THE AMAU STATEMENT OF 1934: ITS SOURCES AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

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THE AMAU STATEMENT OF 1934: ITS SOURCES AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

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PREFACE

In the midst of the turbulent decade of the 1930's, Japan by her words and deeds attempted to eliminate all foreign influence from China, Japanese influence alone excepted. Since the Manchurian Incident of 18 September 1931, Japan had by degrees moved to force all other nations out of North China. On 17 April 1934, the gradual approach apparently gave way to a hasty one as Japan issued a challenge to the world to keep "hands off" China.[1] Amau Eiji, the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman, asserted that Japan opposed foreign undertakings in China tending to disturb the peace of Asia or to take advantage of China. By the Amau statement Japan apparently asserted for itself the right to pass judgment on the desirability of all foreign aid, foreign loans, or sales of military equipment to China. Japan apparently claimed the right to preserve the peace in East Asia, this right deriving from her intimate knowledge of the needs of China. Finally, Japan warned that the political situation in China concerned only Japan and China. Ambiguously Japan, at the same time, reaffirmed her desire to observe the Open Door policy and to uphold her obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty that called for the Signatories (Japan, China, Great Britain, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, and Portugal) to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China.

One of the major obstacles to a study of this nature is the general unavailability of many of the original documents. Many, naturally, are

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[1]For the complete text see Appendix A. Other versions of the statement are found in Appendices B through D. The difference in wording though not in meaning is due to different translators. The text in Appendix A was considered "official" since it was issued by the Japanese Government.

still classified by the governments involved. Furthermore, the limited number of Chinese and Japanese language documents readily available, and with my even more limited knowledge of the languages has prevented this study to be probed as deeply as I would prefer. There was, however, enough material at hand to dispel some of the uncertainty surrounding the question.

Deep indebtedness is acknowledged to Professor Sidney D. Brown of Oklahoma State University, who first propounded the question of the Amau Statement, and who guided me in my research and writing. Also, I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professors Homer L. Knight, O. A. Hilton, and Alfred Levin, all of Oklahoma State University. Also my deepest thanks and appreciation of the Oklahoma State University Library who tolerated my idiosyncrasies and forgetfulness. Lastly, I acknowledge my debt to Charles Stanislaw of the Animal Husbandry Department of Oklahoma State University and my roommate, who tolerated my long disquisitions on the theory and practice of History.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Amau statement "fell among the Diplomatic Corps like a bombshell" and set off a flurry of reactions throughout the world.[1] The arbitrary assumption by Japan as the moderator of peace in the Pacific area was not welcomed by the world, though the world seemed to have no intention of disputing this claim by force.

Amau Eiji, the Foreign Office spokesman, who released the statement was a relatively unknown figure when he first caught world notice. To this point his career was routine. Born in 1887 in Naruto City, Tokushima Prefecture on the small rustic island of Shikoku, he began his rise in the world upon graduation from the Tokyo Higher Commercial School in 1912. Promptly entering the Foreign Service, he had labored in minor positions for two decades before winning promotion to the post of Chief of the Intelligence Bureau. From this position he released his famous statement; and, whether, because of it or not, became Ambassador to Switzerland and Italy. Did ambition prompt his statement? Nathaniel Peffer thought so, calling Amau "a blustering young diplomat..., who had concluded that success in Japan was to the egregious and he had affiliated himself with the extreme miliatrists and their plans, hoping to rise with their success."[2]

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[1]Hugh Byas, The New York Times, 19 April 1934, 10; The (London) Times, 19 April 1934, 14.

[2]Nathaniel Peffer, The Far East: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958), 371. Ironically Amau who defied the League of Nations in 1934, became in 1948 the Vice Chairman of the Unesco Committee of the United Nations.

Others believed that Amau won fame--or notoriety--by accident. Wilfrid Fleischer, the journalist who released the statement to the world, a journalist who knew Amau personally, observed that the Japanese spokesman was "devoid of /a/ sense of news value, ... and little realized the importance his words might have."[3]

Amau, whether he spoke unwittingly or for ambition's sake, spoke against a backdrop of militarism and expansion. By 1934 the Military Establishment had begun to shape foreign policy for China. This despite the Constitutional provision that specifically placed foreign affairs in the hands of the Foreign Office. The Military Establishment, or gundai, could do this by reason of its virtual independence of the civil government. No civilian could command the Imperial Armed Forces, not even the Premier. Nor could a civilian block direct access to the Emperor on the part of military leaders. China under partial control of the Japanese Army was a China beyond the control of Japanese civil government. Officially in 1934 the civil authorities who still controlled the government sought reconciliation and good will with foreign nations. The moderates

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[3]Wilfrid Fleischer, Volcanic Isle (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1941), 259. Amau's immediate superior was Vice-Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru (1887-1957). Born in Oita prefecture in Kyushu, Shigemitsu graduated from the German Law Section of Tokyo University. He entered the Foreign Service and served at various posts in several countries. He lost a leg to a bomb thrown by a Korean fanatic in Shanghai. Convicted as a Class A War Criminal in 1946, he received a seven year sentence, had it commuted to five years and was paroled after serving four. He served as Foreign Minister again from 1954 to 1956 when he helped to negotiate normalization of Soviet Japanese relations.

Hirota Koki (1878-1948) Foreign Minister and Amau's ultimate superior was born in Fukuoka Prefecture. He attended the Genyosha school, a fascistic ultra-nationalistic organization that had advocated overseas expansion ever since 1881. After this he graduated from Tokyo University Law School. He joined the Foreign Service and held posts in various countries, becoming Premier after the February 26, 1936 Incident. He was considered one of the promoters of fascism in Japan. He was hung as a Class A War Criminal in 1948.

attempted, in the years after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, to regain for Japan the respect of the world. Their efforts were beginning to bear fruit when Amau destroyed their program by issuance of his famous statement.[4]

[4]The (London) Times, 20 April 1934, 13.

CHAPTER II

THE JAPANESE REACTION TO THE AMAU STATEMENT

The Japanese reaction to the Amau statement was slow in coming; at first few persons grasped its significance. Perhaps Japanese commentators ignored it because they believed that the Amau release espoused no new principles since it simply described the path in foreign relations followed by Japan for the past twenty years.[1] When adverse foreign reactions began pouring in, the unqualified approval initially given by the Japanese to the statement changed to a tone of moderate criticism: Influential persons and nearly all large newspapers now regarded the language of the declaration as awkward; an unfortunate choice of words. The Japanese attacks on the statement were directed at its phrasing and timing, however, not at its substance.[2] The Amau statement was never publicly repudiated, though modified in tone by various government officials. Even Foreign Minister Hirota was "reported to be angry and distressed at Amau's action."[3] Still, Hirota never did discipline Amau; and many prominent Japanese regarded the rambunctious Foreign Office spokesman as a national hero.[4] In short the Japanese reaction to Amau's

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[1]R. T. Pollard, "Dynamics of Japanese Imperialism," Pacific Historical Review, VIII (March, 1939), 5.

[2]J. C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), 129; The New York Times, 25 April 1934, 1.

[3]Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, in Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 115.

[4]International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgement, Part B, Chapter VI, 628.

statement was by no means sharply defined, in fact it was rather uncertain and diffuse.

The Reaction of Government Officials

One thing was certain - the Amau statement caught most, if not all, of the Japanese Government officials by surprise. This became evident when newsmen and foreign diplomats sounded out Japanese officials as to the meaning of the astounding declaration by Amau. Ambassador Grew cabled to Washington a narrow interpretation of the statement by an unidentified subordinate official of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs of the Foreign Office. According to this official, the substance of the Amau statement, that Japan merely wished to be consulted by all other nations before they invest in China, constituted the heart of the statement in the opinion of those in charge of Japan's relations with China. He said the statement should be interpreted only in a negative way; Japan wished to check other powers in China, but did not itself contemplate any unilateral action in China.[5] A further amplification of this was given by Mr. Ariyoshi Akira, the Japanese Ambassador to China, in an interview with The New York Times correspondent in Shanghai. Mr. Ariyoshi said that Japan expected to enforce her policy only by pressure on China, not by pressure against Western powers which might seek to conclude agreements with China.[6]

Other members of the Japanese Diplomatic Corps thought the world voiced interesting, almost random, comments. Consul General Yokoyami at Geneva said that Japan was determined to assume the role of keeper of the

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[5] Grew to Hull, Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 20 April 1934, 118.

[6] The New York Times, 23 April 1934, 1.

peace in Asia in conjunction with other Eastern Asiatic nations.[7] In a subsequent interview Yokoyami claimed a more exclusive role for Japan, saying that Japan envisaged the Powers as standing around the sick bed of China, but that Japan alone was able to diagnose the trouble correctly.[8] The Japanese ambassador to Washington, Saito Hiroshi, confirmed Yokoyami's contention that the Western Powers did not understand China nor know how to deal with her; only Japan had this knowledge. He further declared that the present chaotic situation in China was a present danger to Japan.[9] Saito did seem perplexed though, at the brusqueness of the language in the Amau release, but said that essentially the principles laid down were quite accurate.[10] Foreign Minister Hirota, however, cancelled out these wild efforts to interpret the statement, saying that Japan was not the only power capable of understanding China. He dismissed Yokoyami's contention as unconsequential, and pointedly observed that Yokoyami did not speak for the Japanese government.

A responsible Foreign Office official, Mr. Shigemitsu Mamoru, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Amau's immediate superior, fully endorsed the statement made by his subordinate. He asserted that this formed a part of Japan's fixed policies in China and "will be carried out regardless of the opposition of other nations."[12] The highest responsible official, Foreign Minister Hirota, did not endorse the statement as strongly as Shigemitsu. At first he rather evaded the problem. In his

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[7]Ibid., 24 April 1934, 10; The (London) Times, 24 April 1934, 14.

[8]The (London) Times, 26 April 1934, 14.

[9]Ibid., 23 April 1934, 14.

[10]The New York Times, 25 April 1934, 1.

[11]Ibid., 26 April 1934, 1.

[12]Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, in Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 119.

discussions with Ambassador Grew, Foreign Minister Hirota went to great lengths to assure Grew that Japan would take no action that would create friction or that would run counter to the letter and spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty. Japan was maintaining the Open Door in China while, by contrast, China was trying to close it with her boycott of Japanese goods.[13] In another interview with Grew on 29 April 1934, Hirota said that the Amau statement had caused a "great misunderstanding" and that he, Hirota, would give a reply to the American aide-memoire which directed Grew to ascertain the official status of the Amau statement, if any.[14] Despite Grew's attempts, he did not succeed in pinning down Hirota as to whether he approved of the statement, or not. The Foreign Minister always vacillated or evaded forthright endorsement of the Amau declaration. Many of Grew's diplomatic colleagues scoffed at Hirota's patent insincerity though Grew felt that Hirota made the best of a bad situation.[15] Hirota could not repudiate the principles of the statement since they summed up basic trends of Japanese foreign policy for the past twenty years. Further, the ultra-nationalists' pressure would allow no public repudiation of these principles.[16] Why did the Foreign Minister equivocate? The Tokyo correspondent of The (London) Times reported that Hirota apparently believed that the Amau statement itself was innocuous but that Amau mishandled the release. The subsequent crisis he expected soon to blow over.[17]

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[13] J. C. Grew, Turbulent Era (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1952), II, 960; The New York Times, 26 April 1934, 1; The (London) Times, 26 April 1934, 12.

[14] Grew, Ten Years in Japan, 133.

[15] Grew, Turbulent Era, II, 958-961.

[16] The New York Times, IV, 29 April 1934, 1; Grew, Turbulent Era, II, 960.

[17] The (London) Times, 25 April 1934, 14.

If this was indeed Hirota's hope, it was dashed to pieces almost immediately. The affair was still raging when Hirota called in Tokyo a conference of the Japanese Ambassadors from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, the Soviet Union, and China to meet late in April, 1934. The purpose was to discuss Japan's China policy vis-a-vis the other interested Powers.[18] The results of this conference were never released but the results led the Foreign Minister to adopt a stiffer tone in this matter when he addressed a Conference of Provincial Governors on May 4, 1934. Before the Conference he stressed a more positive policy toward China. He declared that Japan must guard against any action detrimental to the independence of Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet state that had been carved out of China. Also, he reiterated the idea that Japan had a sincere desire to preserve Chinese territorial integrity and unification but this must come from China's own efforts, no outside help would be tolerated except Japanese. He concluded with the standard Foreign Office statement that he expected a termination of hostilities in China very shortly.[19] This last was more in the nature of wishful thinking for home consumption. The Japanese Army had been fighting in China since 1931 and had won all of the battles, but she was still a long way from conquering China. Meanwhile, the expected windfall from Japanese aggression in China had not materialized and the Japanese economy was subjected to a constant strain.

The Newspaper Reaction

Whereas Hirota moved to firm support of the statement only after several days of vacillation the Japanese newspapers at once greeted the Amau

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[18] The New York Times, VIII, 30 April 1934, 11.

[19] The (London) Times, 5 May 1934, 12.

release with general acclaim. Five of the major dailies, all nationalistic in tone, agreed with the substance of the statement. The Tokyo Asahi, the Jiji, the Chugai Shogyo, the Hochi, and the Yomiuri firmly supported the statement.[20] The Asahi described the statement as an "epoch-making" departure, whereby Japan had abandoned her former policy of cooperation with the other Powers in China. From now on, East Asians would settle East Asian problems. In short, the affairs in China concerned only China and Japan. The Asahi further stated that Chinese cooperation was questionable,[21] but agreed that the declaration well defined the cause of Japan on the mainland. The Hochi approved of the statement in principle but felt that the wording was too abstract. This in turn led to misunderstanding abroad. Also, it was issued at the wrong time--before an understanding had been reached through diplomatic channels with other nations.[22]

The more sensational newspapers reviewed the "American Bogey" with an exaggerated report that the United States was going to give a $100,000,000 Chinese loan to Chiang Kai-shek; while the Yomiuri gave prominence to a dispatch saying that the Soviets were secretly building military air bases in Kamchatka with the intention of leasing these bases to the United States in event of war with Japan.[23]

The strongest voice in opposition to the Amau statement was that of the English language Japan Advertiser, a paper edited for foreigners resident in Japan. In the Advertiser's editorial column, Wilfrid Fleisher

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[20]Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, in Foreign Relations, III, 12.

[21]Ibid., 121.

[22]The (London) Times, 24 April 1934, 10.

[23]The New York Times, 24 April 1934, 10.

expressed doubt that other nations would accept the Japanese thesis concerning aid to China.[24] A major Japanese language newspaper that did not join the patriotic bandwagon was the Kokumin. It predicted the strain that the Amau statement would create in United States-Japanese relations. The Kokumin urged reconciliation saying, "If America is on our side we need not fear any combination of other Powers."[25] This urging was based less on love for America than on a realization that if Japan and the United States joined together, they would be absolute masters in the Pacific. This alliance, however, belonged to the realm of fantasy given the realities of the Japanese-American rivalry in 1934. The semi-official Japanese news agency, Rengo, clouded the issue by its alternating press releases. On 22 April 1934, it issued a bulletin that announced that the Japanese Cabinet had formally approved of the claim to exclusive rights in China put forward by Mr. Amau on April 17. This was immediately denied by Amau himself.[26] Then on the night of 23 April 1934, the Rengo Agency announced that the Amau statement enunciated clearly Japan's policy toward China. Again on the following day, Rengo announced that the Japanese policy did not conflict in any way with the Nine-Power Treaty or the Open Door; it was merely aimed at stopping the supply of war planes to China. The Forwign Office immediately declared that this statement was completely unauthorized.[27]

The papers that had whole-heartedly agreed with the Amau statement at the time of its release found occasion to denounce the Foreign Office as first news of the hostile foreign reception trickled in. The Asahi

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[24]Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, in Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 121.

[25]The New York Times, 21 April 1934, 8.

[26]The (London) Times, 27 April 1934, 12.

[27]Ibid., 25 April 1934, 14.

called it "a shocking blunder" while still endorsing its contents. The nationalistic papers now roundly condemned the Foreign Office for its inept handling of the matter. The Asahi went on to say that Japan had been following the same course since 1931 and should have caused no misunderstanding among the other Powers but the Foreign Office fumbled the ball and must take the blame for the bad situation that existed.[28] Within a week after this the Tokyo correspondent of The (London) Times cabled that the consensus of opinion of Japanese newspapers held that the Amau statement was a clear announcement to the world of Japan's attitude toward China but that the other Powers clearly disagreed with Japan.[29]

The Military Reaction

The Japanese military, according to Joseph Grew and others, was caught by surprise when the Amau statement was given out. Five of the vernacular newspapers, The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi, the Tokyo Asahi, the Jiji, the Chugai Shogyo, and the Hochi, besides endorsing it, said that the Army authorities unqualifiedly supported the stand envisaged in the Amau statement,[30] and Hugh Byas, a noted Asian expert and the New York Times correspondent in Tokyo, agreed with this thesis in a dispatch to his paper. Byas did not give the origin for this statement except to say that it came from highly accurate and credible sources.[31] If the military with its important and pretigious role in Japanese politics was caught by surprise as Grew and Byas contend, then the Amau statement could hardly have been

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[28]The (London) Times, 30 April 1934, 14.

[29]Ibid., 3 May 1934, 14.

[30]Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, in Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 120-121.

[31]The New York Times, 29 April 1934, 32.

issued as an official release. The statement reflected the military view of the situation in China and army leaders undoubtedly approved of it,[32] although we have no evidence that they were consulted in advance. This could be a parallel to the Twenty-One Demands in 1915, when army leaders such as Yamagata were furious at the manner in which it was issued. Perhaps as a coincidence, possibly by army plan, the Rengo News Agency on 24 April 1934, only seven days after the Amau statement was released, announced that Japan planned to double her aircraft strength within the next three years. By 1936, Japan expected to add eighteen squadrons (500 planes).[33]

The Intellectual Reaction

The recognized leaders of public opinion outside the Government evinced varied reactions ranging from approval to disapproval. The warmest defender of the Amau statement was Matsuoka Yosuke, an American-educated Japanese, who had served in the Japanese Government but was currently out of office. Matsuoka was incensed at the Western Powers for supplying China with arms, finance, and internal improvements. He contended that these strengthened China sufficiently to enable that land to resist the Japanese forces encroachment. To Western interference he attributed the lack of peace and the unsettled conditions in China.[34]

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[32]Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, in Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 120.

[33]The (London) Times, 25 April 1934, 14.

[34]The New York Times, 29 April 1934, 1. Matsuoka Yosuke (1880-1946). Born in Yamaguchi Prefecture on the southern tip of Honshu island, he attended school in the United States where he graduated from Oregon University. He served briefly in the Japanese Foreign Service and then resigned to join the South Manchurian Railroad in 1921. By 1927 he was Vice-President of the road, and in 1939 he became President of the SMR. In 1930 he was elected to the Diet on the Seiyukai ticket. In 1933 he announced Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations and in 1934 he

The New York Times said that perhaps the ultranationalistic Matsuoka more clearly reflected the spirit of the Japanese people than did Hirota, whose modification of the Amau statement pleased neither the Japanese nor the foreigners.[35]

At the other end of the political spectrum, the more liberal-minded politicians, led by Baron Shidehara, strongly disapproved of the Amau demarché. They regretted the issuance of such a statement at the time when Japanese foreign relations were beginning to calm down after the Manchurian Incident. None of these liberals, however, criticized the principles laid down in the release, only the timing.[36]

If Amau received a censure from the Foreign Office, he at the same time, won praise and congratulations from many non-Foreign Office people who concurred in the views he had publicly announced.[37] Vice-Foreign Minister Shigemitsu said that Japan should have used more tact and patience and eventually the world would have accepted the situation in Manchuria and China.[38] Prince Konoye Fumimaro, a weather-cock politician, was distressed at the timing of the statement, not at the principles.[39]

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resigned from the Diet and began calling for a dissolution of all political parties. He was appointed Foreign Minister in 1940 in the Konoe Cabinet. He toured Europe in 1941 and concluded the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact. This pact freed Japan for her coming war in the Pacific Ocean. He died while on trial as a war criminal.

[35]Ibid., IV, James, Edwin L., 29 April 1934, 1.

[36]The New York Times, 25 April 1934, 10; Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 115-119.

[37]Wilfrid Fleischer, Volcanic Isle (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1941), 44.

[38]Shigemitsu Mamoru, Japan and Her Destiny (New York: Dutton and Co., 1958), 97098.

[39]Fleischer, Volcanic Isle, 44.

The consensus of opinion among the intellectuals as well as the common man was that the Government used very poor timing. Japan was on the verge of gaining the confidence of the world when the release turned all the past gains into ashes.[40]

Many people inquired of Amau himself as to the meaning of his well publicized statement. He expressed surprise that his statement caused such a stir throughout the world. It was merely a reiteration of the principles laid down by the Foreign Minister in his 23 January 1934, Diet speech. Amau constantly repeated that his statement did not conflict in any way with any existing international agreements with China.[41]

Summary

In general the Japanese reaction against the statement was almost as strong as that of other countries but with this difference: the other countries expressed alarm and concern at the principles laid down, while the Japanese expressed concern over the timing, language and method of release. On the whole, the Japanese were receptive to the ideas in this declaration and Amau certainly gained in domestic popularity. It may well have been an accident that Amau issued the statement, but it certainly created a world-wide disturbance.

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[40] The (London) Times, 25 April 1934, 14.

[41] The New York Times, 19 April 1934, 10; Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, in Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 112-113; The Manchester Guardian Weekly, XXX (20 April 1934), 307; The (London) Times, 21 April 1934, 10; Chamberlin, Japan Over Asia (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1939), 6. J. Roscoe Drummond, "Open Door Off Hinges in Manchukuo," The Christian Science Monitor, 21 December 1934, 1.

CHAPTER III

THE UNITED STATES REACTION TO THE AMAU STATEMENT

The United States Government was alarmed over the Japanese declaration but took no immediate action.[1] The State Department was not willing to express interest in what it felt to be an unofficial statement. Any such action would tend to give the statement official standing, something it did not enjoy at the time of its issue.[2] Still, the statement emanated from an important enough source that it could not be disregarded.[3] State Department lawyers temporarily divided into two groups over its possible legal effects. One group maintained that silence was the best policy since "consent by implication" was impossible under any circumstances, while the other held that the United States should get itself on record as soon as possible to avoid any future misunderstanding of its attitude.[4] This impasse was resolved when it became obvious that the statement could not be ignored. It had already stirred up much world-wide attention. Although the United States was not willing to go to war over the Amau statement, the State Department was quick to reaffirm the American

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[1] C. A. Buss, The Far East: A History of Recent and Contemporary International Relations in East Asia (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1955), 390; Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, in Foreign Relations, III, 117; The New York Times, 18 April 1934, 12.

[2] Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, Foreign Relations, III, 117; The New York Times, 26 April 1934, 13; The (London) Times, 2 May 1934, 14.

[3] Stanley K. Hornbeck, The United States and the Far East: Certain Fundamentals of Policy (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942), 33.

[4] The New York Times, 27 April 1934, 9.

position in China; and that we would not recognize the Amau statement as valid.[5] This move was unambiguous and specific in denying the Japanese claim.[6] The State Department was aware of the possible adverse effects on the American aid program to China that the Amau statement portended, and it was, at the same time, equally clear that the Stimson Doctrine of moral pressure and non-recognition of territorial gains by force had failed in China. The American answer was not as firm as both Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, and President Roosevelt wished, but the political climate was such that the American people would not have tolerated a war with Japan at this time.[7]

The American and British reactions paralleled each other, although they were arrived at independently and without any prior consultation. The United States hoped that Britain would back her up in the event of a showdown with Japan.[8] The American Government was soon disabused of this hope. London had less inclination than did Washington for a quarrel with Japan in the Pacific. The Amau statement and its effects, however, did not pass unnoticed by the American news media. The American public, by and large, was aware of the Japanese declaration, but it was preoccupied with its own internal problems created by the Depression.[9]

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[5]Meribeth Cameron et al, China, Japan and the Powers: A History of the Modern Far East (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1952), 471.

[6]H. S. Quigley, and G. H. Blakeslee, The Far East: An International Survey (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1938), 190.

[7]Varian Fry, War in China: America's Role in the Far East (New York: Foreign Policy Ass'n., 1938), 63.

[8]The New York Times, 20 April 1934, 10; The Manchester Guardian Weekly, XXX (27 April 1934), 324; The (London) Times, 2 May 1934, 14.

[9]Knight Biggerstaff, The Far East and the United States (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1944), 32.

The Presidential Reaction

President Roosevelt, like his countrymen, was preoccupied with the nation's internal problems. He had little time to spend on foreign affairs. This led to a foreign policy less vigorous in some respects than was Hoover's. It showed in the long run, however, no compromising of principles and little if any change in the Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition of territorial acquisition by force. This position, which did not involve the use of force or the threat of force, was necessary in view of the American people's reluctance to go to war.[10] That Roosevelt took a serious view of the Pacific problem was common knowledge. According to The (London) Times, President Roosevelt would like to do more but was hindered by a Congress that had a morbid fear of becoming entangled in any foreign alliances or altercations.[11] Further proof of Roosevelt's alarm at the Amau statement came when he announced that he intended to ask Congress to start building the Navy up to its full strength as authorized by the Washington Naval Conference of 1922.[12] Though the possibility existed that Roosevelt would have asked Congress to build up the Navy anyway since it was well-known that he had a fondness for the Navy.[13] It is unlikely, however, that he would have asked so soon unless he felt alarmed, since the finances of the country were not adequate for embarking on a Naval expension program.

Perhaps the President's Japanophobia shaped his big Navy views. He

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[10]Ibid., 32.

[11]The (London) Times, 30 April 1934, 14.

[12]The New York Times, 26 April 1934, 13.

[13]The (London) Times, 26 April 1934, 14.

once told Henry L. Stimson, while a dinner guest at the White House, an ancedote which revealed a personal uneasiness about Japan. While he was a student at Harvard in 1902, the President told Stimson, a Japanese classmate confided that Japan had a one hundred year plan for conquest of the Pacific Ocean area. The Japanese student then outlined the plan, one remarkably similar to the subsequent course of the nation's expansion. This tale, told in 1934, remained clear in Stimson's mind for the next seven years.[14]

The State Department Reaction

The Amau statement came as a shock to Secretary of State Hull, though it was no surprise. It meant that after a brief conciliatory interlude, Japan had reembarked on her old course of armaments, treaty breaking, and aggression. Hull could not let this pass unchallenged.[15] In May, Hull observed in a formal statement, that American opinion would not permit Japan unilaterally to break the Nine-Power Treaty.[16] Prior to the May statement, the American Government had dispatched a reply to the Japanese demarché. This reply was delayed for over a week while the American Government decided on a course of action. "The situation was so complicated with cross currents and cross wires," said The New York Times, "that the time was not ripe for a reply."[17] Requests to the Japanese Ambassador

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[14]H. L. Stimson, and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), 301-302.

[15]Cordell Hull, Memoirs, I (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), 279.

[16]F. H. Michael, and George E. Taylor, The Far East in the Modern World (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1956), 627.

[17]Arthur Krock, The New York Times, 27 April 1934, 20.

for an official copy of the Amau statement were unavailing for several days, consequently no answer could be formulated. Also, according to The (London) Times, the State Department waited for the British reply before committing itself since the British were the largest foreign investor nation in China.[18]

The United States reply, reported by The (London) Times, revealed that this nation questioned the Japanese assertion of several "realities" that existed in China, such as the existence of Manchukuo and Japanese primacy in north China and the insistence that all nations recognize them. These were "selected realities" at best and could not be accepted by the Powers. Many of these Powers had interests and connections with China long antedating Japan's opening to the West, the State Department continued. The Japanese pretense that only she understood China because both were Oriental was naive and unacceptable to the West.[19]

The American stand on the Amau statement was greeted favorably in Great Britain and lukewarmly in China. Britain hailed it as the first stand that the Roosevelt administration had taken on Asian affairs.[20] The Nanking Government of Chiang Kai-shek called the American reply "rather weak but generally satisfactory ... At any rate we are now sure where America stands in this matter."[21] The American reply referred to above, was dispatched on 30 April 1934. This dispatch, unequivocally informed Japan that the United States insisted on complete observance of all treaties and that she would not recognize any peculiar interests and

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[18] The (London) Times, 26 April 1934, 14.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid., 2 May 1934, 14.

[21] The New York Times, 3 May 1934, 6.

rights of Japan.[22] This reply was interpreted by both the United States and Japan as including all of Asia, not only China alone.[23]

The American official most intimately concerned with the Amau statement was Joseph C. Grew, the United States Ambassador to Japan, who was at his post when the Amau statement was issued. Grew was a career diplomat with many years service in Europe and Turkey before his assignment to Japan. Both Grew and Roosevelt had attended Groton and Harvard. Roosevelt went on to Columbia Law School while Grew attended George Washington University. This similarity of background may explain the mutual esteem that both men held for each other. Grew, like Roosevelt, never fully trusted Japan though he did a creditable job while Ambassador and gained many Japanese friends. He held the opinion that the statement was a true reflection of Japanese feelings regarding China, but the Foreign Office, for diplomatic reasons, maintained an aloof position enabling it to deny the official standing of the by now famous statement. Grew also believed that it was open to broad interpretation, and for the present it would not be enforced by Japan. Further, at first Grew did not feel that any answer was warranted until a more definitive translation was obtained than the one printed in The New York Herald-Tribune. The only way to obtain this was to ask the Japanese Foreign Minister, Hirota Koki for an official copy but this Grew refused to do until ordered by Hull.[24] Grew, also, was of the opinion that the British had acceded too hastily to the Japanese assertion of special rights and realities in China. At the same time, Grew felt that the American reply was "wholly admirable, absolutely called for by the circumstances, drafted in a masterly fashion, perfectly clear

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[22]The Nation, CXXXVIII (9 May 1934), 520.

[23]The New York Times, 2 May 1934, 11.

[24]Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, in Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 115.

in substance, [and] moderate and friendly in tone."[25] Ambassador Grew was in perfect accord with the policy followed by Roosevelt and Hull. It would almost seem that such perfect accord was the result of coordinate planning. As to how much advice Grew gave in arriving at this course of action, one can only speculate.

The Congressional Reaction

Congress was to show little interest in the Amau statement. Congress was aware of the statement and there was comment upon it from the floor of both Houses of Congress, but little came of it. Congress refrained from any discussion of the matter until the Administration had had a chance to act. On 2 May 1934, Senator James Hamilton Lewis, (Democrat, Illinois), rose and in a lengthy speech called for unanimous Senatorial approval of the State Department's reply to the Japanese statement. He also called for unanimous consent on the part of the Senate in endorsing the foreign policy of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull toward Asia. In this same speech, Senator Lewis decried the weak English acquiescence to Japan's "special position" in China.[26]

Mr. Anthony Joseph Dimond, Territorial Delegate from Alaska, on 7 May, called the attention of the House of Representatives to an article written by Senator Arthur R. Robinson of Ohio. Senator Robinson saw Alaska as being in danger from an attack by Japan which was on a military aggression spree. He pointed out that Alaska, or parts of it, were closer to Japan than they were to the United States. Japan's past actions in China were a prelude to expansion throughout the Pacific area. The United

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[25]Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), 133.

[26]U.S. Congressional Record, 73d Congress, 2d Session, 1934, LXXVIII, Part 7, 7899.

States must take a determined stand and build up Alaska to be as well defended as Pearl Harbor. He concluded by saying that the United States could only be secure in the Orient when it was militarily strong. The problem of defense could be solved by action, "not . . . by polite though firm notes from the State Department."[27] This last sentence was the only discordant note in Congress and it was a mild one. It seemed to be aimed at the State Department's reply to the Amau statement but the article read on the floor of the House was written before the statment was issued. It was unintentional but prophetic.

This was the extent of the part Congress played in the Amau statement except to give the President his requested increased naval appropriations.[28] That Congress did not take a more positive course in the matter of the Amau statement was not surprising in view of the economic condition of the nation at the time. The foremost problem facing the nation was the bringing back of prosperity and the President and Congress were immersed in this question. The traditional isolationism in Congress and the President-Congress "honeymoon" period, which was still in effect, precluded any runaway action by the legislature in the field of foreign affairs. Congress, at this time, was content to follow the President in his foreign policy as long as it did not lead to foreign entanglements.

The Press Reaction

Though Congress took little notice of the Amau statement, the same cannot be said for the news media, and the press in particular. It was

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[27]Ibid., Part 8, 8257-8259. Mr. Dimond quoted the articles of Senator Robinson from "Will Japan Seize Alaska?", Liberty Magazine, 24 March 1934.

[28]U.S., Senate, Establish Composition of United States Navy . . ., 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1934, Senate Doc. 156; Ibid., Construction of Naval Vessels, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1934, Senate Doc. 157.

the press which actually called world attention to the Japanese release. Of all the segments of American life, the press was the most vociferous in its reaction to the Japanese declaration. The story was first released in the United States by the New York Herald-Tribune on 18 April 1934, the day after it was issued by Amau. The Herald-Tribune correspondent in Tokyo, Mr. Wilfrid Fleischer, who was also the editor of the Japan Advertiser, cabled the Amau statement to the United States from the translated edition that had appeared in the Advertiser's morning edition of 18 April.[29] The Baltimore Sun as quoted by The (London) Times, declared that China would fall to Japan by default if the Western Powers did not take immediate action. The Nine-Power Treaty provided the means for this and the signatories should invoke the treaty without delay.[30] The New York Times, in an editorial, theorized that if Japan was serious about wanting peace in China, she should be happy to see China armed. As long as China was fragmented into small territories held by different war-lords, she would never know peace. If Chiang Kai-shek received arms and secured unification he would suppress and pacify China. There would then be the opportunity for Japanese trade on a large scale.[31] The New York Times printed a guest editorial from the Philadelphia Inquirer entitled "Menace to China." It was one of the most outspoken of all American newspaper editorials on the Amau statement.[32]

> It is difficult to imagine Japan acting as headmaster in a school of social welfare. That is not her way. She absorbed Korea. She advanced on Manchuria in the name of peace,

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[29]Fleischer, Volcanic Isle, 260.

[30]The (London) Times, 26 April 1934, 14.

[31]"Topics of the Times," The New York Times, 27 April 1934, 20.

[32]The New York Times, IV, 29 April 1934, 4.

> slaughtering right and left and driving China out of her possession. When Japan had set up her own government she calmly announced that the thing had been done--that it was un fait accompli--and what are you going to do about it? Her invasion of China proper, hurling death and disaster at Shanghai, had no object other than to impress the unfortunate Chinese and the world with the ruthlessness of her power. It is impossible to believe that her present course is not directed toward the virtual domination of China.

Despite such fiery articles, the American people did not get aroused over the Japanese declaration. Perhaps this type of writing sold a few more papers, it did not accomplish much more.

The New Republic adopted a cynical point of view. As long as Japan talked about the activities of the foreign Powers in China, said the New Republic, she would not take any action. Furthermore, should Japan cease talking and attempt to do something about enforcing the Amau doctrine, the United States would have to either back down or go to war. Should the latter course be followed, the United States would be in trouble since it is doubtful if Japan could be beaten in the Pacific, even with British help. There was also the possibility that Japan would offer spheres of influence to other European nations if they would back her in her war with America. The editor concluded with a pessimistic note that no matter the course followed by the United States, we would lose out in China.[33]

The Nation took a brighter view of the situation created by the Japanese statement. It was not sure that Japan was ready to back up her threat since Japan's record over the past twenty years indicated her belief that China would fall to her influence anyway. The time would come when the Nine-Power Treaty members will have to fact Japan, by force if necessary, to pressure Japan out of China. Surely the Chinese could hang on until that happened.[34]

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[33]"Japan's Challenge to the West," New Republic, LXXVII (2 May 1934), 323.

[34]"Editorial Paragraphs," The Nation, CXXXVIII (9 May 1934), 520.

As was to be expected, the public expressed its views on the Amau statement in letters to the editors. One such missive was particularly interesting since it adopted a cold-blooded, pro-Japanese view. This writer advocated the complete abstention of the United States from any act that might affect Sino-Japanese relations. It was none of America's business what Japan did in China so long as she did not interfere with American interests there. Also, Japan had brought peace and order to those parts of China that she had occupied. Japan had also respected our Open Door policy since she was motivated only by the highest ideals in her China policy. As for her military attitude, she had only done what the Western nations did earlier when they took over less developed countries as colonies and spheres on interest.[35] This letter was not unique, it was merely more erudite than most of the others.

Such attitudes were all too prevalent in the United States. The traditional American isolationism coupled with a severe economic depression at home were almost a guarantee that any positive foreign policy would be unacceptable to the American people. The leading American newspapers and periodicals did a creditable job of keeping the public informed of world affairs, but the intense preoccupation with internal matters offset much of this effort.

The Economic Reaction

The economic response to the Amau statement was almost negligible. There was no widespread American business reaction. The American Government, however, had always displayed a deep interest in American investments in China due to its established "Dollar Diplomacy" policy. The

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[35]Henry A. Wisewood, "Letters to the Editor," The New York Times, IV, 29 April 1934, 5.

government had long sought to force dollars into areas where they would not go of their own accord. The firm stand of the State Department regarding the Amau statement was a reflection of this interest. Professor Charles Frederick Remer, Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan, explained this by the fact that the United States entered the contest for the exploitation of China at a late date and could not succeed without Government backing. Also, American investors have been either unsuccessful or unfortunate, or both.[36] Of more than the $41,000,000 invested by Americans in Chinese Government obligations, only $8,000,000 were secured by any collateral.[37] This was too risky a margin for most American businessmen to operate on with their own capital. Since few Americans cared to invest in a country as unsettled as China, the Government has had to offer backing to get businessmen to invest. The United States, in contrast to the European Powers, was hesitant to use its troops to protect its interests. Under such conditions it was expected that private investments would be light. In fact, the only significant private American investments in China were in public utilities in Shanghai and railroads in Manchuria.

The railroad loans were secured by the rolling stock and the carrying profits which were substantial.[38] The investments in the Shanghai utilities were in stocks and bonds, not in direct physical plant facilities.[39] American companies engaged in business in China were subsidized by the Government after 1922 with the China Trade Act of that year.

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[36]C.F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), 334.

[37]Ibid., Table 11, 301.

[38]Ibid., 88.

[39]Ibid., 335.

It was amended in 1925 to liberalize the aid even more. This act provided for certain federal tax exemptions and allowed federal incorporation of these firms. Only national banks had enjoyed these rights prior to the passage of this bill.[40] Another significant facet of American governmental interest in Asian investment has been America's traditional concern for events in Manchuria where American investments, once large, were now small. This interest now derived more on political grounds than on economic grounds. "Manchuria has been the chief international political problem in the Far East since the end of the Sino-Japanese War. The United States has shown a keen interest in Manchurian railways because the solution of the railway problem promised a solution of the political problem."[41] Since Manchuria was sparsely settled and underdeveloped with vast distances to span, a steady reliable transport system was the key to development and control of the area. There were no paved roads and even fewer vehicles. Without railroads no supplies could be brought in or produce shipped out. Our American Trans-Mississippi West during the post-Civil War era was an excellent example of this. Hence, the control of the railroad was equivalent to control of the country.

Business Week magazine pointed out another economic facet of the Amau statement as it affected American trade in the Orient when it said in effect, that China is a great potential market for American goods but until the disorganization within the country ends, and American manufacturers adapt their products to a low-income market this potential will not be realized. Japan today offers a more ready market for American raw materials such as cotton. This aspect was true for the long run

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[40] Ibid., 317.

[41] Ibid., 335.

picture, but the immediate American investments in China were the chief and immediate problem.[42] The United States was only the fourth largest investor in China, being surpassed by Great Britain, Japan, and Russia, in that order.[43] The American investments were valued at approximately $200,000,000.[44]

An excellent indicator of the business world's lack of any real interest in the Amau statement is evident from the lack of any sharp trading on the New York Stock Exchange. There was no flurry of selling or buying of Chinese or Japanese stocks. No American company doing business in China showed any indication or fluctuation of stock from the normal. An examination of the stock quotations in The New York Times for the month of April gave no hint of any undue activity on the Exchange. The State Department displayed more of an interest in the Japanese declaration than did any segment of the business world. This could only be true if the United States Government was more interested than any other segment of American life. There was no major American corporation with heavy investments in China. The largest individual American companies doing business were the shipping and trading concerns, and even these had the majority of their funds invested in the American end of the business, and though a few American firms owned their physical facilities in China, these amounted to very little in the total sum of American investments.

American Foreign Policy Before the Statement

The American foreign policy before the Amau statement can best be described as one of non-intervention and non-recognition. Besides the

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[42] "Business Abroad," Business Week, (28 April 1934), 30.

[43] Remer, Foreign Investments, Chart 2, 75.

[44] Ibid., 239.

traditional distaste for entangling foreign alliances, the United States was too pre-occupied with its own internal troubles to consider any positive action in China over the Amau statement. Further, the American people were disillusioned over the results of the attempt to remake Europe into a peaceful community of nations. The United States had pulled Europe's chestnuts out of the fire and Europe was ungrateful. The Japanese in the Far East were involved in an "incident" with China that had no end in sight. It would only bring grief to the United States to get involved in the situation in China. This pessimistic attitude, coupled with the domestic problems at home, made it all but impossible for the Government to follow any positive course abroad.

The non-recognition policy, followed by Henry L. Stimson, dated back to William Jennings Bryan, according to Cordell Hull. Bryan employed this device after Japan had presented her infamous Twenty-one Demands in 1915.[45] George E. Sokolsky, Tokyo correspondent of The New York Times and a recognized authority on the Far East, traced the non-recognition policy back to John Hay's Open Door of 1900.[46] Cordell Hull, in his Memoirs, gave full credit to Stimson for taking the non-recognition principle of Bryan, expanding it, and attempting to gain world recognition for it.[47] Stimson, while Secretary of State under Hoover, had tried to work with the League of Nations in dealing with Japan over the Manchurian Incident in 1931. He believed that world opinion could be marshalled against Japan through this organization, thus forcing the militaristic group to back down in their demands. This then would lead to the

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[45]Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. I (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), 270.

[46]George E. Sokolsky, The New York Times, VIII, 29 April 1934, 11.

[47]Hull, Memoirs, 270.

strengthening of the civilian elements of the Japanese Government.[48] Stimson soon grew disillusioned with this idea when it became obvious that the disparate interests of the various members of the League were too strong for any concerted action against Japan.

As Cordell Hull entered the State Department in 1933, he had two points on the Far East firmly in mind. The first was the definite interest of the United States in maintaining the independence of China and in preventing Japan from gaining overlordship of the entire Far East. The second conviction was that Japan had no intention whatever of abiding by treaties but would regulate her conduct by the opportunities of the moment.[49] Though Hull was determined to follow these two objectives while he was Secretary of State, neither he nor President Roosevelt were prepared to use force to halt Japan. The pacifism and isolationism that had existed under Hoover and Stimson were still deeply entrenched in the nation.[50] Roosevelt and Hull, despite their intentions, were hampered by the traditional American attitude toward foreign entanglements.

American Foreign Policy After the Statement

The United States did not modify its policy in China as a result of the Amau statement. Neither did the Japanese Government modify the policies that foreshadowed this statement.[51] Prior to its issuance, Japanese-American relations had been steadily improving. After the

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[48]Franz H. Michael, and George E. Taylor, The Far East in the Modern World (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1956), 624.

[49]Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 270.

[50]Meribeth E. Cameron, Thomas H. Mahoney, and George E. McReynolds, China, Japan and the Powers (New York: Ronald Press, 1952), 471.

[51]Michael and Taylor, The Far East in the Modern World, 627.

statement, the relations steadily declined.

The chill put upon Japanese-American relations by the Amau statement was never removed. The affair soon passed over, but the realization that the problem of East Asian affairs would someday be settled by resort to arms, lurked in the minds of people on both sides of the Pacific. The two differing policies of Japan and the United States were bound to clash unless one side gave way. Emotional factors, arising from the strong moral positions attached to their respective policies, made such agreement impossible. The United States policy of a free China, with free trade and access to all nations with no single nation gaining absolute power over all or part of China, was destined to clash with Japan's expansionist, imperialist plan to subordinate China to a satellite position within the yen bloc.

CHAPTER IV

THE EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE AMAU STATEMENT

As much as it surprised the United States, the Amau statement caught the rest of the world off guard and, in Europe, caused a mild furor. The first official reaction came from Great Britain which sidestepped the issue by sending a "friendly inquiry" on 25 April, as to the meaning of the statement. The Government accompanied this with a reminder that Japan had recourse to the Nine-Power Treaty, which was still in force and of which Japan was a member, to voice any dissatisfaction that she might have with the other Signatories as to their conduct in China. Furthermore, Great Britain had pursued in China no activity that might give cause for alarm to Japan.[1] France and Italy, whose interests in Asia were much less important than Britain's followed its lead. Russia, filling her usual role of profiting by other nation's problems, stood on the sidelines and denounced both sides as greedy capitalists fighting over the spoils of colonialism. The other nations of Europe noted the situation but since they had little or no interest in Asia, they remained mere spectators. Europe was plagued with her own problems and had no inclination to become involved in an Asian squabble.

The British Reaction

The Amau statement was issued on 17 April 1934, printed in The (London)

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[1]G. E. Hubbard, Survey of International Affairs, 1934 (Oxford, 1935), 656. The Signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty were Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States, Japan, China, the Netherlands, and Portugal.

Times on 18 April, but not answered by the British government until 25 April. The reasons for the week's delay in answering this challenge are varied. As mentioned above, the statement took the world by surprise. Still, in her history Britain had responded more rapidly to other challenges. The British reacted in several stages. The first was a "friendly inquiry" on 25 April 1934 as to the meaning of the Amau statement. The next stage was on 30 April 1934 with the Government's willingness to accept the Japanese reply to its inquiry wherein the Japanese agreed in the British assumption that it in no way transgressed any treaties or common rights in China that Japan shared with the other Powers. With this answer, the British Government was prepared to "leave the question where it was."[2] The Parliamentary Opposition, on 30 April 1934, formed the third stage of the reaction when it refused to "leave the question where it was." The Government remained adamant, and since the Opposition could not muster enough votes in Commons to overturn the Government, the question was suspended. British attention soon was focused on the European situation. The reactions from the other segments of British life were not influential in affecting the Government's stand, though they are of much interest. Along with Britain's attention to Hitler's sabre-rattling in Europe, the effects of the world-wide depression were making themselves felt. There was much unemployment throughout the world and Britain was no exception. The Japanese declaration may have been startling to Britain, but Japan had not previously bothered Britain's large investments in China. Besides, Japan and Britain had long been allies in the Pacific, even before the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Britain

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[2]Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCLXXXIX (30 April 1934), 14.

had only a short time before ended any formal arrangement but the friendly feeling was still supposed to exist. Perhaps another reason for the delay was the well-known pacifist principles of the British Prime Minister, Ramsey MacDonald, who would not rush into a policy that could easily lead to war without first giving it deep consideration.[3] Viewed in this perspective, the delay was understandable.

British Economic Interest in China

Great Britain, of all the foreign investors in China, was the largest. Over 36% of all foreign investments belonged to Britain. In terms of United States dollars, this amounted to $1,189,200,000.[4] Professor C. F. Remer summed up the importance of these investments by observing "that the history of British investments in China is the history of Chinese capital imports. The study of China's international economic relations meant . . . the study of British trade, British shipping, the British business community, and British investments in China."[5] That Britain should be concerned over the Amau statement was to be expected, and the Members of Parliament from the English industrial areas that had dealings with China were prompt to question the validity of the statement. Although they did not mention their investments as such, it is significant that these Members took the lead in Parliament in demanding action from the Government. It would almost seem as if economic determinism were the overriding factor in the British foreign policy.

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[3]Walter P. Hall, Robert G. Albion, and Jennie B. Pope, A History of England and the Empire-Commonwealth (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1961), 603.

[4]C. F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1933), Table 18, 407.

[5]Ibid., 406.

The Debate in Commons

Whatever the Government's reasons for delaying a week before answering the statement, they did not extend to Parliament. Two days after the Japanese *demarche*, and one day after it appeared in *The Times*, the Opposition from the Liberal and Unionist Parties attacked MacDonald's National Government. This spirited and prolonged offensive lasted for a month. It did not cease until 18 May 1934, which was adjournment time. The Opposition centered on economic reasons with moral justifications a poor second. Outside of the usual wish of the Opposition to embarrass the Government, the concern for British investments in Asia was the driving force for the attack.

The opening shot was fired by the Liberal Member from the Midlands port of South Shields, Mr. Harcourt Johnstone, whose constituency was deeply involved in the Asiatic trade. He wanted to know what Japan meant by the Amau statement.[6] Since the Government had not yet decided upon a course of action, Sir John Simon, the Foreign Minister, ever the slippery politician,[7] put off the question by replying that there were several versions of the statement and until he received the definitive one he would offer no comment.[8] This was only the start of a deluge that would not cease until the May adjournment. Every day brought a series of questions designed, it seemed, more for embarrassing the Government than for eliciting information. In all fairness to the Opposition, however, one must say that these questions were legitimate even though the questioners may not have expected to receive answers. These queries for the most part

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[6] *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), CCLXXXVIII (19 April 1934), 1124.

[7] Helen P. Kirkpatrick, *Under the British Umbrella: What the English Are and How They Go To War* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), 128.

[8] *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), CCLXXXVIII (19 April 1934), 1125.

concerned themselves with Britain's Asian markets. These covered such matters as the status of foreign loans to China, the employment of foreign advisors by China, and cooperation between the Government and the United States. Sir John attempted to answer these as best he could but his replies did not satisfy the Opposition. He finally promised to answer these questions as soon as the Government received more information.[9]

During the Oral Answer period on 25 April 1934, Sir John attempted to fend off the Opposition. He told the House that the British Ambassador to Japan, Sir Francis Lindley had an appointment with the Japanese Foreign Minister that very day. It should take a few days to receive an answer though.[10] This attempt did little good, however, for the Opposition continued to hammer at the Government for the rest of the week and into the next. On 30 April, Sir John could report to the House that the Japanese Government had agreed with the British contention that Great Britain had not followed any policy in China that conflicted with Japanese interests.[11]

Meanwhile, the Japanese diplomats in Geneva, Washington, and Shanghai had been "explaining away" the Amau statement to newspaper reporters with differing interpretations than that issued by Hirota to the British Government.[12] Mr. Johnstone asked the Government to clarify this situation. Sir John immediately replied that one must not believe everything that one reads in the papers or that every press release is authorized.[13]

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[9] Ibid., 1366-1367.

[10] Ibid., (25 April 1934), 1692.

[11] Ibid., CCLXXXIX (30 April 1934), 13-14.

[12] The (London) Times, 23 April 1934, 14; 24 April 1934, 14; The New York Times, 25 April 1934, 1; this explaining away" refers to the statement made by Ambassador Saito in Washington and Consul Yokoyama in Geneva, cf. supra, 5-6.

[13] 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCLXXXIX (30 April 1934), 14.

Hitherto, the concern by Commons had been with British commercial interests. Now, Mr. Alan E. L. Chorlton, Unionist Member from the Platting Division of Manchester, and who had spent many years in Russia and Germany as a civil and automotive engineer, was anxious to know if there had been any measures taken to increase the defense of Singapore in the light of the Japanese statement? The First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell, informed him that there had been none and none were contemplated. The measures for Singapore's defense as embodied in the Naval Estimates for 1934[14] were considered adequate and would not be increased at this time.[15] For the remainder of the week, Parliament devoted the rest of its time to a more important matter, the Unemployment Bill.

On Monday, 7 May 1934, the Far Eastern question appeared again. During this discussion, the matter of Japan's "special rights" in China that were recognized by other nations but not shared by them was brought forth. Sir John replied in the negative, but he did say that insofar as the Japanese are running a peculiar enterprise such as the Japanese Concession at Hankow, they do have special rights, the same as Britain in her entities and enterprises.[16]

The protracted debate on Tuesday, 18 April, cleared the atmosphere that had become beclouded and befogged in rhetoric. Sir Stafford Cripps, Labor Member for East Bristol, mentioned what was to become, in the eyes of many, the true cause for the issuance of the startling Japanese declaration. He said that Japan had gotten by with her aggressions on the

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[14]Ibid., CCLXXXVIII (12 March 1934), 41 ff.

[15]Ibid., CCLXXXIX (30 April 1934), 24.

[16]Ibid., (7 May 1934), 712.

Asian continent, not because of her strength, but more because of the West's vacilliation; that Japan, "when the moment seemed opportune, ... flew a kite to ascertain the attitude that other Governments were likely to take as regards her claim for a sphere of influence in China," and being pleased with the little disturbance it caused, had proceeded to make this her new official policy.[17] A four hour debate followed over disarmament, and the League of Nations; and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes even spoke in virtual praise of Japan for her attitude and actions on the Asian continent.[18] The session ended by adjournment for the Whitsuntide holidays with the doubts and questions still unsettled. The wide variety of opinions and the lack of clarity of purpose in the debates, demonstrated clearly that there was to be no firm course of action prescribed for the present, neither by the Government nor by the Opposition. The bulk of the Opposition were motivated by their concern for the nation's commercial interests, and by their desire to embarrass the MacDonald Government rather than fear of Japanese aggression. The attempt to disconcert the MacDonald Government was led by the Labor and Conservative Opposition. Labor had a deep distrust of MacDonald after he had made what they felt to be a turncoat break with them. His pacifist principles during the Great War were still lurking in the background and his mildly socialistic program, although acceptable to Labor, was thoroughly distasteful to the Conservatives.

The Debate in Lords

The reaction in the House of Lords was as varied as that in the House

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[17]Ibid., (18 May 1934), 2054-2055.

[18]Ibid., 2082-2085.

of Commons. Here, too, no solution was found. The Opposition attacked the Government more for its lack of a program than for the mildness of the note dispatched to the Japanese Government.[19] Still, the Opposition did not have a plan of its own to put forth.[20] The House of Lords is not empowered to make or alter policy, though it can and quite often does, debate the issues and bring them into the open for the public to study. Though the Lords fulfilled this role admirably, they did not succeed in crystallizing public opinion. This in itself is not surprising since the British people were not united as to what course to follow.

The Lords did not begin discussion of the Amau statement until 7 May 1934, and then as part of the general disarmament discussion. The general level of the debate, as debates always are in the Lords, was intelligent and quick to remove the excess verbiage that had grown up around the subject. Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, Chencellor of Birmingham University, and a noted jurist, saw the Japanese declaration as a forerunner to the complete take-over of China by Japan. He approved of the Government's action in response to the Japanese statement though he had his doubts as to the motivation behind it; he hoped that it was not motivated by economic interests but rather motivated by the fact that a Treaty signed by His Majesty's Government had been violated.[21] The Lords who participated in this debate were men who had had extensive public service and were unusually well versed on foreign affairs. Even here, among these well informed Members, there was no unanimity of opinion as to the proper course to follow. Viscount Cecil's discussion was the apogee of the discussion

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[19]Ibid. (Lords), XCII (7 May 1934), 22-25.

[20]Ibid., 45-46.

[21]Ibid., 34-39.

in Lords and those who followed him in speaking added nothing towards clarifying the issue. His interpretation, that this was the first step towards Japan's domination of China was to prove true in less than a decade. This was one more step on the road to fulfillment of the Japanese destiny of Hakko Ichiu, or the world under one roof.

The Press Reaction

The British press met the Amau statement with the same varied reactions that were found in Parliament. The various papers and journals reflected their biases and prejudices when they commented on the statement. The daily papers were the fairest in their treatment of the issue, though the degree of fairness varied from publication to publication. The (London) Times, as befits its preeminent position, presented the most thorough and impartial account of the matter. The Times was large enough to have a full-time correspondent stationed in Tokyo and he was at his post when the statement was issued. The Manchester Guardian Weekly, while giving the issue an excellent coverage, was far more outspoken. The Guardian used the Reuters News Service dispatches which did a very good job of covering the event.

The monthly and semi-monthly magazines such as the Nineteenth Century and After, the Fortnightly Review, and the Contemporary Review offered a sounding board for a wide range of opinion, though each of these had its own pet biases and prejudices that were reflected in their editorial columns and in the type of reader's communications that were printed. The most opinionated and pro-Japanese magazine was the arch-conservative National Review.

The Times editorial of 20 April 1934, made a significant statement to which few seemed to pay much notice. It said that despite the "modest

appearance, the statement is the most important declaration of Japanese policy in regard to China which has been made for many years." The Washington correspondent of The Times saw the statement as an analogy to the infamous Twenty-One Demands of 1915 and a changing concept of the Open Door policy and the integrity of China.[22] The Times' summation of the affair in their editorial column on 26 April 1934 said that "the latest developments at Tokyo suggest that to condemn Japanese policy toward China unheard is just as premature as to applaud it. The releases have been unofficial and were not declarations of the Japanese Government." This dispassionate summation was in sharp contrast to the blunt but accurate summation of The Manchester Guardian Weekly that:[23]

> There is a shorter way of saying the same thing; Japan having failed to cow China, a strong China will be anti-Japanese, and therefore Japan will prevent China at all costs from becoming too strong. Japan seized Manchuria through China's weakness and will hold it so long as China remains weak and no longer; therefore Japan would resist the idea that China should . . . receive assistance from the League that will make her stronger . . . . Unless China is prepared to be the respectful satellite of Japan, she will become strong at her peril.

The National Review was at the extreme end of the spectrum in its outspoken views. It was anti-Government, anti-American, anti-League of Nations, anti-Chinese, but it strongly backed Japanese activity on the Asian mainland. It saw all the trouble in China as a result of the meddling of all the Powers, except Japan, in the internal affairs of China. Japan was merely trying to bring enlightenment to the hopeless Chinese and all nations should leave China to Japan's tender mercies. It also called for a new Anglo-Japanese Alliance.[24] The printed word in

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[22]The (London) Times, 20 April 1934, 14.

[23]The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 27 April 1934, 323.

[24]National Review, CII (May 1934), 575-576.

Britain then was no more in agreement than was Parliament. From the man-in-the-street came the same wide range of opinions found in the British governing bodies.

The French Reaction

France followed Britain in replying to the Amau statement. This was a practical necessity since France by herself was too weak to carry on a war halfway around the world. She was more concerned with Hitler's threat to peace and with her own internal problems. When Paris did get around to replying, the note was lukewarm in tone and the Japanese reply to it was readily accepted.[25] The French Government dropped the matter when the other Signatories declined to move. France's investments, while extensive, were nowhere as large as those of the British. The French investments totalled less than 6% of all foreign investments in China, or approximately US $192,000,000.[26] Besides, France could do nothing should Japan decide to take overt action to enforce the principles of the Amau statement.

The Italian Reaction

Italy reacted much the same as France though Italy and France had different interests. The total Italian investments in China formed a fraction over 1% of the total foreign investment. In terms of US dollars they amounted to a mere $46,000,000.[27] Mussolini, for sometime, had been making obvious attempts to increase Italy's influence in China ever since

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[25] The (London) Times, 4 May 1934, 11.

[26] Remer, Foreign Investments in Japan, Chart 2, 75.

[27] Ibid., 661.

he had clashed with Japan in Abyssinia over trade rights in 1930. He also had dreams of restoring to Italy some of the ancient glory that was Rome's. The Japanese trade attempt in Abyssinia had brought with it sympathy for the poor oppressed blacks whom Mussoloni was persecuting. That these were crocodile tears on Japan's part made them no less effective in influencing the natives. Italy soon found a chance to embarrass Japan and to accomplish her aim of self-aggrandizement. Mussolini sent General Lordi to China to build up the Chinese air force and to build an aircraft factory in Kiangsi Province. Italy also helped China with the revision of her penal code and with currency reform.[28] The Amau statement was clearly directed toward Italy. Italy, despite her policy of retaliation against Japan for encroaching on the Abyssinian market, did not want war in Asia as the price for this retaliation.

The Russian Reaction

The initial Russian reaction to the Amau statement was a determined silence.[29] The Soviet press refrained from any mention of the statement for over a week. The first newspaper to comment was the Za Industrialzatsii in an article that portrayed the statement as a challenge to all the capitalist nations by an Imperialism dizzy with military successes.[30] The general tenor of the Soviet press was that Japan had exploded a trial bomb rather than a trial balloon. Moscow tried to give the impression that she had no interest in this matter, but the truth was that Russia

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[28]Ibid.

[29]William Bullitt to Secretary of State, 22 April 1934, in U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 125.

[30]Za Industrialzatsii, quoted in The Manchester Guardian Weekly, XXX (27 April 1934), 324.

was vitally concerned. If Japan intended to carry out the policy enunciated in the Amau statement, the Russian interests in Mongolia and Manchuria were in danger. These interests extended back two centuries, although they did not become extensive until the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. Russia's single largest economic investment was the Chinese Eastern Railway which, built primarily for strategic purposes, nevertheless paid a handsome cash dividend. In terms of US dollars this investment was $261,000,000. The total Russian investments in Manchuria, Mongolia, and China proper totalled $273,000,000.[31] Whatever course Russia's political planning would take, it would not stand by and see these investments disappear. The Russian diatribe depicting the situation in China as a falling out among thieves over the loot was in keeping with the Soviet character. The Communist government could never pass up an opportunity to ridicule the capitalistic investors even though Russia was the third largest investor nation in China. The Russian press soon dropped the subject when it became apparent that Japan was not going to push the matter to its logical conclusion.

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[31] Remer, Foreign Investments in China, 605-608.

CHAPTER V

THE CHINESE REACTION TO THE AMAU STATEMENT

The Chinese reaction to the Amau statement was bitter, as was expected. The statement was aimed at China, although if accepted, would apply to all of Asia almost automatically. Hu Shih-tseh, the Chinese Minister at Berne, Switzerland, gave out the following statement at a Geneva press conference:[1]

> In short, we have now arrived at the stage of Japanese policy which, according to the famous Tanaka Memorandum, was to follow the conquest of Manchuria. In that Memorandum it was said that to conquer China Japan must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia, and to conquer the whole world the conquest of China was a necessary preliminary. If, the Memorandum said, the Japanese succeed in conquering China the other Asiatic countries would be afraid of Japan and would submit. Then the world would see that Asia belonged to Japan and would no longer dare to violate Japanese rights.

This was perhaps the best expressed opinion of all the Chinese reactions although it was not unique. All Asia was aware of the danger to its freedom should Japan consummate her hegemony over China.

Despite these fears, there was an underlying respect for Japan by the rest of Asia, especially China. Japan, a small Oriental country, had, in less than fifty years, become a major world power on equal terms with the Western Nations. The example set by Japan, with her victories over China in 1895 and Russia in 1905, had given an impetus to Asian independence that would reach fulfillment shortly after 1945. It was manifested against Japan herself during her period of hegemony in the Pacific

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[1]Hu Shih-tseh, quoted in "Chinese Diplomats and Treaty Violations," The Manchester Guardian Weekly, XXX (27 April 1934), 324.

during World War II. The Chinese respect for Japan was inspired less for her military achievement, which was considerable, than for her economic independence from foreign control. Herein lay the true secret of independence, financial control of one's own nation. The growth of nationalism in China was closely linked with a desire for economic freedom. "The elimination of foreign control [of her economy] became the goal of China."[2] This same nationalist impetus that Japan had spurred in China was to react against her when she tried to follow the Western imperialistic course. The affront to Chinese sovereignty offered by the Amau declaration was so obvious it need not be delineated here. The statement did, however, pose a serious threat to Chinese economic independence.

Militarily weak as she was, China had a good chance of staving off complete Japanese occupation by reason of her immense size. A great danger to China's sovereignty lay in the Amau Declaration's implied threat to seize for Japan control over all foreign investments and aid for China. This economic subjection is the hardest to resist or to over throw should it be imposed. China had for many years been the target for foreign speculation and economic exploitation, but she had staved off any one Power gaining control by playing one against the other. Should Japan make her claim good, China would be lost.

Japan, the second largest investor in China, was exceeded only by Great Britain. Japan's investments, in terms of United States dollars was $1,136,900,000.[3] Britain's also in terms of US dollars was $1,189,200,000.[4] A comparison of these two countries' investments in

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[2]Harold M. Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times, 5th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), 473.

[3]C. F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China, Table 39, 553.

[4]Ibid.

China revealed that Japan despite her slightly smaller investment was in a much better position to achieve economic domination over China than Britain or any other foreign country. The two cited tables above (n. 3 and 4), show that Britain had 36.7% of all foreign investments in China, and Japan had 35.1%. Of the direct trade with China, Japan controlled 24.7% to Britain's 7.8%. In shipping, Britain had 36.8% while Japan had 29.3%. In the number of firms owned or controlled in China by foreigners, Japan had a commanding lead of 55.9% to Britain's low 12.4%. Finally, in percentage of foreign population resident in China, Japan outweighed all the other Powers combined with a total of 70.6%. Thus, one can readily see that Japan was only slightly behind Britain in shipping and total investment, but she was far ahead of Britain in domination of the economic factors that gave Japan a better opportunity to control Chinese economics and ultimately to force the rest of the Powers out. These factors were direct trade, number of firms actually operating in China and a large Japanese population living in China. The bulk of this Japanese group was resident in Manchuria. A further danger, and one that could back up the Japanese threat was the large military force kept in Manchuria by Japan, the Kwantung Army. In addition, Japan kept the main army in readiness in the homeland and had troops stationed in Korea and Formosa. These military forces were much more prepared to fight than were any of the other Powers. Thus, Japan was in a strong position to enforce the Amau statement should she wish to do so. Japan had risen from last place, as an investor, in 1900 to the second largest by 1930. To continue her growth and to become the first Power in China, both economically and militarily, the other Powers must be forced out of China or at least reduced to a much smaller role. The Amau statement, might well have been the first step to Japan's eventual take-over of all China.

CHAPTER VI

WHY WAS THE AMAU STATEMENT ISSUED?

Immediately upon its issuance, speculation was rife throughout the world as to why Japan took this step. Two New York Times correspondents, Hugh Byas in Tokyo, and Hallett Abend in Shanghai, saw the Amau statement as an error in timing on the part of the Japanese Foreign Office[1] but a true reflection of Japanese policy. An error because the Japanese Government had been so assidiously cultivating good relations with the Western Powers. Now, all these efforts were wasted. Wilfred Fleischer of the Japan Advertiser and the New York Herald-Tribune saw this as a blunder on Amau's part, due to his lack of news sense and timing.[2] The principles of the statements were not new, they had been in practice for many years, but they had not been proclaimed. Amau's immediate superior, Vice-Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru, felt that Amau had done nothing wrong since he merely gave out an innocuous statement in reply to questions from the vernacular newspapers. The mistake, according to Shigemitsu, was in the mishandling of the statement by the foreign press.[3] The (London) Times correspondent cabled his paper on 29 April 1934 that the statement was instigated by Foreign Minister Hirota, who was using

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[1]Hugh Byas, New York Times, 21 April 1934, 32; 29 April 1934, 1; Hallett Abend, Ibid., 20 April 1934, 10.

[2]Wilfrid Fleischer, Volcanic Isle, 260.

[3]Shigemitsu Mamoru, Japan and Her Destiny, 99.

Amau as a front for his own machinations.[4] Where he obtained this information was never determined. Joseph C. Grew, the American Ambassador to Japan, writing in later years felt that Amau was merely carrying out orders when he made his famous statement.[5] Grew, however, believed that Amau was not following the orders of his superiors in the Foreign Office, but had succumbed to pressure from the ultra-nationalists within the Army.[6] Professor Nathaniel Peffer of Columbia University believed that Amau was a gross opportunist and a compliant stooge of the militarists, and had voluntarily sided with them in the hope of future gain.[7]

Less severe in his assessment attitude was G. E. Hubbard, the author of the Far Eastern section of the Survey of International Affairs, 1934, and a member of the editorial board of The New York Times. He saw this as a "trial balloon" on the part of the Japanese government, a balloon that failed to rise.[8] The trial balloon was an ancient diplomatic device whereby a government could issue a statement and if it was not well received, could deny its authenticity. Japan felt the foreign aid to China was detrimental to her own program in China,[9] hence, the trial

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[4]The (London) Times, 30 April 1934, 14.

[5]J. C. Grew, Turbulent Era, II, 958.

[6]Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 119; Turbulent Era, II, 960; Ten Years in Japan, 149.

[7]Nathaniel Peffer, The Far East: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1958), 371.

[8]G. E. Hubbard, Survey of International Affairs, 1934, 650; New York Times, 19 April 1934, 24.

[9]Yanaga Chitoshi, Japan Since Perry (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949), 567; Hishida Seiji, Japan Among the Great Powers (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1940), 353; E. L. Presseisen, Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy (The Hague: Maritinus Nijhoff, 1958), 72; Crispian Corcoran, "Hands Off China," The Nation, CXXXVIII (6 June 1934), 644; W. N. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy Since Versailles (London:

balloon to ascertain the reaction of the other Powers which had interests in China. This was due to Japan's traditionally China orientated foreign policy. A strong China meant a diminution of Japanese influence in Asia. Still, others saw this as Japan's attempt to frighten China into line with Japanese policy by proving to China that the other Powers could not be relied upon for help.[10] This thesis was soon discredited when the Powers, while not wanting war over the Amau statement, would not back down either. George E. Sokolsky, a correspondent for The New York Times, believed that Japan feared the possible danger of one or more Powers gaining a military base in China from which Japan might be attacked.[11] Soviet Russia was the chief suspect in this case.[12]

While many Asian experts have propounded many reasons for the issuance of the Amau statement, few have asked Amau himself. Why this state of affairs had existed, is hard to determine. One of the few, however, who did ask, was Joseph C. Grew. Ambassador Grew, reported that Amau in a private conversation, "asserted that the statement was issued as sort of a preliminary to the forthcoming naval conference, which would be a success if Japan's thesis regarding assistance to China is accepted by the other Powers and which would fail if the thesis is not

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Methuen and Co., 1940), 203; A. Morgan Young, Imperial Japan, 1926-1938, (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1938), 205; John Ahlers, Japan Closing the Open Door in China (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1940), 11; Meribeth Cameron, et al., China, Japan and the Powers, 456; Business Week, 5 May 1934, 30.

[10]F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 21; C. K. Webster, "Japan and China," Contemporary Review, CXXXXVI (6 June 1934), 655.

[11]The New York Times, VIII, 29 April 1934, 1.

[12]W. G. Fitz-Gerald, "Japan's Monroe Doctrine," The Nineteenth Century and After, CXV (June 1934), 640; C. C. Tansill, Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), 136.

accepted."[13]

Thus we see that the motivation for the statement, as expressed by its author, was a statement of Japan's position in China. Should this thesis be accepted by the world Japan would be a major Power with a recognized need for a larger Navy. Japan had felt, ever since the Washington and London Naval Conferences, that she had need of a larger Navy for national defense. Not only did she feel insecure with what she believed to be an inferior Navy but her overweening pride was wounded. That the implications of the statements ranged farther than intended and created a furor in the capitals of the world was unfortunate. Fortunately, the consequences were few, with this being one more false alarm, but it was apparent to the world, indeed if it was not already so, that a general war in Asia was not too far distant should the world political movements continue on their present courses. America was shaken a little out of her lethargic state and the world was racked by one more political tremor. The voicing of such a statement in a tension ridden world plagued with insoluble problems, both at home and abroad, was blown up into gigantic size with little effort. That war did not come derived from the reluctance of all parties to engage in one. Each had its own internal problems that weighed heavily upon the nation; more problems were not needed.

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[13]Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 119.

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A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX A

UNOFFICIAL STATEMENT BY THE JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE, APRIL 17, 1934

Owing to the special position of Japan in her relations with China, her views and attitude respecting matters that concern China, may not agree in every point with those of foreign nations: but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission and in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia.

Japan has been compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations because of their failure to agree in their opinions on the fundamental principles of preserving peace in East Asia. Although Japan's attitude toward China may at times differ from that of foreign countries, such difference cannot be evaded, owing to Japan's position and mission.

It goes without saying that Japan at all times is endeavoring to maintain and promote her friendly relations with foreign nations, but at the same time we consider it only natural that, to keep peace and order in East Asia, we must even act alone on our own responsibility and it is our duty to perform it. At the same time, there is no country but China which is in a position to share with Japan the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in East Asia. Accordingly, unification of China, preservation of her territorial integrity, as well as restoration of order in that country, are most ardently desired by Japan. History shows that these can be attained through no other means than the awakening and the voluntary efforts of China herself. We oppose therefore any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan: We also oppose any action taken by China,

calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents are bound to acquire political significance. Undertakings of such nature, if carried through to the end, must give rise to complications that might eventually necessitate discussion of problems like fixing spheres of influence or even international control or division of China, which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China and at the same time would have the most serious repercussion upon Japan and East Asia. Japan therefore must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade, as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to the maintenance of peace in East Asia.

However, supplying China with war planes, building aerodromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries and to disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

The foregoing attitude of Japan should be clear from the policies she has pursued in the past. But, on account of the fact that positive movements for joint action in China by foreign powers under one pretext or another are reported to be on foot, it is deemed not inappropriate to reiterate her policy at this time.

APPENDIX B

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES (Commons), CCLXXXVIII, 1368

Owing to special position of Japan in her relations with China her views and attitude respecting matters that concern China may not agree in every point with those of foreign nations; but it must be realised that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission and in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia. Japan has been compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations because of their failure to agree in their opinions on fundamental principles of preserving peace in East Asia. Although Japan's attitude towards China may at times differ from that of foreign countries such difference cannot be evaded owing to Japan's position and mission.

It goes without saying that Japan at all times is endeavouring to maintain and promote her friendly relations with foreign nations, but at the same time we consider it only natural that to keep peace and order in East Asia we must even act alone on our own responsibility and it is our duty to perform it. At the same time there is no country but China which is in a position to share with Japan the responsibility for maintenance of peace in East Asia.

Accordingly, unification of China, preservation of her territorial integrity as well as restoration of order in that country are most ardently desired by Japan. History shows these can be attained through no other means than awakening and voluntary efforts of China herself.

We oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan; we

also oppose any action taken by China calculated to play one Power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after Manchurian and Shanghai incidents are bound to acquire political significance. Undertakings of such nature if carried through to the end must give rise to complications that might eventually necessitate discussion of problems like division of China which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China and at the same time would have most serious repercussion upon Japan and East Asia.

Japan therefore must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to peace in East Asia.

However, supplying China with war aeroplanes, building aerodromes in China, and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses would obviously tend to alienate friendly relations between Japan, China and other countries and to disturb peace and order in Eastern Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

Foregoing attitude of Japan should be clear from policies she has pursued in the past, but on account of the fact that positive movements for joint action in China by foreign Powers under one pretext or another are reported to be on foot it was deemed not inappropriate to reiterate her policy at this time.

APPENDIX C

CHINA YEAR BOOK, 1934

Accordingly, unification of China, preservation of her territorial integrity, as well as restoration of order in that country, are most ardently desired by Japan. History shows that these can be attained through no other means than the awakening and the voluntary efforts of China herself.

We oppose therefore any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan; we also oppose any action taken by China, calculated to play one Power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers, even in the name of technical or financial assistance, at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents, are bound to acquire political significance. Undertakings of such nature, if carried through to the end, must give rise to complications that might eventually necessitate discussions of problems like fixing spheres of influence or even international control or division for China, which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China and at the same time would have the most serious repercussion upon Japan and East Asia.

Japan, therefore, must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade, as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to the maintenance of peace in the Far East.

However, supplying China with war planes, building aerodromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries and to disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

The foregoing attitude of Japan should be clear from the policies she has pursued in the past, but on account of the fact that positive movements for joint action in China by foreign Powers, under one pretext or another, are reported to be on foot, it is deemed not inappropriate to reiterate her policy.

APPENDIX D

THE NEW YORK TIMES

Japan has no wish to infringe on the independence, interests or prosperity of China. As regards Manchukuo, we ask the other powers to recognize the fair and free actions of that country. Neither in Manchukuo nor in China have we any territorial ambitions.

Japan is geographically in a position to share in the trade and profits if China is united and developed, but the unification and prosperity of China must be attained by her own awakening and not by selfish exploitation by other powers.

We have no intention to interfere with the interests of third parties. If other powers engage in trade with China, for the benefit of China, we welcome it. We have no desire to deviate from the policy of the open door and equal opportunity or to infringe treaties, but Japan objects to any action whatsoever by other powers that may lead to disturbance of peace and order in Eastern Asia.

Japan bears the responsibility for maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia with other Asiatic powers, particularly China. The time has passed when other powers, or the League, can exercise their policies only for the exploitation of China.

*The last sentence is said to be omitted in the official translation.

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