THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION:
ITS MEN, HISTORY, AND PRINCIPLES.
(1910-1937)

THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION:
ITS MEN, HISTORY, AND PRINCIPLES.
(1910-1937)

by

WOODROW WILLIAM PEARCY

BACHELOR OF SCIENCE

OKLAHOMA AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE

1933

Submitted to the History Department
Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
1937

APPROVED:

T. H. Reynolds
In charge of Thesis

T. H. Reynolds
Head of Department of History

D. G. McCutcheon
Dean of Graduate School

PREFACE

The obvious fact that Mexico is our only nationally independent land neighbor, and will continue to be so, would justify any investigation that might be made upon the subject. International good-will and peace are deeply involved in the relations of the United States with Mexico. If the two countries are to be truly neighborly, knowledge and still more knowledge are prerequisite.

There is not a single authoritative book in either Spanish or English that is comprehensive enough to stand as an interpretation of the Revolution as a whole. Much documentary material is not available, and many facts are highly controversial in nature. The Revolution began November 20, 1910, and is still in progress. To write comprehensively, one should be a trained historian, ethnologist and economist. One should have achieved proficiency in Spanish and other tongues spoken in Mexico. Nevertheless, the study seemed interesting, and worth study and research. The writer hopes that in a small way this thesis might explain something of the Men, History, and Principles of the Mexican Revolution, and encourage

others to make research and study of our neighbor below the Rio Grande.

Materials used in making this study have been available in the library of Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, and the library of the University of Oklahoma.

The writer wishes to express his sincere appreciation to Dr. T. H. Reynolds, the head of the History Department at Oklahoma Agriculture and Mechanical College, and to Senor L. Perez-Abreu, Consul de Mexico, for their advice in gathering of materials and helpful suggestions in the writing of the thesis.

W. W. P.

CONTENTS

THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION: ITS MEN, HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES. (1910-1937)

Chapter I

A Background of Mexican History prior to the Revolution of 1910

To understand the Revolution of 1910, one must comprehend something of the background of Mexican History prior to the outbreak of the Revolution. The Revolution did not just happen in 1910 out of a clear sky, but started fomenting as far back as 1519, when suddenly and without warning, a small group of Spaniards, equipped with gunpowder and coats of mail, injected themselves into the life of the Indian. By force the Spaniards grafted a totally unfamiliar political, economic, religious, and cultural pattern upon the conquered area totally strange to the population that occupied it.[1] This band of soldiers, adventurers, and priests were too few to exterminate the Indians they had subdued; the Indians were too divided and inadequately armed to eject the foreigners; so they have lived for the last four

---

1 L. P. Abreau, (Consul de Mexico) Personal interview, (Okla. City, Oklahoma, June 11, 1937)

Also A. T. Zabre, A Modern Interpretation To The History of Mexico, (Mexico Press of The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, 1935), pp. 6-7.

hundred years--one like a parasite, too small a body to destroy its victim; the other too weak internally either to absorb or cast off the parasite. The Spaniards tried to impose a political, economic, and cultural system upon the Indian.[2] Mexican History for the last four centuries is the history of the relationship between the parasitical body and the body politic, between the conqueror and the conquered, between the victor and the defeated. The conquerors and the conquered lived lives peculiar to themselves, with their special interests, problems, conflicts, and passions. More important in the long run was the institutional by-product that grew out of this enforced relationship. The larger meaning of the Conquest has found expression in the partial blending of the two races: of their institutions, of their culture, and in the gradual absorption of the Spaniard by the Indian. Not that the Indian is reverting to his past, but the Spaniard with all of his institutional set-up is being frittered away by slow attrition.[3]

---

2 Frank Tannenbaum, Peace By Revolution (The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1936) p. 4.

3 Ibid., p. 4.
Also A. H. Noll, From Empire to Republic (A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago, 1903) pp. 1-24.

R. J. MacHugh, Modern Mexico (Methuen, London, 1914) pp. 1-31.

It is interesting and worthy of contemplation by all students of culture in Mexico, where a system of institutions was implanted by one race upon another, implanted by force, fear and fraud, by cruelty, murder, and robbery, that such a system, after four hundred years, should have practically disintegrated--and that with it the race responsible for the imposition should also have largely disintegrated.[4]

Underlying Mexican History, therefore, is a conflict between two races with sharply divergent cultures. It was a system of behavior that had hate, fear, and suspicion on one side, with power, cruelty, and lust on the other.[5]

The assimilation of the Indians was never complete; their pacification was never complete; their civilization was never complete; their conversion was never complete. In spite, therefore, of four hundred years of domination by Spanish language and Spanish custom, the cultural, linguistic, and economic complexity of the country is perhaps as great as before.[6] The Smithsonian Institute reports that there are fifty different languages spoken in Mexico.[7]

---

4 Tannenbaum, op. cit., p. 4.

5 Abreau, Personal interview, op. cit.

6 Tannenbaum, op. cit., p. 8.

7 Sen. Doc. No. 7665, 66 cong., 2 Sess., IX p. 161.

Since the Spanish Conquest, wandering military bands that have continuously ravaged Mexico have been the greatest source of racial mixture. Military turbulence, more than any other phenomenon, has spread the mestizo throughout Mexico. Armed bands went into every region of Mexico, and their seed sprouted in some proportion wherever they went. Out of the 7,800,000 people in Mexico who are described as living in a primitive civilization, 4,300,000 are considered as mestizos. There are very few people of Spanish descent in Mexico, who have not also some Indian blood. The white population, which was one out of ten in 1921 by the most favorable estimate, was probably one out of eleven in 1930, after four hundred years of residence. The census of 1921 gives 1,474,057 whites out of 14,344,700; ten per cent of the total. The census of 1910 gave the Indians 6,573,000.[8]

Racial change thus reveals a definite tendency. The white element is declining in proportion to the total; the Indian is gaining in proportion to the White; the mestizo is gaining in proportion to both. The ultimate outcome seems clear enough: Mexico will become a mestizo country in which

---

[8] Tannenbaum, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

the Indian element will be greater than the White. The Indian has lost much of his self-respect, much of his confidence and much of his sense of worth. He has been beaten every time; he has attempted to rise in rebellion, so he has retreated into apathetic listlessness, drunkenness, fear, humility, subjection and silence.[9] His retreat has served to conserve and to protect him. Wherever he could, he has held on to his old values, his old beliefs, religion and his old government, becoming poorer in every way (economically, culturally, spiritually) than he was ever before. The Mestizo and white continued to exploit the Indian by every means at their disposal, and with little power of resistance on the part of the Indian.[10]

We may now draw this part of our discussion to a conclusion by pointing again to the fact that the Spanish Conquest of Mexico left neither a unified race, nor a unified culture,[11] and that Mexico is a country of intermingled colonization, composed of people of quite different races traditions, and civilizations. As a people, they may be regarded as a genuine national unit; yet, such has only come

---

9 E. H. Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, (The Century Co., New York 1928) pp. 543-550.

10 Tannenbaum, op. cit., pp. 21-25.
Also Abreau, op. cit.

11 T. E. Gibbons, Mexico under Carranza, (A. L. Burt Co., New York 1928) pp. 218-225.

into existence during recent years. Mexico was the principal colony founded by Spain in America, and so it was here that the conservative classes, the aristocracy, the clergy, and the military gained their highest development and stood in opposition to the humble conditions of life in which the great mass of the inhabitants lived. These facts have been the cause of the several convulsions that have afflicted the Mexican nation in its struggle for life during the last hundred years.[12]

The War of Independence was a social rather than a political strife, its main object was to emancipate the Indian, the mixed bloods, and the peasants, whom the wealthier classes, too jealous of their own privileges, had denied the right to mingle in public affairs. This war for independence lasted for over 11 years, and it did not come to an end until the aristocracy gave it their own support in the hope of becoming more powerful under the new regime than they had been under the Crown of Spain.[13]

The War of Independence was largely motivated, at least in its early stages, by agrarian ambitions on the part of the Indians. It laid the foundation for three policies that contributed to the attempted break-up of the large estates.

---

12 Sen. Doc. No. 6536, 63 cong., 1 sess., 1913, Aug. 6 (153)

13 Ibid.
Also R. P. B. Baerlein, Mexico the Land of Unrest, (The MacMillan Co., New York 1928) pp. 61-76.

It led to the abolition of the legal inferiority of the Indian, a gesture, it is true, but yet a change in the relative position of the races in the direction of greater social, and ultimately, of political and economic, equality. It led also to an abolition of entailment of large holdings which, in spite of little immediate effect, must be considered as a contribution towards destroying land feudalism in Mexico. Finally, the internal conflicts to which independence gave rise led to the ultimate confiscation of the church lands. This policy at one blow transferred a great body of land from the hands of the church to laymen. But in the confusion and stress of civil conflict the records were lost, titles to the properties were obscured, land ownership was made more confused than ever, and what is still more important, the transfer of the church lands did not change the fundamental character of the land system. The lands of the church seem to have gone either to enlarge existing estates or more generally to create new haciendas of a type already dominant in the country.[14] The purpose of the reform, therefore, in so far as it was aimed at the creation of small sized holdings was defeated, though it is probably true that a considerable number of comparatively small properties that did not exist before were carved out of the church lands. But as a whole it is clear that these lands merely

---

14 Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution (Washington, D. C. The Brookings Institution 1930) pp. 153-155.

added to the wealth of the large land holders, and did not help the Indian or the small land owners.

Once the political but not the social independence was accomplished, the struggle covered a long period of time and was full of dramatic events, such as the French Intervention and the subsequent establishment of the so-called Empire, an enterprise which ended in the death of an Austrian prince and which brought about the final establishment of a democratic government and the separation of the church from the state.[15] The clergy were granted full liberty in respect to their own welfare and ecclesiastical duties, but were thereafter not allowed to meddle in Government affairs.

The country, now almost exhausted by long internal strife, was willing to tolerate the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz, who maintained a state of peace for over thirty years.[16]

---

15 J. F. Rippy, The United States and Mexico, (Alfred A. Kopf, New York, 1926) pp. 197-211.
Also H. I. Priestley, The Mexican Nation, (The MacMillan Co., New York, 1930) pp. 345-364.

16 Sen. Doc. No. 6536, 63 cong., 1 sess., 1913, Aug. 6 (153)

Chapter II

Conditions in Mexico under the Reign of Diaz.

Early in the nineteenth century all labor had been agricultural, but after Diaz came into power and valuable grants were made to foreigners, mines began to be opened and manufacturing establishments put up. These called for a new class of labor and for this the quickest and brightest of the agricultural laborers were used. These, turning from serfs into day laborers, thence a few into skilled workmen and artisans, gradually adopted a higher standard of living, following the example set by the foreigners with whom they came in contact. As these men attained a degree of skill, many of them received promotions until, with the passage of time, they were completely elevated above the old laboring class from which they arose, so that they, along with the various groups which had never been quite recognized by the elite, became the nucleus of the new middle class which was to start the trouble for the regime a little later.[1]

Without a leader to excite his emotions and stir him to action, the peon would never object to the existing order; but

---

[1] L. M. Smith, American Relations with Mexico, (Harlow Publishing Co., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 1924) p. 14.

the middle class was quick to see injustice and had no scruples against action. And, though it had become a byword with many, that the peon wanted his plot of ground it was this same middle class who really desired the change and who incited the peon to revolt.[2]

Porfirio Diaz served the longest term of office ever held by any President in the history of the world, from 1876 to 1910. During this long term of the Diaz regime, foreigners were granted enormous concessions. They were in substance as follows:

> 1. The sale of half of Lower California for a mere pittance to Louis Huller, of German extraction and a naturalized American Citizen, who passed it on to an American colonizing enterprise. It was held that Lower California would follow the fate of Texas.
> 2. The modification of the mining code, including the clause which assigns to the owner of the land the coal deposits that may be found upon it, for no other reason than that of enriching the grantees of unclaimed lands in the state of Coahuila, who had acquired the Sabinas lands for an insignificant sum with a view to selling them to the American multi-millionaire, Huntington.
> 3. The granting of concessions to foreign companies to exploit the oil lands, among which companies the Americans predominated. The exemption of these companies from export duties on the crude and refined product, thereby depriving the Mexican people of the only means at their command to derive anything from the exploitation of their great national wealth.

---

[2] L. M. Smith, op. cit., p. 15.

4. Failure to prevent the Guggenheims from monopolizing almost completely the important metallurgic industry upon which the progress of mining in the country depended.

5. The sale for next to nothing of 3,000,000 hectares of excellent lands in the state of Chihuahua to two favorites of the Mexican Government, that they might resell to Mr. Hearst.

6. The granting to Colonel Greene, an American citizen, of enormous concessions in the copper lands of the state of Sonora, upon which he had established the famous Cananea plant, where the four thousand employees were treated like slaves, and with such inhumanity that there was an uprising among them, with the result that armed men from the United States passed into Mexican territory to protect the American oppressors.

7. The granting of concessions in rubber lands to the American multi-millionaires, John Rockefeller and Nelson Aldrich, which caused the ruin of a number of towns in the state of Durango.

8. The sale to twenty-eight favorites of some fifty millions of hectares of marvelously fertile lands so that these favorites might alienate them for a song to foreign companies, mostly American.

9. The expulsion of the Yaquis Indians from their magnificent lands in order that bureaucrats could sell them to American investors.

10. The appointment of Americans to all important positions in the national railway system.

11. The placing of foreign loans with the New York banks, particularly the New York house of J. P. Morgan.

12. The complete prostitution of Mexican courts to American litigants.

13. Neglect to pursue the Chamizal question to the end, which would have put the Mexican people in the possession of the territory upon which the city of El Paso is built.[3]

---

[3] Francisco Bulnes, The Whole Truth About Mexico, (The American Book Co., New York 1931) pp. 120-127.

The increasing power and influence of the United States citizens in the life of Mexico during the Diaz regime is well known. It is generally understood that not more than 75,000 United States citizens were in Mexico in 1910, of whom about 10,000 were in the capital.[4] The influence of this group was out of all proportion to its numbers. For one thing its members very seldom intermarried with Mexicans, maintaining their identity just as they nearly always most jealously retained their nationality. Esteban Maqueo Castellanos speaks of the "Yankee Peril" during the Diaz regime in his book Algunos Problemas Nacionales (Some National Problems) as follows:

> There are annually invested in Mexico by Americans about fifty million dollars; the American population increases annually by about three or four thousand. Some six to eight hundred millions of American money are invested in the country; the American colony may be as high as sixty thousand. This immigration is dangerous, because it represents a rapid absorption which may fuse Mexican nationality with American through disappearance of economic and political autonomy.
>
> There are three types of American population in Mexico. The American population which comes to make itself permanent is one-third composed of sane and judicious elements, well-educated men of enterprise, who have a proper conception of equity and justice, and are adaptable to environment. This type of Americans

---

[4] United States Foreign Relations, (1910) Investigation of Mexican Affairs pp. 2250-2253.

> proceeds ordinarily from the center or north of the United States. It considers our laws good enough. It never speaks of war, annexation, or imperialism with reference to Mexico.
>
> The second one-third is formed of that group of Americans who come to Mexico looking for work, to struggle for a future, for a better economic situation than they enjoyed in the States. They are modest in means and education, good Yankees, strong enough for rude tasks, or sometimes, persons who are anxious to dress in style. They neither hate us or like us. For them a Mexican is always an intellectual, social, and political inferior. They come especially from the northwest and southwest of the United States. This group follows the first group of Americans, considering them the distinguished ones and having a sort of snobbish desire to be associated with them.[5]

In 1902 the United States investments in Mexico were estimated at over $500,000,000, while by 1912 the sum had more than doubled. In fact, at the latter date it is estimated that if all property in Mexico had been sold at its market value and the proceeds distributed to the owners, more would have been sent north of the Rio Grande than remained south of it.[6] In 1911, American holdings in Mexican railways were valued at $650,000,000. Americans had constructed about two-thirds of Mexico's sixteen thousand miles

---

[5] Hispanic American Historical Review, (1919), II, pp. 287-288.

[6] W. H. Callcott, Liberalism in Mexico, (1857-1929), (The Stanford University Press, Stanford University, California 1931) p. 160.
Also Rippy, op. cit., p. 312.

of railways.[7] The percentage of investment by the Mexican Government in railways was only fifteen to eighteen per cent.[8] In 1903, President Diaz estimated the American capital invested in mining enterprises to be $80,000,000 and in 1912, American mining properties in Mexico were valued at $250,000,000.[9]

Along with the railroad men and the miners came the ranchmen, the planters, the land-speculators, and the small farmers. The large holdings was the rule. Into Lower California went Flores, Hale and Company of San Francisco, for the purpose of buying and leasing thousands of square miles of land for the production of orchilla. Into this territory went likewise the agents of the McCormick harvester interests of Chicago, to exploit the maguey fibre, and the representatives of great land and cattle companies or speculators in real estate, to purchase properties varying in area from fifty thousand to three million acres.[10]

In cattle and oil lands Americans purchased over a billion acres of land in various parts of Mexico. Large American holdings could be found in every Mexican state and particularly in

---

[7] Fall Committee; United States Commercial Relations Report (1902) I, 433-435. Report II, p. 2553.

[8] Sen. Doc., 66 cong., 2 sess, IX, pp. 1794-1795.

[9] Sen. Doc., 58 cong., 3 sess, LXVI, p. 232.

[10] Rippy, op. cit., p. 313.

the north and in the tropical regions where Americans engaged in the cultivation of sugar, coffee, rubber, cotton, and tropical fruits. These lands totaled approximately 2,500,000 acres. The Fall Committee of the United States Senate reported that there were in 1912 not less than fifteen thousand Americans residing permanently in Mexico and cultivating lands in small holdings.[11] The value of the total investments of United States citizens in Mexico is estimated in 1912 to be over $1,057,000,000. According to Fall the Americans owned in the year of 1919, 78% of the mines, 72% of the smelters, 58% of the oil, and 68% of the rubber business of Mexico.[12]

During the ascendancy of the "cientificos" under the reign of Diaz, the process of despoiling the Indian of his land became a regular science. 85% of the agricultural land of Mexico fell into the hands of less than 1% of the rural families.[13] In Chihuahua, the Terrazas Family and the Creel Family (related by marriage) had nearly 15,000,000 acres of land. Fewer than 2,700 families had more than half of the property of the Republic, and 114 families owned approximately

---

11 Fall Committee, Report II, p. 3312; House Doc. No. 305, 57 cong., 2 sess., p. 507.

12 Ibid., pp. 3312, 3322; p. 503.

13 Ramon Beteta, Programa Economico Y Social De Mexico, (Ciudad de Mexico 1935) p. 54.

one fourth of the land.[14] The Indian had so little that it is hard to estimate such a small quanity. It was argued that the Indian was unprogressive and lacking in energy and foresight. Therefore, Mexico had remained a backward state, principally due to the failure of the Indian to develop the country's agricultural resources. For his best interests, it was urged, the property of the Indian and even the Indian himself, should be placed in the hands of those who would make better use of the natural and human resources of the country.[15]

Theoretically this seemed sound; practically, Mexico made considerable material advance but showed deterioration in those characteristics of the population which in the aggregate are generally regarded as measuring civilization and progress. Education languished; democratic political institutions disappeared, or at least failed to develop; land owners showed little interest in improving their properties but preferred to reside in Mexico City or Paris and make this possible through the exploitation of tenants and laborers. Even such inadequate wages as were paid generally took the form of orders on the tiendas de rayas where bad

---

[14] Abreau, op. cit.

[15] Tannenbaum, (R by R.) op. cit.,

merchandise was sold at unconscionable prices. Children inherited and became responsible for the personal debts of their parents. A working arrangement was developed between the planters and the Church by which religious dues of all kinds were advanced by the hacendado, enjoyed by the clergy and charged to the laborer. Thus the peasant or peon found himself burdened with debts which were completely beyond his poor ability to ever pay, while legislation conveniently provided that he could not leave his employer until all indebtedness had been met. This was the system of peonage which developed to its highest form under the reign of Diaz. It differed little in practical effect from the negro slavery which formerly existed in the United States. Such a system was bound to generate increasing opposition to its stupidities and oppressions, and paved the way for the revolution.[16]

The Diaz Government did not rest upon public opinion or congressional action. Under the Constitution the Republic of Mexico has its three governmental bodies, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. The first of these had now outgrown and hidden the others from view. Diaz did not govern through the force of legislative sanction, but through the iron hand of military force. Congress was fully in accord with him

---

16 Beteta, op. cit., p. 54-56.
Also Abreau, op. cit.,

and supported him in all his measures. When the president and cabinet had no special work for the legislature to do, they indulged in literary declamations upon subjects that served to pass the time, but that were utterly destitute of political significance.[17]

The Chamber of Deputies had a peculiar organization. First, came the members of the "royal family," a dozen or so; then, the sons of the old war companions of the chief; then, the sons-in-law, who had married daughters of government officials. Then, came the ninos finos, who through family influence, followed in the wake of Dona Carmelita (the Senora de Diaz).[18] Of course such a body could be only reactionary and subservient. The cabinet officers with notable exception, such as Romero Rubio, Baranda, and Limantour, were subservient and incompetent. The Supreme Court made no consistent decision and had no uniformity. No interest or responsibility was felt by the members, because Diaz made their decisions in advance for them. Mexico was as a consequence always surbordinate to the White House[19].

---

17 Charles Morris, The Story of Mexico, (L. T. Myers Co., Chicago 1914) pp. 226-228.

18 Abreau, op. cit.
Also Hispanic American Historical Review, op. cit.,, p. 287.

19 Abreau, op. cit.

Perhaps the chief cause for the immediate development of the agitation against the continuance of President Diaz in power may be attributed directly to the president's own action. Some time before his election for his last term of office he had explicitly stated that under no conditions would he again allow himself to be nominated for the Presidency. In an interview with a representative of Pearson's Magazine for March, President Diaz made the following statement in March 1908, and its veracity has never been questioned. His words were:

> No matter what my friends and supporters say, I retire when my present term of office ends, and I shall not serve again. I shall be eighty years old then. I have waited patiently for the day when the people of the Mexican Republic will be prepared to choose and change their Government at every election without danger of armed revolutions and without injury to the National credit or interference with National progress. I believe that day has come. I welcome an Opposition party in the Mexican Republic. If it appears, I will regard it as a blessing, not an evil; and if it can develop power, not to exploit but to govern, I will stand by it, support it, advise it, and forget myself in the successful inauguration of complete democratic government in the country.[20]

Certain elements took the President at his word, and there immediately began a discussion of possible candidates for the Presidency, and of various questions relating to popular government. Diaz watched this movement very closely, and from his

---

[20] R. H. Murray, World Work "Porfirio Diaz at First Hand." XXII, (May-Oct., 1911) pp. 14571-14591.

knowledge of Mexican affairs he very speedily discerned that it was not traveling in the direction which he had anticipated. There were symptoms which showed that his retirement at that stage might lead to a revival of the old conditions which had distracted Mexico for fifty years arter the achievement of independence.[21]

The prediction of the Antireelection Party that President Diaz would run again, in spite of what he had declared to Creelman, was realized. The President, who had been president for 34 years, announced his candidacy for his eighth term, despite his declaration. He selected for Vice President Don Ramon Corral, leader of the "cientificos" and thoroughly unpopular. General Bernardo Reyes, governor of the State of Nuevo Leon, who had been minister of war on President Diaz's staff, was reported to be opposed to the reelection of Vice President Corral, and many persons advocated that General Reyes himself be elected Vice President. In the midst of the campaigh General Reyes went to Mexico City and, soon after, to Europe on a special military mission.

The opposition nominated Francisco I. Madero, of Monterrey, for President.[22]

---

21 MacHugh, op. cit., pp. 159-160.

22 United States Foreign Relations, (1911) p. 348.

Chapter III

THE FALL OF DIAZ AND THE RISE OF MADERO
THE BEGINNING OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION

Madero came from a very wealthy and very influential family, most of whom had always been staunch supporters of President Diaz, and, although they greatly respected their distinguished relative, many of the family openly declared in favor of Diaz. Madero was a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was conscientious and believed he could govern Mexico better than Porfirio Diaz, better than any one except himself.[1] Francisco Madero had written a book, which had had a wide circulation, and which emphasized the probability that a Corral administration would be even worse than the Diaz regime.

Madero was a fluent speaker. During the campaign he went about for months, urging the people to rise against the existing tyranny and fight with what weapons they could find for the reestablishment of Constitutional government.

The election date was June 26, 1910. On June 5, in the midst of his campaign, Madero was arrested at Monterrey on

---

[1] World Work, op. cit., pp. 14551-14552.

a charge of having concealed a fugitive from justice--Roque Estrada, Madero's own secretary, and habitually in Madero's house. Madero was taken to San Luis Potosi, where he was convicted of sedition, held until after the elections were over, and then, through the efforts of friends, released on 8,000 pesos ($10,000.00) bail, with restriction, however, to the limits of San Luis Potosi, where he was kept under observation. Other Antireelectionists were similiarly treated. Some escaped and fled to revolutionary centers in the United States, where their writings and other activities greatly emboldened the revolutionists. Two of these, Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magon, were indicted by the United States Federal grand jury for violating the neutrality laws; Ricardo was convicted and imprisoned; Enrique continued writing widely quoted articles.[2]

The tasks of the United States Federal officers were greatly increased when, on October 6, 1910, Madero escaped from San Luis Potosi to San Antonio, Texas, general headquarters of the revolutionary junta, and was at once announced in the press as its president and leader of the

---

2 United States Foreign Relations, (1911) p. 349.
Also Priestly, op. cit., p. 396.
Also Smith, op. cit., p. 55.
Also Gruening, op. cit., p. 212.
Also Bancroft, op. cit., p. 531.

revolution. A few days later, in a manifesto addressed "To the American people," he declared that all he asked was "The hospitality which all free peoples have always accorded to those from other lands who strive for liberty."[3]

Madero came prepared with a specific revolutionary program, which had long been maturing, known as "The Plan of San Luis Potosi," in which the purpose of the revolution was set forth; effective suffrage and no re-election. It contained, also, demands for reforms in the distribution of land; free restitution of land wrested from Indian tribes; the liberation of all political prisoners, the abolition of making soldiers out of confirmed criminals; and positive guarantees of the right of free speech and free press.[4]

Madero was not content with a literary propoganda. He felt that he had been legally robbed of an election to the presidency and proposed to regain his rights by force of arms. Consultations with Democratic leaders were held and the date of November 26 was fixed for a rising against the government. Such was the first step in the revolution of

---

3 United States Foreign Relations, (1911) p. 350. Also Bancroft, op. cit., p. 531.

4 Smith, op. cit., p. 55. Also United States Foreign Relations, (1911) pp. 350-352.

1910, the only effective insurrection which Mexico has known since 1876.

With little heed to these underground movements preparations were made for a great celebration, that of the hundredth anniversary of the "Grito de Dolores," the beginning of the Mexican war for independence on September 16, 1810. It was to be celebrated by a month of festivities, embracing the whole of September, 1910. The chief features of the celebration were fete days in Mexico City on the 15th and 16th, an imposing pageant on the 19th, and a sham battle on the 25th. Also, a million-dollar palace was dedicated in the City of Chihuahua. The festivities in the capital embraced such agreeable incidents as a ball in the palace, which was lighted by 30,000 electric stars, a fairyland entertainment on the rock of Chapultepec, a mimic firework battle on a lake, a banquet in a cavern by the Pyramids of the Sun and the Moon, and various other spectacles. More permanent was the founding of a university, and the introduction of a more copious supply of drinking water.[5]

5
Morris, op. cit., p. 244.
Tannenbaum, (T. M. A. R.) op. cit., p. 137.
Also Abreau, op. cit.

While these entertainments were taking place in the south, the agents of anarchy were at work in the north. Madero, despite his order to remain in Mexico, made his way in disguise to Laredo, on the border, and crossed the Rio Grande into Texas. Here he engaged in the purchase of large quantities of arms and ammunition, which he succeeded in shipping over the border. He next made his way to San Antonio, and thence to El Paso, where he founded a revolutionary junta. Learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, on the charge of breaking the international laws of the United States, he crossed the Rio Grande to Juarez, and was once more on Mexican soil, where his adherents had been busy in preparing for the proposed insurrection.[6]

The Mexican Embassy at Washington got definite information concerning these actions,[7] even of the exact time of carloads of arms crossing the border to the revolutionists. They appealed to the State Department of the United States to observe the neutrality laws. This Department did take action but not quickly enough and much ammunition was carried across the border. The Mexican Embassy next asked

---

[6] Smith, op. cit., p. 55-56.

[7] United States Foreign Relations, (1911) p. 476.

for the arrest of Madero for violating the neutrality laws of the United States[8] and the State Department saw to it that such a warrant was issued; but, before the warrant was served, Madero had crossed the border into Chihuahua and had entered the campaigh actively.[9]

It is beyond question that a very large portion of the arms and ammunition used in this revolution was obtained in the United States. Even after the Mexican government appealed to Washington to stop the privilege, a great deal was still smuggled through. Fortunato Hernandez, in his book "El Pulpo Blondo" says that the United States started three revolutions and three protectorates: those of Panama, Cuba and Mexico. The revolution beginning in 1910 was, says Hernandez developed and fomented in the United States, provided with American munitions and money, and assisted by illusory American neutrality and stupid Mexican diplomats.[10]

The Madero revolution did have the moral support of the United States, and of the border states in particular. Many smugglers were intercepted; few were convicted on account of

---

8 United States Foreign Relations, (1911) p. 512.

9 Smith, op. cit., p. 56.

10 Hispanic American Historical Review, op. cit., pp. 303-304.

a law of the United States which defined a military expedition as being composed of at least three persons; and at this time there was no embargo on arms or ammunition.

The Revolution broke out prematurely on November 18th. The government had got wind of what was in the air, and itself set the ball rolling. On that date the police attempted to break up a mass-meeting in Puebla, called to protest against the fraudulent election of Diaz, and a fight occured in which twenty-five persons were killed. Tidings of this affair hurried Madero's movements. Many refugees crossed into Mexico from Texas ready to take to the field. Outbreaks quickly followed in Chihuahua and neighboring states, in which the development of large landed estates under government supervision had made a large majority of the population hostile to the administration. An interesting incident in this connection is the fact that on December 1st, when Diaz and Corral took the oath of office for their new term, Madero then on his estate in Coahuila, had himself at the same hour, inaugurated and proclaimed as Provisional President of Mexico.[11]

The Revolution was confined almost wholly to the Northern part of the country. The South was largely indifferent.

---

[11] Morris, op. cit., p. 245.

Some personally conducted bands of outlaws arose there, but these could hardly be called a part of Madero's forces. They were simply taking advantage of the opportunity to devastate, gain a little personal wealth, and have an opportunity to gain personal recognition. The central portion of the country was conservative. It surrounded the capital and was under its control. The North was farther away, and in addition it was nearer the border of the United States. Laborers had gone back and forth, imbuing the entire border region with liberal ideas with reference to industry, to government, and to social life. The old order was in conflict with these ideas; thus the revolution naturally began in the North and on the border.[12]

In a short time the insurrection was fully launched, the Maderists having appeared in arms in various localities, in which brushes with the Federal troops had taken place. Navarro was the Federal leader, but he found the whole population of the country hostile to his movements. Every man seemed to adhere to the rebel cause, and helped the military chief of the insurgents, Orozco in every way possible, fired on the Federals from the roofs and hill tops, and refused to supply the troops of Navarro with food, and at the

---

[12] Smith, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

same time acting as spies for Orozco, and keeping him informed of every movement of the enemy. Desertions from the Government army to the rebel troops were frequent. Many of the Federal soldiers were political prisoners, or men drafted from the jails into the ranks, and numbers of these found their way into the Liberating Army, as Madero styled his forces.

By the opening of 1911 the affair had begun to look serious; the insurgents were evidently gaining ground; the Government troops had been beaten at San Ignacio, Galeana and elsewhere, and were making no visible progress in putting down the rebellion. By February Madero had a large body of well-trained and organized men in the field, who made their appearance at so many points that the Federal commanders had to break up their troops into small bodies. The trouble was not confined altogether to the north, but had even extended to the south, risings taking place in Vera Cruz and Oaxaca, which called for new diversions of the Federal forces. Madero declared that he would not lay down his arms until Diaz resigned his ill-gotten office, and a fair and full suffrage was assured to the Mexican people.[13]

---

[13] Morris, op. cit., pp. 246-247.
Also Priestly, op. cit., pp. 398-350.

Only two important engagements took place; Juarez, just across the border from El Paso, Texas, and Agua Prieta across the border from Douglas, Arizona, were captured by the Revolutionists. In fact bullets at times crossed the border into American towns, several Americans being wounded by them at Douglas, Arizona. American troops were hurried in numbers to the border. Many thousands of them gathered at San Antonio and were distributed thence to various threatened points, while four swift cruisers were sent to Galveston, in readiness if naval operations should be needed.[14] To pacify the Mexican authorities the government at Washington announced that these troops had been sent south simply for practice in military evolutions, but this was too transparent an excuse for their presence to deceive anyone.[15]

Madero had a number of American soldiers of fortune among his troops, a grandson of the famous Garibaldi was there to fight for liberty of an oppressed people, as his grandfather had done in former years. Madero's forces were not yet in condition to attack important towns. Their arms were poor,

---

[14] United States Foreign Relations, (1911) pp. 459-463. Also Smith, op. cit., p. 63.

[15] United States Foreign Relations, (1912) pp. 708, 738-739.

and their ammunition supply was scanty. Munitions of war were hard to get from across the border due to diplomatic protests of the Federal Government at Mexico. Therefore the rebels were obliged to content themselves with the taking of small places and the wearing out of the Federal troops in in effective pursuit. The task of the Government daily grew more and more difficult, and it was steadily losing prestige. Little money could be had from abroad, manufactures had largely declined; powder was made, but other implements of war grew scarce, and week by week Madero's cause made promising headway. Uucatan, Campeche and Guerrero became seats of rebellion; and Zapata, a brigand chief of barbarous character, added to the confusion in the south by his daring raids and frequent vandalism.[16]

While all this went on, President Diaz feigned to make light of the Revolution. He sent troops to deal with it, but spoke in terms of contempt of Madero and his aspirations.[17] But as time passed his tone changed. The condition of affairs had become too serious to disregard any longer, and anxiety began to replace his former indifference. His feeling that

---

16 Morris, op. cit., pp. 247-248.

17 United States Foreign Relations, (1912) pp. 723.

affairs had grown critical was shown by the changes made in his Cabinet, most of the old members being dismissed and replaced by new ones.[18] This change of cabinet was a palliative intended to gratify the popular demand for a renovation of the personnel of the administration. Essentially, the change in personnel meant no material change in program. Real policy remained the same. Among these changes in the cabinet was Francisco de la Barra, who had been Mexican Minister at Washington, and who now became Secretary of Foreign Affairs. This change in the Cabinet was but an opening wedge.

For the first time in many years Congress now began to legislate. It had hitherto been the mere mouthpiece of the President, obeying his orders with the meekest docility and indulging in rhetorical flourishes of no significance in the intervals. The members, appreciating the imminence of affairs, commenced to talk about matters of real importance without awaiting orders, and the public, astonished at the change, flocked to hear them.[19]

President Diaz had requested an armistice with the revolutionists, and one was granted to last five days from April 23d. Madero expressed himself as ready to give up his

---

[18] Priestly, op. cit., pp. 399-400.

[19] Morris, op. cit., pp. 248-249.

aspirations for the presidency if Diaz would consent to resign. But he demanded that the Constitution must be enforced, that five members of the Cabinet and fifteen of the governors should be of his party till the time of the next election, and that his soldiers should be paid. These terms were declined, and the armistice ended on May 6th. The negotations had taken place outside of Juarez, then occupied by Navarro and besieged by the revolutionists. The attack on this place was resumed, and prosecuted with such energy that it fell on the 10th. It was the first place of leading importance the insurgents had won, and was of the greatest value to them from the large store of rifles, rapidfire guns and ammunition which it contained. General Navarro was among the prisoners. He had committed acts of bloodshed upon prisoners in the ordinary Mexican fashion, and the victorious troops demanded his execution. But Madero took him in his motor car to the banks of the Rio Grande and bade him wade across into Texas.[20]

The position of Diaz had become hopeless. Everywhere the insurgents were victorious. Alike in the north and south they had prevailed. Other cities were being occupied, states were yielding allegiance and the whole country was in Madero's

---

[20] Morris, op. cit., pp. 249-250.
Also Priestly, op. cit., p. 401.

hands. Under these circumstances all hope for the continuance of the Diaz rule was at an end. On May 25th, Diaz resigned.[21] When the tidings came that the long rule of President Diaz was at an end, the madness of enthusiasm was equal to that of the fury the day before. On the succeeding day, May 26th, Diaz took a train secretly out of Mexico.[23] The journey was not taken altogether in safety. At Tepechualco the train passed through a rain of bullets fired by a hostile throng, bringing death to six or seven of the escort. These were the last shots fired for or against General Diaz on the soil of Mexico, Vera Cruz being reached without further show of hostilities.[24] On the 31st of May the vessel bore Diaz away from Mexico.

Diaz, in many ways, was a great man. He accomplished what none of his country men had been able to do before him--to maintain a generation of peace. He towers head and shoulders above the many would-be despots in previous Mexican history, who had the desire, but not the ability, to intrench themselves as he did.[25] It can be said that Diaz bore

---

23 United States Foreign Relations, (1911) pp. 486, 494. Also H. H. Bancroft, History of Mexico, (The Bancroft Co., New York 1914) p. 532.

Also H. C. Lodge, History of Nations, (P. F. Collier & Son, New York 1913) p. 411.

24 Morris, op. cit., p. 251.

25 Gruening, op. cit., p. 65.

no ill will against his country. He can justly be called "one of the Grand Old Men of America." He has made a place for himself in history equalled by few others. His nobility of character, his firmness of purpose, his simplicity of manner, his gentleness of temper, his love of his people, and his ability of mind, joined with his qualities as a soldier, patriot, statesman, husband, and father, made him indeed a unique world character.[26]

But the overshadowing fact to remember is that the Mexico he left in 1911 had all its problems, the problems of four centuries, still to solve. The conclusion that he solved none of the nation's political, social and economic problems is unavoidable. On the contrary, he deepened many of the national vices, stifled what vestiges of evolutionary self-development might have grown out of the labors of the Reformists, inculcated deception, hypocrisy, abasement, and the rule of force. He stifled the best impulses that might have led the nation permanently forward and upward; and, second, that with all the power and means that mortal man could dream of as his, he left--he kept--his people, the ninety per cent., in the depths of degradation. He tightened upon a nation of serfs the shackles of political and economic servitude, thus paving the way for

---

26 Pan American Union Bulletin, (July-Dec. 1910) XXXI, pp. 555-557.

a tremendous reaction, supressing natural tendencies, so as to make the explosion inevitable.[27]

---

[27] Gruening, op. cit., p. 64.

Chapter IV

President Madero and his Policy.

The 10th of May, 1911, when Juarez fell before the arms of the Madero revolutionists, was the first definite appearance of Francisco I. Madero in the role of President of the Mexican Republic. On the 31st of May, Diaz left the city of Mexico. On the 7th of June, the victor entered the capital city in triumph amid the plaudits of the population.[1]

The revolution initiated on October 5, 1910, by Francisco Madero was largely a protest against the continued power of Diaz. Madero's program differed but little from other political pronunciamentos upon which previous Mexican rebellions had been made to hinge. To the agrarian problem, that problem which was to become central in the urge of the revolution, he devoted but a single and meagre paragraph, while the labor problem, which next to the agrarian became one of the dominating issues in the revolution, received no mention at all.[2] But the ignorant masses of the Mexican people expected the millennium to arrive with the advent of the new President; electoral reform, land reform, the breaking up of the great haciendas, higher wages--everything that

---

[1] Priestly, op. cit., p. 403.

[2] Tannenbaum, op. cit., (T. M. A. R.) pp. 156-157.

could appeal to the prejudice or cupidity of the people--had been dangled before their eyes. The foreigners who owned or controlled so large a proportion of the wealth of the country were to be exploited or expropriated for the benefit of Mexicans. So the ignorant mass of the population hailed Madero as the saviour and benefactor of Mexico. Alas for their hopes! Once seated in the Presidential chair, the new President forgot, apparently, all the promises made during the elections and while the revolt against Diaz was in progress. No attempt whatever was made to fulfil them, for the sufficient reason that they were impossible of fulfilment at this time, with conditions in Mexico as they were.[3]

With all of his popularity, Madero had other men in Mexico to be considered and powerful forces to be placated. The most important of these forces was the Church. The influence of this strong body could not fail to make itself felt. Madero recognized this fact and felt the necessity of putting himself in good standing with the Catholic clergy, lest, with their control over the great body of illiterates and the use of the Australian ballot and a broader franchise, they might compass his defeat at the polls.

In addition there were two men of great prominence in the field for the presidency, Francisco de la Barra and General

---

[3] Gruening, op. cit., p. 95.

Bernado Reyes, men with aspirations and strong followings. Reyes, an old soldier of prominence, had formerly been governor of Nuevo Leon and recently Secretary of War in the Diaz Cabinet, from which he had been dismissed by the President and sent to Europe in disgrace. He was now back in Mexico, and like de la Barra was in the running for the presidency. To secure himself on one side Madero entered into a compact with the Church and obtained its support, an act which lost him a considerable following. To placate Reyes he offered him the position of Secretary of War in the coming Cabinet. This idea was flouted by the Maderist party, who hated Reyes, and when the latter offered his name as a condidate for the presidency the outbreak of opposition was so strong that before the election he was forced to flee from the country. De la Barra, on the contrary, was shrewd enough to refuse the nomination for the executive office, being well assured that he had no chance of winning.[4]

Madero, meanwhile, was taking steps to keep himself prominently in the minds of the people and to indicate the kind of government he proposed to institute. In July he made public a plan for the equalization of the taxes, and another providing for national irrigation, of the type of

---

[4] Priestly, op. cit., pp. 402-403.

that recently instituted in the United States. He proposed the construction of dams and canals, the reclamation of waste lands, and the prevention of periodical failures in the crops. A further proposition was to remove from office the officials who had been active under the Diaz administration. His purpose in this was to guarantee peaceful conditions for the new government.[5]

The election, which took place on October 1, 1911, showed that the people regarded him as the man of the day, since they gave him an almost unanimous vote.[6] For Vice-President Jose Pino Suarez was elected. When Madero entered upon the office of President it was to find that the existing conditions were not calculated to yield him a peaceful administration. Congress was not in sympathy with him, and was little disposed to aid him in the measures of reform which he had in mind and had promised the people. Nor did the country as a whole show a disposition to cooperate with him actively in these measures. All the partisans of the old regime, and they were many and influential, were opposed to what they considered Madero's idealistic schemes. Many of the lower class, who had imbibed the idea that the lands of the rich were to be freely distributed among the poor, and that wages were to be largely increased,

---

[5] Morris, op. cit., pp. 254-256.

[6] Callcott, op. cit., p. 200.

were soon discontented. Nothing of the kind had been promised, but the peons had expected it and resented the lack of the measures they had anticipated.

While this feeling of dissatisfaction was gathering and growing, General Reyes, the late candidate for the presidency, attempted to inaugurate the old system of a resort to arms. He sought to make Texas a safe place to organize a military expedition against Madero. The United States arrested him and sent him back to Mexico City.

Pascual Orozco, who had been Madero's chief agent, and now commanding Federal troups in the State of Chihuahua, threw off the mask in February, 1912, declaring himself an enemy of Madero. General Salas was sent with a force of 1,600 men to fight Orozco. Orozco with a force of 5,000 completely annihilated the small force of Salas.[7]

General Huerta, the Federal commander who had been operating against Zapata in the south, was sent against Orozco. Orozco was defeated by Huerta. (only 200 men lost on both sides.) Huerta then advanced to Jimenez, and halted there for a week. While there a quarrel broke out between Villa and Huerta. Villa was arrested and ordered to be executed. Fortunately for Villa there was present Emiliano Madero, a brother of the President, who sent news of the incident to

---

[7] Morris, op. cit., pp. 256-259.

the capital. The president wired back, staying the execution, and later releasing Villa. The Federals did not care much whether they put down the insurrection or not. The Federal army was made up a great deal on the line of the old Diaz administration, and it was lukewarm in the Madero cause. The inactivity of Huerta led the President to distrust him, and finally ordered him to the capital.

The worse state of affairs at this time was in the southern State of Morelos, where the bandit chief, Emiliano Zapata, created much disorder and suffering by his depredations. He and his followers entered upon a course of barbarous activity, destroying property, abducting women, slaying prisoners and practicing other atrocities. On July 21st a train from Mexico to Cuernavaca was held up and eighty-four persons slaughtered.[8]

By October matters in general seemed much improved. Orozco in his rebellion had lost him the support of the better class of his followers, and his movement degenerated into one of brigandage. But the Mexican people had been too long accustomed to a vigorous administration of affairs to be satisfied with a weak hold upon the helm of state, and although

---

[8] Ibid., pp. 259-261.

Madero meant well and no one questioned his honesty, he was looked upon as a weak and unpractical man. All this led to a loss of public confidence.[9]

Diaz thought he could overthrow President Madero and proceded to issue a pronunciamento inviting all opponents of the government to join him in the effort to overthrow Madero. But the support in which he had trusted failed him. Diaz and several officers were captured, tried and sentenced to death. The President interfered and Diaz, even in prison, continued to plot and succeeded in communicating with his adherents.[10]

At the beginning of February, 1913, President Madero had reason to believe that he had overcome his enemies. He had been a year and a quarter in the presidency, Orozco and Zapata having sunk out of sight as revolutionists and turned back to their true vocation of Brigandage. Reyes and Diaz were in prison and apparently rendered incapable of trouble All looked clear and promising; there was not a cloud visible on the sky of his presidential career.

To the astonishment and dismay of the people and the friends of Madero, on the night of the 8th of February, 1913, Diaz and Reyes were set free. A section of Federal troops

---

[9] Priestly, op. cit., pp. 405-408.

[10] Bancroft, op. cit., p. 533.

joined Diaz and the insurrection against the government was started. General Blanquet and Huerta suddenly turned against their chief, joined their forces to those of Diaz, and all was at an end. Madero was put under arrest by the insurgents, and Huerta was proclaimed Provisional President. To justify himself for his act of treachery, Huerta declared that he deemed it necessary to take this course to prevent further sacrifice of life and property in support of a man whom the people were not willing to sustain. His supporters having turned traitors, President Madero's cause at once became hopeless.[11]

On the night of the 22nd the two captives, Madero and Suares, were taken from the palace and sent under guard to the Penitentiary, to be held there until the Senate should decide upon what action was to be taken in their case. In this short journey a tragedy occurred that shocked the world. As the prisoners and their escorts neared the Penitentiary, shots were fired. When it was over both captives lay dead. It was asserted by the soldiers who shot them that the

---

[11] United States Foreign Relations, (1913) pp. 720-723.
Also Tannenbaum, op. cit., p. 154.
Also Abreau, op. cit.
Also Mrs. Nelson O'Shaughnessy, A Diplomats Wife in Mexico, (Harper & Bros., New York & London 1916) pp. 221-222.

captives sought to flee. The Law of Flight, under which any one who seeks to escape arrest by flight, whatever the charge against him, may be summarily shot down, has long served in Mexico as a convenient method of disposing of many men that are obnoxious to the party in power.[12]

The feeling was general that the soldiers were acting under the orders of Huerta. Huerta was widely accused of the murder of his predecessor in office. The foreign diplomats in Mexico sustained the same view and refused to acknowledge the new government.[13] This sentiment was felt in many parts of Mexico as well as in foreign countries, and several of the state governments refused to acknowledge the authority of the new ruler.[14] Governor Carranza of Coahuila, especially maintained a hostile attitude, refusing to acknowledge the rule of the assassin, and opposition also existed in the State of Sonora.[15] The Mexican point of view with regard to the assassination has never been understood by the Americans. The Mexican people were not as a rule so shocked by the assassination of Madero. Mexicans who favored

---

12 Callcott, op. cit., pp. 226-227.

13 United States Foreign Relations, (1913) pp. 770-772. Also H. H. Fyfe, The Real Mexico, (G. Allen & Unwin, London 1930) p. 126.

14 Lodge, op. cit., p. 412.

15 Bancroft, op. cit., p. 536. Also Smith, op. cit., p. 81.

Huerta maintained that if Huerta did kill Madero it was good politics; the followers of Madero, while protesting that they were sorry their chief had been killed, admitted they could understand the attitude of the opposition as constituting good politics.[16]

---

16 Sen. Doc. No. 7665, 66 cong., 2 sess., 1919-1920, I, p. 770.

Chapter IV

Huerta, the Constitutionalist, and Mexico's Relations with the United States

The method by which Victoraiano Huerta officially secured the title of president of Mexico was as follows: as soon as the recognition of Madero and Pino Suarez had been accepted, the Minister of Foreign Relations, Pedro Lascurain, automatically succeeded to power. His first act was to announce the name of Victoriano Huerta for the office of Minister of Governacion. On confirmation of the nomination President Lascurain forthwith resigned as the chief executive. When this resignation was accepted, Huerta as head of the cabinet, became the President ad interim. The whole affair had consumed from 10:24 P.M. to 11:20 P.M., Pedro Lascurain being a fifty-six-minute President.[1]

During the moments of surprise and horror that followed the overthrow of the constituted government, the governor of the State of Coahuila, Senor Venustiano Carranza, and after him the governor of the State of Sonora, Senor Jose Maria Maytorena, and a group of members of Congress had the courage

---

1 United States Foreign Relations, (1913) p. 826.

to protest against the crime and in favor of the constitution. In order to render these protests more effective they rose in arms.[2]

At this point it is desirable to note that the pretended government set up by those who overthrew Madero had never been legal. In the first place, the resignation obtained from him was secured, if it existed, through misrepresentations as well as by moral and material pressure; by duress. In the second place, the Chamber of Deputies, before which he ought to have appeared and by which he should have been received, during the night of the extraordinary session, when it was given notice of the existence of that document, lacked a legal quorum, having no more than 90 of the 120 members, which, according to the law, constitutes its relative majority. In the third place, when the acceptance of the resignation of Madero was obtained from the chamber, prior to the taking of the oath of office as provisional President by Huerta, moral and material violence was employed against its members, to whom were communicated threats that if they did not forthwith accept the resignation of Madero he would at once be sacrificed without mercy. Simultaneously a battalion of troops was stationed

---

[2] Ibid, pp. 772-774.
Also 63 cong., 1 sess., (1913) XXI, p. 8.

under the arches of the Legislative Palace, and the galleries of the chamber were filled with soldiers, a demonstration of armed force intended to intimidate, as it did, the members in the free exercise of their duty. A member from the State of Guadalajara says: "I protested against all and each of these unlawful acts, and there were five others who, in spite of the menace, voted against the acceptance of the resignation of Madero."[3] The chamber was not legally constituted at the time and was under moral and material pressure; so that, by right, its action was void, rendering the Government of Huerta illegal.[4]

On the other hand, the authority of Carranza and Matorena, representing the executive power of the sovereign States of Coahuila and Sonora, respectively, as well as that of Castillo Brito, governor of the State of Campeche, was sustained by the constitution and the law. Therefore they were not rebels. On the contrary they were, as in duty bound, promoters of an effort to vindicate the constitution.[5] They were the remnant of the government of Madero. Those who were really rebels were Huerta and his cousurpers, who trampled the constitution under foot and defied society.[6]

---

[3] 63 cong., 1 sess., No. 6536 (1913) XXI, p. 9.

[4] Fyfe, op. cit., p. 128.

[5] United States Foreign Relations, (1913) p. 756.

[6] 63 cong., 1 sess., op. cit., p. 10.

The prompt determination of Governor Carranza to take arms rather than submit to Huerta[7] impelled the proclamation of what is known as the "Plan of Guadalupe," which was, at the same time, approved by a large number of military chiefs who rallied about him with their respective commands. This plan reads more or less as follows:

> 1. We repudiate General Victoriano Huerta as president of the Republic, the legislative and judicial powers of the Federation.
> 2. For the organization of the military forces necessary to make compliance with our purpose we name first chief of the force, which shall be called "Constitutionalist," Don Venustiano Carranza, governor of the State of Coahuila.
> 3. On the occupation by the Constitutionalist force of the City of Mexico, the executive power shall be taken charge of by Don Venustiano Carranza, first chief of the forces, or whoever may be substituted in command.
> 4. The President ad interim of the Republic shall convoke general elections as soon as peace shall be established, delivering the power to the person who shall be elected.
> 5. The person acting as first chief of the Constitutionalist forces will assume charge as provisional governor of States as have recognized Huerta, and shall convoke local elections, after which the persons elected shall assume their duties.
>
> Signed at the estate Guadalupe, Coahuila, on the 26th day of March, 1913.

This rather simple but direct declaration devoid of high sounding phrases and complex considerations, met with a high approval at once by a vast majority of the people of

---

[7] United States Foreign Relations, (1913) p. 742. Also Priestly, op. cit., p. 420.

the northern States, and later by 90% of those of other parts of Mexico when its terms became known.[8]

Carranza was quickly in the field with a force of some strength and military equipment. The governor of Sonora joined in this movement of revolt, and it quickly spread to Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas, organized resistance breaking out simultaneously in many widely separated sections of the north. Obregon was put in command of the forces raised, and fought a fierce battle with the Federal troops, driving them from the whole of Sonora except the port of Guaymas, which they continued to hold. At the same time Villa, who had so narrowly escaped execution at the hands of Huerta, and had no love for that personage, organized a force in Sonora, while Urbina did the same in the north of Durango. The greatest difficulty of the revolutionist at this stage of the conflict was the lack of arms and money, but this was partly overcome by the Madero family, which contributed $1,000,000 in support of the movement.

The rebels spent most of their time tearing up roads and railroads, while the Federals spent most of their time rebuilding them and chasing the elusive rebels. Orozco and Salazar were induced to join the Federal army.

Obregon had in his ranks a considerable number of Yaqui

---

[8] 63 cong., 1 sess., op. cit., pp. 10-11.

Indians, among the best fighters in the land. At Ojeda, Obregon with 4,000 men came into contact with the Federal troops with 1,600 men and defeated them, with a loss of only 200 rebels against 800 of the Federal's.

The most important work of the campaign, however, was that accomplished by the elusive Villa. On October 1, Villa took Torreon, which was a severe blow to Huerta, both from its importance as a railroad center and the effect upon the public mind of the loss of a stronghold so far south. Overriding the while vast region of the north, one after another of the cities; Tierra Blanca, Juarez, Chihuahua, Torreon, San Pedro, Tampico and Ojinaga fell before Villa. The capture of Ojinaga from the Federals ended the power of Huerta in northern Mexico.[9]

A considerable part of the border between the United States and Mexico is little more than a mathematical expression, no line of demarcation existing and the territories of the two countries meeting each other on an open plain. At points frontier towns of the two republics approach so conspiciously near that they almost run together. At one time a conflict between the two opposing Mexican forces took place so near the border line that bullets whizzed from Mexico into the United States and endangered the lives of persons in the

---

9 Morris, op. cit., pp. 276-307.
Also Bancroft, op. cit., pp. 536-541

town of Douglas, Arizona.

On the 14th of March, 1912, President Taft issued a proclamation forbidding the exportation of arms to Mexico during the struggle in that country. Power to do this had been granted him by Congress.[10] When Wilson succeeded Taft as President this prohibition was allowed to stand unchanged, though as time went on and the insurgents showed indications of winning in the struggle many Congressmen urged that it should be lifted as the surest means of bringing to an end the hostilities existing in Mexico. By the end of 1913 Mexico had become divided between two factions, the whole northern section being in the hands of the revolutionists, the southern section in those of the Huertists, though in the latter case not fully, since the Zapata brigands were in control of a considerable part of the south.[11]

The argument brought by General Carranza and his fellow leaders was that their control over Mexico was equal to that of the illegal Huertists, the territory under their control larger than that held by the latter, and their right to consider theirs as the actual government better than that of a man whose power rested on the murder of the legitimate

---

10 Review of Reviews arrangement of "The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson," I, p. 55.

11 Callcott, op. cit., pp. 236-238.

president and nomination by a Congress of his own making. But as matters stood the Huerta faction was able to purchase arms in Europe and Japan and import them freely, as they held all ports.[12]

The Huerta administration in Mexico was early recognized by several European powers,[13] including Great Britain, Spain and France. The British recognition was said to have been instigated by the fact that British subjects were holding large petroleum interests in Mexico.[14] Later, however, when it became evident that the United States would not recognize a government founded on force, the British recognition was declared to be only temporary, and open to withdrawal. Europe in general showed a similiar disposition to follow the lead of the United States.[15] Henry Lane Wilson, the American ambassador to Mexico, had expressed the belief that the Huerta government was innocent of any connection with the murder of President Madero, and asked for its recognition.[16] This was not given. The policy adopted continued to be a waiting one,[17] though accompanied by the

---

[12] Callcott, op. cit., p. 238.

[13] United States Foreign Relations, (1913) pp. 799, 805-807.

[14] C. R. Fish, American Diplomacy, (American Book Co., New York 1925) p. 484.

[15] United States Foreign Relations, (1913) pp. 828-866.

[16] Ibid, pp. 736, 807.

[17] Ibid, pp. 737-739.

presence of large armed force on the frontier and ten ships of war in the Gulf waters. Many believed that there was nothing the United States could not have done with Huerta if they would. Mrs. O'Shaughnessy believed that all concessions, all claims, pending through decades, could have been satisfactorily adjusted.[18]

The attitude of President Wilson was clearly stated in the following address:

> It is clearly my duty to lay before you, very fully and without reservation, the facts concerning our present relations with the Republic of Mexico. The deplorable posture of affairs in Mexico I need not describe, but I deem it my duty to speak very frankly of what this Government has done and should seek to do in fulfillment of its obligation to Mexico herself, as a friend and neighbor, and to American citizens whose lives and vital interests are daily affected by the distressing conditions which now obtain beyond our southern border.
>
> Those conditions touch us very nearly. Not merely because they lie at our very doors. That, of course, makes us more vividly and more constantly conscious of them, and every instinct of neighborly interest and sympathy is aroused and quickened by them; but that is only one element in the determination of our duty. We are glad to call ourselves the friend of Mexico, and we shall, I hope, have many an occasion, in happier times as well as in these days of trouble and confusion, to show that our friendship is genuine and disinterested, capable of sacrifice and generous manifestation. The whole world is interested as never before. Mexico has a great and enviable future before her, if only she choose and attain the path of honest constitutional government.
>
> The present circumstances of the Republic, I deeply

---

[18] Mrs. Nelson O'Shaughnessy, op. cit., p. 104.

regret to say, do not seem to promise even the foundations of such a peace. We have waited many months, months full of peril and anxiety, for the conditions there to improve, and they have not improved. They have grown worse, rather. The territory in some sort controlled by the provisional authorities at Mexico City has grown smaller, not larger. The prospect of the pacification of the country, even by arms, has seemed to grow more and more remote; and its pacification by the authorities at the capital is evidently impossible by any other means than force. Difficulties more and more entangle those who claim to constitute the legitimate government of the Republic. They have not made good their claim in fact. Their successes in the field have proved only temporary. War and disorder, devastation and confusion, seem to threaten to become the settled fortune of the distracted country. As friends we could wait no longer for a solution which every week seemed further away. It was our duty at least to volunteer our good offices--to offer to a sist, if we might, in effecting some arrangement which would bring relief and peace and set up a universally acknowledged political authority there.

Accordingly, I took the liberty of sending the Hon. John Lind, formerly governor of Minnesota, as my personal spokesman and representative, to the City of Mexico, with the following instructions:

1. All fighting in Mexico to cease.
2. An early and free election to be held.
3. General Huerta not to be a candidate for the presidency at this election.
4. All parties to abide by the results of the election.[19]

In speaking to the Mexican Foreign Secretary Mr. Lind seems to have emphasized United States power by calling attention to the fact that it could use a financial boycott, that it could recognize the rebels, and finally, it could

---

19 Review of Reviews, op. cit., pp. 18-26.

intervene.[20] The negotiations continued, but the United States was firm in its demand that Huerta must cease to be a candidate for the presidency. On October 27, 1913 President Wilson again referred to the attitude of the United States toward Mexico, as follows:

> Comprehension must be the soil in which shall grow all the fruits of friendship, and there is a reason and a compulsion lying behind all this which is dearer than anything else to the thoughtful men of America. I mean the development of constitutional liberty in the world. Human rights, national integrity, and opportunity as against material interests--that, ladies and gentlemen, is the issue which we now have to face. I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest. We must unite in sympathy and in spiritual interest with the Latin American peoples. We are only emphasizing the points of our own life, and we should prove ourselves untrue friends to them.[21]

Without American recognition the Mexican government could not obtain a foreign loan, the financial interests abroad feeling it dangerous to risk their funds on such doubtful security. The financial straits of the Huerta government at length proved so severe that the payment of interest due January 1, 1914, on the Mexican national debt was suspended. This greatly increased the stringency of the relations between the Mexican and foreign administrations.[22]

---

[20] Mrs. O'Shaughnessy, op. cit., p. 44

[21] Review of Reviews, op. cit., pp. 32-37.

[22] Morris, op. cit., p. 312

The position maintained by Ambassador Wilson, that the Huerta government was innocent of any connection with the murder of President Madero and should be recognized by the American government, became in time so embarrassing to President Wilson that he recalled the ambassador.[23] Wilson, as President made the tacit diplomatic bargain by which Great Britain agreed to support American policy in Mexico and the President secured from Congress a repeal of the exemption from tolls of coastwise vessels of the United States using the Panama Canal.[24]

To Congress in his annual message December, 1913, the President disclaimed any intention of intervention as follows:

> There is but one cloud upon our horizon. That has shown itself to the south of us, and hangs over Mexico. There can be no certain prospect of peace in America until General Huerta has surrendered his usurped authority in Mexico; until it is understood on all hands, indeed, that such pretended governments will not be countenanced or dealt with by the Government of the United States. We are the friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions; because in no other way can our neighbors, to whom we would wish in every way to make proof of our friendship, work out their own development in peace and liberty. Mexico City of Mexico has broken down, and a mere military despotism has been set up which has hardly more than the semblance of national authority. It originated in the usurpation of Victoriano Huerta, who, after a brief attempt to play the part of constitutional President, has at last

---

24 66 cong., 2 sess., No. 7665. (1919-1920) p. 773.

Also Callcott, op. cit., p. 239

Also Review of Reviews, op. cit., p. 57.

> cast aside even the pretense of legal right and declared himself dictator. As a consequence, a condition of affairs now exists in Mexico which has made it doubtful whether even the most elementary and fundamental rights either of her own people or of the citizens of other countries resident within her territory can long be successfully safeguarded, and which threatens, if long continued, to imperil the interests of peace, order, and tolerable life in the lands immediately to the south of us. Even if the usurper had succeeded in his purposes, in despite of the constitution of the Republic and the rights of its people, he would have set up nothing but a precarious and hateful power, which could have lasted but a little while, and whose eventual downfall would have left the country in a more deplorable condition than ever. But he has not succeeded. He has forfeited the respect and the moral support even of those who were at one time willing to see him succeed. Little by little he has been completely isolated. By a little every day his power and prestige are crumbling and the collapse is not far away. We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of watchful waiting. And then, when the end comes, we shall hope to see constitutional order restored in distressed Mexico by the concert and energy of such of her leaders as prefer the liberty of their people to their own ambitions. [25]

The foreign powers accepted this policy. Under British leadership their diplomatists in Mexico City formally advised Huerta to accept the demands of the United States. The implied threat had very little effect upon Huerta, who stood defiant of all protesting powers. He immediately made the following declaration:

> When I resign it will be to seek a resting place six feet in the soil. When I flee the capital it will be to shoulder a rifle and take my place in the ranks to fight the rebels. [26]

---

[25] Review of Reviews, op. cit., pp. 37-47.

[26] Morris, op. cit., p. 314.

During the month of November the feeling of the powers grew more decided in favor of using force against the Mexican dictator, and on the 3rd President Wilson plainly told Huerta that he must resign the presidency of Mexico without loss of time, and must not leave as his successor General Blanquet.[27] The plans of the American President were backed by England, France and Germany, which joined in ordering Huerta to withdraw. The President urged all Americans to leave the country, and Congress voted an appropriation of $100,000 to aid Americans who were destitute of the necessary funds for the homeward journey.[28]

The method of "watchful waiting," which had been broken at times by ineffective efforts to force Huerta to resign, went on until February 3rd, when a new step was taken by the American President, that of lifting the embargo on trade in arms which had existed for nearly two years, and opening the way for the Constitutionalists to place themselves on a level with the Federal forces of Huerta.[29] This step went far towards equalizing conditions between the contending factions.

---

[27] 66 cong., 2 sess., No. 7665, (1919-1920) p. 775.

[28] House Joint Resolution No. 130, 63 cong., 1 sess.

[29] Review of Reviews, op. cit., pp. 55-57.
Also Statutes at Large, XXXVIII, pt. II, p. 1992.

The proclamation had scarcely been made public before the supply of arms in the military stores at El Paso was exhausted by the demand from Juarez. Larger supplies were set in motion from New Orleans toward the border. During the previous period smuggling of arms over the border had occurred to a considerable extent, and a large quantity of arms that had been seized and held by the border patrols was now set free and permitted to reach those who long before had paid for them.

The officials at Washington now began freezing out the Huerta government from obtaining funds from Europe. The refusal of recognition on the part of President Wilson had put the nations into a somewhat awkward attitude. The shadow of the Monroe Doctrine lay across the path of action on the part of foreign powers, and they felt chary of taking any decisive step under the circumstances. As the United States had so long stood forward as the guardian of the weaker American republics, the watch-dog over American interests in general, the attitude of this country regarding the Mexican or any Latin-American question had grown to be looked upon as antecedent to any decision on their own. They preferred to have "Uncle Sam" pull their chestnuts out of the fire.[30]

---

[30]Morris, op. cit., pp. 316-319.

Chapter VI

The Tampico Incident and the Rise of Carranza

The policy of "watchful waiting" adopted by the President of the United States in regard to the belligerent conditions existing in Mexico came to a sudden and striking end on April 9, 1914. The presence of American warships in Mexican waters, and the anti-American feeling rapidly mounting among Huerta's followers, produced a procative incident, which at the disposition of a less patient and humanitarian President of the United States might have led to prolonged intervention. A party of uniformed American sailors went on shore with a launch at the port of Tampico to buy gasoline. Local military officials summarily arrested them and took them from the boat flying the American flag to headquarters, where they were quickly released. Admiral Mayo, commander of the maval forces, demanded a salute to the American flag by way of reparation.[1]

Huerta saw a possible chance, by provoking the United States into forceful action, to strengthen his position by rallying opposing Mexican factions behind him. He refused the salute. President Wilson backed up the Admiral. He informed Huerta that if the salute were not given he would

---

[1] S. F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, (Henry Holt & Co., New York 1936) pp. 548-549.

turn the matter over to Congress. When a president of the United States resorts to such a statement he usually is sure that Congress will support forcible action. Huerta, still adamant, Wilson informed Congress that Tampico was only one spectacular incident in a series of events which showed contempt for American rights. Disclaiming aggression or purpose of intervention, he asked for authority to use force if necessary to bring about a proper respect for the flag of the United States. Congress supported the request overwhelmingly. The vote in the House was 323 to 19. The vote in the Senate 72 to 13.[2]

The President had to act before the resolution passed the Senate. Just as the German merchant ship Ypirango, was about to land a cargo of arms at Vera Cruz, Admiral Mayo's forces shelled the defenses there (April 21, 1914) and, after some sharp fighting, took the customs house and the entire city, and seized the ship. There followed a proclamation prohibiting the importation of arms into Mexico. Huerta sought in vain to rally all armed Mexicans to a united resistance of the "invader." The "constitutional" opposition, under Carranza and other leaders, looked with increasing disfavor upon the American occupation of Vera

---

[2] Review of Reviews, op. cit., pp. 59-63.

Cruz, "a violation of the national sovereignty," as Carranza notified the Department of State, but, with success so imminent, they would not rally to Huerta.[3]

The immediate duty of the American occupation was to prevent delivery to Huerta forces of a cargo of munitions from the German steamer Ypiranga. The munitions arrived and were delivered at another port. There was sharp street fighting in Vera Cruz, in which several American and many Mexican lives were lost; Huerta ended diplomatic contacts on April 22. War loomed imminent. In principle it actually existed.[4]

President Wilson's position at Vera Cruz was as unwelcome to himself as it was to his opponent. He accepted with alacrity an invitation of the diplomatic representatives of the Argentine, Brazil, and Chile in Washington to mediate. At their instance a conference met at Niagara Falls, to which the revolutionists, the Huerta party, and nine Hispanic American countries were invited. The Carranza group accepted only "in principle," and its representatives, arriving in June, played the part of observers rather than of participants.[5] The effort to avert war took the form of an attempt to find a

---

[3] Bancroft, op. cit., p. 543.
Also Bemis, op. Cit., pp. 548-549.

[4] Priestly, op. cit., p. 423.

[5] 66 cong., 2 sess., No. 7665 (1919-1920) pp. 779-789.

provisional president who would prove acceptable to all parties concerned. In this the Conference was unsuccessful, as the Carranza forces declined to participate officially in the deliberations, their chief's attitude being one of resentment against the constructive intervention in Mexican internal affairs. Huerta's representatives had few instructions, little influence, and less authority. His appeal to appeal to Carranza for aid to repel the Americans had been properly rejected by that governor and self-styled chieftain, for Huerta had, since his dissolution of his Congress,[6] no legal authority, let alone moral, upon which to base his claim to the administrative power. The net result of the Conference was to affirm the oft-repeated dictum of President Wilson, "Huerta must go."[7]

Very shortly, the continued successes of the revolutionists, aided as they were by the intransigent attitude of the United States, brought Huerta to a realization of his physical danger. The forces from the north had been steadily drawing nearer while the last phases of his discomfiture were being enacted. Early in July he had made a futile effort to carry out "elections" again, but these resulted more ineffective than the early effort of the preceding autumn. It was evident

---

[6] Review of Reviews, op. cit., p. 63.

[7] Priestly, op. cit., p. 424.
Also Rippy, op. cit., p. 337.

that there was no help through intervention by Hispanic American nations, no recognition from the United States, no loan from any source, no funds of any kind, no hope of escaping ultimate defeat at the hands of his enemies.

On July 15th Victoriano Huerta dictated a bombastic resignation, acknowledging in effect that he had been forced out of office by President Wilson.[8] "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the abdication and flight of Huerta, in July 1914, was directly related to the withdrawal of British support." Of course rebels were pressing from all sides and the roar of discontent of the masses was everywhere heard, but the overthrow of Huerta must be largely credited to persistent pressure of the United States.[9] The remnant of power which he left behind was confided to the hands of his Chief Justice, Francisco S. Carbajal, now made Minister of Foreign Relations, whose sole governmental function was to be the surrender of the executive power to the Constitutionalist Army within a month. Huerta fled, a German steamer taking him away under the protection of Emperor Wilhelm's flag. Some two years later he made his way back into the United States from Europe, to foment armed activity in Texas against the power of Carranza. In this violation of the neutrality laws of the United

---

[8] Priestly, op. cit., p. 425.

[9] Callcott, op. cit., p. 241.

States he brought about his arrest by agents of the American government. Being taken ill, and evidently with little time to live, he was released from confinement, and presently died in the same year.[10]

The high lights of American intervention may be summarized as follows:

1. The undisguised concern with which Washington saw the fall of Madero, who was considered friendly to United States financial interests in Mexico, and the establishment of a de facto regime presided over by General Huerta, who was known to favor British oil interests.
2. The stand adopted by President Wilson at the outset of the Huerta regime, declaring "We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition," and refusing to recognize it on the ground that it had been created by violence and unconstitutional means.
3. The paternalistic attitude of President Wilson in suggesting Huerta's withdrawal, and stating before Congress: "The present situation in Mexico is incompatible with the fulfillment of international obligations on the part of Mexico, with the civilized development of Mexico herself, and with the maintenance of tolerable political and economic conditions in Central America," thereby arrogating to himself the tutelar task of preserving good government in neighboring foreign countries. President Wilson had said: "I am going to teach the South American republics to select good men."
4. The direct interference of President Wilson with the political contest in Mexico when he sent personal representatives to deal with the various factions and suggested the terms upon which peace should be established.
5. The open opposition to Huerta's continuance in power, which President Wilson avowedly admitted and promised to maintain "by such means as may be necessary."
6. The diplomatic pressure exerted on foreign powers, to prevent their support of the Huerta regime.
7. The military aid given to Huerta's opponents, and the blocading the finances of Huerta's government.

---

[10] Priestly, op. cit., p. 425.

8. The Tampico flag incident, and the asking of the use of armed force because "the dignity of the United States was at stake."

9. The capture of Vera Cruz, major Mexican port, without previous declaration of war, by naval forces of the United States. The customs, by the taking of this port cut Huerta's income a million pesos a month, thus creating an economic blocade.

10. The failure of the Niagara Conference, and the protests of the faction opposed to Huerta in Mexico.

None of these actions could find a justification in the accepted rules of international law. They reveal an undisclosed intervention of the government of the United States in the domestic affairs of Mexico. They savor of imperialism, even if the man ultimately responsible for them was not motivated in his paternalistic attitude by selfish designs, but by an ill-advised idealism which wandered too high above the earth to recognize the limits of national sovereignty.[11]

---

11 Gaston Nerval, Autopsy of the Monroe Doctrine, (The MacMillan Co., New York 1934) pp. 276-280.

Chapter VII

Carranza and the New Constitution

The elimination of Huerta did not bring peace to Mexico. Rival revolutionary armies, under Zapata in the southwest and the bandit Villa in the north among others, ravaged the country. Wilson's task now was to get placed in authority a group which could command the support of the people of Mexico as a provisional government that could receive the sanction of later free elections, a government that could guarantee protection of American and other foreign life and property in Mexico. The Carranzistas, despite their unsympathetic response to Wilson's attitude, seemed to offer the best chance of such a government.[1]

Confusion, murder and pillage, swept Mexico. Anxious to hasten the establishment of order, President Wilson summoned a conference of diplomatic representatives of six Latin-American powers--the Argentine Republic, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Bolivia and Uruguay--at Washington (August, 1915) to advise on which warring faction to recognize and support as the government de facto of Mexico.

---

[1] Rippy, op. cit., p. 340.

The conference invited representatives of the Mexican groups to participate. Despite the fact that Carranza refused the invitation and consistently denied the right of outside parties to give advice to Mexico, the conferees announced their decision that the Carranzista party was "the only party possessing the essentials of recognition as the de facto government of Mexico." This was an anxious response to the desire to see somebody in authority in Mexico whom foreign powers could support and with whom they might expect to make conventions for the settlement of claims and the protection of lives and property of their nationals. The United States then promptly (October 19, 1915) recognized de facto Carranza's authority, followed by similiar action by the six Latin-American conferee powers. "We will aid and befriend Mexico," President Wilson explained to Congress, but will not coerce her."[2]

The de facto recognition of Carranza proved premature. He was unable to control the ravaging chieftains who refused to accept his leadership. The most notorious and bloodthirsty of these, Pancho Villa, operating in the northern states, deliberately attempted, by a series of sanguinary incidents, to provoke an armed intervention of the United States which

---

[2] Bemis, op. cit., pp. 550-551.
Also, Review of Reviews, pp. 133-155.

might enable him to supplant Carranza in public estimation as a leader of a patriotic revolutionary Mexico to repel the hope for invasion. Carranza had invited American mine owners, who had abandoned their properties on advice of their government, to return and operate the mines. A group of fifteen graduate engineers promptly entered the State of Chihuahua for this purpose. Villa's forces took the young men from a railroad train and murdered them in cold blood at Santa Ysabel (January 10, 1916).[3] The Congress of the United States passed a resolution (March 7, 1916) for armed intervention, but Wilson accepted, this time, the promise of Carranza to punish the perpetrators of the massacre. To this day they have gone unpunished. Next Villa led a hostile raid on American soil, "shooting up" the town of Columbus, New Mexico, with the loss of seventeen American lives--innocent citizens killed within their own country, in their own home town (March 9, 1916).[4]

President Wilson with the quick approval of Congress, immediately sent a punitive expedition of 15,000 militia on the southern frontier against further contingencies, to supplement the regular army, a military episode which exhibited to

---

[3] 66 cong:, op. cit., p. 348.
Gibbons, op. cit., p. 248.
Bemis, op. cit., p. 551.

[4] Ibid.
Also A. P. Payne, Pershing's Punitive Expedition, (Thesis Oklahoma Agricultural & Mechanical College 1927) pp. 3-9.

the world such a lamentable unprepardness for war that it encouraged Mexicans of all groups, including Carranza, to resist American demands, however reasonable. The untamed Villa perpetrated new raids into Texas (affairs of Glen Springs and Bonquillas, May 5, 1916), which happened at the time of the Lusitania crisis with Germany.[5]

From now on the increasing uncertainty of American neutrality and the war in Europe exerted its influence on the benevolent "watchful waiting" of the exasperated President Wilson. Carranza refused to accept American requests for co-operative action for the suppression of Villa with American troops on Mexican soil. Another column of 8000 crossed the frontier over the rising protests of Carranza. The Department of State again publicly advised all American citizens remaining in Mexico to leave. The American President was sincere in his explanations that these punitive expeditions were necessary to prevent further and general intervention, for which public opinion within the United States began to clamor, led by Theodore Roosevelt, and backed of course by those people whose legitimate investments in Mexico were being wiped out.[6] The second pursuit of Villistas led to a collision with

---

[5] United States Foreign Relations, (1916) pp. 538-545. Also Bemis, op. cit., p. 553.

[6] Payne, op. cit., p. 45.
Also Bemis, op. cit., p. 553.
Also Gibbons, op. cit., p. 248.

Carranza's forces at Carrizal. Other smaller attacks on American naval or land forces on the ports and frontiers of Mexico showed the eager enmity of Carranza's Government. General hostilities seemed to have been averted only by a hair's breadth by Carranza's prudence in accepting Wilson's demand (June 25, 1916) for the immediate release of 17 troopers who had been cut off and made prisoners at Carrizal.

A series of futile conferences (at New London, Atlantic City, Philadelphia and New York) between commissioners of the United States and of the de facto Mexican Government, endeavored in vain to agree on bases for evacuation of Pershing's regiments, based on a right to intervene again when necessary and sufficient promise of protection by the Carranza forces. Only when the crisis of approaching war with Germany developed, in January, 1917, did Wilson order the withdrawal of the troops, without adequate guaranties. The Mexican Congress, acting as an electoral college, elected Carranza as President, March 11, 1917, and established a new constitution, embodying the reforms of the Revolution.[7] It was a spectacular victory for Carranza, who maintained his authority successfully--through not faithfully to the principles of the Revolution--in Mexico during the remainder of the World War, in which the

---

[7] Bemis, op. cit., pp. 552-553.
Also Tannenbaum, (T. M. A. R.) p. 172.

United States was envolved.

The New Constitution

Venustiano Carranza belonged to one of the leading families of the State of Coahuila. He was educated at the City of Mexico and began a course of study at the National School of Law, but was caused to abandon it because of trouble with his eyes. But his splendid preparation put him in a position to become highly cultured. In his personality he was a thinker; he spoke but little; he was famously honest and well to do. He was about 55 years old at the time of the overthrow of Huerta.[8]

For over two years Carranza ruled Mexico as a dictator. There was no Congress in session when his government was recognized by the United States and Europe and none had been called after that. This situation was embarrassing from an international standpoint especially for the United States. She had refused to recognize Huerta on the ground, not only that he was a murderer, but that he was not the constitutionally elected president of the Republic.[9] This being true, since

---

[8] 63 cong., 1 sess., No. 153, (1913) XXI, p. 6536.

[9] Smith, op. cit., p. 209.

Carranza had not been duly elected by the people, it was hard for her to give the Carranza government full support. This situation was recognized by Carranza. He called a duly elected convention to meet in Queretero in December and during the next two months an entirely new constitution was formed and signed by the members of the convention, January 31, 1917. It was proclaimed to the people as the new law of the land by Carranza February 5th. This constitution has given rise to more international troubles as well as domestic litigation than any other document ever accepted by a Mexican Congress.[10]

To begin with, this assembly did not represent, by any means, all classes in the Mexican republic. Previous loyalty to the Constitutionalist cause was a prequisite of each delegate to the Convention.[11] The spirit of the convention was to correct all the evils of the nation which had accrued during the last four hundred years. The idea with reference to correcting these evils seemed to be to dethrone the class which had always been down-trodden. Consequently, this convention was the culmination of class feeling. Hatred for the ruling class had grown all through the revolution and it was only to be expected that there would be no land barons represented

---

[10] Tannenbaum, op. cit., pp. 166-167.

[11] 66 cong., op. cit., p. 314.

in the convention.

A summary of the Constitution may be condensed in the following fundamental points:

1. A general tendency to progressive reform in a revolutionary sense. The remains of the old feudal classes and the wealthy middle class, on the strength of their social, political and economic privileges, lorded it over the proletarian classes. The principles of the Mexican Revolution sought to level up the working class or at least to better its condition. (Art. 123.)

2. The former economic regime upheld the principles of free industrial or commercial competition, with no limits other than private agreements between companies or firms.

The formula of transition was intervention by the State in economic production, and as a controlling, supervising and balancing agency (managed economy.) (Art. 28.)

3. The bourgeois system recognized private ownership of all property, without limitations and as an absolute and personal right. The Mexican constitutional system recognizes private property, but with limitations in the public interest and considering it as a social function; it endeavors to promote small holdings, small industries, the property of Indian agrarian communities and cooperative forms of production and consumption, and the utilization of credit and technical methods for the cultivation of the soil. (farming, schools and banks.) (Art. 27.)

4. The bourgeois regime did not permit the organization of labor organizations nor their taking part in the managing functions of industry. The Constitution recognized the standing of workers' organizations in the form of unions, grants to them a moderate intervention in production and works for community of interest between workers, peasants, and soldiers. (Art. 123)

5. A tendency to complete separation of the Church and the State and curtailment of Church action in educational functions. (Art. 130)

6. Stricter State control over charities, education, and public health.

7. Emancipation of woman by making the bonds of family organization ampler and less rigorous.

8. A struggle against clerical fanaticism and any remaining interference by the Roman Catholic Church in education, politics and ownership of property in mortmain.
9. A strong nationalistic tendency, in the sense of promoting the development of a strictly Mexican culture, but connected with créole or Spanish-American, Iberian and European cultures, and with all those that have contributed to form the heritage of present-day humanity.[12]

A mistake of this constitution was the granting of universal suffrage. Because with such a high degree of illiteracy it would be impossible to have good government with the vote in the hands of everyone. It would have been better to restrict suffrage to the portion of the population able to read and write, regardless of social class or race. Under this plan as the lower classes became elevated they would automatically be given the franchise. Thus the possibility of having a large body of voters which could be bribed or persuaded to vote in one way or another through an emotional appeal.[13] In the words of Senior Abreau: "Mexico needs more democratic tendency without allowing democracy to be excessive freedom, because that wouldn't be democracy."

Carranza had been recognized as de facto head of the Republic of Mexico in October, 1915, after he had refused to abide by promises he had made not to assume the presidency,

---

[12] 66 cong., op. cit., pp. 446-449.

[13] Tannenbaum, op. cit., pp. 168-173.

and had quarreled with Francisco Villa and others of his companions in arms against Huerta. Recognition was bestowed, not in full confidence, but in the belief that Carranza led the party which had made the most effective campaign against the prevailing disorders and which was most likely to succeed in the pacification of the country.

Carranza's Constitution of 1917 was never really in force or accepted. It was too idealistic for practical use. Carranza undertook to revolutionize the government upon a socialistic theory while a corrupt military oligarchy and a none too honest set of civilian officers vitiated whatever was good in the new plan by the most cynical grafting.[14]

The President had disregarded electoral formalities, imposing his own candidates as governors in numerous states, and had used these gentlemen to further his design to seat his own candidate as his successor, had arrested the partisans of Obregon, and imprisoned, upon flimsy charges, the members of Congress who opposed his political program. In external affairs the non-payment of the interest on the public debt, and the observance of a neutrality in the Great War which veiled only too thinly a wish for German success fathered by the thought that a European friend might rise up to check

---

[14] Priestly, op. cit., pp. 441-442.

the hegemony of the United States upon the American continent, combined to complicate a difficult situation.

The political campaigns of would-be successors were waged for a year and a half. Early in January of 1920 the well-known fact of Obregon's lead in the race was recognized. He was a popular revolutionary idol. He was a popular candidate from a foreigners viewpoint. He was the only man who had ever defeated Villa. He had fathered several startling attempts to amend the new Constitution, thereby earning the enmity of Carranza. He had practically admitted that he would start a revolution if there were not a fair election. It was generally felt that if he did so he would surely win, as the majority of the military were for him.

In January a force of picked military police were sent to Sonora to fight Yaqui supporters of Obregon, who controlled that state politically. These traditional enemies of the central government had been on the warpath several months.

On February 11, Carranza told an assembly of governors that he would not hold the presidency after the expiration of his term, and that if no executive were elected Congress would name one.[15]

On April 3, a threatened strike by the employees of the

---

[15] Priestly, op. cit., pp. 444-446.

Southern Pacific of Mexico broke out. This was the signal for the officials of Sonora to begin the revolution. On April 15th Obregon escaped from Mexico City in disguise.[16] It was but a short time until the states of Nayarit, Michoacan, and Chihuahua joined the "Obregonists," The attempt of Carranza to deal with the revolution from the eastern side was futile.[17]

The Liberal Constitutionalist Party (Obregon's party) made a demand that Carranza should relinquish his office, and under declarations contained in the Plan de Aqua Prieta, set up Adolfo de la Huerta as supreme commander until such time as the States joining Sonora should make a choice. A provisional president was to be named as soon as the Plan should be adopted by the Liberal Constitutionalist Army. The Plan announced a policy of protection to all citizens and foreigners and the enforcement of all their legal rights. A determination to develop industries, commerce, and business in general was especially emphasized.[18]

The legal government continued to camouflage the situation by claims of strength, but its position was serious. More than

---

[16] United States Foreign Relations, (1920) p. 130.

[17] Ibid, pp. 130-140.

[18] Ibid, pp. 150-152.

50,000 troops joined the cause of Obregon.

On May 5th President Carranza issued his last manifesto. He declared that he would fight to the finish, that he would not resign, nor turn the power over to anyone not his duly elected successor. While Carranza was making this declaration, he was preparing to transfer the government to Vera Cruz, whence so many hard-pressed forlorn hopes have been able to "come back." Twenty-one trains, collected and equipped at great effort, were to carry away 20,000 troops, carloads of records, and millions of treasure (100,000,000 pesos.) In addition to the troops there was a carload of employees of state, the cabinet, the Supreme Court, and the Permanent Commission of Congress. Misfortune attended every step.[19] There was delay and confusion in getting off. Attacks on the convoy began almost at once. Before they passed La Villa the last four trains were cut off. Finally, after his trains were cut to pieces and unusable and his troops defeated at Aljibes, Carranza tried to escape for the Puebla mountains. A man named Herrero killed Carranza on the night of May 18th, while he slept in a mountain shack at Tlaxcalantongo, in the State of Puebla.

The body of Carranza was brought back to Mexico City,

---

[19] United States Foreign Relations, (1920) III, p. 148.

where he was buried in the cemetery of Dolores. Adolfo de la Huerta was chosen Substitute President by the reorganized Congress. He served the unexpired term of Carranza, that is, until the end of November, 1920.[20]

---

20 Priestley, op. cit., p. 452.
Also Tannenbaum, op. cit., (T. M. A. R.) p. 185.

Chapter VIII

Alvaro Obregon.

After the fall of Carranza the Obregon forces quickly consolidated their power. Congress at once organized, or reorganized, itself and recognized Adolfo de la Huerta as provisional president. Obregon, himself, was pacifying the country and preparing for the general elections to take place in September. He was elected with little or no opposition and started his own administration of four years on December 1, 1920. From this date the Constitution of 1917 really first became a force. Most of the labor and agrarian legislation dates from after 1920. Obregon was the only man who had the mixture of ability, sterness, tact, and prestige to control the army, the old conservative elements of Church and aristocracy, the bandit organizations, who were mostly pro-Church and reactionary, the land reformers, who wanted spoils in many cases, the Yaqui Indians wanted their lands and privileges, and lastly the radical labor organizations.[1]

President Obregon, seeking full recognition of his government, offered his personal assurances for the security of

---

[1] Callcott, op. cit., p. 289-290.

American property and citizens in Mexico[2] and the ownership of lands acquired by American citizens before the adoption of the new Constitution of May 1, 1917. He would shape his policy, he said, "according to the dictates of law and morality." Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes, in the new Republican Administration of President Harding, insisted that recognition be contingent upon a treaty which would explicitly bind the Mexican nation itself to adequate guaranties. Obregon refused this. Eventually Hughes gave way and accepted, instead of a treaty, a statement of agreement written into a protocol of informal conferences in Mexico City--the so-called Bucareli Conferences--of a commission composed of delegates from the two countries.

In the Bucareli Conferences, the two countries negotiated two claims conventions for the settlement of all outstanding claims between the two governments: one, a general claims commission of 1868; the other, a special claims convention for Claims arising out of the Revolution, 1910-1920. The United States formally recognized the government of Mexico, de jure, under the presidency of General Obregon. (August 31, 1923)[3]

When a revolution broke out in the north against the

---

[2] United States Foreign Relations, (1921) II, pp. 396-417.

[3] Bemis, op. cit., p. 556-560.

established Mexican Government, the United States saved it by selling, on deferred payment, munitions to the constituted authorities. Numerous army officers longed for the good old days of disorder when they could plunder more or less at will, have plenty of excitement, and still be both patriots and heroes. Of the 508 generals in the army 102 joined the rebellion. Added to these were about 3,000 minor officers and over 23,000 men.

The rebels announced as the cause of their opposition the attempts of Obregon to foist Calles upon the country. The leader of the movement, De la Huerta, was generally looked upon as the representative of the Cientificos, the old conservatives, and the clergy. It has been claimed that all of these groups helped to finance the movement. To support the administration, Obregon could depend upon his own organization, "a section of labor and the agrarians."

The President seems to have been almost criminally negligent up to this time, but, once aroused, his activities were definite and effective. The rebels had not concentrated or co-ordinated their forces, so the government struck fast and furiously under the leadership of Obregon and Calles. By the latter part of 1924, the President reported that all the states but Morelos were pacified.[4]

---

[4] Callcott, op. cit., pp. 314-315.
Also Gruening, op. cit., pp. 42, 44, 320, 322, 107.

Chapter IX

Plutarco Elias Calles.

The transmission of office when General Obregon finished his term, and Calles took over the Presidency, did not take place altogether peacefully. Before and after the elections, uprisings took place that were severely repressed by the Government. In 1928, while electioneering for Calles, Obregon was assassinated by a Catholic fanatic. Calles was commander--in-chief of the army under Obregon, under whom he served as Minister of Interior and head of the Cabinet. In accordance with the law he resigned his office in 1923 on announcing his candidacy for the presidency. In the election he was faced with no serious opposition and took office December 1, 1924.[1]

Calles carried on the revolutionary program of Obregon. Faced by a deficit of 47,000,000 pesos and a badly disorganized treasury on account of the defalcation of De la Huerta, the new President had no easy task. A thorough housecleaning, coupled with strict economy and efficiency, produced surprising results. In nine months the budget was balanced, interest payments on the foreign debt had been resumed, and a new

---

[1] Callcott, op. cit., pp. 316-317.
Also Sabre, op. cit., p. 349.

national bank with a gold reserve of 68,000,000 pesos was established.[2]

The Nicaraguan issue complicated Mexican-American relations for a short time. The Mexican Government supported the "Liberal" Government of Sacasa and the United States the "Conservative" Government of Diaz. On January 10, President Coolidge, in a message to Congress, charged that Mexico was shipping munitions to Nicaragua. He thereupon intervened, sent marines and sailors to Nicaragua, effectively routed the Liberal forces of Sacasa, and established Diaz firmly in the presidential chair. American public opinion, and good sense used by the Mexican government prevented a conflict from arising.

President Coolidge sent Ambassador Dwight Morrow to Mexico in 1927, where he succeeded in restoring an abundant measure of good will between the estranged people and governments. He showed a sympathetic understanding of Mexico's heavy problems, and he was resourceful in his manner of turning public opinion to friendly appreciation. One of the spectacular devices thus promoted was the exchange of nonstop aerial flights between the two capitals.[3]

---

[2] Gruening, op. cit., p. 107.
Also Callcott, op. cit., p. 317.

[3] Bemis, op. cit., p. 561.

Chapter X

Lincenciado Emilio Portes Gil, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, and General Abelardo L. Rodriguez.

On September 1, 1928, General Calles drew up the bases of a new system of government, for the purpose of limiting dictatorial methods and substituting a government by institutions, for government by men exclusively. Political control and the dignity of Chief of the Revolution continued to be vested in General Calles, with modifications consisting in a presidential system and a State political party, which at the same time constitute limitations upon and amendments to the old procedure of theoretical democracy and actual dictatorship.[1]

This system was consolidated during the provisional presidency of Lincenciado Emilio Portes Gil, under whose government the agrarian policy of land distribution and strengthening of the peasant class was prosecuted with still greater intensity; an autonomous National University was established; the National Revolutionary Party was placed in active operation as a State institution; the rebellion provoked by the electioneering problem was put down, and also the religious conflict which seemed to have been settled by

---

[1] Zabre, op. cit., p. 351.

submission of the clergy to laws and regulations, and the task of putting into legal form the social conquests of the Revolution, especially by drafts of labor and agrarian laws and amendments to civil and criminal legislation was continued.

After Pascual Ortiz Rubio was president, and on his resignation in September, 1933, General Abelardo L. Rodriguez was appointed Provisional President; he persevered in revolutionary policies and especially aimed at betterment of the working classes by means of legislation on minimum salaries. He was succeeded, on November 30, 1934, by General Lazaro Cardenas.[2]

---

[2] Ibid., p. 352.

Chapter XI

General Lazaro Cardenas

(1934-1940)

The program of General Lazaro Cardenas' Government is marked by the framing of a definite plan of political and administrative action, to be carried into effect during the six years of the presidential term. The plan is quite similiar to that of the "New Deal" program of President Roosevelt. The Six Year Plan includes the whole of the tendencies previously adopted by former revolutionary governments, in an advanced onward march, in a radical direction.[1]

Revolutions are traditionally so popular in Mexico, that the party in power continues to call itself the Revolutionary Party, although twenty-seven years have elapsed since this particular revolution was launched of which the present administration is the lineal descendant. Few countries in recent years have had governments which made greater protestations as to solicitude for workers and farmers.[2]

Many persons believe that ownership of private property,

---

[1] Zabre, op. cit., p. 353.
Also Abreau, op. cit.

[2] Ibid.

particularly land, has been abolished in Mexico. This is not the case. Conditional ownership has merely been substituted for unrestricted, perhaps irresponsible ownership. While title to land, water and subsoil resources is declared vested in the state, exclusive possession of lands and certain waters may be granted to private persons. Not only are substantial land holdings continued for existing owners as a matter of law under the Constitution of 1917, but individual distribution of cultivatable lands is required of such parcels as have been made available to the landless through the process of restitution or dotation. Common ownership is in force only for certain urban zones, pasture land and wood land and for necessary water rights.[3]

According to the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations, 4,400,000 acres were awarded to 119,000 heads of families from February to November, inclusive, of 1934.

Per capita income in Mexico was calculated at $36,00 per annum in 1929, as compared with $657.00 in the United States. Local and foreign observers seem to share the opinion that the agricultural workers and the inhabitants of the rural villages have bettered their condition during the administration of Cardenas. Mexico did not feel the

---

[3] Beteta, op. cit., p. 58.

impact of the depression as acutely as was the case in industrial countries, but it was sufficiently affected to require suspended judgment in regard to the social value of its labor and agricultural programs.[4]

Commendable efforts are being made to extend irrigation. Since 1926, water was furnished to 737,500 acres. For 1935 approximately $2,775,000 was appropriated for this purpose.

As to Education we go to the Constitution for its definition: "Education imparted by the State shall be socialist, and in addition, shall exclude every religious doctrine, shall combat fanticism and prejudice, and to this end the school will organize its teaching and activities so as to permit the creation in the young of a rational and exact conception of the universe and of social life." There is no law in Mexico prohibiting parents to teach their children anything they please, provided they do not use the schools for that purpose.[5] The Constitution was ammended in 1934 declaring: "That the Government had the exclusive right to direct both primary and secondary education and that private schools could be established only if they accepted the ideas, the text-books, and the non-religious attitude of the Government. It was thought that the merely negative principle so

---

[4] Beteta, op. cit., p. 58

[5] Ibid, p. 76.

principle so far established was not enough. The Church had a certain philosophy of life, well defined economic ideas and well-known methods. The Government should, likewise, establish and teach its ideals, preach and defend the economic ideas of the Revolution and forbid the breeding of a class of enemies whose continuous efforts from the time of the Independence had been directed towards the getting of the control of the government, in order to foster their own privileges. This reform is know in Mexico as the establishment of "socialistic" education.[6]

More than 74% of the Mexicans were illiterate in 1900. The Revolution, in spite of the many economic difficulties it has encountered and the opposition of the Catholic church, had in 1925 reduced that figure to 59% for the total population and to 47% for the age-group ten to fourteen. The Mexican-Six-Year Plan provides that no less than 16% of the total annual budget of the Federal Government be devoted to education. The Plan calls for a continuous increase of the educational budget until by 1939 it amounts to 20% of the total annual Federal budget.[7]

From the standpoint of foreign relations, the Mexican Government in 1936 voted for the economic sanction during the conflict between Italy and Ethiopia. Through the International

---

[6] Emilio Portes Gil, The Conflict Between the Civil Power and the Clergy, (Press of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City, 1935) pp. 100-112.

[7] Beteta, op. cit., p. 170.

boundary Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has continued to cooperate with the Ministry of Communications and Public Works in work for rectification of the Channel of the Rio Grande, and also for defense works along the lower course of this same river.

The General Claims Commission, Mexico and the United States of America, has been functioning under the Protocol of April 24, 1934. During the period covered (1936) 270 Mexican claims against the United States, aggregating two hundred and fifty-one million pesos, and 1,149 American claims totalling four hundred and forty million pesos, have gone through the various stages of procedure. During 1936 Mexico was represented at several Congresses and Conferences, among which were: Labor Conference inaugurated at Santiago, Chile, December 30, 1935; the Pan American Conference of Health Directors, held at Washington; the Association of American Librarians, held in Virginia; the International Labor Conference held at Geneva, June 1936; and the Universal Historical and Geographical Congress, held at Buenos Aires.

20,000 rifles and 20,000,000 rounds of ammunition were sold to the Spanish Government, through their Ambassador, H. E. Felix Gordon Ordaz.[8]

---

[8] Lazaro Cardenas, Message to the Mexican Congress (1936) (Ministry of Foreign Relations 1936) pp. 32-40.

Mexico's greatest triumph from a Foreign Relations standpoint came December 13, 1936 as brought out in the Roosevelt Buenos Aires Peace Conference. The non-intervention doctrine embodied in an international commitment binding all the American Republics unanimously approved by the Roosevelt Buenos Aires Peace Conference, crowned Mexico's efforts of many years.

Mexico sponsored this doctrine at the Havana Conference, in 1928, where it was defeated by the joint attack of Victor Maurtua, Peruvian delegate, and Charles E. Hughes, United States delegate. Again in the Montevideo Conference, in 1934, Mexico championed it. Then the United States delegation, headed by Cordell Hull, was agreeable to the Mexican resolution yet could not commit the United States.

The first definite triumph Mexico won came when President Roosevelt, shortly after Mexico's efforts at Montevideo, made a momentous declaration at the Wilson Foundation Dinner in Washington, December 28, 1934, that it was his policy as President not to intervene in the internal affairs of foreign nations.[9]

In that epoch-making speech, for which Salomon de la Selva

---

[9] Mexican News Letter (December 13, 1936)

of the Centro de Estudios of Panama awarded President Roosevelt the 1935 prize for the greatest contribution to better relations between the American nations, the United States Chief Executive said:

> It has seemed clear to me as President that the time has come to complement and to implement the declaration of President Wilson (that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest, and that material interests must never be made superior to human liberty) by the further declaration that the definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention.[10]

Throughout the period of intensest United States interference in Latin American countries, which reached a climax during Philander C. Knox's tenure of the State Department in 1909, with the intervention in Nicaragua, and which culminated with the war the United States waged against General Sandino also in Nicaragua from 1927 to 1933, there grew in Latin America a strong anti-United States feeling voiced by practically every decent citizen of these countries. These men were usually dubbed by the imperialist press of North America as "professional Anti-Americans." In his Wilson Foundation speech President Roosevelt paid his respects to these patriots:

> I do not hesitate to say, that had I been engaged in a political campaign as a citizen of some other American republic I might have been strongly tempted to play upon

---

[10] Ibid.

> the fears of my compatriots of that republic by charging the United States of North America with some sort of imperialistic desire for selfish aggrandisement.

Accused of having written the Haitian Constitution while he was Under-Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson cabinet, Franklin D. Roosevelt, with that spiritual transformation which now makes him a beloved and trusted continental figure, knew better in 1934 what his feelings would have been as a citizen of these republics so long and cruelly harried and injured during the pro-slavery growth of the United States about the middle of the past century, and from 1909 to 1933 in the present century.[11]

> As a citizen of some other republic, President Roosevelt said, I might have found it difficult to believe fully in the altruism of the richest American republic. In particular, I might have found it hard to approve of the occupation of the territory of other republics, even as a temporary measure.

His great enunciation repudiating armed intervention, already quoted, followed. It must be born in mind that he was supposed to be eulogizing Woodrow Wilson. He could hardly have used stronger terms, in repudiating the Knox doctrine which Wilson also followed, when he said:

> The maintenance of constitutional government in other nations is not a sacred obligation devolving upon the United States alone. The maintenance of law and the orderly process of government in this hemisphere

---

[11] Ibid.

> is the concern of each individual national within its own borders first of all.
>
> It is only if and when the failure of orderly processes affects the other nations of the continent that it becomes their concern; and the point to stress is that in such event it becomes the joint concern of a whole continent in which we are all neighbors.

Still, that statement fell a little short of what Mexico was striving for. "Armed" intervention alone was repudiated. Manipulation of Cuban politics at the time of that statement and later-the role of self-appointed "Mediators" between Cuban factions played by Ambassadors Sumner Wells and Jefferson Caffery made it evident to Latin American opinion.

Eventually Roosevelt would denounce this other sort of intervention also, which he did on various occasions, especially in 1935, refusing the many requests made by the Knights of Columbus, a Roman Catholic association with million of members in the United States, to interpose his "good offices" in Mexico in behalf of alleged governmental "anti-Catholicism" here in Mexico.[12]

There is no doubt that the United States delegation, which at Montevideo sympathized with but would not commit their country to the outlawing of intervention of all kinds, was sent to Buenos Aires instructed to uphold Mexico's long

---

[12] Ibid.

defended contention. By this token it has been made manifest that the United States and Mexico have cemented as never before a mutual friendliness insuring the closest cooperation for maintaining peace.[13]

SUMMARY

The Mexican revolution which began in 1910 may be divided into two periods--that between 1910 and 1920, and that between 1920 and the present. The period between 1910 and 1920 was characterized by popular revolution. The movements headed by Madero, Zapata, Carranza, and Obregon were essentially popular uprisings against military tyranny and feudal aristocracy, with a program at first shadowy but constantly growing more definite--a program that gradually laid more and more emphasis upon a change in the position of the large mass of the common people of Mexico. Since 1920 all of the revolutions have been seesntially military rebellions against the continuance in power of those groups that had fought the earlier revolutions of 1910 and 1920, and had for their objectives the modification of the agrarian and

---

[13] Ibid.

industrial features embodied in the Constitution of 1917. The upheavals from 1910 to 1920, were democratic and popular. Those between 1920 and 1934 were military and reactionary.

This revolution, reaching over a period of 24 years, that has surged over Mexico like a turbulent sea, seemingly planless and without any idealogical formulation, has thus finally crystallized into a constitutional order, the application and enforcement of which is the present source of Mexico's external and internal difficulties.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Abreau, L. P., Consul de Mexico, Personal interview, (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, June 11, 1937).

Beteta, Ramon, Program Economico y Social de Mexico, Cindad de Mexico, Press of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Mexico City, 1935).

Cardenas, Lazaro, The President's Message to Congress, Ministry of Foreign Relations, Press of the ministry of Foreign Relations, (Mexico City, 1936).

Gil, E. P., The Conflict between the Civil Power and the Clergy, Historical and Legal Essay, Press of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Mexico City, 1935).

Hispanic American Historical Review, II, (1919).

House Document 57 cong., 2 sess., Number 305.

House Joint Resolution Number 130, 63 cong., 1 sess., (1913).

Pan American Union Bulletin, XXXI, (July, December, 1910), pp. 555-557.

Review of Reviews Arrangements of Woodrow Wilson Messages and State Papers, I.

Senate Document Number 6536, 63 cong., 1 sess., XXI.

Senate Document Number 7665, 63 cong. 1 sess., XXI.

Senate Document, 58 cong., 3 sess., LXVI.

The Mexican News Letters, National Revolutionary Party, Foreign Information Bureau, (Mexico City, December 13, 1936).

United States Commercial Relations, I, (1902).

United States Foreign Relations (1910).

United States Foreign Relations (1911).

United States Foreign Relations (1912).

United States Foreign Relations (1913).

United States Foreign Relations (1920).

United States Foreign Relations (1921).

BIBLIOGRAPHY(cont'd)

Primary Sources

Zabre, A. T., History of Mexico, Press of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Mexico City, 1935).

Secondary Sources

Baerlein, H. P. B.,Mexico, The Land of Unrest, The Macmillan Company, (1928).

Bancroft, H. H., History of Mexico, The Bancroft Company, (New York, 1914).

Bulnes, Francisco, The Whole Truth About Mexico, The American Book Company, (New York, 1931).

Bemis, S. F.,A Diplomatic History of the Unites States, Henry Holt & Company, (New York, 1936).

Collcott, W. H., Liberalism In Mexico 1857-1929, University Press, Stanford University, California, (1931).

Fish, C. R., American Diplomacy, American Book Company, (New York, 1925).

Fyfe, H. H. The Real Mexico, G. Allen & Unwin, (London, 1930).

Gibbons, Edward,Mexico Under Carranza, Ol. Burt Company, (New York).

Gruening, E. H., Mexico And Its Heritage, The Century Company, (New York, 1928).

Lodge, Henry Cabot, History of Nations, P. F. Collier & Son, XXII, (New York, 1913).

MacHugh, R. J., Modern Mexico, Methven,(London, 1914).

Morris, Charles, The Story of Mexico, L. T. Myers Company, (1914).

Murray, R. H., Porfirio Diaz At First Hand, World Work, XXII, (May, October, 1911).

Noll, A. H. From Empire to Republic, Chicago A. C. McClurg & Company (1903).

O'Shanghnessy, Mrs. Nelson, A Diplomats wife in Mexico, Harper & Brothers, (New York & London, 1916).

BIBLIOGRAPHY(cont'd)

Secondary Sources

Payne, A. P., Pershings Punitive Expedition, A & M College, (Thesis, 1927).

Priestly, H. I., The Mexican Nation, The MacMillan Company, (New York, 1930).

Rippey, J. F., The United States and Mexico, Alfred A. Kapf, (New York, 1914).

Smith, L. M. American Relations With Mexico, Harlow Publishing, (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 1924).

Taunenbaum, Frank, Peace By Revolution, The Brookings Insitute, (Washington D. C., 1936).

Taunenbaum, Frank, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, The Brookings Institute, (Washington D. C., 1930).

Typist Maurine Chilton