

A STUDY OF AMERICAN CATHOLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 1936-1939

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PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to examine American Catholic opinion on the Spanish Civil War during the period of that conflict. Recognizing the lack of fairness in severely criticizing an institution in retrospect and by concentrating wholly on Catholic opinion expressed in the years of the actual war, I have tried to avoid making of this study a gratuitous exercise in hindsight. While ranging freely over recorded opinions on this subject, an attempt was made to discover and exhibit the diverse factors that formed persistent or recurrent themes in American Catholic thought. Yet I am under no illusion that this investigation can be any more than a tentative survey of the matter. It may seem hazardous to attempt to sum up opinions of clergymen on politics due to the complexities involved in justly relating their views to Church history and moral theology, but perhaps one can at least trace certain significant continuities.

Even at a time when American history as a profession is enjoying the fruits of its labors by insisting upon high standards of objective scholarship, there will always remain those polemicists who ransack historical materials to find justification for preconceived judgments. With this in mind, I undertook this topic with full awareness that the controversy still surrounding aspects of the Spanish Civil War imposes a special responsibility on any aspiring historian, while yet providing him with an important assignment.

Careful study of the source material on the subject dictated a scheme of interpretation which showed American Catholic concern to be focused on

four main aspects: (1) An antagonism to the constitutional experiment of the Republic after 1931 which culminated in the Popular Front government of 1936. (2) A strong backing of President Roosevelt's Neutrality policy and the maintenance of the Embargo. (3) Fundamental disagreements with the American Press and the American Protestant Churches. (4) A general apologia for the Nationalist side. Each of these four phases was discussed with appropriate sub-divisions. The treatment, being expository in nature, endeavored to indicate the attitude of American Catholic leaders.

The conclusions presented were derived mainly from a study of the writings and accounts found in the three most prominent American Catholic periodicals during the period in question - America, the Jesuit weekly; Commonweal, the most influential lay weekly; and Catholic World, the leading monthly published by the Paulist Fathers. Particular attention was devoted to editorials, since it may rightfully be presumed that they often represent well thought out and widely held opinion of Catholic leaders. A search was made for both pertinent individual statements by important Catholics and evidence of composite evolving attitudes on the part of the Church as a whole. Other sources of value were the Christian Century, which included items of Catholic interest, and the New York Times, which contained official pronouncements of influential Catholics.

I have also drawn heavily upon the research of Professors F. Jay Taylor and Allen Guttman whose works deal primarily with the nature and extent of America's involvement in the Spanish Civil War. My principal indebtedness is to the British historian Hugh Thomas whose volume The Spanish Civil War acquainted me with the war itself and was especially valuable in this study for introductory purposes, in establishing vital links between important events, and generally providing the essential

frame of reference to make the narrative more intelligible and meaningful.

A discriminating use of the mentioned sources should suffice to discern a composite view of the American Catholic attitude on the Spanish Civil War. The nature of the subject required a higher level of representative Catholic opinion than is usually found in the files of the diocesan press. Concentration was directed to analysis of the ideas found in America, Commonweal, and Catholic World rather than the gathering of less substantial impressions from diocesan journals and lesser known periodicals.

I am happy to acknowledge my obligation and gratitude to the members of my thesis committee: Dr. Theodore L. Agnew, Dr. O. A. Hilton, and Dr. Alfred Levin. They provided me with very useful criticism in both the general form and specific detail of this thesis. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Agnew, the chairman of the committee for his kind help, encouragement, and wise counsel while this thesis was being written and while a student at Oklahoma State University.

INTRODUCTION

The immediate cause of the Spanish Civil War was the successful rebellion against the Republican government by center-right forces under General Francisco Franco on July 17, 1936. The following day witnessed the revolt of garrison after garrison, but the surprising and obdurate resistance of the Republic's improvised militia averted total defeat. By August, 1936, the rebellion had materialized into a full-fledged civil war with foreign intervention an already accomplished fact. Russian workers contributed funds to the Loyalists while German and Italian aircraft furnished aid to the Nationalists. On October 1, 1936 Franco was proclaimed head of the Nationalist movement. In November, international brigades were formed to help the Republic and soon to save Madrid. By the spring of 1937 German and Italian troops and technicians fought with the Nationalists. Great Britain and France, desiring to contain the embroilment, proposed neutrality in the form of a Non-Intervention agreement. Twenty-seven nations officially complied, but it was never strictly observed.

The Spanish Civil War was uniformly characterized by lightning offensives and tedious delays, the latter enhancing the marked ruthlessness and cruelty on both sides. The loss of northern Spain early in the war consequently resulted in a unified front by the Loyalists which simplified their practical military problems. From this front they launched a number of unexpected offensives like that of the capture of Teruel in Aragon, but the Nationalists would always eventually regain the initiative and win crucial victories.

Internal strife constantly hampered the Republican cause, a noted example being the "civil war within the Civil War" in Barcelona on May 4-7, 1937. Communist leadership dominated the military effort but created seeds of dissension within the faltering Republic. Disputes continually arose as to the desirable degree and details of the centralization needed to prosecute the war effectively. In January, 1939 the fall of Tarragona in the south and the mounting offensives in the center and the north marked the last stages of the war. Barcelona was severely bombed and fell on January 26th. Barely two months later Madrid capitulated. The Loyalists surrendered on March 28, 1939. Great Britain and France recognized de jure the Franco government on February 27th, and the United States did so on April 1st.

CHRONOLOGY

Relevant and Important Dates on the Spanish Civil War

February 16, 1936	National Elections. Victory of the Popular Front
February 29, 1936	United States Neutrality Act of 1936, extends provisions of the 1935 law until May 1, 1937
July 17, 1936	Successful rebellion against the republican government by center-right forces under General Franco
August, 1936	Rebellion materializes into a civil war
August 3, 1936	France proposes non-intervention. By the end of August, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the U.S.S.R. agree to a non-intervention policy
August 6, 1936	Secretary of State Cordell Hull unofficially informs the European powers that the United States intends to follow a strict non-intervention policy
September 4, 1936	Francisco Largo Caballero becomes Prime Minister of Loyalist Spain
October 1, 1936	Franco proclaimed head of the Nationalist Movement
November 6, 1936	Caballero government flees to Valencia from Madrid
November 7-8, 1936	Formation of the first International Brigade in Madrid
January 8, 1937	United States Congress passes joint resolution which levies an embargo on war supplies to nations engaged in civil wars
February 8, 1937	Germans bomb Guernica
May 1, 1937	United States enacts "permanent" Neutrality Act of 1937
May 4-7, 1937	Anarchists revolt in Barcelona
May 17, 1937	Caballero government overthrown. Dr. Juan Negrin becomes Prime Minister
June 19, 1937	Fall of Bilbao. Loss of Basque autonomy

August 25, 1937	Fall of Santander to Nationalists
October 21, 1937	Fall of Gijon-virtual end of northern campaign
January 11, March 13-18, 1938	Severe Nationalist aerial bombardments of Barcelona
March-April, 1938	Nationalist advance in Aragon. Catalonia's autonomy annulled
January 26, 1939	Fall of Barcelona
February 27, 1939	Great Britain and France recognize de jure the Franco government
March 28, 1939	Fall of Madrid. Surrender of Loyalists
April 1, 1939	United States recognition of Franco regime

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CHAPTER I

CRITICISM OF THE LOYALIST GOVERNMENT

Popular Front Claimed Only a Screen for Communism

Much of Catholic thought in the United States with regard to Spain was affected by a concept of an idealized older Spain isolated from modern political ideas. It seemed to those holding this notion that the advent of modern intellectual liberalism had brought forth new fashions of thought and behavior alien to its inherent Catholic civilization. One scholar felt that this development had emanated from the influences of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period,¹ while another viewed the situation as resulting from the recent Republican period beginning in 1931.² Both were equally convinced that Spain had broken too sharply from a glorious past, and that her new politics had unduly undermined her social structure. Even before the rebellion broke out, American Catholic hierarchy contended that leftist agents were subverting Spain under the guise of liberal republicanism.³ They were particularly disturbed at a secularized Spain that practically removed the Church from its traditional role in public concerns.⁴

¹Aileen O'Brien, "Analysis of the Social Structure of Spain", America, LVII (July 31, 1937), pp. 388-389.

²Reverend James A. Magner, "Alternatives in Spain", Commonweal, XXVI (June 11, 1937), pp. 173-174.

³New York Times, June 6, 1936.

⁴Ibid.

The important monthly, Catholic World, featured lead articles by British Catholics who placed full responsibility on the founders of the 1931 Republic of Spain for having created so great a rift in the country's institutions that it became readily accessible to the threat of international Communism.⁵ Agents from the Comintern were believed to have been most active in the late 1920's even though the avowedly Communist faction in Spain was rather small. They were said to have penetrated liberal elements by way of the socialist and syndicalist movements, thereby eventually winning the allegiance of the urban proletariat, the troubled miners of the Asturias region, and the agrarian masses of the South.⁶ A further claim stated that Soviet influence was so pervasive that Moscow agents were actually preparing for civil war, and that the Russian ambassador himself, being permitted to sit in on cabinet meetings, helped to dictate general policy.⁷ The American Catholic attitude from many quarters coincided readily with the world radio address made by

⁵Reverend Arthur S. Riggs, "No Surprise in Spain", Catholic World, CXLIV (November, 1936), pp. 158-159; G. M. Godden, "How Communism Attacked Spain", Catholic World, CXLIV (January, 1937), pp. 403-407; R. Sencourt, "How Spain Has Reacted", Catholic World, CXLVII (May, 1938), pp. 138-142.

⁶Lawrence K. Patterson, "Right and Left Battle for Spain", America, LV (August 8, 1936), pp. 412-413. Hugh Thomas' study clearly shows that an inability or too frequent failure to distinguish between the various proletarian parties prior to the Civil War credits too much strength and influence to the Communists whose position in Spain was relatively minor. Gerald Brenan's study on the agrarian South did not reveal any considerable Communist authority there; on the contrary, Brenan regarded Andalusia as the principal barrier to Bolshevism in Spain. See Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper Brothers, 1961), pp. 89-94; Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth (London: Cambridge University Press, 1950), pp. 87-131.

⁷Owen B. McGuire, "The New Spain", Commonweal, XXVII (October 29, 1937), p. 8. Recent works on modern Spanish history do not make mention of any member of the Russian embassy sitting in on Republican cabinet meetings prior to the Civil War.

Pope Pius XI on September 14, 1936 assailing the menace of Communism in Spain.⁸ With the above in mind, the Spanish Civil War was often interpreted as nothing less than a war of independence from Russia.

Two prime sources of anxiety affecting American Catholic leaders on the eve of the Civil War were the establishment of the Popular Front government and the severe persecutions suffered by the Spanish Catholic Church. The feeling that these two were intimately related was made clear when the situation was often presented as a choice between the Sovietization of Spain or the survival of Christian civilization.

Six months before the Civil War, the national government had undergone a climactic political crisis when President Alcala Zamora, unable to contain the discordant political factions within a workable administration, dissolved the Cortes on January 4, 1936. Elections were to be held the following month, and meanwhile a caretaker government under Portela Valladares (a political nonentity) assumed responsibility. Two distinct political alignments emerged as the various organizations of the Right and Left hurriedly assembled alliances in preparation for the coming elections. Falangists, Monarchists, Carlists, the Agrarian Party of the landlord class, and some Independents stood with the Catholic Party headed by Jose Maria Gil Robles, forming a Right group which became known as the National Front. Opposed to them was a Left group consisting of Socialists, Leftist Republicans, Communists, and the Catalan Separatist Left, which adopted the label of Popular Front. The Anarchists gave the latter tacit support but remained largely outside political life at this time. Of lesser importance was the Center party group made up of moderate independent political parties mostly interested in

⁸Editors, "Comment", America, LV (September 26, 1936), p. 592.

advancing certain specific objectives. National elections were held as scheduled on February 16, 1936. The Popular Front won the majority of votes and seats due to an electoral system which permitted electors to vote for alliances and not individual parties.⁹

After contemplating the news of the Popular Front victory, the editors of Commonweal expressed their sentiment clearly in regard to the meaning of the election. They analyzed the results as follows: of the 9,402,513 votes cast the National Front and Center Parties added together had 4,570,744, the Popular Front had 4,356,559, and a scattered 481,210 votes were cast outside the three principal parties. They then concluded that over half of the electorate had repudiated the Popular Front, thus questioning the legitimacy of their acting so resolutely in the interests of all Spain.¹⁰ Some serious illegalities were also attributed to the 1936 elections. America accepted Gil Robles' charge of irregular election procedures perpetrated by Leftist brutality in the constituencies of Coruna, Pontevedra, Lago, Caceres, Cordova, and Seville.¹¹ A pastoral letter issued by the Spanish hierarchy (later to be defended by the American hierarchy) had declared, among other things, that the election had been unjust due to the arbitrary annulment of votes in certain provinces. The Popular Front government was therefore accused

⁹Thomas, pp. 89-94.

¹⁰Editors, "The World Revolution", Commonweal, XLIV (August 14, 1936), pp. 373-374. The figures compiled by Hugh Thomas for the February 16, 1936 election also reveal a small numerical majority if Center and Right votes are added together. He shows the aggregate votes as follows: Popular Front - 4,176,156; Basque Nationalists - 130,000; Center - 681,047; National Front - 3,783,601. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 92-94.

¹¹Editors, "Comment", America, LVI (March 13, 1937), p. 530. An investigation by a committee of the Cortes regarding the matter of election irregularities favored the Popular Front. The Popular Front gained twenty-one new seats, the Right lost nine, the Center gained one. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 93.

of being a fictitious product from its very inception.¹² Consequently, many American Catholics would often state that the February 1936 elections did not represent an actual victory for the Popular Front because they had not obtained a majority of the votes but had won due to an unfortunate system of parliamentary representation and unlawful intimidation. These Catholics were especially shocked at what they deemed to be a full-blown Communist victory in Spain.¹³

From its beginning, the Popular Front was regarded as a relatively powerless coterie of intellectuals, journalists, and political idealists who, being constantly outmaneuvered, proved to be little more than a screen for international Communism. The Communists and Anarchists, though often at odds with each other, were understood to be following a dictated policy patterned in Moscow.¹⁴ It was further suggested that government attention, so enthusiastically anti-clerical, was only vaguely desirous of working toward social reform.¹⁵

¹²New York Times, September 3, 1937.

¹³Editors, "Perils of a Communist Victory in Spain", America, LV (August 8, 1936), pp. 420-421.

¹⁴Michael Williams, "An Attack on Democracy", Commonweal, XXV (March 12, 1937), p. 538. It is a known fact that the Spanish Communist Party was linked with that of the Soviet Union, although the full nature and extent of their association still occasions much argument. While true that extreme Left-wing supporters of the Popular Front released a wave of revolutionary enthusiasm in the form of land seizures, strikes, persecution of the Church, and even murder, one must consider also that Rightist elements contributed a large share to civil disorder. However, there seems to be little doubt that Spanish Communists were attempting to suit the needs of Russia's "Popular Front" foreign policy. On the whole, the Anarchists acted independently, strongly distrusting all other Leftist groups at this time. The reason that some of them voted for the Popular Front in the 1936 elections was promises of an amnesty for political prisoners - many of whom were Anarchists. See Brennan, Spanish Labyrinth, pp. 299-314; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 102-110, 125; Stanley G. Payne, Falange (Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 105, 114-115.

¹⁵Reverend J. Murray, "Conflict of Opposites", Catholic World, CXLIV (December, 1936), p. 357.

The fact that the Soviet Union had formally introduced a Popular Front policy at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in 1935 was still fresh in mind. The noted Jesuit, Wilfrid Parsons, (then professor of Political Science at Catholic University of America) viewed the policy as greatly advantageous to the Communists. It permitted them to continue intensified penetration without causing any undue provocation in Europe. Events in France also confirmed his suspicions that Leon Blum and his socialist coalition well represented Popular Front government as an instrument of international Communist conspiracy.¹⁶ Moreover, in Spain, the gradual decline of Manuel Azana (who took over from Portela Valladares) and the rapid rise of Largo Caballero, reputed to be a Communist leader of disaffected Left-wing extremists, signified the worst. Caballero had repeatedly threatened to thrust aside the liberal republican government, unify the Left, and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat.¹⁷ Azana's Popular Front appeared increasingly to have abdicated its leadership and capitulated before Communist pressure.¹⁸

American Catholics were prone to examine the Spanish situation in

¹⁶ Reverend Wilfrid Parsons, "Fascist-Communist Dilemma", Commonweal, XXV (February 12, 1937), pp. 429-430.

¹⁷ Editors, "The World Revolution", p. 374. Largo Caballero was an important trade-union socialist. Late in his career he displayed the tactics and demagoguery of an unprincipled opportunist in efforts to win the leadership of the Popular Front. His intemperate speeches caused great consternation, especially among conservatives, and certainly helped to bring the Spanish situation to the breaking point. Even though he was called "the Spanish Lenin" by his Communist friends, there is no indication that he was ever a Russian agent or a Communist. See Brennan, Spanish Labyrinth, pp. 302-304, 313; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 98-99, 107-108, 185, 192, 232.

¹⁸ Parsons, "Fascist-Communist Dilemma", p. 430.

the light of international Communism. They condemned the Popular Front for answering the demands of Russian foreign policy instead of occupying itself principally with the urgent problems intrinsic to Spain herself. The Popular Front was accused of being traitorous to Spain in its pursuance of Soviet aims. Therefore, Catholic opinion was often infuriated to hear the Popular Front referred to as "Loyalists" when the war broke out in July 1936. According to these writers, only Franco's national forces deserved the name of Loyalists since it was they who were entrusted with the mission of saving Spanish civilization from the clutches of Communism as represented by those who had actually rebelled from their true Spanish heritage.¹⁹

Loyalist Government as Persecutor of the Church

Most countries of Western Europe and the United States have become accustomed to the theory of the separation of Church and State. The increasing secularization of their cultures zealously guards its practice. Meanwhile, Spain has developed from a fusion of Catholicism and national feeling. A religious impetus provided Spain with a sense of nationhood from the days of the Reconquista. It remained vital during the Reformation while making Spain the instigator of the Counter-Reformation. In spite of both the unceasing struggle between the Church and its opponents, and the overall decline in religious belief and practice, scholars well recognize the indissoluble Catholic influence on Spain.²⁰

¹⁹Reverend John P. Delaney, "Call Not These Men Rebels", America, LV (August 22, 1936), p. 460; G.M. Godden, "How Communism Attacked Spain", pp. 403-407.

²⁰Brenan, pp. 39-55; Thomas, pp. 32-37; Elena de la Souchere, An Explanation of Spain (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 96, 273-276.

Many American Catholic thinkers were fully aware of the vital importance of their religion in attempting to understand Spain. The threat of Communism appeared especially vivid when word was received regarding persecution of the clergy and wholesale destruction of churches. By June of 1937 reports indicated that eleven bishops and between 40% and 50% of the total priesthood had been murdered; in some dioceses it was closer to 80%. Over 20,000 religious edifices were said to have been wantonly destroyed.²¹

As the Spanish Catholic persecution intensified during the first months of Azana's regime and the period immediately following Franco's revolt, it invoked the concerted wrath of significant elements of American Catholic opinion. There was staunch agreement with Pope Pius XI that Communism was the agent of religious persecution in Spain. Its insensate oppression of the Church indicated not only a malevolent hatred of Christianity, but an expression of the modern mind's revolt from God.²² This terrorism aroused leading Catholic American prelates to denounce the

²¹Editors, "Fascism and Communism in Spain," America, LVI (February 13, 1937), pp. 444-445; Reverend John A. O'Brien, "Fighting for Social Justice," Commonweal, XXVI (May 28, 1937), pp. 117-119. Hugh Thomas states that almost all the indiscriminate killing and destruction on the part of the Republicans against the Church took place at the outset of the Civil War, the period between July 18 and September 1, 1936. His calculations as to the loss of life incurred by the clergy suggest a favorable comparison with that of the American Catholic reports. They are as follows: 12 bishops, 283 nuns, 5,225 priests, 2,492 monks, and 249 novices. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 171-173. Elena de la Souchère feels that the uncontrolled severity of the persecution of the Church in the Republican zone by extremists, more than any other factor, was responsible for turning the middle classes toward the Insurgents. She believes that this was decisive in the fall of the Republic. See de La Souchère, Explanation of Spain, p. 185. A recent work suggests that most of the evidence of church destruction points to anarchist responsibility. See José M. Sánchez, Reform and Reaction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), pp. 205-206.

²²Editors, "Through the Cross to the Light," Commonweal, XXIV (September 25, 1936), p. 494; Reverend Laurence K. Patterson, "Sad Spain," America, LV (September 12, 1936), p. 545; Editors, "The Real Problem in Spain," Catholic World, CXLV (June, 1937), p. 264.

Loyalists in no uncertain terms. Patrick Cardinal Hayes, in addressing 60,000 laymen at the national convention of the Holy Name Society in New York, referred to them as "the diabolical, blood-crazed enemies of God and His Church in Spain."²³ William Cardinal O'Connell, in a similar vein, declared them to be "no government at all, but an unruly mob of atheists and Communists".²⁴

On November 19, 1936 eighty-nine members of the American hierarchy had gathered at Catholic University of America. They urged prayers for the Spanish Church and issued a message to the bishops, priests, and faithful of Spain extending their sympathy. The message proved noteworthy for being a strong protest against persecution of Spanish Catholics. In part, it read as follows:

The Catholics of America and a legion of their right-minded fellow citizens have been horrified at the savage extremes to which irreligion and inhumanity have been carried. They deplore the horrible carnage the more deeply because of the conviction that the sufferings of the Spanish Church are but the agony of civilization, battling for its spiritual and cultural heritage over the prostrate body of Spain. They know well that the Spanish Catholics are the victims of a studied oppression; and that men like-minded with their oppressors have constantly misrepresented here their struggle.²⁵

The blame for these outrages was placed squarely on the Loyalist government whether due to deliberate policy or to willful negligence. America, being most critical of the Loyalists, informed its readers of an "outstanding revelation" made in the French Chamber of Deputies. Frederic Dumont, a Parisian deputy, accused the Loyalist government of

²³E. T. Buhner, "Denounces Spanish Terrorism", Christian Century, LIII (October 7, 1936), p. 1335.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Rev. Raphael Huber, Our Bishops Speak (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1952), pp. 214-215.

complicity in and abetting clerical atrocities. Dumont was said to have enumerated definite times and places gleaned from reliable witnesses; his evidence was turned over to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.²⁶ As further substantiation, America called attention to the Vatican newspaper, Osservatore Romano, which claimed it had irrefutable evidence that the Loyalists had deliberately ordered this terror as a premeditated act of vengeance. The testimony was said to have been painstakingly compiled from information supplied by two hundred priests who had managed to escape from Loyalist Spain.²⁷ America attributed to the Loyalists many sinister crimes against the Church and blamed them for promoting the Spanish crisis.

Little difficulty was experienced in attempting to find out the reasons for this abhorrent state of affairs. Michael Williams, editor of Commonweal and an influential journalist, easily recalled the veiled hostility existing between the Church and the Republic since 1931. He noted the continued reports of Communist-sponsored hoodlums burning churches and convents, and felt that the government's neglect in not stopping or publicly denouncing the disorders was a degradation of democracy.²⁸ Hundreds of youths were believed to have been impressed into service as an anti-Fascist militia and indoctrinated into rejecting Christianity.²⁹ In the heat and uncertainty of the Franco uprising, and in view of the terrible sufferings of their Spanish brethren, American Catholic leaders indiscriminately blamed their common elusive enemy,

²⁶Editors, "Chronicles", America, LVI (January 2, 1937), p. 290.

²⁷Editors, "Fascism and Communism in Spain", p. 444.

²⁸Michael Williams, "Help the Catholics of Spain", Commonweal, XXV (February 5, 1937), p. 398; Williams, "Degradation of Democracy", Commonweal, XXV (April 9, 1937), pp. 656-657.

²⁹H. C. Plummer, "Spain Demands Religious Freedom", America, LVI (December 12, 1936), pp. 656-647.

Communism, and the Spanish Church's long term antagonist, the Republic. From the vantage point of many years and his own responsible scholarship, Hugh Thomas would disagree with suggestions of complicity on the part of the Republican government toward the persecution of the Church. He has also relegated Communism to a minor role in this matter.³⁰ He is, however, in complete accord with those who testified to the undeserved cruelty and injustice suffered by the clergy, particularly since they had not taken an active part in the rebellion.³¹

News of the persecution of the Spanish clergy created an intense emotional response on the part of American Catholics. Often, it alone was made to serve as ample theoretical justification for an anti-Loyalist view.³²

³⁰Gerald Brenan and Hugh Thomas opine that the "Red terror" of the first two months was a spontaneous movement, a natural consequence of long smouldering resentment and hatred on the part of the working classes toward a Church so obviously identifiable with upper and middle class society. Although sensing a certain indifference in some quarters, Thomas does credit the Government with good intentions and some successful efforts to save the clergy, churches, and convents from destruction in Madrid. Government influence appears to have had little chance to extend its influence to the provinces where local officials were of different mind. Both Brenan and Thomas find that the most serious acts of mass terror were committed by the Anarchists. They minimize the role of the Communists in regard to both active participation and influence until the Russian intervention. Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, pp. 317-319; Hugh Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 171-177.

³¹Thomas' descriptions are unusually vivid and effective. They support his assertion: "At no time in the history of Europe or even perhaps the world has so passionate a hatred of religion and all its works been shown." See Hugh Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 171-172, 175.

³²Allen Guttman has interestingly commented on the growth of a literature of martyrdom and the use of various literary devices by pro-Franco advocates to stigmatize the Loyalists as satanic. He states that the anti-Loyalist poems and stories written by European Catholics are almost indistinguishable from those of American Catholics. Written with stereotyped simplicity, they had little literary merit. See Allen Guttman, The Wound in the Heart, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1962), pp. 37-41.

After the full impact of Franco's rebellion had been felt and the wave of terror against the clergy had receded, American Catholic attention diverted itself from the brutality inflicted upon the Spanish Church to the barbarism that took place daily on the battlefield and the home front. Combatants and non-combatants were equally caught in a conflict of that utmost savagery which is the peculiar quality of civil war. Atrocities committed against the clergy seemed intermittent and relatively mild until the murder of the Bishop of Teruel (Father Anselmo Polanco y Fontecha) on February 5, 1939 renewed accusations of Loyalist cruelty. This incident also discounted a new liberalism toward the Church as announced by Premier Negrin.³³

Negrin's attempts to promote better relations with the Spanish Church had been dismissed as propaganda to better consolidate his position against the adherents of Caballero. Furthermore, the fact that Negrin had permitted Mass to be celebrated openly in Valencia and Madrid for the first time since the outbreak of hostilities was still a far cry from the desired principle of complete religious freedom.³⁴ America expressed dissatisfaction with the status of Catholicism in Loyalist Spain throughout the remainder of the Civil War. In particular, it felt that Negrin's concessions had done little besides granting permission for Mass to be said and sacraments to be administered, and this only with discretion and in not-too-public places. This seemed more like a sign of

³³Editors, "Chronicle", America, LX (March 18, 1939), p. 568; Dr. Juan Negrin succeeded Largo Caballero in the summer of 1937 as an aftermath of the internecine war in Barcelona. The Bishop of Teruel was murdered among other Nationalist prisoners by infuriated Republican soldiers following a heavy incendiary bombing on the town of Gerona in Catalonia. Thomas suggests that the incident was spontaneous and not premeditated. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 577.

³⁴Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (August 28, 1937), p. 482.

defeat than a genuine revision of government policy towards the Church.³⁵
 In January 1939, with some forty or fifty provinces falling under Nationalist control, America rebuked Negrin for needlessly prolonging the war and adding to the sufferings of a religious-starved people.³⁶

The Basque Problem

A distinctive ironic tragedy was the plight of the essentially peaceful Basques who were drawn into the vortex of the Spanish Civil War. The lure of autonomy offered by the Loyalists proved to be too powerful, even though their first reaction to the Republic had been unfavorable due to its pronounced anti-clericalism. The pursuance of autonomy by Basque leaders was prompted by three categorical factors: political, economic, and religious. There had been a long tradition of liberty and self-government before its curtailment due to participation in the Carlist Wars. The economy consisted of an agricultural self-sufficiency and a growing industrialism oriented to western Europe rather than central Spain. The intensity of their religious life made them apprehensive of the anti-clericalism that seemingly enveloped the rest of Spain. In the early twentieth century a nationalist movement arose similar in proportion to that of Catalonia. On the eve of the War, Basque nationalism entered the maelstrom of Spanish politics, replacing Basque isolationism.³⁷

There was much consternation among American Catholics regarding the alliance of Basques and Loyalists. It was perplexing to realize that such a traditionally fervent Catholic people had cast their lot with

³⁵Editors, "The Catholic Church has Battled for Christ", America, LX (December 31, 1938), p. 297.

³⁶Editors, "Comment", America, LX (January 28, 1939), p. 386.

³⁷Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 53-56.

atheistic Spain. The only answer to this paradox was a suggestion that an excessive minority nationalism had superseded the primary aspirations and needs of the majority of the Basque people.³⁸ It followed that these Nationalists were not truly representative of the Basque people; and only sinister propagandists could presume that these devoted Catholics would compromise their spiritual interests for political independence.³⁹ Yet between the elections of February 1936 and the uprising of July, the Basques indeed made their choice - that of political autonomy over religious concerns. On October 1, 1936 the Basque provinces were granted autonomy by the Loyalist Government.⁴⁰

Pope Pius XI never condemned the Basque clergy specifically, even though pressure from Nationalist quarters was exerted on him to do so. Pius XI satisfied himself with the issuance of a sweeping proscription of Catholic collaboration with Communism.⁴¹ This sentiment was reflected in American Catholic opinion, which knew of no division among the Spanish clergy except for the few Basque priests who presumably had been temporarily swayed by blind nationalism rather than remaining

³⁸Michael Williams, "Degradation of Democracy", p. 657; Rev. John LaFarge, "Basque Conservatism Found Strange Bedfellows", America, LVII (July 3, 1937), p. 299.

³⁹Rev. Francis X. Talbot, "Some Further Reflections on the Spanish Situation", America, LVII (April 10, 1937), pp. 9-10; Owen B. McGuire, "Truth about People in Santander", America, LVII (August 21, 1937), p. 464. On August 6, 1936 the Bishops of Vitoria and Pamplona (Basque provinces) condemned by pastoral letter the adherence of the Basque Catholics to the Loyalist cause. But the greater Basque clergy, under the Vicar-General of Bilbao, resolutely upheld the Republic stating that Franco's rebellion had no justification. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 195-196.

⁴⁰F. Jay Taylor, The United States and the Spanish Civil War (New York: Bookman Associates Inc., 1956), p. 32.

⁴¹Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 358.

mindful of their enduring allegiance to the Church.⁴² Thus American Catholics perceived the Basque problem with a mixture of regret and concern instead of bitter condemnation.

One other aspect of the Basque problem elicited much attention - the exile of some Basque children during the War. As the news of the frightful bombing of Guernica (April 26, 1937)⁴³ traveled around the world, some thought was given to the predicament of helpless children victimized by such horrors. Rumors had it that Bilbao was marked for a similar awesome experience. As a result, Great Britain, France, and Russia offered to look after a number of Basque children for the duration of the War.⁴⁴ The League of Nations Council approved this humanitarian gesture.⁴⁵

The exile of these Basque children was called the greatest crime of the Loyalist government to date.⁴⁶ The number in exile was believed to have been around 40,000. Four thousand supposedly had gone to England, 6,000 to France, some to Mexico, but the largest group had left for Russia. Some American Catholics greatly feared that the Russians would nurture these young minds on atheism and Communism before returning them home.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the whole exile question was regarded as an

⁴²Rev. Edward J. Fergar, "Moors and Clergy Loyal to Nationalists", America, LVII (July 31, 1937), p. 392.

⁴³Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 419.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 437-438.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 440.

⁴⁶Rev. Paul McGuire, "Basque Children Exiled", America, LVIII (April 9, 1938), pp. 4-5.

⁴⁷John E. Kelly, "Spanish Waifs", America, LVIII (January 15, 1938), p. 344; Peter Arrupe, "Mexico and Spain's Kidnapped Children", America, LIX (May 21, 1938), p. 152. There is some uncertainty regarding the role

extravagant piece of world-wide propoganda to discredit Franco's Nationalists and make them appear as blood-thirsty aggressors. Such an evacuation scheme seemed altogether unnecessary in the light of the overtures made by Franco to ensure safe asylum for all non-combatants in the vicinity of Bilbao. Committees such as Basque Children's Welfare, the Committee in Aid of Spanish Children, and others of similar nature were designated as Communist-controlled, using the position of the Basque children as an invaluable source of propoganda.⁴⁸

In the United States, leading Catholics such as Cardinal O'Connell and Representative John W. McCormack (D-Massachusetts) reacted strongly to any proposition that advocated the transfer of Basque children to America.⁴⁹ They staunchly supported the United States State Department policy which vetoed any plans by private organizations to ship them from Spain.⁵⁰ The lack of sustained interest in the complex Basque problem by American Catholics may be due to its relative insignificance as a military factor in the Civil War.⁵¹

of children's relief and the number of children involved during the Civil War. The work of the British and French organizations is better known, that of Russia less so. There are indications that the Soviet Union was only interested in the care of Communists' children. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 438.

⁴⁸Editors, "Propaganda", Commonweal, XXVI (June 18, 1937), p. 198.

⁴⁹F. Jay Taylor, The United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 158-159.

⁵⁰Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (June 19, 1937), p. 242; John E. Kelly, "Spanish Waifs", p. 344.

⁵¹Basque resistance was limited to action by small, ill-equipped armies. Few foreign correspondents accompanied the Basque forces. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 404.

Loyalist Agencies in America

The policy of the United States toward Spain's Civil War was that of strict neutrality. It had accepted the British and French view that only non-intervention could check the conflict from accelerating into a world war. Catholic leaders vigorously backed this international agreement and directed some of their efforts to expose those whom they suspected of pro-Loyalist activity in America. They singled out what they understood to be identifiable left-wing groups that had embraced the Loyalist cause.⁵²

The Spanish Embassy under Fernando de los Rios was believed to be a high source of Loyalist intrigue. It was deemed a headquarters for coordinating activity on behalf of the Loyalist regime and a principal source of false propaganda against the Nationalists.⁵³ Fernando de los Rios was denounced for a previous career that designated him as a Communist agent and an enemy of a Catholic people. He had betrayed Spanish culture in the interests of serving a Communist government and consequently was unqualified to represent a country with a 95% Catholic population. For example, in 1931 as Minister of Justice he had been a chief sponsor of a government decision which forbade government officials to attend religious functions.⁵⁴ More serious was the charge by the

⁵²For Congressional law prohibiting war supplies from the United States to Spain explicitly, see United States Statutes at Large, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 3. Editors, "Comment", America, LX (December 10, 1938), p. 232.

⁵³Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (June 12, 1937), p. 219; Editors, "Comment", America, LIX (June 4, 1938), p. 194; Editors, "Propaganda", Commonweal, XXVII (December 10, 1937), pp. 169-170.

⁵⁴John E. Kelly, "His Excellency the Spanish Ambassador", America, LIX (June 4, 1938), pp. 197-198; Hugh Thomas terms de los Rios as "technically a Socialist but ...above all a humanist and far too individual to be a very reliable member of any Marxist party". He also says

American Catholic historian, Rev. Joseph B. Code, that de los Rios was acting as the chief purchaser of war supplies for the Loyalists.⁵⁵ The Embassy was thought to have acquired much ill-gotten wealth by securing some of the money from the Bank of Spain and from the millions of dollars worth of property confiscated by the Loyalist government at the outbreak of the war. A disproportionate amount was said to have been transferred to Loyalist representatives in Washington earmarked for propaganda and the procurement of arms.⁵⁶ Accusations were also levelled against the Embassy for abusing its franking privileges by dispatching large amounts of propaganda through the mail.⁵⁷

In the fall of 1937 and again in the winter of 1939, Ambassador de los Rios extended official invitations to both American Catholic and Protestant leaders in order that they might investigate the Spanish

that de los Rios was instrumental in the decision of Spanish socialists to turn down any affiliation with the Comintern. Although appealing with regularity to America to allow the Republic to purchase arms and making occasional polite rebukes, the Ambassador is not known to have acted improperly while in office. Guttman and Taylor are also in accord regarding this man's basic decency and his proper conduct as Spanish Ambassador. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 25, 26, 293; Guttman, Wound in the Heart, pp. 85, 124; Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 76, 132, 150, 166, 180. See also Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, I (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), pp. 484-485.

⁵⁵Rev. Joseph B. Code, "The Immune Ambassador Trades in Munition Markets", America, LIX (July 30, 1938), pp. 391-392.

⁵⁶John E. Kelly, "Spanish Gold for Propaganda Purposes", America, LVIII (March 19, 1938), p. 556. Kelly states that the confiscations amounted to 489 million dollars in gold and 300 million dollars in private property. Thomas, while not mentioning the amount involved, indicates that the Loyalists in commanding the Bank of Spain, possessed the sixth largest gold reserve in the world. He does not mention any large-scale transfer of funds other than the one to Paris in August, 1936. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 206, 249.

⁵⁷Editors, "Chronicle", America, LVIII (February 26, 1938), p. 495.

situation for themselves. Bishop Robert L. Paddock, head of the American Friends of Spanish Democracy and spokesman for the Protestant churches, accepted, but such prominent Catholics as Archbishop Michael Joseph Curley and Catholic University's philosophy professor Fulton J. Sheen declined, saying they held no confidence in the integrity of Loyalist officials. Carefully guided as it would likely be, the tour might prove of no avail to them, but be useful as propaganda for Loyalist adherents.⁵⁸

Besides suspecting intrigues in the Loyalist Embassy, American Catholics felt that a great amount of malicious propaganda emanated from radical organizations with the aid of innumerable branches and affiliates in the United States. There was also the serious matter of recruiting American citizens for service in Spain.⁵⁹ They wholeheartedly concurred with the findings of Congressman Martin Dies of Texas and his committee on Un-American Activities which had revealed the names and details of groups involved in pro-Loyalist activities. Congressman Dies personally equated pro-Loyalist devotion with disloyalty to the United

⁵⁸Editors, "Chronicle", America, LX (January 21, 1939), p. 376; Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, p. 150.

⁵⁹G. M. Golden, "Catholics and Communists", Catholic World, CXLVII (September, 1938), pp. 667-674; Rev. Joseph B. Code, "Spanish Propaganda Floods the United States", America, LX (December 10, 1938), pp. 220-221. The leading organizations were said to be the following: American Friends of Democracy, American League for Peace and Democracy, American Student Union, International Labor Defense, Young Communist League, Communist Party USA, American Socialist Party, Church League for Industrial Democracy, Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, Spanish Information Bureau, and the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy. As part of an objective and outstanding study of the American Communist Party, Professors Irving Howe and Lewis Cozer clearly illustrate the techniques used by American Communists to penetrate and control Popular Front organizations. Their analysis of the take-over by Communists of the American League Against War and Fascism and the American Student Union are, according to the authors, notable examples of the fate that befell other Popular Front groups. See Irving Howe and Lewis Cozer, The American Communist Party (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1962), pp. 339-368.

States. This resulted in Catholic demands for stringent measures because of flagrant breaches of neutrality, especially for promoters of such enterprises as the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.⁶⁰

American Catholics, among other Americans, were quite justified in their concern over the recruiting and volunteering of United States citizens. Some Americans of democratic or leftist convictions believed that Spain was the necessary battleground to meet the threat of world Fascism. These young idealists evaded their country's neutrality policy, preferring to translate their sentiments into action.⁶¹ The Dies Committee uncovered sufficient evidence to show that there was recruiting activity for Loyalist Spain in the United States,⁶² although many volunteers went on a "visit" to Spain directly or via France.⁶³ The State Department made sincere efforts to dissuade Americans from going to Spain, but as is often the case with certain foreign conflicts in which some Americans take an unusually lively interest, there are peculiar difficulties involved in preventing violations of neutrality laws.⁶⁴ By the spring of 1937, Americans were sufficient in number to form distinct units

⁶⁰John E. Kelly, "Foresworn Americans Serve Red Cross in Spain", America, LVIII (October 23, 1937), pp. 55-56; Editors, "Comment", America, LIX (September 3, 1938), p. 506; Editors, "Comment", America, LX (October 29, 1938), p. 74; Editors, "Chronicle", America, LX (December 10, 1938), p. 232; Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 106-107.

⁶¹The most reliable estimates denote that about 3,000 American citizens fought for the Loyalist side in the Spanish Civil War. Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 101-102.

⁶²Some witnesses testified before the Committee and indicated that well-known American Communists (e.g., Earl Browder and Robert Minor) had been active in recruiting volunteers for Loyalist Spain. See Ibid., pp. 106-107.

⁶³Ibid., p. 102.

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 108, 110.

- the Lincoln and Washington battalions. They later became a part of the famous XV International Brigade.⁶⁵ The role of Communism and Communist leadership among members of the Brigade is still a subject of spirited controversy, yet there would seem little doubt that many of them were much influenced by Communist ideology during their service in Spain.⁶⁶

The efforts of Loyalist agencies in America had been recognized as having borne fruit. Sponsorship of fund-raising speaking tours featuring Spanish Loyalists was arranged. A successful propaganda offensive had been launched involving American educational institutions and mass media such as books, radio, and films. It was also believed that inroads had been made on the thinking of a sizeable number of American congressmen.

Leftist organizations were understood to be active in enlisting the services of prominent Loyalist speakers to address their would-be sympathizers. Clearly, the main objective was to win over American public opinion on the matter of the Civil War. For example, Luis Sarasola, a Basque priest, sponsored jointly by the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy and the American League Against War and Fascism, spoke at a large rally at Madison Square Garden in New York.⁶⁷ Catholic criticism held that Communist leaders had deliberately misrepresented Father Sarasola's real mission, that of a pleader for Basque autonomy and not a

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 102-103. The Americans suffered severe casualties, both battalions later being forced to merge as one. Of 3,000 Americans who served as combatants in Spain, close to 900 were killed. By mid-January of 1939 all known Americans had been evacuated from Spain. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 637, 558-559.

⁶⁶Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 460, 464-465. Contrary to American Catholic opinion at this time, the testimony of most Americans who served in Spain clearly reveals that their motives were profoundly anti-Fascist and not pro-Communist. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 104-105.

⁶⁷Editors, "Comment", America, LVI (October 31, 1936), p. 74.

herald for Spanish "democracy".⁶⁸ Other prominent Catholic spokesmen such as Father Ignaz Eugenio, editor of Madrid's influential liberal Catholic newspaper Cruz y Raya,⁶⁹ and Father Michael O'Flanagan, Vice-President of the Sinn Fein movement of Ireland, were used in a similar manner with the intention of raising money and diffusing Loyalist propaganda.⁷⁰ Particular discontent was noted when Senor Gonzalez Pena, Premier Negrin's Minister of Justice, visited the United States to speak and confer with American labor union representatives.⁷¹

On April 22, 1937, 800,000 college and high school students in the northeastern United States staged an anti-war demonstration. They avidly demonstrated their enthusiasm for Loyalist Spain by donating their lunch money to the American Student Union for the Spanish cause. This action was called radical and interpreted as an absurd contradiction when a so-called fast-for-peace was utilized for purposes of war.⁷² The National Catholic Alumni Federation and officials of Fordham University denounced the operation.⁷³ Loyalist rallies at important institutions such as Swarthmore College and the University of Pennsylvania were, according to a Catholic journal, but other noted examples of how Communist ideology could implant itself in the minds of American youth.⁷⁴ The Archbishop of

⁶⁸Editors, "Comment", America, LVI (November 7, 1936), p. 98.

⁶⁹Editors, "Tin Boxes for Democracy", America, LVI (December 26, 1936), pp. 276-277.

⁷⁰Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (May 8, 1937), p. 98.

⁷¹Editors, "Comment", America, LIX (September 10, 1938), p. 530.

⁷²James A. Donovan, "Anti-War Strike is Anti-Peace Movement", America, LVII (May 15, 1937), pp. 126-128.

⁷³Bradford Young, "Student Peace Strikes Show Spanish Sympathies", Christian Century, LIV (May 5, 1937), p. 393.

⁷⁴Marieli Benziger, "Swarthmore Communists", Commonweal, XXVI (May 14, 1937), pp. 70-71.

Duluth may have keyed Catholic sentiment when, speaking at the Washington Boy Scout Jamboree, he warned that Communism's main drive was the subversion of youth, recently exemplified by their regimentation of the youth in Spain.⁷⁵

American Catholics bitterly complained of the mass communications media that were believed to be almost entirely dominated by Loyalist propaganda agencies. Along with the vital matter of the American press (a subject treated by itself in Chapter III) there was much concern over books and films.

A strong pro-Loyalist position was taken by the League of American Writers, another suspected Communist-led organization of some 418 American writers. Severe censure was directed to its pamphlet entitled "Writers Take Sides", wherein the authors, with but one exception, affirmed their trust in Republican Spain and condemned Franco's rebellion.⁷⁶ There was also consternation regarding pro-Loyalist literature coming from overseas. For example, The Left Book Club, an English literary organization run by the Communist Party of Great Britain, had extended itself to America. It was said to have had a wide appeal to middle-class readership and successfully enrolled 50,000 members in two years. An object of particular concern, other than books, was the arranged reading clubs known as "Spain Groups," which made strong appeals to the Loyalists.⁷⁷

⁷⁵Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (July 17, 1937), p. 339.

⁷⁶Rev. Albert Whelan, "One Noble Writer", America, LIX (August 6, 1938), p. 415. The League of American Writers was a left-wing organization, an off-shoot of the John Reed clubs of 1932-1935. It did include a number of hard-core Communists. However, most of the members of the League provided the Communists with only limited and momentary cooperation. See Harold Clurman, The Fervent Years (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962), pp. 444-445.

⁷⁷G. M. Godden, "Invaded by Leftist Books", America, LIX (August 6, 1938), p. 415.

Some American Catholics deplored the pro-Loyalist bias of both feature and documentary films dealing with the Civil War. Hollywood was thought to be a hotbed of Communists and their sympathizers.⁷⁸ "Blockade" was especially singled out as the most offensive motion picture. It portrayed the Basque people as a downtrodden mass cruelly oppressed by the Nationalists.⁷⁹ Other films severely criticized were: "The Spanish Earth", "Spain in Flames", and "Heart of Spain".⁸⁰

Catholic leaders expressed alarm at what they believed to be strong currents of pro-Loyalist sympathy running through the United States Congress. A case in point had been the congratulatory message of January 1938 proffered to the Loyalist Cortes by twenty-six Senators and thirty-four Representatives.⁸¹ Monsignor Michael J. Ready, Chairman of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and Bishop James E. Walsh, noted Catholic missionary to China, severely denounced the message. They lamented the fact that Loyalist agencies could stir up such enthusiasm for a government that indulged in Catholic persecution.⁸² By mid-February

⁷⁸Editors, "Comment", America, LX (March 19, 1938), p. 554; New York Times, June 17, 1938. Harold Clurman, founder of the famous Group Theatre in the 1930's, states that most of the interested writers, actors, and producers were overwhelmingly pro-Loyalist and were active in promoting the cause. Taylor and Guttman arrive at similar conclusions. It is most probable that many Hollywood personalities lent their names indiscriminately to Popular Front groups but there is no record of undue Communist penetration within the movie industry. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 151-152; Guttman, Wound in the Heart, p. 131; Howe and Cozer, The American Communist Party, p. 365; Harold Clurman, The Fervent Years, pp. 188-191, 200.

⁷⁹Editors, "Comment", America, LX (June 25, 1938), p. 266.

⁸⁰Thomas J. Fitzmorris, "Films for Democracy", America, LX (December 17, 1938), p. 248.

⁸¹Congressional Record, Appendix, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., Message of Greetings to Loyalist Cortes (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938), pp. 959-960.

⁸²New York Times, February 1, 1938; New York Times, February 2, 1938. It should be noted that the National Catholic Welfare Conference

some of the signers of the message had made retractions or pleas of being misquoted or misunderstood, according to a representative of the NCWC news agency. Yet almost one-third reaffirmed their approval of the Loyalist regime.⁸³ Among these, America noted a hard-core group favoring the Loyalists; Senators Robert La Follette Jr. (Prog) of Wisconsin, Lynn Frazier (R) of North Dakota, Allen Ellender (D) of Louisiana, and Elbert Thomas (D) of Washington; House members Thomas B. Amlie (Prog.) of Wisconsin, John Bernard (Farmer-Laborite) of Minnesota, Charles G. Binderup (R) of Nebraska, John G. Boileau (Progressive) of Wisconsin, Usher L. Burdick (R) of North Dakota, John M. Coffee (D) of Washington, Bernard Gehrman (Progressive) of Wisconsin, Clarence F. Lea (D) of California, Jerry J. O'Connell (D) of Montana, Walter M. Pierce (D) of Oregon, William R. Poage (D) of Texas, and Henry Tiegan (Farmer-Laborite) of Minnesota.⁸⁴ The question of absolute neutrality toward the Civil War was highly important to American Catholics at this time; thus impartiality in the United States Congress was of particular significance.

From the very beginning and all through the course of the Spanish Civil War, American Catholic leadership contended that the Loyalist government was a Communist creation. It was held that the Loyalists had illegally assumed power and were instrumental in having integrated a militant Soviet ideology bent on sweeping over all national boundaries. What brought the issue to major attention in the minds of American

is the highest authoritative body in the American Catholic Church. Its pronouncements are made in the name of the hierarchy. See John T. Ellis, American Catholicism (University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 141-142.

⁸³Editors, "Chronicle", America, LVIII (February 19, 1938), p. 471; Editors, "Editorial", Commonweal, XXVII (February 18, 1938), p. 451; Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 157-158.

⁸⁴Editors, "Chronicle", America, LVIII (February 19, 1938), p. 471.

Catholics was the news of severe persecution regarding the Spanish clergy.

CHAPTER II

THE QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY AND INTERVENTION

The Non-Intervention Policy

From the very first, American Catholic leaders had little or no confidence in the European non-intervention policy toward Spain. Although believing in the fundamental principle of the policy, they feared that the Spanish situation would provide such overly strong inducements for aid on the part of the Soviet Union toward the Popular Front government, that the overall results would be a series of Loyalist denunciations of intervention by Germany and Italy while they themselves would be recipients of arms and supplies from Russia.¹

The attitude of Great Britain and France toward the Spanish Civil War was from the beginning one of hesitancy and vacillation to which the democracies in these years were so painfully subject. Other than a profound desire for peace, there was no unison in opinion or will, and consequently a policy of conciliation became the main response of these nations to the Fascist threat in Europe.²

On August 3, 1936, the French government proposed to the Italian and British governments that all three powers should desist from sending war material to either side in the Spanish Civil War.³ Great Britain agreed

¹Editors, "Issue in Spain", Catholic World, CXLIV (October, 1936), p. 101.

²Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 219-220, 224-225.

³Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 257. On August 6, Secretary of State

and suggested that the proposal be extended to all interested powers and, by the end of August, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia had agreed to a non-intervention policy. In September a Non-Intervention Committee representing the above mentioned and fifteen other nations had begun to hold regular meetings in London.⁴

American Catholic opinion did not expect Russia to be mindful of obligations to the non-intervention agreement when its ideological commitment in Spain was so obvious. Overtly or covertly the Soviets would surely render the needed aid. Yet American Catholics were particularly resentful when confronted with evidence of Russian declarations of solidarity with the Loyalists and pledges of that aid. This resentment was noted when it was learned from Moscow that Soviet trade-union delegates, after nation-wide campaigning among Russian workers, claimed contributions of up to 200 million rubles for Loyalist Spain. Although the Soviet government itself was not directly involved, its approval was of course required.⁵ It was just such developments that raised American Catholic suspicions of Soviet support to Loyalist Spain into absolute conviction.

By the summer of 1937, American Catholics believed that the extent of Soviet participation could be more clearly identified. The Loyalist air force was understood to be strengthened by the addition of Russian

Cordell Hull unofficially informed the Committee that the United States also intended to follow a strict non-intervention policy. *Ibid.*, pp. 259-260.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 277-285.

⁵Editors, "Moscow Pledges Aid to Spain", America, LV (August 15, 1936), p. 448. The Soviet Union had not officially accepted the non-intervention agreement until August 23, 1936 but it had given its approval "in principle" to the measure on August 6. On that same day Pravda announced that Russian workers had already amassed over 12 million rubles to aid Spain. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 261, 257.

bombers resembling the American Boeing B-26. It was also noted that all tanks in the Madrid sector and the Loyalist artillery was mainly Russian.⁶

The entire matter of Soviet assistance to Loyalist Spain was considered to be interlocked with France. Up until the summer of 1937 France was held responsible for supplying most volunteers, having transported most ammunition and guns and doing more than other nations for Loyalist regimes. France was therefore regarded as the key nation to the problem of non-intervention. It was felt that if France had been strictly neutral, Russia's effective intervention would have been minimal. France was deemed most guilty of violating the non-intervention agreement because it had not closed the French-Spanish frontier.⁷ A telling eye-witness report by the Rev. Owen B. McGuire, is a good example of what American Catholics told regarding the implications of this serious violation. He stated that the frontier was wide open in the Catalan region and that escape routes were provided at Bilbao, Santander, Gijon, and the Asturias, from which "Communists" were then conducted through French territory. He added that Russian planes bombarded Franco-held provinces after which they returned to bases situated in France.⁸ Gault MacGowan also reported

⁶Editors, "Chronicle", America, LVIII (May 1, 1937), p. 88. Thomas admits the difficulty in making a proper estimate of the extent of Russian assistance, but his account does mention the large amount of Russian aid that flowed into the Madrid sector. Largo Caballero, in a revealing address over the Madrid radio, was in exultation over the arrival of Russian arms in Madrid. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 309, 315-316, 337, 636.

⁷Editors, "Chronicle", America, LVII (April 20, 1937), p. 26. The largest group of volunteers who fought in the Spanish Civil War were French. The number is estimated at around 10,000, of whom 3,000 were killed. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 637.

⁸Letter to America by Rev. Owen B. McGuire, America, LVIII (January 15, 1938), pp. 353-354.

from Spain that "the 200 mile corridor between the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean has become a whispering gallery for propaganda-merchants, spies, contact men, agents-provocateurs, munition salesmen, international adventurers, gun-runners, and modern Mata Haris".⁹

The subject of illegal recruitment was inextricably tied to the issue of the French-Spanish frontier. It was earlier observed that the non-intervention powers had agreed to include the prohibition of "recruitment in, and transit through, or departure from their respective countries of persons of non-Spanish nationality proposing to proceed to Spain or Spanish dependencies for the purpose of taking service in the present war". This was scheduled to be effective from February 21, 1937.¹⁰ Yet American Catholics would later be informed by such as McGuire that the failure of the non-intervention agreement was mainly due to the Blum government, which had permitted, if not encouraged, open recruiting for "Red Spain" in every city of France as well as enabling the Soviets to use French territory to ferry supplies across the frontier.¹¹ America

⁹Gault MacGowan, "Red Vultures of the Pyrenees", Commonweal, XXVII (February 18, 1938), p. 458. The French-Spanish frontier was of inestimable use to the Loyalists in that the arms traffic from Russia was considerable. The frontier was officially opened and closed depending upon France's political leadership and a host of external circumstances such as British policy and the overall development of the war. It appears that there was a certain amount of continuous movement of supplies (especially at night) even when the frontier was officially closed. One must also consider that the alternate route, the Mediterranean, was almost impenetrable due to the effective Nationalist blockade. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 501-502, 522-523, 534, 537, 541, 572, 575-576, 614, 636.

¹⁰Editors, "Comment", America, LVI (February 27, 1937), p. 482.

¹¹Owen B. McGuire, "The New Spain", Commonweal, XXVII (October 29, 1937), p. 5. Most of the recruitment took place in Paris but there were a few other recruiting centers of lesser importance throughout France and Belgium. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 299-300.

claimed that Germany and Italy had gladly offered to withdraw their troops if France sealed off its border from Spain, but France was said to have continually buckled before Soviet pressure to supply and transmit munitions to the Loyalists.¹²

Mexico was the other nation, besides France and Russia, believed to be intimately related with Loyalist Spain. President Cardenas had openly admitted the shipment of 20,000 rifles and 20,000,000 cartridges to Madrid. His justification was that the Loyalist regime was a friendly power. However, some Catholics contended that relations were more than friendly and that Mexico was part of a network engineered by the Soviet Union to help their fellow Communists.¹³ Federal agents were noted to have discovered a conspiracy to violate United States neutrality laws which involved a plot to send shipments of military aircraft from California via Mexico to Spain. The Loyalist ambassador to Mexico was understood to have supervised the operations of this intrigue.¹⁴

¹²Editors, "Comment", America, LIX (May 28, 1938), p. 171. Hugh Thomas' discussion of the many issues surrounding the Pyrenean frontier does not reveal any German or Italian offer to negotiate such an agreement with France. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 501-502, 522-523, 537, 572. I have been unable to locate any reference to such an offer in other sources.

¹³In contrast to other nations who made some effort to follow the non-intervention agreement, Mexico was openly involved in supplying aid to the Loyalists. The Cardenas government was ardently pro-Loyalist. This resulted in opportunities for France and Russia, as well as individual agents, to send arms and supplies secretly to the Loyalists. Including the above-mentioned rifles and cartridges, Mexico's aid totaled about two million dollars. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 233-234, 260, 494, 637.

¹⁴Although Mexico officially agreed to cooperate with America's prohibition regarding the shipment of arms and munitions to Spain, it continued throughout the war to participate in the international traffic of arms to that country. On some occasions, the United States was directly involved, which almost always concerned the illegal shipments of aircraft. Usually the United States was successful in preventing these shipments to Spain, but not always. The above-mentioned incident was one

The aid of Germany and Italy to Franco's insurgents proved to be more than an occasional source of embarrassment for American Catholics. At no time were they under the illusion that help was tendered for altruistic motives. American Catholic opinion simply minimized its importance in both influence and numbers and recognized that each government usually proffers support with the view of securing a later recompense, normally in the form of economic privileges.¹⁵ It was further felt that the Republic had enlisted international aid to a much larger degree than had the Rebels. For example, in the early spring of 1937, America reported that there were from 20,000 to 40,000 French, Russians, and other nationalities comprising the various international battalions and that this greatly exceeded the total strength of Italians, Germans, and Moors in Spain.¹⁶ America's analysis of the composition of the Franco forces in April of 1937 indicated that the nationalist military of half a million men had relatively few foreigners. It was also added that no exclusively German units were fighting with the Nationalists.¹⁷

of a number that complicated relations between the two governments. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 67-68; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 259-260, 338-339.

¹⁵Editors, "Communism at Bay in Spain", America, LV (August 29, 1936), p. 493.

¹⁶Editors, "Chronicle", America, LVI (March 6, 1937), p. 520.

¹⁷Editors, "Chronicle", America, LVI (April 3, 1937), p. 603. Part of this analysis made in the heat of the Civil War has proved to be wrong. The figure 20,000 to 40,000 for the foreign pro-Loyalists is correct, but the estimate that pro-Franco forces numbered much less is incorrect. In mid-1937, Italian pro-Franco forces alone were around 50,000. If one could add the total number of foreign soldiers who fought for Franco at any time exclusive of 1936, it would be found that they exceeded 70,000, thereby outnumbering their enemies by a wide margin. One might also consider that the pro-Franco elements usually came to Spain in the form of "units" or "expeditionary forces" whereas the pro-Loyalist groups (with a few outstanding exceptions) were usually untrained volunteers. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 634-639; Elëna de la Souchère, Explanation of Spain, pp. 172-174.

The concept that Franco was very indebted to Germany and Italy was equally disavowed. Franco was praised for his extraordinary military efficiency and his ability to solicit the necessary funds through voluntary contributions to carry on a modern war. Even without Spain's gold reserve, which was in Loyalist hands, he was said to have received large donations of jewels, ornaments, silver and gold plating, and a generous portion of the individual wealth of such rich backers as Juan March.¹⁸

American Catholic opinion unhesitatingly granted the victory to a Spanish army that was "overwhelmingly Spanish in personnel, inspiration, and leadership".¹⁹ It had castigated the non-intervention policy shortly after its inception as a sheer fiasco, only later to be extended as a useful fiction to cause a stalemate for the selfish reasons of both Great Britain and France.²⁰ France, singled out as the key member of the Non-Intervention Committee, was said to have acted irresponsibly both deliberately and by default. The fact that it too had a Leftist Popular Front government seemed to suggest a coincidence of interests bordering dangerously on outright Communism. Its permissiveness with regard to men and munitions was deemed of vital consequence in delaying an early

¹⁸Aileen O'Brien, "Franco has no Debt to either Germany or Italy", America, LIX (May 14, 1938), pp. 129-130.

¹⁹Joseph F. Thorning, "Franco's Spain", Catholic World, CXLVIII (February, 1939), p. 568. Franco's army may not have been overwhelmingly Spanish in personnel, but it was Spanish in inspiration and leadership. Despite heavy reliance on Italian and German aid, Franco's Nationalist movement is known to have preserved its essentially Spanish character. This was in contrast to the Loyalists who increasingly succumbed to Communist leadership and influence, thus weakening their cause. Frank P. Chambers, This Age of Conflict (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950), p. 520. See H. Stuart Hughes, Contemporary Europe (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1961), pp. 291-293.

²⁰Editors, "Peace for Spain", Commonweal, XXVIII (August 19, 1938), p. 418.

Nationalist victory.

Staunch Support of Neutrality Legislation
and Efforts to Maintain the Embargo

Most Americans had relatively little interest in the Spanish Civil War. Their attention turned inward to the problems posed by the Great Depression. The legacy of World War I, particularly the publicized findings of the Nye Committee, influenced a strong mood of isolationism. In anticipation of the possibility of war due to the belligerence of Hitler and the mounting Ethiopian crisis, isolationist-minded Congressmen rushed to enact neutrality legislation. There then ensued a series of Neutrality Acts, the first of which was passed on August of 1935. It made it unlawful for Americans to sell or transport arms to belligerents once the President declared a state of war. This act was further extended on February 29, 1936 to include the granting of loans to warring powers. Neither act, that of 1935 nor 1936 was of permanent character, nor did they specifically apply to civil wars; therefore only a moral embargo had been imposed on the sale of arms and munitions to Spain. Since this proved unsatisfactory,²¹ Congress attempted to close the loopholes. This reached completion on January 8, 1937 when Congress passed a "permanent" neutrality act which in part levied an embargo on shipments of war supplies to nations engaged in civil wars. In brief, the Republican government of Spain was technically put on the same footing as that of Franco's insurgents.²²

²¹Editors, "Comment", America, LVI (January 9, 1937), p. 314; Guttman, Wound in the Heart, p. 89; Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, p. 69.

²²U.S. Statutes at Large, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 3; Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 39-51.

In the summer of 1937, some members of Congress became increasingly disturbed over the amount and type of aid that Italy and Germany so generously bestowed on Franco. A Fascist-oriented Spain seemed more than a likely possibility, thus putting America's neutrality position to a severe test. By the spring of 1938, it seemed apparent to some that President Roosevelt would raise the embargo.²³ It was at this moment when neutrality policy toward Spain wavered that American Catholic leadership came to the fore. American Catholics proved to be staunch supporters of neutrality legislation and marshalled their efforts to maintain the embargo on Spain.

Aside from the neutrality legislation controversy per se, American Catholics considered the matter of the recruitment and participation of American citizens in Loyalist ranks of utmost importance. The Valencia government was reported to have mentioned that 2,700 Americans were enrolled in the XVth division under the names of Abraham Lincoln and George Washington brigades. America wondered why punitive steps were not taken against them. It further demanded that America's neutrality laws be applied and enforced.²⁴ Blame for the recruiting activities was laid on the American Communist Party and the Communist-sponsored North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy.²⁵ Such a view seemed more than

²³William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York: Harper and Row Inc., 1963), p. 223. Cordell Hull states that both he and President Roosevelt stood absolutely firm on complete neutrality toward Spain throughout the conflict. See Cordell Hull, Memoirs, I, 481.

²⁴Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (September 25, 1937), p. 578. The United States government did not take action against recruiters and other violators until 1940, even though it had the right and the sufficient evidence to do so during the civil war. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 102, 107, 111fn.

²⁵Editors, "Chronicle", America, LIX (July 23, 1938), p. 376.

justified by the ample revelation of the Dies Committee on un-American activities, thus leading to further demands of punishment for violators, more for the recruiters at home than for the soldiers in Spain.²⁶

America's characteristic view of the Abraham Lincoln brigade was as follows: "Most of the 3200 Americans were Jewish and foreign-born riff-raff Americans; a small percentage were respectable citizens. The most of them were enlisted, shipped, and smuggled into Communist Spain by American and French Communists...."²⁷ For many this will undoubtedly seem an uncharitable view towards those Americans who believed they were fighting for democracy against the threat of Fascism.

Moral suasion by the United States in the form of a "moral embargo" was successful during the first five months of the war. However, on December 28, 1936, the United States State Department felt obliged to grant an export license for \$2,777,000 worth of aircraft engines to Robert Cuse, an arms exporter.²⁸ This defiance of government wishes revealed the glaring omission of the Spanish Civil War from the terms of existing neutrality legislation. In granting the license, the State Department made known its disapproval and informed the governments of the Non-Intervention Committee that its policy remained unchanged.²⁹ American Catholic leaders were quick to warn that such conduct could lead America into a European war, and urged Congressional action for a neutrality act

²⁶Editors, "Comment", America, LIX (September 3, 1938), p. 506.

²⁷Editors, "Comment", America, LX (October 29, 1938), p. 74.

²⁸Robert Cuse was a representative of the Vimalert Company of Jersey City, New Jersey which is understood to have acted as an agent for the Loyalist government. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, p. 95fn.

²⁹Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 338.

covering the Civil War.³⁰ Even after the necessary legislation was passed, Catholics protested the continued shipments of pursuit aircraft via Air France to Spain.³¹ Added violations dealing with transfers of military planes from the United States through France and Mexico to Spain were reported until nearly the end of the war.³²

The most controversial aspect of the whole problem of American neutrality in the Spanish Civil War was the embargo.³³ Catholic leaders in the United States were determined that it be maintained, and whether separately or in concert, they waged an effective campaign to that effect. As the fortunes of war turned decidedly against the Loyalists, their supporters in America agonized over the decision to alter their country's inflexible neutrality policy. At what appeared to be a critical juncture of the war for the Loyalists,³⁴ a campaign to lift the embargo was begun in earnest. In the spring of 1938 the President and Secretary of State were besieged by calls, petitions, and letters urging the removal of the

³⁰Editors, "Comment", America, LVI (January 9, 1937), p. 314.

³¹Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (September 4, 1937), p. 506.

³²Editors, "Chronicle", America, LIX (April 30, 1938), p. 87; Editors, "Chronicle", America, LX (January 21, 1939), p. 375. In most cases the United States was able to prevent the shipments of war supplies to Spain. However, there were a few occasions when aircraft were illegally exported out of America by way of France and Mexico. The total number of planes involved was about fifty. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, p. 182.

³³Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, p. 163.

³⁴By March of 1938 the Loyalists' chances for victory seemed unlikely. Although they held their own in staving off attacks on Madrid, they had previously lost a succession of key engagements elsewhere in Spain, e.g. Teruel in the east, Malaga in the south, the Asturias and Basque country in the north, and they had now lost the initiative on the Aragon front where the fall of Barcelona appeared imminent. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 504-562; Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 163-164.

arms embargo.³⁵ Distinguished citizens from all walks of life expressed their desires in various ways. Leftist elements including the American Communist Party were equally active in promoting its abrogation.³⁶ The issue was finally swept onto the halls of Congress when Senator Nye introduced a resolution requesting repeal of the embargo on sale of arms and supplies to Spain.³⁷ Nye's argument rested on principles of justice and self-defense for Spain's lawfully constituted government against insurrection.³⁸

President Roosevelt himself wavered on the matter,³⁹ with two influential members of his cabinet strongly favoring lifting the embargo⁴⁰ but Secretary Hull remained firm in rejecting any resolution toward repeal.⁴¹ In the end the President heeded his Secretary of State, and the

³⁵Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 168-169.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 170-171.

³⁷U.S. Senate, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., LXXXIII, Senate Joint Resolution 288, Export of Military Supplies to Spain (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938), 6017, 6030.

³⁸Ibid. See also Wayne S. Cole, Senator Gernald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 113-114.

³⁹Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 182-184; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: the Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1956), p. 356.

⁴⁰Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, p. 183. The two members were Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of Interior, and Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of Treasury. Ickes claimed that Roosevelt told him that he could not risk raising the embargo because it would mean the loss of every Catholic vote in the fall elections. Undoubtedly President Roosevelt did take the Catholic vote into account, but whether it was a decisive factor is of course impossible to conjecture. See Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, p. 224.

⁴¹Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 183-185. See also Hull, Memoirs, I, p. 483.

Nye resolution was quietly shelved when the Administration refused to back the measure.⁴² It is very probable that, next to Secretary Hull, Ambassador to Great Britain Joseph Kennedy, a noted American Catholic layman, most influenced President Roosevelt in rejecting the idea of reviewing the embargo question. It was he who ably impressed upon Roosevelt and Hull the absolute necessity of doing nothing to undermine Europe's non-intervention agreement.⁴³

When Senator Nye introduced his resolution to repeal the embargo on Spain, American Catholics felt a distinct and serious threat to their interests.⁴⁴ Attempts to discredit Nye and all subsequent efforts were made by identifying the cause with Communism and liberalism. Early in the campaign, America stated that Miles M. Sherover, a top dealer in munitions for the Russian Communists, was the most active assistant working for Nye.⁴⁵ It implored the aid of all Catholic leaders to prevent "American involvement on the Communist side".⁴⁶ It also praised Secretary Hull's radio address in which he took a resolute stand on

⁴²Ibid., pp. 174, 182-185.

⁴³Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 536.

⁴⁴Editors, "Church Issue Enters Nye Campaign", Christian Century, LV (June 22, 1938), p. 780. Nye's Spanish policy made him unpopular with his many Catholic constituents in North Dakota. See Wayne S. Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations, p. 114.

⁴⁵Editors, "Editorial", America, LIX (May 14, 1938), p. 132. Miles M. Sherover, was known as the most important representative of the Loyalist government for purchasing supplies in America. I have been unable to secure information as to whether or not Sherover worked directly for the Soviet Union. See Harold L. Ickes, Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1954), II, pp. 574-575. A scholar whose interest is Senator Gerald P. Nye's career makes no mention of any connection with Miles M. Sherover. See Wayne S. Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations, pp. 79-153.

⁴⁶Editors, "Comment", America, LIX (May 21, 1938), p. 147.

the embargo issue as opposed to the "liberal lobbyists who are working feverishly on the President and Secretary of State to lift the embargo".⁴⁷ A coordinated group of Communist-front organizations called the Joint Committee to Lift the Embargo, was said to be using undue pressure on President Roosevelt and members of Congress.⁴⁸

American Catholics formed organizations of their own to meet the threat of repeal. One such important association was the Keep the Spanish Embargo Committee, sponsored by the National Council of Catholic Men which in turn was under the direction of the National Catholic Welfare Conference. At one of its mass meetings in Constitution Hall, Washington, D. C., Rev. Fulton J. Sheen addressed an impressive number of clergymen and laymen and solicited their full support and active collaboration in a drive to maintain the embargo.⁴⁹ Another prominent group was the directors of the Knights of Columbus. At a conference in New York they called upon all members throughout the nation to inform their Congressmen of their opposition to raising the embargo.⁵⁰ It was

⁴⁷Editors, "Comment", America, LIX (August 27, 1938), p. 482.

⁴⁸America designated the components of the Joint Committee as follows: The American League for Peace and Democracy, The Friends of The Abraham Lincoln Brigade, The Confederated Spanish Societies, The American Friends of Spanish Democracy, The Lawyers Committee on Spain, and the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy. John V. Hinkel, "Keep the Embargo", America, LX (January 14, 1939), p. 340. John V. Hinkel, "Popular Front Forces Unite to Lift Arms Embargo", America, LX (January 21, 1939), p. 366-368. This organization was only a Communist-front in part; other components were Protestant and Jewish clergymen. See New York Times, January 9, 1939.

⁴⁹New York Times, December 24, 1938; Editors, "Comment", America, LX (January 14, 1939), p. 338.

⁵⁰New York Times, January 9, 1939; New York Times, January 10, 1939; Bradford Young, "K of C Fights Lifting of Spanish Embargo", Christian Century, LVI (January 25, 1939), p. 132.

also reported that George Cardinal Mundelein, Archbishop of Chicago, had personally called President Roosevelt advising him to discourage any move toward lifting the embargo.⁵¹

America believed that only Communists and Communist dupes wanted an alteration in neutrality policy, particularly with regard to the embargo. At the same time Commonweal stressed that absolute neutrality was consonant with a higher moral point of view.⁵²

Spanish Relief

American efforts toward Spanish relief were sometimes marred by accusations and counter-accusations of political partisanship and propaganda activities. American Catholics strongly felt that most relief organizations directed their endeavors exclusively toward the Loyalists and also functioned as subversive political agencies. This conviction led to the establishment of relief groups directed by Catholics themselves.⁵³

The Spanish Relief Fund of the Brooklyn Tablet was the first major American Catholic relief organization for Spain. Originating from the work of Rev. Thomas E. Molloy, Bishop of the Brooklyn diocese, its operations began in January 1937 and continued all through the war. It acted mainly as a collection agency for contributions which were forwarded by to

⁵¹Christian Science Monitor, January 26, 1939.

⁵²Editors, "We Want No War", America, LX (January 28, 1939), p. 397; "Our Own Views on Neutrality", Commonweal, (February 17, 1939), p. 452.

⁵³The greater part of American relief efforts toward Spain went to the Loyalists. The largest pro-Loyalist organization was the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy headed by Bishop Francis J. McConnell of the Methodist Episcopal Church. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 129-133.

Cardinal Pedro Segura, Archbishop of Toledo, through a representative of the Spanish laity at the Vatican. Bishop Molloy and his supporters had been appalled by the "suicidal apathy" of most American Catholics toward the suffering of Catholics in Spain while "American Communists and American sympathizers with Spanish Anarchy are freely and generously aiding the Spanish Reds".⁵⁴ Commonweal pointedly declared that the Spanish Relief Fund was not a "war fund" but rather a source of badly needed charity and an opportunity to redress the balance in favor of fellow Catholics in Spain. It urgently appealed to other Catholic journals to follow its lead in soliciting more aid because so far there had been gathered "a very meager amount when contrasted with the huge sums collected for the various funds to aid the Reds in this country and abroad".⁵⁵

The fact that the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy was alleged to have boasted of not having contributed a penny worth of relief to the Nationalists angered and prompted America to set up another separate Catholic relief organization - the America Spanish Relief Fund.⁵⁶ In March 1937 it was but a small local collecting agency in New York, aiming its contributions at the neglected non-combatants of both sides.⁵⁷

The spring of 1937 witnessed the establishment of what proved to be the leading American pro-Franco relief organization - the American

⁵⁴New York Times, January 23, 1937; Editors, "Help the Catholics of Spain", Commonweal, XXV (February 5, 1937), p. 456. The Brooklyn Tablet is the official organ of the Brooklyn diocese.

⁵⁵Editors, "Spanish Relief Fund", Commonweal, XXV (February 19, 1937), p. 456.

⁵⁶Editors, "Comment", America, LVI (February 20, 1937), p. 459. American Consul General Mahlon Perkins testified in a report to Secretary Hull of the intense partisanship of the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy. The Catholic contention regarding the boast is very probable. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, p. 129.

⁵⁷Editors, "Comment", America, LVI (March 20, 1937), p. 554; Editors, "Comment", America, LVI (March 27, 1937), p. 579.

Committee for Spanish Relief. Headed at first by Ogden H. Hammond, a distinguished Catholic layman and former United States ambassador to Spain, it soon fell under the dynamic leadership of Commonweal's editor Michael Williams.⁵⁸ Although not primarily a Catholic committee because the funds would be distributed through the International Red Cross, it received a warm endorsement from America.⁵⁹ On May 7, 1937 Michael Williams announced the formation of the Commonweal Relief Fund, but this new organization was quickly absorbed by the American Committee for Spanish Relief.⁶⁰ New York's Cardinal Hayes exhorted Catholics to back this committee.⁶¹ Although the group had prided itself upon its impartiality as compared with the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy, it presented an unmistakable ideological front when it cooperated with an activist group called the American Association Against Communism in sponsoring a mass rally at Madison Square Garden in New York.⁶²

While Commonweal had been pleased with the work of the American Committee for Spanish Relief and claimed that both sides had benefited equally, America withdrew its approval of the committee due to alleged injustice and inefficiency by the International Red Cross. America's criticism was threefold: overhead costs were unnecessarily high; there

⁵⁸New York Times, May 6, 1937; Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, p. 131.

⁵⁹Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (April 17, 1937), p. 26.

⁶⁰Editors, "Commonweal's Spanish Relief Fund", Commonweal, XXVI (May 7, 1937), pp. 29-30; Editors, "American Committee for Spanish Relief", Commonweal, XXVI (May 14, 1937), pp. 57-58.

⁶¹New York Times, May 15, 1937.

⁶²New York Times, May 19, 1937.

were fewer distributing stations in Nationalist than Loyalist territory; too much attention was paid to injured combatants rather than to the civilian population.⁶³

In June 1937, America expanded the American Spanish Relief Fund from a local New York agency to one of national scope, registering it with the United States State Department. It desired a completely Catholic enterprise. All donations would be sent to Cardinal Isidoro Goma, primate of Spain, for distribution throughout the country.⁶⁴ Rev. Edward J. Ferger, editor of Buffalo's Catholic Union and Times, was appointed the fund's representative in Spain.⁶⁵ America reported in the fall of 1937 that the America Spanish Relief Fund and the one sponsored by the Brooklyn Tablet, the two sole Catholic agencies, had enviable records of charity and efficiency in comparison with other organizations. It claimed that the Medical Bureau to Aid Spanish Democracy and the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy had utilized the generosity of the American public to an egregious extent for propagandistic purposes.⁶⁶

By December 1937 the American Spanish Relief Fund, under the direction of John J. M. O'Shea, a prominent New York Catholic attorney, had

⁶³George W. Mehrtens, "Red Cross Spanish Relief", Commonweal, XXVI (June 18, 1937), pp. 203-204; Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (May 29, 1937), p. 170. Most of the relief organizations were more occupied with the Loyalist side because their need was obviously much greater. The Spanish Military Medical Corps had been with the Nationalists from the outset of the war. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 306.

⁶⁴Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (June 5, 1937), p. 194.

⁶⁵Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (June 19, 1937), p. 242.

⁶⁶The America Spanish Relief Fund stated that although it had collected only \$40,000 and that the above mentioned agencies had collected twice as much, the latter had proportionately spent much more on administration, publicity, and propaganda. Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (September 18, 1937), p. 555.

co-ordinated various diocesan committees in relief work for Spain.⁶⁷
Commonweal began actively to cooperate with it.⁶⁸ In the spring of 1938
 the America Spanish Relief Fund had emerged as the leading Catholic re-
 lief organization in conjunction with thirty leading dioceses in the
 United States.⁶⁹

As human conditions worsened in Spain during the latter stages of
 the war, the United States government decided upon a wheat surplus
 distribution program through the auspices of the American Red Cross and
 the American Friends Service Committee. Some Catholic leaders were of
 the opinion that since Franco's Nationalist government had previously
 refused such an offer, the program was but a shrouded attempt on the
 part of American leftists to strengthen the Loyalists and thereby pro-
 long the war.⁷⁰ President Roosevelt had furthermore appointed a promi-
 nent American Catholic and papal marquis, George Macdonald, to serve as
 chairman of the committee to supervise the wheat shipments. Catholics
 were then called upon to protest directly to the chairman.⁷¹ Objections
 were to no avail, but as the end of the war neared, most Catholics be-
 came supporters of the wheat distribution program to alleviate the ap-
 parent hunger and suffering. The America Spanish Relief Fund joined

⁶⁷Editors, "Comment", America, LVIII (December 11, 1937), p. 219.

⁶⁸Editors, "Spanish Relief", Commonweal, XXVII (February 11, 1938),
 p. 423.

⁶⁹Editors, "Comment", America, LVIII (February 26, 1938), p. 483.

⁷⁰Editors, "Comment", America, LX (December 31, 1938), p. 290. The
 wheat program amounted to about 560,000 barrels of flour by way of
 surplus wheat turned over to the State Department by the Federal Surplus
 Commodities Corporation. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish
 Civil War, p. 132.

⁷¹Editors, "Comment", America, LX (January 7, 1939), p. 315.

hands with the American Friends Service Committee to ensure its success, believing that the American Communists had abandoned both the program and the Republic as a lost cause. These American Catholics had only needed some assurance that the wheat program would not prove to be an overture to direct United States intervention in Spain.⁷²

Recognition of Franco

A Nationalist victory seemed a foregone conclusion by the spring of 1938. The Loyalists' best troops had not recovered from the battle of Teruel, and moreover their war supplies were exhausted. The beginning of Franco's Aragon offensive looked promising; his troops continually advanced in a series of lightning breakthroughs while routing efforts of the Loyalists.⁷³ Therefore, some American Catholics began to reconsider America's neutrality policy toward Spain. They now looked forward to United States' recognition of Franco's Nationalists hoping that it would enhance their efforts to restore peace and order in Spain. They contended that Franco controlled three-fourths of Spain and had earned the freely given loyalty of more than sixty-five percent of the people. Furthermore, he had provided responsible local government, economic security, and social normalcy in the areas secured.⁷⁴

Vatican policy had previously encouraged recognition of the Nationalists. Rome had some diplomatic relations with Franco as early as the summer of 1937. In May 1938, Pius XI formally declared the Nationalist

⁷²Editors, "Comment", America, LX (February 18, 1939), p. 458.

⁷³Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 517-526.

⁷⁴Editors, "Comment", America, LVIII (March 26, 1938), pp. 578-579.

Government to be the only legitimate authority in Spain.⁷⁵ This action on the part of the Holy See was understood by America as being instructive to Europe and the United States.⁷⁶ In the light of renewed appeals to the United States to follow the Vatican's example, Rev. James A. Magner championed the papal recognition of Franco. He outlined general Vatican policy as based on de facto realism and not on approval of the political aims or ethical claims of any one nation-state. He also countered accusations that the authoritarian nature of the Catholic Church caused it to embrace the Fascist cause by attempting to show that the needs of the Church in Nationalist-held Spain were such that diplomatic relations were required.⁷⁷ Rev. John LaFarge, associate editor of America, deemed it most unwise for America not to recognize Franco quickly and take the opportunity to urge upon him whatever was constructive and helpful, rather than view his emergence with reproach and suspicion.⁷⁸

In late January 1939, the Nationalists captured the Loyalist capital of Barcelona. Many of the people in Catalonia attempted to flee and the Republican government appeared to be in the process of dissolution. Serious fighting was limited to the area surrounding Madrid and Valencia.⁷⁹ Franco's continued successes were interpreted as signifying a regeneration of Spain and hence worthy of United States recognition.⁸⁰

⁷⁵Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 450-451.

⁷⁶Editors, "Comment", America, LVIII (May 28, 1938), p. 170.

⁷⁷Rev. James A. Magner, "The Church and Fascism", Commonweal, XXVIII (September 2, 1938), pp. 462-464.

⁷⁸Rev. John LaFarge, "While Spain Burns They Strum Impartially", America, LIX (August 20, 1938), pp. 462-463.

⁷⁹Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 573-575.

⁸⁰Editors, "American Recognition of Spain", America, LX (February 4, 1939), p. 421.

The recent attitudes of France and Great Britain toward Franco also added weight to American Catholic demands. France and Great Britain were blamed for needlessly prolonging the war in pursuance of selfish ends, but even they had realized the Nationalist victory and now sought Franco's favor.⁸¹ America considered it not only a duty, but also advantageous for the United States to proffer the hand of recognition and friendship to the victorious Franco.⁸²

Some prominent Catholic leaders who insisted on immediate recognition for the Nationalists included members of Congress. Representative John W. McCormack (D-Massachusetts) and Senators Dennis Chavez (D-New Mexico) and David I. Walsh (D-Massachusetts), were especially complimentary toward Franco. As did leaders within their Church, they expressed the view that the judgment of their fellow Americans had been clouded by Loyalist propaganda and that Franco's Nationalist movement had prevented a Communist take-over in Spain.⁸³ Of particular note were the remarks of Dr. Joseph B. Code, professor of History at Catholic University of America, inserted in the Congressional Record at the request of Senator Walsh. Dr. Code emphasized the wisdom and necessity of obtaining the friendship of the Spanish people by recognizing the fact that Franco's control extended to almost all of Spain. He also indicated that Spain's good will

⁸¹Editors, "Comment", America, LX (February 18, 1939), p. 459. France and Great Britain officially recognized Franco's government on February 27, 1939. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 590.

⁸²Editors, "Comment", America, LX (February 25, 1939), p. 482.

⁸³Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., LXXXIV (March 10, 1939), pp. 2569-2570; Congressional Record, 76th Sess., 1st Sess., LXXXIV (March 1, 1939), pp. 2056-2064; Extended Remarks of Senator David I. Walsh, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., LXXXIV (March 13, 1939), Appendix p. 962.

could be of assistance to the United States in obtaining cooperation from the Latin American countries in international affairs. Dr. Code's remarks may be considered representative of a segment of American Catholic opinion in that they combined motives of national self-interest and a confidence in Franco's new Spain.⁸⁴

As the probability of recognition drew nearer, America expressed annoyance at the likelihood that United States recognition of Franco's government be contingent upon the granting of clemency to the Loyalists. It stated that although requests for clemency were proper, demands for the same called for a surrender of national sovereignty. America held that moral law alone obligated the state to punish "those malefactors who have inflicted terror, cruelty and privation upon its citizens."⁸⁵

Ambassador Claude G. Bowers was believed responsible for President Roosevelt's "unreasonable" delay in granting recognition to the Nationalists. Roosevelt had been reported to have categorized Franco as another totalitarian dictator like Hitler and Mussolini. Bowers was said to have relied on Loyalist informants, thus having communicated distorted facts to the President.⁸⁶ American Catholic leaders at last obtained satisfaction on April 1, 1939, three days after the final ending of the Civil War, when the United States officially recognized Francisco

⁸⁴Extended Remarks of Senator David I. Walsh, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., LXXXIV (March 13, 1939), Appendix p. 962. See also remarks of Rev. Joseph F. Thorning in New York Times, March 20, 1939.

⁸⁵Editors, "Comment", America, LX (March 4, 1939), p. 506.

⁸⁶Editors, "Comment", America, LX (March 25, 1939), p. 578. Although Ambassador Bowers was known to be strongly pro-Loyalist and had often circumvented normal diplomatic channels to reach President Roosevelt directly, there is no evidence to suppose that he did not use all the available information at his disposal. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 47, 93, 204.

Franco's Nationalist regime.⁸⁷

American Catholic opinion rejected both the legality and constitutionality of the Loyalist government. They allied themselves in large part with the aims and achievements of Franco's Nationalists. Such a cast of mind precluded the possibility of a less than rigid view toward the maintenance of American neutrality legislation and most important, the preservation of the embargo. Only in the last year of the war did they consider altering America's neutrality policy, and then solely with the view of accommodating Franco's victorious regime.

⁸⁷Department of State, Press Releases, XX, April 1, 1939.

CHAPTER III

THE CHURCH MEETS ITS CRITICS

The Protestant Churches

An examination of the response to its foremost critics may provide further understanding of American Catholic opinion on the Spanish Civil War. The liberal commitment on the part of many Protestant leaders plus the haunting obsession of the Catholic Church with the suffering of their brethren in Spain and the threat of international Communism, form the backdrop for their clashing attitudes toward the Spanish conflict. In the 1930's Christian commentary in the United States on foreign affairs was clamorously idealistic; consequently the vast complications surrounding the war tended to be reduced in terms of Democracy versus Fascism or Democracy versus Communism.

The plight of the Republic of Spain had engaged the sympathies of eminent liberal Protestants. They were very much disturbed by the animosity of American Catholic leaders toward the Loyalists. Furthermore, they regarded Catholic appeals to support Franco as pro-Fascist inclinations. Protestants, like the majority of Americans, were dedicated to an uncompromising neutralism on the Spanish situation which neither anti-Communism nor the exhortations of radical liberals could alter in any way.¹ Many Protestants therefore resented any undue Catholic influence

¹Editors, "America Must Preserve Her Neutrality", Christian Century, LIII (December 30, 1936), pp. 1741-1742.

favoring the Nationalist cause.² They suggested instead that American Catholic leadership pursue a course independent from the positions taken by the Spanish Church and the Vatican.³

When Reinhold Niebuhr (of Union Theological Seminary) clearly denounced the Spanish Church, it proved to be a strong opening salvo in a series of heated exchanges between Catholics and Protestants. Niebuhr contended that:

...the hierarchy and the priests of the Spanish Church have been in intimate league with landlordism, monarchism, and reaction in Spain not only before but after the Revolution. The Church in Spain is, in other words, a political instrument, and one which is committed without reservation.⁴

While most Protestants may not have been quite so stern in their disapproval toward Catholicism in Spain, they clearly believed Franco's Nationalists to be Fascist and would under no circumstance consider joining a proposed Catholic anti-Communist crusade led by the Vatican.⁵

American Catholics would often assert that Protestant thought on the Spanish question stemmed from sheer ignorance or a deep anti-Catholic bias that fed on Loyalist propaganda. They were especially sensitive to Protestant charges of sympathy or alliance with Fascism. In direct reply to Niebuhr and other Protestant critics, Michael Williams stated a principle often reiterated by American Catholics throughout the Spanish

²Dr. Guy Emery Shipler, "Fascist Control of the Films", Christian Century, LIII (December 30, 1936), p. 1755.

³E. T. Buehrer, "Congregational Clergy Oppose Catholic Position on Spain", Christian Century, LIV (March 3, 1937), p. 296; Bradford Young, "John Haynes Holmes Warns Hierarchy", Christian Century, LVI (January 25, 1939), p. 132.

⁴Reinhold Niebuhr, "Arrogance in the Name of Christ", Christian Century, LIII (September 2, 1936), p. 1157.

⁵Editors, "Shall Protestants Accept the Pope's Invitation?", Christian Century, LIII (November 25, 1936), pp. 1550-1552.

War: "That [Catholic] policy is not allied with Fascism; it is not allied with any secular absolutism, nor can it be, for it serves God alone instead of man, and bows down to no idols made by men".⁶ Rev. John A. O'Brien, a noted American priest, answered the Christian Century which had previously opposed the entry of Protestants into the Pope's anti-Communist crusade because of Catholicism's suspected sympathy with Fascism. He said, "The editors of the Christian Century need have no fear that the Church is secretly in sympathy with Fascism or with anything but the continued perfection of the democratic ideal to which we in America are committed".⁷ O'Brien felt that the Church was actually opposed to both Communism and Fascism, but that the former's incessant war on religion resulted in its being singled out for the Church's strongest attack.⁸

The first principal occasion for dispute between the Churches in America resulted from the tragic bombing of Guernica on April 26, 1937. The destruction of this small Basque town became a subject of international controversy.⁹ The quarrel was initiated by an appeal to the "world's conscience" by Bishop Francis J. McConnell of the Methodist Episcopal Church and chairman of the North American Committee to Aid Spanish

⁶Michael Williams, "The Policy of Catholicism", Commonweal, XXV (February 12, 1937), pp. 423-426.

⁷Rev. John A. O'Brien, "Fighting for Social Justice", Commonweal, XXVI (May 28, 1937), p. 119.

⁸Ibid., p. 118.

⁹Guernica was savagely destroyed and its populace machinegunned by German aircraft. The only important question remaining to be answered is whether its destruction was ordered by General Mola of the Nationalists, or whether the Germans acted independently. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 419-420. In the United States, Secretary Hull protested against the indiscriminate bombing of civilians. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, p. 127.

Democracy. The appeal had been signed by seventy-six leading American clergymen, congressmen, professors, writers, and other notables condemning the raid on Guernica. It was then sent to 5,000 ministers of all faiths throughout the United States with the request that it be read from the pulpits.¹⁰ On reviewing the Guernica affair, editors of the Catholic World expressed dismay at the indignation of American Protestant ministers who so willingly signed this document of protest but found no fault "with the undeniable atrocities committed by the Loyalists" and who "cannot see Soviet sponsored cruelties". They felt that both sides should be blamed, not just Franco's Nationalists.¹¹ Rev. Joseph F. Thorning, speaking at a meeting of the American Catholic Historical Society, told his audience that the news of Guernica had been another striking example of false Loyalist propaganda.¹²

A consequence of the ruthless warfare being waged in Spain was a suggestion of peace proposals made by the Federal Council of Churches in America. Catholics however, believed that in the case of Spain the issue must be determined by force since only a victory by the Nationalists could ensure peace with any guarantee of permanency. They expressed confidence in Franco's future dealings with enemies and predicted that he would act in a generous Christian manner when building a new Spain.¹³

The most serious quarrel among Protestant and Catholic leaders

¹⁰New York Times, May 10, 1937; Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., Bombing of Guernica in Spain, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), Appendix pp. 1225-1226.

¹¹Editors, "The Real Problem in Spain", Catholic World, CXLV (June, 1937), pp. 260-261.

¹²New York Times, December 30, 1937.

¹³Editors, "Spanish Peace Proposals", Commonweal, XXVI (July 30, 1937), pp. 333-334.

developed over a joint pastoral letter prepared by the Spanish Catholic hierarchy justifying the Franco rebellion. The pastoral letter rendered the following reasons for its publication: (1) the real truth of Spain's plight was so obscured by ignorance that the Church must speak out in the name of spiritual and human justice; (2) the war itself must be understood as an irreconcilable struggle between morality, justice, religion, and the alien ideologies that came with the proclaiming of the Spanish Republic in 1931; (3) even though the evils of war are realized, its prosecution must go on, and though the Church disdains any part in provoking the war, it recognizes itself as the chief victim and claims the right to defensive resistance; (4) Franco's military rebellion must be considered as an armed plebiscite against a Soviet-directed Communist revolution; (5) the Church denies the lies and historical distortions made against her, particularly that she is on the side of the rich. Thus did Spanish Catholic leadership (excepting the Basque clergy) provide theological sanction for the Nationalist cause.¹⁴

Although no official declaration of support was issued from the Vatican, the New York Times speculated that Cardinal Goma, the first signatory to the pastoral letter, would scarcely have so acted without prior consultation with Rome. The Times also had been informed by various prelates that there was nothing in the pastoral letter contradictory to the views of the Vatican.¹⁵

American Catholics immediately and resolutely upheld the principles outlined in the joint pastoral letter by the Spanish bishops. They

¹⁴New York Times, September 3, 1937; Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, pp. 450-451.

¹⁵New York Times, September 3, 1937.

agreed that the conflict was one involving irreconcilable ideologies and that Franco must rescue Christianity and civilized society.¹⁶ It was urged that the Spanish letter be distributed to every American Catholic parish.¹⁷

After a month of silence, the Spanish pastoral letter was denounced in a circular prepared under the direction of Dr. Guy Emery Shipler, editor of the Churchman, an independent Episcopal journal. Herein were listed the signatures of one hundred and fifty Protestant leaders of various denominations and professions, among whom were Bishop James Chamberlain Baker, a Methodist; Bishop Robert L. Paddock, an Episcopalian and president of the American Friends to Aid Spanish Democracy; and the Reverend Harry Emerson Fosdick. Among the main points expressed were the following: (1) the Spanish hierarchy had shown its contempt for principles of popular government, freedom of worship, and separation of Church and State; (2) most Catholics do not share the opinions of the Spanish hierarchy and should be encouraged freely to communicate their own views on the subject; (3) the war is "a clear conflict between the forces of democracy and social progress on the one hand and the forces of special privilege and their Fascist allies on the other". Protestant leaders further wondered if the ideas set forth by the Spanish bishops had the approval of the American hierarchy itself, for the fact remained that as yet "no leaders of the Catholic Church in America have raised their voices in repudiation of the position taken by the Spanish hierarchy".¹⁸

¹⁶Editors, "The Spanish Bishops", Commonweal, XXVI (September 11, 1937), pp. 530-531; Editors, "Pastoral Letter of the Spanish Bishops", Catholic World, CXLVI (October, 1937), pp. 107-108.

¹⁷Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (September 11, 1937), p. 530.

¹⁸New York Times, October 4, 1937.

There was no immediate official reply or comment from the American hierarchy to this Protestant challenge, but within forty-eight hours four prominent American Catholics came to the defense of the Spanish bishops, thus helping to indicate the Catholic reaction. The Reverend Francis X. Talbot, editor of America, led off with a remonstrance against the signers, accusing them of a "perverted attempt to link Catholicism with undemocratic and un-American principles" and claiming that their Loyalist sympathies were based on misinformation and lying propaganda.¹⁹ The Reverend John LaFarge, associate editor of America, said that the signers must have been ignorant of the facts or else "they would realize the reasonableness and logic of the Spanish Bishops' letter".²⁰ John J. O'Conner, acting managing editor of Commonweal, declared that the signers must have been "hoodwinked completely" if they believed that the Spanish conflict was one pitting progress against special privilege. O'Conner also expressed astonishment because the signers were confused as to the American Catholic stand on this matter. He referred them to the editorials of the American Catholic press, where he assured them it would be amply explained.²¹ The most vigorous reply in defense of the pastoral letter came from Monsignor Michael J. Ready, General-Secretary of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, who claimed that the assertions contained in the Protestant circular were "nothing more than a rehash of irresponsible charges long since discredited."²²

¹⁹New York Times, October 5, 1937.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²New York Times, October 6, 1937.

Further doubt on the American Catholic attitude shrank immeasurably when a few days later, one hundred and seventy-five leading Roman Catholic clergymen and laymen made a public statement defending Franco's efforts, thus by implication further substantiating the views of the Spanish hierarchy. The signers represented virtually all known Catholic newspapers and periodicals published in the United States and included a large number of the higher clergy and educators as well. In similar vein to the Spanish Bishops' letter, it expressed the following convictions: (1) Franco was not a Fascist, nor was he ensnared in a Fascist alliance; (2) Franco acted on behalf of the principles of religious freedom and civil liberty; (3) Franco's Nationalists forestalled the establishment of a Communist dictatorship in Spain; (4) accounts of Rebel atrocities were largely Loyalist propaganda.²³ The question of endorsement on behalf of the American hierarchy was referred to as follows:

This Catholic body is a carefully chosen cross-section and represents the rank and file leaders of Catholicism in the United States. Undoubtedly if it had been consulted, the American hierarchy would have endorsed the reply. The Bishops of the United States have confidence in the one hundred and seventy-five signatories and permitted them to express the Catholic answer to the bitter assault of the Protestant signatories.²⁴

One may thus conclude that the Catholic reply to the Protestant letter received at least the tacit approval of the American hierarchy.

On November 18, 1937, two months after the statement of the Catholic leaders, the American Catholic hierarchy itself addressed a message of complete support and sympathy to the Spanish Bishops.²⁵ It read as

²³New York Times, October 14, 1937. For the names and positions of the 175 Catholic Leaders, consult Appendix.

²⁴Editors, "Comment", America, LVIII (October 23, 1938), p. 50.

²⁵Rev. Raphael M. Huber, Our Bishops Speak, pp. 219-221; Editors, "The American Hierarchy", Commonweal, XXVII (December 3, 1937), p. 143.

follows:

In your effort we want you to know that in common with the Catholic bishops of the world we stand beside you and thank you for your clear, calm, dignified statement on the condition of the Church in Spain. Without leaving your field of action as the pastors of the flocks given to your care, you have done a great service by your pastoral letter. The very restraint of its wording and its clear statement of facts by qualified witnesses, gives the lie to the assertions of propagandists of atheistic systems and should compel all right-thinking men to appreciate your work for all men and thank you for high courage and resolution.... As Americans we owe you a great debt of gratitude. In our Far south, South-west, and West there still is told the story of the heroic Spanish priests and friars who did a work which is part of our national glory. Once before, the hierarchy of Spain helped to save the Western world from the menace of Islamism. God grant that once again you may be a powerful force to stem the tide of atheism, translated into social language and disguised with diabolical ingenuity!²⁶

The statement of the one hundred and seventy-five Catholic leaders and the message from the hierarchy to the Spanish bishops, illustrates the attitude of the American Catholic Church toward the Spanish conflict. It is also noteworthy that their apologies are a good composite of those arguments advanced by prominent individual Catholics throughout the Civil War.

The last major dispute between American Catholics and Protestants followed the news of the severe around-the-clock bombings of Barcelona in March 1938. Seventeen air raids at three-hourly intervals affected all parts of the city. The fierceness of these bombings caused consternation all over the world.²⁷

²⁶The message was signed for the hierarchy by Emmet M. Walsh, Bishop of Charleston and Dennis Dougherty, Archbishop of Philadelphia. Rev. Raphael M. Huber, Our Bishops Speak, p. 221.

²⁷Barcelona was the site for "terror" raids ordered directly by Mussolini. At least 1300 were killed and 2000 injured. Military targets did not appear to be the objectives. There is evidence that Franco knew nothing of the character of these bombings. On hearing of them he

In America, sixty-one Episcopal and Methodist Episcopal Bishops representing Churches in thirty-six states, directly appealed to the American Catholic hierarchy to "bring the might of your influence to bear on General Franco in an effort to prevent further bombing of non-combatants in Spain". Bishop Robert L. Paddock made public this letter which included among its signers Bishop Henry St. George Tucker of the Episcopal Church and Bishop Francis J. McConnell of the Methodist Episcopal Church.²⁸ Most Catholics were silent on this latest open letter by the Protestants, though many of them believed that Protestants were too one-sided in their solicitude for the Spanish people and that left-wing propaganda prevented them from receiving news of atrocities perpetrated by the Loyalists.

William Cardinal O'Connell of Boston and Patrick Cardinal Hayes of New York flatly refused to believe that Franco was capable of such savagery and admonished the American people generally for their pro-Loyalist tendencies.²⁹ But it was Dr. Joseph F. Thorning, well known Catholic educator-priest and staunch crusader for Franco, who severely criticized the Protestant bishops for their action. He brusquely set aside the concerns of the bishops who, in his opinion, were being made "the unwitting allies of the atheistic, anarchistic, communistic, elements

ordered their immediate suspension. In the United States, Secretary Cordell Hull expressed his distress on behalf of the American people. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 523-524. See also, statement issued by Secretary Hull on March 21, 1938, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, pp. 165-166.

²⁸New York Times, March 21, 1938, p. 14; Bradford Young, "Protestant Bishops Appeal to Catholics in Spain", Christian Century, LV (March 30, 1937), p. 412.

²⁹New York Times, March 19, 1938; New York Times, March 24, 1938.

in the United States and Spain".³⁰

American Catholicism and American Protestantism were quite conscious of their diversity in attitudes toward the Spanish Civil War. Protestants contended that Catholic leadership was the sole bloc support for Franco in the United States.³¹ Catholics pointed to the harmony of views among the editors of Protestant journals whose fear of a "Fascist" victory in Spain blinded them to the possibility of a Communist conquest.³² A recurring theme of American Catholic criticism was that Protestants willingness forsook and outraged Christian fellowship by accepting the anti-Christian propaganda served by the Communists.³³

The American Press

The reporting of news regarding the Spanish Civil War reflected a preoccupation with ideological considerations. The impulse to take sides seemed irresistible. Some journalistic writings were brilliantly done in that they contained facts along with color, drama, and a sense of the great tragedy that denotes civil war. Most, however, incorporated sufficient inaccuracies to deserve no better than inclusion in the category of propaganda.³⁴ Attempted coverage of the Spanish Civil War introduced

³⁰Bradford Young, "Bishops Attacked for Appeal to Pope", Christian Century, LV (April 16, 1938), p. 440.

³¹D. A. Saunders, "Liberals and Catholic Action", Christian Century, LIV (October 20, 1937), p. 1295.

³²Editors, "Comment", America, LIX (May 7, 1938), p. 98.

³³Rev. Wilfrid Parsons, "Tailor-Made Lies", Catholic Digest, I (September, 1937), pp. 33-34; B. L. Masse, "Christian Liberals - To Whom are they Allied?", America, LIX (June 11, 1938), pp. 226-227.

³⁴Ralph D. Casey, "Pressure Groups and the Press", in N. C. Meir and H. W. Saunders, The Polls and Public Opinion (New York: Henry Holt Co., 1949), p. 132; O. W. Riegal, "Press, Radio, and the Spanish Civil War", Public Opinion Quarterly, I (January, 1937), pp. 131-134. See also Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 235-236.

into the United States a host of press services, both official and unofficial, each one attached to either Nationalist or Loyalist Propaganda bureaus. Consequently, suspicion of bias in news reports caused indignation among certain groups.³⁵

With few exceptions, American Catholic leaders subjected the American press to a severe barrage of criticism throughout the Spanish conflict. They were highly critical of the American press for what they considered a deliberate failure in reporting the facts and the falsification of issues surrounding the conflict. They agreed with the Pope that the news of Spain was saturated with "persistent and most astute propaganda".³⁶

The attacks directed against the American press were generally of the nature recorded in a statement by the Rev. John A. Toomey, associate editor of America (and later to lead a Catholic press counter-offensive). It read as follows:

The American Press has aimed a mortal thrust at the very esse being of the Church in Spain...From the very inception of the Spanish War, American newspapers have misrepresented the situation in Spain...American newspapers have employed every artifice known to propagandists to paint the Red clique as though it were not a Red clique, but a band of simple, innocent lovers of democracy. The American Press has deliberately played down the murder of priests and nuns, the burning of

³⁵The two principal propaganda agencies in the United States which pertained to the Spanish Civil War were: the Peninsula News Service Incorporated, which identified the Loyalists with Communism, and the Spanish Information Bureau which was pro-Loyalist. Both were situated in New York City. See Louis Minsky, "Propaganda Bureaus as 'News Services'", Public Opinion Quarterly, II (October, 1938), pp. 677-678.

³⁶Editors, "The Pontiff Prays for Spain", America, LV (September 26, 1936), p. 589; Rev. Wilfrid Parsons, "Tailor-Made Lies", Catholic Digest, I (September, 1937), pp. 33-34; Rev. Joseph F. Thorning, "Why the Press Failed on Spain", Catholic World, CXLVI (December, 1937), pp. 289-291; Edward H. Knoblaugh, "The Loyalist Propaganda Machine", Catholic World, CXLVI (January, 1938), pp. 479-481. Of the above, only Knoblaugh had been a correspondent in Spain.

churches, and the assault on religion. It has done everything to aid the Spanish Reds and consequently everything it could to destroy the Catholic Church in Spain.³⁷

These reasons had also been the principal ones that prompted Michael Williams, editor of Commonweal, to charge the entire American press with unethical journalism.³⁸

General condemnations of the press often reached shrill proportions, as the above and following representative declarations reveal:

Examine the newspaper reporting of the Civil War in Spain. Never since the World War has our American Press exploited falsehood to such an extent, and never has it permitted itself to be exploited so meretriciously.... American editors with few exceptions have failed to present squarely what facts they have been given. They have distorted the Spanish facts, they have suppressed the Spanish facts, and they have misled the American newspaper readers.³⁹

The American Press is being sabotaged from within its rapidly crumbling walls by a miscellaneous set of radical fanatics, radical rascals, and congenital ignoramuses or treacherous 'foreign correspondents', and a riff-raff of badly educated, underpaid and miserably mistreated 'reporters'....⁴⁰

American Catholics were angry and dissatisfied with what was clearly generalized as "the American Press" for the same reason as that which underlay criticism of American Protestantism - a resentment of the manner in which the Loyalists were viewed as a threatened democracy while Franco's

³⁷Rev. Mr. Toomey's remarks dealt with the American press as a whole. His specific mention of the New York World Telegram and Associated Press were only meant as illustrations. John A. Toomey, "Pointing a Finger at Press Propaganda", America, LVIII (November 6, 1937), pp. 105-106.

³⁸Michael Williams, "Open Letter to Leaders of the American Press on Spain", Commonweal, XXVI (May 7, 1937), pp. 33-37. In a later article under the same heading, Williams named the following New York newspapers as untruthful in their reports on Spain: Times, Herald Tribune, Post, and World Telegram. See Commonweal (June 4, 1937), pp. 151-153.

³⁹Editors, "Comment", America, LVI (April 3, 1937), p. 602.

⁴⁰Michael Williams, "The Truth About Spain", Commonweal, XXVI (May 28, 1937), p. 113.

Nationalists were denounced as Fascists. They expressed great indignation toward the Associated Press who they believed foisted the term "Fascist" on all Spaniards who opposed the Loyalists. That Fascists did exist in Nationalist ranks was admitted, but that they dominated Franco's armies was stoutly denied.⁴¹ The guilt of American newspapers in exaggerating the role of Italians and Germans in Nationalist victories was also believed to have further associated Franco's forces with European Fascism in the minds of its readers.⁴² This proved particularly galling when one noted the conspicuous silence regarding French aid to Loyalist Spain.⁴³ Among the number of unfounded rumors which American Catholics claimed originated from the American press, the ones that rankled them most were those intimating that Franco was veering toward a formal Fascist alignment with Hitler and Mussolini. Such reports were believed to be the epitome of irresponsible journalism, for accounts of this nature would naturally be of utmost concern to Americans, who were not anxious to see any greater widening of totalitarianism in Europe.⁴⁴

Most American Catholic spokesmen strongly opposed any suggestion from the American press that Loyalist sentiment pervaded Spain, and that

⁴¹Editors, "Comment", America, LVI (October 17, 1936), p. 26. United Press and Associated Press, the two largest news syndicates, used the terms "Spanish Government Forces" and "Insurgents" when referring to the Loyalists and Nationalists respectively. Individual newspapers altered the dispatches and substituted the epithets "Red" or "Fascist". Well-known newspapers such as the New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, Washington Post, and New Orleans Times-Picayune, did consistently refer to the Nationalists as "Fascists". On the other hand, the Catholic press and the Hearst press referred to the Loyalists as "Red" or "Communist". See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 117-118.

⁴²Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (May 15, 1937), pp. 122-123.

⁴³Editors, "Comment", America, LIX (April 16, 1938), p. 26.

⁴⁴Editors, "Comment", America, LX (March 4, 1939), p. 507.

Franco's rebellion had been a transgression on Spanish democracy. They seemed more in accordance with E. R. Pineda of Commonweal who reported that "the immense majority in Spain is with Franco despite statistical calculations, despite the reports of experts, and the observations of distinguished writers and correspondents. Developments will show that the strength and universality of Catholicism are determining factors in Spanish life".⁴⁵ American Catholic displeasure increased when it was reported that the American Newspaper Guild had passed an anti-Franco resolution with only minor opposition. In order to accentuate its differences with the Guild, Commonweal quoted part of the resolution--"The American Newspaper Guild realizing that Fascism must be defeated in Spain to halt the anti-labor forces in their lawless attacks on freedom and democracy, hereby registers its vigorous protest against these anti-labor, anti-democratic forces to prevent their ascendancy here and extends its support and encouragement to the heroic people of Spain, who are now offering their lives in defense of organized labor and democracy."⁴⁶ Commonweal's deprecation of the American Newspaper Guild's position is a good example of American Catholic Welfare Conference's exasperation with the supposed naiveté of the American Press on the matter of Loyalist "democracy".

The subjects of atrocities and bombings of defenseless civilians by the Nationalists, principally those of Guernica and Barcelona, were

⁴⁵E. R. Pineda, "Is Spain With the Loyalists?", Commonweal, XXVI (May 21, 1937), p. 91.

⁴⁶Michael Williams, "The Truth About Spain", p. 231. The American Newspaper Guild was a union labor organization whose main purpose was to act as a collective bargaining agency for its members. Founded in December 1933, it had delegates from thirty leading cities and proxites from twenty-three others. See Frank L. Mott, American Journalism (New York: Macmillan Co., 1950), p. 677.

issues that had plagued Catholic-Protestant relations and which also occasioned disputes between American Catholics and the American press. It was said that the American press had acquired a false notion of the events at Guernica due to acceptance without verification of news releases by the Valencia government. America declared the stories of Guernica being gutted by a Nationalist air-raid to be a brazen lie, and that further investigations two days later had shown Basque Communist auxiliaries to have dynamited the city when forced to retreat before advancing Nationalist columns.⁴⁷ Gault MacGowan, writing in Commonweal, agreed and stated that reports of neutral military experts proved the destruction of Guernica to be the work of Communist incendiaries and not of Franco's airforce.⁴⁸ America later accepted the findings of Merwin K. Hart, President of the New York State Economic Council, as final. While admitting the presence of Franco's airforce at Guernica, Hart's report asserted that the targets had been limited to a half dozen buildings and affirmed that nearly all the ruin had been caused by the Loyalists before evacuation.⁴⁹

Reports of bombardments by Nationalists on Loyalist towns, including that of Barcelona, were believed to have been given deliberate coloring

⁴⁷Editors, "Comment", America, LVII (May 15, 1937), p. 123. The "Basque Communist dynamiters" interpretation has since been proven false. One of numerous conflicting statements released by the office of Nationalist propaganda at Salamanca, attributed the totality of destruction of Guernica to the storage of dynamite in the town's sewers by its defenders. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 420.

⁴⁸Gault MacGowan, "Red Vulture of the Pyrenees", Commonweal, XXVII (February 18, 1938), p. 459. Mr. MacGowan does not identify the neutral military experts in question.

⁴⁹Editors, "Comment", America, LX (November 19, 1938), p. 147. Merwin K. Hart was one of the leading organizers of pro-Franco activity in the United States. See Guttman, Wound in the Heart, pp. 21-22.

by American journalism. For example, America pondered "Why the bombing of defenseless towns and villages by the British government in India should be relegated to inside-page news without a head, and similar airplane raids on the Spanish peninsula, especially of the Loyalist towns, to the front page with headlines, is difficult to justify".⁵⁰ Catholics made no attempt to justify any possible use of aerial bombings or atrocities as weapons to terrorize the Loyalists into submission. Rather, they contended that Franco's forces had restricted their objectives to military targets.⁵¹ In turn however, they denounced the American press as: "Bogus lovers of freedom who howled at alleged horrors in Franco's Spain, but felt no righteous spasm at undeniable atrocities in Negrin's or Caballero's Spain".⁵²

American Catholics claimed accuracy and lack of bias in their reporting of the Spanish Civil War. The events surrounding the fall of Barcelona, and the strife existent among the Loyalist defenders during the last days of the Madrid government, appeared to them to vindicate their continued efforts to call attention to the presence of Communism as the directing force behind the Loyalists and to the fictional nature of the democratic republic.

The campaign in Catalonia, lasting from December 1938 to February 1939, heralded the end of the Spanish Civil War. Barcelona fell on January 25, 1939.⁵³ The collapse of the Loyalist armies which led up

⁵⁰Editors, "Comment", America, LVIII (March 5, 1938), p. 506.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Editors, "Getting Wise to Fascism", Catholic World, CXLIX (April, 1939), p. 1. Since most American journalists were pro-Loyalist, they minimized the atrocities committed by the Loyalist side. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 118-128; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 247fn.

⁵³Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 565-573.

to the surrender of Barcelona was particularly revealing to American Catholic opinion. For example, Gault MacGowan stated: "The fall of Barcelona has brought down with a crash the carefully constructed propaganda of the Marxist emissaries that has dictated for so long the Spanish news picture".⁵⁴ The American press, which just prior to Franco's entry had praised the city as solidly Loyalist, had been proven wrong as Barcelona greeted Franco's armies with unreserved enthusiasm. Franco's reception was then understood to be "A convincing answer to the lies and other types of calumnious propaganda offered to the newspaper-reading public in regard to the Spanish Nationalists and General Franco".⁵⁵

The final phase of the Spanish Civil War comprised what Hugh Thomas and other scholars have termed "the civil war within the Civil War". This centered around the question of continued struggle against the Nationalists and marked the passing of the resistance movement in Madrid to Communist control.⁵⁶ Some Catholics were confident that the revelation of the Communist role in prolonging the war would cast aside any lingering pretension that the Loyalist government was the democratic republic so often alleged by the American press.⁵⁷ Commonweal quoted the New York World Telegram in support of what they believed would result in

⁵⁴Gault MacGowan, "Festering Barcelona as the Stooge of Stalin", America, LX (February 11, 1939), p. 439.

⁵⁵Editors, "Barcelona Again Returns to Spain", America, LX (February 11, 1939), p. 435. Actually, Franco's army entered a city of "silent and empty streets". At least a half million persons had escaped to the North. Only a small minority of the citizens of Barcelona (those who had secretly supported the Nationalist cause) gave Franco a joyful reception. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 573.

⁵⁶Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 596.

⁵⁷Editors, "Who's Red Now?", Commonweal, XXIX (March 24, 1939), p. 591.

a revisionist attitude on the part of the discredited American press:
 "...when impartial history comes to be written it will almost certainly record that Spain's democratic republic was crushed from within rather than by Franco's forces from without".⁵⁸

The American Catholic dissatisfaction toward the secular press included such leading newspapers as the New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Washington Post, Philadelphia Record, and the New Orleans Times-Picayune.⁵⁹ The New York Times, (with the noted exception of W. P. Carney) although admitted for the most part to be the best newspaper in the United States, was particularly criticized for its unfair editorials on Franco. It was especially reprovved for misrepresenting the Guernica affair and exaggerating the role of foreign troops in the Nationalist armies.⁶⁰ Herbert L. Matthews and Lawrence A. Fernsworth (a Catholic), were singled out as little more than spokesmen

⁵⁸"Impartial history" grants that internal strife was the chief factor in the defeat of the Loyalists. It no longer readily accepts the idea that foreign intervention in itself was decisive. But historians also recognize the fact that it was the Non-Intervention policy which impelled the Republic to increasing reliance on Soviet aid. In turn, foreign influence not only altered the nature of the war, but operated most unevenly on the two sides. While Franco ably retained a uniquely Spanish character in his Nationalist movement, the Loyalists became prey to a relentless Communist dominance which gradually undermined their unity. What good the Communists may have gained for the Loyalists in military efficiency, they lost for them by perverting their cause. See Frank P. Chambers, Age of Conflict (New York: Harcourt, Brace World Inc., 1962), pp. 420-421, 423-424; H. Stuart Hughes, Contemporary Europe (New York: Prentice Hall Inc., 1961), pp. 289, 292-293; Payne, Falange, p. 194; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 610-614.

⁵⁹Rev. John A. Toomey, "Press Propaganda Tinctures the News", America, LVIII (December 11, 1937), pp. 225-226. The editors of Catholic Action of the South warned the New Orleans Times-Picayune that its pro-Loyalist sympathies were offensive to Catholics. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, p. 151.

⁶⁰Rev. John A. Toomey, "Press Propaganda Tinctures the News", America, LVIII (December 11, 1937), pp. 225-226.

for the Loyalist government whose accounts appeared ridiculous when compared with later dispatches by the United Press and other wire services.⁶¹

Two Catholics, W. P. Carney of the New York Times and Edward H. Knoiblaugh of the Associated Press, were among the few noted journalists who earned American Catholic approval. Carney was said to have caused such discomfiture on the part of American "liberals" that distribution of reprints of his articles was refused by the Times so as not to alienate the large body of its Loyalist sympathizers. Knoiblaugh received praise for exposing the workings of Loyalist propaganda.⁶²

American Catholics expressed dismay over the attempts of the liberal weeklies, Nation and New Republic, to label the Church as pro-Fascist. In particular, they accused Leo Lehmann of the Nation and George Seldes of the New Republic of irresponsible journalism.⁶³ The Nation was said to have endeavored to link the American hierarchy itself with Fascism, thus engendering distrust in Catholic leadership for reasons utterly unfounded in fact.⁶⁴ Michael Williams' succinct retort to the liberal press's associating of Catholicism with Fascism was solidly representative of basic American Catholic opinion. He replied to these allegations in the following terms: Fascist regimes grant the

⁶¹Editors, "Comment", America, LVIII (March 26, 1938), p. 579; New York Times, June 25, 1939.

⁶²Michael Williams, "The Truth About Spain", p. 153. Father Joseph Thorring also had a high regard for Carney and Knoiblaugh. After the Civil War, Carney received an award for distinguished journalism from the Knights of Columbus. See New York Times, December 30, 1937; New York Times, September 11, 1939.

⁶³Michael Williams, "News and Reviews", Commonweal, XXIX (December 30, 1938), p. 268.

⁶⁴Editors, "The 'Nation'", Citation of the "Commonweal", Commonweal, XXIX (January 20, 1939), pp. 336-337.

absolute minimum requirements of the Church - its existence as a living body; Fascism is not approved, but tolerated, because it tolerates the Church; a victory for Franco is desired in the interests of the Church since his defeat would entail the establishment of an anti-Catholic government.⁶⁵

American Catholics fully appreciated the power of the press as a means of influencing public opinion. Perturbed and irritated by what they believed to be a continuous stream of pro-Loyalist propaganda, they decided to apply corrective truths to some of the reported events of the Spanish Civil War. Their main purpose was to effect a united Catholic front toward the general American press.

The first call for counter-measures was in 1936 when Archbishop James Beckman of Dubuque pleaded for the establishment of a national Catholic daily newspaper in view of "the biased crusade against right and truth in the handling of the Spanish Civil War".⁶⁶ Frank H. Spearman, well-known Catholic author, also called attention to the necessity of a Catholic daily to controvert "America's Red Press".⁶⁷ Bishop John F. Noll, founding editor of America's most noted Catholic family paper, Our Sunday Visitor, wrote a pamphlet entitled "It is Happening Here" in which he encouraged Catholics to write their local newspapers expressing the Catholic view as occasions warranted. He designated these letter writing campaigners as "minute men".⁶⁸ Michael Williams published

⁶⁵Michael Williams, "News and Reviews", Commonweal, XXIX (November 18, 1938), pp. 99-100.

⁶⁶Editors, "Comment", America, LVIII (November 6, 1937), p. 98.

⁶⁷Rev. Frank H. Spearman, "They Must Not Get Away With It", America, LVI (November 21, 1936), p. 152.

⁶⁸Anthony Beck, "Minute Men", America, LVII (May 8, 1937), pp. 102-103.

another "Open Letter to Leaders of the American Press on Spain" in answer to what he deemed "biased and tendentious journalism". He relayed its contents to several hundred news agencies and newspapers in the United States and volunteered to guide them and furnish factual information on Spain. His endeavors, however, were largely ignored by the American press.⁶⁹

America's editorial staff assumed primary leadership in the attempt to dispel pro-Loyalist influence among members of the Catholic faith and beyond. The America press was notably active in this effort. One major attempt to augment its persuasiveness took place in the summer of 1937 when America sought and obtained a series of articles written by José Maria Gil Robles, the leading Spanish Catholic political figure before the Civil War. He was heralded as possessing "the clearest, most upright, noblest record of any statesman of Spain".⁷⁰ America considered his contribution to "constitute the most just and sanest analysis of the Spanish conflict yet published in the United States".⁷¹ Gil Robles' writings were largely mild-tempered reflections on interpretations of events and ideas long familiar to readers of the American Catholic press, but were, however, distinguished by the inclusion of descriptive proposals for a vertical type "organic democracy". This "organic democracy" for Spain was to be a Catholic corporate state deliberately differentiating it from a secular Fascism. America forwarded Gil Robles' articles

⁶⁹Michael Williams, "Open Letter to Leaders of the American Press on Spain", Commonweal, XXVI (May 7, 1937), p. 33.

⁷⁰José Maria Gil Robles was the former leader of the Acción Católica (Catholic Action) Party in Spain. He wrote the above mentioned articles from exile in Portugal. Editors, "Who's Who?", America, LVII (May 15, 1937), p. 121.

⁷¹Editors, "Notations", America, LVII (June 5, 1937), p. 193.

to more than one hundred newspapers in the United States, but Robles' efforts disappointingly received little or no attention.⁷²

In 1938 America translated the Nationalist government periodical Spain for its American Catholic readers. The Rev. Francis Connolly assumed the editorial direction of Spain, providing it with introductions by Franco himself, listing decrees and social legislation said to be already achieved, and otherwise devoting its pages entirely to the interests of Nationalist Spain.⁷³

1938 was also the year when American Catholic cooperation and organization markedly asserted itself. This success was achieved through the consolidation of press committees of many Catholic societies and agencies under the direction of America's Jesuit leader, the Rev. John A. Toomey. Toomey's view had been as follows:

For one and a half years we have stood helplessly by while American newspapers and magazines hurled mud at Spanish soldiers who were spilling their life-blood to keep our Church alive...with misinterpretations sailing about us day and night, our protests are relatively few and scattered... The objective of these committees is not to turn secular newspapers into Catholic newspapers but to turn them into truthful newspapers.⁷⁴

The general procedure established for the committees was to approach and negotiate with offending newspapers or magazines only when the question at issue was deemed to be a serious one.⁷⁵ To provide a working model, the first such committee went into operation in New York City. It was called the United Catholic Organization Press Relations Committee, New

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Editors, "Who's Who?", America, LVIII (February 5, 1938), p. 409; Editors, "Comment", America, LIX (August 6, 1938), p. 410.

⁷⁴Rev. John A. Toomey, "Catholic Cooperation Can Free Secular Press", America, LVIII (January 22, 1938), pp. 364-365.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 365.

York Division and consisted of separate sub-committees assigned to contact every daily newspaper in the metropolis.⁷⁶

Reports that Father Toomey had been besieged with requests from every section of the country to form press relations committees of their own, attracted the attention of Bishop John Mark Gannon of Erie, Pennsylvania. Bishop Gannon, also a vociferous foe of pro-Loyalist propaganda and chairman of the NWC Press Committee, (representing the nation's largest religious-interest news service) had independently created Press information Bureaus in every American diocese with a central office in Washington, D.C. He cordially welcomed Father Toomey's committees to serve as a major component in his organization. The United Catholic Organizations Press Relations Committee was then absorbed into Bishop Gannon's overall plan.⁷⁷

The work of Father Toomey and Bishop Gannon was believed to have successfully fulfilled the need for a permanent organization to represent Catholic interests before the American press. Father Toomey, in particular, regarded its growth as phenomenal since its beginnings eight months previously.⁷⁸

⁷⁶Among the first members of this Press Relations Committee were: New York Chapter of the Knights of Columbus, Catholic Daughters of America, National Catholic Alumni Federation, Guild of Catholic Physicians, Catholic Actors' Guild, Fordham Alumnae, Guild of Catholic Lawyers, and Catholic Public School Teachers of New York. John A. Toomey, "Planned Vigilance to Make the Press Fair", America, LVIII (March 26, 1938), pp. 583-584.

⁷⁷Editors, "Comment", America, LIX (July 30, 1938), p. 386.

⁷⁸Father Toomey claimed that Catholic press relations committees were active in such diverse localities as McAllen, Texas, Meadville, Pennsylvania, Berkeley, California, and Conneaut, Ohio. Rev. John A. Toomey, "Press Relations Group Wards Off Attacks on Church", America, LX (October 8, 1938), pp. 10-11. There have since been complaints against the American Catholic Church for having used unethical methods in exerting pressure on the American press during the Spanish Civil War. This

Dissent Within the Church

Though American Catholic thought never exhibited complete unanimity on the Spanish Civil War, dissenting opinion was on the whole politely ignored and did not appear to have caused the Church any undue embarrassment. The only occasion of marked concern to majority Catholic spokesmen was the change in editorial policy by Commonweal in June 1938.⁷⁹

At the outset of the war, some noted Catholics took issue with the "Communist-conspiracy" thesis as the principal cause of the Civil War. Instead, they blamed both the lack of social justice associated with former regimes and failure of positive action by the Church itself. They called attention to a shocking indifference to the papal encyclicals which expressly pertained to social justice in the context of the private ownership system - Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931). The Rev. Laurence K. Patterson, a Jesuit leader, also referred to the grievances of urban laborers and exploited peasants whose plight remained unrelieved by the exigencies of a ruthless capitalism and the unconcern of a selfish landed gentry.⁸⁰ The Rev. R.

includes a resort to censorship, economic boycotts, and direct pressure on individuals. For example see: Heinz Eulau, "Proselytizing in the Catholic Press", Public Opinion Quarterly, XI (Summer, 1947), pp. 189-196; James H. Nichols, Democracy and the Churches (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1951), p. 252, 260-262.

⁷⁹Taylor and Guttman have named prominent American Catholic dissenters (not mentioned in this study): Kathleen Norris, Anne Fremantle, Westbrook Pegler, and Shaemas O'Sheel. Among rank and file American Catholics, both Taylor and Guttman believe that polls showing at least 30% as pro-Loyalist is reasonably correct. Yet reliable polls also reveal Catholics as comprising the largest single majority supporting Franco. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 144, 152-153, 161fn; Guttman, Wound in the Heart, p. 50; Mildred Strunk, Public Opinion 1935-1936 (Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 808.

⁸⁰Rev. Laurence K. Patterson, "Right and Left Battle for Spain", America, LV (August 8, 1936), p. 413.

A. MacGowan, secretary of the NCWC, and Paul Kiniery, distinguished Catholic layman, expressed similar sentiments and demanded a future Spanish state based on social justice in the spirit of the social encyclicals.⁸¹ Monsignor John A. Ryan, considered the most liberal American Catholic leader of the time, was reported to have stated that Spanish Church leadership had long been allied with the enemies of social justice.⁸² The Christian Century understood this declaration to be illustrative of the fact that not all Catholic leaders were sympathetic to papal aims regarding Spain.⁸³ Rev. John A. O'Brien, one of America's outstanding priests, also claimed that the lack of Catholic leadership in social justice was a main cause for the Spanish crisis. He then urged a frank and honest acknowledgment of negligence by rulers of the Spanish Church.⁸⁴

During the progress of the war, dissenting Catholic opinion focused on General Francisco Franco. Commonweal's liberal policy of including diverse views permitted the largest dissemination of Catholic disagreement with the strong pro-Franco views expressed by most Catholics. However, the overall composition of Commonweal remained pro-Nationalist until late June of 1938. Interspersed within its pages were the noteworthy anti-

⁸¹Editors, "Catholic Leader Holds Injustice Responsible for Revolution", Christian Century, LIII (September 16, 1936), p. 1232; Paul Kiniery, "The Catholic Answer to Communism", Catholic World, CXLIV (October, 1936), pp. 659-660.

⁸²Editors, "Shall Protestants Accept the Pope's Invitation?", Christian Century, LIII (November 25, 1936), p. 1550.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Rev. John A. O'Brien, "Fighting for Social Justice", Commonweal, XXVI (June 4, 1937), pp. 148-150. O'Brien also quoted statements by Monsignor John A. Ryan, Rev. Wilfrid Parsons, and Rev. R. A. MacGowan in support of his point of view.

Franco opinions of Barbara Carter, George N. Shuster, and John A. O'Brien. Barbara Carter, an English Catholic author, offered reasons why she thought a large number of European Catholic leaders were against Franco's rebellion. She said that they denounced Franco's insurrection as a violation of Catholic moral theology and therefore could not condone his actions as part of a "Holy War". Furthermore, she herself could find no foundation for a rebellion that contradicted the precept of obedience to constituted authority.⁸⁵ George N. Shuster, a well-known Catholic apologist, strongly disagreed with those who were confident that Franco would inaugurate a beneficial and progressive social order and reminded Catholics: "...they cannot ignore the manifest brutality, reactionary political method, and intellectual simplicity of the Francoites".⁸⁶ The Rev. James A. Magner, a frequent contributor to Commonweal, voiced his apprehension of Franco and hoped that he would not establish an oppressive fascist-type state in the near future.⁸⁷ Commonweal was also an outlet for the ideas of Jacques Maritain, prominent French philosopher and theologian. In one article C. J. Eustace, noted Catholic author, equally perturbed as Maritain by the hysterical enthusiasm which they believed Franco's cause had engendered among so many Catholics, proceeded to outline Maritain's views on the alliance between Catholicism and Franco. They both agreed that this unfortunate alliance must not result in the endowment of Franco's cause with the providential and religious

⁸⁵Barbara Carter, "European Catholics and Spain", Commonweal, XXV (March 5, 1937), pp. 516-517.

⁸⁶George N. Shuster, "Some Reflections on Spain", Commonweal, XXV (April 2, 1937), pp. 625-626.

⁸⁷James A. Magner, "Alternatives in Spain", Commonweal, XXV (June 11, 1937), p. 175.

status of a Catholic crusade.⁸⁸

Few Catholic dissidents appeared to have received a direct response to their criticism by the majority of American Catholics. Barbara Carter and George N. Shuster were among those who did. America and Commonweal dismissed Miss Carter's views on the lack of European Catholic solidarity for Franco as resulting from the overuse of highly selective sources and false knowledge of moral theology. In refutation of Miss Carter's view, Bernard Grimley forwarded the traditional argument of the Catholic Church's moral right of self-defense against regimes that degenerate into tyrannies, inflicting long and continued injury on the Catholic community.⁸⁹ George N. Shuster's series of articles on Spain resulted in the first sharp dispute between America and Commonweal, the two leading American Catholic periodicals. America's criticism of Shuster's writings was plain - he knew much about Germany but too little about Spain, and had therefore misunderstood Spain due to his preoccupation with Nazi Germany. It further felt that acceptance of Shuster's ideas showed that Commonweal had fallen into the snares of propagandists.⁹⁰ Francis X. Talbot, senior editor of America, denied that Shuster's opinions indicated a possible split in American Catholic opinion on the Civil War. Talbot stated the Catholic position as follows:

Most American Catholic spokesmen have declared themselves uncompromisingly against the Leftist junta, now established in Valencia, and against the Communist-controlled

⁸⁸C. J. Eustace, "Maritain Looks at France", Commonweal, XXVII (February 4, 1938), pp. 402-404.

⁸⁹Editors, "Comment", America, LVI (March 13, 1937), pp. 530-531; Bernard Grimley, "European Catholics and Spain", Commonweal, XXV (March 19, 1937), p. 585.

⁹⁰Rev. Francis X. Talbot, "Some Reflections on the Spanish Situation", America, LVII (April 10, 1937), pp. 9-10.

government of Barcelona. They may not have accepted in its totality the side of Nationalist Spain, but they have unequivocally defended the right of Nationalist Spain to assert its claims, and with few exceptions, have admitted the justice of a recourse to arms.⁹¹

America repeatedly asserted that American Catholic opinion was vigorous and unified, with the exceptions of the "new" Commonweal and two minor journals - Catholic Worker and New World.⁹²

On June 24, 1938, without change in editorship, Commonweal declared to its readers: "...the information available is so generally characterized by propaganda that knowledge of the whole situation is impossible."⁹³ Its editors further notified them that it would adopt a new policy of "positive impartiality" so that both sides could be treated with sanity of judgment.⁹⁴ Commonweal then took this occasion to reprove Franco's regime despite his support of the Church, stating the following reasons: disregarding the Pope's protests, Franco bombed defenseless civilians; Franco's entourage were given utterance to totalitarian views similar to ones which the Church had already condemned in other countries; Franco's Fascist alliances with Germany and Italy were too deep and implicating.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 9.

⁹² Editors, "Comment", America, LVIII (October 23, 1937), p. 50; Editors, "Comment", America, LX (October 22, 1938), p. 51. The Catholic Worker was a small New York anarchist-pacifist journal. It proved to be the only pro-Loyalist Catholic periodical in the United States. The New World, official organ of the Chicago archdiocese, although expressing great sympathy for Catholics in Spain, favored neutrality toward Franco. See Taylor, United States and the Spanish Civil War, p. 155.

⁹³ Editors, "Civil War in Spain and the United States", Commonweal, XXVIII (June 24, 1938), p. 229. Michael Williams had been made special editor on April 15, 1938. No other changes in the magazine, personnel or otherwise, were reported. See Editors, "Editorial", Commonweal, XXVII (April 15, 1938), p. 673-674.

⁹⁴ Editors, "Civil War in Spain and the United States", Commonweal, XXVIII (June 24, 1938), p. 230.

Commonweal reminded its readers that the Catholic Church must not bind itself to any specific temporal form of government.⁹⁵ Michael Williams, founder and now special editor of Commonweal, quickly disengaged himself from the new policy, believing it to be positively harmful when based on the comparative merits of both sides in the Civil War.⁹⁶

America, the influential Jesuit organ, speaking for the majority of American Catholic spokesmen, denounced Commonweal for its change in policy. It accused Commonweal of either editorial incompetence or willful ignorance in the following terms: "Information, accurate and plentiful is available to those editors who seek it...Commonweal has thereby split itself off from the solid Catholic thought in the United States and has tended toward the opinions of the non-Catholic majority."⁹⁷ America also announced that Commonweal had no support from the diocesan Catholic press: "The diocesan news weeklies, almost with one accord, have editorially rebuked the positive impartialists. The net result among Catholics, is that of a greater solidarity against the Loyalist regime and a deeper sympathy toward the Nationalists".⁹⁸ The Catholic minority view is perhaps best characterized as being less of a difference in substance and more of a mere departure from the positive self-assured outlook of their colleagues.

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 229-230.

⁹⁶Michael Williams, "News and Reviews", Commonweal, XXVIII (June 24, 1938), p. 241.

⁹⁷Editors, "The Commonweal and the Spanish Civil War", America, LIX (July 2, 1938), p. 293.

⁹⁸Editors, "Comment", America, LIX (July 23, 1938), p. 364. The diocesan weeklies, being affiliated with the NCWC news service, usually spoke with one voice on the matter of the Spanish Civil War. See Nichols, Democracy and the Churches, p. 260.

CHAPTER IV

JUSTIFICATION FOR FRANCO AND THE NATIONALISTS

Defense of Christianity

Most American Catholic leaders assumed an undeviating pro-Franco attitude on the Spanish Civil War. The justification for their position lay mainly in three interrelated reasons: the defense of Christianity, the threat of Communism, and the belief that Franco's Nationalists could establish a new Spain based on Roman Catholic ideals.

Although by and large American Catholic thinkers accepted and upheld the principles of separation between Church and State, they believed it to be largely inapplicable to Spain due to its Catholic tradition. Historical experience seemed to indicate that in certain nations, separation of Church and State eventually resulted in an anti-religious State. American Catholic opinion therefore stood firm to defend the threatened interests of Spain's Catholic Christianity and its new found protector - Francisco Franco.

As previously mentioned, American Catholic leadership was angered by the stream of alleged atrocities in 1936. They asserted that the Loyalist government completely ignored the pleas and remonstrances of the official Vatican newspaper Osservatore Romano and took no action to prevent or punish this constant attack on the Spanish Church.¹ The persecution of

¹Editors, "Communism at Bay in Spain", America, LV (August 29, 1936), p. 492.

the Spanish clergy was believed to be another ugly manifestation of "liberalism", similar to what had been happening in Mexico and Russia.² Like most Catholics, the Rev. John P. Delaney felt constrained to permit no further countenance of the persecutions. He stated: "It is the simplest of issues. A civilization that will admit God or else a God-hating, government-destroying Communism. Neutrality for a Catholic Spaniard is unthinkable".³ Archbishop McNicolas' vehement denunciation expressed in a diocesan letter and included in an America editorial, typified the attitude of America's higher Catholic leadership: "The fiendish cruelty of blood-thirsty Communists, anarchists, and misguided youths taught to hate Christ and to engage in anti-God orgies sickens the Christian heart".⁴

American Catholicism then justified the use of force in the Spanish conflict in defense of Franco's rebellion against the Loyalist government in July 1936. America reconciled this use of force with Catholic moral theology as stated in the following:

...theologians and moralists in our times unequivocally condemn the resort to war against even a manifest aggressor as long as every conceivable means of conciliation and arbitration has not been exhausted. But what of defense against a domestic aggressor?...But what is

²Editors, "Spanish Liberalism", America, LV (September 5, 1936), p. 516. The Catholic viewpoint becomes clearer when one considers that the concept liberalism almost invariably denoted anti-clericalism. On the continent of Europe and in Latin-American countries, anti-clericalism was and is considered by Catholics to be but an euphemism for anti-Catholicism. See John A. Ryan and Francis J. Boland, Catholic Principles of Politics (New York: Macmillan Co., 1960), pp. 161-167.

³Rev. John P. Delaney, "Catholic Spaniards Have Only One Choice", America, LV (September 12, 1936), p. 536.

⁴Editors, "Anarchy in Spain", America, LV (September 19, 1936), p. 564; Editors, "Cincinnati Archbishop is Propagandist for Franco", Christian Century, LIV (January 27, 1937), p. 102.

to be done when the aggressor is from within, when the constitutional agencies of a reforming government, bent upon righting the wrongs of the past and duly elected by the people, have been seized by an armed group that has no interest but the subjection of the whole nation to an arbitrary tyranny, destructive of the very foundations of religion and morality? May force be used then to organize military expeditions to resist such usurpation of power; or should Christians bow their heads ~~and meekly~~ accept persecution in the hope of conquering violence by love? For there is no tribunal, national or international, to which such civil aggression can be referred.

All doubt as to the identity of the aggressor and the heinousness of his aggression vanishes once violent hands are laid upon the altar of God Himself. In the face of this certain fact the individual can prefer martyrdom to resistance. But is the community or citizens as a body obliged to forego armed defense against a certain domestic aggressor because of the excesses to which such armed defense is likely to go? This is the crucial question in the present calamity....our answer is no. So long as humanity is not collected into some super-State and so long as our rulers are themselves not always under the rule of conscience and the moral law, some human quarrels must occur which call for the arbitrament of force.⁵

This well illustrates how the threat of Communism and the defense of institutional Christianity were interwoven in the American Catholic mind. Franco's rebellion, according to the above quotation, was justified on the grounds that Communism had so dominated the Loyalist government that it no longer represented the Spanish people and further had illegally and immorally abrogated the spiritual rights of practicing Catholics.

The Rev. John C. Murray, one of the most noted American Jesuits, deprecated the oft-spoken dictum of the Spanish Civil War as a struggle

⁵Editors, "Is Use of Force Justified?", America, LVI (November 28, 1936), p. 181. Catholic theologians over the past have laid down general conditions to which a contemplation of war must comply in order to remain within the demands of Christian morality and justice. The above quotation coincides with the official Catholic concept of "just war" as outlined in the Catholic Code of International Ethics. See John A. Ryan and Francis J. Boland, Catholic Principles of Politics, pp. 251-261.

pitting Fascists against Communists. Rather, he believed the issue to be an irreconcilable conflict of different opposites - traditional Christian principles and doctrine versus the anti-God materialism of Marxism.⁶

American Catholics were increasingly prone to view the principal theme of the Spanish Civil War as above all, a struggle for the survival of Christianity. Fordham University officials warmly received Hilaire Belloc, England's leading Catholic writer and propagandist of the time, and his interpretation that the Spanish strife engaged Catholic Christianity against anti-religion.⁷ Prof. E. Alison Peers of Liverpool University, England, and author of The Tragedy of Spain, was commended for his brilliant interpretation of how Communist influence had worked complete havoc with Spanish religious life.⁸ Other notables who helped to shape the thought of American Catholics by emphasizing the precarious situation of the Church in Spain were: Gil Robles of Spain, Don Luigi Sturzo of Italy, Aileen O'Brien of Ireland, Paul McGuire of Australia, Robert Sencourt and Gertrude Godden of Great Britain. With the possible exception of Peers, they all demanded a commitment to positive action and were all staunch pro-Franco advocates.⁹

The Spanish hierarchy reasoned that if Franco should fail it would mean the end of Christianity in Spain.¹⁰ The American hierarchy upheld

⁶Rev. J. C. Murray, "Conflict of Opposites", Catholic World, CXLIV (December, 1936), p. 356-358.

⁷E. T. Buehrer, "Belloc Speaks for Rebels", Christian Century, LIV (March 31, 1937), p. 436.

⁸Michael Williams, "Degradation of Democracy", Commonweal, XXV (April 9, 1937), p. 656.

⁹Guttman, Wound in the Heart, pp. 32, 34-37, 47.

¹⁰W. L. Scott, "The Spanish Situation", Commonweal, XXV (March 26, 1937), p. 614.

the contention of their fellow Spanish bishops, praising their pastoral letter for explaining the condition of religious life in Spain.¹¹ Cardinal O'Connell unreservedly eulogized Franco as the defender of Christian civilization.¹²

Rev. Charles P. Bruehl, a contributor to Commonweal, spoke for American Catholic leaders who had a more somber view of Franco as a champion of Christianity and yet considered his aid as absolutely essential for its survival. Bruehl wrote in defense of the Spanish hierarchy who had cast their lot with Franco. He understood the alliance with the Nationalists as predicated on the following: Franco's movement appeared to represent the best national traditions whereas the existing government had taken on a Communist complexion which was directly hostile to Catholicism; the Church is sometimes obliged to use human instruments, including sinful men, to achieve her overall mission; the Spanish hierarchy had acted within the framework of Catholic political principles.¹³

American Catholic leaders resolutely supported their Spanish brethren. They respected the previous close association of Church and State, a relationship that had been disastrously broken when the power of the State no longer stood in defense of the Church. Whether out of

¹¹Editors, "The American Hierarchy", Commonweal, XXVII (December 3, 1937), p. 143; Editors, "Comment", America, LVIII (December 4, 1937), p. 194; Raphael M. Huber, Our Bishops Speak, pp. 219-221; see also my Chapter III.

¹²New York Times, March 19, 1938.

¹³Rev. Charles P. Bruehl, "A Censor of His Age", Commonweal, XXIX (March 3, 1939), pp. 515-518. To center his discussion, Father Bruehl criticized the point of view expressed by George Bernanos, the French intellectual, who had condemned the Spanish hierarchy for having identified itself with the Nationalists.

enthusiasm or a choice involving the lesser of two evils, the just-war motive inevitably led them to side with Franco's Nationalist movement.

Right of Revolution Against Communism

Most American Catholic leaders viewed the Spanish Civil War in the context of an attempt at world revolution by the forces of international Communism.¹⁴ Some considered revolution against Communism in Spain to be a "sacred duty".¹⁵ John LaFarge, senior editor of America, agreed with Pius XI that Communism was the supreme danger and absolutely incompatible with Christianity.¹⁶ Bishop John Francis Noll of Fort Wayne, Indiana, earlier attempted to forge a united anti-Communist front but failed due to Protestant reluctance to follow what they ultimately believed to be Vatican leadership. Consequently, the American Catholic Church felt markedly alone in its advocacy of the right of revolution against world Communism.¹⁷

By the mid-1930's, many Americans viewed the difficulties of domestic and foreign affairs as conducive to the rise of rival totalitarian systems - Communism and Fascism. The crisis years of the depression left a profound sense of ineffectuality. As this feeling continued it sometimes lent support to a growing contention that America itself must eventually face Communism, Fascism, or chaos. Although essentially

¹⁴Editor, "The World Revolution", Commonweal, XXIV (August 14, 1936), pp. 373-374.

¹⁵R. Recouly, "The Hour Has Struck", Catholic World, CXLIII (September, 1936), p. 743.

¹⁶Rev. John La Farge, "Fascism or Communism", America, LVI (October 10, 1936), pp. 4-5.

¹⁷E. G. Homrighausen, "Catholic Appeal for United Anti-Communist Front", Christian Century, LIII (December 9, 1936), p. 1660.

irrelevant to realities, the drama of the Spanish Civil War added to the emotional fervor which caused Americans to cast at each other so indiscriminately the epithets "Communist" or "Fascist". The disturbed world of Europe mirrored more clearly their own anxieties. Granted, that in more temperate minds, the anti-Communist and anti-Fascist impulse was reasoned and sincere, yet in others it was shrill and impassioned.¹⁸

The American Catholic Church, being a member of a larger authoritarian religious body and conspicuous in its militant anti-Communism, found itself squarely in the middle of this Communist-Fascist dilemma. While American Catholics almost unanimously expressed agreement on the threat of Communism in Spain, their outlook varied widely on the matter of Fascism. It was a question of wariness and due concern to some, the lesser of two evils for others, and for still others Fascism was deemed non-existent in Spain. At this time American Catholic leaders were especially conscious of their commitment as Americans to the democratic ideal and therefore they highly resented any notion that loyalty to Catholicism meant sympathy or alliance with Fascism. Much of American Catholic insistence on Spain's right of revolution against Communism was mollified by attempts to minimize the importance of Fascism.

Commonweal's editor, Michael Williams, warned in 1936 that a victory against the Communists would not necessarily result in a secure position for the Church. He cautioned against the establishment of a Fascist regime:

Spanish Fascism will be the antithesis to the radical social demands made by the revolutionists. Superficially it will also oppose anti-clericalism because Fascism is

¹⁸Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. vividly portrays the uncertainties besetting Americans in the 1930's and the recriminations that ensued. See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Politics of Upheaval (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960), pp. 69-96.

traditionalistic and there is only the Catholic tradition in Spain. But it will not liberate creative Catholic social energies, which have struggled to emerge during hundreds of years. We cannot see any reason for stridently applauding the present rebels. The lessons of history are too plain for that.¹⁹

George N. Shuster denied the possibility that any part of the world Catholic body was allied to Fascism: "I do not see how anybody can read the writings of Pope Pius [Pius XI] from the decision concerning L'Action Francaise to the latest encyclical to the Mexican Church without feeling that they constitute a strong warning against that temptation".²⁰ The Rev. John A. O'Brien, while condemning Communism, identified the American Catholic Church with the American ideals of democracy and individual freedom, which he believed would be jeopardized by either Communism or Fascism.²¹ Paul Kiniery protested against the idea that the Catholic Church was upholding Fascism in its historical opposition to Communism. He admitted that the Church had signed a concordat with Italy in 1929 and with Germany in 1933, but implied that a clearer understanding of a concordat would reveal evidence of friction between Church and State, rather than symbolizing harmonious relations. Kiniery spoke for many

¹⁹Michael Williams, "Murder in Madrid", Commonweal, XXIV (August 28, 1936), p. 414.

²⁰George N. Shuster, "Some Further Reflections on Spain", Commonweal, XXV (April 23, 1937), p. 717. Shuster refers to Pius XI's encyclicals directed against Action-Francaise, a rightist movement, and Mexican government policies in December 1926 and March 1937 respectively. (Firmissimam Constantiam was the latest of three encyclicals regarding Mexico since their 1917 Revolution and should not be confused with the more notable Divini Redemptoris issued the same month.) Both encyclicals cautioned against subjecting the interests of the Church to political aims. See Eugen Weber, Action Francaise (Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 234-236; E. E. Y. Hales, The Catholic Church in the Modern World (Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1958), pp. 261-262.

²¹Rev. John A. O'Brien, "Fighting for Social Justice", Commonweal, XXVI (May 28, 1937), p. 119.

many American Catholic thinkers when suggesting that the Church had not accepted Fascism as an approved political system, but could best ensure her spiritual mission through conciliation with the resultant state of affairs in a nation.²² His own personal opinion was that the Church had no assurance that it could thrive in a Fascist Spain.²³

Many American Catholic leaders believed that Communism was the greatest danger and Fascism therefore the lesser of two evils.²⁴ Fascism appeared less of a threat since it was considered the system least likely to lend itself to exportation. While Fascism might be removed by increased social consciousness, Communism was tenacious and irremovable short of military force.²⁵ The Rev. Wilfrid Parsons, then professor of political science at Georgetown University, surmised that Fascism did not arise as a separate and independent movement, but accompanied an inevitable reaction to the peril of Communism; if Communism was destroyed Fascism would then disappear, lacking its *raison d'etre*. The tenuous link between the Church and Fascism could only be forged by the threat of Communism.²⁶ To Francis X. Talbot the prospects of Church life under a Fascist Spain was at least speculative, under "Communist" Spain it had become a record of cruel persecution.²⁷ Bishop Noll summed up the

²²Paul Kiriery, "Equals in Evil: Communism and Fascism", Catholic World, CXLV (August, 1937), pp. 524-525.

²³Ibid., p. 530.

²⁴Editors, "Comment", America, LVI (October 10, 1936), p. 2.

²⁵Rev. John LaFarge, "Fascism or Communism", America, LVI (October 10, 1936), pp. 4-5.

²⁶Rev. Wilfrid Parsons, "Popular Front and Catholics", Commonweal, XXV (February 19, 1937), p. 465.

²⁷Rev. Francis X. Talbot, "Further Reflections on the Spanish Situation", America, LVII (May 1, 1937), p. 77.

attitude of many prominent American Catholics when he proposed that the Catholic Church could actually succeed with its work under any form of government except that of Communism.²⁸ Monsignor Michael J. Ready reiterated Bishop Noll's viewpoint when he cited an encyclical letter of Pius XI regarding Spain dated June 3, 1933, part of which he submitted as forwarding a key to the official Catholic attitude: "Everyone knows that the Catholic Church never prefers one form of government over another. All the Catholic Church demands is that, whatever the form of government, the rights of God and of conscience be respected".²⁹

A number of American Catholics found Fascism versus Communism to be a highly inadequate explanation of the Spanish conflict. For example, the Rev. Laurence K. Patterson accepted the idea that Spain was in reality two nations, an alignment of Right and Left, yet found the political spectrum within each to include such a variety of factions and interests that it did not merit such a common simplification. Patterson viewed the Right as largely centrist in political makeup and aspirations upholding the ideals of a moderate republic. He ascertained the only Fascist group to be the Falangists led by Primo de Rivera, son of the late dictator; the extreme right was claimed to be the Carlists, whose goal was a Catholic monarchy. The Left ranged from various bourgeois parties to extreme firebrands dominated by Communists.³⁰ He agreed, however, with most of his colleagues that the conspirational activities of the USSR were responsible for plunging Spain into a Civil War.³¹

²⁸D. A. Saunders, "Liberals and Catholic Action", Christian Century, LIV (October 20, 1937), p. 1295.

²⁹New York Times, October 6, 1937.

³⁰Rev. Laurence K. Patterson, "Right and Left Battle for Spain", America, LV (August 8, 1936), pp. 412-413.

³¹Ibid., p. 429.

The highly individualistic temperament of the Spaniard's character was often mentioned as an impediment to his succumbing to Communism or Fascism. Once certain basic ills were remedied, it was understood that he would revert to what psychologically suited him best - a constitutional monarchy.³²

The Rev. John Courtney Murray's concept of the Civil War as Marxism against Christianity minimized the importance of Fascism. He considered it to be at most but a temporary phenomenon created by the threat of Russian-led Communism. Murray insisted that the Fascists in Franco's armies did not control the Nationalist movement.³³ The Rev. Albert Whelan, an associate editor of America, stated that the exigencies of civil war demanded the coordination of the military, economic, and political resources under single control, but that this necessitating factor should not be construed as the coming of Fascism.³⁴ The Nationalist movement was believed to be a return to the principles of the past, a reaction to the disruptive ideas of nineteenth century Liberalism and twentieth century Marxism, and a manifestation of something genuinely Spanish.³⁵ Nationalist Spain was judged to be a nation of elan and courage, not the dire repression associated with a Fascist state.³⁶

³²Rev. T. L. Riggs, "No Surprise in Spain", Catholic World, CXLIV (November, 1936), p. 159.

³³Rev. J. C. Murray, "Conflict of Opposites", Catholic World, CXLIV (December, 1936), p. 356.

³⁴Rev. Albert Whelan, "One Noble Writer", America, LIX (June 4, 1938), p. 201.

³⁵Rev. Francis X. Conolly, "Fascist State is not Emerging in Spain", America, LIX (September 24, 1938), p. 580; Rev. Francis X. Conolly, "Spain Renews Itself in the Nationalist Movement", America, LX (October 22, 1938), pp. 52-54.

³⁶Rev. Joseph F. Thorning, "Franco's Spain", Catholic World, CXLVIII (February, 1939), p. 573.

In defending the right of Franco's rebellion, American Catholic leaders did not ally themselves with Fascism. They continually endeavored to avoid being maneuvered into supporting Fascism because of their opposition to Communism in Spain.

Embodiment of a New Catholic Spain

Little of any consequence was actually expressed on the part of American Catholics regarding Franco's goals or Nationalist ideology. They failed to construct a broad theoretical justification for the Nationalist movement (as for example did Gil Robles in exile in Portugal). American Catholic spokesmen upheld the Nationalist cause on the grounds of world anti-Communism and the survival of Catholic Christianity.

The basis for hope in a new Catholic Spain was embodied in the person of Francisco Franco. The Rev. Francis X. Talbot among a number of other important American Catholics, celebrated the prospect of an authoritarian Spain. He believed that the majority of the Spanish people had readily submitted to Franco's leadership for he was said to command the allegiance of Monarchists, Fascists, Centrists, Republicans, and peasants - all except the minority groups of Communists, Anarchists, and the industrial proletariat.³⁷ The Rev. Edward J. Fenger, editor of Buffalo's Catholic Union and Times and representative of the American Spanish Relief Fund in Spain, also reported a great confidence and love that Spaniards supposedly had for the honesty and kindness of Franco. He stated: "Franco has developed for himself a love in the hearts of people that one is unable to describe; his name is on every lip. His

³⁷Rev. Francis X. Talbot, "Some Reflections on the Spanish Situation", America, LVII (April 10, 1937), p. 10.

ambitions and hopes are that of every Spaniard in Nationalist-held Spain".³⁸ On June 19, 1937 the last remnant of Basque independence ended when their chief city, Bilbao, fell to the Nationalists.³⁹ Ferger used this occasion especially to praise Franco's conduct of the operation and to characterize him as a benign and just administrator of public affairs. Franco was said to have expended all his energy after the capture of Bilbao on implementing justice and safeguarding its citizens from vengeful reprisals.⁴⁰

Owen B. McGuire, another influential American Catholic, testified to the peace, order, and justice that prevailed in Franco-held territory. He contended that the orderly success replacing the previous anarchy under the Communists could not have taken place unless Franco enjoyed the trust of Spaniards and their view of him as a liberator.⁴¹ McGuire also affirmed that Franco's justice was tempered with mercy to his former enemies and that an honest study of Franco's career led to the

³⁸Rev. Edward J. Ferger, "A People Intent on Winning the War", America, LVII (July 24, 1937), p. 366.

³⁹Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 447.

⁴⁰Rev. Edward J. Ferger, "Normalcy Restored to Bilbao with Advent of Franco", America, LVII (August 7, 1937), pp. 415-416. Thomas comments favorably on the conduct of Franco's armies immediately following the capture of Bilbao. Franco forbade the "senseless shootings" which had previously taken place after the fall of Malaga. However, there is sufficient evidence indicating that the Nationalists undertook a campaign of systematic pacification against the North after the conquest of Gijon in the fall of 1937. See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 447, 482-484; de La Souchère, Explanation of Spain, pp. 183-184.

⁴¹Owen B. McGuire, "Peace in Spain", Commonweal, XXVII (August 27, 1937), pp. 414-415. The greater part of the population remained hostile to the Nationalists. Despite much of the uncompromising nature of the Civil War, increasing number of peasant landholders and members of the middle class, although formerly pro-Loyalist, willingly cooperated with Franco's promise of a new order. See de La Souchère, Explanation of Spain, pp. 188-201.

conclusion that he was fundamentally a constitutional democrat, which he thought was confirmed by Franco's refusal to aid in establishing a dictatorship after the miners' rebellion in the Asturias region in 1934.⁴²

Rev. Francis X. Connolly, impressed by the broad social and economic reforms which he believed characterized Franco's leadership, concluded:

"Franco is said to be establishing a state that is no Leviathan, but one anxious to steer a middle course between Marxist collectivism and laissez-faire capitalism, a state which regards its citizens as persons of inalienable moral dignity rather than as servants of its will".⁴³

The many unstinted praises for Franco as justiciar and reformer were, however, mixed with the understanding that he represented the forces of Catholicism in Spain.⁴⁴

Three days before the end of the Civil War, the editors of America, expressed their gratification over Cardinal Goma's conviction that the general trend of Spain's new legislation was guided by a Catholic spirit. They rejoiced "that the highest authority in the government wishes to make Spain Catholic".⁴⁵ This statement typified the deep-felt realization

⁴²Owen B. McGuire, "The New Spain", Commonweal, XXVII (October 29, 1937), p. 6.

⁴³Rev. Francis X. Connolly, "Spain's New Charter", America, LIX (May 7, 1938), p. 101. This is a reference to the 'Labor Charter for New Spain' to which Connolly himself had appended a preface. It consisted of a rudimentary skeletal organization of syndicates which encompassed all workers and all branches of production. Although there are said to be important technical differences between the Labor Charter and say the Italian model of the corporatist state, all direction is supplied from a "ministry" above. See Guttman, Wound in the Heart, pp. 33-34; Payne, Falange, pp. 186-190.

⁴⁴Editors, "Comment", America, LIX (July 16, 1938), p. 338; Bernard J. Monks, "Franco of Spain", Catholic World, CXLVII (September, 1938), p. 674; Rev. Joseph F. Thorning, "Franco's Spain", Catholic World, CXVIII (February, 1939), pp. 568-573.

⁴⁵Editors, "Chronicle", America, LX (March 25, 1939), p. 592.

among leading American Catholics that the hope of a new Catholic Spain was vested in the hands of its new leader - Franco.

The American Catholic position throughout the Spanish Civil War remained decidedly pro-Franco. Pro-Loyalist American Catholics had no eminent spokesmen. No visible ferment took place among Catholics in the United States as in France, where important men such as Cardinal Elie Verdier, Georges Duhamel, Jacques Maritain, and Francoise Mauriac were prominent Loyalist sympathizers. American Catholic leaders often exhibited certain qualities more readily associated with Catholic leadership in other countries - an emphasis on doctrine and discipline directed against a secular world that is for the most part essentially hostile. One can almost detect a sought-for "separatism" on the Spanish question by perusing America, Catholic World, most issues of Commonweal, and the pronouncements of ranking Catholics as reported in the New York Times and the Christian Century. Only Catholics, it was implied, because of their persecution really understood what was at stake in Spain, what was true or untrue, and what was Christian and un-Christian.

The shock resulting from the Catholic persecution early in the Civil War had helped to evoke a traditional conservatism in the American Church. Most American Catholic spokesmen viewed the disturbing changes agitating the 1930's as stemming from a dangerous world-wide Communist conspiracy. America and Europe were now supposedly reaping the whirlwind of liberalism which, under the guise of socialism, secularism, and modernism, eroded its most precious heritage - Christianity.

Catholics then felt compelled to close ranks and strengthen the whole Church against this international threat. They readily accepted the version of recent events in Spain as outlined in the Spanish hierarchy's pastoral letter, thereby uniting themselves with Vatican policy.

The traditional Catholic argument that all authority flows from God, His teachings, and the instruction of His Church, was reiterated in almost every article or speech dealing with the Spanish conflict. Many of the cross-currents surrounding the Spanish question centered around the matter of social reform. Although some distinguished Catholics of liberal convictions such as Monsignor Ryan, Father O'Brien, and George Schuster, gave more than tacit endorsement to social reform, most leading Catholics as represented by Cardinals Hayes and O'Connell, and Fathers Thorning, La Farge, and Talbot, were more inclined to favor a Church in Spain that could better preserve Catholic unity by maintaining traditions rather than promoting social innovations. The latter group of Catholics were prone to view as presumptuous such men as "New Dealers". To this majority group, social reform at that time had too much affinity with left-wing radicalism and full scale assaults on ecclesiastical rights. Furthermore, they felt that the Church could not trust "Liberals" to defend its rights during "reform" because, as had been recently demonstrated in Spain from 1931, they were allegedly more than willing to promote, cooperate, or acquiesce in anti-clericalism.

The American Catholic pro-Franco view was based on the concept of just war. They believed that Franco's Nationalist movement would insure the survival of the Church and the defeat of Communism in Spain. This defense of Franco often resulted in gross oversimplifications and glib generalizations which would only occasionally strike close to the truth. In their anxiety, there were few American Catholics who gave more than grudging admission of the Church's shortcomings in Spain. They also failed in attempting to discern the various interests within the political spectrum of the American or Spanish Left. The errors committed in unreservedly compounding Communists, Republicans, Socialists, and

Anarchists in Spain and Communists, Socialists, and Liberals in America, resulted in commentary that was only marginally relevant to the complexities of the Spanish Civil War. While American Catholics would often call attention to the Spaniard's love of liberty, his uncompromising idealism, or in brief the Spanish "mystique", they strangely overlooked the fact that this same spontaneity could be directed against the Church. For after all, as Hugh Thomas, Elena de La Souchère, and others remind us, the Church burnings and mob attacks, however abominable, were not committed by middle-class liberal ideologues but by poor illiterate workmen who presumably had once been part of a devoutly Catholic people.

From the very beginning American Catholicism held that Spain's Popular Front government was but a screen concealing the workings of Soviet imperialism. They continually denied the possibility that the Loyalist government at Madrid, Valencia, or Barcelona was ever a moderate democratic-republican government either in essence or aspirations. American Catholic opinion regarded France's Nationalist movement as one whose prompt action prevented the establishment of a Sovietized Spain and the eradication of Christianity. As Franco's armies rolled from victory to victory these American Catholics hoped that revelations of the actual state of affairs would be communicated to the secular pro-Loyalist American press and the American Protestant clergy for wider distribution.

American Catholic leaders supported the continuance of President Roosevelt's neutrality policy and the maintenance of the embargo on war materials. They conducted a wider program of Spanish relief than they believed previously existed so that neglected non-combatants of both sides as well as Nationalists in general could avail themselves of it. The American Catholic press coordinated its efforts to mount a counter-offensive against American journalism, which it considered to be wholly

one-sided in its presentation of the news. Finally, repeated efforts were made to have the Franco regime recognized and accepted with good grace by the United States.

Taken in sum, and despite some examples to the contrary, the pro-Franco attitude on the part of leading American Catholics appears to have been more in the sense of a defensive posture rather than one of full assurance and enthusiasm. Their grave concern over the plight of Catholic Christianity as a whole and the existence of the Catholic Church in Spain in particular, overwhelmingly pervaded their outlook on the Spanish Civil War.

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APPENDIX

The names of the 175 leading American Catholics who signed a public statement defending Franco's efforts and supporting the views of the Spanish hierarchy are as follows: (excerpt from the New York Times (October 14, 1937))

The Rev. Brother Albert, President of St. Mary's College, California; Dean Leopold F. Arnaud, Columbia University, New York; O'Brien Atkinson, President, New York Catholic Evidence Guild; James P. Aylward, Kansas City; Simon A. Baldus, Assistant Editor of Extension Magazine, Chicago; R. Baudier, Assistant Editor of Catholic Action of the South, New Orleans; The Right Rev. Mgr. John L. Belford, Nativity Church, Brooklyn; The Rev. J. I. Bergin, Editor of the Canadian Messenger, Toronto; Harry Lorin Binsse, Editor of Liturgical Arts, New York; The Rev. W. Howard, Bishop Rector of St. Martin's, Ohio; The Rev. Hyacinth Blocker, O. F. M., Editor of St. Anthony Messenger, Cincinnati; The Rev. John J. Bonner, Superintendent of Schools, Philadelphia; The Very Rev. Mgr. Boylan, President of Dowling College, Des Moines, Iowa; The Rev. L. M. Boyle, Editor of The Catholic Messenger, Davenport, Iowa; Dr. Goetz Briefs, Georgetown University, Washington; John Brunini, Editor of Spirit, New York; W. I. Butler, New York; James Byrne, Chancellor of the University of New York; The Rev. James A. Byrnes, Executive Secretary National Catholic Rural Life Conference, St. Paul, Minn.; Thomas H. Cannon, High Chief Ranger, Catholic Order of Foresters, Chicago; Martin H. Carmody, Supreme Knight, Knights of Columbus, New Haven, Conn.; James T. Carroll, Editor of Catholic Columbian, Columbus, Ohio; The Rev. Patrick J. Carroll, C.S.C., Editor of The Ave Maria, Notre Dame, Ind.; The Rev. Thomas F. Coakley, D. D., Rector of Sacred Heart Church, Pittsburg; Daniel F. Cohnlan, New York; John B. Collins, Editor of The Pittsburg Catholic; The Rt. Rev. Mgr. Joseph M. Corrigan, President of the Catholic University of America, Washington; The Very Rev. Harry B. Crimmins, S. J., President of St. Louis University; The Rev. Edward Lodge Curran, Editor of Light, Brooklyn; John L. Darrouzet, Galveston, Texas; John M. Dealy, National Commander, Catholic War Veterans, Long Island City, N. Y.; The Rev. Francis J. Deery, Editor of the Providence Visitor, Providence, R. I.; H. E. Desmond, Editor of The Catholic Herald Citizen, Milwaukee; Richard L. G. Deverall, Editor of The Christian Front, Villanova, Pa.; John Donahue, Editor of Columbia, New Haven, Conn.; The Rev. J. P. Donovan, Professor of Sociology, Kendrick Seminary, Webster Groves, Mo.; The Rev. Bernard F. Dooley, Editor of The Catholic Sun, Syracuse, N. Y.; The Very Rev. Mgr. Thomas S. Duggan, Editor of The Transcript, Hartford, Conn.; The Rev. John Dunne, Editor of The Tidings, Los Angeles; The Rev. Robert J. Dwyer, Editor of The Intermountain Catholic, Salt Lake City; Benedict Elder, Editor of The Record, Louisville; Dr. Aurello M. Espinosa, Romance Language Department, Stanford University; Thomas H. Fahey, General Manager of the Church World, Portland, Me.; John E. Fenton, National President, Ancient Order of Hibernians; The Rev. Edward J. Ferger, Editor of the Catholic Union and Times, Buffalo; The Rev. Henry P. Fisher, Editor of the Epistle, New York; The Rev. A. M. Fitzpatrick,

Editor of the Catholic Press Union, Cleveland; Vincent De P. Fitzpatrick, Editor and Manager of the Catholic Review, Baltimore; The Rt. Rev. M. J. Foley, Editor of the Western Catholic, Quincy, Ill.; The Rev. Paul J. Francis, S. A., Editor of The Lamp, Garrison, N. Y.; The Rev. Dr. Edward A. Freking, Editor of the Catholic Telegraph, Cincinnati; Very Rev. Robert I. Gannon, S. J., President of Fordham University; The Rev. Harold A. Gaudin, S. J., President of Loyola University, New Orleans; The Rev. F. J. Gilligan, S. T. D., Professor of Sociology, St. Paul Seminary, Minnesota; The Rev. James M. Gillis, C. S. P., Editor of The Catholic World, New York; The Rev. Francis P. Goodall, Editor of The Bengalese, Brookland, D. C.; The Rev. John J. Gorrell, Editor of The Catholic Light, Scranton, Pa.; The Rev. Dr. Peter Guilday, Editor of The Catholic Historical Review, Catholic University, Washington; The Rt. Rev. Richard J. Haberlin, D. D., Vicar-General, Archdiocese of Boston; Frank A. Hall, Director, Press Department, National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington; Dr. Thomas B. Hart, Editor of The Catholic Telegraph, Cincinnati; Dr. Carlton Hayes, Columbia University, New York; J. J. Haverty, Atlanta; William F. Heckenkamp Jr., National President, Western Catholic Union Supreme Council; David J. Heffermin, Civil Court of Record, Miami, Fla.; The Rev. Thomas J. Higgins, S. J., President of St. Joseph's College, Philadelphia; Dr. Ross J. Hoffmann, New York University; The Rev. Edward L. Hughes, O. P., Editor of The Torch, New York; George K. Hanton, Editor of The Interracial Review, New York; The Rev. George Johnson, Editor of The Catholic Educational Review, Catholic University, Washington; The Very Rev. Pascal Kavulic, National Secretary Catholic Slovak Federation of America, Cleveland; The Rev. Thomas L. Keany, Editor of The Guardian, Little Rock, Ark.; The Very Rev. Mgr. Robert F. Keegan, Director of Catholic Charities, New York; The Very Rev. Anselm M. Keefe, President, St. Norbert's College, West DePere, Wis.; The Rev. D. J. Kelly, Editor of The Catholic Week, Birmingham, Ala.; Louis Kenedy, National President, National Council of Catholic Men, New York; F. P. Kenkel, Editor, Social Justice, St. Louis; Herman A. Kreuger, Editor of The Catholic Herald, St. Louis; The Rev. John LaFarge, S. J., Associate Editor of America, New York; Maurice Lavanoux, Secretary, Liturgical Arts Society, New York; The Rt. Rev. Michael J. Lavelle, Vicar-General of the Archdiocese of New York; The Rev. William LaVerdière, Editor, The Sentinel of the Blessed Sacrament, New York; F. W. Lawlor, Publisher of The Catholic Tribune, St. Joseph, Mo.; The Very Rev. Optatus Loeffler, O. F. M., Provincial of the Franciscan Fathers, Chicago; The Rev. Daniel Lord, S. J., Editor, The Queen's Work, St. Louis; The Rev. Robert H. Lord, Vice Rector of St. John's Seminary, Boston; M. J. Madigan, Manager and Editor of The Catholic News, New York; The Rev. Theophane Maguire, C. P., Editor of The Sign, Union City, New Jersey; Joseph Matt, Editor of The Wanderer, St. Paul, Minn.; Dr. George McCabe, University of Newark; The Rev. Raphael McCarthy, S. J., President of Marquette, Milwaukee; William H. McCarthy, Postmaster of San Francisco; The Very Rev. Mgr. Thomas J. McCarty, St. Edwards Church, Philadelphia; The Rt. Rev. Eugene J. McGuinness, Secretary, American Board of Catholic Missions, Chicago; John F. McCormick, Manager of The Commonwel, New York; The Rev. P. A. McHugh, Editor, Superior California Register, Sacramento; The Rt. Rev. J. Francis A. McIntyre, Chancellor of the Archdiocese of New York; Charles A. McMahon, Editor of Catholic Action, Washington; The Rt. Rev. Joseph A. McMahon, Our Lady of Lourdes Church, New York; Thomas F. Meehan, Editor, United States Catholic Historical Society, New York; Dr. Louis J. Mercier, Harvard University; The Very Rev. S. M. Metzger, President of St.

John's Seminary, Texas; The Rev. James Meyer, O. F. M., Editor of The Franciscan Herald, Chicago; John Moody, New York; The Rev. Leo C. Mooney, Editor of The Catholic Courier, Rochester, N. Y.; The Very Rev. Mgr. A. F. Monnot, Director of Missions, Tulsa, Okla.; William F. Montavon, Legan Department, National Catholic Welfare Council, Washington; The Rev. Patrick J. Moran, Editor of True Voice, Omaha, Neb.; The Rev. Charles J. Mulhally, S. J., National Director, Apostleship of Prayer and Editor of The Messenger of the Sacred Heart, New York; The Very Rev. Paul Nahlen, President of Corpus Christi College, Texas; The Rev. Raymond W. Murray, Professor of Sociology, Notre Dame University; Charles N. Nennig, Editor of The Catholic Daily Tribune, Dubuque, Iowa; John P. O'Brien, New York; The Very Rev. Michael J. O'Connell, C. M., President of DePaul University, Chicago; W. T. O'Connell, Editor of the Catholic Northwest Progress, Seattle; The Rev. John A. O'Connor, Editor of The Evangelist, Albany; The Rt. Rev. John O'Grady, Editor of The Catholic Charities Review, Washington; The Rev. John F. O'Hara, C. S. C., President of Notre Dame University; Gordon O'Neal, Editor of The Monitor, San Francisco; The Rev. James P. O'Shea, Editor of The Southern Cross, San Diego; The Rev. Joseph H. Ostdiek, Diocesan Superintendent of Schools, Omaha, Neb.; The Rev. Brother Patrick, President of Manhattan College, New York City; George Pflaum, Publisher of the Young Catholic Messenger, Dayton, Ohio; The Very Rev. A. H. Poetker, S. J., President of The University of Detroit; Martin Quigley, Publisher and Editor of The Motion Picture Herald, New York; Joseph J. Quinn, Editor of The Southwest Courier, Oklahoma City, Okla.; The Very Rev. Alfred H. Rabe, President of St. Mary's University, St. Mary's, Texas; The Very Rev. Michael J. Ready, General Secretary, National Catholic Welfare Council, Washington; Richard Reid, Editor of The Bulletin, Augusta, Ga.; Dr. Kurt F. Reinhardt, Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University; Charles H. Ridder, Publisher of Catholic News, New York; The Rev. T. L. Riggs, Yale University; The Very Rev. Leo R. Robinson, S. J., President of Gonzaga University, Spokane, Washington; James E. Royce, Editor of The Inland Catholic, Spokane; The Rev. T. Rowan, Editor of The New World, Chicago; The Rt. Rev. John A. Ryan, D. D., Catholic University of America; The Very Rev. Vincent J. Ryan, Director of Catholic Welfare Bureau, North Dakota; The Rev. E. B. Scallen, Editor of The Catholic Herald, Louisiana; Patrick Scanlan, Managing Editor of The Brooklyn Tablet; Joseph J. Schifferli, Editor of The Echo, Buffalo; The Rev. Alphonse Schwitalla, S. J., National President, Catholic Hospital Association of the United States and Canada, St. Louis; M. J. Shea, Editor of The Catholic Mirror, Springfield, Mass.; The Rt. Rev. Mgr. Fulton J. Sheen, Catholic University of America; The Rev. Frederick Siedenburg, S. J., Professor of Sociology, University of Detroit; Leonard Simutis, National Secretary, American Lithuanian Catholic Federation, Chicago; The Rt. Rev. Mgr. Albert E. Smith, Editor of The Catholic Review, Baltimore; Alfred E. Smith, New York; The Rev. Charles Smith, Editor of The Catholic Sentinel, Portland, Ore.; The Very Rev. Mgr. Mathew Smith, Editor of The Register, Denver; The Rev. Richard Stokes, Editor of The Far East, Omaha; John Straka, National President, National Alliance of Bohemian Catholics of America, Chicago; The Rev. Francis X. Talbot, S. J., Editor of America, New York; Bernard Vaughan, Editor of The Catholic Bulletin, St. Paul, Minn.; The Right Rev. Martin Veth, S. T. L., President of St. Benedict's College, Kansas; The Very Rev. Edward J. Walsh, C. M., President of St. John's University, Brooklyn; The Rev. Edmund A. Walsh, S. J., Vice President, Georgetown University; The Very Rev. Mgr. M. J. Waltz, Editor of The Catholic Chronicle, Toledo;

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