UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN CUBA

by

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PREFACE

This thesis examines certain areas of the American response to Soviet involvement in Cuba, particularly in regards to the missile crisis of 1962.

I wish to express my thanks to my committee: Dr. Carey G. Rickabaugh for serving as primary adviser and offering innumerable suggestions concerned with both substance and form, Dr. Raymond N. Habiby for critical analysis and counsel, and Professor Harold V. Sare for encouragement and assistance throughout this endeavor.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When thinking in terms of the cold war, the tendency is to focus on Asia, Europe, and Africa. Only recently has Latin America become an increasingly significant factor in the relationship between the United States and the Sino-Soviet bloc. A primary reason for the extension of the cold war to Latin America has been Soviet activities in Cuba, and United States reactions to these activities.

It should not be surprising that the Soviet Union has developed an interest in Latin America, for the countries of that continent offer potentially significant political, economic, and military assets to the U.S.S.R. Politically, the short range Soviet goals are to decrease the influence that the United States has enjoyed in this area, to encourage neutralism in the cold war, and to enhance the Soviet image.[1] Economically, Soviet short range goals in Latin America are modest. To the extent that it is economically and politically profitable, the Soviet Union has attempted to increase trade. Between 1954 and 1958, the total value of goods traded rose from forty million dollars annually to 100 million dollars.[2]

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[1]J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States Latin American Relations (Boston, 1965), p. 209.

[2]Edwin Lieuwen, The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin America (Columbus, 1966), p. 25.

The Soviet Union has been particularly interested in the military advantages that could be realized in several of the Latin American nations, particularly in Cuba. Hanson Baldwin, noted military analyst, lists five advantages.[3] First, the Caribbean area potentially provides an excellent strategic location to place shorter range ballistic missiles that could challenge the southern portion of the United States. Second, Latin American naval ports could provide valuable bases for submarines, refueling, and other nautical needs. A third anticipated advantage is the establishment of a base from which intelligence activities and subversion in the Western Hemisphere could be conducted. Fourth, the Caribbean area is strategically located for missile and satellite tracking stations. These stations would be valuable for observing the American space activities as well as tracking Soviet satellites. Finally, by increasing military activities in the Western Hemisphere, the Soviet Union could divert Washington's attention away from other areas of even greater strategic significance to the Soviets.

Latin America is on the periphery of Soviet interest, and as a result their goals are of a limited nature. The United States, however, has significant political, economic, and military involvement in this area which it considers vital to its national security.

From the political perspective, it is noteworthy that the twenty countries of Latin America comprise a substantial percentage of the United Nations' membership. When voting as a bloc, their influence can be extensive. The Organization of American States[4] is also a potential

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[3]Hanson Baldwin "A Military Perspective," in Cuba and the United States, ed. by John Plank (Washington, 1967), pp. 212-218.

[4]Hereafter referred to as the O.A.S.

political asset to the United States. By approving U.S. international activities, the O.A.S. can lend moral and legal support to those actions.

Economically, both the American private and public sectors have been financially involved in Latin America, and particularly so in the Caribbean. In 1963, trade with Latin America surpassed three billion dollars. American private investment approximated eight billion dollars during that same year.[5] Cuba had been particularly attractive to American capital in the pre-Castro era with total investment averaging one billion dollars annually.[6]

Latin America's size and strategic location make it militarily significant to the United States. In the Caribbean alone, the United States has a total of 20,000 men from the three branches of the armed forces. The Canal Zone supports ten U.S. bases and Puerto Rico is the host for six others.[7] Caribbean bases are valuable as training sites for tropical warfare, tracking stations, refueling stations for naval and air traffic, and a means to deny use of the Panama Canal to a belligerent force. South America is of less geographic value to the U.S. military than the Caribbean. However, the high population of several of those countries make them potentially significant military allies.

American interests in its Latin American neighbors necessitated a reaction to increased Soviet involvement in that area. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the nature of that response. In the interest of limiting the scope of this study, only three aspects of the response

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[5]Lieuwen, Challenge to Security, pp. 18, 19.

[6]Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge, 1966), p. 159.

[7]Lieuwen, Challenge to Security, p. 10.

will be considered. First, the U.S. view of its national security interests in the Caribbean area and the resulting policies will be discussed. In the context of this thesis, the term national interest is considered from the viewpoint of official policy and is limited to security considerations and closely associated corollaries. The second aspect to be considered is the role played by American military forces in implementing foreign policy in the region. The third aspect considers the contribution, if any, of the organization of American States to the U.S. effort.

Four hypotheses emerged from an initial survey of available literature.

One, while a form of communism has come to power in Cuba, American policy has been moderately successful in limiting the gains of the Soviet Union in the state.

Two, U.S. policy in Cuba has been guided by clearly stated interests that are considered to be vital to national security by United States policy makers.

Three, American policy in Cuba has been enhanced by a superior military posture with respect to the Caribbean area.

Four, the actions and resolutions of the Organization of American States have served to reinforce U.S. efforts to frustrate Soviet goals in Cuba.

While the first hypothesis is of a rather general nature, it is limited by the three areas with which this paper is concerned. The last three hypotheses relate to each of these aspects respectively.

In order to limit the scope of this investigation further, three limitations are applied. First, only the American reaction to Soviet

influence in Cuba will be considered. Chinese influence is recognized, but largely ignored. Likewise, an attempt is made to separate U.S. policy regarding the Soviet Union's presence in Cuba from the U.S. Cuban policy in general. While there is of necessity, a degree of overlap, this thesis focuses on the Soviet issue. A second limitation is geographic. Only Cuba or other areas directly effected by Cuba are considered. No attempt is made, for example, to treat communist threats elsewhere in Latin America except to the extent that it sheds light on the Cuban problem. Finally, the United States - Soviet dispute is treated as a classical power struggle. While ideology is certainly a worthy criterion by which to evaluate the conflict, this study leaves that approach to other researchers.

There are at least two criteria useful in evaluating a nation's foreign policy: what that nation does and what that nation says it will do. In this paper the writer concerns himself with both concepts in an analytic and descriptive manner. Because of the nature of this paper, many State Department documents are used. Of special significance are the State Department Bulletin and the State Department Inter-American Series. Documents of the Pan American Union also proved valuable. The selected bibliography is complemented by various analytical articles and books, and by assorted documentary sources.

The first chapter provides historical background of American attitudes and policies in Latin America. Particular emphasis is given to the role of the Monroe Doctrine in U.S. policy, and to the American reaction to suspected communism in Guatemala in 1954. The next chapter deals with the intense interest that the United States has had toward Cuba and the effects of this interest, both on United States' policy and

on the attitudes of other nations dealing with Cuba. The subsequent chapter discusses the effect that American military forces have had on U.S. relations with Cuba and conversely, the effect that relationship has had on American military forces. A fourth chapter deals with the reaction of the Organization of American States to Soviet influence in Cuba. The fifth chapter is a case study and considers the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 with respect to the three areas of concern of this study. The conflict is brought up to date in the sixth chapter which discusses the subject matter from the time of the missile crisis to the present. The final chapter concludes the study and examines the validity of the hypotheses.

CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES POLICY

Unquestionably the rise to power of Castro and the concomitant growth of Soviet influence in Cuba posed new problems and dilemmas for American policy makers. However, the situation was not considered in a vacuum. To a large extent, U.S. policy was influenced by traditional interests in the Latin American area and what was considered by Washington to be threats to those interests.

Two areas are of particular relevance with respect to the Cuban question. First is the Monroe Doctrine, a major cornerpost of American policy. Despite the controversial nature of the Monroe Doctrine, it is difficult to discuss even a segment of the U.S. Latin American policy without reference to that doctrine. The second area of concern is American reaction to what it viewed as growing communism within the hemisphere. The Guatemalan problem of 1954 will be analyzed as the most significant pre-Castro example of the intensity of U.S. opposition to hemispheric communism.

The Monroe Doctrine

In speaking of the Monroe Doctrine, Gaston Nerval emphasises the significance of that policy to inter-American affairs.

> I discovered some time ago that all roads lead to the Monroe Doctrine. There was no problem of Pan Americanism, political or economic, which has not been, in one way or another, related to the Monroe Doctrine or

one of its multiple derivatives.[1]

The Monroe Doctrine has been essentially a policy of national interest. Although many diverse and complex interpretations have been given to this doctrine, its national security implications have remained as a central feature. For this reason, the Monroe Doctrine is a cogent concern even to the present day. The original doctrine was probably not meant to be a doctrine at all, but rather a response to a specific threat.[2] That is, it was an attempt to discourage any imperialistic tendencies that France or Russia might have had toward the Western Hemisphere.

Four basic principles were stated in the doctrine regarding American foreign policy. First the Western Hemisphere is not to be considered as subject to further colonization by European powers.

> In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.[3]

Second, the United States would remain aloof from European affairs.

> In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part nor does it comport with our policy to do so.[4]

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[1]Gaston Nerval, Autopsy of the Monroe Doctrine (New York, 1934), p. v.

[2]Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, 1955), p. 9.

[3]President Monroe's Seventh Annual Message to Congress, 2 Dec., 1823, in A. G. Mezerik, ed., Cuba and the United States (New York, 1960), I, p. 45.

[4]Ibid.

Third, an extension of the "European system" would be a threat to the United States. However, the term "European system" was undefined and vague.

> We owe it, therefore, to candor and the amicable relations existing between the United States and these powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere.[5]

Fourth, the United States proclaimed that they would not intervene in the internal affairs of Latin America.

> It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same courses.[6]

The bases of the Monroe Doctrine were the concepts of isolation and non-intervention.[7] It will be shown, though, that the doctrine maintained at least part of its significance long after the premises were no longer valid due to the basic security orientation of the doctrine. In the 1830s and 1840s, this dictum was not invoked although France and Great Britain interfered in Latin America. France intervened in Mexican and Argentine affairs in order to improve their trade position in these countries. England was similarly involved in Argentina and Brazil. Perhaps the most blatant intervention was a joint naval blockade of a portion of Argentina by England and France in 1845. The blockade lasted

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[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid., p. 46.

[7]Mecham, A Survey of United States Latin American Relations (Boston, 1965), p. 39. See also Donald M. Dozer, The Monroe Doctrine Its Modern Significance (New York, 1965), p. 6, and Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp. 5, 19.

three years and unsuccessfully attempted to force Manuel Rosas, governor of Buenos Aires, to open unrestricted trade between Europe and the Rio Plata area. The United States was indifferent to the intervention as Washington did not view it as a direct challenge to American national interest.[8]

During the remainder of the nineteenth century and through the first third of the twentieth century, the Monroe Doctrine was subjected to several changes and additions that more or less followed the course of U.S. foreign policy. In every case, the change reflected the then current view of national security interests. In 1857, the no-transfer principle was added to the U.S. Latin American policy.[9] By this addition, the United States disallowed the transfer of a Latin American colony from one foreign power to another. In 1895, the United States felt threatened by a British-Venezuelan border dispute in which Great Britain was holding a portion of Venezuelan territory. Washington policy makers forced arbitration in this matter by means of an audacious note which stated, in part, that American interest and honor were at stake, that the Monroe Doctrine was applicable, and that to allow the subjugation of any Latin American nation would be against U.S. national interests. It further stated that,

> Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.[10]

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[8]Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp. 72, 73.

[9]Mecham, Latin American Relations, p. 62.

[10]Richard Olney, Memo to Thomas F. Bayard, July 20, 1895, in James W. Gantenbein, ed., The Evolution of Our Latin American Policy A Documentary Record (New York, 1950), pp. 340-354.

The so called Roosevelt Corollary further distorted the original meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. Although J. Reuben Clark later rejected the Roosevelt dictum as an integral part of the Monroe Doctrine, it is significant that Roosevelt distorted the doctrine to provide justification for his policies.[11] The two major changes introduced by the Roosevelt Corollary were that the Monroe Doctrine was in fact a guarantee of the commercial independence of the Americas,[12] and that the United States possessed the right to intervene in Latin America in cases of flagrant wrongdoings.[13] The Roosevelt Corollary is another example of the relationship between the Monroe Doctrine and the American view of its essential national interests concerning Latin America.

In 1928, J. Reuben Clark wrote a comprehensive memorandum concerning the Monroe Doctrine and its many derivatives. A major thesis of this document was that the Monroe Doctrine had been on occasion distorted to justify all matters of national self interest. Clark's position was that the doctrine should not be so broadly interpreted although it certainly pertained to national interest to some degree.[14]

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[11]U.S. Department of State, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, by J. Reuben Clark, State Dept. Pub. No. 37 (Washington, 1928), p. xxiii.

[12]President Roosevelt's First Annual Message to Congress, 1901, in Robert A. Goldwin, ed., Readings in American Foreign Policy (New York, 1959), p. 198.

[13]Theodore Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message to Congress, 1904, in ibid. The message, in part, reads "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general lowering of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power..."

[14]U.S. Department of State, Memorandum, p. xxi.

The Clark Memorandum sought to end the era of free wheeling interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine, and raised the question of future applicability of the doctrine. Hiram Bingham, for example, wrote a book in 1928 describing it as an "obsolete shillobeth." Interestingly enough, however, he changed his mind several years after the writing of the book. The doctrine is at times dormant and at times applicable depending on the American concept of external threats to the hemisphere. For example, it was referred to extensively in the 1954 Guatemalen situation. Again, in 1960, when Chairman Khrushchev declared the doctrine to be dead of old age, the State Department responded vigorously declaring it very much alive and in fact claiming a multilateralism for it.[15] The Cuban problem has, of course, been a challenge to the doctrine and it has been cited on several occasions in regard to that island.[16] Since World War II, it appears that the Monroe Doctrine has grown in significance due to an increase in external threats to the Western Hemisphere.

It is interesting to note that although the original foreign policy bases of the doctrine, namely isolation and non-involvement, have become obsolete, the doctrine has continued as an important policy consideration. It has become institutionalized as an American policy toward alien powers with designs on Latin America. Several authors have intimated

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[15]U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Reaffirms Principle of Monroe Doctrine," State Department Bulletin, August 1, 1960, pp. 170, 171.

[16]William A. Williams, The United States, Cuba, and Castro (New York, 1962), p. 176. Mr. Williams states that the U.S. invasion of Cuba was consistent with the Monroe Doctrine, immoral a doctrine though it may be. See also J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin, 1961), p. 462. "In view of the heavy Soviet rearmament of Cuba, and the island republic's absorption into the Communist bloc, the time is rapidly approaching when the United States will have to decide whether the Monroe Doctrine has been violated and whether it is worth defending."

that the Monroe Doctrine is dead. Its recent use seems to negate that possibility. It does seem, however, that it varies in significance depending on the intensity of threats on the Western Hemisphere. Dexter Perkins, in his analysis of the Monroe Doctrine, states that the international situation and the position of the O.A.S. tend to lessen the influence of the doctrine when no crisis exists, but he cites the Guatemalan situation as a crisis which brought the doctrine very much to the foreground.[17] He further states that hemispheric cooperation does not make the doctrine obsolete.[18] Some interesting statistics bring this point out even more clearly. In April of 1937 a questionnaire was sent out to a random sampling in the United States asking if the respondants would be in favor of the United States defending by force any Latin American country from foreign attack. The responses were 28.7 per cent yes, 61.9 per cent no, 9.9 per cent don't know. A few years later, with a more critical world situation, the following question was asked, "If a major foreign power actually threatened to take over any of the following places by armed invasion, would you be willing to see United States come to the rescue with armed forces?". The countries mentioned were Canada, Mexico, and Brazil. The affirmative responses in January 1939, were 73 per cent for Canada, 43 per cent for Mexico, and 27 per cent for Brazil. By August of 1940 this had changed to 87 per cent for Canada, 76.5 per cent for Mexico, and 54.7 per cent for Brazil.[19] From these figures it seems that support for the doctrine is relative to where and

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[17]Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, p. 369.

[18]Ibid., p. 377.

[19]Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, p. 377.

when it is applied. This leads us back to the basic tenent of the Monroe Doctrine, hemispheric security.

Of the four principles expounded in the original Monroe proclamation, the two concerned with United States non-intervention in Latin America and Europe have lost their original meaning. Whenever the United States considered its security to be threatened, the United States interfered and intervened as necessary to protect its interests. The two remaining principles, non-colonization and the prohibition of the extension of a European system to the Western Hemisphere, have remained intact. This raises the problem of blatantly ignoring one portion of the doctrine while enforcing another. The justification lies in the American concern with national security. As J. Reuben Clark pointed out in his memorandum, the Roosevelt Corollary was not justified by the Monroe Doctrine, but was justified on the basis of national self-interest as interpreted by the United States.[20] This is the single thread running through the doctrine's diverse history, giving it coherence and unity.

Reaction To Communism: Guatemala

The United States considers communist presence in the hemisphere to be dangerous to its national security. The present U.S. Latin American policy has been developed around defeating the real and imagined aggressiveness of the Soviet Union.

> Our greatest challenge in Latin America since World War II has been that of presenting a hemispheric front against the threats posed by international communism. The United States has been single minded in this purpose; all else has been subordinated to this objective. The threat is viewed as an external

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[20]U.S. Department of State, Memorandum, p. xxiii.

> one which must be opposed by political and military means.[21]

This section will focus on Guatemala as a case study of U.S. reaction to an alleged communist threat. This conflict most closely approximates the Cuban problem, at least in its earliest stages. Guatemala is particularly interesting as it posed a definite threat to the Monroe Doctrine based on the American assumption that a relationship between the Guatemalan government and Soviet Communism did exist.[22] American reaction took the form of limited action and a strong propaganda campaign.

From 1944 to 1954, the Guatemalan government became increasingly leftist in its political orientation. By 1954, the United States suspected that communists, or communist sympathizers, had control of the government, and that leading officials were members of communist front groups. The president's wife was the leader of the National Women's Alliance, an affiliation of the Communist International Federation of Women. The President of the Guatemalan Congress was head of the Guatemalan Peace Committee, a communist front organization.[23] Finally in 1954, Czecholovakia sent arms to the Arbenz government. By that time, the United States had instigated a massive propaganda campaign.

The propaganda campaign took two forms; one was an assortment of statements by the State Department, and the other was an attempt to influence the Tenth Inter-American Conference convened at Caracas.

In July of 1954, after the crisis, the State Department stated the

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[21]Mecham, Latin American Relations, p. 466.

[22]Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 440.

[23]Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, 1957), p. 362.

following:

> The master plan of international communism is to gain a solid political base in the hemisphere, a base that can be used to extend communist penetration to the other peoples of the other American governments.[24]

John E. Peurifoy, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala said:

> In proving that communism can be defeated, we relied on the traditional American principle of honesty in the conduct of foreign affairs and the American doctrine of continental liberty from despotic intervention, first enunciated by President Monroe 131 years ago.[25]

In 1957, the State Department published a paper reviewing the role of international communism in Guatemala. In this pamphlet they used Soviet publications to show communist involvement.[26]

At the Caracas conference, the American goal was to obtain a strong resolution condemning communism and the situation in Guatemala. The Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, appeared personally and stated:

> What I suggest does not involve any interference in the internal affairs of any American Republic. There is ample room for national differences and for tolerances between the political institutions of the different American States. But there is no place here for political institutions which serve alien masters. I hope we can agree to make that clear.[27]

It is difficult to evaluate how influential the United States was in the overthrow of the Arbenz government. Estimates range from mere

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[24]U.S. Department of State, "International Communism in Guatemala," by John Foster Dulles, State Department Bulletin, July 12, 1957, p. 43.

[25]Ibid., "Meeting the Communist Challenge in the Western Hemisphere," by John E. Peurifoy, State Department Bulletin, September 6, 1954, p. 336.

[26]U.S. Department of State, A Case History of Communist Penetration in Guatemala, Inter-American Series No. 52 (Washington, 1957), pp. 66-68.

[27]Council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American Foreign Policy, 1954 (Washington, 1955), p. 408.

nonsupport of the government to a Central Intelligence Agency instigated invasion. In any case, it seems that Washington was quite pleased when Armas invaded and overthrew the government. It is known that U.S. arms were sent to Honduras and Nicaragua, supposedly for defense against the Guatemalan invasion. It is further known that those arms found their way to Armas' army of invaders. Robert Alexander, a leading observer of communist affairs in the Americas, has stated that the invasion could not have been successful without U.S. moral, political, and diplomatic support.[28] The U.S. Ambassador, John Peurifoy, may have been influential in Arbenz' downfall.[29] It is not only difficult to determine what role the United States did actually play, it is even more difficult to speculate what it would have done had the invasion not been successful.

Two points are obvious from this short discussion of Guatemala. First, communist regimes were considered by the United States to be a threat to hemispheric security and therefore a threat to its own security. The State Department called the communist infiltration a direct challenge to the Monroe Doctrine.[30] It also published an abundancy of material condemning communism in this hemisphere. Secondly, the United States was disturbed enough about communism to attempt to counteract it. The ultimate extent to which the United States would have gone is unpredictable. It is interesting to note, however, that Ambassador Lodge, in addressing the Soviet representative in the United Nations, said:

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[28]Alexander, Communism, p. 383.

[29]Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge, 1966), p. 134.

[30]U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, I (Washington, 1957), p. 1312.

> I say to you, representative of the Soviet Union, stay out of the hemisphere and don't try to start your plans and your conspiracies over here.[31]

That they did not heed this warning is attested to by events a few years later.

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[31]Alexander, Communism, p. 382.

CHAPTER III

UNITED STATES POLICY: CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL INTEREST

There is reason to suspect that American interests in Latin-American countries are in direct proportion to their proximity to American shores. For this reason and others, Cuba has played a vital role in the international life of the United States. As early as 1809, Jefferson expressed an interest in acquiring Cuba as a territory of the United States.[1] Involvement with Cuba, however, was generally sporadic until considerations of a transoceanic canal reinforced the interest of the United States toward the Caribbean in the latter part of the 19th century.[2] Since that time, Cuba has been considered vital to American interests, and U.S. policy reflects that Washington has recognized Cuba's significance.

Cuban-American Relations, 1898-1959

In 1898, two events occurred which intensified United States' interest in Cuba. The first was the publishing of a book by Alfred T. Mahan in which he clarified the strategic significance of Cuba to the United States.

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[1]Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge, 1966), p. 92.

[2]Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964), p. 5.

> It may be added here that the phenomena of the long, narrow peninsula of Florida, with its strait, is reproduced successfully in Cuba, Haiti, and Puerto Rico, with the passages dividing them. The whole together forms one big barrier, the strategic significance of which cannot be overlooked or its effect upon the Caribbean; while the Gulf of Mexico is assigned to absolute seclusion by it, if the passages are in hostile control.[3]

Undoubtedly this assertion had a profound effect on American policy makers, especially Theodore Roosevelt.

The second event of importance was the military involvement in Cuba during the Spanish-American War. United States' entry into the war was probably based on a large number of conflicting and complex reasons. In a message to Congress, President McKinley listed four official purposes. They were to put an end to the barbarities and bloodshed, to protect American citizens, to protect U.S. commercial interests, and to protect the peace and security of the United States. In this same message, President McKinley mentioned in passing that Spain had already agreed to meet all of the U.S. demands.[4] The conciliatory attitudes of the Spanish did not seem to affect Congress and war was declared.

The war was not provoked by executive fiat; rather, the American society as a whole was attuned to Cuba and its problems with Spain. The activities of the American press added to the prevalent bellicose attitude of the nation. The American business sector was also very much represented by an enterprising group that attempted to arbitrate the

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[3]Alfred T. Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power (Boston, 1898), p. 305.

[4]President McKinley's Message to Congress, April 11, 1898, in William Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States 1900-1935 (New York, 1964), p. 267.

Cuban-Spanish dispute for a monetary profit.[5] Politicians further exacerbated the tension between Spain and the United States by frequent references to the Monroe Doctrine.[6]

The Spanish-American war demonstrated two facts that are pertinent to this discussion. First, by 1898 the United States considered Cuba to be a neighbor of considerable significance to U.S. national interest. The United States apparently intended to gain influence in Cuba by war or by outright purchase.[7] Second, the United States demonstrated a willingness, perhaps even an eagerness in this case, to use military force to further its national interest. It was not to be the last time that military forces were significant in promoting U.S. purposes in Cuba.

After the war, the United States relegated Cuba to a position of an American protectorate. The relationship was formalized by the Platt Amendment of 1902. By this declaration the United States assumed power of intervention, established certain U.S. military rights in Cuba, and gained economic control. An article of particular significance with respect to the later Soviet-American conflict over Cuba read as follows:

> That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with the foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, or in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or, for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgement in or control over any portion

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[5]David F. Healy, The United States in Cuba 1898-1902 (Madison, 1963), p. 206.

[6]Norman E. Bailey, ed., Latin American Policy and Hemispheric Security (New York, 1965), p. 135.

[7]Leland Jenks, Our Cuban Colony (New York, 1928), pp. 45-48.

of said island.[8]

Although the Platt Amendment was revoked prior to Castro's rise to power, the United States acted as though the article quoted above was still a consideration.

Cuba remained as an American protectorate under the provisions of the Platt Amendment until 1934. During this period, American goals were to promote political stability, to foster economic growth, and to increase American economic ties with Cuba. Politically, the United States intervened periodically, particularly with respect to elections. In 1906, Cuba was unable to conduct legitimate elections due to disruptions by a rebellious group. The incumbent president, Estrada Palma, asked for and received U.S. help. The United States cited the Platt Amendment and established a provisional government under William H. Taft.[9] Again in 1916, Cuba was confronted with an election problem caused by rebellious factors. This time, the problem was resolved without United States aid. Again, however, in the 1920 election, the United States suspected that the victorious party used foul play to win the election. Accordingly, an American advisor was dispatched to Cuba to conduct new elections and "aid" the Cuban president after the elections.[10]

American economic control probably tied Cuba to the United States even more than political control. Total investment grew from twenty

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[8]U.S. Congress, Senate, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record, XXXIV, 2954.

[9]Ralph Eldin Minger, "William H. Taft and the United States Intervention in Cuba in 1906", The Hispanic American Historical Review, February, 1961, p. 85.

[10]Munro, Intervention, p. 504.

million dollars in 1914 to more than one billion dollars by 1927.[11] The sugar industry became completely dependent on American interests both from the perspectives of investment and exports. After political independence in 1934, American investment continued to grow. Until the rise to power of Castro in 1959, the American investment in Cuba was larger than elsewhere in the Caribbean.[12]

The years between 1934 and 1959 constituted a relatively quiet period in Cuban-American relations. The United States was prospering economically from the relationship, and Cuba economic status increased steadily. The United States supported Fulgencio Batista as he represented stability and cooperation, the major goals of the U.S. Cuban policy.[13] During this period, Batista served as Chief-of-Staff of the Army, as President twice, and as the significant political force behind the scene when not in office. There is considerable debate as to the U.S. role in the Batista-Castro conflict. Some authors find fault with American policy due to supposed support for Batista, and others for supposed support of Castro.[14] Clearly, until the advent of Castro in 1959, the United States considered Cuba to be within their sphere of influence and subject to their meddlings.

Even a cursory study of early United States-Cuban relations should corroborate two major points. First, the United States has been

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[11]Perkins, Caribbean, p. 159.

[12]Ibid., p. 161.

[13]Robert F. Smith, The United States and Cuba (New York, 1960), p. 171.

[14]For conflicting opinions see ibid. and Earl E. T. Smith, The Fourth Floor (New York, 1962).

interested in Cuba; Cuba was rightfully called the most important small ally of the United States.[15] Second, the United States demonstrated a willingness to intervene in order to protect its interests. The U.S. established itself in Cuba and enforced limits on Cuba's economic, political and social affairs from 1898 to 1959.

The Conflict With The Soviet Union

As could be expected, Castro's rise to power did not diminish U.S. interest in that island. To the contrary, the implicit threat of Castroism to American national security accentuated the almost proprietary involvement of the United States.

At first review, the spectre of the colossus United States, with all its vast resources, battling an impoverished revolutionary regime would seem to assume the aspects of a David and Goliath struggle. O.A.S. reactions indicate that this image struck a sympathetic note in the Latin American countries. Castro did prove to be a quick and adept irritant to the United States. Of course, the confrontation was soon between the United States and the Soviet Union, and Cuba was reduced essentially to a partisan spectator.

The 1960 Declaration of San Jose was considered irresolute U.S. policy makers and revealed to them that the O.A.S. was going to be of limited use in its campaign against hemispheric communism.[16] Therefore, a continued emphasis was placed on unilateral action to defend the hemisphere against what the United States viewed as communist threats.

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[15]Minger, "Taft," p. 75.

[16]Edwin Lieuwen, United States Policy in Latin America (New York, 1965), p. 96.

Direct action, indirect action, propaganda, and threats were mixed in liberal dosages to achieve the blend of American unilateral policy toward Soviet involvement in Cuba.

The most overt testimonial to American interest was the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion. As early as March of 1960, President Eisenhower had approved American assistance for a Cuban exile army that would invade the Cuban island utilizing anti-Castroites in Cuba, and overthrow the Castro regime. Accounts of the invasion and the political maneuvering involved are both plentiful and conflicting.[17]

While the details of the invasion are not important for this discussion, the incident is vital to an understanding of the extent of U.S. involvement in Cuba. Two extreme points of view can be taken. It can be considered that the invasion indicates an almost messianic purpose to U.S. attempts to rid the hemisphere of communism. Conversely, some might argue that the political dissent involved in the decision and the lack of support by American military forces indicate that the United States did not consider Cuba to be vital to American national interest. In any case, the United States executed the plan with full knowledge of possible consequences indicating that Kennedy felt a commitment to defend the hemisphere. On April 18, 1961, one day after the invasion, President Kennedy warned Russia that the United States was prepared to "honor its obligation under the inter-American system" in case of "military intervention by an outside force". The Illustrated London News noted the threat and predicted that the Soviet Union would act

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[17]See especially, Karl E. Meyer and Tad Szulc, The Cuban Invasion (New York, 1962), and Haynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs (New York, 1954).

accordingly.[18] Why, then, did the Soviets not act accordingly? Quite possibly, the uncertainty and maladroitness involved in execution of the Bay of Pigs affair was on the whole more encouraging to the Soviets than discouraging.

It is probable that the failure of the 1961 invasion caused a few convulsive shudders among American policy makers. However, this author believes that Theodore Draper has probably overstated his case when he commented that the Bay of Pigs fiasco paralyzed U.S. policy for greater than a year.[19]

The United States engaged in two other retaliatory actions prior to the missile crisis. The first was economic and the second was military. On July 6, 1960, President Eisenhower caused a crisis to Cuba's sugar industry by reducing the U.S. quota. The Soviet Union, however, immediately assumed the burden of economic support of the sugar crop, thereby relieving some of the pressures on the Cuban economy. In November of 1960, the U.S. military action resulted from a request by Nicaragua and Guatemala for U.S. naval aid for the purpose of protecting them against invasion by sea from Cuba. The United States complied despite protests from other Latin American countries.[20]

It was on the propaganda front rather than positive actions that the United States best expressed its vital interest in eliminating, or at least reducing, Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere. The

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[18]Cyril Falls, "Fidel Castro at Bay," The Illustrated London News, April 29, 1961, p. 700.

[19]Theodore Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice (New York, 1965), p. 135.

[20]J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-Hemispheric Security, 1889-1960 (Austin, 1961), p. 462.

propaganda took the form of written anti-Castro documents and direct and tacit warnings.

During the 1960 and 1962 period, the State Department constantly referred to either Castro or the Soviet Union's relations with Castro. In the State Department Bulletin of March 28, 1960, President Eisenhower stated:

> Many people do not realize the United States is just as committed as are the other Republics to the principle of the Rio Treaty of 1947. This treaty declared that an attack on one American Republic will be in effect an attack on all. We stand firmly by this committment.[21]

On August 29, 1960 the Bulletin proclaimed:

> It is clear that the Soviet campaign has certain specific aims. They want to undermine the influence of freedom and democracy in lesser developed areas. Ultimately, they hope to achieve two of their basic objectives. These are to bring about the withdrawal of all U.S. forces overseas and to produce the dissolution of regional security pacts, in particular NATO, but also the O.A.S...[22]

Later that year the State Department published a lengthy memorandum entitled Provacative Actions of the Government of Cuba Against the United States Which Have Served to Increase Tensions in the Caribbean Area.[23] Two more important documents are entitled, Inter-American

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[21]U.S. Department of State, "Toward Mutual Understanding Among the Americas," by President Eisenhower, State Department Bulletin, March 28, 1960, p. 472.

[22]Ibid., "Responsibility of Cuban Government for Increased International Tension in the Hemisphere," State Department Bulletin, August 29, 1960, p. 340.

[23]Ibid., "Provocative Actions of the Government of Cuba Against the United States Which Have Served to Increase Tensions in the Caribbean Area," State Department Bulletin, July 18, 1960, pp. 79-88.

Efforts to Relieve International Tension in the Western Hemisphere.[24] and simply Cuba.[25] The latter is also known as the White Paper on Cuba and was brilliantly authored by Arthur Schlesinger. The titles of the first two documents indicate the nature of their contents. Schlesinger's work depicts the betrayal of the Cuban revolution by Castro. The list of informational efforts describing official U.S. thinking could go on indefinitely. Suffice it to say that the United States adequately expressed its displeasure at events in Cuba.

The United States - Soviet conflict over Cuba was characterized by warnings which were issued back and forth at an astounding rate. On July 9, 1960, for example, President Eisenhower cited the Monroe Doctrine and warned that the United States would never permit a communist dominated regime in this hemisphere.[26] Chairman Khrushchev replied by declaring that the Monroe Doctrine was dead.[27] The warnings continued at a relatively subdued rate until September of 1962. At this time, the tempo and intensity showed a marked escalation. On September 13, President Kennedy announced:

> If at any time the Communist build up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of our citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its

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[24]Ibid., Inter-American Efforts to Relieve International Tension in the Western Hemisphere, Inter-American Series No. 79 (Washington, 1961).

[25]Ibid., Cuba, by Arthur Schlesinger, Inter-American Series No. 66 (Washington, 1961).

[26]A. G. Mezerik, ed., Cuba and the United States (New York, 1960), p. 12.

[27]Ibid.

> aggressive purposes by force or by the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this society will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.[28]

This warning was reinforced by an executive request to Congress for authority to call up 150,000 reservists. Congress added prestige to the warning by adopting a joint resolution to:

> 1. prevent by whatever means may be necessary; including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending by force or threat of force its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;
>
> 2. prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States;[29]

In retrospect, the American policy toward Cuba in this century indicates an intense interest in that island republic. Since Castro, this interest has been inexorably tied to American national security by U.S. policy makers. Since the beginning of Soviet influence in Cuba, the United States clearly expressed its concern over that influence. The Bay of Pigs incident, the economic sanctions, and numerous warnings to the Soviet Union were integral parts of an overall policy. That policy was to minimize the effects of the Soviet presence in Cuba. The limits of expectation of the policy ranged from a maximum hope of eliminating Soviet influence altogether and a minimum determination to prevent Soviet influence from becoming detrimental to the national security of the United States. Despite the numerous warnings and other indications of American interest in Cuba, the Soviet Union chose to send missiles to

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[28]Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, 1967), p. 17

[29]Mezerik, Cuba, p. 24.

CHAPTER IV

THE MILITARY ROLE: POWER AND CREDIBILITY

American policy toward Soviet involvement in Cuba was influenced by its intense and long standing national interest in Cuba. However, in the political interplay of nations, national interest is not the sole determinant of foreign policy. This chapter considers the effects that relative military power and force structures have had in influencing U.S. policy in Cuba. Traditionally, the problem of evaluating relative military strength was comparatively straightforward. The nation which could mobilize the greatest military force in the contested area won an advantage over its opponent. However, nuclear weapons, with their far-reaching and devastating capabilities, introduced new and complex considerations that necessitated a new approach to the military force structure.

The Pre-Nuclear Role of the Military

The Monroe Doctrine declared that the United States would not allow European nations to increase their influence in the Western Hemisphere. An implication of this declaration was that the United States did, in fact, have sufficient military power to prevent the Europeans from engaging in actions prohibited by the Monroe Doctrine. While this was probably not the case in 1823, indications were that Great Britain was prepared to lend its awesome naval might in support of the doctrine, at

least to the extent that England's interest was involved.[1]

During the 19th century, the Latin American policy of the United States became more aggressive as the United States developed as a more significant world power. In 1845, President Polk reasserted the validity of the Monroe Doctrine and implied that the United States was prepared to assume a more forceful role in protecting its hemispheric interests.[2] In this same period, the United States used force to impose its dictates on Mexico. Perhaps American success in the Mexican War caused it to be viewed by future policy makers as a model for forceful imposition of policy.

In any case, the American Civil War caused the United States to restrict its military forces to that domestic crisis. France took advantage of this neutralization of United States military power to establish a puppet government in Mexico under the Hapsburg Archduke Maximillian. The United States protested, but was unable to influence the course of events due to its internal problems. When the Civil War was terminated, however, the United States became more aggressive in its policy and insisted that France leave Mexico. When France delayed, the United States sent arms to Benito Juarez, Maximillian's chief rival. France finally abandoned Maximillian and Mexico when it realized that it might be forced into a military confrontation with the United States if it continued to support him.[3]

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[1]Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, 1955), p. 35.

[2]J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States Latin American Relations (Boston, 1965), p. 57.

[3]John Edwin Fagg, Latin America (New York, 1963), p. 684.

As the twentieth century approached, United States policy in the Caribbean reach a zenith of aggressiveness. This was probably due to an increased martial and expansionist spirit within the United States, the excitement generated by the transoceanic canal possibilities, the increased strategic significance given to the Caribbean by Captain Mahan, and most importantly, a military force capable of enforcing United States policy in the Caribbean. There are several examples of America's muscle flexing in this area. The Olney note of 1895 informed Great Britain that the United States "is practically sovereign" on this hemisphere and demanded that England settle its dispute with Venezuela.[4] In a later Venezuelan problem, this time with Germany, President Roosevelt actually threatened to send naval ships to Venezuela to force a German-Venezuelan arbitration concerning a debt dispute.[5] Perhaps the most obvious 19th century example of the United States using military force to promote its goals is the Spanish-American War. By engaging in a war in which American security was not directly involved, the United States demonstrated both a significant interest in Cuba and a willingness to further that interest with military force. Engagement in the Spanish-American War carried a relatively low level of risk for the United States because of the superiority of its military forces. The conflict did not answer the question of whether the United States would resort to military involvement in a situation in which the local military superiority was not so obvious.

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[4]Richard Olney, Memo to Thomas F. Bayard, July 20, 1895, in James W. Gantenbien, ed., The Evolution of Our Latin American Policy a Documentory Record (New York, 1950), pp. 340-354.

[5]Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964), p. 73.

Changing Defense Concepts

With the arrival of the nuclear age, the United States adopted a deterrent policy of massive retaliation. Because this doctrine emphasized nuclear strength, U.S. conventional forces-in-being diminished. At the same time, it was questionable whether or not the United States would use its nuclear arsenal to promote its policy in Cuba. Because of the weak conventional forces and the credibility question concerning nuclear weapons, the United States was not in a favorable military position vis-à-vis the Soviet presence in Cuba until 1962.

The concept of massive retaliation was first conceived in 1947 by President Truman's Air Policy Commission, although it was not promulgated as policy until the inconclusive termination of the Korean conflict.[6] It is probable that the unhappy experience of Korea left the United States increasingly amenable to a concept that promised noninvolvement on alien soil.

The theory of massive retaliation is deceptively simplistic and straightforward. It states that an overwhelming nuclear superiority combined with an avowed will to use it to protect the vital national interest will deter all enemy aggression. It is a no-nonsense, rigid concept that threatens awesome reprisal for even minor transgressions. Air Force General Lemay, arguing before congress, states, "I do not understand why a force that will deter a big war will not deter a small one too,"[7] General Twinning, also of the Air Force, offers an elaboration

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[6]Eric Larrabee, "The Politics of Strategy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March, 1962, p. 18.

[7]William F. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York, 1964), p. 13.

of this thinking in relation to Korea.

> In retrospect I have often thought that had we dropped one A-bomb on a tactical target during the Korean war, thereby advising the Chinese Communists to stay on their own side of the border, there might have been no Chinese invasion and no second phase to that war, and Korea today might be a united, independent country. Furthermore, Dien Bien Phu might not have happened, nor would Vietnam have been partitioned in 1954.[8]

Again, Twinning states, "I have never liked the term (limited war) because of the thinly veiled weakness and the uncertainty of National interest which it implies."[9]

President Eisenhower was heavily influenced by the doctrine of massive reprisal although it does appear that he was searching for a more flexible policy toward the end of his administration.[10] The trend toward a more flexible military force-in-being was reflected by Defense Secretary Gates in 1960 by his statement that the United States need prepare itself for both general and limited war.[11] However, President Eisenhower's legacy to President Kennedy was essentially a nuclear force structure committed to devastating destruction and a limited conventional war capability.

With respect to Cuba, the reliance on nuclear weapons posed two associated problems. First, the limited conventional war capability put the United States in the position of at times having inadequate forces

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[8]Nathan F. Twinning, Neither Liberty Nor Safety (New York, 1966), p. 117.

[9]Ibid., p. 102.

[10]Kaufmann, Strategy, p. 23.

[11]U.S. Department of State, "Secretary Gates Answers Questions on National Defense," State Department Bulletin, April 11, 1960, p. 557.

available to enforce its will in Cuba. For example, it has been reported that Kennedy was reluctant to commit U.S. military forces to the Bay of Pigs invasion partly because there would not be sufficient forces remaining for a possible contingency elsewhere that might have a higher priority than Cuba.[12] Second, the credibility of a nuclear threat was doubtful. In short, the United States was ill-prepared to handle reactions that required more than diplomatic overtures but less than nuclear holocaust.

Both civilian and military thinkers recognized the shortcomings of the massive retaliation doctrine, and attempted reform. Foremost among the scholars was Henry Kissinger. As early as 1955, he concluded that a strong nuclear force would not necessarily deter all levels of aggression.

> In these circumstances a major or exclusive reliance on general war as a deterrent to Sino-Soviet aggression may come dangerously close to a Maginot mentality - a belief in a strategy which may not be tested but which meanwhile prevents the considerations of any alternative.[13]

General Maxwell Taylor, as chief spokesman for the army, resigned his post as Army Chief-of-Staff in protest and wrote his worthy indictment of the nuclear doctrine, The Uncertain Trumpet. Of primary concern to General Taylor was the need for"... increased emphases on our military preparation directed at coping with situations short of general war".[14] The protagonists of a more flexible military force did not believe that

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[12]Kaufmann, Strategy, p. 273.

[13]Henry A. Kissinger, "Military Policy and Defense of the Grey Areas," Foreign Affairs, April, 1955, p. 47.

[14]Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York, 1959), p. 62.

massive retaliation was a credible deterrent to limited enemy aggression or limited American goals.

The pleas of Kissinger and Taylor, and others, found a sympathetic listener in Senator John F. Kennedy.[15] Kennedy was deeply concerned with what he considered to be the "Maginot mentality" of United States policy.[16] On the Senate floor in June of 1960, the Senator outlined a proposed two point change in American military policy.

> First---We must make invulnerable a nuclear retaliatory force second to none.
>
> Second---We must regain the ability to intervene effectively and swiftly in any limited war anywhere in the world.[17]

Kennedy's inauguration as President of the United States gave him a position from which he could implement his concepts.

Kennedy and McNamara were the initiators of a comprehensive and flexible military program which, by the time of the missile crisis of 1962, had developed into a powerful and reasonably flexible war machine.

> Virtually from the day the Kennedy Administration took office in January, 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara, at the president's request, began the search for a coherent and flexible general war strategy, which would afford the United States a wide range of options between the extreme of

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[15]The decade from 1955 to 1965 abounded in military strategists. The leading group in the earliest years was the Rand Corporation. The contributors included Albert Wohlstetler, Bernard Brodie, and Herman Kahn. For an excellent survey of writings pertaining to this subject see Urs Schwarz, American Strategy: A New Perspective (Garden City, 1966).

[16]John F. Kennedy, The Missile Gap, in The Strategy of Peace, ed. by Allan Nevins (New York, 1960), p. 38.

[17]John F. Kennedy, A New Approach on Foreign Policy A Twelve Point Program in ibid., preface.

national humiliation and nuclear holocaust.[18]

It soon became obvious that Kennedy favored the flexible response doctrine as described by Admiral Burke and General Taylor. The President's program was to develop an invulnerable second strike nuclear capability and to increase non-nuclear conventional forces.[19]

Little time was wasted in developing the desired defense posture. No sooner had Kennedy taken office when he announced his intention to Congress to revitalize the military. By June of 1961, Kennedy was able to recommend a reorganization of Army divisions which would increase their effective firepower. He further recommended an allocation of 100 million dollars to re-equip the Army, an expansion of the armed forces ability to fight non-nuclear and para-military wars, an increase in Army Special Forces, an increase in reserve strength, and an increase in Marine strength to 190,000 men.[20] On July 25, 1961, in a report to the nation, President Kennedy announced his intentions to increase Army strength from 875,000 men to 1,000,000. This was to be complemented by an increase in Navy and Air Force strength of 29,000 and 63,000 respectively, and a 1.8 billion dollar increase for non-nuclear weapons.[21] Again, in October of 1961, Secretary McNamara announced, "...we have taken measures to strengthen both our nuclear and our non-nuclear forces..." This included a 100 per cent increase in the Polaris

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[18]Harland B. Moulton, "The McNamara General War Strategy," Orbis, Summer, 1964, p. 238.

[19]George E. Lowe, The Age of Deterrence (Boston, 1964), p. 228.

[20]U.S. Department of State, "Special Message of the President to Congress," State Department Bulletin, June 12, 1964, pp. 905-908.

[21]Ibid., "Report to the Nation by President Kennedy" State Department Bulletin, August 14, 1961, p. 269.

submarine program, an increase in hardened minute-man missiles, and an increase of 50 per cent in bombers on alert. Of even more significance was the change in conventional warfare ability. Army divisions were increased in number from 11 to 16. Airlift and sea transport capabilities were increased significantly. Finally, counterinsurgency forces were tripled.[22]

It was stated that, "An improvement in our capacity for local war is therefore indicated not only by considerations of national strategy but as our best chance of preserving the peace."[23] A major military contribution of the Kennedy-McNamara regime was to increase the national capacity for alternatives that include local war. The changes made by the Kennedy administration in the military force structure were to be a significant factor during the 1962 United States-Soviet missile confrontation. This avenue will be pursued more fully in Chapter VI. It is first necessary, however, to examine the role played by the O.A.S. prior to the missile crisis.

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[22]Kaufmann, Strategy, p. 53.

[23]Kissinger, "Military Policy," p. 428.

CHAPTER V

THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES: REACTIONS TO HEMISPHERIC THREATS

Thus far, this paper has examined the American reactions to the Cuban problem in only a unilateral sense. Washington's view of its national interest was examined to determine the extent of the U.S. commitment in Cuba. The study of the military role in foreign policy provided insight into one means to accomplish U.S. goals. This chapter deals with the Organization of American States and the role that organization has played pursuant to hemispheric security as viewed by the United States.

Initial Reactions to Communism

John Drier has defined the three roles of the O.A.S. as protection from external threats, solution of inter-hemispheric problems, and "guardianship of the character of American political systems".[1] Its first role is of importance in this discussion. The United States, of course, has been interested in trying to develop the O.A.S. as an effective anti-communist bloc. Unfortunately for the United States, member states appear to be more interested in their domestic economic and political problems. From the point of view of the United States, the O.A.S. has shown a rather parochial orientation, and it has been difficult for

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[1]John C. Drier, The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis (New York, 1962), p. 73.

the United States to develop a recognition of external threats within the O.A.S. framework.

Although the concept of Pan Americanism existed in the nineteenth century, little progress was made until the twentieth century. The first conference was held in Panama in 1826. The United States accepted an invitation, but revealed a limited interest by arriving late.[2] The conference was a failure as the participating countries did not visualize a clear and present threat to spur cooperation.[3] By 1889, the United States had developed enough hemispheric interest to host a conference in Washington. This was the start of Pan Americanism and cultural and technical ties developed from this conference.

The first important conference from the point of view of security was held in Buenos Aires in 1936. At this meeting, the countries involved agreed to confer in case of an external threat on any of the member countries. Another conference held in Havana in 1940 strengthened the concept of mutual security by stating that an attack on any member country would be an attack on all.

A most important conference was held at Mexico City in 1945, just prior to the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco. The Mexico City conference had two related major goals; to strengthen the inter-American system, and to consider the place of a regional system in a future world organization. With respect to the first goal, the conference agreed to certain transitory decisions known as the Act of Chapultepec which reorganized the inter-American system

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[2]Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, 1955), p. 71.

[3]William Mayer, Pan Americanism in Crisis (Washington, 1961), p. 21.

and provided for mutual defense. With respect to the second goal, the O.A.S. sent documents to the San Francisco conference containing "views, comments and suggestions" concerning the role of regional defense alliances in the proposed United Nations system. The Act of Chapultepec was ultimately instrumental in the adoption of United Nations Charter Article 51, which recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.[4]

The present O.A.S. security system is prescribed by two conferences which translated the provisions of the Mexico City Conference of 1945 into more permanent terms. The first conference occurred in 1947 at Rio de Janeiro. The so called Rio Pact that emerged from this meeting had two major points. First, an armed attack on any signatory called for immediate assistance, the type and amount of assistance to be determined by the assisting country. Second, aggression short of an armed attack required consultation among the member nations to determine appropriate actions. In 1948, at Bogata, the O.A.S. established the O.A.S. charter and the treaty of Pacific Settlement. The charter also provided for the competence of the various organs of the O.A.S.[5]

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[4]Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies, The Inter-American System (Dobbs Ferry, 1966), pp. xxx, xxxi.

[5]Charter of the American States, found in ibid., pp. 331-348. Throughout the text of this thesis, several terms will be used. "The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs" is held to consider problems of "an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States, and to serve as the Organ of Consultation." "The Council" is the permanent composition of the O.A.S. consisting of representatives "especially appointed by the respective government..." The Council may serve provisionally as the Organ of Consultation. "The Organ of Consultation" is defined in the Rio Pact as the organ that decides what collective action is to be taken in case of attack on a member nation. (See p. 377 of ibid.)

An appropriate question is, has the O.A.S. effectively opposed what the United States considers to be communist-oriented regimes in the Western Hemisphere? For the pre-Castro era, the answer must be answered in the negative. The Rio Treaty was cited eight times from its inception to 1960.[6] However, the 1954 Guatemala situation provides the only pre-Castro example of O.A.S. involvement concerning a possible external threat.

In 1954, the O.A.S. convened at Caracas to discuss "communist threats to the hemisphere", with the Guatemalan problem being of prime concern. As was previously shown, the U.S. position was to obtain a strong statement condemning communism. The Latin American representatives generally disagreed with the U.S. view of the communist threat.[7] American concern was security; Latin American concern was sovereignty. The Latin Americans were also distracted by domestic, economic, and political problems.[8] The final Declaration of Caracas read in part:

> That the dominance of any political institution of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this Hemisphere the political

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[6]Mayer, Pan Americanism, p. 49. The eight times were:
1. 1948 - Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua
2. 1950 - Caribbean dispute
3. 1954 - Guatemalen crisis
4. 1955 - Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua
5. 1957 - Honduras vs. Nicaragua
6. 1959 - Panama dispute
7. 1959 - Nicaragua
8. 1960 - Venezuelan problem

[7]Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, 1957), p. 376.

[8]Edwin Lieuwen, United States Policy in Latin America (New York, 1965), p. 84.

> system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the social and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of measures in accordance with existing treaties.[9]

The declaration was not as strong as the United States had hoped for, and did little other than restate provisions already enumerated in the Rio Treaty.

The Guatemalan problem continued to exist, and as President Arbenz' control became more tenuous he petitioned the O.A.S. Peace Committee, an advisory organization of the O.A.S., to investigate possible intervention by Honduras and Nicaragua. The situation was thrown into a state of confusion when Arbenz then sent the same petition to the U.N. Security Council, where he could hope for a benign attitude on behalf of the Soviet Union. The next day Arbenz asked the O.A.S. Peace Committee to disregard his request in deference to possible action by the United Nations. A United States-Soviet Union confrontation developed in the United Nations Security Council as to whether the United Nations or the O.A.S. should consider the problem. When the U.N. finally deferred from judging the case, Arbenz agreed to let the O.A.S. have jurisdiction. However, he was overthrown before the O.A.S. committee arrived.[10] It is probably that the O.A.S. would not have taken a strong anti-communist stand since the Latin American countries were so critical of the suspected American involvement in the overthrow of Arbenz. The United

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[9]Council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (Washington, 1955), p. 413.

[10]J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin, 1961), 497.

[11]Ibid., 451.

States was on the defensive until it offered documents purporting to prove communist involvement.[11]

Because of circumstances, then, the O.A.S. did not prove to be an effective aid to the United States in the Guatemalan situation. Based on the attitudes and beliefs of the Latin American countries, it is doubtful that the organization would have given strong support in any but the most threatening conditions.

It is concluded by this writer that in the pre-Castro era, the O.A.S. was not strongly anti-communistic and did not visualize the Soviet Union as a significant threat to the hemisphere. There was a deprecation of affairs external to the hemisphere. For example, at the Rio conference the Latin American countries refused to extend the Rio Pact to U.S. overseas possessions. Also, they provided no military support in Korea.[12] There was a constant clash between the American desire for hemispheric security and the Latin American fear of intervention, a fear brought on by the high handed actions used by the United States earlier in this century. Communism was not as significant a problem as that of rising expectations and the resulting domestic disequilibriums. To the extent that the O.A.S. was anti-communistic, it was more to please the United States than because of any sincere convictions. As the Cuban situation developed, the Soviet Union had less to fear from the O.A.S. than from any unilateral actions that the United States might take.

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[12]Jerome Slater, A Reevaluation of Collective Security (Columbus, 1965), p. 24.

The Organization of American States and the Cuban Problem

Prior to the missile crisis, the United States was involved with a continuous and, on the whole, unsuccessful attempt to develop the Organization of American States as an effective anti-Communist organization. The Organization would not, or could not, act strongly and directly against either the Castro regime or the Sino-Soviet ties with that regime. The O.A.S., however, dealt with several problems associated with Cuba in the early 1960s.

During April of 1959, Panama complained to the O.A.S. that an alien force had invaded its territory and requested O.A.S. action. Subsequent investigation revealed that the invasion had taken place, it had originated in Cuba, and the invaders were almost exclusively Cubans.[13] Despite the evidence, the O.A.S. Organ of Consultation chose to make no complaint against the Cuban government.[14]

Three very important conferences occurred in the first three years of the 1960s. The first was at San José, Costa Rica in 1960 and the second and third were held at Punta del Este, Uruguay. All three were concerned, at least in part, with the Cuban problem. At all three, the O.A.S. took action less forceful than advocated by the United States.

The San José Conference, the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, was convoked at the request of Peru to discuss the

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[13]Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies, Inter-American System, p. 154.

[14]U.S. Department of State, Inter-American Efforts to Relieve International Tension in the Western Hemisphere 1959-1960, Inter-American Series No. 79 (Washington, 1961), p. 9.

inadmissability of extracontinental intervention within the hemisphere and the development of means to prevent such intervention. In a note supporting the convocation, the United States named the Soviet Union as the primary instigator of such intervention. The United States was hoping for a strong declaration renouncing Castro and the Soviet Union.[15]

At the meeting, however, the reaction of the Latin American countries was mixed. Mexico, in rejecting a strong anti-Cuban declaration, admonished that, "Collective action could endanger the principle of non-intervention unless it was limited to use where peace and security were clearly threatened." Venezuela was critical of the U.S. for an "unreasonable attitude" toward Cuba.[16]

The Declaration of San José was a compromise resolution that condemned extra-hemispheric intervention as contrary to the spirit of the Rio Pact and the Bogota Charter, and which criticized the Soviet attempts to exploit hemispheric social and political conditions. However, Cuba was not specifically mentioned. Reaction to the declaration was mixed. Secretary Herter concluded that the declaration constituted a "clear indictment of the Castro government". The Mexican representative, on the other hand, disagreed and stated that the declaration did not:

> ...constitute a condemnation or a threat against Cuba, where aspirations for economic improvement and social justice have the strongest sympathy of the government and people of Mexico.

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[15]Ibid., "American Foreign Ministers Condemn Sino-Soviet Intervention in American States," by Christian Herter, State Department Bulletin, June 12, 1961, pp. 395-407.

[16]Ibid., Inter-American Efforts, p. 73.

Similarly, seven other countries expressed sympathy with Cuba.[17]

The first Punta del Este Conference was ostensibly held to inaugurate Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. However the U.S. representative, Delessops Morrison, writes that the delegation was quietly attempting to gain support for a proposal of sanctions against Cuba due to that island's Soviet affiliations.[18] The attempt failed when Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Cuba's envoy, was able to severely embarrass the American government by releasing a document allegedly captured from the portfolio of an American official. That document crudely condemned the incumbent Venezuelan government as inept and corrupt.[19] Although the United States denied the validity of the document, Cuba had unquestionably scored a stunning propaganda victory and Latin America was in no mood to consider any anti-Castro actions.

By the end of 1961, several Latin American countries were ready to take action to weaken the Cuban-Soviet ties. Peru cited the Rio Treaty and accused the Cuban government of establishing an oppressive dictatorship, incorporating Cuba into the Sino-Soviet bloc, and infiltrating and subverting other Latin American countries. Based on these accusations, Peru requested an emergency meeting of the Organ of Consultation. This request was contested by a South American bloc consisting of Mexico, Uruguay, and Brazil. Action on the request was delayed due to a general recognition by the O.A.S. countries that to force the issue would lead

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[17]George Wythe, The United States and Inter-American Relations (Gainsville, 1964), p. 46.

[18]Delessops S. Morrison, Latin American Mission, ed. by Gerald Frank (New York, 1965), p. 87.

[19]Ibid., p. 89.

to a perhaps irreparable schism.[20] Finally, a month after the Peruvian request, the Colombian delegation demanded that the original request be acted on. At that time, seven countries were reluctant to approve the convention. Colombia and Peru insisted on a roll call, and after a dramatic last minute change of vote by the Uruguayan delegate, the convocation of a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was approved with the minimum votes necessary.[21]

At the second Punta del Este meeting, the United States delegation included four influential Senators and Secretary of State Rusk. The intention of the United States delegation was to ask for full sanctions against Cuba, the most severe measure short of armed conflict that the Organization of American States could inflict. The American delegate, Delessops Morrison, had calculated probable results to be fourteen affirmative and seven abstentions or negative votes.[22] A two-thirds approval is required for passage. These calculations were upset when Haiti, a supposed supporter, declared an intention to abstain. That same evening, the United States offered to build a new airport in Haiti and that erstwhile country then became a firm supporter of anti-Cuban sanctions.[23] In an apparent attempt to secure more general support, the United States tempered its proposal and suggested ouster of Cuba from the Organization of American States system rather than sanctions.

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[20]Hispanic American Report, October, 1961, p. 942.

[21]The final vote was 14 yes and six abstentions. The Uruguayan delegate had disobeyed his instructions by voting in the affirmative. He immediately resigned his position. See Morrison, Mission, p. 157.

[22]Morrison, Mission, p. 173.

[23]Ibid., p. 192.

The American delegation was probably wise to offer the compromise resolution since it passed with only the minimum fourteen affirmative votes. The final Declaration of Punta del Este had three major resolutions. First was the decision to exclude Cuba from the Inter-American system. However, this resolution was not approved by Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, or Cuba. Together these countries comprise better than 70 per cent of the population of Latin America. Secretary Rusk noted that only Cuba actually voted against this resolution and called it a clear cut renunciation of the Cuban-Soviet Alliance.[24] The abstention of six South American countries, however, indicates questionable hemispheric solidarity.

A second resolution excluded Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board. Although this resolution passed unanimously, it was merely recording a fait accompli. Cuba had been excluded from secret meetings of the Board since April of 1961.

The third major resolution of the Punta Del Este meeting established an armed embargo of Cuba by the signatory nations. Despite the fact that this embargo was already in effect, four countries abstained.

In retrospect, this writer does not consider the second Punta del Este meeting an unqualified succes for the U.S. efforts. The resolutions were diluted, and in many cases, a mere recognition of an existing situation.

The O.A.S. convened once again prior to the missile crisis. In September of 1962, Secretary Rusk requested an informal meeting of the

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[24]U.S. Department of State, "Report to the Nation on the Punta del Este Conference," by Secretary Rusk, State Department Bulletin, February 19, 1962, p. 269.

Council of the O.A.S. to discuss areas of general interest. The O.A.S. members seemed willing to meet and did so on October 2 and 3 in Washington.

The conference reasserted the O.A.S. intention to preserve hemispheric integrity:

> ...in accordance with the principles of the regional system, staunchly sustaining and consolidating the principles of Charter of the Organization of the American States and affirmed the will to strengthen the security of the hemisphere against all aggression from within or outside the hemisphere and against acts developments or situations capable of threatening the peace and security of the hemisphere through the application of the inter-American treaty of Reciprical Assistance of Rio de Janeiro.[25]

Since the meeting was informal, no specific resolution was passed. The general proclamation was not contested. Secretary Rusk, however, was reportedly hoping for a stronger statement.[26]

Although the meeting accomplished little other than reiteration of prior agreements, the willingness with which the ministers adopted the statement probably encouraged the United States in its relations with the Soviet Union, and allowed increased flexibility in the oncoming missile crisis.[27] However, overall O.A.S. reaction to the influence of the Soviet Union in Cuba prior to the missile crisis was not as strong as the United States desired.

Three major problem areas are discernible in analyzing the O.A.S.

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[25]"The O.A.S. Resolution on Cuba," Current History, February, 1963, p. 111.

[26]Paul S. Hilbo, "Cold War Drift in Latin America," Current History, February, 1963, p. 72.

[27]Ann VanWynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., The Organization of American States (Dallas, 1963), p. 329.

reluctance to react positively against Castro or Soviet involvement with Cuba. In the first place, the problem was complex from a legal and organizational point of view. Mexico was the chief protagonist of the legalistic argument. In the viewpoint of that government, the O.A.S. was incompetent to act due to its avowed principle of nonintervention. Mexico did not visualize the Cuban problem as a direct and immediate threat to hemispheric security; therefore, action was impossible. John Drier, a longtime American representative to the O.A.S., has described the organizational problems associated with action by the hemispheric organization. A Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is not competent to direct specific measures against a country unless it has been convoked as Organ of Consultation under the provisions of the Rio Treaty. Citation of the Rio Treaty requires proof of imminent danger.[28] The examples of the attempts of Peru and Colombia in 1961 to invoke the Rio Treaty demonstrates the tremendous resistance that need be overcome to obtain action. However, if general agreement exists among the delegates, the organizational problem can be solved. The problem appears to be resistance by the specific governments to action rather than any inherent awkwardness of the organization.[29]

A second group of problems concerns a distrust by the Latin American nations of U.S. intentions. The memory of intervention by the "Collossus of the North" was still very keen. The nonintervention principle was a major cause of Latin American reluctance to condemn Cuba at the

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[28]John C. Drier, "The O.A.S. and the Cuban Crisis," SAIS Review, February, 1961, pp. 4-6.

[29]Ibid., p. 8.

Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in 1960.[30] Similarly, a reluctance to implement an interventionist principle was a primary cause of the recalcitrance of the Latin American countries at the Second Punta del Este Conference.[31] Fear of communism exists, but it is not as strong as fear of imperialism.

A final problem area hindering O.A.S. action was underlying approval of Castro. Initially, many Latin Americans applauded Castro's revolution. It was in the liberal tradition of Mexico and Boliva. In addition, Brazil saw Cuba as a potential hostage to keep the United States on good behavior.[32] Virtually all of the South American countries, and particularly Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Uruguay had a large number of Fidelistas that were too powerful to be ignored or aggravated. It would not be good politics for these countries to condemn Cuba.

For several reasons, then, the O.A.S. was not as effective a brake on the Soviet-Cuban alliance as the United States desired. The Organization of American States was unable to take any effective actions until January 1962, at Punta del Este. Even then, the action was diluted, inconclusive, and heavily opposed. The United States learned that this alliance was of limited use in dealing with the problem of Soviet influence in Cuba.

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[30]Wythe, Relations, p. 50.

[31]Robert N. Burr, Our Troubled Hemisphere (Washington, 1967), p. 28.

[32]Wythe, Relations, p. 49.

CHAPTER VI

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: A CASE STUDY

The Conflict of National Interest

The events of October 1962, brought the cold war into sharp and dramatic focus. The transition was from a relatively stable level of sparring to a direct and highly volatile confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Latin American countries, including Cuba, did not play dynamic roles. It was essentially a face-to-face power confrontation between the two giants in a realpolitik sense.[1] Pachter has classified the conflict as an "instance of a law that governs the power relations of the cold war..."[2]

The first indication of the presence of Soviet missiles on Cuban soil occurred in the United Nations on October 8. Cuban President, Osvaldo Dorticos, proclaimed that Cuba had "inevitable weapons which we would have preferred not to acquire and which we do not wish to employ."[3] On October 14, an American U-2 plane took photographs of missile sites in the San Cristobal area of Cuba. These were shown to President Kennedy on the morning of October 16. From that time, until

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[1]Henry M. Pachter, Collision Course the Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence (New York, 1963), p. 134.

[2]Ibid., p. 99.

[3]A. G. Mezerik, ed., Cuba and the United States (New York, 1960), p. 25.

the proclamation to the nation on October 22, Kennedy met with his advisors repeatedly to search for alternative responses. Fortunately, the build-up had been discovered with sufficient time to allow for some rational calculations.[4]

Six broad solutions to the threat would appear to have existed.[5] To begin with, the situation could have been ignored on the assumption that the nuclear missiles in Cuba did not drastically change the balance of power, and was not therefore worth the risk involved in attempting any forceful measures. A second alternative was to protest to the U.N. and the O.A.S. and hope to obtain action through lengthy negotiations. A third possibility was to propose a clandestine ultimatum to Castro, hoping to frighten him into a unilateral rejection of Soviet missile aid. A fourth consideration was a blockade. The fifth possibility was a surgical air strike aimed specifically at the missile sites. The final alternative was to launch a full fledged invasion against Cuba. Of the foregoing, only alternatives four and five were considered at length.

There were three major objections to the fifth alternative, a surgical air strike: one, it was risky in terms of retaliation since Soviet personnel would be involved; two, it would be a difficult military problem because of limited reconnaissance; and three, there was a moral rejection of a "Pearl Harbor" type of invasion.[6] The blockade, or quarantine as it was to be called, had the advantages of lower risk and higher flexibility. It could be augmented by further unilateral or

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[4]Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, 1967), p. 191.

[5]Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York, 1965), p. 682.

[6]Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 203.

multilateral action if necessary. Kennedy chose this alternative while expressing a willingness to resort to other more stringent measures.[7] The action was termed a quarantine rather than a blockade to further limit the reaction and to avoid an act of war, which a blockade would have been.[8]

After six tension filled days, the immediate crisis was resolved. The Soviet Union sent two conflicting messages. One, received by Washington on October 26, apparently accepted the U.S. proposal to halt the missile build-up and to remove those already received by Cuba as well as the IL-28 Soviet bombers to which the U.S. also objected. In return, the United States would end the quarantine and give assurances against an invasion of Cuba.[9] Before President Kennedy could construct a reply to this satisfactory proposal, he received another communique from the Kremlin. This message involved a quid-pro-quo, the withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba for U.S. withdrawal of missiles in Turkey in return.[10] Although the American missiles in Turkey were obsolete and their dismantling already planned, Kennedy was reluctant to weaken his stand on Cuba by accepting the Soviet proposal. Robert Kennedy reportedly proposed a diplomatic move by which the president would simply ignore the second note and respond in the affirmative to the first. This move

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[7]U.S. Department of State, The United States Response to Soviet Military Build-up in Cuba, Inter-American Series No. 80 (Washington, 1962).

[8]Eustace Seligman, "The Legality of the United States Quarantine Action Under the United Nations Charter," American Bar Association Journal, February, 1963, pp. 142-145.

[9]Mezerik, Cuba, p. 30.

[10]David L. Larson, The Cuban Crisis of 1962 Selected Documents and Chronology (Boston, 1962), p. 159.

succeeded, and the crisis abated. However, Castro never allowed on-site inspection, and President Kennedy never made a formal no-invasion pledge.

ABC newsman John Scali played a significant role as informal intermediary between the Soviet government and the U.S. State Department. On Friday, October 26, Scali met with Aleksandr Fomin, Counselor to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, at Fomin's request. The Russian asked Scali how the United States would react to a Soviet proposal of dismantling of the missile bases in Cuba in exchange for a U.S. no-invasion pledge. Scali consulted with Secretary of State Dean Rusk who secured the President's approval of the proposal and instructed Scali to convey that message to Fomin. Scali did so and the first Soviet message which closely approximated the Fomin proposal arrived later that evening. When the second Soviet message arrived, demanding the removal of American missiles from Turkey, Scali contacted Fomin and expressed displeasure at the second proposal. The next morning, the Soviet Union replied favorably to the formula as first proposed by Fomin.[11]

President Kennedy's handling of the crisis drew general acclaim, although there were dissenters who thought the American response to be too strong and immoral, or at the other extreme, that the United States should have launched a full-fledged invasion to rid the hemisphere of the Castro menace.[12] To a large degree, Kennedy's response was consistent with both traditional American interests in the Caribbean, and

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[11]Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City, 1966), pp. 274-279.

[12]Generally, leftist elements supported a moderate strategy. Two articulate protagonists of this idea were Norman Thomas and William T. Williams. Conservative elements demanded a tough big-stick policy. Chief advocates include Senator Keating and various military elements.

on his own firm opposition to offensive missiles in Cuba. There could be little misunderstanding of Kennedy's intentions underlying his statement of September 13, 1962.

> If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in the hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and of its allies.[13]

Despite this and other warnings, the Soviet Union had chosen to place missiles in Cuba.

There were two reasons for the strength of Kennedy's reaction.[14] The first was that he had, in fact, committed himself by his address of September 13. Also, the suddenness by which the international balance was threatened bothered the President. In any case, the assessed national interest of the United States was certainly a very strong factor in this power struggle. That the United States came out as well as it did in this crisis is due in no small part to the speed and intensity of its reaction. This reaction was motivated by an overwhelming concern for national security.

Given the demonstrated intensity of American involvement, why did the Soviets choose to place missiles in Cuba? Leon Lipson had offered

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[13]U.S. Department of State, "President States U.S. Policy Toward Cuba," State Department Bulletin, October 1, 1962, p. 481.

[14]Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 202.

five major reasons for the Soviet action.[15] Other authors amplify these positions.

First, it is theorized that Cuba requested the missiles ostensibly to defend itself from its aggressive northern neighbors. Khrushchev became a willing partner to Castro's power play as Cuba would then serve as a case study of how the Soviet Union can develop a small nation into a nuclear power capable of threatening the United States.[16] A second and associated rationale was that installment of Russian missiles would serve to drive Castro further into the arms of the Soviet Union by creating a military dependency.

The third reason is that Khrushchev hoped to obtain a diplomatic victory by installing the missiles and presenting the United States with a fait accompli. This would be another defeat to the already weakened image of President Kennedy. Khrushchev thought little of Kennedy's willingness to use forceful measures due to his lack of forcefulness during the Bay of Pigs episode,[17] and reportedly told Robert Frost that Americans were too liberal to fight.[18] This anticipated defeat for Kennedy would of course be a victory for Khrushchev by illustrating Soviet power to the other Latin American countries.

The fourth purpose of Soviet installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba was to obtain a bartering point for possible concessions in Berlin

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[15]Leon Lipsit, "Castro and the Cold War," Cuba and the United States, ed. by John Plank (Washington, 1967), pp. 191-199.

[16]Theodore Draper, "Castro and Communism," Reporter, January 17, 1963, pp. 38-40.

[17]Robert D. Crane, "A Strategic Analysis of American and Soviet Policy," Orbis, April, 1963, p. 532.

[18]Ibid., p. 531.

and other crisis areas of the world.

A final suggestion offered to explain Soviet missile aid to Cuba is related to the deficiency in the number of Soviet missiles vis-à-vis the United States. Despite Kennedy's concern with the missile gap in the 1960 election campaign, better intelligence indicated that the opposite was true. The Soviets had a definite deficiency in strategic missiles. Further, the Kennedy-McNamara increase in military expenditures had widened the gap. However, the Soviets had a very real superiority in intermediate range and medium range ballistic missiles.[19] In Cuba, these missiles would be just as effective as long range ballistic missiles. They had the further advantage of striking from the southern coast of the United States, thus forcing a reorientation of U.S. defenses.

Of the five explanations outlined above, only the last is of strategic importance to the Soviet Union; the other four are largely of tactical significance. Furthermore, the value of Soviet missiles in Cuba as an instant solution to the missile gap is also questionable. The United States was capable of realigning its defenses to counter the new threat. Thus, at best, the Soviet move was only a temporary solution to the missile gap. Correspondingly, the United States considered its vital national interests to be involved. In short, both sides had a high risk involvement and commensurate interests at stake.

National interests alone, however, are not enough to win a confrontation. National interests only provide the will to win. It is also necessary to have the means to both bargain and threaten force. The

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[19]Roger Hogan and Bert Bernstein, "Military Value of Missiles in Cuba," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March, 1963, p. 13.

United States was in a favorable position with superior and balanced military forces, a geographic proximity to Cuba, and an alliance that finally showed a degree of solidarity.

The Military: A Tool of Diplomacy

As a result of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, what has been called the largest invasion force since World War II was assembled in the southeastern portion of the United States.[20] The military front that the United States presented the U.S.S.R. was massive, diverse, and capable of carrying out various purposes. Reports conflict as to the exact disposition of forces. What does emerge, though, is definite American superiority both in nuclear forces and in conventional strength within reasonable proximity of Cuba.

The following data compares the nuclear capabilities of the United States with that of the Communist Bloc at that time. It also shows how a military alliance with the N.A.T.O. countries could change the overall balance if the conflict assumed even broader international proportion.[21]

	U.S.	Communist Bloc	Western World
Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles	400	75+	400
Medium Range Ballistic Missiles	200	700	250
Strategic Bombers	1600	1600	2400
Polaris type missiles	144	Unknown	144

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[20] Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 714.

[21] The chart is a composite from three sources.
a. Pachter, Collision Course, p. 56.
b. Crane, "Strategic Analysis," p. 537.
c. Hogan and Bernstein, "Missiles in Cuba," p. 11.

Although the United States had an overwhelming lead in intercontinental nuclear weapon delivery systems, the Soviet Union had a large superiority in missiles with up to 2,000 miles range. A medium range missle in Cuba could cover the southern portion of the United States where most of the long-range bomber bases are located, thus it has the utility of an intercontinental range missle if properly dispersed.[22]

It has been estimated that close to fifty Soviet missiles would be operational in Cuba by the end of October.[23] This is what caused President Kennedy to be disturbed at the sudden shift in the nuclear balance of power.

The United States preferred to keep the confrontation below the level of nuclear challenge. It therefore mobilized a strong and highly versatile conventional force capable of carrying on local warfare in Cuba with or without nuclear weapons. Eight army divisions, or 100,000 men were deployed to the southeastern part of the United States. Another 10 to 20 thousand were on standby reserve.[24] In addition, 300,000 reserves were alerted and the Naval base at Quantanamo was strengthened by two Marine Battalions. It has been estimated that Florida alone harbored 1,000 military aircraft and 90 ships during the crisis.[25]

Cuba also possessed a significant military force. By this time it had developed a very reputable army, consisting of approximately 100,000

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[22]Hogan and Bernstein, "Missiles in Cuba," p. 12.

[23]Dexter Perkins, The U.S. and the Caribbean (Cambridge, 1966), p. 147.

[24]William F. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York, 1965), p. 271

[25]Pachter, Collision Course, p. 56.

well-trained men. There was also a well-trained militia capable of rapid mobilization, and 30,000 Soviet Troops.[26]

The air arm consisted of more than 100 planes supported by anti-aircraft guns and missiles. The Cuban naval force, however, was quite small. Although the Cuban ground force was equal in number to the American armed forces immediately available for deployment to Cuba, the United States maintained conventional superiority in naval and air power, in refined weaponry, and in a virtually limitless reserve force.

During the crisis, the American nuclear force neutralized the Soviet nuclear force, and served as a shield under which the conventional forces could act. Since Kennedy never did state the exact nature of his military challenge, he was free to choose from a myriad of alternatives. His first problem was how to react to the crisis. Because of U.S. military strength, he could choose from among options ranging from a nuclear showdown to a conventional invasion of Cuba to a limited naval quarantine. Even after he chose the latter, he was reasonably free to escalate as necessary to accomplish his objectives.

A conventional force is a convenient tool for buying time. For example, during the crisis a U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba. Kennedy's initial reaction was to respond to this development by attacking one surface to air missile site. However, since settlement seemed so close, it was deemed overly dangerous to chance a very possible escalation by the U.S.S.R. A plan was decided upon instead to use fighter escorts for future reconnaissance flights. In addition, more

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[26]Hanson W. Baldwin, "A Military Perspective," in Cuba and the United States, ed. by John Plank (Washington, 1967), pp. 201-205.

low-level, high speed planes would be used.[27]

Since the United States had the conventional forces necessary to invade Cuba and remove the missile sites without using nuclear weapons, the decision to resort to a nuclear holocaust would have to be made by the Soviet Union.[28] This was highly unlikely due to American nuclear superiority and the relatively low priority given to Cuba by the Kremlin. The American position might have lacked credibility without the conventional forces, and therefore the crisis could have been even more portentous. It is questionable if the Soviet Union would have believed a threatened nuclear first-strike by the United States as an ultimation to Soviet removal of missiles in Cuba. Sorensen has expressed doubt that the United States could have been effective during the crisis had not the 1961-1962 military build-up occurred in both nuclear and conventional forces.[29] The U.S. nuclear force was sufficient to deter a Soviet nuclear attack, but could not in itself enforce a solution to the crisis.[30] It has been estimated that: "...of all the lessons of Cuba the ones of greatest significance was the realization by Washington policymakers of the unique utility of conventional forces."[31]

Kennedy's management of U.S. military power demonstrated remarkable coolness and adeptness. He avoided the extremists who advocated appeasement or a nuclear challenge in favor of a limited but effective naval

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[27]Pachter, Collision Course, p. 54.

[28]Crane, "Strategic Analysis," p. 547.

[29]Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 714.

[30]Walter Lippman, "Cuba and the Nuclear Risk," Atlantic, February, 1963, p. 56.

[31]George E. Lowe, The Age of Deterrence (Boston, 1964), p. 254.

quarantine. At the same time, he did not eliminate the use of more forceful measures to accomplish his purposes. After the crisis, General Wheeler of the Army and General Lemay of the Air Force each proclaimed a singular victory for his particular service in the Cuban crisis. It would appear that both nuclear and conventional forces contributed to the U.S. position.

> The knowledge that he (Kennedy) commanded large non-nuclear as well as nuclear resources certainly facilitated action by the President. Unlike the situation in early 1961, he could cope with the threat in Cuba and still dispose of reserves for contingencies elsewhere.[32]

The Role of the Organization of American States

A major utility of the O.A.S. in the Cuban problem was a legitimizing function for the quarantine. Kennedy was concerned about the legal problems of the action and had Assistant Attorney General Katzenbach research the question. Katzenbach reported that the quarantine would have a foundation in international law if the action were multilateral. The editor of the American Journal of International Law stated that this quarantine was legal because it was multilateral, it considered international agreements, it was a limited response, and it had general Latin American approval.[33] With respect to the legal problem, Kennedy's proclamation of October 22 stated only his intent to establish a quarantine. It was not actually implemented until October 24, after the O.A.S. had

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[32]Kaufmann, McNamara, p. 273.

[33]Carey Olivier, "International Law and the Quarantine of Cuba," American Journal of International Law, p. 376.

approved the measure.[34]

The United States also considered that it needed the O.A.S. for moral rationalization. Sorensen suggests that tremendous confusion would have resulted if the O.A.S. had not chosen to back the U.S. position.[35] Similarly, Secretary Rusk in a post-evaluation of the O.A.S. role in the crisis noted: "Had there been disunity, and had we fallen to quarreling among ourselves, I think the results might have been quite different."[36]

On October 23, Secretary Rusk presented two resolutions to the O.A.S.[37] The first was a procedural request for convocation of the Organ of Consultation under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. The second resolution called for immediate dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons from Cuba and recommended that the member nations of the O.A.S. take measures necessary to insure that the build-up was halted. The United States strongly desired unanimity on this resolution and was careful to indicate that the action of any Latin American nation would be strictly on a unilateral basis.

The O.A.S. recognized the urgency of Rusk's request and passed a strong declaration that same day. The first two resolutions were passed exactly as requested by the United States; the O.A.S. called for

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[34]Hilsman, Nation, p. 213.

[35]Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision Making in the White House (New York, 1963), p. 24.

[36]U.S. Department of State, "Changing Patterns in World Affairs," Press Conference by Secretary Rusk, State Department Bulletin, December 17, 1962, p. 911.

[37]Dean Rusk, "Statement by Secretary Rusk to O.A.S., October 23, 1962" The Cuban Crisis of 1962 Selected Documents and Chronology, ed. by David L. Larson (Boston, 1963), p. 62.

immediate dismantling of missiles and other offensive weapons, and it was recommended that member nations take all measures necessary, including armed force, to ensure that Cuba no longer received offensive weapons. Further resolutions stated that the Organ of Consultation would remain convened to observe the situation and to report to the United Nations.[38]

In light of the fact that the resolutions were passed unanimously as requested, the October 23 meeting of the O.A.S. was a significant success for U.S. efforts. As usual, however, problems existed. Brazil was still trying desperately to establish a modus vivendi with Cuba, and abstained from the second resolution.[39] Brazil was joined in abstention by Bolivia and Mexico due to their limited view of the extent of legitimate O.A.S. functions.[40] Thus, three consistent opponents of U.S. Cuban policy refused to change despite the dramatic turn of events then unfolding.

Despite these indications of dissention, the O.A.S. showed the strongest concensus concerning hemispheric defense that it had at anytime since its inception. Six countries offered bases to aid the United States in their blockade.[41] Three countries offered naval support including the usually reticent Argentina.[42] That country actually sailed

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[38]Pan American Union, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Applications, Vol. II, 1960-1964, (Wash., 1965), p. 112

[39]Paul S. Hilbo, "Cold War Drift in Latin America," Current History, February, 1963, p. 72.

[40]Crane, "Strategic Analysis," p. 544.

[41]Hilbo, "Cold War Drift," p. 72.

[42]Pan American Union, Applications, p. 115.

ships to the quarantine area, as did the Dominican Republic.[43] Brazil softened its stand somewhat when a brother of President Goulart labeled Castro a Cuban quisling.[44]

There were three reasons for O.A.S. unaniminity at this crucial juncture.[45] First, Kennedy made it clear that the confrontation was between the United States and the Soviet Union, and not between the United States and Cuba. This stand served to temper the usual Latin American fear of Yankee intervention in a neighboring country. Second, the Latins had a genuine fear of nuclear weapons and simply did not want the Latin Americans to become involved in a nuclear arms race. Finally, the Latin Americans felt that Castro had betrayed their community by becoming inexorably involved with the Soviet Union.

A final question remains to be answered concerning the role of the O.A.S. Given the limited role of the O.A.S. in the missile crisis, can anti-Soviet action be classified as multilateral, or was the O.A.S. role so insignificant that American action must be considered as unilateral. This latter view is expressed by Jerome Slater in his book evaluating the O.A.S. as a collective security organization.[46] However, another observer states that although the Organization of American States did support the U.S., it simply supported an essentially unilateral action.[47]

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[43]Ibid., pp. 178, 154.

[44]Pachter, Collision Course, p. 39.

[45]Robert J. Alexander, "Why President Kennedy was Right in the Cuban Crisis," New Politics, January 1963, p. 46.

[46]Jerome Slater, A Reevaluation of Collective Security (Columbus, 1965), p. 34.

[47]Robert N. Burr, Our Troubled Hemisphere (Washington, 1967), p. 69.

Generally, Latin Americans considered the action as multilateral. José Mora, the Secretary-General of the O.A.S., stated that any measures taken by the United States to dismantle bases in Cuba would be "multilateral measures, with multilateral support."[48] An articulate Latin American writer argues that there was general agreement among Latins that the U.S. should invade Cuba.[49]

The resolution of October 23 did make the quarantine a multilateral action. That is why Kennedy so desperately required O.A.S. support for his quarantine and why he did not initiate it until he had O.A.S. approval. On the other hand, the physical role of the Latin American nations was minimal. Some considered that Kennedy initiated a unilateral quarantine because he could not count on O.A.S. support.[50] Others take an opposing view and call the O.A.S. action in the missile crisis the finest hour of the Monroe Doctrine, that it was not a multilateral document.[51] In this writer's opinion, the United States acted consistently with the Monroe Doctrine even though it was not specifically mentioned, and with considerable O.A.S. support. That support was a helpful element in the crisis.

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[48]Mezerik, Cuba, p. 91.

[49]Victor Alba, "A False Crisis," New Politics, January, 1963, p. 29.

[50]Hilbo, "Cold War Drift," p. 72.

[51]Thomas and Thomas, The Organization of American States, p. 361.

CHAPTER VII

POST-CRISIS DEVELOPMENTS

In the period from the missile crisis to the present, the United States-Soviet conflict concerning Cuba has apparently achieved some level of stability. In 1964, Senator Fulbright referred to Cuba as a nuisance rather than a threat.[1] His analysis was valid to the extent that Cuba was no longer a military threat to the United States.

Both United States and O.A.S. attitudes toward Soviet influence in the hemisphere showed a high degree of consistency in this period despite the occurrence of several new and significant events involving Cuba and the Dominican Republic.

United States Policy

American policy toward Soviet influence in Cuba was based on two main assumptions during this period; that time was an asset, and that U.S. moderation would encourage a commensurate Soviet moderation.[2] Accordingly, U.S. policy was consistent, but cautious.

State Department policy makers viewed the problem on two levels. In the long view, Washington considered that the hemisphere as an ideal

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[1]Senator Fulbright in Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge, 1966), p. 148.

[2]Robert D. Crane, "A Strategic Analysis of American and Soviet Policy," Orbis, April, 1963, p. 553.

breeding grounds for international communism, and that improved social welfare would be helpful in creating an environment unfavorable for communists. It was hoped that the Alliance for Progress would be effective in decreasing the political, social and economic problems of Latin America. However, little was done financially to implement the long range goal.

As a more immediate goal, the United States sought the political and economic isolation of Cuba.[3] Politically, the United States pursued its isolation policy in the Organization of American States, and attempted to demonstrate the inappropriateness of the Cuban example to the Western Hemisphere. In 1964, after Cuba had been accused of aggressive activities against Venezuela, Secretary Rusk proposed to the O.A.S. that Castro be warned, sanctions be taken against him, and that appropriate steps be taken in the field of trade.[4] In 1967, Venezuela again accused Cuba of violating its sovereignty. This time, Rusk's proposals to the O.A.S. were a little more specific. They included condemnation of Castro, increased military vigilance, and a resolution that would attempt to limit economic and political support for Castro by non-members of the O.A.S.[5]

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[3]This isolation policy is expressed quite clearly in U.S. Department of State, Cuba, Latin America and Communism, by Edwin Martin, Inter-American Series No. 86 (Washington, 1964).

[4]U.S. Department of State, "O.A.S. Approves Rio Treaty Measures Against Castro Regime," by Secretary Rusk, State Department Bulletin, August 10, 1964, p. 178.

[5]Ibid., "O.A.S. Foreign Ministers Take Steps Against Cuban Subversion," Statements by Secretary Rusk, State Department Bulletin, October 16, 1967, pp. 490-493.

The economic isolation of Cuba had three major goals.[6] First was to demonstrate to Latin America the American position that communism was generally evil and could not succeed. Hopefully, this would block possible Soviet gains in other Latin American countries. A second goal was to demonstrate to indigenous Cubans that Castro was an evil and ineffectual leader. A final goal was to make Soviet involvement in Cuba as costly as possible for the Soviet Union. By all indications this portion of the program was a success as Cuba came to rely more and more on Soviet trade and aid. In the four year period preceding 1963, the number of non-Soviet foreign ships docking at Havana for trade purposes decreased by 60 per cent.[7]

Although the American policy was moderate with respect to Cuba, the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965 demonstrated U.S. willingness to use more forceful measures if the United States considered that its security was generally threatened by communism of any sort. The American policy reflected the belief that, "The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another communist government in the western hemisphere."[8] In this case, the "American nations" referred to a unilateral action by the United States. Although U.S. troops were ostensibly sent to the Dominican Republic to protect American citizens, there is evidence that the American action was to prevent another Cuba. The United States assumed the rebellion was led by Cuban communists and

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[6]U.S. Department of State, United States Policy Toward Cuba, by George W. Ball, Inter-American Series No. 88 (Washington, 1964), p. 12.

[7]Ibid., p. 17.

[8]President Johnson, in U.S. Department of State, Dominican Crisis, Inter-American Series No. 92 (Washington, 1965).

acted to prevent its success.[9] Secretary Rusk admitted on May 8 that the U.S. intent was to prevent the "irreversible process" of communization until the O.A.S. could become effective.[10] Connell-Smith has offered an excellent description relating Johnson's reaction in the Dominican crisis to United States experience in Cuba.

> It would hardly be surprising if Mr. Johnson concluded from the Cuban experience that the only way to prevent the emergence of a second Castro was for the United States to act swiftly in any situation where a communist take-over of another Latin American country seemed likely. The United States could not rely upon her allies to accept her judgement as to when the situation had arisen, but few would oppose her once she was committed.[11]

American action in the Dominican Republic reaffirmed its willingness to resort to unilateral military means to prevent a situation in the Caribbean that Washington considered adverse to American interests. In taking this action, the United States was only adding new expression to its traditional policy in this area.

Defense Posture

George Lowe has commented that the United States continued to increase its conventional forces after the missile crisis due to the usefulness of the military in that crisis.[12] While this statement may ascribe too much influence to the military's role in Cuba, it is

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[9]Theodore C. Draper, "The Dominican Crisis," Commentary, June, 1965, pp. 40, 46.

[10]U.S. Department of State, Dominican Crisis.

[11]Gordon Connell-Smith, "The O.A.S. and the Dominican Republic," World Today, June 1965, p. 234.

[12]George E. Lowe, The Age of Deterrence (Boston, 1964), p. 256.

difficult to see how the U.S. administration could overlook the value that military force had as a tool of diplomacy. "A force posture which is militarily ineffectual is politically valueless."[13] A corollary to this postulate is that the credibility of a force structure is in direct proportion to that force's utility on the diplomatic front. Apparently the United States was pleased with its flexible force as it has been continued basically unchanged since 1962, as the following examples illustrate.

In 1963, Secretary McNamara explained his understanding of flexible response.

> If we were to consider a spectrum of the possible cases of Communist aggression, then, ranging from harrassment, covert aggression, and indirect challenge at one end of the scale to the massive invasion of Western Europe or a full scale nuclear attack on the other end, it is clear that our nuclear superiority has been and should continue to be an effective deterrent to aggression at the high end of the spectrum. It is equally clear, on the other hand, that at the very low end of the spectrum a nuclear response may not be fully credible and that nuclear power alone cannot be an effective deterrent at this level in the future any more than it has been in the past.[14]

In this same address, McNamara stated that regardless of U.S. defense spending, the Soviet Union could continue to inflict serious nuclear damage on the United States.[15] This recognition of diminishing returns from an increased nuclear force led to a gradual decrease in military

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[13]P. O. Mikshe, "The Nuclear Deterrent and Western Strategy," Orbis, Summer, 1964, p. 236.

[14]U. S. Department of State, "Major National Security Problems Confronting the United States," by Secretary McNamara, State Department Bulletin, December 16, 1963, p. 918.

[15]Ibid., p. 916.

spending.

In reviewing the accomplishments of four years of Democratic government, President Johnson noted in 1965 that Army Special Forces had been increased 8 times, Army divisions were up 45 per cent, Marine personnel had increased by 15,000 men, and tactical air forces had been doubled.[16] He further stated that the United States "now possesses a range of credible, usable military power enabling us to deal with every form of military challenge from guerrilla terrorism to thermonuclear war."[17] While much of this expansion was due to the Vietnam conflict, it could be argued that the utility of conventional forces in the missile crisis may have reinforced the original "flexible response" doctrine.

The budget for fiscal year 1966 showed a decrease of two billion dollars from the previous year.[18] The decrease was absorbed almost entirely by nuclear forces, in line with the adminstration's attempt to de-escalate the nuclear arms race.

As recently as October, 1967, the United States defense concepts continued relatively stable.

> What is important to understand is that our nuclear strategic forces play a vital and absolutely necessary role in our security and that of our allies but it is an intrinsically limited role.
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> Thus, we and our allies must maintain substantial conventional forces fully capable of dealing with a wide spectrum of lesser forms of political and military aggression--a level of aggression against which the use of strategic nuclear forces would not be to our advantage and thus a level of aggression

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[16]Congressional Quarterly Survey, Congressional Q W Report, January, 22, 1965, p. 94.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid., February 19, 1965, p. 313.

> which there strategic nuclear forces by themselves cannot effectively deter. One cannot fashion a credible deterrent out of an incredible action. Therefore, security for the United States and its allies can only arise from the possession of a while range of graduated deterrents, each of them fully credible in its own content.[19]

The United States belief in the utility of strong conventional forces was probably reinforced by the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965. There are indications that President Johnson made an early decision not to permit the establishment of the rebels led by Juan Bosch on the basis that they were oriented towards communism.[20] When a military junta informed the United States that they could not guarantee the safety of American citizens in the Dominican Republic, Johnson responded by sending 20,000 troops to that troubled island, ostensibly to protect American citizens.[21] Regardless of American intentions in this affair, it seems that by committing a large number of troops the United States was able to control events, at least until the O.A.S. became involved. As in the Cuban crisis of 1962, military forces were used to help accomplish political ends.

The Organization of American States: Decisions and Conflicts

Based on the events of October 1962, and on the rapid and decisive

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[19]U.S. Department of State, "The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy," by Secretary McNamara, State Department Bulletin, October 9, 1967, p. 445.

[20]Draper, "The Dominican Crisis," p. 39. In this article, Draper vehemently attacks the U.S. position. He offers evidence that events in the Dominican Republic were manipulated with one goal in mind, to prevent the establishment of any government that would be sympathetic to communists.

[21]The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Dominican Crisis (Dobbs Ferry, 1967), p. 7.

O.A.S. reaction to those events, it would be reasonable to anticipate a more aggressive anti-communist attitude by that organization, and such has been the case. However, despite continued accusations of aggressive and subversive communist activities emanating from Cuba, the O.A.S. has been unable to act strongly without encountering internal divisive forces.

The missile crisis proved to be a specific reaction to a very explicit military threat to the hemisphere, it did not indicate a turning point in the general attitude of the member nations of the O.A.S. Less than a year after the missile crisis, the following analysis of the O.A.S. was given.

> As long as many members of the O.A.S. fail to come to grips with the substance of the communist problem, the O.A.S. is sitting on a rumbling volcano. That a unified O.A.S. could aid the hemisphere of communist imperialism and could prevent its further encroachment in this area of the world is unquestionable. That it has not done so to date does not nullify the organization, but its failure in face of the advancing enemy is seriously weakening it to a point where eventual resistance may come too late.[22]

Late in 1963, the O.A.S. faced a new test concerning Cuban agression. Venezuela claimed it was being subjected to Cuban subversive activities on its soil, and in December requested a convocation of the Organ of Consultation.[23] A committee was formed to investigate Venezuela's claims. Their findings corroborated Venezuela's claim completely. They found that Cuban leaders were involved in a Venezuelan insurrection,

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[22]Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., The Organization of American States (Dallas, 1963), p. 407

[23]Pan American Union, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Applications, Vol. II, 1960-1964 (Washingtin, 1965), p. 181.

that Cuba was a training center for insurgents, and that the Cuban government aided sabotage efforts.[24] Despite this evidence, the O.A.S. could not seem to even agree to convoke the appropriate organ. The military coup in Brazil finally gave impetus to the organization and the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs was convoked in July, seven months after the original request.[25]

Controversy concerning the resolution of this meeting led to what has been labeled the most serious split in O.A.S. history,[26] Colombia took a firm position, advocating all sanctions short of armed attack on Cuba. Mexico, on the other hand, claimed that the O.A.S. had no jurisdiction at all since Cuba was no longer a member of the O.A.S. If the O.A.S. did apply sanctions, Mexico threatened to ignore the resolution completely despite the O.A.S. Charter requirement of compliance with a resolution receiving two-thirds of the votes. Argentina offered a watered-down resolution that would provide a compromise solution. It proved to be unacceptable to both sides, however.[27] Apparently, the O.A.S. would have to choose between a strong resolution that could be disruptive to that organization, or ignore the Cuban challenge altogether.

Arthur Whitaker offers an extensive explanation for the hesitancy within the O.A.S. First was the problem of an articulate opposing

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[24]Arthur P. Whitaker, "Cuba's Intervention in Venezuela: A Test of the O.A.S.," Orbis, 1964, p. 511.

[25]Ibid., p. 514.

[26]Max Azicri, "The O.A.S. and the Communist Challenge," Communist Affairs, April, 1965, p. 8.

[27]Whitaker, "Cuba's Intervention in Cuba," p. 529.

faction. The bloc supporting Mexico numbered only five. However, it included Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, influential countries representing a large population. The O.A.S. was reluctant to oppose these countries by a firm resolution against Cuba. These countries, in turn, were effected by their domestic political situation. A second problem was the form that sanctions could or should take. Did the O.A.S. have legal authority to take any action? Should they recommend sanctions or make them mandatory? What specific sanctions should be resolved? A final problem was the recurring one of fear of intervention. The normal O.A.S. reluctance to invade the sovereignty of another Latin American country was accompanied by a particular fear of U.S. power and concern with suspected involvement of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Despite evidence to the contrary, there was some belief that the whole case was a CIA ploy.[28]

The O.A.S. chose to pass a strong resolution despite the inner conflicts. Cuba was condemned as an aggressor and held responsible for intervention in Venezuela. O.A.S. members were instructed to break diplomatic relations with Cuba, to suspend all trade except for humanitarian reasons, and to close all sea transportation. The measures were softened somewhat by a statement that the sanctions would be removed when Cuba ceased to be a threat to the hemisphere. A very significant resolution warned that:

> The member states shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go as far as resort to armed force....

A final portion of the resolution urged non-members to reevaluate their

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[28]Ibid., pp. 517-523.

position with regard to Cuba.[29]

On the portion of the final resolution dealing with sanctions, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay voted in the negative.[30] Likewise a declaration to the Cuban people urging them to throw off their communist yoke received three abstentions.[31] However, by the end of 1964, all Latin American countries, except Mexico, had broken relations with Cuba and ceased all trade.[32] Mexico continued to ignore its responsibilities under the O.A.S. Charter. Despite the strength of the resolution, the debate concerning the resolution indicated a deep seated division within the organization.

The Dominican crisis served to bring this division into more dramatic relief. Even before the Organ of Consultation convened, the United States was accused by Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela of violating the O.A.S. Charter by intervention in a domestic crisis.[33] The United States countered this argument by claiming that the Dominican Republic was under attack from external forces, namely Cuba, and the United States was helping to repel the attack in the spirit of basic O.A.S. documents.[34]

Nonetheless, anti-United States feeling remained quite strong. An O.A.S. resolution which condoned the American position by establishing a

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[29]Pan American Union, Applications, p. 185.

[30]"Ninth Meeting of Consultation," Americas, September 1964, p. 1.

[31]Ibid., p. 2.

[32]Edwin Lieuwen, United States Policy in Latin America (New York, 1965), p. 101.

[33]Connell-Smith, "The O.A.S.," p. 234.

[34]The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Dominican Crisis, p. 30.

multilateral peace force in the Dominican Republic passed with only the minimum number of votes required. The usual dissentions of Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay was joined by Ecuador and Peru. In addition, Venezuela abstained.[35]

Despite the heavy opposition, the O.A.S. was quite helpful in easing the crisis in the Dominican Republic. It first formalized a cease fire and later sent a five nation peace force headed by Brazil.[36] Ultimately this force was instrumental in establishing a provisional government.[37]

In the post-missile crisis era, the O.A.S. proved that it could act and, in fact, a majority of its members supported all anti-communist proposals urged by the United States. It did so, however, at the cost of perhaps irreparable damage to the solidarity of that organization.

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[35]Connell-Smith, "The O.A.S.," p. 235.

[36]Pan American Union, Report of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States Regarding the Dominican Situation (Washington, 1965), pp. 2, 16.

[37]U.S. Department of State, "O.A.S. Achieves Reconciliation in Dominican Republic," statements by President Johnson, State Department Bulletin, September 20, 1965, p. 478.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

In the Introduction, four hypotheses were stated to provide the orientation and direction for this study. The first, that American policy has been partially successful in limiting Soviet gains in Cuba, appears to be valid. The author recognizes that it is a difficult task to evaluate the effectiveness of a nation's foreign policy, and particularly so when major events are of such recent occurrence. As recently as late 1967, Cuba was again accused of subversion and aggression in Venezuela and Cuba's "Che" Guevara was involved in the Bolivian uprising.[1] The problem is further complicated by the presence of a third nation. The United States is, and has been, attempting to neutralize the attempts of the Soviet Union to gain influence in Cuba. Simultaneously, however, the United States needs to construct a specific policy toward Cuba since there are indications that Cuba does not perform as a puppet of the U.S.S.R. but rather, at times, acts in opposition to the desires of the Soviet Union.

Bilateral foreign policy should not be treated as a zero sum game. It is possible that both sides can gain, or conversely lose. In evaluating the missile crisis, for example, it is tempting to call it a clear cut victory for the United States since it prevented installation of

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[1]Pan American Union, Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Washington, 1968), p. 1.

missile sites and certainly caused embarrassment to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, depending on their goals, the Soviet Union may have also made significant gains. It has been suggested that in 1962 the Soviets attempted the impossible and settled for the improbable.[2] Khrushchev, in speaking of the missile crisis scoffed at the idea of a Soviet defeat on the basis that socialism was preserved in Cuba, a verbal non-invasion pledge was secured and the Soviets lost nothing.[3]

If the U.S. policy is viewed from the point of view of Soviet gains in Latin America, and specifically in Cuba, it is tempting to classify that policy as a failure since communist influence is a more significant force in Latin American politics than it was prior to the rise of Castro. However, while several Latin American countries did have significant communist elements, many of these elements are indigenous radical reformers rather than strict puppets of the Kremlin. With the exception of Cuba, Latin America is not under the Soviet sphere of influence or likely to be there in the foreseeable future. To the extent that the United States has been able to contain Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere, U.S. policy has been successful. To the extent that the communists have made ideological gains, the United States considers that their policy has failed.

It is not possible at this time to make a final analysis of U.S. policy in Cuba since the situation is still dynamic. A residual question is whether the United States can continue to prove to Latin America

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[2]Robert D. Crane, "A Strategic Analysis of American and Soviet Policy," Orbis, April, 1963, p. 548.

[3]Henry M. Pachter, Collision Course The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence (New York, 1963), p. 117.

that it can meet Latin American needs to a greater degree than the Soviet Union. In a complex and ambiguous political world, it is conceivable that a clear cut victory or defeat may never emerge from the conflict. Indeed, the United States and the Soviet Union may yet reach a cold war understanding vis-à-vis Latin America.

A second hypothesis is that American policy in Cuba has been guided by clearly stated interests that are considered by U.S. policy makers to be vital to national security. The hypothesis is valid and, historically, the American policy toward the Caribbean area has been remarkably consistent in its orientation to preserve the national security of the United States.

> So predominant has been the security factor in our dealings with the Caribbean countries, that the United States evolved, albeit somewhat emperically, a pattern of methods and techniques possessing such a high degree of coherence, consistency, and singleness of purpose as to constitute a general policy posture.[4]

The State Department has published numerous statements and documents expressing its interest in Cuba and its displeasure concerning the Soviet influence in Cuba. These documents were underscored by various actions such as the Bay of Pigs episode, the missile crisis, and the Dominican intervention.

The Monroe Doctrine has been a significant factor in U.S. policy. Although this doctrine is unpopular with Latin Americans, instances such as the missile crisis of 1962 and the Dominican situation of 1965 demonstrate that some form of the doctrine continues to be basic to American policy toward Latin America.

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[4]J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin, 1961), p. 241.

Unquestionably, part of the U.S. concern with Soviet influence in Cuba was due to the communist overtones involved. However, it is the opinion of this author that the United States would have opposed the presence of the Soviet Union in Cuba even if the U.S.S.R. did not happen to be a communist country. This opposition would be based on traditional rejection of extra-hemispheric influences in the Caribbean.

The third hypothesis proposed at the start of this study suggested that U.S. policy has been enhanced by a favorable military posture with respect to the Caribbean area. Since the turn of the century, the United States has been the military means to enforce its will in the Caribbean. This military superiority has been due to an effective, or at least potentially effective, military force, and to a proximity to the Caribbean compared to an extra-hemispheric force. In the 1950s, the U.S. military superiority suffered from a credibility gap due to an over reliance on nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional forces. The lack of emphasis upon maintaining a strong conventional force limited the possibilities of U.S. action against Castro or the Soviet Union. It has been reported that one reason President Kennedy was adverse to using American troops during the Bay of Pigs episode was a deficiency in troop strength.[5] If the military was used in Cuba, there would be no contingency forces available for action in Asia or other trouble spots that the United States considered as being more vital than Cuba was at that time.

During 1961 and 1962, the United States developed a much stronger conventional force. This force was a deterrent to the Soviet Union

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[5]William F. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York, 1964), p. 269.

during the Cuban crisis and actually was used in the Dominican Republic. Since 1962, the United States has had both a nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union and a superior ability to protect its interests in the Western Hemisphere with conventional ground, air, and naval forces.

It would appear that today the United States is in a favorable power position in the Caribbean. It has a well stated vested interest, and the physical means to protect it. However, U.S. actions are tempered by hemispheric and international considerations.

The fourth hypothesis, that the actions and resolutions of the O.A.S. have served to reinforce American efforts to frustrate Soviet goals in Cuba, has not stood the scrutiny of the foregoing chapters.

Prior to the 1962 missile crisis, the O.A.S. seemed unable or unwilling to develop a firm anti-Castro policy. Whereas the United States has viewed the hemispheric problem as one of security, various Latin American nations have been primarily concerned with non-intervention and economic growth, and have not viewed Castro as a threat to hemispheric security.

Although the missile crisis brought about a strong resolution with almost complete unanimity, it appears to represent an isolated event. O.A.S. action since the crisis has been positive, but at the expense of schism. Some fifteen nations are in accord with the United States efforts to rid the hemisphere of communist influences while the remainder are, for various reasons, in some degree of opposition.

From the point of view of U.S. policy makers, the O.A.S. has been an inhibiting force on American actions. Washington has had to measure its unilateral actions against the standard of its neighbors. In the cases where a significant number of neighbors have opposed U.S. policy,

and this has been almost every case, the United States has had to choose between forcing the action and exacerbating its relations with Latin America, or simply not acting.

In retrospect, the American policy has been forged by three problems. First, and foremost in the minds of U.S. policy makers, has been the need to protect American national interests by keeping the Western Hemisphere free from external influence that could threaten American security. This problem has been the basis of all U.S. policy toward Latin America. The second challenge that the United States has had to meet is to act in national and hemispheric interests while avoiding the label of "meddler". This requires development of hemispheric cooperation which may at times moderate actions that the United States might take if it was acting solely on a unilateral basis. The third problem has been to eliminate, or at least reduce, the socio-economic conditions in Latin America that lead to communism. Programs such as the Alliance for Progress have provided a token response to this problem.

American policy toward Soviet influence in Cuba has been consistent with its overall Latin American policy, That policy has been essentially reactionary and has been determined by the degree of threat to what the United States considered to be its national security, the size and credibility of its military force, and the attitudes of the Organization of American States. It is anticipated that these three elements will continue to be essential determinants of U.S. policy in the foreseeable future.

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