same time aiding Oklahoma's
mers.[16] While none of these plans was ever adopted completely or even
large part, common elements of all became essential ingredients in the
ner in which the committee of five and the city handled relief work the
lowing winter.

Mayor George L. Watkins, searching for a way in which to continue the
y's made-work program of the previous year, came up with a novel plan
finance. In 1929 the city and county had collected $900,000 in taxes
egally since some of their levies were subsequently held invalid. The
ey was impounded in the city treasurer's office for return to the tax-
ers. Watkins proposed that every taxpayer give all or a part of the
und, which he had not expected to get back in the first place, to a
gram of public works.[17] He pointed to the severity of the situation:

> The job of taking care of the relief and unemployment problem in Tulsa will be two or three times as great as last winter. Many of the contributors to the Mayor's scrip plan last year are themselves out of work this fall. I believe that $250,000 will be needed for a work program and that we can get it from this refund.[18]

mayor suggested that a reservoir which would be needed in a year or
anyway be immediately constructed in Mohawk park with hand labor, and

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[16]"The Central Purchasing Plan," Relief Plans Under Consideration,
tral Emergency Committee of Five, p. 1.

[17]"The Mayor's Plan," Ibid., p. 1.

[18]Tulsa Tribune, September 18, 1931, p. 2.

t park and playground improvements be made in the same way.[19]

The plan had been suggested to the mayor by R. Letcher McKee, presi-t of the Tulsa Taxpayers Association. McKee called attention to the t that a small group of taxpayers had initiated the protest action and fought it through the district and supreme courts at heavy expense to nselves. Obviously, McKee pointed out, these taxpayers should not be ed to make the same gifts from their net refunds as should the taxpayers profited without expenses.[20] Others also referred to their special itions. A representative of the Public Service Company said that the ership and management of rental property constituted the sole business income of many people in Tulsa and that these individuals and firms ld not give the same proportion of their refunds to the common fund as ld the individual whose property ownership and tax refund was incidental is income from another source.[21] Some were outright opposed to the n. One very aroused individual said that he would do the winter's work taxation, "unescapable taxation on oil companies for example who have er built a thing here but have made millions out of Oklahoma's soil, as non-resident landlords."[22]

Not only did the means draw criticism, the end did also. It was nted out that by creating a made-work program only part of the com-ity's responsibility was met. "What about the women who are heads of ilies?" asked one man. "And the orphaned children?" He made it clear t it was his belief that the city must provide a large fund that winter

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[19]"The Mayor's Plan," p. 2.

[20]Tulsa Tribune, October 1, 1931, p. 4.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid.

r charity to be administered to hundreds who were unable to partici-
te in any made-work program.[23] Another individual understood that
vernor Murray had the relief and charity problems all worked out, and
s not sure that the city needed to plan a substantial work program.
e city, he felt, though should have a campaign for charity funds, "just
be sure that no one starved."[24] There were some Tulsans who anticipated
at wholesale starvation was just what could be expected if things were
ft for the state's governor to settle.

M. C. Williams, southwest regional director for President Hoover's employment committee, advised the city to forego its system of made-work favor of a system of direct taxation. Made-work was not satisfactory cause the worker:

> ...knows it is just a guise for charity and those who really want to work for whatever they receive resent such a make-shift. Made-work is expensive, and in the long run it is cheaper to pay off than to resort to such practices.[25]

e trend is toward direct taxation to finance work relief:

> About 75 per cent of the help given last year for relief was through tax supported funds. More and more cities are realizing that this is the logical way to handle their problems. It is too late for Tulsa to adopt this method this year, but you should begin planning for next year. Study the records of the cities that have this form of taxation and you will find that it is more satisfactory than the voluntary donation plan.[26]

Mayor Watkins, however, explained that the city was going ahead with s plans to provide work relief on the theory that there was a distinct fference between it and charity. By providing work for the unemployed,

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[23] Tulsa Tribune, October 1, 1931, p. 4.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Tulsa World, October 5, 1931, p. 2.

[26] Ibid.

e mayor contended, the number of calls for charity are lessened.[27] A. Sweeney, Independent party leader, representing Governor Murray's unemoyment committee at the meeting, took exception to some of the suggestions de by Williams. He remarked that the president's committee was just a ifth wheel," and maintained that the federal authorities were just assing the buck" with their suggestions.[28]

A. L. Farmer, chairman of the Chamber of Commerce's fact-finding comttee, proposed the raising of water rates to provide funds for charity. the water rates were raised fifty per cent, he foresaw an additional 150,000 income which could be used for charity work.[29] It was the belief the city administration, however, that such an increase for charity rposes would be illegal since state law required that appropriations for y purpose be based upon an amount no higher than the previous year's come.[30] It was also pointed out that such an increase would over-burden e large industries and the small home owner. The large industries were ready paying the largest water bills anyway, it was said, and with siness conditions like they were, they could not afford to have their penses increased. The "little man" generally would be a poor source beuse the water department was already carrying hundreds of them who could t afford the existing rates.[31]

Soon after its creation the Committee of Five declared itself to be favor of a system of made-work for the city. The committee urged,

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[27] Tulsa World, October 5, 1931, p. 2.

[28] Ibid.

[29] "The Water Bill Plan," Relief Plans Under Consideration, Central nergency Committee of Five, p. 1.

[30] Tulsa Tribune, September 25, 1931, p. 3.

[31] Ibid.

wever, that such a project be financed so as not to interfere with the ising of the Community Fund, which had to be done by public donations. e committee rejected the mayor's tax donation scheme because it could t be "ascertained in advance that a substantial sum of money, say 00,000 to $300,000 could be accumulated from tax refunds..."[32] The com- ttee directed the sub-committee on made-work which it created to seek ways to meet two principal requirements:

> First, the made-work program must return physical good to the community. Second, the work must be done almost exclusively by hand labor instead of by machine.[33]

ıe sub-committee's first task was to work out such a plan for the city.

Local authorities, on the suggestion of the subcommittee on made- ırk, asked the County Excise Board for a readjustment of the city water ıpartment's budget for permanent improvements. In this way $100,000 ıuld be provided for an additional reservoir at Mohawk Park. The reser- ıir was to be constructed with hand labor as a made-work project. City ːficials agreed to provide trained superintendents for this project so ıat no big salaries would have to be paid from made-work funds.[34] Mayor ıtkins was authorized by the city commission to receive oral bids from ırdware merchants on 100 wheel barrows, 200 long handled shovels, 12 axes ıd 36 picks for carrying out the project by hand labor.[35] There was ːtual need of the reservoir aside from that brought by unemployment. It

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[32](Tulsa) Report of the Central Emergency Committee of Five, October), 1931, p. 1.

[33](Tulsa) "Appointment of the Subcommittee on Made-Work," Minutes of ıe Committee of Five, October 15, 1931, p. 1.

[34](Tulsa) Report of the Subcommittee on Made-Work, Central Emergency ɔmmittee of Five, p. 1.

[35]Ibid.

s expected to provide a volume of water storage sufficient to tide the ty over a maximum period of high consumption in time of drought

City officials proposed that the task of employing men on the project left to the special made-work subcommittee of the Committee of Five. e subcommittee announced its intention of using the lists of the mayor's mmittee on unemployment and the governor's unemployment committee as a sis for its direction and coordination of the work relief. But the sub-mmittee asked the mayor's committee to continue to handle the registration d assignment of jobs.[36]

Mayor Watkins, representing the city, and Mrs. Redmond S. Cole, repre-nting the Governor, had cooperated in the registration of the unemployed. eir intention had been to collect the names of all unemployed persons in e city as well as other information about each of them. This information s placed in a central file, to which every approved relief agency was ven access. The cards were classified as to the type of work in which e applicant had experience, the type of case he represented, and whether n or woman.[37] After the central file was assembled, those cards coming der the classification of city employment, carrying the names of those rsons seeking jobs under the city's made-work program, were turned over the mayor's committee for the task of job assignment.

Registration had moved slowly. The larger group of the unemployed s made up of office or white collar workers and office girls, and they w nothing in particular for them in the proposed made-work program of e city. They, therefore, were slow to confess their situation. Some d political reasons for failing to register. With Governor Murray's

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[36](Tulsa) Report of the Subcommittee on Made-Work, Central Emergency mmittee of Five, p. 1.

[37]Tulsa Spirit, September 21, 1931, p. 10.

mmittee in Tulsa beginning work on relief plans at the same time that yor Watkins was meeting with civic leaders to discuss plans for solving nter problems, Johnson D. Hill, president of the Community Fund, sounded warning against scattered effort. He made a sharp appeal for coordinated d consolidated planning before the situation got out of hand. Hill was ghly critical of the governor's committee:

> The governor seems to have set up an organization in Tulsa ostensibly to compete with whatever machinery is set up by the citizenry. Unless the object of the governor is to have representatives who will cooperate 100% with our regular machinery, I think most any person familiar with the situation would call his action ridiculous. Furthermore, the net result would be to destroy the coordination that we have thought to be so imperative at this time.[38]

Obviously Hill had in mind not only past differences with the Governor, t also other current endeavors, not the work being done by Mrs. Cole in njunction with Mayor Watkins. The statement, however, seemed to strengthe e conviction of some that anything connected with Murray had overtones of litical "spoils." This led S. J. Hales, chairman of the governor's unemoyment committee in Tulsa, to remark:

> This movement is distinctly non-partisan, even though it has been sponsored by the governor. Gossip has it that this is a political set-up and for that reason many have refrained from registering. This is an error. Republicans, Democrats, Socialists or whatever their political alignments, will receive due courtesy in registering and equal consideration to /for?/ jobs.[39]

The special made-work committee had concluded that more than $1,000,00(pay rolls would be necessary to provide a twenty-week program of work lief for the city's 8,000 registered unemployed. Since it was not

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[38] Tulsa World, September 27, 1931, p. 2.

[39] Tulsa Tribune, September 30, 1931, p. 4.

ssible to obtain this amount from city and county governments, the rest the relief would have to be provided by means of jobs given to those employed by private citizens who had something that needed to be done. lsa homeowners were therefore asked to provide made-work projects about eir homes. It was hoped that thousands of persons would thus be aided en though their services would be needed for only one day.[40]

The club women of Tulsa were asked to provide at least one day of em-oyment per week for one of the 1,500 unemployed women of the city. The ergency employment sub-committee of the Committee of Five issued the llowing appeal to Tulsa club women:

> There are 1,500 women looking for work--women trying to keep their children in school, women working to save their homes and families, women with no one to turn to, no men to share their burden, women without food and children without food, women cold, hungry, and discouraged!
>
> Pledge one day of work a week, every two weeks, or once a week to some woman. Join the club women's honor roll![41]

A plan to create jobs for the unemployed in support of the made-work peal was adopted by the city street department. Department employees nated nine per cent of their salaries to a relief fund. Mechanical reet sweepers and other men-displacing equipment were taken off and the n put to work. Work was given to fifty men, all heads of families. lf of these men worked the first three days of the week, and half worked e last three days. Men employed under this plan worked just as hard as e regular employees and received just as much pay.[42]

The Central Emergency Committee of Five gave its approval to the

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[40]Report of the Subcommittee on Made-Work, Central Emergency Committee Five, p. 2.

[41]Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[42]Tulsa Tribune, December 17, 1931, p. 5.

mmissary which the city had operated in the previous winter. The comttee declared, however, that it was well aware of the fact that such a mmissary interfered with free enterprise capitalism, and emphasized at its operation should end simultaneously with the end of the emerncy.[43] Meanwhile, competition with privately owned stores would be iminated by accepting only scrip, as in the past, for merchandise. In dition, provided that price and quality were equal, local products were be used in order that producers in the Tulsa territory might have an tlet for some of their surplus.[44] The commissary was to be made availle not only to the city's program, but for the programs of the state, unty and all other relief agencies as well. The purpose of the commisry was to provide a central purchasing agency for food and clothing, d thereby eliminate piecemeal buying. The advantages, it was hoped, uld be increased buying power with lower costs and therefore larger arity dollars.[45]

The commissary was to be under the supervision of the Committee of ve. It would operate as a clearing house for the scrip that came in, ing the money to buy supplies. The minimum stock compatible with a lanced diet was to be carried. A revolving fund was established for e operation of the commissary, and a strict accounting was kept of all penditures. Any contracts made on behalf of the commissary's operation uld require the approval of the committee. All purchases were to be r cash.[46]

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[43]"The Leavell Commissary Plan," Special Report of the Central Emergen Committee of Five, p. 1.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Ibid., p. 2.

A ration plan for the distribution of food through the commissary s originated by committee member Major John Leavell. It was based upon e ration system used by his regiment during World War I. Whereas preously relief recipients had been given the choice of purchasing what ey wished from the commissary's stock, they now purchased the special tion developed by Leavell. While a few objected to this control over eir food, most were glad to find that it was cheaper and that they erefore had additional funds with which to purchase clothing. Since e value of the ration, especially the children's ration, depended largely on the manner in which food was prepared, a cooking school was estabshed in the front of the commissary. Public health nurses prepared ecial rations for malnourished indigent individuals.[47]

The average cost of a weekly food ration was forty-two cents.[48] jor Leavell submitted a synopsis of the rations being distributed by e commissary to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for a check their food values. An analysis of the Tulsa ration revealed that it ntained 2800 calories. The Institute had previously determined that 00 calories was ample for the normal man.[49] Leavell maintained that e food value of the ration exceeded that of the "two star" ration apoved by the Department of Agriculture by several thousand calories ekly.[50] He tried out each new item on his family. Records were cited Leavell to show that persons dependent upon the ration had "a better

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[47]"The Leavell Commissary Plan," Special Report of the Central ergency Committee of Five, p. 2.

[48]Ibid., p. 5.

[49]Harlow's Weekly, November 12, 1931, p. 8.

[50]New York Times, April 25, 1932, p. 3.

alth status than those of the city at large of 150,000 population."[51]

At one point accusations were directed at the commissary that it had sued spoiled food. An investigation revealed, however, that there were ly two articles in the ration which could go bad--cabbage and meat. rst quality cabbage was purchased, and it was never allowed to remain the commissary for more than forty-eight hours. Beeves were delivered e at a time by the packing house and immediately placed in a large well- ed refrigerator and kept there at all times. No meat was ever allowed remain in the commissary for more than twenty-four hours.[52]

The magnitude of the business transacted under this commissary plan best illustrated by the following chart which summarizes the food and othing distributed during one typical week:[53]

FOOD

Flour	16,079	Sugar	3,487.5
Oats	2,033.5	Turnips	9,276
Beans	11,082	Cabbage	4,638
Lard	3,487.5	Carrots	3,500
Potatoes	13,025	Peanut Butter	3,176
Sausage	11,565	Cocoa	2,314
Powdered Milk	8,472.5	Tomatoes	1,924
Salt pork	1,954	Grapefruit	2,425
Soap	4,731	Cod Liver Oil	2.5
Soda	520		

All items in pounds except soap in bars, peanut butter in large jars, and cod liver oil in gallons

CLOTHING

Shoes	3,000	Underwear	1,560
Stockings	2,400	Overalls	1,540

[51] New York Times, April 25, 1932, p. 3.

[52] Tulsa Tribune, March 17, 1932, p. 3.

[53] "Weekly Report of the Commissary Subcommittee, December 8, 1931," entral Emergency Committee of Five Report, p. 7.

The Tulsa commissary attracted international attention. Letters were ceived from such varied places as Washington, D. C., Elyria, Ohio, and rren, Missouri asking for complete details about the ration system. At ast one eastern industrial organization sent a representative to study e plan. Requests for copies of a pamphlet explaining the plan, which s published after a time, came from twelve foreign countries, including o cities in the Union of South Africa.[54]

The commissary plan was later adopted by the state of Pennsylvania a part of its official relief plan.[55] Major Leavell was called to rrisburg in September, 1932, by Governor Gifford Pinchot to explain the stem. A legislative committee, the governor's cabinet, the attorney neral's office, welfare heads of the state, Professor H. C. Sherman, tritionist from Columbia University, public health workers, and corpo-tion heads approved the plan before it was adopted for state wide use.[56]

The activities of the Central Emergency Committee of Five during late 31 and 1932 marked the high point of relief administration in Tulsa. e committee's commissary plan attained international recognition. Welfare encies were brought into closer unity. Relief organizations attained w respect. There was one vital problem, however, with which the committee uld not cope, and this was the all-important problem of finances. On other front, the endeavor to force the public body charged by law with sponsibility for relief to live up to its duty had been largely

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[54] Harlow's Weekly, January 19, 1932, p. 9.

[55] For an extremely interesting account of the controversy which the avell plan later aroused in Pennsylvania, see: Arthur Dunham, "Pennsylvani d Unemployment Relief," Social Service Review, VIII (June, 1934), pp. 246-8.

[56] Tulsa Tribune, September 15, 1932, p. 4.

successful. Even the finest of programs could not operate without
nances. By the late spring of 1932, therefore, the city's commissary
d been closed, its made-work program had ceased, and the committee of
ve had formally terminated its own existence.

CHAPTER V

THE ORIGINS OF FEDERAL AID

Tulsa was facing in the fall of 1932 its most severe winter of unem-
.oyment yet. Its early efforts to combat the complications of the de-
:ession had been far from satisfactory. The county had persistently
:fused to provide as much relief for the indigent as its critics thought
ıs necessary. This reluctance of the county had rendered more pronounced
ıe normal philosophical frictions between public and private charity.
ıese conflicts had nullified, or at least interfered heavily with,
ffforts to centralize relief administration. Even when consolidation
ıd been achieved, as in the case of the Committee of Five, the activities
f the bodies thus created were troubled by inability to obtain theo-
ətical criteria acceptable to all. And, even on matters upon which
greement could be reached, the consolidated effort was soon brought to
ı end by the exhaustion of finances.

As early as February of 1932 the reservoir made-work program initi-
ted by the city and approved by the new committee of five had of necessity
een halted, for funds were totally depleted.[1] With 11,675 registered unem
loyed in Tulsa, an organized spring clean-up, paint and repair campaign
ad been launched. It was designed to serve the double purpose of beautify

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[1]Tulsa's water department officials later declared that it was impossi
le to make profitable use of the extra reservoir at Mohawk Park in which
ver $40,000 had been invested. A private contractor, would not accept
he work done for nearly the amount spent: Tulsa World, June 11, 1932,
. 7.

ıe city, and supplying work for the unemployed. City officials were hopefı ıat every person on the lists might benefit, at least through part-time ɔrk. Fifteen thousand women answered the call to canvass house-to-house ı order to induce every property owner in the city to carry out improve-ənts that would mean jobs for the unemployed.[2]

This program had been largely unsuccessful. Its meager results are ot surprising in view of the mass of destitution in the city. Efforts n this direction were gradually relaxed until finally the whole problem as back with those administering direct relief. When in the late summer f 1932 the county had refused to heed the pleas and threats of the re-ief agencies for more funds, a temporary program, as mentioned before, ad been inaugurated by the city. All city employees and a number of ounty employees had contributed a portion of their salaries to charity n a fixed percentage basis. A mayor's committee had called upon business irms of the city in an attempt to gain donations on a salary percentage ɔasis in order to help finance the distribution of food to the needy. The .dea was to get officials and private enterprise to give a portion of :heir salaries as local governmental employees were doing.[3] The committee ıad fared very poorly.

A city-wide distribution of food was started at six district commis-ɜaries under the direction of Captain Raymond Granger and volunteer city firemen.[4] Only those persons registered, checked against Community Fund ɔr Red Cross records, and investigated by city firemen, were given food.

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[2]Tulsa Tribune, February 26, 1932, p. 2.

[3]Tulsa World, September 1, 1932, p. 3.

[4]Tulsa Tribune, August 23, 1932, p. 1.

ach sacked ration was designed as a week's supply of food for a family.[5] he Tulsa Immediate Relief Association cooperated with the firemen by ollecting two truckloads of vegetables and produce from generous farmers. ive weeks after the commissaries were opened eighty-six thousand pounds f food products had been purchased and distributed at a cost of $2,928.88. he average cost per family was 45 cents, and the average cost per person as nine cents.[6] Five hundred families were served with food on August 22, he first day the commissaries were opened.[7] This number had increased by n average of approximately 400 families per week. On September 8, fami- ies numbering 2,023 were served.[8] In all an estimated 32,475 persons ob- ained food through these commissaries while they were operated by the ity firemen.[9]

In the meantime, since early May, city officials had been striving o get another made-work program into operation. In 1930 a $3,000,000 ond issue had been floated for municipal improvements. More than 1,300,000 of these bonds had never been sold. City authorities proposed ow that $500,000 or more of these bonds be cancelled, and a new bond ssue ranging in size from $250,000 to $500,000 recommended.[10] City uthorities were hopeful that sale could be made to the Reconstruction inance Corporation, which, it had been announced, was to have a fund of

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[5]Tulsa Tribune, August 23, 1932, p. 1.

[6]Ibid., September 9, 1932, p. 2.

[7]Ibid., August 23, 1932, p. 1.

[8]Tulsa World, September 9, 1932, p. 3.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Harlow's Weekly, May 15, 1932, p. 8.

ıre than $300,000,000 for federal loans to municipalities and states on ılf-liquidating construction projects. If an agreement could not be ıached with RFC administrators, the plan was to sell the bonds locally ı small denominations.[11]

Robert W. Kelso, regional representative of the Reconstruction Finance ›rporation, instructed delegates of the city, county, and Community Fund › prepare immediately a report of the charity needs, particularly among ıe unemployed, for the rest of the year. The report was also to include monthly expenditure record for the years 1931 and 1932 through the arious agencies. If any funds were obtained, they were to go toward nemployment relief in the main, although some, it was thought, might be sed to take care of the more serious cases where outright relief was eeded.[12]

The plan had plenty of local opposition. Some expressed the view that nsurmountable obstacles might be encountered in the sale of bonds by ither method. One doubted that made-work was worthwhile, stating that ıen unfit for labor would be engaged and that the slow ones would set the ›ace for the whole crew.[13] One did not believe that the city should sell ıny more bonds for any purpose. He deplored the action of Congress in ›assing what he called a "grab bag relief bill."[14]

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation failed to make a positive reply :o the Tulsa request that it purchase its bonds. The Tulsa city attorney :xpressed disappointment over the apparent failure to make progress in

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[11]Tulsa Tribune, May 15, 1932, p. 1.

[12]Tulsa World, September 19, 1932, p. 2.

[13]Tulsa Tribune, May 16, 1932, p. 3.

[14]Ibid.

gotiating with the RFC, declaring that "the more correspondence we had th them the farther away they got from the object in mind."[15] In the ce of its failure to obtain the cooperation of the Reconstruction Finance rporation, the city commission asked the legal department to prepare an vertising notice to bidders on $150,000 in park bonds as a step toward blic sale of the bonds. It was hoped to sell the bonds to individual tizens, banks and businesses on a patriotic basis, with the bonds being sued in the amounts of $50, $100, $500, and $1000.[16] Tulsans who could ford the investment would be asked to buy one or more of the security its, which they could later sell at par plus accrued interest provided e market for municipal securities ever improved.[17]

In the preparation of the advertising notice, however, it was dis-vered that the ordinance authorizing the 1930 election at which the nds had been voted, had fixed their denominations at $1,000, while the ty in its plans had proposed to sell them in amounts as low as $50 to idividual citizens.[18] Thereby frustrated in both of its bond sale pro-sals, the city commissioners turned to the state. The commissioners re-ested an apportionment of $500,000 to the Tulsa county from relief funds ade available to Oklahoma through the RFC. The resolution directed to vernor William H. Murray called attention to the need of finances for a ide-work program and for general relief.[19]

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[15] Tulsa World, October 4, 1932, p. 2.

[16] Tulsa Tribune, October 10, 1932, p. 2.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Tulsa World, October 14, 1932, p. 3.

[19] Tulsa Tribune, October 18, 1932, p. 1.

In late October, 1932, Tulsa received $146,000 for relief purposes om the Reconstruction Finance Corporation via Governor Murray. All of is fund was designated to go for the payment of labor on made-work pro- cts. These projects included a recreation lake in the northeast part Mohawk Park, water line extensions and the clearing of timber for a w golf course in the park.[20] A central employment registration head- arters was set up and 1,000 heads of families put to work, most of them the lake project. Shifts of 500 men were used, giving each shift three ys of work weekly. The purpose of alternating the shifts was to enable ch man on the job to receive a minimum of $7.20 for three eight hour ys each week. The standard wage was $2.40 per day, while fifteen cents hour was paid for teams and five cents an hour for wagons and similar uipment.[21] A national guard rolling kitchen was procured on order of vernor Murray from Oklahoma City, pots and pans were gathered, and the n were fed on the spot.[22] Unemployment registration for the county ached 13,000, including 706 widows.[23]

At the same time, women were given work in town. More than one ndred women whose families were in need were employed in sewing rooms novating clothing for the needy. The Community Fund provided these men with a daily lunch, and they were paid on an hourly basis from Re- nstruction Finance Corporation funds. Two hundred and ninety-six girls, gistered with the Community Fund, were given work in connection with arities and public service. Most of them had stenographic or clerical

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[20] Tulsa Tribune, October 26, 1932, p. 1.

[21] Tulsa World, October 30, 1932, p. 2.

[22] Tulsa Tribune, November 23, 1932, p. 13.

[23] Ibid., November 8, 1932, p. 11.

:aining and were given part-time work in charity and relief offices. .othing classes in the Tulsa senior and junior high schools completed ,284 garments for needy students from cloth furnished by the Red Cross. ıstribution was made through the Parent Teacher Association and the At- ɜndance and Guidance Department of the schools. Supervisors reported ıat students who received garments showed a change of attitude and often ɜre eager to attend school once they were adequately clothed. Robert ɜlso, Reconstruction Finance Corporation representative on a tour of the ɔuthwest, praised the Tulsa sewing rooms and other ladies' programs as the ɔst effectively planned that he had seen.[24]

As far as the common man was concerned, federal aid made its triumphan ıtry into Tulsa on Tuesday, November 29. This was the day when first ıecks were issued for employment on the made-work projects. The pay was ɔ men employed in the first three-day shift from November 14 through ovember 16. The total payroll amounted to $4,700.00, with the individual hecks usually being $9.60.[25] This was the first pay that many of these en had received in months. Since most of them had been on the Community und charity rolls, their general attitude now showed that they were glad o be, to a degree, self-supporting again.[26] Men took their turns passing hrough a basement hall to a desk where E. B. Howard, Tulsa county made- ork administrator, sat with the checks already made out. A conversation ited by the local press which took place between two men in the line as considered typical. Both were middle-aged, both clad in over-alls:

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[24] Harlow's Weekly, December 11, 1932, p. 8.

[25] Tulsa Tribune, November 27, 1932, p. 1.

[26] Ibid., November 29, 1932, p. 3.

> 'I don't have much coming, but I'll tell you, it looks big to me,' said one. 'I've got three children. It's been so long since we've had any money, I won't know how to count it.
>
> 'Me too,' rejoined the other. 'I've got six kids.'[27]

Others among the Tulsa populace were just as happy over the payment f these men, particularly those to whom the unemployed men owed money or goods and services. These men were, as a matter of fact, so happy hat they could not resist going down to the Community Fund building to xtend congratulations. Of course, once felicitations had been proffered ney had to have something to talk about, and what better subject of conersation was there than past due bills. The attempts of creditors to btain payments of old accounts from men and women barely able to meet mmediate needs with their made-work checks became so insistent, in fact, hat relief administrator Howard declared the Community Fund building ff-limits to bill collectors on pay day. Howard declared:

> The made-work program was created to provide enough funds for the unemployed to keep body and soul together. Under the present rule laid down by Governor Murray, each person may receive only four days pay a month, which gives them $9.60, and that is barely enough to cover the cost of food. I have informed merchants that no check assignments would be honored by my office and that goes for all other creditors.[28]

Winter crept in as the made-work program continued. Since the site f major activity was eight miles from town, and since most of the men mployed had no means of transportation, the cold weather presented even raver problems than normal. In an attempt to cope with this problem, loward appealed to Tulsa businessmen to loan trucks for the hauling of men o work. The appeal went largely unanswered. In fact, only one "ill-used'

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[27] Tulsa Tribune, November 29, 1932, p. 3.

[28] Ibid., December 9, 1932, p. 4.

ld flat-bed vehicle was delivered. This situation provoked an incident ıich indicates the basic attitudes of the unemployed. It snowed heavily ı Tulsa on December 14. It had become established procedure for the ıde-work officials to publish in the local papers a list of names of ərsons on the unemployed registration lists they wanted to report to ɔrk the next day. Promised jobs cutting wood for charity fuel if they ɔuld bring tools for work, 400 men, properly equipped, trudged to the ɔmmunity Fund building on the morning of December 15. There they found ıly the battered flat-bed available for transportation. Two hundred and ɐventy were carried to work by the available truck. All others faced the .ternative of losing a day, or walking the distance through the snow. ıanimously they volunteered to walk:

> Over the shoulders of this straggling army were swung its instruments of war--axes and saws--as it mushed through the business district and out North Main Street to Mohawk Boulevard, thence to the scene of the Bird Creek timber clearing project.
>
> They sang, joked, wise-cracked, and war-hooped as they trudged along, a hodge-podge of humanity, some poorly dressed, but back of everything determined. Half were Negroes. They formed a line to string out for the long stretch along Mohawk Boulevard.[29]

Thus the unemployed in Tulsa, far from being revolutionary or subject) radical agitation, were instead unfortunate people thoroughly dedicated) the root principles of capitalism. They demanded little from the govern- ınt, and what they received, while they accepted it gratefully, they re- ived it with no little bit of shame. Perhaps, as some historians be- eve, the impending New Deal eventually saved the United States from volution. Tulsans, however, were in no such immediate danger.

By the end of 1932, indeed, the national government had began to

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[29]Tulsa Tribune, December 15, 1932, p. 13.

ffect Tulsa's relief policies. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, ıe first of many federal agencies, had achieved substantial improvement f local relief organization by insisting that a proper administrative ıit be set up to distribute federal funds. It also had hastened the rovision of increased state aid through its reiteration that federal rants were available only to supplement fully utilized local and state esources.

CHAPTER VI

ORGANIZATION AMONG THE UNEMPLOYED

One phase of prominence in the Tulsa depression narrative concerns ne evolution of organized groups among the unemployed. Animated by neir dissatisfaction with some aspect of the local relief set-up, eighborhood groups would drift into informal association. The degree f cohesiveness and degree of expansion that each of these organizations ttained normally depended upon the dynamics of its leadership. Some-imes they developed a city wide membership, but in most cases the element f interest restricted membership to the original participants. Although he combined memberships of these organizations never totaled more than very small proportion of the city's unemployed population, they were xtremely vocal, and in many instances their statements were accepted as he general sentiment of all those out of work. As a result, local uthorities were instructed as to which of their practices were offensive o those dependent upon relief, and at the same time relief recipients ere enabled to understand better just what the aims and limitations of elief administrators were. It is probably true, therefore, that these roups contributed significantly to the lessening of hostility between ulsa's "haves" and "have nots" during the Great Depression, and possibly nabled the city to avoid the riotous manifestations of discontent that eveloped elsewhere.

Almost without exception these organizations took little time to ormulate broad social reforms. They concentrated instead on immediate

ocal grievances. Ordinarily they presented their views through the edium of delegations to the city's relief bureaus. Occasionally one of hese organizations did stage a mass demonstration. Judging from the imes when such activity took place, however, they were not usually de-igned to force basic changes in the policy of social agencies.[1]

Of all the organizations of the unemployed which developed in Tulsa, erhaps the most noteworthy, and certainly the most colorful, was the ndependent Party. Organized in the autumn of 1930, it introduced itself o Tulsans with precision drills, described as "hunger marches," on down-own streets. This group was destined to have greater permanency than any ther organization of the unemployed which appeared in Tulsa during the epression. It was not until late in 1932, after the Socialists had ained ascendancy within its ranks, that the party dissolved. Even then ts leftist members reorganized as the Unemployment Citizens League.

As far as members of the Independent Party were concerned, the de-ression had been the inevitable result of the avarice of the economic lite. These men, the party believed, had been so possessed with accumu-lating vast wealth for themselves that they had neglected to return enough f it to the working class.[2] As a result, consumers were unable to buy heir products, and depressed financial conditions had descended upon the ntire nation.

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[1]The one such incident that took on a violent character occurred in October of 1930 when a minor labor disturbance erupted in the downtown district. A small group of Independent Party members thought that the labor being employed in demolishing a half-block of buildings on the site of a new federal building were out-of-towners. Six men were taken into custody and charged with conspiracy to assault government employees. Tulsa World, October 3, 1930, p. 26.

[2]Tulsa Unionist-Journal, October, 1931, p. 5.

Although a few radicals within the party, even in the earlier stages f its development, recommended government ownership of industry and a ational unemployment insurance program, most members scorned the dole.[3] uring the 1931 party convention they stated with great conviction that: No decent American wants anyone to give him anything. All he wants is chance to work for it."[4]

In August of 1931, at the Unemployment Relief Conference in Memphis, ennessee, the Independent Party called its big project to national at- ention. In preference to charity, the Independents advocated the pro- ation of employment, that is, the reduction of jobs to a half-time basis here feasible, and the recruitment of labor from the ranks of the unem- loyed to fill the remaining time. Most proponents of the proration of mployment advocated a three or five day week. Not so with the Inde- endents who preferred a five hour day. The Independents pictured the peration of a policy of proration as a "benevolent circle."[5] Even though o more money would be paid out in wages, they calculated, more money ould be spent by wage earners. Those unemployed would spend because hey would be lifted out of the dependent class and would have the funds ecessary to meet their essential needs. And those who already had jobs ould spend because, even though their incomes would be decreased, they ould have security in their jobs. As fear was lifted more goods would e bought, more orders given, more goods manufactured, better prices made ossible, more jobs made available, higher wages would come, and more oods would be bought.

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[3] Tulsa Tribune, September 8, 1931, p. 3.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

Governor William H. Murray of Oklahoma had summoned the relief onference to meet at Memphis. The research work carried out by Murray's mergency Committee for Employment had convinced him that the unemploy-ent problem was not one of Oklahoma alone. It was a problem, Murray be-leved, that no state could solve within itself without cooperation of ie other states.[6] Acting on this theory the Governor called a conference f the Mississippi basin states for the purpose of organizing a nation-ide program to provide work for the unemployed. Requests were mailed to ongressmen, United States Senators, Governors and mayors of cities in asin states urging that they be represented by delegates at the Memphis onference.[7]

In preparing to attend the conference, Elmer Thomas, Oklahoma Sena-or, wrote to Independent Party officials in Tulsa requesting information bout the proposals they had made for a local solution. The letter of eply offered these suggestions:

> To limit employment in each family to one person where feasible.
> To drop either man or wife where both are found working.
> To secure from city and county officials a half-time policy.
> To ask all ministers to devote time in the churches to securing an understanding of the unemployment needs.
> To provide a citizen's committee for prorating employment.[8]

opies of the letter were also sent to Governor Gifford Pinchot of ennsylvania, Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York, and President erbert Hoover.[9]

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[6]State of Oklahoma, Annual Report of the Department of Labor. Bulletin umber 10-A for the Fiscal Period ending June 30th, 1932. (Oklahoma City, he State of Oklahoma, 1932), p. 56.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Tulsa Tribune, August 27, 1931, p. 7.

[9]Ibid.

Urging the need for a rapid solution to the unemployment problem at out the same time, A. F. Sweeney, Independent Party leader, declared:

> If employment is not forthcoming the dole will be. Odd jobs are not the answer to the problem facing Tulsa and the country, but instead every man must have a job for which he is fitted. The only solution is the proration of employment.[10]

The unemployment relief conference was called to order by United ates Senator K. D. McKellar of Tennessee in the auditorium of the abody Hotel at Memphis on August 24, 1931.[11] Colonel Clarence B. Douglas Tulsa was elected temporary chairman.[12] Senator Thomas, representing, least in part, the viewpoints of the Independent Party was named chairn of the committee on resolutions. At this time Thomas was probably e leading Congressional monetary reform strategist. He had received s political baptism in the campaigns of 1896 and 1900 as an ardent okesman for the monetary doctrines of William Jennings Bryan.[13] In 23, after accumulating considerable wealth in legal work and land velopments in Oklahoma, Thomas had gone to Congress for two terms in e House of Representatives. He had been elected to the Senate in 1926.[14]

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[10] Tulsa Tribune, October 1, 1931, p. 5.

[11] It looked for a time as though the Memphis Conference would be a tal failure. An open breach developed between Murray and the Memphis amber of Commerce because of the alleged indifference of that organizaon toward the meeting. Harlow's Weekly, August 22, 1931, p. 13.

[12] Douglas is one of the most interesting figures of the early history Tulsa. By profession a newspaperman, he had been appointed by Murray a colonel of militia. Lyle H. Boren, Who is Who in Oklahoma, 1935. uthrie: The Cooperative Publishing Company, 1935), p. 138.

[13] Joseph E. Reeve, Monetary Reform Movements. (Washington, D. C.: erican Council on Public Affairs, 1943), p. 148.

[14] Official Congressional Directory, 74th Congress, 1st Session, 1935. ashington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1935), p. 93. e also: Rex Harlow, "Elmer Thomas," Oklahoma Leaders: Biographical etches of the Foremost Living Men of Oklahoma. (Oklahoma City: Harlow blishing Company, 1938) pp. 294-304.

ı had filed, during his first session in Congress, a bill which would ıve ordered the issuance of enough Federal Reserve bank notes for com-ıete payment of the bonus.[15] In December of 1929, after the beginning ɛ the depression, Thomas had proposed an unsuccessful amendment to the ɔover tax reduction bill which would have provided 160 million dollars ı public works appropriations.[16] And ever since he had continually ɔught for larger public works and relief appropriations, and for the ıecking of deflation by the Federal Reserve Board.[17] This, indeed, was ɔ weak champion who carried the standard for the Independent Party at ıe Memphis relief conference.

The resolutions adopted by the conference indicate the significant ɛtent of the influence of Thomas, and therefore the far-reaching effect ɛ the Independent Party's local stand. The delegates had nothing but ɔndemnation for the dole; but, like Sweeney, they feared its eventual ɛcessity:

> We condemn the system of the "Dole" as being not only un-American but anti-American; but costly as such a system is and deadly as its aspects are upon the morale of our people, we believe that unless some other plan for the relief of the unemployment is devised and placed in practical operation the System of the Dole is inevitable.[18]

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[15]Cf. H. R. 6813, 11070, 68th Congress; Congressional Record, LXV, 280, 6322; LXV, 2280, 6322; LXX, 3204-05; LXXI, 1793; U. S. Congress, ɔuse of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Soldiers' Adjusted ɔmpensation, Hearings, 68th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 36-40.

[16]Congressional Record, LXXII, 654-60, 665.

[17]Ibid., LXXIII, 12399; LXXIV, 50, 194-197, 316, 4787-94; LXXV, 1194-9 910, 3915, 4024, 4025; S. Resolution 338, S. 5482, 71st Congress, 3rd ɛssion; S. Resolution 182, 72nd Congress, 1st Session.

[18]State of Oklahoma, Annual Report of the Department of Labor, 1932, p 8. It should be pointed out that Oklahoma's delegation had its way on most f the resolutions by virtue of the non-attendance of others invited. Less han half of the executives of the other states replied to the Murray invita ion. Of those who replied none agreed to attend the meeting and only a ew agreed to send a personal representative. Harlow's Weekly, August 22, 931, p. 13.

As to the proration of employment Thomas drafted, with the approval his fellow delegates, the following resolutions:

> That all employers endeavor to add employees by shortening hours.
> That rotation of labor and increase of number of shifts be utilized to spread employment.[19]

In an address before the gathering Thomas urged a special session Congress. He could not believe, he declared, that a petition from e conference containing its representations and demands would be ther ignored nor denied.

> If the president can be convinced of the seriousness of this emergency, we have confidence he will take action and recommend measures which will bring relief to those for whom we presume to speak. The sole problem is to decide to do something and then to lose no time in getting the people to work.[20]

irray, however, opposed Thomas on the question of an extra session of ngress. To advocate such action, Murray pointed out, might be con-rued as a political move designed to embarrass President Hoover and e Republican Party generally.[21]

Enthused by the publicity given its plan of proration at Memphis, e Independent Party decided on an intensive campaign to get their plan lopted by the city of Tulsa. Their first move, however, was to seek nsolation for the one defeat of Thomas at the conference. The party lopted resolutions only two weeks after the Tennessee meeting urging esident Hoover to call a special session of Congress for the purpose of eking a solution to the unemployment situation, and suggesting a national an of proration. The resolutions held that immediate relief was the

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[19] Ibid., p. 61.

[20] Harlow's Weekly, August 29, 1931, p. 5.

[21] Ibid.

ed of the hour and called on federal, state, city and county authorities
join in a cooperative effort.[22]

The party suggested that representatives of the unemployed, the city
d county officials, the Chamber of Commerce and the Community Fund
ould work out a cooperative plan for instituting proration. An umpire
ould then be named by these delegates to inquire as to what employment
s usable for proration, and to make a definite division of time where
acticable.[23] The Independents further appointed a committee, headed by
. F. Sweeney, to call on every employer in the city to ask that employ-
nt be prorated. The committee was instructed to press particularly hard
r the proration of city, county and school labor.

Neither public nor private enterprise, however, responded very well
these suggestions. Private business feared that additional expenses,
rhaps even loss, would result from the adoption of such a policy. The
roposals that two five hour shifts of labor be worked instead of one
ight hour shift would mean that they would be forced to pay for two
dditional hours of work per day. The industrialists also envisioned
reater costs in providing supervisory and clerical personnel for the ex-
ended hours of plant operation. Either they would have to keep regular
upervisors and bookkeepers on for an extra two hours, which would ne-
essitate the payment of overtime, or they would have to train new foremen
nd hire new clerks. Decreased profits for the industrial concerns, how-
ver, was not the only drawback. The job-sharing movement was also handi-
apped by the fact that some sixty-six per cent of Tulsa's manufacturing

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[22]Tulsa Tribune, September 8, 1931, p. 3.

[23]Ibid.

ncerns were already working on reduced schedules of less than forty urs per week.[24] These obviously could not be expected to divide their rk among many more employees and still allow a living income for all.

The limits to public proration were also rigidly defined. In the se of state, county, and city construction work, the substitution of nual labor for machine labor, as proposed by the party, would have re-lted in increased expenses, which public budgets would not allow. Such policy, it was felt, might also result in considerable delay of the mpletion of public projects which were in vital need.[25] Mayor George . Watkins, however, did order city officials to prorate jobs where possi-e, and called upon contractors of public projects to do likewise.[26] me precedent existed for this partial response by Watkins to the demands f the Independents. In October, 1930, a delegation of the unemployed d presented a resolution to the Mayor:

> ...we, the undersigned committee representing the unemployed of the city, urgently request that you take official action upon the formal paragraph and order it to be made a part of all specifications on excavation work upon city contracts.[27]

e paragraph which the unemployed wanted included in city contracts llowed:

> That portion of all excavations classified as earth of loose rock to a depth of six feet and a width of 12 feet six inches or less, shall be excavated without the

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[24]United States Department of Commerce, Industrial Employment Survey ulletin. XI, Number 9 (September, 1931), p. 31.

[25]Even economy could not sway the city administration. They turned own a proposal by the Independent Party that the city ask for alternate ids on public projects, one bid to be used on machine labor and the other n hand labor. Tulsa World, October 29, 1930, p. 2.

[26]Ibid., October 1, 1931, p. 2.

[27]Ibid., October 1930, p. 4.

use of power machinery, and the back filling of all excavations shall be done in a like manner.[28]

ıe unemployed asked that this be done in order that "self-respecting men" ›uld have an opportunity to earn a livelihood for themselves and their ımilies rather than being "objects of charity."[29] The city had accepted ris request at that time, but had maintained repeatedly that it had gone ı far as it could go. In actuality local officials labeled most public :ojects "vital" and refused to go even this far.[30]

The party was dissatisfied with the meager results of its first ffforts on behalf of proration, and determined to keep the matter of half-ıme employment before the public and the various relief organizations ıtil, as A. F. Sweeney emphatically declared, "something is done about t one way or the other."[31] When Sweeney spoke, the public usually ıstened. He had become something of a legend in Tulsa for his determined ıdeavors on behalf of the "lost cause." He was sixty years old by this ime and had gone through careers as newspaper man, merchant and real state broker. He was aligned with the pro-Murray faction in Democratic ounty politics, being a member of the delegation to the state convention elected by the bolters from the Tulsa county meeting.[32]

There followed an accelerated effort to sell the public on the virtues

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[28]Tulsa World, October 1, 1930, p. 4.

[29]Ibid.

[30]This apparent "double-cross" was one factor behind the trouble which esulted in the jailing of six members of the party in the autumn of 1930. ulsa World, October 29, 1930, p. 2.

[31]Tulsa Tribune, August 20, 1931, p. 3.

[32]Ibid., January 27, 1932, p. 2.

proration. For employees, they proclaimed, it would mean more leisure r recreation, opportunity to cultivate gardens, time to pursue cultural d educational courses, increased incentive to prepare for managerial bs (they felt the new system would require a larger staff in this classi-cation), less fatigue and longer periods of rest. All these, they pro-aimed, would result in a more healthy, ambitious, alert, and aggressive rking force.[33] A further advantage would be greater opportunity for thers who had to support their children to earn a living and yet have ple time at home to care for their families. The cost of living would lower since all meals could be eaten at home. Workers could feel more re of a steady job due to the absorption of more of the city's working ople as a result of the increase in the number of jobs. This absorption uld make the working class earners and consumers once again, and thus uld stabilize the local industrial situation.[34]

The Independents also pointed to advantages for the companies. There uld be increased daily production of the plant as an operational unit, d, therefore, increased return from the capital invested in the plant nd machinery. Since all employees would eat at home, the wasted meal eriod would be eliminated and possibly also cafeteria expense. An oppor-unity would also be presented for reorganizing the working force to ectify inequalities and fit all "pegs" to appropriate holes.[35]

With all this publicity seemingly accomplishing nothing, the Inde-endents suddenly saw the fabled door of opportunity opened wide. As a art of the efforts of local authorities to centralize the administration

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[33] Harlow's Weekly, August 29, 1931, p. 6.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

relief in Tulsa, a fact-finding committee was appointed by the Chamber Commerce to investigate ways and means of effecting such centraliza-on. The fact-finding committee encouraged the party when it mentioned guely in one of its reports that the proration of labor seemed desir-le if a way to make such a plan practical could be found.[36] The party s not content, however, with vague recommendations but wanted a thorough d complete program drawn up by civic leaders in conjunction with the dustrialists of the city. The fact-finding committee recommended that central emergency committee of five be made supreme authority over the ndling of relief and unemployment matters in the city. Provision was de by the fact-finders for the appointment of four of the members of is emergency group, and these were to select the fifth member. The dependent Party saw immense possibilities in bringing pressure to bear this small group while it debated the selection of its other associate. the party demanded representation on the committee of five, the chances emed at least fair that they could achieve it. Should they fail in their d for a committee post, however, they would occupy a strategic position obtain the committee's sanction of proration as a consolation prize, ich, in reality was a trophy of greater importance.

In line with this policy, the Independents announced in open assembly at no committee of five nor any other central organization would have e party's support or approval unless they were given active representa-ion on such committee.[37] The resolution was made even more dramatic by e fact that it came as a substitute motion after one member of the party

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[36]Report of the Fact-Finding Committee, Tulsa Chamber of Commerce, tober, 1931, p. 5.

[37]Tulsa Tribune, October 8, 1931, p. 3.

ved that the Independents go on record as opposing completely the com-
.ttee originally proposed, and suggest that a new one be set up con-
.sting of three representatives of the Independent Party, one from the
:ty, and one from the county.[38]

The first four members of the Committee of Five were selected in ac-
ordance with the plan devised by the fact-finding committee. The men
elected, it turned out, all belonged to the Chamber of Commerce, and in
his fact Sweeney found ripe ground for additional criticism. Pointing
it that two of the members were actually directors of the Chamber,
veeney held that this was a violation of the original plan, and implied
hat there had been collusion designed to establish the ascendancy of
he industrialists over Tulsa's relief program.[39] The Committee of Five
eeded the Independent Party, said Sweeney, more than the Independent
arty needed the Committee of Five.[40]

In dire need of obtaining public respect in order to gain approval
or its projected emergency measures, two of the already chosen members
f the Committee of Five made statements that they were in favor of pro-
ation. With the ranks thus split, into the gap charged the Independent
arty. While the Committee of Five was in the process of choosing its
ifth member, a motion was presented and carried in another public assembly
f the Independents that they put forward Sweeney as the party's candidate
or the committee. The motion that he be elected and that he present his
redentials to the other four members of the committee passed unanimously.

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[38]Tulsa Tribune, October 8, 1931, p. 3.

[39]Ibid., October 16, 1931, p. 5.

[40]Ibid.

reeney delayed strategically the presentation of his "credentials," and, ıring this delay, the committee appointed its fifth member just as stra-ɛgically. The man chosen, municipal Judge G. Ed Warren, was widely known ɔr his strong pro-labor bent and was very popular in relief circles.[41] few days later the Committee of Five presented to the public a five-ɔint program for the proration of employment.

The victory of the party in its long struggle to obtain official en-ɔrsement of the proration of employment proved a hollow one, however. ne Committee of Five never went further with the idea after making a eneral recommendation of proration, and even these suggestions were dis-rmed to avoid offending the businessmen.

The committee's recommendations were:

> First, that all plants and industries operating on twenty-four hour shifts change their mode of operation to six hours per day for all common and unskilled labor wherever possible. This request does not necessarily apply to superintendents, foremen and other key men where the change would result in loss or added expense to the employer.[42]

ot only did this statement enable a very broad interpretation of just hen "added expense" would be accrued, but very few plants in Tulsa opera-ed on twenty-four hour shifts during the depression.

> Second that every homeowner in Tulsa give employment of not less than one-half day per month, and as much more as possible to mechanics in the repair of buildings, decoration, plumbing or any other class of work about the premises.[43]

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[41] Tulsa World, October 18, 1931, p. 1. The local federation of labor ıad adopted the following resolution with respect to the proration of em-ɔloyment: "Because industries have not openly and honestly accepted their ɛsponsibilities for regular amount of incomes to all working together in ɔroduction they have been able to shift many of their problems upon public ınd private relief agencies." Tulsa Unionist-Journal, November, 1930, p. 1

[42] Tulsa Spirit, October 23, 1931, p. 9.

[43] Ibid.

ıe committee also recommended that, wherever possible, housewives give
s much as two days employment monthly to domestic help. Both suggestions
ɜem to divert attention from the signal issue of a workable plan of pro-
ıtion involving the cooperation of public and private enterprise.

> Third, that on all construction work where mechanics are employed eight hours per day that two shift of five hours per day be worked, providing that the employer may use his own discretion regarding the superintendent, foremen and other key men.[44]

ere, again, the effects of proration would be necessarily limited if the
mployer so chose since it was left to him to define "key" men. This was
he only place in which the Committee of Five accepted the Independent
arty's recommendations, and here the applicability was limited to con-
truction work.

> Fourth, that on all state, county and city construction work all labor be hand labor, wherever possible, and that no machine labor be allowed except in cases where hand labor would be prohibitive.[45]

hat "wherever possible" was to mean was left to the discretion of public
fficials, and they chose to give it wide latitude. Hand labor was de-
lared prohibitive in a great many cases.

> Fifth, that all employers in Tulsa and Tulsa county employ only legel residents of the county during the depression.[46]

'his policy had already been followed rather conscientiously by the busine:
ıen of the city, and several campaigns against transients had been carried
ɔut by Tulsa officials. This clause was, in a sense, more of a replace-
ıent for proration than a buttress for it. The most significant weakness
ɔf the recommendations from the standpoint of the unemployed, however, was

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[44] Tulsa Spirit, October 23, 1931, p. 9.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

ıe very fact that they were mere suggestions. There was still no agree-
ɜnt between industrialists and civic leaders for a policy of proration
ıd there never would be one.

Only a few firms of the city took measures to introduce the pro-
ıtion of employment, and then only on a small scale. As to local govern-
ɜntal adoptions of the plan, no further action occurred, except insofar
ɜ made-work was prorated, until May of 1932. At that time, in the face
f the exhaustion of relief funds, a petition bearing the names of 565
ıemployed persons was presented to the city commission asking for the
roration of common labor to make work for more persons.[47] The city com-
lied by asking foremen of the garbage and street department to "stagger"
their payrolls in line with the request. On the national scene, however,
embers of the Independent Party must have obtained some satisfaction from
he fact that Walter Teagle left his desk as president of Standard Oil of
ew Jersey to head a nation-wide job-sharing movement.

A short-lived wave of eviction notices in the autumn of 1931 led to
ction by the Independent Party on another front.[48] The Independents
ere more successful when they adopted resolutions which called on the
tate and federal courts to refuse appointments of receivers in mortgage
oreclosure cases where homes were being lost by their owners.[49] A short
ime after the party took this stand, District Judge Owen Owens declared
rom the bench that he would frown on the foreclosing of homesteads and
equests for receiverships in cases where the loss of homes would result.

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[47] Tulsa World, May 15, 1932, p. 2.

[48] One can follow the complete legal history of Tulsa through the columns of the Tulsa Daily Legal News.

[49] Tulsa Tribune, September 10, 1931, p. 8.

stated that he was taking the financial conditions of many homeowners d would-be homeowners into consideration:

> Too many persons buying homes in Tulsa were caught in the business depression and now face the loss of savings of years. It isn't their fault that they can't meet the payments on their homes. To ask the court to grant orders that would mean ejection is asking the court to completely ignore the humanitarian aspect. This court won't do it.[50]

The Tulsa Clearing House Association and the banks of the city were lso attacked. Accompanied by about fifty members of the party, A. F. veeney appeared before the county commissioners and demanded that action e taken immediately to correct what was termed "corrupt banking practices. veeney exhibited a county warrant for $1.00 in favor of one James Spears n payment for services. The commissioners were told that Spears had ried to cash the warrant at a local bank. The banker, Sweeney said, had old Spears that they were not cashing county warrants any more, but that f he would take seventy-five cents for it they would cash his. Obviously ndignant at the very thought of such conduct on the part of Tulsa's ankers, the fiery Sweeney commented: "If they had the money to cash it or seventy-five cents, they had the money to cash it at full value. Any anker that does that is a racketeer and should be prosecuted."[51]

The Independents adopted and placed before the city commission a esolution asking for special privileges for the unemployed with respect o the use of city water. The resolution urged that the water department uspend its right of declaring water bills delinquent and adding ten per ent penalties for unpaid accounts when the consumers were unemployed.[52]

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[50] Tulsa Tribune, September 10, 1931, p. 8.

[51] Ibid., September 7, 1932, p. 2.

[52] Tulsa World, October 29, 1930, p. 2.

that time Mayor George L. Watkins assured the Independents, however, at the water commissioner would give its members every consideration fore cutting off their water supply. And, in fact, such a policy was llowed by the water department throughout the depression.

For prospective mothers, the Independent Party advocated a plan ıereby local hospitals would provide for their admission and treatment ıtil the child was born, with the added provision that minor children of ıe mother also be cared for during the period of confinement. All this, ıey urged, should be done for a fee of fifty dollars. An investigation ' the party had revealed that a charge was being made which was far in ĸcess of this figure for confinement cases and other charity cases sent ɔ local institutions.[53] In a letter to the editor of the Tulsa Tribune, weeney declared:

> There is not only a necessity now to see that indigent and distressed citizens be given food, clothing and shelter but that they be provided with medical attention. And those who are employed for medical purposes should grade their fees accordingly.[54]

local hospital administrator replied to the Independent Party proposal y informing its members that Tulsa County and the Public Health Associatic 'ere already providing hospital care for a nominal charge of $15.00 to thos 'hom they found deserving of charity.[55] It was also pointed out that the ıospitals had promised to cooperate with local authorities in relieving listress. The Independents correctly replied to this assertion by revealii :hat this charge did not defray the cost of their treatment, but merely ɔostponed payment. The party believed that too great a strain was put on

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[53]Tulsa Tribune, January 15, 1932, p. 16.

[54]Ibid.

[55]Tulsa Tribune, January 21, 1932, p. 14.

e term "deserving" under the existing hospital charity policy. From eeney's viewpoint the rate should have been based on "humanitarian inciples rather than upon the basis of what the traffic will bear."[56]

Whatever its successes or failures, merits or shortcomings, in other eas the Independent Party was at its best when it came to dealing with estions of the moral efficacy of the operations of relief agencies. e party continually championed the cause of the relief recipient, oming as a "watchdog" deterrent to inconsiderate behavior by relief ninistrators.

In the spring of 1931 an incident involving the County Welfare Dertment resulted in a request by the Independents for state intervention. ter internal scandal destroyed public respect for the County Humane ciety in 1931, the County Welfare Department had been created through e combined efforts of the county commissioners and the Community Fund distribute the relief funds of the county. Soon after it began operaons, a number of charges were lodged by those on relief that it was not operly carrying out its function. The accusations ranged from applints being refused food and shelter to their being put bodily out of the partment offices. One woman charged that the rations given her at the mmissary were not "fit to eat."[57] A man claimed that he had been denied the theory that he had "lived here too long."[58]

An investigation launched by the county commissioners revealed that e county welfare workers had indeed been turning some persons away

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[56]Tulsa Tribune, January 25, 1932, p. 8.

[57]Tulsa World, October 24, 1931, p. 3.

[58]Ibid.

hout aid, but only those who were believed to be able to make their way.[59] For example, it was found that the man who felt that his gth of residence was the prime factor behind his inability to obtain p, had actually been on the county rolls for seven years even though had a wealthy sister. Nevertheless, the suspicions of the Independent ty had been aroused, and it immediately appointed an investigating mittee of its own.

The party's investigators, directed in their efforts by A. F. Sweeney, led to turn up any evidence of unwarranted denials of relief, but they discover in the process of the inquiry that men were being compelled work for the city in payment of grocery orders issued through the nty Welfare Department. These men were forced to do the same work that ular employees were doing, for the same number of hours, but were re- ving in return grocery orders amounting to only $1 to $1.50 per week.[60] senting a petition bearing the names of 300 men he claimed had worked the various city departments in this way, Sweeney contended that if men worked, they should have been paid commensurate salaries.[61] stioning of the foremen in the city departments had revealed that none these supervisors had been informed as to what wages these men were eiving, and that they had worked the men as though they were drawing al wages without realizing that many of them were malnourished.

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[59]There were occasions, however, when such charges were found to be e and when the party resorted to court orders to obtain provisions for victims of such discrimination. Two applicants, both claiming that y had been denied aid by both the county and the Community Fund, were ced on the charity rolls by District Judge Halley in the fall of 1932. sa Tribune, October 11, 1932, p. 4.

[60]Ibid., October 26, 1931, p. 2.

[61]Ibid.

A hearing was held into the matter by Mayor Watkins and the city commissioners, and the practice was brought to a sudden stop. The commissioners instructed Harold M. Vaughn, director of the County Welfare Detment, who supplied the grocery orders, to stop sending men "over to city."[62]

The Independent Party supported many of these laborers who had worked city projects in demanding back pay from the city. The commissioners, ever, denied their bill on the grounds that they had never been employed the city, but had merely worked on municipal jobs.[63] Angered by the lure of local authorities to make what they considered to be proper nds for such actions, Independent Party officials now demanded that county commissioners take personal charge of the administration of ief. The party asked that the county welfare work be completely sepaed from the Committee of Five, that the recently opened city commisy be closed, and that grocery orders issued through the county welfare partments be sent to grocery stores as had formerly been the case. Independents asserted that distributing county funds through the Comtee of Five was illegal since the members of that committee were serving hout bond, and that the disposal of the charity fund should be under exclusive control of the commissioners.

The commissioners, however, rejected the demands of the Independents, ntending that they had a legal right to appoint agents to carry out their rity work. In view of the failure of the commissioners to act, Sweeney ntacted Mrs. Mabel Bassett, state commissioner of charities and corctions, and obtained her promise to investigate Tulsa's city and county

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[62]Tulsa Tribune, October 26, 1931, p. 2.

[63]Tulsa World, October 28, 1931, p. 5.

rity distribution.[64] He filed similar complaints with W. A. Murphy, te labor commissioner, and with Governor William H. Murray.[65] The in- ction by Mrs. Bassett never got past the city's excellent commissary. only criticism was directed at the county commissioners. They, she said, ld be derelict in their duty if they did not make some shift to pro- le the money necessary to carry on the program.[66]

One interesting outgrowth of the Independent Party movement in Tulsa the attempted colonization, under party inspiration, of some 500 ilies of unemployed Tulsans on an 8,000 acre tract of land near Hunts- lle, Arkansas. The idea that was to germinate into the colony was born n Mrs. Ida Lawley of Sand Springs, Oklahoma, saw that the land could obtained cheaply. Mrs. Lawley planned the establishment of an old ple's home there, but after she had discussed her idea with J. P. llagher of the Light House Mission in Tulsa, George Perrine, a leader the Independent Party, and others, the plan for a colony for the unem- oyed was adopted. Through this endeavor it was hoped that hundreds of lsans would be able to re-establish themselves as self-supporting tizens.[67]

The Independent Party worked closely with Dr. Herbert Clough of Tulsa, ad of the sponsoring group, in securing pioneers for this constructive erican back-to-the-farm project. Clough replaced Mrs. Lawley as presi- nt of the Oklahoma-Arkansas Ozark Development Association after she parently decided the venture was too risky after all. Memberships in

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[64] Tulsa World, October 28, 1931, p. 5.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Tulsa Tribune, December 4, 1931, p. 2.

[67] Ibid., October 8, 1931, p. 2.

Association were sold for $1 originally. How many joined at this rate
l probably never be known. However, with some private capital added
re was enough for a $500 cash payment on the Ozark land. On October
1931, a contract was signed by officers for the colony and W. H.
lroy, Fayetteville banker, and president of the Industrial Finance Cor-
ation which owned the land.[68] The colonists agreed to pay $4,000 on
h October 20, beginning in 1932, for nine years. Then they were to
$5,002.26 on October 20, 1941, and within five years thereafter $617.
it made the total purchase price with interest $41,619.26. In addition
colonists were to pay the taxes on the land which amount to about
)0 annually.[69]

The entire colonization project was to operate along community lines,
iewhat after the pattern of Brook Farm, and as a self-supporting unit.
this reason the financial program that had been undertaken did not
im difficult at first. Thrown in with the rough, wooded land was what
nained of an old sawmill and 300,000 feet of rough oak lumber. It would
easy, the colonists felt, to set up a thriving wood business. Highway
, which bounded the colony's plot on the West, was an important and scenic
ite. It wound through woodlands and along hillcrests for thirty miles
ch like a park drive. Travelers would support a hotel, garage, and
irist court. The woods abounded with huckleberries which could be
thered and canned. Wild nuts, persimmons, and other fruits were also
ailable in large quantities. The acreage was fertile and considered
eal for the growth of tomatoes, grapes, berries, and other fruits and
getables. There was much talk about a tomato cannery. The possibility

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[68]Tulsa Tribune, December 2, 1931, p. 2.

[69]Ibid., June 20, 1932, p. 12.

other small industries, including a furniture factory, was also a ject of conversation. Pine Creek, a mountain stream traversing the ony's land, was to be dammed in order to create a fishery and produce er for the colony's electric plant.

The colonists had visions of a new town springing up. A townsite to be laid off and permanent homes built. Houses could be constructed native stone and logs. It was agreed that all crops and other products the colony were to be sold by the community as such and proceeds after enses divided equally. Each family was to receive a ten acre plot of id, for which it was to pay eventually $6 per acre. The first payment, ever, was not to come due until after the harvest of the first crop.[70]

There was not to be any radical kind of governmental system for this lvation from the machine age."[71] For, as George Perrine explained, colonists were not "Reds, radicals, Communists, or a little Russia up."[72] They were instead:

> ...merely American men out of work who seek to solve our own relief problems. We are not beggars and believe a general back-to-the-land movement might do much good for a country that has gone too far in buying paper securities. We have a plan--a ten year plan--for our rehabilitation.[73]

y disagreement among the members was to be settled by a board of arbi- ation to be selected by the common vote of all the adult people. Dr. ough, director of the colony, was to be the court of appeals of all sputes. He was a dentist by profession but had also studied law and

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[70] Tulsa Tribune, December 2, 1931, p. 2.

[71] New York Times, December 7, 1931, p. 15.

[72] Tulsa Tribune, January 9, 1932, p. 16.

[73] Ibid.

ology. The colony, which was named Concord Springs, was to conform county, state and federal laws.

The religious, educational and professional needs of the membership e also taken into advance consideration. Dr. Clough, in addition to supervisory and judicial functions would officiate at the "House of " Church in which Catholic, Jewish and Christian Scientist members of colony could worship together. If differences arose, any denomination t preferred could hold its own services separately, and select its own acher from among its members. The Concord Springs school system was to t all the requirements of the state department of education.[74] Each nber of the colony was to be assigned to duties to which he or she was st suited and trained, as determined by a tryout or expression of prerence. The original subscribers to the Association represented almost ery trade and profession.[75]

The advance detachment of thirty colonists departed for Arkansas on cold November day in 1931. Plans were for this group to erect a comssary building and shacks for temporary living quarters for seventy-five oneers. Then, as rapidly as additional living quarters could be cometed, more members of the colony could be summoned, and eventually those ready there would be joined by their families. The colonists planned spend all winter clearing the land, and then in the spring to plant ick cash crops, mostly tomatoes, on as much of it as possible. From is crop they hoped to meet their financial obligations.[76]

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[74]New York Times, December 7, 1931, p. 15.

[75]Tulsa Tribune, December 2, 1931, p. 2.

[76]Ibid., October 8, 1931, p. 2.

On North-South Arkansas highway 23, between Huntsville and Eureka ings, the truckload of utopian-minded colonists caught first sight of ir empire stretching for miles to the East, and engulfing large chunks Madison and Carroll counties. Here they departed from the main road a flint trail which led down a mountain valley. The valley grew a tle wider as they progressed down the winding trail, revealing the ted but majestically rising funnel of the ancient saw mill toward the th. The oak lumber, obtained in the purchase package, was stacked tly near the sawmill, two springs were nearby and the clearing seemed erwise generally desirable. For these reasons it was at this site t the Tulsans decided to set up their headquarters. At the foot of of the towering mountain bluffs they discovered a huge, low, lime- ne cave. In it the first colonists made their winter home.[77]

The $1 memberships provided just enough revenue to make the down ment on the land. There was nothing for the first colonists to live . This problem was remedied by raising the price for new members to) and then to $50. With these funds to provide for their subsistence, d by Perrine, a contractor in pre-depression days, they were able to remai d to construct a dozen oak and roofing paper shacks. The way was thus ared for the arrival of new families. Some of them came after listening the utopian predictions of the sincere but impractical Dr. Clough, who d remained in Tulsa to promote the colony. They scarcely realized the sts of the building. They were broke when they reached the colony, and d been promised that they would be supplied with money until they could

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[77]For a description of the area reliance has been placed upon the count of a visitor to the colony found in the Tulsa Tribune, June 20, 32, p. 12, and on the geographical information given in: Workers of e Writers' Program of the Works Projects Administration, Arkansas: A ide to the State (New York: Hastings House, 1941), pp. 263-264.

duce their first crops. A few had skills suitable to the task, but t had to learn.[78]

The discovery had quickly been made that the sawmill, upon which the ns of the colonists had been so largely based, was totally inoperable. the most part, they had no tools, no teams, no trucks--virtually hing to work with. The pioneers had hoped to get a start by cutting l selling cordwood. Wood cutting and tie "hacking" the Tulsans learned d poor dividends. With their lack of experience and shortage of tools, most they could manage was three ricks of wood a day. This they sold $1.50 a rick in Eureka Springs, some eighteen miles away. But the ason for the sale of cordwood was rapidly running out. With this as eir only cash income the colonists found themselves with little or no od most of the time. On any day that the weather or some other obstacle ood in the way of the preparation of the wood to be sold, there was kely to be no food at all available. Each morning a truck carried the od from the colony into town, and each evening it returned with the ovisions ordered by George Carlon, commissary manager, a plasterer in lsa before the depression hit. All this was a big disappointment to e colonists, who had expected to see the project well-housed and rmanently settled by spring. A number of them now returned to Tulsa scouraged with the prospects.[79]

About ninety men remained struggling to make Concord Springs a success. ey existed upon a monotonous food ration. For breakfast they usually e a flour and water gravy, pancakes and black coffee; for lunch it was

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[78]Tulsa Tribune, December 2, 1931, p. 2.

[79]Ibid., June 20, 1932, p. 12.

eans and cornbread; and for dinner more beans and cornbread and perhaps little soup.[80] Ingenious methods typical of the frontiersman were lopted. One colonist traded a rifle for a power saw, which was repaired id put into running condition at the colony. The engine of the old saw-ill rendered bearings and other parts for a hand-made forge. Oil drums ere transformed into workable stoves, while shoe soles were made from utomobile tires. Vegetables were once traded for a bull which was laughtered by the colonists, and thus provided exactly one half of Concord prings' meat supply during the first year.[81]

Meanwhile, in Tulsa, the energetic Dr. Clough was placed under arrest nd charged with obtaining money under false pretenses. A man had gone o Clough's office and inquired about joining the colony, expressing a esire to build a house and later have other members of his family join im. His subscription fee was accordingly accepted, and he left for the olony. Shortly thereafter, however, the man's father had appeared and emanded transportation to the colony. When it could not be immediately ade available to him, he demanded the money back, claiming that his son ad obtained it from him. Since the son was already at the colony, Clough efused to return the money, and charges were therefore filed against him. lthough Clough was acquitted, his discouragement was so great that he esigned from the presidency of the colony. His negotiations for cannery achinery and three trucks were thus halted. He had already completed a ontract for the sale of some railroad ties during the summer. Perrine, ho was still at the colony, became its acting head.[82]

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[80] Tulsa Tribune, January 12, 1932, p. 11.

[81] Ibid., June 20, 1932, p. 20.

[82] Ibid., January 9, 1932, p. 16; January 12, 1932, p. 11; February 4, 1932, p. 6.

At Concord Springs dissension arose, and a state of "civil war" ısued. The precipitating cause of the dispute was the manner in which ›od was being distributed. The sole commodity in the commissary's stock ıs beans, but one faction wanted these divided differently. Actually ıe hostility had been simmering beneath the surface for some time. The ısis for it was a misunderstanding about how the revenues derived from ıe sale of memberships in the colony were to be used. Some of the ːiginal subscribers had not realized that their membership fees were ɜing used to pay for the land, and most of the newer colonists were un- ware of the fact that their larger subscriptions were being used to ɜep the colony going before they ever got to Arkansas. Both felt that ıe money should be used to pay for food and implements. W. J. Markham ɜsumed the leadership of the rebel group, which charged the older Perrine- ɜd Independent Party faction with assuming a "domineering attitude" and ɜmanded more plentiful and higher quality food and better general living ɔnditions.[83] The rebels gathered and elected their own officers despite ıe fact that the nine men who were incorporators of the colony were al- ɜady officers, and empowered under the Arkansas charter to hold all tock in the colony and to elect their own successors. The revolutionary ɜction then went to a neighboring justice of the peace and secured a re- levin on the charter of the colony, a legal action without precedent. t the same time they seized control of the commissary by force, and com- andeered the colony's truck.[84]

The incorporators of Concord Springs turned to Colonel Charles D. ames, a Eureka Springs attorney, for aid. James had long been convinced

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[83] Tulsa Tribune, January 12, 1932, p. 11.

[84] Ibid., June 20, 1932, p. 12.

ıat a back to the land movement would be an effective way to solve the ınancial depression, and had thus become very interested in the colony ıen he learned of its founding. He had earlier sent out 300 pounds of ılt meat to the colony in order that its member could season their ɜgetables. An able lawyer, James quickly went to court and secured a ıncellation of the replevin. During the fight the food problem had be-ɔme serious. W. H. McIlroy, who had sold the land to the Tulsans, sent ıptain E. K. Hooper, a national guard officer, and several guardsmen to ːotect a truck load of Red Cross supplies to the camp. McIlroy had been ːtracted to the difficulties when the rebels proposed to divide the ɔlony. Meanwhile James had obtained an injunction from the district ɔurt at Huntsville restraining the rebellious group from harming the ːoperty or persons of the other colonists. The court also ordered four ımilies of the rebels to leave the colony. The ruling held that the ɜbels had forfeited their membership in the colony by their failure to ɔrk for it and to cooperate in its success. No member, however, was de-ːived of any just rights in the colony if he labored in harmony as was ıe original understanding and object of the colony.[85]

Subscribers back in Tulsa had, in the meantime, become concerned ɣer their investment. The arrest of Clough and stories of corruption ı the administration of the colony led many of them to demand that they ıther be allowed to go immediately to Concord Springs or given their ɔney back. The colony's builders could do neither. The funds of the ɜbscribers had been exhausted by the trail blazers in an attempt to get ıe enterprise started. The objective for the present had to be to take ıre of those already on hand in the Arkansas hills. As one member put

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[85]Tulsa Tribune, June 20, 1932, p. 12.

:: "We can't let them all come now that the beanpot has enough in it
› feed us."[86] It was earnestly hoped, however, that all members could
:adually be admitted. The plan was to notify ten members at a time,
ıforming them that they had to go to the colony immediately or forfeit
ıeir rights.[87]

The inter-colony strife had convinced the members who remained that
ıey needed an executive head, and they appealed to James, who had won
ıeir court battles for them, to become their president. This James
inally consented to do upon the following conditions:

> First, I was to prepare a suitable set of by-laws for the colony to operate under and I was to have full powers with the advice and assistance of the board of directors in the management of the affairs of the colony. Second, that all members were to forget all differences and work in full harmony and collectively for the success of the colony.[88]

› these qualifications the former Tulsans unanimously agreed.

On Captain Hooper's recommendations, after his two weeks in camp,
:Ilroy refunded virtually all of the $500 down payment that had been
ıde on the land. McIlroy further insisted that any profits the colonists
ıde from an order they had received for railroad ties should go to pay
ıe taxes on the land or the interest on the note. For the other wood
ıich the colonists had already trucked to town to sell, McIlroy felt
ıat if the land should eventually be returned to him, that he would have
eceived fair value due to the clearing that had been accomplished. With
ıis refund the colonists were able to secure two teams, nails, roofing
nd other needed items.

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[86] Tulsa Tribune, June 20, 1932, p. 12.

[87] Ibid., July 10, 1932, p. 14.

[88] Ibid.

In Eureka Springs James was able to obtain nearly 10,000 pounds of he flour being made for the Red Cross from government wheat. The plight f the colonists had also attracted the attention of others. Mrs. L. S. eed, managing editor of the Fayetteville Democrat, conducted a campaign or food contributions to Concord Springs through four counties. Another ɔunty, which had received drought relief only the year before, sent over truck loaded with eight tons of food stuffs.

The colony's largest population at any one time had been 120 people. fter the hardships and disputes of the first year there still remained l, representing 28 families. At one time there had been 40 single men n the group, but at the end of the year there was but one. Of the 21 ıildren, only one was not of school age, and, of course, Dr. Clough's ɔdern educational system had never materialized. The children were, no ɔubt, denied a balanced diet. The colony had no cows, but milk was pur- ıased for the one small child. The remainder of the children had not had ilk since they arrived. Regular visits by the county health nurse, how- ver, revealed that the children were healthy, only one being underweight.[8]

During the fall and winter of the first year seventy acres had been leared, and in the spring vegetables of all kinds were planted. From ɔmewhere the members of the colony obtained a large number of glass jars. ıey were thus able to can large quantities of food for the next winter ıd store it in their cave.

As the United States prepared to meet the worst year of the depression et, the Tulsa colonials contended with the problem of meeting delinquent axes. The fact that there seemed to be no possible way of obtaining the 500 needed to meet this obligation did not seem to worry the average

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[89] Tulsa Tribune, June 20, 1932, p. 12.

olonist a great deal. They still had great faith in the ultimate success f the colony, and they were well aware that it had always been difficult o oust a squatter in Arkansas in less than a year. Thus far the meager ains of their own hard labor and a judicious amount of philanthrophy had ept Concord Springs alive. Through more hard work they felt they might e able to get the payments on the land extended and to produce enough rofits to pay the taxes.

Even if they were unable to pay, they would still be one year's exis- ence to the good. Financial worries were nothing new for these refugees rom charity. Though provisions were scarce and plain, the colonists re- eatedly insisted that they were more contented than they had been before ndertaking the venture. In Tulsa they had been entirely dependent upon harity. In the Ozark mountains of Arkansas they were at least partially roviding for themselves and their families. Concord Springs was probably hopelessly idealistic scheme from the start. Perhaps the super-enthusia hat the immigrants from Tulsa continually exhibited was a necessary pre- equisite. History indicates that the pioneer's quest has always been for ll the things which he did not have, and places in a soup line were all hat these people had left.

There were in Tulsa, however, organizations of the unemployed which ere not at all concerned with the administration of relief. The purpose f the Tulsa Immediate Relief Association, organized in the spring of 1932 as to provide relief for its members in order that they could renounce harity. The constituents of this group insisted that they would rather ork for their food than to receive provisions from the public. They had allied around M. W. "Wildcat" Williams, a professional engineer and forme efinery operator, when he became dissatisfied with an earlier organizatio he sole aim of Tulsa's previous groups of the unemployed, it seemed to

'illiams, was to seek charity.[90]

The Association directed its major efforts toward acquiring food for .ts members. Contracts were made with farmers who had crops of fruits ınd vegetables that they were willing to have gathered on shares. Half)f what was gathered each day went to the farmers under contract. The :emainder was distributed among the members of the Association. In ad- lition Williams closed a deal with the state game and fish department by /hich the members of the Immediate Relief Association rescued perishing :ish from drying streams and lakes. The state furnished equipment and :he Association the manpower.[91] Odd jobs were also sought by the Associ- :ion and members detailed to work at them.

Every member of the organization worked or else he did not share in :he distribution. Williams summed up the no-work, no-member philosophy ın this way:

> When they are sent out on a job, they are put on their honor to do the work. We don't keep up with them all the time, but when we find one shirking work, out he goes. Naturally we have had some deadbeats, but as soon as they are discovered they are eliminated from our rolls.[92]

There was not a single member of the Association on the Tulsa charity roll:

Neither politics nor radicalism was tolerated. On several occasions :adicals appeared in the ranks of the Association, but their memberships /ere quickly terminated. At one point Williams became convinced that ex- :reme left wingers were trying to disrupt his organization, and made a :our of the city speaking in the parks to the unemployed about the matter.

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[90] Tulsa Tribune, September 18, 1932, p. 7.

[91] Ibid., September 27, 1932, p. 2.

[92] Ibid., September 18, 1932, p. 7.

In one such speech he declared:

> It is no good to shoot a red; he is not worth the powder. This nation is in a bad condition, but even so it is the best in the world, and we don't need long-haired Russians coming over here to tell us how to run it.[93]

Although the Association had originally been intended to serve members only, it slowly evolved into an informal relief organization. So successful were its efforts that supplies still remained after the members were cared for. Noting that there were needy families in the suburban districts where neither city nor county relief organizations operated, the members of the Association began to distribute their surplus among them. Before long about 120 families whose wage earners were out of work, ill or incapacitated were being taken care of. The Association further extended its relief activities with a successful appeal for the use of vacant lots for the raising of turnips. Promises of a thousand lots were received, and a large amount of volunteer labor was made available.[94] The city provided plows, tractors and other equipment. In the summer of 1932, when both city and county charity funds were depleted, the efforts of the city employees to cope with the situation drew heavy support from the Association.

With the Immediate Relief Association's initiation into relief work an accomplished fact, city, county and state relief agencies began to rely heavily upon the group as a means of communication with the unemployed. A committee was created by the Association to hear grievances and investigat the complaints and reports of needy persons. Another committee was appointed to handle legal phases of the relief work. The membership rolls

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[93] Tulsa Tribune, September 20, 1932, p. 6.

[94] Ibid., September 7, 1932, p. 3.

of the Association included a competent lawyer and a reputable physician.

Many more temporary and less active organizations of the unemployed also developed in Tulsa. During one extremely bad period a soupline was organized by the Ex-Service Men's Association, a group of 115 men.[95] The members investigated applicants for a place in the line and fed something like sixty families once daily. A local plant donated fifty pounds of soup bones and fifty pounds of pigs' feet day for the preparation of the ration.[96]

The members of the Unemployed Association worked for pay in commoditi and operated an exchange service for the goods they received. Scrip issue by the Shirtsleeves Exchange could be used by its members to pay other members for labor, or to make purchases of food or other necessary article Eventually the Exchange opened a cafeteria at which scrip was accepted in payment for meals.[97]

A group of girls and young women formed an unemployment service for themselves. The Girls Cooperative Employment Club soon had a membership of 250 single, unemployed girls, all of them badly in need of employment. The organization was self-supporting with the unemployed girls donating their services in seeking, listing and assigning jobs as well as attending to all office work.[98] Regular meetings were held with lecturers and experts appearing to discuss such subjects as oil stenography, sales technique, personal appearance, and how to keep physically fit.[99]

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[95] Tulsa World, September 15, 1932, p. 4.

[96] Tulsa Tribune, September 7, 1932, p. 10.

[97] Harlow's Weekly, November 16, 1932, p. 6.

[98] Tulsa Tribune, January 29, 1932, p. 5.

[99] Ibid., February 21, 1932, p. 3.

The development in Tulsa, during the great depression, of organized ;roups among the unemployed was a phenomenon which seems to have flowed :rom the natural gregarious instinct of people with a common problem. ;ome of these groups, notably the Independent Party, concerned themselves 'ith attempts to correct the shortcomings of relief administration in 'ulsa. Others, like the Tulsa Immediate Relief Association, were prima-'ily interested in self-help, a system of organized barter or exchange of ;oods among themselves. In this latter type of activity goods obtained .n exchange for work done outside the group and donated materials, such ;s surplus crops, were brought to a central point and divided to meet the ;eeds of the whole group. Although the Independent Party concerned itself 'ith politics in a minor way, Tulsa was fortunate enough to avoid the more 'iolent forms of behavior by the unemployed.

CHAPTER VII

THE IMPACT ON RELIGION

The Great Depression brought about some significant religious changes . Tulsa, and placed tremendous pressure on the church and the clergy. :e weight of this burden affected the attitude of the church leaders ıward the secular order in all its phases, the church as a social insti- ıtion, and their conceptions of their own roles. Ministers were called ɔon to counsel with many people regarding their troubles during the de- :ession. Since many of these ills were rooted in unemployment, the ıdividual as an individual could do little about them. Recognition of ıis fact forced ministers to think on the major issues of the time.

Some Tulsa church leaders saw a disguised blessing in these troubles f the people. Previous depressions, they believed, had turned men away rom materialistic considerations and toward God. They linked earlier conomic disorders with great religious revivals. It was their feeling hat in times of trial men turn to God because their self-reliant atti- udes are either totally destroyed or at least weakened to the point here they are no longer self-sustaining.

Among Tulsa's ministers the most articulate spokesman of this point f view was the Reverend R. J. Bateman of the First Baptist Church. In n address entitled "Christ and Commerce," delivered before a Chamber of ommerce luncheon, Bateman expounded his beliefs concerning this subject. 'here is, he felt, a moral question at the very core of commerce. This 'as true because people and business rise and fall simultaneously.

> Roger Babson has made a chart of American history. By this he shows the money panics of the United States. Compare with this the chart showing the religious revivals in the United States. He shows that periods of prosperity are followed by periods of religious indifference and increased immorality, drunkenness and crime. These are always followed by financial depression, money panics and hard times.[1]

ıe beginning of each period of commercial crisis and deprivation had .ways been followed by a quickened interest in religion. As Bateman ıw it, then, business depressions were caused by "dissipation, dis- ɔnesty, disobedience to God's will and a general collapse of moral ıaracter." They were cured by "moral awakening, spiritual revivalism, ıd rehabilitation of righteousness."[2]

The Reverend Frank W. Wright of the United Presbyterian Church was ı almost complete agreement with Dr. Bateman. "Providence," he once eclared, "always wears a beautiful face under a dark mask. In de- ression and drouth, crime and unemployment are the means of humbling s and bringing us closer to God."[3] The Reverend O. M. Stallings of the mmanuel Baptist Church also believed that the depression would be a ource of good. It would "goad dormant minds into great thinkers. eaklings will wax strong."[4] Another Tulsa minister, the Reverend E. H. ckel of the Trinity Episcopal Church, also quoted the economist Babson ı commenting on the depression. He was quite sure, he said, that:

> before prosperity can return there must be a renewed interest in the spiritual life of both individuals and nations. Such times as these are a challenge to the manhood and womanhood of each and every one of us, and the kind of courage that we most need today is the kind that is based on faith in God.[5]

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[1] Tulsa Spirit, January 30, 1931, p. 14.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Tulsa Tribune, November 24, 1930, p. 7.

[4] Ibid., January 5, 1932, p. 8.

[5] Tulsa World, July 11, 1932, p. 2.

l these statements and other similar ones seem to indicate that there s a rather widespread conviction among Tulsa ministers that a re- gious awakening would result from personal experiences of the people ring the economic crisis.

If church membership can be taken as an adequate guide, the re- gious awakening which these Tulsa ministers anticipated did in fact cur. Accepting denominational figures, total membership of all of Tulsa' urches increased by almost twenty thousand persons between 1926 and 936.[6] Some of these new members made their way into new congregations, enty of which were organized in Tulsa during the early years of the pression. The growth in the number of congregations was such, indeed, hat twelve of the groups were forced to hold their meetings temporarily n such varied places as movie theatres, auditoriums, schools, parks and ounty fair buildings.[7]

Church membership continued to be more attractive to females than to ales. The number of men who were members increased from 13,349 in 1926 o 18,047 in 1936, a total gain of 4,698. During the same span of years

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[6]The term church is used here, and elsewhere when the need for revity dictates broad general statements, to include all worshipping re- igious organizations--Catholic, Protestant and Jewish. I have accepted he dates 1926-1936 as those approximately right to show the effects of he Great Depression. Total Tulsa membership increased from 35,106 to 54,659. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Religious Bodies, 1926 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1930), p. 356.; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of he Census, Census of Religious Bodies, 1936 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 434. Hereafter cited as Religious Bodies, 1926 and Religious Bodies, 1936).

[7]Polk's Tulsa, Oklahoma City Directory, 1929 (Kansas City: R. L. Polk Company, 1929), pp. 904-906.; Polk's Tulsa, Oklahoma City Directory, 1932 (Kansas City: R. L. Polk Company, 1932), pp. 761-762. There were 97 church edifices as compared to 109 congregations: Religious Bodies, 1936, p. 434.

›men who belonged to worshipping organizations increased from 19,077 › 26,802, thus expanding by 7,795. The number of males to every one ındred females, therefore, showed a decline of from seventy to sixty-ɐven in Tulsa.[8]

The greatest gain in affiliates was made by the Baptists, who ɐlcomed almost six thousand into the fold. The Baptists thus attracted ver one-fourth of Tulsa's total of new church members. Nearly two housand fresh members were involved in the Roman Catholic expansion, hile Presbyterians and Methodists, in that order, had the next largest ncreases in membership. The following table indicates the exact sta-istics of gain for most of the major denominations.[9]

TOTAL MEMBERSHIP

ɐenomination	1926	1936	Gain
ıaptist.....	7,511	13,466	5,955
ɔoman Catholic.....	5,055	7,027	1,972
ʾresbyterian.....	4,617	6,224	1,607
ɪethodist.....	7,076	8,195	1,119
ıssembly of God.....	598	1,530	930
ʾrotestant Episcopal.	1,487	2,089	602
;hristian Scientist..	439	918	479
ɹutheran.....	369	828	459
ſewish.....	2,400	2,850	450
ıazarene.....	72	330	258
ɑormon.....	293	476	183
ʒeventh Day Adventist	172	283	111
ɔnitarian.....	124	190	66
ʒreek Orthodox.....	150	170	20

Even though the rolls kept by the Tulsa denominations thus indicate ɜignificant membership increases during the years of the great depression,

[8]Religious Bodies, 1926, p. 356; Religious Bodies, 1936, p. 434.

[9]Religious Bodies, 1926, p. 560; Religious Bodies, 1936, p. 696.

.e must beware of certain potential flaws in these records. In the .rst place, the definition of a church member varies widely in meaning 'om one denomination to another. Some groups include almost the total)pulation as members, while others use the term in a much narrower :nse. Competent statisticians warn also of the tendency among Protes- ınt Churches to "keep names on the rolls as members even when the ıdividuals have died or have psychologically separated themselves from ıe church."[10] The accuracy of the conclusions drawn from the sta- istics herein, however, should be safe from distortions resulting from hese particular deficiencies. In the accumulation of the figures ited safeguards were adopted to avoid such errors. Each congregation as asked to report as members only those persons who had been accepted nto the church through that particular denomination's ceremonial in- .tiation, if any, and who attended with some degree of regularity.[11]

There is always also the possibility, of course, that church ıembership grew from natural increase rather than from added interest. 'his does not appear to have been the case in Tulsa. In the entire de- :ade of the nineteen-thirties the population of Tulsa expanded by only 399 persons.[12] Such a very limited increase in population indicates also :hat migration into the city could not have been a major factor behind

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[10]Samuel J. Kincheloe, Research Memorandum on Religion During the Great Depression (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937), p. 15.

[11]Religious Bodies, 1926, p. 1; Religious Bodies, 1936, p. 1.

[12]United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1930: Characteristics of the Population (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), Part 5, p. 937. Available statistics do not permit an exact comparison of membership and population increases.

ıe increased willingness of the Tulsa citizenry to attach themselves to religious body.

If doubt still remains as to the major source of the enlarged re-ıgious bodies of Tulsa, a look at the number of children who were members ıy help to dissolve it. The number of non-adults who belonged to a ıurch did expand. In 1926 they numbered 3,916, while by 1936 they nounted to 5,395, a total gain of 1,479. This increase thus constitutes nly a very small percentage of the total newcomers to the worshipping rganizations of the city.[13]

In contrast to the statistics for total membership, Presbyterians, ot Baptists, led all other denominations in the number of new adherents ho were children. Their gain in this category of followers amounted to ıore than a thousand, and was almost three times the size of the increase ›f child members registered by the second place Roman Catholics. Baptists ıere far back in fourth place with only 266 such newcomers. They might ıttribute this position to their policy of voluntary membership for :hildren.[14] The following chart reveals the exact statistics for many ›f Tulsa's denominations as to non-adult members:[15]

CHILDREN MEMBERS

Denomination	1926	1936	Gain
Presbyterians.....	4,248	5,610	1,362
Roman Catholics.....	1,581	2,108	527
Methodists.....	768	1,083	315
Baptists.....	450	716	266
Protestant Episcopal.	227	375	148
Assembly of God.....	13	119	106
Lutheran.....	91	194	104
Mormon.....	14	29	15
Greek Orthodox.....	25	40	15

[13]Religious Bodies, 1926, p. 356; Religious Bodies, 1936, p. 434.

[14]William B. Lipphard, "What do Baptists Believe?" A Guide to the Religions of America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), p. 4.

[15]Religious Bodies, 1926, p. 560; Religious Bodies, 1936, p. 696.

While an increase in religious interest seems to be indicated by urch membership figures, the degree of participation by members in the tivities of the church probably reveals more. The size and scope of e educational work of the church may be the best yardstick for deter-ining the support given to the church program by the membership. The st common form of educational work carried on by the church is the so-alled Sunday School. The Baptists, who led in the recruiting of new hurch members, also had the largest number regularly attending Sunday chool during the depression. An average of 7,852 Baptists were regular cholars in the Sunday Schools of their congregations in 1926, while the sual number in attendance by 1936 was about 9,059. The total increase n average attendance at Sunday educational programs for this denomination as therefore 1,477. The obvious conclusion is that many, though far rom all, of those people who joined the Baptist Church during the economic risis had enough interest to carry through by actively participating ather fully in the total program of their congregations.[16] In contrast, he Methodists, who had a sizeable increase in total membership, regis-ered a decline in average Sunday School attendance. This suggests that any Methodists who started their membership during the years of depressio did not take part fully in the church activity. The table which follows gives some of the pertinent data relative to the attendance at the Sunday Schools of Tulsa's churches during these years:[17]

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[16] Religious Bodies, 1926, p. 357; Religious Bodies, 1936, p. 435.

[17] Ibid.

SUNDAY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

;nomination	1926	1936	Gain or loss
ıptists.....	7,582	9,059	1,477
:esbyterians.....	4,500	5,120	620
ɜsembly of God.....	2,159	2,640	481
ıtherans.....	223	385	162
ɔrmon.....	135	254	119
rotestant Episcopal...	275	370	95
eventh Day Adventists.	130	195	65
ıitarians.....	46	93	47
reek Orthodox.....	24	42	18
ewish.....	220	235	15
ethodists.....	4,423	3,632	-791
hurch of God.....	258	178	-80

It is impossible to prove that all or any part of the people who be-ame members of Tulsa's churches during the depression did so because of he business slump. People accept religious membership for many reasons, auses which only the individual member could reveal. It is just as ifficult to prove that the depression had any relationship to the number ttending Sunday School or participating in the various other parts of :he church program. This analysis of the available statistics does trongly suggest, however, that many Tulsans joined the churches of the :ity as a direct result of the economic crisis, but that most stopped a ɜtep short of complete involvement in the activities of their congre-ɜations.

The fact that many Tulsa churchmen anticipated spiritual profits from the depression did not obscure their concern with the practices which they felt had caused it. For them they had nothing but condem-nation. And while they did not specifically divide the groups of Ameri-can society as to their responsibility for these evils, their sermons imply that some groups were more deserving of the blame than others. Principally there were two such groups. One was made up of those in control of the means of production, the capitalists. The other was in

ontrol of the means of controlling the capitalists, the politicians. The epression might curb the unrighteousness of the masses, but some special ffort was needed to check the sinfulness of those who would remain unffected by the economic crisis, and who were in fact responsible for t.[18]

What appears to be an ambiguity of religious thought thus reveals tself in their sermons. On the one hand, they pointed to the sinfulness f the people at large as a cause of the depression, while on the other and they defended this undefined mass against the greed of the economic lite and the corruption of the politicos. They were led to the first ssignment of guilt by doctrinal tenets which proclaimed all men to be atural sinners. The second conviction resulted from the hard facts f the times which suggested that the sins of some people could be more rastic in their repercussions on society than the sins of others. They laimed that what people had always considered to be individualism was ctually no such thing. It was rather a stark individualistic materialism. he Tulsa ministers were thus carried logically to a denial of economic aissez-faire.

If what had passed for individualism had, in reality, been only the hilosophy of selfishness, where was the true example to be found? It ould be seen in the life of Jesus as a workingman. As Dr. Bateman said:

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[18]The list of those who served the churches of Tulsa during the epression is impressive. The present analysis, however, is not an ttempt to explore the totality of their religious thought. Its object bove all is to present their views as to the causes of the depression nd the best solutions for it. When, moreover, a greater amount of pace is given to some messages than to others, the reason is that me expressed thought about the nature of the depression more than thers; some dealt more than others with the main subject of this tudy.

> We think of him as having a carpenter's shop...in Nazareth. Here the farmers came to have their ploughshares made. He was far-famed for his honesty....His business was not done in a slip shod way. He was a good collector for his work. I can imagine that it was ever his principle to render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things which are God's He recognized the rules of the game. He endorsed the idea of acquiring and possessing property. He never once yielded to the idea of socialism.[19]

:f such a spirit could govern business now, Bateman maintained, the ;hole world would be changed. Businessmen would see that if the factory :xisted for the good of the people, the people would work for the good)f the factory. The laborers would feel that "capital has a soul" and :hat they were going to be cared for.[20]

An indictment was thus brought against American civilization as it ıad developed, not against the basic institutions and ideology which had ;erved it. Accordingly poverty was a disgrace not because it was bad in ltself, but because it could be eliminated. American politics, and :hurches for that matter, needed to be reformed not because they were ;eak institutions, but because men had not properly used them. Bateman ınd many other Tulsa ministers contended, therefore, that the critical)roblem faced by the United States was not the immediate abnormality of lepression but the attitudes which the people had shaped during America's ıistoric development.

Perhaps nowhere is their philosophical position indicated better :han in a sermon delivered by the Reverend Walter Douglass before the :ongregation of the Centenary Methodist Episcopal Church. Douglass based ıis address on Frederick Lewis Allen's book, Only Yesterday, which is

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[19] Tulsa Spirit, January 30, 1931, p. 14.

[20] Ibid.

ssentially a resume of American activities from the end of World War I o the great stock market crash in 1929. Allen, Douglass correctly ointed out, did not propose to analyze depression, nor offer a remedy or it. He evaded philosophy, adhering closely to the historical sur-ey.[21] The object of his sermon, Douglass stated, was to examine con-itions in the world and point the way "out of normalcy."[22] He con-inued:

> Our problems are grounded in business, politics, crime, poverty, church, school and home. The world needs a present day attitude. So long as men think in terms of 'Jeffersonian Democracy,' 'Old Time Religion,' 'Back to Normalcy,' 'The Good Old Days,' and 'The Old Fashioned Home,' civilization will stagnate. We need men who can think in terms of their own generation.[23]

Starting with these basic ideas, the Reverend Mr. Eckel pointed to hree basic truths about labor which he believed that Jesus had taught. f these truths were incorporated into the industrial life of the time, ecovery would follow and a social order would be created that would en-ure.

> The first truth is that society owes every man a job. The second...is that society owes every man a living wage. The third...that society must make some provision to tide the worker over the periods of enforced unemployment.[24]

lot every man, in fact not even most men, could have a job if the selfish-ess of a few was to be allowed to wreck the stability of the American

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[21]The book closes enumerating overproduction, prices, silver, nternational finance, foreign unrest, mental attitudes and general eaction as the seven basic causes of the financial crisis: Frederick ewis Allen, Only Yesterday (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931), pp. 42-343.

[22]Tulsa Tribune, December 6, 1932, p. 4.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Tulsa World, September 6, 1932, p. 4.

conomy. A living wage would be denied as long as big businessmen were llowed to set the standards. The business of caring for the unemployed ust become a duty of the government if the industrialists persisted in eglecting them. Eckel closed his sermon by advocating some form of unmployment insurance.[25]

In the last months of 1932, therefore, a rather large group of Tulsa inisters had moved philosophically to the advocacy of reforms which the ew Deal would soon carry out. They were, in fact, proposing the fundaental political compromise which the administration of Franklin D. oosevelt would make between unrestrained capitalism and socialism. hurch leaders probably recognized that the crisis might make the totaliarian state eventually acceptable to the masses of America, and knew hat such a government often left no place for religious groups to functior his seems to be the point that the Reverend John Allen Hudson, minister f the Tenth Street Church of Christ, was trying to make:

> Statesmen must thrash out this problem or revolutionary sentiments will be fomented on a giant scale before this nation is aware. Meanwhile the sway of the Gospel of Christ is the one element that can neutralize and balance dangerous tendencies.[26]

The Tulsa clergymen, however, moved only hesitantly into the realm f politics. In doing so they bumped into a serious question posed by ecular authorities: What had the church to do with a man's wages? A ermon by the Reverend Claude E. Hill provoked a letter to the editor of ne of the local newspapers which well indicates this sentiment in an xtreme form. The writer of the letter declared:

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[25] Tulsa World, September 6, 1932, p. 4.

[26] Tulsa Tribune, January 12, 1932, p. 4.

> Hypocritical professed Christians are mostly responsible for our plight. And that of the world also. Christ.../did not claim/ for himself the last thought as so many of his professed believers do for themselves.[27]

e ministers were thus forced to justify making the management of the fairs of state and of economics one of their responsibilities.

They found the grounds for this excursion into the political world humanitarianism. Almost unanimously they concluded that there was no cuse for wealthy America to have the poverty which then existed. The verend Mr. Hudson openly debated the matter with himself:

> But what concern has a minister of the Gospel of Christ with political and governmental problems? He might have as good a conception of such problems, even better in some instances than the average man, but he has another role cast for him. There is /however/ no apology for blundering that needlessly brings human suffering and surely there is something radically wrong when there can be want in a land of plenty.[28]

ıe church must, therefore, go to the aid of those who were deprived. In ıe words of the Reverend Mr. Eckel:

> The silent church, the one that is unresponsive, unsympathetic, selfish in the present stress...it matters not how many services are held within its sanctuary, nor how many jewels shine in the cross upon its altar, nor how many prayers are prayed, that church lacks credentials.[29]

The extent and intensity of unemployment and poverty caused many ıurches to abandon all efforts to provide charity or relief for their ıstressed members. Contributions to Tulsa's denominations had declined :astically during the depression, and in consequence church expenditures ıd to be curtailed. City-wide expenditures declined from $1,167,719 in)26 to $704,168 in 1936, or from an average of $13,270 per church to

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[27] Tulsa Tribune, January 2, 1932, p. 20.

[28] Ibid., January 12, 1932, p. 4.

[29] Ibid., October 11, 1932, p. 9.

,581.[30] The following tables indicate depression effects on total penditures of two of Tulsa's largest denominations, Baptists and thodists, by major congregations:[31]

BAPTIST EXPENDITURES[32]

ngregation	1929	1930	1931	1932
rst.....	$9,961.53	$10,793.88	$6,906.88	$5,698.57
manuel.....	$1,770.99	1,850.92	817.95	517.41
rth Trenton..	$ 38.11	264.53	86.75	169.18
ndall.....	$ 60.25	19.75	32.91	33.91
thel.....	$ 39.00	119.05	122.35	113.37
enwood.....	$ 241.77	228.67	100.29	127.82
inton.....	$--------	59.33	1.65	36.98
gales.....	$--------	118.47	291.02	397.86
oenix Avenue.	$--------	188.93	156.70	119.83
le Station...	$--------	83.85	64.62	173.43
ringdale.....	$--------	190.53	115.79	116.02
mple.....	$--------	3.20	1.25	9.74
inity.....	$--------	15.00	23.25	30.60

METHODIST EXPENDITURES[33]

ngregation	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
rst.....	$12,843	$11,909	$9,085	$7,024	$1,287
iversity.....	$ 1,960	1,825	1,272	1,032	342
. Pauls.....	$ 2,416	2,613	2,182	1,342	660
rkview.....	$ 350	259	159	129	132
se Hill.....	$ 306	409	380	277	180
thel-Baldwin.	$------	35	78	65	82
st Tulsa.....	$ 1,071	961	755	623	571

[30]Religious Bodies, 1926, p. 357; Religious Bodies, 1936, p. 435.

[31]These figures, published by the denominations concerned, may not be ntirely trustworthy. The decline in Methodist expenditures during 1933, or example, seems exceptionally sharp. It nevertheless appears safe to ccept the validity of trends indicated by these statistics.

[32]Minutes of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Convention of the Baptist General Convention of Oklahoma (Shawnee: The Oklahoma Baptist Press, 1929), pp. 23-124; Minutes of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention of the Baptist eneral Convention of Oklahoma (Shawnee: The Oklahoma Baptist Press, 1930), p. 80-81; Minutes of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention of the Baptist eneral Convention of Oklahoma (Shawnee: The Oklahoma Baptist Press, 1931), p. 73-74; Minutes of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Convention of the Baptist eneral Convention of Oklahoma (Shawnee: The Oklahoma Baptist Press, 1932), p. 107-108.

[33]Official Journal of the Thirty-Eighth Session of the Oklahoma Annual onference of the Methodist Episcopal Church (Cincinnati: Methodist Book

Many Tulsa churches were heavily in debt at the onset of the de-
ession, and the congregations had to make strenuous efforts to meet
terest and principal payments. Special drives and financial plans were
stituted both by denominational leaders and by leaders of local congre-
tions. H. B. Collins, Tulsa district superintendent of the Methodist
iscopal Church, indicated in a 1930 report to the Annual Conference
eting how severe this problem was:

> Thirteen banks within the bounds of the Tulsa district have closed their doors this year. Regardless of the statements of optimists that the bad financial conditions are largely a state of mind, it is our opinion that some very grim and concrete facts caused the state of mind. Serious and threatening debts upon nine churches of the district have brought worry and heavy burdens upon pastors and laymen.
>
> Beautiful, commodious and attractive church buildings are to be desired but our people would better worship in a tent, a rough tabernacle, or a rented room, than to assume obligations which are to be a millstone around the neck of Methodism for a generation. Overburdened with debt, pastors and churches find it difficult, and in some cases impossible, to put on an effective program for World Service stewardship and evangelism.[34]

Because of these financial problems, much of the relief which Tulsa's
urches had formerly given had to be taken over by other agencies. Conse-
ently, many ministers felt a sense of defeat in accomplishing the good
fe for their members. They felt a responsibility to see that the work

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ncern Press, 1929), p. 188; Official Journal of the Thirty-Ninth
ssion of the Oklahoma Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal
urch (Cincinnati: Methodist Book Concern Press, 1930, p. 282; Official
urnal of the Fortieth Session of the Oklahoma Annual Conference of the
thodist Episcopal Church (Cincinnati: Methodist Book Concern Press,
31), p. 376; Official Journal of the Forty-First Session of the Oklahoma
nual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church (Cincinnati: Methodist
ok Concern Press, 1932), p. 76; Official Journal of the Forty-Second
ssion of the Oklahoma Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal
urch (Cincinnati: Methodist Book Concern Press, 1933), p. 162. (Here-
ter cited as Official Journal of the Oklahoma M. E. Church 1929, 1930,
31, 1932, 1933.)

[34]Official Journal of the Oklahoma M. E. Church, 1930, pp. 222-223.

ıich they had previously controlled through the church was properly ırried out by other organizations. They, therefore, supported, and,) some extent, came to regard themselves as leaders of social, politi- ıl and economic reform.

In interpreting the secular order and proposing reforms for it, ıese Tulsa Protestant leaders of churches necessarily moved away from)nservative religious policy. They emphasized man's initiative and)ility to achieve progress. They contended that man could give a ra- ıonal interpretation to God's message to man. And, in assuming these)ctrinal positions, they turned back to the Calvinist-Lutheran Re-)rmation theology.

One direct social effect of the Great Depression on Tulsa, then, ıs the partial secularization of religion. Relief activities once per-)rmed by the church were completely divorced from it, and taken over by :her organizations. When the Tulsa ministers reached out to claim ;adership over new reforms, they further secularized religion, even ıough they were actually attempting to spiritualize economics and)litics.[35]

Tulsa's clergymen were also affected in a more personal way by the :eat Depression. Pastors' salaries seem to have suffered from a decline ı contributions. Although available statistics do not cover all of the lty's churches, it can be definitely established that the salaries of lnisters in the Methodist Episcopal Church were reduced. The following ıble indicates the extent of these reductions.[36]

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[35]During the nineteen-twenties, Tulsa ministers rarely lectured on ısiness or politics. Sermons which were delivered on these subjects ;ldom, if ever, proposed their reform.

[36]Official Journal of the Oklahoma M. E. Church, 1929, p. 180; Official Journal of the Oklahoma M. E. Church, 1930, p. 270; Official

METHODIST MINISTERS' SALARIES

ongregation	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
irst Church....	$8400	8400	8400	7680	6750
niversity.....	$4280	4600	4600	3100	1800
t. Paul.....	$4600	4600	4105	4200	4200
ark View.....	$1562	1337	1500	1180	720
ose Hill.....	$1240	1300	1400	1000	1000

The Great Depression, therefore, seems to have carried with it many mplications for the churches of Tulsa. A definite increase in church embership was registered during this period of financial crisis, despite he fact that the general population of the city increased almost negli-ibly. Some students of religion maintain that churches which are dominant row. The reasoning is that those groups which have the largest member-hips in any community have a larger proportion of their natural constitu-ncies than do the groups which are in the minority. Moreover, where hurches are weak their incoming members do not find them.[37] This survey f depression effects in Tulsa supports such an hypothesis. The city's our largest denominations, Baptist, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian and lethodist, all registered sizeable gains in membership.

The depression may also have had a positive effect on religious edu-:ational programs. In general the same denominations registered numerical ;ains in this area as in the category of church membership. The gains ;ere not so great, however, and there was one notable exception. This ›robably reflects the fact that while more people joined churches during :he depression, they failed to participate actively in the total church

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Journal of the Oklahoma M. E. Church, 1931, p. 368; Official Journal of the Oklahoma M. E. Church, 1932, p. 68; Official Journal of the Oklahoma M. E. Church, 1933, p. 150.

[37]Kincheloe, Research Memorandum on Religion During the Great Depression, p. 15.

rograms.

Contributions to the Tulsa churches declined during the depression, nd as a result expenditures did also. Since a great many of the city's hurches had accumulated large debts during the prosperous twenties, the ecline in revenues placed church officials under a great strain. inisters were also made keenly aware of the state of the times by the ecessity of counseling individuals who were unemployed or on relief, nd who had other financial problems. Aside from these professional re- ationships with the economic crisis, the ministers suffered personally s their salaries were drastically reduced. All this was reflected in the essage of the church.

Ministers spoke more and more on secular subjects as the depression rogressed. Most of them attributed the hard time to the sins of the ndividual. They anticipated the return to the church, which at least in art actually occurred. But they singled out two groups for special riticism. The capitalists, in their opinion, had been most responsible or the depression because they had employed corrupt business methods. he politicians likewise were blamed for doing nothing to regulate the onduct of big business. The opinions of the ministers in political atters, however, may be best described as "middle of the road," since hey saw nothing wrong with the existing institutions, but quarreled in- tead with the way in which they were being used.

CHAPTER VIII

THE IMPACT ON THE FAMILY

Almost every Tulsa family was probably affected in some way by the Great Depression. The nature and extent of the effect depended on a large number of varied factors. It seems certain, however, that the level of income of each family was the most important of these factors. The 36,970 families living in the city in 1929 represented most occupations and nearly every level of wealth.[1] Family activities center around the home, and many families consider the house to be the home. For this reason, in any study of depression effects on the family, the expenditures of these social units for shelter are significant. The amount paid by the family for housing probably reflects, at least to some extent, the total sum which it is able to pay.

The census bureau estimated that 13,852 Tulsa families owned or were paying on their homes in 1929.[2] Indeed, the percentage of homeowners in the Tulsa population was much greater than that of any other Oklahoma city. This probably resulted from favorable conditions in the nineteen-twenties. An almost unlimited supply of land was available near the industrial districts for the building of houses for workers. This property could be landscaped at little cost. Probably

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[1]United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Population, VI: Families (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 1069 (hereafter cited as Census of Families).

[2]Ibid., p. 1071.

more important, however, was the intense competition among the various building contractors of the city. The boom period of the preceding decade resulted in over-building by this industry and meant lower costs for home-buyers.[3]

Those Tulsans who had bought homes prior to the depression, however, did not in a majority of cases purchase the cheaper units. Only 1,733 city dwellings were valued at less than $3,000.[4] On the other hand, some 3,107 of them were valued at better than $10,000.[5] In fact, the value of property owned by Tulsans was greater than that of the nation as a whole, as the following chart indicates:[6]

Value of Housing	Per-Cent Ownership	
	Tulsa	United States
Less than $1,000	4.1	7.6
$1,000 to $1,999	4.6	5.4
$2,000 to $2,999	4.0	5.1
$3,000 to $3,999	9.6	11.1
$5,000 to $7,499	22.7	22.3
$7,500 to $9,999	24.9	21.9
$10,000 to $14,999	10.0	9.4
$15,000 to $19,999	8.9	8.6
$20,000 or more	6.2	3.4

The purchase of many of these homes during the supranormal economic period of the twenties, of course, created big problems for the depression family. A large number of foreclosures resulted.[7] Much resentment toward money-lenders and other protest actions developed

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[3]Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, Economic Survey of Oklahoma (St. Louis: General Commercial Engineering Department, Bell Telephone Company, 1929), p. 258.

[4]Census of Families, p. 1071.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid., p. 17.

[7]See the discussion of the Independent Party in Chapter VI.

among many of the city's families. Extracts from a letter on the matter by a Tulsa citizen offers a sample of this sentiment:

> A certain man in 1929 bought a home in Tulsa, made a payment of $15,000 cash and assumed a mortage of $14,500. Yes, it was a very nice home! He was a man of ability and accustomed to some measure of success. But a catastrophe not of his own making struck down his income.
>
> Result: Foreclosure. Judgment. Forced sale on a frozen market. Another American family made homeless; deprived even of their necessities, for of course the money-lender must be protected as to his capital.[8]

Considering that Tulsa was a metropolitan area, few of its families lived in apartments and flats during the years of depression. Most, a total of 21,510 families, lived in private residences. The largest single category of Tulsa's rent-paying families, numbering in all 4,369, paid $75 or more in rent per month. The next largest group of families in private residences were those who paid $15 or less per month. There were 3,823 families in this group.[9] This means that better than one-third of the families of Tulsa who rented private residences lived in either the most expensive or the least costly housing available.

Such a condition suggests that the economic distribution of Tulsa's families was slightly irregular. Although comparable statistics for the entire United States are not available, one would expect to find the bulk of the renters concentrated around the middle of the scale rather than at the upper and lower extremes. This was definitely the case for ten of the other leading cities of the country. It appears, therefore, that through some quirk in its natural development Tulsa

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[8] Tulsa Tribune, February 29, 1932, p. 8.

[9] A Study of City Markets, 1928-1929 (Philadelphia: The Curtis Publishing Company, 1929), p. 165.

failed to provide the usual economic opportunities to its citizens.[10] The middle group on Tulsa's private residence rental scale, those paying from $35 to $45 per month, totaled only 2,262 families. Renters of residences valued at from $45 to $75 per month accounted for 6,601 of Tulsa's families, while those living in shelters of this type renting for more than $15 but less than $35 numbered 4,995![11]

Apartments in the city provided living quarters for 729 families. The owners of this type of housing unit very definitely catered to the more wealthy element. Apartments renting for more than $75 per month were occupied by 368 families. There were 286 families living in those requiring payments of from $60 to $75 per month. In contrast, only fifty-five families lived in the apartments of the city which rented for less than $45 monthly.[12]

The dominance of the upper class as occupants of the city's flats was only slightly less marked.[13] For this type of shelter families totaling 272 paid at least $75 per month. The total number of families occupying flats renting for $60 to $75 each month was 539. Six-hundred and forty-one justified their occupancy with payments of from $45 to $60 per month. This means that of the 2,129 families living in flats, 1,452 were paying more than the average rental of $53.

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[10] A natural surplus of executives, who are generally willing to pay high rents, may well have been a contributing factor.

[11] Ibid.

[12] A Study of City Markets, 1928-1929, p. 165.

[13] An apartment differs from a flat in that the former is a part of a divided building while the latter occupies an entire structure.

operty owners extracted rents of from $35 to $45 per month from 315 milies, while the other 362 occupants of flats in the city paid less an $35.[14]

Rental statistics, therefore, indicate that Tulsa property-owners re prospering in the pre-depression years. They were, indeed, re- iving rental payments that exceeded the median charge from better an half of the occupants of all three types of housing. The apparent llingness of so many people to pay higher rents suggests two inter- ting possibilities. Probably a considerable number of families were ying higher shelter costs than they could with ease. Any slight re- ljustment of their economic status would therefore necessitate the andonment of these quarters. The abnormal number paying higher rents obably raised the prices of all housing considerably, and thus forced e families on the lower rungs of the economic scale to live in arters which strained their ability to pay.

Regardless of whether these theories are valid, the property owner ose income came from the leasing of homes was severely affected by the pression. The possessor of high priced housing quickly lost many of s renters, who moved to less expensive quarters. Some families, how- er, could not afford to move, nor could they pay their rents. One ndlord expressed his viewpoint on the matter:

> I believe the property owners are in worse condition than the tenants, because tenants can move. I believe there are twenty per cent or more tenants unable to pay their rents. That is one reason property owners can't pay their taxes.[15]

The condition of landlords made them the worst enemies of transients

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[14] A Study of City Markets, 1928-1929, p. 165.

[15] Tulsa Tribune, April 14, 1932, p. 18.

d the greatest friends of the made-work programs of Tulsa. In early 32 they attempted to organize a Taxpayers and Citizen's Vigilante ague, and, although the movement was ultimately unsuccessful, the scussion concerning it casts much light on the viewpoint of the de- essed property owner of the city. The group pushing for the organi- tion of such a league demanded that all "contractors doing work for e city of Tulsa and Tulsa county...be required to use legal residents d taxpayers who have...helped build Tulsa."[16] They also advocated a ratorium against building and loan payments, a halt of receiverships d foreclosures of mortgages, and reductions in the salaries of city d county government officials. "We should also investigate the loan ark companies who are preying upon the unfortunate citizens of our ty, compel them to operate upon legitimate lines or drive them from e city."[17]

The families in Tulsa forced to accept relief were those most aware the depression. A total of 5,283 families fell into that category ring the first three years of the depression. Some 3,470 of these re white, 1,788 Negro and the other 25 were Mexican and Indian.[18] might be expected that the family with the largest number of members uld be most drastically affected by the downturn in the business cycle. is does not seem to have been the case. In fact, 1,416 had no children all, and 1,025 had only one child.[19] Almost half of the families on

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[16] Tulsa Tribune, April 14, 1932, p. 18.

[17] Ibid., April 30, 1932, p. 28.

[18] Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Unemployment Relief nsus Number One (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 34), pp. 86-87.

[19] Ibid.

:lief, therefore, were of the smallest size. The larger the family, ıe least likely it was to be on relief. Recognition must be given to ıe obvious fact that there were fewer large families than there were ıall ones. This natural factor no doubt accounts for much of the differ- ıce. The following chart indicates the number of relief families by ize:[20]

ASS	TOTAL	FAMILIES COMPRISING					
		1	2	3	4	5	
tal	5,283	771	1,416	1,025	820	542	
ıite	3,470	409	858	670	597	396	
egro	1,788	360	552	353	220	140	
ther	25	2	6	2	3	6	
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
tal	313	196	119	49	20	8	4
ıite	236	149	97	37	11	6	4
egro	73	45	22	12	9	2	0
ther	4	2	0	0	0	0	0

In addition to its obvious economic difficulties, the Tulsa family ı relief had problems of a psychological nature. Most of them were ıoroughly discontented with the state of their financial affairs. They ere especially unhappy over their dependence on relief. The statements f relief administrators refer again and again to the professed willing- ess of these people to work for what they received. Said one such of- icial in the spring of 1932:

> Too many persons, seeing the groups of idle men on the streets brand them as bums and loafers who wouldn't work if they got the chance. It is the chance they need. They come in here and tell me that they have literally walked the souls /sic/ off their shoes looking for work....[21]

his authority went on to state that the spirits of the unemployed heads f families were being broken by their inability to obtain work, and

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[20]Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Unemployment Relief Census eport Number One, pp. 86-87.

[21]Tulsa Tribune, March 2, 1932, p. 7.

ıdicated that this was leading to broken homes:

> Broken spirits and discouragement come with a man having to go home and tell his wife again that he has failed to find a job. This continued failure has led to many men deserting their families in the belief that the welfare agencies would care for the wife and children while the men would shift for themselves.[22]

ıother person who had been working as a volunteer in writing grocery rders for the unemployed commented: "We now have...fifty big strong ən begging for work for themselves."[23] Another relief official expressed ıe same conviction and documented it with cases out of the files of the ɡency in which she worked. One family, which included nine children, was ttempting to earn money for food by selling newspapers. An unemployed ıinter and paper hanger was offering to do anything in order to keep his wo daughters in high school.[24]

While these officials spoke with vigor about the unhappiness caused ɔr the family by its necessity to take relief, the unemployed themselves id not remain silent. In a letter to the editor of the Tulsa Tribune ıe made the following remarks:

> today about sixty able-bodied men went to the commissary and carried away a week's rations and will loaf a week and then go back for another helping. And each day in every week.../we have to/ follow the same routine.... At this same time the city has a contract to construct a viaduct over the railroads at Utica Avenue, for which they will have to pay the contractor cash. For just what reason can't the men who are living on charity (when they don't like to) go down there and tear down the old wooden structure and repay the city for the provisions they got the day before?[25]

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[22] Tulsa Tribune, March 2, 1932, p. 7.

[23] Ibid., January 4, 1932, p. 8.

[24] Ibid., March 2, 1932, p. 7.

[25] Ibid., June 16, 1932, p. 8.

nother person in the ranks of the unemployed relief recipients directed pungent appeal for work through the same medium:

> I am writing this letter hoping that it may be the means of my obtaining work. Have been a reader of the paper ever since it was established....However, I am not reading it now for the reason I have not the price. I am a landscape gardener and florist, and I know the care of chickens. I do not use tobacco in any form, neither do I drink. In other words, I am strictly sober. A small wage with a suitable place to live would be satisfactory to me.[26]

rganizations among the unemployed, in particular the Independent Party nd the Tulsa Immediate Relief Association, further indicate this feeling f dissatisfaction with a dependent status.[27]

Despite this fact, there was a continued effort on the part of many espected local citizens to convince the public that degeneration was not ar away if something was not done to furnish the unemployed with jobs. he best summary of the literature of this campaign perhaps appeared in n editorial in the Tulsa Tribune which declared:

> Hundreds of good steady workers in Tulsa who have been forced to appeal to charity agencies for help during the depression are yet facing a tragic loss of the energy and self-reliance necessary to self-support even in normal times. When unemployment is long delayed, those who are at first uncomfortable at the necessity for seeking assistance and grateful for whatever is given become demanding and grasping. After the initial embarrassment of a first recourse to charity is overcome it is easy to find work, accept a position of dependence, rely on the agency and criticize its methods.[28]

his is merely one example of the steady stream of such expression. One onders how many workers gave in to a permanent state of dependence simply ecause they had heard so many times that it was inevitable. E. B. Howard,

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[26]Tulsa Tribune, January 27, 1932, p. 14.

[27]See Chapter VI.

[28]Tulsa Tribune, March 26, 1932, p. 26.

Tulsa County "made-work" administrator for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, once commented that the "fear of losing the chance to work has been instilled in many of the men dependent on made-work jobs by efforts of 'humanitarians' to shut down the program when the weather turned cold."[29]

These predictions of irreparable character damage constantly antagonized the families on relief. Even more disturbing, however, were the efforts of some local citizens to force their standards of conduct on families dependent on relief agencies for their subsistence. The lack of independence among these families made them susceptible to criticism of their personal habits by their providers. Some of this showed up in an inoffensive way in the city's commissary program in its second stage, when only a prescribed ration was permitted. It revealed itself in a more destructive form in criticisms of dress, attitude, and habitual indulgences. A good example can be seen with respect to cigaret smoking. On this subject one citizen declared: "How is it they can find money to buy cigarettes but have none to buy bread. We believe in charit but when we help a poor fellow, we would prefer he did not blow smoke in our face."[30] The latter type of critism, however, never gained much currency with Tulsa officialdom.

Tulsa's families on relief maintained a remarkably good spirit despit the criticisms, inconveniences, and general discomfort which they had to endure. It was because of their full cooperation with city officials that most of the relief programs were successful. Nowhere is this

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[29] Tulsa Tribune, December 18, 1932, p. 4.

[30] Ibid., February 25, 1932, p. 18.

.llingness to cooperate better indicated than in connection with Tulsa's ıcant lot garden program.[31] Many made an effort to carry their indi-.dual participation in the program beyond the size which the free seed .lotment allowed. One man drove a truck for the Family Welfare Society ırring the winter in order to save enough money to buy a sack of seed)tatoes. Then, as he described what followed:

> ...I went down to a hardware store on First Street and asked 'em what I could do to earn some seed. They set me to work, and I got a lot more. Then I worked out planting some tomatoes for another feller and I got a bunch of tomatoes. I'm going to have just lots to eat this year.[32]

ıe garden program, like all the relief services, had its problems, and : one point the administrators were forced to distribute something less ıan a variety of seed. A Tulsan who had been unemployed for a full year ppeared at relief headquarters in April of 1932 requesting seed. The fficials had only beets available. Apparently only mildly discouraged, ıe man commented:

> Mister, you can live on beets, We pretty near lived on 'em last year. I always plant beets when I can get 'em. Why, my wife, she put up 36 one-half gallon jars of beets last summer. We got lots of folks to eat 'em too. Five of us at home, and then some of my older children who's away come back and say: 'Dad, mother, how's the beets?' And mother, she gets out a half-gallon of beets. And boy, sometimes there's some left and sometimes there isn't.[33]

All this is not to say that relief recipients never criticized the rograms created to benefit them, but for the most part these protests ere mild. One group opposed the favoritism which was shown to the heads f families. This group was composed mostly of single men and women who ad dependents. They believed that the relief priority given to family

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[31] See Chapter II.

[32] Tulsa Tribune, April 29, 1932, p. 3.

[33] Ibid.

ıads was perfectly right, but asked consideration for themselves also, ıintaining that they had:

> cared for parents, educated young brothers and sisters, made investments in real estate, which they...lost to the mortgage companies, and now.../found/ themselves out of money and not any work or financial aid to be had.[34]

few Tulsa reliefers objected also to the fact that many of the city's ıtail merchants employed individuals who were not so much in need of ɔrk and income as they were. As one complained:

> Go into the offices and you will find that young women, usually married, and sometimes living at home, are given the salary so that she might dress more elegantly. Note the fur coats on the streets at the noon hour. Even go into the offices of the Community Fund and you will find a large number of young boys and girls, some from the exclusive homes of the South side. Also many married women, whose husbands have good jobs; the secretary and her sister being members of the latter class.[35]

ɔme, though not so many, also criticized the nature of the work they ɜre given to do in the Tulsa made-work program, considering themselves ıamed by tasks like picking up scraps and leaves in the parks and on ıcant lots.

By far the greatest volume of protest which came from the ranks of ıe relief families, however, was directed at the city's special com- lssary plan during the second winter of its operation. The low cost of ıe rations led many to believe that they were not being given enough to lve on.[36] Moreover, although the ration was wholesome and adequate, ɛs ingredients were not particularly appetizing to some, consisting of ɛimmed milk in powdered form, meal and flour and ground beef. The meat

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[34] Tulsa Tribune, December 5, 1932, p. 8.

[35] Tulsa World, March 28, 1932, p. 8.

[36] Tulsa Tribune, October 27, 1932, p. 16. For additional details on ıe program see Chapter IV.

.s mixed with about twelve percent powdered milk to create a sausage · meat loaf, and was the most unpopular item in the diet. These ex-:essions of dissatisfaction with food supplies by the commissary soon ıbsided, however, and some of the reliefers even became defenders of ıe program. Their initial flurry of protests seem even less unjust ıen one considers that the commissary ration had its critics among ılsa relief officials, and, indeed, even made an enemy of one national)urnal. An editorial in The Christian Century denounced the plan in ıe following terms:

> ...a menu whose monotony might not be revolting to livestock, but can't be any more appetizing to modern humans than were the quail of the desert which in thirty days proved too many for the ancient Israelites. And then there's the spectacle of a young commonwealth of vast resources, in which the best that the free expression of sturdy individualism could produce, after forty years, is a city of redundant skyscrapers, mortgaged cathedrals and two cent charity meals! That there should be any pride in the accomplishment shows how utterly detached from the rational conduct of life our social order now confesses itself to be.[37]

Of all Tulsa families, those most disturbed by the loss of their conomic independence were the white collar workers. To them the prestige actor was apparently as important as the basic desire to provide for heir own. Probably no other group in Tulsa, however, achieved more ympathy for their predicament. In past years they had contributed to harity agencies regularly. Now they were forced to turn to the same gencies for aid. Their reluctance to do this prompted the adoption of special policy in their behalf by the Community Fund. Such persons ere asked to bring their problems before the agencies through special ppointments which would avoid publicity. An official of the Fund ustified the policy with the statement that: "People of this type

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[37]"Editorial," The Christian Century, XLIX (April 20, 1932), p.500.

itate to join the regular lines of charity seekers and come to find mselves in desperate straits."[38] One relief administrator declared t it was "heart breaking" when she came across the name of some son on the unemployment lists whom she had known in "happier times."[39]

While most of the white collar workers wanted to keep their condi- ns as little known as possible, they had the same desire as other e earners to register a protest against their situation. While the ustrial laborer turned to the Independent Party or to the Tulsa ediate Relief Association or some similar organization, the white lar workers looked elsewhere. The Socialist Party, with its economic erpretation of history and its general intellectual orientation, ved to be a satisfactory instrument for expressing the protest of many fessional and clerical workers. W. L. Garver, secretary of the ialist Party of Tulsa, credited this factor as being responsible for rise in strength of the party just prior to the election of 1932.[40] pite the fact that Oklahoma's Socialists were denied the ballot in s presidential campaign, Norman Thomas, the Socialist candidate, de- ered a political speech in Tulsa. He was greeted by an overflow crowd some 4,500 when he spoke in the city's Convention Hall.[41]

The disenfranchisement of this party by the state election board ught about a liberal protest in the city. This protest drew support m non-Socialists, even from some very orthodox Republicans. When the

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[38] Tulsa Tribune, January 25, 1932, p. 1.

[39] Ibid., June 18, 1932, p. 8.

[40] Ibid., December 10, 1932, p. 28.

[41] Ibid., October 18, 1932, p. 4.

ılsa Socialists began raising a fund to question the state's electoral ›te and called for contributions in the name of the "right of suffrage," : was reported that considerable revenue poured in.[42] Even more signi-lcant was the action of Richard Lloyd Jones, editor and publisher of ıe Tulsa Tribune, and an active campaign worker for President Hoover, f presenting the issue to the Supreme Court of the United States. His ɜtter read:

> Has the Supreme Court of the United States the power to protect the franchise rights of American citizens? If not, are those rights without protection? I am not a Socialist and will not vote for Thomas. But in the interest of the American freedom of ballot and as an American citizen I respectfully ask, has the Supreme Court of the United States no power on its own motion to reverse the Supreme Court of Oklahoma which today ruled that /the/ Socialist Party cannot appear on the national ticket to be voted by Oklahoma citizens next November 8? Has any state the power to disenfranchise a national party of the Socialists' proportions? By all the processes of reasoning of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, any state or group of states could have disenfranchised all those who voted for Theodore Roosevelt on the Progressive ticket in 1912, and the Republican party could never have started. Has the Supreme Court of the United States no power, no duty to protect the freedom of conviction and the rights of franchise of every American citizen? Should not the people's highest court now establish precedent by deciding and ordering that no state can obstruct a national election?[43]

here is little doubt that the action of Jones, and lesser expressions f sympathy with the Socialists by others, was the product of their exerience in seeing the families of white collar workers lose their income nd then have their political voice stifled. For Jones, and the others s well, had an intimate acquaintance with and respect for the members f these families.

The family, of course, formally begins to function in our society

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[42] Tulsa Tribune, October 28, 1932, p.15.

[43] Ibid., September 27, 1932, p. 16.

ly after a legal marriage ceremony. The number of marriages in any ar in any city depends upon a variety of factors--some known and some t known--that induce people to marry. In Tulsa it appears that the scent of the business cycle induced people to refrain from the act. e marriage rate in the city, however, did not fall off abruptly in the rst year of the depression as it did in the sociologists' typical erican city, Middletown.[44] Instead it continued a steady climb in mbers which had began in 1926, and reached an all time high of 1,956 rriages in 1929. This undoubtedly reflects the fact that the latter ar was considered by most Tulsans to be perhaps the most prosperous in e history of the city. The full effects of the business slump were t registered until late in 1930.

The fall off in marriages between 1929 and 1930 was negligible, the te being reduced only from 1,956 to 1,871. Then followed, however, a arp descent to 1,449 in 1931, and a further decline to 1,144 in 1932.[45] seems certain that this lessening of those marrying was attributable, least to some extent, to the depressed economic conditions. The county

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[44]Robert S. and Helen Merrill Lynd, Middletown in Transition (New rk: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1937), p. 152.

[45]United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Marriage d Divorce, 1928 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 30), p. 82; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, rriage and Divorce, 1929 (Washington: United States Government Printing fice, 1931), p. 82; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the nsus, Marriage and Divorce, 1930 (Washington: United States Government inting Office, 1932), p. 83; United States Department of Commerce, reau of the Census, Marriage and Divorce, 1931 (Washington: United ates Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 68; United States Department Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Marriage and Divorce, 1932 (Washington: ited States Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 24. (Hereafter cited Marriage and Divorce, 1928; 1929; 1930; 1931; 1932.

rriage license clerk thought so. On one occasion he commented: "In e depression the old saying that two can live as cheaply as one has en found lacking by the young people, and they are afraid to take the ws."[46] At another time he issued a statement to the press which blamed e slump in marriages on general business conditions, stating that many ospective grooms were coming in for licenses without sufficient funds pay the fees.[47] There seems to have been two major ways, therefore, which the depression lowered the Tulsa marriage rate. Both involved e ability to meet financial necessities. Some who would have liked to rry postponed the event for fear that they would be unable to provide r the upkeep of the home. Others were willing to marry but did not have e funds required to make it legal.

The divorce situation in Tulsa during the early years of depression s an unusual one. The theory has been advanced many times that while or business conditions cause a decline in the marriage rate, they do the me for the number of divorces. Divorces, however, did not decrease as ch as marriages in Tulsa, and the city's number still remained high as mpared to the rest of the nation. In 1929 there were 1,307 divorces, 1930, 1,250, in 1931, 1,058, and in 1932 there were 970.[48] In all, en, despite the fact that marriages should theoretically be greater in mber than divorces, marriages declined by 812, while divorces dropped only 337 in the first three years of the depression.

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[46] Tulsa Tribune, December 17, 1932, p. 8.

[47] Ibid., May 7, 1932, p. 2.

[48] Marriage and Divorce, 1928, p. 82; Marriage and Divorce, 1929, p. ; Marriage and Divorce, 1930, p. 83; Marriage and Divorce, 1931, p. 68; rriage and Divorce, 1932, p. 24.

Since the decline in the divorce rate was hardly noticeable from 1929 1930, many Tulsans did not see the reduction as resulting from the de-ession. Some of them, indeed, believed that the economic crisis was using the large number of divorces rather than contributing to a de-ease. An economist on the staff of the University of Tulsa believed at the high number of divorces resulted from the frustration of the onomic desires of an abnormal number of men who had been earning between ,000 and $15,000 per year. He further commented:

> There is to be sure a substantial number of divorces due to absolute poverty. But that number is essentially the same in Tulsa as in other cities, Oklahoma City for example. Our surplus must come from the groups in our citizenship that the average city does not have.[49]

professor of biology at the University agreed with his colleague that e divorce rate was associated directly with the depression. As to the fferences between the rates of Oklahoma City and Tulsa, he felt a "tenor optimism" caused by "sound economic reasons" was the explanation.[50]

A leading psychiatrist believed that Tulsa was a city of "four-ushers" and that this necessarily led to a high divorce rate. Tulsa, his opinion, was no longer a boom town economically but still was rally:

> Make no mistake about it, the major reason for divorce here or anywhere else is maladjustment in the sex life. In the city of Tulsa you have a most unstable assortment of people. They are pleasure seeking and unsettled in temperament. I believe that there is a greater number of kept women in Tulsa than in any other city in the United States.[51]

A woman lawyer who specialized in settling marital difficulties among

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[49] Tulsa Tribune, June 23, 1931, p. 4.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid., June 24, 1931, p. 3.

ıe poorer classes considered "poverty and drink" as the causes of most
f the strife and discontent which was leading to Tulsa county divorces.
ıe too, therefore, believed that economic conditions influence the di-
ɔrce rates. She was convinced that the city was one of extremes--
ɔverty and wealth. As to those impoverished she had discovered that
divorce in most of these cases has just one meaning for women--alimony."[52]
he great wealth of the upper economic group resulted in loose conduct
ocially which, in turn, resulted in divorce.[53] If the major motive be-
ind the Tulsa divorce proceedings started by women was alimony, however,
any females desirous of their "freedom" were frustrated after January of
932. At that time, Judge S. S. Clendinning, following up his liberal
tand on mortgage foreclosures, began in numerous cases to reduce alimony
ayments previously ordered. In cases which were now brought before him,
lendinning was slow to grant alimony where no children were involved,
nd slower still to send men to jail if they could not meet the payments
ater.[54]

The number of births in Tulsa did not decline during the first three
'ears of the depression. As a matter of fact, they increased yearly until
.932, when they declined only slightly. Perhaps the depression stimulated
:ather than reduced births. This might have been caused by a new soli-
larity on the part of the family in the face of the business slump. More-
ɔver, idleness and the lack of funds for amusement and entertainment
ɔrobably contributed. In considering birth statistics, of course, the

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[52]Tulsa Tribune, June 21, 1932, p. 5.

[53]Ibid.

[54]Ibid., January 12, 1932, p. 8. For a discussion of Clendinning's earlier liberal decisions, see Chapter VI.

actor of delayed results must be recognized. Thus the decline in birth ates would not show until later in the depression. Unplanned births also ave to be considered. The following table indicates the number of Tulsa irths for the early depression years.[55]

Year	Number
1928	2,186
1929	2,214
1930	2,266
1931	2,293
1932	2,114

The Great Depression thus had some important implications for the amilies of Tulsa. Many of them had purchased homes, some of them quite xpensive, during the boom period of the nineteen-twenties and now had to age a hard struggle to keep them. Tulsa's renter families also were in any cases dislocated since they could no longer afford to pay as much as ormerly. There was, therefore, considerable intra-city migration on the art of the families of Tulsa. Other families could not afford to move, nd their failure to leave quarters for which they could not pay resulted n eviction or a turn to charity. Either way the families of Tulsa's andlords were affected, and they became an effective pressure group for nti-transient and made-work programs.

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[55]United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Births, Stillbirths and Infant Mortality, 1928 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1930), p. 108; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Births, Stillbirths and Infant Mortality, 1929 (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931), p. 156; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Births, Stillbirths and Infant Mortality, 1930 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1932), p. 162; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Births, Stillbirths and Infant Mortality, 1931 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 112; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Births, Stillbirths and Infant Mortality, 1932 (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 104. Illegitimate birth records are of questionable accuracy, but indications are that the number slightly increased.

The families on relief suffered the most. They were not only forced o live on little, but in many cases were subjected to intense criticism s well. In addition they were disturbed by continued prophecies of their mpending doom to a life as parasites. In spite of these difficulties, owever, they maintained a good spirit during the early years of the de- ression. Only a minority of the reliefers criticized the programs which ere established to relieve them, and generally these protests were not njust.

The most embarrassed group among the relief families, and the unem- loyed generally, were the former white collar workers. Many of them at- empted to register their protest through the Socialist Party. This turn o Socialism and the state's denial of the ballot to them, produced a articular current of liberalism in the city.

The number of new families formed in Tulsa during the depression were ew, and many old ones broke up. Marriages sharply declined with the usiness cycle, but the number of divorces seems to have been raised by he depression. Births showed some increase each year until 1932 but de- lined a little in that year. Without doubt, every Tulsa family was af- ected in some way when the Great Depression descended upon the city.

CHAPTER IX

THE IMPACT ON EDUCATION

The Great Depression directly affected education in Tulsa by reducing school revenue. Reduced funds made retrenchments necessary. While the danger always exists that curtailments of this type will hamper the effectiveness of the schools, the first three years of the financial crisis did not bring this experience to Tulsa.

Most of the schools of the nation reacted to the problem of reduced funds by releasing part of their personnel. In many instances this resulted in "large classes, crowded classrooms, increased absences, lowered standards, lower quality of work, and finally because of...lost faith in the schools, less income from taxes."[1] Salaries formed eighty per cent of the Tulsa school budget in pre-depression days, and necessarily had to come in for some consideration in any effort at retrenchment.[2] It was possible to achieve a lower salary outlay either by reducing the earnings of teachers or by dismissing a portion of them. The first step taken by the Tulsa Board of Education was a straight percentage reduction of teachers' salaries. A system-wide lowering of ten per-cent was the

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[1]Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association, Research Memorandum on Education in the Depression (New York: Social Science Research Council Bulletin Number Twenty-Eight, 1937), pp. 7-8.

[2]United States Department of the Interior, Office of Education, Biennial Survey of Education, 1928-1930 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1932), p. 310. (Hereafter cited as Biennial Survey 1928-1930).

rincipal item in economies effected in drafting the 1931-1932 school udget. An attempt was made, however, to retain salary schedules as a eal feature of teachers' contracts. Rather than freezing salary chedules, Tulsa granted its normal increases scheduled, and then made he cut. Increases were halted only to the extent that the usual bonuses or foreign travel and summer session work were discontinued.[3]

As further reductions were required, higher salaries were trimmed irst and most drastically. The lower salaries were reduced only as a ast resort. In 1932-1933 all persons who had salaries higher than the evised schedule provided were cut fifteen per-cent. Although the change as not mandatory for administrative leaders, they took this curtailment n salary voluntarily. A five per-cent reduction was made in the salaries f those who had been receiving below $1600 a year.[4] Although the alaries of beginning teachers were not so much affected as the pay of xperienced teachers and supervisors, they were somewhat lessened. The ulsa schools now paid entering women teachers $1,260 per year and startin en teachers $1,530 annually. The minimum salary previous to the depressi ad been $1,900 for men and $1,600 for women.[5]

In spite of the good intentions of the Tulsa Board, it was forced to elease seventeen teachers prior to the 1932-1933 term. No particular sex as discriminated against in these dismissals. In many cities married omen were released at the beginning of the depression, but this was not one in Tulsa. Nor did the Tulsa Board in the first three years of the

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[3]Tulsa World, September 1, 1932, p. 12.

[4]Tulsa Tribune, August 25, 1932, p. 2.

[5]National Education Association, Department of Superintendence and Research, Educational Circular Number Three, 1932, p. 3.

epression consider discharging unmarried females in order that more men ith families could have work. The ratio between the sexes, as is indiated by the following chart, stayed about the same:[6]

Year	Total	Male	Female
1927-1928	739	112	627
1929-1930	866	132	734
1931-1932	835	126	709

.s a result of a policy of dismissing teachers with least seniority first, :he average age of the Tulsa teacher, however, did increase. By 1932 'omen teachers averaged thirty-five years of age, while men teachers were)n the average thirty-six.[7]

Where retrenchment was effected by reducing members, staff reorganiation became necessary. Several methods were used to increase the work load of the remaining teachers, and thereby fill the gap in the staff. First and most important was an increase in the size of classes toward an average of forty. Major school systems throughout the country were already above this point when Tulsa made its move.[8] In addition, three administrators were given teaching assignments.[9]

To avoid heavily over-loading the teachers, the Tulsa Board resorted to other tactics as well. A rule was introduced requiring a higher testin average for admitting under-age children to school.[10] This resulted in

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[6]Biennial Survey, 1928-1930, p. 125; United States Department of the Interior, Office of Education, Biennial Survey of Education, 1930-1932 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 127. (Hereafter cited as Biennial Survey, 1930-1932).

[7]Tulsa Tribune, February 7, 1932, p. 10.

[8]National Education Association, Department of Superintendence and Research, Educational Circular Number One, 1931, p. 4.

[9]Ibid.

[10]National Education Association, Department of Superintendence and Research, Educational Circular Number Nine, 1933, p. 4.

ome reduction in enrollment. The device of double-promotion was used udiciously in the elementary schools to help balance the size of classes. very such pupil elevation saved the taxpayers approximately $40. Double-romotions were used only when pupils were developed sufficiently to merit romotion. The action was based on intelligence tests and the judgment of rincipals and teachers.[11] Some of the seventeen teachers who were droppe from the school system were saved by curriculum rearrangements. For xample, two teachers in the junior high schools were saved by an adjustment of time spent on English and on Industrial Arts or Home Economics in he seventh grade. The school health department as a separate unit was liminated, its salaries being included with those for instructional employees, with the justification that "the purpose and intent of the health department is instructional service."[12] All employees in the health depar ment were forced to obtain teaching certificates from the state board of education before signing contracts for 1932-1933.[13] Finally, the line of division between the two junior high schools was moved. The boundary was relocated in such a manner as to eliminate small classes in both schools.[1]

Before any of these reductions were made by the Tulsa Board in the areas of instruction and personnel, huge curtailments were effected in the system's construction and upkeep expenditures. Building programs were halted, and only worn-out equipment was replaced in the existing structure The only repairs made were those "necessary to preserve the investment of

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[11] Tulsa World, September 10, 1932, p. 6.

[12] Tulsa Tribune, October 14, 1932, p. 4.

[13] Ibid., August 28, 1931, p. 2.

[14] Harlow's Weekly, August 29, 1931, p. 6.

taxpayer."[15] Expenditures of this type were reduced from $794,177 in 27-1928 to $92,286 in 1931-1932.[16]

Superintendent of Schools Merle Prunty determined to enlist his aching staff in the economy effort. They were, therefore, instructed ncerning the school budget. Prunty explained the procedure used:

> First, get the teachers together and decide what to teach, that is building a curriculum. Then, assemble the teachers again and determine the best and most economical way of presenting this material...third...make the teachers aware of the entire budget structure.[17]

Actually the Tulsa schools received a large share of total expenditures. Indeed, they received a far greater sum than the educational stems of most towns during the early depression years. The percentage the total payroll which education received, however, steadily declined. 1929 60.5 per-cent of the city expenditures were for the schools, in 30, 56.3, in 1931, 55, followed in 1932 by a slight gain to 56.7 per-nt.[18]

Not until the beginning of the 1932-1933 school term did the members Tulsa's teaching profession begin to warn the people that retrenchment s likely to damage or was already damaging the schools. In an address the staff of the system at the beginning of that year, Prunty pointed t several ways in which teachers could seek to gain greater support from

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[15] Harlow's Weekly, April 2, 1932, p. 8.

[16] Biennial Survey, 1928-1930, p. 192; Biennial Survey, 1930-1932, p. 93.

[17] Tulsa Tribune, January 17, 1932, p. 4.

[18] United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, tate, County, and Municipal Survey of Government Employment and Payrolls, 929 through 1938, "The City of Tulsa and Tulsa County Oklahoma" (Washington: The United States Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 8.

e public. He suggested that teachers, regardless of what grades they ught, could impart to their pupils facts about school organization and dget. Comparison, he suggested, could be made between school costs and e costs of entertainment. This was the fundamental element in a long nge program to cultivate the support of the next generation. Second, urged teachers to visit the homes of their students to inquire about e well-being of the child. This would, he felt, win the support of the rent. Prunty also advised the mailing of letters, reports and other terials to the parents which emphasized the important points in the hools' service. Finally, he urged that teachers and principals take a rger part in civic and community life. In this way they could win for e school the approval of those who could lead in efforts to improve the tuation. He concluded:

> ...the keynote of recovery from today's conditions must be careful planning in the light of facts and needs...recovery must inevitably be slow and gradual. The schools can help by placing their own house in order, by recognizing the relationship between taxation and the general economic life of the nation, and by insisting that the money which is spent for the schools shall be spent with the utmost efficiency at the point where it will accomplish the most good.[19]

Enrollment in the Tulsa schools increased only slightly during the rly years of the depression. During the 1929-1930 school term the otal enrollment was 32,083. It arose only to 32,328 by the 1931-1932 chool term. The increase in average daily attendance from 24,443 to 5,792 was somewhat greater than the rise in enrollment. Since the chool population, meaning all those under the law eligible to go to chool, increased by almost nine thousand during this period, it seems

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[19]Merle Prunty, "What Can We Do?" The Oklahoma Teacher, 14 (February, 933), p. 14.

:ely that the depression had some effect on the number in attendance. this was true, the fact that more students attended regularly might ın that the group no longer in school normally showed up less often : classes. There seems to have been no significant change in the sex :io of those in school. Boys outnumbered girls 16,104 to 14,974 in : school year of 1929-1930, and the girls, with 16,052 enrolled, gained .y slightly on the boys, who had 16,276 in school, in 1931-1932.[20]

Whatever the case may have been with respect to attendance and en-:lment, there is little doubt that the depression created special)blems for the students of these years of economic crisis. This is)hatically indicated by the several policies adopted by the school ıinistration during these years to aid the unfortunate students. Few, any, Tulsa school children were deprived of education through inability purchase the necessary books. Appropriations of the Oklahoma legisla-:e for free text-books had never been adequate, but the Tulsa system i managed a partial distribution of books on its own during the nineteen-ənties. In the elementary schools all texts were loaned to students. ıior high school students received their books for required subjects ɜe, but had to purchase those to be used in optional subjects. It was, ɜrefore, the students from the ninth grade upwards, if they were in poor)nomic condition, who had the most severe problem to face in the de-ɜssion.

School administrators adopted a policy in the 1929-1930 school term ɜreby students would not have to worry over the text-book problem. In ses where students or their parents were able to show that they actually

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[20] Biennial Survey, 1928-1930, p. 125; Biennial Survey, 1930-1932, 127.

ıld not purchase the volumes, any student could obtain free texts in ɹuired subjects. The student or parent simply applied to the principal the school for his district, who immediately wrote an order for the ɔks. The school authorities then drew upon the county for the cost. In ɜ meantime an investigation was made to determine the true facts in each ɜe. If the condition of the student and family had been correctly stated, ɜ student remained in possession of the books. No publicity attended the ɹuirements. This was purposefully arranged in order that the students ıld not be embarrassed.[21]

Although Tulsa had an attendance and guidance department before the pression, its functions and policies were considerably altered by the de- ine in business. A placement service was established within it to seek rk for high school students. Many students were enabled to continue in hool as a result of the part-time-work they received through this service. e placement bureau also sought permanent jobs for the graduates of the gh school.[22] Many other students were able to continue attending school rgely because of the ten-cent lunch which was made available or by othes that were provided.[23]

The most important change which is observable in the activities of the lsa schools during the first three years of the depression related to e curriculum. Although no courses were completely dropped, at least one w course was added, and significant alterations were made in the existing bjects. The most profound developments took place in the social science

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[21]Tulsa World, September 9, 1932, p. 12.

[22]Tulsa Tribune, November 14, 1931, p. 6.

[23]See Chapter II.

urses, and these changes were directly caused by the down-turn in the siness cycle and the reconstruction of thought caused by that decline. alizing, as a result of the depression, that there had to be some cial planning if the American culture level was to be maintained, the cial sciences were selected as the area where this kind of training uld be provided.

A new curriculum of social studies was worked out by a committee of lsa teachers, headed by assistant superintendent Will French, and put to operation with the beginning of the 1932-1933 school year. As a urse of study, it represented an evaluation of all material taught in e social sciences and in reading courses. The material was arranged in instructional pattern that ran through the fourth, fifth and sixth ades and the entire junior high school period.

French and his committee believed that the social sciences are con-rned with the whole process of living. They did not think that a certain riod could be set aside each day for the study of each of the social ience disciplines. Rather they considered the problem to be one of iding "all education in the schools to magnify the social importance the things which are read and studied." They rejected the theory of e social sciences which calls for the teaching of straight facts. The ogram which they attempted to set up called for an interpretation of the cts. The plan worked out in Tulsa was allied to the indoctrination phi-sophy of education which had developed in the late nineteen-twenties and rly nineteen-thirties at Teachers College, Columbia University. This ilosophy recognized education as a social tool with which children's cial attitudes could be shaped.[24]

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[24] Harlow's Weekly, February 11, 1932, p. 4.

The Tulsa committee developed six social viewpoints as the core of course. Rearrangement of material and reintegration of courses was done with these objectives in mind. The six social viewpoints were:

> 1. Social change is both inevitable and desirable... The adult generation can no longer pass on...solutions to social problems. Children should be taught to be expectant of social change.
> 2. Social and economic planning is necessary. Maximum benefits from change can be achieved only when it is a guided and directed movement. The rotting fruits of a planless social and economic order are now everywhere more evident.
> 3. Interdependence is a fact of modern social living. Desirable plans of social welfare cannot be reached through a program of isolation and sectionalism.
> 4. Competition and its inherent individualism...has been emphasized to a degree not justified in present day living.
> 5. Tolerance must break down prejudices. Deep-rooted, unreasoned prejudices obstruct the stream of social progress.
> 6. Human beings are more important than things. The prime purpose of American government is to protect people not property.[25]

:h the adoption of these objectives, the Tulsa schools brought a stern lictment against the American institutions and ideology which the Great)ression had caused to be questioned.

A new course which obtained a place in the Tulsa curriculum during ; 1932-1933 term also indicates the influence of the depression on the ;tructional program. The course was entitled: "Making the Most of One's :sure Time." A local administrator attempted to justify the course:

> The time when schools needed to apologize for teaching children worthy use of leisure time is past. We are going to have leisure whether we want it or not. It is being forced on us. And it is up to the school to find pleasant, profitable, social and valuable use for leisure time.[26]

Before the end of 1932 the Tulsa schools had definitely felt the im- :t of the Great Depression. The curriculum was most importantly

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[25]Tulsa Public Schools, Teacher's Guide to the Social Studies, (Tulsa:)lic Schools, 1932), p. i.

[26]Harlow's Weekly, July 1, 1933, p. 15.

ected by the depressed conditions. For the first time the school at-
ipted to form certain basic student social attitudes. The schools were
ed quickly with the problem of lowered revenues, but the reduction was
so great as it was in many other American cities. Teachers' salaries
e lowered, and eventually a few teachers were released. Employment
licies of the Tulsa school system, however, did not discriminate against
nen--married or single.

Larger classes were necessary, but the Tulsa schools had been well
low the national average in this respect prior to the depression, and
e increase created no major problem. Various other methods were used to
ll the gap caused by the decrease in teachers. The first voices were
ised by the teachers of Tulsa against retrenchments late in 1932, pro-
sts which would grow ever louder in the years to follow.

The depression may have reduced enrollment, since fewer of those
igible to attend actually went to school during this period. Several
ecial services were provided for the unfortunate student by the schools
order that he could continue to attend. These included free text-
oks, aid in obtaining part-time employment, the ten-cent school lunch,
d sometimes clothing. The depression consequences for the city's edu-
tional system, while severe, do not appear to have been as drastic as
r some of the other institutions of Tulsa.

CHAPTER X

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Tulsa first felt the full force of the Great Depression during the ter of 1931. Some unemployment and deprivation preceded that date, the rather unusual nature of the city's economic institutions ob- red it. An international event, the depression had many roots, but haps its major cause was over-expansion of business in the nineteen- nties. In Tulsa, which had never developed a diversified economy, crisis was precipitated by over-production in the oil industry.

The depression was not sudden, but it was unexpected, and Tulsa, e the rest of the nation, was unprepared to cope with the critical blem of unemployment. Oklahoma law vested relief responsibility in county, but Tulsa County's funds proved inadequate to meet the needs the people during the first depression winter. A private organization, Family Welfare Society, had to come to the rescue. City officials moted two employment bureaus and encouraged businessmen to keep all loyees at work in their plants, but nevertheless the crisis deepened.

Eventually, as conditions failed to improve, Tulsa adopted a made- k program in which the unemployed were given jobs on public projects. kers in this program were paid in scrip, a form of credit slip. This ld be used to buy food and clothing wholesale in a specially established missary or in payment for necessary items such as shelter, lighting, t and water. Subsidiary programs provided the unemployed with free gs and medical attention, assisted them in retaining possession of

ıeir housing and public utility service, and distributed some clothing. :hool children were later the beneficiaries of a ten-cent lunch. Tulsa ıthorities were strongly hostile toward transients throughout the crisis, ıt the discovery of squalid migrant camps finally induced them to aid ıch persons with temporary room and board.

The temporary success of these quickly drafted policies was deceptive. ıeir adoption promoted a variety of disputes. Exacting investigations of ındidates for the made-work program produced friction between Tulsa of- :cials and the administrators of Governor Murray's state relief program. ıen Murray attempted to establish soup kitchens in the city, the conflict ıs intensified. Locally, the supervisors of public and private charity :re soon at odds. They disagreed mainly over methods of dispensing relief. :onomic expediency was the predominant objective of the city, while the ›n-public agencies demanded time-consuming and costly professional social- ›rk techniques.

Perhaps the sharpest of the struggles, however, resulted from the ›unty's continued failure adequately to finance Tulsa relief work. Un- ›le to do so in 1931, the county commissioners were unwilling to do so in ›32. The county's attitude won the disapproval of relief recipients, the .ty administration, professional charity agencies and many private citizens large group of Tulsa women, representing the social clubs of the city, ıdertook to strengthen this opposition by uniting these diverse groups. :e successfully organized Emergency Council threatened to ask the Oklahoma :torney-General to intervene, but this move did not inspire the county to .cept a larger share of the charity burden. Undaunted by this failure, ıe Council next undertook to petition the Excise Board, an agency throught › be legally capable of altering the controversial county budget. Al- .ough the Excise Board enlarged the relief allotment, the raise was

nsiderably inadequate. Consequently, the city was forced to continue oviding most of the required finances.

During this financial controversy, many charges of inefficiency and veral hints of political corruption were directed at the county comssioners. Dr. John E. Brindley, a tax expert, subsequently investited Tulsa county government, and proved the validity of several of these arges. But even honesty would not have been enough. Maximum results re not being achieved with the money which was available.. Tulsa was sperately in need of a more effective relief-dispensing organization.

City authorities seem first to have recognized this need in the fall 1931. At that time Tulsa was obviously facing another crisis in its tempts to aid the unemployed. The city's original made-work program had en allowed to lapse. Its single summer replacement was a substantially adequate vacant-lot garden program. These developments partly were used by the shortage of funds, but they also reveal the failure of Tulsa ficials to fully comprehend the depression's scope. The results of this op-gap seasonal approach to relief were not encouraging. The controversy tween public and private charity methods, the uncooperative financial licy of the county commissioners, and the need to serve ever greater mbers of the deprived were just as discouraging.

Having identified these shortcomings, many Tulsa authorities were now nvinced that relief must be centralized. The Chamber of Commerce took e lead by appointing a fact-finding committee to survey depression-sociated charity work in the city. Declaring cooperation to be essential, e fact-finders recommended the creation of a Central Emergency Committeé Five. This body would attempt to eliminate duplication of effort by isting agencies, and replace the dole with employment wherever possible. ty, county, and private charity organs quickly approved the proposal,

d shortly the first Committee of Five was appointed. Virtually every pect of Tulsa's relief program was now brought under the committee's ntrol.

The most controversial obligation of the Committee of Five was the l-important task of selecting basic procedures for aiding the unemployed Tulsa. At least three different types of relief had been proposed. e group led by the city administration, wanted another made-work program. hers, including federal representatives, preferred a system of direct d. They argued that made-work was more expensive and that it did not ach all who were in need. Still another faction suggested leaving the ole problem to the state. Tulsans differed sharply also as to how their ogram should be financed. Mayor Watkins wanted to use $900,000 in il-gally collected taxes, rather than returning it to the taxpayers. Sever- others, who of course favored direct relief, wanted to grow food or buy wholesale from farmers for distribution to the needy. A few city resi-nts advocated the establishment of a cooperative farm where men could rk for their food. A final proposal was that the necessary extra income accumulated by a raise in water rates.

After considerable debate, the Committee of Five adopted essentially e same program the city had used the previous winter. Again, the major atures of Tulsa's relief organization were to be a system of made-work d a commissary. Rejecting all proposed financial plans, committee mbers agreed that part of the water department's budget should be di-rted to finance a $100,000 reservoir and extensive playground improve-nts in Mohawk Park. In order to curtail all unnecessary expenditures, ey ordered a more thorough investigation of all applicants for aid. cognizing, however, that this program still could not provide enough bs for all the unemployed, the committee encouraged various supplementary

asures to support it. Private citizens were urged to give temporary rt-time jobs to the unemployed. Tulsa's club women, at the request the committee, made a special effort to secure work for women who had st their positions because of the depression. The city street depart-nt replaced machinery with additional men, with regular department em-oyees donating a portion of their income to provide salaries for the w workers.

The Committee of Five also revised and expanded the commissary. Now nverted into a central purchasing agency, it aided the relief work of th city and county. The former open-shelf grocery store procedure was andoned. Major John Leavell devised a standard ration which was distri-ted to all participants in the city's program. At the amazing low cost forty-two cents, food containing 2800 calories was provided. The ther unattractive nature of the diet provoked some criticism, both lo-lly and nationally, but the complaints were mostly mild. The fact that her cities, states and even foreign countries eventually established aller commissaries reveals the ultimate success of the plan.

The Committee of Five was outstanding for its accomplishments in ganization. The smoothly operating machine which it created enabled lsa effectively to care for its vastly increased number of dependent milies during the opening months of 1932. In dealing with the sadly fa-liar problem of finances, however, the Committee of Five failed as com-etely as its predecessors. With their entire program stalled, the dis-uraged committee members resigned in early spring. Still desiring to ke work, city officials searched unsuccessfully for a means. A bond le to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was attempted, but that new deral agency seemed disinterested. Tulsa then intended to reduce the ze of the bonds and sell them locally, but a legal obstacle thwarted

his plan also.

Varied minor programs, none publicly sponsored, had to fill the acuum. Too few citizens agreed to hire the unemployed as part of a ampaign to beautify Tulsa. City and county employees and some business-en boosted relief with individual contributions, but the total col-ections were negligible. In the summer of 1932, therefore, Tulsa re-reated to soup-kitchen style charity. At key city locations, firemen ispensed rations donated by farmers and gathered by voluntary organi-ations such as the Tulsa Immediate Relief Association.

Tulsa's relief population was unexpectedly saved by the federal overnment. In July, 1932, Congress permitted the Reconstruction Finance orporation to make temporary loans to the most depressed states. Gover-or Murray quickly qualified Oklahoma for such a loan, and Tulsa, which arlier had rejected state aid, requested a portion of the funds. After ome discussion, Murray granted the city $146,000 for a new state-upervised made-work program. The program eventually gave 1,000 Tulsans hree days work weekly at $2.40 per day. Nor were the ladies neglected. 'omen were employed making clothes for the needy and as secretarial help n charity agencies. In federal intervention, therefore, Tulsa finally ound a solution for its persistent and crucial problem of relief finance.

Meanwhile, government aid seeming ineffective, Tulsa's unemployed ormed various organizations to improve their own position. The largest nd most active of these groups was the Independent Party. The Party laimed the depression on capitalistic greed, but proposed no radical solu-ions. Partly because of their agitation, Tulsa's courts limited mortgage foreclosures, the water department continued supplying destitute Tulsans, nd hospitals lowered medical costs for the unemployed. Closely watching relief administration, the Independents found men working full schedules

for the city in return for food, and insisted they be paid regular wages. Although the practice was halted, Tulsa officials would not grant back pay. Contending that the county should supervise relief, the Party then demanded termination of the Committee of Five and all its policies. When this demand was also rebuffed, they requested a state investigation of city charity work. Mrs. Mabel Bassett, Oklahoma Commissioner of Charities and Corrections, conducted an inquiry, but completely approved Tulsa's program.

Opposed to a dole, the Independent Party advocated distributing available work among all the jobless. In Tulsa, however, business leaders feared higher labor costs, and government officials believed employment proration would strain public budgets and delay vital projects. With both public and private enterprise opposing their policy, the party attempted to secure direct Committee of Five representation. City and county agencies had already chosen four members of this body. Charging industrial domination of the committee, the Independents demanded the right to select the fifth officer. Should that privilege be denied, they hoped for the acceptance of their proposed solution to the unemployment problem as consolation. Needing public support badly, the original committee members added a pro-labor spokesman, and shortly all officially approved proration. Because the policy was recommended rather than ordered, however, few industries and public projects were prorated. Although never fully successful locally, the Independents sent an outstanding representative to the Memphis Unemployment Relief Conference in August, 1931. United States Senator Elmer Thomas, a leading Congressional monetary reformer, persuaded the Conference to condemn the dol and propose national proration.

Hoping to regain their independence, some party members and other

Dissatisfied Tulsans established a large Arkansas colony. With fertile soil and many other resources available, the project seemed economically sound. The colonists formed a government and planned educational and religious facilities. The land was collectively held at first, but each settler could, for a modest investment, eventually own an individual portion. Cooperation and typical frontier ingenuity prevailed at the start, but a monotonous diet and severe financial difficulties soon disrupted harmony. In Tulsa, moreover, Dr. Herbert Clough, the colony's founder, after charges of misappropriating funds, resigned his post. With tempers short, a minor quarrel over rations soon erupted into a violent struggle for governmental control. National guardsmen quelled the disorder, but peace was not completely restored until the "rebels" were expelled and a new regime installed. And, although temporarily sustained by the enterprise, these migrant Tulsans never really prospered.

Members of the Tulsa Immediate Relief Association lacked interest in colonization, but they also attempted to look after themselves. The Association, among other projects, gathered farmers' crops on shares and divided the produce among its membership. After providing for its own needs, the Association rendered vital help to less fortunate city residents. This group's success inspired the development of additional self-help associations in Tulsa. All these organizations, by advertising their viewpoint, helped develop a better understanding between the dispensers and recipients of relief.

The mental and physical adjustments of Tulsans to the problem of unemployment relief are mostly obvious. Other depression-engendered social modifications in the city, though just as important, are far less apparent. Both directly and indirectly, the vastly changed economic

ircumstances altered the social groups and institutions of the community by reshaping individual conceptions of their roles, values and esirability. Thus, the depression had a significant impact on religion, on the family, and on education.

The economic crisis brought about a great spiritual resurgence mong the people of Tulsa. This is evidenced by a substantial increase n membership in the various religious denominations of the city. Reived religious feeling was not limited to selected faiths, but encompassed them all. Greatest membership increases, however, were made y the larger denominations of the city--the Baptist, Methodist and oman Catholic establishments. Accelerated participation in the activiies of the church, especially in the area of religious education, indiates that new spiritual alliances were not shallow. The depression aturally reduced the income of the churches, and consequently placed imitations on the expenditures of the worshipping organizations. Unable o continue their normal charity work in the emergency, the ministers of he city's various denominations began to speak out more on the social roblems of the times. Blaming the economic plight on the bosses of big usiness, they advocated a solution which proved very similar to that hich was later carried out by Roosevelt.

Fewer Tulsa families were established during the first three years f the depression. Although it is impossible to prove that the dession helped reduce the number of marriages, many local citizens beieved this to be the case. The crisis undoubtedly broke up some city amilies, but divorces did not increase greatly. Births do not seem to ave declined importantly between 1929 and 1932. Those families of Tulsa n relief were, of course, most extensively affected by the depression. ew families enjoyed economic dependence, and most hoped and worked for

return to their previous status. Nevertheless, all seemingly appreciated the aid given, and they directed little criticism at either the amount or methods of relief.

Some retrenchment was necessary in education, but Tulsa appears to have fared better in this area than many American cities. Every effort was made to avoid reducing the quality of schooling during the emergency. A few teachers lost their employment, and all were forced to accept less pay, but the instructional staff was not seriously overloaded. Classes increased in size, but the city's classes were well below the national average before the depression. The most important consequence of the economic crisis for Tulsa education was changes in the curriculum. In the social science courses, Tulsa's educators rejected traditional concepts of rugged individualism and laissez-faire economics, and made an effort to promote social planning.

Since the stock market crash in October of 1929, the economic collapse had affected nearly every Tulsan and most city organizations. Jobs had been lost, business firms closed, relief provided, attitudes altered, controversies sparked and resolved, new organizations created, and the traditional functions and characteristics of homes, schools, churches, and even governments modified. And no end was yet in view for the Great Depression.

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ited States Congress. Congressional Record. LXV, 2280, 6322; LXX, 3204-3205; LXXI, 1793; LXII, 654-660, 665; LXIII, 12399; LXXIV, 50, 194-197, 316, 4787-4797; LXXV, 1194-1195, 3910, 3915, 4024-4025.

Debates in Congress on public works and other relief proposals which were partially produced in Tulsa, and which were introduced in Congress by Senator Thomas.

ited States Congress. Official Congressional Directory. 74th Congress, 1st Session, 1935. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1935. pp. 93-94.

An official congressional biography of Senator Thomas.

ited States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means. Soldiers' Adjusted Compensation Hearings. 68th Congress, 2nd Session, 1924. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1924. pp. 36-40.

Reveals the support given by Senator Thomas to a proposal to complete payment of the World War I veterans bonus.

ited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Births, Stillbirths and Infant Mortality in the Birth Registration Area of the United States, 1928. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1930, p. 108.

ited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Births, Stillbirths and Infant Mortality in the Birth Registration Area of the United States, 1929. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931. p. 156.

ıited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Births, Stillbirths and Infant Mortality in the Birth Registration Area of the United States, 1930. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1932. p. 162.

ıited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Births, Stillbirths and Infant Mortality in the Birth Registration Area of the United States, 1931. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1933. p. 112.

aited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Births, Stillbirths and Infant Mortality in the Birth Registration Area of the United States, 1932. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1934. p. 104.

In combination these statistics indicate the trend as to births in the early years of the depression.

nited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Census of Religious Bodies, 1926. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1930.

nited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Census of Religious Bodies, 1936. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1941.

Extremely useful in any analysis of religious trends during the depression. Includes the denominational figures on membership, Sunday School scholars, teachers and classes, and expenditures. Total figures are also given for all of Tulsa's worshipping organizations.

nited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United States: Manufactures, 1929. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1933.

Reveals the number of Tulsans employed by the various kinds of enterprises, and thus enables the drawing of conclusions as to which groups of workers suffered most from the depression.

Inited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United States, Population, VI: Families. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1933.

Shows the number and size of all Tulsa families. When used together with other data, these statistics help to reveal the extent of the depression's impact on the family.

Inited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United States: Characteristics of the Population, 1940. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943. Part 5.

These figures, when compared with similar 1930 statistics, indicate fundamental alterations in the nature and size of Tulsa's population during the depression decade.

ıited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Marriage and Divorce, 1928. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1930. p. 82.

ıited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Marriage and Divorce, 1929. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931, p. 82.

ıited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Marriage and Divorce, 1930. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1932. p. 83.

ıited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Marriage and Divorce, 1931. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1933. p. 68.

ıited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Marriage and Divorce, 1932. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1934. p. 24.

Fluctuations in the number of Tulsans marrying and securing divorces during the early years of the economic crisis become apparent when the data in these volumes are grouped together.

ıited States Department of the Interior, Office of Education. Biennial Survey of Education, 1928-1930. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1932. p. 310.

nited States Department of the Interior, Office of Education. Biennial Survey of Education, 1930-1932. Washington: United States Government Office, 1934. p. 27.

Contain a variety of statistics on the educational system of Tulsa including the number of schools, teachers and pupils, average daily attendance figures, and the proportion of the school budget expended on the various phases of the total program.

nited States Department of Labor. Industrial Employment Survey Bulletin. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1921-1930.

Describes industrial activity in Tulsa on a monthly basis throughout the nineteen-twenties and reveals the effect of increases and declines in production on the workers in each major business. An aid to ascertaining critical weaknesses in the city's economy which made it more susceptible to depression.

nited States Department of Labor. Monthly Report of the Activities of State and Muncipal Services Cooperating with the United States Employment Service. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1929-1932.

Indicates the number of Tulsans who registered at employment bureaus each month, the number of jobs which were then listed with these agencies, and the number of registrants who were successfully placed. It therefore is a valuable, though imperfect, gauge of the severity of the depression in the city.

Newspapers

low's (Oklahoma City) Weekly, 1929-1932.

In addition to excellent coverage of the state's relief program, this publication devoted a full page or more of each issue during the depression to the efforts of Oklahoma to cope with problems caused by the economic crisis. With its aid, therefore, Tulsa's relief organization can be compared with those of its sister cities and relationships between state and local agencies definitely ascertained.

York Times, 1929-1932.

Its references to Tulsa, though rare, help to indicate which depression reactions of the city's residents attracted the greatest national interest.

sa Spirit, 1929-1932.

Official news publication of the Tulsa Chamber of Commerce. Reprinted many key documents relating to the city's relief program, and gave detailed coverage to the work of the Committee of Five.

lahoma City Times, 1931-1932.

Valuable for its detailed treatment of those Oklahoma City depression problems and policies which extended their influence to Tulsa.

lsa Tribune, 1929-1932.

A good source on all Tulsa attempts to aid the unemployed and the disputes and complications which resulted from these efforts. Frequently valuable for its interviews of the impoverished. Editorially it reflects the liberal Republican viewpoint of the depression.

lsa Unionist-Journal, 1928-1932.

Represents the attitude of organized labor and the workingman in general as to the proper types and methods of relief and other depression-related problems.

sa World, 1928-1932.

In discussing controversial issues which resulted from the economic crisis, it expresses the views of conservative Democrats. Gives substantial treatment to all phases of Tulsa's depression policy.

Unpublished Material

lsa) Family Welfare Society. Report of the Year's Work, 1931.

Shows both the severity of the depression and the major part played by this agency in soothing the ills of the Tulsans most critically affected.

ılsa) Report of the Mayor's Committee on Unemployment. February, March, April and May, 1931.

ılsa) Report of the Subcommittee on Transients. Mayor's Committee on Unemployment. February 15, 1931.

ılsa) Report of the Subcommittee on Free School Lunches. Mayor's Committee on Unemployment. May, 1931.

ılsa) Report of the Central Clothing Dispensary. Mayor's Committee on Unemployment. April, 1931.

ılsa) Report of the Subcommittee on Free Public Utilities. Mayor's Committee on Unemployment. May, 1931.

ılsa) Report of the Subcommittee on the Cultivation of Vacant Lots. Mayor's Committee on Unemployment. June, 1931.

Mimeographed records in the files of the Tulsa Mayor's Office. Rewarding both as first hand evidence and in arriving at an accuracy estimate for the various secondary sources used. Unfortunately, reports seem to have been called for only when problems were critical.

ulsa) Report of the Fact Finding Committee. Tulsa Chamber of Commerce. October, 1931.

The Committee of Five materialized as a result of this report.

'ulsa) Report of the Central Emergency Committee of Five. October 10, 1931.

'ulsa) Minutes of the Committee of Five. October 15, 1931.

'ulsa) General Order Number One. Central Emergency Committee of Five. October 25, 1931.

'ulsa) Relief Plans Under Consideration. Central Emergency Committee of Five. N. D.

1sa) Report of the Subcommittee on Made-Work. Central Emergency Committee of Five. N. D.

1sa) "The Leavell Commissary Plan." Special Report of the Central Emergency Committee of Five. N. D.

1sa) "Weekly Report of the Commissary Subcommittee." Central Emergency Committee of Five Report. Weekly in December, 1931 and January, February, and March, 1932.

The records of the Committee of Five's work, though in some cases undated, are apparently relatively intact. These documents, of course, are necessary to any complete discussion of Tulsa relief after the summer of 1931.

VITA

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