THE EFFECT OF IRRELEVANT RESPONSE DETERMINERS ON DELINQUENT MALE RESPONSES TO THE TENNESSEE SELF CONCEPT SCALE

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Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate College
of the Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
July, 1972

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PREFACE

Self esteem is widely held to motivate delinquent behavior. Measures for self esteem take the form of discrepancy scores between self description and ideal self description on a psychological test, with wide discrepancies assumed to reflect low self esteem. This study employed the Tennessee Self Concept Scale on a delinquent population where subjects described the self, the ideal self and a people in general concept. Analysis was undertaken to ascertain if differences in the descriptions emerged. Additional analysis was undertaken to ascertain the validity of these measures by accounting for irrelevant sources of variance stemming from method effects of repeated measures, response styles such as "yeasaying" characteristic of delinquent subjects, and response sets such as defensiveness or uncertainity characteristic of delinquent subjects. An analysis of the stability of the three concepts of self, ideal self and people in general was also undertaken.

Indebtedness is acknowledged to Dr. W. W. Rambo, Dr. W. Price Ewens, Dr. Harry K. Brobst and Dr. Clayton Morgan for their valuable assistance. Also sincere appreciation is extended to Kay Auten, Neldia McQueen, Rennie Wolfe and Connie McCormick for their assistance in clerical details. Particular appreciation is extended to Dr. Vaud A. Travis, Jr., for his unfailing support, and to Vaud A. Travis, III, Daniel Travis, Patrick Travis and Mary Margaret Travis is extended affectionate gratitude for their generous forbearance.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Lefeber (1964) reviewed the theories concerned with the etiology of delinquent behavior and concluded that there was consensus that the primary factor in the motivation of delinquent behavior is loss of self esteem. Self esteem, also widely referred to in the literature on self concept as self regard, is most commonly investigated by direct measure via a self report instrument or by self-ideal discrepancies (Wylie, 1961, pp. 87-97). To derive self-ideal discrepancies, the subject is requested to respond to self report items having to do with self concept, and then is asked to respond to the same items with instructions to describe an ideal self, or how he would like to be. Other variations require the subject to respond under instructions to describe self and parent image (Snortum, Hannum, & Mills, 1970); self and a socially desirable or socially undesirable person (Brassard, 1963); self, ideal self and how others view me (Fannin & Clinard, 1965).

Self-ideal self description experimental differences have been investigated using adolescent delinquent or potentially delinquent populations with the view that discrepancies may provide reliable test indices to predict run-aways (Levinson & Mezei, 1970) or to predict tendencies toward rule violations in a women's prison (Snortum, Hannum, & Mills, 1970). Useful indicators were reported in both studies.

Social class variables in relation to self and ideal self descriptions generated by lower and middle class delinquents were explored by Fannin and Clinard (1965). Lower class delinquents regarded ideal self, or "would like to be," as tougher, harder, and more violent than the middle class responders. This finding was significantly related to behavior of the lower class delinquents, who had committed more violent crimes than the middle class responders.

With adolescent populations, those Ss who exhibit low self esteem, or large discrepancies between self and ideal self descriptions, are held to be delinquency prone (Lively, Dinitz, & Reckless, 1962). Those who have good concept of self and of others are considered to be "insulated" against delinquency (Reckless, Dinitz, & Kay, 1957).

Such findings encourage the exploration of the self esteem of delinquents in terms of what they believe themselves to be and what they would like to be. The self concept of delinquents has been investigated using the Tennessee Self Concept Scale (TSCS). Fitts (1965) derived the TSCS, a self-evaluative standardized instrument, including both self esteem and self consistency measures. Hamner (1968) and Fitts and Hamner (1969) have reviewed the studies on delinquent populations. They reported that at the group level an anti-social profile has emerged which discriminates between delinquent and nondelinquent groups. A study by Motoori (1963), reviewed by Hamner, employed present self and ideal self descriptions. Motoori reported that the ideal self descriptions generated by delinquents on the TSCS were similar to ideal self descriptions generated by a

nondelinquent control group, though present self descriptions were "widely different."

Studies which require the subject to describe himself and then to dissimulate in terms of a response set to describe his ideal self, or to employ any other response set, require the use of repeated measures. There is evidence to suggest that the experimental process of obtaining repeated measures on a self report instrument may in itself contribute significantly to variance. Repeated measures effects have been identified as that effect related to response familiarity, (Taylor, 1955); sequence effects, (Tracy, 1967); and serial position effects (Tracy, 1967; MacRae, 1969). So important may be these sources of variance that MacRae (1969) has suggested that sequence effects and serial position effects are worthy of study in themselves. Wylie (1961, p. 35) has pointed up the need for exploration of the effects of response familiarity in repeated measures designs.

Self esteem studies are also encumbered by those problems attendent to all self report measures, i.e., the lack of validating criteria and the lack of a known universe of content for time sampling. Cronbach and Meehl (1955) have given a series of recommendations for the study of construct validity for constructs such as self concept. One of their recommendations requires the use of repeated measures, with test-experimental intervention-retest procedures. Experimental intervention may take the form of varying response sets, i.e., to "fake good," or "fake bad." If the experimental intervention of the response sets results in a "swing" in retest scores when compared with initial scores, Cronbach and Meehl suggest that this provides evidence for a "ceiling" on the validity of the instrument for a given construct. However, such

findings may confound any differences which are a function or repeated measures with differences which are a function of experimental intervention. An irrelevant response determiner, stemming from the method employed, could obscure the validity of the test or provide spurious evidence for characteristics of S.

Cronbach and Meehl remind the investigator that one of the most powerful tools at his disposal is that of accounting for irrelevant response determiners. If the validity of a self report instrument may not be directly established, the investigator can account for other possible sources of variance which would be irrelevant to the psychological dimension under study. While the investigator still could not say definitively that his instrument measured only the psychological dimension desired, he could state that obtained variance was not a function of known irrelevant response determiners.

Irrelevant response determiners, other than repeated measures effects, have been identified as response styles (yeasaying) and response sets, or conscious efforts to distort results, such as socially desirable responding (Rorer, 1965). Test format may also be regarded as a potential irrelevant influence on responding. Studies employing the TSCS and social desirability (Brassard, 1963); the TSCS and response sets (Jones, 1966); and the TSCS test format (Greenberg & Frank, 1965) have indicated that the TSCS is vulnerable to these scources of irrelevant response determiners. Also, delinquent responders to the TSCS may employ a response style of overusing the positive end of the response continuum independent of item content (Fitts & Hamner, 1969). Studies employing the self-ideal discrepancies, not necessarily employing the TSCS, continue to be reported with repeated

measures effects ignored (Smart & Smart, 1970; Beard & Pishkin, 1970; Peters, 1970); or, with repeated measures insufficiently explored to be conclusive (Tracy, 1967). This study represents an investigation of irrelevant sources of variance on the self, ideal self, and people in general descriptions of delinquent subjects to the TSCS. The suitability of employing repeated measures and of making self-ideal, self-others, or ideal-others comparisons can be in part derived. Such comparisons are essential to the utilization of discrepancies as measures of self esteem, which presumably underlies motivation for delinquent behavior.

Self Concept

Phenomenological personality theorists have sought to develop and validate measures of self concept as phenomenological models are based primarily on the assumption that self concept is a major determinant of behavior. Epstein (1962, p. 220) stated that, "Social theorists have long maintained that one's self-conception is a determinant of behavior and that to understand behavior is to understand how one perceives his 'self', i.e., to find out who he thinks he is and wants to be, what kind of self he seeks to avoid and the negative or positive way in which he evaluates what he is and does."

Fitts (1964, pp. 4-5) stated that "this theory (self theory), when oversimplified, states that the individual's image or concept of self is originally formed from the way others see and treat him. Later his self concept becomes a frame of reference, or a kind of screen or filter, through which he perceives the rest of the world. His image of himself determines to a large degree how he perceives and acts with

other people, and of course, each individual reacts in terms of the way he perceives things.

"Other research supports this general theory. People who see themselves as lovable, respectable, and valuable tend to act accordingly. On the other hand, people with negative self concepts - those who feel worthless, unlovable, undesirable, etc. - tend to act in ways which are consistent with this self concept."

Self concept is difficult to translate into language suitable for testing of research hypotheses. Self concept was succinctly defined by Raimy (1943) as "the more or less organized perceptual object resulting from present and past self-observation. . . . The self-concept is the way which each person consults in order to understand himself, especially during moments of crises or choice." Brownfain (1952) stated that when an individual makes any kind of evaluation of himself, independent of the method used, he refers to a system of central meaning he holds concerning himself and his relationship to the world around him. The system of central meaning is termed self concept. Epstein (1962, p. 221) stated that "Every evaluative statement a person makes about himself may be thought of as a sample of his self-concept from which may be inferred certain properties of the self." Combs and Snygg (1959, p. 127) stated that self concept is "those perceptions about self which seem most vital or important to the individual. . . ." They also stated that "the self is not very useful as a scientific construct. . . . It is probable that no one can observe a self . . ." (p. 123).

The consensus is, however, that no matter how difficult the

theoretical and attendant method problems, that the phenomenological self concept is a major determinant of behavior and must be vigorously attacked by investigators. Wylie (1961) definitively examined the particular problems attendant to research in the area of self concept in contrast to those areas which are considered more rigorous experimentally, the stimulus-response (S-R) or behavioral area. She pointed out that the primary difference between behavioral and phenomenological models is that of focus. The behaviorist emphasizes the relations between imput and output, relegating inferred constructs to a secondary role. Wylie (1961, p. 12) states that "In short, although the phenomenologist may assign greater importance to his inferred constructs, the methodological requirement of anchoring constructs to observable antecedents and consequents is the same for phenomenological theory as for any other."

The phenomenological personality theorist stipulates that the antecedent condition (stimulus) is the self or the environment as the subject sees it, i.e., self concept. Thus, stimulus is not physicalistically defined. Stimuli, then for the phenomenological theorist, must be response-inferred. That behavioral theorists utilize the same procedure is illustrated in an example of the extensive work of Taylor and Spence (1952) who assumed inter-individual differences in anxiety by way of differential responding to the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, a paper and pencil instrument dependent upon self report. Much research is undertaken where E groups on the basis of self report, and then infers back to such internal states as drive level, level of aspiration, or need achievement. Stimulus properties, such as aversiveness to S, are often inferred from responses, i.e., responses from a rat on

food deprivation schedule may be inferred to be a function of frustration drive, when the stimulus signifies frustration, rather than being a function of hunger drive (Wagner, 1963).

Particular difficulty for the phenomenological theorist and researcher then, does not stem from (a) use of inferred constructs; or (b) interpretation of stimulus via response-inference. The difficulty stems from establishing stimulus equivalence for Ss in a phenomenological study. What E may structure, for example, by way of instructional set for a given S could not be assumed equivalent for another S as in studies where the stimulus can be physicalistically controlled. Wylie (1967, p. 19) pointed out that "The instructions which the experimenter gives to the subject in a self-concept experiment are not the stimuli which elicit the self-concept. They are merely cues which elicit S's verbal reports of his self-concept, the latter being itslef elicited by other 'stimuli' (characteristics of S) which are often largely inaccessible to the experimenter's observation." An example of a characteristic of S which may be elicited is that of response style, or "yeasaying."

When the researcher employs self concept descriptions in contrast with ideal self descriptions, he introduces another phenomenological construct, that of ideal self. For many researchers in the area of self concept, knowledge of the phenomenal self is useful only in terms of the phenomenal ideal self. A discrepancy between the two is regarded by investigators as a measure of self esteem which is related to an adjustment-maladjustment dimension (Plutchnik, Platman, & Fieve, 1970; Bills, Vance, & McLean, 1951). Discrepancies are also interpreted as evidence for improvement or nonimprovement in counseling or therapy

(Levinson & Mexei, 1970). Effect of social change is also regarded as being reflected in discrepancy scores; such effects have been investigated with female subjects in Dehli, India (Smart & Smart, 1970) and in South Africa with the Xhosa tribe (du Preez & Ward, 1970). Mitchell (1969) stated that such discrepancies may be used with a single S to indicate improvement in counseling.

Absolute size of discrepancy scores required to establish meaningful phenomenological distance between self description and ideal self description has not been established. Interpretation is often made in terms of significant group differences (Peters, 1970; Levenson & Mezei, 1970). Individual data most frequently takes the form of Q-sorts, first for self description followed by ideal self description. The two scores are then correlated, usually by computing the Pearson's r, which is reported as a self-ideal r (Wylie, 1961, pp. 41-42). The degree of correlation is interpreted as a measure of self regard. Any upward change in correlation, reported following counseling, is interpreted as an improvement in psychological adjustment. Self-ideal discrepancy scores are sometimes included as part of the test instrument as exemplified by Bill's Index of Adjustment and Values (Bills, Vance & McLean, 1951).

The ideal self may be assumed to reflect cultural stereotyping and as such would be expected to be more stable over time. (Wylie, 1961, pp. 50, 57). Changes between test-retest correlation coefficients for self and ideal Q-sorts are assumed to consist primarily of changes in self concept, with ideal self remaining relatively invariant. (Wylie, 1961, p. 57). Ideal self has been investigated and found to be possibly stereotypic in nature (Sappenfield, 1970); and, as such would be

expected to be comprised of socially desirable content (Tracy, 1967). Socially desirable responding would also be expected to contribute to consistency in ideal self description over time.

Wylie (1961, pp. 54, 57) has cautioned that the relative contribution from ideal self to discrepancy scores has not been investigated, nor has the ideal self as a personal referrant versus a cultural stereotype been adequately established. Reversals, where ideal self is reported by Ss as being lower than self concept, have not been interpreted though such findings constitute a refutation of a basic assumption in self theory. Self theorists would expect ideal self concept to be equal to or higher than self concept.

A concept of generalized others is held by delinquents which suggests that they see others as they see themselves. "Those who feel fairly positive about themselves are positive about human nature. Tendencies toward disordered behavior and poor self concept lead to negative judgments about human nature" (Richard, Mates and Whitten, 1967). The phenomenal self, the phenomenal ideal self, and a phenomenal generalized others concept are all dependent upon self report methods.

R-R Method

Wylie (1961, p. 23) concluded that "In order to index constructs involving S's phenomenal fields, E must use some form of self-report response made by S as a basis for his inferences. In practice this self-report behavior has usually taken the form of a verbal response or some sort of a choice response when S is instructed to indicate specified conscious processes. These methods seem to be the only kinds

appropriate to this type of construct." This method is ordinarily referred to as the R-R approach where R correlated with R yields relationships for inference.

Soctt and Wertheimer (1962, p. 75) classify R-R methodology as systematic assessment, where E controls S "just enough to elicit responses that are assumed to reflect pre-existing characteristics of the subjects themselves; he deliberately tries not to affect the nature of the attribute on which the responses primarily depend. Control over extraneous variables can be achieved only passively by appropriate assessment and statistical analysis." They further state "that the stimuli used are conceived as response eliciting rather than response manipulating devices . . . in systematic assessment the aim is usually to study individual differences in response to an unchanging set of stimuli." The unchanging set of stimuli are most often test items.

The investigator who employs R-R methodology frequently uses stability, or reliability as an indication of the adequacy of his measures. If responding should remain stable over time or over occasion with experimental intervention, the test items are assumed to be tapping some stable attribute of S. If experimental intervention or time lapse alone affects scores, assumptions may be made concerning the vulnerability of the dimension to irrelevant response determiners as suggested by Cronbach and Meehl (1955).

Response set must always be assumed to be operating when Ss generate a self report. There are always instructions to answer in a specific manner which would induce a response set. Therefore, if response set, per se, is known to be operating the instrument is not invalidated. The presence of a response set, if it is that desired by

the investigator, is evidence for the validity of the instrument and for the study. A more useful approach would be to ascertain if the instrument can differentiate between experimentally induced response sets and if these sets, along with test dimensions, can remain invariant following experimental intervention. The investigator could then make inferences as to whether the subjects could made discriminable responses to the instrument in terms of a psychological dimension such as self concept, ideal self concept or a concept of others. If responses can be sensitive to treatment in a direction logically predicted by phenomenological theory, then evidence for the validity of the instrument accrues.

The R-R approach may be utilized for the study of self concept by testing for the stability of the self report under varying response sets while taking into account as many irrelevant response determiners as possible. Wylie (1961, p. 23), recommended that Cronbach and Meehl's construct validity approaches be employed, stressing as did the two latter authors, the need for the identification of irrelevant response determiners. Wylie stated that the process of measuring required observation and mathematical analysis to determine what other variables might be contributing to results other than those introduced by the investigator.

Irrelevant Response Determiners and the TSCS

Studies have been undertaken to ascertain the influence of irrelevant response determiners on the TSCS, those of response set, response style, test characteristics, and repeated measures effects. Each of these will be individually examined. A brief description of

the TSCS and delinquent responders follows to provide a framework for the discussion of these studies.

Hamner (1968) reviewed the research on the TSCS and delinquent populations. Hamner's review included investigations of (a) differences between delinquent and non-delinquent populations on the basis of TSCS dimensions, (b) the difference between delinquent and non-delinquent populations with the same sociological backgrounds, and (c) test and retest differences on delinquents with intervening counseling or therapy where the efficacy of the counseling or therapy techniques was the primary experimental goal. Hamner concluded that studies have established that the TSCS can successfully discriminate between the delinquent and non-delinquent (Atchison, 1958; Deitche, 1959). Lefeber (1965) found that the TSCS also discriminates between juvenile first offenders and recidivists.

In addition, Hamner compared data from studies undertaken by Deitche (1959), Angelino (unpublished data), Lefeber (1965), Joplin (unpublished data), and Richard (unpublished data). Total N for the five studies was 302 male and 100 female adjudicated delinquents. Hamner's comparison of the five studies suggested the emergence of the TSCS of a typical anti-social profile which he described as "an amazingly consistent pattern." When group means were derived for the column positive self concept scores (self esteem scores) in the subscale dimensions of Physical Self, Moral-Ethical Self, Personal Self, Family Self, and Social Self, delinquent profiles reflect a characteristic W shape, with high self concept in Physical Self, Personal Self, and Social Self and correspondingly low self concept in Moral-Ethical Self and Family Self. The high-low-high-low-high

scores yield the W shape. This is accompanied by a characteristically low total positive score (total P), which suggests low overall self esteem.

A number of interpretations for the W-shaped profile may be advanced. Hamner favors interpretations that permit low order inferences from the profile, i.e., a low positive score on a test dimension is assumed to reflect low self esteem. Basic to Hamner's interpretations would be assumptions that the profile reflects a unique, stable self concept (a) which the delinquent has in comparison with non-delinquent and norming groups, (b) which he is able to express directly via TSCS test dimensions, and (c) which he is willing to divulge.

Prior to a reduction of the anti-social profile to an interpretive level where the profile is regarded as a reflection of the delinquent S responding to item content in terms of a positive-negative dimension of degree of self-esteem, other sources of variance or distortion which may be systematically contributing to the response require exploration. These sources may be a subject-imposed response set, response style, test characteristics, or method inadequacies.

Response Set and Response Style as Irrelevant Response Determiners

Rorer (1965, p. 134) defined response set as "a conscious or unconscious desire to the part of the respondent to answer in such a way as to produce a certain picture of himself." Rorer stated that to infer that a set is operating, E must assume that S is responding to item content. If S alters responses on the basis of instructions, E must assume S is responding to instructions and item content. Response

set is manipulated by the investigator when he requests Ss to respond in terms of self or ideal self or any other set to dissimulate.

Rorer defined response style as a "tendency to select some response category a disproportionate amount of time independent of item content." For this reason, styles have often been termed "contentless." Styles include "yeasaying," "naysaying," or any preference for a certain response category. Response style, unlike response set, should remain invariant under differing instructional sets.

Hamner (1968) reported a response category preference for the delinquent responders on the TSCS for that category designated as partly true-partly false (response choice 3 on scale). Hamner also reported for delinquent Ss, little use of response categories for mostly true and mostly false (response choices 2 and 4). There is greater use of response category for completely true (response choice 5) than for completely false (response choice 1). This tendency is reflected in the test dimension of T/F ratio. Hamner (1968) and Fitts (1965) interpret high use of category 3 as defensiveness or lack of certainty, which infers that a response set, to defend against self-disclosure, is characteristically adopted by delinquent responders.

Jones (1966) has explored the effect on the TSCS of situational variables which would be reflected as response set. Subjects were asked to indicate on a four point scale the degree of truthfulness to which they would respond to each TSCS item under four instructional sets: to respond, (a) as if participating in research; (b) as asking for help with personal problems from a psychologist or psychiatrist; (c) as being evaluated by a court official prior to sentencing; or (d) as applying for a desirable job. Highest degree of truthfulness

which would be employed was reported for the Help and Research situations with the least truthfulness of the Job situation. Subjects in the Jones study were not actually asked to check items on the TSCS and no test scores were derived. However, the study suggests that the TSCS may be highly vulnerable to variance as a function of response set to dissimulate where response set would not be under the control of the investigator.

Brassard (1963) and Tracy (1967) have explored social desirability effects on the TSCS with college populations. Social desirability was defined by them as a response style variable but which would fall within Rorer's use of the term set. Ss were asked to take the TSCS under varying response sets for both studies. Brassard derived a discrepancy score between self description on the TSCS and a socially desirable person description of the TSCS with an interpolated task. Persons who did not significantly differ on self and socially desirable descriptions would be assumed to be acquiesers, or socially desirable responders. Their responses were assumed to be already so "loaded" with social desirability, that no discrepancy between the two descriptions could occur. Brassard found that if the interpolated task were comprised of a description which had a personal referrant, such as ideal self, there were fewer significant discrepancies between self and socially desirable persons than when the interpolated descriptive task sharply contrasted, i.e., describing a disliked person. The nature of the intervening task could be regarded as a critical variable.

Tracy also derived discrepancy scores between self and the socially desirable person to critically test Brassard's method of

identifying acquiesers. He included a group to provide independent measures of the social desirability of each TSCS item. Discrepancies washed out when he re-scored responses utilizing weights for social desirability for each item as established by an independent group of judges.

Method Effects as Irrelevant Response Determiners

Tracy had noted Brassard's failure to control for effects which might be a function of repeated measures, i.e., sequence and serial position effects. Sequence effects are those which accrue to the experimental condition as a function of the specific nature of the prior experimental condition, or response set. Sequence effects are ordinarily assumed to be controlled by counterbalancing experimental conditions. Serial position effects are those which accrue independent of the specific nature of prior experimental conditions, or response sets. They are a function of whether the task appeared first, second, or third, etc.

Tracy counterbalanced instructional sets of self description and socially desirable description, to allow for testing of sequence effects. Serial position effects, if any, were confounded with sequence effects. Tracy reported significant method, or design effects, composed of sequential and/or serial position effects; that, self description was significantly higher if not preceded by a set to describe what is socially desirable in another person. This effect was further described by Tracy as a contrast effect where the contrast effect inflates self description, or perhaps deflates, depending upon the presence or absence of a specific preceding task.

Taylor (1955) suggested that repeated measures might result in a "regression toward the mean" effect, with the result that retest scores may only appear to reflect "better adjustment," in that they are less deviant when compared to the initial test scores. Tracy (1967) further pointed up the need for E to critically test for repeated measures effects, stating that repeated measures may be appropriate only for physiological measures in which there is a return to pre-experimental base rate, such as in galvanic skin response, aspiration index, etc. In particular, that repeated measures, per se, might be critical is also suggested by the Taylor's (1955) study, where there was a steady upward swing in self concept over trials without experimental intervention.

Brassard's findings suggest that the nature of the intervening task may be critical in the use of Cronbach and Meehl's test-experimental intervention-retest design perhaps generating a contrast effect as reported by Tracy. Tracy's findings of design effects suggests that all studies employing self and socially desirable or ideal self descriptions in a repeated measures design may have confounded the effect with supposed differences in self concept and ideal self description or other response sets. Tracy noted that of the various studies which investigate dissimulation effects at the level of the individual by way of contrasting the individuals' self description with his own concept of desirability or with his estimate of society's concept of what is desirable, none appear to be methodologically sound (Borislow, 1958; Brassard, 1963; Milgram and Helper, 1961; Rosen, 1956; Rosen and Mink, 1961; and Taylor, 1959). Tracy (1968, pp. 50-51) pointed out that "These studies typically fail to counterbalance the

order in which the two descriptions are elicited or to furnish evidence (control group data) assuring that any differences between self and desirability descriptions exceed those attributable to repeated measurement phenomena."

Test Characteristics as an Irrelevant Response Determiner

Greenberg and Frank (1965) have explored variance on the TSCS as a function of item arrangement. On the standard format, the subject is required to respond to a block of three positive self concept items on each subscale followed by a block of three negative ones. Greenberg and Frank found that the means of twelve test subscales, including four of the five subscales which comprise the W-shaped anti-social profile, were lowered when they arranged all items in random fashion. The only anti-social profile subscale not affected as a consequence of randomization was that of Family Self, the second lower point on the W.

Difficulty of the TSCS test format should also be noted. The investigator was unable to interpret results of the TSCS given enrollees of a learning academy for under-achievers sponsored by a large North Carolina school system due to an observation by an interning psychologist that during test-taking the subjects were obviously lost relative to the items being read in the booklet and the corresponding items checked on the scoring sheet. Both the test booklet and the scoring sheet are peculiarly arranged; for example, items on the test booklet page 1 are numbered 1, 3, 5, etc.; while items on page 1 of the scoring sheet are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc. Items on booklet page 2 are numbered 2, 4, 6, etc.

It has also been noted by the investigator that in administering

tests to a delinquent population, any difficulty with format or any requirement of painstaking effort or tedium will result in Ss responding in a haphazard, careless fashion. Psychologists who evaluate juveniles in the same delinquent (training school) population, on an individual basis for diagnostic purposes, reported to the investigator that they observed difficult or tedious format frequently being accompanied by behavior that suggested random responding, carelessness, or caprice. It would seem reasonable to assume that the peculiar TSCS booklet and answer sheet format might contribute to invalid responding.

Summary

The utility of self-ideal descriptions as indices to self esteem, and thence to the underlying source of motivation for delinquent behavior has been suggested by prior studies. However, responding by delinquent Ss as a function of self concept and ideal self concept to TSCS items in terms of discrepancies cannot now be assumed due to test characteristics (Greenberg & Frank, 1965); vulnerability of the TSCS to response set; i.e., to deliberate falsification as a function of the setting of the investigation (Jones, 1966); the need of evidence of the "robustness" or stability of the concepts of self and ideal self in terms of the nature of interpolated tasks as required by Cronbach and Meehl's model for construct validity; to the possibility that delinquent Ss have a characteristic response style of "yeasaying" (Fitts & Hamner, 1969); to repeated measures effects (Tracy, 1967) and to the possibility that uncertainty or defensiveness is employed in the overuse of the neutral response, category 3 (Fitts & Hamner, 1969).

In this investigation a delinquent population was given the TSCS

in an altered, simpler format to reduce test-taking difficulty. The items were arranged in random fashion to control for variance produced by the standard format of three positively phrased items followed by three negatively phrased items relating to the same test dimension. They were informed that they were taking the instrument for research purposes only as Jones' (1966) study indicated this situation was least conducive to dissimulation.

The response sets employed include one which is particularly innocuous, that of people in general, to provide a referrent for degree of defensiveness employed by delinquent responders. Two other response sets, those of self and ideal self were also employed. Experimental intervention Ss took the TSCS four times in a counterbalanced fashion to examine the effects of repeated measures on each response set. The final trial for these Ss consisted of a retest trial where Ss took the TSCS under the same response set employed for the initial trial. This permits an examination of Cronbach and Meehl's test-experimental intervention-retest model; experimental intervention was comprised of the two intervening response sets. Response style was explored by analysis of the TSCS test score which reflects use of the ends of the response choice continuum (T/F Ratio) and by analysis of use of category 3 under varying response sets.

Hypotheses

Construct validity of an hypothesized subject attribute such as self concept may be experimentally attacked by way of a repeated measures design test-experimental intervention-test of self reports and an accounting for irrelevant response determiners. Many studies

have utilized the repeated measures design to explore self concept in terms of discrepancies between how the subject views himself in relation to how he views a hypothesized ideal self or how he views others. The assumption is that repeated measures designs are adequate for this kind of study in that the subject serves as his own control. However, repeated measures effects may be a significant contributor to variance. Other sources of variance which must be identified is that of response style and response sets not under experimental control.

Under the conditions of test-experimental intervention-retest, the effects of intervention are interpreted as indicators of the stability of the self report instrument employed; i.e., a valid instrument would be resistant to the effects of experimental intervention. Valid experimentally induced response sets should also be resistant to experiment intervention.

Whether or not delinquent Ss can describe themselves differently under experimentally induced response sets will partially determine whether differences between self description, ideal self description or people in general description are useful to the investigator as a measure of self esteem.

Hypothesis I. Responses under the response set for self description will not significantly differ from responses under the response set for ideal self description, nor from responses under the response set for people in general description. Responses under the response set for ideal self description will not differ from responses under the response set for people in general description.

Delinquent Ss may describe themselves differently under varying response sets, but such differences may be significantly influenced

by sequential arrangement of the response set or by its serial order position (trials). For differences between response sets to have validity, the effects of sequential arrangement and serial order position must be assessed.

Hypothesis II. For the experimental intervention groups, there will be no significant differences as a function of sequential arrangement of varying response sets of self description, ideal self description or people in general description.

Hypothesis III. For the control groups who receive only one response set, responses under the response set for self description will not significantly differ from responses under the response set for ideal self description, nor from responses under the response set for people in general description. Responses under the response set for ideal self description will not differ from responses under the response set for people in general description.

Hypothesis IV. For the control groups who receive only one response set, there will be no significant differences over trials as a function of repeated measures under a single response set for self description, ideal self description, or people in general description.

Discrepancy scores between self-ideal self descriptions, or between self-people in general descriptions should be sufficiently discriminable to provide evidence for phenomenologically discriminable concepts of self, ideal self, or people in general. Further, the magnitude of such discrepancy scores should not be dependent upon repeated measures effects resulting from sequential arrangement of the response sets.

Hypothesis V. For individual Ss, size of discrepancy scores

obtained between self and ideal self or between self and people in general response sets will not significantly differ as a function of sequential arrangement of the response sets.

Under the conditions of test-experimental intervention-retest, the effects of intervention are interpreted as indicators of stability of the self report instrument employed, i.e., a valid instrument would be resistant to the effects of experimental intervention. A valid response set would also be resistant to experimental intervention. The stability of the instrument and the stability of the experimentally induced response set of self description, ideal self description, and people in general description may be similarly established.

Hypothesis VI. Initial trials and retest trials for the response sets of self description, ideal self description, and people in general descriptions will not significantly differ as a function of experimental intervention.

Delinquent Ss have been described as having a characteristic response style in responding to the TSCS. Response style indicates that Ss respond independently of the content of items. If Ss differentially respond under response sets of self description, ideal self description, or people in general description on the TSCS test dimension, on the T/F ratio, which reflects response style, then Ss may be assumed to be responding to item content. The assertion that a response style is typical of delinquent responders would not be supported.

Hypothesis VII. Response style as reflected in the T/F ratio will not significantly differ under varying response sets for self description, or people in general description.

Response sets may be imposed by the investigator or by the subject. Research has shown that a response set imposed by the delinquent responder may take the form of using the response 3 category of partly true-partly false on the TSCS to defend against self disclosure. If use of response 3 category represents a response set of defensiveness in describing the self, such defensiveness could not be assumed, a priori, to be operating under an instructional response set to describe an ideal self or people in general. Logically, an instructional response set to describe people in general should be sufficiently innocuous to not elicit a need to be defensive. Greater use of category 3 under response set to describe self as compared to ideal self or/and people in general could be interpreted as evidence for selective defensiveness in describing the self. If differential use of category 3 does not appear under varying response sets, then evidence for a response style of choosing a preferred category could accrue.

Hypothesis VIII. Use of category 3 will not significantly differ under response sets to describe the self, the ideal self, and people in general.

Research on delinquent Ss employing the TSCS is indicative of a characteristic mode of responding which yields an anti-social profile. If those findings are valid, the anti-social profile should emerge most frequently under the response set for self description. Delinquent Ss are also expected to view others as no better than himself, so the anti-social profile should emerge as frequently under people in general response set as under self description response set. To be

consistent with previous findings, the ideal self response set should eliminate all anti-social profiles.

Hypothesis IX. For individual Ss the emergence of the anti-social profile will be independent of response set for self description, ideal self description, or people in general description.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

This study explores the effects of irrelevant response determiners on an instrument frequently used with delinquent responders: the Tennessee Self Concept Scale (TSCS). The first effect comes from the design employed, which requires repeated measures. These effects are operationally termed sequential effects which are a function of a response set falling within a specific sequence of varying experimentally induced response sets. Another effect is that of experimental intervention on initial and retest response set scores. A third effect is response style which is operationally defined as the TSCS derived test score, the T/F ratio. The T/F ratio reflects overuse of the positive end of the response choice continuum independent of item content. A fourth effect is that of a subject-imposed response set of defensiveness, which is operationally defined as differential use of response category 3 (partly true-partly false) under varying experimentally induced response sets.

The experimentally induced response sets are those of self description, ideal self description, and people in general description. The former two were chosen as they are most frequently employed by investigators. Differences between self and ideal self descriptions typically are interpreted as indicators of degree of self-esteem. The third response set, people in general description, was chosen as it

appears in the literature with self description with the consequent interpretation that delinquent Ss tend to see others as they see themselves in terms of self esteem.

The Instrument

The TSCS (Manual, 1965) is comprised of 100 self descriptive items to which the individual responds on a five point negative-positive dimension (Completely False, Mostly False, Partly False-Partly True, Mostly True, Completely True) in terms of how he views himself. Ten of the items have been taken from the L-Scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). The TSCS is available in two forms, a counseling form and a clinical and research form. The clinical and research form was chosen for this study as it includes score values which reflect contradiction within test dimensions and also provides six additional scales termed the Empirical Scales. Items and test format are identical for the two forms.

The basic 90 items of the scale, omitting the ten L-Scale items, are arranged in a 3 x 5 format with 15 cells (see Appendix A). Each cell contains three positively phrased items followed by three negatively phrased items. Therefore, the 90 items are equally divided as to negative or positive content. Each of the three rows has five cells, with 30 items; each of the five columns has three cells, with 18 items. The rows are designated as an internal frame of reference, and are labeled Levels I, II, and III. The columns are designated as external frame of reference and are labeled as Areas A, B, C, D, and E.

Levels (rows) are further designated as follows:

Level I Identity--What he is
Level II Self-Satisfaction--How he accepts himself
Level III Behavior--How he acts

Areas (columns) are further designated as follows:

Area A Physical Self
Area B Moral-Ethical Self
Area C Personal Self
Area D Family Self
Area E Social Self

Levels and areas yield both self-esteem and self-consistency scores. The emergence of areas or, external frames of reference, has been supported by factor analysis (Vacchiano & Strauss, 1968); however, support for the levels, or internal frame of reference, did not appear.

Hamner (1968, p. 4) describes personal self as self-worth in terms of psychological traits; family self as self in relation to the primary social group, family and close friends; social self as self in relation to the secondary social group. Fitts (Manual, p. 3) describes physical self as representing the individuals view of his body, health, appearance, skills and sexuality; moral-ethical self reflects his relationship to God, feelings of being a "good" or "bad" person and satisfaction with religion or lack of it.

Fitts (Manual, 1965) began work on the TSCS in 1955 in conjunction with the Tennessee Department of Mental Health. He first compiled a pool of self descriptive statements including those from Balester (1956), Engel (1956), and Taylor (1953). Also, patients and non-patients were asked to provide self descriptions. Seven clinical psychologists classified the items according to Fitts' 3 x 5 phenomenological framework of levels and areas. They also classified the content of each item as positive or negative. Only those items on which

there was perfect agreement among the judges were included in the final scale.

As set forth above, responses are made on a five point positive-negative continuum. Higher values of the scale for either the positively or negatively phrased items reflect high self-esteem. Therefore, acceptance of positive items and denial of negative ones receive equal weight on the scoring sheet in terms of self-esteem.

There are 29 scale variables:

Positive Scores. Each row (level) is summed for a positive score which purportedly reflects degree of self-esteem in that level of self concept. Each column (area) is also scored for self-esteem. Scoring consists of summing response category numerical values (1 through 5) for the positive items (P) and adding to it the sum of the response category values for the negatively phrased items (N), that is P (positive score) is derived from P + N. A total positive score (Total P) is derived for the basic 90 items by summing over row or column P and is regarded as the subject's general level of self-esteem.

Variability Scores. Each row and each column is assigned a variability (V) score, which purportedly assesses self-consistency. This is derived by subtracting the lowest cell value for P + N from the highest cell value for P + N for the particular row or column. Row Total V and column Total V is derived by summing over rows or columns. Total V is the sum of Row Total V and Column Total V. According to Hamner (p. 4), "In the emotionally healthy person, the self concept (SC) should not only be positive but consistent across the several dimensions of the SC. A high degree of inconsistency, or

variability, is found in individuals who tend to compartmentalize certain areas resulting in poor integration of the self."

Distribution Score. A distribtuion score (D) is derived from a frequency count of numbers of times S utilizes each of the response categories of 1 through 5. Frequency of 5 and 1 choices is weighted by multiplying by two; this is added to frequencies in categories 2 and 4. Frequency in category 3 is not included. Therefore, D represents the sum of frequencies in categories 1, 2, 4, and 5, with 1 and 5 weighted. Hamner (pp. 4-5) states that, "Even though positive and consistent (high Total P; low V scores), a person may demonstrate an element of uncertainty or lack of clarity in his self-perception. Low distribution scores (D) are a reflection of such uncertainty but are also found where the subject is being defensive and guarded. High D scores indicate certainty about the way he sees himself. Abnormally high D scores may be seen in those individuals who tend to see everything as black and white are unable to make finer discriminations than simple dichotomies."

Conflict Scores. Two conflict scores are derived for cells and summed across rows and columns, yielding two conflict scores for each row and each column (see Appendix A). Two total scale conflict scores are derived. The cell conflict scores are derived by subtracting the sum of the response category values for negatively phrased items from the sum of the values for the positively phrased items (P-N). The cell net conflict score may have a plus or minus sign. Row and column Net Conflict Scores are derived by algebraic summing across a row or column; total row and column Net Conflict Scores are summed

algebraically for a total Net Conflict Score. Non-algebraic summing yields a cell, row and column conflict score, which then yields a Total Conflict Score.

Hamner (p. 5) stated that in reference to conflict, "Self-appraising statements may be couched in either positive or negative terms. Thus, it is one thing to say, 'I consider myself a sloppy person,' and quite another to say, 'I like to look nice and neat all the time.' . . . Over-affirming his positive attributes and over-denying his negative attributes are both reflected in the Net Conflict Score. The Net Conflict Score measures direction as well as amount of conflict. These may sometimes be so variable as to cancel each other and reduce the score. In order to give an absolute measure of amount of such conflict without regard to direction, the positive-negative differences are summed non-algebraically. This yields a Total Conflict Score. "High scores indicate confusion, contradiction, and general conflict in self perception. Low scores have the opposite interpretation, but extremely low scores is presenting such an extremely tight and rigid self description that it becomes suspect as an anti-social, defensive stereotype rather that his true self image." (Fitts, Manual, p. 4.)

The T/F Ratio. Omitting the 3 category responses, frequencies are derived from the 1 and 2 categories which comprise the false end of the response continuum. Frequencies are also derived for the 4 and 5 categories or the true end of the continuum. The T/F ratio is the ratio of true to false responses on the basic 90 items of the Scale. "This is a measure of response set or response bias, an indication of

whether the subject's approach to the task involves any strong tendency to agree or disagree regardless of the item content." (Fitts, Manual, p. 5.)

The Empirical Scales. "Several other scales have been empirically derived, the General Maladjustment Scale (GM) and the Personality Disorder Scale (PD). Others are the Psychosis Scale (PSY), the Neurosis Scale (N), the Defensive Positive Scale (DP), and the Personality Integration Scale (PI). The PSY, N, and PD Scales successfully differentiate normals from psychotics, neurotics and sociopaths, respectively and differentiate these groups from each other. The DP Scale is a subtle measure of defensiveness." (Hamner, p. 6.)

The Self Criticism Score (SC). "This is comprised of 10 items from the L-Scale of the MMPI, mildly derogatory statements which most people are willing to admit are applicable to them." Individuals who deny most of these statements are being defensive and making a deliberate effort to present a favorable picture of themselves. High scores generally indicate a normal, healthy openess and capacity for self-criticism." (Fitts, Manual, p. 2.)

Hamner's TSCS Anti-Social Profile

The profile which characterizes the delinquent is as follows:

Positive (P) Scores. The mean Total P (self-esteem) is low, falling in the range of 315. The row P scores form an inverted V, with Self Satisfaction less deviant; as follows:

Self Satisfaction
P

Identity
P

Behavior
P

Column P is distributed for delinquents in profile form, as follows:

Physical Self Personal Self Social Self

Moral-Ethical Self Family Self

Moral-Ethical Self and Family Self may be seen to be markedly lower than the dimensions of Physical Self, Personal Self and Social Self. This forms the characteristic W associated with delinquent populations. Social Self is consistently high.

Variability Scores. Mean V Scores are higher for the delinquent population. According to Hamner (p. 11), "Delinquents show a greater tendency to compartmentalize different areas of the self and rate them very differently from each other."

Distribution Scores. Hamner reported that D scores typically reflect a disproportionately high use of the 3 category, little use of categories 2 and 4 with a "slightly greater" usage of category 5 than 1.

Self Criticism (SC) Score. SC scores for the delinquent population were near the mean for the norm group that is, the L-Scale revealed no tendency on the part of the delinquent group to dodge mildly derogatory statements about themselves. Fitts (Manual, p. 2) alluded to this as "a healthy openess."

Conflict Scores. Net conflict (algebraically summed P-N) tends to be higher for the delinquent group. Total conflict (non-algebraically summed P-N) is higher than Net Conflict.

Empirical Scales. Hamner reported sharp peaks for the delinquent groups on the General Maladjustment (GM) and Personality Disorder (PD) Scales. The Personality Integration (PI) Scale fell below the 30th percentile on all groups reviewed by Hamner. Defensive positive (DP) is low, but not significantly low.

Therefore, the delinquent profile is characterized by:

1. Low Total P;
2. Higher Row 2 (Self Satisfaction) than Row 1 (Identity) P and Row 3 (Behavior) P;
3. Low Column P, with a W-shaped profile; lowest points on W fell in column P for Moral-Ethical Self and Family Self;
4. High usage of category 3, low usage of 2 and 4 categories, with $5 > 1$;
5. Self criticism falling near mean for norming group;
6. Net Conflict elevated; Total Conflict higher than Net Conflict with greatest amount from Family Self;
7. High GM, High PD, Low PI, and Low, but not significantly low, DP;
8. Social Self P is consistently high and does not discriminate between delinquent and non-delinquent populations.

The TSCS dimensions selected for analysis in this study are Total P, as this score is regarded to be the best single measure of self-esteem on the instrument. The W-shaped profile for area P scores is also analyzed as an indicator of the anti-social profile. For such identification, Column A, C, and E must have T scores of Total P which fall within the non-deviant range, i.e., above values of 38, 37, and 36 respectively; Column B and D scores must be deviant, with T scores for Total P of less than 38. The cut-off points were chosen on the basis of Fitt's norming group cut-off points for deviance-nondeviance.

Hamner (1968) structured the W-shaped profile on the basis of deviance-nondeviance in terms of the foregoing T scores.

The T/F ratio is employed in analysis to determine if delinquent Ss overemploy the true end of the continuum independent of response set. Discrepancy scores for individual Ss are derived by subtraction of the Total P Score for a response set from that of another response set. Total P for self description is subtracted from ideal self Total P; Total P for people in general is subtracted from ideal self Total P; Total P for people in general is subtracted from self description Total P. Frequency of response to category 3 is analyzed to determine if Ss utilize a response set of defensiveness under the experimentally induced response sets.

Population

The experimental population consisted of white and black males who had been adjudicated delinquent through the Juvenile Courts of the State of North Carolina and who had been incarcerated at Stonewall Jackson Training School at Concord, North Carolina. Each juvenile at the training school is routinely given the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC), the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) or the Wechsler Bellevue II (W-B II) if the tests had not previously been given or reported. Each juvenile is also given the Stanford Achievement Test, Intermediate Battery, Partial Form K, upon entry and grade placement is determined on the basis of the battery median. Those whose median falls below the sixth grade are placed in special education regardless of I.Q. Grade placement therefore roughly reflects

level or reading ability, and regular grade placement usually reflects I.Q of 85 or above. The TSCS is suitable for subjects who can read at a sixth grade level. The research population was limited to those placed in the regular classrooms, grades seven through nine, so that adequate reading skills may be assumed. Classroom populations were utilized intact as this method of data collection is preferred by administrative personnel at the Training School. The population may be assumed to be naive relative to the TSCS as no evidence that any juvenile had taken it was discovered by the investigator through systematic search of the available psychological reports, juvenile diagnostic center reports, court social worker or probation officer reports or through inquiry of induction personnel at the Training School or through inquiry of the juveniles.

Grouping and Procedure

The investigator randomly assigned members of the seventh, eighth, and ninth grade classes at Stonewall Jackson Training School to one of nine groups, six experimental groups and three control groups. Each group consisted of an N of 15, consisting of five subjects from each of the grade levels. Total N was 135. Black subjects, who comprised 11 per cent of the population were randomly assigned to groups.

No grouping was possible on the basis of the Wechsler intelligence test data due to the discovery by the investigator that the tests were administered frequently by unqualified persons, such as social workers or juvenile court employees of widely differing educational backgrounds.

The intelligence tests administered at the training school were given by social workers who had no formal training in the administration or scoring of standardized tests. Grouping on the basis of grade level for some analyses was employed as the groups were homogeneous for age. Differences between 15 year old subjects in the seventh grade and 15 year old subjects in the ninth grade could constitute substantial ability differences.

Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations of Age for Experimental and Control Groups

Group	N	Mean Age	S.D.
I-SD	15	15.79	.8285
II-SD	15	15.50	1.0034
SD-CO	15	15.26	.9420
I-IS	15	15.61	.9659
II-IS	15	15.31	1.1640
IS-CO	15	15.86	.8645
I-GO	15	15.53	1.3010
II-GO	15	15.41	.6856
GO-CO	15	15.46	.7259

Note.--The months are converted to tenths.

Each experimental group was administered the TSCS four times under varying response sets and with varying sequences of response sets. The initial response sets and the final response sets were identical for each group, to provide for a test-experimental intervention-retest analysis. The second and third response sets in each case were regarded as experimental intervention.

Two of the experimental groups received response sets to describe the self on the first and fourth test-retest trials, with instructions to describe the ideal self and people in general as the second and third trials. Accompanying these two experimental groups is a control group which received instructions on all four trials to describe the self only. These groups were designated as I-SD, II-SD and SD-CO respectively.

Two of the experimental groups received instructions to describe the ideal self under test-retest initial and final trials, with instructions to describe the self and people in general on the second and third trials. A control group which received instructions on all four trials to describe the ideal self accompanies these two experimental groups. These three groups were designed as I-IS, II-IS, and IS-CO respectively.

The last two experimental groups received instructions to describe people in general on initial test-retest trials, with instructions to describe the self and ideal self on the second and third trials. The accompanying control group received instructions to describe people in general only for all four trials. These groups were designated as I-GO, II-GO, and GO-CO respectively.

It will be noted from Table 2 that the experimental intervention conditions, trials 2 and 3, are counterbalanced, so that under each test-retest condition, each instructional set appears an equal number of times as trial 2 and 3. Further, it precedes and is preceded by the other two instructional sets an equal number of times.

Table 2

Test-Retest and Sequence of Experimental Instructional Sets

		Test Condition	Experimental Intervention		Retest Condition
Group	N	Trial 1	Trial 2	Trial 3	Trial 4
I-SD[a]	15	SD	IS	GO	SD
II-SD	15	SD	GO	IS	SD
SD-CO	15	SD	SD	SD	SD
I-IS[b]	15	IS	SD	GO	IS
II-IS	15	IS	GO	SD	IS
IS-CO	15	IS	IS	IS	IS
I-GO[c]	15	GO	SD	IS	GO
II-GO	15	GO	IS	SD	GO
GO-CO	15	GO	GO	GO	GO

[a] Self description

[b] Ideal self description

[c] People in general description

Collection of the Data

Ss received all four TSCS test booklets with group number and sequence in which the tests were to be taken clearly marked. E and one assistant monitored throughout the data collecting to insure the TSCS being (1) taken in proper sequence, and (2) to prompt S which instructional set was appropriate for the test he was taking. All four TSCS booklets were completed in one continuous block of time, beginning with the first class period and extending until all Ss within a class completed all four TSCS booklets. Approximate time required was one and one-quarter hours for all classes.

Instructions were given by E to Ss in each class as follows:

> You are going to take the same test four times for research purposes. The test results will have nothing to do with your release and will not be used by your cottage parents, social workers or teachers. Please be as frank as possible.
> You will take the test describing yourself; you will take it again describing how you would like to be; and again as you think people in general, or most people, would describe themselves. (Self, Like to be, People in General or Most People was written on the blackboard by E at this point.)
> Each item has five possible answers. E then placed on the blackboard the following:

1	2	3	4	5
Completely False	Mostly False	Partly True - Partly False	Mostly True	Completely True

> For example, look at the first item on the first test on your desk: "I am a calm and easy going person." If your answer is completely false, you would circle 1; if mostly false, you would circle 2; if partly true - partly false, you would circle 3; if mostly ture, you would circle 4; if completely true, you would circle 5. (E demonstrated by circling each number as the foregoing was given.) Be certain to read the instruction sheet in each test (E pointed to sample copy). This will tell you whether you are answering as yourself, as you would like to be, or as people in general or most people. Some

> of you will be answering as yourself on all four tests; some of you will be answering as you would like to be on all four tests; some of you will be answering as people in general, or most people, on all four tests. This is not a mistake; it is a necessary part of the research. Are there any questions?

Instruction sheets as they appeared on each copy of the TSCS appear in the appendix, as is the random order of the TSCS items employed. Items were randomly distributed for order of presentation as recommended by Greenberg and Frank (1965). Also Ss responded to each item immediately under the item in order to make responding simpler than when S employs both a test booklet and answer sheet.

Statistical Analysis

Unless otherwise specified, all analyses are performed on the TSCS T score values for Total P. For the analysis of discrepancy scores between ideal self description and self description; between ideal self description and people in general description, and between self description and people in general description, subtraction between Total P (T scores) is performed. Discrepancies of one-half standard deviation are arbitrarily regarded as being of sufficient magnitude as to permit additional analysis. No assumption is made that the statistical difference of one-half standard deviation represents a corresponding phenomenological distance between self, ideal self or people in general concepts. The choice of this measure of the discrepancies is solely on the basis of the statistical meaning associated with standard deviation units.

The analysis involving the T/F ratio does not involve an obtained T score. The T/F ratio is the ratio between frequency of responses

for categories 1 and 2 on the negative end of the response continuum to the frequency of responses for categories 4 and 5 on the positive end of the continuum for the 100 items. Category 3 is omitted in computing the ratio. Data for the use of category 3 is a frequency count only for number of times category 3 was employed within a response set. Data from trial 4, which constitutes retest data, is omitted for all analyses except to test those hypotheses which concern test-retest differences between trial 1 and trial 4.

Parametric statistical analyses were performed utilizing analysis of variance for repeated measures, case II (Winer, 1969, pp. 337-345), or single factor analysis of variance for uncorrelated data (Winer, pp. 48-64). The t test for the difference between means, correlated observations, was also employed (Winer, pp. 39-43). One analysis required the use of the nonparametric chi-square one-sample test (Siegle, 1956). The Duncan's new multiple range test for making comparison's among treatment means was also employed (Steel and Torrie, 1960, pp. 107-109).

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Hypothesis I was partially rejected by the analysis presented in Table 3; delinquent Ss can differentially respond under three response

Table 3

Analysis of Variance for Response Sets for Self Description, Ideal Self Description and People in General Description Experimental Intervention Groups (N=90)

Source of Variation	Sums of Squares	d.f.	Mean Square	F
Grade level (G)	6.1408	2	3.0704	.0089
Sequence (S)	1,278.2963	5	255.6593	.7387
G X S	1,888.0815	10	188.8082	.5455
Ss/G X S	24,920.1333	72	346.1130	
Response Set (R)	8,043.0297	2	4021.5149	52.7072*
G X R	156.4814	4	39.1204	.5127
S X R	1,706.1259	10	170.6126	2.2361
G X S X R	2,127.2963	20	106.3648	1.3941
Ss X Cells/ G X S X R	10,987.0667	144	76.2991	
Total	51,112.6519	269		

*Tabled F for significance at the .01 level is 4.77

sets as reflected in the TSCS total positive (Total P) score. Grade level is not significant, nor does grouping on the basis of sequence or response set significantly affect results at the group level.

Means and standard deviations for each response set appear in Table 4. A test of the means for each response set, independent of grade level or sequence, reveals that Ss do not differentiate between self and people in general. Ss do differentiate between self and ideal self and between ideal self and people in general (see Table 5).

Table 4

Means and Standard Deviations Under Response Sets Independent of Grade Level and Sequence

Response Set	N	Mean	SD
Self Description	90	39.36	10.47
Ideal Self Des.	90	50.56	14.74
People in Gen. Des.	90	38.64	12.67

Hypothesis II was accepted as set forth in Table 3. In this analysis, sequence of response set does not significantly affect responding. However, it should be noted that Ss tend to vary within response sets and sequence. Inspection of Tables 6, 7 and 8 show that variance between groups within response sets varies markedly. Both Table 7 and Table 8, which reflect ideal self response set and people in general response set respectively indicate a trend toward increasing variance from trial 1 to trial 3.

Table 5

Duncan New Multiple Range Test
for Difference Between Means

Comparison Between Means	Difference Between Means	*LSR	Level of Significance
IS - GO	11.92	6.06	.01
IS - SD	11.20	5.80	.01
SD - GO	.72	5.80	N.S.

*Least significant range

Table 6

Means and Standard Deviations of Total P Scores
for Self Descriptions Response Set

Group	N	Trial for SD	Preceeded by	Mean	S.D.
I-SD	15	1	-	38.4	9.09
II-SD	15	1	-	37.6	7.25
I-IS	15	2	IS	43.1	10.88
I-GO	15	2	GO	38.9	7.47
II-IS	15	3	IS, GO	40.33	15.95
II-GO	15	3	GO, IS	37.93	7.16

Table 7

Means and Standard Deviations of Total P Scores for Ideal Self Response Set

Group	N	Trial for SD	Preceeded by	Mean	S.D.
I-IS	15	1	-	50.73	10.74
II-IS	15	1	-	42.00	12.86
I-SD	15	2	SD	56.33	14.41
II-GO	15	2	GO	46.73	11.70
II-SD	15	3	SD, GO	55.00	18.57
I-GO	15	3	GO, SD	51.80	16.001

Table 8

Means and Standard Deviations of Total P Scores for People in General Response Set

Group	N	Trial for GO	Preceeded by	Mean	S.D.
I-GO	15	1	-	35.8	6.64
II-GO	15	1	-	34.8	5.69
II-SD	15	2	SD	38.1	13.96
II-IS	15	2	IS	39.1	16.42
I-SD	15	3	SD, IS	41.2	16.42
I-IS	15	3	IS, SD	37.2	11.18

While sequence effects per se cannot be established as a contributing factor, the trend toward greater variation over trials warrants further investigation. For the additional analysis, six experimental groups were established where each group represented a different sequence and trial within a response set (grouped as set forth in Tables 6, 7, and 8). Data for this analysis were therefore uncorrelated in that Ss appeared in only one treatment group under each response set and sequence. Inspection of Table 9 and Table 11 indicate that the further analysis on self description and people in general respectively support the initial finding of no significance for sequence and trial effects. However, scores within the response set of ideal self, grouped in the basis of sequence and trial, vary so widely that they appear to represent different experimental treatments which significantly differ at the .10 level (Table 10). The specific

Table 9

Analysis of Variance for Self Description
Uncorrelated Data (N=90)

Source	d.f.	Sums of Squares	Mean Square	F
Sequence[a]	5	321.25555	64.2511	.6902 n.s.
Subjects within groups	84	7819.2445	93.0862	
Total	89	8140.5		

[a]Ss receiving self description response set in any sequence or on any trial were grouped as an experimental treatment group.

Table 10

Analysis of Variance Ideal Self Description
Uncorrelated Data (N=90)

Source	d.f.	Sums of Squares	Mean Square	F
Sequence[a]	5	2136.5	427.3	*2.0851
Subjects within groups	84	17213.6	204.9238	
Total	89	19350.1		
Sig. at the .10 level				

[a]Ss receiving ideal self description response set in any sequence or on any trial were grouped as an experimental treatment group.

*Significant at the .10 level.

Table 11

Analysis of Variance People in General Description
Uncorrelated Data (N=90)

Source	d.f.	Sums of Squares	Mean Square	F
Sequence[a]	5	397.8333	79.5667	.550115 n.s.
Subjects within Groups	84	12149.4667	144.6365	
Total	89	12547.3		

[a]Ss receiving people in general response set in any sequence or on any trial were grouped as an experimental treatment group.

contribution of sequence and trial to the differences between the group means cannot be assessed with this analysis, but the increased variability set forth in Table 7 indicate that such effects are present.

A contribution from sequence effects which may be contributing to the differences between the group means for ideal self description is a contrast effect. Contrast effects are those which result in an increase or decrease in responding as a function of the Ss comparison of his responses with those generated under the preceeding or subsequent response set. Inspection of Table 7 indicates that group means for ideal self description are higher when ideal self description is preceeded by self description, self description providing a contrast, or referrent necessary for the elevation of the ideal self descriptions. Further investigation of this alternative interpretation is undertaken in the analysis of Hypothesis V and Hypothesis VI.

Hypothesis III was accepted as inspection of Table 12 shows that Ss who receive only one response set for all trials do not significantly differ among response sets. Data generated under instructions to describe the self does not differ from data generated under instructions to describe the ideal self nor people in general. It should be noted that mean ideal self descriptions for the control group (Table 13) is low relative to the mean ideal self descriptions reported for the experimental intervention groups (Table 7). That contrast effects may be contributing to the higher means reported for the experimental intervention groups may account for the lower scores generated by the control group where no other set was introduced which could provide a contrast

or referrent. Further inspection of Table 7 for the experimental intervention groups shows that lowest group means for ideal self description occur on initial trials with no preceeding contrasting response set, and for trial two, (Group II-GO), which provides an initial trial set for people in general. Highest group means for ideal self description follow self description either on the preceeding trial (Group I-SD) and (Group I-GO) or with people in general interceeding (Group II-SD).

Table 12

Analysis of Variance for Effect of Trials on Response Set for Control Groups (N=45)

Source of Variation	Sums of Squares	d.f.	Mean Square	F	
A (Response Set)	1338.63	2	669.3167	2.27	n.s.
Ss within Gps	12369.67	42	294.5159		
B (Trials)	29.98	3	9.9926	.6475	n.s.
AB (Set X Trials)	176.4	6	29.4	1.906	n.s.
B X Ss within Gps.	1943.32	126	15.4332		
Total	15858.00	180			

Hypothesis IV is accepted (see Table 12) in that subjects who receive only one response set for all trials do not tend to vary their responses to a single response set as a function of trials. Delinquent Ss in the control groups demonstrated a minimal kind of stability of responding within a single response set.

Table 13

Means and Standard Deviations Over Trials for Control Groups

	Trial 1		Trial 2		Trial 3		Trial 4	
Group	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
SD-CO	41.73	6.58	39.93	6.89	39.93	5.91	40.00	5.92
IS-CO	42.73	9.69	44.47	13.92	47.20	11.64	45.93	11.27
GO-CO	38.93	10.19	38.27	7.75	38.80	9.01	38.47	8.14

Note.--N is 15 for each group

Hypothesis V, that discrepancy scores between ideal self description and self description (IS-SD); between ideal self and people in general (IS-GO); and between self description and people in general (SD-GO) would not differ as a function of the trials for each description is rejected for the IS-SD discrepancy scores (Table 14) and for IS-GO discrepancy scores (Table 15). That is, discrepancy scores obtained by subtraction between ideal self and self description, where those descriptions constituted trial 1 and 2, differ from discrepancy scores obtained when the descriptions constituted trials 2 and 3, or trials 3 and 1, etc. Trial effects, per se, were not found to be significant for individual response sets as set forth in Table 1.

Table 14

Analysis of Variance for the Values of Discrepancy Scores Between Ideal Self and Self Description (N=90)

Source of Variation	Sums of Squares	d.f.	Mean Square	F
Sequence (S)[a]	3358.6	5	671.72	4.78*
S X WG (Error)	11812.0	84	140.619	
Total	15170.6	89		

[a]Discrepancy scores derived from six experimental intervention groups where each condition also represents a different sequence of trials for the compared response sets.

*Significant at $P > \alpha = .01$ level.

Differences between the response sets are, however, now shown to differ as a function of sequence or trials when comparisons are made between ideal self description and self description discrepancy scores, and also for ideal self description and people in general discrepancy scores. Differences do not emerge as a function of sequence or trials for self description and people in general discrepancy scores (SD-GO) (see Table 16). For further comparison of discrepancy scores obtained between different trials for all response sets, see Tables 17, 18 and 19.

Table 15

Analysis of Variance for the Values of Discrepancy Scores Between Ideal Self and People in General Description (N=90)

Source of Variation	Sums of Squares	d.f.	Mean Square	F
Sequence (S)[a]	2074.136	5	414.8272	5.96*
S X WG (Error)	5849.33	84	69.63	
Total	7923.466	89		

[a]Discrepancy scores derived from six experimental intervention groups where each condition also represents a different sequence of trials for the compared response sets.

*Significant at $P > \alpha = .01$ level.

Table 16

Analysis of Variance for the Values of Discrepancy Scores Between Self Description and People in General Description (N=90)

Source of Variation	Sums of Squares	d.f.	Mean Square	F
Sequence (S)[a]	440.7666	5	88.1533	.8054 n.s.
S X WG (Error)	9177.7333	84	109.258	
Total	9617.4999	89		

[a]Discrepancy scores derived from six experimental intervention groups where each condition also represents a different sequence of trials for the compared response sets.

Table 17

Characteristics of Total P Discrepancy Scores Between Ideal Self and Self Descriptions (N=90)

Group	Trial for Ideal Self	Trial for Self	No. of Reversals[a]	No. No Diff. to 1/2 S.D.	Diff. Above 1/2 S.D.
I-SD	2	1	2	3	10
II-SD	3	1	9	4	2
I-IS	1	2	1	6	8
II-IS	1	3	6	7	2
I-GO	2	3	2	4	9
II-GO	3	2	2	4	9
Total			22	28	40

[a]Reversal signifies self description larger than ideal self description.

Table 18

Characteristics of Total P Discrepancy Scores Between Ideal Self and People in General Descriptions (N=90)

Group	Trial for Ideal Self	Trial for Peo. Gen.	No. of Reversals[a]	No. No Diff. to 1/2 S.D.	Diff. Above 1/2 S.D.
I-SD	2	3	3	2	10
II-SD	3	2	1	1	13
I-IS	1	3	1	2	12
II-IS	1	2	4	7	4
I-GO	2	1	3	1	11
II-GO	3	1	2	3	10
Total			14	16	61

[a]Reversal signifies people in general description larger than ideal self.

An inspection of Table 17 shows that if one-half standard deviation (a value of five for the T distribution) is regarded as a minimal difference between ideal self and self description for meaning to be ascribed to the discrepancy, more useful data is generated when self description precedes ideal self description or when no other response set intervenes. For the 90 discrepancy scores derived, there are 22 reversals where self description exceeds ideal self description. Reversals constitute 24 per cent of the scores obtained. One-third of discrepancy scores are so small as to constitute no differences to less than one-half standard deviation difference. There are 40 scores, or 44 per cent, which constitute differences above one-half standard

deviation and which are in the theory predicted direction, where ideal self description is expected to be higher than self description. Thirty-six of these scores were generated in sequences which juxtapose self description immediately prior to or subsequent to ideal self description. Further support for a sequence effect of contrast is derived.

Inspection of Table 18 shows that there were only 14 reversals, or 16 per cent of the cases where ideal self description was shown to be lower than people in general description. Subjects generated total P scores for the ideal self description as higher than people in general for 68 per cent of the cases. Since delinquent Ss in

Table 19

Characteristics of Total P Discrepancy Scores Between Self Description and People in General Descriptions (N=90)

Group	Trial for Self Desc.	Trial for Peo. Gen.	No. of Reversals[a]	No. No Diff. to 1/2 S.D.	Diff. Above 1/2 S.D.
I-SD	1	3	6	6	3
II-SD	1	2	7	4	4
I-IS	2	3	3	6	6
II-IS	3	2	6	4	5
I-GO	2	1	4	7	4
II-GO	3	1	3	7	5
Total			29	34	27

[a]Reversals signifies people in general description larger than self description.

previously reported studies tended to see others as they see themselves and also to view themselves lower than ideal self, these findings are in the direction which would be predicted by the previous findings.

Reversals, arbitrarily identified as people in general description exceeding self description, were generated by 32 per cent of the Ss as set forth in Table 19. Thirty-seven per cent of the Ss reported no differences to less than one-half standard deviation difference, while 30 per cent reported self descriptions as higher than people in general by one-half standard deviation for the Total P scores. Previous findings suggest that delinquent Ss view others as no better than themselves which was not supported by 30 per cent of the respondents where a minimum of one-half standard deviation is regarded as a criterion for differences.

Hypothesis VI was partially rejected by test-retest analyses as set forth in Tables 20, 21, and 22. These analyses were performed on difference scores for Total P on trial 1 and trial 4. There were two concerns; to ascertain if the scores derived on the retest trial for each sequence were significantly different from initial trials and also to ascertain if sequence of intervening sets was a significant variable. There were significant differences for ideal self only (Table 21). Table 23 shows that differences between initial and retest trials were significant for two of the ideal self groups, II-IS and IS-CO. Intervening sequence of response sets for II-IS is people in general for trial 2 and self description for trial 3. Self description immediately preceeds ideal self description on trial 4. Trial 4 ideal self description is higher than trial 1 ideal self description (Table 23). For the IS-CO group, trial 4 ideal self description is higher

than trial 1 ideal self description, differing significantly when only ideal self description intervenes. Ideal self description is shown to be less stable than either self description or people in general description.

Table 20

Analysis of Variance for the Effects of Intervention on Test-Retest Scores Under Instructional Set of Self Description (N=45) (Includes control group data)

Source of Variation	Sums of Squares	d.f.	Mean Square	F
Intervention (I)	86.5777	2	43.2888	2.53 n.s.
I X WG Error	717.6674	42	17.0873	
Total	804.2445	44		

Note.--Intervention consisted of IS-GO, GO-IS, and SD-SD.

Table 21

Analysis of Variance for the Effects of Intervention on Test-Retest Scores Under Instructional Set of Ideal Self Description (Includes control group data, N=45)

Source of Variation	Sums of Squares	d.f.	Mean Square	F
Intervention (I)	277.5110	2	138.7555	3.0147*
I X WG Error	1933.0668	42	46.0254	
Total	2210.5778	44		

Note.--Intervention consisted of SD-GO, GO-SD, and IS-IS.

*Significant at .10 level.

Table 22

Analysis of Variance for the Effects of Intervention on Test-Retest Scores Under Instructional Set of People in General Description (Includes control group data, N=45)

Source of Variation	Sums of Squares	d.f.	Mean Square	F
Intervention (I)	5.872	2	2.9300	.0874 n.s.
I X WG Error	1407.068	42	33.5016	
Total	1412.940	44		

Note.--Intervention consisted of SD-IS, IS-SD, and GO-GO.

Table 23

T test for the Difference Between Means for Correlated Observations Trial 1 and Trial 4 Ideal Self Groups

Group	Mean of Differences	S.D. of Differences	d.f.	t test (two-tailed)	Level of Significance
I-IS	.666	5.54	14	.466	n.s.
II-IS	-5.330	8.72	14	-2.370	.05
IS-CO	-3.20	5.61	14	-2.210	.05

Note.--Minus sign on mean and t test value indicates that Trial 4 scores were higher than Trial 1 scores.

Hypothesis VII was accepted as set forth in Table 24. Delinquent Ss do not vary the response style of overuse of the true end of the response continuum, as a function of response set. Differences between groups on the basis of grade level may be seen to be highly

Table 24

Analysis of Variance for T/F Ratio Under Three Response Sets (N=90)

Source of Variation	Sums of Squares	d.f.	Mean Square	F
Grade level (G)	12.4955	2	6.2478	9.7060*
Sequence (S)	10.1601	5	2.0320	.4064
G X S	7.7962	10	.7796	1.2111
Ss/G X S	46.3437	72	.6437	
Response Set (R)	2.9931	2	1.4966	1.6220
G X R	2.4959	4	.6240	.6763
S X R	7.0533	10	.7053	.7644
G X S X R	7.4734	20	.3737	.4050
Ss X Cells/ G X S X R	132.8656	144	.9227	
Total	229.6768	269		

Note.--Tabled F for significance at the .01 level is 4.77.

significant. Inspection of Table 25 and Figure 1 show that the mean T/F ratio for all response sets is deviant, indicating overuse of the positive end of the response choice continuum. See appendix H for

means and standard deviations for the T/F ratio by grade levels. Inspection of appendix H shows that the mean T/F ratios generated by eighth grade Ss tends to be greater than that generated by seventh and ninth grade Ss and also to be more variable.

Table 25

Means and Standard Deviations for T/F Ratio Under Three Response Sets

Response Set	N	Mean	S.D.
Self Description	90	1.3831	.7204
Ideal Self Description	90	1.5478	.6975
People in General Description	90	1.6373	1.2490

Note.--All values above one denote greater use of positive end of response choice continuum relative to negative end. Maximum value obtainable is 3.00.

Hypothesis VIII, that Ss would not differentially employ the neutral category 3 for responding under varying response sets, was rejected by way of the analysis set forth in Table 26. Delinquent Ss tend to employ the category 3 response most often under the condition of describing people in general, next for self description, and least for ideal self description (Table 27). Grade level was not significant. An inspection of Table 28 shows that Ss employ category 3 significantly more often under instructions to describe people in general than to describe the ideal self. Also, Ss employ category 3 to describe the self significantly more than to describe the ideal self. Use of

category 3 does not differ for people in general and self description. Use of category 3 for people in general is deviant (Figure 1).

Table 26

Analysis of Variance for Frequency of Category 3 Responses Under Three Response Sets (N=90)

Source of Variation	Sums of Squares	d.f.	Mean Square	F
Grade level (G)	132.2741	2	66.1370	.0069
Sequence (S)	1523.3519	5	304.6703	.0319
G X S	4319.3519	10	431.9192	.0452
Ss/G X S	686754.4000	72	9538.2555	
Response Set (R)	13748.6519	2	6874.3259	44.6084
G X R	402.5259	4	100.6314	.6530
S X R	4201.0814	10	420.1081	2.7261
G X S X R	1540.1408	20	77.0070	.4997
Ss X Cells/ G X S X R	22190.9340	144	154.1037	
Total	734812.5526	269		

Note.--Tabled F for significance at the .01 level is 4.77.

Table 27

Means and Standard Deviations for Frequency of Use of Category 3 Under Three Response Sets

Response Set	N	Mean	S.D.
Self Description	90	25.59	14.62
Ideal Self Description	90	15.66	13.83
People in General Description	90	33.08	20.07

Note.--Category 3 represents neutral category of partly true-partly false.

Table 28

Duncan New Multiple Range Test for Difference Between Means

Comparison Between Means	Difference Between Means	*LSR	Level of Significance
GO - IS	17.42	12.20	.01
GO - SD	7.49	8.89	n.s.
SD - IS	9.93	8.89	.05

*Least significant range

Hypothesis IX was rejected as set forth in Table 29. Ss tended to generate the anti-social profile most often for the people in general response set. Only 30 of the 540 profiles met the criteria



FIGURE I. MEAN T SCORES FOR THREE RESPONSE SETS

NOTE.- LINES WITHIN COLUMNS DENOTE DEVIANT CUT-OFF POINTS

for the W-shaped profile. Of the 30 profiles, 15 were generated under the response set for people in general. Three were generated under the response set for ideal self; 12 were generated under the response set for self description. One-half of the 30 profiles were generated under retest conditions (see Appendix F).

Table 29

Anti-Social Profiles Categorized According to Response Set and Chi Square Test for Independence (N=30)

Chi Square Test for Independence of Response Set and Anti-Social Profile	Self	Ideal	People in General	Total
	12	3	15	30

Note.--X^2 = 7.8 (significant at the .02 level).

Mean Total P scores, mean Column P scores, the mean T/F ratio, and mean frequencies for category 3 choices are plotted on Figure 1. Inspection of the Column P portion of the figure reveals that the average Column D P scores are not deviant for self description and people in general descriptions as other findings would predict. Column B is deviant, in keeping with other findings. Columns A, C, and E roughly approximate the W shape. Means and standard deviations for columns are set forth in Appendix G.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

For many investigators in the area of phenomenological self theory, discrepancies between the self concept and ideal self concept are of primary importance. For such investigators, discrepancies are utilized as indicators of adjustment-maladjustment, improvement or change under planned conditions such as counseling, or to indicate delinquent proneness. Most frequently, discrepancy scores are regarded as indices to self esteem. Research in the area has been characterized by poor experimental control. Data for self and ideal self descriptions are obtained with no attempt to control for repeated measures effects; or, counterbalancing has been employed with the assumption that repeated measures effects will be effectively eliminated. Pretest and posttest scores are also derived, with intervening controlled experiences, to assess the effects of the intervening experiences; again, with repeated measures effects ignored or inadequately accounted for. Interpretation is then made on the basis of the obtained discrepancy, with differences assumed to be a function of conscious differences held by Ss between the two phenomenological concepts of a pretest and posttest self concept or self and ideal self concept.

The stability of a self concept or an ideal self concept is seldom investigated. The investigator must assume that the two concepts are discriminable, that they are stable, and that Ss are willing to divulge

them. The effects of response styles such as "yeasaying" or of preferance for a response category may be present and be undetected. Also, low self esteem scores which are generated as a function of a response set of defensiveness or uncertainity may reflect those and not self esteem as such. If such effects are present, they tend to obscure differences or to spuriously produce them.

This study employed the TSCS under varying experimentally induced response sets on an experimentally naive, delinquent population of incarcerated males to examine the emergence of various test dimensions which are characteristic of delinquent responders. A test-experimental intervention-retest design was employed to permit the exploration of the stability of the self concept, the ideal self concept and a people in general concept. Also, repeated measures effects were explored to ascertain the effect of preceding trials on a response set. The characteristic response set of delinquent Ss to choose the neutral response category 3 (partly false-partly true) was explored under the experimentally induced response sets of self description, ideal self description, and people in general description. The characteristic response style of delinquent responders to overemploy the true end of the response continuum under the three experimentally induced response sets was also investigated.

Repeated Measures Effects

The experimentally induced response sets of people in general and self description were shown to be resistant to repeated measures effects. Neither sequence effects nor the intervention of other

response sets were shown to significantly affect responding. Cronbach and Meehl's concept of a "validity ceiling" for the generation of self descriptions and people in general descriptions may not be invoked when the TSCS is administered to delinquent populations in a repeated measures design.

Ideal self descriptions were shown to be so tenuous that differences appeared in pretest and posttest trials when only ideal self response sets intervened on trials 2 and 3. The intervening response sets of people in general and self descriptions on trials 2 and 3 respectively also significantly affected ideal self descriptions between pretest and posttest. Posttest scores for two of the three ideal self pretest-posttest groups had significantly higher ideal self descriptions for the posttest scores. Two factors could account for the trend upward. For the control group, with no contrasting intervening response sets, the upward trend could represent a regression toward the mean over trials as suggested by Taylor (1955). For the experimental intervention group, self description immediately preceeded the posttest trial for ideal self description; such a sequence was shown to have an inflationary effect on ideal self description. A "validity ceiling" could be assumed to be present for ideal self descriptions generated by delinquent Ss on the TSCS.

The specific nature of the preceeding response set as a critical variable is supported by this study. Ideal self description was shown to be inflated when self description was provided for contrast. For the control groups, ideal self description without self description as a referrent did not differ from self description or people in general group data. The effects of contrast can be most clearly seen in the

discrepancy scores which met the one-half standard deviation requirement for differences between self and ideal self description. Forty such scores were generated by the 90 subjects in the experimental intervention groups. Of the 40 scores, 36 were obtained where self description juxtaposes ideal self description in the experimental sequence.

Tracy (1967) also reported a contrast effect; however, the inflation resulting from the contrast effect resulted in higher self description scores when preceeded by ideal self description. Brassard (1963) found inflationary effects on ideal self description when an intervening response set to describe a prestigious person was employed. Thus, in the derivation of discrepancy scores, greater differences between self description and ideal self description were seen to emerge a function of the specific nature of other response sets.

Twenty-four percent of the self-ideal self discrepancies constituted reversals, where ideal self is lower than self expressed as total P scores. For the 22 scores which represent reversals, nine were obtained where ideal self constitutes trial 3 and self description constitutes trial 1. Six were obtained where ideal self description constitutes trial 1 and self description constitutes trial 3. Seven are generated where self description is juxtaposed with ideal self description. The emergence of reversals is minimized by sequencing self description adjacent to ideal self description.

Investigators who employ discrepancy scores may consider the above findings in an effort to maximize the emergence of discrepancies in the theory predicted direction. Criticism could be directed at the investigator in that he may merely be taking advantage of sequence effects, that of inflation of the ideal self when contrasted with self

description. However, it may be that for delinquent responders such a sequential positioning is needed to provide a referrent for ideal self. Counterbalancing would be a necessary condition to assess the effects of inflation.

Only 14 of the 90 subjects generated reversals where people in general were shown to be higher than ideal self descriptions. One-third of the respondents generated descriptions of people in general higher than self description. Reversals may reflect the inability of some delinquent Ss to adopt the response sets imposed by the investigator. Such a possibility must be more fully explored before interpretation of reversals as a valid phenomenological view can be made.

This study did not permit a separation of the effects of sequence and trials for the experimental intervention groups due to the fact that sequence was confounded with trials effects. For trials to be tested independently of sequence effects, data must be collected on two separate occasions (MacRae, 1969). Or, elimination of the posttest trials would permit the use of a conventional latin square analysis. The contribution of trials as a repeated measures effect will require further investigation. Such investigations would appear to be particularly warranted for ideal self description elicited from delinquent Ss.

Characteristics of Delinquent Responders

The results of this study suggest that delinquent Ss can discriminate between the self and the ideal self and between people in general and the ideal self at the group level. Differences between the self and people in general do not emerge, which is in keeping with the

findings of Richards, Mates and Whitten (1967). Delinquent responders in this study were shown to have a deviant self concept in terms of total positive (total P) scores under the response sets of self description and people in general description. People in general descriptions were also deviant in the use of category 3, partly false-partly true, which is assumed to reflect defensiveness or uncertainity (Fitts & Hamner, 1969). The response style of overuse of the true end of the response continuum emerged in the deviant range under all of the three response sets of self, ideal self and people in general description.

Delinquent Ss can be characterized as "yeasayers" when this term is defined as a tendency to affirm positive statements with a concurrent lack of denial of negative statements on the TSCS. The emergence of this response style supports the findings reported by Fitts and Hamner (1969). The low total P scores reported by delinquent responders reflect in part their characteristic response of failing to deny negative statements. This has the effect of lowering positive scores under all three of the response sets employed in this study.

Overuse of the true end of the response continuum may reflect other aspects of delinquent responding than a response style of "yeasaying." Delinquent Ss are often deficient in test taking skills. Denial of negative statements such as, "I should love my family more," by choosing a response category of completely false or mostly false may constitute a more complex response than affirming positive statements. If denial of negative statements should be a more difficult test-taking task, then failure to do so should appear under all response sets as a consistent finding. Such a consistent finding did emerge for

all response sets in this study. Degree of difficulty in responding should be explored by other investigators before designating delinquent Ss as "yeasayers."

The tendency to overemploy the neutral response category 3 emerged for people in general descriptions only. An interpretation of this finding as reflecting uncertainity or defensiveness would be favored by Fitts and Hamner (1969). However, there is no evidence that delinquent responders are employing the category in any way except to reflect that for them, some items are correctly marked partly false-partly ture. Least defensiveness should emerge for the response set to describe people in general. Deviant use of category 3 for people in general most likely reflects the fact that this response set represents a concept of broad generality. For most items, the most logical response might be partly false-partly true for people in general. A more useful response set might be employed by other investigators which would provide a more specific group referrent, such as most boys I know. While Ss did not employ category 3 for self description to a deviant degree, it should be noted that category 3 was employed on the average for one out of every four responses for the 100 items on the TSCS. Frequent use of the category for both people in general and self descriptions did contribute to the deviant total P scores for both descriptions which is typical for delinquent responders.

It should be noted that for all points on the ideal self data, that the mean positive scores are low. This does not support the contention by Motoori (1963) that delinquent Ss generate ideal self data that is similar to ideal self data generated by nondelinquent Ss.

That the points for ideal self description are low can be demonstrated by comparison with data reported by Atchison (Hamner, 1968) for non-behavior problem boys. Self description data generated by the non-behavior problem boys is remarkably similar to the ideal self data generated by delinquent Ss in this study. The non-behavior problem boys reported a mean self description total P of 47; ideal self data for this study yields a mean total P of 51. Column A, Column D and Column E positive scores for both groups are identical, with T scores of 54, 50 and 48 respectively. Column B mean positive score data for the non-behavior problem boys falls at a T score value of 40, for this study at 44. Column C data yields a mean positive T score of 53 for the Atchison Ss, for this study at 57. Ideal self description for the delinquent Ss then yields results most like the self description data reported by non-behavior problem boys in Atchison's group. Atchison's group profiles were also W-shaped. Ideal self description for the delinquent Ss in this study suggests that they would most like to resemble the self descriptions generated by non-behavior problem boys.

The delinquent respondents in the current study did not appear to share a commonly held concept of the ideal self. Ideal self varied over trials for the control group. Also, ideal self was described in such a differing fashion as to appear to represent different treatment groups. Ideal self data for this study could not be regarded as representing a cultural stereotype as evidenced by the W-shape and by the low positive scores. The socially desirable component of cultural stereotypes would have elevated all positive scores and would also have flattened the W-shape of the profile for ideal self descriptions.

Delinquent Ss may hold an idiosyncratic view of the ideal self. Wylie (1961) recommended that this possibility be explored. Wylie's assumption that the ideal self remains essentially invariant, while changes in discrepancy scores reflect essentially changes in self description is not supported. The findings of this study show that changes will more likely reflect differences in ideal self description than in self description. Wylie's contention that the relative contribution of ideal self to variance in a discrepancy score constitutes a needed major research effort is supported.

The emergence of rough approximations of the anti-social W-shaped profiles under all response sets raises further difficulty for the assumption that delinquent Ss possess a concept of "how he would like to be" in the direction predicted by the theory. The phenomenological area of moral-ethical self (Column B) is low for the ideal self response relative to other areas. Ss may be selectively defending as has been suggested by Jourard & Laskow (1958), or they may be less concerned about how they ideally view themselves relative to moral and ethical items and relationships to formal religious institutions. If this should be the case, delinquent Ss are reflecting an idiosyncratic ideal self concept not commiserate with nondelinquent populations. That delinquent Ss may be selectively defending or less concerned about the moral-ethical self could be reflected in the low positive scores for this area under the response sets for self and people in general descriptions. Support for either assumption would require further exploration.

Serious difficulties remain for the investigator who wishes to employ discrepancy scores as indices to self esteem. Does the

delinquent responder have a stable concept of the ideal self which reflects distance between how he views himself and how he would like to be? Do delinquent Ss vary in terms of how they view themselves, how they would like to be, and how they view others; or, do they merely differ in terms of ability to adopt the response sets requested by the investigator?

In order to maximize the possibility of tapping a conscious difference between the two concepts of self and ideal self for delinquent Ss, the investigator may wish to employ a method allowing Ss to review their self description as they generate their ideal self descriptions as recommended by Wylie (1961). This would have the disadvantage of increasing the influence of response familiarity, but it is not likely that response familiarity can be eliminated. Further research is needed to ascertain if contrast effects for ideal self with self description as a referrent constitute a repeated measures effect, and thus a spurious contributor to variance. The research design should also permit the exploration of the alternative interpretation that the contrast effect reflects valid phenomenological differences between self description and ideal self description which can emerge for delinquent Ss only when self description serves as a referrent. Future investigators may also consider Cronbach and Gleser's (1953) contention that the reduction of configurations, such as the W-shaped profile, to a single index results in the loss of a great deal of information. Analysis of the configuration (column data) for the TSCS for delinquent Ss could result in more precise measures of the variables which serve as indices to low self esteem.

Summary

Irrelevant response determiners were shown to influence self description, ideal self description and people in general description generated by delinquent responders. The response style of overuse of the true end response continuum was shown to emerge under all response sets, which supports the previous research findings that delinquent responders are "yeasayers." Delinquent responders do more frequently affirm positive statements about themselves than deny negative ones. Delinquent responders overemploy the response category 3, the neutral category of partly false-partly true for people in general response set only. No response style, therefore, emerges which presupposes a preference for the neutral category, nor does evidence that the neutral category is employed as a response set of defensiveness or uncertainity emerge. Sequence effects were not shown to be significant on the group level; however, further analysis indicates that a contrast effect inflates ideal self descriptions when they are sequenced adjacent to self description. Trial effects could not be explored due to confounding of sequence with trial effects and the introduction of retest sets as trial 4 for each group.

The use of self-ideal self discrepancies to measure self esteem in delinquent populations must be interpreted on a tentative level pending further investigation of the nature of the ideal self concept, the contribution of contrast effects, and variability of the ideal self concept over trials and with moderate experimental intervention.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

The Tennessee Self Concept Scale

How the Individual Perceives Himself

(After Tracy, 1968)

In terms of:	Physical characteristics (Column A)	Moral-Ethical characteristics (Column B)	Psychological characteristics (Column C)	Primary Group Membership (Column D)	Secondary Group Membership (Column E)	Net pos. Score
Abstract description (What he is) (Row 1)	1 2 3 P__ 4 5 6 N__ Net P__	19 20 21 P__ 22 23 24 N__ Net P__	37 38 39 P__ 40 41 42 N__ Net P__	55 56 57 P__ 58 59 60 N__ Net P__	73 74 75 P__ 76 77 78 N__ Net P__	
Self-satisfaction (How he feels about himself) (Row 2)	7 8 9 P__ 10 11 12 N__ Net P__	25 26 27 P__ 28 29 30 N__ Net P__	43 44 45 P__ 46 47 48 N__ Net P__	61 62 63 P__ 64 65 66 N__ Net P__	79 80 81 P__ 82 83 84 N__ Net P__	
Functioning or behavior (What he does) (Row 3)	13 14 15 P__ 16 17 18 N__ Net P__	31 32 33 P__ 34 35 36 N__ Net P__	49 50 51 P__ 52 53 54 N__ Net P__	67 68 69 P__ 70 71 72 N__ Net P__	85 86 87 P__ 88 89 90 N__ Net P__	
Net Positive Score	__	__	__	__	__	__ Total

APPENDIX B

Instructions for Tennessee Self Concept

Scale for Self Description

Name:

Group:

Sequence:

Date:

TENNESSEE SELF CONCEPT SCALE

Instructions

The statements in this booklet are to help you DESCRIBE YOURSELF AS YOU SEE YOURSELF. Please respond to them as if you were describing yourself TO YOURSELF. BE VERY HONEST. DO NOT OMIT ANY ITEM! Read each statement carefully; then select one of the five responses listed below. Under each item, put a CIRCLE around the response you choose. If you want to change an answer after you have circled it, erase it and then circle the response you want.

Remember, put a CIRCLE around the response number you have chosen for each statement.

Response-	Completely False	Mostly False	Partly False and Partly True	Mostly True	Completely True
	1	2	3	4	5

You will find these response numbers repeated at the bottom of each page to help you remember them.

REMEMBER TO DESCRIBE YOURSELF AS HONESTLY AS YOU POSSIBLY CAN.

APPENDIX C

Instructions for Tennessee Self Concept Scale

for Ideal Self (Like to Be) Description

Name:

Group:

Sequence:

Date:

TENNESSEE SELF CONCEPT SCALE

Instructions

Answer the statements in this booklet as IF YOU WERE EXACTLY AS YOU WOULD MOST LIKE TO BE AS A PERSON. DO NOT ANSWER AS YOURSELF. Do not omit any item! Read each statement carefully; then select one of the five responses below. Under each item put a circle around the response you choose. If you want to change an answer after you have circled it, erase it and then circle the response you wish.

Remember, put a CIRCLE around the response number you have chosen for each statement.

Response-	Completely False	Mostly False	Partly False and Partly True	Mostly True	Completely True
	1	2	3	4	5

You will find these response numbers repeated at the bottom of each page to help you remember them.

DO NOT DESCRIBE YOURSELF AS YOU ARE. REMEMBER TO DESCRIBE YOURSELF AS YOU WOULD MOST LIKE TO BE.

APPENDIX D

Instruction for Tennessee Self Concept Scale

for People in General Description

Name:

Group:

Sequence:

Date:

TENNESSEE SELF CONCEPT SCALE

Instructions

Answer these statements in this booklet as YOU BELIEVE PEOPLE IN GENERAL WOULD ANSWER THEM. DO NOT ANSWER AS YOURSELF. Do not omit any item! Read each item carefully; then select one of the five responses listed below. Under each item, put a circle around the response you choose. If you want to change an answer after you have circled it, erase it and then circle the response you wish.

Remember put a CIRCLE around the response number you have chosen for each statement.

Response-	Completely False	Mostly False	Partly False and Partly True	Mostly True	Completely True
	1	2	3	4	5

You will find these response numbers repeated at the bottom of each page to help you remember them.

DO NOT DESCRIBE YOURSELF AS YOU ARE. REMEMBER ANSWER AS YOU BELIEVE PEOPLE IN GENERAL WOULD ANSWER.

APPENDIX E

Statements comprising the Tennessee Self Concept Scale

in Random Order Employed in This Research

Item No.

39. I am a calm and easy going person. (Response category choices omitted for remainder of items.)

    1 2 3 4 5

2. I like to look nice and neat all the time.

24. I am a morally weak person.

55. I have a family that would always help me in any kind of trouble.

94. Sometimes, when I am not feeling well, I am cross.

74. I am popular with women.

68. I do my share of work at home.

69. I take a real interest in my family

92. Once in a while I think of things too bad to talk about.

15. I try to be careful about my appearance.

35. I sometimes do very bad things.

62. I treat my parents as well as I should. (Use past tense if parents are not living.)

Response-	Completely False	Mostly False	Partly False and Partly True	Mostly True	Completely True
	1	2	3	4	5

82. I should be more polite to others.

40. I am a hateful person.

34. I sometimes use unfair means to get ahead.

67. I try to play fair with my friends and family.

52. I change my mind a lot.

22. I am a moral failure.

91. I do not always tell the truth.

8. I am neither too tall nor too short.

58. I am not loved by my family.

25. I am satisfied with my moral behavior.

85. I try to understand the other fellow's point of view.

47. I despise myself.

23. I am a bad person.

42. I am losing my mind.

84. I ought to get along better with other people.

10. I don't feel as well as I should.

49. I can always take care of myself in any situation.

57. I am a member of a happy family.

27. I am satisfied with my relationship to God.

21. I am a honest person.

Response-	Completely False	Mostly False	Partly False and Partly True	Mostly True	Completely True
	1	2	3	4	5

95. I do not like everyone I know.

64. I am too sensitive to things my family say.

63. I understand my family as well as I should.

51. I take the blame for things without getting mad.

83. I am no good at all from a social standpoint.

48. I wish I didn't give up as easily as I do.

66. I should love my family more.

13. I take good care of myself physically.

65. I should trust my family more.

61. I am satisfied with my family relationships.

41. I am a nobody.

59. My friends have no confidence in me.

12. I should have more sex appeal.

70. I quarrel with my family.

43. I am satisfied to be just what I am.

72. I do not act like my family thinks I should.

30. I shouldn't tell so many lies.

32. I do what is right most of the time.

17. I often act like I am "all thumbs."

14. I feel good most of the time.

Response-	Completely False	Mostly False	Partly False and Partly True	Mostly True	Completely True
	1	2	3	4	5

87. I get along well with other people.

79. I am as sociable as I want to be.

56. I am an important person to my friends and family.

86. I see good points in all the people I meet.

33. I try to change when I know I'm doing things that are wrong.

20. I am a religious person.

50. I solve my problems quite easily.

3. I am an attractive person.

88. I do not feel at ease with other people.

29. I ought to go to church more.

46. I am not the person I would like to be.

53. I do things without thinking about them first.

100. Once in a while I put off until tomorrow what I ought to do today.

16. I do poorly in sports and games.

11. I would like to change some parts of my body.

4. I am full of aches and pains.

26. I am as religious as I want to be.

78. I am hard to be friendly with.

6. I am a sick person.

98. At times I feel like swearing.

Response-	Completely False	Mostly False	Partly False and Partly True	Mostly True	Completely True
	1	2	3	4	5

45. I am just as nice as I should be.

90. I find it hard to talk with strangers.

38. I have a lost of self-control.

71. I give in to my parents. (Use past tense if parents are not living.)

77. I am not interested in what other people do.

54. I try to run away from my problems.

37. I am a cheerful person.

18. I am a poor sleeper.

19. I am a decent sort of person.

99. I would rather win than lose in a game.

81. I try to please others, but I don't overdo it.

31. I am true to my religion in my everyday life.

5. I consider myself a sloppy person.

96. I gossip a little at times.

73. I am a friendly person.

44. I am as smart as I want to be.

93. I get angry sometimes.

97. Once in a while, I laught at a dirty joke.

9. I like my looks just the way they are.

76. I am mad at the whole world.

Response-	Completely False	Mostly False	Partly False and Partly True	Mostly True	Completely True
	1	2	3	4	5

80. I am satisfied with the way I treat other people.

36. I have trouble doing the things that are right.

1. I have a healthy body.

75. I am popular with men.

7. I am neither too fat nor too thin.

28. I wish I could be more trustworthy.

89. I do not forgive others easily.

60. I feel that my family doesn't trust me.

APPENDIX F

Number of Anti-Social Profiles According to Group, Grade Level, and Response Set

Group	S	Grade	Self Description	Ideal Self Description	People in General Description
I-SD	1	7			x
	2	7	x		
	3	8	x (Retest)		x
II-SD	1	7			x
	2	7	x (Retest)		
	3	7	x (Retest)		
	4	8	x		
	5	9	x (Retest)		
II-IS	1	8			x
I-GO	1	7			x (Retest)
	2	8			x (Retest)

(Table continued on next page)

APPENDIX F (continued)

Group	S	Grade	Self Description	Ideal Self Description	People in General Description
II-Go	1	7	x		x (Retest)
	2	8			x (Retest)
	3	9			x x (Retest)
SD-CO	1	7	x (Retest)		
	2	7	x x (Retest)		
	3	9	x x (Retest)		
IS-CO	1	9		x (Retest)	
	2	9		x (Retest)	
GO-CO	1	9			x x
	2	9			x x x (Retest)
Total			12	3	15

APPENDIX G

Means and Standard Deviations Column P Scores Under Three Response Sets

Response Set	N		Col A	Col B	Col C	Col D	Col E
Self Description	90	Mean	46.62	30.40	45.74	42.29	40.66
		SD	12.77	9.62	11.30	6.13	9.99
Ideal Self Description	90	Mean	54.30	44.13	57.32	50.31	48.08
		SD	14.30	15.46	15.68	4.28	9.57
People in General Description	90	Mean	42.022	33.27	48.96	39.19	41.46
		SD	12.70	13.07	12.98	8.86	7.07

Note: Data in form of T scores

APPENDIX H

T/F Ratio for Grade Levels (N=90)

Grade Level	Mean	S.D.
7	1.3568	.4165
8	1.7981	1.5619
9	1.3784	.6180

VITA

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Doctor of Philosophy

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