

A "VALUE ANALYSIS" OF FOUR ADDRESSES
BY PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
ON UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT
IN VIET NAM

By

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
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Definitions of Terms Used

For full appreciation of this study the reader should be acquainted from the beginning with the definitions that were given five key terms. Care was taken to make these definitions as consistent as possible with those attributed to the same terms in former studies employing "value analysis" of speech content.

Values. Edward Steele says that

Values are "concepts," of the "desirable," "influencing choice," and they are shared by a "group." As concepts they are moralistic rather than physiological--they are generalizations. They are, generalizations about the desirable, implying that they are generalized feelings about things or experiences. Their influence on behavior is to guide or canalize choice; they are the criteria against which alternative courses of action are measured. Having emerged from common experience and having been inculcated by education and interaction, they are often shared as group norms. Values are the elements to which people are emotionally committed; they are the rules, criteria, standards which have been internalized (accepted) as proper guides for living.¹

Briefly, then, values are concepts to which a person has an emotional commitment and which serve as guides to the "proper" way to act or believe.

¹Edward D. Steele, "The Rhetorical Use of the 'American Value System' in the 1952 Presidential Campaign Addresses" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1957), p. 33.

Value Analysis. Duane Angel gives the following descriptive definition of "value analysis" as applied to speech content:

What "value analysis" does is attempt to get at the heart of the persuasive process. It views whatever the audience member "places value upon" as the key to the whole persuasive process. Here is what is hypothesized: people are persuaded by logic; logic is based on a premise; premises are based on "popular conception of the good." A person must agree with the premise or he will not be persuaded. If he agrees with the premise, he will persuade himself.²

In other words, in relation to speech content "value analysis" is the study of the manner in which a speaker makes use of appeals to the shared values of his audience.

Value Orientation. Angel tells us that a "value orientation"

. . . is a descriptive term for the way values are put together or organized by an individual, group, or culture. This orientation is the individual or group frame of reference from which the comments of a speaker will be judged.³

Or as Steele more simply puts it, a "value orientation" is "a set of linked propositions about the desirable"⁴--i.e., it is the particular context in which certain values find their meaning.

Value Cluster. The term "value cluster" as used in this study denotes the categorical labeling of the major value orientations found in the four speeches examined. Several values may be included in each category or "cluster."⁵

²W. C. Redding, "A Methodological Study of 'Rhetorical Postulates' Applied to a Content Analysis of the 1944 Campaign Speeches of Dewey and Roosevelt" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1957), pp. 168-169.

³Duane D. Angel, "The Campaign Speaking of George Romney: 1962 and 1964" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University, 1965), pp. 172-173.

⁴Steele, p. 33.

⁵Cf. Angel, p. 173.

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Value References. "Value references" are taken to be observable appeals to values as they are incorporated in value clusters. Any appeal which may be properly ascribed to one of the categories of values, then, is a "value reference."

The Problem

Emergence of the Problem. In their 1957 doctoral dissertations two authors, Edward Steele and W. C. Redding, arrived at almost identical conclusions concerning the practicality of utilizing cultural values described by social scientists as criteria for content analysis of contemporary public address.⁶ Of particular interest are the facts that these studies were written independently and simultaneously--neither writer having knowledge of the other's work--and that the writers approached the problem in diametrically opposite ways: One author moved from a consideration of the culture to an examination of selected political speeches while the other went from an examination of selected political speeches to a consideration of the culture.⁷ In a jointly written article these scholars later summarized their convergent findings:

. . . (1) it is possible to locate a body of relatively unchanging values shared by most contemporary Americans; (2) it is possible to formulate these values--at least approximately--in "clusters" of assertions; and (3) it is possible to observe the explicit or implicit functioning of such values as underpinning for persuasive, appealing, argument in speeches addressed to a mass audience. In other words, the evidence in these two dissertations appears to substantiate the basic contention that cultural values

⁶See footnotes 1 and 2. In particular see pages 12-20 of Steele's dissertation for a review of social scientist's studies on American cultural values.

⁷Edward D. Steele and W. Charles Redding, "The American Value System: Premises for Persuasion," Western Speech, XXVI (Spring 1962), No. 2, p. 83.

(in this particular case, those of the United States) provide many--not, of course all--of the major premises from which the persuasive speaker argues for audience acceptance of his recommendations. . . .⁸

A third dissertation involving the idea of "value analysis" appeared in 1965.⁹ Its author, Duane Angel, evaluated the campaign speaking of Governor George Romney and he emphasized that his study differed in scope and purpose from the former ones in that:

. . . They were concerned with (1) Whether or not value references could be located in speeches, and (2) Whether or not different speakers used the same value references. This study attempts to go one step further by examining only one speaker and concerning itself with value adaption to particular audiences. In short, the question is raised, Does Governor Romney use different value references before the six diverse audiences selected for study? . . .¹⁰

The author concluded that Mr. Romney did use different value references before different audiences.¹¹

Thus these three studies substantiated the contentions that (1) cultural values provide many of the major premises of persuasive arguments and that (2) a speaker may vary value references as a means of adapting to different audiences.

Statement of the Problem. The present study was undertaken as an attempt to go still "one step further" in the study of value analysis of speech content by considering the value references in the speeches of one speaker on one specific subject before essentially the same audience over a marked period of time. Exactly, then, the purpose was to answer the

⁸Ibid., p. 84.

⁹See footnote 3.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 174.

¹¹Ibid., p. 209.

question, What major value references did President Johnson (with knowledge that he was in each case indirectly at least addressing the entire American public) utilize most in four major addresses--delivered over the course of twenty-three months--on the justice of United States involvement in the Viet Nam conflict? It was hoped to determine (1) to which values references were made most often in the speeches considered as a whole; (2) whether the values to which references were made most often in the speeches considered separately varied significantly; and (3) if there was a significant variance in the values to which a majority of the references were made in the separate speeches, whether a detectable pattern was established toward the predominant use of references to a few select values during the two years represented by the speeches examined.

Importance of the Study. Assuming that the American people have a strong aversion to war,¹² the attempt to justify a war effort to them may be thought to demand the best possible persuasive appeals. As a man whose success at appealing to the American public is testified to by over twenty-five years of national elective officeholding--including, of course, a term as President--and as one who has the best possible advisers available to him, Lyndon Johnson may be considered to be as likely as anyone to know (whether consciously or unconsciously) what the best appeals might be. Thus, it is not unreasonable to believe that an examination of the values he has emphasized most in his efforts to

¹²The notion that any one really has a depth aversion to war has been seriously challenged many times. For a recent and brief example see Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative (New York: Atheneum, 1966), pp. 335-336.

persuade the American public of the justice of involvement in the Viet Nam conflict will yield a valid indication of values for which Americans are most willing to fight a war.¹³ If Aristotle is right, this would be vital information for the political or deliberative orator since his aim is expediency and this requires an awareness of the public "concept of the good"--i.e., popularly shared values¹⁴--so as to allow the selection of the best possible persuasive appeals in any given circumstance.¹⁵

This study, then, offers a distinct contribution to the field of Speech in that it goes beyond designation of value references and indication of the variance of those references in select addresses and purposes to specify some of the American cultural values to which reference can most reliably be made in arguing a particular case. Hence it says to

¹³It might well be suggested at this point that President Johnson has apparently been remarkably successful in his efforts to justify American involvement in Viet Nam. This writer does not remember ever seeing a reputable estimate suggesting that opponents to the war effort constitute more than 5% of the American population. All indications--such as Gallup Poll reports--of more wide-spread discontent have to do with the manner in which the war is being conducted and not with the fundamental justice of American involvement. It can easily be argued that this discontent itself is almost unbelievably small in light of the fact that this war has already lasted (for the United States) longer than World War II, shows no sure signs of ending, has taken thousands of American lives, has cost billions of dollars, and is quite different in nature from any other war Americans have ever witnessed.

¹⁴Cf. Steele, dissertation, p. 7: "The extreme pragmatic nature of 'the good' in this system [Aristotle's Rhetoric] makes his definition of the good almost identical with the modern social-science definition of value." The interpretation of "the good" as popularly shared values is discussed in detail in Steele's dissertation, pp. 3-12.

¹⁵Aristotle, "Rhetoric," tr. W. Rhys Roberts, Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 9, pp. 602-603.

the student of rhetoric, "Here may be found values to which you can refer with expectation of drawing a favorable response from an American audience in arguing the case of war."

Selection of the Speeches

In order to accomplish the purpose of this study the speeches chosen for analysis, in addition to being those of President Johnson, had to meet four criteria--they had to have (1) had the same primary purpose, (2) been major addresses, (3) been directed to essentially the same audience, and (4) been given at sufficient intervals over a marked period of time. On the basis of the criteria used four addresses of the President were selected: an address made at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, on April 7, 1965;¹⁶ the opening address made at the Presidential press conference of July 28, 1965, at the White House;¹⁷ an address made at Freedom House, New York City, N. Y., on February 23, 1966;¹⁸ and an address made at a joint session of the Tennessee State legislature, Nashville, Tennessee, on March 15, 1967.¹⁹

Primary Purpose. It has been stated that this study was intended, in part, to concentrate on the addresses of a single speaker on one specific subject; therefore, only those speeches of the President in which the primary purpose was to justify American involvement in Viet Nam

¹⁶This speech will hereafter be referred to as the "Johns Hopkins" address.

¹⁷Hereafter referred to as the "White House" address.

¹⁸Hereafter referred to as the "Freedom House" address.

¹⁹Hereafter referred to as the "Nashville" address.

were acceptable. This primary purpose is not only evident but is explicitly stated in each of the four speeches analyzed.

In the Johns Hopkins address the President begins by saying:

Last week 17 nations sent their views to some two dozen countries having an interest in Southeast Asia. We are joining those 17 countries and stating our American policy tonight, which we believe will contribute toward peace in this area of the world.

A few paragraphs later he raises the rhetorical question "Why are we in South Viet Nam?" and then proceeds to answer it. In the White House address the question of "why" we are in Viet Nam is again the point of departure as the President says:

Well, I have tried to answer that question dozens of times and more in practically every state in this Union Let me again, now, discuss it here in the East Room of the White House.

In the address delivered at Freedom House the purpose is announced after preliminary remarks about "the four freedoms of mankind." The President says:

On the other side of the earth [in Viet Nam] we are no less committed to ending violence against men who are struggling tonight to be free. It is about that commitment that I have come here to speak now.

In the Nashville speech President Johnson makes some brief comments about the "broad principles on which most Americans agree" and then declares:

On a less general level, however, the events and frustrations of these past few difficult weeks have inspired a number of questions about our Viet Nam policy in the minds and hearts of a good many of our citizens. Today, here in this historical chamber, I want to deal with some of those questions that figure most prominently in the press and in some of the letters which reach a President's desk.

Since each of these four addresses primarily sought to justify American involvement in Viet Nam, they were judged to have met the criterion of "purpose."

Major Addresses. It seemed likely that the best indication of the value references considered most important by President Johnson in his efforts to justify American involvement in Viet Nam would be found in those speeches of sufficient length to allow full development of his case. Thus, only those speeches of 1,500 words or more were deemed acceptable for this study. The shortest of the four addresses finally selected for analysis is the White House address and it is over 1,600 words in length. The speeches used in this study, then, were deemed acceptable in terms of the "length" criterion.

Same Audience. The intent of the study dictated that only those addresses that could be said to have been delivered, in essence at least, to the entire American public be deemed usable. Such speeches (1) would have been initially addressed to a nationwide television audience and/or (2) would have been made immediately available to the nation in full text form.

Two of the selected addresses were nationally televised--the Johns Hopkins address was viewed by an estimated audience of sixty million persons²⁰ and the White House address was viewed by an estimated audience of twenty-eight million persons.²¹ All four of the speeches received extensive news coverage and their full texts appeared in many major newspapers within a day after they were delivered.²² In addition, three of the speeches have been published in pamphlet form for distribution by

²⁰New York Times, April 8, 1965, p. 16.

²¹Ibid., July 29, 1965, p. 12.

²²Ibid., April 8, 1965, p. 16; July 29, 1965, p. 12; February 24, 1966, p. 16; and March 16, 1967, p. 8.

the Department of State.²³ The "audience" criterion, then, indicated the adequacy of the addresses analyzed in this study.

Time Factor. Testing for a "pattern development" toward the predominant use of a few specific value references demanded addresses which would represent the President's approach to his Viet Nam case at sufficient intervals over a period of many months. Since the speeches chosen for analysis spanned a period of twenty-three months and were separated from one another by at least three months in each instance, it was decided that they met the criterion of "time."

Chapter Sequence

The present chapter has included a specification of the problem dealt with in this study, definitions for key terms, and the criteria used for the selection of the speeches that were analyzed. Following is a brief indication of what each of the remaining chapters encompasses.

Chapter II. In Chapter II the reader is told how the particular value clusters used in this study were chosen. A working definition for each cluster together with illustrative examples from the speeches is offered.

Chapter III. In Chapter III the method of applying the selected value clusters to the four selected speeches of the President is outlined.

²³Lyndon B. Johnson, Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia [the Johns Hopkins address], Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State, publication 7872 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965); We Will Stand In Viet-Nam [the White House address], publication 7937 (1965); Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free [the Freedom House address], publication 8048 (1966).

Then the results of that application are presented. Attention is first directed to the resultant data concerning the number of references to each value cluster in the collective speeches. Next, consideration is given the resultant data concerning the number of references to each value cluster in the separate speeches. Finally, in Chapter III, the resultant data is analyzed to determine if there is a detectable pattern toward the predominant use of references to a few select value clusters in the course of the two years represented by the speeches examined.

Chapter IV. In the fourth and final chapter a summary of the study is given. Then the necessary conclusions are drawn and some of the possible implications of the study are pointed out. Lastly, suggestions are made for future studies.

CHAPTER II

THE VALUE CLUSTERS

Selection

The authors of the three prior studies involving value analyses of speech content incorporated cultural values into slightly different sets of clusters. Each set consisted primarily of categories suggested by various social scientists with minor revisions and additions made by the respective authors in order to render the clusters more applicable to the specific speeches being analyzed. The set of value clusters employed in the most recent of these earlier works--Duane Angel's 1965 analysis of the campaign speaking of George Romney¹--was chosen for use in the present study.² Angel tested the usability of these value clusters by asking eleven Sociology graduate students to specify the particular cluster referred to in thirty sentences chosen at random from the speeches he analyzed; working independently these students reached concurring conclusions in seventy-nine per cent of the cases.³

After a preliminary study Angel's set of ten value clusters was altered by the present writer in the following ways: (1) cluster

¹Duane D. Angel, "The Campaign Speaking of George Romney: 1962 and 1964" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University, 1965, pp. 172-173.

²Angel's cluster titles were: Optimism, Activity, Achievement, Frugality, Rationality, Individual Worth, Freedom, Equality, Sociability, and Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong.

³Angel, pp. 176-178.

definitions were refined where they were thought to be ambiguous, too inclusive, or too narrow;⁴ (2) the essentials of two categories were combined under one title in the process of redefinition;⁵ (3) one category title was changed to make it more suggestive of its redefined content;⁶ and (4) one entirely new cluster was added to better account for references pertaining primarily to the use of arms in international relations.⁷

Definitions

Following is a specification of the titles for and definitions of the value clusters used in this study. A letter designation for each cluster will be found in parentheses following the title of the cluster. All illustrative quotations are from the four Presidential speeches analyzed⁸ and when the specific speech is not referred to by name, it is denoted by the appropriate letters in parentheses immediately following the quoted material.⁹

⁴Each definition was refined at least slightly.

⁵The categories "Individual Worth" and "Sociability" were combined under the latter title.

⁶Angel's title "Equality" was changed to "Humanitarianism" and the scope of its content was broadened.

⁷This new category was entitled "Peaceful Coexistence." Its formulation was aided greatly by the reading of Robert W. Tucker, The Just War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960). The first chapter of this book spells out "The American Doctrine of the Just War."

⁸See Chapter I, pp. 7-10, for a discussion of the speeches used.

⁹The Letters "JH" will designate the Johns Hopkins address; the letters "WH" will designate the White House address; the letters "FH" will designate the Freedom House address; and the letter "N" will designate the Nashville address.

Optimism (O). "Optimism is operationally defined as a positive reference to the future. It is the general belief that 'the best is yet to come.'¹⁰ More specifically it is the belief that a "bright future" is (1) possible or (2) likely. For example, in the Johns Hopkins address President Johnson suggests:

The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA. The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from lack of care. Schools can be established to train people in the skills needed to manage the process of development. And these objectives, and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and determined effort.

In this instance the President is not saying that these wonderful objectives are to be expected, but that, if "a cooperative and determined effort" is exerted, they could be accomplished, that is, their accomplishment is possible.

In another of the speeches President Johnson tells us of the "hopeful report of progress" received from one of his advisers on the economic future of South Viet Nam:

Mr. Lillenthal () said that the South Vietnamese were among the hardest working people that he had seen in developing countries around the world, that "to have been through 20 years of war and still have this amount of 'zip' almost ensures their long-term economic development." (N)

"Long-term economic development" of South Viet Nam is judged to be very likely.

Appeals to Optimism may also be made in a negative fashion--an adversary may be portrayed as pessimistic or a partially bleak future may be forecast in order for the speaker to characterize himself as a "realist." The "bleak future" like the bright one is expressed as

¹⁰Angel, p. 177.

possible or likely. In one speech the President declares that unless we "have the courage to resist"

we will see it all--all that we have built, all that we hope to build, all of our dreams for freedom--all--all--will be swept away on the flood of conquest. (WH)

This catastrophe is held out as a possibility. It should not occur as long as there is "the courage to resist."

In another of the addresses a troubled future is foreseen by the President:

This will be a disorderly planet for a long time There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence We must expect that nations will on occasion be in dispute with us. (JH)

Here the President is representing himself as a "realist" by depicting the future as certain to have its share of troubles.

Appeals to Optimism, then, are concerned with what is to come. Any reference to the future, positive or negative, is included in this cluster.

Activity (A). "Reference to Activity can be operationally defined as showing that the present administration is doing something worthwhile now. It indicates business and that there is 'progress in the making.'¹¹ This is stated in terms of what the present administration (1) has been doing, (2) is doing, or (3) will be doing.

In the White House address President Johnson replies to the question of why we are in Viet Nam by saying:

Well, I have tried to answer that question dozens of times and more in practically every state in this Union. I have discussed it fully in Baltimore in April, in Washington in May, in San Francisco in June.

¹¹Ibid., p. 180.

What the President is stressing, of course, is that he has been very busy trying to explain to the American public why we are in Viet Nam.

Later in the White House address the President informs his audience of action taking place even while they are listening.

I have directed Ambassador Goldberg to go to New York today and to present immediately to Secretary-General U Thant a letter from me requesting that all of the resources, energy, and immense prestige of the United Nations be employed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Viet Nam.

The key word in this passage is "today"--the Administration is busy and progress is in the making.

An allusion to administrative action that is to come is made when President Johnson tells us that Secretary McNamara

will ask the Senate Appropriations Committee to add a limited amount to present legislation to help meet part of this new cost until a supplemental measure is ready, and hearings can be held when the Congress assembles in January. (WH)

We are told, in other words, that the present administration has plans-- it will be busy getting things done.

Action references, like Optimism references, may be invoked in a negative manner. Condemnatory attention may be drawn to "inaction" or to "uncommendable business."

In one paragraph the President makes full use of negative Activity references. He warns us of the business of Communist China:

The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peiping. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Viet Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes. (JH)

Thus the listener is told that Communist China has been, is, and plans to be busily engaged in uncommendable activities.

References to Activity, then, are allusions to the "efforts" of the present administration. All references to business are included in the Activity cluster.

Achievement (ACH). "Whereas Optimism deals with positive assertions concerning the future and Activity concerns what is being done at the present, any reference to Achievement points out progress that has been made in the past."¹² Such references primarily manifest themselves in terms of alleged (1) moral, spiritual, or educational growth, and (2) scientific, technological, or economic advancement.

In the Freedom House address President Johnson verbalizes his opinion that Americans have undergone some significant moral growth over the years:

I believe we are more tolerant of sectional and religious and racial differences than we were a quarter of a century ago. The majority of our people believe that a qualified man or woman, of any race, or any religion, of any section, could hold any office in our land. This was not so--not very clear at all in 1940 We have learned to despise the witch hunt, the unprincipled harassment of a man's integrity and his right to be different. We have gained in tolerance

This moral maturing was not a spontaneous event, rather it took place over a period of years--spanning the lives of several administrations. It may still be in the process of being fully achieved, but it has been, in good part, already achieved.

The President reminisces in another of his addresses:

In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchens warmed, and the home heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity came to our area along the humming wires of the REA. (JH)

¹²Ibid., p. 131.

It was science and technology which made this advancement possible. And it is an advancement which has been made.

Negative references to Achievement are made by pointing to a "lack of achievement." This lack of achievement is often implied in showing a need for achievement.

Moral underachievement is charged by the President when he argues that:

The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure . . . they are witness to human folly. (JH)

It is inferred that past moral failures are responsible for the present need of arms. Had the people of former times more nearly attained moral perfection arms would not be needed today.

Particular tragedy for the Vietnamese is seen in their war because it is accountable for a lack of adequate economic development:

It is the story of economic stagnation. It is the story of a generation of young--the flower of the labor force--pressed into military service by one side or the other. (N)

Much opportunity for economic progress has been lost due to the demands of war.

Frugality (F). "Frugality is the cluster that is concerned with the method by which activity is carried out. The name suggests that actions must be economical and pragmatic. There must be no 'waste' in terms of money or effort."¹³ The speaker, of course, depicts himself and his party or administration as frugal and an adversary as wasteful.

Of his own administration President Johnson declares:

We will do everything necessary to reach that objective [the independence of South Viet Nam and its freedom from attack], and we will do only what is absolutely necessary. (JH)

¹³Ibid., p. 184.

And elsewhere, after outlining his plans for execution of the war he adds:

These steps, like our actions in the past, are carefully measured to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement. (WH)

In other words, the President is assuring us that he does not intend to waste men, money, time, or effort in obtaining our goals in Viet Nam.

But the President does not attribute the same concern for frugality to the people of North Viet Nam. He says in the White House address that what they really want is "food for their hunger, health for their bodies, a chance to learn, progress for their country, and an end to the bondage of material misery," but they are defeating their own purpose for "they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful association with others than in the endless course of battle." (JH) And they should know that

we are going to continue to persist, if persist we must, until death and desolation have led to the same conference table where others could now join us at a much smaller cost. (WH)

The North Vietnamese, then, are engaging in a wholly unnecessary, highly costly, and fruitless effort.

Rationality (R). "This value cluster may be operationally defined as reference to the logical process."¹⁴ Such a reference usually denotes the present administration as one that practices and advocates the use of reason or it describes an adversary as "irrational."

In his Nashville speech President Johnson announces that

the representatives of all the countries that are contributing troops in Viet Nam will be coming to Washington for April 20 and 21 meetings for a general appraisal of the situation that exists.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 186.

"Appraisal" is the key word--the allies are going to critically examine the facts, that is, they are proceeding on a rational basis.

At one point the President serves as an advocate of rationality:

The complexities of this world do not bow easily to pure and consistent answers. But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try to follow them as best we can. (JH)

Difficult as it may be we should pursue the "course of reason."

The North Vietnamese are chided for their "irrationality" when the President proclaims that we are ready

to help the men of the North when they have the wisdom to be ready. . . . How much wiser it would have been . . . if Hanoi had only come to the bargaining table at the close of the year. (FH)

The evident implication is that the leaders in North Viet Nam are not conducting themselves very intelligently.

Thus any reference, positive or negative, to the use of reason is included in the Rationality cluster. These references are often indicated by such words as: "facts," "decision," "confusion," and "evidence."

Freedom (FR). "The Freedom cluster consists of references made to the popular desire for freedom of choice. Any statement inferring that the individual [person or country] should be free to decide or rejecting the use of authority will thus be found in this cluster."¹⁵ Positive references to Freedom commonly portray the speaker and his country and its allies as the "defenders of freedom" while negative references label an enemy as the "destroyer of freedom."

That Freedom is the cause for which the United States fights in Viet Nam is made clear in the declaration of the President:

¹⁵Ibid., p. 189.

Washington will not impose upon the people of South Viet Nam a government not of their choice. Hanoi shall not impose upon the people of South Viet Nam a government not of their choice. So we will insist for ourselves on what we require from Hanoi: respect for the principle of government by the consent of the governed. We stand for self-determination--for free elections--and we will honor their result. (FH)

And again,

we insist and we will always insist that the people of South Viet Nam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the south, or throughout all Viet Nam under international supervision, and they shall not have any government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it. (WH)

Our purpose is clear, singular, and settled--Freedom for South Viet Nam.

But not so for North Viet Nam:

The first reality is that North Viet Nam has attacked the independent nation of South Viet Nam. Its object is total conquest. (JH)

Or further:

Its goal is to conquer the south . . . and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism. (WH)

Thus North Viet Nam's aim is to defeat "the popular desire for freedom of choice" and to rule by armed force.

Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong (TSRW). This value cluster includes any reference to what the audience member considers to be morally "right" or "wrong" conduct, that is, morally praiseworthy or blameworthy behavior. This sense of morality is primarily derived from our puritan and pioneer heritage. "Thus value is placed on being dedicated, having a good reputation, being honest, keeping promises, [carrying out] responsibility, facing problems squarely, persistence [sic] . . . , paying debts,"¹⁶ and similar socially laudable behavior.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 193.

The importance of "promise keeping" is stressed by the President in his Johns Hopkins address as he explains that, among other reasons--

We are there [in Viet Nam] because we have a promise to keep . . . we have made a national pledge to help South Viet Nam defend its independence. And I intend to keep that promise. To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.

A few paragraphs later we are instructed that the defense of South Viet Nam is our "responsibility."

There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom. (JH)

Near the end of the Johns Hopkins address President Johnson appeals to our "sense of dedication":

Have I done enough? Ask yourselves that question in your homes--and in this hall tonight. Have we, each of us, all done all we can do? Have we done enough?

Negative references to the Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong insinuate that an individual or a group is guilty of iniquitous social behavior. For instance, the President contends that many people harp about the civilian casualties that "inadvertantly" result from our bombing of North Viet Nam and yet,

the deeds of the Viet Cong go largely unnoted in the public debate. It is this moral double bookkeeping which makes us get sometimes very weary of our critics. (N)

Thus it is strongly hinted that critics of the administration's bombing policy aren't facing the problem squarely, they aren't being entirely honest, and they aren't conducting themselves as responsible citizens.

"In brief, the Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong cluster is less than a catch-all. It refers to right for the sake of doing right and is based upon our pioneer and puritan heritage."¹⁷

Sociability (S). This cluster may be defined in two somewhat different ways. First, Sociability may be discerned as the speaker's attempt to represent himself or a friend as likable or admirable. Positive references, in this case, consist of exhibiting good manners, complimenting the audience, relating personal experiences, "name-dropping," or otherwise showing oneself to be "an all-right guy."

In the opening of his Freedom House address President Johnson displays good manners by recognizing the "honored guests":

Mr. Chief Justice, Mr. Secretary, Senator Kennedy, members of the fine delegation from New York, ladies and gentlemen at the head table, my fellow Americans . . .

A little later he compliments his audience members for their labor "to give real meaning to 'freedom.'"

You have warned our people how insatiable is aggression and how it thrives on human misery. You have carried the word that, without the sense that we can change the conditions of their lives, nothing can avail the oppressed of the earth . . . (FH)

A rather conspicuous plea for the sympathetic support of his listeners is registered in one of the President's speeches:

Let me also add a personal note. I do not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle. I have spoken to you today of the divisions and the forces and the battalions and the units. But I know them all, every one. I have seen them in a thousand streets, of a hundred towns, in every state in this Union--working and laughing and building, and filled with hope and life. I think I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their families sorrow. This is the most agonizing and the most painful duty of your President. (WH)

¹⁷Ibid., p. 196.

This relating of personal experience is President Johnson's means of characterizing himself as a conscientious and compassionate individual worthy of sympathetic respect and admiration.¹⁸

"Name-dropping" is illustrated in the following sentences from the address at Freedom House:

I talked on my ranch last fall with Secretary Freeman, the Secretary of Agriculture, and in my office last week with Secretary Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, making, over and over again, the same central point: The breeding ground of war is human misery.

There is no particular reason why Secretaries Freeman and Gardner are mentioned except that their names lend weight to what the President is saying and serve to exalt his position--it is they who came to him and he who "made the point" to them.

Sociability also includes allusions to the idea that every person in a nation's society is important. Government and society are expected to see that the individual has an opportunity to develop his capacities to the fullest and is treated fairly. Thus the success or justice of governmental policies or societal activities may be judged in terms of effects on the individual citizen.

In the Freedom House address the President lauds the "enlightened public policy, established by Franklin Roosevelt and strengthened by every administration since his death." This policy is commendable because it

¹⁸This particular appeal was quite successful--New York Times, July 29, 1965, p. 12: "President Johnson's news conference today moved some of those present, including his wife, to the verge of tears. The most moving part of his opening statement on the American buildup in Vietnam came when he told of the personal agony involved in sending 'our finest young men' into battle."

has freed Americans for more hopeful and more productive lives. It has relieved their fears of growing old--by Social Security and by medical care. It has inspired them with hope for their children by aid to elementary and higher education. It has helped to create economic opportunity by enlightened fiscal policies. It has granted to millions, born into hopelessness, the chance of a new start in life by public works, by private incentive, by poverty programs. For the Negro American, it has opened the door after centuries of enslavement and discrimination--opened the doors to the blessings that America offers to those that are willing and able to earn them. (FH)

Because "enlightened public policy" has served the people in this way-- that is, helped individuals--it is to be praised.

The intent of the present administration is also to help individuals, the President assures us. For since he is President--

It is now my opportunity to help every child get an education, to help every Negro and every other American citizen have an equal opportunity, to help every family get a decent home, and to help bring healing to the sick and dignity to the old. (WH)

In another of the speeches we are assured that the present administration intends to be "fair" to its soldiers in Viet Nam:

Reciprocity must be the fundamental principle of any reduction in hostilities. The United States cannot and will not reduce its activities unless and until there is some reduction on the other side. To follow any other rule would be to violate the trust that we undertake when we ask a man to risk his life for his country.

The government of North Viet Nam, on the other hand, is charged by the President with denying the individual worth of its citizens. He claims that Hanoi would have shown itself to be "much more compassionate toward its own people" if it "had only come to the bargaining table at the close of the year":

Then the 7,000 Communist troops who have died in battle since January the first, and the many thousands who have been wounded in that same period, would have lived in peace with their fellow man. (FH)

That is to say, the government in Hanoi has not placed the proper value on the lives of the individuals in its society. And continuance of the

war will only accentuate Hanoi's low estimate of individual worth:

Today, as then, Hanoi has the opportunity to end the increasing toll the war is taking on those under its command. (FH)

President Johnson also accuses some Americans of being "unfair" to our soldiers. He confides:

I think it is simply unfair to our American soldiers, sailors, and marines and our Vietnamese allies to ask them to face increased enemy personnel and fire power without making an effort to try to reduce that infiltration. (N)

This statement is made in response to those Americans who demand a cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam. The rather clear insinuation is that these people are unjust to our soldiers--they seek to place them in a terribly dangerous and unnecessary position.

References to Sociability, then, argue the importance of social adeptness and of the individual in society and argue that it is the duty of government and society to be concerned about each person's well-being. All such references, positive and negative, are included in this cluster.

Peaceful Coexistence (P). The Peaceful Coexistence category is operationally defined as references to the belief that nations can and should try to settle disputes by means other than armed force. Such references often express the conviction that "peace-loving" nations are bound by practical necessity to a course of unrelenting response to aggression since lasting peace and security depend on demonstrating to present and potential aggressors that initiation of armed conflict will bring punishing force. Positive references to Peaceful Coexistence claim that one's own nation and its allies recognize the need for and are exerting every effort toward the peaceful settlement of disputes. Negative references advert to those who consider armed force to be a

legitimate means of dissolving differences or to men who advocate ignoring or yielding to aggressors.

In the White House address President Johnson accentuates the eagerness of the United States to negotiate a settlement of the Viet Nam conflict by announcing--

We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the battlefield to the conference table. I have stated publicly and many times, again and again, America's willingness to begin unconditional discussions with any government at any place at any time.

In another of the speeches he reiterates this desire for peaceful settlement:

United States representatives are ready at any time for discussions of the Viet Nam problem or any related matter, with any government or governments, if there is any reason to believe that these discussions will in any way seriously advance the cause of peace. We are prepared to go more than halfway and to use any avenue possible to encourage such discussions. And we have done that at every opportunity. (N)

The President makes it clear in his Johns Hopkins address that the United States has responded and will continue to respond to what it considers to be aggression in Viet Nam:

In recent months attacks on South Viet Nam were stepped up. Thus it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air We do this in order to slow down aggression And we do this to convince the leaders of North Viet Nam--and all who seek to share their conquest--of a simple fact: We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

Such determination is a practical necessity the President argues:

Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in Southeast Asia--as we did in Europe--in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further." (JH)

Negative reference is made to the values in the Peaceful Coexistence cluster as President Johnson indicts "the enemy" for failure to seize the opportunity to end the war peaceably:

They have three times rejected a bombing pause as a means to open the way to ending the war, and go together to the negotiating table. . . . It takes two to negotiate at a peace table and Hanoi has just simply refused to consider coming to a peace table. (N)

Negative reference is also made as the President reminds us:

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile--that China's power is such that it is bound to dominate all South-east Asia. (JH)

And further:

As our commitment in Viet Nam required more men and more equipment, some voices were raised in opposition. The Administration was urged to disengage, to find an excuse to abandon the effort. (N)

It is intimated that such is the attitude of men who have not learned "the central lesson of our time"--we must respond to aggression.

Humanitarianism (H). Value references which pertain to international justice and philanthropy fall into this category. Such references infer that (1) all men are fundamentally equal--that is to say, they have the same needs, desires, and emotional make-up--and that (2) we should be desirous of and helpful toward the well-being of the people of other countries.

The equality of man is enunciated in the Johns Hopkins address:

The ordinary men and women of North Viet Nam and South Viet Nam, of China and India, of Russia and America, are brave people. They are filled with the same proportions of hate and fear, of love and hope. Most of them want the same things for themselves and their families. Most of them do not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their homes, or the homes of others destroyed.

Elsewhere in the Johns Hopkins speech President Johnson confides:

I would hope tonight that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could use the prestige of his great office and his deep

knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area [Southeast Asia], a plan for cooperation in increased development And I would hope that all () industrial countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror with progress.

Here the President is emphasizing his desire for the greater well-being of the people of Southeast Asia through cooperative efforts to further develop that area.

On another occasion the President makes our duty to others clear by instructing us that

as a nation we must magnify our struggle against world hunger and illiteracy and disease. We must bring hope to men whose lives now end at two score or less. (FH)

And further:

I () intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not allow people to go hungry and wear rags while our own warehouses overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn and rice and cotton. (JH)

The Humanitarianism cluster also contains all references to the doctrine that national goals and means of attaining those goals are to be judged by their actual or promised affect on mankind. Self-seeking ambition is reprehensible; nations should sacrifice for the common good. In the case of war a nation should be careful not to inflict any more destruction and suffering on the enemy--especially its civilians--than necessity requires.

The President stresses the purity of our motives in Viet Nam when he avers:

Our purpose in Viet Nam is to prevent the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. It is, simply put, just to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet Nam by North Viet Nam. (FH)

And again:

We have threatened no one, and we will not. We seek the end of no regime, and we will not. Our purpose is solely to defend against aggression. (FH)

That is, we are not fighting in Viet Nam for personal gain, but rather are making a great national sacrifice for the sake of world peace and security.

And in regard to the means of realizing our purpose the President asserts:

As to bombing civilians, I would simply say that we are making an effort that is unprecedented in the history of warfare to be sure that we do not. It is our policy to bomb military targets only. We have never deliberately bombed cities, nor attacked any target with the purpose of inflicting civilian casualties. (N)

In other words, the United States has been extremely careful not to inflict more damage and injury than is absolutely necessary.

But, on the other hand, a negative reference to Humanitarianism alleges that the enemy has pursued a calculated "policy of systematic terror":

Tens of thousands of innocent Vietnamese civilians have been killed, tortured, and kidnapped by the Viet Cong. There is no doubt about the deliberate nature of the Viet Cong program. One need only note the frequency with which Viet Cong victims are village leaders, teachers, health workers, and others who are trying to carry out constructive programs for their people. (N)

The inference is that the malevolence of the enemy is vividly evidenced by his "systematic terror" tactics.

In brief, positive references to Humanitarianism praise particular individuals or groups of people for their concern for mankind while negative references allude to misanthropic behavior. Phrases such as "men who hate and destroy" and "the forces of chaos" often designate the latter.

Summary

In this chapter (1) it has been explained that for use in this study the present author revised the set of ten value clusters employed by Duane Angel in his 1965 Doctoral dissertation; (2) the cluster titles have been designated as: Optimism, Activity, Achievement, Frugality, Rationality, Freedom, Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong, Sociability, Peaceful Coexistence, and Humanitarianism; (3) definitions have been given for each category; and (4) examples from the speeches analyzed have been used to illustrate each kind of value reference.

CHAPTER III

THE METHOD AND RESULTS

In this chapter the method of applying the selected value clusters to the four Presidential speeches chosen for analysis is discussed and the results of that application are presented. The discussion of method is primarily concerned with the selection of the "unit of analysis" and the manner of recording resultant data. In the presentation of results attention is first directed to the data concerning the number of references to each value cluster in the collective speeches. Next, consideration is given the resultant data concerning the number of references to each value cluster in the separate speeches. Then the resultant data is specified concerning the possibility of a detectable pattern toward the predominant use of references to a few select value clusters in the course of the two years represented by the speeches examined.

The Method

The analysis of President Johnson's speeches on Viet Nam involved, first, an evaluation of each separate sentence in terms of the prescribed value clusters.¹ Each sentence was carefully examined and value references were registered under their respective cluster titles.² To

¹Cf. Duane D. Angel, "The Campaign Speaking of George Romney: 1962 and 1965" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University, 1965), pp. 172-173.

²Complete sentences joined by a colon were treated as separate sentences.

insure as accurate an analysis as possible the following steps were taken:

(1) The four speeches were read through once for a general understanding.

(2) Then the definitions for the ten value clusters were carefully studied and as the speeches were read a second time the more obvious value references were marked.

(3) Next came a thorough analysis of each sentence of each speech, all suspected value references being marked. The cluster definitions were frequently reviewed during this step.

(4) The original analysis was followed two weeks later by a careful reanalysis and designation was made in each case where there was question of whether a value reference was being made or of exactly what kind of reference was being made. During this step, too, the cluster definitions were frequently reviewed.

(5) A further reanalysis followed two weeks later. Particular attention was directed to the references that had formerly been designated as questionable and a final decision was rendered as to how they should be marked. Frequent review of the cluster definitions was, again, part of the process.

The analysis of the speeches involved, secondly, a conversion of numerical data into percentages and the recording of those percentages on charts. This was done to allow a better comprehension of the relative emphasis placed on references to each cluster by the President.

The Results

Multi-Reference Sentences. Duane Angel observed that in using the single sentence "unit of analysis":

Each sentence was classified at least once. However, when there was a definite reference to more than one cluster the additional references were tallied. Some sentences were tallied twice and a few three times. No sentence was tallied more than three times.³

In the present study also "each sentence was classified at least once" and "when there was a definite reference to more than one cluster the additional references were tallied." Unlike Angel, however, the present writer encountered multi-reference sentences quite frequently. A goodly number of sentences were tallied twice, many three times, and several more than three times. Indeed, the average for the four speeches was two value references per sentence and one sentence contained as many as six references. A spot analysis by the present writer of the Romney speeches included in Angel's study brought results similar to those cited above from the Angel dissertation. This would tend to indicate that it is primarily the particular style of President Johnson that accounts for the greater frequency of multi-reference sentences in his speeches. This conclusion, however, deserves further study.

The Numerical Incidence Chart. Table I records the numerical results of the speech analyses. Each horizontal column designates the number of references made to a particular value cluster in the separate speeches. The bottom horizontal column shows the separate and combined totals for the number of value references made in the four addresses analyzed. Each vertical column records the number of references directed to the separate value clusters in one of the four addresses. The right-hand vertical column shows the separate and combined totals for the number of references made to the ten value clusters in the speeches of the President. By

³Angel, p. 175.

TABLE I
 NUMERICAL INCIDENCE
 OF VALUE REFERENCES

Value Clusters	JH	WH	FH	N	Total References To Each Cluster
R	63	36	71	79	249
S	20	37	98	46	201
P	48	34	42	71	195
TSRW	47	24	48	52	171
H	49	18	56	29	152
A	26	30	15	43	114
FR	15	7	47	13	82
ACH	17	6	30	5	58
O	24	7	10	10	51
F	17	7	6	6	36
Total Refer- ences in Each Speech	326	206	423	354	1309

utilizing the numerical data included in Table I we are able to devise graphs to demonstrate the percentage of references made to the separate value clusters.

The Collective Speeches. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the comparative emphasis placed on references to each of the value clusters in the four analyzed speeches considered as a whole. The combined total number of references made to each value cluster in the four addresses was divided by the total number of all references made in order to arrive at the respective Percentages of Total.

An examination of Figure 1 discloses that in the speeches as a whole the primary emphasis was placed on references to Rationality. And by utilizing the median line as a dividing point between kinds of value references given a major emphasis and those given a minor emphasis we can determine that references to five of the categories--Rationality, Sociability, Peaceful Coexistence, Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong, and Humanitarianism--constituted major emphases. The percentage indicator for the next cluster in line falls more than two percentage points below the median.

The wide disparity between the emphases placed on references to certain value clusters should be carefully noted. For instance, the percentage of references attributed to the Rationality cluster is more than six-and-one-half times greater than the percentage of references attributed to the Frugality cluster. President Johnson did, we may conclude, make significantly greater percentages of references to certain value clusters than to others. This suggests that the President considered (consciously or unconsciously) references to certain values to be more important than references to other values in building his case for




Figure 1. Percentages of Value References in the Speeches as a Whole.

United States involvement in Viet Nam. However, we should realize in our interpretation of Figure 1 that it does not necessarily reflect the actual emphases placed by the President on references to the respective clusters; for an unusually high or low number of references to a particular cluster in one of the four speeches (for whatever reason explainable) might yield a disproportionate image of the importance President Johnson attributed to references to that value cluster during the course of the four speeches analyzed.

It is interesting to consider that while the ten value clusters used in this study are very similar to those used by Duane Angel in his study and while the category of Rationality is almost identically defined in both, Angel writes that Governor Romney totaled less than ten per cent usage of references to Rationality in the six speeches he analyzed⁴ while this writer finds that President Johnson totaled more than nineteen per cent--the major percentage--usage of references to that cluster in the four speeches analyzed; this may or may not denote an obsession of the President to appear highly rational or a pronounced uneasiness in regard to the public estimate of the rationale behind the commitment of the United States in Viet Nam. The reverse phenomenon also occurred in that the President made a rather insignificant percentage of references to Achievement while Angel specifies Achievement as one of the three categories Romney "relied upon" for his references;⁵ perhaps the very nature of the Viet Nam war defies one to speak very much of Achievement in regard to it.

⁴Ibid., pp. 201-206.

⁵Ibid., pp. 208-209. Sociability and the Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong were the other categories "relied upon."

The Individual Speeches. Figures 2-5 illustrate the comparative emphasis placed on references to each of the value clusters in the four analyzed speeches considered separately. The total number of references made to a value cluster in a particular speech was divided by the total number of value references made in that speech to all ten categories in order to arrive at the Percentage of Total for that cluster. The value clusters maintain the relative positions in Figures 2-5 that were established in Figure 1, page 37.

An examination of Figure 2 discloses that the primary emphasis in the Johns Hopkins address was on references to Rationality, as was the case in the speeches considered as a whole. And we see in Figure 2 that a major percentage of references to Rationality, Peaceful Coexistence, Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong, and Humanitarianism were made in the Johns Hopkins address, as was, again, the case in the speeches considered as a whole. But the percentage indicator for Sociability in Figure 2 when compared to the percentage indicator for Sociability in Figure 1 depicts a sizable discrepancy between the emphasis on references to that cluster in the Johns Hopkins address as opposed to the emphasis on references to the same cluster in the speeches considered as a whole; the indicator falls far short of the median line in Figure 2 rather than above it as it did in Figure 1, representing a difference of more than nine percentage points.

A comparison of Figure 2 to Figure 3, page 42, Figure 4, page 44, and Figure 5, page 45, will disclose that markedly less emphasis was placed on references to Sociability in the Johns Hopkins address than in any of the other three speeches analyzed. Though the explanation for this is not precisely discernible, it is this writer's opinion that the




Figure 2. Percentages of Value References in the Johns Hopkins Address.

President's attempt to adapt to the particular solemnity of the occasion and to his immediate Johns Hopkins University audience was responsible for a reluctance to rely very heavily on overt flattery and self-commendation and resulted in a comparatively low percentage of references to Sociability.

Another noticeable factor in Figure 2 is the decidedness of the major emphases as denoted by a rather sizable gulf, representing almost six-and-one-half percentage points, between the lowest percentage indicator above the median line and the highest percentage indicator below the median line. This can best be interpreted as an indication of confidence on the part of President Johnson as to what would persuade his audience, that is, to which values he could most rewardingly appeal.

We can see in Figure 3 that President Johnson's most frequent appeals in the White House address were to five categories. As in Figure 2 the percentage indicators for Rationality, Peaceful Coexistence, and Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong again rise above the median line. They are joined there by the percentage indicators for Sociability--which replaces Rationality as the primary emphasis--and Activity, representing an increased emphasis on references to these categories as compared to the Johns Hopkins address (Figure 2); this increase is so marked--almost twelve per cent for references to Sociability and more than six-and-one-half per cent for references to Activity--that it suggests the President felt an increased need to flatter the audience, display social concern, and assure his listeners that everything possible was being done to bring the war to a desirable end.




Figure 3. Percentages of Value References in the White House Address.

Figure 4 shows that references to the Rationality and Sociability clusters still received major emphases in the Freedom House address; an unmistakable primary emphasis is recorded for references to Sociability. It can also be observed that President Johnson renewed a major emphasis on references to Humanitarianism.⁶ At the same time the percentage indicators for Peaceful Coexistence, Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong, and Activity show that the President moved away from major emphases on references to these clusters in the Freedom House address; the percentage indicator for Activity, in fact, registers eleven per cent lower in Figure 4 than in Figure 3.

We learn from Figure 5 that President Johnson continued to make a major number of references to Rationality and Sociability in the Nashville address and renewed major emphases on references to the Peaceful Coexistence, Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong, and Activity clusters.⁷ The Peaceful Coexistence percentage indicator registers more than ten degrees higher in Figure 5 than in Figure 4, higher than in any other speech, and more than five per cent higher than in the speeches considered as a whole. We also learn from Figure 5 that the President made more frequent references to Rationality and the Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong in his Nashville speech than in any of the other speeches analyzed. In contrast, the Achievement and Humanitarianism clusters received less frequent references than in any of the other speeches and although references to Sociability constituted a major

⁶See Figures 2 and 3.

⁷See Figures 3 and 4.




Figure 4. Percentages of Value References in the Freedom House Address.




Figure 5. Percentages of Value References in the Nashville Address.

emphasis, they were more than ten per cent less frequent in the Nashville address than in the Freedom House address (Figure 4). In a word, in his Nashville address the President was apparently most concerned with arguing that a rational man should recognize that it is the duty of the United States to be in Viet Nam since only her presence there can bring lasting peace.

Value Reference Patterns. By utilizing the median line as the dividing point between the value references given a major emphasis and those given a minor emphasis, we were able to determine which value clusters received a major percentage of the references in the speeches considered as a whole and in the individual speeches. We also saw that there was a significant variance in the value clusters most frequently referred to from speech to speech. We are now ready to ascertain whether a detectable pattern was established toward the predominant use of references to a few select value clusters during the two years represented by the speeches examined. This will involve a consideration of which value clusters fall into four groups: (1) the value clusters to which a major percentage of references were made in the speeches as a whole; (2) the value clusters to which a major percentage of references were made in the most recent of the speeches;⁸ (3) the value clusters to which a major percentage of references were made in a majority of the speeches; and (4) the value clusters to which a steadily increasing percentage of references were made in the successive speeches. We should keep in mind that no one of these considerations by itself will

⁸The Nashville address, it will be recalled, was the most recent of the four speeches.

give proof of a pattern. But we may safely conclude that if a value cluster(s) is found in two or more of the above groups, this denotes a detectable pattern toward the predominant use of references to this cluster(s) by President Johnson during the two years represented by the addresses analyzed.

(1) In way of review, a major percentage of references was made to Rationality, Sociability, Peaceful Coexistence, Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong, and Humanitarianism in the speeches as a whole.

(2) In the Nashville address,¹⁰ it may be recalled, major percentages of references were made to Rationality, Sociability, Peaceful Coexistence, Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong, and Activity.

(3) A re-examination of Figures 2-5 will reveal that Rationality was the only cluster that had a major percentage of references made to it in each of the four speeches analyzed. The categories of Sociability, Peaceful Coexistence, and Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong each had a major percentage of references made to it in three of the four speeches. No other category received a major percentage of references in more than two of the speeches.

(4) Table II records the percentage of references to each of the ten value clusters in each of the four speeches. The symbols for the

⁹See Figure 1. It should be understood that while these categories are the ones to which the President made a predominant percentage of references, that fact alone does not denote a "pattern" toward predominant reference to them. If, for instance, a major percentage of references had been made to Rationality in the Johns Hopkins (the first) speech and a minor percentage of references had been made to it in each of the three speeches following that, the composite chart (Figure 1) could record a predominant percentage of references to Rationality while the "pattern" would be away from predominant references to it.

¹⁰See Figure 5.

TABLE II
 PERCENTAGES OF VALUE
 REFERENCES

Value Clusters	Speeches			
	JH	WH	FH	N
R	19.3	17.5	16.8	22.3
S	6.1	17.2	23.2	13.0
P	14.7	16.5	9.9	20.1
TSRW	14.4	11.7	11.3	14.7
H	15.0	8.8	13.2	8.2
A	8.0	14.6	3.5	12.1
FR	4.6	3.4	11.1	3.7
ACH	5.2	2.9	7.1	1.4
O	7.4	3.4	2.4	2.8
F	5.2	3.4	1.4	1.7

addresses are in chronological order at the top of the Table. The symbols for the value clusters are found in the left-hand vertical column. By reading from left to right on the Table we can determine if there was a pattern toward a steadily increasing percentage of references to any given value cluster in the four Presidential addresses. Such a reading will show that there was not a steady increase in references to any of the clusters, rather the increase and decrease in percentage of references is somewhat erratic for each of the value clusters.

Four value clusters fall into a majority of the above mentioned groups. Rationality, Sociability, Peaceful Coexistence, and Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong are clusters to which: (1) a major percentage of references was made in the speeches as a whole; (2) a major percentage of references was made in the most recent of the speeches; and (3) a major percentage of references was made in a majority of the speeches. Only two other clusters fell into any of the four groups and they were each registered in one group only.¹¹ So we can conclude that a detectable pattern toward the predominant use of references to the Rationality, Sociability, Peaceful Coexistence, and Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong clusters was established in the Presidential addresses analyzed in this study. We can go one step further and say that President Johnson relied primarily on references to Rationality inasmuch as references to Rationality scored the highest percentage on the Numerical Incidence chart, the highest percentage in the final speech, and a major percentage in each of the four addresses.

¹¹These value clusters are Humanitarianism and Activity.

Summary

In this chapter it has been explained that: (1) a single sentence "unit of analysis" was adopted for the present study; (2) a five-step procedure was followed to insure an accurate analysis of the speeches chosen; (3) sentences containing multiple value references were often encountered in the analyses; (4) the categories of Rationality, Sociability, Peaceful Coexistence, Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong, and Humanitarianism each received a major percentage of references in the speeches considered as a whole; (5) there was a significant variance in the value clusters most frequently referred to from speech to speech; (6) a detectable pattern toward the predominant use of references to the Rationality, Sociability, Peaceful Coexistence, and Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong clusters was established in the speeches; and (7) President Johnson relied primarily on references to Rationality in arguing his case for United States involvement in Viet Nam.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

It was stated in the first chapter that this paper was undertaken as an attempt to go one step further in the utilization of cultural values described by social scientists as the criteria for content analysis of contemporary public address. It was observed that three former studies substantiated the contentions that (1) cultural values provide many of the major premises of persuasive arguments and that (2) a speaker may vary value references as a means of adapting to different audiences. The present study was designed for consideration of value references in the speeches of one speaker on one specific subject before essentially the same audience over a marked period of time. It was hoped to determine (1) to which values the speaker referred most often in the speeches considered as a whole; (2) whether the speaker varied from speech to speech the values to which he referred most often; and, if so, (3) whether a detectable pattern toward the predominant reference to a few select values was established. Four major public addresses by President Lyndon B. Johnson on the subject of United States involvement in Viet Nam, delivered over a twenty-three month period, were chosen for analyses. It was suggested that because of the President's long and successful role as a "public persuader" it might be expected that the results of this study would point out specific values to which the

student of rhetoric could refer with confidence of drawing a favorable response in supporting United States involvement in Viet Nam before an American audience.

For the purpose of this study cultural values were arbitrarily divided into ten well-defined categories or "clusters" which were used as the "tools" for the analyses. The cluster titles were designated as: Optimism, Activity, Achievement, Frugality, Rationality, Freedom, Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong, Sociability, Peaceful Coexistence, and Humanitarianism. Fundamentally, the analyses consisted of registering each observable value reference in each sentence of each speech under one of these ten categories. The results of the analyses showed that (1) the categories of Rationality, Sociability, Peaceful Coexistence, Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong, and Humanitarianism each received a major percentage of references in the speeches considered as a whole; (2) there was a significant variance in the value clusters most frequently referred to from speech to speech; (3) a detectable pattern toward the predominant use of references to the Rationality, Sociability, Peaceful Coexistence, and Traditional Sense of Right and Wrong clusters was established in the speeches; and (4) President Johnson relied primarily on references to Rationality in arguing his case for United States involvement in Viet Nam.

A Final Consideration And Suggestions for Future Studies

Upon reflection it would seem to this writer that when we begin considering the possibility of making practical application of the results of value analyses, as we have in this study, it becomes important to distinguish between the rhetorical and dialectical modes of

speaking. Allen Tate writes of these two different kinds of speaking as they have characteristically been manifested in America:

The traditional southern mode of discourse presupposes somebody at the other end silently listening: it is the rhetorical mode. Its historical rival is the dialectical mode, or the give and take between two minds. . . . The typical southern conversation is not going anywhere, it is not about anything. It is about the people who are talking,¹ even if they never refer to themselves, which they usually do not, since conversation is only an expression of manners, the purpose of which is to make everyone happy. This may be the reason why northerners and other uninitiated persons find the alternating, or contrapuntal, conversations of southerners fatiguing. Educated northerners like their conversation to be about ideas.²

Mr. Tate, himself, is quick to state that this is a "rather too broad distinction between dialectic and rhetoric,"³ but it serves to make the point that is needed here--that the speeches analyzed in this study seemed to definitely be of the rhetorical mode. The speeches seemed to be about Lyndon Johnson first and foremost and about Viet Nam only secondarily. More bluntly, the attempt apparently was to sell United States involvement in Viet Nam by selling Lyndon Johnson. The President appeared much more concerned with convincing us that we should trust his decisions on Viet Nam policy because he is a rational, socially concerned, peace-loving, and morally upright individual than he was with carefully analyzing and justifying his Viet Nam policy on its own merits.

It may well be that it is required of President Johnson by virtue of his office to attempt justification of United States involvement in Viet Nam by justifying himself. As Edward Rogge writes in the December, 1959, issue of the Quarterly Journal of Speech:

¹Emphasis in the original.

²Allan Tate, "A Southern Mode of the Imagination," Studies in American Culture, ed. John J. Kwiat and Mary C. Turpie (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960), pp. 100-101.

³Ibid., p. 101.

As government becomes more complex, the basis for decision more complicated, and the necessity for quick decision more imperative, Americans have granted greater and greater responsibility to leaders.

An important responsibility of that leader is to make a decision and then to rally the people to its support. Oftentimes only indirectly and over prolonged periods of time can the citizens expect to affect a policy.⁴

Mr. Rogge goes on to suggest that in assuming the precise function of his office the President of the United States must suppress some information, carefully select his appeals, and, on occasion, "short circuit" the critical thinking process of his listeners.⁵ Thus it becomes conversely more important for a President to focus the attention of his fellow citizens on his own trustworthiness and dependability.

The suggestion that it is increasingly necessary for a President to rely upon the rhetorical mode of speaking has implications which are quite dramatic both within and beyond the realm of rhetoric. Both the rhetorician and the political scientist must ask how lax a President can be in detailing for the public the essentials of major decisions for consideration and challenge before a "representative democracy" becomes an "administrative despotism" wherein citizens free themselves periodically of governmental dependency only long enough to select their ruler.⁶ Moreover, the student of speech must ask if "busy" Americans haven't come to expect, if not demand, "rhetorical" speech not only from the President but from all quarters. Do the masses in our society refuse to be participants in the give and take of dialectic? It may be that the

⁴"Evaluating the Ethics of a Speaker," Vol. 45, pp. 424-425.

⁵Ibid., p. 425.

⁶Cf. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1964), pp. 313-318.

prophecy of the Apostle Paul has been fulfilled in Twentieth Century America: "For the time is come when people will not endure sound teaching, but having itching ears they will accumulate for themselves teachers to suit their own likings."⁷

One may well ask if the average American isn't far more inclined to seek out (and find) speakers--whether on television, radio, at public assemblies, or wherever--who are primarily concerned with presenting themselves as entertainers, inspirers, or men of commendable character and only secondarily, if at all, with getting at the heart of a vital issue. And if that be the case, should the student of speech lend his consent or decry the situation and attempt to change it? These are all questions that have been dealt with before but it is important that they be raised anew. The readiness or reluctance with which we approach them will itself go a long way toward answering them.

But regardless of whether new studies of the relative ethical, social, and political merits of rhetorical versus dialectical discourse are forthcoming, future studies in the area of value analysis should, at least, include methods for specifying when a value reference is rhetorical and when it is dialectical in nature, that is, when it is made primarily in support of the speaker's personality and when it is made primarily in support of an idea. Moreover, a determination of the relative effectiveness of rhetorical and dialectical value references is needed.

Once the dichotomy between the rhetorical and dialectical modes of speaking has been established, a study should consider the significance

⁷II Timothy 4:3.

of multi-reference sentences. Such a study should seek to determine if a particular number of value references per sentence is more effective than others and if too few or too many value references per sentence can alienate an audience to a speaker's appeals. Of course a study of this type would not have to measure multi-reference effectiveness in terms of rhetorical and dialectical sentences to be valuable, but it would be more meaningful if it did.

Finally, since this is the fourth study to conclude that the utilization of cultural values described by social scientists as criteria for content analysis of contemporary public address is feasible and desirable, a studied attempt at practical application of this information in classroom settings is in order. Future students of speech (of persuasion in particular) should find the study of cultural values and effective appeals to those values to be an important part of their course work.

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APPENDIX A

THE JOHNS HOPKINS ADDRESS

The text of an address made by
President Johnson at Johns Hopkins
University, Baltimore, Md.,
on April 7, 1966.

Last week 17 nations sent their views to some two dozen countries having an interest in Southeast Asia. We are joining these 17 countries and stating our American policy tonight, which we believe will contribute toward peace in this area of the world.

I have come here to review once again with my own people the views of the American Government.

Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change.

This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania. It is a principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Viet Nam.

Viet Nam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and difficult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and promise, have ended their lives on Viet Nam's steaming soil.

Why must we take this painful road?

Why must this nation hazard its ease, its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so far away?

We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny, and only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure.

This kind of world will never be built by bombs or bullets. Yet the infirmities of man are such that force must often precede reason and the waste of war, the works of peace.

We wish that this were not so. But we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish.

The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or peaceful place.

The first reality is that North Viet Nam has attacked the independent nation of South Viet Nam. Its object is total conquest.

Of course, some of the people of South Viet Nam are participating in attack on their own government. But trained men and supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from North to South.

This support is the heartbeat of the war.

And it is a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the targets of assassination and kidnaping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their men are loyal to their government. And helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale raids are conducted on towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities.

The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy.

Over this war--and all Asia--is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peiping. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost

every continent. The contest in Viet Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.

Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Viet Nam?

We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Viet Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Viet Nam defend its independence.

And I intend to keep that promise.

To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.

We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests in part on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Viet Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.

We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in Southeast Asia--as we did in Europe--in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further."

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile-- that China's power is such that it is bound to dominate all Southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all the nations of Asia are swallowed up.

There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.

Our objective is the independence of South Viet Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves--only that the people of South Viet Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.

We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.

In recent months attacks on South Viet Nam were stepped up. Thus it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires.

We do this in order to slow down aggression.

We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Viet Nam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.

And we do this to convince the leaders of North Viet Nam--and all who seek to share their conquest--of a simple fact:

We will not be defeated.

We will not grow tired.

We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.

We hope that peace will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require patience as well as bravery--the will to endure as well as the will to resist.

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: armed hostility is futile--our resources are equal to any challenge--because we fight for values and we fight for principle, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending.

Once this is clear, then it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement.

Such peace demands an independent South Viet Nam--securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others--free from outside interference--tied to no alliance--a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of any final settlement.

We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Viet Nam.

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small

ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.

We have stated this position over and over again 50 times and more to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready with this purpose for unconditional discussions.

And until that bright and necessary day of peace we will try to keep conflict from spreading. We have no desire to see thousands die in battle--Asians or Americans. We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Viet Nam have built with toil and sacrifice. We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command.

But we will use it.

This war, like most wars, is filled with terrible irony. For what do the people of North Viet Nam want? They want what their neighbors also desire--food for their hunger, health for their bodies, a chance to learn, progress for their country, and an end to the bondage of material misery. And they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful association with others than in the endless course of battle.

These countries of Southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverished people. Each day these people rise at dawn and struggle through until the night to wrest existence from the soil. They are often wracked by diseases, plagued by hunger, and death comes at the early age of 40.

Stability and peace do not come easily in such a land. Neither independence nor human dignity will ever be won though by arms alone. It also requires the works of peace. The American people have helped generously in times past in these works, and now there must be a much

more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world.

The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North Viet Nam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible.

The United Nations is already actively engaged in development in this area, and as far back as 1961 I conferred with our authorities in Viet Nam in connection with their work there. And I would hope tonight that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could use the prestige of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.

For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion-dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway.

And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror with progress.

The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.

The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA. The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from lack of care. Schools can be established to train people in the skills needed to manage the process of development. And these objectives, and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and determined effort.

I also intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not allow people to go hungry and wear rags while our own warehouses overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn and rice and cotton.

So I will very shortly name a special team of outstanding, patriotic, and distinguished Americans to inaugurate our participation in these programs. This team will be headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very able former President of the World Bank.

This will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, and elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations. There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence. Great social change--as we see in our own country--does not always come without conflict.

We must also expect that nations will on occasion be in dispute with us. It may be because we are rich, or powerful, or because we have made some mistakes, or because they honestly fear our intentions. However, no nation need ever fear that we desire their land, or to impose our will, or to dictate their institutions.

But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer another nation.

We will do this because our own security is at stake.

But there is more to it than that. For our generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. But we have the power, and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true.

For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so.

For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we dream of an end to war. And we will try to make it so.

For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so.

The ordinary men and women of North Viet Nam and South Viet Nam, of India and China, of Russia and America, are brave people. They are filled with the same proportions of hate and fear, of love and hope. Most of them want the same things for themselves and their families. Most of them do not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their homes, or the homes of others, destroyed.

Well, this can be their world yet. Man now has the knowledge-- always before denied--to make this planet serve the real needs of the people who live on it.

I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to master hate. The complexities of this world do not bow easily to pure and consistent answers.

But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try to follow them as best we can.

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly.

A dam built across a great river is impressive.

In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchen warmed, and the home heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity came to our area along the humming wires of the REA. Electrification of the countryside--yes, that, too, is impressive.

A rich harvest in a hungry land is impressive.

The sight of healthy children in a classroom is impressive.

These--not mighty arms--are the achievements which the American nation believes to be impressive.

And if we are steadfast, the time may come when all other nations will also find it so.

Every night before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this question: Have I done everything that I can do to unite this country? Have I done everything I can do to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world? Have I done enough?

Ask yourselves that question in your homes--and in this hall tonight. Have we, each of us, all done all we can do? Have we done enough?

We may well be living in the time foretold many years ago when it was said: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live."

This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill or aid, hate or understand.

We can do all these things on a scale that has never been dreamed of before.

Well, we will choose life. And so doing, we will prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind.

To Dr. Eisenhower and Mr. Garland, and this great institution--
Johns Hopkins--I thank you for this opportunity to convey my thoughts to you and to the American people.

Good night.

APPENDIX B

THE WHITE HOUSE ADDRESS

The text of a statement on Viet Nam made by President Johnson at his press conference of July 28, 1965, at the White House.

My fellow Americans: Not long ago I received a letter from a woman in the Midwest. She wrote,

Dear Mr. President: In my humble way I am writing to you about the crisis in Viet Nam. I have a son who is now in Viet Nam. My husband served in World War II. Our country was at war, but now, this time, it is just something that I don't understand. Why?

Well, I have tried to answer that question dozens of times and more in practically every State in this Union. I have discussed it fully in Baltimore in April, in Washington in May, in San Francisco in June. Let me again, now, discuss it here in the East Room of the White House.

Why must young Americans, born into a land exultant with hope and with golden promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die in such a remote and distant place?

The answer, like the war itself, is not an easy one, but it echoes clearly from the painful lessons of half a century. Three times in my lifetime, in two world wars and in Korea, Americans have gone to far

lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at a terrible and brutal cost that retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace.

It is this lesson that has brought us to Viet Nam. This is a different kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some citizens of South Viet Nam, at times with understandable grievances, have joined in the attack on their own government.

But we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Viet Nam, and it is spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the south, to defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism.

There are great stakes in the balance.

Most of the non-communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist growing might and the grasping ambition of Asian communism.

Our power, therefore, is a very vital shield. If we are driven from the field in Viet Nam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise or in American protection.

In each land the forces of independence would be considerably weakened and an Asia so threatened by communist domination would certainly imperil the security of the United States itself.

We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else.

Nor would surrender in Viet Nam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another country, bringing

with it perhaps even larger and crueller conflicts, as we have learned from the lessons of history.

Moreover, we are in Viet Nam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American nation. Three Presidents--President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President--over 11 years have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation.

Strengthened by that promise, the people of South Viet Nam have fought for many long years. Thousands of them have died. Thousands more have been crippled and scarred by war. We just cannot now dishonor our word, or abandon our commitment, or leave those who believed us and who trusted us to the terror and repression and murder that would follow.

This, then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Viet Nam.

What are our goals in that war-stained land?

First: We intend to convince the communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power. They are not easily convinced. In recent months they have greatly increased their fighting forces and their attacks and the number of incidents. I have asked the Commanding General, General [William C.] Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs.

I have today ordered to Viet Nam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested. This will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 over a period of time to 35,000 per month, and for us to step up our campaign for voluntary enlistments.

After this past week of deliberations, I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now. If that necessity should later be indicated, I will give the matter most careful consideration and I will give the country due and adequate notice before taking such action, but only after full preparations.

We have also discussed with the government of South Viet Nam lately the steps that we will take to substantially increase their own effort, both on the battlefield and toward reform and progress in the villages. Ambassador Lodge is now formulating a new program to be tested upon his return to that area.

I have directed Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to be available immediately to the Congress to review with these committees, the appropriate congressional committees, what we plan to do in these areas. I have asked them to be able to answer the questions of any Member of Congress.

Secretary McNamara, in addition, will ask the Senate Appropriations Committee to add a limited amount to present legislation to help meet part of this new cost until a supplemental measure is ready, and hearings can be held when Congress assembles in January.

In the meantime, we will use the authority contained in the present defense appropriations bill under consideration, to transfer funds in addition to the additional money that we will ask.

These steps, like our actions in the past, are carefully measured to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement.

We do not want an expanding struggle with consequences that no one can perceive, nor will we bluster or bully or flaunt our power, but we

will not surrender and we will not retreat, for behind our American pledge lies the determination and resources, I believe, of all of the American nation.

Second, once the communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable.

We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the battlefield to the conference table. I have stated publicly and many times, again and again, America's willingness to begin unconditional discussions with any government at any place at any time. Fifteen efforts have been made to start these discussions with the help of 40 nations throughout the world, but there has been no answer.

But we are going to continue to persist, if persist we must, until death and desolation have led to the same conference table where others could now join us at a much smaller cost.

I have spoken many times of our objectives in Viet Nam. So has the Government of South Viet Nam. Hanoi has set forth its own proposals. We are ready to discuss their proposals and our proposals and any proposals of any government whose people may be affected, for we fear the meeting room no more than we fear the battlefield.

In this pursuit we welcome and we ask for the concern and the assistance of any nation and all nations. If the United Nations and its officials or any one of its 114 members can by deed or word, private initiative or public action, bring us nearer an honorable peace, then they will have the support and the gratitude of the United States of America.

I have directed Ambassador Goldberg to go to New York today and to present immediately to Secretary-General U Thant a letter from me

requesting that all of the resources, energy, and immense prestige of the United Nations be employed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Viet Nam.

I made a similar request at San Francisco a few weeks ago, because we do not seek the destruction of any government, nor do we covet a foot of any territory, but we insist and we will always insist that the people of South Viet Nam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the south, or throughout all Viet Nam under international supervision, and they shall not have any government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it.

This was the purpose of the 1954 agreements which the communists have now cruelly shattered. If the machinery of those agreements was tragically weak, its purposes still guide our action. As battle rages, we will continue as best we can to help the good people of South Viet Nam enrich the conditions of their life, to feed the hungry, and to tend the sick, and teach the young, and shelter the homeless, and help the farmer to increase crops, and the worker to find a job.

It is an ancient but still terrible irony that while many leaders of men create division in pursuit of grand ambitions, the children of man are really united in the simple, elusive desire for a life of fruitful and rewarding toil.

As I said at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, I hope that one day we can help all the people of Asia toward that desire. Eugene Black has made great progress since my appearance in Baltimore in that direction--not as the price of peace, for we are ready always to bear a more painful cost, but rather as a part of our obligations of justice toward our fellow man.

Let me also add now a personal note. I do not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle. I have spoken to you today of the divisions and the forces and the battalions and the units. But I know them all, every one. I have seen them in a thousand streets, of a hundred towns, in every state in this Union-- working and laughing and building, and filled with hope and life. I think that I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their families sorrow. This is the most agonizing and the most painful duty of your President.

There is something else, too. When I was young, poverty was so common that we didn't know it had a name. And education was something that you had to fight for. Water was really life itself. I have now been in public life 35 years, more than three decades, and in each of those 35 years I have seen good men and wise leaders struggle to bring the blessings of this land to all of our people.

Now I am President. It is now my opportunity to help every child get an education, to help every Negro and every other American citizen have an equal opportunity, to help every family get a decent home, and to help bring healing to the sick and dignity to the old.

As I have said before, that is what I have lived for. That is what I have wanted all my life, since I was a little boy, and I do not want to see all those hopes and all those dreams of so many people for so many years now drowned in the wasteful ravages of cruel wars. I am going to do all I can to see that that never happens.

But I also know, as a realistic public servant, that as long as there are men who hate and destroy, we must have the courage to resist or we will see it all--all that we have built, all that we hope to build,

all of our dreams for freedom--all--all--will be swept away on the
flood of conquest.

So, too, this shall not happen. We will stand in Viet Nam.

APPENDIX C

THE FREEDOM HOUSE ADDRESS

The text of an address made by
President Johnson at Freedom
House, New York, N.Y. on
February 23, 1966.

Mr. Chief Justice, Mr. Secretary, Senator Kennedy, members of the fine delegation from New York, ladies and gentlemen at the head table, my fellow Americans:

To be honored with this award by this organization is a very proud moment for me. I accept it with the gratitude of my heart and with renewed commitment to the cause that it represents, the cause of freedom at home and the cause of freedom abroad.

Twenty-five years ago, to a world that was darkened by war, President Franklin Roosevelt described the four freedoms of mankind: freedom of speech and expression; freedom of every person to worship God in his own way; freedom from want; freedom from fear. Franklin Roosevelt knew that these freedoms could not be the province of one people alone. He called on all his countrymen to assist those who endured the tyrant's bombs and suffered his opposition and oppression. He called for courage and for generosity and for resolution in the face of terror. And then he said, "Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights-- or keep them."

Wendell Willkie, Franklin Roosevelt's opponent in the campaign of 1940, shared his belief that freedom could not be founded only on American shores or only for those whose skin is white. "Freedom is an indivisible word," Wendell Willkie said. "If we want to enjoy it and fight for it we must be prepared to extend it to everyone, whether they are rich or poor, whether they agree with us or not, no matter what their race or the color of their skin."

That was Republican policy 25 years ago. It was Democratic policy 25 years ago. It is American policy here tonight.

Then how well have we done in our time in making the four freedoms real for our people and for the other people of the world? Here in America we accord every man the right to worship as he wills. I believe we are more tolerant of sectional and religious and racial differences than we were a quarter of a century ago. The majority of our people believe that a qualified man or woman, of any race, of any religion, of any section, could hold any office in our land. This was not so--not very clear at all in 1940. We are committed now, however great the trial and tension, to protecting the right of free expression and peaceful dissent.

We have learned to despise the witch hunt, the unprincipled harassment of a man's integrity and his right to be different. We have gained in tolerance, and I am determined to use the high office I hold to protect and to encourage that tolerance. I do not mean to say that I will remain altogether silent on the critical issues of our day. For just as strongly as I believe in other men's freedom to disagree, so do I also believe in the President's freedom to attempt to persuade.

So let me assure you and my fellow Americans tonight that I will do everything in my power to defend both.

Twenty-five years ago freedom from want had the ring of urgency for our people. The unemployment rate stood at 14.5 percent. Millions of Americans had spent the last decade in the breadlines or on farms where the winds howled away any chance for a decent life.

Tonight there are still millions whose poverty haunts our conscience. There are still fathers without jobs, and there are still children without hope. Yet for the vast majority of Americans these are times when the hand of plenty has replaced the grip of want. And for the first time in almost 9 years, tonight the unemployment rate has fallen to 4 per cent.

This liberation from want, for which we thank God, is a testimony to the enduring vitality of the American competitive system, the American free enterprise economy. It is a testimony also to an enlightened public policy, established by Franklin Roosevelt and strengthened by every administration since his death. That policy has freed Americans for more hopeful and more productive lives.

It has relieved their fears of growing old--by Social Security and by medical care. It has inspired them with hope for their children by aid to elementary and higher education. It has helped to create economic opportunity by enlightened fiscal policies. It has granted to millions, born into hopelessness, the chance of a new start in life by public works, by private incentive, by poverty programs. For the Negro American, it has opened the door after centuries of enslavement and discrimination--opened the doors to the blessings that America offers to those that are willing and able to earn them.

Thus we address the spirit of Franklin Roosevelt, 25 years after his message to America and the world, with confidence and with an unflagging determination. We have served his vision of the four freedoms essential to mankind--here in America.

Yet we know that he did not speak only for America. We know that the four freedoms are not secure in America when they are violently denied elsewhere in the world. We know, too, that it requires more than speeches to resist the international enemies of freedom. We know that men respond to deeds when they are deaf to words. Even the precious word "freedom" may become empty to those without the means to use it. For what does freedom mean when famine cloaks the land, when new millions crowd upon already strained resources, when narrow privilege is entrenched behind law and custom, when all conspires to teach men that they cannot change the conditions of their lives?

I do not need to tell you how five administrations have labored to give real meaning to "freedom," in a world where it is often merely a phrase that conceals oppression and neglect.

Men in this room, men throughout America, have given their skills and their treasure to that work. You have warned our people how insatiable is aggression and how it thrives on human misery. You have carried the word that, without the sense that we can change the conditions of their lives, nothing can avail the oppressed of this earth--neither good will, nor national sovereignty, nor massive grants of aid from their more fortunate brothers.

You have known, too, that men who believe they can change their destinies will change their destinies. Armed with that belief, they will be willing--yes, they will be eager--to make the sacrifices that freedom

demands. They will be anxious to shoulder the responsibilities that are inseparably bound to freedom. They will be able to look beyond the four essential freedoms--beyond to the freedom to learn, to master new skills, to acquaint themselves with the lore of man and nature; to the freedom to grow, to become the best that is within them to become, to cast off the yoke of discrimination and disease; to the freedom to hope, and to build on that hope lives of integrity and well-being.

This is what our struggle in Viet Nam is about tonight. This is what our struggle for equal rights in this country is all about tonight. We seek to create that climate, at home and abroad, where unlettered men can learn, where deprived children can grow, where hopeless millions can be inspired to change the terms of their existence for the better.

That climate cannot be created where terror fills the air. Children cannot learn, and men cannot earn their bread, and women cannot heal the sick where the night of violence has blotted out the sun. Whether in the cities and hamlets of Viet Nam, or in the ghettos of our own cities, the struggle is the same. That struggle is to end the violence against the human mind and body, so that the work of peace may be done and the fruits of freedom may be won.

We are pitting the resources of the law, of education and training, of our vision and our compassion against that violence here in America. And we shall end it in our time.

On the other side of the earth we are no less committed to ending violence against men who are struggling tonight to be free. It is about that commitment that I have come here to speak now.

Tonight in Viet Nam more than 200,000 of your young Americans stand there fighting for your freedom. Tonight our people are determined that

these men shall have whatever help they need and that their cause, which is our cause, shall be sustained.

But in these last days there have been questions about what we are doing in Viet Nam, and these questions have been answered loudly and clearly for every citizen to see and hear. The strength of America can never be sapped by discussion, and we have no better nor stronger tradition than open debate, free debate, in hours of danger. We believe, with Macaulay, that men are never so likely to settle a question rightly as when they discuss it freely. We are united in our commitment to free discussion. So also are we united in our determination that no foe anywhere should ever mistake our arguments for indecision, nor our debates for weakness.

So what are the questions that are still being asked?

First, some ask if this is a war for unlimited objectives. The answer is plain. The answer is "No."

Our purpose in Viet Nam is to prevent the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. It is, simply put, just to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet Nam by North Viet Nam.

Second, some people ask if we are caught in a blind escalation of force that is pulling us headlong toward a wider war that no one wants. The answer, again, is a simple "No."

We are using that force and only that force that is necessary to stop this aggression. Our fighting men are in Viet Nam because tens of thousands of invaders came south before them. Our numbers have increased in Viet Nam because the aggression of others had increased in Viet Nam. The high hopes of the aggressor have been dimmed and the tide of the

battle has been turned, and our measured use of force will and must be continued. But this is prudent firmness under what I believe is careful control. There is not, and there will not be, a mindless escalation.

Third, others ask if our fighting men are to be denied the help they need. The answer, again, is and will be a resounding "No."

Our great military establishment has moved 200,000 men across 10,000 miles since last spring. These men have, and will have, all they need to fight the aggressor. They have already performed miracles in combat. The men behind them have worked miracles of supply, building new ports, transporting new equipment, opening new roads. The American forces of freedom are strong tonight in South Viet Nam, and we plan to keep them so.

As you know, they are led there by a brilliant and resourceful commander, General William C. Westmoreland. He knows the needs of war, and he supports the works of peace. And when he asks for more Americans to help the men that he has, his requests will be immediately studied and, as I promised the nation last July, his needs will be immediately met.

Fourth, some ask if our men go alone to Viet Nam, if we alone respect our great commitment in the Southeast Asia treaty. Still again, the answer is a simple "No."

We have seven allies in SEATO, and we have seen five of them give us vital support, each with his own strength and in his own way, to the cause of freedom in Southeast Asia.

Fifth, some ask about the risks of a wider war, perhaps against the vast land armies of Red China. And again the answer is "No," never by any act of ours--and not if there is any reason left behind the wild words from Peking.

We have threatened no one, and we will not. We seek the end of no regime, and we will not. Our purpose is solely to defend against aggression. To any armed attack we will reply. We have measured the strength and the weakness of others, and we think we know our own. We observe in ourselves, and we applaud in others, a careful restraint in action. We can live with anger in word as long as it is matched by caution in deed.

Sixth, men ask if we rely on guns alone. Still again, the answer is "No."

From our Honolulu meeting, from the clear pledge which joins us with our allies, there has emerged a common dedication to the peaceful progress of the people of Viet Nam--to schools for their children, to care for their health, to hope and bounty for their land.

The Vice President returned tonight from his constructive and very highly successful visit to Saigon and to other capitals, and he tells me that he and Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge have found a new conviction and purpose in South Viet Nam--for the battle against want and injustice as well as the battle against aggression.

So the pledge of Honolulu will be kept, and the pledge of Baltimore stands open--to help the men of the north when they have the wisdom to be ready.

We Americans must understand how fundamental is the meaning of this second war--the war on want. I talked on my ranch last fall with Secretary [Orville] Freeman, the Secretary of Agriculture, and in my office last week with Secretary [John W.] Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, making, over and over again, the same central point: The breeding ground of war is human misery. If we are not to fight forever in faraway places--in Europe, or the far Pacific, or the

jungles of Africa, or the suburbs of Santo Domingo--then we just must learn to get at the roots of violence. As a nation we must magnify our struggle against world hunger and illiteracy and disease. We must bring hope to men whose lives now end at two score or less. Because without that hope, without progress in this war on want, we will be called on again to fight again and again, as we are fighting tonight.

Seventh, men ask who has a right to rule in South Viet Nam. Our answer there is what it has been for 200 years. The people must have this right--the South Vietnamese people--and no one else.

Washington will not impose upon the people of South Viet Nam a government not of their choice. Hanoi shall not impose upon the people of South Viet Nam a government not of their choice. So we will insist for ourselves on what we require from Hanoi: respect for the principle of government by the consent of the governed. We stand for self-determination--for free elections--and we will honor their result.

Eighth, men ask if we are neglecting any hopeful chance of peace. And the answer is "No."

A great servant of peace, Secretary Dean Rusk, has sent the message of peace on every wire and by every hand to every continent. A great pleader for peace here with us tonight, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, has worked at home and abroad in this same cause. Their undiscouraged efforts will continue.

How much wiser it would have been, how much more compassionate toward its own people, if Hanoi had only come to the bargaining table at the close of the year. Then the 7,000 communist troops who have died in battle since January the first, and the many thousands who have been wounded in that same period, would have lived in peace with their fellow men.

Today, as then, Hanoi has the opportunity to end the increasing toll the war is taking on those under its command.

Ninth, some ask how long we must bear this burden. To that question, in all honesty, I can give you no answer tonight.

During the battle of Britain, when that nation stood alone in 1940, Winston Churchill gave no answer to that question. When the forces of freedom were driven from the Philippines, President Roosevelt could not and did not name the date that we would return.

If the aggressor persists in Viet Nam, the struggle may well be long. Our men in battle know and they accept this hard fact. We who are at home can do as much, because there is no computer that can tell the hour and the day of peace, but we do know that it will come only to the steadfast and never to the weak in heart.

Tenth, and finally, men ask if it is worth it. I think you know that answer. It is the answer that Americans have given for a quarter of a century, wherever American strength has been pledged to prevent aggression.

The contest in Viet Nam is confused and hard, and many of its forms are new. Yet our American purpose and policy are unchanged. Our men in Viet Nam are there. They are there as Secretary Dillon [former Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon] told you, to keep a promise that was made 12 years ago. The Southeast Asia treaty promised, as Secretary John Foster Dulles said for the United States, that "an attack upon the treaty area would occasion a reaction so united, so strong, and so well placed that the aggressor would lose more than it could hope to gain."

But we keep more than a specific treaty promise in Viet Nam tonight. We keep the faith for freedom.

Four Presidents have pledged to keep that faith.

The first was Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his State of the Union message 25 years ago. He said:

. . . we are committed to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations for our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers. We know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom.

The second was Harry S. Truman, in 1947, at a historic turning point in the history of guerrilla warfare--and of Greece, Turkey, and the United States. These were his words then:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

The third was Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his first Inaugural address.

He promised this:

Realizing that common sense and common decency alike dictate the futility of appeasement, we shall never try to placate an aggressor by the false and wicked bargain of trading honor for security. Americans, indeed, all free men, remember that in the final choice a soldier's pack is not so heavy a burden as a prisoner's chains.

And then 5 years ago, John F. Kennedy, on the cold bright noon of his first day in office, proclaimed:

Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans--born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage--and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

This is the American tradition. Built in free discussion, proven on a hundred battlefields, rewarded by a progress at home that has no

match in history, it beckons us forward tonight to the work of peace in Viet Nam. We will build freedom while we fight, and we will seek peace every day by every honorable means. But we will persevere along the high, hard road of freedom. We are too old to be foolhardy and we are too young to be tired. We are too strong for fear and too determined for retreat.

Each evening when I retire, I take up, from a bedside table, reports from the battlefield and reports from the capitals around the world. They tell me how our men have fared that day in the hills and the valleys of Viet Nam. They tell me what hope there seems to be that the message of peace will be heard and that this tragic war may be ended. I have read of individual acts of heroism, of dedicated men and women whose valor matches that of any generation that has ever gone before. I read of men risking their lives to save others, of men giving their lives to save freedom. Always among these reports are a few letters from the men out there themselves. If there is any doubt among some here at home about our purpose in Viet Nam, I never find it reflected in those letters from Viet Nam.

Our soldiers, our marines, our airmen, and our sailors know why they are in Viet Nam. They know, as five Presidents have known, how inseparably bound together are America's freedom and the freedom of her friends around the world.

So tonight let me read you a letter that I received from an American father, a warm friend of mine of many years, about his son, a young Army captain. He said:

I have never known a man at war who showed less bravado in his communications with home. When he was not flying missions in his helicopter or working out of the battalion headquarters, he and

some of his buddies on their own visited the orphanages as individuals and played with the kids. He was deeply interested in the Vietnamese people, particularly the peasants, and he told me how sorely they wanted, more than anything else, to just be left alone in some semblance of freedom to grow their rice and to raise their families. This good young American, as thousands like him, was not on the other side of the world fighting specifically for you or for me, Mr. President. He was fighting in perhaps our oldest American tradition, taking up for people who are being pushed around.

The young captain described in this letter is dead tonight, but his spirit lives in the 200,000 young Americans who stand out there on freedom's frontier in Viet Nam. It lives in their mothers and in their fathers here in America, who have proudly watched them leave their homes for their distant struggle.

So tonight I ask each citizen to join me, to join me in the homes and the meeting places our men are fighting to keep free, in a prayer for their safety.

I ask you to join me in a pledge to the cause for which they fight--the cause of human freedom to which this organization is dedicated. I ask you for your help, for your understanding, and for your commitment, so that this united people may show forth to all the world that America has not ended the only struggle that is worthy of man's unceasing sacrifice--the struggle to be free.

APPENDIX D

THE NASHVILLE ADDRESS

Remarks of the President at a
Joint Session of the
Tennessee State Legislature,
March 15, 1967.

Lieutenant Governor Durell, Speaker Cummings, Governor Ellington,
distinguished members of the Legislature, and my friends:

It is always a very special privilege and pleasure for me to visit
Tennessee.

For a Texan, it is like homecoming, because much of the courage and
hard work that went into the building of the Southwest came from the
hills and fields of Tennessee. It strengthened the sinews of thou-
sands of men--at the Alamo, at San Jacinto, and at the homes of our
pioneer people.

This morning, I visited the Hermitage, the historic home of Andrew
Jackson. Two centuries have passed since that most American of all
Americans was born. The world has changed a great deal since his day.
But the qualities which sustain men and nations in positions of leader-
ship have not changed.

In our time, as in Andrew Jackson's, freedom has its price.

In our time, as in his, history conspires to test the American will.

In our time, as in Jackson's time, courage and vision, and the
willingness to sacrifice, will sustain the cause of freedom.

This generation of Americans is making its imprint on history. It is making it in the fierce hills and the sweltering jungles of Viet Nam. I think most of our citizens--after a very penetrating debate which is our democratic heritage--have reached a common understanding on the meaning and on the objectives of that struggle.

Before I discuss the specific questions that remain at issue, I should like to review the points of widespread agreement.

It was two years ago that we were forced to choose, forced to make a decision between major commitments in defense of South Viet Nam or retreat--the evacuation of more than 25,000 of our troops, the collapse of the Republic of Viet Nam in the face of subversion and external assault.

Andrew Jackson would never have been surprised at the choice we made.

We chose a course in keeping with American tradition, in keeping with the foreign policy of at least three administrations, with the expressed will of the Congress of the United States, with our solemn obligations under the Southeast Asian Treaty, and with the interest of 16 million South Vietnamese who had no wish to live under communist domination.

As our commitment in Viet Nam required more men and more equipment, some voices were raised in opposition. The administration was urged to disengage, to find an excuse to abandon the effort.

These cries came despite growing evidence that the defense of Viet Nam held the key to the political and economic future of free Asia. The stakes of the struggle grew correspondingly.

It became clear that if we were prepared to stay the course in Viet Nam, we could help to lay the cornerstone for a diverse and independent Asia, full of promise and resolute in the cause of peaceful economic development for her long-suffering peoples.

But if we faltered, the forces of chaos would scent victory and decades of strife and aggression would stretch endlessly before us.

The choice was clear. We would stay the course. We shall stay the course.

I think most Americans support this fundamental decision. Most of us remember the fearful cost of ignoring aggression. Most of us have cast aside the illusion that we can live in an affluent fortress while the world slides into chaos.

I think we have all reached broad agreement on our basic objectives in Viet Nam.

First, an honorable peace, that will leave the people of South Viet Nam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the north.

Second, a Southeast Asia in which all countries--including a peaceful North Viet Nam--apply their scarce resources to the real problems of their people: combating hunger, ignorance, and diseases.

I have said many, many times, that nothing would give us greater pleasure than to invest our own resources in the constructive works of peace rather than in the futile destruction of war.

Third, a concrete demonstration that aggression across international frontiers or demarcation lines is no longer an acceptable means of political change.

There is, I think, a general agreement among Americans on the things that we do not want in Viet Nam.

We do not want permanent bases. We will begin with the withdrawal of our troops on a reasonable schedule whenever reciprocal concessions are forthcoming from our adversary.

We do not seek to impose our political beliefs upon South Viet Nam. Our republic rests upon a brisk commerce in ideas. We will be happy to see free competition in the intellectual marketplace whenever North Viet Nam is willing to shift the conflict from the battlefield to the ballot box.

So, these are the broad principles on which most Americans agree.

On a less general level, however, the events and frustrations of these past few difficult weeks have inspired a number of questions about our Viet Nam policy in the minds and hearts of a good many of our citizens. Today, here in this historical chamber, I want to deal with some of those questions that figure most prominently in the press and in some of the letters which reach a President's desk.

Many Americans are confused by the barrage of information about military engagements. They long for the capsule summary which has kept tabs on our previous wars, a line on the map that divides friend from foe.

Precisely what, they ask, is our military situation, and what are the prospects of victory?

The first answer is that Viet Nam is aggression in a new guise, as far removed from trench warfare as the rifle from the longbow. This is a war of infiltration, of subversion, of ambush. Pitched battles are very rare, and even more rarely are they decisive.

Today, more than 1 million men from the Republic of Viet Nam and its six allies are engaged in the order of battle.

Despite continuing increases in North Viet Nam infiltration, this strengthening of allied forces in 1966 under the brilliant leadership of General Westmoreland, was instrumental in reversing the whole course of this war.

-- We estimate that 55,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were killed in 1966, compared with 35,000 the previous year. More were wounded, and more than 20,000 defected.

-- By contrast, 9,500 South Vietnamese, more than 5,000 Americans, and 600 from other allied forces were killed in action.

-- The Vietnamese Army achieved a 1966 average of two weapons captured from the Viet Cong to every one lost, a dramatic turn around from the previous two years.

-- Allied forces have made several successful sweeps through territories that were formerly considered Viet Cong sanctuaries only a short time ago. These operations not only cost the enemy large numbers of men and weapons, but are very damaging to his morale.

What does all of this mean? Will the North Vietnamese change their tactics? Will there be less infiltration of main units? Will there be more of guerilla warfare?

The actual truth is we just don't know.

What we do know is that General Westmoreland's strategy is producing results, that our military situation has substantially improved, that our military success has permitted the groundwork to be laid for a pacification program which is the long-run key to an independent South Viet Nam.

Since February, 1965, our military operations have included selective bombing of military targets in North Viet Nam. Our purposes are three.

-- To back our fighting men by denying the enemy a sanctuary;

-- To exact a penalty against North Viet Nam for her flagrant violations of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962;

-- To limit the flow, or to substantially increase the cost of infiltration of men and materiel from North Viet Nam.

Our intelligence confirms that we have been successful.

Yet, some of our people object strongly to this aspect of our policy. Must we bomb, many people will ask. Does it do any military good? Is it consistent with America's limited objectives? Is it an inhuman act that is aimed at civilians?

On the question of military utility, I can only report the firm belief of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, General Westmoreland and our commanders in the field, and all the sources of information and advice available to the Commander-in-Chief and that is that the bombing is causing serious disruption and is bringing about added burdens to the North Vietnamese infiltration effort.

We know, for example, that half a million people are kept busy just repairing damage to bridges, roads, railroads, and other strategic facilities, and in air and coastal defense and repair of power plants.

I also want to say categorically that it is not the position of the American Government that the bombing will be decisive in getting Hanoi to abandon aggression. It has, however, created very serious problems for them. The best indication of how substantial is the fact that they are working so hard every day with all their friends throughout the world to try to get us to stop.

The bombing is entirely consistent with America's limited objectives in South Viet Nam. The strength of communist main-force units in the south is clearly based on their infiltration from the north. I think it is simply unfair to our American soldiers, sailors, and marines and our Vietnamese allies to ask them to face increased enemy personnel and fire power without making an effort to try to reduce that infiltration.

As to bombing civilians, I would simply say that we are making an effort that is unprecedented in the history of warfare to be sure that we do not. It is our policy to bomb military targets only.

We have never deliberately bombed cities, nor attacked any target with the purpose of inflicting civilian casualties.

We hasten to add, however, that we recognize, and we regret, that some people, even after warning, are living and working in the vicinity of military targets and they have suffered.

We are also too aware that men and machines are not infallible, and that some mistakes do occur.

But our record on this account is, in my opinion, highly defensible.

Look for a moment at the record of the other side.

Any civilian casualties that result from our operations are inadvertent, in stark contrast to the calculated Viet Cong policy of systematic terror.

Tens of thousands of innocent Vietnamese civilians have been killed, tortured, and kidnapped by the Viet Cong. There is no doubt about the deliberate nature of the Viet Cong program. One need only note the frequency with which Viet Cong victims are village leaders, teachers, health workers, and others who are trying to carry out constructive programs for their people.

Yet, the deeds of the Viet Cong go largely unnoted in the public debate. It is this moral double bookkeeping which makes us get sometimes very weary of our critics.

But there is another question that we should answer: Why don't we stop bombing to make it easier to begin negotiations?

The answer is a simple one:

--We stopped for five days and 20 hours in May 1965. Representatives of Hanoi simply returned our message in a plain envelope.

--We stopped bombing for 36 days and 15 hours in December 1965 and January 1966. Hanoi only replied: "A political settlement of the Viet Nam problem can be envisaged only when the United States Government has accepted the four-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, has proved this by actual deeds, has stopped unconditionally and for good its air raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam."

--Only last month we stopped bombing for five days and 18 hours, after many prior weeks in which we had communicated to them several possible routes to peace, any one of which America was prepared to take. Their response, as you know, delivered to His Holiness the Pope, was this: The United States "must put an end to their aggression in Viet Nam, end unconditionally and definitively the bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, withdraw from South Viet Nam all American and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnamese National Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs."

That is where we stand today.

They have three times rejected a bombing pause as a means to open the way to ending the war, and go together to the negotiating table.

The tragedy of South Viet Nam is not limited to casualty lists.

There is much tragedy in the story of a nation at war for nearly a generation. It is the story of economic stagnation. It is the story of a generation of young men--the flower of the labor force--pressed into military service by one side or the other.

No one denies that the survival of South Viet Nam is heavily dependent upon early economic progress.

My most recent and my most hopeful report of progress in this area came from an old friend of Tennessee, of the Tennessee Valley Authority--David Lillienthal, who recently went as my representative to Viet Nam to begin to work with the Vietnamese people on economic planning for that area.

He reported--and with some surprise, I might add--that he discovered an extraordinary air of confidence among the farmers, village leaders, trade unionists, and the industrialists. He concluded that their economic behavior suggests "that they think they know how all of this is going to come out."

Mr. Lillienthal also said that the South Vietnamese were among the hardest working people that he had seen in developing countries around the world, that "to have been through 20 years of war and still have this amount of 'zip' almost ensures their long-term economic development."

Mr. Lillienthal will be going with me to Guam Saturday night to talk with our new leaders about the plans he will try to institute there.

Our AID programs are supporting the drive toward this sound economy.

But none of these economic accomplishments will be decisive by itself. And no economic achievement can substitute for a strong and free political structure.

We cannot build such a structure--because only the Vietnamese can do that.

I think they are building it. As I am talking to you here, a freely elected constituent assembly in Saigon is now wrestling with the last details of a new constitution, one which will bring the Republic of Viet Nam to full membership among the democratic nations of the world.

We expect that constitution to be completed this month.

In the midst of war, they have been building for peace and justice. That is a remarkable accomplishment in the annals of mankind.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who has served us with such great distinction, is coming to the end of his second distinguished tour of duty in Saigon.

To replace him, I am drafting as our Ambassador to the Government of Viet Nam, Mr. Ellsworth Bunker--able and devoted, full of wisdom and experience acquired on five continents over many years.

As his Deputy, I am nominating and recalling from Pakistan, Mr. Eugene Locke, our young and very vigorous Ambassador to Pakistan.

To drive forward with a sense of urgency the work in pacification in Viet Nam, I am sending Presidential Assistant Robert Komer.

To strengthen General Westmoreland in the intensive operations that he will be conducting in the months ahead, I am assigning to him additional top-flight military personnel, the best that the country has been able to provide.

So you can be confident that in the months ahead we shall have at work in Saigon the ablest, the wisest, the most tenacious, and the most experienced team that the United States of America can mount.

In view of these decisions and in view of the meetings that will take place this weekend, I thought it wise to invite the leaders of South Viet Nam to join us in Guam for a part of our discussions, if it were convenient for them. I am gratified to be informed that they have accepted our invitation.

I should also like for you to know that the representatives of all the countries that are contributing troops in Viet Nam will be coming to Washington for April 20 and 21 meetings for a general appraisal of the situation that exists.

This brings me to my final point, the peaceful and just world that we all seek.

We have just lived through another flurry of rumors of "peace feelers."

Our years of dealing with this problem have taught us that peace will not come easily.

The problem is a very simple one: it takes two to negotiate at a peace table and Hanoi has just simply refused to consider coming to a peace table.

I don't believe that our own position on peace negotiations can be stated any more clearly than I have stated it many times in the past--or that the distinguished Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, or Ambassador Goldberg, or any number of other officials have stated it in every forum that we could find.

I do want to repeat to you this afternoon--and through you to the people of America--the essentials now, lest there be any doubts.

-- United States representatives are ready at any time for discussions of the Viet Nam problem or any related matter, with any government

or governments, if there is any reason to believe that these discussions will in any way seriously advance the cause of peace.

-- We are prepared to go more than halfway and to use any avenue possible to encourage such discussions. And we have done that at every opportunity.

We believe that the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 could serve as the central elements of a peaceful settlement. These accords provide, in essence, that both South and North Viet Nam should be free from external interference, while at the same time they would be free independently to determine their positions on the question of reunification.

We also stand ready to advance toward a reduction of hostilities, without prior agreement. The road to peace could go from deeds to discussions, or it could start with discussions and go to deeds.

We are ready to take either route. We are ready to move on both of them.

Reciprocity must be the fundamental principle of any reduction in hostilities. The United States cannot and will not reduce its activities unless and until there is some reduction on the other side. To follow any other rule would be to violate the trust that we undertake when we ask a man to risk his life for his country.

We will negotiate a reduction of the bombing whenever the Government of North Viet Nam is ready and there are almost innumerable avenues of communication by which the Government of North Viet Nam can make their readiness known.

To this date and this hour, there has been no sign of that readiness.

Yet, we must--and we will--keep trying.

As I speak to you today, Secretary Rusk and our representatives throughout the world are on a constant alert. Hundreds and hundreds of quiet diplomatic conversations, free from the glare of front-page headlines, or of klieg lights, are being held and they will be held on the possibilities of bring peace to Viet Nam.

Governor Averell Harriman, with 25 years of experience of trouble-shooting on the most difficult international problems that America has ever had, is carrying out my instructions that every possible lead, however slight it may first appear, from any source, public or private, shall be followed up.

Let me conclude by saying this: I so much wish that it were within my power to assure that all those in Hanoi could hear one simple message-- America is committed to the defense of South Viet Nam until an honorable peace can be negotiated.

If this one communication gets through and its rational implications are drawn, we should be at the table tomorrow. It would be none too soon for us. Then hundreds of thousands of Americans--as brave as any who ever took the field for their country--could come back home.

And the man who could lead them back is the man whom you trained and sent from here, our own beloved, brilliant General "Westy" Westmoreland. As these heroes came back to their homes, millions of Vietnamese could begin to make a decent life for themselves and their families without fear of terrorism, without fear of war, or without fear of communist enslavement.

That is what we are working and fighting for. We must not--we shall not--and we will not--fail.

Thank you.

VITA

William Wallace Dawson, Jr.

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