

UNRRA IN CHINA 1945-47: THE AMERICAN ROLE IN

CHINA'S RECOVERY

By

Floyd R. Goodno

Bachelor of Science

Phillips University

Enid, Oklahoma

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Thesis Approved:

Sidney D. Brown

Thesis Advisor

Harold L. Knight

Loew Mearns

Dean of the Graduate School

504466

PREFACE

This thesis focuses on the role of the United States and its citizens during the operative period of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in China: 1945-47. The obvious fact emerges that the American people rallied to China's aid following the close of the Second World War; but it is also obvious that a loss of interest on the part of the American people in general and the refusal of Congress in particular to vote appropriations for this humanitarian organization led to its premature death.

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CHAPTER I

THE HWANG HO - A WARTIME DISASTER

The Hwang Ho winds for some 2700 miles across the diversified terrain of Northern China.¹ To most Americans the literal translation, "Yellow River", would sound more familiar. But the Hwang Ho is known by another name, the "Hundred Sorrows" or more commonly as "China's Sorrow," to the eighty million Chinese who reside in its drainage basin of 297,905 square miles.² A study of the Yellow River will reveal that it has changed its course many times both in geological and historical times, and it is these changes of the lower reaches, in historical times, which have brought untold suffering to the Chinese people.

In 1947, after running amuck for nearly nine years, meandering over a broad belt of China's best farmland, the Yellow River again was put under control. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration assumed the greater financial burden of harnessing the floods of China's most unruly river, and nearly completed the task in little over a

¹George B. Cressey, Asia's Lands and Peoples, A Geography of One-Third of the Earth and Two-Thirds of Its People (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951), p. 55.

²Cressey, Land of the 500 Million, A Geography of China (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955), p. 249.

year. The project had its beginning in early 1946 and the main flow was turned back into its old course in mid-March of 1947. The work of cutting off seepage and completing waterproofing of the main division lasted several weeks longer. Mending of the dikes from the original break to the sea went on for several additional months and the project was substantially complete, but the Chinese civil war abruptly terminated UNRRA's work just short of goals originally established.

Throughout historic times the existence of the Yellow River has been the great fact of Chinese civilization. The river gave birth to the civilization; and the river enabled it to flourish through three millenniums. Appropriately the yellow of the silt-laden water became the Imperial color; and the river matched Emperors in arbitrary behavior and unrestrained power over those who lived within its drainage basin. Historically, the middle section of the river is the most important, for it is here among the hills of the loessland that the earliest traces of Chinese civilization are to be found. In the present day provinces of Shensi and Shansi the neolithic Yangshao and Lungshan cultures (commonly referred to as the Painted Pottery Culture and the Black Pottery Culture respectively) of 4000-3000 B.C.³ evolved most rapidly into a civilization which is quite recognizably Chinese in character. In this same region the great Emperor Yu reputedly founded the Hsia dynasty in 2205 B.C.⁴

³ Nigel Cameron, "Taming the Yellow Dragon (Yellow River)," The Geographical Magazine, XXXVIII (July, 1960), 149.

⁴ Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, East Asia The Great Tradition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), p. 38.

The legend surrounding the Emperor Yu, a culture-hero, tells of his preparing the land for occupancy by draining the flood waters and confining them to the Yellow River. The Great Yu ruled the Nine Provinces which comprised the China of his day. The later historic dynasties definitely controlled this area, the birth place of a unique Chinese civilization.

Far to the west in the Kunlun Mountains of Eastern Tibet lie the headquarters of the Yellow River. Here are found a number of lakes, and marsh areas, fed by melted snow. The largest of these lakes are Tsaring-Nor and Oring-Nor,⁵ lying at an elevation of over fourteen thousand feet.⁶ Rising out of these lakes in Tsinghai province of Tibet, the Hwang Ho crosses the Chinese province of Kansu as a torrential stream only seventy-five feet wide, then swings through the Inner Mongolian districts of Ninghsia and Suiyuan.⁷ From there it flows on to form the border between Shensi and Shansi provinces. It then continues on through the delta provinces of Honan, Hopei, and Shantung to the sea, having traversed nine provinces. The river flows through most diverse terrain, then, out of the rugged highland of Tibet, into the delta of the Yellow River. The sediment which the river has taken from the mountainous hinterland has built up one of the world's great alluvial plains in northeastern China.

⁵Ferdinand C. Lane, Earth's Grandest Rivers (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1949), p. 60.

⁶Cressey, Land of the 500 Million, p. 249.

⁷Ibid., Asia's Lands and People, p. 55.

The known history of the Yellow River is as old as that of China itself, going back to the earliest records of some thirty centuries ago.⁸ During this span of time it is possible to count nearly 1500 floods,⁹ which have occurred in the middle and lower reaches. Spectacular floods have made millions homeless and have inundated hundreds of thousands of square miles of good farmland, resulting in epidemics and famines as their inevitable consequences. During this period the Hwang Ho has drastically changed its course at least nine times,¹⁰ sometimes flowing south of the Shantung Peninsula and sometimes, as it does at the present, to the north to empty into the Yellow Sea.

In 1852 when Great Britain tried to bring pressure on the Chinese Government, the Royal Navy blockaded the mouth of the river, only to find that after several months the river had moved 250 miles to the north.¹¹ In 1938 when the Chinese cut the dikes, in Honan province, to delay the invading Japanese, the main flow of water was diverted southeast to the Hwai River which served as the main channel in 1289 and 1887,¹² and here the river continued to flow until 1947 when the dikes were repaired under the supervision of UNRRA.

⁸ Cressey, Asia's Lands and Peoples, p. 101.

⁹ Cameron, "Taming the Yellow Dragon (Yellow River)," p. 147.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Cressey, Asia's Lands and People, p. 103.

¹² Ibid.

The reasons for the Yellow River's history of calamities are both geographic and climatic in nature. As stated above, the river rises as an innocuous stream, or a series of streams, in the Kunlun Mountains. It is during the spring melting period that the snows of central Asia add a tremendous, sudden, and unpredictable volume of water to the river's headwaters. The water moves at great speed through an area of mountainous desert and loess soil whose surface is largely denuded of any vegetation. At low water, the river's flow may amount to only 5,000 cubic feet per second, while in flood periods it has increased to 1,000,000.¹³ The river's average gradient, in the mountainous area, is some seven feet per mile. The combination of the gradient and the condition of the top soil produces erosion on a grand scale, as the silt is easily carried and comprises a large percentage of the water's content. At a given point in Honan Province, in the lower reaches of its course, the amount of silt carried in suspension exceeds a million cubic yards a year.¹⁴ But before the water reaches this point, the Hwang Ho has become a menacing race whose potentialities can seldom be predicted. The water moves from its source through successive oxbow loops and newly created cutoffs, at times leaping bodily from its bed to gorge out a new route on its way to the sea. At times the river appears to be a victim of suicide, by allowing its bed to fill up with silt; however, this has caused the river bed to

¹³Cressey, Land of the 500 Million, p. 248.

¹⁴Cameron, "Taming the Yellow Dragon (Yellow River)," p. 149.

rise above the surface of the surrounding area, making diking mandatory. A wall of water, following the spring thaw, has often poured out on the rice and cotton growing plains of northeastern China, which is one of the world's most densely populated areas. The impetus of the rushing water slackens as the river widens and the gradient levels out and the silt is deposited on river bed, which has resulted in a gradual rising of the bed. Thus, nearly every year, for some two thousand years the peasants of the area have been laboriously adding a few inches to the dikes in an effort to contain the onrush of disaster. However, on the average of every two years the Hwang Ho has won,¹⁵ pouring out from the weak points in the dikes, onto the helpless and defenseless land and people.

The loess area of north China is an astonishing creation of nature and phenomenal in its makeup. There are mountains entirely composed of yellow loess, a stratified silt of yellowish-brown loam or aeolian deposit, whose origins are debatable, but which probably blew eastward from the deserts of northwestern Asia, shaped and moulded by both the work of erosion and man. For hundreds of miles there can be found no area of level soil that has not witnessed the ageless struggle between peasant and climatic conditions, which has on numerous occasions eroded their land from under their feet. Today the landscape is terraced, as it has been since the days of the mythical Yu, by mud embankments around

¹⁵Ibid., p. 149.

each tiny plot of land waiting to be hand plowed, hand sown, and later hand reaped.

These recurring floods, so frequent in China's history, have served as reminders, to the Chinese, of the magnitude of control measures necessary to preserve large areas of fertile farmland for cultivation. China, in the immediate postwar period, with materials and technical aid from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, started the repair work of dikes and conservancy projects, most of which had either fallen into disrepair due to wartime neglect or had been damaged as a result of the war.

By the end of 1947 a total of eleven flood prevention projects, carried out under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Water Conservancy, and largely financed by UNRRA were in various stages of progress, some nearing completion, while others were in an earlier stage of progress. The Yellow River Project received the highest priority and was almost completed.

When the Chinese, hoping to impede the Japanese advance in 1938, breached the southern dike in Honan Province, they intended only to flood a small area of the surrounding countryside. But they found the "Hundred Sorrows" could not be controlled. To the military mind this move proved successful. However, the waters, swollen with late spring rains, not only formed a barrier which the Japanese could not cross, but inflicted untold suffering on the Chinese peasants. The results to them were catastrophic. The wall of water burst through the opening in the dike, making a gap some five thousand feet wide and flooding some two million

acres of fertile farmland. With the passing of time the breach continued to widen. The wall of water caught the peasants by surprise and without warning. Some 400,000 people were drowned and nearly a million homes swept away. In areas where the water stood only a few feet deep the population found spots of higher ground to which they fled, while in other places the depth forced the people to escape by climbing to the tops of houses or trees. Within a few days after the breach at least three million peasants were caught in the flood's path in Honan Province alone. Accurate statistics do not exist concerning the full extent of the damage. However, in addition to the estimated quarter of a million persons who were drowned in Honan Province, some three times this number were reported to have died of diseases or starvation.¹⁶

Thus, once again the Hwang-Ho found its way to the Yellow Sea along its old southern course and continued periodically to flood the countryside. However, China's ever increasing population virtually demanded that every available acre of cultivatable land be used; therefore some 250,000 peasants moved in and began to cultivate the old bed of the Hwang-Ho. Flooding, possible starvation, disease, all menaced them continuously, but they remained there until UNRRA, in 1946, moved to reroute the Hwang Ho and to restore life to the devastated villages in Honan, Anhwei, and Kiangsu Provinces.

¹⁶"The Mouth of the Yellow River Moved 250 Miles: China's Sorrow Harnessed as an U.N.R.R.A./sic/ Project," Illustrated London News, June 7, 1947, p. 592; Raymond Moyer, "Current Conditions in Postwar Honan," Far Eastern Survey, XV (June 17, 1946), p. 219.

CHAPTER II

AN ORGAN FOR PEACE - UNRRA

The sweeping destruction and derangement imposed by the Japanese in China were of such a nature that only foreign aid for relief and rehabilitation purposes could save the invaded nation from complete chaos. The total areas occupied by the Japanese in China approximately equalled those overrun by the Axis Powers in Europe. However, the population directly affected by the occupation was much larger and the period of submission more extended.

A disaster of such proportions aroused traditional American humanitarian sentiment. On July 23, 1942, speaking to the American people by radio, the Secretary of State Cordell Hull said: "With victory achieved our first concern must be for those whose sufferings have been almost beyond human endurance....Unknown millions will be far from their homes ...refugees from battle, from cruelty, from starvation. Disease and danger of disease will lurk everywhere....Victory must be followed by swift and effective action to meet these pressing needs."¹ To answer and meet these needs the future United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was created. Thus the idea of international cooperation

¹Andrew Boyd, The United Nations Organization Handbook (New York: Pilot Press Inc., 1946), p. 102.

in the restoration of postwar economic and social stability in war-torn countries antedated by some years the conclusion of the Second World War.

Prior to the United States' entrance into the war, British statesmen voiced an opinion concerning the need for a noble, postwar relief plan. During August of 1940 Prime Minister Churchill spoke before the British House of Commons, and pledged to the people of Europe that when the Nazi power was broken, they should have food, freedom, and peace. To fulfill this pledge, a little more than a year later, in September, 1941, representatives of the Allied Governments, excluding the United States, met at St. James's Palace. Governments represented included Great Britain and the Dominions, Soviet Russia, the Governments-in-Exile, and the representatives of General de Gaulle.² Here they set up the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements, which would carry out the decisions of the conference. The participating governments declared their adherence to the Atlantic Charter, as announced by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Further, the representatives approved, with the exception of Soviet Russia, a six-point resolution concerning postwar rehabilitation. In essence the resolution provided: "although each government was 'primarily responsible for making provision for the economic needs of its own people,' the governments concerned proposed to coordinate their plans 'in a spirit of inter-allied collaboration.'"³ Under the Chairmanship of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, a

²National Planning Association, UNRRA: Gateway to Recovery, Planning Pamphlets No. 30-31 (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1944), p. 61.

³Ibid.

noted and long-time chief economic adviser to the British Government and later a Deputy Director General of UNRRA, the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements would coordinate the program and relationships among the adhering nations. In addition, the Committee "would also set up and supervise a Bureau of Post-War Requirements 'with which the Allied Governments and authorities would collaborate in gaining estimates of their requirements."⁴

The conference overruled the Soviet Government's objection to an exclusively British secretariat and established the Bureau of Post-War Requirements. Then the committee started to work on plans for relief activities. The Bureau maintained close communications with Washington.⁵

In December, 1941, Pearl Harbor reversed the whole American attitude toward relations with the allied powers, and the United States joined the Inter-Allied Committee.⁶ To this point only an observer had represented the United States. The following December, 1942, the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, created the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations within the State Department. The former Governor of New York, Herbert H. Lehman, later the first Director General of UNRRA, headed the OFRRO upon its establishment. The business of OFRRO centered around the making of provisions and preparations for

⁴Ibid., p. 61.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Boyd, The United Nations Organization Handbook, p. 109.

relief of war victims in liberated areas. Upon taking office the OFRRO Director declared that administering of relief was a world-wide problem and not solely the responsibility of the United States, or a select few nations which suffered less because they had not been successfully invaded.⁷

During the spring of 1943 Governor Lehman visited London, and he began working out a basis for discussion with the other Allied Nations for a world-wide relief program. The results of this meeting were not made known to the world until late May, 1943. On May 18, 1943, a United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture convened at Hot Springs, Virginia, and after termination of its discussion on more permanent aspects of applying the doctrine of "freedom from want," the world received the news of the future UNRRA.⁸

The initial draft of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was published during June, 1943, by the United States Department of State with the concurrence of the Governments of the United States, China, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The second draft, which embodied several amendments proposed by various governments and certain influential members of the United States Congress was released on September 23, 1943. Out of the final amendments came UNRRA, of November, 1943, to which forty-eight nations eventually attached

⁷ National Planning Association, UNRRA, p. 62.

⁸ Boyd, The United Nations Organization Handbook, pp. 111-114.

themselves.⁹

China officially became a member of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration on November 9, 1943. Forty-four nations were represented at the White House, Washington, D. C., for a formal signing of the UNRRA agreement. The following day the first Council session met in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

When President Roosevelt established the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, he stated officially that Herbert H. Lehman, "would, in association with the State Department, undertake the work of organizing American participation in the activities of the United Nations in furnishing relief and other assistance to the victims of war in areas reoccupied by the forces of the United Nations."¹⁰ From this time on it was generally understood and agreed by the Allied Powers that Governor Lehman would be the future Director General of UNRRA. However, Lehman was not responsible for negotiating the United Nations Agreement; this remained a function of the State Department.

On November 10, 1943, representatives of the forty-four founding nations meeting as the first Council in Atlantic City, unanimously elected Governor Herbert H. Lehman the first Director General. He continued in this capacity until the spring of 1946, at which time he retired because of ill health, and was succeeded by Fiorella La Guardia,

⁹National Planning Association, UNRRA, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 62.

the "Little Flower" and former mayor of New York City. P. W. Kuo, Chinese Vice-Minister of Finance, was selected to serve as a Deputy Director General of the administration.

The Council, UNRRA's controlling body on which each member nation had one representative, made its decisions by a simple majority. At its first meeting the Council provided for the establishment of two regional committees, one for Europe and the other for the Far East. Dr. T. F. Tsiang, then Director of Political Affairs in the Executive Yuan, and the chief Chinese delegate to the Council, was elected to head the Far Eastern Committee.¹¹

The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was created specifically to deal with emergency problems during the remaining period of the war and during the period of transition from war to peace. It was planned as a temporary creation with the expectation that its work in Europe would be concluded by the end of 1946, and in the Far East by early 1947. UNRRA's fundamental purpose, as its name suggests, was to administer relief and to rehabilitate, and as such, it hoped to relieve as much suffering as possible in the world, during this transition period, and save as many lives as possible. The task undertaken by UNRRA differed from all other previous relief and rehabilitation programs as it was the first United Nations organization whose specific purpose was

¹¹Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook 1937-1945, A Comprehensive Survey of Major Development in China in Eight Years of War (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 538.

to plan for readjustments essential for creating peace. The extent of its activities were almost global in nature, and the experience gained through the activities of this relief and rehabilitation program served as the basis for the establishment of permanent agencies, within the United Nations, to further alleviate human suffering. Even though emergency problems involving relief and rehabilitation preoccupied UNRRA leaders much of the time they realized early that the supply and distribution of materials required the reconstruction and rehabilitation of public utilities, transportation facilities, and other public services which would be of more permanent value.

During the spring of 1944, the Chinese Government created the Chinese Commission on the Investigation and Planning of Relief and Rehabilitation to determine postwar needs of China and plan for the relief and rehabilitation activities which the country would require. This commission included technicians from the ministries of Communications, Agriculture, and Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Finance, and Food, as well as the National Health Administration.¹² Dr. Tsiang received the appointment to serve as chairman of the commission. Y. C. Koo, Vice-Minister of Finance and the Managing Director of the Farmers Bank, was appointed Vice-Chairman of the commission and also acting chairman, because of Dr. Tsiang's duties with the Far Eastern Regional Committee.¹³

The China Government requested the Director General of UNRRA,

¹²Ibid., p. 538.

¹³Ibid., p. 539.

Herbert H. Lehman, to appoint three experts as consultants to the investigating committee, to expedite the complicated task of manning its plans and estimating its relief and rehabilitation needs. Specifically the government requested an economist, an agricultural expert, and a public health expert. UNRRA Headquarters answered by sending Mr. Owen L. Lawson as the agricultural expert, Eugene Staley as the economist, and by arranging for Dr. John B. Grant, a public health specialist working with the Rockefeller Foundation in India, to contribute his services.¹⁴ Mr. Staley, formerly a professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and Mr. Owen L. Dawson, an agricultural expert, served in China, in the capacity of technical advisers, from April to July of 1944. Dr. Grant came from Calcutta, India for several weeks during the commission's operations.¹⁵

The two experts spent most of their time in Chungking, working with the commission's various subcommittees.¹⁶ These subcommittees closely paralleled the subheadings of the UNRRA organization, with the exception of the Flooded Areas Rehabilitation subcommittee, as flooding was a problem more peculiar to China than the other war torn countries assisted by UNRRA. While working with the subcommittees the two men also visited

¹⁴Eugene Staley, "Relief and Rehabilitation in China," Far Eastern Survey, XIII (October 4, 1944), p. 183.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶The Commission's subcommittees consisted of: Food, Clothing and Textiles, Health and Medical Care, Transport and Communications Rehabilitation, Agricultural Rehabilitation, Industrial Rehabilitation, Welfare Services, Displaced Persons, and Flooded Areas Rehabilitation; Ibid.

various public institutions, industrial and agricultural plants and training institutions for personnel in related fields to relief and rehabilitation. On returning to the United States they carried with them the preliminary reports of the commission's nine subcommittees, which served as the basis for the overall report prepared by the Chinese officials on postwar relief and rehabilitation needs, and which they submitted to UNRRA Headquarters.¹⁷

Mr. Staley, upon completing the Chinese study, found the Chinese working on the various problems in hearty agreement with the basic aim of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. That aim was: to help people to help themselves. He found that the Chinese officials did not expect their postwar needs to be met primarily by shipments of imported goods, even if it were physically possible, but that they believed their greatest need would be in the forms of technical help and assistance. They realized that the technical help and assistance, obtained from the United Nations in trained people, could and would train Chinese relief and rehabilitation workers. Supplies, tools, and equipment would help to meet the great problems of human distress that existed in the invaded areas, and would put China's disrupted transportation, communications, agriculture, and industries on their way to recovery.¹⁸

The key to postwar relief and rehabilitation in the occupied part

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 183-184.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 184.

of China, according to Staley, was the prompt restoration of transportation systems. He placed inland waterways and highway transportation first and then the restoration of railway transportation as second in importance. Engines were badly needed for the locally built river boats and barges, which could be used to haul heavy goods cheaply and quickly. All of China's railways needed extensive repair, and time was needed to restore them. The number of trucks in the country was extremely small and badly in need of repairs which were not available. Not only were engines and propellers, trucks, tools and spare parts needed; there also existed a desperate need for personnel from abroad to give the Chinese the necessary technical assistance and training.¹⁹

The tentative estimate made by the Chinese Commission on the Investigation and Planning Relief and Rehabilitation proved too great to present to UNRRA. The commission, after due deliberation with all parties concerned, decided to divide the program into two parts, one part to be financed by UNRRA and the other by China herself. UNRRA's part was set at US\$945,196,000.²⁰ The Program and Estimated Requirements for Relief and Rehabilitation in China, a voluminous document, was formally transmitted to UNRRA's Director General on September 30, 1944.²¹ Early in 1945 the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, working with other agencies of the Chinese Government

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 184.

²⁰ Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook 1937-1945, p. 538.

²¹ Ibid., p. 539.

and UNRRA representatives, began to formulate, from the tentative estimates, a formal request to UNRRA, the purpose being to initiate procurement for the first major portion of the program in China.

At the Second Council held in Montreal in September, 1944, the China representative stressed the differences between his country and those of Europe, concerning approaches used by UNRRA. Dr. Tsiang related to the Council that he was happy to be in a position to report that so far as China's position was concerned there was no fog concerning UNRRA. He pointed out that in spite of the fact that few UNRRA activities could be seen in China, the Chinese understood the difficulties in the way, and that these were beyond the control of the administration. He further mentioned that during the first year of UNRRA it had done only two things involving China. Its technical consultants had begun to cooperate with the Chinese Government in planning postwar relief and rehabilitation; and UNRRA had sponsored the training of a number of Chinese technicians in the United States. He stated that these activities of the past month were understood and accepted even though they were not large, because they could not have been larger. Tsiang continued, however, by observing that he had two hopes for the future. First, he hoped that the Council would examine and give some attention to the essential differences between the Far East and Europe. Mr. Tsiang concluded his remarks with the statement that "while I am ready to stand by the Resolutions of the Council and the Agreement, I suggest to the Director General that we approach the Far East problem realistically. We

should not follow the European pattern slavishly....Europe is a much smaller region than the Far East as defined by the Agreement and the Resolutions. And within the region there is much less homogeneity than in Europe."²²

The Council acknowledged that it had achieved few things during its formative period; but during this Second Council meeting it did announce the coming establishment of two Far Eastern offices, one to be located at Sydney and the other in Chungking.

Before the Third Council closed in London the Allies had defeated the Japanese in the Far East. The Council recognized that their greatest task in China still lay ahead of them.

During the Fourth Council of March, 1946, ex-Governor Lehman's resignation was accepted and his successor appointed. Mr. Lehman in his final report to the Council pointed out the seriousness of the world shortage of food and the problem of displaced persons not prepared to return to their homes. He stressed the points learned by UNRRA in the field of relief and rehabilitation, emphasizing the great work yet undone, and lamenting that the end of UNRRA was in sight; yet, with so much to be done. He continued:

We have not been frightened of political dramas. We were realistic enough to recognize that our problems sometimes touched political interests. I think, I am justified in saying, however, that UNRRA has successfully refused even to allow political interests to influence its judgments, its determinations, or its work....UNRRA has shown beyond any

²²United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Journal Second Session and Related Documents of the First Session (Montreal, Canada, September 15 to 27, 1944), pp. 48-49.

doubt that men and nations can work together, can live together, can develop an understanding of each other's problems....This very session, which is now coming to an end, has shown that 48 nations can sit around a table, can honestly and fearlessly and without pulling any punches, discuss their problems and seek to work out a solution....We have demonstrated that there is hope in international cooperation, a hope that I am confident, if properly developed, will lead to security and lasting peace.²³

The retiring Director General received due tribute from various members of the Council. Then Mr. William L. Clayton, United States representative to the Council, read a letter from the President of the United States, to Mr. Lehman, dated March 25, 1946:

'Under your guidance...the practical concept of mobilizing resources of food, clothing, medicines and other necessities to aid the victims of war broadened from one of national scope to one of joint responsibility of the United Nations....Under the trying limitations of your supply and distribution imposed by the war, you laid the foundation for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and prepared the structure of international cooperation which now is bringing effective aid to millions of our liberated allies....the world...no less than those receiving UNRRA aid, will be grateful to you for your part in making possible this collaboration in the interest of lasting peace.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Harry S. Truman.²⁴

Fiorello H. La Guardia, Former mayor of New York City, on March 29, 1946, accepted the leadership within UNRRA by becoming its second Director

²³United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Journal Fourth Session of the Council and Related Documents of the Fourth Session (Atlantic City, New Jersey 15 to 30 March 1946; Washington D. C. 9 May 1946), pp. 126-127.

²⁴Ibid., p. 122.

General. Mr. La Guardia's opening address to the Council contained all of the punch of the "Little Flower." He explained to the Council that he was not a diplomat: "I am going to talk very frankly with you. I hope you will understand that I am not a diplomat and am not used to the language of diplomacy. When I have something to say I will say it. So, from this point on, the protocol is off." He described his task as: "to take food where we can find it and bring it to the people who are in need, wherever they may be." His second task was: "the health problem: to prevent epidemics, to control such epidemics as have started, and to maintain the general public health in countries where it is threatened." And the third task he saw as: "aiding, wherever needed, in getting people rehabilitated so as to be self-sustaining."²⁵ Dramatizing the need for immediate and direct action, the new Director General continued: "It is food that we need. The people are crying for bread, not advice. I want plows, not typewriters. The people need relief, not sympathy. I want fast-moving ships, not slow-reading resolutions. People cannot eat resolutions, and even the people in our country have learned through a period of depression that 'ticker tape ain't spaghetti!'"²⁶

The Nation, commenting on UNRRA's new chief, said: "The dynamic attack by Fiorello La Guardia on the tasks facing UNRRA must have sent a tremor through the creaking joints of that unwieldy organization. If one

²⁵Ibid., pp. 128-129.

²⁶Ibid., p. 129.

man can make it operate anything like the efficiency the terrible situation calls for, that man is La Guardia." The author of the article pointed out that this was said "without suggesting any criticism of Governor Lehman, who contributed energy, organizing ability, and diplomatic skill to the up-building of UNRRA." "We need," the article declared, "high-powered drive, a determination to cut red tape into confetti and save lives. We need a touch of drama. We need a little ferocity. All in all, we need New York's recent Mayor, and I am glad he has, for the duration of hunger, abandoned the typewriter for the meat-ax."²⁷

Mr. La Guardia's acceptance speech to the Council called for greater international service:

The American people are kindly. They would not want to see mass suffering. I am sure they will respond if we can get all of the facts to them. And I now swallow my pride, and this is difficult for me to do, and ask the newspapers for their full and complete cooperation... I cannot help repeating again: this is all so new; it is all so hopeful. Have ever before in the history of the entire world 48 nations come together to save lives? We are united to preserve life, to build, not to kill, not to destroy. There is precedent for the spirit of UNRRA in the Old Scripture, in the New Scripture: to love our neighbor, to aid the needy—that is not original. It just has not been carried out. As the sun moves from place to place, there is one continuous prayer to God asking for His heavenly kingdom to come to earth. In every land, in every dialect which is spoken by man, the prayer is spoken: Give us this day our daily bread. Our task is to respond to that prayer. We then become a great army of mercy, a great army carrying out God Almighty's response to the call for daily bread. I refuse to be stopped by pettiness, greed

²⁷Freda Kirchwey, "Here and There - UNRRA's New Chief," The Nation, CLXII (April 6, 1946), 389.

or selfishness. That is the mission of UNRRA and that is the army I am willing to lead.²⁸

The Fifth Council convened in Geneva during August, 1946. It started to sound the death knell of an international effort. The Director General pointed out that the emergency task was over, but the need for UNRRA was not. Provisions had not been made for UNRRA's continuance in 1947. Forty-one per cent of UNRRA's entire commitments had not been delivered to the receiving countries. Mr. La Guardia reviewed the problems yet unsolved by UNRRA, then submitted his first plans for the demobilization of UNRRA, and at which time he requested to be relieved of his duties as Director General as soon as arrangements had been made for the completion of procurement.²⁹

The Sixth and last Session of the Council met in Washington, D. C. in December, 1946. The Director General reported that seventy-four per cent of UNRRA's programs had been fulfilled and the administration was bound to complete the remainder as approved by the Central Committee. Shipments to China through November 30, 1946, in dollar value amounted to \$229,104,000, only forty-three per cent of UNRRA's commitments to China.³⁰ The Director General informed the Council that the functions and funds of

²⁸ George Woodbridge, UNRRA The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, three volumes), I, 45; UNRRA, Journal Fourth Council, p. 121-1923.

²⁹ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Journal Sixth Session of the Council and Related Documents of the Sixth Session (Washington, D. C. 10 to 14 December 1946), p. 16.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

UNRRA would be transferred to other international organizations and the arrangements for the completion of the industrial rehabilitation program.³¹

Mr. La Guardia's farewell message to the Council restated his faith in international co-operation:

We have carried out a plan drawn up by economists and drafted by lawyers, but we did it in the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount. I hope that nothing will happen during the remaining days of UNRRA, or during the years that are to come, that will spoil that effort. We have demonstrated to the world that forty-eight nations can work in harmony, that forty-eight nations, bent upon good, can carry out a great mission. Let not that be lost to history.³²

The resignation of Fiorello H. La Guardia became effective on December 31, 1946. Major General Lowell W. Rooks, the Director General elect, took office on January 1, 1947.

When China was finally liberated from the scourge of Japanese occupation, its problems and needs for relief and rehabilitation were as great, if not greater, than any other country aided by UNRRA. At the height of occupation over 200 million Chinese lived in the enemy occupied zone or partial occupied zones. In addition, many millions of refugees had fled south and west previous to the occupation. During the flight of the refugees, as well as the retreat of the National Army, great damage was done to real property and public utilities such as transportation facilities. Agriculture and industries were seriously disrupted in many regions of the north. Economic life had come to an almost complete standstill during the nine years of Japanese occupation. When the Japanese were

³²Ibid., p. 50; UNRRA, Journal Sixth Council, p. 21.

finally driven out many regions were still more seriously effected.

Over large parts of Asia the situation was desperate, perhaps much more so than in Europe, at the close of the war. China's crop failure of 1946 added to the already desperate conditions. Estimates were made that nearly 400 million people were on the verge of starvation in Asia.

In carrying out its humane mission UNRRA spent during its short duration over four billion dollars. Of this sum the United States contributed some two and three-fourths billions.³³ The United States Army fed during the latter years of the war large areas of occupied Europe, as well as areas not occupied in China. In addition lend-lease continued to pour foodstuff and other needed supplies into European and Asiatic Allied countries, until it was abruptly terminated in August, 1945, only one week after the capitulation of Japan. Private gifts and CARE, however, supplemented governmental contributions on a generous scale.

UNRRA almost inevitably got mixed up in politics. And it was with some truth that the charge was made that American supplies were being used to bolster Communist regimes abroad. The original UNRRA Agreement stipulated that political belief would not be considered in the distribution of relief supplies. Large amounts of foodstuff and other relief supplies were turned over to the Communists in North China, in order that the Communists might complete their portion of the Yellow River Project. Partly for this reason, partly because inadequate appropriations made for

³³UNRRA, Journal Sixth Council, p. 16.

inefficiency of administration and partly because of the widespread feeling that the crisis was ended, Congress lost enthusiasm for UNRRA and allowed it to die in 1947.

If the United States did much for relief in China and other areas in dire need, she did much less than her resources permitted, as there was no postwar rationing. In many cases we continued to feed our cereal grains to our livestock rather than export them directly to the starving abroad.

CHAPTER III

CNRRRA - UNRRA'S CHINA COLLEAGUE

The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration operated on the premise that it might win final victory in the fight against hunger. To have done so in China alone, UNRRA would have had to devote all of its resources to that country. In 1945 few Americans realized the challenge or the complexity of the operations of UNRRA in China. Certainly UNRRA did not possess either the time or personnel to discharge its mission there. Thus the realization of a strong Chinese counterpart, an UNRRA subsidiary to operate strictly in China, came into existence. The job which UNRRA had to face in China proved to be technically more difficult, and the political significance of the organizational and administrative machinery used by UNRRA differed greatly from that used in Europe.

Upon returning to his native country on November 1, 1944, Dr. T. F. Tsiang reported on his work with UNRRA to the Nationalist Government and received instructions to draft a statute providing for the administration of postwar relief and rehabilitation in China. The Executive Yuan acted favorably on the draft, as submitted by Dr. Tsiang early in January, 1945, and forwarded it to the Legislative Yuan for enactment. The Organization Statute of the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, as promulgated on January 21, 1945, brought to completion

Dr. Tsiang's lawmaking duties. Dr. Tsiang's association with the organization, however, had just begun. He received the appointment as its first Director General. Cheng Tao-ju, then Secretary General of the Kweichow Provincial Government, moved to the position of Deputy Director General of the administration. The Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, UNRRA colleague in China, and commonly referred to by its initials CNRRA, was given Ministry status. Its function centered on the administration of postwar relief and rehabilitation in China; also its arranged fulfillment of all agreed obligations of the Chinese Government toward UNRRA.

The activities of UNRRA became so complex and varied within China that certain aspects of the work passed from CNRRA responsibility to other agencies. CNRRA, however, retained direct responsibility for all relief operations. The creation of fifteen regional and several supply and special field offices enabled CNRRA to expedite its activities. A Bureau of Relief was established to ensure that standards were met and to furnish general guidance and supervision over the regional and other field offices.¹ To aid CNRRA in carrying out its program the UNRRA China Office was opened in Chungking, China's wartime capital, late in January, 1945. Benjamin H. Kizer, the former Chairman of War Labor West Coast Lumber Commission, serving as special representative of Mr. Lehman, became the Director of the China operation.

¹United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Operational Analysis Papers, No. 53, UNRRA in China 1945-1947 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 128.

The actual administration of relief and rehabilitation activities fell to CNRRA while UNRRA stood by for advice and supplied the greater number of experts who engaged actively in the relief activities. The Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration served in a double role in its relief mission. It was the official agency of the Chinese Government for UNRRA in China, as provided for in the basic agreement; in addition, it was an executive organ of the Chinese Government created to handle relief and rehabilitation matters.

The life span of CNRRA was short. From its inception until its liquidation only two years elapsed. During the period from October, 1945, through September, 1946, CNRRA occupied itself with relief activities. Then from the first of October, 1946, until its liquidation, it concentrated on rehabilitation. The general operation of CNRRA fell into three types of direct relief. Immediately after the liberation of an occupied area, CNRRA provided emergency relief was administered for the natives. It gave food, clothing, and shelter to people in need. Preventive measures against epidemics also occupied an important position in the emergency relief administered.

The second phase of the direct relief activities consisted of aid given to displaced persons and refugees who had fled from the occupied areas to return to their homes. Provisions were made for homeless children, the crippled, and the aged without means for self support.

CNRRA's work centered, however, on public works, the rebuilding of railways, highways, and dikes for the rivers of China. These enabled

China to reconstruct her prewar transportation system and to rehabilitate the cultivated areas which were flooded during the war.

Sales of certain categories of supplies and from appropriations of the Chinese Government provided funds for the operations of CNRRA. The selling of UNRRA supplies was not unique to China; all European countries receiving aid followed this pattern. The quantity of supplies sold in China, however, proved to be greater than the quantity of supplies sold in Europe. For the most part the government sold supplies directly to the consumer rather than through the free market. This method of financing the CNRRA program not only provided a profit but also met public relief needs. Finances for the entire CNRRA relief program rested most heavily on the proceeds from the sales of supplies and very little on the appropriations of the Chinese Government.

CNRRA distributed some 900,000² tons of foodstuff and some 28,000³ tons of clothing to the inhabitants of the recovered areas. It is estimated that about sixty million⁴ needy Chinese people in these areas received relief from CNRRA. The total cost of the material and technical support given for a wide range of urgently needed relief and rehabilitation projects in China far exceeded that of any other country. The

²Ibid., p. 246.

³Ibid., p. 257.

⁴Ibid., p. 246.

shipping and warehouse charges and certain other expenditures⁵ raised the total spending to about \$670 million. This amount included about \$517,800,000 worth of various supplies, weighing almost 2,500,000 long tons.⁶

Perhaps one of the most note-worthy accomplishments in the field of rehabilitation was the closure of the Yellow River gap, known as the Yellow River Project, which diverted the river to its former course. The project, a joint endeavor of CNRRA and the Ministry of Water Conservancy, was started in early 1946 and completed, or nearly so, in March, 1947.

The principal objective of the Yellow River Project was the rehabilitation of China's "food basket," some two million acres of China's most fertile farmland in the provinces of Honan and Annwei, a good part of which had been buried under a layer of sand and volcanic ash deposited by the Yellow River. The reclamation of these areas would favorably affect approximately 200,000,000 persons. It was believed that if the river's course could be changed by mid-1946, that all, or nearly all, of the reclaimed land would be sufficiently drained by fall to permit planting a winter wheat crop for harvest in June, 1947. According to official Chinese estimates, the old river bed had a potential productive

⁵These expenditures involved cost of coastal and internal shipping, displaced persons operations, and a foreign-exchange endowment for UNRRA-sponsored long-term projects; George Woodbridge, UNRRA The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, three volumes), II, p. 371.

⁶Woodbridge, UNRRA, II, p. 371.

capacity of 7,500,000 bushels of wheat. Further, a rice crop planted in the spring of 1947 and harvested in August of the same year could be expected to yield about 13,800,000 bushels.⁷

Twentieth century China has never been able to provide enough food from her own domestic agriculture to feed the masses of her people. She has always been dependent upon food imports. UNRRA officials agreed that this project would be the most important contribution that UNRRA could make to the agricultural rehabilitation of China. They stressed the point that when completed, this project would not only permit the growth of an estimated 200,000,000⁸ bushels of grain annually from the land reclaimed, then either flooded or cut off by the river, but would alleviate pressure on UNRRA for foodstuff supplies and provide an important step forward in China's postwar recovery.

Mr. O. J. Todd, a civil engineer who had spent twenty-one years in active engineering practice in China, specializing chiefly in flood control and irrigation, received the appointment as chief UNRRA advisor to the project. Of the eight major flood control projects, the Yellow River received top priority by both UNRRA and CNRRA.⁹

⁷United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Monthly UNRRA Review, XX (May, 1946), p. 22.

⁸Ibid., XVIII (February, 1946), p. 23.

⁹The eight major flood relief projects included the Yellow, Huai, Yangtze and Han, Chien Tang and Pearl Rivers, the Grand Canal, and the Kiangsu and Chekiang sea walls. There were also sixteen minor flood relief projects and a large number of local conservancy projects; Wood-bridge, UNRRA, II, p. 428.

The total Yellow River Project was carried out in four parts. The first undertaking in diverting the river to its original course was the closure of the Huayuank'ou break which had been widened to nearly a mile. After sealing the break, additional work had to be done in reinforcing the four hundred miles of dikes to the sea. But before the gap could be closed, those peasants who had settled in the old river bed, and had taken up farming, had to be relocated. Once it had completed the closure, UNRRA had to carry out reclamation measures in the wartime areas. UNRRA experts in the fields of planting, fertilization, drainage, livestock care and dairy operation were ready to begin work in the flooded region as soon as the river waters receded.¹⁰ And CNRRA arranged the transfer of occupants of the old river bed to their original land plots.

Mr. Todd arrived in China during December, 1945, to lay the ground work for the giant project. The following month he served as the chief representative of UNRRA, with two additional engineers, one representing the Ministry of Water Conservancy¹¹ and the other the Yellow River Commission, in making an official inspection of the dikes from the break at Huayuank'ou to the Grand Canal. The plan decided upon, by the group of engineers, for repairing the break called first for an earthen dike to cover 3400 feet of the total width of 5000 feet, and in the second stage,

¹⁰United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Monthly UNRRA Review, XXI (May, 1946), p. 22.

¹¹The Ministry of Water Conservancy's name was changed from the National Conservancy Commission in 1946.

the construction of a rock-fill dam for the water-covered section of the gap.¹²

To prepare for building the dike, CNRRA arranged for the deliveries of UNRRA equipment and supplies from the ports of entry to the project. The supplies included food for the workers, primarily flour. In addition, CNRRA handled the relief and resettlement work in the areas reclaimed.

On March 11, 1946, the UNRRA Shanghai Office reported that work on the giant Yellow River Project, the greatest of UNRRA's world-wide undertakings proceeded night and day as a nucleus of UNRRA technicians, many of them recruited from the U.S. Navy "Seabees," and 150,000 Chinese laborers started their dramatic battle against time. As reported, the break had to be sealed by late June, the high flood period or the months of work and the vast expenditures would be swept away.¹³

Limestone for the project came principally from the quarry at Lu wang fung, some sixteen miles from the dike break, the scene of the main project. Here a thousand laborers worked round the clock, using floodlights, and blasting out the limestone which would be used as a foundation for the new dike section. Chinese coolies carried much of the stone for the project on their backs. Workers transported some, however, by river boats, a spur railroad, and wheelbarrows or crude carts, over a dirt road which had to be wetted down to prevent the dry, shifting

¹²O. J. Todd, "Yellow River Reharnessed," Geographical Review, XXXIX (January, 1949), p. 45.

¹³UNRRA, Monthly UNRRA Review, XXI (May, 1946), p. 22.

soil with its extremely high volcanic ash content from becoming hopelessly rutted.¹⁴

At the site of the mammoth Yellow River Project itself, a vast army of workers placed tough kaoliang and willow sticks in position, for the earthen part of the dam, weighting them down with tons of limestone, pouring in a broad clay core, and then covering the whole with a thick layer of earth. This created a wall about 200 feet wide at the base and about sixty-five feet wide at the top. The forward part of the earthen dam almost collapsed at one time because of a freakish veering of the current. Only the massed efforts of thousands of workers halted a near catastrophe.¹⁵

At the main break, the water-covered section which remained after completion of the earthen dam, the workers built a heavy timber trestle, consisting of sixty-five feet Douglas fir piles, across the 1535 foot gap. Pile drivers brought by UNRRA from Portland, Oregon, forced the timber into the bed of the swift moving river. About five hundred of these piles, set in rows from four to twelve feet apart, formed the base of the trestle.¹⁶ Around the limestone foundation they placed a heavy wire flood matting similar to that used on the Mississippi River for flood control.¹⁷ Seepage continued for a while but silt carried by the

¹⁴Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁵United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Monthly UNRRA Review, XXIII (July, 1946), pp. 24-25.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁷UNRRA, Monthly UNRRA Review, XXI (May, 1946), p. 22.

water finally plugged all leaks.

Under any circumstances mending the break in the dikes would represent a monumental victory over natural obstacles. The 1946 Yellow River repair project came to completion under the added handicap of political division created by civil war. The Chinese Communists controlled most of the territory through which the old channel of the Yellow River ran and in which the 400 miles of dikes had to be repaired. Throughout much of 1946 and early 1947, Communist and UNRRA representatives met intermittently in an attempt to complete the crucial dike reconstruction with as little interruption as possible. Cooperation proved possible during the earlier period of negotiations; however, with the advance of the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists, distrust mounted and the two factions disregarded previous commitments.

Early in the negotiations the Nationalists and Communists agreed that UNRRA flour would be shipped into the Communist-held areas for the maintenance of the Chinese Communists engaged in the levee work. UNRRA flour actually delivered to the Communists laborers amounted to some 20,000 tons.¹⁸ The Nationalist Government further agreed that it would provide cash for paying workers for the earth work in reconstructing the damaged dikes in the Communist-controlled area, but the work by the Communist laborers had to be attested by UNRRA engineers. Further, UNRRA shipped UNRRA relief supplies and provided allocations for distribution among the refugees who were forced to move from the river bed.

¹⁸ UNRRA, Operational Analysis Papers, No. 53, p. 260.

Attempting to forestall a complete breakdown of the Yellow River Project, UNRRA, CNRRA, Nationalist Chinese officials, and members of the Communist relief representatives stationed in Shanghai and Nanking negotiated around the clock, but eventually cooperation ceased. Still some 200,000 Communist and Nationalist laborers participated in the dike program of the Yellow River. Yellow River Commission engineers estimated initially that the closure project would require 2750 cubic meters of earthwork. The project actually required far more, however, and some twenty-two million cubic meters of earth work eventually went into the closure project for rendering the dikes safe from Huayuank'ou to the sea.¹⁹

The equipment and supplies furnished by UNRRA for the closure project alone amounted to 9,000 long tons. In addition to this amount the international organization provided some 5,000 tons of flour for the Nationalist Chinese workers. The equipment and supplies included 1,000 long wooden piles of Oregon pine, 800,000 board feet of Oregon lumber which was used for trestles and camp houses for the supervisory personnel. Also, the project consumed 2,243,000 sand bags, 2,300 rolls of wire mesh amounting to 300 tons, forty-three tons of wire cable, iron wire, railway tracking, pile drivers, bulldozers, trucks, barges, and numerous other equipment.²⁰

To supplement UNRRA's foreign-made equipment and supplies, the

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 260.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 259; Todd, "Yellow River Reharnessed," p. 49.

Chinese Nationalist Government provided native materials, less expensive in nature. Out of nearby limestone quarries came some 150,000 cubic meters of rock. In addition, the Nationalists made available an estimated 50,000 tons of willow branches, 20,000 tons of kaoliang, a tall Chinese millet whose grain is used as a cereal food, 1,000 tons of hemp which was twisted into rope by the workers and used to bind the kaoliang and willow branches for the flood matting and 198,412 units of short piling and stakes. In addition to these supplies, 191 iron anchors weighted down the flood matting.²¹ Most importantly Chinese peasants put roughly three million man-days of labor into the closure project.²²

²¹UNRRA, Operational Analysis Papers, No. 53, p. 259; Quoted from "History of the Yellow River Project," unpublished documented monograph. (155 pp. and Annexes), prepared by O. J. Todd.

²²Ibid., p. 259.

CHAPTER IV

IN DEFENSE OF UNRRA IN CHINA

Throughout its existence UNRRA was plagued constantly with the shortcomings of its personnel and defects in its administrative structure. This makes its achievements all the more remarkable, and the lessons learned doubtless have application to future international welfare projects--for China and for the rest of the world as well.

If we are to judge the activities of any international organization--and judge them, we must if they are to have public support; then we must explain clearly the tasks which they face. We must realize what specific limitations are placed upon them by their policy-making bodies. The mass of the American population has known little about the history of international organizations, and Americans have known less about UNRRA than about most others. Some who ought to have known better, regarded UNRRA as purely an American enterprise. This general lack of information concerning UNRRA is reflected in various misconceptions which arose during the period of its operation and can be found in the types of questions asked about UNRRA in letters to the editors, editorial comments, and by strange ideas thrown out by the daily columnists. Woodbridge charges in his official history of UNRRA that many of the American correspondents in China failed to realize that the first objective of UNRRA

was immediate relief and rehabilitation. The material which they dispatched, he charged was determined by their own interests and what they considered to be important. Thus they failed to grasp the scope of UNRRA's activities.¹

UNRRA critics often failed to comprehend that UNRRA officials had to draw a line between the two jobs of getting relief supplies into China and then distributing them equitably after they had arrived. The distribution problem was the more serious one, and it subjected UNRRA to much criticism. To assure contributing countries--especially the United States--that supplies which they donated were reaching persons for whom they were intended, the organization applied constant pressure and inspected frequently.

A great deal of misunderstanding and controversy evolved from resolution number seven of the First Session of the UNRRA Council, which dealt with relief and rehabilitation policies. The resolution prohibited discrimination in the distribution of UNRRA supplies based on race, creed, or political belief. Further, the general responsibility for distribution of relief supplies rested with the recognized government within any given area. All classes of inhabitants of an area, irrespective of purchasing power, received assurance of their equitable share of essential commodities. The resolution further provided that commodities sold by relief agencies should be priced so as to facilitate the flow of such

¹George Woodbridge, UNRRA The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, three volumes), I, p. 290.

commodities into proper hands and to keep rationing, price controls, and suppression of black market activities at a minimum. Profit margins on all purchases by the recognized government of an area should be limited to a "fair and reasonable" amount. Normal agencies were to be utilized to the maximum in the distribution of supplies. The Director General, as the responsible official of UNRRA, the resolution stated, must receive full information concerning distribution of supplies from the officials within all recipient areas. Finally, cooperation within each agency and with other related agencies was demanded for maximum efficiency of the overall program.²

A constant problem facing UNRRA officials involved the policy of selecting recipients, thus making relief supplies freely available to all persons who fell within certain clearly marked categories. Any discretionary basis or any attempts at individual determination of needs violated the charter governing UNRRA. Administrative devices employed for insuring a reasonable degree of compliance with the basic policy of UNRRA utilized not only local supervision of operating committees, but field inspectors or observers employed by UNRRA. Many private citizens and Congressmen of the United States toured the relief areas in China and reported their findings.

American newspapers and newsmagazines frequently charged that luxury foods and goods found their way to those who could pay the price.

²United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Journal First Session of the Council (Atlantic City, 10 November to 1 December, 1943)(Washington, D.C., 1947), p. 185.

The poor masses, the U.S. often charged, went without the coarse essentials. In violation of resolution number seven, speculation, black marketeering, and hoarding were rampant, according to the editorial columns of numerous newspapers and letters to the editors of various magazines and the daily news press. Time newsmagazine reported on July 22, 1946:

Since November, 1945, UNRRA has poured \$132,250,000 worth of food...and various relief supplies...into the country /China/. But only a trickle had got where they were needed most. The bulk of the supplies piled in warehouses filtered down into the depths of the black market, enriched the morass of government corruption and 'squeeze' (China's term for 'Honest graft')....Flour supplied free by UNRRA was being sold far above the average Chinese's means. UNRRA Ford trucks were selling at \$3,750 (gold).³

Newsweek, of the same date, reported:

'The starving continue to starve and needy remain without...Supplies are piling up in warehouses undelivered to the needy and hungry.'

That was the net result of UNRRA's operations in China, according to a blast released last week by 300 UNRRA employees⁴...In a cable to Director General Fiorello H. La Guardia on July 9, they charged 'persistent misuse' of relief supplies and suggested: 'It would be unfortunate, though justified, if because of continued failures of the Chinese Government, you were compelled to direct supplies to the needy elsewhere in the world who would be assured of receiving these supplies.'

La Guardia denied receiving the cable from his protesting subordinates and denounced them for releasing their complaint to the press.⁵

Illegal activities dealing with the misuse of UNRRA supplies tended

³"Thunder; UNRRA Relief Halted in China," Time, July 22, 1946, p. 27.

⁴The number reported by Time as cited above was "over 200 local UNRRA officials" which signed the cable.

⁵"UNRRA: Last Boat for China," Newsweek, July 22, 1946, p. 36.

to center in and around Shanghai. Here, it is reported that godowns bulged while the needy areas called for supplies which never came. "The Chinese people, starving almost within the dreamlike sight of rich rice and yellow wheat, hardly protested; they were too accustomed to inefficiency and graft."⁶ Reports of hoarding and speculation centered in Shanghai, prompted the Nationalist Government to replace the mayor who had served in this capacity during the early period of UNRRA shipments.⁷

With revelation of the scandal, incensed American readers and editorial writers demanded the stopping of relief imports to China. Top UNRRA leaders opposed the halting of shipments, however, on the grounds that this could only make a bad situation worse. Scarcity is the mother of profiteering, they noted as they advocated an increase in relief supplies, thus making racketeering less lucrative. During the first few months of UNRRA's operation in China, the small volume of foodstuff imported did not constitute a threat to the existing market price. Only once during the period of operation in China did the Director General find it necessary to suspend shipments, and this lasted for only a brief period.

The Nationalist Government desired, during the early period of UNRRA's operation to maintain but not break, the existing food price levels. It operated on the theory that the relatively high prices

⁶"Thunder; UNRRA Relief Halted in China," Time, July 22, 1946, p. 27.

⁷Donald S. Howard, "Emergency Relief Needs and Measures in China," Social Service Review, XX (September, 1946), pp. 300-301.

prevailing in late 1945 would directly benefit food producers, who not only constituted some eighty per cent of China's total populace, but had customarily existed on an extremely low economic level.⁸ This economic conclusion explains why the early food sales by CNRRA averaged only five to ten per cent below market prices. If the supplies had sold at extremely low prices, a greater and more rapid wrecking of the existing price structure would have been experienced.

Critics of UNRRA and CNRRA activities quarreled with the policy of selling any foodstuffs so long as the need for them among the lower economic classes remained so acute. They favored outright gifts of goods. However, the policy of selling foodstuffs tended to decrease with increased appropriations of contributing countries and finally stopped altogether. Those who favored the sale of supplies argued that China could best rehabilitate small industries and trade by putting important relief commodities into normal trade channels, which in turn would decrease the possibility of racketeering.

Coal workers, construction workers, and other peasants actively engaged in the reconstruction program often received UNRRA imported flour in lieu of wages. This flour sometimes turned up on the local market, thus providing fuel for criticism of UNRRA by its critics. The quality of flour, which constituted a large proportion of UNRRA's imports, consisted of a grade far superior to any used by the poorer classes of Chinese. Because of its superior quality and the fact that flour was

⁸Ibid., p. 301.

one of the most significant import food items, its distribution served as a source of great criticism and illicit activity. Often Chinese officials in charge of administering supplies considered it "too good" for the "low ones." Not infrequently the administrators substituted an inferior grade of Chinese flour for the superior UNRRA import and distributed the inferior product to the peasants.

Ilona Ralf Sues, author of Shark Fins and Millet, and a severe critic of UNRRA and the Nationalist Government, stated that: "Fiorello H. La Guardia would go down in Chinese history as the only present day American official who placed human rights above political and military opportunism." Miss Sues had previously served ten years in the opium control work at Geneva, for the League of Nations, and during UNRRA's operations she lived in China and studied the economic and political conditions in that country. She described La Guardia as one of the few who believed and tried to practice what he preached and who possessed the moral fiber to stand up for the Chinese peasants in the face of all opposition. La Guardia, she believed, adhered to the ideas of the spokesmen for the vast majority of the Chinese people, who pleaded for the discontinuance of military, financial, and economic support to the government of Chiang Kai-shek. She points out that our unconditional assistance to Chiang Kai-shek practically nullified the results achieved by General Marshall in establishing peace negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communists. The Director General stopped shipments on one occasion because he felt that the Chinese Government was using relief supplies as an anti-democratic political weapon. Miss Sues charged that the UNRRA scandal in China derived

from our obtuse help to the reactionary clique surrounding the Generalissimo. CNRRA, she reported, was nothing more than a government monopoly which made the decisions governing the distribution of supplies. The Chinese relief program fell completely under the control of the "Soong Dynasty" which at this time controlled finances, foreign relations, and almost all profitable rackets in China. She charged that flour and other relief items were in many cases distributed by the phony "labor unions" of the Kuomintang. People employed at the time relief distribution started got relief, and those unemployed were not allowed to join the labor unions, thus allowed to starve because they had no means of support. During the first two months of 1946, Miss Sues further charged, that some thirty to sixty Chinese children were picked up weekly from the streets of Shanghai having died from starvation.¹⁰

Miss Sues also advances the opinion that CNRRA's program of industrial rehabilitation served as another racket controlled by the Kuomintang Party. Here, she charges that a person in good standing could buy all the machinery he wanted, but the less fortunate, who had lost everything during the war and occupation, found himself unable to purchase any of the needed industrial supplies. This resulted in a further concentration of wealth in the hands of the selected few.¹¹

The following excerpts are typical of the criticism offered by UNRRA workers who spoke out against CNRRA and the existing conditions in

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 71.

¹¹ Ibid.

China during the period of UNRRA's operations. The excerpts are from a letter written by an American UNRRA worker stationed in Tsingtao, Shantung Province, China, Dr. Catharine L. Dealtad, to a friend of The Nation:

The Nationalists have been clever enough to get Kiser, the UNRRA director, [Shanghai branch] to give them carte blanche in the allocation of UNRRA supplies....It is tragedy in view of the need and the indescribable poverty and misery that the money spent by UNRRA isn't in the hands of men who are 100 per cent honest....There are too many Americans and Englishmen in this organization for what they can get out of it--people who don't give a damn about the Chinese and who are willing to play ball with the Nationalists in CNRRA.¹²

Dr. Herbert K. Abrams, Regional Medical Officer for UNRRA in Shantung Province from November, 1945, to July, 1946, reported that technical difficulties were imposed by CNRRA officials which made it almost impossible to get the desperately needed medical supplies into the Communist controlled areas of Shantung. The CNRRA regional medical officer attempted to carry out the UNRRA-CNRRA program but was black-listed and then discharged.¹³

Individuals in the United States opposed UNRRA for varied reasons, and it would be most difficult to group the critics into categories or to establish a true pattern of criticism. However, it can be concluded that much of the critical publicity of UNRRA coming from the U.S. press evolved from ignorance and was colored by sentimentality or political bias. Members of Congress followed no strict partisan line in their

¹²Catharine D. Lealtad, M.D., "Letter to the Editor - Report from China," The Nation, CLXIII (June 29, 1946), p. 794.

¹³Herbert K. Abrams, M.D., "Health Rehabilitation in Shantung," Far Eastern Survey, XV (November 6, 1946), p. 341.

voting habits on UNRRA legislation; however, Liberal Democrats were more vocal in supporting UNRRA legislation than the more traditional conservatives of both the Democratic and Republican parties. The more rabid conservatives held to their traditional isolationist attitudes and opposed all issues concerning UNRRA arising in Congress.

Daniel A. Reed of New York, a member of the Republican opposition, was perhaps the most outspoken critic of UNRRA in Congress. On March 11, 1946, speaking before the House of Representatives, he stated that it was his desire to "call attention, as I have done several times previously, to the extravagance of the organization known as UNRRA."¹⁴ Mr. Reed continued to relate that black markets had developed out of UNRRA abroad, and that several hundred people employed by UNRRA engaged themselves with black market activities and "have never been given the publicity which this cheap political organization deserved."¹⁵ Congressman Reed felt that the charity of the United States should be carried on exclusively by American church organizations.

In direct contrast to the viewpoint expressed on many occasions by Congressman Reed and his cohorts can be found the statement made earlier by General Eisenhower, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on November 22, 1945:

It is a privilege for a soldier to have the opportunity of pleading for assistance in repairing the ravages of war.

¹⁴U.S. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, XCII, Part 10, A1265.

¹⁵Ibid.

The Congress has appropriated many billions of dollars during the past few years to enable us to forge the weapons of destruction....I have noted suggestions that the United States should discharge this responsibility /foreign relief/ single-handed..../UNRRA/ was established to do this specific job and it would be wasteful to dissipate its experience....¹⁶

A statement on behalf of UNRRA, by the District of Columbia Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, was read into the Congressional Record by the Honorable Jerry Voorhis of California, on November 24, 1945:

In the interest of human kindness we cannot allow the people of China...and other liberated countries to face starvation and complete annihilation while we enjoy prosperity....It is our responsibility...to see that those less fortunate than we are supplied with at least the barest fundamentals for existence.¹⁷

Congresswoman Emily Taft Douglas of Illinois, a member of the Democratic supporters of UNRRA, read into the Congressional Record on October 24, 1945, an editorial from the New York Times of the previous day. The editorial was an urgent plea for an increase of funds for the extension and continuance of UNRRA activities. Twice during the month of October, 1945, President Truman urged Congress for action and reminded them of the necessity of living up to our committed obligations with UNRRA. At this time UNRRA's massive relief program for the newly liberated China rested with Congressional appropriations. The editorial

¹⁶ The New York Times, November 23, 1945, p. 8.

¹⁷ U.S. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part 13, A5240.

summarizes its object in the statement: "UNRRA is not an instrument of policy--it is, like the Red Cross, a disaster service. In the name of humanity, Congress should act without further delay."¹⁸

The Michigan Council of Churches and Christian Education forwarded a letter to the Honorable George S. Sadowski on October 12, 1945, urging support of UNRRA. The Michigan Council felt that as a Christian nation the United States should render all help possible to this international relief organization; it also urged the Congressman to support all measures for rehabilitation of liberated war-torn countries and the immediate release of UNRRA funds. The Council felt that the future peace of the world would be in jeopardy as long as people were allowed to go hungry.¹⁹

Clare Boothe Luce, a strong Republican supporter of UNRRA, read into the Congressional Record on December 21, 1945, a letter which she had written to the editor of the Greenwich Review (Connecticut). The letter served to answer a specific letter which had appeared in the Review and other critical correspondence in general which had appeared previously in the paper. Mrs. Luce explained the reasons for the need of increased appropriation for UNRRA. She reasoned that UNRRA could not confine itself simply to meeting the deficiencies created by wartime destruction and loss of manpower, but the relief organization had to go beyond this and provide additional services for the people of formerly occupied areas. Mrs. Luce pointed out in the letter that it is often overlooked by many

¹⁸Ibid., pp. A4478-A4479.

¹⁹Ibid., p. A4577.

that UNRRA was an international organization and not exclusively an American organization. Due to the nature of the organization, its activities fell under the control of all members of the United Nations. She continued in pointing out that the needs abroad were of the most urgent nature and beyond verbal description; regardless of the abuses of UNRRA and the inefficiency found within the organization, which were being corrected, America and Americans had to support UNRRA.²⁰ In reply to previous remarks made by Mrs. Luce in the House of Representatives, Herbert H. Lehman wrote her from UNRRA Headquarters thanking her for the support of UNRRA and informing her that 850 women commentators would carry her defense of UNRRA on their broadcasts of December 13, 1945, along with a statement from Lafell Dickinson, National President of General Federation of Women's Clubs.²¹

On Thanksgiving Day, November 22, 1945, the Director General of UNRRA, Herbert H. Lehman, pleaded the cause of UNRRA before the American people over the Columbia Broadcasting System:

Thanksgiving Day is a deeply-cherished American tradition....Today we Americans fervently give thanks on this, the first Thanksgiving Day after we have come through a great peril....Today this nation is free and united -- its people are healthy and have food in abundance. God has been good to us....Today the people of Europe and China are thankful that many years of death from the air -- and slave labor -- and concentration camps -- are at an end. But, also, their danger is not abated. Hunger and cold, disease and suffering stalk the streets and the byways....I must plead

²⁰Ibid., p. A5742.

²¹Ibid.

before the court of American opinion the cause of these millions of suffering victims of war who must otherwise stand mute and helpless in the face of disaster....You, my fellow Americans, and only you - will decide the fate of those people who fought alongside your sons, who bled and died with them -- and who today are still dying.²²

Continuing, Mr. Lehman reminded the American people that the United States took the lead in establishing UNRRA and in championing UNRRA; the United States acted not only for humanitarian reasons, but also for enlightened self-interest. He pointed out that no nation can remain healthy in a disease-ridden world and no country could remain strong and prosperous in a world wracked by starvation and social chaos. But continuing, Mr. Lehman said that UNRRA's criticism came from the United States, the richest, healthiest, and the best-fed nation in the world, and to him this came as a most disheartening surprise. He stated that in those countries which suffered the most, as we have never called upon to suffer, there can be found nothing but the highest praise for UNRRA's work and a solid support behind it. He concluded his appeal with: "Let us then finish the job at hand. UNRRA can prove in truth that international cooperation is not just a hope but a reality. And every day that courage, strength and health is given to the suffering millions...abroad it will constitute for them a day of Thanksgiving, in which we, too, will be able to join with all our hearts."²³

Perhaps one of the most intense and humane pleas made in behalf

²²Speech by Herbert H. Lehman, Director General of UNRRA, Thanksgiving Day, Thursday, 22 November 1945.

²³Ibid.

of UNRRA can be contributed to the Most Reverend Richard J. Cushing, Archbishop of Boston, at the Communion Breakfast of the St. Vincent De Paul Society, on December 9, 1945:

The scope of charity embraces everything we do for our fellow beings out of the love of God without any hope of material reward....The challenge to charity is thus a challenge of Christianity. If we love God, then love of neighbor is the necessary corollary of love of God....We attached no rider to our lend-lease shipments of war materials. Should we now attach one to charity? If we do, and if the UNRRA should fail for lack of funds, then the Good Samaritan has been waylaid....The people of.... China, and several other countries which have no credit resources will not eat without UNRRA....In all human history there was never such sorrow, suffering and starvation....The work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration must not fail....We have a moral duty to make known our opinion on the matter...Write immediately...to your representatives in Congress....If we do not measure up to the task, the basis for an enduring peace will not be laid in this generation.²⁴

Shortly after becoming Director General of UNRRA, Mr. La Guardia, on May 10, 1946, spoke before members of the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., in defense of UNRRA and attempted to clear up some of the erroneous rumors and misconceptions concerned with the operational functions of the organization. To the charge that UNRRA food could be brought on the open market, Mr. La Guardia readily admitted the truth of this accusation. He explained the situation and the factors which made this necessary and then spoke on UNRRA's distribution system. He pointed out that a regular budget is kept on file for each of the receiving

²⁴U.S. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part 13, A5501.

countries and each one had an appropriation or allocation made to it. He explained that this allocation resulted from intensive study on the part of the UNRRA organization, that it was approved by the Director General and then submitted to the Central Committee, which consisted of representatives of the various countries which made up the UNRRA Council, and that this group served as the final approving agent for the allocations. Mr. La Guardia then explained that in administering those funds, the administrative body had to adhere strictly to the appropriations. To the illogical charge that one country received more aid than another, the Director General replied that the appropriations were made on an equitable basis. Many factors had to be taken into consideration, such as the amount of devastation, the area of population, the means of transportation, the economic condition of the country, and the food situation.²⁵

The Director General continued by stating that the Department of Agriculture in the United States served as the food purchasing or procuring agent for UNRRA. The Director General's office forwarded requisitions to the Department of Agriculture, the Department did the purchasing and then at the direction of the administration shipped the foodstuff. Mr. La Guardia declared that it would require a study of at least a sixty to ninety day period of weekly reports of shipments and disparities to get a true picture of the distribution process. Foodstuff and supplies upon reaching the receiving country fell into the channels of the recognized

²⁵ Transcript of UNRRA Director General La Guardia's Address to Members of the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 1:00 P.M. Friday, 10 May 1946.

government of that country, and the government distributed them through the regular channels of trade or sold the commodities at ceiling prices. From the proceeds of sales, the cost of distribution and the expenses of the Missions had to be deducted. The Director General reported that these proceeds could be used for agricultural rehabilitation, machinery for agricultural purposes, reconstruction of roads and highways, the repair of public utilities, or for health and welfare purposes. But the appropriate UNRRA Mission checked the uses to which these proceeds were put.²⁶

To the charge of UNRRA flour being sold by individuals, Mr. La Guardia replied that this was quite understandable. The many people suffering from abject poverty would often find it necessary to trade their rations for something else which they needed most urgently, such as medical supplies or other such important items. The flour was accumulated by certain individuals and then sometimes it would find its way to the shelves of the black marketeers. Mr. La Guardia pointed out that the situation resulted from the dire needs and necessities of the people involved, and thus it was out of the hands of UNRRA to control directly. The same factors would be true concerning clothing which UNRRA had shipped to China for distribution.²⁷

Another story which Mr. La Guardia attempted to squelch involved the rumors that luxury articles including liquor, had been shipped to China by UNRRA. The Director General replied that if it had happened,

²⁶
Ibid.

²⁷
Ibid.

it was before his association with UNRRA, and would have happened under any administration. He related that just preceding V-J Day there were several steamers headed for their destination in the Far East. In the week or weeks that followed UNRRA purchased from the Army some fifteen complete cargoes of these ships. The steamers transported general cargoes for United States military personnel in the Far East, and they carried about ninety per cent food and some ten per cent miscellaneous cargo. Of this ten per cent miscellaneous cargo could be found soft drinks, toilet articles, canned beer, and other personal items demanded by our military personnel in all theaters of operations. Further, Mr. La Guardia pointed out that it was extremely difficult to get the accurate manifest listing of these cargoes. But UNRRA needed food for China and most prudently and wisely purchased the complete cargoes. The foodstuff received normal distribution and the other items were placed in storage. After La Guardia became Director General instructions were issued that such toilet articles which would be of comfort to any of the United States Missions in China, any personnel of the United Nations, or hospitals or institutions in China should be distributed to them. "The beer we have already sold back to the Army - they know how to use it."²⁸

In evaluating UNRRA in China, Woodbridge concludes in his history of UNRRA²⁹ that certain UNRRA field operations suffered undue and often resultant misrepresentation in the press of the various contributing

²⁸
Ibid.

²⁹
Woodbridge, UNRRA, I, p. 291.

countries. He feels that this often resulted from errors in judgment or failures on the part of UNRRA public information personnel. He states that they failed to realize that information they considered to be everyday knowledge was often unknown elsewhere. But more often, it resulted from snap judgments made by correspondents and visiting celebrities on the basis of inadequate and erroneous information and observation. Mr. Woodbridge freely admits that some of the bad press in the United States and the United Kingdoms on UNRRA operations in China was unquestionably deserved. However, he further states that some of it undoubtedly arose from the unfortunate but prevalent confusion of UNRRA's activities and CNRRA's fields of operations.

The Chinese Nationalist Relief and Rehabilitation Administration worked closely with UNRRA. Its staff came partially from UNRRA personnel on loan, and CNRRA had the responsibility of handling UNRRA supplies and giving assistance to UNRRA relief service programs. But, CNRRA was an official organ of the Chinese National Government, and because of this fact, the Nationalist Government alone was responsible for its policies and its personnel. This fact seldom found mention in the press and the western press, and its readers generally failed to grasp it. Thus UNRRA alone bore the brunt of the criticism.

CHAPTER V

THE AMERICAN ROLE IN UNRRA - OUR SERVICES TO CHINA

The story of UNRRA does not end with the foregoing account of governmental policies and officials. Foreign voluntary agencies, both professional and religious, also contributed much to the UNRRA project in China. The voluntary groups contributed supplies and personnel directly to UNRRA; and, in addition, they supplemented UNRRA's work through their independent programs. In handling displaced persons, to cite one example, they took care of a problem which limited resources prevented the Chinese Government and UNRRA from resolving.¹

From the beginning, UNRRA officials recognized the importance of the active voluntary foreign relief agencies. Resolution nine entitled "A Resolution Relating to Welfare Services and Voluntary Relief Agencies," and passed by the First Session of the Council, stated that welfare services administered by or in conjunction with UNRRA, would be administered without discrimination concerning race, creed, or political belief. This meant that the agencies had to operate, if they were to operate legally in China, on a broad impersonal basis, rather than on a narrow

¹George Woodbridge, UNRRA The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, three volumes), II, p. 67.

personal basis to bolster the prestige of their own agency. Further, the resolution stated that it would be the policy of the organization, subject to the consent and regulation of the Director General, to seek and enlist the cooperation and participation of appropriate foreign relief agencies, in so far as they could be effectively utilized in relief measures for which they might have special competence and resources.²

The original UNRRA Agreement provided that the Director General would proceed, immediately upon taking office, with the emergency relief plans for the civilian population in areas occupied by the Chinese military, or by any of the United Nations. He should coordinate his plans and action with the military and other appropriate authorities. Further, the Director General was responsible for the arrangements leading to the procurement and assembly of all necessary supplies and for creating or selecting the emergency organizations which would be needed to carry out these activities. In addition, the basic UNRRA Agreement stipulated that foreign voluntary relief agencies could not engage in activities, in areas receiving relief from UNRRA, without the consent or unless they subjected themselves to the regulations of the Director General.³ The extent to which the foreign voluntary relief agencies would be used in giving assistance, in the relief and rehabilitation of natives, would be a matter determined by the Director General in consultation with the

² United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Journal First Session of the Council (Atlantic City, 10 November to 1 December 1953) (Washington, D.C., 1947), p. 186.

³ Ibid., p. 2.

recognized government of the areas where UNRRA operated.⁴

As a result, the voluntary agencies which cooperated with UNRRA made a significant contribution to the ultimate success of UNRRA in China. These contributions were felt both in the help given UNRRA in meeting the needs of UNRRA-assisted countries and in building up international understanding. Further, the officials of UNRRA and CNRRA realized the desirability of close working connections with the voluntary relief societies as these groups would be the source of continuing relief measures after UNRRA relief activities had ended.

To assure the best possible coordination among the voluntary agencies at the national level, a National Clearing Committee was created in China. The committee included members from CNRRA, UNRRA, the Ministry of Social Affairs, and foreign and Chinese voluntary agencies.⁵ In many cases the committee failed to accomplish its objectives, but it did provide much valuable information on inter-agency problems and made for better cooperation among the foreign and national agencies. As a result of this extensive inter-agency cooperation, numberless Chinese who would not otherwise have benefited were saved from utter destitution.

To properly understand the extensive role played by voluntary agencies in China, we need to observe the UNRRA situation there at the

⁴Ibid., p. 186.

⁵United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Report of the Director General to the Council (For the Period 1 July 1947 to 31 December 1947 and Summary of Operations 9 November 1943 to 31 December 1947) (Washington, D.C., 1948), p. 310.

close of the war. The UNRRA China office, as of September 30, 1945, had only fifty-three persons on regular appointment and twenty-one others en route to China.⁶ Likewise CNRRA suffered from an inadequate staff. The sudden acceleration of the overall China program at this time made it necessary to increase the staff of both organizations without delay. The China organization had proposed to carry on its operation with local personnel; however, it requested UNRRA's aid in procuring many of the highly trained professional workers who were needed in the over-all program. The recruitment for China proved distinctive in that candidates were sought who could work in fields much broader than their speciality, but still they had to be highly specialized technicians. The majority of positions called for experts in health, welfare, and agricultural and industrial rehabilitation.

The schedule called for recruitment for the China operations mainly in 1946. The acceleration of the China program, however, prompted CNRRA officials to request UNRRA to provide at the earliest possible date a total of 1,048 persons for service in China. Of this number about half were needed to work directly with CNRRA and other cooperating Chinese Ministries. UNRRA Headquarters had hoped for a broad representation of nationalities with not more than sixty per cent of the quota from the United States. The Secretary of War authorized on August 29, 1945, the release of United States Army personnel in the China and Pacific

⁶United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Report of the Director General to the Council (For the period 1 July 1945 to 30 September 1945) (Washington, D.C., 1945), p. 52.

theaters eligible for discharge who desired to work with UNRRA. Both the British and Canadian Armed Forces issued similar orders.⁸

Both professional and religious voluntary agencies served as important sources of UNRRA personnel in China. Some sixteen American agencies, professional and religious, loaned personnel to UNRRA and most of these same agencies were active in China during this period.⁹ In addition, ten British agencies and eight other various, non-Chinese, national agencies loaned personnel to UNRRA.¹⁰ A total of some forty to fifty alien and non-alien, secular and religious agencies worked for or with UNRRA and CNRRA during the period of their relief activities within the country.

For most positions within the UNRRA staff, a university or professional education and administrative or technical experience of at least five years served as a prerequisite for the program. Candidates

⁸ Ibid., p. 53.

⁹ U.S. Agencies which loaned personnel to UNRRA were: American Christian Committee for Refugees; American Friends Service Committee; American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee; Congregational Christian Service Committee; Girl Scouts of America; Greek War Relief Association; Hadassah; International Migration Service; International Rescue and Relief Committee; Mennonite Central Committee; National Catholic Welfare Conference; Near East Foundation; Southern Baptist Convention; Unitarian Service Committee; World Student Relief; and Young Women's Christian Association; UNRRA, Report of the Director General of the Council (For the Period 1 July 1947 to 31 December 1947 and Summary of Operations 9 November 1943 to 31 December 1947) (Washington, D.C., 1948), Appendix II, p. 359.

¹⁰ UNRRA, Report of the Director General to the Council (For the Period 1 July 1945 to 30 September 1945), p. 53.

accepted for UNRRA employment had to pass a strict medical examination and acknowledge a willingness to endure physical hardship. Persons from thirty to forty years of age fell within the preferred age category, and individuals over fifty found it most difficult to obtain a position without exceptional qualifications, or a speciality falling in the acute shortage category. Lack of foreign language qualification did not prevent employment, but knowledge of a foreign language aided in the selection of personnel for employment. All applicants who possessed suitable qualifications underwent an interview by UNRRA officials and investigation prior to appointment.

UNRRA Headquarters attempted to equate salaries with those of comparable civilian occupations by basing salary standards for various positions requiring training and experience in the country where the employee resided permanently. Previous experience and earnings also figured in the determination of individual salaries. In addition, a field allowance designed to cover the extra cost of living abroad increased income beyond base salary, and allowances paid to married persons or employees with dependents were greater than those paid to single persons. Occasionally the amount paid employees with the same qualifications differed even within certain countries, depending on a great difference in the cost of living in specific areas.

The Chinese Government's initial "Program and Estimated Requirements" included the request that UNRRA recruit and lend, for service within Chinese governmental agencies, a total of more than 2,250 experts. Of this number twenty-two were requested for work in flooded areas and

230 for welfare and training. An undetermined number would serve or work on transportation, and assist in the displaced persons program. Such a request met at first with a cautious response at the Washington Headquarters. Ultimately, however, Washington arranged to recruit the needed "program personnel." This request led to one of the largest and most difficult recruiting operations which faced UNRRA. From the start it was realized that to obtain satisfactory, and not infrequently, highly specialized personnel would be difficult.¹¹

Operations as difficult and specialized as those carried out in China called for the institution of a special training program for those individuals employed for the China field. Like the program of recruitment, the training program embraced both the personnel assigned to UNRRA's China office as well as persons who worked with CNRRA in various technical and advisory capacities. For those persons recruited specifically for China, a brief but intensive orientation to UNRRA and Chinese relief problems served to familiarize the personnel with their expected activities.

The UNRRA Training Branch established the UNRRA Training Center on the campus of the University of Maryland, College Park, May 1, 1944. From September to December, 1945, the school was conducted exclusively for those employees of UNRRA designated for overseas assignment in China. As the size of the body of recruits for China exceeded the numbers which could be trained at the University, it was necessary to move some members

¹¹Woodbridge, UNRRA, II, p. 359.

into Washington to continue the program. During December, 1945, adequate accommodations were found in Washington, D. C., to house the Center as one unit again. Members going to missions other than China were housed in the new quarters also, and special programs were conducted by the Training Center staff for them.¹²

The Training Center offered two or three weeks, and sometimes as many as eight weeks, of intense instructions given by a staff of specialists in Chinese affairs, designed to make fullest utilization of the short period involved. Stress centered on providing an understanding of the basic social, political, and economic instructions of China and the position of the Chinese governmental agencies in relationship to the goals of UNRRA for China. A brief introduction to the Chinese language, with emphasis on the learning of words and phrases of maximum utility, was given by the Chinese instructors.

The UNRRA Training Center concluded its operations after two years of operations on April 30, 1946. During its period of operation the school prepared 2,585 persons of thirty-eight different nationalities for relief and rehabilitation activities in twenty-three countries. The training was organized and instruction provided by a relatively small international staff. Never more than four full time professional persons gave instructions at the school at any one given time. Executives from UNRRA Headquarters selected the staff for the school and it consisted of

¹²United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Monthly UNRRA Review, XVII (January, 1946), p. 23.

officials from the diplomatic corps and federal services, and also, a carefully selected group of outside experts. Many distinguished guest speakers and visitors contributed to the general program. Included among the selected personalities could be found ambassadors, delegates to the UNRRA Council, outstanding journalists, United States Congressmen, and such experts as Eleanor Roosevelt, Owen Lattimore, Colonel James Boettiger, James Brunot, Henry Cassidy, Vera Micheles, and scores of others.¹³

The Training Center operated as one of the three sections of the Training Branch of UNRRA; the other two centers were located in England and France. Persons of four nationalities directed the United States branch during its brief history. The school opened under the leadership of Dr. Frank Munk, a noted Czech economist who later became Director of Training. Dr. Munk, Dr. Hertha Kraus, and Mr. Bryn Mawr, gave much of the instructions during the center's formative period. Bryn Mawr, a professor and an authority on international relief, served as a part-time instructor throughout the two years operation period. In the fall of 1944, Dr. Harry Cassidy (not related to Henry Cassidy), Director of Training and a Canadian social welfare expert, assumed the leadership. He was followed in May, 1945, by Bertram Pichard, a prominent English Quaker who had been for many years the director of the Friends' Center in Geneva; later Dr. Cassidy became the chairman of the Committee on

¹³ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Monthly UNRRA Review, XXI (May, 1946), p. 27.

Refugees and Displaced Persons of the United Nations. Also, for a brief period, Pierce Williams, a United States Government executive and adult educator, headed the Training Center. Then finally, with the inauguration of the program for China in September, 1945, a prominent United States sociologist of Yenching and Temple Universities, Dr. J. Stewart Burgess, assumed the administration of the center.¹⁴

By mid-1945, as previously mentioned, UNRRA had only a skeleton staff in China aiding the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The relations between CNRRA and the China office of UNRRA were during this early period of active operations marred by disagreements, mostly minor in nature, by inefficiency, and by a great deal of friction. Both fractions were confronted with urgent demands from many sources. Such problems as the piling up of UNRRA supplies in the Chinese ports without adequate organization, lack of transportation facilities, or proper funds for distribution, and many marked divergences in the structure and operational concepts held by the two groups took time to work out.¹⁵

Under such circumstances, consultation, joint planning, nor effective coordination could be readily achieved. However, the strengthening of CNRRA and other agencies of the Chinese Government resolved many of the differences. In this area, the loans of UNRRA personnel to key

¹⁴Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁵Woodbridge, UNRRA, II, p. 376.

agencies of the government played a significant part; also, by the establishment of joint committees on allocations and supply operations and by improving liaison between corresponding functional units of the two organizations, as well as by increasing effective consultation and cooperation at all levels, the two groups were able to work more effectively. Differences and issues continued throughout the period of operations; however, in a progressive measure they were dealt with through a more frank discussion which led in most cases to agreement and coordinated effort.¹⁶

By this time, mid-1945, a minimum amount of medical supplies, as well as seeds, had been shipped to Chungking. Medical and welfare recruitment had started, and the personnel employed in turn trained Chinese personnel in the field. By late 1946 a number of medical and public health experts had arrived at the training centers in China and had started training the native Chinese in the fields of public health, sanitary engineering, and nursing. Also, by this time a training program for Chinese welfare workers had been put into operation. In July, 1945, UNRRA had agreed to sponsor the training of twelve native welfare experts who wished to pursue additional study in the United States on relief and rehabilitation problems.¹⁷ In addition, the United States Federal Government cooperated with CNRRA in a project of recruiting and training some

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 376.

¹⁷ UNRRA, Report of the Director General to the Council (For the Period 1 July 1945 to 30 September 1945), p. 54.

sixty Chinese welfare workers who at this time resided in the United States. UNRRA Headquarters met a request of CNRRA by providing the supplies required for the establishing of five training centers in China for the training of local personnel who were used in relief operations.¹⁸ Shipment of health and welfare training supplies and equipment had started at this time. Also, the UNRRA China Headquarters in Shanghai with a liaison office in Nanking had been established, with some fifteen regional offices scattered throughout the country. Many UNRRA welfare specialists served as advisers to the Chinese Government and various CNRRA committee officials.

A major problem which UNRRA Headquarters in Washington had to face involved getting personnel to China. Personnel leaving from the United States had to fit into the entry quotas established by the military authorities in China. The cooperative relations which existed between UNRRA and military authorities in China proved to be of the utmost value in facilitating movement of UNRRA representatives into China and in attaining the travel necessary in carrying out their duties. The assistance of military authorities, who controlled the principal air routes in China, continued to be essential to the expansion of UNRRA's program during the post-surrender period.¹⁹

During the operative period of UNRRA in China, both the Washington and China Headquarters made little or no effort to control the

¹⁸Ibid., p. 54.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 53.

activities of the professional and religious voluntary agencies operating within the country. The entire responsibility for determining the nature of relief, scope, and areas of operation of all voluntary agencies resulted from the "Principles of Cooperation among CNRRA, UNRRA, and Foreign Voluntary Agencies," which placed this responsibility in the hands of CNRRA in June, 1945.²⁰

Action had to be taken by these foreign voluntary agencies, to ensure that the progress of internal reconstruction in China would not, in any way, be blocked by fears and jealousies, and that each of the agencies could develop its own program in keeping with the genius of its people. This factor is especially true in Eastern Asia, namely China, because of the wide disparity between the social values cherished by orientals and occidentals. Great differences can be found in the fields of family relations, manual labor, and attitude concerning races. Chiang Kai-shek had expressed the opinion several times during the war that the United States and England looked upon the Chinese as an inferior people. Thus, the relations between China and her allies dared not be that between donor and recipient. The views of the Chinese leaders had to be heard with respect. They needed the recognition as equals in regard to the part which the Western Powers gave them. The acceptance of aid from the west in general could only be interpreted as a sign of strength, and not one of humiliation. After nine years of war and blockade, the Chinese people needed all the help they could get to feed the starving

²⁰ Woodbridge, UNRRA, II, p. 71.

and clothe the naked. The relief needs proved to be as great, and in many cases greater, in Free China with its impaired economy than it had been in the formerly occupied regions. The task proved not necessarily one of supplying from abroad the relief supplies and other lacking materials, but of restoration of productive capacity which would enable the people to produce what they needed.

During the Second World War many American churches, working through the Church Committee on Overseas Relief and Reconstruction, sent such aid as possible. But the American Protestant churches relied for administrative help on a variety of recognized religious agencies.²¹ Chief among the agencies through which relief was channeled, however, was the Church Committee for Relief in Asia, which had grown out of the former Church Committee for China Relief.²²

The Protestant missionaries had, for over a century, been steadily expanding their work in China before the coming of UNRRA. By the late 1920's, the leadership previously held by foreign missionaries had largely passed into the hands of the native Christians. During the Second World War the Chinese Christians contributed greatly to the

²¹Such as the American Bible Society, the American Friends Service Committee, the Orphaned Missions Fund of the International Missionary Council, the Young Men's Christian Association (war-prisoner's aid and chaplaincy service), the Young Women's Christian Association, the World's Student Christian Federation, and the American Christian Committee for Refugees.

²²A. L. Warnshuis, "How the Churches Can Help," Social Action, XIII (November, 1946), pp. 30-31.

nation's war effort and civilian relief. Immediately after the close of the war, both native Christians and foreign missionaries engaged extensively in the relief and rehabilitation activities. Like the Catholic missionaries, the Protestant missionaries could credit themselves with the establishment of many educational and medical institutions in China, in addition to the activities of direct relief rendered. The end of the war found the work of the missionaries greatly disrupted, but in spite of the many difficulties, the religious bodies manifested remarkable endurance and growth, both in membership and the rendering of humane services.²³

Protestant groups working in China based their relief plans for the war-shattered country and operated on the assumption that the peak of suffering and relief needs resulting from the war would be passed before 1948. This projected assumption, however, tragically underestimated both the depth and the extent of damages within China, as resulting from the war and the abnormal conditions existing at the close of Japanese occupation. With the surrender of Japan, all of occupied China was liberated at once; this sudden and total liberation left the country in a state of confusion and distress much worse than that experienced by most European countries. Soon thereafter, Protestant missionary leaders realized that a return to conditions even remotely resembling those existing before the catastrophe could not be expected for a least a

²³The China Handbook Editorial Board, China Handbook 1952-1953, (Taipei, Taiwan: China Publishing Company, 1952), pp. 52-53.

generation, even under the most desirable conditions. This realization resulted in a re-evaluation of the consideration given to future activities on the part of Protestant missionary leaders in regards to relief policies. It was realized that a united program projected over a long range in which immediate physical, as well as spiritual, aid had to be the primary concern. Cooperative efforts on the part of the Christian missionaries in China concerning relief, during both natural and unnatural disasters, were not new. The history of the foreign missionaries in China covers a period of several decades of administering aid to those among whom they labored and lived.

The Catholic missionaries were among the first foreigners to work among the Chinese. During the war the Chinese Catholic Medical Service, founded in Chungking during 1937, at the suggestion of Archbishop Paul Yu-pin, distributed medical aid, medical supplies, and relief to orphanages and dispensaries in the unoccupied sections of China. This organization continued to function until early 1946, with its main source of revenue coming from the American Catholic organization known as the War Relief Services. After the disbanding of the Chinese Catholic Medical Service, the Catholic Welfare Committee established during July, 1946, in Shanghai, served as a central agency for the 288 hospitals, 866 dispensaries, and 320 orphanages maintained by the Catholic Church in China. The Catholic Welfare Committee cooperated with other relief agencies through its eight regional directors.²⁴

²⁴The China Handbook Editorial Board, China Handbook 1950, (New York: Rockport Press, Inc., 1950), p. 28.

Other relief work carried on by the Catholic agency included the training of child welfare personnel, in conjunction with the Aurora College for Women in Shanghai, and maintaining a mobile children's clinic in the same city. Additionally, the Catholic missions conducted eight leper hospitals in China.²⁵

Following the war, the Protestant mission hospitals faced great rehabilitation difficulties. Shortages of medical supplies, medical equipment, and trained personnel added to their already numerous problems. On March 21 and 22, 1945, Dr. Sze Sze-ming, chief of the Far Eastern section Health Division, attended in New York a meeting called by the Foreign Missions Conference of North America. Its purpose centered on discussion of participation of Protestant mission hospitals in the relief and rehabilitation program of CNRRA. The conference group, consisting of representatives of the missionary societies of the United States and Canada, approved and urged future cooperation between the missionary societies and CNRRA; it also recommended placing the various societies' hospital buildings in China at the disposal of Chinese authorities. In addition, the conference representatives endorsed the proposal of sending back to China whatever technical personnel the various societies might have available to staff the hospitals; the group also urged that the missionary societies station a full-time medical representative in Chungking to act as a liaison officer, whose duties

²⁵Ibid., p. 28.

would be to determine which mission hospitals should be reopened for maximum effectness to the relief effort and how mission personnel could be best utilized.²⁶

The National Christian Council established and maintained a relief committee in China during 1946 and 1947, and from March, 1946, to the following March, the National Council spent in administering for general relief and aid to church workers a sum of CNR \$1,153 million; the aid given to church workers included the tuition for minister's children and subsidies given to theology students. The source of income for work carried on by the National Christian Council came primarily from the Church World Service, New York, and was channelled through China. The National Christian Council terminated its work on September 30, 1947, and the Protestant Service Department of the American Advisory Committee took up its relief activities.²⁷

During mid-1945, a movement was set afoot to merge the Church Committee on Overseas Relief and Reconstruction, the Church Committee for Relief in Asia, and the Commission for World Council Service, which concerned itself primarily with interchurch aid in Europe. This Church World Service, Incorporated, the resulting organization of the merger, held its first meeting in May, 1946. The organization described itself as not another separate relief agency, but as the churches themselves working together. The funds and goods contributed by the American

²⁶United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Monthly UNRRA Review, VIII (April, 1945), p. 11.

²⁷The China Handbook Editorial Board, China Handbook, 1950, p. 30.

churches were administered almost together by the local church and mission personnel in the countries receiving aid, rather than by the religious relief agencies in those countries.²⁸

The Church World Service, Inc., purchased powdered milk and other concentrated foods at wholesale prices and shipped them overseas in bulk quantities. Clothing, shoes, layettes, bedding and other household items and supplies were greatly needed in China, where textiles were not yet available for manufacturing and where the people could not obtain these necessities. To aid in fighting the misery of cold and exposure, the American churches asked their various congregations for used clothing. The member churches united in opening ten warehouses under Church World Service, Inc. Most of the work of sorting, packing, and shipping the clothing was done by volunteers. Churches located near the ten warehouses sponsored salvage sewing groups which helped in mending the used garments, which resulted in the most economical relief program ever conceived. Gifts-in-Kind received at the warehouses were credited to the donor's home church.²⁹

During the war years, the Committee for War Victims and Services channelled \$1,000,000 in gifts from individuals of the Congregational Christian Churches to relief needs in England, France, Italy, Greece, and China. This amount comprised the Congregational Christian Churches'

²⁸ Warnshuis, "How the Churches Can Help," p. 31.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 31-32.

share in which all demoninations united during this period to send \$10,000,000 to war victims overseas.³⁰

The Congregational Christian Relief Committee changed its name to the Committee for War Victims and Reconstruction; it sought before the close of 1948 to raise a minimum of \$4,000,000 as its share of \$125,000,000 sought by Protestant denominations in the United States for relief purposes and for the reconstruction of church life around the world. A total of \$1,294,000 of this amount was needed for the reconstruction of church property, such as hospitals, schools, and churches overseas. The essential nature of such a program in the rehabilitation of war victims can be seen in many ways; for example, the fact that eighty per cent of all civilian hospital beds in China were in Christian institutions, and of the 250 hospitals supplying these beds, nearly all were either destroyed or stripped of their equipment during the war.³¹

The Brethren Service Committee of the Church of the Brethren not only made a substantial contribution to UNRRA through its livestock program, but engaged in a new type of humanitarian service which proved most beneficial in China. Through the efforts of this religious organization, American farming methods and mechanized farming equipment were introduced into China by the Brethren agricultural missionaries.

The agricultural missionaries consisted of a fifty man tractor-

³⁰ Hawley William, "The Congregational Christian Program of Reconstruction," Social Action, XIII (November, 1946), p. 37.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 37-38.

operator unit sponsored by UNRRA and the Church of the Brethren. The members of the team underwent a two-week course at the Harry Ferguson, Inc., Educational Farm near Ypsilanti, Michigan. Here they learned to tear down and reassemble tractors and farm implements and perform actual farm work.³²

The idea for the "down-to-earth" ambassadors originated with Howard Sollenberger, the son of American missionaries to China. When UNRRA decided to send American tractors and implements to the Yellow River area to help solve China's food problem, Mr. Sollenberger's idea met with approval and adoption by both the Brethren and UNRRA, which ordered an emergency shipment of 2,000 tractors and farm implements. UNRRA financed the cost of transportation, while CNRRA contributed \$15 per month and maintenance for each of the "down-to-earth" ambassadors. The worker-missionaries left the United States in September, 1948, with a contract calling for eighteen months of service.³³ Tractor-training bases and tractor-plowing projects were set up in Honan, Hupei, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kiangsi, Shantung, Chekiang and Northeast China; the bases were located in areas where arable land had been out of cultivation for some time. Thousands of acres were planted which otherwise would have remained idle. Much of this land had been reclaimed after the completion

³²United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Monthly UNRRA Review, XXVI (October, 1946), p. 25; From an account which appeared in the Wall Street Journal of 27 August 1946.

³³Ibid., p. 25.

of the Yellow River Project.³⁴ The men, in addition to work done in the field, aided in teaching at two agricultural schools which had been established earlier in the year. Some of the men indicated that they expected to remain in China after their contracts expired as full time missionaries.

Perhaps this was one of the most practical projects on the part of American religious organizations. China has never been able to provide enough food from her domestic agriculture to feed the masses of her people. She has always been dependent upon food imports. The devastation of nearly fourteen years of war, especially the breaking of the Yellow River dikes and the consequent flooding of a large area of good agricultural land, widened enormously the gap between needs and domestic production.

³⁴ UNRRA, Report of the Director General to the Council (For the Period 1 July 1947 to 31 December 1947 and Summary of Operations 9 November 1943 to December 1947) (Washington, D.C., 1948), p. 235.

EVALUATION

UNRRA can list many triumphs in China. UNRRA probably saved two to three million destitute people from starvation. In addition, at least eight to ten million more received UNRRA food, clothing, or medical supplies to tide them over. Finally UNRRA created some two million jobs through its various work projects; and wages distributed enabled many to readjust to postwar China.

Aside from meeting human needs, UNRRA left a material legacy of consequence. It constructed or repaired several thousand miles of highways and railway roadbeds. It started, and in some cases, completed many sanitation projects, river dredging projects, and dams. The eight large, as well as many small conservancy projects were completed or started. Many small local businesses and industries started operations again as a result of UNRRA. Further, UNRRA restored four million acres of land to productivity, in turn protecting about thirty million acres.

Chinese medical and health institutions, as a result of UNRRA, recovered their prewar positions; and they had made a major breakthrough on anti-epidemic work. Work restored food output to prewar levels at a cost of \$71,000,000. Estimates show that the annual food production from land reclaimed through the conservancy projects alone was about four times the total amount of foodstuff provided by UNRRA and about thirty-seven times

the amount used in feeding the workers in carrying out the projects.¹

Other positive benefits brought to the Chinese people as a result of UNRRA activities included power plants and waterworks projects, aid to coal mining, the machine shop industry, and the textile industry. Likewise it improved coastal and river shipping and highway transportation facilities. Finally UNRRA supplies did enable China to scrape through the postwar period relatively free from starvation.

If China made a slow recovery under UNRRA auspices, this resulted from factors beyond the organization's control. Without UNRRA aid, millions of Chinese would surely have starved.

¹George Woodbridge, UNRRA The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, three volumes), II, p. 452.

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VITA

Floyd Russel Goodno

candidate for the degree of

Master of Arts

Thesis: UNRRA IN CHINA 1945-47: THE AMERICAN ROLE IN CHINA'S RECOVERY

Major: History

Biographical:

Personal data: Born in Ludington, Michigan, September 2, 1930,
the son of George R. and Erma Mary Goodno.

Education: Attended elementary school in Aline, Oklahoma;
graduated from Aline Public High School in 1947; received
Bachelor of Science degree from Phillips University in 1952;
completed requirements for the Masters of Arts degree in
August, 1962.

Professional experience: Taught Social Studies and General
Science at Hominy Junior High and Senior High, Hominy,
Oklahoma 1956-1961; Served as a Graduate Assistant in the
History Department of Oklahoma State University, 1961-1962.

Professional organizations: Phi Alpha Theta.