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UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

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CHOOSING TO RUN: THE DYNAMICS OF CANDIDATE EMERGENCE IN THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF OKLAHOMA

A Dissertation

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

JEFFREY BIRDSONG Norman, Oklahoma 2001 UMI Number: 3004868

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CHOOSING THE RUN: THE DYNAMICS OF CANDIDATES EMERGENCE IN THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF OKLAHOMA

A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

By Me

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Abstract

This research is a qualitative study on potential candidates who were in the process of deciding to run for the state legislature. From the interviews and observations of potential candidates, a greater understanding develops on why individuals decide to run for office and also how organizations, namely political parties, help them. While individuals must ultimately make a personal decision on whether or not to run for office, all potential candidates are shaped by the same factors, such as a state's political culture, political party strength, and the status of the incumbent. These factors and others are portrayed in the following chapters. Chapter one provides a literature review on candidate emergence and theories on candidacy. Chapter two describes how the political culture of Oklahoma is changing and how this change will affect the decisions of potential candidates. Chapter three categorizes potential candidates for the state legislature based on their motivations and political abilities. In chapter four, the outcomes of the 2000 election are used to evaluate the success of potential candidates that participated in the research. On the basis of deciding to run, the status of the incumbent has the most influence on candidacy. The most qualified candidates, those with name recognition, political experience, and fundraising capabilities, are less likely to run against incumbents. This leaves those with less qualification to challenge incumbents, which perpetuates the strength of incumbency. The ability of incumbents to "scare off" quality challengers suggests the effectiveness of the permanent campaign for officeholders, especially for those incumbents in rural districts. The research contends that the process of individuals' decisions to be candidates is not only a good indicator for the attractiveness of an office and the strength of an incumbent but also an important signal to the status of a country's democracy.

Chapter One: Introduction

At the beginning of his book Parties and Politics in America, Clinton Rossiter summarizes the importance of political parties to America by stating that "no America without democracy, no democracy without politics, no politics without parties, no parties without compromise and moderation."¹ There is one more step to the progression aptly described by Rossiter: no parties exist without candidates who are willing to put their prestige and, perhaps, their own incomes on the line in order to run for office. Rossiter reasons that America could not survive, as it is known, without having moderate parties. However, where would these parties be without candidates to fill their ranks? A party is a collection of individuals seeking a common purpose or, as Anthony Downs puts it, "a team seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election."² In this regard, no "team" can win unless some decide to move from a supporting role as party members and become candidates themselves. While parties are vital, it is individuals who must make the choice to run for office. This is certainly the case here in the United States, where campaigns for office are more candidate-centered than most democracies.³ This system can mean that most candidates view parties as labels, instead of controlling organizations over their campaigns. While the status of parties may change, it is undeniable that a party at any time in history must have candidates if it is to keep its relevance to a democracy.

To focus only on parties is to base an election on the give and take of groups. This mindset overlooks the reality that elections in this country are competitions between individuals. It is an individual act to be a candidate. One of the tenets of democracy is the interaction between individual voters and candidates.⁴ In order for that interaction to be

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meaningful, there must be competitive elections. A democracy renews itself with each election as individuals decide to change their lives by becoming candidates and accept the risks that come with both winning and losing an election. The amount and quality of candidates who run for a particular office signify the importance of that office. This certainly may be a good indicator for U.S. congressional offices, especially in districts with open seats. However, the number and quality of individuals who are willing to run for offices of all levels may indicate to us the overall health of a democratic political system. In Electoral College politics, analysts concentrate on certain states to determine the status of a presidential candidate's bid for the White House. Missouri has been known as the quintessential Bellwether State for presidential politics. The candidate who wins Missouri almost always wins the presidency.⁵ To determine the status of a democracy, perhaps, it is candidates, not just winning candidates but all candidates from all levels of electability for all offices, that tell us the direction of a democracy. As Joseph Schlesinger notes, " a political system unable to kindle ambitions."⁶

My study will be on who runs and why certain individuals run for the state legislature. The decision to be a candidate for office is a process that is known as candidate emergence. Research such as this cannot only consider candidates who have . formally announced and are in the process of running for office. It also identifies individuals who are considering a run for office. Candidate emergence studies potential candidates and the thought processes that go into deciding a candidacy. For strong candidates, such as most incumbents, their victories are often decided before the election. Successful candidates can win before the campaign season begins by weakening the field

of opponents. This philosophy of winning before the event itself goes back centuries, as the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu writes that to be victorious in war, a general must take "measures designed to make it easy to win."⁷ In the modern age of democratic electoral competition, an incumbent may scare off opponents by essentially campaigning at all times, thus preventing any opportunity for challengers to make political inroads. If incumbents are considered to be weak, the most attractive challengers to a race make decisions to run early and decisively, which causes fellow challengers and the incumbents to pull out of the race or to stay in the race but with less support and enthusiasm. With regard to potential candidates for congress, Thomas Kazee, one of the preeminent scholars on candidate emergence, claims that "decisions made well before the first campaign speech is given or the first advertising dollar is spent—shape the universe of winners.⁸ Clearly this analysis considers that long before most people are paying attention to an election, a large amount of the work needed to win has already been done. My research will apply the same reasoning used by Kazee, but at the state legislative level.

It is through candidate emergence that the field of political science understands the personal motivations and the political strategies of those who choose to become politicians. Studies on candidate emergence primarily have focused on candidates for statewide or federal offices and have formed some generalized views on candidates. Most people who run for office are highly ambitious, well-educated, and successful in other fields.⁹ Also, candidates act strategically, which means that they choose their moments on when to run for office. Stronger challengers may wait until incumbents either retire or are weakened politically by being entangled in scandals or by taking political stands that

have alienated a large part of their constituency. Some candidates may focus on the opportunity costs involved in running. If an individual wants to run for office but would need to sacrifice a lucrative career in the process, he or she may put off the bid for political office. My study will apply these theories on candidate emergence to the state legislature and determine if similar patterns exist.

Studies pertaining to state legislatures take on added importance in this era of devolution. Although there had been a call for more policymaking power shifted to the states from federal government before the 1994 election, the tremendous change brought about from that election has led to greater emphasis on state governments. The majority party since the 1994 election, the Republican party, has called for a shift of domestic policy from Washington D.C. back to the states.¹⁰ Devolution is a powerful action because it frees states from federal constraints. This enables states to have variations on social and economics policies, leaving the United States with a patchwork of policies within its borders.¹¹ At this time in American political history, state governments truly are the laboratories for democracy, which Supreme Court Justice Louis Bradeis wrote about years ago.¹² Now more than ever before, we need to know who serves in state legislatures and why they decided to run for that office. The way to understand individuals who consider running for the state legislature is to identify them, observe their actions, and interview them extensively. This type of research develops through descriptions of the subjects under study.

The process I have used to study candidate emergence has been a series of semistructured interviews and my own personal observations. These research methods are from the qualitative school of research and also referred to as intensive case studies. In

order to get potential candidates to open up and express their motivations and strategies, I needed to build a rapport with them. Conducting structured, close-ended surveys would have prevented individuals from fully expressing their motivations. They also would have had considerable mistrust for anyone who would question them on their thought processes of being candidates, especially after the researcher had let them know members of their communities identified them as potential candidates for the state legislature.

Candidate emergence may appear to be research that is difficult to analyze because part of its dynamics occur before there are actual campaigns to cover or elections to review. It is a study of campaigns in the embryonic stage, by its nature a time of uncertainty. Nevertheless, as Kazee notes, it is in this stage where many winners already are decided. The difficulty in this research is the process of identifying potential candidates. Indeed there are roughly over 200 million potential candidates for public office in the United States, once children, legal aliens, and felons have been excluded. The field of potential candidates, however, is quickly narrowed down once the political elite that exists in any region of study, no matter how small, is identified.¹³ Contacts with local political and community activists are necessary to find out who is considered a potential candidate for the state legislature. After the individuals have been identified, interviews are conducted with observations made during the interview process. These procedures require time and information in order to build trust. As Linda Fowler and Robert McClure note on their research of potential candidates for Congress, "The unseen candidates for Congress are not easily identifiable. They can be discovered only with a detailed understanding of the political life of a specific congressional district."¹⁴ For example, a local businessman may not want members of the community to know that he

is considering a run for office. This could cause of some of his customers to think that he is not devoting all his time to his business, or if he is considering a campaign against an incumbent, some people may believe he is disloyal. It would be understandable for that individual to be suspicious of a researcher on candidate emergence.

Making contacts and building trust take time, so I devoted my research to an area and to potential candidates that I could get to know. This was the area in which I could build up the contacts needed to find potential candidates, and from that trust I also was able to get thorough information. Most individuals are far more likely to express their true beliefs and insights to a researcher who makes the effort to contact them and listen. It is also important, perhaps more so in a rural area, to have a researcher that has some identity to the area under research. One county chair remarked on two surveys he got from a New York university on the Christian Coalition, "I just chucked them both in the trash." Once I described my background and reasons for the research, my access rate, I believe, was very successful. Of over sixty people I approached, only one rejected my request for an interview.

The districts and potential candidates researched center on the northeastern section of the state of Oklahoma. The majority of the cases come from within the current boundaries of the second district for the United States Congress. The area, which consists of seventeen counties, is primarily rural, but also includes suburban counties bordering with Tulsa county. This may raise questions of generalizability for this research. However, as V.O. Key, one of the most astute observers of American government, noted, there is a weakness in generalizing any research from one particular state.¹⁵ The issue of generalizability from one state may be even greater for the case of Oklahoma because of

its unique political development, which will be discussed in more detail later. Despite its locality, the findings of my study can be applicable to most regions of the country, especially regions that are rural and have one dominant party. This research also would have application to any region that is going through demographic changes, which are occurring to northeastern Oklahoma, as it becomes less rural and more suburban.

There are also, for the sake of comparison, a few cases involving legislative districts in the urban area of Tulsa. These cases enable me to compare candidate emergence differences among urban districts and rural districts. Over thirty years ago John Kingdon observed that politics in rural areas was more personalized, while politics in urban areas was more policy-oriented.¹⁶ Similarly, over twenty years ago, Lester Seligman and colleagues noted a split between urban and rural: urban areas more likely to have professional legislators, while rural areas more likely have "citizen" legislators.¹⁷ If there are still urban/rural differences, it is noteworthy for this study for two reasons. First, it may help to explain why some individuals, depending on their locations, are more likely to run for the state legislature than others are. Secondly, it may help to explain why the Democratic party, which has its strength in the rural areas of Oklahoma, continues to have success as the majority in the state legislature, despite its recent failures in statewide and federal races.

The use of some districts in Tulsa also enables me to observe potential differences in two-party competitive areas (Tulsa) versus a one-party dominant area (northeastern Oklahoma). Statewide statistics on demographics, party strength, and voting results also are used for contextual reasons to compare where the parties have the most support and where they have the weakest. Such data may help explain the variation in the quality of

candidates that both parties have in races for the state legislature. It stands to reason that strongholds for a party should bring in more viable candidates for the party. Indeed, stronger candidates (candidates with name recognition, fundraising ability, and political experience) may not run until their chances to win are excellent. However, candidates from the minority party in a traditionally one party area always may take somewhat of a risk because the voter registration is not in their favor. These candidates need to intuitively decide that their area is ready to vote against a candidate from the dominant party. Statewide statistics are used to determine if there are patterns that should encourage more members of the minority party (usually Republicans in Oklahoma depending on the region) to run for the state legislature. Obvious results in recent elections should cause more Republicans to believe they can win state legislative races, since Republicans have tremendous success at the federal and state levels in Oklahoma. Nevertheless, Republicans may not win at the state legislative level because they either cannot get any candidate to run against the incumbent or cannot get their best candidates to run. On the reverse side of the issue, it may be that Democrats get more candidates and better candidates to run in state legislative offices. In order to determine who is running and why for the state legislature, case studies such as this one must be conducted on the thought processes of potential candidates. This type of study gives the researcher a better understanding of who decides to be a politician in the contemporary age.

Alan Ehrenhalt considers politics of today to be for "people who are willing to give it vast amounts of their time. It is also for people who are not particularly concerned about making money."¹⁸ Although this may be too much of a heroic description of the politician, Ehrenhalt's view is refreshing compared to the usual vilification of politicians

that is found in the media. No matter how one sees politicians, however, a democratic system must have individuals who are willing to serve. Democracy is a political system that provides benefits to the population, even if the public is unaware of the benefits. Among the benefits democracy provides to the people, according to Robert Dahl, are an avoidance of tyranny, human development, prosperity, and a government that is peace-seeking.¹⁹ In order to preserve democracy, the system that most enriches the needs of the individual, there must be candidates for public office. This research not only determines who decides to run for office but also explores the implications of how the status of candidate emergence for the state legislature affects the strength of democracy.

Objective of the Research

The primary objective of my research is to develop a greater understanding of the types of individuals who run and their reasons why they run by investigating candidate emergence at a state legislative level. This research will add to the field of political science greater knowledge on the dynamics of state legislative races, especially in rural regions that have one dominant party. The main issues explored through this research center on potential candidates for the state legislature and the legislative districts they hope to represent. In addition, there will be implications on other issues, such as political parties at the local level, the status of the office of state legislative races, and the human element of campaigning. The approach of this research is interpretive. It requires answers to the "how," the "who," and the "why" of candidate emergence by focusing on several questions: How much importance does an individual running for the state legislature place on local connections? Who is considered a viable potential candidate for the state

legislature? Why do some individuals ultimately decide to run for the state legislature, while others do not? In order to attain a deeper understanding of potential candidates for the state legislature, the research also has additional questions that are explored in this dissertation.

Theoretical Framework

The phenomenon I propose to analyze is this: why some individuals decide to run for the state legislature as well as what is needed for these individuals to make their decisions. Studies on candidate emergence can make significant contributions to political science, not only on the motivations of the individual who runs but in other areas such as political parties, interest groups, and legislatures. As a result of the extensiveness candidate emergence brings to the discipline, four justifications for this study have been developed. First, the research is important in its own right by asking, "Why do some people run for office?" This gives us real life implications on understanding the political mind. Gordon Black writes that most individuals who run for office are rational, which means that they run when the benefits of attaining an office are greater than the costs of pursuing the office.²⁰ If such an analysis of candidacy is correct, then more individuals should be running in open-seats or against weakened incumbents. However, it also may be the case that fewer people may become candidates as the costs of running a viable campaign continue to increase. Black also makes reference to the opportunity costs of running for office, the costs an individual must forego in other activities while seeking an elected office.²¹ For the state legislature, this may mean that the opportunity costs are too great for most individuals who are in the midst of their careers. It would mean that most of the candidates for the state legislature have either not started another career or have

retired from their careers. It would also signify that some careers might have fewer opportunity costs than others may have. There is also an urban/rural distinction in Black's analysis. He purports that "occupants in the larger and more competitive cities are, in general, more committed to politics and to a political career than the occupants of offices in other communities."²² A comparison of urban legislative potential candidates with rural potential candidates would shed light on Black's observation. Urban potential candidates may be more receptive to risk-taking and run against incumbents than rural potential candidates. Also, potential candidates in urban areas also may pay a higher opportunity costs to run for the legislature, risking their current careers than individuals in rural areas.

Second, this research will help political science to understand the theories we are developing, such as theories on human nature and ambition. Black states that political ambition is not created inherently among some individuals. Rather, it is the political system that determines in an indirect way the types of people who run for office. To Black, ambition is shaped based on the cost and benefits a political system can produce.²³ There may be, however, individuals who do not evaluate costs and benefits rationally and run for office to satisfy a personal desire for power. According to Harold Lasswell, one of the bases of power is social position or respect.²⁴ To some individuals, being considered a potential candidate for the legislature or to be a candidate in what is considered a "hopeless" campaign, one with very little chance of winning, fulfills a basis of power they look for in their lives. While most people may find other ways to boost their self-esteem, some individuals may enjoy the attention that even a losing bid for office may bring them.

Ambition can never be underestimated when one studies candidate emergence. Any race involves some risks. Even a race with no opponent still has a risk. In that most benign situation for potential candidates, there is still the risk of a negative reaction by the candidate's family for losing its anonymity. The change from private citizen to public official may not go smoothly. All candidates and their families must accept that they will live in the public arena more than most. As Joseph Schlesinger notes, it is the choice of a political career that is most revealing of one's ambitions.²⁵ Schlesinger also mentions that those individuals who want to develop political careers make decisions appropriate to gaining office.²⁶ For research on candidate emergence of the state legislature, such a statement means that younger potential candidates focus on building a political career beyond the state legislature. The individuals who want a career in politics are the ones who have developed a political base that may help them reach future political goals. They are the ones that have worked in their party, have helped other candidates, and have attended candidate workshops, all with the intent to use this network and knowledge when the time comes.

According to James Payne, a scholar of politicians' motivations, individuals who run for office are as well-adjusted and healthy as the rest of us. Yet, Payne ponders why there are politicians when the pleasures most people seek in their lives are lacking in the pursuance of office. When a person becomes a candidate, some people do not like the candidate for partisan or personal reasons. In addition, the candidate needs to explain his or her personal views on subjects most people avoid discussing, and the candidate will be away from his or her friends and family while campaigning and serving. Knowing all this, Payne comes back to the question, "Why does someone run for office?" From his

analysis, ambition is the only definitive answer to the question on running for office. Politicians find personal incentives that keep them going through the ordeals of campaigning. It may be, as Lasswell suggests, the incentive of status. It may be to work on a particular public policy area. It may be to please others or to please their own consciences. It also may be to compete against another politician.²⁷ Whatever the incentive may be, politicians are distinguished from the rest of us through their need to find achievement in running for office.²⁸ This ambition should be evident in many of the potential candidates for the state legislature. Many of them are individuals who have reached success in some other facet of their lives. Most potential candidates certainly believe that their candidacy is worthwhile to themselves and their party and that the system they participate in is worth preserving.

The third justification for this research is that we get many of our members of the United States Congress from the state legislature. Schlesinger writes that the state legislature is the most common office experience of a state's political leaders.²⁹ Currently, five members of the Oklahoma congressional delegation have served in the Oklahoma state legislature. Experience in a state legislature, especially a professional legislature, gives members of congress with such experience a better chance of getting higher-level committee assignments.³⁰ Nationally, roughly fifty percent of U.S. House members are former members of their states' legislatures. Because of this advantage, we should expect that many of the congressional leaders have served in their respective state legislatures before serving in congress. In fact, the members of congress who are most likely to get a high-profile committee assignment are former state legislators from professionalized states.³¹ A professionalized state in this regard would be one that pays

its legislators full-time salaries and gives them a large staff to assist in constituent service. Former state legislators often may be more prepared in congress than their colleagues who lack state legislative experience. From his interviews with a congressional staffer, Michael Berkman writes that state legislative service helped the staffer's boss focus in congress because "his state service helped him define what his areas of interest were."³² Thus, a study on candidate emergence at the state legislative level can be used by U.S. congressional researchers as well. Despite the entrepreneurial nature of modern politics, a hierarchical climb is still necessary for many members of congress. This should make the state legislature a good beginning office for those individuals who have the ambition to make politics a career.

The last of the four justifications is that this study will provide a greater understanding of how interest groups and political parties work and interact at the local level. Studies have concluded that despite the belief among many researchers that parties have lost influence, local parties have not become less active or organized.³³ Such a finding suggests that potential candidates assess the strength of the local party before running. In fact, research shows that candidates from the minority party are more likely to run if their local party is strong and active.³⁴ Potential candidates for the state legislature from the minority party, which would be, until recent years, the Republican party in most areas of Oklahoma, have a greater possibility of running if their local party can help them. Thus, there should be more evidence of growing strength among Republican county organizations in Oklahoma. In the South, the Republican party has made the region an emerging two-party area, although in only a few areas are the contests among the two parties evenly balanced.³⁵ Even though Oklahoma often is categorized by political scientists as a border state, the area in the country that is a transitional zone between North and South, it has a political history similar to the states of the South. This should mean that Oklahoma, like many southern states, is getting more qualified Republican candidates to run for the state legislature. Republicans should be fielding candidates in areas of Oklahoma that have never had Republican candidates, or at least competitive candidates, before. Perhaps one of the reasons why Republicans are making Oklahoma a more competitive state is through their party building and organizational strength.

A political party also may behave differently if an activist from its ranks runs for office. The leaders of political parties, however, may be rational actors and support those candidates they deem most likely to win regardless of party activism from the candidate. Based on his experience as a candidate, Sandy Maisel writes that parties tend to stay neutral in primaries with no incumbent representing their party.³⁶ This research explores how neutral local parties remain when a fellow party activist is in the race.

Local politics in Oklahoma has been dominated by the Democrats. However, in recent years, the Republican party has been successful at the federal and state level. Because of the success for federal and state Republican candidates, it diminishes the complaint made by Republicans that their minority status in voter registration hurts their ability to win at the state legislative level. It may not be party label or party strength that keeps the Republicans from controlling the state houses. Perhaps, as discussed earlier, the types of candidates who emerge or do not emerge put the Republicans at a disadvantage in state legislature races.

The activity of interest groups is also considered as an important justification for research on candidate emergence. Interest groups may be more involved in the campaigns of candidates who belong to their group than those of candidates who do not, regardless of the support candidates may pledge to the interest group. Interest groups also may be rational actors; they may not actively recruit or encourage individuals to run but wait until a candidate has entered the race and appears to have a strong chance of winning, before giving support. The inclusion of interest groups in the study has significant relevance for Oklahoma because it is considered to be a state with powerful interest groups. This is also, according to David Mayhew, a state that has weak political parties. Mayhew ranks party organization in Oklahoma in the lowest category and writes that seeking office in Oklahoma is a "personal enterprise."³⁷ The combination of powerful interest groups and weak political parties could mean that interest groups play an active role in the recruitment of candidates for the state legislature.

In addition to the justifications for the study, which are the broad themes of the research, other areas relevant to the research are explored. The nativity of potential candidates is investigated. This is done to determine if one party has a greater likelihood of having a candidate from out of state and also to measure the importance of nativity for one's candidacy. The political experience of potential candidates also is part of the research in order to determine if a difference exists when an individual with political experience chooses to run as compared to an individual with no experience. It would be expected that potential candidates with political experience would be more likely to wait for an open seat or a weakened incumbent before they decided to run than those with no political experience.

Potential candidates to the state legislature may have different family demands on them as they decide to run for office. This is referred in the research as the human element of campaigning. Family needs may prevent some potential candidates from committing to the rigors of a candidacy. Because of family demands, it is to be expected that most potential candidates are retired or have their children grown before they decide to run. The primary exceptions may be young potential candidates, under thirty years of age, that want to make politics a career and have yet to marry and have children. If these are the two categories for our potential candidates, the retired and the young, this leaves a large portion of American society that is limited in their ability to serve.

Why individuals take it upon themselves to be candidates has been a topic of interests among social scientists for nearly a century. The bases of past observations and theories provide structure to contemporary research, although the theories used in candidate emergence have changed as the field of political science has changed.

Literature Review

Theories of Candidacy

The chronological changes on theories of candidacy are described in Linda Fowler's <u>Candidates, Congress, and the American Democracy</u> and Thomas Kazee's <u>Who</u> <u>Runs for Congress? Ambition, Context, and Candidate Emergence</u>. Both provide excellent reviews on how political scientists and other social scientists have developed theories on candidacy. Linda Fowler notes that no single theory has encompassed all aspects of candidacy.³⁸ No theory, as Fowler states, has completely refuted previous ones on candidate emergence, which indicates that all theories still have some relevance. Folwer breaks down the theories into five traditions: sociological, psychological, process, goal, and rule.

The sociological tradition is based on the works of European sociologists Max Weber, Robert Michels, and Gaetano Mosca. This tradition was dominant from the turn of the 20th century to the post-World-War II Era. Fowler writes how the sociological paradigm creates a deterministic and macrolevel theory of elite behavior. The rules and behavior of the political elite are strictly defined according to class structure. A major part of the political elite that Weber identifies are lawyers, whom the author describes as having dispensable time that helps them play a dominant role in politics.³⁹ This tradition would state that there is no other way to politically organize, even at the small local level, without using an elite. Similarly, Michels writes that an incompetence of the masses causes parties to be increasingly based upon the competence of the few.⁴⁰ Mosca is even more direct than Michels on the existence of a political class which rules society. In The <u>Ruling Class Mosca states</u>, "in all societies...two classes of peoples appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled."⁴¹ While this claim may seem to be a relic from the blatant class-oriented industrial age of which it was written, Mosca's description of politics is the foundation of Kenneth Prewitt's 1970 research The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians. Prewitt focuses on the political elite of the San Francisco area in making a determination on who would run for a city council office and why. From his research, Prewitt concludes that the leaders selected for city government primarily respond to the elite class who selected them and are rarely concerned with punishment at the polls if they neglect the demands from the public.⁴² Based on the observations of Michels and Mosca, it is understandable that researchers on candidate emergence do not focus on the common person and survey those who may have limited

knowledge on local politics but instead identify political elites at the local level for information on potential candidates.

Compared with the sociological tradition, the psychological tradition signifies a shift from group analysis to the analysis of individuals. This tradition was indicative of the behavioral movement for all social scientists in the thirties, forties, and fifties. According to Fowler, the psychological tradition "examined the motivations behind political behavior and attempted to demonstrate how particular actions flow from certain personality traits."43 Candidates would have needs in their lives fulfilled by campaigning. The need for power is one of the leading motivations. According to Harold Lasswell, one of the leading proponents of the psychological tradition, individuals get involved in politics in order to accumulate power. It is through this accumulation of power that individuals achieve satisfaction: "power is expected to overcome low estimates of the self, by changing either the traits of the self or the environment in which it functions."44 However, even the leading authority of the psychological tradition had doubts as Lasswell later wrote that individuals consumed by power would seek other outlets than democratic politics.⁴⁵ Neglecting the emotional costs of public life, according to Fowler, is another flaw of the psychological tradition.⁴⁶ These flaws, however, do not diminish the theory entirely from the study of candidate emergence. With regard to candidate emergence, James Payne uses the psychological tradition in The Motivation of Politicians. Payne observes that there is a distinction between the politician and the nonpolitician "in having a particular, quasi-compulsive drive. To refer to this emotional need we use the term 'incentive'."47 It is important for researchers, when observing and

interviewing potential candidates, to not overlook the personal incentive individuals may have for choosing to be candidates.

The psychological tradition is also the basis of James David Barber's research in <u>The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life</u>. Barber observes that there must be motivation on the part of potential candidate before that person decides to run. According to the author, there are two types of motivation for candidacy: personal needs that are met by some form of political participation and a positive predisposition toward politics.⁴⁸ An individual who runs for office must have one, if not both, of these motivations before that person would choose to be a candidate. However, candidates in Barber's analysis do not make their decisions in a vacuum. Candidates need to be self-selected in the sense that they are confident enough to make a bid for public office, but they must also be reassured they are doing the right thing, which explains why recruitment is important. Barber recognizes the importance of the psychological approach as well as its inadequacies. He concludes that candidates not only must be motivated but also must have the acceptance of party leadership. In other words, as Barber notes, it is not enough for a candidate to ask, "Do I want it?" Instead, the candidate also must ask, "Do they want me?"⁴⁹

Beyond the notion of a single group in the sociological tradition and the study of individuals in the psychological tradition, the process tradition focuses on the political competition among rival groups.⁵⁰ This tradition is characterized in Fowler's statement that "the number of opportunities to run for office and the structure of party competition influenced the level of aspirations among officeholders."⁵¹ Based on this tradition, a researcher, when formulating questions on candidate emergence, reviews the structure of

local political parties, the strength of incumbents, political positions from local media outlets, activity of interest groups, and the political history of regions. All of these factors must be included in research because they serve as agents of leadership development for potential candidates. From Joseph Schlesinger, we know how the state legislature is used as a springboard for statewide or federal offices, although, by 1966 when Schlesinger's book <u>Ambitions and Politics: Political Careers in the United States</u> was published, Oklahoma was one of the eight states that did not have any base office in the political structure to serve as a springboard.⁵² Commenting on the primary weakness of the process tradition, Fowler argues that it assumes an existence of an eligible population of politically ambitious people.⁵³ Through observations and interviews, a researcher can determine if in fact there are politically ambitious people in a region. If there was not, then that would be a research question in itself. Schlesinger's work is pivotal in the realm of candidate emergence because the two major approaches that have been developed after his research, which are the rational actor, also known as goal, and rule-based theories, both assume an autonomous individual as central to their analyses.

By the 1970s, the ambition theory emphasized primarily by Schlesinger had been overshadowed by the belief that candidates are rational actors rather than solely ambitious individuals. Gordon Black and David Rohde were two of the primary political scientists who, Fowler writes, viewed a candidacy as "a relatively straightforward calculation of costs and benefits discounted by the perceived probability of winning."⁵⁴ One of the weaknesses of rational actor theory is that it is less applicable to amateurs. This is important to keep in mind when one does research on state legislature candidates because more of the candidates are indeed amateurs. Nevertheless, the rational actor

approach is still valuable because it signifies the strength of political parties by judging the quality of candidates a party can bring to a campaign.⁵⁵ The rational actor theory is very important to my research when considering the factor of term limits. As Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, advocates of rational-choice, surmise, "more and better candidates appear when signs are favorable; worse and fewer when they are unfavorable."⁵⁶ This may explain why more qualified candidates decide not to compete against incumbents and simply wait until term limits are imposed on the incumbent, thus causing an open seat, a more favorable electoral condition.

One final theory featured by Fowler is the rule-based theory. According to this theory, rational decision making about ambition is constrained by political institutions.⁵⁷ Pointing out the distinctions of rule-based theory, Jeffrey Banks and D. Roderick Kiewiet note that inexperienced challengers are less rational because they do not fit into the costbenefit model of accounts for candidate emergence. They also argue that inexperienced challengers calculate a mini-max strategy against a more qualified person in their party.⁵⁸ The mini-max strategy suggests that inexperienced challengers are less rational than experienced candidates, but also that inexperienced candidates receive a large reward from the act of running.⁵⁹ This theory is important to include in a study of candidate emergence at the state legislative level because, more than likely, there may be candidates who do not have the support or association with their party and also candidates who decide to run at the last moment and put little calculation into their decisions.

Fowler concludes her description of candidate emergence theories with the emphasis that the debate over which theory is most appropriate has yet to be resolved.

She also notes that this lack of intellectual unity is not an issue that should inhibit or disenchant political scientists on candidate emergence. Instead, Fowler points out that other areas of political science continue to have theoretical conflicts by stating, "the inability of scholars to reconcile the purposive and conditional dimensions of candidacy is quite similar to the conflict among students of voting behavior about the rational versus social origins of partisanship and the long-term relationship of party identification to governmental performance.⁴⁷⁶⁰

Thomas Kazee has some variations from Fowler's chronological study of candidate emergence. He also has five categories, which are called "approaches." Kazee's five approaches are titled--sociological, leadership, ambition, rational actor, and strategic. He changes the psychological approach to "leadership" and puts the work of Jacobson and Kernell in the strategic category rather than the rational actor category. He also highly values the work of Donald Matthews in his sociological approach category. Matthew's research on decision-makers in 1954 made a contribution to the behavioral school of political science because his research emphasized the importance of attitudes among political decision-makers. One of the main areas of research for behavioralism is the role of the individual in a political system.⁶¹ This is a distinction from the sociological school of Mosca, Michels, and Weber, which focused on politics in terms of class rather than individuals. It is not just the elections and primaries that create decisionmakers, according to Matthews, but the "continual sifting and sorting of the citizens who enter the quest for political power."62 Citing Matthews in his study, Kazee notes that eligibility for public office is dependent primarily on considerations such as occupation, economic status, and social standing.⁶³ This is an important concept to remember in

research on candidate emergence. While it may be true that every adult citizen is indeed a potential candidate, realistically many individuals are eliminated from the candidacy pool because of their social standings. Matthews makes a clear explanation on why the study of social background is helpful for understanding political behavior. He lists three reasons for its importance: the study of social backgrounds provides a foundation for a clearer appreciation of the decision-making process; it also provides a more reliable picture of how decision-makers are selected; finally, it creates another perspective to the study of the relationship between social and political change.⁶⁴ All three have an impact on candidate emergence in the state legislature.

Kazee's own analysis of his research on candidate emergence is substantial. He writes of the typical candidate for U.S. Congress as one who is "an ambitious but cautious individual who decides on whether to run for Congress based largely on perceptions of the winnability of the seat."⁶⁵ Kazee also notes how his research is in disagreement with the research of Jacobson and Kernell, by stating that he found hardly any candidates that focused on national factors for their emergence as candidates. Jacobson and Kernell believe that potential candidates for congress consider national issues in their strategic behavior.⁶⁶ If few candidates for the federal legislature focus on national issues, as Kazee believes, then state legislative candidates are even more likely to focus on local issues and less, if any, on national issues.

Candidate Emergence in the State Legislature

For both Kazee and Fowler, the emphasis is on the U.S. Congress. Of course, congressional candidates are not the only subject of candidate emergence. Journals such as <u>Legislative Studies Quarterly</u> have focused on candidate emergence at the state

legislative level. In "Why Do U.S. State Legislators Vacate Their Seats?" Wayne Francis and John Baker write that the most dissatisfied members were those who felt legislative service was not very rewarding. For some of the younger incumbents who chose not to run, those in their early forties, a primary reason for leaving the legislature was to pursue another political office. Added to the lack of reward and higher political ambition is the growing opportunity costs, the costs to a legislator's other occupation while serving in the legislature, that some legislators perceive as a negative to serving.⁶⁷ This article helps to make the point that not all incumbents are the same and that there are a variety of reasons why incumbents choose not to run. Another article that provided insight on the challenger/incumbent variation is "The Increasing Advantage of Incumbency in the U.S. States" by Gary Cox and Scott Morgenstern. These authors discover that the incumbency advantage for state legislators has continued to increase in the past two decades and that this advantage can be explained by increased legislative operating budgets and by increased casework.⁶⁸ The use of casework is possibly one of the reasons that in most rural areas of Oklahoma Democrats have been able to field stronger candidates than Republicans at the state legislative level. In "Money and Votes in State Legislative Elections" Anthony Gierzynski and David Breaux write that campaign expenditures are found to play a significant role in state legislative election outcomes. They also note that spending by challengers has a greater impact than spending by incumbents. This difference in spending may indicate that state legislative districts are more homogeneous and that successful incumbents find it easier to reach the voters of their districts without spending large sums of money.⁶⁹ From this article, there can be further insights as to why some incumbents receive stronger challengers than others. It may also help to explain

why some potential candidates may ultimately rule out a state legislative bid because of the behavior of their incumbents.

A common theme from all three articles is the power of incumbency. Incumbents continue to have an advantage over their challengers, and it is far likely for incumbents to leave office rather than to be defeated. However, the demands of the office, suggested by the dissatisfaction of some incumbents in Francis and Baker's research, may mean that incumbents must be in a continuous campaign mode in order to ward off strong challengers. In fact, Jeffrey Cohen writes that incumbents feel insecure about their status even when they have very little threat in their districts.⁷⁰ This constant feeling of insecurity may actually help incumbents stay elected. An in-depth analysis on incumbency is done by Malcolm Jewell and David Breaux in "The Effect of Incumbency on State Legislative Elections." The authors determine that in a twenty-year period, legislators consistently were reelected, with an over eighty-percent success rate in the fourteen states they studied. They conclude that unless a state has effective recruiting efforts from parties, incumbents in most states grow in strength and discourage potential challengers from running.⁷¹

Despite the advantages of incumbents, there will be some victorious challengers in almost every election. Anita Pritchard's analysis of the Florida House of Representatives concludes that incumbents who appear vulnerable would get challengers in their general elections. A vulnerable incumbent in this study would be a legislator who is losing his or her individual electoral appeal and who belongs to a party facing declining strength in his or her district.⁷² Pritchard also does not find any variation in the strategic decisions made by potential challengers who had office experience and those

who did not. For potential challengers in both cases, the vulnerability for the incumbent has been considered.⁷³

Determining the status of an incumbent is one factor in deciding to run; fund raising is another important factor. In "Campaign Spending in State Legislative Primary Elections," Robert Hogan notes how most candidates in primaries must come up with independent sources of funds because parties and interest groups wait for the general election before contributing to a campaign. Usually incumbents outspend challengers in primary elections by large amounts. This suggests that challengers must not only consider the electoral vulnerability of the incumbent but also most likely need some personal wealth and connections to funding sources in order to be successful in the primary.⁷⁴ The demand for money may explain why more potential challengers may choose not to run against incumbents.

Two sources used to provide background for a broader perspective on state legislatures are Alan Rosenthal's <u>The Decline of Representative Democracy: Process</u>, <u>Participation, and Power in State Legislatures</u> and Malcolm Jewell's <u>Representation in</u> <u>State Legislatures</u>. Rosenthal writes that legislatures are elitist bodies with membership comprised of individuals from the more privileged and achieving sectors of society.⁷⁵ One of the major changes that has been occurring among the membership of state legislatures, according to Rosenthal, is the decline in the number of attorneys, which is primarily due to the time demands and financial disclosure requirements that are imposed on most legislators. While the demands on legislators may be greater today than in the past, more legislators currently see themselves as legislators first and their other occupations as secondary. Rosenthal also mentions that a larger number of teachers are

now running for the state legislature, especially in rural and suburban areas where they are best organized.⁷⁶ Noting how the increases in professionalism occur in more states, he argues that professionalism is primarily signified in state legislatures through the expansion of staffing.⁷⁷ Although professionalism may benefit the incumbent, Rosenthal asserts, it has harmed the legislature as an institution by diminishing the value of teamwork. He believes the importance of working together as a team has been removed as the professionalization of legislators has made the job more individualistic. To Rosenthal, the growing strength of incumbents is harmful to democracy, as it diminishes competition. The growing strength of incumbents, as a result of increased professionalism, has reduced the cohesion needed in the legislature for effective lawmaking.

While Rosenthal focuses on how the attitudes of individual legislators may affect the institution of the legislature, Jewell stresses how incumbents can avoid strong challengers by providing constituent service. That the way legislators represent their constituents, Jewell states, means less competition from challengers in elections. Most of the legislators studied by Jewell left their posts through retirement rather than defeat at the polls.⁷⁸ This seemingly entrenchment by incumbents certainly is an important factor for the study of candidate emergence. As incumbents continue to get more entrenched in their offices, fewer qualified challengers will run, which can diminish the overall quality of democracy in the United States. Jewell also finds that in the primary campaigns, issues are of minor significance. In most state legislative campaigns, but especially primary campaigns, the most important factors for electoral success are local connections and personality.⁷⁹ This lack of emphasis on issues and greater emphasis on local connections may explain why candidates of one party may do well in local campaigns in spite of a poor showing in federal and statewide races.

Candidate Emergence and Political Parties

Political parties are another organization that is an important factor in the study of candidate emergence in the state legislature. Despite the reports in political science on the rise of candidate-centered or even campaign-centered politics, both of which signify an increase in importance for individuals or consultants at the expense of parties, state legislative candidates still use parties. In <u>Political Parties and the Winning of Office</u>, Joseph Schlesinger asserts that a true party nucleus emerges only in those constituencies that have a short-run or long-run chance to win.⁸⁰ This assumes that parties in America are created primarily to win elections. Based on this assumption, a party that has a chance to win an election must have a party nucleus in place that is geared toward the goal and can help the candidate. Schlesinger notes that there is a different party nucleus for each level of competitive election for each competitive party. Such an analysis may explain that the potential candidates for one party may be less qualified and less motivated to run for the state legislature if there is no true party nucleus to help them in their bid for the state legislature.

Two significant sources on the importance of political parties in legislative politics and the strategies of state parties are <u>Legislative Party Campaign Committees in</u> <u>the American States</u> by Anthony Gierzynski and <u>Party Organizations in American</u> <u>Politics</u> by Cornelius Cotter, James Gibson, John Bibby, and Robert Huckshorn. Exploring how parties have adapted to their changing roles in American politics, Gierzynski points out that currently political parties at the state level provide services to

candidates, such as workshops on fundraising, and also serve as brokers for resources to campaigns.⁸¹ He believes that parties have found their niche in candidate-centered politics. Connected to this research is Cindy Simon Rosenthal's analysis that the legislative caucus campaign committees, the money source for state parties, spend more funds if they are faced with increasing competition from their counterparts in the state.⁸² In both sources, parties have found ways to strengthen their electoral base in legislatures and to make sure that parties are a vital source for campaigns.

Similarly, arguing about the significance of parties' roles, Cotter and his colleagues charge that the literature in the field of political science describing the demise of parties is inaccurate. They note that state and national parties have increased in strength.⁸³ Their view of parties is reemphasized in a subsequent article, which focuses on local parties' influence on candidates.⁸⁴ The authors argue that parties make an important contribution to politics, but that the two parties contribute in different ways. The service Republican state parties provided to their local parties is campaign seminars, while Democratic state parties focus primarily on national party rule enforcement for their local parties.⁸⁵ Such a difference certainly indicates that the Republican party should be able to help state legislative candidates, especially in areas where the Republican party is growing. Oklahoma Republican legislative candidates, especially in the urban areas of the state, seem to have benefited from campaign seminars from their party.

How political parties support their candidates for the legislature may reflect deeper cultural differences between the parties. Local Democratic and Republican parties may have clear distinctions from each other. In <u>Political Parties in Local Areas</u> William Crotty writes, "parties are creatures of the local environment."⁸⁶ This will cause parties to

emphasize different elections and focus on different issues. Crotty and his associates assert that Republicans at the local level "identify with national policy issues and campaigns and relate less to local political concerns."⁸⁷ These differences among the parties may help explain the odd political configuration of Oklahoma, a Republican state federally and a Democratic state locally.

Members of the two major parties may have differences that are intellectually deeper than just those on policy issues. From her research Jo Freeman finds that the two parties have systemic differences. She describes the Democratic party as pluralistic and polycentric and the Republican party as unitary.⁸⁸ Differences like these, if they exists in most states, may give one party an advantage in some elections and disadvantages in other elections. Legitimacy in the Democratic party, according to Freeman, is based on "who you represent, and in the Republican party by whom you know and who you are."⁸⁹ Critics may claim that these accounts are overly simplistic. Larry Sabato would argue that both parties are quite adaptable because the will to win is so great that it overrides ideology and prevents rigidity, suggesting that Freeman's analysis overlooks the primary goal of a party, to win elections.⁹⁰ However. Freeman's analysis is an important effort to consider an individual's party membership to be more than a statement of support for certain policies and to instead claim that individuals belong to a certain party because of their worldview on how the nation should be governed. These different worldviews, polycentric for Democrats and unitary for Republicans, may mean that Democrats have more success in elections where diversity is emphasized whereas Republicans may have greater success in elections where unity is needed. Not only may these differences have

influence on which party wins, but it may also have an impact on the type of candidates that emerge within the parties based on the features of a certain election.

Parties find themselves in changing positions due to their success or failure in elections. David Canon and David Sousa explore this situation in "Party System Change and Political Career Structures in the U.S. Congress." They write how parties that emerge out of noncompetitive positions may rely heavily on political amateurs because they do not have an adequate pool of experienced politicians.⁹¹ This is indicative throughout the South as the growing Republican party still must find candidates to run in state legislative races. Amateurs, Canon and Sousa argue, play a significant role in the realignment of parties. As a party grows in strength, a larger number of party switchers and career-oriented candidates may represent that party.⁹² Since there is a strong indication that the Republican party is growing in Oklahoma, these changes should occur in Oklahoma to the advantage of the Republicans.

Candidate Emergence at the Congressional Level

Amateurs in electoral politics are the theme of David Canon's <u>Actors, Athletes,</u> <u>and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress</u>. Canon finds that amateurs, individuals with no political experience, are elected to Congress in greater numbers during times of electoral upheaval and that amateurs running for Congress are less strategic in their decisions to run for office.⁹³ These findings may have some relevance to a study on candidate emergence in the state legislature. Similarly to their congressional counterparts, amateurs for the state legislature also may be less strategic in their decision to run. They may run against a strong incumbent, not considering the odds against winning, as most calculating potential candidates would. The most ambitious

amateurs, Canon describes, are those who can be identified by voters on the basis of their celebrity status.⁹⁴ However, individuals with celebrity status may not desire a candidacy for the state legislature. This may mean that at the state legislative level, the amateurs who could challenge incumbents avoid that office, leaving other amateurs with little name recognition to fill the void, which would partly help explain the success of incumbents. Although there is always the question of how much research on Congress can transfer to the state legislative level, Canon's work is useful for research on the state legislature because it focuses on the motivation of amateurs and candidacy.

With regard to the issue of generalization, some research on Congress can still be used as comparisons to the dynamics of state legislative politics. In "Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections," the authors Jon Bond, Cary Covington, and Richard Fleisher find that partisan forces had influence on getting strong challengers to face incumbents. The authors also argue that constituency service from the incumbent is not enough to withstand strong challengers if that incumbent has voted inconsistently with the district's desires. One final relevant point from this research is the finding that diverse constituencies are no more likely to find quality challengers than homogeneous constituencies.⁹⁵ The research emphasizes the importance of party and indicates how difficult it is for the minority party to gain success, especially if incumbents stay in touch with their districts. It also suggests that urban, more diverse legislative districts do not have stronger challengers than the rural, less diverse legislative districts. According to the authors, the incumbents who do not face strong challengers are usually ones who did not have a close race in their last campaign and are from the dominant party in the district.⁹⁶ Additionally, Sandy Maisel and Walter Stone conclude from their research that strong

potential challengers for the U.S. Congress, who believe they have a good chance of winning their party's nomination, may not challenge an incumbent from their own party and compete in the primary.⁹⁷ One of the benefits for many incumbents is to have districts with party registration in their favor, which then requires a strong challenger who could get cross-over voters to unseat the incumbent. In "The Deterrent Effect of Incumbency on Recruiting Challengers in U.S. House Elections" Thomas Kazee also concludes that the most qualified challengers usually choose not to run against an incumbent. The most qualified challengers would be the ones with the most political savvy, the same ones who most understand the difficulty of defeating an incumbent. While qualified challengers tend to choose not to run against incumbents, challengers with less political skills may run. The weaker challengers however, are not prepared to face an incumbent because of lack of fundraising and communication skills. As a result of the weaker challenger's campaign and subsequent loss to the incumbent, the election builds up the political strength of the incumbent even more for future campaigns.⁹⁸

The power of incumbency at the congressional level is the primary theme of Lyn Ragsdale's "Incumbent Popularity, Challenger Invisibility, and Congressional Voters." Ragsdale investigates how voters compare both the challenger and the incumbent when the information on both candidates is balanced and available. Since information is rarely evenly distributed, she concludes that the voters most likely vote for the incumbent, the one the voters know and at least minimally support.⁹⁹ Such a conclusion ties in with Tom Loftus' analysis that voters continue to vote for the incumbent because they view their support as an investment they have made with the current officeholder.¹⁰⁰ Both Ragsdale and Loftus imply the importance of personal characteristics on the part of the candidates for office. They also indicate the daunting task facing most challengers. The money needed to offset the name recognition given to an incumbent may deter many potential candidates. Thus, it should be expected that the strongest challengers do not face an incumbent unless name recognition actually harms an incumbent. This situation could be a result of voting record or perhaps a personal mishap or controversy, such as a drunk driving arrest or a divorce.

If there are no personal weaknesses evident on the part of the incumbent, then a challenger must hope that there is a growing partisan weakness in an incumbent's district. In "Strategic Decisions of Candidacy in U.S. Congressional Districts" William Bianco finds that quality challengers is correlated to the strength of the challenger's party. Conversely, if the conditions do not favor the party of the opposition in any district, the candidates for that party are politically inexperienced and underfinanced.¹⁰¹ Bianco's research suggests that before quality challengers will take on incumbents, there must be a change in party registration in the district that would benefit the challenger.

Continuing on the theme of challengers, in "Preempting Quality Challengers in House Elections," Jonathan Krasno and Donald Green write that strong challengers are not inhibited to run against a well-financed incumbent if there are signs of electoral vulnerability.¹⁰² For the authors, it is the local political climate that has the greatest impact on the status of challengers. This suggests for the state legislature that, regardless of their fundraising ability, incumbents must continue to maintain their districts' political base or risk a strong challenger. However, if incumbents maintain their political base, then they can suppress quality challengers, which is called the "scare off effect" in Gary Cox and Jonathan Kratz's "The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections." According

to Cox and Kratz, incumbents can scare off quality challengers by utilizing the resources of their office, such as their legislative staff and franking privileges.¹⁰³ State legislators may not have the office personnel advantage that members of Congress have, but the more staff they have the more time they can devote to campaigning. State legislators may also use franking, postage-free mailing, to their advantage by mailing congratulatory messages, such as birthday cards to their constituents. All instances indicate that the findings by Cox and Katz have some relevance for state legislature research and that this research further explains the power of incumbency in almost all levels of government.

Candidate Emergence and Realignments

One of the more perplexing issues of Oklahoma politics is the dominance of Republicans for statewide and federal offices, and the dominance of Democrats at the state legislative level. In "Regional Realignment from an Officeholding Perspective," Charles Bullock provides an explanation to this phenomenon, which is also occurring in Southern states. He finds that in the South, the Republican Party has had greater success at finding viable candidates for statewide and federal offices than for the state legislature. Part of the reason for this is that Democrats can draw advantageous district lines for the state legislature and keep these seats despite losing in other races.¹⁰⁴ Bullock believes that the realignment that has occurred for Republicans in higher offices eventually spreads to lower offices in the legislature. This would mean more success for Republican legislative candidates in these states as they continue to have their voting returns for local offices increasingly reflect those for federal offices.

Candidate Emergence and the Power of Incumbency

The structure of the legislature may have influence on how legislators campaign. According to Peverill Squire, professionalized legislatures, those with higher pay and more personnel, for example, have more contact with their various constituencies. Professionalized legislatures also receive lower attention levels and lower opinions from the voters of their states.¹⁰⁵ The status of professionalism may have an impact on the success for members of the Oklahoma legislature. Michael Berkman, using the standards established by Squire, puts Oklahoma in a "more professionalized" category.¹⁰⁶ This means that the Oklahoma legislature is not as professionalized as some state legislatures, but more professionalized than others. The more professional the Oklahoma legislature becomes, the higher pay members receive and the more personnel its members can use, the more time legislators can have to devote to campaigning, which can give them greater electoral success. Squire notes that for professionalized legislatures the similar paradox occurs as in the U.S. Congress: "people like their representatives but not the institutions in which they serve."¹⁰⁷ This paradox works to the advantage of incumbents in both state legislatures and in Congress. In another article pertaining to the professionalism in the legislature, Squire cites Morris Fiorina's concept that increased pay induces "government service oriented Democrats, but not more private sector oriented Republicans, to stay in the legislature."¹⁰⁸ Such insight provides another answer for the continued Democratic success in the Oklahoma legislature. Increased pay may give incumbents more time to campaign as noted by the research of John Carey, Richard Niemi, and Lynda Powell. Salary increase, according to Carey, Niemi, and Powell, more than any other aspects of professionalization, help incumbents, precisely because the higher salaries allow them to

focus on their political career.¹⁰⁹ However, salary increases can be a limited benefit for legislators, because, as Gary Copeland suggested, an increase in pay may provide a powerful incentive for others to pursue a career in the state legislature.¹¹⁰ Then, for most candidates, the rewards for winning may be greater than the risks of running as the increase in the salaries for legislators continues. This occurrence would make it imperative for legislators to make the environment for challengers as harsh as possible, thus scaring off as many quality challengers as possible.

A recurring theme for most of the relevant literature on candidate emergence has been the power of incumbency. Political parties cater to their incumbents in order to protect the areas they already dominate in a state. Lawmaking bodies, the legislatures, give institutional advantages to incumbents, through redistricting, franking privileges, and constituency service. With the clear support bestowed on incumbents from both their parties and the legislature, it should come as no surprise that most qualified candidates, those with fundraising ability, name recognition, and excellent communication skills, would wait until their districts become open seats. It is not unique to find an incumbent with a weak challenger or no challenger at all. However, some incumbents would be challenged and some might go on to lose. The assumption must be made that most challengers believe they will be one of the few that pull off an upset and defeat an incumbent. Most are not in that category, yet they find some motivation to make them run. Because of this motivation the political system of a democracy is in a continued state of regeneration. To put it simply: no candidates, no democracy.

Preview of Chapters Two, Three, and Four

The remaining sections of the research focus on Oklahoma politics and profiles of potential candidates for the Oklahoma State legislature. Chapter two provides a detailed analysis of Oklahoma politics. It includes a brief history of Oklahoma politics, the differences between the two major parties, and the differences among urban, rural, and suburban legislative districts. This may help identify the reasons for the patterns of candidacy that currently exist in Oklahoma.

The best way to understand the motivation to run, an important tenet of candidate emergence, is to explore this issue on a case-by-case basis to understand why candidates exist, which is found in chapter three. This involves interviews and observations of potential candidates. The subsections of this chapter focus on structural factors that influence who runs for office and why. Two of the subsections describe the importance of parties, which includes the differences among candidates for the two major parties as well as the support both parties can give potential candidates. The other subsections profile the potential candidates and put them into different categories based on their political capabilities and experiences: amateur and career candidates, the incumbents in uncontested seats, and the "hopeless" challengers. This chapter also includes a subsection on the human element of campaigning such as the family and personal demands a candidacy for the state legislature has on the individual.

The following chapter is an evaluation of candidate emergence from the 2000 election. It reviews the potential candidates for this study and analyzes their campaigns. Other subsections include an investigation of how most incumbents successfully protect themselves from defeat. This chapter also discusses the ramifications of term limits and

the possible impact on candidate emergence. The chapter concludes with a discussion on how the current status of candidate emergence in Oklahoma shapes democracy.

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Chapter Two: The Changing Political Culture of Oklahoma

This chapter focuses on the political culture of Oklahoma and its changes over time. Not only must candidates understand the political culture, but also must they know that the culture is always in a state of change. Therefore, while most candidates develop an understanding of their own ability to run for office, they must add to their decisionmaking process the political culture of their state and district. The changing political culture of a state has an impact on the candidates who decide to run for office. Potential candidates who believe they have a better chance to win because of the strength of their parties are more likely to run. It is a matter of perception. If potential candidates from one party believe their chances to win are minimal, then even individuals that could be strong candidates will forego a campaign. Thus, the perceived political culture of a state or part of a state may embolden some individuals to run and may intimidate others for the same reason. It is for this reason that the changing political culture of Oklahoma should be analyzed.

Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, two leading American political scientists on political culture, write that "the collective political attitudes, values, feelings, information, and skills of the people in a society affect the way politics works in that society."¹ A society is a collection of individuals who bring their own viewpoints into the mix. It is why the political culture is always in a process of change, for any state in America. People are constantly moving into a new culture and bringing with them their own experiences. These experiences will now interact with the political experiences of their new state. Each person, as Almond and Powell note, goes through a continuous political socialization process that explains how political attitudes are formed and in turn

shapes the political culture. All individuals go through changes in their viewpoints of politics because of the agents of political socialization that they are exposed to, such as their family, school, religious institutions, the media, interest groups, and political parties.² Along with these factors, each individual is shaped by the political history of the state or region that he or she lives. In this regard, Oklahoma has a unique political history, which has led to a very interesting political culture for the state.

The Distinction of Oklahoma

Because all individuals are shaped as a result of the region in which they live, it is necessary to find out how a region can be identified. Geographers define a region as an "area on the earth's surface marked by certain characteristics that distinguish it from surrounding regions."³ Most states in America can be collectively defined in a region. However, some states like Oklahoma, one of the best cases, are difficult to label for a particular region. Political scientists, demographers, and other social scientists have various categories for states. Physical location may be the factor used by geographers for state categorization. For instance, Florida is a southern state if physical location is the factor used for categorization. However, a demographic study may use ethnicity as the way to categorize states. If that is the factor, Florida may not appear as a southern state. For political scientists, Key's party competition has been used as a way to categorize states politically.⁴ Key has separated states based on the competitiveness of the two major parties. Built on Key's theory of party competition in states, Thomas Dye devises a system of categorizing states based on their policy-relevance of the parties within each state. Dye's point is that it is not enough to have party competition in a state, but that there also must be distinct policy outcomes as a result of one party besting the

competition.⁵ The uniqueness of a state's development can be another way to categorize a state. Because of how a state develops politically, it may be an anomaly to the states around it. This may mean that potential candidates are faced with a different political culture from what they may find in other surrounding states. Oklahoma has been one such anomaly.

As a result of its distinctive history, Oklahoma is a state that has never had a common political culture with any other region in the United States. Oklahoma, like Alaska and Hawaii, has a unique political development. Of course, the uniqueness of Alaska and Hawaii comes from their physical separation from the mainland of the United States. Since both states have developed separately without regional influences from other states, no other states have the shared experiences of Alaska or Hawaii. Although the state is part of the United States' mainland, Oklahoma, like Alaska and Hawaii, also developed separately. Oklahoma's political development is uncommon because of its history. When Oklahoma was admitted to the Union in 1907, most parts of the mainland that had been territories had become states. Oklahoma became a state from two territories. In fact, for political expediency, it is believed that the two separate territories of Oklahoma, Oklahoma territory of the West and Indian territory of the East, were merged together as one state, instead as separate states.⁶ Oklahoma is also a very young state. It is surrounded by older states, with the exception of New Mexico, that have their own political traditions. Kansas, Missouri, Texas, Colorado, and Arkansas were all part of the United States decades before Oklahoma joined the ranks. These border states, with the exception of Colorado, had their political traditions shaped over key issues of the 19th

century, such as slavery and the Civil War. Thus Oklahoma has developed its politics isolated from its border states.

Oklahoma historians James Scales and Danney Goble write of the isolation of both political parties that was evident during the pre-statehood days: "Eastern Democrats, whose number was probably greater than that of the Republicans were systematically excluded from the patronage troughs. As a result, their party long lacked purpose, not to mention organization. On the other side, the territory's Republican party existed largely as a distribution center for federal appointments, its activities geared for winning not the voter's approval but the president's favor. For those reasons, both were isolated from the mainstream of the national party battle."⁷ This helps explain why Oklahoma's political development is so unique. Not only has Oklahoma developed separately from every other state, but its history does not share commonalties with states from other regions.

The two territories of Oklahoma were forced together into a shotgun wedding by the national government. President Theodore Roosevelt had thwarted the plans to make Indian Territory its own state. The primary reason for this refusal has been accepted as mainly political in that such an action would have meant the strong possibility of four Democratic senators added to the senate. While Democrats dominated Indian Territory politics, Republicans controlled Oklahoma territory primarily on the bases of political patronage. In fact, during the movement to statehood, the Republicans were, according to Scales and Goble, "cursed by [the] original source of their territorial supremacy—their control over patronage."⁸ The Republicans' basis for success in the territorial days, patronage, gave those outside the benefits of patronage a chance to settle old scores by backing the Democrats in statehood. Scales and Goble explain that many Republican

territorial officeholders, knowing that the voter's antipathy to patronage would diminish their chances of winning, avoided campaigning once Oklahoma became a state.⁹ This made the early political history of Oklahoma one with a state that had one dominant party, the Democratic party, but at least two regions that sharply divided the state.

The East-West division in Oklahoma was only one regional division, based on the two territories. The other division in Oklahoma based on regions was the North-South division. This division is based on the settlers who moved into the northern and southern regions of the state. The settlers who moved into the eastern and southern parts of the Oklahoma were primarily from states in the South, such as Texas, Mississippi, and Alabama. The settlers who moved into the western and northern parts of Oklahoma came from states in the North such as Kansas.¹⁰ There was also a southern connection in Indian territory with the Indian tribes, which were mainly in charge of the territory. The tribes known as the five civilized tribes, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole, were for the most part slave holding tribes and therefore had connections with the old Confederate states from the South. This also meant politically that these tribes, despite their obvious historical differences with Democratic founding father, Andrew Jackson, were supportive of the Democratic party. In the North and West of the state, were settlers not only with a shared heritage in northern and henceforth Republican states but also a pragmatic reason for belonging to the Republican party. In Oklahoma territory, most jobs ranging from judge to postmaster were doled out to the members of the "Grand Old Party" (GOP).¹¹ Thus, in its early history Oklahoma was a state that had both a historical division, which separated the state along East-West factions, and a political division, which separated the state along a North-South faction.

The political division was minimized in many parts of Oklahoma history, due to the collapse of the Republicans in two distinct periods, the time of statehood in the early 1900s and the depression of the early 1930s. Despite these collapses, Republicans have always managed to have considerable influence in the northwest part of the state. Since the collapse of the 1930s, Republicans have continued to make gains to the point that it can be fairly determined that they are at least an equal with Democrats in Oklahoma today and appear to be on cusp of dominating the state. A greater discussion of the parties will be made later in this research. A vexing question to the first approach on Oklahoma is where it belongs regionally in the United States. Once a region has been decided, other issues concerning Oklahoma's political culture can be considered.

A Regional Classification for Oklahoma: An Unresolved Debate

Oklahoma has been placed in three different regions according to various political studies. The Sooner State has been labeled a Border state, a Southern state, and a Midwestern state. None of the three categories adequately describe Oklahoma, adding to the argument that Oklahoma has a very unique political culture. One of the immediate problems with putting Oklahoma in the category with states from the South is that Oklahoma was not part of the Confederacy during the Civil War for the obvious reason, its non-existence as a state. Oklahoma historically had a dominant Democratic party, like states from the old Confederacy. As with the southern states, Oklahoma also may have had a traditionalistic political culture, which is discussed by Daniel Elazar in <u>American Federalism: A View from the States</u>. Elazar views a traditionalistic culture as one in which a single political party usually dominates state politics, but party cohesion is weak, politics are personal, and politicians are "personalities."¹² Elazar correctly describes the

partisan situation throughout most of Oklahoma political history because the politics of the state have been controlled by personalities that are mainly concerned with their own success rather than party building. However, it should be noted that not all scholars of Oklahoma share Elazar's view. Foremost Oklahoma historian Angie Debo states that Oklahoma was a "seething caldron of politics" in its early stages.¹³ In fact, it is frankly impossible to put Oklahoma in the traditionalistic category, a hierarchical and deferential culture, when this state had the highest vote ever recorded for a Socialist presidential candidate.¹⁴ The state appears to be traditionalistic based on Elazar's format, just as it appears to be southern based on the general one-party heritage. While it may not be a southern state, there can be no doubt that it shares a border with southern states, Arkansas and Texas. Perhaps, then, Oklahoma belongs in the border state category.

University of Oklahoma political scientist Jean McDonald refers to Oklahoma as a state that has "traditionally been dominated by the Democratic party" but the "Republicans [have] always possessed a regional base of electoral strength."¹⁵ She goes on to point out that as with other border states, Republicans have made gains due to urbanization and increased conservatism.¹⁶ While Oklahoma may share similarities with border states, it is still very unique from the other states in this category. Maryland, West Virginia, Delaware, Missouri, and Kentucky are the states that are known to make up the border between states firmly in the North or South categories. These states do not have a large percentage of African-Americans as do the states in the South, and these states also, despite the heritage of Democratic strength, have always had pockets of Republican strength in their states. Oklahoma does fit both descriptions. In 1957, an interesting study by H. D. Price titled <u>The Negro and Southern Politics</u> placed Oklahoma in a category all by itself. Price ranked states from the most to the least southern. All states from the old Confederacy were in various degrees of "southerness" based on their partisanship and their opposition to Civil Rights. The border states listed above were separated from Oklahoma because these states had been slave states as of 1860, and the border states were also separated from the states of the South because of their low population of African-Americans. It can be concluded from Price's analysis that Oklahoma is the least southern of the southern states, if it is southern at all. Oklahoma can be considered to have similarities with the border states, but it still lacks of historical identity with other border states. The segregation legacy of Oklahoma, which required a state-wide public school desegregation in the nineteen-fifties, led to its ranking by Price as a somewhat southern state, is a residue from its southern immigration during the pre-statehood days.¹⁷ This also signifies that Oklahoma has very few ties with the South and the border states. The same can also be said of the Midwest for Oklahoma.

John Fenton's <u>Midwest Politics</u>, one of the classics on regional politics, does not list Oklahoma in this region. Oklahoma would fail to be in this region not only because of its geographic location but also because it traditionally has not had a competitive twoparty system. However, added to the complexity of defining Oklahoma, Fenton's earlier book <u>Politics in the Border States</u>, a well-known study on the Border States of Missouri, Kentucky, West Virginia, and Maryland, has no mention of Oklahoma as a border state. Oklahoma is listed as a Midwestern state according to Ronald Hrebenar and Clive Thomas's <u>Interest Group Politics in the Midwestern States</u>. The reason for the inclusion of Oklahoma as a Midwestern state is that it has more in common with the Great Plains states than with the South. While this claim is dubious on geographical grounds because

the region that was Indian territory has far more in common with the Ozark mountains than the Great Plains, such a claim is on even shakier ground from a political point of view. A commonality of Midwestern states, according to the authors, is that interest groups have had less power in this region than the South, because in the South "the Democratic Party's dominance [has] failed to provide a check on interest group power."¹⁸ Midwestern states, as Fenton notes, have competitive two-party systems. Oklahoma, throughout most of its history, has had a dominant one-party or a modified one-party system. Robert England and David Morgan, the two contributors on Oklahoma for this study on Midwestern states, comment that Oklahoma has a traditionalistic political culture and has had an absence of two competitive parties, making it different from states in the Midwest. Oklahoma is deemed a state, according to England and Morgan, that is a "strong" pressure group state. This assessment, which is understandable from the lopsided partisan structure that traditionally described Oklahoma, does not fit with Midwestern politics because these states are known to have weak interest groups. Midwestern states' weak interest groups reflect their parties' competitiveness and strength, a diametric situation from Oklahoma.

All of these three regions, South, Border, and Midwest, fail to complete the description of Oklahoma for geographic, political and historical reasons. Geographically, some Oklahomans from the northern counties may identify with the Midwest. Of course, Oklahomans from the southern counties may geographically identify with the South, and they may do so culturally as well. After all, the official meal for Oklahoma includes chicken-fried steak, fried okra, grits, biscuits and gravy, and black-eyed peas, a meal with considerable southern influence. Without a doubt, the description by Arrell Gibson of

Oklahoma as the "most northerly of the southern states; as the most southerly of the northern states" correctly applies.¹⁹ For political reasons, Oklahoma does have similarities with the southern and border states. Although it has had a dominant one-party, Oklahoma has never had the population of African-Americans that is found in states from the South, and it was not a confederate state during the Civil War. Oklahoma may have similarities with the Border states, but it does not have the same history of these states. The conclusion is that no other state in the continental United States is as difficult to regionally define as Oklahoma.

By being unique, Oklahoma also has been isolated. H. Wayne Morgan and Anne Hodges Morgan describe Oklahoma as "one of those states without any intense sense of place in national thinking."²⁰ Because it does not have a complete connection with the politics and history of any other region, Oklahoma has developed on its own. As a consequence, as mentioned earlier, Oklahoma has been formed in isolation from the national political environment. This has made not only Oklahoma unique but also the political parties, mainly the Democratic party, unique as well.

The Party Structure of Oklahoma

Political parties, especially the two major parties in the United States, are structured to win elections. This means that parties must respond to the localized needs of the public, causing state organizations of the same party to vary due to the differences in history and culture. As a result of its situation, Oklahoma had a political system that developed primarily on its own. Thus, it does not have a shared experience with any other states. This is important because one of the important features of a culture is a shared experience. Because of its lack of shared experience with other states, Oklahoma could

be in a category by itself. The political parties of Oklahoma have been developed independently of the national parties. This has made the parties, especially the Democratic party, not appear to be in step with their national counterparts. With the independent development of the parties, candidates for the two parties also have needed to respond to the local needs of the party but not focus on the national issues. This may be changing with the growth the Republican party as the legislative candidates for the GOP appear to be more connected with their national party than Democratic legislative candidates, which will be addressed later. A review of the evolution of party systems in Oklahoma must first be conducted.

The Deceptive History of One-Party Dominance

Throughout most of its history, Oklahoma has been known as a one-party or modified one-party system with the Democrats as the majority party. Both descriptions suggest that Oklahoma has had at best two-party competition only at the statewide level, such as gubernatorial races, as the modified one-party system indicates. This structure would put Oklahoma in a similar classification to states from the South. Indeed, Oklahoma did have considerable influence from southerners in its early statehood years. Many early leaders of the state who came from southern states were able to wield power because of their role in the failed Sequoyah convention.

The Sequoyah constitutional convention met without federal authority in Indian Territory with the intent of getting this territory, named Sequoyah, admitted to the Union as the forty-fifth state. Most of the delegates at the Sequoyah convention were either white southerners or members of the Indian tribes who had been supportive of the South and henceforth predominately Democrats. This plan went down to ignoble defeat and received little national support. For example, Vice President William Howard Taft described the meeting as "a zoological garden of cranks."²¹ However, the delegates at the Sequoyah convention were prepared to incorporate their document into the constitution formed at the Oklahoma convention. Added to the lopsided partisan design of the constitution, most Republican officials did not participate in the convention because of the "carpetbagger" image that plagued them from the patronage rule of the federal government in Oklahoma territory. The Oklahoma delegation for the constitutional convention included one-hundred Democrats and only twelve Republicans. The constitution that was created put the Democrats in a position of power for many years. The Democrats made sure that county governments formed during statehood would be the power base for the party for years to come.²²

As a result of the legacy from the territorial days, Republicans were the minority party in Oklahoma in the early years after statehood. The push for statehood in Indian territory alienated many in that area from the Republican party when their goal was thwarted by the Republican president Teddy Roosevelt. Democrats in Oklahoma territory got the upper hand because of the antipathy its citizens felt towards the Republican officials who got their job through federal patronage. The only way for Republicans to get in the political game would be for voters to reject the Democratic ticket. This occurred in the 1920s.

As is often the case when one party dominates a state, the dominant party begins to suffer divisions within its ranks. The decade of the 1920s, a short thirteen years after statehood, began successfully for the Republicans as they were united in their stance against the League of Nations, while the Democrats were divided on the issue. The

Oklahoma Democrats started to have fissures within the party over president Wilson's leadership in World War I. The 1920 senate race typified this conflict with Democratic challenger Scott Ferris facing incumbent senator Thomas Gore, who was a well-known critic of fellow Democrat and president Woodrow Wilson. Ferris went on to defeat Gore in the primary, but lost to Republican John W. Harreld. The Republicans not only captured the electoral votes and the U.S. Senate seat in Oklahoma in 1920, but they carried every statewide office as well. One race that signified the sweep of Republicanism in Oklahoma for this election was the victory for Alice Robertson, who won in the 2nd district, northeastern Oklahoma, thus becoming the first woman in the state to win and the first Republican to carry that district. Robertson would remain the only Republican to carry the 2nd district until Tom Coburn won in 1994. Robertson won with a very straightforward platform: "I am a Christian, I am an American, I am a Republican."²³ While the first two planks of her platform would have been respected in the one-party states of the deep South, it is doubtful, even in the extraordinary election of 1920, that her third plank could have helped her win in most states, where Democrats completely dominated.

Oklahoma was on its way toward two-party competition as a result of the Republican gains during the decade of the twenties. The Republican nominee for president in 1928, Herbert Hoover, defeated Democratic nominee Al Smith by an astounding 125,000 votes. Smith's Catholicism and his anti-prohibition stance cost him many votes in a heavily Protestant state like Oklahoma. Scales and Goble, using an old charge against the Democrats, note that in the election of 1928 in Oklahoma, "Rum and Romanism [were] battled by some of the sons of the Rebellion."²⁴ The conflicts among

Democrats and the commonality among Republicans were problems for Democrats in the legislature. While the Democrats could hold on to the majority, the Republicans were able to merge with dissident Democrats to produce a governing coalition that was powerful enough to impeach the governor at the time, Henry S. Johnston.²⁵ Republican success in the twenties seemed to indicate a great opportunity for them to take over the legislature and the governor's mansion by 1930. That hope for Oklahoma Republicans, however, collapsed with the stock market crash of 1929.

The early stages of the depression and the Hoover presidency were devastating to the Republicans in Oklahoma. Perhaps no election fit the problems Republicans faced in this state as a result of the off-year elections more than the election of 1930. V. O. Key notes Republicans could not make consistent gains in Oklahoma because they could not build from their presidential victories of the 1920s since many statewide offices held their elections in off-years. With regard to the situation in Oklahoma and the frustration of Republicans, Key writes, "the state is by no means isolated from the great currents of national politics yet those tides run at the wrong time to benefit the Republicans of Tulsa and environs."²⁶ The work of Republicans from the 1928 election was completely reversed in 1930. William "Alfalfa Bill" Murray, the Democratic candidate for governor, carried sixty-four of the seventy-seven counties in the gubernatorial race. Scales and Goble assess how this election altered the status of party competition in Oklahoma succinctly by stating "the Democrats' 1930 sweep all but obliterated the hapless Republican party within the state and struck a mighty blow at the earlier signs of an emerging two-party system."27 Republicans bottomed out during the sweep of Franklin Roosevelt in the 1936 election. Oklahoma was certainly a one-party state at this point

with only three Republicans in the state house and a unanimous Democratic state senate.²⁸

At this time Oklahoma did fit the description by Key of a one-party state in the South, for the Democratic party was "a holding-company for a congeries of transient squabbling factions."²⁹ Roosevelt had been so successful in Oklahoma for Democrats that the party no longer had to fear competition from the Republicans. Since Democrats were no longer concerned about Republicans, however, they could now focus on the factional differences within their own ranks, and they also could afford to not ally themselves with their national party. It was during the era of Roosevelt that the isolated development of Oklahoma politics came through. The historians Scales and Goble make this observation of the Democrats: "having obliterated their Republican opposition, the state party fell victim to the fragmentation of personality cults, even as its national counterpart was evolving into a disciplined, if diverse, body."³⁰ The greatest split during this era of Democratic dominance in Oklahoma was over Roosevelt's New Deal policies. The Democratic party in Oklahoma had leaders, such as William Murray and E. W. Marland, who wanted to expand Roosevelt's policies in ways that would help the state and also help their own political careers. On the other hand, other Democrats, such as governor Leon C. "Red" Phillips, spent a good portion of his term as governor in the late 1930s campaigning against the national Democrats and the New Deal. Phillips directly campaigned against his 1942 successor, Robert S. Kerr, by endorsing the Republican candidate and disparagingly calling Kerr a "Gimmecrat" during one of his radio addresses.³¹ This attitude did help the Republicans make a comeback with the election of

Republican Ed Moore to the U.S. senate, which came about from a coalition of anti-New Deal Democrats and Republicans.

Robert S. Kerr went on to survive the division within his party and was the leader of the Democrats in Oklahoma for the next twenty years until his death in 1962. Kerr's political career can be considered the last of three major factors that have made Oklahoma throughout its history, until recently, a predominantly Democratic state. Unlike the states from the old Confederacy, the groundwork was always in place for twoparty competition in Oklahoma. Unfortunately for the Republicans their success was always stymied by events that were in large part beyond their control. The first was the statehood convention that gave Democrats control over most county governments and the state legislature for many years. The second was the Great Depression and conversely the political success of Franklin Roosevelt during the 1930s. The third was the political career of Kerr. As governor and senator, Kerr did not spend his time fighting for the Democratic party. Instead, he was, as Robert Darcy mentions, "a tireless booster of Oklahoma products and industry."³² The best way to describe Kerr would not be a Democratic senator from Oklahoma but rather an Oklahoma senator who happened to be a Democrat. This left Republicans with a conundrum: as Darcy writes, "Republicans found it difficult to campaign against an incumbent, issue avoiding, Oklahoma booster, in Washington."³³ While this may have been difficult for the Republicans to position themselves against Kerr, it was also detrimental for Democrats on the issue of party building. From the legacy of Kerr, Democratic officials in Oklahoma have been more concerned with holding office than with the policies that could be shaped as a result of having the office. In other words, since Kerr's leadership more Democratic officials have

been concerned with power for power's sake than with power to build a party with a purpose. This lack of clarity from Democrats and its independence from the national party made the Democrats unique, and it has helped survive as the majority party in the state legislature. Nevertheless, the weakness in this attitude for state Democrats has been evident in its growing failure to field candidates and its lack of a political "bench" for statewide and federal offices.

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Democratic control of Oklahoma government began to noticeably erode in the 1960s. Scales and Goble observe how the death of Robert S. Kerr on New Year's Day of 1963 coincided with the accelerated decline of power for the Democrats in Oklahoma. At about the same time of Kerr's death, the first Republican governor of Oklahoma, Henry Bellmon, was to be inaugurated. Bellmon had taken advantage of another split within Democratic ranks, this time between urban and rural factions. This division had grown out of the reform movement instigated by the urban-oriented governor from Tulsa, J. Howard Edmondson. By 1962, the year of Bellmon's victory, the Democrats had sharp divisions along clear urban/rural lines with candidate W. F. Bill Atkinson, who represented the urban faction, and former governor Raymond Gary, who represented the old guard against reform and the predominately rural faction. Atkinson squeaked by with 449 votes and from this narrow, divisive victory could not prevent a bolt from the party, which helped Bellmon substantially in his victory.³⁴ The fractious behavior of Democrats finally caught up with them as Bellmon, a tireless organizer for the Republicans, not only became "the father of modern Sooner Republicanism" but also ushered the beginning of two-party politics in Oklahoma.³⁵

While it may have been inevitable that Republicans would break the stranglehold Democrats had on politics in Oklahoma, the fact cannot be diminished that Democrats in Oklahoma did not have a unified front at the time when Republicans began their success. Oklahoma Democrats that had abandoned their national party years before Bellmon's victory also began to leave their state party by the nineteen-sixties. In presidential politics, the only Democratic presidential candidates to carry this state since the days of Franklin Roosevelt have been Truman in 1948 and Lyndon Johnson in 1964. Even with his landslide in 1964, Johnson's victory in Oklahoma was less than his average margin of victory in other states where he won. Republican Richard Nixon's 1972 victory replaced Roosevelt's victory in 1932 with the greatest margin of victory in Oklahoma, as Nixon defeated George McGovern in all seventy-seven counties, garnering an amazing seventythree percent of the vote. The success of Republicans that has increased considerably since the 1960s shows the dichotomy of Oklahoma politics: success for Republicans for federal office and continued success for Democrats in the legislature. Focusing on this conflicting party image in the state. The Oklahoma Voter asserts that "the Oklahoma electorate is less Democratic and somewhat more Republican than the party identification measure would indicate."³⁶ Republican support among Oklahoma voters has grown since the publication of The Oklahoma Voter in the late 1970s. In the late 1990s, this state was the largest state to not have at least one Democratic member of congress. Despite their success federally, Republicans have not taken over the legislature. Why is this the case? One way to explain this strange political configuration is the difference in rural and urban politics. Compared to most states, Oklahoma has different dynamics in its rural and urban politics. This has made the two parties of Oklahoma not fit the typical patterns found

nationally for Democrats and Republicans. Differences among the parties help explain why one party may have more success in some areas of the state than the other one. These differences also suggest that candidates who represent certain images and perspectives for one of the parties can be successful as well.

Differences between Democrats and Republicans in Oklahoma

Sarah McCally Morehouse identifies the typical groups of support for the two major parties nationally. According to Morehouse, a state with the poor, African-Americans, union members, Catholics, and central-city dwellers have an active Democratic party, but it must also appeal to the middle-class suburban voter to get elected. For the Republicans, Morehouse lists a combination of nonpoor, Whites, nonunion families, Protestants, and residents outside of the central cities as the elements that lead to an active Republican party.³⁷ Except for the poverty element, Oklahoma has the combination that should benefit the Republicans. This combination may explain why Republicans have been dominant at the congressional level. The elements mentioned by Morehouse that lead to Republican success are found in most southern states, which have also witnessed a tremendous growth for the Republicans in the last two decades. There is one major exception, however, and that is the large percentage of African-Americans that reside in southern states. It is the African-American vote that has kept many southern Democrats in congress.³⁸ Oklahoma does not have a large population of African-Americans, so the Republican sweep in congress was absolute for this state. Democrats have been able to hold on to the legislature in Oklahoma because of the distinction of Democrats in the rural areas from the national Democratic party. Regarding state politics, several decades ago Malcolm Jewell wrote that Democrats received most of their support

from the cities, while Republicans received most of their support from small towns and farms.³⁹ This has not been the situation in Oklahoma. The two major cities. Tulsa and Oklahoma City, have been the main areas of support for the Republicans, whereas the rural areas of northeastern, southeastern, and southwestern Oklahoma have been the areas of support for the Democrats.

The demise of Democrats in Oklahoma, which has certainly been the case in all races except for county offices and the legislature, was forecasted by the party's inability to win in the two major cities. The last Democratic presidential candidate to win in Oklahoma City was Johnson in 1964, while the last one to win in Tulsa was Roosevelt in 1936. Although a Democrat can carry these counties for governor, as David Walters did in 1990, the credit should go more to a weak Republican candidate in that race. Frank Keating carried both counties by large numbers in 1994 and 1998. These two cities represent over thirty-five percent of the vote in Oklahoma. The strength of these two cities was evident in 1976 when Jimmy Carter, the last Democratic candidate with a strong chance of winning Oklahoma, lost by a slim margin that was a result of the support Gerald Ford received in the metro areas.⁴⁰ That election also proved a turning point in Oklahoma politics because voting strength of the two metropolitan centers could now swing elections for the Republicans.

Why are the two major cities in Oklahoma politically different from many American cities? Oklahoma City and Tulsa fit the descriptions by Morehouse on Republican strongholds. Both cities have small minority populations, both are heavily Protestant, and despite their union neighborhoods, both have far more nonunion households. It also can be said that both cities have newspapers that favor Republicans


and that the dominant Protestant faiths are fundamentalist or evangelical, which both tend to support the GOP in overwhelming numbers. These are all reasons why the cities of Oklahoma do not fit the normal pattern of Democratic support that is found in many cities throughout the United States.

The same demographic patterns, however, can be found in areas of Oklahoma outside of the two major cities. In the case of Oklahoma, rural regions are the strongest areas of support for the Democrats. A good example of this support would be the 1988 presidential election with Republican George Herbert Walker Bush, the vice president from Maine and Texas, and Democrat Michael Dukakis, the Massachusetts governor. The campaign centered on Dukakis's liberal record on taxes and his stance against the death penalty. Dukakis lost by a large margin in Oklahoma, fifty-eight to forty-one percent, vet he managed to carry thirty-three out of seventy-seven counties. Dukakis out-polled Bush in the northeast, southeast, and southwest portions of the state. One may assume that these areas are more liberal than the metropolitan areas and the northwest portion of the state. However, Dukakis received support because these areas have been "yellow dog" Democratic regions.⁴¹ These areas have a deep-seated tradition of backing Democrats since the days of Roosevelt. Because the rural areas of Oklahoma have not received the influx of outsiders, as have had Oklahoma City and Tulsa and their surrounding suburbs, they support the Democratic ticket out of party loyalty, not for policy. Democratic candidates for the legislature use this loyalty to their advantage when they run for the legislature, but two other reasons can help explain their continued success. Democrats win races for the legislature in rural areas because their candidates are more conservative,

at least on social issues, than national Democrats and because their candidates focus on service far more than policy.


A comparison of the urban and rural differences in Oklahoma with those in other states can be made with bordering state Missouri. In the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections, Missouri split its electoral votes, first going with Republican Bush in 1988 and Democrat Bill Clinton in 1992. In Oklahoma, both elections went for Republican Bush, although Bush defeated Clinton in 1992 by only eight percentage points, forty-two percent to thirty-four percent, with Ross Perot getting twenty-six percent of the vote. The strong Democratic areas for Missouri as shown in the following maps have the traditional pattern of support in the urban areas. Both Kansas City and St. Louis went for Dukakis in 1988. The change in 1992 that made Missouri switch to the Democratic column was the gains Clinton made in the surrounding counties of the two major cities, the suburbs. Although he made considerable gains in the rural areas of Missouri, Clinton won the state through the support of urban and suburban residents. In contrast, Oklahoma is a solid Republican state in presidential politics because of its urban and suburban areas, not in spite of them. In 1988, the only Oklahoma county connected to an urban center that went for Dukakis was the Democratic stronghold of Okmulgee county, which is south of Tulsa county. Clinton was only slightly better in 1992 in this regard, by picking up one more border county to Tulsa, Osage county, in addition to Okmulgee. Dukakis picked up thirty-three counties from the rural northeastern, southeastern, and southwestern portions of Oklahoma. Clinton picked up forty-one counties, but the additional counties were also from the rural northeastern, southeastern and southwestern portions of the state. Unlike states with conservative leanings, Oklahoma goes Republican in presidential elections not

because of its rural voters but because of its urban and suburban voters. The Democrats who continue to support their party nationally are from rural areas of the state, are primarily conservative and back their party out of tradition more than anything else. In the area of social policy, this conservatism is especially noticeable.



Map 1. 1988 Missouri Presidential Election (Democratic Counties Shaded)


Source: 1989-1990 Official Manual State of Missouri, Jefferson City, MO




Map 2. 1992 Missouri Presidential Election (Democratic Counties Shaded)

Source: 1993-1994 Official Manual State of Missouri, Jefferson City, MO





Source: 1997-1998 Oklahoma Almanac, Oklahoma City, OK



Map 4. 1992 Oklahoma Presidential Election (Democratic Counties Shaded)

Source: 1997-1998 Oklahoma Almanac, Oklahoma City, OK

On social issues, Oklahoma can be considered one of the most conservative states in America. Republicans may have grounds for complaint on the tax levels in this state, by arguing that taxes are too high for the population and economy of Oklahoma.⁴² On the morality front, when comparing Oklahoma to most states, it would be hard to believe the state could become much more conservative, although some Republicans believe that it should. On the issues that Oklahoma's junior United States Senator Jim Inhofe proclaims as "God, Gays, and Guns" morality and gun rights policies, which prove to be advantageous for Republicans in federal races, Democrats in the state legislature fall in line with the conservative point of view. The Democratic legislature never voted to allow liquor by the drink or gambling on horses; both practices were approved by the people through referendums, not legislation. While the abortion laws may not be as strict in Oklahoma as in other states, only a few clinics are available for women, to begin with. The Oklahoma legislature has required schools to provide only sexually transmitted

disease (STD) and/or HIV/AIDS education and has not required sexuality education as have many states.⁴³ On gay rights, Oklahoma is one of the sixteen states that still have sodomy laws that prohibit consensual sex between same-sex partners. Oklahoma does not have a law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, nor does its hate crime law include sexual orientation.⁴⁴ On guns, many Democratic legislators are supported by the National Rifle Association (NRA) in their reelection bids. This support may come in part from their majority status, but the Democrats have passed legislation that is supported by the NRA. The legislature passed a concealed handgun law that allows citizens with a license to carry a concealed handgun in public places. On all three areas, the morality or social issues involving God, Gays, and Guns, Democratic legislators in Oklahoma find themselves to the right of their national party. Republicans, as Morehouse notes, would have a difficult time breaking the hold of one-party systems because they would find little room to maneuver politically if they campaigned to the right of the Democrats.⁴⁵ This may cause Republicans competing in traditionally one-party states to move against their own national party's conservative bent and campaign from the middle or even left of center. This has not been the case in Oklahoma, so voters in many regions of the state must base their choice on what degree of conservatism they prefer. The person responsible for recruiting Republican candidates for the legislature in northeastern Oklahoma, second district Party Chairman Bob Hudspeth, mentioned that part of the frustration for Republicans was that Democratic legislators were more conservative than their national party, which caused conservative voters to stick with the Democrats. However, Hudspeth also noted that at least one of his Republican candidates recruited, Ed Brocksmith of Tahlequah, was to the left of his party and his Democratic opponent on

environmental issues. Perhaps in the old strongholds of Democratic conservatism, such as rural northeastern Oklahoma, Republicans may need to follow Morehouse's suggestion and abandon their national party.

The distinctiveness of the Democratic party in Oklahoma may not be the only reason why it has been able to survive so long as the majority party in Oklahoma's legislature despite losing all federal seats and governor's office. Although Oklahoma Democratic candidates at the local level may be able to separate themselves from their national counterparts, they must still have voters identify with them. It may mean that voters have a dual identification of the parties, identifying with the Democrats at the local level and the Republicans at the national level. This is the premise of Charles Hadley's "Dual Partisan Identification in the South." Hadley claims that the phenomenon of dual partisan identification began to occur in the South after Goldwater's presidential campaign in 1964.⁴⁶ As mentioned before, Oklahoma is not a southern state but does share many similarities, and in the case of the 1964 election Johnson, while winning the state, did not do as well as his national average. Such an election result indicates that there was strong support for Goldwater in Oklahoma. The 1964 election may have marked the beginning of more Oklahomans also identifying with the Republicans nationally. Hadley also states that voters have a psychological attachment to their local party and would rather have a dual partisan identification rather change party registration.⁴⁷ Of course, one of the reasons why voters may have a strong attachment to their local party is that it behaves in a similar fashion as the party they vote for nationally. In other words, the local Democratic officials are more like national Republicans than national Democrats.

This cross identification with national parties also may imply that voters are not concerned with ideology at the local level. For example, the legislature of Texas, Oklahoma's southern neighbor recently has been identified as an organization that is generally non-ideological. This description was made because of the issue concerning then governor and now-president George W. Bush's ability to work with nationa! Democrats. The Democrats Bush successfully worked with were state legislators who were not ideological like their federal party officials, and the Texas Democratic legislators were instead primarily concerned with constituent service.⁴⁸

"Home Style" and Rural Democrats

State legislators can succeed where their state party may not because the voters have different expectations for them. If state legislators continue to provide services and stay in contact with the "folks back home," then, despite their national party, they can get reelected. On the issue of service to the district, Richard Fenno's <u>Home Style</u> serves as a good example of what incumbents try to do in order to be successful. Fenno writes that "Home Style" is the method by which a member of congress cultivates their constituencies. While state legislators do not deal with the same amount of separation as members of congress, they also must work at maintaining an electoral base in their districts. Fenno believes that voters rarely vote on the issues, but instead vote for style on the issues.⁴⁹ This means that the way in which incumbents present themselves and build a trust with their constituencies determines their success more than how they vote. What helps Democrats in rural areas of Oklahoma is that they are individuals who have been in the area for quite some time. Such lengthy residency allows them to be trusted by the voters and their voting records to not be an important issue. If there were more

newcomers to a district, perhaps voting records and positions on policy would become more important than the personal touch of the incumbent. However, for most rural areas of Oklahoma, Democratic legislators can build solid support by their campaign style and constituency service. Fenno concludes as much when he writes of change in society and the politicians' reaction to it by stating that "it might be added that the more fragmented and kinetic American society becomes, the more difficult it will be for House members to reach people."⁵⁰

As a district is shaped by new additions of citizens and by the reductions of district member who have extended roots in the area, politicians need to rely on other practices in order to get votes. Politicians who must continue to reintroduce themselves to voters need to stress ideology and policy positions. Fenno has describes this campaign pattern in the South among members of congress as rural Democrats must transform their political strategies by adopting less "person-intensive connections" and by adopting more "policy-intensive connections" as their districts change.⁵¹ Only in traditional areas, those with little change in the population, namely rural areas, can a politician continue to stress personality or service as a reason for reelection because the politician is essentially talking to the same group of voters every election year. Ray Miller, a successful candidate for the state legislature in rural Oklahoma, described what voters in his district wanted from him. Miller had sought out the advice of former House speaker Glen Johnson on what issues to campaign on during his election bid. Johnson bluntly stated, "People don't care about the issues, they want to know if they can call you if they have a problem and will you help them find a job if they ask."52 Johnson's assessment falls in line with the analysis of V. O. Key on one-party systems versus two-party systems. Key

describes the competition of two parties as the representation of different policies that the "parties seek to effectuate through government."⁵³ In contrast, a one-party system, according to Key, creates no real party because the one dominant organization "fails to meet the standards of permanence, cohesiveness, and responsibility that characterize the political party."⁵⁴ With choices limited, voters turn to other aspects of candidacy rather than issues. Miller went on to describe his own experience that prospective voters never asked him his stance on an issue but instead would inquire where he lived and how long he had lived there. For Miller's constituents, the issue they care about is the candidate and how much he is "one of them."

Jimmie White, the Democratic chairman of McIntosh, gave a great example of how one of the Democratic incumbents for his county, State Senator Frank Shurden, campaigned to his constituency, compared to how his most recent opponent did. The "Home Style" of local Democratic politicians separates them from their national party and keeps them in the win column. White described how to campaign successfully in McIntosh county:

> Shurden would rig up a barbecue cooker in the back of his pickup and pass out free barbecue to the folks at political events and fairs. His last opponent was a millionaire who wore pink polo shirts to campaign events. That was not the type of attire people were used to. A candidate needs to have an agriculture background. You need to have some land and some cows. A candidate would need to go down to the Checotah café and talk about cows and hay bales. For example, the local banker here is an OU graduate, but he has some cows. A college education will not hurt unless

the local folks figure out you got one. You also better have some kinfolks in the region.

In cases such as this one, constituents would not need to follow how the legislator has voted in the legislature because they know him and more than by name. The voters have known his family for generations and know that he makes a living in basically the same way most everyone else in the region does. The local electorate then would assume that a legislator with such close ties to their district would vote in a manner acceptable to them.

Party Activists and Their Influence on Candidates

Not all citizens participate in politics with the same intensity. Only a small number may participate in a campaign or in a political party.⁵⁵ For Robert Michels, the activism of only a few in political parties is a natural phenomenon as a party goes from a movement for the masses to an organization that serves the needs of the political class. Such a pattern would exist in all organizations. As Michel claims, "who says organization, says oligarchy."⁵⁶ A discussion on the relevancy of Michel's theory is not a subject for this research. However, it is worth remembering that parties at all levels are governed by activists, who through their money, talents, hard work, or other distinguishing features have more influence over candidates than does an average citizen.

Party activists in Oklahoma of the two major parties have dissimilar outlooks on candidacy, which means that potential candidates for the parties need to incorporate these differences in their decision to run. Republican leaders consistently have viewed politics in national and ideological terms. When asked the following question, "What would an ideal candidate for the state legislature be like?," almost all political activists stressed that candidates should be conservatives. Bob McDowell, the Republican chairman of

Delaware county and also an Oklahoma elector, commented that not only do candidates need to be conservatives, but they also need "to be dedicated to following the constitution of the United States and Oklahoma," hinting, somewhat, that elected officials who were not conservative would not be dedicated as such.

Several activists would comment directly on what they meant by conservatism with a statement that they wanted the candidates to be pro-life, pro-gun, and pro-family. For those who did not stress conservatism, they would want a candidate of good character and honesty. Bill Pratt, the chair of Okmulgee county, believed the ideal candidate would be one who had knowledge of biblical standards, which to him would imply that a candidate would be conservative. Dave Hampton, the Republican chairman of rural Adair county, stated that the ideal candidate would be one that was "well-known, well-liked, honest, and fair." An activist representing one of the most rural areas did not mention ideology, but instead mentioned what could be interpreted as the preferred home style of the county. Perhaps in Adair county, conservatism is a given, and candidates do not need to make distinctions on their ideological connections to the voters, but rather emphasize their personal connections with them. As noted, most Republicans stressed ideology and also had a national strategy in mind for their party. When asked the question "What is your party's greatest advantage going into the 2000 election?" most Republicans activists responded by noting the dissatisfaction with President Clinton and Vice President Gore as well as the popularity of Governor Bush. This, of course, may have overstated the case, although Governor Bush did win Oklahoma by a large margin, but the importance of this answer is how Republicans believed the top of the ticket would help the rest of their candidates. Other activists would respond to the question on their party's advantage in

ideological terms by stating that the truth was on their side and that they were right on the issues. Dave Hampton also gave a unique answer, legitimizing the description that those on the conservative side were actually "sentimentalist" about the world. He believed the advantage for Republicans was that "people are looking for a time when morals and character were important and they want to go back to that time." He was convinced that his party could send this country back to such an idealized better time.

Perhaps the greatest current difference among the activists of the two parties in Oklahoma is their attitude on recruitment. Bob Hudspeth, the Republican second district chair and the individual most responsible for GOP recruitment in northeastern Oklahoma, wanted all Democratic incumbents to be challenged. When Hudspeth was asked if there were any circumstances in which he would discourage someone from running for the legislature, he responded, "I would never discourage anyone that is wanting to take on anyone [because] I want to make everyone be challenged." In contrast, both Keith McArtor, the Tulsa county Democratic chair, and Gordon Melson, the executive secretary for the Oklahoma Democratic party, stressed that candidates should not run if they had a limited chance to win. Because of this philosophy among Democrats, at least in part, both major cities in Oklahoma are being ceded over to the Republicans. In the 2000 election, as chapter four will discuss in greater detail, the majority of Republicans who won uncontested seats were found in urban or suburban areas. The Oklahoma Democrats are becoming, by their own admission, decreasingly noncompetitive in the urban areas of the state. A candidacy is based on faith. In this regard the Republicans have a much greater belief that its candidates can be competitive in any area of the state than have the Democrats. In the case of the Democrats, it seems that they continue to circle their

wagons in a defensive position around the rural areas of Oklahoma. For Republicans, their strategic approach to candidacy is "maximax" to have a maximum number of candidates in as many districts as possible, regardless of the prospects for candidates. For the Democrats, their strategic approach to candidacy is "minimax," which focuses on minimizing losses and concentrating resources where victory is likely.⁵⁷

Through her research on political organizations, Jo Freeman describes the differences of the two major parties on the bases of legitimacy. She suggests that for Democrats, legitimacy in the party comes from the groups one represents, while for Republicans, legitimacy is based on one's own ideals as well as one's connections with the party's chain of command.⁵⁸ While none of the Republican activists in this research dropped names of Republican leaders, they did stress their conservative credentials. This indicated that they were solid conservatives, and that ideological bent was what they needed in order to have influence in the Republican party. Freeman's Democratic version of legitimacy was very accurate based on the Democratic leaders interviewed for this research. Three groups were consistently referred to when Democratic activists described their ideal candidates for the legislature: labor, teachers, and farmers. An ideal candidate for them would be one who had contacts or what was called "leanings" with these groups. Very few of the Democratic activists would mention any specificity on policy, except to support these certain groups, and also little emphasis on ideology. Rick Cardwell, the Muskogee county Democratic chair, did mention that an ideal candidate would be one who was a conservative Democrat, one who was against abortion, gay rights, and gun control. Charles Wheeler, the Ottawa county Democratic chair, was the only activist who stressed policy by stating that an ideal candidate would be one who would stand up for

Democratic policies such as social security, the GI bill, and federal housing programs. The rest of the activists would mention support for certain groups that would signify an ideal candidate, but would also make what can be considered "home style" descriptions of their ideal candidates. Mike Winneger, the chairman for the Adair county Democrats, remarked, "we need someone who will not embarrass us but still be a country boy." Winneger mentioned two other groups that needed representation but were not brought up by other Democratic activists, Cherokee Indians and game fowl enthusiasts. This is a reflection of the local population and the area, which is one county in Oklahoma deep in the Ozarks region. Many of the activists also stated that an ideal candidate needed to live in the area for a long time and needed to have family in the area as well. Several of the activists from rural counties stressed the importance of agriculture. J. D. Parkerson of Craig county, a county made up of rolling hills and ranches, noted that the ideal candidate needed to be a cattleman. This comment is in sharp contrast with that of Keith McArtor, the Tulsa county chairman. McArtor believed that an ideal candidate would be one who was socially moderate and fiscally conservative. He also mentioned that an ideal candidate would need to run an inclusive campaign and unite various ethnicities and important interest groups for the party. The importance of uniting groups is the same viewpoint of Democratic activists from the rural areas, but the ethnicity issue is not something rural candidates must deal with. For McArtor, as with Republican activists, ideology seems to have more importance. Ideology appears to be a more important aspect of a campaign in urban areas, where a more fluid population shift occurs. Ideology is also more important for Republicans, the aspirant party in rural Oklahoma that is trying to break traditional connections.

While activists at the county level had mixed views on the importance of policy. ideology, or home style, Democratic activists at the district and state level did not mention any of these issues when describing ideal candidates. For Cheryl Harder, the second district chairwomen, the ideal candidate for the Democrats would be one who was a good speaker, had some education, and was a hard worker. For Gordon Melson, the executive director of the state Democratic party, the ideal candidate would simply be one who could win. He wanted candidates who had name recognition and money raising ability. There was no mention from him on what an ideal candidate should do to represent the people or what this candidate should do in the legislature after winning the election. Melson's statements illustrate both the lingering success of Democrats for the state legislature and also their growing demise. It is an attitude of winning for winning's sake. whereas the Republicans have political goals that are directed to the conservative ideology they support. Malcolm Jewell writes of party competition in state party politics, "the closer the two-party competition, the greater the likelihood the party norms will be strong."⁵⁹ Democrats in Oklahoma, throughout most of the state's history, have not had to follow the party norms of the national Democratic party because of their dominance, especially in rural areas. As Key observes, having only one party in power means that there is no political party. Having no competition suggests that different policy choices represented by competing parties do not exist. In areas where candidates can rely on their family histories and their own contacts with local voters, a failure to bring up issues or ideological differences between the parties works. However, as the population shifts in Oklahoma, fewer areas in the state will respond to that type of campaigning. New voters will respond to ideological, partisan, or policy cues when making their choices if they do

not know the candidates. Republicans have responded successfully to this new age, while Democrats have not.

There is a commonality among Democratic activists when describing the advantage of their party. Unfortunately for them, their view of an advantage may not impress an average voter. Almost unanimously the response on the advantage for their party was that "the Democrats are the party of the common people." Traditional responses on the Democratic advantage were made; Franklin Roosevelt's name was frequently invoked. This gives some indication of the traditional, "yellow dog" Democrat that still exists in rural Oklahoma. When asked of the advantage, Jack Barnes, the Rogers county chair and union man for decades, stated, "the Democrats represent working people and Republicans represent rich people and the rich people can take care of the themselves. The Democrats take care of people who need help." Cheryl Harder believes the advantage for the Democrats is that they "do the greatest good for the greatest number." It appeared that many activists viewed this question in personal terms and answered by explaining why they were Democrats. This perceived advantage can work if enough voters accept this belief as well. If there are not enough voters, however, that grew up with this attitude, then the Democratic party will need to provide more than statements that they support the common people. The statements by activists on the Democratic party's advantage help confer how the Democrats continue to have success in traditional rural areas, but are losing in urban and suburban areas, where the population is in flux.

If an activist's worldview of politics is shaped by the occupation he or she may have, the differences between the Republican and Democratic activists for this research

suggest stark dissimilarities between the two parties. Of the eight Republican chairs, none of them work or did work for the public sector. Three of them are engineers, two work in politics full time, one in agribusiness, and two work in the service sector. Of the fourteen Democratic activists, seven work for or did work in the public sector. Those who worked in the public sector were primarily teachers. Four of the Democratic activists were also active in unions, with one of the individuals working full time as a union representative. None of the Republican activists were active in unions. Of the Democratic activists who work in the private sector, two of them were lawyers. None of the Republican activists were active in dividual did not fit the typical pattern for Democratic activists: Rick Cardwell of Muskogee county. Cardwell is a computer consultant who had lived in his county for a relatively short period time, roughly ten years. Cardwell was also one of the few, along with Tulsa county chair Keith McArtor, who mentioned the importance of ideology.


Clearly there are differences between the parties. The parties in Oklahoma have differences on their viewpoints of ideal candidates, which depict how the parties view the responsibilities of their candidates. For Democrats, candidates should support particular groups that have been loyal to the party. For Republicans, candidates should be loyal to an ideology. However, the Democratic troika of labor, teachers, and farmers may not always be reliable for their candidates in Oklahoma. The latter two groups, teachers and farmers, may not be united behind a Democratic candidate, although teachers who are party activists are far more likely to Democratic activists than Republican ones. Labor unions in Oklahoma have some limited political success primarily in the state's two major cities, where they have to compete with areas that have been and continue to be

Republican strongholds. If Democratic candidates cannot rely on these groups, they have been able to utilize their connections in the rural areas to keep conservative Democrats elected. Nonetheless, if the rural area changes, newcomers move in, or the area becomes more suburban rather than rural, candidates who have used personality-based techniques in the past will lose out. It cannot be enough for a candidate to say that "you know me and you know my family" to voters who have moved in from out of state. In areas of Oklahoma that are going through demographic changes, Republicans, who stress ideology and also have a national strategy in their campaigns, can give voters who do not have roots in the area a reason for supporting them. This cannot be said of the Democrats, who stress their service in the past and campaign in ways that have been used since the beginning of the state. Thus we are left with this status report of the parties in Oklahoma: a Republican party that is contemporary and national in its outlook and a Democratic party that is traditional and parochial in its outlook. This puts the Republicans in an apparent strong position to take advantage of changes in the state's demographic and political changes. The Democrats in rural Oklahoma, the area where the party still has success because of the unique politics of rural Democrats, continue to campaign in traditional styles for a political culture that is slowly ceasing to exist.

The Rural to Urban Shift

Jean McDonald, a political scientist with the University of Oklahoma in the early nineteen-eighties, wrote of Oklahoma legislative politics, "state legislative contests in Oklahoma provide little evidence of a trend toward a two-party system."⁶⁰ Since the time of McDonald's analysis, 1982, the fortunes of the Democratic party have been altered dramatically. As of the 2000 election, the Democrats in the Oklahoma state house have a

slim three-seat majority. What has changed? More than any other shifts in the demographics have been the increase in population from the rural areas of Oklahoma to the suburbs and urban areas. The changes that have occurred in Oklahoma's population have had the greatest impact on the rural legislator of all the political groups in the state. Rural Democrats have never developed with the national party. This was to the advantage of rural Democratic politicians because a loyal group of voters would support them and there were no consequences for them to pay if their national party alienated that same group of voters. For years, rural Democrats would not need their national party because Republicans in Oklahoma, in most parts of the state at least, were not competitive. As the state has changed and has become more urban and suburban, the rural Democrats have a smaller group of voters to attract.



Map 5. Population Growth per County in Oklahoma 1990-1997


Source: 1999 County and City Extra: Annual Metro, City, and County Data Book

Since the 1950s Oklahoma has increasingly become an urban state. By the 1970s, more than two-thirds of the state's population was found in urban areas.⁶¹ An urban area may not necessarily be a major city, since the census bureau signifies that any city of

twenty-five thousand would be an urban area. To most people, a city of twenty-five thousand still would be a fairly small town. However, most Oklahomans live in metropolitan areas. A metropolitan area has over a fifty-thousand population "with adjacent counties that have predominantly urban populations with close ties to the central city."⁶² In 1970, Oklahoma had fifty-six percent of its population living in metropolitan areas. The metropolitan population has continued to increase slowly in the 1980s and 1990s with a growth of fifty-seven and fifty-nine percent respectively.⁶³ The majority of Oklahoma's population live in cities, and of that population most live in either the two major cities of Oklahoma City and Tulsa or in their hinterlands. Populations in Oklahoma are shifting more to counties that surround the two major cities and also to counties that have retirement areas. These retirement areas are found primarily in eastern Oklahoma around lakes.


The changes in population are illustrated on the following maps. For population growth, the counties with largest increases, those over ten percent, are primarily counties that border to two major cities or are found around lake areas. Canadian, Cleveland, Wagoner, and Rogers counties all had population increases of over ten percent. All four counties share a border with either Oklahoma City or Tulsa. The counties of Cherokee, Delaware, Sequoyah, McIntosh, Love, and Marshall all have used their lakes as areas for people to enjoy their retirement: Lake Texhoma in Love and Marshall counties; Lake Tenkiller in Cherokee and Sequoyah counties; Lake Eufala in McIntosh county; and Grand Lake in Delware county. All six counties have increased their population, primarily through retirees moving to neighborhoods on the lakes. This explains how most of these counties could have a high percentage of their population over fifty-five and also

be a high growth area. The most extreme case of high growth and also high percentage of older residents is Delaware county, which has a population growth in this period of over twenty percent and also has over thirty-two percent over the age of fifty-five. This shift in population is important for the local politics because the outsiders who have moved in may have a different partisan makeup than the locals. In fact, Steve Edwards, the Republican party state chair, cited that on the recruiting process for his party "we look to where Republicans are moving in, which is the lake areas in northeastern Oklahoma." Two of the potential candidates in Delaware county for the Republicans were both new comers to the area who have lived there for roughly ten years.



Map 6. Percentage of Residents 55 or Older per County in Oklahoma

Source: 1999 County and City Extra: Annual Metro, City, and County Data Book



Source: 1999 County and City Extra: Annual Metro, City, and County Data Book This could mean that the Republicans, in the future, might get candidates who have the time and money to run for the state legislature in many of the rural areas of Oklahoma. Of course, as retirees, these same potential candidates have to find the motivation to run in areas in which they are still considered outsiders to a large number of the residents.

On the category of oldest residents, those over seventy-five, the rural areas have the largest percentage of such residents, while the urban and suburban counties have the lowest. For the most part, this map coincides with the map on population growth, although some of the counties with greatest growth, Love, Marshall, McIntosh, and Delaware counties, also have higher percentages of residents seventy-five and older. The combination of increased population growth and a lower percentage of older residence are understandable because it should mean less attrition among the population. Thus legislators with a high amount of older residents should be faced with a decreasing

population, which could alter their districts after redistricting, causing many rural legislators to incorporate suburban areas. This could create districts for rural Democratic legislators with more Republicans in them. This was the concern among some legislators. For example, Joe Eddins, who has for most of his career represented mainly rural Craig county, has had his district change in recent years to include parts of suburban Rogers county in order to pick up more population, making the district appear to be increasingly competitive. From a demographic standpoint, Democratic legislators in rural areas are faced with two changes that work against them: one is a merge with suburban areas that have more Republicans, and the second is an influx of new residents in their districts of new retirees who have a tendency to vote Republican. From a political standpoint, a district with a higher percentage of voters over seventy-five would generally mean having the last generation that strongly identifies with the Democratic party. In The New American Voter Warren Miller and Merill Shanks write of the important epochs in American political history that have shaped the mentality of voters. Of these epochs, the first is the Civil War of the 1860s, the second is the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the third is the fallout from the Vietnam conflict beginning in 1968.⁶⁴ Citizens over seventy-five would be the last ones to have an impressionable memory of the Franklin Roosevelt era and the success it brought the Democratic party. This success for Roosevelt was also great for the Oklahoma Democratic party as Roosevelt carried the state in all four of his elections. As these elderly voters pass on, Democrats will lose their most reliable voting base in Oklahoma.

What does the political culture of Oklahoma mean for candidate emergence? As will be discussed in further detail in chapter three, Democrats and Republicans have

divided up the state along urban and rural areas. Democrats have almost completely ceded the urban areas of Tulsa and Oklahoma City to the Republicans. The Republicans still avoid many of the rural Democratic incumbents, but more and more they are competing in rural open seats. Growth for the Republicans in Oklahoma has been considerable. Republicans had only eighteen percent of registered voters in their ranks in 1960, as opposed to eighty-two percent for Democrats. By 1990, the Republicans could claim thirty-three percent of the registration. As of this year the Republicans have thirtyfive percent registration to the Democrats fifty-seven percent, although the growth for Republicans has waned in the last few years. As Oklahoma election board secretary Lance Ward has observed, "the percentage of Democrats is going down, but the percentage of Republicans is not going up." According to Ward, the largest area of growth is among independents.⁶⁵ These independents appear to be strongest in suburban areas, where voters with traditional ties to the state are the weakest. The political battle will take place in Oklahoma as it does in many states, in the suburban areas. Political analyst William Schneider writes, "we are now a suburban nation with an urban fringe and a rural fringe."⁶⁶ Indeed most of the counties with the greatest growth in Oklahoma can be considered suburban counties surrounding Oklahoma City and Tulsa. Schneider also notes that suburban voters are more likely to be opposed to politics and government, thus more aligned with conservative Republicans.⁶⁷ With the suburban areas of Oklahoma tilting Republican, the urban areas increasingly becoming solid Republican. and the traditional Democratic rural areas losing either population or their Democratic characterization or both, Republican potential candidates should have the confidence to run for office. As Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell suggest, candidates will be rational

and decide to run when their chances of success are good. As political and demographic trends benefit one party, it should be reflected in the increased number of candidates representing the same party at the polls.⁶⁸ As the population shifts from rural to suburban and as the traditions change from the personality, service-oriented campaigns to more partisan and ideological features, Republicans should gain the upper hand in fielding better candidates over Democrats.

That Oklahoma has been a strong state for Democrats throughout most of its history belies the fact that Democrats have dominated as a result of two political calamities for Republicans, the statehood fiasco and the GOP collapse from the Great Depression. Democrats have controlled the statehouse through their strength in rural regions as well as their emphasis on constituency service. Republicans have worked with their national party and have built their campaigns for support for the top of the ticket to the state legislative level. As new voters participate in Oklahoma and continue their support for the Republican party, Republican state legislative candidates should do well in areas with new voters, urban and suburban districts. Democratic candidates have maintained independence with their national party, which has helped them in areas where there may be a dual identification of the two major parties or where the voters are more concerned with service or personality than partisanship and ideology. With new voters moving into rural areas, as well as the suburbs, Democratic candidates will have to find new ways to attract these voters. The tradition of voting for the candidate who has lived in the district all his or her life or for the candidate who may try to get a job for a family member is easing out in many districts. Successful candidates are those who understand not only their own strengths and weaknesses but also the changes that are occurring in

their districts. Such reasoning made by potential candidates on their decision to run is the basis of the next chapter.

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Chapter Three: Who Runs and Why for the State Legislature?

This chapter examines the individuals who become candidates for the state legislature. Different types of candidates emerge depending on the political environment, which means primarily the status of the incumbent. Individuals who were studied for this research are referred to collectively as potential candidates. They are called potential candidates because the basis of the study is to understand the thought process of determining to run for the legislature. The sections in this chapter are to categorize potential candidates and the factors in their decision to run or not to run. The categories include partisan differences among potential candidates, amateur and career-oriented potential candidates, uncontested seats, potential candidates who decide to run with little hope of winning—the "hopeless candidates, the influence political parties have on potential candidates, and the human element on potential candidates. Before the categories are analyzed, this chapter begins with discussion of the methodology, which explains how potential candidates were identified and how information was collected from them.

Methodology

The methodology for this research to explore who runs for the state legislature and why is multiple case studies. This methodology involves a two-step process. First, I contacted local political leaders in order to determine who were potential candidates. Local political leaders were asked questions regarding potential candidates: "Who is most likely to run?"; "Can you name anyone who would make a good candidate, but would probably *not* run?"; "Is anyone grooming himself or herself for a run in the future?"; "Who would you like to see run for the state legislature?" From these questions, I got names of potential candidates in their counties and/or districts.

I also asked questions pertaining to party strength: "Could you describe the political structure of the county?" "Does the local party recruit candidates?" "What is your party's greatest strength and weakness at the local and state level?" Local leaders' responses to these questions gave me more detail regarding the partisan differences that may be found in Oklahoma. If there are partisan differences, then there might be an explanation for the successes or failures a party may have in certain races. Information was gathered from three separate categories, the local political leaders, the potential candidates, and the districts/counties these individuals came from. Together these three categories broaden the research on current status of candidate emergence for the Oklahoma legislature.

After the potential candidates were identified, I then tried to contact them and set up a time for an interview. I told them about myself, the purpose of the interviews, and even my residence. This candor was necessary because for some of the individuals I contacted, their thoughts on their candidacy had been discussed with very few people. To have someone that they did not know call them and to have this unknown person identify them as potential candidates can be disconcerting. It would not be out of the realm of possibility to have research like this used against a potential candidate, since I asked them to go into detail on their thought processes of running for office. In fact, one potential candidate, a man who did go on to run for office tried to find out more about me before our interview. Fortunately we had a mutual acquaintance that vouched for me. That candidate suspected that I might have been working for who could arguably be

considered one of the last political bosses in Oklahoma, Gene Stipe. The need for openness on the part of the researcher is one of the reasons a multiple case study methodology was used for this research. The two other reasons for multiple case studies can be listed under two words, understanding and legitimacy. These studies are the best way to understand the research problem. Multiple case studies also gave me as the researcher legitimacy in the eyes of the potential candidates I interviewed and observed. Both reasons deserve further explanation.

My research problem is to develop a greater understanding of the type of individuals who run for the state legislature by investigating candidate emergence of state legislative candidates. The main issues explored through this research center on local political leaders who identify potential candidates, potential candidates for the state legislature, and the legislative districts they hope to represent. From these focal points, there are implications for other issues, such as political parties at the local level, the status of the office of state legislator, the importance of interest groups and media in state legislative races, and the "human element" of campaigning. The human element, for further detail, is the impact campaigning for a public office such as the legislature has on the family as well as on the individual candidate. Because of this impact, both positive and negative, certain individuals may be more likely to run depending on their family situations. This research problem is, therefore, descriptive and interpretive. It requires answers to the "how," the "who," and the "why" of candidate emergence. For example, how much importance do individuals running for the state legislature place on local connections? Who is considered a viable potential candidate for the state legislature?

Why do some individuals ultimately decide to run for the state legislature and others do not?

Multiple case studies, as noted methodologist Robert Yin writes, "are the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.¹ This description fits the situation for my research. It is not a historical study because I have direct observations and systematic interviewing. Nor can it be survey research because I ask the "why" questions rather than only the "how" or "what," which is the typical survey procedure. In addition, it cannot be an experiment because I do not have control over the events of my research.² The structure for my case study composition is linear-analytic. Yin writes that such a structure is one in which "the sequence of subtopics involves the issue or problem being studied, the methods used, the findings from the data collected and analyzed, and the conclusions and implications from the findings."³

The nature of understanding a research problem like this is exploratory. The study has a weakness in that it does not draw substantial conclusions but point directions for further research. Multiple case study research may not provide much generalization for the problems that are studied, but as Robert Stake writes in <u>The Art of Case Study</u> <u>Research</u>, "we do not study a case primarily to understand other cases. Our first obligation is to understand this one case."⁴ Despite the lack of firm conclusions and generalizations, research like this must be conducted in order to understand potential candidates. If only quantitative methods were used, political science could not study candidate emergence because the field would be restricted to counting what already

existed.⁵ Research on candidate emergence requires people to answer in their own words on why they decide to run or ultimately decide not to run.

The process of developing an understanding of the research problem requires interpretation from the researcher. This is a key segment of all case study research. Michael Quinn Patton writes that qualitative research uses more detailed data that comes from a smaller set of cases or people than quantitative research would use. This leads to analysis that can be "painstaking, time-consuming, and uncertain."⁶ In spite of the difficulty of such analysis, my interpretations must be balanced with the viewpoints of the individual cases. As Stake notes, "the interpretations of the researcher are likely to be emphasized more than the interpretations of those people studied, but the qualitative case researcher tries to preserve the multiple realities, the different and even contradictory views of what is happening."⁷ Potential candidates who give their own analyses of their chances of winning may be far removed from the reality anyone else may have, but it is still relevant in case study research because it is only their reality that determines their decision.

Based on the numerous interviews and observations I made with regard to candidate emergence, I have found patterns from the data that can be analyzed. From these patterns, I have developed concepts and categories concerning candidate emergence. It is concepts and categories that occupy the bases of qualitative research rather than the incidences and frequencies that determine quantitative research.⁸ As M. B. Miles and M. Huberman explain in <u>Qualitative Data Analysis</u>, qualitative research utilizes words rather than numbers.⁹ Words help us find a greater understanding of the research problem of why people choose to run.

Focusing on words does not mean that qualitative research such as case studies avoids collecting data. There is a collection process to my research, and it follows the features described by John Lofland in Analyzing Social Settings. Lofland writes that the qualitative researcher should be close to the people he or she is researching.¹⁰ This feature combines both reasons I have for using case study methodology. A close proximity gives the researcher a better sense of place and time regarding the people and events he or she is investigating. I would also note and will explain in more detail that it provides legitimacy on the part of the researcher for the individuals under study. Lofland also states that the report from the data must be truthful, a factual representation of what occurred.¹¹ This requires that the researcher be subjective when collecting data, but this means, as cited above, that the researcher must provide an objective interpretation. As paradoxical as that may appear to some, such research can be done with the inclusion of multiple realities, including the reality of the researcher to the study. Qualitative research must also have a pure description of the people, areas, and events involved in a study.¹² This is done to provide the deeper understanding that is necessary to know why decisions, in this case the decision to seek public office, are made by some individuals and not by others. Lofland also believes that good qualitative research would include direct quotes from the participants.¹³ To provide understanding and truth, an objective interpretation, for the cases involved in qualitative research, nothing works better than the reality of direct quotes. By following these features outlined by Lofland, I can provide a detailed description of potential candidates for the state legislature. This is how multiple case studies make the best approach to understanding candidate emergence. What is also necessary when researching potential candidates is to develop a bond of trust between the

researcher and the individuals involved in the study. This is the second reason for using multiple case studies, the legitimacy the method of data collection provides to the cases. Once the method of data collection has been determined, there must be a decision on what cases are used for the research.

Multiple case study research does not involve random selection. Instead the cases are purposive. In order for the cases to be conducive for study, Stake writes that researchers need to "pick cases which are easy to get to and hospitable to [their] inquiry."¹⁴ This process involves a nurturing on the part of the researcher. There must be an indication that the researcher is sincere and respectful for the individuals who are to be asked and observed on a personal level. This is something that, for most people, cannot be carried out through the telephone or through email, but by one-on-one interviews that include open-ended questions. To build legitimacy, it is important for the potential candidate to see the researcher as much as for the researcher to see the potential candidate. Earl Babbie writes that the interview provides many research advantages over other data collection methods such as mail or telephone surveys. There is a much higher response rate through interviews, with fewer people ready to turn down an interview once it has been arranged and the researcher is present.¹⁵ Indeed, out of the over sixty people I requested interviews with, only one contacted me and denied my request for an interview. Babbie also notes that the individuals questioned are more likely to give lengthier, more thoughtful answers with an interviewer's presence.¹⁶ Likewise, my presence gave the potential candidates the opportunity to open up and discuss their versions of reality involving their possible run for the state legislature. In fact, some individuals told me that my questions gave them a new perspective on their own candidacy and made them think

of issues that they had not approached before. For many individuals, especially those who were new to the world of politics, it is unlikely that they would have responded to a mailin survey. Tied in to the interpretive aspect of case study research, Babbie also notes that an interviewer can observe as well as ask questions during a personal interview.¹⁷ Such an one-on-one encounter gives the researcher the opportunity to get a deeper understanding of the individual running and, frankly, to assess the possibilities an individual may have for politics that would not be evident through the mail or over the phone. An interview gives the researcher the ability to make observations on the personality, race, class, social skills, and motivation of potential candidates. In the final analysis of this methodology for this research problem, the two reasons I have outlined interconnect. I need to use case studies in order to develop an understanding of the motives for candidacies. In order to get close to potential candidates so I can get a deeper understanding, I must have legitimacy among the individuals I question.

This legitimacy meant that I was as honest with the individuals as I wanted them to be with me. For instance, if asked about my political leanings, I told them that I had been a Democratic chair of Ottawa County, my home county. I also told them about my current political status: a registered Independent and moderate on most issues. I believe that studying American Government for many years has helped me attain the ability to understand the many sides of an issue. During the interview I became more than a voice or an address to my cases, but a person they knew, albeit briefly. I believe that was important. Did it skew their answers to my questions? It might have done so, but most people did not ask about me until they were through explaining their own thoughts and beliefs. Most people that have dabbled in some way with politics, which would include

most potential candidates, do not mind sharing their viewpoints once they know their words will not be used against them in a campaign. My trust, which I built through the interview process, allowed individuals to give me their insights with minimal reluctance.

The area utilized most for my unit of analysis has been northeastern Oklahoma, which usually goes by the name Green Country. I also used some cases in Tulsa in order to get an urban/rural comparison. Using twenty legislative districts, I identified and then interviewed thirty-nine potential candidates. Some of these potential candidates were incumbents, some were declared candidates, some were still in the thought process of deciding to run for the current election cycle, and some were planning to run in the future. While the research may not have a wide variety of geographical and cultural differences, the large amount of cases is diverse in terms of their political configurations. I have been able to analyze candidate emergence from a variety of combinations: Republican incumbents and Democratic challengers, Democratic incumbents and Republican challengers, open seats, Republican uncontested seats, Democratic uncontested seats, rural districts, urban districts, and suburban districts. This plurality of cases gives my research considerable perspectives on candidate emergence for the state legislature.

I have focused primarily on state representative races. Although Alan Rosenthal has explained that the senate and representative districts in state legislatures have no real differences today other than number of constituents, I did make contact with state senators, but could never follow through with an extended interview. One of the differences that may not occur in every state but does in Oklahoma is that representatives must run for reelection every election cycle, while senators do not.¹⁸ Thus, for the sake

of consistency, it seemed prudent to focus on representatives. I did interview my own local state senator, Rick Littlefield, because he had served in the Oklahoma house of representatives and could provide a valuable insight on how politics has changed in the nearly twenty years he has served in the legislature. I believe that this research can fit Patton's description of the importance of case studies: "[case studies are] useful when intended users need to understand a problem, situation, or program in great depth, and they can identify cases rich in needed information—rich in the sense that a great deal can be learned from a few exemplars of the phenomenon of interest."¹⁹ These cases, despite the narrowed focus, can give us direction for further knowledge of candidate emergence.

The individuals that I interviewed were in various stages of the thought process on deciding to run. Some had formally announced, and I interviewed some of these candidates in their campaign headquarters. Others had placed little time into the details of running, but were still considering if they had the motivation, the "fire in the belly," to run. Most would be somewhere in between these two extremes. They would have made some approaches to party officials, they would have talked to former candidates, and they would have investigated how funds should be raised but would not have formally announced their candidacy. Most of the interviews were one hour to an hour and a half in length.

The Candidates of the Two Parties

There are still obvious distinctions in the two Oklahoma parties. Party officials come from different backgrounds and have different ideas on what their ideal candidates should be. Each party's candidates are also different, not just on their policy beliefs but in other areas that help shape their "worldviews." On the issue of native/non-native

candidates, there are some differences between the parties, although the numbers are small. Oklahoma has been the state with the lowest percentage of non-native members in its legislature at twelve percent.²⁰ However, when Gary Moncrief and Joel Thompson compiled these statistics, which must have been in the 1980s, the number was lower than it is today. Based on the 1998 legislature, the Oklahoma House of Representatives has twenty-four representatives (24%) that are non-native. The measurement used has little substantive meaning, but is accurate since the word "native" defines a person's origin of birth. A legislator is a native Oklahoman if he or she is born in the state. Of the nonnatives, fifteen (63%) are Republican and nine (37%) are Democrats. For the Republicans, twelve (80%) of their non-native representatives serve urban districts. Although the overall number is small, non-native legislators in Oklahoma are more likely to be Republicans representing urban districts.

As for potential candidates to the legislature, I used a more extensive measurement based on my interviews. One of the questions asked was, "How long have you lived in the district?" This may mean someone was from Oklahoma, but not native to the area. This distinction may be more important in rural areas. A native of Tulsa may be a native Oklahoman, but in rural counties the person would still be, to many, an outsider. One potential candidate from Cherokee County remarked of one of his opponents, "He has only lived in this county for fifteen years or so." Natives for this study mean any individuals who have spent a large majority (75%) of their adult lives in the district they are running for. There is a greater likelihood that a Republican potential candidate would be non-native than a Democratic potential candidate would be. Of the subjects interviewed for this study, only four (20%) of the Democrats were non-native and seven

(38%) of the Republicans were non-native. Even though they may have been deemed non-native, many in that category had lived in Oklahoma or even in their district for quite some time, but these individuals may have been away from the area for an extended period of time. Many had been "born and raised" in their districts, but they spent most of their adult lives somewhere else pursuing careers. The military and ministry are two careers that exhibited these patterns. Very few individuals were completely new to the districts; in other words, they had lived in the districts for only a handful of years, five years or less. These individuals in this category were more career-oriented towards politics and viewed serving in the legislature in ideological and partisan terms. In the state of Oklahoma and especially in its rural regions, it is still important for the candidates of both parties, especially Democrats, to be native of the state and native of the districts.

Of the potential candidates interviewed, almost all considered the status of the seat before deciding whether or not to run. If a district had an incumbent with no political weaknesses, then it was unlikely that a strong challenger would emerge. As one potential candidate from Ottawa County, a well-known community activist and businessman, remarked, "If I run I want to win, so I have no desire to run against an incumbent." This same individual said of his two incumbent state legislators: "They're both good guys and they've done nothing wrong." Doing something wrong in a state legislative district would have little to do with voting records and far more to do with personal behavior. The only incumbent whose district was researched for this project that had strong challengers within his own party was Bobby Frame in District 15. He received the challenges because of his own personal problems, not his voting records.

Of course, having no personal problems does not guarantee that an incumbent will be free from challengers. A couple of incumbents had to face strong challenges because of a policy decision that affected their districts or because of the partisan make-up of their district. Incumbent Joe Eddins of District 9 (primarily Craig County) did receive a strong challenger, the mayor of Vinita Joe Johnson. Johnson challenged Eddins because he believed there would be a backlash against the incumbent for the layoffs of state employees at the state hospital. A lack of leadership was the issue that Johnson hoped to use against the incumbent. The only other incumbent with a formidable challenger interviewed for this project was Tad Jones in District 6 (primarily Rogers County). The campaign against him was a result of his party membership rather than a personal vulnerability or his voting records. Jones's political success appeared to many Democrats to be fragile. He was the only Republican at the time of this research to represent a district of northeastern Oklahoma that did not include the city of Bartlesville, a traditional Republican stronghold, as part of his constituency. Thus, he was challenged because Democrats believed he could be defeated on the basis of party membership.

Even incumbents themselves did not challenge incumbents when they were first candidates. Before he became an incumbent, Jones, like most candidates, did not choose to run until his district seat was open. Of the incumbents interviewed, only two defeated incumbents to gain their seats. Of these two, one believed that the incumbent would not run, and the other did run precisely because she believed the incumbent had been an embarrassment to the district and could be defeated. Three of the incumbents interviewed mentioned that when they were challengers, they had been defeated by incumbents when they first ran. Two came back to win their races against the same incumbents that had defeated them two years earlier. Before running, almost all incumbents had name recognition because many were from well-known families in their districts. Also, about half of the incumbents had some political experience at the school board, city, or county level. Others had name recognition by serving as school administrators or law officers. Incumbents are, by the nature of their position, successful politicians. It is safe to say that most successful politicians at the state representative level won their position in open seats because they were well known to their districts before their race.

Despite this general tendency among candidates to avoid challenging incumbents, there are some differences between Democrats and Republicans in running for a state office. For most Democratic potential candidates, they would not run until they had open seats. In one district, two Democratic potential candidates faced the prospect of challenging an incumbent from their own party, but both hoped the incumbent would bow out, which the incumbent ultimately did. Two other interviewed Democrats ran as challengers against Republican incumbents.

The two open seats in northeastern Oklahoma brought out Democrats who had political experience and/or name recognition. In district 13, primarily Muskogee County, Democratic Allen Harder had considerable experience as a Democratic party activist. In fact, he has been described by the *Tulsa World* as a Democratic party "operative."²¹ Harder stated that he would not have sought office were it not for the fact that Bill Settle, the Democratic incumbent, had run for another office. Lela Foley Davis, another Democratic candidate for District 13, had been an elected official for many years. Ms. Davis is the first African-American woman to be an elected mayor in the United States. She too would not have been a candidate had District 13 not been open. The same can be

said for District 4, primarily made up of Cherokee County, where the city of Tahlequah is located. Wayne Ryals, member of the Tahlequah city council and former local school superintendent, would not have run for office were it not for the retirement of incumbent Bob Ed Culver. James Wilson, another Democratic candidate for District 4, would also not have run unless it was an open seat. Wilson is unique among Democratic candidates in the heavily Democratic area of northeastern Oklahoma. He was a candidate with no political experience as an elected official or as a party activist. He also had limited name recognition. Yet he entered the race not to make a statement or to build up stature for future races as some unknowns might do. Instead he planned on overcoming his campaign deficiencies by spending a considerably large sum of money for a rural legislative race. The total sum from the primary, run-off, and general race for Wilson would be at least in the eighty-thousand-dollar range. This is high even for an urban race, which usually costs more than rural campaigns. For other Democrats, part of their strategy to win was to wait for the right moment to run, which would be the time when no incumbent was in the race. Of course, not every candidate waits for the departure of the incumbent. Some had run against incumbents before, and once they had realized the difficulty in winning, then they would decide to wait until the seats became open. In general most potential candidates would prefer to avoid incumbents, but if one party dominates an area, facing incumbents may be unavoidable for those in the minority if they want to be candidates.

For Republicans who reside in northeastern Oklahoma and want to be candidates, their fate is similar to that confronted by minority candidates in any one-party dominant area. Many may not have the chance to wait for the most opportune time to run, the open-

seat, because of entrenched incumbents. Some may cling to the optimism that, as one Republican challenger told me, "Anyone can be beaten." While this is certainly true because upsets do happen, it is rare. In 1998 only one incumbent representative in Oklahoma lost. Perhaps, incumbents benefit from the lack of issues in state legislative campaigns and can focus more on what they have delivered to the voters. As one Republican potential candidate stated, who ultimately decided not to run against the Democratic incumbent in her district, "The bridge has been built and the roads have been paved." She had run and lost to this same incumbent in a past election, in which she tried to stress issues over personality. Since believing issues matter little in a state representative race, based on her own experience from her first campaign, she withdrew before the 2000 race had started.

Most Republican potential candidates who decided to run against incumbents did not have elected experience, but all of them had to some extent political experience within their party. Only two Republicans who decided to run against an incumbent had elected office experience. Of the two Republican potential candidates who decided to run in races with open seats, one had decided to run before the incumbent had retired and in fact wanted to run specifically against the incumbent. The other Republican potential candidate decided to run once his district was an open seat. He made a strategic decision like most of the Democratic potential candidates. It is interesting to note that this particular Republican potential candidate was younger than most candidates for the legislature and would also like to make politics a career.

Party activism is an important factor for candidacy. Those who have been active in a party do have a base to turn to during the campaign. They also have access to

workshops and political consultants, which non-partisans may not have. Those who had been partisan activists as opposed to community activists were far more likely to have attended workshops. These findings are important because studies have consistently revealed that political parties do not play a major role in potential candidates' decisions to run.²² Political parties, however, do provide potential candidates with knowledge on campaigning and can help network for fundraising.²³ This evidence suggests that party activists receive benefits from their service and have an advantage when vying for the legislature. Party activists seem to have added confidence to run because they have builtin local support to rely on. Of all the potential candidates interviewed, only one who had been a party activist had not attended workshops. This potential candidate cited a lack of funds as the reason for not attending. It may not be an entirely valid reason for not attending a workshop, since most workshops are sponsored by the parties. However, some of the potential candidates who had been activists have stated that the parties expected them to buy their literature if they were to attend their workshops. The prices mentioned were around fifty dollars, but added to that would be a trip to either Oklahoma City or Tulsa. Nevertheless, when one considers the costs of campaigning, the costs for workshops did not seem to be burdensome. The younger, more career-oriented candidates had attended more workshops. Republican John Smaligo, Jr., age twenty-four and the son of a former state legislator, had attended workshops, even in Virginia. Democrat Donald Childers, age twenty-two, had attended workshops sponsored by the Democratic National Committee. Both of these individuals did see their future involving politics in some fashion. As for partisan differences, there may be no discernable differences in the way

the two parties use workshops. The differences belong to the individuals within the parties, not the parties themselves.

Potential candidates who were not active in their parties were less likely to attend workshops. It seems that the more one had participated in a party, the greater possibility the individual would go to a party's workshop. Of course, not all workshop participants have been party activists. However, going to workshops seemingly has some impact. Most of the potential candidates interviewed decided to attend workshops once they had become candidates. It was not the workshop that made them candidates, although the workshop gave them more confidence for their campaigns. All the individuals interviewed who had not been active in their parties and/or had not attended workshops, either ultimately decided not to run or were defeated in the primary or general election, with one exception. As with the issue of campaign experience, candidate Jim Wilson of Cherokee County breaks the mold on party activity and contact with his party's campaign infrastructure. He did not attend workshops before his candidacy and was not active in his party in any way. He did win his primary and the general campaign. What did separate him from most candidates was the amount of money spent for his rural representative race. His case is a clear indication that money spent on advertising can offset other shortcomings.

Wilson's case, while unique, does bring into question whether party activity or workshop attendance has any impact on electoral success. As for the incumbents, the candidates that had been successful in many campaigns, only one had ever served as a party chair for his county. Most were not active at all for their parties. As for workshops, only one had attended before he became the incumbent. This may signify a change for the

times. The incumbent who had attended workshops was the youngest by far of the incumbents interviewed. Rick Littlefield, a state legislator who has served as a representative and senator for Ottawa and Delaware counties for nearly twenty years, signifies some of the changes in campaigning. He did not attend any workshops sponsored by the Democratic legislature until his majority leader twisted his arm. He found the workshop to be a waste of time for him because he did not plan to use web pages or chat rooms--the most recent campaign techniques offered in workshops. He has an office in his store in Grove that he uses for contact with his constituents. This will also be his last term as term limits have now "caught him." He noted that when he first started campaigning, there were a few people he went to see to make sure they were supporting his campaign. These were local officials who could "deliver" a precinct, a vote box, or perhaps a whole town to his campaign. Those days are now gone even in the small towns and rural areas, according to Littlefield. Such a description may imply that incumbents in the past did not need new technologies and workshops, and consequently, did not need their party. In the contemporary, cyberspace age, the party may be more important because of the service it can provide potential candidates. This indicates that the role of parties could be greater as politics in America, even at the local level, moves from the candidate-centered era to the campaign-centered era.²⁴ Parties are not the only organizations that can assist potential candidates when making the decision to run. Interest groups can play an important role as well.

Interest groups seem to have a minimal impact on potential candidates. Few individuals mentioned that interest group activists had recruited them or had even discussed with them the possibility of running for the state legislature. In fact, one

potential candidate who had been a candidate in the past and now worked for a public employee's union remarked that interest groups did not recruit candidates, but instead supported candidates once they had formally announced. He believed the only possible area where interest groups might recruit would be in the urban areas with open seats. Incumbents bear out this claim by noting that they received support from interest groups once they became candidates, not before. Phil Ostrander, a Democratic representative from the Tulsa suburb of Owasso, pointed out that he "made the decision to run and get active, then groups came to me." Those incumbents who had once been challengers to incumbents remarked that not only had they not received help from interest groups but that interest groups were openly hostile to their campaigns. These same interest groups would then support them once they had defeated the incumbents. Such is the nature of politics. As one officeholder stated, "Everybody loves you when you are the incumbent."

While no potential candidates said that they were recruited by interest groups, many noted that they were encouraged by interest groups to run. Most individuals in this situation would have initiated the idea of running with a representative of an interest group. This was done in many cases to see if there would be potential for support and also to get an outside opinion of the individual's chances. The outside opinion was, of course, not too far removed from the potential candidate since he or she had some association with the group in the first place. There were some clear-cut partisan differences in the area of interest group encouragement to run. It may mean that Republican potential candidates are reluctant to discuss their associations with various interest groups to a researcher they hardly know, or it may also mean that Republican potential candidates are isolated from the dominant interest groups in the area I

researched. Only two Republican potential candidates mentioned encouragement from interest groups on running for an office. One received encouragement from his professional organization; as an optometrist his state organization was supportive of his potential bid. The other Republican received support from, in his words, "conservative interest groups," which was the only description he gave. He was also the only one, of all potential candidates, who mentioned ideological groups. Interest groups may be responding primarily to the majority party in the area.

Democrats were far more likely to receive encouragement from interest groups on their bid for office. In almost all cases, the moral support they receive when thinking about running would blossom into financial support once they run because they already had an association with these same groups. For instance, former school administrators received support from teacher's associations. Union members received support from unions. Retirees would mention encouragement from the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP). Farmers and ranchers would note that the Farmers' Union or Farmer's Bureau was happy to see them enter the race. However, for all Democrats, they received encouragement from these groups only if they were running in open seats, not against incumbents of their own party. This signifies the inherent conservatism of interest groups to go with what they know than to take risks with challengers.

Incumbents noted that part of their success was based on seeking out the support of interest groups once they were in the race. One group found in rural areas that can have an impact in a race is volunteer firefighters. Rick Littlefield stated that this was the most important group for his election campaigns since there were over twenty rural districts in his area and that firefighters themselves were registered voters, respected in

their communities, and networked throughout the county. Other groups mentioned by all incumbents in rural areas included teachers, farmers, and retirees. Thus we can conclude that interest groups are not significant in the recruitment phase of an election, but are vital in the campaign phase.

The potential candidates of the two parties did have some differences. Potential candidates for a party signify not only which party they belong to but also which party they most want to represent. Only one potential candidate did not know which party he would run on when he decided to be a candidate. He did not run in this election because an incumbent was in his district. In the future, he has expressed, when he runs, he wants to know which party will be the best for his candidacy and the most beneficial to his district. Most other potential candidates had partisan beliefs, although many of the Democratic potential candidates clearly indicated that they were more conservative than the national Democratic party. The biggest difference among the parties was the occupations of the potential candidates. Only one of the Republican potential candidates had experience in public service; she was retired from the Foreign Service and now resided in Delaware County. The rest of the Republicans came from the private sector, working as marketers for major companies, as consultants for businesses, or as small business owners themselves. There were also blue-collar workers who were Republican potential candidates. The profile of these candidates goes against the stereotype of Republicans and may indicate that a party's candidates may be atypical in areas with lopsided party registrations.

For the Democrats, there was a polar opposite in occupations. Only a small number did come completely from the private sector. Some may have had a part-time

occupation in private business, mainly farming and ranching. Almost all came from the public sector or were retired from the public sector. Some Democrats had been school administrators, some had managed public parks or had been game wardens, some had come from law enforcement, and some had come from county government. Of those in the private sector, with the most likely occupation being some form of agriculture, they were also involved in government service as school board or city council members. This may be indicative primarily of the lopsided party registration of the area, but it may signify the relevance of Alan Ehrenhalt's analysis of the two parties in which he described the Democrats as the party of government.²⁵ That is certainly the situation from the cases analyzed for this research. The one Republican with public service complained to me that her party was hurt by what she saw as ideological rigidity of the GOP at the state level. To her, the important issues of her district, such as roads, drugs, and economic development call for pragmatism of public service, not ideology. Perhaps individuals with a background of public service are more prepared to govern, and that is what makes them attractive to voters in races for the state legislature.

Interestingly enough, only two potential candidates were attorneys, one Democrat and one Republican. The Republican became a candidate as the only one candidate for his party in an open seat. He was young and wanted to make politics a profession. The young Democratic attorney also had the same ambition, but he backed out of running because he needed to build up his law firm and also because he would have faced a difficult primary bid against three other opponents. This pattern follows the research of Moncrief and Thompson, who find that the old breed of legislature who were predominantly lawyers have been replaced by other occupations.²⁶ The decline may also

reflect the time demands from both the legislature and legal professions, which prevent many attorneys from serving.²⁷

Malcolm Jewell, one of the leading experts on state legislatures, notes that there is little empirical evidence on the impact of issues on state legislative campaigns.²⁸ This is certainly the belief among most Democrats and some Republicans interviewed. The incumbents believed that the issue had been their service and their presence. As one incumbent remarked, "The issue is that people remember me." Most incumbents, looking back on their experience as candidates, would remark that issues rarely had an impact in the race. For potential candidates who met with consultants, they too concluded that issues matter very little in a state legislative campaign. As one Republican candidate who had used a well-known Republican consultant for his campaign remarked, "It is a personality driven campaign; the issue is who knocks on the most doors." When issues were brought up, Republicans would generally bring up issues that matter most to conservatives, tax cuts, right to work, and, in some reflecting their frustration in Oklahoma, the legislature itself. For Democrats the issues brought up most would be education, roads, and service to their districts. To narrow down issues to single-word statements, one could say that Republicans focus on "reform" and Democrats focus on "service."

It is evident that potential candidates have differences, especially in occupations and in some degree on issues. It is another indication that indeed parties do matter. To a minor extent, these observations also suggest that Democrats have an advantage at the state representative level because they have candidates who appreciate public service and understand it more than Republicans. This may explain, in part, the ongoing success

Democrats have at the state legislative level. Partisan viewpoints are not the only separation of potential candidates, for candidates also may have different expectations about the job of legislator. Some may want to make politics a career, and others want to be amateurs.

Amateur and Career-Oriented Candidates and Their Motivations

A career candidate is one who wants to make politics his or her primary career. Alan Rosenthal defines career-oriented candidates as "those who have already been in politics and those who are looking forward to higher office."²⁹ This definition does not neatly fit the typical legislator in Oklahoma. Some in the state legislature of Oklahoma may make the office a career and do not look forward to higher office. These individuals are going to be few in the years to come as term limits will prevent anyone from making the state legislature a lengthy career. But, the pay for legislators in Oklahoma now makes it affordable for one to live only off of the salary if a person desires to do so. Thus, individuals that are identified as career-oriented potential candidates for this study are those who plan to use their service in the state legislature as what Joseph Schlesinger refers to a "springboard" for higher office, such as federal or statewide posts. In Schlesinger's own research, done in 1966, Oklahoma had the lowest number of state leaders who had state legislative service of any state he studied.³⁰ Also Oklahoma was one of the few states that did not have any base office used by politicians as a springboard for higher office. Today, five of Oklahoma's eight member congressional delegation, Don Nickles, Jim Inhofe, Wes Watkins, Ernest Istook, and Franck Lucas, did serve in the Oklahoma State legislature.³¹ Perhaps Oklahoma has changed since Schlesigner's research.

For this research, an amateur candidate for the state legislature is a retired or semi-retired individual who wants to serve a few terms or someone who plans to serve a few terms and return back to his or her current job. Individuals in the latter category would need to have jobs that they know will be available to them once they return. These are usually people who have their own businesses. David Canon considers a political amateur to be a candidate who lacks political experience and is less strategic in his or her decision to run for office.³² Amateur candidates should then be less concerned or less conscientious about losing than career-oriented potential candidates. This should mean that career-oriented potential candidates would run only in an open-seat or when the incumbent appears to be very vulnerable. This also may indicate that career-oriented potential candidates are young individuals with limited family demands.

Most incumbents questioned fit the analysis by Schlesinger. Two had made the legislature a career, both serving for close to twenty years, and both will continue to serve until their terms are limited. These individuals have very little ambition to run for higher office and would rather go into the private sector, mainly real estate or small business, full-time once they can no longer serve. One reason why incumbents who have made the state legislature a career may say they have no desire to seek higher office is the recent track record politicians in similar circumstances have had when they tried to run. In northeastern Oklahoma alone, Glen Johnson, the one-time Oklahoma speaker of the house was defeated in his U.S. congressional bid, and most recently Bill Settle, the former house appropriations chairman, could not win his party's nomination for congress.

Other incumbents did not enter the legislature until later on in life, only after they had built up years of service in another occupation. Some of them had enough years to

draw retirement from their past jobs. These individuals are not in the age in life to really use the state legislature as a springboard, even if they wanted to. In fact, only one incumbent involved in this project, Tad Jones, could be considered in the career-oriented range. He was the youngest incumbent interviewed and one of the youngest members in the legislature. Jones did mention that he would like to run for the United States Congress if the opportunity presented itself, and he believed in a few years that it would.

Unless term limits will be challenged in the future, which it may be, no one will be able to have a lengthy career in the Oklahoma legislature. This does not stop potential candidates for the legislature who want to build a career in politics. These individuals may see the legislature not so much as a springboard for higher office but as a training camp, the same way a baseball player may view the minor leagues. It is a place to go to build up one's political and legislative skills before trying out the major leagues of politics, the United States Congress. Certainly it is not a place to stay too long, least one gets accused of being the "professional politician" or "washed up" politician as state Republican chair Steve Edwards referred to long serving Democratic legislators who run for congress.³³ For the older state legislators, as Fowler and McClure observe, a bid for federal office may not be practical since they will be too old to build up clout in congress.³⁴ It is far better for one to serve only a few terms in the state legislature and then run for federal office. If an individual is elected to congress from that circumstance, as in the case of Senator Nickles or Representative Istook, who have both stayed in Congress far longer than the average legislator stays in the legislature, a lengthy stay at the federal level seemingly lacks the negative connotation of "professional" politician.

With regard to their political career, potential candidates were asked the question, "how important is it for you to build a future in politics?" This caused them to bring out their impressions not only about themselves but also on politics in general. As a result, some answers were, at first, contradictory, such as this response from an electronics technician: "I would like to build a future in politics, but I do not want to be a politician." Many responses had a similar tone, but were not as direct. To these individuals, most who have been involved in their communities in some way, service is "good," but politics is "bad." Thus they may believe a future of serving is good, but if one does serve only as a politician, then it connotes helping oneself more than others. Many who responded as such were currently serving as school board members, city council members, or elected members of their political party, an indication that the term "politician" is subjective indeed. Very few would respond in a completely positive fashion to this question. Those that did were the ones who had no qualms about planning a career in politics. The most clear-cut question to measure political ambition was "Have you ever thought of moving to another district in order to run for the state legislature?" Only one potential candidate announced that he had. This individual also happened to be the youngest of the potential candidates and he had planned out his political path. He would not run for the legislature this term because the incumbent, a legislator he had paged for, would retire in two years. At twenty-two, he was already a veteran of a few political campaigns. In fact, our interview took place in congressional candidate and former state senator Bill Settle's campaign headquarters in Muskogee. This young politico was the only individual who stated that his final goal in politics was to be a United States Senator. Noting that a

lengthy stay in the legislature seemed to mark political death for other offices, he mentioned that if he became a legislator, his stay would end far before term limits.

Of the few others who wanted to build a career in politics, only two decided to run for office this time. The two were both young Republicans, ages twenty-four and thirty respectively. The twenty-four-year-old had run for office two years earlier, whereas the thirty-year-old had wanted to run for congress in the second district but decided against it when Republican candidate Andy Ewing was endorsed by the Republican incumbent, Tom Coburn. Both individuals had been planning to run for well over a year in advance. Both had attended workshops and had developed connections within the state Republican Party. If either one of them or both were to lose, then a return to non-political jobs would not be very likely. The young twenty-four-year-old suburbanite commented, "I feel a life around politics is important and I will either practice or study politics throughout my life." The other young potential candidate, a young attorney from Muskogee, stated that he would run for office in the future and want to build a political base, but for now he must worry about promoting her law practice. This indeed may be the reason, but there were also three well-known candidates running in the open seat election when he decided not to run.

It is reasonable that the young potential candidates would have the ambition for a career in politics. Other individuals interviewed may have had those ambitions, but by the time they have reached their forties or fifties, the idea of a career in politics does not seem possible, although it is worth noting that President Harry S Truman really did not begin his career in politics as a local county judge until he was thirty-six and as a United States Senator until he was fifty. For most people with an interest in politics, they are

faced with a choice, building a career in politics or focusing on their careers in business, education, or the public sector, but they cannot do both. That is why most potential candidates interviewed thought about running for the state legislature only after they had finished their first careers. These individuals could be viewed as being risk-adverse, deciding to run only after they had built up a retirement or some other careers to fall back on. However, it must be noted that it is not only candidates who run for office, but their entire families. A loss for someone who has not built up a safety net would then jeopardize not only himself but everyone else in the family as well. Only one of the four young politicos was married and had children. This sets up an interesting distinction for candidates to the state legislature in Oklahoma: on the one hand, a few candidates are in their early twenties; on the other hand, a large number of candidates in their late forties and early fifties who have already retired from one career; very few candidates somewhere in the middle of those extremes. The Oklahoma legislature seems to have candidates that are similar to those Allen Hertzke has found running for congress in Colorado. These individuals are "less like the rest of us than we think or hope.³⁵

Unopposed Candidates

The best position to be in as a candidate is to be in a race with no opponents. That may appear to not be a race at all, but actually these candidates are usually incumbents who have done their best as a legislator to avoid having an opponent. Many legislators, especially those in rural areas, remark that they campaign year around. This campaigning is maintaining a presence by attending local high school functions, community functions, and even private affairs, such as weddings and funerals. When an incumbent has no opponent in either the primary or general election, it is a decisive sign of party and

incumbent strength in the district. An unopposed candidate also suggests that indeed, as Kazee notes, many elections are decided long before campaign speeches are made and advertising funds are collected. Party leaders have suggested that having more candidates compete for an office is a sign of party strength. However, that is a sign of party *attractiveness*, not strength. The number of candidates a party brings to an open-seat or the number of challengers a party has against an incumbent, and also intra-party competition against an incumbent can measure party attractiveness. An organized party can prevent challengers from taking on its own incumbents. A measure of strength for a party and/or the party's incumbent is the number of unopposed candidates for a party.

In Oklahoma the statewide pattern for unopposed candidates has made partisan changes in the last two decades. For many years, following its one-party roots, essentially Democratic legislators would go unopposed. That has now changed, and both Republicans and Democrats have areas of the state in which their incumbents may run unopposed. Oklahoma politics, which at one time was as volatile as any place in the country, has now calmed down to the point where many voters have no choices via the voting booth. One observer of Oklahoma politics concludes that recent elections have left as little as only one-third of the legislative posts to be decided by general elections.³⁶

To strengthen its numbers, a party must have more candidates. It must be willing to improve in areas where the party has failed in the past. Joseph Aistrup's research on Republican activity in the South measures the change that occurred in this region during the 1980s. Perhaps from the popularity President Reagan had in the South, more Republican candidates began to emerge in rural districts during his presidency.³⁷ There

must be candidates who are willing to make a leap of faith and run in areas that have been and may continue to be weak areas for their party.




Chart 1. Number of Unopposed Candidates 1980-2000

Source: Election Results and Statistics 1980-2000, State Election Board, Oklahoma City, OK





Chart 2. Unopposed Democratic Candidates 1980-2000

Chart 3. Unopposed Republican Candidates 1980-2000



Sources: Election Results and Statistics 1980-2000, State Election Board, Oklahoma City, OK

In the last two decades, Republicans have made tremendous gains in representation in the Oklahoma legislature. It may be that Republicans are running in areas where they have been weak in the past, or it may be that Democrats are vacating Republican strongholds and are failing to compete against Republicans. As recently as 1984, Democrats had eighteen unopposed candidates, whereas the Republicans had only two. For the Democrats, the bulk of the unopposed seats came from their traditional strongholds found the rural areas of northeastern, southeastern, and southwestern Oklahoma.

For the Republicans, their two unopposed candidates came from traditional Republican strongholds in northwestern Oklahoma and in the Tulsa metropolitan area. The following election in 1986 made little change for the Democrats, but the Republicans had six unopposed seats, perhaps reflecting a good Republican year with Henry Bellmon winning the governor's race. The Republican unopposed seats, save one, all came from Republican strongholds in the northwest and in Tulsa.

In the 1990s, the number of unopposed seats has generally increased for both parties. The Democrats had fourteen in 1990, twenty-eight in 1992, twenty-six in 1994, thirteen in 1996, twenty-eight in 1998, and sixteen in 2000. In 1990 the Republicans had five unopposed seats followed by ten in 1992, fifteen in 1994, ten in 1996, seventeen in 1998, and fourteen in 2000. Democrats continue to have unopposed candidates in northeast, southeast, and southwest rural areas of the state. Pockets of Democratic dominance in districts would be non-rural, such as in urban Commanche County, where the city of Lawton is located. Democrats also have had unopposed candidates in the metropolitan areas of Oklahoma City or Tulsa, in districts with larger numbers of labor union families and/or African-American voters. According to research on national trends, Democrats have their strength in the urban areas, and Republicans have their strength in small cities and rural areas.³⁸ However, Oklahoma has an opposite pattern. It is in the metropolitan areas where the Republicans have made the greatest strength. Since 1992, the largest percentage of unopposed seats for the Republicans has come from the metropolitan areas of Oklahoma City and Tulsa. From a voting perspective, this pattern of unopposed seats, if it does accurately measure party strength, does not bode well for the Democrats. In the 1970s, Samuel Kirkpatrick, David Morgan, and Thomas Kielhorn wrote, "It will undoubtedly be increasingly difficult for any candidate for important statewide office to carry the state without winning in the Oklahoma City and Tulsa areas."39 This has been the case for statewide offices such as governor, lieutenant

governor and senator. Democrats have won statewide offices in the nineties when the Republicans have essentially vacated the office to them.⁴⁰

Is the unopposed seat an accurate measure of party strength? Individual districts can be misleading. In rural areas, the number of potential challengers may be limited, and unopposed incumbents may be determined by such non-political factors as the health of a potential candidate, the health status of a family member for a potential candidate, or the job status of a potential candidate. Bob Hudspeth, the chairman for the Republican Party in the 2nd district of Oklahoma, mentioned several individuals who had discussed the possibility of running for the legislature but could not because of their jobs or health. He mentioned that in many local races, fielding challengers had little to do with the political strength of the incumbent. In District 32, for example, incumbent Don Kinnamon had a scare in 1996, winning by less than five percent, yet he did not draw an opponent in 1998. These cases suggest that unopposed seats may have as much do with personal matters for potential candidates as political considerations. Certainly, party strength can be difficult to measure in the United States, where, as Leon Epstein has written, parties have little means of punishing candidates who go against the party.⁴¹ However, the two major parties in America make strategic decisions on which candidates to back and which ones to avoid. Of the adjustment made by parties in the last two decades, especially in the state legislative ranks, Anthony Gierzynski writes that parties "were found to target their resources, concentrating them in competitive races where they were needed the most."42

Keith McArtor, the Democratic chairman of Tulsa County, bears this strategy out for his own city. The strategy for Democrats in Tulsa, according to McArtor, was "to concentrate sources in areas where [we] can win." When asked if he would ever

discourage a candidate from running, he said that he would if a candidate would run for a position that a Democrat "just can't flat win." As a chairman of the minority party in his county, McArtor acknowledged that the Democrats "could not call the shots" in many districts throughout Tulsa. His best hope was that the moderate and conservative Republicans would split giving the Democrats a chance. If that scenario did not unfold, Democrats would be best served by not running. In some ways, Gordon Melson, the executive director for the Oklahoma Democrats, seconded McArtor's analogy. When asked what attributes he was looking for in a candidate for the state legislator, Melson replied, "Can the candidate win?" By contrast, Bob Hudspeth, on the Republican side, did not look at from a strategic perspective but thought more in terms of party representation. He stated that he would not discourage anyone from running who wanted to take on a Democratic incumbent. His goal was to make everyone, meaning Democratic incumbents, be challenged. However, Hudspeth gave no indication that challengers to strong Democratic incumbents would be getting financial support for their endeavors. Through these discussions with party leaders, we can see that the number of unopposed candidates, despite the idiosyncrasies of each race, is a good sign of party strength.

Having an unopposed candidate in a district may also signify the lack of a party nucleus for candidates. Schlesinger points out that a party nucleus "must offer voters reasons for supporting its candidates, its positions, or policies on issues that concern them."⁴³ Although it may be a realistic attitude at this time, the belief that Democrats cannot win in parts of Tulsa means that few candidates will run and those who do will not get party support. This leaves voters in these districts that want to support or may be inclined to support Democratic candidates with little incentive or opportunity to do so.

Without a party nucleus, Democratic potential candidates in Tulsa and Republican potential candidates in rural districts will have less initiative to take on the financial and personal burdens of candidacy. Through the interviews of Democratic and Republican leaders, it is apparent that Republicans want to develop a party nucleus in more legislative districts than Democrats do.

These conversations with party leaders signify the directions of the parties in Oklahoma. The Democrats are ceding the metropolitan areas to the Republicans, and the Republicans are making inroads in areas that have been Democratic strongholds. The year 2000 marks the closest number in recent history of unopposed candidates between the two parties, with sixteen for the Democrats and fourteen for the Republicans. However, some of the Republican incumbents who are being opposed are not challenged by a candidate from the Democratic party. The decrease in the number of unopposed candidates for the Republicans from 1998 to 2000 is misleading because four of the six Republicans who are from metropolitan areas are opposed from someone in their own party or from the Libertarian party but not Democrats. This is a further indication of the Democrats ceding urban areas to Republicans. Democrats could find very few challengers to face urban Republican incumbents as only two Republicans from Oklahoma City, Bill Graves and Tim Pope, were in the position of facing a challenger in 2000 after having run unopposed 1998. Thus the high profile election of 2000, a presidential election and an election that determined which party would redraw congressional district lines, seems to have little influence in attracting Democrats to challenge Republican incumbents in urban areas.

In the northeast, the region where most of the qualitative research for this study was conducted, the Republicans have made considerable gains. They had a net of four more challengers in 2000 than in 1998. Plus, the Republicans had Todd Hiett, the incumbent state representative from Creek County who was not challenged. Hiett was an unopposed incumbent for the Republicans in a traditional Democratic area. The lack of a challenge to Hiett from the Democrats, in a high-profile election year, signified the weakened state of the Oklahoma Democrats.

There is a need to make the distinction of unopposed and guaranteed seats. A guaranteed seat means that it is guaranteed for the *party* but not so much for the incumbent. To have a candidate run unopposed in only the general election but not the primary signifies the strength of the party and a weakness for the incumbent if there is an incumbent. To run unopposed in the primary but not in the general signifies a weakness of the party, and to a lesser degree, a weakness of the incumbent. To run unopposed in the primary and the general signifies the strength of both the party and the candidate in that district. Unopposed seats are the ultimate indication of the scare-off effect. This is the term Gary Cox and Scott Morgenstern deem as the ability of incumbents, primarily through fund-raising skills, but also casework and party support, to inhibit strong challengers from ever entering the race.⁴⁴ As we see in Oklahoma in many regions for both parties, no challenger enters the race. The most extreme example of the scare-off effect for Oklahoma occurred in House District 75 in Tulsa. In this district, Dennis Adkins filed for office in the open seat and was the only candidate to enter the race. This is the only example in 2000 to have a challenger scare-off all other intra-and inter-party challengers in an open seat, a powerful measure of party and candidate strength. A

guaranteed seat may mean that the opposition party is involved in some electioneering shenanigans by backing a candidate within the dominant party to challenge an incumbent from the dominant party. Keith McArtor intimated that sometimes this is all the minority party can do. When challengers take on incumbents, it may be nothing more than an act of self-delusion on part of the challenger. This especially may be the case of challengers who take on members of their own party, unless the incumbent has proven to be an embarrassment to enough voters in the district. However, it is an absolute certainty that any challenger has more of a chance in a race than no challenger.

Two other factors should be considered when one analyzes the pattern of unopposed candidates: elections that precede redistricting and elections that involve presidential candidates. The editorial page for the *Christian Science Monitor* points out how the number of the uncontested races or unopposed candidates in the Massachusetts state house was considerably higher in 1998 than in 2000, with the difference for this year being the state's redistricting that will occur in the 2001 legislative session.⁴⁵ The 2000 election is the last one held for the state house before redistricting will take place. Are other states similar to Massachusetts and have a decrease in the number of unchallenged seats in elections that precede redistricting years? Party leaders may encourage wavering incumbents to run again in these elections to help insure greater numerical strength for their party as congressional and legislative district lines are redrawn. It does appear to have some impact in Oklahoma. There was a drop-off in the number of unopposed candidates from 1988 to 1990. In 1988 Democrats had twenty-one unopposed candidates and fourteen in 1990, while Republicans had eleven unopposed candidates in 1988 and only five in 1990. There was also significant change between the

two parties from 1998 to 2000 in unopposed candidates. The Democrats went from twenty-eight unopposed candidates in 1998 to sixteen in 2000 for a drop-off of twelve unopposed candidates. The Republicans went from seventeen unopposed candidates in 1998 to fourteen candidates in 2000 for minimal drop-off of three unopposed candidates. To have such a small reduction in unopposed candidates for the Republicans gives further indication of their growing strength throughout the state.

When one incumbent was asked if he would draw an opponent in 2000 as opposed to years past when he had not, he replied that he would because it was a presidential year. Three of the incumbents interviewed had gone several elections unchallenged, but all three were challenged in 2000.

Do presidential years make a difference? Challengers may believe that the higher voter turnouts that usually occur in presidential elections may bring to the polls voters who are less inclined to vote for the incumbent, hence a stronger reason to challenge. In 1992, also the first election after redistricting, Democratic legislators doubled up their number of unopposed candidates from the election before, and so did the Republicans. This also was a year with a strong presidential campaign by Bill Clinton in the state of Oklahoma. Clinton's campaign in 1992 was the closest a Democrat candidate had gotten to victory in Oklahoma since Jimmy Carter 1976. In the presidential election of 1996, Democrats had only thirteen unopposed candidates, which was a thirteen-seat drop off from the mid-term election of 1994. Republicans in the same year had ten unopposed candidates in comparison with fifteen in 1994, leaving them with much smaller drop off of five seats. As noted with the redistricting years, the Republicans have a small drop off of only three unopposed seats from 1998 to 2000, while Democrats have the considerable

drop off of seats at twelve. These changes in unopposed seats for Democrats, which has been far greater in 1996 and 2000 than in other years, may reflect the one-sided nature of presidential politics in Oklahoma. This is a state that has carried for the Democrat only twice since 1948, in years 1948 for Truman and 1964 for Johnson. The support for the Republican candidate for president may give more Republican legislative candidates the sense of confidence they need in order to decide to run.

The incumbents who have gone unopposed believe the reason for success is their service to their districts. Thus, when opponents emerge against them, they accept that it has to do with presidential politics, redistricting, or the personal aspirations of a challenger rather than any fault of their own. Larry Adair, the speaker-elect for Democrats, has commented that he campaigns year-round. He constantly makes contacts in his district. He sends out congratulatory cards, birthday and wedding, which run to about three hundred a week. He takes nothing for granted and is always in attendance for local events. Adair does believe that his service to the district has been the main reason he does not draw a strong opponent and why he also has often gone unopposed. He sees his service and contact with constituents as a main difference between rural and urban representation. Constituents in rural areas, such as Adair's district in Adair County, rely on their legislators more than urban districts.

In Larry Rice's district, a rural and suburban area that makes up parts of Mayes and Wagoner Counties, the representative must find ways to provide services for suburban areas that have outgrown city government. Rice mentioned that he had to get a game ranger to work on animal control in parts of Broken Arrow, a suburb of Tulsa that had grown beyond the city limits. Rice, who had an opponent for the 2000 election, last

had an opponent in the 1988 election. He believes the key to his success is to be accessible, to make sure that he returns all phone calls and letters, and to be in campaign mode all the time. He attends family reunions in his district; he goes to office Christmas parties and to open houses.

Rick Littlefield also mentioned the importance of service to his district. In 2000, he and state Senator Gene Stipe are the only two Democratic state senators that went unopposed. He was often unopposed when he was a state representative. He believes he has been successful because of his visibility, "by keeping his nose clean and by returning calls." As a veteran lawmaker commented to him during Littlefield's early years in the legislature, "the day they don't call, that's the day you go home." Littlefield practices old-time politics and foregoes computerization. He uses his extra campaign funds not to develop a web page or issue ads but instead to spend on flowers for funerals and ads in high-school yearbooks. In rural districts legislators can continue the old style of politics. While Cox and Morgenstern may be correct that fundraising is the most important factor for incumbents to scare off quality challengers, it is, perhaps, the urban areas where fundraising is most effective. In the rural areas, service to constituents or "sweat equity politics" is how incumbents scare off challengers.

The "Hopeless" Candidates

In his book <u>Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United</u> <u>States Congress</u>, David Canon describes a "hopeless" candidate as an amateur who was swept into office by national partisan tides.⁴⁶ It is an interesting use of the negative word, hopeless, because the word describes a successful candidate, although the candidate may have had little to do with his or her own success. As noted earlier, challengers for state

legislature in Oklahoma have very limited success. Only one incumbent had lost in the 1998 legislative election. Statewide partisan tides, such as in 1994, seem to have little impact on state legislature races involving challengers. For this research, a "hopeless" candidate is exactly that, a candidate who has a minimal chance of winning. When one considers the problems facing challengers, the question political scientists should ask is not why there are so many unopposed candidates but why there are so many challengers who are still willing to try to unseat an incumbent. It is the quality of the challenger that makes a district race competitive. Robert Huckshorn and Robert Spencer illustrate the problems of challengers for the federal legislature, and many of their descriptions accurately describe the problems for state legislative challengers. They note that the districts are drawn to favor the incumbent, that the challenger may not fit in with his or her party's grand strategy, and that the incumbent knows the district far more than the challenger.⁴⁷ All of these factors are true, and it can be added, probably for all races, especially for rural state legislative elections, that the voters will know the incumbent far more than the challenger. With all of these disadvantages present, why would anyone run?

In <u>The Motivation of Politicians</u>, James Payne lists that most candidates for pubic office have a certain incentive for their endeavor. Payne claims that it is usually one incentive, not a mixture of incentives.⁴⁸ He developes five categories of incentives for politicians: status, the need for public recognition; program, the need to work on specific policy issues; conviviality, the need to please others; obligation, the need to follow one's conscience; game, the need to compete with others. Payne goes on to note that each candidate tends to behave in a manner consistent with his or her incentives.⁴⁹

Unlike Payne, Harold Lasswell has one category for politicians in Power and Personality. According to Lasswell, politicians are individuals who want power. Lasswell writes that the bases of power included, "well being, wealth, knowledge (enlightenment), proficiency of skill, social position (respect), affection, uprightness (rectitude)."⁵⁰ Some candidates for the state legislature, especially after a hard day of campaigning, may wonder if any of Lasswell's terms would apply to the position they are seeking. Lasswell also states that power "is expected to overcome low estimates of the self," which means that those who seek the power of public office are using this position as a way to overcome a shortfall in their esteem somewhere else.⁵¹ Lasswell later acknowledges, several years after Power and Personality, that "the pure power seeker has other outlets more satisfying than democratic politics."⁵² Indeed, when one considers the positions in American society that are far more authoritarian than an elected official, such as chief executive officer of a corporation (Lasswell regards this as the primary outlet for power), federal judges, and school superintendents, individuals seeking public office must have other incentives than power. Certainly, as Alan Rosenthal has described how one state legislator, from Oklahoma, acted on a constituent's complaint of high grass on the highway median by mowing the grass himself, it is hard to see this office as one for power-seekers.53

The category of hopeless candidates is a subjective one. For this research some individuals were in similar circumstances that made them appear to have little chance of winning. To begin with, they would represent the party that is in the minority. For northeastern Oklahoma, this would mean the Republican Party. Many of the districts never had a Republican State legislator. In addition, these individuals would have limited

amount of funds, less than ten thousand dollars, for example. They would have limited name recognition, especially as challengers, compared to better-known incumbents. They would also have a minimal campaign organization in place. This was often due to the lack of preparation time many put in to their campaigns. The most extreme case was the candidate who waited until the Friday before filing deadline, which ran starting on Monday July 10th until Wednesday July 12th, to decide on his candidacy. In another case, the candidate announced to me, in late May, that in fact he would be a candidate, but he had yet to tell his fellow business partner, who happened to be his wife. The lack of preparation, fundraising, and name recognition all work against the hopeless candidates' ability to run a good campaign and to be even in a position to win, which may occur in the rare case in which an incumbent would stumble. Since these candidates start late, perhaps because they have not thought through all the processes needed to run a campaign, they have less time to raise money. If they have little name recognition in the first place, they need more money to overcome this liability. Anthony Gierzynski writes that legislative party campaign committees make strategic decisions on campaign resources by "concentrating them in competitive races where they were needed the most."⁵⁴ One can picture Republican strategists in Oklahoma City marking out the names of these hopeless candidates as they map out a strategy for taking over the statehouse.

In <u>From Obscurity to Oblivion</u> Sandy Maisel writes of his own experience as a candidate for public office, that he and other politicians "tend to have an incredible ability to delude themselves."⁵⁵ That was the situation in some aspects of the campaign for many of the hopeless candidates. However, in some ways, the hopeless ones were very realistic. Those who were running against incumbents, which was all but one of

them, knew that it was extremely difficult to win. All were aware that the incumbent had built-in advantages. They noted that the incumbents did stay in touch with their districts and that many of their votes in the legislature were used to help them get reelected. One challenger even mentioned that the Democratic incumbent should get the vote of any government employee because he had voted for salary increases. Many of the challengers believed that the incumbent would be vulnerable on the issues, but they also acknowledged that issues, while they believed they should be, were not the most important factor for the voters. Although they would admit that an uphill climb was facing them, they clung to the idea that "anyone can be beaten." Indeed, even only one state representative incumbent's loss in 1998 proves to challengers that an incumbent can lose.

Hopeless candidates were most delusional not so much on the usual outcome for most challengers, which is a losing bid for office, but on the process needed to be a successful challenger, namely the ability to raise money. Incumbent Larry Roberts of Ottawa County commented that based on his knowledge from legislative campaign consultants, a rural campaign for the legislature would cost fifteen-thousand dollars, while an urban campaign could cost as much as fifty thousand dollars because of the money needed for direct mail. Democratic candidate James Wilson of Tahlequah, a political neophyte, managed to win his party's nomination in part because of a staggering amount of money spent for a rural race, a pledged amount of over eighty thousand dollars. Challengers in the hopeless category, perhaps knowing inherently that they cannot raise the money needed to run effectively, paper over the importance of campaign funding. Said one potential candidate who had determined to run in May but eventually

backed out because of a perceived lack of support from his party, "I think if a person visits with people it will not be that expensive." Several would say that they were campaigning on a "shoestring" budget and that they would be outspent considerably by the incumbents, but that would still not be the deciding factor because they would go and "meet the people." The reality is, for any candidate, that money is a deciding factor in the quest for office. A potential candidate, who eventually backed out for personal reasons but was certainly facing a daunting task if he had chosen to run, had attended a candidate workshop sponsored by the Oklahoma Republicans. At this workshop he had learned that no candidate who had been outspent by his opponent had won in 1998. He would have faced the incumbent Larry Adair, the speaker elect for Democrats, if he had decided to be a candidate.

However not all challengers are scared off by the money factor in modern day politics. Some find the motivation to persevere despite the disadvantages. While Lasswell's analysis of why people run for office has been disputed even by Lasswell himself, Payne's categorization has some relevance. It is still important to separate candidates, in this situation, into "hopeless" and "possible" categories. Stronger candidates run when there is a better possibility to win, such as a race against a weak incumbent or an open seat. These are candidates who can raise the necessary funds to be viable, have name recognition in the district, can be motivated to run because they can win the race. An optometrist, who wanted to run once an open seat became available, opined, "If I run, I want to win." Hopeless candidates are those who know the chances of victory are not nil but remote. Thus, some other motivations other than winning keep the hopeless candidate going. Of the five categories outlined by Payne, only two, program,

the need to work on specific policy, and obligation, the need to follow one's conscience, fit with the information I derived from my interviews. Although individuals may be reluctant to admit or even fail to recognize that the reason for running might fall under Payne's category of conviviality, the need to please others, all candidates may have, to some degree, the need to compete with others, Payne's game category. The three categories used to describe the hopeless candidates are taken from Payne's analysis and are combined with new ideas. The three categories are ideological motivations, policy motivations, and partisan motivations.

The hopeless candidates interviewed for this project that had an ideological motivation were conservatives or libertarians. When one such candidate was asked how his family felt about his running for the legislature, he replied, "They are happy that I am trying to prevent the continuous loss of our freedoms." He was a member of the patriot movement, which wants the government, in their view, to follow a strict interpretation of the constitution. He believed that the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments were power grabs by the federal government to bring all states under the control of congress. He stated that the 16th amendment was unconstitutional and that the Internal Revenue Service was an illegal government agency. Another found his race against the incumbent to be a battle between liberalism and conservatism. He stated that he was running for future generations. He wanted their freedoms and liberties to be protected. The one Libertarian interviewed certainly had an ideological motivation for running, but also a partisan motivation because he did want his party to be represented. He spoke of how he was sick of the two-party system, the "Republicrats," who imposed penalties on citizens for moral decisions and taxed forty-seven percent of the public's incomes. For the Libertarian

candidate, the only reason for having a government was to protect citizens against force and fraud. These are extremely ideological positions, which seems to motivate some individuals to make them run for office when facing tremendous odds against them. Unfortunately for them, most voters do not share their ideological positions. Nevertheless the fact that most voters do not share their ideology comes not as a surprise to the candidates. They feel that most voters are uninformed and unconcerned about their government and thus do not support them. This gives credence to the *congratulationrationalization effect* John Kingdon described over three decades ago. Kingdon wrote that winning candidates attributed their victories to their hard work, while losing candidates attributed their defeat to partisan disadvantages, lack of name recognition, or lack of resources.⁵⁶ The hopeless candidates with ideological motivations have another rationalization, which is the ignorance of the public.

Hopeless candidates with a policy motivation are concerned about one overriding policy. Many potential candidates have commented that if they run, they want not to prove a point but to win an election. In comparison, candidates motivated by policy want to win, but they want to prove a point as well. For one Republican candidate in a heavily outnumbered district, his motivation is to protect the scenic rivers of Oklahoma. He is a candidate that even his district chairman noted is "not as conservative as I would want him to be." Another candidate motivated by policy, a retired minister, is concerned with in his view the moral decline in the nation, noting that the government has taken God out of the schools. The policy in question may be enough to motivate individuals to accept the burden to run for office, but it may not be a policy that affects the voters' choice for state legislator. Malcolm Jewell notes that there is little empirical evidence on the impact of issues on state legislative campaigns.⁵⁷ The issue that has the most importance to a state legislative campaign is the status of the incumbent. Two of the incumbents interviewed had attained their offices by defeating incumbents themselves. In both cases, policy issues were not emphasized but instead the lack of responsiveness on the part of the incumbent, for one incumbent the embarrassing comments he made to a local newspaper. For the hopeless candidates, their concerns may be shared with many voters, but it is not part of the broad concerns many voters look for when voting for legislator, issues such as schools, crime, roads, and jobs.

Some hopeless candidates are motivated by party to run for office in order to give their party representation. This is similar to Payne's "obligation" category, the need to follow one's conscience. In this case the obligation is not just to one's self but to the party as well. It is the belief that an incumbent should not be given a free ride. This may not be enough of a motivation for many, as the unopposed candidate analysis suggests. Party strategists would like all opposition incumbents to be challenged. This causes the incumbent to spend money he or she would not want to do. It also causes the incumbent's party to spend money. Gierzynski writes that the majority party in the legislature tends to play defense, making sure all incumbents are protected before helping its party's challengers. ⁵⁸ Many hopeless candidate backed out of his race for state representative when he concluded that the Republican Party wanted him in the race primarily to get the incumbent to deplete his campaign war chest. This individual, a mayor of a small town and respected as a steward of the public's finances, believed such behavior was a waste of both time and money. Only one candidate interviewed would fit neatly in the category

of party motivation. For Republican challengers motivated by party, their campaigns quickly turn into a campaign against the institution of the legislature itself. When asked why he was running, this Republican candidate replied, "I had been gone from my county for thirty-five years, when I came back, not a damn thing had changed. The legislature is busy promoting itself. It sustains itself with political contributions. The legislature provides no economic freedom for my county, which is a wealth consumer, not a wealth generator." As in the case of the other two motivations, the party may be enough of a motivator for the individual to run, but it provides little incentive for the average voter to decide in its favor.

Some individuals would make references that would indicate that all three motivating factors had some influence on their candidacy. Usually, through the interview process, one motivating factor would emerge more than the other two. It appears that when a challenger is faced with overwhelming odds, the party is not as strong as motivating factor as ideology or policy can be. In all three cases, the positions of the hopeless candidates perpetuate their loss in the election. They find their own motivation, an extreme ideological stand, a singular policy, or a campaign against the very institution they hope to belong to, but it is their own motivation that works against them. Few voters find their positions as attractive ones when choosing a state legislator. Party leaders may appreciate hopeless candidates have no chance to win in part because of the very positions these candidates choose to run on.

The Influence of Political Parties on Candidate Emergence

There has been much discussion in political science on the current status of political parties in contemporary America. Far fewer Americans strongly support political parties, with more Americans registering to vote as independents or at least viewing themselves to be independents. This may mean that more Americans choose to go a nonpartisan route when participating in politics. In The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1996 Martin Wattenberg has a far gloomier analysis of the American electorate. Wattenberg believes more Americans are not becoming independents as part of a political trend but instead are independent because political parties "are considered less relevant in solving the most important domestic and foreign policy issues of the day."⁵⁹ This viewpoint is not shared by John Aldrich, who writes that the decline in party thesis is based on a weak premise, namely the decrease in the public's identification with the two major parties. Aldrich argues that the decline in party membership signifies that parties are changing from the mass party invented by President Van Buren, a "party in control" created to govern, to a "party in service" geared towards serving the candidate. He describes how parties are adaptable as they now confront a candidate-centered era.⁶⁰ In the candidate-centered environment, parties still have relevance, but only in terms of how they can help their candidates win elections. Once the election is over, parties are not in the position to govern. In other words, parties would not be in a position to tell elected officials how to vote or what strategy the legislative caucuses should take on a particular policy. David Menefee-Libey takes a middle tact between Aldrich and Wattenberg on the relevance of parties. He describes contemporary American politics as campaign-centered. In this environment, the focal point of electioneering falls to the

"transient mediators and coordinators of campaign-centered politics."⁶¹ The role of the parties would be to arrange or coordinate with candidates and their "handlers," the pollsters, consultants, and media gurus, who approach a campaign the same way an advertising firm approaches cereal or tires, sell the product and move on.

Perhaps the best way to analyze political parties today is not to apply their relevance to the public as a whole, but to the voting public. This group, unfortunately, is a much smaller one than it was thirty years ago. Warren Miller and J. Merrill Shanks describe what has happened to the American voters since the 1960s: "From the early 1960s to the 1980s there was a gradual replacement of the habitual voters of the pre-New Deal generations with the non-voting, post-New Deal cohorts that produced the thirtyyear national decline in aggregate voter turnout."⁶² To those Americans who continue to vote, the party still is important. Miller and Shanks purport, "There is no indication that in any recent election party identification [was] less relevant to the vote decision ... than it was three decades earlier."⁶³ As Larry Sabato writes on the importance of partisanship, "a voter's partisan identification acts as an invaluable filter for information, a perceptual screen that affects how they digest the political news that manages to reach them."64 Sabato also suggests that a number of voters still use the parties to simplify their decision making process and see politics through their party's point of view. Those who still belong to a party may be more willing to support the political system. This may indicate the fall out from the political system that is occurring among independents that Wattenberg has described. It is also evident in The Confidence Gap, where Martin Lipset and William Schneider note that Democrats and Republicans have greater confidence in America than Independents.65

For those running for the state legislature, support from a political party is still necessary. While candidates may not emphasize party, it is assumed that party members will support their party most of the time if elected. As Sarah Morehouse points out, "party voting is the strongest determinant in state legislatures."⁶⁶ Jim Burdge, a longtime political activist and consultant for Republicans in Tulsa, put the role of parties succinctly by stating, "The first vote for all legislators is a partisan vote, the vote for speaker." Perhaps this quote slices through the debate on the relevance of parties more than anything else: as long as the leadership in the legislature is decided through partisanship, parties always will be relevant.

While political parties are important to candidates for the state legislature, as this research documents, parties have little influence on the primary focus of candidate emergence, which is the decision to run. No one had the experience that Lou Martin, a Sapulpa city councilman who decided to be the Republican challenger against his Democratic incumbent legislator, had when he made the decision to run. He mentioned that he was approached by the Republican Party, and that was what "lit the wick." Once Steve Edwards, the state Republican chairman talked to him, Martin was on his way to candidate class, where he got "pumped up." This is as close as any potential candidate got to claim that he or she was recruited. Even Martin, who was contacted first by the Republican Party, concluded that he "finally decided I have to do it myself." Parties seem not to recruit candidates for the legislature but at best to encourage those to run who show an interest. Almost all individuals who decided to run for the legislature made their decision first and then contacted the party. One candidate remarked that he did not contact his party before making the decision because he "did not want to be talked out of

it." Another candidate commented that his "inner voice [told him] this is the time to run." The frankest statement on deciding to run came from a candidate with little chance of winning according to his own assessment. He said, "I got tired of myself bitching and wanted to do something on my own." The responses of these candidates complement the research by Thomas Kazee on congressional candidates. From his research, Kazee determines that most candidates are " 'self-starters' who received little or no formal party encouragement."⁶⁷ When asked about the role of the party in their decision to run, most replied in a similar way as the retired minister, who decided to run at age sixty-five against an incumbent, "My decision came on my own." His statement seems to suggest that he did not want anyone else to share the burden of deciding to run. Some would say that they made their decision without really talking to anyone. This fits with the conclusion made by Paul Herrnson that the decision to run for office is "extremely personal."⁶⁸

An interesting dynamic in this research on party influence has been the response of the few potential candidates who were actually contacted first by their party. Of the four in that category, all four are Republicans, and only one, Lou Martin, decided to run. The other three were encouraged by some of the top leaders of their party. Second district officials and state officials would contact them. One prospective candidate, a former mayor and local businessman who had been a prominent Reagan supporter when he lived in Colorado, was personally recruited by Governor Keating. Three of the four had been involved in their city government, two of them mayors, and the other had been a county official for his party. Party recruitment did not have much effect on their decision. These individuals are in districts where Republicans have had little success, and also they would

have had to take on an incumbent. It indicates that the Republicans are more active in encouraging candidacy and do want candidates to run even in areas where their chances of success are not very high. It also signifies that the decision to run cannot be based on party persuasion; the decision must come from within.

Encouragement from party leaders to potential candidates rather than recruitment of potential candidates is the best way to describe how parties increase their number of candidates. It may seem like only semantics to discern a difference between "encouragement" and "recruitment," but the words suggest a matter of intensity, with the word encouragement being less intensive. However, those who choose to run against an incumbent from their own party will almost always receive very little encouragement from the party. In most cases, this should be expected, but a challenger may run against an incumbent because the incumbent is electorally weak. In this situation, party officials may be working behind the scenes to get the incumbent out of the race. This seemed to be what happened in District 15 when incumbent Bobby Frame decided not to run after four challengers had filed.

Parties may also, occasionally, persuade challengers not to run. Of all the candidates interviewed, only one potential candidate stated that he got out of the race because he was discouraged by his party. The potential candidate, a blue-collar worker and Republican who wanted to take on a Democratic incumbent, was called a week before the filing deadline by a county official of the party and told not to run because he did not have a chance to win. Despite such discouragement, he plans to run in 2002, but more likely as an independent. Another Republican candidate who did decide to run realized once she was in the race that she would not get support from her party. She

believed the reason for the lack of support was her views for abortion rights given during a question and answer session she had with party leaders. She could not prove that this was the reason, but she noticed that other Republicans who were also facing incumbents in northeastern Oklahoma did receive financial assistance from the party. It is true that political parties have little means to block an individual or a group from using their label. This puts parties in a status Leon Epstein views as "institutionalized porousness."⁶⁹ However, parties can, as these cases describe, still make a campaign difficult for those who choose to run on their label without the blessing of the party.

The encouragement a party may give its candidates tends to come after an individual has made a private decision to run. Do parties give anything more than a pat on the back to their candidates? As with so many things that deal with politics, the answer is, "That depends." Allen Harder, a Democratic Party and labor activist, mentioned of the role of parties, "It is a misconception of the assistance it gives you. The party can give you names of people who can donate." Democratic incumbents did not receive much financial assistance from the party, but instead relied heavily on political action committees within the legislature, House PAC, for example. Assistance from House PAC is also available for non-incumbent Democrats who are running in open seats or against Republican incumbents. A few Republican candidates suggested that they would get financial help directly from their party. One Republican candidate from the Tulsa suburbs commented that Republican leadership did have some expectations that had to be met before he received financial support. On his first bid for the state legislature in 1998, no financial support came from the party until there were some positive poll numbers, and then he got substantial support. Another Republican candidate running in

an open seat and in a rural district stated that if he could raise twenty thousand dollars on his own, then the party would consider his campaign a targeted district. Based on the interviews with potential candidates, there is strong indication that both parties do make strategic decisions and contribute, as Gierzynski writes, "to races that appear to be competitive."⁷⁰ Thus party activity does have an important influence on candidate emergence. The individuals that had been active in their parties, with their attendance in local meetings and their status as officers, had contact with party officials and had access to fundraising. Also, these individuals were more prepared to run a strong campaign when their district was most conducive for victory, an open seat or a vulnerable incumbent. In general party activists are more likely to wait for the appropriate time to run for office. Individuals who have not been party activists may then run against strong incumbents and become, in other words, "hopeless" candidates with little help from their parties. Political parties make strategic choices with their contributions, but these choices are also rewards to party activists, because the candidates who are in competitive races most often tend to be party activists.

On the issue of party support, research has determined that Republican state party organizations provide more assistance than their counterparts.⁷¹ However, my interviews with potential candidates suggest that the Democrats may be catching up, at least in the state of Oklahoma, in providing services. Democrats also put on workshops as do Republicans. What gives Republican candidates for the state legislature a tremendous boost is the fundraising ability of the U.S. Congressmen and Senators. Republican candidates in open seats mentioned that they planned to have fundraisers by Senator Nickles and Representative Largent in their districts and also direct contributions from

these members of congress. For Democrats, research by the authors of Party

<u>Organizations in American Politics</u> has found that they have stronger organizations in the states in which they have had limited success and weaker organizations in the states where they have been successful.⁷² Oklahoma is in a hybrid category for Democrats in terms of success. It has been a disaster for Democrats in federal offices. Oklahoma was, for part of the 1990s, the largest state with no Democratic representatives in its congressional delegation, yet it has had a Democratic state legislature for all but two years in its history. The Oklahoma legislature has been the Democratic Party organization. This is advantageous for incumbents as well as for challengers in traditional Democratic districts, but it does not help candidates in weak areas for the party or candidates in other races than the legislature.

How much impact the party has on a campaign may be overstated or understated, depending on the viewpoint of the individual. When potential candidates were asked, "Which of these three factors, party label, the issues of the campaign, or personal characteristics of the candidate, do you believe has the most impact on voters when they make their voting decision?" most Republicans who had lost or had decided not to run answered that the party label was most important. Most Republicans who had decided to run would usually answer that they hoped it was the issues or personal characteristics. In comparison, incumbents would usually state that it was personal characteristics, which meant working hard and representing their districts. Democratic candidates would rarely answer party as the most important, but would acknowledge in rural Oklahoma that it was an advantage. The responses were highly indicative of Kingdon's congratulationrationalization effect.

Party support may have little influence on some candidates. Those candidates who have little support must have other advantages that make them viable in a campaign. The best example of this would be state legislator John Ostrander of the Tulsa suburb of Owasso. Ostrander, a Democrat, has never attended a Democratic state convention and has only once attended a county convention. He has been openly critical of his party on issues such as gun control, gay rights, and abortion rights. Yet Ostrander knows that the Democratic party would not challenge him because were he to lose, the district would go Republican and would be hard for the Democrats to take it back. He talked of the freedom that gave him to pick and choose when to back the party, even to the point of voting against an education bill sponsored by his own house speaker. His support was from business groups, labor groups, and even the National Rifle Association, and leniency from his own party, which would rather have him on its side some of the time than to lose the seat. Oddly enough, the advantage for Ostrander is his competitive district, which allows him to be independent of his party without an intra-party challenge. For candidate Jim Wilson of Tahlequah, who had never been involved with the Democratic Party, support from the party was not his concern when he decided to run. After he had announced his candidacy, he faxed the announcement to the state party headquarters. That was the party's first introduction to this candidate. Once he won the nomination, he believed, support from the party would come his way because his district was traditionally Democratic. He has been able to be successful without party support because of his use of the media, which was enhanced by the large amount of money spent on his campaign. Wilson's candidacy is common in the fact that it was a personal choice,

but his candidacy is also unique in the fact that he has been a strong candidate who had no contact with his party before his candidacy.

The Human Element of Campaigning

As a political scientist and practitioner of politics, Sandy Maisel decided to run for congress in Maine. Maisel focused on using government to strengthen families. As he continued to campaign for families, he was away more from his own family. He surmised that the values he idealized were not those he lived while serving as a politician. Maisel concluded, "it is nearly impossible for one who really cares about his or her family to seek high public office and to serve."⁷³

While service in the Oklahoma legislature does not involve the separation or stress on the family that comes with U.S. congress, state legislators are away from their families and must devote considerable time to the legislature. Most potential candidates are aware of the impact serving in the legislature will have on their families as well as their families' incomes. Although the Oklahoma legislature has been criticized by Republican State party chair Steve Edwards as "the highest paid part-time legislature in the country," the regular legislative sessions preclude most individuals from maintaining their regular jobs and also serving in the legislature. The legislature is in session each year from February to May, and in special sessions in any other time of the year. As the legislature can call itself into special session with a petition signed by two-thirds of the membership.⁷⁴ This means legislators may be at the capitol several times throughout the year. Some legislators, however, are able to maintain their previous jobs while serving in the legislature. Those are usually legislators with occupations that can allow for flexible

working hours. The demands of a candidacy on family and career influence the decision to run. These factors are the human element of a potential candidacy.

The young candidates, those under thirty, all decided that running for office now was the time not only because of the political situation in their district but also because of their own family situations. This also means that as young people want to start a family on their own, such a situation may prevent their candidacy from happening. Thus, although they see their single status as an advantage for campaigning, it hurts their own personal lives when starting a family. In addition, the image of those who are single and running for the legislature is not always positive as many of these candidates noted that some voters wanted a family person to be their legislator. As one single candidate remarked, "The best case scenario is to have two kids and a wife."

For those with families, the age of the children is also a serious factor to consider before running. A few of the candidates did have young children, but one who did believed that the time to run was when the children were as young as his, ages one and three. He concluded that if he won his state legislative bid, he could build up experience and run for the U.S. congress in the future, but he would wait for that office until his children were in high school, because this plan was the best way to help his family and his political career.

Although the evidence suggests that choosing to run is a personal decision made by the individual, most potential candidates stated that their families did have veto power over their decision. Many would emphasize that they could not be candidates without family support. The concerns families would have regarding a candidacy most often dealt with time. Children and spouses were apprehensive about the time their loved ones would

have to spend campaigning. Some would try to alleviate that concern by making the campaign a family event, by using their family members as campaign workers. Others in this situation would use an opposite tact and want their family completely separated from the campaign. The idea would be that the family would serve as a refuge from politics and enable the candidate not to bring politics home. According to this belief, one spouse member can manage the campaign and the other can manage the household, but the two should not be mixed. Most candidates conclude that the best way to manage family life and a campaign is to either campaign before there is a family or wait until the children have grown.

Time away from home was not the only concern family members had. Some family members did not want someone they cared about involved in the "dirty" world of politics. This may especially be a concern in districts with small towns and rural areas, where a "whispering campaign"⁷⁵ could be devastating to the individual and to his or her family. This is a campaign where a rumor is spread through the churches, stores, and schools of a community. It may even be carried in a more blatant way, as one candidate, who ultimately decided not to run again after the negative attacks carried out against him in his first race, stated that campaign workers of his opponent went door to door and made claims against him. Interestingly, the potential candidates who either believed a negative campaign like this would occur or believed that it had occurred were usually single. They believed that their marital status was a weakness in their campaign. This may be another example of Kindon's congratulation-rationalization effect because not all single people are rejected by the voters. Therefore, it may be that unmarried candidates who lost overemphasize the importance of their single status.

The burden on the family is a real dilemma for potential candidates. The stress on the family may be an overused excuse for those who decide not to run, but stress exists nonetheless. When asked "What personal sacrifices have you made while running for the state legislature?," most answered that it had been time and money, yet one legislator remarked that it had cost him his first marriage. Because it can be that stressful, most candidates do not run without family support.

While family support is needed for both male and female candidates, women who choose to run may face additional burdens. The Oklahoma legislature has not been an institution for many women to make political gains. Women make up roughly ten percent of membership in the legislature. Only the state of Alabama has a lower percentage.⁷⁶ Because their numbers are so low many women legislators in Oklahoma may sense that they are subject to greater scrutiny than their male counterparts.⁷⁷ The additional scrutiny may first occur when a woman becomes a candidate for the legislature. Of the thirty-nine potential candidates interviewed, only four were women. Two of the women candidates were neutral on the question of whether gender helped or hurt their candidacy. However, first-time candidate Liz Nottingham did believe that being a woman had some impact on her candidacy. According to her, voters make assumptions about a candidate based on their party and gender. Nottingham remarked, "some assumptions are not positive, some people think that you are not as tough on crime or as supportive on labor." Unlike men candidates, Nottingham noted that women candidates might not be able to campaign in the personalized way that is usually expected in rural Oklahoma. "If a male candidate goes into a coffee shop at seven in the morning and jokes around," Nottingham observed, "he is being one of the guys. But, if a woman candidate went to the shop at seven, is she

being a candidate or being a flirt?" Perhaps it is not just gender but the combination of gender and age that puts some women candidates at a disadvantage. Nottingham is thirty-four, which may have been unsettling to some older voters. In contrast, Barbara Staggs, a legislator from Muskogee, actually finds that being a woman works to her advantage. When first elected in 1994, Staggs defeated an incumbent. She was able to win, she believes, because the voters were tired of the "good old boys" and because a first-time woman candidate could not be accused of belonging to the same clique. She thinks her gender and age (fifty-nine) work for her in conservative rural Oklahoma because "rednecks like their mama, and white haired ladies remind them of their mamas." Even though Staggs finds a benefit from her age and gender, she also acknowledges the difficulty younger women may have. She has said that were her two sons still young and at home, it is doubtful she would have run for office. The need to take care of children and postpone candidacy until the children are raised is probably a greater issue for women potential candidates than for men, and thus it may explain why so few women campaign for the legislature.

The occupation of a potential candidate also could have an impact on the decision to run and even how a campaign would be conducted. In <u>White Collar: the American</u> <u>Middle Classes</u>, C. Wright Mills notes that attorneys seek the legislature as a way to advertise and gain name recognition for their law practices.⁷⁸ Through the interviews for this research, none of the candidates remarked that they were running for office in order to help their careers. There were comments from some that the way they presented themselves in their campaigns would have a positive effect, win or lose, on their businesses. One young lawyer hinted such when he stated that his candidacy would not

hurt his law practice unless "he became a jerk in the papers." Another potential candidate, a restaurateur, stated that his business was a character business, implying that his reputation is what made people come back to his restaurant. He made sure in his first campaign that whether he won or lost, which he lost, his reputation would not be harmed as a result of how he conducted himself on the campaign trail.

Some candidates who had run and had lost in the past did incur losses in their businesses. These individuals, like most who run for the state legislature, were in a service-related business. One individual who runs a pool-cleaning service lost business, not because of his political loss, but because he could not do his job during the summer campaigning. Thus he lost clients. Another candidate, who decided to run in 2000 despite his loss in the last campaign, had fewer clients for his heating and air-conditioner business. He had taken on a popular candidate, and he believes some people resented his candidacy.

Few candidates who had never run before considered that their candidacy would hurt their businesses. For those who thought otherwise, it made their candidacy all the more intense. Jim Wilson, the computer storeowner from Tahlequah, who had never been involved in politics, commented that his candidacy was a "big risk," which he could not afford to lose. This explains why Wilson spent so much money for his candidacy. Another candidate noted that it was a risk to lose because of her profession. As a person who runs a public relations business, she noted that her ability to advertise her skills would be curtailed if she could not get herself elected.

Most individuals who were candidates or were considering a candidacy reasoned that it would not help or hurt their careers. This may have been a case of overconfident

people deluding themselves, as Maisel has cited. But for most people interviewed, it was the reality of the situation because they were either too young to have established a career or had retired from one career and were healthy enough to seek another. Incumbents did see somewhat of a negative impact on their other careers once they got involved in politics. Despite the complaints from some observers towards the pay for legislators in Oklahoma (roughly 38,000 a year) many incumbents noted that they took a cut in pay to serve in the legislature, because they had to give up their jobs, such as the ones who came from the education field, or had to cutback on their business endeavors.

The Ultimate Decision for Candidacy

From the previous sections of this chapter, the focus has been on the elements that influence an individual's decision to run for the legislature. This section provides a brief description of reasons that prove to be the final turning point on candidacy. Ambition has been portrayed as the overriding reason for candidacy in the House of Representatives.⁷⁹ One can argue that nearly all candidates must have a personal motivation that makes them want to run. However, based on the responses below, personal ambition was not the most frequent reason given for candidacy. It could be that most individuals would not want to reveal that much of their personality to a researcher. It also could be that the strength of the incumbent overwhelms the personal ambition of candidates. Clearly, the status of the incumbent was on the mind of most participants. The following table is a review of the circumstances that made some individuals become candidates as well as the reasons that made others reject a chance at candidacy.

Incumbents	Why did you run? (first campaign)
Phil Ostrander*	The incumbent was unresponsive to firefighter issues.
Rick Littlefield	The resignation of the incumbent made the district an open seat.
Larry Roberts	It was an open seat.
Joe Eddins	I thought we needed better representation.
Larry Adair	It was an open seat as a result of reapportionment and I thought I could make a difference.
Tad Jones	The incumbent stepped down and it was a good year to run. I would have run even against the incumbent in order to get name recognition.
Larry Rice	As a city councilman, I had an interest in the legislature. The legislature had a direct impact on the city. I ran because I thought I could do a better job than the incumbent.
Barbara Staggs	In 1994, I thought the timing was right because I thought the incumbent was going to retire (the incumbent, John Monks, did run again, but lost to Staggs in the primary).
*Ostrander lost his reelection bid in 2000.	
<u>Challengers</u>	Why did you run?
Lou Martin	The partisan bickering. Frank Keating will still be governor after the 2000 election and the GOP may have the majority.
Allen Harder	Bill Settle's decision to run for the 2 nd district congressional seat.
Shelby Satterfield	I just wasn't finished. I got beat last time in a non-presidential year (1998). More voters may turn out this time.

Table 1. Synopsis of Reasons for Candidacy

Joe Johnson	I've always wanted to do it. If Joe (Eddins, the incumbent) did not have his six years in, which locks in his retirement, then I would not have run.
Joe Peters	There is no change from the years that I've been gone from this area (roughly thirty-five years). Not a damn thing has changed because the legislature is too busy promoting itself.
Jim Wilson**	Governmental incompetence which has lost revenue for the state. We continue to lose jobs in this state. Also, having an open seat was important.
Ray Miller	Representative Frame got a second DUI, in which he rear-ended a car in Oklahoma City. Frame also got into a heated argument with GOP chairman Steve Edwards. Mike Mass, the Democratic chairman, was concerned this seat could go Republican. I think this is an opportunity to make a difference and that is not some political BS.
Lela Foley Davis	It's an open seat.
Wayne Ryals	For three reasons: 1) the legislation concerning education 2) the legislation concerning the department of corrections 3) health care at the state level.
Ed Brocksmith	Disappointment with the leadership of the incumbent on the protection of the Illinois river.
Russell Turner	The taxes in Oklahoma are too high. The legislature implements "user fees" instead of taxes, which is nothing more than "shell game politics."
Curt Working	An opportunity that I might make a difference.
Liz Nottingham	My family is in good shape financially. There is no incumbent Democrat. Democratic registration outnumbers Republican registration in my district.
Stuart Ericson**	It's an open seat. I want to do it and I have people to help me. With an open seat I have a chance to win. I can get crossover Democrats to vote for me and this presidential election will help Republicans.

Albro Daniel	I wanted to get on the ballot. We needed to get some people to run. I'm sick of the two-party system (Daniel is a Libertarian).	
John Smaligo**	The same desire to make the state a better place and the fact that I got so close in 1998.	
Julian Coombs	An inner voice saying this is the time to run. It is the same feeling I had when I ran for the board of trustees.	
Dal Newberry	My inner belief—my age (65) or work (minister) had nothing to do with it.	
** Denotes challengers who were ele	ected in 2000.	
Non-candidates	Why did you not run?	
Carolyn Allen	Based on my previous candidacy, I do not think I would get support from the state Republican party.	
Mark Mann	I do not think I would have a chance to win against the incumbent.	
John Handshy	Did not have time to run this year.	
Paul Landers	I do not believe that the Lord wanted me to do that this time (Mr. Landers ran previously based on his belief that God wanted him to be a candidate).	
Michael Dill	My job is too demanding.	
Doyle Seawright	Not enough Republicans in the county to get me elected.	
Tex Slyman	It is not an open seat. If I could not defeat the incumbent last time, why could I win this time?	
Don Childers	I am waiting for the incumbent to retire.	
Keith Armstrong	I wanted to run, but there was no support from the local Republican party.	

David Hampton	To run against the incumbent (Larry Adair) I would need to raise 100,000 dollars. Party officials have told me I would need to raise that amount or I could not win.
Anonymous	I need to build my law practice. I don't have anything else to fall back on.
Greg Gatz	The county's election board put me in the wrong district.
Clark McQuigg	I do not want to take on an incumbent and also I do not want to leave my business in the lurch.

See appendix D for interview schedule.

While Fowler and McClure emphasize the importance of individual ambition for those who become candidates, they conclude that the status of the incumbent often determine the number of candidates in a congressional race as well as the quality of candidates.⁸⁰ Indeed, for this study most candidates for the legislature regarded the status of the incumbent as the most important reason for their candidacy. For the incumbents interviewed, all initially decided to run either because there was no incumbent, an open seat, or because the incumbent, in their view, was doing a poor job. For the challengers, the status of the incumbent was a major reason, but also other factors were mentioned. The perceived strength of their political party also gave some challengers incentives run. Some challengers considered the past election a good year for their party, and others viewed their district as conducive for their party. Only one challenger explained his candidacy in "party building" terms. Albro Daniel, the Libertarian, did approach his candidacy as a way to get his party recognition.

As found in Jewell's research that notes the absence of policy issues in legislative campaigns, very few challengers mentioned policy as a reason for candidacy. Also, none of the incumbents mentioned policy specifically. While personal ambition can be the only way to describe the reason for candidacy among some of the challengers, it is evident from most challengers and all incumbents interviewed that most understand the limitations of ambition. The status of the incumbent, the perceived strength of party, and to a much lesser degree policy issues, must be taken into consideration in conjunction with personal ambition, before most individuals are willing to become candidates.

Statements made by those who decided against candidacy reflect the same reasons as those who did become candidates. Only for these individuals, the incumbent is too strong or their party is too weak. Among the reasons given by non-candidates is also some introspection. Based on their own experiences, many knew the difficulties of campaigning, while others recognized through their jobs or their own personal desires that the devotion needed for a candidacy did not exist. Personal ambition may not always be the resolving factor for candidacy, but the statements made by those who decided against candidacy remind us that it can never be discounted.

This chapter has illustrated the various factors that go into making a decision to run for the state legislature. Each potential candidate has his or her own unique story to tell, which is what qualitative research tries to bring out. Even with the distinctiveness of each potential candidate, similar patterns for some cause the need for categorization. As a result of these categories, we can determine who is more likely to run and who among those is more likely to be successful. By determining who does run for the state legislature and why they run makes it possible to discern the importance candidate emergence has on shaping a political institution. An evaluation of candidate emergence on the Oklahoma State legislature from election 2000 will be explored in the next chapter.

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Chapter Four: An Evaluation of Candidate Emergence from Election 2000

A decision to be a candidate is based on faith. For candidates, there must be faith in their parties, in the political climate, and ultimately in their own ability as a campaigner. In the 2000 election for the Oklahoma state legislature, Republican candidates had an overall greater faith in their party and in their own candidacies than their Democratic counterparts. Many of the Republican potential candidates interviewed for this research had a firm belief that the 2000 election was the year to run. Republican candidate Lou Martin decided in part to run precisely because it looked to be a good year for his party. Commenting on the presidential race, Martin said, "I do not know if coattails will help, but if they do, then this is the year. There are many things helping Republicans this year at this time." Martin referred to the popularity of the Republican presidential candidate George Bush and the popularity of the state's Republican governor Frank Keating. Ultimately coattails, the popularity of a candidate on the top of the ticket, which would help candidates of the same party throughout the rest of the ticket, was not enough to help Martin win his district, although there was a great deal of support for the Republican presidential ticket. Bush received a higher percentage of the vote in Oklahoma than what he received in his own home state of Texas. In Creek county, Martin's home county, Bush carried, but so did Democratic congressional candidate, Brad Carson. Martin's own election was not close as he lost to incumbent Mike Tyler by more than two-thousand votes in a race that had eleven thousand votes casts. Even while foreseeing the possibility of losing, which he did during the spring when he made his decision to run, Martin remained undaunted as he planned to run again in 2002.

Martin will be comforted by the fact that three Republicans who had lost their previous bid for the legislature in 1998 won in 2000. Republican state chair likened the success of these three candidates to another type of race: "It's like running your first stock car race, a lot of people don't win the first time, but they get to know the track." John Smaligo, one of the candidates interviewed for this research, was one of the candidates who was victorious in this second bid, along with Sue Tibbs of Tulsa and Mike O'Neal of Enid. All three candidates defeated incumbents who had previously defeated them. Also all three of these candidates come from urban or suburban areas. Smaligo noted the advantage he thought his suburban district gave him. In 1998 he got forty-nine percent of the vote and lost by four-hundred-and-thirty votes total in his district of Owasso, a bedroom community north of Tulsa. Smaligo was also well-known in his district from his past campaign and from his father's campaigns in the same district. From party registration since the 1998 election, Smaligo mentioned that the total vote difference from two years ago was now made up with more registered Republicans in his district. The registration change most likely did not come from old residents changing parties but from new residents from Tulsa or from out of state who were already registered Republicans. During the time between the elections Smaligo remained active in Republican politics, maintaining ties with Rogers and Tulsa county Republican activists. This connection and his narrowness of his loss made him a viable contender for party contributors to consider when investing campaign funds. The Republican party also may have rewarded with support early by persuading a potential Republican opponent to forego a race for the legislature and run for the city council instead. Smaligo had no primary to deal with and had over forty thousand dollars to spend on the general

campaign. It cannot be discounted that Smaligo, a young man age twenty-four and unmarried, had the time and energy to campaign and prepare for another race. The human element of campaigning worked in Smaligo's favor.

There are many lessons to be learned from 2000 election in Oklahoma, especially from the race between Republican John Smaligo, the challenger, and Democratic incumbent Phil Ostrander. First, being a conservative Democrat does not trump all other competitors in every district throughout the state. As explained in chapter three, Ostrander was one of the most conservative Democrats in what is already a conservative Democratic legislature. Ostrander was supported by the National Rifle Association, was adamantly opposed to all forms of abortion, and did not support any form of gay rights. He was the picture image of the conservative Democrat who was on the correct side, as far as conservatives were concerned, on the issues of God, gays, and guns. Despite his positions, or maybe because of it, Ostrander lost a close election, losing to Smaligo by nearly three hundred votes with over fourteen thousand votes casts. While Ostrander may have continued to receive support from legislative PACs that support Democrats, he may have offended rank and file Democrats with his overtly conservative responses. Ostrander believed that the party had to back him because they could not afford to have him lose. This way of strategizing may work for politicos, but it may not work for typical partisan voters.

Second, presidential coattails do occur and may have considerable impact on state legislative races. James Campbell suggests that short-term forces, such as a presidential race, will "fill the information void of the state legislative decision."² With most voters investing little time on state legislative campaigns, voting along party lines from their

presidential choice seems logical. Coattails, of course, may not assist all candidates to the same degree. Bush's candidacy not only helped Smaligo to victory but also two other Republican challengers who won their second time out. For all three, the presidential election with a popular Republican candidate on the ballot meant that there would be more Republican voters than in a mid-term election. It also should be noted that these three candidates won in areas that lacked a competitive congressional race. Campbell also observes that the absence of disheartened partisan voters is a factor as well as the presence of encouraged ones.³ Democrats, in most parts of the state, had no assistance from the top of the ticket with their candidate Al Gore, who discounted the state of Oklahoma early in the presidential race, and they also received little support from congressional races.

In the third district, Democrats had no opponent against Republican congressional incumbent Wes Watkins. In congressional districts one, four, five, and six, Democrats polled an average thirty-two percent of the vote. This meant that most Democratic congressional candidates did not bring out partisan voters and consequently did not help their party's legislative candidates. The poor campaigns of Democratic candidates in most congressional races for Oklahoma support Campbell's assertion that a presidential election can determine whether quality challengers enter a congressional race.⁴ Compared with the other five congressional districts, Democratic candidates for the state legislature in northeastern Oklahoma had a successful candidate in their ranks for the second congressional district, Brad Carson. His total of the vote was surprisingly strong as he even carried Republican Andy Ewing's home county of Muskogee county. The Democratic presidential candidate also had his best results in northeastern Oklahoma,

carrying six counties in the area. However, the success of Gore and Carson in the county was not enough for Allen Harder, the Democratic candidate for the legislature in Muskogee county. He lost despite having Gore and Carson carry the county. This brings us to the third lesson: the importance of the individual candidate.

Harder lost to Stuart Ericson, a thirty-year-old lawyer who had planned on running for the second congressional district but backed out once the party leaders pledged support for Andy Ewing. Ericson transferred his enthusiasm for a campaign and also his party contacts to his race for the state legislature once the district became an open seat with legislator Bill Settle's running for congress. Like Smaligo, Ericson also used his contacts within the party leadership to dissuade other potential Republican candidates from entering the race. Unlike Smaligo, Ericson personally confronted potential opponents and won them over to his side. Both Smaligo and Ericson are young and forward-thinking politicians, which means that both understand that eliminating as much competition as possible is the best way to position oneself for winning an election. Smaligo had the personal drive to never end his campaign. Ericson was undeterred by the partisan disadvantage he had and was able to get enough ticket splitters to win a race that Democrats thought belonged to them.

Ericson's candidacy signifies the importance of individual candidates because of two important aspects of his campaign. First, Ericson managed to avoid a primary by getting potential competitors to drop out; secondly, he convinced contributors that he could win, thus making his candidacy a self-fulfilling prophecy. Both young Republicans won their races because they reflected the growing confidence Republicans had in the state of Oklahoma. Confidence became contagious, as it led other Republicans to believe

they could win too, and the faith among Republican potential candidates compelled them to run against incumbents in areas where they would not have competed in the past. Indeed, Oklahoman Tom Cole, the chief of staff of the Republican National Conference, cited the growing strength of Republicans in the traditional stronghold of the Democrats in Oklahoma, the rural areas. Cole stated "Republicanism is no longer an urban and suburban phenomena."⁵ Ericson's victory in Muskogee is surely a signal of the growing strength of Republicans in rural Oklahoma. A strong candidacy can overcome the disadvantages a party may have in a legislative district, and a strong candidacy can also enhance advantages for a party as well. With every election the heart of success for a party is based on the strength of the candidates it can field. In contrast to the attitude that Smaligo had after his 1998 loss, Democrat Tex Slyman, who lost to Republican Todd Hiett in rural Creek county, decided not to run again because he believed that if he could not win the first time, he had little chance to win. Although Slyman lost his race by a much greater margin than Smaligo, it does illustrate the different confident levels found among candidates of the two parties in Oklahoma.

It may be through their gains in rural Oklahoma that Republicans will finally have enough seats to put them in the majority, which may happen by 2002. As a result of the 2000 election, Republicans in the state legislature are just three seats from a majority. This is the greatest amount of representation Republicans have had in the legislature since 1921.⁶ Republicans stunned prognosticators from both sides of the aisle by picking up eight seats. One way to measure the success of the Republicans in 2000 is to consider the analysis of Larry Roberts, a high-ranking Democratic legislator, who reviewed the districts that had legislators deemed vulnerable by the opposition. Roberts based his

opinion of vulnerability on the closeness of the past election, the registration numbers for the opposition party in a district, and political activities, which would be subject to interpretation. Political activities that can make an incumbent vulnerable would be legislative votes that alienate the legislator's party or a failure to support the district or state-party apparatus. From this analysis, Roberts determined that there were thirteen vulnerable house seats for Democrats and eight vulnerable house seats for Republicans. Of the thirteen vulnerable Democrats, two retired before the race, four lost to Republicans, six defeated Republicans in their reelection bids, and one had no opponent. Of the eight vulnerable Republicans, six defeated Democrats in their reelection bids and two had no opponents. Republicans had considerable success against perceived vulnerable Democrats, while Democrats had no success against perceived vulnerable Republicans. In addition, Roberts considered the open seats that would be contested for both parties. The Republicans won three races in districts with open seats that Democrats defended. For the Democrats, they won no races in districts with open seats that Republicans defended. The expression of "defended" in this case refers to the retiring incumbent. If the incumbent that retired was a Democrat, then the Democrats defended the open seat; if the incumbent that retired was a Republican, then the Republicans defended the open seat. The change of party control in open seats signifies that Republicans are gaining new political territory and that the Democrats are retreating.

With this devastating election for the Democrats, it is expected for their leaders to consider the events of the last election cycle that led to defeat. There have been discussions among Democrats on the coattails of George Bush and the lack of support from Al Gore in Oklahoma. Al Gore's poor showing in Oklahoma, winning only ten

counties in the state, is the closest a Democratic presidential candidate has gotten to George McGovern's absolute collapse of 1972, in which the South Dakota senator failed to get even one Oklahoma county in his column. Democratic leaders also should consider the advantage Republicans have in fundraising with, until the election of Democrat Brad Carson, complete Republican control of the federal congressional and senatorial offices. Republicans can use their congressmen and senators for both fundraisers and contributions, and the Democrats do not have that ability. While coattails and money are important and may explain in large part the success of the Republican legislative candidates, what cannot be overlooked is the decision made by many individuals to run for the state legislature. Candidate emergence is the beginning point for a political party's success, and the inability to get viable candidates to run is the beginning point for a political party's demise. As Democrats consider what happened in November of 2000, they would be wise to review what happened in February and March as individuals pondered their candidacy. Simply put, the Republicans fielded better candidates in more competitive races than the Democrats.

Candidate emergence helps researchers understand that many elections are won before votes are casts. It is based on the actions of individuals who decided not only whether they should be candidates but also what types of candidates they should be. In other words, candidates must determine how strong of a race they will run. Of course, candidates are subject to factors that may limit their candidacy. They must have funds, receive support from their party, and must be taken seriously by the voter. It is often the decisions made by candidates, however, that make these factors work in their favor rather than against them. In the United States, perhaps more than any democracy, politics is a

process conducted by individuals. A political shift, a realignment, which may be happening in Oklahoma, first occurs from the collective decisions of individual candidates. This research provides an insight from some of the individuals who became candidates and some that ultimately did not. Their insights can give us some inclination on which way the political winds are blowing. The question remains: "Do candidates respond to the voters, or are voters responding to the candidates?" For candidates who believe they can win, they must answer that both events occur. Candidates decide to run because they think the votes are there for them and also because they think they can persuade people to vote for them. Thus the "intricate churning" of voters that V.O. Kev⁷ writes about, which cause partisan shifts in the halls of power, is not based solely on the voters but on the candidates as well. Individuals who decide to run for office must base their decision to run on the voters, on the opposition, and most importantly on themselves. If potential candidates ultimately decide to forego a campaign, then the political shifts that may occur will be delayed. As James Campbell notes, presidential coattails can be wasted if no candidate at the lower level takes advantage of political change.⁸ The remaining portions of this chapter will include a review of the potential candidates for this study, a discussion of how open seats can serve as an indicator for party strength, an analysis of how incumbents seemingly protect themselves from defeat, the impact of term limits, and the future effects it may have on Oklahoma politics.

Review of Potential Candidates in the 2000 Election

Of the thirty-nine potential candidates studied for this research, twenty-six became candidates and thirteen bowed out. The twenty-six candidates include eight incumbents. Regarding candidacy there is a difference between incumbents and other

candidates. When asked why they decided to run, incumbents most often answered in ways that reflected more on their work in the legislature, whereas other candidates would answer from a more personal standpoint. For example, representative Larry Adair responded to the question by stating, "the challenge to be able to accomplish some goals." Representative Joe Eddins viewed his past campaigns as an investment that now gave him an opportunity to govern: "If you don't stay awhile you don't accomplish much. I have spent too much time trying to win the office. The time I spent trying to win would be a total waste if I resigned. If I retired now it wouldn't make much sense spending over 100 hours trying to understand an agency's needs." Representative Barbara Staggs regarded her policy goals and also her gender as reasons to run: "I think you make a commitment to do something, then you should follow through. I would like some more changes in education. I also think women need to make the playing field more level for the next generation of women, women should not have to prove more than men." Representative Larry Rice of Pryor focused on the important policy areas for his district and his service to his district, "probably the ability, because of my seniority, to do more for my district. I can do more for my district for tourism and highways." For Representative Tad Jones, who was first elected two years ago at the age of twenty-five and was at that time the only Republican representative east of Tulsa, had a partisan reason to run again, "because of the gains we [the Republicans] have made in the house."

Understandably, non-incumbents do not cite work in the legislature as a reason for their candidacy; instead the reasons were usually more personal. Joe Johnson, a Democratic challenger to Joe Eddins, decided to run because "the amount of support I felt I would have, if I did not have a chance to win then I would not run." Johnson, the

mayor of Vinita, made a decision to run in part from his perceived political support he would get from voters. Although he was not successful in his race, his decision to run reflected a judgment an experienced politician would make. Stuart Ericson, the surprising Republican victor in a heavily Democratic district in Muskogee, made his decision to run on two issues: "First, I wanted to run for an office that I can make a difference on a wide range of issues, and secondly, I got people to support me." Entering the race with a firm understanding of his own capabilities and the district, Ericson won an election that many political observers would have thought unlikely because of the registration numbers. John Smaligo, the youngest candidate at age twenty-four yet one who was already a veteran campaigner having run in 1998, gave as a reason for running a response that was similar to the answers given by the incumbents. Smaligo stated that his reason for running was for the "opportunity to change the state." This answer indicated that Smaligo was already thinking like an incumbent.

For first-time candidates who had not been active in their parties, their reasons for running tended to reflect their own occupations. Jim Wilson, the owner of a computer store in Tahlequah, gave as his reason for running as simply "improving e-commerce." Wayne Ryals, a former superintendent who competed against Wilson for the legislative post in Tahlequah, decided to run to "improve the state of education." Ed Brocksmith, an activist for scenic rivers in eastern Oklahoma, ran because of his "dissatisfaction with the leadership of the incumbent on the scenic river issue." For Curt Working, a candidate who had not been active in politics before, his motivation was his own sense of civic duty: "As a lay speaker of the Methodist Church, I stress responsibility. I believe we will be held accountable if we do not serve." For those who had been active in politics, party

chairs or local elected officials, their factors for running dealt more with the political situation of their districts. Liz Nottingham, a Democratic activist, stated that her main factor for running was "the fact that there is a young Republican in there for just one term." Allen Harder, a union and Democratic activists from Muskogee, became a candidate because of "the fact that Bill Settle [the incumbent] decided not to run."

Both Nottingham and Harder lost their races, despite their activities in Democratic politics for several years. They had the political savvy to be candidates at a moment that looked beneficial for them. Nottingham ran against Tad Jones, a first-term Republican in Rogers county and at the time the only Republican incumbent East of Tulsa. From his limited experience and the Democratic tradition of the area, Jones looked vulnerable. However, Rogers County, like many of the counties that border Tulsa are decreasing as Democratic strongholds, perhaps due to the number of former Tulsans moving in and other new residents from out of state. George Bush carried Rogers County by over tenthousand votes with over twenty-six-thousand cast. Brad Carson, the victorious Democrat for the 2nd congressional district, carried Rogers County, his home county, but by less than one-thousand votes out of twenty-five thousand votes cast. It was one of his weakest counties. Nottingham began the race with not as many Democratic votes as she might have expected. Also she might have overlooked the incumbent's ability to raise money. She raised over thirty-three thousand dollars, but she was outspent two to one as Jones raised over seventy thousand dollars for his reelection campaign. Nottingham believed that she would need over sixty thousand to win. In a clear indication that she underestimated the incumbent, she noted that the money would be needed to defeat her opponent in the primary and that after the primary, the Democratic victor would "sail in

the general" because of the voter registration numbers. As shown in recent elections, it should be obvious to Democratic candidates that they cannot rely on the registration numbers to win an election and that they must also be competitive with Republicans in fundraising if they hope to win.

Allen Harder's case, is at first much more difficult to explain. Harder lost in Muskogee County, which is still a Democratic stronghold. The county was one of ten in Oklahoma that Al Gore carried, albeit by less than one thousand votes. It was also a county that Democratic congressional candidate Brad Carson carried by three thousand votes, despite being the home county of Republican congressional candidate Andy Ewing. Harder lost in a close race by roughly one-hundred-and-thirty votes to Stuart Ericson, the thirty-year-old attorney who had only lived in Oklahoma for a few years before announcing his candidacy. The race appears to be an anomaly, suggesting that maybe there was a personality deficit with Harder or a scandal. There was one, perhaps minor, scandal involving Harder, which related to his wife's announced support for Bill Settle, Brad Carson's competitor in the Democratic primary for the second district congressional seat. Cheryl Harder was the Democratic chairwoman for the second district, and many of Carson's supporters believed her public support was improper because of her formal position in the party. This may have alienated some Democratic supporters from Allen Harder's candidacy. While this may have had a negative impact for Harder, he also faced a tremendous spending advantage for Ericson. Harder raised forty-seven thousand dollars, but Ericson came close to doubling that amount at ninetyone thousand dollars. Harder, like Nottingham, fell short of his projected fundraising plans. He had budgeted his campaign for seventy-seven thousand dollars. However, from

his discussions with then House Speaker Lloyd Benston, Harder realized that most candidates did not reach their fundraising target; he then planned for at least fifty to eighty-thousand dollars. Even this conservative estimate of fifty thousand was not reached. Harder and Nottingham may have been candidates that looked viable for their party in the spring, but as Democratic incumbents looked to have strong opponents, then money that could have gone to challengers such as them was instead spent on the incumbents. After all, both Harder and Nottingham got their budget estimates from party insiders who work with legislators.

Ericson's ability to raise over ninety thousand dollars in such a strong Democratic area was a true testament of the strength of his candidacy. Ericson did not enter the race with only his personal motivation but also a calculation on his ability to raise funds. He maintained the contacts he had made from his aborted congressional campaign and used that to his advantage. As a challenger, Ericson raised the amount of money that would have been expected from an incumbent with a tough reelection bid. Ericson thought of the advantages that he would have from his party if he proved to be a competitive candidate. Although he believed he could run a good race with twenty thousand dollars, his goal was to raise at least fifty thousand. His plan was to utilize the GOP leadership in his fundraising by reasoning, "if I have twenty thousand raised on my own, then this race will be a targeted district for the GOP. At that point I can get Nickles (U.S. Senator), Largent (U.S. Congressman), and Keating (Oklahoma Governor) to help with fundraising." Because of the strength of the federal Republicans in Oklahoma, Ericson had a source of funds that his Democrat opponent could not tap into.

Money is always a factor in an election. Candidates who have more funds can define their opponents as they want and can portray the image they want of themselves to their voters. All incumbents interviewed for this project raised more money than their opponents did. The contributions for both incumbents and challengers are listed on table two. In fact, for most incumbents the discrepancy in fundraising with their opponents appears to be overkill as the table indicates. Most of the incumbents faced no competition in the areas of fundraising. All of the incumbents, except for Tad Jones, were Democrats. Most challengers did not come close to raising even half the money that the incumbents raised. The noteworthy exception is Smaligo, who raised seventy-three percent of the money raised by Ostrander. Smaligo was also the only challenger interviewed who went on to defeat the incumbent, reflecting the observation that a challenger does not need to outspend the incumbent but must be at least within a similar spending range. With such a wide margin of fundraising, it is clear that Democratic legislative organizations made the decision to protect incumbents rather than risk their contributions on challengers. The wide gap in funding must be unsettling to Democratic challengers such as Liz Nottingham and Allen Harder. Both candidates fell short of their own fundraising goals. Their shortfall occurred despite the fact that some Democratic incumbents in northeastern Oklahoma, namely Larry Rice and Larry Adair, each outspent their opponents by over a hundred thousand dollars. With spending gaps that great, the strategy of protecting incumbents at all costs takes on a perverse reasoning. As described in Anthony Gierzynski's Legislative Party Campaign Committees in the American States, a party adopts this legislative strategy: the main goal for the majority party is to not lose seats that it already has. This is done by practicing a defensive strategy, which puts its top

priority on defending especially vulnerable incumbents.⁹ This strategy turned out to be less successful than projected for some Oklahoma Democrats in the 2000 election. Of the five Democratic incumbents who lost, three of them outspent their challengers. There were, however, nine incumbents, six Democrats and three Republicans. who were outspent and still were reelected. Money had the greatest impact in open seats. Of the seven open seats in the Oklahoma state house, six were won by the candidates who spent the most money; of these six, four were Republicans. Only one open seat had a winning candidate who spent less than the other candidate.

Table two also explains why some challengers are described as hopeless. Both Julian Coombs and Russell Turner had considerable fundraising disparities in their campaigns. Coombs did not decide to run until July 7, the Friday before the filing deadline. He also had no idea how much a campaign would cost. Turner, on the other hand, never stopped campaigning from his 1998 campaign. However, Turner could never get used to asking supporters for donations. He told of a farmer, who got exasperated from his shyness and blurted out, "Hell son, I know why you're here. Just ask me!" Most of his supporters were not that blunt, and Turner could not raise the funds to be competitive. It cannot be overlooked that Turner was up against the then speaker-elect in Larry Adair. Challenging such a strong incumbent could very well have had a negative impact on Turner's ability to get contributors to his campaign. Anyone who has to do business with the legislature would certainly want to be on the good side of Adair, and that may have even included some of Turner's fellow Republicans.

Table 2. The Contribution Disparity for Incumbents Interviewed (in bold)			Vote %	
District 6	Joe Eddins (D)	\$37,995.00	61%	
	Jim Debowski (R)	\$15,061.84	39%	
District 7	Larry Roberts (D)	\$19,350.00	73%	
	Julian Coombs (R)*	\$2,673.43	27%	
District 8	Larry Rice (D)	\$102,172.55	70%	
	Paul Hollrah (R)	\$970.00	30%	
District 9	Elizabeth Nottingham (D)*	\$33,222.00	41%	
	Tad Jones (R)	\$70,734.48	59%	
District 14	Barbara Staggs (D)	\$41,321.00	69%	
	Robert Ross (R)	\$18,113.00	31%	
District 74	Phil Ostrander (D)	\$78,013.00	49%	
	John Smaligo (R)*	\$57,045.84	50%	
	Albro Daniel (L)	\$111.00	1%	
District 86	Larry Adair (D)	\$158,658.53	67%	
	Russell Turner (R)*	\$6,623.50	33%	

The information comes from the Oklahoma State Ethics Commission. Asterisks denote challengers who were interviewed.

However, having more funds cannot alleviate all other negatives for a candidate in a campaign. The five Democratic incumbents, who lost their reelection race, had large deficits to overcome. The spending patterns for all five incumbents and their challengers are listed on table three. All five had been in difficult reelection bids in 1998, with each winning by less than a ten-percent margin. None of them were in districts that favored their party; all the five Democratic incumbents were in urban or suburban districts with strong support for the Republicans. The lessons from these races are that some incumbents face problems that money cannot overcome.

Incumbents who defeated opponents who raised more money came from either the Oklahoma City area or in the rural southwestern and southeastern portions of the state. The campaign contributions for these nine incumbents and their opponents are listed on table four. With the exception of Opio Toure, who appears to be an anomaly on the issue of fundraising and electoral success, most incumbents were close to their opponents in the amount of funds raised, although Robert Worthen had an eleven thousand difference from his opponent. Worthen also nearly lost, winning his reelection bid by less than one percent. Lloyd Fields was the other incumbent among this group, who won reelection by less than ten-percent of the vote. The success of these incumbents does not mean that spending is irrelevant but rather suggests that an incumbent can fall behind their opponents on fundraising and still win. For these nine incumbents, all but Worthen, had a partisan advantage in their districts. Of course, these incumbents could also rely on their name recognition and constituency service to help erase fundraising deficits. The lesson learned from these races is that some incumbents may have advantages that can reduce the necessity to outspend opponents.

e 3. Spending Pa	atterns of Incumbents Who Le	ost Reelection (Incumbents in Bold)	Vote %
District 23	Betty Boyd (D)	\$60,894.00	48%
	Sue Tibbs (R)	\$38,341.00	52%
District 40	John Sellars (D)	\$68,185.00	48%
	Mike O'Neal (R)	\$45,807.35	52%
District 45	Wallace Collins (D)	\$74,991.47	48%
	Thad Balkman (R)	\$88,461.73	52%
District 74	Phil Ostrander (D)	\$78,013.00	49%
	John Smaligo (R)	\$57,045.84	50%
	Albro Daniel (L)	\$111.00	1%
District 96	Mark Seikel (D)	\$32,675.00	46%
	Lance Cargill (R)	\$64,854.88	54%

The information comes from the Oklahoma State Ethics Commission.

Keith Gaddie and Charles Bullock determine that in open seats for the United States congress, candidates "who dominate on the money and experience dimensions typically win at least eighty percent of the time."¹⁰ The election results for open seats in the Oklahoma state legislature show how important it is for candidates to outspend their opponents (see table five).

ble 4. Successful I	ncumbents Who Were Outspea	nt (Incumbents in Bold)	Vote %
District 1	Terry Matlock (D)	\$21,253.00	59%
	Wenda Blakenship (R)	\$21,919.00	41%
District 18	Lloyd Fields (D)	\$37,375.66	54%
	Angela Hendrix (R)	\$48,243.45	46%
District 57	James Covey (D)	\$59,549.60	56%
	Rick Kock (R)	\$71,426.43	44%
District 84	Ronald Wasson (D)	\$6,306.47	34%
	Bill Graves (R)	\$5,850.00	66%
	Amy Corely (D)	\$24,699.00	49%
	Robert Worthen (R)	\$13,140.89	51%
District 88	Debbie Blackburn (D)	\$87,158.66	60%
	Michael Osborn (R)	\$98,483.16	40%
	Al Lindley (D)	\$31,382.00	60%
	W.T. Whalen (R)	\$43,141.52	40%
	Marshall Dunnam (D)	\$46,312.00	39%
	Tim Pope (R)	\$21,295.00	61%
District 99	Opio Toure (D)	\$5,975.00	73%
	Al Mertens (R)	\$66,186.00	27%

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Districts 1 and 18 are found in the southwestern Oklahoma. District 57 is found in southwestern Oklahoma. Districts 84, 87, 88, 93, 98 and 99 are found in Oklahoma City. The information comes from the Oklahoma State Ethics Commission.

In the campaigns of James (Jim) Wilson in District 4 and Stuart Ericson in District 13, both candidates knew that they must raise a large amount of money to compensate for the impediments in their campaigns. Wilson had never been involved in a campaign; in fact, he mentioned that political activists were quite surprised he had an interest in being a politician. Also, Wilson had to reduce the confusion, as best as possible, voters would have in distinguishing his campaign from Jim "Bob" Wilson's campaign for congress. Wilson believed he had to advertise early and often to alleviate the confusion. Ericson had two drawbacks for his campaign: he was a Republican in northeastern Oklahoma; although he had married a local woman, he was originally from California. Ericson's advertising, especially through direct mail, gave the voters a chance

to get to know him and diminish his outsider image. In the other open seats, with the exception of District 20 and District 32, the one seat where the outspent candidate actually won, the differences in campaign contributions between the candidates were slight. The overriding lesson learned from Ericson's and Wilson's campaign is that when one starts out, it is advantageous to overwhelm one's opponent in spending, especially if the individual is politically unknown. Outspending one's opponent is an important factor in open-seat races for the state legislature in Oklahoma.

ble 5. Campaign Spending in Open Seats (Winners in Bold)			Vote %
District 4	James Wilson (D)*	\$92, 531.04	65%
2.52.00	Ed Brooksmith (R)*	\$20,971.30	35%
District 13	Allen Harder (D)*	\$47,202.27	49%
	Stuart Ericson (R)*	\$91,275.14	51%
District 20	Paul Roan (D)	\$36,710.00	63%
	Thomas Stephens (R)	\$31,207.00	37%
District 26	Terry LaValley (D)	\$55,840.00	45%
	Kris Steele (R)	\$81,719.00	55%
District 32	Danny Morgan (D)	\$59,561.00	49%
	Kent Friskup (R)**	\$53,493.00	51%
District 43	Lisa Collins (D)	\$6,080.00	33%
	Ray Young (R)	\$24,129.00	67%
District 80	Fred Keas (D)	\$16,198.00	31%
	Ron Peterson (R)	\$25,715.00	69%

The information comes from the Oklahoma State Ethics Commission.

* Individuals interviewed for this project. ** Kent Friskup is the only winner of an open seat that was outspent.

For the remaining challengers interviewed in this study, money had a deciding impact on their ability to compete. The four challengers listed on table six were all interviewed and far behind their opponents in fundraising. The closest in fundraising was the former legislator from District 68, Shelby Satterfield, who was still over thirty thousand dollars behind the incumbent, Chris Benge. Satterfield was also one of the most competitive, but none of the challengers in this category were close to the ten percent margin that constituted a competitive race. Satterfield believed that he would need to raise at least forty thousand dollars, and he thought that he would be able to raise that much since he had raised fifty thousand in 1998. However, in 1998 Satterfield was the incumbent. His plight may be indicative of the Oklahoma Democratic party in 2000 that seemed to support its incumbents at the costs of its challengers. The other three challengers were Republicans facing incumbents from fairly strong Democratic districts, although only Dal Newberry's region in District 16 was carried by Al Gore. Both Newberry and Joe Peters decided to run late. Newberry did not finalize his decision to run until late May or early June, with the filing deadline on July 12. Newberry also admitted "if there's any competition in the Republican primary, then I'll pull out." Joe Peters also did not decide to run until late May. Peters had also been a candidate in both 1996 and 1998, receiving about the same votes as he did in 2000. With the uphill fight Republicans face in this area, Sequoyah county, with five times more Democrats than Republicans, most potential Republican candidates may decide it is an impossible task to run. Peters believed one of the reasons he did not get more contributions, which would make him a more competitive candidate, was the inhibition among the business community to alienate themselves from the incumbent.

Perhaps this will change as a result of the increased strength for Republicans in the legislature. Contributors may be more willing to give to Republican candidates in Democratic areas if the GOP is on the cusp of gaining the majority in the legislature. Lou Martin, the challenger among this group who raised the most funds, was told by state representative Todd Hiett that he would need to raise over sixty thousand dollars. Martin

could only raise half that amount. Martin was another candidate that spent some time considering the decision to run. Although he was told by a long-time party activist in Creek county that it was not a good time to run because of the strength of the incumbent, Martin made the decision to run not because of the incumbent he would face but because of Republican strength in Oklahoma. He believed that 2000 would be a good year for Republicans to run, which it was, but it is always tough to run against incumbents, especially those that can outspend their challengers two to one. With regard to his election bid, Martin described: "When I first talked to Todd Hiett (Republican legislator) in early spring, he was pleasantly surprised that I was committed to run, but when I thought of it, I was seventy-five percent against it and twenty-five percent for it. Then by mid-April I was ninety-nine percent against running. But by May when I started to see the good quality candidates the GOP was getting, I thought we might take the house and my district needs representation in the majority." Like most of us, Martin may have listened to the advice he wanted to hear, such as the advice that encouraged him to run, not the advice that implied he could not win.

Table 6. Selective	ble 6. Selective District Races (Challenger in Bold)		
District 2	Joe Peters (R)	\$2,175.00	30%
	J.T. Stites (D)	\$34,246.55	70%
District 16	M.C. Leist (D)	\$24,225.00	71%
	Dal Newberry (R)	\$5,000.00	29%
District 30	Lou Martin (R)	\$30,693.90	39%
	Mike Tyler (D)	\$66,249.25	61%
District 68	Chris Benge (R)	\$54, 224.06	61%
	Shelby Satterfield (D)	\$20,550.00	39%

The information comes from the Oklahoma State Ethics Commission.

When analyzing the differences between successful and unsuccessful candidates, the timeless phrase from the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu is appropriate, "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."¹¹ While the phrase has extreme language for a political campaign, it does explain not so much how to win but how to make sure that one will not lose. Sun Tzu does not mention victory by knowing oneself and the opposition, but only the probability that the individual will not be in peril. If in war, avoiding peril suggests dodging a dangerous battle, in politics, for a potential candidate, avoiding peril may mean choosing not to run. Strong candidates use their resources to cause other potential opponents to withdraw from the race. Jim Wilson, the computer storeowner and novice politician, showed a strong determination to win. Referring his possible loss as "the biggest risk" he could take, he said, "I cannot afford to lose." Perhaps most potential candidates who find themselves in a position in which they "cannot afford to lose" will decide that a campaign is not worth the cost and bow out. Once Wilson had made the decision to run, he then made a concerted effort to weaken the field before the primary race ever began. Wilson used the most important asset he had, money. Wilson's district is rural and predominately Democratic. He expected eight to ten candidates that would run for the office. His prediction on the number of candidates was a bit of a stretch; the last time there were eight candidates in a primary was in 1982 when a new district was created. When Wilson's district was last an open seat in 1986, three candidates competed in the Democratic primary. Nevertheless Wilson wanted to thin out the field. When asked if he thought anyone had decided not to run for the legislature because he was in the race, he replied, "Yes, the perception is that I will spend a lot of money to get elected." This is a good example of the "scare off" effect developed by Gary Cox and Scott Morgenstern. Wilson may appear to have not had much success since three other candidates did enter the race, but two of the candidates made a minimal effort.

His only real competition on the Democratic side came from school superintendent Wayne Ryals. As a city council member and member of the local hospital board, Ryals was well known in his district. Ryals' local connections may have helped him persuade other community leaders from running. Ryals mentioned two local businessmen, who decided that they would not run because of his candidacy. His name recognition may have also been a strike against him because as a city council member Ryals had angered some residents. One particular citizen had planned on running against Ryals because he had an abatement against a relative's house. Ryals may have been well known, but for all those who knew him, he was not always well liked. The thankless but important jobs on city councils, school boards, and hospital boards may not provide much reward for those who plan to run for higher office.

Both John Smaligo and Stuart Ericson, the two new Republican legislators in northeastern Oklahoma, made sure that they would not have an opponent in their party's primary. In contrast, Liz Nottingham and Allen Harder, two Democratic candidates who lost races that had been traditionally Democratic, did not make much of an effort to persuade opponents from their party to leave the primary. Nottingham had a difficult primary race against a local businessman. There was an obvious division between the two Democratic challengers, as Nottingham could not get an endorsement or any additional help from her fellow Democratic challenger after the primary. As a result of the arduous primary, Nottingham found herself without funds to immediately compete for the general campaign. She did not get much financial support for her race in the general campaign until the last three weeks before the election. Her support at that time finally arrived because she was able to convince key Democratic groups that she could win the general election. According to Nottingham, this is the paradox that occurs to candidates and their fundraisers: "they (PACs) won't help you until you prove that you don't need their help." For Nottingham, the timing of contributions hurt her family's income as she and her husband mortgaged their house for thirteen thousand dollars. On her financial situation, Nottingham commented, "I got most of the money for the campaign in the last two or three weeks, which means you cannot make the necessary moves in a campaign, buying billboards and air-time, for example, which is why we put our money in the race." Nottingham concluded that she did not realize the need for money would dominate every other part of candidacy: "the party leadership spent far more discussion on money than ideology." She knew that money was important, but she "did not know that money would be used as a benchmark." The campaign of Nottingham can be indicative of those of candidates from a party that has had the luxury of only focusing on its primary to decide the winner in legislative races. As parts of Oklahoma increasingly become areas of twoparty competition, potential candidates will need to consider a successful campaign as a two-part strategy, winning the primary and then the general. Part of that strategy for potential candidates should be to weaken or eliminate the field of competitors in their own party, through persuasion as Ericson used or through scare off tactics as Jim Wilson used. If there is a tough race in the primary, then many candidates may find themselves winning the battle only to lose the war, which was the case with Allen Harder.

Harder had two opponents in the primary. His opponents were both African-American women. He believed that they would represent the same constituency, causing a split and giving him the race. This did not work out exactly according to the plan, as Lela Foley Davis, the mayor of Taft, received enough votes to have a run-off election

with Harder. After surviving the run-off with Davis, Harder noted that he did not have money to immediately compete with Ericson, the Republican candidate. Harder stated that the amount of money was important, but even more so was "the point at which the money is available to spend." Harder had "ten days of silence," as he put it, waiting for funds from House PAC and other Democratic sources to come through. Harder believed that his depletion of funds from the run-off in addition to the financial advantage Ericson had were two major reasons for his loss. However, Harder had every reason to believe that once he won his primary, he would be able to win the general election. But this was a race in which the Republican nearly doubled the spending on his Democratic opponent and could hold off his spending until the general campaign. The timing on the spending of funds meant that Ericson had much more than a two-to-one spending advantage over Harder. One practice the Republicans followed that clearly gave them an advantage over Democrats, in Harder's view, was that Republicans would find one candidate for a district and support only one candidate. This suggests far greater discipline among the Republicans, although it may not always benefit the Republicans because their lack of primary competition may also decrease their name recognition. It is also not always the case that Republicans have only one candidate per district. In districts where they have been competitive, the urban and suburban areas of Oklahoma, the Republicans have fielded more than one candidate in open seats. It is only the rural areas where Republicans have had a lack of candidates in open seats. This suggests that both parties in Oklahoma have areas of strength and weakness as the tables below indicate.

The Number of Candidates in Open Seats

In their study on open seat elections in the House of Representatives, Gaddie and Bullock note that the results from the elections are the best sign for the direction of partisan control in congress.¹² Indeed the number of candidates a party may field in an open seat gives an indication of the strength of the party and attractiveness of the office. However, having more than one candidate in the race may also indicate that the party does not have the ability to get weaker candidates out of the race. The concern with having too many candidates for one party in a primary may be greatest in areas where there is greater two-party competition, as was the case in the recent election in Muskogee county. In areas where there is little competition between the two parties, the dominant party would view a primary as the main election and have little incentive to reduce candidates before the primary. Oklahoma is a state that continues to evolve into a twoparty state, but the two parties have divided up their domains, cities for Republicans and rural areas for Democrats. This division can be seen through open seats in rural and urban regions. If more candidates run for a seat once it is open, then it would suggest that more individuals are attracted to the office of legislator and that the race is winnable.

Year	Total # of Rural Seats	Average	Number of Seats With No Candidate	
1980	7	2.85	0	
1982	10	3.6	I	
1984	5	2.4	0	
1986	13	3.15	0	
1988	6	2.66	0	
1990	9	4.33	0	
1992	6	3.33	0	
1994	8	3.75	0	
1996	7	2.42	0	
1998	3	2.66	0	
2000	7	2.85	0	

Table 7. Average Number of Democratic Candidates in Rural Open Seats 1980-2000

Source: Election Results and Statistics, Oklahoma State Election Board, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, OK

Year	Total # of Rural Seats	Average	Number of Seats With No Candidate
1980	7	0.57	4
1982	10	1.2	l
1984	5	0.4	3
1986	13	0.92	5
1988	6	1.0	1
1990	9	1.11	3
1992	6	1.33	2
1994	8	1.25	2
1996	7	1.57	2
1998	3	1.66	0
2000	7	1.14	2

Table 8. Average Number of Republican Candidates in Rural Open Seats 1980-2000

Source: Election Results and Statistics, Oklahoma State Election Board, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, OK

As the tables show, Democrats have more candidates in rural open seats than Republicans do. There was only one rural open seat in the twenty years of analysis that the Democrats left uncontested. In most election years, Republicans averaged at best one candidate per rural open seat. This is the average, so when one considers the number of rural open seats in almost every election year that the Republicans did not contest, in some primaries contended more than one Republican candidate. Overall, Harder's comment on Republicans is correct in the rural areas, one candidate per race. If singular candidates receive the financial support that Ericson got, then having one candidate per race may be helpful to Republicans in rural areas in the future.

Year	Total # of Suburban/Urban Seats	Average	# of Seats With No Candidate	
1980	6	1.33	l	
1982	8	2.75	0	
1984	11	2.63	0	
1986	11	1.8	2	
1988	7	1.42	1	
1990	3	3.33	0	
1992	2	1.2	2	
1994	6	1.66	0	
1996	3	2.0	0	
1998	2	3.0	0	
2000	4	0.75	2	

Table 9. Average Number of Democratic Candidates in Suburban/Urban Open Seats 1980-2000

Source: Election Results and Statistics, Oklahoma State Election Board, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, OK

Year	Total # of Suburban/Urban Seats	Average	# of Seats With No Candidate
1980	6	2.33	l
1982	8	1.25	3
1984	11	1.81	0
1986	11	2.54	0
198 8	7	1.57	0
1990	3	1.66	l
1992	5	2.4	0
1994	6	2.5	0
1996	3	1.33	l
1998	2	1.5	0
2000	4	3.0	0

Table 10. Average Number of Republican Candidates in Suburban/Urban Open Seats 1980-2000

Source: Election Results and Statistics, Oklahoma State Election Board, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, OK

Republicans have been slightly more competitive in urban/suburban open seats. In the last two decades, both parties rarely cede legislative elections in non-rural districts. For the 2000 elections in non-rural districts, the Republicans were far more competitive than Democrats were. Of course, this is only one election, and the number of districts were only four, but in addition to the number of Republican incumbents who were unchallenged, it does appear that Democrats are becoming less active in the urban areas. Oklahoma Republican leaders see the increase of candidates on their side as a sign of confidence among prospective candidates. The increased number of candidates prompted state chairman Steve Edwards to say, "It's a sign that the Republican party is becoming more competitive. We have fielded the best group of candidates I have ever seen"¹³ Fred Morgan, Republican party leader in the Oklahoma statehouse, noted that the number of Republican challengers, "shows an optimism about the future of the Republican party in the state."¹⁴ Tom Cole, a longtime Republican strategist in Oklahoma and founder of the political consulting firm Cole, Hargrave, Snodgrass & Associates, focused on the growing confidence of Republicans throughout all areas of the state: "Republicanism is no longer an urban and suburban phenomena."¹⁵ These comments all follow the rationalactor theory developed by Jacobson and Kernell among others, which purports that

stronger candidates will emerge for a party as favorable times for that party appear. Republican potential candidates in Oklahoma will believe in future races that they have a good chance to win, and if they do win, they have a good chance of being part of the majority party as the Republicans increase their ranks in the legislature. There should be more Republican candidates emerge in future legislative races that have name recognition and money, a sure sign of two-party competition in Oklahoma.

The Power of Incumbency


Compared to the last two elections before it, the year 2000 was slightly less beneficial to incumbents. Only five incumbents were defeated in 2000, but that was an increase from 1998 with only one incumbent defeated or from 1996 with three incumbents defeated. Nevertheless, defeating incumbents is a difficult task, as the line graph indicates, there has been a sharp decline in the number of defeated incumbents since the late 1980s. In 1988 actually more incumbents were defeated than retired. Representative Larry Roberts, who has served in the legislature since 1984, recalled that the late 1980s was a time of particular unrest within the legislature. Speaker of the House Jim Barker was removed from his post. During that time the speaker was removed, the legislature did politically unseemly acts such as raising their own pay and preventing the state capitol clock from striking midnight in order to postpone the constitutionally mandated adjournment.¹⁶ Voters may have taken out their frustration with Oklahoma government on the incumbents running for reelection. The election in 1988 appears to be atypical of most elections in recent memory, although 1990 was not particularly kind to incumbents as well. What is typical in recent elections is that to defeat an incumbent is difficult and may be getting tougher in the state of Oklahoma.

Year	Retired	Change in Party	Defeated	Change in Party
1980	15	D-R=1	11	D-R=4
		R-D=1		R-D=0
		D-D=8		D-D=6
		R-R=5		R-R=I
1982	18	D-R=0	4	D-R=0
		R-D=1		R-D=1
		D-D=13		D-D=2
		R-R=4		R-R=1
1984	15	D-R=4	7	D-R=3
		R-D=0		R-D=0
		D-D=6		D-D=3
		R-R=5		R-R=1
1986	21	D-R=2	9	D-R=4
		R-D=2		R-D=4
		D-D=11		D-D=1
		R-R=6		R-R=0
1988	12	D-R=I	15	D-R=4
		R-D=2		R-D=2
		D-D=5		D-D=7
		R-R=4		R-R=2
990	15	D-R=0	11	D-R=3
		R-D=1		R-D=2
		D-D=12		D-D=5
		R-R=2		R-R=1
1992	7	D-R=0	5	D-R=2
		R-D=0		R-D=1
		D-D=5		D-D=2
		R-R=2		R-R=0
1994	21	D-R=4	5	D-R=3
		R-D=2		R-D=0
		D-D=9		D-D=I
		R-R=6		R-R=1
1996	11	D-R=1	3	D-R=1
		R-D=0		R-D=2
		D-D=7		D-D=0
		R-R=3		R-R=0
1998	8	D-R=3	1	D-R=1
		R-D=0		R-D=0
		D-D=2		D-D=0
		R-R=3		R-R=0
2000	11	D-R=3	5	D-R=5
		R-D=0		R-D=0
		D-D=4		D-D=0
		R-R=4		R-R=0

Table 11. Number of Incumbents Retired/Defeated Per Year (1980-2000)

Source: Election Results and Statistics, 1980-2000, Oklahoma State Election Board, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

Chart 4. Number of Incumbents Retired/Defeated Per Year



While it is an arduous task to defeat an incumbent in the Oklahoma state legislature, it should be noted that only eight incumbents lost in the U.S. House of Representatives in the 2000 election. The U.S. House is over four times larger than the Oklahoma statehouse, indicating that there should be a greater number of defeated incumbents in a federal race than in a state race. In their study of campaigns in two state legislatures, California and Iowa, Gregory Caldeira and Samuel Patterson point out that the competitiveness of the elections in these states are not an exercise in the "mindless return of incumbents on the part of voters" as is so often the case involving congressional campaigns. Instead, Caldeira and Patterson find that challengers for the legislature can have leverage against incumbents if they can spend large amounts of money or mobilize partisan electorates in their favor.¹⁷ The mobilization of partisans in Oklahoma is increasingly taking place in the general election, instead of the primary stage. In 1988, the most unique year of this analysis, nine of the fifteen incumbents who lost were defeated in their own primary. A large number of incumbents lost their own primary in 1990 as well, with six out of eleven who never made it to the general election. Since then, there has been a continued decrease not only in the number of incumbents losing but also

in the number of incumbents who have lost in the primary. In the last three election cycles in Oklahoma, not one incumbent has lost in a primary. Incumbents have been successful in scaring off challengers in the general as well as the primary races. The strength of incumbents may be based on a variety of factors. First, the incumbents are the beneficiaries of their parties who decide to protect incumbents before they invest in challengers, although the Republicans as indicated from the 2000 election spend on challengers when it appears that the challenger has a good chance to win. Anthony Gierzynski notes that the majority party is most likely to have a defensive strategy and support its vulnerable incumbents.¹⁸ Clearly that happened in Oklahoma as the funding for Democratic incumbents far overshadowed most Democratic challengers. Gierzynski also mentions that both parties ultimately do not want to lose seats they have already gained.¹⁹ This strategy increasingly helps incumbents. Many researchers have observed that increased spending by an incumbent is a sign of the incumbent's uncertainty for reelection.²⁰ It also shows that more incumbents are in a position to match well-financed challengers in spending. Oklahoma house speaker Larry Adair, who overwhelmingly outspent his opponent, reasoned that fundraising like other parts of the campaign was something that could not be overused; he remarked that a candidate should "raise all the money you can raise and use all the volunteers you can use."

A second factor for the power of incumbency is the increased salary for Oklahoma legislators, which has increased in the 1990s, gives legislators a strong incentive to get reelected. Legislators are paid \$38,400 in Oklahoma, with the leadership making at least an additional \$12,000.²¹ While the base salary is roughly ten thousand dollars more than the average annual pay an American makes, it is roughly fifteen

thousand dollars more than the average pay for an Oklahoman.²² It is also compensation for a legislature that is in session ninety working days per year. The salary and the limited days in session made Republican chairman Steve Edwards derisively label them "the most highly paid part-time legislature in America." Edwards may decide to use another tact now that the Republicans are only three seats away from a majority. All incumbents interviewed for this research believed that to be a legislator was a full-time job. However, for those incumbents who were not retired, most had another job such as a storeowner or business consultant. What made the job of legislator full-time for most was the contact with constituents, which would include not only helping the folks back home but also participating in functions that could maintain the incumbent's identity throughout the district. Incumbents with a good salary have a higher advantage than their counterparts in states that pay very little. John Carey, Richard Niemi, and Lynda Powell conclude that the advantage is that well-paid legislators can devote full time to their political career.²³ With the increased salary, incumbents may believe the job is worth fighting for.

Third, term limits may have caused the more qualified challengers to wait until an incumbent's term is out rather than run a difficult campaign against the incumbent. The most politically astute candidates would also be the ones who wait for an open seat because they would know that their chances of winning are much greater in an open seat. Jacobson and Kernell have illustrated how important it is for the most qualified candidates to have a high probability of winning before they enter the race.²⁴ The risks are high in a state legislative race, the funds needed to spend seem to increase with each election cycle, and an individual's reputation also can be harmed from losing a race. Therefore the best candidates want minimal risks. Donald Childers, the young

Democratic activists who plans to run for the legislature once the incumbent in his district is term limited out, said "The only positive thing about term limits is you know that the day is coming that there will be an open seat." The number of incumbents losing reelection has declined since the passage of term limits in 1990. While the number of incumbents losing is currently not much greater than some of the years before term limits passage, the number of incumbents losing in their primary has continued to decrease. It seems that more highly qualified challengers are waiting for term limits to create open seats than to compete against incumbents.

Fourth, the increased professionalism of the legislature has enabled legislators to do more casework for their constituents, thus improving incumbents' reelection status. The Oklahoma house, as well as the senate, has a permanent staff. House members also have secretaries that work both during and after legislative sessions.²⁵ Based on Michael Berkman's extensive analysis of all state legislatures, using salary, session length, staff size, and control over federal grants, Oklahoma qualifies for the "more professionalized" category. Only the eight states that make up the "most professionalized" category would have a higher degree of professionalism, according to Berkman.²⁶ Legislative professionalism, Peverill Squire states, improves the stability of a legislature.²⁷ The pay and the career advancement give legislators in a professional legislature a greater incentive to stay in office. The use of staff also gives legislators more opportunity to help their constituents. More professionalism in the legislature increases the likelihood that constituents have contacted their legislator.²⁸ Interestingly enough, Squire also finds that as professionalism increases, the public's perception of the legislature becomes more negative. Squire concludes that the demands on the legislature, which are expanded

through their professionalism, cannot all be met and thus the public support for the legislature diminishes.²⁹ On this last point, for Oklahoma the negative viewpoint on legislators may be greater for urban legislators than rural legislators.

Most Professionalized	More Professionalized	Less Professionalized
Alaska	Iowa	Tennessee
Pennsylvania	Arizona	West Virginia
Michigan	Missouri	Least Professionalized
New York	Washington	New Mexico
Massachusetts	Hawaii	South Dakota
California	South Carolina	Maine
Illinois	Delaware	Rhode Island
New Jersey	Less Professionalized	Utah
More Professionalized	Florida	Wyoming
Wisconsin	Mississippi	New Hampshire
Ohio	Arkansas	
Oklahoma	Nevada	
Maryland	Connecticut	
Colorado	Indiana	
Minnesota	Oregon	

Table 12.	Berkman's	Ranking of State	e Legislative	Professionalism

Berkman determines the ranking of state legislative professionalism on four factors: salary, session length, staff support, control over federal grants.

"Former State Legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives: Institutional and Policy Mastery" Legislative Studies Quarterly 18 (1993): 96-97.

As the Oklahoma legislature has become more professionalized in the 1990s, with the base salary for legislators that has gone from \$22,150 in the mid-80s to \$38,000 currently, only eight rural legislators have lost reelection, and none have lost since 1994.³⁰ Incumbents commented to me that, for the most part, rural legislators have a closer and more significant relationship with their constituents than do urban legislators.

As stated in <u>The Personal Vote</u>, representatives try to build a personal relationship with voters based on accessibility and trust. The main reason for building this relationship is that lawmakers are then able to be independent of their national or statewide party organizations.³¹ Rural legislators in Oklahoma may have a greater advantage in building this relationship because they are utilized more by their constituents. Rick Littlefield, the state senator from rural Ottawa and Delaware counties, said that he could always tell a secretary for a rural legislator as opposed to an urban legislator: "The secretary for the rural legislator always has a cluttered desk, full of requests from constituents; the secretary for the urban legislator might be reading a book and have a clean desk with little work to do. In rural Oklahoma, people know their legislator. That is not the case in the urban districts." Littlefield likes gave the story on the campaign trail of the time he received a call from a Cherokee woman in Jay that her sewer was backed up. He then asked her where she lived, and she gave an address which put her in the city limits of Jay. Littlefield then inquired if she had contacted the Jay mayor. "Oh no," she answered, "I don't want to start at the top with the first call!" Littlefield used the amusing anecdote to show where he fit on the leadership ladder to some voters, but such a story signifies how a state legislator is used in rural Oklahoma. Shelby Satterfield, who had been a legislator in Tulsa, also noted the difference in urban and rural districts. In his Tulsa district, he found quite a bit of apathy for legislature elections and that most urban residents rarely contacted their legislators. The reason for this, according to Satterfield, is that urban residents have other service providers, such as their city government to turn to, so they find fewer reasons to deal with their legislators.

As these four factors indicate, incumbents have several advantages. These advantages have increased the ability for incumbents to get reelected at greater rates than in the past. However, one way to insure that incumbents will not be able to dominate

challengers is to make sure that incumbents can no longer run. The impact of term limits on candidate emergence will be further explored.

What Will Term Limits Mean to Candidate Emergence in the Legislature?

Term limits is certain to change the political landscape of states that have adopted it. This certainty is based on the fact that many of the political leaders who dominate state politics will simply no longer be able to hold their offices. New members will have power as a result of term limits. How much more certain we can be about the impact of term limits is still in doubt. Some researchers have found no effect that term limits will have on the demographics of state legislatures.³² Other studies have concluded that there may some benefit to women and nonwhites, as well to the minority political party of a state.³³ The overall status on the assessment of term limits and its impact on legislatures may depend, as Rick Farmer has suggested, "upon one's partisan point of view."³⁴

For the study of candidate emergence, term limits will have its largest effect on ambition. While term limits will provide for more open seats, it may also decrease the allure of some offices since an individual will have less opportunity to build a career. Linda Fowler strongly argues against term limits because it would "remove the most fundamental incentive for people to engage in political entrepreneurship." This would reduce the incentive to run for office because, Fowler surmises, candidates could not see a return on their investment by building a political career.³⁵ Indeed, a limited number of terms should eliminate the politicians Schlesinger refers to as having "static ambition." These are the politicians who plan on making a long-run career out of a particular office.³⁶ In the case of Oklahoma, the twelve-year limit may not have harmed the ambitions of most legislators, since most appear to not intend to serve many years in the

legislature to begin with.³⁷ However, rural legislators may see a benefit to their districts if they build up seniority, and that may require serving more than twelve years. A perusal of current legislators in Oklahoma shows a fairly equal number of years served among both urban/suburban legislators and rural legislators. Current urban/suburban legislators, on average have served seven years, and current rural legislators have served eight years. Of the fifty-eight districts deemed rural, eleven legislators had served over twelve years, the number of years that will now be the limit for legislators, and in the forty-two districts considered urban/suburban only five representatives had served more than twelve years.

The incumbents interviewed from rural areas expressed concern over what would happen to their districts with term limits in effect. Larry Adair's statement reflects such concern once term limits force incumbents out: "You are probably going to see the demise of rural Oklahoma. Most rural lawmakers stay [in office] a long time. In metropolitan areas lawmakers leave earlier. Rural lawmakers stay in touch with their constituents more than metropolitan lawmakers do. Term limits will cause a shift of power from rural to urban that will create a consolidation of county government and rural schools and a more centralized form of government." Rick Littlefield, another rural legislator, commented on the impact of term limits: "Seniority is the key to the Oklahoma legislature. It matters for committee assignments and the contact a legislator has with agency directors. Bureaucrats and lobbyists will run the government of Oklahoma once term limits kicks in." Littlefield gave an example of why experience was needed in the legislature, "as chairman of the appropriations committee, I oversee the funding of state boards and agencies. I noticed in the last budget cycle (1999) that the Water Resource Board was trying to double the funding for a lake study. Since I had served on the

committee for a number of years, I knew how much funding the board had asked for in the past. Were it not for experienced legislators like myself, the increased funding would have passed." Through his example, Littlefield makes reference to the importance of institutional memory. which critics of term limits believe will be damaged once experienced lawmakers are gone.³⁸ Both Adair and Littlefield suggested that some areas of a state might need politicians with static ambition more than others. If term limits shifts the power from rural to urban areas in the state, the legislature may not seem as attractive to candidates in rural Oklahoma in the future. Of course, as noted in chapter two, the political power shift from rural to urban has already occurred due to the demographic changes in the state. Rural legislators may not have the seniority clout as a result of term limits, but rural districts may have better representation from the competition term limits brings. Kazee writes how strong campaigns are most often based on how a candidate would serve the district, not how a candidate would seek consensus in the capitol. Candidates may become more parochial from term limits and focus more on casework than on legislation.³⁹

While incumbents may not have liked the impact term limits may have on their districts, most did not view it as a negative impact to their own careers because few planned on serving twelve years. Phil Ostrander said of term limits, "I don't plan on staying that long, I don't plan on serving twelve years in the legislature. I have children and a business, so I don't want a political career." Similarly, Tad Jones remarked, "term limits did not have an impact on me, twelve years is enough." Joe Eddins noted, "I'm so old; it won't matter (he was 59 when first elected and 65 now). Once term limits kicks in, it will be a blessing for the community and me." These are reactions from legislators who

have been elected after term limits was enacted. Representatives who are "post-term limits" legislators may tend to accept limits as part of their contract. as Farmer and Rausch suggests.⁴⁰ Pre-term limits legislators may be against term limits not so much because it will limit their career, although that is an issue, but because they believe it will harm the institution of the legislature that they have been so much a part of for many years.

As for the non-incumbents, none stated that term limits had an impact on their candidacy. For those potential candidates who ultimately did not run, none mentioned term limits as a reason for their decision. This lack of concern over term limits may be explained by both the number of years one can still serve in the legislature and the fact that candidates must now accept term limits as part of their contract. While both candidates and non-candidates considered term limits having no impact on their own decision, some did believe it would have a positive effect on their ability to serve in the legislature. Allen Harder mentioned that if he would be elected in this recent election, he would have seniority over most legislators as other incumbents would be term limited out. This is a case of a candidate, an experienced political operative, thinking of term limits by means of the old system rather than the new. Harder still believed that seniority would matter even though one of the primary motivations of term limits is to eliminate seniority.⁴¹ On the other hand, Jim Wilson, a political newcomer, responded to term limits with a different insight to the change it may bring in the legislature. "Overall seniority is harmful for state legislatures," Wilson said, "it takes away from the big job of legislators, which is to find money and appropriate it. Because that is such a big job I want to be on the budget committee, which would be difficult if the seniority system

continued. As for term limits, it is refreshing to know that a freshman does not have to wait twenty years to be influential in the legislature." Wilson considered term limits to be an alteration in the legislature that will transform the statehouse in positive ways, while Harder considered term limits as an imposition that will be shaped by the old system of the legislature. Term limits may allow, for better or for worse, more candidates like Wilson to be entrepreneurs in the legislature. Future research on candidate emergence will determine if term limits has changed the types of candidates who run for the Oklahoma legislature.

The types of candidates that emerge in an election can give an indication to the status of parties and to partisan shifts in the legislature. Republicans who ran for the Oklahoma legislature believed that it would be a good year to be a Republican candidate. Since this confidence gave Republicans better candidates who campaigned diligently and raised large amounts of funds, which gave them name recognition, the belief that 2000 would be a good year for Republicans became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The conclusion drawn from Jacobson and Kernell that better candidates appear for a party when signs are favorable, while worse candidates appear when they are unfavorable, seems to be true in recent legislative elections in this state. Jacobson and Kernell also note that favorable conditions for a party, such as a popular presidential candidate, cause the party to have an offensive strategy with its campaign spending. For a party with unfavorable conditions, the demand will be to spend its campaign funds defensively.⁴² In the 2000 election, Republican challengers had considerable funding if they proved electable, whereas Democrats protected their base of incumbents, leaving some of their challengers with a funding shortfall. Some Republican challengers, like Stuart Ericson, were able to win in

areas that have had minimal success for his party in the past. Funding proved to be an important factor for Ericson's success. However, it is also important to mention that Ericson focused on education and "doing what's right" for his district rather than emphasized his party.⁴³ Ericson's use of funding and campaign style is a textbook example of how a challenger from the minority party can win in an open seat.

While most incumbents in the Oklahoma legislature are safe from defeat, some Democratic legislators turned out to be vulnerable and lost. At this time, Democratic legislators from urban and suburban should count on having strong challengers emerge against them. The five Democratic legislators who lost were all from urban or suburban areas, and most had been in narrow reelections in the past. Republican challenger John Smaligo has proved that incumbents could be defeated, but it was his second time against the incumbent, and by his own admission his campaign had never ended. By using Smaligo as the model, candidates who decide to run against incumbents must be prepared to make more than one attempt at victory and to have an occupation that allows them the time to campaign and build networks within their parties.

Defeating incumbents is never easy, but before the changes of the 1990s, legislators in Oklahoma did have some risk of losing in their own primaries. Perhaps because of term limits, increased salary, legislative Political Action Committees (PACs), and increased staffing, all which have improved or have been enacted on in the last decade for Oklahoma legislators, the risk of losing in the primaries has diminished considerably. Term limits may, contrary to the desires of its supporters, decrease competition, as potential candidates will simply wait for seats to open up rather than go through the arduous task of facing incumbents. Term limits may also diminish the quality

of candidates in rural districts, as the opportunity to build a long career that gives the rural legislator more political clout will now be impossible.

Overall, candidate emergence for the legislature gives us the current picture: one political party on the upswing, brimming with confidence and fielding strong candidates in more areas throughout the state as a result of that confidence; the other political party in a defensive mode trying to protect its incumbents and ceding more and more urban and suburban areas to its competitor by fielding weak candidates or none at all. It could be that if national trends become unfavorable for Republicans, now that nationally they are the majority party, Democrats may regain the confidence they have lost and have more Democratic candidates decide to run. However, as it currently stands, the success Republicans had in 2000 will bring in more success because better candidates will emerge for their party.

Notes

 Brian Ford, "Demos' Caucus Smaller but Determined," <u>Tulsa World</u>, 10 November 2000, A6.

 James E. Campbell, <u>The Presidential Pulse of Congressional Elections</u> (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1997), 189.

- 3. Ibid., 189
- 4. Ibid., 115.

5. Brian Ford, "Demos' Caucus Smaller but Determined," A6.

6. Brian Ford, "GOP Celebrates Largest Advance in State History, but Democrats Still Retain a Slight Majority," <u>Tulsa World</u>, 8 November 2000, A8. 7. V. O. Key, <u>The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting</u> <u>1936-1960</u> (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 15.

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Chapter Five: Conclusion

This chapter reviews the observations and research from chapters two, three, and four and previews what direction future studies may take on candidate emergence in the Oklahoma State legislature.

Review of the Preceding Chapters

From the research in chapter two, we find that Oklahoma's political culture is changing and potential candidates must recognize this if they want to be successful. A major part of the culture has been the difficulty to categorize Oklahoma with other states. Because of its history and geographic location, Oklahoma does not belong to any particular region. While historically the politics of Oklahoma has been dominated by the Democratic party, it is misleading to call it a one-party state. The Republicans have always had a base in the state, and their failures to compete are due primarily to political calamities in the early decades of statehood. Democratic politicians in this state have had very little need to coordinate their campaigns with the national party. This behavior has worked for Democrats as long as the bulk of campaigns have been based on personality and not on policy. However, the traditional campaign style is in jeopardy as the state's demographics change, and the Republican party is in the best position to take advantage of those changes.

The most important alteration in Oklahoma politics has been the growth and, in some aspects, domination by the Republican party. Unlike many states, Oklahoma Republicans have their strongest support not in the rural areas but in the cities and suburbs. As these areas have grown, so has the strength of the Republicans in Oklahoma. With more people leaving the countryside or with the countryside transforming to

suburbs, more voters are in new surroundings. This shift is indicative of the transfer from person-intensive campaign strategies to policy-intensive campaign strategies described by Fenno. Campaign activists and potential candidates from the Republican ranks are more likely to approach politics in policy or ideological terms than are activists and potential candidates from the Democratic party. In addition, the parties have different viewpoints on their approach to fielding candidates. The Republican activists and party leaders have a strategy to field candidates in as many legislative districts as possible, regardless of their chances for victory. For the Democrats they are more likely to have a defensive strategic outlook by supporting candidates in areas where they have a strong chance of winning.

For the individuals who had been identified as potential candidates for the legislature, the demographic and political changes in Oklahoma helped shape their candidacy. Some of those interviewed had been in politics long enough to witness how personal connections of candidates were reduced in importance and have been replaced with a greater significance on fundraising and advertising. While these changes were significant, especially for political newcomers, personality-based campaigning still had a place in rural Oklahoma. Most incumbents operated in a permanent campaign mode by touching base with their constituencies year-round.

From the interviews and observations of potential candidates, a greater understanding develops on why individuals decide to run and also how organizations, namely parties, help them. Running against an incumbent is a daunting task for most challengers. The most qualified candidates, those with name recognition, political experience, and fundraising capabilities, are less likely to run against incumbents. This

leaves those with less qualification to challenge incumbents, which perpetuates the strength of incumbency. The ability of incumbents to "scare off" challengers suggests the effectiveness of the permanent campaign for officeholders. Casework, fundraising, and name recognition give many incumbents an aura of invincibility. A review of the number of unopposed candidates, who almost always happen to be incumbents, signifies the growing strength of Republicans in Oklahoma. In the most recent legislative elections, Democrats had sixteen unopposed candidates and the Republicans had fourteen. Republicans had most of their unopposed candidates in the cities, while Democrats had most of their unopposed candidates in rural northeastern, southeastern, and southwestern sections of the state. If this trend advances then the two parties will have their own domains with both dividing up the territory, in which each serves as the majority and the suburbs serve as the primary area for true competition among the parties.

For party building purposes, a minority party may try to get candidates to run against incumbents in areas where there is little support for them. However, parties may not lend much support to challengers facing strong incumbents, and they certainly do not give support to fellow party members who challenge their own incumbents. Parties, thus, make strategic choices on which candidates of theirs to support. Even the Republican party, which has a broad based strategy to field candidates in most districts will not give much assistance to candidates who do not raise some finances on their own. Political parties are active participants in affecting candidate emergence. They are not obsolete organizations in the campaign process but, in fact, provide important services, such as workshops on fundraising and campaigning. Parties also serve as a network for candidates who need contributors and campaign workers. Political parties in Oklahoma

have adapted to campaign-centered politics. Both political parties and interest groups are reactive rather than proactive when it comes to candidate recruitment. Candidates make the decision to run, and then support comes from parties and interest groups. signifying that candidates today are "self-starters."

Among the individuals who decided to run, very few considered politics as a profession. Even most incumbents who did view their service as a full-time job stressed that they had other means of employment as well. Most potential candidates began to focus on candidacy when they were in a comfortable position to do so. In other words, they had retired from one job or their businesses were secure enough for them to run. This meant that many candidates were in their fifties by the time they seriously considered a campaign for the legislature. On the other end of the spectrum, some potential candidates in their twenties or early thirties decided that now was the moment to run precisely because they had yet to build up time in another career. It was these young candidates who also had a positive outlook on the possibility of having a career in politics.

Combined with the issue of career risks when considering a campaign is also the impact a campaign may have on family life. The human element reminds us that individuals do not make decisions on candidacy in a vacuum. Before deciding to run, many individuals made the point that their children were either grown or pre-school age. According to many candidates, a campaign would have a negative impact on their lives and on their children's lives if they ran for office while their children where in school.

Campaign style and gender could also have an impact for some candidates. Women candidates may not be able to run a personality-based campaign in rural

Oklahoma the same way as men. Although one female candidate remarked that her gender and age, which is over fifty, seemed to work to her advantage, due to lack of women candidates, it may be difficult to make any assertions on the impact gender has on candidate emergence. Of course, the low number of women candidates does indicate that there could be some impediments for women as they consider a candidacy for the Oklahoma legislature.

While most potential candidates strongly considered their chances of success before making a decision to run, some individuals had other motivations. These candidates approached their campaigns knowing fully well that they had minimal chance to win. The motivations these candidates maintained were broken down into three categories: ideological, policy, and partisan. Candidates following on these three motivations were inspired to continue on with a campaign despite the overwhelming odds. To some degree, however, these same motivations also made candidates who followed them passionately less attractive to a broad spectrum of voters and made them unelectable.

Although some candidates did not need a positive prospect for success to serve as their main reason for running, most potential candidates considered the status of the incumbent as the primary deciding point for their candidacy. An open seat or a perceived vulnerable incumbent was paramount for most individuals who decided to be candidates. Many potential candidates also regarded the strength of their party and, to a lesser degree, policy matters before deciding to run.

With the combination of the changing political culture from chapter two and the categorization of who runs and why for the legislature from chapter three, chapter four

considered the issue of candidate emergence from the perspective of the 2000 election. This election resulted in the greatest success for Republicans in the Oklahoma legislature since the early 1920s. Republican candidates certainly appeared to have more confidence in their party's chances in this election, and they also were able to get candidates who had lost in 1998 to compete in 2000. Three such candidates proved to be successful in 2000. To the detriment of some Democratic challengers, their party's defensive approach left them with less financial means to compete as Democratic incumbents received the bulk of party funding. More funding for candidates in open seats proves to be a deciding factor. In open seat campaigns, six out of seven races were won by the candidates who had the most funds. For many challengers interviewed, the difference in funding between themselves and the incumbent was tremendous, leaving them with little chance to be competitive. This instructs us that candidates must consider their ability to raise money before they make the decision to run. Less qualified candidates are more likely to not regard this important factor.

The most important races for the party leaders and the races with the strongest candidates mainly took place in the open seats. This research suggests that the number of candidates in open seats can give some indication of a party's strength and also can locate where that strength exists. Republicans have more candidates for open seats in urban districts than in rural districts. In contrast, Democrats decrease their competitiveness in urban district open seats. This characterizes the strength of the two parties throughout the state of Oklahoma, and it also can be used to measure partisan trends. For example, through observing the gains in the number of candidates in rural open seats, one can conclude that while Republicans are still a minority they have become more competitive.

Meanwhile, according to this same measurement, Democrats have become less competitive in urban districts.

While open seats can be used to determine the strength of parties, the power of incumbency can be used to determine the strength of a governmental institution as well as party strength. In any given year, with few exceptions, incumbents are much more likely to end their service willingly through retirement than to be forced out by the voters. Incumbents have four advantages outlined in the research. First, incumbents are the beneficiaries of the parties that decide to protect their incumbents before investing in challengers. Second, due to the increased salary there is a greater incentive to get reelected and also greater ability among incumbents to devote more time to their political career. Third, while term limits may have been encouraged by its supporters as a way to bring about more competition, it may have the reverse effect as more qualified challengers will now wait until the incumbents' terms are out rather than risk difficult campaigns. Finally, the increased professionalism of the Oklahoma legislature has enabled incumbents to better serve their constituencies, which improves their standing in the eyes of the voters. Incumbents, especially those in rural districts, may have advantages, but they also are rewarded for the connections they build with the community. These connections may be severed with the advent of term limits.

From the incumbents interviewed there is a strong belief that term limits will have a negative impact on the rural areas of Oklahoma. Indeed, most legislators do not serve more than the twelve-year limit to begin with. But for those who do, they are most likely to be from the rural areas. One major concern is that term limits will make the job of legislator less attractive for potential candidates in rural districts, causing the most

qualified candidates to bypass a stay in the legislature. This could cause Oklahoma to be increasingly governed according to the demands of its two major cities and their suburbs and less those of the small towns and countryside. Of course, this transition was already underway before term limits was approved by the voters. From this analysis of the 2000 election and the debates over term limits, one can conclude that candidate emergence is not just a study on the psychological needs and strategic undertakings of individual candidates, but also can contribute to the study on the political and social transitions of a state.

During the several months of interviewing potential candidates, I was struck by the accuracy of Sandy Maisel's assessment of candidates: politicians had an incredible ability to delude themselves.¹ Almost everyone who runs must believe that he or she will win. It is understandable that people who go through the arduous task of being a candidate—time away from family and consequently strains on the family, financial sacrifices, and a public exposure of one's personal beliefs—would convince themselves of their success. All candidates interviewed thought they would win, albeit some knew it would be difficult, especially for those who were heavily outspent and those with minimal name recognition. Of course, not all interviewees became candidates. Some of the potential candidates, who decided against a candidacy ironically, had the qualifications that could have made them strong candidates. Many of these well-qualified potential candidates ruled out their campaigns because based on their sound judgment, a trait that made them strong candidates, they found victory a daunting possibility. While the decision to run is a personal one, a candidacy is not just about one person, because it involves family members and volunteers. Since most candidates do receive support from

others, they may feel obligated to portray an air of confidence about their campaigns, even when one should not exist.

Maisel also analyzed his own candidacy: "I was amazed by how little I knew when I decided to run. I did not know who my opponents would be; I did not know how I was perceived throughout the district, by the political leaders or by those at the grass roots; I did not know how much money I could raise, and not what others would spend against me."² It is interesting to note that this self-revealing analysis is coming from an individual who studies politics for a living. Maisel's experience is like that of many candidates: when it was time for him to run he did so. He considered primarily his own career and made his decision based on that. He did not regard what Sun Tzu would suggest as vital to success, the enemy (opponents) and the terrain (the district).³ Most candidates in this project would decide because the "the timing was right" for them. Usually this meant that the seat was open, but it also could mean that they were retired and were physically and financially prepared to run. For the successful candidates, they ran not only because they were personally prepared but also because they knew who their opponents would be, what their districts were like, and they knew how to raise money. These candidates may have understood this full spectrum of a candidacy beyond their own desires because they had been candidates before or because they had attended workshops and had worked in their political parties. Political novices, in the true sense of the word, do not get elected even to local offices, such as the state legislature, unless they understand that they are novices and do what they can to rectify the situation. That was the case with Jim Wilson from Tahlequah, who understood that as a political neophyte he would have to spend more on advertising than most candidates to overcome this deficit.

As described in chapter four, Wilson spent an astounding amount for a rural legislature post in Oklahoma. For better or for worse, as more newcomers try to gain seats in the legislature, which may happen as a result of the increased open seats through term limits, Wilson's strategy of an advertising deluge may be adopted by more future candidates.

Through research on potential candidates, I also came in contact with local party organizations and their coordination with district and state party officials. From this aspect of the research. Jacobson and Kernell's description on the strategy of parties was telling: how national conditions would cause a party to have an offensive strategy if the conditions were favorable and a party to have a defensive strategy if the conditions were unfavorable.⁴ While there is some doubt on the impact of national conditions on candidates, just as Kazee found that potential candidates for congress placed very little importance on national factors.⁵ state and local parties may have more confidence in the success of their candidates based on what they believe the outcome of a national election may be. Republican candidates and party officials believed that it would be a good year to run for the Oklahoma legislature, in part, because of the projected success GOP presidential candidate George W. Bush would have in the state. On the issue of offensive strategy for a party, a good model would be Republican second district chairman Bob Hudspeth's desire to have all Democratic incumbents challenged. Counter to Hudspeth's enthusiasm, there was Tulsa county Democratic chairman Keith McArtor's belief that Democratic candidates should not run in districts where they cannot win. Democrats in the state of Oklahoma evidently had a defensive strategy based on the amount of funds received by incumbents in contrast to the money received by their challengers. The strategy for Democrats in Oklahoma matched up strongly with Gierzynski's research that

the majority party in the legislature, which is now barely the Democrats, places as its top priority the protection of vulnerable incumbents.⁶ In the case of Oklahoma, some Democratic incumbents may not have been that vulnerable, and the money could have been spent in a more beneficial way to help challengers. Perhaps in the future, as Oklahoma increasingly becomes a two-party state, Democrats will develop a more encompassing plan that disperses funding, instead of the lopsided distribution that was in use during the 2000 election.

As suggested throughout this dissertation, a study on candidate emergence reveals not only the decision making process of potential candidates but also the status of political parties, the changes of a state's legislature, and its legislative districts. This dissertation marks a beginning on how candidate emergence can be used to understand the political dynamics of a state. There are areas from this dissertation on which studies on candidate emergence in state legislative politics can build.

Improvements on the Study

This research included thirty-nine potential candidates, including eight incumbents, eighteen challengers, and thirteen individuals who decided against running. In addition to the potential candidates, twenty-two political activists from the county, district, and state level were also interviewed. From this group of sixty-one of potential candidates and activists, one could get a good picture of candidacy for the legislature in Oklahoma for the year 2000. Despite the limited ability to generalize beyond one state and one time, the goal of case studies, as methodologists have argued, is not to generalize. Instead it is to provide a thick description as Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln advise⁷ or to give the reader a better understanding or "Verstehen" of the processes and

the people under study.⁸ Thus, the research community should be able to learn from a case study. There should be useful application; these case studies apply to any state that is in a transition similar to Oklahoma, states that are having a power shift from rural areas to urban/suburban areas and states that are changing from one party rule to a competitive two party system. States with similar political dynamics as Oklahoma should be found in the South, where many states in that region are also experiencing increased competition between the two parties.⁹ Since there is application, it not only makes this study useful but also suggests opportunity for improvements.

The "thick description" characterized by Guba and Lincoln is a useful way to remember the type of research needed for candidate emergence. Guba and Lincoln write that extensive or thick descriptions are needed in cases that have multiple realities and complex interactions that may occur between the researcher and the person who is studied.¹⁰ My research is focused, as mentioned before, in the northeastern part of Oklahoma and the city of Tulsa. Further research could include coordination with other researchers from other parts of the state. The political and demographic patterns in most parts of the state would be similar to the regions studied in this research. Northeastern Oklahoma is rural and dominated by the Democratic party, with an emerging Republican minority. This would be a similar pattern found in the southeastern and southwestern parts of the state. Oklahoma City is a metro area that has a dominant Republican party with pockets of Democratic strength, which is the same pattern found in Tulsa. However, only one other region could provide, I believe, a different insight from what is in this study. The one area of Oklahoma that would not fit into any pattern found in this study would be northwestern Oklahoma. This is a rural area that traditionally has been

dominated by the Republican party throughout most of Oklahoma history. Additional studies in the future could include this area, where rural Republicans dominate, to determine what differences there may be in the decision to be a candidate for the state legislature. One particular issue to consider would be if rural Republican candidates in areas with little change in the population also stress personality and service, which would be similar to their Democratic counterparts in the northeastern part of the state.

Perhaps what would be an even greater improvement on the study would not be extending the research into other parts of Oklahoma, but instead expanding the research to include other states. One comparison with other states that will be of importance in the years to come would be based on the impact of term limits. As term limits in Oklahoma prevents any politician from serving more than twelve years, a comparison of the impact term limits has on candidate emergence in this state could be made with another state that does not have term limits. A comparison with Kansas, a state without term limits, may give us insights into the differences term limits may bring to candidate emergence. States without term limits would still give politicians with static ambition an opportunity to serve. Another interesting comparison could be with a state where the legislators are expected to be only part-time public servants as a result of their salary. States with low pay may have a smaller pool of potential candidates than Oklahoma.

This study has brought out many questions that can be answered through future research. As the state of Oklahoma continues to change, additional research questions can be considered on the status of candidate emergence.

What Future Research May Bring

As Oklahoma continues to proceed towards a two-party system, the state should reap the benefits of having increased political competition. Key firmly believes that when a state has two-party competition, it would be helpful to the state's citizens. According to Key, "in the two-party states the anxiety over the next election pushes political leaders into serving the interests of the have-less of society, therefore putting the party into the countervailing power operation."¹¹ This comes from the understanding that two parties would need to appeal to larger pool of voters rather than a narrow pool that would exist in a one-party state. However, as Morehouse points out, Republicans in states that have been dominated by conservative Democrats would need to be more moderate than their national party in order to appeal to the non-conservative voter.¹² For the Oklahoma voter, future legislative elections may be more competitive, but they may involve two competing conservatives with the little variation in policies. It is the absence of competition, according to Thomas Dye, which brings about an absence of what he calls "policy-relevant" parties. Additionally, Dye asserts that in noncompetitive states the political parties in the states do not conform to the national party model. Thus states with little competition would not have distinctive parties based on policy differences. Once there is two-party competition, there may be policy-relevant parties that represent different class constituencies and issue-oriented activists.¹³

Increased competition between the two parties in Oklahoma may cause different types of candidates to emerge for the legislature in the future. Candidates for the legislature may represent the policies of their national parties. If this happened, it could be verified from the candidates who run for office. If Democratic candidates decided to

run in the future to oppose Republican policies and if Republican candidates decided to run to oppose Democratic policies, there would be some indication that policy differences were brought about through two-party competition. State legislative candidates, especially Democratic candidates, may be more aligned with the policies of their national party if competition between the parties increases. If this occurred, it could be proven from the motivation to run by certain candidates and also by the types of activists who control a party organization.

It will be interesting to study if two-party competition does give the voters a greater variety of choices on policies and if it also creates more disciplined parties that follow the guidelines of their national counterparts. This competition could increase voter participation and political activism in the state. However, it does appear, as this research has indicated, that the two parties may have competitive numbers in the legislature but that in only a few areas of Oklahoma the two parties are competitive. As noted, Republicans have made some inroads in rural Oklahoma and will probably continue to do so. Democrats, on the other hand, have become less competitive in the metropolitan areas of Oklahoma. Thus studies on candidate emergence in the future can measure if there has been increased competition by analyzing the quality of candidates for a party in areas that have been dominated by the opposition. If the parties are becoming competitive throughout the state, then Republican candidates in rural areas will be of the quality that can win elections. In addition, two-party competition should bring about more contestation in the urban areas, with more Democrats challenging Republican incumbents and the Democrats fielding better candidates in urban open seats.

Increased competition also may cause conservative potential candidates in rural areas, who may have in the past run as Democrats, now to run as Republicans. One of the potential candidates interviewed, a candidate that intends to run once an open seat would be available, did not determine which party he would run under. As the Republicans gain seats and may become the majority party in the legislature, rural conservative potential candidates may be emboldened enough to run on the GOP ticket. These candidates could claim it was in the best interest of their districts to serve with the majority party. Ironically, this is a reason currently used by some rural Democratic candidates. As they lose their majority status, the Democratic party may have a more difficult time fielding quality candidates. However, this also may cause the Democratic party in Oklahoma to concentrate on policies. As a minority party, Democratic potential candidates may become more ideological and may also embrace the national party. This may harm their chances of winning, but as witnessed from the "hopeless" Republican candidates interviewed in rural Oklahoma, it will be their ideological and partisan beliefs that motivate them to run. The more ideological and partisan Democratic candidates may also focus on single issues as appears to be the case for Republican candidates who run in hopeless campaigns.

If rural Republicans expand on the success of candidates such as Ericson in Muskogee county, the GOP may become a strong majority in the Oklahoma legislature. It will be interesting to study the behavior of rural Republicans and determine if they behave in many ways as rural Democrats. Rural campaigns tend to focus more on the personalities of the candidates, while urban campaigns focus more on policy.¹⁴ A concern has been among political consultants, journalists, and political scientist that modern

campaigns are "personality-oriented but impersonal."¹⁵ Contrary to this concern, my research on rural candidates indicates that rural campaigns in Oklahoma are personality-oriented and personal. Once they are the majority, rural Republican candidates may become more like their Democratic counterparts and stress service and personality over policy and ideology. A future study on Republican potential candidates may show urban and rural differences within the party.

Demographic changes in Oklahoma will encourage more studies on the types of candidates that emerge in areas with increased population, compared to areas with decreased or static population growth. Suburban areas or the lake areas, as described in chapter two, have, for the most part, the greatest increase in population for the state of Oklahoma. Potential candidates in these regions may be more likely from out of state than candidates in other areas. As a result of their status as newcomers, these potential candidates' campaigns may center on partisan issues, ideology, and single issue policies rather than on the "home style" method outlined by Fenno.¹⁶ Thus as suburban and retirement areas have the greatest population increases and changes in its politics, Oklahoma legislative campaigns will increasingly benefit candidates who can raise more money and rally their partisan base of voters. This would prove Fenno's argument that as districts become destabilized through population shifts, candidates have less ability to campaign through traditional methods.¹⁷

In the next few years, certainly by 2004, the impact of term limits on the state legislatures will be evident. By that time, the legislators with the most experience, those first elected before 1990, will be term limited out. The change brought about by term limits may mean that younger representatives, more women, and more Republicans will

be in the legislature. Term limits also may cause legislators to behave as delegates, who vote consistently with their constituents, rather than trustees, who vote their own consciences.¹⁸ For these changes to occur, there must also be changes in the types of candidates who run for the legislature. In the 1990s, the number of incumbent legislators that have lost in their primary has gone down. It may be that term limits has caused and will continue to cause quality challengers to wait for open seats and allow incumbents to have essentially a free pass during their times in office. Those supporters who believed term limits would increase competition may be disappointed, as the competition against incumbents may actually decrease. Through studies on candidate emergence, we can surmise if in fact more potential candidates wait for open seats, which was indeed found in this research.

The possibility of having more delegate legislators from term limits seems mixed. Kazee believes that there may be more representatives who are parochial in their interests as a result of term limits.¹⁹ However, legislators who are delegates may behave as such because of their fear of losing reelection.²⁰ If term limits decreases the motivation for quality candidates to challenge incumbents, incumbents may lose the incentive to be a delegate and become a trustee. More trustees in the Oklahoma legislature may actually benefit the state, but once again with the issue of competition, term limits may create the effect opposite to what its supporters intended. A decline in electoral competition could give legislators a reason to avoid the demands of the public, much to the chagrin of term limits advocates.

Term limits will end the careers of politicians who have static ambitions. These are politicians who wanted to build up a career in the legislature and had no desire to use

their position as a springboard for a higher office. As of now, no legislator can build a career beyond twelve years in the Oklahoma legislature. Reducing the number of politicians with "static ambition" may seem to be a positive step for a state government, because politicians with static ambitions seem to imply that these legislators are, to use the terminology of James David Barber, "spectators." Barber describes spectators in the legislature as individuals with low self-esteem who do not lead in the legislative process.²¹ While it may appear that a legislator with static ambition has low self-esteem, it could be that these politicians are actually very comfortable with their status and have no esteem problems. In other words, they have the personality of "lawmaker" that Barber espouses. Lawmakers, Barber describes, are politicians who "enter politics from a position of personal strength, not as a compensation for personal weaknesses."22 Lawmakers are, according to Barber, the best personality types to have in a legislature. Since term limits will end the ability to build a career in the legislature, could it actually decrease the possibility to have such personality types as Lawmakers in the Oklahoma legislature? It may be difficult to determine the impact term limits could have on personality types in the state legislature. However, if term limits causes a decrease in competition for legislative seats, then there may be an increase in legislators with personality types that do not benefit the district or the state. One such personality type is the advertiser, the type of individual that Barber describes as basing "politics primarily through the central dimension of his life—his occupation."²³ Knowing that a life-long career cannot be built in the Oklahoma legislature, more candidates in the future may use the office to promote a business or to prepare them for other careers once they are term limited out. This may not be a problem in Oklahoma if a large portion of candidates have

already retired from one occupation and do not plan on serving that long in the legislature to begin with.

Term limits may not have any impact on the personality types of candidates who run for the legislature in urban or suburban districts, but as mentioned in chapter four, it may have an impact in the type of legislator who serves in rural Oklahoma. Of course, the change in the type of legislator in rural Oklahoma may have more to do with demographic and partisan changes. Still, many rural legislators do believe that term limits will diminish the power of rural districts and give more authority to Oklahoma City and Tulsa, simply because those two urban areas have more legislators. Rural Oklahoma will not be able to use the experience of their legislators to balance out these larger numbers from urban centers. As a result of this loss of clout, there may be a decrease of quality in legislative candidates from rural areas. In addition, there could be fewer incentives for individuals from rural areas to run for the legislature if the job is less important due to term limits.

Without doubt, studies on candidate emergence in the Oklahoma legislature will continue to be needed as a result of more two-party competition, demographic changes, and term limits. The types of candidates that choose to run for the legislature will tell the political science community much about the status of this state's legislature and also about changes regarding the overall political and demographic structure of Oklahoma. This research is a beginning to the understanding of who wants to run and why for the Oklahoma legislature.

This dissertation began with the observation that Clinton Rossiter's succinct analysis on the need for political parties in America should be expanded to include the

importance of candidates. Americans get a choice at the voting booth because some individuals are willing to take risks and become candidates. The number and quality of candidates can be a measurement used by political observers to judge the strength of a political party and the importance of a political office. The overall strength of a country's democracy can also be judged on the number and quality of candidates who choose to run for the various elected offices. If fewer individuals see the need to run or have no personal desire to serve, then a country's democracy is harmed because of it. I believe anyone who studies candidate emergence develops a greater personal respect for the people who decide to be candidates. Considering the personal and financial risks candidates may incur as result of running, it is surprising and reassuring that many people will run for office. A democratic society will have candidates who achieve victory from their hard work. Their reward is easy to understand. At the same time, a democratic society will have even more candidates who do not achieve victory from their hard work but instead find rejection at the polls. For these unsuccessful candidates, their reward must be "in the running rather than in the winnning."²⁴ All supporters of democracy should be grateful to the individuals who enter the political arena and accept the risk of losing. America does not exist without them. Their endeavor is our reward.

Notes

1. L. Sandy Maisel, From Obscurity to Oblivion: Running in the

Congressional Primary (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1982), 23.

- 2. Ibid., 19.
- 3. Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London: Oxford University

Press, 1963), 129.

Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, <u>Strategy and Choice in Congressional</u>
 Elections, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 41.

5. <u>Who Runs for Congress? Ambition, Context, and Candidate Emergence</u>, edited by Thomas A. Kazee (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1994), 179.

6. Anthony Gierzynski, <u>Legislative Party Campaign Committees in the</u> American States (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1992), 103.

7. Egon Guba and Yvonna S. Lincoln, <u>Effective Evaluation: Improving the</u> <u>Usefulness of Evaluation Results through Responsive and Naturalistic</u> <u>Approaches</u> (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1981), 58.

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John Aldrich, "Southern Parties in State and Nation," <u>The Journal of Politics</u>,
 62 (2000): 661.

10. Egon Guba and Yvonna S. Lincoln, <u>Effective Evaluation: Improving the</u> <u>Usefulness of Evaluation Results Through Responsive and Naturalistic</u>

Approaches, 58.

 V. O. Key, <u>Southern Politics in State and Nation</u> (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), 307.

 Sarah McNally Morehouse, <u>State Politics, Parties and Policy</u> (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), 73. 13. Thomas R. Dye, "Party and Policy in the States," <u>The Journal of Politics</u>46 (1984): 1111-14.

14. John W. Kingdon, <u>Candidates for Office: Beliefs and Strategies</u> (New York: Random House, 1968), 61.

15. Frank Luntz, <u>Candidates, Consultants, and Campaigns: The Style and</u> <u>Substance of American Electioneering (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 22.</u>

16. Richard Fenno, Jr., <u>Home Style: House Members in Their Districts</u> (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 32.

17. Ibid., 236.

18. Dave Rausch and Rick Farmer make the argument that more legislators will be delegates in "Oklahoma Term Limits: Reflecting a National Movement," <u>The</u> <u>Almanac of Oklahoma Politics 2000</u>, eds. Gary W. Copeland, Ronald K. Gaddie, and Craig A. Williams (Stillwater: OPSA Press, 1999), 97. A good description of the differences between delegate and trustee representatives can be found in Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Jerry Goldman, <u>The Challenge of Democracy</u>, 6th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 469-470.

19. <u>Who Runs for Congress? Ambition, Context, and Candidate Emergence</u>, edited by Thomas A. Kazee, 183.

20. Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Jerry Goldman, <u>The Challenge of</u> <u>Democracy</u>, 469-470.

21. James David Barber, <u>The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to</u> <u>Legislative Life</u> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 219.

22. Ibid., 252.

23. Ibid., 231.

24. Robert Huckshorn and Robert Spencer, <u>The Politics of Defeat: Campaigning</u> for Congress (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1971), 83.

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
Appendix A

Unopposed Candidates


Provided below are the names of unopposed candidates from 1980-2000 for the Oklahoma House of Representatives. The categories for unopposed candidates, those with no opponent in the primary or general elections, are broken down by regions and demographics. Regional categories include northeast, southeast, northwest, southwest, central, and metro. Four of the regions are identified, as shown from the map below, from the division of the state based on the interstate highway system. Combining Interstate Highway-35, which divides Oklahoma East-West, and Interstate Highway-40, which divides Oklahoma North-South, identifies four regions for the state. The central category includes three categories listed on the second map, which make up the "tail" of U.S. House District 3. These counties are Payne, Lincoln and Pottawatomie. The category for metro includes Oklahoma county and Tulsa county.

Three demographic categories are rural, urban, and suburban. The Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) rates three areas in Oklahoma as metropolitan as of October 25, 2000, the Internet release date. The three SMSA are Lawton (Comanche county), Oklahoma City (Canadian, Cleveland, Oklahoma counties), and Tulsa (Creek, Osage, Tulsa counties). Canadian, Cleveland, Creek, and Osage counties, which border Tulsa county or Oklahoma county are listed as suburban. Garfield county, where District 40 is located, is a rural area, which is not connected to Oklahoma county or Tulsa county; thus it is not a suburban county. However, District 40 is in the city of Enid with a population of 50,000, which makes it more urban than rural. Garfield and Comanche counties are listed as "urban/rural" counties. Some districts overlap counties, which may cause these districts to have a combination of demographic descriptions. Certainly Rogers and Wagoner counties, which border Tulsa, take on the characteristics of suburban areas, as does Pottawatomie county, which borders Oklahoma county as well. Since these three counties are not listed as suburban by the SMSA, they are listed as "rural" for this study.

Map 8. Regions of Oklahoma Based on Interstate Highway System



Map 9. Central Counties from Third Congressional District



U.S. Congressional Districts for Oklahoma

Source: Oklahoma Almanac, 46th ed., The Oklahoma Dept. of Libraries, Oklahoma City, 1998.

1980 Democratic Unopposed Candidates (32)

Name	<u>District</u>	Region	Demographics
M. Thompson	3 (LeF. McC)	southeast	rural
W. Willis	4 (Adair, Cher.)	northeast	rural
A.C. Holden	11(Os., Wash.)	northeast	rural/suburban
B. Lancaster	12 (Mus., Wag.)	northeast	rural
J. Monks	14 (Muskogee)	northeast	rural
F. Shruden	16 (Okmulgee)	northeast	rural
F. Harbin	18 (Pittsburg)	southeast	rural
G. Davis	21 (Bryan)	southeast	rural
B. Robinson	24 (Co., Hug., Okf.)	southeast	rural
L. Abbott	25 (Pontotoc)	southeast	rural
R. Henry	26 (Pottowtomie)	central	rural
C. Morgan	32 (Lin., Log., Okf.)	central	rural
D. Draper	34 (Payne)	central	rural
D. Johnson	35 (Gar., Kay., Now.)		rural
D. Feddersen	43 (Canadian)	northwest	suburban
D. Talley	47 (Grady, Mc.)	southwest	rural
D. Duke	48 (Carter)	southwest	rural
V. Dunn	51 (Car., Grv., Ste.)	southwest	rural
H. Cotner	52 (Jack., Kiowa)	southwest	rural
B. Harper	53 (Com., Har., Jac.)	southwest	rural
J. Weichel	55 (Cad., Ki., Wash.)	southwest	rural
R. Reimer	59 (seven counties)	northwest	rural
W. Rogers	60 (Beck., Gre., Har)	southwest	rural
M. Baughman	63 (Comanche)	southwest	urban/rural
R. Hooper, Jr.	64 (Comanche)	southwest	urban/rural
J. Glover	65 (Comanche)	southwest	urban/rural
E.C. Sanders	87 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
D. Denman	88 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
J. Lawter	90 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
J. Fried	92 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
D. Craighead	95 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
R. Duckett	98 (Oklahoma, Can.)	metropolitan	urban/suburban

1980 Unopposed Republican Candidates (8)

Name	<u>District</u>	Region	Demographics
J. Manning, Jr. R. Milacek R. Andersen L. Kamas W. Hill	 33 (Payne) 39 (Alf., Bl., Gar.,) 41 (Garfield) 58 (Maj., Wo., Wow. 61 (Bea., Cim., Te.) 	northwest) northwest	rural rural urban/rural rural rural

J. Hastings67 (Tulsa)metropolitanurbanN. McCaleb81 (Oklahoma)metropolitanurbanG. Camp85 (Oklahoma)metropolitanurbanSource: Election Results and Statistics 1980, Compiled by State Election Board, LeeSlater, Secretary, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

1982 Unopposed Democratic Candidates (30)

Name	District	Region	Demographics
M. Murphy	1 (McCurtain)	southeast	rural
D. Mentzer	2 (Sequoyah)	northeast	rural
M. Thompson	3 (LeFlore)	southeast	rural
W. Willis	4 (Cherokee)	northeast	rural
J. Fitzgibbon	7 (Ottawa)	northeast	rural
B. Lancaster	12 (Mus. Wag.)	northeast	rural
J. Monks	14 (Muskogee)	northeast	rural
F. Shurden	16 (Okmulgee)	northeast	rural
F. Harbin	18 (Pittsburg)	southeast	rural
G. Sherrer	19 (Choc. McC. Push) southeast	rural
G. Davis	21 (Bryan)	southeast	rural
L. Abbott	25 (Pontotoc)	southeast	rural
R. Henry	26 (Pottawatomie)	central	rural
S. Lewis	27 (Cle., Pott.)	central	rural/suburban
B. Vanatta	30 (Creek)	northeast	suburban
C. Morgan	32 (Lin., Log.)	central	rural
D. Johnson	35 (No., Os., Paw.,)	northeast	rural
C. Deatherage	44 (Cleveland)	central	suburban
D. Talley	47 (Grady)	northwest	rural
D. Duke	48 (Carter)	southwest	rural
J.D. Blodgett	50 (Stephens)	southwest	rural
W. Rogers	60 (Beck., Gre., Har.)	southwest	rural
R. Hooper, Jr.	64 (Comanche)	southwest	urban/rural
J. Glover	65 (Comanche)	southwest	urban/rural
D. McCorkell, Jr.	72 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
E. C. Sanders	87 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
J. Fried	92 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
B. Brown	93 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
D. Craighead	95 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
R. Duckett	98 (Ok. Can, Gra.)	northwest	rural/suburban/urban

1982 Republican Unopposed Candidates (5)

Name	<u>District</u>	Region	Demographics	
J.D. Whorton	8 (My., Ro., Wag.,)	northeast	rural	
D. Conaghan	38 (Alf., Grn., Kay)	northwest	rural	
J. Hastings	67 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban	
N. Little	69 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban	
G. Atkinson	83 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban	
Source: Election Res	ults and Statistics 1982	2. Compiled by State E	lection Board. Lee	
Source: Election Results and Statistics 1982, Compiled by State Election Board, Lee Slater, Secretary, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma				

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1984 Democratic Unopposed Candidates (18)

Name	<u>District</u>	Region	<u>Demographics</u>
D. Mentzer	2 (Sequoyah)	northeast	rural
R. Littlefield	5 (Del.Ott.My.)	northeast	rural
A.C. Holden	10 (Osage-Wash.)	northeast	rural/suburban
G. Sherrer	19 (Choc. McC.Push)	southeast	rural
G. Johnson	24 (Hu. Ofk. Okm.)	southeast	rural
R. Henry	26 (Pott.)	central	rural
E. Haney	28 (Okf. Sem.)	southeast	rural
J. Formby	29 (Creek)	northeast	suburban
C. Morgan	32 (Lin. Log.)	central	rural
D. Anderson	36 (Osage)	northeast	rural
D. Talley	47 (Grady)	northwest	rural
D. Duke	48 (Carter)	southeast	rural
B. Brewster	49 (Car. Lo. Mrsh.)	southeast	rural
B.Smith	51 (Cot. Jef. Ste.)	southwest	rural
H. Cotner	52 (Jackson)	southwest	rural
E. Grieser	55 (Cad. Kio. Was)	southwest	rural
L. Benson	63 (Com. Til.)	southwest	urban/rural
J. Glover	65 (Comanche)	southwest	urban/rural

1984 Unopposed Republican Candidates (2)

Name	District	Region	Demographics
	58 (Woods, Woodw.) 76 (Tulsa) ults and Statistics 1984 te Capitol, Oklahoma (metropolitan 4, <i>Compiled by State El</i>	rural urban lection Board, Lee

1986 Unopposed Democratic Candidates (19)

Name	<u>District</u>	Region	Demographics
M. Murphy	1 (McCurtain)	southeast	rural
D. Mentzer*	2 (Sequoyah)	northeast	rural
R. Littlefield*	5 (Del. Ott. My.)	northeast	rural
J. Barker	13 (Muskogee)	northeast	rural
J. Monks	14 (Muskogee)	northeast	rural
G. Johnson*	24 (Hug. Okf. Okm)	northeast	rural
B. Vanatta	30 (Creek)	northeast	suburban
L. Gish	34 (Payne)	central	rural
B. Brewster	49 (Car. Log. Mrsh.)	southeast	rural
E. Grieser	55 (Ca. Ki. Wash.)	southwest	rural
T. Manar	56 (Caddo)	southwest	rural
B. Widener	57 (Blaine, Custer)	southwest	rural
D. George	60 (Beck. Gre. Har.)	southwest	rural
K. Harris	62 (Comanche)	southwest	urban/rural
L. Benson	63 (Com. Til.)	southwest	rural
J. Glover	65 (Comanche)	southwest	urban/rural
D. Ross	73 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
L. Larason	88 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
G. Bastin	94 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban

1986 Republican Unopposed Candidates (6)

Name	District	Region	Demographics
D. Gleichman	17 (Lat. LeF. McC. P	it.) southeast	rural
J. Holt	37 (Kay)	northwest	rural
H. Rieger	40 (Garfield)	northwest	urban/rural
W. Hill	61 (Bea. Cim. Te.)	northwest	rural
W. Cozort	67 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
B. Clark	71 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban

Source: Election Results and Statistics 1986, Compiled by State Election Board, Lee Slater, Secretary, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

1988 Democratic Unopposed Candidates (21)

Name	District	Region	Demographics
M. Murphy	l (McCurtain)	southeast	rural
D. Mentzer	2 (Sequoyah)	northeast	rural
J. Hamilton	3 (LeFlore)	southeast	rural
R. Medearis	4 (Cherokee)	northeast	rural

R. Littlefield	5 (Del. My. Ott.)	northeast	rural
G. Vaughn	6 (Cr., My., No., Ro.)) northeast	rural/suburban
L. Roberts	7 (Ottawa)	northeast	rural
J. Barker	13 (Muskogee)	northeast	rural
W. Roberts	18 (Pittsburg)	southeast	rural
S. Lewis	27 (Cle. Pott.)	central	rural/suburban
B. Vanatta	30 (Creek)	northeast	suburban
D. Talley	47 (Grady)	northwest	rural
B.Brewster	49 (Carter, Love, Mrs	sh.) southeast	rural
H. Cotner	52 (Jackson)	southwest	rural
E. Grieser	55 (Cad., Ki., Wash)	southwest	rural
L. Benson	63 (Comanche, Til.)	southwest	urban/rural
J. Glover	65 (Comanche)	southwest	urban/rural
D. McCorkell, Jr.	72 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
D. Ross	73 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
L. Adair	86 (Adair, Del, My.)	northeast	rural
W. Peltier	93 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban

1988 Republican Unopposed Candidates (11)

Name	<u>District</u>	Region	Demographics
F. Davis	31 (Logan, Noble)	northwest	rural
J. Holt	37 (Kay)	northeast	rural
J. Reese	38 (Alf., Grn., Kay)	northwest	rural
W. Cozort	67 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
W. Veitch	69 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
R. Williamson	76 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
L. Sullivan	82 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
J. Heaton	83 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
B. Graves	84 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
M. Hunter	85 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
E. Ishtook	100 (Can. Okla.)	northwest	rural/suburban

Source: Election Results and Statistics 1988, Compiled by State Election Board, Lance Ward, Secretary, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

1990 Democratic Unopposed Candidates (14)

Name	District	Region	Demographics
D. Mentzer	2 (Sequoyah)	northeast	rural
L. Roberts	7 (Ottawa)	northeast	rural
L. Rice	8 (Mys. Rog. Wag.)	northeast	rural
D. Steidly	9 (Rogers)	northeast	rural
W. Roberts	18 (Pittsburg)	southeast	rural

T. Thomas	20 (At. Jhn. Pit.)	southeast	rural
B. Mitchell	42 (Garvin-Grady)	northwest	rural
H. Cotner	52 (Jackson)	southwest	rural
L. Benson	63 (Com. Til.)	southwest	rural
J. Glover	65 (Comanche)	southwest	urban/rural
D. McCorkell	72 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
D. Ross	73 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
L. Adair	86 (Ad. Del. My.)	northeast	rural
K. Cox	97 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban

1990 Republican Unopposed Candidates (5)

Name	District	Region	Demographics
J. Dunlap	11 (Wash. Now.)	northeast	rural
L. Ferguson	35 (No. Os. Paw. Pay	.)northeast	rural/suburban
J. Holt	37 (Kay)	northwest	rural
J.Henshaw	79 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
R. Vaughn	81 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban

Source: Election Results and Statistics 1990, Compiled by State Election Board, Lance Ward, Secretary, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

1992 Democratic Unopposed Candidates (28)

Name	<u>District</u>	Region	Demographics
J.T. Stites	2 (Sequoyah)	northeast	rural
J. Hamilton	3 (LeFlore)	southeast	rural
B. Culver	4 (Cherokee Seq.)	northeast	rural
L. Roberts	7 (Ottawa)	northeast	rural
L. Rice	8 (My. Ro. Wag.)	northeast	rural
D. Steidly	9 (Rogers)	northeast	rural
J. Hefner	12 (Muskogee, Wag.)	northeast	rural
B. Settle	13 (Muskogee, Wag.)	northeast	rural
M.C. Leist	16 (Muskogee, Okm)	northeast	rural
M. Mass	17 (Lat. LeF. Pit.)	southeast	rural
J. Dunegan	21 (Bryan)	southeast	rural
D. Hilliard	22 (Cle. Grv. McC.)	southwest	rural/suburban
B. Boyd	23 (Rog. Tulsa)	northeast	urban/rural
M. Tyler	30 (Creek, Tulsa)	northeast	urban/suburban
B. Mitchell	42 (Grv. Grd. McC)	southwest	rural
F. Stanley	49 (Car. Lo. Mrsh.)	southeast	rural
B. Smith	51 (Car. Co. Jef. Ste)	southwest	rural
H. Cotner	52 (Harmon, Jac)	southwest	rural
B. Widener	57 (Bla. Cus. Dew.)	southwest	rural

J. Begley	61 (Bev. Wood. Cim.) southwest		rural
J. Maddox	62 (Comanche)	southwest	urban/rural
L. Benson	63 (Com. Til.)	southwest	urban/rural
J. Glover	65 (Com. Gra)	southwest	urban/rural
S. Satterfield	68 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
D. McCorkell	72 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
M. Seikel	96 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
K. Cox	97 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
A. Monson	99 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban

1992 Republican Unopposed Candidates (10)

Name	<u>District</u>	Region	Demographics	
J. Dunlap L. Ferguson J. Reese	11 (Osage Wash.) 35 (No., Os. Paw.) 38 (Alf, Gr. Kay) 50 (Stephens)	northeast central northwest southwest	rural/suburban rural/suburban rural rural	
E. Apple E. Maddux	58 (Ma, Wo., Wow.)		rural	
R. Johnson	77 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban	
J. Henshaw	79 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban	
B. Gates R. Vaughn	80 (Tulsa) 81 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan metropolitan	urban urban	
M. Fallin	85 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban	
Source: Election Results and Statistics 1992, Compiled by State Election Board, Lance				
Ward, Secretary, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma				

<u>1994 Democratic Unopposed Candidates (27)</u>

Name	<u>District</u>	Region	Demographics
T. Matlock J. Hamilton B. Culver L. Rice G. Taylor J. Hefner	1 (McCurtain) 3 (Leflore) 4 (Cherokee) 8 (Mayes-Rogers) 10 (Now-Wash) 12 (Wagoner)	southeast southeast northeast northeast northeast	rural rural rural rural rural rural
 B. Settle R. Erwin T. Thomas J. Dunegan D. Hilliard D. Kinnamon D. Wells C. Anthony B.Widener 	 13 (Muskogee) 19 (Push-Choc) 20 (At. Coal, Jhn) 21 (Bryan) 22 (Mur., GrvCle.) 32 (Lincoln) 33 (Payne) 34 (Payne) 57 (Custer-Blaine) 	northeast southeast southeast southwest central central central northwest	rural rural rural rural rural/suburban rural rural rural rural rural

R. Beutler	60 (Beck-Gre-Har)	southwest	rural
J. Begley	61 (Cim-Te-Bea)	northwest	rural
A. Deutschendorf	62 (Commanche)	southwest	urban/rural
L. Benson	63 (Com-Til.)	southwest	urban/rural
R. Roach	66 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
S. Satterfield	68 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
D. McCorkell	72 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
D. Ross	73 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
L. Adair	86 (Adair-Cher)	northeast	rural
C. Gray	89 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
M. Seikel	96 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
K. Cox	97 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban

1994 Republican Unopposed Candidates (15)

Name	District	Region	Demographics
J. Dunlap	11 (Wash-Os.)	northeast	rural/suburban
F. Davis	31 (Logan)	central	rural
L. Ferguson	35 (Pawnee-Noble)	northeast	rural
J. Holt	37 (Kay)	central	rural
T. Kouba	43 (Canadian)	northwest	suburban
J. Greenwood	54 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
E. Maddux	58 (Wo, Wow, Ma)	northwest	rural
W. Cozort	67 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
F. Perry	69 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
J. Bryant	70 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
M. Thornburgh	75 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
D. Weese	76 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
F. Breckinridge	78 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
R. Vaughn	81 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
R. Worthen	87 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
Source Flection Re	sults and Statistics 199.	1 Compiled by State F	Tection Roard Lan

Source: Election Results and Statistics 1994, Compiled by State Election Board, Lance Ward, Secretary, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

1996 Democratic Unopposed Candidates (13)

Name	District	Region	Demographics
T. Matlock J. Hamilton B. Culver L. Rice R. Erwin T. Thomas J. Dunegan	 McCurtain) (Leflore) (Cherokee) (Mayes-Rogers) (Push-Choc) (Ato. Coal, Johns) (Bryan) 	southeast southeast northeast southeast southeast southeast	rural rural rural rural rural rural rural
5			

D. Wells	33 (Payne)	central	rural
B. Mitchell	42 (Grv. Gra. McC)	southwest	rural
J. Bonny	55 (Wash. Kiowa)	southwest	rural
R. Beutler	60 (Beck-Gre-Har)	southwest	rural
D. Ross	73 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
C. Gray	89 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban

1996 Republican Unopposed Candidates (10)

Name	<u>District</u>	<u>Region</u>	Demographics
		-	
J. Reese	38 (Alf, Gr. Kay)	northwest	rural
T. Kouba	43 (Canadian)	northwest	suburban
E. Maddux	58 (Wo, Wow, Ma)	northwest	rural
J. Bryant	70 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
D. Weese	76 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
R. Vaughn	81 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
F. Morgan	83 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
O. Dank	85 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
D. Webb	91 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
B. Case	95 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
Source: Election Res	ults and Statistics 1996	5, Compiled by State E	lection Board, Lance

Ward, Secretary, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

1998 Unopposed Democratic Candidates (28)

Name	<u>District</u>	Region	<u>Demographic</u>
T. Matlock	1 (McCurtain)	southeast	rural
B. Culver	4 (Cherokee)	northeast	rural
L. Roberts	7 (Ottawa)	northeast	rural
L. Rice	8 (Mayes-Rogers)	northeast	rural
B. Settle	13 (Muskogee)	northeast	rural
M.C. Leist	16 (Okmulgee)	northeast	rural
M. Mass	17 (Lat. LeF. Pit.)	southeast	rural
R. Erwin	19 (Push-Choc)	southeast	rural
J. Dunegan	21 (Bryan)	southeast	rural
D. Hilliard	22 (Murray, GrvCle) southwest	rural/suburban
B. Plunk	25 (Pontotoc)	southeast	rural
M. Ervin	28 (Sem. Okf.)	southeast	rural
D. Kinnamon	32 (Lincoln)	central	rural
D. Wells	33 (Payne)	central	rural
B. Mitchell	42 (Grv. Gra. McC)	southwest	rural
F. Stanley	49 (Car. Love. Mrsh.)	southeast	rural
J. Askins	50 (Stephens)	southwest	rural
J. Bonny	55 (Wash. Kiowa)	southwest	rural

J. Covey	57 (Custer-Blaine)	northeast	rural
C. Pope	59 (RM, Ellis)	southwest	rural
R. Beutler	60 (Beck-Gre-Har)	southwest	rural
A. Deutschendorf	62 (Commanche)	southwest	urban/rural
L. Benson	63 (Com-Til.)	southwest	urban/rural
J. Glover	65 (Com. Gra)	southwest	urban/rural
D. Gilbert	72 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
D. Ross	73 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
C. Gray	89 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
O. Toure	99 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban

1998 Unopposed Republican Candidates (17)

Name	<u>District</u>	Region	Demographics
M. Wilt	11 (Wash-Os.)	northeast	rural
L. Ferguson	35 (Pawnee-Noble)	northeast	rural
J. Newport	37 (Kay)	northeast	rural
W. Pettigrew	39 (Kingfisher)	northwest	rural
T. Kouba	43 (Canadian)	northwest	rural
D. Miller	46 (Cle.McC)	southwest	rural/suburban
F. Perry	69 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
C. Hastings	79 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
S. Adkins	80 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
R. Vaughn	81 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
L. Sullivan	82 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
F. Morgan	83 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
B. Graves	84 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
J. Nance	90 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
B. Case	95 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
T. Pope	98 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
R. Phillips	100 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
•	sults and Statistics 1998	•	Slection Roard Lan

Source: Election Results and Statistics 1998, Compiled by State Election Board, Lance Ward, Secretary, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

2000 Democratic Unopposed Candidates (16)

Name	District	Region	Demographics
K. Corn J. Hutchison M. Mass J. Dunegan D. Hilliard D. Turner M. Ervin	3 (LeF.) 5 (Cr. Del. My.) 17 (Lat. LeF. Pitt) 21 (Bryan) 22 (Grv. McC, Cle) 24 (Hu, Okf, Okm) 28 (Seminole)	southeast northeast southeast southeast southwest northeast southeast	rural rural rural rural rural/suburban rural rural

D. Wells	33 (Payne)	central	rural
B. Mitchell	42 (Grv.Gra)	southwest	rural
R. McCarter	51 (Car.Cot. Jeff.)	southwest	rural
D. Braddock	52 (Harmon, Jack.)	southwest	rural
J. Bonny	55 (Wash. Kiowa)	southwest	rural
A. Deutschendorf	62 (Commanche)	southwest	urban/rural
J. Glover	65 (Commanche)	southwest	urban/rural
D. Gilbert	72 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
C. Gray	89 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban

2000 Unupposed Republican Candidates (14)

Name	<u>District</u>	Region	Demographics
M. Wilt	11 (Os. Wash)	northeast	rural/suburban
T. Hiett	29 (Creek)	northeast	suburban
T. Ingmire	34 (Payne)	central	rural
L. Ferguson	35 (No. Os. Paw.)	northeast	rural/suburban
J. Newport	37 (Kay)	northeast	rural
J. Reese	38 (Alf, Grn. Kay)	northwest	rural
C. Roggow	41 (Gar. King. Log.)	northwest	rural
H. Smith	67 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
D. Adkins	75 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
J. Wright	76 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
C. Hastings	79 (Tulsa)	metropolitan	urban
O. Dank	85 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
B. Case	95 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban
F. Claunch	101 (Oklahoma)	metropolitan	urban

Source: State Election Board

Abbreviations for Counties

Ad.—Adair	McCuMcCurtain
Alf.—Alfalfa	McIMcIntosh
At.—Atoka	MaMajor
Bea.—Beaver	MrshMarshall
Beck.—Beckham	MyMayes
Bla.—Blaine	MurMurray
Br.—Bryan	MusMuskogee
Cad.—Caddo	NoNoble
Can.—Canadian	NowNowata
Car.—Carter	OkfOkfuskee
Cher.—Cherokee	OkOklahoma
Choc.—Choctaw	OkmOkmulgee
Cim.—Cimarron	OsOsage
Cle.—Cleveland	OttOttawa
Co.—Coal	PawPawnee
Com.—Comanche	PaPayne
Cot.—Cotton	PitPittsburg
Cra.—Craig	PonPontotoc
Cre.—Creek	PottPottawatomie
Cus.—Custer	PushPushmataha
Del.—Delaware	RM—Roger Mills
De.—Dewey	RoRogers
El.—Ellis	Sem.—Seminole
Gar.—Garfield	SeqSequoyah
GrvGarvin	SteStephens
Gra.—Grady	TeTexas
Grn.—Grant	TilTillman
Gre.—Greer	TuTulsa
Har.—Harmon	WagWagoner
Harp.—Harper	WashWashington
Has.—Haskell	WasWashita
Hug.—Hughes	WoWoods
Jac.—Jackson	WowWoodward
Jef.—Jefferson	
Jhn.—Johnston	
Кау—Кау	
King.—Kingfisher	
Ki.—Kiowa	
Lat.—Latimer	
LeF.—LeFlore	
Lin.—Lincoln	
Log.—Logan	
Love—Love	
McC.—McClain	

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Appendix B

Number of Candidates per Open Seat

1980 Number of Candidates per Open Seat

<u>District</u>	<u>Democrats</u>	<u>Republicans</u>
11-Nowata, Wash. NE	1	2
19-Choctaw, Pit., Push. SE	6	0
23-Tulsa, Wagoner	1	4
27-Cleveland, Ok., Pott. CN	3	0
30-Creek NE	2	0
50-Stephens SW	3	0
57-Beckham, Custer	3	1
62-Comanche SW	2	1
70-Tulsa Metro	I	2
76-Tulsa Metro	0	4
79-Tulsa Metro	I	2
83-Oklahoma Metro	3	2
93-Oklahoma Metro	2	0

1982 Number of Candidates per Open Seat

<u>District</u>	<u>Democrats</u>	<u>Republicans</u>
9-Rogers NE	5	I
20-Atoka, Johnston, Pit. SE	3	1
29-Creek NE	4	1
33-Payne CN	3	1
39-Alfalfa, Bla., Gar., King, Mrsh,. NW	1	2
41-Garfield NW	0	3
42-Garvin, Grady NW	4	1
43-Canadian NW	2	0
49-Carter, Love, Marshall SE	4	1
51-Cotton, Jefferson, Stephens SW	4	0
53-Cleveland CN	2	1
68-Tulsa Metro	2	0
73-Tulsa Metro	5	0
77-Tulsa Metro	2	1
81-Oklahoma Metro	2	4
85-Oklahoma Metro	3	1
86-Adair, Delaware, Mayes NE (NEW)	8	1
91-Oklahoma Metro	4	3

1984 Number of Candidates per Open Seat

<u>District</u>	Democrats	Republicans
3-LeFlore SE	2	0
15-Has., McI., Mus. NE	5	0
23-Tulsa, Wagoner Metro-NE	2	1
41-Garfield NW	I	I
44-Cleveland CN	1	2
46-Cleveland, McClain CN	2	1 1 (Lib.)
54-Cleveland CN	3	2
60-Beck., Greer, Harmon SE	2	0
67-Tulsa Metro	0	2
83-Oklahoma Metro	2	2
85-Oklahoma Metro	3	4
88-Oklahoma Metro	5	1
92-Oklahoma Metro	2	3
93-Oklahoma Metro	2	1
94-Oklahoma Metro	5	1
101-Oklahoma Metro	4	1

1986 Number of Candidates per Open Seat

<u>District</u>	Democrats	<u>Republicans</u>
3-Leflore SE	2	1
4-Cherokee NE	3	1
9-Rogers NE	4	1
15-Has., McI, Mus. NE	4	0
16-Okmulgee NE	4	1
17-Lat, LeF, McC, Pit. SE	4	0
18-Pittsburg SE	2	0
22-Car, Coal, Gar, Mur SE	5	0
26-Pottowatamie CN	4	1
28-Okf, Sem SE	3	0
31-Log, No. NW	2	1
38-Alf, Grant, Kay-NW	1	3
53-Cleveland SW	4	1
59-Six counties, NW	3	3
64-Commanche SW	4	0
69-Tulsa-Metro	1	4
75-Rogers-Tulsa Metro	3	2
76- Tulsa-Metro	0	3
82-Oklahoma-Metro	0	4
84-Oklahoma-Metro	2	2
87-Oklahoma-Metro	3	1
89-Oklahoma-Metro	1	2

96-Oklahoma-Metro	I	4
100-Oklahoma-Metro	2	4
101-Oklahoma-Metro	3	1

1988 Number of Candidates in Open Seats

<u>District</u>	Democrats	<u>Republicans</u>
19-Choctaw, Push, McCurtain SE	6	0
32-Lincoln, Logan CN	2	2
58-Woods, Woodward NW	2	1
60-Beckham, Greer, Harmon SW	2	1
61-Beaver, Cimarron, Texas NW	2	Ι
62-Comanche SW	2	1
70-Tulsa Metro	1	2
71-Tulsa Metro	2	2
81-Oklahoma Metro	Ι	3
84-Oklahoma Metro	0	1
91-Oklahoma Metro	2	1
92-Oklahoma Metro	3	1
95-Oklahoma Metro	3	1

1990 Number of Candidates in Open Seats

District	<u>Democrats</u>	<u>Republicans</u>
1-McCurtain SE	б	1
13-Muskogee NE	4	0
21-Bryan SE	3	0
22-Car, Coal, Gar, Mur, Pon SE	4	1
23-Tulsa-Wagoner NE/Metro	4	1
27-Cle, Pott-CN	5	1
41-Garfield-NW	2	4
45-Cleveland-CN	4	4
46-Cleveland, McC-CN	4	2
48-Carter SE	5	1
49-Car, Love, Mrsh SE	6	0
99-Oklahoma-Metro	2	0

1992 Number of Candidates in Open Seats

<u>District</u>	Democrats	Republicans
5-Cra, Del, Mayes NE	3	3
18-Pittsburg SE	3	0
19-Choc, McC, Push SE	3	1
29-Creek, Tulsa NE/Metro	2	1

34-Payne CN	2	l
56-Cad, Can, Grady NW	5	3
64-Comanche SW	4	0
69-Tulsa Metro	0	3
75-Tulsa Metro	2	2
83-Oklahoma Metro	2	1
100-Oklahoma Metro	0	5

1994 Number of Candidates in Open Seats

District	<u>Democrats</u>	Republicans
6-Craig, Mayes, Rog NE	3	1
25-Pontotoc SE	6	1
28-Okf, Pott, Sem SE	4	0
39-Can, King, OK NW	2	2
40-Garfield NW	1	2
47-Can, Grady NW	3	3
59-Six counties NW	7	1
62-Commanche SE	4	0
71-Tulsa Metro	2	1
74-Os, Ro, Tulsa NE/Metro	2	2
83-Oklahoma Metro	1	3
85-Oklahoma Metro	1	6
88-Oklahoma Metro	3	1
101-Oklahoma Metro	1	2

1996 Number of Candidates in Open Seats

District	Democrats	<u>Republicans</u>
11-Osage-Wash NE	2	2
15-Has, McI, Mus, Seq NE	5	0
24-Hug, Okf, Okm SE	2	0
34-Payne CN	2	2
37-Kay-Osage NE	2	3
45-Cleveland SW	2	2
51-Car, Co, Jef, Ste SW	2	2
57-Bla, Custer, Dew SW	2	2
72-Tulsa Metro	2	0
93-Oklahoma Metro	2	2

1998 Number of Candidates in Open Seats

District	Democrats	Republicans
3-LeFlore SE	5	l
36-Osage-Tulsa NE/Metro	4	1
41-Gar, King, Logan NW	1	3
48-Car,Grv, Mur SE	2	1
94-Oklahoma Metro	2	2

2000 Number of Candidates in Open Seats

District	Democrats	Republicans
4-Cherokee NE	4	2
13-Muskogee NE	3	1
15-Has, McI, Mus, Seq NE	4	0
20-Atoka, Bry, Coal, Johns SE	3	1
26-Pottawatomie CN	2	2
32-Lincoln, Creek CN	2	2
43-Canadian-OK NW/Metro	1	4
60-Greer, Beck., Har., NW	2	0
70-Tulsa Metro	0	2
75-Tulsa Metro	0	1
80-Tulsa Metro	2	5

Appendix C

Number of Incumbents Who Retired or Were Defeated

This area considers not only the strength of the incumbent but the strength of the challenger as well. Perhaps when more incumbents were defeated, stronger challengers emerged against incumbents. A retirement of an incumbent may also signify a dynamic of candidate emergence. Incumbents may retire when they are faced with strong challengers. Incumbents may also retire once they have found replacements to their liking. The 1980 election marks the beginning of growing Republican dominance, with the election of Ronald Reagan. Although the election was not a realignment in the textbook form, it has been described by conservatives, namely Republican pollster Richard Wirthlin, as a "rolling" realignment (Leon Epstein, <u>Political Parties in the American Mold</u>, 267). A "rolling" realignment is a shift in partisan support that transpires over a longer period of time that other realignments in American political history. The delay of Republican strength in the Oklahoma legislature after the success of Reagan may add credence to this theory.

<u>1980</u>

<u>District</u>	Retired/Defeated	Party Status
11 NE rural	retired	R-R
19 SE rural	retired	D-D
23 NE suburban	retired	R-D
27 CN suburban	retired	D-D
28 SE rural	defeated	D-D
30 NE rural	retired	D-D
36 NE rural	defeated	D-D
42 NW rural	defeated	D-R
46 NW rural	defeated	D-D
50 SW rural	retired	D-D
57 NW rural	retired	D-D
62 SW rural	retired	D-D

69 metro Tulsa
70 metro Tulsa
75 metro Tulsa
76 metro Tulsa
78 metro Tulsa
79 metro Tulsa
82 metro Oklahoma
83 metro Oklahoma
86 metro Oklahoma
89 metro Oklahoma
93 metro Oklahoma
96 metro Oklahoma
97 metro Oklahoma
99 metro Oklahoma

R-R retired D-R retired D-D defeated R-R retired D-R defeated R-R retired R-R defeated retired R-R D-R defeated D-D defeated D-D retired defeated D-R D-D retired defeated D-D

Total-26 Retired-15 (57%) Defeated-11 (43%)

<u>1982</u>

.

<u>District</u>	retired/defeated	<u>party status</u>
5 NE rural	retired	D-D
9 NE rural	retired	D-D
20 SE rural	retired	D-D
24 SE rural	defeated	D-D
29 NE rural	retired	D-D
33 CN rural	retired	R-D
39 NW rural	retired	R-R
41 NW rural/urban	retired	R-R
42 NW rural	retired	R-D* PD
43 NW rural	retired	D-D
49 SE rural	retired	D-D
51 SW rural	retired	D-D
53 CN suburban	retired	D-D
55 NW rural	retired	D-D
68 metro Tulsa	retired	D-D
71 metro Tulsa	defeated	R-R
73 metro Tulsa	retired	D-D
74 metro Tulsa	defeated	D-D
77 metro Tulsa	retired	D-D
81 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-R
85 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-R
91 metro Oklahoma	retired	D-D

Total-22 Retired-18 (81%) Defeated-4 (19%) PD—**primary defeat**--the incumbent was defeated in the primary, placing two challengers in the general election.

<u>1984</u>

District	retired/defeated	party status
3 SE rural	retired	D-D
9 NE rural	defeated	D-R
12 NE rural	defeated	D-D
15 NE rural	retired	D-D
17 SE rural	defeated	D-D
23 NE suburban	retired	D-D
33 CN rural	defeated	D-R
41 NW rural/urban	retired	R-R
42 NW rural	defeated	D-D
44 CN suburban	retired	D-D
46 CN suburban/rural	retired	D-R
54 CN suburban	retired	R-R
60 SW rural	retired	D-D
67 metro Tulsa	retired	R-R
75 NE suburban	defeated	D-R
81 metro Oklahoma	defeated	R-R
83 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-R
85 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-R
92 metro Oklahoma	retired	D-R
93 metro Oklahoma	retired	D-R
94 metro Oklahoma	retired	D-D
101 metro Oklahoma	retired	D-R

Total-23 Retired-16 (70%) Defeated-7 (30%)

<u>1986</u>

District	retired/defeated	party status
4 NE rural	retired	D-D
8 NE rural	defeated	R-D
9 NE rural	retired	R-D
15 NE rural	defeated	D-D
16 NE rural	retired	D-D
17 SE rural	retired	D-D
18 SE rural	retired	D-D

22 SE rural	retired	D-D
26 CN rural	retired	D-D
28 SE rural	retired	D-D
29 NE rural	defeated	D-R
38 NW rural	retired	R-R
46 CN rural/suburban	defeated	R-D
50 SE rural	defeated	D-R* DP
53 CN suburban	retired	D-D
59 NW rural	retired	D-D
64 SW rural/urban	retired	D-D
69 metro Tulsa	retired	R-R
75 NW rural/suburban	defeated	D-R *CP
76 metro Tulsa	retired	R-R
82 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-R
84 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-R
87 metro Oklahoma	retired	D-R
89 metro Oklahoma	retired	D-D
90 metro Oklahoma	retired	D-R
92 metro Oklahoma	defeated	D-R* CP
93 metro Oklahoma	defeated	R-D
96 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-D
100 NW suburban	retired	R-R
101 metro Oklahoma	defeated	R-D

Total-30

Retired-21 (70%)

Defeated—9 (30%)

CP---changed parties--the incumbent changed parties before the next election.

<u>1988</u>

District	retired/defeated	party status
10 NE rural	defeated	D-D
11 NE rural	defeated	R-R
14 NE rural	defeated	D-D
15 NE rural	defeated	D-D
19 SE rural	retired	D-D
20 SE rural	defeated	D-D
25 SE rural	defeated	D-R* DP
26 CN rural	defeated	D-R
28 SE rural	defeated	D-D
32 CN rural	retired	D-D
33 CN rural	defeated	R-D
36 NE rural	defeated	D-D
40 NW rural/urban	defeated	R-D
54 SW suburban	defeated	R-R

58 NW rural	retired	R-R
59 NW rural	defeated	D-R
61 NW rural	retired	R-D
62 SW rural/urban	retired	D-D
70 metro Tulsa	retired	D-R
71 metro Tulsa	retired	R-R
81 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-R
84 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-R* NE
91 metro Oklahoma	retired	D-D
92 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-D
95 metro Oklahoma	retired	D-D
96 metro Oklahoma	defeated	D-D
98 NW suburban	defeated	D-R* DP
Total-28		
Retired—12 (43%)		

Defeated-16 (57%)

NE-no election-there was not election at the primary or general stage, yet there was a new legislator.

<u>1990</u>

<u>District</u>	retired/defeated	<u>party status</u>
1 SE rural	retired	D-D
4 NE rural	defeated	D-D
13 NE rural	retired	D-D
15 NE rural	defeated	D-D
17 SE rural	retired	D-D
21 SE rural	retired	D-D
22 SE rural	retired	D-D
23 NE suburban	retired	D-D
27 SW rural	retired	D-D
29 NE suburban	defeated	R-D
41 NW rural/urban	retired	R-D
43 NW rural	defeated	D-R* DP
45 SW suburban	retired	D-D
46 SW rural	retired	D-D
47 NW rural	defeated	D-D
48 SW rural	retired	D-D
49 SE rural	retired	D-D
53 SW suburban	defeated	D-R
60 SW rural	defeated	D-D
68 metro Tulsa	defeated	D-D
76 metro Tulsa	defeated	R-R
78 metro Tulsa	defeated	R-D
80 metro Tulsa	retired	R-R
85 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-R

91 metro Oklahomadefeated99 metro Oklahomaretired	D-R D-D
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Total-26 Retired—15 (58%) Defeated—11 (43%)

<u>1992</u>

<u>District</u> 5 NE rural 18 SE rural 29 NE suburban 39 NW rural	retired/defeated retired retired retired defeated	party status D-D D-D D-D R-D* DP
44 SW suburban 55 NW rural 60 SW rural 74 NE suburban	retired defeated defeated defeated	D-D D-D D-D D-D D-R* RD
75 NE suburban78 metro Tulsa83 metro Oklahoma89 metro Oklahoma	retired defeated retired retired	R-R D-R R-R D-D

Total—12 Retired—7 (59%) Defeated—5 (41%) RD—**redistricting**—two incumbents in race.

<u>1994</u>

6 NE ruralretiredD-D14 NE ruraldefeatedD-D	
14 NF rural defeated D-D	
19 SE rural retired D-D* NE	
25 SE rural retired R-D	
28 SE rural retired D-D	
29 NE suburban defeated D-R	
34 CN rural retired D-D* NE	
39 NW suburban retired D-R	
40 NW rural/urban retired D-R	
46 SW rural defeated D-R	
47 NW rural retired D-R	
50 SW rural retired D-D	
59 NW rural retired R-D	
62 SW rural/urban retired D-D	
64 SW rural/urban retired D-D	

69 metro Tulsa	retired	R-R* NE
71 metro Tulsa	retired	R-R
74 NE suburban	retired	R-R
79 metro Tulsa	defeated	R-R
83 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-R
85 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-R
88 metro Oklahoma	retired	D-D
95 metro Oklahoma	defeated	D-R
99 metro Oklahoma	retired	D-D
100 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-R
101 metro Oklahoma	retired	D-R

Total—27 Retired—22 (81%) Defeated—5 (19%)

<u>1996</u>

District	retired/defeated	<u>party status</u>
11 NE rural	retired	R-R
15 NE rural	retired	D-D
24 SE rural	retired	D-D
34 CN rural	retired	D-R
37 NE rural	retired	R-R
45 SW suburban	retired	D-D
51 SW rural	retired	D -D
52 SW rural	retired	D-D
67 metro Tulsa	retired	R-R
72 metro Tulsa	retired	D-D
74 NE suburban	defeated	R-D
77 metro Tulsa	defeated	D-R
78 metro Tulsa	defeated	R-D
93 metro Tulsa	retired	D-D
Total-14		
Retired—11 (79%)		
Defeated-3 (21%)		

<u>1998</u>

<u>District</u>	retired/defeated	<u>party status</u>
3 SE rural	retired	D-D
36 NE suburban	retired	D-D
41 NW rural	retired	D-R
47 NW rural	retired	R-R
48 SW rural	retired	D-R
68 metro Tulsa	defeated	D-R

76 NE suburban	retired	R-R
90 metro Oklahoma	retired	R-R* NE
94 metro Oklahoma	retired	D-R
Total—9 Retired—8 (89%) Defeated—1 (11%)		

<u>2000</u>

<u>District</u>	retired/defeated	<u>party status</u>
4 NE rural	retired	D-D
13 NE rural	retired	D-R
15 NE rural	retired	D-D
20 SE rural	retired	D-D
23 Tulsa urban	defeated	D-R
26 CN rural	retired	D-R
32 CN rural	retired	D-R
40 NW urban/rural*	defeated	D-R
43 NW rural	retired	R-R
45 SW suburban	defeated	D-R
60 NW rural	retired	D-D
70 Tulsa urban	retired	R-R
74 Tulsa suburban	defeated	D-R
75 Tulsa urban	retired	R-R
80 Tulsa urban	retired	R-R
96 OKC urban	defeated	D-R

Total 16

Retired 11 (69%) Defeated 5 (31%)

* Garfield county where district 40 is located is a rural area and it is not connected to Oklahoma or Tulsa county, so it is not a suburban county. However, district 40 is in the city of Enid population 50,000, which makes it more urban than rural.

Sources: Election Results and Statistics 1980-2000, Compiled by State Election Board, Lance Ward, Secretary, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

Appendix D

Interview Schedule

- Adair, Larry. Personal Interview. Stilwell, Oklahoma, 6 June 2000.
- Allen, Carolyn. Personal Interview. Grove, Oklahoma, 16 June 2000.
- Anonymous *. Personal Interview. Muskogee, Oklahoma, 26 May 2000.
- Armstrong, Keith. Personal Interview. Fairland, Oklahoma, 17 May 2000, 20 July 2000.

Barnes, Jack. Personal Interview, Claremore, Oklahoma, 13 Mar. 2000.

Bates, Darlene. Personal Interview, Miami, Oklahoma, 8 May 2000.

Brocksmith, Ed. Personal Interview. Tahlequah, Oklahoma, 18 May 2000.

Burdge, Jim. Personal Interview. Tulsa, Oklahoma, 21 June 2000.

Cardwell, Rick. Personal Interview, Muskogee, Oklahoma, 28 Mar. 2000.

Childers, Don. Personal Interview. Muskogee, Oklahoma, 25 May 2000.

Coatney, Mark. Personal Interview, Choteau, Oklahoma, 16 Mar. 2000.

Coombs, Julian. Personal Interview. North Miami, Oklahoma, 18 July 2000.

Daniel, Albro. Personal Interview. Owasso, Oklahoma, 9 Aug. 2000.

Davis, Lela Foley. Personal Interview. Taft, Oklahoma, 24 May 2000.

Dill, Michael. Personal Interview. Tulsa, Oklahoma, 28 June 2000.

Eddins, Joe. Phone Interview. Vinita, Oklahoma, 12 June 2000.

Edwards, Steve. Phone Interview, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 9 May 2000.

Ericson, Stuart. Personal Interview. Muskogee, Oklahoma, 13 June 2000.

Gatz, Greg. Phone Interview, Coweta, Oklahoma, 10 June 2000.

Hampton, David.** Personal Interview. Chewy, Oklahoma, 30 May 2000, 22 Mar. 2000.

Handshy, John. Phone Interview. Hominy, Oklahoma, 19 June 2000.

Harder, Allen. Personal Interview. Muskogee, Oklahoma, 12 May 2000. Phone Interview, 13 Dec. 2000.

Harder, Cheryl. Personal Interview. Muskogee, Oklahoma, 12 May 2000. Hudspeth, Bob. Personal Interview. Tulsa, Oklahoma, 15 May 2000. Inman, Bill. Personal Interview, Drumwright, Oklahoma, 10 April 2000. Jensen, Neil. Personal Interview, Choteau, Oklahoma, 18 April 2000. Johnson, Joe. Personal Interview. Vinita, Oklahoma. 22 June 2000. Jones, Tad. Personal Interview. Claremore, Oklahoma, 29 June 2000. Kennedy, Cheno. Personal Interview, Grove, Oklahoma, 3 April 2000. Landers, Paul. Personal Interview. Nowata, Oklahoma, 22 May 2000. Littlefield, Rick. Personal Interview. Grove, Oklahoma, 27 July 2000. Mann, Mark. Phone Interview. Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 7 June 2000. Martin, Lou. Personal Interview. Sand Springs, Oklahoma, 23 May 2000. McArtor, Keith. Personal Interview. Tulsa, Oklahoma, 15 June 2000. McDowell, Bob. Personal Interview, Grove, Oklahoma, 6 April 2000. McQuigg, Clark. Personal Interview. Miami, Oklahoma, 9 June 2000. Melson, Gordon. Personal Interview, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 16 May 2000. Miller, Ray. Personal Interview. Stigler, Oklahoma, 24 May 2000. Newberry, Dal. Personal Interview. Okmulgee, Oklahoma, 23 May 2000. Nottingham, Liz. Personal Interview, Claremore, Oklahoma, 4 April 2000. Phone Interview, 14 Dec. 2000.

Ostrander, Phil. Personal Interview. Tulsa, Oklahoma, 9 August 2000.

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Parkenson, J.D. Personal Interview, White Oak, Oklahoma, 15 Mar. 2000. Peters, Joe. Personal Interview. Sallisaw, Oklahoma, 25 May 2000. Powders, Kenneth. Personal Interview, Okmulgee, Oklahoma, 21 Mar. 2000. Pratt, Bill. Personal Interview. Okmulgee, Oklahoma, 17 April 2000. Rice, Larry. Personal Interview. Tulsa, Oklahoma, 5 July 2000. Roberts, Larry, Personal Interview, Miami, Oklahoma, 24 Mar, 2000, 14 Jan, 2000. Rust, Alfred. Personal Interview, Tahlequah, Oklahoma, 4 May 2000. Ryals, Wayne. Personal Interview. Tahlequah, Oklahoma, 18 May 2000. Satterfield, Shelby. Personal Interview. Tulsa, Oklahoma, 30 June 2000. Seawright, Doyle. Personal Interview. Grove, Oklahoma, 11 May 2000. Slyman, Tex. Personal Interview. Sapulpa, Oklahoma, 23 May 2000. Smaligo, John. Personal Interview. Owasso, Oklahoma, 8 Aug. 2000. Staggs, Barbara. Personal Interview. Muskogee, Oklahoma, 12 May 2000. Turner, Russell. Personal Interview. Stilwell, Oklahoma, 19 April 2000. Wheeler, Charles. Personal Interview, Miami, Oklahoma, 31 Mar. 2000. White, Jimmie. Personal Interview, Warner, Oklahoma, 10 May 2000. Wilson, James. Personal Interview. Tahlequah, Oklahoma, 26 May 2000. Winniger, Mike. Personal Interview, Stilwell, Oklahoma, 14 Mar. 2000. Working, Curt. Personal Interview. Checotah, Oklahoma, 5 June 2000.

* One participant did not want his name printed.

**David Hampton was interviewed twice for two different roles, once as a potential candidate and once as the chairman for the Adair county Republicans.

Appendix E Demographic Changes per County in Oklahoma

The following counties in bold are counties that share a border with the two major cities, Tulsa and Oklahoma City, or counties that are described as lake counties from chapter two.

County	% over 55	% over 75	growth ('90-'97)
Adair	22.8	6.6	9.2
Alfalfa	33.7	12.3	-5.6
Atoka	25.7	7.3	4.4
Beaver	27.0	8.1	-0.7
Beckham	27.1	9.7	-1.4
Blaine	29.2	10.2	-7.7
Bryan	26.7	8.3	6.5
Caddo	25.9	8.5	4.7
Canadian	15.9	3.8	13.8
Carter	26.5	8.2	2.8
Cherokee	23.4	6.4	12.5
Choctaw	29.2	9.1	-0.2
Cimarron	27.9	7.9	-6.6
Cleveland	13.4	2.7	13.1
Coal	29.4	10.1	4.8
Comanche	15.9	3.5	2.2
Cotton	30.2	10.6	0.6
Craig	28.3	8.7	2.4
Creek	22.4	6.0	8.6
Custer	21.2	7.0	-4.1
Delaware	32.8	8.2	20.7
Dewey	31.7	12.2	-9.2
Ellis	31.7	11.5	-6.1
Garfield	25.2	7.7	0.0
Garvin	30.4	10.4	1.5
Grady	22.5	6.8	8.8
Grant	34.3	12.3	-5.1
Greer	33.6	12.7	-2.8
Harmon	32.8	13.0	-8.4
Harper	32.9	11.7	-10.9
Haskell	30.1	8.8	4.1
Hughes	34.2	12.1	0.7
Jackson	19.3	5.9	-0.2
Jefferson	32.3	11.8	-4.9
Johnston	27.6	8.8	2.4
Kay	27.2	8.7	-2.5
Kingfisher	25.3	8.0	2.0

Kiowa	32.7	12.5	-4.6
Latimer	27.1	8.1	-0.5
LeFlore	24.5	7.4	7.4
Lincoln	24.8	7.1	6.4
Logan	21.7	6.7	5.5
Love	26.9	8.1	10.4
McClain	21.8	5.6	13.3
McCurtain	23.6	6.7	3.0
McIntosh	35.4	9.2	12.0
Major	29.1	10.0	-3.5
Marshall	34.2	10.2	11.2
Mayes	26.4	6.8	11.1
Murray	30.2	9.5	2.7
Muskogee	25.4	7.4	1.9
Noble	26.2	8.9	1.8
Nowata	30.8	9.7	-0.9
Okfuskee	28.0	8.9	-2.4
Oklahoma	20.9	5.2	5.1
Okmulgee	27.1	8.3	4.7
Osage	23.3	6.1	2.1
Ottawa	30.0	8.2	0.0
Pawnee	26.0	7.4	4.1
Payne	17.8	5.5	4.5
Pittsburg	28.5	8.4	5.5
Pontotoc	26.3	8.5	2.0
Pottawatomie	23.6	7.0	5.3
Pushmataha	30.5	9.2	4.6
Roger Mills	27.6	8.9	-13.1
Rogers	19.6	4.3	19.0
Seminole	28.9	9.2	-1.6
Sequoyah	22.8	6.1	10.0
Stephens	29.1	8.7	3.1
Texas	21.9	5.7	10.1
Tillman	28.9	10.0	-16.2
Tulsa	20.2	5.0	6.5
Wagoner	18.0	4.0	13.2
Washington	26.7	7.1	-1.4
Washita	30.0	9.7	2.1
Woods	32.7	12.4	-9.4
Woodward	22.6	6.0	-1.6
		5.0	1.0

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