THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SPAIN, 1861-1865

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PREFACE

America's relations with Spain have been chronicled chiefly in these areas: the Revolutionary War era until the end of the eighteenth century, the events leading to the Spanish-American War, and the American policy toward Spain during the Spanish Civil War in the 1930's. Other accounts, of course, touch on aspects of Spanish-American relations, but surprisingly, no research study of the relations of the two countries during the American Civil War has been made. Thus this thesis explores a fascinating, fresh area in diplomatic history.

Preparation for writing this thesis included extensive use of previously neglected manuscript materials from the National Archives. This study serves primarily as an introduction to the topic. A definitive work will require the use of manuscript sources in Spain as well as in the United States.

Thanks are extended to Dr. LeRoy H. Fischer who suggested this interesting topic and ordered special materials for the author's use. Dr. Fischer's painstaking editing and valuable advice regarding style and form are appreciated by the author. Further gratitude is due Dr. Homer L. Knight who read the thesis and offered additional recommendations for improving its quality. Helpful librarians at the Oklahoma State University and the University of Colorado simplified research problems. Last but not least, the author's wife, Margaret, provided patience, cogent criticisms, and typing skill which implemented the completion of this thesis.

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CHAPTER I

THE FRAMEWORK OF SPANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

In 1860 the once proud and mighty Kingdom of Spain contained 15,675,000 subjects. Only Madrid with approximately 300,000 residents and Barcelona with a population numbering close to 190,000 were really important cities. The vast majority of Spain's people lived in rural areas and remained completely unaffected by major changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution.[1]

The Spanish Government was split among rival factions arranged around the corrupt queen, Isabella II. The entire reign of Isabella II was characterized by instability; in twenty-five years there were no fewer than 519 cabinet shifts. The fluctuating situation in which Spain was enmeshed reflected the claims to King Ferdinand VII's throne and, to a lesser extent, a cleavage among factions growing out of the Napoleonic War in Spain.[2]

Isabella II was not the strong queen demanded by Spain in the 1860's. A nymphomaniac whose first known affair occurred when she was fourteen, the Spanish queen was subject to the whims of her momentary

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[1]Willard A. Smith, "The Background of the Spanish Revolution of 1868," American Historical Review, LV (July, 1950), p. 795.

[2]William Columbus Davis, The Last Conquistadores: The Spanish Intervention in Peru and Chile, 1863-1866 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1950), pp. 1-3; the number of cabinet changes is in Smith, "The Background of the Spanish Revolution of 1868," American Historical Review, LV (1950), p. 801; Harold Livermore, A History of Spain (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1960), pp. 369-395.

personal passions. Thus the British Ambassador could write Lord Clarendon, the British Foreign Minister, that Spain's strength was not equal to a woman's when compared with the power of other European states. Despite the obvious truth to the contrary, the belief existed among numbers of Spaniards that Spain's glorious empire of old was to be reborn in 1861. Prime Minister Leopoldo O'Donnell bore no small part in helping to give currency to that idea.[3]

The uncommunicative O'Donnell had risen to power in 1858 after serving as the Captain-General of Cuba ten years earlier. He immediately embarked Spain on an aggressive foreign policy: a joint Franco-Spanish force undertook a punitive mission in Cochin-China; then in 1859 and 1860, Spain alone conducted a small police action in Morocco. The fruits of the Moroccan Expedition included a guaranteed neutral zone, a ten-million dollar indemnity, and the loss of seven thousand Spanish lives. However, O'Donnell's adventurous foreign policy succeeded in its purpose of taking the eyes of the Spanish people off Spain's woeful shortcomings and directing them to the restoration of Spain's former glories. Not the least measurement of O'Donnell's success was the durability of his rule, a five-year period from 1858 to 1863.[4]

The American Civil War presented O'Donnell with an opportunity to enhance his administration. He believed that the Union's split was permanent and that one of the two American factions would eventually

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[3]Smith, "The Background of the Spanish Revolution of 1868," American Historical Review, LV (1950), p. 802; Gavin B. Henderson, "Southern Designs on Cuba, 1854-1857, and Some European Opinions," Journal of Southern History, V (August, 1939), p. 378; Sumner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924 (2 vols., New York: Payson and Clark, Ltd., 1928), I, p. 220.

[4]Livermore, History of Spain, pp. 382-384; Davis, Last Conquistadores, pp. 5-6.

align itself as an ally of Spain. Attempting to carry out O'Donnell's foreign policy was Foreign Minister Saturnino Calderon Collantes, a sharp contrast to his superior. Carl Schurz, America's minister to Spain in 1861, found O'Donnell "cold and reticent" as compared to Collantes who struck Schurz more as a schoolmaster than a politician.[5] An even better portrait of the subordinate Spanish official is to be found in a dispatch from Schurz to William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States:

> Calderon Collantes is a man of quixotic propensities, vain and bombastic; altogether not born to be a hero, he possesses the courage commonly falling to the lot of those who have not strength and clearness of mind enough to measure the difficulties of what they are undertaking. Besides, he has committed so many blunders in the management of his important department that he has to fear more from the attacks of the opposition than anyone of his colleagues /sic/. Tenacious of office as he is, he will eagerly grasp at anything that bids fair to relieve him of his embarrassments.[6]

The collapse of the O'Donnell Government in early 1863 ushered in two years of confusion. Replacing O'Donnell as prime minister was Fernandez de Pinedo Pando, the Marquis of Miraflores, an unspectacular politician, according to the American minister to Spain, Gustave Koerner. Miraflores' successor, Lorenzo Arrazola, was no better. Koerner was amazed when Arrazola asked him what language was spoken in the United States! Fortunately, Arrazola was in office only a short time before another interim government headed by Alexander Mon replaced him. With Spain's fortunes declining at every step, a successor to Mon was an

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[5]Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), pp. 284-285; Carl Schurz, The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz (3 vols., New York: The McClure Company, 1907), II, p. 252; the quote is from ibid., p. 266.

[6]Schurz to Seward, September 27, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives, Washington, D. C.

urgent need. Stepping forth to assume the post was Marshal R. M. Narvaez, an old political warhorse who had headed Spain's government on numerous occasions dating from 1844. Narvaez struck Horatio Perry, chargé d'affaires in Madrid, as the man with ability adequate to establish in Spain a government capable of withstanding the shock created by the withdrawal of Spanish forces from Santo Domingo, a land only recently reincorporated into the Spanish empire.[7] However, the London Times said, "Narvaez . . . has long ceased to be the formidable man he was. He has subsided into a respectable old fogey."[8] Happily for Spain during those years of tumult, she had but one representative in Washington, a man who impressed many Americans with his diplomatic flair, Gabriel Tassara.[9]

During the American Civil War, diplomatic etiquette dictated reciprocal gestures of respect and a summoning up of the myth of past Hispanic-American friendship. In actuality, Spain and the United States recognized each other's existence and that was all. A reluctant ally of France in the American Revolution, the Spanish were worried primarily about the potential of the United States. Their worst fears came true as the ever-aggressive Americans pushed into Florida, recognized the independence of the revolting Latin-American colonies of Spain, and began to cast greedy eyes on Cuba. Hence it is not surprising that the

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[7]Thomas J. McCormack, (ed.), The Memoirs of Gustave Koerner, 1809-1896 (2 vols., Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, 1909), II, pp. 308, 393-394; Davis, Last Conquistadores, pp. 7-8; Perry to Seward, September 18, 1864, Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, 1864 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1865), IV, pp. 98-99.

[8]London Times, September 10, 1862, p. 7b.

[9]Howard K. Beale, (ed.), The Diary of Edward Bates, 1859-1866 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 205.

English journal Spectator expressed the opinion that Spain, of all nations, would benefit the most from the disruption of the American Union. The accumulated ill will of Spanish-American relations lived on through the war and was renewed in the question of American recognition of the Cuban insurgents in 1869.[10]

Considering these facts, is it any wonder that the news of the election of 1860 evoked unmitigated joy among Spain's ruling classes? Spaniards gleefully watched the widening discord caused by the North American republic's selection of Abraham Lincoln as President. Such discord neutralized the power of the republic, and rendered the United States powerless to interfere in Spain's current controversy with Venezuela stemming from Spain's demand for an indemnity and an apology for the Venezuelan murder of Spanish citizens. As the crisis grew more serious, some jubilant Spaniards realized it was to their national advantage to have the Union split into two quarreling factions.[11]

Predictably, the Spaniards blunted their own power by dividing into cliques which were utterly at loggerheads with each other. While the elite, ruling classes saw the Civil War as a great blessing for Spain and a time for Spain to adopt a more adventuresome foreign policy, most of the Spanish people were ignorant and indifferent to the general

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[10]James Breck Perkins, France and the American Revolution (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), pp. 512-513, quotes the French ambassador in Madrid, Armand Marc, Comte de Montmorin, as writing Foreign Minister Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, October 19, 1778, that he believed "the Spanish are in singular dread of the prosperity and progress of the Americans;" the question of recognizing Cuban belligerancy and Grant's feelings about Spain's actions in the Civil War are dealt with in Allan Nevins, Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1937), pp. 125, 236.

[11]Preston to Secretary of State Lewis Cass, November 26, 1860, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Preston to Seward, April 14, 1861, ibid.

operations of their government. Those few who were vocal on the matter expressed themselves for the Union. Perry accounted for the feelings of the latter group by explaining that they viewed the United States as the land of democracy and the world's beacon of freedom.[12]

While minister in Madrid, the pro-Confederate William Preston capitalized on this divergence of opinion when he sought by flattery and ostentatious display to win the elite over to a similar line of thought. His success may be judged by an early dispatch of Perry's: "Extraordinary as it may seem, you /Seward/ are in danger from the dense ignorance and robust prejudices of certain classes /the elite/ in Spain."[13] This split in Spanish sentiments remained unhealed throughout the war. As the war progressed and the Confederate cause grew more hopeless, the elite's bellicosely anti-Union sentiments became more subdued.

The gulf between the classes and factions on this aspect of foreign policy was presented graphically in the newspapers of the peninsula kingdom. Early in the war, the prevalent feeling that the Confederacy was bound to achieve its independence was expressed in the Pensamiento Espanol: "The war may continue a long time or a short time, but the indubitable result will be the independence of the Southern States."[14] Later, as General Robert E. Lee's soldiers were invading Maryland in

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[12]Preston to Cass, December 1, 1860, ibid.; Perry to Seward, September 21, 1862, delineates class feelings in Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, 1862 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1863), pp. 515-516.

[13]Perry to Seward, April 20, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[14]Quoted in Edwin J. Pratt, "Spanish Opinion of the North American Civil War," Hispanic American Historical Review, X (February, 1930), p. 20.

the fall of 1862, the same paper visibly gloated that in

> the model republic of what was the United States, we can see more and more clearly of how little account is a society constituted without God, merely for the sake of men. Look at their wild ways of annihilating each other, confiscating each other's goods, mutually destroying each other's cities and cordially wishing each other extinct! The Federals declare their enemies' slaves free, and the latter refuse to allow Federal regiments of whites and blacks any right of war. Both muzzle the press; both vie with each other in reprisals; and at the end of a year of war they are both on the road to becoming barbarians. The history of the model republic can be summed up in a few words. It came into being by rebellion. It was founded on atheism. It was populated by the dregs of all the nations in the world. It has lived without the law of God or men. Within a hundred years, greed has ruined it. Now it is fighting like a cannibal, and it will die in a flood of blood and mire. Such is the real history of the one and only state in the world which has succeeded in constituting itself according to the flaming theories of democracy. The example is too horrible to stir any desire for imitation in Europe.[15]

It is true that such an attitude reflected the feelings of the pro-royalist, anti-American wing of Spanish politics. But Chargé Perry became sufficiently aroused over such expressions to attempt to influence Spanish newspapers. Perry had no qualms about indulging in this activity because he discovered proof that Foreign Minister Collantes was supplying the semi-official La Epoca with snatches of Seward's diplomatic communications. In retaliation Perry launched a three-pronged "truth" campaign.

First, he encouraged the clergy, liberals, and other elements favorable to the United States to put more friendly news in their journals. Next, he personally dashed off editorial columns for certain papers. Finally, he flatly asked Collantes to restrain blatantly anti-American sheets. Thus the Spanish press began to present a more

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[15] Ibid.

attractive picture of the United States in the latter years of the war. Immeasurable strength was added to the hands of Perry, the Spanish liberals, and the clergy when the Emancipation Proclamation was issued on January 1, 1863.[16]

Immediately after the Union's disastrous defeat at Bull Run in July, 1861, Minister Schurz felt the full impact of European scorn and contempt for the Northern states. After great consideration, he came to the conclusion that respect for the United States could be instilled in Europeans in one of only two ways: the Union might win a speedy and decisive military victory over the Confederacy, or the Union's efforts might be elevated to a higher moral level by a clearcut lash against slavery. In dispatches and letters, Schurz vigorously pounded on the anti-slavery theme. Increasingly he came to believe that the Union's entire battle hinged on the question of slavery, and Spain's liberal press also played on the same theme. Secretary Seward was quite aware of the diplomatic trump slavery offered the North. He was even more cognizant of the fact that the trump had to be played at the correct time for optimum benefit to result. In short, Seward realized that an

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[16]Collantes' lacking of information to La Epoca is in Perry to Seward, April 17, 1862, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Perry's efforts encouraging more friendly treatment of America is reported in Perry to Seward, July 18, 1863, ibid.; Koerner to Seward, February 28, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, pp. 9-10; Schurz to Seward, August 19, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives, mentions an early attempt to get more favorable treatment of America; Perry's talk to Collantes to quiet down some violent anti-American papers is mentioned in Schurz to Seward, September 5, 1861, ibid.; Perry's influence on the segments of Spanish press was illustrated by clippings sent in Perry to Seward, January 10, 1862, ibid.; some of Perry's ghosted editorials are in Perry to Seward, July 19, 1863, ibid.

early emancipation would be construed as an act of despair in Europe.[17] He brusquely answered Schurz's passionate pleas, saying "foreign sympathy, or even foreign favor, never did and never can create or even maintain any state."[18]

After a period of quiescence on the slave question as propaganda bait, the issue was revived by Perry in late September, 1862. The Union had fought and won a marginal victory in the bloody Battle of Antietam, and the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation had been issued. A month later Perry reported the tremendous boost given to the Union's prestige by these combined acts. Ironically, the enthusiasm generated by the Emancipation Proclamation did not sufficiently inspire the Spanish to free the numerous slaves in their own colonies for many years.[19]

An unexpected dividend of the Emancipation Proclamation was the surge of Lincoln's popularity in Spain. For the remainder of the war, ordinary Spanish citizens presented petitions of thanks for Lincoln's actions. The assassination of Lincoln was followed by a generous out-

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[17]Schurz's sentiments are in Schurz to Seward, September 14, 1861, ibid.; Pratt, "Spanish Opinion of the North American Civil War," Hispanic American Historical Review, X (1930), p. 23, contains an excerpt from a liberal newspaper opposed to slavery; Seward's answer to Schurz's plans is in Schurz, Reminiscences, II, pp. 302-303; Frederic Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward (2 vols., New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1900), II, pp. 323-327; consult Glyndon G. Van Dusen and Richard C. Wade, (eds.), Foreign Policy and the American Spirit: Essays by Dexter Perkins (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 222-223, for Seward's recognition that a proper time was needed to emancipate the slaves.

[18]Schurz, Reminiscences, II, pp. 277-279, 286.

[19]Perry's revival of the emancipation issue is in Perry to Seward, September 21, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, pp. 516-517; news of the Preliminary Emancipation's effect is in Perry to Seward, October 25, 1862, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

pouring of grief on the part of Spanish commoners.[20]

The distrust of America by the Spanish elite was nothing new, for the republic across the sea had long been an object of contempt. The war in America seemed to prove what those elements had long said, that America was destined to fall because of its republican structure and fluid class lines. On the other hand, most Spaniards appear to have eventually felt a vague sympathy for America due largely to the influence of the clergy and, to a much lesser extent, to the liberals. This dichotomy effectively neutralized Spain. The nation could neither fully take advantage of the Union's distress nor could she be of practical assistance to speed the conclusion of the struggle.

The American minister to Spain on the outbreak of the Civil War was Preston, a Kentuckian. He had been named to his post in 1858 after Senators Stephen Mallory of Florida and Judah Benjamin of Louisiana and Vice President John C. Breckenridge declined to serve in Madrid. Preston resigned his position as minister to return to his native state as the situation in America became more serious.[21]

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[20]The presentation of petitions is recorded in Koerner, Memoirs, II, p. 399; Koerner to Seward, May 23, 1863, Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, 1863 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), II, p. 900; Belle Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman, Europe Looks at the American Civil War (New York: The Orion Press, 1960), pp. 267, 275; Perry to Seward, December 15, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1865, II, pp. 470-471; Spanish sentiments about Lincoln's assassination are in the Appendix to Diplomatic Correspondence of 1865, pp. 530-532, 534-540.

[21]Roy F. Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 232-233, discloses the background of Preston's nomination as minister; for Preston's attempts to sow ill will against the United States see Koerner to Seward, November 15, 1862, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Perry to Seward, September 21, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 515; Barbara Donner, "Carl Schurz the Diplomat," Wisconsin Magazine of History, XX (March, 1937), p. 293n; Pratt, "Spanish Opinion of the North American Civil War," Hispanic American Historical Review, X (1930), pp. 15-16.

Replacing him ad interim was Perry, a New England-born graduate of Harvard, class of 1844. After service in the Mexican War, Perry found his health declining and so journeyed to Spain. There he assumed the position of legation secretary in 1849. He was still in this position when Pierre Soulé, a French-born Louisiana Democrat, arrived in Spain in 1853. At first the two men got along well, as was indicated by the fact that Soulé served as the godfather of Perry's first child. Trouble arose, however, when Perry sent a copy of a letter to President Franklin Pierce to the Washington Intelligencer. In the letter Perry attacked Soulé's mission. The upshot of the affair was that Soulé labelled Perry a "liar" and sought his dismissal. It was later discovered that Perry and his Spanish-born wife had also been guilty of showing Soulé's dispatches to the British ambassador Lord Howden. Thus Perry was shelved on inactive status until the war broke out in America.[22]

During the course of the war Perry was destined to serve as chargé d'affaires more than half the period due to changes in ministers and their leaves of absence. But Perry did not ask for this appointment in 1861. Well aware of his capabilities, Charles Sumner, Republican Senator from Massachusetts, secured his nomination to the Madrid position. Perry remained in relative obscurity throughout the war, although he aspired to be more than a chargé, but the domestic political situation frustrated his promotion. He stayed at his post, performed his required duties, and eventually died in Spain many years later. Schurz, Koerner,

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[22]Edward Wheelwright, The Class of 1844, Harvard College: Fifty Years After Graduation (Cambridge, Massachusetts: John Wilson and Son, 1896), pp. 177-178; A. A. Ettinger, The Mission to Spain of Pierre Soulé, 1853-1855: A Study in the Cuban Diplomacy of the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), pp. 468-470.

Benjamin Moran, the second secretary of the American legation in London, and in fact all who came into contact with Perry during the war commented on his fitness for the job. Perry filled the vacancy existing in Madrid between Preston's departure and Schurz's arrival.[23]

Schurz was a prominent German-born American who had been active in Lincoln's campaign for the Presidency in 1860. As a matter of course, he expected a ministerial appointment to a European capital. Italy was Schurz's first choice because he felt his liberalism would be a valuable asset to him there. In February, 1861, he heard rumors that he would be sent to Sardinia. On March 28, 1861, however, Schurz unofficially learned of his proposed appointment to Madrid as Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary. Flushed with enthuaisam, he wrote his wife that after Mexico "Spain is the most important diplomatic post--and it is mine." Seward apparently had difficulty placing men in ministerial positions who were acceptable to the governments concerned. Seward was in favor of native-born Americans serving their country overseas; he knew that Schurz's radical views on slavery and his revolutionary background might combine to make him unacceptable in Madrid. Being aware of the possible difficulties of serving in such a nation as Spain, Schurz asked the Spanish Minister, Tassara, about the feelings of the

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[23]Sumner's role is disclosed in Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner (4 vols., Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1893), IV, pp. 14, 27; favorable comments about Perry are to be found in Schurz, Reminiscences, II, pp. 229, 254-255, and in Koerner to Seward, November 6, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 886; Koerner, Memoirs, II, pp. 258-259, said Perry's faults included a yen for the sensational and a tendency to procrastinate; Sarah Agnew Wallace and Frances Edna Gillespie, (eds.), The Journal of Benjamin Moran, 1857-1865 (2 vols., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), II, pp. 840, 974. Moran found Perry a laggard at first but later thought him "educated. . . gentlemanly, and much better qualified than the present minister [Koerner] for the post at Madrid." ibid., p. 1176.

Spanish Government regarding his appointment. Tassara assured him that Spain fully accepted him. Secretary Seward wired Schurz on April 27, 1861, that he was the new minister to Spain at a salary of $12,000 per year plus an $800 annual contingency fund.[24]

A fortnight before Schurz was officially notified of his selection, Fort Sumter had been fired upon. Schurz immediately plunged into the task of raising a regiment of Germans from New York for service in the war. Meeting Lincoln, he told him that he felt his place was in the volunteer armies of America. The President, however, told Schurz his position in Spain was more important. Consequently Schurz departed for Madrid, stopping en route in London where he impressed Moran as an individual who "will represent us both to his own and our credit."[25] Shortly thereafter, Schurz's enthusiasm had waned after contemplating the glory to be won on the battlefield as compared to the quiescence of the Spanish legation, and he wrote his brother-in-law how distasteful he

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[24] On Schurz's appointment see Joseph Schafer, (ed.), Intimate Letters of Carl Schurz, 1841-1869 (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1928), pp. 211-212, 250-253; Frederic Bancroft, (ed.), Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz (6 vols., New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913), I, pp. 172-176, 180, hereinafter cited as Speeches of Carl Schurz; Roy P. Basler, (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (8 vols., New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1953), IV, pp. 280-281; Barbara Donner, "Carl Schurz as Office Seeker," Wisconsin Magazine of History, XX (December, 1936), pp. 129, 132-133, 137, 139; Schurz, Reminiscences, II, pp. 221-222; Seward to Schurz, April 27, 1861, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives; on Schurz's military plans, consult Dumas Malone, Allen Johnson, Harris Starr, and R. L. Schuyler, (eds.), Dictionary of American Biography (22 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-1958), XVI, p. 467.

[25] Journal of Benjamin Moran, II, p. 833.

thought the diplomatic routine would be.[26]

For the remainder of his tenure in Spain, Schurz constantly thought of the military situation in America. Even though the ceremony in which he presented his credentials to the Queen went correctly, and despite the fact that he had assuaged the fears of Spaniards who remembered Soulé, Schurz stubbornly refused to be sidetracked from his desire to return to America. He spoke of his passionate desire to fight for America and escape the "hateful business" of explaining away such events as Bull Run. Madrid was a "dull place" to Schurz. Even after Seward wrote him of the important job he was doing in Spain, Schurz continued his agitation to be recalled to the United States.[27]

Despite his desire to return home, Schurz did not serve idly in Madrid. He was very influential in Spanish liberal circles; the liberal press, due in no small part to Schurz's efforts, fully embraced the Union cause. In order to win the sympathy of large segments of the European population, Schurz sought to impress upon Seward the importance of emphasizing emancipation of slaves as a moral cause. Because Seward, in a position to be a better judge of domestic events, refused to accept

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[26]Bancroft, Speeches of Carl Schurz, I, p. 182.

[27]For Schurz's reception see Perry to Seward, July 14, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; indications of Schurz's desire to leave Spain are to be found in Schurz to Seward, August 6, 1861, ibid.; Schafer, (ed.), Intimate Letters of Carl Schurz, pp. 262-266; Bancroft, Speeches of Carl Schurz, I, pp. 183-184, 193-195; Seward's appeal to Schurz is in Seward to Schurz, September 3, 1861, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives; Donner, "Carl Schurz the Diplomat," Wisconsin Magazine of History, XX (1937), p. 305, quotes Perry's writing to Sumner: "The contest at home absorbs his whole soul . . . he must go home or he will be seriously ill. His brain and his great heart will be too much for his body unless their force can be sent outside himself into the struggle for America at least for a time."

Schurz's slavery solution, Schurz finally determined to return home through resignation or leave of absence. Returning from Spain in January, 1862, Schurz resigned as minister in April, 1862, to enter the army and put to use the military tactics he had been studying privately while in Madrid.[28]

To succeed Schurz, Lincoln nominated Koerner who like Schurz had worked for the Republican ticket in 1860. Koerner had been approached in February, 1862, by Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois and intimated his intention of accepting the Madrid post. It was not until June, 1862, that Koerner's nomination was confirmed by the Senate. Worried by the possible expense of his new post, Koerner inquired if N. B. Judd, American Minister to Berlin, would be interested in exchanging places with him. Judd refused and Koerner set out on a leisurely journey to Spain via Germany. Only toward the middle of October, 1862, did he arrive in Madrid. Four months later Koerner asked Seward to grant him a leave of absence because of a nervous affliction and the harshness of Madrid's climate. Receiving no satisfactory answer, Koerner thereafter repeated his request. In response Seward appealed to Koerner's patriotism and asked him to reconsider his appeal since the United States was at the climax of the rebellion, but all of Seward's pleading could not dissuade Koerner. Besides bad health and Madrid's climate, the increasingly

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[28]Schurz's influence on the liberals is treated in ibid., pp. 299, 309; Pratt, "Spanish Opinion of the North American Civil War," Hispanic American Historical Review, X (1930), p. 18; Schurz's ideas about the importance of slavery are in Bancroft, Speeches of Carl Schurz, I, pp. 195-199; Donner, "Carl Schurz the Diplomat," Wisconsin Magazine of History, XX (1937), pp. 302-304; on Schurz's leaving see Schafer, Intimate Letters of Carl Schurz, p. 266, and Dictionary of American Biography, XVI, p. 467; Schurz's Reminiscences, II, p. 274, reveals his study of tactics.

unhappy Koerner now claimed his salary was inadequate and he wished to return to private business. Faced with Koerner's implacable dissatisfaction, Seward acquiesced and Koerner was permitted to leave Madrid on July 20, 1864. His resignation, however, was not effective until January 1, 1865.[29]

After Koerner's departure, Perry acted again as interim minister for the United States. Toward the end of the war, John P. Hale, an "old hack" in the eyes of Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, was named Minister to Spain.[30] He arrived after the war was over.

Seward did not give any indication of being overly concerned with Spain during the war years. The essential fact was that Seward recognized Spain as a secondary theater in comparison with Britain and France. It is unfortunate, however, that in view of Spain's record of unstable conditions, more devoted American diplomats were not sent to Madrid to provide a more coherent and accurate interpretation of events in Spain. Lack of personal interest in the affairs of the legation, dissatisfaction with their appointments, and unfamiliarity with the language and culture of Spain characterized the chief American envoys of the 1861-1865 period. But given the politics and circumstances of the time, what more could be expected?

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[29]Dictionary of American Biography, X, p. 496; Basler, (ed.), Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, V, pp. 100, 383; Koerner, Memoirs, II, pp. 211-212, 224-227, 246, 256, 290-291, 403, 407, 419, 438, deal with Koerner's nomination and reaction and relief; Koerner's attempts to obtain leave are covered in Koerner to Seward, February 22, 1863, and April 29, 1864, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Seward's plea is in Seward to Koerner, April 17, 1864, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives.

[30]Howard K. Beale, (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles (3 vols., New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1960), II, p. 255.

CHAPTER II

THE QUESTION OF CONFEDERATE RECOGNITION

As the situation in America darkened following the election of Lincoln in November, 1860, the Buchanan administration took a positive step to hinder the seceding states' attempts to form a union. Should a Confederate representative arrive in Madrid, Secretary of State J. S. Black instructed Preston to use his own judgment in selecting methods to thwart official Spanish recognition of the seceded states.[1]

Upon assuming office in March, 1861, Seward, the new Secretary of State, expanded the original instruction by suggesting that Preston advance the argument that an independent Confederacy would be an obvious threat to Spain's New World possessions. Special emphasis was put on the danger to Cuba. In stressing Cuba's significance, Seward was merely continuing a policy, the non-transfer of the island of Cuba, long supported by the political parties and people of the United States. In implementing their orders, Schurz, Perry, and Koerner, the American representatives in Spain, repeatedly alluded to the same themes: Spain's colonies could be jeopardized should an independent Confederacy come into existence; Southerners and Southern-dominated politicians of the 1850's were instigators of the drive to acquire Cuba. Indeed, it was the result of the opposition of the free states to the acquisition of

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[1]Black to Preston, February 28, 1861, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives.

new slave territories like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Kansas, that led the South to revolt. That same slave-supporting opposition now sought independence from the Union in order to be in a position to gain territories the remainder of the United States had previously prevented it from acquiring. After the Emancipation Proclamation in January, 1863, Seward observed the illogical nature of the policy of the United States to seek additional slave lands at the same time that it was eradicating the institution of slavery.[2]

When Pierre Rost, a Confederate agent in Europe, met Spanish Foreign Minister Collantes early in 1862, he did not avoid the issue of the South's old desire for Cuba. Anticipating Collantes' doubts, he told the Spaniard that both sections had been equally greedy and explained the advantages each section had expected to gain: the South had hoped to even the balance of power in the Senate, while the North had expected to receive trade benefits. Rost's statements were accurate.

The March, 1862, issue of the Atlantic Monthly noted that both North and South coveted Cuba. The drive for annexation of the island had long been a favorite contrivance of those interested in diverting the attention of the American people away from the widening strife of

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[2]Howard C. Perkins, (ed.), Northern Editorials on Secession (2 vols., New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942), II, p. 817, quotes from the New York World on America's past policy toward Cuba; the main themes of American officials on the danger to Cuba are in Seward to Perry, April 27, 1861, Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, 1861 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1862), p. 259; Perry to Seward, June 13, 1861, ibid., p. 261; Seward to Perry, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, September 3, 1863, pp. 906-907; Seward to Perry, April 15, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, pp. 493-494; Pratt, "Spanish Opinion of the North American Civil War," Hispanic American Historical Review, X (1930), p. 16; James Morton Callahan, Cuba and International Relations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1899), pp. 331-333, 338-339; Schurz, Reminiscences, II, p. 253; F. W. Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, (3 vols., New York: Derby and Miller, 1891), II, p. 638, III, p. 69.

the 1850's, and the proposal for Cuban acquisition had been advanced in the name of all Americans. Previously the abolitionist National Era had also declared in favor of acquiring Cuba, arguing that the United States would profit economically while Cuba would benefit through abolition of the slave trade. The major trade cities of New York and New Orleans had displayed considerable interest in the destiny of the island, and politicians had reflected the national interest in the fate of Cuba.[3] Thus the Democratic platform of 1860 had contained a plank favorable to procurement of the Spanish colony. In the Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858, Lincoln had stated the general American opinion when he said, "The time may come, indeed has now come, when our interests would be advanced by the acquisition of the island of Cuba. When we get Cuba we must take it as we find it."[4] Judging from the evidence, it appears Seward's point of emphasis on Cuba was well taken by the Spanish. Confederate attempts to win recognition by promising to respect Cuban integrity pleased Spain, but did not facilitate recognition.[5]

Besides stressing the threat to Spain's colonies in the Western

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[3]Atlantic Monthly, IX (March, 1862), pp. 362-363; Harper's New Monthly Magazine, XXV (1862), p. 262. For a more detailed account of American interest in Cuba consult Basil Rauch, American Interest in Cuba, 1848-1855 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 185, 191-192, 207-208; Horace Greeley, The American Conflict: A History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America, 1860-1864 (Hartford: O. D. Case and Company, 1864), p. 278, brings up the past Democratic interest in Cuba.

[4]Basler, (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, III, p. 115.

[5]Toombs to Helm, July 22, 1861, in James D. Richardson, A Compliation of the Messages and Papers of the Confederacy (2 vols., Nashville: United States Publishing Company, 1905), II, pp. 47-48; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, pp. 335-337, 345; Perry to Seward, July 31, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

Hemisphere, Seward and the American representatives in Madrid appealed to Spain's self-interest. Ultimately this was to become the prime factor in the evolution of Spain's policy toward the United States and the Confederacy. Meanwhile, United States officials marshalled a series of arguments designed to align Spain safely on their side.

As previously noted, Seward's initial dispatch ordered Schurz to seek to prevent the reception of any Confederate agents in Madrid. The minister was to stress how unequal Spain and the Southern states were in terms of goods produced. Chargé d'Affairs Perry denied that the rebellion was the true sentiment of the majority of southern citizens. Actually, he claimed, the rebellion had been engineered by the large slave holders who constituted a small minority of the population. Though never in an open admission, Perry implied that two could play the revolutionary game. He hinted that Spain's colonies were not immune from rebellion and mused about the consequences of recognition being granted the rebels by a third power. Perry was well aware that Spain's history was replete with examples of insurrections which sundered the will and energies of the Spanish people. As recently as the 1830's the rival royalist faction called Carlists had succeeded in winning control of considerable Spanish territory. Union diplomats were quick to compare that episode with their own internal eruption. Another important point advanced by Perry was that the overwhelming resources of the Union were certain to prevail in the end. Since it was impossible for the rebellious states to win independence, Perry argued, the issue of recognition actually was nonexistent.

As a result of his skillful exposition of the Union cause and the apparent advantages to be reaped by not interfering in what was clearly a domestic affair, Perry was able to report to Seward that the Spanish

Government had assured him that recognition would not be immediately extended to the Confederacy. Slightly more than one month later, on July 15, 1861, Schurz wrote Seward that no Confederate emissaries had appeared in Madrid. The reason for their absence could be found in a letter written that same day from Confederate agents W. L. Yancey and A. Dudley Mann in London to their superiors in Richmond. The note explained that while Spain and other lesser European powers held friendly feeling for the Confederacy, the critical decision for recognition would have to emanate from the major powers in London or Paris.[6]

The results of Perry's efforts in Madrid were embodied in the proclamation of neutrality signed by Isabella II on June 17, 1861. While a conversation with Collantes on June 13 had led Perry to expect a stronger statement, the proclamation was not as disappointing as other European declarations. For example, supplies could not be furnished to privateers, but warships could be outfitted to engage in operations against the vessels of the party issuing letters of marque.[7] Thus Perry wrote Seward, "If the position it /Spain's/ assumes is not all that could be desired, I beg you to consider that after the examples of England and France it is all that could be expected."[8] At the time of the 1868

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[6]Seward to Schurz, April 27, 1861, Foreign Affairs, 1861, p. 259; Perry to Seward, June 13, 1861, ibid., pp. 261-263; Schurz to Seward, July 15, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Yancey and Mann to Toombs, July 15, 1861, Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, II, pp. 42-43; Preston had arrived at the same conclusion as Yancey and Mann in Preston to Seward, May 25, 1861, Foreign Affairs, 1861, p. 260; Perry wrote Seward that Spain would keep the question of recognition of the Confederacy open to be settled only as circumstances /i.e., the policies of Britain and France/ developed, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[7]The Royal Decree is transmitted in ibid., June 19, 1861.

[8]Ibid., June 17, 1861.

Cuban insurrection, Spain's royal decree was to be remembered by President U. S. Grant as an unfriendly act, but the initial American response was just the opposite. Minister Schurz expressed America's gratification at Spain's action in a note to Collantes. In America Seward told Spanish Minister Tassara that the United States wished to continue to be Spain's close friend. In an article, Harper's New Monthly Magazine concluded by stating Isabella II was set in her decision to uphold strict neutrality.[9]

Harper's estimate of Spanish intentions remained accurate for the remainder of 1861. Spain undertook no actions of a nature to incite United States' fears concerning recognition of the Confederacy. Seward became confident enough of the domestic situation to write Perry instructions to inform Collantes the

> Government of the United States is not to be misunderstood as fearing to encounter the intervention of Spain in favor of the insurgents of this country if Her Catholic Majesty's sentiment and purposes have been misconstrued. We are aware, we think, of all the perils of our situation, and have not overlooked the not unnatural one of foreign alliances with our disloyal citizens.[10]

Even though Collantes made it clear that Spain did not plan to recognize the Confederacy, when in discussion with him Schurz never missed a chance to emphasize any act implying that recognition of the Confederacy would lead to a split in Spanish-American diplomatic relations.[11]

The stern tones of Seward and Schurz were modified somewhat when

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[9]For Schurz's expression to Collantes, July 31, 1861, see Foreign Affairs, 1861, pp. 270-271; Seward's announcement to Tassara is in Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, pp. 299-300; Harper's New Monthly Magazine, XXIII (1861), p. 406.

[10]Seward to Schurz, September 18, 1861, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives.

[11]Schurz to Seward, October 9 and October 26, 1861, Foreign Affairs, 1861, pp. 284-285, 287.

Seward's son, Frederick, wrote Schurz that the United States was too involved in suppression of the rebellion to become involved in foreign disputes. The younger Seward's sentiments collated fully with the reticent O'Donnell's desire to remain on a friendly course with the United States. Accordingly, in the immediate wake of the Trent affair, Perry assured Seward that Spain would remain neutral in the event of war with Britain.[12]

Apparently Spanish policy concerning the recognition question changed with the opening of 1862. The prospect of extended war in America, plus Spanish conceit resulting from successfully resolving difficulties in Santo Domingo and to a lesser extent in Mexico, coupled with the opportunistic nature of Prime Minister O'Donnell, contributed to this change in point of view. Perry continued to receive assurances of Spain's intentions to remain loyal, but he suspected the Spanish Government was considering more strongly the recognition of the Confederacy. Perry's pessimistic impressions were reflected by Seward who admitted that a nation which indulged in civil war eventually had to expect intervention and possible conquest by foreign powers. Thus, despite the assurances of non-recognition given by the Spanish diplomats and the widely held opinion that France and Britain had to initiate action, Confederate hopes were fairly high as Rost set out for Madrid from Paris in early 1862.[13]

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[12]Seward's message is in F. W. Seward to Schurz, Foreign Affairs, 1861, pp. 288-289; O'Donnell's assurances to Schurz are contained in Schurz to Seward, November 9, 1861, Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 478; assurances regarding the Trent affair are in Perry to Seward, December 29, 1861, ibid., p. 482.

[13]Perry's expression of fear regarding Spanish change is in Perry to Seward, January 4, 1862, Dispatches from the United States Ministers

Rost was under orders to secure recognition based on mutual acknowledgment of the similarity between the Spanish and Southern social system and Cuba's propinquity to the gulf states of the Confederacy. He was to attempt to remove the stigma of the revolutionary label by stating that the South was in revolt against the Union because the latter had broken the compact that previously had bound the states together. The compact theory of government, Rost was to explain, was a voluntary association of the several states for the benefit of all. Should one section assert itself to the detriment of another, the injured states possessed the right to choose to disassociate themselves from the union if their interests could not be protected in any other way. The Federal Union was not a perpetual thing, for membership was voluntary, and severance of association was equally left at the discretion of the states.

Unfortunately for Rost and the Confederate cause, news of General Grant's Tennessee victories had preceded his arrival in Madrid. Nevertheless, Collantes met Rost, and the Southerner smoothly constructed his case for recognition of his government. First, he analyzed, two powers would be present on the North American continent: first, one would be free from the "puritan fanaticism" that so annoyed Catholic Spain, and, second, the Confederacy was Spain's natural ally with its similarity of social structure. Finally, Rost tried to soothe Spanish fears for Cuba

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to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Seward's sentiments are in Seward to Perry, February 22, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, pp. 469-470; the belief for the necessity of Franco-British action first may be found in Schurz, Reminiscences, II, p. 275; Pratt, "Spanish Opinion of the North American Civil War," Hispanic American Historical Review, X (1930), p. 15; Rost to Jefferson Davis, December 24, 1861, Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, II, p. 134; Charles Helm wrote to Confederate Secretary of State R. M. T. Hunter that Cuba's Captain-General Francisco Serrano felt recognition by Britain, France, and Spain to be forthcoming within sixty days, Helm to Hunter, January 17, 1862, ibid., p. 152.

by pointing out the universal American interest in the island and promising that an independent Confederacy would not look greedily upon the Spanish colony, especially if Spanish recognition was granted to the Richmond government.[14]

Rost's discussion with Collantes led nowhere. The Spaniard told the Southerner that his nation would not take the lead in recognizing the Confederacy until Britain and France had dealt with the blockade of Southern ports. Spain was not going to risk herself before Britain and France had entered the fracas. The discouraged Rost eventually left Madrid and some weeks later returned to Richmond, convinced that recognition would be granted the Confederacy only after a victorious conclusion of the war she was waging.[15]

While Rost visited Madrid, the Atlantic Monthly speculated on the

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[14]Pratt, "Spanish Opinion of the North American Civil War," Hispanic American Historical Review, X (1930), p. 16, discloses Rost's instructions; M. D. Crugat to Confederate Secretary of the Navy S. R. Mallory, March 24, 1861, Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, II, pp. 11-12, 72, states his belief that Spain would be the South's warmest friend in Europe, because of the similarity of institutions; Rost's visit to Madrid was known fully by Perry who was telegraphed by Minister Dayton in Paris about Rost's departure, Perry to Seward, March 8, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 483; Collantes had told Perry any conference with Confederate agents would be the same as recognizing the independency of the Confederacy, Perry to Seward, December 28, 1861, ibid., pp. 481-482; it must be stated, however, that Collantes notified Perry that Rost, living in Madrid as a "private citizen," was trying to see him. He told Rost he would see him only as a "distinguished foreigner," Perry to Seward, May 3, 1862, ibid., p. 494; Rost's presentation of the Confederacy's cause is in Rost to Benjamin, March 24, 1862, Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, II, pp. 202-204; Harper's New Monthly Magazine, XXV (1862), p. 262.

[15]Rost to Benjamin, March 21, 1862, in Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, II, pp. 205-206, includes Rost's impressions of what Spain would do; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, p. 337; Pratt, "Spanish Opinion of the North American Civil War," Hispanic American Historical Review, X (1930), p. 17; Harper's New Monthly Magazine, XXV (1862), p. 262.

probable existence of an agreement among Spain, France, and Britain to aid the Confederacy if United States power declined. Such an accord did not exist, however. Perry continued to reiterate his statements condemning the Confederacy and emphasizing the advantages Spain would receive from a preserved Union. Collantes grew bold enough to state that he considered the United States "overbearing and aggressive" and guilty of paying very little attention to the rights of other nations. But in the same discussion he informed Perry that he believed the Confederacy's cause was doomed.[16]

Seward certainly agreed with Collantes' conclusions; in fact, he informed Perry of his belief that the war would not enter a third year. Thus the remainder of 1862 found Spanish-American relations unchanged. Seward told Tassara, the Spanish minister in Washington, of his desire to see Spanish-American relations remain cordial. In Madrid, Collantes emphasized Spain's similar desire to continue good relations. When Koerner, the newly arrived American minister to Madrid, inquired about instructions for his new post, Seward promptly told him to consult Schurz's old instructions on file at the legation because circumstances still rendered them valid. Seward's confidence stemmed from his belief in the inability of the Confederacy to prosecute the war much longer, in addition to the belief that once again Europe's intramural squabbles would produce a crisis that would monopolize the attention of its governments, thus freeing America from the sometimes troublesome Continental interest. Moreover, the United States was becoming stronger with

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[16] Atlantic Monthly, IX (1862), p. 364; Perry to Collantes, March 22, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 491; Perry to Seward, March 30, 1862, ibid., pp. 488-490; Perry to Seward, July 7, 1862, ibid., p. 508.

the passage of time. He concluded that no European nation could recognize the Confederacy without fear of punitive action by the United States.[17]

The Confederacy resolved to make one more attempt to win official Spanish support. In April, 1862, the Confederate Senate approved a resolution empowering Confederate emissaries to draw up treaties with Britain, France, and Spain. Rost remained quite pessimistic concerning helpful action on the part of Spain. But Confederate Secretary of State Benjamin authorized John Slidell of Trent fame to proceed to Madrid from Paris to uncover further Spanish intentions. In Slidell's instructions Benjamin hinted that Slidell should appeal to the vanity of the Spaniards: if Spain really wished to be a first-rank power, she must take the initiative and recognize the South. Any chance for Slidell to be successful was crushed when the O'Donnell regime collapsed and threw Spain into a succession of weak governments. In fact, Slidell did not even bother to journey to Madrid but simply reduced his activities to a single discussion with Xavier Isturiz, the Francophile Spanish ambassador to the court of Napoleon III in Paris.[18]

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[17]Seward to Tassara, September 9, 1862, ibid., p. 527; Koerner to Seward, November 6, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, p. 885; Seward's directions about instructions are in Seward to Koerner, August 18, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 274; Koerner, Memoirs, II, p. 230; for Seward's belief in a short war, consult Seward to Perry, April 22, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 470; Seward's growing confidence is reflected in Seward to Koerner, August 25, 1862, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives; see also Seward to Koerner, October 21, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, pp. 475-476.

[18]U. S. Senate Document Number 234, 58th Congress, 2nd Session, 1904-1905 (7 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-1905), II, 192-193; Rost to Benjamin, November 28, 1862, Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, II, p. 328; Slidell's instructions are in Benjamin to Slidell, March 26, 1863, and May 9, 1863, ibid., pp. 463-466, 482-484; the collapse of the O'Donnell regime and the

Slidell spared himself a fruitless trip because O'Donnell's regime was replaced by a caretaker government headed by the Marquis of Miraflores. On occasions when he met the Marquis, Koerner found it necessary to spend time modifying the Spaniard's vast ignorance about America. An elderly, indecisive man, the Marquis did not enjoy full obedience from his subordinates. Perry's attention was thus caught by the activities of one such subordinate, General Juan Concha, the Minister of War and Colonies, who obviously was scheming to install a pro-Confederate policy. Concha believed Spain's importance could be restored by unilateral Spanish recognition of the Confederacy. Then a joint Spanish-French-Confederate coalition could be formed to prevent any further expansion by the Anglo-Saxons. The machinations of General Concha collapsed upon the arrival of the news of the Union's great victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. The question of Spanish recognition of the Confederacy was now solved, Perry believed. In early August, 1863, Perry and his Spanish-born wife were received in an audience by Isabella II and her husband, Francisco de Bourbon. Isabella and her husband immediately launched a conversation in which they said they "always" believed in Union victory.[19]

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consequences are in Slidell to Benjamin, May 28, 1863, ibid., pp. 493-494; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, p. 346: Koerner to Seward, March 1, 1863, Dispatches to the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[19]Koerner's impressions of Miraflores are in Koerner to Seward, April 11, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, pp. 896-897; conscious plotting is disclosed in Perry to Seward, July 25, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; the effect of Vicksburg and Gettysburg is recorded in Perry to Seward, July 29, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, p. 903; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, pp. 346-347; Isabella's friendly greeting is recorded in Perry to Seward, August 2, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

During the last half of 1863 a major remaining task for Koerner and Perry was to counteract the pro-French faction General Concha exemplified in Spanish politics. The danger of unilateral Spanish recognition of the Confederacy being past, Perry and Koerner worked to counter the influence and intrigues of Spanish factions who wished their country to follow the lead of France in the recognition question. Collantes even told Perry that the threat of Confederate recognition by France could be used to keep the United States in line. Perry actually acknowledged that policy would be followed by Spain. In reply to Perry's worries, Seward indicated the belief he shared with Lincoln in continued Spanish-American friendship, but emphasized that Spain would be the power to suffer the most if she allowed herself to be seduced by any alluring plot directed against the United States. Seward apparently thought Spain was more likely to follow Britain than France.

Meanwhile, Koerner continued to report his theory that France was seeking to provoke Spain into action first in regard to the Confederacy. When Napoleon III and his Spanish-born wife, Eugénie, personally visited Spain, Koerner concluded that it was to seek cooperation. The minister, however, overlooked the fact that multitudes of Spaniards had harbored little love for France since Napoleon I had struggled to conquer their peninsula in the years from 1808 to 1814. French attempts to win Spain to its ways were doomed to end in failure because of France's own actions of an earlier day.[20]

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[20]Perry's fears about French influence are in Perry to Seward, July 7, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 508; Perry to Seward, July 12, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Seward's ideas about Spain are in Seward to Perry, August 10, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, pp. 904-905; Seward's belief that Spain would follow Britain's lead is in Beale, (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles, I, p. 399; Koerner's reports on Napoleon III's visit

The year 1864 was completely devoid of any attempts by the sinking Confederacy to win Spanish support. Similarly, French influence declined greatly. As the war in the United States drew to a close, Perry tried to win Spain to a policy of withdrawal of the 1861 decree on neutrality and therefore an implied statement of confidence in the United States. Such a course, Perry claimed, would enable the Iberians to improve Spanish-American relations and refute the argument of those who complained that Spain acted only in the wake of Britain and France. Despite promises to study Perry's proposals, the Spanish waited until June, 1865, four years from its issuance, to withdraw their decree of neutrality.[21]

Spain did not recognize the Confederacy because she lacked the essential ingredients to enforce the consequences of such a step. Initially, with O'Donnell at the helm, the Spaniards wished to take advantage of the Union's distress. The bitter realization that Spain was but a second or even third-rank power prevented such a step. Any chance of Franco-Spanish cooperation in recognition was destined to fail because of the antipathy of Spaniards for the French and Napoleon III's personal hesitancy. A host of other factors entered the situation: the rising strength of the United States, the physical distances involved, the memory of the filibustering expeditions against Cuba, and

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and his attempt to seek Spain's "co-operation" as well as the coldness of his reception are in Koerner to Seward, September 20, 1863, October 11, 1863, and November 1, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[21]Perry to Seward, March 11, 1865, Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, 1865 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1866), II, pp. 515-516; Seward to Perry, April 4, 1865, ibid., p. 521; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, pp. 351-352; announcement of the withdrawal of the June, 1861, decree is in Perry to Seward, June 5, 1865, Foreign Affairs, 1865, II, p. 540.

the instability of the Spanish political structure after the fall of the O'Donnell government in early 1863. Spain thus missed her golden chance to be a decisive factor in the American Civil War due to her own inherent shortcomings.

CHAPTER III

CUBA IN SPANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

Despite their careful attempts to show that the cry for Cuba emanated solely from the Confederate states, United States diplomats in Madrid discovered the influential classes of Spain were singularly unmoved by such assurances. Wealthy Spaniards were haunted by the spectre, Perry emphasized, of the "United States surrounding the Gulf of Mexico from Florida to Yucatan and then quietly drawing into the open jaws of that great serpent their fascinated and powerless island of Cuba without effort and without defense."[1] Faced with the dilemma of selecting the lesser evil, the Spanish chose to remain inert. In effect, they tacitly adopted a policy oriented toward the Union, regardless of the consequences to Cuba.

In Cuba itself the ruling elements appeared to have no worries concerning their island's future should the Confederacy emerge victorious. Without exception, Confederates visiting briefly in Cuba were hospitably entertained and often reported on the friendliness felt by the Cuban people for the South. For instance, Special Agent James M. Mason, waiting on the island to board the Trent for Europe, noted the widespread Cuban sympathy which ranged from the Captain General, Francisco Serrano, down to ordinary citizens. After an interview with

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[1]Perry to Seward, April 17, 1862, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

Serrano, Confederate agent Charles Helm reported Serrano had granted him permission to come and go as he pleased. For a number of reasons, Serrano later expressed deep regret to Helm that Spain could not take the lead in recognition of the Confederacy. The Confederacy retained this warm attitude until the conclusion of the war.

Cuba's special feeling for the Confederacy may be traced to a number of factors. First, slavery existed in Cuba, thereby creating a social structure akin to that of the ante-bellum South. Second, Cubans were highly provoked by incidents in Cuban waters involving Union vessels. Third, human nature then, as always, tended to favor the underdog in its struggle with a vastly stronger foe. Finally, Cuba and the South had enjoyed close pre-war economic ties.[2]

Given the sympathy in Cuba for the Confederacy, it is not surprising that Serrano opened Cuban ports to vessels flying the Confederate flag. The decision was so predictable that the United States vice-consul in Havana, Thomas Savage, did not even bother to protest it. It was just as well that Savage remained quiet. Spain's policy was well expressed by Foreign Minister Collantes who told Minister Schurz in

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[2]Admiral Semmes of Alabama fame knew of the sympathy Cubans felt for the Confederacy. However, he attributed Spain's responsiveness to the United States to the nearness of Cuba to the United States. See U. S. Department of the Navy, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion (30 vols. and index, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894-1927), Series II, Vol. II, p. 140; Mason's friendly treatment is reported in Virginia Mason, The Public Life and Diplomatic Correspondence of James M. Mason (New York and Washington: The Neale Publishing Company, 1906), pp. 202-203; Helm to R. M. T. Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State, November 8, 1861, Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, II, pp. 112-113, contains Serrano's friendly instructions to Helm; Helm to Hunter, December 12, 1861, ibid., pp. 124-125, has Serrano's regrets for Spain's not being able to take the lead in recognizing the Confederacy; Koerner, Memoirs, II, p. 291, mentions possible reasons for Cuban sympathy for the Confederacy.

Madrid that Spain would follow her own commercial interests and, if the United States was not happy as it watched Southern shipping in Spain's ports, all it had to do was enforce its blockade. Moreover, Collantes stressed that trading with the Confederacy did not imply recognition. Accordingly Cuba became a convenient entrepot for the Confederacy.[3]

Because Cuba developed into such an important Confederate-oriented trading area, numerous incidents took place in and around its waters. Though the problems were always easily solved, Schurz found that the sheer numbers of them occupied a large part of his time. Finding themselves to be in control of a popular rendezvous point for blockade runners, the Spanish government became highly sensitive to any interferences with ships or individuals under their jurisdiction. The amazing fact was that the United States, though well aware of Cuba's importance to the Confederacy, tolerated its continued intercourse with the South via blockade runners.[4] Early in the war Seward told Schurz, who in turn relayed the information to Collantes, that the United States could not remain idle while Cuba was turned into a "lever for overthrowing either this Union or its institutions of human freedom and

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[3]Helm to Hunter, November 8, 1861, Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, II, p. 111; Savage's apathy is in Savage to Seward, September 6, 1861, Foreign Affairs, 1861, pp. 275-276; Spain's policy is stated in "Memorandum of a conversation between Schurz and Calderon Collantes," October 16, 1861, ibid., pp. 286-287; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, pp. 333-334, 337-338; see also Serrano's answer to Consul-General Savage in the cases of the Allan A. Chapman and Bamberg in Serrano to Savage, September 20, 1861, Foreign Affairs, 1861, pp. 282-283.

[4]Schurz, Reminiscences, II, p. 287; F. W. Seward, Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and Diplomat, 1830-1915 (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916), p. 213, reveals Seward's awareness of what was going on in Cuba.

self-government."[5] But only on that single instance was such a warning issued. The only reason Seward apparently did not issue an ultimatum inspired by Cuba's role seems to be his hope that the ever tightening Union blockade would preclude the necessity of such a drastic step.

Pursuing the suspected blockade runner Blanche, the United States Navy warship Montgomery violated Cuba's maritime boundaries. In the wake of the affair the privilege of United States ships to communicate with the United States consul on shore in Havana was revoked. The United States first appealed to Spain to relax this restriction in December, 1862. The question was thrown into confusion, however, when the Confederate commerce raider Florida was allowed in Havana harbor after destroying a Union vessel. The Florida shipped out of Havana while a Northern vessel was refused admission to the harbor. About this same time another vessel, the Reaney, communicated with the United States warship Oneida in Havana harbor. Shortly thereafter she was halted by a Spanish ship which fired a shot across her bow. Then, a month later near the end of February, 1863, Spain announced the lifting of the ban against American ships communicating with the consul on shore. But in the diplomatic flurry over the Florida and the Reaney, nothing actually was done to remove the restriction. Thus notes were exchanged in which the new Spanish Foreign Minister Serrano smugly expressed tacit surprise over the happenings in Cuba. Seward found such naivete difficult to believe. Koerner denounced the firing on the Reaney as "wholly unjustifiable" and sought to show the Reaney in the right. The problem of

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[5]Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, II, p. 638; see also Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, p. 334.

communication between ship and shore in Havana harbor continued to remain unsettled. Finally, in July, 1863, orders were sent to Cuba's Captain-General Domingo Dulce to revoke the prohibition against American ships.[6] The Blanche affair, the Florida, and the Reaney incidents pointed to the sensitivity of which the State Department was well aware and led to the most bizarre episode involving Cuba's coastal limits.

Tassara initially complained to Seward that Cuba's six-mile territorial limits were being violated in May, 1862. Seward retorted that American ships never had been ordered to violate Cuba's waters and such violations would not be sanctioned in the future. In reply Tassara maintained that the close patrol of Cuban waters was really a form of blockade which hurt the commerce of a friendly power. Seward then referred the question of Spain's claim to a six-mile limit to Welles, Lincoln's crusty Secretary of the Navy. Welles proceeded to tear to shreds Tassara's allegations of the necessity for such exaggerated limits. He made it clear to Seward that America's interests were not best served by adherence to Spain's proposal. Seward closed the question for the year 1862 by announcing there would have to be general acceptance among all interested powers before the United States agreed to

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[6] America's request for removal of the prohibition is in Seward to Koerner, December 8, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, p. 888; Seward to Koerner, January 30, 1863, ibid., pp. 889-890, brings up the Florida and Reaney events; Spain's intentions of removing restrictions in February, 1863, are in Seward to Koerner, February 28, 1863, ibid., p. 892; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, p. 344; more correspondence on the Florida and Reaney is in Koerner to Seward, March 1, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, p. 892; Seward to Koerner, March 1, 1863, ibid., p. 893; Koerner to Seward, April 4, 1863, ibid., pp. 894-895; Miraflores to Koerner, April 1, 1863, ibid., pp. 895-896; Koerner to Miraflores, April 10, 1863, ibid., pp. 898-900; Koerner to Seward, May 23, 1863, ibid., p. 900; the announcement to rescind the restrictions is in Perry to Seward, July 11, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

Spain's claims.[7]

The initial two-thirds of 1863 were devoid of any mention of Spain's claim to a six-mile limit for Cuba. Finally on August 10, Seward indicated to Perry that the best policy for the United States was one of continued waiting and watching for Spain to make a move. He added that Spain's claim was unjustifiable and that there was no precedent the Spanish could advance to prove United States' acquiescence in the matter. Before the August 10 note could be delivered to Perry, Tassara advised Seward that if Cuba's coastal limits were not respected, Spain would use her naval strength to enforce them beginning in October, 1863. Seward responded to this virtual ultimatum by stating that the United States regarded the affair to be a question of international law. He then dispatched a message to Perry expressing surprise that Spain would bypass the embassy in Madrid. But he wanted Perry to make clear to the Spaniards the avowal that the United States would defend its rights if attacked. Writing Minister Charles Francis Adams in London three weeks later, Seward took the same forthright stance.[8]

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[7]Tassara to Seward, May 28, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, pp. 518-519, brings up the violation of Cuba's waters; Seward to Tassara, June 2, 1862, ibid., p. 519, contains Seward's rebuttal; Tassara to Seward, July 23, 1862, ibid., p. 523, mentions Tassara's concept that Cuba was, in effect, being blockaded; see also Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, p. 343; Welles' role is shown in Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Series I, Vol. XVII, pp. 249-251; Beale, (ed.), The Diary of Gideon Welles, I, p. 170; John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (8 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), I, pp. 706-709, has Seward's negative answer to Tassara's claims.

[8]Seward's policy is in Seward to Perry, August 10, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, p. 904; Moore, Digest of International Law, I, pp. 710-712, also indicates Seward's policy and Tassara's fears about Spain's intentions of enforcing her claims; Seward's reply is mentioned in Beale, (ed.), The Diary of Gideon Welles, I, pp. 399-400; Seward to Perry, August 14, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, p. 905; notice to Adams in London is in Moore, Digest of International Law, I, p. 712.

The two routes of Spanish policy that emerged in the middle of September, 1863, must have been a source of amazement to Seward. This policy amounted to nothing less than dual diplomacy. Led by General Concha, the pro-French clique in the Spanish government had spotted an opportunity to plunge Spain into a struggle with the United States while the majority of the Spanish people and government remained in a state of ignorance of the scheme. Perry dispatched a record of his first intimations of the duplicity in Spanish policy to Seward on September 10. Seward's assertion that Tassara's claim to unusually broad maritime boundaries was a matter of international law had been efficiently intercepted and buried by the anti-Tassara faction in Madrid. Meanwhile, orders had been sent to Captain-General Dulce in Cuba to begin enforcing the six-mile limit in early October.

Meeting the Prime Minister, the Marquis of Miraflores, on September 12, Perry discovered to his annoyance that Miraflores had never seen Tassara's dispatch communicating Seward's answer to Spain's decision to enforce Cuba's territorial limits. Miraflores immediately accepted Seward's suggestion for arbitration by a third power.[9] An unidentified Spanish clergyman reported the following conversation he had with Miraflores:

> You /Miraflores/ promised that you would not recognize the South, why did you tell the French Ambassador that you would?
>
> It was necessary to deceive him.
>
> Deceit for deceit--who knows whether you deceive Perry or the ambassador?

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[9]Perry to Seward, September 10 and 12, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

> Perry no! Behind Perry is war with the United States, but behind the Ambassador what is there? Yet we are obliged to do something to get along with France.
>
> Well now you provoke a war with the United States on a question of limits and do not choose to settle it as Mr. Seward offers to do.
>
> How? Who told you that? I have seen nothing from Mr. Seward.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> You are carrying Spain into a war with the United States for the interest of slavery.[10]

Fully believing Miraflores to be innocent of any intrigue against the United States, Perry subsequently elaborated on the American position regarding Cuba's limits and clarified for Miraflores' murky mind the finer points of the American argument. Miraflores then announced that Dulce's orders to enforce Cuba's territorial limits had been cancelled. Moreover, Miraflores accepted arbitration of the thorny problem by Leopold I, the King of Belgium.[11]

Thereafter the question of royal arbitration of the issue receded. Perry had led the Spaniards to believe Lincoln could act unilaterally on the matter; Seward emphasized to Tassara that such was an impossibility and informed him that Lincoln would have to consult the Senate if the king was to serve as arbitrator. A deterrent to senatorial approval was Navy Secretary Welles' opinion that the Belgium monarch was

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[10]Perry to Seward, September 13, 1863, ibid. The remainder of the conversation dealt with Concha's role and Miraflores' stating he had sent an order to Dulce cancelling enforcement instructions. The writer feels there is validity in the conversation because the clergy was very opposed to a pro-French, anti-Union policy, and because Miraflores, as all evidence indicates, was ignorant of events. Moreover, General Concha's earlier role in seeking to have Spain unilaterally recognize the Confederacy fits his position in this case.

[11]Perry to Seward, September 15 and 19, 1863, ibid.

not qualified to settle the issue.

The question arose again when Lincoln referred to it in his 1864 annual message to Congress. In the following months, as Spanish governments changed, so did Spanish policy. Tassara was not delegated the authority to negotiate any agreement to bring the Belgian king into the picture. The war ended without the question being submitted for arbitration.[12]

In retrospect, it is clear that Seward and others in the Department of State were aware of the unabashed pro-Confederate, anti-Union sentiments of many Cubans. They were even more aware of Cuba's importance as a merchandise mart for the Confederacy. Seward had the foresight and patience to see that the Union blockade would remove the importance of Cuba as a supply base for the Confederacy.

The problems arising from the six-mile claim for Cuba's territorial limits constituted a more complicated event. Here again Seward realized that time would remove the cause of trouble. On the other hand, the threat of war was real only to the pro-French clique as represented by General Concha. Most of the Spanish citizenry, under the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church, would have refused to participate in any such struggle. That there was a slim possibility of war starting over Cuba reflects its secondary importance in Spanish-American diplomacy.

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[12]The importance of the Senate in the proposed arbitration is in Seward to Koerner, October 8, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, pp. 1-2; Welles' bewilderment is in Beale, (ed.), The Diary of Gideon Welles, I, pp. 467-468; Basler, (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, VII, p. 37, contains Lincoln's reference to arbitration; Tassara's lack of authority is in Seward to Koerner, February 25, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, p. 9; Koerner to Seward, May 15, 1864, ibid., p. 28; the change of governments in Spain is mentioned in Koerner to Seward, June 27, 1864, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Moore, Digest of International Law, I, pp. 712-713, refers to the question having never been submitted for arbitration.

CHAPTER IV

SANTO DOMINGO IN SPANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

In April, 1861, the Kingdom of Spain reincorporated the nation of Santo Domingo into the Spanish Empire. A casual glance at the situation suggests that the Spaniards were treacherously taking advantage of the developing Civil War in the United States to aggrandize their interests. Careful examination of the events for the year preceding the reincorporation provides evidence that the Spanish action had been thought out well in advance. The Civil War merely served as a screen which Spain found convenient to dislodge any opposition to her action.

Santo Domingo, now called the Dominican Republic, shares the island of Hispaniola with the Negro nation of Haiti. Until 1844 it was controlled by the Haitians; that year the Dominicans threw off Haitian control and proclaimed their independence. From the beginning, however, Dominican independence proved a fragile object. Fear of Haiti was rampant, and the dictatorship that appeared reflected Dominican hope for security against its neighbor. Yet even dictators like Pedro Santana, when threatened with Haitian invasion, looked for outside help. Thus, in 1858, Santana appealed to Spain for aid should Haiti strike. While a Spanish reply is not recorded, the Spanish eventually notified the Dominicans that Spain was favorable to the idea of establishing a protectorate over Santo Dominto. By mid-1860, actual plans for a protectorate were being discussed. Secretary of State Lewis Cass was duly informed that Spain was actively seeking to absorb Santo Domingo and that

settlers from Spain and Puerto Rico were arriving in Santo Dominto in increasing numbers.[1]

Despite the information forthcoming from Americans abroad, the Buchanan Administration took no positive steps to thwart Spanish activities in the Caribbean. Perhaps the lack of action can be attributed to the 1860 presidential election and the turmoil within the American nation. Subsequently the entire Dominican question lay dormant until Spain's decision for reincorporation in 1861.

Why was Spain interested in Santo Domingo? Why did she act only as the American nation appeared to be hopelessly divided? There are a number of explanations. The O'Donnell government was not adverse to any movement seeking protection, as numerous Dominicans maintained, especially if such a development would enlarge the Spanish Empire. Moreover, the Spanish masses would be able to see tangible proof that Spain was a power to be reckoned with; hence they would overlook the backwardness of the Spanish state. Spain would be able to exhibit its strength to the wayward nations of Latin America, and Spaniards could explain that Santo Domingo had experienced independence and had found it unworkable. Santo Domingo was unable to cope with its inherent problems, and for protection against Haiti, the Dominicans had to return to their motherland. Spanish prestige thus would climb throughout the Spanish-

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[1]Selden Rodman, Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), pp. 73-74; Charles C. Tansill, The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1938), pp. 211-212; Preston to Cass, October 9, 1860, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Elliot to Cass, October 16, 1860, U.S. Government, Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Nations, 1860 (Washington: George W. Bowman, 1861), I, p. 447.

speaking nations of Latin America.[2]

The Spanish were interested in trying any course to halt the growth of the United States. From the Spanish viewpoint the United States was an octopus whose tentacles were reaching out for ever more land. It was only a matter of time before the United States would again be after Cuba and even Puerto Rico. Understandable, therefore, was the fright of Cuba's Captain-General, Serrano, when he learned of American economic activities on the nearby guano island of Alto Vela. "The Government of Haiti," Serrano wrote, "will acquire the moral and possibly effective support of the United States whose dominion in that territory /Santo Domingo/ would constitute a danger to us."[3] As the Spanish newspaper Cronica blatantly proclaimed, "with this island stretching its right hand to Puerto Rico and its left to Cuba, we commence a new system, giving us the control of the Gulf."[4] With Santo Domingo and its important anchorage at Samaná Bay in its grasp, Spain would frustrate, even if only temporarily, the territorial growth of the United States.[5]

With Spanish settlers entering Santo Domingo throughout 1860 and

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[2]Revue des Deux Mondes, XXXIII (1861), pp. 645, 658-659; Rodman, Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic, p. 70.

[3]The quote is from a letter sent by Serrano to the Minister of War in Madrid, July 4, 1860, David G. Yuengling, Highlights in the Debates in the Spanish Chamber of Deputies Relative to the Abandonment of Santo Domingo (Washington: Murray & Heister, 1941), pp. 2-3; see also Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, p. 283.

[4]Italicized and quoted in Samuel Hazard, Santo Domingo, Past and Present; With a Glance at Hayti (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1873), p. 255.

[5]For evidence of America's interest in Santo Domingo, see Rodman, Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic, p. 74; on Spanish fear that the United States would obtain Samaná Bay, see Rayford W. Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti, 1776-1891 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941), p. 312; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, p. 350.

early 1861, it was merely a matter of time before Spain officially took possession of the land. The Spaniards, cleverly, allowed President Santana the honor of proclaiming the annexation of the island on March 18, 1861. In so doing, they knew Santana's action would help to perpetuate the myth that the wishes of the Dominican people were being fulfilled. Immediately upon receiving news of Santana's act, Serrano embarked Spanish troops to occupy the country, ostensibly at the request of the Dominicans.

Thereafter the Spaniards repeatedly stressed that by their action they were simply fulfilling the wishes of the Dominican citizens. In the opening ceremonies of the Cortes, for instance, Queen Isabella II declared that the "Dominican people, menaced by external enemies, and wearied of intestine discords, invoked in the midst of their struggles the august name of the nation to which they owed civilization and life . . . . Convinced that their prayers were spontaneous and unanimous I did not hesitate to accede to them."[6]

Foreign Minister Collantes argued along similar lines to Chargé Perry; Spanish intervention, he said, could be justified by Dominican fear of Haiti, the protection of Spanish citizens and interests, and the prevention of an eventual takeover by American economic interests. "Spain might be charged with selfishness," he maintained, "if she remained indifferent to the sincere desire of those who, invoking old and close ties, ask to incorporate themselves to the mother country in order

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[6] Isabella's speech is printed in Great Britain, British and Foreign State Papers (Volumes LI to LV, London: William Ridgeway, 1868-1870), LIII, pp. 1064-1068; ibid., LII, pp. 1221-1223, contains Santana's Proclamation of Reincorporation; ibid., pp. 1351-1356, prints Isabella's Decree for Reincorporation. See also Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, p. 282.

to save themselves from certain ruin."[7]

In the United States the New York Times noted Spain's action without comment. Harper's New Monthly Magazine observed that the Spanish promised not to reintroduce slavery. The Daily Boston Traveller believed the Spanish action illustrated how readily Spain would take advantage of American troubles and commented that while Spain's interests were at one with the Confederacy's, the Spanish might have seized Santo Domingo out of fear that the Confederacy might try to do so.[8]

The firing on Fort Sumter may explain the lack of extended comment on the reannexation of Santo Domingo in the United States. In Madrid, however, Minister Preston reacted otherwise. In a note to Collantes he reminded him that the United States had abstained from European affairs. He then went on to say that

> there is no doctrine /Monroe's/ in which my government is more fixed than in its determination to resist any attempts of an European power to interfere for the purpose of controlling the destiny of the American Republics or reestablishing over them--monarchial power, and to--regard any such endeavors as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

The United States did not wish to block free choice of government, Preston continued, "but neither will they consent, that European monarchs shall avail themselves of every tumult or intestine struggle to establish monarchical governments in the Western Hemisphere." If it was true that Serrano had sent vessels and troops to occupy the island, he continued, "such haste would convey the impression irresistibly that

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[7]Collantes to Seward, April 25, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[8]New York Times, April 3, 1861, p. 1, c. 6; Harper's New Monthly Magazine, XXIII (1861), p. 703; the Daily Boston Traveller is quoted in Perkins, (ed.), Northern Editorials on Secession, II, pp. 961-962.

the Spanish authorities were the instigators of the Revolution."[9]

Until he left Madrid six weeks later, Preston badgered the Spanish about Santo Domingo. When told that Spain was surprised by the Dominican events, he asked how Spain could justify the seizure when only the previous October he had been reassured that Spain had no territorial aims in the New World. As for the Dominican people revolting to secure annexation, Preston asserted, the true will of the Dominicans had never been ascertained. Spain already blocked the mouth of the Mississippi River with Cuba; possession of Santo Domingo would only enhance Spanish influence and subject American commerce to control "from the Gulf to the Atlantic."[10]

Preston warned Seward that Spain had decided to retain Santo Domingo "unless firmly resisted by our government . . . /then Spain/ will retire from its design by asserting that the evidence of the spontaneous and free will of the people of Dominica is not sufficiently manifest."[11] In other words, the whole Spanish plot would dissipate in a moment if the United States assumed a bold stance.

When no instructions were forthcoming from Seward, Preston concluded that Spain would formally annex Santo Domingo unhindered. Spanish newspapers, he said, were claiming that American protests were not important. Preston next reported that a complaint he had drawn on his

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[9]Preston to Collantes, April 12, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; see also Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, pp. 290-291, 293.

[10]Preston to Seward, April 22, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Preston to Collantes, April 23, 1861, ibid., contains Preston's report.

[11]Preston to Seward, April 27, 1861, ibid.

authority would not be forwarded to the Spanish for three reasons: first, he was leaving Spain; second, sufficient evidence already existed to show the Spaniards that the United States was unhappy with its action; third, indicting the State Department for its silence, Preston said it "seems to acquiesce in the seizure of the island. In the short space of a month the whole policy of Spain has been changed and the Monroe Doctrine has been violated and overthrown."[12]

It would therefore seem that Preston was a staunch upholder of the Monroe Doctrine, a true American recommending a firm policy as the only alternative to outright Spanish annexation of Santo Domingo. On the other hand, there is the reality that Preston chose to follow the Confederacy. It is quite possible that he was seeking a confrontation between Spain and the United States with an independent Confederacy as the consequence. However, this remains a speculative point without positive evidence to support or deny it.

Spanish seizure of Santo Domingo presented Seward with his first major problem in office as Secretary of State, and he was not equal to the challenge. Instead of evaluating the possible courses to follow to parry the Spanish threat, Seward quickly formulated a bellicose ultimatum to the Spanish and all Europe. The ultimatum was primarily intended to check the Union's disintegration and rally the nation against Europe. Seward undoubtedly shared the view later expressed by his son Frederick that "Spain had already openly seized the government of San /to/ Domingo, toppled down the Dominican republic and again planted the

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[12]Preston to Seward, May 19, 1861, ibid.; Preston's reasons for not delivering his protest and the protest are in Preston to Seward, May 25, 1861, ibid.

banners of Castile on the island where it first waved four hundred years before."[13]

President Lincoln modified Seward's famous "thoughts," but not enough to prevent the Secretary from warning Tassara that Lincoln would be forced to regard Spanish actions as "manifesting an unfriendly spirit towards the United States and to meet the further prosecution of enterprises of that kind in regard to either the Dominican Republic or any part of the American continent or islands with a prompt, persistent, and if possible, effective resistance."[14] Subsequent domestic developments forced Seward to backpeddle in an embarrassing manner. Instead of seeking to provide "effective resistance," Seward talked of continued protests as America's policy. But he learned his lesson quickly. He realized that the United States would be able to vindicate itself when civil strife no longer rent the Union. Meanwhile he let Perry, Preston's interim successor in Madrid, fulminate against the annexation of Santo Domingo.[15]

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[13]Seward, Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and Diplomat, 1830-1915, pp. 148-149.

[14]Quoted in Tansill, The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873, p. 214; for other pertinent literature see Basler, (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, IV, pp. 316-318; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, pp. 329-338; Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward, II, pp. 157-161.

[15]Dexter Perkins, historian of the Monroe Doctrine, attacks Seward's "thoughts" on two grounds. In an early essay, Perkins says the only real reason for a grievance on Seward's part was the reannexation of Santo Domingo, and this act had not taken place when the "thoughts" were sent to Lincoln. See his sketch of Seward in Malone, Johnson, Starr, and Schuyler, (eds.), Dictionary of American Biography, XVI, p. 618. In a later essay Perkins maintains Seward's early handling of the Spanish intervention was foolish in view of the fact that the Union's life was threatened. See Van Dusen and Wade, (eds.), Foreign Policy and the American Spirit: Essays by Dexter Perkins, p. 220; Rodman states that Seward's paper was leaked to the press "and its publication so infuriated the European imperialists that they took sides throughout the

Perry continued to follow Preston's emphasis on the Monroe Doctrine. Material interest, he told Collantes, was a very small factor to be considered by the United States over Spain's action. It was the

> moral and political significance of the act of Spain which gives it importance, and because this is the first circumstance since the foreign policy of the United States was announced to the Allied Powers of Europe in 1823, that any nation has failed to see its own clear interests in the maintenance of policy on the one side and on the other.[16]

Shortly thereafter Perry admitted in a message to Seward that the Spanish were set in their determination to retain the Dominicans. The Queen was quite flattered to believe that the Dominicans had spontaneously offered their allegiance to her after "experiencing the evils of liberty and republicanism." Collantes had discussed the situation with him, Perry reported, like a "gentleman" and had gone as far as laying his hand on his heart when he reached the point about the spontaneous action of the Dominican people.[17]

A few days later Collantes formally answered Perry's note centering on the Monroe Doctrine. The Spanish Foreign Minister said that the United States' position on the Monroe Doctrine had never before been laid before the government of Her Catholic Majesty and, furthermore, he

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conflict with the Confederacy." See Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic, p. 75; Seward's instructions about continued protests is in Seward to Perry, May 21, 1861, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives.

[16]Perry to Collantes, June 19, 1861, enclosed in Perry to Seward, July 1, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[17]Perry to Seward, July 1, 1861, ibid. Perry had gullibly reported earlier that while Spain had "played a little fast and loose" with Santo Domingo, the government was actually surprised at what had happened and would probably follow a half-way course--i.e., follow the will of the Dominican people. See Perry to Collantes, June 19, 1861, enclosed in Perry to Seward, July 1, 1861, ibid.; Perry to Seward, April 20 and 24, 1861, ibid.

could see no reason to look at it then. He reiterated the subterfuge idea about the will of the Dominican people. As Perry observed, the question revolved around how spontaneous the movement for annexation had been in Santo Domingo, and the United States and Spain read different meanings into Spain's actions.[18]

Seemingly Schurz was unaware of any coherent United States policy towards Spain's Dominican coup, for shortly after nomination as minister to Spain he directed an inquiry to Seward concerning the course he should pursue about Santo Domingo.[19] How did the United States propose to maintain its protest, Schurz asked, referring to Seward's initial directive to him that retention of the Dominican Republic would be "a matter claiming very serious attention on the part of the . . . United States."[20] Schurz's question was never really answered by Seward and the Spanish proceeded to express their attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine and the United States' weak position with a proclamation of annexation incorporating Santo Domingo in the Spanish Empire.[21]

Denied America's full strength to enforce a unilateral protest, Seward tried a last idea to check the Spaniards. He sounded out Great Britain about a joint protest, aware of British antipathy to slavery and

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[18]Collantes to Perry, July 9, 1861, in Perry to Seward, July 11, 1861, ibid.; see also Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, pp. 293-304.

[19]Schurz to Seward, June 5, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[20]Seward to Schurz, April 27, 1861, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives.

[21]For material touching on the Dominican situation see George E. Baker, (ed.), The Works of William H. Seward (5 vols., Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1890), V, pp. 232-236; Moore, A Digest of International Law, VI, pp. 515, 517-518; Bancroft, Life of William H. Seward, II, pp. 158-159; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, pp. 330-331, 334.

the fact that slavery existed in Spanish-held Cuba. His hopes were crushed when the British responded negatively to his proposals. O'Donnell, they said, had assured them that slavery would not be reintroduced in Santo Domingo.[22] O'Donnell had cleverly anticipated the chief British objection and met it directly with assurances of what Spain intended to do.

The London Spectator was probably correct in its assessment of the British reaction to the reincorporation of Santo Domingo. The Spectator noted that Dominican mulattoes were probably in favor of Spain's action while the blacks were opposed. If Spain could bring order out of chaos, the Spectator said in effect, more power to her. Britain's one duty was to prevent Cuba from serving as a "Virginia or Maryland," or in other words, from exporting slaves to Santo Domingo.[23] Thereafter, for the duration of 1861, whenever the Dominican problem was broached in Parliament or newspapers, the government reaction was to state O'Donnell's continued assurances that slavery would not be reinstated in Santo Domingo; therefore, Spanish annexation was not contrary to British interests.[24]

Rejected by the British, Seward failed to approach France or any other major European power. The French minister in Madrid initially

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[22]Seward to Schurz, June 21, 1861, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906; Spain, The National Archives.

[23]London Spectator, April 27, 1861, as quoted in Littell's Living Age, LXIX (1861), pp. 628-629.

[24]For British interest in Santo Domingo consult Great Britain, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (Third Series, volumes CLXII to CLXXVI, London: Cornelius Bock, 1861-1864), CLXII (1861), pp. 717-718, 1652-1653, 2044; ibid., CLXIII (1861), pp. 66-68; ibid., CLXIV (1861), pp. 105-108; London Times, August 29, 1861, p. 10f; ibid., September 5, 1861, p. 10d; Cramptor. to Russell, September 21, 1861, British and Foreign State Papers, LII, p. 370; Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti, p. 295.

communications involved.[26]

In Madrid the newly arrived Schurz was unaware of Seward's fluctuations and had only the directive about continued protests to guide him. Frustrated by such a policy, he declared that "a war of notes and remonstrances will avail us nothing. If we want to make an impression upon Spain, we must suit our actions to our words." Otherwise the United States might as well take steps to encourage commercial intercourse.[27] Eventually Schurz was informed about the demands of domestic events taking precedence over foreign matters. Seward suggested that this being the case and because Spain was observing the Union's blockade of Southern ports, perhaps exploratory negotiations leading to a commercial treaty could be worked out. If Spain was being sincere, as Schurz stated, about no hostile intentions towards the United States, closer commercial relations seemed a distinct possibility.[28]

Replying to the hints of better Spanish-American relations, Foreign Minister Collantes informed Schurz that from his vantage point any improvement hinged on the United States' acceptance of Santo Domingo's reincorporation by Spain. Only then would Spain feel secure from possible American hostile action. As Schurz noted, "it is no easy task to dissuade the Spanish Government from the idea that we intend to pounce upon their transatlantic possessions as soon as our internal difficulties

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[26]Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, II, p. 592; Basler, (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, p. 446, deals with the House resolution.

[27]Schurz to Seward, July 18, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[28]Seward to Schurz, August 14, 1861, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives; Moore, A Digest of International Law, VI, p. 517; Shurz, Reminiscences, II, pp. 274-275.

are disposed of."[29]

Thus an impasse was reached concerning any commercial treaty. Spain would not relent until the United States assured her of her peaceful intentions or, even better, renounced the weak but potentially dangerous policy of continued opposition. Justifying this position, Frederick Seward wrote Schurz that "we have said concerning the annexation of San /to/ Domingo what . . . seemed to us were required by a consideration of our rights and by our responsibilities to mankind."[30]

The Dominican question thereafter lapsed into a state of semi-quiescence until early 1863. When Schurz asked Collantes why Isabella II had failed to mention the annexation of Santo Domingo in her speech opening the Cortes in November, 1861, he was told that Spain still adhered to its proclamation of neutrality and any mention of the American protest by the Queen might stir talk. Clearly the Spanish ruling circles were not seeking trouble with the United States. Schurz, ready to leave Spain, recognized this fact and suggested to Seward that Spain and the United States might coexist in mutual harmony if the latter refrained from making harsh statements about Santo Domingo and treated Spain respectfully.

Schurz's temporary successor, Perry, as well as the regular appointee, Koerner, thought similarly. Perry admitted he did not feel it "politic" to bring up Santo Domingo after Collantes discussed Spain's respect for the sovereignty of other nations. In fact, Perry was

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[29]Schurz to Seward, October 9, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; also Perry to Seward, July 31, 1863, ibid.

[30]F. W. Seward to Schurz, November 5, 1861, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives.

repeating Spanish arguments for Dominican annexation as late as the summer of 1864! When a Peruvian brought up seeming similarities between Spanish actions against Santo Domingo and Peru, Perry denied any. Santo Domingo, he said, was a special case. It had an unstable government, it was geographically situated between two Spanish colonies, Spain was fearful of an outside power seizing the unhappy nation and, lastly, Dominican reannexation came as a complete surprise to the Spanish people. Koerner felt as Seward did that the United States could not run the risk of alienating Spain while engaged in a Civil War.[31]

While the Dominican question remained relatively quiescent on the diplomatic front, American businessmen led by William L. Cazneau and Joseph W. Fabens were busily engaged in promoting Santo Domingo as a new Eden for American settlement and investment. A glowing picture was drawn of Santo Domingo's potential wealth, enhanced by the presence of Spain as a stabilizing factor. The few Americans venturing to the island were sadly disillusioned. They found heat, disease, poverty, hopelessness, and not least, Spanish haughtiness. The State Department began receiving complaints from American citizens of injustices committed against them. Seward calmly forwarded these protests to Madrid for explanations by the Spanish authorities, thereby helping to insure continued tranquility in Spanish-American relations.[32]

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[31]Schurz to Seward, November 9, 1861, Foreign Affairs, 1861, pp. 477-478; Schurz to Seward, November 11, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Perry to Seward, July 7, 1862, and August 15, 1864, ibid.; Koerner, Memoirs, II, pp. 287-288.

[32]Tansill, The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873, pp. 215-217, 219-220; Allen Nevins gives a sketch of the careers of Fabens and Cazneau in Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration, pp. 252-256; Seward to Koerner, May 9, 1863, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives.

One such case dealt with regulations imposed by Catholic Spain on the activities of Protestants in Spain and her possessions. Needless to say, United States citizens considered any infringement on their religious rights harsh, and they subsequently complained. When Koerner discussed the matter with the Marquis of Miraflores, the latter replied that the people of Santo Domingo, by their free and spontaneous wish for reincorporation into Spain, subjected themselves to Spain's conception of the unity of law and religion. Therefore, American Protestants had no basis for their complaints.[33]

The final blow to any commercial dreams held by Cazneau, Fabens, and other Americans evaporated with the large scale Dominican insurrection of 1863. Thereafter the Americans could only attempt to salvage the undamaged property they owned. Seward continued his restrained policy concerning compensation, and as a result he refused to seek damages against Spain in conjunction with other nations. Furthermore, he directed that if Cazneau should seek aid through the American ministry in Madrid, he should be referred directly to the Department of State in Washington. By his adroit handling of the problem, Seward prevented a major flareup from developing between Spain and America that would neutralize the effectiveness of the Dominican revolt.[34]

The revolt that erupted in 1863 was the primary reason for Spain's

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[33]Koerner to Seward, June 19, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[34]The question about joining with other powers to seek damage compensation is in Koerner to Seward, February 14, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, p. 8; Seward to Koerner, March 12, 1864, ibid., pp. 12-13; Seward's moderation in face of damages done to Americans is illustrated in Seward to Koerner, February 22, 1864, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives; the directive about dealing with Cazneau is in F. W. Seward to Perry, September 3, 1864, ibid.

evacuation of Santo Domingo in 1865. In the midst of the Civil War the people of the United States could do little but watch events and speculate on the eventual course of the insurrection. The first rumors of revolt against Spanish authority appeared a scant six weeks after Spain's formal proclamation of annexation in 1861. Denied in Spain, the embers of revolt smoldered until February, 1863, when news reaching the outside world forced the Spanish to admit that a revolt had broken out. News of this should not have surprised Seward or other informed Americans. From Santo Domingo came stories of mismanagement, the high cost of living, and excessive taxation. Dominicans charged that they had been led to expect their land to be governed as a province of Spain; instead, they found that Santo Domingo was being governed as an overseas colony like Cuba. Finding their only recourse was arms, they revolted.[35]

As the Spanish sped reinforcements to Santo Domingo, they sought to determine the causes of the revolt. Rather than accept responsibility themselves, Spanish journals affirmed that "the revolt is supported by the Federal /United States/ Government."[36] Shortly afterwards a rumor

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[35]Rodman, Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic, p. 77, mentions the uprising after six weeks of Spanish rule; denial of the early revolt is in Schurz to Seward, August 5, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; sources to consult on the origins of the 1863 insurrection include Rodman, Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic, pp. 77-79; Welles, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924, I, pp. 241-242; Hazard, Santo Domingo, Past and Present, p. 255; New York Times, March 22, 1863, p. 4, c. 6; ibid., March 29, 1863, p. 2, c. 3; London Times, April 10, 1863, p. 6d; Jaeger to Seward, April 1, 1862, U. S. Government, Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Nations, 1862, I, p. 649; Elliott to Seward, January 13, 1863, ibid., p. 588; Jaeger to Seward, October 3, 1863, ibid., p. 589.

[36]London Times, October 5, 1863, p. 10b; see also the letter of Cuba's Captain-General Dulce, September 14, 1863, Yuengling, Highlights in the Debates in the Spanish Chamber of Deputies Relative to the Abandonment of Santo Domingo, p. 176.

swept Spain that two American ships loaded with arms and munitions destined for rebel use had been destroyed by a Spanish warship.[37] Investigating the sources of the tales, Koerner discovered French journalists responsible. They alleged that Lincoln wanted the island of Hispaniola as an area to colonize free Negroes from the United States and thus had formented the revolt.[38]

On his own authority, Koerner denied that the United States had any connection with Dominican rebels, and Seward shortly confirmed Koerner's assumption. The United States, Seward declared, had nothing whatsoever to do with the rebellion. Seward again reiterated his long standing sentiment that all European attempts to establish governments in the New World contrary to the wishes of the people would come to naught.[39] Implementing official United States policy, Navy Secretary Welles ordered Rear Admiral J. L. Lardner, commanding the West Indian Squadron, to be alert for illegal, waterbound American aid for the insurgents. Lardner eventually informed Welles that while no American vessels were violating Dominican waters, British ships were. He also stated that he had refused an opportunity to meet an individual proposing to put Santo Domingo under the protection of the United States. The refusal to rush headlong into the Dominican maelstrom reflected Seward's growing diplomatic maturity. Stung more than two years before with his brash "thoughts,"

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[37]London Times, November 24, 1863, p. 12a.

[38]Koerner, Memoirs, II, p. 379; Koerner to Seward, October 8, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[39]Koerner to Seward, October 8, 1863, ibid.; Seward to Koerner, November 17 and 23, 1863, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, pp. 348-349, dates the insurrection from August, 1863.

Seward saw with reflection that time was working to America's advantage.[40] This realization is illustrated in a dispatch to Tassara concerning revolts in Santo Domingo and elsewhere. The United States, the Secretary cleverly said, would "avoid throwing themselves across the way of human progress, or lending encouragement to factious revolutions."[41]

The Lincoln Administration was directly confronted with the question of extending recognition to the Dominican rebels when the latter proclaimed the restoration of the Dominican Republic on September 14, 1863. Immediately thereafter the rebels sent William Clark and then Pablo Pujol to seek recognition and aid for the insurgent cause.[42] Both were rebuffed in their efforts to see Seward, who told Koerner that the

> revolutionists . . . have . . . appealed to this government for recognition, for aid, and for sympathy. . . . We have not received any agents of the revolution, even informally, nor have we in any way responded to them, while we have given instructions to the ministerial offices to see that the neutrality laws of the United States are regularly maintained and enforced.[43]

It might also be argued that in addition to Seward's realization that

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[40] Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Series I, Volume II, pp. 504-511; ibid., pp. 492-493, 589, contains Welles' directive to Lardner and the Admiral's replies; see also Seward to Koerner, March 12, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, p. 12; Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, pp. 308-309.

[41] Seward to Tassara, February 3, 1864, Moore, A Digest of International Law, VI, p. 24.

[42] Tansill, The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873, pp. 220-221.

[43] Seward to Koerner, March 12, 1864, ibid., pp. 222; Welles, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924, I, pp. 280-281, states that Seward met Pujol unofficially and that strict neutrality was not observed by the United States. He alleges that nothing was done to prevent the fitting out and sailing of ships under the Dominican flag from New York City. Not having discovered any of what Welles maintains in the documents, the author inclines toward Tansill's interpretation.

time was on the side of the United States, he was also realistic enough to see that any American aid to the Dominican rebels could be reciprocated by Spanish dealing with the Confederacy.

Seward continued his circumspect diplomacy in a conference with the Haitian representative in the United States. The latter told Seward that Haiti desired an independent Santo Domingo as its neighbor. Because Haiti lacked the requisite prestige, he suggested that the United States, Britain, or France attempt to mediate the quarrel. He implied that Spain's presence next to Haiti was partly due to Spain's fears about American desire for Samaná Bay. Seward admitted that previous administrations had expressed interest in Samaná Bay, but times had changed. The United States possessed ample land to settle without need for either Samaná Bay or Santo Domingo. When Koerner, following Seward's instructions, asked if Spain would accept mediation by an impartial power, he was promptly told no--unless it be by France. He was also told that opinion had shifted from the United States to Haiti as the nation supplying the rebels.[44] As no French offer was forthcoming, Spain's refusal to face mediation by the United States or Britain meant that the Dominican insurrection had to run its bloody course.

Writing almost a decade after the insurrection, Samuel Hazard noted that he had

> neither the space . . . nor the inclination to detail the horrors of this war . . . the details of some of the acts of the Spanish officials show that, while they have not forgotten the example of crimes perpetuated in this very island by their bloodthirsty ancestors, the civilisation

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[44] Haiti's role in the Dominican controversy is included in Seward to Koerner, May 6, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, pp. 19-20; Koerner to Seward, May 30, 1864, ibid., pp. 29-30; see also Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti.

> of the present day has done nothing towards softening those instincts engendered by the blood of these same ancestors.[45]

Hazard did not overstate the ferocity of the insurrection, for its very nature would have made it bloody. The Spanish, finding their authority challenged by guerilla warfare, responded in kind, and both sides stooped ever lower in the fighting. To make the situation more desperate, there were two complicating factors: tropical climate with its inherent diseases such as yellow fever, and worse, the tendency toward racial war--white Spaniards pitted against dark Dominicans--which distressed Seward deeply.[46] Even the Spanish admitted that the "conflict in Santo Domingo has become a war of races. The negroes commit the most atrocious cruelties on any whites that fall into their hands."[47]

Toward the end of 1863 Koerner noticed a change in Spanish public opinion. Initially the O'Donnell regime was popular for its expansionist policy resulting in the annexation of Santo Domingo. The revolt dampened enthusiasm considerably until numerous Spaniards openly advocated withdrawal from the accursed island.[48] But this change in sentiment did not reach the ranks of the governing elite. Queen Isabella II typified the opinion of this segment of Spanish thought when she stated

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[45]Hazard, Santo Domingo, Past and Present, p. 264.

[46]For the effects of the climate on the Spanish soldiers see Welles, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924, I, pp. 247-248; Beale, (ed.), The Diary of Gideon Welles, I, pp. 519-520, records Seward's distress.

[47]The Correspondencia as cited by the London Times, November 23, 1863, p. 10d.

[48]Koerner to Seward, October 24, 1863, November 20, 1863, and December 28, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, pp. 305-307.

that "the honour of our flag must be preserved."[49] As a result, Spain stepped up preparations to subjugate the rebels until many observers shared the opinion that it was only a matter of time before no Dominican dare challenge Spanish authority.

Throughout most of 1864 the press described a succession of Spanish victories: one rebel group after another was being crushed; rebel leaders were fleeing over the Haitian border; rebels were making peace overtures to Spanish authorities.[50] Yet the struggle continued. War costs soared until one British newspaper stated that occupation of Santo Domingo from 1861 to June 30, 1864, had cost Spain 30,000,000 pounds, a "dead loss."[51]

As the war dragged on and the toll of casualties and treasure mounted, the transformation in Spanish public opinion began to penetrate the government's higher echelons. Still the Spanish maintained that honor prevented withdrawal.[52] Seward saw that time and the war would insure a change in Spanish policy. He understood the Spanish position completely, and as he wrote Koerner, "nothing is more sensitive than

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[49] British and Foreign State Papers, LV, pp. 908-911.

[50] See the London Times, December 24, 1863, p. 9b; March 5, 1864, p. 14a; July 18, 1864, p. 12a; October 15, 1864, p. 9e; November 4, 1864, p. 10a; November 7, 1864, p. 10b; see also the New York Times for February 7, 1864, p. 5, c. 3; April 28, 1864, p. 9, c. 4; May 26, 1864, p. 2, c. 4; July 20, 1864, p. 5, c. 1; Harper's New Monthly Magazine, XXVIII (1864), p. 413.

[51] London Times, September 29, 1864, p. 11a.

[52] See Koerner to Seward, February 14, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, p. 8; Koerner to Seward, March 20, 1864, ibid., p. 13; Koerner, to Seward, April 18, 1864, ibid., pp. 17-19; Koerner to Seward, April 10, 1864, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Koerner to Seward, May 30, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, II, p. 465.

National Honor," and Spain's honor was on trial in Santo Domingo.[53]

Thus Lincoln's comment at the end of 1864 that the war in Santo Domingo exhibited no indication of an early settlement seemed appropriate. Even as the President uttered this sentiment, however, opinion in Spain had matured to the point that the government was asked to furnish the truth about the Dominican situation. In her yearly speech opening the Cortes, the Queen no longer mentioned vindication for Spain's flag. Instead she alluded to the pro-annexationist will expressed by the Dominicans in 1861.[54] In other words, Spain was setting the stage for a withdrawal from Santo Domingo because the will of the Dominican people had changed.

That Isabella spoke against her will emerged in a dispute she had with the new prime minister, Marshal Narvaez. It developed that Narvaez was determined to introduce a measure in the Cortes pointing to abandonment of Santo Domingo. Opponents immediately circulated false stories that the Marshal was doing such because he was cowed by Britain's and the United States' extension of belligerent rights to the rebels. Isabella seized a chance to lobby for retaining the Dominicans. In reply, Narvaez resigned, forcing the Queen to humble herself by asking Narvaez, the only candidate with enough support, to form a new government. Hence Perry came to believe that Spanish evacuation of the island was assured.[55] Narvaez used the standard, hackneyed expression about

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[53]Seward to Koerner, May 4, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, p. 19.

[54]Basler, (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, VIII, p. 138; London Times, December 13, 1864, p. 9c; The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1864 (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1865), p. 754.

[55]Perry to Seward, December 19, 1864, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

the will of the Dominicans changing. A French newspaper suggested that the real reason existed in Spanish fears that the insurrection would spread to Puerto Rico and other colonial possessions.[56]

Narvaez's only serious opposition came from O'Donnell's followers in the Cortes. O'Donnell stated that if he had been in command, "he would have guaranteed with his head to put down the rebellion in three months" and, furthermore, he was still ready to assume command.[57] Perry reported America's name was being used as a "bugbear by the . . . opposition . . . that the occupation of Santo Domingo by the Spaniards was the only way of averting the annexation of Dominica to the United States and the consequent ruin of Spanish interests in the West Indies."[58] Seward testily retorted to Perry that if he had been nearby when such a charge was leveled, he would have informed Spanish officials that "there is one national passion which the United States has not developed, and are not likely to develop as strongly as other states, namely, the passion of conquest."[59]

Before Narvaez's proposal was put to a vote, a full scale debate allowed the Cortes' members to air their views. Those members among the more liberal elements in Spain charged, just as Perry had to Seward, that the United States' name was being used to frighten Spaniards. The United States would not be interested in post-war expansionism, but would put all her strength into rebuilding and consolidating the Union.

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[56]London Times, January 5, 1865, p. 10a; January 9, 1865, p. 6d; January 14, 1865, p. 6f.

[57]Ibid., January 28, 1865, p. 12a.

[58]Perry to Seward, January 31, 1865, Foreign Affairs, 1865, II, p. 471.

[59]Seward to Perry, February 27, 1865, ibid., p. 508.

Moreover, they asked, why should the United States or any other nation covet a poor nation like Santo Domingo? Lastly, O'Donnell and other Spaniards interested in expansion ought to have realized that America would attempt to sustain the Monroe Doctrine as soon as the Civil War ended.[60]

Opponents like Saavedra Meneses asked why, if the United States was not really interested in Santo Domingo, a company had been formed to exploit Dominican resources in America. Referring to Cazneau's premature colonization plans, he implied the possible consequences of success.[61] Another speaker discussed the changing attitude of the United States:

> And what would the North Americans say of us? They hate to speak of this war, they hate to speak of old Europe. Not only do they feel that they are a great race but they exaggerate their force, and in those newspapers we read that now they are not limiting their aspirations to the Monroe Doctrine, but they extend them to suppose that the hour has struck, the moment has arrived to carry their arms, their power, and their influence to Europe.[62]

Yet another Cortes member, seeing almost inevitable war, declared that "if the United States breaks lances against European intervention in America with Santo Domingo or without Santo Domingo, a conflict threatens. Keeping or not keeping a foot in Santo Domingo will not increase or diminish it."[63]

While the abandonment question was building to a climax, Perry

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[60] Yuengling, Highlights in the Debates in the Spanish Chamber of Deputies Relative to the Abandonment of Santo Domingo, pp. 24-25, 50-51, 74-75.

[61] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[62] Ibid., pp. 112-113.

[63] Ibid., p. 132.

wrote Seward that the Haitian minister to Spain had approached a Spanish politician with the idea of neutralizing the island of Hispaniola. He had assured the Spaniards that the United States acquiesced to the plan. When the Spaniards broached the subject to Perry the American representative was dumbfounded, but promised to discover Seward's sentiments. The latter was quick to reply he would be delighted to see neutralization of the troublesome island, but he disclaimed any possibility of American cooperation because of earlier precedents. Seward's rejection was enough to founder the neutralization scheme.[64]

The neuralization scheme had not been lain to rest before the good news arrived from Spain that Cortes members had voted for abandonment of Santo Domingo and that the Queen had sanctioned the bill. After the expenditure of thousands of lives and millions in treasure, the last Spanish soldier departed from Santo Domingo in July, 1865.[65]

With the evacuation of Santo Domingo one of the most serious challenges to the United States' hegemony in the Western Hemisphere ended. Of all the reasons forwarded for Spain's decision to evacuate, in none will one find much about fear of the United States.[66] As shown, there

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[64]Perry to Seward, March 11, 1865, Foreign Affairs, 1865, II, pp. 514-515; Seward to Perry, April 4, 1865, ibid., p. 522; Perry to Seward, May 12, 1865, ibid., p. 55.

[65]For coverage of Spain's decision to evacuate see Perry to Seward, May 7, 1865, ibid., pp. 534-536, and Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; London Times, April 3, 1865, p. 12a, and May 1, 1865, p. 12a; The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1864, pp. 733, 754-755; The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1865, pp. 754-755, 768; Welles, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924, I, pp. 294-298; Tansill, The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873, p. 220; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, pp. 350-351; Moore, A Digest of International Law, VI, p. 518.

[66]Ibid.

were Spaniards who worried about America's post-war course and vindication of the Monroe Doctrine. Not once, however, did the United States deliver an ultimatum for what was seemingly a clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine.

The reason for the apparent contradiction in American policy was, again, the nature of the Civil War. While the nation's life was at stake, all lesser issues were put aside. By the time danger had passed, the United States found that the Spanish were conveniently vacating New World territory. Yet, in view of Seward's prodding of the French in Mexico, a prolonged Spanish occupation could have led to strained diplomatic relations or perhaps even an ultimatum. One has only to ponder the lessons of the Cuban revolt from 1868 to 1878 and from 1895 to 1898. Thus, dismissing the reasons for Spanish involvement in the first place, withdrawal in mid-1865 was to the advantage of all parties concerned.

Secretary Seward, after his initial bungling "thoughts," handled the Dominican crisis with masterful grace. Avoiding chauvinism, but not a touch of righteousness, he let events take their course while maintaining a continued protest. In the end, time and the Spaniards' own blundering insured the Dominican insurrection and Spain's final humiliating exit.

CHAPTER V

SPAIN AND THE MEXICAN QUESTION

Mexico, the onetime jewel of Spain's American empire, had won independence early in the nineteenth century. Thereafter, she proceeded on a highly erratic course, being governed by a succession of despots and becoming involved in numerous incidents with foreign powers. Hence, it was not surprising that Spain should choose to use force in an attempt to gain redress for grievances inflicted on her by her late colony.

Disputes had plagued the diplomatic relations of the two nations from 1836. In the mid-1850's, with the outbreak of civil war in Mexico, the situation rapidly deteriorated when Mexicans killed several Spanish citizens near Cuernavaca, Mexico. The Spanish ambassador was insulted and declared unacceptable as soon as the forces of Benito Juarez gained control of the Mexican capital. The Spaniards retaliated by staging naval demonstrations near Vera Cruz and ejecting Mexico's representative in Madrid. Even more important, emigrant Mexicans and Spanish citizens arrived in Spain with tales of insults and injuries; nor was it forgotten that Mexico owed Spain a ten-million dollar debt. Thus the Spanish government was confronted with crucial problems concerning her future Mexican policy when news arrived that the ambassadors of Britain and France had broken diplomatic relations with Mexico in July, 1861.[1]

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[1]See Henri Léonardon, "L'Espagne et la question du Mexique, 1861-1862," Annales des Sciences Politiques, XVI (1901), pp. 59, 62; Revue des Deux Mondes, XL (1862), p. 737; Egon Caesar Corti, Maximilian and

Would Spain join Britain and France to discipline Juarez's wayward government? Or would Spain's pride assert itself and that nation take unilateral actions to protect her own interests? What would be America's reaction to Spanish intervention?

When it appeared in 1860 that Spain would take action against Mexico, Tassara, the Spanish minister in Washington, was warned that the United States would regret seeing unjust claims made against Mexico. Furthermore, he was told, the United States "would not allow hostilities to be waged against her legitimate government."[2] Later that same year, Tassara was notified that because the United States had vital interests in Mexico, she would be strengthening her navy off Vera Cruz. However, this did not mean that Spain could not press demands for grievances, but that the United States would be glad to see Spanish-American difficulties settled by arbitration. Why the change in American policy? No official reason can be given, but perhaps the looming struggle between North and South entered the calculations of President Buchanan and his figurehead Secretary of State, Cass. In any event, Spain did not take any action in 1860. In March, 1861, debate still raged in Madrid over what, if anything, should be done. About the only common sentiment shared by all interested Spaniards, Preston reported, was a tendency to

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Charlotte of Mexico (2 vols., London and New York: A. A. Knopf, 1928), I, pp. 74, 94-95; Moore, A Digest of International Law, VI, p. 484; biased and only partially reliable is Madame Carette's Recollections of the Court of the Tuileries (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1890), pp. 237-238; the ten-million dollar figure is from Charles Sumner. The Works of Charles Sumner (11 vols., Boston: Lee and Shephard, 1870-1875), VI, p. 370; especially pertinent is Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, p. 353; William Spence Robertson, "The Tripartite Treaty of London," Hispanic American Historical Review, XX (May, 1940), pp. 167-168.

[2]Ibid., p. 167.

blame the United States for Juarez's actions.[3]

Confronted with a civil war, President Lincoln chose sixty-seven year old Thomas Corwin of Ohio to serve as American minister to Mexico. Lincoln owed Corwin a political debt from the 1860 election and he could not have been unaware that Corwin had unalterably opposed the Mexican War fifteen years previously and would therefore be welcomed in Mexico. In fact, the non-Spanish speaking Corwin was a happy choice and completely outclassed his Confederate opposite, John Pickett, a braggart who made no secret of his desire to see Mexico partitioned between Spain and the Confederacy. Corwin provided Secretary of State Seward with a steady stream of information about Spain and the Mexican question.[4]

The summer of 1861 saw the American Civil War take a new slant with the Confederate victory at the First Battle of Bull Run. Meanwhile, luckily for Secretary of State Seward's peace of mind, no dispatches hinting at Spanish interference in Mexico arrived in Washington. Only in October did a disquieting note arrive from minister Schurz in Madrid. According to Schurz, the decision had been made for Spain to intervene in Mexico to seek redress for her grievances. Under no circumstances would Spain attempt to impose a new form of government on the Mexican

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[3]Preston to Black, February 26 and March 7, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; the unaccounted for change in American policy is in Cass to Preston, September 7, 1860, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives.

[4]On Corwin see J. Jeffrey Auer, "Lincoln's Minister to Mexico," Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly, LIX (April, 1950), pp. 115-128. Auer makes absurd statements to prove how Corwin wooed success in Mexico. Thus, "his brilliant personality and even his swarthy complexion might count heavily . . . to his advantage." Ibid., pp. 118-120. For Pickett, see ibid., pp. 121-122; James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 284; J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1926), p. 233.

people. The decision had been hasty, Schurz disclosed, because Spain would look like a caboose instead of a locomotive if she waited for France and Britain to act. Moreover, rapid intervention would forestall the criticism expected from the opposition in the soon-to-open Cortes.

Little more than a fortnight later, on September 27, 1861, Schurz sent a long dispatch that corrected his earlier views on why Spain would intervene in Mexico. Redress of grievances was only a minor consideration, Schurz reported; the truth was that Queen Isabella II was tending to think of herself as another Isabella I (1479-1504), when Imperial Spain was on the road to empire. All court officials flattered the Queen in this respect. The government of O'Donnell harkened to such a mirage because it would appeal to the Spanish masses. These sentiments were not a new phenomenon, Schurz said; Spain had long been casting envious eyes on Mexico even while astute Spaniards realized what an intolerable financial burden any new empire would create. Shrewdness, Schurz noted, was not given its proper attention in Spain's governing circles. To preclude any possible American outcry when actual Spanish intervention should occur, the Spanish would use agents to prepare the way for their arrival and thus minimize possible charges of interfering with Mexico's internal affairs "<u>against the will of the Mexican people</u>."

In sum, it would be a "repetition of the San [to] Domingo comedy," Schurz observed, his memory filled with the guises the Spanish had used when they seized that tragic Caribbean land the previous April. Ultimately, the Spanish planned to put a Bourbon prince on Mexico's throne with Spain providing any needed protection from her bases in the West Indies. Whom did the Spanish have in mind? "Don Juan de Bourbon the

son of Don Carlos [whose name had come up] . . . is not thought of here," Schurz answered. "He is considered an idiot and incapable of doing anything that requires sence [sic] and force of character." The most likely was Don Sebastian, Isabella's uncle and a repentant follower of Don Carlos. He had married "a half-foolish sister of the King" and gained "royal favor by being a fierce church man, and entirely in the hands of the clergy."

With these factors in mind, Schurz recommended as countermeasures dispatching agents into Mexico to counteract Spanish emissaries and working to create dissension among the allied powers--England and Spain united against France, or Spain and France united against England. On his own Schurz reported he had adopted the position that the

> United States are materially interested in the welfare of the Mexican Republic. They entertain no ideas of conquest and it is their sincere desire that the Mexican people should enjoy the blessings of a stable and orderly government, but no government imposed upon Mexico by foreign interference can be stable and permanent, unless established with the consent of the United States.[5]

Clearly Schurz was warning the Spaniards that intervention without American acquiescence was bound to fail because the word "stable" in the American lexicon was synonomous with a republican form of government, while the Spaniards thought stable was equivalent to a monarchical form; the former connoted popular support, while the latter would result in government of, by, and for the chosen few. In this light, intervention by any power was foolish. Despite this and despite the offer of America's good offices to mediate the dispute coupled with a warning that subjugation of Mexico by an alien power would be construed as a menace

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[5]Schurz to Seward, September 11 and 27, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

to America's safety, joint intervention took place in late 1861.[6]

It would be foolish to maintain that Spain did not have other reasons than redress of grievances to intervene in Mexico. Official Spanish spokesmen, of course, stressed this point as late as May, 1862.[7] Isabella II's speech at the opening of the Cortes in November emphasized the Mexican need for "an example of wholesome vigor and evidence of magnanimous generosity." Spain wished to see all New World nations enjoy the blessings of liberty and independence.[8] Much more blunt and more interesting to Americans was the semi-official newspaper La Epoca which stated that

> we . . . would entreat our country, our government, and public to support measures tending to . . . two supreme results . . . . constituting a stable condition of things in Mexico--preventing her absorption by the United States, and keeping up the intimate alliance of the three western powers in the face of the eventuality to which the American question [the Civil War] may give rise.[9]

Not all Americans denied the fact that Spain had just grounds to demand redress of grievances from which war "not of an utterly dishonorable character" might result, as the Daily Boston Traveller recorded. And, as the same paper observed, if Mexico should fall into Spanish hands, it would be better than seeing her in the Confederacy's

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[6]Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, II, p. 637; Schurz, Reminiscences, II, pp. 290-293.

[7]Perry to Seward, May 25, 1862, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[8]Schurz to Seward, November 9, 1861, Foreign Affairs, 1862, pp. 478-479.

[9]Perry to Seward, March 15, 1862, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives, underlined in the original.

grip.[10]

Schurz was not the only American diplomat to make predictions and warn Seward concerning Spanish intentions regarding Mexico. Corwin also warned Seward about Spain's goals, and he also predicted that any attempt by the Spanish to impose a monarchy on Mexico would fail because "hatred of the Spanish race is extreme here, and has been so since 1820."[11] Perhaps this was one of the deciding factors in the decision for joint intervention in Mexico instead of unilateral Spanish action. In any event, the diplomacy of the Mexican question cannot be understood unless the joint intervention of Britain, France, and Spain is explored at some length.

Great Britain set the course of European diplomacy during the Civil War. If the British had intervened in the war, there can be no doubts as to the course the rest of Europe would have followed. In fact, Britain was the arbiter of Europe. The same was true for Mexico as will subsequently be shown. The British had their own interests to protect in Mexico, and they were aware that other nations like France and Spain also possessed vital interests in the strife-torn land. The British were willing to see the vital interests of her own citizens and those of other nations safeguarded, but they were especially interested in seeing that no single nation dominated Mexico. Prime Minister O'Donnell certainly knew this, for he assured the British ambassador at Madrid,

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[10]Perkins, (ed.), Northern Editorials on Secession, II, pp. 961-962; see also the Atlantic Monthly, IX (1862), pp. 364-365.

[11]Corwin to Seward, November 29, 1861, U. S. House Executive Document Number 100, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, 1862-1863 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1862), p. 35, in compilation entitled "The Present Condition of Mexico."

Sir John Crampton, as early as October, 1860, that Spain had no interest in acquiring new territory in America at Mexico's expense. Spain, he said, sought only to protect the rights of Spanish citizens.[12]

Almost a year later O'Donnell was still emphasizing the same themes to Crampton. The latter noted one difference from O'Donnell's earlier assurances: O'Donnell was stressing Spain's necessity to protect her rights immediately via joint intervention by Britain, France, and herself, whereas nothing of this nature was discussed in 1860. O'Donnell still sought to quiet any British fears about intervention in Mexico's internal affairs by stating his belief in the patent impracticality of establishing a monarchy in the New World. But even as O'Donnell tried to reassure Crampton, the Spanish ambassador at Napoleon III's court was agreeing to the necessity of a Mexican monarchy. Furthermore, a Mexican royalist, Tomas Murphy, had visited London in August to sound out English opinion on a monarchy in Mexico.[13]

Rumors began to circulate in London that Spanish troops were ready to move momentarily against Mexico. O'Donnell denied these stories while cleverly extolling the virtues of joint intervention and holding out the threat of unilateral Spanish action using the augmented Spanish forces stationed in the Western Hemisphere. When Crampton indicated fear that Spanish action against Mexico might lead to a situation like the annexation of Santo Domingo, O'Donnell denied the validity of any

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[12]Preston to Cass, October 25, 1860, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[13]Crampton to Russell, September 13, 1861, House Document 100, pp. 302-303, contains O'Donnell's assurances about Spain's intentions; the French ambassador's activities are in Robertson's "Tripartite Treaty of London," Hispanic American Historical Review, XX (1940), p. 172; Murphy's mission is in Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, pp. 375-376.

comparison. He pointed out that in unfriendly hands Santo Domingo endangered Spanish possession of Cuba because of its close proximity to the latter. Shortly thereafter, when Crampton brought up the United States and said she should be invited to join any joint intervention, O'Donnell tried to evade the question by stating that America was too busy with her own affairs. Pressing O'Donnell further about American involvement, Crampton could only elicit O'Donnell's announcement that he reserved his decision. To O'Donnell, the very fact that Spain sought joint, not unilateral, action was sufficient proof that she was not seeking any advantage from America's distress. Crampton discounted O'Donnell's altruistic reasoning for joint action. The reason Spain supported a joint intrusion, he said, was that Mexico would probably resist a single invader, but not three.[14]

Thus, notwithstanding British apprehension, the Spaniards sought to prod the English into an arrangement of mutual satisfaction. Repeatedly the Spaniards alluded to the insults suffered at the hands of the Mexicans; repeatedly they hinted that Spain would have to take unilateral action if no agreement be reached. The British initially insisted that they would have nothing to do with intervention in Mexico's internal affairs, especially as both factions were equally cruel. Then the British began to weaken. Admitting Spain's just demands for a redress of grievances, Lord John Russell said Britain would accept joint intervention if the United States was asked to join and if the joint powers agreed not to interfere with Mexico's internal affairs. The Spaniards hedged and

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[14] Crampton to Russell, September 16, 21, and 24, 1861, House Document 100, pp. 303, 357-359; Crampton to Russell, September 21, 1861, in British and Foreign State Papers, LII, p. 370; see also the Revue des Deux Mondes, XL (1862), p. 740.

then talked of exercising a European "moral influence" in Mexico. Eventually the European powers were able to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement.[15] As Minister Charles Francis Adams wrote Seward from London, "Spain seems to be eager to accept the advance in the movement, encouraged by its success in the case of Dominica and by the hope of profiting by the present difficulties of the United States."[16]

Despite Minister Adams' fears, the incompatibility of the Anglo-Spanish agreement was illustrated by the intense jealousy with which each nation regarded the other. For instance, the early Spanish attack on Vera Cruz in November, 1861, led the London Examiner to declare that Spain was not the most trustworthy of allies; the Spanish attack, the Examiner declared, would probably be approved just as "the lawless and unprincipled aggression upon the Republic of San /to/ Domingo." Furthermore, allied intervention in Mexico will result in forfeiting "the right to protest" against the Confederacy should it try to expand into Mexico under the subterfuge of bringing order out of chaos.[17] O'Donnell, meanwhile, found it necessary to reassure Crampton that he regarded any attempt to establish a monarch in Mexico as foolish and foredoomed to failure.[18] Seemingly the British and Spanish were again in accord.

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[15]Britain's gradual acceptance and modification of Spain's desire for joint intervention can be traced in Isturiz to Russell, September 23, 1861, House Document 100, p. 307; Russell to Crampton, September 27, 1861, ibid., p. 310; George P. Gooch, The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, 1840-1878 (2 vols., London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1925), II, pp. 320-321, containing a letter from Russell to Queen Victoria; Spain's grudging acceptance is in Crampton to Russell, October 9, 1861, House Document 100, pp. 360-361.

[16]Adams to Seward, September 19, 1861, ibid., p. 191.

[17]The Examiner as quoted in Littell's Living Age, LXXII (1862), p. 519.

[18]For O'Donnell's reassurance see Crampton to Russell, January 30, 1862, British and Foreign State Papers, LIII, pp. 381-382; Perkins, The

However, another party, Napoleonic France, must be considered if the collapse of the joint intervention in Mexico is to be understood.

While the Spanish government was following an on-again, off-again policy concerning intervention, France was consulting its own best interests to determine what diplomatic course should be followed concerning Mexico. French citizens had been insulted and, furthermore, the Mexicans showed signs that they were ready to default on debts owed to foreign powers, among whom was France. Napoleon III had already brought some glory to France through the Crimean War (1854-1856) and the brief conflict with Austria (1859). In Indo-China, France participated in a joint punitive expedition with Spain, thereby laying the foundation for a future empire.

But the Anglo-French treaty of 1860 leading to a lowered tariff schedule between the two nations had hurt Napoleon's popularity in France. There was also Eugénie, Napoleon's Spanish-born, arch-Catholic wife who despised America and was willing to go to any extreme to humble the North American colossus. Thus, examining the situation, Napoleon saw that glory and increased prestige might accrue from action against Mexico on one hand, while Eugénie and her Catholic intimates would be placated on the other. The definite Mexican suspension of payments on her foreign debt (July 17, 1861), served as the catalyst for Napoleon's plans. Aware of Britain's importance, the French sought to entice the British into agreeing on a joint Anglo-French policy.

At the same time, the Spanish, as already shown, were seeking to prod the British into agreement with their proposed plan of action.

Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, p. 377n; Léonardon, "L'Espagne et la question du Mexique, 1861-1862," Annales des Sciences Politiques, XVI (1901), p. 80.

Hence, out of the common Franco-Spanish desire for British co-operation the Tripartite Treaty of London emerged. The first person of importance to see the advantage of joint action appears to have been France's ambassador to Britain, Dubois de Saligny, who wrote Foreign Minister Edouard Thouvenel in late July, 1861, urging the seizure of important Mexican ports to support British and French claims. Spain, he added, "has many just grievances to avenge and will certainly ask nothing better than to join us."[19] Thouvenel was quick to grasp the opportunity presented. He realized that Cuba would provide a convenient springboard for launching any force against Mexico; thus he asked that Lord Russell be sounded out for his sentiments about asking Spain to join in any Anglo-French actions. At the same time the Spanish were telling the British they would act alone unless an agreement was forthcoming.[20]

Although the official records do not say so, it appears that the Spanish and French were working together at this juncture. Both realized Britain's predominance as well as the dangers from the United States if Britain were left out. Perhaps the Spanish and French thought that once Britain committed herself, they would be free to seek their own goals. Here the record becomes even cloudier. The Spanish, as already mentioned, had ambitions for a Bourbon to occupy a Mexican throne. The French, too, developed such a dream, but apparently did not state a preference for any candidate, leading the Spanish to believe their nominee would be sanctioned by France. How else can account be made for Spain's ambassador in Paris writing Collantes, "I know that the idea of

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[19]Robertson, "The Tripartite Treaty of London," Hispanic American Historical Review, XX (1940), p. 168.

[20]Ibid., pp. 169-170; Cowley to Russell, September 5, 1861, House Document 100, p. 300; London Times, October 4, 1861, p. 8c.

a monarch there is agreeable; the occasion is favorable for a solution because we are all offended and the United States very weakened."[21]

Minister Schurz was aware that Spain, France, and Britain were engaging in negotiations, but his inquiries to Collantes led to the latter's same hackneyed answers: Spain was not aware of what France and Britain would do, and Spain was not interested in interfering in the internal affairs of any nation. However, Schurz was ominously told, Mexican institutions needed to be put on a sound footing and Spain would not remain idle if France and Britain acted. Noting the enthusiasm for intervention in Madrid newspapers, Schurz concluded that Spain had more than debt collection in mind and that negotiations were underway in which Spain would be seeking an opportunity to install a monarch in Mexico or, at the very least, to aid the clerical party. Schurz recommended that Seward should try to come to an understanding with Britain whose interest, Schurz suggested, did not lie in seeing a government dominated by France and Spain. Schurz was misled into believing such an accord was possible by the innocent declarations of Crampton who first told him that he was unaware of any proposed joint intervention and then said that in any joint agreement Britain would go no further than seeking redress for her grievances.[22]

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[21]Léonardon, "L'Espagne et la question du Mexique, 1861-1862," Annales des Sciences Politiques, XVI (1901), p. 63.

[22]Schurz, Reminiscences, II, pp. 289-290; Schurz to Seward, September 7, 1861, and October 9, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Thouvenel told Minister Dayton in Paris that Spain could join Britain and France against Mexico, but only if she agreed not to seek any Mexican territory, see Dayton to Seward, September 21, 1861, House Document 100, p. 212; Schurz's recommendation and Crampton's assurances are in Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

The Convention of London was signed by Britain, France, and Spain on October 31, 1861. According to the official text the contracting powers disclaimed any desire for territorial gain, and they agreed to abstain from intervention in internal affairs.[23] But, as the Revue des Deux Mondes noted in 1862, the true sense of the Convention of London was to insure a strong government able to protect foreign citizens and property against popular outbreaks. Such guarantees would only be worthwhile with a strong monarchical government in power. Schurz felt this when he asked Collantes about the possibility of Spanish intervention in Mexico's internal affairs. The latter replied that Spain would not force a government on Mexico although Spanish actions might give new strength to the conservative party composed largely of Catholics and monarchists. He readily admitted that the calling of a constitutional convention had been discussed by the three contracting powers, but the proposal had been definitely rejected.[24]

Schurz believed Spain meant no hostile expression to the United States through her adherence to the Convention of London. He interpreted the Spanish action as the work of dreamers who believed in Spain's restoration to the glory of former days. American policy should be one of not questioning the rights of the three powers to make war on Mexico;

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[23]Léonardon, "L'Espagne et la question du Mexique," Annales des Sciences Politiques, XVI (1901), p. 64; British and Foreign State Papers, LI, pp. 63-65.

[24]Revue des Deux Mondes, XL (1862), p. 742; Schurz to Seward, November 3, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives. In London, Charles Francis Adams had talked with a Republican Mexican and asked him if a repetition of the Dominican episode--annexation through the will of the "people"--could occur. He was told that it was unlikely since almost all Mexicans would be opposed to any such action. See Adams to Seward, October 24, 1861, House Document 100, p. 200.

the United States should clearly state its wish not to see an alien type of government forced on Mexico. Secretary Seward followed this policy exactly. He furthermore declined American participation in intervention even though American citizens possessed claims against the Mexican government. Such participation would be alien to the United States' long established policy of avoiding entangling alliances. The United States instead would attempt to alleviate the difficulties between Mexico and the allied powers.[25]

With the allied powers agreeing on intervention, what proved to be an important choice was made when a Spanish general, Juan Prim y Prats, was selected to lead the expeditionary force to Mexico. With Spanish newspapers glorifying Prim as the new Cortez who would restore Spain's New World empire, Schurz coolly appraised him. He reported Prim to be a great favorite of the Spanish people, a pompous and vain liberal, violently anti-clerical. The latter quality led the British to acquiesce to his appointment. As commander of the expeditionary force, he would be removed from sight of the O'Donnell ministry. Schurz sat next to Prim at a banquet in mid-November, 1861, and reported that Prim had assured him that a monarchical form of government for Mexico was an absurdity and that he preferred Benito Juarez to any clerical candidate. He went so far as to lampoon the concept of a monarchy, "Why, if there is to be a throne established in Mexico under Spanish auspices, why should not the commanding general sit on it?" As commander, Prim said, he would act in accordance with his political beliefs. He went on to praise America and American institutions and said that he would be

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[25]Schurz, Reminiscences, II, pp. 275-291; Moore, A Digest of International Law, VI, pp. 485-488, succinctly states American policy; see also Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, p. 339; Sumner, Works of Charles Sumner, VI, p. 369.

pleased to see an American diplomat agent attached to his headquarters. Schurz took him seriously and recommended sending a diplomat fluent in French and Spanish to accompany Prim.[26]

Another factor in Prim's selection was the preponderance in numbers of Spanish troops available in Cuba for the initial action against Mexico. Even before Prim arrived, at Serrano's behest Spanish soldiers had begun landing at Vera Cruz, the operation the London Examiner acidly commented upon. Xavier Isturiz, the Spanish Ambassador in London, sought to sooth British fears by stating that the expedition had been ready for some time and must have sailed in ignorance of the conclusion of the Convention of London. The British eventually accepted this reasoning supplemented by Isturiz's further clarification that the dispatches informing Serrano about the London signing had been sent via New York and reached Havana too late to recall the expedition.[27]

In Mexico Corwin initially reported his belief that Spain was trying to fulfill her own selfish desires and that Spain would try to prevent any settlement with the allied powers until Spanish control of Mexico was a fact. Little more than a month later, Corwin had become much more optimistic and he said he had no fear whatsoever that Spain

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[26]Schurz, Reminiscences, II, pp. 293-300; Bancroft, (ed.), Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz, I, p. 204; Schurz to Seward, November 16, 1861, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[27]On Prim's selection consult Léonardon, "L'Espagne et la question du Mexique," Annales des Sciences Politiques, XVI (1901), pp. 68-69; Revue des Deux Mondes, XL (1862), pp. 743-745; John Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life (5 vols., New York: The Baker and Taylor Company, 1909), II, pp. 375-376; for Spain's early dispatching of troops to Mexico see Cowley to Russell, November 14, 1861, House Document 100, p. 370; Isturiz to Russell, December 22, 1861, ibid., pp. 392-393; Russell to Isturiz, January 16, 1862, ibid., p. 421; Isturiz to Russell, January 18, 1862, ibid., p. 422; Russell to Crampton, January 19, 1862, ibid., pp. 423-424.

would impose a monarchy on the unwilling Mexican people.[28] How is Corwin's change in sentiment explained? Here one confronts the nub of the illusive Spanish policy towards her allies and Mexico. The Spanish were as interested in establishing a monarchical government in Mexico as were the French. However, the two powers differed over who was to occupy the newly established throne. So it was that the French used the excuse of initial Spanish numerical preponderance to reinforce the French troops already in Mexico. Then the Spanish reverted to the clauses of the London treaty concerning the interference in internal affairs and proclaimed their opposition to any French plan to install a monarch in Mexico as long as the monarch was non-Bourbon.

If the Spanish had had their way and the French had acquiesced to their candidate, the history of the intervention might have taken a much more dangerous course and threatened the United States' national security.[29] As it was, Napoleon III fulminated that "General Prim seems to be animated by motives of personal ambition . . . Prim has, so to speak, abased himself before Juarez's government . . . . It is very unfortunate that Spain has entrusted this weighty mission to such a man."[30] The

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[28]Corwin to Seward, December 24, 1861, ibid., p. 38; Corwin to Seward, January 26, 1862, ibid., pp. 47-48.

[29]On Franco-Spanish co-operation in the early phases of intervention see Harper's New Monthly Magazine, XXIV (1862), p. 700; Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, pp. 374-375; for the decision to reinforce French troops in Mexico see Russell to Cowley, January 20, 1862, House Document 100, pp. 422-423; Adams to Seward, February 14, 1862, ibid., p. 209; Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico, I, pp. 126-127, 130; the beginning of the Franco-Spanish split are in Dayton to Seward, February 13, 1862, House Document 100, p. 216; London Times, January 31, 1862, p. 8d; Koerner, Memoirs, II, pp. 291-292; Léonardon, "L'Espagne et la question du Mexique," Annales des Sciences Politiques, XVI (1901), pp. 64-67, 79, 91; for Spain's position on a non-Bourbon monarch, see Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico, I, pp. 113, 123, 129-130.

[30]Napoleon III to Ferdinand Max, March 7, 1862, ibid., p. 370.

final split in the allied front occurred with the signing of the Convention of La Soledad in mid-April, 1862. Shortly afterwards the British and Spanish contingents withdrew from Mexico, leaving Napoleon alone with his Mexican schemes.

Occupied by a Civil War, the United States could give only verbal support to the Juarez government in 1861 and 1862, and in this context the disruption of the convention powers was especially fortunate for the United States. All one needs to do is compare Seward's advice to President Lincoln in April, 1861, to his course of action regarding the Mexican question in late 1861 and early 1862. In April, 1861, Seward was advising Lincoln to wage war against Spain and any other power audacious enough to interfere in the Western Hemisphere. This bombastic pronouncement was also meant to solidify the disintegrating Union, and was quite a contrast to United States behavior when allied troops actually were present in Mexico. It appears that Seward did not dispatch warnings or ultimatums to Britain, France, or Spain. Instead came Seward's tardy recognition that perhaps the three powers had justifiable causes to try and bring the Mexican government to account. However, Seward was not being a hypocrite, but simply a diplomatic realist. He recognized that only when the war ended would the United States have sufficient strength to deploy against outside forces in the New World. With the nation's very life at stake the best the Secretary of State could do was to wait with folded hands and hope that time would be to America's advantage. A note sent from Lincoln to the convention powers reflects this sentiment as well as the implication that any involvement in Mexico could only lead to an ever deepening abyss. The President warned that no foreign form of government could hope to flourish in Mexico unless it was supported by military means "and this would be the beginning rather

than the ending of revolution in Mexico."[31]

Aside from Seward's hope and Lincoln's veiled warning, there was little the United States could do. From his Spanish viewpoint, Perry continued to report that Spaniards were quite proud of Spain's actions in Mexico. Spanish pride began to deflate when news arrived that the French intended to increase the number of their soldiers in Mexico; the Spaniards believed they alone would be responsible for land operations. Then stories that the French were backing Maximilian of Austria started to circulate in Madrid. Perry noted another blow to Isabella's dreams of grandeur. Even as the disheartening news reached the Spanish capital the O'Donnell government fell back on its old clichés. Again officials reiterated that Spain sought only to see a strong government ruling Mexico with the consent of the Mexican people. Indeed, Spain would never seek to force a monarchy on the hapless Mexicans.

The true feelings of expansionist Spaniards leaked temporarily when it appeared that the aged General Winfield Scott, at the behest of the United States government, would be embarking on a mission to forestall the allies through negotiations. The newspaper La Epoca declared that the "mission of Scott is probably to calm the excitement produced among the irritable Yankees by the pressure of European troops on that continent."[32] As quickly as it arose, the Scott story faded and Perry again heard the usual Spanish justifications for the Mexican venture. When Collantes expressed fears that the United States would absorb its southern neighbor, Perry assured him that the Republicans in power in

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[31]Seward to Perry, March 3, 1862, Moore, A Digest of International Law, VI, p. 489.

[32]Perry to Seward, March 15, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, pp. 484-488.

the United States had no desire to rule Mexico.

Only in May, 1862, were the full details of Prim's actions in Mexico known in Spain. Perry was highly gratified, but all he could do was offer indirect support to Prim. Upon meeting Collantes, he told him that Spain had placed herself in the right by Prim's disassociation from the French interest. Spain, Perry said, was bound to gain more respect from the various Latin-American republics. She had also shown that she was not a paper tiger; Spanish power had vindicated Spanish national honor in a sensible fashion. Vain as he was, Collantes enjoyed Perry's remarks immensely. He replied that Spain had fulfilled her goals and thus was complying with the provisions of the Convention of London by withdrawal. The discussion then shifted to France's intentions and Collantes expressed doubt that Napoleon III would be as foolhardy as to engage in a permanent intervention. Perry skillfully brought up the interests of the United States, Britain, and Spain in seeing Mexico remain free of French control. As Spanish colonies intersected French communications to Mexico, Perry suggested, Spain had more interest in seeking the defeat of French armies than the United States. In response to this line, the Spanish foreign minister declared to the contrary, that Napoleonic intrigues would be an American matter. While Perry did not acquiesce, he maintained that Napoleon was wise enough never to directly challenge the United States, and he sought to illustrate the advantages of a unified British-Spanish-American front to French dreams for a Mexican empire.[33]

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[33]Perry to Seward, April 15, 1862, ibid., pp. 492-493; Perry to Seward, April 17, 1862, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, p. 341; Perry to Seward, May 25, 1862, Foreign Affairs,

Spanish-American relations definitely improved as a result of the La Soledad agreement. Seward even instructed Perry to inform the Spanish of his pleasure over their withdrawal. More than ever, he was confident that any power enmeshing itself in Mexico's internal affairs only harmed itself. At this juncture news that the United States was negotiating a loan to Mexico in return for collateral consisting of several Mexican provinces swept Spain. Perry immediately repeated his earlier assurances that under no circumstances would America seek territorial aggrandizement at her weaker neighbor's expense. Investigation revealed that Minister Corwin had recommended the previous November that the United States assume the interest on the Mexican debt in return for a mortgage on Mexican land. Sumner's Foreign Relations Committee had agreed with Corwin's proposal only to run afoul of the rest of the Senate.

Before these facts could be exposed Perry reported the American proposal had strengthened the pro-French clique in Madrid. Thereafter for the remainder of the Civil War, Perry and Seward found one of their duties to be to counteract French influence in the Byzantine world of Spanish politics. In July, 1862, Perry disclosed that the pro-French clique led by Alexander Mon was in official favor; in fact, war matériel from Havana was being put at France's disposal. Five months later Koerner wrote Seward of the Spaniards' fear of Napoleonic France coupled with the Queen's backing of Prim's conduct before the Cortes. Before that body Prim had delivered a three-day defense of his withdrawal from Mexico. Prim believed France desired to erect a monarchy in Mexico, contradictory to the terms of the Convention of London. Furthermore,

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1862, pp. 498-499; Perry to Seward, May 30, 1862, ibid., pp. 504-506; the French attitude can be traced in the Revue des Deux Mondes, XL (1862), pp. 760-761; ibid., XLIII (1862), pp. 507, 511-512.

the French were simply deluding themselves because both North and South were committed to the Monroe Doctrine and would vindicate it after the end of their internecine strife.[34]

America's diplomatic stance regarding Mexican intervention can be understood, then, only in the light of complex British, French, and Spanish aims. Once again Seward vindicated his diplomacy. Maturing rapidly in the office of Secretary of State, he realized the suicidal result of any war involving a split United States against three European powers. Instead he let time work to America's advantage and the divisiveness among the Convention powers bore out the soundness of his policy. At the same time, America benefitted from the age-old European rivalries: English suspicion of the Spanish, the general Spanish hatred of the French, and French visions of a New World empire through a diplomatic double cross. One would lose sight of these factors if one examined Spanish-American diplomacy as if it existed in a vacuum.

Time saw United States power increase while Napoleon III had to confront an ever more ominous situation. The British never entered into the Mexican question other than to collect debts owed them. The Spanish wished to install a Bourbon on the throne Maximilian occupied, but finding themselves frustrated, they sulked like spoiled children. What if

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[34]For Seward's belief in the improvement of Spanish-American relations see Seward to Perry, June 23, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 471; Seward to Koerner, August, 1862, ibid., pp. 474-475; the proposed loan to Mexico is covered in Sumner, Works of Charles Sumner, VI, pp. 368, 374-375; Perry to Seward, July 7, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, pp. 507-509; Perry to Seward, July 8, 1862, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; the conflict between factions within Spain between 1862-1865 can be gleaned from the appropriate volumes of Foreign Affairs, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives, and Koerner's Memoirs, II, pp. 292-293, 295-296, 308-310, 381-384.

the Spanish had accomplished their objective? One has only to consider Maximilian's fate. Any Spanish nominee probably would have met the same end. Reflecting on Spain's melancholy four years in Santo Domingo, the inevitable conclusion is that Prim did Spain and America an unmeasurable favor by supporting the La Soledad agreement and the early evacuation of Spanish troops from Mexico.

CHAPTER VI

FRICTION IN NEW ORLEANS

New Orleans, the largest city of the Confederacy, was especially important because of its strategic location on the Mississippi River and its usefulness to the South as a vital port for the consignment of the South's staple crops. Cotton was traded with the Spanish-controlled port of Havana. Somewhat contrary to the June, 1861, proclamation, Tassara, the Spanish Minister in Washington, had sent a letter to the Spanish consul in New Orleans, Juan Callejon, giving him the authority to clear shipping under the Confederate flag for various Spanish ports.[1]

When New Orleans fell to Union forces in the early months of 1862, it was virtually inevitable that friction would arise between foreigners residing in the Crescent City and Northern commanders. When Major General Benjamin F. Butler was placed in command of the Union forces, another omen was added to the prospects for trouble. Suffice to say that wherever the Massachusetts lawyer-turned-soldier arrived, controversies soon developed.

Butler's sentiments about foreign consuls in New Orleans were plainly stated in his declaration that consular offices were "asylums

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[1]Gordon Wright, "Economic Conditions in the Confederacy as seen by the French Consul," Journal of Southern History, VII (May, 1941), p. 200, mentions the New Orleans-Havana cotton trade; Tassara's letter to Callejon is contained in Boswell Bach to Jefferson Davis, September 19, 1861, Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, II, p. 81.

where rebels are harbored and rebellion fostered."[2] Almost immediately strife arose between Butler and the French Consul, Edouard Méjan. Eventually Butler forced Méjan to leave New Orleans, and upon his departure the Frenchman bitterly remarked that the commander probably had bribed one of his servants who had in return invented an inflamatory story Butler wanted to hear. In another instance, on Butler's orders Union officers seized money from a Dutch resident. Only after an investigation by an official dispatched by Secretary of State Seward determined Butler wrong, was the money returned to its proper owner. Butler totally disregarded the protests of the Dutch representatives in New Orleans during the affair. Numerous other outrages involved Butler and the consuls of Belgium, Greece, Switzerland, Britain, Russia, and Prussia.[3] Not surprisingly, Spain had her share of difficulties with the Union commandant.

In mid-February, 1862, the prize Confederate steamer Magnolia was captured by the Union forces. Among the papers uncovered was a letter mentioning that the Spanish consul in New Orleans was to receive a five per cent share in the profits of a proposed sale of 80,000 muskets to the Confederacy. Some months later the Spanish consul complained to Butler that his mail was being opened. Butler acidly replied that the

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[2]Private and Official Correspondence of General Benjamin F. Butler (5 vols., Norwood, Massachusetts: Plimpton Press, 1917), II, p. 347.

[3]Méjan's troubles with Butler are covered in Wright, "Economic Conditions in the Confederacy as Seen by the French Consul," Journal of Southern History, VII (1941), p. 197; Manfred C. Vernon, "General Butler and the Dutch Consul," Civil War History, V (September, 1959), p. 273, deals with Butler's handling of the Dutch Consul; the list of nations whose consuls had difficulties with Butler is from Hans L. Trefousse, Ben Butler: The South Called Him Beast (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1957), p. 298, note 40.

mail should be sent through regular channels, not through blockade runners.

The next minor happening involved Callejon's fear that Butler had decided that foreign citizens who had resided in New Orleans thirty years or more had forfeited their native citizenship. Butler quelled this notion by flatly denying it in a letter to the consul. Next Butler had to deny that Spanish citizens were being held illegally in the United States despite the fact that their credentials were in order. Only after Butler met Callejon did the American realize that a large part of the trouble came from a lack of understanding by each side. The problem, however, was never resolved while Butler was in command of New Orleans.

To alleviate increasing diplomatic troubles in the city, Seward announced to Tassara that a provisional court would be established in New Orleans. Seward was caught between the necessity of placating foreign opinion and agreeing to the demands of the war as Butler presented it. Butler's contemporary biographer, James Parton, claimed Seward generally took the side of the foreign consuls in international disputes, thereby casting Butler in the wrong. This conclusion is not borne out in the evidence concerning Butler and the Spanish consul. Actually Butler showed all foreigners that the power of the United States was a tangible thing, and he instilled in them respect for America.[4] Remembering the

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[4]The captured letter is in Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Series I, Vol. I, pp. 142-143; Butler's trouble with the Spanish consul is touched on in the Correspondence of General Butler, II, pp. 205, 331, 345, 494-496; ibid., pp. 281-282 contains mention of the provisional court; Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, III, p. 139, notes the uproar in New Orleans; Butler's chief apologist was James Parton, General Butler in New Orleans (New York: Mason Brothers, 1864), pp. 355-356.

occasions when Seward had clipped his wings, Butler later wrote that the Secretary "was in distress whenever I did anything that caused a little whipper-snapper emissary from some government in Europe to complain of my treatment of a man who claimed to be a consul, and this caused perpetual interference and was an annoyance."[5]

The primary problem Butler encountered in New Orleans was the deadly yellow fever, a perennial scourge of the city. His partial solution was to establish a quarantine, and with the installation of the measure, the Spanish consul became a prominent figure in his life. Indicative of the virulent nature of the disease were the deaths of eighteen thousand people during the interval between 1853 and 1856. With the coming of the Civil War and the imposition of a partial Union blockade in 1861, the number of yellow fever cases dropped considerably and no deaths were registered which listed yellow fever as the cause.

Butler was well aware of the problem he faced in the spring of 1862. He believed residents of New Orleans actually were hoping for another wave of the dread disease because it most certainly would decimate the ranks of the Union soldiers. Casting about for measures to halt any fresh outbreak, Butler questioned an old New Orleans physician about methods of prevention. While the doctor said no means for absolutely eliminating yellow fever existed, he admitted that a quarantine of incoming ships might be helpful. Butler proceeded to order a strict quarantine to be enforced on the Mississippi River below New Orleans. All shipping had to stop downriver from the quarantine station at Fort St. Philip for initial inspection by a health officer. If the officer

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[5]Benjamin F. Butler, Butler's Book: A Review of His Legal, Political and Military Career (Boston: A.M. Thayer and Company, 1892), p. 426.

approved the vessel, Butler permitted it to proceed to New Orleans. All ships on which an infectious sickness was present and all vessels arriving from ports where yellow fever was active were required to wait forty days for the mandatory inspection.[6] With these stringent requirements on shipping, difficulties were bound to develop, and since New Orleans was a particularly busy port, additional problems would prove excessive for the American officials.

At the end of June, 1862, an irritated and amazed Tassara wrote Seward that the Spanish vessel Cardenas, loaded with a cargo of perishable fruits, had been detained at Fort St. Philip even though no earlier notification had been given that a quarantine was in effect. To compound Tassara's bewilderment, the Roanoke, a "North American steamer," had touched at Havana, the same port from which the Cardenas had sailed, but had been admitted to New Orleans without being subjected to the forty-day detention period. With the case of the Cardenas prominent in his thoughts, the Spanish consul became understandably recalcitrant about granting clearance to the Roanoke, which was making ready to return to Havana. Butler ordered the consul to clear the Roanoke for the Spanish port. When the consul refused and added he would force the Roanoke to wait in New Orleans the same number of days that the Cardenas had been delayed at Fort St. Philip, Butler responded with the thinly veiled threat that the consul could expect to leave New Orleans permanently aboard the Cardenas. To Tassara's request that Butler be overruled, Seward promised the case would be investigated.[7]

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[6]Jo Ann Carrigan, "Yankee versus Yellow Jack in New Orleans, 1862-1866," Civil War History, IX (September, 1963), pp. 248-252.

[7]Tassara to Seward, June 28, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, pp. 520-522; Seward's reply is in Seward to Tassara, July 16, 1862, ibid., pp. 522-523.

The remainder of the summer was spent in the Cardenas-Roanoke controversy. Tassara continued to stress the inconsistent treatment accorded the Cardenas in comparison with freely admitted ships such as the Roanoke, the Virginia Antoinette, and the Wild Cat. Tassara maintained disease conditions in New Orleans were, if anything, worse than in Havana. The idea that Butler was deliberately discriminating against Spanish ships was suggested by Tassara who also implied that Cuban ports could practice the same procedures against American vessels. On the legal front, to compensate for the damages suffered by the Cardenas as a result of Butler's quarantine, the indignant Tassara filed a bill for $16,347.00 on behalf of the Cuban General Steam Navigation Company. With justifiable anger, Tassara reported to Seward that Butler had threatened to sink the Cardenas if the vessel's captain failed to submit to Butler's orders.[8]

Seward again tried to mollify the Spanish diplomat by telling him the Cardenas affair was being investigated by Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. But, he noted, he personally doubted if Butler was unjustly administering the quarantine laws. In a New Orleans conversation with Consul Callejon, Butler insisted he was merely trying to keep the city safe from yellow fever and intended no affront to the Spanish nation. Writing Stanton, Butler continued to justify the quarantine measure as essential to the health of the city. As for the charge of discrimination, against Spanish shipping, Butler assured Stanton such was not the case. The Roanoke and other vessels cited by the Spanish had no difficulty passing quarantine inspection because they had stopped in Havana

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[8]Tassara to Seward, August 7 and 26, 1862, ibid., pp. 524-526, 528, 530; Tassara to Seward, September 3, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, pp. 907-909, contains Tassara's complaint and claims for the Cardenas.

for only a short time and had scarcely contacted the shore. The real trouble, Butler suggested, could be explained in terms of simple economic jealousy.[9] Butler's reply obviously satisfied Stanton and Seward because they made no move to overrule him. Moreover, his quarantine campaign was a complete success. The scourge of yellow fever passed by New Orleans in 1862 as it had in 1861.[10]

Butler next became embroiled in a dispute with the Spanish over the case of another ship, the Blasco de Garay. Initially this ship was also entangled in a snarl with the quarantine laws, but Butler had done all he could to rapidly clear away the red tape. A month later, however, near the end of September, 1862, the Blasco de Garay attempted to leave New Orleans without having been inspected. Butler immediately suspected that escaped prisoners were on board, so he wrote for and received permission to look for prisoners aboard the ship. In the meantime Butler sent an anonymous tip he had received to Consul Callejon claiming numerous rebel passengers were on board the Blasco de Garay. Callejon replied to Butler that no man would be denied the right of asylum if he was involved in political difficulties, but he promised that common criminals would be returned to American custody. After an inspection of the Blasco de Garay revealed an escaped murderer, Butler indignantly

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[9]Seward to Tassara, September 10, 1862, ibid., p. 909; Seward to Tassara, September 17, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 531, for Seward's answer; Correspondence of General Butler, II, pp. 192-193, 274-275, 340-345, 347, contains Butler's justifications for his actions.

[10]Parton, General Butler in New Orleans, pp. 394-399, asserts that but one case of yellow fever was recorded in 1862 and that it came in from Nassau; T. A. Bland, Life of Benjamin Butler (Boston: Lee and Shephard, 1879), pp. 108-109, says no lives were lost in New Orleans due to yellow fever during the days of Butler's administration; Carrigan, "Yankee versus Yellow Jack in New Orleans, 1862-1866," Civil War History, IX (1963), pp. 255, 259-260, mentions two deaths from yellow fever during Butler's days in New Orleans.

objected to the unneutral behavior of Spanish shipping. Numerous rebels had been found on the Pinta and Maria Galanti, two other Spanish vessels. He sent a clipping to Seward from a Havana newspaper to bolster his argument about the illegal removal of passengers from New Orleans.[11]

Seward formally complained to Tassara in Washington about the activities of the Spanish ships. Butler forwarded to Seward two affadavits supposedly proving the Blasco de Garay had periodically granted asylum to political refugees on certain occasions. Tassara duly promised to have the matters investigated.[12]

Apparently Seward was not content with the minister's promise because he sent the papers relating to the Blasco de Garay to Koerner, United States minister in Madrid. By the time Koerner received the papers, Prime Minister O'Donnell's government was in the midst of a crisis. The collapse of the O'Donnell government led to a lull in the case until June, 1863, months after Butler had relinquished command in New Orleans. It was Tassara, in fact, who recalled the affair to Seward's attention. In the eyes of the Spanish government, offering refuge to political outcasts was the humane and proper thing to do. An extradition treaty could be worked out to insure the return of criminals should they secure passage to Cuba under the guise of political refugees. In any event, Tassara said, a mishap such as the Blasco de Garay case should not be allowed to sour Spanish-American friendship. Seward's rejoiner to Tassara stressed that when the Blasco de Garay incident

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[11]Correspondence of General Butler, II, pp. 182, 324-325, 373-375, 419-420; Parton, General Butler in New Orleans, p. 394, repeats the tale of the murderer found on the Blasco de Garay.

[12]Seward to Tassara, November 3, 1862, Tassara to Seward, November 5, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, pp. 909-910; Correspondence of General Butler, II, p. 512.

occurred, New Orleans was under military control and compliance with rules of the government was mandatory. In other words, the State Department continued to support their former governor of New Orleans. Thereafter the Blasco de Garay case was closed.[13]

The last local issue between Butler and the Spanish consul centered on the role of Spanish merchants. The initial incident involved the Spanish merchant house directed by the Puig Brothers. Butler alleged that they were implicated in illicit trade since they used cargo brought in by blockade runners. The resident partner of the firm complicated matters at that point by fleeing to the Blasco de Garay for refuge.[14] Butler's interest in the matter was then diverted to the much more significant case of the Avendaño Brothers who alleged that Butler had demanded they grant him a payoff of $9,600.00 on no justifiable grounds. When Seward queried Butler for details, the general responded that the Avendaño Brothers had been engaged in blockade running, and that the capture of the vessel Fox in May of 1862 had confirmed this fact through bills of exchange found on board. Again Seward took Butler's side and told Tassara about the proof revealed by the Fox's capture. Furthermore,

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[13]For Seward's transmittal of the Blasco de Garay papers see Seward to Koerner, December 18, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, p. 888; the crisis that prevented Koerner from discussing the matter is mentioned in Koerner to Seward, January 10 and 15, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Tassara's revival of the incident is in Tassara to Seward, June 5, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, pp. 913-914; Seward to Tassara, July 2, 1863, ibid., pp. 915-917, contains Seward's answer backing Butler; see also Moore, A Digest of International Law, I, pp. 570-571.

[14]Koerner, Memoirs, II, p. 291, mentions the troubles over the New Orleans merchants; the rest of the disclosures about the Puig Brothers is in The Correspondence of General Butler, II, pp. 204-206, 368-371.

the payment of $9,600.00 demanded by Butler from the Avendaño Brothers was a "just penalty for their crimes against the United States and as a preventative of such treasonable activities in the future."[15]

On the matter of violation of individual rights as claimed by Tassara, Seward once more demurred. He explained that thousands of foreigners had resided in New Orleans for many years and had enjoyed the privileges of American citizenship. When the revolt began, Seward theorized that these aliens owed a unique allegiance to the United States and had a moral obligation not to aid the Confederates. As the crisis developed and their special position no longer appeared to be advantageous, these individuals began clamoring for the protection of various consuls in New Orleans. Thus Seward asserted that the individuals connected with the old mercantile houses were subject to the rules and regulations imposed on them by the military commander of the area.[16] Again Butler's actions were exonerated by the Department of State.

In late 1862 Major General Nathaniel P. Banks replaced Butler as military governor of the New Orleans area. Notifying Spanish Foreign Minister Serrano of the change in command, Koerner said Butler's "successor is known for his great moderation and prudence and will undoubtedly conduct matters there [New Orleans] in a manner which . . . will avoid as much as possible all complications arising from the peculiar condition

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[15]Seward to Tassara, November 15, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, pp. 540-541.

[16]Correspondence relating to the Avendaño Brothers may be found in The Correspondence of General Butler, II, pp. 279-281, 387-388, 390; Seward to Tassara, September 9, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 527; Tassara to Seward, September 11, 1862, ibid., p. 531; Seward to Tassara, November 15, 1862, ibid., pp. 537-541, quotes Butler saying of the Avendaño Brothers, "They should have been hanged; they were only fined."

of affairs incidents to a civil war."[17]

Undoubtedly Seward was glad to see the departure of the controversial Butler for the sake of harmony in Spanish-American relations. While admitting Butler had ruled New Orleans with an iron hand, Seward said the general had maintained order and prevented an outbreak of yellow fever through his vigorous sanitary regulations.[18]

General Butler's primary problems in New Orleans stemmed from the methods he chose to enforce his decisions, not from the validity of his orders. Despite his questionable Civil War reputation, Butler proved himself to be an able administrator in a difficult locale. Proof of the soundness of his measures affecting Spain is indicated by the extraordinary support given him by Secretary Seward in practically every disagreement with Spanish officials. General Banks soon proved the area could be governed with equal efficiency but without the disturbances created by Butler's tactlessness. Never again during the Civil War did New Orleans crop up in the correspondence exchanged between Spain and America.

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[17]Koerner to Seward, about a message delivered to Serrano, January 20, 1863. Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[18]Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, III, p. 139; Gerald M. Capers, "Confederates and Yankees in Occupied New Orleans, 1862-1865," Journal of Southern History, XXX (November, 1964), p. 406, attributes Butler's recall to Europe's unfavorable view of Butler's rule in New Orleans as well as his difficulties with the foreign consuls.

CHAPTER VII

INCIDENTS IN SPANISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

In the routine of daily diplomatic relations among sovereign states, it is inevitable that small disputes will erupt over the conduct of individuals. A war, especially a civil war, multiplies the opportunities for such incidents and creates a greater chance that they will evolve into disputes of major proportions. The American Civil War brought forth numerous events that could have made Spanish-American relations even more torturous than they were.

Immediately after the outbreak of strife Secretary of State Seward warned Minister Schurz enroute to Madrid to make sure that American consuls proceeded energetically to prevent the outfitting of Confederate privateers. The June 17, 1861, Spanish neutrality proclamation led interested Americans to believe Union cruisers could enter and leave Spanish ports at will while the Confederacy's cruisers would be allowed in only for "necessary" repairs. Ideally, the proclamation and American watchfulness should have eliminated potential maritime problems.[1] However, with many ports to keep under surveillance together with the occasional pro-Confederate sympathies of Spanish officials, frequent maritime disputes developed.

Less than a month after the June neutrality proclamation was issued

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[1]For Seward's warning to Schurz consult Seward to Schurz, June 22, 1861, Foreign Affairs, 1861, p. 264; Koerner, Memoirs, II, p. 258.

by Queen Isabella II, the C.S.S. Sumter slipped into the port of Cienfuegos, Cuba, with several American vessels as prizes. Much to the chagrin of the Americans involved, the Sumter was reprovisioned and allowed to depart and ravage more American commerce. Nor was that all, for Cuba's Captain-General Serrano refused to allow the release of the Sumter's prizes. Only after Secretary of State Seward protested to Tassara, Spain's representative in Washington, were the vessels released.[2]

Six months later in January, 1862, the Sumter reappeared to temporarily becloud Spanish-American relations when it entered the south Spanish port of Cadiz for supplies and emergency repairs. Learning of the Sumter's presence, members of the American mission made prompt and energetic protests. The only immediate answer elicited from the Spanish disclosed that the Sumter was being allowed in Cadiz on humanitarian grounds; if emergency repairs were not administered, the lives of the crew would be endangered.[3] Using this excuse, the necessary work was done, but because of continued American diplomatic pressure the Sumter had to weigh anchor for Gibraltar while her commander, Raphael Semmes, wrote admiringly of the successful pressure applied on Spain by the "red Republican German refugee, Carl Schurz, old Abe's worthy representative."[4]

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[2]The Sumter affair is covered in Seward to Tassara, July 15, 1861, Foreign Affairs, 1861, pp. 267-268; Seward to Schurz, July 20, 1861, ibid., p. 269; Tassara to Seward, August 9, 1861, ibid., p. 271; Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, p. 333.

[3]The trouble over the Sumter's presence in Cadiz is mentioned in James D. Bulloch, The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe or How the Confederate Cruisers Were Equipped (2 vols., New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959), II, p. 281; Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, III, p. 69.

[4]Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Series II, Vol. II, p. 142.

The waters washing the coast of South Carolina provided more than their due share of maritime incidents. While lying at anchor in the harbor of Union-occupied Port Royal in December, 1861, the Spanish vessel Nuestra Senora de Regla was searched by United States officials. They found Confederate mail and the official correspondence of the Captain-General of Cuba; the latter's mail was mistakenly opened, but not read, or so the Secretary of State assured the skeptical Tassara. The Federal Government in this particular case elected to hold the ship and Emilio Puig, an individual found on board who claimed to be a Spanish citizen living in Charleston, responsible for the correspondence for judicial proceeding.[5]

The same month another Spanish vessel, the bark Providencia, sailing from Havana to New York, was boarded off Charleston, South Carolina. Finding a discrepancy of 105 miles between her position and her master's reckoning, the boarding party ordered the ship's mate to board the U.S.S. Monticello with the Providencia's papers. Engine trouble led to the separation of the ships, but the following day the Providencia was boarded by men from another Navy ship, the U.S.S. Alabama, who ordered her to sail for New York. As a result of these actions the Spanish government instituted claims for damages and delay to the Providencia. In early June, 1862, referee Moses Taylor awarded $2,791.91 to her owners for the navy's actions.[6]

Minister Tassara in Washington, zealously continuing to watch over Spain's interest, noticed a story in the February 17, 1863, edition of

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[5]Seward to Tassara, December 10, 1861, Foreign Affairs, 1861, pp. 517-518.

[6]David Hunter Miller, (ed.), Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America (8 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931-1948), VIII, pp. 681-689.

the New York Herald insinuating Spain's consul in Charleston was acting in an unneutral way. In answer to his subsequent protest, Secretary Seward declared he had observed nothing offensive in the Herald's story.[7] Ultimately this and any other difficulties remaining from the Charleston area were salved towards the end of the war by Seward's assurances to Tassara that no sealed or unsealed Spanish mail would be read by American military authorities.[8]

Throughout the war numerous cases arose of suspicious vessels using Spanish ports or territorial waters. In August, 1862, Chargé d'Affaires Perry reported the sailing from Barcelona of the Mary Scaife for Vera Cruz. While in port this vessel had been sold under mysterious circumstances despite American protests. With the declared destination of Vera Cruz, Perry expected her to dart for any open Southern port when opportunity arose. What eventually happened is not known, because the Mary Scaife was never mentioned again.[9] Shortly after the Mary Scaife episode, Minister Koerner wrote Seward that strange craft flying English colors were recoaling at the Canary Islands. He then suggested American vessels visit the area. The Canary Islands were reportedly the scene for the recoaling of the Keang-Soo, a ship flying the Chinese flag but English-manned, according to Chargé Perry who not only notified Seward, but Minister Adams in London. While Seward sent no reply about the Keang-Soo, Minister Adams answered somewhat haughtily that he had no

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[7]Tassara to Seward, March 17, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, p. 912; Seward to Tassara, March 20, 1863, ibid., pp. 912-913.

[8]Moore, A Digest of International Law, VII, p. 319.

[9]Perry to Seward, August 16, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 511, relays information about the Mary Scaife from the American consul in Barcelona; see Little to Perry, August 7, 1862, ibid., p. 512.

reason to be suspicious of it or any other Chinese vessel.[10]

Yet another flouting of neutrality by Spain was reported to Seward by American Commercial Agent William W. G. Jaeger in Santo Domingo. Jaeger declared that the Spaniards residing in Santo Domingo were friendly in sentiments for the Confederacy and openly allowed the dreaded Confederate commerce raider Alabama to operate out of Dominican territorial waters. How much truth was contained in Jaeger's declaration can only be conjectured because he was quite biased against the Spaniards who were then shattering his dreams of personal wealth.[11]

While any of these minor episodes could have developed into serious diplomatic quarrels, none did because proof of Spanish complicity was unattainable. But in attempting to suppress any possible trade or aid with the rebellious states, the United States Navy became involved in two important disputes: the affair of the Blanche and, later, the reception of the C.S.S. Stonewall in Spain.

The Blanche only assumed that name after being given an English registration in the port of Havana. While engaged in blockade running for the Confederacy, she had been called the General Rusk. Commanded by a native of New Orleans, R. H. Smith, the Blanche had enjoyed a very active and profitable career running from Matamoras, Mexico, to Havana. Indeed, so successful had she been that her renown spread to the blockading squadrons of the United States Navy in the Gulf of Mexico. Admiral

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[10]On the role of the Canary Islands consult Koerner to Seward, April 11, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, pp. 899-900; Perry to Seward, July 5, 1863, ibid., pp. 901-902; Adams' reply to Perry is in Perry to Seward, July 16, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[11]Welles, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924, I, pp. 242-243, details Jaeger's account.

David G. Farragut was especially anxious to see her adventures halted. The opportunity came in late September, 1862, when the Blanche slipped out of Port La Vaca, Texas, with a cargo containing 569 bales of cotton valued at $142,000.

Early in October the Blanche docked at Mulato, Cuba, to secure a pilot and coal. Shortly thereafter she met her end when she encountered the U.S.S. Montgomery lying off the light of Morro Castle, Havana. The commander of the Montgomery, Captain Charles Hunter, must have been well aware of the opportunity to take the Blanche. Personnel of the Gulf blockading squadron had frequently observed vessels at anchor in Havana Harbor only awaiting a chance to steal away and enter an open Confederate port. In this situation, frustration must always have been present. In any event, seeing the Blanche close to shore, Hunter ordered her to heave to and when she continued on course, a warning shot was fired and she stopped.

The distance between the Blanche and the shore at the time of this meeting is not clear. Since Smith, the Blanche's commander, was able to beach the ship, it would appear that the vessel was close to land. In the meantime, a boarding party from the Montgomery sought to inspect the Blanche's papers. Suddenly smoke began billowing forth. The boarding party did not examine the vessel's authentic papers, but only a "provisional" registration. Later it developed that Smith had ordered his books and papers burned in the fireroom.[12]

Appropriately enough, one of the first American naval officers to learn of the episode was Commodore Charles Wilkes of Trent fame.

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[12]Albert Gleaves, "The Affair of the Blanche," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XLVIII (October, 1922), pp. 1661-1665.

Arriving in Havana on October 13, Wilkes found the populace highly excited and, after he learned the reason, he hastened to see Captain-General Serrano to assure him that appropriate action would be taken to discipline those responsible; he further assured Serrano of America's desire to preserve friendly relations with Spain.[13]

The event was brought to Seward's attention in a long note from Tassara on October 20, 1862. The Spaniard claimed that the Blanche, first thought to be Confederate, had, in reality, been English. The ship had been pursued, the note stated, within Spain's maritime boundaries at Mariano, Cuba, and had hoisted the Spanish flag over the English flag she was flying. All this had been to no avail because the vessel was burned by the boarding party from the Montgomery. Moreover, the Americans had been disrespectful to the Spanish citizens on board. Thus Tassara demanded the restoration of the Blanche's pilot, respect for neutral rights by the United States Navy, and punishment for those responsible. Furthermore, because the Spanish believed the Montgomery had been notified about the Blanche by the American consul in Havana, the right of American ships to communicate with shore by boat in Havana harbor was suspended (see Chapter III). Replying to Tassara, Seward stated that he was not fully informed about the incident; however, he let it be known if Tassara's version was correct, those responsible would be punished.[14]

In Spain the initial reaction to the Blanche incident was strong

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[13]Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Series I, Vol. I, p. 505.

[14]Tassara to Seward, October 20, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, pp. 532-536; Seward's reply is in Seward to Tassara, October 23, 1862, ibid., pp. 536-537; see also Seward to Koerner, October 21, 1862, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives.

enough to lead Perry to doubt if Queen Isabella II would receive Koerner, the newly arrived minister. Only after a hasty explanation, in which Perry assured the Spanish that the guilty party would be punished as soon as the facts emerged was Koerner received.[15] The semi-official press used the Blanche-Montgomery episode in an attempt to bolster popular support for O'Donnell. La Correspondencia, for instance, gloated that

> when the insult put upon our flag in Mariano was first made known in Madrid the Council of Ministers deliberated whether Her Majesty the Queen ought to receive the credentials of the new Anglo-American Minister. The difficulties disappeared by Mr. Perry, chargé d'affaires of the United States, having manifested in a prolonged conference held with the Minister of State that his Government could not do otherwise than disapprove what had happened and Mr. Koerner having interposed in his speech the phrase that since the time of his appointment nothing had occurred with the knowledge or consent of the Government of the United States capable of weakening the friendly relations which exist between it and that of Spain.[16]

When Koerner complained that the press was using the affair in a shameful, overcritical manner degrading to America, fervent reporting in Spanish journals ceased. Nevertheless, with the opening of the Cortes, Koerner had to report that O'Donnell's opposition was using it as a political weapon and was demanding an increase in Spanish naval strength in Cuban waters. Shortly thereafter Koerner discussed the Blanche's fate with Foreign Minister Collantes. The latter manifested the Spanish Government's desire to see justice done and he recalled that Captain Wilkes had been promoted after the Trent confrontation between Britain and America less than a year before. Koerner immediately

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[15] Koerner, Memoirs, II, pp. 265, 267; Perry to Seward, November 4, 1862, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[16] Ibid.

replied that the cases were completely different. Later that same day, Koerner, apparently hoping to cool Spanish passions, brought up the case of the American ship Daniel Webster at the Spanish port of Malaga. A crew member of that vessel had been charged with a crime and carried off the ship; when American officers protested, they were threatened with bodily harm. Despite the fact that this episode had occurred some time before and obviously not on the orders of the Spanish Government, no investigation had even started. Thus, Koerner concluded, Spain could not expect the Blanche-Montgomery case to be settled immediately without an appropriate investigation.[17]

Captain Hunter, the Montgomery's commander, failed to file a report on the Blanche's demise and for this reason Secretary of the Navy Welles ordered him to be relieved of his command. In spite of Admiral Farragut's attempts to defend Hunter's conduct and the submission of his report, Hunter relinquished his command in January, 1863, quite perturbed over the furor created by his action.[18]

In February, 1863, Hunter was tried by a Navy court-martial in Boston on charges of violating the territorial waters of a neutral nation and setting fire to the Blanche. Despite discrepancies in the accounts of what happened, Hunter was found guilty of the first charge and ordered dismissed from the service. However, clemency was recommended

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[17]Koerner, Memoirs, II, p. 271; Koerner to Seward, November 9, 1862, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Koerner to Seward, November 15, 1862, ibid.; the Daniel Webster case was settled in December when Collantes sent Koerner a note disclaiming any disrespect for the American flag and the information that the sailor carried off the ship had been forced. Koerner to Seward, December 20, 1862, ibid.

[18]Gleaves, "The Affair of the Blanche," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XLVIII (1922), pp. 1667-1670; Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Series I, Vol. XIX, pp. 271-272.

on the grounds that Hunter was in reality guilty of being overzealous in fulfilling his duty. Subsequently Hunter was placed on the navy's retired list and the Spanish Government was awarded $200,000 as an indemnity.[19]

In Spain Minister Koerner believed that the whole affair had been settled by an apology from Seward to Tassara. In March, 1863, he informed Seward that he had unofficially heard that Hunter had been acquitted; if this was the truth, Koerner foresaw an impediment to solutions of outstanding problems in Spanish-American diplomacy. When the trial facts finally reached Spain, the Spanish Government signified its satisfaction with the disposition of the case.[20]

As the Civil War in America drew to a close, the last maritime problem in Spanish-American diplomacy emerged in the form of the C.S.S. Stonewall. Early in February, 1865, this ship slipped into the Spanish port of Corunna for emergency repairs. Immediately Chargé Perry began bombarding Seward in Washington, Adams in London, and Minister John Bigelow in Paris with information on the Stonewall. It developed that the Stonewall was French built and had been purchased from Denmark by the Confederacy.

Aware that the ironclad Stonewall could play havoc with America's disminishing merchant marine should she escape, Perry acted on his own responsibility. He sought to bring to the Spanish Government's

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[19]Ibid., pp. 267-286 deals with the whole situation and trial; Gleaves, "The Affair of the Blanche," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XLVIII (1922), pp. 1671-1676; the $200,000 settlement is disclosed in Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, pp. 343-344.

[20]Koerner, Memoirs, II, pp. 270-271; Koerner to Seward, March 29, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Perry to Seward, July 10, 1863, ibid.

attention similar cases in which France and Britain had detained ironclads and emphasized that Spain had nothing to gain but America's enmity for allowing repairs on a vessel at sea under the flag of a soon-to-be-extinct nation. Moreover, he pointed out, any help extended to the Confederate ship would contradict the June 17, 1861, proclamation of Spanish neutrality.

Perry's protestations were to no avail because the Spanish decided to permit limited repairs on the Stonewall on humanitarian grounds. The chargé then attributed the Spanish actions to his lightweight status as chargé ad interim and suggested the preposterous idea that the Spanish would have paid more attention to him if he held a higher rank such as minister! He admitted that other factors existed such as the government's fear of the opposition O'Donnell party, but primary importance was put on his title.[21]

Finally, replying to the chargé's frequent dispatches, Seward let Perry know it would be his duty to inform the Spanish Government that the United States could not "endure piratical warfare from Europe under the care of an insurrection that is without ports or courts."[22] Seward then suggested that Spain would be making a wise move toward a lasting, friendly relationship with America by forcing the Stonewall to depart Corunna harbor. However, Seward's message could not reach Perry immediately and so the Stonewall remained in Corunna and its adjacent port of Ferrol until the first day of April.

In the interim two United States Navy warships, the U.S.S. Niagara

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[21]Perry to Seward, February 8, 1865, ibid.; Perry to Seward, February 14, 1865, ibid.; Perry to Seward, February 19, 1865, ibid.

[22]Seward to Perry, February 20, 1865, ibid.

and the U.S.S. Sacramento, reached the area to watch the Stonewall. But neither Perry nor Navy Secretary Welles was happy over excuses of the commanding officer, Thomas T. Craven, for not exhibiting eagerness to offer battle. While Welles was describing Craven as a "little timid and inert by nature," Perry was informing Minister Bigelow in Paris of his belief that Craven was afraid of the Stonewall because it was an ironclad.[23] When Perry inquired directly of Craven about his intentions should the Stonewall attempt to leave, the latter indirectly indicated he would do nothing by stressing the Stonewall's technological superiority and his humiliation at the realization he could not hinder the ironclad's movements.[24]

The upshot was that the Stonewall left port on April 1, 1865, completely unmolested. A month later she arrived in Havana harbor and surrendered to Spanish authorities. Perry had performed his duties and bears none of the responsibility for the Stonewall's departure.[25]

Besides maritime difficulties, the United States and Spain disagreed in another area, that of slavery. Much earlier in the century, in 1817, the Spanish had agreed to suppress the slave trade north of the equator. As the British were responsible for the pressure that led to Spain's acquiescence, they had provided a money payment to sweeten

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[23]Beale, (ed.), The Diary of Gideon Welles, II, pp. 261, 267; Perry to Seward, Foreign Affairs, 1865, II, p. 502.

[24]Perry to Seward, April 1, 1865, ibid., pp. 520-521; Perry wrote Craven on March 7 that an informant had told him that the Sacramento's officers had, while in Cadiz, Spain, made disparaging remarks about President Lincoln and expressed the wish to see the "damned yankees" lose the war. Perry asked if this was the reason behind the repeated failures of the Sacramento to do its duty? Perry to Seward, March 10, 1865, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[25]Perry to Seward, April 21, 1865, Foreign Affairs, 1865, II, p. 524; William Hunter to Perry, May 30, 1865, ibid., pp. 539-550.

Spanish reluctance.[26] Despite Spain's agreement to halt the odious traffic, it continued to operate both openly and clandestinely, depending chiefly on who occupied the Governor-Generalcy of Cuba. Seward directed Koerner in February, 1864, to inform Her Catholic Majesty's Government that by the ninth article of the Anglo-American (Webster-Ashburton) Treaty of 1842, both signatories agreed to protest and continuation of any slave importations of which the Spanish possession of Cuba was guilty. As Seward wrote, "Spain is believed to be the only Christian state in whose dominions African negroes are now introduced as slaves."[27] Indeed, for the year ending September 30, 1863, it was estimated that seven to eight thousand new slaves were brought into Cuba compared with slightly more than eleven thousand for the year ending September 30, 1862. The smaller figure for 1863 was due primarily to the vigilance of Dulce, the anti-slave trade Governor-General. But, as Britain's ambassador Lord Lyons warned Seward, the situation could change for the worse with Dulce's departure. With this undoubtedly in mind, Seward's dispatch to Koerner is understandable.[28]

Koerner, well aware of Spanish sensitivity, broached the subject towards the end of February, 1864. While he did not indicate Spanish reaction, it was probably similar to that encountered by Perry a year and a half previously when Foreign Minister Collantes greeted the news of an Anglo-American accord to suppress the slave trade with a query as

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[26]Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Diplomacy, 1812-1822 (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), pp. 213-214.

[27]The quote is from Seward to Koerner, February 6, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, pp. 65-66; see also Koerner's Memoirs, II, pp. 399-402; Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, III, p. 215.

[28]Lord Lyons to Seward, February 4, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, p. 61; see also Harper's New Monthly Magazine, XXIX (1864), p. 402.

to why the United States had fought such a measure so long and then given in so easily? While the war ended without any positive steps being taken to halt slavery, an important one involving a Spanish citizen who had engaged in the slave trade allowed the United States to express its opposition to slavery and the slave trade in concrete terms.[29]

The well-known fact that slaves were being transported into Cuba in the early 1860's has been observed. It has also been noted that the enforcement measures seeking to obliterate the slave trade depended upon the Governor-General, and Dulce, Cuba's chief in 1863-1864, was unalterably opposed to the trade. Therefore, Dulce must have been delighted when newly arrived Africans in the environs of Cardenas, Cuba, were seized from slavers and sent to Havana. His subsequent chagrin is understandable when he discovered that a Spanish official, Jose Arguelles, had received a $15,000 reward for helping to expose the case and then quietly sold approximately 140 of the freed slaves back into slavery and fled to New York City, his crime undiscovered.[30] Dulce manifested his sentiments toward Arguelles by labelling him a "scoundrel, worse than a thief or highwayman."[31]

While Dulce continued his fulminations against Arguelles, Minister Tassara in Washington laid the facts before Seward and implored him to

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[29]Koerner to Lorenzo Arrazola, February 27, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, pp. 67-68; Collantes' remarks to Perry are in Perry to Seward, July 11, 1862, Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 509; it was not until 1886 that slavery was finally extinguished in Spain's colonies. See Rafael Altimira, A History of Spain (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1949), p. 578.

[30]Savage to Seward, November 20, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, p. 69; Savage to Seward, March 5, 1864, ibid., pp. 58-59.

[31]Savage to Seward, March 27, 1864, ibid., pp. 59-60.

permit Arguelles' extradition back to Cuba, even though the United States had no extradition treaty with Spain. Despite the lack of a treaty, Arguelles was taken into custody on May 11, 1864, and promptly sent to Cuba where he arrived less than two weeks later admist rumors that he had been kidnapped from New York.[32]

The forces within the Lincoln Administration which sanctioned Arguelles' return are not clear. Secretary Seward apparently believed that failure to turn over Arguelles to Spanish authorities would, in effect, be condoning the slave trade. On the other hand, he wrote that "a nation is never bound to furnish asylum to dangerous criminals who are offenders against the human race." Moreover, "Spanish slave dealers who have no immunity in Havana will find none in New York."[33] However, Attorney-General Edward Bates recorded in his diary the opinion that Seward had acquiesced to Arguelles' extradition in an attempt to win favoritism with the anti-slavery crowd. In fact, Bates indicated that he had not even been consulted about the affair in any Cabinet meeting; he found out about the case from Robert Murray, the Federal Marshall in New York.[34] It is conceivable that Seward and Lincoln were influenced by the press. The New York Times, for instance, called Arguelles' crime "heinous" and praised Lincoln for having Arguelles "arrested and

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[32]Ibid.; Tassara to Seward, April 5, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, p. 63; Savage to Seward, April 23, 1864, and May 23, 1864, ibid., pp. 71, 72.

[33]Seward to Koerner, June 24, 1864, ibid., pp. 55-56; the quotations are from Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, III, p. 216, and George E. Baker, (ed.), The Works of William H. Seward (5 vols., Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1890), V, p. 20.

[34]Beale, (ed.), The Diary of Edward Bates, 1859-1866, p. 374.

sent to Havana, where he will doubtless be convicted and sentenced to the chain-gang, which he deserves." The same newspaper printed a letter signed by "J" and reputedly from Havana. "J" said Arguelles "had his soul disposed to this traffic. He had calculated his gains, prepared his plans, and his plan was robbery, his plan was infamy."[35]

Nevertheless, certain segments of the Union's population were indignant at what they judged to be the high-handed method of handling the case. Yet, time and Seward's use of moral and legal persuasion (especially invoking an Act of Congress of May 15, 1820, that had declared the slave trade to be piracy, and Article 9 of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty), were sufficient remedies to placate the discontented. Thus there was little reaction to the news that Arguelles had been convicted and sentenced to the chain gang for a long term in April, 1865.[36]

These maritime and other incidents help to prove the realities of Spanish-American diplomacy in the early 1860's. They suggest that justification for war was present if either nation so wished. Any of the events above could have been exploited toward such an end, but due to a genuine desire on both sides to avoid a conflict, all problems were resolved. Again Secretary Seward exhibited statesmanship. The Blanche incident, potentially the most explosive, illustrates this. Seward promised prompt action against those guilty only after an investigation.

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[35]New York Times, May 25, 1864, p. 4, c. 3; ibid., May 29, 1864, p. 3, cc. 5, 6.

[36]Seward to Koerner, June 24, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, pp. 38-55; Seward to Lincoln, May 30, 1864, ibid., pp. 68-69; Savage to Seward, April 13, 1865, ibid., p. 86, disclosed Arguelles' sentence. As late as 1865 some Americans could not resist turning a fast dollar by assisting in the slave trade. For instance, Chargé Perry reported to Seward that two successive American consuls in Cadiz had allowed slavers to clear that port under the American flag in return for large bribes. See Perry to Seward, January 13, 1865, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

He used the same occasion to remind the Spaniards of their handling of the Daniel Webster. When in due course it became clear that Captain Hunter was at fault, he was dismissed from the service, despite the fact that his brother, William Hunter, was a long-time employee of the State Department with direct access to Seward.

CHAPTER VIII

SPANISH-PERUVIAN PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

Early in 1863 President Lincoln's attention was drawn to a misunderstanding that had developed between Spain and the South American republic of Peru. Spain claimed insult and bodily harm had been dealt her peaceful citizens residing in Peru. Not wishing to see the Spanish-Peruvian difficulties erupt into a major conflict, Seward instructed Koerner in Madrid to offer America's good offices to settle the dispute. When Koerner received the instructions, the government of Prime Minister O'Donnell had fallen and had been replaced by one headed by the Marquis of Miraflores. Accordingly, Koerner must not have been too surprised to find that the Marquis was completely unacquainted with the details of the Peruvian situation, but he indicated he did appreciate the offer of America's good offices and promised to get acquainted with the pertinent facts. A month later, Koerner could report no change whatsoever; in fact, he said, the whole question was being evaded by the government and the press.[1]

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[1]The best evaluation of Spanish-American difficulties is to be found in Davis, The Last Conquistadores; Seward to Koerner, February 9, 1863, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Spain, The National Archives, informed Koerner of Lincoln's discovery of the Spanish-Peruvian difficulties; Koerner to Seward, March 14, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives, refers to Miraflores' ignorance; Koerner to Seward, April 1, 1863, Foreign Affairs, 1863, II, p. 897; Seward's instructions are also mentioned in Koerner, Memoirs, II, p. 291; Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, III, p. 157.

One year later amidst a flurry of activities among the Spaniards and Peruvians, Koerner again offered America's diplomatic assistance to prevent a repetition of a conflict as bloody as America's own. Again the offer was to no avail and the reason was not difficult to find, for Spain had seized the guano-rich Chincha Islands.[2]

Formal possession of the Chincha Islands was taken on April 14, 1864, with the Spanish alleging that the Peruvians were being overly stubborn in refusing to see a special agent sent from Madrid on a trivial technicality of diplomatic protocol. The initial American response to Spain's action was to urge Peru to send an agent clothed with full powers to negotiate to Madrid. Failing Spanish approval of this step, Seward announced that the President could suggest arbitration by some other friendly power. Two days later, on May 19, 1864, Seward did a complete turnabout when he confidentially informed Koerner that the United States could not remain indifferent if Spain attempted to crush Peru and possibly reannex it as she had annexed Santo Domingo in 1861.[3]

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[2]The interim and revival of Spanish-Peruvian difficulties are in Nathan L. Ferris, "The Relations of the United States with South America during the American Civil War," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXI (February, 1941), pp. 69-70; Seward to Koerner, April 1, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, pp. 15-16; Koerner to Seward, April 24, 1864, ibid., pp. 18-19; Seward's instruction to again offer America's good offices after the seizure of the Chincha Islands is in Seward to Koerner, May 7, 1864, ibid., pp. 21-22.

[3]On Spain's seizure of the Chincha Islands consult Harper's New Monthly Magazine, XXIX (1864), p. 263; Ferris, "The Relations of the United States with South America during the American Civil War," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXI (1941), p. 70; Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, p. 310; the American reaction is in Seward to Koerner, May 17, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, p. 23; Seward to Koerner, May 19, 1864, ibid., pp. 23-24, contains Seward's change in sentiments. See also Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, p. 312; Moore, A Digest of International Law, VI, p. 507; it is odd that Koerner felt his efforts to solve the Peruvian-Spanish clash unimportant in view of Seward's May 19 dispatch. See Koerner, Memoirs, II, p. 405.

The New York Times echoed Seward's confidential dispatch by noting Spain's vigorous actions against other nations while the United States was embroiled in a civil war. The Times said the day was approaching when the United States would say to Spain, "'thus far shalt thou go and no farther.'"[4]

In spite of what the Times and Seward said, the basic American desire was for a peaceful settlement with America doing all that was possible to speed the process. It was in this spirit that Seward said Koerner might drop the information that Peru had approached the United States for ships and arms to defend herself against Spain.[5] Meanwhile, Koerner dangled the offer of American arbitration in front of the Spanish, promising to "support any demand on the part of her Catholic Majesty's government founded on the principles of justice, equity, and international law, and /the United States/ will use its best efforts to persuade and induce the Peruvian government to comply with all such demands."[6]

Seward's velvet-gloved, big-stick approach toward Spain's Peruvian difficulties was successful for a number of reasons. Seward could not help but be aware of Spain's weakness by 1864. The logistical difficulties of trying to wage war thousands of miles from the homeland with other commitments gnawing at the nation's vitals must have entered his calculation. He knew also that France was urging the Spanish to adopt

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[4]New York Times, May 22, 1864, p. 4, cc. 3, 4.

[5]America's desire for a peaceful settlement is in Seward to Koerner, May 24, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, pp. 24-25; Seward to Koerner, May 25, 1864, ibid., p. 25, contains Peru's approach for arms.

[6]Koerner to Seward, May 30, 1864, ibid., pp. 26-27.

conciliatory gestures. On the other hand, Seward was not then aware that Spain was pathetically denying any intentions to seize Peruvian territory to Minister Koerner and British Ambassador Crampton.[7] When all these factors were known and synthesized, the stage was set for further American efforts to bring about a peaceful Peruvian-Spanish settlement.

Seward realized that in time the best interests of Spain and Peru were at work in seeking to prevent war. Thus, instead of instructing Koerner to offer again American good offices to effect a settlement, Seward wrote Koerner to stay alert and to do his best to bring about a rapprochement in Spanish-Peruvian relations by using informal diplomacy. He indicated his firm belief in a peaceful settlement.[8]

Seward's confidence in an eventual settlement was well founded not only because of his knowledge of Spain's position in 1864, but because the Spaniards and Peruvians publicly and privately evinced an interest in peace. An example of this was when the Peruvians' special envoy broached the question of Spain's real aim, the conquest of Peru, to Chargé Perry; Perry assured him that fifteen years in Spain had made it evident to him that the Spanish had no interest in reconquering

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[7]Denials of Spanish ambitions are in ibid. and in other items in Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Koerner to Seward, June 3, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, p. 30; Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, p. 313; Seward's knowledge about French efforts for conciliation are in Seward to Koerner, May 17, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, p. 23; the attitude of Britain and France as observed by Koerner is in Koerner to Seward, June 3, 1864, ibid., pp. 30-31; see also Great Britain, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Series 3, Vol. CLXXV (1864), pp. 911-912; Ibid., Vol. CLXXVI (1864), pp. 1902-1903.

[8]Seward to Koerner, June 17, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, pp. 33-34, contains Seward's instructions about informal diplomacy; Seward to Koerner, June 27, 1864, ibid., p. 86, relates Seward's confidence in a settlement.

Peru.[9]

On such occasions when Spain or Peru began delaying a settlement, the Secretary of State always possessed an effective remedy. When dispatches from Spain and Peru denoted a firmer policy was to be taken by the respective powers, Seward shrewdly repeated all of his old warnings about the terrible costs in blood and treasure that followed in the wake of war. The Spanish Government was also gently informed that the United States still regarded the 1846 treaty with Colombia (then New Granada) as binding. In other words, the United States could intervene in Colombia and prevent the Spanish from conveying men and munitions across the Isthmus of Panama.[10] Aware of the logistical problems confronting the Spanish, Bates, Lincoln's sage Attorney General, remarked, "Spain could not wage much of a war around the horn."[11]

Upset over the possible role of the United States in a Spanish-Peruvian war, the Spanish made an inquiry to Perry whether or not the United States would sell arms to Peru in case of trouble. Perry,

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[9]The interest in peace on both sides is in Koerner to Seward, June 21, 1864, ibid., pp. 34-35; Koerner to Seward, July 11, 1864, ibid., p. 90; Perry to Seward, August 6, 1864, ibid., p. 94; Perry's assurances to the Peruvian envoy are in Perry to Seward, August 15, 1864, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; the Peruvian desire for peace is reported in the New York Times, June 12, 1864, p. 4, c. 3.

[10]Stiffening attitudes are reflected in Perry to Seward, October 14, 1864, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives; Seward to Perry, September 19, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, pp. 99-100, illustrates Seward's use of the blood and treasure argument. The possible importance of the 1846 treaty with New Granada can be gleaned from E. Taylor Parks, Colombia and the United States, 1765-1934 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1935), pp. 254-255; the Spanish undoubtedly saw the decision of Attorney General Bates on the 1846 treaty in the London Times, September 24, 1864, p. 12e.

[11]Beale, (ed.), The Diary of Edward Bates, 1859-1866, pp. 437-438.

missing no chance to get in unfavorable comments about the actions of some neutrals like Britain against the Union, assured the Spanish that the United States would remain completely neutral. The Spanish must have remained disturbed over what the United States would do. Perhaps to forestall any American movements, they assured Perry that they coveted no Peruvian land and would fully respect the Monroe Doctrine.[12]

Evidently Perry eventually became fatigued by the seemingly endless diplomatic stalemate in which the Spanish and Peruvians were locked because on his own he offered to help mediate the dispute. He told the Spanish Foreign Minister, Alejandro Llorente y Lannos, that the difficulties with Peru could be "reduced to this . . . Spanish honor seemed exaggerated to Peru and . . . Peruvian honor seemed unreasonable to Spain. The proposition to yield anything directly in such a question suggested, it seemed, the idea of humiliation."[13] Llorenta calmly said he would consider Perry's offer and convey the essence of their discussion to other members of the government.

Fully two months passed before a reply was forthcoming from the Spanish. In December, 1864, Llorenta told Perry that Spain was grateful for the American offer, but could not accept it. Instead Spain would continue to follow a calm and wary policy in dealing with the irascible Peruvians. In the interval between Perry's offer and the Spanish answer, Secretary Seward had indicated neither approval nor disapproval of Perry's course of action. Nor had he deigned to forward any firm

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[12]Perry to Seward, October 2, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, p. 101, contains the Spanish inquiry about America's possible posture; the assurances about the Monroe Doctrine are in Perry to Seward, September 24, 1864, ibid., p. 100.

[13]Perry to Seward, October 2, 1864, ibid., pp. 102-103.

policy that the United States would follow if guano from the rich deposits on the Chincha Islands was shipped to an American port. Clearly Seward felt that the less officially said about the question by the United States the better.[14]

If Seward deemed quiescence the best policy for Americans to follow in late 1864, President Lincoln erred in announcing that American influence had been used to remove Spanish-Peruvian misunderstanding. This looked especially true when news came from Peru of an ultimatum by the Peruvian Congress for Spain's evacuation of the Chincha Islands or else to suffer the consequences of an attack on the Spanish fleet. At long last reality intervened and settlement was agreed upon in January, 1865, providing for the Spanish evacuation of the guano-rich islands in return for an indemnity to be paid to Spain for the expedition's costs.[15]

Despite the assurances given by the Spanish to the American representatives in Madrid that Spain coveted no American territories and had

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[14]Spain's reply is in Perry to Seward, December 4, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1865, II, pp. 468-469; Seward's course over Perry's action is in Seward to Perry, October 17, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, p. 103; Seward to Perry, October 26, 1864, ibid., p. 104; Seward to Perry, November 17, 1864, ibid., p. 105, contains Seward's statement about what the United States would do if the guano question arose. Perry had raised the question in Perry to Seward, October 28, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1865, II, pp. 464-465; more than a year earlier Perry had gone to Valencia to investigate the killing of an American sailor. Here he observed six American vessels loaded with guano from Peru. See Perry to Seward, August 24, 1863, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906, The National Archives.

[15]Lincoln's pronouncement is in Basler, (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, VIII, p. 138; for the Peruvian ultimatum consult the London Times, December 30, 1864, p. 10a; ibid., December 31, 1864, p. 12a; the settlement is mentioned in Ferris, "The Relations of the United States with South America during the American Civil War," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXI (1941), p. 71; London Times, February 3, 1865, p. 9b; ibid., February 17, 1865, p. 12a; Koerner, Memoirs, II, p. 406; Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867, pp. 314-315.

no intention of seeking to restore the grandeur of Spain, the Peruvian adventure represented another attempt by certain visionaries of the Spanish government to revive the glories of old. In the end, reality forced the Spanish to come to a settlement with the Peruvians in 1865. It is true the Spanish had difficulties with the Chileans in 1865-1866 and even more troubles with Peru. The January, 1865, settlement marked a moment of reality when the Spanish admitted that the past could not be restored. The certainty of Peruvian independence, the difficulties of waging war around Cape Horn, and especially the volatile state of Spanish internal politics in 1864-1865 insured this. Thus it was only in 1895 that Spain finished recognizing her former New World colonies,[16] Pride and Spain's "bitterly hostile attitude to the cause of human freedom" combined to prevent any earlier period for extending recognition.[17] And when recognition was extended by Spain, as to the Argentine Republic and Guatemala during the Civil War, Minister Koerner classified the agreements as mere smoke screens to quiet fears of Latin Americans arising from Spain's clash with Peru.[18]

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[16]The date is from William Spence Robertson, "The Recognition of the Spanish Colonies by the Motherland," Hispanic American Historical Review, I (February, 1918), pp. 90-91.

[17]Littell's Living Age, LXXII (1862), p. 519.

[18]Koerner to Seward, June 27, 1864, Foreign Affairs, 1864, IV, pp. 86-87.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

The more than eighty years of Spanish-American diplomatic contact prior to the firing on Fort Sumter had left a sour taste in Spanish mouths. The cause is easily identified. While Spain lost a large part of her empire in the early nineteenth century, the new United States grew by leaps and bounds. While Spain remained backward under the control of weak, corrupt, and dissolute rulers, the United States surged ahead, and democracy seemed to prove itself.

The eruption of the American Civil War was unbelievably good luck in the eyes of many Spaniards. At long last Spain would be able to repay the grasping Yankees for their overzealousness in acquiring Florida and for giving encouragement to Latin-American rebels. To biased minds, the Civil War also indicated that democracy and republicanism did not suffice as a means of government. At the same time, Spain happened to be under the control of the O'Donnell faction, well aware of Spain's shortcomings. In fact, it was with these in mind that O'Donnell launched Spain on a belligerent, expansionist, foreign policy. Spain either verbally chastised or directly intervened in Cochin-Chinese and Moroccan affairs. In the New World, Venezuela and Mexico drew Spain's wrath. Not only did O'Donnell succeed in distracting Spaniards from the realities of the homeland with his tactics, but many began to believe that a restoration of the old Spanish Empire was a distinct possibility.

In this context it is easier to understand Spain's movements in the Western Hemisphere. In Santo Domingo the Spanish believed many of their own rationales for meddling, such as the Dominican fear of Haiti and the Dominican desire to be "reincorporated" into the bosom of the Spanish Empire. Spain's primary aim, however, was the aggrandizement of her own empire and wealth. When the Dominican people recognized this and realized that their only recourse was to rebellion, a revolt broke out in 1863.

The United States could only stand by and issue warnings. Spain was reminded that the Dominicans would not be receptive to an alien form of government and that she was violating the Monroe Doctrine by reincorporation. Nevertheless, the United States was not able to prevent the Spanish takeover and could only wait until Spanish thoughtlessness turned the Dominicans against them. Even when the Dominicans had raised the standard of revolt, the United States refused to extend recognition to the rebels and denied aid to the insurgents. More than any other example, American policy on Santo Domingo reflected the overwhelming desire of the United States to settle its internal struggle before meeting the challenges of European interlopers in the Western Hemisphere. It is possible that the Spanish believed the United States would side with the Dominicans once the Civil War ended; but the Dominican revolt had progressed so far and Spain had squandered so much treasure and life that the Spanish found it expedient to withdraw in mid-1865 before any drastic change in American policy occurred.

The Mexican question provides yet another example of the American predicament. Seward had argued for war against any power bold enough to challenge the United States through intervention in the New World in his well-known "thoughts" of April, 1861. The joint intervention of

Spain, France, and Britain provided him with the opportunity. Instead of war or the threat of war, Seward meekly allowed that the tripartite powers had the right to intervene in order to gain redress of grievances. American opposition would have been disastrous. The British, French, and Spanish would perhaps have dealt the United States irreparable harm. It seems certain that the Confederacy would have gained its independence. As it was, time proved the best American agent. The joint powers were extremely jealous of each other, and when it became obvious that Nepoleon III had designs on a throne for Maximilian, the Spanish and British withdrew. The Spanish acted the part of a knowledgable bystander reproving the French for foolishly attempting to impose a foreign monarch on the Mexican people. In reality, as has been shown, they were interested in seating their own Bourbon candidate on the proposed throne. The British and Spanish withdrawal left the United States to cope only with France in Mexico when the Civil War ended.

Spanish intervention in Peru is a much less complex case. There the Spanish overreacted to an effront and exhibited their pride. Perhaps they also had the fleeting glimpse of a Peru again in the folds of the Spanish Empire. In any event, America traditionally exhibited aloofness to any foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere when such intervention was far away as, for example, in the Falkland Islands dispute and the joint intervention in the Rio de la Plata region. Seward sought to have the Peruvians and Spanish use the good offices of the United States. But distance, time, and the instability of Spain's government insured the peaceful settlement of the dispute.

Outside of Spanish intervention the most potentially explosive question in Spanish-American diplomacy existed in the question of Spain's recognition of the Confederacy as an independent nation. The

author believes that Spain would have granted this recognition if Spain had possessed the requisite power. Because the nation was weak, however, she could only follow in the wake of the British and French. If either of these two powers had recognized the South, there was a good chance Spain would have followed suit. They did not, and the bellicose Spaniards were forced to swallow their pride and helplessly view a fleeting opportunity.

The Spaniards did not surrender easily, however, as the numerous small incidents near Cuba illustrate. Seeing another chance to force Spain into war with the United States, the pro-French faction led by General Concha acted to foment a confrontation within the six-mile limit claimed by Cuba. More temperate Spaniards stepped in to ward off any serious incident, but such a bizarre attempt demonstrates the Byzantine nature of Spanish politics as well as the possible importance of seemingly minor occurrences.

Perhaps it was for this reason that both nations worked diligently to insure a peaceful continuation of relations. The Spanish thus shifted their course over Cuba's supposed limits. The United States also sought to prevent an eruption from any small incident. One has only to look at the Montgomery-Blanche affair. A year previously when Captain Wilkes, commanding the United States vessel San Jacinto had taken two Confederate emissaries off the British Trent, he was publicly lionized and promoted. When Captain Hunter, commanding the Montgomery, acted in a no more brash manner, he found himself relieved of his command.

There are several possible answers. Wilkes' action came at a time when most believed in a short war and when victories had been few. Bearding John Bull had helped solidify Union sentiment. October, 1862,

presented a different situation, for the war was older, and had continued longer than almost all had foreseen. Some major accomplishments had been registered and, moreover, Spain was not the caliber of Great Britain and hence was not the same value as a rallying symbol. Most important of all perhaps was the added sagacity and maturity of the State Department. Seward readily assured the Spaniards that if an investigation proved guilt, action to punish would be taken. True to his word, the Secretary of State saw to it that Hunter was removed from his command and eventually court-martialed.

Hunter's fate does not prove Seward to have been cowed by foreign dangers. One has only to turn to New Orleans for evidence to the contrary. There the Secretary of State and the Lincoln Administration, despite the claims of General Butler and his apologists, usually backed the measures taken by the controversial Massachusetts lawyer. It should be pointed out that Butler proved a good although heavy-handed military governor in a potentially explosive situation.

In his book, The American Secretary of State, Alexander De Conde rates the Secretaries of State and concludes that Seward was second in that office only to the brilliant John Quincy Adams. Certainly Adams was confronted by major problems after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. But Adams has been the subject of a Pulitzer Prize winning biography by Samuel Flagg Bemis. Seward, on the other hand, has been relatively neglected by biographer-historians. It is the author's contention that Seward has been the greatest Secretary of State in American history. Certainly his tenure of office covered the most trying years of American history. Insofar as he dealt with Spain, his foreign policy reflects to his credit and helps to explain his greatness.

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This is an excellent collection for use in Santo Domingo's place in Spanish-American diplomacy.

VITA

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