

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CLASH OF IDEOLOGY AND NATIONAL INTEREST

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PREFACE

Ideology has been a dominating influence in twentieth century politics. Crucial struggles have been waged to win men's minds for fascism, democracy, and communism. It is a widely held opinion that the policy of a state is formulated in response to the demands of a particular ideology. This contemporary ideological emphasis represents a significant change of emphasis in the historic view of politics. However, the power drives and goals of nations in pursuit of national self-interest cannot be manipulated so easily by diaphanous ideals. Which is predominate-- power or ideals? This dilemma was the motivation for a study of the clash of ideology and national interest in contemporary nations. The particular case in point was the Sino-Soviet dispute, but this paradox represents, I think, a wide-spread dilemma in many nations.

I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. C. A. L. Rich for first illuminating this paradox in the behavior of men and nations, and for patiently and wisely guiding development of this endeavor. I would also like to thank Dr. Harold V. Sare and Dr. Raymond Habiby for reading this thesis and offering constructive criticism. Lastly, a great debt is owed to the Department of Political Science for making this work possible through the granting of a graduate assistantship in the years 1962-64.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1950 an alliance was formed between the Soviet Union and Communist China. This alliance united two of the largest nations of the world in a mutual defense alliance, as well as in agreements of aid and cooperation. In spite of traditional cultural differences and a history of discreet competition dating to Imperial times, the alliance was formulated on the basis of their common adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Sino-Soviet alliance was an awesome development in international relations and greatly enlarged the bloc of Communist nations. It fulfilled the basic condition of an alliance--the sharing of a common enemy. In this case the enemy was Western capitalism and imperialism. Both the Soviets and the Chinese emphasized that their alliance was based on proletarian internationalism, thus free of the tensions and strains of ordinary alliances between bourgeois states. Yet within a decade of its inception the Sino-Soviet alliance was deeply rent by difficulties which have not yet been resolved.

The unique aspect of the Sino-Soviet dispute is its method of engagement. The dispute has been conducted in the frame of reference common to both states--Marxist-Leninist ideology. This was a natural course, as Marxism-Leninism not only provides the governing ideology for both states, but also provides them with a common perspective of viewing the world situation. However, the aesopian nature of the ideological

language made it difficult for non-Communist observers to ascertain whether in fact a dispute existed. It was speculated in the early stages of the Sino-Soviet exchanges that the quarrel was over ideological interpretation. Like the Bible, Lenin's writings are vague in places, overly specific in others, and in general open to wide latitude of interpretation. For this reason the violent discussions of ideology gave the impression of an ideological quarrel--important, interesting perhaps, but not relevant to the world at large, of concern only to the Communist bloc. However, as the quarrel deepened it became couched less in ideological terms and more in terms of specific clashes of policy. The existence of basic Sino-Soviet differences became clear to all the world.

X It was in the area of international politics that the dispute first became apparent. In specific instances, as the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958, China's invasions of India in 1958 and 1962, and the Middle East crisis of 1958, a divergence between Soviet and Chinese pronouncements and actions were noted. It was observed that China was voicing a more belligerent and antagonistic attitude than the Soviet Union. The ever-present ^{SYR 7} diatribes against the United States were now coming from China, rather than from the Soviet Union. Khrushchev, in fact, had visited the United States and spoken highly of President Eisenhower. In view of the common adherence to Marxism-Leninism these actions presented a paradox.^{SYR} There appeared to be a dichotomy,^{SYR} not only between Russian and Chinese actions, but also between Soviet actions and ideology.

There had been much ideological discussion within the Communist bloc about the correct policies to be followed: toward the imperialists, toward non-communist countries not aligned with the West, and concerning

the correct path toward socialism. There appeared to be differences within the bloc on these questions, but because they were ideological in nature, this limited the scope of the arguments. After 1960 it became apparent that much more was involved than ideology. A real conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China had developed. The existence of the dispute forced a new appraisal of Marxism-Leninism by the bloc of states sharing this ideology. Traditional national interests and attitudes began to be discussed and the struggle as to which was to take precedence in policy decisions--ideology or national interest--emerged. X

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute, particularly in reference to the conflict between Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the national interests of the Soviet Union and China. Several hypotheses have been formulated to guide the investigation. The first hypothesis is that the Sino-Soviet dispute is not an ideological quarrel, but rather disagreement caused by divergent national interests of the two countries. The divergent interests were held in check by the absolutism of Stalin, and upon his death began to assume their present shape. The second hypothesis is that the dispute originated because of changes in Soviet policy which were wrought by the new leadership of the Soviet Union. The new Soviet policies did not coincide with the Chinese desire to become a Great Power. This then is the third hypothesis: China wishes to achieve Great Power status and recognition of this status through the aid of the Soviet Union; however, the Soviet Union is not willing to sacrifice her own national interest to aid her socialist ally. This lends credence to the ineffectiveness of Marxist-Leninist ideology as a realistic bond of unity in Communist bloc politics. X

The first chapter is devoted to presenting a historical perspective of the dispute. This will include a brief analytical survey of Imperial relations between Russia and China, as well as the historical relations between the Communist parties of the two countries.

The second chapter provides a detailed presentation of the ideological exchanges between the Soviet Union and China in the current dispute. The emphasis of this chapter is on the ideological stands taken by the Soviet Union and China, but among the ideological arguments other issues of difference emerge.

The third chapter discusses the role of ideology, both theoretically and with specific application to the Sino-Soviet dispute. It stresses the role of the revolutionary experience in Russia and China as a perspective from which each country views the world, as well as the basic underlying differences between the two.

Finally, the fourth chapter is an analysis of the foreign policies pursued by the Soviets and the Chinese, concentrating on the years 1956-1960, showing the divergences between their policies and suggesting possible reasons.

The conclusion will provide a summation of the thesis and hopefully verify the hypotheses set forth.

In investigations of the Sino-Soviet dispute various methods of analysis have been employed by political scientists. These range from the ideologists, who intensively scrutinize all Marxist-Leninist pronouncements of the Soviet Union, China and all the Communist nations, to a study of seating arrangements at banquets and the plotting of graphs according to the number of lines in anniversary greetings. In this study, however, the methodology employed will be in the more traditional nature

of a descriptive analysis. The hypotheses have been set forth and a study of the available data will hopefully verify them. The data and source material used in this study consist of primary sources in the form of documents relating to alliances, statements of the Soviet Union and China relating to particular issues, and pronouncements of Marxist-Leninist theories. These documents are mainly found in collections of documents. Very helpful in supplying information on incidents about which the involved governments may not wish to comment are comments of journalists who were actually "on the spot." Secondary sources in the form of discussions and analyses of the Sino-Soviet dispute by experts have also been perused with the idea of obtaining a consensus, or divergence, concerning the issue. In addition, the authors of these studies usually have had access to information in Communist newspapers, as well as the language proficiency to read them. Articles in professional journals were particularly helpful on specific problems not thoroughly discussed in comprehensive works. The basic difficulty in studying the Communist bloc rests, of course, on the interpretation of primary sources which are phrased in Marxist-Leninist terms. One must put oneself in a particular perspective to unravel the thread of reality running through the cliches and polemics.

CHAPTER II

LEGACY OF RUSSIAN EASTERN POLICY

In the nineteenth century diplomats made allowances for cultural differences between nations. Even though the French and the English might cooperate, there was never much thought that one should adopt the other's style of government. It was not even conceivable by the English that perhaps the French might remedy their chronic political ills by imitation of the stable English Parliament. However, in the modern era of ideological proselytism and de-colonization, the exportation of parliamentary government, "democracy," or Marxism-Leninism has become standard. Often forgotten in this mass exportation is the fact that governments are a reflection of the cultural fabric of a nation. As such, export is impossible because of the basic cultural differences between nations. This is often forgotten, too, in discussions of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Both nations are possessors of long and proud civilizations which no ideology acquired over a few years can obliterate. There remains a cultural heritage which has become an irritation in the present conflict. This cultural incompatibility became apparent, and significant, only after the initial fervor of ideology faded. Thus, age-old national interests and old antagonisms have again asserted themselves.

Basic Cultural Differences Between Russia and China

Cultural differences exist between any two nations, and even among

groups within nations. However, between some nations these differences are not primary, and can be overcome. For example, the nations of Western Europe are basically compatible culturally even though there are marked French, German, English, or Italian characteristics. They share a common heritage and outlook. Contrasted with this, the Russian and Chinese cultures are antithetical. Their cultures were shaped by different processes and produced a completely different outlook. It has often been said that Russia is Eastern in a cultural sense because she was under Mongol rule for three centuries, was isolated from Europe, and experienced neither Reformation nor Renaissance. But it is clear that Russia was influenced for the greatest part by a Western, Hellenistic culture. The greater part of her population has always been in Western Russia with only fringe groups in the Oriental areas. Russia may appear Eastern to Europe, but to the Orient she is definitely Western, and Caucasian. Dostoyevsky clarified the problem of Russia: "In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, whereas we shall go to Asia as masters. In Europe we were Asiatics, whereas in Asia we, too, are Europeans."¹

A closer look at these cultural characteristics of Russia and China is enlightening, as the Communist regimes have not yet had time, especially in China, to completely reshape society. These cultural and social aspects form a significant part of Klaus Mehnert's book, Peking and Moscow, and provide valuable insight not generally considered. Mehnert first considers the "individual man" of Russia and China--his

¹Feodor Dostoyevsky, The Diary of a Writer, Vol. II, (New York, 1949), p. 1048.

outlook and his attitudes.² He makes the point that Russian "man" and Chinese "man" represent exact opposites in outlook and temperament. The Russian puts primary emphasis upon the importance of the soul--over intellect, over reason, or over material abundance. Consequently, this leads the Russian to excesses and fanaticism.

The emotional and impulsive temperament of the Russian exemplifies, among all the people of Europe, the strongest contrast to the rational wisdom of the Chinese, ... to his self-control rising out of his continual state of harmony with his environment.³

In contrast to the Russian, the Chinese attaches more importance to the intellectual and material aspects of life. There is exhibited a stoical acceptance of adversity and a joy in life, even a cynical laughter at almost everything. The result of these two contrasts is that the Russian tends to approach life with a grim seriousness, while the Chinese is more laconic and pragmatic.

Religion is of supposedly slight importance in a Communist state; however, past religious attitudes have shaped present basic attitudes. Since the tenth century, which saw Russia's conversion to Christianity, the Russians have been dominated by Orthodoxy, one arm of Caesaropapism. The Russian is permeated with Christianity and is passionately concerned with an Absolute. The Russian is eschatologically oriented, rather than concerned with the earthly world. "The Russians are not sceptics; they

²The question as to whether there are distinctive national characteristics is a perennial and heated topic. Mehnert offers this proof: "The late Felix M. Keesing, the New Zealand anthropologist, summarized his findings in two theses: first, in the case of each nation it is possible to prove the existence of a certain national character which distinguishes it from other nations; second, this national character is a variable, not a constant, quantity." Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, (New York, 1963), p. 3.

³Ibid., p. 28.

are dogmatists. Among them everything takes on a religious character; they have little understanding of what is relative."⁴ Combined with this passionate religious fervor, wherever it may lead, is the Russian attitude toward suffering. Suffering, usually for an abstract goal, this longing toward an Absolute, is firmly entrenched in Russian life and literature. Combined with their fanaticism this attitude has produced the Messianic outlook with its striving toward an everlasting kingdom.

In contrast to the Russian's permeation and preoccupation with religion, the Chinese present a purely secular state. There has never existed in China a Messianic religion, such as Christianity or Islam, with its powerful impetus. Instead, there was a philosophic system with emphasis on materialism and preoccupation with things and relationships in this world. The primary importance was placed on making this life pleasant, with no thought of preparing for a future life, to which the Russian was oriented. From this emphasis on the present life and relations in it, China developed what Ruth Benedict has termed a "shame culture," as opposed to the Western "guilt culture." The distinction lies in the distinction between shame and guilt: "shame is the disgrace we are conscious of in the eyes of others, and guilt is what we feel inwardly."⁵ The sense of wrong-doing in a "shame culture" depends on other people--whether you were observed--and thus guilt is entirely relative. Contrasted to this are the absolutist tenets of Christianity with which Russian culture is permeated. One might say particularly that the Russians are permeated by this guilt complex. Thus, attitude toward

⁴Nicholas Berdyaev, The Russian Idea, (New York, 1948), p. 27.

⁵Gerhard Piers and Milton B. Singer, Shame and Guilt, (Springfield, Illinois, 1953), p. 50.

religion, with its effect on culture, presents a major dichotomy in Russian and Chinese cultures.

In Russia the atheism of Communism's founders forced this religiously-dominated society to make an either/or choice. The degree of intensity of belief presented a real obstacle to Communism. Contrasted with this situation is China, which never experienced a great religious force. Communism appears as just one more philosophy or way of life which will be absorbed and Sinified.

Part of the cultural differences arising between Russia and China is racism.

In China and Russia we have two very different peoples. One nation consists of men and women with what we call yellow skins, the other mainly of people whose skin colors we loosely lump together as white. Both are proud peoples and each has within its tradition ideas of racial and national superiority which are in their nature mutually incompatible.⁶

Russian superiority has traditionally been expressed in the Third Rome concept, which originated in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the later, related Pan-Slav movement of the nineteenth century. China has traditionally considered herself as the "center of the world" with all non-Chinese being inferior barbarians who had to pay tribute to the Middle Kingdom and acknowledge its superiority. In Russia, religion, and in China, culture became intertwined with politics. Racism is rarely mentioned by the Russians or the Chinese, and then only discreetly. Therefore, discussion on this subject must be speculated upon almost exclusively by outsiders. A few revealing comments indicate that these speculations are based on a genuine issue.

One of the most revealing illustrations of the existence of racism

⁶Schwarz, Harry, Tsars and Mandarins, (New York, 1964), p. 20.

in Sino-Soviet relations occurred at the Conference of Asian and African States, held at Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955. The Soviet Union was either not invited or excluded from coming, all at the insistence of the Chinese. Again, at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Meeting, held at Moshi, Tanganyika in February 1963, the Soviet delegates' right to participate was questioned from the very beginning of the meeting on the grounds that as Europeans they had no business at an Afro-Asian meeting.

Without naming the Chinese directly, a Soviet commentator writing in the spring of 1963 described the Chinese policy /at this conference/: Some of the more chauvinistically-minded leaders would like to direct the solidarity movement not against imperialism, colonialism, and its agents, but against all white people.⁷

At this same meeting "The Chinese called the delegates from Soviet areas in Asia 'marionettes of white imperialists.'"⁸ In addition, the Soviets have pointed out the racist implications of the favorite Chinese slogan "The wind from the East will prevail over the wind from the West."⁹

There is another side to be investigated. The use of racism by the Chinese may be considered as an employment of ideology. In the movement to gain influence over newly-emancipated countries the appeal of race is strong due to the colonial legacy. The Chinese can easily employ racism in these areas, appealing to strong anti-European sentiments.

Clearly, the Chinese use the slogan 'Colored People Unite' as an argument in situations, but that is only one weapon in their armory. They are as ready to accept the allegiance of militant leftist whites, ... as they are of non-whites.¹⁰

⁷Ibid., p. 192.

⁸Ibid., p. 199.

⁹Michael Freeberne, "Racial Issues and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Asian Survey, 5(1965), p. 413.

¹⁰Schwarz, p. 237.

The Chinese have styled themselves as the leaders of African, Asian, and Latin American Communist movements, while relegating North America and Europe to the Soviet sphere of influence. However, the Soviet Union will not acquiesce to this so easily.

There is, however, one problem in China's racist arguments. This is the problem of the Overseas Chinese who are spread through much of Southeast Asia. These Chinese have become merchants, money lenders, and industrialists through frugality and shrewdness, evoking envy and hatred among the native populations. Overseas Chinese are very clannish; they make no attempt to assimilate into the native society and often retain their Chinese citizenship. This makes them suspect to the native population who think of the Chinese in their midst as a "fifth column" for the largest country in Asia. The Asian countries are not quite sure whether to trust their "big brother" who is looking out for their welfare. The Overseas Chinese themselves are naturally put in a difficult position. Most of them are from the Mainland, but they could not accept the restrictions there on free enterprise, yet they have no real ties to the government on Formosa, and the people of their country of residence hate and distrust them. Their position is analogous to that of the Indians in Africa. Time and nationalism will decide their fate, and their passports. Meanwhile, the Communist Chinese prefer not to emphasize the existence of the Overseas Chinese. As Harry Schwarz has stated:

The point is worth repeating: the Chinese will use racism when it suits their purposes; they will eschew racism when such action better suits their needs. And even if the Chinese in the future go over to a completely racist line, they will have no easy time convincing millions of Asians that Peking stands for the welfare of all non-whites, rather than for the

welfare of China.¹¹

In summary, there exist certain national antagonisms which stem from two sources--traditional cultural differences and racial prejudice. The traditional attitudes toward racism have been coupled with the anti-white colonial legacy and exploited for propaganda purposes. The goal of this propaganda has been to increase the prestige and influence of China. Racism appears as a background element to be employed at the proper time and place.

The Legacy of Russian Foreign Policy

As a popular saying goes--behind the Sino-Soviet conflict lie a thousand years of history. No state can completely escape its history, irrespective of which ideology it embraces.¹² Evidences of conflicting interests in Sino-Soviet party relations in the period before the Chinese Communist takeover in 1949 are numerous. During this period Stalin's ambivalent policy toward the Chinese Communist Party resulted at one time in its near-annihilation. Soviet policies in the 1920's, combined with Tsarist activities in the Far East, present a long history of

¹¹Ibid., p. 238.

¹²The debate over the influence of the past on present Soviet foreign policy is a recurring one occupying Russian scholars. Some as Michael Karpovich and David Dallin, say that past policies were wiped out with the Bolshevik revolution. Others, as George Vernadsky, H. W. Chamberlin, and B. H. Sumner, say that Soviet foreign policy is greatly concerned with the same problems which plagued the Tsars. A middle course between these two positions appears the most valid: The Soviets have to contend with the same geographical, cultural, and resource problems of the Tsars; but they have at their disposal a more inclusive weapon than Pan-Slavism--Marxist-Leninist ideology, which provides a much better justification for their foreign policy. Similarly with respect to China, C. P. Fitzgerald, among others, makes the point in his book, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World, that China once again thinks of herself as the "centre of the world" as in Manchu days.

Sino-Soviet suspicions.

A more tangible legacy is the existence of the twenty-seven hundred mile border between China and Russia, which has never been completely defined.¹³ Such a long border presents an almost inevitable problem. In addition, this borderland area presents special problems due to the racial and ethnic composition of the people and its sparsely inhabited areas. That the border dispute still exists may be seen by the heavily fortified borders and by recent actual clashes between the Chinese and the Russians. "In the spring of 1961 it was announced that in Soviet Kazakhstan Volunteer People's Militia Units of the Border Areas had been organized to guard the frontier. The only frontier there is the one with China."¹⁴

The most constant feature of Russian and Soviet foreign policy has been the geography of the state. While governments change and people move the land remains the same. Geography has produced the most characteristic feature of Russian foreign policy--expansion for defense.

The USSR is composed of horizontal bands extending from east to west

¹³"Official maps and atlases continue to differ on some international boundaries. In some cases the difference in Chinese and Soviet maps is sixty or seventy miles." There are three main areas of disagreement:

1. the area of the Pamir highlands (north of Kashmir);
2. in the Gobi Desert;
3. in the region where the Amur and Ussuri Rivers converge.

"Soviet atlases, including some published in recent months, trace the Chinese-Mongolian Frontier in fine detail, giving the impression of an accurate, on-the-spot delimitation. Chinese maps depict the frontier in roughly sketched outline, labeling it with the notation 'undemarcated.'" New York Times, February 26, 1961, p. 7.

From the last statement, one may deduce that as far as the Russians are concerned, the boundary is settled, while the Chinese appear to be interested in changing it.

¹⁴Mehnert, p. 272.

across the country, from Leningrad to Vladivostok. These bands consist of the tundra in the far north, the forest area on a level with Moscow, the steppe (great plain) zone at the level of Kiev, and the desert regions in the southernmost region. These four main regions spanning from west to east have always simplified migration and invasion, and later colonization. This occurred because the land is the same in the east, at the same latitude, as in the west. "With most of its territory a vast plain, Russia lacked natural frontiers. It was always vulnerable to land invasion."¹⁵ This has traditionally given Russia a war-minded outlook-- she has always had to be on the defensive against invaders. The gap between the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea made the southern route the most travelled and eventually forced the movement of the capital from medieval Kiev to Moscow, which was farther north and more protected. This marked the beginnings of modern Russia.

Later the invasion of Russia took a different route. The European invaders came, three times in the last century alone, through Poland and Eastern Europe. This open invasion route naturally forced the Russians to concentrate on this area in defense of their state. In the past Russia has felt it necessary to control this area in order to prevent further invasion. Now the Soviet state has gained control of the foreign invasion route which the Russians sought in order to defend their national security.

The Russian state has been constantly expanding. From the days when Russia was the small duchy of Muscovy in the sixteenth century to its growth into the vast colonial empire of the nineteenth and twentieth

¹⁵William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Enigma, (New York, 1944), p. 9.

centuries, Russia has sought expansion on land. Why has this been? Due to the lack of natural boundaries and the openness of the Russian plain, Russia's only defense against invaders has been to expand and envelop the area surrounding her until natural or human barriers were encountered, in order to put as much territory as possible between the center of the state and hostile peoples. This expansion, a basic characteristic of Russian foreign policy, is an expansion for defense motivated by an instinctive reaction to previous invasions.

The Russian policy of expansion for defense was also manifested in its eastward moves in Asia. After the emergence of the Duchy of Muscovy from the Mongol yoke in the late sixteenth century, Russia began its expansion under Ivan III. At the end of his rule in 1584 Russia encompassed much of what is now European Russia. Russian policy to the east consisted of expansion over sparsely inhabited and largely unclaimed lands until a natural or population boundary was reached. As there were no natural boundaries, the limit of expansion was the Pacific Ocean. The peoples which Russia encountered were nomadic tribes whose defenders were no match for the relatively powerful Russian state. Hence, Russia's expansion to the east was virtually uncurbed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

During this same period of Russian expansion there existed in China a strong state which was also expanding. In 1644 invaders from Manchuria had established the Manchu or Ch'ing Dynasty. This dynasty brought China again to its past power, giving traditional China her last great glory. Between these two powerful and expanding empires lay thousands of miles of barren land, largely uninhabited and unclaimed. This borderland formed a buffer zone between Russia and China which was effective until

the middle of the eighteenth century. At this time the two expanding empires collided. From the initial contact a pattern developed which contains the essence of Russo-Chinese relations. As long as China remained a powerful state, Russia did not attempt further gains into the borderlands. When signs of weakness appeared in China, Russia pushed into the border areas. For example, in the 1840's the Opium War between China and England demonstrated China's interior weakness. It was after this, in the 1840-1860 period, that Russia's gains were made in the borderlands. Thus, Russo-Chinese relations throughout the centuries have been a reflection of China's strength or weakness. "The politics of the northern borderlands of China are based, essentially, upon relative power."¹⁶

Russia's interest in Asia is also dependent on her position in Europe. "It becomes a law in Russian history that every time Russia finds herself checked in Europe she intensifies her drive in Asia."¹⁷ For example, in the period covering the reign of Catherine the Great, the French Revolution and the consequent Napoleonic wars, Russia was too absorbed in European affairs to be interested in Far Eastern policy. In the nineteenth century, during the Pax Britannia, she pursued a vigorous Asian Policy. Thus we see that Russian policy in Asia has been dependent on China's relative power and upon Russia's fortunes in Europe. This has been constant since the early days of the Russian state, and continues to be true of the Soviet state.

¹⁶Howard L. Boorman, "The Borderlands and the Sino-Soviet Alliance," Moscow-Peking Axis, ed. Howard L. Boorman (New York, 1957), p. 196.

¹⁷Prince Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Asia (New York, 1933), p. 147.

Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917-1950

When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 they constituted a tiny minority of the population. Their power was limited to European Russia. In the fringe areas of the Russian empire there was no central control and many of the minority groups took this opportunity to seek independence from Russia. "The eastern regions of European Russia and the whole of Siberia were controlled by anti-Soviet regimes."¹⁸ Out of this chaos the Civil War began and forced the Bolsheviks to reconquer the Russian Empire. In relation to the eastern empire the Bolsheviks were soon confronted with the dilemma Soviet Russia has faced ever since: The Bolsheviks were heirs to the Tsars, and as such commanded a huge state whose imperialistic policies had won important and strategic gains, yet they were purveyors of an ideology which called for world revolution of the oppressed and downtrodden. The solution has varied with the circumstances. In most circumstances, however, the Bolsheviks were not bound by their ideology. In fact, they have now completed a full circle and are legitimating the Tsarist conquests which they originally repudiated.¹⁹

The initial policy the Bolsheviks followed toward China was dictated by necessity. They were by no means strong enough to control the vast reaches of Siberia and the Russo-Chinese borderlands; in fact, they did not control them at all. "Thus there were no initial barriers to a flow of public statements and declarations projecting an image of

¹⁸David J. Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia (New Haven, 1949), p. 159.

¹⁹Lovell R. Tillet, "Soviet Second Thoughts on Tsarist Colonialism," Foreign Affairs 42 (1964), pp. 307-319.

revolutionary fervor, idealism and zeal for justice and equality."²⁰

The Soviet policy became one of repudiation of the Tsarist conquests in the Far East. It is best clarified by looking at the statement to the Chinese nation made by Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Leo Karakhan, issued July 25, 1919:

The Soviet Government has renounced the conquests made by the Tsarist Government which deprived China of Manchuria and other areas. Let the peoples living in those areas themselves decide within the frontiers of which State they wish to dwell, and what form of government they wish to establish in their own countries.²¹

The rest of the document renounced all the special privileges and territories which Tsarist Russia had extracted from China. In August 1919 a similar statement was made with regard to Outer Mongolia, declaring that "Mongolia now becomes an independent country and has the right to contact independently all other peoples without any guardianship whatsoever on the part of Peking or Petrograd."²²

Almost as soon as these noble sentiments were voiced, however, fast-moving events made them obsolete.²³ As soon as the Bolsheviks felt their power to be growing they took steps to reconquer the Tsarist empire. The first step in reconquest was Outer Mongolia. In 1919, when the Bolshevik

²⁰Schwarz, p. 93.

²¹Karakhan Manifesto, In Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China 1917-1924 (New York, 1954), p. 270.

²²The Soviet Government's Declaration to the Mongolian People and to the Government of Autonomous Mongolia, August 1919. In Xenia Eudin and Robert North, Soviet Russia and the East 1920-1927 (Stanford, 1957), p. 200.

²³The events were so fast-moving that the renunciation of the Chinese Eastern Railway was put into the first draft of the Karakhan Declaration, but was deleted from the published version, as the Soviets became more powerful in Siberia. Schwarz, p. 95.

weakness was greatest, the Chinese once again made Mongolia a part of China. This situation was short-lived, for the strange Baron Sternberg came to rule briefly in 1920-21. His dream of being a new Attila was, alas, only a preparation for renewed Russian control. In March 1921 the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Mongolia was proclaimed. It immediately asked for Soviet aid and a Soviet-Mongolian Treaty was signed in November 1921, giving Russia certain concessions. When this secret treaty was discovered, the Chinese accused the Soviets of Tsarist tactics. "Such action on the part of the Soviet Government is similar to the policy the former Imperial Russian Government assumed toward China."²⁴ The Mongolian incident marked the re-emergence of Russia in Asia and was a portent of future Soviet policy in the East.

Soviet policy in the 1920's toward China was a dual policy of open diplomacy with the Nationalist Chinese Government and revolutionary subversion via the Chinese Communist Party. The first was pursued by a Sino-Soviet Treaty concluded in 1924 by Leo Karakhan with the Peking Government. It provided for joint administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the preservation of a dominant Russian influence in Outer Mongolia. The revolutionary goal of the Soviet policy in China--a Communist China--was pursued along two lines. The first of these was the creation in 1921-22 of a Chinese Communist Party subject to the tight discipline and direction of the Communist International in Moscow. As the Communist Party in China had only a few hundred members, all untrained, a more feasible policy was necessary. The more reasonable policy consisted of encouragement to Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang, which was

²⁴Note from the Chinese Foreign Minister to Russian Minister Paikes. In Dallin, Rise, p. 192.

a nationalistic, non-Marxist, middle-class organization, and had many more adherents than the tiny Communist Party. Stalin's dual policy consisted of directing the CCP, while giving material support to the Kuomintang. It was also the particular application of Lenin's theses on the National and Colonial Question, adopted by the Comintern in mid-1920. Lenin urged that in backward countries Communists should not hesitate to support any revolutionary liberation movements which aimed at the overthrow of landowners and other feudal institutions.

The Communist International must be ready to establish temporary relationships and even alliance with the bourgeois democracy of the colonies and backward countries. It must not, however, amalgamate with it. It must retain the independent character of the proletarian movement, even though this movement be in the embryonic stage ...²⁵

So, the CCP was supposed to work with the Kuomintang until it grew strong enough to assume power of its own and overthrow the Kuomintang. This cunning tactic of Lenin's, however, backfired in China and it was Chiang Kai-shek who outmaneuvered Stalin.

The period of 1924-1927 has been called by David Dallin the "Russian Period" in Chinese affairs.²⁶ At this time Russian influence in China was tremendous and the CCP was subservient to the Comintern. Indeed, it was this total subservience to Stalin which accounted for its disaster of 1926-27. In 1923 Stalin had called for a tactical alliance with the Kuomintang. After some hesitation Sun Yat-sen, as leader of the Kuomintang, accepted the Communists into his party as "individuals," only on the condition that they would submit to the Kuomintang and recognize

²⁵Excerpt From the Theses on the National and Colonial Questions. In Eudin and North, p. 65.

²⁶Dallin, Rise, pp. 200-216.

no party outside of it.²⁷ The Joint Sun-Joffe Declaration in 1923 also marks the beginning of the Trotsky-Stalin disagreements on China policy. The split between them had already occurred and was fully expressed in the arguments over China policy. Trotsky favored a pure, if small, Communist Party unaligned with the Kuomintang, while Stalin favored collaboration. So, Soviet policy in the period 1921-27 stipulated alliance of the CCP with the Kuomintang in an effort to overthrow the imperialists. Toward this end the Soviet Union supported the Kuomintang materially, as well as politically, first under Sun Yat-sen, then under Chiang Kai-shek. Relations between Chiang and Michael Borodin, the Russian advisor in China, were very close, and the Kuomintang was officially a sympathizer in the Comintern.

Chiang, however, was under no illusions about Stalin's plans to use him and cast him aside like a "squeezed lemon." He knew that the long-range aim of the Communist members of the Kuomintang was to gain control of the party. He was determined to prevent this. In the meantime he needed Soviet aid. On March 20, 1926 he launched a coup against the Communists in Canton. He arrested Communist leaders while retaining power for himself and apologizing to Moscow. Still the Comintern urged collaboration with the Kuomintang even though Chiang had barred Communists from top posts of leadership in the Kuomintang. Only after the reign of terror launched by Chiang April 12, 1927 in Shanghai and Nanking, in which thousands of Communists were executed, did Moscow realize the need for a change in China policy. Stalin's policy of collaboration had ended in dismal failure. He had been proved wrong, and Russian influence

²⁷Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, 1951), p. 40.

in China had been proved inept. The failure of Soviet policy can only be attributed to sheer ignorance of the local situation and a dogmatic insistence on continuing the collaboration policy.²⁸ The nadir of Sino-Soviet relations was the 1927 raid on the Soviet Embassy in Peking and the departure for Moscow of the Soviet Minister, Michael Borodin, in July 1927. Diplomatic ties between Russia and China were severed, and the "Russian Period" was quite obviously ended when armed clashes over the Chinese Eastern Railway occurred in 1929 between Soviet troops and troops of Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian warlord. The Soviet Union then concentrated attention on the revolutionary aspect of her Chinese policy. The new directives of the Comintern repudiated alliance with the Kuomintang, and urged the establishment of soviets in China.

Soviet foreign policy in the 1930's in the Far East was marked by antagonism with Japan over Chinese territories, primarily Manchuria, and the larger threat of Japanese hegemony in the East. During the entire period from 1931-1937 both the Soviet Union and China attempted to establish peaceful relations with Japan, because neither state was in any condition to wage war. Alternatively, Japan was under a military government, ready to expand. Chiang was the recognized leader of the Nanking Government, but still had to face the two problems of the Communists in the northern hills and rebellious warlords. His policy was to simply stall for time against Japan until he could build up his army. The Soviet Union was sandwiched between two fronts--Germany and Japan--and

²⁸ Benjamin Schwartz and Conrad Brandt contend that Stalin was forced to continue the collaboration policy primarily because Trotsky took the opposite view. By 1928 Stalin had triumphed over Trotsky and could reverse Comintern policies in China. See Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, and Conrad Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China 1924-1927 (Cambridge, 1958).

was also having internal convulsions. In the prewar period the Soviet Union was provoked several times by Japan.²⁹ In all cases she was forced to submit to most of Japan's claims, because of China's inability to defend herself. "It was not only the total collapse of Chinese resistance that made the Soviets regard as imperative an adjustment of their differences with Japan; the situation in Europe also impelled them toward a settlement."³⁰ The proclamation of the existence of Manchukuo only led to the selling of the Chinese Eastern Railway; the border incidents remained unsettled and were aggravated further in 1936; and Japanese penetration of China proper was condoned in Tsiantao. Russian efforts to placate Japan were climaxed by the 1941 Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact.

In China Russia continued to support Chiang Kai-shek, as Chinese unity was essential to stop Japan in China. Consequently the United Front was formed between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang in December 1936. The Soviet Union then supported the Kuomintang-Communist Front with credits of \$250 million in an effort to stop Japan before she penetrated the Soviet Union.³¹ At the very same time, Russia was carrying on rather dubious activities in the Chinese borderland areas. Soviet conciliatory efforts toward Japan could be interpreted as a Soviet desire for a "weak China," until Russia obtained certain border areas. Strong support for this idea can be seen in the Sovietizing of Mongolia in 1924, of Tannu Tuva in 1939, the construction of the Turk-Sib railway,

²⁹See Harriet L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1931-1945, (Princeton, 1945), for a discussion of the Chinese Eastern Railway dispute, the frontier dispute, and the fisheries dispute.

³⁰Moore, p. 31.

³¹Harold H. Fisher, "Soviet Policies in Asia," American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 263(1949), p. 199.

Roosevelt. Due to American lack of information on actual Japanese strength, Russian participation in the war seemed urgent. Consequently, in the negotiations Stalin possessed an advantage which he did not hesitate to use. He went into the Conference with three primary demands which essentially meant the Soviet Union was to inherit all of Japan's rights in the Far East and to further strengthen her ties with Mongolia.³⁴ In relation to China this meant Japan's rights in the Liaotang Peninsula and a restoration of Russian influence in Manchuria. "China was clearly being made to pay the heavy price of Soviet participation in the war."³⁵

The KMT-CCP United Front had been an uneasy armed truce since its inception, but it gave the Chinese Communists another chance to capture China. The soviets which had been established by Mao were the base of Communist power and the Red Army was its instrument. Sanctioned by the war effort the Communists gradually expanded their area of control over North China, which was a vacuum of authority. Along with their military advance the Communists directed a process of popular mobilization of the peasants. By the end of the war the Communists had vastly increased in numbers, as well as the area they controlled. With victory over Japan the United Front disintegrated and civil war was resumed, in spite of American efforts to seek a settlement. In the next four years the Communists, who were fighting a guerrilla war, had the advantage. They had no government to support, no economic problems plaguing their country, and finally they had a disciplined army with strong peasant support.

³⁴Ibid., p. 192. Also see The Yalta Agreement concerning China in H. Wei, China and Soviet Russia (New York, 1956), p. 332.

³⁵Ibid., p. 193.

Innumerable factors undid the Nationalist forces: going against American advice, they became overextended; the military under Chiang were out of civilian economic control and never established a sound economic base; a postwar American-style military reorganization produced confusion; the Whampoa clique discriminated against provincial commanders and armies, particularly those of Kwangsi. ... Corruption, demoralization and desertion steadily depleted their armies.³⁶

The disillusionment of many of the Nationalists, the Communists claim, was a large factor in the loss of the war.³⁷ The CCP seemed to possess the "Mandate of Heaven."

Russian participation in the CCP bid for power was, at best, of a supporting nature. The Soviet Union contributed material aid only indirectly through the KMT, and its Moscow-trained Chinese Marxist-Leninists, the "Returned Students," were overthrown in their bid for leadership by Mao's peasant-based movement. The Chinese Communist Party's victory in 1949 was essentially a product of its own efforts. This is the most vital point that emerges from the Communist victory. Always China assumed the role of a buffer state between the Soviet Union and Japan. Once Japan was defeated, China assumed importance as an ally in the East, further cemented by the fact that both states followed the same ideology.

³⁶John King Fairbank, East Asia The Modern Transformation (Boston, 1965), p. 859.

³⁷"Of 550,000 Nationalists lost, the Communists claimed 327,000 surrendered." Ibid., p. 860.

CHAPTER III

GENESIS OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

The Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung on October 1, 1949 following the defeat and expulsion from the mainland of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang forces. Shortly after the establishment of the Chinese Communist state Mao went to Moscow for a nine-week period of negotiations. The result of these negotiations between Mao and Stalin was the Sino-Soviet alliance announced on February 14, 1950.

The Sino-Soviet Alliance

The alliance was based on three separate agreements. The first of these was the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the basic foundation of the new alliance. It is valid until 1980 and may be further extended by mutual consent. This first agreement was primarily directed against Japan. China and the USSR agreed to take all necessary measures to prevent the resumption of aggression on the part of Japan "or any other state allied with her." It was also agreed that neither Contracting Party was "to take part in any coalition or in any actions or measures directed against the other." They will also "consult with each other in regard to all important problems affecting the common interests of China and the Soviet Union." It was also agreed to "respect the national sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other" as well as to

"render to the other all possible economic assistance and to carry out necessary economic cooperation."¹

The second agreement dealt with the respective rights of the Russians and the Chinese in Manchuria, the major border area in which both have interests, and over which there has been traditional rivalry between the two states. This agreement provided that the Chinese Changchun Railway would be transferred without compensation from the Soviets to the Chinese. However, this would not come into effect until 1952 or upon the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, whichever came earlier. "Pending the transfer, the existing Sino-Soviet joint administration of the Railway shall remain unchanged." Further, the naval base, Port Arthur, would also continue to be "jointly used," with Russian troops garrisoned there, and would be employed to support joint military operations in the event of war with Japan or any country allied with Japan. This arrangement would also be terminated in 1952 or at the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. The administration of Dairen (Dalny), the principal port at the southern end of the Chinese Changchun Railway, was confirmed as belonging entirely to the Chinese.²

The third agreement outlined forthcoming economic aid from the Soviet Union to China. It stipulated that China would receive credits of US\$300 million, to be made available to China each year. China was to repay the loan in ten equal annual installments beginning in 1954 and

¹Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. In Wei, pp. 344-5.

²Agreement on the Chinese Chanchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dalny. Ibid., pp. 345-6.

culminating in 1963.³ The primary purpose of the loan was to finance the delivery of Soviet heavy industry goods to China.

At this same time the Soviet and Chinese governments exchanged notes on two other matters. One of these nullified the August 14, 1945 treaty between the Soviet Union and the Nationalist Government of China. The other note guaranteed the independent status of the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia). In addition to these agreements announced in February 1950, the Sino-Soviet alliance was amplified further by additional agreements signed in the spring of 1950.

These provided for the establishment of a network of Sino-Soviet joint-stock companies to operate in the borderland areas of China: Two companies to undertake the exploitation of non-ferrous and rare minerals, and petroleum in Sinkiang, ... ; a civil aviation company to operate flights between Peking and the Soviet Union via Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang; a company to build and repair ships at Dairen, And in the spring of 1950, the two Communist allies completed initial negotiations on trading arrangements, under which the Soviet Union was to supply industrial equipment while Communist China would, in return, export raw materials.⁴

These spring agreements completed the forging of the Sino-Soviet alliance. The two largest Communist nations were now bound together by political ties, by economic ties, and by joint business enterprises. In spite of these agreements which appeared to cement relations between the two countries, differences developed, first into an ideological dispute and subsequently into a divergence of policy which has threatened the alliance itself.

The existence of a Sino-Soviet dispute was formally acknowledged by

³Ibid., pp. 346-6.

⁴Howard L. Boorman, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance: The Political Impact," Boorman, p. 9.

both sides in December, 1962.⁵ Before this public announcement the differences had been raging in secrecy since at least 1958.⁶ But even before 1958, or 1956, there were seeds of conflict which were present after the promulgation of the alliance in 1950. In order to accurately trace the development of the conflict, it is necessary to look first at Sino-Soviet relations in the years between the signing of the agreements in 1950 and the year of serious disagreement, 1956.

Sino-Soviet Relations, 1950-1956

Due to certain historical and geographical factors, there had been some doubt concerning the strength of the Sino-Soviet alliance from its inception. As G. F. Hudson puts it: "Ever since the Chinese Communists set up their government in Peking in 1949 and promptly concluded a treaty of military alliance with the Soviet Union, there has been speculation in the West about the reality and durability of the Sino-Soviet partnership."⁷ For the first six years, however, there were no outward signs of dissension, although there might have been some disharmony.

This remarkable degree of harmony in the earlier period of the alliance may be explained in terms other than genuine agreement. As is normal with any new state, there is a period of adjustment a new government must make. The period of adjustment is characterized by attention

⁵Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War--Moscow v. Peking (Baltimore, 1963), p. 8.

⁶Crankshaw says that Khrushchev gave 1959 as the beginning date, when he charged that the Chinese first began violating the Moscow Declaration of 1957. However, the Chinese themselves say it began in 1956, the year of the Twentieth Party Congress and Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁷G. F. Hudson, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York, 1961), p. 1.

to internal matters, with a great deal less emphasis placed on foreign relations. This is necessary in order that the new government may establish itself and consolidate its power. In the case of China this period of internal adjustment was complicated by the Korean War which broke out in mid-1950.

From 1950 through 1952, the government in Peking was in the difficult position of having to push through its initial programs of political unification and economic rehabilitation at home, while at the same time deeply involved in a costly and risky military engagement in Korea.⁸

However, this military engagement was helpful in many respects to China. The presence of an external enemy provides a government with an opportunity to consolidate its support, mobilize its resources, and put down any internal opposition. The Korean War provided such an external enemy against whom the Chinese government could rally the people. In addition to obtaining for China domestic consensus and support, the Korean War served to test the six-month-old Sino-Soviet alliance. G. F. Hudson says of the Korean War:

Above all, the Korean War brought Russia and China together; both had the strongest common interest in preventing the overthrow of the Communist regime in North Korea after the failure of its attack on the South, and while China put in an army to fight against the United Nations forces, Russia provided arms and equipment and the threat of intervention if the war should be extended to Chinese territory.⁹

However, Howard Boorman suggests that sometimes the cooperation between Russia and China seemed a bit less than perfect.

At times, Russian and Chinese moves seemed perfectly timed to present a common Communist front. Yet there were instances in the United Nations negotiations where, it would appear, the

⁸Boorman, p. 9.

⁹Hudson, p. 1.

Russians failed to take complete advantage of tactical opportunities favorable to them and made only inconclusive gestures toward advancing Chinese interests.¹⁰

It does seem clear, though, that the Korean War had the effect of drawing the Soviets and the Chinese together to fight a common enemy, even if cooperation was not at a maximum, as well as to serve the Chinese Government by enabling it to mobilize domestic support for the war. By mid-1952 the Chinese realized that not much else could be gained in Korea.¹¹

Perhaps as a result of the threatened invasion of Manchuria the two allies decided that further discussions should be conducted concerning boundary questions. In August Chou En-lai went to Moscow where an agreement was reached by September 1952 and an official communique was issued. The discussions dealt with unresolved points of the 1950 agreement concerning the Chinese Changchun Railway and Port Arthur. The agreement stated that "the Soviet government was to transfer to China, with full title and without compensation, all Russian rights in the joint management of the Chinese Changchun Railway and all property belonging to it."¹² This transfer was made at the end of 1952, and is significant as it is one of the first instances in post-1945 history when the Russians voluntarily relinquished territorial and economic rights once gained. However, in recompense, a second exchange of notes provided that Russia

¹⁰Boorman, p. 10

¹¹Mr. Boorman states: "Caution suggests that the interpretation of the diplomatic history of the Korean War be left to the future, since the present evidence is as overabundant as it is incomplete." Ibid., p. 9.

¹²Ibid., p. 10.

would retain her hold on the naval base at Port Arthur.¹³ In addition, the September negotiations produced an agreement concerning Outer Mongolia. This agreement, however, was not made public by the Communists until October 1954. "The three governments ... worked out a tripartite Sino-Soviet-Mongol agreement on the construction of a new strategic rail link, through the Mongolian People's Republic, to connect the rail systems of the Soviet Union and Communist China."¹⁴ These September agreements seemed to clear up any lingering unsettled points between the two powers.

The sudden death of Stalin in March 1953 marked the beginning of far-reaching changes in the Communist world. The long absolutist rule of Stalin had formed the Communist world into a monolithic structure which was certain to change when the absolute ruler was gone. This certain element of change naturally affected the Sino-Soviet alliance. As Boorman says: "The death of Stalin in March 1953 introduced a distinct note of uncertainty into the relations between the two major powers of the Communist bloc."¹⁵ This note of uncertainty was kept concealed under an outward facade of political and ideological unity. An appearance of unity was necessary after Stalin's death, and China was willing to do this, as from 1950 to 1953 she had followed Moscow's dictates because of her economic and political dependence upon Russia.¹⁶ Thus the succession of leadership in Russia brought little immediate change to the

¹³Text of Chinese note. In David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York, 1964), p. 215.

¹⁴Boorman, p. 11.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁶Crankshaw, p. 22.

Sino-Soviet alliance.

The alliance, in fact, was strengthened by several acts of the new regime. "It appeared that the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow, ... had concluded that the most realistic attitude was to leave no doubt of his Mao's continuing status as the principal ally in Asia."¹⁷ This attitude was substantiated by the appointment as ambassador of Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov, who was higher in rank than the envoy he replaced. In addition, when Kuznetsov left for Peking with Chou En-lai, three new Sino-Soviet agreements were announced. These involved:

A protocol on trade between Communist China and the Soviet Union for 1953, which was a routine agreement renegotiated annually since 1950. The second agreement was a protocol to the original credit agreement of February 14, 1950. The third was an agreement on Soviet assistance to Communist China in the expansion and construction of power stations.¹⁸

As can be discerned, these agreements were indicative only of increased economic and technical assistance. The timing of them is more important than their content. Timed immediately after Stalin's death, it seems clear that their purpose was to assuage any doubts which had arisen concerning the alliance.

Further agreements between Russia and China continued to be negotiated. In mid-October 1954 a new agreement was announced which appeared to further reinforce Sino-Soviet relations. The first declaration of these 1954 agreements affirmed that the two governments were in full agreement with respect to both Sino-Soviet cooperation and their attitudes toward the international situation. In effect, this declaration

¹⁷Boorman, p. 14.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 15. Also consult Floyd, pp. 218 and 225 for the provisions.

pledged Sino-Soviet cooperation and coordination of policy concerning mutual problems, but especially problems in the Far East, and set forth Communist attitudes toward Indochina, Taiwan, Korea, and Southeast Asia. A second declaration concerned relations of the two powers with Japan.

Other agreements were announced at this time. The Soviets agreed to withdraw military forces from Port Arthur and to restore it to full Chinese control by May 1955. They also transferred the four Sino-Soviet joint stock companies established by the agreements of 1950 and 1951 to exclusive Chinese control. An additional agreement of scientific and technical cooperation was also announced. Finally, the two powers agreed on the construction of additional railway linkage between Sinkiang and the Central Asian provinces of Russia.¹⁹ These October 1954 negotiations revised earlier economic financial arrangements, which further increased the economic assistance of Russia to China.

The October 1954 agreements appear to have a twofold significance. First, they emphasized the increasing economic, scientific, and technical aid given to China by Russia, and the consequent dependence of China on Russia. Second, the announcement of these agreements immediately after Stalin's death indicated certain political trends. They demonstrated that both of the Communist powers were eager to present an unbroken Communist monolith to the non-Communist world, which was apparently awaiting drastic changes in the Communist bloc. In addition, the political pronouncements of the agreements in which Russia pledged support of Chinese goals indicated China's rising importance and Russia's consequent desire to support her. As Mr. Boorman observed: "The

¹⁹Floyd, p. 220.

international drives of the Chinese Communist regime ... are greatly reinforced by the alliance between Peking and Moscow."²⁰ It must also be remembered, however, that while Russia's support benefited China's goals, the Soviet Union, in its need for stabilization of its new regime, also benefited from a secure flank, so to speak.

During 1955 and 1956 Sino-Soviet relations appeared to become more firmly cemented. Public pronouncements by high ranking officials of both states indicated support of goals pursued by the other. One example was the Soviet Union's support of China's right to Taiwan and to Nationalist China's seat in the United Nations.²¹ Solidarity was further substantiated by two new Sino-Soviet agreements announced on April 7, 1956. The first of these was an expanded program of Russian assistance for fifty-five new Chinese industrial establishments. The second called for the completion by 1960 of the Lanchow-Urumchi-Alma Ata railway, which would link Northwest China with Soviet Central Asia by way of Sinkiang.²² These agreements meant a further increase of Soviet aid to China, and the consequent increase in involvement of the two Communist powers with each other. Looking at the many economic ties which held these two states together, in addition, of course, to the ideological ties, it becomes understandable why an actual split was even slower and less definite.

²⁰Boorman, p. 46.

²¹Joint Soviet-Yugoslav Declaration of June 3, 1955. In Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record (New York, 1959), pp. 55-60.

²²Boorman, p. 27.

Seeds of the Ideological Conflict

If a broad perspective of the Sino-Soviet conflict is taken, it may be said to have started with the initial relations between Mao and Stalin at the Second Comintern Congress of 1920.²³ However, this broad view serves only to illustrate the long-time strains on the Sino-Soviet alliance, rather than to delineate the beginning of the present open conflict. It is generally considered that the first serious trouble between the Soviet Union and China arose in connection with the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956.²⁴ This was the glove which Khrushchev threw at Mao's feet, and which Mao picked up.

The Twentieth Party Congress represents the major turning point in Sino-Soviet relations in the post-Stalin era. That Congress set the stage for several of the major elements of conflict that have since appeared: differences over global strategy, over intra-bloc relations, over the pace and scope of de-Stalinization, over the permissible diversity of methods used in building socialism and Communism, and over the fundamental question of socialist-camp leadership.²⁵

The Twentieth Party Congress affected Sino-Soviet relations due to two speeches which Khrushchev delivered. The first of these was on February 14, 1956. This speech set forth three major doctrinal modifications in Marxist-Leninist thought. The first of these new axioms was peaceful coexistence. Khrushchev, in essence, said that the development of weapons had made peaceful coexistence with the imperialists necessary. This policy was justified by Khrushchev's new interpretation of the Leninist doctrine of the inevitability of war. "Lenin had argued that

²³Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (Princeton, 1962), p. 39.

²⁴Crankshaw, p. 23.

²⁵Zagoria, p. 40.

imperialist countries would quarrel among themselves over markets and exploitable underdeveloped territories with mounting bitterness. First one then another country would win a temporary advantage and the resultant instability would lead inevitably to war."²⁶ But Khrushchev argued further that "epoch-making changes of the last decades" (i.e., since the outbreak of World War II) entailed that "war is not fatalistically inevitable." These changes were: the growth of a powerful Communist bloc, the existence of a large number of non-Communist countries which were opposed to war, the strength of the labor movement in capitalist countries, and the development of an international peace movement. Thus, on this new optimistic outlook, Khrushchev concluded that war between the imperialist states and the socialist states was not "fatalistically inevitable" and that peaceful coexistence was possible ideologically, as well as realistically.

For in present-day conditions there is no other way out. Indeed, there are only two ways: either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way.²⁷

The next doctrine Khrushchev set forth at this Congress was also an outgrowth of the inevitability of war doctrine. In addition to inevitable war between the imperialists, Lenin had also discussed the inevitability of war between the imperialist and socialist countries. Lenin stated that the imperialists would never relinquish power voluntarily. Therefore, in order for socialists to gain power a violent revolution was necessary. This was another facet of the doctrine of inevitable war.

²⁶Hudson, p. 39.

²⁷Khrushchev's Report to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. In Floyd, pp. 228-231.

Khrushchev, however, posited that as a result of these recent "epoch-making changes" the Communist movement was in a better position relative to the non-Communist world and, hence, had less need to gain power by violent overthrow.

... the weakening of capitalism relative to the growing power of the Communist bloc meant that it might be possible to introduce Communist rule in various countries by parliamentary means rather than by revolutionary violence.²⁸

Thus, the Twentieth CPSU Congress rejected both doctrines of the inevitability of war: both kinds of war are avoidable.²⁹ The end product of the rejection of both facets of the inevitability of war doctrine is Khrushchev's new doctrine of peaceful coexistence.

These two interpretations which Khrushchev introduced were modifications of Marxism-Leninism and dealt with crucial tenets of Communist doctrine: relations with the non-Communist world and the revolutionary goals of Marxism-Leninism. As a result, there was much speculation in the non-Communist world, especially the West, that this meant a softening of Communism's goals for worldwide conquest. Looking at these interpretations from a long-range perspective, it seems that they were a sort of updating of Marxism-Leninism. As Mr. Zagoria stated: "It could be argued that these doctrinal modifications represented the culmination of the adaption of Bolshevism to a new and unique setting--a world with thermo-nuclear weapons," ³⁰

In addition to the three doctrinal modifications in his speech of

²⁸Ibid., p. 230.

²⁹Frederic S. Burin, "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War," The American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), p. 343.

³⁰Zagoria, p. 45.

February 14, Khrushchev at this time also launched the shattering de-Stalinization campaign in his Secret Speech of February 25, 1956, in which he denounced the "Cult of the Individual." Khrushchev accused Stalin of "imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion;" of purging his opponents as "enemies of the people;" of committing "glaring violations of revolutionary legality;" and of creating a situation "where one could not express one's own will."³¹ This speech, which dragged Stalin's memory through the mud with amazing thoroughness and not a little crudity, produced a major crisis within the Soviet bloc. Khrushchev's speeches marked the beginning of the ideological exchanges between the Soviet Union and China, exchanges which were to lose their ideological camouflage and envelop every area of Sino-Soviet relations.

The initial Chinese reaction to these charges against Stalin was an official silence, which lasted from February until April, 1956, when a reply was made in The People's Daily.³² This article conceded that Stalin had made some serious mistakes, but went on to give Stalin credit for carrying out Lenin's principles. The Chinese contended:

Stalin, for all his mistakes, was an outstanding Marxist-Leninist fighter; ... he was a figure whose contributions and whose errors, mostly committed in the latter part of his life, must be weighed against each other with a view to profiting from both.³³

The article admitted that "contradictions" were inevitable even under

³¹Khrushchev's Speech to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU on The Cult of the Individual. In Robert V. Daniels, ed., A Documentary History of Communism, Vol. 2 (New York, 1962), pp. 225-9.

³²The People's Daily is the official press organ of the CCP.

³³Chinese reply of April 5, 1956. In Floyd, pp. 232-235.

Communism and that "to deny the existence of contradictions is to deny dialectics."³⁴ Finally the article noted that one should not deduce from Stalin's mistakes that leaders play unimportant roles in history. "To deny the role of the individual, the role of the vanguard and of the leaders is completely wrong."³⁵

In his discussion of the April theses Mr. Zagoria imputed four purposes to the Chinese defense of Stalin: first, to limit Khrushchev's secret attack on Stalin so that it could not be expanded to a full-scale attack on the Communist system; second, to put Khrushchev's revelations in a theoretical context that would explain to a troubled Communist world how such "mistakes" could have occurred; third, to protect Mao from the charge that he was following in Stalin's footsteps; and finally, by putting de-Stalinization in such a context as to establish Peking as a source of doctrinal guidance for the entire Communist movement.³⁶ These first three purposes were essentially defensive, to rationalize Stalin's crimes. The fourth purpose, however, was a more realistic one. By putting the reply in an ideological context it suggested that the Chinese were better Marxist-Leninists than the Russians. The natural corollary was that Mao should be considered the leading theoretician of the Communist world.

The next important development in the growing dispute was the Moscow Conference of November 1957, marking the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution. The result of this conference was the November 22,

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Zagoria, pp. 43-6.

1957 Moscow Declaration, which was endorsed by twelve Communist states, including Communist China. Its primary interest was foreign policy and relations of the Communist bloc with the non-Communist world. The most important effect of the Declaration was that it endorsed Khrushchev's theoretical innovations of the Twentieth Party Congress.

The Communist and Worker's Parties taking part in the meeting declare that the Leninist principles of peaceful co-existence of the two systems, which has been further developed and brought up to date in the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU is the sound basis of the foreign policy of the socialist countries.³⁷

Thus, Khrushchev's doctrines of peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition to Communism were formally acknowledged by the thirteen Communist nations being valid. In addition the Declaration denied that there was any dissension in the bloc.

Contrary to the absurd assertions of imperialism about a so-called crisis of communism, the Communist movement is growing and gathering strength. ... The results of the Congresses of the Communist Parties in recent times have clearly demonstrated the unity and solidarity of the party ranks and their loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism. This meeting of the representatives of Communist and Worker's Parties testifies to the international solidarity of the Communist movement.³⁸

This Declaration was intended to preserve the outward unity of the Communist bloc, and possibly was an actual attempt to restore unity. It was of pivotal importance. It did not involve a dramatic confrontation between Peking and Moscow, but it did involve serious bargaining. The Chinese were pushing for a major, if limited, assault on the imperialists, while the Russians were evidently holding back for a more cautious strategy. The result was a somewhat "harder" tone as compared with the

³⁷Text of the Moscow Declaration. In Floyd, p. 248.

³⁸Ibid., p. 250.

Twentieth Party Congress statement, but this can undoubtedly be attributed to the general worsening of the international situation between 1956 and late 1957.³⁹ However, the Chinese endorsement of the Declaration did represent a shift in the Chinese line from its sharp criticism of the April theses of the Twentieth Party Congress. The unity of the Communist bloc was precariously restored, but the compromise indicated that three later developments were probable: Peking might adapt its strategy to that of Moscow; Moscow might move into line with Peking; or the gap between the two might widen. It was this latter course that Sino-Soviet relations followed.

The ideological gap widened when the Chinese Communists announced in August 1958 their revolutionary commune program. The commune program was the outward manifestation of internal struggles within the CCP. Sometime in the six months between June and November 1957 Chinese domestic and external policy underwent a sharp leftward shift. As Mr. Zagoria says, this period was one of the most fateful and obscure periods in recent Chinese Communist history.⁴⁰ The result, though, was clear: the Chinese leftist faction headed by Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing prevailed and a radical program was launched.⁴¹ The new radical program in external policy consisted of abandoning the cautious Bandung spirit in favor of a more aggressive attitude; and in domestic policy it meant the introduction of the commune system.

³⁹Hudson, p. 41.

⁴⁰Zagoria, p. 66.

⁴¹See Roderick MacFarquhar, "Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute," Pacific Affairs, 31 (1958), pp. 323-335, for a detailed study of the 1957 struggle within the CCP.

The communal experiment was an attempt to solve China's desperate food and production shortages. The communes also represented a Chinese innovation of Marxism-Leninism, as well as a purer form of communism than that found in the Soviet Union. As such the communes constituted an ideological challenge to Khrushchev, by questioning his gradualist policies of reaching communism. From these two challenges arose the contest over bloc leadership.⁴² Thus, the communes presented a three-fold challenge to the Soviets: to basic Soviet economic planning; to the pace of domestic revolutionary advance (the Soviet path being unnecessarily long and tortuous); and to intra-bloc leadership.

Mao had produced a Chinese variant of Marxism-Leninism.

By 1960, Chinese journals were once again, as in 1949-51, claiming that Mao had 'sinified' Marxism-Leninism. This contention is true. What is now referred to in the Chinese press as 'the Mao Tse-tung ideology' is a peculiar blend of Marxism, Stalinism, Trotskyism, and pragmatism, based on a number of conditioning social and economic factors never or no longer relevant in the Soviet Union.⁴³

Khrushchev's initial reaction to this peculiar blend was an oblique comparison in the fall of 1959 of Mao to Trotsky. The importance of the comparison of Maoism to Trotskyism is not strictly doctrinal, but lies in the fact that Khrushchev was pointing out that it differed from the orthodox Soviet view. The primary application of this theory is to the process of socialist and communist construction in a country already

⁴²"For the Russians to concede this the applicability of the communes for building communism is an underdeveloped country would be tantamount to conceding to Peking the leadership of the revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America." Zagoria, p. 77.

⁴³Ibid., p. 78. Mr. Zagoria espoused the view that "Maoism" is an original application of Marxism-Leninism. This subject is heatedly debated among China scholars. Benjamin Schwartz is one of the leading exponents of this view. See The China Quarterly, 13, for a thorough discussion of the question.

ruled by a Communist Party. This involves the question: what is the correct road to communism? The Soviet view is that of a gradual transition to communism; this was Stalin's view, and was reiterated by Khrushchev. A socialist society "should evolve by the accumulation of elements of the new quality and a dying-away of the old, not ... by quick leaps."⁴⁴ The Chinese view, however, emphasized a quicker route to communism, or the leap forward. The principal reason for the introduction of the commune system was to accelerate production. To make the policy consistent with Marxist-Leninist thought an ideological sleight of hand was introduced by the Maoists.

The ideological challenge which the theories of the CCP imply is best expressed by Zagoria's use of three words: radicalism, chauvinism, and evangelism.⁴⁵ The radicalism represents the justification of the accelerated pace by harking back to the classics of Marxism-Leninism, rather than following contemporary Soviet thought or even Stalinsim. Perhaps here lies Mao's resemblance to Trotsky. The chauvinism is obvious in references to Mao's increased stature as a "great" and "outstanding" revolutionary, statesman, and theoretician. This is even perceived in the growing cult of Mao which has developed in the Chinese press since late 1959. From this radicalism and chauvinism springs the traditional result--a missionary zeal which seeks to evangelize and proselytize.⁴⁶ The implication of Mao's sinified Communism is that this

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 84.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 102.

⁴⁶Here an apt comparison may be made of Maoist ideology and religion, just as with historic communism. Just as most religions seek to proselytize their truth, so Maoist evangelism seeks to proselytize its brand of truth against competing truth--Soviet Communism.

is the path which other underdeveloped countries of the world should follow.

The Soviet reaction to this ideological challenge was a sort of qualified silence, followed by the Twenty-first Party Congress. Between these two events the Soviet press either ignored, distorted, or minimized the communes, while at the same time it stressed Moscow's own ideological claims.⁴⁷ Then, one week after the adoption of the commune resolution, Khrushchev convoked for February 1959, the unscheduled Twenty-first Congress. "The Twenty-first Party Congress was, it seems, convoked in large measure because Khrushchev believed that he had to reply to the Chinese challenge in the highest forum available to him."⁴⁸

The Twenty-first Party Congress was essentially a restatement of the doctrines first stated at the Twentieth Congress.⁴⁹ In his speech to the Twenty-first Congress, Khrushchev emphasized that:

in order to make the transition from capitalism to Communism, it was necessary to pass through a socialist phase of development which could not be violated or bypassed at will; second, there was no particular moment when a state could say 'we are now in Communism' (a concession to the Chinese insistence on continuity between socialism and Communism); third, Khrushchev drew a fine line as to the amount of haste with which the transition to Communism should be pursued.⁵⁰

⁴⁷Zagoria, p. 109.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 110.

⁴⁹In his article Mr. Burin states that the Twenty-first Congress was merely a restatement of the Twentieth Congress propositions, making more explicit "that the continued existence of capitalism will henceforward be compatible with world peace." He also notes, however, that MacFarquar and Zagoria believe that it goes beyond the Twentieth. Burin, p. 345.

⁵⁰Zagoria, p. 130.

These propositions presented nothing new, but seemed to be primarily an emphatic restatement of policies expressed at the Twentieth Congress, modified by the conciliatory Moscow Declaration, and now re-emphasized in reaction to the ideological challenge Mao extended via the establishment of the communes. Six months after this restatement of principles, Khrushchev indirectly attacked the communes in a speech in Poland July 18, 1959. He referred to the 1918 Russian experience with communes, saying that nothing had come of these communes, and implying that nothing would come of the Chinese communes.⁵¹ With this oblique attack the estrangement between the Soviets and the Chinese began to be more pronounced.

The next evidence of a widening of the gap in Sino-Soviet amiability was presented after the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Powers in Moscow in February 1960. A Declaration was made at the close of the meeting and was closely followed by a comment on the Declaration by the Chinese observer at the Conference, K'eng Sheng. In contrast to most of the Sino-Soviet exchanges these two documents were couched in concrete terms, rather than in abstract theoretical terms. The Declaration of Member-States of the Warsaw Treaty was characterized by a remarkable optimism concerning the lessening of tension in the Cold War.

The states represented at the present conference declared that they will act precisely in this direction and urge all other countries to promote the success of East-West talks and to refrain from any steps capable of complicating these negotiations. ... They are unanimous in believing that in our time states do not and cannot have any greater or nobler task than that of contributing to the establishment of lasting peace on earth.⁵²

⁵¹Mehnert, p. 375.

⁵²Declaration of Member States of the Warsaw Treaty. In Floyd, p. 264.

In contrast, the tone of K'eng Sheng's speech to the Warsaw Treaty meeting was harder and more pessimistic.

But U.S. imperialism, hostile to the Chinese people, has always adopted a discriminatory attitude against our country in international relations. Therefore the Chinese Government has to declare to the world that any international agreements which are arrived at without the formal participation of the Chinese People's Republic and the signature of its delegate cannot, of course, have any binding force on China. ... This stand of ours is firm and unshakable.⁵³

The point which these two speeches illustrate seems to be, first, the conflict was broadening from the ideological sphere to that of policy; and second, each side was becoming more intractable in its attitude toward the other.

In April 1960 the Chinese took the occasion of the ninetieth anniversary of Lenin's birthday to launch a series of articles which culminated in Khrushchev's reply at the Rumanian Party Congress at Bucharest June 24, 1960. The first and most expressive article "Long Live Leninism!" appeared in Red Flag⁵⁴ on April 16, 1960.

With copious documentation from Lenin and Marx and pointed references to some of Communism's most notorious heretics, the Chinese, in effect, accused Khrushchev of 'revising, emasculating, and betraying' the most fundamental and sacred tenets of Leninism.⁵⁵

These detailed references to Marx and Lenin connoted a very important development: the conflict was definitely being raised to the ideological plane. The effect was to challenge the right of Moscow to act as supreme arbiter of bloc policy by alleging Khrushchev to be guilty of doctrinal

⁵³K'eng Sheng's Speech at the Warsaw Treaty Meeting. In Hudson, pp. 72-77.

⁵⁴Red Flag is a Chinese Party fortnightly magazine.

⁵⁵Zagoria, p. 299. See the "Long Live Leninism!" article in full in Hudson, pp. 82-112.

deviations. Second, the Chinese were affirming the determination to persist in their own views, and by implication, presenting themselves as leaders of Marxism-Leninism.⁵⁶

The principal targets of the Chinese articles were Khrushchev's three new doctrines which he had presented at the Twentieth Congress: peaceful coexistence, the non-inevitability of war, and the possibility of peaceful roads to power in non-Communist countries. In the "Long Live Leninism!" article the Chinese were insisting on their viewpoint toward these points of doctrine. The Chinese endorsed peaceful coexistence--their's and Lenin's view of it--as a "mere tactical expedient, pending the day when revolutionary hostility could openly declare itself."⁵⁷ Contradicting Khrushchev's doctrine of the non-inevitability of war, the Chinese called not only for the continuance of revolutionary activity, but for a heightening of the revolutionary offensive. All revolutionary movements and "national liberation" movements should be supported and encouraged, because "the capitalist-imperialist system absolutely will not crumble of itself. It will be overthrown by the proletarian revolution, ..."⁵⁸ This denied the validity of Khrushchev's other major assertion--the possibility of peaceful roads to power in non-Communist countries.

In addition to flatly rejecting Khrushchev's proposals of the Twentieth Party Congress the article repeated two other themes. One was that Marxism-Leninism was not outdated and needed no modifications such as

⁵⁶Hudson, p. 78.

⁵⁷Crankshaw, p. 94.

⁵⁸Text of the "Long Live Leninism!" article which appeared in Red Flag. In Hudson, p. 94.

Khrushchev had proposed.

The present world situation has obviously undergone tremendous changes since Lenin's lifetime, but these changes have not proved the obsolescence of Leninism; on the contrary, they have more and more clearly confirmed the truths revealed by Lenin and all the theories he advanced ... The conclusion can only be this: whichever way you look at it, none of the new techniques like atomic energy, rocketry, and so on has changed, as alleged by the modern revisionists, the basic characteristics of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution pointed out by Lenin. ... We believe in the absolute correctness of Lenin's thinking: War is an inevitable outcome of systems of exploitation and the source of modern wars is the imperialist system. Until the imperialist system and the exploiting classes come to an end, wars of one kind or another will always occur.⁵⁹

The other theme running throughout the article was the invective hurled at "the modern revisionists represented by the Tito clique," the "modern revisionists," and "opportunists," which were very thinly veiled imprecations against the Soviets.⁶⁰ Edward Crankshaw has summed up the "Long Live Leninism!" article:

It was an elaborate, passionate, savage restatement of the Leninist position, utterly devoid of any spirit of compromise or live-and-let live, wholly devoted to ways and means of achieving world revolution by the most direct available means in the shortest possible time.⁶¹

The Soviet reply to these vituperative Chinese attacks of April 1960 came at the Rumanian Party Congress in June 1960. The first action of the Soviets at the Congress was a circular letter of June 21. This was an eighty-page letter prepared before the Congress with the fraternal delegates to the Congress in mind. The letter was a basic restatement of the Soviet ideological position. It closed by blaming Peking for

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰These are found in numerous places in the text of the article, "Long Live Leninism!"

⁶¹Crankshaw, p. 93.

weakening the unity of the Communist movement.⁶² The Chinese rejoinder came in rather clandestine fashion through the circulation of a private letter from the Soviet party to the Chinese party. This letter was not intended to be seen by anyone but Chinese party officials, and was not expressed in Leninist polemics, but instead "threw in all sorts of charges, some of them having nothing to do with ideological differences, but rather with power relationships and inter-state rivalries."⁶³

The result of this last Chinese move was Khrushchev's vitriolic speech to the Congress in which he launched an open attack on the CCP, Mao, and Chinese policies. He claimed this was a disagreement between China and all the other parties; he attacked Mao by name, saying in effect "he was another Stalin and he was an ultra Leftist, an ultra dogmatist, and worst of all, a left revisionist."⁶⁴ P'eng Chen, the Chinese delegate, replied to this extraordinary attack, saying it was evident that Khrushchev had organized the meeting for the sole purpose of attacking the Chinese Party and Mao Tse-tung. Peng then challenged the delegates to deduce from Soviet actions what Soviet policy really was.⁶⁵

Out of this unprecedented display of polemics and emotionalism the delegates at the close of the Congress issued the Bucharest Communiqué. The communiqué was remarkable for its innocence and unity:

The participants in the conference affirm unanimously that

⁶²Ibid., p. 103.

⁶³Ibid., p. 106.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 107.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 111.

the whole course of international events and the development of the countries of the world socialist system have fully reaffirmed the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist theses of the Declaration and the Peace Manifesto adopted by the Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in November 1957.⁶⁶

Between the Bucharest Congress in June and the Moscow Conference in November, the Soviet Union launched fresh offensives in Pravda and other Soviet publications. The emphasis in these writings was on the foolishness of risking a world war and the inevitability of Communist victory via economic competition. Just prior to the Moscow Conference the Chinese set the stage for the meeting with articles in the Chinese press which illustrated the attitude of the Chinese delegation. "The major theme of these articles was on the need for revolutionary violence to smash bourgeois state power."⁶⁷ It was apparent, then, at the opening of the Conference that neither side was in a conciliatory mood, and even more obvious was the Chinese determination to fight Moscow to the bitter end.

The Open Break: The Moscow Conference of 1960

The Moscow Conference occupies ultimate importance in the Sino-Soviet dispute because it marked the end of efforts to work out a compromise of ideological differences. After Moscow there could no longer be a question of whether or not things would come to a schism: the schism existed. After this presentation of the issues, the ideological dispute became a process of maneuvering for advantage within the Communist camp. Therefore, it is vital to ascertain what happened at the

⁶⁶Text of the Bucharest Communique. In Hudson, p. 140-1.

⁶⁷Hudson, p. 157.

Conference and which ideological positions emerged from these events.

The Conference ran from November 11 to November 25, with delegates from eighty-one Communist parties. Khrushchev opened the Conference, and Mikhail Suslov formally introduced the draft resolution. As the speeches of the delegates progressed, the Soviet position became clear. In surprising unity each delegate voiced criticism of the Chinese. On the 14th of November the Chinese had their chance when the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Teng Hsiao-ping, spoke. Teng condemned the Soviet Party letter of 5 November which had violently attacked the leadership of the Chinese Party and Mao Tse-tung personally, and charged the Russians with malicious misrepresentation of the Chinese position.⁶⁸ He asserted that the Soviets were the "leading party," but there must be equality between countries; the Soviets must not bind all parties by their own Congresses. Teng further justified the schism by saying that if the Chinese were guilty of forming a fraction, then Lenin was also guilty when he split the Social Democratic Party into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. "The Chinese had an equal right to form a fraction of this kind. And history would tell whether or not the Chinese, in a minority, were wrong."⁶⁹ This announcement that the Chinese were free to form their fraction was, to a system based on authoritarian rule from the top downward, announcement of a schism.

The next important speech was that of Enver Hoxha of Albania. In it was stated that "China and Albania were in favor of peaceful coexistence, but this presupposes the intensification of the class struggle

⁶⁸Crankshaw, p. 124.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 129.

until we achieve the complete liquidation of imperialism."⁷⁰ Hoxha then went on to bitterly denounce the Bucharest Conference and certain other Russian actions, especially Soviet unilateral action in the Hungarian revolution.⁷¹ Gomulka of Poland resumed the attack on the Chinese. "He did not wish to wound the Chinese comrades by stigmatizing them as dogmatists, revisionists, fractionalists, sectarians, Trotskyites, schismatics --but what else were they to be called."⁷² Later speeches by Teng and Gomulka were merely rebuttals of the opening statements. Khrushchev's speech to the Congress, as Crankshaw states "had largely been directed against Mao without mentioning him directly."⁷³

The next step in this somewhat startling Conference was the Declaration. The Moscow Declaration was essentially a Soviet document, and represented a Soviet victory. MacFarquhar states:

The document that emerged, signed by all, expressed essentially the Soviet views on the major points that had been in dispute, but contained a number of concessions to the Chinese.⁷⁴

The Declaration represented a last attempt to restore a genuine unity to the Communist bloc. Yet, the Soviet and Chinese ideological positions which the Conference defined were the final positions and the basis on which the dispute progressed.

The Sino-Soviet dispute developed out of the three theses of the

⁷⁰Notes made on Hoxha's speech of November 16, 1960. In Floyd, p. 289.

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 289-290.

⁷²Crankshaw, pp. 132-133.

⁷³Ibid., p. 133.

⁷⁴Hudson, p. 174.

Twentieth Party Congress. The Chinese had never accepted these, but had only acquiesced with the understanding that the settlement would come at a later date. The basic starting point of the ideological dispute arose over the definition of the "nature of the epoch." The Moscow Declaration states: "It is the principal characteristic of our time that the world socialist system is becoming the decisive factor in the development of society."⁷⁵ This implied that the socialist powers had gained in numbers and influence relative to the non-Communist nations. However, this supposition was interpreted differently by the Chinese, who contended:

The present epoch is still, as it was in Lenin's day, one of imperialism and wars, and that, despite an admitted growth in the might of the socialist camp, the revolutionary battle between imperialism and Communism is far from won; and the battle can only be won if the revolutionary forces intensify their efforts to win it. The world is divided into two mutually antagonistic camps between which there can be no collaboration and ultimately no compromise. Imperialism is the enemy and must be defeated; every other consideration is subordinated to the need for carrying the revolution forward wherever and whenever possible.⁷⁶

In contrast to this "hard" line, the Soviets argued that imperialism had changed from Lenin's time. They judged that the forces of socialism had grown stronger, and that it was possible to complete the revolutionary process by superior economic and military power through the force of example. The definition of the nature of the epoch determined the attitudes of each on the use of violence in the ultimate overthrow of imperialistic nations. The intransigent, somewhat fanatical Chinese position of no compromise with imperialism and revolutionary struggle against world capitalism minimized the dangers of nuclear war. In

⁷⁵Text of the Moscow Declaration. In Floyd, p. 297.

⁷⁶Floyd, p. 113.

advocating a policy of "Communist liberation" for the world, the Chinese proposed to employ Soviet nuclear power as a protective umbrella for their brinkmanship. However, the Soviets reached somewhat different conclusions:

Can it be inferred ... that world war is an indispensable condition for the further intensification of the general crisis of capitalism? Such an inference would be absolutely wrong, A proletarian revolution is not caused solely by military cataclysms; first and foremost it is the result of the development of the class struggle and of the internal contradictions of capitalism.⁷⁷

The result of this Soviet position was the policy of peaceful coexistence. Khrushchev reported to the Moscow Conference that there was some hope of reaching a settlement with "that part of the bourgeoisie which sees the real danger of a thermonuclear war" ⁷⁸ The Soviets also were in some doubt as to the necessity of "national liberation" wars. Khrushchev in his post-conference speech of January 6 finally concluded that they were inevitable, as the colonialists would not grant independence voluntarily.⁷⁹ However, there was a certain reluctance to condone these small wars, as the Soviet Union might have to support them even if it meant war with the West. Hence, the Soviet distinction between "local wars" which require bloc support, and national liberation wars, which would be strictly national movements. In the Declaration this whole distinction was glossed over by saying that in some cases there was a necessity for violence in obtaining socialism, while in other cases, depending on peculiar national conditions, socialism might be

⁷⁷ Khrushchev's Report on the Moscow Conference. In Hudson, pp. 207-21.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 214.

⁷⁹ Khrushchev's Speech of January 6, 1961. In Floyd, p. 309.

achieved peacefully.⁸⁰

Related to the question of violent or non-violent paths to socialism is the question of what path is to be pursued in the building of socialism. This question is more related to policy rather than ideology, but nevertheless it is one of the most burning issues in the Sino-Soviet conflict, and involves what Mr. Zagoria terms the locus of authority within the bloc. The Declaration states that

The Soviet Union is successfully carrying on the full-scale construction of a communist society. Other countries are successfully laying the foundations for socialism; and some of them have already entered the period of construction of a developed socialist society.⁸¹

This statement, then, acknowledged the Soviet Union as the "leading party" of the Communist bloc. This would appear to be a desirable position. However, prestige carries a commensurate responsibility and certain obligations. In a burst of modesty Khrushchev explained in his report of January 6 that the Soviet Union occupied this leading position merely because it was the oldest and largest, and therefore, more experienced party. Further, he noted that "At the moment, ... it is not possible for leadership over socialist countries and Communist parties to be exercised from any centre at all. This is neither possible nor necessary."⁸² Reasoning from this point of polycentrism, Khrushchev then concluded that as conditions differ from country to country, it would be only natural that each Communist Party should apply Marxism-Leninism to its own particular conditions. However, Khrushchev continued, "one must

⁸⁰Text of the Moscow Declaration. In Hudson, p. 193.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 182.

⁸²Text of Khrushchev's Report on the Moscow Conference, January 6, 1961. In Floyd, p. 310.

not inflate the importance of these distinctive feature, exaggerate them and overlook the basic general line of socialist construction charted in the doctrine of Marx and Lenin."⁸³

The ideological question of the correct path to socialism leads quite naturally into the more prosaic organizational question of how policy was to be decided in the Communist world and by whom. This is a highly crucial point as it determines whether Communism shall speak with many voices or with one. David Floyd discusses this point in detail, saying that the Chinese position appears to be that all parties in the Communist movement have equal rights in the working out of policy, and only policies and doctrines developed jointly by conferences (as in Moscow in 1957) had binding force on the movement as a whole. Toward this end the Chinese favored both international meetings and the creation of some form of executive international body.⁸⁴ The Soviet view was somewhat less clear, as it was opposed to such an international body, and to the naming of the Soviet Union as "leader" of the Communist world. But it was equally opposed to "fractional" activities within the movement.

This was, in effect, a demand for obedience by all parties to agreed decision taken at conferences. And, despite their apparent unwillingness to be the 'leader,' they wanted the statements of principle made at their Twentieth and Twenty-first Congresses to be accepted as valid additions to Marxism-Leninism.⁸⁵

The reason for this ambiguous Soviet position seems to be that the Soviet Union would like to "have its cake and eat it too," so to speak. As Mr. Floyd states:

⁸³Hudson, p. 220.

⁸⁴Floyd, p. 115.

⁸⁵Ibid.

The Russians, owners of the main wealth and the only nuclear power in the Communist world, were not prepared to have others deciding how the wealth and power should be used. At the same time, they did not want to lose the use and control of an international political movement which was an invaluable adjunct to their foreign policy.⁸⁶

On whatever points they may differ all chroniclers of the Sino-Soviet dispute agree on one point: the Moscow Conference accomplished nothing toward bridging the gap between the Soviet Union and China. It served only to bring the conflict into the open and to create more bitterness. David Floyd succinctly comments:

The true significance of this meeting of eighty-one Communist parties in Moscow in November 1961 was that the Russians and Chinese had failed, after long and exhaustive discussions and despite the presence of many of the best brains in the Communist movement, to compose their differences on the 'ideological' or the 'organizational' plane. Within the movement, indeed, the conference probably served to draw attention to the extent of the rift between Moscow and Peking and to oblige leaders of many parties not previously aware of or involved in the dispute to consider its implications for themselves. The conference marked the beginning, not of agreement between the two sides but of the process of rallying support for each of them, or 'polarization' in the Communist movement.⁸⁷

After the Moscow Conference the only remaining step in the open breach between the Soviets and the Chinese was the Twenty-Second Soviet Party Congress in October 1961. At this Congress Albania became the alter ego for China and Khrushchev bitterly attacked Albania, primarily on the charge that it had defied the agreed decisions of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow Declarations. William Griffith points out:

Tirana had been so clearly within the Soviet sphere of influence and was so small and so totally dependent upon outside help that Khrushchev must have felt the Soviet Union's prestige simply could not suffer successful Albanian

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 127.

defiance. For this reason he had to attack Hoxha and defy Mao in the process; as he said in his first speech, on a question of principle Moscow could not yield 'either to the Albanian leaders or to anyone else.'⁸⁸

The result was, as Griffith says, "an international sensation," and the whole Sino-Soviet conflict became an open secret.

The role of Albania in this complex drama was both that of a pawn and that of a more direct participant with genuine grievances. The primary grievance was Khrushchev's failure to take a strong enough stand against Yugoslavian "revisionism." This point is, obviously, not ideological. It has its direct origins in the almost pathological fear and hatred with Albania holds for Yugoslavia. Also the de-Stalinization policy of Khrushchev was another source of divergence, because Hoxha was considered to be a "little Stalin," and an attack on Stalin was an indirect attack on Hoxha and his techniques. Albania was able to successfully defy Moscow, the culmination being the breaking of Soviet-Albanian diplomatic relations on November 25, 1961. This signified the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations, as the Chinese never withdrew their support of Albania. As was said by a Chinese delegate: "The friendship between the Chinese and Albanian peoples, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, is unbreakable and no force can destroy it."⁸⁹

With the severing of diplomatic relations between Albania and Moscow, Albania's primary role as pawn in the dispute ended. Soon after this it became apparent that Khrushchev's bitter invective directed

⁸⁸William Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Split (Cambridge, 1963), p. 89.

⁸⁹Quoted from Griffith, p. 93.

against Albania at the Twenty-second Party Congress was only a veiled attack upon Mao which was soon lifted. After this Khrushchev and Mao began discussing each other, rather than Albania and Yugoslavia. The arguments began to broaden into issues of policy, as well as Leninist semantics. Hence, the real issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute began to emerge.

CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN THE DISPUTE

The Sino-Soviet dispute first came to world attention via the ideological exchanges between the two countries. It continued to be waged primarily within ideological terms of reference. To call the dispute purely ideological, however, is to be unrealistic. The real sources of the dispute seem to center over differences in national interest, and the policies based on national interest, between the two countries. Marxism-Leninism does, of course, play a role in the dispute. However, ideology deserves interest primarily as a device to talk about matters of national interest. Why has the dispute been waged in ideological terms? To answer this vital question leads to a discussion of ideology and the Russian and Chinese experiences with ideology.

The Importance of Ideology

The phenomenon of ideology is one of the most important elements, and certainly the most dynamic element, in politics. An ideology such as Christianity, nationalism, or communism can create or destroy whole civilizations, topple governments or change the face of the world, and has. No one can deny the vitality of ideology in politics. One approach to politics, the monistic ideological approach, says we can know politics from studying political ideologies. Necessary to the ideological approach to politics, however, is the assumption that men act politically

in response to their ideals. In the Middle Ages when a theocracy more or less controlled Europe this may have been true. But since Machiavelli, in The Prince, realistically described how men acquire, retain, and use power, it has been exposed that men, more often than not, do not act in response to their ideals. More often the ideals are used to fulfill more realistic ends. "The important difference is the difference between the instrumental approach to ideas and the manipulative approach."¹

It is the ideological approach to politics which is sometimes used to study the Sino-Soviet dispute. The reason is obvious: the dispute has been conducted in ideological terms. Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet alliance was concluded basically because the Soviet Union wished to extend recognition and aid to a new Communist state. However, it can be seen by looking at the terms of the alliance that there were also vital economic and political factors. The ideological dispute tends to obscure the other elements of the alliance. "It [Ideology] has tended to give the impression to the non-Communist observer that the Russians and Chinese were arguing about ideas and not about practical politics."² Ideology is an important part of the dispute, but it does not, obviously, play a determining role. What began as an instrumental attitude to ideas has, unfortunately, ended in a manipulative attitude.

Uses of Ideology

The realistic motives of personal ambition and power are the goals which politicians generally seek. Hans J. Morgenthau posits that men act

¹Max Lerner, Ideas Are Weapons (New York, 1939), p. 12.

²Floyd, p. 199.

politically in response to a power drive, that politics is a struggle for power, and that power is the motivating goal of politics. Whether all of Mr. Morgenthau's propositions are accepted or not, his major thesis is valid: men do act politically out of these motives more often than not. As a means to achieve the goals of politics, ideology is usually used.

Because they conflict with deep-seated moral values, these selfish motives cannot be openly admitted. Some politicians even conceal them from their own souls. Egoism cannot be revealed because of the fabric of every civilization requires that political leaders at least appear to be self-sacrificing. "There is a vast difference between man's actual behavior according to the necessities or urges of a given situation, and the ideas concerning social and political action which such a situation evokes in him."³ This is often the position in which Communists, as followers of a specific ideology, find themselves. Ideology provides a mask behind which political actors obscure their real motives and also serves as a reationalization in order to justify political power both to their followers and to themselves.

In addition to providing the leaders with a rationalization, ideology provides the masses with a raison d'etre^{2/7}. Life is often not only tedious, but actually miserable. Often it is only an ideal which forces them to go on enduring misery. In the Middle Ages it was the otherworldliness of Christianity with its rewards in the life after death which inspired the average serf. And today the ideals of religion with its transcendental reward or a political ideology with its promise of earthly reward is what sustains many people. Ideology often provides

³John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago, 1951), p. 6.

men with hope and a reason for living.

On a governmental level ideology is often used to legitimize a state's policies. This is a ramification of the mask-like character of ideology. In its policy--be it domestic or foreign--a state is always most highly motivated by its national interest. "The idea of interest is indeed of the essence in politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place."⁴ Ideals, it is true, may motivate a state to support certain policies not wholly in its national interest, but rarely will a state consciously pursue a path known to lead to destruction merely for the sake of ideology. States are always checked in their idealism by national self-interest. Often, however, a nation's best interests are difficult to discern, and often a government must embark on policies which seem to be against national interest. In this case, the government must legitimate its policies to the people. So, ideology is used as a tool to obtain support for present or future policies.

These are general statements concerning the uses of ideology, which have obvious applications to Russia and China. Marxism-Leninism provides a base for action. The people of Russia and China have endured privations in the hope of the promised abundance of the future Communist society, and the ideology legitimizes extreme policies such as the communes in China. ^{for recent times} ~~At present~~ both countries ^{have} ~~are~~ ^{ed} justifying their actions through Marxist-Leninist polemics. Unfortunately, the use of a common ideology in very different cultural and temporal settings has produced difficulties.

⁴Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, 1960), p. 8.

The Revolutionary Experience in Russia and China

Despite the many factors involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict there is one historical perspective which must be taken into consideration. This might be termed the revolutionary experience of Russia and China. Both nations experienced revolutions which rent asunder the very fabric of their traditional civilizations. The Russian Revolution occurred in 1917, while the Chinese Communists took power only in 1949. This is a time differential of thirty-two years. As Mr. Floyd has stated: "1949 was for Mao what 1917 had been for the Russian Communists."⁵ This time differential of thirty-two years is important because the world and conditions in it have changed in the years between the revolutions, yet the same infallible rules and unchangeable ideology did not change, at least in outward appearances.

Marxist ideology is a dynamic ideology, since it seeks to implement change. Opposing this is the static ideology, which desires to perpetuate things as they are. These represent the two primary types of ideology, which serve two different purposes. These two types of ideology serve "to legitimize power or challenge the existing power relations."⁶ Static ideology, or status quo ideology, seeks to perpetuate the status quo relationship of power. It is in much the easier position, as it has already won a certain amount of moral legitimacy merely by virtue of its being in existence. It would not be in existence had it not obtained a certain consensus already. By virtue of the legitimacy it possesses

⁵Floyd, p. 12

⁶Roy Macridis, The Study of Comparative Government (New York, 1962), p. 26.

(but also dependent on the degree of approval it possesses) the static ideology need not conceal its motives as much as an ideology which desires a change.

The other type of ideology is termed the dynamic, revolutionary, or imperialist ideology. It seeks to change the relationship of power which exists. Upon this type of ideology is placed the burden of proof. That is, it must prove that the present regime is unjust and must be changed. To do this, revolutionary ideologies usually employ a natural law doctrine. Natural law implies the ought of politics--the law as it should be ideally. The dynamic ideology sees the existing positive law as unjust and feels it must be rectified. Its main purpose is to justify the need for change in a system--to challenge existing power relations. In order for a change to take place there must be a reason for change. By virtue of this fact, it must prove that the static ideology in power has failed to fulfill basic needs of the state.

It must prove that the status quo it seeks to overthrow deserves to be overthrown and that the moral legitimacy which in the minds of many attaches to things as they are ought to yield to a higher principle of morality calling for a new distribution of power.⁷

This has happened in Russia and China.

Thermidorean Reaction in Russia

Marxism as a revolutionary ideology has succeeded in overthrowing a status-quo ideology when the conditions were ripe for such change. However, once in power, the revolutionary ideology gradually and inevitably becomes a status-quo ideology. Milovan Djilas, a close observer,

⁷Morgenthau, 84.

has made this statement:

To date, Soviet Communism, the type which has existed the longest and which is the most developed, has passed through three phases. This is also more or less true of other types of Communism which have succeeded in coming to power (with the exception of the Chinese type, which is still predominantly in the second phase). The three phases are: revolutionary, dogmatic, and non-dogmatic Communism. Roughly speaking, the principal catch-words, aims, and personalities corresponding to these various phases are: Revolution, or the usurpation of power--Lenin; 'Socialism,' or the building of the system--Stalin. 'Legality,' or stabilization of the system--'collective leadership.'⁸

This process has already occurred in Russia and possibly will occur in China in the future. The process has also been called the embourgeoisment⁹ of Russia. Basically, the Russian Communists have realized the folly of idealism and have become more realistic. These all refer to the same process which Crane Brinton in his book, The Anatomy of Revolution, has termed "The Thermidorean Reaction."¹⁰ As Mr. Brinton states, "Thermidor is not by any means something unique, limited to the French Revolution from which it takes its name."¹¹ The Marxists, or rather, the Trotskyites and other anti-Stalinist heretics, have often applied the word to the Russian Revolution ... "¹²

In accordance with his conceptual scheme Brinton describes the

⁸Milovan Djilas, The New Class, An Analysis of the Communist System (New York, 1958), p. 167.

⁹This term is coined by T. H. Rigby in his article, "The Embourgeoisement of the Soviet Union and the Proletarianization of Communist China," Unity and Contradiction, ed. Kurt London (New York, 1962), p. 26.

¹⁰Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York, 1952), Chapter 8, "Thermidor."

¹¹Brinton, p. 262.

¹²Ibid., p. 226.

Thermidorean reaction as "a convalescence from the fever of revolution."¹³ It is characterized by an abating of the excesses of the revolution which has occurred. There are several primary evidences of this:

... moral letdown, a process of concentration of power in the hands of a 'tyrant' or a 'dictator,' a seeping back of exiles, a revulsion against the men who had made the Terror, a return to old habits in daily life.¹⁴

These reactions seem to be inevitable. The ideals of a revolution carry men to heights of ecstasy; but men cannot long live in the rarified air of mountain-top experiences. Soon a desire for a calm, orderly life asserts itself.

That this process of Thermidorean reaction occurred in Russia is clearly seen, as events since 1920 have fulfilled most of the characteristics noted above. Brinton discusses in some detail this point in regard to the aggressive nationalism of the Russians after a brief flirtation with Marxist internationalism. "Since 1939 only a very casehardened fellow traveler can doubt that Marxist Russia is at least as ardently, as simply, and as aggressively nationalistic as ever was Czarist Russia."¹⁵ Brinton's conclusion (as well as other Russian experts) is that Russia has indeed seen no restoration as complete as France or England, but "in Russia we really are back to normal in 1952--normal for Russia."¹⁶

Thus, in the process of revolution and reaction, both the people of a state and the ideology undergo a Thermidor, during which there is a

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 262.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 236.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 252.

return to many of the forms and attitudes of the former regime. This has gradually been happening in Russia and will undoubtedly (human nature being universally similar) occur in China.

It is primarily in this connection that the new policies in Communist China appear to be ideologically, and not just practically, significant, for they bear an imprint of utopian extremism which goes beyond anything currently practiced in Soviet Russia. In the USSR early visions of a perfect society without personal property, family ties or the use of money have faded with the passing of time; in China, on the contrary, there is still a fanatical faith in the early attainment of the Utopian paradise of primitive Marxism.¹⁷

The central fact to keep in mind is that Thermidor has already occurred in Russia, but has yet to occur in China. The time differential involved has created a dichotomy of attitudes and outlook which cannot fail to affect relations between the two countries.

In addition to these typical experiences which affect the Russian and Chinese revolutions, there are certain specific factors of the revolutionary experiences which have contributed further to the dichotomy of outlook. Just as an individual's whole outlook and perspective of life is shaped by his early experiences, so the Sino-Soviet conflict has been shaped by historical experiences.

Historical experience demonstrates that the two countries were essentially dissimilar when they experienced revolution. "When, after the first world war, Mao Tse-tung decided to conquer China for Communism, he found a situation completely different from the one Lenin had to face in 1917."¹⁸ On the other hand, the absolutist character of the ideology

¹⁷G. F. Hudson, "New Phase in Mao's Revolution," Problems of Communism VII (1958), p. 10.

¹⁸Alexandre Metaxas, Moscow or Peking? (London, 1961), p. 46.

indicated identical procedures for both countries. This situation presents a logical impossibility, for two countries cannot be different, yet alike. It is this experience which presents a basic incompatibility--an incompatibility precluding any discussion of solutions.

The characteristics of Marxist ideology put it in the category of absolutistic ideology. That is, it posits its conceptions to be those of objective reality and admits no alternative solutions. The logical consequence of this orientation is the characteristic of infallibility, and consequently, changelessness. However, this represents an inherent fallacy, for however absolute an ideology or an ideal may be, it is implemented by men--who have differing opinions and perspectives. Therefore, any absolutist ideology is irrevocably subject to personal influences. This is true of Marxism also. It has been conditioned and influenced by men and by history. This is especially true in its application to the sources of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

When Marx first set forth his ideas for the overthrow of bourgeois society, he conceived certain conditions to be prerequisites for the revolution. Marx imagined that the revolution would occur in a highly industrialized society. This was a projection of the society he saw in nineteenth-century England. It was divided into only two classes--workers and capitalists--who were unceasingly at war with each other. Necessary, then, for his revolution was a highly industrialized society. The reality of the situation was much different, however. It was some fifty years before Marx's ideas were implemented. In this passage of time, his ideas became almost outdated. The conditions of mid-nineteenth century England were as he had observed--the workers were exploited by the capitalists. However, these conditions soon changed.

At the first rigors of early industrialization passed and the capital created thereby began to be reflected in a rising per capita national income, benefits started trickling down to the workers in the form of improved working conditions, housing, community services, more leisure, and, most important of all, consumption levels rising above mere subsistence and permitting the accumulation of a modest store of personal and family property.¹⁹

Similarly the passage of time between Marx's writings and their implementation had an effect on his theories, as did the "objective reality" of the situation.

The first Communist government was established in Russia, one of the least industrialized countries in Europe. The impetus of the revolution came from the two cities which were industrialized, true, but allowance also had to be made for the rest of the country which was peasant.

The Russian proletariat was one of the instruments of the Communists in the 'proletarian revolution' of November, 1917, and in the Civil War that followed. Consequently, alongside the populist slogan of 'land to the tillers,' Bolshevik tactics found a place for the syndicalist slogan of 'worker's control.'²⁰

Thus, the addition of the populist slogans to arouse the peasantry represented an addition to traditional Marxism and gave it a Russian flavor. Lenin himself recognized this. At the Fourth Congress to the Comintern, October 13, 1922, he stated:

At the Third Convention, in 1921, we adopted a resolution on the organizational structure of the Communist Party and what activities it should conduct and how. This resolution is a wonderful one, but it is almost consistently Russian--that is, everything in it is taken from the Russian environment.²¹

Since 1949 Marxism-Leninism has now been adapted to Chinese society

¹⁹Rigby, p. 20.

²⁰Ibid., p. 22.

²¹Quoted from Masamichi Inoki, "Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's Ideology," London, p. 114.

and conditions--Sinified--as it had once been Russianized. As Mao himself stated: "As for the Chinese Communist Party, it must learn to apply the theories of Marxism-Leninism to the real environment in China."²²

The "real environment" in China prior to 1949 consisted of an unindustrialized society with a large peasant base.

The contrast between urban-based Russian Communism and village-based Chinese Communism can be exaggerated; ... nevertheless, working-class participation was undoubtedly a much greater factor in the Russian Revolution than in the Chinese.²³

Marxist ideology had to be modified to fit the reality of the situation. Mao based his movement on the peasant majority of China. After the revolution attention was given to creating a working class by regimenting the peasants into communes.²⁴ This was the most obvious Sinification of Marxism-Leninism. It became Maoism.

The fact that Chinese Communism became Sinified cannot be emphasized too much. Mao developed a unique method of bringing Communism to China. This method involved gaining support in the villages among the peasants rather than the traditional Marxist method of beginning in the cities and carrying Communism to the villages. Mao's goal was to gain the support of the peasantry, then storm the cities, the stronghold of the imperialists. His methods were first unknown to Moscow; later they had no authority from Moscow. After the failure of Stalin's directives

²²Ibid., p. 113.

²³Rigby, p. 22.

²⁴In essence, proletarianization consists of alienating the individual from all traditional ties and binding him instead to the party. This is what the Chinese accomplished in the communes. See Rigby's article, p. 20.

exhorting traditional Communist tactics, Mao's policies were officially sanctioned in 1931 by the Comintern. During the crucial period of the 1930's and the period of the last Civil war, Chinese Communism developed quite independently of Russian support. The Chinese revolution was self-made. As such, China owed nothing to Russia. In this respect, Chinese Communism is similar to the Yugoslavian and Albanian Communist movements, with all the same implications.

The Failure of Ideology in the Alliance

The Sino-Soviet alliance was concluded in spite of divisive factors which had existed throughout the centuries as well as in more recent times. The agreement plainly pointed out China's economic, as well as political, dependence upon Russia. China received much-needed economic and military aid from Russia, and political support for her interests in the international sphere. In return, China could only offer territorial concessions and her passive support as an ally in the East. China was a "have-not." The alliance was obviously ideological, based on mutual adherence to Marxism-Leninism. The alliance was unusual. In fact, it has even been called "peculiar."

Neither sociological nor power factors can account fully for the peculiar alliance between the Soviet Union and Communist China. The factor of shared ideology, a shared core of belief, remains crucial. There are aspects of the alliance which can be explained only in terms of the overriding importance of this factor,²⁵

The alliance was, in actual fact, necessary to the interests of Communist bloc unity. The Soviet Union could not ignore the existence of a new "socialist" country, even though the revolution had been wrought without

²⁵Boorman, p. 122.

Soviet help or direction.

This alliance between two of the largest countries in the world was a formidable threat, especially based as it was on the ideology of Communism. However, this was its very weakness. Ideology was helpful only if the national interests of the Soviet Union and China coincide. The alliance was relatively untested in the first years of its existence, except for the Korean War. China was engaged in consolidating her regime, and the Soviet Union was doing much the same as a result of Stalin's death. However, when Khrushchev emerged as the undisputed leader, policy in Russia, of necessity, underwent a change. Russia began to follow a status-quo policy, going so far as a detente with the West. Simultaneously, China had become an established power, full of revolutionary ardor, and desiring to pursue a dynamic policy. It is clear that a status-quo policy and a dynamic policy cannot work together, nor can one ideology shelter them both. The national interests of the two allies had diverged. Only ideology remained, but it alone was inadequate to check the conflict of interests. Instead, the "binding" element of ideology was used as a means to wage the dispute.

Marxism-Leninism as a Means to Wage the Dispute

Marxist-Leninist ideology is the framework within which the Soviet Union and China now think and act. However Tsarist or Confucian or traditional their policies may appear to be, or however Russianized or Sinitified their versions of Communism may be, their frame of reference and language are Marxist-Leninist. Hence, alliances, agreements, and quarrels are carried out in Marxist-Leninist language. The ideology may be used for manipulation as necessity demands, but it is still the system

of state belief, just as democracy may be for other states. Hence, when the Sino-Soviet alliance began to experience conflicts, the natural idiom of its expression was Marxist-Leninist polemics.

In the Sino-Soviet alliance China was placed in the vulnerable position of being a dependent ally. She could only urge the stronger partner to look after her interests, but she had no means of forcing attention to them. China wished to pursue a dynamic foreign policy, but Khrushchev made it clear that the Soviet Union was interested in a status-quo policy. Failing to make her influence felt, China attacked the Soviet Union with the only weapon she had--Marxist-Leninist ideology. This was the Soviet Union's weak spot--her waning application and subsequent modifications of ideology--and China's strong point. Hence, Marxism-Leninism became the Chinese weapon of attack, with the Soviet reply naturally couched in the same frame of reference.

The ideological arguments had the effect of obscuring the realistic conflicts of national interest.

Ideology has tended to give the impression to the non-Communist observer that the Russians and Chinese were arguing about ideas and not about practical politics In fact, as every Marxist, at least, should have been ready to acknowledge--ideology has always played a secondary role in the dispute. It has done little more than provide the medium through which differences could be aired without spelling them out in terms of day-to-day policies.²⁶

The differences could not be discussed realistically or openly, ironically enough, because of ideology--differences between members of the Communist bloc could not be discussed because theoretically they could not exist.

Communist bloc unity is a very important reason why the dispute was

²⁶Floyd, p. 199.

waged in Marxist-Leninist symbols. The ideology of Communism and the "bootstrap" examples of Russia and China have exerted an enormous impact on the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. This advantage over the imperialists could not be sacrificed, if at all possible, because of a split between the two great Communist powers. Hence, if only questions of ideology and not prosaic power politics were involved, the myth of Communism and its impact were not destroyed.

The extent to which ideology is a determinant of the policy of a state is one of those variables in politics which can never be ascertained with any surety. However, ideology is usually secondary to national interest. In the particular case of the Sino-Soviet conflict this is especially true. It was considered, even in the earliest stages of the dispute, that the arguments about correct interpretations of Marxism-Leninism were merely a camouflage. Later this became undeniably obvious. The ideological exchanges between the USSR and China began in 1956 with Khrushchev's two speeches to the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU, and have continued to the present time. However, a noticeable change in the tone and in the content of the exchanges became evident in 1963. At this time Russia and China began to interject non-ideological criticisms among the Leninist polemics. Prosaic questions of national interest and power relationships became evident. The dispute had dropped its ideological mask. Only at this time did the real issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute emerge in terms of a conflict between two opposing national interests.

CHAPTER V

CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

"I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. But perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest."¹ The eminent Sir Winston succinctly expressed not only the key to Russian behavior, but also perhaps the key to the Sino-Soviet dispute. National interest is defined by Feliks Gross "as the general and continual ends for which a nation acts. Despite changing modes of expression, national interests are the constants rather than the variables of international relations."² National interest is usually independent of the form of government, but is dependent on constant quantities of size, geography, and resources. The Soviet Union and China exist as two distinct national states with two distinct national interests. Their national interests have now come into conflict. In pre-nuclear or traditional times the call to arms might already have sounded. In this age the Soviet Union and China are reduced to hurling insults at each other couched in a peculiar vocabulary.

The peculiar vocabulary and ideology of Marxism-Leninism exemplifies a new element introduced into the traditional Sino-Soviet rivalry. The new rivalry is not strictly a traditional rivalry of national interest,

¹Radio broadcast of 1 October 1939. Reprinted in W. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (London, 1948), p. 403.

²Feliks Gross, Foreign Policy Analysis (New York, 1954), p. 53.

as thought of in nineteenth century terms. Yet it is not only an ideological quarrel over varying interpretations of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Rather, the ideological quarrel introduces new elements into a traditional rivalry. These new elements involve competition for leadership of the Communist bloc and, owing to the international viability of Communism, the struggle for influence over the whole world, particularly in the new countries of Asia and Africa, and the not-so-new countries of Latin-America. Marxism-Leninism has given Russia and China a new language in which to expound, and new things to argue about, so to speak. Without the framework of Marxism-Leninism the dispute would undoubtedly exist, but it would lack the world-wide ramifications and consequences which it does have.

New Orientations in Soviet Policy

The natural consequence of Stalin's death in 1953 was a reorientation of the Soviet Union. Stalin had ruled the country with an iron hand for almost thirty years in a very personal sort of way. There was no clear-cut successor to his mantle, so a cautious collegium assumed leadership. Two of the immediate actions of the USSR after Stalin's death point out the prevailing desire of the new leaders to stabilize relations and to ease some of the situations Stalin had created in his latter years.

One of these actions was to secure their relationship with China, by furthering Soviet aid. Stalin had more or less ignored China, both in the period of the 1920's and 1930's as well as after the emergence of Communist China. In 1950, after the Chinese Communists assumed power, Stalin actually had no choice but to conclude an alliance, offer aid,

and exchange ambassadors, since both countries were following the same monolithic ideology.

The Treaty ... represented a retreat by Stalin from some of the positions taken up with regard to China in 1945. ... But in practice Stalin gave away precious little that mattered.³

Clearly the success of their Chinese brothers presented a problem to the Soviets, which has not yet been solved. Stalin had tended to emphasize Europe, to the exclusion of Asia. While the Chinese were concentrating on internal problems, Stalin concentrated on post-war European affairs. When Stalin died there followed the necessarily indecisive period in Soviet affairs. Hence, the new leaders took pains to consolidate the alliance with China. The result was the agreements of 1954, which furthered Soviet aid.

The second course of action was a cautious proposal to resume normal diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia.

The survival of Yugoslavia as an independent Communist state after 1948 created a potential ideological rival and hazard for the Soviet Union. After Stalin died on March 5, 1953, the new Soviet rulers apparently decided to reduce or eliminate the political liabilities they had inherited from their old master.⁴

Tito accepted the invitation and diplomatic relations were renewed, as well as barter agreements concluded in October 1954. Relations between the two states were further strengthened when Khrushchev went to Beograd for talks with Tito in late May 1955. The final Declaration issued after their talks said:

The two governments have agreed to undertake further measures

³Floyd, p. 11.

⁴Vaclav L. Benes, ed., The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (Notre Dame, n.d.), p. xiv.

for the normalization of their relations and the development of co-operation between the two countries, being confident that this is in line with the interests of the two countries.⁵

Rapprochement with Yugoslavia was a part of the policy of the relaxation of Stalin-created tensions in Europe. Tito, however, maintained Yugoslavia's independence from satellite status, remained outside the Communist monolith, and held to his "revisionist" ideological opinions. It appeared to be a Soviet pursuit of Tito.

A third arena of action for the new Soviet regime was Asia. This area had also been ignored, relative to Soviet interest in Europe, by Stalin. In November and December of 1955 Khrushchev made visits to India, Afghanistan and Burma. The very fact that he made this tour only six months after the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference, from which the Soviets were tactfully excluded, seems to indicate that the Soviet Union had not acknowledged the relegation of the Asian world to China. "Certainly Khrushchev was serving notice on Mao that Russia's interest in Asia was no less than China's, and that he was not going to tolerate any division of the world into Communist spheres of influence."⁶

The shift to the right in Soviet policy was dramatically announced by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956. His speeches expressed in the Marxist-Leninist framework the shift in Soviet policy. As was discussed in Chapter III these new pronouncements involved primarily the idea of "peaceful coexistence," and the related idea, the non-inevitability of war. Ideologically, the pronouncements meant that Khrushchev was making some extraordinary revisions in

⁵Text of the Soviet-Yugoslav Declaration, 3 June 1955. In Floyd, p. 223.

⁶Crankshaw, p. 56.

Marxist-Leninist theory, basically up-dating it in accordance with the reality of the nuclear era. Politically, he was implying that the Soviet Union wanted to follow a more cautious policy--peaceful coexistence. The natural means to this end was a rapprochement with the West. Further, the Soviet Union no longer encouraged all wars of revolution. The differentiation was made between local wars which require bloc support and those wars of national liberation which did not require bloc support. No differentiation had been necessary before. These innovations, coupled with de-Stalinization, marked a very different course for the Soviet ship of state.

The new goals of the Soviet Union were a radical departure from the Stalinist goals. The most urgent post-Stalin goal was a relaxation of restrictions within the Soviet Union, as well as relaxation in international relations. This was a necessary action in the face of the insecurity of the post-Stalin leadership. The phrase "detente with the West" was the practical expression of the theoretical "peaceful coexistence." Another of the new goals depended for its success on the implementation of peaceful coexistence. The economy of abundance was Khrushchev's gift to the people, as well as a part of the peaceful illustration of the superiority of the Soviet Union and the superiority of Marxist-Leninist ideology. It was also Khrushchev's personal goal. "He [Khrushchev] is primarily concerned with turning Stalin's prison-house into a prosperous modern society materially as rich, or richer, than the United States."⁷ The other part of this goal was to prove the superiority of Soviet military and technological might. This was achieved in the Russian coup of

⁷Ibid., p. 229.

the 1957 sputnik.

At approximately the same time that Soviet policy was moving to the right, Chinese policy took a sharp leftward turn.

Pekin /sic/ was embarking on a course which was to involve a tremendous swing from the right to the left. ... Very soon it was to lead to the adoption of the harshest and most uncompromising attitude toward the whole of the outside world, and to split the movement.⁸

The manifestation of this leftward swing was a "go it alone" attitude. This attitude was a reaction to Khrushchev's wooing of Tito and the West and the new "peaceful coexistence," as well as a reduction of Soviet help. As Mehnert says: "it was not a question of the Chinese merely wanting to rely on their own efforts--they had no alternative."⁹

The Great Leap Forward emerged out of economic desperation. Edward Crankshaw offers this observation of China in 1956-7:

... the economic situation in China was very ugly indeed. Rationing was stringent. Factories, railways, shipping, were being brought to a standstill for lack of coal. There had been severe natural calamities and, in addition, collectivized agriculture was failing to produce enough food.¹⁰

Precisely when China needed help, the Soviet Union credited the Eastern European countries with a billion-dollar advance.¹¹ China's economic situation was rather like the Soviet Union's had been in 1921. At that time Lenin himself retrenched with the compromising NEP. In a similar situation Mao pushed even harder ahead. In August 1958 he announced the formation of the People's Communes.

⁸Ibid., p. 75.

⁹Mehnert, p. 359.

¹⁰Crankshaw, p. 75.

¹¹Ibid., p. 76.

Manifesting the isolationist attitude in international affairs, Chinese relations with the rest of the world took a virulent turn. In spite of the erratic Soviet overtures to Yugoslavia, the Peking People's Daily said in May 1958 that

the Cominform resolution of 1948 had been 'basically correct' in its attitude to Yugoslavia and that the new Yugoslav Programme was 'a wild attempt to induce the working people to take the path of surrender to capitalism.'¹²

In August 1958 the Chinese bombed the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, all the while denouncing the American "imperialists." Further incidents in 1959 emphasized the reckless path of Chinese policy. In March the Chinese violently suppressed a rebellion in Tibet, and in September the Chinese invaded Indian border territories high in the Himalayas. It appeared that they were deliberately following a policy antithetical to Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence." What exactly were the foreign policy aims of China?

Chinese Foreign Policy

For two millennia China was the center of a world in which her foreign policy consisted of accepting tribute from inferior nations. There were two classes of people in this world--those within civilization, Chinese, and those who were uncivilized, all others. There was a closed, isolated world, little known to others. When the barbarians forced their way into China and eventually divided it into spheres of influence, even this did not prevent the Chinese from regarding them as inferior. The Chinese esteemed the Westerner's technology, but only as a means of ridding China of him forever. The Westerner was still

¹²From the Chronology, Floyd, p. 251.

uncultured. In the early twentieth century the guiding philosophy of Chinese intellectuals remained that China should learn about the modern inventions, but the solid base of Chinese society--Confucian thought--was not to be disturbed. This proved impossible. China had to accept all of the Western ideas. "Unlike China, Russia was never in the dire situation of having to choose between immediate modernization without regard to the consequences, and the loss of its national freedom."¹³ In the agonizing process the old society broke down long before the Manchus lost power. The idea that China was the center of the world was part of old Confucian China. Whether this idea still exists is one of those imponderables of history.¹⁴ That China would like to regain her place in Asia and the world is not.

The basic drive of Chinese policy is to make China strong once again. For over a hundred years China suffered humiliation, conquest, and a loss of culture at the hands of the Western nations, and even from

¹³Mehnert, p. 127.

¹⁴C. P. Fitzgerald in his book, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World, suggests that China still retains the traditional view that China is the center of the world, superior to all others, and lawgivers to them. He further posits that China is consciously translating the old Confucian idea of China into the contemporary idea of serving as a model for all other underdeveloped countries. "These arguments /that China should be a model for Asia and the other underdeveloped countries/ amounted to a restatement in modern terms of two of the fundamental postulates of the old Chinese view of the world: that China was the centre of civilization, the model which less advanced states and peoples should copy if they were to be accepted within the pale, and that the ruler of China was the expounder of orthodox doctrine." C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World (London, 1964), p. 49.

This same drive has been mentioned by others, as Howard Boorman: "One might suggest, therefore, that the ultimate goal of Peking's foreign policy is actually only a Communist adaption of a very ancient Chinese tenet: the irresistible capacity of the Chinese to expand their influence in Asia in periods of strong and energetic central government." Boorman, p. 29.

Japan, a fellow Asian power, stronger than China because she had Westernized in the late nineteenth century. The result was a paradoxical inferiority/superiority feeling. China had been proven inferior militarily, yet she was still convinced of her cultural superiority. The nation to which she had given culture had defeated her militarily by adopting Western knowledge. The only solution was for China to Westernize also. In the ensuing anarchy of civil war, invasions, international war, warlordism, and Westernization, the only strong force to emerge was Communism, which united the country and proved adept at strengthening it. Now China could avenge her humiliations, become Chinese again, and assume her rightful place in the world.

In foreign policy this basic drive of China assumes the form of first desiring to reassert her place as leader of Asia. This ancient goal has been extended in the modern world, in which no isolation is possible, to include acquiring the place in world councils which is due to a country which has more people than any other, and which is one of the largest in the world.

The drive to recover territorial integrity was one of the first goals China set out to accomplish. Before the entrance of the Westerners into the East there existed a delicate system of tributary government with its center in Peking. China either exerted direct governmental control over a number of states, or exerted a more tenuous control of "indirect rule," in which direct control was exercised by the local ruler but a recognition of China's suzerainty and payment of tribute were required. These areas were regarded as Chinese. They were not only under Chinese rule, but they had accepted to a greater or lesser extent Chinese culture. This is what made them Chinese, more than mere governmental

control. The extent of this area staggers the imagination with its population, its riches, and the vastness of its size. China proper, Sinkiang, Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Siam, Hong Kong, Macao, Formosa, and all Indochina have at one time been considered Chinese.

In contiguous areas China has followed a policy of direct conquest whenever possible for the recovery of Chinese territorial integrity. In this respect China followed a policy similar to the Soviets in the early years of the Soviet Union. The first conquest was Tibet in 1950. No one objected when Chinese entered the country because Tibet was so remote and because it had always been acknowledged as being under China's suzerainty, allowing for Tibetan "autonomy." Sinkiang had always been under Chinese rule, in spite of its Moslem, nomadic population, and the tenuous communications with China. The Soviet Union had virtually made Sinkiang a protectorate during the period between the wars, by the secret agreement with the Mongols in 1933. After much discussion, and the dispatch of Chinese troops to counteract the presence of Soviet troops, the Soviets have acquiesced in Chinese domination. Both China and the Soviet Union, however, use neighboring Moslem populations to wage the propaganda wars in Sinkiang.¹⁵ Nearby Mongolia had, from time immemorial, been discreetly disputed between Russia and China. In 1921 Mongolia was declared independent by the 1921 treaty between the Soviet Union and Mongolia. Very quickly, however, it came under heavy Soviet domination in the inter-war period. Today, it occupies what could only be called a

¹⁵Consult Mehnert, Chapter X, "Both Sides of the Longest Frontier," for a discussion of Chinese and Soviet activity in both Sinkiang and Mongolia from one who has been there.

satellite position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. China, however, even though she has acquiesced and renounced any claim to Outer Mongolia, still attempts to influence the country by using her own Mongol population in Inner Mongolia.¹⁶

On the other side of China North Korea is another area of Chinese protection. The action in 1950 could be regarded as a probing operation to determine the strength of the opposition. If China could obtain the whole peninsula easily, it was worth the attempt. When full-scale resistance was encountered, the operation was suspended. Similarly, the later incidents on the Indian frontier in 1958 and 1962 can also be considered as a probing operation, to determine resistance to Chinese influence in Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, as well as the Himalaya areas of India. Conquest here, however, is complicated by the proximity of India.

In the non-contiguous areas China has employed Marxism-Leninism in a policy of propaganda and agitation. The most vital problem is Formosa. The Chinese would naturally like to obtain control of the island, for to have it under the control of any other country is a strategic disadvantage. In addition, of course, there are ten million Chinese on an island traditionally considered Chinese. The minimum goal is "the elimination of the hostile power of the Nationalist forces in Formosa, or at least the withdrawal of the American aid and alliance which alone make this power a menace."¹⁷ China has accepted the fact that it is impossible to obtain control directly as long as the United States

¹⁶See Robert A. Rupen, "The Mongolian People's Republic and Sino-Soviet Competition," Communist Strategies in Asia, ed., A. Doak Barnett (New York, 1963), pp. 262-292, for a detailed discussion of Chinese activities in Mongolia.

¹⁷Evan Luard, Chinese Foreign Policy (London, 1957), p. 4.

Seventh Fleet is committed to its defense and as long as American aid supports Chiang Kai-shek's rule. Therefore, the primary Chinese tactic toward Formosa is virulent propaganda against the "American occupation," the "American imperialists," and offering the alternative of "peaceful liberation" of Formosa.

The Chinese Government's aim from now on will almost certainly be to play on the patriotic and family feelings of the Chinese in Formosa, so that eventually (even if only after Chiang Kai-shek's death) these may help to bring about reunion with the mainland.¹⁸

On another island, the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong, China has made little effort to gain control or to propagandize. No doubt, it serves China as a window to the world, so to speak, as well as a source of valuable foreign currency. Quite recently (May 1967) however, there have been demonstrations and riots against the British. Perhaps this is another type of probing operation.

The second part of China's strengthening process is to provide for the security of her frontier. This has already been done to some extent in the re-subjugation of Tibet and Sinkiang, the efforts in Mongolia, and actions in Korea. The most immediate problem is in the area once known as French Indochina. Here the same forces at work in China in the 1920's and 1930's, complicated by anti-colonialist feelings and false borders, have exploded. North Vietnam represents the nationalistic, Communist-oriented nation, strongly tied to China and friendly to her, which China desires on her frontier. Vietnam, however, is strongly linked by colonial history, culture, ethnology, and geography to the whole of Southeast Asia. It is here that Chinese policy and American policy conflict again.

¹⁸Ibid.

China, on the whole, has followed a friendly policy toward all these countries--Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma. Wherever possible the friendly state policy has been supplemented by encouragement of native Communist parties. In Thailand and Burma this has been relatively unsuccessful due to fear of their large neighbor. Burma was, however, the first non-Communist country to recognize China, and China repaid her by concluding a treaty in January 1960 which gave Burma a few hundred square miles of worthless jungle.¹⁹ What China got in return was good will, which may, one never knows, be useful later. In Cambodia and Laos China has sacrificed some ideological principles concerning the local Communist parties in exchange for friendly relations with the recognized governments.

Throughout the area, therefore, the object has been the same: to encourage or to support friendly (or, even better, anti-Western) governments which may eventually come more and more to be influenced by the weight of Chinese power in the area.²⁰

A third part of China's foreign policy is the expansion of Chinese influence, primarily in neighboring countries and all over Asia. Involved here is a wider area: Japan, India, Pakistan, the Phillipine Republic, and Indonesia. All these are "Asian" countries in the full propagandistic sense. However, they represent a different approach than Southeast Asia. They are not related to China culturally. China's goal in relation to them is to influence them to be "friendly" countries.

Chinese attitudes toward Japan, the main "developmental model" rival in Asia, have undergone sharp changes in the fifteen or so years

¹⁹E. H. Rawlings, "Fundamentals of China's Foreign Policy," Contemporary Review, 207 (1965), pp. 8-11.

²⁰Luard, p. 10.

of the existence of the Chinese People's Republic. Initially China quite naturally regarded Japan with hostility. As the pattern of post-war conditions in Japan became clear the Chinese attitude became less hostile. China began to urge Japan to free herself from "United States domination" and to enter into diplomatic relations with China. In more recent years the emphasis of Sino-Japanese dialogues has been on the possibility of trade between the two countries. The Chinese have encouraged visits of Japanese businessmen and exhibitions of their wares in China. In return there exists in Japan a considerable group of businessmen who would like to engage in trade with China. Japan's relations with China, however, depend on the United States. Japan, since 1952, has followed United States policy in all matters. As long as America continues its policy of isolating China diplomatically and economically Japan cannot do otherwise.

Chinese relations with India and Pakistan have been based primarily on their common Asianess and the repudiation of colonialism. Until the Chinese invasion of India in 1958 India was a "neutralist" country, quite friendly to both the Soviet Union and China, who were vying for her favor. The Chinese invasion has forced India to rely more on the West for support. Pakistan, on the contrary, has always been a member of SEATO and CENTO, formerly the Baghdad Pact, and so theoretically a strong ally of the West. However, Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize China. In return for this, China has evidenced a pro-Pakistan attitude on the question of Kashmir, as well as signing border agreements favorable to Pakistan, giving Pakistan some land in the Himalayas.

The logical area for the expansion of Chinese influence is Asia. The importance to China of becoming the spokesman for Asia cannot be

emphasized too much. It will be a vindication of the hundred years of humiliation, military defeat, and weakness. In consequence of her new awakening and new strength she is unquestionably the predominant Asian country. As a consequence of this position China is a Great Power in the full meaning of the word. However, she is not given the prerogatives of a Great Power. She is excluded from the United Nations, not recognized diplomatically by many countries, and cut off from trading with many countries. The originator of this hostility is the United States. America is committed to support of Nationalist China and boycott of Communist China. It is for these reasons that China directs such virulent propaganda against the United States. The quarrel is an ideological one, rather than one of national interest. The Chinese do resent the presence of American forces in Taiwan and the offshore islands. However, American influence in these islands is not based on a belief that they are her logical sphere of influence, but on an opposition to Communism as a doctrine. It is on this basis that the quarrel began between the two. Other than this China has concentrated most of her energy on Asia. "But in general the Chinese do not appear to be specially interested in the affairs of the Western world and can thus afford to remain indifferent or even hostile to Western opinion."²¹

The immediate goals of Chinese foreign policy are to regain all the power and lands which China ever possessed, to assert herself as the leader and spokesman for Asia, and to acquire status and recognition as a Great Power. A more remote goal of Chinese foreign policy would seem to be the advancement of Communism to all "proletarian and oppressed

²¹Luard, p. 11

peoples of the World." In discussing this fourth aim of Chinese policy the tired questions arise: How Communist is China? and How Chinese is China's Communism? This topic has been much discussed vis-a-vis Russian Communism and undoubtedly will provide a fertile field for China scholars. However, this question lies outside the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that Chinese Communism is following much the same pattern which Russian Communism followed. In the early years after the victory Russia pursued a very ideologically correct policy of proletarian internationalism, urging the rest of Europe to follow her example and revolt. (Lenin actually expected the imminent demise of capitalism.) After a period of facing reality the Soviet Union under Stalin reverted to modified Tsarist policies and traditional Russian culture reasserted itself. The next step is the embourgeoisement under Khrushchev in which the former revolutionary state becomes status-quo and begins to pursue quite ordinary goals. China has already gone through the first step and traditional Chinese culture is reasserting itself in ever-increasing ways.²²

Much the same point can be discerned in a formal analysis of the changes in Chinese foreign policy made by H. Arthur Steiner in a paper entitled The International Position of Communist China. The debut policy of Communist China in the years 1949-54 was epitomized in the slogan "Join the Revolutionaries!"²³ China, too, thought that her own experiences might quickly produce similar revolutions in Asian countries. In 1954-57 Chinese policy became less militant, less idealistic and more

²²Klaus Mehnert discusses the reassertion of traditional Chinese characteristics in a very humorous account in Chapter VIII, "The Party and Its Style," in Peking and Moscow.

²³H. Arthur Steiner, The International Position of Communist China (New York, 1958), p. 8.

nationalistic. The slogan was "Union With All!"²⁴ emphasizing nationalism, antipathy for colonialism, and the uniting of revolutionary internationalism with nationalist spirit. By 1957 the "dual policy"²⁵ developed whereby China had to reconcile her ideological spirit with her goals of national interest. She began to follow one policy toward recognized governments via diplomatic relations and another policy of supporting the subversive Communist parties. This is the period of the re-emergence of Chinese national interest.

Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956-1960

In the attainment of her goals China expected the aid, help, and support of her "socialist ally," the Soviet Union, in pursuing both economic and political goals. This was a natural and logical expectation. In actual fact the Soviet Union was the only source from which China could expect to obtain help.²⁶ China's immediate economic needs were to develop and industrialize the country and increase food production, as well as consolidate the government. Undoubtedly China's expectations were high when Mao went to Moscow in 1949. It is impossible to know exactly what expectations were actually in Mao's mind, but David Floyd hints that they were not fulfilled.

All we know is that it took them two months to conclude an agreement that ought to have been concluded in a few days, Mao left Moscow a wiser and probably a sadder man.²⁷

²⁴Ibid., p. 15.

²⁵Ibid., p. 24.

²⁶Floyd, p. 10.

²⁷Ibid., p. 13.

A glance at the 1950 treaties shows that Soviet aid was not large, certainly when compared with Chinese needs. Besides the size of the aid, all of it was in the form of loans with strict schedules of repayment. The Soviet Union made it clear that it expected prompt repayment, even from her "socialist brother." Soviet aid was increased in 1954 and 1958, but not to an appreciable amount, and very obviously for definite reasons. In 1954 aid was increased to consolidate the alliance in the wake of post-Stalinist insecurities; in 1958 the increased aid was an effort to placate China in the hope that she would follow a less aggressive international policy. In spite of the increases, this still did not make Soviet aid large by China's standards.

Even from what little we know, it is clear that the Chinese Communists would have liked to receive more economic assistance from the Soviet Union than Moscow has been willing to extend.²⁸

The reasons for the niggardly Soviet aid are not hard to discern. Quite simply, China is an unfillable vacuum. For the Soviet Union to give China all she required would bankrupt her own economy, and thus prevent the attainment of Soviet goals. The Soviet Union was pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence and desired the attainment of the economy of abundance. To have become deeply involved with Chinese economic assistance would have meant the sacrifice of Soviet goals indefinitely in order to help China achieve even a viable economy. In addition the Soviet Union may have become aware of the danger of strengthening a huge country on their own doorstep which might one day challenge her.²⁹ Then

²⁸Alexander Eckstein, "Moscow-Peking Axis: The Economic Pattern," ed. Boorman, p. 104.

²⁹Jean Polaris, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute, Its Economic Impact on China," International Affairs, 40 (1964), p. 648.

there is the vague hope that the Soviet Union could keep China as a source of raw materials for the industrial countries of the Communist bloc. One fact is clear: Soviet aid to China was never allowed to reach the extent of infringing on Soviet national interest.

Part of Soviet aid to China was supposed to come in the form of nuclear weapons. In 1955 the Soviet Union announced that they were prepared to put their knowledge in the field of atomic energy at the disposal of other countries (those named were China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and the Soviet zone of Germany).³⁰ This was made more specific by an agreement of October 15, 1957, the Sino-Soviet Agreement on New Technology for National Defense. "The USSR agreed to supply China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture."³¹ Less than two years later, this agreement was unilaterally scrapped by the Soviet Union, according to China.³² It had become clear to China that the Soviet Union was not going to supply her with nuclear weapons. The resulting fact, that the Soviet Union ranks as a nuclear power and China does not, is unquestionably a vital point in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese have ever publicly discussed their military or nuclear relations. It can be discerned that Mao was so impressed with the Russian sputnik of 1957 that he coined his new phrase "The East Wind Shall Prevail Over the West Wind." This at least shows that Mao was impressed with Soviet technical achievements and

³⁰Mehnert, p. 304.

³¹D. S. Carlisle, "Sino-Soviet Schism," Orbis, 8 (1965), p. 798.

³²Ibid.

considered that China would also benefit from them. The reasons for the contrary--the Soviet refusal to give China a nuclear capacity--are based on the premise that if the Soviet Union gave nuclear weapons to China, the United States would have to give them to her allies, notably Germany.³³ An unenunciated reason can be deduced from the radical attitudes of China. The Soviet Union was afraid the Chinese would use nuclear weapons indiscreetly. Since the Soviet Union was pursuing a detente with the West, this would foil her policy. Once again the limits of socialist brotherhood were reached.

China's political expectations and hopes of Soviet support in the attainment of political goals were equally futile. Until 1954 China had not really developed a foreign policy. The first years of the Chinese regime were spent consolidating the victory, establishing the government, and fighting the Korean War, which did pose a very real threat of invasion of Chinese soil. Until at least 1954 foreign policy aims other than the completion of the revolution and defense of her territory could not be evolved. Meanwhile in the Soviet Union, Stalinist policies were still being executed. China had come into the Communist orbit with a status much like any other satellite. Under Stalin it could hardly have been otherwise. In 1954 the relationship was altered by the new leadership in Moscow and the emergence of China on the world scene.

China's emergence into world affairs began in 1954 and continued through 1955 and 1956. At the Geneva Conference on Indo-China Communist China was directly represented for the first time at an international conference. In early 1955 Communist China made its first attack on

³³Ibid., p. 799.

Chiang Kai-shek, a test of its new power which resulted in the obtaining of the Tachen Islands.³⁴ The same year China emerged as the major nation at the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference. The years of consolidation were over and China was making her bid for recognition in the Asian world, as well as in all the world. If 1954 and 1955 marked China's emergence into Asia, 1956 marked China's emergence into Europe. The occasions were the Polish and Hungarian crises. The fact that the Chinese sent Chou En-lai to Europe indicates that China was expressing a direct interest in Europe not consistent with ordinary satellite status.³⁵

The uprising in Poland and the outright revolt in Hungary forced postponement of the Soviet Union's implementation of its new policies. The new goals announced by Khrushchev were not put into action until 1957 due to the repressive action necessary to settle the European crises. The blame for these outbreaks was correctly laid by a certain "anti-party" group on Khrushchev's "revisionist" policies. By July 1957 Khrushchev had defeated Molotov and the "anti-party" group. The new policies could now be put into operation.

The manifestation of Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" policy came in the form of summit meetings. The first proposal for a meeting with Western leaders was made by Khrushchev in an indirect manner at a meeting of Byelorussian farm leaders in January 1958. The topic of the meeting was potatoes, but Khrushchev managed to insert a proposal for a summit

³⁴Mehnert, p. 387.

³⁵The part played by China in the repression of the two uprisings varies quite considerably from author to author. David Floyd barely mentions Chou's trip, while Edward Crankshaw says that "China saved Khrushchev." Since no documents of such an action are available, it can be summed up as "significant" that Chou went.

meeting with the West to discuss major East-West issues. "He wanted to give 'peaceful coexistence' his own special meaning, welcoming face-to-face meetings with the leaders of the West, and notably of America."³⁶

The Middle East crisis of July 1958 offered Khrushchev his chance. The overthrow of the Iraqi government on July 14, 1958 led to the arrival of British and American troops in Lebanon and Jordan. On July 19 Khrushchev sent notes suggesting a meeting of the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France, and India to end the crisis. Macmillan's counterproposal was that the meeting should take place within the framework of the UN Security Council. Upon this proposal Khrushchev's enthusiasm cooled. He then made a sudden trip to Peking. On his return August 5 Khrushchev stated that he was not interested in a special session of the Security Council.³⁷ This was confusing, as before his trip to China he had accepted the proposal. By this time Britain and the United States had recognized the new government of Iraq and the crisis was over.

This episode illustrates two points: the USSR was definitely interested in working with the West for "peaceful coexistence" and the USSR definitely acknowledged the status of China as an ally of some power. Whether there was a divergence of opinion between Moscow and Peking is a matter for speculation only, at this early stage of the dispute.

Khrushchev's next attempt at a summit meeting was more successful. His visit to the United States was announced on August 3, 1959.

Moscow was jubilant: the long-sought summit of all summits,

³⁶Crankshaw, p. 58.

³⁷Mehnert, p. 391.

the dual meeting of Khrushchev and Eisenhower, was in sight. In the exuberance of this success, Khrushchev described the Soviet Union and the United States in his statement to the press as 'the two greatest states in the world' on whose relationship depended war or peace on earth, and he quoted the Russian proverb: 'When the masters quarrel, the servants tremble.'³⁸

Peking also quoted a proverb: "The leopard cannot change his spots."³⁹ The Camp David talks ended on a rather optimistically phrased joint declaration and Khrushchev left America for Peking via Moscow. His trip to Peking was anti-climactic at most. His reception at the airport and in the city was devoid of "spontaneous demonstrations" and Mao himself said nothing publicly.⁴⁰

While Khrushchev was making overtures to the West, Peking was carrying on actions diametrically opposed to Soviet policies. In August 1958 Communist China bombarded the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, which were held by Chiang's troops. The bombardment continued until October 25, but the expected invasion never came. In this matter the Soviet Union supported the Chinese actions, after a week's delay, by saying: "An attack on the People's Republic, the great friend, ally, and neighbor of our country, is tantamount to an attack on the Soviet Union."⁴¹ Moscow's support of Peking in fact went further than previous commitments of 1954 and 1955. However, as Mehnert notes, the timing was a bit slow.⁴² Since this incident Communist China has continued to

³⁸Ibid., p. 395.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 397.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 393.

⁴²Ibid.

bombard the United States with propaganda about Taiwan and the Taiwanese with propaganda about the non-existence of two Chinas. The Soviet Union has tacitly supported this:

Echoes of approval have usually been forthcoming from the Kremlin, and Moscow has supported the thesis that Taiwan is the exclusive concern of the Chinese People's Republic, which, of course, also indicates its aloofness and the fact that it had no intention of interfering in a domestic Chinese quarrel.⁴³

Taiwan thus is the second point of difference in attitude toward the United States between the Soviet Union and China.

The abrupt sharpening of tension by Chinese actions in 1958-9 has been greatly speculated upon. It is clear that some sort of abrupt change in Chinese strategy started in 1958, more specifically in August. August 1958 saw the announcement of the communes, as well as the bombardment of the offshore islands. The reasons for this drastic shift in strategy still remain relatively obscure. However, it is known that an intraparty dispute similar to that of the Soviet Union's in 1957, occurred in China in 1958. The struggle was between the radicals and the conservatives, or rather, the more conservative, and took place at the Eighth CP Congress in May 1958. That the radicals were the victors is obvious from later Chinese actions.

In his article⁴⁴ Roderick MacFarquhar posits that the struggle took place between factions led by Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-ch'i. He terms

⁴³ Ibid., p. 394.

⁴⁴ Roderick MacFarquhar, "Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute," Pacific Affairs, 31 (1958), pp. 323-335. This article offers by far the most detailed description of the dispute, as well as some very interesting conjectures.

Liu's faction the "sloganeers."⁴⁵ The sloganeers "substitute exhortation for planning"⁴⁶ and rely on "straight hard work" to carry out policies.⁴⁷ Opposing the sloganeers were the right-leaning conservatives, who could be called pragmatists, and whose leader was Chou En-lai. The sloganeers won their victory in June-September 1957, which coincides with the beginning of the anti-rightist campaign. Mr. MacFarquhar suggests that Liu Shao-ch'i was the victor primarily because he was enunciating Mao's principles. Mao's belief in the peasants, their Chinese patience and long suffering work is a traditional part of Chinese Communist history. This was also Liu's position. An additional factor in Liu's victory, Mr. MacFarquhar contends, is the question of a successor for Mao. Liu represented the Party and the "mass line" method in which Mao clearly believes. Without the presence of Mao, Chou could have challenged Liu. As it was, Mao stepped in with his overwhelming influence and decided in favor of Liu and the radical group. But, it was not so much a question of personalities, or groups, as of avoiding a possible repetition in China of the confusion in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. Hence, MacFarquhar speculates that Mao and Liu were choosing a successor. Liu represented the party group, and a victory by him meant the victory of the Party and its organization, rather than an individual victory. This seems to be the final importance of the struggle: the strengthening of the Party.

The victory of the radicals meant many things both internally and

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 324.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 330.

externally. Internally it meant the end of the influence of the intellectuals within the Party and the victory of "idealism" in Chinese economic planning. This may be substantiated, notes Mr. MacFarquhar, by looking at the "plans" of the Great Leap Forward:

In fact it was not so much a programme as a list of desirable objectives: illiteracy to be wiped out within five to seven years, the major diseases and the four pests (rats, sparrows, flies, and mosquitoes) within twelve; local road systems and broadcasting networks were to girdle the country by 1967; and all wasteland and denuded mountains were to be covered with foliage.⁴⁸

This was to be accomplished by mobilizing the people for hard work and sacrifice. The radicals seemed to extend their reckless, illogical, idealistic attitude to international affairs. "The real reason for China's growing aggressiveness seems to lie in the fact that the radicals wanted to extend their policy of the Great Leap from internal to external policies."⁴⁹ The extension of the radicals' policies can be observed in Chinese actions in 1958 and 1959.

The reasons for the victory of the radicals lie in Mao's taking a decisive role. What motivated Mao? His prejudice in the efficacy of peasant-based movements can be easily discerned. However, the shift in Soviet policy and the lack of extensive aid from the Soviet Union undoubtedly influenced his decision. It was a matter of using the only resource China has--people. Making a virtue out of a necessity seemed to have become a part of Chinese policy.

In 1959 three incidents illustrated that the Soviet Union was not going to support her Chinese ally politically if this entailed a

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 325

⁴⁹Mehnert, p. 388.

dangerous international situation or interrupted Khrushchev's overtures to the West. In March a revolt in Tibet was brutally crushed by China, which caused the Dalai Lama to flee to India. The Soviet Union carefully avoided reporting the resultant dispute between China and India. "The Russians avoided comment on the Chinese action in Tibet by saying that it was an 'internal affair' of the Chinese people."⁵⁰ Again, this can be interpreted as tacit approval, or disapproval. Later, in September, China again invaded Indian territory. This time the Soviets commented:

One cannot fail to express regret at the fact that the incident on the Sino-Indian border took place. The Soviet Union is in friendly relations both with the Chinese People's Republic and the Republic of India. ... the assurance is being expressed that both governments will adjust the misunderstanding that has arisen.⁵¹

This was not quite the response China, as an ally and socialist brother of the Soviet Union, could expect.

In addition to silent disapproval, Khrushchev positively criticized China on the subject of the Communes. In Poland, in July 1959, he made a sharp attack on the communes saying that the people who advocated them "had a poor idea of what Communism is and how it is to be built."⁵² This was the first public disapproval Khrushchev voiced about the communes, although he had called them "old-fashioned and reactionary" in a confidential chat with the United States Senator Humphrey, which later was made public, much to Khrushchev's anger.

At this point, in August 1959, a very obscure affair involving the Chinese Minister of Defense, Peng Teh-huai, developed. It is the

⁵⁰Floyd, p. 72.

⁵¹TASS Statement on Sino-Indian incidents. In Floyd, p. 261

⁵²Floyd, p. 65.

contention of some that Khrushchev attempted to unseat, through Marshal Peng, the leftist elements in the Chinese Party led by Mao. David Floyd, for instance, states that Khrushchev's policy toward China from the beginning of 1958 had two elements: to increase Soviet aid to China, and "to oust Mao Tse-tung and the leftist elements from the Chinese leadership."⁵³ His vehicle to oust Mao was the person of Marshal Peng, who had been in various positions to have had contact with Soviet officials, as well as with the notorious Kao Kang.⁵⁴ In August 1959 Peng was removed from his office as Minister of Defense and publicly disappeared. This has been widely interpreted as a result of his too close relations with Moscow.⁵⁵ Khrushchev himself mentioned the affair in June 1960 by protesting Peng's dismissal and saying "that his only offence was to have taken the Soviet party into his confidence."⁵⁶ Whatever the actual facts are, the affair and the suspicions engendered cannot have strengthened Sino-Soviet relations, although it might have had it been successful.

Thus, in 1959 the Soviet Union failed to support Chinese actions on three occasions, each of which were aimed at regaining Chinese irrendenta. In addition, Khrushchev made some uncomplimentary remarks about Chinese domestic policies. The two countries were already following divergent

⁵³Floyd, p. 61.

⁵⁴Kao Kang was the Governor of Manchuria who was accused of representing "reactionary forces at home and abroad" and was removed from office only after Stalin's death, in 1954. He later committed suicide. At the time when he was Governor of Manchuria, Peng was commander of Chinese forces in North Korea. Mehnert, p. 252.

⁵⁵See David A. Charles "The Dismissal of Marshal Peng Teh-huai," The China Quarterly, 8 (1961), pp. 63-76, for a discussion of this affair.

⁵⁶Floyd, p. 67.

paths: the Soviet Union was attempting to work out some sort of detente with the West, and China was following an aggressive policy, which, while not aimed directly at the West, was counter to Khrushchev's. The Soviet policy was aimed at preserving the status-quo, while the Chinese policy was directed toward changing the status-quo. It was as if two horses were in the same traces--one running, the other walking. This could not be a permanent situation.

Conflict of National Interests in the Dispute

In examining the Sino-Soviet dispute several important points have emerged. In 1956 the Soviet Union announced in ideological terms a change in domestic and foreign policy. This change was the end product of Stalin's death, and the leadership vacuum created by it. The new goals were a relaxation of domestic and international tension which had developed in Stalin's latter years of rule, peaceful coexistence which required some sort of rapprochement with the West, and the economy of abundance to raise the standard of living for all Soviet citizens. These goals were interrelated and illustrated the turning away from the revolutionary nature of previous Soviet policy. The new Soviet policy was in fact a status-quo policy.

Shortly after the announcement of the change in Soviet policy, China underwent a comparable intra-party struggle and herself embarked on a new policy. China's new policy emphasized a mobilization of the people in a drastic new form--the communes--in an effort to increase production. In international affairs China was concerned with attaining Great Power status. Further, China made it clear by international conferences and diplomatic actions that she wanted to be the leader in Asian affairs.

There were situations in the world which China was determined to change. In the years 1955-1960 it became abundantly clear that China was pursuing an aggressive, dynamic, revolutionary policy.

Russia and China had formed an alliance in 1950. When the alliance was made China had no policy as yet, as the state had just come into existence. In the short space of ten years vast changes have occurred in China and Russia which caused one state to adopt a dynamic policy, and the other a status-quo policy. As was noted in Chapter IV these two types of policies are by definition opposites. That they could work together in an alliance formed on the basis that the two states have similar goals is a logical impossibility. This is the basic cause for the existence of the dispute. The goals of the Soviet Union and China have diverged. Thus, their alliance has become unworkable. In the years between 1956 and 1960 China and the Soviet Union conflicted on various issues, but continued to work together on others, and compromised on some. By 1960 it became apparent that compromise was no longer possible.

If the Sino-Soviet alliance were a traditional alliance, it would have been dissolved and each could have sought new alliances with states of similar goals. However, the common adherence to Marxism-Leninism precludes the dissolution of the alliance. The organizational problem of the Communist bloc has arisen as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute. In Stalinist times it was unquestioned that the Soviet Union made policy for all Communist countries, by virtue of its being the first Communist country, and also by virtue of the fact that Communism had been brought to various countries by the direct actions of the Soviet Union. When Communist China came into existence largely by her own efforts, it was the only Communist nation who could challenge Russia in size. As China

emerged as a potential Power, and as the interests of the two countries diverged, the physical challenge broadened into a challenge for power and leadership.

The non-existence of an international Communist organization allows each state to theoretically be free to formulate its own policies. However, this was always conditioned by the traditional leadership of the Soviet Union, most particularly under the personality of Stalin. China's challenge to this traditional leadership after Stalin's death has forced the Communist bloc to consider a solution to this basic problem. China favors an international organization, while the Soviet Union does not. Perhaps the Soviets recognize more clearly the problems involved in attempting to legislate one policy for all Communist states due to the inherent differences among countries. Until this organizational problem is solved, there can be no solution to the problems of the bloc. However, the existence of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the resultant division of Communist parties around the world, in fact preclude any agreement. By the very existence of the dispute China has obtained one major goal: the recognition of China as a major, and equal, force in the Communist bloc.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

When investigating Sino-Soviet relations from a broad perspective it is imperative to remember the historical background of Russia and China. In analyzing the recent Sino-Soviet dispute two background factors have been considered: cultural differences and historical relations. Cultural differences exist among all nations which form alliances. However, in the case of Russia and China the differences are unusually marked. Race, religious attitudes, governmental traditions, and finally, the process of Westernization have created very different cultures in the two countries. The only common cultural tie appears to be that both the Russian and Chinese states have historically expounded a haughty attitude toward other nations--based upon religious messianism in Russia and upon cultural superiority in China. This common trait has not served to lessen Sino-Russian differences. Hence, the cultural cleavages of Russia and China cannot be disregarded when analyzing their state relations.

Ethnic discord has been among the numerous Sino-Soviet cultural differences which have emerged in the current dispute. This ethnic discord has primarily been used by China to obtain support among the non-European peoples of the world. However, race as an issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute appears to be only a propagandistic by-product of the present dispute, certainly not a cause of the disagreement.

Historic relations between Russia and China for centuries involved

competition for control of the borderland areas between the two countries, which in turn was part of a wider struggle for influence in Asia. The current borderland dispute became part of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the early 1960's when clashes occurred in Central Asia between Russian and Chinese troops. Both states have produced maps claiming territorial revisions. Neither state has, however, strenuously pursued the matter. This alone seems to illustrate that the borderland controversy emerged as an effect of the new dispute. The borderlands only became an issue after the dispute was well defined, at which time both states reasserted their historic territorial claims.

The Imperial legacy of suspicion and competition might have been over-looked had relations changed with the Communist rise to power. Directly after the Bolsheviks gained power it appeared this might be so. From the mid 1920's there was an effort to cement ties between the Russian Communist Party and the Kuomintang. This, however, ended disastrously in 1927 as the result of Russian efforts to engineer a Communist take-over of the Kuomintang. For some years thereafter relations between the Russian and Chinese Communist Parties were less than cordial as a consequence of Mao Tse-tung's rural re-orientation of revolutionary strategy in China. Mao's peasant revolution was reluctantly condoned by Stalin only after Chinese Communist successes in the civil war had vindicated Mao Tse-tung. China took her place as a member of the Communist bloc after 1949 with much the same sense of pride and independence as Yugoslavia and Albania.

Russia and China underwent revolutions with Marxism-Leninism as their governing ideology. They were bound together by this ideology because it specified similar perspectives and compatible paths of

development. Paradoxically, their revolutionary experience unknowingly also produced a difference in perspective between the two countries which provided the immediate basis for the conflict. Between the two revolutions was a difference of thirty-two years during which time Russia, in accordance with Mr. Brinton's revolutionary schema, experienced a Thermidorean reaction which blunted the former revolutionary goals. Alternatively, China has not yet experienced a Thermidor, and still possesses her original revolutionary ardor and goals. The resultant differences in ideological perspective provided the foundation for disagreement. It was only a matter of time before the actual dispute would develop. When concrete issues arose between 1956 and 1960 which required cooperation, the divergence produced by the revolutionary experience became obvious. The importance of the time differential in the Russian and Chinese revolutionary experience is vital since it provided a basis for the dispute, a soil in which it could develop.

Despite long-standing tactical differences arising from their individual revolutionary experiences, the Russian and Chinese Communist regimes cemented an alliance on the common tie of Marxism-Leninism. China's political isolation and insecurity vis-a-vis the United States cast China in the role of dependant upon the Soviet Union, which was bound to be a burden upon the strained Soviet economy. The Soviets attempted to use Chinese economic dependency as a curb on Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Once the dispute developed, Soviet aid to China was first increased in 1958 as an obvious effort to influence Chinese political behavior. When it became clear that economic aid would not deter China from pursuing her radical policies, aid was abruptly terminated in 1960. Economic cooperation became another casualty of the dispute.

The first years of the alliance were marked by apparent concord between the Soviet Union and China. An explanation for such smooth relations was found in the fact that both countries were engaged in either external or internal crises which required all their attention. China was preoccupied with the Korean war and with legitimating the Communist regime. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union was convulsed from 1953 to 1956 in the internal struggle for leadership after Stalin's death. An effect of this intra-party struggle was the formulation of new goals and new policies. The new goals consisted of a status-quo policy emphasizing peaceful coexistence and an economy of abundance. Some sort of easing of East-West tensions was necessary for Russia to attain these goals. Repercussions from the changes of Soviet leadership and policy led to an intra-party conflict in China in 1957. The result of the Chinese intra-party dispute was a leftward swing in policy which aimed at developing domestic economic sufficiency through the establishment of the communes and the recovery of Chinese irrendenta via a bellicose foreign policy which did not hesitate to antagonize the West or the USSR. A comparison of these post 1953 Soviet and Chinese goals showed a definite divergence.

The Chinese had quite naturally expected the help of their communist ally. After the enunciation in 1956 of the new Soviet goals it became apparent to the Chinese that Soviet support would not be total. Since the basic goal of China is to regain Great Power status, it was necessary that she establish a viable economy, develop her military power and redeem her unredeemed territories. Unfortunately these objectives conflicted with the Soviet goals of the economy of abundance and peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union did not wish to sacrifice her own economy indefinitely, nor did she wish to risk a nuclear war with

the West to help China. To help China would require some sacrifice of Soviet national interest, involving accommodations to Chinese national interest demands.

Dependent economically on the USSR and isolated politically from the rest of the world, China had no means, other than the dire threat of war, to compel Soviet support--except through ideology. To influence Soviet policy, the only alternative for China was to attack the Soviets' waning application of Marxism-Leninism. Ideology had provided the binding element in an alliance which progressively had less and less in the way of common interests. After the Chinese disagreed with the Soviet ideological pronouncements of 1956, the dispute was launched in an ideological frame of reference.

Analyzing the general notion of ideology, the conclusion emerged that ideology is employed in every state in order to obtain support or to legitimate policies. A classic divergence exists between the employment of ideology by a state as opposed to action based on a belief in ideology. In this the Communist states are neither exempt nor unique. Following this point to its logical conclusion, it can be ascertained that ideology has also been employed in the development of the Sino-Soviet dispute as a means of discreet argument. Camouflage was necessary to disguise differences which theoretically should not exist, to limit the dispute, and to protect the unity of the Communist bloc and the ideology itself.

The basic question concerning the nature of the Sino-Soviet dispute was to determine to what extent it is an ideological quarrel. This question was answered by the post-1960 exchanges which ceased to wholly concern ideological semantics and began to openly discuss matters of

prosaic politics. Compromise had failed. That the dispute had other than ideological roots could have been foretold by an analysis of the role of ideology in the Soviet Union and China, which in turn could offer clues concerning the role of ideology in the conflict. It is plain that ideology is not the source of the dispute, but merely a means of waging it.

If not a quarrel over ideology, what then is the dispute? An investigation of the background relationships of the two states revealed that antipathy existed, but not to a degree strong enough to cause such a monumental dispute. An analysis of the national interests of the Soviet Union and China showed a divergence of very fundamental goals, goals deeply rooted in the national interests of the two states. This divergence had arisen after the formation of the alliance and was not compatible a decade later with the demands of cooperation which the alliance prescribed. Hence, a clash of interests erupted into a dispute having immense ramifications. Looking deeper into the basis for the change in Soviet and Chinese policies, I think a reason can be found for the changes in the revolutionary experience and the resultant difference in total perspective. This then was the elemental source of the dispute.

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