SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL STABILITY:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of Study

Political stability is an important variable in the study of governments, and as such is a matter of considerable interest to students of comparative politics and international relations. In this era of rapid technological advancement, a matter of particular concern is the assumed effect upon stability wrought by social mobilization, a process which takes into account the various ramifications of economic, political and social development. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between social mobilization and political stability as it is found to exist in 10 countries: Argentina, Canada, Israel, Italy, India, Japan, Mexico, Spain, Turkey, and The Philippines. The primary objectives of the thesis are to determine whether social mobilization may significantly affect political stability, and, if so, the manner in which it is affected. The study should prove valuable in helping to determine the impact of social and economic development on the political process, and should contribute, at the same time, to an understanding of why certain social, political, and economic phenomena do or do not tend to go together under certain historical circumstances.

The concept of social mobilization used is adopted from the writings of Karl W. Deutsch, who defined it as simply "a name given to an overall process of change, which happens to substantial parts of the population in countries moving from traditional to modern ways of life."[1] Continuing, Deutsch further defined social mobilization as denoting a concept which brackets together a number of more specific processes of change, such as changes of residence, of occupations, of social setting, of roles and ways of acting, and of experiences and expectations.[2]

Political stability may be defined in any number of ways, but for the precision required by this study it shall be defined as the ability of a government or constitutional order to maintain its authority with a minimum of violence. Purposely excluded from the definition are such concepts as democracy or dictatorship, for governments under any system may be found to be stable or unstable. The definition is sufficiently broad, however, to include in its purview such things as challenges to the government and/or constitutional order, the frequency of changes or attempted changes, and the different levels of violence connected with the political procedures in each country. Thus, orderly and regular changes of government, through a non-violent electoral process, would be considered an indication of stability, while politically-motivated riots or demonstrations, particularly those directed against the regime's authority, would, for example, be

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[1]Karl W. Deutsch,"Social Mobilization and Political Development," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, no. 3, (September, 1961), p. 493.

[2]Ibid.

considered evidence of instability.

As for methodology, selected economic and non-economic indicators will be used to identify and measure the process of social mobilization, and statistical tests will be applied to the data to determine its significance. Since the definition of social mobilization strongly implies a dimension of dynamism, the study will be concerned not only with the degree of social mobilization achieved by the countries, but also with the rate at which it was achieved. The study, therefore, will cover a specific period of time, with the indicators gathered on a year-to-year basis to permit the charting of progress or regression. To measure the degree of stability or instability present in each of the countries, political data will be extracted from actual political events occurring in the nations over a comparable period of time. One objective of the study is to arrive at a ranking of the countries based on both social mobilization and political stability. The former will be determined from the relative position of the indicators of social mobilization based on comparable statistics. The latter will be obtained by encapsulating the political data into an index of stability, which may then be used to rank the countries horizontally. Presented, therefore, with data relating to social mobilization on the one hand, and political stability on the other, it should be possible to correlate the two phenomena in such a way as to demonstrate the relationship.

Need for the Study

The use of statistics in cross-national research naturally had to await the standardization of national bookkeeping and census-taking

procedures. Surprisingly, substantive efforts to this end were initiated as early as 1887, when the International Statistical Institute was founded. The institute prepared the groundwork for the systematic efforts of comparison and standardization later taken up at the governmental level by the League of Nations, the International Labor Office, and the United Nations and its specialized agencies.[3] The wealth of data compiled, however, did not find its way into the social sciences until after World War II. It was at that time, according to Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., that there developed "a trend toward intellectual innovation, efforts to master the new complexities, and an attempt to create a new intellectual order" in the discipline of comparative government.[4] In brief, these efforts at innovation included a search for theoretical order. Three developments were listed as being primarily responsible for this reassessment of goals and strategies:

> 1. The national explosion in the Middle East, Africa and Asia; the emergence into statehood of a multiple of nations with a bewildering variety of cultures, social institutions, and political characteristics;
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> 2. The loss of dominance of the nations of the Atlantic community; the diffusion of international power and influence into the former colonial and semi-colonial areas;
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> 3. The emergence of Communism as a powerful competitor in the struggle to shape the structure of national politics and of the international political system.[5]

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[3]Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations, (New Haven, Connecticut, 1966), p. 10.

[4]Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics, (Boston, 1966), p. 6.

[5]Ibid., p. 5.

These developments, which clearly demonstrated the rapidly-changing nature of the international community in the post-World War II era, produced a flurry of activity within the social sciences. Economists became concerned with precise analyses of rates and patterns of growth. Sociologists became concerned with comparative measures of processes and structural change. And students of politics, previously absorbed with single systems, became concerned with schemes of comparison and tried to devise ways of testing their hypotheses quantitatively. These activities, in turn, led to the decisive breakthrough in quantitative research in the 1950s.[6] The focal point for the subsequent research and the new methodologies it spawned was the underdeveloped world.

W. W. Rostow was among the first to suggest different stages of economic growth.[7] By defining economic growth and development as a continuous, on-going, and goal-oriented process, he helped pave the way for further studies focusing on the period of transition from one stage to another. Of particular significance was his concept of the "take-off," an interval of only two or three decades in which the economy and the society undergo a radical transformation leading to "automatic" growth.[8] Taking the cue from Rostow, Bert F. Hoselitz saw economic growth as a "...process which affects not only purely economic relations

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[6]Merritt and Rokkan, p. 11.

[7]W. W. Rostow, "The Take-Off Into Self-Sustained Growth," The Economic Journal, Vol. 66, (March, 1956), pp. 25-48.

[8]Ibid., p. 25.

but the entire social, political, and cultural fabric of a society."[9] This viewpoint, if not revolutionary, was a major contribution to a growing body of evidence which urged the addition of a new and behavioral dimension to the study of developing nations. A step in this direction already had been taken by George A. Theodorsen, who asserted that the industrialization of "nonmachine" societies eventually would lead to the development of "new societal patterns."[10] In time, he maintained, these new patterns would resemble certain dominant patterns of Western industrialized society, including the creation of new roles, new skills, and new elites. Neil J. Smelser, who analyzed the relationships between economic growth and the social structure, added to the literature by isolating four functional processes which he said have ramifications throughout society. These are: (1) In the realm of technology, the change from simple and traditionalized techniques toward the application of scientific knowledge. (2) In agriculture, the evolution from subsistence farming toward commercial production of agricultural goods. (3) In industry, the transition from the use of human and animal power toward industrialization. (4) In ecological arrangements, the movement from the farm and village toward urban centers.[11]

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[9]Bert F. Hoselitz, "Economic Growth and Development: Noneconomic Factors in Economic Development," The American Economic Review, Vol. 47, no. 2, (May, 1957), p. 36.

[10]George A. Theodorsen, "Acceptance of Industrialization and Its Attendant Consequences for the Social Patterns of Non-Western Societies," The American Sociological Review, Vol. 18, no. 5, (October, 1953), p. 477.

[11]Neil J. Smelser, "Mechanisms of Change and Adjustment to Change," Political Development and Social Change, eds., Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, (New York, 1966), pp. 28-29.

Additional studies concentrated on defining those social and cultural features associated with the evolutionary process of development. Such criteria were used by Manning Nash, for instance, in his design of a diagnostic scheme for the study of developing areas based upon social stratification, the value system, the economic subsystem, and the political subsystem.[12] Nash dealt with the essence of politics: His study centered on the choice to institute changes, the bringing together of means and facilities to implement the choice, and the organization of social and cultural life.[13]

In generalizing about societies moving from one stage of economic development to another, it is reasonable to say that the political systems in such societies tend to assume new tasks and responsibilities. For example, frequently accompanying economic development are greater expenditures in the areas of health, education and welfare. The shift from a barter system to a money economy may produce more emphasis upon interventional measures designed to prevent inflation or deflation. If trust in the officialdom happens to correspond with increased wages and salaries, banking systems may emerge to encourage savings and lead to the accumulation of private capital. In short, both the economic and political systems become complex. Inasmuch as increasing complexity stimulates the organizing of political parties and special interest groups, the systems eventually tend to become more decentralized as political power and economic power are dispersed among an ever-

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[12]Manning Nash, "Some Social and Cultural Aspects of Economic Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 7, no. 2, (January, 1959), pp. 145-146.

[13]Ibid., pp. 139-140.

widening plurality of individuals and organizations.[14] At the same time, however, powers may evolve or be created at the center as governments take on new duties in the transitional stage between traditional and modern societies. A key factor in the functional analysis of power dispersion and power realignment is the concept of political development.

In its most general form, political development may be defined as "...a process by which a political system acquires an increased capacity to sustain successfully and continuously new types of demands and goals and the creation of new types of organizations."[15] Functionally, political development may take many forms, no fewer than 10 of which are identified and discussed by Lucian W. Pye.[16] Of greatest significance to this study is Pye's view of political development as mobilization and power:

> When political development is conceived of in terms of mobilization and an increase in the absolute level of power in the society, it becomes possible to distinguish both a purpose for development and also a wide range of characteristics associated with development. Many of these characteristics, in turn, can be measured, and hence, it is possible to construct indices of development.[17]

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[14]J. J. Spengler, "Economic Development: Political Preconditions and Political Consequences," Journal of Politics, Vol. 22, no. 3, (August, 1960), pp. 415-416.

[15]Alfred Diamant, "The Nature of Political Development," Political Development and Social Change, eds., Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, p. 92.

[16]Lucian W. Pye, "The Concept of Political Development," Political Development and Social Change, eds., Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, pp. 83-91.

[17]Ibid., p. 89.

A number of political scientists have addressed themselves to the theoretical and practical applications of the formula set down in the above quotations. This study, in part, is itself concerned with the construction of indices of development and the measurement of the range of characteristics associated with development. In anticipation of research using statistical indicators of development, Deutsch proposed a broad range of social and economic indices for the construction of what he termed "national profiles."[18] Also, Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman have compared nations according to their relative "modernity" by using such indicators as urbanization, literacy, per capita income (and per capita gross national product), geographical and social mobility, industrialization, communications, and participation by members of the society in modern social and economic processes.[19] A rigorous analysis of these factors enabled the authors to support their working hypothesis that economic development could be positively correlated with political competitiveness.[20] Equally significant was the study conducted by Seymour Martin Lipset, who used various indices of development--wealth, industrialization, and urbanization--to support his hypothesis that democracy is related to the state of economic development.[21] In each case, Lipset discovered, the average wealth, degree of

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[18] Karl W. Deutsch, "Toward and Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 54, no. 1, (March, 1960), pp. 34-57.

[19] Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton, New Jersey, 1960), p. 532.

[20] Ibid., p. 538.

[21] Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, (New York, 1960), pp. 31-32.

industrialization, and level in education was much higher for the more democratic countries.[22] Lipset further concluded that "...all the various aspects of economic development--industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education--are so closely related as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy."[23] These findings were in strong support of conclusions drawn in an earlier study by Daniel Lerner.[24] Working with the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Lerner found a close connection between urbanization, literacy, voting rates, media consumption and production, and education. Simple and multiple correlations between the four basic variables, based on United Nations statistics from 54 countries, produced these results:[25]

Dependent Variable	Multiple Correlation Coefficient
Urbanization	.61
Literacy	.91
Media Participation	.84
Political Participation	.82

Lerner's findings prompted him to observe that the evolution of a participant society involved a regular sequence of three phases: First comes urbanization; next comes literacy, which helps develop media, which in turn spreads more literacy, and finally comes the mass production of all forms of media, made possible by advancements in technology. "Out of this interaction," Lerner reported, "develop those institutions

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[22]Ibid., p. 32.

[23]Ibid., p. 41.

[24]Daniel Lerner, The Passing of the Traditional Society, (Glencoe, New York, 1958), pp. 54-65.

[25]Ibid., p. 62.

of participation (e.g., voting) which we find in all advanced societies."[26]

By using a more numerous and more diversified set of indicators, Deutsch sought to bring together the broad range of characteristics associated with economic development into a single process called social mobilization. Drawing on the research of Lerner and Lipset, Deutsch postulated a high degree of correlation among the various indicators, and suggested that a significant upward thrust by any one of the selected indicators would have a corresponding effect on the others. To use his terminology, each indicator would have a "threshold of criticality," at which point significant changes, or side effects, in other political and social processes would appear.[27] This is consistent with and related to Lerner's thesis that urbanization stimulates literacy; the two in concert help produce participation in the media, and the interaction of the three lead to greater political participation, as reflected in such indicators as voting rates. Thus Deutsch sets forth the proposition that social mobilization is significant for politics, and that the processes involved in social mobilization may act, in their cumulative effects, to transform political behavior. In illustrating the possibility of applying his model, Deutsch compiled partial data for 19 countries.

The foregoing research points clearly in the direction taken by this study. It has been shown, by a selective review of the literature, that economic development tends to follow a pattern of growth in stages.

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[26] Ibid., p. 60.

[27] Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," p. 497.

It has been shown that economic development appears to effect direct changes in the social, political, and cultural life of a country. With a range of both economic and non-economic characteristics associated with the overall process of development, it becomes possible to devise a number of indices of development. These indicators, in turn, may be measured statistically from one period of time to another. Finally, Deutsch's study proposes an analytical scheme demonstrating that the entire process of development, i.e., social mobilization, may be subjected to quantitative examination. The indicators suggested by Deutsch for quantification include gross national product per capita, population, percent of radio audience, percent of newspaper readers, percent of literates, percent of work force in non-agricultural occupations, and percent of urban population.[28]

This study proposes to apply Deutsch's model, in its general outlines, to the 10 nations named above. The questions guiding the research are these: Can the process of social mobilization be measured? If so, what are the effects of social mobilization on the peoples and institutions of countries undergoing the process? The first question may be approached by subjecting the selected nations to a searching analysis based on the Deutsch model. The conclusions of this examination will rest upon whatever patterns evolve in each of the 10 countries. The second question may be approached from a comparison of the degree of social mobilization in each of the countries with the relative stability of each of the countries. In its totality, the study is expected to yield generalizations relating to the consequences

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[28] Ibid., p. 504.

of stagnation as well as rapid development. At best, correlations so convincing as to indicate probable causal relationships will result. At the other extreme, the model may prove insufficient for the purposes for which it was designed.

Theoretical Framework

In essence, this study shall be conducted along two lines of analysis: The first shall seek to determine the degree and rate of social mobilization in each of the 10 countries, as determined by the position of the indicators and their average annual rate of increase or decrease. The second line of analysis shall consist of a comparison of social mobilization with the political correlate of stability.

For purposes of refinement, the Deutsch notion of the two "thresholds" will be employed.[29] The first of these is the "threshold of significance," which postulates that a significant movement in the level of any one of the indicators will result in a significant movement by the other indicators. Conversely, this notion holds that there is a numerical value below which no significant departure from the customary workings of the society can be detected. For example, the threshold of significance for the indicator of literacy might be 50 percent. Until that level is reached, no significant movements in the other indicators would be detected, indicating that the process of social mobilization in that country has either not yet begun or is at a low stage. Once the 50 percent level is reached, however, jumps in such indicators as newspaper circulation, urbanization, and percentage of the work force

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[29] Ibid., p. 497.

in non-agricultural occupations might occur. To this study, the value of the threshold of significance--if such may be detected--may lie in its ability to help the researcher analyze the social mobilization process on a dynamic, year-to-year basis. The second threshold is the "threshold of criticality," which posits changes in social or political side effects when each of the indicators has reached a certain "critical" level. To merely speculate for purposes of offering an example, one threshold of criticality, insofar as stability is concerned, may lie at a figure of $200 in the indicator of gross national product per capita. At this point, certain characteristics of instability, such as riots or demonstrations, might appear. Another threshold of criticality may be a gross national product per capita of $1,000, at which point those elements of instability may begin to disappear. It is doubtful that such clearly-drawn lines may be detected, but the use of this threshold may aid in the interpretation of the impact of rapid development upon the stability of a nation.

To summarize, the theoretical framework of this study may be stated as follows:

1. Social mobilization is viewed as the process through which significant parts of the population are introduced to new patterns and functions as a country undergoes social, economic, and political development.

2. Such development may be measured by breaking it down into the component parts of various types of demographic changes, geographical and occupational mobility, literacy, communications, and economic progress or regression.

3. As statistics for each of these processes are compiled and interpreted on a year-to-year basis, it is possible to determine the degree and rate of social mobilization by computing the changes in each of the selected indicators.

4. Based on the degree of social mobilization and the rate of social mobilization, the nations can be ranked in relation to one another for comparative purposes.

5. These countries may then be compared with one another on the basis of stability, as determined by the political histories of each of the countries, to arrive at separate rankings.

6. At this point, the different rankings may be correlated in such a manner as to determine the relationships, if any, between social mobilization and political stability.

7. To aid in the interpretation and analysis of statistics relating to the process of social mobilization, and political data relating to stability, levels of significance and criticality may be investigated in accordance with the thresholds of significance and criticality.

Hypotheses

The major hypothesis for this study is that the rate and degree of social mobilization do have significance for the political process. It is anticipated that the research in this study will indicate that those countries ranking high in social mobilization will differ, in their political essentials, from those countries ranking low in terms of social mobilization. This difference, it is expected, will be discernible from a study of the political stability of each of the countries. Connected with this major hypothesis are three corollary hypotheses:

1. A certain amount of stability in the government or in the constitutional order is necessary before rapid social mobilization may take place. Without such stability, it is submitted, a country will be unable to embark upon the programs and processes necessary to mobilize its population to any significant degree.

2. In the short run, rapid social mobilization will place stresses and strains upon the political process which will be made manifest by indications of recurrent violence or instability. In other words, the social mobilization process will place demands on the systems which may be too great to be fulfilled, thus upsetting the political equilibrium.

3. In the long run, the social mobilization process will become institutionalized to such a degree that rapid social and economic development may continue without straining the political process. Under this situation, a country's political system would be so highly developed as to absorb the additional demands placed upon it by a population experiencing social mobilization without upsetting the political equilibrium.

Methodology

Selection and Use of Indicators

Indicators used in this study are workable from the standpoints of both availability and economy: They are, for the most part, readily available, and, though few in number, they combine and illuminate those factors which make it possible to identify and measure the process of social mobilization. Previous studies based on similar data have

demonstrated their usefulness in yielding generalizations concerning economic development and social and political factors. For example, Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris conducted a factor analysis of per capita gross national product and a large number of social and political variables for the period from 1957 to 1962. The results of their analysis showed "...that a remarkably high percentage of inter-country variations in the levels of economic development...are associated with differences in non-economic characteristics."[30] In another study, Edward G. Stockwell found a high correlation between economic development, based on per capita income, and such demographic variables as death rate, birth rate, and infant mortality.[31] All of the indicators used in this study were adopted from the Deutsch model, with the exception of birth rate. It was substituted in favor of raw population figures in order to further refine the social and demographic aspects of the social mobilization index.

The birth rate indicator is intended to measure the propensity of the population to increase or decrease in relation to other factors of development. In many underdeveloped countries with high birth rates, according to C. E. Black, "the growth in population may outstrip by a considerable margin any possible expansion in the output of food and manufactured goods."[32] Thus, per capita gross national product may

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[30]Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, "A Factor Analysis of the Interrelationships Between Social and Political Variables and Per Capita Gross National Product," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 79, no. 4, (November, 1965), p. 556.

[31]Edward G. Stockwell, "The Measurement of Economic Development," Economic Development, Vol. 8, no. 4, part 1, (July, 1960), pp.419-432.

[32]C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, (New York, 1966), p. 30.

decline even under conditions of growth in agriculture or industry. Also, this indicator may be helpful in reflecting traditional values and behavioral patterns of the peoples of countries which are reluctant (or inclined) to adopt birth control measures.[33] By the same token, an analysis of this indicator in relation to other indicators may disclose that a country is unable to employ birth control measures because of poor medical practices, poor communications, or poor transportation facilities. The United Nations Demographic Yearbook contains statistics on the crude birth rate per 1,000 of population on a year-to-year basis.

The second indicator used in this study is the percentage of the work force engaged in non-agricultural occupations. This indicator may be used to measure the ability or inclination of the inhabitants of a country to move from ascribed occupations (those resulting from circumstances of birth) to achieved occupations (those based on acquired skills or achievement). The indicator may also be used to approximate the extent of mechanization in agriculture, as determined by the percentage of population necessary to produce food for the country as a whole. Finally, the indicator provides some insight into the industrialization of a country, as determined by the number of jobs available outside the agricultural sector. Statistics disclosing the percentage of the work force engaged in agricultural occupations are found in the Production Yearbook of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization. To determine the percentage of work force engaged in non-agricultural occupations, the figures will be subtracted from 100

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[33] Ibid.

percent.

The third indicator used in this study is the percentage of population in the urban areas. In general, this indicator tends to reinforce the one described in the above paragraph, and may be used as an aid to the understanding and interpretation of the same processes. At the same time, however, this indicator measures another unique but vital phenomenon: The attraction of the city to the rural dweller. Urbanization, as previously demonstrated by the Lipset and Lerner studies, is a dominant feature in the transition from a traditional to a modern society.[34] Though statistics relating to urbanization on a year-to-year basis are extremely scarce, Bruce M. Russett provides a figure for one year, along with the indicator's average annual increase, in his World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators. From these two figures, a reasonably accurate estimation of urbanization in a country for any given year in the past two decades may be computed. For purposes of comparison, Russett defines an urban area as one having a population of at least 20,000 persons.

The fourth indicator used in this study is literacy, based on the percentage of literate population aged 15 and over. This indicator is intended to measure both the availability of education and the commitment of the population and government to the attainment of minimal educational standards. Literacy also is important in seeking to determine the extent to which the mass media may be spread throughout the population, and thus the degree to which the printed mass media may be used to stimulate the mobilizational process. The age of 15 is used to

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[34]See page 10.

include the adult population, and exclude, for the time being, those children who may drop out of the elementary school at an early age and lose, through disuse, their ability to read and write. Statistics for this indicator are found in the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook.

The fifth and sixth indicators used in this study are the number of radio receiving sets per 1,000 persons and the number of daily newspaper copies circulated per 1,000 persons. The size of the communications network not only reflects the economic development of the society--for a relatively high level of technology is necessary to produce and sustain a mass media--but also the involvement of the society in its environment, since a mass media may not survive without a ready market for information. These indicators may be measured not only in raw numbers, through statistics printed in the UNESCO Statistical Year-Book, but also in terms of audience participation. Using techniques devised by Deutsch for the social mobilization model, one may arrive at the percentage of population exposed to radio broadcasting by multiplying the number of radio sets per 100 persons by a factor of four, and the percentage of population exposed to daily newspapers by multiplying the number of newspaper copies circulated per 100 persons by a factor of three.[35] Assuming each radio set reaches an audience of four persons and each newspaper reaches three readers, broadcasting saturation is attained at a ratio of 25 radios for every 100 persons, and maximum newspaper readership (among the literate population) is attained at a ratio of 33 newspaper copies for every 100 persons.

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[35]Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," p. 511.

The seventh and final indicator used in this study is gross national product per capita. As an indicator of economic development, this variable has found general acceptance among persons widely credited with having expertise in the field, including Deutsch, Almond, Coleman, and Russett.[36] This indicator has particular significance for the social mobilization process in that it compensates for population increase or decrease in relation to the growth or decline in agriculture and industry. Figures used in this study will be taken from data compiled by the Agency for International Development, and will be corrected to the value of the 1965 United States dollar.

Selection of Countries

Three essential requirements should be met by any group of countries selected for use in this study: First, complete or near-complete data should be available for each of them. Second, the nations selected should represent a broad range of economic development to determine whether a model based on social mobilization would have universal applicability. Third, the nations should be well-scattered geographically, in order that different cultures, historical backgrounds, and religious values might be included. The group of countries selected for this study--Argentina, Canada, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Japan, Spain, The Philippines, India, and Turkey--meet each of these requirements.

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[36] Bruce M. Russett, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, (New Haven, Connecticut, 1964), p. 149, and previously cited studies.

Determination of Social Mobilization

The time period covered by this study includes the years 1950 through 1965, a total of 16 years. This provides a period short enough to be manageable, yet long enough, in the researcher's judgment, to reflect fully-established trends. It also permits the inclusion of three nations which gained independence in the post-World War II era--The Philippines, India, and Israel--and three nations which suffered physical damage during the war: The Philippines, Japan, and Italy. Furthermore, the period covers the post-war boom which provides an excellent laboratory for the study of economic development. More so than in virtually any other period of time, the indicators of social mobilization should have experienced significant movements.

Statistics for each of the indicators used in this study will be gathered for each of the years in the period covered by the study, thus permitting a comparison of the relative degree of social and economic development in each of the countries from 1950 through 1965. Based on the data for 1950 and 1965, an average annual increase or decrease for each of the indicators may be computed. This will reveal the rate of progress or regression for each of the indicators, and, when considered as a whole, the rate of social mobilization for each of the countries. To compensate for the relative positions of the countries in the period prior to the base year of this study, the degree of development must be considered along with the rate of development. Charts based on social mobilization would show, therefore, the degree of social and economic development in 1965, the degree of social and economic development as of 1950, and the average annual increase, in plus or minus terms, for

each of the indicators. This chart will depict all 10 nations ranked in order of the degree of social mobilization in 1965. The average annual increase in the indicators will illustrate the rate, or speed, with which a nation might move from one stage of development to another. Other charts will be prepared comparing all of the countries according to a single variable. These charts should yield information concerning the threshold of significance, or the point at which movements in some variables may tend to be accompanied or followed by movements in other variables.

Determination of Stability

Stability, while one of the most widely used concepts in political analysis, is at the same time one of the most difficult to precisely define and measure. If stability were to be defined as the maintenance of a particular system of government or constitutional order, then how should one interpret the peaceful adoption of a new constitution providing for new and different political institutions? On the other hand, if stability were to be defined as the continuance in power of a particular individual or party, then how should one interpret orderly, if frequent, elections? The difficult in determining the stability of a country by either of the definitions is demonstrated by the case of the Third French Republic. When viewed in accordance with the first definition, the country at that time would seem to have been stable; when judged by the second definition, it would be considered unstable. For such reasons, this study combines the two definitions and adds the concept of violence, considering stability to mean the ability of a government and/or constitutional order to maintain its authority with

a minimum of violence.

Naturally, it is recognized that there are degrees of stability as well as instability. Any scale attempting to measure this variable, based on the given definition, should take into account the differing levels of violence within a normally stable government or constitutional order. Also, the scale should be able to approximate the point at which stability begins to break down. With these considerations in mind, it was decided to devise an index which would permit the measurement of stability in accordance with a broad range of political events. To enhance the validity of such an index, it was further decided that the criteria should be based upon actual political events taking place in the countries studied. To this end, the political histories of all 10 nations were researched through the files of the New York Times Index. Information was gathered for the period from 1951 to 1966, advanced one year beyond the period used in the social mobilization index to permit evaluation of the political events in light of the mobilization data. From such information, 27 criteria were obtained, ranging from the hypothetical case of no political activity, numbered zero, to the case of a government overthrown by a general uprising, numbered 26. Listed in ascending order from "peaceful stability" to "violent instability," these criteria are:

0. No cabinet resignations; no elections; government continues.

1. Occasional resignations from cabinet; government remains unchanged.

2. Cabinet is re-organized, but no elections are held and governmental leadership remains unchanged.

3. Cabinet resigns, but executive leadership remains unchanged. New government formed without elections.

4. Government resigns and incumbent party wins election under the old leadership.

5. Government resigns and incumbent party wins elections under new leadership.

6. Government resigns and opposition wins election and forms new government or new coalition to govern.

7. Political demonstrations held to oppose government or seek redress from grievances.

8. Political strikes held to oppose government or seek redress.

9. Isolated rioting occurs in states or cities.

10. Occasional rioting occurs in states or cities.

11. Wide-spread rioting occurs over one-half or more of the geographical area.

12. Plot to overthrow government verified and thwarted.

13. Isolated terrorist activity occurs, including bombings, sabotage and/or attempted assassinations.

14. Occasional terrorist activity occurs, including political murders and assassination.

15. Wide-spread terrorist activity occurs.

16. Central government assumes control of an internal area, under regular constitutional provisions.

17. Government declares a "state of siege" or "state of emergency" without suspending the constitution.

18. Constitution or any of its provisions, including elections and right of habeas corpus, is suspended.

19. Martial law is imposed as an emergency measure to pacify internal areas.

20. Martial law is imposed to preserve stability of the government or constitutional order.

21. Organized armed resistance occurs, with no attempt to overthrow the government or constitutional order.

22. Organized armed resistance occurs with intent to overthrow government or impose new constitutional order.

23. Government survives an unsuccessful attempt at coup d'etat.

24. Government becomes threatened by rebellion and open civil war.

25. Government overthrown by coup d'etat or palace revolution.

26. Government overthrown by rebellion and open civil war.

As can be seen, the first nine steps of this scale--from zero through number eight--indicate governmental stability without violence. The next 13 steps--from nine through 21--indicate different degrees of stability with violence. The last five steps of the scale--from 22 through 26--indicate instability. Thus it may be shown that stability may be maintained through a rather broad range of violent activity, up to a point where the level of violence begins to constitute a threat to the governmental order. Certain acts which may be bloodless in themselves--such as the suspension of the constitution or a neat coup d'etat, must be accorded a high place on the scale because of the violent wrenching of the political process.

Based on this scale, a graph may be drawn to illustrate the levels of stability for each of the 10 nations for the period from 1951 through 1966. These graphs may then be compared with the degree of social mobilization and the rate of social mobilization. From these

comparisons, generalizations regarding the relationship between the two factors may be interpolated.

The next chapter of this thesis shall consist of an overview of the data gathered on both social mobilization and political stability, with particular emphasis on the interrelationship among the variables of social mobilization. In Chapter III shall be presented the findings of the study as they relate to the hypotheses, with individual countries discussed at length. The final chapter shall consist of a discussion of the conclusions and implications of the research contained in this study.

CHAPTER II

OVERVIEW OF THE DATA

This chapter will deal with the determination and ranking of the countries according to the degree and rate of social mobilization and the determination and ranking of the countries according to political stability. To introduce the findings, data relating to these topics will first be presented generally, with a more in-depth analysis to follow.

Table I ranks the countries according to the degree of social mobilization based on statistics for the year 1965. It is structured in such a way as to show the degree of social mobilization in the year 1950, and to report as well the percentage of average annual increase for each of the indicators. In terms of social mobilization, a decrease in the birth rate per 1,000 is counted as an increase, and therefore is scored as a "plus" instead of a "minus." The rankings were determined by the overall position of the indicators, with Canada, being highest in gross national product per capita, percentage of population in non-agricultural occupations, and radios, and second highest in literacy and newspaper copies per 1,000, ranking first. If all indicators other than gross national product per capita were equal or nearly equal, the ranking was determined by the higher figure for gross national product per capita, which, for example, places Italy ahead of Japan. On the lower end of the scale, Turkey had a higher gross national product per

TABLE I

DEGREE AND RATE OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

Country and Rank	GNP/CAP $U.S.	% Literate	% Urban	% Non-ag. occupation	News-papers	% Newspaper Audience	Radios	% Radio Audience	Birthrate
I. Canada									
1965	2451	99.7	40.5	91	227	68.1	536	100	21.4
1950	1810	97.0	37.1	79	287	86.1	370	100	27.1
% AAI*	2.36	.11	.22	.80	-1.6	-1.2	2.9	-	.38
II. Israel									
1965	1325	85.4	62.9	88	143	42.9	288	100	25.8
1950	591	93.7	55.0	88	234	70.2	122	48.8	34.7
% AAI	8.27	-.26	.39	-	-4.2	-1.82	9.0	3.6	.60
III. Italy									
1965	1100	94.1	32.9	76	113	33.9	213	85.2	19.2
1950	541	85.5	29.4	60	98	29.4	68	27.2	19.5
% AAI	6.87	.51	.23	1.6	1.0	.30	14.2	3.9	.02
IV. Japan									
1965	863	99.9	50.1	73.0	451	100	220	88.0	18.6
1950	280	90.0	40.5	51	219	65.7	111	44.4	28.2
% AAI	13.2	.76	.64	1.5	7.0	2.3	6.4	2.9	.66
V. Argentina									
1965	718	93.9	52	82	148	44.4	309	100	21.5
1950	591	86.4	46.8	75	207	621	128	51.2	25.6
% AAI	1.42	.50	.34	.46	-2.7	-1.2	9.4	3.3	.27

*Average annual increase.

SOURCE: For information regarding the various sources, see Appendix A.

TABLE I (Continued)

Country and Rank	GNP/CAP $U.S.	% Literate	% Urban	% Non-ag. occupation	News-papers	% Newspaper Audience	Radios	% Radio Audience	Birthrate
VI. Spain									
1965	688	90.4	46.4	65.0	153	45.9	136	54.5	21.3
1950	320	82.4	39.8	48.0	60	18.0	32	12.8	20.2
% AAI	7.66	.73	.44	1.2	10.3	1.9	21.7	2.8	-.07
VII. Mexico									
1965	455	68.7	33.0	48	116	34.8	206	82.4	44.2
1950	304	56.8	24.0	35	46	13.8	73	29.2	45.5
% AAI	3.32	.65	.60	.87	7.2	1.3	12.1	3.6	.09
VIII. Philippines									
1965	161	84.7	45	41	17	5.1	44	17.6	24.6
1950	106	60.0	12.7	31	26	7.8	4	1.6	31.7
% AAI	3.66	1.4	2.3	.70	-3.5	-.18	66.0	1.1	.47
IX. Turkey									
1965	261	43.1	21.0	28.0	45	13.5	77	30.8	43
1950	181	31.9	17.2	14.0	15	4.5	17	6.8	43
% AAI	2.95	.98	.26	.90	13.3	.60	23.5	1.6	--
X. India									
1965	101	24.8	14.5	30.0	12	3.6	10	4.0	38.4
1950	78	19.0	11.8	28.0	6	1.8	1	.4	41.7
% AAI	1.96	27	.18	.13	6.7	.12	66.0	.26	.22

capita than The Philippines, but was considerably behind in the indicators of literacy, urbanization, percentage of population in non-agricultural occupations, and birth rate, which gives The Philippines the higher position.

As can be seen from the line marked "percentage of average annual increase," the rate of social mobilization is greatest for those countries in the middle portion of the scale. Canada, which had the highest degree of social mobilization in 1950, has an understandably low rate of social mobilization, since there was little room for improvement in most of the indicators. India, on the other hand, also had the lowest degree of social mobilization in 1950. Its rate of social mobilization, consequently, is also the lowest of the 10 countries. The highest rate of social mobilization belongs to Japan, followed by Israel, Italy, and Spain. The other countries have comparatively lower rates of social mobilization, though, in some indicators, the development is more rapid. The Philippines, for example, has the greatest average annual increase in the percentage of literate population of all 10 countries. Its increase in the percentage of urban dwellers also is highest, but the other indicators have either decreased or increased slowly.

Table II ranks the countries according to political stability and levels of violence. The rankings were determined by the peaks in the violence levels recorded over the 16-year period from 1951 to 1966. Graphs charting the violence levels and instability, based on the instability index devised for this study, are included in Appendix B. The appendix also includes a description of the year-to-year political events in each of the countries, highlighted by the occurrence which determined its placement on the graph in each year. Of the 10

TABLE II

Country and Stability Rank	Stability Indicators
1. Canada	Peaceful elections; opposition party victories in 1957 and 1963; terrorist act in 1966.
2. Israel	Terrorist activity from 1953 through 1957; demonstrations until 1963; incumbent party victory in 1964.
3. Italy	Strikes and isolated rioting until 1959; isolated terrorism in 1961; elections in 1964 and 1966.
4. Japan	Wide-spread rioting in 1952, again in 1960 and 1961; plot to overthrow government in 1962; demonstrations up to 1966.
5. Mexico	Rebellion in 1954; state goes under governmental control in 1961; plot revealed in 1966.
6. Spain	Constitution suspended in 1956 and 1958; State of emergency declared in 1962.
7. Philippines	Continual fighting between Huk guerillas and government troops; elections marred by shootings.
8. India	War with Naga rebels; wide-spread rioting and terrorism; government assumes control over areas.
9. Turkey	Coup d'etat in 1960; threats in 1961, 1962, and 1963.
10. Argentina	Government overthrown three times in 16 years; five coup attempts fail.

countries, only Argentina and Turkey experienced instability, due, in both cases, to violent changes in the government. The other countries, while all are relatively stable, were ranked in accordance with the overall level of violence.

Indicators of Social Mobilization

It is suggested throughout this study that the process of social mobilization may be measured by the social and economic indicators of gross national product per capita, literacy, urbanization, percentage of the work force in non-agricultural occupations, newspaper distribution, radio listeners, and birth rate. The use of such indicators rests upon the assumption that, as a nation becomes more highly developed economically, its citizenship has greater educational opportunity, excess farm population becomes siphoned off for attractive jobs in the cities, a greater market is created for the mass media, and birth rates tend to decrease. It cannot be assumed that the process occurs in precisely the same manner in countries all over the earth, or that the variables involved in the process will increase or decrease at the same rates in relation to one another. Some nations, for example, may place a premium on universal education, while others do not. The most that can be suggested is that these processes tend to go together in similar circumstances. To test this assumption, correlation coefficients for all the variables were computed. If the variables correlated at a reasonably high level, one could then be satisfied that they were measuring the same process, i.e., that of social mobilization. The results of the correlations, based upon statistics from the 10 countries for the year 1965, are presented in Table III.

TABLE III

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDICATORS OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION, 1965

Variable	GNP/CAP	Literacy	Urban	% Non-ag.	News-papers	Radios	Births
GNP/CAP		.65	.34	.86	.33	.97	-.57
Literacy			.77	.82	.62	.63	-.85
Urban				.66	.32	.83	-.58
% Non-ag.					.50	.89	-.82
Newspapers						.50	-.54
Radios							-.51
Births							

Of the 21 correlations in the matrix, 18 are above .50, 12 are above .60, seven are above .80, and one is above .90. While a sample of only 10 countries is perhaps too small to completely eliminate the element of chance, the correlations seem to demonstrate that the factors used herein to measure social mobilization are strongly associated. The negative correlations in the birth rate column result from the strong relationship between low birth rates and relatively high social and economic development. The variable which correlates most consistently with the other factors of social mobilization is literacy. If this does not demonstrate that literacy is the most important variable in the measurement of social mobilization, it does indicate that this variable, more so than any other, tends to keep pace with the increases in the other six indicators. Of particular interest is the high

negative correlation between literacy and birth rates, which demonstrates a probable relationship between high literacy and low birth rates, and vice versa. The correlation takes on added significance when, upon examining Table I, it is seen that no country with a literacy rate of more than 80 percent has a birth rate of more than 25 per thousand. Even The Philippines, which ranks comparatively low among all the other indicators of social mobilization, bears this out with a literacy rate of 84.7 percent and a birth rate of 24.6 per 1,000. It may therefore be concluded that, among the 10 countries in this study, a literacy rate of 80 percent has a threshold of criticality for the birth rate; that is, it is at the 80 percent level in the literacy column that a significant movement is observed in the birth rate column.

Indicators which also correlate extremely well with the other factors of social mobilization, excepting newspaper distribution, are the percentage of work force in non-agricultural occupations and the number of radio sets per 1,000 persons. Thus these factors, too, have great significance for the social mobilization process. The relatively low correlations between newspaper circulation and the other factors of social mobilization appear surprising. One would assume, and previous studies have indicated,[1] that increasing social and economic development is accompanied by increasingly higher newspaper circulation. Statistics gathered for this study indicate this is true only up to a

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[1]Wilbur Schramm and W. Lee Ruggels, "How Mass Media Systems Grow," Communication and Change in the Developing Countries, eds., Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm, (Honolulu, 1967), pp. 57-75. See also previously-cited studies by Lerner and Lipset.

point of relatively high development, at which time the electronic media eventually begin to replace newspapers. Evidence for such a conclusion may be derived from the extremely high correlation between radio sets and the other indicators of social mobilization, particularly between radio sets per 1,000 and gross national product per capita. The evidence would be strengthened if the correlations between newspaper circulation and the other indicators of social mobilization were noticably higher for a group of less-developed nations. That such is the case may be seen from correlations between the same variables for the same countries based on statistics from the year 1950, when the nations were at correspondingly lower stages of development (Table IV).

TABLE IV

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDICATORS OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION, 1950

Variable	GNP/CAP	Literacy	Urban	% Non-ag.	News-papers	Radios	Births
GNP/CAP		.60	.43	.68	.75	.97	-.45
Literacy			.85	.88	.82	.62	-.57
Urban				.88	.82	.49	-.50
% Non-ag.					.85	.69	-.54
Newspapers						.85	-.42
Radios							-.28
Births							

Table IV illustrates the strong correlation between newspapers and the other factors of social mobilization in the year 1950. Radios, on the other hand, were less highly correlated with literacy, urbanization, and percentage of work force in non-agricultural occupations. The point may be further illustrated by referring to Appendix A which depicts the degree of social mobilization in all of the countries for each of the years from 1950 through 1965. Four of the countries--Canada, Israel, Argentina, and The Philippines--show a net loss in newspaper circulation while registering overall gains in radio sets. Italy, in the four years during which it jumped in radio sets from 180 per 1,000 to 213 per 1,000 dropped in newspaper circulation from 122 per 1,000 to 113 per 1,000. Mexico, while increasing radio sets per 1,000 from 184 to 206 in the year between 1964 and 1965, dropped in newspaper copies per 1,000 from 151 to 116 in the same year. In Turkey and Spain, newspaper circulation has remained at an even keel in recent years while radios have continued on the upswing. The only exceptions to this pattern are India, which is still striving to develop a mass media, and Japan, which displays a voracious appetite for newspapers as well as radios. Finally, it may be seen that while radios correlate with gross national product per capita at the extremely high level of .97 for both the years 1965 and 1950, newspapers correlated with the same variable at a high .75 in 1950 and a low .33 in 1965. For the wealthier nations, it appears, radios are replacing newspapers as the source of information. Generally, newspaper circulation tends to decrease when radio sets reach a level of around 200 per 1,000, suggesting another threshold of criticality.

Overall, the correlations between the indicators of social mobilization are somewhat higher for the year 1950 than for the year 1965. This suggests that the factors of social mobilization are more closely allied in the less-developed societies, and that they tend to become more divergent as the society becomes more mobilized. In other words, the mobilization process seems to be more pronounced in the countries at a lower stage of development. Urbanization, for example, is much more highly correlated with the other indicators of social mobilization in 1950 than it is in 1965. This implies that urbanization had greater significance for social mobilization in the earlier years--that those who left the farm went to the cities; that the cities tended to produce a more literate population, and that the literates demanded information in greater quantities, thus spurring the growth of a mass media. Such a process was outlined, in fact, by the previously-cited Lerner and Lipset studies. Information gathered for this study suggests, however, a declining role for the cities in the mobilization process. It suggests that, as a society becomes more highly-developed, the beneficial effects of urbanization become more limited, and, at the same time, the rural areas begin to offer increased opportunities. The lower correlation in 1965 between the percentage of work force in non-agricultural occupations and urbanization indicates, for instance, that persons leaving the farm are finding employment in the smaller towns, and do not have to go to the city to find a job. Concurrently, the lower correlations in 1965 between urbanization and gross national product per capita, literacy, and birth rate suggests that the quality of the urban populations in the countries studied is decreasing rather than increasing. Such problems have not gone unnoticed. Tanti Shangri has voiced alarm

at the ever-increasing trend toward urbanization in India,[2] and Philip M. Hauser has outlined the social, economic and physical effects of the deteriorating urban conditions in developed as well as underdeveloped areas.[3] The coincidence in the conclusions of the two writers, and those in this study, is significant; particularly in light of the fact that they were reached quite independently of one another.

Degree and Rate of Social Mobilization

Other than newspaper circulation there are only two exceptions to the overall pattern of increase among the social mobilization indicators for the 16-year period from 1950 through 1965. In Roman Catholic Spain, the birth rate per 1,000 went up from 20.2 in 1950 to 21.3 in 1965. While the increase in births is small, and it perhaps would be unwise to attribute too much influence to religion, it is interesting to note that in two other Catholic countries, Italy and Mexico, the birth rate remained essentially the same. Significant decreases in births are noted in The Philippines and Argentina, also largely-Catholic countries, but the influence of increased literacy in these countries is undeniably potent. The other exception to the pattern of increase among the variables is in Israel, where literacy has decreased from 93.7 percent to 85.4 percent over the 16 years. While other forces may be involved here, at least two factors are influential: One is the

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[2] Tanti Shangri, "Urbanization, Political Stability, and Economic Growth," Political Development and Social Change, eds., Finkle and Gable, pp. 305-319.

[3] Philip M. Hauser, "The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," Industrialization and Society, eds., Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, (New York, 1966), pp. 199-215.

large-scale immigration into Israel of the so-called "Oriental Jews" from the more-traditional and less-literate societies in North Africa, and another is the growing Arab population within Israel. While 98 percent of the Jewish children attend school regularly, only 90 percent of the Arab children do so.[4]

As it is the nature of the indicators of social mobilization to increase--and generally in concert with one another--the 10 countries were in virtually the same position in relation to each other in 1950 as they were in 1965. The outstanding exception would be Argentina, which in 1950 would have been ranked in third place ahead of both Italy and Japan. The reason for Argentina's comparatively low placement on the social mobilization scale in 1965 is obvious: hile it ranks high among the social and cultural indicators of social mobilization, its economy, as measured by gross national produce per capita, has grown, in fact, at a rate of only 1.42 percent per year in the years covered by this study. On several occasions during that period it actually decreased, most noticeably from $670 in 1958 to $620 in 1959, and from $658 in 1960 to $635 in 1963. The latter decline so alarmed President Frondizi that he warned, in February, 1962, that if the negative growth rate were maintained, Argentina would be overtaken and passed by Brazil during the next two decades.[5] The frustrations felt by the Argentines over their sluggish economy are no doubt exacerbated by the fact, beginning in about 1880, the country enjoyed "...a spectacularly rapid

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[4]The World Almanac, (New York, 1967), p. 630.

[5]Arthur P. Whitaker, Argentina, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964), p. 3.

economic and cultural development that placed it in the forefront of Latin America in everything but sheer size."[6] In recent times, however, Argentina has failed to keep pace with the development of other nations around the globe. Its rate of social mobilization, consequently, is lower than that of any other country in this study except India.

Japan, on the other hand, has skyrocketed in all phases of the social mobilization process. Though its social and cultural indicators were relatively high even in 1950, they continued to increase as Japan's gross national product per capita boomed at an amazing 13.2 percent per year. By any standard of measurement, Japan's rate of social mobilization is highest among the 10 nations in this study, if not among the nations of the world. Even by 1965 Japan had passed the other nine nations in three indicators--literacy, newspaper circulation per 1,000, and birth rate--and was gaining ground in the others. Eventually, Japan appears destined to pass Italy and Israel, though Canada, with its large gross national product per capita, may be out of its reach.

In terms of the degree of social mobilization, Spain marks the point of division among the 10 countries; that is, significant differences may be noted in the indicators of social mobilization among those countries above Spain as compared with those countries below Spain. If Spain is included in the upper group, it may be said that countries with a gross national product greater than $600 per capita also will be greater than 85 percent in literacy, 40 percent in urbanization, 65 percent in non-agricultural work force, 40 percent in newspaper readership, 50 percent in radio audience, and will have a birth rate of

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[6]Ibid., pp. 2-3.

less than 25 per 1,000. The converse, therefore, would be true for those countries below Spain. Though certain exceptions may be noted, such as urbanization, literacy, and birth rate in The Philippines, the tendency certainly exists.

Political Stability Rankings

It is considerably more difficult to differentiate among the 10 countries in terms of political stability. Canada, with its history of peaceful elections, ranks as the most stable of the 10 nations, though an ominous note was struck in May, 1966, when a Quebec nationalist destroyed himself with a home-made bomb in the Parliament Building at Ottowa. The New York Times later reported he had intended to explode the device in the Commons Chamber, killing as many members of Parliament as possible.[7] The next three nations--Israel, Italy and Japan--are strikingly similar in their patterns of violence over the 16-year period from 1951 to 1966.[8] Israel, which enjoyed relative tranquillity in domestic affairs from 1958 to 1966, was placed second; Italy, which experienced local terrorism in the province of Bolzano by Austrians to spur seccessionism among the German-speaking Tyrolese in 1961, was placed third, and Japan, still troubled in 1966 by political demonstrations, ranked fourth. Mexico, ranked fifth, reached a high-water mark of violence in 1954, when federal troops were required to put down a localized rebellion led by General Henriquez Guzman. Since

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[7] The New York Times, May 20, 1966.

[8] See Appendix B of this thesis for graphs and explanatory charts depicting the various levels of stability in each of the 10 countries. The reader should also keep in mind the 26-point stability index which contains the criteria upon which the rankings were based.

1954, however, Mexico's level of violence was somewhat lower than that of Spain, which was placed sixth. In seventh place was The Philippines, where the tenacious Huk guerrillas maintained constant pressure on government troops and where terrorism and political murder accompanied most national elections. India, reasonably stable at the center but continually harassed by instability in the states, was slotted eighth, while Turkey, overthrown by a coup d'etat in 1960, was ranked ninth. Argentina, where the government was overthrown three times in the 16-year period, was placed tenth.

It would appear as if only two of the countries--Argentina and Turkey--may be considered unstable, since these are the only nations which experienced violent changes in the governments. The definition of stability employed in this study, however, assumes an erosion of stability in direct proportion to the increase in the level of violence; in other words, as violence increases, stability decreases. It is recognized, of course, that a considerable gap may exist between a government with a high level of violence and a chronically unstable government like that of Argentina. This distance is represented on the stability charts in Appendix B by an "instability line" drawn at the point where a rebellion aimed at the violent overthrow of the government occurs. Beneath the instability line, stable governments may be ranked according to their respective levels of violence. Those governments which manage to escape violence altogether would remain close to the base line of the graph, since violence does not really begin until rioting starts to erupt.

CHAPTER III

DISCUSSION OF HYPOTHESES

The primary hypothesis for this study holds that there is a significant relationship between social mobilization and the political process, and it is submitted that this may be demonstrated through a comparison of the 10 nations based on social mobilization and political stability. Connected with the major proposition are three corollary hypotheses, maintaining that a certain amount of stability is necessary before rapid social mobilization may take place; that rapid social mobilization will, in the short run, place stresses and strains on the political system which will be made manifest by indications of instability, and that, in the long run, the social mobilization process will become institutionalized and permit further mobilization, or development, without unduly straining the political process.

In essence, the propositions are similar to those propounded by other political scientists in recent publications. In developing a general theory of political integration, Claude Ake conducted his research in reference to two related questions: What characteristics must the political system possess to enable it to undertake social mobilization effectively? What type of political system is most capable of neutralizing the disruptive short-run effects of social mobilization? He rephrased the questions like this: How can a minimum of political stability be maintained in the face of the disruptive effects

of social mobilization?[1] In analyzing these questions, it may be seen that Ake is concerned with the same general problems outlined in this study. His first question is closely related to the first of the corollary hypotheses proposed in this study, and his second question is related to the third corollary hypothesis. Both questions, interestingly, assume the validity of the second corollary hypothesis. Ake's theory holds that "the political system undertaking social mobilization maximizes its capacity for carrying out the process and remaining stable despite the potentially disruptive short-run effects of social mobilization if it is authoritarian, paternal, 'identific,' and consensual." If any of these characteristics are absent, he adds, the destabilizing effects of social mobilization are increased.[2] An authoritarian system is defined by the author as one in which "the government's power is large, concentrated, and easily mobilized, and if the government manifests a determination and ability to use this power to carry out its policies..."[3] A paternal system is one in which the political system is dominated by a political class that is willing and able to lead.[4] An identific system is one in which there is a free flow of communications between the political class and the governed; the political formula of the political class is acceptable to the governed, and the civic body considers that it has some interest in the continued existence of

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[1] Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration, (Homewood, Illinois, 1967), p. 98.

[2] Ibid., p. 101.

[3] Ibid., p. 102.

[4] Ibid., p. 106.

the government.[5] Finally, a consensual system is one in which the political class is solidary and the hegemony of the political class is not threatened by a counter-elite.[6]

Another social mobilization study focused on the Communist Party rather than political stability. Conducted by John W. Kautsky and Roger W. Benjamin, it contained these major points: In societies in which there is no modernizing or mobilizational movement, there is no Communist Party. As economic development proceeds, small groups of intellectuals form movements for further modernization. With further economic development, these groups begin to grow and attract support from workers and other groups. At this point, the groups begin to make demands upon the political system. To the extent the demands are not met, the groups become alienated and extremist. Finally, with still more economic development, these extremist groups are absorbed into the political process and are no longer alienated.[7] If it may be presumed that the activities of extremist groups such as the Communist Party lead to political instability, then the Kautsky and Benjamin thesis is closely related to the point of his study. For example, the short-run disruptive effects of social mobilization might be attributable to the rising demands and expectations of different groups, while the long-run institutionalization of the social mobilization process might reflect the absorption of such groups into the political process.

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[5]Ibid., p. 108.

[6]Ibid., p. 111.

[7]John W. Kautsky and Roger W. Benjamin, "Communism and Economic Development," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, no. 1, (March, 1968), pp. 110-111.

Relationship Between Mobilization and Stability

If there is to be any validity to the primary hypothesis that social mobilization has significance for the political process, as manifested by political stability or instability, then there should be a strong correlation between those nations with a high degree of social mobilization and those nations with a high degree of political stability and vice versa. That such is the case may be seen by Table V which ranks the 10 nations in this study according to social mobilization and political stability.

TABLE V

COMPARISON OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL STABILITY RANKINGS OF 10 NATIONS

Nation	Social Mobilization Ranking	Political Stability Ranking
Canada	1	1
Israel	2	2
Italy	3	3
Japan	4	4
Argentina	5	10
Spain	6	6
Mexico	7	5
The Philippines	8	7
Turkey	9	9
India	10	8

Using the Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient, the relationship between social mobilization and political stability among the 10 nations works out to .82, which lends statistical credence to the hypothesis. The correlation coefficient would be even higher were it not for the rather remarkable exception seen in the case of Argentina, which ranks fifth in social mobilization but tenth in political stability.

The case of Argentina is worthy of comment, not only for the element of dissonance it provides this study, but also because of its glaring failure to fit the standard models of economic and political development. With one of the greatest stores of social overhead capital in Latin America, it is expected that Argentina would be relatively immune from the destabilizing factors that plague its sister republics. As K. H. Silvert has written:

> Argentina will probably continue to serve as one of the more striking cases of resistance in the Romanic world to the value and institutional requirements of development. All Latin America offers case after case of differing accommodations of traditional values to a certain ingestion of the modern, especially in the areas of industrialization and mimetic ideology. But Argentina's experience is still the most notable because of the country's extraordinary degree of urbanization, industrialization, and cultural Europeanization.[8]

The roots of Argentina's instability, according to Silvert, lie in three inconsistencies, or paradoxes, which he sets forth in an effort to demonstrate that despite the country's comparatively high level of development it is still in a pre-national condition. These are:

1. There is a clash between the leveling effect of mass

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[8] K. H. Silvert, "The Costs of Anti-Nationalism: Argentina," Expectant Peoples, ed., K. H. Silvert, (New York, 1967), p. 372. The analysis in this study on the case of Argentina is taken primarily from this article.

communications and a very high degree of urbanization on the one hand, and on the other the failure of the political mechanism to escape the corset of an extraordinarily narrow definition of interest.[9] Silvert interprets this narrow definition of interest in terms of an inelastic pie analogy, in which a large slice for one particular group necessarily means a smaller slice for everyone else. An example of this type of thinking, the author continues, was seen in the different positions of the lower classes in the Peron and post-Peron regimes. The former saw considerable improvement in the lot of the labor sector, which, to the Argentines, implied a built-in disadvantage to the upper classes, while the latter saw a return to power of the upper classes at the expense of labor. The opposing groups, Silvert maintains, never realistically considered which policy served the end of general development.

2. There is a failure to adjust a fairly advanced degree of industrialization to responsible entrepreneurial attitudes and to an appreciation of the possibilities inherent in mass consumption.[10] Again, Silvert points out, the problem lies in the Argentines' inability to view their society as in some respects total and interdependent. Instead of promoting the development of healthy markets and thus generating economic growth, the power of industrialization is used to maintain a degree of social inequality. At the same time, however, industrialization contributes to rising material expectations. And morale tends to deteriorate as these expectations are not fulfilled.

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[9] Ibid., p. 350.

[10] Ibid., p. 351.

3. The third paradox lies in the individual. Though he is occupationally highly-specialized--especially in the cities--he holds traditional values which do not permit him to be guided by a set of impersonal loyalties toward all others operating within the system of mutual dependency.[11] This is reflected primarily in his failure to accept the state as the ultimate arbiter in secular disputes. Consequently, social institutions are weakened, and this, in turn, invites autocratic personalism.

These inconsistencies, assert the author, leave Argentina's government in an intrinsically weakened position. Debilities resulting not only from indifference toward the state as the ultimate arbiter, but also from political institutions subject to the crudest of pressures from competing groups, have imposed limitations upon Peron as well as his successors. Peron attempted to balance the competing interest groups in such a manner as to neutralize their effectiveness in pressuring the country's simplistic political institutions. In times of relative prosperity, he was able to succeed. With economic depression, however, brought on for the most part by the stagnation his policies produced, his delicate balancing act was disrupted. The chronic military interventionism which has characterized Argentine politics up to the present might be expected in a country in which direct sanctions by the police or military often have taken the place of legitimate political or judicial action. Thus, political stability in Argentina has suffered--primarily as a result of the traditional, long-entrenched culture which has developed over the years. In spite

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[11] Ibid., p. 352.

of a relatively advanced social and economic status, Argentina remains, as Silvert asserts, essentially pre-national and non-integrated.

The Case of India

The first corollary hypothesis holds that a certain amount of stability is necessary before rapid social mobilization may take place. The key factor in this analysis is the difference between social mobilization per se and rapid social mobilization. The data indicates that the process of social mobilization had already begun--and in most instances was well under way--long before the base date of this study. In at least one nation, however, chronic political violence and subfederal instability appear to be associated with an inability to initiate rapid social mobilization. That nation is India.

India is generally considered to be the epitome of the underdeveloped society. Statistics gathered for this study disclose a gross national product per capita of about $100; a literacy rate of about 25 percent; a work force still overwhelmingly agricultural; a rudimentary communications system, and a runaway birth rate of more than 38 per 1,000. Yet it would be less than accurate to imply that India has been completely by-passed by the process of social mobilization. Slowly, the gross national product has inched upward while the birth rate has been forced downward. Newspapers and radios have increased, albeit slightly, and a growing school system has added new millions to the educated sector of the population. Such development, however, can in no way be interpreted as "rapid." Ever-recurring problems, furthermore, have added greatly to the bleakness of India's future. A brief list of these is given by Krishan Bhatia:

> ...India's population has crossed the 500 million mark and its annual rate of growth shows no sign of declining from 2.4 percent; its economy is stagnating; its once ample resources have been frittered away on grandiose schemes which have failed to pay the expected dividends, and its treasury is literally empty; it has experienced three successive years of drought, a phenomenon unparalleled in living memory, and consequently has a food deficit this year conservatively estimated at twelve million tons...[12]

It should not be necessary to belabor the point that the dimensions of underdevelopment in India are huge and multi-faceted. In the discussion of this corollary hypothesis, however, it is necessary to demonstrate that the rather obvious lack of rapid social mobilization in India is associated with the problem of political instability. In so doing, this discussion shall focus on the centrifugal forces straining the federal system; the failure of the Congress Party to mobilize a durable consensus; the chronic instability at the state level, and the general high level of political violence throughout the nation.

Under the Indian federal system, the states are major arenas of political conflict and competition. The peculiar strain that this places on the dominant Congress Party--and ultimately upon the unity of India itself--is explained in the following passage:

> Nationally, it /the Congress Party/ bears the responsibility for nation-building. Yet the provincial branches of Congress are forced to contend in a very different environment, where they must embrace the particular local causes or perish. Thus, in the 1957 elections, Congress found itself fighting Communists in Kerala, Bengal and Andhra; against communal religious parties in Punjab, Uttar and Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan; against tribal unions in Assam and Bihar; against ethno-linguistic fronts in Madras, Maharashtra, and Gujerat; against feudal-prince restoration parties in Orissa, Bihar, and Rajasthan;

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[12]Krishan Bhatia, "India Adrift," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45, no. 4, (July, 1967), p. 652.

against the Praja Socialists in Bombay.[13]

In spite of the militant but scattered opposition, the 1957 general elections did little to change the political complexion of India, either on the national or on the state levels. But some of the results were unexpected and even startling.[14] Congress gained a few seats in the Lok Sabha, but lost 300 to 400 seats in the state legislative assemblies. In particular, losses were incurred in Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, Bombay, Bihar and West Bengal. "So effective were the coalition tactics of the opposition," writes Norman D. Palmer, "and so strong was the anti-Congress feeling on the linguistic issue, that six State ministers and three Central ministers...were defeated in Maharashtra and Gujerat." The Communist Party of India did so well--winning striking successes in Kerala, West Bengal and Bombay, and placing members in every state assembly--that it appeared to be the only party emerging from the election with confidence in its growing strength. One observer was moved to remark that if the elections had any lesson to offer, it was that the future of democracy in India was dark, because appreciation of its values was "lamentably lacking."[15]

If the 1957 elections were the harbinger of more difficult days to come, the more recent elections did even more to expose India's unity to stresses and strains. In more than half the states, the Congress

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[13] Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, Issues of Political Development, (New Jersey, 1967), p. 42.

[14] Norman D. Palmer, The Indian Political System, (Boston, 1961), p. 229. The analysis in this study of the 1957 elections in India is excerpted from Palmer's discussion.

[15] As quoted in Palmer, p. 231.

Party was pushed out of power while there was no sign that a more stable alternative pattern of power was evolving.[16] In five of the eight states that were lost, ministries were formed by coalitions of parties which have little in common ideologically and are held together only by their desire for power. For example, the two parties which shared control in Punjab represented mutually-antagonistic Hindu and Sikh chauvinism. In West Bengal, the chief minister was a liberal and a former member of Congress, while the deputy chief minister was a Peking-oriented Communist. "In order to maintain their precarious unity," asserts Bhatia, "these strange bedfellows may tend to face Congress at the Center with more belligerence than is justified."[17] In the meantime, he adds, the government of Mrs. Indira Gandhi is unaccustomed to sharing power with other political parties and may not deal with the non-Congress states "with the required degree of patience and understanding."[18] Already, notes the authority, there have been visible indications of the tendency of the central and state governments to move in opposite directions. In Kerala, to name one example, the state government is pressing for foreign exchange earned by exports from Kerala to be earmarked for the exclusive use of that state. "This may open a dangerous avenue of political thinking leading ultimately to secessionist moves," he warns.[19]

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[16] Bhatia, p. 653.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., p. 654.

[19] Ibid.

The Congress Party is more than merely a vehicle for electing candidates to office. It is a broad-based national movement which led the struggle for independence and has since assumed responsibility for India's future. As such, the lines of distinction between the Congress Party as a political party and the Congress Party as the government are hazy. Opposition to Congress, therefore, may be construed as opposition to the government. This, in turn, leads to obfuscation of the issues and a tendency to seek power as an end in itself, rather than as a means of governing more effectively. The problem is exacerbated in India by the lack of a viable opposition. Edward Shils, discussing the problem in theoretical terms as it applies to India as well as other states, puts it this way:

> While the Congress-like party is in the saddle, it impedes the emergence of an opposition responsive to the possibility of succeeding to power through constitutional means and made responsive by that idea. Opposition is either discouraged by the odds against which it must contend, or it is overwhelmed by coercion. Thus, the leadership of opposition either withdraws from politics or gravitates toward the extremist party. Meanwhile, the dominant party, through long tenure in office, grows 'soft' and perhaps 'corrupt.' In any case, it is natural that people should get 'fed up' with it because, equally naturally, the party and its government cannot do all that public opinion requires of them. So, in the course of time the party falls from power, and with its fall comes disintegration of the party. Therewith the unity of the nation is endangered and the oppositional mentality comes once more into active influence.[20]

Shils' comments are virtually echoed by Norman D. Palmer's observations on India:

> One of the ironies of the Indian political scene is that an effective opposition seems out of the question as long as Congress exists in its present form, while at the same time the disintegration of the Congress might have adverse effects

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[20]Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States, (The Netherlands, 1962), p. 41.

on the entire prospects for democracy in India.[21]

If an umbrella-type political party such as the Indian Congress is to survive, it must build a durable consensus and promote an identification among the voting population with its aims and aspirations. Even if such a party were to claim the altruistic goal of tutoring its followers in the democratic process, preparatory to the establishment of a stable multi-party system, it would need as its primary ingredient for success an increasingly larger and broadly-based attentive public that is concerned about public policy, reasonably well-informed, and willing to compete in the political arena. That neither a durable consensus nor a large attentive public has been developed is cause for further concern about the country's future.

One indication of such a lack of consensus is provided in a study based partially on Indian voting habits by Joseph R. Gusfield. Citing statistics from a random sampling of Indian constituencies in the 1957 and 1962 elections, Gusfield noted that approximately 75 percent of the seats in the State Assemblies changed as a result of the 1962 election. In 21 percent of all cases, he reported, an existing party retained a seat but changed the seat holder.[22] In the Lok Sabha, 65 percent of the seats changed, but in 29 percent of the elections the party remained in power while the incumbent was replaced with another candidate.[23] Concerning the Congress Party, Gusfield commented:

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[21]Palmer, p. 195.

[22]Joseph R. Gusfield, "Political Community and Group Interests in Modern India," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 38, no. 2, (Summer, 1965), p. 135.

[23]Ibid., p. 135.

> The internecine conflicts of the Congress Party reveal themselves in the fact that in almost half the elections in which Congress retained control of a state assembly seat, a new legislator had been substituted for the incumbent. Neither between parties nor within the Congress Party do we find the continuity and attachment which might be anticipated if voting for a specific party were a habit and if the party represented a degree of internal consistency and leadership at the local level. It is far from unusual for a candidate to shift parties between the 1957 and 1962 elections. Thus the symbolic and concrete role of party organization and unity as an aggregator of interests is weak and uncertain in India.[24]

As a result of the study, Gusfield was moved to remark that for many Indian voters the party is by no means a symbol of group identification or affiliation. "Their relation to politics is fleeting and unconnected to interests or to subsequent policy," he wrote. "They can be moved from leader to leader, from party to party. Although attachment is discoverable, it is by no means widespread or effective enough to provide great continuity in government."[25]

Another factor of instability reflecting a lack of consensus is a parliamentary tactic known in India as "crossing the floor." Occasionally used in Western Parliaments to dramatize a stand on principle, floor-crossing is often employed in India to topple a state government or produce a precarious, razor-thin margin for the majority party. Besides having the obvious result of hamstringing an assembly, such defections are made even more attractive by the fact that a back-bench representative from the majority party may "cross the floor" to a ministerial position in a coalition government. The use of party discipline to curb floor-crossing, such as denying the defector candidacy in the next election, is ineffective, because, as Gusfield mentioned, it is

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., pp. 134-135.

not unusual for candidates to shift parties between elections anyway. The problem became so acute in 1967 that the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, N. Sanjiva Reddy, focused national attention on it during a conference of presiding officers of the state legislatures: "If the growing menace of floor crossing in state legislatures is not checked in time," he warned, "it might result in administrative instability, reduce the politics in the country to a farce, and thereby undermine the people's faith in Democracy."[26]

In speaking of the "people," Reddy evidently was referring only to a small minority--a well-to-do elite which maintains an interest and knowledge of India's political affairs. For it is only such an educated minority, according to a study on political behavior in India, that is aware and informed on political issues and is able to think intelligently about them.[27] The illiterates--which according to this study represent about three-fourths of the Indian public--are a particular cause for concern since less than 10 percent of them in the urban areas expressed an interest in politics. "This is indeed significant," notes the author, "and dysfunctional to the development of political self-consciousness among the Indian people."[28] In a survey of the total adult population on current political issues, the number of "don't know" responses was alarming. They ranged from 46 percent (urban) and 65 percent (rural) on the question of whether a military dictatorship

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[26] The Times of India, "Crossing of Floor Threat to Democracy," (October 15, 1967), p. 1

[27] Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Political Behavior of the Indian Public," Politics in Transitional Societies, ed., Harvey G. Kebschull, (New York, 1968), p. 217.

[28] Ibid., p. 212.

in India would be good or bad, to 66 percent (urban) and 76 percent (rural) on the questions about community development.[29] "These general levels of political ignorance are high enough," commented the author, "to raise serious questions as to whether the political capacity of the Indian public, based on adequate knowledge, is in fact 'developing.'" He also wondered whether a government which in fact operates on the principle of democratic responsibility, and which also admits that it relies on public support for the implementation of its programs and plans, can function effectively in its present "style" of political and administrative strategy.[30] Linking the lack of knowledge and political interest with the problem of development, the author questioned whether "economic and social planning through India's democratic processes really is reaching and motivating the great mass of the adult public."[31]

Finally, there is the problem in India of widespread political violence. Headlines tell the story in a review of newspapers over the period from 1951 to 1966: Border skirmishes, small Communist-led uprisings, food and language riots, terrorism, guerilla warfare, and mass arrests.[32] Acts of disorder and sources of instability are reviewed in more specific terms in this brief rundown by Michael Brecher:

> The coming of six million refugees posed serious problems to the new government--as it did in neighboring Pakistan. Both Kerala in the south and Orissa in the east and Punjab in the north had to be placed under President's rule on various occasions because of tension and deadlock in the political arena. Fasting has triggered off disorder frequently, notably in

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[29] Ibid., p. 215.

[30] Ibid., pp. 215-216.

[31] Ibid., p. 217.

[32] The New York Times Index, 1951-1966.

> Andhra in 1952. Regional loyalties and linguistic passions have caused widespread violence and destruction, as in Bombay during the States' Reorganization period in 1956 and in Assam in 1960. Students are often in revolt against authority, major strikes are not uncommon, and a Communist-led revolt in Hyderabad caused havoc and disorder from 1948 to 1950. The latest challenge to stability was the Sikh demand for a separate state within India.[33]

Two of the more current sources of political violence are the constant threat of a new outbreak of guerrilla war in Nagaland and the continuing agitation over language policy. Briefly stated, the issue in Nagaland is national independence versus India sovereignty. The Naga Federal Government, established by nationalists in 1956, maintains that when the British left India, Nagaland was not part of India, but under direct British occupation. Hence, India's independence from Great Britain did not confer upon her sovereignty over Nagaland.[34] Using this argument, as well as a claim to ethnic, cultural, and racial difference from the Indians, representatives of the NFG claim an "inherent" right to govern themselves.[35] The Indian government, on the other hand, views Nagaland as an integral part of India and maintains that complete independence for the Nagas is a "preposterous proposition."[36] Tensions over these two opposing points of view eventually escalated into a full-scale revolt pitting Indian troops against Naga guerrillas. A truce, which went into effect on September 6, 1964, has continued uninterruptedly

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[33]Michael Brecher, "Political Instability in the New States of Asia," Comparative Politics, eds., Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, (New York, 1963), p. 622.

[34]Gordon P. Means and Ingunn N. Means, "Nagaland--The Agony of Ending a Guerrilla War," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 39, nos. 3 and 4, (Fall and Winter, 1966-67), p. 290.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Ibid., pp. 290-291.

during several rounds of peace talks, but the problem still is far from solved. Since last year's elections, in fact, there have been reports of numerous incidents threatening the uneasy peace in Nagaland. One report tells of Indian reinforcements in the area bringing troop levels to between 60,000 and 80,000, while another claims the Nagas are receiving arms, munitions, and training in guerrilla warfare from the Chinese Communists.[37] Meanwhile, many Indians are worried about the effect the simmering situation might have on the country's unity. Unless the Nagas are "put in their places," it is argued, "the dikes will open with more of India's minorities resorting to armed violence in the name of national independence, and with the blessings of India's adversaries."[38]

The language problem in India revolves primarily around two issues: One is the divisiveness inherent in the reorganization of the states along linguistic lines, and the other is the more limited agitation over the replacement of English with Hindi as the official language. The former issue dates back to demands made by the Indian National Congress in the heyday of the struggle for independence--but they were demands the Congress might well regret in hindsight. "In stimulating linguistic agitation," one observer has remarked, "the Congress Party before independence helped to create a monster which now challenges India's existence as a single nation and taxes her government's ability to maintain law and order."[39] The decision to re-draw the map of India

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[37] Ibid., p. 311.

[38] Ibid., p. 310.

[39] As quoted in Palmer, p. 106.

along linguistic lines came to fruition in the States' Reorganization Act of 1956. It called for the reorganization of India into 14 states, with a clearly dominant language in each, with the exception of Bombay, which was to be enlarged instead of divided, and the Punjab, where the main prevailing languages were associated with Hindi.[40] While the act was generally popular over most of the country, it was bitterly resented by the linguistically-divided populations of Bombay and the Punjab. For the next several years, news out of India was dominated by riots, strikes, terrorism, demonstrations and mass arrests.[41] Congress made a further concession--or what might be called a surrender--to the linguistic principle in 1960, when Bombay was divided between the Marathi- and Gujerati-speaking peoples.[42] Rivalry continues between Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab, but the problem has been at least temporarily ameliorated by the coalition government in that state. The strain on Indian unity caused by the reorganization plan is summed up by Palmer in this paragraph:

> The entire agitation over linguistic states demonstrated that the Congress had opened a Pandora's box indeed when it championed the principle of the reorganization of India on a linguistic basis, and it stimulated the divisive forces in India to such an extent as to raise doubts about the capacity of free India to survive as a unified state dedicated to the democratic way. Whereas most of the other basic decisions regarding the nature of the Indian state have tended to give meaning and reality to the concept of a democratic India, the reluctant concessions to linguistic demands have revealed the strength of regional as against national loyalties.[43]

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[40] Ibid., p. 107.

[41] The New York Times Index, 1956 and following.

[42] Palmer, p. 108.

[43] Ibid.

Increasing education in India apparently has tended to exacerbate the problem rather than relieve it. "/the/ extension of literacy--in the regional languages--to millions of persons," three authors wrote recently, "has vastly expanded the dimensions of the linguistic problem, by multiplying the numbers of participants."[44]

The language problem has taken a slightly different form in the southern state of Madras, where violence erupted in 1965 over the planned replacement of English with Hindi as the official language. Here, the question was not so much one of the regional Dravidian tongue--Tamil--versus the Aryan Hindi, but it involved the future of Tamilians in a nation with Hindi as its official language.[45] The issue stems from a decision by the framers of the Constitution of 1950 to switch over from English to Hindi for all official purposes after a 15-year period. Since only a small minority of Indians speak English, and more people speak Hindi than any of the other 1,652 languages or dialects in the country, the Tamilians argue that the change-over would give a major advantage in terms of jobs and educational opportunities to those who have Hindi as their mother tongue.[46] The issue, incidentally, was temporarily shelved as a result of anti-Hindi agitation and Nehru's death, but even the status quo is opposed by the Madras Tamilians. Under the present situation there is a "three-language formula" which was implemented in 1961 as a means of bridging the difficult switch

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[44]Anderson, von der Mehden, and Young, p. 42.

[45]Duncan B. Forrester, "The Madras Anti-Hindi Agitation, 1965: Political Protest and its Effects on Language Policy in India," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 39, nos. 1 and 2, (Spring and Summer, 1966), p. 20.

[46]Ibid., pp. 20-21.

from English to Hindi. This formula calls for the use of both Hindi and English as link languages in official business, while regional languages are to be the medium in education and state and local administration.[47] The plan forces an ambitious Indian in a non-Hindi state—who might, for example, aspire to a position in the federal bureaucracy—to learn three different languages: his own, Hindi, and English. The southern Tamilians denounce the program as "Hindi imperialism" and part of a larger plot by the north to dominate the south culturally, economically, and politically.[48] Protests against the policy resulted in successive waves of violence, including a week-long period in which 66 persons were killed.[49]

The foregoing review of instability and violence in India is not intended to leave the impression that India is ripe for a military takeover--though the possibility of such an action was seriously considered by two experts on the country.[50] Rather, it is intended to suggest that the country's deep political difficulties are a retarding factor in efforts to initiate rapid social mobilization. A correspondent for the Hindustan Times reports, for example, that development schemes in the state of Haryana have foundered because of "continued instability

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[47] Ibid., p. 20.

[48] Ibid., p. 23.

[49] Ibid., p. 25.

[50] Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Generals and Politicians in India," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 37, no. 1, (Spring, 1964), pp. 5-19, passim. The authors concluded that the tradition and organization of the military in India mediates against such a possibility--except under circumstances in which the military was drawn into politics as an ally of political leaders. Also, it was conceded, continued "violence and chauvinism" could strengthen existing authoritarian tendencies and create opportunities for military heroes.

in the political field and the resultant lack of direction in the government."[51] Similar charges have been made concerning the lack of coordination in the construction of the MIG aircraft factory; one part of it is located in Maharashtra, another in Orissa nearly a thousand miles away, and the electronic equipment for the aircraft will be produced in Andhra, several hundred miles from the other two plants.[52] If the data is insufficient to demonstrate conclusively that political instability and violence are the cause of India's inertia in initiating rapid social mobilization, it seems reasonable to assert that the task would be far easier if no such problems existed.

The Case of Turkey

A number of the nations involved in this study might be used as examples to illustrate both the second and third corollary hypotheses. The second holds that rapid social mobilization will, in the short run, place stresses and strains on the political system which will be made manifest by recurrent violence or instability, and the third maintains that the mobilizational process will, in the long run, become institutionalized to such a degree that rapid social mobilization may continue without straining the political process. The relationship between these propositions lies, of course, in the fact that the short run eventually becomes the long run, and the number of years spanned by such an evolution may vary from country to country. Analysis of the hypotheses if further complicated by circumstances under which short-run

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[51] Hindustan Times, "Power Politics Bars Development," by Kapil Verma, (October 18, 1967), p. 7.

[52] Bhatia, pp. 654-655.

violence may be absorbed by long-run institutionalization, and therefore constitute no real threat to the political regime or constitutional order. In Japan and Italy, for example, the rapid urbanization and industrialization of the post-World War II period produced serious social dislocations expressed, for the most part, in the rise of extremist political parties and militant interest groups. However, as Samuel P. Huntington would put it, the level of institutionalization in these two countries was high enough to channel these interests into the normal political processes, thereby preventing a serious political upheaval.[53] In Turkey, on the other hand, an increasingly-aggressive peasantry leaped so alarmingly into the political arena that the military was moved to step in and seize power through a coup d'etat. In this case--to borrow another phrase from the Huntington analysis--rapid increases in mobilization and participation had undermined the political institutions.[54] To differentiate between the two hypotheses, then, the analysis shall center on a single question: Under what circumstances may rapid social mobilization be associated with violent change in the political regime or constitutional order? Using such a question as a guide, the discussion may then be directed on the one hand toward cases in which political equilibrium was maintained under conditions of rapid social mobilization, and on the other toward cases in which the equilibrium was upset. Those nations which maintained equilibrium in the face of mobilizational dislocations will be examined under the third corollary hypothesis, while Turkey--the only nation among those in this

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[53]Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, Vol. 17, no. 3, (April, 1965), pp. 393-394.

[54]Ibid., p. 386.

study in which mobilization can be said to have outrun institutionalization[55]--will be discussed under the second corollary hypothesis.

The so-called westernization of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal after World War I is a well-known story and need not be recounted here. Rather, this discussion shall be concerned with more recent developments following World War II: The beginnings of rapid economic growth, the establishment of a two-party system, the victory of the Democratic Party in 1950, and the coup d'etat undertaken by the military in 1960. Particular attention shall be focused on the politicization of the peasantry and the impact of its emergence into the political arena, with the primary point being the manner in which rapid social mobilization contributed to an unstable political situation.

In spite of the successes scored by Kemal Ataturk's efforts to drag his medieval country into the 20th Century, the effects, for the most part, were limited to the urban areas. Indeed, statistics released after Ataturk's death in 1938 showed some progress in economic development, primarily in road and rail improvements and a slight amount of industrialization,[56] but the rural areas remained relatively unchanged. Agricultural development was neglected, new law codes were either unheard of or ignored, literacy rates remained low, and general living conditions were primitive.[57] Indicative of the gap that existed between life in the cities and life in the villages are these comments

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[55] Ibid., p. 421.

[56] Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Political Participation and Modernization in Turkey," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 19, no. 2, (June, 1966), p. 274.

[57] Ibid., p. 275.

by a student from Istambul, who visited a village school teacher a few years after the death of Mustafa Kemal:

> Mahmut—my dear fellow, the squalor, the primitive conditions in this village--they're indescribable! What do people mean by having houses and stables in these conditions? It might be the Stone Age, which one only reads about in history books.[58]

The very process of modernization tended to create a dual society, with a thin layer of the urban elite stretched over the much larger body of rural peasantry. Inevitably, this caused tensions, and in the course of time the urban and educated classes became frustrated by the apathy of the peasant and his slow rate of progress. As a result, they developed authoritarian and paternal tendencies.[59] The peasant, meanwhile, felt neglected and abused. Furthermore, he was opposed to the government's anticlerical policies and favored a return to Muslim principles and practices.[60]

Kemal himself had envisioned the establishment of a multiparty system in Turkey, and, in fact, attempted in both 1924 and 1930 to end the official monopoly of his Republican Peoples' Party by permitting the establishment of short-lived but legitimate oppositions.[61] By 1945, new pressures began mounting which made untenable the continuance of the Republican Party as the country's sole avenue of political

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[58] Ibid.

[59] Aydin Yalcin, "Turkey: Emerging Democracy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45, no. 4,(July, 1967), p. 708.

[60] Hisham B. Sharabi, Government and Politics in the Twentieth Century, (New York, 1962), p. 51.

[61] Ibid., p. 47.

expression. To the internal stresses described above were added demands from the commercial classes, who wished more opportunities for free enterprise; from the laboring groups, who wanted the right to organize and strike, and from the liberals, who were dissatisfied with the party's oppressive monopoly of power and wished to see the democratic ideals of the Kemalist revolution expressed more concretely in the country's political life.[62] Externally, there were pressures from Turkey's friends among the western democracies in the United Nations to end her authoritarian regime and extend to her own people the blessings of free and meaningful elections. The situation was becoming embarassing to the Turks themselves, as reflected by the wit of one critic who referred to Ataturk as the "eternal chief" and to his successor, Ismet Inonu, as the "unchangeable chief."[63] A split in the party ranks provided the opportunity, and on January 7, 1946, four dissident members of the RPP founded the Democratic Party.

The new party's first foray into Turkish politics was a somewhat shoddy affair. As Hisham B. Sharabi has written, "the RPP not only saw to it that all facilities that could be denied its rival were actually denied it but also did all it could to intimidate voters and to manipulate the final results of the elections.[64] Consequently, the Democratic Party managed to win but 62 seats in an Assembly composed of 464 deputies.[65] In the four years preceding the election of 1950, however,

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[62] Ibid. p. 51.

[63] As quoted in Ibid., p. 52.

[64] Ibid., p. 53.

[65] Ibid. According to Szyliowicz, the Democrats won 61 seats.

there developed between the two parties real competition for the hearts--and the votes--of the people. These efforts set into motion a maelstrom which was eventually to break the membraneous surface tension of the elite and bring the rural masses into full political participation. The Democratic Party, inheriting support from the ingrained opposition to the Establishment, emerged from the 1946 elections as a viable opposition in spite of its pitiful showing. And the Republican Party, its monopoly finally broken, knew it could no longer depend upon fraud to maintain its pre-eminent position. For the first time, the peasant became the object of political courtship, and efforts by the two parties aimed at winning his allegiance gave him a reason as well as a will to express his demands. Kemal H. Karpat summed up the effects of the two-party system in these sentences:

> The mobilization and political education of the masses occurred not as a result of a premediated plan but as an accidental result of the need to secure votes and support at a popular level. Indeed, according to the new democratic ideas, the source of power did not reside in small elite groups but in the masses, hitherto ignored. The search for popular support forced both the Republicans and the Democrats to establish thousands of party organizations throughout the villages and towns of Turkey, which became centers of political education and social mobilization.[66]

To the villagers, whose previous contact with the instruments of government had been limited to occasional visits from the gendarmerie and tax collector, the showering of attention by the two parties was stimulating and exhilirating. At the same time, the Democratic Party became a rallying point for various other elements of the society who were disenchanted with the Republicans' reforms and economic policies. Still,

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[66]Kemal H. Karpat, "Society, Economics, and Politics in Contemporary Turkey," World Politics, Vol. 17, no. 1, (October, 1964), p. 57.

the magnitude of the Democratic Party's victory in the 1950 elections was surprising: With 89 percent of the eligible voters turning out to the polls, the Democrats captured 54 percent of the votes and more than 80 percent of the seats in the National Assembly.[67]

After a smooth and orderly transfer of power from Inonu to Adnan Menderes, the new prime minister, the Democratic Party embarked upon a program of economic development, liberalization of various restrictive laws,[68] and a partial relaxing of religious restrictions. The last was aimed primarily at the traditional-minded peasants, who had long resented the abolishment of Islam as the official state religion. The programs having the greatest and most lasting effects upon the peasantry, however, were those dealing with economic development and social integration. A highway construction program opened the rural areas to urban markets, simultaneously facilitating transportation and travel and exposing the villager to the opportunities and advantages of the outside world.[69] Agricultural prices went up, agricultural and industrial credits were freely granted by the government and generous amounts of foreign aid were provided. As a result, the private sector of the economy expanded rapidly.[70] Concurrently, radios and newspapers began to proliferate, and even the Army, reorganized with American support,[71]

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[67] Szyliowicz, p. 276. Cf. Sharabi, p. 53.

[68] Szyliowicz, p. 277.

[69] Ulman and Tachau, p. 154.

[70] Ibid., p. 160.

[71] Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952 and supplies a large part of the NATO ground force. Military service in Turkey is compulsory.

became a force for modernization as peasant draftees were given technical training and exposure to new ideas. Consequently, the first half of the decade decade during which the Democratic Party was in control saw very rapid economic development. Karpat credits the liberal economic policy of the party with leading to the integration of the villages and towns into larger economic units, and to the full emergence of a cash economy and production for market. As a result:

> New jobs were provided for millions of people in transportation, machine maintenance, food processing, small industries, and other related fields. Land values increased, credit facilities were expanded, and usury was considerably reduced. People were aroused from centuries of social and economic inertia and discovered new goals and opportunities in life. Certainly Turkey became incomparably more dynamic in the 1950's than in the 1930's and 1940's. One can readily perceive in any town in Anatolia the changes in living and mentality that have occurred in the past fifteen years.[72]

The Menderes regime was re-elected in 1954 by an even larger majority, winning about 56 percent of the vote and 503 of the 541 seats. And despite some economic difficulties caused by inflation, adverse weather, and a drop in agricultural prices, it was returned to power in 1957 by the still-comfortable margin of 424 out of 610 seats.

In the meantime, the same charges began to be made against the Democrats that previously had been hurled at the Republicans. To Middle East specialist Hisham Sharabi, the charges were justified: "The party in power not only tolerated little criticism" he wrote, "but showed itself willing to use any means short of the direct use of violence to maintain itself in power."[73] A. Haluk Ulman and Frank Tachau explained that, in the face of economic difficulties and the rising tide of

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[72]Karpat, p. 59.

[73]Sharabi, p. 59.

opposition, "the leaders of the Democratic Party began to bring pressure on their opponents, primarily through a narrowing of democratic rights."[74] On the other side of the ledger, however, the political repression failed to excite any strong reaction in the countryside, where matters remained much as they had since the Democrats came to power.[75] And Joseph S. Szyliowicz appears to believe the party's opponents refused to wait for a return to authority through peaceful means. "There was...reason to believe," he quotes a Turkish observer, "that there was afoot a deliberate move to destroy the Menderes administration by ways other than defeating it at the polls."[76] At any rate, the military, on May 27, 1960, suddenly abandoned a long-standing tradition of political neutrality and stepped in to overthrow the Menderes government.

It is not the purpose of this discussion to weigh the relative merits of military intervention in times of real or imagined political crisis. It should be sufficient to point out that the leader of the coup, General Cemal Gursel, felt intervention was necessary "to remove those conditions which made possible the dictatorship of the single party and to provide for political opposition and an equitable distribution of power."[77] In apparent pursuit of these ideals, the junta voluntarily abandoned its control of the government in 1961 to permit elections and a return to parliamentary procedures. Of greater

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[74] Ulman and Tachau, p. 161.

[75] Ibid. p. 62.

[76] Szyliowicz, p. 279.

[77] Sharabi, p. 62.

significance to this study are the reasons why military intervention was deemed necessary. If the coup is viewed in perspective, the most reasonable explanation seems to be that the rapid social mobilization of the peasantry--by far the majority of the population--resulted in the emergence of a huge new group of voters. This led to an intensification of the struggle among the various competing elites, each of which sought to win the allegiance of this new source of political power. As one elite--the Democratic Party--won the allegiance of the rural elements, it adopted policies designed to please and therefore retain its supporters. Unsurprisingly, the other elites tended to take a dim view of these policies, which, in due course, led to further polarization of interests and increased bitterness. It was at a certain point in this cycle that the military decided to step in and bring the crunch of events to a halt, acting, in its own eyes, as a stabilizing rather than destabilizing force. This analysis is supported, in its general outlines, by Ulman and Tachau:

> In short, the coup of May 27, 1960, should be regarded as an integral part of the developing struggle between the more traditional masses of villagers and small townsmen on the one hand and the more modernized urban elite on the other. It was thus not simply a blow for Turkish democracy. Rather, it was an attempt to stem the tide of rising power of newly emerging socio-economic groups.[78]

Karpat was equally to the point:

> ...the introduction of a multiparty system in 1945-46, and the subsequent acquisition of power by the Democratic Party in 1950, started an intensive upward mobility that shattered the previous power structure. There is no reason to believe that either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party, the main protagonists in this political struggle, had advisedly sought

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[78] Ulman and Tachau, p. 162.

> to release the lower social groups or wanted to change the elite organization and its philosophy.[79]

Assuming the validity of this analysis, it is possible to isolate at least two characteristics of the Turkish political system which rendered it unequipped to cope with the destabilizing effects of rapid social mobilization. First, its level of institutionalization was too low, as can be determined by the inability of the system to adapt to the changing conditions brought about by the emergence of a large new bloc of voters. Second, the system was non-consensual in that the elite in power was continually threatened by a counter-elite with substantially different goals and philosophies. The latter could perhaps have been remedied had the Turkish leaders in the Republican Party co-opted the Democrat's primary power source, namely, the newly-mobilized peasants. On the other hand, the low level of institutionalization of the system may have prevented such a manuever. If the charges leveled against the Democrats are accepted at face value, i.e., that they had no compunctions against resorting to extra-legal or even unconstitutional methods to stay in control, then this was surely the case.

The More-Developed Nations

It is now time to consider those polities in which the social mobilization process has become institutionalized to such a degree that rapid social mobilization may continue without straining the political system to the point of instability. For the most part, nations falling into this category are characterized by a comparatively high degree of economic and political development. Furthermore, it is interesting to

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[79]Karpat, p. 57.

note that those nations in this study which appear to be best equipped to handle rapid social mobilization also have the highest rate of social mobilization. The one notable exception to this generalization is Canada, whose comparatively low rate of social mobilization is due to the fact that its very high degree of social mobilization leaves little room for the indicators of social and economic development to move in an upward direction. However, other countries in this classification--Japan, Israel, Italy, Spain, Mexico, and, to a lesser extent, The Philippines--underwent tremendous social changes in the 15-year period covered by this study, primarily as the result of sustained economic booms. In each of these countries, the wrenching effects of rapid social mobilization produced political problems, usually manifested by varying degrees of violence, extremist movements, or both. The governments of these nations, however, have thus far managed to absorb, resolve, or even ignore such problems without upsetting the equilibrium of their political systems. It shall be the purpose of this discussion to search for and hopefully provide a description of the circumstances under which this may be accomplished. The question by which the analysis shall be guided is this: Under what conditions may political stability be maintained in the face of rapid social mobilization?

Claude Ake has theorized that the political system undergoing social mobilization maximizes its capacity for carrying out the process and remaining stable despite the potentially disruptive short-run effects of social mobilization if it is "authoritarian, paternal,

identific, and consensual."[80] Another theorist, Samuel Huntington, has maintained that the strength of political organizations and procedures varies with their scope of support and level of institutionalization, with stability being insured for those societies in which a high level of institutionalization prevents rapid modernization from undermining the political institutions and thereby causing decay.[81] Of the 10 nations examined in this study, the country which perhaps comes closest to fulfilling these conditions is the state of Israel.

A partial explanation for the success of Israel in avoiding many of the problems that plague other states undergoing rapid social mobilization is provided by the uncomfortable proximity of her hostile Arab neighbors. That the existence of such a nearby threat greatly enhances the ability of a government to maintain itself in power and rule effectively has been authoritatively demonstrated by Paul C. Rosenblatt.[82] More to the point, however, is Israel's possession of those qualities held by Ake to be essential for the maintenance of stability during a mobilizational situation. Its government's power is large, concentrated, and easily mobilized, as demonstrated by its success in bringing Israel into existence as a nation and successfully prosecuting three wars against the Arabs. The country has a political class that is willing and able to lead, the civic body certainly considers that it has some interest in the continued existence of the government, and its level

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[80] Ake, p. 101. These terms were defined at the beginning of this chapter.

[81] Huntington, p. 386.

[82] Paul C. Rosenblatt, "Origins and Effects of Group Ethnocentrism and Nationalism," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 8, no. 2, (1964), pp. 131-145, particularly p. 141.

of consensus is extremely high. Numerous features of the Israeli state may be cited as evidence to support these assertions. Its citizen army, for example, acts as a great leveler and melting pot by being the country's principal marriage mart, as well as providing both men and women with an opportunity to take an active part in the defense of their country.[83] As is well known, Israel places great emphasis upon its existence as a national homeland for the Jews, its ancient cultural heritage, its national religion, and its revival of Hebrew as the national language. In addition, Israel, for a new state, has an unusually well-developed set of political institutions. The Jewish Agency--founded in Jaffa in 1908--had an elected assembly, a budget, a bureaucracy, and a secret army, the Haganah.[84] It operated, as Sharabi points out, as "a government within a government, lacking only the attribute of sovereignty."[85] By the time de jure statehood was achieved in 1948, the assembly was experienced and well-equipped to continue its legislative functions as the Israel Knesset. Even Israel's political parties pre-date statehood. The Mapai, for example, has played a dominant role in Israeli politics since the early 1930's,[86] and still provides the country with much of its leadership.[87] A final point worth considering is the quality of Israel's population. At the time

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[83] Edward A. Bayne, "Development and the Cultural Reinforcement of Class," Expectant Peoples, ed., K. H. Silvert, p. 377.

[84] Sharabi, "Israel," p. 170.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Scott D. Johnston, "The Politics of Transition in Israel," Studies on Asia, Vol. 8, (1967), p. 172.

[87] Ibid. Cf. Bayne, p. 391.

Israel became a state, nearly 90 percent of its Jewish population had immigrated to the Middle East from the socially-and-economically-advanced societies of Europe and America.[88] In terms of a population producing a political class able to adapt to changing conditions, this, too, is an indication of a high level of institutionalization.

While Israel has suffered little from the destabilizing effects of social mobilization, Japan and Italy have been forced to seek solutions. Many of the problems faced by these two states may be traced to rapid industrialization, over-urbanization, a breakdown of traditional values, the "revolution of rising frustrations," and the emergence of extremist groups--all of which are concomitants of rapid social mobilization. In Italy, for example:

> ...equalitarian ideals have been propagated by labor organizers and aspiring politicians in even the most remote villages. The once lethargic masses of humble and poor folk have become socially and politically aroused. Strikes, occupations of untilled land and factories, public gatherings and demonstrations have been spurred as a means to exacerbate social tensions and channel social discontent into mass support of labor organizations and extremist politicians. The numerous poor and lowly born Italians have become increasingly unhappy and frustrated over their economic and social lot, despite actual improvements in their living standards, simply because they have been led to expect revolutionary improvements and total equality. Their value aspirations have grown much too fast for existing social and economic realities.[89]

And in Japan:

> In the enormous flux of the postwar period when practically everybody was on the move, the family itself often seemed to have lost its cohesive force....As more and more people from 'elsewhere' moved to cities to live and work, ties with

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[88] Judah Matras, Social Change in Israel, (Chicago, 1965), p. 54.

[89] Clifford A. L. Rich, "Foundations of Italian Politics," European Politics and Government, ed., C. A. L. Rich, (New York, 1962), p. 273.

> the village home and local temple grew somewhat more tenuous. The ramified family system, now legally abolished, began to give way, especiallyin cities, to the 'nuclear' family of parents and their children. Within this smaller family, communication between the generations became difficult and sometimes quite impossible. Those who grew up during or just after the war repudiated the authority of their elders, and particularly in the cities joined a new generation which confused freedom with license. Exploding urban growth deepened the gap between social patterns in city and country areas. Vulgar mass media spread a nihilistic sexuality appalling to older people. This phenomenon is not solely Japanese, but the war left a chasm between young and old that cut across most of the vertical, hierarchical compartments of Japanese society. One saw this in the disorderliness of students, in changing attitudes toward birth control and the care of the aged, and in other contexts.[90]

Evidence of these social dislocations has been marked in both Japan and Italy by frequent outbursts of political violence--usually limited to demonstrations and rioting[91]--and to an extreme factionalization of the political party system.[92] As was the case in Turkey, the newly-emerging classes in Japan and Italy became the target of parties--especially those on the Left--which sought to use the mobilized masses in a power ploy aimed at smashing the more traditional and more conservative ruling groups. In Italy, the Communist Party was the biggest beneficiary of social change, growing to the second largest single party, while in Japan the Socialist Party was the big gainer.[93]

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[90] Lawrence Olson, "The Elite, Industrialism, and Nationalism: Japan," Expectant Peoples, ed., K. H. Silvert, pp. 411-412.

[91] The New York Times Index, 1951-1966. See also Appendix B of this report.

[92] For thorough discussions of the two political party systems, see Warren M. Tsuneishi, Japanese Political Style, (New York, 1966), Chapter Seven (especially page 124) and Dante Germino and Stefano Passigli, The Government and Politics of Italy, (New York, 1968), Chapter Five (especially page 127.)

[93] Theodore McNelly, Contemporary Government of Japan, (Boston, 1963), p. 126.

Unlike Turkey, however, in neither country were these emergent forces large enough to shatter the existing political system. Several factors appear to account for this. For one thing, social mobilization is not a recent phenomenon in either Japan or Italy. It began, in fact, in the same decade for both countries: In Italy, with the unification of the Peninsula in 1861,[94] and in Japan with the restoration of the Meiji Emperor in 1868.[95] The effect of both these events was a new sense of nationalism, a growing sense of identity, and a strident surge toward modernization. The last of these was particularly true for Japan, which felt an urgent need to adopt the technology of the west in order to counter the military and colonial threat of the west.[96] In Italy, the process was more gradual, though again, the Italian, too, felt a need to keep pace with the more advanced nations of Europe.[97] The process of social mobilization, therefore, became institutionalized in advance of the rapid social and economic development that characterized the post-war years, with both countries building huge stores of social overhead capital. Other factors contributing to stability in the face of rapid social mobilization are bound up in the autonomy and complexity of the political institutions, of which the factionalization of the political parties serves as evidence. In both countries, any number of coalitions among the pro-system parties are possible in order to insure against the seizure of power by the anti-system parties. In Japan, the

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[94] Rich, p. 265.

[95] McNelly, p. 14-15.

[96] Joyce Lebra, "Some Perspectives on Modernization in Asia: Japan and India," Studies on Asia, Vol. 8, (1967), p. 48.

[97] Germino and Passigli, p. 6.

Liberal-Democratic Party is of sufficient strength to fend off the Socialist Party, while in Italy the centrist pro-system parties (Christian Democrats, Democratic Socialists, Republicans and Liberals) control a majority of votes. Although factionalism may produce some administrative instability, with cabinets occasionally shuffled to provide a Left-wing or Right-wing flavor, the possibility of a breakdown in the political system is remote.

The Philippines, ranked eighth in social mobilization and seventh in political stability, provides an interesting case for analysis under the third corollary hypothesis. On the one hand, it is tempting to cite the nation as an example in which rapid development has resulted in political decay, as judged from its high rate of urbanization (some 2.3 percent per year)[98] and from its chronic political violence and stubborn Huk rebellion. The temptation is increased by statements from President Ferdinand Marcos, who on one occasion stated that "Filipinos have ceased to value order. Justice and security are myths. Our government is gripped in the iron hand of venality, its treasury is barren." And on another occasion he declared that conditions had combined to produce an outlook of the people characterized by despair and that the country had been dangerously close to "a sudden uprising."[99] On the other hand,however, it would be imprudent to predict an imminent revolution for the island republic. For one can not ignore that "the principle of transfer of political power by popular franchise

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[98]According to statistics gathered for this study. See Table I in Chapter II.

[99]David Wurfel, "The Philippines: Intensified Dialogue," Asian Survey, Vol. 7, no. 1, (January, 1967), p. 48.

has been respected at all levels, and its official results have been challenged only by legal recourse."[100] On two occasions, in fact, power was transferred peacefully to a relative unknown political figure when the president was removed by death, which is a trying condition in any country. For the time being, therefore, The Philippines shall be categorized in this study as a nation in which institutionalization has kept pace with mobilization, permitting rapid bursts of political, economic and social development without upsetting the equilibrium. The most convincing explanation to this assertion is provided by Jean Grossholtz.[101] According to her analysis, the forces of change, literacy, industrialization, and urbanization, "have broadened perceptions of politics and political action and provided a basis for differentiating the electorate into specific interest groups."[102] Since these different groups have institutionalized methods for competing with one another, i.e., through the electoral and political process, politics in The Philippines have come to be characterized by a spirit of bargaining. "Those who would play active political roles must constantly bargain for the continued support of a constituency and with their peers for the wherewithall to maintain that continuous support," she says.[103] It is obvious, she adds, that the willingness to bargain is

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[100] David T. Sternberg, "The Philippines: Contour and Perspective," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, no. 3, (April, 1966), p. 502.

[101] Jean Grossholtz, Politics in The Philippines, (Boston, 1964). Much of the discussion in this part of the study is based upon Miss Grossholtz' searching analysis presented in the introduction to this book.

[102] Ibid., p. 6.

[103] Ibid., pp. 7-8.

related to the individual's sense of a predictable world in which conflict is not wholly destructive and other people can be trusted. Such an attitude is much more conducive to the politics of evolution than to the politics of revolution. These conditions would appear to be ideal to the maintenance of a stable political order.

It is hardly necessary to discuss Canada under this hypothesis. Socially and economically, the nation greatly resembles the United States, while politically, it appears to be something of a hybrid between the United States and Great Britain: Though it has a parliamentary system of government, it has three political parties with a high degree of consensus on fundamentals. The third party, in fact, was formed as something of an alternative to the two major parties, and attracts only a small percentage of the votes. Social mobilization has been underway for such a long period of time in Canada that it presents no destabilization problems, though separatist tendencies may be seen among the French Canadians. That particular problem, however, revolves around national identity and language rather than social mobilization.

This chapter shall be concluded with mention of Spain and Mexico, countries ranked similarly in terms of social mobilization and stability. Both countries, as well, are dominated by single parties: The Falange in Spain and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional in Mexico. Franco, for all intents and purposes, has retired and turned the administration of Spain over to an elite Catholic group known as the Opus Dei.[104] Though Franco will continue to appoint the Prime Minister in accordance with the Organic Law of 1965, the name will be chosen

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[104] Claire Sterling, "Franco's Foes Stop Hoping," The Reporter, (February 25, 1965), p. 33.

from a list provided him by his Council of Ministers. A virtual dictatorship, Spain has been highly stable under the extended Franco regime, but continued stability rests upon two questions: Will it continue to control internal pressures, and what will happen when Franco goes?[105] The Spanish Constitution calls for a restoration of the monarchy upon Franco's demise, but whether the actual reins of government will be left in the hands of an appointed successor is a matter of speculation. In the meantime, internal pressures are the concern of the Opus Dei and the hand-picked parliament, the Cortes, which relaxes or tightens controls as circumstances demand. In Mexico, rival interest groups fight out their battles within the PRI, and thus far have preserved a balance of power.[106] Stability may be maintained in Mexico so long as economic and social development continues within the planned framework of the government, but there is one disquieting note: The Mexican Indian is something of a forgotten person in the Mexican political system. Largely illiterate, he cares little for political or judicial institutions. But he can be aroused, as evidenced by the localized revolt carried out by a group of Indians displaced by a dam project in 1954.[107] If social mobilization is eventually to spread to the Indian population and the "marginal Mexican," the political system will be forced to respond.

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[105] Richard Comyns Carr, "The Outlook for Spain's Economy," World Today, Vol. 23, no. 1, (January, 1967), p. 30.

[106] Karl M. Schmitt and David D. Burks, Evolution or Chaos: Dynamics of Latin American Government and Politics, (New York, 1963), pp. 222-223.

[107] The New York Times Index, 1954. The rebels were led by Gen. Henriquez Guzman (mentioned earlier in this study in Chapter II).

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

As a further step in recent attempts to arrive at meaningful generalizations concerning the effects of social and economic development upon the political process, this study was undertaken for the purpose of investigating the relationship between social mobilization and political stability in 10 different societies. At the outset, it involved two problems in research and design: The definition and measurement of social mobilization, and the definition and measurement of political stability. From the standpoint of methodology, these problems were approached in such a manner as to yield similar results to anyone else who might care to repeat the study. Others, perhaps, may wish to use different indicators in measuring social mobilization. Or they may desire to use more or fewer indicators. However, so long as a range of indicators broad enough to encompass the social, economic and political factors of development is employed in the measurement of this process, the results should not prove to be significantly different. Many such indicators, for example, correlate so highly with other indicators of social mobilization that they are virtually interchangeable. In this study, gross national product per capita and radio receiving sets per 1,000 persons correlated at .97. In another study, a similarly high correlation was discovered between per capita national income and the

infant mortality rate.[1] It is altogether conceivable that, at some future date, a quite small number of indicators may be used to yield findings now discoverable only through the use of a quite large number of indicators. For the degree of discrimination required in this study, the number and type of indicators used in the social mobilization model were found to be sufficient. The scale devised in the study for the measurement of political stability, it is believed, attained an equally high degree of accuracy and discrimination. One shortcoming of the design should be pointed out, however. While the political events included in the scale are numbered zero through 26, there is occasionally more distance between measurable phenomena than a mere digit. For example, a change in party leadership and demonstrations opposing the government are numbered six and seven, respectively. Between these two digits, however, lies a hard decision--the decision to hold a demonstration. As a mental process, it cannot be measured; yet, it is a political event. A similar methodology was employed by Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend.[2] For greater specificity, these researchers scaled the frequency and magnitude of the political events in order to reach a finer degree of discrimination among their 84 nations. A comparison of the results of that study with the results of this study reveals agreement in all but one case. The Feierabends rated The Philippines their most stable country, while this study rated that nation seventh among the 10 studied. While their study did not discuss specific

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[1] Stockwell, p. 432.

[2] Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948-1962: A Cross-Polity Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution," Vol. 10, no. 3, (September, 1966), pp. 249-271.

findings, it can only be assumed that they ignored the Huk rebellion, as well as the violence which accompanies elections in The Philippines. In this thesis, such violence was held to be an important element in the determination of political stability.

This study held as its primary hypothesis that social mobilization is significant to--or bears a significant relationship for--the political process. Connected with this primary hypothesis were three corollary hypotheses: (1) That a certain amount of stability is necessay before rapid social mobilization may be successfully undertaken; (2) That, in the short run, rapid social mobilization will place stresses and strains upon the political system which will be made manifest by indications of instability, and (3) That, in the long run, the social mobilizational process will become institutionalized and permit further mobilization without unduly straining the political system or upsetting the political equilibrium.

In demonstrating the primary hypothesis, the 10 nations were ranked, one through ten, according to the degree and rate of social mobilization and the degree of political stability. Next, the Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient was computed for the two variables. The correlation worked out to an extremely high .82. Furthermore, the ranking was identical for the first four countries. The only real exception to the general trend, in fact, was Argentina, a well-developed country which has seen one military takeover after another. In search of a reasonable explanation for this deviance, the political culture of Argentina was examined and found to be essentially pre-national and non-integrated. Also, there was a definite lack of consensus among the competing interest groups, who trod with impunity

upon one another in pressuring the country's simplistic political institutions. In subsequent analyses, cultural integration and consensus on fundamentals were found to be essential elements in a stable political system. Viewed from this perspective, Argentina is less an exception than it at first appears. Had national integration, enculturation, and institutionalization--in the Huntington sense--been included as elements of social mobilization, Argentina doubtless would have been ranked lower on the social mobilizational scale.

The first corollary hypothesis was somewhat more difficult to pin down. It held that a certain amount of stability was necessary in a country before rapid social mobilization could be successfully undertaken. But the question--still to be answered, perhaps--is this: How much is a "certain amount?" Apparently, the amount of stability required for successful mobilization lies somewhere between that found in India and that found, for instance, in Japan. Though efforts to quantify this "certain amount" of stability on this level of analysis might fall short of the mark, it could provide a framework and a foundation for answering the question in future research. It is possible, as has been shown in this study, to quantify political violence as an indication of instability and compare this phenomenon with other nations. It is also possible to isolate as a factor of political instability a lack of consensus, as demonstrated in India and discussed in this study. These are variables with which the researcher can work in the continuing search for explanation. In this study, these variables were used to differentiate between India and the other nine states.

Interestingly, the first corollary hypothesis adds a dimension to the study of economic development and public policy only touched upon,

when considered at all, by other political scientists. It constitutes something of a back-door approach to the theory of economic determinism. Most of the literature in circulation today views development as a precondition for stability, rather than stability as a precondition for development.[3] It would seem just as reasonable to approach the problem from one side as from the other, particularly if the more accepted viewpoint leads, as it might in some instances, up a blind alley. This holds obvious implications for public policy, especially on behalf of the aid-giving nations. Why, it might well be asked, should billions be spent on nations too unstable to fruitfully deploy these funds for social and economic development? On the other hand, if this point may be carried further, some nations might wish to pursue those policies which would lead to a stable political system in order to qualify for economic assistance. It is not the purpose of this discussion, of course, to lobby for the acceptance of one viewpoint over the other. These implications are mentioned merely as illustrations of how conclusions based on the first corollary hypothesis might be used to increase the number of options available to both the aid-giving and aid-receiving nations.

In the second corollary hypothesis, the country of Turkey was cited and discussed as an example of how rapid social mobilization may lead to political instability. Particular attention should be paid, however, to the manner in which political instability came about in Turkey. Many studies--the Benjamin and Kautsky paper, for example--

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[3]Both Lerner and Lipset correlate economic development with democracy or political participation. See also the Diamant article referred to earlier in this study.

emphasize the theoretical possibility of new groups gaining status and power as a result of social mobilization, and then using this newly-won status and power to overthrow the existing and often more traditional order. In Turkey, however, the inclusion of new groups in the political process increased competition among the existing elites, creating an aura of crisis so untenable as to invite military intervention. At no time did the Turkish peasantry seek, on its own behalf, to overthrow the existing government, nor did its members demand admittance to the power structure. Instead, the involvement of the peasantry in politics merely acted as a catalyst to produce an unstable situation. Therefore, it should be worthwhile in the future to cite Turkey as an example of a departure from the standard model with which students of social mobilization have become familiar. As social mobilization is a complex, multifaceted process, so are the ramifications of social mobilization upon the political process. This, too, could open another area of study. For, as perceptions are broadened, so are the avenues of research leading to explanations of this phenomena.

In the third corollary hypothesis, the remaining seven nations were cited as examples of countries in which the social mobilizational process had become institutionalized, permitting further mobilization without upsetting the political equilibrium. In essence, the discussion of this hypothesis, as well as the others, led as a matter of course to a search for a definitive list of those criteria which insure stability under any circumstances short of military conquest. As mentioned in relation to the case of Turkey, social mobilization has many ramifications which may lead to an assault on the political system. By the same token, some assaults on the political system may be similar

to those which can be traced to rapid social mobilization, but in actuality are in no way connected with social mobilization. The United States and Canada, for example, are highly-developed societies in which social mobilization--as a disruptive force--is a thing of the past. Yet both of these countries find themselves under siege by forces which, in a less-developed country, might well have sprung from the effects of rapid social mobilization.

One of the most important criteria for the maintenance of a stable political system seems to be the existence of a consensus on the fundamental aspects of the constitutional order. This involves the identificism and consensuality propounded by Claude Ake,[4] as well as the integration held necessary by K. H. Silvert in his observations on Argentina.[5] It is possible that this consensus may take different forms or perform different functions from country to country. In Israel, for example, the idea of a Jewish state is of sufficient force to mobilize the population virtually overnight in the event that the nation is threatened. There may be some disagreement over the form of the Jewish state, or over its policies, but the overriding matter of concern is that the state should continue to exist as a homeland for the Jewish people. Furthermore, the vast majority of the Israeli population feels an abiding, personal interest, or stake, in the continuance of the state and the maintenance of internal order. These factors far outweigh the dysfunctional effects of stresses and strains caused by rapid social mobilization--or, for that matter, any other problem. In

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[4]Ake, p. 108 and p. 110.

[5]Silvert, pp. 350-352.

Japan, Italy, and other multiparty states, the consensus performs the function of unifying the various competing factions and elites against the anti-system forces. In other words, the various competitors for political power, while they may squabble incessantly among themselves, are still in basic agreement that control over the government should not fall into the hands of those who would alter the constitutional order or compromise the state's sovereignty. Some parties, for example, refuse to enter into coalitions with the Communist parties. Others may enter into grand coalitions with their chief rivals in order to dilute the strength of anti-system parties. Interest groups, as well, must share the consensus. The alternative, as demonstrated by the case of Argentina, is to rip the society to shreds.

Another important criterion for the maintenance of political stability is a high degree of institutionalization. This refers, in the Huntington analysis, to the adaptability, complexity, independency, and coherency of the political institutions.[6] The political elite in Turkey, for example, was unable to adapt to the emergence of a powerful new voting bloc. In Argentina, the political institutions were too simple to withstand parochial demands and pressures from the competing interest groups. In neither country were the institutions so independent or coherent as to avoid military intervention. On the other hand, the more stable nations have developed institutions which are flexible and more independent of outside influences. They offer a means of contesting differences of opinions or conflicting ideologies in the political marketplace, rather than in the barracks or back-rooms of palaces. As

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[6]Huntington, pp. 394-405.

a matter of necessity, these procedures have a degree of respect high enough so that the losers agree to abide by the results of the contest. Even the noncompetitive, single-party states have institutionalized measures for dealing with differences. In countries such as Spain and Mexico, for example, the differences are fought out in party councils or among ruling oligarchs.

An environment in which there is a low level of politically-motivated violence is desirable for the maintenance of a stable political order, since this would make it less likely that violence would be employed against the government. However, it would be difficult to conclude from the data compiled for this study that violence is necessarily dysfunctional to stability. On the contrary, it would appear that violence could become an institutionalized function of the political process, providing an outlet for political expression and a means of dealing with certain political problems. In many of the countries examined in this study, demonstrations, riots, and even occasional acts of terrorism seem to be accepted methods of articulating political desires. And in The Philippines, literally every election is accompanied by assassination. It is difficult to make generalizations about this type of behavior, of course, but it would seem obvious that violence is a legitimate area of study in relation to the political process.

Naturally, it is conceded that the generalizations in this study cannot exceed in validity the data upon which the study was based. Statistics, for example, are not of unquestionable integrity, particularly those reported by the less-highly-developed countries. This casts an unfortunate shadow over statements concerning social

mobilization in such nations, but it is a shadow which cannot be avoided. Similar criticisms might be levied against newspaper reports upon which the measurement of political stability is based. Again, this problem is uncircumventable; the best that can be done, when relying upon secondary sources, is to use the best material available and trust to its accuracy.

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APPENDIX A

VARIABLES OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

Contained in this appendix are statistical tables showing how the variables of social mobilization increased or decreased over the 15-year period from 1950 to 1965. For each of the variables, an average annual rate of increase, in terms of percentage, was computed. In those instances in which there was a decrease rather than an increase, the decrease is represented by a minus (-) rate of average annual increase.

TABLE VI

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA

Year	Argentina	Canada	India	Israel	Italy	Japan	Mexico	The Philippines	Spain	Turkey
Average Annual Increase (%)	1.42	2.36	1.96	8.27	6.87	13.46	3.32	3.66	7.66	2.95
1965	718	2,451	101	1,325	1,100	863	455	161	688	261
1964	675	2,344	107	1,281	1,073	839	447	158	644	254
1963	635	2,237	102	1,215	1,054	745	420	157	607	249
1962	668	2,165	98	1,129	1,088	699	409	154	570	241
1961	691	2,066	99	1,064	955	657	403	154	532	229
1960	658	2,055	97	1,001	890	574	403	150	480	239
1959	620	2,051	92	959	842	502	386	150	463	238
1958	670	2,031	92	879	796	459	387	146	486	236
1957	638	2,058	88	842	764	447	379	145	468	230
1956	616	2,103	90	821	729	404	363	143	461	222

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA (Continued)

Year	Argentina	Canada	India	Israel	Italy	Japan	Mexico	The Philippines	Spain	Turkey
1955	617	1,982	87	786	701	377	353	140	433	214
1954	589	1,873	87	716	662	346	335	134	413	204
1953	578	1,988	85	610	641	330	313	131	388	231
1952	550	1,966	81	638	600	713	320	125	394	213
1951	598	1,878	80	638	578	n.a.	317	119	382	202
1950	591	1,810	78	591	541	n.a.	304	106	320	181

SOURCE: GNP per Capita, "Growth Rates and Trend Data by Region and Country," Agency for International Development. Office of Program Coordination, Statistics and Reports Division, (March 31, 1967). Figures are corrected to the value of the 1965 United States dollar.

TABLE VII

PERCENTAGE OF LITERATE POPULATION

Year	Argentina	Canada	India	Israel	Italy	Japan	Mexico	The Philippines	Spain	Turkey
Average Annual Increase (%)	.50	.11	.27	-.62	.51	.76	.65	1.42	.73	.98
1965	93.9	99.65	24.78	85.40	94.11	100	68.65	84.72	90.35	43.10
1964	93.4	99.54	24.51	86.02	93.64	100	68.00	83.30	89.12	42.12
1963	92.9	99.43	24.24	86.64	93.13	100	67.35	81.98	88.89	41.14
1962	92.5	99.32	23.97	87.28	92.62	99.32	66.70	80.56	88.16	40.16
1961	91.9	98.21	23.70	87.90	92.11	98.56	66.05	79.16	87.43	39.08
1960	91.4	98.10	21.63	87.50	91.60	97.8	65.4	77.74	86.70	38.1
1959	90.9	99.99	21.36	88.12	89.98	97.02	62.55	76.32	88.87	40.82
1958	90.4	97.88	21.09	88.74	89.47	96.28	61.90	74.90	88.14	39.84
1957	89.9	97.77	20.82	89.36	88.96	95.52	61.25	68.14	87.41	38.86
1956	89.4	97.66	20.55	89.98	88.45	94.76	60.50	67.72	86.68	37.88

PERCENTAGE OF LITERATE POPULATION (Continued)

Year	Argentina	Canada	India	Israel	Italy	Japan	Mexico	The Philippines	Spain	Turkey
1955	88.9	97.55	20.28	90.60	87.94	94.00	59.95	66.30	85.95	38.80
1954	88.4	97.44	20.01	91.22	87.43	93.24	59.30	65.68	85.22	35.82
1953	87.9	97.33	19.84	91.84	86.92	92.48	58.75	64.26	84.59	34.84
1952	87.4	97.22	19.57	92.46	86.41	91.72	58.10	62.84	83.86	33.86
1951	86.9	97.11	19.30	93.08	85.90	90.9	57.45	61.42	83.13	32.88
1950	86.4	97	19.03	93.7	85.49	90.2	56.8	60.0	82.4	31.9

SOURCES: Bruce M. Russett, World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators, (New York, 1964), pp. 221-226; UNESCO Statistical Yearbook; Compendium of Social Statistics, 1963.

TABLE VIII

PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS

Year	Argentina	Canada	India	Israel	Italy	Japan	Mexico	The Philippines	Spain	Turkey
Average Annual Increase (%)	.34[a]	.22	.18	.39	.23	.64	.60	2.3[b]	.44	.26
1965	52	40.5	14.5	62.8	32.9	50.1	33	45.2	45.4	21
1964	51.7	40.2	14.3	62.4	32.6	49.5	32.4	42.9	45.9	20.8
1963	51.3	40	14.1	62	32.4	48.8	31.8	41.6	45.5	20.5
1962	51.0	39.8	13.9	66.6	32.2	48.2	31.2	39.3	45.1	20.7
1961	50.6	39.6	13.8	61.2	32	47.5	30.6	37	44.6	20
1960	50.3	39.4	13.6	60.9	31.7	46.9	30	34.7	44.2	19.7
1959	50	39.1	13.4	60.5	31.5	46.3	29.4	32.4	43.7	19.5
1958	49.6	38.8	13.2	60.1	31.3	45.6	28.8	30.1	43.3	19.2
1957	49.3	38.6	13	57.7	31	45	28.2	27.8	42.8	18.9
1956	48.9	38.4	12.9	57.3	30.8	43.3	27.6	25.5	42.4	18.7

PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS (Continued)

Year	Argentina	Canada	India	Israel	Italy	Japan	Mexico	The Philippines	Spain	Turkey
1955	48.6	38.2	12.7	56.9	30.5	43.7	27	24.2	42	18.4
1954	48	37.9	12.5	56.5	30.3	43.1	26.4	21.9	41.5	18.2
1953	47.9	37.7	12.3	56.1	30	42.4	25.8	19.6	41.1	17.9
1952	47.6	37.5	12.1	55.7	29.8	41.8	25.2	17.3	40.6	17.6
1951	47.2	37.3	12	55.3	29.6	41.1	24.6	15	40.2	17.4
1950	46.8	37.1	11.8	55	29.3	40.5	24	12.7	39.8	17.1

SOURCE: Russet, unless otherwise noted.

[a]The Economic Development of Latin America in the Post-War Period, (United Nations, 1964), p. 76.

[b]Population Growth and Manpower in the Philippines, (United Nations, 1960), p. 72, (population studies, no. 32).

TABLE IX

PERCENTAGE OF WORK FORCE IN NON-AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONS

Year	Argentina	Canada	India	Israel	Italy	Japan	Mexico	The Philippines	Spain	Turkey
Average Annual Increase (%)	.46	.80	.10	-.10	1.15	1.47	.87	.70	1.15	.90
1965	82	91	30	88	76	73	48	41	65	28
1964	81	89	27	88	75	73	46	43	65	25
1963	81	89	30	86	74	67	46	43	59	25
1962	81	89	30	87	74	60	46	42	51	25
1961	75	88	29	83	72	60	42	41	51	23
1960	75	88	29	83	70	60	42	41	51	23
1959	75	87	29	84	70	60	42	41	51	23
1958	75	87	29	82	70	61	42	43	50	23
1957	75	87	29	83	69	61	42	43	51	23
1956	75	81	29	88	58	52	42	31	51	14

PERCENTAGE OF WORK FORCE IN NON-AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONS (Continued)

Year	Argentina	Canada	India	Israel	Italy	Japan	Mexico	The Philippines	Spain	Turkey
1955	75	81	29	89	60	53	42	31	51	14
1954*	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1953*	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1952	76	84	n.a.	89	61	52	42	33	48	14
1951	75	81	n.a.	89	n.a.	53	35	31	48	14
1950	75	79	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	51	35	31	48	14

SOURCE: International Agricultural Organization Production Yearbook, 1951-1966.

*n.a. - not available. Statistics for 1954 and 1953 were not recorded; others not available where noted.

TABLE X

DAILY NEWSPAPER COPIES PER 1,000

Year	Argentina	Canada	India	Israel	Italy	Japan	Mexico	The Philippines	Spain	Turkey
Average Annual Increase (%)	-1.18	-1.2	.12	-1.82	.30	4.64	1.33	-.18	1.86	.60
1965	148	227	12	143	113	451	116	17	153	45
1964	147	227	12	143	111	439	151	17	153	45
1963	146	223	12	143	117	416	119	18	153	45
1962	169	223	13	148	122	416	109	18	110	45
1961	162	222	12	170	101	416	83	17	90	45
1960	155	222	11	190	101	396	79	18	70	51
1959	155	221	10	210	101	389	51	17	70	50
1958	180	232	4	210	102	386	50	18	71	49
1957	179	236	8	210	103	384	50	18	76	46
1956	171	240	8	206	104	382	49	19	81	43

DAILY NEWSPAPER COPIES PER 1,000 (Continued)

Year	Argentina	Canada	India	Israel	Italy	Japan	Mexico	The Philippines	Spain	Turkey
1956	171	240	8	206	104	382	49	19	81	43
1955	163	248	8	202	105	380	49	19	85	40
1954	155	246	8	191	106	378	48	19	85	37
1953	113	232	8	179	106	376	48	18	76	34
1952	100	246	8	167	107	374	48	18	67	31
1951	153	266	7	201	103	296	47	22	63	23
1950	207	287	6	234	98	219	46	26	60	15

SOURCE: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, (United Nations, New York, 1951-1966).

TABLE XI

RADIO SETS PER 1,000

Year	Argentina	Canada	India	Israel	Italy	Japan	Mexico	The Philippines	Spain	Turkey
Average Annual Increase (%)	3.89	4.43	.26	4.43	3.87	2.9	3.55	1.07	2.77	1.60
1965	309	536	10	288	213	220	206	44	136	77
1964	281	519	9	269	203	203	184	39	127	71
1963	267	507	8	250	190	201	169	40	129	54
1962	229	495	7	235	180	193	157	41	113	52
1961	190	503	6	215	171	187	97	34	103	59
1960	167	452	5	194	162	133	95	22	90	49
1959	164	439	4	188	153	137	93	19	85	48
1958	160	426	4	182	145	140	92	16	80	46
1957	156	413	3	176	137	143	90	14	75	43
1956	152	400	3	170	129	146	88	12	69	41

RADIO SETS PER 1,000 (Continued)

Year	Argentina	Canada	India	Israel	Italy	Japan	Mexico	The Philippines	Spain	Turkey
1955	148	387	3	163	121	146	87	10	63	42
1954	144	382	2	154	110	139	85	9	57	37
1953	140	379	2	146	100	13	82	8	51	32
1952	136	376	1	138	89	12	79	7	45	27
1951	132	373	1	130	79	118	76	6	39	22
1950	128	370	1	122	68	111	73	4	32	17

SOURCE: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1951-1966.

TABLE XII

BIRTH RATE

Year	Argentina	Canada	India*	Israel	Italy	Japan	Mexico	The Philippines	Spain	Turkey*
Average Annual Increase (%)	.27	.38	.22	.60	.02	.66	.09	.47	.07	.00
1965	21.5	21.4	38.4	25.8	19.2	18.6	44.2	24.6	21.3	43
1964	21.9	23.5	38.4	25.7	19.9	17.7	44.8	25.7	22.2	43
1963	22.5	24.6	38.4	25.0	19.0	17.3	44.1	26.0	21.5	43
1962	23.0	25.3	38.9	24.9	18.7	17.1	44.2	28.4	21.3	43
1961	22.7	26.0	38.9	25.1	18.6	16.9	44.2	27.7	21.3	43
1960	22.9	26.7	38.9	26.8	18.3	17.2	44.6	29.6	21.8	43
1959	23.3	27.4	38.3	26.8	18.3	17.6	46.0	29.7	21.7	43
1958	23.6	27.5	38.3	26.7	17.7	18.1	44.0	29.7	21.8	43
1957	24.3	28.1	38.3	28.2	18.0	17.3	46.6	29.9	21.8	43
1956	24.5	28.1	41.7	28.8	18.0	18.5	46.1	31.2	20.7	43

BIRTH RATE (Continued)

	Argentina	Canada	India*	Israel	Italy	Japan	Mexico	The Philippines	Spain	Turkey*
1955	24.3	28.1	41.7	29.2	18.0	19.4	45.9	31.2	20.5	43
1954	24.6	28.5	41.7	29.2	18.2	20.1	46.0	30.7	20.0	43
1953	25.2	28.1	41.7	32.1	17.7	21.5	44.7	29.8	20.5	43
1952	24.9	27.8	41.7	33.0	17.9	23.5	43.6	30.1	20.8	43
1951	25.3	27.1	41.7	34.1	18.3	25.4	44.5	30.5	20.1	43
1950	25.6	27.1	41.7	34.7	19.5	28.2	45.5	31.7	20.2	43

SOURCE: United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1951-1966.

*Estimated annual averages, based on a national sample survey.

APPENDIX B

VARIABLES OF INSTABILITY

Contained in this appendix are graphs showing the indicated levels of instability in each of the 10 countries examined in this study for the years 1951 through 1966. For the edification of the reader, each graph is accompanied by an explanatory chart citing the political event which corresponds to the peaks and troughs on the graphs. It should be noted that only the event providing the most illustrative indication of political stability or instability is cited. For example, elections may be overshadowed by terrorism, or terrorism may be overshadowed by revolt. In parentheses at the end of each citation is the number of the variable of instability as it is ranked in the 26-point index of instability, written in full on pages 24 to 26 of this study. It might be helpful to the reader to refer to the index while examining the graphs, as the numbers on the vertical line of the graph corresponds to the numbers in the index. To differentiate between those nations which have experienced violent assaults on the constitutional order and those which have not, an instability line is drawn across the graph at the point where there develops organized armed resistance with the intent to seize control of the government. The exclusive source for this material is The New York Times Index.



Figure 1. Political Stability: Canada

CANADA

1951: No significant activity (0).

1952: No significant activity (0).

1953: Elections held, incumbents win (4).

1954: Three ministers resign (1).

1955: No significant activity (0).

1956: No significant activity (0).

1957: Elections called one year early, opposition wins (6).

1958: Special elections, incumbents win (4).

1959: No significant activity (0).

1960: Cabinet shuffled (2).

1961: No significant activity (0).

1962: Elections called, incumbents win (4).

1963: Parliament dissolved; elections called, opposition wins (6).

1964: Cabinet shuffled (2).

1965: Cabinet shuffled (2).

1966: Terrorist explodes bomb in Parliament Building (13).

Note: Elections normally are held at five-year intervals in Canada; however, under a parliamentary system, special elections may be called for a variety of reasons, e.g., to gain a larger majority for the incumbents, or in the event the incumbent party no longer can command a working majority in Parliament.



Figure 2. Political Stability: Israel

ISRAEL

1951: Ten persons injured in election-day rioting (9).

1952: Rioting; Communists reportedly involved (9).

1953: Terrorists explode bomb in Tel Aviv (13).

1954: Small riot at Nazareth (9).

1955: Terrorists explode bomb at political rally (13).

1956: Minister resigns (1).

1957: Plot to assassinate political leaders revealed (12).

1958: Government resigns; new government formed under same leadership (5).

1959: Government resigns; new government formed under same leadership (5).

1960: Ministers resign; government remains unchanged (1).

1961: Students hold protest demonstration (7).

1962: No significant activity (0).

1963: Government resigns; new government formed under new leadership (6).

1964: Government resigns; new government formed under same leadership (5).

1965: Elections held,incumbents win (4).

1966: No significant activity (0).



Figure 3. Political Stability: Italy

ITALY

1951: Communists call general strike (8).

1952: Rioting, Communists and Fascists clash (9).

1953: Riots, police jail 2,000 persons (9).

1954: Fanfani government ousted; rioting occurs (9).

1955: Rioting, Communists clash with Fascists (9).

1956: Cabinet shuffled (2).

1957: Demonstrations; Segni government resigns (7).

1958: Thirty persons hurt in Spinazzola rioting (9).

1959: Rioting in Rome, Fascists reportedly involved (9).

1960: Rioting in several areas; Segni, Tambroni governments fall; Fanfani returns to power (10).

1961: Isolated terrorist activity (13).

1962: Strikes and violence in Turin, 2,000 arrested (8).

1963: Fanfani government falls; wave of strikes (8).

1964: Moro resigns, forms new government (4).

1965: Minister resigns (1).

1966: Moro resigns; forms new government (4).

Note: Use of the word strike in this chart refers to political strikes, rather than labor disputes, This period in Italy saw a great deal of administrative instability, in which prime ministers formed numerous governments.



Figure 4. Political Stability: Japan

JAPAN

1951: Students riot (9).

1952: Widespread rioting over United States-Japan Peace Treaty; several killed, hundreds injured (11).

1953: Yoshida government falls, returns after elections (5).

1954: Deputies in Diet riot, 50 injured (9).

1955: Hatoyama government resigns; returned in elections (5).

1956: Deputies in Diet riot, 30 injured (9).

1957: Ishibashi government resigns; Kishi named premier (6).

1958: Two general strikes; fighting in Diet (9).

1959: Cabinet shuffled (2).

1960: Japan-United States treaty negotiations touch off massive rioting; Kishi stabbed, another leader assassinated (14).

1962: Another plot against government uncovered, eight jailed (12).

1963: Elections held, incumbents win (4).

1964: Students demonstrate (7).

1965: Thousands hold demonstration at Diet (7).

1966: Demonstration involving an estimated 70,000 (7).



Figure 5. Political Stability: Mexico

MEXICO

1951: Demonstrations (7).

1952: Isolated terrorist activity; shootings during election campaign (13).

1953: No significant activity (0).

1954: Sixteen killed in revolt led by General Guzman (21).

1955: Twenty-eight killed in rioting in Oaxaca (9).

1956: Strikes; student riot (9).

1957: Student riots (9).

1958: Rioting in several areas (10).

1959: Terrorist activity in seven states; several assassinations (15).

1960: Thirteen killed in riot in Guerrero (9).

1961: Riots and uprisings in three states; Pueblo placed under military rule (16).

1962: Several riots; Army puts down outbreaks of violence (9).

1963: Demonstrations against arrest of rightist political leaders (7).

1964: Rioting in Chihuahua (9).

1965: Riots in Yucatan; guerrillas attack army post, 20 die (9).

1966: National conspiracy against government disclosed, 50 jailed (12).



Figure 6. Political Stability: Spain

SPAIN

1951: Rioting in Barcelona, Pamplona, Bilboa, Madrid (10).

1952: Demonstrations (7).

1953: Demonstrations (7).

1954: Rioting accompanies local elections (9).

1955: Students lead demonstrations (7).

1956: Government suspends constitutional provisions to crack down on protests and riots (18).

1957: Franco alleges plot against his government (12).

1958: Strikes called in at least five cities; Franco suspends constitutional provisions to restore order (18).

1959: Sixteen conviced of anti-government plot; terrorists strike in Bilboa (13).

1960: Guerrilla and terrorist activity reported (13).

1961: Terrorist activity (13).

1962: Wave of strikes and terrorism; state of emergency declared in three provinces (17).

1963: Numerous bombings; many terrorists executed (14).

1964: At least six acts of terrorism (13).

1965: Students organize hunger strikes and political strikes (8).

1966: Rioting erupts at four universities (10).



Figure 7. Political Stability: The Philippines

THE PHILIPPINES

1951: War between government and Huk rebels, 2,000 Huks reported killed in one year (21).

1952: Huk rebellion continues, 4,000 reported fighting (21).

1953: Huk rebellion continues, 20 killed in election violence (21).

1954: Huk rebellion continues (21).

1955: Huk rebellion slacks off; at least 23 persons die in election violence (13).

1956: Isolated terrorism blamed on Huks (13).

1957: Army begins new offensive against Huks, 1,000 rebels reported still fighting (21).

1958: Huk rebellion continues (21).

1959: Eight cities put on emergency basis as result of Huk activity; 50 persons die in election violence (21).

1960: Huk war continues; terrorist activity reported (21).

1961: Huk war continues, 1,200 troops sent to Luzon (21).

1962: Huk rebellion continues; mayor assassinated in Cavite Province (21).

1963: Huk war slacks off; six election-connected murders confirmed (14).

1964: No significant activity reported (0).

1965: Huk rebellion picks up, 14,000 Huks reported active and in control of 80 villages; 31 killed during election campaign (21).

1966: Huk terrorist activity reported, five persons killed (13).



Figure 8. Political Stability: India

INDIA

1951: Small civil war reported in Assam (21).

1952: Widespread terrorist activity (15).

1953: Central government assumes control of East Punjab to curb alleged Communist influence (16).

1954: Central Government assumes control of Andhra (16).

1955: Naga tribesmen revolt, about 300 reported killed (21).

1956: Naga war continues, about 350 killed (21).

1957: Naga war continues, 295 deaths reported (21).

1958: Naga war continues, 1,369 reported killed (21).

1959: Naga war continues; violence erupts in Kerala (21).

1960: Naga war continues; clashes in Assam continue (21).

1961: Naga war continues (21).

1962: Naga war continues; internal violence slacks off with attack by Chinese (21).

1963: Naga sabotage reported (13).

1964: Naga activity picks up; central government assumes control of Kerala after state government falls (21).

1965: Central government maintains control of Kerala after Communists win state elections (16).

1966: Naga uprising continues; fighting erupts in Assam and Punjab (21).



Figure 9. Political Stability: Turkey

TURKEY

1951: Cabinet resigns, new cabinet formed under same leadership (3).

1952: Isolated terrorist activity (13).

1953: Ministers resign (1).

1954: Twenty arrested in plot against government (12).

1955: Riots erupt over Cyprus issue (9).

1956: Martial law declared (19).

1957: Troops called to quell rioting in Ankara (9).

1958: Elections postponed (18).

1959: Isolated terrorist activity (13).

1960: Military overthrows Menderes government (25).

1961: Menderes supporters attempt counter-coup (23).

1962: Army group attempts to overthrow Inonu (23).

1963: Army group attempts another coup, six executed; martial law declared (23).

1964: Isolated terrorist activity; attempt made to assassinate Inonu (13).

1965: Inonu government falls, new government formed by Justice Party under Demirel; 15 hurt in rioting (9).

1966: Students lead demonstration (7).



Figure 10. Political Stability: Argentina.

ARGENTINA

1951: Army revolt attempt crushed (23).

1952: Isolated terrorist activity (13).

1953: Terrorism stepped up, bombing and arson reported (15).

1954: Peron sets up extra-constitutional "super-cabinet" (18).

1955: Peron ousted in armed revolt, military junta seizes control (26).

1956: Peron forces crushed in counter-revolt; martial law declared (23).

1957: Numerous acts of terrorism reported (15).

1958: Riots and strikes accompany election, 30-day state of seige declared with constitutional rights suspended (18).

1959: Military coup thwarted (23).

1960: Military coup thwarted (23).

1961: Military coup thwarted (23).

1962: Frondizi government overthrown by military (25).

1963: Military coup thwarted (23).

1964: Central government assumes control of state of Jujay, removes governor and dissolves legislature (16).

1965: Widespread terrorism (15).

1966: Illia government overthrown by military junta (25).

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