

OKLAHOMA'S UNITED STATES HOUSE DELEGATION
AND PROGRESSIVISM, 1901-1917

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PREFACE

This dissertation is a study for a single state, Oklahoma, and is designed to test the prevailing Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis concerning progressivism. The "progressive profile" as developed in the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis characterizes the progressive as one who possessed distinctive social, economic, and political qualities that distinguished him from the non-progressive. In 1965 in a political history seminar at Central Missouri State College, Warrensburg, Missouri, I tested the above model by using a single United States House representative from the state of Missouri. When I came to the Oklahoma State University in 1967, I decided to expand my test of this model by examining the thirteen representatives from Oklahoma during the years 1901 through 1917. In testing the thesis for Oklahoma, I investigated the social, economic, and political characteristics of the members whom Oklahoma sent to the United States House of Representatives during those years, and scrutinized the role they played in the formulation of domestic policy. In addition, a geographical analysis of the various Congressional districts suggested the effects the characteristics of the constituents might have on the representatives. Since progressivism was largely manifested in Congressional enactments, I selected forty-four national political, economic, and social issues which could illuminate the part played by Oklahoma's delegation in the development and revision of national legislation. The analysis included national, state, and local news-

paper and periodical files as well as the speeches and roll call votes found in the Congressional Record. The comprehensive record of the thirteen Oklahoma House members who served from 1901 through 1917 was thus analyzed so as to assess the progressive or non-progressive nature of their representation.

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CHAPTER I

PROGRESSIVISM: DEFINITIONS AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

Before assessing the nature and extent of progressivism in Oklahoma, a definition of terms, as they are meant to be understood in this study, is necessary. An analysis of the following questions will be attempted: Who was a progressive? What was progressivism? What was the progressive movement? What is the progressive school of historiography? Perhaps a discussion of the differences of these terms will lead to a clearer understanding of the vernacular that has been used to describe this epoch in American history. With the terminology in greater perspective, an examination of the various schools of interpretation of the period will follow.

A progressive has been defined by an older source as one who favors the gradual introduction of political and social reforms by government action.¹ A more recent source defined progressive as a term applied, rather vaguely, to persons or theories that claim to favor progress. It stated that the term has often been a convenient label for the omnibus category of views which are "left of center."² For the historian, there appears to be general agreement that the

¹Edward C. Smith and Arnold J. Zurcher, Dictionary of American Politics (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1944), 299.

²Maurice Cranston and Sanford A. Lakoff, eds., A Glossary of Political Ideas (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 131.

goals of the progressive included tariff, tax, and banking reform; regulation of railroads, of trusts, and the employment of child labor; improvement of the conditions of the laborer and the farmer; and political innovations conceived in the interest of perfecting democracy and representative government. These goals, for the purposes of this study, constitute a working definition of the progressive program and thus form the basis for a working definition of a progressive. The terms progressive and progressivism, as used in the present study, do not necessarily reflect any commitment on the part of the writer to the view that there was at any time during the period from 1901 to 1917 any large group of men who were in agreement on all of the goals included in the reform program. Rather these terms and the definition refer to a trend that historians have apparently observed in the politics of the United States during the period from 1901 to 1917, and to the issues that historians suggest became uppermost in the politics of that period. Further insight as to the definition of a progressive and progressivism can be obtained by looking at the writings of the avowed progressives and how they viewed themselves and their beliefs.

Judging by the autobiographies of many of the progressives, Henry George was a kind of Martin Luther to progressivism, a critic whose challenge to orthodoxy in his 1879 book entitled Progress and Poverty opened the gateway to numerous conversions to the reform movement. Writing in the midst of the depression of the 1870's, George saw progress as a social process, rather than a mere advance of science or a fulfillment of individual fortunes. He believed that the "garments of laws, customs, and political institutions which each society

weaves for itself, are constantly tending to become too tight as the society develops."³ In a fine metaphor that struck the keynote of progressive thought, George suggested that men in a community, like sailors adrift in a lifeboat, must pull together to conserve their energies and together chart their course. George's work became something of a catechism for progressives, especially those who became active at the outset of the twentieth century.

The rhetoric of the progressives seemed to satisfy their need for a sense of forward motion, and their phraseology held deep significance in their beliefs. . Therefore, additional understanding of progressivism can be gained by evaluating the words of three of the leading progressives of the period, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Robert M. LaFollette, who convey the sentiments of the progressive spirit,

Roosevelt, as he battled at Armageddon in 1912, said that "progressives stand for the rights of the people." His approach to national problems was one of "understanding and good faith." The main purpose of progressivism, according to this leading progressive, was "to place the American people in possession of their birthright, to secure for all the American people unobstructed access to the fountains of measureless prosperity which their creator offers them,"⁴ In an article entitled "Who is a Progressive," written earlier in

³ Henry George, Progress and Poverty (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1929), 514.

⁴ Theodore Roosevelt, "A Confession of Faith," address before the national convention of the Progressive Party, Chicago, August 6, 1912, in Herman Hagedorn, ed., The Works of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: C. Scribner, 1926), XVII, 256, 260, 287.

1912, Roosevelt gives an excellent peroration regarding his definition of a progressive and a non-progressive:

The essential difference, as old as civilized history, is between the men who, with fervor and broad sympathy and imagination, stand for the forward movement, the men who stand for the uplift and betterment of mankind, and who have faith in the people, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, the men of narrow vision and small sympathy, who are not stirred by the wrongs of others. With these latter stand also those other men who distrust the people, and many of whom not merely distrust the people, but wish to keep them helpless so as to exploit them for their own benefit.⁵

Wilson, a second spokesman of the progressives, eloquently expressed the progressive mood as he campaigned for the presidency in 1912:

There has come over the land that un-American set of conditions which enables a small number of men who control the government to get favors from the government; by those favors to exclude their fellows from equal business opportunity; by those favors to extend a network of control that will presently dominate every industry in the country, and so make men forget the ancient time when America lay in every hamlet, when America was to be seen in every fair valley, when America displayed her great forces on the broad prairies, ran her fine fires of enterprise up over the mountainsides, and down into the bowels of the earth, and eager men were everywhere captains of industry, not employees; not looking to the distant city to find out what they might do, but looking about among their neighbors, finding credit according to their character, not according to their connections, finding credit in proportion to what was known to be in them and behind them, not in proportion to the securities they held that were approved where they were not known.⁶

And looking back in 1913 upon his hard battles for the people as Governor of Wisconsin, LaFollette penned a fitting epilogue, not only for progressivism in Wisconsin, but for progressivism in many other

⁵Theodore Roosevelt, "Who is a Progressive," The Outlook, C (April 13, 1912), 809.

⁶Woodrow Wilson, "The New Freedom, A Call for the Emancipation of The Generous Energies of a People: The Old Order Changeth," World's Work, XXV (January, 1913), 259.

states as well:

This closes the account of my services in Wisconsin--a time full of struggles, and yet a time that I like to look back upon. It has been a fight supremely worth making, and I want it to be judged, as it will be ultimately, by results actually attained. If it can be shown that Wisconsin is a happier and better state to live in, that its institutions are more democratic, that the opportunities of all its people are more equal, that social justice more nearly prevails, that human life is safer and sweeter--then I shall rest content in the feeling that the Progressive movement has been successful.⁷

These were progressives as individuals. What can now be said of the so-called progressive movement?

The historian has generally attempted to place historical movements within definite time brackets, and such is the case with progressivism. It is difficult to delimit the progressive period because of its complexity and far-reaching effects. This is evidenced by those historians who believe it started as early as the last quarter of the nineteenth century and those historians who see it manifested as late as the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century. However, for the purpose of this study and in agreement with many historians, the progressive era will roughly coincide with the beginning of the twentieth century and will end with the American entry into the Great War in 1917.

To begin a definition of the progressive movement, it should be pointed out that there was no such thing as a progressive movement. That is, there was no organized campaign united all diverse efforts at political, social, and economic reform. It manifested itself in no single political party, geographical section, or social class. On the

⁷ Robert M. LaFollette, LaFollette's Autobiography (Madison, Wisconsin: The Robert M. LaFollette Company, 1913), 368-369.

contrary, there were numerous progressive movements operating in different regions at different levels of government simultaneously. The progressive movement meant different things to different people in different regions of the country. As Thomas H. Greer has written, "Here was a social reform movement with no set leadership, no single platform, no disciplined organization, and no planned means of action."⁸ Another view of the movement is expressed by George E. Mowry, one of the leading students of American progressivism, who states that it was nothing less than "a social quest which, in its broadest aspects, attempted to find solutions for the amazing number of domestic and foreign problems spawned by the great industrial, urban, and population changes of the late nineteenth century."⁹ Defining the movement becomes even more perplexing when one analyzes the more recent interpretation presented by Peter G. Filene, a North Carolina University historian, who argues that "the progressive movement" never existed as such.¹⁰

Yet, to some degree, progressivism rested on definable, widely shared, unifying principles. A contemporary historian of that age of reform, Benjamin P. DeWitt, summed them up this way some fifty-six years ago:

In this widespread political agitation that at first sight seems so incoherent and chaotic, there may be distinguished upon examination and analysis three tendencies. The first of

⁸ Thomas H. Greer, American Social Reform Movements: Their Pattern Since 1865 (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1949), 93.

⁹ George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-1912 (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), xiii.

¹⁰ Peter G. Filene, "An Obituary for 'The Progressive Movement,'" American Quarterly, XXII (Spring, 1970), 20-34.

these tendencies is found in the insistence by the best men in all political parties that special, minority, and corrupt influence in government--national, state, and city--be removed; the second tendency is found in the demand that the structure or machinery of government, which has hitherto been admirably adapted to control by the few, be so changed and modified that it will be more difficult for the few, and easier for the many, to control; and, finally, the third tendency is found in the rapidly growing conviction that the functions of government at present are too restricted and that they must be increased and extended to relieve social and economic distress. These three tendencies with varying emphasis are seen to-day in the platform and program of every political party; they are manifested in the political changes and reforms that are advocated and made in the nation, the states, and the cities; and, because of their universality and definiteness, they may be said to constitute the real progressive movement.¹¹

Ideologically speaking, progressivism culminated and diverged in the philosophies and programs set forth by Wilson and Roosevelt in the 1912 campaign for the presidency. Roosevelt termed his program the "New Nationalism," while Wilson's became known as the "New Freedom." This divergence among progressives signaled a full-dress debate over the two conflicting progressive theories of government. Roosevelt's "New Nationalism" was the consummation of a steady progression of this political thought and that of a significant group of progressive thinkers. By 1909 Roosevelt had adopted a program demanding broad federal economic and social regulation, but he had not yet formulated a coherent political philosophy to justify his program. Herbert Croly provided this philosophy when, in 1909, he published the political treatise, The Promise of American Life. This could be correctly termed the philosophical underpinning of progressivism since it became the rationale for the "New Nationalism" as well as for the "New Freedom"

¹¹ Benjamin P. DeWitt, The Progressive Movement: A Non-Partisan, Comprehensive Discussion of Current Tendencies in American Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1915), 4-5.

after 1915. Croly contended that the Hamiltonian belief in direct intervention of government in the economic realm had come to be associated with aristocracy and special privilege, while the Jeffersonian belief in weak government had come to be identified with a democracy of equal rights and opportunities. What he demanded in his political treatise was that the progressives abandon their Jeffersonian prejudices against strong government and adopt Hamiltonian means to achieve Jeffersonian ends. Roosevelt translated these ideas into living political principles and proposed his "New Nationalism," a dynamic democracy that would recognize the inevitability of concentration in industry and bring the great corporations under federal control, and that would press for legislation usually associated with the modern concept of the welfare state.¹²

Wilson had no well defined program when his campaign began; fundamentally he was still a states-rights Democrat who believed that federal power should be used only to sweep away special privilege to help restore competition in business. He wanted no part of an idea that would have the federal government move directly into the economic realm. Louis D. Brandeis, one of the leading progressive lawyers in the country, helped Wilson clarify his thought and formulate the notion that the most vital question confronting the American people was preservation of economic freedom. The government was to provide the means by which business could be set free from the shackles of monopoly and special privilege. Wilson attacked Roosevelt's proposals for social welfare legislation and his "paternalistic" attitude toward

¹² Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), 18-19.

labor. He campaigned under the strong conviction that he was battling for the old American way of life.¹³ Due to pressure from Brandeis and other individuals and factions from within the Democratic Party, perhaps as much because of the upcoming presidential contest of 1916, Wilson began to implement the "New Nationalism" program after 1915. Regardless of the differences in philosophical methods, the first years of the twentieth century witnessed a flurry of reform legislation unparalleled in American history up to that point.

Since that era of social, economic, and political ferment, historians have attempted to create an interpretation of progressivism because, as Richard Hofstadter has explained, "it is the historian's business . . . to assess the general direction of social movements in the past."¹⁴ As yet, however, no one has been able to construct an unchallenged interpretation, one which will account for the variety as well as the unity of the period. The latter part of this segment of the study will analyze the various interpretations that have been applied to progressivism.

Until the post-World War II period, there was little controversy among historians about the nature and character of the progressive years. Most American historians were writing within the tradition of the progressive school of historiography. The progressive school took their cues from the intellectual ferment of the period from 1901 to 1917, from the demands for reform raised by the progressives, and from the new burst of political and intellectual activity that came

¹³Ibid., 20-22.

¹⁴Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Movement, 1900-1915 (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 4.

with these demands. The progressive historians contributed to progressivism by giving reform politics a historical rationale. It was these men who explained the American liberal mind to itself in historical terms. If pragmatism, as Hofstadter has said, provided American liberalism with its philosophical nerve, progressive historiography gave it memory and myth, and naturalized it within the whole framework of American historical experience.¹⁵

To the progressive historian, the reformer's goals were clear and simple: to restore government to the people; to abolish special privilege and ensure equal opportunity for all; and to wipe out all social injustices. This group of historians did not envision the reformers as being anti-capitalist, or as wild-eyed radicals seeking the establishment of a socialist society. On the contrary, they portrayed the reformers as searching for a more democratic and humane society based on egalitarian ideals. The real enemies of society, according to the progressive historians, were the dishonest politicians and the so-called "special interests" who were posing a serious threat to the success of the democratic process.

Vernon L. Parrington, one of the best known of the progressive historians, saw progressivism as a "democratic renaissance"--a movement of the masses against a "plutocracy" that had been corrupting the very fabric of American society since the Civil War. To Parrington the movement was linked to the liberal periods of earlier days, and he likened the progressives to the reformers of the 1840's. According to Parrington, progressivism was a broad-based movement that included

¹⁵Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), xii.

members of the middle class, journalists and scholars, who feared being swallowed by the trend of economic centralization. These were men whose consciences had been aroused by the "cesspools that were poisoning the national household," and who had set for themselves the task of reawakening the American people.¹⁶

The pivotal idea of the progressive historians was economic and political conflict. They were convinced that American history could be characterized by a continuous struggle between liberalism and conservatism. Many of the earliest interpretations of the progressive period stressed the strain of liberalism that was carried over from the agrarian reform movement of a generation earlier. They saw in it a fulfillment of the programs of the Grangers, Greenbackers, and Populists. Such was the position of John D. Hicks, who linked the agrarian reformers to progressivism as cause and effect.

Hicks in 1931 published The Populist Revolt, the first major account of Populism based on wide research in the primary sources. He viewed the Populists as representing the first organized protest of the masses against the encroachments of a monopolistic plutocracy. Although the Populist Party did not survive politically, nor did many of its leaders, the movement was victorious in the long run, as Hicks points out, because much of its program was taken over by the reformers of the progressive era and enacted into law during the first seventeen years of the twentieth century.

In his classical argument, Hicks cites examples of Populist de-

¹⁶ Vernon L. Parrington, The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America, 1860-1920, Vol. III of Main Currents in American Thought (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927-1930), 406.

mands that became progressive legislation. The farmer group observed that the currency of the United States was both inadequate and inelastic; in 1913 Congress adopted the Federal Reserve system. Populists demanded direct government loans on farm lands; Farm Loan Banks were created by an act of 1916. Perhaps most important to the early protest group was the railway monopoly and the long-and-short haul issue; the Hepburn Act of 1906 and the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 gave power to the Interstate Commerce Commission in railway regulation. Hicks makes a good case for his contention that the progressives were direct line descendants of the Populists.¹⁷

During the depression years of the 1930's, many historians condemned the progressive reforms as being piecemeal and superficial in nature. They were critical of progressivism because of its failure to adopt more radical solutions to meet the problems of the early twentieth century. But even these historians, some of whom flirted with Marxism, were strongly associated with the progressive school due to their acceptance of the idea that class conflict had been a major factor in determining progress and social change in America. One of the most vocal of the critics during the 1930's was John Chamberlain, then a young Marxist, who in 1932 attacked the progressive movement as being an abysmal failure. Its advocates, Chamberlain claimed, were motivated by an escapist desire to return to a golden past where honesty and virtue had dominated over egoism and evil.¹⁸ These

¹⁷ John D. Hicks, "The Persistence of Populism," Minnesota History, XII (March, 1931), 3-20. See also Hicks, "The Legacy of Populism in the Middle West," Agricultural History, XXIII (October, 1949), 235-236.

¹⁸ John Chamberlain, Farewell to Reform: The Rise, Life and Decay of the Progressive Mind in America (New York: The John Day Company, 1932).

critics emphasized that the progressive generation had not gone far enough and, therefore, this had resulted in the disastrous depression of the 1930's. Nevertheless, disillusionment with the progressive era expressed by the critics of the 1930's did not necessarily imply that they were disillusioned with the ideals of reform or the aspirations of the liberal tradition in America. Hence, it was not until later that the mood of American historians began to change.

Beginning in the 1950's and continuing in the 1960's, there was a shift in the evaluation of the American past. To these newer scholars, the progressive ideology appeared much too simplified and appeared to rest on an unrealistic analysis of human nature. They believed that the progressive school of historiography had too long played on the morality theme where good always triumphed over evil. Hence, America was unprepared for the challenges of the depression of the 1930's and the world-wide conflict of the 1940's.

This new group of scholars who criticized the progressive school have stressed the consensus that has characterized the American past and have insisted that American history should not be written in terms of conflict. Many of these historians have been categorized into what has been labeled the consensus school of historiography due to their tendency to emphasize the unity of the American past, the stability of basic institutions, and the existence of a homogeneous national character. The result of this changed outlook concerning the American past was a sharp shift in the manner in which historians interpreted the progressive movement.

The attack on the progressive school interpretation of the progressive movement was led by the late Richard Hofstadter, the well-known

Columbia University historian. In criticizing the entire liberal tradition in America, he saw it as a failure and attempted in two of his most brilliant works to show its inadequacies.¹⁹ His thesis was that liberalism had not succeeded because it was based upon the idea of a return to an ideology that emphasized individualistic values.

Because progressivism had been placed within the liberal spectrum, it was severely castigated by Hofstadter. Instead of viewing the movement as a liberal attempt to readjust American institutions and values to a new industrial age, he maintained that progressivism was different. Placing progressivism in more of a behavioral context, he argued that it was related to status anxiety. The conflict that arose in the first two decades of the twentieth century, according to Hofstadter, reflected the drive of different social groups for a secure status in society. By the time of the inauguration of the new century, several of the older groups that had once held prestige and power--lawyers, professors, clergymen, older Anglo-Saxon Protestants--were finding their positions threatened by the new leadership emerging from the industrial and technological changes. The response to this displacement was a moral crusade to restore older Protestant and individualistic values.

Hofstadter's provocative thesis about the "status revolution" portrays the progressive as being blinded by moral absolutism and therefore his ideology as being extremely narrow. This thinking, he wrote, was to lead to later reaction regarding the 1920's. The interpretation of Professor Hofstadter led to the conclusion that progressivism

¹⁹ Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York: Vintage Books, 1948) and The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955).

was not a liberal movement, but a movement by well-to-do middle class groups who had been alienated from their society because of the rapid transformation occurring in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.²⁰

Hofstadter's analysis draws heavily upon two significant surveys of progressive leadership, one by Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. for 260 Progressive Party leaders throughout the United States and another by George E. Mowry for California.²¹ Although there are some regional variations, the conclusions of both surveys are similar. Progressive leaders did not represent the population at large; rather they had some distinct and special characteristics. It was from this groundwork that the "status revolution" concept was derived.

According to Chandler and Mowry, the progressives were vigorous young men who belonged to the generation that came of age in the nineties. Gone were the white-haired men with Civil War memories who were part of the Populist revolt. The elder statesmen could never have come forth with such dynamism as did these young men filled with the spirit of youth. The analyses by Mowry and Chandler show that the progressives drew their leaders mainly from the middle class rather than from the financially downtrodden. The very wealthy were represented, and the movement wore the cloak of respectability. It was nationwide in scope, but primarily urban and northern in setting.

²⁰ Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R., 131-172.

²¹ Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Origins of Progressive Leadership" in Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), VIII, 1462-1465 and George E. Mowry, The California Progressives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 86-104.

At a time when a college education was a rarity to possess, many of the reform leaders had received higher education. Most of them were either professional men, particularly lawyers, doctors, teachers, and member of the clergy, or businessmen who represented neither the very largest nor the very smallest businesses. Mowry depicted these energetic reformers as self-appointed guides for the masses, who could have been dangerous had they not been molded by the far-reaching religious influence of New England. If the names convey anything, it is that they came from old American stock with British origins. The middle class reformer acted, Mowry believed, because he felt himself hemmed in, and his place in society threatened by the monopolistic corporation on the one side, and by organized labor and socialism on the other. Instead of the belly reforms demanded by the Populists during an acute depression, the progressive reforms, in contrast, were more the results of the heart and head due to origin of the demands in a period of relative prosperity. In summary, Mowry saw progressivism as an expression of an older America objecting to the ideological and social drifts of the twentieth century.²²

There can be little doubt that the Hofstadter-Mowry-Chandler interpretation has made a highly valuable contribution to our understanding of the progressive era, but it is equally certain that this thesis alone cannot account for the vast outpouring of legislation which occurred from 1901 to 1917. So that the "status revolution" thesis does not serve to distract attention from other possible evaluations, a considerable number of scholars have undertaken to look at

²² Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-1912, 85-105.

other segments of society and their attitudes toward reform.

Perhaps the most noteworthy challenge to the Hofstadter-Mowry-Chandler approach has been offered by J. Joseph Huthmacher, who criticizes their thesis for ignoring the creative role of the non-Anglo-Saxon urban masses in the progressive movement. Willing to concede that middle class reformers contributed much to progressivism, Huthmacher insists that in the legislatures of the highly industrial states of New York and Massachusetts reform bills received more uniform and consistent support from representatives of the urban lower class than they received from the urban middle class. He writes that the working class liberal and his political representative, the machine politician, provided an active and politically necessary force for reform. These individuals experienced the ills of society which made them more practical and less idealistic. In summary, Huthmacher emphasizes that although the urban working class did not all become reform-oriented, they did produce leaders such as Al Smith and Robert Wagner, and they also produced their share of progressive legislation.²³

In a more recent interpretation, Richard Abrams has examined urban working class liberalism in a different fashion. In his study of Massachusetts, he sees the Boston Irish and other ethnic minorities as the major force for change. The insurgent groups in the Bay State did not derive from the middle class businessmen and professionals, Abrams states, but came instead primarily from the large Irish-American segment of the population, who represented the newer Americans general-

²³J. Joseph Huthmacher, "Urban Liberalism and the Age of Reform," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIX (September, 1962), 231-241.

ly, especially the growing class of labor unionists.²⁴ In a similar vein, Irwin Yellowitz has produced a study of the activities of New York state labor organizations during the progressive years which presents considerable evidence that labor's influence on reform legislation had an impact that the "status revolution" thesis does not recognize.²⁵ In a recent article on organized labor and progressivism in Oklahoma, Keith L. Bryant has presented an enlightening defense of his thesis that labor's impact on progressivism was significant and that labor's influence need not be restricted to progressivism in the northeastern industrial areas.²⁶

A number of historians have not only criticized the conceptual framework of the Hofstadter-Mowry-Chandler thesis, but have also pointed to what is regarded as a flaw in the methodology of the thesis. In arguing that the progressives were a cohesive unit that could be easily categorized, the thesis requires that the anti-progressives represented a different social and economic group. Recent state studies of the anti-progressives have shown that their social, economic, and ideological characteristics were almost identical with those of the progressives.²⁷

²⁴Richard Abrams, Conservatism in a Progressive Era (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), 132.

²⁵Irwin Yellowitz, Labor and the Progressive Movement in New York State: 1897-1916 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965).

²⁶Keith L. Bryant, "Kate Barnard, Organized Labor, and Social Justice in Oklahoma During the Progressive Era," Journal of Southern History, XXXV (May, 1969), 145-164.

²⁷Richard B. Sherman, "The Status Revolution and Massachusetts Progressive Leadership," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVIII (March, 1963), 59-65; William T. Kerr, Jr., "The Progressives of Washington, 1910-1912," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, LV (January, 1964), 16-27; E. Daniel Potts, "The Progressive Profile in Iowa," Mid-America, XLVII (October, 1965), 257-268.

Some of the earlier challenges to the progressive school have been reinforced by a group of historians of the 1960's. A number of these scholars have advanced the thesis that progressivism represented largely an attempt to govern society in accordance with the newer ideals of scientific management and efficiency. Hence, they propose that the business community was not monolithically opposed to all reforms. Robert Wiebe, for example, has produced a comprehensive study of the question, and has discovered evidence of substantial business support for even such supposedly anti-business measures as the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act.²⁸ In addition, Samuel P. Hays and James Weinstein have documented the support of many business leaders for such municipal reforms as the city manager and commission forms of government.²⁹

In his research on the conservation movement of the progressive era, Hays has pointed to what he feels is another misconception held by the progressive school, i.e., the American people were engaged in a struggle with established interests attempting to deprive the nation of its natural resources. Frequently, Hays has found, large corporations influenced by scientific management were ardent supporters of conservationist policies because of their interest in long-range resource planning. On the contrary, many of those groups equated with the democratic masses, such as small farmers and cattlemen, were often

²⁸Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), 129-141, 147-149.

²⁹Samuel P. Hays, "Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, LV (October, 1964), 55; James Weinstein, "Organized Business and the City Commissioner and Manager Movements," Journal of Southern History, XXVIII (May, 1962), 166-182.

opposed to conservation because it deprived them of their hopes of becoming rich quickly. Therefore, Hays concludes that conservation could not be neatly placed in the liberal-conservative categories of the progressive school of historiography.³⁰

With the advent of the 1970's, still another group of historians called the New Left had begun to subject many of the older interpretations to criticism. The progressive period has not escaped scrutiny by the New Leftists, and perhaps Gabriel Kolko's reinterpretation of the era is the best offering. He contends that the reforms of progressivism were not directed at making the government more responsive to the desires of the American people, but to making it and the economy more efficient. The movement for federal regulation of business was not, as the progressive school of historians had argued, motivated by fear of large corporate enterprises. Its goal, according to Kolko, was the elimination of senseless and destructive competition in the economic system. The establishment of regulatory agencies was actually promoted by large industrial concerns because each such agency was usually staffed by individuals sympathetic to the industry that it regulated. Therefore, these agencies often acted in the interests of the industry instead of the public, which meant that the movement toward regulation, rather than being anti-business, was actually a movement by business to eliminate competition.³¹ As

³⁰ Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), 1-4, 265-266.

³¹ Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) and Railroads and Regulations: 1877-1916 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

evidenced by Kolko's work, the relationship of government and business has become a chief concern to historians of the period. Additional interest has centered around the effects of the Rooseveltian "New Nationalism" platform on the Wilsonian "New Freedom" program.

As previously mentioned, Roosevelt regarded bigness in business as both historically inevitable and economically beneficial. He was prepared to regulate monopoly and also to expand the welfare functions of the state in order to aid the laboring poor. Wilson, on the other hand, saw the large corporations as inefficient and a threat to social mobility. He also envisioned using the federal government, but as a tool to break up the trusts and return to the older, more individualistic and competitive spirit of free enterprise. Most historians who have written about the progressive era from the progressive school viewpoint favor the "New Nationalism" philosophy of Roosevelt over the "New Freedom" philosophy of Wilson. In this they reflect the intellectual spirit of the period as espoused by such journalists as Croly and Walter Lippmann, who argued that the twentieth century needed more central planning by the state. The current consensus among most of the progressive school scholars is that Wilson actually implemented the "New Nationalism" program in the latter portion of his first administration and early part of his second as well as carrying out his "New Freedom" platform in the early stages of his White House tenure. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., New Deal historian, portrays progressivism as the precursor to the New Deal program of the 1930's. He believes that the New Deal pragmatic philosophy and the emphasis on the positive role that government should play in the economy had its roots in the

progressive programs of Roosevelt and Wilson.³²

Arthur S. Link accounts for the differences between the two programs largely in terms of strong agrarian and Southern influence in the Democratic Party. These two elements within the party pressured Wilson into accepting some of the long awaited demands of the progressives, e.g., rural credits and good roads. Link believes that Wilson gradually assented to this pressure of using the federal government in a more positive role in these various programs. In doing so, Link concludes, Wilson had extended the basic tenet of Rooseveltian "New Nationalism."³³

Hofstadter, mentioned earlier in relation to the group composition of progressivism, challenges both Schlesinger and Link on the philosophical aspects of "New Nationalism" and "New Freedom." In a scathing indictment of both Roosevelt and Wilson, he writes that neither went far enough toward the principle of central state planning. The progressives, epitomized by Roosevelt and Wilson, were backward in wanting to restore the avarice of economic individualism and in looking for solutions of contemporary problems in an unreturnable past.³⁴

Two regional studies since World War II have made significant contributions to the enlightenment of scholars in interpreting the progressive era. Arthur Mann, long time scholar of progressivism, has

³² Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951).

³³ Arthur S. Link, "The South and the 'New Freedom': An Interpretation," American Scholar, XX (Summer, 1951), 314-324.

³⁴ Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It, 206-282.

made a study of Boston and its intellectual hinterland. In this volume he has indicated for the first time the contributions made to twentieth century reforms by Jews and Irish Catholics. This study of the impact of ethnic groups on the progressive era has added an important dimension to scholarship in the field. Moreover, he has examined another neglected group found within reform elements, the women. In his chapter on "The New and the Newer Women as Reformers," Mann has supplied an important service in the study of feminist influences that colored the progressive element. Perhaps Mann's most valuable addition in the understanding of the progressive years has been to prove once again that modern liberalism owes its beginnings to the city as well as to the farm.³⁵

The Midwest has long been considered by many historians as the place of origin of twentieth century reform. No examination of progressive historiography could be complete without mentioning Russel B. Nye's study of progressivism in the heartland of America. In an excellent volume, Nye accepts the older agrarian interpretation that twentieth century progressivism was a descendant of nineteenth century farmer protest. In many ways he has offset Mann's urban interpretation by defending the thesis that progressivism was a result of the agrarian influence and not of the urban influence.³⁶ A recent article that certainly complements Nye's neo-agrarian thought is "The Rural Roots of the Progressive Leaders" by Wayne E. Fuller. The author suggests that the urban character of progressivism has been overemphasized,

³⁵ Arthur Mann, Yankee Reformers in the Urban Age (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1954).

³⁶ Russel B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Historical Study of Its Origins and Development, 1870-1950 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959).

especially when the historian discovers that many of the leading progressives, e.g., Jane Addams and Robert M. LaFollette, spent their youth being nurtured in the values of rural America.³⁷

The diverse nature of the reform impulse of the progressive years, however, has not obscured the fact that there were certain measures of unity among groups and regions. The mixture of legislation that was enacted indicates strongly that the ideals and interests of a variety of groups and regions must have coalesced on a number of issues. Huthmacher, for one, insists that forward-looking legislation, at least in such industrial states as New York and Massachusetts, depended upon collaboration between reformers from both urban lower and urban middle classes. At times, this coalition was further supplemented by the efforts of organized labor.³⁸ The almost legendary achievements of the governorship of LaFollette in Wisconsin, according to Robert Maxwell, scholar of Wisconsin's progressivism, were owed to the efforts of farm groups, labor leaders, and intellectuals, a union of "soil, shop and seminar."³⁹ Indeed, even as far back as 1913, Walter Weyl, a contemporary observer, recognized that certain issues might make common cause for a variety of people. "The Polish slag worker," he said, "the Boston salesgirl and the Oshkosh lawyer have a similar interest as consumers of national wealth."⁴⁰

³⁷Wayne E. Fuller, "The Rural Roots of the Progressive Leaders," Agricultural History, XLII (January, 1968), 1-13.

³⁸Huthmacher, "Urban Liberalism and the Age of Reform," 29-31.

³⁹Robert Maxwell, LaFollette and the Rise of Progressivism in Wisconsin (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1956).

⁴⁰Walter Weyl, The New Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1913), 249-254.

As the historiography of progressivism indicates, it is difficult to evaluate the specific achievements of the period without dealing with certain moral values that inevitably influence the historical judgments of scholars studying the subject. The progressive school of historians saw progressivism as a valiant effort to aid Americans in their adjustment to a society where values were business oriented. They tended to agree with goals of the reformers and thus pictured the concentration of economic power as undermining the moral fabric of our society. The reforms and reformers were described in sympathetic language by these scholars.

With the advent of a highly technological civilization, many historians have tended to emphasize the constructive aspects of the business community throughout American history. Within this framework, they have either stressed the more conservative aspects of the era or have pointed to its lack of realism in order to show the failures of progressivism.

The problem of surveying the historiography of the progressive era, therefore, is by no means easy or simple. The divisions among historians are not disappearing despite considerable research on this important epoch in American history. On the contrary, the division between the old and the new generations appear to be widening, and with the introduction of recent hypotheses the problem is compounded. However, in the final analysis, when one examines the varying interpretations of progressivism, the assessment will perhaps make it easier to understand the ability of Americans to adapt themselves to new problems in any given era.

CHAPTER II

OKLAHOMA AND ITS CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS: A GEOGRAPHIC- BIOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS FROM 1901 TO 1917

The purpose of this portion of the study will be to concentrate on the geography of Oklahoma from 1901 to 1917 and the individuals who served as the representatives from the state. Various census data are used to present the economic and demographic characteristics of the state and the congressional districts.¹ Oklahoma Territory, eighteen years old and predominantly white, and Indian Territory, with her civilization established seventy-five years earlier, were combined into one state and admitted to the union under the name of Oklahoma on November 16, 1907. The last of the thirteen states formed wholly or in part of the Louisiana Purchase, Oklahoma entered the union larger in land area than any state east of the Mississippi River and smaller than any west of that river excepting Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas,

¹United States, Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Population (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), III, 433-484; Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Agriculture (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), VII, 350-393; Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Manufactures (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), IX, 1001-1017; Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Population (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923), III, 811-831; Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Agriculture (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923), VI, 617-652; Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Manufactures (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923), IX, 1213-1233; and Religious Bodies, 1916 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), I, 301.

Washington, and Louisiana. The commonwealth had an area of 70,057 square miles, of which 643 represented water surface. Its population was 1,657,155. The density of population was doubling, from 11.4 per square mile in 1900 to 23.9 in 1910. Racially, the population in 1910 was approximately eighty-seven per cent white, eight per cent Negro, four and one-half per cent Indian, and the remaining one-half per cent Oriental and other groups. There was a fifty-three to forty-seven percentage ratio of males to females in the state. According to the religious census of 1916, the state was eighty-eight and one-half per cent Protestant, eleven per cent Roman Catholic, and the remainder Jewish.

As the forty-sixth state to be admitted, Oklahoma ranked twenty-third among the states according to population in 1910, a rise from thirtieth in 1900, when its total population was divided between the Twin Territories. The percentage of increase during the decade 1900-1910 was greater than for any other state except Washington. Relatively speaking, the combined population of the Twin Territories was more than eight times the number of persons who lived in California in the year it became a state, and more than eighteen times the population of Nevada in 1900, a third of a century after admission.

According to the 1910 census the population of the state was primarily rural, with only 19.3 per cent of the people residing in incorporated units having a population of 2,500 or over (see Figure 1). Eight cities in 1910 had more than 10,000 residents--Oklahoma City, Muskogee, Tulsa, Enid, McAlester, Shawnee, Guthrie, and Chickasha. These most populous cities contained 10.2 per cent of the state's inhabitants, and in the manufacturing census of 1909 they were

**PER CENT URBAN POPULATION OF OKLAHOMA
BY COUNTIES: 1910
GROUPED INTO THE FIVE CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS**




Figure 1


credited with 37.3 per cent of the total value of manufactures.

From an economic point of view, the state's leading industries in 1909 directly depended on the products of agriculture, e.g., railroad and flour milling. However, a marked increase in independent industrial activities began in 1907 with the development of oil fields and the discovery of natural gas. An abundance of coal and lumber and the presence of such minerals as gypsum, asphalt, granite, limestone, lead, and zinc further stimulated manufacturing. By 1910 the state had 2,310 manufacturing establishments which provided employment to 18,034 persons. The value added by manufacture had reached \$19,529,000 by 1910, representing a four-fold increase from the 1899 figure.

Variety was the most striking feature of the Oklahoma landscape (see Figure 2). Elevations in Oklahoma range from about 300 feet on the Coastal Plain in the southeastern corner of the state to almost 5,000 feet on Black Mesa in the extreme northwestern part. Local relief varies greatly in different sections of the state, being as great as 2,000 feet in the Ouachita Mountains and as little as 10 feet in extensive areas of the Great Plains.

While most of Oklahoma receives between 26 and 40 inches of rainfall annually, it is not evenly distributed through the year. Spring is the wettest season and winter the driest. The natural vegetation of Oklahoma reflects the rainfall pattern. Dense forests of oak, hickory, and pine are found in the Ouachitas, but toward the west, as the rainfall decreases, the forests are replaced by park lands, tall grass, short grass, and finally bunch grass and cacti. The chief agricultural crops likewise reflect the distribution of rainfall.

PHYSIOGRAPHIC MAP OF OKLAHOMA



SOURCE: Oklahoma Geological Survey, 1912.

Figure 2

Wheat is important in the drier western part of the state, corn and vegetables in the wetter eastern section. Ranching is common in all parts of the state, for there is usually sufficient moisture for pastures.

All of northern Oklahoma and much of the central part of the state is in the drainage basin of the Arkansas River, with the remaining streams flowing into the Red River located along the southern border. These two large rivers and their tributaries flow in a general eastward direction and have played a primary role in the development of the state.

These environmental factors have likewise shaped the state's governmental development. Oklahoma's political history may be said to date from 1889, the year in which six million acres of central Oklahoma was opened to settlement by whites, or from 1890, the year in which Oklahoma Territory was officially organized. From 1890 until 1907, Oklahoma Territory was predominantly Republican in political sentiment, partly because of the large initial influx of settlers coming from Republican states north of the territory. In addition, the homesteaders developed a Republican bias out of gratitude to the national administration for the law opening the territory to white settlement. Only the residents of Oklahoma Territory elected delegates to Congress from 1890 until 1907, and they elected a majority of Republican delegates.

Indian Territory, on the other hand, was predominantly Democratic because Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes had come from Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and Mississippi. Since many were slaveholders, a majority had been Confederate sympathizers during the

Civil War. They therefore lost much of their original land holdings after Lee's surrender. In addition, the white settlers in the Indian Nations were mostly from Arkansas and Texas. Thus the assumption was that the region would probably vote Democratic upon achievement of statehood. Before 1907 the Indian Territory was not eligible to send delegates to Congress.

The Enabling Act for Oklahoma statehood, signed by President Theodore Roosevelt on June 16, 1906, provided that the new state should elect five representatives until the next regular apportionment act. The first legislature of Oklahoma therefore divided the state into five Congressional districts (see Figure 3).

After the federal census of 1910, the new apportionment gave the state eight representatives. After careful thought, Governor Lee Cruce directed that the voters elect three members-at-large, thus avoiding the unnecessary expense of a special legislative session to reapportion districts. Therefore in 1912 three representatives were selected at large by the voters of Oklahoma, in addition to the five elected from the previously created districts. By 1914 the state's congressional boundaries had been redrawn so as to include eight districts, a plan that remained in effect until 1951 (see Figure 4). A regional analysis of the 1907 and 1914 districts follows.

Congressional district number one was composed of ten counties covering some 9,850 square miles in the north central part of the state. The population of the district was approximately 240,000 in 1910, which gave it a density of more than 24 people per square mile. The counties of the district included Garfield, Grant, Kay, Kingfisher, Lincoln, Logan, Noble, Osage, Pawnee, and Payne. The district

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS 1907-1913





Figure 3

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS 1914-1951



SOURCE: Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, et al.,
Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections
 (Norman: Bureau of Government Research, 1970), 26.

Figure 4

contained the largest county in the state, Osage, which had a total area of 2,293 square miles. Some of the important cities located within the district were Guthrie, one of the most populous centers during the territorial era and state capital until 1910; Kingfisher, another city with more than 1,000 inhabitants during territorial days and a leading contender for location of the state capital before Guthrie was selected; and Stillwater, the site of the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, established by statute in 1890 and holding its first classes in 1891.


The second congressional district occupied the major portion of northwestern Oklahoma. It consisted of fifteen counties plus four townships of northern Grady County and nine townships of northern Roger Mills County. The total of 17,273 square miles made it the largest of the five districts. Within the second district lived approximately 324,000 people, giving it a density of nearly 19 people per square mile. The counties making up the district were Alfalfa, Beaver, Blaine, Caddo, Canadian, Cimarron (the only county in the United States bordering three states), Custer, Dewey, Ellis, Harper, Major, Oklahoma, Texas, Woods, and Woodward. The Grady County townships were Verdon, Washington Valley, Hillsborough, and Kochi. The nine townships of Roger Mills County included Hamburg, Preston, Fairview, Churchill, Rail, Lone Star, Texmo, Shirley, and Crawford. The district can be described as the most urban in demographic composition, i.e., possessing the most cities with more than 2,500 population. Over 26 per cent of the second district's population lived in these urban areas, with three quarters of the 84,600 urban population in Oklahoma County; Oklahoma City, the state capital after 1910,

predominated.

Congressional district three incorporated a major portion of the northeastern counties of Oklahoma. Nearly 285,000 people lived in the more than 10,000 square miles, giving the district 28 people per square mile, the highest density of the five. Eighteen counties plus nine townships of McIntosh County made up the district. The district possessed the second highest number of urban centers and was by far the leader in manufacturing. Almost 24 per cent of the district's population lived in cities of over 2,500. The district contained over 41 per cent of the total value added by manufacture and more than 33 per cent of the total labor force in the state. Of the five districts, number three had the largest percentage of black population, nearly 12 per cent, a significant concentration of Negroes in 1910 (see Figure 5). Both Muskogee and Tulsa, which ranked second and third in state population, were located in district three. Muskogee, a city of 25,278 in 1910, was the terminus for the first railroad running into Indian Territory and had the agency for the Five Civilized Tribes. Tulsa, a city of 18,182, was soon to become known as the "oil capital" of the United States. Okmulgee and Tahlequah, capital of the Creek and Cherokee Nations, respectively, were also important. The eighteen counties comprising the district were Adair, Cherokee, Craig, Creek, Delaware, Hughes, Mayes, Muskogee, Nowata, Okfuskee, Okmulgee, Ottawa, Rogers, Seminole, Sequoyah, Tulsa, Wagoner, and Washington. The townships of Shady Grove, Rentiesville, south part of Minton, West Checotah, south part of Elm, Hitchita, Huffman, Guyson, and east Checotah in northern McIntosh County were also included.

Twenty counties, the largest number of counties in any district,

PER CENT OF NEGROES IN TOTAL POPULATION BY COUNTIES: 1910



SOURCE: U. S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census,
Census of Population: 1910
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office),
Vol. III, pp. 433—484.

Figure 5

made up district four, located in the southeastern section of the state. Close to 272,000 people living on over 12,700 square miles gave the district a population density of nearly 22. In comparison with the other four districts, number four had the largest percentage of non-Protestants, even though the figure of 14.07 per cent does not significantly deviate from the norm which showed all the districts being more than 85 per cent Protestant. Important cities included McAlester, center of early coal mining activities and home of the state prison, Ardmore, Durant, and Hugo.

The fifth district, situated in the southwestern area of the state, contained sixteen counties and the southern townships of Grady and Roger Mills Counties. This district was the most striking example in Oklahoma of the White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant political unit. Proportionately fewer blacks, foreign born, and non-Protestants lived in this district than in any of the other four. It was likewise least urbanized, with only about 16.5 per cent living in cities of 2,500 or over. Yet the density of the district ranked second at 26.5. Most of the incorporated communities were small. Lawton was adjacent to Fort Sill, one of the principal artillery posts in the nation. Norman was designated by the first legislature in 1890 as the site for the territorial and later state university. Other urban areas deserving mention were Chickasha, one of eight cities in the state having a population of over 10,000 in 1910, Duncan, and Altus. The counties were Beckham, Carter, Cleveland, Comanche, Garvin, Greer, Jackson, Jefferson, Kiowa, Love, McClain, Murray, Pottawatomie, Stephens, Tillman, Washita, and those townships of Grady and Roger Mills Counties that were not included in district two.

In reviewing the demographic and economic composition of the five districts that existed from 1907 to 1914, several observations can be presented. Districts two and three can be classified as being the most urban and industrial, and district three was the most densely populated. The remaining three districts can be categorized as more rural and agricultural in nature (see Table I).

In 1914 Oklahoma's congressional district boundaries were redrawn, increasing the number to eight from five. Most districts were smaller than before, except for district eight. District one, which covered the extreme northeastern part of the state, was composed of ten counties. Its area was 7,871 square miles, with 316,156 people and a density of approximately 40. District one contained the highest percentage of non-Protestants, with over 19 per cent (see Figure 6). It likewise had the highest percentages, 33.4 and 23.9, in the categories of value added by manufacture and average number of wage earners, respectively. However, over 75 per cent of the total in each category was found in one county, Tulsa. The most populous cities in the district, primarily due to their connection with the development of the oil industry, were Tulsa and Bartlesville. Tulsa, which had 18,182 people in 1910, numbered 72,075 in 1920, a growth rate of nearly 400 per cent. Bartlesville had increased its population by 1920 to 14,417 to become Oklahoma's seventh largest city. Counties other than Tulsa were Craig, Delaware, Mayes, Nowata, Osage, Ottawa, Pawnee, Rogers, and Washington.

TABLE I

CENSUS CHARACTERISTICS OF OKLAHOMA'S 1907-1914 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

| District Number | Area (square miles) | Population | Density (per square mile) |
|--------------------|------------------------|------------|------------------------------|
| 1 | 9,850 | 239,942 | 24 |
| 2 | 17,273 | 323,283 | 19 |
| 3 | 10,185 | 284,326 | 28 |
| 4 | 12,706 | 271,797 | 22 |
| 5 | 14,084 | 371,406 | 26.5 |

| District Number | Urban | Rural | Per Cent Urban |
|--------------------|--------|---------|-------------------|
| 1 | 43,131 | 328,275 | 17.97 |
| 2 | 84,681 | 186,116 | 26.19 |
| 3 | 67,258 | 217,068 | 23.65 |
| 4 | 47,317 | 276,966 | 17.04 |
| 5 | 61,188 | 178,754 | 16.47 |

| District Number | White | Per Cent White | Black | Per Cent Black | Foreign Born | Per Cent Foreign Born |
|--------------------|---------|-------------------|--------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| 1 | 217,452 | 90.62 | 18,733 | 7.82 | 8,931 | 3.72 |
| 2 | 306,292 | 94.74 | 13,133 | 4.06 | 13,424 | 4.15 |
| 3 | 215,334 | 75.73 | 33,593 | 11.81 | 2,912 | 1.02 |
| 4 | 231,633 | 85.22 | 24,773 | 9.11 | 6,945 | 2.55 |
| 5 | 354,414 | 95.42 | 10,094 | 2.71 | 6,811 | 1.83 |

TABLE I (Continued)


| District Number | Protestant | Per Cent | Catholic | Per Cent | Jewish | Per Cent |
|--------------------|------------|----------|----------|----------|--------|----------|
| 1 | 70,802 | 88.30 | 9,373 | 11.69 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | 74,464 | 86.59 | 10,939 | 12.67 | 630 | .72 |
| 3 | 68,700 | 87.16 | 9,907 | 12.56 | 210 | .26 |
| 4 | 53,524 | 85.92 | 8,703 | 13.97 | 65 | .10 |
| 5 | 79,618 | 92.54 | 6,347 | 7.37 | 71 | .08 |

| District Number | Value Added By Manufacture | Per Cent of Total |
|--------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|
| 1 | \$12,315,759 | 15.01 |
| 2 | 18,137,843 | 22.43 |
| 3 | 36,288,037 | 43.88 |
| 4 | 7,944,598 | 9.95 |
| 5 | 6,885,128 | 8.73 |

| District Number | Average Number of Wage Earners | Per Cent of Total |
|--------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1 | 3,649 | 14.36 |
| 2 | 7,032 | 23.83 |
| 3 | 10,986 | 34.18 |
| 4 | 3,664 | 14.41 |
| 5 | 2,625 | 8.89 |

Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Population (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), III, 433-484; Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Manufactures (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), IX, 1001-1017; Religious Bodies, 1916 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), I, 301.

PER CENT OF NON-PROTESTANTS IN TOTAL POPULATION
BY COUNTIES
GROUPED INTO CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS: 1916



SOURCE: U. S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census,
Religious Bodies: 1916
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office),
Part II, p. 301.


Figure 6

The second congressional district of 1914, composed of eight counties, was located in the east central part of the state. Its area of 5,308 square miles and 244,315 people gave it the second highest density of 46. It had the highest percentage of Negroes (17.23) and the lowest percentage of foreign born whites (1.12). The greatest concentration of blacks was found in the western counties of the district, namely Wagoner, a county whose population was more than 25 per cent black, Okmulgee, Muskogee, and McIntosh (see Figure 7). Muskogee and Okmulgee by 1920 were the centers of urban growth in district two. Muskogee, which in 1910 was the second most populous city in the state with 25,278, had dropped to third, but still showed a growth to 30,277. Okmulgee, still a city of less than 10,000 in the census of 1910, had increased its population ten years later to 17,430 to become Oklahoma's fourth most populous city. There were eight counties in district two: Adair, Cherokee, Haskell, McIntosh, Muskogee, Okmulgee, Sequoyah, and Wagoner.

The eleven southeastern counties of the state made up the third congressional district. Second largest in area with 11,407 square miles, it contained 325,680 people for a density of 28.7, somewhat below the average district's 33.7. The third district's most populous city was McAlester, which in 1910 had ranked fifth with 12,954, but declined in population by 859, which dropped it to the ninth largest city in the state by 1920.

The fourth district of 1914 embraced nine counties in the central portion of the state. 286,218 people living on 6,705 square miles gave the district a density of 42.7. This district, as well as district two, showed a significant percentage of Negroes, with

PER CENT OF NEGROES IN TOTAL POPULATION BY COUNTIES: 1920



SOURCE: U. S. Department of Commerce,
 Bureau of the Census,
Census of Population: 1920
 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office),
 Vol. III, pp. 811-831.

Figure 7


nearly 30,000 blacks, or more than 10 per cent of the population, living in the district. Sapulpa by 1920 had grown to be the most populous city in the district with 11,634, ranking it eleventh in the state. The nine counties of the district were Coal, Creek, Hughes, Johnston, Lincoln, Okfuskee, Pontotoc, Pottawatomie, and Seminole.

District five was a tier of seven centrally located counties running from Payne in the north to Murray in the south. It was the smallest of the districts in area, but with Oklahoma County and Oklahoma City, was heavily populated, showing the highest density of all the districts with 57.4. Again because of Oklahoma County, the district was the second leading industrial area, with over 21 per cent of the state's total value added by manufacture. As further proof of its industrial nature, over 23 per cent of the inhabitants were laborers. The foremost urban center, Oklahoma City, grew from 64,205 in 1910 to 91,295 by 1920. This district was unique in that it was the home of the two major institutions of higher learning: Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical at Stillwater in Payne County and the University of Oklahoma at Norman in Cleveland County. The seven counties were Cleveland, Garvin, Logan, McClain, Murray, Oklahoma, and Payne.

To the west of the fifth district lay a two-row tier of counties making up the sixth district. 207,648 people occupying 9,132 square miles indicated a density of 22.8. The leading city in 1910 was Chickasha, whose 10,320 residents ranked it seventh in the state; although it had declined in population by 1920, it still ranked twelfth with 10,189. In each of the counties of the sixth district more than 60 per cent of the land area was devoted to farms.² In

²It should be pointed out that as one moves westward in Oklahoma the per cent of land area in farms increases (see Figure 8).

PER CENT OF LAND AREA IN FARMS IN OKLAHOMA BY COUNTIES: 1910 GROUPED INTO THE EIGHT CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS



SOURCE: U. S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census,
Census of Agriculture: 1910
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office),
Vol. VII, p. 350.


Figure 8

Caddo, Canadian, and Kingfisher Counties, more than 90 per cent was in farm land. The average value of land in the sixth district was high, running from \$25 to \$50 per acre in six of the nine counties. Only Oklahoma County in the fifth district had land that was more valuable per acre (see Figure 9). The counties other than those previously mentioned were Blaine, Comanche, Cotton, Grady, Jefferson, and Stephens.

The seventh congressional district covered the far western central area, with eleven counties, 10,149 square miles, and 189,472 people. This low density district was the most heavily Protestant, nearly 96 per cent, and least industrial, with only 2.1 per cent of the state's total value added by manufacture. Correspondingly, fewer than 2 per cent of the state's wage earners were located in district seven. In contrast, a high degree of agricultural activity was carried on, ranging from 60 to 80 per cent of the land area in farms in Ellis, Roger Mills, and Beckham Counties to over 95 per cent in Washita County. The value of farm land per acre was highest in Washita, Kiowa, Jackson, and Tillman Counties, all of which fell in the category of \$25 to \$50 per acre. In addition to those counties listed above, Custer, Dewey, Greer, and Harmon were included in this district.

The eighth and last congressional district of 1914 was the northwestern portion of Oklahoma including the Panhandle. A dozen counties made up this sparsely settled but largest district of 14,775 square miles. Its 200,402 inhabitants gave it the lowest density, 13.5. Ten of the twelve counties were less than 1 per cent Negro, with two counties reporting no blacks at all. District eight was also rural. In the eastern part of the district, the four counties of Grant, Gar-

AVERAGE VALUE OF FARM LAND PER ACRE IN OKLAHOMA BY COUNTIES: 1910 GROUPED INTO THE EIGHT CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS



SOURCE: U. S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census,
Census of Agriculture: 1910
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office),
Vol. VII, pp. 350—393.

Figure 9

field, Kay, and Noble were heavily farmed, with more than 90 per cent of the land set aside for agricultural purposes. Both the percentage in farm land and value of farm land decrease as one proceeds westward into the Panhandle. In the eastern sector of the district the value of farm land ranged from \$25 to \$50 per acre, but this figure dropped to approximately \$8 per acre in Cimarron County. The remaining seven counties making up the district were Alfalfa, Beaver, Harper, Major, Texas, Woods, and Woodward.

Several general observations can be made in regard to the eight districts of 1914. Demographically, the density of population is significantly less in the three western districts, primarily due to their rural nature. These same three districts, six, seven, and eight, show the greatest percentage of whites and Protestants. In contrast, districts one, two, and five emerge as the more urban oriented and industrial centered, due primarily to the location of Tulsa County in district one, Okmulgee and Muskogee Counties in two, and Oklahoma County in five (see Table II).

The study will now focus on the individuals sent to Washington from 1901 to 1917 from the Territory of Oklahoma and the congressional districts that were subsequently established. The thirteen men who represented Oklahoma in the United States House of Representatives during the progressive era will be presented in chronological order as they were elected. The biographical information concerning the

TABLE II

CENSUS CHARACTERISTICS OF OKLAHOMA'S 1914-1951 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

| District Number | Area (square miles) | Population | Density (per square mile) |
|--------------------|------------------------|------------|------------------------------|
| 1 | 7,871 | 316,156 | 40 |
| 2 | 5,308 | 244,315 | 46 |
| 3 | 11,407 | 325,680 | 28.7 |
| 4 | 6,705 | 286,218 | 42.7 |
| 5 | 4,495 | 258,312 | 57.4 |
| 6 | 9,132 | 207,648 | 22.8 |
| 7 | 10,149 | 189,472 | 18.6 |
| 8 | 14,775 | 200,402 | 13.5 |

| District Number | White | Per Cent White | Black | Per Cent Black | Foreign Born | Per Cent Foreign Born |
|--------------------|---------|-------------------|--------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| 1 | 283,969 | 89.81 | 16,550 | 5.23 | 5,453 | 1.72 |
| 2 | 186,934 | 76.51 | 42,119 | 17.23 | 2,756 | 1.12 |
| 3 | 283,775 | 87.13 | 27,390 | 8.41 | 5,187 | 1.59 |
| 4 | 246,752 | 86.21 | 29,903 | 10.44 | 3,629 | 1.26 |
| 5 | 233,121 | 90.24 | 22,611 | 8.75 | 6,365 | 2.46 |
| 6 | 193,706 | 93.28 | 6,726 | 3.23 | 5,408 | 2.60 |
| 7 | 182,000 | 96.05 | 2,758 | 1.45 | 4,096 | 2.16 |
| 8 | 197,639 | 98.62 | 1,351 | .67 | 7,074 | 3.52 |

| District Number | Protestant | Per Cent | Catholic | Per Cent | Jewish | Per Cent |
|--------------------|------------|----------|----------|----------|--------|----------|
| 1 | 42,185 | 80.49 | 10,013 | 19.10 | 210 | .40 |
| 2 | 47,503 | 92.33 | 3,791 | 7.36 | 150 | .29 |
| 3 | 52,511 | 87.27 | 7,554 | 12.55 | 105 | .17 |
| 4 | 43,091 | 89.28 | 5,169 | 10.70 | 0 | 0 |
| 5 | 49,948 | 86.18 | 7,376 | 12.72 | 630 | 1.08 |
| 6 | 44,885 | 87.03 | 6,613 | 12.82 | 71 | .13 |

TABLE II (Continued)

| District Number | Protestant | Per Cent | Catholic | Per Cent | Jewish | Per Cent |
|--------------------|------------|----------|----------|----------|--------|----------|
| 7 | 46,758 | 95.97 | 1,962 | 4.02 | 0 | 0 |
| 8 | 68,351 | 92.37 | 5,638 | 7.62 | 0 | 0 |

| District Number | Value Added By Manufacture | Per Cent of Total |
|--------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|
| 1 | \$29,659,818 | 33.41 |
| 2 | 8,711,459 | 9.81 |
| 3 | 8,768,553 | 9.87 |
| 4 | 7,961,568 | 8.97 |
| 5 | 18,867,637 | 21.25 |
| 6 | 5,373,073 | 6.05 |
| 7 | 1,868,386 | 2.10 |
| 8 | 7,546,546 | 8.50 |

| District Number | Average Number of Wage Earners | Per Cent of Total |
|--------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1 | 7,055 | 23.91 |
| 2 | 3,706 | 12.56 |
| 3 | 3,576 | 12.12 |
| 4 | 3,376 | 11.44 |
| 5 | 6,849 | 23.21 |
| 6 | 1,694 | 5.74 |
| 7 | 506 | 1.71 |
| 8 | 2,147 | 7.27 |

Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Population (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923), III, 811-831; Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Manufactures (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923), IX, 1213-1233; Religious Bodies, 1916 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), I, 301.

representatives was taken from several different sources.³ Two territorial delegates, Dennis T. Flynn and Bird S. McGuire, belong in the time period of this study; both were Republicans. Flynn, serving from 1901 to 1903, terminated his congressional career in 1903; but McGuire, who succeeded him, was re-elected with statehood, serving in five consecutive Congresses from 1903 to 1913.

Flynn, born in 1861 in Pennsylvania, moved to Guthrie in 1889 and was postmaster of that city until 1892. Previously he had been raised in a Catholic orphanage, attended the common schools and Canisius College, edited the Riverside, Iowa, Leader, and practiced law in Kiowa, Kansas, as well as publishing the Kiowa Herald. Defeated in 1890 for Oklahoma territorial delegate, he was successful in 1892 and served in the Fifty-third and Fifty-fourth Congresses. Failing to be re-elected in 1896, he won two more consecutive terms and served from 1899 to 1903. Although nominated again in 1902, he declined the offer. He resumed his law practice in Oklahoma City, in 1908 being an unsuccessful Republican candidate for the United States Senate. He was a delegate to the Republican National Convention in 1912. Flynn died in 1939.

³Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961); Lyle H. and Dale Boren, Who Is Who in Oklahoma (Guthrie: The Co-operative Publishing Company, 1935); Marian L. Brockway, "A Study of the Geographical, Occupational, and Political Characteristics of Congressmen, 1800-1919," (Unpublished M. A. Thesis, University of Kansas, 1938); Rex Harlow, Oklahoma Leaders: Biographical Sketches of the Foremost Living Men of Oklahoma (Oklahoma City: Harlow Publishing Company, 1928); A. N. Marquis, Who's Who in America (Chicago: A. N. Marquis and Company); H. F. O'Beirne, Leaders and Leading Men of the Indian Territory (Chicago: American Publishers' Association, 1891); Portrait and Biographical Record of Oklahoma (Chicago: Chapman Publishing Company, 1901).

McGuire, the other territorial delegate included in this study, was born on an Illinois farm in 1865. After living in Missouri, he moved with his family to Kansas, where McGuire taught school and attended the State Normal School at Emporia; later he studied law at the University of Kansas, and served as a county attorney and mayor. McGuire moved to Pawnee, Oklahoma Territory, in 1894. President William McKinley appointed him assistant United States Attorney in 1897, and McGuire served in that capacity until his election to the Fifty-eighth Congress in 1902. Elected as a Republican from the first district, McGuire was a member of the Oklahoma delegation until 1915, when he declined a renomination. In his final years he practiced law in Tulsa and operated a large ranch near Bartlesville, dying in 1930.

Along with McGuire the five original United States House members to be elected on September 17, 1907 were Elmer Fulton, district two, James S. Davenport, district three, Charles D. Carter, district four, and Scott Ferris, district five.

Elected in the special election of 1907 was Fulton, an Oklahoma City Democrat, who failed in his bid for the second district seat in 1908. A native of Iowa, Fulton attended the public schools of Nebraska and received his higher education at Tabor College in Iowa. He was admitted to the bar in 1895 and, after practicing in Nebraska for six years, moved to Stillwater in Oklahoma Territory. After his short stint in Congress, Fulton resumed law practice in Oklahoma City and remained active in Democratic party affairs. He was assistant attorney general of Oklahoma from 1919 to 1922. Fulton died in 1939.

Davenport, born in Alabama in 1864, moved to Muskogee in Indian Territory after being educated in Arkansas. He made law his occupation,

but had also taught in Arkansas. He settled in Vinita in 1893, where he acted as speaker of the Indian Territorial Council from 1899 to 1901, and then was one of the attorneys for the Cherokee Nation from 1901 to 1907. During that time he was elected mayor of Vinita in 1903. A Democrat, Davenport was elected to the Sixtieth Congress, but was returned to the Sixty-second, Sixty-third, and Sixty-fourth Congresses, serving from 1911 to 1917. In the reapportionment of 1914 Davenport's district became number one. His congressional career ended with his defeat for re-election to the Sixty-fifth Congress in 1916. His remaining years, until his death in 1940, were spent practicing law and serving as judge of the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals.

An Ardmore Democrat, Carter was born of Choctaw blood in Indian Territory in 1868. He was educated in the Indian day schools and Chickasaw Manual Training Academy at Tishomingo. From 1887 to 1900 Carter was employed on a ranch and in a mercantile store near Ardmore, served as auditor of public accounts of the Chickasaw Nation, and headed the schools of the Chickasaws. In November, 1900, President McKinley appointed him mining trustee for Indian Territory, a position he held for four years. Carter was elected to Congress on September 17, 1907 and was re-elected nine times, serving twenty years in the United States House from district four and district three after the reapportionment of 1914. After failing to regain the nomination in 1926, he was appointed to the state highway commission and served in that capacity until his death in 1929.

Another Democrat who served a lengthy term in the United States House was Ferris. Born and educated in Missouri, he moved to Lawton to practice law after graduating from the Kansas City School of Law in

1901. Ferris began his political career in the state House of Representatives, serving there in 1904-1905. Elected to the Sixtieth Congress in 1907, he successively represented districts five and six until 1921. He was an unsuccessful candidate for a United States Senate seat in 1920. Ferris was active in political party affairs, serving as delegate to the Democratic National Convention in 1912 and 1916 and as vice-chairman of the national committee. He was Democratic national committeeman from Oklahoma from 1924 to 1940, dying in 1945.

Replacing Fulton from the second district in the 1908 election was Dick T. Morgan, a Republican from Woodward. He was educated in Indiana, his state of birth, and received both a B.S. and M.S. in mathematics from Union Christian College. He was a professor at his alma mater for one year while also acting as superintendent of the high school in Hagerstown, Indiana. From college professor to lawyer, Morgan earned a bachelor of laws from the Central Law School of Indianapolis. His initial practice was at Terre Haute, where he also edited the Terre Haute Courier for two years. He served in the Indiana legislature in 1880 and 1881. After moving via Kansas to Guthrie in 1889, Morgan settled at Woodward. President Theodore Roosevelt appointed him registrar of the United States land office, a position he held from 1904 until his election to the United States House in 1908. He served in the five succeeding Congresses until his death in 1920. After the reapportionment in 1914, Morgan's district was eight instead of two.

A Muskogee Republican, Creager was elected from the third district, replacing Davenport for the Sixty-first Congress. Primarily a

newspaperman, he had edited two papers in his native Ohio, the Columbus Press-Post and the Marietta Daily Leader. He moved to Muskogee, Indian Territory in 1904 and was engaged in the newspaper business until his election to Congress in 1908. After his unsuccessful attempt for re-election in 1910, he was employed by the United States Indian Service and was later involved in oil production. His death came in 1965.

In the 1912 election three representatives were elected at large due to the failure of Governor Cruce to carry out a plan for reapportionment following the results of the 1910 census. Those elected in this capacity to the Sixty-third Congress were William H. Murray from Tishomingo, Joseph B. Thompson from Pauls Valley, and Claude Weaver from Oklahoma City, all Democrats. Murray and Thompson were later elected in 1914 from districts four and five, respectively. Weaver, elected only as a representative-at-large, never attempted to seek a House seat after the congressional redistricting took place in 1914.

A man of varied interests, Murray came to Indian Territory in 1898 from his native Texas. Teacher, newspaperman, rancher, and lawyer, he played an important role in the formation of the state of Oklahoma, having been president of the constitutional convention in 1906. After statehood, "Alfalfa Bill," as he was known by his friends, served as speaker of the first state legislative session. A hard working and outspoken Democrat, he was a delegate to the national conventions in 1908, 1912, 1916, and 1932. After serving two terms in the United States House from 1913 to 1917, he failed in his attempt for renomination. During most of the 1920 's, he lived and colonized in Bolivia, but returned to Oklahoma and was elected governor in 1930, serving from 1931 to 1935. He later unsuccessfully sought the gover-

nor's chair in 1938 and a United States Senate seat in 1942. He died at the age of 87 in 1956.

Another native Texan, Thompson, graduated from Savoy College in 1890. After being admitted to the bar in 1892, he moved to Ardmore, Indian Territory, where he was appointed commissioner for a United States Court in 1893. Active in party politics, he was a delegate to the Democratic national conventions of 1900, 1904, and 1908, was chairman of the Democratic state committee in 1906 and 1908, and was elected to the state senate in 1910, serving to 1914. Elected as a representative-at-large to the Sixty-third Congress, he served Oklahoma in three succeeding Congresses until his untimely death in 1919 at the age of 48.

William W. Hastings and James V. McClintic, district three Democrat and district seven Democrat, were elected freshman members of the Sixty-fourth Congress in 1914. A native of Arkansas, Hastings was a Cherokee and was educated at the Cherokee Male Seminary at Tahlequah. After graduating from the law department of Vanderbilt University, he was attorney general for the Cherokee Nation from 1891 to 1895 and then national attorney for the Cherokees from 1907 to 1914. In 1912 he was a delegate to the Democratic national convention and was also a presidential elector for the Wilson-Marshall ticket nominated at the Baltimore convention. Although this study includes only Hastings' first term, he was returned to Washington for a total of eighteen years. After rejecting the opportunity for renomination in 1934, he died four years later at the age of 71.

McClintic was a Texas lawyer who migrated to Snyder in Kiowa County immediately after the turn of the century. He had attended

Add-Ran University (now Texas Christian University) in Fort Worth and later studied law at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C. Prior to his election to Congress, he served in both houses of the Oklahoma legislature from 1911 to 1915. Elected to the Sixty-fourth and nine succeeding Congresses, he equaled Hastings' long time career of public service. After his failure to secure the nomination in 1934, he held various positions in Washington. He died in 1948 at the age of 70.

In a biographical summation, several conclusions can be made in regard to the thirteen congressmen as to their age, place of birth, occupation, length of public service, and political affiliation. Of the thirteen individuals covered by this study, only one was born in Indian Territory, Carter. Four of the remaining eleven, Murray, Thompson, Weaver, and McClintic, were from a contiguous state, Texas. The other delegates to come from adjoining states were Ferris from Missouri and Hastings from Arkansas. Other than Davenport, who came from Alabama, the rest of the delegates originated in the Old Northwest-Ohio Valley region. Flynn was from Pennsylvania, Creager, Ohio, Morgan, Indiana, McGuire, Illinois, and Fulton, Iowa.

As to occupation, all were practicing attorneys except Creager, who was a newspaperman, Carter, a farmer-rancher, and McClintic, a merchant. However, many of them had at one time or another been teachers or connected with some phase of newspaper work. Those who had been in the classroom were McGuire, Davenport, Murray, and Morgan. Flynn, Morgan, and Murray had been associated with newspapers.

All thirteen men were relatively young when they took the oath of office to serve as United States representatives. The youngest was

Ferris, who was elected in 1907 as one of the original representatives at the age of thirty, whereas the oldest was Morgan, who was sworn into office at the age of fifty-five. The average age of the thirteen upon taking oath was just over forty-one, with five in their thirties and six in their forties.

In terms of public service as representatives from Oklahoma, two of them, Carter and McClintic, spent twenty years each in the United States House. Others with long records of service included Hastings, eighteen years, Ferris, fourteen years, and Morgan, eleven years. Of the twelve not born in Indian Territory, six, McGuire, Davenport, Murray, Thompson, Weaver, and Flynn, came to Oklahoma or Indian Territory before the turn of the century; three, Ferris, Morgan, and McClintic, waited until the century had turned; and two, Fulton and Creager, came in 1901 and 1904, respectively. Only Flynn, McGuire, Morgan, and Creager were affiliated with the Republican Party. The remaining nine were Democrats (see Tables III and IV).

This section of the study sets the stage for further examination of the nature of progressivism in the Oklahoma House delegation. This will begin with territorial representation in 1901 and conclude with the termination of the second session of the Sixty-fourth Congress in 1917.

TABLE III

REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS FROM OKLAHOMA
(ORIGINAL DISTRICTS) (PLUS DELEGATE FLYNN)

| Name | Politics | Term | Occupation | State of Birth | Age on Taking Oath | Home Town | Years Service in Congress |
|-----------------------|----------|--------------------|------------|----------------|--------------------|------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Bird S. McGuire | R | 1907-15 | Attorney | Illinois | 43 | Pawnee | 8 ¹ |
| 2. Elmer L. Fulton | D | 1907-09 | Attorney | Iowa | 44 | Okla. City | 2 |
| Dick T. Morgan | R | 1909-15 | Attorney | Indiana | 55 | Woodward | 11 ² |
| 3. James S. Davenport | D | 1907-09 1911-15 | Attorney | Alabama | 43 | Vinita | 8 ³ |
| Charles E. Creager | R | 1909-11 | Newspaper | Ohio | 35 | Muskogee | 2 |
| 4. Charles D. Carter | D | 1907-15 | Rancher | I. T. | 38 | Ardmore | 20 ⁴ |
| 5. Scott Ferris | D | 1907-15 | Attorney | Missouri | 30 | Lawton | 14 ⁵ |
| Dennis T. Flynn | R | 1901-03 | Attorney | Pennsylvania | 31 | Guthrie | 8 ⁶ |

¹Served as Oklahoma Territorial Delegate prior to statehood--1903 to 1907

²Including five years from eighth district after reapportionment

³Including two years from first district after reapportionment

⁴Including twelve years from third district after reapportionment

⁵Including six years from sixth district after reapportionment

⁶Served as Oklahoma Territorial Delegate prior to Statehood--1892 to 1896 and 1899 to 1903

TABLE IV
REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS FROM OKLAHOMA
(REVISED DISTRICTS)

| Dis- trict | Name | Poli- tics | Term | Occupation | State of Birth | Age on Taking Oath | Home Town | Years Service |
|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------|--------------------|------------|-------------------|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|
| 1. | James S. Davenport | D | 1915-17 | Attorney | Alabama | 43 | Vinitia | 8 |
| 2. | William W. Hastings | D | 1915-21 1923-35 | Attorney | Arkansas | 50 | Tahlequah | 18 |
| 3. | Charles D. Carter | D | 1915-27 | Rancher | I. T. | 38 | Ardmore | 20 |
| 4. | William H. Murray | D | 1915-17 | Attorney | Texas | 43 | Tishomingo | 4 |
| 5. | Joseph B. Thompson | D | 1915-19 | Attorney | Texas | 41 | Pauls Valley | 6 |
| 6. | Scott Ferris | D | 1915-21 | Attorney | Missouri | 30 | Lawton | 14 |
| 7. | James V. McGlentic | D | 1915-35 | Merchant | Texas | 36 | Snyder | 20 |
| 8. | Dick T. Morgan | R | 1915-20 | Attorney | Indiana | 55 | Woodward | 11 |
| At Large Representatives | | | | | | | | |
| | William H. Murray | D | 1913-15 | Attorney | Texas | 43 | Tishomingo | 4 |
| | Joseph B. Thompson | D | 1913-15 | Attorney | Texas | 41 | Pauls Valley | 7 |
| | Claude Weaver | D | 1913-15 | Attorney | Texas | 45 | Okla. City | 2 |

CHAPTER III

THE TERRITORIAL DELEGATES: DENNIS T. FLYNN AND BIRD S. MCGUIRE (FIFTY-SEVENTH THROUGH FIFTY-NINTH CONGRESSES, 1901-1907)

With the assassination of President William McKinley on September 6, 1901 and his death on September 14, Vice-President Theodore Roosevelt, the former reform minded governor of New York, became president. After he entered the White House, Congress, following his recommendations, began to expand the social, economic, and political responsibilities of the federal government and laid the groundwork for a whole series of subsequent developments. The role of Oklahoma's United States House of Representatives members in this development was an important one, though it has received little attention. This chapter will examine the stand taken by the territorial delegates, Dennis T. Flynn and Bird S. McGuire, on the reform issues that came before the United States House from the Fifty-seventh through the Fifty-ninth Congresses.

The standard employed to determine the bills that constituted progressive legislation is derived from the judgment expressed by eight leading American historians of the period, primarily from the consensus

school of historiography.¹ These historians cited several measures and actions which they considered reform issues of the progressive period (Appendix A). It should be noted that the standard to be used expresses the interpretation of one school of historiography; it does not take into account the more recent studies which have suggested a re-evaluation of the progressive period indicating that it was not a reform era, but rather a period of conservatism.²

Dennis T. Flynn, a Guthrie Republican, had previously served as the non-voting delegate from Oklahoma Territory from 1892 to 1896 and again from 1898 to 1900. He was re-elected in the campaign of 1900 to serve in the Fifty-seventh Congress and therefore falls within the

¹ Benjamin P. DeWitt, The Progressive Movement, A Non-Partisan, Comprehensive Discussion of Current Tendencies in American Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1915); Harold U. Faulkner, The Quest for Social Justice, 1898-1914 (New York: Macmillan, 1931); Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1939); George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-1912 (New York: Harper and Row, 1958); Russel B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Historical Study of Its Origins and Developments, 1870-1958 (New York: Harper and Row, 1959); Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1952); Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: Harper and Row, 1954); and Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955).

² The most outspoken proponent of the New Left re-evaluation of the progressive period is Gabriel Kolko, who states that the combination of glittering promise and empty performance in progressivism in the end headed off "the radical potential of mass grievances and aspirations of genuine progressivism," or, in other words, of true social reconstruction. See Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). The same theme in a narrower compass may be found in Kolko's volume on railroad legislation during the progressive period. See Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). For a brief discussion of how the New Left historians have treated the progressive period see Irwin Unger, "The 'New Left' and American History," American Historical Review, LXXII (July, 1967), 1237-1263.

scope of this study. Throughout his service prior to 1900, Flynn had solicited support for his constituents largely on the issue of "free homes." While the provisions of the Homestead Act applied chiefly to Oklahoma Territory, much of the land was not free as was the case for most of the public land in the West. To open Indian Territory land to homeseekers the federal government had first to extinguish Indian title by purchasing each tribe's surplus land. This cost was passed on to settlers, generally running about \$1.25 an acre, and Flynn's "free homes" plan proposed to repeal these charges. When Congress finally passed the "free homes" bill in 1900 it saved Oklahoma settlers an estimated \$15,000,000.³

As "free homes" had been the rallying cry of all Oklahoma politicians and political parties since the campaign of 1894, it was natural that Flynn should be the hero of the hour. In the issue of May 19, 1900, the Weekly State Capital of Guthrie printed some twenty special dispatches from towns over the territory expressing gratitude at the passage of the bill and praising Flynn. "Free Homes Day" was celebrated in a score or more cities.⁴ In part these celebrations were engineered by Republican politicians, but the greater number represented spontaneous acclamation. When Flynn returned from Washington, a "welcome home" celebration drew approximately 5,000 people at Guthrie, and a similar rally at Oklahoma City, July 2, 1900, was attended by

³Victor Murdock, "Dennis T. Flynn," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XVIII (June, 1940), 107-113; Dennis T. Flynn, "Strenuous Political Legislative Battle Fought to Obtain Free Homes Bill," Oklahoma City Times, November 10, 1932.

⁴Guthrie Weekly State Capital, May 26, 1900 and June 2, 1900.

about 6,000.⁵

Flynn had become so popular as a result of his parliamentary success that he was easily renominated by the Republican state convention, which assembled at Guthrie in August of 1900. He was opposed in the general election by Robert A. Neff, the coalition candidate of the Democrats and Populists, a combination that had been victorious over Flynn in 1896. But Flynn's candidacy was so closely tied with the "free homes" success that it was inevitable that wherever he spoke the meeting turned into a celebration. The Democrat-Populist coalition pointed in vain to the fact that "free homes" was a non-partisan or perhaps a multi-partisan issue and that all parties had assisted in securing adoption of the bill in Congress. Regardless, Flynn was given all the credit for this gift to the settlers, credit which could only assist his campaign.

On the other hand, the lack of a unifying issue was apparent in the ranks of the Democrat-Populist coalition. The problem was that in 1896 the great national issue of free silver had served to unite all reform forces. This issue had declined in importance by 1900, and its absence left the coalition with no campaign message to match Flynn's "free homes" issue. The schism was deepened when the Republican press called Populists' attention to the fact that Neff was a straight-out Democrat and not a Populist.⁶ The campaign of 1900 turned out to be a very one-sided affair as Flynn, the veteran Republican campaigner, won a decisive victory over Neff. The election returns were as follows:

⁵Guthrie Weekly State Capital, July 7, 1900.

⁶Guthrie Weekly State Capital, September 15, 1900 and September 22, 1900.

| | | | |
|--------|-------------------|--------|-----------------|
| Flynn | Republican | 38,253 | 52% |
| Neff | Democrat-Populist | 33,529 | 46% |
| Others | | 1,585 | 2% ⁷ |

Evidence clearly shows that Flynn associated with the men who formed the nucleus of what came to be called the "Old Guard" or "stand-patters." This was the wing of the Republican Party which favored the status quo or conservative philosophy, and whom the progressives viewed as conferring favors on special interest groups such as the railroads and manufacturers. Flynn became well acquainted with Thomas B. Reed, House member from Maine, and supported Reed for the 1896 Republican presidential nomination over McKinley.⁸ Reed, Speaker of the House during the 1890's, became known as "the Czar" due to his arbitrary leadership and his interpretation of existing rules which curtailed any power the Democratic minority might have possessed. Flynn's support of "Czar" Reed did not place him in a favorable position with certain progressive politicians. Territorial newspapers also told of Flynn's intimate association with the powerful Speaker Reed. In the Blackwell Times-Record of March 12, 1903, an article entitled "Passed 98 Bills" told of the "fancy" that Reed had taken for the delegate from Oklahoma Territory and the assistance provided by Reed to Flynn in passage of the "free homes" bill.⁹

Due to his association with Reed and others of like political nature, Flynn ran into trouble when Roosevelt took the oath of office. His relationship with the new president is vividly described in the

⁷ The Oklahoma Red Book (Oklahoma City: Office of the Secretary of State, 1912), II, 306.

⁸ Murdock, "Dennis T. Flynn," 111.

⁹ Blackwell Times-Record, March 12, 1903.

Mangum Star, a Democratic publication. The December 19, 1901 article was entitled "Flynn's Hot Wire Grounded." Flynn had gone to Roosevelt seeking action on some Indian Territorial matters and was met by an irate president. "You should confine your business to your own constituency Flynn. And right here I want to say that there is to be a general change in conditions in Oklahoma."¹⁰ The article stated that much more was said and that Flynn became so angry that he forgot to state the business that he had come on. According to the story, Flynn was no longer an admirer of Roosevelt.

In the first session of the Fifty-seventh Congress, Flynn delivered some lengthy remarks concerning statehood for the territories of Oklahoma, Arizona, and New Mexico. In a May 8, 1902 speech before the House Flynn favored H. R. 12543, which provided for the people of Oklahoma, Arizona, and New Mexico to form constitutions and state governments and be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original states. Arguing for statehood, Flynn said:

It has now come to this, that in the consideration of this bill, in the language of old, 'Just and due consideration of the rights of the people should be the paramount question considered.' There are more people in every one of these Territories now applying for admission than were in many of the States now represented upon this floor.¹¹

Flynn was asked why Oklahoma was not reported alone for statehood, and he promptly replied that all members of the Committee on Territories, both Democrats and Republicans, had unanimously approved the bill as it now stood; he thought it was right that all three of the

¹⁰ Mangum Star, December 19, 1901.

¹¹ U. S., Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 1902, XXXV, Part 5, 227.

territories should be admitted.¹²

From the above evidence it would seem that Flynn's posture on the statehood for territories issue would have endeared him to the progressives. This issue became more relevant to progressivism somewhat later when the Arizona and New Mexico state constitutions were being debated prior to the 1912 elections. It appears that the issue of Oklahoma statehood was Flynn's major concern.

Flynn introduced one significant bill (H. R. 8327) in the first session of the Fifty-seventh Congress, a resolution which would provide for the protection of miners in the territories. It was a revision of a previously passed law of 1890 governing the protection of miners in the Indian Territory. The old bill had required 3,300 cubic feet of air per minute for every 50 men at work in the mines, whereas Flynn's bill would increase the cubic feet per minute to 5,000. Flynn stated on January 30, 1902, on the House Floor, that the old bill had been most beneficial for miners, but he felt that the additional protection was essential.¹³ Since the social justice element of progressivism had campaigned for the improvement of working conditions and more stringent safety requirements, it would appear that Flynn might have been commended by progressives for this legislative action, even though somewhat minor in its extent of coverage.

Another measure of Flynn's work in Congress was the reaction of the territorial press, although it is limited to some degree by the political polemics and partisanship of many of the papers. Among the territorial papers, one of the leading critics of Flynn was the Shawnee

¹²Ibid.

¹³U. S., Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 1902, XXXV, Part 2, 1130.

Herald, known for its Democratic leanings. In a scathing editorial written near the close of Flynn's last term, the Herald published a list of bills under the heading "Flynn's Great (?) Work." The editorial mentioned that even the Republican controlled Newkirk News-Journal was able to find only three bills for which Flynn was responsible that directly or indirectly benefited all the citizens of Oklahoma: a bill creating two additional judges for the territory, a bill prohibiting the legislature from locating the capital or any of the public buildings, and a bill providing for the redistricting of the territory by a commission which it expected would gerrymander the territory so that the Republicans might control both houses of the territorial legislature. Every other bill, the editorial proclaimed, was either a private graft for someone who had been able to enlist the stalwart offices of the self-serving delegate, or it was a measure of purely local interest, such as allowing the new counties to spend their own money, or appropriating \$100,000 for Guthrie and Oklahoma City public buildings. In a damning summation of what the paper called Flynn's great (?) work, the article said:

The facts are that Oklahoma would generally have been better off if Dennis Flynn had gone to Honolulu before Congress met instead of after. His private grafts and personal ends are his chief aim and even a Republican Congress would do more for the territory if we had no delegate at all--unless we had an honest one. The territory has had enough tommy-rot about Flynn's 'great work.'¹⁴

On the other hand, Flynn's work was praised by a Kansas City Journal article which was reprinted in several Oklahoma newspapers. The story, entitled "Passed 98 Bills," told of Flynn's pride in the

¹⁴Shawnee Herald, July 26, 1902.

fact that he had left Congress with more bills to his credit than any other previous member of Congress.¹⁵ However, only the "free homes" bill of the 98 in which Flynn was involved was of enough significance to mention in the article. The article reported that according to "Mr. Cannon and the late Speaker Reed, Flynn was the most successful delegate that ever entered Congress."¹⁶ The "Mr. Cannon" referred to was the new Speaker of the House, Joseph G. Cannon, Republican of Illinois, who replaced Reed in the Fifty-seventh Congress. This statement was of interest to progressives since Cannon's name became virtually synonymous with dictatorial power in the House.¹⁷ Company of this type did not leave Flynn in a satisfactory position with the early progressives.

Did Flynn speak in behalf of any of the early progressive legislation that was of national concern? The best indication of Flynn's attitude toward national issues is reflected by his statement upon retirement that the reason he had enacted so many measures affecting Oklahoma was the fact that he "never tried to meddle in general legislation."¹⁸ Asked about general legislation, Flynn remarked that he had introduced but one bill that was of general concern, and that was in regard to the authorization of fourth class postmasters to administer oaths in pension vouchers and the use of postmarking stamps

¹⁵Blackwell Times-Record, March 12, 1903.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷For an interpretation of Cannon's dictatorial power see Blair Bolles, Tyrant from Illinois: Uncle Joe Cannon's Experiment with Personal Power (New York: W. W. Norton, 1951).

¹⁸Blackwell Times-Record, March 12, 1903.

instead of a notary public seal.¹⁹ The nature of this piece of legislation leaves something to be desired in comparison with the burning reform issues of the day.

Even after his retirement from Congress, Flynn remained active in Republican Party circles. In 1908 there was considerable talk of Flynn being appointed to the newly elected President William Howard Taft's cabinet. In an Oklahoma City Times editorial, there was a call for Taft to appoint Flynn as Secretary of the Interior. Flynn, having just been defeated for the United States Senate, appeared as a likely candidate to many Republicans, at least in Oklahoma, since he represented a western state and, according to the Times, should be rewarded in some fashion for the faithful service he had rendered for the Republican Party.²⁰ Apparently there was not a serious national effort for Flynn's appointment.

The first territorial delegate of the progressive period retired from Washington in March of 1903, after making the following announcement: "I originally entered politics for the purpose of passing the 'Free Homes' bill. That has been accomplished and that statehood must come shortly, there are others who can as well represent the people and the party in congress as myself."²¹ This announcement by Flynn gave hope to all aspirants for the office, both Democrats and Republicans. The Democrats believed that Flynn had been stronger than his

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Oklahoma City Times, November 7, 1908.

²¹ Guthrie Daily State Capital, March 8, 1902. See also the Oklahoma City Times, May 14, 1925.

party in the territory and for this reason it might be possible to wrest control of the territory from the Republicans. Meanwhile, the Republicans began a campaign to convince the territory that congressional action on the statehood question would depend upon the election. Flynn was quoted as saying: "If Oklahoma goes Republican, and thus gives an evidence of the ability of the Republican Party in the territory to continue in control, there will be little doubt of her admission."²²

In the Republican preliminaries, Dick T. Morgan of Woodward, Bird S. McGuire of Pawnee, and Joseph W. McNeal of Guthrie entered the race.²³ On the other hand, some nine Democrats sought the nomination of their party, with William M. Cross of Oklahoma City the leading contender. At the Enid Republican convention, McGuire was selected on the third ballot. In contrast, the Democrats took thirty-nine ballots before Cross was nominated.²⁴

In their platform, the Republicans endorsed the Flynn statehood bill, which provided for the admission of Oklahoma Territory as a state without regard to Indian Territory.²⁵ The Democrats, in their platform, urged the admission of Oklahoma and Indian Territory as one state. In the campaign the Republicans took the point of view that immediate statehood for Oklahoma with an eventual addition of Indian

²²Guthrie Leader, April 19, 1902.

²³Guthrie Leader, April 18, 1902; Guthrie Daily State Capital, April 20, 1902.

²⁴Guthrie Leader, April 23, 1902.

²⁵Luther B. Hill, History of the State of Oklahoma (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1910), I, 343.

Territory would secure quick admission and that the Democratic plan could mean only prolonged delay.²⁶ The Democrats charged that the Republican members of the Senate Committee on Territories were the ones that were delaying statehood.²⁷ The election was extremely close, with McGuire winning by a plurality of 484 votes. Cross carried eight counties: Cleveland, Day, Greer, Kiowa, Oklahoma, Pottawatomie, Roger Mills, and Washita, while McGuire won the remaining eighteen.²⁸ The results were as follows:

| | | |
|---------|--------|--------------------|
| McGuire | 45,896 | 48.7% |
| Cross | 45,409 | 48.1% |
| Others | 2,998 | 3.2% ²⁹ |

McGuire, taking his Congressional seat on March 5, 1903 in the Fifty-eighth Congress, held his position until March 3, 1915, the termination of the Sixty-third Congress. This portion of the study will cover only his legislative career as a territorial delegate from 1903 to the special election of September 17, 1907 which selected five Congressmen from the new state of Oklahoma. McGuire was re-elected in 1904 by a 1,586 vote plurality over Frank Mathews, the Democratic candidate. The results were:

| | | |
|---------|--------|--------------------|
| McGuire | 51,454 | 47.2% |
| Mathews | 49,868 | 45.7% |
| Others | 7,823 | 7.1% ³⁰ |

The legislative battles in the Fifty-eighth and Fifty-ninth Congresses, of which McGuire served a delegate, fall into two groups.

²⁶ Guthrie Weekly State Capital, August 23, 1902 and September 27, 1902.

²⁷ Guthrie Weekly State Capital, June 14, 1902.

²⁸ The Oklahoma Red Book, II, 306.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

One encompasses three bills to regulate the railroads. Of these, the most important was the Hepburn bill, providing for the regulation of freight and passenger rates by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Another bill increased the railroads' liability for injury to employees, and a third limited the hours of railroad employees engaged in interstate commerce. The second group includes two bills intended to protect health and welfare, the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection amendment to the Agricultural Appropriation bill.

Among the pro-McGuire newspapers, the most outstanding tributes were paid by the Blackwell Times-Record and the Chandler News-Publicist. Both of these papers published full page articles in 1910 covering McGuire's work in Congress. Under the sub-heading entitled "Wonderful Legislative Record" they proclaimed that he participated in the efforts of Congress that had brought forth more constructive and progressive legislation in the interests of the whole people than any similar era in the history of the country.³¹ Both papers stated that he had stood shoulder to shoulder with the Republican organization in Congress in permanently placing these reforms on the statute books.³² The specific legislation, mentioned by both papers, that McGuire had supported were the Pure Food and Drug Act, the Meat Inspection Act, the Employer's Liability Act, and the Hepburn Railroad Act, all passed in 1906. They also pointed out that Delegate McGuire was deeply interested in reclamation of lands and in good roads. Yet the pages of the Congressional Record reveal nothing. McGuire's activity in the

³¹Blackwell Times-Record, June 16, 1910; Chandler News-Publicist, June 3, 1910.

³²Ibid.

Fifty-eighth and Fifty-ninth Congresses was confined to the introduction of a statehood bill for Oklahoma (H. R. 4078) and two bills concerning the granting of additional land for the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Oklahoma Territory (H. R. 17212 and H. R. 17769). All of his remarks on the House floor were limited to discussion of his statehood bill. There is no evidence to indicate how McGuire felt concerning the issues which were of interest to progressives.

There were denunciations of McGuire's record as territorial delegate supplied mostly by the Democratic newspapers of the territory. In an editorial that appeared in both the Shawnee Herald and the Muskogee Times-Democrat, McGuire was verbally assaulted for his laziness:

" . . . he has done nothing more strenuous than draw his salary and throw bouquets at his Republican press agents."³³ The article continued to assail McGuire and the "guff now being handed out to the Republican newspapers of Oklahoma by a worshipping press agent in Washington, proclaiming McGuire as the Modern Moses."³⁴ Nothing was mentioned as to the progressive stance of McGuire in these strongly Democratic newspapers.

Likewise unfavorable to McGuire's legislative record was the nationally known mouthpiece of progressivism, LaFollette's Weekly Magazine, edited by the former governor and then United States Senator from Wisconsin, Robert M. LaFollette. The magazine stories on McGuire, which were written in 1910 and 1912, are the best analyses of his service as a territorial delegate from a point of view outside Oklahoma.

³³ Shawnee Herald, May 29, 1908.

³⁴ Ibid.

In the LaFollette magazine's permanent column headed "The Roll Call on Men and Measures," McGuire was the featured legislator on June 18, 1910. The first part of the column defines a demagogue as one who attempts to control the multitude by specious and deceitful arts. The definition, said LaFollette, was applicable to McGuire since he secured his election to Congress by false promises of public service, and when in office, betrayed the trust of the people who elected him.³⁵

The next segment of the article discussed McGuire's record in the two Congresses prior to statehood for Oklahoma. LaFollette thus described McGuire's tenure as territorial delegate:

Oklahoma and Indian Territory comprised the last general reserve which the Federal Government had set aside as a home for the Red Man in exchange for his native land. It was a reserve rich in fertility and mineral resources. The disposition of Indian lands, the distribution funds, and the extension privileges in coal and oil in Indian reserves have ever been sought and cherished as 'opportunities' by the Interests which have 'stood in.' As spokesman for the territory before it became a State, and as a member of Congress since, BIRD MCGUIRE has taken a conspicuous part in the behalf of the various System schemes to promote the game of getting the Indians' patrimony into the hands of those who would use it to 'develop the country.' MCGUIRE has served the System and in turn the System supports MCGUIRE.³⁶

The progressive magazine went on to describe McGuire as schizophrenic due to the fact that he posed as "a champion of reform, a devotee of the Roosevelt policies," but "in spite of his campaign professions, a careful study of the record fails to disclose a single issue upon which McGuire failed to line up with the reactionaries for special interests

³⁵ LaFollette's Weekly Magazine, II (June 18, 1910), 4.

³⁶ Ibid.

against public interests."³⁷

Two years later, McGuire was again spotlighted in the LaFollette publication. This time he received attention in an article entitled "A 'Progressive' at Home; A Standpatter in Congress." The article included a photograph of McGuire with the caption under it reading "a political Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde who professes to be progressive at home but is a stand-patter in Washington."³⁸ The periodical declared that McGuire "lost no time after reaching the Capitol to roll up his sleeves in the service of special privilege."³⁹ McGuire's contribution to legislation, asserted Editor LaFollette, consisted mainly in the introduction of endless pension bills. Furthermore, he contributed nothing to the debates upon important measures of statecraft.⁴⁰ The magazine summarized his career as territorial delegate by picturing McGuire as the "representative in Congress for the System, and was the representative of the same System in the state of Oklahoma."⁴¹ Realizing that LaFollette's political viewpoints may have changed by 1912, we should nevertheless carefully weigh his assessment of McGuire's record as territorial delegate from 1903 to 1907.

In evaluating the territorial delegates who served Oklahoma from 1901 to 1907 and their relation to progressivism, it is difficult to

³⁷Ibid., 5.

³⁸LaFollette's Weekly Magazine, IV (October 12, 1912), 4.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid.

establish a definitive conclusion due to the non-voting status of their position. However, it is important for the purpose of this study to attempt to draw some conclusions based on the delegate's remarks in the Congressional Record and the response to his speeches and record from a variety of sources, including territorial newspapers and observations made by the press outside the territory.

Flynn, though serving only a limited time in what this study has delimited as the progressive period, must be classified as reacting negatively on most progressive issues, but he did take a positive stand on two local issues that were of concern to progressives, i.e., statehood for territories and regulation of working conditions for miners in the territories. The first reason for placing Flynn in a more negative role concerning progressivism is the notable lack of statements supporting the early reform efforts of President Roosevelt and the schism that apparently developed between the two. Even though progressivism had not fully developed at the national level, there were important reform issues to which Flynn might have addressed himself. There is no evidence to indicate that he spoke for Roosevelt's early attempts at trust regulation, e.g., the Northern Securities case. Flynn made no supporting statements for such legislative proposals as the Elkins Act of 1903, aimed at eliminating the rebate evil; the Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902, a step toward conservation reform; or the act of 1903 establishing the Department of Commerce and Labor which was to include a Bureau of Corporations empowered to investigate and report upon the operations of corporations engaged in interstate commerce.

A second argument for placing Flynn in the more negative mold is

the fact that he was recognized as holding close ties to the Republican "Old Guard," the conservative wing of the party which frowned upon reform. His association with such "Old Guard" members as "Czar" Reed and Cannon, both of whom later became symbols of anti-progressivism, lend credence to this argument. And finally, the last point to show Flynn's lack of progressive qualities is his own admission of not meddling in general legislation. He took no active role unless the issues debated affected Oklahoma. It is apparent from the preceding evidence that Flynn envisioned the good of the nation as less pressing than the good of his immediate area.

In analyzing McGuire's legislative career as territorial delegate, we find him appearing as negative as Flynn. The evidence indicates that McGuire paid verbal tribute through Republican newspapers in the territory to many of the progressive reforms enacted in the Fifty-eighth and Fifty-ninth Congresses. But there is nothing to indicate that he was vitally concerned about these reforms since he spoke not once on the House floor in their behalf. Yet, he could have debated for such progressive legislation as the Pure Food and Drug Act, Meat Inspection Act, Hepburn Act, and Employer's Liability Act, all passed in 1906.

It is likely that Flynn, as well as McGuire, represented the "Old Guard" and "stand-pat" conservative wing of the Republican Party, which took a limited stand on progressive issues. Therefore, it is apparent that Oklahoma Territory was represented by delegates who could not be considered in the forefront of progressivism. Additional investigation of McGuire's record in the later Congresses is needed to determine if he shifted as progressivism developed.

CHAPTER IV

OKLAHOMA'S FIRST TWO CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS FOLLOWING STATEHOOD (SIXTIETH AND SIXTY-FIRST CONGRESSES, 1907-1911)

President Theodore Roosevelt shifted more to the left in his last two years in office, as he requested increased reform legislation from Congress in 1907 and 1908. In December of 1907, he sent his annual message to Congress. In its 35,000 words were recommendations for the adoption of an inheritance and income tax, the national incorporation and regulation of interstate business, the regulation of railroad securities, and the fixing of railroad rates based upon a scheme of physical evaluation. The President also called for the establishment of a postal savings bank, the limitation of labor injunctions, and the extension of the eight-hour day and workmen's compensation principles.¹

Then at the end of January, 1908, as Congress seemed disinclined to consider his proposals, Roosevelt sent it the most radical message of his entire eight years in office. Included in it were all of the proposals he had recommended the previous December together with a new one demanding the federal regulations of stock market gambling. But the real blow was delivered at the federal courts. The courts had just declared unconstitutional the railway workingmen's compensation law of

¹George Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-1912 (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), 220.

1906. The decision had evoked bitter criticism from the progressives.

In these two messages, as Professor Elting E. Morison observes, Roosevelt had proposed practically every reform that was to be made during the Taft and Wilson administrations, and even a few that were to lie dormant until the New Deal days.² But as most Presidents before him had found, Congress becomes more and more indifferent to their desires during their last months in office. Part of the reason for Roosevelt's problems with Congress lay in the traditional decline of power which all Presidents seem to experience. Deprived of patronage power, and no longer an important factor in future elections, Roosevelt's leverage with Congress diminished as his term neared its end. Another reason for the President's lack of success was the adverse economic conditions that jarred the nation in 1907. The Panic of 1907 revealed the flaws in the economy's currency and credit structure, but the business community attributed the recession to Roosevelt's radical program.

The Sixtieth Congress apparently felt much the same way, as the President received only two bills that interested progressives: a bill authorizing the temporary expansion of the currency and the establishment of a National Monetary Commission, and a workingmen's compensation measure that applied only to the railroads. Roosevelt's major proposals of a progressive nature were ignored. In addition to the bills signed by the President, two other bills concerned progressives but did not reach the President's desk: a child labor bill for the District of Columbia, which died on the House calendar;

²Elting E. Morison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951-1954), VI, 922.

and a bill to create a Bureau of Mines within the Interior Department, which passed the House but died in the Senate Mines and Mining Committee. The major consideration of the first segment of this chapter will be to evaluate the response to these bills by the new voting delegation from Oklahoma to the United States House.

The Oklahoma Enabling Act, which allocated Oklahoma five congressmen, was signed into law on June 16, 1906. The boundary scheme of the act had encouraged Republicans in the hope of capturing all three of the districts touching the Kansas border (see Figure 3). But the Democratic landslide in the special election of September 17, 1907, carried into all but the first district, where Delegate McGuire of Pawnee, for whom it was especially designed, won by a narrow margin over William L. Eagleton, 22,362 to 21,003. Elmer L. Fulton of Oklahoma City took the measure of former Governor Thompson Ferguson of Watonga, 26,006 to 25,028 in the second, and James S. Davenport of Vinita, former speaker of the Cherokee House, defeated Frank C. Hubbard of Muskogee in the third, 26,370 to 23,623. Under this district system, which lasted until 1914, the two southern districts were conceded to the Democrats from the beginning. Charles D. Carter of Ardmore in the southeastern fourth won a decided majority of 29,782 to 15,752 over Loren G. Disney, the Republican candidate. In the southwestern fifth district, Scott Ferris of Lawton defeated Henry D. McKnight by the wide margin of 32,935 to 14,883. Both of these latter Congressmen won four successive elections by widening majorities to retain their seats for the duration of the 1907 district boundaries. After 1914, representing new and smaller districts, they continued their long careers in the lower house to complete ten and

seven terms, respectively.³

To cope with the Panic of 1907, the Sixtieth Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Bill, an emergency currency measure. It authorized national banks for a period of six years to issue circulating notes based on commercial paper and state, county, and municipal bonds. In order to limit bank note emission based on securities other than Federal bonds, a graduated tax up to 10% was levied on such notes. While the bill introduced some elasticity into the national currency, it provided no safeguards for the credit supply. The most important provision was the establishment of a National Monetary Commission authorized to investigate and report upon the banking and currency systems of the United States and European countries. Its report, submitted to Congress in 1912, contained legislative proposals that were incorporated in modified form in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. The bill is important in the study of progressivism because LaFollette's Weekly, a leading progressive journal, described it as "the most important legislation of the 60th Congress." The magazine opposed the bill by picturing it as being "designed to enable the Standard Oil-Morgan financial system to perfect its strangle hold upon the money supply of the country."⁴ How the Oklahoma delegation responded to this measure pertains to the essential questions of this study.

Former territorial delegate McGuire is recorded as making no

³Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, David R. Morgan, and Larry G. Edwards, Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections (Norman, Oklahoma: Bureau of Government Research, 1970), 28-30.

⁴LaFollette's Weekly Magazine, II (June 18, 1910), 5.

speeches for or against the Vreeland Bill when it was introduced into the House. However, the Blackwell Times-Record of June 16, 1910, stated that Congressman McGuire had supported the emergency currency act to relieve the panic.⁵ Moreover, LaFollette's Weekly reported that he had voted for the Vreeland Bill when it passed the House, and paired in favor of the Aldrich-Vreeland Conference Bill on final passage.⁶ In examining the Congressional Record, the evidence indicates that McGuire did vote in the affirmative on both, the original H. R. 21871 introduced by Representative Edward B. Vreeland of New York, and the Aldrich-Vreeland Conference Bill which passed the House on May 14, 1908, by a vote of 185 to 145. McGuire, the lone Republican in the Oklahoma delegation, was the only "yea" vote found among Oklahoma's new Congressmen. "Insurgent" Republicans, such as Victor Murdock of Kansas, C. A. Lindbergh of Minnesota, and E. A. Morse of Wisconsin, voted against the bill; therefore, it was not a party measure. All Oklahoma Democrats, Ferris, Carter, Davenport, and Fulton, voted "nay" on the Aldrich-Vreeland Bill, which became law on May 30, 1908. There is no evidence, other than their vote, to show their opposition to the measure.⁷

The only other bill enacted by the Sixtieth Congress that interested progressives was the Second Employer's Liability Act, which covered only railroads. The bill (H. R. 20194), introduced by Illinois Congressman John A. Sterling, experienced no opposition among the

⁵ Blackwell Times-Record, June 17, 1910.

⁶ LaFollette's Weekly Magazine, II (June 18, 1910), 5.

⁷ U. S., Congressional Record, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 1908, XLII, Part 7, 6294-6295.

Oklahoma delegation. Representative Davenport was recorded as not voting, but the remaining four, including McGuire, voted yes on this proposition.⁸ However, there is no evidence to demonstrate that any of the delegates spoke on the House floor or anywhere in the state on behalf of this issue which deeply interested progressives, especially the social justice wing.

Two additional bills of the Sixtieth Congress that did not reach the White House, but which received attention among progressive circles, were H. R. 16063, written to regulate the employment of child labor in the District of Columbia, and H. R. 20883, which was a bill to create a Bureau of Mines in the Department of the Interior. The child labor bill, offered by Congressman Samuel Smith of Michigan, was designed to set an example in the District for the rest of the nation. It was reported out of the Committee on the District of Columbia, but died on the House calendar. Scanty evidence discloses that none of the Oklahoma Congressmen spoke for this bill. The only information discovered concerning this legislation was a Chandler News-Publicist article which stated that Bird McGuire supported an act prohibiting child labor in the District of Columbia.⁹

The Bureau of Mines bill, important to progressives because of its provisions for miner safety, did come before the House for a vote on May 21, 1908, and passed 222 to 29. Among the Oklahoma legislators, McGuire and Davenport did not show enough interest to record a vote,

⁸U. S., Congressional Record, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 1908, XLII, Part 5, 4438-4439.

⁹Chandler News-Publicist, June 3, 1910.

but Carter, Ferris, and Fulton supported the resolution.¹⁰ The bill died in the Senate but later reappeared for legislative action during the Wilson administration.

Besides the enacted legislation, this study is also interested in the numerous bills introduced by the fledgling Congressmen from Oklahoma. None of these was ever brought to the House floor for approval, dying in committee or on the House calendar. Nevertheless, the type of resolutions put forward by the delegates during the Sixtieth Congress will serve as some measure of their progressivism.

The most active Oklahoma Congressman in the Sixtieth Congress, as far as legislation presented is concerned, was Elmer L. Fulton of district two. It is also important to look at Fulton's record more carefully since he was replaced by Dick T. Morgan in the election of 1908 and was never re-elected to Congress. Since Fulton was from Oklahoma City, he received considerable publicity in the Daily Oklahoman, most of which was favorable due to its Democratic leanings. In two separate editorial statements concerning Fulton's election to Congress in 1907, the paper was full of praise. One article reviewed Fulton's personal characteristics but said little regarding national issues. However, the second article pointed out that Fulton's platform breathed the "spirit of genuine democracy."

It opposes graft in all forms, whether it be in the form of tariff rates, ship subsidies, railroad rates, asset currency or something else, and stands for those things which will conserve the best interests of every citizen of Oklahoma.¹¹

¹⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 1908, XLII, Part 7, 6723-6724.

¹¹Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, March 8, 1907.

Fulton was again praised by the Oklahoman as he faced re-election in 1908. In an article headlined "What the Oklahoma Delegation Did and Expects to Do in Congress," he was commended for introducing in the Sixtieth Congress the initiative, referendum, and recall in national affairs (H. J. Res. 43 and H. J. Res. 44); the election of United States Senators by direct vote (H. J. Res. 70); an income and inheritance tax amendment (H. J. Res. 71); publicity of all campaign expenditures at stated intervals before elections (H. R. 9193); the repeal of import duties on lumber, printing paper, hides, leather, and all farm and agricultural implements and machinery (H. R. 9190); and an amendment to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 making restraint of trade a felony instead of a misdemeanor (H. R. 9191).¹² While none was reported out of committee, they were of vital concern to progressives.

During Fulton's unsuccessful campaign for re-election in 1908, he condemned the Republican Party's continued support of high tariff schedules. Speaking before approximately 1,000 people in Oklahoma City, the second district representative declared that tariffs were responsible for the miserable plight of the American farmer. The price of the farmer's products have decreased 15 per cent, proclaimed Fulton, while his cost of living has increased 17 per cent.¹³

Although Fulton enjoyed limited service, many of the bills he introduced were to become reality as progressivism developed. It would thus appear that Representative Fulton was ahead of his times

¹²Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, August 9, 1908.

¹³Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, July 21, 1908.

in achieving political and economic reform. His defeat in the election of 1908 may also indicate that he was ahead of his constituents in demanding these progressive changes.

Like Fulton, Scott Ferris was busy during December of 1907, introducing a Constitutional amendment providing for direct election of United States Senators (H. J. Res. 61). Ferris also proposed two bills pertaining to the regulation of railroads. One was to regulate and establish a uniform passenger rate on railroads engaged in interstate commerce (H. R. 9113). The other would require payment by the railroads of attorney's fees in personal injury and loss claims to employees (H. R. 9114). The other three delegates, Carter, Davenport, and McGuire, were relatively inactive on issues of progressive nature, as they presented only numerous pension bills.

The unsatisfied legislative demands of Theodore Roosevelt in 1907 and 1908 had provided the progressives with a program. By the time Roosevelt left office and Taft became President in 1909, a distinct cleavage had appeared in both parties. The Republican Party was clearly dividing into two groups: the conservative or "stand-pat" element, which were still in the majority, and the progressive or "insurgent" wing, which was beginning to merit attention. The Democratic Party was also divided, with the Bryan Democrats, the progressive wing of the party, in the majority, and the conservative group in the minority. The potential coalition of progressive Republicans and Democrats in the House spelled trouble for the "stand-pat" Republicans, led by Speaker Joseph Cannon.

Even though William Jennings Bryan carried Oklahoma over Taft in the presidential contest of 1908, the Republicans won three of the

five congressional races. Dick T. Morgan, former mathematics professor and Woodward lawyer, replaced Elmer L. Fulton in the second district by a margin of 26,273 to 25,349; and Charles E. Creager, Muskogee postmaster and former newspaperman, ousted James S. Davenport in the third by a vote of 24,952 to 23,881. Bird S. McGuire defeated Henry S. Johnston of Perry, 23,312 to 20,501, to hold the first district for the Republicans. Charles Carter easily won the fourth district by a margin of over 6,000 votes, and the Republicans failed to field a candidate to oppose Scott Ferris in the fifth.¹⁴

When the first session of the Sixty-first Congress convened on March 15, 1909, the Republicans still controlled the House. The first order of business was to elect the Speaker. The Oklahoma delegation voted along party lines, with McGuire, Morgan, and Creager supporting Joseph Cannon of Illinois, who had held the post since 1903, and Ferris and Carter supporting Champ Clark of Missouri. With this issue settled, the Sixty-first Congress turned to what became its five major accomplishments: the Payne-Aldrich tariff, the resolution initiating an income tax amendment to the Constitution, a significant change in the rules of the House drastically curtailing the power of the Speaker, the Mann-Elkins railroad act, and the law authorizing the establishment of postal savings banks.

The Sixty-first Congress was called into special session by President Taft to deal with the tariff. Popularly blamed for the high cost of living, tied up in the public mind with "the trusts" and "the interests," the tariff was one of the chief issues on which

¹⁴Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections, 31-33.

progressives and "stand-patters" of both parties appeared to be dividing. In the House, the Payne bill made some reductions in the existing tariff schedule, and a number of raw materials were put on the free list.¹⁵ In the Senate, however, Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island was still powerful enough to defend the protectionist position, and duties which had been lowered by the House were raised again.¹⁶ The final outcome was the Payne-Aldrich tariff, destined to play an important role in progressivism. All the Congressmen from Oklahoma took advantage of their opportunities to be heard from the floor of the House of Representatives and delivered speeches in behalf of their convictions regarding the tariff of 1909.

Dick T. Morgan, the new Republican member from the second district, was the first to be heard. On March 31, 1909, his "maiden speech" concerned the gypsum clause in the 1909 tariff.¹⁷ The Dingley tariff of 1897 had placed a duty of fifty cents per ton on gypsum and \$2.25 per ton upon calcined or ground gypsum. The Payne bill proposed a duty of forty cents on crude gypsum and \$1.75 upon ground gypsum. Morgan opposed this reduction because western Oklahoma was in the center of a gypsum deposit stretching across four states. A substantial protective tariff should be retained for such an infant industry, he declared, for under the existing tariff protection, seven gypsum mills had been located in his district.

Continuing, Representative Morgan declared that the Republican

¹⁵ F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914), 372-373.

¹⁶ Ibid., 375-377.

¹⁷ The Oklahoma State Capital, April 6, 1909.

Party had always maintained that a protective tariff does not raise the price of commodities as the Democrats believed, but "that home competition, the development of manufacturing plants, improvement in machinery, the acquirement of greater skill among our mechanics and artisans will . . . cause a great reduction in the price of the article so protected." He proved his point by stating that the price of gypsum had fallen by more than 33% after the duty had been placed on it. Morgan concluded his argument by saying that the Republican Party had insisted that a protective tariff is not class legislation, but that it has a dual purpose, for it furnishes revenue and it "scatters its blessings to every section of the country and to the people in every occupation and calling."¹⁸ Thus the representative from district two had supported the protection of home industries.

On April 2, Scott Ferris, one of the two Democrats in the new delegation, made a vehement speech on the floor of the House against the tariff in general. He began his speech by saying:

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, the Payne bill (H. R. 1438) bears the following title: 'To provide revenue, equalize duties and encourage the industries of the United States, and for other purposes.' I submit a more appropriate title would be: 'To raise revenue moderately, to encourage industries hugely, to issue bonds lavishly, to invade state rights perceptibly, to equalize duties terribly, and for other purposes too numerous to mention, of which the American people can never hope to know or understand.'¹⁹

He then asked Congress to remove the duty on iron and agricultural implements, as "any rate you fix is prohibitive." The iron and steel

¹⁸U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, Part 1, 709-711.

¹⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, Part 1, 907.

industries, said Ferris, have admitted that they no longer need protection, with even Andrew Carnegie so testifying before the House Ways and Means Committee. Ferris demanded that barbed wire be placed on the free list.

Then Ferris brought up the tariff subject that was nearest to the interests of the majority of his constituents, free lumber. With his state just emerging from the sod house era, Ferris pleaded, "Free the home builders of the Nation from the clutches of the lumber trust." He also advocated eliminating the tariff on wood pulp and print paper because it was "but a premium on education, a premium on the press . . . and I might say even on intelligence." His idea of conservation of the forests was to place lumber on the free list, thus allowing foreign lumber to come in and thereby saving our own supply.²⁰

Ferris then attacked the theory of protection for which the Payne bill stood. As he saw it, the manufacturers wanted the government to pay them for running businesses which without government aid would run at a loss. And it appeared to Ferris that the greatest of the trusts always were running at a loss whenever it came time for Congress to meet. Then employing a bit of irony, Ferris said:

If it be advisable to pay men to manufacture . . . why could we not with the same logic pay the merchant, the artisan, the farmer, or the laborer for his daily toils when they were insufficient to maintain him in luxury and splendor? We may all feel thankful . . . that there is one industry in the land today that needs no subsidies, that needs no tariff, that needs nothing but brains and brawn to maintain itself. It is the industry arising from our fertile soil, the business of agriculture.

Continuing, he proclaimed that the protective tariff does not fall

²⁰Ibid., 908.

upon all like spring showers but rather it comes "from the thread-bare pockets of the needy who toil and slave."²¹

Ferris concluded his speech by contrasting the philosophies of the two political parties in regard to prosperity. He believed that the Republicans would have prosperity if they had to borrow money, or "even if they have to take it." The Democratic theory of prosperity was "an abundance of commodities fairly distributed among those who produce them." "This is a tariff without profit to the government, tariff without advantage to the producer, tariff that ravishes the consumer," proclaimed Ferris. As a final statement to his lengthy speech, which was interrupted over thirty times by applause and laughter, he emphatically declared:

You of the Republican faith believe it is right to tax the masses for protection, enrichment, and benefit of the few, to the end that they may distribute prosperity among us as to them of right appear The Democratic theory often stated . . . that equal rights to all and special privilege to none should be and is the watchword of all free government.²²

It is interesting to note that although Ferris vigorously opposed protective provisions in the Payne bill, he was as deeply opposed to placing hides on the free list. A protective tariff on hides would benefit one of the larger industries of the state of that period. Nevertheless, he insisted that all products closely connected with hides should be placed on the free list, such as finished leather.

Taking the opposite view from that of Ferris, Charles E. Greager, the other new Republican Congressman from Oklahoma, spoke on April 3

²¹Ibid., 909.

²²Ibid., 910.

on "The Indian and Protection." The theme of his argument was "for American protection to the original citizen--the Indian." He began by tracing the plight of the Creek and Cherokee Nations to statehood. They hold land now that they call home, said Creager, not of their own choice, but because they were driven there at the point of the bayonet by a Democratic administration. That same party left them there to starve and freeze until they were finally "clothed and fed by the party of protection--the party which now offers protection to their industries and their crops." Creager went on to say that despite the suffering experienced by the Indian, they had worked together with whites from surrounding states to form the forty-sixth state of the union, and "Oklahoma today is an apt pupil in the school of protection."²³

Creager then reviewed the protectionist policies on oil being utilized by both neighbors of the United States, Canada and Mexico. In view of these facts, Creager encouraged the United States to be true to her duty to the Indian citizen and "to guarantee to his production privileges and benefits and encouragement equal at least to that afforded by our nearest neighbors."²⁴

According to Representative Creager, the Indians and whites of Oklahoma were also interested in the protection of other industries. Coal, lead, and zinc producers were anxious, stated Creager, for continued profits "guaranteed to them by the Republican doctrine of protection." In conclusion, he pointed out that "the sword of the

²³U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, Part 5, 13.

²⁴Ibid.

Cherokee has never been drawn against the white man or his Government," but rather the Indian has always aided in every time of peril. He now believed that the Indian should be " . . . permitted to enjoy the blessings of real American protection in their every industry."²⁵

On April 6, Congressman McGuire from Pawnee delivered a speech against placing hides on the free list. He introduced his speech by stating this was the first time that he had ever spoken against any part of a committee bill. He then announced his stand on protection:

I am a protectionist and in advocating protection upon hides I am absolutely and unqualifiedly doing it, I believe, in the interests of the principles of the great Republican party of this country.²⁶

The Daily Oklahoman on March 7, 1909 carried an article that showed there was not only disaffection among the ranks of the national Republicans, but also a split beginning to evolve in the Oklahoma Republicans. The row that developed was between Joe Norris, chairman of the Republican State Committee, and Cash Cade, a member of the Republican National Committee, and the topic was patronage. Bird McGuire lined up behind Norris while Creager backed Cade. Morgan rode the fence, but later seemed to favor Cade. This split with McGuire had to be considered a major factor in Morgan's frequently voting with the Democrats from Oklahoma.²⁷

Much of April 6, 1909 was spent discussing lumber and hides schedules. The backers of free lumber in the House were defeated by a margin of six votes after the striking out of the countervailing duty

²⁵Ibid., 14.

²⁶U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, Part 2, 1144.

²⁷Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, March 7, 1909.

on lumber. The people of Oklahoma, many living in sod houses, were interested in the vote of the Oklahoma House members on the free lumber amendment. McGuire, Morgan, and Creager voted against it; Ferris and Carter voted for it. David DeArmond of Missouri introduced a similar amendment, and again the Oklahoma vote was the same. An amendment reducing the tariff on lumber two dollars per thousand feet was introduced. Only McGuire voted against it.²⁸

After a month of debate, the Payne bill (H. R. 1438) was voted on April 9, 1909. The first three amendments were related to lumber. The first would admit lumber free of duty, being defeated 244 to 133, with Carter, Ferris, and Morgan favoring it, and Creager and McGuire opposing it. The second amendment revised downward the tariff on finished lumber. It too was defeated 200 to 180, with the Oklahoma vote identical to that on the previous amendment. A vote was then taken on an amendment to paragraph 708 which would have placed certain rough lumber on the free list. This was also defeated 200 to 181, with the Oklahoma Congressmen voting as they had on the first two amendments.²⁹

The second amendment topic to be considered was the tariff raising the duty on barley from fifteen to twenty-four cents per bushel and on barley malt from twenty-five to forty cents per bushel. It passed by a count of 194 to 186, as McGuire, Creager, and Morgan voted for it, and Carter and Ferris voted against it.³⁰ An amendment

²⁸Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, April 7, 1909.

²⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, Part 2, 1294-1296.

³⁰Ibid., 1296-1297.

was then presented which read, "Hides of cattle, raw or uncured, whether dried, salted, or pickled, ten per cent ad valorem." This was defeated by a vote of 274 to 103. The Oklahoma Republicans voted for the duty, while Ferris and Carter opposed it. Ferris voted against the duty although, as previously shown, he opposed the placing of hides on the free list in his speech of April 2. Another topic of interest to Oklahomans was oil, which was on the free list at that time, but a countervailing duty³¹ prevailed. An amendment had been proposed which provided that the countervailing proviso be deleted. The amendment was ordered by a vote of 322 to 47. Carter, Ferris, and Morgan voted in favor of striking out the proviso, Creager voted for retaining it, and McGuire did not vote.³²

After the disposal of these amendments, Champ Clark of Missouri made a motion to recommit the whole bill to the Committee of Ways and Means. This resolution also contained several amendments which would have lowered the proposed tariff rates and provided for a graduated income tax. The vote on recommitment was 162 for and 218 against. Carter and Ferris favored the Clark resolution; Creager, McGuire, and Morgan opposed it.³³ The Payne bill was then considered as a whole. The result was "yeas" 217, "nays" 161, answered "present" 1, "not voting" 9. Creager, McGuire, and Morgan favored the bill; Carter and Ferris opposed it.³⁴

³¹ A countervailing duty is a special surtax designed to insure that American producers remain competitive with foreign producers.

³² Ibid., 1299-1300.

³³ Ibid., 1300-1301.

³⁴ Ibid., 1300-1301.

Immediately the Daily Oklahoman began a withering attack upon the Congressman from its district, Dick T. Morgan. One article accused him of voting sod houses for the farmers, that is, he supported the then existing duties on lumber. It went on to say that "the prevailing high prices on lumber were largely artificial . . . the American forests are practically exhausted. We depend in large measure for our lumber supply upon the Canadian forests. In importing the same, we pay import duties averaging about fifty per cent of the total cost" In spite of this, the article concluded, Morgan voted for the tariff on lumber. "He evidently likes to see the farmers living in sod houses."³⁵

An editorial entitled "Oklahoma's Tariff Dromios"³⁶ appeared the next day in the same newspaper. The three Oklahoma Republicans, according to the article, had voted to continue the high protective schedules on lumber while the two Democrats had voted "in the interests of the people of Oklahoma and for tariff reduction on lumber." The editorial continued, "It will be remembered also . . . that the same three Republican Congressmen voted for the re-election of Mr. Cannon as speaker . . . and a continuance of the tyrannous house rules."³⁷

On April 13, Scott Ferris arrived at Lawton for a few days while the tariff bill was being considered in the Senate. The Daily Oklahoman interviewed Ferris and the result was a story the following day on "Morgan Votes for Lumber Tariff." This article stated that

³⁵ Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, April 10, 1909.

³⁶ These were two characters in Shakespeare's "The Comedy of Errors." They were twin brothers of close resemblance.

³⁷ Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, April 11, 1909.

Ferris "expresses great dissatisfaction with the tariff law, especially because of its neglect of western interests." The story further stated that Morgan voted, along with the other two Republicans, against the proposition putting lumber on the free list. And later, when Champ Clark put forth another amendment placing lumber on the free list, Morgan voted against it. Ferris stated:

I went to Morgan . . . and said to him, 'The people in your district will get you for that.' 'Oh, I can't vote with you Democrats all the time,' was the reply.

The article concluded by pointing out that in addition to lumber, Morgan had voted against reducing the duty on barbed wire, as did the other two Republicans from Oklahoma.³⁸

In yet another editorial on April 16, the Oklahoman wrote on "Morgan and Free Lumber." The editor stated that on April 13, Morgan sent a telegram to the Oklahoman which read, "In the committee of the whole and in the House I voted to put lumber on the free list. Your Washington dispatch untrue. Please publish telegram and make editorial correction. The people entitled to the truth." The paper's investigation of the affair proved that Morgan had voted against free lumber in the committee and then to save face had changed his vote when it was to be recorded. The editor summarized by denouncing Morgan as a dodger, and that if he and the other dodgers had voted for free lumber in the committee, the free lumber resolution would have carried.³⁹

On April 19, the Guthrie Leader carried an editorial which said, "First thing you know Congressman Morgan will be denying that he repre-

³⁸Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, April 14, 1909.

³⁹Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, April 16, 1909.

sents that northwest district."⁴⁰ On the same day, Morgan delivered a speech in the House on the tariff. In this speech he attempted to explain how the policy of protection would be beneficial to the farmer.

Morgan believed there was no possible way the farmer could be benefited by removing tariff walls and placing agricultural products on the free list. He reasoned that the reduction of the tariff would not increase the capacity of the American people to consume, and, therefore, the result would be less manufacturing at home. With a decrease in manufacturing, he continued, there would be an increase in unemployment. With a high rate of unemployment, Morgan observed that these people would have only one place to go and that was to the farms. There they would become competitors of the farmer, whereas before they had been customers.

The old question of why people left the farms and went to the cities was easy for Morgan to answer. It was due to the policy of protection, he avowed, because no person would go to the cities unless employment was offered. According to Congressman Morgan, the motivating force behind this employment was the protective tariff to industries and labor. The second district delegate viewed the protective tariff as giving the farmer better customers, as well as more customers, because they have more purchasing power. He then submitted a table comparing wages in 1903 in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and France. It showed that wages were from 100 to 200 per cent higher in the United States. Thus, Morgan said, the protective

⁴⁰ Guthrie Daily Leader, April 19, 1909.

tariff had given a protected market to the farmers. He pointed out that within five hundred miles of the Canadian boundary are located the large cities of the United States; and that if the duty were taken off farm products, the two million farmers of Canada would find a enormous market for their commodities.

The results of the Dingley tariff of 1897 were used by Morgan to provide additional proof for his argument for a protective tariff. He cited facts to show that in eight years, the national wealth had increased twenty per cent, and that in ten years the increase in money circulation had been over one hundred per cent. Deposits in savings banks, according to Morgan, had increased more than sixty per cent during the period from 1896 to 1908. Then he concluded his lengthy defense of protection by saying, "Does this support the charge that the Republican party, by its protective tariff policy, legislates for the benefit of the few and not for all?"⁴¹ Thus Morgan failed to realize that America had exportable surpluses of farm products, thereby needing no protection.

On July 8, the tariff of 1909 passed the Senate with several amendments, most of which raised the duties upward. Following passage, Senator Aldrich made a motion "that the Senate insist upon its amendments to the bill and ask for a conference with the House of Representatives upon the bill and amendments." The motion was agreed to.⁴² The next day, the House of Representatives voted on the question of

⁴¹U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, Part 5, 56-58.

⁴²U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, Part 4, 4316.

a committee of conference to join the Senate committee, with the result being 178 for and 152 against. Creager and Morgan voted for the committee, Carter and Ferris voted against it, and McGuire did not vote. Proponents of the Payne-Aldrich bill voted for the committee so that a compromise might be reached, whereas opponents voted against it, hoping that legislation might be stalled. So the resolution was accepted and the speaker appointed the conferees.⁴³ The joint committee acted upon the bill and returned it to the House for its consideration.

In the proceedings of the House following the return of the tariff bill, Congressman Charles D. Carter, the Ardmore Democrat, spoke on July 31. Clark of Missouri, the Democratic floor leader of the debate against the tariff, yielded four minutes of his time to Carter. In his remarks, Carter passionately attacked the tariff bill as it then stood. He predicted that the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill would "doubtless prove a doleful, death-like procession to many of the liberal Republican members from west of the Allegheny Mountains" who had promised their constituents a downward revision of the tariff. He added:

The burden of explanation is on you, my friends of the majority, and not upon us, for we of the Middle West on this side of the Chamber have zealously kept the faith by voting for every reduction which your special cloture rules would permit.⁴⁴

Carter continued by stating that representatives had been sent to Congress for the specific purpose of revising the tariff downward, but "the height of inconsistency was reached" when a tariff commission

⁴³ Ibid., 4384-4385.

⁴⁴ U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, Part 5, 4750.

was appointed from the Republican Party "whose political success depends largely on campaign funds contributed by the tariff barons." He concluded his speech by saying that some day there would be an equitable adjustment of the tariff, but it would not come from the Republican Party, "a subsidized auxiliary of predatory wealth, but by a just, sensible and united Democracy backed and fortified by public opinion at last aroused to the abuses committed in the name of Republicanism."⁴⁵

On the same date as Representative Carter's speech, the House voted on the conference report. They first voted on recommitting the bill to the conference committee, which was rejected by a margin of 191 to 186. Ferris and Carter voted for recommitment, while the three Republicans voted negatively. Then the vote was taken on agreeing to the conference report, with the count being 195 in favor and 183 against. The Oklahomans voted according to their party affiliations.⁴⁶ The bill then went back to the Senate, was voted on, August 5, and passed 47 to 31. The President signed the bill on the same day.⁴⁷

The next day the Daily Oklahoman severely criticized President Taft for signing the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill. The editorial declared:

If President Taft is sincere in his utterance relative to the measure just passed by Congress and which has received his signature, a genuine surprise awaits him when the returns from the Congressional elections are received next year, for it may confidently be expected that an indignant

⁴⁵ Ibid., 4751.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 4754-4755.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 4949.

people will reverse the present Republican majority, in the lower house, of seventy-seven members and it is likely that the upper branch will also undergo material alteration.⁴⁸

The elections of 1910 would prove just how accurate the Oklahoman's prediction was. The tariff of 1909 made little change in the existing tariff schedules. It left a high system of rates and showed an unfriendly attitude towards foreign trade. The worst feature of the special session was the fact that industrial magnates still unquestionably held an upper hand in Congress.⁴⁹ This fact gave more support for the progressive belief that the tariff was "the mother of the trusts." The protest from the progressive wings of both parties was vigorous and undoubtedly would play a significant role in the composition of the next Congress.

In the course of the tariff debate, another issue arose that concerned progressives. The reform minded of both parties saw the income tax as a more equitable means of financing the government than the protective tariff, which bore heavily on the consumer. On April 15, 1909, Senator Joseph W. Bailey of Texas introduced an income tax amendment to the tariff bill. According to Cordell Hull, the "Old Guard" crowd in charge of the Senate under the leadership of Aldrich saw there was a real chance of the provision being approved. Therefore, they proposed, instead of the rider on the tariff bill, a Constitutional amendment which they felt would never be ratified. By

⁴⁸ Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, August 6, 1909.

⁴⁹ Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, 407-408.

this plan, they could have it both ways.⁵⁰

The original Bailey amendment called for a flat 3 percent on all individual and corporate incomes over \$5,000. On April 21, Senator Albert B. Cummins, a leading "insurgent," introduced an income tax amendment calling for a graduated income tax. On June 11, Cummins and Bailey compromised and agreed to unite their followers behind a 2 per cent income tax on all incomes over \$5,000.⁵¹ It passed the House by a vote of 318 to 14. Carter, Ferris, Morgan, and Creager all voted in favor of the resolution while McGuire dodged the issue by not voting.⁵² But strong White House pressure forced the Senate to postpone consideration until after the completion of the tariff schedule. Apparently none of the Oklahoma delegates felt strongly enough about the proposal to speak in support of it, nor did other evidence indicate their attitudes on the issue.

Three months after the second session of the Sixty-first Congress convened, Republicans in the House split again along progressive-"stand-pat" lines over the issue popularly called "Cannonism." As previously mentioned, the Speaker of the House had been given increasing power over the years. He appointed members to House committees, and through his membership on the Rules Committee and the power of appointing its members, he could decide what legislation should come

⁵⁰Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), I, 60.

⁵¹U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, Part 3, 3136-3137; Kenneth W. Hechler, Insurgency: Personalities and Politics in the Taft Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 148.

⁵²U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, Part 4, 4440.

before the House. Through the power of recognition he decided who would and would not be heard. Complaints had multiplied against the undemocratic nature of this system. In addition, it was widely felt that Speaker Cannon had wielded his power for the benefit of large business interests, so the question became not only one of democracy versus oligarchy, but also the familiar one of "the people" versus "the interests." "Cannonism" had become a symbolic term.⁵³

The very nature of the system made change extremely difficult. A bill to revise the rules would have to clear the Rules Committee before it could come to the floor of the House, an unlikely event at best. Once in each Congress when the House adopted rules, an opportunity existed, but at this point the Speaker's power of recognition was the hurdle. Undismayed by these apparently insurmountable obstacles, George Norris, an "insurgent" Republican from Nebraska, had composed a motion which he kept in his pocket in the hopes that an opportunity to put it before the House might occur. On March 17, 1910, the opportunity came. The day before, Speaker Cannon had held a motion dealing with the census to be privileged on the grounds that the Constitution required a census to be taken. Congressman Norris thereupon offered his motion to change the composition of the Rules Committee and its method of selection, arguing that his motion should also be privileged because the Constitution permitted the House to make its own rules. One of Cannon's lieutenants immediately raised a point of order against Norris' motion, which the Speaker sustained. An appeal from the decision of the chair promptly followed, and on a

⁵³Mark Sullivan, "The People's One Chance in Two Years," Colliers, XLIII (March 6, 1909), 15.

roll call vote Norris won 180 to 159. Ferris and Carter voted with Norris; the three Republicans adhered to the principles of "Cannonism."⁵⁴

Norris thereupon offered a substitute motion (H. R. 502) which represented an agreement with Champ Clark, speaking for the Democratic caucus. The new motion proposed to establish a Committee on Rules of ten members, six of the majority and four of the minority, to be elected by the House. The Speaker was not to be a member, and the Committee was to elect its own chairman. The Norris resolution passed by a final vote of 191 to 156. Again both Carter and Ferris gave a positive indication of their attitude toward progressivism by voting for the resolution. Creager, Morgan, and McGuire failed to join the "insurgent" Republicans, as they stood firmly with the "Old Guard" and Speaker Cannon and cast their votes against the resolution.⁵⁵

The law establishing postal savings depositories has often been cited as one of the progressive achievements of the Taft Administration, and it was by and large one which progressives favored. Since a provision of this kind had been endorsed by both party platforms of 1908, it might have been expected to be a relatively uncontroversial measure. However, among the supporters of the postal savings idea there was a division between those who approved of the administration bill (S. 5876), and those who opposed it because they feared that deposits could be drained off to the large cities and Wall Street. Therefore, in the House, a substitute amendment was proposed by David

⁵⁴U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLV, Part 4, 3435.

⁵⁵Ibid., 3436.

Finley of South Carolina (H. Res. 729) which followed the theory of the postal savings bank plank of the Democratic Platform of 1908:

We favor a postal savings bank if the guaranteed bank can not be secured, and that it be constituted so as to keep the deposited money in the communities where it is established. But we condemn the policy of the Republican party in proposing postal savings banks under a plan of conduct by which it will aggregate the deposits of rural communities and re-deposit the same, while under government charge, in the banks of Wall Street, thus depleting the circulating medium of the producing regions and unjustly favoring the speculative market.⁵⁶

For some reason which is not clear, since the Bryan Democrats and "insurgent" Republicans supported the idea of keeping deposits at home, they could not muster enough support to pass the substitute bill, even though George Norris lent his strong support. The vote was 114 for and 195 against, as Ferris supported the substitute; McGuire, Morgan, and Creager opposed it; and Carter did not vote. The administration bill was then presented and passed 192 to 113, as McGuire, Morgan, and Creager favored it, Ferris opposed it, and Carter did not vote.⁵⁷

The last major accomplishment of the Sixty-first Congress was the Mann-Elkins Act, which had been recommended by President Taft. It was generally favored by progressives, especially the railroad regulation clause dealing with the long and short haul problem. But many progressives opposed the administration bill due to its lack of a provision for the physical evaluation of railroads and because of the broad powers given the Commerce Court. The progressives had managed

⁵⁶ U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLV, Part 7, 7758.

⁵⁷ U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLV, Part 7, 7765-7767.

to add to the administration bill a provision which placed telephone, telegraph, and wireless companies under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Only Dick Morgan of the Oklahoma delegation spoke on either the administration or substitute bill. Five days before the bill passed the House, he arose to support the administration proposal and to discuss the issue of rate discrimination in the Southwest. He saw no reason why rates charged by steamship companies carrying freight from New York to the Gulf ports should not be placed under the regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission. He concluded:

If this control is not necessary, if there are no evils to remedy, if there are no wrongs to right, if there are no discriminations to correct, if there are no unfair methods of practices to abolish . . . then we lost nothing by giving this additional power to the Interstate Commerce Commission.⁵⁸

On May 10 the bill passed the House by a vote 201 to 126. The Oklahoma delegation apparently held mixed emotions about the administration bill, as McGuire and Morgan voted for it, Carter voted against it, Ferris answered "present," and Creager did not vote.⁵⁹

As to further activity of the Oklahoma representatives during the Sixty-first Congress, both Scott Ferris and Dick Morgan deserve additional attention due to the remarks made on topics that were of interest to progressives. None of the other three is recorded as having introduced any significant legislation or delivered any major speeches. In the second session, Ferris introduced two measures

⁵⁸U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLV, Part 6, 5853.

⁵⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLV, Part 6, 6033.

supported by progressives, especially the Bryan Democratic wing. The first bill (H. Res. 18173) was designed to prevent gambling in cotton and grain futures. It was referred to the Committee on Agriculture, but was never reported out. However, it is important to note that this proposal became law in the form of the Cotton Futures Act of 1916. The second bill (H. Res. 18174) concerned the improvement of the public highway and post road system in the United States. Both Ferris and Morgan spoke on behalf of the good roads movement, whose interests were finally put into law in 1916 as the Federal Highway Act.

In his March 1, 1910 speech, Ferris pointed out that the Federal government had appropriated \$7,000,000 between 1806 and 1838 for the improvement of highways, but since then they had appropriated nothing. Highways, stated Ferris, are not the property of one man or class of men, but are the property and interest of everyone, whether he be black or white, educated or uneducated, weak or strong, savage or civilized. "They are the property of us all, and we should all aid in their upbuilding," concluded the Oklahoma Democrat.⁶⁰

In a later speech, Morgan likewise demanded aid in the improvement of the public highway system. A number of important matters had been considered by the Sixty-first Congress, asserted Morgan, but one of the great problems pressing for a solution had been neglected, that is, the development of the public highway network. He viewed the issue as:

⁶⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLV, Part 3, 2571-2575.

One of the important measures that must receive our serious attention in the future is the enactment of laws that will enable the Federal Government to aid, so far as it can under the Constitution, in the building and construction of better public highways throughout the various States of the Union.⁶¹

Not concerned with legislation of the Sixty-first Congress, but a matter of definite interest to progressives was the conflict that erupted in 1910 between the Secretary of Interior, Richard Ballinger, and Gifford Pinchot, Chief of the United States Forest Service. This conservation controversy of 1909-1910 might have blown over, like many political squabbles, but the clash made national headlines for months and created even more of a split between progressives and conservatives, between the anti-Roosevelt people and the ex-President's friends, and between conservationists and anticonservationists.

The clash centered around certain water-power sites in Wyoming and Montana that had been withdrawn from sale during the Roosevelt Administration by Secretary of the Interior James R. Garfield. The new Secretary, Ballinger, doubted the legality of the action and reopened the lands to public entry. Pinchot publicly accused Ballinger of injuring the conservation movement in order to aid corporation interests. Siding with Pinchot was Louis Glavis, a special agent in the Interior Department, who was dismissed by order of President Taft. The feud was heightened when a Pinchot letter criticizing Ballinger was read before the Senate by Senator Jonathan Dolliver of Iowa, an "insurgent" Republican. Taft immediately ordered Pinchot's removal

⁶¹U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLVIII, Part 12, 356-357.

from office. A joint Congressional committee was established to inquire into the administration of the Interior Department. While the majority of the committee, which the progressives accused as being packed with "stand-patters," exonerated Ballinger, the dispute had already become a major issue separating the progressives and conservatives. It ultimately contributed to the break between Taft and Roosevelt. Public feeling toward Ballinger was so unfavorable that he eventually resigned in 1911 to relieve the Taft administration of further political embarrassment. The only Oklahoman serving in the Sixty-first Congress to speak out on this conservation controversy was Scott Ferris, later to become chairman of the Committee on Public Lands during the Wilson administration.

On January 7, 1910, the day after the Pinchot letter was read in the Senate by Dolliver, Ferris asked that the investigation of the Interior Department be conducted by the two Committees on Public Lands of the House and Senate. He felt that these two standing committees, which represented a large group of states, could give a more honest and less passionate evaluation than a special committee which would be appointed by the "stand-pat" leaders, which Ferris believed might be prejudiced. We must have a committee that is honestly and impartially constituted, demanded Ferris, because the American people are deeply interested in the matter and are entitled to know the truth.

In response to a question of whether the Forest Service should be simultaneously investigated, Ferris quickly replied that "no charges have been made against Pinchot, and the American people do not believe that he is in the wrong." He added that many may complain of Pin-

shot's policies, but, according to Ferris, honest policies do not make dishonest men or occasion their investigation. In relation to Agent Glavis being insubordinate to Ballinger, Ferris charged that "when it comes to conserving the Nation's assets" some of the red tape and formalities should be disregarded. When the bandit comes in the nighttime to rob our home, declared Ferris, we are not so concerned about properties. Neither should properties enter in when the Nation's resources are involved. He concluded:

We need fearless men like Glavis, who dares to attack superiors or anyone else, in order to let in the light of day. We need men like Pinchot, who stands willing to fight, even if it costs him his head.⁶²

Later in an April 20 discussion over a bill that had Ballinger's support to reopen the lands in Wyoming that had been set aside in the Roosevelt Administration, Ferris again spoke on behalf of the conservationists. He urged "the friends of real preservation of the Nation's resources to help destroy" the resolution. As a final question in regard to the Ballinger-instigated bill, he asked, "Who ever heard of the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Ballinger, who vouches for this bill, being a conservationist?"⁶³

The stand taken by Scott Ferris on reform issues was making him the leading progressive spokesman from the Oklahoma delegation in the Sixty-first Congress. As further proof of his progressive leanings, Ferris delivered a brilliant resume of progressive legislation provided

⁶²U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLV, Part 1, 399-400.

⁶³U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLVIII, Part 5, 5095.

for in the Oklahoma state constitution. In a June 9, 1910 speech, he explained that the document had advanced legislation fashioned in the interests of the people and "agreed to force as far as possible the railroads, the Standard Oil Company and its various subsidiary companies to submit to reasonable regulation . . . and to bear their just portion of the taxes." A corporation commission had been established, said Ferris, to provide that the railways would not be guilty of merger and would submit to decent regulations. He pointed to the eight-hour day which was unpopular with the interests and corporations, but would ever be appreciated by the toilers of the land.

Ferris then praised the constitution makers for such progressive political reforms as the initiative, referendum, and direct election of United States Senators. These principles "render men powerful in fact as well as in theory," said Ferris. These laws are unpopular with the "boodlers, tricksters, and ringsters," stated Ferris, "but they are near and dear to the people, for whom we should at all times act." A note of praise was given to the "insurgent" Republicans by Ferris for supporting the above reforms. "They dare to think, to act, and to do for and in behalf of their constituency, they must have the executioner's ax applied to their heads, as 'shooting is too good for them,' in the language of Uncle Joe." He concluded his remarks by eulogizing the Oklahoma constitutional convention members:

There were no reactionaries, no standpatters, no Cannonites, no Aldrichites, no high-tariff-rob-the-peopleites, but they were a body of patriotic men who were sworn to do their duty, and they did it well.⁶⁴

⁶⁴U. S., Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1910, XLVIII, Part 8, 7730-7732.

Thus it appears that the Lawton Democrat from Oklahoma's fifth district espoused many of the principles favored by the progressive movement.

In conclusion, the Sixtieth Congress has been remembered for its inactivity except for the Aldrich-Vreeland Act and the Second Employer's Liability Act. In contrast, the Sixty-first Congress is more important to this study because of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, the victory over "Cannonism," and the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy, all of which rent in twain the "stand-pat" from the progressive elements of the American political scene. It is also noteworthy as the Congress in which progressives of both parties developed a pattern of cooperation which enabled them, in some instances, to modify greatly the nature of legislation.

In evaluating the progressive nature of the Oklahoma delegation in the Sixtieth Congress, only limited observations can be made due to the paucity of significant legislation and the relative inactivity of the delegation. The major consideration of the Congress was the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908, which was passed to cope with the economic recession of 1907, but was opposed by leading progressives like LaFollette, who saw it as creating an economic strangulation of the money supply by Wall Street. As to the stand taken by Oklahomans, only Bird McGuire supported the measure which had been proposed by the "stand-patter" Nelson Aldrich. His vote for the bill indicates his continued support for the Cannon-Aldrich "stand-pat" faction rather than the Norris-LaFollette "insurgent" brand of Republicanism. The four Democrats, Carter, Ferris, Fulton, and Davenport, voted against the act, thereby showing their opposition to "stand-pat" economic policies, and placing themselves in a favorable light with leading

progressives such as Bryan and LaFollette.

In contrast to the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, McGuire joined with the four Democrats in supporting social reform passed in the shape of the Second Employer's Liability Act of 1908. The second social justice measure that came before the House was the bill which would have created a Bureau of Mines in the Interior Department. It received the support of the four Democrats, with McGuire not voting. It would seem that, at least in the Sixtieth Congress, all of the Oklahoma delegates favored the social justice phase of the progressive movement. However, it is also apparent that none of them felt strongly enough about social reform to lend vocal support on the House floor for these bills.

Although most of the Oklahoma Congressmen remained silent, two of them were active in presenting progressive legislation for House consideration. Both Ferris and Fulton proposed bills dealing with such progressive ideals as direct election of United States Senators; initiative, referendum, and recall; regulation of trusts; and the income tax. The lack of vocal support does not hide the fact that both Fulton and Ferris espoused ideas that had long been of interest to the progressive movement. The scarcity of debate on the part of the Oklahoma delegates can be attributed, in some degree, to the fact that they were neophytes in the halls of Congress. But the experience they gained in the Sixtieth Congress would be reflected by their activity in the more spirited sessions of the Sixty-first.

With two changes, Republicans Morgan and Creager replacing Democrats Fulton and Davenport, Oklahomans played a more active role in the decision-making process following the 1908 elections. The stand taken by the Oklahoma representatives on the Payne-Aldrich Tariff,

that monument to "stand-pat" Republicanism, provides the first significant signal as to how they would react to progressivism. As evidenced by their voting record and strong speeches for protection, both McGuire and Greager communicated their total support on behalf of the trusts and "stand-pat" principles. On the other hand, Morgan, the third Republican, was indecisive on the tariff. He voted for higher duties in the Committee of the Whole, but voted with the progressives in opposing higher duties on certain items. Morgan's record on the tariff indicates a trend that began to be visible in the Sixty-first Congress. That was the tendency of many delegates of hitherto unimpeachable conservatism to begin to reflect the growing progressive sentiment of their constituents. Both Democrats Carter and Ferris voted against higher duties on all commodities and delivered strong speeches against what they considered an atrocious tariff policy. Their opposition to this symbol of "stand-pat" conservatism implies the beginnings of progressivism in their legislative records.

The first great progressive success was the victory over "Cannonism." It is notable because for the first time both progressive Democrats and Republicans teamed to defeat one of the important leaders of the "stand-pat" philosophy. Both Carter and Ferris, continuing in the progressive tradition, aided in reforming the House rules to strip Speaker Cannon of his autocratic methods. On the other hand, the three Republicans voted against the Norris resolution, indicating that they did not join the "insurgent" progressive branch of the Republicans.

On the income tax amendment resolution, there was little opposition among the Oklahoma delegates. However, this is not a signifi-

cant measure of progressivism since the majority of the "stand-pat" Republicans also supported the amendment idea, rather than the rider attached to the tariff bill, in hopes that the states would never ratify such an amendment.

The postal savings bank issue and the Mann-Elkins Act are confusing because they were generally supported by progressives, but various propositions were offered in both measures that the progressives disliked. The postal savings bill supported by the Taft administration was opposed by rural progressives because they felt it would drain money off to the big cities. Morgan, McGuire, and Creager voted for the administration proposal. Carter and Ferris held true to their progressive ideals, and voted for the substitute bill which would have kept money closer to home and away from Wall Street. Thus, once again, the three Republicans from Oklahoma failed to join many of the "insurgent" Republicans such as Norris who favored the substitute bill.

The railroad regulation part of the Mann-Elkins bill was also favored by the progressives, but they opposed the administration bill due to its lack of a provision for the physical evaluation of railroads and the broad powers given the Commerce Court. This may have accounted for the reluctance on the part of Carter and Ferris to support the otherwise progressive measure. The three Republicans voted along party lines as they supported the original administration bill. But it should be pointed out that Morgan again diverged from the pattern set by McGuire and Creager, as he made a strong speech in regard to strict enforcement of the long and short haul clause.

In reviewing the actions of the Oklahoma delegation in the Sixty-first Congress, it is evident that Ferris and Carter emerge as the most

outspoken for progressive ideals, with Ferris being the most vocal in his stand against the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, "Cannonism," and Interior Secretary Ballinger's conservation policies. McGuire, Morgan, and Greager maintained strong ties with the "stand-pat" Republicans, and usually did not join the "insurgent" element in their drive for reform. However, Morgan, as indicated earlier, may have begun to shift with the growing progressive sentiment, as he, on occasion, voted with the progressives. This may have also reflected the split between McGuire and Morgan over the distribution of party patronage in Oklahoma Republican circles.

The next step of the progressives would be the election of 1910, when they hoped to capitalize upon public dissatisfaction with the "stand-pat" Republican policies. The next chapter will deal with the Oklahoma House delegation in relation to the consequences of these off-year Congressional elections and the attempt on the part of the progressives to expand their influence in the Sixty-second Congress.

CHAPTER V

THE 1910 ELECTIONS AND THE SIXTY-SECOND CONGRESS

In the off-year Congressional elections of 1910, President Taft and the Old Guard joined forces in an attempt to root "insurgency" out of the Republican Party. A plea was made by Taft to re-elect Congressmen who had been his staunch supporters. The "insurgents," in turn, were goaded by the administration's attacks into virtually declaring their independence from the party dominated by Aldrich, Cannon, and Taft. According to Arthur Link, leading historian of the period, the flames of Midwestern progressivism had become the "raging prairie fire of insurgency," and the revolt was spreading to all sections of the country except the Republican "rotten boroughs" of the South. The battles that shaped up for the fall of 1910 would decide the fate of Republicanism in the nation as well as in the Mississippi Valley.¹

The Democratic Party, like its ancient rival, was at a critical juncture in its career in 1910. It had been fourteen years since William Jennings Bryan had captured leadership of the party, and it had been fourteen years since the Democrats had possessed patronage or national office. Democratic hopes of profiting from the Congressional elections in November, 1910, exceeded their wildest expecta-

¹Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), 5-6.

tations. As Link points out, it was a virtual Democratic landslide throughout all sections of the country except the Pacific coast.² The House of Representatives went Democratic for the first time since 1892: 227 Democrats, 162 Republicans, and 1 Socialist were elected.³

Several factors may have contributed to the Republican decline. The Payne-Aldrich Tariff and Taft's support for it may have been the final straw. Certainly the high cost of living, of which the tariff was thought to be the partial cause, did not help the Republicans. The open division within the Republican ranks, as well as the traditional off-year Congressional gains by the party out of office, also aided the Democratic cause.

The purpose of the initial segment of this chapter will be to examine the critical contests of 1910 in the five Oklahoma districts in an attempt to ascertain whether the Republican decline, which was evident in the nation, carried into Oklahoma. Attention will also be focused on the 1910 campaign issues and their relation to progressivism. The last part of the chapter will look at the Oklahoma delegation in the Sixty-second Congress, which would now be under Democratic leadership, to see if any noticeable changes would occur in their sentiment toward progressivism.

The Oklahoma races in 1910 lined up as follows: Incumbent Republican Bird McGuire from Pawnee was challenged by Neil McNeill, a Democrat also from Pawnee, in the first district; Incumbent Dick Morgan, a Woodward Republican, faced former Congressman Elmer Fulton, an

²Ibid., 6.

³Ibid., 7.

Oklahoma City Democrat; Incumbent Republican Charles Creager of Muskogee and former Congressman James Davenport of Vinita squared off in the third district; Charles Carter, the Democratic incumbent from Ardmore, received competition from Charles M. Campbell of Ardmore in the fourth district; and J. H. Franklin of Lawton challenged Scott Ferris, the Democratic incumbent from Lawton, in the fifth district. Based on past legislative records, the contests in the Oklahoma districts were looked upon with particular interest as affording an opportunity, in some degree, of determining the extent to which the people would react to the all-important basic division between the progressive and the "standpatter."

National attention was directed toward the Oklahoma elections with an article, "Choose Your Congressman," by Frederic C. Howe, a leading "muckraker," in the progressive Everybody's Magazine.⁴ Howe categorized the incumbent Congressmen into the following groups: insurgents, near-insurgents, system Democrats, and system Republicans. He classified the insurgents as those who had "jeopardized their political careers in Washington and at home to organize the fight on Cannon and Cannonism." In addition, he described them as representing "Progressive ideas rather than Privilege," and they had "created the

⁴Frederic C. Howe, "Choose Your Congressmen," Everybody's Magazine, XXIII (October, 1910), 593-601.

new issues which have since awakened the country."⁵ The near-insurgents, according to Howe, were those who had voted to eliminate Cannon from the Rules Committee on March 18, 1910, but had shown

⁵Ibid., 600.

Insurgents

California:

E. A. Hayes

Iowa:

J. W. Good
G. N. Haugen
E. H. Hubbard
N. E. Kendall
C. E. Pickett
Frank P. Woods

Kansas:

E. H. Madison
Victor Murdock

Minnesota:

C. R. Davis
C. A. Lindbergh
A. J. Volstead

Nebraska:

E. H. Hinshaw
N. P. Kinkaid
G. W. Norris

North Dakota:

A. J. Gronna

Washington:

M. Poindexter

Wisconsin:

William J. Cary
H. A. Cooper
J. H. Davidson
A. W. Kopp
G. Kuestermann
Irvine L. Lenroot
E. A. Morse
John M. Nelson

"little other evidence of Progressive sympathies."⁶ None of the incumbent Republicans from Oklahoma, McGuire, Morgan or Creager, appeared on either the insurgent or near-insurgent list. The system Democrats were named by Howe because they "bolted their party as an opposition party, and joined the Republican regular members to keep

⁶Ibid., 600.

Near-Insurgents

Indiana:

William O. Barnard

Iowa:

Albert E. Dawson

Massachusetts:

Butler Ames

A. P. Gardner

Michigan:

James C. McLaughlin

Charles E. Townsend

Minnesota:

Clarence B. Miller

Halvor Steenerson

New York:

Hamilton Fish

Otto G. Foelker

Herbert Parsons

Ohio:

David A. Hollingsworth

Paul Howland

A. R. Johnson

E. L. Taylor, Jr.

South Dakota:

E. W. Martin

Cannonism in power."⁷ Neither Ferris nor Carter, the two Oklahoma Democrats, could be found on this list. Howe's last category was

⁷Ibid., 600.

System Democrats

Florida:

S. M. Sparkman

Georgia:

W. G. Brantley

W. M. Howard

L. F. Livingston

Illinois:

J. T. McDermott

Louisiana:

R. F. Broussard

Albert Esopinal

Massachusetts:

J. A. Keliher

Joseph F. O'Connell

A. J. Peters

Nevada:

G. A. Bartlett

New York:

M. F. Conroy

John J. Fitzgerald

Charles V. Fornes

H. M. Goldfogle

Joseph A. Goulden

Francis B. Harrison

G. H. Lindsay

D. J. Riordan

Tennessee:

John A. Moon

under the caption titled "system Republicans."⁸ Before naming these Congressmen, Howe explained the rationale used in the last category.

⁸Ibid., 601.

System Republicans

California:

W. F. Englebright
Julius Kahn
Joseph R. Knowland
James C. Needham
Sylvester C. Smith

Connecticut:

E. Stevens Henry
Edwin W. Higgins
Ebenezer J. Hill
N. D. Sperry
John Q. Tilson

Delaware:

William H. Heald

Idaho:

Thomas R. Hamer

Illinois:

Joseph G. Cannon
Pleasant T. Chapman
George E. Foss
Charles E. Fuller
Joseph V. Graff
Frank O. Lowden
Frederick Lundin
William J. Moxley
William B. McKinley
James McKinney
Martin B. Madden
James R. Mann
George W. Prince
William A. Rodenberg
Howard M. Snapp
John A. Sterling
N. B. Thistlewood
William W. Wilson

Indiana:

Edgar D. Crumpacker

Kentucky:

Joseph B. Bennett
Don C. Edwards
John W. Langley

Maine:

Frank E. Guernsey

Maryland:

John Kronmiller
Sydney E. Mudd
George A. Pearce

Massachusetts:

Frederick H. Gillett
William S. Greene
George P. Lawrence
Samuel W. McCall
Ernest W. Roberts
Charles Q. Tirrell
Charles G. Washburn
John W. Weeks

Michigan:

Edwin Denby
Gerrit J. Dickema
Francis H. Dodds
Joseph H. Fordney
Washington Gardner
Edward L. Hamilton
George Alvin Loud
Henry McMorran
Samuel W. Smith
H. Olin Young

Minnesota:

Frank M. Nye
Frederick C. Stevens
James A. Tawney

Iowa:

Charles A. Kennedy
Walter I. Smith

Kansas:

Daniel R. Anthony, Jr.
Philip P. Campbell

Montana:

Charles N. Pray

New Hampshire

Frank D. Currier
Cyrus A. Sulloway

New Jersey:

John J. Gardner
Benjamin F. Howell
Henry C. Loudenslager
Richard Wayne Parker
Ira W. Wood
William H. Wiley

New York:

De Alva S. Alexander
John E. Andrus
William S. Bennet
Thomas W. Bradley
William M. Calder
William W. Cocks
William H. Draper
Michael E. Driscoll
Cyrus Durey
John W. Dwight
George W. Fairchild
J. Sloat Fassett
Charles L. Knapp
Charles B. Law
George R. Malby
Charles S. Millington
J. Van Vechten Olcott
Sereno E. Payne
James S. Simmons
George N. Southwick
Edward B. Vreeland
Richard Young

North Carolina:

Charles H. Cowles
John G. Grant
John M. Moorehead

Missouri:

Richard Bartholdt
Harry M. Coudrey
Charles A. Crow
Politte Elvins
Charles H. Morgan
Arthur P. Murphy

Pennsylvania:

Andrew J. Barchfeld
Charles F. Barclay
Arthur L. Bates
Henry H. Bingham
James F. Burke
Thomas S. Butler
Joel Cook
Allen F. Cooper
John Dalzell
Benjamin K. Focht
W. W. Foulkrod
Alfred B. Garner
William H. Graham
William W. Griest
George F. Huff
Daniel F. Lafean
J. N. Langham
George D. McCreary
Reuben O. Moon
J. Hampton Moore
Martin E. Olmstead
Henry W. Palmer
Charles C. Pratt
John M. Reynolds
John K. Tener
Irving P. Wanger
Nelson P. Wheeler

Rhode Island:

Adin B. Capron
William Payne Sheffield

South Dakota:

Charles H. Burke

Tennessee:

Richard W. Austin
Walter P. Brownlow

Utah:

Joseph Howell

Ohio:

Ralph D. Cole
Albert Douglas
Herman P. Goebel
James Joyce
J. Warren Keifer
James Kennedy
Nicholas Longworth
W. Aubrey Thomas

Oklahoma:

Charles E. Creager
Bird S. McGuire
Dick T. Morgan

Oregon:

W. R. Ellis
Willis C. Howley

Vermont:

David J. Foster
Frank Plumley

Virginia:

C. Bascom Slemp

Washington:

William E. Humphrey

West Virginia:

Joseph H. Gaines
William P. Hubbard
James A. Hughes
George C. Sturgiss
Harry C. Woodyard

Wisconsin:

John J. Esch

Wyoming:

Frank W. Mondell

The following Republicans supported Cannon and Cannonism. Through the organization of the House, and the preservation of the rules, they are responsible for the Payne-Aldrich Tariff bill. We do not attempt to pass on the honesty and integrity of these men, nor do we know the motives which prompted them in supporting Cannonism; but the roll-call finds them on the side of Privilege. To the voters of a district familiar with the declarations, pledges, or character of these men this record is furnished to aid them to a choice which should be influenced by some consideration for the American people as a nation.⁹

Following down the list of states, Howe named the three Oklahoma Republicans, McGuire, Morgan, and Creager. In a damning indictment of the system Democrats and system Republicans, Howe concluded his article with a section subheaded "Is Your Congressman For or Against You?" Howe stated:

What is the cure? We used to think that the remedy was to put somebody in jail, to levy a twenty-nine million dollar fine, or to change some charter or to amend some law. Now we see . . . that we must abolish Privilege; we must repeal all the privileges that are created by law. That is a long process, and necessarily a slow one, but we can begin it now. How?

BY GOING TO THE POLLS ON NOVEMBER 8 AND VOTING FOR MEN WHO WILL REPRESENT US; OR, IF THERE ARE NO CANDIDATES THAT REPRESENT US, THEN WE MUST DEFEAT THOSE REPRESENTATIVES REGARDLESS OF PARTY, WHO HAVE SHOWN BY THEIR RECORDS THAT THEY REPRESENT NOT US, BUT--PRIVILEGE.¹⁰

Thus a nationally known progressive magazine, by including the three Oklahomans as system Republicans, had called for their defeat because they represented the privileged classes. On the other hand, neither of the two Democrats from Oklahoma was listed among the system Democrats. What impact, if any, the article might have on Oklahoma voters would not be determined until the polls closed on election day in

⁹Ibid., 600.

¹⁰Ibid., 597.

November. The article drew further attention, and perhaps was of more significance to Oklahoma voters, when the Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman reprinted a major portion of the Howe column.¹¹ The editorial, entitled "The System Republicans," emphasized the procedure that Howe had used in categorizing Congressmen, and pointed out that neither Carter nor Ferris was included in the "system Democrats." But the major focus of the article was concentrated on the fact that the three Republicans from Oklahoma, by being listed as "system Republicans," had supported "the interests that have made the cost of living burdensome to the American consumer."¹²

Three days later the Daily Oklahoman continued its attack on the three Republican Congressmen with an editorial headed "Oklahoma's Stand-pat Congressmen." It listed a number of commodities, indicating the real value in one column and in a second column displayed the effects of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff on the same goods. The statistics were based on \$10 purchases.

| Tariff Rate | Real Value | Tariff ¹³ |
|---|------------|----------------------|
| Sugar, 60.80 per cent | \$6.25 | \$3.75 |
| Glassware, 60 per cent | \$6.25 | \$3.75 |
| Window glass, 84 per cent | \$5.45 | \$4.57 |
| Soap, 46 per cent | \$6.84 | \$3.16 |
| Machinery, 45 per cent | \$6.89 | \$3.11 |
| Metal Tools, 45 per cent | \$6.89 | \$3.11 |
| Tinware, 45 per cent | \$6.89 | \$3.11 |
| Stockings, \$1 dozen, 33 per cent | \$5.31 | \$4.69 |
| Shirts, 60 per cent | \$6.25 | \$3.75 |
| Blankets, 107 per cent | \$4.83 | \$5.17 |
| Flannels, 144 per cent | \$4.09 | \$5.91 |

¹¹ Arthur S. Link, "The Progressive Movement in the South, 1870-1914," North Carolina Historical Review, XXIII (April, 1946), 193.

¹² Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 26, 1910.

¹³ Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 29, 1910.

According to the editor, this was the type of legislation that Morgan, McGuire, and Creager had voted for and had called the best tariff bill ever written. The tariff money, stated the article, goes into the "coffers of the trusts," and the table shows the results of the three Republican's "subserviency to the Cannon-Aldrich gang." In conclusion, the editorial asked: "Did they represent you and safe-guard your interests, Mr. Average Man, as an agent should?"¹⁴

Further editorials lambasting the three "standpat" Republicans were found in the Oklahoma Farmer and Laborer, a Guthrie based publication that spoke for organized farmer and labor groups, and the Ponca City Democrat, a Democratic newspaper located in the strongly Republican first district. In a late September editorial, the Farmer and Laborer noted the Republican leaders' argument that Oklahoma's three "standpat" Congressmen should be re-elected in order to serve their people as members of the majority party in the House. The article declared that the next House was as sure to be Democratic as it was sure to meet, and if the Republicans used the same logic as they had previously, the question should be asked, "What good can three 'standpat' Republicans from Oklahoma accomplish in the House with a Democratic majority against them?" The article thus called for the election of Fulton, Davenport, and McNeill so as to oust the "standpatters" from Oklahoma.¹⁵

The editor of the Ponca City Democrat analyzed the elections of 1910 as a test between the "standpatters" and the "insurgents." He

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵The Oklahoma Farmer and Laborer, September 30, 1910.

believed that Oklahoma Republicans had not seen the handwriting on the wall, because in every other state, the "insurgents" were now the Republican Party. The "standpat" program, he added, has "once and for all taken the count." In conclusion, the Ponca City paper editorialized:

On November 9 the McGuire, Morgan, Creager cabal will be forced to read what other leaders in other states have already read. And they will not require a Lick telescope to do the reading act either.¹⁶

Thus the elections in the first, second, and third districts of Oklahoma drew attention from both the urban and rural press as well as a farmer and laborer publication.

In the heavily Republican first district, McGuire, the incumbent Republican from Pawnee, received opposition in the person of a thirty-five-year-old bachelor, Neil McNeill, a county court judge also from Pawnee. The campaign did not feature one particular topic as several issues were raised in the newspaper coverage. The pro-McGuire publications in the first district, such as the Pawnee Times-Democrat, Blackwell Times-Record, and Chandler News-Publicist, praised McGuire's past record and emphasized the fact that he was "dean" of the Oklahoma delegation. By virtue of his seniority, the papers pointed out, the first district incumbent would be of more benefit to his constituency. In addition they stressed that McGuire would be able to accomplish more with the Republican controlled White House and Senate than would a young and inexperienced Democratic legislator.

According to the editorials, the Pawnee Republican should be

¹⁶ Ponca City Democrat, September 22, 1910.

re-elected to comply with President Taft's advice. Concentrating most of their statements on McGuire's seniority, the pro-McGuire papers noted his strong position as chairman of one House committee and ranking third on another.¹⁷

In contrast, the pro-McNeill papers, which included not only the Pawnee Courier-Dispatch and Ponca City Democrat of the first district, but also the Daily Oklahoman and the Oklahoma Farmer and Laborer outside the first, attacked McGuire on several counts and praised the progressive platform of Judge McNeill. They pointed out that McNeill was running on an issue-oriented campaign of "less tariff, no trusts, no Cannon, more progress." The Farmer and Laborer denounced the Republican newspapers of the first district for calling McGuire a progressive: "That is on a par with calling the devil an angel." The papers favoring McNeill stated that he would be a "progressive worker" as compared to McGuire's record of doing nothing but telling "fish stories" to the people of the first district.

In an editorial entitled "McGuire Going Down," the Daily Oklahoman of October 19, 1910, proclaimed that the delegate from the first district was to regret that he had chosen "to stand pat as a standpatter." McGuire now believes, said the Oklahoman, that "standpatism" is the political millstone around his neck that will drag him below the surface in the upcoming election. The article concluded by saying that the tariff and the high cost of living represented the best argument

¹⁷ Blackwell Times-Record, June 16, 1910; Chandler News-Publicist, June 3, 1910; and Pawnee Times-Democrat, October 20, 1910.

against sending "standpatters," like McGuire, to Congress.¹⁸

The results of the November 8 election showed McGuire the winner by a margin of 1,866 votes.

| | | |
|---------|--------|--------------------|
| McGuire | 20,301 | 49.2% |
| McNeill | 18,415 | 44.6% |
| Others | 2,522 | 6.2% ¹⁹ |

This represented a decrease of 925 votes from McGuire's victory margin of 2,811 in the 1908 election, when he received 50.6% of the total vote. This was the first time that the Pawnee Republican had received less than half of the total vote in any of his five races thus far, from 1903 to 1910. Although he was the victor, the results indicated more dissatisfaction among McGuire's constituents than he had previously encountered in the strongly Republican first district. Apparently his seniority on committees and prestige as being "dean" of the Oklahoma delegation prevailed over the tariff issue raised by his opponent.

Even more interest was stimulated in the second district, where incumbent Republican Dick Morgan faced former Congressman Elmer Fulton, an Oklahoma City Democrat. Most of the interest was generated by the fact that the leading daily newspapers of Oklahoma City, the Daily Oklahoman and the Times, carried on a running editorial battle in support of Fulton and Morgan, respectively. The Times began their attack on Fulton and defense of Morgan in an early campaign editorial titled

¹⁸ Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 19, 1910; Pawnee Courier Dispatch, September 22, 1910, September 29, 1910, October 20, 1910; Ponca City Democrat, November 3, 1910; and The Oklahoma Farmer and Laborer, August 2, 1910.

¹⁹ Samuel Kirkpatrick, David R. Morgan, and Larry G. Edwards, Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections (Norman: Bureau of Government Research, 1970), 33-34.

"Old 'Free Trade' Again." The September 28, 1910 article roundly denounced Fulton for his support of free trade. The facts showed, said the editorial, that the free trade idea, espoused by Fulton, would mean a drop in wages of 60 per cent for skilled laborers and 40 per cent for common labor. It further pointed out that these same laborers are the chief consumers of farm products such as wheat, and if free trade was again imposed, the farmer would lose money on his produce prices. Therefore, the editorial concluded, "Don't take any chances on voting for a man like Fulton."²⁰

In a quick rebuttal to the Times editorial, the Daily Oklahoman editorial page of October 5, 1910, carried an article comparing the records of Morgan and Fulton and posing the question whether Morgan truly represented his constituents in the Sixty-first Congress. The editor answered by reviewing Morgan's voting record on what was termed as critical decisions:

The election of the speaker of the house, on which occasion Morgan voted for Cannon; the rules fight, where Morgan went on record favoring the old system of 'gagging' legislation which opposes Cannonism; the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill, on which Morgan voted 'aye,' and thereby raising the cost of lumber, sugar and other necessities of life and lowering the duty on luxuries.²¹

The article went on to say that Morgan had acted in direct opposition to his campaign pledges of 1908, and every time the "machine" had signaled for Morgan's vote, he had "delivered it as graciously as a royal flunkey hands a card to his master."

Unlike Morgan, the Oklahoman stated that Elmer Fulton had never

²⁰Oklahoma City Times, September 28, 1910.

²¹Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 5, 1910.

been criticized for any bill that he had introduced while a member of the Sixtieth Congress. It added that Fulton had voted against Cannon and his machine in all legislative matters so as to bring government back to the wants and needs of the common people.²²

As the campaign in the second district became more heated, the two newspapers of Oklahoma's largest city carried more statements concerning the race. However, as in many political contests, the major issues were not always given priority in the printed discussions. Such was the case in the October 14, 1910, editorial in the Oklahoman headlined "Labors of a Statesman." It told of Morgan's procurement of 35,000 packages of garden seeds for the people of the second district. In a satirical tone, the article asserted that it must have taken a great deal of statesmanship and long experience to address the names of these 35,000 packages, even though Morgan's secretary, whom the government pays, could have done the job. It is doubtful, alleged the editor, that either Cannon or Aldrich with all his reputed power could have ever bestowed such a magnificent gift on their constituents. "Picture to yourself an old man, with straggling gray hairs clinging to a moisture laden brow, toiling throughout the hot summer days" in order that his "clamoring constituents" might have garden seeds.²³ From this editorial, Morgan was labeled "Garden Seed Dick" by his opponents, and the title was used throughout the campaign. This editorial initiated a series of "mud slinging" tactics employed by both candidates.

²²Ibid.

²³Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 14, 1910.

On the heels of the "garden seed" editorial, the Times began a vitriolic attack on Fulton's association with the so-called "salary grab." The editorial of October 18, 1910, proclaimed that the United States government had paid the campaign expenses of Fulton in the 1907 election. According to the article, the former Congressman's term began on November 16, 1907, with statehood, and ended March 3, 1909, a period of fifteen months. Yet, the Times alleged, the official records show that Fulton drew salary at the rate of \$7,500 per annum from March 4, 1907, till March 4, 1909. This meant, declared the editor, that Congressman Fulton drew salary from the government eight months before he was elected to the office and before such an office existed. "He knew . . . that he was taking something that did not belong to him," affirmed the article, "money which he had not earned." In short, the editorial concluded, "it was GRAFT."²⁴ This inaugurated substantial discussion that took precedence over the other issues, especially in Republican controlled newspapers where Fulton was overwhelmingly indicted for his "dishonesty." Two days later, the Times editorialized:

Fulton says that he participated in the salary grab because others did the same thing. To which we might add that there also is considerable precedent for stealing, but that does not excuse the crime.²⁵

The Oklahoman then attempted to bring the voter's attention back to the fact that Morgan had supported the tariff of 1909. "Morgan, Political Pendulum" was the headline of an editorial in the October

²⁴Oklahoma City Times, October 18, 1910.

²⁵Oklahoma City Times, October 20, 1910.

22, 1910 issue. It announced that the incumbent Republican had claimed to have voted for an appropriation of \$250,000 per annum for a tariff commission to investigate the cost of production at home and abroad. But, the Oklahoman asked, "why didn't the Republicans want a commission to do this investigating before the passage of that nefarious bill? Because the trusts, their masters, did not want it." It accused Morgan of enlisting as a high private in the "Stand-pat-Cannon-Aldrich brigade" which, realizing widespread dissatisfaction with the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, wanted to appease the voters by adopting the tariff commission plan.²⁶

"Salary Grabber" was the editorial featured in the October 24, 1910 copy of the Times. "Let Fulton, the salary grabber, stay at home," voiced the article, "and send Dick Morgan back to Congress." The question was asked of the voters as to whether they wanted Fulton, free trade, and 4-cent cotton, or Morgan, protection, and 15-cent cotton. It elaborated further by saying that Morgan had secured over a million dollars in appropriations for the second district, while Fulton had secured nothing.²⁷

Both papers carried lengthy articles on October 29, 1910 in which they stressed the weaknesses of their respective opponents. The Times, in front page headlines, told of the fact that Fulton's "salary grab" was being exposed to the voters of the second district. It related how Morgan and Fulton had encountered each other face to face at a political rally at Cherokee. In the debate, Morgan had charged Fulton with accepting \$5,255.14 for eight months when he was still a private citi-

²⁶ Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 22, 1910.

²⁷ Oklahoma City Times, October 24, 1910.

zen. The article reported that Fulton presented an extremely weak defense of the "salary grab" charge.²⁸ In dissimilar fashion, the Oklahoman published an article on the same Cherokee debate under the title "Fulton Lambasts Morgan's Record." According to the article, Morgan publicly admitted that he had been wrong in voting with the "interests." Furthermore, Morgan refused to debate with Fulton at any later date, and evaded all questions that Fulton posed to him concerning his vote against free lumber, free leather goods, and free farm implements.²⁹ The last editorial of the campaign was presented by the Oklahoman on November 2, 1910. It was entitled "Morgan: Brazen Standpatter," and included a cartoon assailing the second district Congressman for not being ashamed of his vote for the tariff on lumber when hundreds of his constituents were living in sod houses.³⁰

Thus the campaign ended to await the results of the November 8 election which would determine how the voters would respond to what apparently became the principal campaign issues: Morgan's assaults on Fulton's "salary grab" and Fulton's charges in regard to Morgan's "standpattism" on the tariff and Cannon. Morgan won re-election to the Sixty-second Congress by a margin of 1,072 votes.

| | | |
|--------|--------|-------|
| Morgan | 25,134 | 46.5% |
| Fulton | 24,062 | 43.7% |
| Others | 5,382 | 9.8% |

These statistics reveal that Morgan's margin was approximately the same as it was in 1908, when he defeated Fulton by 924 votes and garnered

²⁸ Oklahoma City Times, October 29, 1910.

²⁹ Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 29, 1910

³⁰ Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, November 2, 1910.

46.3% of the total vote.³¹ It appears that Fulton's emphasis on Morgan's "standpatter" platform of high tariff and Cannonism was effectively counteracted by Morgan's charges of Fulton's dishonesty connected with drawing money when he was not serving as delegate for an eight month period.

As in the second district, two former opponents, Charles Creager, the Republican incumbent, and James Davenport, representative to the Sixtieth Congress, struggled for the third district House seat in 1910. Most of the pre-election activities were covered by the Republican controlled Muskogee Phoenix, Creager's hometown paper; the Tulsa Democrat, a Davenport outlet; and the Vinita Daily Chieftain, which supported their local candidate, Davenport. The campaign coverage became more frequent by the middle of October as the Vinita paper contained a front page article on a Davenport speech which accused Creager of refusing to debate the tariff issue. Davenport felt that Creager had declined to discuss the issue because the people knew that the incumbent had not worked for their interests.³²

The Tulsa Democrat editorial page on October 12 included an article on the records of both candidates. The issues were quite clear, declared this pro-Davenport publication, because tariff reduction and a lower cost of living would have been in the interests of the masses. But instead, Creager had voted the tariff upward, which suited the wishes of a few "trust barons in New York." On the other hand, the article heralded Davenport's platform for a revision of the tariff downward, and an income tax to make the rich pay their just proportion

³¹Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns, 34.

³²Vinita Daily Chieftain, October 11, 1910.

of the burdens of government.³³ It was apparent that the leading Davenport newspapers had decided that the tariff would be the key issue as far as they were concerned.

Continuing their assaults on Creager, the Daily Chieftain in an October 13 editorial portrayed him as two-faced. To the "standpatters," Creager puts forth statements that he is so "steadfast with the regulars that he is often mistaken for Joe Cannon." However, to the progressive Republicans, he would have them believe that he was a "simon pure insurgent." The story explained that Creager had stated that he would have been an "insurgent" if the "insurgents" had controlled Congress; but it appeared to the paper that he had missed a wonderful opportunity "to get in the progressive move, when the rules were revised." Instead, he voted with Cannon and the regulars, but would have the people of the third district believe that he would have "insurged if the insurgents controlled."³⁴

On October 29, the Muskogee Phoenix, printed in the largest city of the district, finally came to the defense of Creager's stand on the tariff. It was a lengthy editorial describing the situation in regard to the wage difference between Windsor, Canada and Detroit, Michigan. The question had been presented by Democrats as to why workingmen in Windsor could buy a suit for \$10 and the same suit cost Detroit laborers \$18.64. The Democratic leaders avowed that it was because of the "velvet that goes to the wool trust." However, the Phoenix editorial queried: "Why don't those workingmen move just across the river if they can get things so cheap?" The answer was simple according to

³³Tulsa Daily Democrat, October 12, 1910.

³⁴Vinita Daily Chieftain, October 13, 1910.

Creager's hometown paper. It was because the workers of Detroit were being paid the highest wages in the world due to the existing tariff schedules. The article pointed out that the workers might save \$8.64 on a suit of clothes by moving across the river; but was it worth it if they lost \$600 per year on wages, even if they could get a job under the old Democratic free trade theory.³⁵

In a quick reply, the Vinita Daily Chieftain reaffirmed its anti-Creager sentiments by expounding on the evils of the trusts. In an October 31 editorial, the northeastern Oklahoma daily severely criticized the role of trusts in their campaign contributions to Creager. It reasoned that the "oil trust, sugar trust, harvester trust" donated large sums to Creager's campaign treasury due to the fact that he "can be depended upon to continue collecting excessive toll from the consumer in the United States."³⁶

The tariff continued to be the main issue in the third district race, but on election day, the Muskogee Phoenix attempted to divert people's attention to Creager's service to the city of Muskogee, particularly the federal building appropriation, the federal jail site, the Cherokee payment of \$4 million, most of which went to Muskogee, and numerous rural routes. In addition, the article commended Creager for his important position on the Public Grounds and Buildings Committee, which, according to the Phoenix, was "alone sufficient to induce every loyal Muskogee citizen to vote for Mr. Creager's return."³⁷

The election results in the third district contest were as

³⁵ Muskogee Phoenix, October 29, 1910.

³⁶ Vinita Daily Chieftain, October 31, 1910.

³⁷ Muskogee Phoenix, November 8, 1910.

follows:

| | | |
|-----------|--------|--------------------|
| Davenport | 25,312 | 50.2% |
| Creager | 22,367 | 44.0% |
| Others | 2,923 | 6.8% ³⁸ |

The 2,945 vote margin rolled up by Davenport signaled a definite reversal to the 1908 election statistics, when Creager had defeated Davenport by 1,071 votes. Over-all, Davenport picked up 4,016 votes over his 1908 showing, and carried Muskogee County. Because the tariff was the primary campaign issue in the third district, the results indicated, to some degree, the dissatisfaction with Creager's record. This election, perhaps more than any other of the 1910 Congressional races in Oklahoma, reflected the attitude of the voters in regard to "standpat" versus progressive ideals because the campaign had been conducted largely on the issues of the tariff and Cannonism.

In the heavily Democratic fourth and fifth districts, incumbents Charles Carter and Scott Ferris, both Democrats, faced slight opposition as they won easy re-election by approximately two-to-one margins. Carter outdistanced Charles M. Campbell, Ardmore Republican, by a vote of 21,959 to 11,979, with Ferris rolling over J. H. Franklin, Republican from Lawton, 28,600 to 13,425.³⁹ The newspapers of both districts were primarily Democratic, and therefore extremely laudatory in their statements concerning Carter and Ferris. The Daily Ardmoreite, a progressive minded newspaper, applauded Carter's record in a September 20, 1910 editorial. It pictured Carter as an insurgent

³⁸ Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns, 34-35.

³⁹ Ibid., 35-36.

who stood against Cannon, even though he lost his seat on the Indian Affairs Committee over it. "His home people think a thousand times more of him because he refused to bow to such men." The editorial pointed out that LaFollette and Cummins had, like Carter, felt the sting of the "special interests."⁴⁰ In a later editorial, Carter was again complimented for his courageous act of voting against Cannon "at any personal cost." It declared that Oklahoma needed a man like Carter whose election was not forced by campaign contributions by the "interests who will control those whom they elect." The voters of Oklahoma as well as the fourth district need a man, demanded the editorial, who will do his part in providing a tariff law that will be in the interests of the people instead of the "special interests who have heretofore had the tariff lawmakers on their payroll."⁴¹

Finally, just prior to the election, the Ardmoreite printed a letter from Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, endorsing Carter's re-election. Gompers expressed his appreciation to the fourth district Congressman for responding to labor's call. He pointed out that Carter had voted in the Sixty-first Congress for several bills which passed the House and were of great interest to labor including the mine worker's bureau bill, the eight hour legislation affecting construction of battle ships, and the postal savings bank bill, and had declared his support for the Wilson bill which would grant relief from the injunction abuse.⁴² Hence Gompers ringingly endorsed Carter. It appeared that the fourth district was

⁴⁰The Daily Ardmoreite, September 20, 1910.

⁴¹The Daily Ardmoreite, October 16, 1910.

⁴²The Daily Ardmoreite, October 27, 1910.

safe for the Democrats and a progressive one as well.

Scott Ferris won re-election by the widest margin of any of the 1910 Congressional contests. He received the strong support of not only the Lawton Constitution-Democrat, the Democratically controlled newspaper in his hometown, but most of the other papers of the fifth district, including the Maysville News, Comanche Reflex, Mangum Star, Cornish News, and Duncan Eagle. Ferris was also beginning to make an impression outside his district as evidenced by the solid support given to him by the Daily Oklahoman, considered by many the leading outlet in Oklahoma for progressive views. Various comments from newspapers around the district were published in the Constitution-Democrat on November 3 just before the election. The Maysville News, in reference to a speech by Ferris, said: "He made it plain to the listeners that the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill was all wrong for the people of Oklahoma and the West, and also explained it was a good thing for a handful of eastern manufacturers." Ferris was described by the Comanche Reflex and the Mangum Star as a hard working young Congressman who had made an earnest attempt to keep in touch with the people of his district, and represent them intelligently.⁴³

At Cornish and Duncan, the fifth district Democrat addressed large crowds during the campaign, and again dealt with the evils of the Republican instigated Payne-Aldrich tariff. He commented on some of the different schedules, and demonstrated how they would be of benefit to certain Eastern trusts. Speaking out against his Republican colleagues from Oklahoma, he concluded his speeches by showing how they

⁴³Lawton Constitution-Democrat, November 3, 1910.

had voted against the interests of the people of Oklahoma.⁴⁴

Ferris likewise received strong approval in the November 5 edition of the Daily Oklahoman. The editorial entitled "Organized Labor's Friend" expounded on Ferris' outstanding labor record, and defended his stand for labor despite one or two untruthful assertions made by partisan Republican leaders.⁴⁵ It appears that Ferris was not only attracting attention in the fifth district, but from other sections of the state as well. He was also beginning to utilize his fifth district political base to speak out against what he considered the "standpat" atrocities committed by the Republican members of the Oklahoma delegation.

The elections of 1910 in Oklahoma proved somewhat disappointing to men of the progressive spirit because of the failure to unseat McGuire and Morgan, who had held steadfastly to the "standpat" principles during the Sixty-first Congress. These two candidates, it appears, effectively nullified the progressive drive to oust them by stressing their experience, in McGuire's first district case, or revealing a scandal, as Morgan had done in the second.

The national trend of a Democratic landslide carried only into the third district of Oklahoma, where Davenport won a convincing victory over the incumbent, Creager. Because the fourth and fifth districts were conceded to Carter and Ferris, respectively, the third district appears to be the only area where some measure of the effects of "standpat" versus progressive principles could be taken. Both

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, November 5, 1910.

candidates, Creager and Davenport, addressed themselves to the major issue in 1910, that is, the Payne-Aldrich tariff. Creager possessed no distracting issue such as Morgan in the second, nor could he rely on his seniority as McGuire did in the first. The result was a victory for Davenport, the apparent progressive, over the "stand-patter," Creager. Thus, the Oklahoma delegation to the Sixty-second Congress was realigned only in the third district. Morgan and McGuire joined the other 160 Republicans; Ferris, Carter, and Davenport became a part of the 227 Democrats who were now in the majority.

Cordell Hull, a veteran House member from Tennessee, gave a succinct analysis of what the Sixty-second Congress might hold in store for the nation, and the temper the Democrats hoped to establish:

The Democrats carried the House of Representatives by a suitable majority. Now at last we had the power, and with it the chance to put into effect some of the ideas we cherished . . . we then went to work night, day and Sunday--with enthusiasm.⁴⁶

Hull's hopes were fulfilled as the special session of the Sixty-second Congress, which convened from April 4 to May 23, 1911, passed five major bills and related minor ones, and little that was not germane was allowed to enter the debates. All this was done by a party that had neither the Senate nor the White House at its command, drawing up its own program, with the exception of the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty. The Sixty-second would bear closer examination by those political analysts who contend that the American Congress is incapable of formulating a legislative program of its own, and that this function must, according to protocol, be left to the executive branch.

⁴⁶Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948), I, 62.

What would be seen was the enactment of more progressive legislation than in any Congress since the beginning of the twentieth century. In the House, major tariff reductions for which there had been popular outcry, especially among progressives, were achieved; steps were taken to improve election morality and popular control of representatives; some twenty bills were introduced and many passed in an attempt to alleviate pressing industrial problems; and several resolutions were initiated and passed for the benefit of the hard-pressed agricultural sector of the population.

First on the House agenda was the election of a new Speaker. Champ Clark of Missouri, who had been Democratic minority leader, was elected over James Mann of Illinois by a vote of 220 to 131. The Oklahoma delegation voted along party lines, as Carter, Ferris, and Davenport supported Clark, while McGuire and Morgan backed Mann. Clark then gave an address in which he outlined six aims of the Sixty-second Congress. He promised an "honest, intelligent revision of the tariff downward . . . which would reduce the cost of living by eradicating the enormities and cruelties of the present tariff bill." A resolution to provide a constitutional amendment for the election of United States Senators by popular vote was the second request from Clark. A third aim of the session, according to Clark, would be a change in the House rules to provide for "intelligent consideration of measures for the public good." He then asked for economy in expenditures in the House as well as the nation. A fifth objective set by Clark was the publication of campaign contributions and disbursements before elections; and last, he called for the admission of both

Arizona and New Mexico as states.⁴⁷

After dispensing with the opening formalities, the House began the consideration of H. J. Res. 39, which called for the direct election of United States Senators, a matter that concerned progressives not only because it would democratize the election machinery, but also provided a means to attain more significant ends, such as railroad and trust regulation. On April 13, 1911 the resolution was presented and two members of the Oklahoma delegation, Ferris and Morgan, wasted no time in speaking on behalf of the proposal.

Ferris expressed his wholehearted support of the resolution because "it accomplishes what 90 per cent, nay, I believe, 99 per cent, of what the people desire." He congratulated the Committee on Election of President, Vice-President, and Representatives for causing H. J. Res. 39 to be the first bill reported by a Democratic committee. It would be a "beautiful tribute to the House of Representatives . . . to the American people . . . and a beautiful compliment to the Democratic Party," declared Ferris, to pass this as the first bill of the new Congress. He then castigated the Republican Party for refusing to enact such a law while they controlled the White House and Congress for 16 years.

Reviewing the graft and corruption that existed in state legislatures where Senators were elected, Ferris demanded that the people be given the choice of selecting their representatives to the upper House. "I can never think it less safe to trust all the people of any State than it is to trust a few of the same people of the same State,"

⁴⁷U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 1, 6-7.

were Ferris' sentiments. He believed that closer contact with the people could only be acquired by forcing the candidate to consult them; and this close acquaintance would allow the people to punish or reward their representative and his actions. There will be a faith placed in the people, Ferris asserted, and they are entitled to it and to the purification of elections that will become a reality with this much needed reform.

According to Ferris, opposition to the measure was based on the theory that it was revolutionary and socialistic. He answered these charges by saying that they were not based on fact and exclaimed:

It is common justice and common sense. It is but the doing of exact justice to a people who have long been denied that right to select their Members of Congress in both branches.⁴⁸

Ferris' interest in the principle of direct election of United States Senators was of long standing, as he had introduced a resolution to that effect in each session since becoming a member of the House. In his speech Ferris avowed that he would continue to propose such legislation as long as he remained in the House. And at each occasion this principle was to be discussed, he declared that he would appear like "Banquo's ghost" until it became the law of the land. He concluded his remarks by saying:

Pass this resolution and the American people will see we intend to keep the faith when in power that we advocate when not in power. Pass this resolution and make responsive that body which is too far removed from the aches and pains of the people. Pass it and endear yourselves to the people of all political faiths and enact a reform from which no ill effects can emanate.⁴⁹

⁴⁸U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 1, 221-222.

⁴⁹Ibid., 228.

Therefore, Scott Ferris, complying with the program outlined by Speaker Clark, made another positive move in the direction of progressivism. He was to be joined in his support of the measure by a fellow delegate, Republican Dick Morgan.

Congressman Morgan, delivering his speech almost immediately after Ferris, enumerated six reasons why he supported the resolution. He stated that he represented a district that was evenly divided in politics, and he believed that he expressed the will of all his constituents, Republicans and Democrats, in supporting this measure. Secondly, Morgan felt that in governmental affairs, especially legislative matters, that power should be distributed rather than concentrated. As a third reason, Congressman Morgan said that, in his judgment, better men would be elected to the Senate. It was his belief, that if the people voiced their opinion, men who had a reputation for ability, integrity, and high character would be selected. This reasoning led Morgan to argue that with more capable men in the Senate, better laws would be enacted because the ability of legislators is reflected in the laws they enact. A fifth point that Morgan mentioned was that a resolution of this type would make the Senators more responsible to the will of the people. And finally, he saw the direct election method as a technique in promoting the purity of elections. Granted corrupt methods may still be employed, concluded Morgan, but "it is more difficult to corrupt the people constituting the many than to corrupt the legislators constituting the few."⁵⁰ Thus there seemed to be strong agreement between two members from the

⁵⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 1, 260.

Oklahoma delegation on the question then before the House. These two strong supporting statements, however, were not equaled by any of the other Oklahoma House members, and the only indication in regard to their feelings on the subject was to be their vote on April 13, 1911.

The bill passed the House by more than the two-thirds required for a joint resolution: 296 for, 16 against, and 77 not voting. Ferris and Morgan were joined by Carter in casting "yeas" in favor of passage. However, McGuire and Davenport, for some reason, did not pair or vote on this important legislation.⁵¹ On May 13, 1911 the amendment was sent to the states for ratification, and eventually became the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Following in rapid succession to the direct election of United States Senators resolution was a bill requiring that publicity be given on campaign expenditures before elections (H. R. 2958). There appeared to be no opposition to this reform measure as it took only one day for debate and passed the House by a vote of 307 to 0, with three of the Oklahoma delegates commenting on the value of the measure.⁵² McGuire delivered his remarks on April 14, 1911, the day of passage. He believed that more honest elections could be guaranteed by the bill, and it would make men more honest in their campaigns. In addition, McGuire argued that there should also be a provision to force the candidates to account for expenditures prior to the nomination; that is, the present bill did not go far enough "to be square

⁵¹U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 1, 242-243.

⁵²U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 1, 268.

with the people."⁵³ However, McGuire did not offer any amendment to the resolution expressing his additional interest. It was his only recorded speech of the Sixty-second Congress.

Both Morgan and Ferris commented on the merits of the bill, but not until more than a year later. On May 31, 1912, Ferris, in reviewing legislation of the Sixty-second Congress, pointed proudly to the campaign publicity proposal. He declared that such legislation was needed so that "the people shall know who puts up the money to elect men to Congress." Asserting that it was a bill in the interests of the people, Ferris said it was action "that the people want and would be wholesome for them to have."⁵⁴ Morgan spoke in August of 1912 on the general subject of improving the political machinery. There seemed to be little doubt in Morgan's opinion that the publication of campaign expenses was a necessity in streamlining the democratic process. He stated:

In order that the will of the people may be supreme and that we remove every obstacle which might thwart the will of the people, and in order that the voice of the people, as expressed at the ballot box, shall have full sway in this country, we should, so far as possible, by laws limit, restrict, control, and prohibit the excessive use of money in election campaigns.⁵⁵

Hence, only Carter and Davenport failed to lend vocal support for the bill. However, Carter did vote for the bill, but again Davenport was recorded as not voting. Consequently, within the Oklahoma delegation,

⁵³ Ibid., 260.

⁵⁴ U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1912, XLVIII, Part 8, 7467.

⁵⁵ U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1912, XLVIII, Part 12, 781.

as well as the entire House, there was slight disagreement over the first two bills of the Sixty-second Congress, both of which fell into the realm of political reform. But the story was to change as the House took up H. R. 4412, a bill to promote reciprocal trade relations with the Dominion of Canada.

As in 1909 the tariff still remained the major dividing line between progressives and conservatives in each party. Protectionist views were characteristic of Republican "standpatters," just as a stand for lower tariffs characterized Republican "insurgents" and progressive Democrats. The Canadian Reciprocity Treaty, initiated by the White House, did not propose any drastic alteration of the tariff schedules. It would have admitted into both countries, free of duty, certain agricultural products, and a few raw materials, such as lumber and wood pulp. Nevertheless, it was bitterly opposed by the protectionists.⁵⁶ To complement the reciprocity treaty, the House proceeded promptly to the passage of a Farmer's Free List which would remove tariffs on a considerable number of items used by farmers, such as farm implements, fence wire, cotton bagging, meats, cereals, and leather boots and shoes.

Two of the Oklahoma Congressmen, Ferris and Morgan, were interested enough in the reciprocity issue to speak on the House floor. Ferris, delivering his speech on April 18, 1911, argued for the measure because it would reduce tariffs or place on the free list approximately 600 items from the Payne-Aldrich rates, and not a single schedule was to be increased. There should be absolute free trade between the two countries, Ferris said, just the same as existed between the states of the union. He told of the arguments presented by the pro-

⁵⁶F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914), 414.

tectionists against the treaty, that is, it would reduce the price of land, reduce the wage scale, and be detrimental to the farmer's interests. In answer to these charges, the Lawton Democrat declared that the value of lands in Canada and the United States of similar type are essentially the same, so therefore "the scarecrows erected by the protectionists and high-tariff advocates are again not trustworthy." This treaty presents a wonderful opportunity, Ferris added, to reduce the "exorbitant burdens of the Payne-Aldrich law that was so recently by the people universally repudiated." In regard to wage scales, Ferris showed that wages were approximately the same in Canada as in the United States. The question on this issue, proclaimed Ferris, is whether the high protectionists will make the "laboring men carry the load for their high protection schemes when the laboring man gets none of the profit or glory." Too long have the laboring people of this country "borne the brunt of selfish manufacturers, monopolists, and trusts," stated Ferris.

Representing primarily an agricultural district, Ferris was quite emphatic in explaining how the treaty, rather than being detrimental as high tariff advocates had claimed, would be beneficial to the farmers. He quickly pointed out that lumber, barbed wire, and wood pulp would be placed on the free list. Referring to the free lumber provision, Ferris said: "I ask the high protectionists who are opposing this treaty, Will that do the American home builder of the broad prairies good or harm? Will it not be beneficial to every citizen in all the land save the Lumber Trust?" He concluded his argument for free lumber by saying that the timber lands of the country had been held by a few "lumber barons" while the American people had gone

"homeless and roofless."

Elaborating on the value of the treaty, Ferris maintained that the farmers of the country would appreciate the duty provision of free barbed wire. This is a commodity, he added, that is used extensively for fencing "throughout the length and breadth of the country." The people who will not appreciate this schedule will be the "Iron and Steel Trust," and, Ferris explained, the opponents of the proposition are those who are more "concerned about the farmer that farms the steel mills in the heart of Pittsburgh."

Another item to be placed on the free list, wood pulp, was to be an advantage for the farmer, according to Ferris, because it would allow him to buy schoolbooks for his children. Furthermore, it would place "books and magazines within more easy reach of both rich and poor." Of course, Ferris suggested, there would be protests from the "Paper Trust of New England," but:

We must legislate for all as distinguished from the few
We must not sit here and allow the few New England selfish
paper trusts to fatten at the expense of the many when it
strikes at the intelligence and the advancement intellectually
of our very Republic.⁵⁷

In relation to the argument presented by the high tariff people that certain agricultural products, such as wheat and corn, would be left unprotected, Ferris countered with the reasoning that there was not a country in the world that could compete with the United States in the production of those commodities. For example, Ferris pointed out that the United States produced 3,125,713,000 bushels of corn in 1910, of which 44,072,209 bushels were exported to Canada. On the other hand,

⁵⁷U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 1, 369-370.

Canada in 1910 produced only 18,726 bushels of which 5,881 were imported into the United States. "Can there be a man so ignorant or unfair as to claim that Canada is any competitor to our producers," declared Ferris. Concluding his remarks in support of the reciprocity treaty, Ferris pleaded that the House not let the "greedy monopolist pick the threadbare pockets of the needy" behind the tariff walls of the "vicious and unconscionable duties of the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill."⁵⁸

Two days later Dick Morgan rose on the House floor to speak against the Canadian reciprocity plan. Holding true to his 1909 protectionist views, he declared that the measure would do irreparable damage to the farmers and gypsum industries of his home district. The agricultural products that were to be placed on the free list would put the Canadian farmers, Morgan reasoned, in direct competition with the farmers of the United States. "Agriculture will be robbed of any direct benefit from our protective tariff policy," declared Morgan. It was his contention that the reciprocity plan had not been previously presented to the American people in either 1908 or 1910, and he felt that the farmer and others should have the opportunity to be heard on the subject. The effect on the farmer, according to the second district Congressman, would be far reaching because it would result in:

1. Reduction in the extent of his market.
2. Reduction in the price of his products.
3. Reduction in the value of his land.
4. Reduction in his annual profits.
5. Reduction in his ability to support his family.
6. Reduction in his value as a citizen.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Ibid., 371.

⁵⁹ U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 1, 470.

He proceeded to elaborate on the six points by suggesting that the reciprocity law would force the farmers of America to divide their customers with the farmers of Canada, and thereby reduce the market considerably. With the increased competition and the law of supply and demand in effect, Morgan argued that prices would naturally be forced downward. As the price of farm products decreased, the value of farm land would subsequently be lessened, reasoned Morgan. Continuing his logic, the Woodward Republican alleged that a reduction in profits for farmers would naturally follow the three propositions first enumerated. "Canadian reciprocity will reduce the ability of the farmer to provide for his family," and these conditions will make farm life so unattractive that it will cause the desertion of thousands of farms, asserted Morgan. And finally, if the farmer is subjected to these conditions, Morgan informed his colleagues, you have thereby made him a less valuable citizen due to the fact that he has been "shorn of the means whereby he might serve his country."

In contrast, Morgan pointed out how the resolution would aid the farmers of Canada. He believed that the bill should be amended to read as follows:

A bill to encourage Canadian agriculture, extend the market of the Canadian farmer, increase the prices of his products, augment the value of his land, magnify his annual profits, and make him a more valuable citizen of the British Empire.⁶⁰

He maintained that his vote would be cast for the farmers of America rather than for the farmers of Canada.

Another major consideration of Morgan in his April 20 speech was the fact that gypsum would be placed on the free list by the reciprocity

⁶⁰Ibid.

measure. This schedule was of particular importance to the second district because of the growing gypsum industry in that area. Morgan advanced the argument that large importations of gypsum from Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton would decrease the demand for gypsum from his home district. He pleaded with House members to allow the 30 cents per ton duty to remain in order to protect the gypsum mills of Oklahoma. For these reasons, Morgan concluded his speech, "I can not vote for the so-called reciprocity treaty."⁶¹

The next day Morgan again made a request that the House seriously consider the gypsum free list issue. He felt that the treaty discriminated against the infant gypsum industries of Oklahoma. "My congressional district has the crude gypsum sufficient to supply not only the United States, but the entire world," and Morgan stated that he firmly believed in the policy of protection so that this grave injustice would not be allowed.⁶² It appears that Morgan failed to realize that Oklahoma gypsum would not be greatly threatened by imports if such large quantities were already being produced.

The same day as Morgan's final plea, the House voted on the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty. The vote was 268 for and 89 against, with the Oklahoma delegation casting three in the affirmative, Carter, Ferris, and Davenport, and Morgan and McGuire against.⁶³ The bill also passed the Senate on July 22, and President Taft signed it on July 26, 1911. In the meantime, however, the Canadian Liberal Party adminis-

⁶¹Ibid., 471.

⁶²U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 1, 556.

⁶³Ibid., 559-560.

tration, which favored the reciprocal arrangement, had been overthrown, and the new Conservative Party government repudiated the measure, largely because of widespread popular fear that it might lead to the annexation of Canada by the United States.

In analyzing the stand taken on the reciprocity bill, it appears that Ferris reasonably justified his posture by arguing that there was no need for tariffs on such agricultural products as corn and wheat because of their overabundance. Importation of these commodities would provide the American farmer with no significant competition. On the other hand, Morgan in opposing the measure was more concerned with the protection of the gypsum industries in his district, but did argue that Canadian farm produce would hamper the American farmer's market. However, as Ferris pointed out, the free lumber, barbed wire, and wood pulp would be of more importance to the farmer than the protection of wheat and corn. Thus Morgan and McGuire were adhering to the "standpat" principles on tariff reform in opposing one of the progressive measures that had been recommended to Congress by the Taft administration.

To complement the Canadian Reciprocity agreement and provide additional aid to farmers, H. R. 4413, commonly called the Farmer's Free List bill, was next considered by the Sixty-second House. This resolution was designed to place on the free list commodities that were of consumer importance to the farmer including agricultural implements, cotton bagging, cotton ties, leather boots and shoes, meats, cereals, bread, sewing machines, and salt. Originating in the Democratic House, it met Taft's opposition because it went too far.

Representative Oscar Underwood, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and author of the Farmer's Free List bill, yielded

twenty minutes to Charles Carter of Oklahoma on May 6, 1911. Delivering his first speech of the Sixty-second session, Carter declared his enthusiastic support for the measure. He argued that it was a logical complement to the reciprocity bill in that "it unlocks to a freer exchange of commodities the door so long kept closed by the restrictive policy of Republican protection." Moreover, Carter heralded the bill as a step in the reduction of the much discussed high cost of living, which, he felt, fell most acutely on the farmer and laborer. Carter asserted that the "apostles of high protection" had always claimed that in giving the farmer cheaper commodities that an injustice was being done to the workingman because he would suffer lower wages, but now Carter disclosed, they "seem to be impaled on the other horn of the dilemma," because they state by giving the laboring men cheaper commodities that an injustice is levied on the farmer. Carter declared that the high protectionists had set their argument "like the Arkansas negro set his 'coon trap--so as to catch'em a-comin' and a-gwine." Furthermore, he accused the high tariff advocates of being "professional political acrobats," but did not feel they were capable of performing the feat of "riding two horses going in exactly opposite directions."

Carter then asked who actually paid the cost when a manufacturer, under a protective policy, received higher prices for his products. According to Carter, the answer was simple.

The farmer knows that if the protected manufacturing industry is given an additional profit, it is done at the expense and discouragement of agricultural and pastoral pursuits, and you

can not longer throw dust in the eyes of the American farmer with your protective-farm-product 'bunco.'⁶⁴

Comparing the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty and the Farmer's Free List with the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, Carter denounced the protectionists for not wanting to give to the farmer something substantial like "free shoes, free saddles, free harness, and free belting." How perfectly in keeping with the "blood-sucking policy of a high protective tariff," exclaimed Carter, is the refusal to give the farmer free barbed wire and free cotton ties. He then castigated the "Agricultural Implement Trust" which "sits upon the neck of the American farmer like the Old Man of the Sea sat on Sinbad the Sailor." He thought the American farmer had too long been "tortured" by this "hydra-headed monster," referring to the implement industry. Believing that the bill under consideration would go a long way in clipping the "tentacles" of the implement "monster," Carter contended that the farmer would be given "free plows, free harvesters, free reapers, free cotton gins, and free farm wagons."

Continuing his remarks, Carter pointed out that two and one-half years earlier the major parties had both promised a revision of the tariff downward. But, he recounted, the high protectionists for five long months had "dickered, wrangled and jangled, growled and howled . . . over a putrid carcass." The result was the Payne-Aldrich tariff which violated every campaign promise that had been made to the people. "They asked you for bread and you gave them a stone," Carter eloquently concluded.⁶⁵

⁶⁴U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 2, 1029.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 1030-1031.

On May 8, 1911, the day the bill was to be voted on, Dick Morgan offered an amendment to the resolution. He believed that the pending resolution involved two classes, manufactured articles which the farmer purchased and used, and those commodities made from farm produce. Therefore, he requested in his amendment that certain items manufactured out of farm products, such as lard, sausage, and various types of pickled, dried, and smoked pork, veal, beef, and mutton, be deleted from the free list. If these items are not protected, argued Morgan, then the farmer's price for the produce from which they are derived would be reduced accordingly. Despite Morgan's plea, the amendment was rejected when George Norris, Nebraska "insurgent," called for a division of the House and the "noes" prevailed.⁶⁶

Later that day the Farmer's Free List proposition passed the House with 236 favoring and 109 opposing. Morgan's objection to the farm produce provision was apparently not strong enough to overcome his support for the over-all plan of the bill, as he united his vote with the three Democrats, Carter, Ferris, and Davenport, in upholding the resolution. Only McGuire voted against the bill.⁶⁷ The Senate passed the House version of the bill in mid-summer, but on August 18, President Taft vetoed the measure, and it was returned to the House for reconsideration. Carter, Ferris, Davenport, and Morgan joined 223 other House members in an attempt to override the veto, but the effort failed when 126 voted to sustain the veto. McGuire, although not voting, would undoubtedly have voted to sustain since he

⁶⁶U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 2, 1112-1113.

⁶⁷Ibid., 1121.

had previously opposed the measure when it originally passed the House.⁶⁸

On this issue, Carter, Ferris, and Davenport held to their principles of tariff reform; McGuire remained steadfast in his support of high protection; but Morgan reversed his stand from what it had been on the reciprocity measure. The second district representative was still concerned about placing farm produce on the free list, but must have realized that he would be held responsible by his agricultural constituents if he did not vote for the duty free entry of agricultural implements and other articles of consumer interest to the farmers.

Later in the session two other bills concerning tariff revision were introduced in the House. These were H. R. 11010, created to reduce the duties on wool and manufactures of wool, and H. R. 12812, designed to reduce the duties on manufactures of cotton. Both were proposed by Representative Underwood, a leading spokesman for tariff reform. These bills were of concern to progressives because of their reform nature, but also because a reduction in tariff on the staples, from which most clothing was made, would be a great benefit to the masses.

Only Morgan of the Oklahoma delegation spoke on either of the tariff resolutions, and his remarks were directed to the wool bill. He was primarily concerned with the reduction of raw wool, admitting that a modification of the present tariff on wool manufactures would be in order. But he stated that he could not support the Underwood

⁶⁸U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 4, 4174.

measure because of the injustice committed to the wool growers. It was Morgan's theory that additional tariff reductions were premature, and that more scientific investigation of tariff legislation should take place. He advocated waiting for the report that was forthcoming from a tariff commission that had recently been appointed by President Taft. Then, Morgan declared, we will have more accurate information as to the difference between the cost of production at home and abroad, and will be better prepared to fix rates of duties so they will more nearly equalize the difference between the cost of production in the United States and other nations. Continuing, Morgan described the existing tariff on wool as non-excessive. He pointed out that foreign wool growers pay the existing tariff rates and still compete in our markets with American wool growers. "If under present rates they can compete," Morgan said, "under the proposed rates they can destroy." Morgan concluded his June 17, 1911 speech by saying:

I will vote for any reasonable reduction that does not mean annihilation to American industries, but if to get this reduction on woolen and worsted goods you demand that I shall vote to confiscate the property of the woolgrowers of the country, I refuse to follow you. In order to make reasonable reduction in the tariff on wool it is not necessary that you inflict irreparable injury upon the woolgrowers.⁶⁹

Three days later, on June 20, 1911, the day the woolen bill passed the House, Morgan delivered another speech urging the House to await the tariff commission study before voting. He cited from the Democratic platform of 1908 a phrase stating that articles entering into competition with trust controlled products should be placed upon

⁶⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 3, 2250-2252.

the free list. If this promise is to be carried out, Morgan suggested, the only way it can be done is to first ascertain whether or not the articles on the woolen schedule "enter into competition with trust controlled products." Morgan argued that there was no information in the Ways and Means Committee report to show that the articles under consideration were trust controlled products. Therefore, he concluded that he could not support such a tariff measure or any future tariff bill unless he had additional information.⁷⁰ None of the remaining Oklahoma delegates spoke for or against the tariff revision bill, so their vote was their only expression of sentiment.

Just before the vote was taken on H. R. 11019, Representative Sereno Payne of New York introduced an amendment to recommit the wool reduction resolution to the Ways and Means Committee. His line of reasoning followed Morgan's in that he felt that more study was needed before such hasty action was taken. Apparently the tariff "standpatters" were hoping to delay passage by using this method of stalling. The resolution offered by Payne, House sponsor of the 1909 tariff, was defeated by a vote of 197 to 118, with 66 not voting. Morgan and McGuire voted for recommitment; Carter and Ferris against; and Davenport was absent. The vote was then taken on the Underwood woolen bill and the results were 220 for, 100 against, and 61 not voting. Davenport was present on this vote and joined Ferris and Carter in supporting the wool reduction. McGuire and Morgan cast "nays" on the resolution.⁷¹

The Senate and House eventually agreed to consider a Conference

⁷⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 3, 2340.

⁷¹Ibid., 2355-2357.

Committee report, which was presented to the House on August 14, 1911. Carter, Ferris, and Davenport voted for the report, while Morgan opposed, and McGuire failed to vote.⁷² But President Taft wasted no time in vetoing the measure on August 17, 1911. Congressman Underwood, the bill's sponsor, asked for passage over the presidential veto on August 18. The vote was 227 "yeas," 129 "nays," and 27 "not voting." Carter, Ferris, and Davenport voted in the affirmative, Morgan in the negative, and McGuire again failed to vote. So the two-thirds necessary to override the White House veto failed.⁷³

The other tariff measure, H. R. 12812, was also introduced by Underwood. It provided for a reduction of duties on manufactures of cotton. There were no comments offered from any of the Oklahoma delegates in the preliminary debate on the resolution. Again Payne moved to recommit the bill to the Ways and Means Committee to hold it there until the tariff commission could make a complete investigation in regard to cotton. The recommittal amendment failed, 186 to 106, with 87 not voting. Morgan voted for recommittal, whereas Carter, Davenport, and Ferris registered their votes against, and McGuire was absent. The bill then passed 202 to 90, with 88 not voting. Affirmative votes were recorded for Carter, Ferris, and Davenport, Morgan opposed, and McGuire did not vote.⁷⁴

On August 21, 1911 the bill was returned to the House with Senate

⁷²U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 4, 3919-3920.

⁷³U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 4, 4170.

⁷⁴U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 4, 3583-3585.

amendments which Speaker Clark stated amounted to virtually the same bill that Underwood had introduced. It likewise passed, 180 for, 107 against, and 88 not voting. Again Carter, Ferris, and Davenport held firm in their support of tariff reduction, while Morgan opposed. McGuire, by not voting, managed to miss all the roll calls on this measure.⁷⁵ The Underwood cotton tariff bill was also vetoed by President Taft because, as he explained in his veto message, the legislation had been hastily prepared without any scientific investigation. Representative Underwood, realizing that there was not the two-thirds needed to override the veto, asked that Taft's veto message be printed and sent to the Ways and Means Committee.⁷⁶

Thus ended the long discussion over tariff reform in the Sixty-second Congress. The House had concurred with the administration proposal for Canadian Reciprocity which progressives believed was a step in the right direction. But the complementary Farmer's Free List, wool, and cotton tariff reduction, which progressives also endorsed, failed chiefly because not enough support could be mustered to overcome the administration's opposition. Carter and Ferris not only voted for tariff reduction, but also made forceful speeches on behalf of tariff reform. Davenport remained silent on the topic, but indicated his support by voting in the affirmative on the tariff bills. On the other hand, McGuire adhered to his past performance by opposing all forms of tariff reduction, even the administration-backed recip-

⁷⁵U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 5, 4351.

⁷⁶U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 5, 4393-4395.

reciprocity agreement. He missed the cotton tariff bill votes as well as the final two votes on the wool measure, but undoubtedly would have voted negatively. Morgan was the interesting case as he also defied President Taft by speaking and voting against reciprocity, primarily because the gypsum industries of his home district were to lose their protection. However, he supported the Farmer's Free List, perhaps realizing that he had better take cognizance of the fact that he represented not only the gypsum interests, but also a considerable number of farmers. But on the wool and cotton tariff reduction propositions, he returned to his "standpat" posture due to his belief that more research was necessary which, he felt, could be supplied by the newly created tariff commission.

The first session of the Sixty-second Congress was to consider one more issue that concerned progressivism, the statehood bill for New Mexico and Arizona (H. J. Res. 14). The debate on admitting the two states was especially illuminating with respect to the progressive political outlook because the constitution of Arizona provided for the initiative, referendum, and recall. For this reason a good many people, including President Taft, had opposed admitting Arizona as a state. The President was particularly critical of the clause in the Arizona document which provided for the recall of judges. He regarded that clause as being destructive of the independence in the judiciary, and he felt it would subject the rights of the individual to the possible tyranny of a popular majority. The admission of Arizona thereupon became a popular progressive cause, and those who opposed admission were placed in the "standpat" category by progressives.

Both Morgan and Ferris spoke at length on the Arizona and New

Mexico Joint Enabling Act on May 22, 1911, the day it passed the House. Both recommended passage as they addressed themselves to the beneficial aspects of not only the initiative and referendum clauses, but also the controversial recall of judges section. In addition, Ferris discussed some of the additional progressive features of the Arizona constitution such as the secret ballot, direct primary, and campaign expenditure publicity.

Speaking first, Morgan proclaimed that he planned to vote for the bill because there should be an enlargement of the powers of the people to participate directly in the administration of state affairs. Morgan disclosed that opponents to the bill had suggested that the recall of judges provision would serve as a great danger to free institutions. However, as Morgan saw it, "the public official is rightly regarded as the servant of the people" and "the judiciary and our courts are creatures of the people." Therefore, if the services of any public official, including judges, are not satisfactory, Morgan argued, then the people should have the right to remove them and select another. He believed that the initiative, referendum, and recall would serve as instruments "in the hands of the people whereby they can more speedily secure what is right and just and best for all." And in defiance of President Taft's dissatisfaction with the recall clause, Morgan concluded by saying:

In my opinion, the recall provision applied to judges will not destroy the independence of judges or interfere with the administration of justice The able, honest, upright, conscientious judge will not have and need not have any fear of being recalled.⁷⁷

⁷⁷U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 2, 1456-1459.

Immediately following Morgan and reinforcing his thoughts was Ferris of the fifth Oklahoma district. He viewed the Arizona constitution as the handiwork of men who were concerned with rights of people: "It is an embodiment of human liberties and human rights made by men who believe in humanity and scringe for their every ache and pain." In regard to the initiative principle, the Lawton Democrat told of the beneficial results that it had provided for the people of Oklahoma. Those who described it as "fanaticism" were making indictments that were "faulty and untrue." To Ferris it was a right vested in the "hollow hand of each citizen . . . to play his part in initiating legislation when recreant legislatures fail or refuse to act."

The referendum principle, according to Ferris, permitted the people of a state to remove from the statutes a law that had been passed through "inadvertence or corruption." He revealed that many opponents of the principle had argued that the instances would be so rare when it was needed that it was undesirable. But, declared Ferris, the principle is "sound even if such a case did not occur once in an age." Concluding his remarks on the referendum issue, Ferris stated:

It would stand as a solemn sentry ever patiently guarding the people's rights, inexpensive and unpretentious when not in use, ever courageous and willing to act when encroachments and usurpation appear.⁷⁸

Then Ferris delivered a convincing argument for the recall of public officials, either elective or appointive. He contended that President Taft, in opposing this clause, was transgressing "the spirit and letter of the Federal Constitution when he meddles with the provisions of their State constitution so long as it is republican in

⁷⁸Ibid., 1461.

form." In regard to Taft's argument that the recall might impair the right of the officer recalled, Ferris maintained that while it might be true that to remove an "unworthy officer" would damage the pride of one citizen; it was also true that "his obnoxious retention would wound the pride of the entire citizenship that placed the mantle of power about him." Ferris terminated his defense of the recall clause by arguing:

I can not but firmly believe it will be the one superior agency that will pull up and eradicate the weeds of corruption and neglect now luxuriantly growing in by far too many of the fence corners of the legislatures and congresses.⁷⁹

The next day, Republican Minority Leader James Mann of Illinois introduced a motion to recommit the bill with an amendment striking out Section VIII which provided for recall of judges. The Oklahoma delegation vote reveals that McGuire was the lone affirmative vote backing Mann's proposal. Ferris and Morgan, abiding by their verbal support, cast "nays" on the recommittal motion. Carter, although absent, paired against recommitment, while Davenport did not vote. The Mann proposition being defeated, a vote was then taken on H. J. Res. 14, the Arizona and New Mexico Joint Enabling bill. It passed the House with no vote being recorded.⁸⁰

The Senate, after lengthy debate, passed the joint resolution on August 8, 1911. However, on August 15, President Taft, as expected, returned the resolution to Congress without his approval based upon his objection to the recall of the judiciary section in the constitu-

⁷⁹Ibid., 1464.

⁸⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 2, 1528-1529.

tion of Arizona. After due consideration by the House Committee on the Territories and consultation with members of the Senate, a resolution was presented which would require Arizona as a precondition for her admission to resubmit the question of the recall of the judiciary to her voters. This brought Davenport of Oklahoma to his feet to speak against the proposed revision.

Davenport delivered his only speech of the Sixty-second Congress on August 19, 1911, in support of the recall clause. He declared his approval of the initiative and referendum sections of the Arizona document, and then proceeded to give an eloquent defense of the right of recall. In his experience of practicing law, Davenport related that he had never found a judge that was "any more sacred than any other gentleman filling a public trust." He said that he firmly disagreed with the President's views, and believed that if judges were subject to the recall "their decisions would not be written by representatives of the special interests or the corporations," although many decisions had been written in that manner in the past. In not approving the resolution, the President, Davenport maintained, had refused to approve what the people of Arizona desired. By his action the President has told the people of Arizona, Davenport continued, that they cannot be admitted into the Union as a state "unless you incorporate into your constitution what I believe should be in it." Arguing that the closer you can bring government to the people the better government you have, Davenport concluded his remarks by saying that the real issue now confronting the people of the United States was "shall this Government be

administered by the people or the interests."⁸¹

Not until Arizona removed the objectionable recall provision was it granted admission, along with New Mexico, in 1912. Once in the Union, to the rejoicing of progressives, the Arizona citizenry proceeded to add the questioned clause, and there was nothing Taft could do about it.

Again it appeared that among the Oklahoma delegates to the Sixty-second Congress there was little disagreement over the question of political reform. McGuire, who had vigorously supported the campaign publicity act, was the lone opponent to the Arizona statehood issue. The remaining four representatives energetically supported the measure, especially Ferris, Morgan, and Davenport, who conveyed their sentiments through speeches on the House floor.

Thus ended the first session of the Sixty-second Congress, which proved to be a profitable one for progressives. In less than two months, the House had introduced and passed legislation dealing with both political and economic reform. The two remaining sessions which followed were hardly less impressive as the Congress devoted more attention to social reform issues. In the course of the next sixteen months the House voted to establish a Children's Bureau in the Department of Commerce and Labor, set up the parcels post system, established an eight-hour day for workers on government contracts, limited the use of injunctions in labor disputes, and adopted a system of workmen's compensation for railway workers. Not all these bills became law. The House members nevertheless accomplished their purpose of demon-

⁸¹U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1911, XLVII, Part 5, 4229-4230.

strating that they could be expected to respond to the progressive demands of the hour.

The humanitarian strain among progressives was strong. A concern for the welfare of children began to show up in numerous ways. For one thing, there was the problem of child labor. Children of very tender years were working from dawn till dark in factories, ruining their health in many cases and losing any opportunity for education. The National Child Labor Committee and well known reform workers such as Jane Addams urged Congress to establish a federal Children's Bureau which would undertake studies of the problems of children and provide information to the various state and local groups working for child welfare.⁸²

Answering the call for a Children's Bureau, Senator William E. Borah of Idaho introduced such a bill (S. 252) in the second session of the Sixty-second Congress. Apparently with little debate on the proposal, the House passed the Borah bill on April 2, 1912, by a vote of 177 to 17, with 190 not voting. A week later the bill was signed into law by President Taft.⁸³ Among the Oklahoma delegates, there was no opposition found as Ferris, Morgan, and Davenport were recorded in favor of the bill, while Carter and McGuire were absent. Only Scott Ferris of the Oklahoma representatives addressed himself to the issue. On May 31, 1912, he reviewed several pieces of legislation that had received the approval of the Sixty-second House, and the Children's Bureau Act was included in his list. He described the resolution as

⁸²Stephen B. Wood, Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era: Child Labor and the Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 19.

⁸³U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII, Part 4, 4624.

creating an agency to care for the children of unfortunate circumstances and conditions that "human flesh and blood were not intended to endure." The bureau, according to Ferris, would deal with the problems of "unclaimed infants, infanticide, orphanage, desertions, and dangerous and deleterious occupations" that would blight the future of children. In his summation, Ferris declared that it was a resolution that displayed "the religion of human sympathy, human justice, and equal rights."⁸⁴ Although none of the Oklahomans disapproved of the resolution, it appears that Ferris still remained the most outspoken of the Oklahoma Congressmen for progressive causes.

The parcels post issue had been debated for some time, dating from the late nineteenth century. It was heavily favored by rural areas because they distrusted the private express companies which charged exorbitant rates.⁸⁵ A government owned parcels post, according to the argument presented, would provide a cheap means for sending farm produce to town and a cheap means by which the farmer could supply his needs without a time consuming trip to the source of supply. The proponents pointed to the English and German systems as models, and argued that the parcels post system would also reduce the cost of living.

In the second session, the provision for an experimental parcels post, which would include rural delivery, was introduced in the form of a rider to a Post Office appropriation bill (H. R. 21279) by Congressman John A. Moon of Tennessee. In this form it passed both

⁸⁴U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII, Part 8, 7470.

⁸⁵Outlook, XCVI (November 12, 1910), 567.

houses and was approved by the President on August 24, 1912. All of the Oklahoma delegates, with the exception of Davenport, who did not vote, were among the 240 House members supporting the bill. There were 86 members who voted against the provision, with 61 not voting.⁸⁶ It is not too surprising to find unanimity among the Oklahomans on this issue since it was of such vital interest to farmers, a group that the Oklahoma House members considered a major part of their constituency. However, none of them felt strongly enough about the issue to lend vocal support to Moon's rider.

Of the twenty labor bills which the Chairman of the House Labor Committee, William B. Wilson of Pennsylvania, claimed for the Sixty-second Congress, perhaps the most significant were the various provisions for an eight-hour day, the anti-injunction bill, and the workmen's compensation bill.⁸⁷ The increasing willingness of Congress to legislate an eight-hour day for workers under its jurisdiction stands out in a period when unregulated private industry often worked people for sixty or more hours a week.

With the introduction of H. R. 9061, which provided that workers on government contracts should be limited to an eight-hour day, Congress reached with a long arm into industry, for a plant working on government orders could not very well work some of its people longer than others. The bill, introduced by Representative Wilson, was passed on

⁸⁶U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII, Part 6, 5752.

⁸⁷U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII, Part 11, 10679-10682.

December 14, 1911, with no vote being recorded.⁸⁸ After some debate in the Senate, it was sent back to the House with amendments. Wilson moved on June 5, 1912, that the House concur with the Senate revisions, and the motion was agreed to with no one demanding a roll call. The vote was unanimous in the House, and the President approved the bill on June 8, 1912.⁸⁹

Only Ferris of the Oklahoma contingent spoke for the eight-hour day issue. In a short speech on May 31, 1912, he explained how the resolution had long been needed by labor. He said:

This bill . . . is the hope of labor in the morning
with dinner pail in hand as he goes to his daily task;
is the dream of labor as he returns at night with tired
muscles, but with rested brain.⁹⁰

We are only keeping our word to American labor, Ferris concluded, with the enactment of such legislation. Once again, the Lawton Democrat had provided the only voice for Oklahomans in the United States House.

The resolution to limit the use of the injunction in labor disputes was brought to the floor of the House by Henry D. Clayton, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. On May 14, 1912, the House passed his bill providing that, in general, no injunction should be issued in a labor dispute unless it was necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property for which there was no adequate recourse at law. The vote was 243 "yeas," 31 "nays," 6 "present," and

⁸⁸U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII, Part 1, 396.

⁸⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII, Part 8, 7715.

⁹⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII, Part 8, 7469.

113 "not voting." Four of the five Oklahoma Congressmen, Carter, Ferris, Morgan and McGuire, cast votes in the affirmative, while Davenport answered the roll call as "present."⁹¹

Two of the representatives from Oklahoma declared not only roll call support, but also commented on the merits of the anti-injunction proposition. The first to speak was Ferris. This bill will guarantee the laborer his solemn rights, asserted Ferris, and will "lift aloft the standard of his manhood and the improvement of his future." Continuing, he said that the Clayton bill would give to the laborer his constitutional rights, and he reminded his colleagues that the proposal had been the hope of the country's toilers since his boyhood. This is the "resurrection" of labor's rights, their "hope by day," their "dream by night," argued Ferris. And even though the "great modern trinity of standpatters, Cannon, Fordney, and Dalzell," have voted against the bill, Ferris proclaimed that the "supreme wish of labor" had finally been granted.⁹²

Joining Ferris in support of the bill was Morgan. He informed the House members on July 9, 1912 that there were about 35,000,000 persons engaged in gainful occupations; 11,000,000 on the farm, 7,000,000 in domestic and personal service, 7,000,000 in trade and transportation, and 9,000,000 in manufacturing and mechanical pursuits. It is this "army of toilers," avowed Morgan, that gives our country its wealth and prosperity. Therefore, Morgan reasoned that Congress should be concerned about the advancement, welfare, and happiness of this

⁹¹U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII, Part 7, 6470-6471.

⁹²U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII, Part 8, 7469.

"grand army of workers." He acknowledged that only a small percentage of the American workers were organized, but that all wage earners benefited from the "battles fought and won by organized labor." Morgan ended his remarks by saying that as long as he was intrusted with legislative power he would vote for all measures which would contribute to the welfare of labor.⁹³ Unfortunately for labor and others interested in this measure, it was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and left unfinished in the Sixty-second Congress.

For years reformers had been increasingly troubled by the defenselessness of industrial workers, who ran a considerable risk of being injured on the job. In addition, the workers, under the common law as interpreted by American courts, had very little chance to recover damages if they were injured. There had been an uphill fight in many state legislatures and in Congress itself to modify the old common law doctrine of the "fellow servant" (if an accident could be laid at the door of a negligent fellow employee, the employer might get off free) and "assumption of risk" (if you took a job knowing it to be dangerous it was nobody's fault but your own if you got injured or killed).

As recently as 1908 Congress had enacted a good Employer's Liability law. In the meantime, the newer concept of workmen's compensation, i.e., compensation for every injury regardless of liability, was gaining ground. A bill, introduced by Senator George Sutherland of Utah, reached the House floor in March of 1913. S. 5382 provided for compensation for railway employees in case of accidental injuries

⁹³U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII, Part 9, 8799-8801.

which resulted in disability or death. The resolution was opposed by many of the progressives because they felt some of the provisions inserted by the Taft administration were highly favorable to the railroads and also because:

. . . the rates of compensation provided for in this bill are so at variance with the amounts that may be recovered under the existing law and in many instances so small that they are wholly inadequate to the necessities of the injured employees⁹⁴

Consequently many of the House members who customarily took the progressive view of legislation argued against, and either voted against the bill or were recorded as not voting.

The vote came on March 1, 1913, and the results were 218 for, 81 against, and 80 not voting. Among those in favor of the act were Carter and McGuire of Oklahoma. Davenport, Ferris, and Morgan were recorded as not voting.⁹⁵ It was not unusual for Davenport to be absent, but the failure of Ferris and Morgan, who were quite faithful in answering roll calls, to vote on the bill displays some reluctance on the part of these two men who heretofore had supported the laborer's cause. This may have been due to the fact that they disapproved of the administration's provisions which were considered unfavorable by many of the traditional House progressives. The Senate failed to concur with House approval as Senator Hoke Smith of Georgia threatened a filibuster, and therefore Sutherland withdrew a motion to concur on

⁹⁴U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 3rd Sess., 1913, XLIX, Part 5, 4482.

⁹⁵U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 3rd Sess., 1913, XLIX, Part 5, 4547.

March 2, 1913 because he felt it useless.⁹⁶

Certain resolutions of a progressive nature were introduced by Oklahoma representatives, but never acted on by the Sixty-second Congress. Most of these proposals were concerned with benefitting the agricultural sector of the population. Ferris continued his relentless campaign for a bill to prevent gambling in cotton and grain futures as he presented H. R. 1324 on April 4, 1911. It was referred to the House Committee on Agriculture, but was never reported out. Similar Ferris resolutions had encountered the same fate in the Sixtieth and Sixty-first Congresses.

Morgan wrote two bills that were of interest to progressives, H. R. 18711, which would provide for the regulation of corporations engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and H. R. 20282, which would provide for the establishment of agricultural extension departments in connection with agricultural colleges. He introduced the first bill on January 25, 1912, and it was referred to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. About a month later, the second district Congressman spoke on the subject of controlling industrial corporations, a topic relevant to his bill. He emphatically stated that further control of industrial corporations should be extended because the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 had become antiquated to deal with the problems of increased industrial concentration. There is sufficient evidence, Morgan alleged, to show that many of these corporations have the power to arbitrarily control the prices of common goods. "We should proceed with unflinching firmness

⁹⁶U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 3rd Sess., 1913, XLIX, Part 5, 4677.

and determination to enact such laws as will wrest this power from them," added Morgan. The objectives of his anti-trust legislation, according to Morgan, were to create a seven man interstate corporation commission with jurisdiction over industrial corporations which would be equivalent to the jurisdiction that the Interstate Commerce Commission exercised over railway corporations; to place industrial corporations with gross annual receipts in excess of \$5,000,000 under the commission's supervision and control; to establish a new code of business ethics which would require the corporations to dispose of their products at just and reasonable prices; and to conduct their business by using methods that would not be unfair, unjust, or unreasonable, or dangerous to the public welfare.

Continuing, Morgan believed that the people of America had a right to complain on account of monopolistic control of prices, and therefore the government "should extend its strong arm around the people to protect them and make them secure from monopolistic prices." He maintained that his bill would not be in conflict with the Sherman Act, but that it would aid in its enforcement. However, he pointed out that the 1890 law sought to destroy monopoly, whereas his act would control so as to preserve competition.

Morgan likened the growth of monopolistic power to a disease that had gotten out of control. He said:

We do not allow the malady to go on indefinitely, slowly but surely sapping the life and vitality of the patient. In like manner we should treat our industrial system, now infected with a malignant monopolistic fever. In spite of our efforts to prevent and destroy, the malady has grown more virulent Let us act the part of a wise physician--continue our

efforts to destroy the disease, but in the meantime apply some remedy that will keep it under control.⁹⁷

It was Morgan's theory that competition should never be eliminated, and that under no circumstances should the people surrender this "mighty agency as a factor in our industrial system." On the other hand, he argued, where competition has been eliminated the government should provide a substitute: "Control is the only substitute for competition. Control must begin where competition ceases." He concluded his lengthy remarks in defense of his bill by saying:

The people of the United States are now in a second great struggle. Their antagonist at this time is our great industrial corporations. These gigantic organizations are strongly intrenched. . . . These great corporations will not recede, they will not retreat, they will not willingly surrender a single advantage they enjoy. The interests of 90,000,000 people are at stake. . . . Let us not disappoint the people in their expectations. Let us give them the same instrument of warfare . . . that they used so successfully and effectively in their contest with the greater railroad corporations. Let us create a great interstate corporation commission, clothe it with ample power and jurisdiction, and direct it to proceed forthwith to bring our gigantic industrial corporations into subjection.⁹⁸

Thus it appears that Morgan was promulgating legislation that had the appearance of both Roosevelt's "New Nationalism" plan and Wilson's "New Freedom" platform. It resembled the "New Nationalism" theory in that it recognized industrial units as the most effective agencies of business, but believed that their activities should be brought under strict public control by the use of a national commission. Morgan's ideas were also similar to Wilson's "New Freedom" ideals in that they both wanted to abolish special privileges so as to preserve

⁹⁷ U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, XLVIII, Part 3, 2241-2242.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 2243-2244.

and restore competition in business. It would seem that Morgan's proposal coming in the latter days of the Taft Administration was a precursor to the Clayton Anti-Trust and Federal Trade Commission Acts, which would not become a reality until 1914 during the first Wilson term.

The second bill to be introduced by Morgan was an elaboration of a resolution presented by Representative Asbury Lever of South Carolina. Lever's act provided for the establishment of agricultural extension departments in connection with agricultural colleges to disseminate practical information to the farming populace on subjects relating to agriculture and home economics. Morgan's bill broadened the scope of Lever's proposal so as to require instruction of this type be given in graded rural schools. Morgan maintained that this form of education should be given "to the boys of to-day who will be the farmers of tomorrow." The Woodward Republican, however, strongly supported the Lever bill, and explained that his resolution was presented because he felt it would improve the existing agricultural extension proposition.⁹⁹ Neither Lever's nor Morgan's bill was accepted, although the Senate passed Lever's bill with amendments, most of which concerned the topic of matching funds provided by the states. The House could not agree on the Senate amendments, and so it was referred to a Conference Committee, where it died for the Sixty-second Congress. Morgan's bill was submitted to the House Committee on Agriculture on February 16, 1912, but was never reported out. The agricultural extension program had to await the approval of the Sixty-third Congress,

⁹⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1912, L, Part 7, 310-311.

where it was enacted in 1914 as the Smith-Lever law. Again it seems as if Morgan was in the vanguard of promoting progressive legislation that would become major considerations during the Wilson administration.

In conclusion, the record of the Sixty-second Congress, for which Oklahoma Congressmen could take partial credit, was outstanding from a progressive point of view. The members of the 1911 to 1913 session could claim that serious efforts had been made to reduce the tariff and make the cost of living cheaper. In the Oklahoma delegation, Ferris, Carter, and Davenport lent strong support to this effort by speaking and voting for Canadian Reciprocity, Farmer's Free List, and wool and cotton duty reductions. Morgan was something of an enigma on the tariff question as he disapproved of the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty and the wool and cotton revisions, but declared his support for the Farmer's Free List proposal, perhaps realizing that a majority of his constituents were agricultural. McGuire remained a steadfast protectionist on all occasions when tariff reduction was presented.

The Sixty-second Congress could also take credit for the serious effort to make political life both cleaner and more democratic. Oklahoma representatives found little to disagree with on this issue, which included direct election of United States Senators, a campaign publicity act, and Arizona and New Mexico statehood. There was no opposition to the first two measures, although Davenport and McGuire were absent on the direct election of Senators vote, and Davenport was also absent on the campaign publicity roll call. The record indicates that three of the Oklahomans, Ferris, Morgan, and McGuire, spoke in direct support of these resolutions; Morgan and Ferris

on direct election of Senators, and McGuire and Ferris on campaign publicity. The only dissent on political reform came when McGuire refused to support the Arizona and New Mexico joint statehood bill because of the recall of judges provision in the Arizona document. However, the other four favored the right of initiative, referendum, and recall, with Ferris, Davenport, and Morgan delivering forceful remarks in favor of these principles provided for in the Arizona constitution.

The Oklahoma representatives could take some of the credit for the earnest attempt made by the Sixty-second Congress to establish more humane conditions in industry. There was no opposition among the Oklahomans to the creation of a Children's Bureau, the eight-hour day proposition, the anti-injunction bill, or the workmen's compensation measure. Ferris delivered strong supporting statements on behalf of three of the four measures, the Children's Bureau, the eight-hour day, and the anti-injunction issue. On the anti-injunction proposal, Ferris was joined by Morgan, who conveyed strong sentiments in favor of the bill. The other Oklahoma delegates remained silent, but did extend roll call support. The Oklahoma delegates displayed a broad progressive spirit by favoring these social welfare proposals since they represented primarily agricultural districts which contained few large urban areas. But the interests of the farmer were not completely excluded by the Oklahoma delegation as well as by the entire Sixty-second Congress.

Long demanded by rural areas, the parcels post system was created with the help of Carter, Ferris, Morgan, and McGuire, with Davenport not voting. In addition, Ferris and Morgan introduced legislation

providing for the prevention of gambling in cotton and grain futures and agricultural extension education, respectively. Apparently both men were forerunners in the advancement of legislation of particular importance to farmers, and would continue their legislative battles for these bills until they became law during the Wilson administration.

In regard to economic reform other than the tariff, Morgan stands out among the Oklahoma delegates for his recommendation dealing with anti-trust legislation. Of growing concern to progressives, the issue was to become a controversial topic in the 1912 presidential campaign and would not be resolved until the first Wilson administration.

What explanations can be offered for this manifest change in the character in Oklahoma representation? Probably two factors were at work. First, the general public sentiment for reform was making progressivism almost fashionable. In Washington, Oklahoma Congressmen read the same papers, listened to the same speakers, became acquainted with pressure groups urging reform, and rubbed elbows with progressives in the Congressional chambers.

Secondly, at home the Oklahoma population was becoming better informed. In the rural areas and growing cities, there was a significant increase in the diffusion of information. Newspapers, such as the Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, were propounding the benefits of reform. There also appeared to be a broadening of opinion due to lecture tours and the increased circulation of the writings of social, political, and economic reformers. The next chapter will examine the Sixty-third Congress to determine whether the tendencies evident in the Sixty-second would become more marked.

CHAPTER VI

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1912 AND THE SIXTY-THIRD CONGRESS

After harvesting the fruits of Republican dissension and popular protest against the Payne-Aldrich Tariff and the Ballinger Affair in the congressional and gubernatorial elections of 1910, the Democrats looked with great anticipation to the presidential contest of 1912. However, a crucial struggle ensued for control of the party. Bryan remained titular head of the party, but he announced soon after the elections of 1910 that he would not be a candidate for a fourth nomination, and a host of new leaders emerged to claim his mantle. Woodrow Wilson, who had made a brilliant campaign for the governorship of New Jersey, quickly rose as the most formidable Democratic claimant. After his election in November of 1910, Wilson, in a spectacular display of leadership, forced through a reluctant legislature a series of measures for which New Jersey progressives had been fighting for almost a decade: a direct primary, corrupt practices legislation, workmen's compensation, and effective state regulation of railroads and public utilities.¹ As a consequence of these triumphs, by the summer of 1911 many progressive Democrats throughout the country were looking to Wilson as their spokesman. For his part, Wilson threw

¹ Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), 10.

himself into the movement for his nomination for the presidency with such vigor that it seemed at the beginning of 1912 that he would easily win leadership of the Democratic Party.

Wilson's apparent success made the meteoric rise of his chief rival, Champ Clark of Missouri, Speaker of the House, all the more surprising. In contrast to Wilson, who represented the newcomer and the nonprofessional in politics, Clark was an old-line politician who had served in the House since the 1890's. Although he had accumulated a consistent progressive voting record over the years, he had never originated any legislation of a progressive nature. Having been a politician of the Populist type, Clark inherited most of Bryan's following in the West. In addition, he made a number of alliances with eastern and southern state organizations, and won the support of William Randolph Hearst and his chain of newspapers.

Thus, while Wilson campaigned fervently and won 248 delegates, almost one-fourth of the total convention vote of 1,088, Clark negotiated shrewdly and harvested a crop nearly twice as large, 436 delegates.² To make matters worse for Wilson, Oscar W. Underwood of Alabama, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and the pre-eminent Democratic tariff reformer, had entered the contest, and won over one hundred southern delegates who probably would have otherwise gone to Wilson.³ It was a critical moment in the life of the Democratic Party when the delegates assembled in national convention in Baltimore on June 25, 1912, and the Oklahoma Democratic delegation

²Ibid., 12.

³Arthur S. Link, "The Underwood Presidential Movement of 1912," Journal of Southern History, XI (May, 1945), 230-245.

was to play an important role in the outcome.

In the pre-convention activities in Oklahoma, Senator Thomas P. Gore and future Congressman William H. Murray served as the Wilson leaders; Senator Robert L. Owen and Representative Scott Ferris favored Clark for President. Both sides tried to persuade the county Democratic conventions to endorse their candidate and send delegations to the state convention pledged to him. When the county conventions met, Wilson was endorsed by thirty-three counties, Clark by only twenty.⁴ Wilson showed surprising strength over the entire state, while the Clark supporters were centered primarily along the Missouri border. The opposing factions prepared to resolve the conflict at the state convention to be held at Oklahoma City on February 22, 1912.

Gore and Ferris tried to prevent a floor fight at the convention by suggesting that the delegation be divided equally between Wilson and Clark, but this conciliatory effort failed. Murray led the Wilson forces on the convention floor and attempted to gain control of the convention committees.⁵ He kept the Wilson men united during the proceedings, in which both sides claimed a majority. Fearing that further strife would lead to defeat in the general election, both groups finally agreed to a divided delegation, with each candidate to have ten of the twenty votes.⁶ Should either Wilson or Clark withdraw, the remaining candidate would receive all the votes.

At Baltimore, Murray was the showman of the Oklahoma delegation,

⁴Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, February 12, 1912.

⁵The Daily Ardmoreite, February 23, 1912.

⁶Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, February 24, 1912; Johnston County Capital-Democrat, March 7, 1912.

and as at Denver in 1908, "Alfalfa Bill" did not disappoint his audience. In the lobby of the Emerson Hotel, wearing three day's growth of beard and puffing on a corncob pipe, he taught the bellboys to sing Wilson's campaign songs.⁷ Murray had come out for Wilson as early as December 21, 1911, in a letter which praised the New Jersey governor as "progressive, clean, able, and scholarly," and stated that he was the only candidate who could get the independent vote necessary to win the Presidency.⁸ Murray tried to gain control of the delegation, but the presence of Gore, Ferris, and Owen among its members prevented anyone from dominating the group. He also wanted to serve on the resolutions committee, but was not selected.⁹ Murray did become a member of the staff of Wilson managers that met to map convention strategy.¹⁰ However, it was on the convention floor that he rendered his greatest aid to the Wilson cause.

During the deliberations of the convention, the division within the Sooner delegation was made apparent when Gore seconded the nomination of Wilson and Ferris gave a similar speech for Clark. On the first nine ballots Oklahoma cast ten votes each for Wilson and Clark, a split which reflected the plight of the entire convention. The delegates were deadlocked between Clark and Wilson even though the Speaker took a commanding lead in the early balloting. Then on the tenth ballot, Charles Murphy, the political boss of the ninety

⁷ Muskogee Times-Democrat, June 24, 25, 1912.

⁸ Shawnee News-Herald, July 6, 1912.

⁹ Muskogee Times-Democrat, June 25, 1912.

¹⁰ Arthur S. Link, "The South and the Democratic Campaign of 1912," Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1945, 413.

Tammany-controlled New York delegates, cast the state's votes for Clark, giving him a majority, but not the necessary two-thirds. Not since 1844 had a Democrat obtained a majority in a national convention and then failed to win the nomination.¹¹ As the states following New York were polled, each side watched for a break to Clark, but it never came. When the Sooner State was called, a delegate asked for a poll of the twenty men, as he had instructions to vote for Wilson first and Clark second, and now it appeared that the convention was shifting to Clark. It was at this point that Murray, collarless and wiping his face with a red bandanna, declared that he did not mind the delegation being polled, but "we do insist that we shall not join Tammany in making the nomination."¹² This reference to New York and its switch to Clark brought on a Wilson demonstration that lasted fifty-five minutes. When the uproar subsided, the Oklahoma delegation stood firm with ten votes for each of the major contenders. Murray and Gore held their men together through 46 ballots, when Underwood switched his support to Wilson and gave him the two-thirds necessary to win the nomination.

Murray's demonstration-provoking speech on the tenth ballot was credited by Wilson's secretary, Joseph Tumulty, with keeping Clark from getting the full benefit of the New York shift. According to Tumulty, Murray's statement stemmed the tide to Clark and changed the whole complexion of the convention.¹³ Ray Stannard Baker, one of

¹¹Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 13.

¹²Urey Woodson, (ed.), Democratic National Convention Proceedings, 1912 (Chicago: Peterson Linotyping Co., 1912), 219-220.

¹³Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I Knew Him (Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1921), 119-120.

Wilson's biographers, praised Murray's effort to stop the move to Clark and wrote "Alfalfa Bill struck the keynote of the hour."¹⁴ The Oklahoma delegation returned home believing that they had played a major role in Wilson's nomination. Thus control of the Democratic Party was given over to its progressive element, and without any open rupture or more than the usual dissension.

The Republican Party, however, did not resolve its dilemma so happily. The elections of 1910 had amounted to a mass repudiation of Taft's leadership, and the "insurgents" had made it plain that they would not tolerate Taft's renomination. All they lacked was a dynamic leader of national standing to unite their ranks and lead their campaign. Many signs pointed in 1910 and early 1911 to Senator Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin as this leader, especially after prominent "insurgents" formed the National Progressive Republican League in January, 1911, to fight for the Senator's nomination. LaFollette had the support of a small and dedicated band of individuals, but the great mass of Republican progressives wanted Roosevelt. Convinced that his party faced certain defeat if Taft was renominated, and persuaded that LaFollette could never be nominated, Roosevelt at last gave in to the pleas of his friends and announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination on February 24, 1912.¹⁵

The battle for control of the Republican Party that occurred from March through May of 1912 was bitter. In the thirteen states that held presidential primaries, Roosevelt won 278 delegates, as

¹⁴Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson Life and Letters, Governor 1910-1913 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), 349.

¹⁵Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 13-14.

compared to 48 for Taft and 36 for LaFollette. However, Taft controlled the southern states, had the support of "Old Guard" strongholds like New York, and dominated the Republican National Committee. Consequently, the Taft forces organized the national convention that met in Chicago on June 18, awarded themselves 235 of 254 contested seats, and proceeded to renominate the President on the first ballot on June 1. Meanwhile, over 300 Roosevelt delegates had stormed out of the convention and, in consultation with Roosevelt, had decided to go back to Chicago and form a new party dedicated to advancing the cause of progressivism. The result was the Progressive Party, organized in Chicago on August 5 and 6, 1912.¹⁶

The confusion in which the nation's voters approached the tri-cornered presidential battle was deepened in Oklahoma by the fact that the Progressive Party was not on the ballot. Yet all but one or perhaps two of the Republican candidates for elector were committed to Roosevelt instead of Taft, and it was generally believed that the entire group would support whoever showed stronger in the electoral college. It was a peculiar dilemma for Oklahoma Republican Party officials, most of them emotionally attached to Roosevelt, but serving under the dispensation of Taft. In the crisis, State Chairman Jim Harris of Wagoner announced that, to allay possible discord, there would be no state-convention. Despite such efforts to promote harmony, there was a great deal of activity in Oklahoma in Roosevelt's behalf. A Progressive Party organization emerged, and its chairman, Alva L. McDonald of El Reno; L. G. Disney of Muskogee, who had unsuccessfully opposed Charles Carter in the 1907 fourth district Congressional race;

¹⁶Ibid., 15-16.

E. N. Wright of Olney, Republican candidate for the Carter seat in 1912; and Frank Frantz of Bartlesville attended the Bull Moose convention and returned home to campaign for the Progressive Party platform.¹⁷

Roosevelt made a tour of Oklahoma on September 24, 1912, speaking before enthusiastic crowds at Chandler, where he said "no honest man should vote the Republican ticket this year,"¹⁸ Shawnee, McAlester, and Oklahoma City. Jane Addams, the well known social reformer, and Senator Henry Allen of Kansas visited Oklahoma to speak for Roosevelt. Even though most of the campaign activity centered on Roosevelt, the Republican press of the state remained in Taft's camp. This fact was pointed out in the Shawnee News-Herald of October 22 which stated, on its editorial page, that the "progressives are without a newspaper organ of any consequence in the whole state."¹⁹ The Oklahoma City Times, Muskogee Phoenix, and Tulsa World, representing Oklahoma's three largest cities, endorsed Taft, but in an attempt to display unison, emphasized how the Republicans and Progressives had fused to promote political harmony.²⁰ Dennis T. Flynn, former territorial delegate, carried the brunt of the battle for the regular Republicans, but his campaign speeches were aimed primarily against the Democratic state administration rather than against Wilson.²¹

¹⁷ James R. Scales, "The Political History of Oklahoma, 1907-1949," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1949, 146.

¹⁸ Shawnee News-Herald, November 1, 1912.

¹⁹ Shawnee News-Herald, October 22, 1912.

²⁰ Oklahoma City Times, October 31, 1912.

²¹ Scales, 147.

The Democratic press did all it could to encourage the Republican split so as to ensure a presidential victory. The theme of the Democratically-controlled newspapers was to concentrate on forcing the ten Republican electors to declare their position for either Taft or Roosevelt so the Republican voters would know where they stood. The Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, Shawnee News-Herald, and Enid Morning News urged Oklahoma Republicans to write each Republican elector and "compel him to publicly announce for whom he will vote in the electoral college if he is chosen to the college." They stressed that all of the electors on the Democratic ticket were pledged to Wilson, and that the Democratic voter knew exactly how his vote would be counted when he went to the polls in November. The varying reports on how the Republican electors stand, declared the Democratic press, makes it "plain that someone is getting the double-cross." "Somebody is being fooled" added the Morning News, and the only way the riddle will be solved was for each candidate on the Republican electoral ticket to make a specific declaration of his position. In conclusion, the Democratic publications asked: "Will these candidates have the courage to declare themselves, or will they permit themselves to be gagged by the Politicians?"²² Apparently the influence of these comments had some effect on the voters of Oklahoma as Wilson rolled up a plurality of over 28,000. Wilson's vote was not a majority, however. Presenting their strongest alliance, a combination of the Farmer's Union of the southwest and the United Mine Workers of the southeast, the Socialists polled over 43,000 votes for Eugene V. Debs. The results

²²Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 12, 1912; Shawnee News-Herald, November 1, 1912; and Enid Morning News, October 13, 1912.

were as follows:

| | | |
|----------------|---------|---------------------|
| Wilson | 119,140 | 46.9% |
| Roosevelt-Taft | 90,742 | 35.8% |
| Debs | 43,755 | 17.3% ²³ |

The census of 1910 revealed that Oklahoma had a population increase of such magnitude as to give the state three additional congressmen. The legislature failed to redistrict in 1911, which meant that the new congressmen would be elected at large in 1912. The Democrats engaged in a free-for-all primary, with twenty-eight candidates running for the three posts. William H. Murray of Tishomingo, Joseph B. Thompson of Pauls Valley, and Claude Weaver of Oklahoma City were the victors in the August 6 primary. Murray, his name undoubtedly the best known, led the large field of candidates with 39,140 votes; Thompson was second with 31,887; and Weaver was third with 26,923.²⁴

All three winners had campaigned on progressive platforms in the pre-primary battle. Murray stated that he had neither the time nor money to conduct a major primary campaign, but was running on a platform of tariff reform, the direct election of United States Senators, and an extensive federal program of irrigation. He asked his friends first to search out his name among the list of candidates and then vote for two others. The Democrats would need a strong ticket in the fall, and Murray urged voters to consider this factor when selecting congressional nominees.²⁵ During the summer Murray wrote letters and

²³Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Presidential, Senatorial, and Gubernatorial Elections (Norman: Bureau of Government Research, 1970), 36.

²⁴Directory: State of Oklahoma (Oklahoma City: State Election Board, 1915), 85.

²⁵Johnston County Capital-Democrat, May 16, 1912; Muskogee Times-Democrat, May 11, 1912.

mailed campaign cards but made no personal appearances other than at Medford, where he conferred with William Jennings Bryan, who was on a speaking tour.²⁶ Campaign letters, accompanied by sample ballots emphasizing the location of Murray's name, called him a "progressive candidate" whose nomination had been conceded by his opponents. The letter announced that he would spend fifteen to twenty days campaigning for Wilson in the fall, but that he would not campaign before the primary.²⁷ Murray's campaign strategy was successful.

Weaver, in contrast to Murray, conducted an extensive campaign and outlined an elaborate platform. Like Murray, he favored tariff revision downward, calling for duties to be highest on luxuries and lowest on necessities. Describing the trust problem as the most difficult the nation faced, Weaver called for the replacement of the Sherman Act, by more stringent legislation that would include penitentiary imprisonment for violators. He supported the initiative, referendum, and recall, and demanded that there be direct primaries for all offices, including President and Vice-President. Also included in Weaver's platform were planks upholding the eight-hour day, general employer's liability, and a separate federal department of labor.²⁸ Weaver had set the progressive tone for his upcoming general election race.

Former Democratic State Chairman Thompson also spoke out for

²⁶ Johnston County Capital-Democrat, June 13, 1912.

²⁷ Letter, William H. Murray to Charles L. Daugherty, July 18, 1912, Daugherty Collection, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library.

²⁸ Campaign Book of Claude Weaver, Claude Weaver Collection, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library.

progressive measures in the 1912 primary race. In a political advertisement that appeared in the Johnston County Capital-Democrat, Thompson was described as a "PROGRESSIVE AND REFORM DEMOCRAT." It stated that he believed in the initiative, referendum, and recall principles, and supported the direct election of not only United States Senators, but also of United States Marshals, Attorneys, and Judges.²⁹ There was little doubt that the Democrats had selected three at-large candidates who at least paid lip service to progressive causes. Time would tell whether the rhetoric would be bolstered by action. Ideologically, Murray's association with Wilson had imbued him with the progressive principles of the New Jersey governor. Weaver's platform was the most specific of all three candidates as he touched on economic reform in his tariff plank, political reform in his support of direct primaries, and social reform in his overtures to labor. As State Chairman, Thompson had led the Bryan forces to victory in Oklahoma in the presidential contest in 1908, and he appeared to follow the progressive line long advocated by Bryan-type Democrats.

Alvin D. Allen of Waurika, James L. Brown of Oklahoma City, and Emory D. Brownlee of Kingfisher were the three Republicans chosen to run for the at-large seats in the Republican primary. Allen polled 17,853 votes; Brownlee, 15,275; and Brown, 19,260.³⁰ The Republican press across the state paid little attention to the primary race, and no information was divulged as to the ideological position of Allen, Brown, or Brownlee. Apparently the Republican newspapers intended

²⁹ Johnston County Capital-Democrat, August 8, 1912.

³⁰ Directory: State of Oklahoma (Oklahoma City: State Election Board, 1915), 86.

to remain as silent as possible on differing positions, if any, so as to prevent any more dissension than already existed.

The at-large races in the general election of November, 1912, attracted little or no notice throughout the state. Only Murray of the at-large candidates intrigued the state press, and this was due to his political appeal and national notoriety. He was asked by the state Democratic organization to campaign for all nominees from Wilson on down the political hierarchy. From early September until the November election, he answered the call by speaking from one end of the state to the other, carrying the message of Wilson's "New Freedom" platform. He wrote to his wife, Alice, that it was one of the most extensive campaigns of his career.³¹ Murray's speeches concentrated mainly on the banking and currency question. He pointed out that Wilson was the only presidential candidate who offered any remedies for breaking up the banking and credit monopoly. According to Murray, this issue alone should entitle Wilson to the support of all progressives. He usually concluded his speeches by puncturing the "pretensions" of Roosevelt's platform by showing that it completely ignored the farmer, especially on the subject of rural credits.³²

Former State Senator Thompson, an arch-foe of corporations, carried his progressive demands into the general election campaign. Serving the Cleveland-Garvin-McClain County Senatorial District, he had introduced much of the early regulatory legislation in Oklahoma, including the law prohibiting corporate contributions to political

³¹Letter, William H. Murray to Alice Murray, October 22, 1912, William H. Murray Collection, Divisions of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library.

³²Shawnee News-Herald, October 5, 1912.

campaigns. He believed that a law of this type should be passed at the federal level, and, in addition, felt there should be a law prohibiting a public official from accepting employment from a corporation while in office, for, as Thompson stated, "no man can serve two masters."³³

Weaver, who was an old-time handshaking campaigner, stated in his speeches that "the protective tariff is an insidious system of petty larceny by which the masses are pilfered to make the rich the favored few." He supported the 1912 Democratic platform which called for a tariff for revenue only. Weaver was convinced that the tariff was the "mother of the trusts" as he declared:

Vast corporations engaged in interstate commerce, enriched by the tariff's special privilege, have combined to restrain trade, to destroy competition, and to crush lesser concerns, thereby constituting the private monopoly known as trusts Entrenched behind ill-gotten millions, by bribery they have attempted the wholesale corruption of the general electorate and of state legislatures. . . . And where they could not write they have defied the law.³⁴

Weaver idolized Wilson and, if elected, stated that he would provide unyielding support for the "New Freedom" principles of tariff reform and trust regulation.

The two Oklahoma City newspapers gave scant coverage to the races for Congressman-at-large. Although not specifically endorsing the Republican candidates, the Times, a Republican organ, carried an editorial on October 31, 1912, entitled "Republicans and Progressives Unite." It stated that of the twenty-eight Democrats running for

³³ Johnston County Capital-Democrat, August 8, 1912.

³⁴ Weaver Campaign Book, Claude Weaver Collection, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library; Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, April 22, 1912.

Congressman-at-large, only three were chosen, and the question was posed as to how many of the voters across the state could have been familiar with the three selected. The result, according to the editorial, was that many voted for the first three names on the list, whether they were good, bad, or indifferent. Therefore, the article declared that when a choice is given, the position on the ballot becomes more important than the personal character or ability of the candidate. With the Bull Moosers and Republicans working together, the editorial concluded, the country will be saved from bad or incapable officials.³⁵ The Times had thus implied that the Democratic candidates had been elected because of their place on the ballot, and that the voters had made their judgment disregarding the candidate's capabilities. In analyzing the Times editorial, the evidence shows that it was clearly in error because the Democratic ballot listed the candidates alphabetically, with the names of Murray and Thompson appearing quite low among the candidates, and Weaver's name last. Consequently, the Times presented a weak argument for supporting the Republican candidates because it made no mention of the qualifications of Allen, Brown, or Brownlee for serving in Congress, and attacked the Democratic candidates by using incorrect facts.

Like the Times, the Democratic Daily Oklahoman in an October 8, 1912, editorial endorsed no specific candidates, but called for the election of a Congressional delegation that would be entirely Democratic. Pointing out that Wilson would be the next president, the article said that Republican representatives would receive little

³⁵ Oklahoma City Times, October 31, 1912.

recognition on affairs concerning Oklahomans. "Why have one or more Republican dummies in congress?" stated the Oklahoman. The editorial asserted, in conclusion, that it was time for Oklahoma to make itself a force in Washington, and the means for accomplishing this end was to elect a solid Democratic delegation.³⁶

Thus in an indirect fashion both papers were supporting their respective candidates for the at-large seats, but certainly not in the positive manner that both papers had displayed in the 1910 second district election. It appears that, to some degree, the press, both Democratic and Republican, had conceded victory to the Democrats, especially Murray, whose name had become almost synonymous with Oklahoma. The relatively unknown Republican candidates for the at-large seats were not helped by the reluctance on the part of the Republican officials and the Republican press to lend support in their efforts to prevent further rupturing of the Oklahoma Republican Party.

All three Democrats were victorious in the November 5 general election. Murray led the ticket in the race for Congressman-at-large, receiving 121,411 votes. He was followed by Weaver, with 120,753, and Thompson, with 120,346. The leading Republican in the race, Allen, polled only 87,469 votes, or 32,877 fewer than Thompson, the lowest Democrat. Brown and Brownlee, the other Republican candidates, finished fifth and sixth in the balloting, with 87,264 and 86,883 votes, respectively.³⁷

With the failure of the state legislature to redistrict Oklahoma,

³⁶ Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 8, 1912.

³⁷ Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections (Norman: Bureau of Government Research, 1970), 41.

the original five Congressional districts remained intact for the 1912 elections. In the first district, incumbent McGuire sought his sixth consecutive term to the United States House. He was challenged by John J. Davis of Chandler. During the campaign, the pro-McGuire newspapers, such as the Newkirk Republican News-Journal and the Enid Events, re-emphasized the length of service given by McGuire to the people of Oklahoma, and reasoned that he had become a more capable public servant because of his long experience in the House. The Newkirk paper editorialized: "To change from an experienced, capable man to an inexperienced and uninformed man would be as foolish as to put a telegraph operator in a cab to run an engine."³⁸ Besides his experience, the Republican press of the first district praised McGuire for his stand on the tariff. They argued that his support of the tariff was necessary in order to keep the business of the country stable, and would prevent the Democratic Party, with its slogan of "tariff for revenue only," from paralyzing the economy as it did in 1893.³⁹

As indicated by the Congressional Record, McGuire had devoted considerable time to bills concerning pension increases for his constituents. The Republican press did not let the voters forget this service as evidenced by a front page article in the Enid Events just prior to the 1912 election. It applauded McGuire's efforts in the last Congress in securing quick action on pensions for old soldiers in his district. According to the article, McGuire had sent out applications to old soldiers while the veteran's pension bill was still

³⁸ Newkirk Republican News-Journal, October 4, 1912.

³⁹ Newkirk Republican News-Journal, October 25, 1912.

being considered. Hence, the old soldiers in the first district, the story declared, would receive their increased benefits months before those of other districts across the nation.⁴⁰ Thus it appears that McGuire would again count, as he had in the past, on his experience and his loyalty to constituents to attain his objective of a sixth term in Congress.

The Democratic newspapers from both the first district and around the state realized that for the first time there was a golden opportunity of defeating McGuire because of the expected landslide for Wilson, who, they hoped, would carry several Democrats into office with him. Their anticipations were also heightened with the splintering of the Republican Party, which might lead some progressive Republicans, who did not agree with McGuire's "stand-pat" record, to vote for a Democrat, particularly if he was a progressive one. The Democrats felt they had a progressive candidate in the person of Davis, and the Democratic press emphasized this fact. The Enid Morning News editorial page of October 26, 1912 proclaimed that the re-election of McGuire would be a victory for "stand-pat" Republicanism, and a defeat for the progressive cause. If McGuire is re-elected, avowed the article, the sincere progressive will find little satisfaction in the result, because in the first district there is one chance for a definite victory for progressivism.⁴¹ In regard to the first district contest, the Democratic Shawnee News-Herald of October 29 queried: "Is it not time for the voters of the first Congressional district to put an end to the

⁴⁰Enid Events, October 25, 1912.

⁴¹Enid Morning News, October 26, 1912.

misrepresentation of their great district in the House of Representatives?"⁴² Despite the intensive Democratic effort, McGuire was successful in his bid for a sixth consecutive term, although by the narrowest margin of his political career. The results were as follows:

| | | |
|---------|--------|---------------------|
| McGuire | 19,035 | 43.0% |
| Davis | 18,456 | 41.7% |
| Others | 4,768 | 15.3% ⁴³ |

Davis carried Kay, Noble, Pawnee (McGuire's home county), and Payne, but McGuire remained in firm control of the traditionally Republican counties of Garfield, Kingfisher, Lincoln, and Logan.⁴⁴ The Wilson presidential victory undoubtedly strengthened the position of Davis, while the Republican dissension created problems for McGuire. Apparently, McGuire's experience once again prevailed over the inexperienced Democratic candidate. But the narrow margin of victory and the fact that McGuire had less than a majority, indicated that the voters were not fully satisfied with McGuire's representation.

The other Republican incumbent, Morgan, seeking his third term, was opposed by Judge John J. Carney of El Reno, who considered himself a progressive Democrat. A Daily Oklahoman article of November 3 entitled "Carney Will Guard People's Interests," outlined his platform in detail. Carney believed that the Constitution should be amended so as to provide for the nomination and election of presidents, senators, supreme court judges, and all federal authorities by direct vote of the people, eliminating the electoral college and other indirect methods.

⁴²Shawnee News-Herald, October 29, 1912.

⁴³Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections, 41.

⁴⁴Ibid.

"No man was ever big or great enough to be able to withstand the corrupting influence of unlimited power conferred upon him for life," said Carney. Recommending that more suitable laws be placed on the statute books to deal with the trusts, Judge Carney stated that in his opinion the "inefficient Sherman anti-trust law had proven to be inadequate." Tariff revision must also be included in a program for the betterment of the nation, affirmed Carney, and he described the Payne-Aldrich Tariff as not being "written in the interests of the people . . . but was written at the dictation of the special interests of the country." "I have been a progressive ever since I was 15 years old," announced Carney, and to lend credence to this statement, he explained that in the Oklahoma constitutional convention he had voted for the initiative, referendum, and recall provisions; for child labor laws; and for a graded income and inheritance tax, designed to prevent the great accumulation of wealth in the hands of one. Carney concluded his Oklahoma City speech by saying:

I am an ultra-progressive. All democrats must be progressive, because it means but a recognition of justice and human rights. If progressive legislation is not enacted within a few years, the country is going to have serious trouble, just as foreign countries have had and just as occurred in other great republics immediately before they tottered to their fall. It is because the republican party does not represent the people and has been taking care of the big interests too long.⁴⁵

There could be no uncertainty on the part of the second district voters that Carney stood for reforms of all types, economic, political, and social.

The Democratic Daily Oklahoman, a long time critic of Morgan, continued its scathing attacks on the Republican incumbent in the 1912

⁴⁵ Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, November 3, 1912.

contest. In an editorial of October 14 headlined "Tearing Off the Mask," the paper castigated Morgan for his performance in the House. The mask over the face of Morgan has been removed, alleged the story, and his countenance clearly reflects a "stand-pat" expression. Explaining that Morgan was a Taft Republican, the article maintained that Roosevelt Republicans, if they were to be consistent, could not vote for him. The editorial pointed to Roosevelt's statement at Chandler in September, in which he said that no honest man could vote the Republican ticket in 1912. Therefore, the Oklahoman reasoned, if Roosevelt followers voted for Morgan, they were already branded by Roosevelt as dishonest men.⁴⁶ It appears that the Oklahoman was inferring that Bull Moosers, to be true to their principles, had no choice but to cast their ballots for the more progressive candidate, Judge Carney.

During the midst of the heated campaign in the second district, Alva McDonald, chairman of the Oklahoma Progressive Party, declared that he could not support Morgan because the latter was for Taft, and had the support of Flynn. Explaining that his decision was purely a personal matter, McDonald informed the public that he would vote for Carney. The Democratic press wasted no time in using this announcement as further argument for the support of Carney. The Enid Morning News urged all Roosevelt supporters in the second district to follow McDonald's lead. If Morgan is re-elected, the October 16 editorial argued, he will owe his re-election to the votes of Roosevelt Republicans; but, if he is defeated, the "defeat will be a victory for

⁴⁶ Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 14, 1912.

the people in which the Progressives as well as the Democrats will participate."⁴⁷

McDonald continued to speak out against Morgan, particularly his association with Flynn. The Bull Moose Chairman disliked the manner in which Flynn, who had been a delegate to the Republican national convention, helped participate in the "stealing" of the nomination by Taft. McDonald accused Flynn of aiding the Taft people in "stealing" two delegates from the Oklahoma third district who rightfully belonged to Roosevelt. The Democratic press capitalized on the McDonald-Morgan-Flynn feud, as Renfrew's Record, an Enid based Democratic publication, carried a front page article which stated: "We have been hearing from progressives from all over the second district. They absolutely will not stand for any man who has the support of Dennis T. Flynn." The pro-Carney paper summarized the campaign by saying that Flynn's open endorsement of Morgan had "just about baked Uncle Dick's dough and given the cake to Judge Carney."⁴⁸

In what seemingly became the major issue of the campaign, the Republican press, led by the Oklahoma City Times, Cherokee Republican, and Woodward News-Bulletin, counteracted the McDonald move by pointing out that Morgan should not be punished for Flynn's actions in Chicago. The Times of October 18 carried an editorial headlined "McDonald's Queer Choice," which reasoned that if the Bull Moosers start voting against the Taftites, the Taftites may retaliate and vote against the Rooseveltites, and, consequently, both may lose out to the Democrats.

⁴⁷ Enid Morning News, October 16, 1912.

⁴⁸ Renfrew's Record, October 18, 1912.

The course set by McDonald, according to the article, is "foolish and suicidal." The Times concluded by saying:

Is it not foolish for the Bull Moosers to sacrifice the State to the Democrats because they prefer Roosevelt to Taft, when it has been promised that the Progressives and Republicans may disagree on the national ticket and vote for all the Republican state, congressional, and county tickets regardless of whether the candidates are for Taft or Roosevelt.⁴⁹

The obvious attempt on the part of the Times to placate the differences created by the McDonald announcement was taken up by the Cherokee Republican in an October 25 editorial. Whereas the Times had taken great pains to smooth over the apparent rupture, the Cherokee paper castigated McDonald's declaration for Carney, and listed several reasons why McDonald had suddenly turned against Morgan. The article told of McDonald's attempt to secure appointments for a United States marshalship and a post office, which he had failed to receive, and then pointed out that he had tried to obtain a position through Morgan as an appraiser of the segregated coal and asphalt lands, which also failed. Because of these factors, the editorial asserted, Morgan ceases to be progressive in the eyes of McDonald. Hopes for appointment, none of which McDonald had received, have certainly influenced the "violent progress with which he is innoculated," concluded the editorial.⁵⁰

In a speech at Woodward, his hometown, Morgan endeavored to clear the air concerning his position in the controversy as well as outline his stand on national issues. He urged all voters to support the ten

⁴⁹ Oklahoma City Times, October 18, 1912.

⁵⁰ Cherokee Republican, October 25, 1912.

Republican electors regardless of whether they were for Taft or Roosevelt. The Progressive Party has no slate of candidates for county, district, or state offices, explained Morgan, and, therefore, he wanted their support in his bid for re-election. Attempting to resolve the ideological differences between the Progressives and Republicans, Morgan suggested that there were two great national issues involved in the campaign. One was the tariff; the other was the trust problem. Both the Republican Party and the Progressive Party, according to Morgan, supported a protective tariff policy. Likewise, both parties in their 1912 platforms had declared as being in favor of an interstate trade commission that would have jurisdiction over large corporations corresponding to the authority the interstate commerce commission had over railways and express companies. As Morgan viewed the two issues, the Republican and Progressive Parties were united for "protection, to maintain our industrial prosperity, and a national trade commission to protect the people from prices which may be the result of monopolistic power." In his concluding remarks, he emphasized the fact that he had introduced in the House the first bill to create an interstate trade commission, and had made the first speech in the House advocating such a commission.⁵¹ Morgan's overtures for appeasement were apparently successful, as he was re-elected for a third term.

Yet Morgan, like McGuire, won by the smallest margin of his career. Carney rolled up over a 2,000 vote majority in the contiguous counties of Oklahoma, Caddo, Canadian, and Blaine, but it was not

⁵¹Woodward News-Bulletin, October 25, 1912.

enough to combat the strength that Morgan showed in the northwestern counties of the second district. The results were as follows:

| | | |
|--------|--------|---------------------|
| Morgan | 24,349 | 43.7% |
| Carney | 23,773 | 42.7% |
| Others | 7,486 | 13.6% ⁵² |

The slim 576 vote margin can be attributed to several factors. As in the first district race, the strength of Wilson leading the ticket aided Carney. The continual harrassment of Morgan's "stand-pat" record by the Daily Oklahoman apparently had some impact on the Oklahoma County voters as well as the neighboring counties of Caddo, Canadian, and Blaine. And finally, Judge Carney presented a strong progressive platform, which may have enticed many Bull Moosers, led by McDonald, to cross party lines and support Carney. On the other hand, Morgan campaigned hard in his home area, which allowed him to carry Woodward, Woods, Alfalfa, and Major Counties by sizeable margins. It appears that he sufficiently convinced many of the Bull Moosers that his position on national issues was no different from Roosevelt's. Morgan also pointed proudly to his national trade commission bill, and seemingly got extra political mileage on this proposal.

The Republicans did not fare so well in the three remaining districts. Incumbent James Davenport was confronted by a millionaire Tulsan, J. B. Daniel, in the third district. Daniel, during most of the campaign, attacked Davenport's record in the Sixty-second Congress. In an open letter to Davenport which was reprinted in the Tulsa Democrat, Daniel asked of Davenport: "How many bills did YOU introduce, and get through Congress? Name ONE?" Davenport was described by Daniel as

⁵²Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections, 37.

having utterly failed to do one single thing of merit in Congress, which, according to Daniel, had given him a name not only among his colleagues in Washington, but among his constituency in Oklahoma, as "Do-Nothing Davenport." "The name is certainly well applied," argued Daniel, "as your record shows." In the same letter, Daniel outlined his views on the issue of free trade versus protection. He contended that the American people had experienced enough of the free trade principle in the 1890's, and informed Davenport that the free trade idea would do away with all protection of the farmer, the laborer and mechanic, as well as the manufacturer. This would have disastrous effect on the third district, said Daniel, which is one of the richest in the country in terms of oil, gas, lead, and zinc. Daniel affirmed his belief in a "conservative, scientific, non-partisan revision of the tariff downward," but not to the extent that "it bankrupts the man who manufactures the product."

In regard to other issues, Daniel stated that he was for direct election of United States Senators, the eight-hour day, and the employment of union labor on all public buildings. "With me, organized labor is a matter of principle," avowed Daniel, "and not a matter of bait for votes." Other reforms which Daniel approved were a children's bureau, a child labor law, workmen's compensation, and old-age pensions.⁵³ It appears that Daniel took a progressive stand on all issues except the tariff.

Davenport based his campaign mainly on his progressive voting record, but also aimed his speeches at the wealth possessed by Republi-

⁵³Tulsa Democrat, October 22, 1912.

can Daniel. Davenport alleged that Daniel had made it known openly that he planned to spend \$100 in each of the 700 voting precincts in the third district in an effort to secure his election. Consequently, Davenport placed considerable emphasis on the issue of the publication of campaign expenses. He stated that legislation along these lines was needed to prevent the corruption of government by big business, and added that he did not think that Daniel had complied with existing laws on the subject.⁵⁴

Further interest on the campaign money issue was aroused when Congressman Ferris came to Tulsa to stump for Davenport. Ferris declared that he thought it was both "impudent and preposterous" for Daniel to let it be known that he expected to spend \$100 per precinct in order to unseat Davenport. "The 300,000 bright and intelligent citizens of this district cannot be bought like beef over a butcher's scale," argued Ferris. Emphasizing Davenport's experience, Ferris maintained that the third district Democrat was acquainted with committee work in Washington, and that he had always been found voting on the "side of the right." Ferris ended his Tulsa speech by asking: "Who is Daniel? The answer is, he has never held any office within the gift of any people."⁵⁵

Davenport with the aid of fellow Congressman Ferris won easy reelection on November 5. He displayed well-distributed voting strength, as he carried all but two of the nineteen counties in the third district, Nowata and Creek. The totals for the election were:

⁵⁴Tulsa Democrat, October 24, 1912.

⁵⁵Tulsa Democrat, October 20, 1912.

| | | |
|-----------|--------|---------------------|
| Davenport | 27,184 | 51.3% |
| Daniel | 20,884 | 38.0% |
| Others | 6,826 | 10.7% ⁵⁶ |

Davenport's margin of 6,300 votes was considerable. It more than doubled his previous victory margins of 2,747 in 1907 and 2,945 in 1910. Seemingly, Davenport capitalized on the campaign expenditures issue by re-iterating the fact that Daniel was a millionaire, and was exceeding the financial limitations placed on political candidates. Another factor in accounting for Davenport's convincing victory was the participation by Ferris, who had become the leading progressive spokesman from the Oklahoma Congressional delegation. Apparently, the voters of the third district were satisfied with Davenport's performance in the Sixty-second Congress.

The landslide trend established by the Democrats in the third district would continue in the traditionally Democratic fourth and fifth districts. Although Charles Carter, the Democratic incumbent, won re-election by a comfortable margin in the fourth district, the victory would have been in jeopardy if the Republican and Socialist candidates had combined their total vote. Therefore, Carter campaigned more extensively in 1912 than he had in any of his three previous races. It was necessary for Carter to make his position clear on national issues, particularly those of a progressive nature, because he was challenged by a Bull Moose Republican, E. N. Wright of Olney, who had attended the Progressive Party convention and had campaigned for Roosevelt in Oklahoma. In addition, the Socialist Party presented a formidable candidate, Fred Holt of McAlester, a United Mine Workers

⁵⁶Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections, 37.

official, who showed strength in the coal mining area in and around Pittsburg County.

In a Wilson-for-President rally held at Durant in late October, Carter made it clear that he was a Wilson man by describing the New Jersey governor as a "grand and matchless statesman." The theme of his speech was of considerable interest to Oklahomans because it concerned the settlement of tribal affairs. Carter, a full blood Choctaw, denounced Taft and Roosevelt for their lack of sympathy in adjudicating land titles, and in their presidential terms, he said they had completely failed "to execute expeditiously the laws which we have placed on the statute books for the settlement of tribal affairs." According to Carter, there was but one man in the presidential race who had not proven his absolute antagonism to the people of Oklahoma, and that was Wilson. Concluding his speech, Carter said:

Let us discard prejudice, and for one time in life cast an unbiased intelligent vote for the interest of ourselves . . . and for the interest of progress.⁵⁷

Carter continued to wage a strong campaign, and ended his speaking tour at another Wilson rally at Ardmore on November 2. He directed most of his comments toward the Bull Moose platform, explaining that most of the reform measures espoused by the new party had been lifted from former Democratic platforms. "The Bull Moosers now promise us direct election of United States Senators which during its very first session a Democratic House insisted in submitting to the different states an amendment to that effect," declared Carter. Another promise that the Bull Moosers make is the publicity of campaign contributions,

⁵⁷ The Daily Ardmoreite, October 28, 1912.

a principle, according to Carter, that the Democratic House had also fulfilled in its first session. On the issue of labor injunctions, Carter stated that the Bull Moosers were merely adopting a Democratic plank, since the Democratic Party, "ever since the first use of the injunction writ against the laboring people," had opposed injunctions. The Bull Moosers had promised a separate Department of Labor and an income tax. These reforms have not only been promised by the Democratic Party, but, asserted Carter, they have been given legislative attention by the Democratic House.⁵⁸

Thus it seems that Carter was attempting to negate his chief opponent, Wright, who was of Bull Mooser orientation. Wright had attended the Progressive Party convention in August, and had returned to the fourth district to campaign for the Progressive platform of woman's suffrage, the recall of judicial decisions, and restrictions on the political activity of Federal appointees.⁵⁹ Incumbent Carter also aligned himself closely with Wilson in hopes that it might bear fruits of victory. Whatever Carter's strategy may have been, it worked as he won by 12,474 votes over the nearest candidate, Socialist Holt. Holt had attempted to form an alliance consisting of the United Mine Workers and the Farmers' Union, and, although running behind Carter in each of the twenty counties of the fourth district, showed a great deal of strength in his home county, Pittsburg, which was the center of most labor union activity.⁶⁰ Holt ran ahead of the Republican, Wright, in Pontotoc, Marshall, McCurtain, Johnston, and Bryan Counties; and his

⁵⁸The Daily Ardmoreite, November 4, 1912.

⁵⁹Scales, "The Political History of Oklahoma, 1907-1949," 146.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 148.

margin in these counties, along with scattered support elsewhere, helped him to outpoll Wright by 274 votes in the final tally. The results were as follows:

| | | |
|------------|--------|---------------------|
| Carter (D) | 23,987 | 51.3% |
| Holt (S) | 11,513 | 24.6% |
| Wright (R) | 11,239 | 24.1% ⁶¹ |

Carter won by a clear majority, but the combined Socialist-Republican vote of 22,752, or 48.7%, would lead one to speculate that perhaps Carter was not as popular as he thought, and that in the future he might have to devote more attention to the diverse elements of his district, especially when he did not have the popular coattails of Wilson to help his cause.

Congressman Ferris of district five won an overwhelming victory for re-election on November 5. Because of his popularity and well known speaking ability around the state, Ferris spent considerable time stumping for other Congressional candidates, especially Davenport in the third and Carney in the second. He opened his own campaign on October 2 in Shawnee, where he heralded the standard bearer of the Democratic Party, Wilson. He firmly enunciated his support for Wilson, and stated that "every Democrat and every real progressive" should vote for him. Ferris proclaimed that the time had come "when party ties and party traditions must be made subservient to the interests of the great mass of the people." In Ferris' opinion, the G. O. P., based on its record and promises, had failed to do this, and did not deserve to succeed in 1912. He believed that "a new era is at hand, and political parties must be known by what they do, and not what they promise."

⁶¹Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections, 38.

Congressman Ferris then reviewed the actions of the Democratic House in passing bills, some of which had become law, but others which had been defeated, Ferris said, by the "stand-pat Senate, and others have been killed by the presidential veto." Among the measures that he mentioned in his Shawnee speech were the bills providing for a Constitutional amendment for the direct election of United States Senators, free lumber, income tax, farmer's free list, free wool, Arizona-New Mexico statehood, and an eight-hour day. He concluded his address by castigating President Taft for his lack of concern for these issues.

When these bills came up to the President for his signature, it does seem, friends, does it not, that he would at least once have taken his stand with the 92,000,000 people of this nation? But he didn't do it. He preferred to stand with the steel trust, and the lumber trust, and the harvester trust. I don't know what can be the matter with him.⁶²

In a speech at Alva on October 18, Ferris again took up the issue of tariff legislation. He reminded the voters that the big duty reductions on lumber and wool were accomplished by a union of Democrats and progressive Republicans in both House and Senate, against, what Ferris termed, a "united front of stand-pat Republicans." As he had in previous speeches, Ferris recounted how President Taft had vetoed many progressive measures, thereby "setting up his judgment against the majority of the representatives of all the people."⁶³

Ferris carried all twenty counties in the fifth district as he led his nearest competitor, Republican C. O. Clark of Lawton, by 17,587 votes. The results were:

⁶² Shawnee News-Herald, October 3, 1912.

⁶³ Renfrew's Record, October 18, 1912.

| | | |
|--------------|--------|---------------------|
| Ferris (D) | 29,574 | 56.2% |
| Clark (R) | 11,987 | 22.7% |
| Stallard (S) | 11,033 | 21.1% ⁶⁴ |

Even if the Republican and Socialist votes had been combined, Ferris would have been re-elected by 6,554 votes, an overwhelming margin. This represented a 2,412 vote increase over his 1910 victory margin of 15,175, which indicates that Ferris' progressive record in the Sixty-second Congress had been approved by the voters of his district.

With the addition of three new legislative seats, Oklahoma would send eight representatives to the House: six Democrats, Carter, Davenport, Ferris, Murray, Thompson, and Weaver; and two Republicans, McGuire and Morgan. The Democrats dominated the 1912 Congressional elections in Oklahoma. They won the three at-large seats by comfortable margins, demonstrating state wide strength which they had previously displayed in gubernatorial elections, and the one presidential race in 1908. Even in the traditionally Republican strongholds of the first and second districts, though McGuire and Morgan won, the Democrats made their best showing over any previous year. And finally, Carter, Ferris, and Davenport were elected by landslide margins.

Several reasons lie behind the Democratic ascendancy in 1912. First, the united Democratic Party behind Wilson was too much for the splintered Republican legions to overcome, even though there was a concerted effort on the part of Oklahoma Republicans to prevent differences. Second, the Democrats fielded a list of formidable candidates, with the popular Murray leading the at-large ballot. Davis and Carney in the first and second districts, respectively, presented strong

⁶⁴Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections, 38-39.

progressive platforms, and conducted energetic campaigns, even if in a losing cause. Carter, Ferris, and Davenport relied on their experience and progressive voting records to achieve re-election. Third, the increased strength of the Socialist Party, especially in the southeast and southwest sections of Oklahoma, stimulated the Democratic organization to campaign harder, and to encourage a larger voter turnout which apparently went in their favor. And finally, the voters of Oklahoma seemingly registered their protest against the "stand-pat" Republican administration and their desires to see more progressive legislation put into effect by the Sixty-third Congress.

The Wilson administration first moved toward reforming the existing economic order; and its initial step was to consider a revision of the tariff, a logical move because the Payne-Aldrich schedules had made high protection appear a symbol of the predatory rich in the eyes of the reformers. A new tariff bill, drafted by Underwood, became the chief interest of the special session of the Sixty-third Congress which Wilson summoned to meet on April 8, 1913. The bill (H. R. 3321) was designed to reduce the cost of living by placing wheat, corn, sugar, meat, eggs, and milk on the free list, along with flax and shoes. Duty free also were iron ore, pig iron, steel rails, paper and wood pulp. On luxuries, such as precious stones, furs, and perfumes, the old rates were left unchanged. Taken as a whole, the Underwood bill was by no means a radical abandonment of protection, but it did propose the first genuine downward tariff revision since the Civil War.

One of the most important features of the bill was an income tax clause sponsored by Hull of Tennessee. His graduated income tax provision was made possible by the Sixteenth Amendment, which was ratified

on February 25, 1913. The rates adopted were moderate, with incomes of less than \$3,000 for unmarried persons and of less than \$4,000 for married ones exempt; a flat 1 per cent tax was applied on all incomes, individual and corporate, over \$4,000. In addition, a surtax of 1 per cent on incomes from \$20,000 to \$50,000, 2 per cent on incomes from \$50,000 to \$100,000, and 3 per cent on incomes over \$100,000 was added.⁶⁵

The debate on H. R. 3321 was heated, and Oklahomans presented their views, both favorable and unfavorable. Morgan, a strong advocate of protection, was the first to speak, as he rose on the House floor on April 28. He denounced the new tariff bill by saying that it was not just a bill to reduce duties, but that it would revolutionize the whole tariff policy of the country. If it became law, according to Morgan, the national policy of protection would be abandoned, and the nation would be committed to a policy of a tariff for revenue only. He pointed out that since the enactment of the Payne-Aldrich bill, there were no factories closed, no bankruptcies declared, no investors frightened, and no depreciation in the value of property. The protective tariff law has also provided the farmer with good prices for his products, added Morgan. There was no question, in Morgan's opinion, that the increased importations under the proposed bill would be a great boon to the farmers and manufacturers of other countries, but would be a detriment to the farms and factories of America, as it would "cramp, cripple and dwarf our fundamental industries, curtail production on the farm, lessen the demand for labor, and lower wages, and tend to

⁶⁵Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 38.

stagnate business, demoralize enterprise, and impede progress."

Morgan explained that the authors of the bill had proposed, through foreign competition, to destroy trusts and annihilate monopoly. "Competition from abroad is not a remedy for monopoly at home," declared Morgan. It was his belief that to cure the trust evil, a remedy should be applied that would act on the trust alone; whereas the tariff reduction would act upon all industries alike. The trust can stand foreign competition, in contrast to the small industrial and business concerns that would be destroyed. Thus, according to Morgan, the tariff reduction bill would not solve the trust problem because the greater part of the monopoly of the country existed wholly independent of the tariff. Morgan felt that monopoly was the result of business methods and not the tariff. Therefore, he reiterated his proposal for some kind of national commission to prevent the formation of monopolies, and to place effective control over the large corporations that already existed. It was Morgan's theory that "we might have years of absolute free trade and the trust and gigantic corporation would abide with us still." He concluded his remarks on the Underwood bill by stating:

It is the duty of those who constitute the minority in this House, before it is finally too late, to point out the defects of the measure, to call attention to its probable effect upon the country, and warn the majority in this House of the imminent danger in abandoning the principle and policy of protection, under which our country has made its greatest strides of progress and attained its highest plane of prosperity, and in substituting for protection a tariff for revenue only, under which when last tried, during the Cleveland administration, our country suffered its greatest business depression, our industrial development met with its severest and most bitter reverses, and when our people felt most keenly the awful scourge of poverty and hard times.⁶⁶

⁶⁶U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 7, 197-200.

Obviously, Morgan had not departed from his protectionist views that he had expressed so often since his entrance into the House in 1908.

In contrast to Morgan, Congressman Murray on April 29 indicated that he shared Wilson's desire to lower the tariff. Giving his attention to the arguments of Morgan and other protectionists that a lower tariff would force American wages to compete with cheap foreign labor, Murray contended that wages had little to do with the tariff, but were based on "the cost of keep," or the cost of living. Wages were high in this country because of the labor unions, he said, and that was as it should be.⁶⁷ Murray would speak later in the session in regard to the income tax provision of the Underwood bill.

Morgan again spoke against the bill almost immediately following Murray's short remarks on April 29. He directed his comments on protection toward the manner in which it aided the factories of Oklahoma. "The fact is that if our State could be kept under the protective-tariff policy it would become one of the great manufacturing States of this country," emphasized Morgan. He voiced further opposition to the bill because of the reduction of wages that he felt would occur if protection was eliminated. Quoting statistics from the Bureau of the Census, Morgan informed his colleagues that over \$4,000,000,000 of total wages were being paid to laborers in American manufacturing establishments, and "no other country on earth pays out so large an amount of wages anywhere, and in no other country do we distribute such an amount of the total wealth in wages." Morgan ended his comments by criticizing Underwood for leading the House and the nation into a tariff policy,

⁶⁷U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 1, 795.

that "will reduce the total amount of wages paid out," and "it means a loss to every one of the 7,000,000 men who are employed in the manufacturing industries, and I protest against it."⁶⁸

In the course of Morgan's April 29 defense of protection for industries, he briefly mentioned the glass factories and lead mines of Oklahoma that longed for protection. On April 30, Davenport, a supporter of a lowered tariff, replied to Morgan. Davenport revealed to his colleagues that the glass factories that Morgan had referred to had gone out of business in Oklahoma immediately after the adoption of the Payne-Aldrich bill. He explained that most of the lead mines in Oklahoma were located in his district, and they "do not need protection greater now than they have had for years, and they are not clamoring in my district for that protection."⁶⁹

McGuire joined Morgan in opposing the tariff bill, when he spoke at length on May 1 against the principles of free trade and tariff for revenue only. He was particularly concerned about the lack of attention given to the interests of the American farmer, and recounted that most of the representatives defending the bill came from "sections and cities where the products of the farm are consumed and not where they are produced." Taking data from the 1910 census and Department of Agriculture reports, McGuire made a comparison of the value of four farm commodities under a Republican and Democratic administration. The Wilson bill, disclosed McGuire, which ruined the country during the Cleveland Democratic administration, provided for a duty of 20 per cent ad valorem on

⁶⁸U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 1, 797.

⁶⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 1, 854.

cattle; whereas the Payne law provided for a duty of $27\frac{1}{2}$ per cent ad valorem. The proposed Underwood bill only provides for 10 per cent ad valorem on cattle, or only one-half as much as the Wilson bill, which, according to McGuire, had wrought destruction to the farmers due to the ruinous cattle prices under it. Using Oklahoma as an example, McGuire pointed out that "the average worth of all cattle under a Republican administration and a Republican tariff has been and is \$20 more per head than under a Democratic administration and a Democratic tariff."

The value of horses and mules was only about \$30 and \$40 per head, respectively, under a Democratic tariff, stated McGuire. On the other hand, under a Republican tariff, by 1912, their value had increased to \$110 and \$120 per head, respectively. How can the Democratic Party, queried McGuire, who uses the mule as its party emblem, treat this animal so shamefully? It does not seem possible how, in the light of such a record, "an honest Democrat can look a mule in the face," added McGuire.

In 1896 and 1897, under a Democratic tariff, the average value of wheat was 57 cents per bushel on the Chicago market, asserted McGuire, but in 1910, 1911, and 1912, the average had risen to almost \$1 per bushel under the Republican tariff. Therefore, it should be remembered, declared McGuire, that the present Underwood tariff reduces the tariff still lower than the Cleveland administration, when the farmer's plight was appalling. Ending his defense of the American farmer, McGuire maintained that protection had always been "the watchword of the Republican Party, and as long as we adhere to it the Nation will succeed;

and when we abandon it, we will fail."⁷⁰

Taking up where McGuire finished, Morgan also spoke on behalf of the American farmer's position in regard to the tariff. In his opinion, the farmer was entitled to the same protection as the manufacturer. "Give our farmers a fair chance, give them prices that will make their labor remunerative, and they will furnish products in abundance for all," declared Morgan. He voiced opposition to the opening of our markets to the cheap farm products of Canada, Mexico, and South America, where the price of labor was only about one-fifth what it costs the American farmer. Farming is the greatest industry of the nation, concluded Morgan, and "if our legislation makes the farmer prosperous, all other classes will share in that prosperity."⁷¹ This terminated the participation of Oklahomans in the debate on the tariff section of the Underwood bill, but just prior to the vote on May 8, one of the Oklahoma delegates, Murray, spoke on the income tax provision of the bill.

"Alfalfa Bill" favored the income tax proposal, and during the final hours of debating, he expressed strong opposition to an amendment which would have lowered the base income from \$4,000 to \$1,000 per year. He demanded a tax on surplus wealth, which, he claimed, had gone untaxed for fifty years. Men who were making only a decent wage should not pay this tax, which was a means of redistributing surplus wealth. Displaying a great deal of perception, Murray predicted that the income

⁷⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 1, 935-937.

⁷¹U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 1, 941.

tax method would, in a very few years, be the only means for supporting the government, and "the days for protective-tariff favoritism will be over."⁷²

On May 8, the day the first vote was to be taken, a motion was presented by Mann of Illinois to recommit the Underwood bill to the Ways and Means Committee for further study. The motion, which was obviously a stalling tactic employed by opponents of the bill, failed, 122 "yeas" to 295 "nays," with 14 "not voting." McGuire and Morgan, adhering to the posture they had displayed in the debate, voted for recommitment. Carter, Ferris, Davenport, Murray, Thompson, and Weaver voted against the Mann motion. The vote was then taken on the bill, with 281 voting for, 139 against, and 12 not voting. The Oklahoma delegation was aligned as follows: Carter, Ferris, Davenport, Murray, Thompson, and Weaver were among the 281 for; Morgan and McGuire were among the 139 against.⁷³ Under the skillful leadership of Underwood the bill had passed the House by a resounding majority. Now public attention was focused on the Senate, where the Democratic margin of control was small, and a hard fight developed.

Throughout the summer, the lobbyists descended upon Washington in swarms to try to influence Senators. So active were the lobbyists that the President said that "a brick couldn't be thrown without hitting one of them." On May 26, Wilson issued a public statement denouncing the

⁷²U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 2, 1252.

⁷³U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 2, 1386-1387.

"industrious and insidious" lobby.⁷⁴ Reaction to Wilson's sensational statement was favorable among the progressive members of the House and Senate. Among those supporting the President's concern about the pressures being applied by interest groups were Oklahomans Murray, Morgan, and Ferris.

On June 10, Murray introduced H. Res. 165, to amend the House rules to place limitations on lobbying. He then spoke briefly on behalf of his proposal:

I hope to see the day come when railroad lobbyists or paid lobbyists of any kind will cease and that the great interests will come before the committees and before Congress and in the open and to the public say 'We want this, and we will show you why it is right;' and whatever is right . . . should be enacted into law.⁷⁵

Although Murray's resolution was not accepted, he had shown early approval of Wilson's stand against lobbying. A resolution, similar to Murray's, that had been introduced by Congressman Robert L. Henry of Texas was approved on July 9, and drew attention from Ferris and Morgan. The measure (H. Res. 198) was favored by Ferris, but in a July 5 speech, he declared that it should be made into joint resolution form. He felt that if any member of the House was "venal or corrupt . . . he ought to receive the condemnation of both ends of the Capitol." Another reason why Ferris thought it should be a joint resolution was that the charges reached both Senate and House members; and, he felt, if the two houses selected separate committees, it would involve "a duplication of time, a duplication of investigation, as well as a con-

⁷⁴New York Times, May 27, 1913.

⁷⁵U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 2, 1957-1958.

flict of authority." Thus he was "heartily in favor of an investigation that will bring about good results and purify the membership of this House."⁷⁶ Ferris' views were reinforced by fellow Oklahoman, Morgan, on the same day.

The Henry resolution specifically mentioned the alleged lobbying activities of the National Association of Manufacturers, an interest group who opposed the tariff bill. Morgan believed that the House investigating committee, proposed by the resolution, should include a clause requiring the said committee to inquire whether money had been used, or improper influence exerted by the National Association of Manufacturers in securing or preventing the nomination or election of any candidate for the House.⁷⁷ Although neither Morgan's nor Ferris' suggestions were approved, their positions indicate that they advocated limits on lobbying activities. The Henry resolution was adopted by the House on July 9, 1913, with no vote being recorded.⁷⁸ Thus, three of the eight Oklahoma representatives had signified their approval of political reform by expressing hope that the proposed special investigative committee would conduct a searching campaign to rid Congress of any improper dealings.

After the smoke had cleared concerning the lobby investigation, the Senate passed the Underwood bill, with revisions, on September 9 by a vote of 44 to 37. Instead of wrecking tariff reform, the Senate had

⁷⁶U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 3, 2320-2321.

⁷⁷U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 3, 2324.

⁷⁸U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 3, 2353.

actually effected a general reduction of 4 per cent in the Underwood rates, thus bringing the general level of rates down to 24-26 per cent.⁷⁹ The revised bill was sent back to the House, where it was approved on September 30 by a vote of 255 for, 104 against, 3 present, and 67 not voting. On the day of passage, two members of the Oklahoma delegation, Morgan and Davenport, addressed themselves to the issue, with Morgan speaking against the Senate version, and Davenport for it. Morgan, in a last minute plea, reaffirmed his opposition to the bill because of the detrimental effects it would have on Oklahoma's chief industries, farming and manufacturing. He pointed out that the farmer without protection would be forced to share his markets with the farmers of all the world without compensation. By passing this tariff bill, Morgan contended that the American farmer would lose his most valuable asset, a market. "Destroy the farmers' market and you have ruined their business," added Morgan. Turning his attention to manufacturing, Morgan argued that even though Oklahoma possessed great natural advantages, the national government was about to embark upon a tariff policy that would "deter men from investing capital in mills and factories in Oklahoma."⁸⁰ For these reasons, Morgan remained steadfast in his opposition to tariff reduction.

Davenport, on the other hand, called the Underwood bill "one of the best bills that has ever been written upon the tariff question." Concentrating most of his remarks to the farmer's position on the tariff, he stated that he felt fortunate to be able to cast his vote

⁷⁹Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 42.

⁸⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 6, 5262-5265.

for putting lumber on the free list. Furthermore, the American farmer, according to Davenport, can now purchase all his machinery and implements without paying any tariff duty. Davenport proudly concluded his speech by saying that he was glad to be a part of a bill which would be of such great "benefit to the toilers of the United States."⁸¹

The only other Oklahoma representative to comment on the Underwood bill was Ferris, but his remarks did not come until a later session of the Sixty-third Congress. On February 2, 1914, he addressed the House on the accomplishments of the Sixty-third Congress, and among the achievements was the Underwood Tariff. He described it as a piece of legislation that "from the first line to the last one was in the interest of the American people." Ferris noted that tariff reform had been demanded by the American people during the last administration, but that Taft had denied them, and thus had been driven from power.⁸²

In the final roll call, Ferris, Davenport, Murray, Thompson, and Weaver were included in the 255 votes cast in the affirmative; Morgan in the 104 negative votes; with Carter and McGuire answering "present."⁸³ As signed by the President on October 3, 1913, the Underwood Tariff lowered the average ad valorem rates from the Payne-Aldrich level of over 40 per cent to about 25 per cent, besides providing an extensive free list.⁸⁴ The passage of the bill was signifi-

⁸¹U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 6, 359-360.

⁸²U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, Part 4, 3424.

⁸³U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 6, 5274.

⁸⁴Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 42-43.

cant in that Wilson's dominance in the Democratic Party was firmly established, and, in addition, he had won the admiration of many "insurgent" Republicans. The three incumbent Democrats, Carter, Ferris, and Davenport, who were already on record for tariff reform, lent considerable support for the Wilson tariff reform proposal. Although Carter answered "present" on the final vote, he had voted for the bill when it originally passed the House in May. Davenport, in the midst of debate, and Ferris, later in the session, added their vocal support for the measure. The three new Congressmen-at-large, Murray, Thompson, and Weaver, all indicated approval of tariff reform as shown by their roll call votes, but Murray was the only one of the three who felt strongly enough about the bill to speak on its behalf. Murray not only commented on the benefits of tariff reform, but was the only Oklahoma delegate who cited the merits of the income tax provision of the bill.

McGuire and Morgan did not break the tradition of their past records on tariff legislation that they had established in the Sixty-first and Sixty-second Congresses, as they continued their forceful support for a protectionist policy in the Sixty-third. McGuire delivered his only significant speech in the Sixty-third Congress against the Underwood bill, focusing most of his criticism on the fact that the farmer would be left unprotected. Morgan was quite prolific in his speechmaking on the tariff, directing his remarks to the lack of protection that both agriculture and industry would be afforded by the new tariff. However, Morgan, a "standpatter" on the tariff issue, joined Murray and Ferris in condemning the lobbying activities that enveloped Washington during the summer of 1913. It seems rather inconsistent for

Morgan to display such an attitude since the chief lobbying agent for a higher tariff was the National Association of Manufacturers, which was cited by the House resolution for its improper dealings. This may reflect the fact that Morgan placed political reform on a higher priority basis than economic reform. Murray, by introducing a resolution for lobby limitations, and Ferris, who wanted a joint resolution on the subject, likewise recognized the need for reform in the political realm.

While the tariff debates were still in progress, Congress was given a new assignment--the complicated and difficult task of banking and currency reform, which was high on Wilson's list of legislative priorities. Serious faults in the banking structure of the country had been obvious for years. National banks still operated under antiquated legislation passed during the Civil War; state banks went their own way under a hodgepodge of conflicting statutes; and over the system as a whole there was no agency of control. Bank reserves were not mobilized in a manner to meet depositors' runs on fundamentally sound institutions. Small town banks followed the practice of depositing their reserve funds principally in the banks of larger cities, which in turn deposited in the bigger New York City banks. Since the funds of these banks were available for speculative loans, the banking structure of the entire country was likely to be jeopardized by trouble in the securities market. The system furthermore tended to drain funds from rural districts where credit was badly needed, and concentrate them in the cities where they encouraged speculation. Credit and currency were inelastic. In the first case, banks unable to borrow themselves were often compelled to refuse to make new loans to their

clients or to renew old ones, even when perfectly good collateral was offered. In the second case, instead of expanding and contracting as business interests increased or diminished, national bank notes were fixed in amount by the number of government bonds available for purchase by the banks.⁸⁵

An inner circle of Democratic leaders began an intensive study of the banking problem soon after the 1912 election. Colonel Edward M. House, Wilson's top assistant and a former banker, conducted private discussions with leading financiers of the country, while the task of actually drafting a bill was placed in the hands of Representative Carter Glass of Virginia, Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee. The bill that Glass first drafted was so conservative that it aroused hostility among progressives because they felt it was still a sell-out to the "money trust." A countermeasure representing the progressives' demand for strict government control was drawn up by Senator Robert L. Owen of Oklahoma, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee. Wilson's first impulse was to side with the Glass version, but after lengthy consultation with Louis Brandeis, a progressive lawyer who was quickly becoming Wilson's chief advisor, he accepted the two important principles for which the progressives had been contending: that the central governing board of the new system should be made up exclusively of government appointees, and that the new currency should be an obligation of the United States government rather than of the banks.⁸⁶ Out of all these preliminaries,

⁸⁵Ibid., 43-47.

⁸⁶Ibid., 48.

the Glass-Owen or Federal Reserve bill emerged, being introduced in April of 1913. In final form, the bill provided for twelve districts, each with a federal reserve bank to be owned by the national banks within each district; all national banks were required to join the system. These federal reserve banks were to do no direct banking with individuals or business houses, but were to act simply as agents of the member banks of the district; to purchase and sell bills of exchange; grant loans to member banks; issue federal reserve notes; and perform similar financial operations. The provisions of the bill were intended to alleviate the problems involved in the poor geographical distribution of money and credit, to reduce private control over banking, and to create a more elastic money and credit.

The first Oklahoma representative to speak on the Federal Reserve bill (H. R. 7837) was Morgan, who offered an amendment to it on September 15, 1913. His proposition was to insert a paragraph that stated that any person residing within a given Federal Reserve district could subscribe to the capital stock of the Federal Reserve bank of that district at any time under such rules and regulations as was prescribed by the Federal Reserve Board. Morgan declared that he had heard much about "equal opportunities to all and special privileges to none," and, therefore, asked: "Under the provisions of this bill, in allowing no one except banks to subscribe to this stock, are you not giving them a special privilege that is granted only to the bankers of the United States?" He asserted that two benefits would be derived from his amendment:

First, it would strengthen the system by enlarging the capital; it would give these banks more financial strength, more capital.

Second, I think another benefit would be that it would popularize this system with the great masses of the people. I believe one of the defects in all our great corporations in this country, including the banks, is that there are so few people interested in them.⁸⁷

Morgan's amendment was rejected, and little can be gathered from these early remarks as to how he stood on the general provisions of the bill. He would offer additional amendments to the bill later in the debate.

Also entering the debate on September 5 was Weaver, one of the new representatives. In his first speech on the House floor, Weaver emphasized the fact that he was a member of the Banking and Currency Committee, which had written the bill, and he felt that a summary of the "benefits of this great constructive measure" was necessary. He proceeded to itemize several benefits that would result in the passage of the bill including government control of the currency and banking system instead of private control; mobilization of cash reserves; more equitable distribution of surplus money, which would destroy the "Money Trust;" and more uniform credit facilities.⁸⁸ Concluding his remarks on behalf of the measure, Weaver expressed hope that it would be such a nonpartisan issue that all independent Republicans and Democrats of a progressive mind would vote for the bill.⁸⁹

Oklahomans remained active in the debate as Morgan proposed two more amendments on September 15. The first dealt with using the earn-

⁸⁷U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 5, 4976-4977.

⁸⁸U. S. Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 5, 4985-4986.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 4986.

ings from Federal Reserve banks to establish a public highway fund to improve road conditions in all the states. Morgan feared that the earnings were going to be used to pay the national debt, and he felt that money to pay the national debt should come through regular channels of taxation. "If the Government proposes to appropriate any of the profits of the Federal Reserve banks, let the money be solemnly dedicated to some great national purpose that will contribute to the general welfare of the country," said Morgan in defense of his amendment. This amendment was rejected, but Morgan immediately offered another. Included in this amendment was a recommendation that all earnings derived from Federal Reserve banks should be used to initiate a fund to protect the depositors from loss from the failure of any member bank. Morgan, patterning his amendment on the bank deposit guaranty law in Oklahoma, avowed his firm convictions in regard to the protection of the 15,000,000 depositors in the nation's banks.⁹⁰ This amendment was also rejected, even though Morgan's dream would come true with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation legislation of the New Deal. Both of Morgan's September 15 amendments appear to have merit and seem sound, but apparently since he was a Republican, the Democratic authors of the bill did not recognize the benefits that might accrue from such proposals. It would not be Morgan's last attempt to alter the bill.

On September 16, new Congressman Thompson delivered his first major speech, which was a critique of the Glass-Owen bill. He first explained that he was going to vote for the bill as it was written

⁹⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 5, 4995-4996.

because it was such an improvement over the existing banking and currency laws. However, he proclaimed that he felt it a duty to his conscience and to the people of the country to expound on some of his reservations concerning the bill. Thompson, referring to the Federal Reserve Board, cautioned his colleagues against such an advisory board, which, he believed would be tied too closely to the banking interests of the country. He asked:

Why does not the bill carry a provision permitting the farmers of the country to have an advisory board? Why does it not carry a provision permitting the laborers of the country to have an advisory board? . . . I will answer by saying that none of the great classes of industry into which our country is divided should have an advantage over any other class.⁹¹

Another provision of the bill which drew Thompson's criticism was section 14 which dealt with maturity dates. He believed that the time provided in this section should be extended from 90 days to 6 months for the maturity of commercial paper secured by staple farm products, so that farmers' and stockmen's paper would be the subject of rediscount and placed on an equal footing with the paper of Wall Street speculators. Thompson contended that the recognition of staple farm products as a basis of security of notes and commercial paper was a great triumph for the producing class, but he suggested that the farmer could not afford to borrow for 60 days because from the time he plants until the time of maturity of his products, a much longer period was needed. If the time is not extended, affirmed Thompson, people in agricultural parts of the country, who usually borrow money about planting time and are unable to repay until the crops are harvested,

⁹¹U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 5, 5009.

will be handicapped by the 90 day time limit of the notes.

Thompson, speaking again for the agricultural sector, propounded a rural credit system. He compared the difference in interest rates of $8\frac{1}{2}$ per cent paid by the American farmer to the $3\frac{1}{2}$ to $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent paid by the farmers of Europe, where a farm credit system had been adopted. It was Thompson's opinion that by charging these excessive rates of interest, the producing masses of the country were being ignored, and that any new banking and currency act should recognize "the interests of every class of citizenship--those engaged in the farming industry as well as in commercial and other industrial occupations." Although a rural credits system was not provided for in the Glass-Owen Act, Thompson established a precedent on this subject, which he would maintain until the realization of a rural credits system in the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916.

Still on the subject of agricultural welfare, Thompson continued his lengthy remarks by demanding a provision that no notes should be eligible to discount if they were to be used for the purpose of dealing in futures or trading on margin in staple agricultural products. He pointed out that section 14 was one of the great provisions of the bill because it prohibited the rediscount of notes and bills issued or drawn for the purpose of trading in stocks, bonds, or other investment securities; and, Thompson reasoned that a similar provision should check the gambling in farm products. According to Thompson, the price of staple farm products had ceased to be controlled by the law of supply and demand, but "it has become the football to be either raised or lowered as the interests of the speculator . . . may be best

served."⁹² Thompson had again raised his voice on behalf of legislation that would not be included in the Federal Reserve Act, but would receive legislative approval in the Sixty-fourth Congress as the Grain Futures Act of 1916.

Complementing Thompson's concern for the farmer was Murray. He felt that the bill needed amending, like Thompson, to protect the farmers and to give them the benefit of more currency and credit. Murray favored a plan based on agricultural banking developed in Scotland. The Scotch-bank system was a decentralized scheme which would issue currency based not on gold or silver but on the products of the soil, and it smacked of the earlier Populist subtreasury plan of the 1890's.⁹³ On September 16, Murray told the House that he would vote for the bill, but only because he was bound by the Democratic caucus. The bill, he declared, was an improvement for agriculturists over the form in which it was first presented because of a number of amendments that Glass had been forced to accept; one of these was Murray's amendment to have all twelve reserve districts represented on the Federal Reserve Board, with a limitation of only one member from each district. Another Murray criticism of the bill was that the President had been given absolute control of the banking system, and now, claimed Murray, banks would enter the realm of Presidential politics to influence appointments to the Federal Reserve Board. His principal objections to the bill were, like Thompson's, the absence of a rural credits system, and guaranteed bank deposits along the lines that Morgan had advanced

⁹²Ibid., 5010-5012.

⁹³William H. Murray, Memoirs of Governor Murray and True History of Oklahoma (Boston: Meador Publishing Co., 1945), II, 186-200.

earlier.⁹⁴

The day before the vote was to be taken, Morgan united his support with Thompson and Murray for a rural credits system. He put forth another amendment to the bill that would establish a system of national rural banks which would provide the farmers with better credit, cheaper interest, and larger capital. "In my judgment," argued Morgan, "there is more of an emergency for a better rural credit in this country than there is for a better system of banking or better system of currency." He reprimanded the bill's author, Glass, for "letting the farmers go." Currency is provided for merchants, manufacturers, businessmen, bankers, speculators, and capitalists, but, proclaimed Morgan, nothing has been provided for the agricultural interests which "ought to be the very corner stone of our financial structure." For the fourth time, a Morgan attempt to alter the bill was defeated.⁹⁵ The debate, in which Oklahoma Congressmen had played a major role, was over as the bill came to a vote on September 17, 1913.

The bill passed 287 for, 85 against, 2 present, and 55 not voting. Davenport and Ferris, who had remained silent in the debate, joined Murray and Weaver, who had committed themselves vocally to the bill, in casting "ayes." Morgan, who had taken great interest in the measure, opposed the bill; McGuire answered "present;" and Thompson, who had commented at length on the bill, and Carter, who did not par-

⁹⁴U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 5, 5020-5023.

⁹⁵U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 5, 5099.

ticipate in the debate, did not vote.⁹⁶ The alignment of the Oklahoma contingent was something of an enigma. Weaver, who was a freshman member of the Banking and Currency Committee, was the only Oklahoma delegate who supported the bill without reservations, which can perhaps be attributed to the fact that he had helped Glass in its formulation. Murray, although supporting the bill in the end, had raised several questions, particularly concerning agrarian interests. Ferris and Davenport voted for the bill, but had lent no vocal support for the resolution. On the other hand, Morgan, whose four amendments were defeated, probably opposed the bill because he believed that the bill was inadequate without his proposals. McGuire's answer of "present" to the roll call presents somewhat of a mystery since he did not speak in the preliminaries. Carter and Thompson did not vote, which is surprising, especially since Carter had been such a strong supporter of Wilson in the presidential election, and Thompson had entered into the debate with such vigor. Perhaps they felt their vote was not needed for passage; however, they, or at least Thompson, were displeased with some of the bill's provisions.

The Senate proceeded in a leisurely fashion until the last of October, when Wilson stepped in and threatened to go to the people if the bill's opponents persisted in blocking legislation. The Senate leaders of the bill, such as Owen, were determined to pass the bill before Christmas. Finally, on December 19, it passed the upper house by a vote of 54 to 34.⁹⁷ During the course of Senate debate, Repre-

⁹⁶U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, Part 5, 5129.

⁹⁷Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 52.

sentative Weaver, on November 1, delivered a speech before the Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce on the subject of the Glass-Owen Currency bill. He introduced his address by describing the faults of the existing banking and currency system: "It is archaic because it was nurtured amid the horrors of a Civil War and evolved of military necessity." In response to the criticism of the Presidentially appointed Federal Reserve Board, Weaver defended this provision by saying that if the President can be trusted with appointing the Supreme Court Judges, Interstate Commerce Commission, and all Executive officers of the government, then "why can he not be trusted to appoint the Federal Reserve Board?" With government control and supervision of the entire banking system, Weaver stated, the reserve funds will be mobilized and may be shifted and transferred from one depository to another wherever needed, to suit the exigencies of the hour. Weaver concluded by saying that the bill:

Will be a God's blessing to the farmer and stockraisers of the South and West, a class that has long borne the burden of exorbitant interest, because of the scarcity of money in those sections, drained from them and concentrated in Wall Street's gambling hell.⁹⁸

Thus Weaver carried his convictions concerning the bill back to his Oklahoma constituents, emphasizing the beneficial aspects of the pending resolution, and presenting arguments to counteract the criticism that had been presented by fellow delegates with regard to the situation of the farmer.

The Senate version of the bill contained several new amendments, on which Murray, Thompson, and Morgan commented before the final vote

⁹⁸Speech of Claude Weaver, November 1, 1913, Claude Weaver Collection, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library.

was taken on December 22. One of the Senate amendments provided for the extension of credit to farmers from three to six months, which all three heralded as an improvement over the original House bill.⁹⁹ In addition, Murray sought to win House approval for an amendment forbidding Congressmen, Senators, or federal bank directors from serving on the Federal Reserve Board, which failed.¹⁰⁰ Murray, along with Thompson, Weaver, Carter, Ferris, and Davenport, agreed to the conference report of the bill, which passed the House on December 22 by a count of 298 "yeas," 60 "nays," and 76 "not voting." Morgan and McGuire, who answered "present" to the roll call when the bill originally passed the House, cast negative votes on final passage.¹⁰¹ The next day President Wilson signed the measure. According to Link, it was the greatest single piece of legislation enacted during the Wilson administration.¹⁰² The Glass-Owen Act, which began as a bill designed to serve only the business community and to reinforce private control over banking and currency, had undergone considerable change due to progressive pressure. Oklahoma Congressmen, especially Murray, Thompson, Weaver, and Morgan, could take partial credit for the revisions that the bill had experienced. Weaver was commended by Chairman Glass for his efforts as a member of the House Banking and Currency Committee: "No member of the Committee has been more regular in

⁹⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1913, LI, Part 2, 49, 1303, 1458.

¹⁰⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1913, LI, Part 2, 1314.

¹⁰¹U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1913, LI, Part 2, 1464.

¹⁰²Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 52.

attendance, more devoted to its work or more useful generally . . . and he enjoys the cordial respect and confidence of the administration."¹⁰³ In contrast to Weaver's unwavering support of the bill, Murray and Thompson evidently joined the bloc of Western and Southern Democratic Congressmen who sought additional benefits for the farmer. No one can definitely measure the amount of influence these two Oklahoma representatives had within this bloc; however, it is obvious that they were active participants in reshaping the bill to give more recognition to the agriculturists' interests.

The other Democrats, Carter, Ferris, and Davenport, were not enthusiastic for the bill, as was indicated by their lack of participation in the debate. However, Ferris at a later date manifested his support in an open letter to his constituents of the fifth district. He described the new currency law as a measure which would "prevent future money panics, more equitably distribute the money circulation of the country, enable the farmer to borrow money for lower rates of interest and for longer periods than ninety days, distribute the money now retained by Wall Street Banks."¹⁰⁴ It appears that Weaver, to some extent as expressed in his Oklahoma City speech, Murray, Thompson, and Ferris all shared a hatred for Wall Street which was reminiscent of the days of the Populist Party. Morgan, suffering from the disappointment of his failure to amend the bill, opposed as well as McGuire, who did not deviate from his "stand-pat" philosophy on eco-

¹⁰³ Letter, Carter Glass to D. C. Pryor, July 9, 1914, Claude Weaver Collection, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library.

¹⁰⁴ Campaign Letter of Scott Ferris, January 13, 1914, Claude Weaver Collection, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library.

monic reform. On the whole, the Oklahoma delegation had played a significant role in this phase of Wilson's legislative program.

The Underwood-Simmons Tariff and the Federal Reserve Act were considered by the President as two of the three integral parts of his program, which was known as the "New Freedom." The third area concerned the problems of curbing or destroying industrial monopoly. And so on January 20, 1914, Wilson asked Congress for new anti-trust legislation. During the 1912 campaign, Roosevelt and Wilson had taken positions that seemed sharply opposed on this perplexing question. The former's "New Nationalism" program assumed that big business was inevitable, and should be strongly regulated by the Federal government; the latter's "New Freedom" platform held out hope that competition could be restored through a strict anti-trust policy without expanding Federal power. With the responsibility of office, Wilson and his advisors found this antithesis too simple. The legislative program that evolved was neither as broadly Hamiltonian as Roosevelt's proposals nor as Jeffersonian as Wilson's. Instead the resulting legislation struck a kind of middle ground between the two.

The original anti-trust bill was drafted by Representative Henry D. Clayton of Alabama, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. The bill (H. R. 15657) was designed to make the Sherman Act more specific by including a series of explicit prohibitions against interlocking directorates and other monopolistic practices. The resolution was criticized from various sources. Businessmen felt that the new prohibitions were so sweeping that they would hamper natural corporate growth; union leaders protested that the proposed law would not give labor its promised exemption from anti-trust prosecution; and others

repeated their conviction that what was needed was not more anti-trust suits, but Federal regulation.

In his confusion, Wilson once again turned to Brandeis for guidance. The Boston lawyer's thinking on the trust problem had been changing, and he had now come over to the strong Federal Commission approach, similar to the Rooseveltian "New Nationalism" plan. Hence Brandeis drafted a new bill to which Wilson swung his powerful support. The resultant Federal Trade Commission bill (H. R. 15613), introduced by Representative J. Harry Covington of Maryland, provided for a bipartisan commission of five members, which was empowered to investigate corporate practices and, where these were found to be illegal, to issue orders to "cease and desist" from doing so. The orders of the commission, however, were subject to review in Federal courts.

As the trade commission approach gained ascendancy, enthusiasm for the Clayton bill declined. Nevertheless, the bill was important because it prohibited discrimination in pricing where it would tend to foster monopoly, and carefully limited interlocking directorates. As a concession to the interests of organized labor, the act exempted from the anti-trust laws all farmer and labor groups conducted not for profit; it also restricted the use of injunctions in labor disputes and legalized practices such as strikes and picketing. Samuel Gompers, President of the A. F. of L., hailed these provisions as a "Magna Carta" for labor.

Even before Wilson presented his January 20 anti-trust message, Congressman Morgan was receiving national attention on the issue. Morgan, who on January 25, 1912, in the Sixty-second Congress had introduced a bill to regulate the commerce of certain corporations, reintro-

duced a bill on January 17, 1914, to create an interstate corporation commission. The Congressional Record indicates that Morgan was the first legislator to introduce a bill to create such a commission, and, in addition, was the first representative to deliver a speech advocating such a measure. Morgan, three days before the President appeared before Congress to present his anti-trust message, called for the administration to adopt his plan. He declared that a commission was necessary "to aid in the dissolution of unlawful corporations" because, in Morgan's opinion, "our courts are overcrowded," and lack "the executive machinery necessary to dismantle these vast industrial corporations." Declaring the Sherman Act ineffective, Morgan stated that if the execution of the 1890 law had been placed under an independent commission, with adequate authority, the trust question would have been largely settled years ago. He then enumerated some of the purposes for which a commission was needed:

1. To control the practices and business methods of large industrial corporations.
2. To reenforce, restore, and maintain competition as a factor in price regulation and, if necessary, exercise direct control over the prices of all monopolistic corporations.
3. To maximize the power of our industrial corporations as agencies for the equitable distribution of wealth and to minimize their power as instruments for the concentration of wealth.
4. To respond to the imperative public sentiment of the country for antitrust legislation that will adequately protect the people from all monopolistic industrial concerns.¹⁰⁵

Morgan's House speech received coverage in the January 18 edition of the New York Times. The article, entitled "Wilson Definite on Trust

¹⁰⁵U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, Part 2, 1866-1872.

Curbs," stated that the Oklahoma Congressman had strongly endorsed what he hoped would be the creation of an interstate trade commission by the administration. The article outlined many of the proposals that Morgan had presented in his House speech, and quoted Morgan as saying, "We need a commission to aid in the readjustment of business in harmony with the law."¹⁰⁶

Morgan created additional furor when he appeared before the House Interstate Commerce Committee on February 7 and criticized the Administration bill. In yet another New York Times article headlined "Wants Trade Board Only to Curb Trusts," Morgan was cited as saying that he felt the Administration bill would give "the commission jurisdiction over too many corporations and too little power over the big corporations." He urged consideration of his bill which, in Morgan's belief, contained important provisions which the Administration-backed bill did not contain. The government, contended Morgan, should limit the jurisdiction which it assumes over private enterprises to those corporations which have attained such size as to give them dangerous monopolistic power, commonly known as "trusts." Morgan's bill restricted the proposed trade commission's jurisdiction to those corporations which had a gross annual output in excess of \$5,000,000. While this would include only 300 to 500 corporations out of 268,000 in the country, Morgan argued that it would include corporations which employ one-third of the wage earners and produce nearly 50 per cent of the manufactured products of the country. Morgan maintained that the proper method of controlling the properties of corporations engaged in

¹⁰⁶ New York Times, January 18, 1914.

interstate commerce was "to prohibit specific practices which are inimical to public good," which, he declared, his bill provided. He concluded his testimony by saying:

Acquired monopoly is as dangerous to the public interest as is natural monopoly, and it is as much the duty of the National Government . . . to protect the people against the evils of acquired or artificial monopoly as it is to protect them against natural monopoly.¹⁰⁷

Thus Morgan continued to wage a relentless campaign on behalf of his original trade commission bill. Again in April, before the debate on the Administration bill actually began in late May, Morgan drew the attention of the national press. "Favors Fixing of Prices" was the title of a New York Times article which stated that Morgan had called for the consideration of the "Oklahoma Idea" in connection with the creation of a Federal Trade Commission. According to Morgan, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission had the right to fix prices, which, he said, had worked successfully, and deserved examination by the Administration. Morgan was quoted as saying that he was "an ardent advocate of the proposition to create a Federal trade commission," and, it was "absolutely necessary to protect the people from large industrial concerns."¹⁰⁸

When House debate finally began on the Administration bill on May 19, Morgan was the first Congressman to speak. He reiterated many of the points that he had made in his January 17 speech, and related that it had been 24 years since the Sherman law had been enacted. He asked: "What law since that time has been placed on the

¹⁰⁷ New York Times, February 8, 1914.

¹⁰⁸ New York Times, April 3, 1914.

statute books that gives to the Federal Government any additional power to control or regulate the practices of our great industrial corporations?" "Not one," said Morgan, answering his own question. "What has been done by Congress in those 24 years to curb the trusts," queried Morgan. "Nothing" was again his own answer. Morgan reasoned that it was time for Congress to "promulgate a rule of business morality, create a standard by which the methods and practices of industrial corporations shall be judged," rather than confining legislation to "statutory provisions prohibiting industrial corporations from doing this or that thing."¹⁰⁹ From the outset of the debate, Morgan made it clear that he favored some type of regulatory commission, whether it be the one provided for in his bill, or the Administration proposal.

But Morgan alone was not to have a corner on Oklahoma participation in the debate. Murray favored the trade commission bill, but wanted to give the commission greater powers. He offered an amendment to authorize the commission to send all information gathered on the railroads to the Interstate Commerce Commission and the state railroad commissions. The idea was to make the Federal Trade Commission a clearinghouse of factual data. The amendment was rejected. Another Murray amendment provided that all business reports to the commission must be made under oath, corporations must submit lists of the names and addresses of all stock or bond owners, and corporate books and records must be opened to the commission. Murray argued that this information must be made available to aid in the prosecution of trusts

¹⁰⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, Part 9, 8854-8857.

and monopolies. This Murray proposal was also rejected.¹¹⁰ The discussion on the Federal Trade Commission bill ended on May 26, with two Oklahomans having vigorously participated in the debate. The House then moved to consider the Clayton bill, which also dealt with the anti-trust problem. More of the Oklahoma representatives took an active interest in this bill, particularly the section concerning the removal of labor and farm organizations from the anti-trust provision, which the President did not favor because it would have placed labor organizations beyond the pale of the anti-trust law entirely.

Congressman Thompson was quick to jump into the debate as he delivered a speech the first day the bill was presented to the House. He was specifically concerned with the exemption of farm and labor organizations from the anti-trust laws. Emphasizing the Democratic platform of 1912, he quoted from the plank, which stated that labor organizations should not be regarded as illegal combinations in restraint of trade. Thompson urged his colleagues to uphold the Baltimore platform, stating that farming and laboring organizations were not instituted for profit and, therefore, should not be penalized as the corporate monopolies. These organizations are designed for the purpose of "mutual help," and it would be a "monstrous proposition" to prosecute their members for doing the right thing, namely, to better their condition, proclaimed Thompson. He concluded his remarks by saying:

I can not and will not support a bill which does not in the plainest language exempt these organizations from the penalties of the antitrust act. I can not and will not vote for a provision that will subject our workingmen to prosecution if they organize to secure a better wage for

¹¹⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, Part 9, 8973-8994.

their labor. I can not and will not vote for a provision that will subject our farmers to prosecution if they organize and agree to hold the product of their toil for better prices or if they agree not to plant as large an acreage of wheat, corn, or cotton as they formerly planted.¹¹¹

Thompson gained additional support for his arguments from within the Oklahoma delegation.

Murray presented a series of amendments which he hoped would aid farmers and laborers. Like Thompson, Murray favored the exemption of labor unions from the anti-trust provision. He led the fight to exempt farm co-operatives as well. His amendment to exclude co-operatives was defeated, as was his proposal to lower from \$2,500,000 to \$1,000,000 the amount of capital stock which placed a business under the interlocking directorate portion of the bill.¹¹² The same day that his amendments were rejected, Murray delivered a speech on the House floor that revealed the disagreement among Democrats over the Clayton bill. He said that in the coming Congressional election his opponents might charge him with walking out of the "President's patronage pantry," but, despite the President's opposition, he favored excluding labor unions and farm co-operatives from the bill. Parts of the measure were vicious, he claimed, such as the provision forbidding co-operatives from withholding products from market. Murray explained that in his experience as a farmer, he felt that a farmer "must some times reduce the acreage of his crop and at all times limit the amount that goes upon the market, otherwise he would never receive a

¹¹¹U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, Part 9, 523.

¹¹²U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, Part 10, 9481-9484.

fair price."¹¹³

Morgan united his efforts with Thompson and Murray in attempting to exclude farm organizations from the anti-trust laws. He informed fellow House members that he believed the United States was doing more to help the farmer become better educated, but pointed out that American farmers were 25 years behind Europe in learning how to organize so as to improve their marketing and purchasing methods. Morgan urged Congress to include an amendment that would encourage the farmer to organize, "so that the products of the farm can come more directly to consumers with less cost and with a fewer number of middlemen."¹¹⁴ Through the efforts of Murray, Thompson, and Morgan, as well as other representatives, the House finally approved amendments to the Clayton bill which removed labor unions and farm co-operatives from its anti-trust sections. Standing by their convictions, the three Oklahoma Congressmen had parted company with the Administration on this issue, which could have been particularly damaging to Democrats Murray and Thompson. Nevertheless, it was an issue that progressives had long demanded.

Departing from the farm and labor interests in the bill, three other Oklahoma Congressmen addressed themselves to the Clayton measure, especially on the subject of interlocking directorates. Ferris, Carter, and Davenport all spoke in favor of an amendment that Ferris had introduced, which provided that the transportation of oil

¹¹³U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, Part 17, 543-545.

¹¹⁴U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, Part 10, 9577-9578.

and water power be included under the common carrier section of the bill. It was their belief that pipe lines carrying oil and wires transporting hydroelectric power should be subjected to regulation under the interstate commerce clause of the bill. Ferris, speaking on behalf of his amendment, declared that in dealing with anti-trust legislation, Congress could not afford to disregard the pipe line monopoly held by the Standard Oil Company, and the monopolization of transporting facilities by the water power trust. He emphatically stated: "What are the pipe lines? The worst monopoly in the country. What is the Standard Oil Company? The worst monopoly in the country. What is the Water Power Trust? One of the worst monopolies in the country." Therefore, Ferris contended that in considering the problem of interlocking directorates, the Clayton bill must recognize the question of transportation monopoly, which, he said, "is the vital cord in the whole trust question."¹¹⁵

Carter and Davenport agreed with Ferris, confining their remarks to the pipe line monopoly possessed by Standard Oil. Both felt that Standard Oil, by having a monopoly of transportation facilities, fixed the price of oil that best suited their convenience. Hence, the oil of independent producers, according to Carter and Davenport, was flatly refused at any price until Standard Oil was taken care of. They both demanded amendments that would disallow pipe line companies from producing oil so as to break up "the worst monopoly on the face

¹¹⁵U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, Part 10, 9586-9587.

of the earth."¹¹⁶ Thus it appears that Ferris, Carter, and Davenport were vitally concerned with trust-busting, but seemed more interested in the provisions of the Clayton bill than with the Federal Trade Commission bill, on which they remained silent. Six of the eight Oklahoma Congressmen had engaged in the debates on the two bills of Wilson's anti-trust program, as only McGuire and Weaver refrained from commenting.

The Federal Trade Commission bill passed the House first, with no vote being recorded as indicated by the Congressional Record for June 5, 1914. The Clayton bill was then presented for a vote the same day, receiving approval by a count of 277 for, 54 against, and 99 not voting. Davenport, Ferris, Murray, Morgan, Thompson, and Weaver supported the measure, with Carter absent, and McGuire casting the only negative vote.¹¹⁷ The conference committee report on the Federal Trade Commission bill was agreed to in the House on September 10, 1914 with no roll call. A motion was made for a division of the House on the bill, but died because there was not a sufficient number seconding the motion.¹¹⁸ The Clayton bill conference committee report was approved on October 8, 1914 by a vote 245 "yeas," 52 "nays," and 126 "not voting." Seven of the eight Oklahoma delegates cast affirmative votes; McGuire was the only exception, as he failed to answer the roll call.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, Part 10, 9475-9477.

¹¹⁷U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, Part 10, 9910-9911.

¹¹⁸U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, Part 15, 14943.

¹¹⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, Part 16, 16344.

The near unanimity within the Oklahoma group, not only by vote but by favorable commentary for the most part, indicates that they desired some type of legislation to deal with the trust problem, an issue that had long concerned progressives. Morgan stands out among the Oklahomans for his innovative ideas in regard to the Federal Trade Commission plan. It appears that his plan was well formulated long before Brandeis persuaded the President that this was the proper method in coping with the trust problem. National attention was directed toward Morgan's plan, even before the President's recommendation, as he received coverage in the nation's largest newspaper, the New York Times, on three different occasions. And although his original proposal was not accepted, Morgan supported the Brandeis written resolution, without resentment, because of his intense desire to see legislation of this type enacted. Another significant aspect of the anti-trust debates would be the influential role that Murray, Thompson, and Morgan played in reshaping the Clayton bill so as to exempt farm and labor groups from prosecution. In defiance of the Administration, these three Congressmen helped determine the fate of an issue which had troubled reformers since the Sherman law was put into effect. On the whole, the Oklahoma delegation, with the exception of McGuire, had in some manner helped in the fulfillment of Wilson's third and last recommendation that he had presented to the Sixty-third Congress, the strengthening of anti-trust laws.

One outstanding achievement of the Sixty-third Congress was not a part of the President's legislative program, though there is no evidence that Wilson opposed it. As the end result of a number of years of effort on the part of both public and private groups to improve the

conditions of life on American farms, a bill (H. R. 7951) introduced by Representative Asbury Lever of South Carolina and Senator Hoke Smith of Georgia established a system of cooperative extension work to be carried on by the land grant colleges and the Department of Agriculture.

The basic idea of demonstration as a technique in agriculture and home economics had been developed by Dr. Seaman Knapp, financed by a combination of public and private funds. In many cases Dr. Knapp's demonstrations had been spectacularly successful in increasing production and improving the farmers' standard of living. The bill authorized the use of federal funds, which had to be matched by state funds, to finance demonstration work in agriculture and home economics in every rural county. The bill passed the House on January 19, 1914, with no roll call being demanded.¹²⁰

Although Morgan had introduced legislation and presented supporting statements for agricultural extension education in the Sixty-second Congress, the only Oklahoma representative to enter the Smith-Lever debate in the Sixty-third was Murray. The Tishomingo Democrat had a long interest in agricultural education, and in his December 11, 1913, speech, he called for an expansion of both agricultural and mechanical education. Using Biblical stories and analogies, he stated that the white race knew less about agriculture than any other race. There were two basic kinds of education, Murray contended, classical and industrial, and it was the latter that needed federal aid. He edified the members of the House by relating his efforts for agricultural education at the Sequoyah and Oklahoma Constitutional Con-

¹²⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914, LI, Part 2, 1947.

ventions. Vocational agriculture was a means to increase production, lower the cost of living, create better farmers, and improve marketing methods, he said, but too often the farmers themselves had opposed agricultural education. He planned to vote for the Smith-Lever bill, but wanted to add an amendment to provide for district junior agricultural schools such as the one he had established at Tishomingo. Using the University of Oklahoma as an example, he said that state universities opposed agriculture and that graduates of agricultural and mechanical colleges, such as Oklahoma A. and M., often refused to return to the farm because of better employment opportunities elsewhere. Therefore, he believed that the only answer was a federal system of two-year vocational colleges. He concluded, "I have learned that men will take a cold, a cussing, or a rail off your fence; indeed, anything, except your good advice." The American farmer, complained Murray, knew more about every other man's business than he did his own. The entire speech extolled the virtues of agriculture, but one phrase, repeated throughout his life, gives the key to his thinking: "Civilization begins and ends with the plow." Although his speech received praise from men in and out of Congress, his amendment was not accepted.¹²¹ Neither his animosity toward the University of Oklahoma nor his desire for agricultural education would diminish in the future. It is surprising to find so little support among the Oklahoma delegates for a bill that affected such a large portion of their constituents. The overwhelming support of the bill, as indicated by the lack of a roll call, may have caused the remaining

¹²¹U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1913, LI, Part 1, 713-729.

Oklahoma delegates to reason that vocal support was not necessary for final passage.

The resolution for a women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution was definitely not on the Administration's legislative program, since the time when Wilson could bring himself to support it was yet in the future. This issue, concerned with reform in the political procedure of the country, had been an objective of many progressives. By 1914 the male monopoly of the voting booth had been broken in eleven states, all west of the Mississippi.¹²² Frank Mondell, representing Wyoming, which was the first state to adopt women's suffrage, introduced H. J. Res. 1, which provided for a Constitutional amendment that would not deny the vote on account of sex.

Only Carter from the Oklahoma delegation participated in the women's suffrage debate. Praising the virtues of the American woman, Carter declared that he welcomed the idea of feminine participation in public meetings and public affairs. He said:

I am really such a believer in woman as a class that sometimes I am almost convinced against my better judgment that she should indulge in the pastime of voting. Were it not for shattering an ideal, were it not for dethroning her from that high pedestal upon which we are accustomed to place her, and dragging her down to the level of us beastly men, I believe I might even to-day be willing to vote for universal woman suffrage.¹²³

However, Carter, in conclusion, rejected the principles of the resolution because, in his opinion, the Federal government should not prescribe qualifications for the rights of suffrage in any of the

¹²²Harold U. Faulkner, The Quest for Social Justice, 1898-1914 (New York: Macmillan, 1931), 174.

¹²³U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 3rd Sess., 1915, LII, Part 2, 1459.

separate states, but rather leave this to the discretion of the states themselves.¹²⁴ As indicated by the tone of his final remarks, Carter, as well as Murray and Weaver, were among the 204 representatives who voted down the resolution. On the other hand, Davenport, Ferris, Morgan, McGuire, and Thompson were recorded as voting with 169 other representatives for the resolution.¹²⁵ Thus, five of the eight Oklahomans favored this political revision that had been advocated by reformers since the days of the Populist Party's recognition of women's rights. Only Carter gave his reasons for opposing the measure, which mainly were based on his belief that the states were given the Constitutional right to establish voting regulations. Murray and Weaver, great admirers of Wilson, may have failed to support the resolution because of Wilson's negative position. However, three of the Democrats, Ferris, Davenport, and Thompson, defied the Administration by supporting the bill. Ferris and Davenport had supported previous political reform bills, and, therefore, adhered to their progressive tradition. Thompson, a Bryan type Democrat, may have been led by his strong Populist background. Morgan and McGuire, the two Republicans, were also positive on this aspect of progressivism, which continued their support of reform along political lines, with the exception of McGuire's disapproval of judicial recall.

The third session of the Sixty-third Congress enacted only one major piece of progressive legislation, the LaFollette Seamen's Act. This bill, for which LaFollette had been working since 1909, was an

¹²⁴Ibid.

¹²⁵U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 3rd Sess., 1915, LII, Part 2, 1483-1484.

effort to improve the conditions of labor for seamen on American vessels. In many ways, sailors were still bondsmen in almost the medieval sense, and maritime safety requirements were often inadequate. The bill had passed Congress in the latter part of the Sixty-second Congress, only to receive a pocket veto from President Taft in the closing days of his administration.¹²⁶ But Senate bill 136 passed the House on February 25, 1915 with no roll call vote being recorded, though a two-thirds majority was counted.¹²⁷ The Senate had already given its approval, and Wilson signed it into law on March 4, 1915.¹²⁸

Only Ferris of the Oklahoma delegation commented on the LaFollette bill. Reviewing the achievements of the Sixty-third Congress on July 21, 1916, Ferris declared that labor had long requested and petitioned for such legislation. He pointed out that the Democratic House of the Sixty-second Congress had presented President Taft with a seamen's bill, but he had refused it. Ferris concluded his remarks by saying that the Democrats and progressive Republicans had given labor what it deserved to have, in enacting the LaFollette bill.¹²⁹

With the conclusion of the Sixty-third Congress, President Wilson had to be satisfied with the results. His three major recommendations dealing with revision of the tariff, reorganization of the banking and currency system, and strengthening of the anti-trust laws had been enacted in the form of the Underwood-Simmons Tariff, the Federal Re-

¹²⁶Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 62.

¹²⁷U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 3rd Sess., 1915, LII, Part 5, 4654.

¹²⁸Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 63.

¹²⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 11, 11410.

serve Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act. In addition to these three major areas of national policy, three other bills were important in indicating the progressive attitudes of Congressmen: the Smith-Lever bill, the LaFollette Seamen's bill, and the Women's Suffrage Amendment resolution; the first two were enacted. In all of these resolutions, Oklahomans played a significant role in the debates and roll call votes.

In final analysis, the tariff and taxation reforms included in the Underwood bill were supported by Carter, Ferris, Davenport, Murray, Thompson, and Weaver. Of the six, Davenport, Ferris, and Murray spoke on behalf of tariff reduction, and only Murray presented favorable arguments for the income tax provisions of the bill. Ferris and Davenport had consistently spoken and voted for tariff reduction as indicated by their previous records. On the other hand, Carter in his three terms of service had always voted for lowered tariffs, but had little to say on the subject. Known for his verbosity, Murray was the only one of the new at-large representatives to comment on the bill. McGuire and Morgan, remaining devoted to the Republican Party protectionist policy, opposed the Underwood bill as both spoke and voted negatively. However, neither of the two apparently opposed the income tax clause, as their remarks were concentrated on the lowered tariff provisions. It was not unusual for Morgan and McGuire to oppose such legislation for they had been strong supporters of the Payne-Aldrich bill in the Sixty-first Congress and had resisted the tariff reduction attempts by the Sixty-second Congress. Thus the alignment of the Oklahoma delegation remained the same as it had on previous tariff propositions.

On the issue of banking and currency reform, Carter, Davenport,

Ferris, Murray, Thompson, and Weaver supported the leadership of Wilson. The three at-large Congressmen, Murray, Thompson, and Weaver, took the most active part in the preliminary debate on the Federal Reserve bill. Weaver appeared to be the Oklahoman most committed in favor of the bill, undoubtedly because he was a member of the House Banking and Currency Committee, which had drafted the legislation. Both Thompson and Murray stated their support for such reform, but addressed themselves to the bill's lack of provisions for the agricultural sector of the economy, namely, the scant attention devoted to lowered interest rates and a longer credit system for the farmer. Only Morgan commented in a negative fashion to the bill, primarily because he, like Thompson and Murray, favored more adequate credit facilities for the farmer; but he also wanted a bank guaranty provision added to the bill. Carter, Ferris, and Davenport voted for the bill, but did not feel strongly enough about it to vocalize their support. McGuire, who remained silent on all legislation following the Underwood Tariff, cast a "no" on the Federal Reserve bill.

The last of Wilson's three-part program dealt with the anti-trust question. Of all the "New Freedom" legislation, this one was the most favorably accepted by the Oklahoma delegation. Whether the trust question was to be settled by a national trade commission, or by strengthening the Sherman Act, seven of the eight Oklahomans supported anti-trust legislation. The Clayton bill, which was the original White House proposal in handling the trust problem, received both vocal and roll call support from six of the Oklahoma representatives. Thompson, Murray, and Morgan showed particular interest in the clause exempting farmer and labor groups from anti-trust suits, which re-

flected their concern for the agricultural and laboring constituency of Oklahoma and the nation. In contrast, Davenport, Carter, and Ferris directed their remarks to the problem of monopoly, especially the Standard Oil Company, which affected the independent oil producers in Oklahoma. Thus, for various reasons the Oklahoma delegation was virtually united in its support of the Clayton bill.

The Federal Trade Commission bill, which replaced the Clayton bill as the Administration's chief method of coping with the trust problem, likewise received approval of most of the Oklahoma delegation. Republican Morgan and Democrat Murray were the most outspoken for this plan. Morgan achieved national prominence on this issue as he had been the first Congressman to propose such legislation, doing so in the Sixty-second Congress, which was prior to Roosevelt's proposal in the 1912 presidential race. Therefore, Morgan was the forerunner of the "New Nationalism" plank advocating a national trade commission, which the "New Freedom" program of Wilson eventually adopted. Morgan was given a great deal of credit by the national press, and based on the evidence he deserves the title of "Father of the Federal Trade Commission." Murray, whose ideas were not as innovative as Morgan's, nevertheless proposed several amendments which would have given the commission greater powers. Hence, the existence of the Federal Trade Commission Act owes much to the Oklahoma delegation, especially Morgan.

The remaining progressive legislation presented to the Sixty-third Congress was not on the Administration's agenda. Of the four proposals, they were divided between political and social reforms. In regard to the former, limitations on lobbying and women's suffrage were the specific issues. The problem of excessive lobbying became an issue

during the tariff debate, and Murray, Morgan, and Ferris were among those who answered Wilson's call to put a halt to the pressure group activity. Although no vote was recorded, the evidence indicates that at least three Oklahomans supported this political reform. Of long interest to progressives, the resolution to add a Constitutional amendment providing for women's suffrage was first presented to the Sixty-third Congress. Only Carter from the Oklahoma unit spoke on the resolution, and his remarks were negative in nature. However, his speech did not reflect the feelings of the entire delegation, as the roll call vote shows that five of the eight supported the resolution, even though it was defeated. Murray and Weaver joined Carter in opposing the resolution, but Davenport, Ferris, Thompson, Morgan, and McGuire voted for this political reform.

The social reform bills, both of which were enacted, were the Smith-Lever Act and the LaFollette Seamen's Act, both advocated by farmer and labor groups, respectively. No roll call votes were recorded for either bill, but two Oklahomans lent strong vocal support for the proposals, Murray for the Smith-Lever Act, and Ferris for the Seamen's Act.

The preceding evidence indicates that the voters of Oklahoma had been well represented on the leading progressive issues in the Sixty-third Congress. With Wilson facing re-election and war on the horizon, the next chapter will examine the growing progressivism of the Oklahoma delegation in the Sixty-fourth Congress.

CHAPTER VII

THE ELECTION OF 1914 AND THE SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

With the outbreak of war in Europe in August, 1914, the attention of the people of the United States was diverted to matters other than political. As it turned out, the developments abroad were significant to the Democrats during the ensuing Congressional campaign. The Republicans did not wage a vigorous fight, and there seemed to be a general disposition to stand by the President during a time of peril. The most important Democratic asset, however, was the continued disruption of the Republican Party, with Roosevelt and the Progressives making one last and futile effort to establish themselves as a major party.¹ In spite of all these advantages, the Democrats made a poor showing nationally in the state and Congressional elections on November 3, 1914. (The Democratic majority in the House was reduced from seventy-three to twenty-five.² However, the national trend did not hold true for Oklahoma, as the Democrats picked up seven of the eight Congressional seats.)

Congressional redistricting in Oklahoma, after a long delay, was finally accomplished in 1913. Dozens of bills had been offered in the

¹George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1946), 300-303.

²Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), 78.

legislature since the 1910 census, but the eight district plan, which favored the Democrats, was the one which was approved in the end. The district boundaries were regular and appeared sensible, except for the saddle-shaped fifth (see Figure 4). Moreover, they were fairly equal with respect to population (see Table II). Leaving only two districts touching the Kansas border, the Democratic legislature hoped to reverse the Congressional dictate of 1906 so as to assure at least six of the eight seats to Democratic nominees as long as the traditional voting patterns continued. The elections of 1914 exceeded the Democratic expectations, as they were victorious in all but one of the newly created districts.

Due to the fact that the third session of the Sixty-third Congress did not adjourn until late October, the various Congressional campaigns in Oklahoma attracted little attention. Furthermore, the Oklahoma Republican Party, like the parent national party, conducted something less than an energetic campaign. The political climate of the pre-election days was best evaluated by an editorial in one of Oklahoma City's newspapers. The October 10 article, entitled "The Political Calm," stated that with only about three weeks to go, there seemed to be little excitement or interest in the elections except that displayed by the candidates. The editorial attributed the situation to a well satisfied electorate which apparently was pleased with the manner of representation in the past and the prospect for the future.³ The political calm that rested over the state set the temper for the state's 1914 Congressional elections.

³ Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 10, 1914.

The new first district included the ten counties of northeastern Oklahoma, and the 1914 race pitted Davenport, the Democratic incumbent from the old third district, against Joseph A. Gill, a Vinita Republican. In appealing to the voters of the new district, Davenport emphasized his six years of Congressional service which, he believed, had given him the necessary experience to become a competent legislator. The Tulsa Democrat endorsed Davenport's candidacy by publishing two October editorials on his behalf. The first was headlined "What Davenport Does," which dealt with Davenport's committee assignments and the various appropriations he had procured for Tulsa County. It also stressed the fact that Davenport had always labored for the independent oil producers of his district, and although he represented the largest oil district in the world, according to the Tulsa paper, he had never been accused of "having the smell of Standard Oil on his clothes."⁴ The second editorial, "Why Honorable James S. Davenport Should Be Returned to Congress," was a glowing tribute to Davenport's record as third district representative. It castigated his opponent, Gill, as being a "standpat Republican" and a "carpetbagger." The article concluded by asking, "Will the good people of the First Oklahoma district endeavor to deter the progress of our nation and the policies of that great executive, Woodrow Wilson, by voting for a Republican?"⁵ Davenport's campaign rested on his prior service and experience, as well as the role he had played in the first Wilson Congress.

Gill, on the other hand, centered his campaign on the tariff

⁴Tulsa Democrat, October 4, 1914.

⁵Tulsa Democrat, October 28, 1914.

issue, especially the lack of import duties on oil, lead, and zinc, three minerals of interest to the first district voters. His platform, revealed in a front page article in the Bartlesville Daily Enterprise, called attention to the fact that "no effort was made to protect the American market for American oil." He called for import duties on oil, lead, and zinc so as to equalize the cost of these imported minerals with the cost of producing them in Oklahoma.⁶ Gill's campaign promised a return to the protectionist spirit of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff.

Though Gill won Tulsa and Washington Counties by narrow margins, Davenport was the victor in the 1914 race by 1,238 votes. The results were as follows:

| | | |
|-----------|--------|--------------------|
| Davenport | 15,489 | 46.4% |
| Gill | 14,251 | 42.0% |
| Others | 3,665 | 11.6% ⁷ |

Davenport's greatest strength was in Rogers, Pawnee, Osage, Mayes, and Delaware Counties, where he rolled up more than enough votes to offset Gill's slim margins in Tulsa and Washington Counties. It is difficult to compare Davenport's victory with his previous elections because he now represented a much smaller district, both in area and population. But apparently the voters of the new district were aware of his experience and his devotion to the Wilson administration.

In the second district, which was the remainder of the old third district, two new candidates took to the stump. William W. Hastings, a Tahlequah Democrat, vied for the post against Charles A. Cook, a

⁶ Bartlesville Daily Enterprise, October 28, 1914.

⁷ Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), 42.

Muskogee Republican. Hastings won a convincing victory over Cook as he carried all eight counties of the district. He was given strong support by the Democratic press of the district, particularly the Okmulgee Daily Democrat and the Muskogee Times-Democrat. On the other hand, Cook could not muster the support of the leading Republican newspaper of the district, the Muskogee Phoenix, which was also his hometown paper.

The pro-Hastings papers pointed out that President Wilson wanted Congressmen who were in "sympathy and harmony with his plans for progressive national legislation." The Democratic press stated that Hastings would be such a legislator.⁸ In an editorial entitled "A Full Grown Congressman," which was printed in both the Okmulgee Daily Democrat and the Muskogee Times-Democrat, Hastings was pictured as a candidate so fully equipped with the legislative tools that he would not have to serve the long apprenticeship accorded to most new Congressmen. It was emphasized that Hastings was well acquainted with the President's cabinet and department heads, a matter which, according to the newspapers, made him a stronger candidate to represent the new second district.⁹ The election results show that Hastings won by a 4,150 vote margin.

| | | |
|----------|--------|---------------------|
| Hastings | 12,719 | 49.0% |
| Cook | 8,569 | 33.0% |
| Others | 4,618 | 18.0% ¹⁰ |

It seems that the popularity of Hastings and the strong endorsements he

⁸ Okmulgee Daily Democrat, October 15, 1914.

⁹ Okmulgee Daily Democrat, September 24, 1914.

¹⁰ Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections, 42.

received from the press were sufficient to solidly defeat the remaining candidates in the field. Although he did not quite poll a majority, Hastings' margin was considerable.

The race in district three, which included the eleven counties of southeastern Oklahoma, was a three-cornered affair with Charles Carter, the Democratic incumbent from old district four; C. H. Elting, a Republican from Durant; and R. L. Norman, a McAlester Socialist, being the principal participants. Carter's support of the Wilson administration was underscored by the pro-Carter newspapers such as The Daily Ardmoreite and the McAlester News-Capital. They pointed out that he had voted for the new tariff law, the new banking law, the income tax, and the trade commission bill. Basing his speeches on the Wilsonian reforms, Carter emphasized the fact that the Democratic Party was "the party of the people always found on the side of the masses struggling for their rights."¹¹ The traditional campaign oratory was seemingly absent as Carter carried all eleven counties which allowed him to win his fifth consecutive term to Congress. The Socialist candidate, Norman, ran second to Carter in nine of the eleven counties, and polled 4,109 votes more than the Republican, Elting, to become the principal opposition for the Democrats in the new third district.

| | | |
|------------|--------|-------------------|
| Carter (D) | 17,474 | 50.3% |
| Norman (S) | 10,588 | 30.4% |
| Elting (R) | 6,479 | 18.6% |
| Others | 191 | .7% ¹² |

Although Carter rolled up an impressive majority, the size of the Socialist vote undoubtedly disturbed both major parties as it appeared

¹¹ The Daily Ardmoreite, November 1, 1914; McAlester News-Capital, October 24, 1914.

¹² Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections, 42-43.

to be gaining strength by 1914, especially in the third, fourth, and seventh districts of the southern half of Oklahoma.

William H. Murray, who was one of the three Congressmen who had been elected at-large in 1912, did not have the same advantage in 1914. His home county, Johnston, had been put together with eight other counties to form the new fourth district. Murray's chief opponents were James Dennis Flynn, a Sapulpa Republican, and Marion Hughes, a Socialist from Shawnee. Robert L. Williams, the Democratic candidate for governor in the November elections, wrote Murray asking him to get a leave from Speaker Clark and return to Oklahoma to help in the upcoming campaigns. Murray told Williams to support the President by name, to praise the tariff and the Federal Reserve, and to call for rural credits legislation.¹³ After Congress adjourned in late October, Murray stayed in Washington for a while and then, at the request of the White House, went to New Jersey to campaign for the Congressman of Wilson's home district.¹⁴ The election returns in the fourth district indicate that Murray had been almost too complacent about his own race.

| | | |
|------------|--------|-------------------|
| Murray (D) | 13,758 | 42.2% |
| Flynn (R) | 9,395 | 28.8% |
| Hughes (S) | 9,198 | 28.2% |
| Others | 251 | .8% ¹⁵ |

The election statistics show that Murray carried all counties except Lincoln; however, the combined Republican-Socialist vote appears to

¹³Robert L. Williams to William H. Murray, August 24, 1914; Murray to Williams, August 26, 1914, William H. Murray Collection, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma Library.

¹⁴Shawnee News-Herald, October 27, 1914.

¹⁵Kirkpatrick, et al., Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections, 43.

indicate that Murray's popularity may have declined and that in future campaigns he could not rest on his laurels.

In the new fifth district, At-Large Congressman Joseph Thompson was challenged by D. K. Pope, a Republican attorney from Oklahoma City. Very little coverage was given to Thompson in the Democratic press because they apparently felt that his record and experience would assure his re-election. On the other hand, Pope received a strong endorsement from the Oklahoma City Times, the leading Republican publication of the district. The Times praised Pope's innovative plans concerning the establishment of cotton mills in Oklahoma, especially since the state had become a major producer of cotton. Industries such as textiles have not been started in Oklahoma, Pope declared, because of the lack of protection afforded by the government while they are attempting to gain a foothold. Pope demanded protection so that the infant industries of Oklahoma would not have "to compete with foreign pauper labor."¹⁶ Despite the lack of campaigning by Thompson, the activity of Pope, and the strong editorial support given to Pope by a leading Republican newspaper, Thompson won an easy victory with a 4,754 vote margin. He carried six of the seven counties of the new district, Logan being the only exception.

| | | |
|----------|--------|---------------------|
| Thompson | 14,040 | 47.5% |
| Pope | 9,286 | 31.3% |
| Others | 6,198 | 21.2% ¹⁷ |

As in the fourth district, it appeared that the lackadaisical attitude

¹⁶ Oklahoma City Times, October 31, 1914.

¹⁷ Kirkpatrick, et al., 43.

expressed by Thompson would not hold up in future campaigns.

The ever popular Scott Ferris was the Democratic candidate in the new sixth district, which embraced nine counties in south central Oklahoma. Ferris' chief opponent was Republican Alvin Campbell of Lawton, but the Socialists entered a strong candidate in the person of J. T. Cumbie of Lawton, who had been a candidate for the at-large seat in 1912. Most of the Democratic press in the district and around the state was lauding Ferris' record; and there was considerable discussion, at least among Oklahomans, that Ferris might succeed Oscar Underwood as the House majority leader. This idea was being promoted by editorials in The Daily Ardmoreite, and it appeared as a front page story in the Tulsa Democrat.¹⁸ Despite all the favorable publicity on his behalf, Ferris conducted a vigorous campaign in the time allowed due to the late adjournment. Most of his speeches praised the achievements of the Democratic Congress, and he reasoned that his party had done more for the relief of the common people in eighteen months than the Republicans had done in the twelve years prior to 1912.¹⁹ Ferris won re-election to a fifth consecutive term by 6,287 votes as he carried all but Kingfisher County.

| | | |
|--------------|--------|--------------------|
| Ferris (D) | 14,578 | 48.2% |
| Campbell (R) | 8,291 | 27.4% |
| Cumbie (S) | 6,671 | 22.0% |
| Others | 745 | 2.4% ²⁰ |

This marked the first time that Ferris had won by less than a majority.

¹⁸The Daily Ardmoreite, October 16, 1914; Tulsa Democrat, October 20, 1914.

¹⁹Kingfisher Times, October 22, 1914.

²⁰Kirkpatrick, et al., 44.

And though he won quite handily, the combined Republican-Socialist vote against Ferris was 14,962, or 49.4%.

The new district seven emerged from the eleven southwestern counties of Oklahoma where the 1914 race brought forth all new candidates: J. V. McClintic, Democrat from Snyder, W. S. Mills, Republican from Clinton, and H. H. Stallard, Socialist from Snyder. The Democratic newspapers of the district, especially the Mangum Star and the Cordell Beacon, strongly supported McClintic's candidacy. With McClintic tying his campaign closely to the efforts of the Wilson administration, both the Star and the Beacon encouraged the voters to elect a man who would be in sympathy with the Wilson policies.²¹ In an October 29 editorial, the Mangum publication proclaimed that McClintic would "cooperate and assist Wilson in pushing through the national congress the great measures in the interest of the producing masses of America." The editorial concluded that a vote for McClintic was a vote to "keep Oklahoma progressive."²² Stallard, the Socialist, accused McClintic of not supporting the eight-hour law for women and campaigned on the platform that he, rather than McClintic, represented the wishes of the farmer. This controversy was discussed in an open letter to the Beacon from C. M. Portwood, McClintic's campaign manager, on October 15. Portwood refuted the Stallard accusation by stating that McClintic had supported the eight-hour law for women while he was a member of the state legislature. As for the charge that McClintic did not represent the farmer, Portwood declared that he did "not know of any

²¹Mangum Star, October 22, 1914; Cordell Beacon, October 29, 1914.

²²Mangum Star, October 29, 1914.

Democrat farmers in this section but what will support Jim McClintic.²³ Apparently McClintic was successful in thwarting his opponent's charges, as he won by 2,840 votes over Stallard, his closest competitor. Republican Mills carried only Ellis County and ran behind Stallard in the other ten counties. Stallard outpolled McClintic in Beckham, Dewey, and Kiowa Counties, but McClintic's strength in Washita, Tillman, Greer, and Custer was enough to overcome the Socialist challenge.

| | | |
|---------------|--------|-------------------|
| McClintic (D) | 11,861 | 43.3% |
| Stallard (S) | 9,021 | 32.9% |
| Mills (R) | 6,179 | 22.6% |
| Others | 337 | .2% ²⁴ |

The election results in the seventh district indicated that the Socialist Party had displaced the Republican Party as the major opposition to the Democrats in the heavily rural southwestern part of Oklahoma. Once again it was fortunate for the Democrats that the combined vote of the Republicans and Socialists was split since that total would have been 15,200, or 3,339 more than McClintic received.

The new eighth district was one that the Democrats had conceded to the Republicans, primarily because such a large portion of it bordered on Republican Kansas, and it had gone Republican in the four previous elections. Dick Morgan, the incumbent Republican from the old second district, was opposed by Henry S. Johnston from Perry, who had been the unsuccessful Democratic candidate in district one in 1908. Johnston had been a member of the state constitutional convention and the state senate, where he had supported such progressive policies as primary elections, a corporation commission, mine and factory in-

²³ Cordell Beacon, October 15, 1914.

²⁴ Kirkpatrick, et al., 44.

spection of child labor, establishment of a state pure food and drug department, and a graduated inheritance and income tax.²⁵ In an October 20 editorial, the Enid Morning News, a Democratic publication, contended that the people of the eighth district should show their approval of the Wilson administration by voting for Johnston. The editorial argued that the re-election of Morgan would mean a vote in Congress against the President, and "it would mean disapproval by the people of this district of the wise and progressive policies of the President."²⁶

Morgan counteracted Johnston's attempt to relate to the Wilson administration by emphasizing his faithful service to his constituents and his six years of experience in the House. In an Enid speech just prior to the election, Morgan reaffirmed his ideas on the regulation of corporations by a federal trade commission, and the protective tariff. He believed that the free trade provision of the Underwood Tariff had placed the American farmers in competition with the farmers of every country of the world, where they had cheap land and labor. Consequently, said Morgan, the market for American farm products has been "contracted, diminished, restricted, limited, and lessened."²⁷ In the hotly contested race, Morgan won by a mere 765 votes as he polled large margins in the traditional Republican counties of Garfield and Woods. Johnston showed his greatest strength in the eastern counties of the district, Noble and Kay. The results were as follows:

²⁵ Noble County Sentinel, July 23, 1914.

²⁶ Enid Morning News, October 20, 1914.

²⁷ Enid Events, October 29, 1914; Alva Review Courier, October 29, 1914.

| | | |
|----------|--------|---------------------|
| Morgan | 13,294 | 41.7% |
| Johnston | 12,529 | 39.3% |
| Others | 6,092 | 19.0% ²⁸ |

The fact that Morgan had received considerable national publicity did not keep him from being engaged in another close contest. The late adjournment hindered Morgan's campaigning, which probably reduced his vote total as he was not able to explain his position on his votes in the Sixty-third Congress. On the other hand, Johnston was a formidable candidate who was well known in the area and seemingly espoused a progressive platform. Overall, it was the traditional Republicanism of the counties comprising most of the new eighth district that enabled Morgan to win a fourth term.

The new alignment from Oklahoma to the Sixty-fourth Congress would be seven Democrats and one Republican. Most political analysts predict that the party in power suffers more setbacks in off-year elections, but this was not evident in Oklahoma in 1914. There are several reasons why the Republicans fared so poorly as compared with elsewhere. First, it appears that the Republican state organization was still feeling the pains of the 1912 rupture and, in addition, waged a weak campaign. Second, the Democratic Party was in an advantageous position in Oklahoma because of the strength exhibited by the Socialist Party. If there was an anti-administration feeling among Oklahoma voters in 1914, it was apparently divided between Republicans and Socialists. It should be noted that in six of the seven districts where Democrats were victorious, the combined Republican-Socialist vote was greater, the lone exception being the third. In districts three, four, and

²⁸Kirkpatrick, et al., 44.

seven, the Socialist Party provided the chief opposition for Democrats as 1914 proved to be the peak of Socialist sentiment in the state.

(The record of the Sixty-fourth Congress was remarkable, primarily because it included an election year when Congressmen are generally more interested in oratory than in action. Between January, 1916, and March, 1917, the Congress initiated legislation concerning federal regulation of child labor; adopted a model workmen's compensation law for federal employees; established a system of agricultural credit; decreed an eight-hour day for certain classes of railroad employees; and set up federal programs for the improvement of rural roads and vocational education. All this was accomplished in the midst of concern about the possible development of hostilities between the United States and one or more belligerents in the European War.)

One of the most startling achievements of the Sixty-fourth Congress was the passage of the Keating-Owen bill which forbade the shipment in interstate commerce of goods manufactured in whole or in part by children under fourteen, of products of mines and quarries involving the labor of children under sixteen, and of any products manufactured by children under sixteen employed more than eight hours a day. Long advocated by the proponents of humanitarian legislation and sponsored by the National Child Labor Committee, such a bill had until now made slow progress in Congress. But after the Democratic victory in 1912, the progressives became more and more insistent, and on this issue as on others, President Wilson changed his mind. At the outset he believed that such a law would be an unconstitutional invasion of states' rights, but his commitment to progressive principles led him to overlook his earlier scruples. The bill (H. R. 8234), introduced by Representative Edward Keating of Colorado, passed the House on February 2, 1916, by a

vote of 337 to 46.²⁹ Then the bill languished in the Senate, where it would probably have died had it not been for Wilson's personal intervention. On July 18, the President went to the Capitol and pleaded with Senate leaders to allow the measure to come to a vote. With the aid of Senator Robert L. Owen, the sponsor of the bill in the upper house, the measure was adopted by the Senate on August 8 and signed by the President on September 1.³⁰

None of the members of the Oklahoma House delegation entered the child labor bill debate. However, the roll call indicates that there was unanimous support for the resolution among the Oklahoma members as all eight voted for the bill when it passed the House on February 2.³¹ After Senate passage on August 8, the bill went to conference committee, and the report coming out of that committee was agreed to in the House on August 18 with no roll call vote recorded.³²

Although not participating in the discussion over child labor, the Oklahoma delegation appeared to be ahead of the President on this social reform which had been advocated by progressives since the administration of Roosevelt. It was not until July, 1916, that Wilson made his move for the child labor cause, and as Link points out, he might have never intervened had he not been warned that the Democrats might

²⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 2, 2035.

³⁰Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, 226-227.

³¹U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 2, 2035.

³²U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 13, 12845.

stand or fall on this issue in 1916.³³

Even though President Wilson had devoted a good deal of attention to the question of rural credits in his first annual message to Congress, and again when the Federal Reserve bill was under consideration in the House, until 1916 he maintained that the government itself should not become involved in lending money to farmers. Oklahoma spokesmen such as Murray, Thompson, Ferris, and Morgan felt otherwise, and had lobbied for such legislation throughout 1914 and 1915. The President and his Secretary of Agriculture, David Houston, changed their stand on the issue in January, 1916, maintaining that the pressure of war time conditions had altered their stance. The anticipation of the upcoming presidential election may have also played a part as it gave Wilson ample time to appear as friend of the farmer in the campaign. Again the Oklahoma delegation, especially Democrats Murray, Thompson, and Ferris, as well as Republican Morgan, appear to have been ahead of the President's progressive spirit, because they had advocated rural credits of some type since the early meetings of the Sixty-third Congress. These four were joined in the floor discussion of the bill by Democrats Davenport, Hastings, and McClintic, with only Carter remaining vocally inactive.

The first to speak on the much controverted issue was Morgan, who had already introduced rural credits legislation (H. R. 10310) in the first session of the Sixty-fourth Congress. On March 29, 1916, he arose and first demanded that the Banking and Currency Committee report a rural credits bill to the House: "In the name of 6,500,000

³³Link, 227.

farmers of the United States, I protest against any further delay in rural-credit legislation." Morgan then outlined the provisions of his resolution which included a plan for twelve Federal land bank districts that, according to Morgan, would insure equal credit facilities and uniform interest rates to farmers in all sections of the country. In addition, Morgan's bill set a maximum interest rate of 5 per cent per annum; required that each Federal land bank have an operating capital of \$1,000,000, one-half of which was to be contributed by the United States government; and stated that the United States government would contribute \$500,000 to the guaranty fund of each Federal land bank.³⁴

On May 6, Morgan again entered into the discussion over rural credits. On this occasion, he addressed himself to the bill under consideration (S. 2986) which had been introduced by Senator Henry Hollis of New Hampshire. The Hollis bill was the one eventually adopted; and it provided for 12 Federal farm loan districts under the general administration of a Federal Farm Loan Board consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury and four other members. In addition, each district would have a Farm Loan Bank, capitalized at \$750,000, in which cooperative farm loan associations held membership. Farmers belonging to these associations could secure long-term loans up to 40 years on farm-mortgage security at interest rates lower than those prevailing in commercial banks.

Morgan, on the whole, supported the Hollis bill, but commented on two sections that he felt should be eliminated to improve it for the sake of the farmer: one, a section which authorized the creation

³⁴U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 5, 5125-5127.

of joint-stock banks; and two, the section which placed restrictions upon the loans. It was Morgan's belief that joint-stock banks should not be established under government auspices because they would be conducted for a profit, and, acting as middlemen between farmers and investors, they would be "clothed with power to levy unjust tribute on both borrowers and lenders." He declared, "They will be organized as money-making institutions." The argument was then presented that Germany had joint-stock banks, to which Morgan replied: "It is true that Germany has joint-stock banks. . . . But the joint-stock banks were not intended primarily as farm-mortgage banks. . . . Only 6 per cent of the business on these banks consists of loans on farm lands."

Morgan concluded his argument against the joint-stock bank section by saying that "in organizing our system of land credits for the farmers of this Nation we should not create private, profit-sharing, surplus-creating, dividend paying, land-credit banks." As for the restrictions to be placed upon loans, Morgan asserted that the bill should not make loans restricted only for certain purposes. According to Morgan, there "are many legitimate purposes for which farmers will want to borrow money." He maintained that every land-credit system in Europe made loans without restrictions, and he said, "I am in favor of striking out all restrictions." Concluding his remarks, Morgan proclaimed that "the average American farmer will not borrow money unless it is for good purposes, and I am opposed to making a ward out of him."³⁵ Although Morgan's suggestions were not accepted, he had reaffirmed his strong convictions concerning rural credits.

³⁵U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 8, 7544-7547.

On May 9, Representative Carter Glass, one of the chief sponsors in the House of the Hollis bill, yielded to freshman Congressman Hastings to speak in its behalf. For the most part, Hastings heralded the bill as one that "will have more far reaching and beneficial effect" than any other to be considered by the Sixty-fourth Congress. He expressed the need for such legislation by pointing out that the Federal Reserve Act had provided only for the short time six months' loan, and these loans were on first farm mortgage security for a period not to exceed five years. In Hastings' opinion, "the time is too short, renewals are too frequent, and the interest rate of commercial banks are too high." Furthermore, Hastings asserted that the threat of foreclosure was always hanging over the farmer because of the risk of the farming seasons. He reasoned:

It is only in exceptional cases where a farmer can borrow money at commercial rates, buy a farm, and pay his note within the time usually granted by commercial banks. If crops fail and he is unable to meet the interest and the installment when due, the mortgage is foreclosed and he loses his initial payment, together with the time and work he has expended on it.³⁶

Hastings concluded his favorable comments by saying that "the importance of this bill cannot be overestimated" because it advances a means whereby the farmer may secure loans upon long terms at the lowest possible rate of interest and payable in small amortization payments.³⁷

On the same day, Glass likewise yielded to Congressman Ferris to speak for the rural credits bill. Using a statistical approach to his

³⁶U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 8, 7702.

³⁷Ibid.

argument, Ferris informed his colleagues that tenantry in the United States had increased 16.3 per cent from 1890 to 1910 whereas home ownership had increased only eight-tenths of 1 per cent. Ferris further revealed that in 1890, only 28.2 per cent of American farms carried mortgages, while by 1900, 31.6 per cent carried mortgages, and in 1910, 33.6 per cent of the farms carried mortgages. Ferris declared that there were notable exceptions where farms were mortgaged due to lack of thrift and to mismanagement, but it was his contention that the Sixty-fourth Congress had the "solemn duty resting upon it to help reduce the interest the farmer must pay and liberalize the loans he must execute, to the end that he may retain his homestead, educate his children, and properly care for himself and his family in the station in which the American farmer deserves to live." Ferris disclosed that the total farm mortgages on American farms amounted to almost \$4,000,000. The interest on this figure at 8 per cent, reasoned Ferris, would be \$320,000,000. If by the legislation under consideration, avowed Ferris, we can reduce the interest rate to 5 per cent, the drain in interest upon American farmers would be only \$200,000,000, a saving to them of \$120,000,000 annually. Ferris concluded by asking:

Who is there present who would not be willing to say that the lifting of this partial load from the back of the farmer would be an inducement to the boy who has left the farm to return to it and try again?³⁸

Thus, Ferris, a veteran member of the Oklahoma delegation, added a strong voice in the affirmative.

Another Oklahoma House member, Davenport, offered an amendment to

³⁸U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 8, 7724-7726.

the Hollis bill on May 12. The debated bill provided that the United States government would supply \$750,000 capital to each of the 12 Federal land banks for a beginning. Davenport's amendment, like that provided in Morgan's bill, would have increased the initial sum from \$750,000 to \$1,000,000. Speaking at great length in defense of his amendment, Davenport explained that for years we have been providing for all classes of business and all classes of enterprises in Congress, and everyone said it was for the good of the farmer. Now, said Davenport, we come to a proposition where we can really do some good for the farmer if we are willing. "I say to you that \$1,000,000 is a small amount to start these banks with," exclaimed Davenport. He believed that America must realize that proper development of agriculture required capital. The mainstay of our government, claimed Davenport, is made up of the people who feed and produce the raw materials for our food and clothing, and yet they have not had any direct legislation in their behalf. Davenport concluded his speech by saying that the farmer and rural dwellers had not been provided for in the same manner as those who live in cities and those interested in corporations; therefore, according to Davenport, the passage of the bill was mandatory to give the farmers that to which they were entitled and for which they had so long contended.³⁹ Davenport's amendment was rejected, but he had presented an eloquent defense for rural credits.

Davenport's remarks were complemented the same day by fellow delegate Murray. He saw the rural credits legislation as justifiable because it would prevent home-owning farmers from becoming tenants and

³⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 14, 1058-1061.

aid tenant farmers in becoming home owners. However, Murray, like Ferris, felt that the bill did not go far enough in regard to the tenant. He saw it as discrimination against the homeless who did not have the 45 per cent of the cost of a farm required when seeking a loan. Murray believed that the prerequisite figure should be reduced to 10 per cent of the cost of the farm, and he offered an amendment to that effect. There were arguments, according to Murray, that this legislation was "special" legislation, but he answered these objections by contending that "special" laws had been passed for all classes of people from the railroad interests to the laboring man. Concluding his remarks, Murray declared that this was a "special" act enabling the tenant to become interested in his occupation and increase production, which would aid the whole society by lowering the cost of living.⁴⁰ Murray's amendment failed, but his interest in the tenant farming class reflects the growing problem of agricultural unrest in his part of Oklahoma.

On May 13, Morgan, displaying an intense interest in the bill, offered three amendments. His first proposal was to lessen the 1 per cent per annum charge due on the loan for administration expenses to one-half of 1 per cent. Morgan recommended this alteration because he felt that it would still be sufficient and, in addition, might decrease the "extravagance in the management of public affairs." His second proposition dealt with an extension of the time period of Federal land bank loans from 36 to 60-years. Morgan advocated this extension for two reasons: one, he knew that most European institu-

⁴⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 8, 7884-7887.

tions that loaned money had no date of payment; and two, he believed that it was the only way that the credit could reach a poor man. To give the poor man a loan for 60 years, argued Morgan, is to give him an opportunity to pay off the principal at a half of 1 per cent per annum. In his opinion, the limitation of loans to 36 years was a "discrimination against the farmers of limited means." A third amendment sponsored by Morgan was to permit borrowers to pay off the principal or any part of it at any time in two years after the date of the mortgage. The Hollis bill would not allow the borrower to pay any part of the principal for five years. Morgan believed that the borrower should be given every encouragement to pay his loan at the earliest date possible.⁴¹ Although all three of Morgan's amendments were rejected, they do indicate a strong interest on his part in making the credit facilities more acceptable to all classes of farmers.

Also on May 13, Representative Thompson made his first speech of the Sixty-fourth Congress, and it dealt with rural credits, a topic which he had spoken for in the Sixty-third session. He began his remarks by describing the Hollis bill as the most important resolution that would come before the House because it involved "a subject that vitally affects 40,000,000 of our people, and on its proper solution depends on the happiness and prosperity of the whole country." Thompson alleged that the farming class had been "discriminated against in the rate of interest they have been compelled to pay, from the period when our Government was established down to this time." He argued that while the United States government had been able to borrow at from

⁴¹U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 8, 7918-7920.

2½ to 4 per cent, cities and school districts at 3 to 5 per cent, and railroads and other industrial corporations from 4½ to 6 per cent, the farmers had been "required to pay two, three, four, five, and often ten and twenty times that rate of interest." Thompson explained that farmers had finally learned that credit systems had been established that enabled practically every other character of business to secure money at greatly reduced rates, and they are demanding the same consideration. "The farmer has the best security in the world--the land," proclaimed Thompson; "what he needs is some system that will connect him with the man who has money and wants to loan it on good security." Concluding his speech, Thompson maintained that the farmers of the United States are among its best credit risks: "They do not seek special favors; all they ask is fair terms."⁴² Thus Thompson added his support to the growing list of Oklahoma House members in favor of rural credits.

On May 15, the day the bill passed the House for the first time, several Oklahoma delegates became involved in the debate over an amendment proposed by a fellow representative, Hastings. As a member of the House Banking and Currency Committee, Hastings was deeply concerned over the outcome of the Hollis bill. He believed that section 15 was a nonworkable proposition, and therefore suggested an alternative. Hastings explained his fear that under the existing terms of section 15, there would be too many delays in securing the loans. The method proposed by section 15 to obtain a loan was through a farm-loan association of at least 10 persons, and the minimum amount borrowed must be

⁴²U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 8, 7941-7947.

\$20,000. He felt that this provision was unworkable because the average loan would be, according to Hastings, about \$500; and, in addition, there would be too much time consumed in establishing a loan association, if there were sufficient numbers applying for membership, and finally being admitted. Hastings' amendment made provision that if no local association was formed within 90 days after the establishment of the Federal land bank in the district, then a farmer could apply directly for loans through local agents of the Federal land bank. According to Hastings, the amendment would cut about 30 days' delay in the loaning process.

Taking up the Hastings substitute were fellow Oklahomans, Morgan, Ferris, Thompson, and Davenport, who vigorously supported it. Their comments were directed to section 15, which they described as cumbersome and unworkable, whereas they viewed the Hastings alternative as practical, giving the land bank board more latitude and flexibility than that provided in Section 15. Ferris summarized their sentiments by saying, "Hastings has offered you a razor that will shave."⁴³ The Hastings amendment was voted down, but not before a majority of the Oklahoma House members had made their feelings known concerning section 15, which they considered impractical.

Before the roll call vote was taken, McClintic became the seventh of the Oklahoma delegates to speak for the rural credits bill. He praised the rural credits system, saying that where it had been in effect, it had caused "the people to be more energetic, thrifty, and more saving," which had the result of creating larger deposits and

⁴³U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 8, 7973-7975.

surpluses. McClintic believed that this would result in the creation of more capital in local communities to be used for the construction of different kinds of public works. Describing the legislation as "the best and foremost step ever taken by this Nation," McClintic related that it would allow the farmers to become better businessmen and enable them to solve their economic problems. He ended his speech by declaring that:

The cost of production will be reduced and consumers as a result will be greatly benefited and lenders of money will find a better and safer market, as practically all the risks will be eliminated.⁴⁴

Thus, as the debate ended, only Carter of the Oklahoma group had failed to comment on the rural credits issue.

The vote on the Hollis bill was 295 for, 10 against, and 125 not voting. Even though Carter abstained from the discussion, he joined the other seven Oklahoma representatives in voting for the bill.⁴⁵ The conference committee report was also accepted in the House on June 27, 1916, by a vote of 311 to 12 with 108 not voting. The positive position of the Oklahoma delegation remained intact as all eight cast "yeas" to the roll call.⁴⁶ From the debate there was little doubt remaining as to the posture of the Oklahoma contingent on the issue of rural credits. For Murray, Morgan, Ferris, and Thompson, it was an act that they had desired since the passage of the Federal Reserve Act. The four veterans received considerable help from two newcomers, McClintic and

⁴⁴U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 13, 967-968.

⁴⁵U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 8, 8017.

⁴⁶U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 10, 10114.

Hastings. Apparently the rural orientation of most of the Oklahoma Congressional districts affected the stand taken by Oklahoma's House members. Furthermore, the fact that several of the group, such as Murray and Ferris, had spent their early years on farms, gave them additional insight. Another factor which may have accounted for the increased participation for rural credits was the large 1914 vote of the Socialist Party, which had made its largest appeal to the farming and laboring classes. Of all the legislation enacted during the scope of this study, rural credits received the most discussion, most roll call attention, and unanimous support from the Oklahoma delegation.

Another notable domestic reform that came about during the Wilson administration was the "dollar matching" policy. Grants from the federal government to aid the states in education and internal improvements were almost as old as the Constitution, but throughout the nineteenth century, these grants had been made primarily in the form of land or the receipts from land sales. When Wilson became President, this source of supply had so nearly approached exhaustion that some new form of aid had to be found. It was discovered in the form of income tax revenue which was used to appropriate money by the federal government to the states provided that the federal appropriations be matched by money from the states. An urgent demand of the farmers was the improvement of roads in rural areas. The Federal Highway Act of 1916 met this demand as it applied the "dollar matching" principle to road building. The bill (H. R. 7617) was introduced by Congressman Dorsey Shackleford of Missouri, and provided an appropriation of \$5,000,000 for the first year of distribution. Size, population, and existing mail routes were all factors in determining the amounts to be

allotted to each state. Four of the eight Oklahoma House members entered the debate in January, 1916, concerning the good roads proposal. The first to speak was Hastings, who, on January 22, was yielded ten minutes by the bill's sponsor, Shackleford. Viewing the legislation as affecting every citizen of the United States, Hastings asserted that good roads meant better schoolhouses, increased attendance at school, and therefore less illiteracy. Good roads would make it possible, he declared, to extend the rural mail service to every farmer's door and thus would allow him to enjoy the same mail privileges afforded by those living in cities. Hastings, who had introduced similar legislation on January 12, 1916 (H. R. 8819), concluded by referring to the Shackleford resolutions:

Over and above it will restore confidence to the farmers of this country and bring them to realize that their Representatives in Congress have their welfare at heart, and that while the farmers of the country bear so much of the burdens of this Government in the way of taxation, Congress is ready and willing to give them recognition and to give them some of the benefits of this Government.⁴⁷

Hastings thus became an early and active participant in the campaign for better rural roads.

Later on January 22, Shackleford yielded to Thompson from Oklahoma. It was Thompson's opinion that the debate over the good roads bill had demonstrated that those states which had been the greatest beneficiaries of tariff legislation were those that were unalterably opposed to any bill that appropriates money which might in any way benefit the farming and producing masses of the country. To those who oppose the bill by saying that it would aid in the "con-

⁴⁷U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 2, 1384-1385.

struction of cow trails," Thompson affirmed that the money was intended to aid in the "construction of roads from the farm, where the products that go to feed the multiplied millions of this earth are produced." Thompson ended his speech by warning the Congress that if it continued to neglect the laboring and producing masses of the country:

We will soon be face to face with the condition which the British Parliament had to solve in Ireland less than half a century ago and which has called for an appropriation of two and one-half billion dollars out of the British Treasury to encourage a movement back to the farm in order that the British Nation might produce enough within its own borders to supply the necessities of its people.⁴⁸

Thus Thompson had added a strong voice for the good roads measure.

On January 24, Congressman Davenport rose to speak for the good roads bill. He believed that the resolution was not political in nature, and he asked those who opposed it "not to vote against this measure from a selfish motive or because he feels his section of the country will not profit thereby." According to Davenport, "all of the people of the United States will be benefited if this measure becomes law." Davenport, a member of the House Committee on Roads from which the bill originated, stated that the United States was the only progressive nation of the world which had not given consideration to the construction of its highways. "All of the progressive nations of Europe," argued Davenport, "are giving national aid to their highways, while this Government has neglected to extend aid and has thereby imposed a burden of millions of dollars annually on our producers." Another argument for good roads presented by Davenport was that all people depended upon the products of the farm, and, as Davenport

⁴⁸U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 2, 1394-1395.

stressed, the cheaper you can bring those products to the door of the consumer the better off everyone would be. Davenport said that he wanted to see the day when every farmer could haul his product to market over good roads "without being forced to drive in mud up to the hub of his wagon." Calling for passage of the bill, Davenport expressed hope that in the future, the appropriations for road improvement would be greatly increased so that there would be "better opportunities for school and church attendance" which, in Davenport's opinion, "will in every way tend to upbuild the intellectual and moral standards of every community in the United States."⁴⁹ It appears that Davenport was anxious for some type of legislation concerning rural road improvement.

On the day of passage, January 25, McClintic commented on the Shackleford bill, but also pointed out the features of the good roads bill that he had introduced on December 6, 1915 (H. R. 620). McClintic contended that the government should assist in the building of roads, and as he viewed it, more roads were necessary if the country wanted to "successfully develop the West." Roads were mandatory, according to McClintic, if the natural resources of the western country were to be transported to the thickly populated sections of the country. He declared that "the progress of every nation goes hand in hand with the development of its roads." McClintic then elaborated upon the provisions of his bill, which differed little from the Shackleford proposition. In conclusion, he maintained that in the past the government had spent enormous amounts for rivers, harbors, and public buildings, and therefore, it was time that funds be appropriated for

⁴⁹U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 2, 1453-1456.

"those people who live in the rural districts, the tillers of the soil, the producers."⁵⁰ As representative from the heavily rural southwestern section of Oklahoma, McClintic had a vested interest in the passage of this bill. Although Ferris did not participate in the good roads debate, he did introduce H. R. 405 on December 6, 1915, which was a bill designed to aid states in the construction and maintenance of rural post roads. However, the bill was never reported out of committee.⁵¹ Thus five of the eight Oklahoma representatives had taken an active part in the pre-roll call process, all expressing favorable comments on the good roads resolution.

The Shackelford bill passed the House on January 25, 1916, by a vote of 283 "yeas," 81 "nays," and 67 "not voting." Seven of the eight Oklahomans voted in the affirmative, with Ferris not voting.⁵² The roll call absence of Ferris, however, indicated neither lack of interest nor opposition. The conference committee report was agreed to on June 28, 1916, with no roll call vote recorded.⁵³ The Oklahoma House delegation had openly displayed unanimity on the issue of good roads. Not only was this an expression of a desire to aid rural areas, but it also indicated that the Oklahoma contingent approved of the "dollar matching" principle which many opponents had declared unconsti-

⁵⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 13, 172-174.

⁵¹U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 1, 23.

⁵²U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 2, 1536-1537.

⁵³U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 10, 19173.

tutional because they felt it infringed upon states' rights. The passage of the law thus marked an additional extension of federal power to be used in attaining domestic reform goals.

"Dollar matching" in education became an issue in the second session of the Sixty-fourth Congress as the Smith-Hughes bill was proposed. This legislation was designed to allow Congress to appropriate funds, to be matched by the states, for education in commercial, industrial, and domestic science subjects in schools of less than college level. A board of vocational education, recommended by the bill, would be given the right to pass on the merits of the projects for which the various states proposed to use their allotments.

The only two Oklahoma House members to expound on the vocational education issue were Hastings and Morgan. In the course of debate, Hastings became disturbed with the section of the Smith-Hughes bill (S. 703) which dealt with the distribution of the appropriation within the state. He asked the House sponsors of the bill how they planned to distribute the funds throughout each state "so as to reach the poor boy and the poor girl on the farm who is unable to pay board or go away from home to some city." The great concern of Hastings appeared to be the possible concentration of funds in a few schools, but he declared that he was "heartily in favor of the principles of the bill." It seems that Hastings wanted the control of funds to be placed in a Federal board instead of a state board; however, his wishes were not fulfilled as the act provided for control of the appropriations by the state board of education. Nevertheless, Hastings had shown by his participation in the debate his interest for vocational education which meant much to agricultural states like Oklahoma. In conclusion,

Hastings contended that "there is no more important bill pending before Congress."⁵⁴

Prior to passage, Morgan expressed his continuing interest in vocational education by offering an amendment to S. 703. He wanted to make the teaching of "agricultural subjects" more specific by including the study of "rural credits" and "cooperation in business among farmers" as part of the curriculum. Morgan believed that much was being accomplished in teaching better farming methods, but his concern was that "farmers are losing many millions of dollars every year because they have not been taught and trained to apply better business methods." Morgan reasoned that all of the business interests of the country were united, except the farmers who do not cooperate in business. The farmer must be informed on how to secure his proper share of the wealth he produces, asserted Morgan, and the way to do that is to adopt this amendment whereby he will learn how to cooperate in his business efforts. In the complex system of sale and distribution, Morgan emphasized that the middleman was taking "one-half of the value of the farm product," and he felt his amendment would help the farmer learn that he "can sell direct to the customer and thus cut out the cost of distribution."⁵⁵ Morgan's amendment was rejected, but it did not thwart his continuing interest in the field of vocational education. He had proposed vocational education legislation in the Sixty-third Congress, and had spoken on behalf of the Smith-Lever Act of 1914. No other House member from Oklahoma had spoken out and labored

⁵⁴U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1917, LIV, Part 1, 752.

⁵⁵U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1917, LIV, Part 1, 755.

as long on this issue as had Congressman Morgan.

There was no roll call vote demanded either time the Smith-Hughes bill passed the House. It was first approved on January 9, 1917,⁵⁶ and the conference report passed on February 16, 1917.⁵⁷ Therefore, the participation by Hastings and Morgan serve as the only indicators as to how the Oklahoma delegation responded to the issue of "dollar matching" in vocational education. It is notable that only two representatives, Hastings, a newcomer, and Morgan, a veteran, lent vocal support to a bill that so vitally affected all districts in Oklahoma.

Another accomplishment of the Sixty-fourth Congress that falls within the realm of progressive legislation was the Kern-McGillicuddy Workmen's Compensation Act of 1916 (H. R. 15316). Introduced by Representative Daniel McGillicuddy of Maine, the act established a system of workmen's compensation for federal employees. The bill was drawn up with the aid of the American Association for Labor Legislation, and was described by a contemporary periodical as "the most scientific and the most liberal compensation act in any country."⁵⁸ It is still recognized by one of the foremost studies on the subject as "one of the most advanced workman's compensation laws in the world."⁵⁹

None of the Oklahoma House members entered the July, 1916 debate

⁵⁶U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1917, LIV, Part 2, 1083.

⁵⁷U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1917, LIV, Part 4, 3429.

⁵⁸John B. Andrews, "New Federal Workmen's Compensation Law," Survey, XXXVI (September 23, 1916), 617.

⁵⁹Herman M. and Anne R. Somers, Workmen's Compensation (New York: John Wiley, 1954), 291.

concerning the workmen's compensation issue; however, a roll call vote was taken when it passed the House on July 12. Davenport, Ferris, Hastings, McClintic, Morgan, and Thompson were among the 287 votes for the bill. None of the Oklahoma delegates were to be found in the list of three dissenting votes; however, Murray and Carter were counted with the 140 members who did not answer the roll call.⁶⁰ The conference committee report was accepted with no roll call on September 4, 1916.⁶¹ Therefore it appears that the Oklahoma delegation unanimously approved of this social reform. The fact that it received only three negative votes in the House could account for the lack of debate activity on the part of the Oklahoma members. On the other hand, the eight members had been quite vocal in the discussion of other issues, some of which had passed with scant opposition.

In late summer of 1916, a protracted dispute between the four railway brotherhoods representing the trainmen and the management of the railroads threatened the country with a nationwide rail strike. When President Wilson personally intervened to effect a compromise, he secured the agreement of the brotherhoods to his proposal but failed to move the management. Wilson then went to Congress and asked for a law providing that the trainmen be paid on the basis of an eight-hour day. The President also recommended that a commission be established to observe the effects of the eight-hour day.⁶² On September 1, 1916,

⁶⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 11, 10916.

⁶¹U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 13, 13774.

⁶²Link, 235-236.

the House passed the Adamson Act (H. R. 17700) introduced by William C. Adamson, Congressman from Georgia. The bill, which provided for the eight-hour day and the commission to investigate its effects, passed the House by a vote of 239 to 56, with 132 not voting.⁶³ The resolution was unanimously accepted in the Senate on September 2, and the President signed it on September 3, and the railroad strike was prevented.⁶⁴ As on workmen's compensation, the Oklahoma House members chose to remain silent on this issue. However, Davenport, Hastings, McClintic, Morgan, Murray, and Thompson answered "yea" to the roll call. Carter and Ferris were recorded as "not voting."⁶⁵ The Adamson Act was another step in the direction of general recognition of the eight-hour day as a reasonable basis not only of wages but of work. The lack of debate on the part of Oklahoma House members may be attributed to the short amount of time devoted by Congress to the railroad legislation due to the possibility of a strike. Another factor which accounted for the inactivity in the debate may have been the strong White House pressure that was being exerted for passage. The Oklahoma delegation positively responded by supporting the eight-hour legislation.

What conclusions is it possible to draw about the attitude of Oklahoma Congressmen during the Sixty-fourth Congress? The six pieces of legislation that are considered progressive can be broadly defined

⁶³U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 13, 13608.

⁶⁴Link, 237.

⁶⁵U. S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 13, 13608.

into two categories: those dealing with labor reform, i.e., Keating-Owen, Kern-McGillicuddy, and Adamson; and those dealing with agricultural reform, i.e., rural credits, good roads, and vocational education. None of the labor reform bills received vocal support from any of the Oklahoma House members. On the other hand, the roll call votes show that all eight voted for the Keating-Owen Act, while six of the eight voted for the Kern-McGillicuddy and Adamson Acts. On these two occasions, Carter and Murray and Carter and Ferris were absent, respectively. Therefore, there appears to be strong sentiment within the delegation for these social justice causes.

In contrast, all of the legislation that was concerned with reform for the agricultural sector received both vocal and roll call attention from the Oklahoma House members. The rural credits bill provoked more discussion on the House floor among the Oklahoma delegation than any other single issue included in the scope of this study. In addition, no other issue of this study generated more favorable support. Seven of the eight Oklahomans commented on the bill at least once during the first session of the Sixty-fourth Congress. Only Carter remained silent on the issue, but he joined the remaining seven in throwing roll call support behind rural credits. The good roads legislation also stimulated a great deal of interest within the Oklahoma group. Davenport, Hastings, McClintic, and Thompson participated in the debate, all from a positive stance. Furthermore, Ferris introduced good roads legislation, although he was the lone Oklahoma delegate to be absent for the roll call which indicated that the other seven voted for the good roads bill. The third agricultural reform bill dealt with vocational education. It drew praise from Morgan, an ardent worker on behalf of voca-

tional education in earlier sessions, and Hastings, a first term representative. No roll call votes were taken on the Smith-Hughes Act, so little analysis can be made along those lines. Overall, the six pieces of progressive legislation passed by the Sixty-fourth Congress achieved virtual unanimity within the Oklahoma delegation as little dissension could be found.

The near total agreement of the Oklahoma House members indicates several points. First, the record shows that there was a fundamental change of outlook on the part of most House members which undoubtedly influenced the Oklahoma members. The eight-member Oklahoma contingent moved with the progressive leadership in Congress and the White House, and on agricultural reform, particularly rural credits, led the way for change. In addition, the first term Congressmen, Hastings and McGlentic, who were quite active, may have encouraged the veteran members to speak out more often.

A second reason for the general consent among Oklahoma House members was the desire to win re-election in 1916. The reform proposals of the Sixty-fourth Congress were designed to attract as many as possible of the voters who had supported the Bull Moose Party in 1912. Wilson himself boasted in his acceptance speech in 1916 that the Democratic Party had not only carried out its own platform pledges, but most of those of the Progressive Party as well.⁶⁶ The three representatives from districts three, four, and seven, concentrated in the southern half of Oklahoma, also had to nullify the rising tide of Socialism, and the party in power had to appeal to the disgruntled

⁶⁶Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson (New York: Harper and Bros., 1925-1927), V, 200.

farmers and laborers in these areas. This may have accounted for the vigorous support for the agricultural and labor reforms. So there was obviously a contest for Progressive and Socialist Party support, and evidently the seven Democrats and one Republican felt that it was up to them to prove that as elected representatives they were the proper channel for domestic reform.

With the end of the Sixty-fourth Congress, progressivism in the United States was destined to pass, at least temporarily, into the limbo of forgotten things. So completely was the public mind taken up, first with the war itself, and then with the battle over the Versailles Treaty, that domestic policy faded in importance or interest. This is not the end, however, but only a stopping place. The thread of progressivism which has been developed in this study would reappear in the 1920's and would become extremely important in the early days of the New Deal. But how the Oklahoma House delegation would react at a later date is another story.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The record of the thirteen men Oklahoma sent to the United States House of Representatives during the progressive era is a significant one. During the sixteen year scope of this study, Bird S. McGuire served twelve years; Scott Ferris and Charles Carter, ten; Dick T. Morgan and James S. Davenport, eight; William H. Murray and Joseph B. Thompson, four; Dennis T. Flynn, Elmer Fulton, Charles Creager, Claude Weaver, William H. Hastings, and James V. McClintic, two each. Forty-four issues were selected for this investigation, with twenty-one concerning economic reform; seventeen, social reform; and six, political reform (see Appendix B). As indicated in Chapter III, the selection of these issues was based on the citation of these measures or actions by eight historians whose writings concentrate on the progressive period (Benjamin P. DeWitt, Harold U. Faulkner, Henry F. Pringle, George E. Mowry, Russel B. Nye, Eric F. Goldman, Arthur S. Link, and Richard Hofstadter).

McGuire's twelve years of service advance him as the record holder for length of term among the thirteen Oklahoma representatives. His tenure lasted from the Fifty-eighth through the Sixty-third Congresses, with thirty-four of the forty-four issues falling in this time period. All six of the political reform issues were included in his legislative career, with McGuire voting for two of them: the

campaign expenditures act of the Sixty-second Congress, for which he spoke, and the resolution for a Constitutional amendment for women's suffrage in the Sixty-third. On the other hand, he opposed the House rules change, or revolt against "Cannonism," and the Arizona statehood issue which concentrated on the initiative, referendum, and recall principles, especially the latter. In addition, he displayed a lack of interest in the Constitutional amendment for direct election of United States Senators, as he failed to vote or even to pair on it in the Sixty-second Congress, and he took no stand regarding the lobby investigation that took place in the Sixty-third Congress.

Eleven of the seventeen social reform issues were presented during McGuire's service. He took no position on the three 1906 measures enacted while he was territorial delegate: Pure Food and Drug Act, Meat Inspection Act, and Employer's Liability Act. Even though McGuire had no vote he might have been interested enough to give his views. He supported the Second Employer's Liability Act of the Sixtieth Congress, and the Anti-Injunction Bill and the Workmen's Compensation for Railway Employees Act of the Sixty-second. Five social issues were introduced on which McGuire made no stand, including the Bureau of Mines Bill in the Sixtieth, the Children's Bureau and Eight-Hour Day for Government Contracts legislation in the Sixty-second, and the Smith-Lever and LaFollette Seamen's Acts of the Sixty-third. Apparently McGuire favored some social reforms, especially regarding labor, but his no-position stance on eight of the eleven issues indicates a disinterested attitude.

McGuire had the opportunity to pass judgment on sixteen of the twenty-one issues dealing with economic reform. He remained silent on

the Hepburn Act of 1906, the one economic reform that was brought forth during his territorial delegate career. McGuire's protectionist philosophy was indicated by his support of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of the Sixty-first Congress, and by the fact that he voted against four measures that dealt with lowering tariffs: Canadian Reciprocity, Farmer's Free List, wool and cotton duty reductions, and the Underwood-Simmons Tariff. He voted for the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of the Sixtieth Congress, which many progressives opposed because they felt it would extend Wall Street's control over the money supply, and he opposed the Clayton Act of the Sixty-third Congress, which dealt with trust regulation. McGuire did vote for the Mann-Elkins Act and Postal Savings Act of the Sixty-first Congress, but took no position on either the income tax Constitutional amendment resolution of the Sixty-first, or the Federal Reserve Act and Federal Trade Commission Act of the Sixty-third Congress.

McGuire vocally addressed himself to only three of the thirty-four progressive issues that confronted him. On two occasions he spoke for higher tariffs, in the Payne-Aldrich and Underwood-Simmons debates, and the third concerned the noncontroversial campaign expenditures act, which passed the House by a vote of 307 to 0. Furthermore, he offered no resolutions in his twelve years that could be considered progressive in nature. Nor did he attempt to amend any proposals that would have given them a more progressive tone.

Overall, McGuire cast himself in the non-progressive mold although he took a positive stand for eight of the thirty-four progressive issues. The remaining twenty-six he either opposed or took no stance thereon. His opposition to the House rules change and the recall pro-

vision of the Arizona constitution, and his lack of enthusiasm for the direct election of United States Senators leaves him out of the ranks of those who shared the progressive hope for perfecting the democratic process. Although he did not directly oppose any of the social reforms, he displayed a significant lack of interest in such progressive matters as the abolition of child labor and the eight-hour day. Perhaps McGuire's non-progressive qualities are best revealed by his record on economic reform. He consistently supported higher tariffs, and his non-progressive stand on the tariff question was complemented by his negative attitude toward any form of trust regulation; he was the only Oklahoma delegate to oppose the Clayton Act. Further argument for his non-progressive tendencies would be the fact that he was the only Oklahoma delegate who did not support the income tax principle or the banking and currency reform provided by the Federal Reserve Act. McGuire's record falls far short of the progressive mark.

Scott Ferris was elected to the Sixtieth Congress and remained there through the ten years which constitute this study. Thirty-two of the forty-four issues received his attention. On the political reform questions, Ferris maintained a perfect progressive record as he voted for all six, and spoke in support of four including the Constitutional amendment for direct election of United States Senators, the initiative, referendum, and recall provisions of the Arizona constitution, campaign expenditures, and lobby investigation. In addition, he offered resolutions providing for a Constitutional amendment for the direct election of United States Senators in the Sixtieth, Sixty-first, and Sixty-second Congresses.

Thirteen of the seventeen social reforms were put forth during the

tenure of Ferris. He voted for nine and spoke in behalf of five. On the remaining four issues Ferris took no position. His commitment to social reform was shown by his roll call support of the Second Employer's Liability Act, Bureau of Mines Bill, Keating-Owen Act, Kern-McGillicuddy Workmen's Compensation Act, Children's Bureau, Eight-Hour Day on Government Contracts, Anti-Injunction Bill, and LaFollette Seamen's Act.

Ferris took a progressive posture on fourteen of the sixteen economic reforms that were proposed during his service. He was a strong advocate of tariff reform, as indicated by his speaking and voting against the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, and for Canadian Reciprocity, Farmer's Free List, and the Underwood-Simmons measures. Although he was silent on the Federal Reserve Act, he did lend roll call support. On the issue of trust regulation, he spoke and voted for the Clayton Act and, in addition, introduced two resolutions in the Sixtieth Congress concerning railroad regulation. Ferris was interested in tax and conservation reform as he cast a positive vote for the Constitutional amendment providing for a graduated income tax, and he was the only Oklahoma representative in the Sixty-first Congress to denounce Secretary of the Interior Ballinger's conservation policies. Finally, he spoke for the improvement of the farmers' conditions by supporting the Federal Highway Act and the Federal Farm Loan Act.

Ferris supported thirty-one of the thirty-five progressive matters in the ten years he served, speaking in behalf of fifteen. From the preceding evidence, Ferris falls within the mainstream of progressivism perhaps better than any of the other twelve representatives. He voiced strong sentiments for tariff, tax, banking and mone-

tary reforms; supported regulation of trusts by introducing two resolutions on the subject and attempting to amend the Clayton Act to make the interlocking directorate clause more stringent; favored improvement of the laborer by upholding legislation for the Abolition of Child Labor, the Eight-Hour day, Workmen's Compensation, Seamen's Welfare, and the Anti-Injunction bill; and backed improvement of the farmers' plight by supporting the parcels post, good roads, and rural credits. For these reasons, Ferris must be classified as one of the leading, if not the leading, spokesman for progressivism among the representatives who served Oklahoma during the progressive period.

Like Ferris, Charles Carter served ten of the sixteen years covered by this research, the Sixtieth through Sixty-fourth Congresses. He therefore encountered thirty-five of the forty-four issues selected for this study. In regard to political reform, Carter gave affirmative roll call support to the House rules change, Constitutional amendment for direct election of United States Senators, campaign expenditures regulation, and the initiative, referendum, and recall principles of the Arizona state constitution. On the other hand, he not only voted but spoke against the Constitutional amendment for women's suffrage. Apparently his attitude on that political reform, like President Wilson's, had not become sufficiently advanced. On the thirteen social reform issues, Carter voted for seven and took no position on six. He favored legislation pertaining to workmen's compensation, anti-injunction, and abolition of child labor. However, his no-position stance on such reforms as the eight-hour day displays a certain lack of enthusiasm for social reform. The fact that he did not once speak for any of the social reforms also lends credence to the above argument.

Carter advanced a progressive attitude on twelve of the sixteen economic reform issues. He spoke and voted consistently for tariff reform including a "nay" vote on Payne-Aldrich and "yea" votes for Canadian Reciprocity, Farmer's Free List, wool and cotton duty reductions, and the Underwood-Simmons Tariff. In legislation affecting trust regulation, Carter voted and spoke for the Clayton Act, but remained silent on the Federal Trade Commission proposal. His support of the Constitutional amendment for an income tax and the Federal Farm Loan Act give additional proof of his desire to achieve economic reform. The one area of economic reform on which Carter appears weak is that of banking and currency, as he failed to vote for the Federal Reserve Act.

Carter's favorable attitude toward twenty-three progressive issues and the fact that he opposed only one, women's suffrage, places him in the role of a progressive. Carter was a silent progressive as he addressed himself to only three of the twenty-three measures he supported. It should also be noted that he offered no resolutions of a progressive nature. Nevertheless, his strong voting record for meaningful progressive issues indicate Carter's convictions for progressivism.

Dick T. Morgan was elected to four terms, serving from 1909 to 1917. He had to answer to thirty-three of the issues embraced by this study. Morgan was one of the most active Oklahoma representatives, as he spoke on seventeen of the thirty-two propositions; introduced numerous resolutions dealing with vocational education, rural credits, and a federal trade commission; and offered amendments in an attempt to improve the Federal Reserve Act, the Smith-Hughes Act, and the Federal Farm Loan Act. Opposing only the House rules change in 1910,

Morgan was a strong advocate of political improvements as he spoke in direct support of the Constitutional amendment providing for direct election of United States Senators, the initiative, referendum, and recall provisions of the Arizona statehood issue, campaign expenditures, and the lobby investigation that President Wilson demanded. Although he did not speak, his vote was cast in the affirmative for the Constitutional amendment for women's suffrage.

Appearing as a friend of social reform, Morgan favored ten of the eleven issues related to this aspect of progressivism. His deliberate speeches and numerous resolutions concerning vocational education classify him as the most outspoken Oklahoma representative for this cause. In addition, he backed legislation for Workmen's Compensation, the Eight-Hour day, Abolition of Child Labor, and Anti-Injunction bill.

Morgan's position on economic reform was mixed. For the most part, he adhered to the traditional Republican high protective tariff policy. In limited cases, however, he supported a revision of certain schedules downward. On the whole, he was a proponent of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, but did vote for the free lumber schedule and the proposal to strike the countervailing duty on oil. Morgan opposed other tariff reform issues including Canadian Reciprocity, wool and cotton duty reductions, and the Underwood-Simmons Tariff. He did make additional overtures toward tariff reform by approving the Farmer's Free List, and he admitted in the wool tariff debate that a revision of duties on wool manufactures was in order. On trust regulation there was no doubt as to Morgan's opinion. According to the record, he was the first to propose a federal commission to regulate the large corporations, introducing and speaking for such legislation in both the

Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth Congresses. Morgan was nationally recognized for his efforts to deal with the trust problem. Having failed to amend the Federal Reserve Act to provide for a bank guaranty clause and a rural credits system, Morgan opposed it. His impact was later felt on the Federal Farm Loan Act as he not only supported but offered three amendments which sought to improve the farmers' economic plight. Morgan's support of the Constitutional amendment for an income tax and the parcels post legislation present further proof that his progressive spirit developed throughout his eight years of service.

Although not aligning himself with the progressive Republicans on the House rules change, Morgan must be described as a progressive. He supported twenty-three of the thirty-three issues on which he was held accountable. His vocal and roll call support for the techniques to improve the mechanics of voting indicate that he desired political reform. He favored tax, banking, and currency reform as evidenced by the type of amendments that he proposed to alter the Federal Reserve Act. He stands out among the Oklahoma delegation as well as in the nation as a vigorous supporter of trust regulation. Apparently he held mixed emotions in regard to tariff reform, but it seems that he shifted with the progressive tide. Perhaps the strongest point to make in behalf of Morgan's progressivism was his intense interest in improving the conditions of the farmer and laborer. He campaigned for rural credits and vocational education throughout the Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth Congresses.

James S. Davenport also served eight years covered by this sixteen year study, including the Sixtieth and Sixty-second through Sixty-fourth Congresses. Twenty-eight of the forty-four issues were brought to his

attention, with eighteen receiving his support and ten on which he took no position. The evidence on Davenport indicates that his attendance record was poor during the Sixtieth and Sixty-second Congresses, which accounts for the fact that no position could be found for him on such a large number of issues. His roll call inactivity was complemented by his silence, as he spoke on only four measures. Five of the six political reform issues came across Davenport's desk, missing only the House rules change of the Sixty-first. One of the speeches he delivered was a strong supporting statement for the initiative, referendum, and recall principles provided in the Arizona state constitution. He supported the Constitutional amendment providing for women's suffrage, but failed to vote on a similar amendment for direct election of United States Senators, the campaign expenditures act, and he remained uninvolved in the lobby investigation issue. Davenport's roll call votes for Abolition of Child Labor, the Eight-Hour day, and Workmen's Compensation manifest a willingness for social change. However, he failed to answer the roll call on several social reforms such as the Bureau of Mines Bill, Second Employer's Liability Act, and the Anti-Injunction Bill. Davenport's most consistent record for change comes within the realm of economic reform. He did not miss a single vote on the five tariff reform questions presented and indicated his tariff philosophy by speaking for the Underwood-Simmons downward revisions. In addition he voted for the Federal Reserve Act and Federal Farm Loan Act, which displayed a desire for banking and currency reform. His support for trust regulation was demonstrated by a speech and a roll call vote for the Clayton Act. Although Davenport at times missed roll calls and debated infrequently, his support of eighteen of the twenty-eight issues

classifies him as a progressive. This description can also be maintained because he opposed none of the remaining ten issues. Despite his spotty voting record, enough evidence can be garnered to show that he advocated tariff, banking and currency reform; trust regulation; increased public participation in political decision making; and advancements for the farmer and laborer.

William H. Murray served in the Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth Congresses. Fourteen of the forty-four issues were brought forth during this time span, including two political, seven social, and five economic. Most of the important political reform issues occurred before Murray's time, but he did introduce a resolution which would have provided for an investigation into the lobbying activities during the Sixty-third Congress. Moreover, he delivered a strong speech against the alleged lobby. Murray saw fit to oppose the other political reform, women's suffrage. Among the social reform issues, Murray voted for Abolition of Child Labor, the Eight-Hour day, and Vocational Education, being recognized as one of the leading spokesman for the latter. But it was on economic reform that Murray made his greatest contributions to progressivism. He both spoke and voted for the four planks of Wilson's "New Freedom" platform: the Underwood-Simmons Tariff, the Federal Reserve Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. He proposed a series of amendments to the Federal Reserve Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. He succeeded in altering the Federal Reserve Act so that each of the twelve districts was represented on the Federal Reserve Board, but his attempts to strengthen the power of the Federal Trade Commission were rejected; nevertheless, it displayed his sentiments concerning trust regulation.

Proposals offered by Murray to liberalize the rural credits section of the Federal Reserve Act were eventually adopted in the Federal Farm Loan Act. He and others campaigned for and eventually won exemption for farmer and laborer groups in the anti-trust section of the Clayton Act. Murray had the distinction of being the only Oklahoma representative who spoke for the Hull income tax clause of the Underwood-Simmons measure. Thus on the five economic reform issues, Murray lent both roll call and vocal support to the progressive cause.

Murray therefore favored eleven of the fourteen progressive measures and must be considered as playing a strong role for reform despite his serving only four years. His presence was keenly felt on tariff, banking, and currency reform; trust regulation; improvements for the laborer in the form of Keating-Owen Child Labor and Adamson Eight-Hour Acts; and improvements for the farmer through vocational education, good roads, and rural credits.

Joseph B. Thompson also served four years, from 1913 to 1917. On the two political reforms, he favored the women's suffrage Constitutional amendment resolution, but took no position with regard to the lobby investigation. Social reforms that met Thompson's approval were Abolition of Child Labor, the Eight-Hour day, and Federal Workmen's Compensation. He took no position on the Smith-Lever and Smith-Hughes vocational education acts. On economic reform, Thompson adhered to tariff revision downward, rural credits, and trust regulation. He made a lengthy speech pertaining to the rural credits section of the Federal Reserve Act, but did not vote either positively or negatively on the bill, apparently because of the weak rural credits provisions. His energetic campaign for rural credits was finally realized in the Federal

Farm Loan Act, on which he delivered positive remarks. Thompson's concern for the farmer and laborer was elaborated when he spoke in favor of exempting such groups from the anti-trust provisions of the Clayton Act.

Thus Thompson favored eight of the fourteen issues that arose in the Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth Congresses, speaking on four. He must be considered a progressive because of his reform attitudes toward the tariff, child labor, workmen's compensation, the eight-hour day, women's suffrage, good roads, rural credits, and trust regulation.

The remaining six representatives, Flynn, Fulton, Creager, Weaver, Hastings, and McClintic, served only two years each, producing less evidence on which to base conclusions. Dennis T. Flynn served as territorial delegate in the Fifty-seventh Congress, the first session analyzed by this research. There were only four major progressive issues to which Flynn might have addressed himself. All four were primarily economic in nature; three dealt mainly with Roosevelt's early attempts at trust regulation, the fourth being concerned with conservation. Flynn offered no response to any of these four national issues either from a negative or positive view. It appears that Flynn, having previously served as territorial delegate for three terms, did not intend to become involved in national legislation as he approached retirement, especially since he could retire on his fame connected with the "free homes" legislation. Because of the opportunity that delegates possessed to speak on the House floor and because of the numerous newspaper outlets in the territory, Flynn could have taken a position if he had so desired. Therefore, Flynn does not meet the qualifications of a progressive.

Elmer L. Fulton served only in the Sixtieth Congress, an inactive one since only three of the forty-four issues were brought forth during its tenure. None were related to political reform, two pertained to social change, and one on economic reform. According to the record, Fulton voted progressive on all three issues, for the Bureau of Mines and Second Employer's Liability, and against the Aldrich-Vreeland Act. The seven resolutions that Fulton introduced are the best indication of his relation to progressivism. The seven included Constitutional amendments that would have provided for the recall of Representatives, the initiative, referendum, and recall, the direct election of United States Senators, and an income tax. In addition, he sought legislation that would prohibit campaign contributions by corporations, repeal duties on agricultural implements, and amend the Sherman Act to make restraint of trade a felony instead of a misdemeanor. Based on the character of these resolutions, Fulton was a progressive because he desired political innovations, tax and tariff reform, and the regulation of trusts. His votes for employer's liability and a Bureau of Mines indicate that his progressivism was not limited to political and economic reforms.

Charles Creager was elected to the Sixty-first Congress. Only six of the forty-four issues emerged during those two years, one dealing with political reform and the other five, economic reform. However, two of these issues, the House rules change and the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, were significant measures of a representative's progressivism. On both, Creager voted non-progressive, casting a "nay" vote on the Norris proposition to change House rules and both speaking and voting for the protectionist Payne-Aldrich Tariff. On the other hand, Creager

oted for the income tax Constitutional amendment and postal savings, but took no stand on Mann-Elkins or the Ballinger-Pinchot conservation controversy. Even though Creager's response to tax reform may have seemed progressive, his negative position on tariff and political reform symbolizes a non-progressive attitude.

The Sixty-third Congress was Claude Weaver's only term as Oklahoma representative. Eight of the progressive issues fell within that time span. On political reform, Weaver voted against women's suffrage and remained silent on the lobby investigation. The Sixty-third Congress passed two social reform issues, the Smith-Lever and LaFollette Seamen's Acts, with Weaver taking no position. In contrast, Weaver strongly favored the economic reforms enacted by the Sixty-third session including the Underwood-Simmons Tariff, the Federal Reserve Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. He delivered positive speeches both in the House and in Oklahoma on the benefits of the Federal Reserve Act. Weaver, as a member of the House Banking and Currency Committee, helped draft the Federal Reserve legislation, and was commended by Chairman Carter Glass for his work. Based on his sentiments concerning tariff, banking, and currency reform, plus his endorsement of trust regulation, Weaver was a progressive.

William W. Hastings represented Oklahoma's second district in the Sixty-fourth Congress. Six reforms were presented, five social and one economic. Hastings voted with the progressives on all six issues, including the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act, the Kern-McGillicuddy Workmen's Compensation Act, the Federal Highway Act, the Adamson Eight-hour Day Act, the Smith-Hughes Act, and the Federal Farm Loan Act. He gave emphatic speeches in support of the Federal Highway Act, Smith-

Hughes Act, and Federal Farm Loan Act. Furthermore, he offered a resolution for the improvement of rural roads, and attempted, by proposing an amendment, to liberalize the Federal Farm Loan Act by making loans more accessible to all classes of farmers. Although having no opportunity to express his convictions on political reform, Hastings, on the social and economic reforms, stood for progressivism.

James V. McClintic was also a member of the Sixty-fourth Congress. He supported five progressive issues and took no position on the sixth, the Smith-Hughes Act. Good roads were important to McClintic, as he spoke, voted, and introduced legislation in support of that cause. His advocacy of the Abolition of Child Labor, Workmen's Compensation, the Eight-Hour day, Good Roads, and Rural Credits indicate progressive behavior on the part of McClintic.

Thus from 1901 to 1917 Oklahoma sent to the United States House of Representatives ten progressives and three non-progressives. The ten progressives actively sought political reform, dissenting only on the question of women's suffrage. Their support of social reform was less vocal, but not once did the Oklahoma House progressives vote against any of the seventeen social issues. Perhaps their greatest impact was felt in the area of economic reform, with Morgan, Murray, and Ferris leading the way, especially on such vital progressive issues as the Underwood-Simmons Tariff, Constitutional amendment for an income tax, Federal Reserve Act, Clayton Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, and Federal Farm Loan Act. In regard to speeches and legislation proposed, Ferris and Morgan emerge as the most active progressives among those who served longer periods, whereas Murray and Hastings appear as the most active among the representatives who were elected for two

terms or less. Ferris' record shows that he supported all types of progressive legislation and is perhaps the most well-balanced progressive of the ten. Morgan's progressive spirit grew throughout the period, and he seems to be the Oklahoma House progressive most interested in economic reform.

The remaining question to be answered by this study is to what degree, if any, do the ten Oklahoma House progressives fit the "progressive profile" of the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis, which has traditionally been the principal model for determining a progressive. Mowry examined the personal histories of forty-seven California progressives in order to form a composite portrait of the "typical" progressive. This person, according to Mowry, was a middle-class Protestant with a west-European background and/or a north-European name; he was quite often a Mason; young, under forty years of age; and well-educated.¹ Three years later, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. made a study of 260 national progressive leaders and reached similar conclusions. Chandler's "typical" progressive was likely to be urban and middle-class, a native Protestant American, a professional man and college graduate, and one who had had little experience in politics except on the local level.² Hofstadter accepted the Mowry-Chandler studies, combining the results with the results of his own research to develop seemingly impressive ideas about progressivism. According

¹George E. Mowry, The California Progressives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 86-88.

²Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Origins of Progressive Leadership," in Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), VIII, Appendix III, 1462-1465.

to Hofstadter, the ferment of the progressive era was an urban, middle-class response to changing patterns in American society, a status revolution of the middle-class against the "newly rich, the grandiosely or corruptly rich, the masters of great corporations."³

In my Oklahoma study, I have used the same biographical criteria as the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis to show the similarities and dissimilarities of the ten Oklahoma progressives as compared with the "typical" progressive described by the above thesis. In addition, my conclusions will analyze the biographical relationships of the three non-progressives from Oklahoma to the "typical" progressive proposed by the standard thesis. The seven most important biographical aspects examined follow.

1. Age. Compositely, the California progressive was a young man, often under forty years of age.⁴ In Oklahoma, the average age of the ten progressives upon taking the oath of office was slightly older, at 42.5 years. On the other hand, the three non-progressives averaged 36 years of age, 6.5 years less than the progressives. One of the most active House progressives from Oklahoma, Ferris, took the oath of office at the age of 30 in 1907, and remained in the House throughout the duration of this study, making him only 40 by 1917. Other Oklahoma House progressives who fall into the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter

³ Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 131-137. In analyzing the progressives in Wisconsin Robert Maxwell, LaFollette and the Rise of the Progressives in Wisconsin (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1956), 4-5, and Russel B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Historical Study of Its Origins and Development, 1870-1958 (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), 183-185, drew much the same conclusions.

⁴ Mowry, The California Progressives, 86.

age category were Carter and McClintic, who were sworn in at the ages of 38 and 36, respectively. Five other Oklahoma progressives were less than 45 years old at the time of their election: Thompson, 41; Murray, 43; Davenport, 43; Fulton, 44; and Weaver, 45. However, Morgan, an ardent progressive on all issues except tariff reform, was elected at the age of 55 and by 1917 was 63, and Hastings, an outspoken progressive of the Sixty-fourth Congress, was 50 when he was sworn in. The three non-progressives, Flynn, Creager, and McGuire, were all quite young when assuming the duties of a representative. Flynn was 31, Creager 35, and McGuire 43 when elected.

2. Origins. In dealing with their nativity, Chandler remarked that his 260 progressives "were native born" with "only nine being born outside the United States."⁵ Mowry commented that the California progressives "had probably been born in the Middle West . . . and . . . carried a north-European name."⁶ The ten Oklahoma House progressives were all native-American, but so were the three non-progressives. Only three of the ten progressives came from the Middle West: Ferris from Missouri, Fulton from Iowa, and Morgan from Indiana. On the other hand, two of the three non-progressives originated in the Middle West, Creager from Ohio and McGuire from Illinois. Flynn, the third non-progressive, was born in Pennsylvania. Of the remaining seven progressives, Carter was born in Indian Territory, and the other six were

⁵ Chandler, "The Origins of Progressive Leadership," 1462.

⁶ Mowry, The California Progressives, 57. In dealing with progressives in general, and not just those of California, Mowry adds that "an overwhelming proportion . . . came from old American stock with British origins consistently indicated." See George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-1912 (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), 86.

native to the South; four came from Texas; Murray, Thompson, Weaver, and McClintic; one from Arkansas, Hastings; and one from Alabama, Davenport. The ten progressives as well as the three non-progressives carried north-European names. It appears that Mowry's thesis on origin in the Middle West holds true for two of the more active progressives, Ferris and Morgan, but the other eight were Southern in origin.

3. Geographical Distribution. Chandler writes that progressive leaders were city men, and Hofstadter states that the ferment of the progressive era was urban.⁷ Only two of the ten progressives, Murray and McClintic, came from municipalities of less than 2,500, the population figure used in 1910 by the Bureau of the Census in dividing rural from urban. However, three other progressives, Morgan, Thompson, and Hastings, were drawn from locations with fewer than 3,000 inhabitants, and a fourth, Davenport, was a resident of a town of slightly over 4,000. According to the 1910 census data, there were eight cities in Oklahoma with a population over 10,000, and four Oklahoma representatives lived in three of these. Two progressives, Weaver and Fulton, resided in Oklahoma City, which had a 1910 population of 64,205; and two non-progressives, Creager and Flynn, came from Muskogee and Guthrie, which had populations of 25,278 and 11,654, respectively. The third non-progressive, McGuire, came from a rural village of 2,161. Carter and Ferris, the other two progressives, dwelled in cities that fell between the 4,000 to 10,000 range, Ardmore and Lawton, which had populations of 8,618 and 7,788, respectively.

⁷Chandler, "The Origins of Progressive Leadership," 1462; Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R., 131.

| | Progressives | Non-Progressives |
|-----------------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| RURAL (2,500 or less) | McClintic (1,122) Murray (1,408) | McGuire (2,161) |
| CITIES (2,500 to 10,000) | Thompson (2,689) Morgan (2,696) Hastings (2,891) Davenport (4,082) Ferris (7,788) Carter (8,618) | |
| CITIES (Over 10,000) | Weaver (64,205) Fulton (64,205) | Flynn (11,654) Creager (25,278) |

Although the nomenclature used by Chandler and Hofstadter is confusing, it would appear that eight of the ten Oklahoma House progressives could hardly be described as coming from highly urban areas.

4. Occupation. Chandler found that the occupations of his progressive leaders clearly linked them with the urban middle class, with over sixty per cent being professional men. He discovered that among the 260 progressives there were no farmers or laboring men.⁸ Mowry's summary notes that the California progressives were "a group of highly literate, independent free enterprisers, and professional men."⁹ Both progressives and non-progressives from Oklahoma's House delegation were predominantly middle-class professionals and businessmen. Eight of the ten progressives and two of the three non-progressives were lawyers, the exceptions being Creager, a non-progressive, who was a newspaperman; McClintic, a progressive, who was a small businessman-merchant; and Carter, a progressive, who was a farmer-rancher. However, in

⁸ Chandler, "The Origins of Progressive Leadership," 1462-1463.

⁹ Mowry, The California Progressives, 88.

addition to Carter, seven of the progressives, Ferris, Morgan, Davenport, Murray, Thompson, Hastings, and McClintic, were either born or reared on a farm. Ferris and Murray owned farms during their legislative tenure, and Morgan and Murray had taught in the rural schools. Thus the evidence shows that eight of the ten progressives as well as two of the three non-progressives were professionals. But it appears that a large percentage of the progressives were sons of farmers, whereas none of the non-progressives were.

5. Education. Seventy-five per cent of the California progressives, Mowry found, had received a college education.¹⁰ Chandler remarks that "at a time . . . when college graduates were much fewer, over sixty per cent . . . were professional men, a large number of whom attended graduate schools."¹¹ Six of the ten Oklahoma House progressives were college graduates, including Ferris, Weaver, and Hastings, who were trained in law schools, and Morgan, Murray, and Thompson, who graduated from small four-year institutions. Of the remaining four progressives, Fulton and McClintic had attended college but apparently never graduated, whereas neither Davenport nor Carter had received any higher education. McGuire, Creager, and Flynn, the three non-progressives, had attended college but never graduated. Oklahoma's House progressives thus fell below the seventy-five per cent of Mowry's study but within the sixty per cent of Chandler's survey.

¹⁰ Mowry, The California Progressives, 87. Writing of the national "reformers," he adds that "most . . . had had a college education in a day when a degree stamped a person as coming from a special economic group." See Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-1912, 86.

¹¹ Chandler, "The Origins of Progressive Leadership," 1462.

6. Previous Political Experience. Chandler states that the national progressives had had little experience outside of local politics.¹² Four of the ten Oklahoma House progressives, Fulton, Weaver, Carter, and Hastings, had held no elective office prior to their service in Congress. On the other hand, Ferris, McClintic, Thompson, and Murray had all served two or more terms in the Oklahoma legislature, with Murray acting as the first Speaker of the Oklahoma State House of Representatives. Morgan was elected to two terms in the Indiana legislature before coming to the Sooner State. Davenport's elective office was least significant, as he had been mayor of Vinita for two terms. Both Thompson and Murray had been active in state Democratic circles, with the former representing Oklahoma as a delegate to the Democratic national conventions of 1900, 1904, and 1908, and the latter attending the 1908 and 1912 conventions in the same capacity. Thompson, in addition, was chairman of the Democratic state committee in 1906 and 1908, helping in the Bryan victory in Oklahoma in the latter year. The three non-progressives, Flynn, McGuire, and Creager, had never held an elective office previous to their election to the United States House. Thus it appears that Oklahoma's non-progressives fit Chandler's observations better than the progressives, five of whom were significantly active outside of local affairs.

7. Religious and Fraternal Associations. In dealing with the religion of the progressive leaders, Chandler states only that they were Protestant.¹³ Mowry goes into more detail: "The long religious hand of

¹²Ibid., 1464.

¹³Ibid., 1462.

New England rested heavily upon California progressivism. . . . Of the twenty-two progressives whose biographies indicate a religious affiliation, seven were Congregationalists, two were Unitarians, and four were Christian Scientists."¹⁴ Eight of the ten Oklahoma House progressives expressed a religious preference in their biographies, all of them Protestant. The Methodist, Presbyterian, and Christian denominations were represented among the eight. This seems to resemble something other than the New England influence discussed by Mowry. All three of the non-progressives declared a religious affiliation, with McGuire and Creager, Protestant, and Flynn, Catholic. Mowry's California progressive "was more often than not a Mason."¹⁵ According to their biographies, six of the thirteen Oklahoma House members were affiliated with the Masonic order, four progressives, Ferris, Hastings, McClintic, and Carter, and two non-progressives, Creager and McGuire. It appears that the six could well be described as multiple joiners, since they also listed membership in other fraternal groups such as Odd Fellows, Elks, and Shriners.

It has now been illustrated that the ten Oklahoma House progressives were in many ways dissimilar to the "progressive profile" theorized by the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis. The two greatest disparities occur with regard to political experience and geographical distribution, with the Oklahoma House progressive having achieved a more solid political background, and originating from a more rural or small town environment. Furthermore, the Oklahoma House progres-

¹⁴Mowry, The California Progressives, 88.

¹⁵Ibid.

sive differed in that he tended to be slightly older, and somewhere in his occupational background he had been associated with farming. More than likely he came from the South rather than the Middle West.

And yet there are common denominators when one compares the Oklahoma House progressive to the "progressive profile." All ten of the progressives were born in the United States of north-European ancestry. Of the eight declaring a religious preference, all were Protestant, and of those affiliated with a fraternal association, all were Masons. The percentage of the ten progressives receiving a college degree was slightly less than Mowry's study, but the same as Chandler's.

On the other hand, the three non-progressive Oklahoma House members likewise fit many of the criteria laid down by the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis. On age and degree of political experience, they more nearly resemble the "progressive profile" than the progressives, as they averaged 36 years, and none of them had ever held an elective office prior to serving in Congress. The greatest difference between the three non-progressives and the "progressive profile" was in education, as none were college graduates. But on origins, occupation, geographical distribution, religious and fraternal associations, the three non-progressives conformed to the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis.

It therefore appears that though the Oklahoma House progressive was very much like Chandler's national progressive leader and Mowry's Californian, he was also very much like the three non-progressives. That the Oklahoma House progressive was not unique in some of the features mentioned by Mowry and Chandler, belies their "progressive profile," and disrupts their resulting theories, seized on by Hof-

stadter and others to explain partially, if not completely, the development of progressivism.

The ten Oklahoma House progressives may be more appropriately described by the hypotheses presented in the interpretative essays by Arthur S. Link¹⁶ and Anne F. Scott.¹⁷ Both of these historians recognize the presence of the Populist element, or at least agrarian interests, in the growth of progressivism. It appears that Oklahoma's House progressives, many of them sons of farmers, were influenced chiefly by the Populist traditions. They inherited the philosophy underlying the agrarian crusade, i.e., it was the government's duty to intervene directly in economic affairs in order to benefit submerged or politically impotent interests. Hence, planks from the Populist Party platform were still an important part in the thinking of the Oklahoma House progressives. Direct election of United States Senators, a graduated income tax, rural credits, parcels post, corporation regulation and Wall Street control, which had been Populist causes, were also the causes of Oklahoma Congressmen.

Examples of their strong rural sentiment abound in their speeches, as even the members who represented the more urban districts often spoke eloquently of the simplicity and the inherent goodness of life on the farm. Poetry was read, the Deity was petitioned, and stories

¹⁶ Arthur S. Link, "The Progressive Movement in the South, 1870-1914," North Carolina Historical Review, XXIII (April, 1946), 172-195; Link, "The South and the 'New Freedom': An Interpretation," American Scholar, XX (Summer, 1951), 314-324.

¹⁷ Anne F. Scott, "A Progressive Wind from the South, 1906-1913," Journal of Southern History, XXIX (February, 1963), 53-71.

were told to emphasize their concern for the farmer, whom they considered the backbone of their country. As a majority of the Oklahoma House progressives were reared on the farm, they usually mentioned their rural background and the hard toils of their youth in the country.

In addition to the agrarian or Populist influence on the Oklahoma House progressives, there was increasingly a humanitarian and a pro-labor strain and a general philosophical willingness to extend the direct intervention of the federal government in economic, social, and political life. As the climate of opinion in Oklahoma as well as the nation became more receptive to progressive principles of this broader scope, these too were reflected in the votes and speeches of Oklahoma's representatives, although not to the extent of agricultural reform issues.

Although neither Link nor Scott draw a "progressive profile" such as the one proposed by the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis, I believe that the ten Oklahoma House progressives could be a starting point for a parallel "progressive profile" thesis. The preceding evidence clearly indicates that the Oklahoma progressive possessed certain characteristics differing from that of the "typical" progressive described by Mowry and Chandler; he was usually over 40 years of age rather than under, was native to the South rather than the Middle West, had a strong rural background rather than urban, and had a considerable amount of prior political experience rather than being a political novice. Therefore, it behooves historians of the progressive era to investigate progressivism more thoroughly by researching United States House delegations or similar state studies before they rely so heavily on the national study done by Chandler and the one state study

investigated by Mowry. Perhaps if additional "progressive profiles" were drawn at the state level, a more accurate and representative national profile could be presented.

It must be concluded that the contributions of the ten Oklahoma House progressives were in many ways significant to the progressive era. The leadership of Ferris on a broad range of progressive issues, the influence of Morgan on the Federal Trade Commission and Federal Farm Loan Acts, the impact of Murray on the Federal Reserve and vocational education acts, the role of Weaver in the formulation of the Federal Reserve, and the strong roll call support of all ten Oklahoma House progressives prove that Oklahoma's role in shaping progressive legislation was no less important than any other state delegation's during the progressive era. Their accomplishments laid the groundwork for other reforms yet in the future, reforms in which some of them or their children would play a vital part.

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Another state study which attempts to disprove the Mowry-Chandler-Hofstadter thesis on the basis that the non-progressives of Massachusetts had the same socio-economic characteristics as the progressives.

Sullivan, Mark, "The People's One Chance in Two Years," Collier's, XLIII (March 6, 1909), 15.

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The article contains a brief discussion of the New Left historical interpretation of the progressive period.

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An essay which explains the role of business leaders on one aspect of progressivism.

Wiebe, Robert H., "Business Disunity and the Progressive Movement, 1901-1914," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIV (March, 1958), 664-685.

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This article was an excerpt from Wilson's book entitled The New Freedom.

Books

Aaron, Daniel, Men of Good Hope. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961.

The author defines progressivism as a social philosophy which proposes that the proper concern of government is the care and culture of men.

Abrams, Richard, Conservatism in a Progressive Era: Massachusetts Politics, 1900-1912. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964.

A state study showing that the progressive era was characterized by shifting coalitions around different issues.

Baker, Ray Stannard, Woodrow Wilson Life and Letters. 8 vols., Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927-1939.

This collection is useful for Wilson's statehouse training for the presidency. The first four volumes carry the biography through 1914, with three and four most helpful for this study. Volumes five through eight cover neutrality and the war.

Baker, Ray Stannard and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson. 6 vols., New York: Harper and Bros., 1925-1927.

A carefully edited collection for the period after 1912.

Blum, John Morton, The Republican Roosevelt. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Since Roosevelt was a pivotal figure in the progressive period, a good study of his politics such as this one is helpful background. The author sees Roosevelt as a conservative though responsible president who was flexible enough to deal with the major issues of the day in a constructive yet practical manner.

Bolles, Blair, Tyrant from Illinois: Uncle Joe Cannon's Experiment with Personal Power. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1951.

Boren, Lyle H. and Dale, Who Is Who in Oklahoma. Guthrie: The Co-operative Publishing Company, 1935.

A useful collection of biographical material which contains information on several of the Oklahoma Congressmen included in this study.

Bryant, Keith L., Jr., Alfalfa Bill Murray. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968.

The most recent biography of Murray, which is a much improved volume over the Hines biography.

Chamberlain, John, Farewell to Reform: The Rise, Life and Decay of the Progressive Mind in America. New York: The John Day Company, 1932.

A provocative discussion but written with condescension toward progressivism.

Clark, Champ, My Quarter Century of American Politics. New York: Harper and Bros., 1920.

An autobiography by the Speaker of the House of the Sixty-second through Sixty-fourth Congresses.

Cranston, Maurice and Lakoff, Sanford A., eds., A Glossary of Political Ideas. New York: Basic Books, 1968.

Croly, Herbert, The Promise of American Life. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1909.

A profound and illuminating study of national conditions during the early twentieth century. A blueprint for a better United States that became the primary source for Roosevelt's "New Nationalism."

DeWitt, Benjamin P., The Progressive Movement: A Non-Partisan, Comprehensive Discussion of Current Tendencies in American Politics. New York: Macmillan, 1915.

This is one of the earliest efforts to show that the progressive movement rested on unifying principles. It is still the fullest account of what the author's contemporaries were trying to do.

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One of the few general works covering the period in detail. This volume deals with the more general aspects of the progressive era.

_____, The Decline of Laissez Faire, 1897-1917. New York: Rinehart, 1951.

This volume is another general treatment which deals mainly with economic and social phenomena.

Flint, Winston A., The Progressive Movement in Vermont. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941.

Foreman, Grant, A History of Oklahoma. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1942.

George, Henry, Progress and Poverty. New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1879.

This volume was the starting point for reform to many of the progressives.

Gittinger, Roy, The Formation of the State of Oklahoma, 1803-1906. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939.

Goldman, Eric F., Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform. New York: Vintage Books, 1952.

Chapters eight and nine were the most helpful for this study because they explain the influence of Croly's The Promise of American Life on the thought of Roosevelt.

Greer, Thomas H., American Social Reform Movements: Their Pattern Since 1865. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1949.

Gwinn, William Rea, Uncle Joe Cannon: Archfoe of Insurgency. New York: Bookman Associates, 1957.

Hagedorn, Herman, ed., The Works of Theodore Roosevelt. 20 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926.

Harlow, Rex, Oklahoma Leaders: Biographical Sketches of the Foremost Living Men of Oklahoma. Oklahoma City: Harlow Publishing Company, 1928.

Hays, Samuel P., The Response to Industrialism, 1885-1914. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.

This is an interpretation that comes close to denying the existence of a distinct progressive era.

_____, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959.

Hechler, Kenneth W., Insurgency; Personalities and Politics in the Taft Era. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940.

Along with Mowry, this is the standard study of the progressive revolt within the Republican Party.

Hill, Luther B., A History of the State of Oklahoma. 2 vols., Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1910.

Hofstadter, Richard, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. New York: Vintage Books, 1955.

This work has become one of the standard treatments of the progressive era. His thesis is based on the "status revolution" concept.

_____, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It. New York: Vintage Books, 1948.

The author's thesis is that the liberal tradition had failed because it was based upon the idea of a return to an ideology that emphasized individualistic values.

_____, The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968.

_____, The Progressive Movement, 1900-1915. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963.

Holt, James, Congressional Insurgents and the Party System, 1909-1916. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967.

Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 vols., New York: Macmillan, 1948.

These two volumes are useful for Hull's background and especially his activities in the Sixty-second Congress.

Kirkpatrick, Samuel A., David R. Morgan, and Larry G. Edwards, Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Congressional Elections. Norman: Bureau of Government Research, 1970.

This publication is an invaluable source for voting statistics in Oklahoma congressional elections.

_____, Oklahoma Voting Patterns: Presidential, Senatorial and Gubernatorial Elections. Norman: Bureau of Government Research, 1970.

Kolko, Gabriel, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.

The author argues that business interests were the dominant forces within progressivism. He contends that government regulation tended to limit or eliminate competition.

_____, Railroads and Regulations 1877-1916. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

LaFollette, Belle Case and Fola LaFollette, Robert M. LaFollette. 2 vols., New York: Macmillan, 1953.

This is an excellent picture of progressivism from the point of view of one of the great middle western insurgents. It is a family biography but very rich.

LaFollette, Robert M., Autobiography of Robert M. LaFollette. Madison: The Robert M. LaFollette Company, 1913.

This was LaFollette's view of the progressive era written in the midst of it. The volume was written in part as a campaign document.

Link, Arthur S., Wilson: The Road to the White House. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947.

_____, Wilson: The New Freedom. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956.

_____, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

These three works constitute a multi-volume biography which covers Wilson during the period 1902-1915 in massive detail.

_____, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917.
New York: Harper and Row, 1954.

A part of the New American Nation series, this shorter volume contains a wealth of material.

Link, Arthur S., ed., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Volume ten which deals with the high points of his teaching career was the most helpful for this study.

Lowitt, Richard, George W. Norris: The Making of a Progressive, 1861-1912. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963.

McReynolds, E. C., Oklahoma: A History of the Sooner State. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954.

Mann, Arthur, Yankee Reformers in the Urban Age. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1954.

Focusing on the Boston area, this work examines urban social reform in the seminal decades 1880-1900. The author's purpose is to prove that modern liberalism owes its beginnings to the city as well as to the farm.

Marquis, A. N., ed., Who's Who in America. Chicago: A. N. Marquis and Company, 1912.

Maxwell, Robert S., LaFollette and the Rise of Progressives in Wisconsin. Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1956.

Morison, Elting E. and John M. Blum, eds., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vols., Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951-1954.

These volumes contain about one-fifth of Roosevelt's letters, but are extremely well selected and annotated. It is a superbly edited collection.

Mowry, George E., The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-1912. New York: Harper and Row, 1958.

This work is a volume in the New American Nation series and is extremely useful for the Roosevelt administration.

_____, The California Progressives. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951.

The author presents an excellent state study which affords an interesting comparison with Oklahoma's United States House delegation.

_____, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1946.

This is a detailed study of the Bull Moose Party.

Murray, William H., Memoirs of Governor Murray and True History of Oklahoma. 3 vols., Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 1945.

A valuable source for Murray's position on rural credits.

Nye, Russel B., Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Historical Study of Its Origins and Development, 1870-1958. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

A persuasive account of progressivism that goes beyond its title in significance.

Parrington, Vernon L., Main Currents in American Thought. 3 vols., New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927-1930.

An interpretation of progressivism by one of the progressive school historians.

O'Beirne, H. F., Leaders and Leading Men of the Indian Territory. Chicago: American Publishers' Association, 1891.

Portrait and Biographical Record of Oklahoma. Chicago: Chapman Publishing Company, 1901.

Pringle, Henry F., Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1931.

This Pulitzer Prize biography describes Roosevelt as a man of many brilliant ideas. It deserves high commendation as a narrative which deals with an extraordinarily full life.

_____, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft: A Biography. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1939.

This is more detailed and scholarly than the Roosevelt volume.

Somers, Herman M., and Anne R., Workmen's Compensation. New York: John Wiley, 1954.

One of the most exhaustive works on this subject.

Smith, Edward C. and Arnold J. Zurcher, Dictionary of American Politics. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1944.

Sullivan, Mark, Our Times, The United States, 1900-1925. 6 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926-1935.

Taussig, F. W., The Tariff History of the United States. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914.

This volume was helpful in its general discussion of the debates over the Payne-Aldrich and Underwood Tariff bills.

The Oklahoma Red Book. 2 vols., Oklahoma City: Office of the Secretary of State, 1912.

Tindall, George B., The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967.

Tumulty, Joseph P., Woodrow Wilson As I Knew Him. Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1921.

Weinstein, James, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.

A revisionist study that views reform-minded businessmen as "corporate liberals."

Wiebe, Robert H., The Search for Order, 1877-1920. New York: Macmillan, 1967.

The author characterizes the progressive era as a period of multiplicity with various coalitions forming around different issues. The specific nature of the coalitions differed on federal, state, and local levels and from region to region.

_____, Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962.

The author claims that businessmen were reform minded and deserve membership as progressives of the period.

Weyl, Walter E., The New Democracy. New York: Macmillan, 1914.

An important contemporary work on progressive theory because it attempts to answer the question as to which direction the American government is headed. The author is concerned with the new spirit that pervades American institutions.

Wood, Stephen B., Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era: Child Labor and the Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968.

This study explains the campaign during the progressive era to establish national child labor standards. It is especially useful on the Children's Bureau and Keating-Owen Act.

Woodson, Urey, ed., Democratic National Convention Proceedings, 1912. Chicago: Peterson Linotyping Company, 1912.

Woodward, C. Vann, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951.

An excellent volume dealing with Southern history from 1877 to 1913. It contains information on Southern progressivism.

Yellowitz, Irwin, Labor and the Progressive Movement in New York State: 1897-1916. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965.

Newspapers

Ada Weekly News, 1914.

Alva Review Courier, 1912-1914.

Anadarko Daily Democrat, 1906-1915.

Anadarko Tribune, 1914.

Ardmore Daily Ardmoreite, 1908-1914.

This newspaper was edited by Sidney Suggs, a leading Oklahoma progressive and strong supporter of President Wilson's policies.

Bartlesville Daily Enterprise, 1914.

Bartlesville Daily Examiner, 1910.

Blackwell Times-Record, 1904-1916.

Chandler News-Publicist, 1908-1914.

Clinton News, 1914.

Cordell Beacon, 1914.

Durant Daily Democrat, 1914.

Enid Events, 1912-1914.

Enid Morning News, 1910-1914.

Guthrie Daily Oklahoma State Capital, 1900-1911.

Guthrie Daily Leader, 1900-1914.

Harlow's Weekly, Oklahoma City, 1912-1914.

Hobart Republican, 1914.

Johnston County Capital-Democrat, Tishomingo, 1912-1914.

Kingfisher Times, 1914.

LaFollette's Weekly, 1909-1916.

This was the personal voice of the Wisconsin Senator after 1909. It was published at Madison, Wisconsin.

Lawton Constitution-Democrat, 1910-1914.

McAlester News-Capital, 1914.

Mangum Star, 1904-1914.

Muskogee Phoenix, 1910-1914.

A strong Republican outlet which included articles covering all Oklahoma Congressional districts.

Muskogee Times-Democrat, 1912-1914.

Newkirk Republican News-Journal, 1912.

New York Times, 1901-1917.

By far the most comprehensive newspaper in its coverage and one of the most objective. Unfortunately its published index was not started until 1912. Among other newspapers, it was useful for Morgan's national publicity on the federal trade commission debate.

Noble County Sentinel, 1914.

Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, 1908-1916.

Link describes it as one of the leading progressive newspapers in the South. A major source for speeches and editorials dealing with national progressive legislation.

Oklahoma City Times, 1908-1916.

The major Republican newspaper in Oklahoma which counteracted the Daily Oklahoman.

Okmulgee Daily Democrat, 1914.

Pawnee Courier-Dispatch, 1910-1912.

Pawnee Times-Democrat, 1912.

Perry Republican, 1914.

Ponca City Democrat, 1910-1912.

Renfrew's Record, Enid, 1912.

Shawnee Daily Herald, 1906-1911.

Shawnee News-Herald, 1911-1917.

The Commoner, 1902-1912.

This was William Jennings Bryan's personal outlet.
It was published at Lincoln, Nebraska.

The Creek County Republican, Sapulpa, 1914.

The Labor Signal, Oklahoma City, 1902-1906.

The Oklahoma Farmer, Guthrie, 1912-1913.

The Oklahoma Farmer and Laborer, Guthrie, 1910-1915.

Tulsa Daily Democrat, 1904-1917.

Vinita Daily Chieftain, 1904-1917.

Vinita Leader, 1914.

Woodward News-Bulletin, 1912-1914.

Contemporary Periodicals

Collier's, New York, 1901-1917.

A magazine which often published articles and editorials
of significance to progressivism.

McMaster's Magazine: An Illustrated Monthly Journal of Oklahoma and
the Indian Territory, Oklahoma City, 1895-1900.

Sturm's Oklahoma Magazine, Tulsa and Oklahoma City, 1905-1911.

The Outlook, 1910-1917.

Roosevelt wrote regularly for the magazine after 1910.

Twin Territories: The Indian Magazine, Muskogee, 1899-1904.

World's Work, New York, 1901-1917.

A middle-of-the-road progressive journal inclined to
support the Roosevelt and Wilson policies.

APPENDIX A

Fifty-Seventh Congress

1. Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902
2. Elkins Act of 1903
3. Bureau of Corporations in newly created Department of Commerce and Labor of 1903
4. Northern Securities Case of 1902

Fifty-ninth Congress

1. Hepburn Act of 1906
2. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906
3. Meat Inspection Act of 1906
4. Employer's Liability Act of 1906

Sixtieth Congress

1. Abolition of Child Labor in District of Columbia of 1908
2. Second Employer's Liability Act of 1908
3. Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908
4. Bureau of Mines Bill of 1908

Sixty-first Congress

1. Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909
2. Revolt Against "Cannonism" of 1910
3. Resolution for Income Tax Amendment to Constitution of 1910
4. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910

5. Postal Savings Banks of 1910
6. Ballinger-Pinchot Controversy of 1910

Sixty-second Congress

1. Resolution for Constitutional Amendment for Direct Election of United States Senators of 1911
2. Publicity of Campaign Expenditures of 1911
3. Arizona and New Mexico Statehood of 1911
4. Canadian Reciprocity of 1911
5. Farmer's Free List of 1911
6. Wool Tariff Reduction of 1911
7. Cotton Tariff Reduction of 1911
8. Children's Bureau of 1912
9. Parcels Post of 1912
10. Eight-Hour Day on Government Contracts of 1912
11. Anti-Injunction Bill of 1912
12. Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Employees of 1913

Sixty-third Congress

1. Underwood-Simmons Tariff of 1913
2. Lobby Investigation of 1913
3. Federal Reserve Act of 1913
4. Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914
5. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914
6. Smith-Lever Act of 1914
7. Resolution for Women Suffrage Amendment to Constitution of 1915
8. LaFollette's Seamen's Act of 1915

Sixty-fourth Congress

1. Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916
2. Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916
3. Kern-McGillicuddy Federal Workmen's
Compensation Act of 1916
4. Adamson Eight-Hour Act of 1916
5. Federal Highway Act of 1916
6. Smith-Hughes Act of 1917

APPENDIX B

Note: The reform issues have been broken into three groups based on my judgement. The number in parentheses indicates the Congress in which the issue appeared.

Political Reforms

1. House Rules Change (61)
2. Constitutional Amendment for Direct Election of United States Senators (62)
3. Campaign Expenditures Act (62)
4. Arizona and New Mexico Statehood (Initiative, Referendum, and Recall) (62)
5. Lobby Investigation (63)
6. Constitutional Amendment for Women's Suffrage (63)

Social Reforms

1. Pure Food and Drug Act (59)
2. Meat Inspection Act (59)
3. Employer's Liability Act (59)
4. Child Labor for District of Columbia (60)
5. Second Employer's Liability Act (60)
6. Bureau of Mines Bill (60)
7. Children's Bureau (62)
8. Eight-Hour Day on Government Contracts (62)
9. Anti-Injunction Bill (62)
10. Workmen's Compensation for Railway Employees (62)
11. Smith-Lever Act (63)

12. LaFollette Seamen's Act (63)
13. Keating-Owen Act (64)
14. Kern-McGillicuddy Workmen's Compensation Act (64)
15. Adamson Eight-Hour Day Act (64)
16. Federal Highway Act (64)
17. Smith-Hughes Act (64)

Economic Reforms

1. Elkins Act (57)
2. Bureau of Corporations in newly created Department of Commerce and Labor (57)
3. Newlands Reclamation Act (57)
4. Northern Securities Case (57)
5. Hepburn Act (59)
6. Aldrich-Vreeland Act (60)
7. Payne-Aldrich Tariff (61)
8. Constitutional Amendment for Income Tax (61)
9. Mann-Elkins Act (61)
10. Postal Savings Act (61)
11. Ballinger-Pinchot Affair (61)
12. Canadian Reciprocity (62)
13. Farmer's Free List (62)
14. Wool Tariff Reductions (62)
15. Cotton Tariff Reductions (62)
16. Parcels Post (62)
17. Underwood-Simmons Tariff (63)
18. Federal Reserve Act (63)
19. Clayton Act (63)

20. Federal Trade Commission Act (63)
21. Federal Farm Loan Act (64)

VITA

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