

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE HOLY LAND

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PREFACE

The dilemma of the Holy Land has been an anachronism of all historical times. The earliest history of the Bible indicates that the problem of possession has long been the source of much war and strife. At its best this area of limited resources is of little value with the exception of the tremendous treasure of religious monuments and archeological ruins. It is perhaps over these things of small material value that make the region unique in modern international relations. Strangely enough, the religions spawned or nurtured in this barren, almost desert land have emanated and intruded into the four corners of the earth. There is hardly a nation on the international scene today that is not either directly or indirectly affected by the political tensions of this highly controversial area.

This thesis endeavors to integrate and correlate the political, economic and geographical features that have contorted this region into its present situation. The scattering of the "Tribes of Israel" and the Zionistic movement are of special interest because they show the redundancy of the state of Israel. The upsurge of nationalism in this area is also to be noted. Last, but not least, is the potential threat that this area is one of the geo-politically recognized places that could well set off a world conflict.

Source materials include official documents and publications of the

United States Department of State and the British Foreign Office. Other governmental publications are included. Also, reference books in geography, political science, history and related subjects were used to expand on certain points of interest contained in the governmental publications.

The writer would like to point out that his interest in this subject has been greatly enhanced by the fact that he resided in the Middle East for over a year and has seen, first hand, the strange influence it fosters on the minds of people, particularly the Holy Land.

It is only fitting and proper that the writer acknowledge that he is indebted to several persons for the consummation of this thesis. The writer is indebted to the faculty of the Geography Department for their assistance; especially to Dr. Edward E. Keso, my adviser, to Dr. Ralph E. Birchard and Mr. James L. Stine for their encouragement. Finally, to Mr. Jack E. Moore for his moral support and his initial efforts of my introduction to the Geography faculty. To the library staff of the Oklahoma State University go particular thanks for their kindness and understanding which really made this study possible. Mrs. Marguerite S. Howland was most helpful in the finding and use of governmental documents. The termination of these acknowledgements must of certainty belong to my family for patience, understanding and encouragement during this extended effort.

R. W. V.

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CHAPTER I

THE RELIGIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE HOLY LAND

The dilemma of the Holy Land is: "To whom does it belong?" An uneasy truce is maintained today along an armistice line established by the armistice agreements of 1949 and, according to Secretary of State Dulles, there were three basic problems to be solved: (1) The tragic plight of 900,000 refugees who formerly lived on the territory now occupied by Israel; (2) the pall of fear hanging alike over Arabs and Israelis, and (3) the lack of fixed permanent boundaries between Israel and its neighbors.¹ The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the background and factors involved in the third problem, the boundaries of Israel. This chapter will deal with the ancient Biblical and historical political boundaries in the area adjacent to the Dead Sea and Jordan river valley; an area commonly referred to as Palestine, which means the home of the Philistine. For simplicity, the boundaries will be discussed chronologically as follows: (1) Biblical times (generally under Hebrew influence); (2) the Christian Era; (3) the Moslem period of Arab Ottoman and Turkish influence; and (4) the modern concept of the mandate of the League of Nations.

¹United States Department of State Publication, United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia and Africa - 1955, Near and Middle Eastern Series No. 20, (Washington, 1956), p. 13. (Hereafter referred to as U. S. Department of State Publication)

The Hebrew Period: The Divine Discipline

The Hebrew claim to Palestine is clearly illustrated in the Holy Bible. The Lord said unto Moses: "and I come down to deliver them (children of Israel) out of the hand of the Egyptians and to bring them up out of that land unto a good land, and a large land, unto a land flowing with milk and honey, unto the place of the Canaanites and the Hittites and the Amorites, and the Perizzites, and the Hivites and the Jebusites."² This was to become known as the Promised Land for the descendants of Abraham and it was to that portion of this land to be seen west of the Dead Sea from the heights of Mt. Nebo that Moses was to lead his people. With the settlement of the tribes of Israel in Palestine it was divided with little thought to boundaries; however, in time to come it was more particularly divided between the kingdoms of Israel and Judah. Based upon the above, it would not be improper for the Jewish people to lay claim to most of the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and to include part of Turkey, Lebanon and Syria in addition to Palestine and Jordan. The claim proper has been restricted to Palestine by the fact that throughout the ages the sphere of Jewish influence has been restricted to that area.

During the period in question the Jews have very little claim to the area in terms of possession. Off and on during this time they were overrun by various invaders and were a part of the second Babylonian (Assyrian) Empire. They became a colony of the Roman Empire in 218 B. C. and remained so until the fall of the Empire.

²King James Version, Holy Bible, Exodus 3:8.

The Christian Era: The Corporatism of Rome

Following the time of Hebrew influence was a short period of rule connected with the development and spread of Christianity. This was "The Patriarchate of Jerusalem," established by Constantine in Byzantine Times.³ It was Christian, politically, and remained so until overrun by the Persians in 604 A.D. They were aided by the Jews and the Christians were massacred. The Jews had hoped to gain possession of the area and establish an autonomous state; however, fate dealt them out in the form of a far more powerful enemy, the followers of Muhammad (Islamites) who conquered the country in 636.

The Continuum of Islam: The Vacuous Regime

The followers of Islam have a longer claim, in terms of possession, to the Holy Land than any of the three contending religious groups. The Arab influence in one form or another remained intact, with the exception of the Crusades, over Palestine until General Allenby entered the city of Jerusalem on December 11, 1917 (see Appendix A). From 636 to 1105 the area was under the Arab Caliphs. By 1187 the Crusaders were firmly entrenched in Palestine and the Latin States had been formed. This interim Christian influence lasted until the fall of Acre in 1293, thus giving the Christians a claim, at least in terms of possession, as great as the Jews. In the time following,

³James Parkes, A History of Palestine, (New York, 1949), p. 72.

⁴U. S. Department of State Publication, Mandate for Palestine, Near Eastern Series No. 1, (Washington, 1931), p. 10.


Palestine was under the influence of Mamluk (slave) Sultans until 1517 when it became a part of the Ottoman Empire. This arrangement survived until the Turkish Territorial Divisions of 1914. From the fall of Acre until the British took Jerusalem is the latter portion of Moslem influence.

The Days of Zion: The Dilemma and the Enigma

The problem of the territorial rights and claims to the Holy Land was a "leftover" from World War I. It provided a great deal of discussion for the League of Nations and, pushed by the British, a Mandate was issued in 1923 establishing firm boundaries in the Holy Land for the first time in several years.⁵ The establishment of Palestine as a national home of the Jews was advocated. This was advanced and perpetuated by the Zionistic movement, a return of the Jews to Jerusalem, and gained favor of the British government. The United States position was that it should be neither Jewish nor Arab, although they agreed to the mandate. This position was reaffirmed in the State Department Report of April 20, 1946.⁶ The mandate was dissolved in May, 1948 following considerable fighting and disorder between the Arabs and Jews. On the 15th of May the United States had suggested a temporary truce and the establishment of a trusteeship to be administered by the United Nations; however, on the 14th

⁵ Ibid., pp. 10-20, p. 107. (See Appendix A)

⁶ U. S. Department of State Publication, Anglo American Committee of Inquiry, Report of the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, 1946, Near Eastern Series No. 2, (Washington, 1946), pp. vii and 49.



Courtesy of United States Department of State
 Figure 1
 Current Map of Israel


of May the Jewish National Council, meeting at Tel Aviv, formally declared the establishment of a Jewish state, to be called Israel, in the area allotted to the Jews by the United Nations.⁷ The State was immediately recognized by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The present Armistice Line established by the United Nations is shown in figure 1, and a comparison with figure 2 shows the remarkable similarity between the ancient and new Israel. An almost equal portion of land inside Palestine has been given to Jordan comparative to that portion of ancient Palestine that lay in Jordan.

In the disputed area lies the enigma of the dilemma of the Holy Lands, Jerusalem, a city separated by an Armistice Line (see figure 3). The city is divided between the Arab and Jew, however, it is of more historical importance to the Christian than to either Arab or Jew from a religious viewpoint.⁸ Throughout all discussions and mediations over this area, no action has been initiated or suggested that the city is of great importance to Christianity, particularly since the Moslems (in the 3rd Sura of Muhammed) proclaimed that the Promised Land was really the area around Mecca and not Jerusalem, thus relegating their interest from the religious concept.

Another problem as to the Jewish establishment of a national home and state lies in the following statement by Mr. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State: "To the Israelis I say that you should come to truly look upon

⁷U. S. Department of State Publication, Background Jordan, Near and Middle Eastern Series No. 19, (Washington, 1955), p. 2.

⁸James Parkes, A History of Palestine, (New York, 1949), p. 183.



Courtesy of United States Department of State

Figure 2
Comparative Map of Ancient and Modern Israel


yourselves as a Middle Eastern state and see your own future in that context rather than as a headquarters, or nucleus so to speak, of worldwide groupings of peoples of a particular religious faith who must have special rights within and obligations to the Israeli State....," in short, a description very well fitting what could be referred to as a "Jewish Vatican."⁹ This is a problem that could very easily bring about much agitation, especially from other world-wide established religious groups. (See Appendix B)

With all of the above in mind, it is not difficult to understand that the truce that exists in the Holy Land is an uneasy one, marked each day by claims and counterclaims of violations, atrocities and local war.¹⁰ This situation is a most unhappy one and positive action is required to bring about a solution that is agreeable to Arab, Christian and Jew alike. The latest United States position is broad and without compunction as shown by the following taken from a discussion between Prime Minister Eden and President Eisenhower, January 30, 1956.¹¹ It was agreed that every effort should be made to reduce the sources of misunderstanding between the Middle Eastern Nations, whose peoples should be helped to achieve "their legitimate aspirations." Similarly, an Arab-Jewish settlement was considered urgent, but possible only if both sides were "willing to reconcile

⁹U. S. Department of State Publication, United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia and Africa - 1954, Near and Middle Eastern Series No. 18, (Washington, 1955), p. 23.

¹⁰ibid., p. 23.

¹¹U. S. Department of State Publication, United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia and Africa - 1955, Near and Middle Eastern Series No. 20, (Washington, 1956), p. 54.



Courtesy of United States Department of State

Figure 3
Map of Jerusalem

the positions" hitherto taken. On this provocative and apparently negative note the situation now stands. In the recommendations one possible solution will be given.

In summary, it should be noted that the dilemma of the Holy Land is almost a universal tragedy with responsibility divided amongst the British, the Arabs, the Jews and Christian Churches.¹² All have political, religious and other historical claims. All have suffered unstable tenures, including the present ownerships. Therefore, it appears that the only solution lies in the establishment by the United Nations of a commission to form what would be known as "World Monuments and International Parks" with the Holy Land as the first area of consideration. It is recognized that there would be many problems; however, the eventual outcome foresees a solution to a hitherto unsolved problem of ownership and offers a precedent for the solution of similar problems in other parts of the world.

¹²James Parkes, A History of Palestine, (New York, 1949), p. 361.

CHAPTER II

THE PHYSIOGRAPHY OF THE JORDAN RIVER VALLEY AND VICINITY

Physical Features

Israel is about the size and shape of New Jersey. It has a fertile coastal plain with ample rainfall. In the north are the streams and hills of Galilee; in the center, the stony Judean mountains; and stretching southward, the Negev, a triangular desert area which gives the country an outlet to the Red Sea. To a degree, Israel and Jordan are separated by the Jordan River Valley, with Israel to the west and Jordan to the east. Jordan is about the size of Indiana. Geographically, it occupies a central position in that area from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea, known as the Middle East. The greater part of the country stretches east and south from the Jordan River Valley in a wide "V." West of the Jordan river, the Kingdom encompasses a significant portion of the Holy Land.¹

By reason of its situation and structure, a land bridge is formed between Africa and Eurasia across Palestine and Jordan. This comparatively fertile area

¹U. S. Department of State Publication, Background Jordan, Near and Middle Eastern Series No. 19, (Washington, 1955), p. 1.


also attracts the desert nomads.

Palestine is cut into two parts by a deep, wide trough passing through it longitudinally. Through this trough runs the Jordan river and here, too, lie three lakes supplied with water by that stream. Because of the trough, the division made by the Jordan river makes it an important political line of demarcation.² Eastern and western Palestine both represent elevated table lands. This is particularly clear in the east, while western Palestine has been cut more deeply, due largely to the greater amount of rainfall and consequent erosion. The mountainous region to the east of the Jordan is intersected by three deep clefts. The most northerly is the valley of the Yarmuk river, shown in Figure 4. The plateau north of the Yarmuk falls away in a steep slope towards the sea of Galilee, and is composed of a fertile mixture of tufa and red-brown earth. To the south lies the Jabbok river and between it and the Yarmuk lies a mountainous area, still heavily wooded. The third valley is formed by the Arnon river which is deeply imbedded in a canyon that empties into the Dead Sea.

The Jordan River Valley is a geographical phenomena unique on earth because it is farther below sea level (-1286') than any other valley in the world.³ As mentioned before, there are three lakes that remain from an ancient sea bed: Huleh, the Sea of Galilee, and the Dead Sea. The northern part of the valley is luxuriant. In springtime, the amply watered plain receives 30 inches annual

²U. S. Department of State Publication, Mandate for Palestine, Near Eastern Series No. 1, (Washington, 1931), p. 7. (See Appendix A)

³Joseph E. Williams, Prentice-Hall World Atlas, (New Jersey, 1959), p. 71.



Courtesy of Rand McNally & Company

Figure 4
Physical Map of Palestine

rainfall.⁴ The highest amount of rainfall in the area is 60 inches annual mean on the Lebanon slopes of Mt. Hermon.⁵ Around Lake Huleh and above all the western shores of the Sea of Galilee, flowers and vegetation grow abundantly. Below the joining of the Jabbok river with the Jordan, the valley may be described as a desert. Vegetation is restricted to the vicinity of springs which are sporadic in location.

The Dead Sea fully justifies its name. Owing to the high mineral content of its water (sodium chloride, bromides, etc.) it has a salinity six times the normal ocean content. Fish die within moments after trespassing into the Dead Sea.

To the west of the Jordan River Valley a ridge is formed by a mountain chain running north and south. These compose the Judean Mountains and the Hills of Galilee. To the northwest of the Sea of Galilee, the peaks rise to more than 3500 feet, where the ridge then falls away in the plain of Jezreel.

In the south, between the straight coast line and the central mountain ridge, are situated—from west to east—a narrow belt of dunes, a very fertile coastal area and a series of gently-sloping hills. This area is known as the Shephelah. To the south of the Shephelah is the Negeb (Negev), a limestone plateau extending to the desert of Sinai to the west, the Arabian desert to the east. It is a veritable desert itself that terminates southward on the Gulf of

⁴Emil G. Kraeling, Bible Atlas, (New York, [year]), p. 38.

⁵W. G. Kendrew, The Climates of the Continents, (London, 1953), p. 247.

Aqabah.

Geologists report that the rocks of this area are marine sedimentary beds representing deposition during several stages of the Cretaceous period. Sometime long after this deposition, and still before human history, the area was subjected to crustal warping and faulting. Some segments were elevated several thousand feet above sea level while others were depressed into great troughs. The sea coast of Palestine and the great trough (El Ghor) of the Jordan Valley are examples of the depressed areas.⁶

Climate

Typical of the Mediterranean area, the climate of Israel is mild with a wet winter season and a dry hot summer. In the hills (highest: Mt. Atzmon, 3,962 feet, in upper Galilee), and on the plateau which separates the Jordan Valley from the coastal plain, the winters are cold and snowfalls are not unusual. Winds, generally from the Mediterranean, have a moderating influence in the summer. Around the Dead Sea and in the Negev, where winters are mild, summer temperatures frequently exceed 100 degrees Fahrenheit. There is practically no rainfall in the Negev, but enough in Galilee to enable a wide variety of vegetables and grains to be cultivated. Rainfall is erratic in the area as shown by the drought conditions of 1953 followed by the ample, well-distributed rains in 1954. In much of the country flash floods are not uncommon, and

⁶Rand McNally and Company, Bible Atlas, (New York, [year]), pp. 33-34.

nearly all tributary streams are wadies (dry beds except in the rainy season). Precipitation is likely to come down in two or three torrential drenchings over a short space of time, swelling usually dry stream beds and carrying off topsoil.⁷ Only a few short coastal rivers, such as the Yarkon and Kishon, have a continuous flow. By far the most life-giving stream in the entire region is the River Jordan. This is an inland river with headwaters near Mt. Hermon (9,232 feet) and terminates in the below-sea-level, salt-laden Dead Sea (-1,286 feet).

The following climatic information is taken from Kendrew to help show the climatic conditions of this region:⁸

	<u>Mean Average Temperature (F)</u>	<u>Mean Temperature Range</u>	<u>Mean Average Precipitation (in.)</u>
Haifa (El. 52')	71	26	24.4
Jerusalem (El. 2,485')	63	28	15.9
Jericho (El. -820')	74	31	5.0

In Jordan the climate is somewhat similar with the exception of being located farther inland from the Mediterranean than Israel. Throughout the hilly part of the country, the climate is generally of the Mediterranean type except

⁷ U. S. Department of State Publication, Background Israel, Near and Middle Eastern Series No. 17, (Washington, 1954), p. 4.

⁸ W. G. Kendrew, The Climate of the Continents, (London, 1953), p. 246.

that the summers are not quite so hot and the winters are cooler. Snow is not unusual in the higher altitudes. The west bank of the Jordan has a better rainfall than the east. In the lower Jordan Valley, as in the outlying desert regions, rainfall is slight and summer heat intense.⁹

The general climate in this area is truly Mediterranean and is affected by both altitude and latitude.¹⁰ The land rises eastward from the coast and reaches heights of around 3,000 feet, where high-steppe conditions prevail. Naturally, the great cleft of the Jordan valley is a striking topographical and climatic feature forming a dry pocket that becomes more desert-like in the lower latitudes. East of the plateau of Palestine, the Mediterranean climate succumbs to arid desert wastelands. Thus Jordan, for the most part, has a problem in water supply; whereas Israel does benefit from the coastal upslope rainfall.

⁹U. S. Department of State Publication, Background Jordan, Near and Middle Eastern Series No. 19, (Washington, 1955), p. 4.

¹⁰W. G. Kendrew, The Climate of the Continents, (London, 1953), p. 246.

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF ISRAEL AND JORDAN

Israel

Israel, as a newly independent state, has existed since May 14, 1948. It is a Republic and, previous to its independence, was a part of the British mandate for Palestine. It has an area of about 8,000 square miles (exact figure not obtainable due to undefined borders) and a population of 2,114,000.¹ The principal cities are as follows: Tel Aviv, on the central Mediterranean coast, has 500,000 inhabitants and is the country's largest city. It occupies a unique position in this ancient land, for it was founded less than 50 years ago and became the first capitol when Israel was proclaimed a nation. Haifa, to the north, with a metropolitan population of 220,000, ranks second, has a fine natural harbor and is the main port. The third largest city and present location of the government is the new portion of Jerusalem, which has a total population (both Israel and Jordan sides) of 167,613. This portion is sealed off from the older section of the city by a no man's land several blocks wide and the older section is under the control of the Jordan Government (see figure 3). Although the city is

¹Publication of United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, (New York, January, 1961), p. 3.

TABLE VI. PALESTINE/ISRAEL: OUTPUT OF CERTAIN INDUSTRIES
(Thousands of metric tons, except as indicated)

Industry or product	1928	1938	1946	1950	1954	1955	1956
Flour	158.1	252.0	233.8	242.1
Chocolate, sweets and jams	10.7	12.6	13.8	12.0
Canned fruits	1.0	3.0	2.8	3.1
Preserved and pickled vegetables	7.3	7.0	8.4	12.1
Citrus beverages ^a	6.4	15.1	19.0	16.7
Refined oils	4.0	6.1 ^b	1.4 ^c	12.5	14.2	17.7	21.8
Margarine	4.0	7.8	7.8	10.0	9.7
Beer ^a	—	1.7	18.1	12.3	14.3	14.6	13.0
Wine ^a	1.8	3.1	...	3.1	3.1	7.4	9.1
Other alcoholic beverages ^a	3.1	3.6	5.4	3.9
Cigarettes	0.5	0.6	1.2	1.5	2.0	2.0	2.1
Cotton and mixed fabrics ^d	12.6
Plywood ^e	—	—	—	7.6 ^f	15.7	21.3	21.3
Tires ^g	—	—	—	—	144.9	171.0	187.8
Tubes ^g	—	—	—	—	109.6	117.8	171.1
Alcohol	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.4
Superphosphates	—	—	—	8.0	70.5	101.3	95.5
Sulphuric acid ^h	—	—	—	—	43.7	71.3	73.3
Matches ⁱ	110.7	237.6	...	291.8	381.5	389.1	385.8
Soap	8.0	...	9.0	9.4	9.2	10.2
Detergents	—	—	—	0.9	9.2	10.5	10.2
Motor spirit	—	—	646	30	165	188	...
Kerosene	—	—	361	27	137	139	...
Heavy oils	—	—	...	137	587	631	...
Plate glass ^j	—	—	—	1.0	1.7	1.4	...
Cement	59.2	98.0	255.0	380.1	563.1	663.5	612.8
Nails and rivets	—	—	—	2.0 ^f	3.0	3.1	2.8
Electric bulbs ^k	—	—	—	—	2.1	2.8	...
Motor vehicles, assembled ^g	—	—	—	—	3.4	2.6	2.9
Diamonds ^l	—	—	138.0 ^m	119.5	185.1	229.5	263.7

SOURCE: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*; Statistical Office of the United Nations; S. B. Himadeh, *Economic Organization of Palestine* (Beirut, 1938); Government of Palestine, *Statistics of Imports, Exports and Shipping* (Jerusalem); *Statistical Abstract of Palestine, 1944-45* (Palestine, 1946).

^a Millions of litres.

^b 1934-1938 average, olive oil only.

^c Olive oil only.

^d Millions of metres.

^e Thousands of cubic metres.

^f 1952.

^g Thousands.

^h In terms of 98.4 per cent H₂SO₄.

ⁱ Thousand gross of boxes.

^j Millions of square metres.

^k Millions.

^l Thousands of carats; exports only.

^m 1945.

Courtesy of United Nations

under "defacto" control of Israel and Jordan, the United States has not, in view of standing United Nations resolutions, recognized the sovereignty of either country over the portions of Jerusalem they hold. There are nearly 20 other cities with a population of 15,000 or more, among them are: Acre, with turrets and battlements recalling the crusades; Roman-built Tiberias, still a favored vacation spot; Nazareth, the largest Arab settlement; Jaffa, a secondary port; and Safad, where many of the early immigrants settled.²

Located between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem is the Lydda Airport, terminus of Israel's El Al Airlines, and also served by other international lines. Local air service is provided between cities. In addition, the country is linked by 618 kilometers of state-owned rail lines and a good system of paved roads. It is possible to drive the entire length of Israel in one day. Also, in 1958 Israel had 30 vessels in its merchant marine.³

Agriculture is the most important industry in Israel. The most important crop and biggest export is citrus fruit grown on the sandy, well-watered, fertile coastal plain.⁴ Between 1952 and 1959, land under irrigation in Israel increased from 162,000 acres to 300,000 acres. Citrus production increased from 352,000

²U. S. Department of State Publication, The Newly Independent Nations, Israel, Near and Middle Eastern Series 58, (Washington, D. C., 1960), p. 1.

³Publication of the United Nations, The Development of Manufacturing Industry in Egypt, Israel, and Turkey, (New York, 1958), p. 96.

⁴U. S. Department of State Publication, The Newly Independent Nations, Israel, Near and Middle Eastern Series 58, (Washington, D. C., 1960), p. 4.

tons to 570,000 tons.⁵ There is mixed farming in the valley areas and other agricultural activities include vineyard cultivation and poultry raising. There are plantations to be found that produce such items as tobacco and olives. These are located in the Galilee lowlands. Banana plantations are found on the sub-tropical plainlands. In the northern part of the Negev, farming is being developed and in the more promising areas intensified. Vegetables, wheat sorghum, barley and sunflowers are the principal crops grown at present. There is a considerable number of livestock including cattle, sheep and goats. As a matter of fact, the country's beef cattle have increased from 1,000 head in 1948 to 15,000 head in 1959; the dairy cattle from 18,800 head to 44,000 head during the same period. Meat production in 1957-58 amounted to 18,500 tons, an increase of 18 percent over the previous year. Farm communities and rural settlements are of many types in Israel. They range from the "kibbutz" (communal collective settlements), where all property and earnings are collectively owned and work is organized the same way, to the "moshava" (village) in which land and property are privately owned and every resident is responsible for his own well-being.

The United States has given Israel technical assistance in several branches of agricultural activity, for instance, animal husbandry. This has been mainly in livestock breeding for beef production.⁶ Poultry production in terms

⁵U. S. Department of State Publication, Fact Sheet, Israel, Near and Middle Eastern Series 51, (Washington, D. C., 1960), p. 7.

⁶ibid., p. 7.

of egg laying has been increased and poultry diseases have been checked. Range and forestry assistance has been provided. Work has also been done with field and horticultural crops and progress is being made to place all agricultural research under the direction of the Agricultural Research Station. In agricultural education, a number of buildings have been renovated and equipped for the Technical Agricultural Institute, training courses for agricultural teachers have been established, and homemaking courses have been introduced in secondary schools.⁷

Israel's industries of manufacturing or processing are also on the upswing.⁸ Many products are manufactured or processed, including chemicals, textiles, paper, metal products, plastics, leather goods, building materials, ceramics and electric goods such as refrigerators and radios (see Table I). Israel's known natural resources are limited consisting mainly of potash, bromine and other deposits of the Red Sea. Other resources are copper and oil. Approximately 200,000 tons of oil were produced in 1957. This country is, to a great extent, dependent upon raw materials from the outside world. Domestic markets are limited and outside trade is an important factor in the economy. Israel has had to utilize foreign capital, both private and public, in order to keep the trade balance favorable and to finance internal development programs. The United States has been helping Israel since 1951. This congressional legislation set up a program compatible to both the Jews and Arabs. Some of the primary

⁷Ibid., p. 7.

⁸U. S. Department of State Publication, The Newly Independent Nations, Israel, Near and Middle Eastern Series 58, (Washington, D. C., 1960), p. 5.

assistance has been in the development of water resources. The Yarkon-River project has been used to supply water for irrigation in the Negev and supplementing the water supply of Tel Aviv. Other programs have been used to increase power generation. Most recent aid has been to assist in the procurement of basic food-stuffs, petroleum products, raw materials and heavy equipment for agriculture, industry and railways. A ceramics and Rubber Institute has been organized and a pilot plant for petrochemicals has been equipped and technical assistance provided in organizing activities and training personnel. Assistance has been given in developing equipment requirements for a plastics pilot plant. The state has modernized its entire railway system, and in addition to technical cooperation on this project, some of the heavy equipment mentioned above have been diesel locomotives.

Following is an excerpted summary of United States economic assistance to Israel:⁹

"Total official United States economic assistance programmed for Israel, from 1948, when the state was created through the fiscal year ending June 30, 1959, amounts to \$634.6 million. This includes aid of \$326.4 million under the Mutual Security program, broken down as follows: development of special assistance, \$292.1 million; technical cooperation, \$9.3 million; Development Loan Fund, \$25 million.

"Surplus agricultural commodities, sold to Israel for local currency under

⁹U. S. Department of State Publication, Fact Sheet, Israel, Near and Middle Eastern Series 51, (Washington, D. C., 1960), p. 13.

Public Law 480, title I, have amounted to \$130.3 million. Of this amount, \$91.7 million has been loaned back to Israel for development financing. United States voluntary agencies provided \$52 million worth of agricultural commodities under title III of Public Law 480.

"The United States Export-Import Bank has provided Israel with credits totalling \$162.2 million for development projects."

Jordan

Jordan is another newly independent state that has existed in its present form of constitutional monarchy government since May 25, 1946. It was previously a part of the British Mandate for Palestine. The area of Jordan can only be approximated due to the undefined borders; however, it is about 37,500 square miles, some five times the size of Israel. In 1960 the latest available population was 1,600,000 of which 475,000 are Arab Palestinians who lost their home in Israel as a result of the conflict there.¹⁰ This group constitutes a heavy burden of unemployment on the Jordanian economy. The principal cities are: Amman, the capital, population 204,000; Irbid, population 50,000; Al Karak, population 40,000; and the old portion of Jerusalem with an estimated population of 75,000.¹¹ Amman is located to the east of the Jordan River and was

¹⁰U. S. Department of State Publication, The Newly Independent Nations, Jordan, Near and Middle Eastern Series 57, (Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 1.

¹¹Ibid., p. 1.

once called Rabbath Ammon, stronghold of the Ammonites. The Egyptians later rebuilt the city under Ptolemy Philadelphus and named it Philadelphia after him. As such, it is the most historically famous city in the country with the exception of the "old city" of Jerusalem with its many sites of religious value. In the "old city" live a number of Christians who constitute 12 percent of the population, the remainder being Moslem.

Jordan has a primarily pastoral and agricultural economy composed of small landholders. Nine percent of its land is arable; of this, only 80 percent is under cultivation. The east bank of the Jordan River is the most fertile in the country and has suffered little from erosion and overcropping.

The west bank located on the leeward side of the Judean mountains has little rainfall and is severely denuded except for some terraced farms. As rainfall in general is irregular, crop production from year to year is unpredictable and great fluctuations occur. This tends to keep the economy unstabilized and contributes to the trade gap between imports and exports. Chief crops of Jordan are: millet, maize, barley, wheat, vegetables, fruits and olives. Forest reserves are insignificant. Livestock raising is, of course, the main pursuit of the Bedouin tribes and is an important element of the country's economy. Jordan's mineral resources are of minor importance. Potash from the Dead Sea and phosphates from Rosaifa and Hasa are the most important. Oil exploration has been done, but as yet, no oil has been found. No coal or lignite deposits are known, therefore hydroelectric power is very important to the economy.

CHAPTER IV

THE GEOPOLITICAL PATTERNS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

United States Policy and Interests

The primary determinant of United States foreign policy in the Middle East lies in the following statement made by President Truman in March of 1947: "Totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundation of international peace and hence the security of the United States."¹ Security is not only a determinant but also an objective. The overall policy is implemented in a type of "casual containment." This containment in the Middle East is a more passive type, due in part to the area being farther away from the Russian heartland and Soviet sphere of influence, than in the more contiguous areas of Central Europe. The long range objective therefore is to bring a peaceful and lasting settlement to middle eastern problems which, in turn, will satisfy United States political, economic and ideological objectives. There are several salient policies and arrangements that enhance the primary objective. Included are such things as military agreements, treaties

¹U. S. Department of State Publication, The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951, Near and Middle Eastern Series No. 5, (Washington, 1952), p. 840.

and pacts. Also economic aid, technical assistance and outright grants are very important. In addition there are Development Loan Fund loans, surplus farm products under the Public Law 480 program, and loans from the Import-Export Bank.

The following table shows United States government aid to this area from 1948 through 1959:²

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>U. S. Government Economic Aid</u>	<u>U. S. Government Economic Aid</u>
	<u>to Israel since May, 1948</u>	<u>to Arab States since May, 1948</u>
	(In millions)	(In millions)
1948	none	7.3
1949	none	none
1950	135.0	none
1951	none	4.8
1952	63.5	9.5
1953	73.7	20.1
1954	54.0	25.8
1955	54.6	56.2
1956	54.4	39.2
1957	37.5	37.68
1958	89.2	70.9
1959	52.4	114.5
Grand Total:	\$614,300,000	\$386,480,000*

*These figures supplied by the United States government exclude American donations to Palestine refugee relief, which have ranged between \$20,000,000 and \$30,000,000 a year from 1949 to the present.

In addition to the above--Turkey, the eastern anchor of NATO, (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) has received almost three billion dollars in United States aid and continues to be a primary recipient of aid in the area.

²Harry B. Ellis, Challenge in the Middle East, (New York, 1960), p. 96.

Since World War II, the Middle East has remained an area of strategic importance because of its proximity to the Iron Curtain. The region constitutes a land bridge between three continents and militarily, although the West does not wish to conquer or dominate the area, it could ill afford to stand by and see it ruled by irresponsible self-seekers who pose as communist sympathizers. The United States has NATO (Turkey) and the Central Treaty organization (Turkey, Iran and Pakistan) which provide mutual security and assistance. Also there are bilateral agreements with Lebanon, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Oil is one of the main reasons for the importance of the Middle East in world politics.³ The United States, Britain, France, and Holland have oil interests in the region, but the interests of the first two are by far the largest. Britain is dependent on Middle East oil for her very economic existence. The energy needs of Britain, the revenue from the oil and the difficulty she would have in financing the purchase of oil from the dollar area are the chief reasons for this dependency. If President Nasser of Egypt became master of this region he could nationalize its oil and Britain and Western Europe would be at his mercy. He has already shown what consequence the West could expect if free passage of shipping through the Suez Canal is interrupted.

The West has valuable strategic air bases and numerous staging posts in the area, for example, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. This base, however, will lose

³ George Lenczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East, (New York, 1960), p. 1.

its military value within the next year due to a reluctance on the part of the Saudi Arabian government to extend our military mission to that country. These bases are mainly to provide protection for our economic interests and to counter any overt communist encroachment in the Middle East.

The Western policy towards the Middle East is one of development of stable, viable, and friendly governments in the area, capable of withstanding communist inspired subversion from within and willing to resist communist aggression.⁴ Additionally, the West is vitally interested in assuring protection of oil rights, strategic positions, and traditional passage rights in the area.

Although Britain and the United States share the same interests in containing communism, in the past they have reacted differently to political situations in this region, and their policies have not always been harmonious. Britain adopted a firm policy in the Middle East while the United States favored evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone, wavered on British attempts to create an international authority for the Canal, and opposed the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt. The Soviet tried to widen the rift by playing one side against the other. Fortunately, talks between Eisenhower and MacMillan helped to strengthen relations and, through the Eisenhower Doctrine, American armed forces are permitted to assist any Middle East country requesting aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international

⁴U. S. Department of State Publication, United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Near and Middle Eastern Series 25, (Washington, 1957), pp. 1-5.

communism.⁵ However, the communists are masters in the art of subversion and infiltration and the Eisenhower Doctrine provides no counter to "peaceful" Soviet subversion. Perhaps the Truman doctrine should provide this assistance but this is controlled by domestic politics.

Several activities in the Middle East show that the Eisenhower Doctrine has been superseded.⁶ The anti-western riots in Lebanon resulted in American troops being flown into Turkey and Lebanon. Likewise, the murder of King Feisal in Iraq prompted King Hussein of Jordan to appeal for aid for his country and Britain flew in paratroopers and jet aircraft. The British move into Jordan, like the American precautions in Lebanon and Turkey, claim United Nations justification. A government which believes itself threatened with aggression is entitled to seek aid. The aim of the Jordan intervention was threefold: to prevent a repetition of the Iraqi events; to preserve Jordan's independence; and to free the Jordan army and security forces to deal with any attempted coup d'etat.

The British and American view on the situation was that if Allied troops had not landed in Jordan and Lebanon, King Hussein and President Chamoun might have been assassinated. There were only two clear-cut choices, intervention or withdrawal. If they withdrew from the region, it would mean completely changing their policy, coming to terms with Arab nationalism, and negotiating with Egypt's President Nasser.

⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 211-358.

⁶ Harry B. Ellis, Challenge in the Middle East, (New York, 1960), pp. 180-201.

The West wanted the United Nations to take over protection of the independence of the Middle East's small states under the auspices of a United Nations Commission in the area. However, if the United Nations Organization is as unsuccessful in protecting its members against the new technique of subversion as it has been in halting open aggression, the West must defend freedom on its own. The West realizes that no problems were solved by the show of force in Lebanon and Jordan, and that anti-westernism in the Arab world may be strengthened. However, the alternative of allowing the whole of the Middle East to fall into Nasser's hands was unthinkable.

The Western Powers planned to leave their forces in Lebanon and Jordan until the United Nations General Assembly had solved the disturbance. The Lebanon crisis was essentially a domestic matter, even though Nasser's Soviet-supported United Arab Republic had been subverting Lebanon's moslem elements and providing aid for the rebels.⁷ The international implications were exaggerated, President Chamoun agreed to step down and was replaced by General Chehab, who summarily suggested a date for withdrawal.

The situation in Jordan is difficult to unravel. King Hussein was determined to avenge King Feisal's death, but he soon realized the futility of such action when forcefully told that British troops would not assist him. Britain feared that as soon as her troops left Jordan, endeavors would be made to assassinate King Hussein, and that Nasser would soon gain control of the country. Israel is also anxious; some of her politicians advocate attacking West Jordan,

⁷Ibid., pp. 133-135.

arguing that if they do not attack Nasser will soon have Jordan under his influence and Israel's security would be jeopardized under these conditions.⁸

The United States is hoping for the formation of an effective United Nations force, permanently situated in the Middle East, authorized to investigate subversion and interference, and able to move quickly to protect threatened borders. When this happens, Britain and the United States might be agreeable to withdrawing their troops from the area. Western influence has certainly waned during the last few years, but present Western strategy appears designed to uphold the independence of the small countries and in particular to protect oil sources and outlets in the region. The eventual recapture of lost prestige will result and their position will be enhanced.

Soviet Policy and Interests

In January of 1957, President Eisenhower stated: "The problem today is a conflict of ideologies, on the one hand based around the dignity and rights of the individual and on the other the rights and power of the state."⁹ In essence it is evident that the sole determinate of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East is "power politics." Specific Soviet interests in the area are twofold: to neutralize Western strategic bases, thus outflanking and isolating NATO; and

⁸ibid., p. 214.

⁹U. S. Department of State Publication, United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Near and Middle Eastern Series 25, (Washington, 1957), pp. 15-23.

to deny Western Europe vital oil resources. The Soviet believes that in close alliance with Nasser she could control the Middle East. This would accomplish multiple goals for her as it would: ensure an abundant oil supply; isolate India from the Middle East and Europe; open the Atlantic and Indian Oceans to her submarine fleet; and pave the way for Russian domination of Europe, Africa and Asia. The shift in the world balance of power could be decisive if Soviet penetration was successful, and could result in complete Russian hegemony.

The aim of the Soviet Union is to intensify unrest. Any political disturbance, any social unrest, any economic hardship that would best serve this goal is the objective. With this clear-cut objective in mind, the Soviet Union followed a consistent and very successful policy. Until 1955, the Russians had shown little interest in the Middle East, but while the West remained in a quandry over the Arab-Israeli disputes, the Russians adopted a policy of hostility towards Israel and assumed the role of champion of Arab nationalism.¹⁰ In particular, it was important for Soviet policy that no peace settlement should be reached with Israel and that Arab hatred and fears should be amplified.

The Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 was claimed to be a preventive war since there was evidence that Egypt was planning an offensive against Israel. The subsequent Anglo-French intervention could not be regarded as a political success. This action seriously weakened Britain's influence in the area and undermined her international prestige and moral standing. Russia did everything

¹⁰ Harry B. Ellis, Challenge in the Middle East, (New York, 1960), p. 20.

possible to decry the British and French as aggressors and her prestige rose high throughout the Arab world. Russia's policy of championing Arab nationalism has paid dividends. At present she is trying to consolidate her position in Syria, Egypt and Iraq. It is considered that present Soviet policy does not include any plan to embroil her forces in a global war. Her basic policy of intensifying unrest remains unchanged.

Mr. Khrushchev's exploits in the Arab world, through Nasser, are a key to his design for victory in the cold war. His original demand for Summit talks was changed to a proposal for the United Nations General Assembly to consider urgent aspects of the Middle East crisis. The Western Powers agreed to this proposal, realizing that the Soviet Union would brand the West as aggressors and would try to talk the Western Powers into removing their forces from Lebanon and Jordan. The new President of Lebanon, General Chehab, demanded the withdrawal of American marines irrespective of United Nations deliberation. Furthermore, Britain's position became increasingly difficult in Jordan. Because Israel cancelled permission for British and American aircraft to fly over her territory, providing supplies to British troops is a lengthy process, particularly if the Cape route is used.

Mr. Khrushchev bid and consummated a political foothold in the Middle East. His strategy was to use Nasser, in the name of Arab nationalism, to win control over all the important oil producing countries in the region. The price and flow of oil could then be regulated in the form of economic blackmail against West European countries in the hope of destroying both the Baghdad Pact and NATO. Because Nasser might have his own plans and welcome a chance to

reduce his dependence on Russia, he was reluctant to carry out Khrushchev's bidding. Any Nasser rebuff to the Russians could affect Mr. Khrushchev's personal power in the Kremlin. Russians are adept at making satellites of leaders who depend upon them, even in part, for economic support. Because Khrushchev has had many difficulties with Yugoslavia and almost lost Poland and Hungary; he cannot afford to lose face at this juncture. Any moderate Western success, such as keeping Lebanon and Jordan out of Nasser's hands, or of restoring a semblance of stability in the area, would lower Khrushchev's prestige and be a defeat in the Soviet's eyes.

The popularity of Nasser with the Soviet is clearly shown in the fact that they have maintained relations with him despite the failure of the United Arab Republic. This collapse was due mainly to the secession of Syria on September 29, 1961.¹¹

From the first days of the Iraqi revolution of July 14, 1958, the Soviet Union began a long-term massive effort to plant its influence firmly in Baghdad. Not only was the opportunity there to drive the Communist political wedge deeper into the Middle East; there was also the chance, through trade and aid deals, to siphon off some of Iraq's pounds sterling to help meet Russia's hard currency commitments in the West.

As with President Nasser, so with the Iraqi regime of Abdel Karim Kassem, "Moscow dangled the lure of speedy industrialization through low-interest credits

¹¹New York Times, (New York, September 29, 1961), p. 1.

advanced without political strings. The bait was snapped up, partly because Iraqi Communists were active in the new regime, but also because Iraqis in general, cut off entirely from the Communist bloc by the former government of Nuri es-Said, had been ready to accept the Soviets at face value as technological supermen who had launched the first sputnik and photographed the back side of the moon before anyone in the West had done so."¹²

Current Soviet strategy is one of propaganda, bluff and bluster. The Soviets desire to be recognized as having a zone of influence in the Middle East in the same way as the United States has in Saudi Arabia and Britain has in the Persian Gulf. The Soviet already has more than an interest in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. It is obvious that she wants her influence to spread throughout the whole of the Middle East.

¹²Harry B. Ellis, Challenge in the Middle East, (New York, 1960), p. 143.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Future Trends

The future of the Middle East is one of uncertainty, and it is likely to be this way for years to come. The United Nations General Assembly has discussed the situation and has accepted a resolution later rejected by the Arab peoples. Briefly, the Arab plan called for the Arabs to respect each other's sovereignty and instructed the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, to find a means of settling Lebanon's and Jordan's internal troubles and allowing British and American troops to withdraw.

On the surface, it would appear that Nasser gained a victory and the countries of the Middle East should soon be restored to a state of peaceful co-existence. However, this is not the case; Nasser, an ambitious, dictatorial, but popular leader throughout the Arab world, is determined to unite the Middle East in one Republic with himself as President. Subversion, infiltration, and propaganda broadcasts will continue despite any United Nations direction.

In the meantime, Nasserism will continue to grow, fostered and encouraged by the Soviet, or fall due to the vagaries of Arab politics. Nasser's next target is the oil-rich Sheikdoms along the Persian Gulf. He will not attempt to

take over by direct action. He will require Iraq to express its claims of these territories. Although the Sheiks in this area believe in Arab nationalism and dislike communism, they do not want to forego the luxuries that oil has brought them. Recent events in Iraq have shown that monarchy is outdated in this area, that the people of the Middle East detest this type of regime, and that eventually these ruling Sheikdoms will be overthrown and independent governments set up. Saudi Arabia will also follow this pattern.

Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf region have too much to lose by joining Nasser's United Arab Republic as full members. Certainly Nasser will have a tremendous influence in their affairs, but he will not be able to stop oil flowing to Western Europe in peacetime because of the economic implications to the Middle Eastern states concerned. Subsequently, the West will have to withdraw from these areas when requested and face up to the prospect of having to pay more for their oil, and the possibility of uncertain deliver. The West could not expect Middle East oil in a global war. The oil states would invoke neutrality and stop all oil deliveries to the West. This would be due to limited production operations and partly from local fear of the Soviet. However, since the West is the major user of this oil it is obvious that in peacetime the West will receive this oil at a high price.

General Chehab's political affiliations are not fully known, but Lebanon is likely to steer a neutralist course until pressure from within and also from Egypt and Syria forces her to join the pro-Arab nationalism cause. Israel will then be the only non pro-Nasser state in the region. In the past, Israel has been impulsive and has already stated her intention of taking over West Jordan. Meanwhile,

pressure from the United Nations will deter Israel from any aggression, but if the Arabs attempt to build up forces to move against her, she will attack. Under these circumstances, Israel might have the West's backing and another grave situation could materialize.

Conclusion

The Middle East has great geographic, strategic and economic significance. In the last few years a struggle for influence and control in the area has been in progress between the West, the Soviet Union, and the forces of Arab nationalism. President Nasser has played heavily on the nationalist, anti-colonialist sentiment in the Arab world, and has emerged as the Arab's champion against the old feudal dynasties. Russia has vigorously supported Nasser with arms, technical, and economic aid, and consequently she now has a major influence in Middle East affairs.

The landing of British and American troops in the area, although increasing Arab nationalism and invoking outbursts from Moscow and Cairo, has shown a firmness and decisiveness which surprised the Soviets. Likewise, the Western Powers were surprised by the coup d'etat in Iraq which took that country out of the West's sphere of influence and further undermined the West's position in the Middle East.

In spite of the secession from the United Arab Republic by Syria on September 29, 1961, the growth of Nasserism and Arab nationalism is so powerful it could eventually bring about the complete collapse of Western influence

in the area.¹ If this is what the Arab populace wants, then the World Powers should accept it. Oil will still be delivered in peacetime to the West but the price will be high. This will suit Soviet strategy, since, while Nasser continues to dominate the political scene the Soviets will be able to wield considerable influence in Middle East affairs. The British have recognized this situation and recently they moved to restore diplomatic relations with the Arabs, relations that were severed in October, 1956, by the Suez invasion. On January 15, 1961, Mr. Harold Beeley was named ambassador to Cairo and Mohammed Al Kuni was named ambassador to London. What affect this will have on the overall strategy of the West could, at its best, be only conjecture. For certain, the United States will be forced to reevaluate its position. It is also evident that the pacifist leanings of Ben-Gurion in Israel are under fire and a dynamic, militant leader there could well be the trigger that breaks the impasse in the Middle East. More impressive is that an international power play could be in the offing.

Again, in concluding, the suggestion is made that certain portions of the Middle East be considered as possible "World Monuments." The Holy Land (see page 10) lends itself most fittingly to this situation and could well serve as the first area to be so recognized. This could be the key to prevention of local hostilities in the Middle East.

¹New York Times, (New York, September 29, 1961), p. 1.

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APPENDIX A

EXTRACTS FROM

Publications of the Department of State, Near Eastern Series, No. 1, Mandate For Palestine, P. 7.

Zionism is a movement of return; in particular it is the movement of an organized body of modern Jewry for the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jews. In its broader aspect it dates from the final destruction (135 A.D.) of the Jewish Kingdom and the resulting edict of Rome which denied to the Jews further access to Palestine; for, scattered throughout the world, the Jewish people have ever held tenaciously to the ideal of reestablishment in their ancient homeland. In its modern sense, Zionism may be said to date from the beginnings of Jewish recolonization in Palestine in 1880 following persecutions in eastern European countries, and from the summoning in 1897 at Basle of a Congress of Jews which defined the meaning of Zionism as the effort to win "a legally secured, publicly recognized Home for the Jewish People in Palestine."

The original program of the Zionist organization was to obtain, with the approval of the powers, a charter from the Ottoman Government authorizing the realization of its aim. Failing in this, its leaders concentrated their efforts on colonization projects and on fostering in the minds of Jews throughout the world the idea of the creation in Palestine of what was termed "a home for the Jewish spirit." With the advent of the World War, however, a new opportunity was offered to the Zionist leaders to press for the recognition and support of their original program. Their overtures finally met with success in London, where on November 2, 1917, Mr. Balfour, then His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, issued what has since come to be known as "the Balfour Declaration," reading as follows:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country.

Ibid., p. 10

On December 11, 1917, General Allenby entered the city of Jerusalem.

With the occupation of northern Palestine and Syria, following the brilliant advance of September, 1918, a first endeavor was made to meet the various

political claims discussed in the preceding section of this report. Under the supreme command of General Allenby as commander in chief, France assumed administrative responsibility in Syria from the coast to the anti-Lebanon, an Arab administration was set up in Damascus and the hinterland, and British control was extended over all of Palestine west of the Jordan. This tentative division of control was confirmed in the Franco-British military convention of September 15, 1919, which, at the same time, abolished the office of the commander in chief.

The final status of Palestine, complicated as it was by Arab pretensions, Zionist aspirations, and Allied agreements pointing to an eventual international control, became a subject of Allied discussions at the Peace Conference which had met in Paris in December, 1918. There the theory of the mandatory system was evolved, and it was of the Ottoman Empire, a solution of the problem would be found.

Meanwhile, in Palestine, under British military administration, considerable progress was made towards the creation of a stable form of government and the rehabilitation of the economic life of the country.

Ibid., p. 13

Article 2

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the Preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

Article 4

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part, in the development of the country.

The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

Article 5

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of the Government of any foreign Power.

ibid., p. 107

American-British Palestine Mandate Convention of December 3, 1924.

"Whereas by the Treaty of Peace concluded with the Allied Powers, Turkey renounces all her rights and titles over Palestine; and whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection on the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; . . ."

APPENDIX B

EXTRACTS FROM

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Report of the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, April 20, 1946, U.S.D.S. p. vii.

We were appointed by the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom, as a joint body of American and British membership, with the following Terms of Reference:

1. To examine political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living therein.
2. To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression and to make estimates of those who wish or will be impelled by their conditions to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.
3. To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine as such problems are affected by conditions subject to examination under paragraphs 1 and 2 above and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States for ad interim handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution.
4. To make such other recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph 2 above, by remedial action in the European countries in question or by the provision of facilities for emigration to and settlement in countries outside Europe.

Ibid., p. 49

We have considered the matter anew and we have heard the views of various witnesses of great experience. Partition has an appeal at first sight as giving a prospect of early independence and self-government to Jews and Arabs,

but in our view no partition would have any chance unless it was basically acceptable to Jews and Arabs, and there is no sign of that today. We are accordingly unable to recommend partition as the solution.

4. Palestine is a country unlike any other. It is not merely a place in which Arabs and Jews live. Millions of people throughout the world take a fervent interest in Palestine and in its Holy Places and are deeply grieved by the thought that it has been the seat of trouble for so long and by the fear that it may well become the cockpit of another war. Lord Milner in 1923, having declared himself a strong supporter of pro-Arab policy, said:

"Palestine can never be regarded as a country on the same footing as the other Arab countries. You cannot ignore all history and tradition in the matter. You cannot ignore the fact that this is the cradle of two of the great religions of the world. It is a sacred land to the Arabs, but it is also a sacred land to the Jew and the Christian; and the future of Palestine cannot possibly be left to be determined by the temporary impressions and feelings of the Arab majority in the country of the present day."

The Peel Commission having cited those words wrote (Chapter II, paragraph 51): "The case stated by Lord Milner against an Arab control of Palestine applies equally to a Jewish control." That expresses our view absolutely.

Efforts have been made from time to time to encourage both Arabs and Jews to take part in the Government of the country but these efforts have failed through mutual antagonism; perhaps they might have been pursued further. It is not the case of a backward people going through a period of tutelage; the issue lies between Jews and Arabs.

We believe this can only be met by acceptance of the principle that there shall be no domination of the one by the other, that Palestine shall be neither an Arab nor a Jewish State. The setting up of self-governing institutions is dependent on the will to work together on the part of Jews and Arabs. There has been little sign of that in recent years and yet we hope a change may take place if and when the fear of dominance is removed. We do not think that any good purpose would be served by our going into further detail; once the will to work together appears, representatives of both sides will be of help in framing a constitution; until that happens no step can be taken.

Meantime Palestine must remain under some form of Mandate or Trusteeship. We have suggested elsewhere in our Report that much can be done to encourage general advancement by the improvement of educational facilities and measures directed to narrowing the social and economic disparities. We feel, too, that it should be possible to draw the communities closer together, and foster a popular interest as a spirit of good neighborliness exists among the common people, Arabs and Jews, despite the general state of political tension in the country. Practical cooperation is evident in day-to-day affairs. We suggest

that local administrative areas might be formed, some purely Arab or Jewish in composition, but some of mixed population where a corporate sense of civic responsibility can be encouraged and a new beginning made in the development of self-government.

5. Land questions have been the cause of much friction and dispute between Jews and Arabs. We are opposed to legislation and practices which discriminate against either, and for the reasons already given we recommend the rescission and replacement of the Land Transfers Regulations of 1940 and the prohibition of restrictions limiting employment on certain lands to members of one race, community or creed.

VITA

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