

SELF-ESTEEM, FORCED COMPLIANCE, AND
ATTITUDE CHANGE

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
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
ATTITUDE CHANGE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In recent years a large body of literature has investigated change in attitude as a function of a number of variables. Before going into the variables that were related to attitude change in the present investigation, some discussion should be devoted to the concept of attitude. Although a number of separate definitions of attitude have been attempted (see Shaw & Wright, 1967), all seem to have several aspects in common. Generally, an attitude is seen as a relatively enduring system of affective, evaluative reactions to a referent or class of referents. The affective quality and intensity of these attitudes vary from positive to negative toward a given class of referents. An individual acquires an attitude toward any given referent by means of reinforcement. Thus, if we knew the reinforcement history of any individual with any specific referent, we might be able to predict his attitude toward that referent with a high degree of success.

Since this historical reinforcement knowledge is not directly available to the experimenter, he must use indirect methods to measure these learned attitudes. These indirect methods usually involve measurement with paper and pencil psychometric instruments, labeled "attitude scales". Such attitude scales generally consist of a group of statements which are related to a single referent or class of referents. The test-taker responds to these statements by expressing his degree of agreement

or disagreement with the statements - thus revealing a negative, neutral or positive attitude toward the referent.

There are a number of scaling techniques which have been developed for constructing attitude scales. These techniques produce questions which vary in possible responses from a dichotomous agree-disagree to a multiple (most often five) category rating system of agreement or disagreement. The self-esteem measures used in the present study had five possible answers for each question, while the attitude measure items had only two possible answers, agree or disagree.

The present research was designed to examine the relationship between self-esteem and the attitude toward censorship when the subjects were tested in either a passive or active (forced compliance) situation. In the present study the passive situation was defined as having the subject read the communication opposing censorship to himself. Forced compliance, according to Festinger (1957), is a situation in which a person is forced to behave in a manner inconsistent with his cognitive beliefs. In the present forced compliance situation the subject was required to present a speech on censorship which expressed a point of view with which he had previously disagreed.

The specific attitude to be changed was the attitude toward censorship. This choice was based largely on the work of Gibson (1962), who used the Attitude Toward Censorship Scale and a forced choice measure he developed to examine whether changes in attitude would result when the subjects were presented with two communications opposing censorship. Both measures of attitude reflected essentially the same decrease in support of censorship following the communications. A second factor in this choice was the Attitude Toward Censorship Scale itself, which had

been developed earlier by Rosander and Thurstone (1931), using the method of equal-appearing intervals (Thurstone, 1929, 1931). The reliability and validity of this scale are given in Chapter III, Materials section.

Self-esteem was defined operationally by two measures, the Feelings of Inadequacy Scale and the Social Inhibitions Scale, which were taken directly from the Janis and Field Personality Questionnaire. Both of these scales have been used in previous studies and have been found to correlate positively with changes in attitude. These scales are examples of self-rating self-esteem scales, in which the subject responds directly as to how he feels about himself. The other type of self-esteem scale is the discrepancy measure, in which the subject rates both his real or actual self and his ideal self. Cohen's work, which will be discussed later, is an example of research which used this type of measure.

In spite of the fact that many self-esteem measures of each type have been constructed and related to attitude change, there are a number of indications that what they measure is quite similar. The strongest evidence for this commonality is the fact that studies using different measures of self-esteem report similar results. Nisbett and Gordon (1967) used both of the two general types of scales to measure self-esteem, and they reported that each measure showed approximately the same correlations with attitude change. Overall, the level of self-esteem on all of these measures seems to reflect the individual's general expectations for satisfaction of his needs in various situations, particularly social situations.

This relationship between attitude change and self-esteem has not previously been studied in a passive versus forced compliance situation. The review of the literature which follows is presented in support of

the general research design of the investigation.

Self-Esteem and Attitude Change

Most earlier research related to self-esteem was concerned primarily with investigating persuasibility. In general terms, persuasibility is a predisposition which tends to determine the individual's unique degree of influencibility in various situations. Research by Janis (1954, 1955) showed that for male college students high persuasibility was associated with personality variables indicative of low self-esteem. Janis and Rife (1959) found an even stronger inverse relationship between persuasibility and self-esteem for male patients at a state hospital for the mentally ill.

Several studies have found conforming behavior to be directly related to personality characteristics which may be considered similar to low self-esteem (Asch, 1948; Berkowitz and Lundy, 1957; Crutchfield, 1955; Hockbaum, 1954; Maslow, 1939). For example, Berkowitz and Lundy (1957) found a significant inverse relationship between scores on a modified Gulliford and Zimmerman sociability scale and influencibility by peers. The authors stated that the lower the scores on this sociability scale, the lower the individual's confidence in interpersonal situations.

Other studies have related more direct measures of self-esteem to behavior in groups. One study on college students reported that low esteem individuals are more influenced by group evaluations than high esteem subjects when all subjects were made to fail on a task (Stotland, Thorley, Thomas, Cohen and Zander, 1957). Stotland and Hiller (1962) reported that low esteem subjects seem to identify more readily with others than do high esteem individuals. Low self-esteem subjects

generally perceive their social influence in interpersonal decision-making to be less than do high esteem subjects (Thomas and Burdick, 1954; Cohen, 1956). Analysis of actual influence in interpersonal situations has revealed that low esteem subjects do tend to have less influence on others than do high esteem individuals (Cohen, 1959).

Some confusion exists as to whether the same findings occur for both sexes. Using both male and female high school students, Janis and Field (1959) determined that the inverse relationship between attitude change and self-esteem was significant only for the male subjects. However, another study with children (Lesser and Abelson, 1962) showed that persuasibility was inversely related to self-esteem for both sexes. Also, Silverman (1966) reported one study where the negative relationship existed for both males and females, although the same report contained another study where the relationship held only for males. In conclusion, there is at least some indication that one should examine the results with males and females independently.

From what has been presented so far, it might appear that, as Janis and Hovland (1959) have said, persuasibility tends to be a general characteristic of the individual, which is somewhat independent of any aspect of the situation, and that this persuasibility characteristic is inversely related to the person's self-esteem. However, several studies have failed to confirm these hypotheses. Some investigations have failed to find any significant relationship between the individual's level of self-esteem and persuasibility or attitude change (Gollib and Dittes, 1965; Silverman, 1964a). Studies by Dabbs (1962) and Leventhal and Perloe (1962) indicate that communicator characteristics are an important factor in the relationship between self-esteem and attitude change. Dabbs

found that low esteem individuals are more influenced by non-copers or non-manipulators, and high esteem individuals tended to be more influenced by copers.

Cohen (1959) has proposed that those who score high in self-esteem use avoidance defenses (reaction formation and avoidance), while those who score low in self-esteem use expressive or sensitizing defenses (projection and regression). Cohen went on the hypothesis that "threatening appeals may be rejected more by those of high self-esteem. On the other hand, appeals which enhance an individual's self picture might be accepted more by highs than the lows" (p. 199). Several studies have provided evidence for this later relationship (Cohen, 1959; Coopersmith, 1959; Dabbs, 1962; Leventhal and Perloe, 1962; Silverman, 1964a, 1964b). Leventhal and Perloe (1962) found that high esteem subjects were more influenced by an optimistic communication than by a pessimistic one, while low self-esteem showed a greater attitude change for the pessimistic communication than the optimistic communication. Silverman (1964a) showed that high esteem individuals were more easily influenced following success on a task than failure, and low esteem subjects demonstrated a reversal of this relationship (more influenced following failure than success). However, Gollib and Dittes (1965) showed the opposite effect for fear appeals as predicted by Cohen. Overall, though, the research favors the conclusion that high self-esteem persons are more susceptible to influence when the situation is self enhancing in some way, whereas low self-esteem individuals are less easily influenced in these situations. Also, it seems that threatening situations make high self-esteem subjects more resistant to influence or changes in attitude.

Other characteristics of the communication besides its pessimism-

optimism have a great effect upon the relationship between self-esteem and attitude change. Nisbett and Gordon (1967) have found that a relatively unsubstantiated attack (lacking in facts) is more effective with low esteem subjects than high esteem subjects, while a substantiated communication (seemingly well grounded in fact and logically constructed) is more effective in changing attitudes with high esteem subjects. Gollob and Dittes (1965) found that lowering the person's self-esteem (making the subject fail on a task) increased the effectiveness of clear messages and decreased the impact of ambiguous messages.

In a recent review of literature on self-esteem and attitude change, McGuire (1968) accepted the hypothesis that self-esteem is inversely related to attitude change when receptivity is the same for all levels of self-esteem, but he also hypothesized that the high esteem subject pays greater attention to the message. Further, McGuire assumed that attention would not be a significant factor in attitude change when the communication was extremely simple or extremely complex, and thus, the function of attitude change for self-esteem should be linear and negative. More specifically, when the communication is extremely complex, the total amount of attitude change should be fairly small, and this relationship between attitude change and self-esteem should be linear, but only slightly negative. However, when the message was intermediately complex or difficult to understand, he felt that the attention level would be an important variable; the relationship between self-esteem and attitude change would be nonmonotonic, with the slope changing from positive to negative with increased levels of self-esteem.

Role Playing and Attitude Change

In all of the above studies with self-esteem and attitude change the subjects played a rather passive role - they simply read or listened to a persuasive argument. Yet, one of the more reliable findings in the area of attitude change is that greater modification of attitudes occurs following role playing than following passive exposure to a communication (Culbertson, 1957; Carlson, 1956; Harvey and Beverly, 1961; Janis and King, 1954; Kelman, 1953; King and Janis, 1956).

In most of these studies, the role-playing condition has consisted of the subject first improvising some counter-attitudinal arguments and then presenting these arguments as a speech. However, several studies (McGuire, 1961; Jansen and Stolurow, 1962; Zimbardo, 1965) have demonstrated that simply reading a prepared message may be just as effective, or even more effective, than improvising arguments in changing or helping to defend attitudes. Zimbardo (1965) showed that active participation is more effective than passive participation (reading to oneself) in changing attitudes. Furthermore, his active participation condition included one group which read a prepared paper and another group which improvised its arguments, and there was no significant difference between these latter groups in the amount of attitude change. Therefore, improvisation does not appear necessary for increased attitude change in active participation.

One explanation of the process of attitude change through role playing is provided by the theory of cognitive dissonance, as proposed by Festinger (1957). To summarize, briefly, dissonance is produced when the person is aware of an inconsistency between cognitive elements. When dissonance exists, the person is motivated to do something that

will reduce this dissonance. For Festinger, role playing is an example of forced compliance, which is a situation where the individual is somehow forced to behave in a way that is inconsistent with his cognitive elements. Thus dissonance is the result of role playing or forced compliance. Cohen (1964) has described the dissonance explanation of role playing as follows:

If a person is led to express outwardly an attitude which is discrepant from his actual private attitude, a state of dissonance in such a setting can be reduced by changing one's attitude so that it becomes consistent with the behavior one has engaged in publicly. There is no dissonance remaining because private attitude and public expression are now consistent with each other (pp. 82-83).

The main line of research favoring the dissonance interpretation of the effect of role playing relates to the study of justification. Festinger (1957) has argued that the greater the force (or justification) used to make the individual behave in a way opposite to his opinion, the smaller will be his change in attitude. Only a few of the studies favoring this interpretation will be discussed.

Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) found that subjects given \$20.00 to lie showed less attitude change in the direction of this lie than those given \$1.00. Cohen (1962 in Brehm and Cohen) found similar results for various rewards (\$.50, \$1.00, \$5.00, \$10.00). Brock and Blackwood (1962) also found more attitude change toward a disliked position with low justification than with high justification when students were persuaded to write a counter-attitudinal essay.

A major alternative to the dissonance interpretation of attitude change is called the incentive theory or conflict resolution theory (see Elms, 1967). The incentive theory approach, as summarized by Hovland, Janis, and Kelly (1953), says that the acceptance of a new attitude or

opinion occurs when the incentives associated with the new position become greater than those for the prior attitude or opinion. These incentives could either be the logical arguments that the person accepts, or the motivation for greater rewards or less punishments upon the acceptance of the new opinion. A clearer understanding of this approach can be gained from the following explanation of the effect of role playing by Janis and Gilmore (1965):

He becomes temporarily motivated to think up all the good positive arguments he can, and at the same time suppresses thoughts about the negative arguments which are supposedly irrelevant to the assigned task. This 'biased scanning' increases the salience of the positive arguments and therefore increases the chances of acceptance of the new attitude position. A gain in attitude change would not be expected, however, if resentment or other negative affective reactions were aroused by negative incentives in the role-playing situation (p. 18).

A common sense prediction from incentive theory would be that the greater the reward, the greater the change in attitude. The above studies on justification, of course, contradict this hypothesis. However, there are numerous studies which favor the incentive or conflict-resolution theory. Rosenberg (1965) conducted a study similar to Cohen's (1962), and Festinger and Carlsmith's (1959) study, but he had a different person measure the postexperimental attitude than had made the person do the task; so, as he thought, there would be less negative affect transfer from the experimenter to the attitude measurement. His results reflected an increase in attitude change with larger rewards. Bostrom, Vlandis, and Rosen (1961) randomly assigned an evaluative grade, either an A or a D, to the subject for counter-attitudinal essays. As predicted, the group which received the A showed the greater change in attitude. Janis and Gilmore (1965) told the subjects that they were writing their essays for either a low-justifying commercial organization or a

public service company and those who were told about the low justifying sponsor showed less change in their attitudes. In this experiment monetary rewards were also varied, but this had no significant effect.

Self-Esteem, Role Playing, and Attitude Change

Cohen (1964), in discussing forced compliance has hypothesized that:

A person with low self-esteem has characteristically been shaken in his convictions and has had his opinions questioned; when induced to adopt a discrepant stand, he should experience less dissonance and consequently less attitude change. We might expect, therefore, that the higher the self-esteem, the more the dissonance upon complying and the stronger the pressure on the person to reduce those tensions, everything else being equal, by justifying his stand more and by being more certain that his new position is the correct one. In general, any personality trait that would lead a person not to perform a discrepant act contrary to his initial attitude will produce more dissonance and consequently greater attempts at the reduction of dissonance when he does perform it (p. 92).

This prediction is, of course, derived from the dissonance explanation of role playing.

The only study that Cohen quotes to show this relationship is by Gerald (1961). In this study the experimenter made subjects think they were either high or low in ability to judge perceptual stimuli. Then by means of an electrode they were made to believe that their first impulse was either to conform to or to deviate from group judgements. It was found that the higher his perceived ability, the more he became attached to the group to which he supposedly conformed and the more he modified his behavior in the direction of the group on subsequent trials.

Summary and Conclusions

A number of variables seem to affect the relationship between attitude change and self-esteem. When the task is preceded by

experimentally-induced failure or when the communication is fear arousing, the relationship tends to be negative. The complexity of the communication also seems to be an important variable. When the communication used is quite simple, the relationship between attitude change and self-esteem tends to be negative. As the message becomes more complex, however, function of attitude change tends to become curvilinear, changing from positive to negative with increasing self-esteem. For very complex messages, this relationship is slightly negative.

Role playing or forced compliance generally results in greater attitude change than a more passive situation, and this increase can apparently occur without improvisation. Cohen (1964) predicted that forced compliance should lead to a positive relationship between attitude change and self-esteem. This hypothesis was tested in the present study.

CHAPTER II

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The primary problem to be analyzed in this experiment was the relationship between attitude change and self-esteem in passive versus active (forced compliance) situations. A second focus was the comparison of the amount of attitude change in the active versus passive conditions, regardless of self-esteem. Finally, the present study examined the relationship between attitude change and general comprehension of the censorship materials used.

First, the predictions for the active condition will be considered. Cohen (1964) has said that the higher the self-esteem, the greater the dissonance upon performing an act discrepant with personal beliefs. Therefore, Cohen predicted that high esteem would lead to greater attitude modification than low esteem in a forced compliance situation. Since this study used high, middle, and low self-esteem groups, another way of saying this would be that with increases in the level of self-esteem, there should be a corresponding increase in the amount of attitude change. Also, on the basis of Cohen's statements, predictions could be made concerning attitude change within self-esteem groups across participation conditions. For example, the high esteem group should show greater attitude change in the active condition than in the passive condition, while the low esteem group should show greater attitude change in the passive than in the active condition.

However, Cohen's (1959) hypothesis that low esteem individuals use sensitizing defenses, while those with high esteem use avoidance defenses would seem to lead to predictions contrary to those based on Cohen's (1964) statements about forced compliance. Cohen (1959) stated that low esteem individuals typically respond to threat (anxiety) by changing their attitude, while high esteem individuals become more resistant to attitude change under threat conditions. These predictions are referred to herein as Cohen's "threat" theory. It is assumed that the subjects would consider the active condition more threatening than the passive condition, and therefore, the high esteem group would become more resistant to changing their attitudes in the active condition, while the low esteem group would become more susceptible to attitude change. Overall, since the middle esteem group would be expected to be intermediate in attitude change, it might be predicted that there would be an inverse relationship between attitude change and self-esteem. This "threat" theory would also lead to predictions for attitude change within self-esteem groups across participation conditions which are in contradiction to Cohen's dissonance explanation. The high esteem group should show greater attitude change in the passive than in the active condition, while the low esteem group should show greater attitude change in active than in the passive condition.

In regard to the total amount of attitude change in the active versus passive conditions without concern for the level of self-esteem, incentive theory and dissonance theory might differ in their predictions. Incentive theory would emphasize the interference to attitude change caused by negative affect when the subject is forced to participate in a role playing task, as he is in the active condition. Incentive theory

also stresses the importance of improvisation in role playing in producing increased attitude change. The present study did not allow improvisation but used a set communication in the active condition. Therefore, it seems that incentive theory would predict less overall attitude change in the active than in the passive condition.

Dissonance theory does not use either the negative affect or the improvisation interpretation for explaining the effects of role playing. The increase in attitude change in role playing is explained on the basis of dissonance produced by outwardly expressing an attitude which is discrepant from his actual attitude. Since this situation existed in the active situation, the dissonance theory would predict greater attitude change in the active than in the passive condition.

From the review of the literature, only one prediction appears to be particularly relevant to the present passive condition. McGuire (1968) discussed what results might be expected for various levels of complexity of the message in typical attitude change experiments, like in the present passive condition. Since an extremely complex message was chosen as the communication for the present study, such a communication should produce a linear and only slightly negative (non-significant) function of attitude change for self-esteem. If, as predicted, the relationship between attitude change and self-esteem was not significant in the passive condition, any significant results in the active condition could then be attributed to some effect associated with forced compliance.

In addition, the complexity of the message may be closely related to the correlation between attitude change and comprehension. McGuire (1968) said that attention, and thus comprehension, would not be a

significant factor in attitude change when the communication was extremely complex. Therefore, since the communication used in the present study was quite complex, the prediction was that a non-significant relationship between attitude change and comprehension of the censorship message would be found. Moreover, McGuire implied that comprehension in general would be quite low for such a message.

In light of the preceding discussion, the following six hypotheses were selected. The first three hypotheses were primarily based on Cohen's (1964) statements about the forced compliance situation. Hypotheses four and five were drawn from McGuire's (1968) predictions concerning the effect of complexity of message on attitude change, while the final hypothesis stems from Festinger's (1957) dissonance theory.

1. The relationship between attitude change and self-esteem will be positive in the active condition.
2. The high esteem group will show a greater amount of attitude change in the active than in the passive condition.
3. The low esteem group will show a greater amount of attitude change in the passive condition than in the active condition.
4. The relationship between attitude change and self-esteem will be non-significant in the passive condition.
5. The overall relationship between attitude change and comprehension scores will be non-significant.
6. The total amount of attitude change, regardless of the levels of self-esteem, will be greater in the active condition than in the passive condition.

CHAPTER III

METHOD

Subjects

The initial attitude measure (either Form A or Form B of the Attitude Toward Censorship Scale) and the self-esteem measures (Feelings of Inadequacy and Social Inhibitions Scales) were administered to 337 male and female students enrolled in introductory psychology classes at Oklahoma State University. These tests were administered to students in their regular classrooms about four weeks prior to the experimental sessions.

Only students who scored above the mean on the Attitude Toward Censorship Scale were used in Ss. Thus, all of the Ss used were above average in support of censorship. The entire distribution (337 cases) from the Feelings of Inadequacy (FI) Scale was divided into low, middle, and high groups, as were the Social Inhibitions (SI) scores. Any student whose FI or SI score fell on one of the dividing points between the thirds was eliminated from the population to be sampled. Table I gives the descriptive statistics for all of the FI and SI scores, plus this same information for the Test Anxiety scores, a scale which was originally given to all the students. Appendix A gives the percentages of scores falling in the various intervals for each self-esteem scale.

The subjects who met the above two criteria were divided into male and female groups. Then a random sample was taken and each subject

TABLE I
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND SCORES DIVIDING
DISTRIBUTIONS INTO THIRDS FOR
SELF-ESTEEM SCALES

Scale	Mean	Standard Deviation	Lower Dividing Score*	Upper Dividing Score**
Feelings of Inadequacy	39.90	13.37	34	45
Social Inhibitions	12.16	5.79	9	14
Test Anxiety	12.55	6.50	9	15

*Score separating lower third from middle third of subjects

**Score separating middle third from upper third of subjects

selected was put in the correct FI-SI cell, for example, low FI low SI. Sampling was continued until each level (high, middle, and low) of both FI and SI contained 16 subjects. Table II shows the distribution of the resultant sample. Since there was not an equal number of subjects within each cell, it was necessary to analyze the measures of self-esteem independently. Finally, the subjects were assigned to either the active or the passive condition by the same randomization procedure, so that each level of both FI and SI contained eight subjects for both the active and passive conditions.

TABLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS
ON SELF-ESTEEM SCALES

		Females						Males			
		FI						FI			
		Low	Middle	High	Total			Low	Middle	High	Total
SI	Low	8	6	2	16	Low	8	5	3	16	
	Middle	6	4	6	16	Middle	5	5	6	16	
	High	2	6	8	16	High	3	6	7	16	
	Total	16	16	16	48	Total	16	16	16	48	

Materials

Self-Esteem Measures

The measures of self-esteem were directly adopted from the Janis and Field Personality Questionnaire (1959). Although there are nine self-rating clusters in this questionnaire, the first three clusters - Feelings of Inadequacy, Social Inhibitions, and Test Anxiety - are considered by the authors to be more closely related to self-esteem. Janis and Field (1959) correlated these three measures with a persuasibility test, but they failed to find significant results for Test Anxiety cluster. For that reason, only the Feelings of Inadequacy (FI) and Social Inhibitions (SI) scores were used as self-esteem measures. The individual questions for these two measures used, plus a description of the answers for individual items, are shown in Appendix B.

The following instructions were printed with the self-esteem items:

Each of the following questions has five possible answers.
Check the one answer which most nearly describes you. Answer
every question as carefully and honestly as possible.

On the questionnaire given the subjects, the items from the three different clusters were mixed in such a way that items from a particular scale generally occurred as every other question. This was done as an attempt to prevent the subjects from forming a response set to a particular type of question. The range of scores on each item was 0 to 4. The higher the score on each question, the lower the presumed level of self-esteem.

Attitude Measure

Form A and Form B of the Attitude Toward Censorship Scale were developed by Rosander and Thursone (1931), using the method of equal-appearing intervals (Thurstone, 1931, 1929). This procedure begins with a large number of items which are related to a particular attitude. Several judges sort these items into 11 piles, which they think are equally spaced and which range from strongly opposed to highly favorable toward a class of social referents. The median of the position given the item by the judges is the scale value of that item. Appendix C contains the items, their scale values, and the instructions for the Attitude Toward Censorship Scale. Although Thurstone recommended using a median of the item scale value that the individual agreed with as his attitude score, this study used both the median and mean scores of the item scale values to determine the attitude, so that comparisons could be made between these two types of scoring of attitudes.

The two different forms were used to decrease the probability that

the subject would attempt to answer the post-experimental attitude measure as he had the original measure. Available evidence indicates that the the two forms are equivalent. Ferguson (1939) found equivalent reliabilities between the two forms of this scale that ranged from $+.74$ to $+.84$. Lorge's (1939) tests of reliability ranged from $+.65$ to $+.82$. Gibson (1962) found that split half reliability was $+.90$ when the two forms of this scale were combined.

Evidence for validity of this scale has been established by correlations with other Thurstone scales. The Attitude Toward Censorship Scale correlated $+.16$ to $+.58$ with the Thurstone Scale for treatment of criminals and $+.15$ to $+.46$ with Thurstone's Attitude Toward Capital Punishment Scale (Diggory, 1953). Also, when Gibson (1962) combined Forms A and B, he found essentially the same results in attitude change with this combined scale as with a forced choice scale that he developed. Thus, this scale appears to be fairly valid.

Communication on Censorship

The censorship communication was adopted from one used in a study by Gibson (1962), where it was shown to be effective in changing attitudes. The various statements and arguments in this message are strongly opposed to the use of censorship under any circumstance. The experimenter made minor changes in the original communication, so that the message would be somewhat easier to present orally. The actual modifications of the communication consisted of omitting a few of the more difficult sentences and of simplifying the structure of some of the complex statements.

Even after these changes were made, this material appeared to be of

college level reading difficulty and contained approximately 850 words. The main arguments used were that there are no standards for censorship, censorship deprives people of their individual rights and would impede man's progress, and only a minority support censorship. The communication used is shown in Appendix D.

Comprehension Test

In order to test the hypothesis related to attention and comprehension, six multiple-choice questions were constructed to measure the subject's memory and understanding of the communication. These questions and the accompanying instructions are contained in Appendix E. When the questions were designed, it was hoped that all of the questions could be answered correctly if the subject remembered the general content of the message. For example, question four was as follows:

The major arguments in the communication center around (1) majority rights (2) individual rights (3) property rights (4) prerogatives of local government.

The correct answer, individual rights, was the main theme for over half of the communication. Except for one question on the author's general position on censorship, all of the questions involved major points that the communication was trying to make and the correct answer was directly stated in the material.

Procedure

All of the ninety-six subjects that had been selected were contacted by telephone and asked to participate in some further research. Three subjects failed to show up for the experimental session and had to be replaced by further sampling. All subjects were randomly assigned to

either the passive or active condition. These experimental conditions will be discussed separately.

Passive Condition

The subject was brought into the experimental room, given the communication opposed to censorship, and the experimenter said to him, "The first thing I'd like for you to do, is to read through this material once very carefully." After he completed the first reading, the subject was asked to read the material a second time. After he completed the second reading, the subject was told that he would now answer two "surveys". The first questionnaire he was given was either Form A or Form B of the Attitude Toward Censorship Scale. The form he received was always different from the one he had used in class.

The second questionnaire that the subject was given consisted of two parts. The first part, which was adopted directly from Gibson's (1962) study, consisted of a series of eight semantic differentials on which the subject rated his evaluation of the communication he had read (instructions and items in Appendix F). The second part of the questionnaire was the comprehension test, on which the subject displayed his memory of the material.

Active Condition

In this condition the subjects were initially told the following:

This research is designed to study how people differ in the ability to make an oral presentation. What I want you to do is read some written material into a tape recorder as a speech. Now you can read through this material once before reading it into the tape recorder.

After the subject finished reading the communication opposed to

censorship once, he was informed that his taped presentation was going to be presented to a group of Oklahoma State University students. He was asked to present the material as convincingly and sincerely as possible. Before the subject began his presentation, the experimenter, while clearly in view of the subject, tested the tape recorder to insure that it was working.

After the subject completed the presentation, he was given the same two questionnaires as those in the passive condition, with the exception that a third part was added to the second questionnaire. This third part consisted of two semantic differentials on which the subject rated how satisfied he was with his performance and how hard he tried to do a good job in his presentation. These two items with their accompanying instructions are shown in Appendix F.

Scoring

Individual attitude scores were again calculated with both the mean and median of the scale values of the items agreed with. Attitude change was defined as the difference between the scores on the two forms of the Attitude Toward Censorship Scale. When the change in attitude was in the opposite direction from the communication, that is, when the subject became more in favor of censorship, the difference was given a negative sign. When the subject became less in favor of censorship, the difference was given a positive sign.

For each comprehension question, there was only one correct answer. The individual's comprehension score was the total number of correct responses, with a possible range from zero to six.

Many subjects were confused by the semantic differentials (second

questionnaire, first and third parts) and the experimenter often found it necessary to give Ss further instructions. Because of these variations in individual understanding and variations in the amount of help given, the two measures consisting of semantic differentials were not scored.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Several procedures were used to examine the relationship of attitude change to the level of self-esteem and the participation conditions. The initial statistical procedure used was a 2 X 3 factorial analysis of variance, one factor representing the two levels of participation, the other factor the three levels of self-esteem. The purpose of this design was to see if there were main effects for, or interactions between self-esteem and participation. When any interaction proved significant, the simple effects were examined.

When the interaction was not significant, individual comparisons were made using only the high and low groups. These comparisons were as follows: between high and low esteem groups within each participation condition; between active and passive conditions within the high esteem level; and between active and passive conditions within the low esteem level. For all of the above procedures, both individual mean and median attitude scores were calculated, thus making it possible to compare attitude change results across measures of central tendency. In addition, correlations between comprehension scores and attitude change scores were determined. All of the calculations for the above procedures were done by computer (IBM 1050).

Comparison of Mean and Median Scoring of Attitudes

In only one case were significant results obtained with one measure of attitude change and not the other. The main effect for FI with males was significant for medians, but not for means. However, when individual differences between mean and median scores of attitude change were examined, the t (96) was equal to 5.279 ($p < .001$). Still, the correlation between individual attitude change scores based on means and on medians was highly significant, $r = .8269$, $p < .01$. Overall, the evidence seems to support the notion that results with the mean or median scoring of a Thurstone attitude scale will be essentially the same.

Since the results using the two different measures were similar, only the findings based on the median of the scale values of the items agreed with are reported for the present study. The median, instead of the mean, was used because Thurstone had recommended the use of the median score.

Initial Attitude Measure

Table III gives the descriptive statistics for both Form A and Form B of the attitude scale. The two forms were not significantly different (t (335) = .758, $p < .45$). From the small size of this difference and from tests of equivalency discussed earlier, it seems safe to assume that the two forms are equivalent.

TABLE III
ORIGINAL SAMPLE SIZES, MEANS, AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF FORMS
A AND B OF ATTITUDE TOWARD CENSORSHIP SCALE

	Sample Size	Mean	Standard Deviation
Form A	162	4.502	1.040
Form B	175	4.584	.957

Attitude Change

For the present study, attitude change was defined as the difference between the subject's pre- and post-experimental scores on the attitude measure. Table IV shows the mean attitude changes for different levels of self-esteem from both FI and SI measures, and for different participation conditions. Figures 1-6 provide graphic illustrations of this same information. Generally, in the passive conditions, the slopes showing the relationship between self-esteem and attitude change tend to be positive or fairly level. In the active conditions, on the other hand, the slopes showing this relationship tend to be negative. From this information alone, it seems clear that the results do not support the hypothesis that higher self-esteem will cause greater dissonance in a forced compliance (active) situation and thus greater changes in attitude.

The analyses of variance (Tables V-X) revealed only one significant main effect, that for level of FI for males. Inspection of Figure 1




Figure 1. Mean Attitude Change of the two Participation Conditions for Male FI Groups




Figure 2. Mean Attitude Change of the two Participation Conditions for Female FI Groups




Figure 3. Mean Attitude Change of the two Participation Conditions for Total FI Groups




Figure 4. Mean Attitude Change of the two Participation Conditions for Male SI Groups




Figure 5. Mean Attitude Change of the two Participation Conditions for Female SI Groups




Figure 6. Mean Attitude Change of the two Participation Conditions for Total SI Groups

TABLE IV
MEAN ATTITUDE CHANGE FOR VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE FEELINGS OF
INADEQUACY AND SOCIAL INHIBITION MEASURES, AND
ACTIVE-PASSIVE PARTICIPATION CONDITIONS

		Males		Females		Total	
		Act.	Pass.	Act.	Pass.	Act.	Pass.
FI	High	1.719	1.300	1.553	0.700	1.636	1.000
	Middle	1.388	1.106	0.525	1.316	0.956	1.206
	Low	0.106	1.244	0.646	1.431	0.270	1.338
SI	High	1.019	1.875	1.174	0.613	1.096	0.866
	Middle	1.281	1.000	0.848	1.219	1.064	1.109
	Low	0.700	1.531	0.703	1.606	0.701	1.569

TABLE V
AOV OF ATTITUDE CHANGE SCORES FOR MALES AS A FUNCTION
OF FI AND PARTICIPATION

Source	df	SS	MS	F
Participation	1	0.563	0.563	0.609
Feelings of Inadequacy	2	7.539	3.769	4.073*
Part. X FI	2	7.744	3.872	4.184*
Error	42	38.870	0.925	
Total	47	54.716		

*Significant beyond the .05 level

TABLE VI
AOV OF ATTITUDE CHANGE SCORES FOR FEMALES AS A
FUNCTION OF FI AND PARTICIPATION

Source	df	SS	MS	F
Participation	1	0.679	0.679	0.570
Feelings of Inadequacy	2	0.358	0.179	0.150
Part. X FI	2	7.134	3.567	2.993
Error	42	50.063	1.192	
Total	47	58.235		

TABLE VII
AOV OF ATTITUDE CHANGE SCORES FOR MALES AND FEMALES
AS A FUNCTION OF FI AND PARTICIPATION

Source	df	SS	MS	F
Participation	1	1.240	1.240	1.162
Feelings of Inadequacy	2	4.237	2.119	1.986
Part. X FI	2	11.609	5.804	5.440**
Error	90	96.025	1.067	
Total	95	113.110		

**Significant beyond the .01 level

TABLE VIII
AOV OF ATTITUDE CHANGE SCORES FOR MALES AS A
FUNCTION OF SI AND PARTICIPATION

Source	df	SS	MS	F
Participation	1	0.563	0.563	0.489
Social Inhibitions	2	0.043	0.021	1.017
Part. X SI	2	2.557	1.278	1.042
Error	42	51.555	1.227	
Total	47	54.716		

TABLE IX
AOV OF ATTITUDE CHANGE SCORES FOR FEMALES AS A
FUNCTION OF SI AND PARTICIPATION

Source	df	SS	MS	F
Participation	1	0.679	0.679	0.542
Social Inhibitions	2	0.547	0.273	0.218
Part X. SI	2	4.399	2.200	1.756
Error	42	52.610	1.253	
Total	47	58.235		

TABLE X
AOV OF ATTITUDE CHANGE SCORES FOR MALES AND FEMALES
AS A FUNCTION OF SI AND PARTICIPATION

Source	df	SS	MS	F
Participation	1	1.240	1.240	1.053
Social Inhibitions	2	0.398	0.199	0.168
Part. X SI	2	5.222	2.611	2.356
Error	90	106.251	1.181	
Total	95	113.110		

shows that the amount of attitude change for males decreased significantly as the level of self-esteem increased.

Two interactions were found to be significant. These were participation X FI for both males and the total of males and females. None of the main effects or interaction effects were significant when SI scores were used as the measure of self-esteem.

In order to understand fully the nature of these significant interactions, it was necessary to analyze the simple effects, i.e., the change across one level of a factor for the other factor. Tables XI and XII show the analyses of simple effects. The active condition was significant across all levels of FI and the high self-esteem (low FI) was significant across the participation modalities for both males and the total. Reference to Figures 1 and 3 shows the direction of these differences. For the active condition, there was a decrease in the amount of

TABLE XI
AOV FOR SIMPLE EFFECTS WITH MALE FI GROUPS

Source	df	SS	MS	F
FI for Active	2	15.12	7.56	8.13***
FI for Passive	2	0.16	0.08	0.09
Part. for Low SE	1	0.70	0.70	0.75
Part. for Middle SE	1	0.31	0.31	0.33
Part. for High SE	1	7.29	7.29	7.84**
Error	42	38.87	0.93	

** Significant beyond the .01 level

*** Significant beyond the .005 level

TABLE XII
AOV FOR SIMPLE EFFECTS WITH TOTAL FI GROUPS

Source	df	SS	MS	F
FI for Active	2	14.92	7.46	6.99***
FI for Passive	2	0.93	0.46	0.43
Part. for Low SE	1	3.23	1.62	1.515
Part. for Middle SE	1	0.50	0.50	0.47
Part. for High SE	1	9.12	9.12	8.55***
Error	90	96.03	1.07	

*** Significant beyond the .005 level

attitude change as a function of increases in self-esteem. Also, for the high-esteem (FI) groups, the passive condition produced greater changes in attitude than the active condition. These results fail to support the predictions derived from dissonance theory by Cohen (1964).

Because of their relevance to hypotheses given earlier, for each separate analysis where interactions were not significant, individual comparisons were made between the low and high-esteem groups within the same participation condition, between the two high esteem groups, and between the two low esteem groups. The formula used to make these planned comparisons was adopted from Winer (1962, p. 209). Summarized in Table XIII are the results of these comparisons. Only one type of difference was found to be significant, that for SI totals between the high self-esteem groups across participation conditions. Reference to Figure 6 indicates that the passive condition produced greater attitude change than the active condition for high esteem (SI) groups. This result again fails to support a prediction made from Cohen's (1959) statements about forced compliance.

TABLE XIII
PARTIAL ANALYSIS OF SIMPLE EFFECTS BETWEEN
LEVELS OF VARIOUS FACTORS

	Bet. High & Low Esteem Within		Bet. Active & Passive Conditions Within	
	Active Condition	Passive Condition	High Esteem	Low Esteem
FI Females	2.756	1.794	2.068	2.439
SI Males	0.331	0.554	2.252	0.033
SI Females	0.709	3.154	2.608	1.006
SI Totals	1.057	3.350	5.100*	0.360

*Significant beyond the .05 level

Comprehension

The correlation between the comprehension score and the amount of attitude change was not significant, $r = .0946$. This finding supports McGuire's (1968) hypothesis that comprehension would not be a significant factor in attitude change for highly complex messages.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

Of the six experimental hypotheses, only the two hypotheses (four and five) which were derived from McGuire's (1968) statements about the complexity of the message were supported. McGuire has said that for very subtle complex messages, the amount of attitude change would show a small, linear decrease as the level of self-esteem increases. In the present study, which used a highly complex message, it was found that the relationship between attitude change and self-esteem was non-significant, as was predicted, and that the graphs for the passive conditions generally appear linear. Therefore, when the situation involved reading the message to oneself, the present evidence tended to support McGuire's prediction for highly complex messages. However, the slope in the passive conditions tended to be slightly positive, instead of slightly negative, and thus, it is possible that with even greater complexity, this positive relationship between attitude change and self-esteem might become significant.

In addition, McGuire has said that for extremely complex messages comprehension will not be a significant factor for attitude change. The failure to find a significant correlation between attitude change scores and comprehension scores seems to support this prediction.

The three hypotheses which were based on Cohen's (1964) discussion of the forced compliance situation for different levels of self-esteem

were not supported. Instead, for males it was found that a significant negative relationship between attitude change and self-esteem (from FI) existed in the forced compliance situation and that significantly more attitude change occurred in the passive than in the active condition for the high esteem (low FI) groups. Although the results did not reach significance, the low esteem (high FI) males tended to show more attitude change in the active than in the passive condition.

The above three findings, however, may be explained by Cohen's (1959) "threat" theory, which states that high esteem individuals primarily employ avoidance defenses, while low esteem individuals use mainly sensitizing defenses. Cohen also stated that when the situation becomes threatening, high esteem subjects are more resistance to attitude change, while low esteem individuals are less resistant to changes in attitude. Logically, it would seem quite feasible to assume that people would feel more threatened by being required to give a speech on censorship which was to be heard by fellow students, than by simply reading some material on censorship. In addition, from the experimenter's observations, students in the active condition seemed to manifest more signs of anxiety than those in the passive condition. Therefore, the results in the present study may indicate that when the task to be performed is fairly threatening, there is an inverse relationship between the amount of attitude change and the level of self-esteem. Also, if one assumes that the task in the passive condition was at least minimally threatening, the present evidence may suggest that this relationship becomes increasingly negative as the task becomes more threatening.

The failure of the low esteem group to be significantly higher in attitude change for the active condition might also be explained by the

differences in defenses. Since low esteem subjects supposedly use sensitizing defenses, they may have perceived the passive condition as more threatening than did the high esteem individuals. Therefore, the low esteem group may have perceived less difference in the amount of threat between the active and passive conditions than did the high esteem group.

Analyses of variance revealed no significant differences when degree of Social Inhibitions was used as the measure of self-esteem. This result does not support the finding of Janis and Field (1959). Even though the differences were not significant, however, the general trends of the data were in the same direction as when FI scores are used. That is, the evidence tends to support Cohen's "threat" theory in the active condition. The significant difference between the total high esteem (low SI) groups across participation modalities seems to support the hypothesis that high esteem subjects are more resistant to attitude change when the situation is threatening. Overall, though, since most of the differences failed to reach significance, scores from the Social Inhibitions Scale seemed to be inadequate predictors of attitude change.

For females, no significant relationships were found between any of the variables investigated in the present study. This finding was not totally unexpected since other experimenters (Janis and Field, 1959; Silverman, 1966) have reported non-significant results when using females as subjects. Studies reporting significant results for females have generally used instruments other than the Feelings of Inadequacy Scale or Social Inhibitions Scale. Therefore, the possibility exists that the FI Scale is not a satisfactory measure of self-esteem for females.

Most studies have shown that role playing leads to greater attitude change than passive participation. The lack of an overall difference in

attitude change in the present study between the active and passive conditions might be explained on the basis of incentive theory. This theory emphasizes the interference to attitude change produced by negative affect when the subject is forced to perform a role playing task, particularly when the same experimenter runs the experimental procedure and measures the attitude, as was done in the present study. In addition, incentive theory stresses the importance of improvisation in producing this increase in attitude change and the present study omitted improvisation. This explanation, however, would be hard put to explain the results of previous studies where this increase occurred without improvisation and with only one experimenter (Jansen and Stolurow, 1962; Zimbardo, 1965). An alternative explanation of this lack of increase in the active condition, based on the complexity of the message, could also be put forth. McGuire (1968) has said that highly complex messages produce only small changes in attitude. In the present experiment the effect of the high complexity of the censorship message may have overridden the overall effect usually produced by the different tasks. On the basis of the present data, however, there seems to be no way to distinguish as to which is the more valid explanation.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

The present study examined the function of attitude change for different levels of self-esteem in an active (forced compliance) versus a passive situation. The specific hypothesis put forth centered around Cohen's (1964) prediction that a high esteem individual would experience more dissonance and thus more attitude change than a low esteem individual in a situation where the person is forced to publicly adopt a discrepant position.

Ss were selected on the basis of their attitude toward censorship (measured by Form A and Form B of the Attitude Toward Censorship Scale) and their level of self-esteem (measured by the Feelings of Inadequacy Scale and the Social Inhibitions Scale from the Janis and Field Personality Questionnaire). High, middle, and low self-esteem groups were exposed to the same counter-attitudinal, pro-censorship communication in either an active or passive condition. In the passive condition, Ss simply read the communication silently to themselves, while in the active condition they presented this material as a speech. Attitudes were measured again immediately following the tasks. Attitude change was the difference between the pre- and post-experimental measures.

The results failed to support the hypotheses based on Cohen's (1964) dissonance predictions. For males, it was found that attitude change was inversely related to self-esteem (from FI scores) in the active

condition, and that high esteem (from FI) Ss showed more attitude change in the passive than in the active condition. These significant findings were explained in terms of Cohen's (1959) "threat" theory and the greater threat produced by the active task. Analyses of variance revealed no significant effects for females or for self-esteem based on SI scores. As predicted, a non-significant relationship between attitude change and self-esteem was found in the passive condition and the correlation between comprehension scores and attitude change was not significant.

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APPENDIX A

PERCENTAGE OF SCORES IN VARIOUS INTERVALS
FOR EACH SELF-ESTEEM SCALE

Feelings of Inadequacy

Scoring Interval	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89
% in Interval	1.19	4.75	13.06	34.12	23.74	16.32	4.75	11.48	1.59

Social Inhibitions

Scoring Interval	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44
% in Interval	7.4	27.7	35.7	22.4	10.0	4.5	.5	0	0

Test Anxiety

Scoring Interval	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44
% in Interval	10.0	26.0	26.6	22.4	10.0	4.5	.5	0	0

APPENDIX B

SCALES FOR MEASUREMENT OF SELF-ESTEEM

THE JANIS AND FIELD PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRE

The following is a description of the various answers used for different questions (Hovland and Janis, 1959, p. 300):

All questions beginning with the phrases "How often do you ...?" and "Do you ever ...?" had the following check list of five answer categories: Very often, Fairly often, Sometimes, Once in a great while, Practically never. Most of the other questions dealt with various sources of worry and other disturbing affects and were worded in terms of "How _____ do you usually feel ...?" For such questions, the check list was always given in the following standard form: Very, Fairly, Slightly, Not very, Not at all.

Feelings of Inadequacy

1. How often do you feel inferior to most of the people you know?
2. Do you ever think that you are a worthless individual?
3. How confident do you feel that some day the people you know will look up to you and respect you?
4. How often do you feel to blame for your mistakes?
5. Do you ever feel so discouraged with yourself that you wonder whether anything is worth while?
6. How often do you feel that you dislike yourself?
7. In general, how confident do you feel about your abilities?
8. How often do you have the feeling that there is nothing you can do well?
9. How much do you worry about how well you get along with other people?
10. How often do you worry about criticisms that might be made of your work by whoever is responsible for checking up on your work?
11. Do you ever feel afraid or anxious when you are going into a room by yourself where other people have already gathered and are talking?

12. How often do you feel self-conscious?
13. When you have to talk in front of a class or a group of people your own age, how afraid or worried do you usually feel?
14. When you are trying to win in a game or sport and you know that other people are watching you, how rattled or flustered do you usually get?
15. How much do you worry about whether other people will regard you as a success or a failure in your job or career?
16. When in a group of people, do you have trouble thinking of the right things to talk about?
17. When you have made an embarrassing mistake or have done something that makes you look foolish, how long do you usually keep on worrying about it?
18. Do you find it hard to make talk when you meet new people?
19. How often do you worry about whether other people like to be with you?
20. How often are you troubled with shyness?
21. When you are trying to convince other people who disagree with your ideas, how worried do you usually feel about the impression you are making?
22. When you think about the possibility that some of your friends or acquaintances might not have a good opinion of you, how concerned or worried do you feel about it?
23. How often do you feel worried or bothered about what other people think of you?

Social Inhibitions

1. Do you prefer to work with others rather than alone?

2. How important is it to you to have some really close friends of your own age?
3. When you need to make an important decision do you usually work things out entirely for yourself rather than get someone else's advice?
4. How often do you feel that you would prefer to become so absorbed in your own work or hobbies that you would not care about having any friends?
5. How often do you wish that you would not have any responsibility to do things for other people?
6. When you are invited to go some place where there will be a large number of people, do you try to avoid going?
7. Do you enjoy talking with people?
8. How often do you have the feeling that you would be better off if you were to live in a place where there are no people around who know you?
9. Do you prefer to spend your evenings alone?
10. How often do you prefer to be by yourself rather than with other people?
11. How often do you feel that you would prefer to be left alone by all your relatives and friends so that you would have no obligations toward others?

APPENDIX C

THURSTONE ATTITUDE SCALE

ATTITUDE TOWARD CENSORSHIP

Scale
Value

Form A

- 6.9 1. Censorship is a good thing if there isn't too much of it.
- 3.6 2. The judgement of intelligent people is the only effective censorship.
- 0.3 3. Nobody has any right to dictate to me what I shall read.
- 8.0 4. Censorship is needed because most people are unable to judge for themselves.
- 5.5 5. There is much to be said on both sides of the censorship question.
- 4.1 6. Morality varies so much with different places and times that censorship is arbitrary.
- 2.2 7. Censorship is absurd because no two people agree about morality.
- 8.9 8. Our national morality is safeguarded by censorship.
- 6.0 9. The censors are needed, but they go too far.
- 3.0 10. It is a shame that so many fine books and plays have been suppressed by the censors.
- 0.0 11. Censorship is a disgrace to our country.
- 7.2 12. Censorship when reasonably exercised is desirable for morality.
- 5.7 13. Whether censorship is good or not depends entirely on the censor.
- 2.8 14. People should be allowed to make their own distinctions between good and bad.
- 9.6 15. What we need is more and better censorship.

- 7.1 16. Our system of censorship isn't perfect but it is better than none.
- 3.8 17. The education of public opinion would be a great improvement over censorship.
- 1.4 18. Censorship can never be justified in a free country.
- 8.3 19. Some authorized power is certainly needed to keep obscene literature in check.
- 2.4 20. Censorship can never make people moral.

Form B

- 4.2 1. I doubt if censorship is wise.
- 2.2 2. A truly free people must be allowed to choose their own reading and entertainment.
- 9.1 3. We must have censorship to protect the morals of young people.
- 6.7 4. The theory of censorship is sound, but censors make a mess of it.
- 3.1 5. Only narrow-minded Puritans want censorship.
- 0.0 6. The whole theory of censorship is utterly unreasonable.
- 7.5 7. Until public taste has been educated, we must continue to have censorship.
- 2.5 8. Many of our greatest literary classics would be suppressed if the censors thought they could get away with it.
- 9.9 9. Everything that is printed for publication should first be examined by government censors.
- 6.0 10. Plays and movies should be censored but the press should be free.
- 3.5 11. Censorship has practically no effect on people's morals.

- 0.5 12. Censorship is a gross violation of our constitutional rights.
- 8.2 13. Censorship protects those who lack judgment or experience to choose for themselves.
- 5.6 14. Censorship is a very difficult problem and I am not sure how far I think it should go.
- 7.1 15. Censorship is a good thing on the whole although it is often abused.
- 3.9 16. Education of the public taste is preferable to censorship.
- 1.7 17. Human progress demands free speech and a free press.
- 8.5 18. Censorship is effective in raising moral and aesthetic standards.
- 6.0 19. Censorship might be warranted if we could get reasonable censors.
- 2.8 20. Morality is produced by self-control, not by censorship.

APPENDIX D

EXPERIMENTAL COMMUNICATION STIMULUS

CENSORSHIP

Since the beginning of the United States, various persons and organizations have attempted to censor ideas and forms of expression to which they object. Earlier censors considered such books as The Scarlet Letter unfit reading for women. They felt that these written materials were obscene. Even recently, the censorship campaigns have been extended to almost ridiculous proportions, as in Cleveland in 1953. There the police forced booksellers to withdraw Sigmund Freud's General Introduction to Psychoanalysis because it had a chapter on sex. Contributing to the current confusion is the fact that legal experts and scholars have expressed widely different impressions of the term obscene. For example, an international conference at Geneva on Suppression of the Circulation and Traffic in Obscene Publications accomplished little because the delegates could not agree upon the meaning of obscenity. The American judiciary has frequently changed its interpretation of the term obscene.

Particularly disturbing is the case with which censors sometimes can prevent the sale of a book at a public store. If a child brings home a copy of, for instance, The Grapes of Wrath, a parent could underline or note the immoral passages and take the book to the nearest policeman. This policeman can then force the dealer to cease sale of the book and remove all the remaining copies from display. Finally, the bookseller can be sued by the parent for offering for sale material containing impure or indecent language. The prosecution does not have to prove that the entire book is impure or indecent, but only that selected passages in the book are objectionable.

The theory of censorship is that it can prevent the lowering of moral standards. No educated and sensible person would quarrel with

this objective if it were possible to accomplish this effect without imposing other ill effects. Men such as Aristotle and Oliver Wendell Holmes have maintained that man is free only so long as he may make choices - choices such as whether he desires to read Lady Chatterly's Lover or Stevenson's Treasure Island; to see "Gone With the Wind", or "I, a Woman". But censorship would deny these choices by not permitting a man to be exposed to some materials because they could be considered objectionable.

What the censors would do, then, is to deprive us of the right to freely choose that which we wish to examine. What is even more frightening is that this moral censorship might spread to financial and political matters. The effect in these areas is obvious.

Various religious and civic groups, such as the Legion of Decency, The National Organization for Decent Literature, Citizens Group for Clean Literature and thousands of others, are dedicated to the removal of all publications which violate what they consider the established bounds of moral acceptability. If all they did was to suggest to their members the films they should view and the books they should read, no American would question this as one of their rights. If, however, these groups come into bookstores and tell the bookseller to remove books and magazines they consider objectionable or they will urge their friends to discontinue buying his products, they have violated individual rights. And, if they impose a boycott on movie houses showing films to which they object, then they are again overstepping the legitimate boundaries of any social or religious group.

Down through the ages, man's progress has been directly related to his opportunity for freedom of expression. Great nations such as

England, France, the United States, and ancient Greece have, in large measure, achieved their position of world leadership by allowing their citizens the freedom to speak, write, and experiment. Authoritarian states like Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia have made military advances but only at the expense of the individual rights of their citizens. When nations like Russia find it necessary to so restrict the voice of public opinion that only the state may publish newspapers and operate radio and television stations, then it is apparent that thought control ranks at the top of their list.

It is ironic indeed, that American citizens who have experienced this freedom of expression are willing to deprive others of this right. These persons, of the pro-censorship faction, would act as the conscience of the community. Although these people are a small minority of our population, this does not mean that they will exert little influence. In the past small minorities have wielded influence far beyond their size. As examples we can point to the Nazi Party in Germany and the Communist Parties in many of the captive nations of Eastern Europe.

If we look at the problem in broad and long range terms, it should be obvious to clear thinking people that censorship springs from fear. And those who have not learned by now that fear is our worst enemy had better learn it before it is too late.

APPENDIX E

CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF COMPREHENSION

COMPREHENSION TEST

Based on your memory of what the communication said, mark one answer for each of the following multiple choice questions.

1. The communication (1) strongly favors censorship (2) slightly favors censorship (3) strongly opposes censorship (4) slightly opposes censorship (5) argues both for and against censorship.
2. In this country, the communication says that (1) a majority of people favor censorship (2) a minority of people favor censorship (3) about half of the people favor censorship (4) most people are unconcerned with the censorship issue.
3. The communication stresses that (1) it is very difficult to get anyone to object to books (2) the courts will rarely allow censorship, due to the difficulty of defining what is obscene (3) it is very easy to have books censored (4) it is usually futile to fight censors because of the power of the organizations favoring censorship.
4. The major arguments in the communication center around (1) majority rule (2) individual rights (3) property rights (4) prerogatives of local government.
5. The communication says that the desire for censorship results from (1) ignorance (2) high morality (3) fear (4) hatred (5) none of the above.
6. With regard to the outcome of the censorship issue, the author appears (1) afraid of minority influence (2) confident of majority rule (3) confident of the preservation of minority rights (4) afraid of majority dominance.

APPENDIX F

SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIALS FOR EVALUATION OF EXPERIMENTAL STIMULUS AND PRESENTATION

In evaluating the communication which you have just read, please make a check mark at the appropriate location on each of the following continua.

convincing :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : unconvincing

logical :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : illogical

specific :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : general

clear :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : vague

insufficient material :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : too much material

structurally sound :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : structurally weak

interesting :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : boring

accurate :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : inaccurate

In evaluating your presentation, please make a check mark at the appropriate location on the two following continua.

satisfied with performance :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : not satisfied with performance

did attempt to do a good job :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : did not attempt to do a good job

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