

THE DECLINE OF INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY: A VOTING STUDY OF
THE CHANGING PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL
ALIGNMENTS, 1956-1963

By

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I.	INTRODUCTION 1
	Purpose and Justification 1
	Methodology 6
	Chapter Procedure 12
II.	THE VOTING SHIFTS 14
	The General Assembly Collectively 14
	The African Caucusing Group 14
	The Afro-Asian Caucusing Group 20
	The Arab Caucusing Group 26
	The Commonwealth Caucusing Group 27
	The European Community Caucusing Group 30
	The Latin American Caucusing Group 30
	The Scandinavian Caucusing Group 35
	The Western European Caucusing Group 38
	The Soviet Bloc 43
	Summary 43
III.	CONCLUSION 48
	BIBLIOGRAPHY 57
	APPENDIX 61

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
I.	The Voting Behavior of the General Assembly Collectively . .	15
II.	The Voting Behavior of the African Caucusing Group	21
III.	The Voting Behavior of the Afro-Asian Caucusing Group . . .	24
IV.	The Voting Behavior of the Arab Caucusing Group	28
V.	The Voting Behavior of the Commonwealth Caucusing Group . .	31
VI.	The Voting Behavior of the European Community Caucusing Group	33
VII.	The Voting Behavior of the Latin American Caucusing Group .	36
VIII.	The Voting Behavior of the Scandinavian Caucusing Group . .	39
IX.	The Voting Behavior of the Western European Caucusing Group	41
X.	The Voting Behavior of the Soviet Bloc	44

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure		Page
1.	The Voting Behavior of the General Assembly Collectively . .	18
2.	The Voting Behavior of the African Caucusing Group	22
3.	The Voting Behavior of the Afro-Asian Caucusing Group	25
4.	The Voting Behavior of the Arab Caucusing Group	29
5.	The Voting Behavior of the Commonwealth Caucusing Group . .	32
6.	The Voting Behavior of the European Community Caucusing Group	34
7.	The Voting Behavior of the Latin American Caucusing Group .	37
8.	The Voting Behavior of the Scandinavian Caucusing Group . .	40
9.	The Voting Behavior of the Western European Caucusing Group	42
10.	The Voting Behavior of the Soviet Bloc	45

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose and Justification

The purpose of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that there has been a significant alteration of the bloc system of voting in the United Nations General Assembly. This hypothesis is being tested in order to determine whether there has been a transformation of the bipolar nature of international politics which developed immediately after the termination of World War II.

Beginning late in 1945 the wartime coalition of anti-Axis powers began to break up. Many points of friction developed between the western nations and the Soviet Union, including the status of Germany, Austria, and Korea; Communist threats to Turkey, Greece, and Iran; and the control of nuclear weapons. The creation of the two opposing military alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact, formalized the establishment of two hostile blocs in international politics.

For a time after the commencement of the Cold War the two bloc leaders, the Soviet Union and the United States, tended to view every country as either an ally or an enemy. At the Nineteenth Party Congress of October 1952 the Soviet Union abandoned the post-1945 dogma which divided the world into two camps, and depicted a tripartite division. In this division there existed, aside from the West and the Communists,

a third grouping of underdeveloped and largely uncommitted countries. It became the official aim of the Soviet Union to win the third group to its side and thus isolate the West.⁽¹⁾

By the mid-1950's the United States had also abandoned its attempt to perpetuate the rigid bipolar system. This modification in American foreign policy became evident in the change of attitude of the United States toward Egypt in the mid-1950's. In 1955 Egypt, having failed to secure military equipment from the West on acceptable terms, turned to the Soviet bloc for that purpose. The American reaction to that action was an abrupt termination of aid to Egypt and an attempt to separate and isolate Egypt from its Arab neighbors. A year later, after the Suez crisis had greatly enhanced Nasser's prestige, the United States reinstated aid to Egypt and sought to re-establish normal relations.⁽²⁾

This change in the attitudes of the Soviet Union and the United States did not mean the abandoning of the bipolar structure of the Cold War; it only meant the recognition of the existence of countries uncommitted to either bloc. It also implied that each bloc would struggle to keep the uncommitted countries from joining the other bloc, and attempt to absorb them within itself.

This thesis attempts to estimate the success or failure of the two bloc leaders in achieving their aims. In order to make this estimate

(1) Philip E. Mosley, "Soviet Policy in the Developing Countries," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 1, October, 1964, p. 88.

(2) John S. Badeau, "U. S. A. and U. A. R.: A Crisis in Confidence," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 2, January, 1965, p. 285.

the voting behavior of caucusing groups in the United Nations General Assembly on political issues of Cold War significance is studied.

The General Assembly of the United Nations is a body that reflects the political alignments of world politics and mirrors the power struggle of the Cold War. According to Robert E. Riggs;

It would be commonplace to say that the Assembly is a forum where states and groups of states seek influence, prestige, political advantage, or whatever other values may be at stake. More than this, an extra-legal political structure has developed alongside the formal structure established by the Charter, which reflects the real power alignments and interests in the Assembly more accurately than the formal organization could.⁽³⁾

It follows that the "real power alignments and interests" in the Cold War are best reflected when the Assembly is involved in voting on political issues of significance to the East-West conflict.

In order to properly estimate the success or failure of each bloc in reaching the aims of keeping unity in its ranks, preventing uncommitted countries from joining the opposing bloc, and absorbing the uncommitted within its own ranks, it will be necessary to determine whether there have been significant voting realignments in the United Nations General Assembly.⁽⁴⁾ It will be necessary to establish which caucusing

(3) Robert E. Riggs, Politics in the United Nations. Urbana, Illinois, 1958, p. 1.

(4) A "significant" voting realignment is arbitrarily defined as a shift away from either of the superpowers, the United States or the Soviet Union, in terms of withdrawing support from one side or the other.

groups have shifted, and when the shifts have occurred.⁽⁵⁾ This information will, in turn, help identify some of the causes of the shifts.

Since its inception the United Nations has been an institution of major importance to American foreign policy. At times it has become an instrument of American foreign policy, at other times the setting in which that policy has unfolded. In relation to the General Assembly, Ernest A. Gross wrote in 1954:

-
- (5) All of the investigation will be done in terms of caucusing groups. This will be done partially in order to expedite the analysis; it will be more convenient to study the voting behavior of nine units rather than one hundred and ten. Another reason is that this investigation intends to probe the overall shifts rather than isolated shifts by individual countries. Caucusing groups have been formed primarily to influence the formal decisions of the various organs of the United Nations. To achieve that purpose, groups attempt to vote as blocs. In order to vote as blocs they attempt to reach some degree of consensus among their members through meetings and discussions. The importance of this level of analysis has been indicated in a number of works. See the following references as examples of group analysis:

Best, Gary, Diplomacy in the United Nations, Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1960.

Hovet, Jr., Thomas, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960.

Hovet, Jr., Thomas, "United Nations Diplomacy", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1963.

Vincent, Jack Ernest, The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations -- An Examination of Their Attitudes Toward the Organization. Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1964.

Riggs, Robert E., Politics in the United Nations, a Study of the United States influence in the General Assembly, Urbana, Illinois, The University of Illinois Press, 1958.

Wilcox, Francis Orlando, U. N. and the Nonaligned Nations, New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1962.

The American leadership record in this forum is a proud one. In the years 1945 through 1953 the General Assembly adopted over 800 resolutions. The United States was defeated in less than 3 per cent - and in no case where our important security interests were involved. In these eight years only two resolutions supported by us failed of adoption.(6)

Other official publications have made statements such as:

The United States has never been defeated on any important political question in the United Nations. On the other hand, the Soviet Union can usually count on only 5 out of 60 votes (before 1955) in the General Assembly. (7)

There has been a great deal of speculation, particularly since the mass admission of Asian and African nations in the period 1955-1957, about the declining influence of the United States in the United Nations. Leland M. Goodrich, citing as causes the development of the Cold War and the admission of many new Asian and African states to the United Nations, wrote; "Changed circumstances, however, have in the minds of many made the United Nations a less useful instrument of United States foreign policy than it initially was." (8) Vernon V. Aspaturian, writing in 1957, placed the blame solely on the influx of new members:

Conceived as an expedient weapon of the moment to halt Communist aggression, the American-invented "Uniting for Peace" resolution permanently shifted the center of gravity of the U. N. from the Security Council to the General Assembly. This meant that as long as the United States commanded automatic majorities in the Assembly, conflicts between American policy and that of the United Nations could be kept to a minimum, but with the recent influx of new members that era is over. (9)

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- (6) Ernest A. Gross, "Why the U.S. Needs the U.N.", Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. 34, September 15, 1954, p. 2.
- (7) Department of State, You and the United Nations, Publication No. 5887, International Organization and Conference Series III, 105, Washington D.C., 1955.
- (8) Leland M. Goodrich, "The United Nations; its Successes and its Failures," Contemporary Civilization, 1959, p. 125.
- (9) Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Metamorphosis of the United Nations", Yale Review, Vol. 46, No. 4, Summer 1957, p. 558.

Much of the discussion surrounding the weakening of American influence in the United Nations has been impressionistic. There has been little empirical investigation to verify or reject these impressions. One basic purpose of this investigation is to fill that gap.

Methodology

To accomplish the purposes of the thesis the following method will be used: the voting behavior of individual nations on five substantive political issues of every plenary session of the General Assembly from 1956 to 1963 will be recorded in terms of coincidence with the voting behavior of the United States, the voting behavior of the Soviet Union, or abstention. Those issues will be chosen that are substantive and have a distinctly political character. For example, the five issues chosen for the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly (1959) are: Resolution 1239, Representation of China; Resolution 1353, Question of Tibet; Resolution 1454, Question of Hungary; Resolution 1455, Question of Korea; Resolution 1441, U. N. Emergency Force.

To record the voting behavior of individual states, this form will be followed:

+1 for coincidence with the U. S.

-1 for coincidence with the U. S. S. R.

0 for abstention

Examine the following pattern:

XIII Session (1958)

	(1)	Resolutions ⁽¹⁰⁾		(4)	(5)	Individual	Total
		(2)	(3)				
Uruguay	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	=	+5
Venezuela	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	=	+5
Afghanistan	-1	0	0	0	0	=	-1
Albania	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	=	-5
Bulgaria	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	=	-5
Burma	-1	0	0	+1	0	=	0
Byelorussia	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	=	-5
Cambodia	-1	0	0	+1	0	=	0

Even though this pattern is only representative of one session, yet it is fairly indicative of the political alignment of each state. The three states with scores of -5 -- i.e. Albania, Bulgaria, and Byelorussian S. S. R. -- are members of the Soviet Bloc, and vote consistently with the Soviet Union. The two states with scores of +5 -- i.e. Uruguay and Venezuela -- are members of the Latin American Group, and vote almost consistently with the U. S. The two states with scores of zero -- Burma and Cambodia, both members of the Afro-Asian Group -- consider themselves neutralists. Afghanistan, scoring a -1, is also a member of the Afro-Asian Group and is considered a neutralist nation which leans toward the U. S. S. R.

As was noted earlier in this study, caucusing groups, not individual states, will be the basic units. A caucusing group, according to Thomas Hovet, Jr., is "... a term applied to any group of states which

(10) See Appendix for title of resolutions.

has some degree of formal organization, holds fairly regular meetings, and is concerned with substantive and procedural matters."⁽¹¹⁾ Hovet lists eleven groups and one bloc in existence at the U. N. as of December, 1962.⁽¹²⁾ The caucusing groups are the Afro-Asian Group, the African Group, the Arab Group, the Benelux Group, the European Community Group, the Brazzaville Group, the Casablanca Group, the Commonwealth Group, the Latin American Group, the Scandinavian Group, and the Western European Group. The Soviet Bloc is the only bloc.⁽¹³⁾

The African Group consists of 32 states: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta.⁽¹⁴⁾

(11) Thomas Hovet, Jr., "United Nations Diplomacy", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. I, 1963, p. 37.

(12) Hovet define a bloc as " ... a group of states which meets regularly in caucus, the members of which are bound by their votes in the United Nations by the caucus decision; the Soviet Bloc is the only bloc." *ibid.* pp. 35-37.

(13) *Ibid.* p. 37. In this study the Benelux Group, The Casablanca Group, and the Brazzaville Group will be excluded. The Benelux Group will be excluded because of its very small size which makes any kind of group analysis meaningless. The three countries, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Netherlands, will be treated along with Italy and France in the European Community Group. Any meaningful dynamic analysis of the voting behavior of the Brazzaville and Casablanca Groups will also be impractical because these two groups did not come into being until very late in the time period covered by this study.

(14) All the information concerning the memberships of the groups is from Hovet's chart, *Ibid.* p. 36.

The Afro-Asian Group consists of 55 states: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy, Malaya, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Phillipines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanganyika, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen.

The Arab Group consists of 12 states: Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen.

The Commonwealth Group consists of 16 states: Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Malaya, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Trinidad - Tobago, Uganda, United Kingdom.

The European Community Group consists of 5 states: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands.

The Latin American Group consists of 20 states: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba⁽¹⁵⁾, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.

(15) Despite the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States in 1962, the Latin American Group has not followed this decision. Rather, the Group has evaded decisive action on the issue by not inviting Cuba to informal caucusing sessions. Ibid. p. 36.

The Scandinavian Group consists of 5 states: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden.

The Soviet Bloc has 10 members: Albania, Byelorussia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Ukraine.

The Western European Group Consists of 19 states: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia.

In order to find out whether there have been significant voting realignments in the General Assembly this procedure will be followed: each nation's votes will be calculated in terms of the group or groups with which that nation caucuses. The score representing the voting behavior of a group on a single issue in one session of the General Assembly will be called the Group Score. For example, if in a particular session of the General Assembly the members of a group voted in this order on a resolution:

A	+1
B	+1
C	0
D	+1
E	+1
F	+1

the Group Score will be the algebraic sum of the individual scores divided by the number of members in the group;

$$+5/6 = +0.83$$

In every session there will be five Group Scores for each group. The

five Group Scores will yield the Yearly Group Scores. This will be done by dividing the algebraic sum of the Group Scores by five, the number of issues. For example, if a group's Group Scores for a particular session were:

Issue 1	+0.83
Issue 2	+0.77
Issue 3	+1.00
Issue 4	+0.90
Issue 5	+0.95

the Yearly Group Score of that group would be;

$$+4.45/5 = +0.89$$


An overall view of the changes in Yearly Group Scores would indicate whether there have been significant voting realignments.

There will be nine graphs to show the voting behavior of groups over a period of eight years. The horizontal coordinate of each graph will indicate the sessions of the General Assembly, and the vertical coordinate will indicate the voting behavior of the group in terms of coincidence with the United States, the Soviet Union, or abstention.

For example, if the Yearly Group Scores of a group are:

Session	XI	+1.00
"	XII	+0.80
"	XIII	+0.40
"	XIV	0.00
"	XV	+0.20
"	XVI	+0.80
"	XVII	+1.00
"	XVIII	+0.60

They would be indicated on the graph in this manner:



Finally, by relating this information to various factors and developments beyond the framework of the United Nations, it may be possible to make some generalizations as to the causes of the voting realignments.

Chapter Procedure

After the introductory chapter there will be one chapter devoted to the analysis of the voting shifts in the United Nations General Assembly on issues of Cold War significance. This chapter will consist of eleven sections. In the first section of the second chapter there will be a table representing the voting behavior of countries without group classifications. In this table the Yearly Scores, rather than Issue Scores, will be recorded. This table will also include the Yearly Scores of the four noncaucusing countries, the United States, Republic of South Africa, China, and Israel. For purposes of comparison with

the voting behavior of groups the voting behavior of the entire General Assembly will be illustrated on a graph.

Each of the next nine sections will be devoted to one caucusing group. At the beginning of each of the first nine sections there will be a short introductory note describing the background and composition of a caucusing group and a brief description of the voting behavior of that caucusing group on the selected issues in the period under study. The introductory note will be followed by a table representing the voting behavior of the members of the group on the five selected issues per year for the eight years under study. Then, the Group Score will be taken on every issue, and a Yearly Group Score on every year. The voting behavior of the group over the eight year period will then be illustrated on a graph.

In the eleventh section of the second chapter there will be a summary note describing the voting shifts of all the groups.

The third and final chapter will deviate from the methodology utilized in the second chapter in order to relate the voting shifts described in the second chapter to the trends in the Cold War conflict, and to generalize about the causes of the shifts.

CHAPTER II

THE VOTING SHIFTS

The General Assembly Collectively

In the last session of the United Nations General Assembly studied in this thesis there were one hundred and ten countries which took part in voting on the five selected issues.

Table I lists all the countries and their voting behavior in alphabetical order without reference to group classifications. In this table the Yearly Scores, rather than Issue Scores, of the countries are recorded. Included in this table are the Yearly Scores of the four non-caucusing countries, the United States, Republic of South Africa, China, and Israel.

For purposes of comparison with the voting behavior of groups the voting behavior of the entire General Assembly is illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1, which utilizes the Net Yearly Scores of the General Assembly, indicates that the overall support for the American position on political issues of Cold War significance declined steadily between the years 1956 and 1963. In 1956 the Net Yearly Score of the General Assembly was +0.52. In 1963 that score stood at +0.22, an all-time low.

The African Caucusing Group

The African caucusing group came into being in 1958, as a result of the Conference of African States in Accra. The object of that

TABLE I

THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY COLLECTIVELY

	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
	XI	XII	XIII	XIV	XV	XVI	XVII	XVIII
Afghanistan	+1	0	-1	-1	-2	-1	0	-2
Albania	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5
Algeria							-1	-2
Argentina	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+3
Australia	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5
Austria	+5	+5	+3	+4	+4	+4	+4	+2
Belgium	+5	+5	+5	+4	+3	+5	+4	+5
Bolivia	+5	+5	+3	+4	+4	+5	+5	+2
Brazil	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+1
Bulgaria	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5
Burma	+3	+1	0	0	0	0	0	-2
Burundi							0	-2
Byelorussian SSR	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5
Cambodia	+3	+1	0	0	-1	0	0	-2
Cameroon					+2	+4	+3	+3
Canada	+5	+5	+5	+5	+4	+5	+5	+5
Central African Rep.					0	+4	+3	+3
Ceylon	+2	+1	-1	+1	-2	-1	0	-2
Chad					+3	+3	+2	+3
Chile	+4	+3	+5	+4	+5	+5	+5	+3
Columbia	+5	+5	+5	+5	+4	+5	+5	+3
Congo (Braz)					0	+1	+3	+2
Congo (Leop)					+2	+3	+2	+3
Costa Rica	+4	+4	+5	+3	+4	+5	+5	+4
Cuba	+3	+4	+5	+3	-3	-5	-4	-4
Cyprus					+3	+4	+3	+3
Czechoslovakia	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5
Dahomey					+1	+5	+3	+2
Denmark	+3	+3	+2	+3	+3	+3	+3	+2
Dominican Rep.	+4	+5	+5	+4	+3	+5	+5	+4
Ecuador	+4	+2	+5	+5	+3	+3	+4	+4
El Salvador	+4	+4	+5	+4	+4	+5	+5	+5
Ethiopia	+4	+4	+3	+1	0	0	0	-1
Fed. of Malaya		+3	+5	+5	+3	+5	+4	+4
Finland	+1	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	0
France	+5	+5	+4	+4	+3	+3	+2	+4
Gabon					+2	+2	+2	+2
Ghana	+1	0	+1	0	-2	-1	0	-2
Greece	+5	+5	+3	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5
Guatemala	+4	+4	+5	+4	+4	+5	+5	+5
Guinea					-4	-2	-2	-1
Haiti	+5	+5	+5	+4	+3	+5	+5	+2
Honduras	+4	+5	+5	+5	+4	+4	+5	+4


TABLE I (Continued)

	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
	XI	XII	XIII	XIV	XV	XVI	XVII	XVIII
Hungary	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5
Iceland	+5	+5	+4	+4	+4	+5	+4	+2
India	+1	+1	-1	0	-2	0	3	0
Indonesia	+1	+1	-1	0	-2	-2	0	-2
Iran	+5	+5	+5	+5	+4	+5	+5	+3
Iraq	+5	+4	-1	-1	-2	-2	-1	-2
Ireland	+5	+2	+3	+3	+2	+5	+5	+5
Israel	+3	+3	+2	+3	+4	+4	+4	+2
Italy	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5
Ivory Coast					+1	+3	+2	+3
Jamaica							+4	+4
Japan	+1	+4	+4	+5	+5	+5	+5	+4
Jordan	+2	+5	+5	+3	+3	+4	+2	0
Laos	+3	+4	+4	+5	+2	+5	+1	0
Lebanon	+3	+3	+2	+1	+1	+2	+1	+1
Liberia	+5	+4	+4	+4	+4	+4	+4	+2
Libya	+3	+4	0	0	+1	+2	+2	+1
Luxembourg	+4	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5
Malagasy					+1	+4	+3	+2
Mali					-2	-2	-1	-3
Mauritania						+4	+2	+2
Mexico	+4	+4	+5	+4	+2	+4	+5	+3
Mongolia						+5	+5	+5
Morocco	+4	0	-1	-1	-4	-1	-1	-3
Nepal	+2	0	+1	0	+1	-1	0	-1
Netherlands	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+4	+4
New Zealand	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+4
Nicaragua	+4	+5	+4	+4	+5	+5	+5	+3
Niger					+1	+4	+3	+2
Nigeria					+3	+1	+1	0
Norway	+3	+3	+3	+3	+3	+3	+3	+2
Pakistan	+5	+3	+5	+5	+4	+3	+3	0
Panama	+4	+4	+5	+5	+5	+5	+4	+3
Paraguay	+3	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+3
Peru	+5	+5	+4	+5	+4	+5	+5	+3
Phillipines	+4	+5	+5	+5	+4	+5	+5	+4
Poland	+4	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5
Portugal	+3	+4	+4	+3	+3	+2	0	+1
Romania	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5
Rwanda							+3	+3
Saudi Arabia	+1	+1	0	0	0	+1	-1	-1
Senegal					+3	+3	+2	+1
Sierra Leone						+2	0	+1
Somalia					+2	0	0	0
South Africa	+3	0	+5	+4	+4	+4	+3	+3
Spain	+5	+5	+5	+4	+3	+4	+4	+4

TABLE I (Continued)

	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
	XI	XII	XIII	XIV	XV	XVI	XVII	XVIII
Sudan	+4	0	0	-1	0	0	-1	-2
Sweden	+3	+3	+2	+3	+1	+3	+3	+1
Syria	0	0				-1	-2	-3
Tanganyika						0	0	-1
Thailand	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5
Togo					+1	+1	+1	+3
Trinidad & Tobago							+4	+3
Tunisia	+3	+3	+4	+3	+3	0	0	-1
Turkey	+4	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5
Uganda							-1	0
Ukrainian SSR	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5
U. S. S. R.	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5
United Arab Rep.	0	0	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1	-3
United Kingdom	+5	+5	+5	+4	+5	+5	+3	+3
United States	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5
Upper Volta					+1	+3	+2	+2
Uruguay	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+3
Venezuela	+5	+5	+5	+4	+3	+5	+5	+4
Yemen	0	0	-1	-1	-2	-1	+2	-2
Yugoslavia	-2	0	-2	0	-2	-2	-2	-3
NET YEARLY SCORES	+0.52	+0.49	+0.46	+0.44	+0.32	+0.42	+0.37	+0.22

Figure 1. The Voting Behavior of the General Assembly Collectively.



conference was to "produce an African identity and personality in international affairs."⁽¹⁾

In 1958 the African caucusing group consisted of eight countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic. By 1963 the number had grown to thirty-two. This large increase in the number of African states in the United Nations did not, however, bring about a corresponding increase in the influence of the African caucusing group in that body. Ideological differences among the African states caused a division within the African group, which was manifested by the formation of two factions, the Brazzaville group and the Casablanca group.

The Brazzaville group consists of Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. This group was formally organized at the opening of the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly in September, 1961. The Brazzaville group had previously operated informally from September, 1960 until September, 1961. One of the first decisions of this group, which served to set it apart from the Casablanca group, was the endorsement of the French position on Algeria in opposition to the F. L. N. The Brazzaville group consists entirely of former French colonies, and it appears to be more Western-oriented than the Casablanca group.⁽²⁾

The Casablanca group was formed by Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic in January, 1961. This group was formed

(1) Ghana, "Draft Memorandum Conference of African States", as cited in Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 94.

(2) Hovet, Africa in the United Nations, pp. 91-98.

partly in reaction to the views of Brazzaville states on Algeria, the Congo, and Mauritania, and partly because its members had a more militant attitude respecting African issues and a concept of nonalignment in the East-West conflict.⁽³⁾

Ever since their inception these two groups have been modifying their attitudes toward the international political situation. This continual process of modification has brought the two groups closer to each other. The Brazzaville states, in response to the demands of the more radical groups at home, have moved toward a posture more characteristic of African neutralism. The Casablanca states, because of the real demands of the problems of state-building, have become more moderate in their attitudes toward the West.⁽⁴⁾


The Afro-Asian Caucusing Group

The Afro-Asian caucusing group consists of fifty-five members, almost half of the total U. N. membership. Prior to 1950 most of the Asian-African members of the United Nations were Arab states which had their own caucusing group. Since 1950 there has been a steady increase in the number of non-Arab, Asian-African members of the United Nations. The common interests of these members, coupled with their opposition to the domination of the United Nations by the Western Europeans and the Latin Americans, caused the formation of a formal African-Asian caucusing group to replace the former ad hoc Arab-Asian group. The

(3) Ibid., pp. 98-100.

(4) Robert C. Good, "Changing Patterns of African International Relations", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 58, No. 3, September 1964, pp. 632-641.

Figure 2. The Voting Behavior of the African Caucusing Group.*



*Explanatory note: The line plotted by circles indicates the voting pattern of the General Assembly, while the line plotted by squares denotes the voting pattern of the caucusing group on this and succeeding figures.

formal African-Asian group in its present form came into being after the Bandung Conference in 1955, and began operating at the start of the Xth Session.⁽⁵⁾

The Afro-Asian group includes most of the poorer and less developed countries of the world which contain almost half of the world's population. These countries have one major thing in common, their hatred of imperialism and colonialism in any form. On the other hand, there are many divisive factors within the group. These divisive factors range from border disputes and traditional enmities between states to radically different positions on Cold War issues. Therefore, it cannot be expected that the group show a strongly cohesive vote, and it does not.

The important function of the Afro-Asian group is to bring its members together formally so that those having special interests in common can consult conveniently. There are two formal caucusing groups, the Arab group and the African group, plus a few other factions within the Afro-Asian group. Therefore, the Afro-Asian group is more of a discussion group than a group for making tactical and strategic decisions.⁽⁶⁾

The voting record of the Afro-Asian group shows that it supported the U. S. position more than the Arab group and the African group, but less than the whole General Assembly. Since the Arabs and the Africans are also members of the Afro-Asian group, it is obvious that the non-Arab Asians supported the U. S. position on political issues more than the rest of the group.

(5) Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, pp. 85-86.

(6) Ibid.


TABLE III

THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE AFRO-ASIAN CAUCUSING GROUP

	Session XI - 1956					Session XII - 1957					Session XIII - 1958					Session XIV - 1959					Session XV - 1960					Session XVI - 1961					Session XVII - 1962					Session XVIII - 1963				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Afghanistan	0	-1	+1	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	+1	-1	-1	0	-1				
Algeria																																								
Burma	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	-1	0	0	+1	+1	-1	0	0	+1	0	-1	0	+1	0	0	-1	0	0	0	+1	+1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	0	0				
Burundi																																								
Cambodia	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	0	+1	0	0	-1	0	0	+1	0	-1	0	+1	0	0	-1	0	0	+1	+1	-1	0	0	0	0	+1	-1	-1	0	-1					
Cameroon																																								
Central African Rep.																																								
Ceylon	0	-1	+1	+1	+1	-1	0	0	+1	+1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	+1	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	0	+1	+1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Chad																																								
Congo (Braz.)																																								
Congo (Leop.)																																								
Cyprus																																								
Dabomey																																								
Ethiopia	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	0	0	+1	0	0	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	+1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Gabon																																								
Ghana	+1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	+1	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	+1	+1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Guinea																																								
India	0	-1	+1	0	+1	-1	0	0	+1	+1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	+1	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	+1	+1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Indonesia	0	-1	+1	0	+1	-1	0	0	+1	+1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	+1	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Iran	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1				
Iraq	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Ivory Coast																																								
Japan	+1	0	0	0	0	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1				
Jordan	+1	0	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	0	+1	0	0	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1				
Laos	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1				
Lebanon	+1	+1	0	0	+1	0	+1	0	+1	0	+1	0	0	0	0	0	+1	0	0	0	+1	0	0	0	0	+1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Liberia	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1				
Libya	+1	0	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Malagasy																																								
Malaya																																								
Mali																																								
Mauritania																																								
Mongolia																																								
Morocco	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	-1	0	+1	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Nepal	0	-1	+1	+1	+1	-1	0	0	+1	0	-1	0	0	+1	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Niger																																								
Nigeria																																								
Pakistan	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1				
Philippines	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1				
Rwanda																																								
Saudi Arabia	0	0	+1	0	0	0	0	0	+1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Senegal																																								
Sierra Leone																																								
Somalia																																								
Sudan	+1	-1	+1	0	+1	-1	0	0	+1	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Syria	0	-1	+1	0	0	-1	0	0	+1	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Tanganyika																																								
Thailand	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1				
Togo																																								
Tunisia	+1	0	+1	0	+1	0	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1				
Turkey	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1				
Uganda																																								
United Arab Rep.	0	-1	+1	0	0	-1	0	0	+1	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Upper Volta																																								
Yemen	0	-1	+1	0	0	-1	0	0	+1	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	+1	+1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				

YEARLY GROUP SCORES +0.52 +0.46 +0.27 +0.33 +0.07 +0.30 +0.27 +0.09

Figure 3. The Voting Behavior of the Afro-Asian Caucusing Group.



The Arab Caucusing Group

The Arab caucusing group is one of the few such groups that has been in existence during the entire course of the history of the General Assembly; it began operating as an interest group at the San Francisco Conference. Its organizational nucleus was the Pact of the League of Arab States, which was signed at a conference in Cairo on March 22, 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trans-Jordan (now Jordan), and Yemen. All the members of the Arab League, except Yemen and Jordan, were charter members of the United Nations. Yemen did not become a member of the United Nations, and consequently a member of the Arab caucusing group, until 1947. Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia joined the group in 1955, and Sudan became a member in 1956. The admission of Algeria to the United Nations in 1962 raised the number of members to the present twelve.⁽⁷⁾

The unification of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic early in 1958, which included the unification of their foreign offices, for a time reduced the Arab vote by one. The readmission of Syria to the United Nations after the re-partition of the original United Arab Republic raised the voting membership of the Arab caucusing group back to eleven in 1961. In order to avoid confusion, Egypt is listed as United Arab Republic throughout this study.

The Arab caucusing group has been fairly effective in presenting a united front to the Assembly. This group is one of the most active caucusing groups in terms of regularity of meetings and planned tactics.

(7) Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 56.

The main reason for the high degree of voting cohesion in the Arab caucusing group is perhaps the common problem of Israel, and the prolonged attention of the United Nations to that problem.⁽⁸⁾

The voting record of the Arab group on political issues of Cold War significance indicates that this group had a U. S. support score of +0.43 in 1956, and a U. S. support score of +0.36 in 1957, but from 1958 to 1962 it dropped to a steady score of zero -- supporting neither the United States nor the Soviet Union. In 1963 the U. S. support score of the Arab group dropped to -0.28, making that group the first, outside the Soviet Bloc, to support the Soviet Union more than the United States.

The Commonwealth Caucusing Group


The Commonwealth caucusing group is basically a consultation group. It is not concerned with agreeing on common policies because its members have very little in common except their historic association with Great Britain, and they belong to a number of other groups. The meetings of the Commonwealth group therefore provide an informal means of expressing different points of view.⁽⁹⁾

A study of the overall voting behavior of the Commonwealth caucusing group indicates very little because this group does not represent a specific outlook, a common problem, or a particular culture. The only valid generalization that can be drawn on the basis of its voting behavior is that its support for the U. S. position has declined as its

(8) Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 58.

(9) Hovet, "United Nations Diplomacy", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1963, p. 37.

Figure 4. The Voting Behavior of the Arab Caucusing Group.



membership has grown. This has been due to the fact that its new members have been mostly newly independent states who foster policies of neutralism and non-involvement in the East-West conflict.

The European Community Caucusing Group

The European Community group consists of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. This group came into being as a consequence of the Treaty of Rome which established the European Common Market in 1957. This group has only five members because the sixth member, West Germany, is not a member of the United Nations.

The European Community group has very strong voting cohesion. This group which, at its inception, voted 100% with the United States, has been gradually moving away from supporting the U. S. position on certain issues. (10)

The Latin American Caucusing Group

The twenty Latin American members of the United Nations have had a great deal of experience in diplomatic cooperation with each other. This experience in joint cooperation can be traced back as far as the League of Nations and the various Pan-American organizations. As a caucusing group, the Latin American states initiated their joint consultations about the United Nations at the Chapultepec Conference early in 1945. (11)

(10) The causes of this shift are discussed in the final chapter.

(11) Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, pp. 64-69.

Figure 5. The Voting Behavior of the Commonwealth Caucusing Group.





TABLE VI

THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY CAUCUSING GROUP

	Session XII - 1957					Session XIII - 1958					Session XIV - 1959					Session XV - 1960					Session XVI - 1961					Session XVII - 1962					Session XVIII - 1963				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Belgium	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
France	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	-1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+1
Italy	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Luxembourg	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Netherlands	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1
YEARLY GROUP SCORES	+1.00					+0.96					+0.92					+0.84					+0.92					+0.80					+0.92				

Figure 6. The Voting Behavior of the European Community
Caucusing Group.



The voting record of the Latin American group indicates a strongly uniform pattern of voting among the members. The cause for its not having a perfectly identical voting record is due to a number of abstention votes, and, more recently, the shifting of Cuba away from the Western camp. In spite of the decisions of the Punta del Este meeting of the foreign ministers of the Organization of American States in January, 1962, Cuba has remained a member of the Latin American caucusing group. Rather than face the question of the continued membership of Cuba, the group resorted to the technique of holding ad hoc meetings without notifying Cuba. (12)

The voting record of the Latin American group can be interpreted as a relatively steady support of the U. S. position on political issues of Cold War significance.

The Scandinavian Caucusing Group

The origin of a unified approach by the Scandinavian states to international organization lies in their cooperation with each other in the League of Nations. The Scandinavian caucusing group in its present form did not come into being until 1946, when Sweden and Iceland were admitted to the United Nations. At that time the group consisted of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Iceland. Finland, which joined the United Nations in 1955, was under great pressure by the Soviet Union to avoid too much association with Western oriented countries. Nevertheless, Finland joined the Nordic Council in October, 1956. (13)

(12) Hovet, Africa in the United Nations, p. 17.


(13) Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, pp. 73-76.

TABLE VII

THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE LATIN AMERICAN CAUCUSING GROUP

	Session XI - 1956					Session XII - 1957					Session XIII - 1958					Session XIV - 1959					Session XV - 1960					Session XVI - 1961					Session XVII - 1962					Session XVIII - 1963				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Argentina	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Bolivia	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Brazil	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Chile	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Colombia	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Costa Rica	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Cuba	+1	+1	0	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	-1	0	-1	+1	0	-1	0	-1	+1	0	-1	0	-1	+1	0	-1	0	-1
Dominican Rep.	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Ecuador	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
El Salvador	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Guatemala	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Haiti	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Honduras	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Mexico	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Nicaragua	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Panama	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Paraguay	+1	+1	0	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Peru	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Uruguay	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Venezuela	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
YEARLY GROUP SCORES	+0.86					+0.89					+0.96					+0.87					+0.86					+0.89					+0.89					+0.58				
	56					57					58					59					60					61					62					63				

Figure 7. The Voting Behavior of the Latin American Caucusing Group.



The voting record of Finland indicates that even though it has not voted in uniformity with the other members of the Scandinavian group, its record has not been contradictory to the voting behavior of the other members either. On the average, Finland voted 40% of the time with the Scandinavian group, and abstained on the remainder. This type of voting is characteristic of the Scandinavians. As a general practice they do not vote against each other. If they do not vote identically, they tend to abstain rather than express opposition to each other.

The Western European Caucusing Group

The Western European group is a loose geographic group that meets with less regularity than any other group in the United Nations, and its membership may vary with meetings. (14)

Its major function, aside from that of consultation on issues affecting the European continent, appears to be that of serving as a meeting ground for the two European groups, the Scandinavians and the European Economic Community, with the other countries of Western Europe.

The voting record of the Western European group indicates that the group as a whole has had less support for the U. S. position on issues than one of its major factions, the European Economic Community group, but more than the other faction, the Scandinavians. Its support for the U. S. position has been declining slightly faster than that of the European Economic Community. In 1962 its U. S. support score fell slightly below that of the Scandinavian group.

(14) Hovet, Africa in the United Nations, p. 13.

TABLE VIII

THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE SCANDINAVIAN CAUCUSING GROUP

	Session XI - 1956					Session XII - 1957					Session XIII - 1958					Session XIV - 1959					Session XV - 1960					Session XVI - 1961					Session XVII - 1962					Session XVIII - 1963														
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)															
Denmark	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	0	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Finland	0	-1	+1	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	+1	0	0	-1	+1	0	+1	0	-1	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	+1
Iceland	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Norway	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1
Sweden	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	0	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	0	+1	0	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1
YEARLY GROUP SCORES	+0.60					+0.56					+0.44					+ 0.52					+0.48					+0.52					+0.52					+0.28														

Figure 8. The Voting Behavior of the Scandinavian
Caucusing Group.





TABLE IX

THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN CAUCUSING GROUP

	Session XI - 1956					Session XII - 1957					Session XIII - 1958					Session XIV - 1959					Session XV - 1960					Session XVI - 1961					Session XVII - 1962					Session XVIII - 1963					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Austria	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	0		
Belgium	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1			
Cyprus																																									
Denmark	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	-1	0	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	0			
Finland	0	-1	+1	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	0	+1	-1	0	+1	0	0	-1	+1	0	0	0	-1	+1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	0	0	+1	-1	0	0		
France	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	-1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1
Greece	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1		
Iceland	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0	0	
Ireland	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	0	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1		
Italy	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1		
Luxembourg	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1		
Netherlands	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1		
Norway	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0		
Portugal	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0	+1	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-0	0	0	+1	0	-0	0	0	+1		
Spain	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0	+1	0	+1	0	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1		
Sweden	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	0	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	0	+1	0	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	0	+1	0	
Turkey	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1		
United Kingdom	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1		
Yugoslavia	-1	-1	+1	-1	0	-1	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	-1	0	-1	0	0	+1	0	-1	0	0	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	-1	-1	0	-1		
YEARLY GROUP SCORES	+0.76					+0.77					+0.67					+0.71					+0.63					+0.71					+0.50					+0.58					

Figure 9. The Voting Behavior of the Western European Caucusing Group.



The Soviet Bloc

The Soviet Bloc is the most tightly organized and cohesive interest group in the General Assembly. The nucleus of the Soviet Bloc was created when the San Francisco Conference admitted Byelorussia and the Ukraine as charter members of the United Nations. Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and the Soviet Union combined with Yugoslavia and Poland initially as a caucusing group. The caucusing group became a bloc when the Soviet Union extended its complete influence over Poland and the Cominform was constituted in 1947 to coordinate and centralize the political role of the satellites. The bloc was enlarged following the coup in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948. The Molotov Plan in January of 1949, which completed the economic integration of the satellites, further solidified the Soviet Bloc. Yugoslavia broke with the Cominform, and consequently with the Bloc, in 1948. The remaining five members were joined by Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania in 1955. The admission of Mongolia in 1961 raised the number of members in the Soviet Bloc to the present ten. (15)

A very strong degree of cohesion is evident in the Soviet Bloc. In this study there is only one case of divergence from strict bloc voting in the Soviet Bloc, a vote of abstention cast by Poland in the XIth Session of the Assembly.

Summary

The Net Yearly Scores of the General Assembly indicate that the overall support for the American position on political issues of Cold


(15) Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, pp. 47-48.

TABLE X

THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE SOVIET BLOC

	Session XI - 1956					Session XII - 1957					Session XIII - 1958					Session XIV - 1959					Session XV - 1960					Session XVI - 1961					Session XVII - 1962					Session XVIII - 1963				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Albania	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Byelorussia	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Bulgaria	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Czechoslovakia	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Hungary	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Mongolia	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Poland	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Romania	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Soviet Union	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Ukraine	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
YEARLY GROUP SCORES	- 0.80					-1.00					-1.00					-1.00					-1.00					-1.00					-1.00									

Figure 10. The Voting Behavior of the Soviet Bloc.



War significance decline steadily between the years 1956 and 1963. In 1956 the Net Yearly Score of the General Assembly was +0.52. In 1963 that score stood at +0.22, an all-time low.

The voting records also indicate that the decline in the support for the American position did not bring about a corresponding increase in the support for the position of the Soviet Union. In most cases the shift in the voting behavior of caucusing groups was away from support of the United States toward an attitude of non-participation in the Cold War conflict. The African Group is an exception to this generalization. In 1961 the African Group shifted from its neutral attitude and to some degree supported the American position on issues of Cold War significance. One possible explanation for the African voting shift is that the African countries were forced to abandon their attitude of abstaining on issues of Cold War significance because of the African continent itself having become a major battleground in the Cold War conflict. Yet their support for the American position was so relatively low that one cannot call their shift a victory for United States foreign policy.

The Arab Group exhibited the greatest shift away from support of the United States. This group had a Yearly Group Score of +0.43 in 1956, and a Yearly Group Score of +0.36 in 1957, but from 1958 to 1962 it dropped to a steady score of zero -- supporting neither the United States nor the Soviet Union. In 1963 the Yearly Group Score of the Arab Group dropped to -0.28, making that group the first, outside the Soviet Bloc, to support the Soviet Union more than the United States.

The voting record of the Afro-Asian Group shows that it supported the United States more than the Arab Group and the African Group, but

less than the whole General Assembly. Since the Arabs and the Africans are also members of the Afro-Asian Group, it is obvious that the non-Arab Asians supported the United States more than the rest of the Afro-Asian Group.

The Soviet Bloc solidly supported the Soviet Union with almost one-hundred per cent solidarity. In this study there is only one case of divergence from strict bloc voting in the Soviet Bloc, a vote of abstention cast by Poland in the XIth Session of the General Assembly.

All the other groups, while reducing their support of the United States, voted with the United States on political issues of Cold War significance more than the whole General Assembly. The European Community Group had the highest score in support of the United States, followed by the Latin American Group, the Western European Group, the Scandinavian Group, and the Commonwealth Group.

CHAPTER III

CONCLUSION

In 1955 an official publication of the United States stated that "The United States has never been defeated on any important political question in the United Nations. On the other hand, the Soviet Union can usually count on only 5 out of 60 votes in the General Assembly."⁽¹⁾

The 1955 session of the General Assembly was the last year when the United States could count on such overwhelming support for its position on major issues. In that session the United Nations admitted 16 new members, which opened the way for the massive expansion of its membership from the original 51 to the present 114. Some observers link the steady decline of United States influence in the United Nations with the expansion of membership in that organization and the "political weakness and disorientation of many of the new members."⁽²⁾

Had this statistical study of the voting behavior of caucusing groups in the United Nations General Assembly shown a decline in the support of the U. S. position on important political issues only by the African Group and the Afro-Asian Group, to which most of the new members belong, such contentions would have been borne out. On the

(1) Department of State, "You and the United Nations", Publication No. 5887, International Organization and Conference Series III, 105, Washington, 1955.

(2) Hans, J. Morgenthau, "The U.N. of Dag Hammarskjold is Dead", The New York Times Magazine, March 14, 1965, p. 37.

contrary, this study shows a decline in U. S. support on important political issues by every group. Table I and Figure 1 reflect this decline in support of the U. S. position by the whole General Assembly.

The voting behavior of nations in the General Assembly of the United Nations is a reflection of international politics on a world scale. The clear division of nations into two distinct groups, one supporting the Soviet Union and the other supporting the United States, in the first ten years of the operation of the United Nations reflected the bipolar nature of world politics. In that era the basic policy of the U. S. was the stabilization, through a combination of the two tactical weapons of containment and deterrence, of the division of the world between the two super-powers.⁽³⁾

In regard to the future of the bipolar system, Hans J. Morgenthau wrote:

The bipolar system contains within itself two contradictory potentialities: the tendency to expand into a two-bloc system by absorbing the uncommitted nations of the world, and the tendency to disintegrate under the pull of centrifugal forces from within and the attraction of new power centers from within or without.⁽⁴⁾

This study shows that at least in the case of one pole, the West, the latter possibility is becoming an actuality. It could not indicate the same process in the Soviet pole because one of the centrifugal forces within that bloc, Communist China, is not a member of the United Nations, but many observers believe that "... a gradual process of erosion is at work in each of the two opposing blocs."⁽⁵⁾

(3) Amitai Etzioni, Winning Without War (Garden City, New York, 1964), p. 2.

(4) Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York, 1961), p. 361.

(5) Roberto Ducci, "The World Order in the Sixties", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 3, April, 1964, p. 384.

Roberto Ducci has described this process allegorically as follows: "The two apparently monolithic constructions of the fifties now have more resemblance to boiling underground magmas, from which come rumbles indicating the formation of deep and wide crevices."⁽⁶⁾

The decreasing difference in economic and technical capacity between the leading nation and the other nations of a bloc is cited as one cause of the crumbling of duopoly.⁽⁷⁾ This factor, in combination with the recurring economic crises in the leading nations, can be regarded as a cause only in the specific cases of United States-Western European and Soviet Union-Eastern European relations.

World War II left Western Europe economically devastated and militarily weak. It was in the American interest that a balance of power be established in the interior of Europe. Strategically, Western Europe was in control of the sea gateways vital to American security -- the Skagerrak, the English Channel, and the Straits of Gibraltar. Economically, it possessed not only the greatest aggregation of skilled workers, technicians, and managers outside the United States, but also the second greatest concentration of industrial power in the world. It was in the interest of American security that Europe be revived.⁽⁸⁾

The revivification and protection of Europe necessitated massive amounts of money and military forces. The United States provided reconstruction funds through the Marshal Plan, the dollars that Europe's trade needed, and most of the forces and finances of NATO. Under these

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid.

(8) John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, (New York, 1963), pp. 34-40.

circumstances it was only natural that the foreign policy of Europe follow the dictates of American foreign policy, particularly in dealings with the Soviet Union.⁽⁹⁾

On one issue after another the Europeans, no matter how they personally felt about it, had to follow the American lead. Economically, the Europeans were required by the United States to cooperate with each other as a prerequisite for receiving Marshall Plan funds. Politically, the United States "encouraged" Britain's withdrawal from Palestine, France's withdrawal from Indochina, Belgium's withdrawal from the Congo, and the Netherlands withdrawal from Indonesia. Militarily, the commander of the NATO forces was always American; Norway and Denmark did not form a Nordic defense union with Sweden, in part, because the United States objected; West Germany was re-armed and accepted as a member of NATO in 1955 under considerable American pressure. In the process, this heavy-handed leadership made the United States quite unpopular in Europe. A French senator, expressing a widely held opinion, said in 1958: "At bottom the conflict is that America and France have neither the same world interests nor policy goals. America looks after her own self-interest, which is entirely different from ours."⁽¹⁰⁾

By 1961 European economic reconstruction had long been completed and its need for dollars satisfied while, at the same time, the United States had come upon a balance of payments difficulty. At a time when the United States needed the help of Europe to halt its increasing gold outflow, Europe, under French leadership, not only refused to

(9) Etzioni, p. 38.

(10) As cited in Etzioni, p. 39.

help, but took steps to aggravate the American financial situation. Only recently France has begun converting its large dollar holdings into gold. As the European Common Market scheme succeeded in turning Europe into a major industrial and commercial power competing with American industry, Europe became less and less willing to follow the American foreign policy line.⁽¹¹⁾

This situation also holds true for the Communist Bloc. The Soviet Union has been in the grip of a severe agricultural crisis while the Comecon countries have looked to it for the capital necessary for their further development. This, in combination with other factors, is the probable cause of the Rumanian drift away from the Soviet orbit and toward the European Community.

The decreasing difference in economic and technical capacity between the leading nation and the other nations of a bloc has made it possible for some countries to break away in order to form new poles, but this economic and technical difference is still very real in the case of many other countries. In the case of the underdeveloped countries the situation is reversed; it is the desire of the poor countries to reach the level of economic development achieved by the bloc leader that has placed them outside the bipolar system. By remaining uncommitted, an underdeveloped country can accept, indeed, bid for economic aid from all sides. Aside from the real financial value of such a stand, by diversifying its reliance on external assistance the uncommitted nation minimizes the potency of foreign influence in its domestic life.

(11) Etzioni, p. 41.

A case in point is Ghana. Even though Ghana has been a British responsibility and, therefore, has received most of its development aid from Britain, the United States has also been a great source of funds for that country. For example, Ghana received \$26,400,000 in grants and loans from the United States in the period 1953-1961 and, at the present, the United States is strongly committed to the financing of the Volta River Project.⁽¹²⁾ At the same time Ghana has been able to attract capital from the Soviet Union. For example, Ghana received \$40,000,000 in loans and credit from the Soviet Union in 1960 alone.⁽¹³⁾ With the entry of Peking in the international political arena, Ghana has discovered another source of capital. An agreement was signed between Ghana and China in July, 1964 to enable Ghana to receive a \$22,400,000 loan for economic and technical purposes. The loan, which is interest-free, must be repaid in ten years starting in 1974. In 1961, China loaned Ghana \$19,600,000.⁽¹⁴⁾

Economic development is not the greatest problem with which the newly-independent countries are faced. The problem of "state-building" is of primary importance and has the greatest influence on matters of foreign policy.

"State-building" is the problem of building an entity within arbitrarily drawn boundaries that can justly qualify to be a nation; where the people are united by common beliefs, common ideals, common aims --

(12) Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics (New York, 1963), p. 365.

(13) Ibid., p. 232.

(14) "China Lends Another L8m," Times & Tide, The British News Magazine, July 23, 1964, p. 13.

in short, by common bonds. This is a difficult task for many of the newly-independent countries because the populace living within their artificially drawn boundaries consists of many radically diverse peoples, professing different religions, speaking different languages, and having different backgrounds. (15)

These differences were somewhat overlooked during the struggle for independence from the colonial masters. They were overlooked because, at the time, there existed a common unifying bond, the struggle for political independence. After the colonial master had been physically eliminated from the scene there remained no visible unifying bond and, therefore, the old internal antagonisms returned to the fore.

There is a unifying role which economic growth could play in breaking down separatist tendencies. The key factor in this role of economic growth is the market economy. One characteristic of the market economy is that it places primary recognition on individual performance rather than on tribal affiliation or clan status; and in this way, as more and more people are drawn into it, it can progressively minimize the tribal differences. (16)

(15) For example, according to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the population of India consists of seven racial types, speaking thirteen main languages (782 languages in all), and adhering to eight main religions.

According to Freda Wolfson (Pageant of Ghana, London, Oxford University Press, 1958), the seven million inhabitants of Ghana belong to thirty-six principal tribes and many more minor tribes. According to P.A.Owideru ("Proposals for a National Language for Ghana", African Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 251, April, 1964), there are five principal languages having some literature used by the inhabitants of Ghana, and many more dialects and languages without any literature. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the majority of the people of Ghana are animists, though there is a general belief in a supreme deity. The leading Christian communities are Methodist, Presbyterian, and Roman Catholic. There is also a substantial Moslem element.

(16) Arnold Rivkin, The African Presence in World Affairs (New York, 1963), p. 22.

But economic growth is a long range proposition and, therefore, of little use in preventing the impending chaos and dismemberment of the newly-formed country. The logical answer is to continue the revolution against the colonial master in spite of the fact that the colonial master is no longer physically present.

Anti-colonialism was the common unifying bond that in the pre-independence days held together otherwise incompatible groups. Now, translated into neutralism and non-alignment, it perpetuates the cohesive role of the revolution against colonialism. It also underscores the existence and integrity of the newly-independent country which has been detached from the identity of its former colonial master.

The voting record of the newly-independent countries of Africa and Asia in the United Nations General Assembly indicates that the majority chose not to take sides on issues of East-West conflict. One cannot accuse them of acting irresponsibly by casting votes of abstention, nor can they be accused of being blind to the realities of the Cold War. It must be understood that the anti-colonialist attitude, so vital to the survival and unification of the newly-independent country, does not permit taking the same stand on a major political issue as the countries which are identified as colonialists or supporters of colonialists.

In recent years the attitude of refraining from taking a stand on Cold War issues -- the attitude of neutralism -- has had more influence on voting behavior in the United Nations than the tactics of the Communists since the inception of that organization. Arthur P. Whitaker explains the rising disaffection of the Latin American bloc toward the West in general, and the United States in particular, through the spread

of the idea of neutralism: "The explanation seems to lie in the spread not so much of pro-Communism as of neutralism."⁽¹⁷⁾

Whatever the causes may be, the process of the disintegration of the rigid bipolar system is very real. This disintegration has become possible because the effectiveness of the nuclear protection afforded by each of the two bloc leaders is diminishing and the fear of nuclear reprisal against political misbehavior is vanishing. The risk of total annihilation is so great that it is inconceivable that nuclear weapons would be used to protect or harm bloc members.

Furthermore, the two bloc leaders no longer hold a monopoly over nuclear weaponry. France and Communist China, despite the relative smallness of their nuclear arsenals and the low potential of their delivery systems, have become new choices as group leaders.

Also the psychological effect of drawing the line between capitalism and communism, as between good and evil, has worn out after fifteen years of Cold War tension. "Imperialist encirclement" and the "Conspiracy of International Communism" have ceased to serve effectively as all-purpose explanations and causes.

Finally, the rise of neo-nationalism and neo-neutralism -- perhaps as an indirect result of one decade of bipolarity -- has closed any possibilities of returning to the bipolar system. Now there are any number of forms that the world order could take, but the termination of duopoly renders the methodology utilized in this thesis useless for the study of those forms.

(17) Arthur P. Whitaker, "The Latin-American Bloc", in Franz B. Gross (ed.), The United States and the United Nations (Norman, Oklahoma, 1964), p. 188.

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APPENDIX

IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES

Session XI - 1956:

- (1) Resolution 1133: The Hungarian Question.
- (2) Resolution 1108: The Question of Representation of China.
- (3) Resolution 1122: Administration and Financial Arrangements for the United Nations Emergency Force.
- (4) Resolution 1128: Urging the Government of Hungary to Permit the Secretary General of the United Nations to Travel to Hungary in Order to Inspect the Situation.

Session XII - 1957:

- (1) Resolution 1135: The Question of Representation of China.
- (2) Resolution 1180: The Korean Question.
- (3) Resolution 1148: Disarmament with International Inspection.
- (4) Resolution 1150: Enlargement of the Disarmament Commission.
- (5) Resolution 1151: United Nations Emergency Force.

Session XIII - 1958:

- (1) Resolution 1239: The Question of Representation of China.
- (2) Resolution 1264: The Question of Korea.
- (3) Resolution 1252: Disarmament with International Inspection.
- (4) Resolution 1312: Situation in Hungary.
- (5) Resolution 1300: The Question of Increasing the Membership of the Economic and Social Council.

Session XIV - 1959:

- (1) Resolution 1351: The Question of Representation of China.
- (2) Resolution 1353: The Question of Tibet.
- (3) Resolution 1441: United Nations Emergency Force.
- (4) Resolution 1454: The Question of Hungary.
- (5) Resolution 1455: The Question of Korea.

Session XV - 1960:

- (1) Resolution 1493: The Question of Representation of China.
- (2) Resolution 1590: Financing of the United Nations Operations in the Congo.
- (3) Resolution 1616: Complaints of Cuba Against the United States.
- (4) Resolution 1600: Situation in the Congo.
- (5) Resolution 1498: Credentials of the Representative of the Republic of Congo (Leop.)

Session XVI - 1961:

- (1) Resolution 1668: The Question of Representation of China.
- (2) Resolution 1741: The Question of Hungary.
- (3) Resolution 1740: The Korean Question.
- (4) Resolution 1723: The Question of Tibet.
- (5) Resolution 1649: The Need for a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with Effective International Inspection.

Session XVII - 1962:

- (1) Resolution A/5380: Financing of the United Nations Operations in the Congo (No roll-call vote was taken in the Plenary Session of the General Assembly, but the tally was identical to the Committee vote.)
- (2) Draft Resolution A/L.395: (Rejected in Plenary) Restoration of the Lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.

- (3) Resolution A/C.1/L.322-A/5383: The Question of Korea. (No roll-call vote was taken in the Plenary Session of the General Assembly, but the tally was identical to the Committee vote.)
- (4) Resolution 1857: The Question of Hungary.
- (5) Resolution 1762B: The Need for a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with Effective International Inspection.

Session XVIII - 1963:

- (1) Resolution 1885: Appropriations for the Congo Operation.
- (2) Draft Resolution A/L.427: (Rejected in Plenary) The Question of Representation of China.
- (3) Draft Resolution A/C.1/L.334: (Rejected in Plenary) Mongolia
Draft Resolution Calling for Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from South Korea.
- (4) Resolution 1964: The Korean Question.
- (5) Resolution 1909: Referring the Question of the Prohibition of Nuclear and Thermo-nuclear Weapons to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

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