THE TURMOIL OF TRANSITION: THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICAN REVOLUTIONARIES, 1910-1915

By

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THE TURMOIL OF TRANSITION: THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICAN REVOLUTIONARIES, 1910-1915

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PREFACE

Poor Mexico!
So far from God;
So near the United States.
Mexican Proverb

The problems inherent in all revolutions are broader and more complex when lifted from their purely domestic aspects and forced to the center of the international scene. This was the fate of Mexico in the years 1910-1915. The constantly shifting storms of change that swept over the country were magnified and, at times, worsened by the fear of intervention and meddling by the United States.

The purpose of this study is to present one small aspect of the larger problem involved in dealing with nations in a state of revolution. In any period of violent change there will be groups that branch off from the stream of consensus and attempt to channel the movement toward their objectives. When factions of this type first started arriving in the United States in 1910, they were ignored or unnoticed until their continuing presence made necessary an official attitude in dealing with them. The necessity for a policy gave birth to the question: what stand could be taken that would satisfy the American-supported government in Mexico in 1910 and still keep alive the image of the United States as a democracy created by revolution? President William Howard Taft's response was to follow a line that was always called neutrality, but that varied in application. The neutrality of 1910 had little in common with neutrality in 1912. Chapter II describes the contortions of the President and the State Department in adapting to changing

circumstances.

The Wilsonian confrontation with the Mexican melee provides an excellent contrast to that of President Taft. Under any interpretation of the word, Woodrow Wilson was not content to remain neutral in dealing with the events in Mexico. He not only wanted the revolution to succeed in its objectives, but also had rather firm ideas as to what these objectives were. President Wilson's complete confidence in popularly elected democratic government to solve the Mexican problems colored all of his actions from 1912 to 1915. These actions do not appear to be the result of a well-thought-out policy but rather the results of a lack of any clear understanding of the forces at work in Mexico and the men who led them. The consequence of this lack of understanding was a never-ending vacillation that caused confusion, doubt and animosity as the American President bounced back and forth from faction to faction. The longest part of the thesis, Chapter III, deals with this search for the ideal with methods that were not.

All comments to the contrary notwithstanding, it is a fact that any thesis is the result of the work of many people. This study is no exception. I wish to extend sincere thanks and appreciation to Mr. Dave Warren who advised, criticized and listened; to Dr. Theodore L. Agnew for correcting the many lapses into incoherency; and to Mr. James M. Poteet for many hours of typing and also for convincing me daily that theses can be completed.

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CHAPTER I

"POOR MEXICO..."

THE REVOLUTIONARY YEARS, 1910-1920

Mexico entered the twentieth century with all the trappings and gilt of a relatively prosperous and rapidly expanding industrial nation. Law and order seemed secure where before it had not been safe to travel in the backlands.[1] Railroads were starting to unite the country, and that requisite of modernity -- electricity -- was becoming more and more evident. The capital city could boast street lights that shone down on well paved, clean streets.[2] Visitors who arrived in Mexico City to celebrate the centennial of Mexican independence in 1910 noted these adornments and praised Porfirio Díaz as one who had ruled long and well. Had these visitors scratched the surface, they would have found the affluence to be more apparent than real; already its supports were swaying with the precursory winds of revolution.[3]

Porfirio Díaz ruled Mexico with the rationale that all governmental actions were instituted for the good of the people, if not by them. In

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[1]Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 37.

[2]José Godoy, Porfirio Díaz: President of Mexico (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910), p. 75.

[3]Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 208 and Charles C. Cumberland, "Precursors of the Mexican Revolution of 1910," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXII (May, 1942), 344-345.

actuality, the main beneficiary of his policies was the "Quadrumvirate" that controlled the economic, social, and religious life of the country.[4] This group, composed of military, church, hacendados and foreign investors, was not the innovation of Díaz. They had existed long before he came to power, and it fell to him to control and harness them if he expected a reign of any length. His more than thirty years of power effectively demonstrated his ability along these lines.

To the man in charge of largesse, it was comparatively easy to control these four factors. The army was expected to do little more than conduct an occasional sortie into the streets or countryside to smash small-scale uprisings. It was to be neither professional or powerful -- characteristics which could be dangerous if united with self-respect. Those who commanded were pacified and corrupted with gambling concessions and legal licenses to operate houses of prostitution.[5] To control latent and less obvious unrest was the responsibility of the church.[6] Through fear and superstitution, the illiterate Mexican peasant was coerced into an acceptance of the status quo that made a clear and definite delineation between church and state impossible.[7] The omnipresent hacendado continued the time-worn tradition of his class by trying to satisy an insatiable appetite for land and more land. This greed was partially

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[4]Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Forge Village, Mass.: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 51-55.

[5]Ernest Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage (New York: Century Co., 1928), pp. 301-302.

[6]Ibid., p. 211.

[7]Ibid., pp. 254-255 and Moíses González Navarro, El Porfiriato: La Vida Social, Vol. IV of Historia Moderna de México, ed. Daniel Cosío Villegas (6 vols.; Mexico City: Editoria Hermes, 1955-1963), p. 477.

placated by a Porfirian land reform law that provided for the sale of uncultivated plots of not more than 2,500 hectares. The interpretation of this measure resulted in purchases by single individuals that far exceeded the stated maximum.[8] The newest member of the "Quadrumvirate," the foreign investor, poured money into Mexico with reckless abandon, knowing that his demands would be met before those of the native capitalists. This group of exploiters was led by businessmen of the United States who controlled more than $2,000,000,000 of the economy and could count more than 290 companies at work on various projects.[9]

The system was smooth and profitable to those who participated, but had little to recommend it to the more than two-thirds of the people who were non-participants. The agricultural and industrial workers not only failed to progress, but saw their purchasing power diminish during the Porfiriato.[10] Those who could buy had money in sufficient quantity to take a lackadaisical attitude toward the rising prices. The remainder found that the cost of living made survival hard and comfort impossible. This had been the fate of the lower classes in Mexico for years, and they had suffered in silence. Now it was more obvious than before as the peasant and the rich man stared at each other across a chasm unbridged by a strong, growing middle class.[11] Discontent was slight but

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[8]Although it was not necessarily commonplace, there were purchases under this land law that reached outrageously high figures. Three individuals alone bought land amounting to more than 8,000,000 hectares. See Navarro, El Porfiriato: Vida Social, IV, pp. 188, 216.

[9]Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (2 vols. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1964), I, p. 462 and J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), p. 317.

[10]Gruening, Mexico and Heritage, p. 136.

[11]Ibid., pp. 64-65.

always present, and a sign of weakness on the part of the system could precipitate open and active rebellion.

The awaited sign appeared in 1908 when, for reasons still not thoroughly understood, Porfirio Díaz granted an interview to an American journalist named James Creelman. In this interview the old ruler stated that the present term would be his last and urged candidates to start preparing for the upcoming elections. Criticism of the Porfirian regime burst forth from all sides as both Porfiristas and reformers made ready for the election of 1910. Díaz, more than a little shocked by the rancor of these attacks, suppressed many of the groups. However, he did allow the Anti-Re-Electionists, a faction of young middle class Mexicans who had gained popular support, to continue their campaign although arresting its leaders, including Francisco Madero. The results of the election were as expected. Díaz was returned to office, and the system again cracked into action.[12]

The fraudulent aspects of the election of 1910, following the Creelman statement, provided the spark that ignited the revolution. The Anti-Re-Electionist party had aroused popular sympathy, and the people resented the arrest of its leaders. When Francisco Madero fled the country after being released from prison, a murmur of approval swept the nation; when he issued his Plan of San Luis Potosí from San Antonio on October 5, 1910, the murmur changed to action, and people of like sentiments rallied to his cause. The first step of the Mexican revolution was under way.

The San Luis Potosí plan proclaimed November 20, 1911, as the

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[12] Cline, United States and Mexico, pp. 120-121.

starting date of the Revolution.[13] Within seven months, on May 25, 1911, the old dictator of Mexico resigned. In the period between these two dates little of particular significance occurred. There were few battles of any size, with casualties to both sides being minimal. The only real success of the revolutionaries was the capture of Ciudad Juárez, which provided a bargaining position and which signalled the resignation of Díaz.[14] The numbers of men involved were small in comparison with the total population of Mexico. Maderistas never totalled more than 20,000 men, composed of small groups operating in various parts of the country. Finances were meager, and the entire action consumed no more than $1,500,000.[15]

The question remains: all this being true, how could such a revolution succeed and succeed with so little difficulty? Several responses can be made. Porfirio Díaz and his top subordinates were old, and their reaction to the danger was not as quick nor as forceful as it once might have been. The average age of the cabinet was well over seventy, while that of the state governors was only slightly less.[16] They had been entrenched in power for so long, and with only slight resistance, that a

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[13]The plan in its entirety may be found in Rafael Martinez, Carlos M. Samper and Gral. José P. Lomelin, La Revolución y Sus Hombres (Mexico City: Talleres Tipográficos de "El Tiempo", 1912), pp. iii-vii.

[14]Charles C. Cumberland, "Mexican Revolutionary Movements From Texas, 1906-1912," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, L (January, 1949), 315.

[15]Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 121 and Gruening, Mexico and Heritage, p. 94.

[16]The cabinet of Díaz was composed of the Secretaries of War and Justice, who were over eighty years of age; heads of the Departments of Communication, Interior and Public Works, seventy; and the remaining members, over sixty. The Porfirian governors were also old--two were past eighty, six over seventy and seventeen over sixty. See Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), pp. 49-50.

carefully defined plan of controlling large scale insurrection was not present. The only resource that could have been used effectively was the army, and here the Díaz system had succeeded too well in its objectives. The generals had so padded the muster rolls that the army consisted of much paper but not many men. These same generals looked on the revolution as little more than a lark that presented increased opportunity for graft in supply contracts.[17] The answer, then, is probably found in a combination of old age with its debilitating effects plus a degenerative corruption that made resistance difficult and ineffectual.

When the Porfiriato collapsed, the people of Mexico City awaited the arrival of the "Apostle" of the new Mexico. The announcement that he would enter the capital city on June 7, 1911, brought out jubilant crowds anxious for a glimpse of the future president.[18] The man they came to see was a short, dark, rather unimpressive individual.[19] Francisco Madero was the well-educated son of a wealthy hacendado. He had rapidly accumulated a fortune of his own and then, being a strange mixture of realist and dreamer, liberal and conservative, had turned against the people of his class. In political philosophy he was a nineteenth century liberal who had supreme faith and confidence in the ameliorative effects of universal suffrage and education.[20] Nothing more was needed to correct the existing evils of Mexican society and, if the people wanted more,

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[17]Gruening, Mexico and Heritage, p. 302.

[18]Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 175.

[19]Edith O'Shaughnessy, Diplomatic Days (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1917), p. 74.

[20]Ross, Madero, pp. 51-60 and Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915: The Convention of Aguascalientes (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1960), p. 3.

voting and knowledge would give it to them.

While Madero believed the revolution was political, there was less agreement among the others involved.[21] The peasants, led by men like Emiliano Zapata in the south, believed it to be economically based on the need for land distribution.[22] Those who demanded social reform, such as Pascual Orozco in the north, were positive the revolution would bring some manner of social equality.[23] The young man on the rise assumed that with the collapse of the old order, he would have a chance to climb to a higher position economically and socially. The members of the "Quadrumvirate" feared all change and felt that reaction was the only course open to them. All of these groups pulled and pushed the new president until, in hopeless bafflement, he could only wait for the passion to pass and give the people time to get accustomed to the idea that if they did not have land or food, they did have democracy.

By itself political philosophy is a poor substitute for reform; thus, as Madero waited, pondered, and planned, the revolution began to disintegrate. Pascual Orozco revolted in the north but was smashed by a member of the old military clique,[24] Victoriano Huerta. Zapata rose in the south, using guerrilla tactics which made his defeat impossible. Two Porfirian generals, Bernardo Reyes and Felix Díaz, revolted and, though captured and obviously guilty of treason, were spared by the President

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[21]John J. Johnson, "Mexico's Nationalist Revolution," The Caribbean: Mexico Today, ed. A. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1964), p. 10.

[22]Rosa E. King, Tempest Over Mexico: A Personal Chronicle (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935), p. 260.

[23]Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 49.

[24]O'Shaughnessy, Diplomatic Days, p. 300.

and allowed to continue their treachery within prison walls. While all this was occurring other elements of the Porfirian regime, as well as some of the former revolutionaries, fomented discord from within.[25]

In February, 1913, the Madero regime had tottered as far as it could go. Early in that month the two generals who were under arrest for treasonous activities escaped and attacked the National Palace. In this engagement Bernardo Reyes was slain, but Felix Díaz and his followers took refuge in the arsenal within Mexico City.[26] Madero needed someone to crush this insurrection, and once again turned to the man who had demonstrated ability in defeating Orozco -- Victoriano Huerta. This was his last, and greatest, mistake. General Huerta was disgruntled at earlier treatment by Madero, and his role in the next few days was a study in perfidy. Conveniently all military acumen deserted him, and the shells fired by those under his command fell everywhere but on the entrenched insurrectionists. As the casualties among the citizens of Mexico City rose, the opinion became stronger that this was a full-scale revolution and that a Porfirian-like leader was needed.[27] It was Huerta's plan to fill this need.

The General was aided in his plans, either directly or indirectly, by the machinations of the United States ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson. The Ambassador had long been an opponent of Madero and advocated a return

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[25]Ross, Madero, pp. 218-219 and Gruening, Mexico and Heritage, p. 95.

[26]American Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson to Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, February 9, 1913, in United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1920, pp. 699-700. Hereinafter cited as PRFR, and the proper year.

[27]Gruening, Mexico and Heritage, p. 305.

to the old secure strong-rule system.[28] He was able to realize his wishes when, on February 18, he called Huerta and Felix Díaz together for a meeting in the American embassy and effected an armistice and pact. In this agreement the government positions were divided among the followers of the two generals.[29] Madero had not resigned, but all, including the Ambassador, acted as if the resignation was an accomplished fact.[30] On the same day, Wilson was informed of Madero's arrest by Huerta and requested that no harm come to him. Huerta agreed, and the United States representative proclaimed his faith in the good intentions of the new regime.[31] Four days later Madero and his Vice-President were slain on a dark street while being transferred to another prison.

Death provided Madero what he had never been able to obtain in life. Supporters flocked to the standard of the murdered leader, and his name became the cry of the next phase of revolution.[32] Reports of his death quickly spread through the country and were followed by firm resolve that the revolution could fight within itself, but that no interference would be brooked from outsiders. Since Huerta was the interloper, immediate steps were taken to proclaim his rule illegal, unconstitutional and unacceptable. The most significant of these early proclamations was made

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[28]The anti-Madero attitude of Ambassador Wilson can be found in most of the dispatches he wrote in this period. For representative examples, see his dispatches for February 20, August 22, and August 28, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, pp. 722-723, 826-827, and 828-832.

[29]American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, February 18 and 19, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, pp. 720-724.

[30]Ross, Madero, p. 310.

[31]American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, February 18, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 720.

[32]Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 51.

by Venustiano Carranza, Maderista governor of Coahuila. In mid-February of 1913, he issued a statement urging all states to refuse recognition and co-operation to the usurper and to use extraordinary powers to restore constitutional government.[33] This action initiated the so-called Constitutionalist movement, which in the following months became an increasing irritant to the new dictator. In its ranks were middle class patriots of some wealth who were sickened by the slaying of the President and who opposed Huerta morally and politically, ex-Maderistas who fled north to escape the wrath of the newly re-established old order, and small-time bandits who continued rapine and pillage under the guise of righteous indignation.[34] The two Constitutionalists who rose to prominence under Carranza's leadership were Alvaro Obregón and Francisco Villa, better known by the sobriquet Pancho. The former was a sincere and intelligent Mexican patriot with obvious military ability, and the latter was a crude and brutal leader who believed that all wars were won by expending men in break-neck and bloody charges. Both individuals operated under the supervision of Venustiano Carranza, the First Chief of the Constitutionalist movement. Meanwhile in the south, Emiliano Zapata transferred his wrath from the slain Madero to the new dictator and continued to take outright the land that no government would give him.

Victoriano Huerta did not lack adherents to his reactionary regime. Those who had felt the loss of the Porfirian gifts had turned to him with the expectation of receiving the traditional rewards. The Catholic Church, in its traditional desire for order, supported the new ruler with

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[33]Proclamation of the Independent Constitutionalists of the State of Coahuila, February 19, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 721.

[34]Gruening, Mexico and Heritage, pp. 310-312 and Tannenbaum, Peace and Bread, p. 58.

unseemly haste and was only slightly in advance of the hacendados and foreign investors. It was an attempt to stop time and turn Mexico back into the channel of exploitation and economic medievalism that had been her lot before 1910.[35] But now the people knew something they had not known before. Revolution was an easy thing. Had they not removed Díaz in only seven months, after he had had thirty years to entrench himself? The new Díaz would be even easier to remove. The people were beginning to enjoy these revolutions, but the next few years would change that as succeeding revolutionary waves brought desolation and extremity to a land that eventually would grow sick of both. Many of these waves were created by seemingly unconnected events in the United States.[36]

In March, 1913, Woodrow Wilson, a slight, mild-looking scholar, was inaugurated as President of the United States, and the confused and torn country to the south was confronted by still another force. The ex-Princeton professor regarded Mexico as an overly aggressive student who needed to be taught the error of his way.[37] It was not a matter of recognizing the faction in power at the moment in Mexico. This would be nothing more than expediency, and Woodrow Wilson was listening to a different drummer. The crux of the situation in his opinion was one of morality involving recognition to an individual who had risen to power over the bodies of popularly elected constitutional leaders.[38] There was

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[35]Edith O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife in Mexico (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1916), p. 31 and Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 52.

[36]Tannenburg, Peace and Bread, p. 58 and H. H. Dunn, The Crimson Jester: Zapata of Mexico (New York: National Travel Club, 1934), p. 168.

[37]Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), pp. 2-3.

[38]The best statement of President Wilson's moral outlook on the Mexican situation can be found in his Swarthmore College Address, Oct.

a right and wrong involved, if he could only determine what it was. To ascertain the right moral position, he compounded his errors by dispatching special envoys who quickly fell under the spell of one or another of the various revolutionary leaders.[39] As their reports returned to Washington, the President vacillated from intervention to non-intervention, to open aid and finally to utter helplessness. The only unity in such a policy was the desire to isolate and depose Huerta, and even this incurred the displeasure of the Mexican people.[40] It was not a standard text-book problem, and Wilson found a constant effective policy hard to determine and impossible to impose.

As President Wilson's insistence on the removal of Huerta hardened through 1913 and 1914, the Constitutionalists continued making some encroachments on federal-held territory, particularly in the north. The United States Navy, which had been rushed to Mexican coastal waters during the last days of the Madero administration, remained in position despite the strong protests of the Huerta government.[41] In April, 1914,

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25, 1913, and the Mobile Address, October 27, 1913. See Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (8 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1927-1939), III, pp. 56, 67.

[39]Ibid., IV, p. 307.

[40]O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife, p. 66 and Manuel Calero, The Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilson (New York: Smith and Thompson, 1914), p. 15.

[41]Secretary of State Knox to American Ambassador Wilson, February 27, 1913; American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State William J. Bryan, March 20, 1913; American Embassy to Mexican Office of Foreign Affairs, March 22, 1913; American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Bryan, March 27, 1913; American Ambassador Wilson to Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco de la Barra, April 1, 1913; Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco de la Barra to American Ambassador Wilson, April 5, 1913; Secretary of State Bryan to Ambassador Wilson, April 17, 1913; and Acting Secretary of State T. B. Moore to American Ambassador Wilson, May 7, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, pp. 275, 781-782, 785-786, 783, 786-787, 791-792, 793, 799.

the crisis that Wilson had considered inevitable occurred.[42] A gasoline crew from the American flagship, the Dolphin, went ashore at Tampico, was seized by federal troops and then released with apologies. The expressions of regret were not considered sufficient by the United States naval commander of the area, who demanded an immediate disavowal of the action and a salute to the American flag.[43] To do this would have cost Huerta support from the anti-American faction of Mexico which, as always, was vocal and latent. In not meeting such demands, he could appear as the individual who stood alone against the Yankee imperialists. His decision was clear, and the following days witnessed an exchange of proposals and counter-proposals that would have been amusing if the result had not been so tragic.

The humor of the spectacle of two modern nations haggling over who would salute whose flag first disappeared with the introduction of battle plans of the United States to take Tampico or, due to a dangerous sandbar outside the harbor, to shell the port.[44] These plans were altered on April 20 when United States Consul William Canada at Veracruz reported the expected arrival of a German steamer, the Ypiranga, with a cargo of war supplies for Huerta's forces.[45] The occupation of Veracruz would achieve both long-and short-range objectives. Huerta's forces would be immediately hampered by the loss of the needed supplies. More

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[42]Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910-1917 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 189.

[43]Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo to General Ignacio Morelos Zaragoza, April 9, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, pp. 438-440.

[44]Quirk, Affair of Honor, pp. 46-47.

[45]Consul William Canada to Secretary of State Bryan, April 20, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 477.

importantly, the central government could not exist without the customs receipts of its largest port.

The landing of American troops at Veracruz was made on April 21 in the face of opposition that was stiff and unexpected.[46] However, in spite of this opposition, the action was successful, and the United States took control of the port. President Wilson expected the action to be condoned, if not applauded, by the Constitutionalists as it appeared in their best interests. He was mistaken, and his hopes that the action would not be "misunderstood" or "misconstrued" by the revolutionaries were not realized.[47] Venustiano Carranza made his opposition known the day after the port was taken; in a letter to Wilson he condemned the seizure as violating the national sovereignty of Mexico. The rebel leader invited the United States to suspend hostilities, evacuate the port and submit complaints to the Constitutional Provisional Government for mediation.[48] This attitude prevailed among most other Constitutionalists except Pancho Villa, who stated that as far as he was concerned the United States could hold Veracruz so tight that not even water could get in.[49]

The reply of the Constitutionalists was embarrassing to President Wilson, who now found that the use of force and loss of American lives

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[46]Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), pp. 17-18.

[47]Secretary of State Bryan to Special Agent George C. Carrothers, April 21, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 480.

[48]Special Agent Carrothers to Secretary of State Bryan, April 22, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, pp. 483-484.

[49]Special Agent Carrothers to Secretary of State Bryan, April 23, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, pp. 485-486.

was not applauded by the Mexican rebels or anyone else. An avenue of escape was offered him in late April when the ABC countries -- Argentina, Brazil and Chile -- offered their services as mediators.[50] The offer was eagerly accepted and a conference arranged, only to find that not one of the interested parties could even agree on the issues to be arbitrated. The United States considered the problem to be one of stabilizing the internal situation of Mexico; to Huerta it was a matter of ridding his country of foreign troops and collecting the port revenues so necessary for his survival. Carranza denied the legality of the entire conference and refused to send delegates or to be bound by its decisions. The meetings dragged on and on, and each day saw the diminution of Huerta's control over Mexico. The Constitutionalists were gaining as the federal funds were slipping away. On July 14, 1914, Huerta resigned his position and departed for France. Wilson's policy of "watchful waiting" had achieved its goal, but not by merely watching and waiting. The question may have been little more than a choice of good or bad, but the people involved had not made the choice.[51]

Despite the fall of Huerta, the Constitutionalist victory was a hollow one. Without an outside force as a focal point to contend with, the new rebel forces became aware of their heterogeneity.[52] When its leaders paused and looked around, they found little rapport or personal friendship among themselves. This situation can be blamed on

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[50]Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 160.

[51]The ironic points of interest were that this conference did not concern itself with the disputed salute which had precipitated the invasion, while the Ypiranga and its cargo reached Huerta's forces in spite of all the precautions. See Baker, Wilson, IV, p. 349 and Quirk, Affair of Honor, pp. 150-151.

[52]Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 53.

personalities, with the differences between Villa, Zapata and Carranza as one source of blame; but this view is only superficial. The root of the disagreement rested in the fact that no basis for the revolutionary movement had been laid. A cry for government that was constitutional and legal was sufficient to arouse the patriotic zeal and anger of the people, but once emotion had cooled something much more firm and definite was required: a clear and precise revolutionary program. It did not exist except in the minds of each of the rebel leaders. Mexico found herself facing rule by one of three individuals who had served well and long without agreeing on the principles they were serving. Were the battles fought for the moderate middle-class ideas of Carranza? Did men die to bring the lower classes to the fore and turn the country over to them? Had it all been for land redistribution with the naive assumption that such redistribution would dissolve all barriers? No one knew, and a conference of revolutionary leaders was called in the hope that discussion and debate would prevent the use of the battlefield as arbiter.

The Aguascalientes Convention of the Constitutionalist forces, which began in October, 1914, did not resolve the divisive issues. An uncompromising air permeated the proceedings as strong-minded men who had found common ground in war could not do so in peace. When the Villistas and the Zapatistas united to elect a Provisional President who did not meet the approval of Carranza, he withdrew to Veracruz and prepared to defend his title of "First Chief."[53] With him went Alvaro Obregón, whose military genius was priceless to Carranza's success.

The intra-revolutionary strife forced Carranza to seek popular

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[53]Acting Secretary of State Robert Lansing to Consul Canada, February 6, 1915, in PRFR, 1915, p. 651.

support for his leadership. Thus he declared a "pre-constitutional" period and ruled by decree. These edicts attacked the problems that lay at the heart of the revolution. They included the abolishment of the hated jefes políticos in the provinces of Mexico, declared enforceable the laws already on the books to outlaw peonage, legalized divorce, and announced shorter hours and higher wages for labor.[54] These proclamations were more liberal than the man who issued them, and the question arises whether they could be enforced since Carranza did not control enough of Mexico to do so. Their purpose was propagandistic, and they are not to be understood as characteristic or indicative of the "First Chief's" philosophy.[55]

By the middle of 1916, Carranza had eliminated the factions that opposed him. Obregón had hammered at both Villa and Zapata until they retreated to their local areas where they could irritate but not endanger Constitutionalist control. With victory came the necessity of the Carrancistas to legitimize their struggle on whatever basis they chose. In September, 1916, a constitutional convention was called. The delegates to this meeting were popularly elected, and there was only one requirement to their being seated -- they had to take an oath of loyalty to Carranza's Plan of Guadalupe. This, in effect, made the gathering little more than a "Constitutionalist Party Convention."[56]

The result of the convention was the new constitution promulgated the following year. This was not a nebulous, hurriedly written plan, but a full-scale revolutionary document that incorporated most of the hopes

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[54]Gruening, Mexico and Heritage, p. 99.

[55]Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 137.

[56]Gruening, Mexico and Heritage, p. 99.

and grievances that had initiated the first revolutionary wave in 1910. The forces in Mexican society that had for so long stood outside the pale of authority were noted and provisions made for their control. The Church was shorn of all power and prestige other than those of a strictly defined religious nature. Faith itself was to be a matter of individual conscience, and each person was given the right to "embrace the religion of his choice."[57] With the realization that those who educate, control, it was written that education would be "entirely apart from any religious doctrine." The land problem that had crippled the real growth and prosperity of the nation was corrected in an article proclaiming that all ownership of land within the borders of Mexico was now restored to the state, which in turn granted it to private owners.[58] This provision was expanded to include the valuable mineral rights which had resulted in the exploitation of Mexico by outsiders.[59] Outside capital could still enter the country, but the real property possessed by the foreigners was to be regulated by the same rules that applied to native property owners. Aliens also gave up the right to invoke the protection of their government in all disputes arising over such ownership.[60] The constitution clearly defined the relationship between employers and employees concerning working conditions, hours and wages. Rights were extended to these groups to organize unions or associations as well as to strike and

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[57] Amos J. Peaslee (ed.), Constitutions of Nations (4 vols.; Concord, New Hampshire: Rumford Press, 1950), II, p. 421.

[58] Ibid.

[59] O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife, p. 471.

[60] Andrew N. Cleven, "Some Social Aspects of the Mexican Constitution of 1917," Hispanic American Historical Review, IV (August, 1921), 478-479.

to have lock-outs.[61] The liberties of all citizens were defined and clarified, and the responsibility of the individuals to the states, and vice-versa, were defined. The document concluded with a clause stating its non-revocability; even if the nation was in revolution, the constitution was still in effect.[62] The Mexican revolution at last had created a base.

Peace and security did not follow the promulgation of the Constitution of 1917 or the inauguration of Venustiano Carranza as the first president thereunder on March 12, 1917. The same conservative groups that had held Mexico in chains for so long still existed. It would take more than a piece of paper and revolutionary ideas to destroy their power. The Constitution of 1917, like most constitutions, was open to interpretation. It mentioned nothing of a time limit in which its provisions should be put into effect. The President, who could have greatly increased the speed of the process, did not approve of the constitution because of its radical nature and was slow in carrying out its articles. Indeed, on two occasions he made unsuccessful attempts to modify it to meet his original proposals.[63] As the dissident sectors of Mexican society prepared to take advantage of the guarantee given to them in 1917, they found themselves checked by the President. Organized labor struck, only to be declared an enemy of the government and suppressed.[64] The peasant farmer awaited the redistribution of land, only to find the

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[61]Peaslee, Constitutions, II, pp. 454-455.

[62]Ibid., p. 459.

[63]Stanley E. Hilton, "The Church State Dispute over Education in Mexico from Carranza to Cardenas," The Americas, XXI (October, 1964), 167.

[64]Gruening, Mexico and Heritage, p. 338.

process slow; it would be several years before his wants could be met.[65] The promises for education were not put into effect; the facilities for education actually seemed to be decreasing, with critics claiming money for the education program was going to keep Carranza in power. Indeed, the budget showed that more money was spent in the Department of War and Marine than in all others combined.[66] Still the people waited for the promises that had been made them.

Carranza was making the same mistakes that Madero had made in 1910. He was trying to carry out social and economic reforms by cleaning up the political situation. He did remove the people of the old Diaz regime from the government and replace them with representatives of the revolution, but this did not aid the people. The military was also curtailed and controlled, but the people were still hungry and landless. As 1920 rolled around it was obvious that the President was getting more and more dictatorial. He had disregarded election formalities and had imposed his candidates as state governors.[67] The revolutionary leaders waited as they remembered the last round of intra-revolutionary fighting and the damage it had done to the country. Then on April 9, 1919, Emiliano Zapata was assassinated. It could not be absolutely proven that Carranza had planned the murder, but circumstantial evidence seemed to indicate that he was involved. The revolutionaries shuddered; if the President could murder Zapata, then the same fate could befall them. The mutterings of revolt were heard again. This murmur became a roar of anger when Carranza

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[65]John W. F. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution, 1919-1936 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), pp. 99-100.

[66]Thomas E. Gibbon, Mexico Under Carranza (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1919), pp. 24, 29.

[67]Herbert I. Priestly, The Mexican Nation: A History (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), p. 443.

attempted to designate a puppet to follow him as president.

The mover of the new revolt was Alvaro Obregón, the man most responsible for placing Carranza in power. To Obregón, the President was making the same mistakes that had been made in the past. The country was not allowed to "liberate itself from its liberators."[68] The result was a continuation of the old repression under a new name and oppressor. Alvaro Obregón declared himself a candidate for the presidential election of 1920 and toured the country seeking popular support. In each area he visited, Obregon always managed to talk to the military commanders and explain to them that it was their duty as part of the revolutionary army to stop Carranza from imposing his candidate as president. The result was the Plan of Agua Prieta issued by a group of Sonoran generals. The plan proclaimed that Carranza had made a travesty of popular rule and by imposing his governors had violated the sovereignty of the states. Peaceful means to prevent this imposition had failed; force now had to be used. The revolutionary generals were so quick to follow this declaration that this movement earned the title of "the strike of the army men."[69]

Carranza tried to do again what had been so successful for him in the stormy days after the fall of Huerta. He placed faithful officials and the contents of the national treasury on a train and departed for Veracruz. In the state of Puebla the train ran into broken tracks, which forced the travelers to mount horses in their journey to the north. On May 27, 1920, the President of Mexico was killed in the small village of Tlaxcalantongo while sleeping on the mud floor of a peasant hut. He was not a victim of counter-revolution or reaction; the revolution had made

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[68]Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, p. 25.

[69]Ibid., 33.

him its leader and then had removed him.[70]

The death of Venustiano Carranza marked the end of the Mexican revolution in its active and most bloody aspects. There would still be insurrections and insurgents who talked of overthrowing the government, and some even tried. But the old anger and passion was gone. Men could no longer be stirred to combat by speeches that ended with the cry of "tierra y libertad." They were quickly approaching the point of having both. For ten years revolution had thundered across the nation, and its innocent victims had remained as a warning to future movements. Mexico had her revolution, and she wanted no more. The people now desired the benefits that had been flaunted before them for so long. A decade of surgery had been performed, and the nation had tired of blood-letting. The patient required peace and time to heal.

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[70]Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 59.

CHAPTER II

"SO FAR FROM GOD..."

FRANCISCO MADERO AND UNITED STATES NEUTRALITY, 1910-1913

The Mexican Revolution was an event of the twentieth century, but its pattern was as old as discontent. There was no straight and clearly discernible route from the overthrow of Porfirio Díaz to the "institutionalization" of revolutionary doctrines. It was a long, painful and laborious task with all the set-backs and reversals that are concomitants of forceful and violent change. As the path veered and wandered, there were occasional groups of individuals who no longer felt safe or comfortable within the confines of revolutionary consensus. To escape from real or imagined punishment for their respective heresies, they fled to the United States and from there plotted, propagandized and pressured for acceptance of their ideas and plans for the future of their country. The effect and consequence of their actions was as much a problem for the nation to which they fled as for Mexico.

There was nothing unique or unusual in refugees seeking a protective haven in the United States. A cursory examination of United States-Mexican relations shows that a large part of the interplay between 1910-1915 could point to a long, diverse and undeniable historical precedent for their actions. Even Porfirio Díaz, whose iron regime precipitated the revolution, came to power in 1876 from a base located in Texas and

faced movements from that area and others.[1]

The entrance of the United States into the Mexican milieu of the early twentieth century was not the result of chance or unfortunate accident. It can be explained in part by geography, in that this country and Mexico share a border exceeding 1,400 miles in length. It is no natural boundary with physical barriers to explain its location, but rather a negotiated, arbitrary line; in many areas it can be crossed by merely taking another step. The Rio Grande extends over more than one-half its length, but it is normally easily forded and provides only a slight hindrance to the determined traveler. Once the border was crossed the Mexican fugitive could find neutrality laws that were extremely vague and border patrols that were practically non-existent; both circumstances would be necessary to the success of his venture.[2]

There were a large number of people in the United States who showed an active interest in Mexico and were not entirely ignorance of the revolution and its implications for them. This was particularly true of those individuals who stood to gain or lose by the events to the south. The border inhabitants expressed an interest for a variety of reasons. There are several cities that are located astride the boundary line and are part Mexican, part American. Any activity that affected the Mexican portion of the city would have similar results on its counterpart. This, by necessity, made the turbulent affairs below the border a point of considerable interest, since military actions often occurred within

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[1]Charles C. Cumberland, "Mexican Revolutionary Movements from Texas, 1906-1912," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LII (January, 1949), 301.

[2]J. Fred Rippy, Jose Vasconcelos and Guy Stevens, American Policies Abroad: Mexico (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), p. 10 and New York Times, February 13, 1915, p. 8.

eyesight, and United States citizens on the border were oftentimes on the casualty lists. The attention of Americans was heightened by a bond of sympathy between them and the Mexican revolutionaries. All of the border states had at one time been controlled by Mexico, and the inhabitants prided themselves on breaking away from what they considered to be a degenerate political body. Some border states had only recently received statehood and felt that their closeness to the frontier made them more aware of the true meaning of democracy. Both factors tended to make these people eager to aid revolutionaries, occasionally to the point of breaking the law. It would have been difficult for Americans in the area, so strong in their democratic faith and so aware of the usefulness of revolt, to deny the necessity or obligation of others to follow suit.

The business community was directly involved and concerned with the events in Mexico. A total of $1,000,000,000 invested in Mexico and a fear of the anti-American tendencies of the revolution made American financiers more than a little anxious when the blind passion of quick change appeared. Violence is bad for business, but revolution can be disastrous, and the outcries of American businessmen were among the first to be heard. They expected their money, property, and lives to be protected and with good reason; for President Taft had stated on December 7, 1909, that a citizen of the United States remained so no matter where he resided, and it was not to be expected that he relinquish his "personal or property rights" when in a foreign country.[3]

In addition, there were other segments of the American population who made their preferences known on how the Mexican situation should be

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[3]James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (11 vols.; Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National Literature, 1931), X, p. 7795.

handled. The Catholic Church feared the anti-religious and anti-clerical wrath of the rebels; labor leaders, notably Samuel Gompers, from time to time spoke of the universality of their movement and the right of the Mexican laborer to share in it; and the usual assortment of people who pictured revolution as something dashing and romantic, filled with bloody charges and the companionship of the campfire after a day of blood-letting. All had to be taken into account if the government of the United States was to realize a Mexican policy that was supportable and supported. The exile groups had either to counteract or utilize this assorted idealism and materialism to convince the officials in Washington of the popular support for their cause. It was not a task for the meek or weak-hearted.

As already stated, there had been a long procession of refugees fleeing from Mexico to the United States. The precursor in terms of operative method and intent to those under discussion was that of Ricardo Flores Magón. In 1904 this anarchist and labor organizer was already preparing a philosophical basis for Madero's revolt in Mexico. His base of operation was initially southern Texas, although he eventually relocated in St. Louis, Missouri. From here he issued "El Programa del Partido Liberal,"[4] the first of the important revolutionary plans. Flores Magón's faction received support and financial aid from Francisco Madero, a member of a wealthy, landed family of northern Mexico, to keep propaganda pouring into the restless country. This aid was particularly important in helping finance the chief propaganda organ, Regeneracion, a newspaper printed in Spanish and distributed in both the United States

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[4] Cumberland, Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LII, 302.

and Mexico.[5] This publication had considerable influence in causing the large number of labor strikes of 1906 in Mexico.[6] For more than five years Flores Magón was pursued from state to state by federal authorities and was eventually arrested for violation of the neutrality laws.[7] Shortly before his arrest, he and Madero had disagreed over the opportuneness of revolution, and he was no longer getting money from the future rebel.[8]

This incident of exile activity in the United States received little popular support due to the fact that its leader espoused ideas of anarchism and international organization -- both of which were unacceptable to the majority of Americans. The only open support of any significance was from Samuel Gompers, who worked for Flores Magón's release whenever he was imprisoned; but this was done in the name of labor rather than revolution.[9] It is impossible to prove, but quite plausible, that Madero learned from his predecessor's experiences. Madero never spoke of a universal need for revolution and always kept his utterances in vague and emotional terms which the American people could sympathize with and support.

Francisco Madero's exile activities began on October 7, 1910, when he crossed the bridge at Laredo dressed in the clothes of a railroad

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[5]Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 42.

[6]William M. Rossiter, "Mexican-American Relations, 1913-1920. A Reappraisal," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1953), pp. 8-9.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ross, Madero, p. 43.

[9]Rossiter, "Mexican-American Relations," p. 12.

mechanic.[10] From Laredo he journeyed to San Antonio, Texas, where he established a "Junta Revolucionaria." A few days later he issued a proclamation entitled "To The American People." In this first pronouncement on United States soil the rebel leader asked for nothing more than "hospitality which all free peoples have always accorded to those from other countries who strive for liberty."[11] There was no radical statement here, for Madero was no ill-kept radical haranguing people with ideas that opposed the tenor of the times. In a word, he was no Ricardo Flores Magón. The new rebel was a member of a wealthy and influential family with connections in the United States and who always conducted himself with a quiet and restrained dignity that lent popular sympathy to his movement.[12] The mayor of El Paso stated some years later that 95% of his consistuency supported Madero.[13] Flores Magón could be hounded; Madero would have to be handled.

There was little doubt from the beginning that Madero was equipping a revolution and using the United States as a base of operation and source of supply for arms and ammunition. In his "Plan of San Luis Potosí" he had proclaimed November 20 as the starting date for his insurrection, and agents were active in preparing for that date. As early

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[10]Ross, Madero, p. 112.

[11]Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1911 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 350. Hereinafter cited as PRFR and the proper year.

[12]Cumberland, Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LII, 307 and Federico González Garza, La Revolución Mexicana. Mi Contribución Político-literária (Mexico City: Talleres Tipográficos, 1936), p. 223.

[13]U. S. Congress, Senate, Revolutions in Mexico, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1913, p. 452 and Rafael Martínez, Carlos M. Samper and Gral. José P. Lomelin, La Revolución y sus Hombres (Mexico City: Talleres Tipográficos de "El Tiempo," 1912), p. 122.

as November 14, Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson relayed the message that there were revolutionaries gathering war material in the United States, and that the Mexican government would be appreciative of all steps to prevent the continuance of such activities.[14] Two days later the Díaz regime was positive that these men were led by Madero. A suspected rebel in Mexico had been arrested, and a search of his house revealed commissions signed by Don Francisco in his capacity of "President ad interim and Commander of the Revolutionary Army of Mexico."[15] The reaction of the State Department to this information was non-committal. It informed the Mexican government that all complaints of rebel activities would be forwarded to the Department of Justice with the recommendation they be investigated as quickly as possible.[16] The Mexican government was also requested to provide all the evidence it possessed pertaining to such action.[17] As November 20 approached the complaints described the massing of bands along the border in preparation for the expected invasion.[18] On the aforementioned date Consul Edwards at Ciudad Porfirio Díaz reported that Madero had crossed the border into Mexico.[19]

The first step in the revolution was not only a failure, it was

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[14]American Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson to Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, November 14, 1910, in PRFR, 1911, pp. 358-359.

[15]Same to Same, November 16, 1910, in PRFR, 1911, p. 326.

[16]Secretary of State Knox to American Ambassador Wilson, November 19, 1910, in PRFR, 1911, p. 364.

[17]Acting Secretary of State James Adee to American Ambassador Wilson, November 19, 1910, in PRFR, 1911, p. 364.

[18]Mexican Ambassador Francisco de la Barra to Secretary of State Knox, November 19, 1910, in PRFR, 1911, p. 364.

[19]American Consul Ellsworth at Ciudad Porfirio Díaz to Secretary of State Knox, November 22, 1910, in PRFR, 1911, p. 365.

almost a laughable one. One can see the rebel leader crossing into Mexico fully expecting his supporters to rise up and join him en masse. Such was not the case. No force of any size awaited him, and again Madero fled over the border. It was not defeat but merely postponement. Running low on funds, the revolutionary leader disbanded his organization in San Antonio and traveled to New Orleans in the hope of entering his country from that port.[20]

The days spent in New Orleans were barren, but Madero believed in himself and his cause. Not even the condition of unaccustomed poverty could diminish his confidence in the inevitability of a Mexico without Díaz.[21] While he was in Louisiana, federal authorities in San Antonio had been instructed to arrest him, believing he was still in the area.[22] The United States attorney in that district stated that he lacked sufficient cause for such action unless Mexico could provide more evidence.[23] Since the Mexican government could not provide the information, Madero returned to Texas in late December still free and active.

The protests by Mexican officials against rebel activities in the United States did not abate. The demand for action continued through January and into February of 1911, with the United States government insisting it would prosecute all violators of the neutrality laws if the

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[20]Cumberland, Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LII, 310.

[21]Living conditions were so bad for Madero while in New Orleans that the once aristocratic rebel was reduced to repairing his own shoes. His spirits remained high, and while his brother worried about food he thought of men who could serve in his cabinet when his revolution triumphed. See Ross, Madero, p. 129.

[22]Acting Attorney General J. A. Fowler to Secretary of State Knox, November 30, 1910, in PRFR, 1911, p. 370.

[23]Attorney General G. W. Wickersham to Secretary of State Knox, December 2, 1910, in PRFR, 1911, p. 371.

violations could be verified. It would not prosecute on reports of rumors, and "mere word, written or spoken" was no offense.[24] By February 4 the obvious had become blatant, and authorities in this country could no longer deny that Madero was indeed breaking the neutrality laws in preparing to launch military expeditions into a friendly country from the United States.[25] A warrant was issued for his arrest.[26] Meanwhile the revolution had gained momentum without Mexico; the impending arrest and a belief that he could be of more use in his country prompted Madero to hold a hurried meeting with his officers and then to cross into Mexico. San Antonio remained the headquarters of the Provisional Government and still served as the supplier of guns and ammunition for the rebellion.[27]

In conducting operations for the revolution it was mandatory that its leader remain on or near the border. This location greatly facilitated the solution of problems that might arise within Mexico and allowed frequent meetings of the commander and his subordinates. But there was crucial and demanding work to be done in other parts of the United States. The success of this revolution, and all others in Mexico, depended on the attitude of the government in Washington, and it was necessary to have men there who could speak well and convincingly for the cause. Therefore,

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[24]Secretary of State Knox to Mexican Ambassador Francisco de la Barra, January 23, 1911, in PRFR, 1911, p. 393.

[25]The Neutrality Laws state that anyone who prepares and, or initiates acts of aggression from within the United States against nations friendly to the United States is subject to a large fine and a maximum three year jail sentence. See Section XIII, Appendix A.

[26]Secretary of State Knox to Mexican Chargé d'Affaires, February 4, 1911, in PRFR, 1911, p. 401.

[27]Cumberland, Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LII, 318.

shortly before November 20, 1910, Ernesto Fernández y Artega, a long-time friend of the Madero family, was appointed as the rebel spokesman to the national government. To avoid the pitfalls of international law, Fernandez y Artega took the precaution of retaining a lawyer well versed in that field. The mission was later supplemented by the addition of Juan Sánchez and Gustavo Madero, brother of Francisco and financial agent of the revolution.[28]

With the collapse of the first abortive attempt to oust Díaz, the Maderista junta in Washington was disbanded, as it was neither immediately necessary nor monetarily tolerable. On deciding to return to Mexico, the rebel leader again recognized the need to have representation in Washington. This time his choice fell to Dr. Francisco Vásquez Gómez, a noted physician and statesman in his own right. Vásquez Gómez had refused to associate with the San Antonio Junta, but as it became more obvious that the revolutionary wheel was rolling in Madero's direction, he decided to follow it.[29] The two men met in El Paso in February of 1911 to arrange a working agreement and to mediate their differences. After some pressure, the doctor agreed to head the second mission to Washington as chief of the "Agency of Revolution." In return he obtained a pledge that Madero would not re-enter Mexico.[30] This promise was later broken. A secretary and aide was also chosen to help Vásquez Gómez. This was José Vasconcelos, who later became one of the leading intellectuals of the revolutionary

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[28]Garza, Mi Contribución, p. 220.

[29]Charles Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1952), p. 130.

[30]Martínez, et al., Revolución y Hombres, p. 85.

movement.[31]

The Revolutionary Agency was established to serve two essential functions. It was to meet with governmental officers on the official and unofficial level, and argue the rebel cause in the hope of obtaining a recognition of belligerency for the government. Such recognition would be of little material significance, but would have considerable effect on the morale of the rebels. If granted, it would indicate to people within Mexico that the rebellion was more than another small-scale insurrection. In addition, recognition of belligerency would imply that cause existed for the overthrow of Diaz and that the United States was willing to recognize a government created by the revolutionaries.

The second purpose of the Maderistas in Washington was to keep the legitimacy of their purpose before the American people and to make it clear that the movement was the action of a down-trodden people removing the boot of tyranny from their throats. The press of the United States was, in large part, responsible for success in fulfilling this function. The revolution itself was news, and the reporters were eager to seek interviews with the Maderista spokesmen in the country.[32]

In all its duties the agency conflicted with the representatives of the Porfirian government in this country. The Díaz government expended large sums of money for spies to infiltrate the exiles at work in the United States and to betray arm shipments and smugglers.[33] Dr. Vásquez Gómez had to frustrate this plan as much as possible from his position in

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[31]José Vasconcelos, A Mexican Ulysses: An Autobiography, trans. and abridged by W. Rex Crawford (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), pp. 59-60.

[32]Vasconcelos, American Policies, p. 104.

[33]Vasconcelos, Ulysses, pp. 59-60.

Washington and with considerably less money than the enemy.[34]

As mentioned, the chief financial agent of Francisco Madero was his brother, Gustavo. Fiscal operations were not confined to a single state or area, and Gustavo's duty was deceptively simple -- to solve all financial difficulties involved in ridding Mexico of Díaz. The Madero family was wealthy in terms of land, but it was difficult to convert these holdings into liquid assets. Shortly after Francisco had fled to Mexico the family estates had been frozen and could not be disposed of for cash, while gun sellers insisted on being paid in currency. In 1910 a loan was negotiated with a Paris banking house by underwriting bonds in exchange for railroad rights through Zacatecas.[35] By early 1911 much of this money had already been used in launching the revolution, and Gustavo was placed in the position of finding money where none was to be had. At least one major oil company reportedly offered aid but withdrew it when the State Department and Francisco Madero indicated their disapproval.[36] As nearly as can be determined, the Madero revolution received no financial aid of any consequence from the people of the United States or the business community. The situation was so critical at one point that the selling of bonds of the Provisional Government was considered, but this proposal was never carried out.[37] By May 4, 1911, the inability to obtain funds was rapidly nearing the point of halting the rebellion altogether. In this crisis, Gustavo Madero grew careless in

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[34]E. I. Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico (Boston: Little, Brown, 1914), p. 43.

[35]Ibid., p. 48.

[36]Howard C. Cline, The United States and Mexico (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 123.

[37]Martínez, et al., Revolución y Hombres, p. 220.

his attempts to solve it and was forced to flee to Canada.[38] In May Ciudad Juárez fell to the rebels, which alleviated some of the financial pressure. A few days later, on May 25, the grip of Díaz on Mexico completely collapsed, and the old dictator became an exile in Europe.

The months between Madero's entry into Mexico City on June 7, 1911, and his formal election as President of Mexico on October 15 were not peaceful. Opposition was immediate, if not particularly effective, and the United States again served as a sanctuary for the discontented. As early as May 29, 1911, four days after the resignation of Díaz, a plot backed by supporters of Díaz was reported in El Paso. One of the conspirators informed the United States Secret Service, and the instigators were arrested.[39] Three months later another remnant of the Porfiriato, General Bernardo Reyes, left Mexico in a disenchanted mood due to the lack of support his candidacy for President was receiving. The General's cry of rigged elections was evidently more expediency than truthful proclamation.[40] For more than a month the government of Mexico was not sure of his whereabouts, although he spent part of the time in Havana and New Orleans before arriving in Texas.[41]

By October Reyes had located along the south Texas border amidst fears that he was planning another revolution. Not wishing to give the General any more publicity than he already had, Provisional President Francisco de la Barra sent his brother to San Antonio to ascertain the

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[38]Garza, Mi Contribución, p. 220.

[39]New York Times, February 10, 1913, p. 3.

[40]Ross, Madero, p. 254.

[41]Ibid.

plans of Reyes and attempt to conciliate any grievances.[42] He found that the recalcitrant General was indeed planning an attempt to oust the government in Mexico and that he was not in the least interested in conciliation. This information forced the Mexican government to give the threat official recognition. On November 10, the Mexican Ambassador, Crespo y Martínez, reported that his government had "serious reason for believing" that Reyes and a band of followers were plotting an invasion in San Antonio and that such an action would undoubtedly violate the neutrality laws of the United States.[43] Five days later the "reason for believing" had hardened to "definite information" which included the collusion of certain Texas officials, among them the sheriff of Webb County. The Mexican government insisted that it was capable of handling any action taken by the Reyistas but recommended a liberal interpretation of the neutrality laws to nip the movement in its infancy.[44] The State Department's answer was identical with those made to the Díaz regime during Madero's action; the suspects would be arrested if their movements could be factually proven as infractions of existing legislation.[45] The Maderistas in this country provided the required evidence, and on November 18, the General, the Sheriff and other less notable participants were arrested, while the confiscation of arms started.[46]

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[42]American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, October 27, 1911, in PRFR, 1911, p. 520.

[43]Mexican Ambassador Gilberto Crespo y Martínez to Secretary of State Knox, November 10, 1911, in PRFR, 1911, p. 521.

[44]American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, November 15, 1911, in PRFR, 1911, p. 521.

[45]Secretary of State Knox to Mexican Ambassador Gilberto Crespo y Martínez, November 17, 1911, in PRFR, 1911, p. 522.

[46]American Consul Garrett at Neuva Laredo to Secretary of State Knox, November 18, 1911 in ibid. and Same to Same, November 19, 1911, p. 522.

Two days after this arrest Reyes was released on a bond of $5,000 and placed under surveillance.[47] He was also warned not to cross the border into Mexico under any circumstances.[48] The General pleaded with Robert La Follette, the Republican Senator from Wisconsin, to intervene in his behalf, but to no avail. All hope of help from high governmental circles was smashed when President Taft stated unequivocally that no invasion of Mexican territory would be permitted from the United States.[49] Realizing that the United States was less than warm to his cause, Reyes crossed the border in December and found the people of Mexico equally cool to his blandishments. On Christmas Day he surrendered to a small band of rurales and was transported to Mexico City for trial.[50]

Despite official protests to the contrary, there were differences in the manner in which the United States handled Madero and Reyes. Reyes had been in this country only a short period before he was investigated as to his motives and was arrested. Madero had been working along the border for months before the same occurred to him, and he had always had free access into Mexico. Reyes had made no hostile political movements toward Mexico, and unless the interpretation of the laws had been modified, there was no case for arresting him. All this being true, President Taft was perhaps overstating the facts a bit when on December 7, while reporting to Congress the conditions along the border, he proudly announced that the United States was doing no more for Madero than it had

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[47]Ross, Madero, p. 255.

[48]Cumberland, Genesis, p. 188.

[49]Ibid.

[50]American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, December 30, 1911, in PRFR, 1911, p. 525.

for Diaz.[51]

Reyes' revolution was an irritant to the Mexican government and little else. He represented the "old Mexico" of iron rule, and the trend was toward less severe government. There was another movement partially concurrent with the Reyistas that did show signs of producing serious consequences. This revolt was led by members of the first revolution, and their claim to speak for reform was clearly as good as Madero's. The old cynical and defiant axiom of revolution was rearing its head: united in opposition, divided in victory.

Upon entering Mexico City Madero started the long task of finding individuals to serve as his advisors after his expected victory in the national election of October 15, 1911. There were relatively few men available who were capable of fulfilling the requisites of these offices. Among this small number were the two Vásquez Gómez brothers, Francisco and Emilio; the former had served as Madero's confidential agent in Washington. Emilio was selected as Minister of Government and Francisco as Minister of Public Instruction. It was also generally assumed that the Public Instruction Minister would be the vice-presidential candidate in the elections. A split between the brothers and Madero was developing long before the appointment, but the soon-to-be president thought he could bridge it. He and Dr. Vásquez Gómez had some misunderstandings during the revolution itself over when action should start and over the final goals of the revolution. This was widened by Madero's appointment of some members of the old Díaz regime to the ad interim cabinet.[52] Disputes

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[51]President William H. Taft to Congress, December 7, 1911, in PRFR, 1911, pp. xv-xvi.

[52]Ross, Madero, p. 206.

with Emilio followed a like pattern, with the added fact that he openly encouraged the rebel chiefs to oppose Madero unless the leader removed all vestiges of the Porfiriato from the new government.[53] These conflicts could not be resolved, and Emilio, after resigning his position under pressure, went to San Antonio and starting issuing anti-Madero propaganda.

From San Antonio Emilio circulated a letter to his followers in Mexico announcing that Madero was certain to fall, which made it their duty to take up the reins of government before other less acceptable groups did.[54] This was followed on December 29, 1911, by an open invitation for all the discontented revolutionaries to join the movement.[55] In mid-February Emilio proclaimed himself Provisional President[56] and stepped up his propaganda, to the displeasure of the Mexican government.[57] The government in Mexico and United States Ambassador Wilson recommended that he either be gagged or expelled from the United States in the hope of settling the tense situation in Mexico.[58] The case was investigated, but as there was nothing to indicate that the law had been broken, the Mexican government was reminded that Madero had been able to do the same while in residence in the United States two years earlier.[59]

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[53]Cumberland, Genesis, p. 159.

[54]Ross, Madero, p. 256.

[55]Cumberland, Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LII, 318-319.

[56]American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, February 18, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 721.

[57]Ibid., January 6, 1912, p. 710.

[58]Ibid., February 27, 1912, p. 727 and February 28, 1912, p. 728.

[59]Acting Secretary of State Huntington Wilson to Mexican Ambassador Gilberto Crespo y Martínez, February 29, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 729.

Late in February the Vasquistas in Mexico had succeeded in capturing the border city of Ciudad Juárez.[60] This was the same city that had been so crucial in the success of Madero's rebellion and it appeared that the revolution had gone full cycle. Again, the Mexican government and the United States argued, reasoned and pleaded in a clash over the rights of rebels to get arms in this country. The Madero government first requested that all exportation by way of Ciudad Juárez be halted, only to be informed by Acting Secretary of State Huntington Wilson that there was no reason for altering the stand taken when Madero held it during his rebellion.[61] Moreover, the question involved the broader issue of recognition of the belligerency rights of the rebels.[62] According to international law, Ciudad Juárez, though held by insurgents, was still officially in the hands of the central government; thus the United States refused to take any action in isolating this entry city between the United States and Mexico.[63] The only alternative, following this line of reasoning, would have been to recognize the rebel forces as belligerents and then boycott Ciudad Juárez. This course was unacceptable to the Madero government.

Finding no legal basis for their demands, the Mexican government turned to logic and cajolery by arguing that unless the arms shipments through Ciudad Juárez were stopped, the government in Mexico might fall and the United States would be forced to intervene; therefore, why not

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[60]American Consul Edwards at Ciudad Juárez to Secretary of State Knox, February 27, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 882.

[61]Acting Secretary of State Wilson to American Ambassador Wilson, March 1, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 729.

[62]Ibid., February 29, 1912, p. 729.

[63]Ibid., March 4, 1912, p. 736.

halt the movement before that point was reached?[64] The State Department refused to base present policy on future contingency and, while expressing its sympathy, insisted it was a Mexican problem which Mexico would be required to solve. The United States had neutrality laws, and all it could do was prosecute the violators of these laws, leaving other problems to the solution of the responsibile nation.[65] This Olympian detachment was more than the harassed Mexican Ambassador Crespo y Martínez could endure, and with an anger evident even in his cordial response he recounted the attempts of his government to protect Americans and their property from rebels using guns purchased in the United States, and partially led by a man who resided in San Antonio. He then charged the United States with hiding behind its inadequate neutrality laws by claiming they existed and thus had to be followed. If the laws were ineffectual, he wrote, they should be amended and not apologized for.[66] No connection can be proved, but three days later, on March 4, 1912, Congress passed a joint resolution allowing the President to control and divert the shipment of arms to countries where violence was aggravated by arms coming from the United States.[67]

The Vasquistas uprising was in effect the forerunner and "stalking horse" of a movement led by one of Madero's best fighting commanders, Pascual Orozco. Orozco was among the first openly to support Madero and

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[64]American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, March 5, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 737.

[65]Acting Secretary of State Wilson to Mexican Ambassador Gilberto Crespo y Martínez, March 8, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, pp. 740-742.

[66]Mexican Ambassador Gilberto Crespo y Martínez to Secretary of State Knox, March 11, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, pp. 743-744.

[67]Joint Resolution of Congress, March 14, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 745.

had been instrumental in the fighting that had toppled Díaz. Though only superficially educated, he had a rather exaggerated belief in his mental powers and expected rewards commensurate with his revolutionary contributions and his presumed capability. He wanted to be Governor of Chihuahua but was disappointed when Abraham González won that position. When González received an appointment in Madero's cabinet, Orzico felt he should be the one to fill the unexpired term. However, he was again passed over for a more qualified man. He eventually received the position of commander of the rurales of Chihuahua, but this was a small and relatively unimportant position. On January 12, 1912, he resigned, and the germ of rebellion was growing within him.[68] When the Vasquistas took Ciudad Juárez, Orozco joined the movement in early March.[69] It was inevitable that Orozco would gain leadership of the Vasquista forces. The fighter has always appealed more to the Mexican people than the intellectual, and Orozco was in Mexico while Emilio was safe in the United States. By early April the rebel chiefs were drifting away from the leadership of Vásquez Gómez and were following Orozco.[70]

From the first the Orozquistas were hostile toward the United States for what they considered to be the pro-Madero inclination of the Washington officials.[71] Yet they were not so foolish as to believe that their rebellion could succeed without the support of the United States, and

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[68]Cumberland, Genesis, pp. 191-192.

[69]Secretary of War H. L. Stimson to Secretary of State Knox, March 4, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 736.

[70]American Consul Letcher at Chihuahua to Secretary of State Knox, April 7, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 776 and Acting Secretary of State Wilson to American Consul Letcher at Chihuahua, April 11, 1912, p. 780.

[71]American Consul Letcher at Chihuahua to Secretary of State Knox, April 7, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 776.

Orozco was quick to proclaim his friendship[72] and ask for recognition of belligerency. The request was refused with the result that the Orozquistas decided that such a refusal was a two-sided weapon. Orozco informed the government of the United States that since they did not recognize those areas under rebel control in Mexico, the rebels did not recognize the official status of the American consuls in insurgent-held districts.[73] This statement placed Americans in a position of danger, since theoretically they would have no protection. The State Department replied that recognition or no, Americans would be treated humanely and in a civilized manner. If not, the Mexican people would answer.[74] This response was somewhat stronger than the rebels had anticipated, and they backed away. On April 18 Orozco wrote that his action met all the standards necessary for belligerency recognition. If the United States persisted in denying the obvious, the rebels would continue to deal with the consuls accredited to the central government.[75] In order that Washington might better understand the cause of the Orozco rebellion, the leader expressed willingness to communicate with the United States government on any level and stated his intention of sending a confidential agent to confer in his name.[76]

On April 20 Manuel L. Lujan, Orozco's agent, arrived in Washington

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[72]Acting Secretary of State Wilson to American Consul Letcher at Chihuahua, April 11, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 781.

[73]American Consul Letcher at Chihuahua to Secretary of State Knox, April 11, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 781.

[74]Acting Secretary of State Wilson to American Consul Letcher at Chihuahua, April 14, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 788.

[75]Pascual Orozco, Jr. to Acting Secretary of State Wilson, April 18, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 795.

[76]Ibid., pp. 795-796.

and informed the State Department that he exercised full power to confer and bargain with the United States government.[77] The State Department expressed a lack of interest in Senor Lujan and his credentials. He later stated that all his conferring was with clerks who blocked his entrance to the people he wanted to see.[78]

In addition to a confidential agent, Orozco also established a propaganda-disseminating center in New York City. This organization attacked Madero by claiming that he had dissipated the financial surplus left by Díaz; that he was not the true leader of the revolution but a mere opportunist; and that Gustavo Madero had stolen large sums of money.[79] The charge most popular in Mexico, that Madero was a lackey of the United States, was missing in these accusations. All of these were verifiably untrue, but Orozco was not interested in truth; he wanted power.

By May the split between Vasquistas and Orozquistas was no longer a matter of conjecture; it was a fact. Early in that month an envoy from Orozco offered the Provisional Presidency of Mexico to Emilio Vásquez Gómez with the seat of government in the rebel-occupied city of Ciudad Juárez.[80] On May 7 Orozco had second thoughts and removed his President after a term of less than four days.[81] Emilio returned to San Antonio and, without seeming in the least compromised, attacked Orozco and

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[77]Manuel L. Lujan to Secretary of State Knox, April 20, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 799.

[78]U. S. Congress, Senate, Revolutions in Mexico, p. 293.

[79]Cumberland, Genesis, p. 194.

[80]American Consul Edwards at Ciudad Juarez to Secretary of State Knox, May 4, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 809.

[81]American Consul Garrett at Nuevo Laredo to Secretary of State Knox, May 7, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 809.

Madero.[82] With the division in the rebel forces consummated, the movement was even less of a threat. The summer of 1912 saw its strength rapidly melt away.

In September the insurgent forces were so completely smashed that Orozco was forced to flee to the United States, where he was arrested. This arrext was an indication of a stronger line toward rebel activities on the border. In October the State Department requested the U. S. Department of War to arrest all rebels entering the United States from Mexico, giving Section XIV of the neutrality laws as the basis.[83] It was expected that this policy would shore up the tottering Madero government. If other justification was required, the State Department added that these rebels had consistently taken up arms to molest Americans and their property in the war-torn country.[84] As 1912 drew to a close it appeared that time had removed some of the old impartiality from the interpretation of the laws of neutrality. Where no authority could be found to arrest early rebels on the border in 1910, "ample authority" was present in 1912.[85] The novelty had worn off as border conflicts grew in number. There appeared to be a never-ending succession of rebels who operated in the area, and United States public opinion grew tired of appeals to democratic principles.

The conditions facing Madero in the first months of 1913 were

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[82]Cumberland, Genesis, p. 197.

[83]This section of the Neutrality Laws gives the President, or any person enpowered by the President, authority to use the land or naval forces of the United States to detain individuals suspected of violating the neutrality statutes. See Section XIV, Appendix A.

[84]Acting Secretary of State Wilson to Secretary of War Stimson, October 2, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 848.

[85]Cumberland, Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LII, 323-324.

relatively calm, and there was cause for optimism. He was still subject to vicious attacks from the Mexican press, but these were of little real danger to the growing strength of his regime. The prison in Mexico City contained the two rebellious generals, and what harm could they do as captives of the government? Yet this period of apparent tranquility was only superficial. The old ruling order was plotting, and President Taft was beginning to have his doubts about the ability of President Madero to stabilize and pacify the dissenting elements. In two months Madero would fall, but the forces that toppled him were predominantly internal. The United States would play the role of a spectator presented with an accomplished deed.

CHAPTER III

"SO NEAR THE UNITED STATES"

WOODROW WILSON AND THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS, 1913-1915

Mexico's hopes of avoiding the long and bloody path of the typical Latin American revolution disappeared with the murder of Francisco Madero on February 22, 1913. This act turned the country back to the forces of reaction. The following two years saw the elements of reform unite in defiance and divide in victory as rebellion was replaced by civil war.

On February 9, 1913, a barracks' revolt engineered by Generals Bernardo Reyes and Felix Díaz erupted in Mexico City. In the ten days that ensued, "la decena trágica", the Capital was raked by gunfire as it became little more than a crowded battlefield where shells made no discrimination between participants and non-participants. When the smoke cleared and the dead and dying were removed from the streets, Victoriano Huerta, a bespectacled, restless-eyed remnant of the Porfiriato, emerged as the new ruler of Mexico.[1] The forces of Madero had been routed and the former President murdered while being transported from one prison to another.

The dangerous conditions in the capital city had caused concern in Washington for the American citizens located there. To express this concern, battleships were dispatched to Mexican waters in the hope of

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[1]Edith O'Shaughnessy, Diplomatic Days (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1917), p. 102.

bringing the people to their senses.[2] Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson requested this action be complemented with "drastic and firm instructions" which would enable him to negotiate with the parties involved. The request was denied because officials feared if negotiations failed, the United States Congress might feel obligated to take more hostile action.[3] Ambassador Wilson, acting on his own authority, invited the leaders of the revolt to the American embassy, where they arranged the compromises that ended the fighting. On February 18 General Huerta gave official notification of President Madero's arrest, and Henry Wilson publicly stated his belief in the good intentions and ability of the new dictator.[4]

Washington remained silent during the events leading to Madero's fall. The usual statements concerning protection of American lives and property were issued, but no stand was taken on the events that occurred. At least one major newspaper reported that the Taft administration was relieved to hear of the coup and the appearance of a strong man who could handle the mercurial situation.[5] In view of later statements made by Taft after leaving office, this was probably an accurate description of

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[2]Secretary of State Philander C. Knox to Secretary of the Navy G. von L. Meyer, February 10, 1913, in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 700. Hereinafter cited as PRFR and the proper year.

[3]American Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, February 11, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 704; Secretary of State Knox to American Ambassador Wilson, February 12, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 706.

[4]American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, February 18, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 720.

[5]New York Times, February 19, 1913, p. 1.

his feeling.[6] Rather than making an immediate decision concerning recognition, President Taft decided to stall by asking that specific assurances be received. These assurances involved the damage claims that had arisen during the Madero rebellion, as well as others that had existed over a period of years between the United States and Mexico. A settlement of this sort would require months of negotiation. This was precisely what Taft wanted. The new President would be inaugurated in March, and Taft was not adverse to dumping the entire problem into someone else's administration. Stalling enabled the judicious and slow-moving Taft to avoid quick, unpopular decisions and would present the newly elected Democratic president with an initial problem. Consequently, Ambassador Wilson was told to await instructions and conduct business in the informal manner used in such situations.[7]

The response of groups within Mexico to the arrest and murder of Madero was immediate and hostile. Led by Venustiano Carranza, Maderista governor of Coahuila, a faction called the "Independent Constitutionalists" disavowed Huerta and asked other states to follow their lead.[8] This declaration was followed by a strongly worded letter to Taft criticizing his lack of opposition to the reactionary forces that had captured the Mexican government. It was also hoped, the communication continued, that Taft's sucessor would "work with more circumspection for

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[6]"They are not Sunday School superintendents down there, and we cannot make the qualifications of Sunday School superintendents square with the necessities of the situation where anarchy prevails." William Howard Taft to Gus Karger, July 22, 1913, in Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (2 vols.: Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1964), II, p. 865.

[7]Secretary of State Knox to American Ambassador Wilson, February 25, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 738.

[8]Proclamation of the Independent Constitutionalists of the State of Coahuila, February 19, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 721.

the social and political interests of Mexico."[9] This act of open resistance to the new regime was followed by the dispersal of federal troops against the rebels. Most of northern Mexico was soon the scene of fighting.[10]

As the signs of rebellion spread over the states of Sonora, San Luis Potosí and Coahuila, it became necessary for the Constitutionalists to promulgate a plan of revolution. This is the first prerequisite to such movements in Mexico. On March 26, 1913, this formulation was completed when Carranza dictated the "Plan of Guadalupe" to his secretary, Alfredo Breceda.[11] In order to make room for all anti-Huertistas, the plan was a series of broad general statements that allowed all discontended people to find cause for joining the movement. The most far-reaching provision stated that the rebellion was no mere provincial upheaval. Its objective was the complete military defeat of Huerta and control of Mexico. This objective could be reached by an all-Mexican army, and help would not be sought or accepted from other nations.[12] On March 30, 1913, Carranza declared himself Provisional President of Mexico. With this the rebellion had the necessary components--rationale, objectives and leader.[13]

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[9]Venustiano Carranza to President William H. Taft, February 26, 1913, in Secretaría de Gobernación, ed., La Labor Internacional de la Revolución Constitucionalista de Mexico (Mexico: Imprenta de la Secretaria de Gobernacion, 1960), p. 19.

[10]American Consul General Hanna at Monterrey to Secretary of State Knox, February 24, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 736.

[11]Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915: The Convention of Aguascalientes (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1960), pp. 8-9.

[12]American Vice Consul Bowman at Nogales to Secretary of State William J. Bryan, March 28, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 783.

[13]American Consul Ellsworth at Ciudad Porfirio Díaz to Secretary of State Bryan, March 30, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 784.

The next step was to establish a Constitutionalist Agency in Washington as an avenue of communication with the government and people of the United States. The agency thus created was headed by Rafael Zubarán Capmany and given unofficial aid by Luis Cabrera.[14] This organization was the base and front for rebel activities throughout the country. The man in charge of carrying out the agency's orders was Roberto Pesquiera, whose duties kept him constantly traveling between Mexico and the capital of the United States.[15] In addition, there were other agents like Felix Sommerfeld who were to mingle with officials and reporters in Washington to present the Constitutionalist movement in its best light.[16] Sommerfeld had held a similar post under Madero and later carried out the same duties for Pancho Villa after the split in the rebel movement. To handle legal matters an expert on international law, Charles A. Douglas, was retained to represent the Carrancistas before the State Department. The retention of Douglas was particularly fortunate as he was a close friend of Secretary of State William J. Bryan.[17] Some agencies were also formed in European countries. For instance, the one in Paris was headed by Geraldo Murillo whose duty was to block all loans that Huerta might attempt to obtain from Paris banking houses.[18]

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[14]U. S. Congress, Senate, Investigation of Mexican Affairs. Report and Hearing Before a Sub-Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Albert B. Fall, Presiding, Pursuant to Senate Resolution 106, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1920, II, 2412. Hereinafter cited as Fall Hearings; New York Times, August 6, 1914, p. 18.

[15]New York Times, May 21, 1913, p. 6; Constitutional Secretary for Foreign Affairs Francisco Escudero to Secretary of State Bryan, November 6, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 856.

[16]New York Times, August 10, 1913, p. 2.

[17]Ibid., June 19, 1914, p. 2.

[18]Fall Hearings, II, 1943.

Changes were also occurring in the United States, albeit in a little more orderly manner. On March 4, 1913, Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated as the President, and with this ceremony came changes in United States diplomacy that were revolutionary in themselves. President Wilson's comment that "it would be an irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs" has been quoted so often that one wonders if he really said it.[19] If he did, the chances are that he regretted it quickly. The international problems that confronted him might have been tiring, irritating and frustrating; but it is doubtful if he ever found any humor in them.

The new President's view of foreign affairs was that of an extremely moral democrat. Expediency would no longer be the watchword of the State Department. When it came to recognizing men who came to power by coups d'etat, it was to be understood that there was a right and wrong involved in such actions. Governments that came to power over the dead bodies of the officials that preceded them would no longer be recognized. This moral outlook was born from an over-confidence in the ballot box and democracy to ameliorate bad conditions within nations. Woodrow Wilson was never to understand the Mexican revolution until he tempered moral democracy with realistic appraisal.

On becoming chief executive, the new president had inherited the policies of his predecessor. The battleships called up during the coup were still in Mexican waters[20] and were left in position despite the loud grumbling of Huerta that it was a violation of Mexican sovereignty.

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[19]Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 81.

[20]New York Times, March 11, 1913, p. 1.

Not even the implication by Ambassador Wilson that discussion of such matters was impolitic at the time and that de jure recognition could be wrecked by such protests, smoothed the pride of the dictator.[21] In addition to the ships, the embargo imposed on arms to Mexico, except for the central government, was still in effect.[22] The Constitutionalist Agency in Washington protested that this policy discriminated against them and asked arms either to be given or denied to both sides.[23] Such requests were more in the line of show than in the hope of realizing effects. Besides, the Constitutionalists were getting a large number of arms by way of the age-old border tradition of smuggling that had been so prominent in the days of Madero.[24] These surreptitious activities were aided indirectly by the Governor of Texas, who refused to cooperate with federal authorities along the border.[25]

These Taft-initiated measures were retained while Wilson pondered a solution to the Mexican crisis. He had already felt the pressure of interest groups in his first cabinet meeting. When he polled his advisors at their first meeting President Wilson found much diversity of opinion. The only stable point held by the President himself was that Huerta could not retain power in Mexico, and before any plan was acceptable it would have to include that provision.

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[21]American Embassy to Mexican Office of Foreign Affairs, March 22, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, pp. 785-786.

[22]Secretary of State Bryan to American Consular Officers at Nogales, Ciudad Juárez, et al., April 2, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, pp. 876-877.

[23]Confidential Agent M. Pérez Romero of the Constitutionalist Government of Mexico to Secretary of State Bryan, June 26, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, pp. 880-881.

[24]New York Times, March 31, 1913, p. 4.

[25]Governor O. B. Colquitt of Texas to Secretary of State Bryan, April 7, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 877.

On May 6, 1913, a ready-made proposal was presented to the President by Julian Kruttschmidt, chairman of the Southern Pacific Railroad. This plan embodied the wishes of the business classes of the United States to stop the warfare in Mexico. It called for fair elections to be held earlier than the announced date in October. Until such elections, Huerta would remain ad interim president with the understanding that he would not be a candidate. If these guarantees were received, the United States would grant immediate recognition to the Huerta regime in Mexico City.[26] President Wilson was in basic agreement on most of these demands, but balked on giving recognition to Huerta. On May 26 the plan was modified by dropping immediate recognition and merely volunteering the services of the United States to mediate points of dispute between the federal government in Mexico and the rebels, with the objective of holding elections.[27]

With the modified proposals in hand, the President wavered momentarily. No matter how fine the plan, it mattered not if conditions within Mexico were unknown. Wilson did not know what these conditions were. Such information was usually obtained from ambassadorial reports, but the President's initial distrust of Ambassador Wilson had turned to disbelief. All dispatches from that source were disregarded.[28] As Wilson hesitated more pressure was applied, this time from Mexico itself. In early May Huerta sent an ultimatum stating that unless his regime was recognized, Ambassador Wilson's official status would be revoked and the negotiations

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[26]Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (8 vols.; Garden City, New York: Page, Doubleday and Doran, 1927-1939), IV, pp. 245-246.

[27]Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 352.

[28]Baker, Wilson, IV, pp. 238-239.

of claims ended.[29] Hard on the heels of this dispatch came another from the Constitutionalists declaring that if they won, the principles of international arbitration would be used to settle all disputes.[30] There was clearly a need for more information.

In mid-April the President had decided that William B. Hale, a personal friend, was the man to send to Mexico as an observer. He wrote Hale asking him to tour central and southern Mexico and report his impressions. This was to be done as quietly as possible and with no official instructions from the President.[31] It should be noted that this original tour was not through the rebel stronghold in northern Mexico. This was a mistake that Wilson would suffer for in later months. Another agent, Reginald del Valle, a friend of Secretary of State Bryan's, was sent a little later, but was recalled after making statements that indicated the official nature of his tour.[32]

By July most of Hale's reports had been completed and studied in Washington. The President began to plan actively on a policy in line with the situation reported by Hale. The reports had been highly critical of Henry Lane Wilson, and it was felt the ambassador should be removed as quietly and quickly as possible. He was recalled for a supposed conference with the President in mid-July and the Embassy was left in the care of Chargé Nelson O'Shaughnessy.[33] The conference turned out

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[29]New York Times, May 9, 1913, p. 1.

[30]Launa M. Smith, American Relations with Mexico (Oklahoma City: Harlow Publishing Co., 1924), p. 102.

[31]Baker, Wilson, IV, p. 264; New York Times, May 29, 1913, p. 5.

[32]Link, Struggle for Neutrality, p. 355.

[33]American Chargé Nelson O'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State Bryan, July 17, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 812.

to be little more than the usual meeting of a president and his ambassador. Henry Lane Wilson was permanently removed from his Mexican post due to his activities during the period in which Madero fell and to his repeated demands that Huerta be recognized.[34]

The second step of Wilson's plan was the appointment of John Lind, Progressive ex-Governor of Minnesota, as confidential agent to the Huerta government for the purpose of presenting a solution based on the modified Kruttschmidt plan. Lind's instructions lamented the lack of progress being made by warring factions to stop the strife and called for the establishment of a government at Mexico City which the country would obey and respect. To aid in creating this government the United States was willing to offer its services in the interests of all Mexico as opposed to the interests of a special group or groups in Mexico or the United States. Before Mexico received these services the following conditions would have to be met:

(a) an immediate cessation of fighting throughout Mexico, a definite armistice solemnly entered into and scrupulously observed;
(b) security given for an early and free election in which all will agree to take part;
(c) the consent of General Huerta to bind himself not to be a candidate for election as President of the Republic at the election; and
(d) the agreement of all parties to abide by the results of this election and cooperate in the most loyal way in organizing and supporting the new administration.[35]

Rumors of his mission and instructions arrived in Mexico before Lind. The fear of a new wave of anti-American feeling prompted Chargé O'Shaughnessy's request for authorization to deny that the instructions

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[34]Secretary of State Bryan to American Chargé O'Shaughnessy, August 4, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, pp. 817-818.

[35]Secretary of State Bryan to American Chargé O'Shaughnessy, August 27, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, pp. 820-822; Baker, Wilson, IV, p. 267.

included the demand for the resignation of Huerta. This could not be done; Secretary of State Bryan told the Chargé to state that Lind came on a peace mission and that President Wilson felt it would help settle the civil war.[36] The Mexican government replied that peace mission or no, it would not accept a non-accredited representative, and if Lind did not carry official credentials "his sojourn in the republic [would] not be pleasing."[37] The credentials were there, but it is highly doubtful that they made Lind's Mexican stay any more enjoyable.

By August 16, 1913, Huerta's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Federico Gamboa, had studied the four conditions offered by Lind and was ready to reply. Of the twenty-seven Mexican states, he explained, eighteen were controlled by the government in Mexico City. The remainder would follow the Huerta regime if the United States would only place more stringent controls on smuggling activities along the border. The first proposal of the settlement was then answered with the statement that the Constitutionalists were bandits and, as such, could not be expected to obey an armistice even if it was possible to negotiate one. As for the early and free election, it was hoped that this policy could be carried out, but he could not presume to speak with certitude about future events. Whether Huerta would be a candidate was not a question that could be discussed. Only the Mexican people could properly respond to that inquiry. Secretary Gamboa closed by stating that the whole issue of recognition was in itself a little ridiculous. After all, had not Lind been sent to the government in Mexico City, and did this not imply that it was the legal

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[36]American Chargé O'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State Bryan, August 5, 1913; Secretary of State Bryan to American Chargé O'Shaughnessy, August 6, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 818.

[37]Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico Garza Aldape to Chargé O'Shaughnessy, August 6, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 819.

one? Therefore, the entire situation could be easily solved if two things were done: the United States should accept a fully accredited Mexican Ambassador and appoint a like individual to Mexico.[38]

Nine days later, after receiving only slightly modified instructions from Washington, Lind attempted to reopen negotiations with the Huerta government. The old proposals were reintroduced and again ridiculed and demolished by Señor Gamboa. Then Lind offered a veiled bribe by hinting that if the United States' proposals were accepted, Huerta would find American bankers more agreeable. This implication irritated the Mexican Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who replied that the dignity of a nation could not be bought at any prive. But in the midst of this rancor the Huerta official did make one statement that cheered President Wilson. Constitutional provision prevented Huerta from being a candidate in the October election and, furthermore, neither Huerta nor anyone else had said that he would be.[39]

With this exchange the Lind mission officially ended. Was it a success or failure? The answer is both. The United States did obtain the information that Huerta apparently would not be a candidate, although even this was never specifically stated. Yet the old Mexican fear and dislike of Yankee intervention was aroused, and the people hardened in their support for the dictator.

The northern rebels, left out of the events involved in the first attempt by Wilson to bring peace to Mexico, did not remain silent during

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[38]Reply of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs Federico Gamboa to the Proposals of the American Government, conveyed through the Honorable John Lind, August 16, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 824.

[39]Secretary for Foreign Affairs Gamboa to John Lind, August 26, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, pp. 832-835.

the negotiations. As the points of settlement involved a certain amount of cooperation in the form of an armistice between the opposing factions, the revolutionaries were angry over not being included. On August 20, 1913, José Maytorena, rebel governor of Sonora and a Carrancista spokesman, gave the Constitutionalist view of the necessities required to end the internal strife. It was impossible, wrote Maytorena, to expect to reach an agreement with Huerta alone that would stop the fighting. The only solution was the complete military defeat of the central government by the "good Mexican people." For this to be accomplished, he added, it was only necessary for the United States to lift the embargo on arms to rebel-held areas. Once this was done, the rebels would drive out the dictator with considerable ease and rapidity.[40] This was not news to Washington circles. The Constitutionalist Agency had emphasized, from the day of its creation, that Carranza would not compromise on his ideas of complete military victory and absolute refusal to confer with Huerta. Madero had tried conciliation and compromise, and his fate taught the rebels the inefficiency of such a policy.[41] Further requests that the embargo on arms be dropped were made by Dr. H. A. Tupper and Captain J. T. Armstrong of the International Peace Forum. These two had talked with Carranza in Mexico and had been asked to travel to Washington for the express purpose of asking the President to allow the Constitutionalists to obtain arms openly from the United States. In return the First Chief promised to negotiate all damage claims with foreigners, guarantee free and fair elections and harmonize United States-Mexican relations.[42] No

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[40]Governor José Maytorena of Sonora to Secretary of State Bryan, August 20, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 820.

[41]New York Times, May 21, 1913, p. 6.

[42]Ibid., August 27, 1913, p. 2.

known reply was made.

Having received Huerta's rather nebulous promise not to be a candidate in the elections, President Wilson decided to adopt a "watch and wait" attitude. He went before Congress on August 27, 1913, to explain his policy and report on the Lind mission. In this address the President asked the rhetorical question: what should be done? Before anyone could respond, he answered his inquiry. "We can afford to exercise the self-restraint of a really great nation which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it." The United States would, therefore, withdraw completely from any sort of intervention in Mexico and leave the factions to their war. To insure that this could be done, all Americans were requested to leave Mexico to avoid any unnecessary risk.[43] Furthermore, the embargo was extended to include military supplies to all areas. If, in the future, a central administration was established that followed the lines of Wilson's proposals, the United States would recognize it.[44] Until that day, Mexico's problems were her own.

Following this pronouncement conditions in Mexico appeared to be stabilizing. The pressure on President Wilson diminished as both parties soft-pedaled the issue lest it cause a shift of the equilibrium, an attitude that was in direct contrast to the events preceding the Presidential address. In mid-August Senator Hoke Smith of Georgia had stirred Washington with the accusation that a powerful rebel lobby was operating in Washington and had been influential in obtaining the recall of Ambassador

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[43] U. S. Congress, Mexican Affairs, Address Delivered at joint session of the two houses of Congress, August 27, 1913, House Document 205, 63rd Cong., 1st sess., p. 6.

[44] New York Times, August 28, 1913, p. 1.

Henry Lane Wilson.[45] The charge was answered by the Constitutionalist Agency in Washington, which replied that it was completely false. According to the Agency, only one Senator had been engaged in conversation by the Constitutionalists, and this had been casual. Furthermore, no contact at all had been made with the State Department. After this minor outburst, Congress settled back and waited to see what the future would bring to Mexico.[46]

This period of relative calm was not to last. When the Catholic Party nominated Federico Gamboa and Ugenio Rascón for President and Vice President on September 24, the United States was optimistic. Both of these men were acceptable to Washington, and the Mexican government was informed that if these two or men of equal merit were elected, recognition would be rapid, even if the Constitutionalists did not recognize them. But while Gamboa was campaigning in the Parque de San Angel in Mexico City, a shadow was already falling over the capital. The northern rebels had got their offensive underway. In late September, the Constitutionalist leaders assembled to plan an attack on the Huertista stronghold of the north, Torreón. Pancho Villa, former small-time bandit and Maderista, was given command of the operation and the 10,000 man army to effect it.[47]

The importance of this attack can be seen by a glance at a map of Mexico. If Torreón fell, Mexico City, not an easy city to defend, was open to the Constitutionalist onslaught. President Wilson's first agent

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[45]Ibid., August 19, 1913, p. 2.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Alfonso Taracena, La Verdadera Revolución (17 vols.; Mexico: Editorial Jus, S. A., 1965), II, pp. 95-96.

to Mexico, William H. Hale, recognized this fact and rushed to Washington to confer with the President. He told Wilson that the Carrancistas could no longer be ignored and urged the President to work behind the scenes to bring Huerta and the First Chief to the conference table.[48] This information was surprising to Wilson as, for the first time, he became aware that the factions were of approximately equal strength and that a solution would have to include both. Feeble efforts were made to thaw the coldness between Washington and the Constitutionalists by suggesting that if Carranza took part in the October elections, the United States would be appreciative. The rebel reply was short, firm and pointed. They would not participate in the elections, and they reiterated their former statements on the need for absolute victory.[49]

The confidence, so evident in the Constitutionalist reply, was justified. On October 18 Torreón fell, and repercussions swept the country. The conservative groups in Mexico City began to picture the fate that awaited if the Constitutionalists occupied the Capital. Panic and fear were everywhere. Chargé O'Shaughnessy requested more battleships be sent to Mexican waters in the hope that a display of force would aid in abating the fear and bring the people "to a sense of political responsibility."[50] The use of ships had not worked during the chaotic days of Madero's fall and did not work now. All definitions of political responsibility were violated on October 12 when Huerta dissolved an increasingly rebellious Chamber of Deputies and arrested more than one

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[48]Link, Struggle for Neutrality, pp. 364-365.

[49]Ibid., p. 365.

[50]American Chargé O'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State Bryan, October 8, 1913, in FRFR, 1913, pp. 835-836.

hundred of its members.[51]

The parliamentarian who served as President of the United States could only view this action as repugnant and unjustifiable. Huerta was warned that if harm came to any of the legislators the United States and the rest of the civilized world would begin to have doubts concerning Mexican character.[52] Additionally, the dissolution and arrest caused other doubts to rise. How would the government finance itself as it could no longer legally impose taxes? Would it seize American property to get money? If Huerta did so, would he have any compunctions about imposing himself as a candidate in the elections?

Two of these questions were quickly answered. For finances, the Mexican government would use the tariff as the principal source of revenue. Therefore, the tariff was raised 50% above its former level.[53] Only time could answer the third question; but Wilson feared the response. He had committed himself to recognizing the winner of the elections. Yet if Huerta controlled them he could get a man of his choice elected and rule behind the scenes. To avoid this possibility the United States started to hedge on the commitments of recognition. Wilson made it clear that doubt existed that the elections would be conducted in a valid manner, and the United States would be cautious in accepting the results.[54]

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[51]American Chargé O'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State Bryan, October 12, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 836.

[52]Secretary of State Bryan to American Chargé O'Shaughnessy, October 12, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, pp. 837-838.

[53]Secretary of State Bryan to American Chargé O'Shaughnessy, October 20, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 844.

[54]Secretary of State Bryan to American Chargé O'Shaughnessy, October 13, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 838; Edith O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife in Mexico (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1916), p. 14.

Wilson's expectations were not to be denied. The October elections were fraudulent; Huerta not only ran, but won.[55] The American President was furious and made no attempt to conceal it. On November 1, 1913, he instructed Nelson O'Shaughnessy to deliver an ultimatum to Huerta that mirrored his feeling. The ultimatum stated that retention of power by Huerta was a complete denial of his previous claims; that a Provisional Government, headed by a neutral or a group of neutrals, be formed immediately; and that any attempt on the part of Huerta to substitute a puppet would cause extreme complications in Mexico-United States relations. If not, the U. S. might be forced to back another group, in particular the Constitutionalists.[56]

In light of past events, President Wilson had no illusions as to what Huerta's reply would be. Consequently, in mid-November, he sent William B. Hale to the border, near Hermosillo, where the Carrancistas were holding conferences. In return the Constitutionalists dispatched their agent-at-large, Roberto Pesquiera, to Washington. He was not given entrance to the State Department but was promised that all his reports would be read.[57]

While Washington read reports, Hale delivered a telegram from Secretary of State Bryan to the assembled rebels at the Hotel Escobosa in Hermosillo. The message contained in the telegram promised a lifting of

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[55]General Victoriano Huerta to General Joaquín Mass, Military Governor of Puebla, October 22, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, pp. 853-854; Will G. Davis, Experiences and Observations of a Consular Officer During the Recent Mexican Revolution (Chula Vista, Calif.: Wayside Press, 1920), pp. 8-9.

[56]Link, Struggle for Neutrality, pp. 380-381.

[57]New York Times, November 4, 1913, p. 2; The Constitutionalist Secretary for Foreign Affairs Escudero to Secretary of State Bryan, November 6, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, p. 856.

of the embargo for the rebels if three conditions were met. First, Carranza must sign a Washington-prepared declaration stating that the lifting of the embargo was no personal favor to Carranza but to all of Mexico. Secondly, he must proclaim publicly that he protected lives and property in the areas he controlled; when it appeared he had not, it was due to a breakdown in communication. Thirdly, the rebel leader had to state that United States' interests in Mexico were superior to those of any European country.[58]

The choice was simple. If Carranza turned leadership of the rebellion over to President Wilson, he could get arms. It was an obvious and crude attempt to bribery, and Carranza's response clearly indicated his feelings toward the machinations of Washington. Constitutionalist Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Francisco Escudero, chided the United States for not giving full credentials to Hale as it had for Lind in his mission. Unless such credentials were given to Hale, and the conditions put in writing, they would not even be discussed. But if all this was done, Carranza still would not relinquish leadership of the movement for guns.[59]

Carranza's refusal turned Wilson to declarations and dispatches that were more emotional and emphatic than any previously made by him. The President stated that revolution and murder must end in Latin America. Mexico was going to be the starting point of the creation of a new attitude toward democracy in the southern hemisphere. And all this, even if

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[58] Isidrio Fabela, Historia Diplomática de la Revolución Mexicana (2 vols.; Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1958-1959), I, pp. 246-248.

[59] Ibid.

it required force rather than persuasion and a call to moral principle.[60] With each declaration of this nature by Wilson, the conservative classes of Mexico stiffened in their support for Huerta. They were now aware that he was their last chance to retain the Mexico that had been so profitable to them. This bolstered the sagging central government in Mexico, and by 1914 the Constitutionalists were halted. Yet Wilson had said force if necessary, and once stated such threats tend to become alternative avenues that are hard to avoid.

The American President had one last reserve before he gave way to the use of force. This was to lift the embargo on arms to the rebels to see if the Constitutionalists could deliver on their promises. After a hasty exchange of letters, Luis Cabrera, Constitutionalist representative in Washington, assured President Wilson that the rebels would take all possible precautions to protect lives and property in their areas.[61] The usual feelers as to how such a policy would be accepted by Congress were issued. When no opposition was evidenced from that source, the revolutionaries started receiving guns on February 3, 1914. Mexico would undergo a "housecleaning . . . by home talent."[62]

Again, the results were not those expected. Rather than weakening Huerta, the embargo actually aided him, as the monied classes now raised loans to help their leader withstand American pressure.[63] In this

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[60]Secretary of State Bryan to American Charge O'Shaughnessy, November 24, 1913 in PRFR, 1913, pp. 443-444; Eduardo Luquin, La Política Internacional de la Revolución Constitutionalista (Mexico: Talleres Gráficos de La Nación, 1957), pp. 29-30; O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife, p. 66.

[61]Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Forge Valley, Mass.: Atheneum, 1963), p. 154.

[62]Clarence Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 195.

[63]Link, Struggle for Neutrality, p. 195.

period, the Constitutionalists were successful in retaking Torreon, which they had lost earlier, and the route to Mexico City was open again to them. However, a division emerged between Villa and Carranza to cripple the advance.[64] It was soon evident that Wilson must deliver on his threats of force or admit that he was bluffing; but he needed justification for such action. He did not have long to wait.

On April 9 the American sailors were arrested at Tampico, and what seemed a minor accident expanded to a matter of international importance. It served as the cause for initiating a plan that had been urged on Wilson in January by John Lind. Lind had advised Wilson to use force even to the extent of seizing Mexican ports along the coast.[65] On April 21 American forces seized Veracruz and placed all other Mexican Gulf ports under blockade.[66] It was not long before the American President realized his blunder. Huerta, as expected, broke all diplomatic relations with the United States. But, less expectedly, Carranza spoke of being on the verge of war due to American troops on Mexican soil.[67] The Constitutionalists had little choice in making such a declaration. To have done otherwise would have marked the rebel movement as a Yankee-dominated one, and this would have meant its death in the eyes of Mexican popular opinion. The President's unawareness of this basic Mexican trait is incomprehensible. But the fact remains that he did not understand that his

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[64]Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), pp. 5-6.

[65]New York Times, January 3, 1914, p. 2; Baker, Wilson, IV, p. 299.

[66]Link, Struggle for Neutrality, p. 401.

[67]Venustiano Carranza to George C. Carrothers, April 22, 1914, in La Labor Internacional, pp. 78-80.

leadership could be only as effective as it was unnoticed. The result was the American occupation of a foreign port with enemies on all sides.

The offer of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to settle the conflict was quickly accepted by the United States, which was more than willing for negotiation. Before the conference could begin the ABC countries insisted that the embargo be reinstated and that hostile groups within Mexico declare a general armistice. The first of these conditions could be met by the United States alone. The second depended on Venustiano Carranza, and the rebel leader showed his ever-present obdurancy. The First Chief was agreeable to having the withdrawal of troops discussed; but this had nothing to do with the internal affairs of Mexico or the civil war there, and he declared he would accept no armistice.[68] To prove that this denial was a matter of principle rather than pettiness Carranza instructed Rafael Zubarán in Washington to write the President that the rebels had complete faith in the justice and high moral character of the people and leaders of the United States.[69] Still the Constitutionalists would send no delegates to the conference that opened on May 18, 1914, and refused to recognize the legitimacy of the mediators. After some pressure, Carranza did relent and instruct the leaders of the Constitutionionalist Agency in Washington to attend the meetings. By that time the ABC countries refused to admit them to the bargaining tables except as unofficial observers.[70]

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[68]Venustiano Carranza to ABC Mediators, May 1, 1914, in ibid., p. 91.

[69]R. Zubarán Capmany, Representative of Carranza to Secretary of State Bryan and President Wilson, May 14, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, pp. 496-497.

[70]Special Commissioners to Secretary of State Bryan, May 22, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, 504; Link, Struggle for Neutrality, p. 401. (The U.S. Commissioners to the ABC Conference were Joseph R. Lamar, Frederick W. Lehmann and H. Perceval Dodge.)

Wilson considered the First Chief's refusal to be signs of narrowness and dullness and began to seek other means of controlling the revolution. He still believed in Carranza's honesty and high moral principle, but what was needed was a man who showed more inclination to cooperate. In June Wilson wrote W. H. Page, Ambassador to England, that the people of Mexico needed a better understanding of Pancho Villa,[71] who would be whatever the United States wanted him to be. If the Constitutionalist split widened, the United States stood to gain from any contingency that arose.

In late July the ABC mediators adjourned. Their recommendations spoke of a Provisional Government agreed on by all parties and then recognized by the United States. Huerta was never called by name, his removal being only implied. Even with this neutral and nebulous ending, the conference had served Woodrow Wilson's purpose. He had wanted to rid Mexico of Huerta, and he succeeded. While the conference talked, the United States continued to hold Veracruz and enforce the embargo. This course forced the dictator to obtain arms from Europe, which was more expensive. At the same time, the American occupation of Veracruz robbed Huerta of his main source of revenue. The longer the conference talked, the more Huerta lost.

Huerta's losses were the Constitutionalists' gain. The rebels had lost no money by the capture of Veracruz, and they were still obtaining arms from the United States. Three or four days after the embargo had been reimposed, the steamer Antilla puffed out of the port of New York. The steamer carried guns and ammunition bound for the Constitutionalist-

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[71]Woodrow Wilson to Walter H. Page, June 4, 1914, in Baker, Wilson, IV, p. 347.

held port of Tampico. Huerta threatened to blockade the port to prevent delivery. The United States, stating it was an international port and could not be blockaded, sent ships to enforce the declaration.[72] This violation of the embargo was a little too blatant; John Lind informed the Constitutionalists in the United States that no more such open violations would be allowed. He advised them to take out papers for Havana and then sail to Tampico instead. On June 16, 1914, a million cartridges were shipped on the Sunshine with papers for Havana. Due to "stress of weather" the Sunshine was blown to Tampico; other like shipments followed.[73] There was a small fine charged for taking out false papers, but this fine was later remitted by the Secretary of the Treasury.[74]

An armed and moving Constitutionalist offensive, plus financial exhaustion, caught up with Huerta on July 16, 1914. The dictator resigned, leaving the only act to signify a full victory the occupation of Mexico City by the rebels. President Wilson, remembering the past attitude of Carranza, decided not to wait before making his demands. On July 23 Carranza was presented with conditions on which hinged United States recognition.[75] This requirement was followed eight days later by a message to Carranza stating the reluctance of the United States to contemplate the "possible consequences to Mexico if the [U. S.] should be forced to withhold recognition from those who are to succeed Huerta."[76]

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[72]Fall Hearings, I, p. 792; Manuel Calero, The Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilson (New York: Smith and Thompson, 1914), p. 27.

[73]Fall Hearings, I, p. 793.

[74]Ibid., II, p. 2411.

[76]Secretary of State Bryan to Vice Consul Silliman, July 31, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 577.

The Constitutionalist leader made no reply, but when he entered Mexico City on August 20 he made several remarks of appreciation for Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy.[77]

There was no Constitutionalist celebration on the August day when Carranza entered the capital of Mexico. There was no longer a Constitutionalist movement. Now the rebels were either Carrancistas or Villistas. This division was not one precipitated by a disagreement in revolutionary dogma, for neither faction had specific stated policies of reform. Rather it should be viewed as a struggle between caudillos, with the man, not the principle, the only factor of importance.

As early as June 12, 1914, Carranza and Pancho Villa violently disagreed over military strategy, which led to Villa's resignation, quickly followed by his re-enlistment after an appeal made by others of the rebel movement.[78] Hoping to avoid the consequences of such a division, the President of the United States sent George C. Carrothers to Mexico in June with the purpose of patching this break in the revolutionary wall. By June 18 Carrothers informed the Secretary of State that a rapprochement was impossible although Villa promised to follow the will of the other generals even if it meant following Carranza.[79] The Villista agent in Washington, Felix Sommerfeld, followed with the declaration that Villa did not dispute Carranza's leadership and was not contemplating hostile action against him.[80] Just as this statement was beginning to soothe

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[77]Vice Consul Silliman to Secretary of State Bryan, August 20, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 588.

[78]Consul Edwards to Secretary of State Bryan, June 12, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, pp. 541-542.

[79]Special Agent Carrothers to Secretary of State Bryan, June 18, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 542.

[80]New York Times, July 1, 1914, p. 2.

worried officials, the Constitutionalist division widened. This time it appeared in the courts of the United States. The Villistas operating in the United States had attempted to make off with 4,000,000 pesos of Constitutionalist currency. Villa was sent a strong protest by Roberto Pesquiera. The protest had little effect, and a court injunction was obtained to prevent the Villa rebels from leaving the country with the money.[81] This was hardly the attitude of factions that had composed their differences.

In an attempt to work out an operable unity, Villa and Carranza conferred on July 8. Both men agreed there should be a convention held, after Huerta had been removed, for the express purpose of setting election dates and arranging the new government. Delegates to the meeting would be appointed on the basis of one per 1,000 men; this ratio would favor Villa's Army of the North.[82] This agreement was effective, but the rebel movement was still far from united. On July 18 Villa wrote his friend, General Hugh Scott of the United States Army, that he was still having difficulties with the First Chief and was not getting his share of supplies and coal for his troop trains.[83] To correct this situation, Villa ordered Felix Sommerfeld to increase his purchasing activities in the United States. With the aid of the Flint Company of New York, Villa soon had all the needed arms and ammunition.[84] A stockpile of supplies was also assembled in apparent preparation for the full break with

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[81]Ibid., July 6, 1914, p. 3.

[82]Special Agent Carrothers to Secretary of State Bryan, July 14, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, pp. 559-560.

[83]Clendenen, The United States and Villa, pp. 100-101.

[84]Link, Struggle for Neutrality, p. 235.

Carranza that Villa had already visualized.

The split in the north had its counterpart in a division between the southern rebels led by Emiliano Zapata and the northern Carrancistas. It was an historical accident that Zapata and Carranza were fighting Huerta. There had been no communication between the groups in the years between Madero's death and the resignation of Huerta. This coldness was enhanced by the fact that Carranza allowed federal troops to hold the capital until he arrived rather than letting the closer Zapatistas occupy it.[85]

After Carranza took Mexico City, Washington urged him to reach some sort of conciliation with Zapata.[86] Before Carranza's arrangements could be made, Villa and Zapata had already met and reached an understanding. The only way that Zapata would unite with Carranza was for the First Chief to sign the "Plan of Ayala" which called for immediate land distribution and Zapata for President. Since Carranza would not meet these conditions, he was told that Zapata would not agree to anything that Villa had not previously endorsed.[87]

In the first days of October the dissenting revolutionary factions convened as provided for in the Villa-Carranza agreement of July. The meetings were held in the quiet Mexican village of Aguascalientes. There the rebels debated and argued throughout the remainder of the month. By the first of November the decision had been made to turn from Carranza,

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[85]Quirk, Aguascalientes Convention, p. 56.

[86]Secretary of State Bryan to Vice Consul Silliman, August 25, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 591.

[87]Special Agent Canova to Secretary of State Bryan, September 1, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, pp. 592-593.

and Eulalio Gutiérrez was elected Provisional President of Mexico.[88] Carranza refused to recognize the authority of these proceedings and was promptly given an ultimatum to turn over the executive power by November 10 at 6 p.m.[89] He refused the ultimatum, ordered his delegates from Aguascalientes, and told all loyal generals to take command of their armies.[90]

With the above action the revolution was changed to a civil war. On one side was Villa in command of the forces of the convention at Aguascalientes and supported by Zapata in the south. Opposite him was Venustiano Carranza with his excellent tactician, General Alvaro Obregón, who bore the major responsibility of military planning. The remaining force was Woodrow Wilson. What policy would he follow in dealing with the two factions, both claiming to be working for the general good of Mexico? The fall and winter of 1914 must have been a dark period after the relaxation of tension that had followed the taking of Mexico City by the Constitutionalists. The Mexican problem was still unsolved.

The United States government was well informed about the constantly widening gulf that appeared in the rebel ranks. There were several agents of the United States operating in Mexico as representatives to the various military groups. They could also see the signs of the division that occurred among the Constitutionalists at work in the United States. In August, Carranza had established the Mexican Bureau of Information in New York which claimed that Villa was the tool of reactionaries

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[88]Special Agent Canova to Secretary of State Bryan, November 2, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 617.

[89]Special Agent Canova to Secretary of State Bryan, November 5, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 618.

[90]Vice Consul Silliman to Secretary of State Bryan, November 8, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 618.

in Mexico and that Carranza was the true representative of the revolution.[91] Following these activities was the creation of a Villista Agency in Washington to publicize the revolutionary qualities of Pancho Villa.[92] Further to complicate the situation, the convention at Aguascalientes also employed its own representatives in the United States, under the general direction of José Vasconcelos.[93]

Before the split was complete President Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan had decided they would support Pancho Villa.[94] This policy, so incomprehensible in retrospect, seemed proper at the time. Carranza would not accept Washington's advice or leadership, while Villa was only too willing to work hand-in-hand with Wilson and Bryan.[95] By guiding Villa, Wilson felt it possible to direct the revolution toward his goals without making the mistake he had made at Veracruz. There were also reasons of expediency for supporting Villa. Such a policy would be popular in the United States, where the military exploits of Villa had been given colorful coverage by the press. It was also believed that Villa had the resources to win in a showdown. He commanded a 40,000 man army with ample supplies for an extended conflict.[96]

There was one remaining entanglement from which Wilson had to

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[91]William M. Rossiter, "Mexican-American Relations, 1913-1920. A Reappraisal" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1953), p. 162; Clendenen, The United States and Villa, p. 195.

[92]New York Times, October 21, 1915, p. 1.

[93]J. Fred Rippy, José Vasconcelos and Guy Stevens, American Policies Abroad: Mexico (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 121-122.

[94]Link, Struggle for Neutrality, p. 238.

[95]Ibid., p. 235.

[96]Clendenen, The United States and Villa, pp. 131-132.

extricate himself before withdrawing and working through Villa. Veracruz would have to be evacuated. On September 15 the President ordered Secretary of State Bryan to start preparations for withdrawing American troops from the port city. As Carranza controlled the general area around the port, Washington asked him to name the official who would take over the customs house.[97] However, immediate plans for evacuation were halted by rumors that Carranza would demand additional payments other than those collected by the United States on goods imported and exported during the occupation and that the people who had worked for the United States would be punished.[98] Bryan sought a denial of these rumors by a direct statement from the Mexican Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Isidrio Fabela, but the Carrancistas remained silent.[99]

While Carranza made no promises, the Provisional President Eulalio Gutiérrez did. He stated that he would fulfill the conditions for evacuation. Villa added that he would support Gutiérrez's promise with his sword.[100] Carranza was therefore pressured into responding. The removal of American troops was particularly important as Carranza needed a site for his headquarters that would be easier to defend than Mexico City. On November 9 he issued a general amnesty to all Mexicans who had worked for the United States and promised no additional taxes or import duties.[101]

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[97]Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison to Secretary of State Bryan, September 15, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 598.

[98]Acting Secretary of State Robert Lansing to Brazilian Minister to Mexico Cardoso de Oliverira, September 22, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 603.

[99]Secretary of State Bryan to Brazilian Minister to Mexico Cardoso de Oliviera, October 7, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 617.

[100]Special Agent Carrothers to Secretary of State Bryan, November 3, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 617.

[101]Quirk, Affair of Honor, pp. 167-169.

The United States was now ready to leave, but before doing so it wanted an understanding that the port was not being left to a particular faction. On November 13, 1914, the State Department wrote Villa, Gutiérrez, and Carranza identical letters informing them that American troops would be withdrawn on November 23.[102] One week later, General Frederick Funston, commander of the occupation troops, was ordered from the city "in the best practical fashion . . . and /to make/ no declaration that would be interpreted as committing this government to the recognition of the authority of any individual or faction."[103] Three days later Consul William Canada at Veracruz reported that American troops had left without incident.[104] On November 26 Carranza was already setting up the seat of his government in the port.[105] The following day Emiliano Zapata entered Mexico City.[106]

With the flight of Carranza to Veracruz, the United States broke off all unofficial and official communication with him. Even the omnipresent Wilson agent was no longer in attendance. The next logical step would have been for Wilson to recognize the pro-Villa Convention government; but the American President had acquired a certain degree of caution and hesitated to commit himself. On December 2 Secretary of State Bryan

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[102]Secretary of State Bryan to Brazilian Minister to Mexico Cardoso de Oliveira, November 13, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, pp. 621-622.

[103]Acting Secretary of War John Breckinridge to General Frederick Funston, November 20, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 625.

[104]Consul William Canada to Secretary of State Bryan, November 23, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 626.

[105]Consul Canada to Secretary of State Bryan, November 26, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 627.

[106]Brazilian Minister to Mexico Cardoso de Oliveira to Secretary of State Bryan, November 29, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, p. 627.

suggested that the government in Mexico City seemed harmonious, and perhaps the United State could send an official communication concerning protection of American lives and property. The President replied that the time was not ripe and the action might prove embarrassing until the Conventionists had better solidified their position.[107]

Wilson's refusal to recognize the Convention government was so correct that it was almost clairvoyant. By the end of December the true character of Villa had become increasingly obvious. Two of his generals, Rodolfo Fierro and Tomás Urbina, began the bloody task of purging anti-Villistas and executing them.[108] President Gutiérrez' attempts to halt this course were fruitless,[109] and appeared only to quicken a break between Villa and the Provisional President. On December 29 Villa accused Gutiérrez of planning to abandon the capital and establishing the government elsewhere, to which Gutiérrez answered that he could see no reason to remain in an area where insubordination to his orders was rampant. Villa responded by sending a number of his troops to "protect" the President.[110] Thus as 1914 ended the Carranza-Villa split was matched by another within Conventionist's ranks, and there was even talk of Villa proclaiming himself dictator.[111]

The beginning of the new year saw a decline in Villa's strength. On

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[107] Link, Struggle for Neutrality, p. 260.

[108] Secretary of State Bryan to Special Agent Silliman, December 13, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, pp. 628-629; Link, Struggle for Neutrality, p. 624.

[109] Vice Consul Silliman to Secretary of State Bryan, December 29, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, pp. 634-635.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Vice Consul Silliman to Secretary of State Bryan, December 31, 1914, in PRFR, 1914, pp. 635-636.

January 5, in the first full-scale engagement with the Carrancistas, he was defeated by Alvaro Obregón. The defeat was followed by his evacuation of Mexico City in late January, whereupon the capital city was immediately retaken by the Carrancistas.[112] Now the nations that had dealt with the Convention government felt the brunt of Carranza's displeasure. On February 15, he removed all government functions from Mexico City; thereby he left diplomats with no one to deal with in protecting the lives and property of their nationals.[113] In addition, Carranza issued a decree making it necessary for all Constitutionalist generals to refer all requests for protection to him and declared illegal the presence of confidential agents of foreign countries in the camps of generals.[114] All business would have to be conducted through Venustiano Carranza.

As Pancho Villa's power rapidly dissipated, President Wilson was forced to cast about for alternatives. To ascertain the true strength of the factions in Mexico Duval West of Texas was sent to the war-torn country as another of Wilson's personal representatives.[115] On March 15 West reported that Villa remained the leader with the best chance of bringing peace. This report would have been considerably less optimistic had it been written one month later. On April 16 the bloody and decisive battle

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[112]Vice Consul Silliman to Secretary of State Bryan, January 28, 1915, in PRFR, 1915, p. 649.

[113]Brazilian Minister to Mexico Cardoso de Oliveira to Secretary of State Bryan, February 3, 1915, in PRFR, 1915, p. 649.

[114]Confidential Agent Emilio Arredondo of the Constitutionalist Government of Mexico to Secretary of State Bryan, February 15, 1915, in PRFR, 1915, pp. 652-653.

[115]New York Times, February 2, 1915, p. 4; ibid., February 11, 1915, p. 4.

of Celaya was fought with disastrous results for Villa's army.[116] This engagement for all practical purposes eliminated Villa as a power in Mexico, although the United States continued attempts to rebuild his military strength.

The military collapse of Villa left the field to Carranza, but still Wilson was not willing to recognize or morally support him. This reluctance was in part due to past attempts to deal with the First Chief as well as the open hostility of the Catholic Church leadership in the United States toward Carranza.[117] If Villa was impotent and Carranza impossible, whom would the United States support? At one point consideration was given to going outside the coterie of well-known revolutionaries in the hope of getting a man without the taint of factionalism that both Villa and Carranza had. Eduardo Iturbide, who had been helped from Mexico in 1914 by United States officials, was suggested by a member of Wilson's cabinet as the man whom foreign investors, diplomats, and big business would all support. Wilson refused to be drawn into a scheme of this sort, and the idea was dropped.[118] In late April Secretary of State Bryan announced there were no plans for recognizing anyone in Mexico.[119] The best the United States could offer was a statement by Woodrow Wilson that he was undecided, and that recognition would be given to the leader or group that could rally the people; but that it had better be soon, or the United States would be forced to decide what action was necessary "to

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[116] Link, Struggle for Neutrality, p. 465.

[117] Ibid., p. 468.

[118] Clendenen, The United States and Villa, pp. 137-138; Daniels, Years of Peace, pp. 185-186; Link, Struggle for Neutrality, p. 473.

[119] New York Times, April 30, 1915, p. 7.

help Mexico save herself and serve her people."[120] The important new idea in this statement was the hint at a compromise government and at the use of force if one was not soon found.

On June 17, 1915, Wilson asked ad interim Secretary of State Robert Lansing if unofficial channels existed in which the United States could tell Carranza that he could possibly be recognized if he attempted to conciliate the opposition.[121] John Silliman delivered this suggestion to Carranza.[122] The reply made on June 22 was emphatic and curt. Carranza would not deal with Villa or accept recognition based on his doing so.[123] Once more, the American President was checkmated. He had publicly declared that if Mexico did not "save herself" the United States would be forced to do so. The question was, how could this be done without another Veracruz debacle?

The answer to the question had been studied as early as March 8, 1915, when Secretary of State Bryan requested the counsel for the State Department, Robert Lansing, to determine what the results of direct force on Mexico could be and to suggest alternatives. Lansing replied that the use of force would be resented by the Mexican people, who would not believe it was only temporary action; that military intervention would further wreck the image of the United States throughout Latin America. Further, people within the United States would urge permanent occupation,

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[120]Ibid., June 3, 1915, p. 1.

[121]President Wilson to Secretary of State ad interim Lansing, June 17, 1915, in The Lansing Papers (2 vols.; Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), ii, p. 535.

[122]Secretary of State ad interim Lansing to Agent Silliman, June 18, 1915, in PRFR, 1915, p. 715.

[123]Special Agent Silliman to Secretary of State Lansing, June 22, 1915, in PRFR, 1915, p. 718.

and European governments would demand that the United States protect their interests, which would create additional problems. None of these results would be agreeable if the United States acted unilaterally; but there was another course. The United States could act in conjunction with other Latin American nations as it had in negotiating the Veracruz incident. This would be Pan Americanism rather than imperialism.[124]

By July Wilson had decided that joint action with the Latin American nations was the only practical route. By the end of that month the United States had outlined a fairly comprehensive plan to present to the conferees. It was built around the idea of finding an individual other than Villa, Zapata or Carranza whom all factions would support. It should be a man who had not been directly involved in the recent civil war. The United States was adamant in the stand that it not be Carranza. If the proposed individual could be found, the United States and Pan-American conferees would recognize and support him.[125]

By August 2 plans for the Pan-American meetings were complete, and on the fifth the delegates met in New York City.[126] It was decided in the first meeting that factions in Mexico should also start negotiations of their own in case the other Latin American diplomats could not decide the question. From the first there was general agreement rejecting

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[124]Councilor for State Department Lansing to Secretary of State Bryan, March 8, 1915, in Lansing Papers, II, pp. 529-530.

[125]Link, Struggle for Neutrality, p. 484.

[126]President Wilson to Secretary of State Lansing, August 2, 1915; Same to Same, August 5, 1915, in Lansing Papers, II, pp. 542-543. The delegates to this Conference were Ambassador Domicio da Gama of Brazil, Ambassador Eduardo Suarez-Mujica of Chile, Ambassador Romulo S. Naón of Argentina, Minister Ignacio Calderón of Bolivia, Minister Carlos María de Peña of Uruguay, and Minister Joaquín Mendez of Guatemala.

Carranza.[127] But the meeting of the factions involved problems that only the United States could handle. Villa was obviously on the verge of total collapse, which would put Carranza in the lead as the only substantial power in Mexico. Therefore a way would have to be found to sustain Villa so that he could act as a bargaining power for the conference. Thus the United States established meat inspection points in Chihuahua to allow Villa to market the cattle rustled in Mexico.[128]

The Pan-American conference had met for only six days when Wilson had a mysterious change of heart that was in direct contradiction to all that he had previously demanded. On August 11 he wrote Lansing that to insist on the elimination of Carranza was, after all, a little ridiculous. The fact could not be contested that Carranza was the strongest man in sight. The conference should remain flexible enough to leave the way open for recognition of him.[129] On August 15 Secretary of State Lansing sent dispatched to Villa, Zapata and Carranza asking them to meet in a neutral zone for a conference under the auspices of the Pan-American negotiators.[130] Carranza agreed to a meeting only if it discussed the international implications of the civil war and the question of recognition.[131] Wilson agreed, and while he held meetings with the Carrancistas in Washington, another conference was held in Mexico to see on what

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[127]Secretary of State Lansing to President Wilson, August 6, 1915, in Lansing Papers, II, pp. 543-544.

[128]Secretary of State Lansing to President Wilson, August 7, 1915; Same to Same, August 9, 1915, in Lansing Papers, II, pp. 546-548.

[129]President Wilson to Secretary of State Lansing, August 11, 1915, in Lansing Papers, II, p. 549.

[130]Secretary of State Lansing to Mr. Parker, representing American interests in Mexico, August 13, 1915, in PRFR, 1915, pp. 735-736.

[131]Secretary of State Lansing to President Wilson, September 12, 1915, in Lansing Papers, II, pp. 550-551.

conditions the other rebels would submit to Carranza.[132]

It was still necessary to convert the Latin American nations to the new line of thinking, and these diplomats were not so agile in reversing their stand. By October 9 Lansing had succeeded in getting their consent. Two days later the Secretary of State wrote all ambassadorial posts in Europe that the conference had decided the Carrancistas were the only party with the ingredients necessary for recognition.[133] On October 19 the United States placed another embargo on all arms to Mexico, recognizing Carranza as the de facto ruler of Mexico and excepting war materials for his use.[134] Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, Guatemala, Colombia and Nicaragua followed this lead.[135]

After two and one-half years of torturous turning and twisting, Mexico at last was on the way to establishing a government that showed promise of bringing stability. More importantly, this new regime had proven already that it possessed the ability to withstand outside pressure and interference. Mexico, a nation dominated and exploited by foreign forces since the revolution that freed it in the early 19th century, was independent.

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[132]President Wilson to Secretary of State Lansing, September 13, 1915, in Lansing Papers, II, p. 552.

[133]Secretary of State Lansing to Principal American Missions in Europe, October 11, 1915, in PRFR, 1915, p. 767.

[134]A Proclamation of the President of the United States of America, October 19, 1915; Secretary of State Lansing to Mr. Parker, representing American interests in Mexico, October 19, 1915; President Wilson to Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo, October 19, 1915, in PRFR, 1915, pp. 772-773, 771, 781-782.

[135]New York Times, October 20, 1915, p. 6.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Involved and trying relations between the United States and Mexico existed outside the years 1910-1915; however, interplay of this period gave it a particular significance and importance. Both nations were undergoing a transition which cast them in a different character from previous years. Mexico was beginning the laborious and still unobtained quest of gaining her rightful position in the Western Hemisphere. The United States was close to becoming a world leader with a foreign policy worthy of such a position. The former country was no longer willing to act as a colony to be exploited by others, while the latter found it increasingly necessary to use more sophistication, and less force, in realizing its will.

In 1910 the United States Department of State was functioning under a policy derisively called "dollar diplomacy" by its enemies. This policy was composed of a mutually beneficial coalition of government and the business classes. The surplus capital would be placed in backward, non-industrialized areas of the world. The investors could logically expect high returns on their investment, and strong economic interests in these areas would greatly aid the foreign policy and influence of the United States. But the problems involving the unstable political conditions usually present in undeveloped areas caused "dollar diplomacy" to be a little more complex in application than in theory. The point of contention was the extent to which the military might of the United

States should be employed to protect the financial interests of American businessmen. It was generally assumed that such force would be used when necessary, an assumption which President Taft supported in a number of speeches, including the one of December 7, 1909, in which he stated that American citizens could rely on personal and property protection no matter where they resided.

Latin America was one of the areas where "dollar diplomacy" had been instituted, while Mexico was one of the leading recipients of the surplus capital of the United States economy. However, the question is not why the United States was so interested in that country, but rather why this interest did not take on a more forceful nature. Later circumstances indicated that the vague neutrality laws in effect at the time could have supported any stand that was taken by the government in Washington. There were also precedents for active military intervention in Latin America. But the fact remains that President Taft used neither of these potential weapons; the question is why.

A reasonable answer to the question concerning the United States apparent lack of interest in the revolutionary movements underway in Mexico in 1910 has many facets. First, it was generally accepted that Porfirio Díaz had complete control of Mexico and that no revolution could hope to remove him. When Francisco Madero started his revolt, officials in Washington assumed that he was merely another in a long line of individuals with a high sounding principle and little chance of success. The United States government found it difficult to be overly concerned with such minor irritations. The Mexican rebel could have been imprisoned at any time, even though the United States kept insisting that it lacked adequate proof of his violations of neutrality. Yet the Taft administration refused to arrest him when requested to do so by the Mexican

authorities. This action or lack of it was not in support of Madero but a way of avoiding the needless controversy that would be engendered if an influential rebel were imprisoned. The second reason for the lack of a forceful policy by the United States was the rapidity with which Díaz fell from power. Only a short five months after the official starting date of the revolution, the old dictator had fallen, This speed, plus the earlier confidence in Díaz, made action by the United States difficult to effect.

Another partial explanation for the vapid and weak attitude that Taft expressed during the Madero revolution was public opinion in the United States. The business leaders urged intervention from the beginning, but the mass of Americans expressed sympathy for Francisco Madero and the principles for which he fought. The Maderista junta in Washington, unable to meet with officials of the Taft administration, was still successful in creating an image of Madero as being the Mexican counterpart to George Washington or Abraham Lincoln. This rapport between the rebels and the American people intensified as one approached the border. The pro-Madero inclination was also prevalent among the governors of some of the border states as well as among the United States officials located there. President Taft eventually realized this situation and mobilized 16,000 troops to patrol the area, but the opportune time for such action had long since passed. Despite denials, use of the troops gave the appearance that the United States had doubts about the ability of Díaz to handle the insurrection, whereupon the Mexican people looked a little closer at the Maderista revolt.

For these reasons the official policy of the United States remained clearly neutral during the actions leading to the removal of Porfirio Díaz. It was a policy motivated by over-confidence in the dictator, by

the swiftness of his decline, and by Taft's inability to decide what conditions were in Mexico; but it was still neutrality.

After Madero's regime had been installed legally in October of 1911, President Taft granted immediate recognition. There was no reason to compound past mistakes by not doing so. There were no strong pro-Diaz movements to oust the new President of Mexico, and Taft was not a man to lead a crusade without the bounds of diplomatic correctness. But the United States was in the process of changing its former attitude toward Mexican rebels and particularly those who fled to this country. These changes did not involve immediate concrete legislation, but rather a new interpretation of the laws that existed. Madero had been allowed to roam at will when he fled to the United States in 1910. The reception accorded to General Bernardo Reyes in October and November of 1911 was considerably cooler. After being in the United States less than one month, his activities had been investigated by United States officials on the border. On November 18, 1911, he was arrested. The rapidity of this action was due in part to the effectiveness of Madero's agents in providing bona fide evidence that Reyes had violated the laws. The fact remains that he had done no more than had Madero in 1910. But United States officials were quick to investigate him and limit his activities along the border although he had taken no overt action against the Madero regime.[1]

The changes that were evolving in 1911 culminated with two specific measures in 1912. On March 4 of that year Congress passed a joint resolution giving the president authority to embargo military supplies

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[1]Charles C. Cumberland, "Mexican Revolutionary Movements From Texas, 1906-1912," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LII (January, 1949), 318.

to all factions in Mexico, but allowing access to these supplies by the forces of the central government. In October of 1912 the United States Department of War received orders to arrest all rebels entering the United States from Mexico. Justification for this action was Section XIV of the Neutrality Laws. This section, by a liberal interpretation, could be used, but as written it covered only those who were preparing to launch military expeditions from the United States. Whether these revolutionary refugees were making plans for a military expedition or not was beside the point. This fact could not be ascertained the instant the rebels crossed into the United States, yet if observed they would be arrested at that instant.

These changes in policy could only be justified by the constant irritation faced by the United States government in dealing with rebel factions along the border. What had been expected to be only a temporary problem in 1910 was found to be a constant condition in 1912. This condition necessitated a policy that was firmer and harsher to prevent further difficulties.

If the foreign policy of William Howard Taft was based on an uncertain expediency, that of Woodrow Wilson was constructed on a base of good intentions. President Wilson as a diplomatist stands as a warning to those who believe that high ideals and principles should be universally recognized in the field of foreign affairs. He was a democrat by birth-right and choice, a moralist by temperament, and an international idealist by reason of inexperience. To Wilson, the governments of other countries were as good or as bad as they were democratic or undemocratic. His criterion for determining a democracy included universal suffrage and responsible government. The Mexico that confronted him in 1913-1915 had neither of these; thus she would need to be led by the United States into

the fold of the democratic nations of the world.

Woodrow Wilson was an idealist in ends but not in methods. To reach the desired objective, it mattered little with whom he dealt. He constantly vacillated between factions at work in Mexico, and in a period of slightly more than two years he had given support to all of them. In studying this confusing patch-work there are certain trends that can be detected. From March, 1913, to August of the same year Wilson attempted to negotiate directly with the Huertista government for the removal of the dictator and the creation of some sort of temporary coalition government that would permit free elections. By October and Huerta's participation in the elections of that month, the American President turned to negotiation with Venustiano Carranza and carried this to the extent of allowing the rebels to get arms in March of 1914. The inability of the Constitutionalists to produce on their promises of defeating Huerta with United States military supplies turned President Wilson to unilateral action at Veracruz in June of 1914. The resentment engendered by this action provided the opportunity for a Pan-American answer to the Mexican situation. This was the Niagara Conference which started in May of 1914. After Huerta's fall, in part due to the slowness of the Pan-American conference to reach a decision, the Constitutionalist forces split, and Wilson was faced with a choice between Pancho Villa and Venustiano Carranza. His choice fell on Villa because he expressed a child-like eagerness to follow the lead of the United States and also because Carranza had been reluctant to follow Wilson's recommendations. By February of 1915 Villa's power was only a memory due to the onslaught of the Carranzista General, Alvaro Obregón. Still Wilson refused to support Carranza, and Pan-Americanism was once again called to extricate the United States from an impossible situation. On August 2 these conferences

started with all sides agreed that Carranza would not be considered as the man to solve the Mexican crisis. Nine days later Wilson reversed himself for the fourth time in two years and urged the recognition of Venustiano Carranza.

The only consistency in these obtuse and contorted trends was the desire to bring responsible government to Mexico. They do not represent a long-range, realistically conceived policy to settle the Mexican crisis. Rather they provide an excellent study of a collision between ideals and reality.

In all of his dealings with Mexico President Wilson was hampered by his ignorance of the Mexican character and by what he considered to be a lack of appreciation on the part of the rebels for what he was attempting. The American President expected the rebel leaders publicly to express their support of his every action, providing it was done in the name of their cause. This expectation was impossible and impolitic. When American troops seized Veracruz on April 14 Wilson fully expected the Constitutionalists to applaud the action. When this applause was not forthcoming, he was hurt and resentful. In November of 1913 he had sent William B. Hale to Hermosillo to obtain Carranza's pledge to follow certain conditions, including a statement that United States interests were dominant in Mexico. The refusal of the rebels to go along with these conditions was also never understood by Wilson. The President, as a trained political scientist, should have recognized that the years of sharing a common border with the United States in its moods of expansion had given birth to a distrust of the motives and intentions of the country to the north. This attitude was latent but omnipresent. Therefore, no faction could afford to give a sincere and complete endorsement to plans conceived by the Chief Executive of the United States. This is not

to say that it was impossible for Woodrow Wilson to lead and direct the revolution, but such direction could be only as effective as it was unnoticed.

Of equal importance in understanding Mexican-United States relations during Wilson's term was the view of revolution held by the President and the American people. The United States had been created by a revolt against what was considered a tyrannical political power. Still earlier, our English heritage with its emphasis on the political aspects of the revolution of 1641 and 1688 had also inclined Americans to think of revolution as predominantly political. Both of these national experiences made the United States see the Mexican revolution as the same type of movement. This view was not completely fallacious, since the people of Mexico did have political reason for revolting. But of much more importance were the social and economic aspects of the revolution. Mexicans knew very little of ballot boxes and proportional representation, but they were aware of their lack of food and land; and they knew that life and hunger were synonomous. The future offered little hope of change. Therefore their resentment was concentrated more against a system than a man, and a hated system which was old, all-pervasive and entrenched. It would require more than the removal of a Diaz or a Huerta and the substitution of a democrat. To effect genuine reform the superstitious hold of the church would have to be smashed, the army emasculated, foreign money reduced in influence, and land more evenly distributed. Thus, while the United States had freed itself by revolution, Mexico recreated herself with a similar action. President Wilson was exceedingly slow in realizing this basic factor, and it is quite possible that he never thoroughly comprehended it; most of his plans for settling the internal strife of Mexico were politically oriented. This fact can be seen in the

instructions given to John Lind in August, 1913, which outlined a settlement that was entirely political and constructed on the presumption that free elections would solve all. This same fault was also present in Wilson's belief that Carranza and Villa could negotiate their differences and unite on some common ground. As one correspondent at work in Mexico stated, this would be like asking Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt to confer, or even more like expecting "Bill Haywood and Judge Gary to get together."[2]

Merely listing the blunders of Woodrow Wilson in Mexico would be unjust and false to the truth. He did make many mistakes, but in the midst of these he gave indications that times were changing. His determination to talk rather than to use military force was admirable. It is true that he did eventually use force, but only after he had exhausted all visible alternatives. His belief in Pan-Americanism, albeit one dominated by the United States, was often an expedient way out of uncomfortable situations, but it did further the idea of multilateral Latin American policy rather than a series of unilateral doctrines issued by the United States. All in all, the chief contribution made by Wilson in these years was a determination to improve the conditions of the submerged classes of Latin America. His efforts were faulty, inconsistent, and often fruitless, but no one can deny the sincerity of his efforts. Perhaps this quality should soften the harsh summing up of the failures of a man who labored diligently, if not wisely.

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[2]Lincoln Steffens to Colonel Edward M. House in Ella Winter and Granville Hicks (eds.), The Letters of Lincoln Steffens (2 vols.; New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1938), I, p. 356.

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The date of publication and the author's nationality explain the strong anti-United States attitude of this book.

Cronon, E. David. The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-1921. Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1963.

The cabinet notes of Daniels are short and sketchy. There are few penetrating insights on anything and none on the manner in which the Mexican situation was handled.

Daniels, Josephus. The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910-1917. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944.
A decidedly pro-Wilson study of the man and his term as president.

_____. The Wilson Era: Years of War and After, 1917-1923. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946.
See above annotation.

Davis, Will G. Experiences and Observations of a Consular Officer During the Recent Mexican Revolutions. Chula Vista, Calif.: Wayside Press, 1920.
The view of the events in Mexico are limited by the fact that the author served in only one Mexican state.

Gonzalez, Garza Federico. La Revolucion Mexicana. Mi Contribucion Politica-Literaria. Mexico: J. Cantu Leal, 1936.
A documentary history of the revolutions by an individual who wrote a great many of the documents.

Gonzalez, Manuel W. Con Carranza: Episodios de la Revolucion Constitucionalista, 1913-1914. 2 vols. Monterrey: J. Cantu Leal, 1933-1934.
A romanticized look at the first years of the Carranza-led movement. It is more hero-worship than good history.

Grayson, Cary T. Woodrow Wilson, An Intimate Memoir. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Co., 1960.
The book is not as near or personal as Mr. Grayson would have the reader believe. There is little new or profound.

Houston, David F. Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913-1920. 2 vols. Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Co., Inc., 1926.
Mr. Houston's remembrances of his years as Secretary of Agriculture are not very enlightening or complete.

King, Rose E. Tempest Over Mexico: A Personal Chronicle. Boston: Brown, Little and Co., 1935.

Lodge, Henry Cabot. The Senate and the League of Nations. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925.
There are only a few pages dealing with Woodrow Wilson's Mexican policy, but it does show his attempts to work in cooperation with Congress.

Martinez, Rafael, Samper, Carlos M. and Lomelin, Gral. Jose P. La Revolucion Y Sus Hombres. Mexico: Talleres Tipograficos de "El Tiempo," 1912.
A large number of short biographies of those who played active roles in the early years of change. Some of these short sketches are all that is available on these men.

O'Shaughnessy, Edith. Diplomatic Days. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1917.
An inside view of action in and around the American Embassy that is marred by the author's condescending attitude towards Mexico.

_____. A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1916.
This is much like the above work and suffers from the same fault.

Seymour, Charles (ed.). The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. 4 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926-1928.
A well-edited collection of the writings of Wilson's closest advisor. There is little here on Mexico, but much of general interest.

Tumulty, Joseph P. Woodrow Wilson As I Knew Him. Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Co., Inc., 1921.
One would expect a much more detailed study of Woodrow Wilson and his administration than this work provides in view of Tumulty's closeness to the President.

Vasconcelos, José. A Mexican Ulysses: An Autobiography. Translated and Abridged by W. Rex Crawford. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1963.
An excellent, humorous and thought-provoking biography of a born revolutionary.

Wilson, Henry Lane. Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium and Chile. Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1927.
One Mexican scholar has called this work "adjusted to the truth." This view seems to be essentially correct.

Winter, Ella and Hicks, Granville (eds). The Letters of Lincoln Steffens. 2 vols. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938.
The excellent letters of one of the United States' most outstanding journalists, they are pro-Carranza, pro-revolution when dealing with Mexico.

Books

Brandenburg, Frank. The Making of Modern Mexico. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964.
One of the best recent studies of the factors that have shaped modern Mexico. The author is pro-revolution.

Callahan, James M. American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations. New York: Macmillan Co., 1932.
There is little of importance here on the twisting and turning involved in creating an effective Mexican policy. The author has dug very little below the surface.

Carreño, Albert María. La Diplomacia Extraordinaria Entre Mexico y Los Estados Unidos, 1789-1947. 2 vols. Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1951.
A unique study of the various unofficial envoys that have so confused Mexican-United States relations.

Clendenen, Clarence. The United States and Pancho Villa. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961.
This book suffers from too much United States and not enough Villa. It is good for showing the prevailing popular mood in this country.

Cline, Howard F. The United States and Mexico. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953.
Mr. Cline's book is probably the best single volume dealing with the problem of the Mexican policy of the United States.

Dulles, John W. F. Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution, 1919-1936. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961.
The first few chapters give some information of the years 1910-1919. The remainder is excellent for the following seventeen years.

Fabela, Isidrio. Historia Diplomática de la Revolución Mexicana. 2 vols. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1958-1959.
These two volumes show the rising interest of Mexican historians in their revolution. One hopes the trend will continue.

Gibbon, Thomas Edward. Mexico Under Carranza. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., Inc., 1919.
A biased, warped, unresearched and hostile study of Carranza's term as President of Mexico.

Godoy, José F. Porfirio Díaz: President of Mexico. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910.
The year of publication should aid the reader in evaluating this book. It was written when Díaz was considered the greatest of Mexico's statesmen.

Gruening, Ernest. Mexico and Its Heritage. New York: Century Co., 1928.
A detailed, excellent topical study of the problems of Mexico and the historical factors that caused them.

James, Daniel. Mexico and the Americans. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.
A well written, although rather light-weight study of Mexico-United States foreign policy.

Link, Arthur S. Wilson: The New Freedom. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956.
One of the excellent, well researched volumes written by the best biographer of Wilson, the man and his administration.

_____. Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.
This book is much like the preceding volume and deserving of the same praise.

Luquin, Eduardo. La Política Internacional de la Revolución Constitucionalista. Mexico: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1957.
A rather philosophical study of the Constitutionalist foreign policy and why it was that way.

MacCorkle, Stuart A. American Policy of Recognition Toward Mexico. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933.
An historical study of the various policies followed by the United States in recognizing Mexican governments.

Notter, Harley. The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937.
A closely reasoned, carefully researched study of Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy and the reasoning behind it.

Peaslee, Amos J. Constitutions of Nations. 4 vols. Concord, N. H.: Rumford Press, 1950.

Pinchon, Edgcumb. Zapata, The Unconquerable. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1941.
A study of Emiliano Zapata, this is more fiction than historical fact.

Priestly, Herbert I. The Mexican Nation, A History. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927.
One of the old general histories of Mexico that has become a little dated.

Pringle, Henry F. The Life and Times of William Howard Taft. 2 vols. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1964.
A standard biography of Taft that is excellently written and researched.

Quirk, Robert E. An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962.
Mr. Quirk is the best American historian writing about Mexico. This study of the occupation of Veracruz is outstanding.

_____. The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915: The Convention of Aguascalientes. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960.
This study of the years in which the revolutionary forces divided is comprehensive in detail and indispensable to the student of this period.

Rippy, J. Fred. The United States and Mexico. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926.
This book was, at the time, the best study of United States-Mexican relations. More recent works have somewhat dated it.

_____, Vasconcelos, José and Stevens, Guy. American Policies Abroad: Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928.
A series of essays tracing the historical policy of American policy in regard to Mexico.

Romanell, P. Making of the Mexican Mind. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1952.
A psychological study of the national mind of Mexico and the events that created it.

Ross, Stanley. Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.
An exceptionally good biography of the Initiator of the first Mexican revolution in 1910. The concentration is on the years Madero led Mexico.

Rossiter, William M. "Mexican-American Relations, 1913-1920. A Reappraisal." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Chicago, 1953.
This dissertation is supposed to be a reappraisal but has little that has not been said. It does place the Mexican problem in relation to other aspects of the Woodrow Wilson administration.

Smith, Launa M. American Relations With Mexico. Oklahoma City: Harlow Publishing Co., 1927.
An incomplete, weakly researched and badly written study of United States-Mexican relations.

Starr, Frederick. Mexico and the United States: A Story of Revolution, Intervention and War. Chicago: The Bible House, 1914.
A sensational and pro-Mexican look at relations between the United States and Mexico in the decade of revolution.

Tannenbaum, Frank. Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950.
A well-written study of the revolution and its causes by one of the best historians of Latin America.

Turner, Ethel D. Ricardo Flores Magón y El Partido Liberal Mexicano. Translated by Eduardo Limon G. Morelia, Michoacan: Editorial "Earndi" del Gobierno del Estado Morelia, Michoacan, 1960.
An excellent study of the political party and its founder who laid the foundation for Francisco Madero.

Vasconcelos, José and Gamio, Manuel. Aspects of Mexican Civilization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926.
Several essays on various areas of the Mexican civilization and character written by two of Mexico's best known scholars.

Villegas, Daniel Cosío. Historia Moderna de Mexico. 6 vols. Mexico City: Editoria Hermes, 1955-1963.
This entire series is excellent. The emphasis is on the years of Porfirio Díaz and it is detailed and comprehensive.

Wilgus, A. Curtis (ed.). The Caribbean: Mexico Today. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964.
This book on the "Caribbean scene" shows the present-day accomplishments of the Mexican revolution and also its shortcomings.

Journal Articles

Barrett, John. "Mexico, Review and Forecast," Pan American Union Bulletin, XLIV, No. 1 (January, 1917), 41-57.
An economic barometer showing businessmen of the United States the potential of Mexico.

Brandt, Nancy. "Pancho Villa: The Making of a Modern Legend," The Americas, XXI (October, 1964), 146-162.
This article concentrates overly on the legend and little on the man.

Castañeda, Jorge. "Revolution and Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly, LVIII (September, 1963), 391-417.
A philosophical study of revolution in general and its effect on foreign policy.

Cleven, Andrew N. "Some Social Aspects of the Mexican Constitution of 1917," Hispanic American Historical Review, IV (August, 1921), 474-485.
This essay traces the provisions of the Constitution of 1917 and places them in their historical perspective.

Cumberland, Charles C. "Precursors of the Mexican Revolution of 1910," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXII (May, 1942), 344-356.
An excellent study of the revolutionaries who preceded Madero and his followers. The concentration is on Ricardo Flores Magón.

_____. "Mexican Revolutionary Movements from Texas, 1906-1912," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LII (January, 1949), 301-324.
This is an exceptionally good description of rebel groups operating on the Mexican-United States border and the problems involved.

Hilton, Stanley E. "The Church-State Dispute over Education in Mexico from Carranza to Cardenas," The Americas, XXI (October, 1964), 163-183.
A description of the problems involved in making the separation of church and state in Mexico a reality.

Jones, C. K. "Bibliography of the Mexican Revolution," Hispanic American Historical Review, II (February, 1919), 311-314.
An incomplete and badly outdated listing of works available for researchers in the field of the Mexican revolution.

Kahl, Louis G. "Robert Lansing and the Recognition of Venustiano Carranza," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXVIII (August, 1958).
A carefully researched essay on Robert Lansing's involvement in the Mexican crisis and his attempts to solve it.

New York Times, 1910-1916.

Rausch, George J. "The Exile and Death of Victoriano Huerta," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLII (May, 1962), 133-152.

An account of the mysterious circumstances surrounding the death of the former Mexican dictator in the United States.

Tannenbaum, Frank. "Mexico's Internal Policies and American Diplomacy," Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, CXXXII (July, 1927), 172-175.

A brief study of the manner in which the internal problems of Mexico have become intertwined with United States' foreign policy.

APPENDIX

NEUTRALITY LAWS IN EFFECT, 1910-1915

SEC 9. Every citizen of the United States who, within the territory or jurisdiction thereof, accepts and exercises a commission to serve a foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, in war, by land or by sea, against any prince, state, colony, district, or people, with whom the United States are at peace, shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than three years.

SEC. 10. Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlists, or enters himself, or hires or retains another person to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than three years.

SEC. 11. Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, fits out and arms, or attempts to get out and arm, or procures to be fitted out and armed, or knowingly is concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming of any vessel, with intent that such vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign prince or state or of any colony, district, or people, to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens, or property of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States are at peace, or whoever issues or delivers a commission within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States for any vessel, to the intent that she may be so employed, shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than three years. And every such vessel, her tackle, apparel, and furniture, together with all materials, arms, ammunition, and stores which may have been procured for the building and equipment thereof, shall be forfeited; one half to the use of the informer and the other half to the use of the United States.

SEC. 12. Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, increases or augments, or procures to be increased or augmented, or knowingly is concerned in increasing or augmenting, the force of any ship of war, cruiser, or other armed vessel which, at the time of her arrival within the United States, was a ship of war, or cruiser, or armed vessel, in the service of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, or belonging to the subjects or citizens of any such prince or state, colony, district, or people, the same being at war with any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States are at peace, by adding to the number of the guns of such vessel, or by changing those on board of her for guns of a larger caliber, or by adding thereto any equipment solely applicable to war, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned

not more than one year.

SEC. 13. Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, begins, or sets on foot, or provides or prepares the means for, any military expedition or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States are at peace, shall be fined not more than three thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than three years.

SEC. 14. The district courts shall take cognizance of all complaints, by whomsoever instituted, in cases of captures made within the waters of the United States, or within a marine league of the coasts or shores thereof. In every case in which a vessel is fitted out and armed, or attempted to be fitted out and armed, or in which the force of any vessel of war, cruiser, or other armed vessel is increased or augmented, or in which any military expedition or enterprise is begun or set on foot, contrary to the provisions and prohibitions of this chapter; and in every case of the capture of a vessel within the jurisdiction or protection of the United States as before defined; and in every case in which any process issuing out of any court of the United States is disobeyed or resisted by any person having the custody of any vessel of war, cruiser, or other armed vessel of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, or of any subjects or citizens of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, it shall be lawful for the President, or such other person as he shall have empowered for that purpose, to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the militia thereof, for the purpose of taking possession of and detaining any such vessel, with her prizes, if any, in order to enforce the execution of the prohibitions and penalties of this chapter, and the restoring of such prizes in the cases in which restoration shall be adjudged; and also for the purpose of preventing the carrying on of any such expedition or enterprise from the territory or jurisdiction of the United States against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States are at peace.

SEC. 15. It shall be lawful for the President, or such person as he shall empower for that purpose, to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the militia thereof, as shall be necessary to compel any foreign vessel to depart the United States in all cases in which, by the laws of nations or the treaties of the United States, she ought not to remain within the United States.

SEC. 16. The owners or consignees of every armed vessel sailing out of the ports of, or under the jurisdiction of, the United States, belonging wholly or in part to citizens thereof, shall, before clearing out the same, give bond to the United States, with sufficient sureties, in double the amount of the value of the vessel and cargo on board, including her armament, conditioned that the vessel shall not be employed by such owners to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens, or property of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States are at peace.

SEC. 17. The several collectors of the customs shall detail any vessel manifestly built for warlike purposes, and about to depart the United States, or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, the cargo of which principally consists of arms and munitions of war, when the number of men shipped on board, or other circumstances, render it probable that such vessel is intended to be employed by the owners to

cruise or commit hostilities upon the subjects, citizens, or property of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States are at peace, until the decision of the President is had thereon, or until the owner gives such bond and security as is required of the owners of armed vessels by the preceding section.

SEC. 18. The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to extend to any subject or citizen of any foreign prince or state, colony, district, or people who is transiently within the United States and enlists or enters himself on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, which at the time of its arrival within the United States was fitted and equipped as such, or hires or retains another subject or citizen of the same foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people on board to serve such foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people on board such vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, if the United States shall then be at peace with such foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people. Nor shall they be construed to prevent the prosecution or punishment of treason, or of any piracy defined by the laws of the United States.[1]

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[1]U. S. Statutes at Large (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), XXXV, pp. 1089-1091.

VITA

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Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Thesis: THE TURMOIL OF TRANSITION: THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICAN REVOLUTIONARIES, 1910-1915

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Personal Data: Born in Morley, Missouri, January 3, 1941, the son of Kermit C. and Ruth McMillan.

Education: Attended grade school in Oran, Missouri; graduated from Central High School, Springfield, Missouri, in 1958; received the Bachelor of Science degree with a major in education from Southwest Missouri State College, Springfield, Missouri, in May, 1962; completed requirements for the Master of Arts degree from Oklahoma State University in July, 1966.

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