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GRADUATE COLLEGE

IS THERE ANYBODY OUT THERE?: TOWARD AN
AUDIENCE ORIENTED WRITING PEDAGOGY

A Dissertation

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

BRIAN ARTHUR JOHNSON

Norman, Oklahoma

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
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
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
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
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CHAPTER ONE

Audience and Competing Histories

To begin, I want to consider a well-known model within composition and rhetorical studies: the rhetorical triangle, which features as its three points the speaker/author, the hearer/reader, and the speech/text. This basic model, also known as the communication triangle, suggests that writers, readers, and texts are the only factors which need concern rhetoricians as they seek to describe the totality of any given communicative act. The value of this model has been noted by many, as it has become a basic element in fields as diverse as rhetoric, literary theory, philosophy, and modern communication theory. But the limitations are fairly obvious as well. An important critique of the rhetorical triangle would be that its three points pay little attention to the context in which communication takes place, or to the reality to which communication refers.

In his seminal work, *A Theory of Discourse: The Aims of Discourse*, James Kinneavy argues that "the so-called communication triangle" lays out the basic "interrelationships of expressor, receptor, and language signs as referring to reality," and that these three factors combine to form a "structure [that] has dominated rhetorical theory for twenty-three centuries" (18). In addition to "encoder," "decoder," and "signal," he adds a fourth element, which he terms "reality." Kinneavy states that "Basic to all uses of language

are a person who encodes a message, the signal (language) which carries the message, the reality to which the message refers, and the decoder (receiver of the message)" (19). Finally, in addition to the speaker, audience, text, and reality, Kinneavy argues that "Discourse, therefore, is characterized by individuals acting in a special time and place" (22). This interest in the time and the place in which the more traditional elements of the rhetorical triangle occur is really an interest in the context in which discourse occurs. The importance of the rhetorical triangle also extends beyond rhetoric and composition studies. In M.H. Abrams' *The Mirror and the Lamp* (first published in 1953) for instance, we see an arrangement similar to Kinneavy's. Abrams describes four essential "elements" of a "work of art." The "work" of art itself, the "artificer" who produces the work, the "subject" to which the work refers (and which is thus grounded in reality), and the "audience" that observes the work (6).

Of all of these considerations, of speaker/writer, hearer/audience, speech/text, reality, and context, the concept of the writer/speaker has arguably received the most attention from within rhetorical studies, beginning with ancient Greek rhetoricians attempts to create excellent orators and to describe excellent oratory, through to the mid twentieth century's preoccupation with locating and/or preserving an author's authentic "voice," a

movement seen most clearly in the work of Ken Macrorie and Peter Elbow.¹ More recently, attention has been paid to the "subjectivity" of authors, to the ways that writers and their texts are bound up with the contexts in which they find themselves. In its most extreme form, this move to understand writers in terms of the contexts in which they write leads to what Roland Barthes has termed the "Death of the Author." The author is "dead" because we no longer feel the need to attribute the production of discourse to discrete individuals. Instead, we are increasingly aware that the "author" is really simply a "scriptor," a body that "no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, impressions, but rather [an] immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt" (147). Barthes suggests that if we abandon the unrealistic overvaluation of individual writers, we can move on to the study of textuality itself, acknowledging that while discourse often flows through author/scriptors, it is in no way dependent on them. The study of discourse is far more important than considerations of the author for Michel Foucault as well. Since, rather than asking "how does a free subject penetrate

¹ In *Writing with Power*, Elbow describes the process which led him to emphasize authorial voice over other concerns: "...gradually, a new and mysterious standard began to emerge. That writing was most fun and rewarding to read that somehow felt most 'real.' It had what I am now calling a voice. At the time I said things like, 'it felt real, it had a kind of resonance, it somehow rang true'" (283). In *The I-Search Paper*, (a revised edition of *Searching Writing*) Ken Macrorie argues that students who are forced to reject their own voices and their own interests are left to produce "Engfish, a name one of my [Macrorie's] students gave to the say-noting, feel-nothing, word-wasting, pretentious language of the schools" (22).

the density of things and endow them with meaning?" we should be more concerned with finding out "under what conditions and through what forms can an entity like the subject appear in the order of discourse; what position does it occupy; what functions does it exhibit; and what rules does it follow in each type of discourse?" (148). Answers to these questions help us to understand the "author-functions" which we enact when we write. Understanding these functions entails an appreciation not of the skills individual writers display, but rather of the ways in which discourses course through and around us.

In composition theory, the move to understand the author as the "subject" is clearly articulated in Lester Faigley's *Fragments of Rationality: Postmodernity and the Subject of Composition*. Faigley argues that the "author" can no longer be thought of as autonomous and self-determining, but must instead be considered as one player within a field of players, all of whom shape and are shaped by each other, by history, and by culture. In Faigley's estimation, "postmodern theory understands subjectivity as heterogeneous and constantly in flux" since "the subject, like judgements of value and validations, has no grounding outside contingent discourses" (227). The author/subject certainly exists in this construction, but not in any way which resembles the constructions Elbow and Macrorie would call "authentic." Instead, the individual finds subjectivity through an appreciation of the "contingent discourses" which swirl around him or her. Despite substantial

shifts in what we mean by speaker, author, or individual, the producers of texts have remained centrally important to the study of rhetoric from antiquity through to the current day.

Almost as carefully studied as the notion of the speaker/writer has been that of context and of the speech/text. In ancient rhetoric special attention was paid to the occasions for speaking, as well as the stylistic concerns and genre-specific conventions of epideictic, judicial, and legislative speeches.² In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, arguments for the primacy of the text have come to us from what has come to be known as the Current-Traditional paradigm, the paradigm from which most rhetorical instruction was taught beginning in America in the nineteenth century. Richard Young describes the Current-Traditional paradigm thus:

emphasis [is placed] on the composed product rather than the composing process; the analysis of discourse into words, sentences, and paragraphs; the classification of discourse into description, narration, exposition and argument; the strong concern with usage (syntax, spelling, punctuation) and with style (economy, clarity, emphasis), the preoccupation with the

² In *The Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric: Appropriations of Ancient Discourse*, Kathleen Welch cautions us not to blindly accept these as being the only categories of speech from antiquity, but rather to consider them together as a tripartite way the rhetoric of the ancient world has been transmitted to us through what she terms the "Heritage School" of rhetorical interpretation and instruction.

informal essay and the research paper; and so on. (quoted in Crowley, 13)

According to Young then, the Current-Traditional paradigm from which composition was taught drastically reduced the importance of rhetorical and persuasive concerns and simultaneously magnified attention to the mechanical details and surface features of texts. Additionally, Current-Traditional rhetoric focuses on texts, not on the processes whereby texts come to be. According to Sharon Crowley, the rise of Current-Traditional rhetoric was linked to the tradition of faculty psychology, which emphasized that the human mind was "divided into compartments," each of which housed one of the faculties, or propensities, of the individual (16). Crowley argues that "since it was beyond the province of pedagogues to contribute to the quality of minds--aside from recommending certain habits and practices that might strengthen them--writers in the later tradition transferred its concern with minds to concern with the shape of texts. The hope was that a well-formed text would reflect a well-oiled mind at work" (13). With no direct access to the functioning of the human mind, the best substitutes instructors could rely on were the products of the mind, among them finished texts. According to Crowley, Current-Traditional rhetoric remains the dominant mode of composition instruction in our own time, and while this contention has been and will continue to be hotly debated, we can at least agree that texts,

ostensibly "finished" texts, represent one of the central focal points of writing instruction.

Along with considerations of the speaker/author, context, and speech/text, audience has long been thought of as one of the most central aspects of any rhetorical theory. Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* devotes the bulk of Book 2 to considerations of audience, focusing especially on strategies intended to help speakers accurately imagine their audiences' tastes and proclivities. Further, Book 2 provides strategies intended to help rhetors capitalize on the attitudes and emotions of their audiences. These strategies are broken down into discussions of *ethos*, *logos*, and *pathos*, which work together to help audiences perceive speakers as being believable, intelligent, and logical; and which help speakers imagine the emotional wants and needs of audience members. More recently, Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede have articulated a central question concerning audience: are readers actual parties for whom writing can be intended, or are they instead invented within the writer's mind? According to Lunsford and Ede, the problem with *only* imagining readers or with *only* addressing audiences is that in either case we fail to "adequately... recognize (1) the fluid, dynamic character of rhetorical situations; and (2) the integrated, interdependent nature of reading and writing" (156). If we assume that writers only "address" readers, we do not allow for the sheer unknowable variety of rhetorical encounters that exist, nor do we guarantee that the audience has been addressed appropriately. If, on the

other hand, we assume that writers only "invoke" readers, we are likely to fail to realize that a text and/or its author might be engaged by audience members who were not adequately invented or properly invoked in the first place. As a solution to this dilemma, Ede and Lunsford advocate a simultaneous invoking and addressing of audiences by writers. This interest in audience also extends to the domain of literary studies, centering on the reader-response theories developed by Wolfgang Iser, Stanley Fish, David Bleich, and others. According to Nan Johnson, comparing reader response theory with "contemporary rhetorical theories of audience response" can lead to a deepening of our understanding of "critical notions of how and why texts become meaningful" (152).³ But despite the attention paid to audience by, among others, Aristotle, Andrea Lunsford, Lisa Ede, James Porter, and reader response theorists, I contend that, compared to considerations of the speaker/writer or of the speech/text, the concept of audience has been seriously under theorized and therefore remains the most seriously underdeveloped aspect of the rhetorical triangle. This is true despite the seeming obviousness of audience as an important consideration for

³ Johnson goes on to describe an English course that "combines the study of writing and reading in a fundamentally different way from how we normally treat composition instruction and literary study. In a curricular sense, we tend to isolate these subjects from one another as if writing to communicate and reading to interpret were fundamentally unrelated acts pertaining to different types of texts" (164). I will explore this move to combine the traditional categories of reading and writing more fully in chapters three and four, in which I consider James Berlin's notion of critical pedagogy.

composition and rhetoric studies. Whereas writers and/or the texts they produce have been and remain dominant within current composition studies, audience considerations are consistently granted far less time and energy. Rather than merely stating to ourselves and students that audience is important, writing instructors and rhetorical theorists need to find historical precedents which can help to describe the ways that audience is important, the ways that audience can be effectively theorized for writing situations, and the ways that audience can be used as an effective aspect of the teaching of writing. I think we need to expand the concept of audience to include previously overlooked historical instances of its theorization and to suggest future formulations of audience that can be used productively in the classroom. Thus far, when audience has been the central focus of recent composition and rhetorical theory, it has typically been "treated" and/or replaced by concepts that are overtly concerned with finding the common ground between writers and readers. This common ground which writers and audiences share has been described by some through the idea of "discourse communities," as can be seen in the work of James Porter, David Bartholomae, Douglas Park, and Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford. For many contemporary theorists of audience then, the idea of the discourse community eventually comes to replace their earlier considerations of audience. But what is meant by "discourse community," especially as the term is deployed within the fields of composition studies and rhetorical theory? Also, why must

concerns over the discourse community come to replace those of the audience? I offer a reading of James Porter's *Audience and Rhetoric* in order to answer these questions, and it is to his work that I will now turn.

Porter and the Rejection of Audience

One of the best and most helpful pieces of work concerning audience is James Porter's *Audience and Rhetoric: An Archeological Composition of the Discourse Community*, published in 1992. Here, Porter treats the history of audience as a concept that is central to composition and rhetoric and asserts that it is one of the most important, yet least understood, aspects of the communicative process. Porter suggests that a careful appraisal of the writings concerned with audience reveals that it comes to be seen as

[a] floating, perhaps an empty signifier. We hear people say "audience"--but mean very different things by it. The term refers to different concepts, (or senses of "audience") in different contexts. Though those in rhetoric and composition have preferred the simpler sense of audience represented by the communication triangle, contemporary theorists have recognized that audiences are very often more than simply "real people." Audiences also exist in texts, in the writer's imagination, in the general culture, as well as "out there" in the assembly hall. (x)

Since terms such as audience, author, or text, are indicative of such large concepts, and since these concepts have been discussed by so many rhetorical theorists, it is hard to develop universal definitions which would be agreed upon. According to Porter,

The question rhetoric theory asks is, Where is the audience located? In the text? Outside the text? Or somewhere in between? The answer is all of the above and, at the same time, none of the above. We talk about audiences in different, sometimes contradictory, ways. Indeed, we cannot help but do so, for the term is one of those, like "writer" and "style," that defies our efforts to pinpoint its meaning. (x)

Thus, for Porter, the concept of audience is an open, shifting, and ultimately undefinable nexus rather than a term which is easily defined. It is one of the "slipperiest" terms in rhetoric, one which "belongs to that special class of terms, the foundational terms defining the field (like 'writer' and 'text') which, as in any discipline, are the most likely to resist efforts to fix their meaning or function. As soon as we claim decisively and univocally that 'Audience is such and such,' we are lost" (8). This lack of stability, this seeming invisibility, the possible status of audience as a fiction (especially in the composition classroom wherein writers may have access to or respect for only one reader--the instructor), all conspire to make audience one of the most

difficult concepts not only for students to learn about, but for teachers to address as well.

The sense of the history of audience as a theoretical concern which Porter promotes leads him to "an understanding--not a definition--of the notion of audience that will, I hope, inform and enlighten research on audience and readers" (xi). But while Porter recognizes the complexity implied by the term "audience," he nevertheless creates in his book what amounts to a "greatest hits" version of history which emphasizes the contributions of Aristotle, Cicero, and George Campbell, but which leaves out many, many others. Porter's history of audience is valuable and useful to scholars of composition and rhetorical theory, but it also severely limits the visible scope of what audience means. As a result, Porter's conclusions concerning the validity of audience as a tool for conceiving and executing acts of writing are preconditioned by his truncated sense of history.

The history of Audience as received through Porter and others is only part of the story. Many others theorized audience in the past and did so in ways which potentially add to the complexity of audience considerations. That these theorists do not conform to Porter's narrow historical model of audience need not concern us here. Instead, I feel that by focusing on these previously "silenced" theorists we can come to an understanding of audience which encourages the continued assertion that it is relevant, both in our research and our teaching of writing. Through careful description of aspects

of this "secret" history of audience, my hope is that we can reclaim the power of some of these older, less well known voices, and can move to reinstate audience in its primary position alongside considerations of text and authorship, rather than as a secondary consideration. Porter and I are in agreement that the superiority of the writer/author must be challenged and partially dismantled, but whereas this leads him to inadvertently overvalue the text via the hegemonic and normalizing power of the discourse community, I want instead to argue that audience needs to remain a central concern, and that we can benefit from rediscovering those theorists from the past who help to problematize, rather than homogenize, the notion of audience. Before I lay out my own revised history of audience, I want to consider the major figures in Porter's history, a history which leads him inexorably toward a managerial view of audience.

According to Porter, Aristotle's interest in audience functions primarily as a means to divide types of audience into a) those individuals who could intelligently listen to and participate in the dialectic of philosophical discourse, and b) those large groups who represented the "passive mass audience of rhetoric" (17). Of this second category, Porter goes on to say that in Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* we find a notion of audience which "posits an ethical dilemma for any speaker whose aim is to change the beliefs of the ignorant, emotional, and prejudiced mass. Is it ethical to change an audience's beliefs without providing them sound reasons and a basis in fact for changing

their beliefs?" (18). While Aristotle raises this question in *On Rhetoric*, Porter feels that it is Aristotle who is at fault since

the dilemma itself is created by the managerial communication situation Aristotle envisions in *Rhetoric*: a knowledgeable orator facing an ignorant audience is placed in the position of (possibly) manipulating an audience. Within his framework, audience analysis can easily deteriorate into a kind of market survey to determine exactly what prejudices and emotions the audience holds, or to determine what the audience does not know, in order to better persuade them. The process is not aimed at determining what knowledge the audience can *contribute* (as in dialectic). (18)

The "managerial communication situation" is indeed problematic in that it seems to regard the ethical treatment of audiences as a non-issue. Such a view of audience forces the relationship to benefit the speaker exclusively: the speaker calls for a predetermined change and if he is successful the audience comes to agree, by any means necessary. For Porter then, Aristotle's notion of audience is coercive, except in those rare instances when qualified intellectuals engage in dialectic.

One important question here, though is, is Aristotle's notion of audience *only* managerial, *only* coercive? Porter mentions both the managerial and the dialectic attitudes towards audience which we find in Aristotle, but dismisses

the latter as philosophy, as a mode of discourse which is not related to rhetoric. I agree that Aristotle distinguishes philosophy from rhetoric, but it does not necessarily follow that a dialectic view must be reserved for the former, or that the managerial view must be the norm in the latter. At the very beginning of *On Rhetoric* we find that "Rhetoric is an *antistrophos* to dialectic," and not it's opposite (28). According to George Kennedy, "*antistrophos* means 'counterpart,'" and this important distinction helps us understand that "the functions of rhetoric and dialectic...are comparable methods. Both deal with matters that are common subjects of knowledge; neither falls within any distinct discipline. All people have occasion to question or support an argument, to defend themselves or accuse others, and the issues relate to a variety of subjects" (79-80). Thus, in either dialectic or rhetoric, the managerial view of audience can, but does not have to, hold sway. Similarly, in both rhetorical and dialectical discourse, non-coercive attitudes toward audience are possible. This is evidenced throughout Book 2 of *On Rhetoric*. Here, Aristotle carefully considers the audience's emotions and tastes to which a rhetor can appeal as well as the ways in which speakers can adapt themselves to their audiences. These are important considerations because "it makes much difference in regard to persuasion (especially in deliberations but also in trials) that the speaker seem to be a certain kind of person and that his hearers suppose him to be disposed toward them in a certain way [favorably or unfavorably to him]" (120). While it may be

impossible to know whether a speaker is "disposed" to the audience's best interests or instead only "seem[s] to be a certain kind of person", this very ambiguity of Aristotle's approach to audience should force us to hesitate before accepting Porter's contention that Aristotle is supportive only of a managerial view of audience.

Cicero is the second important figure in Porter's history of audience, and in his rhetorical theory Porter finds that audience "begins to become embedded in stylistic and formal conventions--and to be treated as a function of subject matter. And, as such not a concern of rhetoric" (19). In other words, Cicero contributes to the eventual valorization of textual issues (which finally reached their full flowering in the Current-Traditional rhetoric of the nineteenth century), and begins to move us away from concerns of, say, the aims of discourse or the contexts in which meaning is made through communication. Porter goes on to argue that both "Cicero and Quintilian note that different audiences, or audiences in different mental states, require different approaches. The speaker has to decide the relationship between his case (including his stance toward it) and the audience frame of mind to determine which stylistic or organizational approaches will work best" (19). This suggests that Cicero was focused on the very practical concern of helping speakers determine their relationship to their audiences *prior* to speaking with them. But Porter argues that this pragmatic concern leads to a more sinister problem: we find that as "Roman legal and deliberative

procedures became institutionalized and formalized," audience became less important, resulting in the rule that "when conventions embody shared audience values and preferences, there is a lesser need for [a] distinct treatment of audience. The danger that arises when audience is 'conventionalized' like this is that the conventions will exclude certain voices from participation" (21).

I agree that undue attention to the conventions of discourse will tend to valorize norms and simultaneously exclude those texts that fail to embody these norms. I also agree that Cicero's promotion of conventions may help lead us toward a form of communicative homogeneity which fails to acknowledge any discourse which it cannot recognize. But Cicero also believes that the speaker and the audience are very important elements of communication. Of the role audience considerations play in persuasion, Cicero asks in *De Oratore*

who is ignorant that the highest power of an orator consists in exciting the minds of men to anger, or to hatred, or to grief, or in recalling them from these more violent emotions to gentleness and compassion? Which power will never be able to effect its object by eloquence, unless in him who has obtained a thorough insight into the nature of mankind, and all the passions of humanity, and those causes by which our minds are either impelled or restrained. (19).

Like Aristotle before him, Cicero sees great value in understanding human nature. As applied to persuasion, this value centers on finding ways for audiences and speakers to sympathize with one another. While "insight into the nature of mankind" could lead to the manipulation of audience, Cicero seems more concerned that speakers appreciate their audiences than that they find ways to manage them. What surprises me is that, in arguing that Cicero overemphasizes textual concerns, Porter concludes that this overemphasis must lead to the inadvertent support of the managerial view of audience. Porter seems to be unaware that his own definition of the discourse community leads us to a similar impasse. The norms to which members of a discourse community must adhere are not the same ones which help in genre formation, but both sets of norms tend to reinforce potentially exclusionary, hegemonic communicative structures.

According to Porter, audience was in decline after Cicero until George Campbell rescued it from the dustbin of rhetorical theory in the middle of the eighteenth century. But this renewed interest in audience only worked to reinforce the coercive, managerial version of audience that Porter found in the Greek and Roman rhetorics that came before. Campbell's take on the "managerial view" forced the audience to function "not as a contributor of knowledge, arguments, or topics, but as a body that the speaker acts upon" (32). This view resonates with the earlier discussions of Aristotle and Cicero: in all three cases Porter finds that the audience is cast as the passive recipient

of the speaker's words, and that the audience must therefore be docile and obliging to the speaker. In other words, these audiences could be considered "dialectically challenged" as it were, unlike the "audiences" (who are really interlocutors) engaged in philosophic considerations.

I think it is worth noting that while Aristotle's *Rhetoric* contains the possibility not only of a managerial, but also of a dialectic model of audience, when it comes to Campbell's work, I must agree (for the most part) with Porter's assessment. In Campbell's universe there are only writers who are gifted to varying degrees and audiences whose function is to merely await the opportunity to be persuaded by the ablest, most gifted writers. Campbell's analysis of audience does allow for two different psychological tendencies; audience members can tend toward "vivacity" or "perspicuity" (33). But beyond this, the audience is defined only insofar as is beneficial to the writer's attempts at coercion. This coercion need not negatively affect the audience; it must merely "manage" the audience in ways which are predetermined by the writer. As Campbell himself says "To head a sect, to infuse party-spirit, to make men arrogant, uncharitable, and malevolent, is the easiest task imaginable, and to which almost any blockhead is fully equal" but the more complex, and worthwhile task is "to produce the contrary effect, to subdue the spirit of faction, and that monster spiritual pride, with which it is invariably accompanied, to inspire equity, moderation, and charity into men's sentiments and conduct with regard to others, [this] is the genuine test of eloquence"

(110). The point here is not to swindle the audience through deception, but it is clearly an argument in favor of the managerial mode of audience conception. Of the three rhetoricians which Porter places into his canon of audience theorists, Campbell is the one who most overtly champions this managerial sense, but even here we find a glimmer of more than just that. Campbell states that "The necessity which a speaker is under of suiting himself to his audience, both that he may be understood by them, and that his words may have influence upon them, is a maxim so evident as to need neither proof nor illustration" (102). So while the primary function of the rhetor is to "produce" effects in order to "influence" the audience, a secondary function is simply to be understood.

After considering the managerial view of audience which he finds throughout the work of Aristotle, Cicero, and Campbell, Porter decides that it is perhaps best to abandon audience concerns in favor of an overt attention to the concept of the discourse community. I contend that this abandonment is the result primarily of Porter's highly selective historicizing process, whereby he allows three and only three figures to represent the totality of what we mean by "audience." It is this process of history making, then, that ultimately leads him to reject audience as a tenable category or field of rhetorical considerations. The turn to discourse community operates as a release from the corner into which Porter has painted himself via his rather monochromatic use of the palette of audience theorists.

Porter is working from within a tradition of composition and rhetorical theories that were focused on the concept of the discourse community. This tradition includes the work of Carol Berkenkotter, Patricia Bizzell, Lester Faigley, Joseph Harris, and David Bartholomae, whose "Inventing the University" is one of the earliest statements of the ways the discourse community concept applies to rhetorical situations. In his essay Bartholomae describes the relation between writers and audiences within discourse communities in a way which is reminiscent of that developed by Porter. According to Bartholomae,

Writers who can successfully manipulate an audience (or, to use a less pointed language, writers who can accommodate their motives to their reader's expectations) are writers who can both imagine and write from a position of privilege. They must, that is, see themselves within a privileged discourse, one that already includes and excludes groups of readers. They must be either equal to or more powerful than those they would address. The writing, then, must somehow transform the political and social relationships between basic students and teachers. (277)

This construction of the power relations between writer-students and reader-instructors relies on the equivalence of the manipulation of audience with "accommodating" the writer's motives to the "reader's expectations." Such an equivalence is troubling since it suggests that power differentials

(uncorrectable ones) are the most important, perhaps the only, markers for student-teacher interactions, and that the only way writers can write is to assume that they are the possessors of superior power, relative to the powerlessness of passive audiences. For Bartholomae, the teacher's job is basically to help students pretend to have power when they do not, so that one day when they will in fact have a measure of power, they can then wield that power over their own truly subordinate audiences. Or as Bartholomae says, students "initial progress will be marked by their abilities to take on the role of privilege, by their abilities to establish authority" (223).

The problem with Bartholomae's attitude here, and with the notion of the discourse community in general (at least insofar as it is applied to composition studies), is that it assumes "role[s] of privilege" when it should instead seek to more clearly understand and critique the notion of privilege as a quality which is conferred upon us in varying degrees, based on our race, gender, class, age, nationality, educational level, and the like. As a descriptive tool then, Bartholomae's definition is useful, but as a tool to aid in the critique of cultural norms, it does very little.

After quickly considering the history of audience, Porter concludes that the best approach to the rhetorical problems which it signifies is to adopt the notion of the discourse community. I want to make clear that while Porter's definition is heavily indebted to Bartholomae's, it is nevertheless his own distinctive definition. For Porter then, a discourse community is

...a local and temporary constraining system, defined by a body of texts (or more generally, practices) that are unified by a common focus. A discourse community is a textual system with stated and unstated conventions, a vital history, mechanisms for wielding power, institutional hierarchies, vested interests, and so on. Thus, a discourse community cuts across sociological or institutional boundaries. (106)

The actual, embodied "community" is not present in this definition. What is present is an official "trace" left by those members of the community who were most oriented toward leaving behind textual artifacts, a "body of texts." Porter continues, noting that his

'community' is quite different from Kuhn's sense of 'paradigm,' because there is more than one paradigm operating here.

Writing within this community is much more complicated than merely determining a simple set of paradigmatic conventions.

The discourse community has more open borders than Fish's 'interpretive community' and is much broader in scope than either Kinneavy's sense of 'situational context' or Bitzer's sense of 'rhetorical situation'--both of which vary from discourse to discourse. The discourse community is not a nice, neat compartment built by the accumulation of knowledge from within (Kuhn's description of 'normal science'). (107)

If a discourse community is not a "nice, neat compartment," then what exactly is it? It is not a "forum" as Douglas Park would describe the term, and it is certainly not the addressing or invoking of an audience, as described by Lunsford and Ede. But Porter does suggest that the notion of the forum be used along with the discourse community, and he does intend that the discourse community be used in order to get at an understanding of audience. Porter defines the forum as a "concrete, local manifestation of the operation of the discourse community" (107). It is *through* the physically constraining forum that the conceptually nebulous discourse community can inform our understanding of audience. Porter feels that the best way to learn and teach audience, then, would be not to *consider* the audience, and not merely to *consider* the physical discursive sites (such as journals), but instead to consider the conceptual spaces within which audiences can and do interact with forums.

While Porter implicitly draws on the history of discourse community as a concept within composition and rhetorical theory (as represented by Bartholomae) two of his biggest influences in *Audience and Rhetoric* are Kenneth Burke and Michel Foucault. From Burke Porter takes the idea of the Burkean Parlor which describes communicative acts not as instances of speakers merely finding and then utilizing voice, but rather as social enterprises, wherein speakers enter into ongoing conversations, learn the topics of the conversations, and observe the communicative norms which

prevail. Only then does the speaker truly become qualified to speak. And when the speaker tires of the conversation, she can leave it behind, knowing full well that it continues on without her. Burke's parlor is a metaphorical description of the ways in which speakers come to speak in meaningful ways--largely thanks to their ability to appreciate the rhetorical contexts they find themselves in. Once these contexts are adequately understood, the new member of the parlor is able to speak in such a fashion as to be understood by the other experienced members of the discussion. Porter's understanding of the Burkean parlor adds to the original slightly by emphasizing that not one, but many conversations take place simultaneously, and that we continually negotiate the spaces within and around these various discourses.

Porter's focus on the modified model of the Burkean parlor leads him to conclude that speakers do not simply have voice, but that they instead locate voice through processes of adaptation to the conventions of the various groups within which they find themselves. The "community," we are told, "provides speaking and writing roles for its members--an *ethos* in other words. The 'individual person' who wishes to 'identify' with the community adopts the role provided" (81-2). Burke and Porter both move away from the idea that speakers are the sole driving force behind communication, and this in turn contributes to a critique of modernist subjectivity. But both also provide a space *only* for those who are already in the group (and in control of the group) to grant to new members the status of "speaker." This is especially

problematic when we consider that non- majority members of groups have historically been given fewer and lesser speaking roles than majority members have had. Worse still, non-majority "others" can frequently find themselves with no voice at all. I will explore the implications of this problem in greater detail in the following chapters. For now though, I want simply to state that Porter's appropriation of the Burkean parlor in no way responds to the problem of the silencing force of hegemonic communicative norms, and may in fact contribute the permanence of these norms.

In addition to Burke, Porter draws his version of discourse community partly from his reading of the work of Michel Foucault. As the subtitle of Porter's book (*An Archeological Composition of the Discourse Community*) suggests, he closely follows Foucault's understanding of the ways in which discourses create knowledges. According to Porter, Foucault "argues that we cannot understand a field until we understand its birth, its emergence (e.g., the birth of the prison, of the clinic, of the concept of 'sexuality'). In that historical moment lies the key to understanding the perspective and classifying orientation of the formation being studied" (89). Within the context of Porter's book, this means, among other things, that his ultimate interest in audience is only its ability to help him discover the "*Archeological Composition of the Discourse Community*." This knowledge helps us explain why it is that a book entitled *Audience and Rhetoric* would, in the end, deny the usefulness of audience as a category for rhetorical considerations. Foucault's influence

extends into Porter's definition of discourse community so that it needs no overarching structure. Instead, "the coherence" the community achieves "is established by what Foucault terms a 'regularity in dispersion.' That is to say, there is no single nodal point of reference for the community; the discourses disperse themselves. At the same time, coherence is achieved through the principle of the dispersion of discourses" (90). Autonomy, which we once thought to be a property of speakers and writers, is here only attributed to the discourses themselves.

Porter is aware that the idea of the discourse community has been critiqued previously and notes that some of these "criticisms" are

justified: in emphasizing the influence of community, we cannot forget the role of the writer. Heresy resides at both extremes. But we might remember that community theories themselves are reactions to what was perceived as the overemphasis on the writer and her cognitive processes. They serve as a balancing corrective to that emphasis--though we must avoid swinging too far in either direction. (94)

Porter's altered definition of discourse community thus tries to maintain a balance between it and authorial authority. My own critique of Porter's discourse community is almost the opposite of this: whereas some have attacked it for denying the author any measure of subjectivity, my critique is focused on the possibility that it grants "authors" far too much authority, while

at the same time diminishing the definition of audience to being merely the segment of the population upon which speakers act. Porter dismissed the concept of the audience initially because his own history of the term led him to believe that audience had only been theorized in a managerial model. But instead of finding a way to diminish the power of the managerial view, his adoption of the discourse community only sidesteps the issue.

This is so because the discourse community represents, to a far greater extent than any single author/subject could, "a textual system with stated and unstated conventions, a vital history, mechanisms for wielding power, institutional hierarchies, vested interests, and so on" (106). My critique of Porter's discourse community is not that it diminishes the autonomy of authors; it is that, through the wielding of "mechanisms for...power," it works to maintain its "vested interests," and in so doing, the function of the discourse community is simply to perpetuate itself. If we were all equally able to enter into new communities, to learn the norms of various conversations, or to find a subjectivity of sorts (or to ride the wave of discourse autonomy) within the discourse community, then Porter's discourse community idea would sound wonderful. But since American history is filled with silences, with silenced "others," it seems as if we are not all granted equal access to the various discourse communities which swirl around us. Instead, some have access to some communities, others to others. Again, this would be fine if it were not for the fact that some communities are powerful (officially sanctioned) and

others are weak (disregarded by the dominant cultural norms which establish "meaning, "knowledge," and "truth").

In addition to its power to normalize the “othering” processes of racism, sexism, classism, ageism, and other -isms, a major critique of Porter's discourse community is that it tends, in devaluing the audience, to overvalue texts. According to Porter, "the division between writer and reader breaks down in the discourse community: from the social perspective the discourse community is at once the producer and consumer of its own discourse" (84). This may be an ideal of Porter's since it diminishes the possibility of speakers coercively managing audiences, but it also suggests that discourses are the most, perhaps the only, aspects of communication which have any stability or last-ability. A major weakness of the discourse community as expressed in Porter's work, then, is that it tends to devolve into a valorization of the kind of textual considerations which Porter himself accused Cicero of overemphasizing. In his earlier discussion of Cicero he remarked that it was the over-reliance on textual considerations which represented a debasement of ancient Greek rhetoric. This is represented as an early step toward the development of the managerial notion of audience as eventually realized in the work of George Campbell. Cicero encouraged the study of increasingly codified "legal and deliberative procedures," a situation which lead to the eventual exclusion of "certain voices from participation," if these voices happen to belong to would-be speakers who have not mastered the correct

conventions (21). In spite of Porter's best efforts to define the discourse community as being an enhancement of what used to be called audience, his rendition instead tends toward the glorification of textual concerns, of the "products" of discourse rather than of "processes" whereby meaning is temporarily and contextually made or arrived at. And while I agree that texts are eminently important to any theory of written communication, I emphatically disagree that their importance should come at the expense of a sense of audience. I maintain that the rhetorical triangle, while possibly needing to grow into a rectangle in order to accommodate a sense of the context in which communication takes place, should never be reduced to having only texts as its primary consideration.

My three major critiques of Porter's book then, are that it a) provides a historical approach to audience which is far too narrow and which leads inevitably and needlessly toward a rejection of audience due to its supposed coercive, "managerial" overtones; b) creates a justification for othering processes rather than a tool for the critique of such processes; and c) suggests that texts are the only aspects of communication which have any lasting importance.

Whereas audience is deemed important in Aristotle, Cicero, and Campbell, it is rejected in Porter. Why? Because Porter's highly selective history forces him to conclude that audiences can only be considered insofar as they can be managed; that audiences can only be written to if the goal is to

subvert their own desires and replace them with those of the author; that audiences can only be considered insofar as they are likely to be a part of a discourse community, a community which, according to Porter, is really only visible (and perhaps existent) in textual artifacts. I reject these contentions and instead of forgetting audience, I think we need to explore some of the ways we can reclaim it as a meaningful category, as a set of considerations which do not merely lead to coercive management of readers. I think that by considering some of the voices which Porter neglects, we may find a notion of audience which is historically defensible and which allows us to retain audience rather than rejecting it in favor of a discourse community model which may inadvertently further communicative norms by teaching students to write in ways that maintain the status quo. Porter's goal is of course to interrogate, not to maintain, the status quo. He believes that his conception of discourse community emphasizes a social view of writing. Porter says that, "rather than diminishing me, or threatening my personality, the social view is elevating, enabling and also ethical. The kind of accommodation it encourages aims for a 'good' that is greater than the individual elements of me the writer or you the audience" (119-120). I agree that the social view is the best view of rhetorical situations. But I feel that the social view can be grasped best through attention to non-managerial notions of audience. Further, I believe that an exploration of the "secret" history of audience will work to emphasize the fact that audience considerations create a unique space

from which we can move toward a writing pedagogy which does not only promote conformity, but which celebrates diversity and which creates the possibility for more democratic educational practices, practices which do not rely on the tropes of race, gender, and class in order to maintain the status quo. I do not think we should abandon this part of the rhetorical triangle. Instead, I think we need to focus more on Audience, to theorize it more carefully, to fulfill the promise of Porter and others that it should remain an illusive yet important aspect of composition and rhetorical theory and practice.

Elements of a Secret History of Audience

I propose that a large part of Porter's problem with audience comes as the result of a highly selective historicizing process which privileges the voices of Aristotle, Cicero, and George Campbell above all others. Figures such as Quintilian and Plato are considered, but only briefly and only as signs that the major trend of a managerial notion of audience is in fact the only trend worthy of note. A major corrective to this would be to seek out more historical figures that we could consider as contributors to audience theory throughout the history of rhetoric. To do so would, at the very least, allow us to think through a more well rounded, multivalenced view of the conversations which have gone on concerning audience. This move would work to reduce the power that a few have over the rest, and would also create

spaces to be occupied by the voices which have thus far been silenced entirely, or at least with regard to their potential status as theorists of audience.

Rather than letting Aristotle, Cicero, and Campbell represent the whole of ancient thought concerning the nature of audience, I argue that the history of audience is twofold: the "approved" history which Porter has created, and a secret history, which I will now begin to cobble together. The secret history of audience presents a more dynamic model than the one which is typically presented. The concept of audience which is revealed through this secret history does not function merely to justify or explain our present, dominant pedagogical practices, but instead attempts to problematize our pasts, to create spaces in which we can nurture a more mature, complex vision of audience. The attempt to develop a fuller, richer view of the history of audience as a theoretical concern is similar to recent attempts by Cheryl Glenn to "retell" the history of rhetoric as a discipline through which not only men speak, but women as well.

We do not have to let audience be subsumed by authorial considerations, which is not to say that the writer is unimportant. Rather, my point is that writers need to be aware of audiences and not only of themselves as speakers, speaking to no one in particular and thus only to themselves, and only through the received voices which have previously been granted them. Instead, both need to be emphasized, both need to be considered, and both need to be taught. Similarly, audience does not need to be replaced by the

discourse community. The two can instead peacefully coexist, with discourse community perhaps being the fourth point on the newly revised rhetorical triangle cum rectangle. What we would then have would be writers, texts, audiences, and discourse communities as descriptors of particular contexts. But there is no need to eliminate audience; indeed, there is a need to reemphasize the importance of audience as a category of communication. To allow discourse community, as Porter defines it, to take the place of audience is tantamount to condoning what results in racism and sexism; the exclusion of outsider voices through the upholding of the status quo. This is accomplished because if new conversants must become familiar with existing communicative norms in order to become "authorized" to speak, then they must also, to a certain extent, be forced to relinquish that which made them non-majority in the first place. Thus the communicative norms which are emphasized through over-reliance on the discourse community are also norms which serve to maintain the hegemonic structures which are already in place. That these structures work to emphasize some (mostly white, mostly male) voices while de-emphasizing the voices of the "other" seems to go almost without saying. But through the notion of audience, we possess a tenuous hold on at least the possibility for an opening of the processes by which voices become authorized. And while a renewed interest in audience cannot hope to eliminate the various exclusionary -isms, it can work as a powerful pedagogical tool for confirming the importance not only of the contexts

writers are a part of, but also of the others who can be affected by the words of the writer.

I want to offer some brief comments concerning the usability of the sophists in forming a more rich notion of audience than has been offered by Porter. This is appropriate because the history to which I am adding draws so heavily on the legacy of Aristotle, whose rhetorical treatise has been alternately thought of as being either very much in line with sophistic rhetoric, or very much opposed to it. Later, in chapter two, I consider Gertrude Buck as a rhetorical theorist and pedagogue whose work is especially useful to the project of expanding our definition of audience, and to problematizing the idea that the history of audience results in the managerial view as epitomized by Campbell. This is appropriate because Campbell was a major influence on the rhetorical thought that predominated during Buck's lifetime.

To begin with then, I offer several expressions of audience from the time of the sophists. To do so will be to work toward a rhetoric which will, as Cheryl Glenn would say, "do something new" in order to " fulfill our present needs: our needs as citizens, researchers, teachers, students, and colleagues in the diverse and multidisciplinary professions of rhetorics" (Glenn 17). Specifically, this "something new" is a reclamation of audience as a concern which can lead toward dialogue, toward shared responsibility for meaning making; and is in contrast to allowing only authors or only readers to be the ones who create knowledge and understanding.

Starting with Gorgias of Leontini, we see a fifth century B.C.E. view of rhetoric as literally having mind-altering capabilities. For Gorgias, "The effect of speech upon the condition of the soul is comparable to the power of drugs over the nature of bodies. For just as different drugs dispel different secretions from the body, and some bring an end to disease and others to life, so also in the case of speeches, some distress, others delight, some cause fear, others make the hearers bold, and some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion" (53).⁴ In the hands of the right orator, audiences may be induced to swoon, to be transported into the wor(l)ds created by the speaker. This may be strictly to the speaker's advantage, for instance in gaining freedom during legal proceedings. But like a drug, Gorgias' understanding of the power of speech is also similar to his understanding of the power of medicine. While medicine can offer a cure for illness, so speech can have a positive impact on the audience's psyche. But just as poison can harm the body, language can also be used to harm the hearer's mind. While Gorgias' interest in the power of speech could be said to indicate a preoccupation on his part with the text (as opposed to speakers or the hearers), it must also be noted

⁴ Despite the power of rhetoric to "bewitch" audiences, according to Richard Leo Enos, Gorgias' rhetoric was primarily bound up with political action. As ambassador to Athens, Gorgias of Leontini's skill did more than "secure the political affiliations of two democracies;" it went so far as to elevate "rhetoric as an effective source of power within a democratic context" (56). For Enos then, Gorgias represents not only an effective deployment of rhetorical skills, but also an overt attachment of rhetoric to the democratic enterprises of the ancient Greek world.

that this power is enacted only through the audience's reaction to the speech. And while the drug-like effects of language on an audience can certainly be managerial, or manipulative for the speaker's gain, the effect is just as likely to be a palliative on the crowd, a means to make the worse seem better. Just as likely, the power of a speech may be used to enhance, rather than detract from, the audience. In any event, Gorgias' understanding of language as having medicinal properties suggests that the interaction between speaker and hearer can work to serve the interests of both parties, and not only those of the speaker.

For Protagoras, a rough contemporary of Gorgias', audience was an aspect of the concept of *dissoi logoi*, wherein at least two sides must always be presented when considering any issue. This leads to Protagoras' refusal to view knowledge as monological, but rather always as dialogical. Only by gaining a view of knowledge as multiple can even the most temporary of truths come to light. Knowledge for Protagoras was not located in timeless and external truths, but in the individual. According to R.J. Willey, "each person is the ultimate judge of truth. No longer can the rhetor claim the wisdom of the gods and invoke his audience into that relationship to himself and his text. The individuals in the rhetor's audience are now seen as truly active, ready to think and to judge. Protagoras appears to recognize the very real possibility that certain individuals may judge or think in a way contrary to the rhetor's wishes" (35). From the perspective relayed to us through Porter,

we find that any rhetor whose audience *did not* passively accept what was said was no great rhetor to begin with. For Protagoras, though, just the opposite is true. Through dissensus we come to know not truth, but the field of knowledge which is relevant at any given time. Consensus is really the masking of voices which contradict the "truth," which is maintained by the powerful and which is portrayed as self-evident and commonsensical. Thus Protagoras' interest in tentative meaning-making, and on the importance of dissensus, leads me to believe that he would reject the notion of audience as managerial, favoring instead the attitude that only through full participation of both speakers and audiences can understanding, of each other and of reality, be achieved.

Unlike Protagoras and Gorgias, who focused primarily on oral communication, Isocrates, in the fourth century B.C.E., avoided speaking in public and instead preferred to utilize the then relatively new technology of writing. He believed that language was a major separator of humans from other animals, and that "because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire...we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts" (327). Further, he considered the thought processes of individuals as analogous to communicative acts with two or more parties. In his *Antidosis* he states that "...the same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak in public, we also employ when we deliberate in our own thoughts"

(327). Isocrates here describes the processes of conversing and of contemplating in similar terms. And like Protagoras and Gorgias, he supports a view of audience that goes beyond the merely managerial. Kathleen Welch has noted that this tendency in Isocrates has been overlooked because of a notion of the logos which has been limited by translators. For Welch, Isocrates' concept of logos is concentrated "on the relationship between inner speech and thought and the centrality of rhetoric in this relationship. Isocrates' development of judgement through interaction of various kinds of language--in writing, in speaking, and in self deliberation--make his rhetorical theory highly useful for today's postmodernized rhetorics and practices" (46). Thus, for Welch, we find in Isocrates' notion of logos not merely careful attention to the logic of a given speech, but also a focal point for the dialectical possibilities of communicative acts. This dialectical possibility allows for inner contemplation, but also for rhetoric as exchange, not merely as the imparting of knowledge from the knowledgeable party to the ignorant or gullible one.

Isocrates, Protagoras, and Gorgias all work to complicate our understanding of what ancient rhetoric was, and of what it is for us today. This work extends to their approaches to the notion of audience, and the result is that we find much in ancient rhetoric with which to problematize the view of audience that James Porter finds in Aristotle and, to a lesser extent, in Plato. Among other things, this wider understanding of audience helps us to realize

that not only are the seeds of a managerial model in place in antiquity, but also those of a more dialectical interrelation between speakers, texts, and audiences, one which values potentially beneficial outcomes for audiences, dissensus between communicative actants, and the importance of a logos which is partly defined by speakers' abilities to contemplate not only internally but also with other participants. Inclusion of these three thinkers into the history of audience works to mediate the influence that Aristotle has in this history, and allows for multiple attitudes to emerge. While Aristotle's notion of audience is surely more rounded than Porter's reception of him, by including more than only one ancient rhetorician, we can increase the richness and complexity of audience and can introduce competing and overlapping definitions and descriptions.

By retaining Porter's history while also adding to the secret history of audience, we gain a more complete view of what the term implies. Reclamation of this secret history helps keep audience vital as its own category and confirms that we do not have to replace it with a notion of the discourse community which promotes the primacy of texts and the intrinsic rightness of hegemonic othering processes. Porter's tracing of the managerial mode of audience considerations is a valuable asset to the history of audience, but it is by no means the whole of the story. If it were, I might be tempted to reject audience in favor of the discourse community that he develops to replace audience. But Gorgias, Protagoras, and Isocrates provide us not with a

single vision of audience which contradicts Porter's, but with several different perspectives, several different attitudes toward audience. In adding these to the discussion of what audience means, my hope is to describe more clearly the ways audience was conceived of in the past, in order to explore the richness of audience considerations for contemporary rhetorical studies and for the teaching and learning of writing.

In the next chapter I will continue the process of rehistoricizing audience in order to reassert that it needs to be a central tenet of rhetorical studies. To do this, I will focus on Gertrude Buck, one of the first American women to earn a Ph.D. with an emphasis on rhetoric. Buck presents us with a unique vision of the rhetorical landscape in general and of audience in particular. Like the understandings of audience provided by Isocrates, Protagoras, and Gorgias, Buck works to complicate the history of audience which Porter develops from the work of Aristotle, Cicero, and Campbell. Importantly, we find in Buck responses to the attitudes that George Campbell developed, and whose work of some 100 years earlier was still a major component of the dominant forms of rhetorical instruction in Buck's time. My claim is that in exploring Buck's notion of audience we discover a voice which has been far less accepted than those of Aristotle, Cicero, or Campbell, a voice which brings to us a unique vision of the power of audience as a serious rhetorical consideration.

CHAPTER TWO

Gertrude Buck and Audience:

A Turn-of-the-Century Alternative

According to James Porter, the only truly important and influential theory of audience during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is found in the work of the Scottish Common Sense rhetorician George Campbell.¹ Campbell and later American imitators such as Alexander Bain, A.S. Hill, and Barrett Wendell, promoted what Porter has termed the "managerial" perspective of audience, which suggests that the writer's or speaker's main rhetorical challenge should lie in deciding how best to "manage" readers or hearers so as to insure previously determined outcomes. Porter notes that a few rhetorical theorists tried to provide alternatives to this managerial view because they felt that it promoted an overly antagonistic set of rhetorical practices which severely limited the democratizing potential they felt belonged in composition instruction. Chief among these non-managerial theorists were Fred Newton Scott and two of his students, Joseph Villiers Denney and

¹ Along with Hugh Blair, Campbell is one of the central figures of the Scottish Enlightenment movement. Both worked to establish "taste" as an important quality and both presented rhetorical theories that emphasized the refinement of taste and an appreciation of how emotion plays into communication. According to James L. Golden and Edward P.J. Corbett, Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric* "demonstrates that the purpose of oral communication is to express sentiments, passions, and moods as well as ideas" (140).

Gertrude Buck. Porter, James Berlin, and Robert Connors have all argued that these three worked to develop alternatives to the mainstream composition theorizing, which prevailed during the second half of the nineteenth century. But Porter, Berlin, and Connors spend very little time exploring the exact nature of these alternatives, and spend even less on Buck's contributions than on those of Scott and Villiers. Instead, these three rhetorical historians merely mention Buck as someone who followed Scott's example of presenting an alternative to the mainstream.

Thus, while Porter acknowledges that the managerial perspective on audience was rejected by some in the late nineteenth century, he does so by only exploring Scott's work, and even this is done in a rather superficial manner. My own reading of Buck's work suggests that her texts deserve far more attention than they have thus far received, and this is true for several reasons. First, too often Buck is referred to as being "important" but is then not adequately treated (Berlin 1984, Connors 1997). Second, when she is considered, it is typically only insofar as she followed her "mentor's," (Scott's) lead. Finally, her understanding of classical rhetoric, combined with her position as a woman rhetorician in what was then a predominately male field, makes her work unique.

Despite the minor role Buck plays in the histories constructed by Porter, Berlin, and Connors, I want to argue here that Gertrude Buck is an important turn of the century rhetorical theorist. More specifically, I want to

explore her theory of audience, arguing that it yields an important, unique, and until now overlooked, part of the history of audience as a concern within composition studies. I will focus on two key articles by Buck, “The Present Status of Rhetorical Theory,” and “What Does ‘Rhetoric’ Mean?” first published in 1900 and 1901, respectively. In these articles Buck lays out her understanding of what constitutes the related fields of composition and rhetoric, including a developed sense of audience as both a theoretical construct and as a pragmatic concern for writers. This sense is at odds with the then prevailing ways of thinking about audience, and represents a truly inventive and unique perspective which relies not only on a keen understanding of ancient rhetorical theory, but also on new developments within the discipline of psychology, as well as on a concern for egalitarian issues through which she sought to counter what she saw as the exclusionary nature of an overly antagonistic rhetoric. After considering Buck’s notion of audience, I will compare it to the recent work of Kay Halasek, whose appropriation of Bakhtin’s theories of discourse have great consonance with many of Buck’s ideas.

Taken as a whole, a rehistoricizing of Buck’s work can make a distinct impact on current rhetoric and composition studies, and in these articles we find an interesting alternative to the managerial model of audience which was passed down from George Campbell, a model which can enrich and inform our own understanding of the communicative process in several ways. First,

analysis of Buck's sense of audience yields a turn of the century voice which called into question the prevailing norms of the Current-Traditional paradigm for composition instruction, which in turn complicates our own understanding of the history of rhetoric. Second, a serious consideration of Buck's understanding of audience helps us to better understand the extent to which audience, and the contexts it implies between the writer and the reception of texts, has historically been valued. Finally, this study is important because, while Buck's sense of rhetoric is firmly rooted in her own time, much of what she has to say about audience sounds surprisingly contemporary, suggesting that although her voice has been neglected, her work can serve not only to validate, but to strengthen the importance of audience considerations, an importance which is at least partly a result of the fact that it was seriously considered by Buck more than 100 years ago. I feel that Buck's work, when presented to her own students (young women attending Vassar), offered an emancipatory set of possibilities, and that this sense can be at least partially reclaimed in our own time.

Buck's Background

Gertrude Buck was born in 1871 in Kalamazoo, Michigan. At the age of nineteen, she entered the University of Michigan, where she first studied Greek and medicine before settling on a major in English. She earned her Bachelor's in 1894 and went on to graduate studies, earning her M.S. in 1895

and her Ph.D. in 1898. During her graduate studies she worked with Fred Newton Scott, who chaired her dissertation and encouraged her interest in exploring the democratizing possibilities of rhetoric. Buck accepted a position at Vassar and taught courses on composition and rhetoric from 1897 until her death in 1922.

During her time at Vassar Buck was a prolific writer, authoring or co-authoring six writing textbooks and contributing many articles to journals such as *Educational Review* and *Modern Language Notes*. In addition to her writing, she worked to bridge the gap between academic and nonacademic learning, especially through her involvement with the Vassar Dramatic Workshop, which, according to Joann Campbell, “provided a perfect vehicle for the democratic connection between college and community that Buck advocated” (“Introduction” xiv). In all of her intellectual activities Buck simply assumed that women had the same rights as men, and that both were equal in terms of intelligence and in the ability to contribute knowledge concerning the world and humans’ interactions within it and with each other. And while she was acutely aware of the disparities that existed between men and women, the confidence of her tone in all of her writings is quite inspiring. Buck’s dissertation was concerned primarily with exploring the development of metaphor in languages, and this work displays her early interest in understanding the human mind through the lens of the psychology which William James and others had begun developing late in the nineteenth century.

The majority of the useful research concerning Buck's rhetoric has focused on her doctoral dissertation, and on its dependence on Buck's knowledge of what later evolved into the cognitive model of psychology. For instance, Alfred Kitzhaber has incorporated Buck's work into his own history of rhetoric. In his *Rhetoric in American Colleges, 1850-1900*, Kitzhaber suggests that it was "Buck's interest in psychology" above all other considerations, which "colored her definition of argument," exposition, and narrative writing (134). Gerald Mulderig is another writer whose efforts to insert Buck into the mainstream history of rhetoric are based primarily on a focus on Buck's interest in turn of the century psychology. Mulderig argues that Buck's sources were, among others, William James and John Dewey. These late nineteenth century psychology theorists confirmed for Buck the likelihood that the human mind should not be viewed as "a mechanical, static entity," but instead as "something biological and dynamic, constantly growing, developing, adapting to its environment" (95). Kitzhaber and Mulderig are right to emphasize Buck's interest in psychology as a major contributor to her rhetorical theory. But we should also explore the ends which that interest served, her more overtly stated interests in the teaching of writing, as well as her focus on the cultural and interpersonal aspects of the composition process. I contend that these interests, and her particular responses to them, were at odds with the predominant ways writing was being taught and theorized at the turn of the century.

By the time Buck became a professor of rhetoric in 1900, two main strands of thought prevailed in American composition studies. First, the belles lettres model of rhetoric, which, though somewhat dated by then, still had an extremely important influence on the production of textbooks and theoretical treatises. The continuing popularity of this rhetorical schema, initially developed in the work of Hugh Blair, can be attributed to the fact that the belletristic model focused on the individual as a consumer or receiver, not as a producer, of information and of art. This focus in turn led to an interest in the development of the consumer/individual's sense of "taste." While becoming increasingly less relevant as American universities opened to ever-larger numbers of non-elite students, taste nevertheless remained an important goal of rhetorical studies during this time. A second major strand during this time was what has become known as Current-Traditional rhetoric, to which I referred in chapter one. The Current-Traditional rhetoric which predominated during Buck's lifetime in institutions of higher learning was marked by careful attention to stylistics, grammar, and correctness, to the exclusion of larger rhetorical concerns such as the context in which communications take place, or the aims to which texts are put. Many rhetorical historians have sought to explain the rise of Current-Traditional rhetoric, including James Berlin, who has said that

Accepting the faculty psychology of eighteenth-century rhetoric,
Current-Traditional rhetoric takes the most mechanical features

of Campbell, Blair, and Whately and makes them the sole concern of the writing teacher. This view of writing instruction is also an extension of the elective system in the American college, with the various concerns included in eighteenth-century rhetoric relegated to their appropriate places in the college curriculum. From another point of view, it can be regarded as the manifestation of the assembly line in education. Current-Traditional rhetoric is the triumph of the scientific and technical worldview. (62)

While neither taste nor correctness can by themselves be considered “bad,” both the belles lettres and the Current-Traditional rhetorics are capable of excluding, of negatively “othering,” individuals. As long as access to American higher education was limited to upper class white males, the entire structure of education worked to perpetuate the class, race, and gender based hierarchies that are the legacy of America’s past. But with the expansion of post-secondary educational opportunities to include women and minorities during the second half of the nineteenth century, these two powerful forms of composition-rhetoric could easily be used to work against the democratizing potential of an increasingly “open” admissions policy in American colleges

and universities.²

The focus on correctness and grammar which Current-Traditional rhetoric promoted was ostensibly based on factual, concrete data about the English language. In other words, it was presumed that the rules of the language could be prescribed, that an ideal of correctness existed, and that students' needed to strive towards that ideal. According to Sharon Crowley, this ideal was embodied in "prescribed rules that strictly govern the inventional process; equally restrictive rules force writers to select from only a few mandated genres and prescribes the way that every discourse is to be arranged, down to the very order in which sentences are to follow one another" (95). In order to be considered a "good" writer then, students had to submit to a "Current-Traditional pedagogy [which] removes writers' right to control their discourses, to choose whichever style, arrangement, or inventional procedure" that will best "suit the occasion" (95). That most students (male or female) were unable to perfectly meet the ideal of correctness should surprise no one today, but in the late nineteenth century it was thought by many to be both a

² Joann Campbell, in exploring female students' receptions of male teachers' writing "instruction" at Radcliffe during the late nineteenth century, has convincingly argued that the Current-Traditional and belles lettres models were quite capable of adversely effecting women's abilities to perceive the production of academic writing as a worthwhile skill. As Campbell says in "Controlling Voices: The Legacy of English A at Radcliffe College 1883-1917," the turn of the century male instructor at Radcliffe could, by "hiding behind punctuation and grammar corrections" work to "maintain his authority, keep the students at a distance, and remain in a comfortably safe realm" (473).

realistic and worthwhile goal for students who received writing instruction. With the belles lettres model, the focus was on taste, a faculty which could only be partially “taught.” More important was the student’s innate ability to perceive writing as embodying the elements of good taste, an ability which teachers could only hope to amplify. However, as the population of college students began changing at the turn of the century, any sense of homogeneity that had previously existed became increasingly untenable. Homogeneity was slowly replaced by men and women who not only represented different gender stereotypes, but also different walks of life, sets of experiences, and socioeconomic conditions. All of this helped the Current-Traditional and belles lettres rhetorical stances to flourish, as educators and administrators fought to recreate the stasis that had once marked the American college and university system. Additionally, both of these rhetorical stances made any notion of audience a moot issue, since the belletristic tradition valorized the receiver/individual who was able to appreciate the intrinsic value of the text, while the Current-Traditional model, with its focus on textual correctness, made both writer and reader secondary concerns.

It was into this milieu that Gertrude Buck went upon her graduation from the University of Michigan. As a professor at Vassar, one of the Seven Sisters schools, she had access to a relatively new type of student, women, with whom she could work to impress a new sense of the worth of rhetorical instruction. The form of rhetoric which Buck promoted had little to do with

Current-Traditional values or with the precepts of the belles lettres. Instead, it worked to actively promote the democratizing possibilities of composition, and to provide for the development of the basic writerly skills which men had long been taught. Additionally, her position as a woman in a predominantly male-run discipline gave her a unique perspective on the prevailing order of the day, a set of rhetorical strategies that she viewed as promoting mechanical, overly antagonistic, and wholly artificial views of communication.

Despite being one of the first American women to earn a Ph.D. with an emphasis on Rhetoric, Buck was not the only one developing alternative theories and uses of rhetoric at this time. Other women such as Hallie Quinn Brown, Ida B. Wells, and Mary Augusta Jordan helped to redefine the history of rhetoric in more inclusive terms than had existed in America prior to the nineteenth century.³ For instance, according to Susan Kates, a textbook which Mary Jordan "authored for women who studied writing and speaking outside the formal academy" is well worth recovering; it "makes a contribution to the history of a feminist rhetoric because of its critique of the dominant pedagogical ideals of the writing and speaking instruction of the period" (501-2). While Buck worked from within, rather than outside of, the American

³ Current rhetorical historians such as Jane Donawerth, Jacqueline Jones Royster, and Susan Kates have worked to reclaim these women's contributions and in so doing have helped us more accurately understand and re/vision the formation of contemporary rhetorical studies.

system of higher education, she too developed rhetorical strategies that were at odds with the male-centered, dominant mode of composition instruction of her day.

But despite the fact that there were other rhetoricians who had similar interests as Buck's, she stands apart in important ways. Unlike most of the women who came before her, she was more firmly entrenched in the world of academia. Partly as a result of this, Buck produced both textbooks and heavily theoretical treatises that were considered difficult reading in her day. More importantly, her assumption that women and men had the same right to create and negotiate the terrain of rhetorical inquiry is readily apparent when we read her writings, but also when we consider the tone she achieved in these writings. What we find is a confident, intellectual, articulate, and highly educated woman whose concerns embraced the democratizing potential implied by the opening of the university system to a broader spectrum of the American population. This interest in accommodating the new student body, of which she herself had been a member, helps to explain her attitudes toward many of the questions which confronted rhetorical instruction at the turn of the century, from considerations of the importance of graduate studies in rhetoric and composition, to the development of ways to theorize communicative acts as they occur both orally and in writing, to her commitment to developing compositional skills across gender boundaries.

In considering Gertrude Buck's rhetoric, a valid question is, was she a

feminist? And if so, of what sort? My contention here is not only that Buck's rhetorical theory is unique, but also that it is, in some respects at least, feminist. John Brereton has noted that "Buck's emphasis on personal writing...helps to distinguish her from the mainstream of male rhetoric," and that recent scholarship into Buck's rhetoric has tended "to emphasize her differences from her teacher Fred Newton Scott and [to] stress her search for a distinct, specifically feminine community" (20). One writer who has helped bring attention to Buck's work as being separate from Scott's is Jane Donawerth, who has suggested that we look to Gertrude Buck not as the sole generator of a feminist rhetoric, but that we instead view her work as being partly constitutive of a distinctly feminist inflected rhetoric which began developing in the early part of the nineteenth century. For my own part, I would argue that Buck's contribution to rhetorical theory is particularly helpful in that it embraces many of the precepts of first wave feminism such as the importance of equal economic opportunities, shared political power, and equal access to educational and professional possibilities. And although Buck's texts do not yield much in terms of an overtly feminist agenda, she certainly felt that education was for both men and women, and she suggested by example and experience that women were quite capable of entering and succeeding in intellectual arenas such as the field of rhetoric studies.

Donawerth convincingly argues that "The women who wrote rhetoric textbooks for co-ed and female audiences at the turn of the century do not

express the same kind of theory as do the majority of the men, writing for audiences of male students: they offer alternatives accommodating women's experience, most frequently by using conversation rather than public discourse as a model" (337). While Buck was committed to the teaching of specifically *written* communication and tended not to rely (at least in her writings) on the types of conversational models to which Donawerth refers, it must be noted that she was acutely aware of her own audience. This audience was not a monolithic whole, but was rather a heterogeneous group, comprising both men and women while she taught at Michigan during her graduate work, and of women who represented varying educational backgrounds, while she taught at Vassar. This understanding of her own audience of textbook readers mirrors her promotion of a notion of audience as being composed of actual people who lead actual lives, and helps to imbue her rhetorical theory with the feeling of being grounded in real, concrete concerns. This is a feeling that is distinctly lacking in many of the texts which prevailed at the turn of the century and which relied either on the Current-Traditional or belletristic models which I have already discussed. Based on her writing, Buck should be considered as both a feminist and an egalitarian, because she actively promoted a model of communication that favored mutual understanding over competition, and because she sought to develop a rhetorical theory that would recognize that diversity fuels dialogue and dissensus. This is in sharp contrast to the Current-Traditional or belles lettres rhetorics of her day that ignored or glossed over

dissensus and instead emphasized the development of taste and/or mechanical correctness.

Gertrude Buck's Consideration of Audience

Gertrude Buck's notion of audience represents most clearly her interest in understanding written communication not strictly from a textual base or in terms of determining writerly aims, but as an instance in which the author has an opportunity and a responsibility to share the power of the communicative act with her audience, in order to increase the likelihood that two or more minds can, at least temporarily, find some shared values, perspectives, and attitudes. Unlike most of the rhetorical models which existed at the turn of the century and which focused on externally generated rules being applied to writing in order to insure "correctness," Buck's sense of audience allows for a rich understanding of communication as something which takes place specifically *between* individuals and *within* groups. Buck's notion of audience thus provides a stark contrast to that of many of her contemporaries, who either adhered to the managerial view or instead felt that, since a universal psychology applied to all humans, all humans as reasonable people would be susceptible to the same rhetorical strategies.

According to Sharon Crowley, this attitude was fully developed by George Campbell, who "shared the modern faith in the uniformity of human nature." Crowley says that

since the operations of the faculties were similar in every human being, rhetors were not compelled to analyze specific audiences to determine their probable response. Indeed, the uniformity of human nature certified that a rhetor's introspective review of her own probable response sufficed as a prediction of the response of other 'thinking beings endowed with understanding, imagination, memory, and passions, such as we are conscious of in ourselves, and learn from the experience of their effects to be in others. (29).

While Buck was well versed in faculty psychology, she argued that audiences had to become known, that they were not necessarily similar to the individual rhetor, that their tastes and attitudes could not be readily guessed at. Buck viewed the prevailing managerial notion of audience and communication as being overly antagonistic in terms of argumentative techniques. In "The Present Status of Rhetorical Theory" she links, unfavorably, the rhetoric of her time to that of the ancient sophists, noting that "According to the sophistic teaching, discourse was simply a process of persuading the hearer to a conclusion which the speaker, for any reason, desired him to accept"(45). This suggests that the speaker's purpose is twofold: first, s/he must determine what the goal of a communicative exchange is to be and second, s/he must decide how best to cajole or intimidate audience to help meet that goal. Often this led to an antagonistic relationship between speaker and hearer, and Buck notes

that “As the definition [of sophistic rhetoric] has previously suggested, the hearer's ultimate importance to discourse is of the slightest. To his interests the process of discourse is quite indifferent” (46).⁴

Buck's understanding of the sophistic notion of audience is surprisingly close to James Porter's description of the earlier mentioned managerial view, a view that Porter traces back to George Campbell. Porter states that “Campbell viewed audience not as a contributor of knowledge, arguments, or topics, but as a body that the speaker acts upon. Campbell takes a managerial view, in other words. In fact, he views the orator in terms of absolute despotism: the ideal speaker attains a kind of mastery over the body and soul of the audience” (32). Buck, Porter, and I would agree that the managerial view of audience is insufficient for explaining the complexities of communicative acts and is thus inadequate for any theory of rhetoric which hopes to understand audience in more complex terms than are implied in the fields of advertising or propaganda production. By focusing on the needs or desires of the writer

⁴ Buck's interpretation of the sophists here is similar to the one which has held sway until only very recently, and while writers as diverse as Susan Jarratt and Victor Vitanza have begun to reconsider the sophists in terms of their own time and through their own words, the sophists are even now frequently met with skepticism. In Buck's day the sophists were understood to be primarily interested in the manipulation of rhetorical situations for their own ends, and they were unfavorably compared to figures such as Plato, whose view of rhetoric was thought to be far more generous and even-handed. That these attitudes are perfectly inverted for many of us today is a testament to the power of the type of rehistoricizing I am attempting with Gertrude Buck.

only, the audience is manipulated and ultimately silenced and, according to Buck, this antagonistic and manipulative communicative mode could have grave consequences not only for the audience but for the speaker as well. She makes this clear when she says that the

anti-social character of the sophistic discourse, as seen both in its purpose and in its outcome, may be finally traced to the fact that the process, as we have analyzed it, just fails of achieving complete communication between speaker and hearer. Some conclusion is, indeed, established in the mind of the hearer, but not necessarily the conclusion which the speaker himself has reached upon this subject. It may, in fact, oppose all his own experience and thought, and thus hold no organic relation to his own mind. But wishing the hearer to believe it, he picks it up somewhere and proceeds to insert it into the hearer's mind. (47)

Or, at least, the speaker *attempts* to “insert it into the hearer’s mind.” Here Buck notes that, while a speaker may assume all the power within a communicative act, s/he can never be sure that the audience is actually listening or acting in accordance with the speaker’s wishes.

This point is crucial when discussing the power of the managerial view of audience. In Porter's hands, the managerial view is so dangerous that it leads him to move away from audience altogether, adopting the discourse community as an audience-surrogate. But Buck's understanding of the

unpredictable dynamics of communicative acts leads her to assert that, despite the speaker's best (or in this case worst) intentions, audience members are as likely *not* to go along with what they are told, are as liable to ignore a writer's arguments as they are to listen, and are as likely to refuse the writer's wishes. The opportunity for misunderstandings, willful or otherwise, is so present for Buck that the entire managerial notion of audience is dismissed as being supremely unhelpful, unrealistic, and potentially hurtful to all of the parties involved. For Buck, the deployment of the managerial model illustrates a writer's essential "anti-social character," which leads not to the speaker's ability to facilitate a desired outcome, but rather to his inability to control or even predict that outcome. Thus, in attempting to claim the power to both speak (to the audience) and act (upon the audience), the writer runs the very real risk of losing, along with the audience's sympathy, any chance of "winning" the argument. And if the writer's text turns out to be sufficient to compel the audience to accommodate him, this does little to insure that what is understood by the reader bears any relationship to what was intended by the writer.

Buck looks again to the ancients in order to find an alternative to the managerial view of audience. Not surprisingly, her antidote to the sophists is found in her reading of Plato's dialogues, wherein she discovers both a discussion and illustration of the dialectic method of communication. Within this dialectic field

The speaker has certain obligations, not perhaps directly to the hearer, but to the absolute truth of which he is but the mouthpiece, to the entire order of things which nowadays we are wont to call society. Discourse is, indeed, persuasion, but not persuasion to any belief the speaker pleases. Rather it is persuasion to the truth, knowledge of which, on the part of the hearer, ultimately advantages both himself and the speaker as well. The interests of both are equally furthered by legitimate discourse. In fact the interests of both are, when rightly understood, identical; hence there can be no antagonism between them. (48)

As was the case with her reading of the sophists, Buck's understanding of Plato may seem naïve or even wrongheaded to us now, but in her own time it surely did not. For Buck, Plato expressed that the common bond between speaker and hearer was (or at least should be) the search for truth. This search could only be conducted within the confines of *legitimate discourse*, a term Buck uses to distinguish this Platonic/dialectic mode of communication from the sophistic tradition of persuasion in order to secure the speaker's advantage.

This *legitimate discourse* is marked by its tendency to "equally" further the potentially disparate goals of both the writer and the audience, and this tendency strikes at the core difference between Buck's notion of audience and what Porter claims is the only historically tenable one, the managerial view of

audience.

Buck's *legitimate discourse* can still be read as an act of persuasion, but it is one from which all involved parties potentially benefit. It is also a model that emphasizes the productive possibilities of dissensus, instead of promoting a monological worldview. Buck continues her analysis of the dialectic mode of *legitimate discourse*, arguing that

In respect, then, to the advantage gained by each party to the act of discourse, speaker and hearer stand on a footing of at least approximate equality. In fact the ultimate end of discourse must be, from the Platonic premises, to establish equality between them. Before discourse takes place the speaker has a certain advantage over the hearer. He perceives a truth as yet hidden from the hearer, but necessary for him to know. Since the recognition of this truth on the part of the hearer must ultimately serve the speaker's interests as well, the speaker, through the act of discourse, communicates to the hearer his own vision. This done, the original inequality is removed, the interests of both speaker and hearer are furthered, and equilibrium is at this point restored to the social organism. (48)

Buck, like Plato, relies heavily on the speaker's ability and inclination to begin the process of equalizing what would otherwise be a severe power differential between speaker and audience. Perhaps surprisingly, this new found equality

between speaker and hearer in turn reflects on “the social organism,” for which “equilibrium” must be “restored.” Reference to this larger sphere in which the communication between two parties takes place indicates that Buck was aware of the contextual nature of discourse; it also suggests that she felt that writing could and often did have an impact on the larger society in which it occurred. And if this was so, Buck must have viewed her role as an educator, as a teacher of rhetorical skills, as being of importance for the society to which she and her students belonged.

We could say, then, that like Porter, Buck views context as important to a successful theory of communication. But this importance, along with an incomplete understanding of the complexities of audience, led Porter to drop audience in favor of discourse community as a means to help writers write with a self-conscious attention to the contexts in which their texts occur. Unlike Porter's view, Buck's contends that context can be fully understood only when writers develop and then retain a strong sense of audience as a major consideration in any communicative act.

Buck's appropriations of the sophists and of Plato are noteworthy because she uses them to help create a set of poles, between which we could expect most actual discourses to fall. At one pole, the function of discourse is to compel others to accommodate the speaker's desires. At the other, the function is to subvert individual desires in the quest for truth. Despite the fact that we may be inclined today to champion the sophists and to reconfigure

Plato's "dialogues" as literally being monologues that are designed to appear to be dialogues, Buck's larger point (that audience and writer both have a responsibility to the success of communicative acts), makes sense from the perspective of our own appropriations of ancient rhetorical theory. A result of Buck's argument is that we do in fact have opportunities to communicate, that we do in fact have the ability to share the power that resides within communicative acts, and that the involvement of both parties is required if "truths" are to be agreed upon, if even for only a short time.

Of course, a necessary critique of this perspective is that truth is not so easily found (or agreed upon) as this rendition of the Platonic model would lead us to believe. Anticipating this critique, Buck sounds surprisingly post-modern as she discusses the problems associated not only with finding the truth, but also with even considering what the nature of truth is. With some humor she concedes that her social theory of rhetoric cannot claim to be "on such joyfully intimate terms with the absolute truth as was Plato['s]" (49).

Within the context of Buck's essay this insight seems almost to be an afterthought, but it is one which is worth our careful attention. If this passage is any indication, Buck seems to have felt very little discomfort at the prospect of not having access to timeless and immutable truths. This is in part because she perceived truth as being experiential in nature, as having to do with the individual's response to the world. Of this she says that "the practical value of even a little relative and perhaps temporary truth has become clearer to us--

such truth as touches us through our personal experiences and observations” (49). This passage suggests that truth is contested, temporally bound, highly mutable, and always closely related to the individual’s “experiences and observations” of the world around her or him.⁵

By contrast, more mainstream rhetorical theories relied on the idea that truths really were static, monolithic, and at least partly knowable. The belles lettres tradition assumed that truth could be found through the tasteful appreciation of, well, tastefully produced art, and that there were aesthetic standards which could be relied upon to help cultivate taste. The Current-Traditional model relied on the exactness of a prescriptive grammar and on a stylistic set of rules, which was intended to insure that language remained pure and undiluted. This focus on exactness in American colleges arose, according to Robert Connors, when in the late nineteenth century “more than half of the candidates--the products of America's best preparatory schools--failed” the written entrance exams developed at Harvard in 1874 (11). The illiteracy which this failure supposedly exposed “became an obsession. College freshman could not write. This situation could not be allowed. Secondary

⁵ More recently, ideas centering around the relationship between personal experience and truth have been developed by can be found in George Hillocks' belief, based on his reading of John Dewey's theory of warranted assertions, that “propositions may have little ‘truth’ to them, but if we have taken the time to think about them and relate them to one another, they provide a matrix of ideas, what Dewey calls ‘the ground of inference to a declarative proposition that such and such an act is the one best calculated to produce the desired issue under the factual conditions ascertained’” (109).

curricula must change. Teachers must be proselytized. Principals must be warned. Schools must be put on notice" (11). So, while Current-Traditional rhetoric seriously overvalued the importance of correctness, it did so because of a genuine concern that American students were increasingly found to be illiterate. Despite the fact that Buck also did not want her students at Vassar to be considered illiterate, her rhetoric stood in stark contrast to these more established and traditional ways of structuring knowledge about rhetoric and composition. Buck's model allowed for and encouraged contingency above all else, with her the sincere hope seeming to be that writers and readers would enter into a communion of sorts, wherein truths, albeit temporary and culturally determined ones, could be found and agreed upon.

Despite the fact that I find this version of the Platonic dialectic extremely compelling and far more useful than the end-of-the-line managerial view of audience which Porter locates, Buck's model presents at least one serious problem: it assumes real people in real *speaking* situations. Earlier I mentioned that Buck tends not to rely on models of oral conversation to promote her view of rhetoric. Nevertheless, her reading of Plato's dialectic method seems utterly reliant on the give and take, back and forth nature of conversation. This reliance on the truly interactive possibilities of oral communication is especially compelling because it implies what our students so rarely anticipate that their writings could elicit. Namely, an answer. We need to remember that Gertrude Buck was working to develop strategies

which would be effective for the written communications in which her own students, as well as those in classes which deployed her textbooks, were engaged. In these classes were students who were faced with the situation of having only one of the communicative parties, themselves, present.⁶

In her article "What Does 'Rhetoric' Mean?" Buck suggests that teaching practices "throughout the country" had, in her time, stopped promoting writing situations that failed to acknowledge audience at some level. Replacing such unrealistic, decontextualizing preconditions for writing, students were increasingly being encouraged instead to write to "real" audiences:

Within the memory almost of the youngest of English teachers, the precepts of formal rhetoric as a guide to writing have been discredited and abandoned, the act of composition in our schools has been conditioned more naturally by a real occasion for writing and a real audience to be addressed, such theory as must be involved in the criticism of the student's writing has grown

⁶ This is so unless we consider 1) the writing instructor to be the audience, in which case we find a truly unique rhetorical situation in which a writer's audience has far more than the power to accept or reject a writer's ideas and arguments; this audience also has the power to administer a grade, or 2) the

steadily less complex and dogmatic because [it is] springing
more directly from the writing itself. (54)

Buck's textbooks did not sell very well in her day, so it does not follow that her own work was responsible for this sea change which she both perceived and argued for. And while it is true that many aspects of the classical rhetorical tradition had by the turn of the century been abandoned or highly modified, it does not follow that the same was true of "the precepts of formal rhetoric." Buck's comments may have been overly optimistic; she called for change by suggesting that it had already occurred (thereby questioning the validity of pedagogical practices that had not already made the change she refers to). Buck's call for writing situations in which the writer is encouraged to consider a "real audience to be addressed" resonates strongly with Lisa Ede's and Andrea Lunsford's seminal work concerning audience considerations. In "Audience Addressed/Audience Invoked: The Role of Audience in Composition Theory and Pedagogy," Ede and Lunsford argue that audience, if overtly considered at all, is always theorized in one of two ways. Either the audience is addressed as if it/they were physically present, or it is invoked, imaginatively created by the writer's knowledge of the rhetorical situation.

Ede and Lunsford state that "a fully elaborated view of audience" must

student's in-class peers.

always “balance the creativity of the writer with the different, but equally important, creativity of the reader” (169). As with Buck’s analysis of Plato’s dialectic, Ede and Lunsford focus on two “real” actants: the sender and the receiver. But Ede and Lunsford want to go beyond this conception of audience, to develop a notion that can encompass the best parts of both addressed and invoked audiences. Their take on audience represents an attempt at bridging these two otherwise mutually exclusive conceptions; audience considerations

...must account for a wide and shifting range of roles for both addressed and invoked audiences. And, finally, it must relate the matrix created by the intricate relationship of writer and audience to all elements in the rhetorical situation. Such an enriched conception of audience can help us better understand the complex act we call composing. (169-170)

Lunsford and Ede want to promote a notion of audience which allows writers to imaginatively create their readerships, while at the same time approximating as closely as possible the actual readers which would be inclined to read any given text. Further, their notion of audience is one that, like Buck’s much earlier theory, must account for the social and cultural situatedness which readers and writers both share and help to create and maintain. The problem of negotiating between these two ways of getting to the audience is not finally resolved by Buck, or by Ede and Lunsford.

This is partly due to the reliance all three have on a model of communication which assumes both parties, writer and reader, as being present and, at least metaphorically, embodied. But the problem is really much larger than this, and extends all the way back to the time when classical oratorical theory was first applied to written expression. Within the realm of the oral, physically present audiences can exist, and can participate in the meaning making process of conversation and debate. In this situation speaker and hearer can take up matters collaboratively in order to find mutually believable, albeit temporary, “truths.” Thus, we can say that true interlocutors can participate in oral communication. But written communication by its very nature has tended to value the producer of text above other considerations, and this certainly is true within the confines of the composition classroom.

Teachers often exhort students to “consider their audience” and to promote the belief that they (the teachers) are not the audience for whom writers should write. Instead, they should do as Ede, Lunsford, and Buck recommend, they should work to imaginatively re/create their audiences, audiences who far too often simply do not and will not exist for the writer in any practical way.

Recently, rhetorical theorists have attempted to tease out the difficulties to which I have just alluded, and increasingly solutions to these problems are sought within the confines of postmodern theory. I conclude by considering Kay Halasek' recent attempt to write Mikhail Bakhtin into the realm of composition studies. Among other things, Halasek contends that the notion of

audience has a Bakhtinian, or dialogic, dimension. Finally, I will consider Buck's notion of audience as a potential contributor to this discussion.

Halasek and Buck and Bakhtin

In her recent book, *A Pedagogy of Possibility: Bakhtinian Perspectives on Composition Studies*, Halasek seeks to insert into composition studies one of Mikhail Bakhtin's most interesting ideas, that written (and usually literary) communication contains multiple, often contradictory and competing voices within single, supposedly single-authored texts. Bakhtin describes these competing, overlapping voices as *dialogism*, and defines the term thus:

Everything means, is understood, as a part of a greater whole-- there is a constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential of conditioning others. Which will affect the other, how it will do so and in what degree is what is actually settled at the moment of utterance. This dialogic imperative, mandated by the pre-existence of the language world relative to any of its current inhabitants, insures that there can be no actual monologue. (426)

Dialogism refers to a polyvalenced voice that is borne along by any number of speakers. "No actual monologue" can exist because speakers never speak only their own words, but instead always give voice to the variety that is

dialogism.⁷ Halasek's attempt to involve Bakhtin in her rhetorical theory of audience begins with a discussion of Douglas Park's recommendation that students should be directed to visualize realistic audiences to which their writings can aim (for instance, to the readers of a local newspaper). Halasek argues that Park's position "is amenable to Bakhtin's understanding of [the] immediate and broader social contexts" within which all writers find themselves (55). Halasek goes on to argue that a Bakhtinian perspective would lend itself more to the "invoked" than to the "addressed" audience. This makes sense when we consider that Bakhtin was primarily interested in exploring literary texts, works that had aesthetic goals and motivations. But within this invocation lie multiple voices, all of which compete and intermingle in the writer's mind.

This is because the writer's own consciousness contains, at least in some form, its own dialectic range of possibilities, its own internal, polyvocal, dialogism. The virtue of this natural semi-schizophrenia is that it allows for the writer, in invoking an essentially nonexistent audience, to nevertheless have access to a rich array of opinions, voices, and even subject positions. But there is a danger as well. The internal dialectic which Halasek finds in her

⁷ This is quite different from dialectic, which emphasizes interactions between speakers. Jean Dietz Moss believes that "Dialectic achieves its best known classical form in the 'Socratic method' of Plato's Dialogues. Socrates regularly questioned his hearers on controversial issues and used the contradictory answers elicited to refine ever more penetrating questions in the expectation of consensus." (183).

Bakhtin-informed notion of audience runs the very real risk of encouraging an inordinate degree of myopia or egocentrism on the part of the writer, who may feel authorized to write anything at all, on the grounds that both writers and readers tap into and are tapped by the larger discourses which flow all around us.

Buck and Bakhtin would probably agree that truth is temporary rather than permanent, but whereas Bakhtin's rendition of the heterogeneity of the communicative act is purely internal and takes place within the author, Buck's is external and communal. I mean by this that the dialogic imagination that Halasek considers is one that takes place solely within the writer's mind. Contrasting this, Buck's notion of audience refuses to relinquish its focus on "real" interlocutors.

Halasek is well aware of the limitations of the Bakhtinian model of audience. She concludes her chapter by noting that, as a writing instructor, she is encouraged

[t]o acknowledge (rather than to deny through vague and empty references to decentering authority and student-centered or dialogic pedagogies), question, and lay bare the play of power inherent in my role as an evaluative audience. By defining myself both as an immediate audience whose role is to respond... to students' writing *and* as an evaluative audience—one who evaluates a text on a defined set of terms that emanates

from this complex set of audiences—I acknowledge that, because of my position between students and the institution, my roles in the classroom as audience are complex, even contrary to one another. (82)

Halasek's interest in Bakhtin in no way releases her from the tension she feels as both instructor and "audience" to her students. Similarly, my interest in Buck's notion of audience does not alleviate my own tension concerning the "right" way to teach audience to my students. But Buck does help me to see that any managerial conception of audience will tend to make the communicative act "a process essentially individualistic, and thus socially irresponsible. It secures the advantage of the speaker without regard to that of the hearer, or even in direct opposition to it" ("The Present Status" 47). As writing instructors we must strive to enact social models of audience if we are to hope to instill in our students a sense of communication which is not necessarily agonistic or divisive in nature, but which is instead socially responsible.

When we consider the time in which Gertrude Buck produced her work, it becomes apparent that she stood in sharp contrast to the composition practices and rhetorical theories that held sway at the turn of the century. By comparison to the rules based, eristic models of rhetoric then being promoted in American college level composition courses, Buck's work strikes a chord with us today because it foreshadows our contemporary understanding of acts

of literacy as having democratizing potential, assumes a heterogeneous population instead of monolithic “American” spirit, and it expresses a communally bound, ethical dimension for communication. With regard to her understanding of the notion of audience as a theoretical construct, she sounds quite contemporary and in some respects she is even ahead of us now. Her calls to understand communication as essentially dialectical foreshadow Halasek’s recent appropriations of Bakhtin and other postmodern theorists that have been useful in the formulation of rhetorical theory.

But even though certain aspects of Buck’s work may seem to belong to the late rather than the early twentieth century, we must not lose sight of the fact that in many ways she was firmly entrenched in the modernist project, with its attention to the rights of autonomous individuals who could act and react to the world around them without those actions seeming to be preordained by the larger culture. But this is in fact a positive quality which, while not necessarily jibing with some of the more extreme versions of postmodernism, at least allows for the possibility of individual accountability and communally based ethics.

So, even though Buck speaks from a past that is only now being re-remembered, she speaks clearly and in a surprisingly contemporary way about the ideas which have recently cohered around the theoretical construct known as audience. Buck’s writings do not resolve the issue of audience for us any more than Porter’s, Ede’s and Lunsford’s, or Halasek’s, but they do encourage

us to rethink the histories which have thus far been generated, to consider a past which includes academically oriented women as well as men, and which includes not only agonistic and potentially exclusionary rhetorical practices, but also egalitarian-oriented communicative modes which emphasize shared power, responsibility, and meaning making possibilities. My hope here has been to enact the argument I made in chapter one that, contrary to the history of audience which is presented in James Porter's *Audience and Rhetoric*, we can consider figures in addition to Aristotle, Cicero, and Campbell as parts of a revised history of audience. Further, in the work of Gertrude Buck we find a clear alternative to the managerial view, and instead find a notion of audience that is rich, complex, and in accordance with many of the theoretical precepts which concern contemporary rhetorical studies.

The various threads of Buck's thought create an interesting theory of audience which contrasts sharply with the one James Porter develops and then rejects. Six major ideas are constitutive of her theory of audience. To begin with, Buck understood communication not simply as something written by writers. Nor did she adopt the managerial view of audience, wherein the author attempts to manipulate the reader. Instead, she conceived written communication as something which takes place specifically between individuals and within groups. Second, since writing should represent the communication that takes place between and among communicative participants, Buck felt that writing should not be antagonistic or manipulative

but should instead work to achieve “complete communication between speaker and hearer” (47). This “complete communication” takes into account the fact that writers and audiences do not have the same goals, expectations, agendas, or experiences. Thus, one of the primary functions of communication is to bridge the gaps that exist between interlocutors. A third element that is essential to Buck’s notion of audience is that we recognize that the reader is never fully known. Thus she always has more power than the writer does because she can decide whether or not to read, whether or not to consider what the author says, and whether or not to act upon the author’s words. A fourth aspect of her theory of audience is that any author’s impulse to deploy a managerial notion of audience betrays his essential “anti-social behavior” since he is trying to manipulate rather than communicate. Fifth, despite Buck’s belief that communication can lead to an understanding of truth (a concept she derived from her reading of Plato), she nevertheless argues that this truth is found only through what she called “legitimate discourse,” wherein the goals and attitudes of both reader and writer are kept in mind. Because “legitimate discourse” allows for competing views to be simultaneously considered and maintained, we can say that Buck’s notion of audience leads to a concept of the productive potential of dissensus. Finally, while Buck’s rhetorical theory is centered on writing, her models and metaphors are typically drawn from the realm of oral discourse. And while this is problematic if we assume that written discourse is typically more static

and rigid, while oral discourse can be modified continually, it is important to note that her main motivation for using orality as a model for literacy is because she was convinced that literate acts should be conceived as occurring within contexts and between people.

The notion of audience which Buck develops represents a non-managerial view which is at odds with the history of audience which Porter located in his history of audience. And while it was developed during the early twentieth century, it has a surprising resonance for current composition and pedagogical theory. It is to these similarities that I will turn in the next chapter. Specifically, I want to argue that many comparisons can be drawn between theories of audience which present alternatives to the managerial notion, such as Buck's, and critical pedagogy. I want to compare the two in the next chapter because I want to argue that critical pedagogy, while very interesting and useful to my own notions about teaching, has many limitations.

These limitations can be at least partly overcome by infusing a sense of audience into our conceptualizing of writing pedagogies. After finding common ground between audience theories and critical pedagogy in the next chapter, I will present my own audience oriented pedagogy of writing in chapter four.

CHAPTER THREE

Audience and Critical Pedagogy:

Finding Productive Intersections

In the last chapter I reviewed Gertrude Buck's rhetorical theory in order to argue that, despite James Porter's claims to the contrary, a non-managerial notion of audience historically exists. In this chapter I will explore some of the intersections between this recovered sense of audience and what has become known as critical pedagogy. The non-managerial model of audience theorized by Buck, Andrea Lunsford, Lisa Ede and others has not been previously compared to the literature on critical pedagogy, and it is my contention that such comparison can help us develop critical pedagogical strategies which are especially useful to the study of rhetoric and composition. I will focus on major elements of critical pedagogy as it has been expressed by three well-known theorists who have contributed to it: Henry Giroux, Deborah Brandt, and James Berlin. I pick these three not only because each theorizes important and different aspects of critical pedagogy, but also because their work can be put to use to develop a pedagogy which will be specifically oriented toward the composition classroom. These three renditions speak to a wider set of concerns than do those arising from the composition classroom. I will be modifying their positions in light of audience theory in order to produce a more effective composition pedagogy.

A major problem with the formalized, institutionalized teaching that takes place in schools is that, instead of opening up new possibilities for students, it tends to merely reproduce and promote existing conditions. Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron explain the reproductive function of educational processes thus:

Given that it must reproduce the institutional conditions enabling interchangeable agents to carry on continuously, i.e. daily and over the widest possible territorial area, WSg [the work of schooling] reproducing the culture it is mandated to reproduce, the ES [educational system] tends to ensure that the corps of agents recruited and trained to carry out inculcation operate within institutional conditions capable of both dispensing and preventing them from performing heterogeneous or heterodox WSg, i.e. those conditions most likely to exclude, without explicitly forbidding, any practice incompatible with the function of reproducing the intellectual and moral integration of the legitimate addressees. (57)

The primary function of "the work of schooling", then, is to maintain the "educational system" itself. The "corps of agents" who enact the work of the school are its teachers and administrators, while the "legitimate addressees" are the students, the recipients of the function of schooling. Many would argue that education should uphold traditional values; thus the reproductive

function of education is a primary and wholly positive function. In this scenario, teachers are cast as active speakers and students as passive audiences. The educational enterprise is very similar to the managerial notion of audience as defined in chapter one: here, it is the teacher's responsibility and right to manipulate students to society's ends. These ends are focused on a desire to see that all students receive the knowledge which will mark them as "educated" and culturally literate. But in this scenario students should only learn what has previously designated as worthwhile knowledge.

But many others view this reproductive function of education as a very bad thing since many aspects of tradition, such as racism and sexism, are negative. Recent pedagogies (often referred to as "critical" or "radical" pedagogies) attempt, in a variety of ways, to subvert the reproductive function of educational processes as they play out in educational institutions. Such pedagogies attempt to do this in a variety of ways: by trying to help students develop critical thinking skills, by helping them to become "better" citizens, by emphasizing the dialectical nature of communication and knowledge production, by focusing on the democratic potential implied by the American governmental system, or by focusing on and critiquing the reproductive nature of education itself. In contrast to older pedagogies' reliance on a notion of students as being the passive recipients of the teacher's intellectual bounty, critical pedagogies tend to emphasize non-managerial, non-manipulative interactions between teachers and students. Such non-managerial interactions

have much in common with the notion of audience which Gertrude Buck developed; both assume that knowledge is constructed within contexts and through communities, and both explicitly cast students as active participants in the educational enterprise.

Perhaps the chief popularizer of what has become known as critical pedagogy is Paulo Freire, whose *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* was first published in 1968. Freire lays out a pedagogy that is in sharp contrast to what he calls the "banking" model of education. With the banking model, teachers attempt to deposit (typically through lecture) knowledge, which has previously been designated as important and pertinent, into students' minds. Testing procedures are then utilized to illustrate the degree to which the deposits were successfully made. For Freire the relationship between teacher and student which is encouraged by the banking model "involves a narrating Subject (the teacher) and patient, listening objects (the students)" (57). Such a relationship breeds passivity on the part of students, leaving teachers to be the only truly active participants in the educational enterprise. Should an instructor follow the banking model, the "task is to 'fill' the students with the contents of his narration," to hand to students the information that the instructor already has. In opposition to the banking model, Freire is interested in helping students gain or create knowledge through interaction, both with teachers and with the environments in which they find themselves. This rejection of the banking model of education comes about because, within it, the pieces of information

provided by the instructor are “contents which are detached from reality, disconnected from the totality that engendered them and could give them significance. Words are emptied of their concreteness and become a hollow, alienated, and alienating verbosity” (57). Thus, if information is merely transmitted from teacher to student with no context, with no link to the circumstances which cause that knowledge to come about, that knowledge is almost completely worthless for the student. Instead of the banking method of education, Freire works to develop a pedagogy that can take into account the historical and socio-cultural conditions from which knowledge arises. This Freireian pedagogy is intended to become an agent for social change because it calls into question the validity of the banking method of education, a style of teaching that tends to reproduce existing conditions and to implicitly argue for the maintenance of the educational institution at the same time.

In addition to taking into account socio-cultural and historical contexts, Freire’s pedagogy emphasizes the importance of critical thinking skills.

According to Freire,

true dialogue cannot exist unless the dialoguers engage in critical thinking--thinking which discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world and men and admits of no dichotomy between them--thinking which perceives reality as a process, as transformation, rather than as a static entity--thinking which does not separate itself from action, but constantly

immerses itself in temporality without fear of the risks involved.

(81)

It is hoped that through the teaching of critical thinking skills, students will be able to think critically about pervasive and unfair power differentials, and to possibly think themselves out of unequal circumstances. This is because critical thinking encourages active participation rather than passive acquiescence. The pedagogical stance which Freire develops is similar to the non-managerial notion of audience insofar as both emphasize all communicative parties should be active rather than passive, and that it is through this shared activity that meaning can be arrived at and agreed upon.

Since the initial publication of *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, many different iterations of critical pedagogy have emerged. But despite the differences between pedagogies as developed by many different theorists, virtually all the incarnations share at least two important goals: to help teachers find ways to make institutionalized educational processes become less reproductive of (certain aspects of) the past and to help students find ways to question hegemonic structures in order that they may be better understood, negotiated, dismantled, ignored, or superceded. According to Elizabeth Ellsworth, the "different emphases" of various critical pedagogies "are reflected in the variety of labels give to them, such as 'critical pedagogy,' 'pedagogy of critique and possibility,' 'pedagogy of student voice,' 'pedagogy of empowerment,' 'radical pedagogy,' 'pedagogy for radical democracy,' and

'pedagogy of possibility'. But despite their different names, they all share important "fundamental assumptions and goals," since the overwhelming majority of these pedagogies "represents attempts by educational researchers to theorize and operationalize pedagogical challenges to oppressive social formations" (90). Virtually all incarnations of critical pedagogy share the assumption that oppression (of some sort) can be countered through institutionalized educational processes (of some sort). The objects of students' critical thinking may be political, governmental, or cultural institutions, the strictures of regularized language use (which are viewed by some as upholders and maintainers of oppression or other forms of control), or almost anything else which requires careful consideration and developed analytical skills to understand. In what follows I explore three different influential incarnations of critical pedagogy developed in the work of Henry Giroux, Deborah Brandt, and James Berlin. I select these three because their ideas strike me as being especially useful to my own understanding of recent pedagogical trends and because their work is especially amenable to the pedagogy I want to develop in the next chapter--a pedagogy which is specifically concerned with writing instruction. For each of these theorists, I will explore the ways their pedagogies can productively intersect with the notions of audience developed in chapters one and two.

Giroux's Radical Pedagogy and Considerations of Audience

Henry Giroux is an educational theorist who has developed some of the best known aspects of what we call critical pedagogy¹. His debt to Freire's work is considerable, and, like Freire, Giroux views the educational enterprise as an opportunity for either students' repression or their liberation. Central to Giroux's understanding of traditional educational processes is the assumption that educational regimes are designed to help students learn how to conform to existing power relations. This is similar to the managerial notion of audience with which James Porter is so concerned, wherein teachers are dynamic speakers and students are passive receptacles, passive audiences waiting to be managed. The teachers work to uphold the existing dominant educational regimes while students are expected to quietly and unquestioningly listen and then accept what teachers have to say.

Instead of "managing" students through enforced passivity and repression, Giroux wants education to provide opportunities for students to learn about these repressive, institutional learning regimes, to question their validity, and to find ways to overturn or subvert them. Thus, students' simple knowledge of their oppressed status is of some benefit to them. And this knowledge is useful not only to those students who are members of groups

¹ Actually, Giroux often refers to his work as "radical" pedagogy. Still, it is valid to consider his work within the present context. Rightly or wrongly, "radical" and "critical" have become interchangeable terms within much of the literature which is concerned with recent pedagogical trends.

which have historically been oppressed by racism and sexism: it is useful to all students because all students are oppressed, all are ensnared in the same educational enterprise that continually works to uphold itself and the traditions that undergird and validate it. All students are the audiences and recipients of an institutionalized educational process whose primary function is to manage students, to speak for itself and for its own self-interests.

Giroux believes that what is needed is a “politics of voice and representation” which can help students find or create the narratives that can adequately explain their lives. In "Radical Pedagogy and the Politics of Student Voice" Giroux says that

...both radical and conservative ideologies generally fail to engage the politics of voice and representation--the forms of narrative and dialogue--around which students make sense of their lives and schools. While this is an understandable position for conservatives or for those whose logic of instrumentalism and social control is at odds with an emancipatory notion of human agency, it represents a serious theoretical and political failing on the part of radical educators. (120)

Giroux can understand why the political right would be interested in maintaining a pedagogy that in turn maintains "social control" because he feels that the political right is defined by its allegiance to tradition and history. For the right, education should be motivated by a desire to uphold commonly

accepted truths, to maintain social mores, to present students with the knowledge which is most valuable, correct, or accurate. For instance, the teaching of the canon suggests that there are indeed certain texts that are intrinsically important to the culture in which they are produced (leaving everything else to be judged as having only minor importance), and they should therefore be the texts that are always taught to students in order to insure the successful transmission of the dominant, relevant culture. It is the responsibility of teachers and of educational institutions to mold and manage students, who become passive audiences of the approved, traditionally validated knowledge which the institutions' agents speak.

But for Giroux this is the worst possible function of institutionalized education. Rather than a “logic of instrumentalism and social control” which he associates with political conservatism, he wants to encourage the political left to find ways to help education promote the "emancipatory notion of human agency." He wants to find out

How to develop a radical pedagogy that acknowledges the spaces, tensions, and possibilities for struggle within the day-to-day workings of schools. Underlying this problematic is the need to generate a set of categories that not only provides new modes of critical interrogation but also points to alternative strategies and modes of practice around which a radical pedagogy can be realized. (120-21)

Rather than using education to uphold tradition, Giroux considers the central problem of pedagogy to be the development of new configurations of schools as spaces which would not merely reproduce itself or reproduce, unquestioned, the validity of canonical knowledge. These radical strategies would encourage students to interrogate their own surroundings, and to create for themselves their own sites of resistance to oppressive, homogenizing conditions. Like Gertrude Buck's call for a non-managerial notion of audience, in which both speaker and audience are "equally furthered by legitimate discourse" ("The Present Status," 48), Giroux wants education to represent a space in which students can realize that their discourses are as legitimate as the hegemonic, self-sustaining discourse of institutionalized educational processes.

Giroux hopes that his pedagogical strategy will result in a "discourse of critical understanding" which "not only represents an acknowledgement of the political and pedagogical processes at work in the construction of forms of authorship and voice within different institutional and social spheres" but which also "constitutes a critical attack on the vertical ordering of reality inherent in the unjust practices that are actively at work in the wider society"(120). The politics of voice is key to Giroux's pedagogy because it seeks to create spaces in which authors can express themselves, in which they can do more than merely receive and then mouth the words of institutions. Like Buck's "legitimate discourse," Giroux's pedagogy seeks to remove the

allure of the managerial style of education, implicitly arguing that students who can find their own voices can in turn strengthen society at large by strengthening democracy. This move to give voice to oppressed or silenced students works to complicate and even dismantle the “vertical ordering of reality” because it multiplies the number of voices, giving voice to individuals instead of only to institutions. Rather than manipulating or managing its audience (students), institutions can encourage relationships in which audiences become authorized to speak, to actively participate in the educational enterprise. Doing away with the vertical, hierarchical ordering principles of society, Giroux’s pedagogy attempts to institute a horizontal, non-hierarchical structure in which students have just as much of a right to speak as teachers, schools, and governments.

Finally, Giroux believes the problems of education can be solved only if schools are "reconceived and reconstituted as 'democratic counterpublic spheres'--as places where students learn the skills and knowledge needed to live in and fight for a viable democratic society." Once reconceived, schools will

Be characterized by a pedagogy that demonstrates its commitment to engaging the views and problems that deeply concern students in their everyday lives. Equally important is the need for schools to cultivate a spirit of critique and a respect for human dignity that will be capable of linking personal and

social issues around the pedagogical project of helping students to become active citizens. (143)

By reconceiving the basic function of schools, Giroux hopes to create the interstices within which students can understand their oppressed status and can work to diminish or eliminate their oppression. The hope is that they will not be prey to a banking model of education in which they have no say. Instead, they are to become "voiced" players who are no longer managed by school. It is further hoped that this will lead to a more purely democratic society in which individuals are authorized to speak. Schools will no longer be expected to merely transfer accepted, traditional, or canonical truths to passively receptive student audiences. Schools will instead be organized such that their primary function is to help "students to become active citizens."

It is tempting to think that, by arguing for "voice," Giroux is implicitly arguing against conceiving students as audiences. But while a disjuncture exists between Giroux's pedagogy and the logic of a managerial notion of audience, no such disjuncture presents itself if we consider the non-managerial version of audience developed by Buck, Andrea Lunsford, Lisa Ede, and others. And this non-managerial notion of audience is especially relevant if we take it to be a part of the pedagogical stance which teachers should adopt. In other words, if teachers, as agents of educational regimes, can collaborate with students to develop knowledge and to design educational practices, then they can decrease the extent to which they "manage" their "audience."

So, some of the major tenets of critical pedagogy as envisioned by Giroux are that schools need to “engage the politics of voice and representation” (120), that they should acknowledge the “spaces, tensions, and possibilities for struggle within the day-to-day workings of schools” (121), and that schools need ultimately to be “reconceived and reconstituted as ‘democratic counterpublic spheres’...where students learn...to live in and fight for a viable democratic society” (143). And although they may seem contrary to one another, Giroux's interest in students and "voice" is quite similar to my own interest in institutions and audience. Potentially, these two considerations come together to recreate schools as sites wherein students and teachers both alternate between being speakers and being audiences. Students come to school oppressed. As things now stand, they only become more oppressed throughout their educational experience. But Giroux believes that if his pedagogical plans were followed, students would be made aware of their oppression and would be encouraged to overcome their unfavorable circumstances by enacting the democratic potential of the American governmental system.

Audience and Brandt's Pedagogy of Involvement

Another important theorist whose work can add to our understanding of critical pedagogy is Deborah Brandt. Whereas Henry Giroux comes from the discipline of Education, Brandt's focus is a result of her background in

composition and rhetoric studies. And while Giroux's emphasis is on institutionalized educational regimes, Brandt's is more squarely focused on the students who are found within these regimes. Another major difference between the two has to do with the specificity of their projects: Giroux is most concerned with describing a pedagogy which is general enough to be applied to educational processes as they take place within many different disciplines, while Brandt's pedagogical focus is on acts of "critical literacy," especially (although not exclusively) as they play out in the composition classroom.

Brandt's more focused pedagogical theory explores the supposed simplicity of reading and writing in order to argue that these are not merely instrumental, utilitarian skills, but are instead acts which can be performed only as students begin to understand the intersubjective nature of communication. She is concerned with creating a conception of "literacy as involvement" in which writers' literate acts extend beyond the merely instrumental use of language. Her iteration of critical pedagogy promotes students' awareness of others, and it is this awareness of others which drives her understanding of literacy as something which

requires heightening awareness of how language works to sustain intersubjectivity, particularly the intersubjective work of reading and writing. This intersubjectivity is deeper and more particular than rhetorical considerations of audience and persona or even the general ability to recognize and anticipate the

viewpoints of others (although these factors are clearly important in the development of literate ability). (5)

For Brandt, awareness of one's own intersubjectivity is the single most important key to attaining critical literacy. She feels that it is more important even than "audience or persona" because it manages to encapsulate both of these concepts at the same time. I agree that intersubjectivity is a far more encompassing term than persona. However, it is troubling that Brandt opposes a concept of the subject, who comes to appreciate his or her own intersubjectivity, to a notion of persona, that represents that subject within discourse. This is because it sets up the ground for Brandt to argue for the development, through educational processes, of an authentic self, a subject who is not "real" until schooling takes place. Brandt's idea of intersubjectivity is more far reaching than the managerial notion of audience but the non-managerial notion which Buck and others have developed goes much further than Brandt's idea of critical literacy. This is because while a non-managerial notion of audience and the idea of intersubjectivity both rely on an assumption that communicative acts are always built on interaction rather than on monologue, Brandt's intersubjectivity really only allows for subjects to experience their own inter-relatedness. By contrast, a non-managerial notion of audience suggests that all of the parties in discourse are equally, at least potentially, intersubjective.

Both Brandt and Giroux place a great deal of importance on students' developing abilities to perceive themselves as being acted upon, as being themselves actively involved in communicative acts, and as being in need of help (through the educational enterprise) in order to develop a "voice." In addition to the argument that intersubjectivity requires voice, Brandt's other main thesis is that literacy should not be defined as the "'mere ability' to read and write texts." Brandt recognizes that the supposed simplicity of "mere" reading and writing "is far from simple and unproblematic." Instead, she argues that "the ability to see sense in written language" along with the ability to "do something with" language "requires terrific coordination of language, knowledge, and social awareness. The trouble is not in treating literacy merely as decoding or encoding print but in underestimating how much is actually involved in these processes" (10). The concept of literacy being developed here applies to a complex set of critical analytical skills. Despite her belief that her concept of intersubjectivity subsumes both persona and audience, this description of the complexities required for literate acts is similar to Ede and Lunsford's belief that "the most complete understanding of audience...involves a synthesis of the perspectives we have termed audience addressed, with its focus on the reader, and audience invoked, with its focus on the writer" (167). Brandt's expansion of the subject is similar to Ede and Lunsford's expansion of the audience: the two concepts try to anticipate and

reach out to each other in order to enact Buck's "legitimate discourse" and to achieve what Kenneth Burke termed "identification."²

Those students who possess or acquire the requisite "coordination of language, knowledge, and social awareness" are the ones who are most able to enact an "involved" sense of literacy. And while the term literacy still applies to basic reading and writing skills, Brandt's notion of an involved literacy emphasizes that

writers and readers at work, especially those who know what they are doing, are immersed in practical contexts of action, in which the important interpretive decisions are always toward determining what to do now. The aim is to keep the process itself viable, to keep making one's own decisions make sense, and to figure out what to do when they do not. (125)

Brandt's interest in helping students decide "what to do now" indicates that her critical pedagogy is tied to the idea that institutional education should encourage its recipients to be active participants in the world. Writers and readers who "know what they are doing" are the ones who are most likely to

²According to Burke, identification has to do with an individual's ability to go beyond merely understanding another person's point of view. Instead, it implies that an individual can empathize with another. As he says, "In being identified with B, A is 'substantially one' with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time he remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another" (21).

grasp the interactive dimension of language use. Those students who “know what they are doing” are most able to understand communication as an ongoing process, as something which does not merely consist of the teacher's depositing of knowledge into students' passive minds as in Freire's banking model. Earlier, I described the intersection between a non-managerial sense of audience and Giroux's reinvented educational regimes, arguing that audience consideration could lead to shared power between teacher and students as regards curriculum development and knowledge construction. These intersections apply to Brandt's pedagogical stance as well. But in addition to considering relationships between students and education's agents, here audience has special resonance between and among students. This is because of Brandt's focus on students as potentially active participants, as intersubjective communicators. While Giroux wants to give voice (a new, liberatory voice) to the educational discipline itself, Brandt's involved literacy tries to give voice to students, by noting that the student/subject is surrounded by others who are simultaneously subjects and audiences; others who are also intersubjective.

Brandt's conception of students is dependent on the idea that they can and should develop their own singular, individual voices. Once students are able to voice for themselves, they can begin to think of communication as an intersubjective enterprise. This conception of critical literacy as an ongoing and interactive process implies that knowledge is made within communication

and not merely reported through it. Her pedagogical stance also assumes that knowledge is most readily acquired and that learning effectively takes place only when we understand these processes as interpretive acts that occur in specific socio-cultural and historical contexts. "Writers and readers (again, especially the effective ones) are able to carry out this interpretive work because when they look at written language they see what it is saying, right here, right now, about what they should (or could) be doing" (125). Again, the emphasis is on action. But the liberatory, action-oriented tone is weakened by Brandt's preoccupation with students who already have a sophisticated understanding of literacy. It is as if the students whose intersubjectivity can be most fully realized through education are the ones who are already encouraged to view themselves as having vital participatory potential. In other words, it is as if those students who already feel enfranchised are the ones who are most encouraged by Brandt's description of an involved literacy, while students who do not already "know what they are doing" remain marginalized, who remain least "involved."

Nevertheless, the voice of the intersubjective, authentic, student can only be fully realized through an understanding of and identification with the other communicative actants with whom s/he comes into contact. As with the non-managerial notion of audience, Brandt's involved literacy suggests that in order for communication to take place, the process of Burkean identification must take place between speaker and audience. This process of identification

is precisely what Buck was getting at with her concept of "legitimate discourse" in which the goal is "complete communication between speaker and hearer" ("The Present Status" 47).

As students become literate in an involved sense, they can engage in the interpretive activities of meaning making, both as readers and as producers of texts. These "especially...effective" students are then able to use literacy not only to read and write, but also to understand what reading and writing mean within the specific contexts in which they occur. This is similar to Giroux's interest in helping students find ways to enact their potential ability to be involved citizens in a democracy because, through an "involved" sense of literacy, it is hoped that students will come to see "what they should (or could) be doing."

While I am troubled by Brandt's description of an involved literacy which relies so much on "effective" writers and readers who "know what they are doing," I nevertheless think that her pedagogy, like Giroux's, has a distinctly liberatory air about it. Her conception of a critical pedagogy which focuses on the importance of students' acquisition of literacy skills is promising, as is her expansion of literacy to include an appreciation of the intersubjective nature of language use. Additionally, she argues that students need to see that literate acts are processes and not products, and that knowledge is not merely doled out to students but is instead made through the work of interpretation and communication.

Students may come to school expecting that literacy means only reading and writing. But Brandt's pedagogical stance requires much more of them. More than anything else, she expects that literacy will become a term which describes the potentially dialectical function of language. And once students grasp this dialectical potential, they (like the recipients of Giroux's pedagogy) will have access to the knowledge that helps them understand "what to do now" (125). The difficulty is that Brandt does not present a clear vision of what a pedagogy could do to help students emerge from school with a greater sense of intersubjectivity than they had when they came in. Perhaps by developing non-managerial attitudes toward students, institutions and teachers can increase the likelihood that disenfranchised students can, through education, become more enfranchised. And perhaps by including an overt attention to the development of a non-managerial model of audience, pedagogies which are specifically geared toward literacy and writing can provide students with ways to become intersubjectively involved in meaning making activities.

Audience and Berlin's Refiguring Pedagogy

The third iteration of critical pedagogy I want to consider is developed in the work of James Berlin. Like Brandt's, Berlin's critical pedagogy emerges from a tradition that emphasizes the importance of rhetoric and composition. And like Giroux's, his work presents pedagogical strategies that can be

relevant not only within the composition classroom, but also in the larger context of cultural studies. Berlin argues that, by upholding traditions, educational institutions play a large role in the maintenance and promotion of the status quo. One of the chief sites for this function of education is the English department. But Berlin also believes that this is a particularly rich site for the subversion of the status quo. It may seem arbitrary to select English (and not History, Sociology, or some other area) but Berlin was an English teacher, his argument was largely based on his own experience. But his selection of the English department as a perfect place for subversive critical pedagogies to be enacted was also due to what he saw as an artificial "bifurcation" between literature studies and rhetorical studies.

If a critical pedagogy could help to eliminate this bifurcation, a space would open up for the promotion of critical thinking and critical literacy skills to be developed by students. This is because English is viewed as having been unnecessarily divided into two pieces; the study of literature, which is the study of the ways to consume and/or preserve "great" texts, and the study of rhetoric, which is focused on textual production. If they are reunited, students will be encouraged to see that "texts--whether rhetorical or poetic--are ideologically invested in the construction of subjectivities within economic, social, and political arrangements" (119). This removal of the bifurcation is similar to what Nan Johnson has called for in her comparative analysis of contemporary rhetorical theory and reader response theories of literature.

Johnson envisions English courses that can combine "the study of writing and reading in a fundamentally different way from how we normally treat composition instruction and literary study." This new combination will alter the existing structure, in which "we tend to isolate these subjects from one another as if writing to communicate and reading to interpret were fundamentally unrelated acts pertaining to different types of texts" (164). For Johnson and Berlin, all discourse, whether it is received or produced, is "ideologically invested." And since these ideological investments so often work solely to preserve hegemony, students need to learn, by focusing on the processes of both textual consumption and production, that writing is never innocent and that writers never only speak their own minds.

Instead, reuniting the two halves of English studies helps students to see that writing always has a political bent and that writers both speak and are spoken. Students and teachers who recognize the ideological bias of texts can work to reset the imbalances of evidenced in racism, sexism, and classism. The process of re-balancing or redistributing power is done by reviving the ideals of democracy, ideals that can only be realized if and when all citizens share equally in political action. Berlin believes that hegemony is served either by consensus or by a power imbalance that leaves many people effectively silenced. Therefore, he argues that hegemony is weakened (or at least continually re-figured) through productive uses of dissensus, dissensus which is brought about by a healthy democracy in which all citizens fully

participate by voicing their own opinions. This idea of dissensus links up to the non-managerial notion of audience developed by Buck, Ede, and Lunsford. If Burkean identification is a goal of communication, we can assume that it is not a precondition of communication. In other words, in order to believe that consensus exists prior to discoursing on any given matter, we must imagine either no audience at all, or a generalized audience that is unrealistically homogenous. By contrast, productive dissensus implies that we should not only expect that audiences express difference, we should also go so far as to rely on it.

For Berlin, the elimination of the bifurcation in English studies allows students to focus on both the production of their own formerly silenced texts, and on an active and critical reception of canonical, approved, “great” texts. This integration will result in an understanding of texts as existing always within (never outside of) contexts. Like Brandt, Berlin believes that literate acts are essentially interactive. And like Giroux, he believes that his pedagogical stance can help students to enact democracy more fully. Whereas Giroux's focus is primarily on institutionalized educational processes and Brandt's is on the recipients of these processes, Berlin is attempting to maintain emphases on both. Thus, “English studies refigured along the postmodern lines of social-epistemic rhetoric in the service of critical literacy would take the examination and teaching of reading and writing practices as its province” (105). This province would pay special attention not only to

modifications of educational regimes, but also to the outcome of these modifications and would be especially useful for the promotion of a critical literacy because

rather than organizing its activities around the preservation and maintenance of a sacred canon of literary texts, it would focus on the production, distribution, exchange, and reception of textuality, in general and in specific cases, both in the past and present. English studies would thus explore the role of signifying practices in the ongoing life of societies--stated more specifically, in their relations to economic, social, political, and cultural arrangements. (105)

The reason Berlin calls for the reunification of English studies then is because he wants to move away from the traditional study of texts and instead wants to institute an exploration of "signifying practices in the ongoing life of societies." This aligns English with the interdisciplinary nature of cultural studies because it is accompanied by the move away from the study of fixed, finished "texts" and on to the study of the "production, distribution, exchange, and reception of textuality" instead.

This reminds me of a main consideration from chapter one: James Porter's interest in discourse community as a concept which could function as a replacement for audience considerations. Like Porter, Berlin seems more interested in discourses than in the individuals who produce texts. But while

Porter's rendering of the discourse community leads students to study smaller, increasingly specific, increasingly restricted sets of texts which are thematically and structurally similar, Berlin's move is expansive. Unlike Porter's discourse community (with its over-dependence on texts); Berlin is interested in textuality, in discovering the overarching similarities between texts and textual systems which initially appear to be dissimilar.

In order to facilitate the refiguring of the domain of English studies into the study of textuality, one of the most crucial steps is to have teachers "call on recent discussions of discourse analysis" by Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco, and others, in order to "develop a terminology adequate to the complexity of signifying systems" (112). This terminology would serve teachers as well as students, since they would work together to develop an understanding of the "signifying systems" under consideration. But the critical pedagogy Berlin envisions would not only be the development of an adequate terminology of textuality; it would also rely on a breakdown between the traditional notions of theory (as an esoteric area of inquiry) and practice (as pragmatic activities). Thus, "it remains the central task of teachers to rethink theory through classroom practice and classroom practice through theory" (112). Berlin is aware that even his own theory of a critical pedagogy as well as the in-class activities which derive from it are nothing more or less than signifying practices, and that they too can be subjected to the critical activities implied by the study of textuality.

Once English studies are no longer bifurcated, and once students are encouraged to focus on the fluidity of “textuality” rather than on static texts, then they are ready to begin learning how to read, interpret, and produce “textual codes” wherever they occur. “One of the most effective ways of tackling the difficult job of identifying culturally determined textual codes is to examine the contrasting semiotics of different media” because, in looking at different media, we begin to appreciate what they have in common rather than how they differ: we begin to appreciate their textuality.

Indeed, critical pedagogy must insist that students be given devices to interpret and critique the signifying practices that schools have typically refused to take seriously: the discourse of radio and television and film. Studying the manner in which meaning is constructed in these media works to demystify their characteristic textual practices and inevitable ideological inscriptions. It also illuminates the textual practices of print, indicating through contrast the diverse semiotic strategies of the differing forms of communication. (112)

So, familiarization with the various vehicles of information is important to Berlin's plan, as it helps us to see, by contrast, the differences between delivery systems, and perhaps the arbitrariness of the rules of any given specific, concretized, and hegemonic, discursive practice. But this multi-media approach also helps students to see the overarching textuality all media utilize.

By looking at the textual differences and similarities found in different media, Berlin's students should be able to plainly see the "inevitable ideological inscriptions" which pervade them.

By exploding the term "text" and by encouraging students not only to learn to read, but also to write such diverse texts, "the inevitable commitment of all of these textual forms to culturally coded ideological notions of race, class, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and gender in the service of economic and political projects become accessible" (112). This is where Berlin's thoughts swerve completely away from Porter's rejection of audience and adoption of discourse community. While Porter's idea of the discourse community works to help students tune in to increasingly specific textual and thematic traits, Berlin wants students to develop a "big picture" view which includes the analysis of different textual modes and the different "commitments," the different audiences for whom texts can be intended. The "inevitable commitment of all...textual forms" is indicative not only of the ideology which creates the text, it is also indicative of what is presumed to be the appropriate, or likely, receiver of the text. Once students learn how to discover the "inevitable commitment" of any text, they can "gain at least some control over these forms" which in turn allows them to become "active agents of social and political change, learning that the world has been made and can thus be remade to serve more justly the interests of a democratic society" (112). This is very much in line with Giroux's interest in helping students

find ways to maximize their ability to participate in democracy, and is also closely related to Brandt's desire to help students learn to enact an "involved" literacy which is particularly cognizant of the potential for making and remaking aspects of "the world."

Berlin's critical pedagogy is driven by the goals of helping students learn how to read and remake the world into a more egalitarian field, expanding notions of textuality, blurring disciplinary boundaries by collapsing the work of English departments into one field. The inclusion of a non-managerial concept of audience here would provide Berlin's pedagogy with another way to achieve the goals, because, like a mirror, this inclusion would give students a way to think about textuality not only from supposedly stable subject positions, but also from the infinite number of positions of the Other that is not the "I."

For Berlin, the move away from traditional English studies constitutes a shift into the world of cultural studies, a shift away from the consumption of traditional texts and into a study of textuality as it occurs across disciplinary lines and throughout different media. This move is accomplished by the teacher's ability to develop a critical pedagogy which lets theory and practice overlap, and which ultimately allows students to become "active agents of social and political change" (112). Thus, above all else, Berlin's critical pedagogy attempts to make institutionalized educational processes create libertory spaces in which students learn how to participate meaningfully in

democracy. Brandt's iteration of critical pedagogy emphasizes the importance of students' developing or possessing an involved sense of literacy, and like Berlin, she feels that education should help students learn that they never communicate in a vacuum but instead that discourse always occurs within specific contexts. Giroux argues that educational institutions need to be redesigned so that they no longer reproduce themselves, but instead promote students' ability and right to participate in democracy.

All three of these versions of critical pedagogy can benefit from the inclusion of audience considerations because all three, despite intentions to the contrary, focus on institutions or students specifically and exclusively as speakers. Berlin and Brandt emphasize that student/speakers never operate in isolation, but they still do so by emphasizing student/speakers. Giroux works to make the educational enterprise do more than merely voice its own reproductive ability, but he does so by emphasizing that educational enterprises do indeed have voices. All three theorists implicitly argue against the managerial, manipulative treatment of the audience as Other, but neither Giroux nor Brandt makes this argument with any overt attention to the voicing of audience concerns. Berlin notes that "the receivers of messages--the audience of discourse--obviously cannot escape the consequences of signifying practices" (83). This is because audience members are Others and at the same time they are subjects, but they are subjects who are being observed (or ignored) rather than subjects who are being encouraged by

critical pedagogies. Thus, "an audience's possible responses to texts are in part a function of its discursively constituted subject formations--formations that include race, class, gender, ethnic, sexual orientation, and age designations" (83).

By taking time to consider the audience, Berlin only amplifies the value of his critical pedagogy. But even though Berlin catalogues some of the main categories that we use to establish difference, we need to note that the audience being presented here is a single, unified mass. This presumed singularity is indicative of one of the critiques which has been leveled at critical pedagogy: namely that it tends to unrealistically homogenize students into a single, unified mass. I have tried to establish that productive intersections exist or can be forged between critical pedagogy and non-managerial notions of audience as developed by Gertrude Buck, Andrea Lunsford, Lisa Ede and others. In the next chapter I want to consider some other critiques which have arisen from careful analyses of critical pedagogy, and I want to offer an audience theory as a corrective for the weaknesses uncovered by the critiques. In so doing, I will develop my own Audience Centered Writing Pedagogy, a pedagogical strategy that is especially useful for writing instruction. This pedagogy retains the best elements of critical pedagogy, embraces and rectifies critiques of critical pedagogy, and helps teachers and students think through issues of Otherness as they play out in the classroom.

CHAPTER FOUR

Critiquing Critical Pedagogy and Configuring an Audience Oriented Writing Pedagogy

While I am in agreement with many of the tenets of critical pedagogy which I explored in the last chapter, I think critical pedagogy needs to be critiqued in order to ascertain the limits of its usefulness as a focusing tool for pedagogy and teaching practices. I do this in order to delineate the differences between critical pedagogy and the pedagogy I am here developing, a writing pedagogy that is both critical and audience oriented. This pedagogy is intended specifically for the composition classroom, although it may turn out to have wider ramifications. I will consider critical pedagogy in general, but will call on the theorists referred to in the last chapter for specific examples. I will be looking at these three important renditions of critical pedagogy and will explore their commonalties and differences. After considering the strengths and weaknesses of various critical pedagogies which currently hold sway, I will suggest ways that we could take some parts of critical pedagogy as a starting point for an approach which is concerned specifically with the instruction of writing. Finally, I will present an audience oriented writing pedagogy. This will be based on a non-managerial notion of audience as initially and partially theorized by Gertrude Buck, Lisa Ede, Andrea Lunsford

and others, and will attempt to include the best aspects of critical pedagogy while also accommodating its critiques.

The three versions of critical pedagogy that I considered in chapter three differ from one another. Giroux's is a theory that comes out of the tradition of Education studies, while those of Brandt and Berlin emanate from English studies. Giroux's is intended to be a general theory, a critical pedagogy that would be applicable to a variety of fields. By contrast, Brandt's pedagogical stance seems more squarely focused on considerations of literacy as they occur within writing classrooms. Different again is Berlin's which, while focused on English, attempts to transform English into something like Cultural Studies. Giroux wants pedagogy to "engage the politics of voice and representation" in order to help students find ways to express their own desires (120). Brandt wants her pedagogy to help students see the intersubjective nature of language use. Berlin's pedagogy attempts to help students come to grips with the ideological implications that are housed within any act of communication.

But despite these and other differences, these three versions of critical pedagogy also share some key overarching assumptions. Giroux, Brandt, and Berlin all want to help their students become more engaged in the world around them; they all want to help their students become more active participants in meaning-making activities; and they want to reduce the likelihood that educational institutions will continue to merely reproduce

themselves. All three are shot through with the assumption that education should not be exclusively focused on the transmission of accepted, canonical truths, but instead should be laden with liberatory potential. All three agree that this potential can be exploited: by helping students understand that they are oppressed by existing power structures, that they can and should share in the power to interpret reality, or that they can become more active democratic participants.

I am sympathetic with many aspects of Giroux's, Brandt's and Berlin's versions of critical pedagogy and am tempted to agree with their common assumptions. But despite my sympathy, I think that these well-known iterations of critical pedagogy need to be interrogated rather than merely accepted or adopted. They need to be questioned so that they can be better understood, and they need to be critiqued so that we can make informed decisions as to which aspects of these theories should be adopted, which should be modified, and which should be disregarded. The critiques of critical pedagogy I will consider here can be grouped into three main categories: those critiques that center around the concept of foundational truths, those that deal with images of individuality or of subjectivity, and those that are concerned with issues of homogeneity and heterogeneity.

The Truth

According to Carmen Luke and Jennifer Gore, some configurations of critical pedagogy include a postmodern turn “which highlights the complicity of all discourses in disciplinary power, and so shatters any illusions of innocence held by self-proclaimed emancipatory discourses” (9). This turn is in evidence in James Berlin’s critical pedagogy, discussed in the last chapter. He believes that a sophisticated study of textuality as it occurs in different media will lead to an understanding of the underlying political agendas that pervade all discourses. This understanding will in turn lead to students’ increased ability to participate fully in democracy.

A major critique which has been mounted against critical pedagogy is that, even when it argues that master narratives or supposedly irrefutable truths should be interrogated, it tends also to construct its own narratives of truth. For instance, even as Berlin criticizes English studies’ overdependence on supposedly “great” canonical texts, he simultaneously constructs a pedagogy that relies on the intrinsic value of a democracy in which all citizens have not only the power but also the desire to participate participate. Luke and Gore note that many critical pedagogies have “failed to achieve their goals, in part because of their dogmatic insistence on global and unitary projects and subjects” (9). The democracy that Berlin envisions is useful only if everyone participates in it; thus it is one of the “global and unitary projects” because it is put forth as something which is obviously worthwhile. As such,

it implicitly argues that any other political agenda is inferior to the democratic agenda.

While I too feel that a democracy, especially one that leads to an egalitarian dispersion of power, is a worthwhile ideal, I also feel that Gore and Luke's critique of such overarching assumptions is valid. Why? Because the democracy that Berlin conjures is an idealized vision which, while being appealing, is nevertheless quite different from the actual practice of democracy. The actual practice of democracy implicitly encourages race, gender, and class based power differentials between citizens. The idealized vision of democracy which Berlin puts forth is of course not based on power differentials, but instead assumes shared power among all citizens. But how does this shift from the actual to the idealized take place? By arguing that students should learn to assume their fair share of power, Berlin offers an empowering alternative to inequality, but in doing so he glosses over the fact that this is far easier said than done. The effect of Berlin's call for a democracy in which all citizens fully participate is that it sets up an idealized master narrative as a goal and provides students with the skills they need for a critical appreciation of the political agendas embedded within all textuality. But the unfortunate outcome is that students' knowledge of political agendas does not necessarily lead to the erasure of unfair power relations. Instead, the master narrative of the intrinsic value of democracy works to simultaneously reveal inequality and to maintain the conditions which lead to inequality.

After teaching a class in which she tried to incorporate elements of critical pedagogy, Elizabeth Ellsworth has argued that we should seriously interrogate these overarching assumptions of the value of democracy or of the potential for institutionalized educational processes to provide some form of empowerment for students. According to her, the “key assumptions, goals, and pedagogical practices” which are “fundamental to the literature on critical pedagogy--namely, 'empowerment,' 'student voice,' 'dialogue,' and even the term 'critical,' are repressive myths that perpetuate relations of domination” (91). Since these terms are “fundamental,” they are presented as true. According to Ellsworth, these terms become the canonical terms for a highly codified body of literature concerned with critical pedagogy.

Reflecting on the class she taught, she notes that while her goal was to empower her students and to help them find their own voices, she and her students “produced results that were not only unhelpful, but actually exacerbated the very conditions we were trying to work against, including Eurocentrism, racism, sexism, and 'banking education'” (91). This result was not only unexpected, it was contrary to the very nature of the class as Ellsworth had imagined it. The reason for this is that, while she wanted to create a space in which students could feel empowered and find voice, her best attempt to do so relied on her ability to enforce definitions of “empowerment” and “student voice,” and thus only perpetuated the hegemonic norms which her students had already come to associate with the educational enterprise.

For Ellsworth, Luke and Gore then, a major critique of critical pedagogy is that even as it attempts to disassemble the power of master narratives, it tends to create its own replacement foundational truths. But replacing old truths with new ones does not eliminate the problem of having overarching master narratives in the first place. This is because the new master narrative must be every bit as repressive of competing narratives as was the older one. In considering how she might teach a future version of her class that would incorporate elements of critical pedagogy, Ellsworth is interested in moving away from the terrain of the known (represented as truth), and instead wants to "think through the implications of confronting unknowability." She asks

What would it mean to recognize not only that a multiplicity of knowledges are present in the classroom as a result of the way difference has been used to structure social relations inside and outside the classroom, but that these knowledges are contradictory, partial, and irreducible? They cannot be made to 'make sense'--they cannot be known, in terms of the single master discourse of an educational project's curriculum or theoretical framework--even that of critical pedagogy. (112)

The critique of critical pedagogy here is that it tends to enforce the attitude that there are in fact pre-existing truths which all students need to learn about, which all students need to know. In sharp contrast to this, Ellsworth wants her

pedagogy to value uncertainty, unknowability, and contradiction. But even if the discourse of critical pedagogy had been able to help Ellsworth and her students to feel somewhat emancipated, this feeling could quickly evaporate with the realization that the discourse of emancipation, as rendered in critical pedagogy, is all too often an unwitting carrier of repressive myths of domination. These myths perpetuate a belief in immutable, static truth. Instead of the pursuit of these static truths, Ellsworth wants her class to be a space in which she and her students can explore the "multiplicity of knowledges" in order to appreciate, rather than deny, difference.

Giroux, Brandt, and Berlin all argue against at least two foundational truths that they locate in more traditional pedagogical practices. First, they work against the assumption that knowledge exists a priori and that it can simply be deposited, banking style, in students' minds. Second, they all are interested in interrogating and undermining the master narratives which allow for the tendency of institutionalized education to perpetually validate and reproduce itself. But in questioning these truths, all three also institute their own master narratives of the intrinsic validity of helping students to find their own voices, of helping them become emancipated through the educational process, and of helping them to become active participants in the ongoing process of meaning making. For Berlin and Giroux, this meaning making activity is fully realized through students' interaction with democracy. For Brandt, "good" or "especially... effective" students can learn to engage in

meaning making activities by understanding that language use is always “involved.” These master narratives which value democracy and critical engagement are compelling to me because they share an ideal world in which all citizens have an equal opportunity to express themselves, have an equally strong desire to do so, and have an equal likelihood of being heard. But the foundational truth of an ideal world which is borne along by the discourse of critical pedagogy is also troubling to me because it assumes the presence of a stable subject whose voice is singular and whose desires are ultimately knowable.

An audience oriented writing pedagogy would not devalue the importance of the writer. Instead, it would problematize this importance by moving an important rhetorical consideration to the forefront of writers' minds: writing becomes communication only when it is received. I want to question the "truth" of democracy as it is put forth in the discourse of critical pedagogy not because I am opposed to it, but because its seemingly obvious validity needs to be interrogated. The next critique I want to consider is also based on a notion of truth: the truth of critical pedagogy's reliance on concepts of subjectivity and on the supposedly stable subject position of individuals. I want to question the "truth" of the individual's autonomy not because individuality no longer exists in this postmodern world (of course it does), but because the failure to interrogate subjectivity inevitably works to maintain

unequal power relations between people, wherein some are more "subjects" and others are more "subjected."

The Subject

Critical pedagogy is often concerned with empowering students in order that they may appreciate the nature of their subjection and then discover ways to become independent individuals who are not merely subject to the will of the educational institutions in which they find themselves. This is based on the desire to help students become free, emancipated individuals who can use critical thinking skills in order to come to their decisions about the world. But some feel that the emancipatory potential of critical pedagogy is diluted by its adherence to a modernist conception of the individual. If it is not overtly defined, this conception of the individual is invariably masculinist and white, making white males the de- facto norm against which all individuals are judged. Carmen Luke argues that the discourse of critical pedagogy often fails to theorize gender. In "Feminist Politics in Radical Pedagogy," Luke states that "...from a feminist position, the discourse of critical pedagogy constructs a masculinist subject which renders its emancipatory agenda for 'gender' theoretically and practically problematic" because of an "absence of a coherent and systematic engagement with theorization of 'gender'" which "leads to an acritical reinstatement and revalorization of history's 'great' patriarchal metanarratives" (25). Clearly, an

emancipatory pedagogy should be emancipatory for all students, and while this is surely the intent of the critical pedagogies constructed by Giroux, Brandt, Berlin, and others, it is not necessarily the outcome. Instead, pedagogical practices which do not take into account issues of gender (or of race for that matter), tend to reproduce rather than replace existing conditions. And since we live in a culture that valorizes the masculine, this valorization is conveyed through any pedagogy that does not specifically address the issue.

For Luke, the masculine bias contained in many iterations of critical pedagogy is closely linked to western conceptions of selfhood and individualism. "The ethic of individualism" which is "historically envisioned by and a vision of the constitutive male subject" is utterly "inscribed in the egalitarian ideals of participatory democracy." This inscription cannot be removed by teachers' calls for female students to speak out more in class or to find and maintain a personal voice. This is because such pedagogical strategies "do not provide the conceptual tools with which to rewrite those theoretical narratives and structural conditions that historically have formed the basis of institutionalized gender asymmetries of power" (39). Even if teachers are aware of the gender inequalities that play out in front of them within the classroom, this knowledge does little to remove the problem.

According to Lester Faigley, part of the problem of the individual has to do with the confusion over exactly what is meant by the term. "Discussions of the subjectivities that students writers occupy," says Faigley, "are often

confusing because two related notions of the *individual* are frequently conflated" (16). One meaning of the term is modernist, in which the individual has a "coherent consciousness capable of knowing oneself in the world...the individual is granted the possibility of being able to critique" the world "from a distanced viewpoint and to discover a potential course of human emancipation" (16). This modernist version of the individual has the ability to reach an objective understanding of the world, and is at least potentially able to apprehend objective truths. According to Faigley, the postmodernist attitude (at least as it is rendered in composition and rhetoric studies) "locates the subject in terms of the shared discursive practices of a community" (17). The confusion arises because these two definitions of the individual are often opposed to one another, one representing a perfectly stable subject and the other representing a perfectly unstable subject position. I find both positions frustrating because neither seems to adequately explain what it is to be an individual, or rather, both seem able to only partly explain it. But in either case, the discourse (modernist or postmodernist) of the individual betrays an unshakable fascination with "The One."

In order to productively complicate things and to call into question our dependence on either the individual or the subject, I will present an image of audience theory that borrows heavily from the theory of Otherness that has been developed in post-colonial and cultural studies. "Otherness" can refer to everything that is not the individual, to anything that-is-not-me. In this case a

rock or a table is "other." But Otherness can also refer to that-which-is-not-*like-me* or not-*like-us*. People are often "othered" through labels that refer to differences from the supposed norm. A third kind of "Otherness" takes place when marginalized groups or individuals claim for themselves the role of the other. The difficulty of teaching audience is to understand that it forces us and our students to confront an activity that we all already participate in: we all already other others, either because we do not have the tools and the wherewithal to see others or because we have been trained to focus solely on the subject, on ourselves. My contention is that an audience oriented writing pedagogy moves us into a space in which we must confront the tendency to other people, rather than merely doing it and not worrying about it.

Theories of race and gender have often depended on coherent, essential identities as the core around which groups of people could feel they "belonged." In contrast to this, postmodern theories often work to subvert or dismantle the notion of the subject as one who is essentially black, white, male, or female. Donna Haraway has articulated a "socialist-feminist" stance toward technology in which "cyborgs," or human/animal/machine hybrids, proliferate in the space formerly occupied by "humans." Ironically, Haraway's socialist-feminist politics includes the notion that a "cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world" (192). Presumably, this is also a post-race world in which cyborgs can learn to manipulate systems of discourse so as to create new egalitarian spaces which were denied them when they were raced

and gendered humans. But while Haraway definitely believes that we have reached a period in our development from which we can never go back to a more innocent time, she is careful to note that this in no way means that all is well. Instead, Haraway argues that we should be wary of our present circumstances, and that we should work to understand exactly what is lost and what is gained when we engage in a cyborg lifestyle in which our bodies and consciousnesses are inextricably bound up with the communicative environment in which we find ourselves. Haraway imagines a present and a future in which we no longer distinguish between the “us” of humanity and the “it” of technology and the “them” of the animal world, but that we instead create and maintain cyborg relations with all three categories.

According to Terry Goldie, it has long been "a commonplace to use ‘Other’ and ‘Not-self’ for the white view of blacks and for the resulting black view of themselves. The implication of this assertion of a white self as subject in discourse is to leave the black Other as object" (233). The subject/object binary here is the device by which categories of we and them are maintained. According to the logic of the Other, the binary cannot be subverted. Instead, the "category of Other must be assumed or internalized in order for peripheralized groups to become part of the totality" (McLaren 272). This is the way in which non-dominant factors can be erased and replaced by images that conform to the dominant's view of itself as a homogeneous body. But Otherness is also an opportunity to claim authenticity since it implies that

some of us can be other than the mainstream. This more subversive understanding of Otherness can be expressed as an inappropriateness that confronts the status quo. As Trinh T. Minh-Ha says of an/other, "She is the Inappropriate Other/Same who moves about with always at least two/four gestures: that of affirming 'I am like you' while persisting in her difference; and that of reminding 'I am different' while unsettling every definition of Otherness arrived at..." (218). The subversion of the other/same binary as seen here is really the paradoxical occupation of two positions at once, and it is this type of co-occupation that my audience oriented writing pedagogy attempts to promote and normalize.

To critique critical pedagogy for its tendency to construct (or reconstruct) us all as white, "masculinist subjects" as Luke does, is not to say that the emancipatory discourse of critical pedagogy is evil or useless. In fact, the authors of the iterations of critical pedagogy I explored in the last chapter would all agree that their projects are meant to empower students, not to homogenize, whitewash, or erase them. Nevertheless, any pedagogical stance that does not explicitly engage the problem of Otherness, that does not work to understand itself as having the potential to become an Othering agent, can inadvertently work to maintain racist and sexist forms of unequal power relations.

If we theorize the subject, we need also to theorize the Other in all its incarnations. Overt attention to audience is key not only to our theorizing of

Otherness, but also to our classroom practices. An audience oriented writing pedagogy works to reveal, rather than hide, the tendency we all have to "Other" others. In revealing the tendency to "other," an audience-oriented pedagogy encourages the acknowledgement and acceptance of difference, rather than its elision or erasure. Failing this, we are left to recreate traditional forms of oppression by implicitly arguing/believing that our students are somehow totalizable, that "they" are somehow monolithically knowable. It is to this problem of totalizing that I would now like to turn in my third critique of critical pedagogy.

Homogeneity

In order for master narratives of the validity of democracy or of the solidity of the individual to be accepted, a certain measure of homogeneity (or at least the appearance of homogeneity) needs to exist. This is because acceptance implies consensus. Homogeneity is expressed through a tacit acceptance of truths, or through would-be dissenters' inability to speak out against supposed truths. In order for the truths of critical pedagogy to become valid to students, students must either be in some respects a homogenous, or must at least appear to be so. A major critique of critical pedagogy is that, while it attempts to democratize or equalize students, it does so by imposing homogeneity upon heterogeneous student populations.

In examining the radical pedagogy that Henry Giroux and Stanley Aronowitz develop in *Postmodern Education: Politics, Culture, and Social Criticism*, Vincent Leitch explores the problem of a supposedly homogenous student population. Leitch argues that a problem with Aronowitz's and Giroux's iteration of critical pedagogy is that it unrealistically homogenizes a heterogeneous student population, that "it herds numerous 'marginals' into an imaginary collective, rails against separatism, and speaks with a 'unified' voice for innumerable persons" (143). Even as it seeks to subvert institutionalized educational practices, critical pedagogy is deployed *through* institutionalized educational practices. The same could be said of Brandt's and Berlin's stances: they both rely on master narratives which, to some extent at least, force them to conceive of and treat all students similarly. Indeed, to do otherwise would be deemed "unfair" since otherwise different students would be told different things, would have different assignments, and would need to meet different teacherly expectations. But the iterations of critical pedagogy which I discussed in chapter three cannot value these kinds of differences because to do so would be deemed unfair. To treat students differently based on assessments of the differences between them could even be viewed as discriminatory. I want to expand Leitch's contention that Giroux's critical pedagogy is too homogenizing to encompass Berlin's and Brandt's pedagogical stances as well. All three have a legitimate desire to better their

students' lives, but all three rely on unrealistically homogenized conceptions of "The Student," in order to construct their pedagogies.

The critical pedagogies promoted by Giroux, Brandt, and Berlin all presume that, since they are dealing with "The Student," a consensus either exists among students or that it can and should be made to exist. This consensus would seem to be crucial to the workings of a participatory democracy just as it would seem to be necessary to literate practices which work to involve communicants with one another. In both cases, shared assumptions must exist. But do these shared assumptions exist if our students are far more heterogeneous than our teaching theories allow for? No, they do not, and that is part of the reason why critical pedagogies have not been able to create a truly participatory democracy or a set of literate practices in which everyone can equally participate.

Gertrude Buck found it useful to acknowledge dissensus within the classroom as well as in the relationship between writer and reader. Susan Jarratt also believes that the teaching of writing should emphasize dissensus. This is in contrast to the pursuit of objective or knowable reality, which implies a consensus, a truth, waiting to be arrived at. Jarratt thinks "that for pedagogical purposes--that is, as a model for the language of the classroom--it is more productive to bring out and examine the contradictions and conflicts being resolved in that space than to overlook them or minimize their significance" (116). Jarratt is interested in the ebb and flow of conflict and

resolution, not in the attainment of consensus or the prolongation of dissensus. By assuming a heterogeneous student population, we can anticipate that agreements as well as disagreements can take place within the classroom, and that both will be tentative and subject to change over time. The productive dissensus Jarratt desires would be seriously curtailed by any critical pedagogy which seeks to value consensus.

While Jarratt and Buck both see pedagogical value in dissensus, neither argue for an absolute moral relativism. Instead, both seem interested in promoting their students' awareness of different perspectives and in helping them to understand that all perspectives carry some specific political dimension. This attitude is similar to Berlin's belief that the study of textuality will help students learn that all discourse carries within it "inevitable ideological inscriptions" (112). But unlike Brandts' understanding of literacy-as-involvement, Jarratt argues that communicators are always already involved, and that simply helping students to become involved is not enough. For Jarratt, the composition classroom which emphasizes and capitalizes on dissensus, takes on a specifically Protagorean air:

I envision a composition course in which students argue about the ethical implications of discourse on a wide range of subjects and, in so doing, come to identify their personal interests with others, understand those interests as implicated in a larger communal setting, and advance them in a public voice. Such a

content for composition would replicate closely the Sophist Protagoras's identification of the subject of rhetoric: 'prudence in affairs private as well as public.' (121)

Unlike Jarratt, Gertrude Buck opposed the sophists on the grounds that their rhetorical teachings favored a managerial view of audience. Instead, Buck turned to Plato in order to argue that, in the pursuit of "legitimate discourse," dissensus could and should exist between readers and writers. Jarratt's linking of Protagoras to the "larger communal setting" betrays her very different understanding of at least one of the sophists. But both Buck and Jarratt share an interest in the productive uses of dissensus, and both argue that this interest comes from ancient rhetorical theory. While dissensus alone would be inadequate for creating a useful pedagogy of writing, Jarratt's perspective does call into question the value of Brandt's invigorating but naïve call for a literacy of involvement, especially when no clear pedagogical method is laid out, beyond the call for teachers to understand and validate their students' preexisting attitudes.

While the discourse of critical pedagogy implicitly assumes homogeneity in its students, the appreciation of heterogeneity is a major goal of an audience oriented writing pedagogy. Attention to audience can lead to an appreciation of the heterogeneous, the different. And in overtly acknowledging that our students are not a monolithic whole, we can teach the value of dissensus. Dissensus does not necessarily lead only to strife or to

relativism; instead, it can lead to the appreciation and valuation of difference, and to the importance of understanding that our own assumptions are often not shared by others. With an audience oriented writing pedagogy, we encourage our students to think through rhetorical situations with a mindset that assumes that difference exists, and that this difference is part of what drives dissensus. Conversely, the avoidance of heterogeneity leads us to inaccurately create an image of students and other people as homogenous, similar, like-minded or capable of reaching consensus. This fantasy is dangerous because of what it disallows, and is dangerous because of what it encourages; not sameness, but a veneer of sameness, the primary function of which is lock people out, to disenfranchise them.

Toward an Audience Oriented Writing Pedagogy

To summarize, the discourse of critical pedagogy is susceptible to several critiques. First, it tends either to valorize existing foundational truths or to replace one set of truths with another. Second, it often puts forth an overly simplistic vision of the subject. Third, it tends to totalize students into a homogenous group. These three critiques are important not because they dismantle or invalidate critical pedagogy; in fact, those who offer these critiques are most likely motivated by a desire to improve upon existing models of critical pedagogy. This is my interest as well. Like Patti Lather, I am interested in developing a pedagogy that embraces the best elements of

critical pedagogy while at the same time accommodating the above critiques. For Lather this would be a "Post-critical pedagogy," which would "include ways of disagreeing productively among ourselves, as we struggle to use postmodernism to both problematize and advance emancipatory pedagogy" (132).

In chapter two I argued that Gertrude Buck's non-managerial theory of audience contrasts sharply with the managerial, coercive one that James Porter develops and then rejects. Buck's notion of audience as a rhetorical construct centers on several major ideas. First, she conceived written communication as something that takes place specifically between individuals and within groups. This idea is compatible with Deborah Brandt's interest in developing a sense of literacy which emphasizes the involvement between interlocutors, but goes further by not assuming that only experienced or particularly talented students can appreciate their involvement with others in rhetorical scenes. An audience oriented writing pedagogy also embraces a critique of the modernist individual as one who can gain an objective understanding of the world. Instead, it explicitly states that any understanding of the world is contingent and subjective, not only because it is individual, but also because it is utterly driven by the contexts in which understanding occurs.

Buck also felt that writing should not be antagonistic or manipulative but should instead work to achieve "complete communication between speaker and hearer" (47). But this "complete communication" does not mean

that audience and author must be of the same mind; it takes into account the fact that writers and audiences do not have the same goals, expectations, agendas, or experiences. Thus, one of the primary functions of communication is to bridge the gaps that exist between interlocutors. An audience oriented writing pedagogy embraces a dissensus which does not necessarily lead to antagonism, but which can instead lead to the widening of acceptable possibilities. While the discourse of critical pedagogy often argues for consensus building, an audience oriented writing pedagogy would follow Susan Jarratt's lead and promotes the belief that we should embrace contradictions and should never "overlook them or minimize their significance" (116).

Buck's notion of audience encourages us to recognize that the reader can never be fully known. This means that an audience member actually has more power than does the writer because she can decide whether or not to read, whether or not to consider what the author says, and whether or not to act upon the author's words. This is in stark contrast to an understanding of audience as something merely to be managed or controlled. Like the discourses of Otherness that represent "the white view of blacks" or other dominant views of the so-called margins, a managerial notion of audience forces authors to elide difference. A writing pedagogy, which emphasizes audience, represents an attempt to embrace and explore differences between and among attitudes, students, teachers, and educational institutions.

Following her understanding of Plato, Buck believes that acts of communication can lead to an understanding of truth. But Buck also argues that truth can only be found through what she calls "legitimate discourse," wherein the goals and attitudes of both reader and writer are kept in mind. Because legitimate discourse allows for competing views to be simultaneously considered and maintained, we can say that Buck's notion of audience leads to a concept of the productive potential of dissensus. But even this potential does not lead to immutable truths. The truths which Buck feels can arise from legitimate discourse are tentative and subject to change. James Berlin also believes in such local truths. He speaks out "against the plea for the abandonment of comprehensive historical accounts and the denial of any significance in the myriad details of everyday life" and instead argues that we need "provisional, contingent metanarratives" if we are to "account for the past and the present" (73). A major critique of critical pedagogy is that it tends to replace old foundational truths with new ones, and while any truth which is put forth by any pedagogical stance should be interrogated, this does not mean that it must be abandoned. My contention that a non-managerial theory of audience can improve the teaching of writing is my own "truth." But rather than abandoning it, I choose to acknowledge the special place I am reserving for audience, in order that I and my students can question its validity.

Buck develops a non-managerial view of audience that is at odds with the history of audience that Porter traces. And while it was developed during the early twentieth century, it has a surprising resonance for current composition and pedagogical theory. I want to argue that many of the critiques that have been leveled at critical pedagogy can be accommodated by an audience oriented writing pedagogy. Critical pedagogy, while very interesting and useful to my own notions about teaching, has many limitations. These limitations can be at least partly overcome by infusing a complex sense of audience into our conceptualizing of writing pedagogies. A pedagogy that pays special attention to the rhetorical concept of audience is particularly useful insofar as it can represent a valuing of the best parts of critical pedagogy while also valuing the critiques that have been aimed at it. These critiques help us to see more clearly what we mean by the term "critical pedagogy" and, far from rendering it useless, they help us to see that many tenets of critical pedagogy should be retained. My contention is that the notion of audience helps us to understand the ways in which Otherness gets played out in literate acts. Further, I contend that audience and Otherness are two concepts which are key to the development of a writing pedagogy which can embrace the best aspects of critical pedagogy as well as address its major critiques.

One of the most important aspects of the teaching of writing should be that students learn to appreciate the other parties to whom they are writing.

They need this emphasis not only in order to better understand to whom they are appealing and who it is that receives their attempts at persuasion, but also so that they can think through the ways they themselves are acted upon by an audience's attention, silence, or other attitude. The agenda that needs to be put forth then is not one that advocates democracy simply because of its supposedly curative powers, but rather an appreciation of the others who read or ignore the author. The audience oriented writing pedagogy seeks to insert this appreciation by emphasizing that writing is not merely the imposition of one's will (the author's) over another's (the reader's). Buck's understanding of the rhetorical situation emphasizes that it should not favor antagonistic or manipulative relations but should instead work to achieve "complete communication between speaker and hearer" (47). And while "complete communication" does not mean that perfect agreement exists between audience and author, it does suggest that truths can only be arrived at through the interaction of communicative parties.

Of course, often these interactions will be driven by all involved parties' shared belief that they have the truth, and that the point of communication is to convince others of the truth's validity. But from the standpoint of pedagogy, it should be quite clear that the teacher's vision of truth is the one that can most easily win the day. This is not because teachers have superior access to truth than students, but it is because teachers, as agents of institutional education, often give voice to already prevailing master

narratives. An audience oriented writing pedagogy would need to acknowledge the differences between teachers' and students' wielding of supposed truths. This acknowledgment would come in the form of teachers engaging with students in collaborative efforts to determine which truths could be tentatively shared in order for communication to take place. In addition to such collaborative engagements, an audience oriented writing pedagogy would also address some negative aspects of Othering processes. This would entail encouraging the development of the student/author's ability to recognize the Other as one with whom s/he is in communication. This is so because any text is a call to an/other, to one who is not "I." In the classroom, two of the major ways students Other or are Othered are through race and gender. Thus, issues of race and gender are two of the main ways we can address Otherness in pedagogical terms.

Michael Omi and Howard Winant have defined race, and one of the most important aspects of their definition is that it is not based on peoples' physical attributes, but is instead based on socially constructed expectations and stereotypes. According to Omi and Winant, there is a "continuous temptation to think of race as an essence, as something fixed, concrete, and objective" (54). This may account for the durability of racial stereotypes and the prejudicial behaviors that flow from them. Omi and Winant replace this notion of race as being physically embodied by arguing that "the effort must be made to understand race as an unstable and 'decentered' complex of social

meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle" (55). And even if these transformations are not always achieved, they are constantly being sought. Shifting the view of race from exclusively physical and genetic circumstances to that of a "decentered complex of social meanings" allows the authors to put forth this definition: "race is a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies" (55). This definition of race encourages us to consider racial categories as constructs rather than as "accurate" categories, and simultaneously creates spaces in which we can confront the constructors of racial categories, or at least the conditions that lead to these constructions.

Like race, the concept of gender is often thought of as having a strictly physical connotation. From this perspective, biological males are (or should be) "masculine" and biological females are (or should be) "feminine." But in order to the simple one-to-one ratios between sex and gender to be accurate or final, only mannish men and womanish women (both of course being exclusively heterosexual) can exist, and any deviation is tantamount to abomination. Again, like race, the concept of gender has shifted over time, at least for some. Judith Butler argues that even the concept of sex, which was previously considered to be a simple physical reality, is gendered.

Gender ought not to be conceived merely as the cultural inscription of meaning on a pre-given sex (a juridical conception); gender must also designate the very apparatus of

production whereby the sexes themselves are established. As a result, gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural means by which 'sexed nature' or 'a natural sex' is produced and established as 'prediscursive,' prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture acts. (7)

For Butler, gender cannot merely exist as the cultural countersign to the physical expression of sex, but is instead part of the process by which a concept such as sex comes into being. The move to locate gender as existing before sex is one that emphasizes the socially constructed nature of the categories that designate physical differences as well as sexual practices.

Like Omi and Winant's definition of race then, here we find a conception of gender as something that is not merely given, biologically determined, or apparent to the naked eye. Instead, both race and gender are configured as categories and categorizing practices, which are maintained and promoted not by biology, but through social relations. What this means within the classroom is that students should never be expected to live up to the stereotypes that instructors provide. At the same time, we as instructors must remain aware that, as agents of educational "institutions," we have an inordinate amount of power over the socially constructed categories of race and gender. As such, we must at all times take care not to mistake the educational process for a process of shaping students to our own world view(s).

Similarly, we can learn to think of the Other not simply as that-which-is-not-I, but instead as a construction which has been designed to stand in for actual others. The managerial notion of audience is a construction which writers have used to help them achieve a sense of control over rhetorical situations and their own worldviews. The discourse of critical pedagogy often works to homogenize students, eliding their differences in order to present theories of how we ought to teach. In the act of homogenizing our students, we elide culturally constructed racial and gender differences, and recreate our students along the lines of the supposed societal norm of whiteness/maleness.¹ And while this accidental whitewashing may lead teachers to feel that they "know" their students (because they "know" societal norms) and thus have some control over their students, this control is imaginary. By acknowledging rather than denying that we are always engaged in Othering processes, an audience oriented writing pedagogy can offer students and teachers insight into these processes. These Othering processes include the racing and gendering of ourselves and of others and an acknowledgement of and engagement with this fact can be a powerful part of the teaching of writing. By emphasizing the importance of audience, we can encourage students to focus on gender and race not as issues of physical difference, but as

¹ Of course, the societal norms of whiteness and maleness are just as Othering as those of blackness and femaleness. The difference is that whiteness and maleness are "supposed" norms; those people who are designated white and/or male often have a correlative designation of being empowered.

categorizing principles which represent, as Omi and Winant say, an "unstable and decentered complex of social meanings" that can be "transformed by political struggle" (55).

In the next chapter I will turn to a consideration of the ways that wired classrooms can create spaces for an audience oriented writing pedagogy to take hold. I will consider the ways that a technologized classroom can be utilized to deal with issues of Otherness. If we consider race and gender as socially constructed categories, it is reasonable to assume that gender- and race-equity are potentially furthered by the new spaces created by technology, by the virtuality of the world wide web, and by the sheer flexibility and newness of recent communicative technologies. But considerations of race and gender in technologized environments are potentially susceptible to the age-old problems of discrimination, stereotyping, and failure to access power in a culture still dominated by a white, male hegemonic structure which has proven very capable of maintaining itself. The technologies to which I will now turn are almost universally considered to be the products of a computer culture which has traditionally been controlled by white males and which presumably works to maintain white males' privileged positions in our society. How can these technologies serve an "us" which includes a wide array of gendered and raced subjects, instead of only serving the hegemonic interests of whiteness/maleness? And how can they be used to further a non-managerial view of audience?

CHAPTER FIVE

Audience and the

Technologized Classroom

For many, computer technology is viewed as either a savior or a demon for education in general and for literacy studies and writing instruction in particular. This chapter is my attempt to productively reconfigure this good/evil dichotomy so as to explore other possibilities, possibilities that in turn will help me to consider the impact computers can and do have on the modern composition classroom. I want to explore some of the ways that wired classrooms can be beneficial to the realization of an audience centered writing pedagogy. In this context audience can refer to the writer's invented set of expectations to which she or he is supposed to write, to a writer's peers in or out of the classroom, and to the writing instructor, whose job is to read, assess, and comment on student texts. Thus, we should view audience concerns as having three distinct connotations within the composition classroom. First, we need to consider the writer who invents, or "reads," an audience. Second, we need to look at the reader as someone whose job includes writing back to authors, often in the form of peer commentary. Third, we need to consider the roles teachers play, both as literal audiences who read student-produced texts, and as audience surrogates, as readers who adopt specific perspectives which are appropriate to the writing produced by each student in each new rhetorical

situation.

The purpose of this chapter is to develop an understanding of audience in these three ways and to offer some suggestions on how we can use computers to teach audience more effectively. Of course, all of these notions are also in play in the traditional classroom; thus the point is to describe how they play differently in the wired classroom, how computer mediation offers different possibilities for them. These three categories of audience can be better taught with the use of computer technology than they can in traditional classrooms because in wired classrooms we have more communicative options. This assumption is in contrast to the important debate over whether we should or should not use computers in our classrooms. Following questions posed by Christine Neuwirth and David Kaufer, I want less to ask, "Should we use computers?" and more to ask "what should the computers we use look like?" (173). Following their lead, I pursue this line of inquiry in hopes of addressing the notion of audience as it can be taught with the aid of computers.

Ellen Barton has argued that there are two common views of technology's role in literacy education; it is either viewed optimistically as a means to greater literacy, or pessimistically as the beginning of the end of literacy. These two views, or "discourses of technology," are constituted by people from all walks of life, "people discussing, authors describing, and scholars analyzing assumptions and attitudes about technology as expressed in

casual conversations, advertising, newspaper articles and best-sellers, educational materials, and scholarly research." For Barton, then, these discourses which are generated from within and without academia, have major "implications for the development of a critical perspective on research in computers and writing" (56). This is so because our outlook on computers and technology determines what we will do with that technology, what we expect it to do for us, and how we want to integrate it into our lives. Barton goes on to say that

There are two prevailing discourses of technology: one is a dominant discourse characterized by an optimistic interpretation of technology's progress in American culture and by traditional views of the relations between technology, literacy, and education; the other is an antidominant discourse characterized by skeptical interpretation of technology's integration in contemporary culture and education. (56)

The pro-technology discourse is considered to be dominant because computers have become integral to so many Americans' lives, but it is also dominant in the sense that it is the discourse of the politically and economically enfranchised; the producers and consumers of expensive equipment are rarely at the lowest rungs of the economic ladder and are quite often at the top instead. The antidominant discourse is voiced by skeptics, luddites, and the economically disenfranchised, the people for whom computers are a luxury or

a waste of both time and money. This binary division of attitudes about technology into the dominant discourse of pro-technology and the anti-dominant discourse of anti-technology is far too simplistic to encompass the wide variety of views which exist but if we consider these two positions as poles, we can see that most attitudes toward technology's role in literacy based education would fall somewhere between the two.

Sven Birkerts is one whose attitudes toward computers and recent technologies can be said to express Barton's antidominant perspective toward technology. Birkerts is interested in preserving and hopefully reinvigorating America's love of literacy, specifically as it is embodied in traditional, paper bound texts. For Birkerts, computers represent more of the same problems initially associated with television; both breed laziness, short attention spans, and a willingness to consume the media's pre-formed attitudes toward the world instead of taking the time to consider all factors before productively engaging in the process of meaning-making. Birkerts is clear on this point in the coda to his provocatively titled book, *The Gutenberg Elegies: The Fate of Reading in an Electronic Age*. Here, the computer is metaphorically likened to "the devil," which "no longer moves about on cloven hooves, reeking of brimstone." Instead, he is both a computer and a computer salesman, and his sales pitch leaves Birkerts

almost persuaded. I saw what it would be like, our toil and misery replaced by a vivid, pleasant dream. Fingers tap keys,

oceans of fact and sensation get downloaded, are dissolved through the nervous system. Bottomless wells of data are accessed and manipulated, everything flowing at circuit speed. (229)

But the fantasy of accessible information is shattered since Birkerts favors literate acts that focus less on volume and more on depth. Computer technology signals the end of deep analysis and a turn to an ever-changing sea of surfaces: information comes to replace knowledge. Birkerts concludes by complaining that "this may be an awakening" into the future, "but it feels curiously like the fantasies that circulate through our sleep. From deep in the heart I hear the voice that says '[r]efuse it'" (229). While Birkerts' love for the bound paper book is one I share, his move to create a specifically causal link between the loss of traditional print literacy and the rise of computer technology is one which is simply not defensible. Further, Birkerts' focus on traditional literacies leaves no room for the possibility that computer, television, or any other sort of literacy might be as important, or as wholesome, as print literacy. Further, we could easily argue that the proliferation of print materials presents us with the problem of deep versus surface readings, thus making computer technology not markedly different but only more of the same.

At the other end of Barton's spectrum is the "dominant discourse" of technology, which optimistically assumes that technologies are useful aids to

the progress of culture. Representing this view quite effectively is Richard Lanham, who's *The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts* works to assert the (seemingly inevitable) connection between technology and a democratizing ideal for education to strive toward. Lanham believes that "the university world has for half a century been desperately seeking a 'core curriculum' for the arts and letters. And more recently we have yearned with equal hunger to expand the canon, to breathe air not yet passed through the Arnoldian purifier. The digitization of the arts promises a solution to both desperations" (13). For Lanham, the redefinition and expansion of the "arts and letters" are crucial to the future of education in particular and democracy in general, and it is to technology that Lanham turns to insure this shift in the educational enterprise. As a result of this technologizing of the arts and letters, we are told that

What will emerge finally is a new rhetoric of the arts, an unblushing and unfiltered attempt to plot all the ranges of formal expressivity now possible, however realized and created by whom- (or what-) ever. This rhetoric will make no invidious distinctions between high and low culture, commercial and pure usage, talented or chance creation, visual or auditory stimulus, iconic or alphabetic information. And rather than outlaw self-consciousness, it will plot the degree of it in an artistic occasion.

(14)

I am attracted to the set of possibilities which Lanham creates here because it seems that, through technology, we can in a sense start over, creating a relevant and technologically savvy educational realm which will forever break down the boundaries between formerly distinct categories of knowledge and experience. But I find Lanham's focus on "expressivity" troubling since it suggests that a powerful enough and transparent enough technology is all that is necessary for students to accurately "express" themselves. Such a view implies that technology can help diminish or even eliminate the problem of moving from thought to language, leaving the opportunity for thought to be perfectly realized via a new and perfectly transparent literacy.

Lanham's pro-technology stance is overly optimistic, just as Birkert's anti-technology stance is too pessimistic. It is unlikely that most people would occupy either position to the extent that they do. It is far more reasonable to look for positive uses of technology and to be aware of its limits at the same time. Whether we like it or not, computers are a part of the landscape at this point and they should neither be lovingly embraced nor utterly rejected. Instead, we need to guard against a pro-technology perspective that implicitly teaches students to become good technology consumers and at the same time we need to confront the fact that the computer is beginning to replace pen and paper as the standard tool for literacy. At the same time, it is important that we realize that computers, like all technologies, "are inherently political in the most general sense of the term: In key ways technologies define allowable

ranges of action, hierarchies of power, and appropriate ways of communicating" (Johnson-Eilola 98). In addition to decisions regarding the design of computer hardware and software, factors such as cost and availability make it likely that computers are far more "political" in this sense than are pen and paper. Technologies of literacy help shape what we say and what we think. But we need to cautiously embrace rather than reject computers in our classrooms because to deny that writing on and with computers has become the dominant mode of literacy is to hamper our students' ability to communicate in meaningful ways. Ilana Snyder argues that instead of celebrating or demonising computer technology, it seems more productive to try to widen our understanding of developments such as hypertext in order to exploit their educational potential. We have to look critically at assertions that the technology will either radically transform or degrade and diminish the social interactions intrinsic to effective teaching and learning (138).

An important way to explore and embrace the possibilities of the wired classroom is to encourage students to think of themselves as writer-investigators. In addition to producing essays, writer-investigators need to also work to discover and create the audiences to whom they will write. Part of the process of investigating audience also includes writers becoming audiences, producers becoming consumers of other student-produced texts.

But becoming an audience does not merely mean passively reading the work of others. It also means that audience members need to write back to authors, creating a communication circuit.

Currently the concept of audience is left largely to the instructor's, and, we hope, the student's imagination. Still, some important theories of audience have been developed, as I noted in the previous chapters of this work. But, these theories of audience do little for us in terms of providing concrete in-class strategies, and do even less within the context of the wired classroom. Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford in particular offer a useful starting point for considerations of audience. Their gloss of the research reveals two main schools of thought, and in their article "Audience Addressed/Audience Invoked: The Role of Audience in Composition Theory and Pedagogy," we are told that "The 'addressed' audience refers to those actual or real-life people who read a discourse, while the 'invoked' audience refers to the audience called up or imagined by the writer" (156). For Ede and Lunsford then the scholarship tends to either favor readers or the author's construct of readers. Of course, the two become enmeshed when we consider that writers invent perceptions of audience in order to anticipate actual audience members. For Ede and Lunsford, what we need is the confluence, in the author's mind, of an invented and an addressed audience. They state that "The most complete understanding of audience... involves a synthesis of the perspectives we have termed audience addressed, with its focus on the reader, and audience invoked,

with its focus on the writer” (167). I agree that authors should consider their own desires as well as those of their audience, but I feel that the notion of audience needs to extend beyond the limitations of the addressed/invoked dichotomy.

We need to teach our students not only to *think* carefully about audience in abstract and concrete terms, but also to *be* audience. Actually, there are at least three aspects of audience implied by any student-generated discourse. The first is the audience which writers reach out to, either by invoking and addressing them. The second are the audience positions which students adopt when they read the work of their peers and when they “read” the work of the instructor (the teacher’s stated and implied expectations, and her general attitudes toward students and their writing). The third audience consideration which students need to grapple with is that of the teacher as audience. We need to develop specific strategies for teaching these three aspects of audience in a non-managerial way, and we need to consider ways that the use of the wired classroom can differently-enable our students and us in this regard. It is my contention that the presence of computers in our classrooms creates a new field upon which we can build our notions of audience into the curriculum. This is not to suggest that computers are a necessary component of the effective teaching of composition--too many of us know from personal experience that we do well without them. But I am suggesting that as more classrooms become wired, we have an opportunity and

a responsibility to exploit a new resource that is especially well adapted to the enterprise of writing and of considering audience.

Technology and Postmodern Assumptions

I will begin with a discussion of the ways in which computer technologies have changed things for us all, and particularly the ways in which it has made certain tenets of postmodernism more real for many of us. As computers have become more prevalent in our culture we have become increasingly aware of both their presence and of the implications of what seems at times to be an almost ubiquitous technology. Of course they are not ubiquitous, as can be seen by the fact that so many countries are not wired and that even in countries such as ours where computers are available, many people cannot afford them. But within the university computers are certainly more prevalent than ever. Many, perhaps most, English programs now offer writing instruction classes in computer aided classrooms, which allot one computer to every student in the class.¹ Many students now have easy access to computers and consider them to be the primary technology to use when

¹ I had the opportunity to experience just this sort of situation during my graduate work. For one course, my fellow students and I were linked to students at two other schools. The added perspectives we all encountered were refreshing, surprising, and fun. At the end of the semester many students from the three schools were able to meet in person. Because of our previous connectedness, our first real-life meeting felt more like a gathering of old friends.

composing discourse of any kind.

A major result of this availability, of this perceived ubiquity, is a feeling of connectedness, of being part of something much larger than the local community, and of being able to access an almost limitless amount of information on every conceivable topic. The two major contributors to this feeling (in terms of software) are of course e-mail and the World Wide Web. In addition to the feeling of connectedness, computers remind us of the collaborative nature of language use, enacting a call and response mode of communication more akin to conversation than to monologue. Another feature of computer usage is that it confirms, in my mind at least, that it is difficult if not impossible to ascertain anything but temporary and “local” truths. This is so because the contents of web spaces change so frequently, because the sheer volume of available texts forces us to focus on what is most current, and because the notion of reliability (which we retain and promote when we send our students to the library in order to find "reliable" sources) is seriously compromised by the seemingly author-less nature of the web.

These three features of computer-mediated information flow, the feeling of connectedness via shared interests rather than geographic reality, the sense that language use is more dialogic than monologic, and the non-existence of reliable overarching truths, force us to conclude that computer based acts of literacy are unlike any preceding forms. These are also some of the defining features of what has become known as postmodernism. While the

study of postmodern theories represents for me an ongoing challenge to simply understand, I have long felt that many of my students take for granted the theoretical constructs with which I struggle. For instance, students often seem unconcerned if I assert that supposedly overarching truths are not held to be true by all people.

Perhaps the biggest problem postmodernism poses for writing instruction is the assertion that the single, autonomous author no longer exists. According to Lester Faigley, postmodern theorists

Have shown how no theory can claim to stand outside of a particular social formation and thus any critique must be self-reflexive. In overturning notions of the self and individual consciousness, postmodern theorists stress the multiplicity, temporariness, and discursive boundedness of subject positions (112).

Instead of individual, we now speak of dispersals, of polyglots, and of social constructedness. These ideas play out in the classroom whether we mean for them to or not, as students experience the feeling of not being fully in control of their texts and instructors (often students ourselves) feel them too. Roland Barthes has suggested that the notion of the cohesive author has collapsed as we have come to realize the intertextuality of all texts. In "From Work to Text," Barthes notes that all the elements of the text tend to "cut across" that text

in a vast stereophony. The intertextual in which every text is held, it itself being the text-between of another text, is not to be confused with some origin of the text: to try to find the 'sources,' the 'influences' of a work, is to fall in with the myth of filiation; the citations which go to make up a text are anonymous, untraceable, and yet already read: they are quotations without inverted commas. (160)

This has serious consequences when we think about the writer in our classroom who struggles to develop an "original" idea. According to Barthes, the writer disappears, and while I think this seriously underestimates the importance of the writer, I agree that we have (and should have) turned away from strictly authorial considerations and toward the audience as a primary concern. We should no longer urge our students to find their "true" selves, to expose themselves through their writing, to find and utilize their own unique "voice." Instead, we should urge them to understand the connections they have to their readers, to understand intertextuality, to consider the multiple subject positions they occupy, to grasp in writing the complexities of dialectic. Chief among these complexities is the notion of audience, an element that becomes even more important when we see the erosion of power that accompanies the shift from writer-as-a-solitary- speaker to writer-as-one among-others.

For some, the modernist subject must be retained at all costs in order

for the teaching of writing to continue. For others, this set of possibilities and limitations simply explains the way things are, and thus postmodernism becomes the lens through which we must look when trying to solve problems of a pedagogical nature. In “Electronic Meetings of the Mind: Research, Electronic Conferences, and Composition Studies,” Gail Hawisher notes that

until the profession accepted and endorsed a view of meaning as negotiated, texts as socially constructed, and writing as knowledge creating, we were unable to value the kinds of talk in writing classrooms that electronic conferences encourage. In other words, the adoption of the electronic conference as pedagogy corresponds closely to the profession’s evolving theories of what it means to learn to write in the late eighties and nineties. (83)

I agree that most of us know about these things, but does that mean we have integrated this understanding into the classroom? In other words, does this important theoretical realization have any pedagogical value? And if it does, does that value have any practical outlet in the classroom? Our interest in audience addresses the breakdown of mono-vocal, monolithic, authorship. But we leave our students in the lurch when we do not make this step overtly--when we give assignments or arrange peer groups without carefully considering the intended outcomes of these arrangements.

Sherry Turkle has noted that computers have helped her to understand

many of the tenets of postmodernism, arguing that the two are useful as metaphors for each other. In *Life On the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet*, Turkle notes that “more than twenty years after meeting the ideas of Lacan, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, I am meeting them again in my new life on the screen” (15). For Turkle at least, the computer makes normal many of those postmodern ideas which we all struggle to grasp. Part of what this means is that our students potentially take, as basic assumptions about the world, the very intellectual constructs which we find so elusive, so abstract, and yet so charged. For them these may simply be concrete realities, a possibility which adds new meaning to the notion that we live in a postmodern time. Turkle goes on to say that, unlike before, now these theoretical

... abstractions are more concrete. In my computer-mediated worlds, the self is multiple, fluid, and constituted in interaction with machine connections; it is made and transformed by language; sexual congress is an exchange of signifiers; and understanding follows from navigation and tinkering rather than analysis. And in the machine-generated world of MUDs, I meet characters who put me in a new relationship with my own identity. (15)

Odd to think that the technology of today should fulfill the dreams and nightmares expressed in postmodernism so well. In her exploration of the world of MUDs (multi-user domains), Turkle, like Donna Haraway, feels that

she is both constitutive of others and constituted (in part at least) by her on-line interactions with others. And in these on-line, co-constitutive relationships, Turkle is able to transcend or redesign her gender, her race, her ethnicity and her sexuality, all in the name of experimentation, fun, and insight.

MUDs and other forms of on-line conversing are spaces in which a sophisticated form of fantasy building takes place, in which people become characters who get to act out aspects of their personalities which they would otherwise keep hidden or private. Such highly interactive spaces also represent new possibilities for writer/audience interactions. This is not only because the interactive nature of on-line chat compels participants to move back and forth between the role of reader and writer, thereby becoming interlocutors, but also because of the sense of play which pervades so much of chatroom discourse. Just as Turkle is actually at home typing on a computer, so students are actually writing papers because their teachers require them to do so. But just as Turkle can imaginatively, virtually, engage with her cyber-environments due to their ability to construct context, so too can writing students learn to imaginatively, virtually interact with one another as they develop topics or critique drafts which betray an awareness of and concern for audiences.

Barthes' death of the author, Hawisher's understanding of meaning as being negotiated socially, and Turkle's interest in shifting subjectivity; all are

important contributors to my belief that audience concerns can and should be emphasized in the wired classroom. As the importance of the vision of the author as monolithic fades, the relevance of the author's co-communicators, the audience, increases. If texts are socially constructed, we do our students a disservice if we encourage them to think that truth can be found outside of social relations. And if subjectivity is at least partly dependent on factors beyond the control of the subject, then we owe it to our students to help them explore the ways that they both construct, and are constructed, by others.

These "postmodern" features of life are as important in the composition classroom as they are in theoretical texts, and as such, need to be overtly addressed. I believe that a writing pedagogy which emphasizes these concerns should do so through careful attention to audience concerns, and in what follows I will argue that the wired classroom offers an especially good environment for this audience centered writing pedagogy. I will consider audience as a) that which the author invents and/or perceives, b) the positions which students occupy in order to read and respond to the texts of their peers, and c) the roles writing instructors play as audiences and as surrogate, make-believe audiences.

Writing Readers and Reading Writers

At present, a severe disjuncture exists between theoretical constructs and practical renderings of audience. As I argued in chapter one, this

disjuncture is much more severe for the notion of audience than it is for that of "author" or of "text." A result is that we have given less thought to what hearers or readers may experience and more to explorations of either the author's ability to write or the texts ability to speak. What we lack is a multitude of voices speaking about readers' potential interactions with composers, what I term the process of "writing readers."

But some have specifically looked at the notion of audience, including Lisa Ede, Andrea Lunsford, and James Porter, whose work I critiqued in Chapter one. In *Audience and Rhetoric: An Archeological Composition of the Discourse Community*, Porter argues that "if any tenet in rhetoric and composition is axiomatic, it is this one: the audience is a primary factor, perhaps the primary factor, influencing discourse" (2). For Porter then, what is most important also tends to be that which is least taught or understood. Looking to the point of access to such ideas for most writing students, the composition textbook, Porter finds that while textbooks tend to "advise the writer to 'consider' audience." They also tend to "do no more than that" (137). Obviously, writers need to be able to actively imagine or apprehend their audiences in the rich tapestry in which they exist. If we have realized that we are always already receivers and collators of data (as well as many other things), we should find ways to use this knowledge in the teaching of audience. We should find ways to help readers imagine the "invoked" audience to which Ede and Lunsford refer. So, how can this be done more

effectively?

Computers can help with this by letting students access databases on the audience to which they are writing. Web based research needs to be conducted not only for the particular subject with which a writer is concerned, but also on the appropriate audience(s) for that subject. Additionally, on-line chat (or in this case a chat space used solely by the class) could be used from the earliest stages of writing in order that writers and audiences continually get feedback from one another. By talking to others we can see what they need, what they value, and how they speak, since knowing the language of the group is so important to being heard within the group. Encouraging on-line chat cannot compel students to communicate with one another any more than physically placing them in groups ensures that they will, but computer mediation does give us access to another communicative mode, and this in turn gives writers and readers one more way to meaningfully interact. The important element in all of this is the writer's ability to create a believable vision of an audience that is "out there." As instructors we look to finished texts in order to judge their qualities, asking questions such as: has the writer shown an awareness of audience? Has the author worked to keep that audience reading, or have they perhaps been alienated and either stopped reading sympathetically or simply stopped reading? These questions can never be fully answered in the positive; such is the nature of written discourse.

Another use of computers in the classroom that would lead to a greater

understanding of audience is hypertext. As authors write, they need to decide how much information is required in order to make sense to audiences. In traditional texts, footnotes and endnotes are used to provide information that is of secondary, or tangential, importance. We should encourage students to write hypertexts in order to help them decide what is necessary, what is unnecessary, and what information should be available to readers. According to Nicholas Burbules, the authorial choices represented by the links which are created in hypertexts "imply choices; they reveal assumptions; they have effects--whether intentionally or inadvertently" (117). These assumptions have to do with the authors' decisions of what knowledge should be primary, secondary, or tertiary. According to Burbules, "the credibility of the designer/authors, then, is continually open for question and challenge by hyperreaders, not only through the standard criteria of expertise, impartiality, and other informal standards of credibility--important as these are--but also, now, as creators of a semic system" (118). The texts that are produced in hypertexts also include, at the author's discretion, as much or as little context as is desired or needed. And this context, like the "primary" text which it surrounds, represents the author's attempt to realistically imagine audience. In so doing, the author is carefully creating a knowledge system which can contract or expand depending on the needs of readers.

This flexibility can be used to help students think about the Othering processes which they enact when they write; in becoming responsible for

building contexts for readers, authors are compelled to address and include their own assumptions and the background information from which they emerge. Once assumptions are out in the open, they can be interrogated, partially accepted, or even wholly rejected. According to Burbules,

Printed texts are by nature selective and exclusive. Any page, any volume, can contain only so many words; it can refer to other texts, but accessing those involves activities such as reaching to a shelf, purchasing the book, going to the library, and so on; activities that are not themselves reading, activities that require energy, time, and sometimes money that a reader may not have to spare. Hypertexts on the Web are by nature inclusive: texts can be almost any size one wishes; any text can be linked to a virtually unlimited number of other texts online; the addition of new links does not in any significant way detract from the text at hand; and accessing any of these textual links requires little time or effort. (103)

A major problem with the inclusive nature of hypertexts is that it goes on and on, making it difficult to compartmentalize writing processes into gradable units which students can hand in to teachers for evaluative purposes. But this problem already exists, at least if we assume, like Bakhtin, that discourse is essentially dialogic in nature. Using research, including footnotes, plagiarizing texts, deploying cliches, these are easy-to-locate features of the

inclusive nature of all discourse. Making authors responsible for contexts and asking writers to engage with the dialogic nature of discourses, does not exacerbate the problem; it only exposes it.

Key to all of this is writer's ability to invent, to manage texts, and to remain aware of audience expectations and needs. Shannon McRae has noted that, among online MUD (multi-user domains) users, there seems to be a high degree of attention and energy spent in understanding the relationships between people. Writers must consistently betray an awareness of their audience (who are themselves also writers and also looking carefully at their audience). In "Coming Apart at the Seams: Sex, Text, and the Virtual Body," McRae argues that MUDs exist for their users as "communities that allow for very real social and emotional engagement, political activism and opportunities for collaborative work on various civic, technical and artistic projects" (246). McRae's position is very close to Turkle's; both emphasize the power of on-line chat to create contexts in which interactors can imaginatively alter their own subjectivities.

McRae notes that many of the MUD users are interested in adopting alternative subject positions, often based along gender lines. McRae says that the importance of these accounts is not that women can feel what it's 'really like to be men,' any more than the men I spoke with imagined that what they were feeling was authentically female. Rather, we can experience for ourselves, inside ourselves, the

kinds of things that we associate with female or male, and realize that those aspects are not, after all, something Other and outside of us. (253)

Much of McRae's text is devoted to an analysis of sex room MUDs and the implications these rooms have on our understanding of gender and gender difference. Within the wired composition classroom, gender would be only one of the potential focal points, along with race and class. The instability of these concepts confirms that identities, like social relationships, are built and must be maintained. Shifting along the lines of race, class and gender, subjectivities are able to fit MUD participants into different groups. These different groups are in effect different audiences. Audience and author flow into one another as true interlocutors and take on the traits of the rhizome. According to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, the rhizome "has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overflows" and has "neither subject nor object, which can be laid out on a plane of consistency" (21). MUDs, searches on the World Wide Web, and hypertext documents all overflow into one another. They all signal a breakdown in traditional subject/object relations because they highlight the dialogic nature of discourse. As writers and readers work collaboratively to write texts which are inclusive of a multitude of other texts, a multiplicity of discourses is produced, which

Unlike a structure, which is defined by a set of points and

positions, with binary relations between the points and biunivocal relationships between the positions, the rhizome is made only of lines: lines of segmentarity and stratification as its dimensions, and the line of flight or deterritorialization as the maximum dimension after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis, changes in nature. (21)

Using hypertext, it may be that many of these traits can be encouraged in composition students, and that this can in turn allow for a greater degree of audience awareness, as the audience “invoked” becomes buttressed by actual, multiple, and contradictory audiences, respondents who are encouraged to provide their own links, and to critique those which have been provided by the author. It is to this group of actual audience members, the writer’s peers, that I would now like to turn.

Typically peer revision processes work to help writers develop their essays more fully and to help readers become more critically aware of the writing which goes on around them. Our hope is that, through peer interaction, we can approach more “real” writing environments, in which texts are produced collaboratively and are then read by actual readers. But often we struggle to convince students that there are substantive differences between revising texts and editing them, and often this difference is only partially understood, since students have been taught to think in terms of grammatical and local correctness over other concerns. Additionally, peer writers tend to

appropriate student texts or to simply disagree with the author's argument. We need to develop strategies that can help peers write specifically as audiences to writers. Students need to be both audiences to whom essays are addressed and advocates for writers, who can provide advice on what the audience needs to hear. If readers are able to articulate well and to operate as advocates for the writer, then they do the writer a service and also enhance their own critical reading and thinking skills. An outgrowth of this would be an increase in the reader's writing skills, for here the audience gets to speak, thus becoming an author whose task is to write a critique. All of this amounts to an acknowledgment of and working with the concept of intertextuality.

Computers can help writers and audiences communicate in new ways, anonymously or in small chatrooms, which may offset the power differentials felt between groups of students when they must speak in person. Additionally, classrooms could be tied together across time and/or space so those writers could develop relationships with other students, who while being disembodied, may be more honest and critical as a result. Specifically, the use of hypertext would encourage the sort of "readers writing" move I am proposing. As audiences contribute commentary to authors' hypertexts, they help to create a discourse which includes at least some of its own context, which embraces at least some of its own dialogism. Nicholas Burbules cautions that the benefit of hypertext "remains to be seen" because the "development of new practices of reading...depends upon much more than just changing characteristics of

text--indeed, traditional text can be read hypertextually and hypertexts can be read quite traditionally" (107-108). Still, Burbules believes that

In part, this enthusiasm is understandable, for web-like textual systems are much more flexible than traditional resources, such as books: they can accommodate all the textual forms that paper and print can, and more. Where text is linear, hypertext can be lateral as well. Where traditional conventions of writing and reading depend on (or create artificially) hierarchies of importance, hypertext can also represent more complex 'rhizomatic' relationships between ideas (Burbules & Callister 1996a). Where traditional text depends upon the disciplines of the Outline and the Syllogism, hypertext opens up additional textual possibilities of Bricolage and Juxtaposition: assembling texts from pieces that can be represented in multiple relations to one another. (107)

Hypertext does not automatically "make" students see texts as lateral or rhizomatic. But asking writers to compose and readers to recompose texts which are electronically linked to any number of other texts does make the dialogic, collaborative nature of discourse far more visible than it is in the traditional classroom. This is so because hypertexts enact a dynamism between and among texts, readers, and writers that is in contrast to comparatively inert, paperbound essays, books, footnotes, an bibliographic

data.

Davida Charney notes that “collaborative writing may be fostered by systems that enable peers to annotate each other’s drafts or that help writers integrate individually written sections into a coherent draft” (239). Using hypertext as an aid to the annotation of student texts becomes a way for peer groups to communicate more efficiently than they presently do. With a click on, say the second sentence of the third paragraph of a student generated essay, the writer could see what several of his/her have to say about that specific passage. This is a bit like whole discourse writing: students are responsible for describing strengths and weaknesses of the entire essay, looked at globally. But when readers' comments are hyperlinked to authors' texts and contexts, they contribute to the growth of the text, rather than merely offering a qualitative assessment.

But here we are talking also of specific strategies that we hope readers of student writings will adopt. Instructors could point out problem areas in student writings with hypertext technology, leaving it to peers to decide exactly what might be done with linked or highlighted portions of the essay. If we want readers to be active, dialectic participants in the composition process, this would be a useful way to do it, by attaching the concept of whole discourse critique to the flexibility of hypertext. I believe that part of any student’s work for the semester could be specifically oriented toward acquiring and displaying just these traits. On-line chat would be of tremendous help

because it blurs the line between reading and writing by suggesting that active reading entails some form of writing, some form of response. Having readers' comments exist as hyper-text documents would also be helpful because such texts would help readers "flash" between their own work and the commentary provided by their peers. Of course, these activities would need to be overseen by the instructor in order to insure that on-line chat does not devolve into mere chatter, and to make sure that hyper-text commentary does not become the electronic equivalent of a smiley face with "Great job! I wouldn't change a thing!" scrawled beneath.

Teachers: Audiences and Audience Surrogates

The last audience issue I want to take up has specifically to do with instructors, who students may consider as the only "real" audience, whether we mean to be taken as such or not. This is so because we are the ones who administer grades, we are the ones who are supposed to know what constitutes "good" writing. And yet this is problematic since we don't want to create replicas of ourselves, we don't want to appropriate student texts and we don't want students to merely write to please the teacher.

We may try to minimize this problem by distributing power more evenly within the classroom by valuing group work, offering unlimited opportunities to redraft assignments, or collaborating with students to design and implement classroom activities. But the fact remains that students,

especially first year composition students, often over-respect instructors. One way to limit the role we as instructors have as a specifically authoritarian audience is to encourage our students to think of us as “audience surrogates,” readers who have several different subject positions from which we read. For instance, I often suggest to my students that they write to the president of our university in order to effect some change within the university. This is done specifically with an eye toward my future responsibility to try to read like the president, a reading strategy that must be collaboratively developed between my students and myself.

In many ways, the instructor’s act here is similar to that of the students, who are trying to understand the president well enough to know what he needs to hear, what the essay needs to “sound” like, what constitutes appropriate or inappropriate language, etc. Since we are working with a set of considerations not unlike that of our students, we can use this to help understand the difficulties they experience as they try to develop believable notions of the audience. We already respond to student texts verbally and in writing, and this process can be furthered by adding comments to ever-growing and changing hypertexts. Links are thus established by authors for the benefit of a variety of readers, by a variety of student-readers for the author and by teachers for both the authors and readers who collaboratively create and manage hypertexts. What is important is that we experiment with the technologies to which we have access, carefully analyzing for ourselves what works well and what

doesn't. By remaining flexible, by avoiding a blind technophilia which leads to presume that computers will make it all better, while at the same time avoiding technophobia, we can remain responsive to student performances. This responsiveness in turn will help us as we consider what technologies, if any, we may decide to deploy in the classroom.

Some people have argued that more needs to be done at the level of technology design, that strategies need to be developed which will help us to make technology serve our own pedagogical purposes instead of only and always forcing us to serve it. The challenge then is to appropriate the mainly commercial enterprise of software and hardware production in order to render technology more than a consumer good and to insure that teaching with computers does not devolve into a series of product demonstrations. Christina Haas and Christine Neuwirth have alluded to these issues and have argued that teachers should gain more authorial control over developing computer technologies. For Haas and Neuwirth, it is imperative that "those in literacy studies take greater responsibility in 'authoring' technology--that is, engaging in sustained and critical dialogue about technology, both its shape and its uses" (330). Most of the rhetorical and composition theorists I have thus far referred to in this chapter can be said to be "engaging" in "critical dialogue about technology," but Haas and Neuwirth are interested in having a say about the way software is actually designed rather than in merely discovering ways to best use preexisting programs. Such a move would hopefully help to create

technologies specifically suited to accommodate the pedagogical purposes which writing instructors have in mind, thus making computers more and more use/full.

For Haas and Neuwirth, the way to “author” these new technology discourses (we could call them “tech-sts”) is to follow a three part plan: first, “we need to alter our perceptions of ourselves,” second, “we need to support more contact across disciplinary boundaries,” and third, “we must reduce the homogeneity of orientation and background of our students” (331). By focusing on the field of rhetoric and composition, Haas and Neuwirth hope to increase the likelihood that instructors of writing will be able to creatively imagine the new types of literacy which computers suggest. By communicating “across disciplinary boundaries,” we create alliances between computer engineering programs and departments on the one hand, and compositionists and rhetorical theorists on the other. Finally, by focusing on the “homogeneity” of students’ previous experiences, Haas and Neuwirth hope to find ways to help students learn, with the aid of technology, more than they already know. I am especially interested in the possibility which lies in this three-part plan, as well as in the consideration of dominant and anti-dominant technology discourses which Barton lays out. Both of these help me to think of technology as manageable, as something which can be “put to good use,” and I am sure that this has already been the case for many instructors and students in computer mediated writing environments. But is this notion of

"good use" equally good for all of us?

If on the one hand we promote the belief that technology can erase or eliminate past discriminations while simultaneously creating the spaces and opportunities for egalitarian action, we are missing the fact that the technology which we now confront is as much a product of our history as are the social conditions which we may want to alter or dismantle. In fact, the hegemonic structure which has generated these technologies is to a very great extent the same group which we would seek to change so profoundly--thus the problem is one of gaining access to and using a technology which is designed both by and for the maintenance of the existing racist and sexist power differentials to which we have become "used." What impact does technology have or what can it have on the postmodern theories which I have already explored and which I embrace?

The communicative technologies of e-mail, the World Wide Web, on-line chat, and hypertext all work to highlight the notion that speakers are never simply speakers, that audiences are never only audiences, but that we are all and always interlocutors, participating to greater or lesser degrees in the formation of knowledge and opinion. In other words, these technologies create a microcosmic view of what goes on in the formation of subjectivity, audience, and otherness, a microcosm in which we can all experience the processes by which we are constituted and through which we help to construct others, at least at the discursive level. This is useful knowledge because it

allows those of us who are unaware of the ways in which we are constructed to experience it firsthand through electronic communicative acts. Further, by experiencing the ways in which we are socially constructed, we gain access to historical critiques of the ways in which some have been constructed less equally through racism, sexism, ageism, and classism throughout American history. But, as Kathleen Welch has pointed out, technology will not in and of itself accomplish this goal. If we assume that technology will unproblematically solve educational disparities, the injustices of the past "will be replicated in electric rhetoric unless the racial construction of objectivist historiography is interrogated and reinscribed" (119). The process of interrogating and reinscribing our histories is partly accomplished by becoming critically aware of the ways in which we shape and and are shaped by others and by culture.

Along with these tendencies to shape humanity, through social controls, are more practical pitfalls we must avoid when we bring technology into the classroom. Billie Wahlstrom argues that "although we talk of networks' ability to extend literacy to excluded individuals, the reality is that the more technology is brought into our systems, the more chances exist for financial, cultural, and social exigencies to limit access." This problem comes into play along with considerations of race and gender in the writing classroom, since both tend to connote the non-hegemonic Others who have traditionally been held outside of the realm of the haves. Wahlstrom continues, noting that even

the erasure of access problems is not enough, and that "contrary to our expectations, perhaps, simple exposure to and experience with technology does not alter the influence of gender on students' attitudes about computers...and, as a consequence, does not automatically result in computer-supported literacy for men and women in the classroom" (175). Carefully rethought and re-taught, historical perspectives can be introduced in the classroom in order to highlight the fact that technology will most likely have different meanings and connotations for different students, and that this is at least partly due to the wildly different ways that, say white heterosexual males and black lesbian females have been constructed and treated throughout American history.

Far from becoming irrelevant, instructors are perhaps more important now than ever, since it is the instructor who determines not only how writing will be taught, but also how technology may help or hinder that enterprise. I have argued that the wired classroom is an especially good environment for an audience centered writing pedagogy to flourish because on-line chat, hypertext documents, Web based research, and e-mail all add to the communicative array to which students have access. Further, the implications of teaching audience as having three distinct connotations is very important if we are to help our students understand the complexities implied when we casually deploy this term. The wired classroom represents an opportunity to teach audience precisely because it provides an atmosphere in which it is plausible

to say that the author is only partly responsible for the construction of texts,
that meaning is socially mediated and continually shifting, and that even as we
construct our own and others' subjectivity, so too do others construct us.

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