HUMAN NATURE AND EDUCATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN ARISTOTLE, CONFUCIUS, AND JOHN DEWEY

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

There is no question that man can influence his environment and that man can be shaped by environmental variables. Man has an exceptional ability to adjust to a variety of environmental conditions and to modify the environment and bring it more nearly into accord with his needs and conceptions. This ability is manifested in the power to abstract and generalize and has raised practical skills to the level of scientific technology. That is why, in the early twentieth century, technology has appeared as the most potent force in the environment.

Technology became a watchword in the early twentieth century, and eventually it came to define civilization. To be civilized is to be technological; to be a developed nation is to be a technological nation; to lack technology is to be behind, to be underdeveloped. Technology is especially regarded as the key to solve the basic problems, whatever they are, facing our society. Many people seem to think that there is no need for further thought over and above technological development.

On the other hand, it has not been realized what problems might occur in an exclusively technological culture. Early in this century, educators advocated reorganizing education to produce individuals able to "man" the machines of the industrial society. Under these

circumstances, tests generally do not measure an ability to think or to solve problems, but measure only the ability to remember facts and to perform behavioral tasks. Under this kind of education, even though technically excellent radio programs can be tuned in, some people may not know how to listen thoughtfully and critically. Edgar Dale implies this as follows:

> The trained worker may be technically literate but aesthetically, economically, and politically illiterate in the sense that he lacks thoughtfulness, futuremindedness, and a deep concern about the way society is moving.[1]

In other words, in the early twentieth century education emphasized too much the process of problem-solving for the sake of techniques. There is an interesting story which tells something about the condition in our times.[2] There was once a man who discovered his shadow. Because the shadow followed him so faithfully, he decided that it must be his servant. But gradually, he began to believe that he was imitating the shadow. Finally, the man became, in effect, "the shadow of his shadow." The story tells us that man is constantly struggling to understand himself and the relation between this self and its many images. It also tells us that man has lost sight of himself and has lost his direction. In other words, man has become a tool for technological society. He is almost entirely directed by machines. Our age is going in a peculiarly troubled way. Man sees the ability of human power advance and move, while he is supposed to fit to environmental variables.

Is man the creator of the roles he plays, or is he reduced to be the image of his image? Needless to say, the crucial problem for today's education is not technological. Today's education does prepare people for the machines of technology. Nevertheless, contemporary man has become what is indicated by John M. Rich in his book, Education and

Human Values:

> Contemporary man derives his values from the group; he has few independent beliefs or convictions; the average or 'normal' person has little idea of who he is or where he is going.[3]

In other words, man in a technological culture has lost sight of "who he really is," and "where he is going." He has also lost certain convictions about himself. Such a man can be called "dehumanized." Dehumanization is an outcome of technological culture in a modern society. How did this come about? It resulted from man's ignoring his true "human nature."

What solution to the problem of dehumanization is there? Strictly speaking, one solution is to let man have independent beliefs about himself and an idea of who he is or where he is going. How can this be accomplished? Through education. This is a new role of education in a modern society. Because of such circumstances, not only the methodology but the aim of education needs to be revolutionized. How? Education should emphasize techniques for the sake of using them for understanding "human nature," that is, education should be concerned with human nature. Education should stand for the rediscovery of human nature which can be manifested in human life.

Contemporary man has to be educated in a way different from what is customary in order to restore his independent belief or conviction, and in order for him to know "who he is" and "where he is going." To attain these goals, how should man be educated? "Developing the powers of the individual" is a cliche in statements of present educational aims rather than an adequate answer to this question. What does it mean to speak of human nature? What is the peculiar nature of man which

distinguishes him from all other creatures? Everyone has attempted to say, but no one has been, in fact, satisfied with each other's answer. Speculation and conjecture have been the rule and continue to be until today. Does it make sense to talk about human nature?

This study reveals that there are in history several strong beliefs about "what man is," intrinsically, prior to any accounting of what man has achieved or received. Because education, in the present author's view, has to do with values in action, this study will seek to determine whether or not the idea of "the intrinsic worth of the individual (the sanctity of the individual)" can be identified strongly enough to be a guiding principle in educational theory and practice.

Justification of the Study

Concern about man is important not only to philosophers but to everyone who seeks to make sense of his life and to direct his activities into the most significant channels. While man can be influenced by environmental variables, our understanding of human life in society can also be altered through investigating human nature. That is why knowledge about human beings has been spread today through cultural anthropology, psychology, and sociology in the sense of the actual behavior of human beings, and why some allied fields of study, such as ethics and existentialism, continue to influence by their respective aspects "what man is" and "what man does," in the sense of the understanding of human nature.

Among the prophets of technology there are some dissenting voices: rather than equating technology with civilization, some have said that the more technological we become, the closer we may be moving to the

spiritual destruction or the actual extinction of man. What does "spiritual destruction" mean? It can be defined as "a dehumanized person (alienated person)." Dehumanization has been defined as "transfer of ownership to another."[4] In Paul Tillich's interpretation[5] "alienation" is used as a term of disparity between man's actual (existential) condition and his essential nature. This sort of "dehumanized person" has been described in the statement of John M. Rich: a person who has little idea of who he is or where he is going.[6] According to Arthur W. Chickering,[7] the dilemma for many, especially young adults, is not just "who am I?" but "who am I going to be?"; not just "where am I?" but "where am I going?". These problems of dehumanization will be dealt with in the thesis: the self-identity crisis; having few independent beliefs; and the general meaninglessness of life. As pointed out by Chickering, many young adults are all dressed up, and do not know where to go; they have energy, but no destination. Such problems will be examined as the first topic in this thesis.

How may the problem of dehumanization be solved? Some alternative suggestions may be noted: Erich Fromm's method emphasizes love, intelligence and courage;[8] Paul Tillich's Christian way emphasizes changing "anxiety of alienation" into "courage to be" through the person of Jesus as Christ;[9] Karl Marx's classless society surpasses class consciousness.[10] In order to gain insight into ways of addressing the problem of dehumanization here, however, the following questions will be dealt with in this thesis: What is "human nature"? What is the nature of the person?, that is, how do we conceive of the phenomena of our living? On the basis of these questions, the thesis will address the problem of human nature and its relation to the phenomena of our living.

The phrase "human nature" has both an empirical and a normative sense. "Human nature," in its empirical sense, means something which is innate to the human being; in its normative sense it means something which ought to be as a quality or characteristic of man--virtue. Virtue is not something underlying human nature, but a way of living (the art of living). In other words, "knowing human nature" and "the art of living (virtue)" can give answers to the question of "who am I going to be?" and "where am I going?" How? Through the process of becoming a person (education). As far as a human being is concerned, "knowing" human nature cannot be separated from "living" in a society and from "becoming a person." Knowing, living, and becoming should be put into one task as a whole. These three elements are interrelated and influenced through each other as a whole. Through the unification of these elements, the value of a person can be recognized in a society.

Previous Work on These Problems

Every age has its key ethical notion around which it can best formulate the cluster of its basic problems. For instance, "duty," systematized by Kant, summarized the meaning of life in the Prussian bureaucratic and pietistic society; "peace," the basic longing of Hobbes, was promoted as the key which could challenge the arbitrary rule of a landed aristocracy. Today, the notion of "alienation"[11] might be used to summarize the present situation.

Some studies on human nature and its phenomena of living have been done by some philosophers such as Olaf Stapledon, Erich Fromm, B. F. Skinner, Paul Tillich, and Lawrence Kohlberg.

The general map of human nature has been sketched by Stapledon.[12] Man, according to him, is limited, but has an important uniqueness, although he is at bottom identical with the beasts. The uniqueness of a man is moral experience. Some of man's powers, e.g., "free intelligence," "community," "creative imagination," are developed in him to such an extent that they transform his whole experience and behavior into something essentially different from the other non-human beings. This something is moral experience. But Stapledon concluded his article by indicating that human nature strongly suggests a goal toward which it approximates but which it can never attain.

Man, according to Erich Fromm's writings, shares with other animals physiological needs which must be minimally satisfied for human survival. Yet even if these are satisfied, man is still affected by other needs. Fromm says:

> . . .inasmuch as man is human, the satisfaction of. . . instinctual needs is not sufficient to make him happy; they are not even sufficient to make him sane. The archimedic point of the specifically human dynamism lies in this uniqueness of the human situtation; the understanding of man's psyche must be based on the analysis of man's needs stemming from the conditions of his existence.[13]

What are these needs? The characteristics as described by Fromm are: relatedness, transcendence, rootedness, self-identity, and a frame of orientation and devotion. They are based on a psychoanalytic perspective on man.

On the basis of human nature, Fromm states that the procedure which promotes human nature is also more "real" and "alive" than that which promotes the concepts such as virtue or justice. Maximizing the quality of human existence is part of the "game" of survival. Ethical dispute hinges not on our assumption that survival is good but on what

kind of behavior contributes to it. Fromm thinks that society goes through a course of development analogous to the growth of the individual. The role of society for Fromm, therefore, has been emphasized in shaping the content of human consciousness which has a profound effect upon human character.

In Skinner's study of human nature, he begins by rejecting any traditional philosophies or religious approaches, and employs a positivistic methodology emphasizing the effects of environmental variables on human behaviors.[14] He aims at exhausting the explanatory power of external variables, rather than dwelling on the possible nature of man's inborn propensities.

He then proceeds with the methods of comparative psychology, the S-R paradigm of the behaviorist, as stated in Beyond Freedom and Dignity. He says,

> Human behavior does not depend upon the prior choice of any value. When a man jumps out of the way of an approaching car, we may say that he chooses life rather than death. But he does not jump because he has so chosen; he jumps because jumping is evoked by certain stimulating circumstances.[15]

Skinner insists that man does not have any hypothesis about the peculiar causal relationship between internal mental events and external behavioral events. What man is pleased to view as knowledge or understanding is nothing more than connections among traces of experiences. Man acts according to the reinforcing consequences of the way he acted before.

Refutation of Skinner ought not to be based on basic similarities between man and lower animals, but on a too restrictive concept of man's nature, which differs essentially from other animals. In areas of similarity which do not distort the basic essential nature of man,

Skinner's behavior modification can be employed as a method, but not the only method, for improving the learning process and for treating a man as an end in itself. It might be said that Skinner abandons the search for the causes of behavior in motives, will, and entelechy. Is man's part in making the environment only a mechanical reaction to what the environment has made of him? Is man not a creature who sometimes knows why he is doing what he is doing?

In Tillich's philosophy, man is seen as separated from God, who is conceived as the "ground of all being." Human nature is analyzed and expressed is existential terms and categories:[16] for instance, an immediate awareness; Being-in-the-world through awareness; a finite man; and the self-awareness of man as a finite being feeling anxiety. The significance of the finite being, the self-awareness of anxiety is expressed in the religious term "sin" and in the philosophical term "estrangement."

Is there any way to solve the problem of "sin"? This is Tillich's own theological answer to a philosophical question. This is the way through which the problem of estrangement can be solved: that is, only on the basis of the Christian revelation. Revelation is not by philosophical analysis, but it is "spoken to man" from beyond and not by man to himself. The source of man's courage and of the healing of his estrangement is the ground (God) of the ontological structure in which man and all other finite beings participate.

Every type of education for Tillich, therefore, is ultimately dependent upon the spiritual (religious) meaning which determines what its goals and method are to be. The educational method is also in a

certain sense epistemologically dependent. The positive content of the Christian faith, though not derivable from an analysis of the human situation, can be formulated in a way that will provide answers to the questions actually raised in man's contemporary self-analysis. This view, however, can be criticized on the ground that the gap between knowledge and action is not satisfactorily bridged.

Kohlberg's "cognitive-development" approach is concerned both with analyzing the thought structure underlying the moral concepts of individuals of varying ages, and also is concerned with investigating the individual's attempts to structure his social environment.[17] This approach aims not at producing mere conformity with the society or the teacher, but at developing capabilities in decision-making and problem-solving.

The stimulation of cognitive capacities has been encouraged by Kohlberg through his famous cognitive-development stage theory of moralization[18] for moral education. What is moral education for him? It is defined in one place as "the encouragement of the capacity for principled moral judgment and of the disposition to act in accordance with that capacity"[19]; in another place he states that "the goal of moral education is the stimulation of the 'natural' development of the individual child's own moral judgment to control his behavior."[20]

Another more specific strand, however, attempts to set goals, methods, and tests for curriculum use. In an article entitled "Development as the Aim of Education,"[21] Kohlberg says that there have been three broad streams in the development of Western educational ideology: Romanticism, Cultural Transmission and Progressivism. Romanticism holds what comes from within the child; Cultural Transmission puts its emphasis

on the view that educating consists of transmitting knowledge, skills, and social and moral rules of the culture. As an educational ideology, progressivism holds that education should nourish the child's natural interaction with a developing society or environment.

Among these three aspects of educational objectives, Kohlberg maintains that only progressivism provides an adequate basis for a higher level or stage of development in the process of education. He states its reason as follows:

> The progressive educator stresses the essential links between cognitive and moral development; he assumes that moral development is not purely affective, and that cognitive development is a necessary though not sufficient condition for moral development. . . . The progressive also points out that moral development arises from social interaction in situations of social conflict. Morality is neither the internalization of established cultural values nor the unfolding of spontaneous impulses and emotions; it is justice, the reciprocity between the individual and others in his social environment.[22]

He then concludes that the aim of education should be progressivism with its cognitive-developmental psychology, its interactionist epistemology, and its philosophically examined ethics.

Kohlberg, however, seems to put his emphasis only on the role of reason in making decisions. On the basis of the cognitive-developmental theory of morality, we can see that the place of "habit" is rejected by Kohlberg. He believes that the aim of moral education should not be to instill in the individual various habits but rather to facilitate the individual's pattern of thought between stages of moral development.

What makes a human being to be a (morally) valuable being? It is, at first, necessary to infer within the substantial makeup of the human being a factor completely absent from the makeup of other animals. Through that factor a man can be a being who is the subject of inviolable

rights that are to be recognized and protected by society. It is, then, necessary for man to live well by exercising the essential human factor theoretically as well as practically. Through the combination of these two aspects, a human being can be, finally, made to be a being of moral worth. There have been some philosophers who have attempted to advance some views that would help us to get answers to those problems: Aristotle, Confucius, and John Dewey.

Aristotle in his "Nichomachean Ethics" argues that man has a special function different from non-human beings, and that the function relates to the actions in which the human nature finds its expressions. Confucius attempts to offer a philosophical reconstruction of reasonable action and its relation to moral arguments. Confucius introduces us to a schematic map of various validity-factors in terms of the spirit of the doctrine of rectifying names. John Dewey argues that an adequate ethical theory of self-realization requires for its completion the specification of what man's nature is, toward what ends he should progress, and what pattern of inter-relationships exists among these ends.

Aristotle's thought is very well known internationally; Dewey has been one of the most influential recent American thinkers in philosophy and education; and Confucius is the most significant, influential philosopher in Oriental societies and has begun to be known to Western thinkers. These three philosophers have developed their own thought with unique emphases on the above problems.

William K. Frankena[23] has done a comparative study of educational theories in Aristotle, Kant and Dewey. The primary purpose of this book, as indicated by the author, is to give the reader an opportunity

to look long and deeply into three rather different historical philosophies of education and thus to learn some account of their origins and influences. This study presents the historically important types of educational philosophy through comparisons on three basic questions: views about dispositions, aims of education, and methods for education.

A study on Confucius and Socrates is presented by M. Cohen in an article entitled "Confucius and Socrates."[24] Confucius and Socrates, according to Cohen's view, lived in similar times and had comparable views. Their activities were practical and reformist, not theoretical--a genuine choice in each case. But their lives and work generated philosophical traditions which are still alive, practically as well as theoretically.

Nothing, however, has been done yet on the comparative study of the problem noted above between Oriental and Occidental views as these are represented in the thought and works of Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey. According to George Dykhuizen,[25] one of the most important influences in Dewey's thinking is reflected in his constant reference to ancient Greek philosophy, especially that of Aristotle, and his use of Greek philosophy in formulating some of his own theories. John Dewey found in Greek philosophy insights and approaches that enabled him to escape the assumptions and methods of modern science and philosophy. This means, as John H. Randall, Jr. remarked, that "Dewey is not inside the classic tradition looking out, but stands outside it, looking in. . . ."[26] Methods in the Western world emphasize experience, the highly developed scientific method, and the historical or evolutionary view of truth and morality. According to Hu Shih, however,

> These methods of the West are not totally alien to the Chinese mind, and on the contrary, they are the instruments by means of which and in the light of which much of the lost treasures of Chinese philosophy can be recovered.[27]

This similarity has been indicated by John Dewey as follows: "Some of the elements in Western cultures and Eastern cultures are so closely allied that the problem of 'synthesizing' them does not exist when they are taken in isolation."[28]

Even though they come from different cultural backgrounds, these philosophers (Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey) have asked some common questions, each with some degree of originality: "What is human nature?"; "How can knowing about human nature be connected to human conduct?"; "How can the theory be applied to practice?". They seem to be concerned with the essence of ultimate human nature, such a concern defining the metaphysical quest; they are concerned with formulating the nature of ultimate reality in a systematic way. Aristotle has been described as "the first person to approach the study of human beings in an objective and systematic way."[29] In the field of ethics and social philosophy, there is probably more fundamental agreement between them: the verities about human nature (metaphysics) determined what rule of conduct should be observed (ethics); in all ethical systems, a close relationship between ethical and metaphysical theory is recognized. The good life must at least be in accord with the nature of things. Through discussing the problems of "human nature," and "the phenomena of living," this thesis attempts to bring about the ultimate objective for a "substantial synthesis of East and West," as already suggested by Dewey.[30]

Proposed Methodology of the Study

The following approach will be used in this thesis: (1) an effort will be made to define some of the basic philosophical postulates and beliefs which may have entered into the development of the psychology pervading the thought of each of the philosophers to be studied (Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey); (2) an analysis will be presented of their concepts of original human nature and its workings (virtue); and (3) their views on human educability will be examined in order to relate them to their concepts of human nature.

In order to analyze, understand, and evaluate their notions on the relation between human nature and virtue, their views on "the good life for man" will be emphasized. It will be hypothesized that their views on the good life for man will manifest the same fundamental meaning of moral wisdom: moral virtue and practical wisdom are the same in Aristotle; moral psychology and Jen are the same in Confucius; experience and practical judgment are the same in Dewey.

This hypothesis consists of the following specific points: the (moral) good life for man is not only intellectual but is also practical. While it is important to know the essence of human nature, and to recognize human living as the manifestation of a philosophic mind, it is more important for man to adjust himself to principle by practice. It is not enough to know what the doctrine of the golden mean is; the doctrine of the mean should be applied to concrete circumstances by practice. This suggests that the art of living can be improved, and learning by practice is the means of developing the art of living in order to become a wise man (an educated man). "Learning" here is more

than something acquired through a formal process in a social institution. There must be a personal relationship between two distinct human beings--learner and teacher. Because of this, teaching another human being cannot be compared with lighting a stick of wood or inducing a chemical reaction. "To learn" means to learn how to think and to act. This should be a prime outcome of the educational process as such--the thinking man who contemplates the truth and then communicates it. These two aspects of life, it will be argued, are continuous and unified, rather than disjointed, because activity is merely an extension and fulfillment of contemplation. The conclusion to be demonstrated is that the good life for man can be derived from and based on the essential characteristic of human nature (rationality), and should be practiced by means of the principle of rectification (learning by practice) based on reason.

This study, then, will (1) analyse selected writings of Aristotle, Confucius, and Dewey in order to discover their views on the relation between human nature and virtue; and (2) point out and clarify their recommendations concerning the "good life" for man through the educational implications of their views on human nature and virtue.

ENDNOTES

[1]Edgar Dale, Building a Learning Environment (Bloomington, 1972), p. 20.

[2]Gordon E. W. Wolstenholme, ed., Man and His Future (Boston, 1963), p. 288.

[3]John M. Rich, Education and Human Values (Menlo Parks, Calif., 1968), p. 78.

[4]Richard Schacht, Alienation (Garden City, N. Y., 1971), p. 10.

[5]Paul Tillich, "The Person in a Technical Society" in Christian Faith and Social Action, ed., John A. Hutchison (New York, 1953), pp. 137-153.

[6]John M. Rich, op. cit., p. 78.

[7]Arthur W. Chickering, Education and Identity (San Francisco, 1974), pp. 15-16.

[8]Erich Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion (New York, 1963), pp. 45-66.

[9]Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven, 1952), Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II (Chicago, 1957, pp. 66-75.

[10]Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," "Alienation and Social Classes," "Manifesto of the Communist Party." These articles are contained in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed., Robert C. Tucker (New York, 1972), pp. 52-103, pp. 104-106, pp. 331-359.

[11]More detailed explanations of the concept of "alienation" will be found in Chapter II.

[12]Olaf Stapledon, "Sketch-Map of Human Nature," Philosophy, Vol. XVII, No. 67 (July 1942), pp. 210-230.

[13]Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (New York, 1955), p. 32.

[14]B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Nature (New York, 1965).

[15]B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York, 1972), p. 58.

[16]Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II (Chicago, 1957), pp. 66-75.

[17]Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. LVI, No. 10 (June 1975), pp. 670-677, Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Development and the New Social Science," Social Science (May 1973), pp. 14-15.

[18]Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Child as a Moral Philosopher," Psychology Today, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Sept. 1968), pp. 25-30.

[19]Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages in Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education," Moral Education, ed., Clive Beck and Edmond V. Sullivan (Toronto, 1970), p. 41.

[20]Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Education, Religious Education, and the Public Schools: A Developmental View," Religion and Public Education, ed., T. Sizer (Boston, 1967), p. 183.

[21]Lawrence Kohlberg and Rochelle Mayer, "Development as the Aim of Education," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Nov. 1972), pp. 449-496.

[22]Ibid., p. 455.

[23]William K. Frankena, Three Historical Philosophies of Education: Aristotle, Kant, Dewey (Chicago, 1965).

[24]Maurice Cohen, "Confucius and Socrates," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 3 (March 1976), pp. 159-168.

[25]George Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey (Carbondale, 1973), p. 209.

[26]John H. Randall, Jr., "John Dewey, 1859-1952," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Jan. 1953), pp. 5-13.

[27]Hu Shih, The Development of the Logical Methods in Ancient China (New York, 1963), p. ix.

[28]John Dewey, "On Philosophical Synthesis," Philosophy: East and West, Vol. I, No. 1 (April 1951), p. 3.

[29]R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development (London, 1974), p. 48.

[30]John Dewey, op. cit., p. 3.

CHAPTER II

THE DEHUMANIZATION--A PROBLEM FOR CONTEMPORARY MAN

The impact of scientific knowledge and of technological innovation upon society has been the main factor in the twentieth century social change. Economic goals and technological development assure a basic importance to this continued growth-model of the future. The increase in scientific knowledge and the technological advances of recent years have been instrumental in bringing about the new conditions which affect us educationally. But this continued growth with the technological development characterizes a society by a rapid rate of change in its quantitative dimensions more than in its qualitative dimensions. The tempo of change in the social order is so rapid that one never expects to see a constant which is unchangeable in reality so far as the things themselves are concerned. All real things are variables; they are passing events. A person is also variable in that sense, and he is a passing event exhibiting a pattern of behavior. The pattern of behavior involves a plan, an organization; and also the capacity to react to a variety of situations.

This approach seems to have given rise to new problems of an acute form: It does not specify what the precise content of the "quality of life" is for most people. In other words, the peculiar problem of our age is that the same achievements that have been developed in our own

powers have also threatened human personal being and integrity. What is the real problem? The science that elevates man's capacities also degrades him by turning him into an object for research and manipulation. The industrial technology that raises the economic standard of living also seems increasingly to make human personality unnecessary as a basis of human evaluation. What is meant by such an expression? Nikolai Berdyaev answers: "The machine dehumanizes human life. Man, desiring no longer to be the image of God, becomes the image of the machine."[1] The present has been described as a technological age and consequently as the age of dehumanization. Dehumanization here means that mankind becomes alienated by losing the basis of supposed human dignity. What has been seriously taking place in the world today is "not a crisis of humanism, but the crisis of humanity."[2] This crisis is the crisis of alienation.

What is alienation (dehumanization)? Some definitions are given in a major unabridged dictionary.[3] It, first, denotes alienation as a "conveyance of property to another party," and second, relates the term to the "estrangement of a person" or of his affections, and third, defines it as "mental derangement." Kurt Lang defines alienation as "an estrangement or separation between parts or the whole of the personality and significant aspects of the world of experience."[4] He describes the term in its reference to (1) objective states, (2) states of feeling which accompany alienation, and (3) motivational states tending toward estrangement. In these latter states, separation is possible between self and the objective world, self and factors within the self, and finally, between self and the complete self. George Lichtheim[5] has described the concept of alienation as a basic ontological theme in

Western culture stemming from a Neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation. Through this doctrine, finite, existent beings are depicted as creations springing from some ultimate source. He traces the fusion of this concept with early Christian interpretations of creation.

The above situations of alienation[6] apply equally to the three following contemporary circumstances. (1) Alienation as separation describes the process or state whereby two or more entities become distinguished; for example, Tillich's distinction between the essential and the existential entity. (2) Alienation as transfer is closer to the meaning of transfer of property or of right belonging to an individual over others, that is to say, the machine, or masses. This point was shown by Marx:

> The external character of labour for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but another.[7]

(3) Alienation as objectivity suggests its source in being aroused by the basic, subjective "awareness of others". Here, man's capacity to perceive "the other" as discrete from himself is identified as the basis of alienation; for example, Fromm uses the term "alienation" to characterize certain possible relations of a person to his own self, other men, and nature. Alienation from oneself in Fromm[8] consists of something like the loss or lack of "a sense of self-identity." There is consequently no unique individual entity. Man's alienation from his nature means "making man a slave of his nature." His nature here means a natural environment, and the world of physical objects. Man's alienation from "others" especially means two things: "distinctness from others," which means "separated from all others;" "relatedness to

others," which means "using others as a means."

In much current writing connected with this term "alienation," distinctions often are not made among the above three meanings. Although admitting a broad meaning of alienation as separation, the word "alienation" is used to express "negative aspects (pessimism, despair, hostility)" presented in any circumstances. Robert Blauner points this out as follows:

> Alienation exists when workers (human beings) are unable to control their immediate work processes, to develop a sense of purposes and function. . ., to belong to integrated industrial communities, and to become involved in the activity of work as a mode of personal self-expression.[9]

The various shades of meaning involved in the word "alienation," have also been introduced through an operational description of its meaning and uses within particular disciplines. For instance, in the discipline of Biblical interpretation, Genesis in the Bible is a story of separation--creation and the fall; man is seen as not only separated from God but also as separated from meaningful experience with other men, institutions, Nature and even himself.

There is again a very strong tendency to identify alienation as a post-industrial phenomenon for human beings in the technological society. Through industrial progress, men as individuals have actively and passively been cut off from significance, meaning, and power. Some social scientists have tried in recent years to define this dimension of alienation. Melvin Seeman[10] distinguishes five variants in alienation--powerlessness (the perceived lack of freedom), the events in which one is engaged, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement. R. Blauner[11] in Alienation and Freedom clarifies the idea through four ways: powerlessness (modes of freedom and control in industry), meaninglessness

(purpose and function in manual work), social alienation (integration and memberships in industrial communities), and self-estrangement. Lewis Feuer[12] divides the phenomena of alienation somewhat differently listing the following modes: the alienation of class society, the alienation of competitive society, the alienation of industrial society, the alienation of man's society, the alienation of race, and the alienation of the generation. M. B. Scott[13] describes alienation in regard to its sources as a series of deficiencies: lack of commitment of values, absence of conformity to norms, loss of responsibility in roles, and deficiency in control of facilities.

The chief perspective in the theory of alienation traditionally has been sociological or perhaps socio-psychological. But through a more philosophical-ethical approach, it will become clear that the problem of alienation is also crucial in relation to a personal value-system as well as to a sociological theory. As already stated by John M. Rich, contemporary man has few independent beliefs and convictions about his own self, and such a man does not even know "who he is" or "where he is going." Such a human being might cease to be, as Berdyaev says, "a being with a spiritual center, retaining his inner continuity and his unity."[14] The alienated man, described by Berdyaev,[15] refuses to consider every man as of real value, as the likeness and image of God. An "alienated" man has energy in himself, but no destination, and thus does not know where to go. The "alienated" are those people who have been excluded or who have excluded themselves: the escapists, nihilists and self-destroyers. The "alienated" can easily fall prey to self-identity crises, social alienation and meaninglessness.

How may the problem of alienation (dehumanization) be solved? For some alternative solutions, I would like to examine, first, through a philosophical-ethical approach, situations which have been described as phenomena of the "alienated," and then I will observe through the philosophical writings of Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey that personal autonomy, responsibility, social connection with others, and self-actualization should be positively recognized as the dignity of the human individual in order that he not be dehumanized.

The Self-identity Crisis

The first attempt to understand the concept of "alienation" in a philosophical-ethical approach can be accomplished by means of an examination of the concept of "self-identity." The Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definition of "identity": "the quality or condition of being the same in substance, nature, and properties." "Identity" refers to the self or the person one feels oneself to be; the same entity through time and space. The entity means, according to W. E. May, "the subject of inalienable rights that are to be recognized by other entities capable of recognizing rights and that demand legal protection by society."[16] A. C. Paranjpe states the concept of self-identity as follows: "Identity accounts for the unity, self-sameness, and continuity of the personality, and for the shared sameness and solidarity of the individual with his community."[17] Self-identity can mean something unique and irreplaceable in a person: A is A, and A is not non-A (the principle of identity). Here I do not mean to analyze the logical proposition or the mind-body theory; instead I am interested in how to characterize the definite, fixed,

circumscribed personality. I do not mean an observed scientific or even explicit aspect. but I am describing an implicit concept, which remains permanent or unchanging in the sense that we say it is the same individual.

I think that human beings are the unity, self-sameness, and continuity of personality, no matter what happens externally to them. The self-sameness which is valuable, precious and irreplaceable makes a human being valuable. This self-identity makes "a human being to be a person or a meaningfully human existent (a being of moral worth),"[18] which means a being of inherent dignity and incomparable value. On the basis of this self-identity, a human being can be a subject of moral rights, and a subject of protectable rights.

Man is also an integral working part of the world of technology. His goals and desires are not only to manage his environment, but also his mind becomes one of the tools and forces he uses both to construct and to operate other tools. In other words, man is a determining or a determined part of technology. The characteristics of the technological society have been well described in A. Toffler's writing.[19] Among some features are the reliance on complex mechanical and electronic devices and on technical process; the substitution of technical organization for interpersonal relationship; emphasis on utility as a measure of individual worth by deemphasizing personal characteristics. Some people discover themselves less useful and more trouble than the machines that replace them. Replaceable skills rather than irreplaceable personality are more useful for the society. Technology refers to the complex of physical objects and technical operations (both manual and machine), but it also includes the technical "know-how" and mechanical skills involved

in production. Much work in technology is done by man's skill. For modern cultures, the definition of what a man is depends in part on the stage of technological development. What a man can do in a technological context determines what he is.

In this circumstance, "social roles" in a social organization can be substituted for "personality." Everything that a person is involved with becomes and constitutes the characteristics of the person. William James pointed this out by saying, "In its widest possible sense . . .a man's self is the sum total of all that he can call himself, not only his body, his psychic powers, but his clothes, and his house . . . ."[20] The concept of identity has apparently become obsolete in a technological/technocratic society. This seems to have come about through the following common practices. We establish our identity by showing a driver's license or some document which tells about us. This paper-identity has been substituted for something fixed and definite in the present society.[21] Or, we establish our identity by showing something concerning physical needs, clarification of sexual identification, of sex-appropriate roles and behavior.[22] However, this paper-identity or clarification of physical needs, and sex-appropriate roles and behavior do not answer the question who this person really is as a person. Both a driver's license and physical needs tend to confirm that persons do not really know who they are, what they want to be, or how they feel about other people. That is why the situation of the alienated person has been stated as follows:

> Many young adults are all dressed up and don't know where to go; they have energy but no destination. The dilemma is not just 'who am I?' but 'who am I going to be?'; not just 'where am I?' but 'where am I going?'.[23]

> A person is powerless when he is an object controlled and manipulated by other persons or by an impersonal system (such as technology), and when he cannot assert himself as a subject to change or modify this domination.[24]

Loss of self-identity means lack of direction and control in life. Lack of direction and control in life makes man powerless and subject to control and domination by others because such a man has already lost his subjectivity. Loss of self-identity creates an alienated person who is directed or dominated, rather than one who is self-directing.

What is the solution to the crisis of self-identity? That is to say, how shall we characterize the persistence of a person through time and space? It is necessary to establish a definite, fixed identity--to recover a being of inherent dignity and incomparable value. The establishment of a self-identity means to restore self-directing, which means direction and control in life. How can we characterize this self-identity? William E. May states it as follows:

> It is intelligible to maintain. . .that every being, every entity, is a bearer of rights in a significant sense; everything that is is a bearer of what might be termed ontic rights. These rights, of course, can be recognized and articulated only by special sorts of entities, namely those capable of intellectual knowledge, and they impose moral obligations only on these kind of entities.[25]

What is the ontic property for the self-identity in a human being? It is the "nous" of Aristotle, "Jen" (mind) of Confucius, and "intelligence" of Dewey. These three terms constitute and characterize the definite, fixed, circumscribed personality. They make a human being's value by distinguishing him from all other beings. A human being in Aristotle is a substance with a distinctive kind of soul, namely, an intellectual or rational soul. Confucius is acutely aware of the intrinsic worth of human actions by maintaining that human nature is

good. What distinguishes man from other animals, Dewey thinks, is the fact that man has the ability to engage in reflective thought and to solve complex problems. He insists that man has a mind because he has previously evolved a social potential. He describes it as follows:

> Mind is, so to speak, structural, substantial; a constant background and foreground; perceptive consciousness in process, a series of heres and nows. Mind is a constant luminosity; consciousness intermittent, a series of flashes of varying intensities.[26]

The principle immanent in human beings, an ontic property (rights), makes them to be what and who they are.

The persistence of a person can be changed into the existential subject of a person. This existential subjective person can be characterized as "the morally autonomous person." What are the characteristics of the morally autonomous person? John Rich indicates, "The morally autonomous person characteristically finds the locus of evaluation within himself, assumes responsibility for his acts, and is self-governing as he strives for freedom and mastery."[27] The autonomous person is one in whom the locus of evaluation lies within himself rather than within the rules of society. To be autonomous means to develop morally the thinking ability as an individual rather than to follow the social rules, the public principles. Rich states further that the morally autonomous person in Education and Human Values ". . .would find that the locus of evaluation lies within himself, and be inclined to appraise his actions on the basis of a consistent set of principles."[28] The existential subjective person is the morally autonomous person with freedom and control. Freedom is the state which allows a person to remove himself from those dominating situations that make him simply a reacting object. Control is more positive, suggesting the assertion of the self-directing

subject. What is required for a morally grown person would be a "morale making" mastering of living,[29] rather than the inability to function meaningfully. A human being who has a morale-making mastery can put his own value system into practice. As self-mastery, autonomy is a person's propensity to conform his behavior to his decisions about what to do. This is the goal that would change the situation of the alienated man and would restore his sense of self-identity.

Having Few Independent Beliefs

The second reason for understanding the concept of alienation can be explained in the social relationships of one person to another. For a human being to become a moral agent, it is necessary to exist within an environment that includes other human beings and their culture. Personality and society are separate, but interdependent and interpenetrating systems. Personality develops and exists in the context of, and in relation to, the personalities of others. An individual personality in this context has to be evaluated highly in regard to membership in the human species. May states its significance as follows:

> . . .the reason why a human being is a being of moral worth is rooted in his membership in the human species. . . . The thesis advanced here, moreover, holds that the ultimate reason why a human being can become a personal subject is rooted in his being human to begin with and is identical with what makes a human being to be a being of moral worth.[30]

A person ought to be valued as a participant in a meaningful heritage and community. The idea of society is, therefore, clearly an idea which assumes that the proper state of man is one in which he is closely bound up with his fellows in intimate and significant relationships. More specifically, his fellows are not instruments to be used

as means toward other ends, but are whole beings recognized as valuable because they are deserving of the respect and dignity reserved for one's self. The denial of determination over one's own human qualities, that is, to use another, is to impose a condition of alienation upon him.

In the contemporary technological society there seems to be something amiss when a person, through a social structure, is denied a feeling of integrity including the possession of his own soul and the ultimate determination over his physical being. He does not seem to determine what he shall do with himself as a physical being. What he does as a social being, is even more pervasively controlled by the community. This involves the struggle of social alienation. The fundamental problem in this kind of alienation is not simply man's internal mental life, but his relationships with others. What causes a human being to become alienated in the contemporary society? R. Blauner states its causes as follows:

> An industrial community also has a structure of norms, informal and formal rules, which guide the behavior of its members. . . . And the bureaucratic principle of the rational utilization of all resources to maximize organizational goals furthers the tendency to view employees as labor, as means to the ends of profit and company growth.[31]

Main factors in social alienation are a structure of norms for the social community, and the organization to make more production through using people.

Loss of self-identity goes together with alienation in a community. In the present, the processes that characterize life in industrial societies ultimately lead to alienation in all spheres of life. In The Sane Society, Fromm states the situation of alienation as follows:

> By alienation is meant a mode of experience in which the person experiences as an alien. He has become, one might say, estranged from himself. He does not experience himself as the center of his world, as the creator of his own acts--but his acts and their consequences have become his masters, whom he obeys, or whom he may even worship. The alienated person is out of touch with himself as he is out of reach with any person. He, like the others, is experienced as things are experienced; with the sense and with common sense, but at the same time without being related to oneself and to the world outside productively.[32]

The alienated can be characterized as one who experiences himself as other; someone who is powerless; someone who does not even know what to do, where to go. Such a man has few independent beliefs about himself. For instance, Karl Marx suggested more than a century ago that the capitalist society alienates man from himself and other men. In his view, man, working within the capitalistic system, is deprived of control over the products which he creates with his labor. Human labor is thus "objectified" and turned into a mere commodity which destroys the essential quality of life (reason). As a result, man is "alienated," that is, separated from, and turned into an enemy of, himself and other men responsible for "exploiting" him. There are, thus, four forms of alienation: alienation of the worker from the process of his work; alienation of the worker from the product of his work; alienation of the worker from himself; and alienation of the worker from his fellows. In particular, the alienation of self-estrangement (loss of self-identity) is to be equated with the notion of "other-directedness" made famous by David Riesman.[33] The child, Riesman says, is conditioned to other-directedness when it learns that whatever it does must not be valued for itself, "but only for its effects on others." The "other-directedness" means that an individual's actions are guided by others and even his feelings are determined by a psychic radar that gives him

signals from the people around him. The person who is "other-directed" becomes self-estranged because he enjoys nothing for its own sake, and bases his behavior upon anticipated future rewards.

In this view alienation implies some kind of separation of man from other men in a sense of isolation, loneliness, or lack of personal relationship with a community of people. Nearly every formulation of the concept implies alienation as some kind of pathology and not as a healthy state of human existence. This is the contrary of the view that the personality system, in a normal state of identity, must be integrated into, or work in harmony with, the broader social systems.

How can we handle the problem of the reconciliation between the two--individuality and the whole (society)? What is the best way for man to experience himself as the center of his world? The best way to avoid social alienation is for the person to bring about changes in the objective circumstances in which the person finds himself, i.e., in the social structure, in order to bring about a more meaningful subjective experience. What kinds of changes are necessary for this struggle? I would like to present two methods; to examine the way of a person's social life and its relation to human nature; to examine the relation between an individual person and the society (community).

I have observed that a man can be the subject of ontic rights that are to be recognized and protected by society. These ontic rights have been justified in the philosophical writings of three major philosophers: Aristotle, Confucius, and Dewey. It will be necessary, and can be possible, to examine the way of living in a society, and its relation to human nature in each of these three philosophers' views.

"Mind" in Dewey is not simply some static or permanent entity within a man but also a function of reflective behavior. Insofar as that behavior is intelligent or related to mind, the individual behavior is displaying or achieving mind. In other words, Dewey insists that mind can only be known by inference from the behavior that results. The individual can define himself by what he does. Dewey's most insightful remark about the mind is to say that grammatically it is best employed not as a noun but as a modifier.[34] He meant by this to make more than the simple observation that the mind is related to the various ways people behave. His assertion is intended to have the force of a manifesto.

Some similarities to Dewey can be discovered in Aristotle and Confucius. Aristotle says,

> There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of a possessing one and exercising thought.[35]

For Aristotle, a soul is a principle differentiating a human being from a non-human being. The way of human life is not in nature as an accidental setting, but as a prerequisite for human existence and as a basis for its development. About this position, Henry B. Veatch says:

> Such, then, is what it takes if as men we are to live wisely and intelligently, realizing that the perfection and function of human beings consists precisely in our bringing our rational knowledge and understanding to bear directly upon the course of our daily lives.[36]

For Confucius, the motives and intentions of human agents are of paramount significance in evaluating human actions. Confucius believes in the intrinsic worth of the action and its consequence with the motives (Jen) of the human being. He states it as follows: "Duke Ching of Chi

asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, 'Let the ruler be a ruler, the minister be a minister, the father be a father, and the son be a son'."[37] This means that a human action is the externalization of Jen. Human actions can be described morally as one dimension, which are integrated both inter- and intra-personally. Confucius asserts that following and cultivating Jen in all situations is the way of human life.

From the philosophical view of these three philosophers, it can be concluded that the proper way of living is self-expressive and self-actualizing for the human nature. On the basis of the ontic right, then, a person's activity cannot be a means to an end, but should be evaluated as the end in itself, which is actualizing the human nature.

Secondly, in order to solve the problem of the reconciliation between the two--individuality and the whole (society)--we have to examine the relation between an individual person and the society (community). If the community is said to be superior to the individual, obedience to the authority of the community would be right, critical thinking would not be allowed, and there would be no right to refuse sacrifice of the individual. On the other hand, when individuals are asserted to be superior to the community, the value of particular individuality can be recognized, but harmony in the community could be destroyed. What is the method by which reconciliation of these two aspects can be accomplished? The characteristics of a society based on interpersonal values have to be considered. The society here means an organization in which members can be recognized as an individual person, as a member seeking a common goal for mutual cooperation. Mutual cooperation has to be established in the concept of "the whole" beyond

you and me, rather than in the simple relation between you and me. This is similar to the following case: after two persons get married, they say, "we are. . . ." This "we are. . . ." is not just the simple connection between male and female, but should be interpreted as an interpersonal value through a new, higher dimension of experience. The society of persons, similarly, should be an organization of persons sharing some common concerns and interests. The society can persist as long as there is a continuity of purposeful cooperative behavior and an awareness of inter-relationships and inter-dependence among the individual members. Any society preserves its continuing existence and stability as a society for the reconciliation of the individual to the whole.

This reconciliation is not the relation of instrument to end, not a causal relation. The relation is not accomplished by blind obedience to the authority of the society, but can be established through personal, autonomous, free choice. This can be put in the formula: "I can do as I wish." This assertion includes not only the absence of compulsion or constraints, but also the special relationship existing between a man's self and the community (other people). After the individual is "subjectively" related to the society, the society (other people) can be thought of as <u>our</u> society; otherwise the society is simply the object of research. The subjectively related situation can be no longer an object of inquiry; it becomes a living energy capable of being revealed through the actions of the agent. On the other hand, when a man stands in objective relations with the community, he is an inquirer--a third person--not a participant in it. There is no commitment, or no

obligation to act in accordance with the community. The subjective relationship, however, is not established through any external compulsion, but is formed through "being morally free." Being morally free means I could have acted differently if the circumstances had been different. To be morally free or to act with moral freedom is to act with a personal commitment; it is not acting because of fear or punishment. To perform a morally free act is to act out of one's own moral convictions not because of threats and danger. In the objective relationship with society a man may act to avoid punishment, but in the subjective relationship the man can achieve his fulfillment with (through) the help of the society participated in as his agent-self. Through the subjective relationship with the society, the society is no longer strange to him, but becomes the situation of "we" including both the man and the society.

What is the best way for the alienated in an industrial community to extricate himself from his alienation? Such a man needs to bring about a more meaningful subjective experience through "being morally free." Experience through "being morally free" is based on an inherent sanctity of the human being and his personal commitment to the society through the way of living.

The General Meaninglessness of Life

Finally, inseparable from the problems of self-identity and of social alienation is the question of "meaning" in life. Even though the question "what is the meaning of life?" is notoriously vague and abstract, it is still an important question. An answer to the question depends on answers to two more distinct questions, as pointed out by

Paul Kurtz.[38] One may ask "Is life worthwhile?" or "Why ought I to live?". A second question is the quest for psychological stimulus and motivational appeal: Can people provide the substenance they seek on the desire for life? What is at issue here is whether we can find within life's experience its own reward.

The question, "Is life worthwhile?" or "Why ought I to live?" depends on whether one finds the life of meaningful activities or not. For the life of meaningful activities, the essential activity of education is the apprehension of significant meanings. This activity is not simply dependent on attending school for a knowledge, but also dependent on suggesting a knowledge which is helpful to the assessment of both actions and life styles. Education should be relevant to the question about the meaning of life. For instance, there is a difference between saying that two things are related and saying that something is relevant to something else. Consider the teacher who evaluates the student's essay. To do that, some of the norms have to be taken for granted: correct grammar, complete sentences. Other norms should be involved. That essay should have something to say, because a person's uttering something and meaning it occurs within the context of that person's attempting to communicate with others. In other words, a conversation between the teacher and the student can be carried on through the essay. Through the essay, the student can have a meaningful relation with the teacher. Otherwise, the student will lack understanding of the co-ordinated activity and a sense of purpose in his work. What is it that makes activities meaningful? Some people talk about satisfaction of basic needs. Our basic needs, according to Kurtz,[39] are of two dimensions: <u>biogenic</u>, that is, they have biological and psychological origins

and roots, and sociogenic, that is, they are made manifest in and are given through society and culture.

In the question of meaning of life, W. D. Joske[40] stipulates the significance of meaning in the following way: an activity is said to have "worth" if it has intrinsic merit; to have "point" if it is directed to the fulfillment of an end; it is not trivial if its point or purpose has sufficient worth to justify its performance; it is not futile if the world does not prevent the achievement of its end or point. If an action lacks all four elements (worth, point, aim, fruit) of the meaningful, it will be valueless or meaningless. What we want is a full life in which there is satisfaction, achievement, significance. The full life is related to the ideal of the full expression and further development of the individual's capacity for personality--or more accurately, for personality-in-community. The full life is not simply one of quiet contentment, but "the active display of my powers and of their development and expansion."[41] Through this activity, a human being can find his meaningful way of life in a society.

Loss of purpose or function in the way of living is meaninglessness which occurs when individual roles are perceived as lacking integration into the total system of goals of an organization. Some people lack understanding of co-ordinated activity and a sense of purpose in work and are thus alienated from self and from society. As such there is no meaning in their existence. In other words, individual roles may seem to lack meaningful connection with the whole structure. Like the hero in Albert Camus' The Stranger,[42] the individual does not feel anything related to anyone or anything at all. An existential

state like that of Camus' Stranger may be described as a feeling of "meaninglessness" or nothingness." This judgment of contemporary man has been confirmed by H. Richard Niebuhr in the following passage:

> Our situation is not one of conflict between great forces. It is better described as a situation of emptiness. Life for man becomes empty because it is without great purpose and great hopes and great commitments, without a sense of participation in great conflict of good and evil.[43]

The concept of meaninglessness is usually used to describe the failure to find certain circumstances which an individual feels should be available to him. It is the absence of certain events in the life of persons that ought to be encountered.

In the contemporary society where man is presumably free, he alone does not determine what he shall do with himself as a person. In such circumstances, man has lost his function and his own controlling power. Man comes to be in a situation of the general meaninglessness of life, that is to say, in a situation of "inauthenticity," "existential anxiety," and "ontological insecurity."

What is the method to overcome these kinds of meaningless situations? We should observe that man is capable of something very different, in fact of social behavior and experience which deserves to be called distinctively human. What is the distinctive characteristic which makes man human? According to Philip H. Phenix,[44] human beings are essentially creatures who have the power to experience meaning. Man is a being that discovers, creates and expresses meaning. Experience of "meaning" is used to cover the entire range of connotations of reason: symbolics, empirics, aesthetics, synnoetics, ethics, and synoptics.[45] Reason here means not only rationality as referring to the process of logical thinking, but also the life of feeling, conscience, imagination,

etc. This distinctive characteristic of experience, however, does not appear automatically by a process of natural growth and development; it is a product of deliberate nurture. It is not a gift of nature, but a creation of man's working. In other words, "meaninglessness" is the failure to develop the power to experience meaning, that is, reason.

"Inauthenticity," "existential anxiety" in terms of "meaninglessness" refer to the "existential vacuum."[46] Man within an existential vacuum does not have any "primary motivational force." This vacuum is manifested in a state of boredom, "Sunday neurosis," widespread phenomena such as alcoholism, and juvenile delinquency.[47] In order to restore meaningfulness to human beings the specific motivational force of a person's life should be given to him. By what means? Viktor Frankl suggests the following:

> Logotherapy. . .focuses on the meaning of human existence as well as on man's search for such a meaning.[48]

> Logotherapy tries to make the patient fully aware of his own responsibleness; therefore it must leave to him the option for what, to what or to whom he understands himself to be responsible.[49]

A human being should be treated as "self-determining".

In order to overcome the meaningless situation, we need to have a combination between the motivational force of a person's life and its phenomenon through experience. In other words, not only must there be the existence of reason as an ontical substance, but also the activities of reason should not be disregarded in a human being if the being is to become truly human.

The search for the cause of behavior in motives, will, and entelechy has been done by Aristotle, Confucius, and Dewey, and may

provide an answer for how this needed combination can be actualized. Aristotle describes the way to determine what this combination is as follows:

> This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function?. . . Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought.[50]

Which human acts are moral acts from Confucius' perspective? This is reinforced in the Analects 12:1, when Yen Yüan asks how to achieve Jen, and the Master replies: submit yourself to following property (li) and you will achieve Jen.

> Yen Yüan asked about humanity. Confucius said, 'to master oneself and return to propriety is humanity. If a man (the ruler) can for one day master himself and return to propriety, all under heaven will return to humanity. To practice humanity depends on oneself. Does it depend on others?' Yen Yüan said, 'May I ask for the detailed items?' Confucius said, 'Do not look at what is contrary to propriety, do not listen to what is contrary to propriety, and do not make any movement which is contrary to propriety.' Yen Yüan said, 'Although I am not intelligent, may I put your saying into practice?'[51]

For Dewey, growth in man is subject not only to impulse and habit but to the increasing employment of both by a wide-ranging intelligence. The term "intelligence" in Dewey is interpreted in the light of the experimental method, not as traditionally related to abstract contemplation. Dewey says that education is "that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases

the ability to direct the course of subsequent experience."[52] Dewey identifies "social efficiency" with "personal culture," and "moral" with "social." He justifies the worth of the individual by the cultivation of intelligence.

In these three philosophers' views, it is important to discover a clear idea of human nature as an individual human being. This attitude implies a metaphysical discussion of the nature of a human being. This will also determine the shape of our living and influence the direction of future life through education.

As indicated by Nikolai Berdyaev,[53] we are moving in an inhuman world, a world of inhumanness, not only in fact but also in principle as well. In contemporary tendencies of dehumanization, man as a whole being, as a creature centered within himself, has already begun to disappear. The evidences that contemporary man is alienated have been described as the search for self-identity; the struggle against social alienation; and meaninglessness. The concept of the morally autonomous person was introduced as a pattern by which to restore something unique and irreplaceable, that is, personal identity. In order to attain self-perfection, reconciliation to the whole should be accomplished through personal autonomous free choice. Finally, the existential vacuum can be filled up through experience of meaning. Meaningful experience is not given by the process of natural growth, but as a product of deliberate creation through the use of reason.

What is the solution for the question of dehumanization? Stuart Hampshire suggests that reassessment of the person should be taken as the starting point:

> A human being has the power to reflect on what kind of person he wants to be, and to try to act accordingly, within the limits of his circumstances. His more considered practical choices, and the conflicts that accompany them, will show what he holds to be intrinsically worth pursuing, and will therefore reveal his fundamental moral beliefs.[54]

In order to solve the problem of dehumanization, we need to develop this reflective power and encourage people to consider what they are, and how this power of being human is related to the entirety of action. The external signs of human power (reason) are manifested in various ways of life: habits, manners, and behavior in accordance with men's moral ideas. But these signs are not enough to produce a true human being. We also need to discover how the rationality of human beings can be transformed into the ideal way of life.

Rationality in a human being allows an individual not only to transcend present actions and beliefs determined by the particular immediate impulses and perceptions of his current experiences, but also to consider his identity through his current experiences. There is the influence of the rational individual's concern for consistency and the avoidance of contradiction in the way of life (act). Under this circumstance, rationality in a human being functions as the active ground for an individual's beliefs and actions, and structures the continuum of virtue generated by the demands of consistency and relevance. These active grounds and the continuum of virtue are closely connected with the concept of a person that endures through time. That is why reason in an individual is related to consistency of virtue (the way of action).

Now, we need to return to the original problem which we started with: "what is the solution for dehumanization?" The question of "what

kind of person one wants to be" must be answered as "how to act." The characteristics which enable us to call a being distinctively "human" can be translated into "how the man is living or acting." That is to say, the good life for man must be derived from and based on the essential characteristics of "human nature," and should be practiced through "learning by practice based on reason." From this the question of what standards of action should be employed can be answered. This answer can be given primarily through the philosophies of Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey because the character of rationality in human nature according to their views, is itself regarded as the measure of good conduct. What is fundamental to man is not what his acts are, but whether the acts are an index to his essential characteristics. Defining the good life for man is not solely a function of the calculation of his performance, but is a function of the continuum of virtue connected with rationality (human nature). This continuity of virtue does exist in the process, and it is only realized through deliberate steps in "learning by practice" (education). All deliberation and planning by a human being makes the use of reason invaluable through education.

Aristotle tries to find the idea of good through the acting process in itself, which is based on human nature. It seems to me that Aristotle correctly emphasizes the intelligent ability of man which is happiness by recognizing the first principle (reason) in the universe, and the ways for human actions which can be done concretely (virtue). I think that Aristotle exhibits the autonomy of reason, its responsibility, social connection and self-actualization for the dignity of the human individual. According to Richard J. Bernstein's comments[55] on Dewey, Dewey had perceived long ago that the great danger of a modern

technological society was that to shape a more passive, mechanical, adaptable creature, who is alienated from the community and from himself, man would become dehumanized. How can the human being be protected from dehumanization? According to Dewey, only through continually attempting to make the idea of freedom and intelligence a concrete reality (virtue). Work without these characteristics limits the development of personal self-actualization and is therefore to be negatively valued. Jen generally has been considered the most important concept in Confucius as a principle of human nature as well as an ideal of human perfection through human conduct. Human perfection here means how to become fully realized as an authentic human being.

Let's return to the problem with which we started: the situation of dehumanization in a contemporary society. How can such a problem of dehumanization be solved? Through combining "knowing about human nature" and "human conduct" in order to be a morally autonomous person. Thus the problem of the relation between human nature and virtue in the process of becoming a person will be the focus of the remaining chapters.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER III

HUMAN NATURE

To overcome the dehumanized situation described in the preceding chapter, everybody should be educated as a person with independent convictions about himself. Two interrelated assumptions can be considered. One is that although man has always been influenced by a given structure external to him, the ultimate ground of self-realization lies within his own nature. Man has the inner strength to actualize the potential of his distinctive being. This distinguishing mark of man is called "soul" by Aristotle, "mind" by Confucius, and "intelligence" by John Dewey. Man, therefore, can be thought of not simply as a creature, but as a creative agent who gives significant relation to everything. The second assumption is that, despite his ontical self-sufficiency, for a man to become a fully actualized person, he must constantly engage in the process of "learning by experience." It should be remarked that the process of learning to become a person does not take the form of linear progression, but gradual integration. Man authenticates his own being not by detaching himself from the world of human relations, but by making sincere attempts to harmonize his relationships with others. A harmonious relation with others can be accomplished for Aristotle through "practical wisdom," for Confucius through "the principle of rectification," for Dewey through "practical judgment." By emphasizing the essence of human nature, one may answer the question of how to become a

person, or how to become fully realized as a human being in contemporary society.

Aristotle's, Confucius' and Dewey's whole systems of philosophy seem to have been based on a consideration of the nature of the human being and how human nature is related to concrete situations. Therefore it is necessary to examine their observations on human nature. In each, what makes man different in nature from non-human beings is "reason," by which man thinks, knows, wills and decides, and by which man can correct his mistaken actions and control himself. Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey all proclaim the power of human reason and its autonomy, even though they use different terms to express this idea. "Soul" is Aristotle's term, "mind" is Confucius' and "intelligence" is Dewey's. For all, however, there is: a rational mind which distinguishes man from non-human beings; a reason which overcomes desire and passions, an urge to seek knowledge; and cardinal virtues which furnish a foundation for self-actualization and for the structure of education.

Four principal approaches to the concept of "human nature" have been described by Dewey in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.[1] (1) The term is used to designate an alleged original and native constitution, which is "instinctive instead of acquired." (2) Human nature is defined in terms of psychological powers or faculties. (3) Human nature is in itself empty and formless like John Locke's tabula rasa. (4) Human nature can be known only through its great institutional products--language, religion, law and the state, and the arts. According to Dewey's indication, this fourth approach can be supported from the teachings of Aristotle.

Aristotle starts to explain "what the nature of the good life for man is" and has to begin by describing his view of human nature. He observes that eudaimonia (happiness) is something that we choose only for itself and never anything else, and it is this which characterizes man's function.[2] This function is what distinguishes human nature from non-human beings. The fulfillment of man's function is "how to live well" as a being who seeks "to be happy."

For Dewey, what makes human beings differ fundamentally from other living things is that man is unique because he has a mind (an intelligence) and thus the ability to think. As the plant takes in the soil, the mind assimilates the energies of the body.[3] Mind is expressed as a satiable substance capable of absorbing and retaining, but also as a function of what we discern in relationships of means to ends. In this sense we equate having a mind with having intellectual foresight. We regard a man who is determined by emotions, guesswork and hunch as stupid, unintelligent, lacking in mind. To have foresight is to base conduct on well weighted calculations.[4]

Confucius insists that human nature is good. This essence of human nature may be said to be Jen, which is love, beginning with filial piety, and flowing out as universal love to all the men with whom we have definite ethical relations. From the thesis that human nature is good the principle of actualization is seen to be immanent in human nature. The man who has fully realized his nature is the wise man. It can be assured that everyone can be the wise man, because sagehood is nothing more than his own nature, Jen, wholly realized.

These three philosophers describe human nature in the sense of a metaphysical ground that underlies worldly events. This aspect leads us

to find and formulate some ideas held in common: What is human nature in their perspective? How do they describe human nature, especially in order that man may become fully realized as a human being? These questions will be answered through this chapter by comparing these three philosophers: Aristotle, Confucius, and Dewey. It was observed in Chapter II that the principle immanent in human beings, an ontic property, makes them know what and who they are, and also that this principle as the ontical property of a person can be identified with the function of self-identity. To describe this ontic property of a person will in turn raise the question--how is human nature related to concrete situations?

"Soul" in Aristotle's View

What Aristotle is seeking is the essence of the human being's life. He speaks of this essence as the "soul,"[5] the form or actuality of the body. He observes that the distinctive mark of a human being is "an active life of the element that has a rational principle."[6] Further he states that "all men by nature desire to know."[7] "By nature" means having in itself the source of its own production.[8] In other words, the intelligent ability in human nature is self-productive, not created by another. Again he says, "It is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties. . . ."[9] Philosophizing here obviously begins with the mind, that is, with thought. For Aristotle, man has the culminating power of thought which distinguishes him from all non-human beings. Human nature is rational power and intelligent fulfillment and is attributed to all members of the human species as a defining

characteristic. Reason in Aristotle contains "autonomy" and "thinking."

How is human nature employed in Aristotle's philosophy? His answer is:

> At present we must confine ourselves to saying that soul is the source of these phenomena and is characterized by them, viz. by the powers of self-nutrition, sensation, thinking and motivity.[10]

Thus in the human soul, there are vegetative functions, such as nutrition, growth, and reproduction; animalistic functions, such as sensation, desire and movement; and besides these there is also the pure human function of reason. Nourishment and desire, so-called irrational functions, belong to a human being only in so far as man is an animal (non-human being) and not in so far as he is a rational being. What is the distinctive function of man? As "sight is the soul of eyes"[11] and the ergon (translated as "function"[12]) of vegetables is "to reproduce and feed,"[13] the ergon of a human being is "an active life of the element that has a rational principle."[14] Human nature in Aristotle's view, then, consists of the capacity of a practical operation based on reason (logos). This is expressed as "the good life," "living well" (eudaimonia). The good life for man will be determined in relation to the nature of the human being. To discover the good at which a man should aim we must discover the distinctive function (ergon) of human nature, a function different from activities such as vocational skills, as well as from the irrational functions in man, because these may be animalistic functions. He formulates as follows the idea that there is a "good for man."

> If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake, (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for

> the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right?[15]

The good life for man is not only something that "we choose only for itself and never for the sake of something else"[16] but also something in which the function of man (reason) is fulfilled. He points out, "Happiness is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action."[17] From this it can be argued that to live as a tool, a channel for another life, is not really to live oneself as an active life based on the rational principle. "Hence we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another's man, is by nature a slave."[18] A slave is in a way of a part of his master.[19] But he who is a man by his own nature (reason) cannot be a tool. What is characteristic of the human is to be free, to show the autonomy of reason.

> Evidently then we do not seek it (i.e. wisdom) for the sake of any other advantage; but as the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another's, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for its own sake.[20]

What do we simply in living is "to grow," "to reproduce," and "to perceive." What else do we do? "Practical activity of what has <u>logos</u>." This is what makes a man happy, but it also allows him to become an authentic (real) person.

Aristotle states the autonomy of reason as follows: "When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal. . ., and without it nothing thinks."[21] He also states the divinity of reason as follows:

> Whether it be reason or something else that is this element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness.[22]

> But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him. . . . If reason is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life.[23]

Reason, therefore, is not only a faculty influenced by environmental variables, but is also transcendent, divine. Human reason is one with divine reason, exercising a faculty which is external. To Aristotle, divinity is not absolutely opposed to humanity: "Something divine is present in him (man)." Something divine means God, a pure metaphysical principle. He says that God is reason or that His act is "thinking."[24] This reason is not like human reason, the reason of a finite being who "sometimes thinks and sometimes does not,"[25] but is an eternal thinking. Such an eternal thinking is not possible for a reason which is concerned with an object other than thinking itself, because such a reason is passive and conditioned by an objective form.[26]

How is the divine related to human reason? The answer to the question is explained by reference to the four kinds of cause: the material, the formal, the efficient and the final cause.[27] First of all, human reason is both passive and active. The passive reason is the material cause from which actual knowledge is formed, just as a product is formed from its material. This can then be changed into the understanding--power of reason. The passive reason is the mere capacity for receiving ideas. The active reason, however, as the agent, the producer that makes all things, is the efficient cause of thought: "a cause which is

productive in the sense that it makes them all."[28] Aristotle continues, "And in fact mind (reason). . .is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things."[29] If we equate passive reason with the eye, active reason with light, and the object of thought with color, there ensues a complete analogy in the phenomena. The object of thought is received by passive reason through active reason, and thereby the form of the object is realized in passive reason. As for the formal cause, the object of thought is considered to be the conceptual form which gives an actual form to passive reason. Light makes the eye become convinced of its activity. Reason in the act of becoming self-conscious is the active reason, the constructive reason, the "poietic reason."[30] This active reason is not identical with human reason (understanding) which means "sometimes thinks and sometimes does not;" active reason is self-conscious personality as a subjective faculty. It should be distinguished as imperishable and immortal. It is both transcendent and immanent, divine as well as human. The passive reason is mortal and inseparable from the body, but the active reason, eternal and immortal.[31] If it is right to explain constructive reason as rational self-consciousness in a human being, this would be equivalent to a decision in favor of human immortality. To Aristotle, divinity is not absolutely opposed to humanity.[32] Human reason is one with divine reason, exercising a faculty which is eternal. Man does not reflect his own dignity as far as his thinking is concerned with outside objects. In such a condition, he is not yet man as a person. He becomes a real man only through knowing himself. This means that when he turns his eyes from the object to himself, he is able to find the self as the subject of

thinking. Man is connected with God[33] only through manifesting active reason. In other words, personality alone has that unbroken life which is constituted by the absolute and eternal self-thinking of God. The active and divine reason makes a human being a valuable being. The subject thinking with autonomy constitutes the ontic property of self-identity in a human being.

Man is by nature able to think. Reason is the distinctive nature of man. On its passive level it is merely the latent but unexercised capacity for conceptual thought; but active reason is thought itself; that supreme faculty by which man apprehends truth, i.e., enters into the universal realm of relationship, essence, quality, and form. In speaking of the active reason as the divine and immortal in man he says:

> Mind in this sense of it is separable, impassive, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which it forms).[34]

How can an actual thinking be developed? Through a habitual knowledge which is acquired or exercised through learning. It is developed through education by those who have acquired or exercised knowledge by means of actual thinking. Here learning means, first, the regulation, in the direction of the mean, of man's natural feelings and dispositions (the appetitive elements of the soul) and next, the contemplation of truth by the active reason (the rational element of the soul). Man does have a distinctive function, that of exercise of his reason. Thus man's distinctive function is an activity of the soul in conformity with rational principle. Only those who are educated and learned can think for themselves[35] and thus be happy. "For man, therefore, the life according to reason is best and pleasantest, since reason more than

anything else is man. This life therefore is also the happiest."[36]

"Jen" in Confucius' View

To Confucius, too, like Aristotle, the good life for man is to cultivate his own mind. The phenomena of living are the same as the objectification or manifestation of human nature. He bases his ethics upon the nature of man and of society through an explanation of human nature. He teaches in the Analects that the goal for the individual is the development of personality until the ideal of a perfect man, a true gentleman (the superior man), is reached. The ultimate ground of man's self-realization lies within his own nature. Man has the inner strength to actualize the full potential of his being, and his creativity is inherent in his humanness. Man, therefore, is not a creature but a creative agent who gives meaning to "Heaven, Earth and the myriad things." Confucius says:

> The man of wisdom delights in water; the man of humanity delights in mountains. The man of wisdom is active; the man of humanity is tranquil. The man of wisdom enjoys happiness; the man of humanity enjoys long life.[37]

In Confucius' philosophy, the individual self is no longer conceived as an object in the world, but rather as a subject capable of achieving an ideal of perfection independent of the contingencies and limitations of the empirical world.

What is inner human nature? Confucius never systematized his teaching (sayings), but he once remarked that "there is one thread that runs through my doctrines."[38] Even though he himself does not specify what this thread is, it is not difficult for us to identify it as Jen, popularly translated into English as "humanity" and "human-heartedness."[39] In the Analects Confucius says,

> A superior man (the perfect man) never abandons humanity even for the lapse of a single meal. In moments of haste, he acts according to it. In times of difficulty or confusion, he acts according to it.[40]

> Confucius said, 'the way of the superior man is threefold, but I have not been able to attain it. The man of wisdom has no perplexities; the man of humanity has no worry; the man of courage has no fear.'[41]

Simply stated, his philosophy is a philosophy of the Jen (humanity) of man. All his teachings have to do with the explication and realization of the Jen in man. In other words, it can be said that he exposes the Jen of man as found in man's inner nature in much the same way as Aristotle actualizes the inner function (ergon) of human nature, that is, reason. Although Confucius talked a great deal about Jen, he never attempted to give a formal definition of it, and also was not even conscious of the methodological problems that still occopy the minds of modern moral philosophers on the topic. According to C. Hansen,[42] the antithesis of the Confucian approach is that of the legalists and formalism. Confucianism, however, rejects the formulation of abstract rules and the application of specific prescriptive rules of conduct. The philosophy of Jen is not a system of lofty principles, but instead is organized around an important class of qualities of man as revealed in the encounter of the individual with others and the world.

What is it which contains those potential qualities of man? It is Jen, human-heartedness, man-to-man-ness. The mind is Jen as a human nature. There is a great potentiality for self-development in each man, and to develop it to the fullest extent is Jen. The following statement in the Analects enables us to understand what this really means:

> a resolute scholar and a man of humanity will never seek to live at the expense of injuring humanity. He (a man of humanity) would rather sacrifice his life in order to realize humanity.[43]

How should the word "Jen" be defined or described for Confucius' thought? It signifies literally the proper intersubjective relations among people. Jen (仁, humanity) is defined as Jen (人 man: the Chinese word for "man" is also pronounced Jen). Confucius says, "Becoming Jen originates from oneself."[44] Jen therefore signifies the inner reality of man as situated in society. It distinguishes man from other animals. The following statements in the Analects show us how he dealt with it:

> A man of humanity, wishing to establish his own character, also establishes the character of others, and wishing to be prominent himself, also helps others to be prominent.[45]
>
> Confucius said, 'One who is not a man of humanity cannot endure adversity for long, nor can he enjoy prosperity for long. The man of humanity is naturally at ease with humanity. The man of wisdom cultivates humanity for its advantage.'[46]
>
> Confucius said, 'Only the man of humanity knows how to love people and hate people.'[47]
>
> Confucius said, 'If you set your mind on humanity, you will be free from evil.'[48]

The mind in man is Jen as a human nature. Jen is not a state in life, nor does it modify any perfect faculty of man, but Jen signifies man's total nature. Jen (仁) is basically close to Jen (人) by nature. Man's total nature means a totality which exhibits itself in a will to goodness as well as in feelings of love and natural inclinations to do good. Again, Jen, the ideal relationship among human beings, is the perfect virtue of men. Jen as the supreme human virtue has the power to enable man to live a life of peace. It is the only road to the peace and harmony of a society.

Confucius does not deny that man is limited and determined in many ways by external conditions,[49] i.e., by the inevitability of death,

temporality of human existence, and the burden of irrationality. But he recognizes also the positive element of man as a subject capable of controlling, disciplining, and perfecting himself. This element is naturally obtained in the nature of the human being in itself and in an understanding of his ontological ground (Jen). Jen becomes a source of man's freedom and power only through constant effort to reflect on (investigate) his own human nature. What is meant by saying that "Jen (仁) is Jen (人)?"[50] It means that man has for his self-identity a metaphysical principle of his existence: that man has a freedom inherent in his existence, a freedom which is constant in perceiving and giving meaning to his behavior; that by the process of cultivating the essence of Jen, man is able to transcend the limitations and objective determinations imposed by environmental variables and therefore will transform them into something positive and meaningful to himself.

How is human nature employed in this philosophy? The answer to this question can be derived from the following:

> Tzu-Kung said, 'we can hear our Master's (view) on culture and its manifestation, but we cannot hear his views on human nature and the Way of Heaven.'[51]
>
> Man is born with uprightness. . . .[52]
>
> By nature men are alike. Through practice they have become far apart.[53]

Instead of finding a formal definition of Jen as human nature, we can only discover descriptions of concrete examples of it in the Analects through its manifestations. Dewey, in the article "Human Nature," has maintained that knowing human nature through its great institutional products is basically an Aristotelian concept.[54] This could also be said of the Confucian concept of Jen. How can we know the character of

Jen? Only through its manifestation: "Confucius said, 'Is humanity far away? As soon as I want it, there it is right by me.'"[55] How can Jen be manifested (be the way of living)? His explanation is: (1) Jen is manifested in Li, it is man's affirmation of cosmic harmony; (2) it is found in man's inner nature as the intersubjective love that reigns in society; (3) it is fidelity, man's interiorization of self through being-true-to-self. In other words, to attain perfect Jen a man has to fulfill his nature totally; but this is not possible to man in his existential state. It is therefore a moral ideal to be sought by all men; but it is not a rule of specific conduct. To follow Tao, as the general rule of good conduct, requires self-examination, self-deliberation, and self-control as stated by Confucius: "Set your will on the Way. Have a firm grasp on virtue. Rely on humanity. Find recreations in the arts."[56]

From ancient times, the Chinese view has been that reason and desire (the function of the animal) oppose each other. Chinese philosophers have repeatedly stressed that one should not indulge oneself in gratifying desires, but should put desire under the control of reason. According to Aristotle, the soul consists of three parts: the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive. The first part is the highest and noblest. It leads to the intellect, knowledge, and truth, while the other two parts give rise to desires, greediness, and violence. To keep these three parts in harmony and in balance is the work of the care of the soul. Aristotle holds that a man is a soul using a body and that a soul should be in a good and healthy state. But in Confucian philosophy, the advice for curing the disease of a soul is self-control or moderation. It is part of the Chinese tradition that a

philosopher should seek knowledge, including self-examination, meditation and self-perfection. This is the way to nourish the mind. In other words, the care of the mind in Confucius' thought is based upon three rules:[57] (1) "knowing the root," which means to have the realization of knowledge by the examination of things; (2) "making the will sincere," which means not to allow self-deception; (3) "rectifying the mind." As the aim of investigating the nature of things was primarily "making thought sincere" and "rectifying the mind," this theory dwells upon the necessity for action after the acquiring of knowledge. Any and all knowledge is worthwhile only when it is applicable in action in daily life with goodness as its result.

If Jen is so important, what are the methods suggested by Confucius for its attainment? He teaches that only by strenuous moral effort can one hope to increase in Jen, and such moral effort involves self-cultivation and the continued practice of goodness (Jen). All men act according to their nature. He knows very well that virtue grows not in a vacuum but in the practical affairs of everyday life. The basic concern in his philosophy is how to become the superior man (or a sage). Such a concern seems to involve a method (how), a process (becoming), and an end (sagehood). Since the attainment of Confucius sagehood (being an autonomous person) is predicated on the belief that man becomes perfect by self-effort, the method in question is not an acquired technique but is self-cultivation through "learning and practice." The process, similarly, is not an external procedure but is self-transformation. And the end is not an objectifiable goal but is self-realization.

"Intelligence" in Dewey's View

The human being in Dewey's philosophy lives within an environment and by means of it. "Experience" is the result of two interacting or interpenetrating influences--experiencer and experienced--in environmental variables. The important thing in understanding Dewey's philosophy, therefore, is the origin and content of experience. These basic philosophical postulates on the nature of "experience" are fundamental to an understanding of his ideas on the problem of human nature and its relation to value and education.

In experience there is not an antecedently given subject and an antecedent object; nor can subject-object be separated from each other. The nature of each is determined by the relation which each sustains to the other in a situation. In experience there is no separate subject and no separate object. The distinction between subject and object can only be perceived by deliberate analysis and is not found in immediate experience itself. Thus experience is the internal relation which determines the nature of the subject as experiencer and the object as experienced. Experience, therefore, is the quality of consequences of organically united processes between experiencer and experienced. If this view of experience is correct, the following is implied: experience is not simply an event going on inside somebody's mind, but an event in which transformation in Nature (the world) results.

> Experience is of as well as in Nature. It is not experience which is experienced. . . . Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is experienced. Linked in certain other ways with another natural object--the human organism--they are how things are experienced as well.[58]

Experiences also have a prevading quality which unifies them and makes them unique as a whole. If we ask "How does a quality prevade experiences?", we could get a clue from the following illustration.

> A painting is said to have quality, or a particular painting to have a Titian or Rembrandt quality. The word thus used most certainly does not refer to any particular line, color or part of the painting. It is something that affects and unifies all the constituents of the picture and all their relations. It is not anything that can be expressed in words for it is something that must be had. Discourse may, however, point out the qualities, lines and relations by means of which pervasive and unifying quality is achieved.[59]

The uniqueness of what is directly experienced in the painting is something as an intellectual projection of a subjective mind on a colorful objective reality.

The primary nature of the relation between experience and the mind is "like the wheat and tares of the parable."[60] This situation is said to be "a scene of risk,"[61] which is uncertain, unstable. Dewey does not mean to formulate a negative (or pessimistic) attitude to life in emphasizing the indeterminate aspect in experience, but rather he urges us to concentrate on the activity of man's faculty (mind). In other words, the mind cannot operate simply as a passive spectator of independent events and occurrences. Instead, he argues that the existence of mental activity is contingent on active participation in environmental affairs. Here is the significance for man's faculty of the mind: the activity of inquiry in man can change the indeterminate situation into a cognitively meaningful one. Here is the significance for what makes man differ fundamentally from other living things. Dewey believes that man is unique because he has a mind (an intelligence) and thus the ability to identify or discriminate. He says, "the activity of intelligence consists in identifying the apparently unlike, and in

discriminating the apparently like. . . . Each relation is, therefore, indispensable to intelligence."[62]

Dewey's critical analysis of experience shows some intellectual affinities to Aristotle. Intelligence, according to him, is an operative factor within nature; it is active and effective in transforming and modifying experience. For intelligence to play an effective role in the world there must be real conflict and indeterminancy, precariousness and uncertainty in experience. To him experience is a process where everything is changing temporally. There is no absolute beginning nor any predetermined end for the things in nature. In order to "transform confusion, ambiguity and discrepancy into illumination, definiteness and consistency,"[63] the indeterminate situation demands that we make a choice for each situation through the faculty of identity and discrimination. Some particular way of acting must be selected. This distinctive feature of human choice means that man can anticipate and deliberately select among alternative preferences. "The present experience is comprehended, and the past experience grows into richer forms."[64] In other words, man can evaluate future possibilities from the present circumstances, and enlighten intelligently his choices. In the course of his selective adjustment to the environment, thus, man can exercise genuine choice to resolve the indeterminancy inherent in experience. This also means that the goal of intelligence is not predetermined by certain fixed ends. Thinking makes a difference in our relation to the environment, and thus he believes that intelligence can actually get things done. He further believes that through the exercise of intelligence and effort, man is capable of shaping his own future. Man's choice must be intelligently reformed. To say that man determines his choices intelligently is the

same as saying that man has freedom in his nature. That is why man's nature for Dewey is neither good nor bad--contrary to what Confucius was concerned about--and the crucial issue for man is what he does with choice.

What is the precise function of intelligence? How is the notion of intelligence employed in his theory of human nature? In earlier writings, Dewey seems to follow closely the Darwinean formula:

> The process of biology has accustomed our minds to the notion that intelligence is not an outside power presiding supremely but statically over the desires and efforts of man but is a method of adjustment of capacities and conditions within specific situations.[65]

But in his subsequent writings, he does not seem to stick strictly to this description. For he develops not only the conception of intelligence as a method of biological adjustment but also a novelty of intelligence and its creative power. He writes:

> . . .the pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind is to project new and more complex ends--to free experience from routine and from caprice. Not the use of thought to accomplish purposes already given either in the mechanism of the body or in that of the existent state of society, but the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action, is the pragmatic lesson.[66]

The notion of intelligence as "creative" becomes clearly dominating in his later writings whenever he talks about the aim and function of philosophical problems. For instance, in discussing the necessity of guiding desires and impulses by intelligence: "What intelligence has to do in the service of impulse is to act not as its obedient servant but as its clarifier and liberator."[67] Similarly, in explaining the place of active and planning thought within the processes of experience he writes:

> To. . .suggestions used in constructive fashion for new ends the name intelligence is given. It liberates man from the bondage of the past, due to ignorance and accident hardened into custom. It projects a better future and assists man in its realization.[68]

Dewey has two different accounts of intelligence: intelligence as a method of adjustment of capacities and conditions within specific situations, and intelligence as a creative novelty projecting new ends and assisting in the realization of those ends. He does not, however, treat these two accounts as two separate notions, but rather he emphasizes the continuous process accomplished by the "going-on" activity in the organic unity between subject and object. He is not actually concerned with the changeless state. For instance, knowledge for him does not mean a state of consciousness, but a way of acting, a way of continuous readjustment of ourselves to circumstances always new. "To readjust" requires knowing the characterization of the problematic circumstance, considering deliberately how to act, and finally making a choice. Thinking, according to him, "is seen to be a specific event in the movement of experienced things, having its own specific occasion or demand and its own specific place."[69] In Dewey's view "a thought is creative,--an incursion into the novel. It involves some inventiveness."[70] This means that "thinking is originally in a projection of considerations which have not been previously apprehended."[71] Human intelligence manifests itself in creative thinking. Creative thinking points out the need of new ideas, and has creative possibilities. Creative thinking implies dissatisfaction with routine solutions, and also lets man become a subject capable of controlling the methods for solutions.

Knowing is something that happens to persons in the process of their career. Knowing is nothing but a series of acts. Knowledge does not

depend for its value upon any consistent consequences taken as ready-made structures of thought. Its value exists in serving to clarify a program of action in problematic situations. Knowledge has the role of criticizing, determining the circumstances. The value of knowledge is not established by verifying any kind of satisfaction or conformity with the given situation, but is established through functioning to produce a better organization of activity moving to the direction of the future.

Man is not a passive, inert spectator of a neutral world. He is an organism plunged into an environment that infiltrates at every point his own nature. Habits are the functions by which men normally make the necessary adjustments. But since the environment is immensely complex and anything but static, these habitual adjustments constantly require modification. This modification is the work of intelligence as described above. According to Dewey, intelligence itself is a mode of behavior; it is the specific way in which a living organism interacts with its environment, pursuing ends and choosing means to attain ends. His concern with human nature is associated with the course of intelligent deliberation.

Human nature for Dewey "exists and operates in an environment, but it is not in that environment as coins are in a box, but as a plant is in the sunlight and soil."[72] He speaks of man in the concrete, that is, not of abstract man or of abstract city, but of people as persons and of persons in association. He points out that original human nature is a complex of impulses and pattern that manifest themselves in blind, chaotic activity. But since each individual is born within a group with already established ways of acting, this intellectual activity is

immediately guided into channels set by the group's demands and customs. Such channeling results in habits of conduct and of disposition in the individual, helping to make him the kind of person he is. Habits, however, are constantly challenged, or confronted with a problematic situation in which they do not work. To avoid this conflict, intelligence intervenes to mediate impulse and habit. Thus life may be said to be a process in which impulse, habit and intelligence play continuing roles in modifying or reinforcing each other to bring about a widening and deepening harmony among themselves.

Conclusion

Man in the present technological society has been described as a person who "transferred his ownership to another" and who "has little idea of who he is or where he is going." Such a man was described as one who has lost his own self-identity and his own personal dignity. Is there any way to recover a being of inherent value and to keep the ground of self-identity? What basis do we have for assuming that there is a continuous and unified existence behind the phenomena of our living? This is an ontological question--it is about the nature and the real existence of man. The answer to these questions will help us to realize the intrinsic worthwhileness of a human being, and also to emphasize his ontological ground. That is why the essence of human nature in Aristotle's, Confucius' and Dewey's views has been described through this chapter.

(1) They all contend that the essence of man by his nature is rationality, a trait not possessed by any of the lower animals: "soul" in Aristotle, "Jen" in Confucius, and "intelligence" in Dewey. This

peculiar nature of man enables him not only to be unique, but also it provides the ontological ground for his existence. Rationality makes a human being valuable.

(2) The activities of human nature according to these three philosophers provide the reason why man should be treated as a being of moral worth or as a morally autonomous person. The activities of human nature have been divided into two aspects by each of these philosophers: the active and the passive in Aristotle's philosophy; rationality in or of mind and rationality as the order of nature in Confucius' thought; intelligence as a creative novelty for a new plan and as a method of adjustment to environment in Dewey's philosophy. Aristotle agrees with Confucius that the active rationality of mind is divine, a substantial principle in man which is a priori and universal to all human beings. This principle is an eternal "thinking" which has freedom inherent in its power. For Aristotle and Confucius that there are universal and inalienated essences of human nature is certain because they regard metaphysical premises as admissible. Dewey rules out all metaphysical premises that cannot be interpreted pragmatically in experience. The active, creative intelligence in man for him is based on man's experience; it has to be acquired and exercised for self-control in man. This activity for Dewey characterizes man as a self-conscious personality. Intelligence is empirical, not-universal, but determines deliberately man's actions. Intelligence works by itself but constructs the coherent uniqueness of experiences for what is valuable in human life. Here Dewey agrees with Aristotle and Confucius that man's freedom depends upon his nature.

(3) On the basis of man's freedom, Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey all assert man's responsibility for his life. For Confucius, when he says that one is responsible for X, it means that this is his duty or that the task has already been assigned to him. Man, according to Dewey, can choose and act on the basis of intelligent decision. Intelligence consists both in the ability to find commonalities and in discriminating what appears to be identical. No one is morally responsible for X except the agent who decides, chooses and acts. Aristotle asserts that man is morally responsible for developing his moral character. Such a development is regarded as the highest development of a person, a prudential obligation. Man is morally responsible for prudential obligations. Although these three philosophers differ from each other, the point common to them is: man must be responsible for his life because the way of living itself is a product of the essence of human nature.

(4) The fourth point about human nature is whether it is good or bad. Confucius holds that human nature is fundamentally good. He insists that if there is evil in man's conduct, it is because his original nature is not completely developed or is obscured. For Aristotle the rational goodness of human nature is discounted in the excellent activities of reason as intrinsically worthwhile. He recognizes that doing evil is due to ignorance. Dewey shows how "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong" emerge naturally out of human life-situations. Values are not predetermined by an Absolute mind (as in Confucius' case) but are either discovered in situations or created by man himself when he struggles to adapt himself to the world in which he lives. Dewey accepts an evolution of value, and rejects the essential superiorities in the Aristotelian

view, and the intrinsic nature of goodness in the Confucian sense. But no matter how the good is interpreted by these three philosophers, they provide a common concept that the goodness of man is a totality which involves a deep awareness of reality as a source of freedom and power and also a natural and spontaneous expressiveness for actualization of the self in the world. Human goodness is the basis of man's being a morally autonomous person. This makes him an existential, subjective person with freedom and control, able to avoid dehumanization. Here is the significance of asserting the subject of inalienable rights in man which has been dealt with in Chapter II.

(5) Finally, human nature for these three philosophers involves a sense of community in the sense that human nature is revealed or manifested as the way of living. Aristotle states that the practical function of reason is necessary for the social well-being of the human being. The activity of reason is clearly revealed in society as the way of living. Jen, for Confucius, signifies the proper intersubjective relations among human beings; Jen points out the inseparability of man himself and his co-humanity. Intelligence for Dewey manifests itself in various forms and functions. One function of human intelligence is to seek new meanings in experienced objects and initiate responses to these meanings. In some sense, these three philosophers believe that "knowing" human nature must be its actualization and its activity in a life; that "knowing" human nature cannot be separated from "living in a society." Even though the question "what is human nature?" is a metaphysical question, we know the answer through observing man's external activities.

But there is another problem for our consideration. The subjective element of a human being is the actualizing power of an autonomous agent, while the objective element of human existence is the unlimited and the indeterminate context in his environment. How can these two aspects be reconciled in man's life? How can one regard human nature as a starting point for a process of transforming the subjective into the objective and the individual into the universal? These questions will be taken up in the next chapter.

ENDNOTES

[1]John Dewey, "Human Nature," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, ed., Edwin R. A. Seligman, Vol. 7 (New York, 1937), pp. 531-537.

[2]Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," Book I, Ch. 7, 1097 b 1 ff, from The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed., Richard McKeon (New York, 1971). All further quotations from Aristotle's writings are taken from The Basic Works of Aristotle, unless another reference is given as footnote.

[3]Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1922), pp. 295-296.

[4]Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York, 1966), p. 103.

[5]Aristotle, "On the Soul," II, 1, 412 b 12.

[6]Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," I, 7, 1098 a 3-4.

[7]Aristotle, "Metaphysics," I, 1, 980 a 22.

[8]Aristotle, "Physics," II, 1.

[9]Aristotle, "Metaphysics," I, 2, 982 b 12-14.

[10]Aristotle, "On the Soul," II, 2, 413 b 10-13.

[11]Ibid., II, 1, 412 b 19.

[12]W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford, 1968), p. 23.

[13]Aristotle, "On the Soul," II, 4, 415 a 26.

[14]Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," I, 7, 1098 a 3.

[15]Ibid., I, 2, 1094 a 18-25.

[16]Ibid., I, 7, 1097 b 1f.

[17]Ibid., I, 7, 1097 b 21.

[18]Aristotle, "Politics," I, 4, 1254 a 14-16.

[19]Ibid., I, 6, 1255 b 11 f.

[20]Aristotle, "Metaphysics," I, 2, 982 b 24-28.

[21]Aristotle, "On the Soul," III, 5, 430 a 22-23.

[22]Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," X, 7, 1177 a 13-19.

[23]Ibid., X, 7, 1177 b 26-30.

[24]Aristotle, "Metaphysics," XII, 7, 1072 b 18; XII, 9, 1074 b 21.

[25]Aristotle, "On the Soul," III, 5, 430 a 22; "Metaphysics," XII, 7, 1072 a 16.

[26]Aristotle, "Metaphysics," XII, 9, 1074 b 21ff.

[27]Aristotle, "Physics," II, 3, 1946 b 23-33; "Metaphysics," V, 2, 1013 a 24ff.

[28]Aristotle, "On the Soul," III, 5, 430 a 12.

[29]Ibid., III, 5, 430 a 14-15.

[30]This is not Arisotle's own term but A. W. Benn's interpretation. A. W. Benn, "Note on Aristotle's Theory of the Constructive Reason," Mind, Vol. XIX (1910), pp. 390-394.

[31]Aristotle, "On the Soul," I, 4, 408 b 29.

[32]Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," X, 7, 1177 a 13-19.

[33]God, to Aristotle, is a pure metaphysical principle which rises above the anthropomorphism of Greek mythology and is beyond the personality of the Christian God. He has neither will nor human thinking; God is reason and His act is "thinking."

[34]Aristotle, "On the Soul," III, 5, 430 a 17-20.

[35]Ibid., II, 5, 417 b 16-26.

[36]Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," X, 7, 1178 a 6-8.

[37]Confucius, "Analects," 6:21, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, trans., Wing-Tsit Chan (Princeton, 1972). All further quotations from Confucius' writing are taken from Chan's work unless another source is given.

[38]Confucius, "Analects," 4:15.

[39]According to Fung, Yu-Lan, the word "Jen," one of the most important in Confucian thought, is composed of the character (人) meaning "man" (Jen), combined with the character for "two" (二). Thus it is a word embracing all those moral qualities which should govern one man in his relations with another. As such it may perhaps be best translated into English as "human-heartedness," though it is often also equivalent to such words as "morality" or "virtue."

[40]Confucius, "Analects," 4:5.

[41]Ibid., 14:30.

[42]Chad Hansen, "Freedom and Moral Responsibility in Confucian Ethics," Philosophy: East and West, Vol. XXII, No. 2 (April, 1972), pp. 169-186.

[43]Confucius, "Analects," 15:8.

[44]Ibid., 4:2, "The Doctrine of the Mean," 20.

[45]Confucius, "Analects," 6:28.

[46]Ibid., 4:2.

[47]Ibid., 4:3.

[48]Ibid., 4:4.

[49]"The Great Learning," 8.

[50]For a good discussion on this point, see "Dialectic of Confucian Morality and Metaphysics of Man," Chung-Ying Chen, Philosophy: East and West, Vol. 21 (April 1971), pp. 111-124.

[51]Confucius, "Analects," 5:12.

[52]Ibid., 6:17.

[53]Ibid., 17:2.

[54]Dewey, "Human Nature," p. 532.

[55]Confucius, "Analects," 7:29.

[56]Ibid., 7:6.

[57]"The Great Learning," 5, 6, 7.

[58]Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York, 1929), pp. 4a-1.

[59]Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York, 1938), p. 70.

[60]Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 47.

[61]Ibid., p. 41.

[62]Dewey, "Psychology," The Early Works of John Dewey: 1882-1898 (Carbondale, 1967), p. 114.

[63]Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 67.

[64]Dewey, "Psychology," p. 114.

[65]Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought (New York, 1910), p. 68.

[66]Dewey, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," Creative Intelligence, ed., John Dewey (New York, 1917), p. 63.

[67]Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 255.

[68]Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston, 1948), p. 96.

[69]Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (New York, 1953), p. 127.

[70]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 158.

[71]Ibid., p. 159.

[72]Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 296.

APPENDIXES

Aristotle's View

According to Aristotle, the full development of man's essential nature is called "arete," translated in English as "virtue" or "excellence." The virtue of each person seems to lie in the full efficiency of his peculiar function. He says: ". . .every virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well."[1] For him any thing is virtuous which is performing its function in the best and most complete way.[2] Man's function is what he alone has or does best, his distinctive mode of activity in which his nature is most clearly seen. Arete is the way in which man's conduct and character could be revealed. Arete thus is the way of living.

We need to know how to live well, or how to do well. Before we can know how to live well, we must know what it is we do simply in living. For Aristotle, human nature consists not simply in rationality, i.e., the intellectual function, but in the full range of activities identified by the vegetative, sensitive or appetitive and the rational soul. Man grows, digests, reproduces, perceives, and moves, and there is no difficulty in deciding what it is to do these things well. But what else does man do in living? His activity, according to Aristotle, is a practical activity of what has logos,[3] which means an activity in accordance with his proper nature, reason. This means that virtue is not a psychological state, but an activity of reason. What is virtue? It consists in activity of soul in accordance with reason, in accordance with the best and most complete function of man.

Man, according to Aristotle, consists of a rational aspect, or part, and an irrational part. In between comes the area of desire and

appetites, which belongs to the rational to the extent that desires conform to reason, and to the irrational, to the extent that they do not. The presence of both rational and irrational powers in the soul accounts not only for moral contrariety but also for the two-fold division of the concept of virtue. He states this division as follows:

> Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name ethike is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit).[4]

"Intellectual virtue" is the function of the completely rational part of the soul; and "moral virtue" has as its province the rational control of desire. Moral virtue is promoted by habituation but consists in a disposition to make right choices in action. What makes an outcome moral in its effect is not nutritive or sensitive but appetitive intelligence, which, in fact, is identical with deliberate choice.[5] Moral virtue is to be attained by an energy (exercise) of the soul according to the aid of well-considered habits of choosing.

However, here a problem arises. Aristotle says in "On the Soul,"

> Hence appetite contains no deliberate element. Sometimes it overpowers [rational] wish and sets it in movement: at times, [rational] wish acts thus upon appetite, . . .or appetite acts thus upon appetite, i.e., in the condition of moral weakness. . . .[6]

Because man is defined rationally, it could be thought that human behavior should be spontaneously ethical, that is, that there is an automatic progressive development in accordance with the demand that all impulses and desires, namely, the irrational parts, are subordinated to the principle of intelligence. But there is conflict between the rational and the irrational soul.[7] The irrational function overpowers

the rational to fulfill its own purpose, something incompatible with rationality. Aristotle tries to resolve this conflict by appeal to the functional interrelation of those faculties and their independent development. This means that the overcoming of this conflict and the cumulative maintenance of the harmony of the faculties becomes essential to moral development. The virtuous disposition always lies between two extremes, that of going too far (excess) and that of not going far enough (defect). Moral virtue is a disposition to choose the golden mean with respect to action and feeling. Moral virtue, for Aristotle, may be characterized in the right degree, the right time, the right occasion, the right recipients, the right purpose, and the right manner as what is involved in the "mean and in the best."[8]

The mean in Aristotle's sense of virtue is not an arithmetical mean. It cannot be arithmetically determined. For instance, the proper amount of food for football players would be too much for business men. The athlete's fitness is maintained by the proper amount of food, neither too much nor too little. Courage is a mean between rashness (to fear nothing) and cowardice (to fear everything); temperance, a mean between self-indulgence (to abstain from no pleasure) and insensibility (to abstain from all). Liberality is the golden mean between stinginess and prodigality; magnificence, between ostentatious display and niggardly living. Applying this analogy to attitudes, emotions, and conduct, Aristotle develops a rational ethics which is not yet relativistic. Though the mean is variable, since some means lie nearer one or the other extreme, there is a mean for all situations--actually that middle course recognized with choice and intention. Therefore virtue is a disposition of choice. He says, "Virtue is a state of character concerned with

choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle."[9] The mean is emphasized as the standard of moral virtue in human action. This means that one is virtuous only when one's desires are controlled by reason, because reason judges the worth of objects and discovers the means of obtaining them. Thus, moral virtue requires the cooperation of the desiderative and the rational parts of the soul. Moral virtue is a disposition displaying purpose, in a mean relative to the agent and determined by a rule whereby a wise man would determine it.[10]

In the case of all moral virtues, the virtuous man conforms to the mean, avoids excess and defect, in respect to both passions and actions. By "relative to us," Aristotle means "that which is neither too much nor too little and it is not one, nor the same for all."[11] This does not imply the complete negation or rejection of natural capacities or irrational functions.[12] Moral virtue is a mean between two vices, and the vices "respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions."[13] Virtue lies in feeling or acting rightly in relation to time, objects, people, motives and manner. Aristotle says,

> In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take more, less or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself or relatively to us; and the equal is an intermediate between excess and defect.[14]

"Equal" here is not explained enough for us to understand what he really means. Equal to what? There can be no answer except "equal to the amount which is right."

How is it possible to recognize "an equal to the amount which is right?" A man must find exactly what "right mean" is. How can it be discovered? There are some rules through which moral virtue is developed

as "a habit or trained faculty."[15] These are: (1) the agent (a human being) desires an end; (2) the agent deliberates, seeing that B is the means to A (the end to be obtained), C the means to B, and so on, until (3) he perceives that some particular means near to the end or remote from it (as the case may be), is something that he can do here and now; (4) the agent chooses this means that presents itself to him as practicable; and (5) does the action in question. All moral virtues have to be learned and practiced with deliberative choice. Through "learning and practicing" by steps of moral process the mean can be determined in all moral situations. Moral virtue is the result of habit or custom, and this is developed by training. Aristotle says, "we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts."[16] In other words, a man cannot evaluate his own action as being honest unless he believes "a person must be honest." And if he knows what he is doing and he acts with a result of continuous character for the sake of rational action in itself, then he becomes honest through trained, repeated behavior. Belief and habit are interrelated with moral virtue. The function of habit in moral action is stressed as follows:

> . . .it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. . . . Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.[17]

Moral virtues involve choice; choice presupposes right desire and a true reasoning-process. The man who has the rule of moral virtues has a standard which determines the mean, i.e., what is intermediate between excess and defect. But there is no simple way for the wise man to use

the rule of moral virtues. How could there be when there are so many variables? What is needed is intellectual virtue as well as moral virtue. So we have to consider Aristotle's account of the intellectual virtues. He held that intellect (reason in pursuit of truth and reason as an agent of thinking) is proper to man, indicating that all men by nature desire to know. To solve the problem raised above in regard to moral virtues, Aristotle brings in the function of intellectual virtue. Why did he do that? There are two reasons:[18] (1) the virtuous man has been defined as acting in accordance with the "right rule";[19] (2) well-being has been defined as "activity of soul in accordance with virtue. . ., in accordance with the best and most complete."[20] In the stable continuity of human virtuous conduct as a process, virtue is the ideal intelligent response to the alternatives of action. And in order to have perfect moral virtue the habits of right choice, right thinking, and right decision should be developed.

The intellectual virtues differ from the moral in that they are acquired by instruction rather than habituation. Whenever one excels in a particular type of reasoning, he may be said to have the corresponding virtue. When one is "able to deliberate well about what is good or expedient for himself,"[21] he is said to be a man of practical wisdom (phronesis). Art (techne),[22] the reasoned capacity to make things well, is the virtue of the productive reason. A man skilled in demonstration possesses scientific knowledge (episteme).[23] The person who is able to grasp first principles, from which all demonstrations follow, has intuitive reason (nous). Wisdom (sophia) is found in the man who combines scientific knowledge with intuitive reason. Practical wisdom is the power of good deliberation about how particular things are to be

made, or particular states are to be brought into existence. Practical reasoning is always connected with the faculty of desire, and its exercise is always directed toward a specific end involving an activity. Thus, a virtuous man must have a variety of intellectual abilities; the capacity for deliberation as well as the capacity to choose good ends; practical wisdom, the temper of mind which selects ends wisely, must supplement understanding, good sense, and cleverness.[24]

Moral virtues[25] are practical and instrumental and function as the conditions and principles of prudent action that lead to the chief Good by helping man develop intellectual virtue. Moral virtues are dispositions to choose according to a certain rule and are an instrumental ground to establish the chief Good. Having said that all actions aim toward an end, Aristotle wants to distinguish between two major kinds of ends: instrumental ends (which become means for other ends), and intrinsic ends (which are for their own sake). The criteria of intrinsic ends are finality and self-sufficiency, which means to leave nothing to be desired. Intrinsic ends will be the chief Good as happiness. Other ends are desired as an instrument for the sake of the chief Good, and when the instrumental function is fulfilled completely it may be called good, but not the chief Good. How does the soul attain happiness? The general rule of moral virtue is "to act in accordance with right reason." In other words, what makes an outcome moral in its effect is not nutritive or sensitive action, but intelligence which is identical with deliberate choice.[26] Consequently there is a certain type of action through which man becomes positively moral. This type of action stems from the distinctively human faculty of intelligence. A human being not only thinks and uses reason to discover the truth

about things, but also acts and uses reason to choose among the alternatives open to him. Thus Aristotle distinguishes between reason as a cognitive faculty and reason as a practical faculty. John P. Anton describes the point of this distinction as follows:

> The powers of the soul at the end should come under the intelligent control and guidance of prudence so that the indeterminacy of their vast contrarieties (a disposition to choose between extremes, excess and defect) may become determinate and channelled behavior with charity in order and succinctness in expression.[27]

For Aristotle, an ethical (moral) virtue, therefore, is something more than a natural disposition, that is, its essence is more reason or intellect, not something which follows social custom or culture.

Ethical virtue is the habital character which is fostered through lawful conduct and does not need the consciousness of duty. It is a moral accomplishment that one becomes free from the consciousness of duty.[28] For Aristotle the complete reality of ethical virtue is practical wisdom. Aristotle does not accept that virtue can be identified with practical wisdom or that virtue is defined as a habit in accordance with reason. But he himself characterizes virtue with the expression, "habit accompanied by reason."[29] "In accordance with reason" means conforming to law, but "accompanied by reason" is applied to the expression of a rational character which is acquired completely. To be morally good, one must act through practical consideration and resolution.

The moral value of conduct is sustained by the calculation of values. For this reason an act motivated by passion is inferior to one which is accompanied by rational insight into value. What ensures constant morality is a steady character regulated by reason.[30] One who

acts with passion may succeed through a lucky chance, but his action cannot be well done in a moral sense. Aristotle does not agree with the way of living following a lucky chance. He rather assumes a happy man to be one who has a constant character such that he can endure even an unfortunate fate with confidence.[31] The man whose faculties are all regulated by reason--who maintains a complete harmony of reason and desire in himself--is called a wise person.

Confucius' View

In answering his disciples' questions on the existence and function of Jen Confucius stresses the importance not only of internalizing the principle of Jen as man's natural disposition, but also of putting it into daily practice. In the Analects, "daily practice" is given an ethical connotation. It is the "way" (tao) a man ought to travel because it is by Heaven that he should walk in it. It is, fundamentally, "the Way of Heaven" and only becomes "the Way of man" because all wise and good men follow it, seeking to conform their conduct to the Way of Heaven. To follow Tao (the Way) is to practice Jen. The essence of Jen is the way of living (virtue) humanized, Jen (humanness), thus, has to be conceived as an externalization of Jen (human nature) in a concrete situation.

Confucius does not employ a systematic method of developing his theory of Jen, but he demonstrates and illustrates directly the factual examples of Jen through his conversations with disciples. For instance, he recognizes this point when he says, "The common people may be made to follow it (the Way), but may not be made to understand it."[32] And Tzu-hsia quotes him as stating that "If a superior man is

reverential (or serious) without fail, and is respectful in dealing with others and follows the rules of propriety, then all within the four seas (the world) are brothers."[33] It can be derived from Confucius' conversations that the phenomenon of living is the same as the objectification or manifestation of Jen (human nature). The good life for man is to cultivate his own mind, Jen. What are the methods suggested by Confucius for its attainment? He teaches that only by strenuous moral effort can one hope to increase in Jen, and such moral effort involves self-cultivation and continuous "practice." He knows that the way of living grows not in a vacuum but in the practical affairs of everyday life. All men have to act by their nature. The proper way of living is the manifestation of Jen, being morally virtuous.

Jen is manifested in three ways:[34] (1) through personal morality by just being compassionate, concerned with personal relationships; (2) through speech-acts in which language is used persuasively and prescriptively; and (3) in a more "theoretical" sense through connections and relationships between specific and particular modes of action, the sense in which he speaks of the "one thread that runs through my doctrines." Confucius believes that cultivation of sympathy and affection for others is essential for a moral society to exist, and then requires us to master his specific virtues: propriety (li), righteousness (i), altruism (shu), loyalty (chung) and filial piety (hsiao). On the other hand, Confucius uses the more committed and prescriptive attitude to his disciplines in the "performative speech-act"[35] as a standard for action: "Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you." A "performative speec-act" is neither a descriptive statement nor a logical analysis of what an obligatory action consists

in. It is rather to love men, and to know men.[36] Finally he wants to unify the whole into one virtue; Jen comprehends specific virtues when it is stated that "Jen (仁) is Jen (人)." Thus the term Jen is used in Confucius' thought both in reference to factual, specific human action and at an evaluative level where it refers to a virtue that the ideal, perfectly good, complete man realized.

To say that Jen is the standard-bearer and consummation of all human relationships is not to ignore other human virtues and relationships. For instance, the term "li" (propriety) was originally used for religious rites, including ethico-religious connotations, but the term "li"[37], as pointed out by Fung Yu-Lan, is very widely used for the present definition of "politeness" or "courtesy" as well as for the entire body of usages and customs, political and social institutions.[38] In a slightly different context, the term "li" may also be understood as "harmonizing" the directions of other important virtues in Confucianism. Li connotes the order and harmony in which nature functions. The moral order of man is taken from the natural order of the cosmos. Natural necessity becomes moral necessity. In the Confucian universe, li, therefore, is the order, the law by which all things evolve. Li can be conceived of as an externalization of Jen (the inner nature of the human being) in a concrete social situation. When Confucius was asked how to cultivate the virtue of Jen (reverential love), the master said,

> Do not look at what is contrary to propriety, do not listen to what is contrary to propriety, do not speak what is contrary to propriety, and do not make any movement which is contrary to propriety.[39]

Li can be again defined as the debitum (what is due or proper) or

"becoming." Its origin, as The Book of Rites says,[40] comes from the primordial one, is manifested in the cosmos, transformed as Yin-Yang, changing as the four seasons, exhibited as intelligence. This concept of li as an externalization of Jen really is the self-realization of human nature. Confucius said, "The superior man (the perfect man) expensively studies literature (wen) and restrains himself with the rules of propriety (li). Thus he will not violate the Way."[41] Li as a process of ritualization refers in this particular context to the process of humanization, becoming the superior man, or becoming fully realized as an authentic human being. Wei-Ming Tu believes that Jen is "basically linked with the self-reviving, self-perfecting, and self-fulfilling process of an individual."[42] In another article[43] he also conceives Jen as a process of humanization in a dehumanized society. For man to attain his personal authenticity, he must undergo a process of self-transformation. This self-transformation in the Confucian sense must be manifested in the context of human relations. The term "li" thus implies the existence of an "other." To dwell in li is not to remain isolated. In other words, li, as a body of ritual rules, functions as a restraining arbiter of moral actions.

Of another virtue Confucius says:

> The superior man (Chün Tzu) regards righteousness (i) as the substance of everything. He practices it according to the principles of propriety. He brings it forth in modesty. And he carries it to its conclusion with faithfulness. He is indeed a superior man.[44]

Righteousness is a principle which belongs to man's nature. It is the fundamental principle of morality that confers qualities of right and wrong on human actions and what produces a situation which intrinsically satisfies us as moral agents. Righteousness is a principle which

relates to the character of the superior man and therefore relates to every virtue which relates to the character of the superior man. This role of righteousness is indicated in the following:

> The superior man (Chün Tzu) considers righteousness (i) as the most important. When the superior man has courage but no righteousness, he becomes turbulent. When the inferior man has courage but no righteousness, he becomes a thief.[45]

Righteousness determines the total significance of one's life and activities. That is what makes justification according to a norm possible and constitutes the normativeness of an action so justified. Confucius never refers to a fixed or unchangeable law, but righteousness does represent a unity which penetrates into a variety of cases of action, because righteousness is a quality motivated by Jen and displayed in conduct. This unity of human conduct comes from within, rather than from without, as reported in the Analects: "A superior man in dealing with the world is not for anything or against anything. He follows righteousness as the standard."[46] This means that with regard to material gains and all life activities the lack of righteousness (i) causes their meaninglessness and yet their value is not found in the activities and gains themselves.

How ought we, as human beings, to act in a particular situation? What kinds of action are manifestations of righteousness? There is a conversation between Duke Ching of Chi and Confucius which gives some insight on this:

> Duke Ching of Chi asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, 'Let the ruler be a ruler, the minister be a minister, the father be a father, and the son be a son.' The Duke said, 'Excellent! Indeed when the ruler is not a ruler, the minister not a minister, the father not a father, and the son not a son, although I may have all the grain, shall I ever get to eat it?[47]

Proper action imposes a task of intellectual reorganization. Its object is to make the names stand for what they ought to stand for, and then to so reorganize the social and political relations and institutions as to make them what their names indicate they ought to be.[48]

Confucius believes in an intellectual reorganization of society by means of "names" and "judgments." Words are to express the "ideas" or "ideals" (what things ought to be). That is why the main focus of Confucian philosophical attention is on moral psychology--a doctrine of human nature--and not on the development of traditional codes of behavior. When Chi Kang Tzu, who exercised the real power in the state of Lu, asked Confucius about government, Confucius replied,

> If you (Chi Kang Tzu) desire what is good, the people will at once be good. The virtue of a ruler is like the wind. The virtue of people is like grass. When the wind passes over it, it cannot but bend.[49]

This indicates explicitly and implicitly that life is a total sum of social and political relations; and these interwoven social and political relations are implied in and defined by the names of man which identify his proper works or functions. But Confucius also notes what will happen to the society when the principle of rectification fails: "To allow people to go to war without first instructing them is to betray them."[50] The inevitable result of a state of intellectual disorganization is the breakdown of all rights and duties, the obliteration of all relationships and obligations proper to the various strata or classes of society and the state.

We may say that while Jen gives substance to human virtues by way of extending oneself to others in terms of one's concern and love for others, righteousness (i) gives meaning to human virtues by way of

defining oneself in understanding one's end and the relation of oneself to the totality of all men. Similarly, while li (rite) actually exhibits virtues of human behavior and formulates rules by which human virtues can be stabilized and harmonized, righteousness confers on li the sanction of being relevant to the realization of Jen and an awareness of self-realization and self-justification. Thus, righteousness is the principle which mediates the universal and the particular as well as the understanding of the universal and the understanding of the particular.

Here is a question which should be considered. Is the moral principle (Jen) absolute and universally applicable or relative and confined to a particular situation? The classic case of such a conflict is the following passage in the Analects:

> The Duke of She told Confucius, 'In my country there is an upright man named Kung. When his father stole a sheep, he bore witness against him.' Confucius said, 'The upright men in my community are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this.'[51]

From Confucius' answer it can be known that although the moral principle is absolute and universally applicable, moral rules are relative and confined to particular situations. This distinction may help to clarify some of the issues we are facing now. Jen, for instance, would be a moral principle, whereas the manifestations of Jen would be moral rules (maxims). Moral maxims give definite, concrete instructions, while the moral principle points only to general directions. Principle is one, the manifestations are many. It is in this way that man has been able to combine a highly situational ethics with an ethics which upholds a universal moral principle (Jen). In answering his disciple's questions on the existence and functions of Jen, Confucius stresses the

importance not only of internalizing the principle of Jen to make it a part of one's natural disposition, but also of putting it into daily practice.

> The cultivation of the person is to be done through the Way, and the cultivation of the Way is to be done through humanity. Humanity (Jen) is (the distinguishing characteristic of) man, and the greatest application of it is in being affectionate toward relatives.[52]

Confucius seems to be concerned about factors of time and change in human history. In other words, no system, no matter how perfect it may be, can be simply put into different concrete situations. Moral behavior in Confucius does not consist of a short of Kantian "respect for the moral law," or in acting in accordance with moral law without benefit of any natural inclination. But the means-end dichotomy is also inadequate to express the basic principle of the application of Jen to concrete situations, because strictly speaking the attainment of the superior man should not be conceived as something external to the structure of man. Rather, it is a manifestation of that which constitutes true humanity. It is a misunderstanding to argue that since the perfection of the superior man is inherent in the nature of man, its attainment requires nothing more than a process of inner transformation, independent of society at large. Why? Despite his ontological self-sufficiency, for man to become a fully actualized human being he must constantly engage in the process of learning to be a sage (the highest form of authentic humanity). It should be remarked that the process of learning does not take the form of linear progression but that of gradual integration. Specifically man authenticates his being not by detaching himself from the world of human relations but by making sincere attempts to harmonize his relationship with others. This is the function

contained in the Confucian doctrine of the mean.

How can the universal principle of Jen be applied to concrete situations? Through the doctrine of the mean. It underlies the immediacy of moral judgment. Confucius states: "Study it (the way to be sincere) extensively, inquire into it accurately, think it over carefully, sift it clearly, and practice it earnestly."[53] To apply the universal principle of Jen to concrete situations, we need the learning process which consists of the five steps which could have come from John Dewey[54]: study, inquiry, thinking, sifting, and practice.

The emphasis on experience known in the West is not totally alien to the Chinese mind.[55] In the scheme of The Great Learning[56] the student is asked first to study all things. The main idea in this book is summed up in the following passage:

> When things are investigated, knowledge is extended; when knowledge is extended, the will becomes sincere; when the will is sincere, the mind is rectified; when the mind is rectified, the personal life is cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regulated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; when the state is in order, there will be peace throughout the world.[57]

The most important part of this statement consists of the three opening clauses. "To investigate things" means to find out the reason for particular things. The saying that the extension of knowledge depends on the investigation of things means that in order to extend our knowledge we must study everything, including experience, and find out exhaustively its reason. For in every human soul there is knowledge (the intuitive knowledge of the mind), and in everything there is a reason. It is only because we have not sufficiently inquired into the reason of things that our knowledge is so imperfect. The following passage tells us how to investigate everything thoroughly,

> There is a way to be sincere with oneself: If one does not understand what is good, he will not be sincere with himself. Sincerity is the Way of Heaven. To think how to be sincere is the way of man. . . . He is naturally and easily in harmony with the Way. Such a man is a sage (the superior man). He who tries to be sincere is one who chooses the good and holds fast to it.[58]

To investigate everything thoroughly we must apply the principle of Jen to concrete situations by exploring the situation through the intuitive knowledge of the mind. In other words, man's behavior, based on the doctrine of the mean, is connected to a knowledge of the reason contained in everything and every situation. This knowledge thus is not only intellectual but practical, because it knows not only what is but also what is right. This is, strictly speaking, wisdom--one of the three cardinal virtues of the perfected sage in Confucius' philosophy. The three virtues--goodness, wisdom and courage were considered by Confucius to be most important for the perfection of personality.

> The way of the superior man is threefold but I have not been able to attain it. The man of wisdom has no perplexities; the man of humanity has no worry; the man of courage has no fear.[59]

The doctrine of the mean includes two elements: rationality and intuition. Rationality is having a knowledge-seeking attitude based on experience, and intuition is the process of knowing by direct apprehension, not by logical inference or experimentation. Confucius emphasized "learning," while at the same time he stressed "inner reflection" for the behavior of the perfected sage. Once this preparatory knowledge was mastered, comprehensive understanding or sudden awakening could occur and a new truth could be unfolded. Through this combined process of the mean we can answer the given question: "Is the moral principle (Jen) absolute, and universally applicable or relative and confined to

particular situations?" The answer is "yes," to both parts. Jen is the moral universal principle, but it can be externally manifested as the maxim relative to particular situations. Confucius said, "The superior man is broadminded but not partisan; the inferior man is partisan but not broadminded."[60]

Dewey's View

In his "Theory of Valuation," Dewey begins an account of evaluative propositions by indicating that "good sense in practical affairs is generally identified with a sense of relative values."[61] By "relative values" is meant that for an action to be judged as having value, the action must sustain to something else the relation of means and end (or consequences) in experience. It can thus be asserted that what Dewey deals with--preferences, moral judgments (good, bad), as well as the objects of such preferences--are products of human attitudes toward experience. In other words the problem of valuation is closely associated with two diverse accounts of the relation between the activities of individuals--habits, impulse, and deliberation--and the objective situation which constitutes the environment and the setting of these human activities.

Valuation for Dewey is not simply located in a subject or an object; it is "in" a situation which cuts across the subject-object distinction. Value can be pervasive and exert a regulative influence on the development of a situation. Value is not internal and psychic; it is objective and factual. The problem for Dewey is not to find the good, but to construct it. The good is not, strictly speaking, the object of knowledge, but must be directly experienced or had. The

human being is not isolated from nature. "We live mentally and physically only in and because of our environment."[62] This experience of contact with environment gives meaning and value to man's activities. Values (the good) are ultimately grounded in human attitudes toward nature.

To explain how values are constructed, in Dewey's view, it is necessary to introduce the distinction he makes between direct experience and knowledge--what he calls the difference between the enjoyed and the enjoyable, the desired and the desirable, the satisfying and satisfactory.[63] He points out that to say something is enjoyed, desired, or satisfying is to "make a statement about a fact, something already in existence."[64] Such a statement is not different from one which says something is sweet or sour, white or red; as a statement of fact it is an assertion of matter existing in a situation. But to assert that a thing is enjoyable or desirable or satisfactory is,

> to define it in its connections and interactions. . . . To declare something satisfactory is to assert that it meets specifiable conditions. It is, in effect, a judgment that the thing 'will do'. It involves a prediction; it contemplates a future in which the thing will continue to serve; it will do. It asserts a consequence the thing will actively institute; it will do. That it is satisfying is the content of a proposition of fact, that it is satisfactory is a judgment, an estimate, an appraisal. It denotes an attitude to be taken, that of striving to perpetuate and to make secure.[65]

Direct experience, as he states in Experience and Nature,[66] denotes what is experienced, the world of events and persons, and it denotes that world caught up into experiencing, the career of mankind. Direct experiences are also,

> mixed not mechanically but vitally like the wheat and tares of the parable. We may recognize them separately but we cannot divide them for unlike wheat and tares they grow from the same sort.[67]

There is a crucial point, indicated by Dewey, which is involved in direct experiences as the "uncertain, unsettled, disturbed" situation.

> While the precarious nature of existence (direct experience) is indeed the source of all trouble, it is also an indispensable condition of ideality, becoming a sufficient condition when conjoined with the regular and assured.[68]

This introduces the need to determine how the decision-making process operates in knowledge. How does one apply intelligence to human affairs? The chapter on "Experience and Thinking" in Democracy and Education sets forth the general features of a reflective experience as contrasted with trial and error behavior,[69] and Part Three of Human Nature and Conduct treats the place of intelligence in conduct.[70] Much of The Quest for Certainty is devoted to the role of intelligence in human affairs and the pattern of experimental knowing.[71]

In order to transform an indeterminate situation into a determinate one, we should analyze direct experience through the five steps of thinking: (1) a felt difficulty; (2) its location and definition; (3) suggestion of a possible solution; (4) development by reasoning of the bearing of the suggestion; (5) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection.[72] The process of observing and collecting facts from which hypotheses are formed, and subjecting these hypotheses to empirical verification constitutes what Dewey calls the process of inquiry. Inquiry thus produces the unified whole of experiencer and experienced. The inquiry process has both a theoretical and a practical phase. The theoretical phase involves the settlement of an issue in a problematic situation; the practical phase involves a means of control which is "instrumental." For Dewey, "to inquire" is to act in a certain way when confronted with a problematic situation.

Experience analyzed through inquiry results in man choosing to act in a specific way. The way selected is "a judgment, an estimate, an appraisal" which states "a rule for determination of an act to be performed, its reference being to the future and not to something already accomplished or done."[73] The judgment thus is not merely an outcome of inquiry, but it also serves to direct future actions. To make such a selection implies the evaluation of several alternative ways, and then saying "such and such a way is valuable;" the selected way of acting not only settles an issue, but also commits one to an organized activity moving in the direction of the future.

Values are not predetermined by an Absolute mind but are either discovered in reality or created by man himself as he struggles to adapt himself to the world in which he lives. Values and ideals are reformed in the course of intelligent deliberation. In other words, intelligent deliberation is a mode of behavior; it is the specific ways in which a man interacts with environments, pursuing ends and choosing means to attain them. Dewey basically denies the objective reality of values, and value comes to be characterized as consisting of experience and the man's attitude to it through intelligent choice. This choice is just the practical, social living of life.

In "Theory of Valuation," Dewey distinguishes two uses of the term "value": value as prizing, and value as appraising; "prizing" in the sense of holding dear or precious, and "appraising" in the sense of putting a value upon, assigning value as dear or precious. Prizing is a preference which is non-judgmental and constitutes an emotional response, but appraising is characterized by a judging process, an

intellectual activity which involves the relation between a means and its consequence.

> There is present an intellectual factor--a factor of inquiry--whenever there is valuation, for the end-in-view is formed and projected as that which, if acted upon, will supply the existing need or lack and resolve the existing conflict.[74]

Judgments of appraisal occur through a relation between means and end as empirically ascertained and tested. Values, therefore, are seen as tools or instruments by which man decides what to do. In other words, the determination of an act is based on the considered relation between the means and the end. The particular consequence anticipated is expected to ensure against undertaking a certain course of action. The end-in-view is the valuable action which is expected to unify the operative elements of the situation, but it is not itself the unification. In other words, an end in Dewey's contention is never intrinsic or ultimate but always an end-in-view since it represents the solution to a specific problem; and the end-in-view is also never separated from the means of the series of predictable events which lead up to it. According to this viewpoint, Dewey seems to think that empirical methods can directly confirm all kinds of value judgments including ethical judgments. He says,

> Ends-in-view are appraised as good or bad on the ground of their serviceability in the direction of behavior dealing with states of affairs found to be objectionable because of some lack or conflict in them. They are appraised as fit or unfit, proper or improper, right or wrong on the ground of their requiredness in accompanying this end.[75]

Goals and ends remote from present activities do not absorb and concentrate in themselves the meaning of present activities because present activities should be subordinated to future ends and enjoyments. Dewey, thus, emphasizes the significance of activity in a problematic situation

rather than an objective situation. Values are not simply located in a subject or an object, but they are within a peculiar relation between an object and a human attitude to it in order to solve a problematic situation.

An activity is morally valuable depending upon its consequences, and evaluation of consequences as good or valuable depends upon the attitudes which are able to satisfy a human being in such a situation. Values for Dewey are reflected in man's choices which are determined by his attitudes or desires. A good is a satisfaction of desire in a particular situation. Satisfaction becomes a good only as the result of consequences of the satisfaction being good and as those consequences promote other desires and interests, and as a result of its incorporation into an organized activity. The good is always a process, not a fixed state, for adaptation of personal capacities with environing forces. He says,

> The good character, considered in relation to the moral struggle, is the one which chooses the right end, which endeavors to be better. The good character in itself is that made by this choice. . . . A wholly good man would feel such satisfaction in the contemplation of the ideal good that contrary desires would not affect him. He would take pleasure only in the right. Every accomplished moral deed tends to bring this about. Moral realization brings satisfaction.[76]

What is the good for Dewey? The good is seen as tools or instruments for making judgments of satisfaction and, therefore, it has value only in a particular, concrete situation. This is because the good consists in the activity of choosing what to do in a problematic situation. The good life for Dewey is "not getting or having, but doing and thus being."[77] This means that there is no absolute in ethics any more than there is in growth; there is no good in itself apart from judgment of

the thing in question in relation to a particular problematic.

What is meant by "doing and being?" Two types of virtuous (good) action have been recognized by Dewey[78]: (1) the special virtues; and (2) the cardinal virtues. Special virtues arise from special capacities or special opportunities, that is, "some special fitness or power of an agent"[79]--for instance, the "virtue" of a painter, of a scientific investigator, of a statesman, etc. These are basically occupational skills. But what are the virtues for a whole human being? These are the cardinal virtues (e.g., conscientiousness, truthfulness). They do not have to do with an act belonging to some particular capacity. The cardinal virtues have to do "with the spirit of the whole self"[80] as manifested in an ideal human being as well as in ideal human relations. How can good be described? The good is the excellent[81] activity of a man to become the whole man, and this is "the practical end of morality."[82]

How can we as human beings act in particular situations? How is it possible to recognize the right means?

> Intelligence becomes ours in the degree in which we use it, and accept responsibility for consequences. It is not ours originally or by production. . . . The stuff of belief and proposition is not originated by us. It comes to us from others, by education, tradition and the suggestion of the environment. Our intelligence is bound up, so far as its materials are concerned, with the community life of which we are a part. We know what it communicates to us, and know according to the habits it forms in us.[83]

As can be seen here, how to act in a particular situation is related to the problem of how to effect the interactions of the individual and his environment in order for him to discover good principles of conduct. Principles can be interpreted as general ideas arising out of experience as guides for experience--a view that would accord with both Aristotle

and Confucius. A rule, on the other hand, is like a recipe, a set of specific steps to follow to attain a fixed end. But for Dewey there are no fixed general ends, either psychological (as there are in Aristotle's case), sociological, or religious; no authority with a decreed moral principle (as there is in Confucius' case); and no eternally specified way of acting (virtues or vices). He insists that goals (ends), rules (the ways of action, laws) and judgments (how to act in particular situations)[84] must be balanced and related to each other in any account of ethics (any study of the interactions of the individual and his environment) and that the account must be given in terms of actual (moral) experience and not in terms of a divine plan. All judgments (the ways of action) involving valuation demand a concrete, specific context or an active, practical situation. Under these circumstances, Dewey states the problem of how our actions should be determined as follows:

> Our thoughts of our own actions are saturated with the ideas that others entertain about them, ideas which have been expressed not in explicit instruction but still more effectively in reaction to our acts.[85]

It has been observed that Dewey denies that there is a Good or an ideal as a principle, and also that the specific way of action is the means of producing value in particular situations. Nevertheless, our actions should be determined in an effective way in order to develop our way of living (virtue). How can virtue be developed effectively and significantly? Through the function of practical judgment.[86] How to judge what the direction of action should be in a problematic situation involves the process of practical judgment. Practical judgments are of the form: "M. N. should do thus and so; it is better,

wiser. . .to act thus and so."[87] Dewey's concern is thus with "e-valuating-activity" rather than just the nature of value. Practical judgments deal primarily with fixing the course of action demanded to carry an incomplete situation to its fulfillment. Dewey says,

> I do not mean by practical judgment a type of judgment having a different organ and source from other judgments. I mean simply a kind of judgment having a specific type of subject-matter. Propositions exist relating to agenda--to things to do or to be done, judgments of a situation demanding action.[88]

The characteristics of practical judgment[89] are: (1) its subject-matter implies an incomplete situation; (2) its subject-matter is itself a factor in the completion of the situation, carrying it forward to its conclusion; (3) that the judgment is practical implies that it makes a difference how the given is terminated; (4) a practical proposition is binary--a judgment that the given is to be treated in a specified way; it is a judgment of end and of means; and (5) the judgment of what is to be done implies a state of what the given facts of the situation are. All judgments, whatever they are, are indeed practical as long as they relate to what is to be completed or organized in the context of an incomplete or uncertain situation. Practical judgment is relative to a problematic situation which is the impetus for initiating the inquiry process. Consequently a judgment already having the value of good or bad for a specific subject-matter cannot be practical. Practical judgment informs us about a certain circumstance of the present situation (that it lacks something it should have), but also predicts the adequate (good) possible ways to get a solution to the particular situation. According to Geiger's comments on practical judgment, the practical judgment for Dewey,

> is one applying to specific, incomplete, problematic, objective situations; situations in which, as with the self-fulfilling prophecy, the proposition plays a part, even if a minor one, in the completion of the situation. Thus, a practical proposition is one dealing hypothetically with a predictive future.[90]

How can practical judgment be decisive for the future direction of actions? Through intelligent choice. Here is the role of intelligence in Dewey's philosophy, especially in the art of living. Intelligent choice controls the means to reach the next step (end-in-view) through using knowledge of previous means-ends relations. The practical judgment determines means and ends at the same time through the function of intelligence. He explains the relation between means and ends, but does not say what way should be chosen for the activity because he denies any worthwhile substantive directions can be given for this choice.

Dewey does not have a list of particular virtues as Confucius and Aristotle do, even though he distinguishes between the special virtues and the cardinal virtues. For Dewey a list like Confucius' or Aristotle's would inevitably be made up of those modes of behavior approved at a particular time and place. Instead of such a list of virtues Dewey gives the criteria of how to make practical judgments in particular situations.

> Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Sufficient it is to stimulate us to remedial action, to endeavor in order to convert strife into harmony, monotony into a variegated scene, and limitation into expansion. The converting is progress, the only progress conceivable or attainable by man. Hence every situation has its own measure and quality of progress, and the need for progress is recurrent, constant.[91]

The standard for practical judgment is harmony throughout intellectual choice. This is the good life; it is virtuous behavior for Dewey.

Conclusion

There is no question that man can be shaped by environmental variables. Man is governed by them. Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey seem to agree on this point. Man is intended to live in relation with others as a social animal. Man can fulfill himself only within the life of the society. Man, according to Dewey, takes his origin from nature, is a part of nature, finds his fulfillment in nature and ends in nature. But, as indicated in Section 2 of Chapter II, what man does as a social being in the contemporary technological society is even more pervasively controlled by the community. The man who is shaped absolutely by his environment is a person with "other-directedness." This means that man experiences himself as other, does not even know why he acts, what to do, or where to go. Such a man has been defined as a man who has few independent convictions about himself.

In order to solve such a man's situation, two questions have been raised: "what is the way of living in a society?" and "what is society's relation to human nature?" In the present chapter the notion of virtue in Aristotle's, Confucius' and Dewey's views has been described. Virtue, generally speaking, is the external manifestation of human nature. This means that in order for man to be virtuous human nature has to be concretely actualized as an action, the so called way of living (virtue).

It has been observed in Chapter III that a human being is a being of moral worth--a being of inherent dignity and incomparable value. This inherent property in man is identified with the essential, intelligible nature of man for Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey. The activities of human nature are the life-style in a society. In other words,

similar to Socrates' view in the famous dictum, "Knowledge is virtue, and virtue is knowledge," this teaching can be summed up as "to know what human nature is is to do it." Human nature should be not only used for the direction of human life, for the control of the inner man, but also identified with the life-style. Man can form virtue for himself.

(1) Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey all contend that man by his nature is a rational social being; and therefore he is not an isolated self but a member of his community. But within the community he must always perform his proper works or function. This means that man must have an intelligently planned life. Reason has to be awarded a guiding place in the conduct of life. Through this man is able to know what he is doing and why, through his function of intelligence, he is moving toward a definite future goal. This is the way to make a person morally valuable. This is the way to avoid the situation of the dehumanized man. If man lives up to or does his proper works or functions in conformity with virtue, he surely will avoid alienation.

(2) Confucius also seems to agree with Aristotle and Dewey that the performance of activities, or activity in conformity with virtue, is uniquely the good of man. Further while Confucius and Aristotle agree with one another that the doing as such is itself self-sufficiently pleasant, Dewey's view is that "doing" is always related to the next step (practical) for the solution of a problematic situation. However since virtuous activity is pleasant (either self-sufficiently pleasant for Confucius and Aristotle or instrumentally pleasant for Dewey), it is therefore the most delightful happiness of man for which he can possibly wish in his life-time.

(3) The next point is about how the concept of virtue has been defined by these three philosophers. They agree with each other that virtue is the excellent activity with the best and most complete function. In their views excellent activity means to cultivate man's own peculiar mind or reason, even though Dewey expresses differently the activity in man as a vocational technique for practical outcomes in society, that is, as a tool for the purpose of explaining and ultimately understanding why people do what they do. Nevertheless all three philosophers have a common aspect in regard to virtue, namely the virtuous life has to be lived through intellectual activity or choice.

(4) The fourth point is how the good life of man is understood by these three philosophers. For Aristotle and Dewey the performance of activities, i.e., the virtuous life of man, is done through intellectual choice. For Aristotle the choice is made in the practical activity of the agent on the ground of intellectual virtue, i.e., wisdom and intuition; Dewey's concern is with the process by which valuation occurs and on the nature of value only as a function. This process is one of intelligent deliberation based on practical judgment. Confucius, however, says that the virtuous life of man is to follow Jen by confirming his conduct to the Way of Heaven (Jen). For Confucius and Aristotle the priori and universal principle for the virtuous life exists as reason in human nature, but Dewey sets up a situational value capable of stating "relations between things as means and other things as consequences,"[92] and denies that there is a Good or an ideal. Nevertheless all three philosophers assert that happiness is to be found in a life of virtuous activities. Only a man who fully realizes all his human capacities can truly be called happy. Every man is striving for happiness, but not

everyone can hope to obtain it. Happiness belongs to the man whose life is active and rational.

Throughout this chapter there has been a strong emphasis on the unity of human nature and practice. No gap or inconsistency between human nature and practice should be allowed if there is to be a harmonious unity.

Here is a problem for our consideration: How can harmonious unity be established? How can reason in human nature be applied to concrete circumstances? This is the question of how to connect a principle with moral rules. Principle means something universally applicable to all mankind. Moral principle is the basis of the standard and rule of conduct which determines all concrete human behaviors. A rule has to be based on circumstances. It can be changed according to a particular person, situation or culture. It need not be absolute. Rules contain in themselves always the possibility to be changed. As observed above, principle is admitted in Aristotle and Confucius; the highest virtue (happiness) in Aristotle; Jen in Confucius. While Dewey does not accept a fixed principle or an eternally determined way of action, he does emphasize the growth of moral value in a problematic situation in a way that implies a kind of absolute or universal principle. Because man is shaped by circumstances, he can be changed and probably act at each situation. But he needs to discover the rationale for and justification of his whole behavior, no matter how or when he is acting. Thus it is important to think of one universal moral principle which lies at the foundation of all the varying moral rules of different societies. There is no question that what is right in one society may be wrong in another,

because each society provides different criteria (local rules) to judge moral situations. This does not, however, mean that a person has a different human nature applicable to each different society. The same mind internally is expressed differently, depending on particular situations.

How can this combination between principle and rules in a person be achieved? Through "learning and practicing" in the situation. The person with this reconciliation can be called a wise man, a morally harmonious person, and a morally autonomous person. Thus human nature and human virtue can be united through "learning by doing" or "practice."

ENDNOTES

[1]Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," II, 6, 1106 a 15-18.

[2]Ibid., I, 7, 1098 a 18.

[3]Ibid., I, 7, 1098 a 3.

[4]Ibid., II, 1, 1103 a 14-26.

[5]Ibid., VI, 2, 1139 b 4.

[6]Aristotle, "On the Soul," III, 11, 434 a 12-14.

[7]The typical terminology will be used to explain the division of soul: rational and irrational (not non-rational).

[8]Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," II, 6, 1106 b 16-24.

[9]Ibid., II, 6, 1106 b 36-1107 a 2.

[10]Ibid., II, 6, 1106 b 36.

[11]Ibid., II, 6, 1106 a 31-32.

[12]Ibid., II, 6, 1106 b 16-18; 1109 a 20-24.

[13]Ibid., II, 6, 1107 a 2-6.

[14]Ibid., II, 6, 1106 a 26-29.

[15]Ibid., II, 9, 1109 b 1-10.

[16]Ibid., II, 1, 1103 b 1-2.

[17]Ibid., II, 1, 1103 a 19-25.

[18]W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1949), p. 215.

[19]Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," II, 2, 1103 b 32 f.

[20]Ibid., I, 7, 1098 a 16.

[21]Ibid., VI, 4, 1140 a 25.

[22]Ibid., VI, 4, 1140 a 1-23.

[23]Ibid., VI, 3, 1139 b 14-36.

[24]Ibid.

[25]The cardinal moral virtues are courage, temperance, justice. Aristotle also considers the virtues of magnificence, liberality, friendship and self-respect.

[26]Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," VI, 2, 1139 b 4.

[27]John P. Anton, Aristotle's Theory of Contrariety (London, 1957), p. 193.

[28]Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," I, 1, 1099 a 7-21.

[29]Ibid., VI, 13, 1144 b 17-27.

[30]Ibid., III, 10, 1115 b 19ff.

[31]Ibid., I, 11, 1100 a 10- b 11.

[32]Confucius, "Analects," 8:9.

[33]Ibid., 12:5.

[34]For a good discussion, cf. "Socrates and Confucius: Moral Agents or Moral Philosophers?" G. H. Mahood, Philosophy: East and West, Vol. 21 (April 1971), pp. 177-188.

[35]Ibid., p. 178.

[36]Confucius, "Analects," 12:22.

[37]The term actually has no single meaning or usage. There are at least five different ways of interpreting the term "li" (propriety): (1) Li as a pattern of behavior as opposed to a set of rules; (2) Li as the essence of rites; (3) Li as important tools in the process of self-cultivation; (4) Li as a claim about human nature; (5) Li as the doctrine of rectification of names. Chad Hansen, "Freedom and Moral Responsibility in Confucian Ethics," Philosophy: East and West, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April 1972), pp. 169-186.

[38]Fung Yu-Lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde, Vol. 1 (Princeton, 1953), p. 68.

[39]Confucius, "Analects," 12:1.

[40]Li Chi: Book of Rites, trans. James Legge, Vol. 1 (New York, 1967), pp. 380-384.

[41]Confucius, "Analects," 6:25.

[42]Wei-Ming Tu, "The Creative Tension Between Jen and Li," Philosophy: East and West, Vol. 18 (Jan. 1968), p. 34.

[43]Wei-Ming Tu, "Li as Process of Humanization," Philosophy: East and West, Vol. 22 (1972), pp. 187-201.

[44]Confucius, "Analects," 15:17.

[45]Ibid., 17:23.

[46]Ibid., 4:10.

[47]Ibid., 12:11.

[48]cf. Confucius, "Analects," Book XIII, Ch. III, The Chinese Classics, trans. James Legge (New York, 1870).

[49]Confucius, "Analects," 12:19.

[50]Ibid., 13:30.

[51]Ibid., 13:18.

[52]"The Doctrine of the Mean," 20, Chan, Source Book.

[53]Ibid.

[54]This is Wing-Tsit Chan's comment on the five steps, Chan, Source Book, p. 107.

[55]Hu Shih, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China (New York, 1963), p. ix.

[56]"The Great Learning," Chan, Source Book, pp. 84-94.

[57]Ibid., pp. 86-87.

[58]"The Doctrine of the Mean," 20.

[59]Confucius, "Analects," 14:30.

[60]Ibid., 2:14.

[61]Dewey, "Theory of Valuation," International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. II, No. 4, p. 4.

[62]Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 327.

[63]Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York, 1929), pp. 261-264.

[64]Ibid., p. 260.

[65]Ibid., pp. 260-261.

[66]Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 28.

[67]Ibid., p. 47.

[68]Ibid., p. 63.

[69]Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York, 1966), pp. 139-151.

[70]Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 172-277.

[71]Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 195-222.

[72]Dewey, How We Think (Boston, 1910), pp. 68ff.

[73]Dewey, "Theory of Valuation," p. 20.

[74]Ibid., p. 34.

[75]Ibid., p. 47.

[76]Dewey, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics (New York, 1957), pp. 227-228.

[77]Ibid., p. 208.

[78]Ibid., pp. 229-233.

[79]Ibid., p. 229.

[80]Ibid., p. 230.

[81]Dewey agrees with Aristotle's interpretation of "Excellence."

[82]Dewey, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics, p. 233.

[83]Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 314.

[84]The distinction of these three factors first appeared in a communication presented to the French philosophical society by John Dewey. "Three Independent Factors in Morals," Trans. by Jo Ann Boydston, Educational Theory, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (July 1966), pp. 197-209.

[85]Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 315.

[86]Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 374.

[87]Ibid., p. 335.

[88]Ibid.

[89]Ibid., pp. 337-345.

[90]G. R. Geiger, John Dewey in Perspective (New York, 1958), p. 49.

[91]Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 282.

[92]Dewey, "Theory of Valuation," p. 21.

CHAPTER V

EDUCATION

To find a solution for the dehumanized situation of human beings in a modern technological society, two subjects--"what human nature is" and "what human nature does (works)"--have been investigated in Chapters III and IV according to Aristotle's, Confucius', and Dewey's views. But it is not enough simply to know "what it is" or "what it does." The most important task is to discover how these elements can be unified and developed into one whole, because the unification is the process of becoming a person. This process produces a true being, who should be an end in itself, but should not be a tool for others.

How can this unification between human nature and its manifestation (virtue) be effectively accomplished? In other words, what is the solution to overcome the alienated situation involved in a technological culture? Through education, which will determine the shape of our living and the direction of future life. Education here is not simply the function of cultural transmission, but it is also a process of making man become a person. If a man undergoes education, he would be educated for becoming a person, regardless of whether he is conscious of it or not. To overcome the dehumanized situation described in Chapter II, everybody should be educated as a person with independent convictions about himself. Here is the role of education and its significant meaning. While human nature and virtue are being unified through education,

a man not only overcomes the phenomenon of dehumanization, but also he positively becomes a true being with happiness, the wise person.

If the life of harmony with reason is necessary for a man to overcome dehumanization, what is it that effectively makes the harmonious life? What kind of educating does a man need? What is the aim of such education? Answers to these questions will be sought through this chapter by comparing the educational views of these three philosophers: Aristotle, Confucius, and Dewey. Through such a discussion educational solutions to problems of technological culture will be suggested.

According to Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey, the good life for man can be derived from and based on the essential characteristics of human nature. The good life for man is the aim of all human activities. And also this life is identified with "being happy." Being happy means to seek not simply living, but living-well, doing-well. This is because any account of happiness depends upon an account of the nature of virtue, "perfection of any sort." Perfection of any sort, or "excellence," is called good. These three philosophers maintain that the good is related to the activity of human nature. If man lives up to or does his proper work on the basis of human nature, such an activity is "living well," or "doing well." Thus, "living well" is the active display of human nature as it is cultivated or actualized. A man who is living well is called "a person with happiness" because he is actualizing and fulfilling his essential human nature. This person is also in a situation of overcoming alienation, and of knowing "who he is going to be" or "where he is going." Such a person is a wise man, a superior man as a moral ideal.

How can human nature be fully actualized? How can human nature be exemplified through its activities (virtues)? By means of education. Education for these three philosophers is the key for the whole living enterprise whereby one becomes a wise man who has overcome the alienated situation through perfect virtue. Thus the aim of education is to move man in the direction of happiness, in the direction of obtaining all the good human nature craves and must actualize in order that its essential nature might be fulfilled.

How can human nature be put into practice? To answer this a more detailed explanation of views about the morally ideal person (the wise person for Aristotle, Chün-Tzu for Confucius, and a realized man for Dewey) will be necessary; and along with this the respective philosophies of education will be outlined in this chapter.

Aristotle's View

For Aristotle man is partly an emotional and sensitive, and partly a rational being; all deliberate human activities aim at the good, and the good of man is the active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue. Aristotle uses the phrase "well being" to identify the chief Good (Happiness), which is never considered as a means to some more final end. Happiness is not only the ultimate standard for all our moral judgments on the good for man, but also the ultimate aim of education. The aim of education is "to realize the good;" its central concern is "to make man virtuous"[1] in order that he may become a wise person. According to Aristotle, happiness is essential to morality from the outset. Man reaches the ultimate end of his activities through "habit or instruction." Aristotle also

stresses "learning by doing" or "instruction (formal discipline)." Habit means not only the repeated performance of just and temperate actions which produce virtue, but it also includes some conscious reflection on the activities, awareness of what one is doing. Instruction teaches the rules for right action or the reason why things are as they are. Aristotle describes the importance of education as follows:

> Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to determine out of what and what sort of elements the state which is to be happy and well-governed should be composed. . . .
>
> We maintain. . .that happiness is the realization and perfect exercising of virtue, and this not conditional, but absolute. . . . There are three things which make men good and virtuous; these are nature, habit, rational principle. . . . Man has rational principle, in addition, and man only. Wherefore nature, habit, rational principle must be in harmony with one another; for they do not always agree; men do many things against habit and nature, if rational principle persuades them that they ought. We have already determined what natures are likely to be most easily moulded by the hands of the legislator. All else is the work of education; we learn some things by habit and some by instruction.[2]

In this passage he defines the end of education, the nature of the thing to be educated, and the process of education.

What is the ultimate aim of education? Happiness (the highest Good). Happiness means perfectability of human nature, and is an activity, not merely a capacity or a disposition. He says that the human good

> turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.
>
> But we must add 'in a complete life.'[3]

Happiness is identified with the activities of "living well" of "doing well." Man has a soul as man; and man needs to exercise well and excellently the distinctive function of his soul, that is, his intellect or reason. The good of man is the active exercise of his soul's

faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue. But not all excellent activity of the soul is the highest good. The highest good for which we are seeking is desired as being what it is and not because of anything produced by it.[4] Happiness is something different from the activity which is required to produce it. Since happiness is an activity of man, it should be the best kind of activity, and this is the activity of the best part of man, i.e., of the part which thinks. The life of contemplation will be this activity, for it is most continuous and most self-sufficient as well as the necessary condition for happiness. Such activity is also most divine.[5]

Happiness for Aristotle consists in two forms of rational activity: in the free exercise of reason in theoretical study and in the discipline of the emotions according to a rule or purpose formulated by reason. Accordingly, Aristotle distinguishes two forms of reason: theoretical wisdom (sophia, the scientific faculty) and practical wisdom (phronesis, the calculative faculty). The former is necessary to human happiness as a component, the latter as a productive agent. Sophia is concerned only with permanent truths which man is powerless to change. Phronesis is concerned with how to apply moral principles intuitively to given situations. Theoretical wisdom is to exercise its essential, "philosophizing," scientific, contemplative activity of grasping the truth. Through this faculty of reason man contemplates what is necessary and admits no contingency. On the other hand, when reason is calculating how to attain what will make a man happy, it displays itself as practical wisdom, which is the basis and guide of distinctively moral action. This calculative faculty of reason is concerned with what is contingent. Sophia is intrinsically valuable, but phronesis is a disposition the

active manifestations of which constitute happiness. Strictly speaking, the highest and most desirable form of happiness lies in the activity of contemplation (sophia).[6]

If a man wants to achieve his function, in order to be morally virtuous, then a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral virtues is acting for the sake of reasons or on reasons. Because the impetus to action is desire, however, Aristotle said that moral virtues belong to the sensitive soul. Nevertheless, one is virtuous only when one's desires are controlled by reason, because reason judges the worth of objects and discovers the means of obtaining them. How is theoretical wisdom useful? Although practical wisdom is not an efficient cause of happiness, what is it that makes practical wisdom more effective? The answer to both questions comes from the relation between sophia and phronesis. The relation is to be attained not merely by philosophical speculation, but by "an energy of the soul according to reason," by well-considered habits of choosing the golden mean between two extremes--excess and defect. The virtuous man must not only have good intellectual habits of various sorts, but also sound habits of action involving habitual desires of genuinely good ends as well as good emotional dispositions. Here is the nature of the thing to be educated. In other words, the relationship between theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom (moral virtue) can be improved and developed by the process of education: habit and instruction. According to Aristotle,[7] happiness, the best activity of human nature, is not endowed by nature, nor bestowed by divine providence, not yet attained by mere learning, and it is not a matter of luck. Moral virtue is a product of habituation or practice. It requires learning and also habit and discipline.

Habit means the repeated rational activities which understand the rules that make practice right and then which perform the right mean between extremes--excess and defect. Habit can be got only by performance, i.e., doing of what is good or just, and so on, as being good, just and so on. A man who habitually acts in a certain way knows the rules that determine the way he ought to act and the reason why he should follow these rules. In Aristotle's view habit includes some conscious reflection on what one is doing, and why. Instruction, the formal discipline, means to teach the rules for right action or the reason why things are as they are. When a man is trained to act rightly through habit, he is not likely to change his ways; moral behavior becomes second human nature as a personality. Aristotle says, "I say that habit's but long practice, friend, And this becomes man's nature in the end."[8] All teaching by way of reasoning proceeds from pre-existing knowledge of happiness.[9] The knowledge of happiness should be exercised through the educational programs--reading, writing, gymnastics, music and drawing. Education is the activity of experiencing what is meant by happiness. Habit and instruction are the methods which can develop this activity of human nature. The more we partake of this method, the closer we come to the divine. These activities of education cannot be limited to a short period, but must continue through the whole life process. Aristotle says,

> Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name ethike is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature.[10]

Deliberate reflection on an act, according to Aristotle's view, can be characterized as a habit. It is a habit of intelligence which enables man to know the cause of his action. Habit involves being aware of the situation, seeing the future consequences and choosing one of several possible actions through practical judgment which requires an intellectual deliberation. Since happiness is to be found in the best activities of human nature, these activities should be considered. In order for them to be considered, three main elements are required[11]: (1) what is meant by happiness as an activity and its connexion with goodness; (2) intellectual development; and (3) character-training. Since happiness belongs to man who has cultivated his human nature to the utmost, he knows what happiness really is through the active rationality and tries to have the best life (moral virtue) which can be expressed in practical wisdom.

Aristotle states the relation of reason and moral virtue as follows:

> The origin of action--its efficient, not its final cause--is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character.[12]

This implies that a man does not act rightly (does not have a moral sense) by nature, although he has a natural capacity for right behavior. Man must move from what he is capable of doing to what he actually does by knowing what he must do, deliberating about it, and then choosing in fact to do it.

Aristotle sees that there must be deliberate choice[13] in action. "The object of choice being one of the things in our power which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things

in our own power."[14] The proper human act is the act performed through choice preceded by deliberation. Deliberation is the search which concerns not the end of the act, but the various possible means of attaining this end. Choice preceded by deliberation can operate and answer only where there is indeterminateness and contingency.[15] Deliberation about this contingent situation, thus, is concerned with selecting the best means (moral virtue) to the good life (the final end); so deliberation is a function of the productive intellect which can command and sometimes control the irrational soul, the feelings and desires. There cannot be any choice producing moral virtues apart from reason (the deliberating faculty). This is a significant role for the productive intellect (practical wisdom).

Practical wisdom must not only calculate the means but recognize the end; so Aristotle remarks: "It is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral virtue."[16] Practical wisdom is intimately connected with moral virtue. Practical wisdom is a power which tells the agent how to act in an indeterminate situation. This means that this wisdom is not simply a faculty of rationality, but includes the power to control the agent in deciding which is the right means to happiness in a general situation. This wisdom is instrumental for happiness, as medicine is instrumental to health. Aristotle states it:

> It is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, . . .but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general.[17]

The means to the end should be evaluated as right or wrong relative to the end. Practical wisdom is concerned about the moral mean, not the

fact-description--what occurs in the situation--but the moral judgment with action[18]--what activities are to be produced and why and how. In other words, the origin of moral action is choice, by which we know to be good.

Here is a question: How can practical wisdom choose rightly? Aristotle says nothing about the concrete criteria to select the sequences to happiness, so how can we choose the right means to the end? The moral virtues (the wise man's behavior) are something "possessing truth about the first principle" or "following the principle." Aristotle points out:

> Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles.[19]

How can practical wisdom possess truth? Through intuitive reasoning. This wisdom presupposes intuitive reasoning which grasps the first principle. Aristotle continues: "Therefore wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge--scientific knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion."[20] He says again in Posterior Analytics,

> If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge (truth). And the originative source of science grasps the original basic premiss.[21]

That is to say, the relation between moral virtues and practical wisdom has to be sought not simply in the extension of the notion of means to reason, but in the fact that reason is the ultimate judge for the right mean constituting moral virtue. Therefore, philosophical wisdom (sophia) makes us choose the perfect happiness to aim at. The end for man is a life of contemplation establishing perfect happiness, the

theoretical life.

> If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue, . . . The activity of this in accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness. That this activity is contemplative we have already said.[22]

The life of philosophic contemplation can confer supreme happiness[23] (the chief Good) on a man.

By combining moral virtue and human intelligibility, Aristotle shows that man is a rational animal seeking the completion of his rationality both in thinking and practice. But Aristotle's basic concern, according to John H. Randall, Jr., is, "Always how to make this man here healthy. Just so, Ethics does not seek the Good in itself. . .but how this man here can act well in this situation."[24] What is necessary in order for man to be good? Moral virtue. What is the formal standard for every moral virtue? Unfortunately Aristotle says nothing more than ". . .lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle. . . ." But this is exactly why it is important for us to deal with human intelligibility as related to moral virtue. Happiness for the best life is based on the complete operation of human moral virtue through practical wisdom. How can moral virtues be obtained through practical wisdom? Not as a result of "subjective preference,"[25] or as being a hidden force in nature pushing nature toward the moral goal by necessity,[26] but by habit and instruction.

Through habit and instruction, the activity of human nature can be perfected. In other words, education for Aristotle is intended to produce the good man. The good man is the educated man. What kind of education? "Moral-intellectual" education. Education which cultivates man's moral virtues as related to practical wisdom. It teaches not only

how to act at the present time, but also how to take new directions in life. Through this education, a man can discover how to decide what to do in a particular problematic situation, and also the educated man is able to close the gap between knowing what is right (moral knowledge) and doing it (moral action). The man who accomplishes this can be called a morally autonomous person. He knows "what he is going to be" and "where he is going." That is why he is no longer an alienated person.

> Happiness extends, then, just so far as contemplation does, and those to whom contemplation more fully belongs are more truly happy not as a mere concomitant but in virtue of the contemplation; for this is in itself precious. Happiness, therefore, must be some form of contemplation.[27]

Confucius' View

Confucius stresses the importance not only of internalizing the principles of Jen to make them a part of man's natural disposition, but also of putting them into daily practice. For Confucius Jen is not a lofty metaphysical abstraction beyond the comprehension of the ordinary person. On the contrary he insists that Jen is close at hand for everyone to grasp. Confucius affirms a this-worldly life. Everyone needs to grasp the essence of Jen in order to become a man of Jen (this is the doctrine of the perfectability of human nature). But not all people will be men of Jen. How can the perfection of human nature be achieved? Through education. Education for Confucius is the process of cultivating human nature in order to produce Chün-Tzu. This "ideal man" can be actualized through the development of a good character and its practice. Confucius says:

> Some are born with the knowledge of those duties [five duties of universal obligation]; some know them by study; and some acquire the knowledge after painful feeling of their ignorance. But the knowledge being possessed, it comes to the same thing. Some practice them with a natural ease; some from a desire for their advantages; and some by strenuous effort. But the achievement being made, it comes to the same thing [the man of Jen].[28]

For Confucius the word "education" is not only used in the sense of merely training a man intellectually, but it also means to develop and discipline man morally by practice. Confucius points out the importance of practice in education.

> The master said, 'To live in obscurity, and yet practice wonder, in order to be mentioned with honour in future ages--this is what I do not do.'[29]

> The good man tries to proceed according to the right path, but when he has gone halfway, he abandons it--I am not able so to stop.[30]

When Confucius was asked about "humanity (Jen)," he said: "Jen is to love men and knowledge is to know man."[31] For Confucius the proper function of man is Jen, which is innately good and capable of realizing its function in the universe. Confucian philosophy deals with the concrete and contingent human world, and considers history (immediate experience) as the unfolding, as well as the deposit, of essence, that is, the intelligibility of human nature. That is why the way of Jen is found in the encounter of the common people living their lives in association with one another. He insists on this association. All any one can hope to achieve in his lifetime is to practice (follow) Jen: Jen is "the guiding principle for conduct through life."[32] As indicated in the Chinese character "仁(Jen),"[33] man is involved in mankind and lives his everyday life in relation to others, i.e., in the family, in the community and in the nation. Man lives in an atmosphere of humanity.

Man in isolation is not only a fiction but also an infraction of being human. Reciprocity constitutes the humanness of man. Only through sociality does a man become a man. Thus, for Confucius, Jen is primarily an existential index of human reality. It is the "sacrament of coexistence,"[34] while man's ultimate concern is coexistence. As the way of everyday life and sociality in one,[35] Jen entails morality. To be a man of Jen (the superior man), one has to practice it. It is accessible not just to the privileged few, but, on the contrary, the privileged few are determined by the practice of Jen.

There are generally two fundamental senses in which we may define the concrete use of reason (the essence of Jen) in Confucius' philosophy. In the first sense man has to open his eyes to reality and observe activities (doing) and patterns of things. Confucius states:

> Things have their root and their completion. Affairs have their end and their beginning. To know what is first and what is last will lead near to what is taught in The Great Learning.[36]

The first sense of reason is on the basis of empirical observation and experience at large. In the second sense Confucius' philosophy is generally oriented toward action and practice in society and government and aims at the reform and perfection of man and the world. This means that theoretical understanding (knowledge) must entail practical doing (practicability), and in practical doing of any kind one will acquire knowledge and wisdom of oneself and the world, and thus perfection through a process of self-cultivation[37] and of concrete realization of knowledge in practice. Confucius points out the importance of self-cultivation as follows, "From the emperor down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of every thing besides."[38] This process of self-cultivation is not simply

an intellectual activity of reason, but a manifestation of reasonableness in life and in the attainment of an ideal of perfection. What is the ideal of perfection?[39] The ideal of perfection in human nature is to be a man of Jen (Chün-Tzu). This is the end of education for Confucius. And also a man of Jen becomes a person who has already overcome dehumanization.

What are the characteristics of the man of Jen? (1) One has to do his duty to others, but not require others to do their duties to him. Confucius says, "The superior man brings the good things of others to completion and does not bring the bad things of others to completion. The inferior man does just the opposite."[40] The man of Jen sets himself free from all the instinctive and irrational desires in human life.[41] (2) The man of Jen ought to cultivate his virtues and abilities without asking praise from others. Man, motivated by the universal principle of reason, would be naturally appreciated for what he has done to others. Confucius says,

> The Master said, 'Alas! there is not one that knows me.' Tsze-Kung said, 'What do you mean by thus saying--that no one knows you?' The Master replied, 'I do not mean murmur against Heaven. I do not grumble against men. My studies lie low, and my penetration rises high. But there is Heaven;--that knows me!'[42]

In other words, leaving the desire for praise itself alone and as unconditionally right, then man may simply take the praise of others as personal gratification. (3) All the moral principles, moral ideals, and moral values of man's actions and intentions can be discovered by self-reflection in his mind. Since human nature is essentially good, moral ideals and its principles are nothing other than the norms or standards awakened within human nature and immanently presented to our

moral self-consciousness for self-evaluation. Confucius says,

> When the mind is not present, we look and do not see; we hear and do not understand; we eat and do not know the taste of what we eat. This is what is meant by saying that the cultivation of the person depends on the rectifying of the mind.[43]

The process of self-cultivation is not an extension from individual perfection to the perfection of all men; it is rather one of unifying one's internal attainment with one's external efficaciousness.

How can self-cultivation be attained? Of the Confucian writings specifically, The Great Learning presents eight steps[44] of self-cultivation with harmonization of the world as the ultimate goal. The first two steps--investigating things and extending knowledge--are directed toward the goal of understanding the world. The next three steps--making sincere one's intentions, rectifying one's mind and cultivating or improving one's personality--are directed toward the goal of perfecting oneself within, so that one can be ready for social and political responsibility in order to serve others. The last three steps--regulating a family, governing a state well, and pacifying the world--are directed toward extending one's virtues among men so that one can be said to realize one's potentiality in a reality of relationships. One needs to open his eyes to investigate the root of things (the principle of Jen). On the basis of this root, man can promote cultivation of character (Jen) in himself and others related to him in a specific way. That is why Confucius believes that there is unity and continuity in man's search for political ideals. The system of the ancient sage kings is but a symbol for a government of humanity.

How can man carry on the eight steps of self-cultivation? Through practice. Practice is the method of education for Confucius. He does

not accept the means-end dichotomy; rather he suggests practice of the eight steps for their own sake and for their own perfection. The means-end dichotomy is not adequate to express the basic spiritual orientation involved because the attainment of sagehood is not the attainment of something external to man. Rather, it is a manifestation of that which constitutes true humanity. But it is misleading to argue that since a wise-man-nature is inherent in the nature of man, the attainment of sagehood requires nothing more than a process of inner transformation, independent of society at large. In fact Confucius points out a dialectical interplay between self-cultivation as internal examination and complete self-realization as communion with others and with the universe. Practice is the way by which the essence of human nature can be perfected. Confucius recommends "practice" accompanied by Jen. He says, "To be able to practice five things[45] everywhere under heaven constitutes perfect virtue."[46] For Confucius education does not aim at acquiring technical analytic skills or historical knowledge about philosophers, rather it is the cultivation of moral virtue and self-realization by practice accompanied by Jen. Education is concerned with the moral performance of the individual by which he becomes a perfect moral man. The superior man is not the product of disciplines of a purely intellectual training, but is produced through the cultivation of the moral life. Such a man does not lead his society by exercising technical skills, nor does he lead it by exercising political power. He leads his society through the total performance of his moral action which is the exemplification of his convictions and ultimate concern[47] about a true man of Jen.

In discussing how to educate students Confucius acknowledged two ways: through the doctrine of rectification of names; and through having students think of their own solutions. In the doctrine of rectification of names, Confucius asserts that any name or title given to man is a manifestation of possible duties and obligations.[48] This means that if once a man accepts or acknowledges his name or title, he is at once obliged to discharge faithfully the responsibilities implied in that particular given name or title. As an educator Confucius does not separate the attainment of knowledge from action and practice, but asserts the complete identification of name with actuality. Concern with this matter reveals his underlying assumption that the name is not just a representation of a thing, but is the very essence of the thing itself. That is why he taught rulers and government officials principles of courage and prudence, the value of education and self-criticism, the rules of filial duty and of selecting friends, the basis of good human relations, and the art of good government.[49] For Confucius' second method of education, we can see that while Confucius might have been a sort of pragmatist, he certainly was not a dogmatist in the following passage: "He who learns but does not think is lost; he who thinks but does not learn is in danger."[50] What he did was to urge people to think for themselves. He was willing to help them and train them how to think; but he would guarantee no answers. Confucius was frank in admitting that he did not know the truth but that he likewise was involved in searching for it. Because knowledge is based on data and the method of thinking, if one has no data to work with, and merely plays with the phantasms of one's imagination, thought will be unreliable or adventurous; but if one only collects data, no principle will run like

a thread through the congeries to organize them into a system. The result would be that one may know much but would be unable to reach a goal or to set up an ideal pattern for life.

According to Confucius all men are essentially equal and basically good; and men desire to be happy and have peace of mind. His belief that any man might become a gentleman, regardless of his birth did not remain a mere matter of common men; he undertook to make his students into gentlemen. He accepted them from the lowest as well as the highest social class, and was equally earnest in teaching them, regardless of their social status and family origins. He believed in the educability of men, but he admitted differences in intellect and talent among them. In the Analects, he accepts those "who are born with knowledge" as the best, and those who learn after industrious study as the second type of desirable mind.[51] Confucius' remark about men "born with knowledge" is extremely provocative, but unfortunately the Analects does not yield any adequate exposition of this concept.

The contents Confucius stresses in education are[52]: letter (文), ethics (行), devotion of soul (忠), and truthfulness (信). Letter means literature (the cause of truth); ethics is for the problem of virtue; the devotion of soul (loyalty) is for politics; truthfulness is linguistics, rhetoric. In describing these educational contents Confucius always uses concrete examples through the way of propriety, in archery, in the order of succession, in speech, charioteering,[53] and from music. These six example areas contain the lessons which Confucius wants to teach to the student. In other words, instead of learning fixed patterns of thought, man, according to his view, should learn the principles involved in Jen. A man needs to know how to apply the

principle (Jen) to concrete circumstances in order to overcome the kinds of conflicts which man may face in a society.

Here is the significance of Confucius' division of education into two aspects: the cognitive learning style and moral education. The cognitive learning style demands that man learn how to think, especially how to find clues to solve problems which many have faced day by day. Here a person's creative use of his or her energy (thinking-power) is of great importance. This is "self-governing," which is encouraged through self-directed education. It can be described as autonomous interaction among persons and their present problematic situations. So education for Confucius means development of thinking power for a man to make his own decision for self-cultivation. This education is not either moral training or religious training. It is making man critically aware of what is involved in moral decisions and making moral judgments based on Jen. It is the development or influence of persons in such a way that their action becomes morally responsible. It is not a simple, but a composite phenomenon. This education, so-called moral education, makes man a moral actor, a man of Jen. He says:

> There are those who act without knowing (what is right). But I am not one of them. To hear much and select what is good and follow it, to see much and remember it, is the second type of knowledge (next to innate knowledge).[54]

Though he accepted men from all classes he was very strict in his requirements about their intellectual abilities. He wanted them to have an inquiring mind, and would endure no laziness nor stupidity.

Confucius taught that through the development of a good character (Jen) and the practice of good conduct happiness could be achieved. He not only said it but also proved it by his own examples and by what he

achieved among his disciples. In other words, education for Confucius is intended to produce a superior man, a perfect man. He knows what is meant by happiness, and establishes moral virtues based on Jen. He knows not only to act at the present period, but also how to choose in each new direction the right thing to do. Through education, man is able to cultivate his true human nature of Jen for a moral agent, and to know why he should perform this act rather than other acts.

> A man of humanity, wishing to establish his own character, also establishes the character of others, and wishing to be prominent himself, also helps others to be prominent. To be able to judge others by what is near to ourselves may be called the method of realizing humanity.[55]

The perfect man knows what he has to do in a society, and how. He knows where he is going. He is no longer an alienated person.

Dewey's View

For Dewey, what man is is what he does here and there, now and then through immediate experience. Experience means the organic unity between subject and object. Experience is the inclusive situation which determines the nature of the subject as experiencer and the object as experienced. Dewey believes that it is only through experience that man learns about the world, and only by the use of experience that man can maintain himself and better himself in the world. How can man make himself better in the world? Here is the role of inquiry in human nature. Dewey says: "The striving to make stability of meaning prevail over the instability of events is the main task of intelligent human effort."[56] Through the activity of inquiry man lives in experience which can be transformed into a unified whole.[57]

Immediate experience is neither a passive contemplation of trans-temporal essences nor something "happening" somewhere in man's mind exclusively. It is an inter-actional, situational experience. Immediate experience in its situational context is not simply located in a subject or an object. Immediate experience is "in" a situation which cuts across the subject-object distinction. The immediate experience is what Dewey calls "qualitative immediacy," "a dumb formless experience of things as good."[58] Values are facts found in experience through intelligent inquiry in order to transform a problematic situation into a determinate one.

The problem for Dewey was not to find the good, but to construct it. The goods that are experienced directly are unsettled and dubious. "Thought goes beyond immediate experience," and thinking (human nature) alone can settle and secure directly enjoyed goods as valuational policy. Dewey writes: "Without intervention of thought enjoyments are not values but problematic goods, becoming values when they reissue in a changed form from intelligent behavior."[59] Valuation or value-inquiries are thought-processes (the intellectual choice), but this thought-process is not merely the problem of <u>what is</u>, but rather that of what <u>should be</u>. Now, how to determine what should be done for the particular situation? Dewey states his main proposition on valuation in the following way:

> Judgments about values are judgments about the conditions and the results of experienced objects; judgments about that which should regulate the formation of our desire, affections and enjoyments.[60]

The main problem with this is: How does Dewey move from one side to the other, that is, from "judgments about experiences" to judgment about that which should regulate what man is? How does he justify his judgment

on valuation? What does he really want us to inquire into through experience? Answers to these questions are entailed by his theory of education: the aim of education, the nature of the thing to be educated, and the method of education. How to construct the good is related to how man is educated. Because there is no fixed and final end that man should reach, growing itself, based on the activity of intelligence, is man's experience for something to be realized. Growing is education. Education is the process of growing or self-realization.

To explain how, in Dewey's view, values are constructed by the intervention of thought the distinction he makes between the enjoyed and the enjoyable, desire and the desirable, the satisfying and the satisfactory was introduced in the section on Dewey in Chapter IV. Values should be determined by the scientific method of inquiry. "Science. . . is the supreme means of the valid determination of all valuation in all aspects of human and social life."[61] Dewey was impressed with the success of the physical sciences in solving practical problems and in explaining control of man's environment. He considered the scientific mode of inquiry and the scientific systematization of human experience the highest attainment in the evolution of the mind of man. And this way of thinking and approach has been used by Dewey to deal with value. Value in Dewey's view is not a metaphysical, but a practical, social problem which has to be determined by the evaluating activity. This scientific approach requires us to "know the conditions under which the act of liking, of desire and enjoyment, takes place" and also "to know what are the consequences of that act."[62] This activity includes the process of intelligence to make a choice among several alternative ways, and then the choice is called good or valuable. Choice is absolutely

the individual's own decision. Value (the good), thus, is not discovered by our intelligence, but created by the activity of intelligence through the method of the "means-ends-continuum."

Values for Dewey must be directly experienced or had in the means-ends relation. In other words, every experience involves the thorough incorporation of the process with the next step, of the means with its consequences. Each end which is created intelligently by our thinking can be a means to create the next step. What is an end in one situation becomes a means to the creation of new values in the next; but whatever is an end is not simultaneously a means. Only when the relation of a means to the final consequence is perceived is the whole experience meaningful, significant, and valuable. However, such a means-consequence relation turns out not to be temporal; it is not a statement with a future reference; and it is not the formulation of a method. The means-ends continuum is only the continuous process of perfecting. Perfecting what?

Here is a problem: we may know that certain experienced objects have such and such conditions and consequences, but how does this knowledge alone produce the conviction that we should regulate our desire and enjoyments in a particular way? Dewey has spoken of growth (education) as "the only moral end," and "the only end."[63] Growth is not represented by or embodied in an ideal, that is, something settled and already fixed. As growing, it is an activity. The "acquisition of skill, possession of knowledge, attainment of culture are not ends : they are marks of growth and means to its continuity."[64] Growing alone is good. The personal choice is a matter of deciding what sort of person one is going to be.

Through the course of his intellectual choice man not only establishes intellectual development to be fully realized, but also makes himself unified, consistent and complete. Growth is not the approximation of something fixed and antecedently "given," but growth is the outcome and result that is the "significant thing,"[65] i.e., a "continual reorganization, reconstruction and transformation of experience."[66] Growth is an activity, but it seems to have a sense of direction, something to be realized. This something to be realized is not given to us a priori and fixed ideally (contrary to Aristotle's and Confucius' view), but it is still represented empirically in the world through continuity. Growth is not limited to any already given direction, but depends for its direction upon the means-ends-dichotomy.

"Something to be realized" (self-realization) is not only the aim of education[67] but also the "morally ideal" for Dewey.[68] For him self-realization is not a filling up process of an undetermined self; but rather it is the self acting as self and not for the self. In Dewey's philosophy process is substituted for substance. Process means growth and becoming. Consequently, it is existentially subject to time, place, and circumstance. If the structure as well as the process are subject to change, how can the individual maintain his self-identity while learning, change, and maturation are going on? Dewey's answer involves the concept of the self acting as self. What does "the self acting as self" mean for self-realization? It means "to find the self in the highest and fullest activity possible at the time, and to perform the act in the consciousness of its complete identification with self."[69] "The self acting as self" means to realize one's own human nature and to perform one's self-identity through action. The self acting as self

is the aim of growth. The aim of education as the process of perfecting is to reach the realized self as the moral ideal through the present activities of intelligence.

The daily activities in experience are, according to Dewey's view, the method by which the self specifies and defines its own satisfaction and anticipates the identity of self. Each particular process, therefore, becomes universalized in the total activity of the self which will constitute the remote ideal self. Dewey says,

> But in any case, to realize capacity means to make the special act which has to be performed an activity of the entire present self--so far is it from being one step towards the attainment of a remote ideal self.[70]

The remote ideal self is "the nature of the moral end itself."[71] The moral end itself includes both "the realized self" and "the ideal self."[72] Dewey denies the separation of two selves--one the realized self, and the other the ideal self. According to him, this realized self is no reality by itself; it is simply a partial conception of the self erected into an entity--something to be realized (the ideal self). He says:

> the good person is precisely the one who is. . .most concerned to find the openings for the growing self: he becomes 'bad' (even though acting upon a relatively high plane of attainment) as soon as he fails to respond to the demand for the growth.[73]

Now we can see why Dewey spoke of growth as the only moral end, how he moved from "judgments about conditions and results" to judgment about that "which should regulate. . . ." We can also see that the aim of education in Dewey is to reach the moral end itself as something to be realized.

What capacities have to be fully, concretely actualized in order to

find the self with its complete identification of self? He says that the progressive development of human nature,

> consists on one side in a richer and subtler individual activity, in increased individualization, in wider and freer functions of life; on the other it consists in increase in number of those persons whose ideal is a 'common good,' or who have membership in the same moral community; and, further, it consists in more complex relations between them. It is both intensive and extensive.[74]

The function of intelligence has to be fully realized intensively and extensively. Its intensive function is intellectual freedom. Man's ability to think in progressing toward self-realization is what makes one free. For Dewey, it cannot be possible to separate the three aspects of freedom:[75] choice, action and responsibility. Intelligence and action are mutually dependent. Intelligence is the means of enlarging the scope and effectiveness of our choices through planned action, and action is the only means of strengthening intelligence. The distinctive feature of human choice is that man can anticipate and deliberately select among alternative preferences. He can evaluate future possibilities and intelligently enlighten his choice, thereby giving direction to his life. Thus choice can itself be a way of living, "a decisive direction of action which constitutes our life."[76] On the basis of intelligent choice man will be morally responsible for his life. Traditionally free will has implied a separation between an act and an environment which is its cause.[77] Even though various philosophers have given special emphasis to one or the other of these areas, the separation cannot be accepted by Dewey. Freedom is not mere random activity, nor is it mere freedom from the restrictions which the social environment places upon it (negative freedom), nor is man endowed with it as a kind of innate gift. Freedom is an achievement of the individual

living in society, where the individual-social continuum contains the conditions required for its function. Here is the significance of the extensive function of intelligence. Dewey here means that the individual develops itself within society. The individual can develop by displaying an ideal forged out of his concrete experiences and his particular function in his social environmental variables. Intelligence is instrumental, that is, it is prompted by a problem which arises in the on-going activity of living, and it is directed toward a practical outcome, solving a problem. Every individual is marked off from every other individual by his peculiar capacities (intelligence) and the special surroundings in which he functions. The adjustment of individual capacity to environment in the exercise of function effects the realization of individuality, and its accomplishment marks off each individual from others. He says: "The exercise of function by an agent serves, then, both to define and to unite him. It makes him a distinct social member at the same time that it makes him a member."[78] "To realize oneself," therefore, means to encourage the development of one's personal faculties which are essential for making intelligent judgments and decisions, and to create a community in which fundamental values are shared and critically examined.

How can such a self-realization be successful? How can "the realized self" be united with "the ideal self?" Here is the importance of education. Dewey identifies education with living or growing and describes it as the continuous reconstruction of experience or as the enrichment of the content or meaning of experience, saying that it goes on "in, by, and for experience." "Education is. . .a fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating, process. All these words mean that it implies

attention to the condition of growth."[79] Education is not just growth, and is not just a "reconstruction of experience." Growth has a criterion and direction. According to W. K. Frankena's commentary on Dewey's philosophy of education, to grow is to develop a self capable of living a life that is good or enjoyable, and thus education is a continuous reconstruction of experience which is also a "construction of good."[80]

What are the aims of education? Dewey specifies aims as "natural development" and "social efficiency" which are clearly regarded as phases of universal growth by stressing the growth and enlargement of the whole individual. The status of various human values is contingent on the contribution they each make to universal growth at any given time. The end of education proposed by Dewey is "participation in social life,"[81] and education consists in "the formation of wide-awake, careful, thorough habits of thinking."[82] He indicates that the ultimate problem of all education,

> is to coordinate the psychological and the social factors. The psychological requires that the individual have the free use of all his personal powers; and, therefore, must be so individually studied as to have the laws of his own structure regarded. The sociological factor requires that the individual become acquainted with the social environment in which he lives, in all its important relations, and be disciplined to regard these relationships in his own activities. The coordination demands, therefore, that the child be capable of expressing himself, but in such a way as to realize social ends.[83]

Education is not only to develop the individual for social efficiency, but is also to ingrain into the individual's working habits methods of inquiry and reasoning appropriate to various problems. This "social efficiency" and "natural development" have been considered also as the

ultimate standard of morality.[84] But they are ultimate in the sense of being essential qualities, not in the sense of being absolute goals. The goal of education is psychological, intrinsic growth and also social, specific discipline for the sake of relationship with the social environment. This growth not only arises within the context of ongoing activities, but it also will constitute the moral ideal. Any and all experiences are educative when they broaden and deepen the person's future experiences. Interaction and continuity are the criteria for judging the educative value of an experience.[85]

The other aspect of education in Dewey's thought is to educate the thinking person through the analysis of the complete act of thought.[86] Teaching how to think is one of Dewey's aims in education just as it was one of Confucius' aims. The significance of thinking was indicated by Dewey:

> Thinking enables us to direct our activities with foresight and to plan according to ends-in-view, or purpose of which we are aware. It enables us to act in deliberate and intentional fashion to future objects or to come into command of what is now distant and lacking.[87]

Thinking gives us a better control of our present life as well as of future possibilities. It enables us to have a rational and intelligent life. Thinking also enriches our life by giving additional meaning to things that surround us. The aims of education, thus, are to teach us how to think, and to let man develop or grow both intellectually and morally.

There are two ways capable of achieving these aims of education: (1) learning by doing; (2) aesthetic experience. Doing is the method by which we discover what man is. Learning is not accumulating already organized knowledge. "Learning" is "growing" through the present

situation which is unsettled, uncertain, and precarious. Learning by doing means to participate in something inherently worthwhile, and to transform the "something" within the relation of means to ends in order that it might be an essential part of what man is. All proper learning is achieved by an individual when he acquires something in the present that will help him learn more in the future. This is the significance of the cognitive learning style.

Learning by doing requires the hard and earnest use of intelligence in experience through which it will be good to learn. What kind of experience? An aesthetic (or consummatory) experience. Aesthetic experience is an active and dynamic field of integrated participation in experience. The varied parts of experience are bound together into one, and do not just succeed each other. Consummatory experience is an activity through which man achieves a life that is enjoyable.[88] In this consummatory experience the experiencer and the experienced are so fully integrated into a unity that each disappears; but also this produces a state meaningful and happy to the experiencer. Dewey believes, thus, that "education is a process of living and not a preparation for future living,"[89] and that "education must be conceived as a continuing reconstruction of experience"[90] for something to be realized.

For this aim of education, Dewey gives us a general principle by which to design the subject matter of education-contents: "relate moral theory to teaching, learning, and the curriculum."[91] He asserts that the separation of industry and education, of mindless labor and noble living is to be deplored. We must make industry educational, and education industrial.[92]

Man must be aware of his over-all purpose which is self-realization through education. Education constitutes the good and reasonable life. In Dewey's view happiness results from one's becoming the sort of person he has set himself to be; it results from the realization through growth of those capacities and abilities to which he has assigned priority. The character of happiness varies with the differences in talents, abilities and intellectual capacities of individual persons. What it does is to promote the conditions which foster the growth of individual persons, even though we should remember Dewey's saying regarding the education of children, that "Growth is not something done to them; it is something they do."[93] It can be assumed that for Dewey happiness is a byproduct of growth, a consequence of self-realization.

> The final happiness of an individual resides in the supremacy of certain interests in the make-up of character; namely, alert, sincere, enduring interests in the objects in which all can share. It is found in such interests rather than in the accomplishment of definite external results because this kind of happiness alone is not at the mercy of circumstances. No amount of outer obstacles can destroy the happiness that comes from lively and ever-renewed interest in other men in the conditions and objects which promote their development. . . . If we identify the interests of such a self with virtues, then we shall say, with Spinoza, that happiness is not the regard of virtue, but virtue itself.[94]

Even if this passage can be read in several ways, Dewey may be saying, in the manner of Aristotle, that happiness is to be defined by reference to virtuous activity (for Dewey the creative activities associated with growth), but that such activity is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition of happiness. The good life in Dewey, therefore, is a harmonious whole consisting of good experiences or values that are achieved through intelligent action. The good life must be assessed according to whether, and to what extent, individuals can freely develop and exercise

their talents in which happiness consists.

> Freedom is an actuality when the recognition of relations, the stable element, is combined with the uncertain element, in the knowledge which makes foresight possible and secures intentional preparation for probable consequences. We are free in the degree in which we act knowing what we are about.[95]

One's ability to think is what makes one free, and what makes one a morally realized person. Education for Dewey not only functions to transmit the contents of knowledge, but also functions as the essential process to establish ways of living.

Conclusion

The alienated man expresses himself as one who has lost the meaning of life. Loss of purpose in the way of living is a meaningless state. It occurs when the individual role in a society is neglected, and when a man lacks understanding of coordinated activity. The meaninglessness of life is externalized, as observed in Chapter II, "a state of boredom," "Sunday neurosis," "juvenile delinquency," so-called, and as the "existential vacuum."

In order to overcome the alienated situation, however, it has been suggested that everybody should be educated as a person with independent convictions about himself and with moral experience. How should man be educated? Where should education be grounded? What makes education most effective? For these answers, three philosophers' views regarding education have been described in this chapter.

As indicated in previous chapters, III and IV, the good life for man, according to these three philosophers, is to cultivate his own mind. The phenomena of living coincide with the objectification or

manifestation of human nature. This manifestation is called virtue. Virtue can be rendered as "the art of living." The art of living has not been fixed at a given time and for given circumstances. How can that be correct? For Aristotle it is manifested through practical wisdom; for Confucius, through the principle of rectification; for Dewey, through practical judgment. How can the art of living be improved? Through the educational process. What is the final goal in such an educational program? To "become a person," who should be an end in itself in a society.

(1) The unity of theory and practice has been a central theme in these three philosophers. In "Moral Theory and Practice,"[96] Dewey describes that theory as the cross-section of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should be; practice is the realization of the idea thus gained. From Confucius' viewpoint the moral performance of the individual and the totality of his convictions or theories should be in harmonious unity, without any inconsistency.[97] Also the harmony between theory and practice has been emphasized in Aristotle's ethical discussion. There we meet this concept as the virtuous "mean" preventing contrary human propensities from operating excesses. Therefore, the harmonious unity between theory and practice is able to answer the question of how human nature is related to concrete life-styles. And also this unity can give an answer to the questions of "who am I going to be?" and "where am I going?" Through this unification between theory and practice the value of a person can be recognized in a society.

(2) This harmonious unity drawn from the views of these three philosophers also emphasizes the difference between "simply living" and "living-well." They contend that "living well" is not just physical

contentment or bare existence in the world, but the active display of human nature in pursuing the good way. "Simply living," according to them, means the way of living with unintelligent acts according to irrational functions. The purpose of "living-well" is to make man a person with real happiness. Real happiness for Aristotle is the life of philosophic contemplation realizing the first principles of the universe; for Confucius it is to "become a man of Jen;" and for Dewey it is man's becoming a morally ideal person as a realized person. Such a person has no difficulty in deciding or in acting. This is because he knows why he is doing what he does, how he should act, and what the consequences will be.

(3) How can such a purpose be achieved? How can man make himself a valuable being? Through education with moral experience. Since the good life for man is intellectual and practical, education for this purpose should also be both intellectual and practical. The intellectual discipline enables one to know what is good and bad or right and wrong through the designed curriculum; but "learning by doing" or "by practice" actively promotes moral conduct related to achieving objectively a knowledge of moral principles: thus "being good" is related to "doing right." Moral knowledge and moral action, according to these three philosophers, can be different in expression, but they have the same contents. Rather than talking separately about moral knowledge and moral action, moral knowledge is supposed to be manifested objectively through the action. Rather than having merely intellectual knowledge about morality, moral knowledge should be actively demonstrated through the appropriate moral behavior. A pattern of human behavior is just a moral judgment. "Doing morally right" is the same as "knowing morally

right." A knowledge of good and bad is the same as knowing how to act, according to these three philosophers.

(4) What is the final goal in the educational process in these three philosophers' views? To become a person, so-called, a morally educated person. A morally educated person is a person who knows that his contemplated action is right to do in a particular situation. Reason as human nature makes man know the meaning of good and bad, of right and wrong, in order to determine how he should act. The morally educated person develops his moral thinking ability as an individual rather than simply by following social rules. He can find the proper method to close the gap between knowing the good and doing the good. Despite man's ontical self-sufficiency to become a fully realized person, he must constantly engage in the process of "learning by doing" or of "practice." This is because man is shaped by his environment. That is why it has been said that the unification between moral knowledge and moral action is of very great importance.

Through this chapter an important point can be found: contemporary man has to be educated in a way different from what is customary in order to restore his independent belief or convictions, in order to know "who he is" and "where he is going." How should man be educated? "Developing the power of the individual to become a perfect man." Education is not merely a means to accomplish an end, but the process itself of becoming a person. This means that educating a man is the same as producing a person. Knowing the good and doing the good are sufficient as well as necessary conditions for morally virtuous conduct. How can the gap between "knowing the good" and "doing the good" be eliminated?

Through education for moral choice.[98] This is education which helps the student (man) to become more sensitive to life's major alternative goals and to the moral means recommended for attaining them; that is the aim of education according to Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey. Here is the answer to the question of why everybody should be educated in a different way. The aim of education in their views is to develop the morally autonomous individual and to turn all students (men) into morally autonomous adults through the educational process. Here is an educational solution to the problem of technological culture. Why do students need to be morally educated persons? In order to restore their independent beliefs or convictions and enable them to know "who they are" and "where they are going."

ENDNOTES

[1]Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," II, 4, 1105 a 31-1105 b 4.

[2]Aristotle, "Politics," VII, 13, 1331 b 24-1332 b 10.

[3]Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," I, 7, 1098 a 15-18.

[4]Ibid., I, 5, 1096 a 6-7.

[5]Ibid., X, 7, 1177 a 12-1178 b 8.

[6]Ibid., X, 7, 1177 a 12-18.

[7]Ibid., I, 8, 1099 b 9-1100 a 9.

[8]Ibid., VII, 10, 1152 a 31-1152 a 33.

[9]Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics," I, 1, 71 a 1-2.

[10]Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," II, 1, 1103 a 14-20.

[11]C. Winn and M. Jacks, Aristotle: His Thought and Its Relevance Today (London, 1967), p. 17.

[12]Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," VI, 2, 1139 a 31-35.

[13]Deliberate choice is one of the conditions for voluntary action in Aristotle: (1) involuntary actions are due either to compulsion or to ignorance; (2) voluntary actions are based on deliberate choice and wish and will. Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," III, 1-3.

[14]Ibid., III, 3, 1113 a 10-12.

[15]Ibid., III, 3, 1112 b 9-12.

[16]Ibid., VI, 13, 1144 b 30-32.

[17]Ibid., VI, 5, 1140 a 25-28.

[18]See W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1971), p. 199.

[19]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics," VI, 7, 1141 a 16-19.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics," II, 19, 100 b 14-16.

[22]Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," X, 7, 1177 a 18-19.

[23]According to Aristotle, the attributes of perfect happiness are "self-sufficiency," "leisureliness," "unweariedness." Ibid., X, 7, 1177 b 21-22.

[24]John H. Randall, Jr., Aristotle (New York, 1960), p. 251.

[25]This term is from J. H. Randall's Aristotle, p. 252.

[26]John P. Anton, Aristotle Theory of Contrariety, p. 194.

[27]Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," X, 8, 1178 b 27-1179 a 32.

[28]James Legge (trans.), "The Doctrine of the Mean," XX, 9, The Chinese Classics (New York, 1870).

[29]Ibid., XI, 1.

[30]Ibid., XI, 2.

[31]Confucius, "Analects," 12:22.

[32]Ibid., 15:23.

[33]The form of the Chinese character 仁 (Jen) is the combination of man (人) and two (二).

[34]Hwa-Yol Jung, "Confucianism and Existentialism: Inter-subjectivity as the Way of Man," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XXX (Sept. 1969-June 70), p. 194.

[35]For an excellent discussion of Jen as a way of action and sociality, cf. Chan, Wing-Tsit, "The Evolution of the Confucian Concept of Jen," Philosophy: East and West, VI (Jan. 1955), pp. 295-319.

[36]Legge's, "The Great Learning," I, 3.

[37]According to Cheng's commentary, "self realization is defined by means of philosophical cultivation." Cheng, Chung-Ying, "Chinese Philosophy: a Characterization," Inquiry, No. 14 (1971), p. 135.

[38]Legge's "The Great Learning," I, 6.

[39]See Tang Chün-I, "The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Value," The Chinese Mind, ed., Charles A. Moore (Honolulu, 1967), pp. 190-199.

[40]"Analects," 12:16.

[41]Legge's "The Great Learning," VII, 1.

[42]Legge's "Confucian Analects," XIV, 37:1-2.

[43]Legge's "The Great Learning, VII, 2-3.

[44]Ibid., I, 5.

[45]Five universal duties: between sovereign and minister; between father and son; between husband and wife; between elder and younger; in the relationship between friends. "The Doctrine of the Mean," 20.

[46]Legge's "Confucian Analects," XVII, 6:1.

[47]The term "ultimate concern" comes from Paul Tillich, but this is used in a stronger moral and humanistic sense, as used in Philip G. Smith's case "Knowledge and Value," Educational Theory, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 1976), pp. 29-39.

[48]"Analects," 12:11.

[49]Joseph Gaer, What the Great Religions Believe (New York, 1963), p. 67.

[50]"Analects," 2:15.

[51]Legge's "The Doctrine of the Mean," XX, 9.

[52]"Analects," 7:24.

[53]Legge's "Confucian Analects," IX, 2:1-2.

[54]"Analects," 7:26.

[55]Ibid., 6:28.

[56]Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 50.

[57]Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, pp. 104-117.

[58]Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 401.

[59]Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 246.

[60]Ibid., p. 265.

[61]Dewey, "Theory of Valuation," p. 66.

[62]Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 253.

[63]Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston, 1948), pp. 177, 184.

[64]Ibid., pp. 184-185.

[65]Ibid., p. 33.

[66]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 50.

[67]Ibid., Ch. 4.

[68]Dewey, "Self-realization as the Moral Ideal," The Philosophical Review, Vol. II, No. 6 (Nov. 1893), pp. 652-664.

[69]Ibid., p. 662.

[70]Ibid., p. 659.

[71]Ibid., p. 652.

[72]Ibid., p. 663.

[73]John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics (New York, 1945), pp. 341-342.

[74]Dewey, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics, pp. 209-210.

[75]See Richard J. Bernstein, "Knowledge, Value, and Freedom," John Dewey and the Experimental Spirit in Philosophy, ed., Charles W. Hendel (New York, 1959), p. 87.

[76]Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 193.

[77]Ibid., p. 18.

[78]Dewey, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics, p. 137.

[79]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 10.

[80]W. K. Frankena, Three Historical Philosophies of Education: Aristotle, Kant, Dewey, p. 162.

[81]Dewey, Moral Principle in Education, p. 11.

[82]Dewey, How We Think, p. 78.

[83]Dewey, "Plan of Organization of the University Primary School," John Dewey, The Early Works, 1882-1898, Vol. 5, pp. 223-243.

[84]Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 316.

[85]Dewey, Experience and Education, Ch. 2, 3. Kohlberg discusses Dewey's three levels of moral development. "The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Moral Education," Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. LVI, No. 10 (June 1975), p. 670.

[86]Dewey, How We Think, p. 17.

[87]Ibid., p. 17.

[88]Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 365.

[89]Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed," John Dewey, The Early Works, 1882-1898, Vol. 5, p. 87.

[90]Ibid., p. 91.

[91]Ibid., p. 89.

[92]Dewey, "Culture and Industry in Education," Teachers College Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 1919), pp. 10-18.

[93]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 42.

[94]Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life (New York, 1960), p. 167.

[95]Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 249f.

[96]Dewey, "Moral Theory and Practice," John Dewey, The Early Works, 1882-1898, Vol. 3, pp. 93-109.

[97]In the history of Chinese philosophy, Confucius is probably the first philosopher to have insisted on the necessary correspondence between words and actions. See Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, pp. 609-656.

[98]This term comes from W. F. O'Neil, "Existentialism and Education for Moral Choice," Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. XLVI, No. 2 (Oct. 1964), pp. 48-53.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the early twentieth century technology became the judge of all activities, human as well as mechanical. Many people feel in this society that they are treated like machines with values of "machine-efficiency, replaceability-expendability." They seem to know themselves, but at the same time know that they do not know about themselves. People have become "problematic" to their own selves.

Such a man has been described as a person "who transferred his ownership to another," and "who has little idea of who he is or where he is going." He has lost sight of himself and also lost his direction for himself. This man is called "alienated" or "dehumanized." In order to observe the specific phenomena of the alienated man, a philosophical-ethical approach has been used. These phenomena are "self-identity crisis," "having few independent beliefs," and "the meaninglessness of life." But how did alienation come about in the technological society? It resulted from man's ignoring his true "human nature" in the society.

In order to discover a solution for the dehumanized situation described, therefore, the following questions have been examined: "What is human nature?" "How can knowing about human nature be connected to human conduct?" "What educational practices will make the connection between human nature and human conduct more effective and relevant to a person?" These questions are the means by which potential solutions to

the problem of alienation can be discovered. These questions are answered in this dissertation through the works of Aristotle, Confucius, and Dewey because each attempts to correlate human nature and virtuous living for the perfect human being. Even though these three philosophers come from different cultural backgrounds they have developed views which might provide an adequate solution for the dehumanized man's situation in both West and East.

Regardless of geographical boundaries, as long as there are human beings many in the world have common questions: "What is man really?" "How can he make himself a morally valuable being?" and "What is meant by a morally valuable being?" No matter how man in West and East has begun asking these questions, the purpose behind them is the same. It is not only to avoid but also to overcome dehumanization.

Man has the inner power (strength) to actualize the potentiality of his existence, so he is not only a creature of his environments, but is also a decision-maker. This inner power of man by his nature is "rationality," a trait not possessed by any of the lower animals. Rationality makes a human being a valuable being. Rationality has two aspects: understanding and thinking. Understanding is related to grasping, analyzing, interpreting, and describing natural phenomena, but thinking (logos) is the basic principle in man which leads back to the ultimate ground of his existence as a human being. This ultimate ground constitutes the ontic property for the sanctity of the human being. "Being rational" means also that if man is to act rationally he must know what he is doing and why, and must do it freely--it must be really the man himself rather than some other compulsive pressure that makes him do

it. Man as a rational being, therefore, must be responsible for his life because the way of living is a product of the essence of human nature. Here is the significance of the autonomy of reason. Rationality implies freedom.

Human nature for these three philosophers involves a sense of community in the sense that human nature is revealed or manifested as the way of living. Although the question of "what is human nature?" is a metaphysical question, the answer can be known through observing man's external activities. In other words, the way of living for man is to cultivate his own mind, and the phenomenon of living is exactly the same as the objectification or manifestation of human nature. This manifestation is called "virtue." Virtue originates in human nature. Human nature, therefore, must be expressed externally as the life-style in a society. That is why man should be governed neither by desires nor by passions. Rationality should be the direction of human life.

Despite man's ontical self-sufficiency to become a fully realized person, he must constantly engage in the process of "learning by doing" or "practice." This is because while there is no question that man can be shaped by environmental variables, the fully realized person is not something which has been already fixed or antecedently given. In other words, man is influenced by environmental variables and is on the way to become. . . . But in a technological society man no longer knows who he is or what he is to become. Here is a problem. How can man know "who he is going to be" or "where he is going?" The answer is: "the power of the human intellect and the autonomy of reason must be developed or cultivated in the process of becoming a morally educated person." What kind of process? The process which will close the gap between

knowing and doing; the process which produces the morally educated man. But the process is not perfected at a moment or at a certain period. Its perfection is entirely based on "learning by doing" or "practicing" through practical wisdom or practical judgment. "To learn" means to learn how to think and to act. "To practice" means to follow and master the principle of rationality. Education here is more than something acquired through a formal process in a social institution. "Learning by doing" or "practice" is a process to produce the thinking person who contemplates the truth and then communicates it. Yet the morally educated person is a person who has an ability to prescribe action for right reasons and who develops the ability to think morally as an individual with subjectivity. His education is not only to undergo a process, but also to become a person. Through the unification between knowing and doing (living), a man becomes a person, that is, a self-actualized person, develops a man's sagehood. This is the philosophical gate toward which a person of the future should be directed.

It is clear to see what the philosopher of education is supposed to do for the dehumanized man. Early in this century educators who had communicated with young adults advocated reorganizing education to produce individuals able to "man" the machines of the industrial society. One of the crucial problems for today's education has been to emphasize the technological aspect. Its emphasis could be interpreted as preparing people (the young adults) for the machines of technology. Education should not be simply something to let them be adjusted to or to let them accept the given society. But educating another human being cannot be compared to lighting a stick of wood or inducing a chemical reaction. Education should also be something to develop their human potentialities

through subjectivity and to develop a self-directedness capable of controlling the given society on the basis of the dignity of human nature. The former case emphasizes the passive function of rationality in human nature, that is, dependent, inseparable from the material world; the latter stresses the active function, that is, the separable, independent, divine function of rationality. When a man is educated for something, it means that the value of "an existential subjectivity" is recognized. This subjectivity should not be a means but an end in itself. This is because the active function of rationality in human nature includes something divine as related to the first principle of the universe (God), the autonomy of reason, and the moral power of valuing good and bad. "Developing the power of the individual" is to cultivate and actualize the power of human nature. That is why, through "actualization of human nature," the young adult is able not only to discover what person he wants to be in terms of existential subjectivity, but also to project where he is going in the given society.

The other problem for today's education is what kinds of direction should be given to the young adults. Dewey states about it:

> Philosophy still has a work to do. It may gain a role for itself for turning to consideration of why it is that man is now so alienated from man. It may turn to the projection of large generous hypotheses which, if used as plans of action, will give intelligent direction to men in search for ways to make the world more one of worth and significance, more home-like, in fact.[1]

"To cultivate" human nature is expressed as an action. "To act" should be considered as the way to shed light on the reality of man's authentic self, but it also should be the realm of projection for future direction: "to identify living well and doing well with being happy."[2]

Happiness is to be found in a life of virtuous activities. A man who fully realizes all his human function (rationality), can be called a happy person. This person has a reason for doing so and so, and this reason must be some believed facts or convictions about himself. Such a person considers the world more worthwhile and homelike and then makes him pursue the goal of the final Happiness, that is, "the superior man or a man of superior refinement." Here is the philosophical meaning of the unification between thinking (knowing) and living resulting in a person. There is no longer the alienated man in this situation, because the superior man finds his self-subjectivity, and knows who he is and what he is going to be. He knows what he is doing and why, because he has a strong conviction and belief about himself. His actions, whatever they are, come from his subjective personality, so he has always the significance or meaning in life. "Knowing" and "living" in a society come to be part of man's very being. Then such a person may say, with Confucius, that "having sincere faith and loving learning, I am not afraid to die for pursuing the good Way."[3]

Therefore, in order to restore a true human being, we must recover our home from homelessness. How? Through "education" capable of identifying living well and doing well with being happy. This is one of the answers to the question which might be raised about this dissertation: Why "human nature and education" should be dealt with. Education is not simply a methodological term. Education is the way through which a man can be brought to a self-restoration from a self-loss. This is the philosophical goal of education toward which a person of the future should be directed. "The superior man seeks the Way and

not a mere living. . . . The superior man worries about the Way and not about poverty."[4]

ENDNOTES

[1]Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 20.

[2]Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," I, 4, 1095 a 17-20.

[3]Confucius, "Analects," 8:13.

[4]Ibid., 15:31.

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