

AN ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT IN A
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY SYSTEM

By

WILLIAM ROBERT BRANDT

Bachelor of Science

Oklahoma State University

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Thesis Approved:

Wilson J. Bentley

Thesis Adviser

E. J. Ferguson

N. Durham

Dean of the Graduate College

688223

PREFACE

A totally professional military service could be a reality within a very few years. This professional military system would probably closely resemble a large industrial enterprise with respect to many leadership and management techniques. Being a career military member, I feel that the Services are not placing enough emphasis on this impending change. Leadership training does not seem to be geared toward producing the successful managers that such a complex industrially oriented organization would demand.

In order to better understand the management requirements of a professional military system, I believe it is necessary to investigate the existing military structure to determine where any problem areas might lie in the leadership-management spectrum, and would, therefore, impede or deter this "professionalization." A clear understanding of these problem areas is necessary in order that present and future military managers may effectively deal with them.

It is the purpose of this thesis to explore the trends leading toward a totally professional military, to present research findings concerning the establishment of

the military as a profession, and to discuss the existing management problem areas which are in need of correction.

Very little is written concerning the differences between military and industrial leadership-management. Every military careerist should establish an understanding of how his chosen profession differs from its industrial counterpart. It is my hope that this thesis will aid in the development of a clearer understanding of these differences and serve to promote thinking concerning the evolution of a professional military service.

Indebtedness is acknowledged to Professor Wilson J. Bentley, Professor and Head of the Industrial Engineering and Management School of the Oklahoma State University, whose firm and valuable guidance has been much appreciated. Invaluable assistance was provided by Dr. Earl J. Ferguson and Dr. M. Palmer Terrell, of the Industrial Engineering and Management School of Oklahoma State University, and reference material was provided by the staff of the Technical Library of the Air Force Logistics Command at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, and by the United States Naval Academy Library at Annapolis, Maryland. The direction and typing by my wife, Janice Ann, are acknowledged as being of invaluable assistance.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

American industry continually grows and becomes more complex. The need for a constantly improved and revised management system for industry is probably universally understood by almost everyone, and is evidenced by the large increases in the nation's job force since World War II and the corresponding increase in the problems this large job force presents to management.

Whether or not this constantly improving method of management techniques in industry has effected an equivalent improvement in military management techniques is uncertain. The American military establishment could be considered the largest "industrial" complex in the world in terms of men, materiel, and equipment. The system of managing the vast resources of materiel and equipment in the military is probably sustained by the most modern of techniques. This thesis will explore the realm of personnel and manpower management in the military.

It is the purpose of this thesis to present an analysis of management in a totally professional American military system. This will be accomplished by examining the trends toward a professional service and the demands

placed on the managers, followed by a critical evaluation of several key management problem areas in the military.

Leaders and managers in the military need to fully understand the somewhat unique manpower problems that now exist so that they may successfully cope with future issues. Manpower and methods of using manpower present similar problems in industry and in the military and have similar needs. It is possible, however, that the military management system is not doing everything it could to prepare for eventual "professionalization." By professionalization, this writer refers to the process by which each member of the military is allowed to obtain a professional character, spirit, and method of performance as he becomes an integral link in a totally voluntary and industrially oriented organization as pertaining to management techniques.

These management techniques are defined by this writer as pertaining almost solely to those methods and tools used by leaders to direct workers. Whenever the term "management" is used in this thesis, it shall refer to that realm of management dealing with the worker, unless special emphasis is placed upon materiel or equipment management. The trends pointing toward a totally professional military service will be discussed in depth later in this thesis.

It is not the purpose of this thesis to delve into the qualities, characteristics, and elements involved in

leadership per se. Rather, it is this writer's intention to present military leadership and management in the realm of the specific environment in which the individual concerned confronts it - namely, the less republican, or more oligarchic structure.

It would be naive to say that there is no difference between industrial leadership-management and military leadership-management. However, the difference between the two is uncertain and ill defined. The precise answer is not known, but there are some areas where possible differences may arise. These areas of difference could be defined as those of human relations, the theory of authority and the theory of mission. A description of each of these areas begins below followed by a summary of the management philosophy of the military.

Human Relations

The environment in which the military person lives and works represents a potential frustration to the average freedom-loving American. Most American adults choose not to be in the Armed Forces.¹

This gives rise to the idea that human relationships in civilian organizations are inherently different from their military counterpart. It is this writer's belief

¹Leadership and Human Relations, Lackland Military Training Center Manual 50-1 (1966), p. 124.

that a recordable difference does exist between leadership and management methods in the military and their counterparts in industry, but that this difference is based primarily upon the different environments. That is to say, there exists totally civilian and totally military environments, with varying degrees in the middle. This concept will be covered more fully in a succeeding chapter. For purposes here, it is sufficient to say that management methods should be tailored to fit the operating environment. Not only does there exist this non-parity, but, for the most part, it seems to remain unchallenged. ✓

There are three carefully selected areas in the leadership management spectrum that differ quite conclusively with regard to the military versus the industrial environment. These areas, substantiated by research, offer problems to the managers in the military that are more demanding and quite unlike those problems confronting industrial managers. This is not to say that these problem areas do not exist in industry, but the nature of these problems does differ quite conclusively. These three vital areas are: (1) Job Attitude and Morale, (2) Supervisor-Employee Relationships, and (3) Retention. Each of these areas will be investigated separately in succeeding chapters, but are reviewed here.

Job Attitude and Morale

Industrial studies substantiate the fact that the job

attitude and morale of the worker are of prime importance in the over-all plan of production. Military personnel often have poor job attitude and morale due to a lack of motivation, a sense that their jobs are meaningless and an inability to satisfactorily air their grievances.

Supervisor-Employee Relationships

Supervisor-employee relationships comprise the most important single element contributing to higher production. The section chief or shop foreman is the key man in the military, as he is in industry, for he functions as a morale builder and human relations expert, in addition to his tasks of managing materiel and equipment. The foreman is important because the responsibility for full utilization of his men and resources lies with him. The function, importance, and selection of successful section chiefs may be overlooked by management heads in the military more often than by their counterparts in industry due to the nature of the organization.

Retention

The basic structure of the military labor force presents an aggravating problem to the manager, although the quality of the personnel is comparable to that of the personnel in industry. A general dissatisfaction with pay, promotions, and other vital incentives may cause many servicemen to abandon any plans for a military career.

Recently approved and currently proposed pay legislation and promotion directives offer to alleviate some of the problems, but much remains to be done before certain members of the military are afforded the same basic rights and incentives which attract civilian workers. It is imperative that managers strive to retain the skilled and trained personnel necessary for an efficient and productive organization, but their efforts can only reap benefits that are a product of the tools with which they have to work. According to Lieutenant Colonel Armstrong,

We are on dead center in our officer manpower management practices. The old machine, designed a generation ago for a world that is no longer with us, has creaked and wheezed its way into 1967. Balky and inflexible, periodically threatening to break down completely, its dedicated manpower engineers make it work somehow, albeit at ever reduced levels of efficiency.²

Nature of Military Authority

There is probably no way of assigning absolute values to the differences that exist between the military and the industrial establishment, as concerns leadership and management. In intense combat situations, the differences are undoubtedly greater than in non-combat situations. Under noncombat conditions, the military leader is supported by authority that is not comparably vested in the industrial leader. This concept of military authority

²Lt. Col. Peter F. C. Armstrong, "Manpower Management," The Marine Corps Gazette (June 1967), No. 51, p. 44.

differs from a viewpoint first tendered by Chester I. Barnard several decades ago. Barnard's concept of authority states that:

Authority is the character of a communication (order) in a formal organization by virtue of which it is accepted by a contributor to, or member of, the organization as governing the actions he contributes; that is, as governing or determining what he does or is not to do so far as the organizations is concerned.³

Under this definition, the decision as to whether an order has authority or not lies with the persons to whom the order is addressed. It does not reside in "persons of authority", or in those who issue the order. That is to say, authority lies at the bottom of the organization, for if the lowest member on the organization chart is not willing to accept an order from a superior, then this superior has no authority, as concerns that individual member. Perhaps then, the concept of military authority should be restated to read: "Under non-combat conditions the military leader is supported by the threat of strong negative incentives, which are not comparably vested in the industrial leader."

In the military, this concept of authority has never been held, but rather, men are spoken of as possessing authority by virtue of legislation, or that officers have a "vested" authority to back up their orders. Perhaps it would be better to say that they have a vested prerogative

³Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1938), p. 163.

to dispense strong negative incentives if their orders are not carried out.

In the military as in industry, it is possible to secure the necessary cooperation for the organization to exist under this concept of authority. It is possible because the decisions of individuals occur under the following conditions: (a) the communication is fully understood, (b) the communication is not inconsistent with the purpose of the organization, (c) the communication is compatible with personal interest, (d) the member is mentally and physically able to comply with the communication, (e) there exists a "zone of indifference" in each individual within which orders are acceptable without conscious questioning of their authority, (f) the interests of the other members of the organization condition and influence the individual's reaction to the subject.⁴

Thus, the members are willing to maintain the authority of communications because, where care is taken to see that only acceptable communications are issued, most of them fall into the zone of indifference; and because a communal sense influences the motives of most members most of the time. The old line of thought is that authority = responsibility, while under Barnard's concept, the control of incentives = accountability.

The person in uniform is not a free agent, and,

⁴Ibid, pp. 163-170.

therefore, cannot resign easily. In civilian life this is not the case. A man may leave his job, refuse to obey the orders of his boss, and travel freely in search of employment. These statements, at first glance, sound plausible enough; however, are they really true? It is quite probable that after an individual resigns "too many" jobs that he would no longer be able to secure the type of job most pleasing to him. It is also probably true that civilian workers cherish the retirement equity as much as people in the military cherish it. An individual cannot sensibly "tell off" his boss and go off looking for a new job whenever the going gets difficult. The key to this discussion lies in the motives of men, which will be treated in the following description of mission.

Demands of the Mission

In the military, the mission is absolute. In civilian industry, the mission is a compromise between the needs of management and the needs of the worker. This can be explained partially through the military team concept. The importance of teamwork in the military cannot be overemphasized. From the combat crews, whose very existence in a battle situation depends upon mutual confidence and trust, to the office worker whose job is to type supply requests, the word cooperation must be meaningful. The methods of a supervisor and his impact as a leader on the majority of the workers in the military will be more

valuable if he applies his talents in a cooperative atmosphere. Not unlike a civilian organization, the military is a team which makes use of the individual resources of a large group of persons in order to accomplish a mission which individuals or smaller groups could not possibly accomplish. On the highest level, this mission is the defense of America.⁵

Industrial employees cultivate greater loyalty to their fellow workers than to the company.⁶ These inter-employee loyalties are not in themselves destructive, and where antagonism to company policies has been reduced to a minimum, this sense of group loyalty may be an asset. In the military, this group loyalty is the heart of effective leadership, and the loyalty of the group must be to the leader and to the mission. It is this writer's belief that the differences in mission between industry and the military lie in the degree of concentration placed on reaching the resolved purpose, and in the importance of the ultimate end result. That is to say, survival of a nation carries a higher priority than the making of Cadillacs; probably higher than anything other than the dignity of man.

Under the present structure, the military group is a "forced" group. Its members do not come together on the

⁵Air Force Leadership. Lackland Military Training Center Student Study Guide OYMO103-2 (May 1966), p. 34.

⁶Leadership and Human Relations, p. 126.

basis of common interests or background; yet, service in the Armed Forces is said to be one of the highest forms of public service. It requires a certain curtailment of many of the individual freedoms which civilians enjoy and a commitment to immediate participation in military action if the situation warrants. Here, one gets into the motives of men.

In combat, the motives of men are essentially to survive. Security and esteem are probably felt as needs, but are not very intense. In an industrial environment, leadership is oriented to the desire to advance. The difference between the two is significant. The good combat leader is a symbol to his men of physical survival. The civilian leader is a symbol of self respect, friendliness, a feeling of well being, getting ahead, being important, and so on. This does not deny the need for good human relations in combat, but it does reaffirm this writer's concept of mission and the method of incentives. In industry, the employee will be hostile to all actions that deny him a positive self concept and stable social environment. Without security, self esteem, and the opportunity to advance, most Americans will be resentful of the cause of their predicament.⁷

⁷Ibid., p. 124.

Management Philosophy

A basic concept of the management philosophy of the military is that management is an inherent responsibility of command. For military purposes, it is defined as a process of organizing and employing resources to accomplish predetermined objectives.⁸

These predetermined objectives logically refer to mission. The fact that responsibility ties management to command is only logical; however, in actuality, this may not always be the case. Often, young Non-commissioned and Commissioned Officers are placed in positions of command but are not allowed to fully exercise their responsibilities. Thus, they are not able to become successful managers as they are not given the prerogative to dispense the necessary incentives. Air Force Manual 25-1 defines a manager as a person who makes things happen through the efforts of other people.⁹ These managers are the individuals who must see to it that results are achieved through the efforts of their subordinates.

As was stated earlier, the military group is a forced group. Under the present structure, its members do not come together on the basis of common interests or background. As is often the case, individuals are placed in specific situations where their interests may coincide with those of their fellow workers, but this is rarely

⁸Air Force Leadership, p. 127.

⁹Ibid.

accomplished through the choice of the individual. The individual has almost no choice as to who the people will be with whom he lives and works, especially if unmarried. Single personnel are usually required to live in dormitory type housing. The exception to this lies with certain career people, especially if they are of field grade rank (Major - Colonel) or higher. These individuals are dedicated professional military men and women who possess a common core of interest, although they work in an almost totally non-professional service. The distinction is fine, yet does exist.

One of the objectives of this thesis is to attempt to show that perhaps this inequity need not exist. By altering the working environment to that of true professionalism, all of the members would benefit.

What is really important in the organization is how these members actually feel about their status, and how they are looked upon by the civilian world. The alarmingly high attrition rate among these men and women definitely testifies to the fact that many of them are dissatisfied with their lot and are seeking employment outside the military. In order to maintain an efficient and economical organization, it is essential that this trend be stopped. A total professionalization of the military service could do much to halt this trend.

CHAPTER II

TRENDS TOWARD A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY SERVICE

The author once had an esteemed engineering professor give him the following advice: "You must deal with reality, not with what we wish it to be or think it ought to be. Get away from idealistic thinking and deal with the facts as they exist."

The above statement certainly does have an element of truth about it; however, it is often this type of thinking that impedes progress and slows down the growth process. To be wholly idealistic would certainly be considered to be unrealistic, but perhaps a compromise can be achieved somewhere between these two extremes. Exactly how and where depends on the situation, desired results and the environment.

In dealing with a totally military situation, it is probably necessary to weigh realism quite heavily; however, when considering end results, totally casting aside idealism would also be folly.

It is the author's contention that a totally military environment does not exist for any appreciable length of time. This can best be illustrated by examining each of three possible environments: (1) the totally military,

(2) the semi-military, and (3) the civilian.

Totally Military

This environment can best be exemplified by an intense combat situation with a rapid exchange of fire and prime concern for survival. Here, the individual will submit to true authoritarian leadership (Figure 1) in order to accomplish the unit organization's mission and his own personal mission (which may or may not be the same). This type of environment does not exist for long unbroken periods.

Semi-Military

This is by far the most common environment to which the military member is exposed. It covers the wide range from the front line combat soldier resting between battles to the after duty hours recreation at the base theater. Into each of these situations slip varying degrees of the civilian influence on the military member's life. If the individual lives on a military installation and conducts the majority of his private affairs on or through the installation, he probably seldom slips out of the semi-military environment.

Civilian

This environment consists of everything that is definitely non-military as it influences an individual's




Figure 1. Leadership Techniques¹

¹Air Force Leadership, p. 88.

actions. If a military man lives off the base, attends a civilian church, buys at civilian stores, and is influenced by civilian oriented thinking, he can be said to exist primarily in a civilian environment, treating his military service as just another job. An increasingly larger number of the military people on active duty experience this type of environment.

Since the majority of military members operate in semi-military and/or civilian environments most of the time, leadership and management techniques should probably be developed and implemented with this in mind.

Figure 1 illustrates the different extremes that a military leader may take, depending on the situation and environment. These extremes do not represent ideal forms of leadership, but rather, realistic forms of leadership. The most effective type of leader is probably an interplay among a, b, and c, although everyone has probably observed an authoritarian type of leader at least once in his life. The same holds true for the other types.

Trends toward or away from a professional military service are measurable in three distinct areas: (1) leadership techniques, (2) the economy of incentives, and (3) the forced draft.

Leadership Techniques

It is often said that leadership has but one purpose, that of mission accomplishment; that leadership techniques

vary with the situation and that ideal military leadership is not a type, but rather, an application.²

The same may be said of industrial leadership, as here, too, mission accomplishment is paramount and only the methods and means employed to reach the objectives may differ. In industry, the techniques also vary and leadership is an application of principles rather than a type. Where, then, is the difference?

Research has shown that there is no one infallible list of qualities essential to effective leadership. A comparison of successful military leaders of the past shows that they differ markedly in the degree to which they possessed some of the desired characteristics. According to published military directives and manuals, there are certain attributes which are desirable in a leader, since they contribute to the probability of his success. These directives further state that the basic attributes found in successful military leaders include human characteristics aimed at helping the men develop quality in themselves. The technically competent commander can organize his men, facilities and functions; he can solve the materiel problems and he can communicate logically.³

The author believes that it is necessary to evaluate

²Ibid., pp. 88-89.

³Ibid., p. 91.

certain "proven" military leaders in order to better understand the nature of military leadership.

General Mark W. Clark states that "contrary to the old saying that leaders are born, not made, the art of leading can be taught, and it can be mastered."⁴ General Clark lists confidence, energy, timing, clarity, tenacity, boldness, concern, morality, and faith as the necessary characteristics of a good leader.

The following is taken from an article based on an address given by General Omar N. Bradley at the United States Army Command and General Staff College on April 27, 1966.

Leadership is something which cannot be defined in a few words. Having been associated with industry for some 13 years since leaving the Pentagon, I find it difficult to separate completely the principles of military and industrial leadership. They have much in common. Good leadership is essential to organized actions where any group is involved. The one who commands - military officer or captain of industry - must project power, and energizing power which coordinates and marshalls the best efforts of his followers by supplying that ingredient for which they look to him, be it guidance, support, encouragement, or even new ideas and imagination. The test of a leader lies in the reaction and response of his followers. ... The greatness of a leader is measured by the achievements of the led. ... I once knew a company vice-president who would formulate plans but never follow up to see that his plans got the expected results. ... A good leader is one who gets others to do the job.⁵

⁴General Mark W. Clark, "What it Takes to be a Leader," Reader's Digest (July 1967), pp. 160-162.

⁵General Omar N. Bradley, "Leadership," Military Review (September 1966), pp. 48-53.

General Bradley went on to encourage constructive criticism, to discourage "yes-men", to encourage interest in the jobs of those working for you, to praise whenever possible and to encourage good mental and physical health. He also emphasized the need for human understanding and consideration for others, the need to have courage in one's convictions and the need to allow the young to take on responsibility and work things out.

General Matthew B. Ridgway feels that character, courage, and competence are the chief ingredients for good leadership.⁶

The principles of leadership as taught in the United States Air Force are as follows:

1. Know your job.
2. Know yourself and seek self improvement.
3. Know your men and look out for their welfare.
4. Keep your men informed.
5. Set the example.
6. Insure that the task is understood, supervised and accomplished.
7. Train your men as a team.
8. Make sound and timely decisions.
9. Seek responsibility and develop a sense of responsibility among subordinates.
10. Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities.
11. Take responsibility for your actions.⁷

The above excerpts concerning military leadership have one thing in common. They all deal with a fixed or

⁶General Matthew B. Ridgway, "Leadership," Military Review (October 1966), pp. 40-49.

⁷Air Force Leadership, pp. 94-99.

well-defined environment. This is not to say that these characteristics and traits are not essential or desirable for good organization. On the contrary, each of the sources mentioned provides the necessary elements for adequate leadership. They form the backbone of the leadership training in the military today.

It is this author's belief, however, that this "cook-book" type of leadership training omits three vital factors. These factors can be simply stated as flexibility, open-mindedness and nonresistance to change. Each characteristic is related, yet different. Perhaps they provide the necessary vehicle to allow Colonel Armstrong's "balky, inflexible and sometimes broken-down management machine" to cruise into the modern world.⁸

Flexibility has to do with deviating from established dogma when the situation warrants, yet being careful not to violate set judicial boundaries. This is a commonly practiced "unofficial" management tool for many seasoned and respected leaders. It could at times be called "cutting red tape" in order to secure swift results. It is unfortunate that the organization must warrant such actions, but for lack of better management tools, and because of an inflexible system, this is often the only way to produce effectively. Flexibility would allow managers to question the existing system and possibly promote

⁸Armstrong, p. 5.

needed change.

Open-mindedness deals with the important moral and social responsibilities that go along with the established managerial responsibilities. To accept people, things, and situations for what they are, and to laud their good points and forgive their bad points is undoubtedly the heart of open-mindedness.

Hayakawa states that the proneness to divide the world into opposing forces - "right versus wrong," "good versus evil," - and to ignore or deny the existence of any middle ground, may be termed the two-valued orientation.⁹ Whenever individuals are faced with a decision that demands the rendering of an opinion along with the decisive choice, they are confronted with two-valued facts on which to base their decision. However, one must not allow the two-valued facts to be the sole determining factors in the decision, for then one becomes a slave to the two-valued orientation. On the other hand, if one allows these facts to set limits on his decisions and then investigates further into the social and moral implications of the proposed acts, he is opening the way for a decision which is based on the much preferred multi-valued orientation.

In his treatment of the two-valued orientation, Hayakawa uses man's inhumanity to man to illustrate his point. When German soldiers blindly obeyed the dictates

⁹S. I. Hayakawa, Language in Thought and Action (New York, 1963), pp. 230-261.

of Hitler, they were acting as automatons. The two-valued orientation concerning the evil of everything non-Aryan was so firmly engrained in those individuals that their action in the killing of the Jews was not inhuman, but rather, for the good of the fatherland. This same type of thinking is often evidenced in today's world. To maintain an open mind and practice tolerance in all situations is every manager's responsibility. As a professional, one can work to promote harmony within his own ranks and to mold his decisions to benefit mankind socially as well as materially.

Nonresistance to change is the acceptance of new tools and methods with which the manager can better accomplish his job. In this high speed computer age, it is imperative that change come easily, with a minimum of complication. As stated earlier, a professional military system is imminent. The degree of professionalization to which the military system progresses, and how smoothly this is accomplished is dependent upon its leaders, present and future.

Military leadership, as it exists today, may not be capable of competing with its industrial counterpart in the areas of flexibility, open-mindedness or nonresistance to change.

The Economy of Incentives

The greatest steps toward a professional military

have been taken in the area of incentives. These incentives have been largely of the material kind. Military pay raises since 1959 have constituted almost 75 per cent of the total dollar amount in raises since 1900. Housing has constantly been improving in both quality and quantity for both married and single members.

The trend toward a professional military service has been making itself manifest in the currently proposed Hubbell Pay Plan. This plan would do much to insure an annual income for each member of the military on an equal basis with his civilian counterpart. Under the Hubbell Plan, all careerists would be switched to a new salary schedule in place of the present system of base pay, quarters and subsistence. The marital status of a member would make no difference in the salary he is paid. Government quarters would be put on a rental basis with no discrimination by rank as to eligibility. The total salary setup would use Government Scale salaries as bench marks in establishing the new military pay scales. Each member, although paying a larger tax due to having his salary 100 per cent taxable, would be guaranteed an equal or higher "take-home" pay than he had before the change. Figure 2 outlines the Hubbell plan.¹⁰ This plan will undoubtedly be ratified by Congress and implemented before the end

¹⁰"Hubbell Plan Bared; Asks Pay Revolution," Air Force Times (January 24, 1968), pp. 1, 4, and 10.

For Career Men		
Under the PRESENT pay system, You ..		Under the HUBBELL PLAN, You would ..
.. draw base pay, col- lect quarters and sub- sistence if eligible	PAY	.. collect a single salary at all times
.. pay taxes on base pay, not allowances	TAXES	.. pay taxes on your entire pay
.. get a percentage increase in base pay when rates are raised by law	FUTURE RAISES	.. get selective by- grade raises geared to civilian wages
.. collect severance only if you are an officer	SEVERANCE PAY	.. collect as either officer or enlisted
.. pay nothing, get 2½ per cent of base pay per year of service	RETIRED PAY	.. contribute 6.5 per cent of salary, col- lect on same basis as now
.. draw basic bonus for each re-up, get a vari- able bonus in some skills	RE-UP BONUSES	.. get a VRB based on skill for first and later re-ups
.. lose quarters pay when housing assigned	GOV'T QUARTERS	.. pay rent for quar- ters out of salary
.. draw less allowance when mess is available, none when it is used	GOV'T MESS	.. pay for meals out of salary
.. earn more if you have dependents	KIN BENEFITS	.. draw the same pay whether married or bachelor
.. pay less because stores non-profit	BX, COMMISSARY	.. probably pay more to make stores self sustaining
.. get free mortgage insurance	FHA INSURANCE	.. lose the insurance benefit
.. earn special pay for skill, duty	SPECIAL PAYS	.. continue to collect

Figure 2. Hubbell at a Glance*

*Reprinted from Air Force Times (January 24, 1968), p. 4.

of 1969.¹¹

For enlisted men serving their first enlistment, the present pay system would remain in effect almost as is, but they would be guaranteed promotion to pay grade E-2 within four months after enlistment and to E-3 within one year. They would also be able to move into the career force after two years (with promotion to E-4 and a six year service commitment). "First termers" would benefit from future raises, as well, which probably would come yearly on the basis of the growth of the economy. "The present military pay-allowance-benefit system is no system at all. It is a confusing hodge-podge that desperately needs revamping."¹²

The Hubbell Plan or its equivalent would do more than just place military compensation on a par with civilian compensation, for it would establish an enlisted "up or out" program, as well. If individuals did not produce at accepted levels or were clearly unfit for promotion, they would be forced out of the military. This forced elimination of the "dead wood" has long been needed. The military would no longer be a haven for the unfit, lazy, or unproductive individual and would take on a new air of

¹¹Ibid., p. 10.

¹²"Pay Proposal Revolutionary," Editorial, Air Force Times (January 24, 1968), p. 12.

respectability.¹³

In addition to recommending the adoption of the Hubbell Plan or its equivalent, this writer proposes a stratification of enlisted pay grades beyond that proposed within the Hubbell Plan (Figure 3). This stratification would incorporate skill level and necessary knowledge in the base pay, thus eliminating Proficiency Pay, as such. As an example, illustrated in Figure 3, the grade E-4 would use the Hubbell Plan recommendation as its base pay. This would be Level 1. Level 2 under the grade E-4 would include the base pay plus a 6.5 increase above that of Level 1. Persons qualifying for this pay would be those currently drawing Proficiency Pay 1 (P-1). Level 3 would include a 13 per cent increase over the base pay for those now drawing P-2. Proficiency pay is extra compensation for highly skilled workers in specially designated career areas.

Commissioned and Warranted Officer pay grades would not be stratified in this manner, but would follow the Hubbell Plan, as all of these officers are considered to be equally skilled. In addition, this writer proposes that hazardous duty pay for enlisted personnel be increased from \$55 to \$100 per month and that flight pay for officers be eliminated, substituting a hazardous duty pay similar to that of the enlisted system, at a flat rate of

¹³"Up or Out Program for EM?," Air Force Times (January 24, 1968), p. 1.

\$150 per month for all grades.

GRADE	LEVEL	OVER 4 YRS	OVER 6 YRS	OVER 8 YRS
E-5	3	510	576	632
	2	480	543	596
	1	450	510	560
E-4	3	452	508	566
	2	426	479	533
	1	400	450	500

Figure 3. Example of Enlisted Personnel Pay Grade Stratification

Bachelor officers should not be forced to live on the military installation in dormitory like facilities, which in some instances are inadequate and which, also, are not in keeping with the professional status of the members. These officers should be given the option of living where they choose, and this without suffering monetary loss. This aspect of incentives will be treated more fully in the chapter entitled Retention, as it is a primary cause of dissatisfaction on the part of many individuals who resign from the military service.

The Forced Draft

This writer proposes certain changes in the military draft system. One of America's current "thorns in the flesh" is this draft system as presently established. This system may preclude any possibility of establishing a totally professional military service. Undoubtedly, as agitation hastens and as the passage of time prompts change, the draft system will be modified. Perhaps this forced modification would not be necessary if the military system were allowed to professionalize, for professionalization would eliminate the draft as it exists today. The threat of a mercenary force developing would be eliminated by maintaining the currently established system of civilian controls in the Executive Branch of the national government.

The problem of maintaining a force sufficiently large to counteract any and all threats to the freedom of America should properly be met through positive incentives rather than by negative ones. By establishing the military as a profession, its appeal for career-minded men and women would multiply greatly. No longer would service men be "second-class citizens" in the areas of salary, prestige, and self-determination.

With any radically new and challenging change, there are problems that arise which cannot be handled with existing tools. Management techniques become antiquated very quickly in the computer age. Whatever the system

that evolves from our present military structure, contingency provisions must be built in to insure workability. In a totally professional military system, it is possible that situations may arise whereby a fast build-up of men is essential to the security of the nation. In this event, the longer process of recruitment may have to give way to emergency draft measures. However, this would in all probability only affect the fighting force ground soldiers, and they only for a short period of time. In all likelihood, the reserve forces could be mobilized to meet any serious threat, doing away with the need for an emergency draft.

The author firmly believes that the difference between having to stay and being forced to obey is significantly contrasted to choosing to stay and choosing to obey.

CHAPTER III

JOB ATTITUDE AND MORALE

Many industrial studies have established job attitude and morale of employees as of prime importance in the over-all plan of production. This serves to emphasize the individual in the scheme of organizations. This importance of men is well described by Gilbreth:

Manpower, behind the material of production, requires recognition if it is going to contribute its utmost to production. The worker is important because of his human values. The full development of our human resources will mean more to the future of this country than any other one item. The evaluation of human potentialities and ways of developing them are measuring devices of management.¹

The military worker, whether officer or enlisted, has a job, an attitude about his job and a certain level of morale on the job. Often, especially among the enlisted personnel, this job attitude is poor and morale is low. It is believed that the reason for this is twofold. First, the worker lacks proper motivation, and second, the worker may not have a clear concept of the value of his own productivity or of that of his unit.

¹Lillian M. Gilbreth and Alice R. Cook, The Foreman in Manpower Management (New York, 1947), p. 5.

Motivation

The morale of the military worker depends upon the same factors that the morale of the worker in industry depends upon. Major morale factors are: (1) adequacy of immediate supervision, (2) satisfaction with the job itself, (3) compatibility with fellow employees, (4) satisfactory organizational purpose and effectiveness, (5) reasonable satisfaction with economic and related incentives, and (6) general physical and mental health.²

Management heads in the military sometimes operate under the assumption that morale is something that can be bought, persuaded or even ordered into existence. According to Halsey:

Proper motivation of workers requires high morale, which introduces into the work situation certain conditions which are favorable to morale development. These conditions are: (1) each employee needs to feel that his efforts are really appreciated, (2) management must weigh carefully and thoughtfully the effect of each rule and notice, (3) each employee needs to take part in the planning of those things which affect his working conditions, (4) each employee must have a feeling of pride in the worthwhileness of his work and his company, (5) each employee needs satisfactory social experiences in his working condition, (6) each employee needs job security and freedom from worry, and (7) each employee needs fair policies and practices from management.³

Halsey's idea of an equitable management system for

²Keith Davis, Human Relations at Work (New York, 1962), p. 78.

³George D. Halsey, Handbook of Personnel Management (New York, 1947), pp. 2-8.

employee motivation tends to be more permissive than this writer feels would be workable for military purposes. In spite of the ideal situation as proposed in the above quotation, industry rarely offers each employee an active part in the planning of those things which affect his working conditions, due primarily to the existence of the conditions before the employment of the individual. The remaining items certainly are applicable in varying degrees, however. It is this writer's belief that military management heads may often overlook some of these conditions in the evaluation of jobs and the establishment of job specifications and requirements. As a result, manpower may suffer, proper motivation may not be obtained, morale may drop and production rates may decline.

The adequate satisfaction of egoistic needs seems to offer the best opportunity to motivate employees to better job performance. Sutermeister establishes the egoistic needs of the worker as those that an individual must have for a high evaluation of himself; and includes such needs as knowledge, achievement, competence, independence, self-respect, respect for others, status, and recognition.⁴

The military worker often feels that he has a meaningless job, that he does not play a significant role through his work. This writer has recently witnessed lower grade enlisted men doing KP for two to four weeks at a time, six

⁴Robert A. Sutermeister, People and Productivity (New York, 1963), p. 14.

and seven days a week, for twelve to fifteen hours a day. Conditions such as this are not only deplorable, but are an affront to the dignity of man. The proposed civilian contracted dining halls are slow to materialize. With situations existing such as just mentioned, it is next to impossible to instill any real sense of job pride in an individual.

Leaders should strive to eliminate degrading jobs and deplorable working conditions in the military. Granted, not all jobs offer the optimum in working conditions by their very nature, but with skillful immediate supervision any job can be made tolerable. Often, it is not necessarily the job that is intolerable, but rather, the immediate supervisor. This topic will be covered in depth in the following chapter.

Some situations offer more hardships than others, of course, but management heads should endeavor to instill job pride in all individuals. Studies show that workers are not mere cogs in a wheel, or cards and numbers in an enterprise. A sympathetic understanding of human nature will reveal the same thing. Individuals respond to good human relations with enthusiasm, initiative, and drive.⁵ Military leaders should always realize that individuals have to work together, that all behavior is caused and

⁵Nathan Shefferman, The Shefferman Personnel Motivation Program (Englewood Cliffs, 1961), p. 5.

that motivation provides this cause.⁶ It is the means by which the manager creates and maintains the desire of his people to achieve the planned goals.

The importance of the military group to mission accomplishment cannot be overemphasized. The small group is the basic working unit in every type of organization, but this is perhaps especially true of a military organization.⁷ As a dynamic entity, its sum total and value is greater than the sum of its parts.

The group can be an instrument of good or evil, depending on the role assumed by the leader. The group must never be allowed to submerge the individual; yet, each individual must work toward the goals of the group with enthusiasm and determination.⁸

It is possible that closer control of the merit rating process, the institution of a workable collective bargaining system and of a means of effective arbitration may help to solve many motivation problems.

Merit Rating

Manpower management in industry has long made use of effective merit rating systems to appraise the performance of their workers. The military system of merit rating differs little from that of industry. The Officer

⁶Davis, p. 16.

⁷Melvin R. Lohmann, "A Concept of Organization and Management" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1954), p. 92.

⁸Air Force Leadership, p. 18.

Effectiveness Report, Airman Performance Report, Officer Efficiency Report, Commander's Enlisted Evaluation Report and other similar reports, depending on which branch of the service one is familiar with, play an important role in the promotion of the serviceman. Such a report may be the sole criterion for promotion in some instances. Often, the person making out the efficiency report for individuals under his supervision may not be trained in the proper preparation of these reports. This is most likely to occur when dealing in the ranks of the enlisted man. The military often seems to neglect to take into account the inadequacy of using untrained enlisted men, often only one grade higher than the individual being rated, to write the efficiency report. As Halsey states, the primary purpose of employee merit rating is to measure and evaluate as fairly and as objectively as possible each worker's general merit, especially as related to his eligibility for salary increase or promotion.⁹ Employee merit rating is an orderly, systematic, and carefully considered analysis and evaluation of a person's services, based on observation over a considerable period of time and on a study of all available objective records of performance and behavior.

Personal opinions, prejudice and bias often are the primary source of information in military rating reports.

⁹Halsey, pp. 177-178.

This unfair practice hampers proper motivation, lowers morale, and good job attitude and lowers productivity, as well. This writer once worked for a boss who drew lots to see which one of his workers would take the credit for specific achievements in the shop whenever Efficiency Report time came around. Several other foremen in the same squadron used similar methods. Manpower management should realize that, as in industry, the development of successful methods of measuring job proficiency is one of their most difficult and complex problems. This important task requires effective management for increased productivity.¹⁰ The need for finding workable solutions is paramount to a successful professional system.

Collective Bargaining

In industry, the labor union provides additional psychological and sociological benefits, such as group solidarity, leadership opportunities, protection from unreasonable supervisors, communication to management and social power to get rewards for its members.¹¹ Since unions do not exist in the military, other means have been tried with the purpose of providing the worker with a stronger voice. These means, such as the Airman's Council established at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, were

¹⁰Edwin A. Fleishman, Studies in Personnel and Industrial Psychology (Homewood, 1961), p. 67.

¹¹Davis, p. 279.

designed to allow enlisted men the opportunity to present grievances concerning their jobs, supervision, and working conditions.¹² These steps have proven ineffective largely due to a lack of confidence in the setup on the part of those with grievances. Holding power of judgment in military hands has caused suspicions of coercion and prejudice. Currently, United States Air Force Headquarters is considering implementation of enlisted councils at various levels, to provide Non-commissioned Officers and Airmen direct route to their commanders and even to the Pentagon.¹³ In the opinion of this writer, this program resembles a giant suggestion box. Air Force controlled, it is designed as a means to collectively treat existing problems which cause low retention rates. There is no provision to hear low level grievances that are meant to stay on a low level. The individual, for the most part, is ignored, as major emphasis is placed on the collective.

To offer a possible solution to the above stated problem, this writer proposes that a system of collective bargaining be established for all military personnel.

America's military system is so structured that a military takeover of the government is virtually impossible. The system of checks and balances that affects

¹²"McGuire AFB Establishes Council for Airmen," Air Force Times, XXV (March 31, 1965), p. 6.

¹³"Advisors on Trial as 'Friend in Court'," Air Force Times, XXVIII (March 6, 1968), p. 13.

the various governmental bodies also affects the military. It is often said that America's armed might is an instrument of foreign policy. Whether it be an instrument of foreign or domestic policy, or more probably, a combination of both, does not require that the members be subject to the political and prejudicial whims of the legislature. Service professions, such as teaching, law enforcement, and fire protection, have suffered degrading salaries, long hours, and poor working conditions as a direct result of being subject to what is perhaps the poorest compensation program known - that based on the taxpayer.

Recently, remarkable steps have been taken to insure that these professions are more justly rewarded; although, unfortunately, these steps were not initiated by employers, but rather, by organizations formed by the members in order that they may bargain collectively. Government workers in a civilian capacity have long had employee associations that have successfully presented their demands in the areas of salary, working conditions, promotion, and grievance handling. At present, only a few members of Congress can be said to "crusade" for the military man. The establishment of a system of collective bargaining for military people would probably ease the pain of changing to a highly professional military.

Arbitration Boards

As stated earlier, councils do not seem to have proved

capable of providing the necessary sounding board for individual members of the military. Non-political arbitration boards set up along lines similar to industrial ones could conceivably provide a solution. These boards could be called whenever the employee association felt that a member was not receiving fair treatment in any area. Individuals could directly request a hearing, which would also lead to the convening of a board. Board members would need to be either civilians or retired military personnel, as objectivity is essential. The American Arbitration Association uses men from various walks of life to perform arbitration services for industry. These men usually have industrial experience, but this is not essential. As long as an arbitrator is acceptable to both sides in a dispute, he is qualified, regardless of occupation. A similar group of men could be formed to arbitrate military cases as well.

Productivity

As in industry, the military looks to high productivity to remain strong and capable. This high productivity is usually a direct result of long range planning. In industry, this type of planning is made possible by the very nature of a more subdued environment. The military environment does not offer a stable situation all of the time; however, in the semi-military environment an approximation to the industrial situation can usually be made.

Often, military management operates with a purely military environment in mind. Optimum long range goals may be sacrificed, when in fact, they should have been implemented. Each year, the General Accounting Office investigates high cost areas; areas with a high cost to production ratio. Workers usually know fairly accurately how efficient their unit organization is. If their organization falls under GAO scrutiny, or even if they have only an informal understanding that efficiency is low, their job attitude is going to be affected. Voorhees states it well when he says that attitudes are not inherited, but rather, require learning through social participation.¹⁴ This concept is belongingness, in an industrial sense, a condition which influences the attitudes and behavior patterns of the workers towards the group to which they belong.

High productivity demands a meaningful and efficient organization. Efficiency is affected by morale, discipline, and esprit-de-corps. Conversely, efficiency plays a major role in the development of morale, discipline, and esprit-de-corps.¹⁵

Although morale is often confused with esprit-de-corps, the former is an individual feeling, while the

¹⁴John E. Voorhees, "The Relationship of Psychology and Sociology to Industrial Engineering" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Oklahoma State University, 1951), p. 81.

¹⁵Air Force Leadership, pp. 19-21.

latter is an aggregate of the first. Morale can be said to be dependent upon the welfare of the individual, his understanding of the mission, his confidence in himself, his leader and his unit, his acceptance by his peers and discipline.¹⁶

True discipline is a quality of the mind.¹⁷ True discipline also implies ultimate authority, as discussed in a previous section, for it is a member's acceptance of the need for a common law to coordinate and limit the group's actions. A pure military environment prompts instinctive discipline - obedience under all conditions.

Esprit-de-corps is the collective morale of the individuals making up a group. It could be said to be the degree of loyalty, pride, and enthusiasm of members for their unit. "Esprit-de-corps is a hidden power within a group that stems from its solidarity and makes possible unusual accomplishment against great odds."¹⁸

The ingredient that allows an efficient organization to exist and that plays a large part in establishing morale, discipline, and esprit-de-corps, is supervision. It is the responsibility of managers and supervisors to provide a means by which a worker can find a meaningful and efficient operation. Each worker that expresses

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

anxiety in any of these areas should receive carefully prepared instruction and counsel concerning the necessity of his job and the mission of his unit.

A final point to consider under this area of productivity is the importance of careful and responsible use of personnel. Efficient use of time and personnel is difficult to measure, for it cannot be readily subjected to statistics.

This is particularly true of management and staff work; the quality of the end product - decisions, directions, plans and programs - is not measurable in terms of work units and hours, but in the final results attained, sometimes months and miles away.¹⁹

As this article in TIG Brief goes on to point out, this is where the managers must make sure that they are making effective use of their personnel and equipment. The repetitive nature of giving advice and assuming responsibilities improves a person's ability to do just that.

Providing an opportunity for junior personnel to participate in meaningful ways prepares them to be better contributors to the commander's staff resources of ability, makes them sooner able to assume additional responsibilities, either in their own, or in some other command.²⁰

¹⁹"The Junior Officer and Programs to Utilize Personnel Abilities, as Well as Time," The Inspector General's Brief, 18:3 (November 11, 1966), p. 3.

²⁰Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

SUPERVISOR-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIPS

It is perhaps true that the most important element of industry is supervision. The military, as well as industry, depends upon adequate supervision to operate successfully. Military supervisors, in their relations with the workers, do not differ appreciably from those in industry. An individual must possess and effectively use certain special qualities to be a good supervisor. Shefferman states that a good supervisor first needs a sound working knowledge of the operation that he supervises.¹ Management seldom fails to recognize this need when selecting its formal leaders. Secondly, a good supervisor needs to establish sound employee relations.

There are three main factors with which a supervisor must deal in managing his "business within a business". These are men, materiel, and equipment. The supervisor must build a strong organization of skillful, interested, alert, and loyal workers, fitting each man to a job that he can do best and developing each worker to his highest potential. He must stimulate each man to work toward a

common goal of the entire department and company. Finally, the supervisor must hold his own part of the organization together.

Halsey lists similar qualities that pertain to an effective leader, adding that the supervisor must do all of this fairly, patiently, and tactfully, so that each worker is inspired to do his work skillfully, accurately, intelligently, enthusiastically, and completely.²

Industry has long realized the importance of good supervisor-employee relationships. Industry also realizes that the qualities which make up a good leader are not necessarily inherent in that individual, but rather, are the product of careful training. The military seems to be abreast with industry in these realizations. In the past, military leadership training emphasized protocol, bearing and the ability to command. Officer and Non-commissioned Officer development courses today are striving to incorporate a strong human relations element into them. According to Davis, leadership is the human factor which binds a group together and motivates it toward goals. The leader's planning, organization, and decision making reach fruition only when followers are motivated to carry them out. Leadership is the result of a complex interaction of the leader and his followers in a dynamic environment.³ An

²Halsey, p. 161.

³Davis, p. 118.

understanding of the informal organization may serve to underscore the importance of the interaction between leader and worker.

The informal organization actually controls many military activities theoretically governed by the formal organization. Customs which may either contradict or reinforce formal regulations are developed in the informal group to control many of the details of military life. The officially defined roles of a leader are redefined through his association in the informal group and through his acceptance by the informal group as its leader.⁴ The leaders of the official formal group may or may not be the same persons that are the leaders in the informal group.

C. I. Barnard characterizes the informal group as being unconscious in its structuring of society, while the formal group is consciously structuring society. Barnard goes on to explain that the informal organization has two important effects: that of establishing certain attitudes, understandings, customs, habits, institutions, and values; and that of creating the conditions under which the formal organization may arise. It is the informal organization that establishes friendships and comradeship among workers. "Comradeship is much more powerful than patriotism in the behavior of soldiers."⁵

⁴"Informal Social Organization in the Army," Leadership and Human Relations, p. 177.

⁵Barnard, pp. 116-119.

Whenever managers have an opportunity, they should try to ascertain the composition of the informal groups operating in their command. Often, this is difficult due to the very nature of this type of organization. Whenever possible, supervisors should be chosen with regard to the informal group, since it is through this means that job attitude and morale are the most affected.

In the military organization, the shop chief, platoon leader, section chief, or whatever these immediate supervisors are called, corresponds to the foreman in industry. These individuals are the backbone of supervision. The function and selection of these supervisors in the military will now be examined.

The Function of the Shop Chief

The job of shop chief usually falls to the highest ranking Non-commissioned Officer in the shop. Many possess the qualities necessary in a good supervisor, while others do not. The foreman determines the relative success of his unit organization depending on his leadership abilities. Gilbreth states that top management in industry expects the foreman to be a morale builder.⁶ One of the greatest morale factors is loyalty to a common goal. Mutual interest and identification among employees builds and strengthens loyalty. When foreman and worker

⁶Gilbreth, p. 175.

feel that they are engaged in doing something larger than their own job, their satisfaction is increased.

The shop chief has the function which is almost identical to that of the foreman. His methods of supervision determine shop productivity, morale, and the quality of human relations. Gilbreth establishes human relations as the foreman's most important job.⁷ By sensing early signs of manpower trouble, he must take the necessary steps to prevent it. By establishing open lines of communication with his workers, he encourages favorable job attitudes, behavior, speech, and interest in the shop. Just as the successful foreman must estimate and plan his budget of time and energy to develop new leaders in his shop, so must the section chief.⁸ Shefferman states that the immediate supervisor has the responsibility of building and maintaining employee morale.⁹

The military has long realized that the relationship between supervisor and employee must be favorable for effective organization and production. The mere realization of the need for this favorable relationship does not guarantee that it will exist. Managers have the responsibility of not only making management directives, which are now in existence, work, but also of formulating new tools

⁷Ibid., p. 8.

⁸Ibid., p. 178.

⁹Shefferman, p. 174.

to keep pace with the changing world.

The Inspector General of the Air Force recently expressed his concern for this problem.

A smooth working relationship between the supervisor and his employees is necessary for maximum production and well being of the unit. This ideal relationship, which is not a one-sided responsibility, can be obtained through the tactful and effective use of 'downward' and 'upward' communication, which builds trust and confidence between supervisor and employee. Primary responsibility for establishing this management aid lies with the supervisor, who must explain what is required of each employee and encourage constructive suggestions and criticisms. Further, he must keep them informed of changes which regard their job, employment, and organization. Effective communication includes praising a dedicated employee when he does a fine job, as well as telling him when he is falling down. It requires both kindness and firmness, as the situation dictates.¹⁰

The establishment of effective relationships, as an important function of the shop chief, is emphasized by Sergeant Mikles, himself a section chief in the United States Army. Mikles states that in order to become a more effective military leader, each Non-commissioned Officer must depend on his ability to set group goals with group members, must coordinate group members into a cooperative team, must have interest in the group and be especially human in his style of leadership.¹¹

The section chief is the backbone of production in

¹⁰ "Management-Employee Communication," TIG Brief, XIV (September 14, 1962), p. 6.

¹¹ Truman F. Mikles, 1st Sgt., USA, "How to be a More Effective NCO," Army Information Digest, XX (January, 1965), pp. 30-32.

the military; his position, in the over-all organization, is most important. His importance may be neglected when job accomplishment and production rates are considered foremost to the mission of the military. In industry, as expressed by Gilbreth, a foreman interprets and carries out company policies. This responsibility demands the use of clear, forceful language, possession of the art of persuasion, an understanding of the individual and a knowledge of the facts involved.¹² He is a key man, for he sees that the worker knows what the company wants and is planning to do. As a "keyman" in the military, the section chief has to realize that the majority of his work is a human relations job. His ability to communicate by giving orders, instructing, suggesting and writing establishes the two-way cooperation between supervisor and employee that is necessary for full production.

Being close to the majority of his men, the Non-commissioned Officer is in a position to influence their decisions and the quality of their work. He is in a position to impress upon subordinates the meaning of traditions and customs in the military, and he is the logical person to create good morale, discipline, and esprit-de-corps within the unit. The degree to which he is able to accomplish the above depends on the status, authority, and support given him by his subordinates. If the Non-commissioned

¹²Gilbreth, p. 176.

Officer is not an effective leader, is not dedicated or if he lacks position in the eyes of his subordinates, the military is in serious difficulty.¹³

The Selection of Supervisors

The military structure is different from the civilian and individuals employed in one or the other are affected in different ways.

The military facts of life include chain of command, degrees of rank, correct wearing of the uniform, and military regulations, traditions, and justice. Military leaders are taught to make more effective use of existing military structure and environment in putting management techniques to work; however, the average normal man who is fitted into the uniform of an American ground soldier ... is what his home, his religion, his schooling, and the moral code and ideals of his society have made him. The Army cannot unmake him.¹⁴

This writer believes that the military system would be more effective in the management of its men and materiel if it were not always necessary to use the existing management structure and environment to put management techniques to work. It is the difference between the management concept of forcing the man to fit the machine versus the method of designing the machine to fit the man.

In order to assure that every supervisor is well equipped to handle his position, it is necessary that a

¹³Air Force Leadership, p. 22.

¹⁴Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (New York, 1947), p. 54.

thorough check be made of each individual who is eligible to hold a supervisory position on the basis of rank and seniority. Unfortunately, social ties may play a strong role in the selection of supervisors. The testing of individuals to determine leadership qualities does exist, as do leadership training programs. These tests and the training that accompanies them may often be only a means to satisfy regulation; however, with the eventual selection based upon social contact. Halsey emphasizes the importance of careful selection of supervisors.

The first question which needs answering in the planning of any supervisory program for the selection and training of supervisors is: What qualities, knowledge, and skills will reflect success in performing the duties of a supervisor? Some of the most important qualities are: (1) good health, (2) intelligence, (3) mechanical comprehension, (4) human relations, (5) judgment and ingenuity, (6) tact, (7) initiative, (8) ability to teach, (9) thoroughness, (10) courage, (11) emotional control, (12) technical knowledge, and (13) coordination and strategy in getting results.¹⁵

Industry uses training and testing programs to the fullest extent in their selection of supervisors. Several testing programs are in use, but one which deserves note is the one developed by the Office of Industrial Relations. Its director, Arthur J. Jones, states that his supervisors train and test in the principles and techniques of good management and supervision. They use the evaluation standards and make recommendations for changes in job

¹⁵Halsey, pp. 151-158.

content, titles, and grades. They conduct cyclic reviews of jobs and make various adjustments pursuant to their salary administration directives. The workers take an active part by advising on a more economical distribution of skills, thereby bringing into play all of the qualities necessary in a good supervisor.¹⁶

In this writer's opinion, a serious program should be initiated in the military whereby management heads could be made aware of existing weak links in the supervisory program. By knowing the potential weak links in the development of the supervisory staff, management could then develop a training program to meet the needs, based on objective evidence.

Probably the most neglected area of military supervisor training is in the effective and successful handling of people. According to Voorhees, industry offers extensive training in the psychological aspects of handling people. Included are such subjects as individual differences among workers, practical psychology on the job, types of people who need special treatment and rules for good mental health.¹⁷

At present, the main emphasis on supervisor training in the military seems to place equipment and materiel

¹⁶Arthur J. Jones, "The Vital Link - Human Relations, Personnel Management," The Review, XLIII (March-April 1964), pp. 52-54.

¹⁷Voorhees, p. 96.

ahead of manpower. The Inspector General of the Air Force holds the opinion that examinations test the interrelationships of supervisors responsibilities and internal procedures, to insure that directive requirements are known and accomplished as a normal routine. Furthermore, supervisory proficiency in operations, maintenance, supply, and security has a profound effect on Air Force safety, readiness, and economy. Written examinations require that officer and enlisted supervisors are proficient in these areas. This insures that they understand and apply properly the latest directives and prescribed procedures to the unit's operation.¹⁸

Training and testing procedures should place manpower as a full equal to equipment and materiel to insure adequate supervisor-employee relations.

Since it is through the junior officer that future policies will be formulated, his is an important role in management. This role will be considered before concluding this section on supervisors.

The lieutenant is normally energetic and enthusiastic; however, this desire to excel is sometimes without adequate direction. This may be due primarily to a lack of experience in the application of his practical knowledge and to the newness of his commission. It is the responsibility of the middle managers - majors and lieutenant colonels -

¹⁸"Testing Supervisors," TIG Brief, XVI (December 18, 1964), p. 3.

to provide the necessary motivation and direction to the young officers. First Lieutenant McDowell contends that the junior officer's desire to remain in the service may be substantially affected by his relationship with his immediate supervisors, primarily those officers in the major and lieutenant colonel group. Lt. McDowell goes on to make a very salient point; namely, that these field grade officers have been out of the junior officer category for a number of years and have become less and less aware of the attitudes and feelings of the young lieutenants.¹⁹ If a young officer is discouraged from bringing his problems to his boss, he is prevented from gaining a portion of that valuable experience that would enable him to become a more effective manager. Good officers need to be good leaders, but leadership skills are not inborn.

Given the equipment and other management resources, the role of the manager still centers around getting things done through people. Military management faces a problem not usually encountered by industrial management. The former demands of the manager greater resiliency, flexibility and adaptability due to the highly structured organization of the military system. This is particularly true in a military-civilian mixed environment, which is becoming increasingly more prevalent. This "Mix-Fix," as

¹⁹First Lieutenant Charles P. McDowell, "The Junior Officer and His Supervisor," Air University Review (May-June, 1966), pp. 91-92.

it is referred to, is placing highly skilled civilian workers into jobs previously held by all military personnel. The need for this has been made evident by the great advances in technology in the past decade, advances which the military manpower programmers have been striving to keep pace with. These civilian workers are often more highly paid for doing the same job as their military counterparts. This situation creates management problems that are compounded by accompanying disparities in position, privilege, and responsibility. The manager is, thus, required to master the nuances of a mixed military - civilian environment.²⁰

The junior officer of today is going to be tomorrow's middle and upper management head. By preparing himself to cope with these new problems and planning for future problems not yet manifest, the lieutenant can do much to insure a command position for himself in tomorrow's highly professional military organization.

²⁰"The Air Force Manager and His People," TIG Brief, XIX (May 12, 1967, p. 1.

CHAPTER V

RETENTION

One of the most obvious problems of any military organization is the procurement and retention of highly competent contributors. High labor turnover presents a serious problem to military manpower management.

Industry uses several methods to screen and select its employees; however, the most common are the general intelligence and aptitude tests. The military uses similar tests to screen its labor force. The results of these tests show a marked similarity in the quality of personnel between the military organization and industry.¹

The only significant physical difference in the two labor forces lies in the comparative age groups. A large percentage of enlisted men are in the seventeen to twenty-one year old age group, a much larger percentage than in industry. This difference does not seem to exist when comparing officers to their industrial counterparts. The unbalance in the enlisted group results in a more immature work force than that of industry. On the other end of the

¹"Aptitude Testing," TIG Brief, XVII (March 12, 1965), p. 1.

age scale, industry has a much larger percentage of its labor force in the fifty to sixty-five year old age group than does the military. Many military men, enlisted and officers, retire after twenty to twenty-five years service, while they are still in their forties.

Some reasons for the high labor turnover in the military and possible solutions to this problem will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

The problem of retaining a skilled and trained work force plagues management heads in the military. The excessive cost of technical training aggravates this problem. Voorhees states that the reason for this problem in an industrial environment, is that managers do not cope with their manpower problems properly. He lists some of the common shortcomings of industrial managers in this area, shortcomings that could be applied to managers in the military, as well. These are: (1) failure to upgrade employees whenever possible, (2) neglect to train foremen to have a better appreciation of human relations, (3) failure to make use of modern, scientific methods of psychological evaluation of employees, and (4) general failure to do a good job in using human assets.²

A general dissatisfaction with pay and allowances, especially in the lower enlisted and lower officer grades causes many individuals to leave the service in order to

²Voorhees, p. 98.

search for higher paying jobs as civilians. Monetary reward is not the only key, however, for the majority of servicemen that get out do so for other than monetary reasons. As the largest trainer and employer of technicians in this country, the military is an excellent source of trained personnel for industry.³ Since servicemen cannot use collective bargaining as a means of increasing the incentives for staying in, they must depend on politicians to provide "adequate and fair compensation."

Recommendations presented earlier in this paper outline a method of collective bargaining similar to the American Arbitration Association used by industry. This would provide the needed means to present the wishes of the serviceman before an appropriate agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Armed Services Committee.

One reason that many Air Force men give for leaving the service is that the military gives too little recognition for individual effort and achievement. The editor of the Air Force Times states that there is a lack of the kind of personnel recognition the civilian professional can expect when he is doing his job.⁴ The stress in the military is on the team and staff effort. Often, the person making the actual contribution must take second place

³Technician Manpower Associates, Teamwork in Technology: Managing Technician Manpower (Scarsdale, 1959),

⁴"Enough Recognition?" Editorial, Air Force Times, XXVII (January 18, 1967), p. 12.

to the team leader who accepts the recognition for the "team." Whatever is accomplished out of the ordinary by the civilian worker is often well published and lauded, while the military worker's accomplishment may be put down as "all in the line of duty." This collective spirit is good, but when it serves to destroy individual pride and recognition, steps need to be taken to reverse the trend.

Bachelor officers and enlisted men are not treated equitably in pay and housing with their married co-workers and are often subjected to more stringent protocol requirements. A bachelor Captain in the Air Force recently wrote a letter to the editor of the Air Force Times complaining about disparities in housing requirements for bachelors and married men. He states, in part, that one of the strongest reasons for his decision to leave the service was a desire to live in a manner comparable to bachelors in the civilian world. The college dormitory type of living, he went on to say, is hardly suitable for an adult ten years out of college. It is this individual's contention that as long as single men are forced to live in bachelor quarters or face losing their housing allowance, they will be second class citizens in the service, will look at their civilian counterparts with envy and perhaps even join them.⁵ Other dissatisfactions, such as pay differentials and the relative frequency of personnel

⁵"Letters to the Editor," Air Force Times, XXVIII (February 28, 1968), p. 14.

and quarters inspections, prompt many resignations.

The above factors certainly do not exhaust the reasons military personnel have for leaving the service, but do serve to illustrate some of the more common ones.

Some of these complaints will be alleviated with the adoption of the Hubbell Plan or its equivalent. Housing policies will no longer be arbitrary and pay will be for work performed, rather than for how many dependents a member is supporting. These changes will serve to further professionalize the services and make the military more attractive as a career.

According to Barnard, non-material inducements are much more important than material rewards in the development of organizations.⁶ Barnard also states that:

The non-economic inducements are as difficult to offer as others under many circumstances. To establish conditions under which individual pride of craft and of accomplishment can be secured without destroying the material economy of standardized production in cooperative operations is a problem in real efficiency. To maintain character of personnel that is an attractive condition of employment involves a delicate art and much insight in the selection and rejection of personal services offered, whether the standard of quality be high or low. ... It is for this reason that good organizations - commercial, governmental, military, academic and others - will be observed to devote great attention and money to the non-economic inducements.⁷

The application of non-economic inducements requires

⁶Barnard, p. 145.

⁷Ibid., p. 94.

properly trained managers and leaders. These leaders will need to stress prestige, opportunities for distinction, pride in workmanship, loyalty, sense of adequacy, patriotism, and association.

Another important aspect of incentives is seen in the situation in which an organization is not able to provide the necessary inducements for cooperation by its members. Barnard's treatise on persuasion exemplifies the eventual result. If an organization cannot provide adequate incentives to insure the contributions of its contributors, it will perish unless it can change the desires of the contributors through persuasion. Persuasion is the forming of coercive conditions, the rationalization of opportunities and the inculcation of motives.⁸

Coercive conditions are negative incentives, such as the threat of non-judicial disciplinary punishment or trial by Courts Martial in the military. The rationalization of opportunity pertains to immediate and short term situations where it is convincingly pointed out that it is to a person's "best interests" that he perform certain tasks or conform to specific regulation. The rationalization of religious motives was the basis of the Crusades. The rationalization of hate was the means of increasing national solidarity in Hitler's Germany. The rationalization of patriotism is a means of securing proficient

⁸Ibid., pp. 139-160.

bomber and tanker crews in the Strategic Air Command. The form of persuasion that is most important is the long term inculcation of motives. This is the deliberate education of the young and the use of propaganda for adults, such as results in a belief in the necessity for debt free, sound financial stability in order to maintain the finest protective military force in the world.

The attitudes and methods of leadership used by present officers in the middle management area are probably the most important single element in officer retention. If the working atmosphere for the junior officer is conducive to growth and rewarding experience, the entire military benefits; while if the atmosphere is one that permits little exploration, flexibility, or resourcefulness on the part of the junior officer, he is very likely to leave the military and look for more meaningful employment in the civilian world. As stated in the previous chapter, the atmosphere is usually determined by the individuals in the major - lieutenant colonel group.

According to Captain Butchart, the quality which a man most highly regards in himself is integrity. "No man can carry on in any job which he feels is destroying his integrity."⁹ Butchart goes on to point out that, equal to

⁹Captain E. W. Butchart, 'The Real Problem,' "The John A. Lejeune Forum: Officer Retention," Marine Corps Gazette (May 1967), p. 41.

integrity to a man, is his self-respect.¹⁰ Without self-respect, an officer's effectiveness is greatly reduced. A man gains professional self-respect only when he is respected professionally.

It is the opinion of Captain M. W. Allinder, Jr., that Congress and the Department of Defense are asking the wrong questions of the wrong men concerning the problems of personnel retention in the armed forces. A serious effort must be made to determine the true set of values of the men who are making the military their career so that these values or needs may be recognized and satisfied.¹¹ Monetary incentives are not the only answer for a person who wants to get a feeling of deep satisfaction and accomplishment out of his job. The opportunity for independent thought and action, for esteem, prestige and worthwhileness are essential in a professional system.

It is the managers' responsibility to improve the attractiveness of service life for their men. These leaders are especially able to help provide and maintain the manpower the military needs to keep its strength and effectiveness. It is up to congress to provide the basic incentives for career motivation and to set the stage

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Captain M. W. Allinder, Jr., 'A Wrong Approach,' "The John A. Lejeune Forum: Officer Retention," Marine Corps Gazette (May, 1967), p. 46.

concerning how management tools are to be implemented in the use of existing manpower.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

This thesis has attempted to present the concept that there is little difference between successful management techniques in American industry and in a professional military system. The existing military organization, however, has not yet attained that degree of professionalism whereby it can be referred to as a profession. As this thesis has pointed out, the American military system may not be keeping pace with the enlightened techniques that have influenced American industry in the area of personnel management. Perhaps military leaders are not preparing for the imminent total professionalization of the services or training future leaders to cope with a more dynamic environment.

The differences between industrial and military leadership lie mainly in the types of environments. Purely military, semi-military or civilian environments each play a significant role in determining the quality of human relations between supervisors and workers, in determining the authority of leaders and in determining the type of mission.

Human relations in a military environment is an

important element of successful leadership, just as it is in a civilian environment. There exist high intensity areas in the military leadership-management spectrum that present greater problems to their proper management and solution than do these same areas in industry. These areas are: (1) Job Attitude and Morale, (2) Supervisor-Employee Relationships, and (3) Retention.

The concept of authority as coming up from the bottom of the organization, or emitting from the subordinate as a reflection of his acceptance of an order, differs from the time-honored precept that military authority, as well as the industrial counterpart, is vested in certain individuals of high position. These officials do not have absolute power over their underlings, but only as much as is granted by the latter. The key to authority lies in the dispensing of proper incentives. The threat of strong negative incentives often prompts military personnel to bow to the wishes of a tyrannical manager rather than to stand up and fight for what they believe in. The military incentive structure, as it exists today, is relatively negative.

Cooperation is possible under a permissive structure of authority if certain conditions are met; namely, that care is taken to see that only acceptable orders are issued and that most of these orders fall into the recipient's zone of indifference.

The mission in the military is absolute, while in

industry it is a compromise between the needs of management and the needs of the workers. Often, in the military, it is necessary that the needs of the worker be circumvented for short periods in order that success of mission be guaranteed. This places an extra burden upon the leader, for it is his job to justify this circumvention.

Military managers are often prevented from becoming successful managers because they are not given the prerogatives to dispense the proper incentives. This type of situation has often been called responsibility without authority.

The military group is a forced group. Under the present structure, its members do not come together on the basis of common interests and backgrounds. A totally voluntary service designed to attract career motivated contributors would probably reduce the high attrition rate and help to stabilize the environment.

The totally military environment does not exist for more than very short periods of time, giving way then to either the semi-military or civilian environment. Military managers are often trained to handle situations that supposedly exist in a totally military environment. The industrial or civilian influence is often neglected or even ignored.

Proven military leaders of the past differed in psychological makeup and in the degree to which they possessed certain character traits thought to be essential for good

leadership. These recognized character traits have a common denominator; that of dealing with a fixed or well defined environment. This rote-memory type of leadership omits three vital factors. These factors are flexibility, open-mindedness, and non-resistance to change.

The greatest strides toward a professional military have been in the area of inducements to service. Pay and housing have improved considerably over the past decade and promotions have become more equitable. The proposed Hubbell Pay Plan would professionalize the pay system for all military personnel. Separate, non-taxable items would be incorporated into the total pay package and existing pay disparities between bachelors and married men would be eliminated. Military personnel would be paid on the same basis as civilian government employees.

Perhaps further refinements to the military pay situation are also called for. A stratification of enlisted pay grades to include proficiency pay; the increasing of hazardous duty pay; the elimination of flight pay, as such, for officers; and the institution of an officer hazardous duty pay on a fixed rate basis would all serve to make military service and compensation more equitable among individual members.

The end of the forced draft is possibly in sight. Modifications of the draft system are being proposed by Senate Committee, interested congressmen, and lawmakers. The problem of maintaining a large enough force to safely

protect the country should be met through positive incentives. In a truly ideal military system, the desire to serve one's country during times of relative peace would be just as great as during times of declared or undeclared war. The large technological base of operations required by the military demands a state of constant readiness. There would not be sufficient time to mobilize millions of men on short notice; therefore, a standing military must be maintained at all times. Many individuals either do not see the need for this or refuse to recognize it. In a stable, peacetime environment, the maintenance of military forces is an economic waste. Like any other tool, it is efficient only when in actual use. America's strength lies in her ability to deter war as well as win declared war. The preservation of a society founded on the principles of individual freedom requires the presence of military might to prevent a totalitarian state from running rampant over her boundaries.

With any new and challenging innovation there arise problems which cannot be handled with existing tools. Management techniques need constant updating in this computer age. Leaders have a responsibility to their followers of keeping abreast of change and continually evaluating their own tool inventory to insure use of proper and effective management methods.

Military manpower needs more effective management in the areas of job attitude and morale, supervisor-employee

relationships and retention.

Job attitude and morale of the worker are of prime importance in the total plan of production. Military members often have poor attitudes and morale due to a lack of proper motivation, poor merit rating techniques, a feeling of meaninglessness in the organization and a sense of inefficiency in their own unit organization. A system of collective bargaining and arbitration would be beneficial to a successful professional military service.

Supervisor-employee relationships comprise the most important single element contributing to full production. The informal organization plays an important role in the lives of the workers. This informal organization should be used to the benefit of managers and workers by seeking to select enlisted leaders that are compatible with the informal group whenever possible. The section chief, who corresponds to the foreman in industry, is the key man in the military. He functions as a morale builder and human relations expert. He is important because the responsibility of full utilization of men and resources lies in him. The function, importance and skillful selection of supervisors may often be neglected to a greater or lesser extent. Management should clarify the importance and function of the shop chief and present a listing of weak links in the supervisory program.

The junior officers of today are the middle and upper management heads of tomorrow, but often their

energy and enthusiasm is without adequate direction. It is the responsibility of the middle managers - the majors and lieutenant colonels - to provide the needed motivation and direction to these young lieutenants.

Due to the basic structure of the military labor force, retention rates fall short of those experienced by industry. These rates are alarmingly higher even than the military's advance estimations, due in part to poor management practices. A general dissatisfaction with pay is a cause for some men to leave the military service. Much more significant causes may be the inequality of treatment between single and married servicemen, the disparity that exists between the bachelor and his civilian counterpart in the area of housing and the need for a workable system of collective bargaining.

The individual is often neglected in favor of the collective group in the present military situation. This undoubtedly causes some men to seek their necessary recognition in the industrial environment. Non-material inducements, such as prestige, opportunities for distinction, pride in workmanship, association, loyalty, patriotism, and a sense of adequacy are much more important than material rewards in the development of organizations. The key to higher retention seems to lie in the professionalization of the system and in the leaders who will manage this professional system.

Nations, like individuals, develop unique

personalities. The national personality of this country is unified geographically and spiritually by what is variously called the American "Dream", the American "Tradition" or the American "Way of Life". As a nation, too, it has managed to work out a series of more or less successful adjustment mechanisms to bridge the gap between reality and the dream. Objective self-appraisal is just as difficult for a nation as for an individual, perhaps even more so. In this complex, interacting society, individuals can become so deeply involved and dependent on things and people around them that they seldom are forced to look at themselves as a nation. Consequently, there is a natural tendency for each individual to believe that human nature is the way he behaves and that others see things the way that he sees them. This, of course, is a form of projection in which all individuals and nations indulge. People tend to fall into the comfortable assumption that their way of doing things is the only way and that anyone with other ideas is to be pitied for his ignorance.

This same assumption holds true for social, political, religious, or even military organizations.

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VITA

William Robert Brandt

Candidate for the Degree of
Master of Science

Thesis: AN ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT IN A PROFESSIONAL
MILITARY SYSTEM

Major Field: Industrial Engineering and Management

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Fitchburg, Massachusetts,
May 8, 1942, the son of Leo J. and Hilja M.
Brandt.

Education: Attended Grays Harbor College, Aberdeen
Washington, Eastern Washington State College,
Cheney, Washington; received the Bachelor of
Science degree from the Oklahoma State Univer-
sity, with a major in Industrial Engineering and
Management, in January 1967; completed require-
ments for the Master of Science degree, with a
major in Industrial Engineering and Management,
in May 1968.

Professional Organizations: A member of Alpha Pi Mu,
Industrial Engineering Honorary Fraternity, and
the American Institute of Industrial Engineers.

Professional Experience: Entered the United States
Air Force in 1960. Worked as an Electronics
Warfare Technician prior to entering the Okla-
homa State University as an Air Force Institute
of Technology student; currently holds the rank
of Second Lieutenant.