

THE RHETORIC OF INTERVENTION: A BURKEIAN
ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFICATION IN SIR EDWARD
GREY'S SPEECH ON "GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE EUROPEAN POWERS"


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
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CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF THE STUDY

An Introduction to the Study

After Kenneth Burke published A Rhetoric of Motives¹ in 1950 much discussion concerned the meaning of his "new rhetoric." Martin Steinmann, Jr., writes that rhetoric in all the concepts of new rhetorics "refers at least to both the art of effective expression and the study of that art."² He states that every rule of rhetoric is a rule of strategy or tactics.³ Marie Hochmuth adds that Burke is "essentially a classicist in his theory of rhetoric."⁴ Accordingly Burke argues that rhetoric is "both the use of persuasive resources (...as with the philippics of Demosthenes) and the study of them (...as with Aristotle's treatise on the 'art' of Rhetoric)."⁵

Kenneth Burke has been labeled "one of the few truly speculative thinkers of our time"⁶ and "unquestionably the most brilliant and suggestive critic now writing in America."⁷ C. I. Glicksberg calls Burke "a subtle and adventurous critic" and "the critic's critic par excellence."⁸ He writes that Burke "has taken upon himself the enormously difficult task of tearing down the whole cumbersome critical structure and building anew on a firmer and more lasting foundation."⁹ With his development of the "new rhetoric" Burke deserves to be related to the great tradition of rhetorical criticism.

Virginia Holland writes that the rhetorical critic has traditionally discussed the speaker's method and its effectiveness. She states that in traditional historical-literary methodology "the critic attempts to discover first what the speaker said, second, why he spoke as he did, and third, how he said it."¹⁰ Arguing for a continuation of such historical, sociological and literary research Holland states the rhetorical insights of Kenneth Burke, particularly the concept of identification, "can provide a methodology that will lessen the difficulty of the rhetorical critic's task and provide tools for sharper insights."¹¹

On August 3, 1914, preceding Britain's entry into World War I, Sir Edward Grey spoke to the House of Commons to unite parliamentary factions and popular opinion in terms of British obligations and interests. The significance of a rhetorical criticism of "Great Britain and the European Powers" is that the methodology employed by Grey provides an ideal backdrop for a study of Burkeian identification. The term "Burkeian" covers "a manifold of particulars under a single head."¹² The "manifold of particulars" for this study stems from suggestions for the critic made by Kenneth Burke in several of his works, especially Attitudes Toward History,¹³ The Philosophy of Literary Form,¹⁴ A Grammar of Motives,¹⁵ and A Rhetoric of Motives.

This study will not attempt to systematize Burkeian terminology nor suggest that another critic discussing both Burke and "Great Britain and the European Powers" would use the same methods of analysis and apply them in the same way. Burke provides the stimulus and insight for analyzing Grey's speech in the context of its historical situation. Part of the function of a rhetorical situation is the

search for identification with an audience. To Burke identification is the key concept in the function of rhetoric.

The historical setting provided for a fragmentation of opposite positions on the need for British intervention in Europe. Grey was compelled by the historical forces to unify the nation and provide direction during the pending crisis. The situation was ideal for polarizing the audience through the use of social cohesion and common ground, unifying the audience by identifying the positive with what it would accept and the negative with what it would reject to establish order and hierarchy, and using strategies to redirect audience attitudes from neutrality to a new position of intervention.

The period prior to 1914 was one of armed peace. For fifty years leading nations of Europe prepared for war. The Triple Alliance and the eventual Triple Entente created a military dichotomy. As British Foreign Secretary, Grey's principal function was to formulate a foreign policy to maintain a European balance of power. Such a balance was thought by parliamentary leaders to exclude any permanent alliances.

To meet the political, social and economic problems of the nineteenth century one solution was "splendid isolation."¹⁶ This failed as intense nationalism created vigorous new nations and alarmed old ones into colonial expansion. Britain was forced toward imperialism.¹⁷ Her leaders became aware of the perils of isolation among nations strong enough to challenge her supremacy.¹⁸

The roots of World War I were in the system of rival alliances which appeared in Europe between 1875 and 1910.¹⁹ Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy formed the Triple Alliance and France, Russia and Britain formed the Triple Entente. The Triple Alliance provided for

military aid. The Triple Entente involved diplomatic aid and suggested the availability of military aid.

A series of six major diplomatic crises gradually increased the tension between the nations of the opposing alliances: (1) the Moroccan crisis of 1905, (2) Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, (3) the second Moroccan crisis in 1911, (4) Britain's request for a naval holiday with Germany in 1912, (5) the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, and (6) the murder of the Austrian Archduke by a Serb on June 28, 1914.

Following the murder of the Archduke, Austria declared war on Serbia. Russia and France supported Serbia. Germany supported Austria and declared war on France and Russia.²⁰ France and Russia sought armed assistance from Britain. However, Grey could not promise support which might not materialize. The Cabinet was radically divided between neutrality and intervention. The public was unsure of its position.²¹

Discussions between Britain and France had led to a division of responsibility on the high seas, Britain to protect the Atlantic and the Channel and France the Mediterranean.²² The German Fleet threatened to come down the English Channel to bombard the French coast while the French Fleet was in the Mediterranean. If the French Fleet were forced to leave the Mediterranean to protect her coast British interests in the Middle East would be impaired. By a treaty of 1839 Britain was responsible for Belgian neutrality. The German Army was advancing and the Cabinet faced the possibility of German violation of that neutrality.²³

To summarize the diplomatic background of World War I: (1) the balance of power Grey attempted to formulate failed to maintain peace,

(2) isolation was contradicted by nationalism which led to imperialism, (3) rival alliances and recurring crises increased international tension, and (4) the division of responsibility on the high seas, commitments to her own interests and the threat to Belgian neutrality forced Britain toward intervention on behalf of France, Russia and Belgium.

Despite Conservative support for intervention, resignations from the principal opposition and token public support, Grey's function was to polarize these and other parliamentary factions and popular opinion into a psychological group.²⁴ He intensified existing attitudes toward world peace in terms of British obligations and interests. Grey's purpose was to place obligations and interests in proper relation to neutrality and intervention. The process he used illustrates the use of material, formal and transcendental identification to justify a policy of intervention.

The Methodology of Rhetorical Studies

Rhetorical critics have traditionally concentrated on the study of individual speakers by observing the same speaker using various types of speeches. Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird write that most studies have evaluated orators according to six concepts:

- (1) the nature of oratory; (2) the constituents of the speaking situation; (3) the offices or duties of the orator; (4) the types of oratory; (5) the traditional parts of the art of rhetoric, and (6) the effect of the oratory.²⁵

Typical lines of inquiry range from the study of one concept in a series of speeches to studies of rhetorical-historical movements.

However, the traditional studies involve a variety of types of speeches.

For modern rhetorical critics Holland argues for a continuation of the historical-sociological-literary analysis suggested in traditional

rhetorical theory. She states that the speech is a speaker's "symbolic response to a situation or problem" and that a speaker's individual strategies are his means for encompassing a situation.²⁶

The modern critic must examine the rhetorical situation within the matrix of the historical background. William C. Lang writes that the speaker, acclaimed or unacclaimed, "is a force in history. Partially dependent upon the mood of the day, he may direct and mold his times."²⁷ Lang adds that the scholar has "the significant task of assessing the forces at work. Most careful historical analysis and evaluation will be inescapable."²⁸ The speaker must be judged in light of his own times. Wayland Maxfield Parrish writes that speeches are studied "for the light they throw on contemporary events," and

events for the light they throw upon speeches. ...speeches have often been instrumental in shaping the course of history, in defining and strengthening a people's ideals, and in determining its culture.²⁹

Marie Hochmuth states that

we may compare the speech with a multi-celled organism, whose units consist of speaker, audience, place, purpose, time, and form. ...to evaluate the speech, all these elements, verbal and nonverbal, must be examined.³⁰

The rhetorical critic must be aware of speaker-audience attitudinal relationships. Thomas Nilsen writes that he must attempt to assess the "climate of opinion" of the rhetorical situation.³¹ Holland summarizes that the critic can comprehend the total rhetorical situation only through

an analysis of the situation or problem that served as stimulus for his speech-response. The critic must consider historical and sociological backgrounds in order to bring into sharp focus the similar attitudes held by audience and speaker which allow the speaker to identify his purpose with that of the audience, and account for the dissimilar attitudes that frustrate the identification. Consideration

of how the speaker 'said it' resolves into a literary-rhetorical analysis of his style and finally into an examination of his delivery.³²

Two implications are in evidence: (1) historical analysis is necessary to determine the rhetorical significance of the speaker and his speech and (2) the total rhetorical situation involves a consideration of speaker-audience attitudinal relationships which allow or disallow identification.

The uniqueness of this study exists in its attempt to analyze a single rhetorical situation where speaker, speech, historical background, method and purpose are tantamount to rhetorical identification. Major emphasis will be placed on Grey's attempt to establish the three categories of identification suggested by L. H. Mouat in "An Approach to Rhetorical Criticism."³³ Mouat states that

if the many rhetorical concepts that produce effectiveness, as well as the area of effectiveness, can be reduced and simplified, and if we can approach an isomorphic, or one-to-one, relationship between the speaker and his speech, on the one hand, and the audience (area of effect), on the other, our search for a unifying medium of criticism will be ended.³⁴

Mouat proposes that the "common denominator of rhetorical concepts" is Burkeian identification. The isomorphic relationship can be established through methods of identification Mouat calls material, formal and transcendental.

Material identification functions within a particular frame of reference where order is established. The emphasis is on rhetorical invention. Formal identification functions where the order is obscure or deteriorating. Here the rhetorical elements of disposition, style, memory, and delivery merge into poetic. Transcendental identification attempts a higher synthesis in a clash between kinds of orders. Dialectic plays a role superior to rhetoric and poetic. But the key to effectiveness in each case is identification.³⁵

The Concept of Identification

Kenneth Burke writes that identification is not meant to be a substitute for the traditional approach to rhetoric but rather "an accessory to the standard lore."³⁶ Recalling that the concept of identification is not new, Burke refers to Aristotle's comment that "it is not hard...to praise Athenians among Athenians."³⁷ Burke explains that "you persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his."³⁸

Identification occurs at two levels: the conscious and the unconscious. Marie Hochmuth writes that "identification, at its simplest level, may be a deliberate device, or a means, as when a speaker identifies his interests with those of his audience."³⁹ Burke states that the concept of identification begins "in the speaker's explicit designs with regard to the confronting of an audience."⁴⁰ He writes that

a speaker persuades an audience by the use of stylistic identifications; his act of persuasion may be for the purpose of causing the audience to identify itself with the speaker's interests; and the speaker draws on identification of interests to establish rapport between himself and his audience.⁴¹

Virginia Holland describes "stylistic identification" as the use of devices, or strategies, for unification."⁴² Through these devices men become consubstantial. They unite in areas of belief which join them together and make them identify their interests with each other.⁴³

The second level at which identification occurs is in the unconscious. Burke writes that identification extends beyond "explicit designs" to "ways in which we spontaneously, intuitively, even

unconsciously persuade ourselves."⁴⁴ He argues that in determining "our personal identity, we spontaneously identify ourselves with family, nation, political or cultural cause, church and so on."⁴⁵

Identification must not be confused to the degree that individuals become the same or identical in every respect. Daniel Fogarty writes that Burke does not mean "an absolute oneness of identity."⁴⁶ Burke argues that even though one individual is not identical with another, when their interests are similar he is identified with him. Even when their interests are not similar identification may occur if one individual assumes or is persuaded otherwise.⁴⁷

Identification, according to Burke, is becoming "substantially one" with another person and yet remaining a unique individual. "Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another."⁴⁸ Identification through common interests does not deny this distinctness but causes consubstantiality.⁴⁹ People may be unlike in many respects but still identify. Fogarty explains that "people, different in other ways, may have one common factor in which they are consubstantial or substantially the same."⁵⁰

Burke writes that

a doctrine of consubstantiality, either explicit or implicit, may be necessary to any way of life. For substance, in the old philosophies, was an act; and a way of life is an acting-together; and in acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial.⁵¹

Burke calls any sensation, concept, image, idea or attitude used to identify "substance" a "property." When two substances share a common property they are consubstantial. To achieve persuasion the speaker must identify his properties with those of his audience.⁵²

Identification implies the existence of division. Hugh Dalziel Duncan writes that "rhetoric involves us in acts of socialization which are attempts to resolve the divided and contending voices which arise out of this division."⁵³ Burke argues that identification confronts and compensates for the "implications of division" because of man's need for unity.

If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity. If men were wholly and truly of one substance, absolute communication would be of man's very essence.⁵⁴

Burke further states that there would be no strife in either pure identification or absolute division because of no mediatory ground to make communication possible. The joining of identification and division is where the rhetoric of unification occurs.⁵⁵ Burke summarizes that "through language and the ways of production" individuals

erect various communities of interests and insights, social communities varying in nature and scope. And out of the division and the community arises the 'universal' rhetorical situation.⁵⁶

Dale L. Stockton lectures that "man is basically lonely" and that a rhetoric based on the drive to overcome this loneliness is much deeper than one based on love or hate. He adds that identification is a solution to loneliness because of its ability to make individuals "substantially one" with each other.⁵⁷ Duncan agrees that identification is a deeper rhetoric. He argues that in persuasion an individual can hate but in identification he can hate more deeply because the symbols by which he once hated are no longer individual but identified with a community of hatred.⁵⁸

Stockton also argues that one philosophical framework for identification is existentialism⁵⁹ which implies that "existence precedes

essence."⁶⁰ An examination of Sartreian existentialism explains that "first of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines himself."⁶¹ Jean Paul Sartre states that man is at first indefinable because "he is nothing."⁶²

Only afterward will he be something, and he himself will have made what he will be.... Not only is man what he conceives himself to be, but he is also only what he wills himself to be after this thrust toward existence.⁶³

Sartre concludes that man is fully responsible for his own existence and individuality. Man is also responsible for the existence and individuality of all mankind.⁶⁴ This suggests a basis for man's loneliness.

Man's responsibility and loneliness relate to his identities. William H. Rueckert explains Burke's philosophical framework in terms of Freudian psychology. A similarity to Sartre appears when Rueckert argues that

the self identifies with one thing or another, consciously or unconsciously; it accepts and rejects various alternatives, merges with and separates from certain things; its growth is the drama of ethical choice and its ideal is that unity of being which constitutes the determined and forward-moving self.⁶⁵

Regardless of his state man begins with a potential for what he becomes. He both is and becomes his own design. Rueckert writes that

each individual self begins, not with a blank self which is finally completely formed from without, but with a self which has as part of its essence this biological-neurological potential. The self embarks on its quest with something intrinsic to it: it has a certain kind of neurological equipment (the potential for speech and reason); certain permanent fundamental needs; and a certain biological potential (physical growth). In the course of its journey through experience the self builds an identity by making contact with various externals, such as nature and society.⁶⁶

Sartreian existentialism implies anguish, forlornness and despair.

Sartre explains that

man is anguish. ...the man who involves himself and who realizes that he is not only the person he chooses to be, but also a lawmaker who is, at the same time, choosing all mankind as well as himself, can not help escape the feeling of his total and deep responsibility.⁶⁷

Sartre writes that forlornness results from the idea that "everything is permissible if God does not exist."⁶⁸ Consequently "man is forlorn" because he has nothing to cling to. With no determinism "man is free, man is freedom."⁶⁹ Sartre continues that since there are no values or commands to legitimize conduct man has no excuses or justification for any of his actions.⁷⁰ Sartre states that

man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet, in other respects is free; because, once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does.⁷¹

Sartre argues that despair would have man deal only with what depends on his will or on the "probabilities which make our action possible."⁷² Despite man's wants he must consider probabilities. Sartre asks that possibilities be dealt with only as far as man's action agrees with the sum of these possibilities.⁷³

Sartre summarizes the loneliness concept,

I am abandoned in the world, not in the sense that I might remain abandoned and passive in a hostile universe like a board floating on the water, but rather in the sense that I find myself suddenly alone and without help, engaged in a world for which I bear the whole responsibility without being able, whatever I do, to tear myself away from this responsibility for an instant. For I am responsible for my very desire of fleeing responsibilities.⁷⁴

The concept of man's freedom, his aloneness, is related to identification in "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric.'"⁷⁵ Burke argues that persuasion is more "to attitude" than "to out-and-out action. Persuasion involves choice, will; it is directed to a man only insofar

as he is free."⁷⁶ Rhetoric is unnecessary unless man is potentially free. When man is forced to act rhetoric is incapable of producing change. When action is restricted rhetoric can only affect attitude.⁷⁷

Related Studies

The listings and abstracts of Graduate Theses in Speech, published yearly in Speech Monographs, record no studies on Grey or Grey's speech on "Great Britain and the European Powers." Nor are any recorded in the Quarterly Journal of Speech, the Speech Teacher, the Central States Speech Journal, Today's Speech, the Southern Speech Journal or Western Speech.

Previous studies using Burkeian methodology have dealt primarily with literary criticism. The major rhetorical interest in Burke stems from works by Hochmuth,⁷⁸ Holland,⁷⁹ and Mouat.⁸⁰ Holland's doctoral dissertation was a Burkeian analysis of a single speech, "Phillips' 'Murder of Lovejoy.'"⁸¹ A 1959 study by Jack Arnold considered the Compromise of 1850 from a Burkeian point of view. Arnold organized his chapters around the pentad. Each chapter begins with a discussion of one term in the pentad then applies the term to the Compromise of 1850.⁸²

Dennis G. Day analyzed the concept of identification and its operation in oral communication. He defines identification as an emotional relationship characterized by a feeling of "oneness." Identification in rhetoric is to Day a basic principle of persuasion as a speaker uses language in such a way that it indicates common properties between speaker and audience.⁸³

Ronald Stinnett's study is an analysis of a category of Democratic

National Committee Dinner Speeches with similar scenes, agencies, purposes and acts by three speakers, Roosevelt, Truman and Rayburn. Stinnett illustrates how a Burkeian analysis can provide an informative understanding of a body of speeches.⁸⁴

Donald Parson used the Burkeian method to argue that isolationist rhetoric failed to accomplish its purpose. Assessments include the America First Committee's strategic potential, how it was employed and the results. The study contradicts the idea that isolationist failure was caused by Pearl Harbor instead of its own strategic rhetorical choices.⁸⁵

Sarah Sanderson analyzed the major nominating speeches for president delivered at the 1960 national political conventions. Instruments for the study were found in Burke's dramatistic criticism and content analysis.⁸⁶ Mark Klyn used the Burkeian method to examine Webster's "Seventh of March Speech" as an act in the slavery conflict and as a continuing problem in criticism.⁸⁷ Thomas Mader interpreted Burke's dramatistic approach to the structure of communication then applied the theory to William Buckley's speech, "The True Meaning of the Right Wing."⁸⁸

Charles Marlin's 1967 study on Ad Bellum Purificandum⁸⁹ and James Mullican's 1968 study are both examinations of rhetorical uses and implications of the Burkeian theory.⁹⁰

Eighteen master's theses relate to the Burkeian approach. Two theses by Jim Chesebro⁹¹ and Peter Coyne⁹² are discussions of dramatism applied to rhetorical strategies and Burke's concept of identification and speech preparation. Two theses by Paul Melhuish⁹³ and Sharryl Hawke⁹⁴ are Burkeian analyses of single rhetorical

situations by individual speakers, John F. Kennedy and Winston S. Churchill. One thesis by Kathleen Corey⁹⁵ considers identification in the speeches of two speakers, Ronald Reagan and Edmund G. Brown, during the 1966 gubernatorial campaign.

Thirteen master's theses by Forbes Hill,⁹⁶ Lucy Melhuish,⁹⁷ John Hammerback,⁹⁸ George Austin,⁹⁹ Joan Orr,¹⁰⁰ Frederick Kauffeld,¹⁰¹ Karolyn Yocum,¹⁰² Chester Gibson,¹⁰³ George Skorkowsky,¹⁰⁴ Thomas Kyle,¹⁰⁵ JoAnne Patton,¹⁰⁶ Billy Vaughn,¹⁰⁷ and Larry Wachter¹⁰⁸ are discussions of the rhetorics of individual speakers during a campaign or a given period of time.

The Organization of the Study

Chapter II is a review of published material relating to the Burkeian methodology. Areas of consideration include (1) the meaning of rhetoric to Burke, (2) the difference between the old and the new rhetorics, (3) identification as the new rhetoric, and (4) rhetoric as symbolic action.

Chapter III is a discussion on the chief British diplomat and the diplomatic background of World War I. Sub-chapters include (1) a biography of Sir Edward Grey, and examinations of (2) the changed world situation from 1815 to 1914, (3) the end of "splendid isolation," (4) the system of rival alliances which appeared in Europe between 1875 and 1910, and (5) the series of six major diplomatic crises which gradually increased the tension between the nations of the opposing alliances.

Chapter IV is an analysis of Grey's use of identification in "Great Britain and the European Powers." Sub-chapters on (1) material,

(2) formal and (3) transcendental identification will argue that Grey's rhetoric of intervention was successful in relating to the common interests within the audience, redirecting audience attitudes from neutrality to intervention, and justifying his policy of intervention to maintain British obligations and interests and eventually attain peace.

FOOTNOTES

¹Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950).

²Martin Steinmann, Jr., (ed.), New Rhetorics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. iii.

³Ibid.

⁴Marie Hochmuth, "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric,'" Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVIII (1952), p. 135.

⁵Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 36.

⁶Malcolm Cowley, "Prolegomena to Kenneth Burke," New Republic, CXXII (June 5, 1950), pp. 18-19.

⁷W. H. Auden, "A Grammar of Assent," New Republic, CV (July 14, 1941), 59.

⁸C. I. Glicksberg, "Kenneth Burke: The Critic's Critic," South Atlantic Quarterly, XXXVI (1937), p. 74.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Virginia Holland, "Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkeian Method," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIX (1953), p. 444.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p. 3.

¹³Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History (2 vols., New York: New Republic, 1937).

¹⁴Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form; Studies in Symbolic Action (rev. ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1957).

¹⁵Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945).

¹⁶Donald Lindsay and E. S. Washington, A Portrait of Britain Between the Exhibitions: 1851-1951 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 189.

¹⁷R. C. Birch, Britain and Europe: 1871-1939 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966), p. 65.

¹⁸Lindsay and Washington, p. 189.

¹⁹Colin Cross, The Liberals in Power: 1905-1914 (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1963), p. 180.

²⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 183-184.

²¹Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis: 1911-1914 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), p. 211.

²²Alfred F. Havighurst, Twentieth-Century Britain (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, 1962), p. 120.

²³Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916 (2 vols., New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1925), II, pp. 1-3.

²⁴Birch, p. 121.

²⁵Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), p. 290.

²⁶Holland, "Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkeian Method," pp. 444-445.

²⁷William C. Lang, "Public Address as a Force in History," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVII (1951), p. 34.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹Wayland Maxfield Parrish, "The Study of Speeches," Speech Criticism: Methods and Materials, ed., William A. Linsley (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown, 1968), p. 77.

³⁰Marie Hochmuth, "The Criticism of Rhetoric," Speech Criticism: Methods and Materials, ed., William A. Linsley (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown, 1968), p. 61.

³¹Thomas Nilsen, "Criticism and Social Consequences," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIII (1956), pp. 173-178.

³²Holland, "Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkeian Method," p. 444.

³³L. H. Mouat, "An Approach to Rhetorical Criticism," The Rhetorical Idiom, ed., Donald C. Bryant (New York: Russell and Russell, 1966), pp. 171-177.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 171.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 176.

³⁶Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. xiv.

- ³⁷Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 55.
- ³⁸Ibid.
- ³⁹Hochmuth, "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric,'" p. 136.
- ⁴⁰Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 301.
- ⁴¹Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 46.
- ⁴²Holland, "Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkeian Method," p. 450.
- ⁴³Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 20-23.
- ⁴⁴Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 301.
- ⁴⁵Ibid.
- ⁴⁶Daniel Fogarty, Roots for a New Rhetoric (New York: Bureau of Publications, Columbia University, 1959), p. 74.
- ⁴⁷Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 20.
- ⁴⁸Ibid., p. 21.
- ⁴⁹Ibid.
- ⁵⁰Fogarty, p. 74.
- ⁵¹Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 21.
- ⁵²Ibid., pp. 23-24.
- ⁵³Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962), p. 169.
- ⁵⁴Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 22.
- ⁵⁵Ibid., p. 25.
- ⁵⁶Ibid., p. 146.
- ⁵⁷Dale L. Stockton, "Contemporary Approach: Kenneth Burke," Lecture to Speech 3733-Persuasion, Oklahoma State University, October 2, 1968.
- ⁵⁸Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Language and Literature in Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 138.
- ⁵⁹Stockton, "Contemporary Approach: Kenneth Burke."
- ⁶⁰Jean Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), p. 13.

- ⁶¹Sartre, p. 15.
- ⁶²Ibid.
- ⁶³Ibid.
- ⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 16-18.
- ⁶⁵William H. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. 43.
- ⁶⁶Ibid., p. 44.
- ⁶⁷Sartre, p. 18.
- ⁶⁸Ibid., p. 22.
- ⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 22-23.
- ⁷⁰Ibid.
- ⁷¹Ibid., p. 23.
- ⁷²Ibid., p. 29
- ⁷³Ibid.
- ⁷⁴Ibid., p. 57.
- ⁷⁵Hochmuth, "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric,'" pp. 133-144.
- ⁷⁶Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 50.
- ⁷⁷Ibid.
- ⁷⁸Marie Hochmuth, "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric,'" pp. 133-144; "Burkeian Criticism," Western Speech, XXI (1957), pp. 89-95; "The Criticism of Rhetoric," pp. 53-75; and Marie Hochmuth Nichols, "Kenneth Burke: Rhetorical and Critical Theory," Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), pp. 79-92.
- ⁷⁹Virginia Holland, "Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkeian Method," pp. 444-450; "Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Approach in Speech Criticism," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLI (1955), pp. 352-358; and Counterpoint: Kenneth Burke and Aristotle's Theories of Rhetoric (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).
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- ⁸² Jack Arnold, "The Compromise of 1850: A Burkeian Analysis" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1959).
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- ⁹³ Paul Melhuish, "The Rhetoric of Crisis: A Burkeian Analysis of John F. Kennedy's October 22, 1962 Cuban Address" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Oregon, 1963).
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CHAPTER II

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Works on the Meaning of Rhetoric to Burke

To Kenneth Burke the basic function of rhetoric is "the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents."¹ Burke notes that the reader or hearer "is ever on guard against 'rhetoric,'" yet by definition the word implies "the use of language in such a way as to produce a desired impression upon the reader or hearer."² He argues that effective literature of any kind is rhetoric and that "eloquence is simply the end of art, and is thus its essence."³

Four recent books are devoted to explicating Burke's views. George Knox wrote Critical Moments: Kenneth Burke's Categories and Critiques⁴ to help explain and synthesize Burke's writings. Knox states that too few people who could profit from Burke have the opportunity because his style makes him difficult and confusing to understand. Critical Moments is an attempt to define Burke's terminology, explain and assemble his ideas, and place them in an established order.

In 1959 Virginia Holland compared Burke's views on rhetoric with those of Aristotle in her Counterpoint: Kenneth Burke and Aristotle's Theories of Rhetoric.⁵ Holland argues that Burkeian theory is similar to Aristotle. "Although it has some innovations, these do not conflict with Aristotle's views of rhetoric, but rather are implicit in them."⁶

To investigate Aristotelianism in Burkeian theory Holland examines Burke's concept of the function of rhetoric, its definitions, scope and methodological devices.

Daniel Fogarty reexamines the meaning of rhetoric in his Roots for a New Rhetoric.⁷ He does not attempt to produce a new synthesis but to explain the term as an aspect of a philosophy of communication and as an area of instruction. Fogarty describes the characteristics of the earlier rhetorics of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian and Ramus and then examines the theories of Richards, Burke and the general semanticists. He relates Burke's background to Aristotle, Bergson and De Gourmont. "This philosophic base, plus his modern socio-psychological orientation, provides the roots for a rhetoric which includes all human action as symbolic gesture."⁸

A 1963 work by William H. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations,⁹ explains Burke's rhetorical development as a "gradual expansion of a literary theory and method into the larger dramatistic system and methodology."¹⁰

Two major articles explain the meaning of Burke's "new rhetoric." In "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric'"¹¹ Marie Hochmuth mainly examines A Rhetoric of Motives. She discusses Burke's other works to clarify his principles. The four divisions of her study include (1) Burke's orientation from which he approaches rhetoric, (2) his concept of rhetoric, (3) Burke's method for the analysis of motivation, and (4) his application of principles to specific works.

Hochmuth writes that Burke approaches "rhetoric through a comprehensive view of art in general, and it is this indirect approach that enables him to present what he believes to be a 'new rhetoric.'"¹²

Hochmuth recognizes Burke's intent to "rediscover rhetorical elements that had become obscured when rhetoric as a term fell into disuse."¹³ She explains the relationships between rhetoric and semantics, anthropology, individual psychology and dialectic. Hochmuth argues that to Burke rhetoric is not a substitute for other studies but a function present in areas covered by other areas. Statements made within other disciplines which relate to the function of language are rhetorical.

The purpose of Virginia Holland's "Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkeian Method"¹⁴ is to suggest how some of Burke's rhetorical insights, particularly the concept of identification through strategies, "can provide a methodology that will lessen the difficulty of the rhetorical critic's task and provide tools for sharper insights."¹⁵

Holland explains the nature of several aspects of formal identification, especially arrangement and style. She argues for a continuation of situation analysis. Holland states that the speech is a speaker's "symbolic response to a situation or problem" and that a "speaker's individual strategies are his stylistic devices for encompassing a situation, and the over-all strategy of his speech is per se his style."¹⁶

The Old and the New Rhetorics

One article by Kenneth Burke is devoted exclusively to comparing the old and the new rhetorics. Robert T. Oliver presents a similar comparison in Culture and Communication.¹⁷ Burke's "Rhetoric - Old and New"¹⁸ gives rhetoric its broadest scope. Anything that anyone does, verbally or nonverbally, consciously or unconsciously, for persuasion or for identification, may be a rhetorical strategy. Burke writes

that

if I had to sum up in one word the difference between the 'old' rhetoric and the 'new'...I would reduce it to this: the key term for the 'old' rhetoric was 'persuasion' and its stress was upon deliberate design. The key term for the 'new' rhetoric would be 'identification,' which can include a partially 'unconscious' factor in appeal. 'Identification' at its simplest is also a deliberate device, as when the politician seeks to identify himself with his audience. In this respect, its equivalents are plentiful in Aristotle's Rhetoric. But identification can also be an end, as when people earnestly yearn to identify themselves with some group or other. Here they are not necessarily being acted upon by a conscious external agent, but may be acting upon themselves to this end. In such identification there is a partially dream-like, idealistic motive, somewhat compensatory to real differences or divisions, which the rhetoric of identification would transcend.¹⁹

Robert T. Oliver devotes a portion of Culture and Communication to a comparison of the old and the new rhetorics. He states that both

are in some ways precise and in some ways extremely diffuse and inclusive. Both insist that rhetoric is a mode of thinking, and especially a mode of influencing the ways in which other people think. The emphasis is upon 'finding all available means' of shifting the opinions of those to whom we talk. Aristotle was concerned with what the speaker himself says and does; the new rhetoricians are concerned with the whole pattern of influences that converge upon the communicative act from the totality of the social situation. Both stress the necessity of analyzing the audience and the occasion in order that the speaker may say what needs to be said, in the manner in which it needs to be said, so that he may achieve the effect he desires with his particular hearers. Both the Aristotelean and the 'new' rhetoricians are so inclusive...that they are adequate as guides for any speaker under any and all circumstances.²⁰

Identification as the New Rhetoric

The most important work on the concept of identification is A Rhetoric of Motives, where Burke expands his "new rhetoric" to its greatest proportions. He attempts to "mark off the areas of rhetoric,

by showing how a rhetorical motive is often present where it is not usually recognized, or thought to belong."²¹

Although Burke develops rhetoric beyond its traditional bounds through the concept of identification, he reviews several classic texts to identify the major implications of persuasion. The review includes works by Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, St. Augustine, the Mediaevalists and several recent writers including De Quincey, De Gourmont, Bentham, Marx, Veblen, Freud, Mannheim, Mead and Richards.²²

In addition to his "extension of rhetoric" through identification Burke notes the

traditional evidences of the rhetorical motive: persuasion, exploitation of opinion (the 'timely' topic is a variant), a work's nature as addressed, literature for use (applied art, inducing to an act beyond the area of verbal expression considered in and for itself), verbal deception (hence, rhetoric as instrument in the war of words), the 'agonistic' generally, words used 'sweetly' (eloquence, ingratiating, for its own sake), formal devices, the art of proving opposites (as 'counterpart' of dialectic).²³

Burke compares persuasion and identification. He writes that

persuasion ranges from the bluntest quest of advantage, as in sales promotion or propaganda, through courtship, social etiquette, education, and the sermon, to a 'pure' form that delights in the process of appeal for itself alone, without ulterior purpose. And identification ranges from the politician who, addressing an audience of farmers, says, 'I was a farm boy myself,' through the mysteries of social status, to the mystic's devout identification with the source of all being.²⁴

In "Persuasion and the Concept of Identification"²⁵ Dennis G. Day questions the meaning of identification. Day comments that "the meaning of the key term of Burke's 'new' rhetoric, identification, remains nebulous."²⁶ He discusses identification as a rhetorical method, its philosophical basis, and the relationship of identification to some modern trends in rhetorical theory. Day suggests that

Burkeian identification is "an extension of traditional rhetorical theory."²⁷ He implies that the concept of identification is expressed implicitly by Phillips and explicitly by Winans. Day argues that although the philosophical context of Burkeian identification is unique the concept itself was presented by Phillips in 1908²⁸ and Winans in 1915²⁹.

Phillips' concept of reference to experience

means reference to the known. The known is that which the listener has seen, heard, read, felt, believed, or done, and which still exists in his consciousness.... It embraces all those thoughts, feelings, and happenings which are to him real. Reference to Experience, then means coming into the listener's life.³⁰

Phillips contends that the speaker thus identifies his purpose with the knowledge, interests and motives of the audience. Day points out that

the difference between Phillips and Burke is that Phillips admits only conscious factors in appeal, whereas Burke, following Freudian psychology, allows both conscious and subconscious motives.³¹

The similarity between reference and identification is seen in Phillips' statement that

our listeners are individualists, with individual ideas, individual feelings, individual beliefs, and that our problem is to liken the thing or things we seek to attain to some equivalent in their stock of knowledge - refer to their experience.³²

Both Phillips' principle of reference to experience and Burke's concept of identification involve the association of the speaker's interests with those of the audience.

Winans' theory of attention relates to the discovery of common ground between speaker and audience. Winans writes that

to convince or persuade a man is largely a matter of identifying the opinion or course of action which you wish him to adopt with one or more of his fixed opinions or

customary courses of action. When his mind is satisfied of the identity, then doubts vanish.³³

Day argues that Winans' use of identification in his attention theory is similar to Burke's concept of identification. The difference is in the emphasis. To Winans identification is "subordinate to his theory of attention whereas Burke makes it the key term of his rhetoric."³⁴

Day concludes that Burke's theory "is not a 'new' rhetoric" but "a 'new' perspective from which to view the 'old' rhetoric."³⁵ He states that the significance of Burke's approach is that he regards identification as the only means of persuasion.³⁶

Two additional works relate peripherally to identification. Robert T. Oliver's chapter on "Identification" in The Psychology of Persuasive Speech³⁷ is a discussion of the bases for establishing identification (community of interests and acquired objectivity) and the types of identification (interests, feelings, beliefs and methods). Oliver suggests several methods of utilization. These include stressing obvious and basic relations between speaker and audience, stressing agreements based on fundamental aims and goals, and keeping auditors' attention away from points of difference.

In "The Rhetoric of Conciliation"³⁸ Lyman Bryson argues that the new rhetoric goes beyond persuasion to encompass mediation. He advocates transcendence as a method to make positions compatible. Bryson suggests that an exploration of any problem should include examinations of each position, a determination of which are significant, which can be changed and which resist refutation.

Rhetoric as Symbolic Action

Any form of identification involves the interaction of language within its rhetorical-historical situation. Burke labels this process "symbolic action." Six major books and three articles by Burke are devoted primarily to explaining rhetoric as symbolic action. One article by Virginia Holland and portions of two books by Hugh Dalziel Duncan further explain the concept. In Counter-Statement³⁹ Burke advances the principle of polarity, or the achievement of perspective through congruity. His primary interest is in tracing symbolic action in literature. He applies his theories to writings by Mann, Gide, Pater and Flaubert.

Burke suggests that the theoretical portions of Counter-Statement be listed under three heads: (1) an "apology for poesy," (2) a "'rhetoric,' an analysis of the processes by which a work of art is effective" dealing with how effects are produced, and (3) a "'program,' a consideration of what effects should be produced at the present time."⁴⁰

Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose⁴¹ is an effort to advance "a philosophy of social values" and present "a critique of social thought and expression."⁴² Burke attempts to achieve understanding by reducing meanings, social in origin and purpose, to their component elements. He defines, compares and contrasts terms until they lose conventional connotations. Burke argues that "planned incongruity should be deliberately cultivated" to separate experimentally "all those molecular combinations of adjective and noun, substantive and verb, which still remain with us."⁴³

In Attitudes Toward History⁴⁴ Burke examines the ideas of acceptance and rejection on the basis that concepts embody attitudes. He suggests that if we are for or against people, we are also for or against what they represent. Burke's primary purpose is to argue that esthetic enterprise is restrained by historical forces. He states that poetic forms are symbolic structures designed to equip us for confronting given historical or personal situations.⁴⁵ Burke suggests a dictionary of critical terms to give more flexibility to language so that words used in one association may be free for use in other associations.

In The Philosophy of Literary Form⁴⁶ Burke attempts to reexamine and reappraise fundamental practices of literary criticism and interpret literature in terms of situations and strategies. As in his other works Burke is primarily concerned with the nature of symbolic action. He suggests ways to analyze symbolic acts to discover what the speech is doing for the speaker. Burke writes that words are part of a larger

communicative context most of which is not verbal at all. And when discussing them as modes of action, we must consider both this nature as words in themselves and the nature they get from the nonverbal scenes that support their acts.⁴⁷

Similar to Counter-Statement, in The Philosophy of Literary Form Burke suggests that literature is designed to elicit a response within the writer or speaker and reader or hearer. He considers literature the embodiment of an act⁴⁸ and as "symbolic action."⁴⁹ Words become "acts upon a scene."⁵⁰ A "symbolic act is the dancing of an attitude" or incipient action.⁵¹

The Philosophy of Literary Form is especially helpful in its discussion of strategy. A speech is "a strategy for encompassing a situation."⁵² Burke states that "critical and imaginative works are answers to questions posed by the situation in which they arose. They are not merely answers, they are strategic answers, stylized answers."⁵³

Charles Morris writes that A Grammar of Motives⁵⁴ is a detailed discussion of ideas presented earlier in Permanence and Change. "It is the same Burke with the same quest and the same strategy, as baffling, as inconclusive, as penetrating, as rewarding as ever."⁵⁵ In A Grammar of Motives Burke relates motivation to human behavior. He describes how to determine the "substance or whatness" of a situation through an application of the pentad. By using the pentad the critic can describe any stimuli causing or motivating man's action. Responses may be expressed overtly or symbolically through language. The pentad is arranged in five parts: act, scene, agent, agency and purpose. These divisions become highly complex and constantly overlap. Man is presented as an actor who acts with a purpose through the use of certain means. He performs this action against the backdrop of the historical scene.⁵⁶

Burke explains the use of the pentad in speech criticism. He suggests that the critic answer five questions: (1) What did the speech say (act)? (2) Who was the speaker (agent)? (3) What means (symbolic linguistic device) did he use to accomplish his purpose (agency)? (4) What was his purpose? (5) What was the historical situation in which the speech was given (scene)?⁵⁷

Language as Symbolic Action⁵⁸ relates peripherally to rhetoric. Burke begins with an essay on the definition of man. His concern for

symbolic action is met with an equal concern for dramatism. Four essays on dramatism, also published in the Quarterly Journal of Speech, appear in the last section.

Burke's article on "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language"⁵⁹ attempts to locate the specific nature of language and the ability to use the negative. Burke points out that

there are many notable aspects of language, such as classification, specification, abstraction, which have their analogies in purely nonverbal behavior. But the negative is a peculiarly linguistic resource. And because it is so peculiarly linguistic, the study of man as the specifically word-using animal requires special attention to this distinctive marvel, the negative.⁶⁰

In "Postscripts on the Negative"⁶¹ Burke presents some afterthoughts on his earlier "Dramatistic View." He argues that "symbol-using demands a feeling for the negative."⁶² A symbol-using animal must "introduce a symbolic ingredient into every experience."⁶³ Consequently every experience includes negativity. The symbol-using animal is incapable of reaction in the purely positive.

In "Symbol and Association"⁶⁴ Burke writes that "to speak of man as the 'typically symbol-using animal'...is to mean that, once man has emerged from the state of infancy, his approach to things is through a fog of words."⁶⁵ Burke attempts to show that symbolism may be explained in linguistic or dialectic terms.

One article by Virginia Holland and portions of two books by Hugh Dalziel Duncan further explain Burke's concept of rhetoric as symbolic action. The major question in Holland's article on "Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Approach in Speech Criticism"⁶⁶ concerns what judgments can be made "in evaluating the dramatistic strategy, or approach to

criticism, advocated by Kenneth Burke?"⁶⁷ Holland attempts first to explain the dramatistic approach and its use by the speech critic. Second, she evaluates the effectiveness of this approach.

Holland discusses Burke's contention that "the rhetorical critic must understand the substance of man, what he is, what his problems are, why he acts as he does, and how he molds the thoughts and concepts of others."⁶⁸ She agrees with Burke that the rhetorical critic achieves "the most valid critical estimate" by using the dramatistic strategy to apply Burke's pentad. Man's action should be considered from the "five interrelated motivational or causal points of view": act, scene, agent, agency and purpose.⁶⁹ Holland suggests that the dramatistic approach should remind the critic of all the factors in a speech and prevent him from over-emphasizing one element or stressing one form of criticism. She writes that the advantage in Burke's approach is "a psychological one" and lies "in the dynamic stress upon the speech as the 'action' of an actor in a scene."⁷⁰

In Language and Literature in Society⁷¹ Duncan explains motivation as a symbolic relationship "between environment and action (scene-act), environment and person (scene-agent), environment and function (scene-agency), environment and ends...(scene-purpose)."⁷² The scene must encompass the act since it expresses "in fixed properties the same quality that the action expresses in terms of development."⁷³ The quality of the scene sets the environment for the action.

In Communication and Social Order⁷⁴ Duncan writes that Burke's theories begin where Mead and Malinowski end. "He does not tell us simply what symbols do in communication, but how they do what he says

they do."⁷⁵ Duncan argues that when we stress symbolism as a motive, these symbols "do not 'reflect' motives, they are motives."⁷⁶

FOOTNOTES

¹Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 41.

²Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement (2d ed., Los Altos, California: Hermes, 1953), p. 265.

³Ibid., p. 53.

⁴George Knox, Critical Moments: Kenneth Burke's Categories and Critiques (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957).

⁵Virginia Holland, Counterpoint: Kenneth Burke and Aristotle's Theories of Rhetoric (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).

⁶Ibid., p. xv.

⁷Daniel Fogarty, Roots for a New Rhetoric (New York: Bureau of Publications, Columbia University, 1959).

⁸Ibid., pp. x-xi.

⁹William H. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963).

¹⁰Ibid., p. viii.

¹¹Marie Hochmuth, "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric,'" Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVIII (1952), pp. 133-144.

¹²Ibid., pp. 134-135.

¹³Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. xiii.

¹⁴Virginia Holland, "Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkeian Method," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIX (1953), pp. 444-450.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 444.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 445.

¹⁷Robert T. Oliver, Culture and Communication (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1962).

- ¹⁸Kenneth Burke, "Rhetoric - Old and New," Journal of General Education, V (1951), pp. 202-209.
- ¹⁹Ibid., p. 203.
- ²⁰Oliver, Culture and Communication, pp. 77-78.
- ²¹Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. xiii.
- ²²Ibid., pp. 49-180.
- ²³Ibid., p. 64.
- ²⁴Ibid., p. xiv.
- ²⁵Dennis G. Day, "Persuasion and the Concept of Identification," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI (1960), pp. 270-273.
- ²⁶Ibid., p. 270.
- ²⁷Ibid.
- ²⁸A. E. Phillips, Effective Speaking (Chicago: Newton, 1908).
- ²⁹James A. Winans, Public Speaking (New York: Century, 1915).
- ³⁰Phillips, p. 28.
- ³¹Day, p. 272.
- ³²Phillips, p. 32.
- ³³Winans, pp. 276-277.
- ³⁴Day, p. 273.
- ³⁵Ibid.
- ³⁶Ibid.
- ³⁷Robert T. Oliver, "Identification," The Psychology of Persuasive Speech (2d ed., New York: David McKay, 1957), pp. 167-197.
- ³⁸Lyman Bryson, "The Rhetoric of Conciliation," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIX (1953), pp. 437-443.
- ³⁹Burke, Counter-Statement.
- ⁴⁰Kenneth Burke, "Counterblasts on 'Counter-Statement,'" New Republic, LXIX (1931), p. 101.
- ⁴¹Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose (New York: New Republic, 1935).

⁴²C. I. Glicksberg, "Kenneth Burke: The Critic's Critic," South Atlantic Quarterly, XXXVI (1937), p. 76.

⁴³Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, p. 157.

⁴⁴Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History (2 vols., New York: New Republic, 1937).

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, I, pp. 41-42.

⁴⁶Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action (rev. ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1957).

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. vii.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. vii.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵⁴Burke, A Grammar of Motives (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945).

⁵⁵Charles Morris, "The Strategy of Kenneth Burke," Nation, CLXIII (1946), p. 106.

⁵⁶Burke, A Grammar of Motives, pp. xv-xxiii.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. xv.

⁵⁸Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

⁵⁹Kenneth Burke, "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVIII (1952), Part I, pp. 251-264; Part II, pp. 446-460; XXXIX (1953); Part III, pp. 79-92.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, Part I, p. 251.

⁶¹Kenneth Burke, "Postscripts on the Negative," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIX (1953), pp. 209-216.

⁶²*Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁶³*Ibid.*

⁶⁴Kenneth Burke, "Symbol and Association," Hudson Review, IX (1956-1957), pp. 212-225.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 213.

⁶⁶Virginia Holland, "Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Approach in Speech Criticism," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLI (1955), pp. 352-358.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 352.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, p. 353.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, p. 355.

⁷¹Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Language and Literature in Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

⁷²*Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁷³Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 3.

⁷⁴Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962).

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

CHAPTER III

THE DIPLOMAT AND THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF WORLD WAR I

A Biography of Sir Edward Grey¹

Sir Edward Grey, better known as Viscount Grey of Fallodon, was born in London on April 25, 1862. His father was a soldier. His grandfather, whom he succeeded in the baronetcy in 1882, was a statesman. Grey was educated at Winchester and Balliol College, Oxford, where he became famous for his tennis and infamous for his neglect of scholarship. He was dismissed from the university in 1884 and elected its chancellor in 1928.

In 1885 Grey entered the House of Commons as a Liberal from Northumberland. He returned to the House each succeeding election during the next thirty-one years. Grey was Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office under Lords Rosebery and Kimberly, Foreign Secretaries in Gladstone's last administration. With Campbell-Bannerman's election in 1905 he became Foreign Secretary. The appointment insured a continuation of the policies begun during the last three years of the previous government and was as popular with Conservatives as with Liberals.²

English liberalism leaned toward radicalism. Liberal leaders were primarily concerned with parliamentary, domestic and social reform. Grey supported reform but his purposes in the Foreign Office were

different from other departments of the government. They were frequently contrary to the desires of a public uninterested in world affairs.

The period prior to 1914 was one of armed peace. For fifty years leading nations of Europe prepared for war. The Triple Alliance and the eventual Triple Entente created a military dichotomy. Grey's principal function was to formulate a foreign policy to maintain a European balance of power. That balance was thought by parliamentary leaders to exclude any permanent alliances since "the shifting equilibrium of national forces in Europe demanded that England...remain free to transfer her weight from one scale to the other."³

Grey's efforts to attain peace failed. Thus on August 3, 1914, he spoke to the House of Commons to unite parliamentary factions and popular opinion in terms of British obligations and interests. That evening in his office Grey made his famous remark that "the lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime."⁴

Grey was Foreign Secretary through the ministries of Campbell-Bannerman and Herbert Asquith. He retired and was elevated to the peerage as a Viscount when David Lloyd George became Prime Minister. Following the war Grey was Temporary Ambassador to the United States. He remained active in the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the League of Nations Union. Grey died at his home in Fallodon on September 7, 1933.

The Changed World Situation

Between Waterloo in 1815 and the outbreak of World War I the general situation changed profoundly. Railroad building shortened distances with respect to time. Political leaders planned ~~Cape-to-Cairo~~ and ~~Berlin-to-Bagdad~~ railways. Steam navigation extended world trade where Britain led all nations. Electricity annihilated space. The automobile speeded transportation. The telegraph, telephone and cable quickened communication. Science developed the airplane, the submarine, powerful explosives, deadly gasses and larger guns.⁵

The political problems of the late nineteenth century were not confined to Great Britain. They resulted from great social and economic changes. Between 1870 and 1914 world population grew from 300 to 500 million. Industrial production quadrupled. European investments in other nations increased. British interests alone trebled in the last thirty years of the century. International trade expanded but individual concerns suffered as rivalries became stronger. Europeans settled throughout the world adding colonial problems to social and economic ones. Britain developed an interest in imperial expansion. The stress of these changes resulted in economic depression.⁶

By the 1890's the principal doctrine of political existence was diversity. The faith of earlier decades vanished and no new set of values was developed. The world saw an infinite variety of moods which included the reformer, the idealist, the materialist, the evangelical and the self-indulgent. The period was one of "splendid isolation." People lived in ignorance of the future. Logic and consistency were contradicted by tension, frustration and chaos.⁷

The End of Splendid Isolation

For nearly half a century European powers prepared great armaments and divided into rival alliances. To remain aloof from European troubles English leaders followed Salisbury's policy of "splendid isolation" and attempted to avoid those alliances.⁸ Great Britain maintained the largest empire in the world. Allies seemed unnecessary. Isolation became a sign of self-sufficiency.⁹

The force of national prestige was significant. An intense nationalism created vigorous new nations and alarmed old ones into colonial expansion. Germany, Italy, Austria, France and Russia developed major colonial interests. Each shunned British trade. Consequently Great Britain was forced toward imperial expansion.¹⁰ Her leaders became aware of the perils of isolation among nations strong enough to challenge British supremacy.¹¹

With the rivalry in industrial markets Britain turned to the more remote, less developed territories, some for extension of political sovereignty, all for mineral wealth or rich resources of raw materials. Her interests in Australia and Africa were stimulated by the discovery of gold and other precious metals. In 1900 Australia joined the British Commonwealth. Much of Africa, however, including the areas of richest mineral wealth, was either independent or disputed territory. Here the concentration of British interests led to intense diplomacy and eventually resulted in armed intervention.¹²

Conflicts began to develop after the Boer War and with the expansion of the German Empire. By 1910 British anxiety about her defense took priority over all other considerations.¹³ The general public did not share the same concern, however. Even after the

fighting began in 1914 most thought it would be "over by Christmas." No one saw the extent that military and political machines would run out of control and how institutions designed to sustain civilization would nearly destroy it.¹⁴

Great Britain was aware of international tensions but war came abruptly. The Liberals in power were traditionally pacific. The Cabinet met twice daily but to discuss Irish Home Rule. Neither they nor the parliamentary party seriously considered the prospect of war. To some Conservatives, however, war with Germany seemed inevitable.¹⁵

Alliances and Ententes

The roots of World War I were in the system of rival alliances which appeared in Europe between 1875 and 1910.¹⁶ Bismarck created the Triple Alliance in 1882. Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy signed treaties providing for military cooperation. Germany and Austria-Hungary promised to defend Italy from French attack. Italy promised to aid her allies if they were attacked by two or more powers but would help Germany if she were attacked by France alone. If one of the three powers were threatened the other two would observe a "benevolent neutrality."¹⁷

By 1888 Bismarck's policies were in ruins. His desire for Russian friendship was shared by few in his government. In the Reichstag powerful new elements were eager for economic, colonial and naval expansion. This eventually brought Germany into conflict with Britain and Russia, the powers Bismarck most sought to conciliate. Consequently in 1890 Bismarck was dismissed.¹⁸

After Bismarck's fall France and Russia signed the Dual Alliance in 1894. This became the first link in the Triple Entente. If Germany or Italy supported by Germany attacked France, or if Germany or Austria-Hungary supported by Germany attacked Russia, the other power would declare war against Germany. Mobilization by any power in the Triple Alliance would imply immediate mobilization by France and Russia.¹⁹

The two alliances frequently disagreed. Austria-Hungary and Russia disputed the dominion of the Balkans. France distrusted Germany for her annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in the Franco-Prussian War. The members of both alliances maintained conscript armies of millions of men.²⁰ The German military budget trebled between 1878 and 1898. Over the same period British and French spending doubled.²¹

The Franco-Russian agreement was originally anti-British instead of anti-German. Britain welcomed the German-Austrian alliance because she hoped it would strengthen Austria-Hungary against Russia. However, she disliked the Franco-Russian understanding because it associated the two powers she most opposed in expansion. Germany overestimated the significance of those differences and assumed wrongly that Great Britain would be forced to join the Triple Alliance on German terms.²²

Great Britain became increasingly more suspicious of her isolation. Joseph Chamberlain and Cecil Rhodes sought an alliance of England, Germany and the United States but that did not materialize.²³ Attempts to reach an alliance with Germany against Russia and France also failed. Germany was unwilling to support Britain in the Far East unless Britain would support Austria-Hungary against Russia in Europe. At this point Japan intervened to offer England the alliance she needed.²⁴

In the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 each power promised to maintain friendly neutrality if a single nation should attack the other and to join its ally if more than one power should attack. This put Japan in a position to avenge her losses to the European powers in 1895. She could now deal with Russia alone. If another European power helped Russia, Britain was bound to aid Japan. Since the British and Japanese Fleets were strong enough to defeat any European combination, aid to Russia was unlikely.²⁵

Germany approved of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance because it estranged Great Britain and Russia. Britain became less dependent on German support and Anglo-German relations improved. Franco-Russian relations were weakened because France was faced with a dilemma in the event of war in the Far East. Britain was able to remain aloof from the balance of power for two more years.²⁶

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Russo-Japanese War strengthened Great Britain's international position and led to the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904. France recognized British primacy in Egypt and Britain recognized French interests in Morocco. Anglo-French relations became more compatible. The original agreement involved no military commitments,²⁷ however, it was eventually transformed into a military alliance. During the first Moroccan crisis the Foreign Office conferred with the French Army on Britain's position in case of war. Their discussions led to a division of responsibility on the high seas, Britain to protect the Atlantic and the Channel and France the Mediterranean.²⁸

Campbell-Bannerman welcomed closer relations with France. However, he and the Liberal Party opposed France's ally, Russia. In

principle they disliked the Czarist autocracy. The Franco-Russian and Anglo-French agreements forced Britain closer to Russia. In 1907 the two nations signed the Anglo-Russian Convention.²⁹

Like the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Entente Cordiale, Great Britain made the Anglo-Russian agreement for the protection of her overseas interests. The Convention made no commitments of either diplomatic or military support. Russia was freed of subservience to Germany. On the Balkan question Germany moved closer to Austria. The Anglo-Russian Convention provided the final link between Great Britain, France and Russia for the foundation of the Triple Entente.³⁰

The eventual formation of the Triple Entente did not mean the parties acted diplomatically in unison. Neither France nor Russia maintained the military strength to defeat Germany alone. They hoped the strength of their Dual Alliance and individual agreements with Britain would discourage a German war effort.³¹

Meanwhile the staff talks between England and France continued with Russia invited to join the discussions. However, Grey still refused to commit himself to the definite alliance France desired.³² They only agreed that to be prepared the General Staffs should discuss military obligations.³³

The Triple Alliance was much stronger on paper than the Triple Entente but because of common interests the Entente became more binding as time elapsed. The Alliance involved military aid. The Entente involved diplomatic aid and suggested the availability of military aid.

Recurring Crises

A series of six major diplomatic crises gradually increased the tension between the nations of the opposing alliances. Britain and France resented each other for their colonial expansion in Africa. In the Far East the struggle centered around China where French, Russian and Japanese ambitions threatened British trade.³⁴ Germany was committed to a policy of world power and tried to achieve it by taking advantage of the colonial difficulties of other nations.³⁵ In 1900 Anglo-German relations were poor. In 1901 they were worse. Britain and Japan signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. France and Great Britain conciliated and signed the Entente Cordiale in 1904. Thus German support of Britain in the Far East and Africa was no longer necessary.³⁶

Germany was disturbed by the Entente. The Moroccan crisis of 1905 was an attempt to shatter that agreement. Italy was no longer a reliable ally and Austria-Hungary was weak. Germany feared encirclement. The Kaiser went to Tangier and declared that Morocco was an independent nation. He demanded an international conference.³⁷ In January of 1906 the powers met at Algeiras. France demanded control of the Moroccan bank and police. Germany demanded Moroccan independence. Austria-Hungary and Morocco supported Germany. Italy wavered and Russia and Great Britain supported France.³⁸ Grey assured the German Ambassador that if Germany made the Moroccan question a pretext for war Britain would not remain neutral. Anglo-French relations were solidified. Germany sustained a diplomatic defeat.³⁹

In 1908 Serbia and Russia opposed Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Germany supported Austria to humiliate Russia

for signing the Anglo-Russian Convention. Russia moved closer to Britain and France. Serbia moved closer to Russia. War was narrowly averted as Serbia was left with a bitter grievance against Austria-Hungary for annexing her kinspeople.⁴⁰

After the Bosnian crisis Franco-German relations in Morocco improved.⁴¹ However, in 1911 Germany challenged the Triple Entente the third time. France was in complete control of Morocco and Germany demanded territorial compensation elsewhere in Africa. To demonstrate her desires Germany sent a warship to Agadir, a port in Western Morocco, ostensibly to protect her interests.⁴² Grey told the German Ambassador that the British Cabinet could not accept "any new arrangements" in Africa. With Britain supporting France, Germany failed to break the Entente.⁴³

Following the second Moroccan crisis the relations between the powers became more critical when Germany challenged Britain at sea. Since control of the oceans was essential to British trade, she could not let Germany destroy her naval superiority.⁴⁴ In 1912 Britain sought an entente with Germany to limit naval shipbuilding. Germany insisted that Britain pledge neutrality under all circumstances involving Germany in a war. No agreement was reached.⁴⁵

In 1912 the Balkan wars began. Italy conquered Tripoli and the Balkan League of Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece attacked Turkey. Turkey's European provinces were divided. Serbia and Greece gained territory and prestige.⁴⁶ A rejuvenated Serbia was a barrier to future Austrian imperialism. Germany supported Austria. Russia supported Serbia.⁴⁷ With the threat to European peace Grey proposed a London conference of the ambassadors. The conference was at first

successful but war resumed in 1913. Serbia, Greece and Rumania defeated Bulgaria and Turkey. Serbia's strengthened position made Austria-Hungary sensitive and apprehensive.⁴⁸

The final crisis was the murder of the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a Serb on June 28, 1914. The Austrian government accused Serbia of complicity in the assassination and demanded Austrian suppression of all hostile activities in the disaffected regions of Serbia. After an unsatisfactory reply to her ultimatum Austria declared war. Russia and France supported Serbia. Germany supported Austria.⁴⁹

The Foreign Office proposed an international conference to conciliate and negotiate peace but the great European powers mobilized their armies in preparation for war. Germany sent ultimatums to France and Russia then declared war on both. German strategists hoped to defeat France in the west then attack Russia in the east. The Kaiser did not expect Britain to intervene. For British neutrality he offered not to attack the northern coast of France which Britain was responsible to defend.⁵⁰ Grey did not accept the German offer. Instead he told the French Ambassador, Paul Cambon, that in the event of war with Germany, British public opinion "would be strongly moved in favour of France." His argument was that "we must be free to go to the help of France as well as to stand aside."⁵¹

The Entente was formed, tested and strengthened. Grey understood the moral obligations the staff talks imposed but questioned if they could bring Britain into the war. Cambon remarked, "I am wondering whether the word 'honour' is to be erased from the English language,"⁵² Grey's personal opinion was that any promise of armed assistance to

France and Russia would only strengthen and encourage the war parties of both countries. The British public was unaware of the gravity of the situation. The Cabinet was more concerned about Ireland than the likelihood of war. Grey told the French that if the question became one of the hegemony of Europe he would then make a decision.⁵³

Grey could not promise support which might not materialize. The Cabinet was radically divided. Winston Churchill, who argued for immediate mobilization, wrote that they were "overwhelmingly pacifist." Most were not convinced that intervention was necessary unless Britain herself were attacked.⁵⁴ John Morley and John Burns saw no reason for hostilities against Germany.⁵⁵ David Lloyd George believed the fighting on the continent was none of Britain's business. His position changed with the prospect of the German Fleet coming down the English Channel to bombard the French coast while the French Fleet was in the Mediterranean. If the French Fleet were forced to leave the Mediterranean to protect her coast British interests in the Middle East would be impaired. The German Army was advancing and the Cabinet faced the possibility of German violation of Luxembourg and Belgian neutrality.⁵⁶

On Sunday, August 2, the issue in the Cabinet was resolved. That morning Conservative leaders gave their unqualified support for intervention. The principal opposition within the Liberal Party resigned. The Foreign Office informed France that the German Fleet would not be allowed in the Channel. After the German invasion of Luxembourg the invasion of Belgium was inevitable.⁵⁷

The violation of Luxembourg's neutrality prompted the examination of the treaties between Luxembourg, Belgium and Britain. Luxembourg and Britain had no agreement. However, by the Treaty of 1839,

reaffirmed in 1870, England was responsible for Belgian neutrality.⁵⁸ Grey asked Berlin and Paris if they would respect Belgian neutrality so long as no other power violated it. France agreed but Germany did not.⁵⁹

On August 3, Belgium refused a German ultimatum and appealed to Britain for diplomatic intervention. Diplomacy was tried earlier and failed. Thus Britain sent Germany an ultimatum to keep out of Belgium or be at war with Britain.⁶⁰

The public gave token support to going to war but did not realize the cost in military obligations or the impact on the life and economy of the nations involved. The slogan was "business as usual." The common man understood the reasons for intervention. He did not understand the reasons for German aggression against the rest of the world for her own aggrandizement. Few saw the war as one for survival as a great power.⁶¹

FOOTNOTES

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⁵J. A. Rickard, History of England (11ed., New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965), p. 208.

⁶R. C. Birch, Britain and Europe: 1871-1939 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966), pp. 18-20.

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⁹George Monger, The End of Isolation (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1963), p. 1.

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¹⁶Cross, p. 180.

- ¹⁷Birch, p. 41.
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- ¹⁹Ibid., p. 104.
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- ²⁴Strang, p. 228.
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- ²⁷Birch, pp. 112-114.
- ²⁸Havighurst, p. 120.
- ²⁹Cross, p. 182.
- ³⁰Strang, pp. 258-259.
- ³¹Ibid., pp. 23-264.
- ³²Cross, p. 182.
- ³³Austen Chamberlain, Politics from Inside (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), p. 428.
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- ³⁵Ibid., p. 107.
- ³⁶Ibid., p. 110.
- ³⁷Ibid., p. 115.
- ³⁸Anthony Wood, Nineteenth Century Britain: 1815-1914 (New York: David McKay, 1960), p. 411.
- ³⁹Elie Halevy, A History of the English People in 1905-1915 (London: Ernest Benn, 1934), p. 125.
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- ⁴²Lindsay and Washington, p. 194.
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- ⁴⁹Gross., p. 183.
- ⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 183-184.
- ⁵¹Strang, p. 265.
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- ⁵³Maximilian Montgelas, British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1928), pp. 101-102.
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- ⁵⁶Grey, Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916, II, pp. 1-3.
- ⁵⁷Havighurst, pp. 120-121.
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- ⁵⁹Montgelas, pp. 104-105.
- ⁶⁰Trevelyan, p. 297.
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CHAPTER IV

THE USE OF IDENTIFICATION IN "GREAT BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN POWERS"¹

Material Identification

Material identification is when the speaker and audience operate within a given frame of reference, sharing similar beliefs and goals.² Material identification is most likely when speaker and audience are drawn together for a specific purpose, at a specific time and place, on a specific occasion.³ Sir Edward Grey materially identified with his peers in the House of Commons to unite parliamentary factions and popular opinion in terms of British obligations and interests. Speaker and audience alike were concerned with attaining world peace. National unity was necessary for a successful British effort toward that peace.

L. H. Mouat writes that material identification is mainly invention:

selection of topics and selection of developmental factors for proof, clarification, or appreciation. Obviously, disposition, style, etc., cannot be ignored; but content is paramount. The audience is given the material it wants and needs.⁴

Karl R. Wallace states that the selection of topics

is a substantive act and the statement of a choice is a substantive statement.... The deliberative or political kind of speech helps an audience decide what it ought

to do, and the materials most often appearing are those that bear on the particular audience's ends and purposes and the means to those ends.⁵

Kenneth Burke argues that the selection of topics in Aristotle's Rhetoric is a survey of opinion of what the people generally consider persuasive. Topics are ways to proclaim substantial unity and are clearly instances of identification.⁶ In traditional rhetoric Aristotle refers to topics as

typical beliefs, so that the speaker may choose among them the ones with which he would favorably identify his cause or unfavorably identify the cause of an opponent; and it lists the traits of character with which the speaker should seek to identify himself, as a way of disposing an audience favorably towards him.⁷

Burke discusses Aristotle's cataloguing of traits "which an audience generally considers the components of virtue."⁸ Examples are justice, courage, broad-mindedness, prudence and wisdom.⁹

In Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916 Grey comments on the selection of topics for his speech. He states that "at such a moment there could be neither hope of personal success nor fear of personal failure."¹⁰

At first it was in my mind to read to the House Bethman-Hollweg's bid for our neutrality, and the reply made to it; but this was deliberately discarded. To read that would tend to stir indignation, and the House ought to come to its decisions on grounds of weight, not of passion. We were not to go into the war because Bethman-Hollweg had made a dishonouring proposal to us. We should not be influenced by that in our decision. When the decision was made, then the communication with Bethman-Hollweg should be published, and it would no doubt strengthen feeling; but this ought to be later - after the decision, not before it. I was myself stirred with resentment and indignation at what seemed to me Germany's crime in precipitating the war, and all I knew of Prussian militarism was hateful; but these must not be the motives of our going into the war. It was not on the case against Germany that our treasure was to be spent and British lives sacrificed in the war. These considerations worked in my mind by flashes of instinct in the pressure of those hours, rather than by calm proofs of reasoning; but it was these considerations that decided the line of this speech.¹¹

Grey's purpose was to place British obligations and interests in proper relation to neutrality and intervention. In Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916 he writes that

if we did not stand by France and stand up for Belgium against this aggression, we should be isolated, discredited and hated; and there would be before us nothing but a miserable and ignoble future.¹²

The major topics stemming from Grey's attitude to support France and Belgium were (1) an obligation of honour to aid Russia, (2) an obligation of honour to aid France, (3) an obligation resulting from Anglo-French friendship, (4) an interest in Mediterranean trade routes, and (5) an interest in maintaining Belgian neutrality.

In the conclusion of the speech after summarizing his selection of topics, Grey materially identified with the audience around the traits of character Aristotle suggests as topics to gain favor with an audience.

I have put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realizes what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the west of Europe, which I have endeavored to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country.

Material identification results from (1) the polarization of an audience through social cohesion and common ground and (2) the identification of the positive with what the audience accepts and the negative with what it rejects to establish order and hierarchy.

An examination of the natures of social cohesion and common ground helps explain the polarization of an audience around common interests in material identification.

Burke describes social cohesion as a way members of a group act "rhetorically upon themselves and one another."¹³ A. Craig Baird writes that social cohesion is created when individuals are drawn together "in common purposes, attitudes and emotionality."¹⁴ The day before Grey's speech leading Conservatives gave their support for intervention. Morley and Burns resigned and the public gave token support to going to war. Grey's function was to polarize these and other parliamentary factions and popular opinion into a psychological group.¹⁵ He intensified existing attitudes toward world peace in terms of British obligations and interests.

The use of common ground is another method of polarizing an audience and "creating receptiveness for a proposition and for action."¹⁶ Baird states that the strength of the identification is greater if the speaker and audience agree.¹⁷ To unite the nation Grey needed popular support, thus a mood in agreement with his goals was necessary. Common ground was established with references to "we" in discussing the common effort for peace. Every member of the House was given credit for his work toward peace. Although proposed methodology for attaining peace differed considerably the common fight was still against a common enemy, German aggression. An example of the use of common ground to polarize the audience is in the introduction of the speech. All who worked for peace were referred to as "we" and the reference was to the entire House and the nation. Grey said that

we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. ...but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other.

...we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The

House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so.

Grey attempted to polarize the audience to continue working together toward attaining peace. In the conclusion of the speech he developed additional social cohesion and common ground. Grey cited the common responsibility of the Government and the House to determine policy. Common goals related to maintaining British obligations and interests. Arguing that the defense of Western Europe must be maintained, Grey stated that "we worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment." The social cohesion was for unity among the Government and the people in the pending crisis. The common ground drew the audience to the same level as the speaker. Grey stated that

we are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others.

The second means for establishing material identification is to identify the positive with what the audience accepts and the negative with what it rejects. In a speech situation different auditors may react to the same speech in different ways. Hugh Dalziel Duncan writes that every speech implies both acceptance and rejection¹⁸ as polar attitudes. An idea may alienate auditors from one group and align them with another.¹⁹ Mouat applies the acceptance-rejection concept to the presentation of specific issues to a specific audience so that individuals previously opposed to an idea may remain opposed but still

identify with the speaker. He states that

to create, strengthen or solidify belief an effective rhetoric will deal with the linkages and oppositions of ideas, identifying the positive with what the audience accepts and the negative with what it rejects. Order is established, complexities are simplified and polarizations are effected.²⁰

In the introduction of the speech Grey identified those nations which worked for peace as opposed to those which worked against it. He meant to align the audience, regardless of individual positions favoring intervention or neutrality, with his effort for peace. Grey identified Britain's search for peace with what the audience accepted.

The co-operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. ...peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly.

Grey then identified those nations which worked against peace with what the audience rejected. He meant to alienate any auditors from upholding aggressor nations.

In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition - at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell - to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate, to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace, as far as the Great Powers generally are concerned, is in danger.

Throughout the body of the speech Grey identified the positive with what the audience accepted and the negative with what it rejected to change audience opinions to his position. Burke writes that

the rhetorician may have to change an audience's opinion in one respect; but he can succeed only insofar as he yields to that audience's opinions in other respects. Some of their opinions are needed to support the fulcrum by which he would move other opinions.²¹

William C. Lang adds that the

speech in harmony, or at least not out of harmony with prevailing moods and passions, is that which is most effective. If public address is outside the 'climate of opinion,'...it may do very little.²²

Material identification resulted from Grey's discussion of the first major topic because he took a negative position on what he knew audience opinion would reject, an obligation to aid Russia. Grey yielded to audience opinions to remain in harmony "with prevailing moods and passions." He explained that during the 1906 Balkan crisis he met with the Russian Ambassador.

I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

Grey covered the second major topic much the same as the first. Audience opinion opposed any obligation of honour to aid France. Grey took a negative position on such aid. He stated that "in this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support."

Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. ...I...was asked the question whether if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said...in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

Grey cited the French reply to his opinion. France stated that should Britain eventually feel justified to give armed support she could not promise in advance, it would be impossible "unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military

experts." Grey stated that he agreed to the conversations with the understanding that nothing

should bind either Government, or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

Grey discussed the decision to put the understanding in writing. After reading the appropriate letter sent to the French Ambassador, Paul Cambon, Grey summarized the obligation by citing an opposition. Polarization and order were not fully established until he clearly identified the difference between Franco-Russian relations and Britain's relationship to France and Russia. At this point in the speech, only after the explanation of the obligation did Grey explicitly state his negative position. He did so by arguing that France was involved because of her

obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. ...that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that Alliance.

The most compelling factor of the third topic was its complexity. Grey was aware of popular sentiment in the House for Anglo-French friendship. Thus he took a positive position on an issue the audience was likely to accept. Attitudes in the House were more favorable to French support out of friendship than they were out of any ambiguous commitment resulting from staff talks few were even aware of before the current crisis. Grey used the attitudes toward Anglo-French friendship to identify with the audience and set the stage for positive reaction to the remaining topics of the speech,

I come now to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. [An Hon. Member; 'And with Germany!'] I remember well the feeling in the House - and my own feeling ...when the late Government made their agreement with

France - the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away. I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible.

Grey then placed the attitude of friendship in relation to an obligation.

But how far that friendship entails obligation - it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations - how far that entails obligation let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself.

Although the obligation was not a formal alliance Grey materially identified with the House by referring to the division of responsibility on the high seas. He was certain of a positive reaction anytime the protection of British interests was at stake. To establish order and hierarchy Grey explained that

the French Fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the Northern and Western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French Fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us.

Based on audience attitudes toward friendship with France and a common interest in the protection of British trade, Grey identified his own position with what the House would accept.

My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing!

From this point forward material identification was less difficult to establish. Despite the House's historic desire for neutrality

as opposed to intervention, they accepted Grey's attitude because it dealt with the war directly from the British instead of the Russian and French point of view. The German Fleet threatened to come down the English Channel to bombard the French coast while the French Fleet was in the Mediterranean. If the French Fleet were forced to leave the Mediterranean to protect her coast British interests in the Middle East would be impaired. Grey developed this topic by looking

at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House.

Grey then explained the implications of the common position.

If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her Fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we would do, she leaves her Northern and Western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German Fleet coming down the Channel, to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French Fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it. ...and let us assume...that consequences which are not yet foreseen...make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight, what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Grey informed the House that following Conservative support and the resignations of the principal opposition he assured France that Germany would not be allowed in the Channel. He then moved to a development of the fifth major topic, the violation of Belgian neutrality as the immediate justification for intervention. The House would not have accepted the thought of intervention and the demands of the Belgian Treaty of 1839 on that justification alone, however. The negative and positive development of the first four major topics was

necessary to assure a positive attitude toward intervention. Order was established to place the violation of Belgian neutrality in a hierarchy at the end of a reasoned progression of topics. The Belgian Treaty made Britain responsible for the maintenance of Belgian neutrality. Grey cited the opinions of Granville and Gladstone who reaffirmed the treaty in 1870. He stated that the treaty was

founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the Treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.

Grey reviewed the requests to Berlin and Paris to respect Belgian neutrality then read the replies to the House. France agreed but Germany did not. He discussed Germany's offer of friendly relations to Belgium for passage of German troops through Belgium. Grey noted the Belgian appeal for diplomatic intervention and stated that "diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now?" He summarized the topic that if Belgian independence were lost

the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests, to consider what may be at stake if France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself...and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any Power?

Grey successfully established material identification by relating his speech to the common interests within the audience. His selection and development of topics were designed to (1) polarize the audience

through social cohesion and common ground and (2) gain substantial unity by identifying the positive with what the audience accepted and the negative with what it rejected. By yielding to audience opinions in some respects he changed audience opinion in other respects.

Formal Identification

Formal identification is needed when (1) the speaker and audience do not operate within a given frame of reference, or (2) the order is obscure or deteriorating, or (3) there are conflicting hierarchies of order.²³ Mouat writes that material identification is usable if "people avoid the complex, think in polarized terms and seek a pattern by which to arrange their lives," and when opinion is not yet formed or crystallized, or partially adverse to the ideas of the speaker.²⁴

Burke describes formal identification as "the psychology of the audience"²⁵ and "the arousing and fulfillment of desires."²⁶ He writes that "the more urgent the oratory, the greater the profusion and vitality of the formal devices."²⁷

Many purely formal patterns can readily awaken an attitude of collaborative expectancy in us.... Once you grasp the trend of the form, it invites participation regardless of the subject matter. Formally, you will find yourself swinging along with the succession of antithesis, even though you may not agree with the proposition that is being presented in this form.... Of course, the more violent your original resistance to the proposition, the weaker will be your degree of 'surrender' by 'collaborating' with the form. But in cases where a decision is still to be reached, a yielding to the form prepares for assent to the matter identified with it. Thus, you are drawn to the form, not in your capacity as a partisan, but because of some 'universal' appeal in it. And this attitude of assent may then be transferred to the matter which happens to be associated with the form.²⁸

Style and arrangement are the principal contributors to formal identification. Mouat states that the careful use of these two

canons may cause formal identification that is transferrable to material acceptance.²⁹

Burke writes that "in its simplest manifestation, style is ingratiation."³⁰ Style is an attempt to "gain favor by the hypnotic or suggestive process of 'saying the right thing.'"³¹ Style is a technique to give the signs of identification and consubstantiation.³²

Burke explains that stylistic devices

can become engrossing objects of study and appreciation; and works once designed to play upon an audience's passions, to 'move' them rhetorically toward practical decisions beyond the work, can now be enjoyed for their ability to move us in the purely poetic sense, as when, hearing a lyric or seeing a sunrise, we might say, 'How moving!'³³

Burke states that stylistic devices must "be functional and not mere 'embellishments.'"³⁴ He adds that "even the most ostentatious" of figures "arose out of great functional urgency."³⁵ Rhetorical style

is rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols. ...there is an intrinsically rhetorical motive, situated in the persuasive use of language.³⁶

The second principal contributor to formal identification is arrangement. The particular arrangement of topics, discussed under material identification, is also formal identification. Virginia Holland comments that "speakers use syllogistic progression"³⁷ when they conduct an argument, advancing step by step from A to E through steps B, C, and D."³⁸ Burke writes that

there is also persuasive form in the larger sense, formulated as a progression of steps that begins with an exordium designed to secure the good will of one's audience, next states one's own position, then points up the nature of the dispute, then builds up one's own case at length, then refutes the claims of the adversary, and in a final peroration expands and reinforces all points

in one's favor, while seeking to discredit whatever had favored the adversary....³⁹

The fact that Grey (1) began with topics suggesting social cohesion and common ground, (2) discussed topics requiring no positive response, (3) moved to topics which gained greater acceptance and clarified his own position, (4) developed his argument by refuting opposing attitudes and supporting his own attitude, and (5) concluded with appeals to unity during the pending crisis, is evidence of formal identification because of the progression of the overall argument. The particular arrangement of the topics provided formal appeal to gradually redirect the thinking of the audience toward a more realistic appraisal of the prospects for peace.

When style and arrangement are combined in the actual construction of a speech the result is strategy. Overall strategy involves the manner in which style and arrangement are used in the total appeal to the audience. Burke believes that a speech develops from "a social situation" and is a speaker's strategic response to "a condition in human affairs."⁴⁰ The speech is the strategic answer of a speaker who "fits his answer to the needs of a speaking situation, of an audience, and of himself."⁴¹

The nature of strategy is better understood with an examination of Holland's "Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkeian Method"⁴² and her later article on "Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Approach in Speech Criticism."⁴³ Holland argues that

if Burke's stricture that 'critical and imaginative works are answers to questions posed by the situation in which they arose,'⁴⁴ is true, then a speaker's speech is his symbolic response to a situation or problem, and is, as Burke has suggested, not merely an answer to a situation, but a strategic or stylized answer,⁴⁵ for the

speaker symbolizes his attitudes in the form of strategies with which he hopes to modify or sustain the situation. The speaker's individual strategies are his stylistic devices for encompassing a situation, and the over-all strategy of his speech is per se his style.⁴⁶

Strategy will be applied at three levels: (1) the initiation and essence of strategy, (2) strategy in the progression of individual topics and (3) the overall strategy of the speech.

A speaker's strategies are initiated by his attitude toward identifying with the audience. The essence of an overall strategy is in the word which best represents the speaker's overall attitude toward his topic. Burke's concept of the word "strategy" is similar to his concept of method but different from his concept of attitude. Holland argues that while strategy is a way to meet a situation, the speaker's "attitude toward the problem of identification initiates the strategies with which he will work upon the audience."⁴⁷ For example Grey feared that the problem of attaining peace might be solved in what he believed was the wrong way, informal or unconditional neutrality. He realized that the audience held a variety of attitudes different from his so he took negative positions on topics of aid to Russia and France which he knew the House would reject. This strengthened audience acceptance of those topics Grey later took positive positions on. Grey's strategy of negative reaction was initiated by his attitude toward identifying with the House.

Holland states that the rhetorical critic should "search for the word which was the essence of a speaker's strategy, which named it in all of its attitudinal implications."⁴⁸ She argues that the speaker may refer to a particular topic and activate it attitudinally.⁴⁹ The topic Grey activated was peace. The essence of his strategy was in

the transplacement⁵⁰ of the word "peace" throughout the speech. Despite the immediate call for intervention Grey implied that peace was still the goal. Peace did not exist at the moment but without intervention certainly would not exist in the future. Grey convinced the House that the search for peace had been and would remain the primary responsibility of the Government. The essence of his overall strategy was to retain audience attitudes toward peace but redirect their attitudes toward a method.

The second application of strategy is in the progression of individual topics. Holland writes that the naming of Burkeian strategies depends on a careful analysis of the speaker's language pattern to determine what words most realistically name the ideas presented by the speaker. The critic must first name the strategy of a particular segment of the speech then present the language which warrants that strategy.⁵¹

The strategies of the first and second major topics in the body of the speech were vindication. Because of Grey's concern that the House "come to its decisions on grounds of weight, not of passion," he upheld the audience position that an obligation of honour was not sufficient reason to bring Britain into a war. He vindicated audience attitudes that intervention on behalf of Russia and France should be based on a legal demand. Grey explained that the obligations to Russia and France were not legal demands for anything beyond diplomatic support.

The third strategy was a reappraisal of Anglo-French friendship. Although no formal alliance existed Grey was concerned that both speaker and audience reappraise "how far that friendship entails

obligation." In view of the staff talks with France he encouraged the House to reconsider the division of responsibility on the high seas. Grey referred to the "sense of security" given France as a result of Anglo-French friendship.

The strategy of the fourth major topic was to explain a commitment to maintain British interests. Grey asked a hypophoric question:⁵² "If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her Fleet in the Mediterranean?" He answered that if the French Fleet were forced to leave the Mediterranean to protect her undefended coasts, British interests in the Middle East would be impaired. The commitment was not to defend the French coasts but to protect Britain's trade routes. British defence of the Channel was an expedient way to keep France in the Mediterranean.

The strategy of the fifth major topic was to explain a commitment to defend Belgian neutrality. Grey reviewed the Belgian Treaty of 1839 and its reaffirmation in 1870. The commitment was a legal demand for intervention.

The transition from the strategy of reappraisal of Anglo-French friendship to the strategies to explain British commitments is better understood through Wallace's discussion of appraisal and explanation. Wallace writes that appraisal is in terms of praise or blame, right and wrong, good and bad.⁵³ In reappraisal Grey attempted to determine right from wrong regarding French security. Wallace continues that the strategy of explanation does not praise or censure. He suggests three categories of values to determine the good, bad, rightness or wrongness of a decision: desirability, obligation and admirability or praiseworthiness, and their opposites. Wallace points out that the

distinction between desirability and obligation is that one action may be a good thing to do but not the right thing or vice versa.⁵⁴ Grey attempted to relate his speech to all three values. Where neutrality was undesirable it was also wrong and unadmirable. It view of his explanation of commitments, where intervention was desirable it was also right and praiseworthy.

Strategy in the progression of topics was equally important in the conclusion of the speech. Grey reviewed the opposition arguments for informal and unconditional neutrality. The strategy was elimination. Britain could simply "stand aside" in a state of informal neutrality and then at the end of the war "intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view." Grey eliminated this position by referring to the commitment to maintain Belgian neutrality. He argued that should Britain

run away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful Fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

The second opposition argument was for a declaration of unconditional neutrality. Grey asked a hypophoric question: "What other policy is there before the House?" He answered that

there is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality,

Grey eliminated this position by arguing that Anglo-French friendship, protection of British trade routes and the legal demands of the

Belgian Treaty prevented unconditional neutrality. He stated that

without those conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, 'We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter' under no conditions - the Belgian Treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France - if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

The strategy of the new position, intervention, was advocacy.

Grey advocated that Britain must be prepared "for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment - we know now how soon - to defend ourselves and to take our part."

The final strategy of the speech was vindication. Grey vindicated his advocacy and the audience's acceptance of intervention. He stated that

the thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed from which no country in Europe will escape, and from which no abdication or neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.

The third application of strategy is in the overall strategy of the speech. Holland states that "there are many ways to conduct an over-all strategy."⁵⁵ She explains how the overall strategy relates to the individual strategies.

The name which we would give to specific, individual strategies would depend upon our analysis of what the language in the speech was doing in each part of the speech, and upon our careful selection of a word which we thought best described what the language was doing in each part. Thus the over-all strategy...is a composite of specific strategies....⁵⁶

The gradual change to a positive attitude toward intervention was complete with Grey's discussion of British obligations to Russia and France, her interests in Mediterranean trade routes and the Belgian Treaty, and elimination of opposition arguments for neutrality. The strategies of vindication, reappraisal, explanation of commitments, elimination and advocacy were used to express the overall strategy of redirection of audience attitudes from neutrality to intervention.

Transcendental Identification

Transcendental identification is needed when (1) the speaker and audience do not possess sufficient apparent material identification to intensify existing beliefs and goals, (2) formal identification does not provide enough strength, and (3) the level of action desired is maximum.⁵⁷ Mouat states that "material and formal identification with varying degrees of emphasis" should be sufficient to shift votes or change opinions. "But when conflict exists between hierarchal orders of 'irreconcilable opposites' identification can be achieved neither through rhetoric nor through poetic."⁵⁸ Mouat continues that "transcendental identification can occur...only when there is a willingness among people to 'break the barrier of misunderstandings in kind.'"⁵⁹

Kenneth Burke writes that

the ability of rhetoric to ingratiate is considered secondary, as a mere device for gaining good will, holding the attention, or deflecting the attention in preparation for more urgent purposes. Since persuasion so often implies the presence or threat of an adversary, there is the 'agonistic' or competitive stress. Thus Aristotle... looks upon rhetoric as a medium that 'proves opposites'

....⁶⁰

Duncan describes "opposites" as "moments of profound social disrelationship."⁶¹ The Aristotelian concept of "proving opposites" implies a

relationship between rhetoric and dialectic. Burke argues that dialectic is needed for a transcendental identification between the opposites. "Ideally the dialogue seeks to attain a higher order of truth" as parties "cooperate towards an end transcending their individual positions. Here is the paradigm of the dialectical process for 'reconciling opposites' in a 'higher synthesis.'" ⁶² Burke explains that the rhetorician

is like one voice in a dialogue. Put several such voices together, with each voicing its own special assertion, let them act upon one another in co-operative competition, and you get a dialectic that, properly developed, can lead to views transcending the limitations of each. ⁶³

Lyman Bryson labels this "competition" "a rhetoric of conciliation." ⁶⁴ The rhetoric of conciliation is most useful when the overall argument is an examination of positions. Bryson states that individual arguments lead to a "higher order of truth" and adjust the differences between the voices. ⁶⁵ The new rhetoric thus goes beyond persuasion to encompass mediation. Burke here explains the difference between "dialectical" confrontation and "ultimate" order. Dialectic leaves

the competing voices in a jangling relation with one another ...but the 'ultimate' order would place these competing voices themselves in a hierarchy, or sequence, or evaluative series, so that, in some way, we went by a fixed and reasoned progression from one of these to another, the members of the entire group being arranged developmentally with relation to one another. ⁶⁶

The ultimate order implies direction or unity behind the competing voices, or topics, or attitudes. In transcendental identification the voices do not confront each other as unrelated competition reaching a compromise but are instead presented as "successive positions or moments in a single process." ⁶⁷ Duncan states that competing forms of

social hierarchy "grow out of one another in terms of some great life-giving hierarchal principle whose power is felt as deep moments of social solidarity."⁶⁸ Bryson agrees that the transcendence is not a compromise but a method to make the positions compatible. He continues that "when a group reaches an agreement, some kind of adjustment has been achieved among them."⁶⁹

Nor is transcendence the same as repression. Duncan writes that transcendence "is conscious because it is public."⁷⁰ Tensions that arise out of conflicts must be expressed openly and directly. Duncan argues that

harmony is possible only if there are ways of transcending differences, not simply eliminating them.... Differences are resolved through symbols which allow us to transcend them on a higher plane.⁷¹

The first step toward a higher synthesis is the exploration of each position. The second step according to Bryson is to decide which positions are significant, which can be changed and which resist refutation. Then the agreement is solidified.⁷² Bryson writes that exploration should locate and clarify the different aspects of the question. The speaker must be aware of the predisposed opinions of the audience. He must discover what elements in each position are most important to those holding the position and then examine the strengths of each argument. Bryson argues that by the time the new position is reached most of the audience will have cast off the "non-essential elements of their own opinions."⁷³ He comments that there is a "creative paradox" in this aspect of rhetoric.

The search for the grounds of decision is an effort to bring into a converging force all the elements in all the differing opinions that can drive action forward. At the same time, the search uncovers the differences which cannot

be managed and undertakes to let people live with them in peace and friendliness.⁷⁴

Bryson concludes that there is no way to insure that opposites will reach a higher synthesis. Satisfaction is found only in the hope that when the strengths and weaknesses of the competing positions are revealed, the cooperation of the parties is strong enough to move the opposites to a new position.⁷⁵ Richard M. Weaver states that rhetoric should thus "bring together action and understanding into a whole that is greater than scientific perception."⁷⁶

In addition to the use of material and formal identification in Grey's speech, elements of transcendental identification exist throughout. Stockton lectures that the four elements in transcendental identification are (1) the speaker's position, (2) the audience's position, (3) the catalyst, and (4) the new position or "higher synthesis."⁷⁷

Although Grey clearly indicated that he favored intervention, the transcendence is recognizable when the critic realizes that Grey's actual position argued instead for a realistic reappraisal of British obligations and interests. Intervention, as he saw it, was the new position necessary to maintain those obligations and interests and eventually attain peace. In exploring the competing positions Grey determined which were the most significant to the audience, which could be changed and which resisted refutation. For example he vindicated negative attitudes toward obligations of honour to aid Russia and France. He argued for a reappraisal of the friendship between Britain and France which led to a division of responsibility on the high seas. Unless Britain fulfilled her responsibility to protect the Atlantic and the Channel, France could not protect British trade routes

in the Mediterranean. Grey explained that England was legally committed to guarantee Belgian neutrality. Intervention, as the new position, was the only way to protect British trade routes and secure Belgian neutrality. Burke suggests that the goal of his "higher synthesis" is to identify around one unifying term.⁷⁸ In this case "intervention" was that unifying term.

Members of the House actually held three different positions. Churchill argued for immediate intervention. Leaders who favored isolation and opposed any kind of international imperialism or hostility resigned. The majority supported standing aside in informal neutrality or declaring unconditional neutrality.

Consequently the opposites emerge as Grey's position of reappraisal and commitment and the audience's position of informal or unconditional neutrality. The material and formal identification provided the cooperation and solidarity needed to move both positions through an "ultimate" order to a "higher synthesis."

The clearest examples of Grey's use of transcendental identification are seen in his evaluations of the two aspects of neutrality. Each form was met by a separate catalyst. Mouat writes that the catalyst may be "a hopeless stalemate, unbearable suffering, or the threat of war of annihilation...."⁷⁹ In Grey's speech the catalysts were selected from the topics of material identification and the strategies of formal identification.

Grey stated that Britain could "stand aside" in a state of informal neutrality. The catalyst was the Belgian Treaty. The legal demands of the treaty eliminated informal neutrality and forced both Grey and the House toward intervention on Belgium's behalf. The

catalyst argued that regardless of Britain's material force at the end of the war it would be worth little in face of the respect lost if she remained neutral.

Grey then stated that the only way to remain outside the war was to "immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality." The catalyst was a reference to Anglo-French friendship and the staff talks, and a second reference to the Belgian Treaty. The division of responsibility on the high seas and British commitments to her own interests forced Grey and the House toward intervention on behalf of France as well as Belgium. The catalyst argued that neutrality would sacrifice British respect and cause serious economic consequences.

The new position, or "higher synthesis," was intervention. Grey moved through a "reasoned progression" from one audience position to another. In the body of the speech he discussed neutrality when he stated that obligations of honour were not legal demands for intervention. He presented his own position when he called for reappraisal and a recognition of commitments to British interests. Intervention was not a compromise but the "higher synthesis" needed to satisfy British commitments.

Mouat writes that once transcendental identification "has been accomplished a new order of social existence is called into being, and material and formal identification can be employed as before."⁸⁰ References to the conclusion of the speech under material and formal identification clarify this point. Grey vindicated the new position as satisfying an urgent need despite the values it violated. He called for unity in the pending crisis and polarized the House and the nation in support of the war.

After the speech but before adjournment Grey read the communication confirming the German ultimatum to Belgium. He left no doubt that war was certain and inevitable. An ultimatum was sent to Germany requiring a satisfactory answer on Belgian neutrality. None came. Britain was at war.

FOOTNOTES

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⁴Mouat, p. 172.

⁵Karl R. Wallace, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIX (1963), p. 241.

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⁸*Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916 (2 vols., New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1925), II, p. 14.

¹¹*Ibid.*, II, pp. 14-15.

¹²*Ibid.*, II, pp. 15-16.

¹³Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. xiv.

¹⁴A. Craig Baird, Rhetoric: A Philosophical Inquiry (New York: Ronald Press, 1965), p. 136.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 137.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

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- 34 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 57.
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- 36 Ibid., p. 43.
- 37 Burke, Counter-Statement, p. 124.
- 38 Virginia Holland, "Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Approach in Speech Criticism," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLI (1955), p. 354.
- 39 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 69.
- 40 Holland, "Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Approach in Speech Criticism," p. 353.
- 41 Ibid.

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⁴³Holland, "Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Approach in Speech Criticism," pp. 352-358.

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⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Holland, "Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkeian Method," p. 445.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Patrick O. Marsh, Persuasive Speaking: Theory-Models-Practice (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 271.

⁵¹Holland, "Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkeian Method," p. 446.

⁵²Marsh, p. 272.

⁵³Wallace, p. 243.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 243-245.

⁵⁵Holland, "Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Approach in Speech Criticism," p. 354.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Dale L. Stockton, "Persuasion as Identification: Kenneth Burke," Lecture of Speech 3733-Persuasion, Oklahoma State Univ., October 7, 1968.

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⁶²Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 52-53.

⁶³Burke, "Rhetoric - Old and New," p. 203.

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- ⁶⁵Bryson, "The Rhetoric of Conciliation," p. 438.
- ⁶⁶Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 187.
- ⁶⁷Ibid.
- ⁶⁸Duncan, Communication and Social Order, p. 122.
- ⁶⁹Bryson, p. 439.
- ⁷⁰Duncan, Language and Literature in Society, p. 138.
- ⁷¹Ibid., pp. 138-139.
- ⁷²Bryson, p. 439.
- ⁷³Ibid., p. 442.
- ⁷⁴Ibid., p. 443.
- ⁷⁵Ibid.
- ⁷⁶Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Regnery, 1953), p. 22.
- ⁷⁷Stockton, "Persuasion as Identification: Kenneth Burke."
- ⁷⁸Burke, "Rhetoric - Old and New," p. 204.
- ⁷⁹Mouat, p. 174.
- ⁸⁰Ibid., p. 175.

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VITA /

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Master of Arts

Thesis: THE RHETORIC OF INTERVENTION: A BURKEIAN ANALYSIS OF
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