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BERKELEY AND WITTGENSTEIN: SOME CORRELATIONS

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Norman, Oklahoma

BERKELEY AND WITTGENSTEIN: SOME CORRELATIONS

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PREFACE

Among the many noteworthy results of contemporary analytic philosophy are logical positivism, ideal language theory, ordinary language analysis, symbolic logic, the new mathematics, empirio-pragmatism in physical science, refinements in axiological theory, and interesting developments in epistemology.

George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (1685-1753), and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), outstanding among critical and analytic philosophers, did much to prepare the ground for this rich contemporary harvest. In an important sense much of Wittgenstein's work can be seen as a logical development of Berkeley's major doctrines. I shall review and compare the ontological, epistemological, linguistic, and psychological aspects of the major works of the two thinkers, showing in what respects their findings are similar and in what respects they are dissimilar.

The value of a comparative analysis lies in the fact that the treatment of a given problem by one of the two philosophers often clarifies and amplifies the treatment of an identical or at least similar problem by the other. The essentially modern thrust of Berkeley's thinking is made clear. Further, the comparison points up patterns of continuity in philosophical investigation.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Berkeley's and Wittgenstein's works are listed below in the order in which they appear in the text.

S Berkeley, Siris, Given by section number.

- <u>PC</u> Berkeley, <u>Philosophical Commentaries</u>. Given by entry number. An asterisk (*) following <u>PC</u> entries indicates that punctuation has been inserted and/or spelling and grammatical changes have been made to make Berkeley's notes more intelligible.
- A Berkeley, The Analyst. Given by section number.
- BB Wittgenstein, The Blue Book. Given by page number.
- PHKBerkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles ofHuman Knowledge.Given by section number.
- <u>T</u> Wittgenstein, <u>Tractatus</u> <u>Logico-Philosophicus</u>.
 Given by entry number. Ogden translation unless otherwise indicated.
- DHP Berkeley, <u>Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philo-</u> nous. Given by dialogue number and page number.
- <u>PI</u> Wittgenstein, <u>Philosophical Investigations</u>. References from Part I are given by the entry number. Those from Part II are given by section number (small Roman numeral) and page number.
- <u>TVV</u> Berkeley, <u>An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision</u>. Given by section number.

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- <u>Alc</u>. Berkeley, <u>Alciphron</u>, <u>or the Minute Philosopher</u>. Given by dialogue number and page number.
- DM Berkeley, <u>De Motu</u>. Given by section number.

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BERKELEY AND WITTGENSTEIN: SOME CORRELATIONS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein use the language model as a gateway through which the philosopher passes to arrive at the solution or dissolution of philosophical problems. Since they both claim that there is a qualified language-thought-reality isomorphism, they endeavor to cast light on philosophical problems which, in part, stem from the language in which they are expressed. If the nature, functions, uses, and abuses of the language model are understood, claim both philosophers, the underlying metaphysical and epistemological problems will either be resolved or be shown up as pseudo-problems. It is possible to reason analogically from that which is clear, i.e., the language model, to a more complete understanding of that which is less clear, i.e., the concepts expressed by the language. Berkeley remarks that

. . . The phenomena of nature, which strike on the senses and are understood by the mind, form not only a magnificent spectacle, but also a most coherent, entertaining, and instructive discourse; and to effect this, they are conducted, adjusted, and ranged by the greatest wisdom. This language or discourse is studied with different attention and interpreted with different degrees of skill. But so far as

men have studied and remarked its rules, and can interpret right, so far they may be said to be knowing its nature.¹

He compares the phenomena of nature which are perceived as sense data to the language-model in which the words stand as signs to the concepts signified. Sense data, according to Berkeley, are the phenomena of nature. The linguistic formulations of the sequences in which sense data occur are the laws of nature. Laws of nature are analogous to the grammatical rules of the language being utilized. Both are initially descriptive, not prescriptive.

Wittgenstein uses two different language models in the course of his philosophical development. He uses a picture-model theory of language in the <u>Tractatus</u> and believes that the comprehensive understanding and use of this model will bring about the dissolution of philosophical problems by showing that they are without sense. Later, Wittgenstein rejects the picture-model as inadequate and, in the <u>Philosophical Investigations</u>, replaces it with the model of language-games. The body of this text is an examination and comparison of the ways in which Berkeley and Wittgenstein interpret the language models and of the conclusions which they draw.

The two philosophers worked in similar intellectual millieus. Berkeley, and his contemporaries in the

¹<u>S</u>, sec. 254.

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intellectual world, were influenced by the mathematical philosophies of Galileo, Descartes, Leibniz, and Newton. The epistemological theories advanced by Descartes, Locke, and Malebranch were also topics for polemical writings. In the British Isles, the predominant tendency was to view and analyze man and the world in terms of a mechanical model. This period was characterized by antischolastic criticism and by epistemological investigation. Inquiry into the scope, methods, and structure of knowledge came as a natural result of the expansion of science which required an acute examination of its first principles.

Berkeley's predisposition for independent thinking along with his critical, inquiring turn of mind enabled him to become an apt student of the new science, but also an independent critic of the mainstream of contemporary thought. He remarks in his notebooks: "I was distrustful at eight years old and Consequently by Nature disposed for these new Doctrines."² At first he received the new doctrines of science with enthusiasm, and was enchanted by the demonstrative power of mathematical reasoning. Soon. however, he turned his attention to the philosophy of mathematics, convinced that the basic mathematical principles then accepted were confused or unintelligible. As evidenced in The Analyst, Berkeley is of the opinion that

²<u>PC</u>, 266.

logic lies at the foundation of mathematics, and that bad logic cannot result in good science, even though it occasionally leads to satisfactory results. He tells the mathematicians that

I have no controversy about your conclusions, but only about your logic and method. . . I beg leave to repeat and insist, that I consider the geometrical analyst as a logician. . . . And, forasmuch as it may perhaps seem an unaccountable paradox that mathematicians should deduce true propositions from false principles, be right in the conclusion and yet err in the premises; I shall endeavour particularly to explain why this may come to pass, and show how error may bring forth truth, though it cannot bring forth science.³

Wittgenstein, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, was influenced by the anti-Hegelian, antimetaphysical reaction, and by the second phase of the scientific revolution. The evolutionary theories of Darwin and Lamarck, Einstein's theory of relativity, and Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy combined to supersede the mechanical model which followed in the wake of Newtonian mechanics. The twentieth century is also an era of epistemological investigation, as the new scientific doctrines necessitate another re-evaluation of first principles.

Like Berkeley, Wittgenstein's early interests were focused on mathematics and the logical foundation of mathematics. He shared Berkeley's anti-metaphysical bias and

 $\overset{3}{\underline{A}}$, sec. 20.

his preference for a common-sense epistemology. Berkeley notes that it is necessary "to be eternally banishing metaphysics and recalling men to common sense."⁴ In a similar vein Wittgenstein comments that "one can defend common sense against the attacks of philosophers only by solving their puzzles."⁵

The theses which I have chosen to emphasize in this comparative study of Berkeley and Wittgenstein can best be understood if we follow the logical sequence of their development from the object pole of experience to the sub-Thus, I show how both thinkers ject pole of experience. work through the language model to an ontic foundation, how the signs and symbols which have an ontological basis form elements of the language. By focusing attention on ordinary language, one can resolve certain metaphysical puzzles which have confounded generations of philosophers, claim both Berkeley and Wittgenstein. An analysis of the roles played by grammar, logic, and propositions in the language model, is the source of the similar epistemological position at which the two men arrive. Both have a contextualist-instrumentalist theory of meaning, which encompasses a theory of truth. Finally, in their respective treatments of the subject-pole of experience, both Berkeley and Wittgenstein resort to phenomenological analysis.

> ⁴<u>PC</u>, 751. ⁵<u>BB</u>, 58-59.

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Of primary importance to both men is the correction of prior philosophical error. Berkeley feels that this critical activity prepares the ground for the reception of true doctrine, i.e., the doctrine of immaterialism. This, he claims, accords with common sense, and is easily seen once the language-model is employed. He writes:

And I give it you on my word, since this revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of Nature and common sense, I find my understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can now easily comprehend a great many things which before were all mystery and riddle.⁶

Unlike Berkeley, Wittgenstein offers no positive doctrine. He claims that the proper understanding of the language and of the logic of the language is sufficient to dissolve all philosophical problems. There are no questions left, hence no need for explanation.

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. . . . Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.

* * *

The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. . . The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question.⁷

. .

⁶<u>DHP</u>, I, p. 172. ⁷<u>PI</u>, 126 and 133.

CHAPTER II

ONTO LO GY

Before turning attention to the analysis of the structure of the language-model itself, both Berkeley and Wittgenstein look through the language-model to its ontic Things and ideas, for Berkeley, and facts and foundation. objects, for Wittgenstein, comprise the world. These are the entities which form the referents of any possible symbolic system. Language, which is thought expressed, is the symbolic system through which the world becomes intelligible. The philosophical problem to be solved, as both Berkeley and Wittgenstein see it, is the relation obtaining between world and language. Difficulties arise because language is a part of the world. It is not only the human activity that makes the world intelligible, but it is inextricably involved in the world-complex. Language, in one of its modes, serves as a tool of analysis, but at the same time it shapes the world it is analyzing. Thus the distinction between language and world is, of necessity, only a conceptual distinction.

Berkeley begins his discussion of the most general categories of being by noting that

. . . nothing seems of more importance, towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a

distinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality, existence. . . Thing or being is under it two kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing in common but the name, to wit, spirits and ideas.¹

<u>Thing</u>, as Berkeley uses the term, means reality, hence intelligibility. In his own words, <u>thing</u> means either "ideas or that which has ideas."² Ideas and that which has ideas comprise the world. The first of the two kinds of things that are to be met with in reality, minds or spirits, will be discussed in Chapter VII. <u>Ideas</u> are the next topic to be considered. For Berkeley,

. . . Idea is the object or subject of thought. What I think on, whatever it be, I call idea. Thought itself, or thinking is no idea. 'Tis an act.' 3

I take the word idea for any the $\sqrt{\text{sic7}}$ immediate object of sense or understanding, in which large signification it is commonly used by the moderns.⁴

Idea has three important kinds of meanings for Berkeley. First, idea includes in its signification all of the sensual qualities, i.e., sight, sound, touch, taste and smell. The internal sensations are included as well, i.e., pain, hunger, fear, etc. Secondly, the term includes in its signification ordinary objects in the world which are congeries of sense qualities. Examples of these are table, my body, events of history, the sight and aroma of

¹PHK, sec. 89. ²PC, 369. ³PC, 808. ⁴NTV, sec. 45.

a broiled steak. Objects of imagination and memory are included as a sub-class. Berkeley notes that in ordinary usage an "idea is the picture of the imagination's making. This is the likeness of and referred to the real idea, or (if you will) thing."⁵ In this passage Berkeley intends to show how his use of the term <u>idea</u> differs from the ordinary usage. In the narrow sense, we say that we have an idea of something when thought or imagination or understanding has acted upon raw sensation. <u>Thing</u>, in the passage cited above, means simply the given in experience, uninterpreted by thought. In the broad sense, or in Berkeley's usage of the terms, <u>idea</u> replaces thing. Berkeley explains why he stipulates a broader usage for the term idea.

First, because the term thing in contradistinction to idea is generally supposed to denote somewhat existing without the mind; secondly, because thing hath a more comprehensive signification than idea, including spirits or thinking things as well as ideas. Since, therefore, the objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withall thoughtless and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word idea, which implies those properties.⁶

Berkeley clarifies his usage of the language because he feels that philosophers have been led into error, particularly into the positing of odd entities such as material substance, by misunderstanding the grammar of the language. He points out that "the referring ideas to

PHK, sec. 39.

⁵PC, 657a.

things which are not ideas, the using of the term <u>idea of</u>, is one great cause of mistake."⁷ The preposition <u>of</u> used in this way leads us to think that there must be some external <u>thing</u> to which our idea can be referred for comparison. Berkeley acknowledges that it sounds harsh, even ridiculous, to say that we eat and drink ideas and are clothed with them because the word <u>idea</u> is not used this way in ordinary discourse. But even so, propositions are more accurately stated in Berkeley's terms because

. . . We are fed and clothed with those things which we immediately perceive by our senses.

Color, figure, motion, extension and the like, considered only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But if they are looked on as notes or images, referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then are we involved all in skepticism.⁹

The word thing as comprising or standing for idea and volition is useful, but as standing for idea and archetype without the mind, is mischievous and useless.¹⁰

The above summary account exemplifies Berkeley's use of language analysis to dispel philosophical puzzlement. It is the grammar of the language that leads philosophers to postulate odd entities such as Locke's material substance and Descartes' res extensa.

⁷ <u>PC</u> , 660.		⁸ <u>РНК</u> ,	sec.	38.
9 <u>PHK</u> , sec.	87.	10 <u>PC</u> ,	689.	

The third sense of the meaning of the term <u>idea</u> is, for Berkeley, the ontological rather than the logical one. Ideas themselves are signs. They are the signs in the language of God, the author of nature, the source of experience. The origin of ideas as signs, in this sense, is transcendental. According to Berkeley, the objective pole of experience is public and universal because the ideas perceived by finite minds signify the course of nature which is the language by which God communicates to man. Ideas are the marks of God's divine sensible language.

Just as Berkeley's most general category of being is signified by the term <u>thing</u>, Wittgenstein's most general category of being is signified by the term <u>fact</u>. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein explains his views as follows:

The world is everything that is the case. . . The world is the totality of facts, not of things. . . The totality of existent atomic facts is the world. . . The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality. . . The total reality is the world.¹¹

The complex facts of which the world is composed can be analyzed into atomic facts. By substitution above, the totality of atomic facts is reality. These general designations differ in that Wittgenstein's term <u>atomic</u> <u>fact</u> includes a logical connotation that Berkeley's term <u>thing</u> lacks. Wittgenstein defines an atomic fact as a complex of objects in relation. The possibility of

 11_{T} , 1, 1.1, 2.04, 2.06 and 2.063.

entering into definite relations is inherent in the objects; thus atomic facts are ordered and impose that order on any possible symbolic representation. The ontological, in effect, determines the logic of the language and shows itself in any possible language. Wittgenstein makes this point in the Tractatus by stating that

. . . An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things). . . . In the atomic fact the objects hang one in another, like the links of a chain. . . In the atomic fact the objects are combined in a definite way.¹²

Wittgenstein's views parallel Berkeley's to the extent that they both insist that there is an order and definiteness in experience which expresses itself in symbolic representation, yet the facts are independent of one another. We cannot infer one fact from another, nor can we say that one fact causes another. Wittgenstein writes that "Atomic facts are independent of one another."¹³ Berkeley expresses the same view by remarking, "I think not that things fall out of necessity. The connection of no two ideas is necessary."¹⁴ Thus neither finds necessity at the object pole of experience. Experience is given as separate, unique drops or atoms, among which there is no discernible necessary connection.

> ${}^{12}\underline{T}$, 2.01, 2.03, and 2.031. ${}^{13}\underline{T}$, 2.061. ${}^{14}\underline{PC}$, 884.

When asked to give a concrete example of an atomic fact, Wittgenstein replies that this is the business of empirical psychology, not of philosophy. He does claim that atomic facts are combinations of objects; thus an examination of Wittgenstein's use of the term <u>object</u> should help clarify the concept of atomic fact. Wittgenstein uses the term <u>object</u> in three major senses. These are similar to the three ways in which Berkeley uses the term <u>idea</u>. First, object refers to an individual sense datum.

A speck in a visual field need not be red, but it must have a colour. . . A tone must have a pitch, the object of the sense of touch a hardness, etc.¹⁵

This coincides exactly with Berkeley's use of the term <u>idea</u> to mark sense data. Secondly, Wittgenstein uses the term <u>object</u> to mark clusters of sense data which are ordinarily referred to as things. An object in this sense would be a table, a shoe, a pickle. This corresponds to Berkeley's second usage of the term <u>idea</u>. Wittgenstein has been accused of inconsistency because he also asserts that the object is simple, and the things of everyday life are complex.¹⁶ This same charge could be made against

 15 T, 2.0131.

¹⁶Cf. Alexander Maslow, <u>A Study in Wittgenstein's</u> <u>Tractatus</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p. 11.

"But 'The object is simple' (2.02), while things of everyday life are obviously complex, and thus while we may

Berkeley. However, the objection loses its force if we take into account the fully developed views of both philosophers about the nature and functions of language. When we talk about the simplicity or complexity of a term out of any context, we are talking nonsense. A term takes its meaning from the language game in which it is being used. Meaning and context are inseparable. The simplicity or complexity of a term is a function of the concrete propositional expression in which it is to be found.

The third sense in which Wittgenstein uses the term <u>object</u> is the metaphysical sense, which again parallels Berkeley's view. Wittgenstein writes that

Objects form the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot be compound. . . If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true. . . It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world (true or false). . . It is clear that however different from the real one an imagined world may be, it must have something--a form-in common with the real world. . . It fixed form consists of the objects. 17

speak of things as objects in the sense of referends of the terms of our language, they cannot be considered as the ultimate elements of experience. And even if we decide that by objects Wittgenstein does not always mean the ultimate elements of the world. It would still be advisable not to use the terms 'things' and 'elements' /i.e., use the term objects as synonomous with both/ interchangeably because these terms have different logical properties."

 17 T, 2.021, 2.0211, 2.0212, 2.022, and 2.023.

Although in a mode quite different from Berkeley's doctrine of divine sensible language, Wittgenstein is nonetheless making ontological claims. He is asserting something about the world; namely, that there is given an objective formal structure which determines experience to He is saying that if there were no form to some degree. the world, the coherence theory of truth would be the only But in this case it would be impossible truth-theory. possible to make any true or false statements about the world. One could only remark on the consistency of propositions with other propositions. In such a case Wittgenstein's entire theory of truth-functions, one of the most fruitful results of his work, would be completely unfounded. Further, Wittgenstein remarks:

The world is independent of my will. . . . Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world. Logic is transcendental. . . . In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one may be a picture of the other at all. . . . This fixed form consists of the objects. . . There is only logical necessity. ¹⁸

How things stand is God. 19

For Berkeley, <u>ideas</u> in the metaphysical sense refer to God's divine sensible language, and determine the objectivity and universality of experience. Wittgenstein's objects serve the same metaphysical function. God is "how

> 18 <u>T</u>, 6.373, 6.13, 2.161, 2.023 and 6.37. 19 NB, p. 79.

things stand" and how things do actually stand determines the logic of the symbolic representation of experience used in the language models of both philosophers.

In summation, Berkeley's things and Wittgenstein's atomic facts serve similar purposes in their respective expositions. Both are the most general descriptive categories of reality, yet both are further analyzable into more fundamental components. Wittgenstein's doctrine of atomic facts reflects the extensive development of modern Facts carry the connotation of the inextricable logic. logical bond between any possible language (or thought) and the world, a bond which is not explicitly included in Berkeley's discussion of the term things. Berkeley's term things includes in its extension that class of entities which cannot be objectified, i.e., self, other selves, and infinite spirit. There is no similar connotation in Wittgenstein's atomic fact.

There is an even closer correspondence between the uses and meanings of the pair of terms <u>idea</u> and <u>object</u> as used by Berkeley and Wittgenstein, respectively. Both terms serve as the ontological foundation upon which the structure of human knowledge is erected. The uses and meanings of this pair of terms are clarified by the use of the language model. The three major meanings of the pair of terms for both philosophers are: (1) sense data; (2) physical objects which are combinations of sense data;

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and (3) metaphysical objects which guarantee the determinateness of sense experience and the universality of experience. The signs and symbols of which language and thought are comprised refer to the ideas and objects.

CHAPTER III

SIGNS AND SYMBOLS

Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein consider signs to be the bridge between being and knowing. Berkeley begins the development of his theory of signs in <u>An Essay Towards a</u> <u>New Theory of Vision</u>, but for didactic reasons does not complete it until he presents his full doctrine of immaterialism in the <u>Principles of Human Knowledge</u>. The most fundamental meaning of the term sign is introduced analogically through the language model.

Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude that the proper objects of vision constitute an universal language of the Author of nature, whereby we are instructed how to regulate our actions in order to attain those things that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of them. It is by their information that we are principally guided in all the transactions and concerns of life. And the manner wherein they signify and mark unto us the objects which are at a distance is the same with that of language and signs of human appointment, which do not suggest the things signified by any likeness or identity of nature, but only be an habitual connexion that experience has made us to observe between them.¹

The above paragraph contains a number of Berkeley's key ideas. First, when a person of normal vision uses that faculty under normal conditions, certain data are perceived.

¹NTV, sec. 147.

The basic elements of these data are color, figure, and relative motion or rest. These data are independent of the will of the perceiver, and he is aware that he does Therefore, these ideas have an external not cause them. Berkeley claims that no idea can be in a thoughtsource. less or senseless thing, and an idea can'resemble only For these reasons, Berkeley claims, the another idea. source of our ideas must be some mind or some thinking being which is external to our own minds. The source of our ideas must be God. It follows that our individual ideas are signs, and the totality of our ideas, including their relations, sequences, and order, comprises the language of the author of nature. God speaks to man directly by means of visual and other sensual signs. These are, so to speak, the end of the line.

In vain do we extend our view into the heavens, and pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned men, and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity; we need only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand.²

Neither our science nor our scholars nor the writings of the past can bring us knowledge in the strict sense. We gain that knowledge by attending to the sensory signs by means of which God communicates with man. We must attend to these signs with a mind free of the prejudices of the past which are built into the common language.

²PHK, Introduction, sec. 24.

By showing that ideas are objects, and that the proper objects of the senses are the marks or signs of God's divine sensual language, Berkeley claims that he has refuted scepticism. The refutation of relativism follows as a corollary, since God's language is both public and universal.

The multiplicity of human languages and culture patterns seems to give credence to philosophical relativism. The signs by which communal groups mark their ideas seem to be totally arbitrary. However, in one of his most interesting arguments Berkeley shows that underlying the apparently arbitrary sounds and scribbles that man chooses to mark his ideas is an order imposed by the ontological In a carefully developed analysis, Berkeley makes factor. this point by showing that the data perceived by the five senses differ. In the case of a cube of any given color, we receive a type of visual datum. Upon touching and tracing the outline of the cube tactually, we have a second type of sense datum. Normally, one would say that either type of sense datum is an adequate sign for conveying the information cube. We think that there is a necessary correlation between tactile and visual signs. However. experiments with persons who gain sight after prior blindness show that a person who is able to give the appropriate verbal sign cube to the touched object is unable to name the object from visual data alone. He cannot distinguish visually between a cube and a sphere, for example.

The data of all the senses, then, are signs given the perceiver directly by God. Each of the types of signs, in most respects, is quite unlike the other types; the visual datum <u>cube</u> differs from the tactile datum <u>cube</u>. The connection between the two is, as far as the human perceiver knows, entirely arbitrary, and must be learned by experience. However, it is a matter of common experience that the visual and tactile data signifying <u>cube</u> are always found in conjunction, so the two are marked, in any human symbolic system, by one sign. This type of order does occur in any possible language because of the nature of the sensible sign-communication system which God has established with man.

Not only do ideas stand as signs in God's communication with man, but they instruct man how to regulate his actions in the "transactions and concerns of life." Berkeley is introducing indirectly his operational concept of the nature of any symbolic system. This concept is amplified in his discussion of distance perception and made fully explicit in his philosophy of science. It is through the universal language of the author of nature that we are instructed how to regulate our actions for our preservation and suit them to our purposes. Experience teaches us what rules we are to follow. As a simple example, let us consider an infant just able to focus its eyes on a brightly colored toy suspended above its crib. At first it is

probable that an infant must learn by experience to distinguish between its body and other bodies. The child reaches toward the toy gropingly at first, and wide of the mark. With experience, the infant learns how to order its actions and its body so that the toy can be grasped. Distance, for Berkeley, is not an absolute. It is not an idea and it is not a given. Distance is a type of relation---a relation involved in operational concepts. Distance is involved in what the infant must do to grasp the toy. Experience, and correlatively, training are necessary factors in learning to read God's language, just as they are a necessary factor in learning the use of human language.

Wittgenstein's doctrine of facts and objects provides the ontological foundation for his theory of signs upon which is based his picture-model theory of language. His rejection of the picture-model in the <u>Investigations</u> does not include an explicit rejection of his doctrine of objects as the ontological basis of signs and symbols. He writes:

. . In our notations there is indeed something arbitrary, but this is not arbitrary, namely that if we have determined anything arbitrarily, then something else must be the case. (This results from the essence of the notation.)³

Wittgenstein does not clarify the meaning of the phrase "essence of notation." This could be interpreted

³<u>T</u>, 3.342.

in a Platonic sense but it is doubtful that one could sustain such an interpretation without qualification. It could also mean something like this: When I commit myself to the association of certain words with certain objects, I also commit myself to a whole nexus of logical (but ontologically based) relationships. Wittgenstein writes, "The postulate of the possibility of the simple signs is the postulate of the determinateness of the sense."⁴

Turning from a consideration of signs as marks of the ontic elements in experience, to signs and their human use, we shall follow Berkeley's further analysis. He notes that all of the senses function as receptors, and all of the perceived data function as signs.

. . . But it is as certain that all signs are not language: not even all significant sounds, such as the natural cries of animals, or the inarticulate sounds and interjections of men. It is the articulation, combination, variety, copiousness, extensive and general use and easy application of signs that constitute the true nature of language.⁵

Not all signs constitute a language, or are included in a language. Language involves signs as the basic element, but also involves a set of rules, a grammar, an order. Further:

Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so necessary that instead of being (when dulyused or in their own nature) prejudical to the advancement of knowledge, or an

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hindrance to knowledge, that without them there could in mathematics be no demonstration. 6

Berkeley cautions his reader to avoid the improper application and interpretation of words used as signs, as misunderstandings in this area lead to atheism, scepticism, and metaphysical confusion. However, he takes pains to reassure us that words are absolutely necessary to the advancement of knowledge. Even in mathematical reasoning or demonstration words are necessary. He remarks that we must avoid confusing the sign and the thing signified, because in the obvious sense the written or spoken characters are totally unlike the thing signified. However, the written characters must picture variation in the sound.

It is indeed arbitrary that, in general, letters of any language represent sounds at all: But when that is once agreed, it is not arbitrary what combination of letters shall represent this or that particular sound.⁷ (Cf. n. 3, supra p. 18.)

General rules, as we have seen, are necessary to make the world intelligible.⁸

Whereas the natural connections of signs with the signified (patterns of ideas stemming from God) are regular and constant, the signification of ideas by words, depending on human convention with its element of arbitrariness, is liable to misinterpretation and ambituity. The simplest use of a word as sign is that of naming. A specific word

⁶<u>PC</u>, 750. ⁷<u>NTV</u>, sec. 143. ⁸S, sec. 256.

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can signify a simple sense quality, e.g., <u>blue</u> represents the color blue. Further, a word can signify fixed or stable patterns of sense data, as we have seen, such as chair, tree, table. Any isolable idea can be given a name. Our mistake, claims Berkeley, is to believe that every name must signify an idea. Where "I" stands for <u>idea</u>, "N" stands for <u>name</u>, and "R" stands for <u>in relation</u> of <u>naming</u>; the truth of $(x) \{Ixs/(\exists y)(Ny \cdot yRx)/)\}$ does not imply $(y) \{Nys/(\exists x))(Ix \cdot yRx)/\}$. Assuming that it does has led men into absurdities such as the assertion of the existence of material substance, a postulate which is the basis of the aforementioned philosophical errors.

Berkeley considers a third way in which signs enter into human experience.

Ideas which are observed to be connected with other ideas come to be considered as signs, by means whereof things not actually perceived by sense are signified or suggested to the imagination, whose objects they are, and which alone perceives them. As sounds suggest other things, so characters suggest those sounds, and, in general, all signs suggest the things signified, there being no idea which may not offer to the mind another idea which hath been frequently joined with it. In certain cases a sign may suggest its correlate as an effect, in others as a cause.⁹

In concrete instances of the above situations, we must note that there is no relation of similitude or causality given. There is no necessary connection. The perceiver develops

⁹TVV, sec. 39.

the habit of expectation of the conjunction of event or idea "A" with event or idea "B" if they have been regularly observed to occur together. We may call "B" the effect, cause, or image of "A", but the basis for this is a psychological one. It is not something given in experience. In Berkeley's words, "The connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of <u>cause</u> and <u>effect</u>, but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified."¹⁰

Next, Berkeley discusses one of the most serious errors resulting from the misunderstanding of the language model and the nature of signs. Names which do not mark particular ideas are nonetheless significant, so men have been misled and have concluded that these names must stand for abstract ideas. Then, if these abstract ideas are significant, they must have some sort of existence. It is this doctrine of abstract ideas which Berkeley is at pains to refute. One of his analogical arguments against the doctrine follows:

A little attention will discover that it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for.¹¹

Names need not have one precise and settled signification for:

There is in truth an homonymy or diversity of significations in every name whatsoever

¹⁰PHK, sec. 65.

11<u>PHK</u>, Introduction, sec. 19.

except only the proper names. Nor is there any such thing as a precise and definite sig-infication annexed to each name.¹²

Berkeley is not denying that there are general names. These are essential to human purpose. We do establish definitions for our terms, but keeping a definition constant is a different matter from saying that a general name must always stand for or mark the same idea. If we attempted to do this, we would become trapped in private language and intelligible communication would not be possible.

One final example of Berkeley's analogical reasoning from the language-model illustrates the strong pragmatic or instrumentalist bias in his thinking.

Words, it is agreed, are signs: it may not therefore be amiss to examine the use of other signs, in order to know that of words. Counters, for instance, at a card-table are used, not for their own sake, but only as signs substituted for money as words are for ideas. . . . Is it necessary everytime these counters are used throughout the progress of a game, to frame an idea of the distinct sum or value that each represents? . . . From hence it seems to follow, that words may not be significant, although they should not every time they are used, excite the ideas they signify in our minds; it being sufficient that we have it in our power to substitute things or ideas for their signs when there is occasion. 13

For Berkeley, words used as signs have a "cash-value." They serve as a convenient shorthand way of meeting our human purposes. When it is convenient or necessary we can

¹² PHK, Introduction to first draft, sec. 18. $13\overline{\text{Alc.}}$, 7th d., sec. 5.

cash them in for ideas or experience, but much of the time it is sufficient to operate with the signs or marks. Mach, in developing his empirio-pragmatism, acknowledges his debt to Berkeley.¹⁴ Other members of the Vienna circle have acknowledged a debt to Wittgenstein for his formulation of this same view.¹⁵

Berkeley does not make a distinction between sign and symbol. In fact, he does not use the term <u>symbol</u>. The distinction between the terms is a fairly recent one. The two terms have different, but related, meanings for Wittgenstein. He explains this difference by noting, "A sign is what can be perceived of a symbol."¹⁶ "The sign is the part of the symbol perceptible by the senses."¹⁷

The simple signs which are employed in propositions are called names, and the name means the object. Wittgenstein feels that a name cannot be analyzed further by any definition. It is a primitive sign. A sign which can be defined, a non-primitive sign, is signified by those signs which define it, and the definitions show how this is the case. Two signs, one of which is primitive and the other

¹⁴Carlton Berenda (Weinberg), <u>Mach's Empirio-</u> <u>Pragmatism in Physical Science</u>. (New York: Albee Press, 1937), pp. 1-2.

¹⁵Arne Naess, <u>Four Modern Philosophers</u>, trans. by Alastair Hannay (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 114.

> ¹⁶<u>T</u>, 3.32 (Pears & McGuiness tr.) ¹⁷<u>T</u>, 3.32.

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not, cannot signify in the same way. It is important to note that names cannot be taken to pieces by definition, nor can any sign which alone and independently refers to an object.

In the above development of the explanation of signs, it is clear that the object is, so to speak, the end of the line. In the <u>Tractatus</u>, Wittgenstein's logic and ontology coalesce. So far, his remarks appear to be in accord with Berkeley's views. The difference in <u>modus</u> <u>operandi</u> is that Wittgenstein omits the psychological evidence for his position. Psychological evidence plays a key role in the development of Berkeley's view. The results of their analysis are quite similar, nonetheless.

Every part of a proposition which characterizes its sense I callan expression (a symbol). (The proposition itself is an expression.) Expressions are everything--essential for the sense of the proposition--that propositions can have in common with one another. An expression characterizes a form and a content.¹⁸

Signs and symbols have different logical properties. As Wittgenstein explains in a later period of his career: "Every sign <u>by itself</u> seems dead. <u>What</u> gives it life? In use it is <u>alive</u>. Is life breathed into it there? Or is the <u>use</u> its life?"¹⁹

Symbols, by definition, are alive. They express. The symbolic activity characterizes a form and a content.

Objects, their marks or signs, and the relations obtaining among them are the elements of form and content. It is often the case that different symbols have written or audible signs in common. But if they are different symbols they signify in different ways. The most fundamental confusions of philosophy arise from the fact that in common usage the same word signifies in different ways and belongs to different symbols, or that two words which signify in different ways are applied in the same way. This account is in accord with Berkeley's views.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein's position is that:

In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign language that excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification: that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by <u>logical</u> grammar, by logical syntax.²⁰

In the early stages of his philosophical development, Wittgenstein advocates reform of language. He seems to feel that an ideal language is possible, desirable and even necessary. Berkeley does not make this proposal. From the beginning of his philosophical meditations, Berkeley is aware of the enormous complexity of language and the multiplicity of its uses. Berkeley is familiar with the work of Leibniz, and apparently does not chose to develop, or even comment on, the latter's conception of the possibility of a universal symbolic language.

20<u>T</u>, 3.325 (Pears & McGuiness tr.).

Wittgenstein's insights into the enormous complexity of language come later in life. They are the basis of his abandonment of the picture theory as well as his rather rigid notions of what an adequate language could and should do.

Wittgenstein continues his exposition of the nature and relations of signs and symbols by remarking that we must consider the significant use if we are to recognize the symbol in the sign. A sign alone is incapable of determining logical form. This is shown only by the sign together with its logical-syntactical application. There is no such thing as a non-referring sign. If a sign is not necessary, not used in context, it has no meaning. Yet the meaning of a sign ought not to play a role in the logical syntax itself.

Wittgenstein discusses the relationship between signs and thought:

In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses. . . . We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation.²¹

The above view is an introduction to the picture theory of language. Wittgenstein distinguishes between a propositional sign (another use of the term <u>sign</u>) and a proposition. The elements of the propositional sign are words

21<u>T</u>, 3.1 and 3.11 (Pears & McGuiness tr.).

which are combined in a definite way. The propositional sign is a fact. Wittgenstein is making the assertion that the propositional sign is the link between being and knowing, between ontology and epistemology. He remarks that,

Only facts can express a sense, a class of names cannot. . . That the propositional sign is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression, written or printed. (For in the printed proposition, for example, the sign of a proposition does not appear essentially different from a word.)²²

Objects are the ontological building blocks of experience. Names mark them, or mean them. Classes of names express nothing. Names as parts of facts are shown in various relations, in the context of a grammar. Thus facts or propositional signs can express a sense, and the expression of that sense is what is called a proposition. The fact is the possibility of expression. The expression or proposition asserts the fact. Therefore, as Wittgenstein says, the proposition is not a mere mixture of words, but is articulate. He notes:

The essential nature of the propositional sign becomes very clear when we imagine it made up of spatial objects (such as chairs, tables, books,) instead of written signs. The mutual spatial position of these things then expresses the sense of the proposition.²³

It follows that states of affairs, or what is the case, can be described by propositions but not named. Names are signs, and they are similar to points and mean objects.

²² \underline{T} , 3.142 and 3.143. ²³ \underline{T} , 3.1431.

Symbols are signs put to use in relational contexts as determined by the rules of grammar or logic. The signs, the rules of relation, and their use together constitute a language.

Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein regard signs as marks of sense experience, and these marks are the foundation of knowledge. Both claim that the signs are not in any sense copies of that which is signified. Berkeley claims that his doctrine serves to refute atheism, scepticism, and relativism. Signs, for both philosophers, have instrumental value. Wittgenstein omits the theological and psychological aspects of Berkeley's analysis of signs. The distinction between sign and symbol is Wittgenstein's most notable contribution to the theory of signs. Both men consider an understanding of the nature, uses and functions of signs essential to an understanding of the nature of language.

CHAPTER IV

LANGUAGE AND METAPHYSICAL PUZZLES

Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein turn attention to the language model itself in order to clear up and dispel these metaphysical puzzles which, both claim, arise from a misunderstanding of the language. Language analysis is the primary methodological procedure for both philosophers. Berkeley outlines his theory of language in his early notebooks, and he develops and refines this theory consistently throughout his lifetime. Wittgenstein presents two language theories, or more accurately, two language models. The picture-model theory expounded in the Tractatus is superseded by the language game-model which forms the core of the Philosophical Investigations. Although some commentators assert that there is a radical dichotomy between these two theories, it is my opinion that the picturemodel is a legitimate instance of one of the multiplicity of actual and possible language games. In his early work, therefore, Wittgenstein mistakes a valid and useful part of the overall theory for the whole of the description of the nature and functions of language.

That language has multiple uses and functions is the crux of Berkeley's language theory. It is also a key concept in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.

Specifically, Berkeley notes:

The communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to, or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition; to which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely ommitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think doth not infrequently happen in the familiar use of language.¹

Berkeley makes the point well that much, if not most, of our discourse is non-cognitive. Language serves many purposes, not least among which is the exhorting the listener to some attitude or emotion which is unrelated to cognitive matters. Confusion of fact and attitude, or fact and emotion, is a common source of philosophical puzzlement. Berkeley writes further:

I entreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen whether in hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, and the like arise, immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any ideas coming between.²

Berkeley also points out that language is used as a principle of economy in reasoning.

Names are for the most part used as letters are in <u>algebra</u>, in which though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts, that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for.³

¹<u>PHK</u>, Introduction, sec. 20. ²<u>Ibid</u>. ³PHK, Introduction, sec. 19. In such cases words, letters, or other symbols are used as shorthand devices to replace both experience and thought.

Berkeley is also aware of the fact that proper names often have more than one signification and that they are not necessarily used to refer. They are often used to put the mind in some particular disposition, and here the cognitive use is subservient.

For example, when a Schoolman tells me Aristotle hath said it, all I conceive he means by it, is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has annexed to that name.⁴

Throughout his writing Berkeley makes an appeal to and gives examples of the way words and expressions are actually used. He does not look for essential meanings based on universal essences, but looks, rather, to ordinary usage. He is not striving for an ideal or perfect language, nor does he call for the correction of the present one. He is using the paradigm-case argument technique. Indeed, he believes that tampering with ordinary language is not only impracticable, but impossible.

In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for our wellbeing, how false soever they may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense. . . it is

⁴PHK, Introduction, sec. 20.

impossible, even in the most rigid philosophic reasonings so far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak. 5

Berkeley cautions his reader to be aware of the scope, tenor, and purpose of the discourse, to make allowances for the metaphorical use of language. He will then avoid falling into the error of being deluded by words or language. A serious consideration of the doctrine of signs will show us that the primary purpose and use of language is:

. . Directing our actions in pursuit of that happiness which is the ultimate end and design, the primary spring and motive, that sets rational agents at work: that signs may imply or suggest the relations of things; cannot be by us understood but by the help of signs, so being thereby expressed and confuted, they direct and enable us to act with regard to things: that the true end of speech, reason, science, faith, assent in all its different degrees, is not merely, or principally, or always, the imparting or acquiring of ideas, but rather something of an active operative nature, tending to a conceived good: which may sometimes be obtained, not only although the ideas marked are not offered to the mind, but even although there should be no possibility of offering or exhibiting any such idea to the mind.⁶

Thus, language is affirmed to be an activity. It is also asserted to be first and foremost an instrumental activity, the purpose of which is not to obtain that elusive commodity <u>truth</u> but rather to enable man to achieve the good life. Finally, in Berkeley's general comments on language, he expresses his belief that there are things that cannot be said.

 $5_{\underline{PHK}}$, sec. 52. $6_{\underline{A1c}}$, 7th d., p. 307.

The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of most things proceeds from the fault and scantiness of language, as much, perhaps, as from the obscurity and confusion of thought.

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We know many things which we want words to express. Great things discoverable upon this principle, for want of considering which divers men have run into sundry mistakes endeavouring to set forth their knowledge by sounds, which foundering them, they thought the defect was in their knowledge when in truth it was in their language.⁷

Berkeley divides the content of human knowledge ideas, relations, and into three general categories: These are on different levels, as it were. ₩e spirits. can speak cognitively of ideas in ordinary subject-predicate We handle the problems of relations by arbilanguage. trarily devising rules of formation and transformation which are checked for adequacy by application to states of affairs, and which are evaluated according to utility; and finally of spirits, minds, or selves, we can speak only metaphorically. If we try to apply the criteria of cognitive language to those areas where they do not and cannot apply, we commit philosophical error. This, I believe, is essentially Wittgenstein's mature position. Each language game must be put to an appropriate use for that game. So, as Berkeley suggests above, when we seek for an idea where it is impossible in principle that there could be one, and when we try to mark a non-existent idea by a

 7 PC, 178 and 233.

significant term, we attribute the ensuing muddle to the frailty of human knowledge, when, in truth, language by its very nature is inadequate to cope with the situation in a strict cognitive manner. Berkeley does not, however, deny the value of metaphor and analogy in the attempted explication of that which is, in the strict sense, unsayable.

Berkeley's positive doctrine in his overall view of language is a theory of cognitive discourse. It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that it is not meant to apply to all possible discourse. This positive doctrine could serve as a precise model for Wittgenstein's picture theory of language.

Berkeley claims that each of the senses has its proper type of object, which is immediately given in perception. There are no necessary connections among the objects appropriate to the different senses, nor are these objects alike in kind, except that they are all both given and received as ideas. For example, colors are appropriate objects for the sense of sight, as are shapes. Extension, texture and hardness are the objects of touch, and sounds, i.e., tones, pitch, etc. are the objects of the sense of hearing. Given normal sensibilities, the perceiver grasps the objects as given--immediately given. No act of will or act of interpretation is involved. The visible, tangible, and audible sensations are what they are. According

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to Berkeley, these immediate objects of perception are explicable as signs of the language of the author of nature, or God. These simple sense data are the universal, public aspect of experience. They are <u>per se</u> noninterpretive.

Congeries of simple sensa are the ordinary ideas to The signs or names by which we mark which we give names. them are arbitrary, with the reservations noted in Chapter II. Ideas are the referents of the signs which signify These signs are the proper nouns, substantives, directly. or names, e.g., Joe Jones, table, larva. Interpretation is involved here. We might, for example, interpret a complex set of sense data as Joe Jones, but upon closer examination find that that particular set of data is George Gonzales sense data. We learn to recognize Joe Jones data initially from experience and training. As children-infants, in fact, -- we are trained in the performance of the activity that is the language game of our particular culture. It is, indeed, a form of life.

Philosophical error is involved, according to Berkeley, when we seek for something behind, beneath, or beyond our table data or our larva data. There is nothing beyond or beneath in any material sense. All is there in plain view. Any search for material substrate or substance which <u>supports</u> the simple perceptual objects is vain. Berkeley claims that all philosophers would agree that we

know our ideas directly. But, he claims, other than ideas which we do perceive directly, we have no immediate knowledge. Berkeley does, however, uphold the validity of inferences to other minds, and God's divine sensible language is the guarantee that there is an objective, public, and universal aspect to our ideas. Berkeley's refutation of mind-matter dualism, he feels, solves the knowledge problem and eliminates scepticism. He writes, "Vain is the distinction twixt intellectual and material world."⁸

The objects of mediate perception which do involve an act of judgment are related to the immediate perceptions according to rules. Cognitive language, which is the concrete expression of the rules, or grammar, or logic of the language, is the outcome of training. It is learned by trial and error, by experience. The patterns of order obtaining in the divine sensible language are learned by us, and we gropingly attempt to act in accordance with those rules. We cannot discern necessity in the rules; hence we must, both as individuals and as communities, learn them through training and experience. There is no necessity in the fact that fire burns, that water quenches thirst while turpentine kills, etc. We can describe, through observation and experience, the ways in which simple sensa are connected, but we cannot deduce these relationships. When we learn, by experience and observation, the workings of

⁸<u>PC</u>, 538.

one system of patterns, we can, occasionally, by analogy use the method of deduction to predict elements in similar patterns, but we find no necessity here. We can assign rules of formation and transformation to various sets of symbols, and then, upon occasion, find appropriate areas of experience to which these sets can be applied; but the only necessity is that we obey the arbitrarily chosen fundamental rules of the system of signs within the context of which we are operating.

A great number of arbitrary signs, various and apposite, do constitute a language. If such arbitrary connexion be instituted by men, it is an artificial language; if by the Author of nature, it is a natural language. . . A connexion established by the Author of nature, in the ordinary course of things, may surely be called natural; as that made by men will be named artificial. And yet this doth not hinder but the one may be as arbitrary as the other.⁹

The signification given by divine sensible language points to the actions a perceiver must perform in order to experience the associated objects. Contemporary developments of this view are called pragmatism, instrumentalism, and operationalism. The meaning of any language or symbolic system is a function of its use.

Although the topic and correlative problems of the subject pole of experience, the "I" pole, will be developed in Chapter VII, a brief statement of Berkeley's view will help clarify his theory of language. He writes:

9TVV, sec. 40.

To me it seems that ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their respective kinds, the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse: and that the term <u>idea</u> would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have any notion of. 10

Mind is a congeries of perceptions. Take away the perceptions and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind.

* * *

Say you the mind is not the perception, but that thing which perceives. I answer you are abused by the words that and thing. These are vague and empty words without a meaning.¹¹

Hence, the form of language employed should be adapted to the respective type of discourse. Cognitive language is to be applied to discourse about ideas. Relations refer to mental activity. The mind recognizes stable patterns and sequences and describes them in terms of relations. Relational language consists of arbitrarily invented symbolic systems such as those of logic and mathematics, which can be applied, when relevant, to the experiential sequences. Finally, mentalistic language is metaphorical or analogical. Berkeley concludes that the limits of the intelligible world are the limits of cognitive discourse, and we must keep in mind the distinction among cognitive, relational, and metaphorical forms.

Wittgenstein develops his theory of language in two distinct phases. The first, the picture-model theory, is

¹⁰PHK, sec. 89. ¹¹PC, 580 and 581.

presented in the Tractatus. The second phase, the languagegame theory, is described in the Philosophical Investigations. The picture-model theory is comparable in scope to that element in Berkeley's discussion of language which we have called his theory of cognitive language. This is the aspect of language which is appropriate to scientific investigation and research. Significant terms are dependent upon and mark either simple sense data or clusters of sense Assertions about matters of fact which can be data. checked against experience, and which can, in principle, be determined to be either true or false, comprise meaningful discourse. We shall investigate Wittgenstein's picture-model theory first.

The picture-model differs from Berkeley's theory of cognitive language in several ways. Wittgenstein is much more concerned with the technical aspects of the logic of language than Berkeley. It is difficult to separate, even in principle, Wittgenstein's language theory from his logic, but we shall attempt a conceptual distinction for expository purposes.

In the <u>Tractatus</u>, Wittgenstein uses the terms <u>thought</u> and <u>language</u> synonomously.¹² He develops his picture-model before he mentions the term <u>language</u>. It will be helpful to recall Wittgenstein's remarks about the nature and function of philosophy.

¹²T, 3.2, 3.202, 4.001.

The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of "philosophical propositions," but to make propositions clear. Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred.¹³

In the light of the above quotation, the utility of the picture-model can be seen. We might liken the propositions of meaningful discourse to a photographic print of reality. The philosopher functions as a trained photographer who understands how to focus the "camera" of understanding, how to develop the negatives (sense data) properly, and how to interpret the prints (language) adequately. If we attempt to substitute a poor, distorted or fake print or picture for reality, we run into difficulties. The philosopher's role is to show men how to bring the lenses of understanding into sharp focus, and how to read the prints. If we can learn to do all this, we shall not be led astray. We shall no longer talk nonsense, or ask nonsensical questions.

Wittgenstein introduces the picture-model in these passages from the Tractatus.

- (1) "The total reality is the world."14
- (2) "We make to ourselves pictures of facts." 15
- (3) "The picture is a model of reality."¹⁶

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(4) "To the objects correspond in the picture the elements of the picture." 17

(5) "The elements of the picture stand, in the picture, for the objects."¹⁸

(6) "The picture consists in the fact that its elements are combined with one another in a definite way."¹⁹

(7) "The picture is a fact."²⁰ It is also useful to keep in mind that Wittgenstein feels that a psychological analysis is completely irrelevant to his central problem.

Psychology is no nearer related to philosophy, than is any other natural science. The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology. Does not my study of sign-language correspond to the study of thought processes which philosophers held to be so essential to the philosophy of logic? Only they got entangled for the most part in unessential psychological investigations, and there is an analogous danger for my method.²¹

Ontological and epistemological questions are meaningless according to Wittgenstein's theory of language, and psychological questions are irrelevant. It is probable that Wittgenstein would criticize Berkeley for attempting to remark on all three. However, we do find all three types of statements in Wittgenstein's philosophy, either explicitly stated or implied.

17 <u>T</u> ,	2.13.	¹⁸ <u>T</u> ,	2.131.
19 <u>'</u> ,	2.141.	$20\frac{1}{T}$,	4.1121.
21 <u>T</u> ,	4.1121.		

In the seven numbered statements above, Wittgenstein sets up his analogy quite clearly. From them we can draw the conclusion that the totality of true pictures comprises the totality of the picture of reality. Reality consists of combinations of objects. These clusters of objects, Wittgenstein terms facts. Facts are groups of objects which are intelligible, or can be thought. There are simple facts and complex facts. The latter can be resolved into the former. The elements of the picture stand, in the picture, for the objects. The elements would be the atomic facts. The elements of the picture are combined in a definite, coherent way because the objects are so com-Therefore, the picture theory does presuppose an bined. ontology. Since the picture is a fact, it is the business of the philosopher to show how the fact that is the picture refers to the facts which are the elements of the picture, and how the elements of the picture stand for the objects. The internal relations of the elements of the picture determine the arrangement of the signs which are thought or expressed.

(8) That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a definite way, represents that the things are so combined with one another. This connexion of the elements of the picture is called its structure, and the possibility of this structure is called the form of representation of the picture.²²

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 $22 \\ \underline{T}, 2.15.$

(9) The form of representation is the possibility that things are combined with one another as are the elements of the picture.²³

Statements (8) and (9) show the ontological basis of Wittgenstein's picture-model theory quite clearly. Statement (8) reiterates the position that things are combined with one another in a definite way. The world is ordered and coherent. Wittgenstein makes no comment about the origin of the order of the world as given, but does state, "The world is independent of my will."²⁴

The pictures that we make to ourselves of the world have a definite structure. The possibility of the structure is called the form of the representation. The form of representation is a key concept in Wittgenstein's presentation because this form also states the possibility that things are combined with one another as are the elements of the picture.

(10) "It $/\overline{t}he \ picture7$ is like a scale applied to reality."²⁵

(11) "Only the outermost points of the dividing lines touch the object to be measured."²⁶

(12) "According to his view the representing relation which makes it a picture, also belongs to the picture."²⁷

(13) "The representing relation consists of the coordination of the elements of the picture and the things."²⁸

(14) "These coordinations are as it were the feelers of its elements with which the picture touches reality."²⁹

(15) "In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common with what it pictures."³⁰

(16) "In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all."³¹

(17) "What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner--rightly or falsely--is its form of representation."³²

The bridge between thought and reality, the common ground, the solution to the problem which has bemused generations of philosophers, Wittgenstein claims to have found in the doctrine of logical form. This seems to be both an ontological and epistemological claim. Logical form shows itself in thought, and in thought expressed, which is language. Nothing can be said <u>about</u> logical form, as it is already presupposed in any meta-language. This is the rationale for analogical reasoning.

²⁸ <u>T</u> , 2.1514.	²⁹ <u>T</u> , 2.1515.	³⁰ <u>T</u> , 2.16.
³¹ <u>T</u> , 2.161.	$32 \underline{\mathrm{T}}$, 2.17.	

In Berkeley's philosophy the sensible language of the author of nature is subject to human interpretation, is the legitimate ground for all cognitive discourse, and may be considered a guide to conduct for the preservation and well-being of mankind. Berkeley's arguments for this view have been presented. In Wittgenstein's case there are logical forms common to language and reality. God's divine sensible language and the logical forms play comparable ontological roles respectively in the philosophies of Berkeley and Wittgenstein. Just as Berkeley points out that a finite mind cannot, in principle, detect necessity in the sensual patterns by means of which God communicates with man, so Wittgenstein claims human reason cannot transcend the limits of the language to talk about the logical form of language. One cannot speak of the world from an extra-terrestrial perspective. The limits of the language are the limits of the world.

The doctrine of logical form is the pivotal concept in the picture-model theory of language. Wittgenstein claims that we cannot say how the picture represents the facts, but this representation shows itself in the picture. The form of representation makes itself manifest. Two analogies are helpful here. We might consider the picture as a map of reality. The pattern of the elements of the picture are a projection of the intelligible groupings of objects, which are the facts. Points ABCD, so arranged in

the picture, are a projection of the objects ordered as facts. We might consider ourselves as spreading the map, the picture, on a coffee table, and pointing out the various relevant features. "See, here is Truchas. Here is The scale is one inch to one mile. Cordova and Cordova. Truchas are two miles apart. These curved lines are elevation lines. Cordova is in the valley five hundred feet below Truchas." One can point to this feature and that feature. One learns to read a map. The analogy between the map and the picture cannot really be explained, but only shown ostensively. Wittgenstein poses the question, "How do we learn to read the map?" but he fails to give an answer. His view is that this is a psychological question, not a logical one.

A second analogy which is helpful is the comparison of the logical picture in logical space with pointer reading. In a lie detector, for instance, a pen marks a moving graph. What do the marks have in common with the state of affairs they are supposed to represent? The common element is a certain form. According to Wittgenstein, this form cannot be <u>stated</u>, but corresponding elements in the various states of affairs can be pointed out. We must understand the method of projection. The black marks on the graph fluctuate when the pulse rate changes. We assume that the pulse rate pictures the state of excitement of the <u>detectee</u>, and that his excitement level, in turn, pictures the

truth-value of the answers he gives his interrogator. Here we are working with a triple picture analogy, each aspect of which has a certain form in common with all the others. We are not dealing with causal relationships here, but with states of affairs sharing a common logical form. The question may be asked, "Which is the picture, and which the reality?" The answer can only be, "Whichever suits our purpose." (This point is further developed in Wittgenstein's extended theory of language, the languagegame model.) Wittgenstein does not give a clear answer to the question of how we learn the method of projection, and how we recognize the common logical form. Is this an innate ability or a learned response? If the latter, how is it learned? Wittgenstein tells us only that

(18) "The picture represents a possible state of affairs in logical space."³³

(19) "The picture contains the possibility of the state of affairs which it represents."³⁴

(20) "The picture agrees with reality or not; it is right or wrong, true or false."³⁵

(21) "The picture represents what it represents, independently of its truth or falsehood, through the form of the representation."³⁶

(22) "What the picture represents is its sense." 37

³³ <u>T</u> , 2.02.	34 <u>T</u> , 2.203.	³⁵ <u>T</u> , 2.21.
³⁶ <u>T</u> , 2.22.	³⁷ <u>T</u> , 2.221.	•

(23) "In the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality, its truth or falsity consists."³⁸

(24) "In order to discover whether the picture is true or false we must compare it with reality."³⁹

(25) "It cannot be discovered from the picture alone whether it is true or false."⁴⁰

(26) "There is no picture which is a priori true." 41

(27) "The logical picture of the facts is the thought."42

(28) "The totality of true thought is a picture of the world." 43

(29) "The thought contains the possibility of the state of affairs which it thinks. What is thinkable is also possible."⁴⁴

In statement (29) above, Wittgenstein replaces the term <u>picture</u> by the term <u>thought</u>, and the further transition is made later from thought to language. The picture or thought or language (i.e., meaningful discourse) represents a possible state of affairs in logical space. We must be careful not to extend our analogies too far. Any definite state of affairs obtaining in logical space lends itself to symbolic representation, both by the sounds and

³⁹<u>T</u>, 2.223. ³⁸т, 2.222. 40 <u>T</u>, 2.224. ⁴²<u>Ť</u>, 3. ⁴¹T. 2.225. 43 T, 3.01. $44_{\rm T}$, 3.02.

marks of ordinary language, and also by the marks of formal symbolic logic. A definite state of affairs, represented in some fashion, divides logical space. A proposition representing that state of affairs does two things: "The proposition <u>shows</u> how things stand, if it is true. And it says, that they do so stand.⁴⁵

A true proposition divides logical space. If state of affairs "A" obtains, state of affairs "not-A" is excluded from the logical space occupied by A. Wittgenstein was extremely interested in giving an adequate account of the use of the term not. The relation of negation to truth is discussed in Chapter V. In order to give an adequate account of experience, we must deal with those pictures which do not agree with reality. If all pictures did agree with reality, because they each share a common logical form with facts, error would be not only inexplicable, it would be impossible. According to Wittgenstein, all pictures do represent possible states of affairs. The picture represents what it represents independently of its truth or falsehood, and it does this through the form of representation, according to (22) above. If both true and false propositions exhibit logical form, it follows that there are many more possible forms than actual forms. The facts are what is the case, and the world is the totality

 $45_{\underline{T}}$, 4.022.

of facts. Also, there is no necessity in what is the case. The objects, although they hang together like links in a chain, are independent. The logical picture of the facts is the thought, and the thought contains the possibility of the state of affairs which it thinks. That which is thinkable is also possible. Wittgenstein avoids the question of what brings the possible into the realm of the actual. He does say that there is no picture which is a priori true.

The proposition is a picture of reality. The proposition is a model of the reality as we think it is.

* * *

At first glance the proposition--say as it stands printed on paper--does not seem to be a picture of the reality of which it treats. But nor does the musical score appear at first sight to be a picture of a musical piece; nor does our phonetic spelling (letters) seem to be a picture of our spoken language.

* * *

. . There is a general rule by which the musician can read the symphony out of the score. . . . And the rule is the law of projection.

* * *

The possibility of all similes, of all the imagery of our language, rests on the logic of its representation.

* * *

The proposition is a picture of reality, for I know the state of affairs presented by it, if I understand the proposition, without having its sense explained to me. The proposition shows its sense.⁴⁶

If it is the case that propositions are pictures of reality because an understanding of a proposition leads to knowledge of states of affairs, then the question of how error is possible is raised again. Wittgenstein, as noted, hopes to avoid the whole realm of metaphysics and episte-He deems it nonsense. Yet it is hard to see, in mology. spite of his analogies, how we get from the picture to reality--that is, to the objects which the propositions represent in combination as states of affairs. He cannot, from his standpoint, attribute error to will, as this is a psychological explanation which he deems irrelevant, if not meaningless. At this juncture his theory sounds dualistic. When Wittgenstein introduces the concept of logical forms as the common element in thought and reality, the dualism is surmounted in principle, but might not this solution be subject to Aristotle's classic third man objection?

Wittgenstein can and does resort to saying that he has shown that we cannot ask the question, since it is senseless.

The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science. . . and then always when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to

 $46 \underline{T}$, 4.01, 4.011, 4.0141, 4.015, 4.021, and 4.022.

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* * *

him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other--he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy--but it would be the only strictly correct method.47

In the <u>Tractatus</u>, Wittgenstein leaves three explicit questions unanswered: (1) the ontological question about the status of objects; (2) the epistemological question about logical form; and (3) the psychological question regarding the learning of the method of projection. Berkeley provides clear-cut answers to all three questions.

In <u>Philosophical Investigations</u> Wittgenstein repudiates the position he presented in the <u>Tractatus</u> insofar as that position was based on the idea that what can be said can be said clearly. His early intense interest in problems which lie at the foundation of logic and mathematics apparently blinded him to the importance of that broad spectrum of discourse which is not amenable to rigorous logical analysis. Wittgenstein uses the term <u>logic</u> in a broad and a narrow sense. In the broad sense, <u>logic</u> refers to the underlying elements and patterns of all discourse, which elements and patterns make the transmission of meaning possible. This is the type of logic with which he is concerned in the <u>Investigations</u>. In the narrow sense, the term refers to the art of assigning and manipulating symbols by means of which ambiguity and vagueness

 $47_{\underline{T}}$, 6.53.

can be eliminated from discourse. It is this sense of logic which is predominant in the <u>Tractatus</u>. At first Wittgenstein feels that logic, in the narrow sense, is the foundation of all meaningful discourse. Those areas to which it does not apply are termed areas of nonsense or meaninglessness. In the Blue Book, however, he writes:

When we talk of language as a symbolism used in an exact calculus, that which is in our mind can be found in the sciences and in mathematics. Our ordinary use of language conforms to this standard of exactness only in rare cases. Why then do we in philosophizing constantly compare our use of words with one following exact rules? The answer is that the puzzles which we try to remove always spring from just this attitude towards language.⁴⁸

The above view is very similar to Berkeley's conviction that men are drawn into error as long as they believe

The only immediate use of words was to signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of every general name was a determinate abstract idea. . . But these being known to be mistakes, a man may with greater ease prevent his being imposed on by words. He that knows he has no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea, annexed to any name. And he that knows names do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas, where there are not to be had.⁴⁹

Berkeley has three primary insights into the nature of language. Wittgenstein comes to realize the importance

> ⁴⁸<u>BB</u>. pp. 25-26. ⁴⁹<u>PHK</u>, Introduction, sec. 23.24.

of these only in his second period of philosophical activity, and they form the bases of his <u>Philosophical</u> <u>Investigations</u>. These insights are: (1) the enormous complexity of language; (2) the instrumental nature of language; and (3) the active nature of language. Berkeley also gives a threefold list of benefits to be gained from arriving at an understanding of the true nature and function of language. These benefits are: (1) to get clear of verbal controversy; (2) to get rid of abstractions and thus the mental discomfort arising from puzzlement; and (3) to avoid mistakes (i.e., if one confines his thoughts to his own ideas, he cannot be mistaken).

Neither Berkeley nor Wittgenstein purports to be making new discoveries or to be setting out new principles. They are both trying to "recall men from metaphysics to common sense." Wittgenstein's program and justification for his investigations pivot about the above three points. He suggests that the expression <u>theory of language</u> is, itself, inappropriate for his philosophical work because it leads us to think we can get beyond language and set up a framework or system in terms of which we can expose or arrive at the essence of language. In the first place, there is no essence of language, and in the second place, a meta-language is impossible in principle.⁵⁰ We would

 $50_{\underline{T}}$, 3.332.

have to assume the structure which we wish to investigate. In this presentation we have used the expression <u>language</u> <u>theory</u> for expository purposes, but it should not be taken literally. Wittgenstein insists:

We may not advance any kind of a theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical pro-These are, of course, not empirical blems. problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand The problems are solved, not by giving them. new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.51

Berkeley's points (2) and (3) above are included here. When Berkeley refers to confining one's thoughts to his own ideas, he means we must look directly into the workings of language itself to find where we are tricked by it, rather than attempt to "search the heavens and pry into the entrails of the earth," for everything is before us and in plain sight.⁵² Wittgenstein makes the point clear in another way:

(<u>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</u>, 4.5): "The general form of propositions is: This is how things are."--That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times.

⁵¹<u>PI</u>, 109. ⁵²<u>PHK</u>, Introduction, sec. 24. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.53

Berkeley urges us to draw aside the veil or curtain of words--stop tracing around the frame, as it were. Wittgenstein's way of expressing the common conviction of the two men that verbal controversies "hinder the sciences" is as follows:

It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved. . . The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.⁵⁴

Here again Wittgenstein offers a contemporary version of major points made by Berkeley in both <u>De Motu</u> and <u>The Analyst</u>. In those works Berkeley insists that the principles of science and mathematics are sets of arbitrary rules in which we may and often do become entangled. We forget that we have made the rules, and we begin to posit the real existence of the referents of terms that we have used in our definitions and postulates. We become entangled in our own rules, and we engage in verbal disputes about non-existent or hypothetical entities. Both

 53_{PI} , 114. 54_{PI} , 125.

men give other examples of verbal disputes in non-scientific contexts.

In the <u>Investigations</u> Wittgenstein emphasizes one of the major points made by Berkeley in the Principles:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not <u>command a clear view</u> of the use of our words. . . Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language.⁵⁵

The above statement reflects the radical difference between the views of the Wittgenstein of the <u>Tractatus</u> and the Wittgenstein of the <u>Investigations</u>. This later view is in accord with Berkeley's view that it is both impossible and impracticable to tamper with ordinary language.

We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall constantly be giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we saw it as our task to reform language. Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstanding in practice is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with. The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work.⁵⁶

Wittgenstein feels that he and others of his contemporaries have been misled into looking for the essence of language. And this is a grave mistake. The multiplicity of uses of language can be likened unto the multiplicity of kinds of games. If someone asks us to tell him

⁵⁵ PI, 122 and 124. ⁵⁶PI, 132.

what a game is, is it possible to give a precise, unified connotative definition? It is not. If we look at the kinds of things called games, we find no one common element by which we can mark all games. Games have groups overlapping characteristics, none of which is common to all games, but some of which are shared by sub-groups. We can point to examples of different kinds of games, and give the answer, "These and similar things are called games." If we search for an essence of games, we are searching for an abstract entity that is not to be found. Berkeley would say that we are first positing an abstract general idea, "essence of games," and then trying in vain to discover it. After we examine particular cases, there is nothing else to be done. Language is a human invention and a human activity. We give names to other sorts of activities. Searching beyond the arena of human use and human activity for a "real meaning" is fruitless. An essential definition is a human contrivance, not a subsistent entity in the realm of Platonic essences. Our language leads us astray. Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein share this view.

According to both, language is a purposive human activity. In order to understand it we must make ourselves aware of the job it is doing under any given set of circumstances. We have listed Berkeley's suggestions. Wittgenstein expands the list:

Giving orders, and obeying them --Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements--Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) ---Reporting an event--Forming and testing a hypothesis--Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams--Making up a story; and reading it ---Play-acting--Singing catches--Guessing riddles--Making a joke; telling it ---Solving a problem in practical arithmetic--Translating from one language into another ---Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.57

The similarity of their views about the complexity of language is paralleled by the similarity of their views about the instrumentality of language. Wittgenstein's statement of this position is clear.

Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments. Now perhaps one thinks that it can make no great difference which concepts we employ. As, after all, it is possible to do physics in feet and inches as well as in meters and centimeters; the difference is merely one of convenience. But even this is not true if, for instance, calculations in some system of measurement demand more time and trouble than it is possible for us to give them.⁵⁸

The analysis of language for the purpose of clarifying concepts is a, if not the, major function of philosophy according to both Berkeley and Wittgenstein. Some concepts are better adapted to our human purposes than others, so there is always business for the philosopher to

⁵⁸PI, 569.

⁵⁷PI, 23.
do. Both men are interested in developing adequate and convenient notations to be used as instruments in mathematics and in the sciences generally. We can, indeed, improve our tools, but we must guard against trying to mold all of language into a single type of tool, which we then attempt to use for all purposes. This is simply fruitless. Ambiguity and vagueness are necessary, for example, in effecting any sort of compromise between varying human goals and purposes. For logic and mathematics, we might say that we need sharp tools. In areas of axiology more versatile tools are appropriate.

It is also a part of the business of the philosopher to clear up misunderstandings stemming from ignorance of the nature of language. There is a striking parallel between Wittgenstein's evaluation of his own work with language and the remarks Mrs. Anne Berkeley, wife of the Bishop, made about her husband's work. It is interesting to compare the following:

Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.) What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand.⁵⁹

Had he built as he has pulled down he had been then a Master builder indeed but unto

⁵⁹<u>PI</u>, 118.

every man his work. Some must remove rubbish, and others lay foundations while a very few have time to go on to perfection. 60

Some of the types of misunderstandings that interest Wittgenstein are of an epistemological and psychological (Recall that Wittgenstein considers epistemology nature. to be the philosophy of psychology.) He uses language analysis to clarify the meaning of knowledge and the meaning of certainty. He does this by examining concrete cases of the uses of these terms, and he shows how some are appropriate and some are not. Berkeley proceeds in a like man-The examination of concrete cases of usage clarifies ner. psychological concepts, e.g., unconscious thought, mind, These are discussed in detail in subsequent chapspirit. Berkeley is concerned with the same sorts of proters. blems and uses similar techniques of analysis. Relief from our perplexities is to be found if we understand language doing its job.

"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"--It is what human beings <u>say</u> that is true and false; and they agree in the <u>language</u> they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.⁶¹

It is not the specific content expressed by a language system that is relevant; it is the fact that any

⁶⁰Luce & Jessop, Letter from Mrs. Anne Berkeley to her son, Vol. 7, Appendix 88, p. 388.

⁶¹<u>PI</u>, 241.

content can be expressed and be intelligible that we need There is, in the broad sense, an to be cognizant of. underlying logic that shows its utility, and its integrity, because it is a universal form of life, or perhaps the universal form underlying all possible human life. Specific languages can and do become outmoded as life forms change and evolve, and new games with new rules supersede But every game has some rules, or it ceases to be them. a game at all. Even though sentences and language do not have the formal unity that Wittgenstein imagined at first, they do belong to a more or less related family of struc-We must not try to fit them into the mold of a tures. preconceived theory, but rather do away with explanation and let description take its place. The philosophical problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known.

CHAPTER V

GRAMMAR, LOGIC AND PROPOSITIONS

In his systematic development of the doctrine of immaterialism, Berkeley shows how the grammar and logic of the language do their jobs, and how propositions are used correctly to make assertions about states of affairs and incorrectly to make assertions about odd entities such as abstract general ideas. Berkeley clarifies his points by drawing on examples from psychology, physics and metaphysics. Wittgenstein attempts to stay strictly within the area of logical analysis. Which of the two methods of approach is the more successful depends, I believe, on the orientation and personal preference of the reader.

Wittgenstein explains the nature of his investigation in the following manner:

Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away, misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language. --Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may be called an "analysis" of our forms of expression, for the process is sometimes like one of taking a thing apart.1

They both feel that a proper understanding of the

¹PI, 90.

nature and functions of language will clear up philosophical puzzlement, and that the key to understanding of reality is language analysis because there is a qualified isomorphism between language and reality. Therefore, the grammar or logic of any possible language or symbolic system shows the common formal structure of being and knowing. Wittgenstein makes this point explicit in his discussion of the relation between objects, facts, and propositions. Berkeley shows this to be the case by his doctrine of sense data standing as signs in the language of the author of nature. Both men are aware that we cannot get outside, beyond, or above that common ground in order to talk about Neither Berkeley nor the later Wittgenstein believe it. that a meta-language is possible. Neither believe that ordinary or common language can be changed, tampered with, or in any sense idealized, although Wittgenstein seems to vacillate on this point in the Tractatus. Berkeley held the view consistently, and Wittgenstein stated explicitly in the Investigations, that if one were to attempt the idealization of language, the attempt would have to be based on an implicit presupposition that there is somewhere an existent ideal of language toward which one is striving. But what could this possibly mean? Ideal for what purpose, in relation to what? Berkeley speaks of the genius and bent of ordinary language which is admirably suited to its purpose as a vehicle for the attainment of human purposes and goals.

Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein do believe that language is a form of life, an activity whose rules are buried deep within that activity itself, and these rules are the grammar or logic of the language.

The true end of speech, reason, science, faith, assent, in all its different degrees, is not merely, or principally, or always the imparting or acquiring of ideas, but rather something of an active operative nature, tending to a conceived good. . . . For instance, the algebraic mark, which denotes the root of a negative square, hath its use in logistic operations.²

A rule stands there like a sign post. --Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go? . . Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not.³

Berkeley lists various related forms of life, each of which has a specific set of operational rules which tend to a human purpose or conceived good. It is clear from Berkeley's further analysis, that if the rules lead us astray, they need to be re-examined and revised. But we need not, in fact must not, be deceived by our operational rules. If we stop midway in our process and reify an arbitrary functional sign, we shall certainly be lead into error.

Wittgenstein points out another aspect of the problem. The grammar, the rules, are like sign-posts. They have instrumental value and help us to find our way about, but are not always, and cannot in principle be, absolutely

2 ³PI, 85. Alc., 7th d., p. 307.

clear and unambiguous. Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein believe that the tools of language can be sharpened and refined to achieve greater clarity and proficiency of performance in certain areas. They also feel that if certain basic errors are exposed, and the language model is understood, philosophers will be more comfortable; the "mental cramps" (Wittgenstein's term) stemming from a certain rigidity of the mind will be removed.

The terms <u>grammar</u> and <u>logic</u> refer to that set of rules which is implicit and shows itself in any symbolic system. A system, by definition, is intelligible. <u>Symbolic</u> carries in its connotation the sense of <u>having a</u> <u>meaning</u>, and <u>system</u> carries in its connotation <u>order</u>. If there is meaning and order at all, rules of some sort are implicit. These rules are the grammar or the logic of language.

Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein realize that we cannot get outside the system in order to talk about the system. In the first place, we must assume at least some of the very rules we are trying to discover and clarify. Secondly, as Berkeley would put it, we do not have an <u>idea</u> of the rules. They are not given in experience. They involve operations of the mind. If we were to talk about them as though they had a real existence, we should be making the error of positing abstract general ideas. The rules according to which the mind operates are prior to

and the necessary condition for that operation. Hence, they are transcendental. They are the necessary condition for human reason. In this same vein Wittgenstein writes: "Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world. Logic is transcendental."⁴

Both Berkeley and the later Wittgenstein feel that the transcendental rules cannot be hypostatized and set out as clear and unambiguous guide posts for finding one's way about. On the subject of rules Berkeley comments as follows:

Those men who frame general rules from the phenomena, and afterwards derive the phenomena from those rules, seem to consider signs rather than causes. A man may well understand natural signs without knowing their analogy, or being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so.⁵

Berkeley is clarifying the ambiguous use of the term <u>rules</u>. General rules, such as those of Newtonian science, are actually inductive hypotheses. But his contemporaries make deductions from these hypotheses and claim certainty for their conclusions. Berkeley is pointing out that the certainty involved stems from the rules <u>men</u> have developed for their system of signs, not from the relations of ideas themselves. The rules by means of which God orders experience are transcendental and beyond the grasp of human knowledge. Thus Berkeley writes that "A man may well <u>understand</u> natural signs without knowing their analogy, or

⁴T, 6.13. ⁵PHK, sec. 108.

being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so."⁶ (Italics mine.)

Berkeley's insight in the above passage accords with Wittgenstein's discussion of the meaning of the term understand. "The grammar of the word 'knows' is evidently closely related to that of 'can,' 'is able to.' But also closely related to that of 'understands.' ("Mastery" of a technique.)"⁷ What does it mean to understand something? Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein are saying that to understand something, whatever it might be, is to be able to operate with or about that something. It is to be able to put it to use, not to give a list of so-called causes, or to cite a set of rules. In other words, the rules show themselves in the situation so that the appropriate actions can be performed, but one cannot get behind the rules and point them out and say, "See, this is the way it is. These are the rules." Rules in this sense refer to the logic that Wittgenstein calls transcendental, in the sense that anything that is unsayable, yet makes itself manifest, is transcendental. We might call this the ontological grammar. For Wittgenstein it is both an ontological and logical necessity, as we have seen, and for Berkeley it is God's The only rules about which we can and do have language. certainty are the arbitrary systems of signs which we have

⁶<u>Ibid</u>. ⁷<u>PI</u>, 150.

developed to help us find our way about. These are the necessary conditions for the intelligibility of human experience.

Berkeley warns the reader that even though

. . . There is a certain analogy, constancy, and uniformity in the phenomena or appearances of nature, which are a foundation for general rules: and these are a grammar for the understanding of nature, or that series of effects in the visible world whereby we are enabled to foresee what will come to pass in the natural course of things;⁸

that we should also be cognizant of the following:

. . . And as it is very possible to write improperly through too strict an observance of general grammar-rules: so in arguing from general rules of Nature, it is not impossible that we may extend the analogy too far, and by that means run into mistakes.⁹

Berkeley is cautioning the reader to beware of falling into the trap of setting up a system of operational rules to effect some particular purpose, and when that set of rules has served its purpose to consider the formal structure of the set of rules as an end in itself.

As in reading other books, a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language; so in persuing the volume of Nature, it seems to be beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules or showing how it follows from them. 10

⁸<u>S</u>, sec. 252. ⁹<u>PHK</u>, sec. 108. ¹⁰<u>PHK</u>, sec. 109.

Berkeley's polemical remarks are, in this instance, directed towards those who, enchanted with the tidiness of Newtonian mechanics, endeavour to reduce the universe to a mechanical universe, and God to only a master mathematician. Applied more generally, it is a caution against logic-chopping and nit-picking in philosophy. Berkeley is also warning his reader not to read into nature an exactness and completeness of detail that may exist only in the abstract formulae. For instance, the literal existence of a Euclidean point in nature is not entailed by geometry, and those who suppose the contrary make needless trouble for themselves. He urges his audience to see what is meant by experience in general, to see how it can be turned to the benefit of man rather than trying to focus on rules for their own sake. Wittgenstein refers to becoming entangled in our rules.

Both men have similar views about the grammar-logicrules trio which forms the bridge between being and knowing, which makes any possible world possible. Wittgenstein asks:

In what sense is logic something sublime? For there seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth--a universal significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the bottom of all the sciences. --For logical investigation explores the nature of all things. It seeks to see to the bottom of things and is not meant to concern itself whether what actually happens is this or that. --It takes its rise, not from an interest in the facts of nature nor from a need to grasp causal connexions: but from

an urge to understand the basis, or essence of everything empirical. Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out new facts; it is, rather, of the essence of our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to <u>understand</u> something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand.¹²

Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein repeatedly point out what they feel is obvious--that nothing is hidden. All is in plain view. Philosophers have the urge to misunderstand due to a certain professional myopia. What is given is the empirically given from which we make inferences. We can see <u>that</u> certain things are necessary to reason, but not <u>what</u> is necessary to reason, because this lies behind reason as necessary condition, and as such it is not given. It shows itself. All that we need to know and can know is there in plain sight. The positing of odd entities and the subsequent search to find those odd entities has been the great philosophical sickness.

One person might say "A proposition is the most ordinary thing in the world" and another: "A proposition--that's something very queer!:--And the latter is unable simply to look and see how propositions really work. The forms that we use in expressing ourselves about propositions and thought stand in his way.¹³

According to the author of the <u>Tractatus</u>, proper philosophy is therapeutic, and the key to the solution of philosophical problems by language analysis is to be found

 12 <u>PI</u>, 98. 13 <u>PI</u>, 93.

in the understanding of the nature, uses, and functions of propositions, the carriers of meaning, the vehicles of expression. At the time of the writing of the <u>Tractatus</u>, Wittgenstein feels that the internal structure of the proposition as well as its logical form can be elucidated (i.e., <u>shown</u>). The structure is exemplified in concrete instances. Berkeley does not share this optimism. He holds that the attainment of the advantages of clarity of understanding, i.e., the solution of the philosophical problems,

. . . Doth presuppose an entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare hardly promise myself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas.¹⁴

In the Introduction to the <u>Principles</u>, Berkeley points out the many ways in which language is used. Wittgenstein arrives at Berkeley's position in the <u>Investi-</u> <u>gations</u>, where he rejects the picture-model and applies the game-analogy to propositions. Here he notes that there is no essence of a proposition, but rather a family of utterances which we term propositions which have no one feature common to all.

In the <u>Tractatus</u> Wittgenstein explains that the propositional sign is the sign through which we express the thought, and the proposition is the expression of the

¹⁴<u>PHK</u>, Introduction, sec. 23.

thought. There is a distinction between the two. The necessity for the distinction is shown by the following example: If one were learning a foreign language and had learned the rules of pronunciation, he might read aloud from a text: "Hinter Nörten stand die Sonne hoch un glänzend am himmel." He could do this without understanding the meaning of the sentence. In this case, the spoken words would not be a proposition, but a propositional sign--the possibility of a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.

To the proposition belongs everything which belongs to the projection; but not what is projected. Therefore the possibility of what is projected but not this itself.¹⁵

The above statements mean that the proposition pictures a possible state of affairs, but that the actual state of affairs, the object terminus, of the projection does not belong to the proposition. It must be this way if truth or falsity can be predicated of propositions. A proposition says how things are. When the actual state of affairs is other than what the proposition says, the proposition is false.

Elementary propositions are expressions of atomic facts. Complex propositions are expressions of complex facts. Complex propositions can be analyzed into elementary propositions. These cannot be further analyzed.

¹⁵<u>T</u>, 3.13.

G. E. M. Anscombe lists five theses which hold for elementary propositions:

- (1) They are a class of mutually independent propositions.
- (2) They are essentially positive.
- (3) They are such that for each of them there are no two ways of being true or false, but only one.
- (4) They are such that there is in them no distinction between an internal and an external negation.
- (5) They are concatenations of names, which are absolutely simple signs.¹⁶

These five theses are based on Wittgenstein's concepts of facts and objects, signs and symbols, and the picture-model. If the objects are independent of each other, thesis (1) stands. If the picture-model is an accurate analogy, thesis (2) is entailed. That is, if a proposition is a projection, it is something positive. Its falsity stems from a structural error--some element in the pictures is displaced. There is a picture, however. Theses (3), (4), and (5) all involve the simplicity of signs, and these are grounded in the simplicity or atomicity of facts, and even more fundamentally in the existence of the logically simple objects. Here is where we run into difficulty. Wittgenstein, working with his analogies, metaphors, similes, and models is nonetheless unable to give examples of atomic facts or of objects. He does not say that it is not possible, but that it is the business

¹⁶Anscombe, <u>op</u>. cit., p. 31.

of empirical psychology to do so. Nor does Anscombe in her explanations of the five theses give examples of a simple sign or simple name. She does give examples of complex names (e.g., Wittgenstein) and shows that this is what a simple name is not. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein does not offer a criterion for simplicity. In one sense it seems that he has run into a dead-end. He postulates these simples because they are both logically and ontologically required, and he works out a formal system of logic in which they play the fundamental role, but he is unable to say what they are. I believe that it is at this juncture that Berkeley would accuse Wittgenstein of postulating the existence of abstract general ideas. Wittgenstein needs the logically simple in order to account for the fact that language is significant. "The postulate of the possibility of the simple sign is the postulate of the determinateness of the sense."¹⁷

Berkeley's ontological-psychological approach offers a more intelligible solution. The sense data provide grounds for the determinateness of the sense of propositions about matters of fact, and otherwise instrumentalism is the criterion. The sense data are the signs of the language of the author of nature. Although Berkeley uses other terms, he subscribes to the view that sense-data

¹⁷<u>T</u>, 3.23.

statements belong to but one of a vast number of possible and actual language-games. For him, as for the later Wittgenstein, contextual simplicity is a derivative of the use of the relevant terms. Wittgenstein develops this position in detail in the Investigations.

Before turning to the concept of the proposition as it is presented in the <u>Investigations</u>, it is interesting to note how Wittgenstein's logical theory (using logic in the narrow sense) evolves from his theory of propositions.

It is clear that everything which can be said <u>beforehand</u> about the form of <u>all</u> propositions at all can be said <u>on one <u>occasion</u></u>. For all logical operations are already contained in the elementary propositions. For "fa" says the same as " $(\Im x)/fx \cdot (x=a)7$ "

Wherever there is composition, there is already relation, or, as Wittgenstein puts it, argument and function. All logical constants are implicit in the general form of the proposition. We select the notation arbitrarily, according to convenience of use, but the general form of the proposition shows itself, prior to being given any notation. This is similar to Berkeley's theory that the sense data perceived are already organized before the perceiver marks them by arbitrary signs. Wittgenstein writes further that:

The general form of proposition is the essence of proposition. . . . To give the

 $18_{\underline{T}}$, 5.47.

essence of proposition means to give the essence of all description, therefore the essence of the world. . . The description of the most general propositional form is the description of the one and only general primitive sign in logic.¹⁹

The restriction of world to that which can be described by propositions as they are defined by Wittgenstein would not be agreeable to Berkeley. As we have seen, he wrote to Molyneux that grammar, hence logic, is not restricted to the syllogistic. It seems equally apparent that he would object to reserving the term logic to mark any formal system of propositional calculus. Berkelev claims that all rules for discourse of any type whatsoever contain, or rather are, logic. As the later Wittgenstein writes, the rules are sign-posts that show us the way we are to go about our activities in the world. They show us how to follow a path, so to speak. When we lose our way, we have taken the wrong turn. Perhaps the sign-post is ambiguous and we have misread it. How do we know which is the right path? What is the criterion for right? Both Berkeley and the later Wittgenstein say that fulfillment of human purpose, and lack of confusion are the criteria. We are confused when we become entangled in our rules.

The instrumental role of the rules is suggested by one of Berkeley's few direct comments on relations. He asserts:

 $19_{\underline{T}}$, 5.471, 5.4711 and 5.472.

Signs may imply or suggest the relations of things; which relations, habitudes or proportions as they cannot be by us understood but by the help of signs, so being thereby expressed and confuted, they direct and enable us to act with regard to things.²⁰

The above, when coupled with Berkeley's statement that

the reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs is that they are perfectly arbitrary and in our power, made at pleasure.²¹

is a point of departure for a discussion of the proposition as seen by the author of the <u>Investigations</u> The gist of Wittgenstein's final position has already become clear from the foregoing He does not write much about propositions in the <u>Investigations</u>, but rather makes his points almost entirely by presenting concrete cases which are intended to show what he means by the concept <u>propo</u>sition.

But haven't we got a concept of what a proposition is, of what we take "proposition" to mean?--Yes; ust as we also have a concept of what we mean by "game." Asked what a proposition is--whether it is another person or ourselves that we have to answer--we shall give examples and these will include what one may call an inductively defined series of propositions. This is the kind of way in which we have such a concept "proposition."²²

This is a radical departure from his former viewpoint, in which he did aver that there was one general formula for all propositions. To avoid the charge of inconsistency, since I have remarked that Wittgenstein did

 20_{A1c} , 7th d., p. 307. 21_{PC} , 732. 22_{PI} , 135.

not abandon, but rather altered his viewpoint, I maintain that Wittgenstein still allows that the general formula is useful insofar as it is the foundation of symbolic logic (one of the possible and actual language games), and that symbolic logic is a useful tool of analysis in certain instances. But as a universal, fixed definition for all propositions, the general formula is not merely inadequate, but meaningless. He shows that it is meaningless by noting that the general formula is a disguised tautology.

At bottom, giving "This is how things are" as the general form of propositions is the same as giving the definition: a proposition is whatever can be true or false. 23

We could say either, "this is how things are" or, "this is true." If we say that a proposition is whatever can be designated as true or false, it is the same as saying that we call something a proposition in our language when we apply the calculus of truth-functions to it. But when we do this we are basing our definition of a proposition on the concepts of <u>truth</u> and <u>falsity</u>. This seems to point to the existence of a standard of truth and falsity which is independent of propositions, and by means of which we can test our utterance to see if it fits. However, neither Wittgenstein nor Berkeley holds this view. For both philosophers, truth and falsity are defined as properties which can be predicated of propositions; thus the general form of

²³<u>PI</u>, 136.

propositions, as noted in the passage cited above, cannot be defined. Any definition becomes a <u>petitio</u> and tells us nothing. We can show <u>how</u> a proposition is formed by citing rules of sentence-formation and rules for the use of signs in the language-game. The use of the words <u>true</u> and <u>false</u> may be among the components of the game, but the upshot is that we cannot get outside the game to point to the rules. The laws of logic cannot obey further logical laws. Our understanding of propositions is inductive. We see what they do, not what they are absolutely.

Berkeley is in agreement with the foregoing comments on defining or understanding propositions by reference to their truth and falsity, or, as he terms it, agreement or disagreement of ideas. He remarks:

As to what we are told of understanding propositions by perceiving the agreement or disagreement of ideas marked by their terms, this to me in many cases seems absolutely false.²⁴

He illustrates his point by an interesting and amusing example. He has the idea of a particular dog named Melampus. From this he forms the proposition: "Melampus is an animal." Now, according to Berkeley's view, it is impossible that <u>animal</u> should be either an ideal archetype or a subsistent genus. In either case, we should be lead into absurdity:

For in the proposition we have instanc'd in, it is plain the word animal is not suppos'd to stand for the idea of any one particular animal,

²⁴<u>PHK</u>, Introduction, sec. 19 (first draft).

for if it be made to stand for another different from that which is marked by the name Melampus, the proposition is false and includes a contradiction. And if it be made to signify the very same individual that Melampus doth, it is a tautology.²⁵

Berkeley considers both contradictions and tautologies to be <u>senseless</u> in the same way that Wittgenstein does, as we shall see. They involve operations about signs, and do not act as <u>sign-posts</u> directing us to the proper attending to our affairs.

Reference was made to the problem of the logical simples, basic to the understanding of a proposition (<u>supra</u>, pp. 62-63). Wittgenstein left some questions unresolved in the <u>Tractatus</u>. He gives his solution in the <u>Investigations</u>. He presents a long series of examples which he summarizes as follows:

We use the word "composite" (and therefore the word "simple") in an enormous number of different and differently related ways. . . Is this length of 2 cm. simple, or does it consist of two parts, each 1 cm. long: But why not of one bit 3 cm. long, and one bit 1 cm. long measured in the opposite direction? To the <u>philosophical</u> question: "Is the visual image of this tree composite, and what are its component parts?" the correct answer is: "That depends on what you understand by 'composite.'" (And that is of course not an answer, but a rejection of the question.)²⁶

Others of Wittgenstein's examples show that the context and use are the criteria of his concept of simplicity. He urges his readers to look and see how a term is used. This accords with Berkeley's view.

²⁵ Ibid.	²⁶ PI,	47.	۰.

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Berkeley, insofar as he turns his attention directly to the topic, lists four or possibly five kinds or propositions. The type or kind depends on the way in which the copula <u>is</u> functions in a given instance. Wittgenstein deals with the same topic in the same way. It is interesting to compare the two views because it is generally thought that the discovery of the multiplicity of variations of the meaning of <u>is</u> is a contemporary discovery. Berkeley writes:

There are four sorts of propositions. Gold is a metal. Gold is yellow. Gold is fix't. Gold is not a stone. Of which the first, second, and third are only nominal and have no mental propositions answering them.^{27*} Also of non-coexistence as gold is not blue.²⁸

Wittgenstein writes:

What does it mean to say that the "is" in "the rose is red" has a different meaning from the "is" in "twice two is four"? If it is answered that it means that different rules are valid for these two words, we can say that we have only one word here.--And if all I am attending to is grammatical rules, these do allow the use of the word "is" in both connexions.--But the rule which shews that the word "is" has different meanings in these sentences is the one allowing us to replace the word "is" in the second sentence by the sign of equality, and forbidding this substitution in the first sentence.

* * *

 27_{PC} , 793.

²⁸<u>PC</u>, 793a.

One would like to speak of the function of a word in this sentence. As if the sentence were a mechanism in which the word had a particular function. But what does this function consist in? How does it come to light? For there isn't anything hidden--don't we see the whole sentence? The function must come out in operating with the word.²⁹

Berkeley does not elaborate further on his comment about propositions, but I believe that one can assume from the general tone of his writings that he is suggesting several things. First, that in the case of the first three propositions he listed, there is no material or substantial existent idea to which metal, yellow, and fix't Therefore, we cannot define propositions on the refer. basis of existing or subsisting simples, as the early Wittgenstein tried to do. Secondly, he is suggesting that the is or copula predicates in subtly different ways in. each of the five examples. In the case of metal, the is means that gold has certain characteristics which are similar to the characteristics of other entities, and because of the similarities, which relations are mental acts, all have a "right" to be called metal. The second use of is indicates that gold has among its other sensible properties, the sense datum yellow. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the sense datum yellow is among the cluster of sense data which form the stable pattern to which we give the name "gold". In the third instance

²⁹<u>PI</u>, 558 and 559.

(fix't), <u>is</u> refers to the maintaining of stability under varying circumstances. The fourth example refers to exclusion, and he explains the fifth. The whole point is, I think, that Berkeley feels that we cannot pin down propositions to a set of definitions without considering their jobs, their uses, and their suitability to a particular purpose, or their instrumental value. This accords with Wittgenstein's later view that there is no essence of proposition, but rather a series of overlapping functions performed by the propositions of the language.

In summary, both Berkeley and Wittgenstein rely upon an elucidation of the language-model to show how the transition is made from knowing to being. Both feel that language deceives us in that it leads us to posit odd entities, and then we become puzzled if those odd entities do not make themselves manifest in reality. Both insist that nothing is hidden, all is there in plain sight. If we understand the multiplicity of functions, uses and jobs a language is supposed to be doing, we understand all there is to know. The rules of the language are imposed on the language by the nature of reality itself, and these rules are transcendental. We cannot get outside of the language system to examine the rules; but this is not necessary, for the rules show themselves in and through the various language-games.

CHAPTER VI

EPISTEMOLOGY

Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein are specifically concerned with the following questions: (1) What is to count as significant discourse? (2) What are the criteria of meaning or significance? (3) What is the nature of and criterion of truth? These are epistemological questions. Berkeley struggles throughout his philosophical career to develop one consistent theory which will provide adequate andwers. The Wittgenstein of the <u>Tractatus</u> gives one answer, and the Wittgenstein of the <u>Investigations</u> another. The first, however, can be considered a special case of the second.

Berkeley's sensitivity to the complexity of the problem is evident in his repeated apologies for his lack of clarity which he attributes to inadequacies of the language. He implores his reader to

. . . Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude. 'Tis what cannot be helpt. 'Tis the fault of language that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate meaning of my words.1*

For, language being accomodated to the praenotions of men and use of life, it is difficult to express therein the precise truth of things, which is so distant from

PC, 636.

their use, and so contrary to our praeno-tions. $^{2}\,$

This plea for understanding recurs throughout his philosophical writings. He has no problem with the significance of empirical statements. They are based on his doctrine of ideas, which has been explained. But mathematical, logical, axiological and mentalistic or mind statements must not be excluded from the realm of significant discourse. I am using the term <u>mind</u> to include all that class of statements referring to <u>mind</u>, <u>spirit</u>, <u>I</u>, <u>person</u>, etc. Berkeley delineates his problem thus: "Truth. Three sorts thereof: natural, mathematical, and moral."^{3*}

In the context of the corpus of his writings, we know that Berkeley is not insisting on relativity of truth, but is rather searching for appropriate criteria of meaning for the three types of statements that fall into the above categories. He realizes that one criterion--i.e., <u>ideas</u>--will not suffice. We shall summarize his conclusions about the appropriate criteria in each case.

<u>De Motu</u> is Berkeley's most complete work on physical science. This is where we find his discussion of the criteria of meaning for the propositions of the natural sciences. The concept of divine sensible language is of central importance here. From experience we observe that certain congeries of sense data form stable patterns, and

³PC, 676. 2 TVV, sec. 35.

we give these stabilities names. Secondly, we observe regular patterns of events; conjunctions, sequences, similarities--in short all the sorts of occurrences which we lump together under the principle of causality. Berkeley cautions us repeatedly, as Wittgenstein does two centuries later, that everything is there before us in plain sight. We must not seek occult powers or odd entities such as material substance. "Sceptics claim the real essence, the internal qualities, and constitution of every <u>/sic7</u> the meanest object, is hid from our view."⁴

Berkeley claims that physical bodies are nothing but the perceived qualities. Their appearance is their reality. The repetitions and sequences of appearances or ideas or events are generalized into laws of nature, which are nothing more than the regularities, similarities, or analogies that we experience. These are descriptive. Once we have established these laws, in which we cannot discern necessity, we endeavour to show how the various observed phenomena accord with the laws. We may, says Berkeley, speak of the causal process if we like, but we must not mistake this for an essentialist explanation, e.g., that gravity is the cause of the attraction between bodies says no more than that it has been observed that bodies attract There is no occult force called gravity which one another.

⁴PHK, sec. 101.

somehow inheres in bodies. This is how men have been mislead by the doctrine of abstract general ideas.

It is not, however, in fact the business of physics or mechanics to establish efficient causes, but only the rules of impulsions or attractions, and, in a word, the laws of motions and from the established laws to assign the solution, but not the efficient cause, of particular phenomena.⁵

He writes further:

From the foregoing it is clear that the following rules will be of great service in determining the true nature of motion: (1) to distinguish mathematical hypotheses from the natures of things; (2) to beware of abstractions; (3) to consider motion as something sensible, or at least imaginable; and to be content with relative measures. If we do so all the famous theorems of the mechanical philosophy by which the secrets of nature are unlocked, and by which the system of the world is reduced to human calculation, will remain untouched; and the study of motion will be freed from a thousand minutiae, subtleties, and the abstract ideas. And let these words suffice about the nature of motion.⁶

He warns us that the scientist must abandon the search for efficient causes, and stick with description and generalization; that mathematical hypotheses must not be confused with empirical observations; that abstractions must not be hypostatized; and finally, that space, time, and motion are relative. This is the crux of Berkeley's philosophy of science, which is amazing in its modernity.

His criterion of meaning in the area he refers to as natural truth is essentially empirical. It is an early

⁵DM, sec. 35. ⁶Dm, sec. 66.

version of the verification theory. We form hypotheses or generalizations from observed phenomena (congeries of sensible qualit_es); from these generalizations or laws of nature, we make deductions and check out the conclusions against experience, against observation data. It is well to remember, however, that although <u>we</u> cannot discern necessity in the given patterns and sequences, what is given does have an external or objective ground insofar as God is the ultimate source from which the given stems. Since the given is fixed and universal, there is an objective standard by which we can judge our hypotheses to be correct or incorrect. Our experienced ideas are the immediate criteria of significance for scientific statements.

The determinant of significance for mathematical statements, the criterion for mathematical truth, is utility. Mathematical and logical systems are arbitrarily chosen sets of symbols manipulated in accordance with arbitrary but consistent sets of rules which are convenient and helpful notations. These enable us to perform certain mental or experimental operations and to predict the results following from various hypotheses. All of mathematics and logic is based on tautology, according to Berkeley, so the question of truth, in the strict sense does not arise. The question of significance does, however, because logic and mathematics are useful in helping man adapt his attitudes and actions to the observable laws of

nature. They are useful instruments which enable men to predict and control.

One who understands the notation of numbers, by means thereof is able to express briefly and distinctly all the variety and degrees of number, and to perform with ease and dispatch several arithmetical operations by the help of general rules. Of all which operations as the use in human life is very evident, so it is no less evident that the performing them depends on the aptness of the notation. . . I imagine one need not think much to be convinced that the science of arithmetic, in its rise, operations, rules and theorems, is altogether conversant about the artificial use of signs, names and characters.⁷

From this it follows that the criterion of meaning in the case of mathematics, and concomitantly logic, is the utility of the arbitrary sign system in fulfilling its intended purpose. Berkeley knows that it is perfectly possible to account for any given phenomenon by more than one hypothesis. It is obvious from his doctrine in <u>De Motu</u> that he would be perfectly at home in the contemporary scientific milieu. With more sophistication than Kant, Berkeley writes of Newton and Torricelli that although they seem to be disagreeing with one another,

They each advance consistent views, and the thing is sufficiently well explained by both. For all forces attributed to bodies are mathematical hypotheses just as are attractive forces in planets and the sun. But mathematical entities have no stable essence in the nature of things; and they depend on the notion of the definer. Whence the same thing can be explained in different ways.⁸

⁷Alc., 7th d. pp. 304-05. ⁸DM, sec. 67.

Finally, moral truth, which belongs to the category of mind or soul, needs an entirely different criterion of meaning. It is unfortunate that Part II of the <u>Principles</u> was lost on Berkeley's trip to Italy, because we do not have a clear and complete record of the development of his moral philosophy and doctrine of the soul. Perhaps we can glean from his scattered comments about problems in this area, what he would hold the criterion of significance for moral statements to be. He writes:

There are two supreme classes of things, body and soul. By the help of sense we know the extended thing, solid, mobile, figured, and endowed with other qualities which meet the senses, but the sentient, percipient, thinking thing we know by a certain internal consciousness. Further, we see that those things are plainly different from one another, and quite heterogeneous. I speak of things known; for the unknown it is profitless to speak.⁹

Thus, Berkeley claims that the soul is known and that we know it by internal consciousness. This internal consciousness of things spiritual he terms <u>notions</u>. He claims that we have immediate and direct experience of our own soul or mind, since we can at will direct the movements of our limbs, etc. The soul, spirit, or mind, is essentially active. "A thinking, active thing is given which we experience as the principle of motion in ourselves. This we call <u>soul</u>, <u>mind</u>, and spirit."¹⁰

¹⁰DM, sec. 30. ⁹DM, sec. 21.

Berkeley also makes it clear that the criteria of meaning in the three cases we are discussing are very different.

If anyone were to extend natural philosophy beyond the limits of experiments and mechanics so as to cover a knowledge of incorporeal and unextended things, that of soul, mind, or vital principle. But it will be more convenient to follow the usage which is fairly well accepted, and so to distinguish between the sciences as to confine each to its own bounds; thus the natural philosopher should concern himself entirely with experiments, laws of motions, me-chanical principles, and reasonings thence deduced; but if he shall advance views on other matters, let him refer them for acceptance to For from the known some superior science. laws of nature very elegant theories and mechanical devises of practical utility follow; but from the knowledge of the Author of nature Himself by far the most excellent considerations arise, but they are metaphysical, theo-logical, and moral.¹¹

The trend of Berkeley's discussion about the cognitive import of value statements is that faith is a practical attitude which affects conduct directly. There is evidence for the existence of God (divine visual language) which is just as adequate as the evidence for scientific hypotheses, if not more so. The function of both science and faith is to promote human happiness. The moral statements stemming from the Christian faith can be verified, or rather they draw their cognitive significance from the observed utilitarian criteria which are analogous to the criteria that are used in the sciences.

¹¹<u>DM</u>, sec. 42.

A discourse, therefore, that directs how to act or excites to the doing or forbearance of an action may, it seems, be useful and significant, although the words whereof it is composed should not bring each a distinct idea into our minds.¹²

The reasoning that we use for discourse spiritual and moral is neither more nor less involved with analogy and with the manipulation of signs than is scientific discourse. It would seem correct to say that in scientific discourse it is the <u>content</u> of God's sensible language that we attend to, and from which we form the laws of nature. In the case of moral and spiritual discourse, it is <u>that</u> God speaks to us and speaks in a coherent manner that is the proof of His existence and the foundation of spiritual and moral significance.

The perspectival differences between Berkeley and Wittgenstein are evident in the discussion of the topics treated in this chapter. Since Wittgenstein approaches philosophy from the standpoint of a logician interested in the foundations of logic and in adequate notation, rather than as a metaphysician interested in the total nature and purpose of man and being, his approach is far more restricted in scope than Berkeley's. In the <u>Tractatus Logico-</u> <u>Philosophicus</u>, Wittgenstein deals with seven specific areas of logic and language. Metaphysics, epistemology, theology, and psychology are "out"---for the reasons already discussed.

¹²<u>Alc</u>., 7th d., p. 292.

Wittgenstein gives stipulative definitions for the terms <u>meaning</u>, <u>sense</u>, <u>senseless</u>, and <u>nonsense</u>, which are the topics for discussion in this chapter.

He stipulates that the term <u>meaning</u> shall refer to the relation between primitive sign and object. Primitive signs are those that cannot be further analyzed, i.e., names.

The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by elucidations. Elucidations are propositions which contain the primitive signs. They can, therefore, only be understood when the meanings of these signs are already known. . . Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of a proposition has a name meaning.¹³

Wittgenstein uses the term <u>elucidation</u> a number of times, but nowhere does he explain his usage precisely. However, in the above passage, he seems to be saying that how the sign representing the object is <u>meant</u> can only be shown by the placement of the sign in the context of a proposition where its relation to other signs is shown by the copula, logical constants, etc. But, taking this into consideration, before the proposition can be understood, a range of possibilities of meaning for at least some of the signs must already be known. We have here the chicken-egg problem. <u>Green</u>, written as it is at the first of a sentence with a capital letter means nothing in itself. It could be used in a proposition as someone's proper name, a

 $13 \\ \underline{T}, 3.263 \text{ and } 3.3.$

color, a term signifying inexperience, youth, an adjective signifying envy--a multiplicity of things. The proposition in which the term <u>Green</u> is used would elucidate the meaning of the sign. But if possibilities of application of the signs were totally unknown, the proposition itself could not be understood.

It is Wittgenstein's tenet that names <u>mean</u>, and that propositions have sense. "Only facts can express a sense, a class of names cannot."14

Referring back to the discussion of propositions, we recall that a proposition is the expression of a fact. A fact is the object or objects in their given relations. Facts are that which can be thought; thus, they are intelligible.

We understand the sense of the propositional sign, without having it explained to us. . . The proposition is a picture of reality, for I know the state of affairs presented by it, if I understand the proposition. . . The proposition shows its sense. . . Every proposition must <u>already</u> have a sense; assertion cannot give it a sense, for what it asserts is the sense itself. And the same holds of denial, etc. . . What can be shown cannot be said. . . The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of the atomic facts.¹⁵

Wittgenstein stipulates that propositions have sense; therefore combinations of words which do not have sense are not

> ¹⁴<u>T</u>, 3.124. ¹⁵<u>T</u>, 4.02, 4.021, 4.022, 4.064, 4.1212 and 4.2.
to be classified as propositions. Further, since the proposition is a picture of reality, and its sense stems from its agreement or disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts, we have a criterion of significance which, for Wittgenstein, applies to all propositions. We might summarize the doctrine of the <u>Tractatus</u> by saying that Wittgenstein admits as significant only those types of statements which correspond to Berkeley's statements about <u>natural truth</u>. These, of course, are the scientific statements. Wittgenstein puts all propositions in this category. "The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e., the propositions of natural science."¹⁶

Wittgenstein's comments relevant to philosophy of science are similar to Berkeley's.

And now we see the relative position of logic and mechanics. (We could construct the network out of figures of different kinds, as out of triangles and hexagons together). That a picture like that instanced above can be described by a network of a given form asserts nothing about the picture. . . . So too the fact that it can be described by Newtonian mechanics asserts nothing about the world; but this asserts something, namely, that it can be described in that particular way in which as a matter of fact it is described. The fact, too, that it can be described more simply by one system of mechanics than by another says something about the world. . . . Mechanics is an attempt to construct according to a single plan all true propositions which we need for the description of the world. . . . Through

 $16_{\rm T}$, 6.53.

their whole logical apparatus the physical laws still speak of the objects of the world. . . We must not forget that the description of the world by mechanics is always quite general. There is, for example, never any mention of <u>particular</u> points in it, but always only of <u>some points</u> or other.¹⁷

Compare the above with the following passage from Berkeley's

De Motu.

And just as geometers for the sake of their art make use of many devices which they themselves cannot describe nor find in the nature of things, even so the mechanician makes use of certain abstract and general terms, imagining in bodies forced action, attraction, solicitation, etc. which are of first utility for theories and formulations, as also for computations about motion, even if in the truth of things, and in bodies actually existing, they would be looked for in vain, just like the geometers' fictions made by mathematical abstraction.¹⁸

Similarly, the following cluster of entries in the <u>Tractatus</u> seem almost a paraphrase of Berkeley's corresponding entries in De Motu.

Although the spots in our picture are geometrical figures, geometry can obviously say nothing about their actual form and position. But the network is geometrical, and all its properties can be given a priori. Laws, like the law of causation, etc., treat of the network and not what the network describes.

* * *

The process of induction is the process of assuming the <u>simplest</u> law that can be made to harmonize with our experience. . . This process, however, has no logical foundation, but

¹⁷<u>T</u>, 6.342, 6.343, 6.3431 and 6.3432. ¹⁸<u>DM</u>, sec. 39. only a psychological one. It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest course of events will really happen. . . That the sun will rise to-morrow, is an hypothesis; and that means that we do not know whether it will rise. . . A necessity for one thing to happen because another has happened does not exist. There is only logical necessity.¹⁹

In summary, then, the type of significant discourse that Berkeley discusses under the heading of natural truths, is, for Wittgenstein, the only significant discourse. For both, we arrive at the laws of nature by inductive reason-The sets of generalizations which describe the obing. served regularities which are manifested in natural occurrences are given preference on the bases of adequacy and simplicity. There is no natural necessity, for either philosopher; only logical necessity. We can speak meaningfully only of that for which there is a criterion of significance. Here, Wittgenstein restricts significance to observed phenomena which lend themselves to observation and The metaphysical foundation (although this description. statement would be an anathema to Wittgenstein) for Wittgenstein's doctrine is the existence of objects, whatever they may be, and Berkeley's doctrine is grounded in divine sensible language.

Wittgenstein's discussions of mathematical and logical systems correspond to Berkeley's category of mathematical truth. Strictly speaking, statements in this

 19 T, 6.35, 6.363, 6.3631, 6.36311 and 6.37.

category do not have <u>meaning</u> or <u>sense</u> for either of the two philosophers. Wittgenstein makes a distinction between statements that are senseless and statements that are nonsense. Logical statements (i.e., tautology and contradiction) are senseless. Statements in which the terms have no meaning are nonsense. Senseless statements are our concern here. Berkeley is in agreement with Wittgenstein on this point, although he would accord a utilitarian significance to mathematics and logic, as indeed, does Wittgenstein.

The proposition shows what it says, the tautology and the contradiction that they say nothing. The tautology has no truth-conditions, for it is unconditionally true; and the contradiction is on no condition true. Tautology and contradiction are without sense. (Like the point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions.) (I know, e.g., nothing about the weather, when I know that it rains or does not rain.) . . . Tautology and contradiction are, however, not nonsensical; they are part of the symbolism in the same way that "O" is part of the symbolism of Arithmetic. . . . Roughly speaking: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing. 20

The concurrence with Berkeley's doctrine is obvious:

"A thing is identical with itself." There is no finer example of a useless proposition, which yet is connected with a certain play of the imagination. . . A stone is a stone. This is a nonsensical proposition and such as the solitary man would never think on. Nor do I believe he would even think on this: viz.

 $20 \underline{T}$, 4.461, 4.4611 and 5.5303.

The whole is equal to its parts, etc. . . Homo est Homo etc. comes at last to Petrus est Petrus etc. Now if these identical propositions are sought after in the mind they will not be found. There are no identical propositions. This is all about sounds and terms.^{21*}

For both Berkeley and Wittgenstein, the logical statements are analogous to arithmetical or mathematical statements:

Numbers are nothing but names, never words. . . Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers. . . In arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of number. They only seek a denomination. This is all that can be of use to them. . . Take away the signs from arithmetic and algebra and pray, what remains? . . These are sciences purely verbal and entirely useless but for practice in societies of men. No speculative knowledge, no comparing of ideas in them.^{22*}

In general, Wittgenstein and Berkeley agree about the nature of logic and mathematics. We have noted that Wittgenstein remarks that logic (taken in the broad sense) is transcendental, while the notation and systems of rules are arbitrary and chosen or invented for adequacy and convenience. Both agree that which system is used is set by convention, but the mere fact that some system or other is necessary to make experience intelligible does say something about the world. There is no doubt that if Berkeley

> 21 <u>PC</u>, 216, 592 and 728. 22 PC, 763, 765, 766, 767, and 768.

agreed to accept Wittgenstein's stipulated meaning of <u>senseless</u>, he would also term the utterances of logic and mathematics as senseless or without sense.

The final member of the trio of types of discourse mentioned by Berkeley includes mentalistic and axiological discourse. Propositions about these topics would be categorized as nonsense by Wittgenstein. It is at this juncture that there is a wide rift between the two thinkers. Let us consider some of Wittgenstein's relevant comments:

All propositions are of equal value. . . . The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything happens as it does happen. In it there is no value--and if there were, it would be of no value. If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise this would again be accidental. It must lie outside the world. . . . Hence also there can be no ethical propositions. Propositions cannot express anything higher. . . . It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental. . . . Of the will as the subject of the ethical we cannot speak. And the will as a phenomenon is only of interest to psychology.

There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.

* * *

* * *

My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.²³

Wittgenstein limits cognitive significant discourse to the propositions of the sciences. Berkeley refuses to do so and endeavors to develop a logic of notions which one could only wish he had completed. In summary, Berkeley writes:

Three sorts of useful knowledge. That of coexistence to be treated of in our Principles of Natural Philosophy, that of relation in mathematics, that of definition, or inclusion, or words (which perhaps differs not from that of relation) in morality.^{24*}

Wittgenstein's doctrine in the <u>Investigations</u> does not lend itself so well to analysis in terms of the three categories we are discussing. In one sense the whole corpus of the work is relevant to the concept of meaning. Wittgenstein is trying to show that the question of meaning is, in itself, not a legitimate question. The <u>Investigations</u> is a body of elucidations. These elucidations are couched in the form of metaphor, simile, and analogy. The gist of the entire <u>Investigations</u> might be summed up in this passage: "For a <u>large</u> class of cases--though not for all--in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: The meaning of a word is its use in the language."²⁵

 $\begin{array}{rcl} & 23 \\ \underline{\text{T}}, & 6.4, & 6.41, & 6.42, & 6.421, & 6.423, & 6.522 & \text{and} & 6.54. \\ & & 24 \\ \underline{\text{PC}}, & 853. & & & 25 \\ \underline{\text{PI}}, & 43. & & \end{array}$

This is, I think, in line with Berkeley's doctrine. Language, in its multiplicity of ramifications, is a tool, a utilitarian instrument, designed to enable man to get about in his life's affairs as conveniently and as comfortably as possible. Wittgenstein feels that too many philosophers from Augustine to the present day (including the author of the <u>Tractatus</u>) have been deluded by a simplistic concept of language and meaning. According to Wittgenstein, St. Augustine felt that the individual words in the language name objects, and that sentences are combinations of such names. This is a vast oversimplification.

In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. . . If we look at $/\overline{this7}$ example, we may perhaps get an inkling how much this general notion of the meaning of a word surrounds the working of language with a haze which makes clear vision impossible. It disperses the fog to study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application in which one can command a clear view of the aim and functioning of the words. A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training.²⁶

Wittgenstein invents primitive language games as examples, and shows how, even in these, the jobs words do are far more varied and complex than had been previously supposed. It is a mistake to consider language a mirror of reality. Language is one human activity, albeit an important one, among many. It would not make sense to call

²⁶PI, 1 and 5.

other types of human activity "mirrors or pictures of reality"--nor does it make sense to apply this appellation to language. There is no one feature common to all sorts of uses that language has, nor to the jobs that it does. We have already discussed the game analogy. Wittgenstein writes, "We see that what we call 'sentence' and 'language' has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family of structures more or less related to one another."²⁷

If, therefore, there is no common characteristic to language, it would be futile to search for the criterion of significant discourse. It would seem to follow that the best we can do is consider the elements of discourse in total context, and endeavor to discern if it seems to be fulfilling its function. (And this would be an extremely difficult task.) Berkeley limits significant discourse to three types, as we have seen. Wittgenstein of the Investigations would deny the possibility of this, and argue that we can work only with concrete cases. There is no warrant for believing that there is a function of language and a common feature that makes language what it is. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein's program is clarification, by use of example, of the multiplicity of jobs that a language does. It is not an attempt to answer questions about meaning. . . .

²⁷<u>PI</u>, 108.

Neither Berkeley nor Wittgenstein is primarily interested in epistemological problems per se, as we have previously indicated. Berkeley is preeminently a practical philosopher. He is combating scepticism and atheism above His interests lie in determination of the good, abunall. dant, and happy life for man in this world, the possibility of which is based on the goodness of God, who speaks to man by means of the signs of sensible language. The natural sciences are to be explored and developed, since they are the means by which God's language is interpreted and turned to the benefit of man. Berkeley is interested in finding the ground for significant discourse in three areas as we science, mathematics, and axiology. He is have seen: interested in problems of knowledge and certainty, but he does not make a distinction between his theory of meaning and a theory of truth. The criteria he advances for what he calls the three kinds of truth, are, in actuality, criteria for the meaningfulness of propositions, not for the truth of propositions.

It is probable that his epistemological doctrines were more fully developed in the lost second part of the <u>Principles</u>. Of this we have only a few hints in his early notebooks and elsewhere in his writings. We can see his struggles with the problems of knowledge and certainty in the following entries in his notebooks:

It seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas, but only about words. 'Tis improper to say "I am certain I see, I feel, etc." There are no mental propositions formed answering to these words and in simple perception 'tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation and consequently no certainty.²⁸

In this passage he seems to be moving toward the view that it is improper to use the term <u>certainty</u> in conjunction with the given in experience. It would be foolish, for example, to say "I am certain I feel pain; I am certain I see a patch of red." Since what is given is given, it adds nothing to say "I am certain." There would be no evidence that could count against an immediate internal or external perception. Evidence could be brought to bear only against a mediate perception which contains an element of judgement or interpretation.

But Berkeley changes his mind and writes, "This seems wrong, certainty, real certainty, is of sensible ideas pro hic and nunc. I may be certain without affirmation or negation."^{29*}

Berkeley now decides that we can legitimately use the term <u>certainty</u> to apply to the immediately given. He is puzzled here, I believe, about the proper use of language, not about the nature of the given itself. He expresses further thoughts on this general problem in his notebooks.

²⁹PC, 731a.

Knowledge or certainty or perception of agreement of ideas (as to identity and

²⁸<u>PC</u>, 731.

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diversity and real existence) vanisheth--becometh merely nominal. Coexistence remaineth. Locke thought in this later our knowledge was little or nothing, whereas in this the only real knowledge seemeth to be found. 30^{*}

Locke's doctrine is that all knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas. There are four types of possibilities: (1) ideas may be identical or not; (2) they may be related in some respect (taller than, father of, for example); (3) they may coexist in the same substance or subject; and (4) they may or may not have a real existence outside the mind.³¹ Berkeley disagrees with Locke's account of knowledge. According to Berkeley, identity statements are senseless (without sense) and give us no knowledge. The problem of real existence outside the mind vanishes with the doctrine of ideas. Relational statements are nominal, as in mathematics. This leaves the field of coexistence, which is the true field of knowledge. It is knowledge of the properties of things, the area of scientific discourse, which depends on the connection of the sign with the thing signified. A briefer statement of Berkeley's doctrine follows: "We must with the mob place certainty in the senses." 32

³⁰PC, 739.

³¹John Locke, <u>An Essay Concerning Human Understand</u> <u>ing</u>, ed. A. C. Fraser. <u>2 vols</u>. Oxford., <u>1894.</u>, <u>Bk. IV</u>. ³²PC, 740.

We do not obtain knowledge from any of the logical Real knowledge, as Berkeley chooses to use the processes. term, comes from the data of the senses. The relations of ideas are operational procedures for working with or using the knowledge which comes to us via the senses. Relations, for Berkeley, stem from a mental act. Here we see Berkeley thinking through the kinds of jobs that words do. He decides that the terms knowledge and certainty are misapplied to mental processes such as relations and the arbitrary use of signs and symbols which we call logic. Knowledge and certainty are terms properly applied to matters of coexistence--the proper subject matter of the sciences. But I am certain of the simple sensibles in the same sense that I cannot question the truth or falsity of logical statements, because the question of truth or falsity just cannot be raised. The difference between logical or mathematical propositions, and propositions about sense data, is that the former are arbitrary sign systems of human invention, and the latter are externally and internally given ideas, the totality of which comprises experience.

Wittgenstein struggles with the same problems that concern Berkeley regarding the use of the concepts <u>knowing</u> and <u>being certain</u>. Norman Malcolm recounts an exchange between G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein on this subject.³³

³³Malcolm, op. cit., pp. 87-92.

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Wittgenstein reacts to Moore's famous dictum "I know that this is a hand." Wittgenstein contends that using <u>I</u> know with sense datum statements is silly. The use of the phrase has no clear meaning here. It is redundant, for there is a point at which there is no longer a question of making more certain. The phrases <u>I</u> know or <u>I</u> am certain would be equally redundant in connection with certain logical utterances. Therefore sense datum statements based on the given, or on immediate experience, are akin to statements of logic. Wittgenstein goes further in his analysis and makes a distinction between knowing and being certain.

Experiential propositions do not all have the same logical status. With regard to some, of which we say that we know them to be true, we can imagine circumstances on the basis of which we should say that the statement had turned out to be false. But with others there are no circumstances in which we should say "it turned out to be false."

Moore's propositions--"I know that I am a human being,' 'I know that the earth has existed for many years," etc.--have this characteristic, that it is impossible to think of circumstances in which we should allow that we have evidence against them.³⁴

Wittgenstein says that Moore's reply to the sceptics who claim that he does not know missed the point. When Moore insists that he does know, he is reporting on his psychological state of certainty, but that is not the issue. The sceptics are trying to make a logical point.

> 34 <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 90-91.

The sceptics are trying to get the point across that degree of certainty is the degree of psychological conviction.

What is needed is to show them that the highest degree of certainty is nothing psychological but something logical: that there is a point at which there is neither any "making more certain" nor any "turning out to be false." Some experiential statements have this property. Some others are related in various ways to those that have this property. Thus we can give a logical justification of the use of "I know" with experiential statements.³⁵

This is, I believe, the decision that Berkeley reached.

Regarding Berkeley and a theory of truth, we can say that he certainly does not hold a correspondence theory. This is eliminated by his doctrine of ideas. We perceive ideas directly, and the ideas are reality. Perception is To be is to be perceived and to perceive. reality. There can be no error in what is immediately given to me. Statements about ideas involve both interpretation and relation. These are mental acts. Questions of truth and falsity do not enter into perception itself, but into propositions about perceptions. Error, for Berkeley, depends on will. We make hasty judgments, erroneous interpretations. Nor does Berkeley hold a coherence theory of truth. He does not discuss consistent sets of propositions. Rather, Berkeley holds a pragmatic or utilitarian theory of truth that is inextricably involved with his theory of meaning. God, through His divine sensible language, arranges

> 35 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 91.

experience so that, by careful attention, man can know how to act in the world. If we interpret the data of experience in appropriate ways, and act accordingly, we can expect certain results to ensue. If our expectations are 'fulfilled, our interpretations or propositions about the given are true. If our expectations are not fulfilled, falsity or error has crept into the system. Berkeley warns the reader:

Once more I desire my reader may be upon his guard against the fallacy of the word. Let him beware that I do not impose on him by plausible empty talk that common dangerous way of cheating men into absurdities. Let him not regard my words any otherwise than as occasions of bringing into his mind determined significations. So far as they fail of this they are gibberish, jargon, and deserve not the name of language. I desire and warn him not to expect to find truth in my book or anywhere but in his own mind. Whatever I see myself, it is impossible I can paint it out in words.^{36*}

This admonition is, in a way, comparable to Wittgenstein's penultimate statement in the <u>Tractatus</u>, which statement has been cited; namely, that his propositions are elucidatory because those who understand him recognize them as senseless. The reader must surmount the propositions; then he sees the world rightly. Both philosophers are trying to say, I think, that <u>the truth</u> is not to be found in words, but, in the last analysis, truth is open and in view of everyone--truth and experience are one.

³⁶PC, 696.

In contrast to Berkeley, the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus has a carefully delineated theory of truth which follows from the picture-theory of language. A proposition is analogous to a picture of reality, a projection. When the elements of the picture correspond to the states of affairs, the proposition is true. A false proposition is also a picture. It is something "positive." However, the elements of the picture do not correspond to the elements in the state of affairs. The proposition or picture does not represent what it is intended to represent. It does not represent an actual state of affairs, but a possible state of affairs. Every proposition that is thinkable represents a possible state of affairs, but only true propositions represent actual states of affairs. Therefore. there are many more possible than actual states of affairs.

If Wittgenstein is offering a correspondence theory of truth it shares the difficulties common to all correspondence theories. If we are to take the above brief explanation at face value, how do we get "behind" the picture to the reality in order to compare the two? Wittgenstein's truth theory is made more complex by the introduction of the concept of objects. The arrangement of objects (given) determines logical form, and logical form is shared by language and reality. It belongs both to the picture and to the states of affairs. From one point of view, if we take Wittgenstein's statements at face value, it would be

difficult to see how error is possible at all. That is, if the objects are given, and logical form is determined by the objects (which hang together like the links of a chain), and logical form, in turn, determines the sense of propositions, there is no room for error. Whatever it may be, Wittgenstein's theory of truth seen in this light is not a correspondence theory. All metaphysics, for Wittgenstein, is nonsense, so he offers no metaphysical explanation of falsity. I cannot see that he resolved the problem. His answer would be that there is no problem because the question itself cannot be asked.

The Wittgenstein of the Investigations tries to show that philosophical theories of any sort are a manifestation of the special sort of sickness to which philosophers are susceptible. Philosophy, Wittgenstein claims. is clarification and description, not theorizing. A theory of truth would be as serious a symptom as any other philosophical theory. He subsumes the (to him) pseudo-problem of truth and falsity under the concept of instrumentalismcontextualism. Just as Berkeley did not make the distinction between meaning and truth before the great age of epistemology, so Wittgenstein does not make it as the interest shifts from epistemology to language analysis. Т believe that this additional correlation between the two men stems from the basic similarity of their philosophical tempers. Wittgenstein would admit the value of those propositions to which the properties of truth and falsity

belong, as instruments in one of the many types of language games. As life-forms change, (and this includes language, which is one component of the total life-form) the jobs, roles, functions, and uses of language change concomitantly. To talk about <u>truth</u>, however, as an absolute and outside the context of any language game, would be to talk nonsense. Such a concept as the theory of truth is simply without meaning.

CHAPTER VII

PSYCHOLOGY

Among the language games that men play, that which centers on the cluster of mind terms is the most proble-Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein are aware that it matic. is here that the grammar of the language leads philosophers into mazes and muddles that are exceptionally difficult to There are three major problems. First, the overcome. erroneous doctrine of abstract general ideas leads to the assumption that mind is an existent substrate which supports or contains ideas. This error corresponds to the postulate of material substance as the thing which supports qualities. Secondly, a complex set of difficulties stems from the fact that there is a cluster of mind words which are sometimes used synonymously in ordinary language, and sometimes not. Some of the troublesome mind words are I, myself, soul, spirit, thinking, substance, subject, consciousness, ego, etc. Berkeley, in particular, struggles with this problem. Finally, there is the problem of infinite regress when I attempt to examine my mind, recognizing that it is with my mind that the survey must be made. This I must stand outside the mind, so to speak. Wittgenstein calls this the fallacy of the angelic viewpoint. How do Berkeley and Wittgenstein solve the problems of mind?

Berkeley uses two approaches. One of these is the method of language analysis, and the other is a method that today is called phenomenology. Wittgenstein also approaches the problem in two ways. His remarks on the philosophical I in the Tractatus comprise the mystical element to which his commentators often refer.¹ In the Investigations Wittgenstein abandons the mystical and uses the techniques of ordinary language analysis. He shows how mind terms are used in particular cases. Berkeley's use of analytical techniques is analogous to that of the Investigations. Berkeley's use of phenomenological techniques shows some correlation to elements in the Tractatus. This latter element in Berkeley has also been called mvstical.² The similarities and differences of Berkeley's and Wittgenstein's approaches to the problem of mind are the subject of the following discussion.

Heretofore, this thesis has been restricted to a discussion of those elements of Berkeley's philosophy which show a direct correlation with contemporary analytic philosophy. However, Berkeley's method of doing philosophy is not limited to language analysis. He attacks the problems which interest him with whatever tools seem appropriate.

¹Anscombe, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., Ch. 13.; Maslow, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., 4.2, 4.3, 4.4.

²Waheed Ali Farooqu, "Berkeley's Ontology and Islamic Mysticism", <u>New Studies in Berkeley's Philosophy</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 123-24.

In some instances his method is a proto-phenomenology.³ John Wild writes, "Husserl, who has, in general, understood the English "Empiricists" more adequately than most commentators, defines abstraction in exactly Berkeley's sense."⁴

In order to do justice to Berkeley's concept of mind and related concepts, it is essential to consider some of the phenomenological correlations as well as the analytic. We shall discuss the phenomenological aspects first. Both phenomenology and analytic philosophy are techniques of analysis rather than philosophical systems. Phenomenology is the descriptive analysis of whatever appears to be consciousness. It claims to be entirely presuppositionless and to be the most radical of empiricisms.⁵ With these tenets, Berkeley is in complete agreement. Although Berkeley's language is different, he urges descriptive, hence allegedly presuppositionless, accounts of

³Peter Koestenbaum, "Introduction", <u>The Paris Lec</u>-<u>tures</u>, by Edmund Husserl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, <u>1964.</u>)

⁴Wild, op. cit., p. 115n.

⁵Note the similarity to Wittgenstein's position; "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place." (PI, 109) A comparative study of analytical and phenomenological methodologies would be enlightening. Maslow writes that "Progress in this area has been modest; i.e. in any comparison between phenomenologists, Husserl in particular, and Wittgenstein. From the point of view of history of ideas, there are indeed resemblances, but they fail to stand up to a closer inspection of the actual ideas of the two philosophers. A experience. He shows the major source of unexamined assumptions and outlines a way to remove them from thought. He says that words have been used unreflectively for such a long time that they have become incrusted with unexamined meanings. This conviction is common to both analytic philosophy and phenomenology.

Since therefore, words are apt to impose on the understanding, whatever idea I consider, I shall endeavor to take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts, so far as I am able, those names which long and constant use has so strictly united with them.⁶

In the passage above, both the phenomenological and analytical aspects of Berkeley's method are apparent. By implication, he notes that the names to which we are accustomed deceive us (the analytical perspective), but he also urges us to look deeper than language at raw sensory experience. Berkeley says, in short, to stop using language in thought, and to examine pure ideas and images. Wittgenstein's predominant view is that language and thought are synonymous.⁷

The reader of the <u>Principles</u> is urged to attain the same train of thought that Berkeley has. He then escapes the danger of being deceived by words. "I do not see how

much more convincing comparison for the sayings of the earlier Wittgenstein is to be found in certain thoughts of Martin Heidegger. Here a number of parallels appear": (Maslow, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 167).

> ^b<u>PHK</u>, Introduction, sec. 21. ⁷<u>Supra</u>, Chapter IV.

<u> $/\bar{t}$ he reader</u>7 can be led into an error by considering his own naked, undisguised ideas."⁸

A further requirement of phenomenological analysis is that it be restricted to those features of any given object without which it could not be said to be what it is. These general, necessary, and invariant features have been called essences in traditional philosophy, and the phenomenologists follow that terminological tradition. However, the referent is not the same. In phenomenology the object of study is whatever appears to consciousness. When the investigation is restricted to reflection upon the appearances themselves, phenomenology is free from the uncertainties of the ordinary world of natural experience. Berkeley's position is in accord with this. "So long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken."⁹

In addition, the phenomenologists concern themselves with the problem of constitution--that of showing how complex meanings and meaning structures are built up out of simple units of direct experience. Berkeley directs attention to this problem specifically, saying that

A certain color, taste, smell, figure, and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple. Other

⁸<u>PHK</u>, Introduction, sec. 25.
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<u>PHK</u>, Introduction, sec. 22.

collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things.¹⁰

Particular meanings are, therefore, attached to objects of sense perception through experiencing the objects.

Probably the most important feature of phenomenology is the requirement that existence be bracketed. It was mentioned above that phenomenology claims to be presuppo-This lack of assumption extends to belief in sitionless. the existence of a world exterior to the mind. The systematic suspension of all beliefs encompasses, if we are to be consistent, those stemming from scientific, cultural, epistemological and metaphysical systems. A distinction should be made here, though, between suspending or bracketing belief and actually doubting existence. Even though the philosopher might believe in the existence of an external material world, during the time of his investigations he temporarily suspends that belief to permit unhampered inquiry. Berkeley repudiates belief in that which is inaccessible to mind or experience in stating that there is no foundation for belief in material substance under any circumstances. He claims the sanction of common sense in holding to an ordinary, philosophically non-problematic "objectivity" for chairs, trees, stones, etc. But Husserl does not reject the objectivity of experiences either. In fact, his essences guarantee it.¹¹

¹⁰PHK, sec. 1.

¹¹Quentin Lauer, <u>Phenomenology</u>: <u>Its Genesis and</u> <u>Prospect</u> (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), p. 40.

Berkeley's linguistic argument for immaterialism has already been presented. His phenomenological argument is summarized as follows. The primary qualities in Locke's system are extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity, and number. The secondary qualities are the sensible qualities of color, sound, taste, odor and texture. Berkeley, however, claims that primary qualities cannot be said to exist without reference to secondary qualities. Since one is mind-dependent, the other must be. From a phenomenological, not linguistic standpoint Berkeley writes:

It is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must withall give it some color or some other sensible quality. . . In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other sensible qualities, are inconceivable.¹²

For Berkeley, these facts combined with his maxim "to be is to be perceived and to perceive"¹³ mean that the primary qualities do not exist as predicates of a material substance outside the mind. Nor, however, do they exist in the mind as though they were items in a box.

When I speak of objects as existing in the mind or imprinted on the senses; I would not be understood in the gross literal sense, as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax.¹⁴

¹²<u>PHK</u>, sec. 10. ¹³<u>PC</u>, 280, 378, 429, 472, 646, 670; <u>DHP</u> 1st d., p. 175; 3rd d. p. 237; <u>S</u>, 251. ¹⁴ DHP, 3rd d., p. 250. For Berkeley, the mind is no more a thing or substratum than is material substance. The passages in which he presents this view represent both the phenomenological and analytical modes of analysis. It is interesting to compare the following group of phenomenological statements with his analytical arguments:

Take away the perceptions and you take away the mind. . . Locke seems to be mistaken when he says thought is not essential to the mind. . . Each Person's time being measured by him by his own ideas. . . The Understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions or Ideas.^{15*}

Compare the above with the following:

It is no more than common custom, which you know is the rule of language, hath authorized: nothing being more usual, than for philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as things existing in the mind. Nor is there any thing in this, but what is conformable to the general analogy of language; most part of the mental operations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things.¹⁶

In this quotation Berkeley is speaking from the standpoint of language analysis. He points out that language is metaphorical in that we use <u>object</u> words analogously to refer to mental operations.

Not only does Berkeley believe that the doctrine of material substance leads to philosophical error, but the doctrine of mental substances does so as well. Using the

> 15_{PC} , 580, 650, 590, and 587. 16_{DHP} , 3rd d. p. 250.

language and logic of contemporary phenomenology, which "tools" were not available to Berkeley in his day, it is possible to reconcile Berkeley's "two concepts of mind"17 and explain what some of his commentators have referred to as gross inconsistencies. 18 From the clues and comments scattered throughout the corpus of his writings, as well as from the considerable number of entires in the notebooks, it does appear at first glance that Berkeley holds both a substantival and a non-substantival concept of mind. It is easy to see why the charge of inconsistency has been made, and we shall examine some of his apparently conflicting remarks. It can never be known how he reconciles the two aspects of his position in the lost manuscripts. However, on the basis of the phenomenological distinction between positional and non-positional consciousness, I believe that it is possible to clear up some of the diffi-In his day, as we have noted, he lacked both the culty. terminology and logic with which to express this distinc-He repeatedly apologizes for this shortcoming. tion. He is too able a logician and critical philosopher to be unaware of the apparent inconsistencies in his comments on

¹⁷Colin M. Turbayne, "Berkeley's Two Concepts of Mind", <u>Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge</u>, ec. by Gale Engle and Gabriete Taylor (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1968), pp. 10-24.

¹⁸Cf Brand Blanshard, "Foreword", <u>New Studies</u>, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., v-vii.

the cluster of terms relevant to mind. In the <u>Principles</u> he writes:

There is likewise something which knows or perceives /ideas7, and exercises divers operations as willing, imagining, remembering about them. This perceiving active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or my self. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.¹⁹

It is my opinion that in the selection above, Berkeley is struggling to find an appropriate explanation of his position, but misses the mark somewhat. In the first sentence he speaks of some thing which knows, wills, etc. If he is going to write about mind at all, he can hardly avoid this way of speaking, since about requires an object according to the grammar of the language. Yet Berkeley has warned us (1) that language is inadequate for dealing with our concepts, and (2) that the term thing, as he has stipulated, refers not only to the object pole of experience, but to the experiencing subject as well. He seems to be groping for an adequate terminology in that he says "wherein they exist, or which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived." In ordinary language these two phrases certainly are not an equivalent pair. The first part sounds as though something (ideas) were in a container, so to speak, and the second half as though there is a

¹⁹<u>PHK</u>, sec. 2.

perceiving agent. Berkeley seems to be trying to avoid the imagery of mind as a box or container, but is unable to find terms appropriate to express his meaning. He indicates that he uses the terms <u>mind</u>, <u>spirit</u>, <u>soul</u>, and <u>self</u> synonmously. He writes, further, that the above terms are not insignificant although they do not refer to an idea. He claims that they do refer to that which perceives ideas and wills and reasons about them. "What I am myself, that which I denote by the term <u>I</u>, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance.²⁰

Berkeley insists that he is not making an unnecessary verbal distinction by refusing to call the mind an idea, even though the immediate significations of many other names are ideas. The reason for making the distinction is that the two types of things are totally different in kind. Ideas are entirely passive, in Berkeley's view, and their existence consists in being perceived. The mind is active and its existence consists in perceiving ideas and thinking. "It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike that we distinguish between <u>spirit</u> and <u>idea</u>."²¹ He writes further that, "Existence $/\overline{1s}7$ not conceivable without perception or volition. It is not distinguished therefrom."^{22*} Further he adds that, "Certainly

²⁰ <u>PHK</u> , sec. 139. ²¹ <u>PHK</u> , sec. 139. ²² <u>PC</u> , 646	•
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the mind always and constantly thinks and we know this too; in sleep and trances the mind exists not: There is no time, no succession of ideas."^{23*} The three comments above seem to be evidence against a substantival concept of mind. I believe that Berkeley wants to say that mind and its synonyms are names given to the stream of consciousness, the stream of experiences, and include in their significations the activities of constitution, i.e., willing, understanding, remembering, imagining, etc.

Berkeley has said that the distinction between the intellectual and material world is vain. Therefore, the distinction between the object pole (ideas) and the subject pole (mind) of experience in general must lie else-For Berkeley, experience is di-polar. One pole is where. active and the other passive. The poles can be separated only conceptually, and even then it is difficult to speak of the I pole because the grammar of the language leads us into the same sort of difficulty as it does when, misguided by the erroneous doctrine of abstract general ideas, we speak of and hypostatize the object pole of experience. Berkeley's "two concepts of mind" can best be reconciled from the phenomenological perspective. Regarding the substantival concept, it seems plausible to assume that when Berkeley speaks about mind, he is referring to what

²³PC, 651.

the phenomenologists term the positional consciousness. That is, when I reflect on the operations of my mind, the mind becomes an object for the I, so to speak. This is the attitude of reflective consciousness. It is natural, linguistically, to refer to mind and to its contents from this perspective: and discourse about mind, accordingly, leads to the positing of mind as substantial entity. From the other perspective. Berkeley equates mind with the succession of ideas. Mind is pure stream of consciousness as a constitutive activity. In phenomenological terminology, this is the attitude of non-positional consciousness. 24 This aspect of Berkeley's thought is particularly clear in his comments on time and existence: "Duration not distinguished from existence.... In sleep and trances the mind exists not. . . . Eternity is only a train of innumerable ideas." 25*

Berkeley is not, I believe, using language analysis to arrive at the above position. But neither is Wittgenstein in those sections of the <u>Tractatus</u> in which he discusses the perceiving subject or the <u>philosophical I</u>. His comments on that and related topics bear at least a superficial resemblance to phenomenological procedures.

²⁴Jean-Paul Sartre, "Being and Nothingness," <u>Masterpieces of World Philosophy</u>, ed. Frank N. Magill (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 1085.

 $25 \underline{PC}$, 5, 651, and 14.

There is therefore really a sense, in which in philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I. The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the "world is my world". The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit--not a part of the world.

* * *

* * *

The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world. . . . I am my world. (The microcosm.)

The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing. If I wrote a book "The world as I found it", I should also have therein to report on my body and say which members obey my will and which do not, etc. This then would be a method of isolating the subject or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject: that is to say, of it alone in this book mention could <u>not</u> be made.²⁶

It is interesting to compare this set of comments with the following remarks of Berkeley:

If you ask what thing it is that wills, I answer if you mean idea by the word thing, anything like an idea, then I say tis no thing at all that wills. This, how extravagant soever it may seem, yet is a certain truth. We are cheated by these general terms, things, is, etc.²⁷

There are several points of similarity between the method and results of the analysis of the <u>I</u> pole of experience conducted by Berkeley and Wittgenstein, and there are some differences. Both agree that the I is not to be

> ${}^{26}\underline{\mathrm{T}}$, 5.641, 5.632, 5.63, and 5.631. 27 PC, 658.

found as an object within experience. It follows from the remarks of both that object-language, the language of science, is misleading when applied to the subject pole of experience.

The following clarifies Wittgenstein's view:

Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted? You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye. And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye.²⁸

Wittgenstein is saying that it is impossible in principle to assume the angelic point of view. The I cannot get outside itself, as it were, and make itself an object among other objects in the world, since the experiencing subject is the outside limit of all possible experiences. For any subject, that which is totally outside of exper-The I is not an object of ience is outside the world. experience, but the subject of experiences. Wittgenstein's analogical presentation is particularly apt, I believe. "From nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye." Similarly, from nothing in the field of experience can it be concluded that it is experienced by an I. We may call the limit of experiences Beyond this we cannot speak. Wittgenstein's the I. remarks on this subject seem to be phenomenological description rather than linguistic analysis. He is

28 **T**, 5.633.

examining the structure of consciousness, not the grammar of the language. If this opinion is correct, as I believe it is, this mode of analysis is another point of correlation between Berkeley and Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein writes further, "There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical."²⁹ His final statement in the Tractatus is, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."³⁰ Wittgenstein is not silent, however. He makes two important claims: (1) he claims that there is something beyond the thinkable or expressible and (2) he claims that it shows itself. Wittgenstein's attitude toward metaphysics seems to vacillate in the Tractatus. At times, he seems content to write it off as nonsense; but at other times he appears to sense what it is that leads philosophers to try to express the inexpressible. Even though the result may be nonsense, as Wittgenstein uses that term, he does evince a symphathetic understanding of the motives behind the attempt. He does claim that nothing can be said about the inexpress-Implicit in Wittgenstein's claim that the inexpressible. ible shows itself, is the notion that it must be perceivable in the broad sense of the word perceive. Otherwise the claim would be meaningless. Wittgenstein thus opens the door to another epistemological critericn. The

 $^{29}\underline{\mathrm{T}}$, 6.522. $^{30}\underline{\mathrm{T}}$, 7.

perception of that which is shown, but not expressible in language, must be an intuitive perception. <u>Expressions</u> of intuitive knowledge may be nonsense, according to Wittgenstein, but they cannot be entirely without significance and it must be a significance that has nothing to do with language. This mode, for the author of the <u>Tractatus</u>, must be the mystical. "Not <u>how</u> the world is, is the mystical, but that it is."³¹

Wittgenstein uses the term mystical to describe the feeling of wonder and awe that anything exists at all, and, also, he uses it in a way that includes the sense of awareness of the transcendental. That is, insofar as we are aware of the inexpressible in the areas of meaning and value, our awareness is intuitive or mystical.

On the subject of <u>person</u> Berkeley makes the following remarks:

Eternity is only a train of innumerable ideas. Hence the immortality of the soul easily conceived. Or rather the immortality of the person, that of the soul not being necessary for ought we can see.³²

He makes a distinction between <u>soul</u> and <u>person</u>, yet his own conclusions trouble him as we can see from these remarks:

N.B. To use utmost caution not to give the least handle of offense to the church or churchmen. . . The concrete of the will and understanding I must call mind, not person,

32 31 T, 6.44. PC, 14.
lest offense be given; there being but one volition acknowledged to be God. Mem: Care-fully to omit defining of person or making much mention of it. . . The spirit, the active thing, /is/ that which is soul; and God is the will alone.33

The above and similar statements are difficult to interpret, but I believe it is plausible to conjecture that Berkeley is concerned about using the word person to denote the I pole of experience because of possible offense to The term Person is too closely tied to the the church. Trinity to be used with regards to the finite in the above Hence Berkeley falls back on the term mind, yet I sense. have shown that Berkeley seems to be aware that it leads to the postulate of spiritual substance analogous to material substance, and this is what he is anxious to avoid. I believe that Berkeley wants to say that eternity is the totality of the train of ideas or the infinity of all ideas originating in God, Infinite Person, Pure Act, which ideas are derivatively constituted (in regard to human purposes and goals) by finite persons. This is the mystical element in Berkeley's thought. Further evidence of this mystical element is found in Siris, his last philosophical work.

Naturalists, whose proper province it is to consider phenomena, experiments, mechanical organs and motions, principally regard the visible frame of things or corporeal world, supposing soul may be tolerated in

 33_{PC} , 715, 713 and 712.

physics, as it is not necessary in the arts of dialling or navigation to mention the true system or earth's motion. But those who, not content with sensible appearances, would penetrate into the real and true causes (the object of theology, metaphysics, or the <u>philosophia prima</u>), will rectify this error, and speak of the world as contained by the soul, and not the soul by the world.

Now, although such phantoms as corporeal forces, absolute motions, and real spaces do pass in physics for causes and principles, yet are they in truth but hypotheses, nor can they be the objects of real science. . . But when we enter the province of the <u>philo-</u> <u>sophia</u> <u>prima</u>, we discover another order of beings, mind and its acts, permanent being, not dependent on corporeal things, nor resulting, nor connected, nor contained; but containing, connecting, enlivening the whole frame and imparting those motions, forms, qualities, and that order and symmetry, to all those transient phenomena which we term the Course of Nature.³⁴

In the first of these passages, Berkeley makes the statement that "the world is contained by the soul." This is, indeed, close in meaning to Wittgenstein's remark in the <u>Tractatus</u> that the subject is the limit of the world, not a part of the world. Berkeley says that the soul contains the world. Wittgenstein says, "I am my world."

Berkeley's second tool for cutting through the cluster of problems associated with <u>mind</u> terms is strictly analytical. He uses both the phenomenological and the analytical concurrently, however. He writes:

 34 S, 285 and 293.

That an <u>idea</u> which is inactive, and the existence whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than barely attending to what is meant by those words.³⁵

Here, he is not urging us to consider our naked ideas or the contents of our consciousness, but rather to attend to the ordinary use of the terms in the language. Berkeley claims the sanction of common sense and claims, as we have seen, to "side with the mob" is his use of terms. He writes that

In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea, or rather a notion of <u>spirit</u>, that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it.³⁶

Finally, Berkeley writes in <u>Alciphron</u> that mind words denote an active principle, not an idea, and are nonetheless significant.

Since I understand what is signified by the term I or myself, or know what it means, although it be no idea, nor like an idea, but that which thinks, and wills, and apprehends ideas, and operates about them. Certainly it must be allowed that we have some notion that we understand, or know what is meant by the terms myself, will, memory, love, hate, and so forth; although to speak exactly, these words do not suggest so many distinct ideas.³⁷

Berkeley states that we do understand and use mentalistic language. Such language is significant even though there

> $35_{\underline{PHK}}$, 137. $36_{\underline{PHK}}$, sec. 140. $37_{\underline{A1c}}$, 7th d., p. 292.

are no ideas, strictly speaking, to which <u>mind</u> terms refer. This is similar to the Wittgenstein of the <u>Investigations</u>. In this later work, Wittgenstein has eradicated most traces of the mystical element which, though not central to the doctrine of the <u>Tractatus</u>, was apparent. In the <u>Investigations</u>, Wittgenstein remarks on the soul in a manner very similar to Berkeley's.

What am I believing in when I believe that men have souls? What am I believing in, when I believe that this substance contains two carbon rings? In both cases there is a picture in the foreground, but the sense lies far in the background; that is, the application of the picture is not easy to survey.³⁸

In discussing the meaning of saying that a friend is not an automaton, Wittgenstein writes that

My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the <u>opinion</u> that he has a soul. Religion teaches that the soul can exist when the body has disintegrated. Now do I understand this teaching?--Of course I understand it.³⁹

Wittgenstein suggests in the first of these passages that we understand what we, and others, mean by the belief that men have souls, just as we understand what we, and others, mean when we say that an organic compound has two carbon rings. Yet the <u>sense</u> of the mental imagery to which the terms excite our imaginations lies deep. The imagery in each instance determines our actions. This is brought out more clearly in the second passage. My attitude toward

³⁸PI, 422. ³⁹<u>PI</u>, iv, p. 178.

a <u>soul</u>, it is implied, would be somewhat different from my attitude toward an automaton. And further, I do understand the teaching of religion in respect to the soul. As Berkeley remarks, we know what is meant by the words or terms, even though they do not suggest specific ideas.

In their comments on the will, the similarities of the analytical techniques of Berkeley and Wittgenstein are readily apparent. Berkeley writes, "This is folly; to define volition an act of the mind ordering. For neither act nor ordering can themselves be understood without volition."⁴⁰ Berkeley is urging the reader to attend to the grammar and logic of the language. It would be meaningless to define volition as suggested above, says Berkeley, because volition or will is a part of the meaning of both act and ordering. He writes further:

It seems that the soul taken for the will is immortal, incorruptible. . . . The will is purus actus or rather pure spirit; not imaginable, not sensible, not intelligible, in no wise the object of the understanding, no wise perceivable. . . . We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, free, can, etc.⁴¹

We see Berkeley groping for adequate terminology, adequate logic, to express his meaning. He is painfully aware that most of our mentalistic words are metaphorical. Perhaps his thoughts could have been better understood if he had

> ${}^{40}\underline{PC}, 723.$ ${}^{41}\underline{PC}, 814, 627.$

hit upon the contemporary term stream of consciousness, and he comes close to this when he speaks of mind as congeries of perceptions.⁴² lle reverts to the analytical in defending this view when he writes, "Say you the mind is not the perceptions, but that thing which perceives. Ι answer you are abused by the words that & thing. These are vague empty words without a meaning."⁴³ Finally, from the perspective of the contextualism-instrumentalism discussed in the last chapter, Berkeley urges the reader to observe how the terms are used in specific cases. This is another instance in which Berkeley might be considered as a precursor of those analytic philosophers who appeal to the paradigm-case argument.

"The will is not distinct from particular volitions."⁴⁴ In other words, the sum of all those particular acts which are said to be volitions, or acts of the will, <u>are</u> the will. It is an easy transition to the view that we can see what the will is by examining the instances in which the term is used in ordinary language. In a similar vein Wittgenstein writes:

When I raise my arm 'voluntarily' I do not use any instrument to bring the movement about. My wish is not such an instrument either. 45

More specifically, he writes:

⁴² <u>PC</u> ,	580.	$43 \underline{PC}$,	581.
⁴⁴ <u>PC</u> ,	583.	⁴⁵ <u>рі</u> ,	614,

"Willing, if it is not to be a sort of wishing, must be the action itself. It cannot be allowed to stop anywhere short of the action." If it is the action, then it is so in the ordinary sense of the word; so it is speaking, writing, walking, lifting a thing, imagining something. But it is also trying, attempting, making an effort--to speak, to write, to lift a thing, to imagine something etc.⁴⁶

It is interesting to compare the above with Berkeley's fuller statement on will: "Will, understanding, desire, hatred, etc. so far as they are acts or active differ not. All their differences consists in their objects, circumstances."^{47*}

Berkeley and Wittgenstein are appealing to paradigm cases and to the "grammar" of the situation as it shows itself in the language. Berkeley implies that the stream of consciousness is undifferentiated act, and that the objects or circumstances determine the names we use. Wittgenstein says willing is the action itself. It is explained by an examination of the multiplicity of situations to which the term is intelligibly applied. Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein seem to be combining the phenomenological and analytical modes of investigation of the problem at hand, and both are making an implicit appeal to a contextualistinstrumentalist criterion of meaning.

There are, as I have shown, similarities in both the techniques and the results in the consideration of

 46 <u>PI</u>, 615. 47 <u>PC</u>, 854.

problems connected with mentalistic terms. Neither Berkeley nor Wittgenstein believes that the mind is a substantial entity which has or contains ideas. Both agree that it is the misunderstanding of the grammar of the language which leads to this error. Both use both phenomenological and analytical techniques in the dissolution of the problem. Not only do both insist on the need for attention to the grammar of the language, but they make use of the data of introspection as well. They find, upon introspection, no substantial entity, mind or self. Both agree that what men refer to as mind, self, soul, or I is not given in experience, but is the necessary condition for and the limit of all possible experience. Secondly, in order to select the appropriate mind term for use in a particular instance, we can appeal to custom, to ordinary language. Even Berkeley said the difference between will, understanding, desire, and hatred consists in their objects and Such and such an observable response to a circumstances. situation would be called desire; an entirely different observable response would be called hatred, etc. Or Wittgenstein remarks that I treat a person as though he were a soul, not an automoton. The point is that the term gets its meaning from the context in which we can observe it being applied. All is open to view here. We do not look for occult substances or Platonic entities which are original models. Finally, the center of experience cannot

. . .

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The most striking similarity in the philosophical activities of Berkeley and Wittgenstein is their use of the language model as point of departure for the resolution of philosophical problems. Both show that their respective language models rest on an ontic foundation. Berkeley claims that God's divine sensible language, given to the perceiver as sense data, guarantees a public and universal aspect in experience. Wittgenstein shows that objects and atomic facts are both logically and ontologically necessary conditions for the intelligibility and communicability of experience by means of language. For both, language is, in an important sense, a map of reality.

The complexity of the language model reflects the multi-dimensionality of human experience, according to both philosophers. Early in his philosophical writings, Berkeley lists a number of the many functions of language, and shows how confusion results from the attempt to limit these uses to the cognitive mode--a mode which is appropriate to scientific discourse alone. In the <u>Tractatus</u>, Wittgenstein, as he later admits, makes this mistake. He rectifies his error in the <u>Philosophical Investigations</u>,

which is a logical development and expansion of Berkeley's earlier insights. In the <u>Investigations</u>, Wittgenstein uses the language game model, and, by example, shows how language functions as an activity and how it reflects the particular <u>game</u> being played. His concern, like Berkeley's, is to make the many functions of language explicit, and to show how confusion results from a restrictive view of language.

Both Berkeley and Wittgenstein claim that the grammar, or the logic of the language, is transcendental insofar as it has an ontic foundation, and is the necessary condition for meaningful discourse. The rules show themselves in the language, but cannot be brought into view, as they are already presupposed by any language whatever. The terms marking the ontic elements are chosen arbitrarily, but the transcendental rules impress some order on that arbitrary notation.

Both men agree that the formal systems of logic and mathematics are tautologous and give no information about the world. The value and meaning of these systems lie in their utility and convenience in ordering human affairs. Both agree that the laws of nature are descriptive, but are not to be taken as truths about the nature of reality, for no necessity can be observed. The development of these doctrines by both Berkeley and Wittgenstein has served as foundation for the work of the logical positivists.

In discussing the subject pole of experience, both Berkeley and Wittgenstein resort to a modest phenomenological analysis. The "I", for both, is not a thing or an entity, but rather the limit or all possible experience, thus the limit of the world.

As well as the similarities summarized above, there are major differences in the methods of the two philoso-In spite of the fact that both claim to be antiphers. metaphysical, Berkeley can be correctly classified as an empiricist who is also a metaphysician. His doctrine of immaterialism is a metaphysical theory, and entails a committment to belief in God's existence. There is a teleological aspect in Berkeley's writings which is absent in Wittgenstein's analysis. The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus develops a metaphysics insofar as his logical objects nonetheless perform an ontological function. Nor does Wittgenstein entirely avoid references to the theological. He writes, "How things stand, is God. God is, how things stand."1

It is illuminating to study the works of Berkeley and Wittgenstein together for several reasons. The clarity and organization of Berkeley's writings provide a structure in terms of which some of Wittgenstein's more obscure passages take on a new clarity. Wittgenstein's Investigations is a logical development and amplification

¹NB, p. 79.

of many of Berkeley's earlier insights. Both men write with the avowed purpose of resolving philosophical problems. Berkeley writes that

My purpose therefore is, to try $/\overline{\text{sic}}/$ if I can discover what those principles are, which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions into the several sects of philosophy.²

In the same vein Wittgenstein avers that "The clarity that we are aiming at is indeed <u>complete</u> clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should <u>com</u>pletely disappear."³

Although it would be far from accurate to say that Wittgenstein's goal of complete clarity has been achieved, it would be correct to say that some of the principles which have caused doubtfulness and uncertainty have been clarified by the analytical investigations of the two men.

> ²<u>PHK</u>, Introduction, sec. 4. ³<u>PI</u>, 133.

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